



**END OF PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT FOR**  
*SUSTAINABLE RETURNS AND PEACEBUILDING THROUGH  
DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND RULE OF LAW IN GOLO, JABEL  
MARRA PROJECT, SUDAN*

Project timeline: 15 August 2018 – 14 August 2020

Evaluation timeline: February 2021-May 2021

FOR UNDP & UNICEF



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Project/outcome title	Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabal Marra Project	
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Corporate outcome and output	<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Accelerate structural transformations for sustainable development</p> <p><b>Output 2.2.3:</b> Capacities, functions and financing of rule of law and national human rights institutions and systems strengthened to expand access to justice and combat discrimination, with a focus on women and other marginalised groups</p> <p><b>Output: 3.3.2</b> Gender-responsive and risk-informed mechanisms supported to build consensus, improve social dialogue and promote peaceful, just and inclusive societies</p>	
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Region	RBAS	
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	15/08/2018	14/08/2020
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## ACRONYMS

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(I)NGO	(International) Non-Governmental Organisation
CBRM	Community Based Reconciliation Mechanism
CDA	Conflict and Development Analysis
CfP	Call for Proposal
CIS	Care International Switzerland
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCPSF	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund
DDRA	Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency
DDS	Darfur Development Strategy
DPI	Darfur Organisation for Peace and Development Initiative
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FMU	Fund Management Unit
GAH	Global Aid Hand
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoS	Government of Sudan
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced People
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JMRDP	Jebel Marra Rural Development Project
KII	Key Informant Interview
MCS	Mercy Corps Scotland
MCE	Mercy Corps Europe
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PBA	Peace Bridge
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SLA/AW	Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid
SLF	State Liaison Function
SLM-MM	Sudan Liberation Movement faction headed by Minni Minawi
SPLM-N Agar	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Malik Agar
SRF	Sudan Revolutionary Front
SUDIA	Sudanese Development Initiative
TS	Technical Secretariat
WCC	War Child Canada
WFP	World Food Program
WHH	Welthungerhilfe
WVI	World Vision International

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### CONTEXT

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In 2003, conflict erupted in the Darfur region of western Sudan, resulting in years of high-intensity armed conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS), with the support of various armed militias on one side, and Darfuri rebel groups on the other. This conflict caused the death and displacement of millions of Sudanese.<sup>1</sup>

Golo locality, in the Jebel Marra region of Central Darfur, has been one of the areas most affected by conflict in Darfur.<sup>2</sup> While Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have started to return to Golo, socioeconomic conditions in Golo continue to face challenges. The root causes of conflict in Golo, as in most areas of Darfur, relate to competition over access to and management of natural resources. These root causes are exacerbated by sub-optimal rule of law institutions (both formal and informal), limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, social norms rooted in gender inequality and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These dynamics and drivers manifest in clashes between the largely nomadic/pastoralist Arab tribes and the mainly farmer/agriculturist Fur tribes. The tribes have also been victims of political exploitation over the years with many members, especially young people, aligning themselves with either the rebel groups or government supported militias. Adolescents and youth continue to be at risk as victims of recruitment into armed or criminal groups. Women particularly face several types of violence including rape, gender-based violence, early marriage, and lack of education opportunities. In addition, women tend to be excluded from security institutions and various social and political negotiation processes.

Golo continues to be recognized as a significantly conflict-impacted area, given the heavy presence and dominance of the SLM-AW (Sudan Liberation Movement - Abdelwahid rebel faction), which is viewed as “the only significant rebel fighting force remaining inside Darfur”<sup>3</sup>. Between 2016 and 2018, Golo suffered through several clashes between Sudanese government forces and SLM-AW rebels, resulting in casualties on both sides and among civilians, as well as triggering waves of displacement.<sup>4</sup> Situated in this context, the Government of Sudan requested UN support for peacebuilding in Golo. The UN Secretary General approved the inclusion of Sudan in a category of countries eligible for UN Intermediate Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) support.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <https://enoughproject.org/blog/darfur-brief-history-conflict-2003-2006>

<sup>2</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/2020-conflict-analysis-central-darfur-sudan>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-factbox/factbox-sudans-rebel-groups-idUSKBN25R2H8>

<sup>4</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20report%20of%20the%20Panel%20of%20Experts%20on%20the%20Sudan%20established-10jan2019.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> This project was funded before Sudan was declared formally eligible to receive PBF support by the Secretary General, as it fell under the “Immediate Response Facility” of the PBF which does not require a formal eligibility process, for up

## *The Revolution*

However, just prior to the launch of the PBF-funded Golo peacebuilding project (“the project”), Sudan experienced a national revolution (beginning in mid-December 2018, and culminating in mid-April 2019, with the deposition of President Omar al-Bashir). The revolution and its aftermath created a range of serious challenges, including shifts, changes and replacements in many key relationships (Ministries and other institutions), a major transformation of the political landscape (in particular, intense scrutiny towards allegiances to the former regime), increased insecurity and violence in some regions, and a general mood of instability and change. The revolution also created important opportunities, including interest on the part of the new national administration to gain access to, stabilize, and increase forms of social cohesion in regions that were well beyond the reach of the previous regime.

The project adapted to this new reality principally through requesting and receiving a six-month No Cost Extension for funding from the Peace Building Fund. The project also adapted through actively engaging with partners, both existing and new, to ensure the project was still relevant and feasible. The six-month extension allowed time to adapt and prepare to implement in this radically changed landscape.

## THE PROJECT

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The *Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo* PBF-funded project started with identifying conflict factors and dynamics, through two thorough Context Analysis and Conflict Analysis and a Baseline Survey<sup>6</sup>. Grounded in this data, the project focused on a select subset of conflict factors and drivers to pursue peacebuilding outcomes:

1. **Enhancing livelihoods and economic stability** and sustainability, through activities supporting individuals, groups, local institutions and government;
2. **Improving rule of law** institutions and nurturing trust and engagement with formal and informal mechanisms; and
3. **Supporting strong, effective conflict resolution, decision making and participatory mechanisms** that connect local institutions with communities and individuals.

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to \$3 million worth of programming. Sudan was declared eligible for PBF support by the Secretary General in 2019, though this was after the current project was under way.

<sup>6</sup> The project design was informed by three forms of conflict analysis: “Baseline Survey Report”, Institute of Peace and Development Studies, University of Zangeji, in collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, January 2019; “Conflict Analysis Darfur”, Transition International in Collaboration with SUDIA (commissioned by DCPSF), November, 2019; “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo Project – Context Analysis”, UNDP, July 2019.

The 2-year (15 August 2018 – 14 August 2020) PBF-funded project implemented jointly by UNDP and UNICEF (with total funding of US\$3million), was the first-ever *integrated peacebuilding and development intervention* in Golo. The project was implemented in collaboration with government of Sudan Ministries and units (including the Peace Council, Jebel Marra Rural Development, Technology Transfer and Productivity Platform, Department of Water Environment Sanitation, and the Ministry of Education), national NGOs (Siyaj Charity Organisation, Peace Code Sudan) and international NGOs (War Child Canada, World Relief and Catholic Relief Services).

### *Project Theory of Change*<sup>7</sup>

The project's Theory of Change (TOC)<sup>8</sup> assumes that **IF**:

- informal and formal justice systems are optimally capacitated and utilized;
- the fertile land in Golo is optimally utilized to boost agricultural productivity and marketing mechanisms are put in place;
- the local government is capacitated to provide effective agriculture tools to benefit both farmers and herders;
- youth and nomads are engaged in cash for work, skills-building or vocational training for long-term self-employment and new jobs; and
- mechanisms that connect local institutions with communities and individuals are established to improve participation and inclusivity in decision making for service provision

### **THEN:**

- tensions and violent threats will be addressed in a timely manner;
- farmers (male and female) will be able to have sustainable income generation opportunities; and
- tensions between herders and farmers will be reduced.

To operationalize the Theory of Change, the project strove to address the conflict drivers, by pursuing two major outcomes:

### **OUTCOME 1: RULE OF LAW - Capacity of state and non-state actors on rule of law established and enhanced**

This project outcome, which relates both to rule of law and vertical social cohesion, was pursued through capacity building for formal and informal justice mechanisms. The project achieved significant success towards this outcome:

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<sup>7</sup> See the “Relevance” sub-section in the “Findings and Conclusions” section of this report for the Evaluation Team’s detailed analysis of the project’s stated Theory of Change.

<sup>8</sup> Theory of Change drawn from “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabel Marra”, Sudan PBF Project Document, edited only for format and readability.



In October 2020 (following the conclusion of the project), a Perception Survey conducted by the University of Zalingei indicated that the project had a direct positive impact on community satisfaction with the formal justice system. For example, “satisfaction” in the *formal* justice system was found to increase from a project baseline of 33 percent in January 2019 (and only 23 percent satisfaction with the police)<sup>9</sup> to 83% reporting satisfaction with the formal rule of law mechanisms after project activities were implemented.<sup>10</sup>

The increase in satisfaction in formal rule of law institutions was supported through the implementation of several project approaches and activities, including:

- capacity building of Sudanese Police Force;
- establishment of paralegal cohorts; and
- support to community police volunteers.

In addition, at the outset of the project, the Baseline Survey showed that 50 percent reported “satisfaction” with the *informal* justice system<sup>11</sup>, while the Perception Report found satisfaction with informal rule of law systems had increased to 93 percent, following the conclusion of the project.<sup>12</sup>

This increase in satisfaction with the informal rule of law institutions followed implementation of several project approaches and activities including:

- improved and supported Community-Based Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (CBRMs);
- capacity building of rural court judges;
- infrastructural support to CBRMs and rural and traditional courts; and
- establishment and strengthening of community-based child protection networks

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<sup>9</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 6. Data collected via questionnaire. *Question posed: “How satisfied are you with the formal court?”*

<sup>10</sup> The Evaluation Team notes that the Baseline Survey Report (January 2019) also reported that 83% of respondents “trust” the informal system, while only 5% “trust” the formal courts and the police. While “trust” is closely related to “satisfaction”, it is not clear that the Perception Surveys (November 2019 and October 2020) posed questions to analyze specifically how “trust” in rule of law systems shifted following the project. This is a potential area for further analysis in future projects, and the Evaluation Team recommends that UN Project Teams review the baseline and perception categories carefully to ensure coherent comparisons between baseline and endline data.

<sup>11</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 6. Data collected via questionnaire. *Question posed: “How satisfied are you with the informal justice system?”*

<sup>12</sup> “Annual Perception Report, November 2019, pg. 7. Data collected via questionnaire: “Are you satisfied with the informal rule of law initiatives introduced by the project such as community resolution mechanisms, community policing, rural courts, rural judges training and paralegals?” and Perception Survey Data Set, October 2020, University of Zalingei

Finally, comparing the Baseline survey against the Perception Report also shows vital improvements related to *social cohesion and intercommunal trust*. For example, the Baseline survey reported that 42 percent “trust” members of other tribes or community groups (32 percent reported not trusting)<sup>13</sup>. The 2019 Perception Survey showed improvements in this critical realm, reporting that 88 percent “reported improved perceptions of social cohesion within eighteen months of project implementation.”<sup>14</sup> The 2020 Perception Survey similarly showed an increase to 89.9 percent.<sup>15</sup>

## **Outcome 2: Durable solutions and local economic recovery for returnees, IDPs and host communities improved.**

This outcome was pursued through a range of innovative approaches and activities, including enhancing agricultural production and support for youth livelihoods to encourage local economic recovery<sup>16</sup>.

Through these various activities, different communities were brought together to work towards common goals, which helped contribute to mutual collaboration and coexistence. For example, 81 percent of the Perception Survey respondents reported an increase in economic interactions<sup>17</sup> in Golo between diverse communities<sup>18</sup>, against a baseline of 49 percent detailed in the Baseline Report.<sup>19</sup>

As shown in the Context Analysis, Conflict Analysis, and Baseline Report, a primary inter-communal conflict in Darfur is driven by competition over natural resources between

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<sup>13</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 12. Data collected via questionnaire. Question posed: “[Do] You generally trust members of other tribes or community groups?”

<sup>14</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zalingei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019, pg. 7. Data collected via questionnaire. Question posed: “Do you feel that trust, interaction and confidence among communities has been restored / increased because of the Golo Peacebuilding Project?” and “Has there been improved perceptions of social cohesion within eighteen months of project implementation due to the concept of collective work?”

<sup>15</sup> October 2020 Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalingei

<sup>16</sup> While these activities are quite standard for economic development projects, the Evaluation Team uses the term “innovative” in assessing the specific leveraging of these activities in this project to explicitly generate *both* developmental (primary) *and* peacebuilding (secondary) outcomes and impacts. This innovative nexus is discussed in several places in the evaluation in more detail.

<sup>17</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zalingei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019, pgs. 6-7. The Evaluation Team notes that the term “economic *interventions* between diverse communities” is used in some places (i.e. the October 2020 Perception Survey). Reading this in context, the Evaluation Team understands this to refer to “economic *interactions*” (versus “interventions”).

<sup>18</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zalingei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019, pg. 7 and October 2020 Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalingei

<sup>19</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 8. Data collected via questionnaire. Question posed: “Do you engage with people from other tribes as part of your daily livelihood activities?”

farmers and nomads.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, this project targeted both nomads and farmers to reduce the potential to exacerbate land and natural resources-related conflict. Activities included equipping and training animal health workers from both communities (emphasizing nomadic communities, given their marginalization from services), the creation of water harvesting facilities along migratory routes for nomads and the rehabilitation of a dam for farmers.

These approaches appear to have contributed to the project outcomes. For example, the Baseline survey reported that 64 percent of community “still experienced conflicts” and 60% “did not feel safe from violence in their daily life”<sup>21</sup>. The Perception Survey brings positive news, reporting that 86% “felt there had been a decrease in communal conflicts”, and “attributed this to the interventions of the Golo peacebuilding project”<sup>22</sup>.

Women were at the center of this project, for example, making up over 60 percent of the farmers in the farmer producer groups and occupying leadership positions.<sup>23</sup> See Findings sections for a thorough analysis of gender equity, women’s empowerment and related themes in the project.

## EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS

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This evaluation launched in February 2021 and concluded in May 2021. The evaluation’s purpose is to consider the *project’s overall added value to peacebuilding* in the targeted region. The evaluation considers the project from conceptualization, through design, implementation, monitoring and conclusion. The primary audiences are UNDP, UNICEF, PBF, project partners (GoS, (I)NGOs, civil society, community leaders, etc.)

The evaluation analyzes the project’s specific peacebuilding results, considering the links between the conflict analysis, the Theory of Change and its assumptions regarding conflict dynamics and drivers, and the project design and implementation.

The methodologies for data collection were: desk research, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group dialogues (FGDs) and site-visits / observations. “Purposive sampling” (or “judgement sampling”) was used to identify KII and FGD participants. The team worked with UN colleagues to ensure gender and age representation, to the extent possible.<sup>24</sup> Consistent with a commitment to gender equality and women’s empowerment, the Evaluation Team pursued equal participation among men and women and across age groups (and other relevant demographic categories). Key data points were the results framework, monitoring data on outcomes and outputs

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<sup>20</sup> Context Analysis, UNDP, July 2019; Conflict Analysis, UNDP, November 2019; Baseline Survey Report, University of Zalingei, January 2019

<sup>21</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 12

<sup>22</sup> Perception Report, November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalingei

<sup>23</sup> Final PBF Project Progress Report, 2020. The Evaluation Team did not find additional data in the Progress Report to confirm not disconfirm this assertion.

<sup>24</sup> See Appendix for details regarding affiliations, locations and gender disaggregation.

(principally through the two Perception Surveys conducted by the University of Zalgengei), and a range of project documents, triangulated with the findings from the qualitative data collection undertaken during the evaluation.

The Evaluation Team conducted 12 interviews with government ministries, NGOs, INGOs, partners and project participants, 8 interviews with UN agency staff, and 5 focus groups.<sup>25</sup> See “Evaluation Approach” section in the body of this report for further details regarding the evaluation and a range of constraints faced.

## PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, when viewed in the context of Golo during the years that the project implemented, and bearing in mind the fundamental and ongoing challenges to peace and development in the region (both historical and throughout the project), the Evaluation Team’s analysis of the project documents, the baseline and endline data<sup>26</sup>, and the qualitative data gathered for this evaluation, found that this project *achieved its outcomes delivered on the vast majority of its outputs, implemented successful and innovative activities, and contributed measurably to sustainable peace and durable solutions in the targeted region.*<sup>27</sup>

As the first project of its kind in Sudan with an explicit focus on peacebuilding through a range of innovative entry points (development, humanitarian and peacebuilding), via a complex and integrated approach (intra-UN, and in concert with INGO, NGO, government, ministry, civil society and traditional leadership partners), the evaluation team found that the successes that were achieved are substantial and important (both backward looking for the target region and stakeholders, and forward looking, to inform future peacebuilding programming).

### *Overall Project Successes*

The most powerful success factor of the project was its ground-breaking approach to peacebuilding through creating a project nexus between peacebuilding, development and humanitarian action. The use of livelihood and rule of law entry points for engagement with Golo communities sets this project apart from many “traditional” peacebuilding efforts (as well as “traditional” development projects), while aligning activities with the real needs and realities in these communities.<sup>28</sup>

Key findings that provide evidence for positive impacts on social cohesion<sup>29</sup>, and that were triangulated with FGD and KII data include:

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<sup>25</sup> Given the travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the international consultant contributed to the project remotely, while the national consultant implemented data collection in Golo and Zalingei

<sup>26</sup> Perception Report, November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalgengei

<sup>27</sup> These themes are all elaborated on throughout the body of the report.

<sup>28</sup> See Findings sections for further details and examples.

<sup>29</sup> Perception Report, November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalgengei

- 86% reported a decrease in communal violence;
- 81% reported that vocational skills activities created positive interactions between diverse communities;
- 88% reported improved perceptions of social cohesion, due to the concept of “collective work among diverse communities” (which was a theme in the agricultural activities, amongst others); and
- 81% reported an increase in economic interactions between diverse communities

Likewise, activities related to rule of law and governance, specifically the CBRMs, police volunteer cohorts and paralegal initiatives, struck a balance between innovation to support change, with integration into existing structures and processes.

These activities also had the critical attribute of being easily integrated into everyday life. For example, project activities focused on agricultural skills and materials, water access and management, beekeeping, sanitation, education services and facilities, and interpersonal and social conflict. Unlike peacebuilding approaches that necessitate major paradigm, culture, and norms shifts to be accepted and integrated by communities (frequently driven by elites, outsiders and the international community), many of the project activities seamlessly connected to local realities, norms and perceived needs.

The key **strengths** of the project can be summarized as:

- innovation, particularly use of development and humanitarian entry points to also target peacebuilding outcomes;
- locally-identified needs and goals, derived through participatory means;
- financial efficiency (doing more with less);
- sound and effective partnerships (intra-UN, with national and local authorities, NGOs, INGOs, civil society, etc.);
- resilience and adaptability to challenges; and
- theory of change linking project approaches to conflict analysis.

**Weaknesses** of the project included (discussed fully in the “challenges” section of this report):

- Stretching to try to implement diverse activities in a range of sectors (WASH, livelihoods, human rights, rule of law, conflict resolution);
- Need for explicit linkages to horizontal social cohesion aspects of peacebuilding, and between development and peace, could have been more explicitly stated;
- Further engagement with displaced communities could have boosted the value for reintegration;
- Some project deliverables were very hard to implement fully, given the dire economic situation that directly impacted providers and markets; and
- A lack of a strong “peacebuilding identity”, focused on how each partner (particularly local partners) were contributing to a renewed vision for peace in Golo, could have strengthened the sense of each being a part of a regional

movement and network, versus disparate actors doing disconnected activities not explicitly supportive of peace.

Project **opportunities** included the willingness on the part of the GoS to work alongside UNDP and UNICEF in new and innovative ways in a remote and often difficult region, the legacy of strong UN efforts throughout Sudan and the readiness for other key partners to collaborate with the UN efforts. The project also was well rooted in evidence from other national and sub-national programs that showed peacebuilding can be a viable and vital outcome from well-designed efforts that are often siloed from peacebuilding (for example UNICEF's *Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy* program, the four year, 14-country innovative effort to link education to peacebuilding, and vice versa<sup>30</sup>. See the *Relevance* sub-section in the "Findings and Conclusions" section of this report for an analysis of the extent to which the Theory of Change was explicitly ground in evidence supporting the project approach.

The evaluation team also found some issues that challenged the project. Many of these issues have roots in the very difficult and unique context in which the project operated. However, the analysis below also notes how some challenges may be addressed through shifts in project design for future efforts, to achieve even greater outcomes and impacts. The below challenges and recommendations are detailed and analysed in the "Challenges and Key recommendations" section, in the body of this report.

#### KEY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHALLENGE	KEY RECCOMENDATION
Lack of "The Big Picture" for partners	<b>nurture a project-wide "cohort" for all partners</b>
Weak shared "peacebuilding identity" for partners	<b>emphasize the peacebuilding aspects of all activities</b>
Financial, budgetary and quality control issues	<b>create business plans for quality and value</b>
Intergenerational and gender-related tensions	<b>support community-based dialogues</b>

<sup>30</sup> See: <https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/what-unicef-doing-peacebuilding-education-and-advocacy>

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

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This evaluation of the *Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo* PBF-funded project was undertaken following the conclusion of the project, to assess the project from the perspectives of impact, value, and challenges. The evaluation's purpose is to consider the *project's overall added value to peacebuilding* in the targeted region. The evaluation considers the project from conceptualization, through design, implementation, monitoring and conclusion. The primary audiences for the evaluation are UNDP, UNICEF, PBF, project partners (GoS, (I)NGOs, civil society, community leaders, etc.). These stakeholders and partners will use the evaluation findings to inform future peacebuilding projects in Golo (and perhaps in other regions of Sudan).

Based on the Evaluation TOR (see appendix A) and guidance from the evaluation reference group (representing UNICEF, UNDP and PBF), the key questions and themes addressed in the evaluation relate to the project's:

- RELEVANCE
- EFFICIENCY
- EFFECTIVENESS
- SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP
- COHERENCE
- CATALYTIC
- TIME-SENSITIVITY
- RISK
- CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES THEMES: Human rights, Gender equality, Conflict Sensitivity

The report first describes the evaluation in further detail, including scope, objectives, and key questions. The approach, methodology and data analysis approach are then detailed. The Evaluation Team's findings (including challenges and related recommendations) are offered. The report's final section includes conclusions and lessons learned. This structure and its content are aligned with the evaluation TOR and the guidance from the evaluation reference group, in order to support a clear final assessment of this project, and also to inform future efforts.

