

REVIEW OF THE DARFUR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
(2013-2019)



CONSOLIDATED REVIEW REPORT – VOLUME I

Submitted to the DDS Review Steering Committee

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Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank	NCP	National Congress Party
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme	NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ARUS	Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan	NHIF	National Health Insurance Fund
BDCs	Business Development Centers	NISS	National Intelligence and Security Services
BERP	Basic Education Recovery Program	NNGOs	National Non-governmental Organizations
BHU	Basic Health Units	NR	Natural Resources
BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	NRM	Natural Resource Management
CAHWs	Community Animal Health Workers	O&M	Operations and maintenance
CBO	Community Based Organization	PAR	Public Administration Reform
CBRM	Community based conflict mechanism	PBF	United Nations Peace Building Fund
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission	PFM	Public Financial Management
CLTS	Community Led Total Sanitation	PHC	Primary Health Care
CRS	Catholic Relief Services	PHCC	Primary Health Care Centers
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale	PRCSP	Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace
CSO	Civil Society Organizations	PTAs	Parent Teacher Associations
CTA	Civil Transactions Act	PWG	Pillar working group
CTC	Central Trading Company	RUR	Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization
DCB	Darfur Coordination Board	RRR	Returns, Recovery and Reintegration
DCPSP	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund	RSF	Rapid Support Force
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
DDRA	Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency	SDDRC	Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	SDG	Sustainable development goals
DDS	Darfur Development Strategy	STDM	Social Tenure Domain Model
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development	SERFAC	State Extension Research Farmer Advisory Council
DIDC	Darfur-wide International Dialogue and Consultation	SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
DJAM	Darfur Joint Assessment Mission	SHF	Sudan Humanitarian Fund
DLC	Darfur Land Commission	SIDA	Sustainable Integrated Development
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement	SIP	Social Initiatives Program
DCPSCF	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund	SIPF	Sudan International Partners Forum
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority	SLA	Savings and Loans Association
DRDF	Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund	SLC	State Legislative Councils
DSWG	Durable Solutions Working Group	SLF	State Liaison Function
ECG	Education Coordination Group	SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
EPG	Education Partners Group	SMoA	State Ministry of Agriculture
EU	European Union	SSTL	State-Sponsored Terrorism List
EVC	Every Voice Counts	SPF	Sudanese Police Force
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization for the United Nations	TEP	Towards Enduring Peace Project
FaST	Foundational & Short-term Activities	TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee
FCPU	Family and Child Protection Units	TMC	Transitional Military Council
FFS	Farmer Field Schools	UHC	Universal Health Coverage
FIC	Feinstein International Center (Tufts University)	UNAMID	United Nations African-Union Mission in Darfur
FMOH	Federal Ministry of Health	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
GDMA	Greater Darfur Microfinance Apex	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	UNDF	UN Fund for Development, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
GIZ	German Corporation for International Cooperation	UN-Habitat	United National Human Settlement Programme
GLTN	Global Land Tenure Network	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GoS	Government of Sudan	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission	UNPBF	United Nations Peace Building Fund
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace	UWA	Urban Water Administrations
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country	VDC	Village Development Committee
IDP	Internally displaced persons	VRRC	Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission
ILO	International Labor Organization	VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
INGO	International non-governmental organizations	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
IOM	International Organization for Migration	WEK	Wadi El Ku Project
IRDS	Innovative Relief and Development Solutions	WES	Water and Environmental Sanitation
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management	WFP	World Food Programme
JPROL	Joint Programme for the Rule of Law & Human Rights	WHO	World Health Organization
MFI	Micro-Finance Institutions		
MIS	Management Information Systems		
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation		
MMTA	Market Monitoring and Trade Analysis		
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding		
NA	Native Administration		
NCDs	Non-communicable Diseases		

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I. Executive Summary

The Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) launched in 2013 and covering the period until 2019 constitutes a comprehensive analysis of peace, recovery and reconstruction needs and a strategy articulating key priorities, objectives and financial requirements for addressing root causes of conflict, promoting a transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery, and laying foundations for sustainable development. The DDS responded directly to Article 31 of the *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur* (DDPD) signed in July 2011, which outlined a range of priorities for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and was developed in 2012 through a multi-stakeholder Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) called for in Article 32 of the DDPD. At the end of 2018, the Government of Sudan (GoS), the United Nations (UN) and international partners agreed to undertake a comprehensive review of the DDS in order to assess progress and lessons learned, and to develop a revised DDS as the basis for strengthening and enhancing national and international efforts to guide peace and development efforts in Darfur. Although interrupted by the events in Sudan of April-July 2019, the team of experts commissioned to lead and facilitate this exercise completed the review of the DDS, the conclusions, findings and recommendations of which are summarized in this report. Volume II of this report contains the full reports for the review of each DDS pillar.

Brief Overview of the 2013-2019 Darfur Development Strategy (DDS)

The overall goal of the DDS was to provide a “sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan for equitable, sustainable and participatory development, vital to move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future”.¹ It emerged at a time of heightened optimism about the prospects for peace in Darfur, and the potential window of opportunity the DDPD provided to end the conflict, and directly responded to Darfuri requests for support to resume normal economic life and address historical drivers of underdevelopment. The DDS was transformational in its approach, seeking to address root causes of conflict, vulnerability and under-development and break a context of aid dependence by shifting the focus of international efforts from humanitarian assistance to development.

The programmatic component of the DDS, which outlines the specific strategies for addressing the priorities identified in Article 31 of the DDPD and assessed through the 2012 DJAM, is articulated in the form of three inter-connected ‘pillars’, namely Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; Reconstruction; and Economic Recovery. Within each of these three pillars, the DDS foresaw a sequenced approach including ‘foundational and short-term activities’ (FaST), comprising those interventions needed to provide the building blocks for long-term recovery and development programs; and the longer-term interventions required to achieve systemic and sustainable recovery and development outcomes.

The overall financing requirement for the DDS was estimated at US\$ 7.25 billion, of which US\$ 177.4 was required for FaST activities. At the international donor conference on Darfur organized in April 2013, US\$ 3.8 billion was pledged, including US\$ 2.75 billion from the Government of Sudan.² Between 2013-2019, US\$ 711.3 million was committed by international partners and US\$ 350 million³ allocated by the GoS for peace

¹ Darfur Regional Authority (2013). *Developing Darfur, 2013-2019: A Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy*. Khartoum. All further references to this document are denoted as ‘the DDS’.

² For present purposes, all references to financing mobilized against the overall objectives of the DDS denote international funding.

³ US\$ 350 million was the total financial allocation by the GoS, but the actual programmable amount was considerably lower (an estimated 65-70% of the total) due to deductions related to financing costs, VAT, charges and fees, and supervision overhead. Source: Communications with DRDF staff, October 2019.

and development interventions which directly and indirectly respond to the DDS strategy and specific Pillar priorities.

Figure 1				
Overview of DDS Funding Requirements and Actual Estimates				
DDS Pillar	Total Estimated Financial Requirements	Foundational & Short-term Activities (included in total requirements)	International Funding Committed (2013-2019)	GoS Funding Allocations
Pillar I: Governance, Justice & Reconciliation	\$845 million	\$25.50 million	\$146.1 million	\$ 350 million ⁴
Pillar II: Reconstruction	\$5,000 million	\$132.90 million	\$392.8 million	
Pillar III: Economic Recovery	\$1,400 million	\$19.00 million	\$172.4 million	
Total	\$7.245 billion	\$177.40 million	\$711.3 million⁵	\$350 million

Overall Impact and Effectiveness of the DDS

In 2013 when the DDS was launched there was considerable optimism that the DDPD could herald the start of transition to peace and development in Darfur. The DDS reflected this optimism in the ambitiousness of its objectives and approach, which were predicated on a comprehensive strategy for addressing root causes of conflict, inequality and underdevelopment. Unfortunately, the DDPD did not live up to expectations of serving as an all-encompassing framework for peace, and 2013-2019 period was marked by continued conflict, violence and insecurity and an environment that was not conducive for large-scale governance, institutional and economic reforms and programmes. Although numerous development-oriented interventions were implemented in Darfur during this period, the DDS failed to serve as a programmatic framework to guide and monitor efforts.

Developing an accurate assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the DDS in relation to its original vision and strategic objectives is extremely challenging. Many national and international stakeholders highlighted the usefulness of the DDS sectoral assessments and the pillar strategies in informing some of their efforts, as well as the continued relevance and salience of the overall DDS strategy and specific priorities as originally formulated. At the same time, the prevailing political context in Darfur and Sudan as a whole constrained its role and effectiveness in achieving meaningful results and impacts on peacebuilding, recovery and development trajectories, or in facilitating more coherent international and national efforts. Many of the contextual and sectoral challenges, priorities and needs identified during the DJAM and reflected in the DDS still remain. While a number of development interventions aligned directly and indirectly to the DDS have been implemented during the 2013-2019 period (corresponding to 10% of the total financing needed for the DDS if only international financing is considered, and 15% inclusive of GoS financing), these have not been sufficient to achieve meaningful and transformational outcomes at scale as originally intended. For the most part, efforts across the three pillars have been significantly fragmented, uncoordinated and highly projectized, with little evidence that the GoS and donors strategically aligned, prioritized and linked their financing with DDS pillar and sectoral strategies. While some projects have achieved important results, including from a learning perspective, overall financing and the scope of interventions was not sufficient to achieve meaningful impact at scale in relation to pillar objectives.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for a Future DDS

With the current transition in Sudan and prospects for peace in Darfur once more at the forefront of national and international efforts, the experience of the 2013-2019 DDS provides valuable lessons that could inform the

⁴ No information was made available to the review team regarding GoS projects and the distribution of GoS funds against pillars. As a result, the Review Team was unable to evaluate GoS funded-projects as part of the overall assessment at pillar level.

⁵ Calculations were based off detailed mapping of donor projects during DDS time period of 2013-2019. For all projects reported in foreign currencies, the USD conversion was calculated based off the project start date. Where a month and date was not available, the year average was used. Where no date information was available, the October 2nd, 2019 rate was used.

development of a new strategy for peace and development. Accordingly, the following recommendations can be highlighted:

- ***A future DDS should be calibrated to the prevailing political, social and economic context, and based on an in-depth understanding of constraints and opportunities.*** In the context of Darfur, transition to development will be a long-term process beset by significant challenges. A future DDS should not aim to provide a comprehensive and long-term ‘masterplan’ for recovery and development, but rather offer a roadmap for addressing urgent recovery and development needs critical for strengthening resilience, promoting peacebuilding and laying foundations for longer-term development and institution building.
- ***Ensuring longer-term accountability for peacebuilding and recovery priorities, while linking these to national systems, reforms and policies is critical.*** Linking a peacebuilding and recovery strategy to a single peace plan can undermine national and international ownership and engagement, particularly if the latter does not succeed. While ensuring appropriate linkages with peace processes and transition arrangements, a future DDS should have an independent anchoring in broader national and international frameworks and commitments.
- ***Darfuri stakeholders should be involved across the design and implementation phases of the DDS.*** This will help to both obtain broad stakeholder participation and inputs on needs and priorities, as well as in the review and validation of draft strategies and programmes, both of which are essential to fostering and sustaining engagement, awareness and buy-in. Facilitating participation of those actors marginalized and most affected by the conflict should be a priority.
- ***A future DDS should take into account how policy, legal and other prerequisites for achieving results will be achieved.*** A future DDS should include a clear strategy for addressing the policy, legislative and regulatory prerequisites for the priorities articulated across the three pillars. It should also include explicit guidance and be linked to a political process to ensure that DDS priorities are directly integrated into national and state level plans, ministerial programmes and budgetary processes.
- ***It is essential that a future national body for the DDS be accorded with a clear legal and institutional mandate.*** A future national body for the DDS should be linked to the executive with cross-governmental authority; possess sufficient institutional capacity to undertake the range of coordination, technical and representational functions; and be established for the duration of the peacebuilding and recovery plan. The international community should provide expertise and capacity development support as necessary.
- ***Securing sustained stakeholder engagement will be essential to the success of a future DDS.*** A clear political strategy as part of the DDS design process is needed aimed at securing consensus on the key strategy, policy and institutional aspects of the strategy, as well as the development of a framework to establish clear accountabilities and responsibilities for implementation. With respect to the latter, some form of mutual accountability framework or ‘compact’ could be considered to define and formalize international and national stakeholder commitments in the implementation of a future DDS.
- ***The DDS and its constituent pillars should be based on over-arching theory of change that explains what changes are expected, the assumptions and conditions that need to be met, and the sequence of actions and interventions that are needed in this regard.*** Providing a causal logic to the presentation of objectives and how these need to be addressed provides a basis for both prioritising interventions and coordinating national and international efforts. It also provides a clear framework for monitoring and reporting on progress and outcomes. Pillar and sectoral strategies and interventions should be built around the short to medium term timeframe of the DDS, phasing programs over time.
- ***A future DDS should be based on the assumption that conditions and needs will invariably change and evolve over a six-year period.*** A future DDS should also be designed as an adaptable and dynamic framework, which takes into account both possible changes to post-conflict and transition timeframes, and facilitates responsiveness to risks and changing circumstances. This will allow stakeholders to continuously adjust priorities and programmes as well as better manage risks to the strategy. Assumptions - including conditions that need to be in place to enable certain interventions or outcomes - should also be addressed in a dynamic manner, notably through the inclusion of scenario-based planning and the flexibility to adjust and revise strategies accordingly.

- ***A future DDS should include sufficient provision for the early stages of its implementation.*** This can include the continuation of the team responsible for development of the DDS, with responsibilities reconfigured towards implementation, as well as the prioritisation of essential ‘start-up’ activities. These arrangements are essential to avoid a loss of momentum following the planning phase, and ensure a clear strategy on how priorities will be translated into programmatic, organizational and financial processes.
- ***A future DDS should have a support system built into the governance structure, with adequate support from the international community.*** High level advisory and strategic bodies (‘apex’ bodies) require a support structure if they are able to carry out their functions effectively. At the minimum this should consist of an adequately staffed and resourced technical secretariat with delegated coordination, monitoring and supervision responsibilities. It should also consist of a technical level body that is responsible for ensuring movement across the pillars in the coordination and alignment of efforts. It should not be automatically assumed that national coordination structures can carry out the entirety of these functions, particularly in the early stages of implementation, highlighting the importance of international expertise and capacity building support.
- ***Financing arrangements in a future DDS should reflect broad stakeholder consensus and commitment.*** The principle upon which the DDS financing architecture was based—the need for a holistic approach to financing that sought alignment across funding instruments against common priorities—was sound, but not properly articulated or operationalized. Operationalizing this approach in a future DDS should include the establishment of a ‘funding board’ consisting of key donors and government, and comprehensive financing strategy defining funding needs and facilitating coordination and monitoring. The multi-window Darfur Facility as originally envisioned should be revisited, with emphasis on expanding funding windows under the management of the government and other development partners.

Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

The overall objective of DDS Pillar 1 is to improve governance by building representative, responsive and effective government institutions accountable to communities wishing to transition from conflict and displacement towards recovery and reconstruction. Pillar 1 targeted improved access to justice, land reform, and reconciliation at community and higher levels. As the table below shows, just over 17% of the funds targeted under the DDS were allocated by international donors, with conflict resolution and peacebuilding receiving the most significant proportion (over 75%) of the available funds.⁶ It is unclear what GoS funding was allocated to Pillar 1 objectives, and is therefore not included in this analysis.

Figure 2
Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

Thematic areas	Objectives	Financing Needs (US\$ millions)	Actual Financing international (US\$ millions),
Governance and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes • Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level • Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery • Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue • Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable 	\$425	\$10.1
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established • People having access to a compensation system and compensation 	\$140	\$104.9
Land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms 	\$55	\$6.1

⁶ Because no pillar breakdown of GoS funds was possible due to lack of available information, financial figures and tables in this and subsequent sections refers only to international financing committed and disbursed.

Rule of law and access to justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to justice (Gender balanced) • Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised armed forces (including special groups) • Security Sector Reform implemented 	\$225	\$25.1
Funding Totals		\$845	\$146.1

Overall Findings

Generally, programming and achievements in Pillar 1 sectors have been modest relative to DDS objectives. Recovery and development needs remain critical, as highlighted in the key developments section. International financing aligned with Pillar 1 objectives amounted to a small proportion of needs identified in the DDS (US\$ 146.1 million out of a total of US\$ 845 million). While the DDS articulated relevant strategic priorities, it did not succeed in galvanizing coherent efforts or strengthening sectoral coordination.

In the governance sector, progress in improving institutional systems and capacities across public delivery, local governance and public financial management systems was extremely limited, although some good practice was developed in individual basic services sectors. In the rule of law sector, while political and contextual constraints limited impacts, UN assistance led to progress including increased numbers of rural courts and cases resolved, development of responses to SGBV, and legal reform. In the peacebuilding sector, no progress occurred on compensation. An effective locality and state level peace architecture, and processes to address root causes of conflict and critical issues such as land occupation were generally not developed.

Progress at community level was secured through integrated models which combined governance and dispute resolution mechanisms and capacities with tangible inputs such as infrastructure and livelihoods, designed to meet community needs and address local drivers of conflict. Results in areas of operation included effective processes for resolution of local disputes, which supported a fragile social peace. Interaction between groups, trust and social cohesion appears to have increased. Community governance mechanisms supported management of natural resources and collective capacities for participatory planning. Civil society skills and networks were developed, and new community based organisations set up. There are examples of inclusive participation and increased roles and voice for women and youth. Instances of women accessing justice through human rights based and paralegal support in the community emerged.

Limitations in programming and results reflected both the ambitious nature of DDS objectives, and the lack of an enabling environment. Key DDS assumptions proved to be unrealistic. Critical constraints included the political context, lack of an inclusive peace agreement between GoS and armed opposition and a governance model which prioritized control from the center and regime survival. Lack of a clear framework for decentralization and for institutional mandates at different levels curtailed governance reform. Limitations in donor coherence, and shared root causes analysis and strategic planning was a further factor, with support in some areas projectized and fragmented. Operational constraints included the economic crisis, limited implementing partner capacity and difficulties in access to remote areas. Pillar 1 concerns emerged as key barriers to return. These include lack of political and technical solutions to land occupation, limitations in security and justice provision, and in capacities to coordinate and plan across basic services sectors.

The state remained unable to meet human needs and to ensure equitable access to resources, and responsive and accountable governance. Such capacity is necessary if impacts of environmental and demographic change are to be managed. These are governance challenges which need to be addressed by effective institutions. Systematic holistic reform of public delivery, local governance and PFM bodies, calibrated according to political conditions, to develop streamlined clear institutional frameworks and capacities is needed. This requires political will and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at locality and state level; and harmonized development partner efforts, with transition to support through GoS systems. Improved capacity at locality level is critical, along with coordination across basic service sectors.

The new political dispensation under the Constitutional Declaration mandates an increased focus on accountability processes, community engagement and empowering people to claim entitlements. Harmonized support to civil society and community governance would support this.

Building on results and lessons of integrated community models, and the knowledge of key I/NGO implementing partners could lead to harmonized integrated approaches to sustainable development at community level, incorporating consensus and peacebuilding over natural resources and basic services. Inclusive work with all groups, on an area, possibly eco-systems basis is suggested.

In line with Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, issues of land occupation and compensation need to be addressed through dialogue and negotiation processes above community level. Needs for protection, access to justice and responsive police and justice sector institutions remain critical. In the rule of law sector, Constitutional Declaration commitments endorse the centrality of human rights, the fight against impunity and accountability principles. Legal and institutional reform is needed to deliver impartial, independent institutions. An increased focus on access to justice in the community, and ensuring service provision is driven by community needs is suggested.

Underlying causes of gender inequality and lack of access for women to political and economic resources and decision-making roles need to be understood and addressed, and women’s organisations and networks empowered to work strategically together. Youth representatives stressed to the review team not their needs, but their wish to be agents of change and implementers of future DDS activities. Top down approaches, and lack of understanding of the growing influence of youth structures in some contexts prevent this important potential being realized.

Pillar 2: Reconstruction

The primary goal of the Reconstruction Pillar of the DDS is to “support the recovery and stabilization of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life have been severely disrupted”⁷. Specifically, the Pillar contains eight high-level objectives, whose associated costed results framework form the core of the Pillar Strategy. These objectives are grouped into the following three interrelated *thematic areas*: basic services; returns, reintegration and urbanization; and large-scale transport and energy infrastructure development. As the table below shows, less than 9% of the funds targeted under the DDS were made available for Pillar 2 investments through international financing, with basic services receiving the majority of Pillar 2 funding (93.4%) and infrastructure receiving less than 1% of total Pillar funding. While a breakdown of GoS funds is not possible, many of the projects financed were infrastructure and service-oriented, which means that the real level of investment for pillar 2 is likely higher than assessed here.

Figure 3			
Pillar II: Reconstruction			
Thematic Area	Objectives	Financing Needs (US\$ millions)	Actual International Financing (US\$ millions)
Basic Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation • Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services • Improved access to and quality of education 	1,720	367
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services 	255	8.5

⁷ Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013). ‘2013-2019 Developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.’ Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

Infrastructure Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to electricity services • Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services 	3,025	17.3
Funding Totals		5,000	392.8

Overall Findings

Most of the goals for Pillar 2 presented in the current DDS were wholly or partially unrealized. This is partly due to the fact that international financing for Pillar 2 objectives amounted to only a fraction of the total needs identified in the current DDS budget (8% of the total required). It also reflects the lack of a conducive environment for many of the investments and reforms that would have been necessary for significant progress in the Pillar 2 sectors. As a result, humanitarian funding (which has not been accounted for in the following analysis) continued to play a predominant role in meeting needs related to Pillar 2—particularly with respect to basic services. This helped to address short-term requirements of Darfur populations, but insufficiently laid the groundwork for sustainable development in the sectors. As a result, the recovery and long-term development needs in each of Pillar 2’s thematic areas remain critical.

The ambitious and—in hindsight—overly optimistic planning that characterized the DDS is particularly apparent in several prominent areas of Pillar 2. For example, the strong assumption in the DDS that there would be rapid, large-scale returns to areas of origin following the signing of the DDPD did not occur. The number of IDPs in protracted displacement is nearly the same as in 2013, owing largely to the fact that key pre-conditions for returns (primarily security, access to land and basic services) have not been met in many areas. In addition, current trends highlight that the number of IDPs who will choose to stay in the current areas of urban displacement will be significant, a fact which was recognized but underemphasized in the current DDS. Similarly, much of Pillar 2’s proposed programming was centered on a massive public works campaign to deliver dramatically improved transport, energy and WASH infrastructure across the five states. Only a very small fraction of international and government financing needed for this work was ever mobilized. Moreover, even if the billions of dollars in funding required for these works would have materialized, the ability of communities and local and state government to absorb, appropriate and sustainably manage these investments in such a short time is questionable.

The division of the DDS into short-term FaST programming and longer-term priorities make good sense in theory, particularly for Pillar 2’s infrastructure-related sectors. However, while the DDS envisioned these short-term projects taking place within one year to 18 months, many took multiple years to launch and then complete, given the complexities of working in Darfur. This is another example of the more realistic approach to planning that needs to be taken into account for future programming.

Despite the challenges noted above, a handful of innovative development projects in several sectors under Pillar 2, including WASH infrastructure, road repair, health, and education provide a template for how high-impact and cost-effective development-oriented programming in infrastructure and basic services could be carried out at scale. Looking forward, programming for Pillar 2 in a future DDS should also be more realistic about the quantity of near-term funds that would be available for development programming in Darfur, prioritizing more modestly scaled, integrated interventions.

As opposed to the large, stand-alone public works campaign envisioned in the current DDS, infrastructure investments should be closely integrated into area-based and community-driven programs linked to other sectors across all three Pillars. This will both ensure that given infrastructure outlays contribute to broader development goals and that there is a greater likelihood of being sustainably managed. This applies to infrastructure related to basic services (WASH, education and health), as well as transport and energy-related infrastructure.

For returns programming, a future DDS should recognize that holistic, multi-sectoral programming over longer periods of time will likely be necessary to address the root causes currently impeding large-scale returns. Progress on the displacement issue will require significant increases in multi-year, multi-sectoral funding. Lessons from the few successful projects in the sphere highlight that achieving durable solutions takes time and

resources, and funding needs to be adjusted to meet these realities on the ground. To do so effectively, returns programming should be integrated as a transversal theme throughout peacebuilding, livelihoods and natural resources management initiatives. This will facilitate a shift away from viewing returns as a one-off assistance package, and instead recognize returns as a longer-term development outcome that needs to be carefully fostered through a multi-sectoral approach, if it is to be durable. A future DDS should also anticipate and plan for a significant percentage of IDP households preferring to integrate within the urban areas in which they have been living for the past decade or more. Proactive, pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure and urban planning can ensure that cities and towns in Darfur are able to not just manage this integration but improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike.

Finally, a strengthened knowledge base for Pillar 2 sectors is also critical. An updated census is badly needed to inform basic services programming, as mentioned by a number of informants across sectors during the Review. Similarly, improved displacement programming needs to be based on accurate intentions data, and a scaling up of the Durable Solutions Working Group’s experiences with IDP profiling should thus be explored.

Pillar 3: Economic Recovery

The main objective of Pillar 3 is described as contributing positively towards poverty alleviation and a transition to development through a three-pronged approach that includes support to rural and urban livelihoods; enhancing the business environment, including through access to financing and private sector development; and improving sustainability of productive sectors through better natural resource management. Overall, 12% of the total financing requirements in the original DDS were met through international development financing.

Figure 4			
Pillar III: Economic Recovery			
Thematic Area	Objectives	Financing Needs (US\$ millions)	International financing committed (US\$ millions)
Economy, Business & Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity Increase access to financial services 	340	28
Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources 	265	33
Rural Livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements Improved crop and livestock production and productivity 	675	82.6
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased access to employment opportunities (gender-balanced) 	120	28.8
	Funding Totals	1,400	172.4

Overall Findings

Generally, the programming and achievements in the last six years that relate to Pillar 3 have been modest compared with the DDS objectives. This is due both to the overly ambitious scope of Pillar 3 objectives, and the lack of a broader enabling environment due to the inability of the DDPD to deliver peace and stability in Darfur.