## 2.0 INTERVENTION DESCRIPTION AND PROJECT OVERVIEW

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This evaluation, which launched in February 2021 and concluded in May 2021, was undertaken by UNDP, UNICEF and PBF to assess the achievements of the “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabel Marra Project”. Immediately following the conclusion of the project, the UN project team sought two evaluation consultants (one international and one national team member).<sup>31</sup>

### 3.1 PROJECT RESOURCES AND KEY PARTNERS

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This 2-year (15 August 2018 – 14 August 2020)<sup>32</sup> PBF-funded project implemented jointly by UNDP and UNICEF with total funding of US\$3million, was the first-ever *integrated peacebuilding and development intervention*<sup>33</sup> in Golo. Over the course of the project, activities reached over 19,171 community members in the targeted villages within the geographical region.<sup>34</sup>

UNDP and UNICEF implemented the project in collaboration with Government of Sudan (Gos) Ministries and units, including: the Peace Council, Jebel Marra Rural Development, Technology Transfer and Productivity Platform, Department of Water Environment Sanitation, and the Ministry of Education, national NGOs (Siyaj Charity Organisation, Peace Code Sudan) and international NGOs (Warchild Canada, World Relief and Catholic Relief Services).

Regarding implementation arrangements, UNDP was the lead agency and UNICEF was a direct recipient.

Government and I(NGO) supported various project activities throughout implementation.

The Project Board was comprised of the UNDP Deputy Country Director, the UNICEF Senior Representative, the Ministry of Production & Economic Resources, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Animal Resources, Police representatives, the University of Zalingei, UNDP Project Manager and Donor representatives. The Project Board was responsible for

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<sup>31</sup> While the process for vetting and hiring the two evaluation team members via the UN expert roster systems faced various procedural delays (beyond the control of the UN project team) the Evaluation Team was finalized in February 2021.

<sup>32</sup> The project timeframe included an additional 6 months, added via a PBF No Cost Extension.

<sup>33</sup> “Integrated” here is intended to highlight that the project involved two lead UN agencies working in collaboration (UNDP and UNICEF), in partnership with the GoS and a range of important and well-positioned INGOs and national NGOs. The project also coordinated closely with UNAMID. “Integrated” also highlights the integration or nexus between development, humanitarian and peacebuilding activities, as well as the cross- sectoral approach that the project undertook.

<sup>34</sup> Per UNDP Project Team records.



making executive management decisions for the project including approval of project revisions and guidance. The Project Board provided guidance and advice to project management when substantive changes needed in the annual planned results, strategies and implementation arrangements. This group also made project assurance reviews. The Project Board was co-chaired by the State Government, UNICEF and UNDP.<sup>35</sup>

The UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office, the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF, disbursed the funds to UNDP and UNICEF for this project on the basis of a signed Memorandum of Understanding between each UN agency and the MPTF Office.

**Note that a briefly summarized description of the project follows below (Theory of Change, outcomes and activities). Adhering to the structure and guidance laid out in the “UNDP evaluation report template and quality standards” document, details, examples, and all Evaluation Team findings are covered in the “Findings” section of this report.**

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### 3.2 PROJECT THEORY OF CHANGE

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Grounded in the context and conflict analyses<sup>36</sup>, the project's Theory of Change (TOC)<sup>37</sup> assumed that **if**:

- informal and formal justice systems are optimally capacitated and utilized;
- the fertile land in Golo is optimally utilized to boost agricultural productivity and marketing mechanisms are put in place;
- the local government is capacitated to provide effective agriculture tools to benefit both farmers and herders;
- youth and nomads are engaged in cash for work, skills-building or vocational training for long-term self-employment and new jobs; and
- mechanisms that connect local institutions with communities and individuals are established to improve participation and inclusivity in decision making for service provision

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<sup>35</sup> From the PROJECT MULTI-YEAR WORKPLAN: To embed UN's accountability, the board included technical counterparts from state line ministries. Project board decisions were made in accordance with standards that ensured best value for resources, fairness, integrity, transparency, accountability and international competition. Based on the approved annual work plan (AWP), the Project Manager reported to the Board on progress, challenges and opportunities, and the Project Board reviewed and approved quarterly, or *ad hoc*, project plans and authorized deviations from these plans when evidence-based. The designated authority signed off the completion of each quarterly plan, authorizing the start of the next. Project Board meetings took place in the state capital or other places as appropriate.

<sup>36</sup> Context Analysis, UNDP, July 2019; Conflict Analysis, UNDP, November 2019; Baseline Survey Report, University of Zalengej, January 2019

<sup>37</sup> Theory of Change drawn from “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabel Marra”, Sudan PBF Project Document, edited only for format and readability.

**Then:**

- tensions and violent threats will be addressed in a timely manner;
- farmers (male and female) will be able to have sustainable income generation opportunities; and
- tensions between herders and farmers will be reduced.

In addition, youth and nomads (in addition to other groups) will be able to contribute more effectively to peacebuilding and have more confidence in leading a productive life, and relations between local authorities and communities and across different groups in community will improve. The project Theory of Change also assumes that, for best impact, engagement with local communities (including returnees), youth, farmers and nomads, and building the capacity of key local government institutions, will be critical to ensure the sustainability of interventions.

The Theory of Change asserts that these various social, economic and political changes will be supported through the implementation of these activities **because** these specific conflict factors were shown to be the root and proximate causes of destructive conflict, in the Conflict and Context Analysis related to this project.<sup>38</sup>

To operationalize the Theory of Change, the project strove to address the above conflict drivers, by pursuing two major outcomes identified in the Theory of Change.<sup>39</sup>

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**OUTCOME 1 – RULE OF LAW: CAPACITY OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS ON RULE OF LAW ESTABLISHED AND ENHANCED**

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In response to the Conflict and Context Analysis findings that weak rule of law was a key conflict driver<sup>40</sup>, and as substantiated in the Baseline Report, the project focused on approaches and activities to both bolster these institutions, and strengthen community access to, trust in and satisfaction with both formal and informal rule of law mechanisms.

**Formal justice system**

Project activities focused on increasing capacity of and trust in the formal justice system included:

- capacity building of Sudanese Police Force in command and control;
- establishment of paralegal cohorts; and
- support to community police volunteers. Informal justice system

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> For analysis of relationship between Theory of change and project approaches / pathways (activities and outputs), see the Relevance sub-section of the “Findings and Conclusions” section in this report. Also see Appendix for project Outcome Indicators.

<sup>40</sup> “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and rule of Law in Golo Project – Context Analysis”, UNDP & UNICEF, 2019 July and “Conflict Analysis Darfur”, Transition International in collaboration with SUDIA, November 2019

Project activities focused on increasing capacity of and trust in the informal justice system included:

- improved and supported CBRMs;
- capacity building of rural court judges; and
- infrastructural support for a rural court in Khiling Administration Unit and a Peace and Reconciliation Centre in Golo.

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## OUTCOME 2: DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY FOR RETURNEES, IDPS AND HOST COMMUNITIES IMPROVED

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The Context and Conflict Analyses found that inequality and marginalization of communities are key drivers of conflict in Golo. The Baseline Report substantiated these findings regarding root causes.<sup>41</sup> This is partly due to limited access to economic opportunities (supply chain and high quality materials, water, transport, markets, and expertise) following years of neglect, rooted in conflict.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, the project, in partnership with local communities, identified approaches and activities intended to enhance and facilitate agricultural production and livelihoods (particularly focused on women and youth) to encourage local economic recovery and interaction between and amongst communities.

Project activities focused on increasing capacity for economic recovery included:

- Vocational Skills Centre rehabilitation
- Vocational Skills Development programmes, leading to income generation with newly acquired skills
- Training in use of eco-friendly and low-cost alternative construction materials, contributing to availability of alternative construction materials for Golo communities at reasonable and sustainable prices
- Agricultural production and marketing activities
- Establishment of farmer field schools / producer associations
- Beekeeping training

### **3.2.1 Farmer-Nomad peacebuilding activities**

The primary inter-communal conflict in Darfur relates to competition over natural resources between farmers and nomads.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, this project targeted both nomads and farmers to reduce the potential to exacerbate conflict.

Project activities towards this output included:

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<sup>41</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, Institute of Peace and Development Studies, University of Zalingei, in collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, January 2019.

<sup>42</sup> “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and rule of Law in Golo Project – Context Analysis”, UNDP & UNICEF, 2019 July and “Conflict Analysis Darfur”, Transition International in collaboration with SUDIA, November 2019

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

- Training animal health workers (from both Farmer and nomadic communities)
- Supporting vaccinations and treatments for over livestock belonging to both farmers and nomads (administered by animal health workers trained in the program)
- Creation of water harvesting facilities along migratory routes for nomads
- Rehabilitation of Mela Dam for farmers

### **3.2.2 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**

Women were also at the center of this project, making up over 60 percent of the farmers in the farmer producer groups and occupying leadership positions. Gender inclusiveness in water sanitation and health (WASH) committees was at least 55 percent.<sup>44</sup> Training was provided in water point management and meeting management skills. In addition, the implementing partners, UNICEF and UNDP encouraged young women's participation in monitoring visits, with these visits designed and scheduled to provide a maximum opportunity for women's perspectives to be heard.

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<sup>44</sup> Data per WASH committee rosters, accessed by Project Team.

### 3.0 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

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The evaluation themes and questions were based on the OECD DAC evaluation criteria, and PBF evaluation criteria, which were adapted to the Golo and project contexts. The evaluation themes, questions and approach were also shaped by extensive inputs from the evaluation reference group, which was made up of representatives from UNDP, UNICEF and PBF. That group convened in March 2021 and provided comments to both the Inception Report and the first draft of the Final Report.

The themes and questions informed the desk review, and the data collection tools and protocols (KIIs, FGDs and site-based field observations, detailed in Annexes). The themes and questions are addressed in the "Findings" section of this report.

Adopting a participatory approach, this evaluation focuses on the *project's overall added value to peacebuilding* through its focus on *livelihoods, rule of law, protection, education* and *WASH*. The evaluation considers the project from conceptualization, through design, implementation, monitoring and conclusion.

The Evaluation Team validated data through five approaches, following best-practice in qualitative research:

1. Use of skilled, trained and seasoned field researcher with deep regional and technical expertise to implement KIIs and FGDs;
2. Careful selection and recruitment of KII and FGD participants to ensure diverse and robust informant pool;
3. Triangulation of findings through data collection at multiple locations, organizations, and stakeholder groups<sup>45</sup>; and
4. Triangulation of findings by comparing KII and FDG data with the Baseline report, the Perception Surveys, and the various project documents and reports.
5. Stakeholder validation in "Validation Workshop", May 2021 in-country (See appendix for list of organizations represented in the Validation Workshop).

Particular attention was given to the project process, and the degree to which cross-cutting issues, including peacebuilding, conflict sensitivity, poverty, human rights, local ownership, sustainability, and gender inclusion frameworks were applied from design to conclusion. Given the PBF context of the project, the evaluation analyzes the project's specific peacebuilding results, considering the project's results framework, monitoring data on the project outcomes and outputs, triangulated with findings from the qualitative data collection undertaken during the evaluation.

The evaluation also highlights key lessons about successful peacebuilding approaches and operational practices, as well as areas where the project performed less effectively than anticipated. Therefore, this project evaluation is equally about accountability as well as learning for future efforts.

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<sup>45</sup> Note that the Evaluation Team did not have resources to further triangulate by utilizing multiple field researchers nor data analysis researchers.

### 3.1 OBJECTIVES & DELIVERABLES OF THE EVALUATION

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This evaluation has the following objectives and deliverables:

- 1) Assess the **relevance** and **appropriateness** of the project in terms of:
  - a. to what extent it addressed key drivers of conflict and the most relevant peacebuilding issues<sup>46</sup>;
  - b. the degree to which the project addressed cross-cutting issues such as conflict sensitivity, poverty, gender-sensitivity, local ownership, and sustainability.
- 2) Assess the effectiveness and impact of the project, namely to what extent the project has made a **concrete contribution to reducing conflict factors**. Amongst other tools, the “UNICEF Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Programming Guide” was used to assess the peacebuilding results that the project has achieved.<sup>47</sup>
- 3) Evaluate to what extent the project helped advance **achievement of the SDGs**, and in particular **SDG 16**<sup>48</sup>
- 4) Evaluate the project’s **efficiency and sustainability**, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money
- 5) Assess whether the support provided by the PBF has promoted the **Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS)**, allowed a specific focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding processes, responded to gender-specific conflict dynamics, and whether it was accountable to gender equality
- 6) Assess whether the project has been implemented through a **conflict-sensitive approach**
- 7) Document **good practices, innovations and lessons learnt** emerging from the project implementation.
- 8) Provide **actionable recommendations** for future peacebuilding programming in Darfur and the Two Areas.

### 3.2 EVALUATION THEMES

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**RELEVANCE:** How and to what extent was the project **relevant** in design and implementation?

**EFFICIENCY:** How **efficient** and successful was the project’s implementation approach?

**EFFECTIVENESS:** How **effective** was the project in achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project?

**SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP:** To what extent did the project contribute to outcomes grounded in **locally owned** and **sustainable** efforts and strategies?

**COHERENCE:** To what extent did the project’s design and implementation facilitate **coherence** between activities and actors?

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<sup>46</sup> Note that the question of “relevance” is key, as the project design influenced the approach of subsequent PBF-funded programming throughout Darfur.

<sup>47</sup> See: <https://www.unicef.org/media/59156/file>

<sup>48</sup> See: <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-16-peace-justice-and-strong-institutions/targets.html>

CATALYTIC: Was the project financially and/or programmatically **catalytic**?

TIME-SENSITIVITY: Was the project **well-timed** to address conflict factors and opportunities?

RISK: Did the project effectively address risks?

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES THEMES

*Human rights:* To what extent did the project enhance the protection and promotion of **human rights**?

*Gender equality:* To what extent was **gender equality** and the **empowerment of women** addressed in the design, implementation, and monitoring of the project?

*Conflict Sensitivity:* Did the project have an explicit and effective conflict-**sensitivity** strategy?

### 3.3 EVALUATION TEAM

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The evaluation was designed and implemented by Dr. Zachary Metz, Director of Peacebuilding Practice with Consensus (International Consultant), and Abdel-Rahman El Mahdi, Managing Director, SUDIA (National Consultant). Per the evaluation TOR, the team responsibilities were:

#### *International Consultant*

- Responsible for evaluation design, analysis of collected data and report writing
- Responsible for all deliverables

#### *National Consultant*

- Contributed to evaluation design
- Conducted all in-country data collection (interviews, focus groups and site visits)
- Contributed to reports

Throughout the project, particularly in the planning for and implementation of field-based data collection (selecting and contracting research participants, planning for logistics and security of field visits, and implementing data collection visits), Golo- and Zalingei-based UNDP and UNICEF staff supported the consultants, and accompanied the national consultant as appropriate and possible. The consulting team also liaised with PBF Sudan counterparts.

### 3.4 EVALUATION CONSTRAINTS

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Given the travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the international consultant contributed to the project remotely, while the national consultant implemented data collection in Golo and Zalingei.

While COVID-19 safety restrictions created constraints, the evaluation team members, with the support of UNDP, UNICEF and PBF, approached the evaluation as a collaborative team, in the interest of addressing some of the endemic barriers to centring local knowledge and expertise in internationally led peacebuilding initiatives.

In this way, the challenge (lack of access for the international consultant to Sudan) became an opportunity for the team to pursue more authentic, and likely more value-added, peacebuilding approaches in the evaluation effort.<sup>49</sup> The team strove to anchor the evaluation in Sudanese local peacebuilding knowledge, versus primarily external technical / technocratic frameworks. Concretely, while the international consultant was accountable to the final outcomes of the evaluation, the national consultant was consistently engaged, to inform the process, tone and content of this evaluation. The national consultant took a primary role in shaping questions and forms of inquiry, as well as helping the international consultant understand responses in the Sudan context.

Overall, the constraints faced in the process were:

- Short timeframe for data gathering in Golo and Zalengei
- Limited team size (one team member was tasked to collect all of the KII and FDG data)
- Limited communication and travel infrastructure in Golo
- Limits imposed by COVID-19 restrictions and safety protocols<sup>50</sup>

Given these constraints, the total number of KIIs and FDGs was necessarily limited. While the team worked closely with UN counterparts to carefully select and contact research participants, the small data pool may mean that the findings may not completely capture the views of all potential stakeholders, communities, and partners. That said, the team is confident that the findings presented here are valid and robust.

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<sup>49</sup> See: Autesserre, Séverine, "Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention", Cambridge University Press: 2014

<sup>50</sup> Safety measures taken by the national evaluator during the fieldwork included the wearing of facemasks, and when/where available use of hand sanitization. Focus group discussions were also undertaken with fewer participants than usual in order to reduce the chances of both participants and/or evaluators in contracting/spreading the virus. Very few FGD participants and interviewees had facemasks, as these would represent a cost for them which might be beyond their ability. In future, UNDP and UNICEF should provide the evaluation team with facemasks and sanitizers, which can be supplied to evaluation participants for safety.



## 4.0 Evaluation Methodology

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This evaluation is summative and employed a participatory approach, in that interviews and focus groups heavily informed the findings. The report triangulates findings using several robust data sources: the Baseline Survey Report (University of Zalengei, January 2019), two Perception Surveys (November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalengei), as well as a Context Analysis (July 2019), a Conflict Analysis (November 2019), and the project reports, which draw on a range of data sources, including partner and implementor logs and records.

The evaluation methodology includes gender equality and women's empowerment as an approach to addressing gender-specific issues. To the extent possible, the Evaluation Team pursued equal participation among men and women and across age groups (and other relevant demographic categories).

The methodologies for data collection were:

### 4.1.1 Desk review

The following documents were reviewed by the Evaluation Team:

- 1) Baseline report (June 2019)
- 2) Integrated Results Framework for the project
- 3) Combined project budget for the project
- 4) Project document (proposal) for the project
- 5) No Cost Extension approval for the project
- 6) Sudan UNDAF
- 7) UNDP IRRF
- 8) PBF Guidelines (2018)
- 9) Semi Annual report (June 2019)
- 10) Annual reports (2019)
- 11) Final End of Project report (2020)
- 12) Context analysis report (2019)
- 13) Conflict Analysis report (2019)
- 14) Darfur-wide Conflict Analysis (2019)
- 15) CBRM narrative Success story
- 16) Golo project web article
- 17) PBF Financial Report (Nov 2020)
- 18) Lessons learned from previous/similar programmes and activities to inform PBF Golo project (February 2020)
- 19) Minutes of PB Working Group - Central Jebel Marra, Golo (October 2019 and November 2019)
- 20) Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Peacebuilding Working Group in Golo
- 21) Perception survey report (2019)
- 22) 2020 Perception Survey Data Set

### 4.1.2 Key informant interviews (KIIs)

The Evaluation Team worked with UNDP and UNICEF to identify the specific individuals / representatives to reach out to for each group / organization. The below details the list of organizations that the Evaluation Team engaged (via UNDP, UNICEF and other project counterparts) in KIIs (see below for KII Protocols). Each interview was approximately 60 minutes in length, conducted in Arabic.

KIIs were conducted by the national consultant in Arabic, who then translated the interview notes into English for analysis.

#### **4.1.3 Golo-based organizations and groups for FGD data collection**

FGDs were conducted by the national consultant in Arabic, and who then translated the FGD notes into English for analysis.

The team also interviewed several UNDP and UNICEF staff who were involved in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project (in Golo, Zalingei, and Khartoum).

**The Evaluation Team conducted a total of 12 interviews with government ministries, NGOs, INGOs, partners and project participants, 8 interviews with UN agency staff, and 5 focus groups.<sup>51</sup>**

#### **4.1.4 On-site field visits and other data collection methods**

In addition to the KIIs and FGDs, the National Consultant conducted site visits at relevant project sites to observe the peacebuilding impacts of project-related activities<sup>52</sup>: Field notes from the field-based observations were included in the evaluation analysis.

## 4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

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### 4.2.1 PARTICIPANT SELECTION METHOD

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“Purposive sampling” (or “judgement sampling”) was used to identify interview and Focus Group participants. This approach allowed the evaluation team, with guidance from UNDP and UNICEF, and based on the desk review and peacebuilding best practices, to subjectively consider and identify specific organizations and individuals best positioned to opine on the research questions.<sup>53</sup> In some cases, “snowball sampling” was also used to populate focus groups. The team worked with UN colleagues to ensure gender and age representation, to the extent possible.

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<sup>51</sup> Given the travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the international consultant contributed to the project remotely, while the national consultant implemented data collection in Golo and Zalingei

<sup>52</sup> Data collection methodology for these alternative sites were informed by conflict-sensitive approaches, informed including the “Everyday Peace Indicators” model, see Firchow, Pamina, “Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War”, Cambridge University Press: 2018

<sup>53</sup> See: <https://methods.sagepub.com/reference/encyclopedia-of-survey-research-methods/n419.xml>

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#### 4.2.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

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Given the short time frame and relatively limited scope and sample size, the evaluation findings in this report are primarily qualitative, and reflect the specific subjective views of the research participants (versus being primarily quantitative and generalizable, as may be possible in a significantly longer evaluation with a much broader and deeper sample size).

The team analysed and disaggregated the data according to parameters defined in collaboration with UNDP, UNICEF and PBF. Categories include gender, geographic location, professional role, age and type of respondent.

The team used NVivo, the leading qualitative data analysis software application. The team created a list of codes in NVivo, directly derived from the evaluation questions, and analyzed the KII, FDG and field observation notes using these codes. This allowed for a detailed analysis, triangulation, quantification, the identification of themes and illustrative quotes.

Data collection during KIIs, FDGs and site visits / observations was done in Arabic (and English, where appropriate). Transcripts were produced in English.

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#### 4.2.3 ETHICS OF RESEARCH

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Data gathering was undertaken in alignment with standard ethical principles for evaluation, with a particular emphasis on conflict sensitivity.

Participants were given opportunities to indicate their wish to have some or all of their inputs "non-attributed" to the extent possible. They were also given opportunities to exit participation in research, and/or to have their inputs removed from the data pool. The research team placed conflict sensitivity, and the safety and security of all research participants (and the researchers and other counterparts) above all else.

The team adhered to best practices and principles for conflict-sensitive data collection:

- The questions asked were appropriate and adapted to age, level of education and culture of the participants;
- The questions were formulated to reflect the sensitive nature of this topic in Darfur and Golo;
- Safety and security (particularly related to gender) was considered and discussed with UNDP, UNICEF and research participants when selecting meeting venues; and
- The team pursued triangulation of data by collecting views from different stakeholder groups on the same questions.

The KII and FDG tools were designed and adapted to the context. The team was aware of its ethical responsibilities towards all research participants. The team bore the safety

and security of the participants in mind throughout the research process. The team treated respondents with respect and took all views and inputs seriously.

### **Locations of KIIs, FGDs and site observations**

The team considered and respected the participants' preferred location for interviews and focus groups. In particular, the team strove to accommodate interview times/locations that ensured women's participation.

### **Confidentiality and protection**

The team respected the sensitive nature of the information collected, and secure systems (passwords, protected data storage, coding) were put in place for safe forwarding and storage of information. No photographs were taken of respondents that would reveal their identity.

The team clearly explained the principle of confidentiality and anonymity to all research participants. Due to the potentially sensitive nature of information disclosed, the data collection method allowed for the anonymity of respondents. As such, no names were recorded during the interviews and no KIIs nor FGDs were audio recorded.

### **Informed Consent**

Researchers respected the principles of voluntary participation. In line with the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) "*Handbook on data protection in humanitarian action*", the team verified that respondents understood "the risks and benefits involved in the research and to exercise his/her right to object and to provide valid consent where applicable."<sup>54</sup> The decision to participate was based on free will and participants were made aware that they could withdraw from the research at any time.

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<sup>54</sup> ICRC (co-editors: Kuner, Christopher and Marelli, Massimo). *Handbook on data protection in humanitarian action*. ICRC: Geneva. P. 46, 2017

## 5.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

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### 5.1 CONFLICT DYNAMICS

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In order to situate the evaluation findings in context, the Evaluation Team provides here a summarized overview of the conflict dynamics and drivers that the project strove to address.

The causes of the conflict in Darfur are multiple and complex.<sup>55</sup> Limited resources and limited or weak capacity of local governance, coupled with competition over increasingly limited natural resources, underpin much of the conflict in the region. The spread of small arms has fuelled a situation where weaponry and violence often define relationships between groups and communities. The deterioration of confidence in governance and rule of law institutions is further compounded by the destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods, employment opportunities, the erosion of social cohesion and community stability, and poor basic social services.

#### 5.1.1 Jebel Marra Dynamics

The Jebel Marra area in Central Darfur is composed of three localities: Golo, Rokoro and Nertiti. The predominant tribe in the area is Fur; other tribes are Masaleet, Zagawa, Tama, Zreigat, Nawaiba, Am Jalol, Falat, Ta'a Iba, and Bargo. Historically, the tribes lived peacefully but increasing competition over natural resources, especially water and grazing lands has created ongoing tribal conflict in the area. In addition, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) has, since they started fighting with GoS in Darfur in 2003, located most of their troops and influential commanders in the Jebel Marra areas close to Nertiti, Rokoro and Golo, further fuelling tensions. Before the Darfur conflict, the Rezaigat (Nawaiba and Ereigat clans who are camel and cattle herders) grazed their animals in the rich pastures of Jebel Marra and had an internal local agreement with the farmer Fur tribes. However, with the formation of the rebel movements in the area and outbreak of war, the dynamic relationship between Nomads and Fur farmers changed; most of the Fur communities in Jebel Marra supported the rebels, while most Nomads supported the GoS and formed militias. The SLA/AW hindered the movement of Nomads to graze their animals in and near their control areas, which resulted in clashes.

#### 5.1.2 Golo conflict dynamics

Within Jebel Marra, Golo has been one of the areas most affected by conflict in Darfur. Due to the conflict situation in Golo, Jebel Marra, notwithstanding the improvement of

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<sup>55</sup> This summary draws on three principal studies: “*Baseline Survey Report*”, Institute of Peace and Development Studies, University of Zalingei, in collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, January 2019; “*Conflict Analysis Darfur*”, Transition International in Collaboration with SUDIA (commissioned by DCPSF), November, 2019; “*Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo Project – Context Analysis*”, UNDP, July 2019.

security conditions in the rest of the Darfur region<sup>56</sup>, UNAMID set up a temporary operation base in Golo per Security Council Resolution 2363. While IDPs have started to return to Golo, socioeconomic conditions in Golo require further focus and improvement.

The root causes of conflict in Golo locality, like most areas of Darfur, relate to the competition over access to and management of natural resources (i.e., socioeconomic). These root causes are exacerbated by sub-optimal rule of law institutions (both formal and informal), limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, social norms rooted in gender inequality and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This situation continues to manifest in regular clashes between the largely nomadic/pastoralist Arab tribes and the mainly farmer/agriculturist Fur tribes. The tribes have also been victims of political exploitation over the years with many members, especially young people, aligning themselves with either the rebel groups or government supported militias.

### **5.1.3 Children / youth and conflict dynamics**

In the above context, many children became victims of violence, abuse, labour and sexual exploitation. With the constant displacement and violence, the number of orphans, and unaccompanied and separated children who need care and protection, increased. The violence and lack of essential services severely impacted the psychological wellbeing of children. Adolescents and youth continue to be at risk and victims of recruitment into armed and other banditry or criminal groups.

### **5.1.4 Gender and conflict dynamics**

While women are significantly involved in social and economic matters and systems, they have been heavily impacted by the conflict as victims of the conflict and as members of the most marginalized groups<sup>57</sup>. For instance, women in Golo play a positive role in improving the economic condition of their families. They are the backbone in agricultural and trading sectors, and they are the majority in population (approximately 65%). However, women are consistently marginalized, receiving far less social and other forms of recognition than men. In the security and political sectors, women are excluded from security institutions and negotiation processes. Politically, there is a lack of participation of women.

In addition, women face several types of violence including rape (cases of rape have been documented by UNAMID and NGOs in Golo), gender-based violence, early marriage, and lack of education opportunities. Specifically, the project document notes that women and girls were subjected to violations and abuses, facing risk of sexual and

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<sup>56</sup> <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/2020-conflict-analysis-central-darfur-sudan>

<sup>57</sup>Context Analysis, University of Zolengej, July 2019

gender-based violence while undertaking regular livelihood activities, for example farming, firewood collection, fetching water and traveling to the market.

Women are also coerced to encourage youth to join the armed movements. Women's roles as actors and instigators of violence in Darfur are evidenced in their role as 'hakamat'. These are influential women poets/singers who are known for chanting songs or poetry that ridicules the masculinity of fellow tribesmen who might be playing a peacebuilding role, during confrontational incidents between two or more tribes. These historical patriarchal masculinity norms also connect to a more recent notion being adopted by young women that armed men represent strong and powerful husbands/providers for the family. These notions of masculinity continue to fuel inter-tribal conflict and entice young men to voluntarily sign up to joining the armed group or military.<sup>58</sup>

## 5.2 GENERAL FINDINGS

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Overall, when viewed in the above detailed conflict context of Golo, and bearing in mind the fundamental and ongoing challenges to peace and development in the region (both historical and throughout the project), the Evaluation Team found that this project implemented *successful and innovative activities, achieved many of its outcomes, and contributed measurably to sustainable peace and durable solutions in the targeted region*. This finding is validated through a review of the two Perception Surveys (2019 and 2020) conducted by the University of Zalingei, as well as the narrative project documents that derived data from partners, implementors and other key sources.

As the first project of its kind in Sudan with an explicit focus on peacebuilding through a range of innovative entry points (development, humanitarian and explicitly peacebuilding), via a complex and integrated approach (intra-UN, and in concert with INGO, NGO, and government partners, civil society, traditional leaders, and private sector contractors), the Evaluation Team found that the successes that were achieved are substantial and important (both backward looking for the project itself, and forward looking to inform future peacebuilding programming).

The Evaluation Team also found a range of issues that challenged the project. Many of these issues have roots in the very difficult and unique context in which the project operated. However, the below analysis also notes how some challenges may be addressed through shifts in project design for future efforts, to achieve even greater outcomes and impacts.

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## 5.3 OVERALL PROJECT SUCCESSES

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<sup>58</sup> Conflict Analysis Darfur produced by SUDIA in collaboration with Transitional International in November 2019.

The most powerful success factor of the project was its ground-breaking approach to peacebuilding through creating an active nexus between peacebuilding, development and humanitarian action. The use of livelihood and rule of law entry points for engagement with Golo communities sets this project apart from many “traditional” peacebuilding efforts (as well as “traditional” development projects), while aligning activities with the real needs and realities in these communities.<sup>59</sup>

For example, the distribution of higher-yield potato and tomato seeds, the installation of agricultural refrigeration units, renovation of an irrigation dam, and the initiation of beekeeping education, all address basic livelihood issues, while supporting long-term strengthening of horizontal social cohesion. This is because tensions related to agriculture and livelihoods in general have widely been shown in Golo to exacerbate other conflict dynamics.<sup>60</sup>

Likewise, activities related to rule of law and governance, specifically the CBRMs, police volunteer cohorts and paralegal initiatives, also struck a balance between innovation to support change, with integration into existing structures and processes.

These activities also had the critical attribute of being easily integrated into everyday life. Unlike peacebuilding approaches that often necessitate major paradigm, culture, and norms shifts to be accepted and integrated by communities, (frequently driven by elites, outsiders and the international community), the project activities seamlessly connected to local realities, norms and perceived needs.<sup>61</sup>

The project showed that innovation in peacebuilding can be achieved through straightforward engagement through everyday entry points. This approach allowed for enhanced local ownership, scaling up, catalytic programming, and context-driven and adaptive design. These are all well-documented best-practices in peacebuilding (and development), making this project an important effort to show the power of these approaches.

The following sections respond to the specific analytical questions framed in the evaluation TOR and further refined by the evaluation reference group (representing UNDP, UNICEF and PBF).

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## 5.4 EVALUATION THEMES AND QUESTIONS

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### 5.4.1 RELEVANCE

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<sup>59</sup> See Findings sections for further details and examples.

<sup>60</sup> Context Analysis, UNDP, July 2019; Conflict Analysis, UNDP, November 2019; Baseline Survey Report, University of Zalengei, January 2019

<sup>61</sup> See for example: Autesserre, Severine. 2014. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.



The Evaluation Team found that the project was well-grounded in robust context and conflict analyses. Key data to inform project outcomes, outputs and approaches was gathered through the following approaches:

- Baseline survey conducted in Golo, in collaboration with the Institute of Peace and Development Studies at Zalingei University (January 2019);
- Conflict Analysis for Darfur conducted by Transition International, in collaboration with SUDIA (November 2019)
- Context Analysis for Golo conducted under UNDP auspices (July 20219)

The above efforts identified conflict drivers, dynamics, actors and capacities for peace, which in turn informed the project Theory of Change. The Golo Context Analysis<sup>62</sup>, identified several root causes, which were directly addressed through project activities:

1. Governance and Rule of Law as “a major contributor to the conflict”;
2. “lack of water resources...at the center of conflict between farmers and nomads as they compete for access”;
3. “loss of livelihoods”
4. “inability to cultivate farmland”
5. “inequitable distribution of basic services”

Lack of production and marketing capacity, which was also targeted by project activities, was identified as a proximate cause.

In addition to the baseline data, the project design was informed by needs-assessment implemented by UNICEF and UNDP colleagues in Golo, in which communities (leadership and community members) were engaged through FGDs and other tools to garner a sense of the pressing needs as articulated by communities in the target region. The Peacebuilding Working Group was also a key platform for community engagement and analysis process.<sup>63</sup> Two of the evaluation participants<sup>64</sup> specifically commented on the importance of the conflict and context analysis for the relevance of the project.

In terms of endline data, a Perception Report was implemented by the University of Zalingei with the support of UNDP and UNICEF, with field work conducted in October 2019 and final report delivered in November 2019. A second Perception Report was implemented in October 2020 by the University of Zalingei. The Evaluation Team notes that the endline data was therefore diverse and timely, meaning that the real impacts (and deficits) of the project would still have been relevant and measurable at the time of data collection.

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<sup>62</sup> Context Analysis, University of Zalingei, July 2019

<sup>63</sup> Discussed further in later section of this report. The Peacebuilding Working Group was a communication platform for the project, as it brought together UNICEF, UNDP, UNAMID, along with government ministries, INGOs, NGOs, university centres, and other key partners for information sharing, updates, and action planning.

<sup>64</sup> HAC and PSDC.

*Was the project appropriate and strategic to the main peacebuilding goals and challenges in the Golo area of Jebel Marra at the time of the PBF project's design?*

The Evaluation Team found that the project was well-designed for the peacebuilding goals, challenges and peace capacities in the target region. Several evaluation participants, particularly those representing government ministries, specifically commented on the alignment between the project and the peacebuilding needs and strategies in the region. For example, a representative from the Jebel Marra Rural Development Project (JMRDP) reflected:

*"The project was responsive to some of the root causes of conflict in Golo, in that the dam which was established would enable farmers increased productivity, and which, in turn, would have a positive effect on their livelihoods and their communities. Poverty and feelings of under-development have underpinned the conflict in Golo and Darfur and so improving people's livelihoods would undoubtedly contribute to addressing some of the root causes of conflict."*

A representative from the Ministry of Agriculture also spoke about the relevance of the project, in particular for young men:

*"The project's various interventions have been very relevant to the needs of peace and stability in Golo locality. More specifically, the interventions targeting the small farmers in the locality."*

A representative from the Ministry of Youth concurred:

*"The impact of the youth focused interventions created the opportunity for activity/engagement between the community members, and they benefited through the training provided as well as economic benefits...Also, there is more peaceful co-existence between the different community groups."*

Representatives from TTPP and PSDC shared similar reflections, as did UNICEF and UNDP project staff.

*Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? Were they sufficiently consulted during design and implementation of the project, and in what ways?*

The Evaluation Team found that, informed by the context and conflict analysis discussed above, key needs and priorities of the communities were reflected in the project. In particular, needs related to safety, livelihoods, conflict resolution and rule of law were prominent in the design and implementation. For example, in the FGD related to Child Friendly Spaces, participants commented<sup>65</sup>:

*There is a need for these child friendly spaces because the children in the*

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<sup>65</sup> FGD notes were summarized by the evaluation team national consultant, and hence are not direct quotes.

*community don't have anywhere to play or even have some structured activities provided to them.*

Project implementation of some activities also emphasized community participation, as noted by participants in the same FGD:

*The community participated and contributed in the construction of the safe spaces. The youth in the community provided free labour, and the women in the community provided water for the construction. Community participated in the construction with 25% in-kind.*

The WES representative commented on WASH activities in the project, particularly the installation of handpumps and water yards, and how these efforts contributed to peacebuilding. Like livelihoods, water access and contestation was shown to be a significant conflict factor in the baseline reports.

A UNICEF evaluation participant reflected on how youth were critical to the project:  
*"We saw youth as key components of conflict because conflict is driven by unemployed youth. To break that movement of youth joining the conflict, we addressed them. Prior to the conflict there was a youth centre, but it was destroyed and looted during the conflict. We rehabilitated the centre and handed it over to the Ministry of Education Department of Youth."*

These activities (and others that make up the project) gained their relevance through sustainable engagement with local institutional partners, and, critically, their direct links to locally-identified conflict factors and peace capacities.<sup>66</sup>

A representative from JMRDP underscored these key aspects of the project design:

*"The project was relevant to the needs of the target group and they were consulted before the interventions were designed and implemented - through the survey."*

*Did relevance continue throughout implementation? Was the project able to adapt to changing a context and fragility over time, especially in light of ongoing changes in the political and institutional situation in Sudan?*

The project adapted principally through the no-cost extension of the project timeline by six months. This allowed more time to address the massive changes brought on by the national revolution in Sudan, and more time to develop partnerships, lay the ground for implementation and engage communities.

The revolution was characterised by significant confusion from key stakeholders regarding who was responsible for what, and who (institutions, actors and individuals) was empowered to make legitimate decisions, as officers, Governors and other officials

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<sup>66</sup> See: <https://www.unicef.org/media/96576/file/Programming-Guide-Conflict-Sensitivity-and-Peacebuilding.pdf> for UNICEF best practices.

were being fired and removed daily. This impacted the ability of the project to proceed on time and as planned, given the need to have buy-in and agreement from empowered decision makers. On the positive side, the national revolution created new and improved levels of access to project sites. The UNDP and UNICEF project team strove to create partnerships with incoming decision makers, while maintaining strong relationships with in-place partners (for example, traditional leaders and civil society groups).<sup>67</sup>

While additional changes could perhaps have been considered during project implementation, the Evaluation Team found that the project's consistency and stability was well served by *not* radically changing the activities. As the project was implementing during a profoundly uncertain time, it would have been virtually impossible to predict what changes would have been both conflict sensitive and net-positive, without fully pausing the project for many months (if not years) to reassess the context. Therefore, the evaluation team found that the adaptations that were made (principally, the timeline), were well suited to the evolving realities.

*How novel or innovative was the project approach? Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?*

As noted earlier, the innovative approaches of this project allowed for creativity in approaching peacebuilding from locally-relevant, relatively low-cost, and sustainable entry points. Specifically, pursuing peacebuilding through livelihoods, agricultural and other development programming, and the revitalization and support to paralegals, CBRMs and other rule of law and conflict resolution, allowed for important peacebuilding entry points.

The beekeeping activities provide an illustrative example. One evaluation participant highlighted the unique links between the beekeeping activities, livelihoods, and peacebuilding:

*"The beekeeping interventions provided sustainable solutions which in some ways contributed to local economic recovery in the area. Individuals receiving and benefiting from the beekeeping gear provided by the project can now go and harvest honey, which is abundant in the area, and in a few days have an income which through other means would take much more effort and time to acquire."*

While the comment above does not explicitly articulate the link to conflict dynamics or peacebuilding, the conflict and context analysis clearly showed lack of unemployment and overall economic deterioration as significant conflict factors. Therefore, there is a logical connection between the beekeeping activities and the conflict root causes.

The Ministry of Agriculture representative specifically commented on the innovative intersection between the utilitarian and technical cold-storage initiative, sustainable

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<sup>67</sup> Per interviews with UNDP and UNICEF project staff.

livelihoods, and peacebuilding, what one might call “potatoes for peace”:

*“The cold storage...is extremely useful to farmers’ livelihoods and peace in Golo, and when it is operational it will greatly improve farmer livelihoods. It will be used to store potatoes which can then be replanted by the farmers during the farming and planting season. The potatoes will therefore serve as seeds and reduce the need to import potato seeds from outside the area.”*

The beekeeping interventions, seed projects, dam restoration, midwife training support, water point activities and other elements were similarly innovative in creating peacebuilding entry points. While these kinds of fairly traditional livelihoods and development projects are not unique in and of themselves, the intentional peacebuilding orientation in the design sets them apart as innovative in this project. Both UNICEF and UNDP have been exploring the intersections between basic and social services with peacebuilding for several years, and this project is a strong example of how such programming can actually work. In addition, the project team worked to ensure the project approaches and outputs were filling a unique niche, in that the team undertook, through the Peacebuilding Working Group (detailed in other sections of this report) an informal mapping on other peacebuilding projects that were funded by the DCPSF. This informed the PBF interventions of this project.

*Did the project’s theory of change clearly articulate assumptions about why the project approach is expected to produce the desired change? Was the theory of change grounded in evidence? Were the logic and assumptions of the theory of change accurate?*

The Evaluation Team found that the project’s theory of change was clear, made coherent connections, and was well-grounded in the evidence supplied by the context analysis, conflict analysis and Baseline Report. The Team is also of the view that the logic and assumptions of the theory of change held up.

That said, an element of the theory of change that is implied, but perhaps could be for future programming more explicitly stated, relates to the project’s contributions to a broader culture of peace and horizontal social cohesion in Golo.

For example, the theory of change asserts that, as a result of the activities, *“tensions between herders and farmers will be reduced.”* The Evaluation Team appreciates and supports the specificity of this TOC goal, and the power of “small”, specific, and incremental shifts in a challenging landscape, versus the tendency of international actors to create rather utopian and unattainable aspirations. However, given the scope and scale of the project, this element of the TOC could be expanded for future projects to explicitly aspire to broader and more pronounced shifts from destructive conflict to sustainable peace. The project created significant entry points for a powerful peacebuilding effort, and the TOC could more assertively speak to these broader opportunities for strengthening vertical and horizontal social cohesion.

In addition, the theory of change could be somewhat strengthened in terms of the “Because” elements, meaning being more explicit about *why* the project team believed the specific approaches would lead to the specific peacebuilding outcomes. Confirming this level of causality is quite challenging. That said, for future projects, UNDP and UNICEF, in consultation with PBF, may find ways to articulate (and then test during project implementation), the causal links.

*Was the project relevant to the UN's peacebuilding mandate and the SDGs, in particular SDG 16?*

The evaluation team found that the project was directly relevant to the UN's peacebuilding mandate, and in particular SDG 16 (*“Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”*) The project's emphasis on rule of law institutions, livelihoods, and conflict resolution mechanisms are all directly in line with SDG 16. In addition, project design focused on equity, inclusivity and sustainability, as called for in SDG 16 and its various targets.

### **Challenges to Relevance**

Given the volatile and complex context in which it operated, the project faced some challenges related to relevance, as dramatic changes swept across Sudan, Jebel Mara and Golo, from just prior to implementation (national revolution) all the way until the very end of the project (COVID-19). Some of these changes obviously impacted important project factors, some positively (security, to some degree), and some negatively (economic deterioration). A TPP representative commented:

*“Changes that have taken place in the country have been beneficial to the groups because they all feel more secure and the improved livelihoods they have achieved are continuing. However, the economic deterioration has offset these gains they have managed to achieve as a result of the project...”*

The WES representative spoke specifically about the impact of currency fluctuation on projects:

*“The fluctuation in the price of the SDG to the USD was by far the biggest challenge – especially when considering the procurement time when working with the UN agencies.”*

The Ministry of Agriculture representative also highlighted the strong impact of economic upheaval on the project, and well beyond:

*“Funding has also been intermittent and the high inflation rates made the completion of various interventions extremely challenging.”*

Impacts of widespread economic deterioration included: inflation that increased prices

for goods and services needed for implementation, reduction in the actual value of project funds, steeply reduced availability, quality and durability of goods, increased time and effort needed for procurement, and increased risk of theft of equipment, as individuals struggled to survive the economic devastation.<sup>68</sup>

For future, additional consideration should be given for how to address inflation and economic deterioration during project delivery (although this risk is quite hard to plan for or act upon).

Another challenge was also fueled by the revolution and its specific impacts on generational divides. A representative from PSDC reflected:

*"The changes that took place in 2019 created tensions between the youth and the older generation, mostly the traditional leaders. The youth perceived these traditional leaders as part of the previous regime and complicit in some of the injustices that had happened. They wanted to replace them in their community roles as decision-makers, but the traditional leaders saw the youth as rash and unfit to play that role in the community. This tension remains until now and manifests itself from time-to-time in the community."*

This comment shows how shifts in the national political landscape impact the role and legitimacy of traditional leaders, and how these changes need to be considered in all projects. Some evaluation participants felt that when local traditional leaders were involved in conflict resolution efforts, some youth resisted being involved in these efforts, viewing them as a continuation of the previous regime.

This suggests an opportunity to bring an inter-generational focus into the peacebuilding and rule of law projects, and to nurture interactions and engagement to increase trust specifically between traditional leaders and youth.

This approach did indeed emerge in some elements of the project. For example, paralegals trained through the project accompanied traditional leaders to help resolve land disputes. The evaluation team found that, because some groups and individuals view the traditional leaders as having other concerns at stake, for example their own family relations, personal, political or economic agendas, etc., some disputants appreciate the involvement of non-traditional and young service providers. Some shared that youth are seen as more "truthful" and straightforward in their mediation or arbitration efforts.

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#### 5.4.2 EFFICIENCY

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*Did the actual results (outputs and outcomes) justify the costs incurred, and were resources effectively used?*

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<sup>68</sup> In fact, several partners reported theft of project-related equipment, and problems with security for project sites.