Economy, business and trade. Despite the DDS objective of creating an enabling business environment, in the last six years a ‘disabling’ business environment has prevailed in Darfur, exacerbated by the seriousness and depth of the macro-economic crisis. The war economy has become entrenched during the years of protracted conflict with the involvement of the state security institutions in resource extraction, production and trade in

some of Darfur's most productive sectors. This, and other factors such as high levels of taxation and the imposition of fees have been major constraints to private sector development, none of which the DDS was able to address. Indeed, few of the DDS sub-objectives intended to improve the business enabling environment in Darfur were implemented.

More progress has been made in meeting the DDS objective of improving value chains, although this has been on a small-scale compared with the potential and the outputs envisaged; there is considerable scope for expansion. Initiatives to strengthen the private sector in Darfur have been on a very small-scale compared with the ambitious sub-objectives of Pillar 3, although there have been a small number of positive experiments of public-private partnerships involving the corporate sector from Central Sudan that offer rich learning. There is a large unmet demand and potential for microfinance. The DDS objectives and ambition for microfinance are significantly behind schedule. More progress has been made in setting up SLAs at community level with revolving funds. Paving of the El Ingaz road has arguably had the greatest impact on trade in the last six years although it was not a specific objective of the DDS.

Natural resource management (NRM). Natural resources are at the heart of Darfur's economy and NRM is key to much development programming. This is essentially about governance, but progress in this area is modest compared with the DDS objectives with some isolated successes such as the East Darfur legislative model for natural resource management. Interventions in this area need to be long-term, addressing community institutions, relationships between different groups and behavioral change. The demarcation of pastoralist livestock migration routes has been a component of many projects but too often depends upon an engineering approach demarcating a fixed physical route when it should be based on concepts of human interaction and negotiation between farming and pastoral communities.

Rural livelihoods. Most funding that indirectly aligns to Pillar 3 has gone into rural livelihoods programming, usually with the objective of building 'resilience'. Followed biases established in the early years of the humanitarian response, this is mostly focused on sedentary farmers and agro-pastoralists, with little engagement with pastoralists, except over managing access to natural resources. There is an urgent need to rebalance rural development programs to be more inclusive of pastoralist groups. Rural livelihoods programming must also better reflect how livelihoods have changed during the conflict years, for example with less specialization between groups and with the growth of irrigated agriculture around Darfur's main towns.

Integrated community-based development programming has been widely promoted in Darfur by donors and implementing agencies as an appropriate developmental approach generating multiplier effects. However, this integrated approach was not evident in the way the DDS was articulated. Nor was there adequate consideration of the relationships and power dynamics between different producer groups in rural areas, yet this is essential in a conflict/ post-conflict environment in which control over, and access to natural resources has been a major faultline. Some exploitative arrangements between different producer groups that developed during the conflict years have been largely overlooked and have thus continued unchallenged.

There is considerable learning and insights from resilience and rural livelihood programming in the last few years in Darfur, particularly from the Taadoud project, but cross-fertilisation between projects has been severely hampered by weak coordination. Overall, the DDS failed to provide a common vision or strategy for the development of rural livelihoods.

Urban livelihoods and youth employment. There have been a handful of projects addressing vocational training and youth employment. These fulfil a critical role but are small in number and coverage compared with the need. The capacity and sustainability of Vocational Training Institutes and Youth Centers are fundamentally affected by the weakness and political economy of the wider institutional environment. The disabling business environment is also a major constraint. Yet there is an opportunity to learn across projects through a comparative study of the different approaches adopted, which could inform an overall strategy that brings coherence to interventions in this sector and builds upon best practice

Providing social protection to the poorest and most vulnerable was not part of the DDS, but is key to the humanitarian-development nexus, and must be informed by a sound understanding of customary systems for social protection, to complement and support rather than replace.

Overall findings. The learning from each different component of Pillar 3 underlines the importance of a systemic approach, whether natural resource management and catchment-based management systems, a market systems approach to developing trade, or a holistic and market-driven approach to youth employment. One-year ‘humanitarian-type’ grants are far too short for such work, and inappropriate for community-based development programming although this has been the funding model of some donors. It also requires more focus on strengthening institutions, working more closely in partnership with government, and building relations with and supporting communities over time. This can be challenging for agencies steeped in over a decade of humanitarian programming and principles in a highly politicized conflict environment. Above all, it requires different skillsets and different mindsets, both on the part of agencies but also the communities they are working with who may have been the recipients of years of relief hand-outs.

II. Introduction and background to the review

The Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) launched in 2013 and covering the period until 2019 constitutes a comprehensive analysis of peace, recovery and reconstruction needs and a strategy articulating key priorities, objectives and financial requirements for addressing root causes of conflict, promoting a transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery, and laying foundations for sustainable development. The DDS responded directly to Article 31 of the *Doha Document for Peace in Darfur* (DDPD) signed in July 2011, which outlined a range of priorities for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and was developed in 2012 through a multi-stakeholder Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) called for in Article 32 of the DDPD. At the end of 2018, the Government of Sudan (GoS), the United Nations (UN) and international partners agreed to undertake a comprehensive review of the DDS in order to review progress and lessons learned, and to develop a revised DDS as the basis for strengthening and enhancing national and international efforts to guide peace and development efforts in Darfur.

To undertake the review of the existing DDS and preparation of its successor, TRIAS Consult was contracted in February 2019, with the following objectives agreed with the DDS Steering Committee:

- Review the 2013-2019 DDS, including progress achieved, challenges and constraints, and identify key lessons learned;
- Assess developments in Darfur since 2013, including identification of key priorities for supporting peace and enabling development.
- Develop a reprioritized and sequenced DDS for the 2020-2025 period, articulating a clear strategy for supporting peace and development in Darfur, and modalities for effective implementation and financing.

TRIAS deployed a team of 8 Sudanese and international experts who commenced work on 2 March 2019 (hereafter referred to as the Review Team). During the inception phase of activities, which took place that month, the Review Team developed an overall methodology and workplan divided into two phases. The review of the 2013-2019 DDS was intended to be undertaken between March-June 2019, and the preparation of the revised DDS was intended to be undertaken between June-August 2019. The escalation of the crisis in Sudan in April and subsequent political and security developments delayed the work and posed a number of constraints to the approach and methodology as originally foreseen. In its meeting of 20 June, the DDS Steering Committee decided to continue the review phase of the assignment and to reformulate the planning phase based on a new timeline and new deliverables, with the development of the revised DDS being postponed.

The present report, consisting of two volumes, presents the results of the review of the 2013-2019 DDS. It has been developed following a methodological approach that was modified mid-course, and under significant constraints and challenges. The following sections of this chapter provide an overview of the methodology utilized in undertaking the review; key constraints and challenges encountered; and the structure of the review report.

A. Methodology for the Review of the 2013-2019 DDS

The methodology for the review of the 2013-2019 DDS was originally designed to be a comprehensive, inclusive and highly consultative process of data collection, analysis, and consultation at both Khartoum and Darfur levels, facilitated and supported by the Review Team. This methodology responded to three core objectives: a) review the evolution of the situation in Darfur as it pertains to challenges, needs and priorities across the three DDS pillars; b) assess the progress, results and lessons learned of national and international efforts in addressing peace and development priorities; and c) identify priorities for strengthening peace and development efforts in the post-2019 period.

The original methodological approach developed in March 2019 and adopted by the DDS Steering Committee was comprised of three basic components, which together were meant to ensure a highly participatory and consultative assessment process, and the development of an analysis and conclusions that represented a

consensus view among Sudanese, Darfuri and international stakeholders. This original methodology was composed of:

- The establishment of three Pillar Working Groups, co-led by representatives of the GoS and the international community, and comprised of key national and international stakeholders, which would, under the overall facilitation and coordination of the Review Team, support the collection of data, analysis and preparation of reports in line with the review objectives. These Pillar Working Groups were further divided into sub-groups focusing on specific thematic areas and objectives of each DDS Pillar;
- The organization of extensive consultations with Darfuri stakeholders in each Darfur state, with the aim of obtaining inputs on the review objectives as well as required data and information. This included sensitization and scoping visits to the Darfur states (undertaken in March-April); organization of consultation workshops in each Darfur state; organization of focus group discussions with particular stakeholder groups in Darfur; and commissioning of specific inputs from Darfuri experts and stakeholders.
- A comprehensive review and validation of the DDS review findings organized around a mid-point workshop, at which there would be participation of stakeholders from both Khartoum and Darfur levels, with the intention of ensuring broad consensus on the key conclusions, findings and recommendations of the review.

Unfortunately, due to the events in Sudan between April-June 2019, the methodology as originally envisioned was not able to be carried out. While the Pillar Working Groups were established and began work, this was interrupted and only partially completed due to the departure of many members, logistical and security constraints to the organization of meetings, and the inability of the international members of the Review Team to travel to Khartoum. These events also precluded the organization of consultations in Darfur as originally intended (with the exception of the sensitization visits).

In view of these challenges, the DDS Steering Committee in its meeting of 20 June 2019 decided that the review should proceed, albeit with the following modified methodology:

- Inputs received to date from the Pillar Working Groups would be utilized and supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders, review of literature and additional data collection conducted by the Review Team;
- The review report would be developed and completed by the Review Team, and not through the Pillar Working Groups as originally foreseen.
- The report would be submitted and reviewed by the DDS Steering Committee, and not presented, reviewed or validated (for the time being) through a workshop as originally foreseen.

B. Constraints and Challenges Encountered

The Review Team faced a number of constraints and challenges which affected their ability to conduct a comprehensive, evidence-based and detailed review of the 2013-2019 DDS. These included:

- Limitations in the availability of high-quality, disaggregated and verifiable data and access to documents on issues addressed across all three pillars at both Darfur and Khartoum levels, due to political, circumstantial, and technical factors. No DDS-specific monitoring, reviews and evaluation have been undertaken (beyond the UNDF), which further hampered data collection.
- Inconsistent and non-inclusive composition and participation of national and international stakeholders in the Pillar Working Groups and associated Sub-Groups, which worsened following the April events due to the absence of government participants and a reduction in participation by other groups, including INGOs and donors.
- While the inputs provided by the PWGs (in the form of review notes) often provided extensive information and analysis, lack of access to key interlocutors and the inability of the Review Team to work in Khartoum precluded adequate triangulation and verification of data.
- Planned stakeholder workshops and other consultative activities in Darfur and Khartoum, intended to provide further information, analysis and review of findings, were not possible. Lack of interaction with Darfuri stakeholders was an important limitation.

- Provision of incomplete and sufficiently disaggregated data on GoS and international financing for interventions directly and indirectly aligned with the DDS.

The individual Pillar Review Reports contained in Volume II provide further details on specific challenges and constraints. This review report should be read with these factors in mind.

C. Structure of the Review Report

The Review of the 2013-2019 is comprised of two volumes. Volume 1 (this document) provides a consolidated overview of review findings, while Volume 2 provides the three DDS Pillar Review Reports in their entirety.

Volume 1: Consolidated DDS Review Report

This volume contains the following chapters:

- **Chapter III** provides a review of key developments in Darfur between 2013-2019, summarized from the individual Pillar Review reports, with a focus on key sectoral trends, challenges and risks, and current priorities and needs.
- **Chapter IV** provides an overall assessment of the strategic framing, relevance and impact of the DDS, with specific focus on its objectives, scope and overall approach; and major challenges and constraints encountered.
- **Chapter V** provides an overview of progress, achievements, limitations and lessons learned in each of the DDS Pillars, including overall findings and observations on alignment of interventions with the DDS and the organization of efforts within each pillar.
- **Chapter VI** provides a review of the DDS governance and financing architecture, with an overview of progress and challenges encountered, and an analysis of resources mobilized against original funding requirements;
- **Chapter VII** provides a set of concluding observations and recommendations, both general and Pillar-specific, with a view to informing reflection and planning on the future DDS.

Volume 2: DDS Pillar Review Reports

This volume contains the following chapters:

- Review of Pillar 1: Governance and Accountability
- Review of Pillar 2: Reconstruction
- Review of Pillar 3: Economic Recovery

III. Key developments in Darfur 2013-2019

Since independence in the mid-1950s, the Sudanese ruling elites were faced with managing the formation of the Sudanese nation and building state institutions effective in delivering development goods. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 marked a turning point in the history of the Sudanese state. The failed transition following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 left the remaining regions of Sudan embroiled in old and new patterns of conflict⁸. Mimicking the role of South Sudan, conflict in Darfur stood out as a major threat to Khartoum ruling elites following 2011. The signing of the Doha Peace Agreement in 2011 came to embody commitments by Sudan government as well as regional and international actors to deal with the root causes of conflict in the region.

Historically, one of the major drivers for conflict in Darfur has been conflict over resources, particularly claims over tenure, control and use of land and the related resources. Additional factors include serious ethnic divisions among the Darfuri population, and the related differences in livelihood systems (farmers and pastoralists). The situation was aggravated by the historical claims and grievances against the central government in Khartoum by many regions in the periphery related to underdevelopment and marginalization in access to infrastructure and essential services, as well as the overall failure of the GoS to enable effective, transparent and just governance. By 2002 this had developed into full-fledged civil strife between the central government and Darfurian rebel groups, leading to a serious break down of the social fabric in Darfur.

In late 2005, the GOS and the Darfur rebel groups, namely the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)-Mini Minawi and (SLM)-Abdel Wahid, were engaged in peace talks under the auspices of the African Union (AU) mediation team. On May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by the government and Mini Minawi's faction. JEM and SLM-Abdel Wahid rejected this agreement. The DPA was met with widespread opposition within the IDPs and Minawi's group. Eventually, the DPA collapsed and Mini Minawi resumed his rebellion against the GoS. 2006 to 2011 was characterized by a continuous splitting among the Darfurian rebel groups.

On July 14, 2011, following the stakeholder consultation in Qatar, The GOS and Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) brokered by Qatar and the African Union. From the start, the DDPD provided a shaky foundation for peace. The other rebel factions of Menni, Jibril and Abdukwahed rejected the agreement, as this was seen by them and many other Darfurian political and civil society as a partial settlement that did not address the fundamental and root causes of conflict.

The DDPD created a new reality by establishing the Darfur Regional authority (DRA) and two new states i.e. East and Central Darfur States. However, there remained a serious lack of coherence within this institutional set up, lack of trust between the states and (DRA) authorities, and lack of coordination due to the confused and overlapping responsibilities between the Federal, Regional and State authorities. Both formal and informal structures of local governance in Darfur have been severely weakened by successive national governments. The two systems have been politicized by the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP). The systematic process of politicization and tribalization has resulted in local governance crisis in Darfur. There was wide dominant perception among the Darfurian activists and ordinary people that the DDPD was not people centered but was rather a political elite-centered document which resulted under the power sharing arrangements in some political and rebel leaders having cabinet positions in Khartoum, El Fashir and other Darfur states.

One of the ambitions of the people affected by war was the compensation and return of the IDPs and refugees. This ambition was never realized, and the majority of IDPs and refugees remain in camps, reliant on humanitarian support by the international community. Gold, seen as an important national resource, became a source of competition between economic and political elites. The economic crisis was complicated by the serious allegations of lack of accountability leveled at the DRA and state authorities.

⁸ Atta El-Battahani., (2013). *The Post-Secession State in Sudan: Building Coalitions or Deepening Conflicts*, in Gunnar Sorbo and Abdelgaffar M. Ahmed'. (eds) Sudan Divided: Continuing Conflict in a Contested State, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp25-44.

Sudan and Darfur reached a historic turning point following the uprisings and demonstrations across Sudan which began in late 2018. The recently signed (18th August 2019) constitutional document between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Transitional Military Council spell out that peace will be a priority in the upcoming six months. The Darfur is now represented by a civilian in the Supreme Council which will be the guardian for peacebuilding in Sudan, according to the constitutional document.

The Constitutional Document reserved Chapter 15 for the Comprehensive Peace Issues and states that during the transitional period, state agencies shall work on performing a number of peace related duties. The first duty spelt out in the document is “achieve a just and comprehensive peace, end the war by addressing the roots of Sudanese problem and handling its effects, taking into account the provisional preferential measures for regions affected by war and under developed regions, and treat issues of marginalization and vulnerable groups and the groups most harmed”. At least fifteen essential issues for peace negotiations were spelt out in the constitutional document. Top on the list among these issues are the security arrangements voluntary return and sustainable solutions for the issues of displaced persons and refugees; and issues of marginalization and vulnerable groups. These are important opportunities knowing that they all declared that peace is the utmost priority for the transitional government and should be concluded within the first six months.

Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

1. Governance and Accountability

During the 2013-2019 period in Darfur, there have been few positive achievements in the areas of governance, transparency and accountability, and little progress in enhanced citizens’ participation, peace and security and reconciliation, and rule of law. A key obstacle has been a “fiscal bargain” between previous central authorities (i.e. the Presidency⁹) and regional and local leaders and rebels in Darfur, which has been at the heart of Darfur’s governance architecture from 2013 to 2019. This fiscal bargain is characterised by short-term rent-seeking, rather than citizen-centred governance in which public servants are held accountable for the well-being of citizens and communities¹⁰, and has served the interests of central authorities and regional and local politicians and elites.

Central Government strategy towards Darfur focused on maintaining power through 2016 re-division of the Darfur states, counterinsurgency measures, constitutional amendment and legislative centralisation measures. Power bases have been fragmented, leaving states based on ethno-political forces. Political expediency compromised proper governance and financial management, and the state of emergency in Darfur and constitutional amendments between 2012-2018 consolidated the power of the Presidency leaving no room for meaningful federal government structures.

The lack of a clear framework for roles, responsibilities, and relationship between different levels of Government remains a challenge. Weak governance and institutional capacities constrained basic service delivery, though there was evidence of some uneven progress in the health sector as outlined in Pillar 2 below. The organisational autonomy of public agencies at the state and locality levels has eroded and been affected by severe resource constraints. This has impacted the delivery of public services and efforts to reform and strengthen state and locality administrations. Localities - entrusted formally with delivery of basic services - continued to lack adequate human resources, funding and capacity.

With limited revenues, state officials have been unable to meet basic recurring expenditures related to wages, salaries, and social subsidies, or continue the operation and maintenance of infrastructure and services. Almost no resources have been available for development, and the budgets of most line ministries have decreased each year. Central authorities remained the ultimate arbiter with respect to distribution of resources. The experience of Darfur states shows that fiscal transfers in Sudan remain relatively centralized. The transfer system is

⁹ The Inqaz regime underwent drastic change in the period post-secession of South Sudan, emerging as “personalist autocracy”, with Former President Bashir concentrating all powers in his hands.

¹⁰ For more details see; Asharf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, 2009, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding Fractured World, Oxford University Press.

fragmented, unevenly applied, and suffers from widespread exemptions. There is no systematic relationship between actual transfers to states and poverty reduction¹¹, or fair and equitable system of fiscal equalization. Fiscal decision-making autonomy of states and localities is limited and accountability is lacking.

The Constitutional Declaration establishes the nature of the Sudanese state for the transitional period as independent, sovereign, democratic, parliamentary, pluralist and decentralized, with rights and duties based on citizenship without discrimination due to race, religion, culture, sex, colour, gender, social or economic status, political opinion, disability, regional affiliation or any other cause¹². Chapter three outlines responsibilities of the three levels of government within the decentralized state, Federal, regional/state and local, including that the local level should promote broad popular participation and express basic needs of citizens.¹³ It also establishes that different levels of governance have both exclusive and shared competencies and powers, and resources, as determined by the law, and that until the geographical demarcation and distribution of powers and competencies between the levels of government is re-examined, the existing system shall remain in effect and executive governments shall be formed in the provinces, as determined by subsequent measures.

1.2 Conflict Dynamics and Conflict Resolution

There have been improvements in the security situation, and reduced levels of violence in most parts of Darfur since 2013. Reported fatalities in armed conflict fell from 3,996 in 2013 to 789 in 2017¹⁴. High levels of violence, with engagements between GoS and armed opposition groups, continued from 2013 until 2016. The strategic defeat of armed opposition groups by GoS forces during operations from 2014 - 2016 led to a ceasefire which largely held in most parts of Darfur since 2017. However, conflict between GoS and armed opposition groups has continued in the Jebel Marra area. New displacement of civilians occurred between 2013- 2016, and in the Jebel Marra region in 2018.

At the local level, inter-communal violence has reduced, and a fragile or negative 'social peace' has developed, reflecting factors including conflict fatigue. The current situation is one of 'no-war, no-peace' in which root causes of conflict have not been addressed, human rights abuses continue, and risks of a return to widespread violence persist. Patterns of armed violence persist. Data for 2017 shows reported incidents of armed violence related to militia (39%), intercommunal (20%), criminal (20%), military (15%) and UXO (6%) factors.¹⁵ Tribal and intercommunal disputes over resources, in particular land, remain a cause of conflict in Darfur. Disputes between clans continue and can occur over land, with incidence of revenge killings and breaching of tribal peace agreements. There are several such longstanding disputes which can flare up periodically, despite efforts to negotiate lasting settlements. Such conflicts may have political dimensions and links to elites, and can be impacted by political dynamics at the centre. Land occupation remains a barrier to return for IDP communities, and incidents of armed violence against IDP communities take place.

Conflict resolution and reconciliation processes at higher levels saw limited progress. Some leaders of armed groups and factions which are non-signatories of the DDPD engaged in the most recent national dialogue launched by the former President shortly before the uprising began in 2018. However, the lack of an inclusive peace agreement, and the failure of the parties to take forward key commitments including those related to transitional justice and compensation (for harm and for loss of land and property) continues to mar prospects for stability and development in Darfur. While there have been efforts to bring together conflicting tribal and ethnic groups around common concerns such as land and water resources, these have consisted for the most part of fragmented initiatives not connected to broader political processes. At the community level though weakened

¹¹ Mekki M. El Shibly, *Fiscal Transfers: Towards a Pro-poor System*, UNDP, Sudan, October, 2013.

¹² Draft Constitutional Charter for 2019 Transitional Period, translation by International IDEA, Chapter 1 General Provisions, Article 3

¹³ Chapter 3 article 8 a) The federal level, which exercises its powers to protect the sovereignty of Sudan and the integrity of its territory, and promote the welfare of its people by exercising powers on the national level; (b) The regional or provincial level, which exercises its powers on the level of regions or provinces as prescribed by subsequent measures; (c) The local level, which promotes broad popular participation and express the basic needs of citizens, and the law determines its structures and powers.

¹⁴ UN Security Council., (2017). *Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)*. December.

¹⁵ Ibid. Militia = armed violence involving SAF and Darfuri rebel groups, intercommunal = armed violence between communities, criminal = armed violence by individuals or organized crime gangs; military = armed violence involving SAF and Darfuri rebel groups; UXO = incidents involving explosive remnants of war and unintended explosions in munitions sites.

by conflict, Native Administration and traditional *juddiya* reconciliation mechanisms remain trusted and address many community level disputes. Development efforts have supported community based reconciliation mechanisms and capacities in some locations.

The withdrawal of UNAMID is a key issue for protection, stabilisation and conflict resolution in Darfur. In 2017 and 2018, the UN and AU decided to significantly reduce UNAMID troops, close most bases, and reconfigure the remainder of the mission to focus on protection of civilians in the Jebel Marra where the human rights and protection concerns were greatest. Full withdrawal of the mission was recommended for 2020 providing key benchmarks were met. In June 2019, the UN Security Council decided to extend for four months the mandate of UNAMID until 30 October, and to “temporarily and exceptionally” extended the period for the mission’s drawdown.¹⁶ The Security Council is expected to consider the mandate of UNAMID on 30 October.

2019 has seen an increase in tensions between farmers and herders, as well as inter-communal violence in some parts of Darfur. The Constitutional Declaration creates a new dispensation for addressing conflict in Sudan, including Darfur. Chapter 15 addresses issues related to achieving comprehensive peace and gives priority to reaching a peace agreement within 6 months of adoption of the Declaration. Commitments include facilitation of humanitarian assistance, release of prisoners of war, and ensuring transitional justice. Establishment of a peace commission is mandated by the Declaration.

1.3 Land Management and Reform

The DDPD committed to ensuring equitable access to land by different users, and to developing security of land tenure. It also includes commitments related to restitution and compensation for unlawful deprivation of land. Progress towards DDPD commitments has been limited, with land governance and conflict related to land remaining key challenges. A system of land tenure which can provide security, while being appropriate to patterns of land use in Darfur has not been established. Legal reform has been initiated at state level but not implemented. Land occupation remains a barrier to returns for IDPs, with no progress on compensation for loss of land and property. While operationalization of the Darfur Land Commission (DLC), and some dispute resolution initiatives proceeded, administration remains weak, particularly at locality level.

Legal, policy and administrative frameworks: The legal situation remains uncertain, ambiguous and plural, with “an overlapping combination of federal legislation, rules introduced by the judiciary, customary laws, and *Sharia* law”¹⁷. Legislative and policy developments since 2013 have not resolved the limitations of the legal framework, although draft legislation has been developed at state level. Institutional arrangements for addressing land issues remain fragmentary and under-capacitated. Both formal and traditional bodies play a role, but neither are empowered or adequately linked, and locality level land departments lack capacity to provide land services accessible to communities. The DLC has wide responsibilities, including land use planning, data collection, research, arbitration and compensation assessments,¹⁸ but it has not had a significant impact on improving land governance to date.

Land tenure and allocation: The land tenure situation is complex and inconsistent.¹⁹ Most communities continue to access land under the customary *hakura* system, without formally registered land titles. The limitations of the traditional system present in 2013 remain. The system is not standardized or transparent and is highly dependent upon social relationships. It works well in situations of land abundance in which it developed but has become strained by changing patterns of land use, increased population density and eroded native administration capacities.²⁰

¹⁶ <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13864.doc.htm>

¹⁷ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019)., *Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management!*. UKAID. Catholic Relief Services. Cafod. Norwegian Church Aid. UMCOR. World Vision. Tufts: April.

¹⁸ DDPD Article 38

¹⁹ UNDP (2016). *Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur!*. November. UNDP: Sudan.

²⁰ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019)., *Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management!*. UKAID. Catholic Relief Services. Cafod. Norwegian Church Aid. UMCOR. World Vision. Tufts: April.

While registration of land has proceeded incrementally in Darfur since 2013, it has tended to occur in urban areas for irrigable land and remains complex, lengthy and expensive. Challenges to the registration process include reluctance to register land due to insecurity; continued occupation of land; lack of awareness and the high cost and long process for obtaining land certificates.²¹ Formal land registration has limitations and risks in Darfur, where traditionally land rights have not been exclusive, and land has been shared. Sources suggest that a mixed system, which recognizes customary land rights is needed.

Since 2013 sales of land appear to have increased in Darfur. This is indicative of increased commoditisation of land, and changing patterns of land use as considered by Pillar 3, which is also linked to urbanisation. This development involves changes in production and power relations, and can involve risks related to patterns of exploitation and marginalization.

Arbitration and dispute resolution structures for land related disputes are present, with some expansion since 2013. Formal and informal mechanisms exist but significant capacity constraints remain. Evidence suggests that native administration and community mechanisms manage to address many land related disputes at community level. Capacity of rural courts to address land disputes increased with UN support. Land Arbitration Committees have been set up at locality level under a DDS project but have not yet been assessed for their effectiveness.

Effective solutions to land occupation and land disputes with political dimensions have not been developed, though there are examples of these being addressed. The Constitutional Declaration includes land among essential issues for peace negotiations, and a commitment for state agencies to adhere to relevant international standards for compensation and return of properties to displaced persons and refugees.²²

1.4 Rule of law and access to justice

While there has been an increase in the physical presence of police and justice institutions, and some evidence of improved capacities, human rights violations, lack of rule of law, insecurity and lack of access to justice persist. Darfuri citizens continued to suffer grave violations of their human rights. Data extracted from UNAMID reports shows that levels of violations, including conflict related sexual violence, have remained largely consistent over the last three years.²³ Violence against women and girls in the community remains prevalent. Violations in the context of hostilities between GoS and armed opposition group decreased, but continued to occur in the Jebel Marra area. In 2018, killing of civilians, burning of villages, and looting by Sudanese Armed Forces were reported, and hostilities resulted in new displacement of civilians.²⁴ A recent study on migration of Darfuris to Europe revealed the systemic persecution faced by many IDPs and those of particular ethnic groups, which drove many of them to forced migration.²⁵ Exploitative practices, including extraction of protection fees for use of land, against farmers, IDPS and returnees in some areas were reported.

Darfuri citizens continue to lack effective protection, redress and accountability for human right violations, and to be subject to repressive security provision. Personal and physical security remains a primary concern for women, in particular in conflict affected areas and IDP camps. The Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultations (DIDC) found that insecurity remains a predominant concern for communities in all Darfur states.²⁶ Between 78% and 91% of households in two IDP camps profiled under the Durable Solutions initiative cited security as a barrier to returning to their homes.²⁷

²¹ DDS Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur, Project Report July 2016 – April 2019

²² Chapter 15, articles 68 (g) and 67 (j)

²³ UNAMID., (2016-2019). 'SG Reports'. UNAMID.

²⁴ Amnesty International., (2018). 'Sudan: Down-sized UN Mission for an Over-Sized Human Rights Crisis'. June.

²⁵ Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). 'Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.' Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

²⁶ UNDP, (2018). 'Progress Report, Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultations (DIDC), An opinion of the people of Darfur'. UNDP.

²⁷ United Nations., (2019)., 'Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps', UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.

There were examples of limited advances in access to justice, and access to legal aid since 2013²⁸, and anecdotal evidence that awareness of rights has increased in recent years in some contexts. However, these gains need to be considered in the light of multiple barriers people face in accessing justice, including absence of police and justice sector facilities particularly in rural and remote areas, prohibitive court fees, and fear and trauma for those who have suffered human rights violations, and due to the conduct of armed actors.

Federal level legal frameworks to ensure rule of law, accountability, civilian policing and independence of the judiciary remain lacking. Appropriate security sector reform has not taken place since 2013, and a clear institutional framework defining roles, responsibilities, limitations and powers for respective security sector institutions is absent. The RSF gained statutory recognition and consolidated its position as the dominant security force in the Darfur region. The RSF lacks civilian oversight and accountability and functions as a counterinsurgency force and not as an independent, impartial security provider.

The physical presence of the Sudanese Police Force (SPF) expanded between 2013 and 2019. The number of police in the 5 Darfur states increased from around 13,000²⁹ to 27,102. Police infrastructure increased, with support of the UN. Improved police professionalism and service orientation were reported anecdotally by some stakeholders. However, SPF presence remains limited in rural areas and concentrated in urban centres. Police stations tend to lack basic resources and equipment for operational policing. The security environment, in which RSF are predominant, also limits the effectiveness of the SPF. There is a lack of civilian oversight of police in Darfur, and a gap between police and population, with weak public – police relations.

The presence of the formal justice sector, including courts, prosecution offices and rural courts increased between 2013-2019, with infrastructure construction supported by UNAMID. Some improvements in judicial proceedings were indicated by UNAMID trial monitoring. Numbers of rural courts and their case adjudication increased.

However, there are fundamental concerns related to the justice sector. Independence of the judiciary and prosecution is still lacking, while the presence of justice institutions remains concentrated in urban areas, with limited provision in some areas of conflict and therefore acute need, and in rural areas. The criminal justice chain continues to have limitations, with necessary institutions in the chain (police prosecution and courts) not always present, and police sometimes conducting investigative roles which are the responsibility of the prosecution. The jurisdiction of rural courts remains limited, and the legal framework requires reform. Rampant impunity continues to create an environment for armed groups, tribal militias and other groups to consolidate influence through criminal activity.

All 14 prisons in Darfur states have been refurbished, and a framework for prison management and inspection, and increased training capacity were developed with UN support. However, the prison sector continues to face severe challenges, including poor conditions in prisons, continuing weaknesses in infrastructure, overcrowding and inhumane treatment of prisoners, poor health-care services, and staff shortages.

Limited progress occurred in the area of transitional justice and accountability for crimes in the context of armed conflict. Due to lack of political will, the Special Court for Darfur is not operational. The Office of the Special Prosecutor tripled staff capacity, and in 2018 prosecuted two militia members responsible for an attack on Sortnoy IDP camp. However, it continues to focus disproportionately on opposition armed groups, and is not present in Zalingei.

UNAMID and the Sudanese Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission organized demobilisation of 10,250 combatants from DDPD signatory opposition armed groups. 3,150 of these received reintegration assistance through a DSS project. However, lack of an inclusive peace agreement and security sector reform limited the impact of DDR. Weapons collection beginning in 2017 contributed to reduction in

²⁸ Bennett, K., de Lacey, C., (2018). 'Assessing the Value of Human Rights Based Interventions in Situations of Conflict: Community Outreach to Combat Violence against Women and Girls in Darfur, Sudan'. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*. 9. 2017, 534-549.

²⁹ 2013-2019 Darfur Development Strategy. Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013). '2013-2019 Developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.' Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

open carrying of weapons and militia activity. However, SALW remain widespread, and weapons collection was considered by some stakeholders to lack impartiality and was not comprehensive.

The Constitutional Declaration establishes respect for human rights and rule of law as central to Sudan's transition. General provisions commit transitional authorities to uphold rule of law, accountability, and restitution of grievances and rights which have been denied. Chapter 14 consists of a Rights and Freedoms Charter, and chapter 2 mandates legal reform, including to ensure independence of the judiciary.³⁰

Pillar 2: Reconstruction

1. Basic Services

Water, sanitation and hygiene. Water continues to be a central factor in Darfur's struggle to develop. Extremely poor water and sanitation conditions throughout the region have spurred years of interventions from both humanitarian and development actors, but the situation remains extremely challenging throughout Darfur, albeit with some important variability between states. Only about half of the population in Darfur states have access to improved water sources³¹. This situation may have improved with interventions post 2014, although the extent of any improvement is not yet known given gaps in data³². Water functionality has been another issue affecting all states, with the worst performing state (West Darfur) recording a functionality rate of 47%. As with other sectors, a generally improving security situation in recent years has made access to isolated regions easier. However, capacity to sustainably manage WASH services at both community and institutional levels remains a challenge. Lack of clarity and accountability continues to affect the roles and responsibilities of relevant authorities, leading to the absence of clear regulatory framework, politicized decision-making, and waste of extremely limited resources. Key risks in the WASH sector include environmental factors (including groundwater depletion and reduced rainfall), continuing urban migration, and weak water management capacities that contribute to increased risks of disease outbreaks.

Health and nutrition. The conflict in Darfur has resulted in a significant disruption of the provision of health and nutrition services, particularly for populations in security-compromised and inaccessible areas. In 2013 health and nutrition indicators for Darfur were among the worst in Sudan. Six years later, these still fall far short of international standards, and glaring problems remain. Malnutrition remains an urgent public health issue, with mixed results since 2013 and large discrepancies between the five Darfur states. Access to healthcare also remains a major problem in Darfur, constrained by lack of funding and human resources, while overall management and organizational capacities of the health system in Darfur remain insufficient, particularly at the local level. Some uneven progress has been made in areas such as improving access to child and maternal health services and enhancing access to health facilities for underserved and disadvantaged populations. These gains are partially attributable to health infrastructure construction; the development of a new long-term National Health Policy; improved alignment of national health priorities; and national and Darfur-level coordination. NGOs remain an important part of the health delivery ecosystem in Darfur, even though a number of humanitarian needs remain unmet. In addition, their prevalence raises substantial questions about sustainability of health access and service delivery, given the many years of dependency development around these services. Key risks include the continued strains on the health system posed by the protracted IDP crisis, the influx of South Sudanese, and possible decreases in humanitarian financing for the sector.

Education. Education in Darfur still faces numerous challenges despite recent large-scale sectoral investments. In terms of access, the total number of schools has increased, but other key indicators, such as Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) have largely stagnated. The capacity of basic and secondary schools are still inadequate to accommodate all eligible students, contributing to high dropout rates. Issues of teacher availability and

³⁰ Sudan Constitutional Declaration of August 2019, Chapter 2, article 7 (5).

³¹ Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), UNICEF Sudan., (2016). 'Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 of Sudan, Final Report.' February. Khartoum: UNICEF and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).

Catholic Relief Services., (undated). 'Taadoud II – Transition to Development. Project Overview Factsheet.'

³² The upcoming release of the Simple, Spatial, Survey Method (S3M) data in August 2019 should shed additional light on trends since 2013 in the WASH sector.

distribution in Darfur are somewhat compensated by a high prevalence of volunteer teachers who have contributed to the highest increase in pupil-to-teacher ratios in Sudan. This helps overcome the difficulties of providing teachers in remote regions of Darfur, but also has implications for educational quality. The National Learning Assessment conducted in 2014 measured students' inability to read familiar words. Darfur states were among the worst performers. A key risk in the education sector is the pressure on the education system posed by significant population mobility in Darfur. Inadequate public financing for education threatens to undermine sustainability of any short-term gains in the sector.

2. Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization

According to the most recent UN OCHA figures, there are currently approximately 1.86 million IDPs in Sudan, 1.64 million of whom reside in one of the five Darfur states³³. New displacements increased between 2013 and 2016 due to renewed conflict, but since mid-2016 the security situation has improved significantly, and new displacements have decreased to the lowest levels since the start of the crisis. At the same time, *protracted* displacement of large numbers of IDPs remains one of the defining features of the Darfur context, with hundreds of thousands of IDP households having been displaced for over a decade.

It is important to note that the figures above represent officially registered IDPs located in approximately 60 Government of Sudan recognized camps³⁴. An unknown number of unregistered IDPs are located in host communities and remain uncounted in this total. Some estimates place the number of unregistered IDPs as high as 500,000, living in over 100 host communities and spontaneous settlements³⁵. The displacement situation in Darfur also includes over 338,000 Sudanese refugees currently residing in neighboring Chad, the majority of whom are from Darfur. Tellingly, the official tallies of Darfuri IDPs and refugees noted above remain largely unchanged from the figures quoted in the 2013 DDS: 1.7 million IDPs and 288,000 refugees³⁶.

While returns data remains patchy, multiple sources indicate that a limited number of both IDP and refugee returns occurred between 2013 and 2019, a trend largely attributable to the improved security context. According to recent OCHA figures, a total of 315,000 IDPs and refugees are estimated to have returned as of March 2019. These figures are tabulated by Government and UN verification missions that investigate and verify reports of returns occurring, although funding and access issues mean that these are not necessarily comprehensive. For refugees returns, a tripartite agreement signed between Sudan, Chad and UNHCR in 2017 has resulted in a total of 3,819 "facilitated" returns, since 2018. An unconfirmed number of Sudanese refugees in Chad have also returned without assistance.

A complicated set of variables places competing pressures on IDP and refugee households, including lack of security, underlying land conflicts, land occupation, and better access to basic services and government administrative services in IDP camps and in urban settings than in areas of return. Overall, it is generally agreed that "*large-scale durable returns have, for the most part, not occurred*,"³⁷ and that the conditions are still not conducive for such returns. Despite improvements, security remains a fundamental concern for many IDPs, who cite it as a key reason why they still do not go back to their lands.

Insufficient political will, which is a critical requirement for comprehensively addressing the root causes of displacement, is a constant threat to the returns process.

³³ UN OCHA., (2019a). "Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, as of 01 March 2019." Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-01-march-2019>

³⁴ UN OCHA., (2018a). "Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview, 1 February 2018". Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-darfur-humanitarian-overview-1-february-2018>.

³⁵ UN News., (2018). "'Durable solutions' needed for durable peace in Darfur, UN envoy tells Security Council". Retrieved from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009402>.

³⁶ Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013:16). '2013-2019 developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.' Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

³⁷ UN OCHA., (2018b:9). "Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018". Retrieved from: <https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/>

Another emerging dynamic related to displacement is the growing body of evidence highlighting that a significant number of IDP households prefer to permanently remain in their current urban or peri-urban locations. With displacement for many families stretching back a decade or more, new livelihoods strategies, new habits and new sociocultural preferences have developed, particularly in the new generation that has been born and raised in camps.

Key risks for this sector include the re-emergence of violence or conflict, which could trigger additional waves of displacement and make returns even more difficult. For those already displaced, there are a number of risks from a deteriorating economic situation, including rising food prices and resulting food insecurity³⁸, and declining levels of humanitarian assistance. The effects of climate change and environmental degradation are additional stressors that could make some areas less conducive to returns, as water sources and agricultural livelihoods are negatively affected by rainfall variability and rising temperatures. Furthermore, increasing urbanization rates put further pressure on Darfur's urban centres. Currently, more than 40% of the population of Darfur is estimated to live in urban areas³⁹.

3. Transportation and Energy Infrastructure

Available data makes clear that Darfur continues to suffer from a critical infrastructure deficit⁴⁰ due to a lack of investment stretching back decades; the damage and deferred maintenance resulting from the conflict and ongoing instability; a growing (particularly urban) population that has accelerated demands for services; and the inability of either the Government of Sudan or international investment to keep pace with these trends.

Poor transportation infrastructure creates enormous challenges for Darfur, including geographic isolation, long distances to markets, stagnation of the rural economy and limited opportunities for employment. Darfur has one of the poorest road networks in the country. Of the 12,000 kilometres of roads surveyed in 2012, only 200 kilometres (1.7%) were asphalted and only 100 kilometres (<1 %) were gravelled, with the rest made of dirt tracks that frequently become impassable in the rainy season⁴¹. Unconfirmed sources estimate that the length of paved roads has increased to 950 kilometres by 2019—500 kilometres of which was attributable to the recently completed El Ingaz road. However, even with this nearly five-fold increase in paved roads, 80% of Darfur's road network would still be unpaved.

There is currently only one railway servicing Darfur, connecting Nyala to Babanousa in West Kordofan. It was reported to be in a state of disrepair but undergoing rehabilitation in 2016⁴². In the area of civil aviation, there are functioning regional airports in three of the state capitals: Nyala (South Darfur) El Fasher (North Darfur), and Geneina (West Darfur). These are complemented by a handful of mini airports used mainly for humanitarian purposes.

Energy access is severely restricted throughout Darfur. The region is not connected to the national grid⁴³. Plans for a transmission line extending from Babanousa to Adila-Ed Daein-Nyala-El Fasher have been in the works but have suffered from lack of funding⁴⁴. Stand-alone diesel generators in each of the five state capitals supply most of the limited amount of electricity that is available in the region. Given the shortcomings of the electrical grid, there is a lucrative—but haphazard and inefficient—private sector for small-scale energy generation and distribution. The result is extremely high electricity rates for consumers. Because of poor access to energy, there is a very high reliance on biomass for household energy needs, which both contributes to deforestation and

³⁸ UN OCHA., (2018b). “*Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018*”. Retrieved from: <https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/>

³⁹ United Nations Human Settlements Programme., (2015:10). “*Regional Spatial Planning Strategy of Darfur. Peace Building, Recovery and Development of Darfur: The Urban Factor.*” Nairobi : UN Habitat.

⁴⁰ See primarily African Development Bank Group, 2016.

⁴¹ African Development Bank Group., (2016:7-9). ‘*Sudan: Darfur Infrastructure Development Report. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group*’. Retrieved from: <https://www.afdb.org/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/Sudan...>

⁴² *ibid*:12

⁴³ *ibid*:17

⁴⁴ *ibid*:25

environmental degradation and increases the household burden for biomass collection that falls inordinately on women and girls.

Key risks in the transport and energy sectors include the current economic crisis—and in particular the increased costs for imported fossil fuels—which have the potential to cause even greater disruptions to Darfur’s troubled electricity sector, driving up costs for consumers and further eroding the limited electricity access that does exist in the region. The current economic crisis also makes capital investment projects in both the energy and transport sectors costlier and riskier, reducing the likelihood that the Government on its own will increase the pace of infrastructure investment.

Pillar 3: Economic Recovery

1. Economy, Business and Trade

Agriculture accounts for a third of Sudan’s GDP. Since the fall in oil revenues it has also become a major contributor to export earnings, driven in particular by livestock exports⁴⁵. Darfur accounts for one-quarter to one-third of Sudan’s livestock resources⁴⁶ and makes a substantial contribution to Sudan’s cash crop production^{47,48}. The Darfur region has long been recognized as having great economic potential, as noted by the DJAM report on private sector development in 2012, given Darfur’s natural resource endowments, its livestock and agricultural wealth, and the potential for agro-industries.

The macro-economic context, which between 2013 and end of 2017 was described as a ‘stable but dysfunctional equilibrium’ has a major impact on the business enabling environment in Darfur⁴⁹. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 dealt an economic blow to Sudan with the sudden loss of 75% of its oil reserves and revenue. Without any major economic adjustments and continued mass subsidies, Sudan’s economy deteriorated further. Since 2018, the country has been in the grip of a severe economic crisis, characterized by severe foreign exchange shortages, soaring inflation peaking at over 70%, currency devaluation and cash shortages. This has been described as an ‘accelerating downward spiral’ unlikely to be mitigated by the latest bailout from governments in the Middle East. Political unrest and the four weeks long shutdown of the internet in June 2019 has damaged the economy further.

The Darfur conflict and the many constraints that Darfur traders have faced in the last 16 years have tested their entrepreneurialism and ingenuity to the limits. Some of the macro-economic challenges described above are exacerbated at the Darfur level owing to decades of structural political and economic marginalization. The intertwining of political and economic interests in Darfur during the protracted conflict has also led to the involvement of the state security institutions in resource extraction, production and trade. Other factors negatively impacting the business environment in Darfur include continued insecurity, despite relative improvements in certain areas in recent years; high levels of taxation and fees imposed by local authorities; lack of fuel and inadequate electricity; and, more recently, the consequences of the serious liquidity crisis in the local economy. A recent assessment in Darfur puts the unemployment rate at 52%: 36% of men unemployed and

⁴⁵ Behnke, R., (2012). ‘*The Economics of Pastoral Livestock Production and Its Contribution to the Wider Economy of Sudan*’ Working Paper, Feinstein International Center & UNEP, June. Retrieved from: <https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Working-Paper-Econ-of-Pastoral-Livestock/>

⁴⁶ See Buchanan-Smith et al (2012) which explains that such estimates should be treated with caution as the last livestock census was carried out in 1975

⁴⁷ Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). ‘*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur*’ Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan. November. Retrieved from: <http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/>.

⁴⁸ UNDP., (2017). ‘*Promoting Commodity Value Chains for Peace and Recovery in Darfur. A Darfur-focussed Value Chain Mapping Analysis for Groundnuts, Sesame, Gum Arabic and Livestock*’. UNDP DLRP.

⁴⁹ Most of this analysis of the current macroeconomic context is based on presentations made at one of the Berlin Group meetings in 2019

68% of women unemployed. Unofficial estimates put the youth unemployment rate in Darfur at 75%⁵⁰. Darfur has the highest levels of poverty (51%) and inequality of all regions of Sudan⁵¹.

Access to formal sources of credit are generally low across Sudan, with a high dependence on family loans⁵². Although some banking and financing services have resumed in Darfur in the last six years, credit remains hard to access. Despite encouragement from the Central Bank of Sudan to consider non-traditional forms of collateral, this appears to have had little impact and there has been a tendency to 'over-collateralize' loans using guarantees such as insurance and conventional physical collateral⁵³. The 2012 DJAM report explains constraints on collateral, which do not seem to have improved since. It also describes how bank financing has been diverted during the conflict years, away from agricultural production and agro-processing into local trade, reflecting assessments of risk and profitability⁵⁴. The situation today remains the same.

Agricultural production fell during the first decade of the conflict due to insecurity, and has been highly volatile since, negatively impacting agricultural trade. Additional trends affecting trade during the 2013-2019 period include the high adaptability and responsiveness to traders to the changing context; significantly increased costs of trading associated with the conflict; deterioration of the quality of some of Darfur's cash crops; a shift in agro-processing towards small local processing plants; and increasing cross-border trade with Chad, South Sudan and Central African Republic. The untapped potential for boosting production and trade in Darfur's main agricultural commodities has been highlighted⁵⁵, but progress remains limited. The exception may be the livestock trade, especially sheep, due to buoyant regional, national and export markets⁵⁶, although there is evidence that the shortage of cash since 2018 has had a negative impact.

2. Natural Resource Management

Many pronouncements are made about desertification and climate change affecting the Darfur region, but these are not always evidence-based, nor do they stand up to scrutiny. Recent analysis, that is evidence-based, shows that vegetation trends have generally remained stable in the Darfur region over the twentieth century, despite large decadal variations; there has been a slight fall in mean annual precipitation over the last 100 years, most pronounced in North Darfur State and less so in southern Darfur states; meanwhile temperature in the Darfur region has significantly increased in the last 40 years⁵⁷.

A major change in NRM is that almost all natural resources in Darfur, including water, cultivable land, forestry products, fodder and hay, are now commoditised. Market-based systems now co-exist alongside customary institutions for managing land and other resources. This has created an institutional plurality. It is now common that fertile land along wadis serving urban markets is sold. These have implications for growing inequality. Commoditisation of natural resources also contributes to increasing competition and conflict over former shared resources, for example herders must now purchase crop residues in dry years, pushing up prices, as farmers now collect crop residues for their own use or for sale; and manure is now sold to brick kilns (Young and Ismail, 2019).

⁵⁰ GIZ., (2017). *Beschäftigungsinitiative Süddarfur: Berufliche Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen für Flüchtlinge*. Binnenvertriebene und Aufnahmegemeinden in Nyala, Süddarfur, Sudan.

⁵¹ World Bank., (2019b). 'Mapping Poverty in Sudan'. *Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa*. June.

⁵² World Bank., (2019a) 'Agricultural Productivity and Poverty in Rural Sudan'. *Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa*. June.

⁵³ Hansen, L. and A. Khojali., (2010). 'Championing the Coping Economy: An Assessment of the Microfinance Market in Darfur: Gaps and Opportunities'. Final Report for UNDP/Sudan, IOM and the Feinstein International Center, June.

⁵⁴ Thematic Working Group (TWG)., (2012). 'Situational analysis. The Private Sector in Darfur: A New Growth Strategy for Recovery and Development'. DJAM. Retrieved from: [darfurconference.com > sites > default > files > files > 9 - Thematic Worki...](http://darfurconference.com/sites/default/files/files/9-Thematic%20Worki...)

⁵⁵ For example by the Tufts suite of trade studies, UNDP's value chain analysis, and by the World Bank

⁵⁶ Suleiman, H. and Young, H. (2019) 'Transforming Pastoralist Mobility in West Darfur: Understanding Continuity and Change'. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2019.

⁵⁷ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). 'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April. Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). 'Complexity, Continuity and Change'.

With many farmers staying as IDPs in camps, pastoralists used land evacuated by those IDPs. The settlement of this land by pastoralists, first identified during the 2006 DJAM, was again highlighted during the 2012 consultations as a major issue that continues to complicate the return of many displaced people. The situation is still the same now. Conflict drivers, in particular access to land and other natural resources, are not being addressed in a systemic way and are therefore affecting IDPs returning to their areas of origin and the relations between pastoralist and farming communities. The eviction of land occupiers is a highly sensitive issue, especially in West and Central Darfur, and in Kebkabiya and Kutum in North Darfur.