The Evaluation Team found that the project strove to maximize the value of funding for activities, in service of outputs and outcomes. Funding was stretched to cover as much as possible, in a very challenging economic landscape. In fact, the team found that although funds were dramatically reduced given inflation and the devaluation of the currency, nearly all activities were still fully implanted (with some exceptions, discussed in below sections). See the **EFFECTIVENESS: OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS** section of this report (below) for a thorough analysis of Outputs and Outcomes.

*How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the two implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?*

UNICEF and UNDP operated with a very lean staff (one UNICEF and one UNDP staff member were fully tasked on this project, with others providing varying degrees of support). Unlike projects that invest heavily in secretariats and larger staff, this project emphasized coordination and partnerships over UN staffing. The result was more resourcing directly to partners and activities, versus a more robust (and complex) UN element.

The funding earmarked for Outcome 1 (Rule of Law) was \$372,000 (UNDP) and \$261,934 (UNICEF). The funding earmarked for Outcome 2 (durable solutions and economic recovery) was \$876,000 (UNDP) and \$419,001 (UNICEF), with total staff salaries of \$537,301 (UNDP) and \$186,916 (UNICEF). Operational costs were fairly low, at \$48,858 (UNDP) and \$41,729 (UNICEF)<sup>69</sup>. Adding more staff support to this project would have reduced substantially the funds available to activities.

Coordination between the two agencies appears to have been consistent and effective throughout the project, with design and implementation connecting well to both UNICEF and UNDP mandates and approaches. The Project Board, on which UNDP and UNICEF sat, was tasked with providing coordinated guidance and advice to the project, as well as making project assurance reviews<sup>70</sup>. The Peacebuilding Working Group was another key UNDP-UNICEF coordination platform (the Working Group also included GoS, INGOs, NGOs, partners, etc.)<sup>71</sup>

*Were project activities delivered in a timely manner?*

The timeline for implementation was extended by the UNICEF and UNDP team, through a formal request to PBF for a no-cost extension by 6 months from the original project timeline. This was a strategically critical change in timing, to address the upheavals and national transformations that took place as the project launched. In addition to implementing in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the project's timeline was challenged by the resultant economic, political, social and security crises in the region, and then by the emergence of COVID-19. Given this context, the evaluation team

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<sup>69</sup> PBF Project Report, Annual Financial report November 2020

<sup>70</sup> Per **Project Multi-Year Workplan**.

<sup>71</sup> Per PBF Project Documents



found that, on the whole, project activities were delivered in a timely manner. The TTPP representative reflected on this question:

*“Project activities were delivered in a timely manner to a great extent. The only delays happened with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions and preventive measures that were put in place.”*

Similarly, the WES representative noted:

*“The project was efficiently implemented and according to the timeline planned – this despite some challenges about the market prices.”*

The JMRPD representative concurred, saying that:

*“The project was efficiently implemented and all the deliverables of the JMRDP contract with UNDP were completed.”*

As noted earlier, the project did face some challenges related to timely implementation. At least one partner reflected that the lengthy UN funds transfer process was a factor in delays:

*“Delivery was delayed...at some points due to delays in the transfer of funds from UNDP to the JMRDP.”*

*Were project financial management systems efficient and fit for purpose?*

The evaluation team found that the project financial management systems were consistent with UN policies and practices, ensuring transparency and accountability.<sup>72</sup>

*How efficient and successful was the project's implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?*

Overall, the project was successful in implementation, including procurement. However, several project partners reported some challenges in this realm, some of which were due to external realities out of the control of UN staff (or partners). Most of the challenges related to timelines for procurement, follow through and quality from contractors, and suitability and availability of materials and equipment. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture representative noted a delay in finalizing the cold storage activity:

*“The completion of the cold storage unit has taken much longer than planned and even at the present time has not been formally handed over to the locality.”*

Given the national economic deterioration, many needed inputs were massively inflated in price and hard to procure. The Ministry of Agriculture representative shared:

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<sup>72</sup> Annual Financial report November 2020. Also see narrative reports and final project report, August 2020

*“Fuel costs for the generator that powers the cold storage unit is of concern to the locality especially since there are fuel shortages and diesel fuel is hard to come by in Golo locality.”*

The Ministry of Education representative discussed a different challenge- the relationship between the contracted provider and the community:

*“The project ran into problems with the local community at the start. The local community imposed on the contractor that he should employ women from the community as laborers, and at an extremely high rate (daily rate of 300 SDG per woman). The contractor was also prevented from using his own trucks for transporting sand and other materials and was told that he should only use the community laborers. After threatening to withdraw from the contract the Min. of Education intervened with the local community and at the end reached a settlement for employing workers/laborers from the community but at a reduced rate which the contractor was able to afford.”*

While the Ministry reports a brokered solution to the problem, future projects should consider how best to address tensions and conflicts between communities and providers.

In addition, some activities faced serious quality control issues. Both community members and UN colleagues discussed such problems specifically in the dam project. One evaluation participant noted:

*“The dam was ineffectively implemented. The funds allocated were not enough and the project took some time [regarding] how best to use the money. The dam was the most problematic of project outputs.”*

While emphasizing the critical importance of the dam for irrigation, farmers who utilize the dam also shared concerns about the process and outcome of this activity:

*The community was not consulted on the technical design of the works to be carried out on the dam. Had they been consulted they would have told the people responsible that the dam needs to be made higher and more doors put alongside the whole dam that would enable the silt to flow out during the rainy season. The contractor also didn't remove any of the silt that had accumulated at the dam over the years.<sup>73</sup>*

The above raises a concern regarding the extent of local ownership this project enjoyed. Also, the outputs (and perhaps outcomes) related to the dam were arguably reduced given this issue. That said, the Evaluation Team did not find this specific critique

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<sup>73</sup> The Evaluation Team notes that this raises a concern regarding the extent of local ownership this project enjoyed, and the outputs (and perhaps outcomes) likely were arguably reduced because of this issue. That said, the Evaluation Team did not find this specific critique for other project elements, or reported by other stakeholders or partners.

(lack of consultation) for other project elements nor were they reported by other stakeholders or partners.

While mundane, the procurement element of peacebuilding programming has been shown to be a critical, if often overlooked, element of both “do no harm” and “do more good” approaches.<sup>74</sup> For future projects, attention should be given to considering the relationship between the provider or contractor and the community, as well as how best to engage communities in the design and implementation process.

*How well did the project collect and use data to monitor results? How effectively was updated data used to manage the project?*

As noted earlier, the project was grounded in a conflict analysis, a context analysis, and a baseline survey<sup>75</sup>. Throughout the project, ongoing data collection was carried out, including semi-annual, annual and final progress reports. Partners submitted monitoring results, and the Peacebuilding Working Group also met regularly to share data, updates and status reports. Several case studies / success stories were developed to illustrate the efficacy of the project. As noted earlier, two perception surveys were carried out by external providers provided endline data<sup>76</sup>.

*How well did the project team communicate with implementing partners, stakeholders and project beneficiaries, including on project progress?*

In addition to regular communications with partners, stakeholders and communities, UN staff made in-depth field visits in advance of the project during the design phase and had regular interactions with stakeholders and partners in the field throughout the project. The Peacebuilding Working Group also acted as a communication platform for the project, as it brought together UNICEF, UNDP, UNAMID, along with government ministries, INGOs, NGOs, university centres, and other key partners for information sharing, updates, and action planning.

*How was the project's collaboration with the UNRCO, UNDP, UNICEF, the PBF, the Government of Sudan, locality institutions, and development partners?*

Partnerships were fundamental to this project's successes. The Evaluation Team found that collaboration amongst official partners was robust in the project. Communication was consistent and effective for the most part. This is particularly striking as the design was done just prior to the national revolution, and the implementation took place in the

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<sup>74</sup> Autesserre, Severine. 2014. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>75</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, Institute of Peace and Development Studies, University of Zolengei, in collaboration with UNDP and UNICEF, January 2019; “Conflict Analysis Darfur”, Transition International in Collaboration with SUDIA (commissioned by DCPSF), November, 2019; “Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo Project – Context Analysis”, UNDP, July 2019.

<sup>76</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zolengei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019 and October, 2020

aftermath of the revolution, meaning that many lead partners on the GoS and locality side were new or subject to massive changes (and insecurity) during the project. That the project successfully implemented in this context is a testament to the value of these partnerships, rooted in the UN's reputation, track record, and relational capital in the country.

For example, the Ministry of Education representative reflected that the Ministry:

*"...has a long-standing relationship with UNICEF and has been jointly implementing school construction projects in several locations..."*

A UNICEF evaluation participant echoed this view, highlighting the strong role partnerships with INGOs, ministries, and others played:

*"UNICEF and their implementing partner CRS were involved in all stages of the project - design, implementation and monitoring. For the schools, UNICEF engaged with the Ministry of Education and the Locality, and the specifications for the school were agreed on and a tender issued for service providers. UNICEF and CRS also monitored all stages of implementation especially with regard to the quality of the materials used."*

The evaluation participant also commented on the high-quality partnership between UNICEF and UNDP, and the role of the Peacebuilding Working Group in coordination, through quarterly (Zalengei) and monthly (Golo) meetings:

*"Coordination between different actors including UNDP also greatly improved efficiency. UNDP and UNICEF were in constant communication with each other, and the Peacebuilding Working Group played an important part in contributing to efficiency."*

Finally, and perhaps most critically for the future sustainability of locally-led peacebuilding efforts, community partnerships were prominent. For example, participants in the Child Friendly Spaces FGD shared that:

*The community participated and contributed in the construction of the safe spaces. The youth in the community provided free labour, and the women in the community provided water for the construction. Community participated in the construction with 25% in-kind.*

*What were the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the project's implementation process?*

The key **strengths** of the project can be summarized as:

- innovation, particularly use of development and humanitarian entry points to also target peacebuilding outcomes;
- locally-identified needs and goals, derived through participatory means;
- financial efficiency (doing more with less);

- sound and effective partnerships (intra-UN, with national and local authorities, NGOs, INGOs, civil society, etc.);
- resilience and adaptability to challenges; and
- strong theory of change linking activities to conflict analysis.

**Weaknesses** of the project included (these are discussed more fully in the “challenges” section of this report):<sup>77</sup>

- Stretching to try to implement diverse activities in a range of sectors (WASH, livelihoods, human rights, rule of law, conflict resolution);
- Linkages to horizontal social cohesion aspects of peacebuilding, and between development and peace, could have been more explicitly stated;
- Further engagement with displaced communities could have boosted the value for reintegration;
- Some project deliverables were very hard to implement fully, given the dire economic situation that directly impacted providers and markets; and The lack of a strong “peacebuilding identity”, focused on how each partner (particularly local partners) were contributing to a renewed vision for peace in Golo, could have strengthened the sense of each being a part of a regional movement and network, versus disparate actors doing disconnected activities not explicitly supportive of peace.

The project worked given several important **opportunities**. These included the willingness on the part of the GoS to work alongside UNDP and UNICEF in new and innovative ways in a remote and often difficult region, the legacy of strong UN efforts throughout Sudan and the readiness for other key partners to collaborate with the UN efforts. The project also was rooted in evidence from other national and sub-national programs that showed peacebuilding can be a viable and vital outcome from well-designed initiatives (for example UNICEF’s *Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy* program, the four year, 14-country innovative effort to link education to peacebuilding, and vice versa)<sup>78</sup>. See the *Relevance* sub-section in the “Findings and Conclusions” section of this report for an analysis of the extent to which the Theory of Change was explicitly grounded in evidence supporting the project approach.

As discussed earlier in this report, **threats** to the project included a national revolution that took place just prior to project launch, rapid and pervasive economic deterioration (which adversely impacted the ability of contracted partners to deliver, including diminishing quantity, quality and timeliness), significant armed clashes and other security-related challenges, the extreme remoteness of Golo and lack of travel and communication infrastructure, the onset of COVID-19, with restrictions on engagement,

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<sup>77</sup> See the *Relevance* sub-section of the “Findings and Conclusions” section of this report for an analysis of the relationship between the project theory of change and the project approaches / activities.

<sup>78</sup> See: <https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/what-unicef-doing-peacebuilding-education-and-advocacy>

field-visits, and supply chain problems, ongoing conflicts between social and political groups, and a legacy of mistrust between citizens and state institutions in Golo.

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### 5.4.3 EFFECTIVENESS: OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

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*What progress has been made towards achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project? What, if any, unintended progress has the project made to peacebuilding in Golo?*

The endline perception surveys<sup>79</sup> and project documents show that the results on achieving targeted outcomes were strong – either in line with or exceeding the outcome indicator targets. Some select highlights that illustrate the specific peacebuilding outcomes of the project include<sup>80</sup>:

- **Percentage of community members reporting satisfaction with informal and formal rule of law mechanisms** rose from 33% (baseline) to 83% (formal) and 93% (informal), well beyond the target of 60%.<sup>81</sup>
- **Number of cases successfully mediated** under the auspices of the PJRCs in localities rose from 16 to 144, beyond the target of 100.<sup>82</sup>
- **Percentage of community members perceiving a decrease in communal conflicts**, because of the presence of CBRMs, rose from 38% to 86%, beyond the target of 80%.<sup>83</sup>
- **Number of human rights issues identified and addressed** (directly linked to the paralegal and community policing activities of the project) rose from 0 to 5, beyond the target of 2. It is important to highlight that all five were sexual and gender-based violence related. The final report notes that “traditionally women in Sudan do not prefer reporting such cases to the police”. Likewise, the number of cases of child protection addressed rose from 0 to 107 (with a target of 100).<sup>84</sup>
- **Number of returnee households reintegrated and receiving basic social services** from project interventions rose from 0 to 5,000 well beyond the target of 4,000. Also, the number of women and men benefitting from economic recovery opportunities rose from 0 to 15,450 (65% women, 35% youth), well exceeding the ambitious target of 10,000.<sup>85</sup>

### **Achieving Outcomes: Rule of Law**

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<sup>79</sup> Perception Survey, November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalengei,

<sup>80</sup> These specific outcomes are illustrative, but far from comprehensive. For the full Indicator Based Performance Assessment also see the project final report.

<sup>81</sup> Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalengei, October 2020.

<sup>82</sup> Final Project Report (drawing on PJRC logs), August 2020. Perception survey (University of Zalengei, October 2020) also notes the percentage of cases successfully mediated and resolved by CBRMs rose from 50% (baseline) to 100%.

<sup>83</sup> Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalengei, October 2020.

<sup>84</sup> Final Project Report (drawing on Police Volunteer logs), August 2020. Perception survey (University of Zalengei, October 2020) also notes that the percentage of population stating increased in access to PJRCs and para-legal services rose from 0% (baseline) to 50%

<sup>85</sup> Final Project Report, October 2020.

The Perception Reports show that project had a direct positive impact on community satisfaction with the formal justice system. For example, “satisfaction” in the *formal justice system* was found to increase from 36 percent (23 percent satisfaction with the police)<sup>86</sup> to 94 percent<sup>87</sup>, after project activities were implemented.<sup>88</sup>

This outcome (increase in satisfaction in formal rule of law institutions) followed the implementation of a range of project interventions, including:

- capacity building of Sudanese Police Force;
- establishment of paralegal cohorts; and
- support to community police volunteers.

In addition, the Baseline Survey showed that 50 percent reported satisfaction with the *informal justice system*<sup>89</sup> at the outset of the project. The Perception Reports found satisfaction with formal rule of law systems had increased to 93 percent.<sup>90</sup> This increase in satisfaction with the informal rule of law institutions followed implementation of several project activities including:

- improved and supported Community-Based Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (CBRMs)<sup>91</sup>;
- capacity building of rural court judges; and
- infrastructural support
- establishment and strengthening of community-based child protection networks

### **Achieving Outcomes: Durable Solutions and local economic recovery**

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<sup>86</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 6. Data collected via questionnaire. *Question posed: “How satisfied are you with the formal court?”*

<sup>87</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zalingei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019, pg. 7. Data collected via questionnaire. *Question posed: “Are you satisfied with the formal rule of law initiatives introduced by this project such as SPF training on SGBV, Family and Child Protection desks, etc.?”*

<sup>88</sup> The Evaluation Team notes that the Baseline Survey Report (January 2019) also reported that 83% of respondents “trust” the informal system, while only 5% “trust” the formal courts and the police. While trust is closely related to “satisfaction”, it is not clear that the Perception Survey (November 2019) posed questions to analyze specifically how “trust” in rule of law systems had shifted following the project.

<sup>89</sup> “Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019, pg. 6. Data collected via questionnaire. *Question posed: “How satisfied are you with the informal justice system?”*

<sup>90</sup> “Annual Perception Report - Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law project”, University of Zalingei, with support from UNDP and UNICEF, November 2019, pg. 7. Data collected via questionnaire: *“Are you satisfied with the informal rule of law initiatives introduced by the project such as community resolution mechanisms, community policing, rural courts, rural judges training and paralegals?”*

<sup>91</sup> A total of 14 CBRMs were reactivated, with 144 members (33 percent women, 45 percent youth), trained on conflict resolution, mediation, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence (per Project Documents, with reference to CBRM logs and records).

The project also pursued and achieved its targets related to durable solutions and local economic recovery, through a range of approaches, activities and outputs.

For example, the project established a Youth Vocational Skills Centre, where a total of 63 youths (30 percent female) from various villages undertook three months of Vocational Skills Development (VSD) courses. The participants gained skills in welding, carpentry, masonry, and food processing. In terms of impacts of these activities, the youth involved in this training have since commenced income generation with their newly acquired skills, thus reducing the risk of their involvement in conflict.

In addition, with support from the University of Nyala, 45 youths (29 percent female) were trained on the use of eco-friendly and low-cost alternative construction materials (for example, Pozzolana, a product added to cement), which has contributed to availability of alternative construction materials for Golo communities at a reasonable and sustainable price.<sup>92</sup>

### **Agricultural production and marketing activities**

Limited production and marketing of cash crops, such as fruits and potatoes, was one of the proximate causes of conflict identified during the context analysis<sup>93</sup>. High prices of basic commodities drive some people towards negative coping strategies. Thus, the project supported the establishment of farmer field schools / producer associations in which 175 farmers (60 percent women) from different tribes worked together to produce maximum yields of potatoes and tomatoes.<sup>94</sup>

In addition, 20 community animal health workers (10 percent female, 26 percent youth), who were predominantly (60 percent) from the nomadic communities, were trained and equipped, with support from Department of Animal Resources.<sup>95</sup> With the support of these community animal health workers, vaccinations and treatments were provided for over 15,000 livestock belonging to both farmers and nomads. Medicine was provided by the government. The project also oversaw the creation of water harvesting facilities along migratory routes for nomads and the rehabilitation of Mela Dam for farmers.

The Evaluation Team notes that endline data was not specifically collected to measure the impact of these activities in and of themselves, so it is not possible for the Team to verify to what extent these activities and their outputs directly impacted the outcomes.

However, 81 percent of Perception Survey respondents reported an increase in economic interactions between diverse communities diverse communities<sup>96</sup>, against a

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<sup>92</sup> Final Project Report, referring to implementer logs and reports.

<sup>93</sup> Context Analysis, University of Zalengei, July 2019

<sup>94</sup> Final Project Report, referencing implementor logs and reports.

<sup>95</sup> Training focused on epidemic control and declaration, primary diagnosis of cases and reporting and use of basic drugs and treatment. CAHWs kits were distributed after the training and they have already started to use the kits in animal treatment. (Final Project Report, 2020)

<sup>96</sup> Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalengei, October 2020



baseline of 30 percent.<sup>97</sup> Endline data also verifies that 89 percent of people in target areas had “improved perceptions of social cohesion within eighteen months of project implementation *due to the concept of collective work*”.<sup>98</sup> These data points suggest that there is a correlation between the outputs and the outcomes (while also highlighting some disconnects between the endline data needed to fully measure the project outcomes).

In the FGD for the Farmers' groups, participants summarized how activities led to outputs and ultimately broader community-level outcomes related to agricultural productivity and sustainability (key conflict drivers). The organic “scaling up” of the project, and possible positive impact on social cohesion is also implied in this comment:

*The beekeepers received technical training and beekeeping equipment (hive boxes and clothing), the beneficiaries from the farmers' schools received technical training and seeds (tomato and potato), and the orchards' group received apple 'nurslings'. The farmer school groups benefited much from the technical trainings as well as the improved seeds and have managed to increase their productivity. Other farmers in their neighborhoods have also benefited from them because they see the new planting techniques and adopt them in their own farms.*

Similarly, participants in the paralegal and police volunteers FDG discussed how the project catalyzed network-building, institutionalization, and the emergence of a professional identity for participants, as they provided needed services to the community:

*The paralegals have now organized themselves in the form of a registered association. Since its establishment it has been able to solve 18 disputes. Their purpose is to create awareness about how to access justice and human rights, the relationship between the citizen and the police, and also to spread awareness to the community about their rights. They were also trained to solve everyday problems that happen in the community. Problems which might be beyond the ability of the police volunteer to resolve would then be referred to the police.*

The above shows how the activity (training and cohort-building) led to important outcomes related to human rights, conflict resolution and citizen-state vertical social cohesion, all critical peacebuilding outcomes.