3. Rural Livelihoods

Despite the disruption and destruction of rural livelihoods during 16 years of conflict, livelihood systems still depend primarily on rainfed cultivation and raising livestock, both of which are adapted to extreme rainfall variability⁵⁸. The extent to which rural livelihoods have been impacted by the conflict, and the extent to which they have recovered since 2013, if at all, is highly context-specific and therefore varies greatly from one place to another. In some areas the extent of recovery has been high, accompanied by adaptations to livelihood strategies in response to the continued threat of insecurity. In others, recovery was set back by renewed waves of conflict, for example in parts of South Darfur affected by tribal conflict in 2013 and 2014⁵⁹. Nomadic communities have also made adaptations: the trend towards sedentarization which began in the mid-1980s has accelerated during the conflict years. Although they may still practice transhumant pastoralism, the range of livelihood activities in which they are engaged has increased, often to include rainfed farming. A noticeable trend is the diversification of livelihood activities by many different groups which has resulted in households engaging in the same few livelihood activities for which there is increased competition⁶⁰. There is also evidence of the changing composition of pastoralist livestock herds, from camel and cattle to sheep, partly in response to market incentives and also because sheep are also less likely to be looted⁶¹.

Dry season small-scale irrigated fruit and vegetable production on land near wadis has continued to increase in recent years, partly in response to demand from an increased urban population. Traditionally, irrigated fruit and vegetable production have been the domain of women, but there is evidence of men becoming more engaged as economic returns have increased. Overall, women disproportionately carry the workload in rural households, partly due to patterns of livelihood diversification during the conflict years as well as out-migration of men, in farming and livestock-herding communities. Access to secondary markets and to trade are crucial to Darfuri livelihoods, to their food security, resilience and their ability to recover⁶². This may have intensified as aspects of the economy become more commercialized with increased urbanization and recently with the greater integration of Darfur's markets with Central Sudan (see section 4.3)⁶³.

Crop production and productivity. The neglect, for years, of rainfed agriculture and livestock at policy level has taken its toll on agricultural production in Darfur. Efforts to address declining productivity have been extremely limited⁶⁴. Agricultural policy and implementation have mainly favored horizontal expansion of the semi-mechanized agricultural sector and the irrigated sector rather than supporting the rainfed agriculture sector which is the main system for crop production in Darfur. Conflict and insecurity have been major factors affecting area cultivated and total production in the last 16 years. Cereal production plummeted in the early

⁵⁸ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). 'Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

⁵⁹ *ibid*.

⁶⁰ Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). 'Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

⁶¹ Suleiman, H. and Young, H. (2019) 'Transforming Pastoralist Mobility in West Darfur: Understanding Continuity and Change'. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2019.

⁶² Research shows access to markets is associated with indicators of food security such as Individual Dietary Diversity Scores for women, and coping strategies index scores (Fitzpatrick, 2016).

⁶³ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). 'Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

⁶⁴ Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A., M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). 'Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur', Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

years of the conflict although there has been some recovery since. In the last seven years there have been three years of better cereal production: 2012/13, 2016/17 and 2018/19, mainly due to good rainfall. 2013/14 was a particularly bad year for cereal production in Darfur. 2015/16 was again a poor year for cereal production, due to a combination of El Nino-induced drought, and insecurity. 2018/19 has been a bumper harvest across Sudan. Not only were the rains good but improved security meant there was a significant increase in area planted and harvested across all five Darfur states. Soil fertility is reported to have increased in fields that had been left uncropped for several years due to insecurity: yields increased significantly. 2018 millet production hit record levels in Sudan with Darfur accounting for more than 60% of the national harvest⁶⁵. Another factor is the substantial numbers of IDPs who engaged in seasonal return to cultivate. While this has been widely welcomed, the extremely exploitative conditions under which households in some areas are having to cultivate must not be overlooked⁶⁶. Despite the bumper harvest, cereal prices have reached record levels in 2019, especially sorghum, with serious implications for the growing number dependent on the market for their food security.

Livestock. Livestock production trends are harder to track as there are major data gaps, although livestock numbers are generally reported to be increasing⁶⁷. The composition of herds is changing as described above, but data on livestock ownership are scant. The long and favorable rainy season in 2018 resulted in greatly improved water availability and pasture, thus benefiting livestock production, but with little granularity in the analysis⁶⁸.

4. Urban Livelihoods and Employment

Trends in urban livelihoods. The conflict in Darfur is associated with a dramatic change in settlement pattern and rapid urbanization, in turn triggered by large-scale displacement. Most of Darfur's main towns, and especially its state capitals, have tripled in size since 2003. The livelihoods of the displaced went through a major transition, from income predominantly based on agricultural produce and livestock pre-conflict, to a more urbanized income dependent on casual labor, trade and small and micro-enterprises. Although urban areas in Darfur, particularly state capitals, have become major economic hubs, this does not mean that everybody is benefiting, nor that there is adequate work to employ the greatly increased numbers of unskilled labor (and indeed skilled labor with the greatly increased number of graduates)⁶⁹. There is intense competition for the same limited livelihood opportunities for the displaced and urban poor⁷⁰. For the professional and better-educated living in urban areas, humanitarian organizations and UNAMID have been an important source of direct employment and have had a major multiplier impact on the wider economy. Many of these opportunities are now disappearing with the withdrawal of UNAMID.

Youth, employment and migration. Sudan has an exceptionally young population. Within Sudan, Darfur has the highest percentage of young people compared with other regions: 60% of the population are under 25⁷¹. The DDS identified the 'double disadvantage' of youth that are cut off from families' traditional livelihoods and are least prepared for pursuing alternative options. There has been a significant increase in higher education opportunities for youth in Darfur during the conflict years, accompanied by a growing awareness of the importance of education amongst IDPs who have better access to education facilities in the camps may have than in the rural areas they came from⁷². But many graduates struggle to find employment. Darfuri youth from the many ethnic groups associated with the rebel movements in Darfur (for example the Fur, Zaghawa and

⁶⁵ FAO., (2019b). 'GIEWS Country Brief: Sudan 29-March-2019'. Retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giews-country-brief-sudan-29-march-2019>

⁶⁶ See, for example, Jaspars and O'Callaghan (2008).

⁶⁷ Behnke, R. and H.M. Osman., (2010). 'The Contribution of Livestock to the Sudanese Economy'. IGAD LPI Working Paper 01-12. IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative, Odessa Centre, Great Wolford. See also Krätli, S., O.H. Eldirani, H. Young, et al. (2013). 'Standing Wealth. Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihood in Sudan'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, UNEP, SOS Sahel Sudan, Ministry of Animal Resources Fisheries and Range, Nomad Development Council, Khartoum.

⁶⁸ FAO., (2019a). 'FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan. Special Report'. 14 March.

⁶⁹ See, for example, the Nyala urbanization case study (Buchanan-Smith et al, 2011)

⁷⁰ See, for example, Young and Jacobsen (2008); UNEP (2008)

⁷¹ World Bank., (2019c). 'The Labour Market and Poverty in Sudan'. Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa. May.

⁷² Ali, O. M. O. Mahmoud, A. M., (2016). 'From Temporary Emergency Shelter to an Urbanised Neighbourhood: The Abou Shook IDP camp in North Darfur, Sudan'. Working Paper Number 3.

Masalit) face serious discrimination in the job market, especially in the civil service, but also in the business environment where connections with government officials are often key to success⁷³. Faced with bleak employment prospects or of successfully setting up their own businesses, many young men have instead turned to high risk activities associated with the war economy. These include gold mining within Sudan and farther afield in Niger and Chad, and joining the RSF to fight for Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen⁷⁴. Other worrying developments include the sexual exploitation of young women, and the involvement of youth in drug dealing.

There has been an increase in the numbers of Sudanese, predominantly Darfuris from particular ethnic groups, migrating irregularly to Europe since 2013. This peaked between 2014 and 2016⁷⁵. The causes are multiple and complex. For many young Darfuris, attack, arrest and harassment by government forces, paramilitary groups and militia were the primary reason for leaving. It was also due to a loss of livelihoods associated with displacement, loss of land, discrimination and limited freedom of movement. This recent outflow of young Darfuri men to Europe has consequences for families and communities left behind. On the positive side, this may result in flows of remittances that can be used by the family. But there can also be a high cost to families if they lose the earning power of their young men, temporarily or permanently as many do not make it. There can also be a high cost to communities that lose an important source of labor and of self-defense in conflict-ridden Darfur (ibid).

⁷³ Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.*' Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

⁷⁴ Headteachers describe losing large numbers of youth to RSF recruitment.

⁷⁵ Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.*' Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

IV. Strategic framing and approach of the DDS

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) signed in July 2011 was at the time considered a major step forward in ending the conflict in Darfur, and despite not constituting an agreement between all parties, was also intended to provide a comprehensive framework for peacebuilding, recovery and reconstruction. The Darfur Development Strategy developed in 2012 emerged directly from the DDPD, and in particular from Article 31 which outlined a range of priorities for post-conflict recovery and development to be addressed over a period of six years. As such the DDS represents a comprehensive and integrated strategy which was intended to serve as the basis for national and international efforts in consolidating peace in Darfur, establishing the groundwork for recovery and long-term development, and facilitating a transition from humanitarian assistance to more durable forms of support. Although the ambitious objectives of the DDS have not been fully met, it has provided an important framework for peacebuilding and development efforts to date and is still considered by many a relevant instrument for the future. This chapter provides an analysis of the overall effectiveness and impact of the DDS to date in relation to its original strategic objectives and approach with a view to highlighting key achievements, constraints and challenges.

A. Brief Overview of DDS Objectives, Scope and Strategic Approach

The DDS was developed in 2012 and reflects the outputs of the *Darfur Joint Assessment Mission* (DJAM) which was foreseen in Article 32 of the DDPD as the vehicle through which the recovery and development priorities outlined in Article 31 would be assessed, identified and costed. The DJAM and development of the DDS were large-scale exercises involving a range of national and international stakeholders, and extensive consultations at both Khartoum and Darfur levels. As stated in the DDS document, a key overall strategic objective of the DDS was to provide a “sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan for equitable, sustainable and participatory development, vital to move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future” (DDS document, p. xvi). Underlying this objective there were several strategic prerogatives which underscored the rationale, relevance and strategic importance of the DDS, namely:

- The need to capitalize on the window of peace and opportunity offered by the DDPD, even if imperfect, in order to address core conflict drivers, address recovery needs and enable sustainable development;
- The necessity of responding to the demands of Darfuri citizens for support in addressing key needs and enabling a return to stability and normalcy;
- A recognition that in 2013, unlike 2006, conditions were more conducive for a shift to development, while recognizing that there would never be a ‘perfect’ time to initiate recovery;
- The urgency and importance of addressing long-standing economic, social and governance grievances in Darfur through developmental approaches in order to break the cycle of conflict;
- The need to better calibrate humanitarian and development assistance and limit the socioeconomic distortions created by the dominant focus on humanitarian assistance alone.

Based on this strategic objective and the priorities for recovery and development outlined in Article 31 of the DDPD, the DDS document provides a comprehensive strategy and approach comprising a detailed analysis of the situation and needs across relevant sectors; corresponding priorities and related financial requirements; and a governance, coordination and financing architecture to ensure implementation and alignment of national and international efforts within the DDS framework. At the core of this strategy and approach are several fundamental principles which were intended to shape national and international efforts, namely:

- A transformational approach to recovery and development (not return to status quo ante);
- A comprehensive, holistic and integrated approach to programming in order to address the complex and multi-sectoral nature of conflict drivers and recovery needs;
- A sequenced and prioritized approach to implementation that focused both on tangible immediate peace dividends while laying the groundwork for sustainable development;
- A focus on supporting a transition from humanitarian to development efforts;

- Establishment of a sustainable framework for recovery and development planning and financial management.

The programmatic component of the DDS, which outlines the specific strategies for addressing the priorities identified in Article 31 of the DDPD and assessed through the 2012 DJAM, is articulated in the form of three inter-connected ‘pillars’, namely Governance, Justice and Reconciliation; Reconstruction; and Economic Recovery. These pillars regrouped the results of the work of the ten DJAM thematic working groups and extensive consultations at Darfur level, with each comprising of a number of objectives and expected outcomes as illustrated in figure 5 below.

Figure 5	
Pillar & Overarching Objectives	Sub-Objectives and Outcomes
<p>Governance, Justice and Reconciliation</p> <p>Overall objective: To support State governments in more effectively executing their mandate, especially at local level, and oversee recovery of the region and initiate revival of basic infrastructure and support to conflict-affected populations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes • Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level • Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery • Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue • Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable • Improved access to justice (Gender balanced) • Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilized armed forces (including special groups) • Security Sector Reform implemented • Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established • Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms • People having access to a compensation system and compensation
<p>Reconstruction</p> <p>Overall objective: To support the recovery and stabilization of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life has been severely disrupted.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services • Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation • Increase access to electricity services • Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services • Improved access to and quality of education • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees (including special groups) • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services
<p>Economic Recovery</p> <p>Overall objective: To contribute positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development in an equitable and environmentally sustainable manner.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements • Improved crop and livestock production and productivity • Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development • Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity • Increased access to employment opportunities • Increase access to financial services • Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources

For each of these Pillars, the DDS document provides a brief narrative strategy, a matrix outlining key outputs and indicators associated with each of the above objectives, and indicative financial requirements. The latter is broken down into ‘foundational and short-term activities’ (FaST), which comprise those interventions needed to provide the building blocks for long-term recovery and development programs; and the longer-term interventions and programs themselves. In total, financial requirements for achieving the DDS amounted to US\$

7.25 billion over the six-year period, of which US\$ 177.4 million were required for FaST activities. At the international donor conference held on 7 April 2013, US\$3.8 billion were pledged, including US\$ 2.75 billion from the GoS. Chapter VI provides a more detailed breakdown of DDS budgets and the resources mobilized during the 2013-2019 period.

B. Overall Challenges, Constraints and Lessons Learned

Six years following the launch of the DDS, it is difficult to obtain an assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the strategy in relation to its original vision and strategic objectives. Many national and international stakeholders highlighted the usefulness of the situation and sectoral analyses and the pillar strategies in informing some of their efforts, as well as the continued relevance and salience of the overall DDS strategy and specific priorities as originally formulated. At the same time, there is little evidence that the DDS has made a significant impact on peacebuilding, recovery and development trajectories in Darfur. As the team's assessment of the current situation in the various areas covered by the DDS demonstrates, many of the challenges, priorities and needs identified in 2013 still remain. While a number of development interventions aligned directly and indirectly to the DDS have been implemented during the 2013-2019 period, these have not been sufficient to achieve meaningful and transformational outcomes at scale as originally intended. For the most part, efforts across the three-pillar scan be characterized as highly fragmented, uncoordinated and projectized, with little evidence of strategic alignment, prioritization and linkage with an overall pillar or sectoral strategy. While some projects have achieved important results, including from a learning perspective, overall financing and the scope of interventions was not sufficient to achieve meaningful impact at scale in relation to pillar objectives.

From the review of implementation, three fundamental sets of constraints and challenges have impeded implementation of the DDS as originally foreseen and explain this less than perfect progress and impact. These include constraints related to the evolution of the context in Sudan and Darfur; issues related to the way in which the DDS was designed which posed challenges for implementation; and challenges related to the governance and coordination of DDS implementation. This section provides an overview of how these and related constraints and challenges affected key aspects of the DDS, notably stakeholder engagement, programmatic alignment and overall implementation. Chapter V provides further details on these issues for each pillar, while specific challenges related to the governance, coordination and financing of the DDS are addressed in Chapter VI.

1. Stakeholder engagement and commitment in the DDS

As the experience of comprehensive and multi-stakeholder peacebuilding and recovery assessments and plans in other countries demonstrates, stakeholder engagement and commitment are essential to ensure that these plans serve as a basis for effectively aligning national and international policies, programs and financing against a common set of priorities. In the case of the DDS, informant interviews and the review of data clearly indicates that there were significant deficiencies in the extent and nature of stakeholder buy in, engagement and commitment to use the DDS as a primary reference for peacebuilding and recovery efforts. Four main factors explain this:

The absence of a conducive political environment. The DDS assumed that Darfur had 'turned the page' with respect to the political and conflict situation with the DDPD following 2011, and a high level of willingness and interest by national and international stakeholders in engaging on peace and development issues. This did not turn out to be the case. The DDPD did not provide the comprehensive settlement to the Darfur conflict as expected, with key parties remaining outside the framework and conflict between the GoS and OAGs continuing. Second, the GoS did not demonstrate a willingness and intention to implement the DDS in good faith in its entirety, resulting in a lack of engagement where its leadership was critical, particularly with respect to the governance reforms foreseen in Pillar one, the engagement of line ministries, and the provision of financing. Third, many international partners, given the continued sanctions in place against the GoS, were hesitant to engage in significant development programming, let alone directly coordinate with government

counterparts or channel financing through national systems, resulting in most donor financing being channeled through humanitarian channels.

Absence of effective national leadership. Within the framework of the DDPD and the DDS, the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) was supposed to have the primary responsibility at national level for the implementation of the DDS in accordance with Article 31 of the DDPD. In practice, the DRA was severely constrained by inadequate capacity to undertake the various coordination, planning and other functions required of this role. Its relationship to federal and state level government bodies, including ministries, was also not clear, leading to confusion and ambiguity with respect to responsibilities and accountabilities for the DDS within government. The abolishment of the DRA in 2016 further undermined national leadership of the DDS, and while the various DDPD commissions were engaged in different aspects and sectors of the DDS, a single strong counterpart to drive implementation and facilitate coordinated international responses did not exist.

Alignment of DDS with national and international policies and strategies. Partly as a consequence of the above factors, many national and international stakeholders did not feel compelled or incentivized to utilize the DDS as a basis for policy making, strategy development and program formulation, with some notable exceptions. Rather, priorities and strategies were developed by individual agencies on the basis of their own interests or bilateral exchanges with specific Sudanese and Darfuri counterparts. Furthermore, while some of the FaST activities were intended to inform the development of enabling policy, legislation and other regulations for specific priorities to be addressed, the DDS strategy lacked an explicit strategy or mechanism to integrate these as part of broader interventions. FaST activities, which were primarily financed through the UNDF, were also subject to significant delays, further constraining their potential to inform broader development efforts.

Absence of communication and engagement on the DDS. A further factor that undermined stakeholder engagement and commitment was a widespread lack of awareness and information on the DDS, particular at the level of the Darfur states. The DDS was simply not known by many key stakeholders, both within state and local level government bodies, civil society and the population at large.⁷⁶ This is due to the absence of an effective communications and outreach strategy around the DDS, as well as the lack of stakeholder engagement and willingness to use the DDS as an actual instrument of policy and program development. It also highlights a more fundamental issue concerning the extent to which the process of designing and implementing the DDS was truly inclusive and participatory.

2. Programmatic Alignment

During the 2013-2019 period significant amounts of development financing were allocated to Darfur, despite the overall political and other contextual challenges. The extent to which this financing and corresponding interventions aligned directly with DDS pillar priorities varied significantly, with little evidence of a coordinated approach to ensuring a strategic or coherent approach with corresponding objectives. Several factors account for this approach, which stem broadly from issues related to how the DDS pillars were developed and reflected in the actual implementation of development programming.

Lack of enabling conditions. All three pillars included core assumptions on the evolution of the context in Darfur which did not always materialize, rendering the feasibility or implementability of certain pillar objectives impossible. Strengthening of governance frameworks and capacities as envisioned in pillar 1, for instance, was not feasible in the absence of reforms at Federal level (which during the 2013-2019 period actually worked against decentralization objectives); likewise, continuing insecurity led to situations of prolonged displacement, rendering the returns and reintegration strategy in pillar 2 unworkable. The lack of a dynamic risk management and monitoring system in the DDS precluded flexibility within the pillars to mitigate, manage or adjust approaches in these contexts.

Absence of pillar-level theories of change. The DDS pillar strategies as articulated in the DDS document are limited for the most part to a results matrix of objectives, outputs, indicators and costs, without a full explanation

⁷⁶ In practice, the Review team's consultations in Darfur found that most stakeholders conflated the overall DDS with FaST programs, not seeing the DDS as anything beyond the \$88.5 million in Qatar funded projects.

or description of the underlying logic or theory of change that connects the various elements of the result framework. This presentation precluded a deeper presentation and understanding of the causal logic of linkages, preconditions/prerequisites, causes and impacts which are essential to properly identify critical pathways and to define, prioritize and sequence interventions accordingly. The reports produced by the ten thematic working groups during the DJAM also fail to provide this clarity, and in some sectors contradict the priorities and elements which are contained in the DDS published report. Without this clarity, the pillar strategies offered little guidance to national and international partners on how to most effectively approach and prioritize interventions at pillar and sectoral levels. While the presentation of FaST activities did articulate some elements of a critical pathway at pillar and sectoral level, these were incomplete and did not extend to the broader sets of interventions.

Absence of cross-pillar and cross-sectoral linkages. The description of the overall approach in the DDS report strongly emphasizes the importance of integrated, holistic and comprehensive interventions across pillars and sectors in order to address the complex requirements of peacebuilding and recovery. At the same time, the formulation and presentation of the DDS Pillars are very much stove-piped, and are notable for the absence of any cross referencing or programmatic linkages between them or individual sectors. This is particularly evident in the disconnects between Pillar 1 priorities on public service delivery capacities and the focus in pillar 2 on basic services, as well as in disconnects between pillars 2 and 3 on transportation and energy infrastructure and livelihoods and economic recovery. Despite the absence of these linkages, many interventions in practice were developed in integrated fashion across the pillars, offering important lessons for how this can be addressed in the future DDS. Moreover, the stove-piped development of the DDS precluded specific focus on core transversal and cross-cutting issues such as gender, youth, and the environment. Many of the pillar objectives and sub-objectives were articulated in technical terms, without adequate attention to power dynamics that are critical to address in a post-conflict context, for example in Pillar 3 on economic recovery. They lacked conflict sensitivity. Beyond the design of the DDS, systemic cross-linkages and integrated strategy and program development was also inhibited by the absence of effective technical coordination fora directly linked to the DDS.

Absence of a strategy linking humanitarian and development efforts. Although the transition from humanitarian assistance to development was identified as a key over-arching priority and objective for the DDS, there is no explanation in the DDS document for how this would be managed and achieved in practice. As the experience in other countries demonstrates, this is not simply a matter of substituting one framework or set of activities for another, but entails a complex understanding of how humanitarian and development needs relate, and how assistance can be calibrated between them over time to ensure a comprehensive, dynamic and flexible approach to addressing both urgent needs while building resilience and initiating a transition to recovery efforts. This is particularly the case in Darfur given the continued scale of humanitarian needs, the volatility of the situation, and the complexities of initiating development processes. Beyond the design of the DDS, the absence of a meaningful coordination architecture around the DDS at pillar level meant that there were no opportunities created for dialogue between humanitarian and development practitioners. As a result, humanitarian efforts in Darfur have continued through a highly active humanitarian cluster system, while development efforts have remained highly fragmented and not meaningfully connected to humanitarian strategies and interventions. The agencies implementing both humanitarian and development programming are mostly one and the same and have faced challenges in shifting skillsets and mindsets from humanitarian to developmental approaches.

Absence of program-level planning and prioritization. As the above has alluded to, the absence of effective alignment between development interventions and the DDS is not an issue of the design of the DDS alone. In the absence of DDS-specific technical or sectoral level fora or mechanisms to bring partners around pillar specific priorities and strategies, no collective priority-setting, targeting, coordination and information-sharing was possible. Had these platforms existed, there would have been a much higher possibility of more strategically focused, coordinated and aligned programmatic interventions, despite the limitations of the original DDS pillar strategies. A good example, albeit imperfect, of what could have been achieved is the development of the interventions financed by Qatar under the UNDF, which were developed through a coordinated and organized process directly linked to DDS pillar and sectoral objectives.

3. Implementation approach

As highlighted above, contextual factors, inadequate stakeholder engagement and lack of alignment were key factors constraining the implementation of the DDS as originally foreseen. Another major constraint was the absence of a dedicated operational strategy and associated mechanisms to manage and oversee the implementation of the DDS itself. As the experience of other countries clearly highlights, such strategies do not implement themselves; they need active management and investment to ensure that they can serve as effective frameworks to facilitate and channel coordinated and collective efforts against common goals. A key function of a dedicated implementation strategy and approach is to ensure sufficient flexibility to allow for adjustments in strategy, objectives and priorities in response to changes in the broader political and operating environment. The absence of an active approach to supporting the implementation of the DDS in practice had several important consequences.

Management of risks and assumptions. The implementation and achievement of DDS objectives (both strategic and pillar-level) were predicated on a number of core assumptions including a conducive political environment; continued progress in peace negotiations; enhanced data availability; improved security and absence of conflict; and long-term donor engagement and commitment to the DDS. In practice, very few of these assumptions have held, and many of the related risks identified in the DDS document have posed significant challenges and obstacles to implementation of the strategy *as originally defined*. This has led a number of national and international stakeholders to state in hindsight that conditions were not conducive for a long-term strategy such as the DDS, and to prefer other modalities for channeling their assistance. In reality, as stated before, a lot of development programming has proceeded despite these risks and challenges. This underscores the importance of a dynamic strategy for managing risks and assumptions that is directly tied to decision-making at strategy-wide and pillar levels on possible compensatory adjustments to both approaches, priorities, activities and intervention. Such an approach would have provided the DDS with much greater flexibility to calibrate the scope of peacebuilding and development efforts to conditions and circumstances as they evolved.

Monitoring and oversight. The above points to a broader limitation in the design and implementation of the DDS. Very little attention was paid to a strategic and management level monitoring and oversight function, beyond the description of the Darfur Coordination Board (DCB). References to monitoring are limited to progress and financial monitoring. As experience from other countries shows, the scope of monitoring needs to be expanded to include a broader overview of progress, challenges and needs to enable a more dynamic and real-time assessment and adjustment of pillar and sectoral strategies to ensure both that needs are being addressed in the most effective manner, and that challenges to implementation can be addressed. The absence of such a mechanism in the DDS, both in its design and during its implementation, is a factor contributing to the ineffectiveness of the framework in creating a center of gravity for development efforts.

Implementation management and approach. As in other countries, an assumption appears to have been made that the DRA, as the official national lead for the DDS, and the DCB, as the collective policy-level oversight mechanism, would manage and supervise the implementation of the DDS. Both assumptions did not materialize, with the DRA being disbanded in 2016 and the DCB functioning intermittently (see chapter VI). Regardless of whether they had functioned effectively, experience from other countries underscores the importance of a clear mechanism and approach to translate the DDS strategy as a document into an active framework for the coordination and management of collective efforts. This is particularly important in the context of complex strategies such as the DDS, which regroups a wide variety of stakeholders across numerous sectors. In the absence of such a mechanism, the DDS remained a reference document, with the exception of the portfolio of activities financed through the Qatari contribution to the UNDF which addressed a number of cross-pillar FaST priorities. Additional reasons for the absence of a concerted focus on enabling implementation are described in Chapter VI.

Absence of an underlying knowledge base. The DDS called for a number of “studies, surveys, and assessments” that would “create a knowledge base that grounds DDS initiatives in a broader context with regard to service delivery, human resources, fiscal management and concomitant infrastructure”. (DDS, p. 103). This laudable goal does not appear to have been carried out in practice, however, at least not in a centralized or standardized way.

V. DDS thematic pillars

This chapter provides an overview of the key findings and conclusions emerging from the in-depth review of each of the three DDS pillars. The analysis is divided into two parts: a summary overview of key developments within each pillar, including a presentation of original objectives and approach; overall findings from the review; alignment of interventions and an overview of financing mobilized in relation estimated requirements. **Because no pillar breakdown of GoS funds was possible due to lack of available information, financial figures and tables in this and subsequent sections refers only to international financing committed and disbursed.** The second part provides an overview of the key conclusions emerging from the review of each pillar as they pertain to progress and achievements; limitations, challenges and constraints encountered, and key lessons learned identified. Additional information, data and references to specific interventions can be found in the detailed pillar review reports contained in Volume II of the Review Report. Annex 2 to this document also provides an overview of all projects identified and included as part of this review.

A. Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

The overall goal of DDS Pillar 1 is to improve governance by building representative, responsive and effective government institutions accountable to communities wishing to transition from conflict and displacement towards rehabilitation and recovery. DDS objectives focused on governance reform, improved access to justice, land reform, and reconciliation at community and higher levels. Pillar 1 contains eleven strategic objectives which have been grouped into four thematic areas for the purposes of the review.

Figure 6	
Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation	
Thematic areas	Objectives
Governance and accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established People having access to a compensation system and compensation
Land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms
Rule of law and access to justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved access to justice (Gender balanced) Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised armed forces (including special groups) Security Sector Reform implemented

Pillar 1 addresses issues considered to be among the root causes of conflict in Darfur. The pillar strategy is broad and ambitious. Alongside development measures focused on institutional reform, it envisaged activities considered part of the early stages of recovery from conflict (peacebuilding, DDR and compensation for loss of assets and harm). The priorities addressed under Pillar 1 are politically complex and linked to questions of access to power and resources. As such, progress in Pillar 1 was dependent on core DDS assumptions, namely a political climate conducive to the implementation of the DDPD, and an enabling institutional environment at Federal level conducive to state-level reforms.

Pillar 1 thematic areas are interlinked. For example, institution-building and better governance is required to address conflict root causes. Pillar 1 has links to DDS Pillars 2 and 3. Governance processes and institutional capacities are needed to ensure that infrastructure and public services are equitably provided, appropriate to community needs, and can be maintained. Economic recovery requires appropriate regulatory and tax provision, and insecurity and land occupation are critical barriers to return.

1. Overall findings

Generally, programming and achievements in Pillar 1 sectors have been modest relative to DDS objectives. Recovery and development needs remain critical, as highlighted in the key developments section. International development orientated financing aligned with Pillar 1 objectives amounted to a small proportion of needs identified in the DDS (US\$ 146.1 million). This amount excludes possible GoS financial contributions due to lack of available information. However, expenditure related to the DDS objective for reconciliation and conflict management mechanisms (in the conflict resolution and peace-building sector) exceeded the planned DDS target, with programming mainly focused on initiatives at community level. While the DDS laid out relevant strategic priorities, it did not succeed in galvanizing coherent efforts or strengthening sector coordination architecture.

In the governance sector, progress in improving institutional systems and capacities in the public delivery system, local government and PFM institutions was extremely limited, although some good practice was developed in individual basic services sectors. In the rule of law sector, while political and contextual constraints limited impacts, UN assistance led to progress including increased numbers of rural courts and cases resolved, development of responses to SGBV, and legal reform. In the peacebuilding sector, no progress occurred on compensation. An effective locality and state level peace architecture, and processes to address root causes of conflict and critical issues such as land occupation were generally not developed.

Progress at community level was secured through integrated models which combined governance and dispute resolution mechanisms and capacities with tangible inputs such as infrastructure and livelihoods, designed to meet community needs and address local drivers of conflict. Results in areas of operation included effective processes for resolution of local disputes, which supported a fragile social peace. Interaction between groups, trust and social cohesion appears to have increased. Community governance mechanisms supported management of natural resources and collective capacities for participatory planning. Civil society skills and networks were developed, and new community based organisations set up. There are examples of inclusive participation and increased roles and voice for women and youth. Instances of women accessing justice through human rights based and paralegal support in the community emerged.

Limitations in programming and results reflected both the ambitious nature of DDS objectives, and the lack of an enabling environment. Key DDS assumptions proved to be unrealistic. Critical constraints included the political context, lack of an inclusive peace agreement between GoS and armed opposition and a governance model which prioritized control from the center and regime survival. Lack of a clear framework for decentralization and for institutional mandates at different levels curtailed governance reform. Limitations in donor coherence, and shared root causes analysis and strategic planning was a further factor, with support in some areas projectized and fragmented. Operational constraints included the economic crisis, limited implementing partner capacity and difficulties in access to remote areas. Pillar 1 concerns emerged as key barriers to return. These include lack of political and technical solutions to land occupation, limitations in security and justice provision, and in capacities to coordinate and plan across basic services sectors

The state remained unable to meet human needs and to ensure equitable access to resources, and responsive and accountable governance. Such capacity is necessary if impacts of environmental and demographic change are to be managed. These are governance challenges which need to be addressed by effective institutions. Systematic holistic reform of public delivery, local governance and PFM bodies, calibrated according to political conditions, to develop streamlined clear institutional frameworks and capacities is needed. This requires political will and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at locality and state level; and harmonized development partner efforts, with transition to support through GoS systems. Improved capacity at locality level is critical, and coordination across basic service sectors.

The new political dispensation under the Constitutional Declaration mandates an increased focus on accountability processes, community engagement and empowering people to claim entitlements. Harmonized support to civil society and community governance would support this.

Building on results and lessons of integrated community models, and the knowledge of key I/NGO implementing partners could lead to harmonized integrated approaches to sustainable development at

community level, incorporating consensus and peacebuilding over natural resources and basic services. Inclusive work with all groups, on an area, possibly eco-systems basis is suggested.

In line with Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, issues of land occupation and compensation need to be addressed through dialogue and negotiation processes above community level. Needs for protection, access to justice and responsive police and justice sector institutions remain critical. In the rule of law sector, Constitutional Declaration commitments endorse the centrality of human rights and accountability principles. Legal and institutional reform is needed to deliver impartial, independent institutions. An increased focus on access to justice in the community, and ensuring service provision is driven by community needs is suggested.

Underlying causes of gender inequality and lack of access for women to political and economic resources and decision-making roles need to be understood and addressed, and women's organisations and networks empowered to work strategically together. Youth representatives stressed to the review team not their needs, but their wish to be agents of change and implementers of future DDS activities. Top down approaches, and lack of understanding of the growing influence of youth structures in some contexts prevent this important potential being realized.

1.1 Alignment of activities with DDS

Projects were included in the review if they were 1) development-orientated and 2) directly or "indirectly" aligned with DDS high level objectives and underlying results framework. DDS FaST projects whose design was based on the DDS logic were the only initiatives fully aligned to the DDS results framework. Rule of law activities were also largely directly aligned.

DDS high level objectives are broadly framed, and therefore many interventions are aligned indirectly. However, interventions mapped as aligned to the DDS were not necessarily inspired by the DDS or designed to meet its objectives, and can often be regarded as only coincidentally aligned. Donors and implementers programming and needs assessment processes guided their work, and potential for the DDS to enhance coherence appears not to have been realized. This reflects factors including weakness in DDS coordination structures, and political constraints.

The DDS high level framework was broadly relevant to sector needs. Better governance at state and locality levels, resourced by improved revenue collection, is necessary to deliver services and address root causes of conflict. Insecurity and vulnerability to violence demands responsive justice and police provision. However, the design of the DDS strategy had some limitations. It included necessary ingredients for institutional reform, but did not set these in a clear theory of change, and sequenced, contingent critical pathway to delivering measurable results. It did not specify which objectives were conditional on reform at Federal level. Measures to address structural inequalities, including gender inequalities, and women's participation in decision making were limited, despite DDPD provision for special measures.⁷⁷ Pillar 1 did not include any youth focused objectives. Objectives and outputs for increased citizen participation were narrowly defined. The strategy did not anticipate the need for integrated, cross community development and stabilization models.

Key *gaps* in implementation of activities envisaged under DDS objectives include:

- Limited institutional strengthening activities related to DDS governance and accountability objectives related to improvements to the public delivery system, local governance, and PFM;
- Absence of implementation on compensation, as envisaged in the DDS and DDPD;
- Limited peacebuilding and reconciliation activities above community level.

1.2 Organization and Coordination of Efforts

⁷⁷ DDPD article 34 Chapter 11 article 2: To address the under-representation of women in government institutions and decision-making structures, special measures shall be taken and implemented, according to this Agreement, in order to ensure women's equal and effective participation in decision-making at all levels of government in Darfur.

Pillar 1 review highlighted concerns related to coherence and coordination of sector peace and development efforts. Coordination arrangements across the pillar varied, and reflected generally less effective structures for the development sector compared to the humanitarian sector. The overall picture is one of relative fragmentation, and failure to maximise opportunities for impact through coordination at the level of strategic planning, common approaches and sharing of lessons and data sets.

There were limits to coherence of efforts between pillars and sectors. These included the fact that improved local conditions and capacities supported by community peacebuilding efforts were not necessarily reinforced by larger development focused inputs, and effective linkages between the two UN non humanitarian funds (DCPSF and UNDF). Community governance mechanisms developed through several programmes could perhaps have been linked to basic services delivery processes.

Integration across sectors has taken place within community level initiatives. Models combined community governance and conflict resolution mechanisms and capacity strengthening with tangible inputs such as livelihoods and local infrastructure. This reflects the priorities at grass roots level, which vary between locations, and may combine humanitarian, peacebuilding and development needs, with drivers of conflict may including lack of access to resources or services. One implementing partner described DCPSF as a “triple nexus” reflecting the diversity of community needs.

Integrated community level initiatives are not necessarily well coordinated with one another. Implementing partners appear sometimes to patch together a response to community needs, filling gaps with different programme funds, rather than being empowered to work in a systematic way. At the village level, there can be a proliferation of different models, committees and structures.

Coordination provision for the pillar 1 thematic areas are outlined below:

- In the governance and accountability sector there are no dedicated structures for coordination of governance reform or PFM work at Darfur or national level. Coordination arrangements for individual basic service sectors are outlined in the Pillar 2 report. These vary in effectiveness, with poor coordination in the WASH sector, but improvements in health sector coordination. There is no organized mechanism to share lessons across basic service sectors. For INGO and NGO implementing partners, the INGO forum provides a locus for coordination and information sharing.
- In the peacebuilding sector, where there are many actors, DCPSF implementing partner forums at the Darfur state level provide a mechanism for information sharing and coordination. Forums may be expanded to include organisations working on other projects. There are no specific national level coordination structures. Coordination takes place among donors on a bilateral basis.
- Coordination on land issues takes place among UN agencies within the framework of the DDS FaST land project, and among Government stakeholders in land technical committees. No specific structures exist to coordinate with non-UN development partners.
- In the rule of law and access to justice sector, coordination took place primarily through UN-led mechanisms. Coordination for UN agencies contributing to rule of law was addressed through a UN Global Focal Point for police, justice and rule of law. UN State Liaison Function (SLF) transition structures are intended to align the work of UN agencies. The Protection cluster, led by UNHCR, coordinates protection activities which include a focus on access to justice and referral pathways.

1.3 Financing and programming structures

As the table below illustrates, there has been limited development and recovery orientated funding for Pillar 1 objectives relative to DDS plans. The highest expenditure among the Pillar 1 sectors was on peace-building and conflict resolution (\$104.9 million). This expenditure relates to conflict management and reconciliation mechanisms and was mainly spent on community level peacebuilding initiatives. There was no expenditure related to compensation objectives. This was predominantly under the DCPSF, one of two non-humanitarian UN funds operating in Darfur.

Rule of law sector activities were carried out by UNAMID and UN State Liaison function structures, including infrastructure and training inputs, in addition to specific projects, largely by UN agencies. Specific projects featured in the mapping of DSS aligned projects are included in rule of law expenditures. UNAMID and SLF programmatic expenditures from 2017 – 2019 are also included.⁷⁸

A small amount of resources relative to planned DDS expenditures was dedicated to governance and accountability development efforts. No institutional reform activities emerged from the mapping that can be allocated to pillar 1. However, some institutional strengthening activities took place under pillar 2 basic services initiatives. Training of GoS staff took place under projects in several DDS sectors, and expenditures cannot be accurately allocated to pillar 1.

Pillar I Distribution of International Development-Oriented Funding and Assessment of Government Investments, by DDS Thematic Area

Figure 7		
DDS Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)
Governance and accountability	\$425 million	\$10.1 million
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	\$140 million	\$104.9 million
Land governance	\$55 million	\$6.1 million
Rule of law and access to justice	\$225 million	\$25.1 million
Pillar I Total	\$845 million	\$146.1 million

2. Governance and Accountability

Figure 8
Governance and Accountability Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes • Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level • Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery • Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue • Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable

The DDS outlined measures to strengthen the public service delivery system, public financial management (PFM) including state level revenue collection and intergovernmental transfers and local governance, and to increase citizen participation. The DDS envisaged systemic reform measures in addition to training and capacity strengthening.

Mapping for the review allocated 7 projects to the Governance and Accountability sector. These focus on citizen participation, with the exception of the DDS FaST Facilities project which supported construction of locality level administrative infrastructure. International financing amounted to US\$ 10.1million, a small proportion of the DDS requirement of US\$ 425 million.

Development efforts since 2013 to address DDS governance, accountability and PFM objectives have been limited, most notably with regard to systemic reform and strengthening of institutions. There was little evidence of support to public administrative reform *systematically* at the sub-national level in Darfur. Capacity development efforts often focused on training for GoS staff. There were some instances of institutional strengthening work in basic service sectors (health and water sectors - expenditures under pillar 2),⁷⁹ However,

⁷⁸ Programmatic funding including SLF, and for direct implementation by UNAMID mainly in Jebel Marra area.

⁷⁹ DfID, supported the strengthening of capacity in Urban Water Administration (UWA), with the objective of developing a sustainable costs recovery model. Institutional assessment by UNOPS and UNICEF of UWAs diagnosed key challenges, and initial

most basic services support focused on service delivery, rather than improvements to institutional frameworks, processes and capacities. There was no evidence of systematic efforts aimed at strengthening local governance systems, structures and processes, or improved PFM and resource mobilisation, as intended by the DDS.⁸⁰ Accountability and transparency processes within executive and administrative bodies were not supported, while the UN provided training for State Legislative Councils.

Citizen participation related projects in the governance and accountability sector focused on supporting civil society advocacy and good governance initiatives, and strengthening grass roots civil society capacity. Projects in Pillars 2 and 3 supported civil society skills and capacity: NGOs acted as implementing partners and community based organizations were established. Integrated project models in all 3 pillars supported community level governance structures for infrastructure, natural resource management and peacebuilding.

2.1 Progress and achievements

Institutional reform and sustainable capacity development results were limited due to the lack of relevant development efforts. However, there were examples in basic service sectors of good practice in supporting institutional strengthening based on holistic assessment, proving that there are entry points for such work, even under constrained circumstances. DfID's work with Urban Water Administrations supported some initial gains in data collection to support performance management. Training was reported to be valued by participants, who gained skills and confidence. Projects provided government staff with exposure to new models of infrastructure and service delivery, and supported learning by doing.

There are examples of projects enhancing civil society capacity and networking. New community-based organizations generated some increased capacities at grass roots level. Community governance structures have brought some innovations in local forms of natural resource governance. They appear to be effective in managing local infrastructure, and to be sustainable after projects withdraw in some cases. There were examples of increased collective capacities, for example in planning.

2.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Lack of enabling conditions constrained international support to systematic reform and strengthening of institutions. Institutional strengthening is difficult in the absence of a clear decentralization strategy, and well-defined institutional mandates. Lack of political will on the part of GoS, and a governance model which focused on centralisation, and related limits to donor engagement constrained efforts. At the Darfur state level, rapid staff turnover, and limitations in MIS and institutional memory appear to have limited engagement and potential to work through government systems.

Engagement of development partners was projectized and fragmented, undermining impact and sustainability of efforts. Development partners tended to work on a project basis, in an ad hoc way, and at different levels, rather than with a consistent and strategic approach to the governance dimensions of engagement. Humanitarian inputs dwarfed institutional development efforts. Modalities for service delivery, with for example 32% of health services in the Darfur region provided by NGOs and INGOs, may not be conducive to capacity development, and may have encouraged dependency.⁸¹ Lack of attention to availability of GoS operation and maintenance capacities constrained the sustainability of some basic services infrastructure inputs. Limitations in community engagement, and accountability processes also limited sustainability in basic services sectors.

capacity development work included a focus on performance monitoring. In the health sector, the EU supported reform of the health insurance framework. In the context of service delivery interventions, UNICEF provided some support to MIS systems.

⁸⁰ No Darfur states were included in the World Bank Sudan Multi-Partner Fund piloted in North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile, and Sinnar. This supported increased state own state revenues and improved budget execution rates. UNDP conducted an assessment of Darfur sub-national revenue mobilisation processes and challenges.

⁸¹ Source: PWG Health Sector Review Note, citing: WHO-Sudan (2013-2019). Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS), multiple year data from 2013 to 2019.

The political and human rights context, and limitations in coherence curtailed systematic accountability and demand side activities. Conditions made systematic work to support rights holders to claim entitlements, and participate in formal governance processes challenging. Support to civil society and community governance appears to have been somewhat fragmented, with a range of different approaches, lack of consistency and of opportunities for implementing partners to compare models and outcomes. It appears that potential to link up community governance structures to support basic services sectors was not exploited.

2.3 Lessons learned

A comprehensive and coordinated approach to governance and institutional reform is needed. Public administration reform, and sustainable improvement in service delivery capacity, requires political will, and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at state and locality. Ad hoc interventions have limited impact. The review highlighted the importance of strengthened coordination of efforts. Lessons on how to support strengthening of governance systems could be shared across basic services sectors. Coordination over community governance and civil society programming might help identify lessons on which approaches are most effective and develop a more coherent approach.

Institutional reform and strengthening, accountability and community engagement need to be considered across all future DDS sectors to support sustainable change. Even in constrained political circumstances, there are still some entry points, where holistic systems strengthening can be pursued in selected institutions. Accountability and community engagement processes and conflict sensitivity are important, for example in a context where poorly placed infrastructure can aggravate conflict risks. Civil society and demand side work to empower citizens and build voice and engagement accountability, is an essential part of improving governance.

A comprehensive framework for local governance and the native administration will be needed to support improved local governance. Project community level governance mechanisms alone cannot provide a pathway to sustainable development or service provision, and their effect is localized and fragmented. Community structures and capacities developed to date can potentially be developed to identify needs, and conduct participatory development planning, as part of a systematic approach.

Systematic inclusion and representation of women and youth, and vulnerable groups including the unemployed, people with disabilities and ex combatants is needed. The humanitarian development nexus needs to be strengthened, and priority given to people in the most vulnerable situations, when developing governance and community engagement processes.

3. Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

Figure 9
Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Objective
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established • People having access to a compensation system and compensation

The DDS set out objectives for reconciliation and conflict management processes at three levels: Government forces and armed opposition; peace committees at state and locality level; and native administration and local mechanisms. It also aimed to ensure that the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission functioned according to international standards. The DDS also planned to support the establishment of a compensation system.

International financing for this sector amounted to US\$ 104.9 million. A total of 15 aligned projects were identified in by the mapping for the DDS review. The focus of sector development efforts supported by international partners has been predominantly on reconciliation and conflict management at the community level, where there was significant expenditure. This exceeded the planned DDS target for reconciliation and conflict management processes. Such interventions used integrated models combining conflict resolution capacities or structures with livelihoods, NRM and community infrastructure components. The Darfur Community Peace and Stabilisation Fund (DCPSF), which began implementation in 2008 is a significant vehicle for community level peacebuilding. Conflict resolution structures above community level appear to have

received less support and investment. They include peace centers built under a DDS FaST project, and crop protection committees supported by UNAMID in some localities. No expenditure occurred to support compensation processes.

3.1 Progress and achievements

There is evidence that community level peacebuilding activities have been effective in resolving local conflicts. A DPSCF evaluation in 2017 found that 88% of conflicts submitted to project Community Based Reconciliation Mechanisms (CBRMs) were resolved.⁸² UNEP project data showed that 78% of conflicts reported at village level during the project period were resolved without escalation.⁸³ There is tentative evidence that DPSCF CBRMs contributed to increased trust within and between communities⁸⁴ and increased economic interaction.

Data also indicates that CBRMs are considered by communities to reduce incidence of conflict overall in project locations, suggesting a conflict prevention effect alongside resolution of individual disputes. 83% of community members stated conflict had decreased due to CBRMs supported by DCPSF. Data also indicates that addressing tangible local drivers of conflict is effective in reducing violence.⁸⁵ UNEP project reporting found that increased access to water combined with inclusive community governance processes may prevent violence. A perception survey shows that 92% of respondents perceived a reduction in conflict over water, 74% perceived a reduction in conflict over rangeland and 67% perceived a reduction in conflict over land, due to the project.⁸⁶

It is difficult to assess the extent to which development partner efforts contributed to the overall reduction in violence in Darfur that has taken place. It has proved difficult to link up community level structures to reinforce results. Reduced levels of violence are generally attributed by stakeholders to a combination of factors, including conflict fatigue and weapons collection.

There is less systematic data to assess whether structures at locality level and state level have proved effective and contributed to reduced levels of conflict. Crop Protection Committees appear to have been effective in linking up community level committees and addressing conflicts beyond the reach of community structures and peace actors.⁸⁷

Project evaluations show community stabilisation and peacebuilding interventions have been relevant to specific community needs; and have been strategically relevant in a context where formal state protection capacities, and higher-level political dialogue are limited, and conflict has eroded trust, social capital and traditional reconciliation capacities. Community stabilization needs are expected to become more critical as due to UNAMID withdrawal.

A more systematic focus on gender has been developed since 2013. This includes an enhanced conceptual approach, and a stronger focus on women's economic empowerment within DPSCF. This has helped women gain access to traditionally male dominated areas such as local committees where they can take part in preventing and solving local conflict. The review found examples of support to youth focused dialogue and new interactions between youth groups due to project activities.

3.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Political constraints and lack of progress with conflict resolution and reconciliation at higher levels: An effective peace architecture has not been developed above the community level. Issues which are political, and where there may be unequal power relations, such as land occupation and compensation, have not been

⁸² Forcier Consulting LLC., (2017). 'Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund Phase II Evaluation.'

⁸³ UNEP (2018). 'Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report' August. UNEP: Sudan.

⁸⁴ Forcier Consulting LLC., (2017a). 'Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund Phase II Evaluation.' Retrieved from: <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download>

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ UNEP (2018). 'Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report' August. UNEP: Sudan.

⁸⁷ Feedback from INGO implementing partner.

addressed by effective dialogue processes. Lack of GoS political will for peace, and absence of an inclusive peace agreement between GoS and armed opposition curtailed reconciliation work at lower levels. Politicization and interference with native administration and reconciliation processes was noted as a constraint by some stakeholders.

Community level peacebuilding has inherent limitations: Community conflict resolution bodies are transitional structures, without institutional anchorage, intended primarily to build conditions for moving towards development. They cannot address deficits in local governance, or sustainably ensure equitable access to resources, and they cannot deliver development or basic services at scale.

Limitations in coherence and coordination of community peacebuilding efforts: It appears that the results of community peacebuilding are not being reinforced by larger scale development inputs, indicating limited coordination between sectors.⁸⁸ A strategic level of coordination among the many peacebuilding actors was not evident, in terms of shared needs identification, alignment of evaluation and rigorous comparison of approaches. Linking up community peace committees was difficult, and projects tended to function as separate units.

Despite progress, women's participation remained limited: Despite advances and concerted efforts women's participation and voice in community peace mechanisms remains relatively limited. Participation in DCPSF CBRMs in 2017 was found to be around 21 – 25%.⁸⁹ The traditional juddiya system is dominated by elderly men, with women traditionally excluded from conflict prevention roles. Women's participation in higher level conflict resolution processes is also limited.

3.3 Lessons learned

Events in 2019 emphasize the need for **effective dialogue processes and political will to address critical challenges such as land occupation, impunity for human rights abuses, and issues contained in Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration.** Processes above community level need to be developed, shaped by, and linked to existing community level mechanisms.

Successful peace-building needs to integrate tangible and intangible inputs, and ensure local ownership. Integrated models which combine livelihoods or infrastructure with conflict resolution capacity and governance mechanisms, carefully targeted to meet community needs and local conflict drivers are effective. Building relationships, ensuring community ownership and basing activities on existing mechanisms and capacities are key.