Given the specific conflict focus of the project, it is important to highlight outcomes related to conflict and its resolution, particularly as it applies to land disputes, which

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<sup>97</sup>“Baseline Survey Report”, UNDP and UNICEF in collaboration with Institute of Peace and Development Studies University of Zalingei, January 2019

<sup>98</sup> Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalingei, October 2020, emphasis added.

were shown in the conflict analysis to be pervasive. The paralegal FGD noted that:

*Paralegals have also been instrumental in solving land disputes, especially since they are perceived as neutral actors who don't have an interest in anything - because the traditional leaders or older people are felt to factor in other considerations when making decisions or rulings.*

The endline Perception Report notes that from a baseline of 0% reporting an increase of access to PJRCs and para-legal services, perception of access increased to 50 percent by the end of the project.<sup>99</sup>

The JMRPD representative also offered perspective on the successful pursuit of outcomes. Here the focus is on vertical social cohesion between citizens and authorities:

*"The project contributed to increased trust and engagement between citizens and the JMRDP especially in that citizens of Golo saw that the state/JMRDP was proactively providing services to the farmers - this was through the farmer cooperatives and training that the JMRDP delivered under the project."*

The JMRPD representative also notes evidence regarding the outcome:

*"Increased trust and engagement between citizens and the state was observed when the farmers turned out in large numbers to enroll in the farmers' training interventions which the JMRDP implemented."*

From a baseline of 25%, trust between members of communities and their local authorities rose to 96.94%.<sup>100</sup>

The Ministry of Education representative summarized key education-specific outputs related to peacebuilding outcomes:

*"Both the construction of the semi-permanent classrooms (in five locations - Bardani, Tiro, North Golo and Quiy, Koy) as well as the establishment of the vocational center in Golo have been responsive to some of the conflict consequences in Golo. The school classes have now replaced the temporary grass huts used for classes by returnees and IDPs to the area. The vocational training center has proved youth with a profession which they can use to get an income - this instead of thinking of resorting to livelihood sources that might be based on violence (joining armed groups or banditry)."*

The representative further specified the impacts related to sustainable returns for IDPs:

*"The project did effectively support sustainable solutions for IDPs and host*

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<sup>99</sup> Perception Survey Data Set, University of Zalengei, October 2020

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

*communities. An example of this was when conflict-affected communities who were displaced because of the fighting that erupted in in East Jebel Marra between 24 January and 31 January were also provided with educational materials by UNICEF."*

The Ministry of Youth representative also commented on youth-related outcomes:

*"The impact of the youth-focused interventions created the opportunity for activity and engagement between the community members. They benefited through the training provided as well as economic benefits...Also, there is more peaceful co-existence between the different community groups."*

The PSDC representative focused on outcomes related to the CBRM activities:

*"The CBRMs did a lot of good work and were able to absorb and resolve a lot of disputes in the Golo area. An example was a dispute they were able to resolve was an incident which led to standoff between the civilians and the military. The CBRMs were able to diffuse the problem and the culprit who was the cause of the problem was sent to Zalingei to be tried."*

The same commentator gave another specific example of the role the CBRMs, beyond the project timeline:

*"In 2020 (one year after the direct collaboration with the UNDP had ended), when the changes that had taken place in the country were beginning to cause tensions between the youth and the traditional leaders (or older generations), in Golo they took the head of the native administration (Dimangawi) and facilitated a large gathering with the youth which helped resolve the tensions. It was agreed that the youth would be part of these CBRMs but that the leadership in mediating conflicts/disputes and making peace would be left with the native administration leaders."*

In line with the above, from a baseline of one, 14 CBRMs were established through the project, with 131 members (33% women and 45% youth, from Fur, Zagawa, Masalit, and Arab tribes).<sup>101</sup> CBRM logs recorded an increase from one case (baseline) to 144 cases of conflict related to crop destruction.<sup>102</sup> 100% of these cases were successfully mediated and resolved (up from a baseline of 50%). This underscores the peacebuilding efficacy of the approach, in that the CBRMs can address not only interpersonal but also intergenerational and broader social tensions.

Discussing the role of water in the Golo conflict (which is well established as a root cause in the conflict and context analyses and baseline report for the project), and the value from water-related activities for peacebuilding, the WES representative offered this powerful reflection on outputs and outcomes from water point activities:

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<sup>101</sup> Final Project report, drawing on CBRM data.

<sup>102</sup> Final Project report, drawing on CBRM data.

*“There was a real gap in water services in Golo, and there are several villages that are without access to drinking water sources. The availability of additional water points contributed to reducing confrontations and friction between the different population groups. This was evident in several locations in Golo, where there are different groups competing for water (people affiliated with the armed groups, people affiliated with the local government), and the selection of the locations was based on this variation of different community groups. This is the case for the area of Sabana which is located between two localities and the community is considered a front-line community made of groups belonging to the different fighting factions. It also has IDPs and host communities living together.”*

The WES representative also spoke about the role of animal troughs in peacebuilding:

*“Animal troughs are used by herders to water their animals, and have reduced confrontations with human consumption at the water source. Herders also feel that the service has addressed their needs alongside the settled community.”*

In addition to the data reviewed above, a wide range of evaluation participants underscored the project's specific peacebuilding outputs and outcomes. Some of these comments are summarized here, noting the FGD or KII source for each comment:

- Peace and social cohesion in Golo has improved over the past two years (CBRM FGD)
- Levels of trust in the justice systems has improved over the last 2 years (Farmers' group FGD)
- Conflicts are resolved through different mechanisms and processes, but the police volunteers solve everyday disputes that happen in the community (Police volunteers and paralegals FGD)
- Peace and social cohesion in Golo have improved considerably over the last two years and justice is being administered better (Police volunteers and paralegals FGD)
- Overall freedom has improved and there is some security, so the overall justice environment has improved (PSDC)
- Community's trust for formal systems was low...we pushed trust up (from next to nothing). They trusted their informal systems much more. We boosted the confidence of trusting the formal systems more *and* also continue trusting their informal systems. We wanted to work with both. (UNICEF staff)

*Did the project monitoring system adequately capture data on peacebuilding results at an appropriate outcome level?*

The Evaluation Team found that the monitoring system was well-designed to generate and capture data specifically on peacebuilding results. For example the 2019 and 2020 Perception surveys conducted by the University of Zalengei measured levels of

intercommunal trust, perceptions of security, faith in formal and informal justice system, protection and child-friendly spaces, relations between IDPs and host communities, inclusion of women, youth, different tribal communities in CBRMs, conflict trends, use of conflict resolution and rights-based mechanisms, establishment and utilization of social services, perceptions related to the role of women in CBRMs etc.

UNICEF staff highlighted one specific tool that collected peacebuilding data:

*“The tools and strategies were effective. One of these tools was the peacebuilding mapping exercise, which was carried out several times during the project by sector. The tool identified community needs.”*

The Peacebuilding Working group in Golo was a platform through which all peacebuilding-related mapping was undertaken. UNICEF, UNDP, UNAMID, the Peace Council and a range of INGOs and NGOs who were implementing peacebuilding projects were participants. Ideas, strategies and locations were mapped and shared with all participants.

*To what extent did project management effectively identify and manage context-specific risk?*

As noted earlier in this report (and in project documents), the project implemented in an extremely risky and challenging environment from its inception (revolution and declaration of State of Emergency) until its conclusion (COVID-19 pandemic and full-scale lockdown). In this context, the Evaluation Team is of the view that the project was strategic, adaptive, and resilient. Many of these challenges were simply constraints to be adjusted for. A few allowed opportunities for adaptive project management, for example the use of bulk procurements for some needed products and services, as discussed in the final report.

*How effective were the strategies and tools used in the implementation of the project?*

Overall, the evaluation team found that the strategies and tools were effective. See above for analysis of outcomes and outputs. See “Challenges” section below for detailed review of aspects that were less than completely effective.

*How appropriate and clear was the project's targeting strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?*

The evaluation team found that, thanks to its grounding in the context and conflict analyses, the Baseline Report, and the field-based engagement with communities and partners, the geographic and beneficiary targeting was appropriate and clear.

That said, two UNICEF and UNDP staff shared that strengthened targeting of IDP and refugee groups would be beneficial for future efforts, and others noted that targeting areas peripheral to the population centres in Golo (what one could term “the periphery

of the periphery") would be an important next step for peacebuilding programming in the region.

*To what extent did the project substantively mainstream gender and support gender-responsive project outcomes?*

The project design and implementation strove to substantively mainstream gender and support gender-responsive project outcomes. The final report affirms that "ensuring young women's meaningful representation and participation in basic services platforms has been a cornerstone of the project's approach."

Key examples of meaningful representation include:<sup>103</sup>

- 33 percent of CBRM members were women (out of 144);
- 38 percent of Youth Volunteers Promoting Peace in Darfur project were women (out of 80)
- 30 percent of youth trained for three months in vocational skills development courses at the Youth Vocational Centre established by the project were women (out of 63);
- 29 percent of youth trained in the use of eco-friendly and low-cost alternative construction materials were women (out of 45);
- 60 percent of farmers supported in farmer field schools and producer associations were women (out of 175); and
- 10 percent of people from the nomadic communities were trained and equipped as community animal heal workers were women (out of 26).

Baseline, monitoring, and perception data was disaggregated by sex, allowing the evaluation of levels of gender mainstreaming. In addition, project design took into account gender throughout, for example, adjusting meeting places to allow for men and women to speak about needs and experiences in both mixed and sex-segregated gatherings.

*To what extent has the project contributed to advancing gender equality?*

The project monitoring and final report documents illustrate how activities were implemented to pursue gender equality. The Farmers' FGD observed that:

*Women have benefited greatly from the interventions of the project, more specifically the TTPP interventions and they represented almost 80% of the beneficiaries from these interventions.*

The Police Volunteers and Paralegals FGD noted the number of women in the police volunteer project (four females, with three males). The JMRDP participant observed that, "some of the farms that are now irrigated by water from the dam, are also owned by women." Similarly, the TTPP representative said that "Farmer schools target both men and women. Women also stand to benefit more from the interventions that TTPP implemented because the orchards are 90% managed by women."

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<sup>103</sup> Final Project report, drawing on data from relevant implementing partner participation logs.

The Ministry of Education representative noted that “UNICEF and the Ministry specifically targeted women in the Golo project. Women received training on sewing and food production through the vocational center.” The Ministry of Youth representative concurred: “Women were targeted by the project and the Ministry ensured that at least 50 of the beneficiaries were women, especially in the vocation training intervention.”

In line with the above, some select examples of advancing gender equality include:<sup>104</sup>

- 60 percent of the farmers in the farmer producer groups and occupying leadership positions were women; and
- 55 percent of people involved in WASH committees were women.

*How effective has the intervention been in achieving different and targeted results for women, men, boys and girls?*

Based on a review of perception surveys<sup>105</sup> and the final report, it appears that the project was generally able to achieve equitable and balanced results for women, men, boys and girls.

However, in terms of challenges to effective interventions, the role of women in actively participating in delivery of CBRM and other conflict-related activities was seen as constrained. The CBRM FGD observed that:

*There is no women's participation in the locality level CBRM. Women only participate in the neighborhood level CBRMs, if at all. However, women's voices are heard, but they do not take part in the conflict resolution process.*

The Evaluation Team notes that it is not evident that the project ultimately was able to achieve “different and targeted” results for women, men, boys and girls. The perception surveys<sup>106</sup> do not offer specific data on this question, nor did participants in KIs and FGDs for this evaluation speak about this specific question.

Therefore, in future, the Evaluation Team recommends that design, as well as baseline, monitoring and evaluation data be carefully considered to pursue “different and targeted” results. In addition, it is important to note that at least one of the few output targets that was *not* achieved had an explicit gender component, namely increasing the percentage of female Police Officers trained in SGBV. The final report suggests that this may have been due to the need for more time to address deeply engrained and pervasive “cultural and religious norms”, and that the time and degree of interaction with stakeholders was restricted due to COVID-19.

This is a deficiency of the project that must be better understood. That said, a UNICEF project team member shared thoughtful reflections on how and why this output was not met, and how gender norms, political legacies, and weak vertical social cohesion contributed:

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<sup>104</sup> Final Project report, drawing on data from relevant implementing partner participation logs

<sup>105</sup> Perception report, November 2019 and October 2020, University of Zalengei

<sup>106</sup> 2019 and 2020, University of Zalengei

*“We tried to recruit women, to advocate for women as police, but we failed. It has traditional connotations: women in Golo were not so keen to join the police, because the police were polarized towards the government party. People didn’t really trust the current police structure.”*

Going forward, these issues should be tackled with a clear strategy to address the barriers faced.

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#### 5.4.4 SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP

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*To what extent did the project contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in locally owned strategic plans, legislative agendas and policies?*

As detailed earlier in this report, several evaluation participants and groups commented on the intersections between the project and broader or ongoing efforts. Participants in the Child Friendly Spaces and Police Volunteers and Paralegals FGDs commented positively on community ownership and collaboration. The JMRDP representative also discussed the interplay between JMRDP policies, plans, agendas and the Golo project:

*“The JMRDP was involved with UNDP in both assessing the needs of the farmer communities in Golo and the implementation of certain activities. In 2020 JMRDP together with UNDP undertook a survey in Golo to better understand their needs. Farmers expressed the need for technical training on farming and the construction of dams. This was developed into a proposal which would construct three dams in the area.<sup>107</sup> ...the agricultural groups that were formed have a good chance of sustainability as they were registered as community-based organizations (CBOs) with HAC.”*

The Ministry of Education representative noted that the project (in addition to broader changes across Sudan), has helped boost the presence of the state institutions in Golo:

*“The state/government in previous years had very little in terms of contribution to the education sector in Golo and was reliant totally on INGOs and UNICEF. More recently and with the changes that took place in the country, the Government has made actual contributions to the education sector budget.”*

The Ministry of Youth representative shared a similar view:

*“Although the Ministry has limited resources, the sustainability of the youth vocational center in Golo is made sustainable by the presence of the community-based committee that is running it.”*

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<sup>107</sup> The evaluation participant added: *“However, the funding that was received from UNDP allowed for only one dam to be constructed in the area of Mela.”*



The PSDC representative emphasized that the organization, *“continues the work that was initiated through the UNDP/PBF project and has maintained a close relationship with the main CBRM in Golo town.”*

The TTPP representative emphasized how the project and partnership with UNDP was mutually beneficial:

*“The interventions were extremely relevant to the goals and plans of the TTPP, [which] was seeking to expand coverage in the state. In 2019, the UNDP project contracted them to deliver some of their services in Golo, and this acted as an incentive for them to establish a sub-station for themselves in Golo.”*

The WES representative appreciated how the coordination elements of the project had lasting value to key actors in the region:

*“The project also had a coordination forum that brought together other actors (not just WASH), which met in Zalingei every month. It had the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health/Nutrition, WASH, UNICEF, etc. The coordination forum was instrumental in identifying sites for the water interventions and identifying needs.”*

*Did the intervention design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting local ownership) to support positive changes in rule of law, service provision and peacebuilding after the end of the project? How potentially effective are the project's sustainability and exit strategies?*

The project design was grounded in an extensive needs assessment and verification mission that involved the Ministry of International Cooperation, and that consulted with a range of key government agencies, NGOs, the Nomads Commissioner and communities, villagers, farmers, ministries in the region, and others. This consultation shaped the design and focus of the project, with the goal (per the PBF project documents) of *“incrementally increasing and empowering service delivery capacity rooted in local governments.”*

The design emphasized building on existing structures in State and Locality Governments (and civil society partners), versus creating new structures or institutions. This emphasis on strengthening versus building from scratch can be seen in the augmentation of existing CBRM, paralegal, farming, and other efforts, and the renovation of existing (but unused or unusable) physical sites. Finally, all assets were handed over to partners for future use once the project concluded.

In addition to the above successes, there were some challenges in ensuring sustainability, which are detailed in the later section of this report focused on challenges.

*How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially women's participation in peacebuilding, consultation and decision-making processes, supported under the project?*

Several government partners spoke about ongoing commitments to sustaining the efforts initiated in the context of the project. For example, the Child Friendly Spaces FGD noted that the the Ministry of Education has provided one teacher who takes care of children in the Dar Esalam center/space.

The HAC representative detailed the government's ongoing and active engagement with specific project activities and outputs:

*“Since taking office, the Commissioner has been closely monitoring the project, and the Governor of Central Darfur has shown interest in the project interventions, namely the cold storage facility and the Dam establishment in Merla. The Commissioner has also been on visits to these two facilities in Golo together with the Governor.”*

Likewise, the Ministry of Education representative discussed ongoing partnerships in service of project-related goals:

*“The Ministry of Education also provided its training centre in Golo to War Child Canada to rehabilitate it and have it serve as a vocational training center. The centre was transferred and handed over to the youth in Golo and who are now responsible for running it.*

The WES representative emphasized that:

*“WES will continue to work and support the peacebuilding objectives of the project. This will be pursued through the peacebuilding coordination forum that was set up because of the project. And although the coordination forum has not been as active since the project ended nonetheless the forum members/representatives continue to meet and engage with each other unofficially.”*

The representative also noted the organization's plans to sustain the project-related facilities:

*“WES also continues to provide its upkeep and maintenance services for the water facilities if required to do so. WES has its own budget for that – especially during the initial period.”*

*How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of local capacity in order to ensure suitability of efforts and benefits?*

The main capacity building elements of the project were training (paralegals, police volunteers, farmers, beekeepers, animal health care workers, CBRM members), access to material and equipment (seeds and equipment for farmers, gear and hive boxes for beekeepers), site renovation and building (cold storage, child safe spaces, peace council, CBRM) and water-related activities (the dam project, water points and water troughs).

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#### 5.4.5 COHERENCE

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*To what extent did the project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors and UNAMID?*

As noted earlier, a key strength of the project was its multi-sectoral, interagency, and inter-disciplinary partnerships. The project facilitated interactions between civil society, INGOs, Ministries, and various UN partners.

A UNICEF evaluation participant reflected that the design itself nurtured the interactions for enhanced value overall:

*"The project had a multi-sectoral approach, so for, example child protection cuts across all the sectors, construction, schooling etc. Water facilities are designed not just to provide water but to also serve schools."*

*To what extent did the project's design facilitate coherence between activities focused on service provision and other activities? Did coherence and coordination result in improved effectiveness, efficiency and likelihood of sustainability?*

While not a prominent goal or feature of this project, several aspects of the project did facilitate synergy, cooperation or coherence between activities and actors. For example, the HAC representative reflected that:

*"The UNDP team in Zalingei is in constant communication with HAC regarding the project in Golo, and the UNDP focal point always informs HAC of any new issues or developments with regard to the project. More recently HAC is facilitating a visit of UNDP donors to the project location in Golo."*

The TTPP representative spoke about the follow-on synergy between various key partners, related to the project:

*"By rehabilitating the offices of the Jebel Marra Rural Development Project in Golo the project did contribute to the state's efforts to provide services in Golo. As a result, the Agriculture department now has an employee providing agriculture extension services to the community there."*

The WES representative underscored the coherence and synergies of one of the water-focused project activities:

*"The project has also involved youth who were part of the water user and tariff community and received training along with the other committee members. In Karoun the water yard was also within close proximity to the health/nutrition center. So the selection of locations for the water facilities always took other things into consideration, and not just the presence of underground water."*

*Did the integrated approach to implementation adopted by this project result in enhanced peacebuilding outcomes?*

The evaluation team found that the integrated approach was fundamental to the project's various successes related to peacebuilding outcomes. Peacebuilding is by definition multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary, and multi-"track". Therefore, integrated approaches stand a much greater chance of succeeding, by taking advantage of the diverse strengths of project partners.

A UNICEF participant noted the value of the integrated and coordinated project approach:

*"Coordination between different actors, including UNDP, also greatly improved efficiency. UNDP and UNICEF were in constant communication with each other, and the Peacebuilding Working Group played an important part in contributing to efficiency."*

The same participant spoke about how integration enhanced the outcomes related to protection:

*"The project contributed to UNICEFs work on SGBV (which was another, separate project) through the Child Protection Committees, which were established by the project. These child protection committees now have the role of also reporting on SGBV in the communities."*

*What were the strengths and challenges of joint implementation between UNDP and UNICEF?*

In a region defined by lack of access and mistrust of institutions, UNDP and UNICEF combined have a wide range of powerful entry points for innovative peacebuilding interventions. The combination of entry points related to children, youth and caregivers from the UNICEF side, and social, political and economic development from the UNDP side, created a rich map of potential peace capacities and entry points for the project to work with. In addition, both have a robust and complimentary commitment to and methodology for conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, and peacebuilding programming, through their unique lenses. See sub-section on coordination, in "Efficiency" section of this report for details on coordination between UNDP and UNICEF.

While not evident in the evaluation team's findings, one challenge could be getting two large and highly structured UN agencies to work well alongside one another to design and implement a joint project.

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#### 5.4.6 CATALYTIC

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*Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?*

The project leveraged \$2.7 million in support from UNAMID/SLF (State Liaison Functions), and \$250,000 in support from CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund), as non-PBF funding.

The SLF funding focused on 1) multisectoral support to traditional mechanisms for resolving communal conflicts and addressing root causes of conflicts, 2) protecting “return areas” and supporting community-level conflict resolution and prevention platforms, 3) setting up and operationalizing land management mechanism 4) supporting the re-establishment of criminal justice institutions, by building the capacity of these institutions 5) strengthening the capacity of the police and rural courts to address land disputes and other inter-communal conflict drivers.

The CERF funding focused on 1) setting up land conflict management systems to accommodate further influx of returnees or displaced people, 2) helping IDPs restore their lifestyle, and 3) supporting local communities to welcome new or returning members of the community.

*Has PBF funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding?*

An important legacy of the project is the peacebuilding coordination forum, which functioned throughout the project, and that can and should serve future peacebuilding programming in the region.

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#### 5.4.7 TIME-SENSITIVITY

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*Was the project well-timed to address a conflict factor or capitalize on a specific window of opportunity? Was PBF funding used to leverage political windows of opportunity for engagement?*

While the project was delayed in implementation because of the national revolution and declaration of state of emergency at the outset, and then by additional challenges throughout the project lifecycle, the evaluation team found that the project was well-timed and indeed timely.

For example, the WES evaluation participant noted the window of opportunity opened by the national political changes:

*“The changes that took place in the country are considered an opportunity for peace and [for] the project. There is greater accessibility and, even in areas deemed conflict areas, people are more accepting of the project interventions and welcoming.”*

A UN evaluation participant reflected:

*“The government wanted to portray an image of peace in Jebel Mara. Golo was found to be ideal because the conflict between the government and the armed movement had subsided. The government felt it was a good place to showcase peacebuilding initiatives.”*

Another UN evaluation participant elaborated on how the project capitalized on

windows of opportunity as well as existing (but defunct) structures:

*“The project made use of the changes that happened in the country to reestablish PTAs in a way that was fair and inclusive. All community members had the chance to participate in the PTAs. There are also new community structures that appeared which contributed to the success of the project such as the revolutionary committees who were keen on participating in the project. They were absorbed in the Golo Peacebuilding Working Group which met every month to deliberate on different aspects of the project and its implementation.”*

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#### 5.4.8 RISK-TOLERANCE

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*If the project was characterized as “high risk”, were risks adequately monitored and mitigated?*

The project documents listed eight identified risks. The highest probable risk (pegged at 3 on the probability scale, with an impact of 3) was identified as “high price increase (inflation) and unpredictable market dynamics as multiple risks for primary producers”. The mitigation measures were noted as “timely procurement planning” early in the project.

This risk certainly came to strongly impact the project's implementation. The project implementors and partners essentially had to adjust and do more with less, but also adopted some innovative approaches, including trying to achieve economies of scale with providers across some activities.

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#### 5.4.9 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

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##### **Human rights**

*To what extent did the project, through its equity lenses, enhance a sense of safety and stability and protection and promotion of human rights?*

Protection and promotion of human rights was key to several project outputs and outcomes. The output of enhancing legal empowerment of local communities, including women and girls, through awareness raising, strove to increase the number of human rights issues that are identified and addressed. The baseline for this output was zero, with a target of 2. The final indicator in the project was 5. These five cases were all protection (rape) that were reported and handled by paralegals and community policing volunteers, before being referred to the Sudanese Police Force.<sup>108</sup> The paralegal and police volunteer FGD participants commented that the purpose of their work was:

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<sup>108</sup> Final project report, referencing implementor logs and reports.

*...to create awareness about how to access justice and human rights, the relationship between the citizen and the police and also to spread awareness to the community about their rights.*

A second output indicator tracked the number of community members attending awareness campaigns on human rights, access to justice and legal aid. The baseline was 0, with a target of 200. The final indicator milestone was 300 (attending a total of 12 intensive awareness campaigns held by UNDP/UNAMID with support from the Bar Association). Sixty percent of participants were female participants.<sup>109</sup>

The Family and Child Protection Unit and Community-based Protection Networks projects also served to enhance a sense of safety and security, and protection of human rights. Those activities also met or exceeded targets.

*To what extent have poor, indigenous, physically challenged, and/or other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project?*

The three main marginalized groups to benefit from the project were women (explored in detail in the gender equality section below), youth (engaged through many activities, including VSD, CBRM and others), and IDPs (engaged through several activities).

### **Youth Inclusion**

The project trained more than 100 youth and adolescents in community peacebuilding, respecting diversity and peaceful communication. A youth centre built through the project in Golo Town has provided a base for youth to meet, discuss, and initiate youth-centered activities. The project supported youth to integrate peacebuilding approaches in their activities.

Youth-led peacebuilding efforts in Golo encouraged youth to serve as Peace Ambassadors and coordinate peacebuilding events bringing together different tribes and communities to form mixed teams and perform in music, dance, and sports. These events helped to inculcate a sense of togetherness and promote social cohesion. Youth also conducted 12 intensive awareness campaigns in Taringa, Killing, Darelsalam, Koron, Durgo, and Dabanira villages, focusing on human rights, access to justice, and legal aid.

Youth involved in the youth centre project approached local authorities to convene a meeting at the youth centre to discuss what role they could play in supporting their locality during the COVID-19 crisis. The youth who led this initiative were members of the Masalit, Fur, Zakawa, and Arab Nawaiba tribes, and included young nurses and medical assistants. In total, five meetings took place at the youth centre and resulted in local COVID-19 awareness campaigns with peace messages being developed. Youth were present during market days to provide information to community members. The youth involved in initiating the COVID-19 coordination activities included 40 percent women. This was not a formal project activity but it provides an example of the catalytic and adaptive impact of the project to address emerging issues in Golo.

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<sup>109</sup> Final project report, referencing implementor logs and reports.

In addition, during the design phase of the project, UNDP and UNICEF secured support from complimentary donors in the same targeted geographical areas. For example, South Korea funded the “*Youth Volunteers supporting Peace in Darfur*” project with UNDP and created the Youth Volunteer system. The PBF-funded Golo project built on the foundations of the South Korean-funded project, by working with the Youth Volunteers in disseminating peace messages, encouraging youth participation in CBRMs and vocational skills development to help reduce youth participation in the armed conflict etc. The *Youth Volunteers Promoting Peace in Darfur* project supported 80 youths (38 percent women) to promote peacebuilding messages and activities<sup>110</sup>. Given the collaboration with and resources from the South Korea-funded project, this activity was completed with zero cost impact on the project budget.

### **Gender equality**

*To what extent were gender equality and the empowerment of women addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project?*

As noted earlier, the final report affirms that women were “at the center of this project”. For example, women made up 60% of the farmers in the farmer production group. Gender inclusiveness in WASH committees was at least 55%.<sup>111</sup> Women were involved in training in both technical and facilitation skills, and were engaged in monitoring visits, to ensure women's inputs into ongoing adaptation of approaches.

*How well did indicators and the monitoring framework capture the unique experiences of women, men, girls and boys? Is the gender marker data assigned to this project representative of reality?*

Most relevant indicators in the project design, monitoring documents, perception survey, and final reports appear to have been disaggregated to track women's participation and differentiate women's experiences and perceptions of impact. The perception surveys and final report disaggregate project participants (and survey participants) by gender and include indicators related to gender-specific activities.

However, the Evaluation Team notes two issues in this regard. First, it is not clear in the two perception reports that data related to perceptions / outcomes were disaggregated (the reports refer to “communities”). Second, while the project appears to have been gender-sensitive, and empowerment and equity focused (see below), it is not clear how project pathways, activities and intended outputs and outcomes were designed to specifically address unique experiences of women and men, girls and boys. This suggests a project weakness, that should be addressed in future efforts.

*To what extent has the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women? Were there any unintended effects?*

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<sup>110</sup> Final project report, based on activity logs.

<sup>111</sup> Data per WASH committee rosters, accessed by Project Team.



The project promoted a range of positive changes related to gender equality and empowerment of women. One example came from the police volunteers and paralegals activities, with their emphasis on rule of law and access to justice for all. The FGD related to those activities reported:

*Women's participation in both groups has been very beneficial, because women are almost always reluctant to access justice or pursue their rights. To a lot of women, the idea of going to a police station is extremely intimidating or scary, and having women police volunteers has encouraged women to come forward and pursue their rights. Women community police volunteers are also better positioned and able to facilitate and translate women's issues to the police.*

The WES representative commented on how the design and implementation of water-related activities emphasized gender equality and empowerment:

*"The water user committees made sure that 80% of the committee members were women. The remaining 20% were other community members (youth). This is especially pertinent since women are the primary community group involved in anything to do with fetching water."*

*To what extent did actual expenditures on Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE) match the budgeted expenditures related to GEWE?*

Budgeted / allocated funds focused on GEWE was \$1,050,000, and expended funds allocated for GEWE was \$1050,000, per the project final report.

### **Conflict Sensitivity**

*Did the project have an explicit conflict-sensitivity strategy? Were internal capacities of both UNDP and UNICEF adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach?*

The project was well-grounded in a robust conflict analysis<sup>112</sup>. The conflict sensitivity strategies utilized by the project throughout implementation included:

1. Convening and addressing concerns and views from the "Peacebuilding Working Group", a cohort of key stakeholders created by UNICEF and UNDP specifically for conflict sensitivity monitoring and information sharing;
2. Regular meetings with partners and UNAMID to share conflict sensitivity-related data and consider any needed shifts in implementation strategy;
3. Considering and addressing findings in semi-annual reports; and
4. Considering and addressing findings in the 2019 perception survey

*Was the project responsible for any unintended negative impacts?*

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<sup>112</sup> Context Analysis, July 2019 and Conflict Analysis, November 2019

Some evaluation participants noted a few unintended negative impacts. These are important to keep in mind for future efforts, as many relate to systemic or structural issues that remain relevant in Golo and the region.

Economic deterioration, insecurity, a very lean budget that could simply not cover all project-related needs, and even harsh seasonal weather, contributed to some of the challenges. For example, the Child Friendly Spaces FGD reported:

*The center was provided with a water storage tank, but because the space doesn't have a guard, the community hasn't installed the water tank because it might be stolen. The fencing for the safe spaces was built, but after one rainy season it collapsed, and the community is now struggling to have it repaired and rebuilt.*

The Mela Dam FGD participants emphasized serious problems of quality control, fraught communications with contractors, and lack of follow up, which contributed to suboptimal results, and reduced value from a major project activity:

*The dam was already there before the project but because it had accumulated silt and was no longer holding water it was opened up a few years ago. UNDP and JMRDP rebuilt the dam and made a small opening at the bottom to allow water to run out when needed. However, the contractor did a shoddy job and the opening/door on the dam does not fully close, and the water is constantly flowing out. Moreover, the opening/door is too small and with time it will be blocked with silt. The farmers estimate that by next rain season the dam will have been fully silted and will likely collapse given the pressure from the water and the silt combined.*

In addition, FGD participants raised safety concerns:

*The dam needs to have a railing installed for people crossing on top of it. At present it is open and dangerous, especially for children making the crossing to go to school on the other side.*

It is important to note that the dam project itself was a request from the community, which points to the importance of communities being involved both in identifying needs, creating strategies for implementation, and addressing problems in implementation, when possible.<sup>113</sup>

Finally, there may have been some unintended negative impacts related to inter-generational tensions. The police volunteers and paralegal FGD explained that:

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<sup>113</sup> The UNDP Project Team reports that the community raised the issue of leaking gates at the dam with UNDP. The Project Team reports that UNDP immediately engaged the contractor through a government partner, and the contractor fixed the issue related to gates and the dam collected water and spilled over last year.

*There is more recognition on the part of the community of youth volunteers playing a role in resolving disputes, however, there are tensions with the elders and the traditional CBRMs.*

*Was an ongoing process of context monitoring and a monitoring system that allows for monitoring of unintended impacts established?*

UN project staff made regular field visits to observe, gather data, and consider adaptations. In addition, semi-annual and annual reports made up the formal monitoring system.

## 6.0 CHALLENGES & KEY RECOMENDATIONS

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As in all ambitious, multi-year, multi-sectoral projects operating in difficult contexts, the Golo project faced some challenges in different aspects of implementation, including unmet targets. As detailed in the final report, unmet output indicators were:

1. Perception of increase in access to Peace and Justice Centres fell 10% short of target. The project documents suggest this was related to government-imposed COVID restrictions.
2. School-teachers and staff trained in violence prevention was short by 23 people. This was due to government COVID-19 restrictions on convening.
3. Child clubs output was zero (vs the target of 15), as “schools were closed in December 2019 and did not open until the end of project 2020.” It is important to note that the project adapted, and funds allocated for this activity were used to cover escalating costs on other activities.
4. Parent Teacher Association members trained was short by 20 PTA members, given COVID-19 travel and convening restrictions.
5. Value-chain related Producer Groups was short by one.
6. Producer Associations was short by one.
7. Water harvesting facilities was short by 18, as “geophysical surveys determined that some selected areas had no ground water to utilize”.
8. Storage facilities with cooling systems was short by 1, as “armed clashes hindered the construction of the second facility”.
9. Water resources rehabilitated along migratory route was short by one, as “the second site could not be established due to escalating costs”.
10. Paralegals trained was short by 18 people. Project documents note this may be related to skepticism in government participation.
11. Percentage of school-aged boys and girls accessing quality and appropriate sanitation facilities was short by 50%, as the number of latrines was reduced given the dramatic increase in cost of construction and materials and high labor costs during project implementation.
12. People having access to safe drinking water was short by 2500 (out of 10,000 target), because access to villages during rainy season was restricted and activity was delayed.
13. Schools provided with WASH services was sort by 2 (out of 4), due to extremely high inflation and high construction costs.
14. Number of animals treated and vaccinated was short by 5,000 (out of 20,000), as “some of the nomad’s livestock was not available during the exercise”.
15. Training modules on conflict sensitivity were not created, as existing modules were utilized.

One unmet output indicator that bears particular scrutiny was focused on increasing the percentage of female police officers trained in SGBV. This output was not achieved. The project monitoring documents suggest that the failure to achieve the target was at least partly due to the time and intensive engagement needed to address cultural and

religious norms related to these issues. Because of COVID-19 restrictions on movement, time and opportunities for longer-term engagement were severely limited.

The Evaluation Team views this as a critical lesson learned for this project and future peacebuilding projects: **allow for maximal time and space to address outcomes that require significant changes in and community acceptance of norms and worldviews** (beyond practices and actions). This kind of outcome simply cannot be “rushed”, and the project showed and accepted that.

Beyond the above unmet outputs, the Evaluation Team derived the following challenges and associated key recommendations from the data:

CHALLENGES	KEY RECCOMENDATIONS <sup>114</sup>
Lack of “The Big Picture” for partners	<b>nurture a project-wide “cohort” for all partners</b>
Weak shared “peacebuilding identity” for partners	<b>emphasize the peacebuilding aspects of all activities</b>
Financial, budgetary and quality control issues	<b>create business plans for quality and value</b>
Intergenerational and gender-related tensions	<b>support community-based dialogues</b>

In the below section, the challenges are detailed, and the evaluation team offers recommendations for each, to be considered for future projects.

## 6.1 CHALLENGE: LACK OF “THE BIG PICTURE” FOR PARTNERS

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The Evaluation Team found that UNICEF, UNDP, and to a great degree GoS partners, well understood and engaged in “the big picture” for this project. Evaluation participants from these institutions spoke with clarity about how each element and activity interacted with the others, how the project’s partners created synergy, and how the project overall was intended to implement over time.

However, the Evaluation Team found that many other partners did *not* have a sense of “the big picture”, nor where they fit into it. The partners did not appear to have a clear sense of how the different pieces of the broader project worked together for synergy and overall value.

In fact, during data gathering, the Evaluation Team found that almost no partners (beyond UN and GoS) could speak from the perspective of “the project”. They instead focused their remarks on their own *discreet and isolated activities or contributions*. Partners therefore viewed themselves and operated more like providers or vendors, and the relationship, which ideally would be experienced as a dialogue and collaboration,

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<sup>114</sup> See narrative section below for recommendations to various stakeholders.

was more akin to a procurement transaction. This has a siloing effect, reducing value, limiting economies of scale, and the likelihood of catalysing “networks of effective action”, which have been shown to be critical for the emergence of local-led peacebuilding and shifts towards cultures of peace.<sup>115</sup>

### 6.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS: NURTURE A PROJECT-WIDE “COHORT” FOR ALL PARTNERS

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*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNICEF and UNDP:* There are several approaches that UNDP and UNICEF can adopt to nurture a project-wide cohort for partners. First, UNDP and UNICEF can *convene partners as a cohort* during design and implementation to explicitly develop and nurture a shared view of the project “forest” (versus “trees”) level view. The goal for this approach is to frequently and consistently reinforce the cohort / team / shared approach.<sup>116</sup> Second, the UN team can reinforce the broader project during field visits for monitoring, and in any and all relevant communications with IPs. Updates about other partners and project efforts shared with all partners can further reinforce a sense of a project-wide cohort on a shared journey.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GoS:* Ministries and other governmental partners can socialize and publicize messages related to the broader project, for example referring to the project as a whole, versus the sectoral element relevant to a given ministry. Government partners can share information and updates with other ministries under the umbrella of the project, and can look for opportunities to collaborate and share resources across the project.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERS:* Community partners, NGOs and INGOs can educate staff and community members about the project as a whole, versus the discrete activities. Logos and materials can reference the overarching project, and interactions with community stakeholders should emphasize how a given activity fits into the bigger picture.

### 6.2 CHALLENGE: WEAK “PEACEBUILDING IDENTITY” FOR PARTNERS

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The evaluation team found that partners involved in the CBRM, paralegal, and child-safe spaces activities were to some degree aware of how their work was a part of a broader peacebuilding effort.

However, while the project design, theory of change, and activities were well aligned to peacebuilding outcomes, many partners in other activities not obviously connected to conflict did *not* perceive the links between their efforts and peacebuilding writ large. For

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<sup>115</sup>Ricigliano R., “Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding”, *Security Dialogue*. 2003;34(4):445-462

<sup>116</sup> This may be challenging given lack of cellular coverage and difficult travel conditions in Golo and elsewhere. Future efforts will need to be creative about how to accomplish this goal.

example, farmer-focused activities, beekeeping activities, water-related, and dam projects were largely seen by partners and participants as being beneficial only in terms of their specific service or sector (agriculture, WASH, livelihoods, etc). The peacebuilding value of these activities was clear to UN actors, but not to most partners.

The lack of clarity and awareness for these partners may have reduced their buy-in to the peacebuilding aspects of the project, may have led to missed opportunities, and may have reduced the contributions from the project to a Golo-wide culture of peace.

### 6.2.1 RECOMMENDATION: EMPHASIZE THE PEACEBUILDING ASPECTS OF ALL ACTIVITIES

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*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNICEF and UNDP:* To generate maximum value from the nexus of humanitarian, developmental and peacebuilding projects, UNDP and UNICEF should encourage partners to develop a keen sense of how their work contributes to peace. To develop broader, scaled-up and systemic change, all partners should have a clear sense of their peacebuilding roles and contributions at the micro, meso and macro systems levels.<sup>117</sup>

Data from community dialogues could also be gathered to test and validate the project's theory of change, by having dialogue participants discuss whether the approaches are causally linked to the peacebuilding outcomes being pursued.

This is not an easy task. Understanding and emphasizing how a traditional bore hole project (for example) can also be a peacebuilding project is a challenge<sup>118</sup>. Therefore, UNICEF and UNDP should welcome partners early and often into dialogue on themes of conflict and peace. UNICEF and UNDP should give partners a role in shaping how the peacebuilding outputs and outcomes of their activities can be defined, understood, monitored, and enhanced, while they also focus on delivering their development or humanitarian work. UNICEF and UNDP can convene gatherings (virtual or in person, as restrictions allow) that allow for dialogue, storytelling and case-sharing about conflict and peace, and brainstorming about how these interventions can and do provide critical peacebuilding opportunities, can be a part of engaging partners in this critical aspect of the project.<sup>119</sup>

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GoS:* Government partners can explicitly frame the project in terms of both peacebuilding and development or humanitarian activity, in materials,

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<sup>117</sup> See for example: <https://www.conducivespace.org/a-global-system-in-flux-pursuing-systems-change-for-locally-led-peacebuilding/>

<sup>118</sup> Referred to by UNICEF and others as “secondary peacebuilding outcomes”. See: <https://www.unicef.org/media/96576/file/Programming-Guide-Conflict-Sensitivity-and-Peacebuilding.pdf>

<sup>119</sup> An important caveat is that “peace” itself carries negative connotations in many settings, in which “peace” has come to mean reinforcing the status quo, which is often oppressive to certain groups. Therefore, partners may also help inform how peace is defined and described, to allow for more locally-led discourses and approaches. See for example: <https://www.peacedirect.org/us/publications/towards-locally-led-peacebuilding-defining-local/>

meetings, communications, etc. Government partners should emphasize how a given activity is fundamental to the government's commitment to peace. Ministries should note how each activity is intended to also address root causes of conflict, and to build peace.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERS:* Community partners, INGOs and NGOs should fully engage with UNDP and UNICEF to shape how peace is defined and pursued. Community partners should emphasize the peacebuilding aspects of each activity they are involved in, in addition to the development or humanitarian aspects, in communications, information sharing, storytelling, etc. Participating in (or convening) local-level dialogues focused on nurturing peace capacities can also be beneficial in reinforcing the links between peacebuilding and a given project.

### 6.3. CHALLENGE: FINANCIAL AND BUDGETARY ISSUES

The evaluation team notes that, while the project was efficient and adaptive to the staggering economic deterioration that swamped the country, aspects of implementation suffered from finance-related problems. It is important to note that the Evaluation Team does not believe the below problems were due to project or UN staff failures, but rather to the broader economic situation that triggered a range of issues. That said, the lessons learned are important to consider going forward.

Poor quality control, lack of materials, and lack of good follow-up from contractors and providers were amongst some of the issues that evaluation participants discussed.

For example, the Peace and Reconciliation Centre was completed, but, as of March 2021, it was not operational, because it had not been furnished. Therefore, the space was not being used, leading to a significant loss of value from the project.<sup>120</sup>

In another case, the child safe spaces or centres were built and staffed, but child safety committee members appear to not have received training. Promised toys to supply the space were not provided, and another project site was being using it as a kindergarten run by a local teacher (also without toys or furnishings). The implementing partner explained that funds had been exhausted, due to very high inflation of prices for materials needed.

In another instance, the youth centre completed one round of successful vocational training for youth, but reported that they could not sustain further programming, due to lack of funds. The partner noted that funds would be needed to pay and host vocational teachers. The training centre also suffered theft of solar panels and a power generator, leaving the centre without power. There are no funds for security.

Other similar challenges include the partially finished rural court building, and a nursery that has faced a water problem and missing fencing. As discussed in earlier sections, the

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<sup>120</sup> The evaluation team witnessed the hasty cleaning and furnishing of the centre for the arrival of international donors. It is possible that the centre is currently up and running.



dam project faced a range of problems that the community attributed to lack of funds and a contractor that was unable or unwilling to provide a quality project.<sup>121</sup>

Currency exchange rates also impacted some activities. For example, throughout the project, the dollar had two rates: the official banking rate and the black-market rate, which in turn impacted the costs of goods and services. Because providers are contracted using the official banking rate but must procure their needed materials from vendors that are much more likely to use black-market rates, procurement becomes extremely challenging.

In addition, as rates change rapidly (even daily), rates that were in place when partners and contractors sign on to projects are likely completely irrelevant once contracts are signed and funds are dispersed, again leaving a gap for the partner to address (both because of the fluctuating exchange rates, inflated costs, and the lack of complete payment to contracted partners). The contractor may be forced to stop short of full or quality implementation, given the financial constraints. This impacts the utility of the activities for communities (and may undermine community confidence in future projects).

The Evaluation Team appreciates the daunting challenges laid out above, while encouraging the project team to consider how a more assertive and proactive approach may have mediated the impacts on the various activities.

### 6.3.1 RECOMMENDATION: CREATE BUSINESS PLANS FOR QUALITY AND VALUE

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*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNICEF and UNDP:* UNDP and UNICEF can develop and use simple, relevant business plans for each project element. While aware that this may place an undue burden on the UN side of projects to develop and monitor business plans, the Evaluation Team is of the view that this should be seriously considered to both ensure quality control and sustainability, and to provide further capacity building for implementing partners (including in the private sector).

Each business plan can be customized to the specific activity it relates to. For example, a plan could commit employed alumni of the VCD training projects to contribute funds, equipment, and expertise back into the VCD project, after graduation. The same approach could be used for beekeeping and farming training alums.

The Evaluation Team also noted examples of potential project budget adjustments that could lead to more value. For example, some traditional leaders and CBRM participants called for an investment in donkeys to use to access remote communities to provide conflict resolution interventions, versus exclusively relying on the ability of disputants to

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<sup>121</sup> In earlier consultations with communities, three dams were planned for, but funds only allowed the rehabilitation of one existing dam.

travel to the newly built site. This was echoed in the May 2021 evaluation validation workshop, in which some stakeholders expressed the view that traditional authorities need support to implement their conflict resolution and peacebuilding role in Golo beyond the physical building that was erected for them. The view was shared that the traditional authorities need donkeys/mules to be able to reach communities in distant locations versus travelling on foot.

Mechanisms should be put in place to both support contractors and partners, and to hold them accountable to complete projects, guarantee quality delivery, and provide effective follow-up. This view was echoed in the evaluation validation workshop, held in May 2021, in which stakeholders expressed the view that UNDP/UNICEF should design projects that have more accountability and transparency mechanisms built into them from the onset. Some felt that communities and beneficiaries should be able to know how much money was spent and on what.

When possible, project budgets should allow for or create cost-sharing schemes for operating costs (fuel, security, maintenance, furniture, cleaning, etc.). If costs are over-budget, project staff should consider reducing the scale and number of activities, working to “under promise and overdeliver” on activities. In fact, per the Project team, UNDP retains 5% of the contract value for each contractor for a year to cover any quality shortfalls that arise during the year after completion. The Evaluation Team supports this approach, and suggests further engagement with contractors could be of use to ensure follow-through and quality control.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GoS:* Government partners can develop and help coordinate cost-sharing business plans and approaches. For example, a business plan could be developed for the produce cold storage project, to collaboratively address the costs for fuel for generators that power the cooling equipment. Ministries, INGOs, UN, private sector and farmers could all cost-share for fuel, maintenance, and security. The enhanced seed project could also benefit from a business model that considers sustainability, for example making enhanced seeds available to farmers beyond the pilot activity phase, so they can continue to enjoy higher yields.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERS:* Community partners can develop project approaches to leverage local and community-based supply chains, for example between the vocational training and the beekeeping activities. In this example, vocational trainees could be trained in carpentry to build inexpensive beehive boxes, while other trainees could be trained to sew beekeeping protective clothing, which would both develop marketable vocational skills while reducing costs for the local beekeeping project. Community partners can partner with UNDP and UNICEF to monitor quality and project completion, and alert project staff when and if there are problems.