There is potential for further integration, evolution and increased coherence of sector efforts. There are indications of some inputs proving particularly effective in building consensus and peace. For example, improving access to water (for both humans and animals) has reduced resource-based conflict. Cooperative economic activities linking communities may help consolidate a fragile social peace. Needs and priorities depend on context. In a fragile transitional context, scale up of community level peace-building may be needed. In positive scenarios, transition towards sustainable development, and consensus building related to Government delivery of based services becomes possible. Capacities and structures could evolve a role in demand driven participatory planning, consultation and participation in decision making.

Establishing community-based organisations and building skills is an alternative to peace committees. Implementers used different models, with DPCSF and others focusing on adapting and strengthening traditional juddiya mechanisms so they are more inclusive, and work inter communally. There is a diversity of approach and comparative lesson learning is suggested.

Inclusion, and empowerment of women improves peacebuilding outcomes. Women are active and highly invested in peace-building. Training of men in gender, civic education and human rights can help change

⁸⁸ Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), (2019). *Prioritized Plan: Sudan*. December. UN OCHA.

⁸⁹ Post 2016 DCPSF data has gender disaggregated CBRM membership, providing the 21 – 25% figure. This is generally supported by household survey data which estimated 20% with a range of 4 – 43%.

entrenched gender biases and promote social cohesion in communities. Inclusion of different groups, including the most vulnerable is important. An increased systematic focus on youth could be considered, reflecting their potential contribution, and links between youth and conflict and migration dynamics.

4. Land Governance

Figure 10
Land Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms • People having access to a compensation system and compensation

The DDS set out an ambitious agenda for land governance and dispute resolution, including the establishment of new bodies for issuing land titles, and resolving disputes (a special court), and for the DLC to become fully functional and representative. Outputs included policy making, legislation, and land registration pilots.

Two projects addressed land issues. A DDS FaST project focused on land governance⁹⁰ and the EU funded a FAO implemented project focused on land use, considered under Pillar 3.⁹¹ Other projects incorporate a focus on land alongside other objectives. Community peacebuilding projects address land related conflicts, and UN rule of law activities build capacity of rural courts. Durable solutions pilot projects have supported processes to address land occupation. International financing for this sub-theme amounted to US\$ 6.1 million out of the total requirement of US\$ 55 million.

4.1 Progress and achievements

Progress supported by development partner efforts included development of draft legislation. The DDS FaST land project supported draft amendments to the state level legal frameworks based on stakeholder consultation, which addressed incorporation of customary land rights. The FaST project also supported new dispute resolution structures. Through consultation, it was determined that arbitration committees at locality level were the best tool for land dispute resolution, and 63 committees were established.⁹²

The DDS FaST project supported the setting up of Land Steering Committees at State level. The project followed a people centred approach and sought to build communication among land stakeholders, in the context of the contentious political nature of land issues. Awareness raising activities informed and sensitized over 3000 people.

The DDS FaST project piloted an alternative land title process with a social tenure domain model which was used in 51 return villages. This established that land was free of conflict through a participatory community approach which is less costly and bureaucratic, and more citizen centred than formal registration processes.

Data collection was supported, including the DLC’s extensive archives. The FAO EU project mapped land tenure, governance, usage and conflict patterns in a number of localities in the 5 states.

4.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Donors and GOS have not been able to fully address the complexities and sensitivities of land issues, which have political and security aspects. Weaknesses in governance and policy making capacities prevented clarity of vision and systematic reform needed to ensure appropriate legal frameworks and systems for equitable land tenure to meet the needs of all groups and recognize customary land rights.

⁹⁰ Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur, 2016 – 2019, jointly implemented by UNDP, FAO, UN Habitat.

⁹¹ Promoting the provision of legitimate land tenure rights using VGGT Guidelines for conflict-displaced communities, including small - scale rural farmers, pastoralists, and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan.

⁹² Arbitration aims to offer a halfway house between the judiciary and traditional and native administration mechanisms.

The challenge of land occupation remains largely without an effective solution, reflecting factors including lack of political will and an inclusive peace agreement. There appears to be insufficient capacity to address land occupation situations under current land administration and dispute resolution mechanisms. Limitations in rule of law and in policing and justice services affect response to land occupation, and exploitative practices linked to land use. There have been some instances of successful resolution of land occupation disputes by communities, and through international support but no significant progress.

Capacity limitations in institutions were a challenge. Limitations in capacity of land administration bodies, and frequent staff turnover presented a challenge to project implementation and land reform. The uncertain status of the DLC in the context of recent political upheaval is a further complexity.

Efforts were also impacted by the limitations in coherence, coordination and adequate monitoring of assistance. Despite some improvements, coordination and coherence of international efforts, and UN agencies on land issues has limitations related to assessment and planning processes, and lack of shared root cause analysis. Data does not appear to be shared among all relevant stakeholders, and improved monitoring and evaluation is needed, to determine the appropriateness and effectiveness of processes and mechanisms supported by development efforts.

Lack of awareness of land rights among the population remains a key challenge. There are particular concerns related to women’s access to land, and the potential impact for women of registration processes. Women may lack confidence in voicing their needs during land consultation.

4.3 Lessons Learned

The resources allocated to land governance have been relatively limited, in comparison to the significance and complexity of the issues involved. If political transition progresses focused efforts to prioritize land concerns, and land occupation will be needed. Alignment and coherence of donor and GoS efforts, political will and inclusive processes will be required. Technical solutions can have risks if underlying political dynamics and power relations are not understood and addressed. A long term and sequenced approach, and policy innovation appears necessary to fully address issues of land tenure, governance, and dispute resolution. Lessons from other countries may be valuable.

Community participation, consultation and awareness raising is key. The FaST project found that bottom up consultation, starting at village level with participatory sketch mapping, linked to higher level activities is the best way to build confidence among stakeholders and increase understanding.

A mixed system for land tenure is needed, to ensure recognition of land held under traditional systems, and to reflect the dual usage of land. The risks and potentially negative consequences of registration need to be understood, and realism about the current context, including the limitations of the civil legal system is required.

Access to land for the most vulnerable groups and for women and youth needs specific systematic consideration, and bias with formal and informal systems needs to be understood and addressed.

5. Rule of law and access to justice

Figure 11
Rule of Law and Access to Justice Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to justice (Gender balanced) • Security Sector Reform implemented (focused on police and prisons) • Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised armed forces (including special groups)

The DDS set out objectives for gender balanced improvement in access to justice, and improved police and prison services, including construction of police infrastructure in return areas under Pillar 2. Improved access to justice was envisaged through both strengthened institutions, and legal aid and awareness raising for

communities. The DDS also planned to support social and economic reintegration of demobilized armed combatants.

Sector inputs have been delivered by mainly by the UN, with UNAMID the main contributor. UN agencies integrated in UN State Liaison Function transition structures continue to prioritize rule of law and human rights. Specific projects have also been implemented. Projects included the UN Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and those targeting the specific justice sector needs of women and children, and the Sudanese Human Rights Commission. UNAMID and the UNCT have worked with the Government with the aim of re-establishing justice and policing services, including through infrastructure provision and training for law enforcement and justice sector institutions, and also supported legal aid. A DDS FaST Project provided a multi-stakeholder approach to reintegration of demobilized combatants, and also addressed small arms control. International financing for this sub-theme amounted to US\$ 25.1 million out of the total requirement of US\$ 225 million.

5.1 Progress and achievements

As outlined in the situation analysis, human rights abuses, impunity and limited access to justice, and structural constraints to rule of law persist in Darfur. There is limited M&E data on the impacts of UN rule of law sector activities, which work with a wide range of stakeholders, UNAMID and UN agencies have supported progress in several areas since 2013:

- Contribution to instances of rights being protected - trial monitoring by UNAMID of cases involving serious crimes indicated a positive trend in application of fair trial standards;
- Improvements to the legal framework and development of strategic frameworks, including ending the possibility of charging women with adultery in cases of rape, and adoption of a national Strategic plan for Darfur Prisons for 2014 – 2018 and a robust framework for prison inspection and management;
- An increase in numbers of functioning rural courts and their case adjudication - disputes resolved (including land) increased to over 2000 in 2018, from 95 in 2017;
- Infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, conducted alongside training included 14 prison facilities, 9 district courts and 89 police infrastructure sites. This represents an extension of the presence of the state, and while it does not guarantee delivery of responsive policing and justice services and citizens' trust, nor that sites are equipped and functional, delivery of police and justice services has increased in some return areas where criminality has been prevalent;
- UNAMID, and other stakeholders anecdotally report improved police professionalism, and increasing service orientation, developed through training;
- UNAMID and UNCT contribution has supported the development of models for institutional response to SGBV and child protection needs including through support to gender desks in police stations and family and child protection units, and through training of police, prosecutors and judges.

The Women's Human Rights Programme, funded by the Baring Foundation and implemented by the Darfur Bar Association⁹³ used a human rights based approach, underpinned by empowerment of women, and resulted in women accessing justice in cases of violence in the community.

Under the FaST DDR project, 3,150 former combatants were provided with reintegration assistance, out of over 10,000 combatants (10% female) demobilized by SDDRC, UNAMID and UNDP. Anecdotal evidence suggests 80% of those reintegrated were dissuaded from re-joining armed groups or gangs.

5.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

- Rule of law sector work faced the challenge of supporting rapid development of state capacities in response to urgent protection and justice needs, in the face of great contextual, political and financial constraints. These included the Darfur security environment where RSF are dominant, and lack of Federal

⁹³ And international partners

level frameworks for democratic policing and an accountable, well organized security sector, and lack of judicial independence. Such factors have limited outcomes from assistance.

- M&E and impact assessment of UN support, and of citizen perception of institutions has been limited. There is therefore limited evidence of the extent to which benefits to citizens and justice service users have been delivered, and on the needs and preferences of communities.
- Lack of political will on the part of GoS authorities to address impunity for human rights violations, including conflict-related sexual violence, by state and non-state actors was a challenge to development efforts. This inhibited progress in securing accountability for abuses, and strengthening relevant mechanisms and capacities, denying justice to affected communities and victims.
- There were constraints to progress on addressing SGBV in the community, which included underlying contextual factors such as patriarchal norms and cultural values. Specific constraints related to development efforts included the fact that infrastructure was not always constructed with a gender sensitive focus and did not allow sufficient space for women police. Numbers of women police remain extremely limited which is a deterrent to women seeking justice.
- While capacity for legal aid has been supported by the UN, there appears to have been more emphasis overall on the supply side and support to institutions than on building up the spaces, networks, capacities and referral pathways to support access to justice in communities.
- Objectives for community policing have not yet been achieved. The model of community policing developed by UNAMID in IDP camps was not accepted by the SPF. Work is now underway to establish an alternative approach through community policing centers.
- Operational constraints to UN cooperation with the Sudanese Police Force included lack of commitment to training in some cases, and centralized decision making within the force.
- The impact of DDR activities was limited by lack of an inclusive peace agreement and security sector reform. There were instances of resentment among communities due to assistance being received by former combatants, which the project sought to mitigate by providing support on a community basis. Operational challenges included weak implementing partner capacity in remote areas.

5.3 Lessons learned

- Sustainable improvement to police and justice provision in Darfur requires Federal level legal and security sector reform, based on the concerns and priorities of citizens, and frameworks for civilian oversight and accountability, including for complaints against security forces.
- The review emphasizes that a focus on promoting human rights and addressing impunity for abuses must be central to a future DDS and to development efforts in the rule of law sector. Efforts to promote accountability and reconciliation need to be integrated into policy and capacity development efforts.
- Further review and impact assessment of sector development efforts is suggested. Building the evidence base and M&E systems, and ensuring that service provision, and infrastructure inputs, are driven by community consultation and needs identification is necessary for sustainable and responsive service provision. This could help to ensure that infrastructure is accessible to all those seeking to access justice, including women.
- Community-based work to support access to justice, and support to legal aid could be scaled up, and community engagement and accountability processes emphasized. Sustainable outcomes in increasing access to justice need to be underpinned by building awareness of rights and capacity of individuals to become proactive drivers of change, empowered to claim rights and seek accountability. This can be linked to protection work by humanitarian efforts and building community protection networks.
- Development assistance in the rule of law sector, and engagement with rule of law sector institutions need careful risk conflict sensitivity and “do no harm” assessments. There are political dimensions to rule of

law engagement in a complex environment that should inform and guide strategic and programmatic engagements. In a context where human rights violations occur, there can be potential human rights related risks.

- DDR needs to be integrated in broad community security frameworks, including elements of conflict transformation and security sector reform, and reintegration of ex combatants approached as part of wider economic recovery.

B. Reconstruction

The primary goal of the Reconstruction Pillar of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) is to “support the recovery and stabilization of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life have been severely disrupted”. Specifically, the Pillar contains eight high-level objectives, whose associated costed results framework form the core of the Pillar Strategy. These objectives are roughly grouped into the following three interrelated *thematic areas* as outlined in the table below.

Figure 12	
Pillar II: Reconstruction	
Thematic Area	Objectives
Basic Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation • Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services • Improved access to and quality of education
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services
Infrastructure Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to electricity services • Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services

1. Overall Findings

The recovery and long-term development needs in each of the sectors within Pillar 2 remain critical. While there has been limited progress on some fronts, other areas are defined by stagnation or slippage. Development-oriented financing that was directly or indirectly aligned with the Pillar 2 objectives amounted to only a fraction of the total needs identified in the current DDS budget (US\$ 392.8 million out of a total requirement of US\$ 5 billion). The international community continued to dedicate a significant amount of humanitarian funding to sectors corresponding to Pillar 2—particularly basic services—over the past six years. Humanitarian funding flows are excluded from the financial analyses below, but the implications for this trend on sustainability, Nexus issues, and longer-term programming are explored in the accompanying discussions.

Looking forward, programming for Pillar 2 needs to be more realistic about the quantity of near-term funds that would be available for development projects in Darfur, prioritizing more modestly scaled interventions, particularly in the areas of transport, energy and water infrastructure. In addition to a recalibration of the strategy to take into account a more realistic amount of available funding, aspects of the underlying logic of several of Pillar 2’s core objectives should also be revisited. First, the implicit assumption that there would be rapid, large-scale returns to areas of origin needs to be reconsidered based on trends over the past six years. The number of IDPs in protracted displacement is nearly the same as in 2013, owing largely to the fact that key pre-conditions for returns (primarily security and access to land) in many areas have not been met. As a result, a future DDS

should anticipate and plan for a significant percentage of IDP households preferring to integrate within the urban areas in which they have been living for the past decade or more. Proactive, pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure and urban planning can ensure that cities and towns in Darfur are able to not just manage this integration, but improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike. Similarly, much of Pillar 2's proposed programming was centered on a massive, public works campaign to deliver dramatically improved transport, energy and WASH infrastructure across the five states. However, even if the billions of dollars in funding required for these works would have materialized, the ability of communities and local and state government's ability to absorb, appropriate and sustainably manage these investments in such a short time is questionable.

The division of the DDS into short-term FaST programming and longer-term priorities make good sense in theory, particularly for infrastructure-related sectors. However, while the DDS envisioned these short-term projects taking place within one year to 18 months, many took multiple years to launch and then complete, given the complexities of working in Darfur. This is another example of the more realistic approach to planning that needs to be taken into account for future programming.

Despite the challenges noted above, a handful of innovative development projects in several sectors under Pillar 2, including WASH infrastructure, road repair, Health, and Education, provide a template for how high-impact and cost-effective development-oriented programming in infrastructure and basic services could be carried out at scale.

1.1 Alignment of activities with DDS

In the review projects were counted in the total if they were, 1) development-oriented and, 2) directly or "indirectly" aligned with the DDS high-level objectives and its underlying results framework. The only truly direct alignment observed under Pillar 2 were the DDS/FaST projects, whose design was based directly on the logic of the DDS.

Beyond the FaST projects, the review found little evidence that other programming was directly guided by the DDS, reinforcing anecdotal reports received by the Review consultants that the DDS suffered from a lack of buy-in from both donors and government. Instead, donor and/or implementers' own programming processes and assessments of needs and guided their work.

However, because DDS plans for Pillar 2 were crafted both very broadly—encompassing a vast range of different potential programming areas—and with little specificity of how this programming would be carried out, most other projects in Pillar 2-related sectors can be considered as *coincidentally* aligned with the broad aims of the Strategy. In the case of these indirectly aligned projects, however, the potential value-added of the DDS as a coherent framework allowing for coordination, synergies and standardization of projects in the Darfur context were not realized.

1.2 Organization and Coordination of Efforts

During the 2013-2019 period, the organization and coordination of interventions directly or indirectly aligned with the DDS under Pillar 2 demonstrated a high degree of fragmentation, a preference for the bilateral design and implementation of projects, and an absence of any substantive linkages with the governance and coordination architecture originally foreseen in the DDS strategy document. Coordination at state and locality levels was also often constrained by weak local government capacities.

Within the basic services sub-component of Pillar 2, coordination was characterized by a fragmentation of mechanisms, including national-level bodies with state-level branches, and the predominance of humanitarian clusters as the main locus for information sharing and dialogue around sectoral priorities. In the WASH sector, development-oriented coordination mechanisms were perceived as largely ineffective between Federal, State and locality levels. Conversely, in the health and nutrition sector, the establishment of the National Health Sector Coordination Council in 2016 has proven effective and has been extended to some of the Darfur states, providing a firm point of anchorage for international assistance. In the education sector, state-level coordination has been

weak, but the establishment of a development-focused forum under the leadership of the Ministry of Education has facilitated stronger cooperation between partners.

Within the RRU sub-component of Pillar 2, there has been an ongoing evolution in the coordination architecture over the past six years. Until recently, coordination has been primarily vested in the Returns, Recovery and Reintegration (RRR) sector group, established in 2013 as part of the humanitarian cluster system. Beginning in 2017, a complementary Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) was created and launched initiatives designed to promote well-coordinated durable solutions options for displaced households in both rural and urban areas. Together, these two coordinating structures were directly relevant for DDS-aligned programming in the Returns sector. However, additional strengthening and formalization of their roles will be necessary to adequately support scaled-up programming to address displacement.

Within the transport and energy sectors there was very little evidence of any collective coordination of efforts. Given lack of donor involvement in these areas, coordination reported by the few actors in the sectors was done directly with State and Federal authorities on a project-level basis. Interlocutors involved in relevant projects described very little planning or coordination capacity on the part of the government at the state level, given limited capacity and high staff turnover⁹⁴.

1.3 Financing

As the table below illustrates, there was a pronounced lack of development-oriented funding for the Pillar as a whole, especially relative to the extremely ambitious plans articulated in the DDS and the major development challenges. Moreover, as discussed below, the programming that was undertaken was relatively fragmented and uncoordinated, based on individual donor priorities as opposed to a coherent whole-of-Darfur approach like the one originally envisioned in the DDS.

Distribution of International Development-Oriented Funding and Assessment of Government Investments, by DDS Thematic Area

Figure 13			
DDS Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)	Assessment of Government of Sudan Funding
Basic Services			
WASH	\$1.08 billion	\$73.1 million	Medium
Health	\$290 million	\$148.8 million	Medium
Education	\$350 million	\$54.2 million	Medium
Cross/ Multi-Sectoral	No allocation	\$91 million	
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization			
Returns	\$140 million	\$8.5 million	Low
Urbanization	\$115 million	< \$1 million	Low
Transport & Energy Infrastructure			
Transport Infrastructure	\$2.025 billion	\$11.6 million	High
Energy Infrastructure	\$1 billion	\$5.7 million	Medium
Pillar II Grand Total	\$ 5 billion	\$392.8	

2. Access to Basic Services

Basic Services Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation • Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services

⁹⁴ Personal communications by Review Team with UNOPS Project Manager on the Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points initiative

- Improved access to and quality of education

The DDS outlined a strategy for basic social services covering water and sanitation (WASH), health and nutrition, and education, broken down according to the following objectives:

- **Increase Access to improved water sources and sanitation.** The DDS strategy was based on a massive increase in urban and rural water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as a small number of complementary plans for improving policies, operations and maintenance and hygiene promotion. The anticipated results of this investment were to provide water to 5.6 million rural residents, 1.7 million urban residents, and 17.8 million livestock, along with sanitation services for 2.1 million Darfuris.⁹⁵ Like in most other sectors in Pillar 2, it was heavily focused on an enormous, one-time construction boom in the sector, intended to overcome decades of underinvestment and damage from the conflict.
- **Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services.** Key priorities included constructing and rehabilitating health facilities; improving human resources for health; improving pharmaceutical supply systems; and subsidizing the enrolment of poor families in the N.H.I. A significant emphasis (over half the total budget for this sector) was placed on construction or rehabilitation of health facilities, with the remainder split across staff employment costs, ongoing recurring costs, and a relatively small (\$10 million) investment in health systems strengthening. It is unclear which portions of these investments were intended for development partners, and which were expected to be absorbed by the Government of Sudan. The inclusion of recurrent costs raises questions about sustainability.
- **Improve access to and quality of education.** Education in the DDS was less focused on hard infrastructure activities and more on equipping and running schools, and subsidizing the education of vulnerable populations. For example, a total of approximately \$110 million was envisioned for school feeding, schooling costs for out of school children and youth, and provision of textbooks and school supplies. This fact is likely partly due to the fact that the DDS plan was meant to complement the recently signed four-year Basic Education Recovery Program (BERP).

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$367 million was mobilized for basic social services (out of a total DDS budget of \$1.72 billion), comprising \$73.1million for water/sanitation, \$54.2 million for education and \$148.8 million for health/nutrition, and roughly \$91 million for cross/multi-sectoral basic services. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard.

2.1 Progress and Achievements

Water and Sanitation

Relative to both the anticipated funding levels and stated aims of the DDS' plans for the WASH sector, and humanitarian investments in WASH (which totalled \$141 million for all of Sudan between 2013 and 2019⁹⁶) accomplishments in this sector over the past six years have been limited. Nevertheless, several of the projects have provided scalable models for sustainably and cost-effectively improving WASH in Darfur in the future. Through the Aqua 4 Darfur project, for example, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles are being increasingly applied in the selection and management of water resources to cover the multiple community water needs, including domestic, livelihood and food security demands. In addition, the Urban Water 4 Darfur project has provided a template for normalizing water service delivery in IDP camps by integrating them into the municipal service delivery system. If successful, this could provide a model for reducing community tensions, strengthening trust between clients (i.e. citizens) and service providers (i.e. local and national government), ensuring holistic management of scarce water resources in the cities, and facilitating the transition away from long-standing but unsustainable water provisioning in IDP camps. Finally, WASH

⁹⁵ DDS Annex – published Basic Services Technical Working Group report.

⁹⁶ Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

partners are increasingly adopting sustained hygiene promotion activities to accelerate cost-effective sanitation behavior change in IDP camps as well in the areas of return and IDP/refugee hosting communities.

Health and nutrition

Interventions in this sector resulted in a fairly significant increase in health infrastructure in Darfur. However, because of funding shortfalls, results fell well short of DDS targets. Moreover, the sustainability of the investments—particularly those related to infrastructure—and the overall capacity of the health systems in Darfur remain in question, particularly in terms of an extremely unequal distribution of human resources for health, with major gaps in rural and remote areas. The little programming that was undertaken in the area of health systems strengthening and capacity building was not part of a longer-term, integrated effort, but rather a handful of stand-alone projects. Fortunately, efforts like the EU-funded systems strengthening project implemented by IMC and Concern represent important forays into scaling up longer-term development assistance for health care in the Darfur region. Taking these kinds of approaches to scale will be critical if the Darfur health sector is able to sustainably develop.

The role of the humanitarian sector in health is a major issue, as development-oriented interventions are dwarfed by Sudan-wide humanitarian spending in the sector over the past six years, which totaled over \$182 million⁹⁷. In 2019, NGOs are still responsible for approximately 1/3 of the primary health care services in Darfur⁹⁸. As a result, observers have characterized the Darfur health sector as being stuck in a humanitarian response mode that needs to move towards longer-term development programming, but which lacks both the national capacity and the development funding to do so⁹⁹.

In terms of policy efforts in the sector, one of the most important developments was the revision of the National Health Strategy in 2017, covering the period 2017-2030. The new plan is guiding health system reform towards the goal of attaining Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and reflects a general shift towards a more holistic conception of health in the Government's approach to the sector, both nationally and in Darfur.

Education

Other than the Global Partnership for Education's BERP development-oriented investments in the sector were modest. Some important progress on addressing the issue of out of school children and youth was made via the Qatari-funded FaST project on Accelerated Learning. However, the total enrolment of 40,000 out-of-school youth is still minimal relative to the over 900,000 children out of school in Darfur estimated by the Ministry of Education in 2013¹⁰⁰.

School construction in order to improve the learning environment was a common feature across the two projects for which detailed programming documentation was available, highlighting the importance of improving the learning environment to combat increasing school dropout rates that have contributed to a stagnating Gross Enrolment rate (see discussion above). As with infrastructure investments in other sectors, however, the sustainability of these bricks-and-mortar centric investments are very much in question, with lack of qualified teachers, learning materials, and overall education sector management processes all undercutting the impact of new and rehabilitated schools.

2.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

⁹⁷ Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

⁹⁸ PWG Health Review Note, citing WHO-Sudan (2013-2019). Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS), multiple year data from 2013 to 2019

⁹⁹ Trithart, A., (2019). "Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency," International Peace Institute. April. Retrieved from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/04/stuck-in-crisis-the-humanitarian-response-to-sudans-health-emergency>.

¹⁰⁰ UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2015:2). 'Joint Project Document: Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), including life-skills and improved access to employment opportunities for out-of-school children and youth'. January. Khartoum: UNDF.

Efforts across the three basic services sectors faced a number of limitations, challenges and constraints, which are described in detail in Volume 2 of the DDS Review. Across all three, a number of common issues can be highlighted:

Sustainability of interventions was affected by inadequate focus on local and community level systems strengthening. Efforts to sustainably enhance provision and quality of services was affected by extremely limited capacities at state, local and community levels. In the WASH sector, there is often lack of adequate community engagement or ownership needed to maintain water facilities. In the health and nutrition sector, efforts to improve access and quality of healthcare services were hamstrung by inadequate capacities of the local/decentralized health system. In the education sector, sustainability of interventions was threatened by extremely limited technical capacities in the state Ministries of Education and high staff turnover, which is even more pronounced at local level.