While by no means simple changes to implement, these approaches may help ensure that concluded projects are viewed favourably by communities, that buy-in to future efforts is increased, and that UN efforts are efficient and sustainable.

## 6.4 CHALLENGE: INTERGENERATIONAL AND GENDER-NORMS-RELATED TENSIONS

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The Evaluation Team noted a few instances of project activities encountering politicized intergenerational tensions and conflicts. Traditional leaders may currently be viewed by some stakeholders as part of the former regime. Because of this, when traditional leaders assert their role in addressing disputes, some youth and some communities refuse to work with them.

As young people may be viewed as both unaligned to the previous regime and as having fewer “agendas” (personal, economic, familial) than older traditional leaders, some stakeholders prefer to work with youth to address conflicts.

This could potentially create or exacerbate further tensions, both between traditional and young leaders, and between groups that “follow” them. Certain project activities may need to consider how to address these tensions (the CBRMs, for example, may occasionally trigger these dynamics).

In addition, as noted in earlier sections of this report, activities specifically related to gender roles and norms, particularly the training of police officers in SGBV, faced difficulties potentially rooted in cultural and religious norms. Gender norms may also have impacted other activities.

### 6.4.1 RECOMMENDATION: SUPPORT COMMUNITY-BASED DIALOGUES

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*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNICEF and UNDP:* For future projects, UNDP and UNICEF should consider convening community-level dialogues on norms and values, to open constructive conversations within stakeholder communities regarding intergenerational tensions and gender norms.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GoS:* Government partners can socialize and broadcast messages and concrete action related to shifting norms related intergenerational tensions and gender. Ministries can proactively engage communities and stakeholders in conversations to make these issues more open to dialogue, and to reduce taboos around discussing these deeper social dynamic.

*RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMMUNITY PARTNERS:* INGOs, NGOs and community partners should participate in convening community-level dialogues, strongly informed by local culture and practice. These partners may be sources for skilled, locally-led, culturally aware and conflict sensitive facilitation. Such dialogues can help support project activities by creating more openness and awareness about these issues over

time. Ultimately norms, practices and structures must be well-grounded in local discourses, and various forms of community-based dialogue could foster this.

## 7.0 CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS LEARNED

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The Evaluation Team found that this project proved that a multi-year, integrated project that works at the nexus between humanitarian, developmental, and peacebuilding activities can have significant outcome-level successes, even in a very challenging environment.

The hallmarks of this project that led to success included:

- Innovative uses of development and humanitarian interventions to *also* achieve peacebuilding outcomes;
- Effective collaboration between UNDP and UNICEF (with UNAMID, INGOs, NGOs, private sector, GoS, Ministries, Localities, traditional leaders and community leaders);
- Authentically locally-focused needs assessment and implementation; and
- Resilience to multiple, radical challenges in the context from start to finish.

All of these hallmarks point the way towards best practices for future peacebuilding projects in Golo, Sudan and beyond.

### 7.1 LESSONS LEARNED

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In addition to the above recommendations, the Evaluation Team offers two final lessons learned, based on the evaluation process and findings.

First, future projects should carefully consider how best to shape midline and endline efforts gather deeper data on peacebuilding outcomes and causality. While the endline data (perception surveys) did a strong job of capturing activity and output-level findings, some of the outcome-level findings were difficult to glean. This is by no means unique to this project, and indeed is a challenge to all peacebuilding efforts (i.e. how to best measure causal links between a given activity and a shift in social cohesion, trust, etc.).

Therefore, the Evaluation Team suggests future projects look to innovative evaluation approaches, for example adapting a version of the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) methodology.<sup>122</sup> It is important to note that such approaches take two things that are often lacking in evaluation efforts (and indeed were constrained in this effort): time and resources – more time and larger teams are critical to success.

Regarding the second lesson learned (or reinforced), the Evaluation Team notes that peacebuilding is a very long process<sup>123</sup>. Two years may be viewed as a “long” project lifecycle in UN programming. It is also understood that some PBF funding is intended for shorter term development and testing for new approaches, catalysing further support from new donors, and engaging in new ways and new regions. The task of deriving and

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<sup>122</sup> <https://www.everydaypeaceindicators.org/>

<sup>123</sup> See for example: Thania Paffenholz (2021): Perpetual Peacebuilding: A New Paradigm to Move Beyond the Linearity of Liberal Peacebuilding, Journal of Intervention and State building

communicating maximum value, given these known constraints, certainly falls to the project teams.

Having said that, the Evaluation Team strongly suggests that considerably more time is needed in a context like Golo to build relationships, trust, partnerships, and to align to existing peace capacities. For future efforts, PBF, UNDP and UNICEF may consider doubling or even tripling the project length, to fully explore what is possible in realizing “sustainable returns and peacebuilding”. This view was again echoed by stakeholder participants in the evaluation validation workshop convened in May 2021 by UNICEF and UNDP, in which stakeholders urged UN counterparts to pursue projects no shorter than 3 years, and ideally close to 5 years in length.

## ANNEX A. EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

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### **End of Project Evaluation Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabel Marra Project**

#### BACKGROUND

In 2003, conflict erupted in Darfur, resulting in years of high-intensity armed conflict between the Government of Sudan (GoS) with the support of various armed militias on one side, and Darfuri rebel groups on the other. This conflict caused the death, and displacement of millions of Sudanese. In 2007, the United Nations- African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established as a UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping mission with the mandate to protect civilians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, mediate between the Government of Sudan and non-signatories of the peace agreement, and support the mediation of intercommunal conflict. In June 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) was signed between the Government of Sudan and various Darfuri Armed groups, while others remained outside the agreement and continued fighting. To effectively implement the DDPD, the Darfur Development Strategy was developed as a pathway to recovery and long-term development in Darfur.

The causes of the conflict in Darfur are multiple and complex. Limited resources and capacity of local governance, coupled with competition over increasingly limited natural resources, underpin much of it. The spread of small arms fuelled a situation where weaponry and violence often define relationships between groups and communities. The deterioration of confidence in governance and rule of law institutions is further compounded by the destruction of infrastructure, livelihoods, employment opportunities, the erosion of social cohesion and community stability, and poor basic social services.

The Jebel Marra area in Central Darfur is composed of three localities: Golo, Rokoro and Nertiti. The predominant tribe in the area is Fur; other tribes are Masaleet, Zagawa, Tama, Zreigat, Nawaiba, Am Jalol, Falat, Ta'a Iba, and Bargo. The tribes lived peacefully but increasing competition over natural resources, especially water and grazing lands has created ongoing tribal conflict in the area. In addition, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) has, since they started fighting with GoS in Darfur in 2003, located most of their troops and influential commanders in JM areas close to Nertiti, Rokoro and Golo thus further fueling tensions. Before the Darfur conflict, the Rezaigat (Nawaiba and Ereigat clans who are camel and cattle herders) grazed their animals in the rich pastures of Jebel Marra and had an internal local agreement with the farmer Fur tribes. However, with the formation of the rebel movements in the area and outbreak of war, the dynamic relationship between Nomads and Fur farmers changed; most of the Furs in Jebel Marra supported the rebels while the Nomads supported the GoS and formed their militias. The SLA/AW hindered the movement of nomads to graze their animals in and near their control areas which resulted in clashes between them

Golo, Jebel Marra, Central Darfur state has been the area most affected by conflict in Darfur. Prior to the conflict, Jebel Marra was known for its semi-Mediterranean climate with fertile land, once tapped as a fruit basket and tourism destination of the country. Due to the conflict situation in Golo, Jebel Marra, notwithstanding the improvement of security conditions in the rest of the Darfur region, UNAMID set up a temporary operation base in Golo as per Security Council Resolution 2363. While IDPs have started to return to Golo, socioeconomic conditions in Golo required further improvement. The root causes of conflict in Golo locality, like most areas of Darfur, remain the competition over access to and management of natural resources (socioeconomic). These are exacerbated by sub-optimal rule of law institutions (both formal and informal), limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, social norms rooted in gender inequality and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This situation continues to manifest in regular clashes between the largely nomadic/pastoralist Arab tribes and the mainly farmer/agriculturist Fur tribes. The tribes have also been victims of political exploitation over the years with many of its members, especially young people, aligning themselves with either the rebel groups or government supported militias. Many children became victims of violence, abuse, labour and sexual exploitation. With the constant displacement and violence, the number of orphans, unaccompanied and separated children who need care and protection increased. The violence

and lack of essential services severely impacted the psychological wellbeing of children. Adolescents and youth continue to be at risk and victims of recruitment into armed and other banditry or criminal groups. Women and girls were subject to violations and abuses as they face risks of sexual and gender-based violence while undertaking their regular livelihood activities of farming, firewood collection, fetching water and traveling to the market.

The Government of Sudan requested UN peacebuilding support and the UN Secretary General approved the inclusion of Sudan in a category of countries eligible for UN Intermediate Peacebuilding Fund support. This 2-year (15 August 2018 – 14 August 2020) PBF funded project implemented by UNDP and UNICEF and worth US\$3million was the first-ever integrated development intervention in Golo. The project was implemented in collaboration with government of Sudan ministries/units (Peace Council, Jebel Marra Rural Development, Technology Transfer and Productivity Platform, Department of Water Environment Sanitation, Ministry of Education), national NGOs (Siyaj Charity Organisation, Peace Code Sudan) and international NGOs (War child Canada, World Relief and Catholic Relief Services). The project focused on addressing the above conflict drivers and contributed to two outcomes:

*Outcome 1: Capacity of state and non-state actors on rule of law established and enhanced*

*Outcome 2: Durable solutions and local economic recovery for returnees, IDPs and host communities improved.*

UNDP MPTF Office which serves as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the PBF disbursed the funds to UNDP and UNICEF for this project on the basis of a signed Memorandum of Understanding between each UN agency and the MPTF Office.

*COVID-19 pandemic in Sudan has infected over 12,000 people and this pandemic affected the implementation of the final phase of this project as government continued to restrict movement within and between states. Alternative efforts have been employed to complete the project but under very difficult circumstances*

#### PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUTION

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This evaluation presents an opportunity to assess the achievements of the Sustainable Returns and Peacebuilding through Durable Solutions and Rule of Law in Golo, Jabel Marra Project. Adopting a participatory approach, the evaluation will determine the project's overall added value to peacebuilding in Jabel Marra, Sudan, in the areas of livelihoods, rule of law, protection, education and WASH. It is of particular interest that while assessing the degree to which the project met its intended peacebuilding objective(s) and results, the evaluation also highlights key lessons about successful peacebuilding approaches and operational practices, as well as identifies areas where the project performed less effectively than anticipated. In that sense, this project evaluation is equally about accountability as well as learning.

#### OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION:

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- Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of: 1) addressing key drivers of conflict and the most relevant peacebuilding issues; 2) the degree to which the project addressed cross-cutting issues such as conflict and gender-sensitivity in Sudan
- Assess to what extent the PBF project has made a concrete contribution to reducing conflict factors in Sudan. The evaluation shall evaluate whether the project helped advance achievement of the SDGs, and in particular SDG 16
- Evaluate the project's efficiency, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money
- Assess whether the support provided by the PBF has promoted the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), allowed a specific focus on women's participation in peacebuilding processes, and whether it was accountable to gender equality
- Assess whether the project has been implemented through a conflict-sensitive approach
- Document good practices, innovations and lessons learnt emerging from the project implementation
- Provide actionable recommendations for future peacebuilding programming in Darfur and the Two Areas.

This evaluation will examine the project's implementation process and peacebuilding results, drawing upon the project's results framework as well as other monitoring data collected on the project outcomes and outputs as well as context. Evaluation questions are based on the OECD



DAC evaluation criteria as well as PBF specific evaluation criteria, which have been adapted to the context.

## **Evaluation Questions**

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### **RELEVANCE:**

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- Was the intervention based on a valid and updated context analysis?
- Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers and factors for peace identified in the conflict analysis?
- Was the project appropriate and strategic to the main peacebuilding goals and challenges in the Golo area of Jebel Marra at the time of the PBF project's design? Did relevance continue throughout implementation?
- Was the project able to adapt to changing a context and fragility over time, especially in light of ongoing changes in the political and institutional situation in Sudan? If so, what process(es) was employed to make adaptive decisions?
- Was the project relevant to the UN's peacebuilding mandate and the SDGs, in particular SDG 16?
- Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project?
- Did the project's theory of change clearly articulate assumptions about why the project approach is expected to produce the desired change? Was the theory of change grounded in evidence?

### **EFFICIENCY:**

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- How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the two implementing agencies and with stakeholders)? Have project activities been delivered in a timely manner?
- Were project financial management systems efficient and fit for purpose?
- How efficient and successful was the project's implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?
- How well did the project collect and use data to monitor results? How effectively was updated data used to manage the project?
- How well did the project team communicate with implementing partners, stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress?
- Did the actual results (outputs and outcomes) justify the costs incurred, and were resources effectively used?
- What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the project's implementation process?
- How was the project's collaboration with the UNRCO, UNDP, UNICEF, the Government of Sudan, locality institutions, and development partners?

### **EFFECTIVENESS:**

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- What progress has been made towards achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project?
- How appropriate and clear was the PBF project's targeting strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
- To what extent did the PBF project substantively mainstream gender and support gender-responsive project outcomes?
- How effective has the intervention been in achieving different and targeted results for women, men, boys and girls?
- Did the project monitoring system adequately capture data on **peacebuilding** results at an appropriate outcome level?
  - To what extent did project management effectively identify and manage context-specific risk?
  - How effective were the strategies and tools used in the implementation of the project?

### **SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP**

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- To what extent did the PBF project contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in locally owned strategic plans, legislative agendas and policies?
- Did the intervention design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting local ownership) to support positive changes in rule of law, service provision and peacebuilding after the end of the project?
- How potentially effective are the project's sustainability and exit strategies? Outline contributing factors and constraints.
- How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially women's participation in peacebuilding, consultation and decision-making processes, supported under PBF Project?
- How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of local capacity in order to ensure suitability of efforts and benefits?
- Describe the main lessons that have emerged including recommendations of factors that require attention to improve prospects of sustainability

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#### COHERENCE:

- To what extent did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors and UNAMID?
- To what extent did the project's design facilitate coherence between activities focused on service provision and other activities
- Did coherence and coordination result in improved effectiveness, efficiency and likelihood of sustainability?
- Did the integrated approach to implementation adopted by this project result in enhanced peacebuilding outcomes?
- How were stakeholders involved in the project's design and implementation?

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#### EVALUATION CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES QUESTIONS

##### Human rights

- To what extent have poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project?

##### Gender equality

- To what extent have gender equality and the empowerment of women been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project?
- Is the gender marker data assigned to this project representative of reality?
- How well did indicators and the monitoring framework capture the unique experiences of women, men, girls and boys?
- To what extent has the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women? Were there any unintended effects?

##### Conflict Sensitivity

- Did the PBF project have an explicit conflict-sensitivity strategy?
- Were internal capacities of both UNDP and UNICEF adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict-sensitive approach?
- Was the project responsible for any unintended negative impacts?
- Was an ongoing process of context monitoring and a monitoring system that allows for monitoring of unintended impacts established?

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#### CATALYTIC:

- Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?
- Has PBF funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding?

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#### TIME-SENSITIVITY:

- Was the project well-timed to address a conflict factor or capitalize on a specific window of opportunity?
- Was PBF funding used to leverage political windows of opportunity for engagement?

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#### RISK-TOLERANCE AND INNOVATION:

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- If the project was characterized as "high risk", were risks adequately monitoring and mitigated?
- How novel or innovative was the project approach? Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?

## METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

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The evaluation will be summative and will employ a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/ verify the substance of the findings. Proposals submitted by prospective consultants should outline a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information. The evaluation methodology should include gender equality and women's empowerment as an approach to addressing gender-specific issues. Proposals should be clear on the specific role each of the various methodological approaches plays in helping to address each of the evaluation questions.

The methodologies for data collection may include but not necessarily be limited to:

- Desk review of key documents
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with major stakeholders including country PBF team, officials from key ministries and the government, representatives of civil society organizations; community and religious leaders. Evaluators should ensure equal participation among men and women and across age groups
- Systematic review of monitoring data and internal assessments and evaluations
- Systematic review of PBF Eligibility Requests and Annual Reports
- On-site field visits;
- Others as appropriate

*As of 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global pandemic as the new coronavirus rapidly spread to all regions of the world. Travel to and within the country has been restricted since 16 March 2020. If it is not possible to travel then the evaluation team should develop a methodology that takes this into account the conduct of the evaluation virtually and remotely, including the use of remote interview methods and extended desk reviews, data analysis, surveys and evaluation questionnaires. This should be detailed in the Inception report and agreed with UNDP and UNICEF. Consideration should be taken for stakeholder availability, ability, or willingness to be interviewed remotely. In addition, their accessibility to the internet/ computer may be an issue as many government and national counterparts may be working from home. These limitations must be reflected in the evaluation report. Remote interviews may be undertaken by the national Consultant in the country if government restrictions persists, otherwise the national Consultant will visit the project site. International Consultant will work remotely. No stakeholders, consultants or UNDP staff should be put in harm's way and safety is the key priority.*

## DELIVERABLES

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**Inception Report:** The expert(s) will prepare an **Inception Report** to further refine the evaluation questions and detail the methodological approach, including data collection instruments, in consultation with the PBF technical team. The report will also include the work plan, clear responsibilities for tasks and deliverables, a realistic time frame and COVID-19 related challenges and mitigation plan. The Inception report should be submitted 8 days after starting the evaluation process. The Inception report must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF prior to commencement of data collection in the field. The inception report should include the following key elements:

- Overall approach and methodology
- Key lines of inquiry & interview protocol
- Data collection tools and mechanisms
- Proposed list of interviewees
- A work plan and timelines to be agreed with relevant PBF focal points

## DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT

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The expert(s) will prepare a draft evaluation report of between 20-25 pages based on PBF's evaluation report

template. The content and the structure of the analytical report with findings, recommendations and lessons learnt covering the scope of the evaluation should meet the requirements of the UNDP M & E Policy and should include the following:

- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Description of the evaluation methodology, including limitations
- Situational analysis regarding the outcome, outputs, and partnership strategy
- Key findings, including best practices and lessons learned
- Conclusion and recommendations
- Appendices: charts, terms of reference, field visits, list of interviews and documents reviewed.

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## PRESENTATION/VALIDATION OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS TO RELEVANT IN-COUNTRY STAKEHOLDERS AND PBF

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The first draft of the final report will be shared with an Evaluation Reference Group (ERG), composed of representatives of all direct fund recipients, and local stakeholders and the PBF, for their comments and input.

## FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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The expert(s) will revise the evaluation report based on feedback received from the ERG during the debriefing and validation process. The final accepted version of the report will reflect ERG's comments and must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF.

*In line with the UNDP's financial regulations, when determined by the Country Office and/or the consultants that a deliverable or service cannot be satisfactorily completed due to the impact of COVID-19 and limitations to the evaluation, that deliverable or service will not be paid. Due to the current COVID-19 situation and its implications, a partial payment may be considered if the consultant invested time towards the deliverable but was unable to complete to circumstances beyond his/her control*

## EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIRED COMPETENCIES

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The Evaluation will be conducted by two consultants, an international consultant who will work remotely in collaboration with in-country national consultant

International Evaluator – Team Leader

- Bachelor's degree with 7-year experience or Master's degree with 5 years' experience or equivalent in Social Sciences with a focus on peace and conflict studies, international relations, political science, development studies or a related field
- Experience in project evaluation in a peacebuilding setting
- Extensive experience in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, rule of law and peacebuilding.
- Experience conducting project evaluations remotely
- Well-developed skills and demonstrated experience in the following areas: design, monitoring and evaluation, data collection methodologies, analysis, gender considerations, inclusivity
- Excellent analytical and writing skills (in English)

NATIONAL EVALUATOR

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- Bachelor's degree with 5-year experience or Master's degree with 2 years' experience or equivalent in Social Sciences with a focus on peace and conflict studies, international relations, political science, development studies or a related field
- Experience conducting evaluations in Sudan
- Experience working in a team remotely including data collection experience
- Understanding of the political, social, and cultural background of Sudan and Darfur in particular
- Fluent in Arabic language

## CORPORATE COMPETENCIES

- Demonstrates integrity by modeling the UN's values and ethical standards
- Promotes the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability
- Treats all people fairly without favoritism
- Ability to work with a multi-cultural and diverse team.

## FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCIES:

- Demonstrated experience in technical issues related to peacebuilding and evaluation
- Demonstrated ability to analyze large amounts of complex and diversified data related to peacebuilding in post conflict environments.
- Demonstrated strong coordination and facilitation skills
- Proved strong interpersonal skills and the ability to conduct the trainings

## EVALUATION ETHICS

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation'. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees, and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses without the express authorization of UNDP and partners.

## IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The selected Evaluation team (2 Consultants – International and National) will report to the UNDP Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator with technical support from the UNDP Peacebuilding Specialist and UNICEF. The Head of Unit, Governance and Stabilization will provide overall technical guidance on evaluation and ensure independence of the evaluation process, and that policy is followed. The Project Manager will provide logistical support.

## INTERNATIONAL CONSULTANT - PRINCIPAL CONSULTANT

- Responsible for design of the whole evaluation, analysis of collected data and reporting
- Responsible for all deliverables on this ToR
- Assist in the selection of national consultant

## NATIONAL CONSULTANT

- Responsible for in-country data collection in Golo and Darfur as required
- Conduct interviews with stakeholders and responding to any other data / information needs from the Principal Consultant in line with this ToR
- Conduct field visits as required and in compliance with Sudan COVID-19 guidance

## TIME FRAME FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS

Deliverables / Outputs	Duration International Consultant	Duration National Consultant	Due Dates	Submission Requirements	% of Payment	Review and Approvals Required
Desk Review of Secondary data Submission of Inception Report – <b>First deliverable</b>	8 working days	3 working days	30 September 2020	Inception report	40%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● UNDP Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator (approval)</li> </ul>
Data collection and analysis (visits to the field, interviews, questionnaires).	8 working days*	10 working days	15 October 2020			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● UNDP Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator</li> </ul>

						(approval)
Draft Report Drafting & Submission – <b>Second deliverable</b>	8 working days	2 working days	25 October 2020	Draft Report		• UNDP Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator (approval)
Final Report Submission – <b>Third deliverable</b>	4 working days	2 working days	05 November 2020	Final Evaluation Report	60%	• UNDP Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator (approval)
<b>Total</b>	<b>28 days</b>	<b>17 days</b>				

\*The 8 days for international consultant during data collection are to assist the national consultant to design the data collection tools, engage each other on data received and commence analysis

#### DURATION OF THE WORK

The total duration of this consultancy will be 28 working days for the Lead Consultant and 17 days for the local Consultant spread over a period of 1.5 Months.