Given the project-focused nature of most interventions and limited funding across all sectors, gaps in geographic targeting and coverage were pronounced. As a result, the impact of interventions was uneven. In the area of health, there are still substantial pockets of underserved and vulnerable populations who lack adequate access to integrated quality healthcare services—particularly, for returnees, host communities and population living in remote and/or security compromised areas. In the area of education, projects also face challenges in improving education outcomes for vulnerable populations given that they are apt to move in and out of the target zones. This is particularly true for IDP, refugee and Out of School youth, but applies to the entire Darfur region—in particular in rural areas.

Across all three sectors, funding for development-oriented interventions was dwarfed by humanitarian assistance. The vast array of services that INGOs provide has offered vital life-saving assistance and increased general access to services for underserved populations across Darfur. They have also been critical in rapid responses to the numerous health shocks that have risen in the region over the past six years. However, there is growing concern that because of short-funding cycles, urgent needs, and NGO capacities and mandates, this has created not just dependency, but unsustainability, in the medium- to long-term.

Operational challenges posed significant challenges to successful implementation of many interventions. Both education and WASH interventions faced significant challenges for day-to-day operations, resulting in delays and cost-overruns that are particularly serious for larger projects.

2.3 Lessons Learned

WASH

- **Need for Holistic Planning.** Planning for all of the uses of scarce water resources in a community can help reduce tensions and ensure sustainability. IWRM's use of catchment-based water management committees, for example, helps bring different users around the table and equitably and transparently plan for multiple demands on the resource. WASH actors need to more fully embed this way of thinking in their programming.
- **Investments in Water Resource Improvements Need to be Conflict Sensitive.** By rehabbing or constructing infrastructure in a zone where land occupation has occurred, WASH implementers have found that there is a risk of legitimizing or reinforcing this situation, thereby raising tensions. This needs to be carefully considered before and during project implementation.
- **Operations & Maintenance Considerations Should be Paramount.** How to ensure repair and upkeep of vital water resources is something that continues to require concerted thought and planning. Evaluations have shown that Darfur is littered with broken down WASH infrastructure.
- **Gender Considerations.** Gender sensitivity needs to be taken into account when planning for WASH sources. Men, women, boys and girls have different use profiles for water and sanitation. Addressing this by engaging the voices of multiple stakeholders during the design of any intervention should be standard practice.

- **Importance of Hygiene Promotion and Behavior-Change Messaging.** Until recently, this was largely restricted to IDP camps and return villages but is being expanded. For example, Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) achievements are still low, but there is an increased pace of activities with the national launch of the Roadmap to make Sudan Open Defecation Free by 2022.
- **Rehabilitating Existing Infrastructure Provides Cost and Sustainability Benefits.** In rural areas throughout Darfur, pre-existing water infrastructure has been abandoned for many years and has thus fallen into disrepair. Rehabilitating this infrastructure should be a priority over new construction.

Health and Nutrition

- **The construction and rehabbing of facilities need careful placement.** Hard infrastructure is useful but costly, and incorrect placement has led to underutilization, lack of maintenance and ultimately ineffective expenditures. Sustainability of health infrastructure investments require a well-coordinated and multi-sectoral approach if the multi-faceted determinants of health and health challenges are to be adequately addressed during their construction.
- **Importance of Community Buy-in.** There is a need to improve and strengthen community health systems and establish or strengthen mechanisms for effective community engagement. Localilty-level government health structures contain a specific role for Community Engagement, but much more needs to be done to enable communities to meaningfully participate and contribute.
- **The growing importance of non-communicable diseases, including mental health and disabilities, are being increasingly recognized** by health experts engaging with Darfur as important to take into account in future programming.

Education

- **Working through Government Systems Reinforces Sustainability.** Instead of using intermediate service providers to conduct the trainings and cash distributions related to its school grants systems, the BERP initiative piloted the use of locality administrators. This increased engagement from government officials, and with it ownership and overall sustainability of completed structures.
- **Community Construction of Schools.** Community contributions to school construction is a common practice in Darfur. Building on this, BERP experimented with community construction grants, in which the local education committee directly received funds and oversaw the construction of schools in their communities themselves. This model has the potential to be replicated in future construction of schools and other small-scale infrastructure (such as health clinics) across Darfur.

3. Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization

Figure 14
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services

Addressing displacement was a major concern for both the DDPD and the DDS. To respond to this important issue, the DDS proposed three interrelated high-level objectives, as highlighted above. A total of \$255 million was estimated as being required to achieve these aims: \$140 million for returns to rural areas, and a total of \$115 million for the two urban-related objectives. Given discrepancies¹⁰¹ between the funding amounts listed for these objectives in the final DDS and the detailed costed results frameworks included in the DDS’ Thematic Working Group on Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization annex, it is not possible to determine the exact

¹⁰¹ For example, while the DDS objective for “social and economic reintegration of returnees” was \$140 million in the final DDS, the TWG Results Framework total was \$70.9 million

breakdown of emphasis and budgets across these three objectives. However, it is clear that the DDS assumed that a large number of rural returns of both IDPs and refugees would occur over the six year time period. Strikingly, despite the DDS' focus on transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development programming, the proposed interventions in the Returns sector were thus relatively short-term in nature, and were apparently meant to join up with other, longer-term, investments in other sectors across the three Pillars. The implications of this siloed approach to returns will be discussed in more detail below.

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$8.5 million was mobilized for RRU, out of a total budget of \$255 million. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard. This total excludes humanitarian funding through the RRR sector, which was a primary source of non-development funding for returns—between 2013-2019, total Sudan-wide RRR sector funding captured by UN OCHA was \$19.9 million¹⁰². The total also excludes a number of short-term integrated programming initiatives (often funded through humanitarian sources) that implicitly link to the issue of returns via investments in areas of return, but which are primarily associated with livelihoods, resilience, peacebuilding / conflict resolution, and access to basic services. As discussed in the “Analysis of Needs and Priorities” section below, a future DDS should seek to more explicitly integrate returns as a transversal issue across all Pillars, as opposed to treating it as a standalone topic.

3.1 Progress and Achievements

Assessing the impact of the projects listed above on the number and sustainability of returns is extremely challenging, given a lack of detailed data on the projects, as well as the highly fluid displacement context, which inhibits gauging the impact of any one project on the returns decision-making of a specific household or community.

Nevertheless, given the relatively low number of verified returns (whether or not they are attributable to specific programming) and the high levels of households known to still be in protracted displacement, it is clear that efforts to promote returns have had a negligible impact on the overall displacement situation. One primary reason for this is the marked lack of funding. Without significantly higher amounts of resources available, supporting the durable return of hundreds of thousands of displaced households is simply not possible. Another factor in the lack of demonstrable results, however, can be attributed to the approach used by many of the projects above. Given their relatively short-time frames and patchwork of loosely coordinated investments that are not anchored in efforts to systematically address underlying barriers to return, many of the initiatives examined are not able to achieve durable returns.

Urbanization and Local integration. Remarkably little programming has been completed related to urbanization and local integration. Multi-sectoral urban planning efforts and investments in affordable housing as envisioned by the DDS have been largely non-existent, leaving major gaps in the ability of local, regional and national authorities to proactively plan for and accommodate ongoing urban growth. Only two projects were identified in this area: a DDS FaST project providing self-help housing grants for low-income households in urban settings, as well as financing for two “urban observatories” within the Ministry of Planning in El Fasher and Nyala; and the Durable Solutions Durable Solutions Pilot Initiative in El Fasher, which developed urban spatial profiling plans for the city as solutions for integrating IDPs into the urban fabric. Beyond these small investments, there have been complementary efforts to improve basic services in several towns. Most prominently, urban master plans for both water and sanitation and related infrastructure investments have been developed as part of DFID's Aqua 4 Darfur project in Zalingei and El Fasher, and the AFDB Darfur Water Project for Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, both discussed in the WASH section above.

3.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Funding. There has been a general lack of funding for returns-oriented activities, as evidenced by the less than \$8.5 million for programming with a specific focus on returns. This is partly due to the absence of a conducive environment for returns, discussed above, that defined much of the 2013-2019 period, and which likely

¹⁰² Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

tempered donor interest in supporting returns programming. However, even where needs have been clearly identified and well-designed plans for responding to them developed, funding has often failed to materialize. Interestingly, the lack of funding for returns programming also appears to extend to humanitarian-oriented efforts.

Coordination. The area-based and multi-sectoral approach to returns and promoting durable solutions requires a high degree of coordination, but this proved challenging in practice. Organizations preferred to propose projects and have them funded independently of other efforts on the ground, rather than taking the time to collaboratively prepare a full array of projects for a certain area and covering the full humanitarian-peace-development spectrum. In these situations, donor processes, including a current preference for short-term, humanitarian-oriented programming, and organizations' own self-interest can tend to work against the development of returns interventions that truly meet the needs of returnees, prospective returnees, and host communities.

Policy Constraints. The Government of Sudan has recently expressed support for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, and the desire to help displaced households choose the option (return to area of origin, relocate, or integrate locally) that is best for them. However, lack of clarity of what this will mean in practice around difficult issues such as land occupation, compensation, and access to land in urban settings frustrates progress. Unlocking donor resources is thus predicated on clear and meaningful steps by the Government to define returns and reintegration plans and policies.

More broadly, contrary to what was anticipated in the DDS, no Government-led compensation program was launched, and no compensation paid (see Pillar 1 for a more detailed discussion of this issue). The lack of movement on this hot-button topic provided another headwind for returns, and continues to be a political impediment to large-scale returns.

3.3 Lessons Learned

The Importance of Accurate Intentions Data for Planning. The recently completed IDP Profiling Initiative has for the first time provided detailed, high-quality data on IDP intentions, needs, and living situations. The study highlights that approximately 50% of camp residents prefer to stay in their current location and fully integrate locally¹⁰³. The study also showed that ongoing lack of security in return areas and the inability to reclaim lost land and property remain major impediments to returns for the estimated 40% of returnees who do want to go back¹⁰⁴. This type of data is essential for the development of effective, evidence-based programming on returns.

Tackling Root Causes of Displacement. Research on the Taadoud project detailed the importance of addressing access to land and water. The lessons from this project clearly highlight that household's recoveries in areas of origin will be severely undermined if they are not able to regain access to their former lands¹⁰⁵. This sets a high bar for durable solutions in many areas and demands realism about what will and will not be possible in terms of large-scale durable returns in the near- to medium-term.

Water as a Key Tool for Leveraging Returns. The importance of water as one of *the* most critical natural resources in Darfur and its direct relationship to returns is worth emphasizing. Several implementers in the returns sector noted during interviews that their primary entry point for community planning, conflict resolution and increased resilience was through increasing the availability and equitable management of water resources. More of this vital resource helps "grow the pie" in resource-constrained settings and—if carefully programmed—both decrease tensions and increase economic opportunities. This in turn creates a more conducive and sustainable environment for returns.

¹⁰³ Durable Solutions., (2018). 'Update on the Profiling and Durable Solutions Process in El Fasher'. December.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). 'Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

Focusing Returns Programming on Entire Communities. Community cohesion is enhanced when both returnees and host communities are incorporated into returns-related programming, as opposed to focusing exclusively on returnees. A more inclusive approach to beneficiary targeting helps prevent community tensions and can tend to facilitate more even and more sustainable development in the zone. This in turn has a greater chance of resulting in lasting “pull” effects to resettlement in the community, as opposed to potentially divisive and ephemeral short-term incentives provided only to returnees.

4. Transport and Energy Infrastructure

Figure 15
Transport and Electricity Infrastructure Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services

Infrastructure Development is a major focus of the DDS, with over \$3 billion of the total \$7 billion price tag devoted to transport (\$2 billion) and energy (\$1 billion) infrastructure. Proposed transport programming in the DDS included not just roads (\$1.087 billion), but also rail (\$780 million) and civil aviation (115 million) while energy investments centered on power plants and transmission lines¹⁰⁶. The proposed interventions under these two objectives overwhelmingly focus on hard infrastructure, as opposed to supporting activities, such as technical studies, regulatory reform or improved management systems. For example, all but \$5 million of the \$2 billion for transportation was expected to go towards construction.¹⁰⁷

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$17.3 million in donor investment was mobilized for transport and energy infrastructure, out of a total budget of \$3.025 billion. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard.

4.1 Progress and achievements

More than any other sector, there was a gap between the aspirations of the DDS with respect to transport and energy infrastructure, and what was actually completed. This was primarily due to the enormous shortfall in funding relative to the extremely ambitious aims set out for these sectors. International support for these activities would traditionally be the focus of development banks, and this did not materialize for a variety of political reasons discussed above. This situation was then exacerbated by the Government of Sudan’s own fiscal problems, which meant that its contributions to the DDS, which would have been expected to include significant investments in transportation and electricity, were also reduced.

Given the lack of investment in these sectors, the overall impact of the minimal amount of programming completed has been modest at best. In the electricity sector in particular, the investments made by both national and international sources have likely proven insufficient to overcome increasing urbanization and demand for electricity, and higher costs of imported fuel.

Investments in road infrastructure—while falling far short of the totals foreseen in the DDS— seem to have had some demonstrable positive effects. Indeed, the recent activity in the road sector represents an important step forward for the region. As noted by Taadoud study¹⁰⁸, “Road construction efforts in Darfur have been much more apparent within the past four or five years than at any other time in its history.” The case of the El Ingaz road provides an example of the major changes that better connectivity in Darfur can have in an area that has been historically severely cut off from the rest of Sudan. Construction of the road began in 1995 and it took until November 2014 for the Khartoum-El Fashir sector to be completed¹⁰⁹. The work in the other sectors

¹⁰⁶ Unpublished re-costing of the TWG 7 (Infrastructure) Results Framework.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016:59). ‘Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project’. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2017). ‘Trade Flows and the El Ingaz Road.’ Issue Paper, MMTA project. March.

(Nyala-Geneina; Kass - Zalingei; El Fasher - Manawashi, a distance of around 100 km on the El Fasher to Nyala road) is ongoing but very slowly¹¹⁰. While this project predates the DDS, its impact on the region has been substantial, including an improved security situation, more stable supplies of commodities in the region, a boosting of the livestock trade between Darfur and Central Sudan, and a general revitalization of the agricultural sector¹¹¹; the effects of this project are discussed in more detail in Pillar 3. Field interviews conducted by the Review team in Geneina confirmed these findings, with key informants repeatedly citing the largely positive impacts of the road on the local economy. While not directly related to the DDS given that it began before 2013, the story of the El Ingaz road and its far reaching benefits highlights the impact that road infrastructure can have in Darfur. On a more limited scale, the DDS FaST project has also reported positive impact in the communities in which it has operated, with spot improvements of choke points on rural roads helping ensure that producers have year-round access to markets, thereby boosting livelihoods¹¹². The cascading benefits and high value-for-money of investing in transport infrastructure in Darfur in the coming years is discussed in more detail below.

4.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Lack of Funding: Overall, the single biggest limitation in this sector has been the lack of funding relative to the need. Financial resources available from all sources (both the Government of Sudan and international donors) were just a sliver of the approximately \$3 billion called for in the DDS for these two sectors.

Challenge Operating Environment for Capital Projects: The difficult security and economic situation has been particularly challenging for large, high-cost infrastructure. Operating in remote regions for long periods of time with long supply chains and valuable equipment makes projects of this type particularly susceptible to security concerns. Similarly, the cash liquidity problems, high inflation rates, importation hurdles and fuel shortages that have affected all programs in Darfur have been particularly hard on infrastructure projects' timelines and budgets.

4.3 Lessons Learned

Conclusions regarding lessons-learned in these sectors remains limited in this sector, given the dearth of investments and lack of evaluations on the projects that have been completed. In general, however, there is clear evidence that infrastructure, including particularly road infrastructure, has the ability for large development impacts for many facets of life in Darfur. As noted in the Taadoud program's operational research, *"Not only does this better infrastructure improve resilience through better market linkages that should reduce the severest price spikes, but it also increases access to services. In one village, households reported that, prior to the road paving, if someone was ill, it could take several days to get them to a hospital. Now, they said they could call a driver in El Geneina who would come to pick the person up, and they could be at a large hospital within a few hours. In some areas, households now commute between large towns like El Geneina and their villages on a weekly basis, facilitating income streams in both locations, and allowing them to maintain a household in El Geneina, where they felt crop storage was safer. Finally, easier travel to Khartoum and other cities reduces the financial barriers of migrating for labor"*¹¹³.

C. Economic Recovery

The main objective of Pillar 3 is described as contributing positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development through a three-pronged approach:

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Interview with UNOPS Project Manager for DDS FaST Roads Project

¹¹³ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016:60). 'Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

- Support to key livelihoods, centered on crop and livestock production, and enhanced agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements
- Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services, centered on facilitating a conducive business enabling environment, institutional capacity and private sector development
- Sustainability of productive sectors through natural resource management, with a focus on land, forest resources and water

This is translated into seven objectives (each with a number of sub-objectives and outputs), as follows:

1. Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements
2. Improved crop and livestock production and productivity
3. Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development
4. Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity
5. Increased access to employment opportunities
6. Increased access to financial services
7. Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources

This review of Pillar 3 has been organized according to the three thematic areas described above, expanded to reflect the current reality in Darfur and Sudan. Thus:

- ‘Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services’ has been expanded into ‘Economy, business and trade’, addressing objectives 3), 4) and 6). The macroeconomic context is given prominence in view of the impact and consequences of the current economic crisis.
- ‘Natural resource management’ carries the same title and covers objective 7)
- ‘Support to key livelihoods’ has been subdivided into rural livelihoods, addressing objectives 1) and 2), and urban livelihoods, addressing objective 5). Using the livelihoods lens encourages a people-centric focus, and reflects how programming has been organized.

Figure 16	
Pillar III: Economic Recovery	
Thematic Area	Objectives
Economy, Business & Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development • Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity • Increase access to financial services
Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources
Rural Livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements • Improved crop and livestock production and productivity
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased access to employment opportunities (gender-balanced)

1. Overall Findings

Generally, the programming and achievements in the last six years that relate to Pillar 3 have been modest compared with the DDS objectives. This is due both to the overly ambitious scope of Pillar 3 objectives, and the lack of a broader enabling environment due to the inability of the DDPD to deliver peace and stability in Darfur. While the DDS framework and structure identified priorities for economic recovery, it did not contribute to a collective vision and strategy, nor significantly strengthen the coordination architecture. Moreover, the depth and seriousness of the Sudanese economic crisis has had a major impact on all sectors of the economy and on the prospects for economic growth in Darfur. This has impacted and constrained the success of many development interventions.

The learning from each different component of Pillar 3 underlines the importance of a systemic approach, whether natural resource management and catchment-based management systems, a market systems approach to developing trade, or a holistic and market-driven approach youth employment. One-year ‘humanitarian-type’ grants are much too short for such work, and inappropriate for community-based development programming, although this has been the funding model of some donors. It also requires more focus on strengthening institutions, working more closely in partnership with government, and building relations with and supporting communities over time. This change in mindset and change in approach can be challenging for agencies steeped in over a decade of humanitarian programming and principles in a highly politicized conflict environment¹¹⁴.

Yet despite these constraints and challenges there are areas of economic growth in Darfur that deserve attention and warrant investment. Many of these relate to the agricultural economy, while others relate to the service economy in urban areas. Rebuilding and supporting markets and trade is critical to economic recovery in Darfur, at the macro, meso and micro levels. However, the shortage of capital for Darfuri businesses and entrepreneurs is a major constraint. At the same time, well-planned and executed public-private partnerships offer considerable potential for boosting the livelihoods of rural producers as well as urban-based agro-processors. There is a small but growing body of experience to draw upon in this respect.

Natural resources – land especially – are key to all livelihood strategies in Darfur. The rate of recovery is directly related to access to natural resources and power relations. Understanding differential access to natural resources and power imbalances, and then finding ways of addressing them at local level, identifying and understanding mutual interests, are fundamental to interventions associated with natural resource management¹¹⁵. There are opportunities to learn from good practice examples as well as from the challenges some projects have faced.

A future DDS, and the projects it spawns, should draw upon the insights into rural livelihoods and how they have adapted and changed/ are continuing to change in the dynamic context of Darfur. The Tufts and Taadoud learning offer much in this respect. It highlights the merging of production systems within households, for example as ‘traditional’ pastoralists engage more in agricultural production. And it warns against ‘the unhelpful labelling of communities or groups as either “sedentary farmers” or “nomads” (which) has enforced dividing lines associated with wider conflicts. This language continues to put people in opposition to one another’, rather than exploring how their livelihood systems are integrated¹¹⁶. ‘Much remains to be done in relation to promoting policy and program approaches that support the continuity and integration between livelihood specializations’¹¹⁷. There is also an urgent need to rebalance rural development programs to be more inclusive of livelihood production systems.

There is a huge unmet need for working with youth, especially in urban areas. Current vocational training and youth employment projects are operating on a small-scale compared with the overall need. In rural areas the improved provision of services and employment opportunities are necessary for youth to remain. Fundamental change is needed, economically and politically, for youth to see a more vibrant and optimistic future, in which they can politically engage, and can earn a livelihood.

1.1 Alignment of activities with DDS

There has been little direct alignment of interventions within pillar 3, resulting in an overall lack of overall strategic coherence and vision driving economic recovery efforts in Darfur. There are a number of reasons for this:

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). ‘*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project*’. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

¹¹⁶ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). ‘*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study*’. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

First, many assumptions made about the trajectory of the post-DDPD period did not materialize in terms of peace and stability. As one senior UN official explained, the situation actually got worse in 2014/15. Fundamentally, some of the root causes and underlying issues related to the conflict were not addressed.

Second and related, some stakeholders have commented that a five-year strategy was long and overly ambitious in a highly volatile context. According to stakeholders in Darfur, it was not sufficiently informed by the realities on the ground, nor by agency capacity in Darfur which had been seriously depleted after the NGO expulsions in 2009¹¹⁸. Yet the objectives were highly ambitious. And there was a lack of flexibility in implementation. Projects designed early in the DDS period were guided by accessibility at that time. But with greater security other areas opened up and IDPs returned, but projects could not always be adapted to the new needs and reality.

Third, the objectives of the DDS as articulated were very general and not sufficiently tailored to the specific context of Darfur. They also did not take into account the multi-sectoral integrated development programming that has prevailed in Darfur.

Fourth, the DDS was perceived as a top-down process and a top-down document with limited national and international ownership or engagement. Linking implementation of the DDS to the DRA created a structural problem. Line ministries at state level describe how they were not involved in the selection of projects, resulting in some duplication. When the DRA was dissolved, political will to implement the DDS dissipated, and the hand-over of projects to line ministries took time.

1.2 Organization and Coordination of Efforts

During the 2013-2019 period, the organization and coordination of interventions directly or indirectly aligned with the DDS under Pillar 3 demonstrated a high degree of fragmentation and an absence of any substantive linkages with the governance and coordination architecture originally foreseen in the DDS strategy document. Coordination at state and locality levels was also often constrained by weak local government capacities. While the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster could serve as a coordination forum for programming related to economic recovery, in practice it has focused primarily on humanitarian livelihood assistance.

Within the economy, business and trade sub-component of Pillar 3, coordination of efforts was extremely weak, with most internationally-financed projects being coordinated directly between implementing agencies and respective counterpart government bodies at state or national level. In the area of micro-finance, the Greater Darfur Microfinance Apex (GDMA) was supposed to provide a platform to oversee the microfinance sector in the Darfur States, linked to the DRA. With the dissolution of the DRA the Apex took years to get off the ground and to this day is not widely known or utilized. In the area of private sector development, coordination between international partners has been limited to ad hoc contacts and individual agency networking and connection. Traditional platforms for international actors to coordinate around macroeconomic reforms have been constrained by Sudan's presence on the State-Sponsored Terrorism List (SSTL).

Within the rural livelihoods and natural resource management sub-components of Pillar 3, coordination has also been characterized by project-level relationships between international partners and respective government bodies. To some extent this has promoted linkages between projects, albeit in the absence of an overall vision and strategy for rural development and resilience programming, or for natural resource management. Agencies have faced challenges in working with technical government departments which have very weak capacity and no clear strategy. There is often a lack of coordination between different government departments and the high turnover of government officials hinders continuity. Some agencies report political interference at locality level.

In the urban livelihoods and employment sub-component of Pillar 3, coordination of international and national efforts has also been weak. Some agencies are working with the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship at federal level in an effort to follow national standards, but without state-level equivalents and with poor capacity, government's ability to coordinate is extremely limited.

¹¹⁸ According to a senior humanitarian official, in 2018/19 there was only a quarter of the agency staff present in Darfur compared with 2009

1.3 Financing

According to information made available to the DDS review team, a total of 31 projects contribute to Pillar 3. By far the largest share of Pillar 3 projects captured in UNDP’s mapping and in subsequent revisions are classified as ‘livelihoods/ resilience/ community stabilization’, accounting for over 70% of the funding for Pillar 3 activities between 2015 and 2021. These are almost always integrated multi-sectoral projects. 8% of funds are allocated to vocational training; 4% to urban livelihoods; and 1% to microfinance. These classifications do not map easily onto Pillar 3 objectives. Only the UNDF-funded projects followed the DDS logic. All other programming appears to have been determined by the respective funder’s programming approach and assessment of need. The DDS identified an ambitious list of Foundational and Short-Term activities to be completed or established in the first 12 months, but few were implemented.

As noted in other pillar review reports there is considerable overlap between pillars, and projects cannot be neatly classified as one pillar or another, especially integrated development projects. Natural resource management and livelihoods development will almost always contain elements of conflict management and peace-building, thus overlapping with Pillar 1. Land tenure and land management are central to work on both pillars. Similarly, rural and urban infrastructure, which appears to fit under Pillar 2, is often a part of Pillar 3 community-based projects.