#### DUTY STATION

The International Consultant can be based outside Sudan and operate remotely and will be the Principal Consultant while the National counterpart will be based in Sudan. The two will work together on the evaluation.

#### SCOPE OF PRICE PROPOSAL AND SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

The **consultancy** fee will be determined on a lump sum basis. The lump sum amount must be all-inclusive, and the contract price must be fixed regardless of changes in the cost components. Payment will be made twice, after submission of inception report and after submission of Final Report with confirmation letter from Darfur Senior Regional Coordinator stating satisfaction with work carried by the Consultant

#### RECOMMENDED PRESENTATION OF OFFER

Applicants are kindly requested to complete and sign and submit all the following documents:

- Duly completed Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability using the template provided by UNDP
- Personal CV or P11**, indicating all past experience from similar projects, as well as the contact details (email and telephone number) of the Candidate and at least three (3) professional references
- Brief description** of why the individual/company considers him/herself/itself as the most suitable for the assignment, and a methodology on how they will approach and complete the assignment
- Financial Proposal** that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price, supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template provided.

#### EVALUATION CRITERIA AND SELECTION OF THE CONSULTANT

The offers received from the candidates will be evaluated using combined scoring method. The combined scoring method assesses the offers with technical merits of the proposals – where the qualifications and methodology will be weighted a maximum of 70%, and later combined with the price offer which will be weighted a max of 30%.

#### TECHNICAL EVALUATION GRID:

	<b>International Consultant</b>	<b>National Consultant</b>
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Assessment Criteria	Maximum Obtainable Points	Weightage (%)	Maximum Obtainable Points	Weightage (%)
Experience in project evaluation in a post conflict setting, and/or extensive experience in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, rule of law and peacebuilding.	21	30%	21	30%
Good knowledge of the political dynamics in Sudan especially in Darfur.			14	20%
Excellent written skills (English), with analytic capacity and ability to synthesize relevant collected data and findings for the preparation of quality knowledge products	21	30%		
Fluent in Arabic and English (both written and spoken)			14	20%
Well-developed skills and demonstrated experience in the following areas: design, monitoring and evaluation, data collection methodologies, analysis, gender considerations, inclusivity	21	30%	14	20%
Experience in conducting remote evaluation	7	10%	7	10%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>

The technical proposals of candidates obtaining 70% and above will only be technically qualified; a subsequent review of the price proposals will be included when assessing for overall ranking of the proposals. Those obtaining lower than 70% will be technically non-responsive proposals; price proposals of such candidates will not be reviewed.

#### ASSESSMENT OF THE PRICE PROPOSALS (30 POINTS) OR 30%

The lowest priced bid from among the technically qualified Offerors will obtain the full marks of 30 points in the price proposal. Price proposals of remaining qualified bidders will be prorated against the lowest priced bid using the following formula to derive the marks in their price proposal: Marks obtained by a Bidder = Lowest Priced Bid (amount) / Bid of the Offeror (amount) X 30 (Full Marks)

#### AWARD OF THE CONTRACT/AWARD CRITERIA:

The contract will be awarded to the candidate (bidder) whose proposal obtains the highest cumulative marks (points) when the marks obtained in technical and price proposals are aggregated together.

#### ANNEXES CAN BE USED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAIL ABOUT EVALUATION BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF EVALUATORS:

##### ANNEXES TO BE PROVIDED CAN INCLUDE:

- Intervention results framework and theory of change. Provides more detailed information on the intervention being evaluated.
- List of key stakeholders and partners. A list of key stakeholders and other individuals who should be consulted, together with an indication of their affiliation and relevance for the evaluation and their contact information. This annex can also suggest people to be interviewed/beneficiaries to be considered.
- Documents to be consulted. A list of important documents and web pages that the evaluators should read at the outset of the evaluation and before finalizing the evaluation design and the inception report. This should be limited to the critical information that the evaluation team needs. Data sources and documents may include:
  - Project' Field Monitoring/Progress Reports and Monitoring plans and indicators.
  - Relevant national strategy documents, strategic and other planning documents (e.g., programme and project documents).
  - Partnership arrangements (e.g., agreements of cooperation with Governments or partners).
  - Previous evaluations and assessments of the project area (if available).

- UNDP evaluation policy, UNEG norms and standards and other policy documents. Code of conduct
- Required format for the evaluation report (per the evaluation guideline Annex number 3 page 117)<sup>1</sup>

APPROVAL

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This TOR is approved by:

NAME AND DESIGNATION: CHRISTOPHER LAKER – DARFUR SENIOR REGIONAL  
COORDINATOR, UNDP SUDAN SIGNATURE: DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 2020



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## ANNEX B. KII SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR GOVERNMENT MINISTRY PARTICIPANTS

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### CONTEXT

- Please describe your Ministry's involvement or connection to the project (in design, implementation and evaluation).
- Please describe your (personal / professional) involvement or connection to the project (in design, implementation and evaluation).
- Was your Ministry meaningfully involved in the *design* of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Was your Ministry meaningfully involved in the *implementation* of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Was your Ministry meaningfully involved in the *monitoring and evaluation* of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

### RELEVANCE:

- In your view, was this project responsive to some (or many) "root causes" of conflict in Golo?
    - If so, in what ways?
    - If not, why not?
  - In your view, was the project appropriate and strategic for the conflict issues and current goals of your Ministry in Golo?
    - If so, in what ways?
    - If not, why not?
  - Did this project enhance peacebuilding / peace-related outcomes?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
  - Did the project support increased trust and engagement between citizens and state actors?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
  - What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show increased trust and engagement between citizens and state actors?
  - Did the project decrease violence and/or mistrust amongst and between groups?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
  - What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show decrease violence and/or mistrust amongst and between groups?
  - Did the project increase trust and cohesion amongst and between groups?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
  - What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show increase trust and cohesion amongst and between groups?
  - Did the relevance of the continue throughout implementation?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- 
- Did the project adapt to *changing context and fragility* over time, especially in light of ongoing changes in the political and institutional situation in Sudan and Golo?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

- **Specifically**, did the project effectively *change or adapt* to the significant political and social changes (revolution) that took place in Sudan in 2019?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Has the process of IDP return been:
  - a) overall peaceful and effective
  - b) overall conflictual or ineffective
  - c) Other

Please expand / give examples regarding the process of IDP return.

- Did the project address the process of IDP return?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Was it clear what the project expected to or intended to achieve?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project connect with and/or support local-led peace efforts?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### EFFICIENCY:

- Do you believe the project was *efficiently* implemented?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Were project activities delivered in a *timely manner*?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- (If Informant was involved with project finances only): Were project financial management systems efficient and fit for purpose?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- How well did the project team communicate with your Ministry and other stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress?
- How valuable and effective was the project's collaboration with your Ministry?

#### EFFECTIVENESS:

- Please describe any progress made towards achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project, as you understand them:
- Did the project's support for state (and non-state) actors on rule of law positively impact community trust of and/or engagement with the formal justice system?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- What specific, *concrete* activities in communities have you observed that you feel indicate an increased trust of or engagement with the formal justice system?
- Did the project effectively support sustainable solutions and local economic recovery for returnees, IDPs and host communities?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

- What specific, concrete activities in communities have you observed that you feel indicate increases in sustainable solutions and local economic recovery for returnees, IDPs and host communities?
- How appropriate and clear was the project's strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
- Do you feel the project appropriately addressed gender and supported gender-responsive project outcomes?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Do you feel the project achieved different and targeted results for women, men, boys and girls?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Do you feel the strategies and tools used in the project were effective?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

#### SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP:

- Did the project contribute to your Ministry's strategic plans, agendas and policies?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project have an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting local ownership) after the end of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Will your Ministry continue the work related to or supported by the Project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project contribute to the development of local capacity?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- What recommendations do you / your Ministry have to improve similar projects in the future?

#### COHERENCE:

- Did the project help facilitate coherence / coordination between related activities or projects?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
 If so, did this coherence and coordination result in improved effectiveness, efficiency and likelihood of sustainability?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### *Human rights*

- Please comment on to what extent poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project?
- What specific activities or changes have you seen that you feel show that such groups have benefited from the project?
- How did the project enhance the protection and promotion of human rights?
- What specific activities or changes have you seen that you feel show that the project enhanced the protection and promotion of human rights?

#### *Gender equality*

- Please comment on to what extent gender equality and the empowerment of women was addressed in the project.
- Please comment on to what extent the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women.

#### *Conflict Sensitivity*

- Did the project *cause* any unintended negative impacts?
  - If so, in what ways?
- Did the project *contribute to* any unintended negative impacts?
  - If so, in what ways?

#### CATALYTIC:

- Did the project help support or contribute to any other peacebuilding work?
- If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### TIME-SENSITIVITY:

- Was the project well-timed to address conflicts or "root causes" of conflicts?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project respond to windows of political opportunity?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### RISK-TOLERANCE:

- Did the project effectively identify and address risks?

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- Are there any other inputs you would like to share regarding this project?

## ANNEX C. KII SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR NGO, INGO AND CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPANTS

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### CONTEXT

- Please describe your *Organization's* involvement or connection to the project (in design, implementation and evaluation).
- Please describe your (*personal / professional*) involvement or connection to the project (in design, implementation and evaluation).
- Was your organization meaningfully involved in the *design* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was your organization meaningfully involved in the *implementation* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was your organization meaningfully involved in the *monitoring and evaluation* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

### RELEVANCE:

- In your view, was this project responsive to some (or many) “root causes” of conflict in Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- In your view, was the project appropriate and strategic for the conflict issues and current goals of your organization in Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the relevance of the continue throughout implementation?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project adapt to *changing context and fragility* over time, especially in light of ongoing changes in the political and institutional situation in Sudan and Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- **Specifically**, did the project effectively *change or adapt* to the significant political and social changes (revolution) that took place in Sudan in 2019?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was it clear what the project expected to or intended to achieve?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project connect with and/or support local-led peace efforts?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

#### EFFICIENCY:

- Do you believe the project was *efficiently* implemented?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Were project activities delivered in a *timely manner*?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- (If Informant was involved with project finances only): Were project financial management systems efficient and fit for purpose?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- How well did the project team communicate with your organization and other stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress?
- How valuable and effective was the project's collaboration with your organization?

#### EFFECTIVENESS:

- Please describe any progress made towards achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project, as you understand them.
- How appropriate and clear was the project's strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
- Do you feel the project appropriately addressed gender and supported gender-responsive project outcomes?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Do you feel the project achieved different and targeted results for women, men, boys and girls?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Do you feel the strategies and tools used in the project were effective?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP:

- Did the project contribute to your organization strategic plans, agendas and policies?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project have an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting local ownership) after the end of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Will your organization continue the work related to or supported by the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project contribute to the development of local capacity?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- What recommendations do you / your organization have to improve similar projects in the future?

#### COHERENCE:

- Did the project help facilitate coherence / coordination between related activities or projects?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- If so, did this coherence and coordination result in improved effectiveness, efficiency and likelihood of sustainability?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

- Did this project enhance peacebuilding / peace-related outcomes?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Are you aware of how stakeholders were involved in the project's design and implementation?

#### *Human rights*

- Please comment on to what extent poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project?

#### *Gender equality*

- Please comment on to what extent gender equality and the empowerment of women was addressed in the project.
- Please comment on to what extent the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women.

#### *Conflict Sensitivity*

- Did the project *cause* any unintended negative impacts?
- If so, in what ways?
- Did the project *contribute* to any unintended negative impacts?
- If so, in what ways?

#### CATALYTIC:

- Did the project help support or contribute to any other peacebuilding work?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

#### TIME-SENSITIVITY:

- Was the project well-timed to address conflicts or "root causes" of conflicts?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project respond to windows of political opportunity?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

#### RISK-TOLERANCE AND INNOVATION:

- Was the project unique or innovative?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project provide any insights that could inform similar approaches elsewhere?

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- Are there any other inputs you would like to share regarding this project?

## ANNEX D. KII SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS

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### CONTEXT

- Please describe your (*personal / professional*) involvement or connection to the project (in design, implementation and evaluation).
- Were you consulted or meaningfully involved in the *design* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Were you meaningfully involved in the *implementation* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Were you meaningfully involved in the *monitoring and evaluation* of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

### RELEVANCE:

- In your view, was this project responsive to some (or many) “root causes” of conflict in Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- In your view, was the project appropriate and strategic for the conflict issues in Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the relevance of the project continue throughout implementation?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project adapt to *changing context and fragility* over time, especially in light of ongoing changes in the political and institutional situation in Sudan and Golo?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- **Specifically**, did the project effectively *change or adapt* to the significant political and social changes (revolution) that took place in Sudan in 2019?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Was it clear what the project expected to or intended to achieve?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?
- Did the project connect with and/or support local-led peace efforts?
- If so, in what ways?
- If not, why not?

### EFFICIENCY:

- Do you believe the project was *efficiently* implemented?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Were project activities delivered in a *timely manner*?
  - If so, in what ways?



- If not, why not?
- (If Informant was involved with project finances only): Were project financial management systems efficient and fit for purpose?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- How well did the project team communicate with you and other stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress?

#### EFFECTIVENESS:

- Please describe any progress made towards achieving the overall outputs and outcomes of the project, as you understand them.
- How appropriate and clear was the project's strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
- Do you feel the project appropriately addressed gender and supported gender-responsive project outcomes?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Do you feel the project achieved different and targeted results for women, men, boys and girls?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Do you feel the strategies and tools used in the project were effective?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

#### SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP:

- Did the project contribute to agendas and policies important for your region?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project have an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting local ownership) after the end of the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Will you continue the work related to or supported by the project?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project contribute to the development of local capacity?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- What recommendations do you have to improve similar projects in the future?

#### COHERENCE:

- Did the project help facilitate coherence / coordination between related activities or projects?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- If so, did this coherence and coordination result in improved effectiveness, efficiency and likelihood of sustainability?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did this project enhance peacebuilding / peace-related outcomes?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Are you aware of how stakeholders were involved in the project's design and implementation?

### *Human rights*

- Please comment on to what extent poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the project?

### *Gender equality*

- Please comment on to what extent gender equality and the empowerment of women was addressed in the project.
- Please comment on to what extent the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women.

### *Conflict Sensitivity*

- Did the project *cause* any unintended negative impacts?
  - If so, in what ways?
- Did the project *contribute to* any unintended negative impacts?
  - If so, in what ways?

### CATALYTIC:

- Did the project help support or contribute to any other peacebuilding work?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

### TIME-SENSITIVITY:

- Was the project well-timed to address conflicts or "root causes" of conflicts?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project respond to windows of political opportunity?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

### RISK-TOLERANCE AND INNOVATION:

- Was the project unique or innovative?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?
- Did the project provide any insights that could inform similar approaches elsewhere?
  - If so, in what ways?
  - If not, why not?

### CONCLUSIONS:

- Are there any other inputs you would like to share regarding this project?

## ANNEX E. FOCUS GROUP DIALOGUE PROTOCOLS

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### **CBRMs – PARA-LEGALs – CHILD PROTECTION COMMITTEES - COMMUNITY POLICE VOLUNTEERS (COMMUNITY LEVEL)**

- Tell me a bit about the group, what role it plays in the community and how/why it was formed? (Relevance)
- What are the main issues/problems in your community and has your group been able to resolve/overcome them? (Relevance – Impact)
- How and in what ways has your group been able to contribute to peace in your community? (Relevance – Impact)
- In what ways has women's participation (or lack of participation) in this group been beneficial to its role/purpose? (Gender)
- How (if in anyway) have you interacted with local government/authorities or other actors (NGOs, UN agencies, etc.) and how would you describe that experience? (Sustainability/Ownership)
- What were some of the challenges facing your group and how did you overcome them? (Sustainability/Ownership)
- What are the different ways that issues or conflicts are addressed/ resolved in your community? (Impact)
- Who participates in that process? Who are the key actors and what role do they play? Positive and Negative? Are they men or women? And what does their participation look like? (Impact)
- What type of support has the group received (if any) and how has it helped you achieve your group's purpose? (Sustainability)
- How have you interacted or engaged with youth in the community and what was the experience like? (Youth)
- How have the changes that have taken place in the country affected your group and your community (Relevance)
- What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show decrease violence and/or mistrust amongst and between groups?
- How has peace and social cohesion in your community and in Golo improved or deteriorated over the past 2 years? and why?

### **YOUTH TRAINED IN VOCATIONAL SKILLS**

- What vocational skills training did you get and how were you involved in selecting the vocation (if at all)?
- Describe/comment on the quality of the training provided!
- How has it helped you gain employment and if not why?
- What other trainings have you received? and how were they useful to you or your community?
- What are some of the positive roles that youth play regarding peace and co-existence in the community?
- What are some of the negative roles that youth play regarding peace and co-existence in the community?
- What are the different ways that issues or conflicts are addressed/ resolved in your community? (Impact)
- Who participates in that process? Who are the key actors and what role do they play? Positive and Negative? Are they men or women? And what does their participation look like? (Impact)
- How have the changes that have taken place in the country affected you and your community (Relevance)
- How has the level of trust and confidence in the justice systems in your community changed over the last few years? and what have been the drivers of these changes?

- What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show decrease violence and/or mistrust amongst and between groups?
- How has peace and social cohesion in your community and in Golo improved or deteriorated over the past 2 years? and why?

**AGRICULTURE PRODUCE GROUP REPS AND FARMERS (PARTICIPANTS IN TRAINING FOR VALUE-CHAIN RELATED PRODUCER GROUPS AND/OR PRODUCER ASSOCIATIONS)**

- Tell me a bit about the group, what role it plays in the community and how/why it was formed? (Relevance)
- What type of support has the group received (if any) and how has it helped you achieve your group's purpose? (Sustainability)
- What trainings (if any) have you received? Describe/comment on the quality of the training provided!
- How has the support or training you received improved your livelihood or income levels?
- What are the main issues/problems facing productivity and livelihoods in your area and how has the project been able to contribute to resolving/overcoming them? (Relevance – Impact)
- How has the support or inputs you received contributed to peace and/or social co-existence in your community? (Relevance – Impact)
- How (if in anyway) have women been able to benefit and improve their livelihoods/income from this project? (Gender)
- How (if in anyway) have you interacted with local government/authorities or other actors (NGOs, UN agencies, etc.) and how would you describe that experience? (Sustainability/Ownership)
- What were some of the challenges facing your group and how did you overcome them? (Sustainability/Ownership)
- What are the different ways that issues or conflicts are addressed/ resolved in your community? (Impact)
- Who participates in that process? Who are the key actors and what role do they play? Positive and Negative? Are they men or women? And what does their participation look like? (Impact)
- How have you interacted or engaged with youth in the community and what was the experience like? (Youth)
- How have the changes that have taken place in the country affected your group and your community (Relevance)
- How has the level of trust and confidence in the justice systems in your community changed over the last few years? and what have been the drivers of these changes?
- What specific activities or changes did you observe that you feel show decrease violence and/or mistrust amongst and between groups?
- How has peace and social cohesion in your community and in Golo improved or deteriorated over the past 2 years? and why?

## ANNEX F. PROJECT OUTCOME INDICATORS

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Outcomes	Outcome indicators	Means of verification	Baseline	Target	Achievement
<b>Outcome 1. Rule of law established and enhanced through capacity building of state and non-state actors</b>	<b>Outcome Indicator 1 a:</b> Percentage of community members reporting a decrease in communal conflicts including child rights and GBV violations.	Perception survey	53%	80%	86%
	<b>Outcome Indicator 1 b:</b> Percentage of community members reporting satisfaction with informal and formal rule of law mechanisms	Perception survey	36%	60%	83% formal 93% informal
	<b>Outcome Indicator 1 c:</b> Number of young people/adolescents with peacebuilding competencies and meaningful engagement at community level	Annual & semi-annual reports	0	100	117
<b>Outcome 2: Durable solutions and local economic recovery for returnees, IDPs and host communities improved</b>	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 a:</b> Number of returnee households in target villages and IDP households reintegrated and receiving basic social services as a result of project interventions	Annual & semi-annual reports	0	4,000	5,000 (54% women; 38% youth)
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 b:</b> Number of women and men benefitting from economic recovery opportunities within eighteen months of intervention, disaggregated by vulnerability groups, gender and age	Annual & semi-annual reports	0	10,000	15,450 (65% women, 35% youth)
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 c:</b> Percentage of community members reporting an increase in the economic interventions between diverse communities	Perception survey	30%	75%	81%
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 d:</b> Number of diverse community-level mechanisms established for management of basic social services	Annual & semi-annual reports	0	24	25
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 e:</b> Percentage of target groups reporting increased trust between members of community and their local authorities	Perception survey	25%	40%	97%

## ANNEX G: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DIALOGUE PARTICIPANT DETAILS

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### Key Informant Interviews

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Stakeholder Type</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Gender</b>
Technology Transfer & Productivity Platform	Government	Zalingei	Male
University of Zalingei/Peace Studies Center	Government	Zalingei	Male
SIAG Charirty Organization	CSO	Zalingei	Male
Water, Environment & Sanitation (WES)	Government	Zalingei	Male
Ministry of Youth	Government	Zalingei	Male
Jebel Marra Dvelopment Project	Government	Zalingei	Male
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)	Government	Zalingei	Male
Ministry of Education	Government	Zalingei	Male
Peace Corps	CSO	Zalingei	Male
Technology Transfer & Productivity Platform	Government	Golo	Male
Youth Union	CSO	Golo	Male
Ministry of Agriculture	Government	Golo	Male
UNICEF	UN Agency	Golo	Male
UNICEF	UN Agency	Zalengei	Male
UNICEF	UN Agency	Zalengei	Female
UNICEF	UN Agency	New York	Male
UNDP	UN Agency	Golo	Male
UNDP	UN Agency	Khartoum <sup>124</sup>	Male
PBF	UN Agency	Khartoum	Male
UN	UN Agency	Khartoum	Female

### Focus Group Dialogues

<b>Group</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total</b>
Farmers	Golo	3	1	4
Paralegals/Police Volunteers	Golo	2	4	6
CBRMs	Golo	4	1	5
Farmers	Merle	8	2	10
Child Friendly Committees	Golo	3	1	4

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<sup>124</sup> The three Khartoum interviews with UN staff were conducted virtually.

## ANNEX H: VALIDATION WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

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1. Golo Locality Executive Manager
2. Golo Shatai (Paramount Chief)
3. Golo Humanitarian Aid Commissioner
4. Golo Paralegal representative (women)
5. Golo Community Police Volunteer (women)
6. Golo Parents and Teacher Association
7. Golo Youth Representative
8. Golo Women representative (women)
9. University of Zalingei Head of Gender studies (women)
10. UNDP Partner - Siyaj Charity Organisation
11. UNDP Partner – Jabal Marra Rural Development
12. UNICEF Partner – Peacecode Sudan
13. Ministry of Physical Planning - Water Environment and Sanitation
14. Zalingei - Humanitarian Aid Commission
15. Peace Council