Figure 17		
DDS Pillar & Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)
Pillar III: Economic Recovery		
Economy, Business & Trade	\$ 340 million	\$28 million
Natural Resources	\$ 265 million	\$33 million
Rural Livelihoods	\$ 675 million	\$ 82.6million
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	\$ 120 million	\$28.8 million
Pillar III Total	\$1.4 billion	\$172.4 million

* Only a proportion of this funding likely to have been allocated to integrated livelihoods/ resilience/ community stabilization programming, but it has not been possible to identify that proportion

** These figures for investment in NRM are indicative as much of the integrated livelihoods programming in the row above also relates to NRM

Sources: UNDP donor mapping, updated with some subsequent donor submissions.

2. Economy, Business and Trade

This section reviews development efforts intended to promote economic and private sector development, and to enhance trade. It relates specifically to three of the Pillar 3 objectives. See Figure 18:

Figure 18	
Economy, Business & Trade	
Overarching Objectives	Sub-Objectives
Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Animals traded in the market, by type of livestock • Products undergoing value addition processing • People employed in value addition activities • Producer-market linkages established • Additional income for beneficiaries from Income Generating Activities

Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectors with tax incentives for investment • Public-private partnerships signed • Sectoral investment strategies (agribusiness, leather and tourism) developed
Increase access to financial services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lines of credit provided • Micro-finance strategy for Darfur completed • States covered by the Credit Information Bureau • States with a Central Bank • Micro-finance institutions supported • Village Savings Loan Association (VSLA) formed

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$28 million was mobilized for economy, business and trade sub-component, out of a total budget of US\$ 340 million.

1.1 Progress and Achievements

In short, the three DDS objectives above, and their sub-objectives, were highly ambitious and few of the outputs have been achieved. The objectives were based on an assumption that there would be an immediate and sustained improvement in security and a conducive macro-economic context, neither of which transpired, and took little or no account of the deeply entrenched political economy in Darfur.

Value chains and livelihoods development. While interventions have not had the scale to achieve systemic economic impact and change, they do provide models and good practices which could be replicated and scaled up in the future. The most relevant projects, on improved market information and analysis, and on strengthening producer-market linkages, had already begun before the DDS was formulated, although they were since expanded. These include the ‘Market Monitoring and Trade Analysis’ (MMTA) project run by DDRA through a network of over 40 community-based organizations to monitor over 70 markets, complemented by three in-depth trade studies; and the UNDP-led Darfur Livelihoods and Recovery Program (DLRP) implemented across Darfur since 2011, with a focus on supporting value chains for various agricultural products through market analysis, establishment of producer associations and facilitating access to credit. Lastly, the completion of the paved El Ingaz road connecting the greater Darfur region to Central Sudan has arguably had the greatest positive impact on trade and Darfur’s economy in the last six years although it was not a specific objective of the DDS¹¹⁹. Darfur’s markets are now much better-integrated than ever before.

Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity. Few of the DDS sub-objectives intended to improve the business enabling environment in Darfur were implemented. There has been some funding of initiatives to strengthen the private sector in Darfur, but again on a very small-scale, especially compared with the ambitious sub-objectives of Pillar 3, and only in the last couple of years. This includes GIZ support for the Small Industry and Crafts Union in El Geneina and El Fasher to establish a unit for business development services (BDS) unit and a membership management system. There have been a small number of valuable experiments in public-private partnerships (such as groundnut production and processing, implemented by the Dal Group and Samil Group) which provide rich learning and indicate the potential for further engagement between development actors and Sudan’s corporate sector.

Increased access to financial services. Shortage of capital and lack of access to credit is a major constraint for both farmers and traders, many of whom struggle to provide collateral. The DDPD stipulated that a microfinance system should be established in Darfur to help support income generating activities for less privileged groups using non-conventional methods. After numerous delays the license for the Darfur Alkubra Microfinance Development Company was granted in August 2018. Although the Government of Sudan is committed in the DDPD to making US\$ 100 million available, so far the company has received less than 1% of that pledge. In

¹¹⁹ It should be noted that recent flooding has destroyed some parts of the road close to Khartoum.

the interim, international agencies provided support to fill the gap in micro-financing services. Many have established Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) with revolving funds, and have trained microfinance actors, usually as part of larger projects. These are regarded as having played a beneficial role in recovery by using capital for joint investments and increasing households' income and generating wealth in the form of livestock, new types of seed or equipment (Fitzpatrick et al, 2016). Business Development Centers have also been set up in each of the five Darfur states to serve as microfinance hubs, and which have reportedly linked 1,700 beneficiaries to commercial banks and microfinance institutions.

1.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

One of the biggest obstacles to efforts to promote economic development, business and trade in Darfur in the last six years has been the wider macro-economic context, and in particular the current economic crisis described above. The liquidity crisis is crippling businesses, large and small, as are high rates of inflation and taxation.

Sudan's political economy is a second major obstacle. This has manifested in a number of different ways. Serious delays in the establishment of the Darfur microfinance company is associated with lack of political will amongst the ruling elite in Central Sudan to support development in Darfur. This is indicative of the long-running political, economic and structural marginalization of Darfur. In addition, the engagement of security institutions in the most productive sectors of the economy, on preferential terms, has been a challenge to some international and national projects, as well as the politicization of formal institutions at state level. Combined, these are major threats to the longer-term sustainability of national and international efforts to boost economic development.

Federal government launched a nationwide initiative on microfinance in 2008 (check) encouraging banks to set aside a certain percentage of their funds for microfinance. This has made very little difference in Darfur. As mentioned above, in a high-risk conflict environment traders are reluctant to take on loans at the high interest rates on offer because of the risks of defaulting, and many would not qualify anyway in terms of the collateral required.

Agencies have commented upon the relatively small amounts of funding available for developmental work, for example on value chains, when the potential is great. In addition, funding is often provided on short term grant cycles, sometimes a year at a time, yet work to develop and support the private sector, including value chains, requires a longer-term commitment, for example to engage in and influence the institutional and policy context.

At a more immediate practical level, project implementation has been hampered by shortages of currency at the banks, fuel shortages, civil unrest and its direct impact on transportation and trade flows. A number of projects have fallen behind schedule as a result.

1.3 Lessons Learned

A key learning from work in this area is the importance of taking a system-wide approach when promoting trade and business development. This means carrying out a stakeholder and eco-system analysis and including a thorough political economy analysis of the sector to be supported, not only to inform how a proposed intervention should be implemented, but also to identify key points of leverage and potential blockages, constraints and risk of co-option by political interests. The complex political economy of trade and business in Sudan, and in Darfur in particular, makes this an imperative.

Business Development Centers have been established in a number of Darfur states. On the one hand these are set up to be as self-contained and self-supporting as possible. On the other hand, they appear to be handed over to government authorities¹²⁰. Whether this is an appropriate long-term strategy deserves further investigation, noting that many of the more successful business and entrepreneurial hubs in Khartoum are now run by the private sector. In a context in which government has weak capacity and very limited resources there is an important role for public-private partnerships as envisaged in the DDS.

¹²⁰ As described in the final project report for the UNDP/ UNICEF 'Accelerated Learning Programme' (ALP).

Building durable structures in a market system while also generating ‘quick wins’ is a challenge. Agency experience indicates that a participatory approach from the outset may be the best approach, for example involving young people who are looking for employment in preparatory work such as a labor market analysis, through which they gain data collection and analysis skills, *and* are exposed directly to a deeper understanding of the market.

There is considerable potential to expand value chain programming, based on results so far, targeting areas of economic growth such as the groundnut and livestock sectors. Continued paving of roads along major trade routes, including feeder roads, strengthens market integration and generates multiplier effects on livelihoods and the economy¹²¹.

In terms of improving access to financial services, there are good practice examples to be drawn upon, but much agency experience is disparate and there appears to have been limited learning and exchange across organizations. However, the experience of VSLAs, for example in many INGO projects and set up by UNDP, demonstrate the relevance and importance of ‘group solidarity’ as collateral and as a method of guaranteeing repayment rather than traditional forms of collateral such as physical property which rules out so many traders and small businesses. Well-supported VSLAs have much potential for the introduction of revolving funds to support production and small-scale trading.

2. Natural Resource Management

According to the DDS document the sustainable management of land will include the demarcation of nomadic routes and restoration of pasture areas with improved seeds. Sustainable forest resource management will involve reforestation, community forest management and rehabilitation of the gum Arabic industry. Sustainable management of water will be ensured through measures that include promoting the systematic capture of rainfall (bundling and harvesting) and the protection of riverbanks against erosion. The table below shows the objectives, sub-objectives and outputs:

Figure 19
Natural Resources Objectives
Overarching
Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources
Sub-objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water Resources Management Information System (MIS) developed and up to date • Functioning meteorological stations • Land use plans approved • Major catchment management plans agreed • Functioning water-user committees • Rehabilitated nurseries • Forestry and environmental laws reviewed and developed • Locality mapping of forestry areas completed • Development of Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in partnership with national program • Wildlife laws and reserve areas established and protected • Integration of early warning system into a comprehensive government strategy for natural resources management • Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for projects with major impact on the environment carried out

¹²¹ Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). ‘*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project*’. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$33 million was mobilized for natural resource management, out of a total budget of \$265 million. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard.

2.1 Progress and Achievements

For the review only five projects that primarily addressed NRM objectives in the DDS and for which information was available were considered. The overall progress achieved in this thematic area in relation to the stated DDS objectives on natural resource management is modest although all projects report varying degrees of success. This is due to the limited coverage and proportion of population that benefited from each project in relation to the total population of the area. Another point relates to the absence of assessment of degree of integration with other projects in the same location or inclusivity of all relevant institutions. The time frame of project implementation also imposes limitations on measuring the impact of project activities in such short periods of time (mostly not exceeding three years). This last point is significant if we consider that NRM programs mostly deal with communal capacity building of institutions and skills promotion of individual actors. Both activities require behavior change which by definition requires more time to achieve and embed compared with change regarding material matters. Key highlights in terms of progress and achievements include:

- The ‘Wadi El Ku Catchment Management Project’ (WEK) funded by the EU and implemented in North Darfur by UNEP focused on improved farming livelihoods through better natural resource management and reduced conflict. Key results included enhancing water availability for horticultural crops; significantly increasing sales to local and urban markets; and strengthening capacities for water management through training and the establishment of water users fora, which are considered a major innovation for sustainable institutional management of water.
- The ‘Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Livelihoods in East Darfur’ funded by the EU and implemented by UNOPS contributed to improved livelihoods and poverty alleviation of conflict-affected populations by helping to ensure that natural resources were more sustainably and productively used. Key results included training, advocacy for legislation and institutional capacity-building as well as the construction of water facilities, together with vegetable farms and nurseries, in three localities (Ad-Dean, Adila and Baher Al-Arab).¹²²
- The EU funded project implemented by COOPI entitled ‘Support to the nomad and sedentary food unsecured communities in Um Baru locality, North Darfur’, has a major NRM component focusing on improving household resilience to recurrent shocks through increasing local capacities to manage natural resources in a sustainable way. Key results include support for the targeted farmers and pastoralists with low incomes, impacting 5,909 households (2,000 in agriculture and 3,909 in livestock); improving the living conditions of the beneficiary households and relaunching the local economy, in particular through the Orschi dam rehabilitation and the creation and capacity-building of VSLAs.
- The EU funded project implemented by FAO entitled ‘Promoting the provision of legitimate land tenure rights using VGGT Guidelines for conflict-displaced communities, including small - scale rural farmers, pastoralists, and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan’. The project produced a baseline survey against which subsequent implemented projects are supposed to be judged. The study identified four localities in each of the five Darfur states where the survey has been carried out. The most important conclusion of the study is that food insecurity is common: most households that participated no longer have stored cereals as they used to in the past, but are instead dependent on the market to supplement their own production. The opportunity for the survey results to inform other programming was limited due to the delays in implementing the project.
- The DFID funded project implemented by a consortium of INGOs in different Darfur states, entitled ‘Taadoud II: Transition to Development’, also has a major NRM component with a logic based on the complementary relationship between the two most important livelihood activity sectors in Darfur: farming and livestock production. The project identified the importance of the institutional basis of NRM and tried to address it accordingly. The project as implemented in different local contexts (South, Central and West Darfur) tried to develop the capacity of communities for NRM and consequently achieve improved

¹²² UNEP, Khartoum. NRMP2 annual report 2018. UNEP (2018). ‘Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report’ August. UNEP: Sudan.

productivity in major livelihood sectors as well as reduced conflict through more cooperation. The Taadoud project is reviewed in more detail in the full Pillar report.

Many other projects designed to develop livelihoods and promote peacebuilding include natural resource management components, the effects of which cannot be easily reflected here. Such projects include those funded by the DCPSF (Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund) which actually preceded the DDS and the SOS-Sahel Sudan project in North Darfur. These projects include training and community capacity-building through establishing CBOs or empowering those already existing in order to handle different problems in a more integrative manner.

3.2 Limitations, Challenges and Constraints

Some of the most common limitations faced by NRM projects can be described as follows:

- Local conflict can erupt suddenly in which case projects are severely constrained. A stark example is the Malia-Rizaigat conflict that has affected the NRM project activities in east Darfur for some time because of lack of access.
- The issue of equal access to project resources cannot be taken for granted and certain groups may become excluded (for lack of sensitivity rather than design). The WEK project is a good example of this. Despite the success achieved in some areas, its non-inclusivity of downstream water users represents a threat for sustainability. Also in the WEK project pastoralists have not been adequately engaged in the Forum which seems to be dominated by urban people from El-Fashir. The fact that the overall benefit is for wealthier farmers with resources to use water pumps may tilt the balance of the project to their favour.

3.3 Lessons Learned

A key lesson learned is the importance of a holistic and integrated approach to natural resource management. In particular, it is important to learn from the disconnect that has sometimes existed between the administration of water and its natural catchment system. That has happened because government has managed water along administrative lines rather than according to hydro-geological zones. And INGOs and communities have focused on managing water resources at the community level without considering the larger environmental or downstream impacts.

Interventions that increase the availability of water without considering the institutions that mediate access of different groups can create their own problems. As the learning document for the Taadoud II project concludes: 'Increasing availability of water without consideration of these mediating institutions can lead to the destruction of the water sources or conflict over them. Increasing availability of water while strengthening inclusive local institutions linked to supporting state and national institutions can increase the productivity, health, and stability of the region'¹²³. The same learning document points out that technical plans need to take into account the unintended impacts on the environment, while supporting the social aspects to support equitable access and participation in management of the systems through the institutions regulating the water sources.

An important issue that commonly shows up in the design of many NRM projects is the issue of demarcation of livestock migration routes, considered a contentious issue behind most interethnic conflicts involving traditional sedentary farmers and mobile herders. Whilst the idea of demarcation is not contested, the challenge lies in way many projects try to apply it. First, most of these activities were carried out in the absence of the full return of IDPs, which does not satisfy measures of inclusivity. Second, many projects manufacture cement poles to be erected in a linear fashion along the migration route, reflecting the misperception that a migration route is a geographical fixed space. Such practice is insensitive to ecological variability and also misses the point that the whole process is embedded in social relations and negotiation between communities and as such reflects a problem of governance.¹²⁴

¹²³ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019a:47). *Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

¹²⁴ This is based on project studies and key informant interviews, full reference will be provided later.

New ideas regarding NRM need to be introduced at the grassroots level. The idea of reseeded pastures and planting private forests proved to be useful in East Darfur where the project also facilitated the formation of state-level and locality-level institutions that allowed for wider participation of all stakeholders in NRM processes. This is an example that needs to be replicated elsewhere. The idea of a coordination body with official and citizen representation is a positive solution for inclusive NRM. Experience has shown that the rich and powerful members of the community tend to dominate newly formed project institutions. Such tendencies should be checked to avoid excluding the needy who are actually the most important target groups of development projects. Men still dominate communal institutions: it is important that the participation of women in development projects is vigorously supported.

3. Rural Livelihoods

As mentioned above, over 70% of donor funding that relates to Pillar 3 is for projects and programs focused on developing rural livelihoods and promoting resilience and food security. Many of these relate to the DDS objective on ‘improved crop and livestock production and productivity’ – see Table below. This is usually articulated in projects as promoting resilience at community level, and almost all these projects have a much broader focus and wider range of objectives, for example with a natural resource component related to peace-building, infrastructural components, and/ or socio-economic components. The integrated nature of many of these projects mean there is considerable overlap with Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 objectives. Integrated community-based development programming has been widely promoted in Darfur by donors and implementing agencies as an appropriate developmental approach generating multiplier effects. This integrated approach was not evident in the way the DDS was articulated.

Figure 20
Rural Livelihoods Objectives
Overarching
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved crop and livestock production and productivity • Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements
Sub-objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feasibility studies on rehabilitation of existing Agricultural Development Projects in accordance with para 174, Article 31 of DDPD • Production of key crops • Productivity of key crops • Average herd size per household

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$82.6 million was mobilized for integrated programs, many of which relate to rural livelihoods, out of a total budget of \$675 million. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard.

3.1 Progress and Achievements

Projects under this thematic area of Pillar have generated important results and contributed to considerable learning and insights on resilience and rural livelihood programming in the last few years. But the scale of achievements, impact and cross-fertilization of experience between projects has been severely hampered by weak coordination and low overall levels of financing. The general sense amongst practitioners is that Pillar 3 of the DDS failed to provide a common vision or strategy for the development of rural livelihoods.

Common achievements and results across most resilience and rural livelihood interventions include:

- The distribution of improved seed intended to boost production by being higher-yielding, earlier maturing, and/ or more drought resilient. Projects mostly report positive results¹²⁵.
- The establishment of demonstration plots and farmer field schools to support farmers in improved crop production;
- The introduction of intermediate technology such as animal traction and water pumps to increase production, and the promotion of improved water harvesting techniques;
- The distribution of small livestock, usually goats and poultry;
- Environmental activities such as the clearance of fire-lines, the planting of trees and spreading seed for pasture.

A number of livelihood interventions also integrated a focus on strengthening local and private sector capacities. These include forming and strengthening community-based organizations; strengthening community-based conflict resolution mechanisms with a specific focus on livelihood conflicts; and establishment of micro-finance mechanisms to support and complement other livelihood focused project activities.

Most livelihood and resilience programming implemented so far target sedentary farmers and agro-pastoralists. Projects are often working with a combination of host communities, returnees and IDPs. There is much less work targeting and supporting pastoralist groups. The most significant work targeting livestock herders has been supported by FAO, which has targeted both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Key interventions have included support for animal health care facilities and veterinary professionals; vaccination of livestock; training in improved animal husbandry; and distribution of animal feed and mineral licks, with specific focus on small-holder female-headed pastoralist households.

What is striking about all of these activities is the extent to which international and national agencies are stepping in to provide agriculture extension services for both crops and livestock, with government extension services having more or less collapsed during the conflict years. While some projects are working directly with agriculture extension officers of line ministries, there is an interesting move to develop community-level extension workers and animal health workers as a means of reaching rural households and rural communities.

A few projects have contributed to improved institutional arrangements for agriculture and livestock, one of the other Pillar 3 objectives, for example in their engagement with state level line ministries, or more commonly in promoting community-based extension practices. There has been much less engagement with, and progress made in improving agricultural and livestock policies, with the exception of the new federal 2018 livestock policy mentioned above. Instead, the fragmentation of policy and frequent contradictions between them have continued.

3.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

A key omission in this Pillar 3 objective is any consideration of the relationships and power dynamics between different producer groups in rural areas, or guidance on targeting strategies. Yet these are essential in a conflict/post-conflict environment in which control over, and access to natural resources has been a major faultline. Instead, objectives, sub-objectives and outputs are articulated in a technically neutral way, for example: ‘average herd size per household’, or ‘area of cultivation of main oil and horticultural crops’, without consideration of the distribution of livestock ownership, nor who has access to agricultural land.

Programming has tended to focus on different livelihood groups, either as pastoralists or farmers, with a major emphasis on farming households, and very few projects meaningfully engaged with pastoralist households. This

¹²⁵ FAO reports increased productivity of 70 to 200%. UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). ‘*Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018.*’ From UNICEF.

does not yet reflect the merging of production systems within households described above, for example that ‘traditional’ pastoralists are now more engaged in agricultural production¹²⁶.

Transitioning from humanitarian to more developmental ways of working has constituted a major challenge. This is due to the limited one-year time for most grants supporting rural livelihoods and resilience activities, which is insufficient for developing holistic, community based and sustainable approaches; the preference for adopting more humanitarian and service-oriented approaches given unpredictability of rainfall and associated food security risks; challenges associated with making progress in economic recovery and livelihoods; and the frequent prioritization of humanitarian over development approaches given limited funding and resources.

Agencies have also faced significant practical and logistical challenges. These include restricted access due to continued insecurity; HAC delays and restrictions, which have constrained access to communities and hampered fast responses; cash and fuel shortages which have delayed implementation; and high transactional costs associated with managing administrative and legal issues with line ministries.

3.3 Lessons Learned

Rural livelihoods and the context in which they are operating are highly dynamic, and face multiple threats, including both climate change and conflict. Households have made many adaptations during the conflict years. These need to be well-understood and tracked to inform programming, for example with a dedicated operational research/ analysis component in livelihood projects, drawing on the Taadoud model.

Tufts researchers propose focusing on ‘what people do for a living and the integration between livelihood sub-systems’, rather than the dichotomy between them¹²⁷. This is an important learning for future development programming to support rural livelihoods, which must start with an understanding of livelihoods, their complexity, how they are adapting and transforming to a dynamic and changing context, and the integration between livelihoods. Thus, livelihoods and resilience programming which has so far focused mainly on settled farmers must be extended to pastoralists as well. Inclusive programming also means engaging women and youth, centrally, in community projects.

Addressing power dynamics and how they are negotiated between different groups is essential to livelihoods and resilience programming. Support to local peace committees appears to be one effective way of achieving this, often focused on managing negotiations and potential disputes when livestock herders enter agricultural farmland. However, an aspect that seems to have attracted remarkably little attention to date is the exploitative practices that some farmers are subject to during the production season, where they have to pay substantial amounts, usually in-kind, to groups controlling the area where their farms are located.

Agency experience indicates that holistic community-based programming, with a long-term perspective, is key to supporting and developing sustainable rural livelihoods. Strengthening community-level structures and embedding agricultural knowledge and extension services within communities is an important counterbalance to weak government capacity.

The value of an integrated approach to community development, that pays attention to services and infrastructure, is the multiplication effect on livelihoods and on the local economy of developing water points, roads and markets as well as finding ways to increase production and income. This is critical as returns accelerate, long-term or seasonally, putting pressure on existing communities. This calls for a clear strategy, both at the local level but also across Darfur, drawing on good practice examples.

Yet the high risk of failure of development efforts to support rural livelihoods must be acknowledged. By definition there has to be much trial and error in these kinds of projects aiming to strengthen livelihoods and

¹²⁶ Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

their resilience in a context of protracted crisis. Taking risks, learning and adapting must be encouraged, not least by donors.

4. Urban Livelihoods and Youth Employment

Development efforts to support urban livelihoods are closely linked to private sector development efforts described in section 4.3 above, and also relate to the Pillar 3 objective on employment opportunities. See Table below. This section therefore focuses on projects targeting youth employment. To date these have been few in number and small in terms of overall funding, yet the need is huge. The immense gap between development interventions to promote employment, and especially youth employment in the last six years, and the overall need was clearly articulated by youth groups during the limited field work the review team was able to carry out in Darfur’s state capitals in March 2019.

Figure 21
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment Objectives
Overarching
Increased access to employment opportunities (gender-balanced)
Sub-Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students finding a job after completion of vocational training • Additional people employed by supported businesses •

During the 2013-2019 period, a total of \$28.8 million was mobilized for urban livelihoods and employment, out of a total budget of \$120 million. See annex 2 for an overview of interventions identified to date in this regard.

4.1 Progress and Achievements

The projects addressing vocational training and employment in Darfur are contributing to all of the DDS sub-objectives and outputs as articulated in the table above, but these sub-objectives and outputs belie the complexity and challenges of work in this area. Once again, conflict/ post-conflict considerations and analysis of which youth groups have access to training, employment and government-aligned institutions are critical to inclusive programming that reaches marginalized groups. Agency awareness of these issues varies. While projects have supported Vocational Training Centers and Youth Centers, their capacity and sustainability are fundamentally affected by the weakness and political economy of the wider institutional environment. The importance of providing support beyond training, to help trainees find jobs and establish businesses, is well-recognized by many projects, although data on the success rate in achieving this longer-term, and on the gendered impact, are scarce. The disabling business environment described above is a major constraint.

Most work targeting youth has focused on vocational training and is urban-based, implemented by a range of agencies including AECOM, GIZ, JICA, UNICEF, COOPI and DRC. Some youth projects have peace-building and empowerment as their overall objective but include a livelihoods/ employment dimension.

The success rate of vocational training in terms of follow-up employment requires further investigation. AECOM, which has been working with school drop-outs, reports that there have been good levels of subsequent employment after the training, and that some trainees grouped together to start their own business, for example in construction. UNDP reports that 43% of their youth volunteers are formally employed and have established their own business. While the vocational training projects target both men and women, it has not been possible to find an analysis of the relative impact, short and long-term, on men and women.

4.2 Limitations, Constraints and Challenges

Limited project impact. Considering the number of youth in Darfur, the high level of unemployment and sense of disenfranchisement many experience, the few projects that do exist are providing support on a very small scale compared to the need.

Institutional constraints. There are major constraints in the wider institutional context. Proposed state-level councils for Vocational Training have not yet been established and there is a lack of government funds for vocational training, for example to pay teachers, for school management and for supervision by the state-level Departments of Labor.

Political constraints. The capture of formal institutions – even those that do not have an overtly political function – by the ruling NCP under the former regime has affected youth organizations, and the Youth Union in particular. As a result, some agencies have chosen to work with independent youth organizations where possible. As the political unrest and demonstrations gathered pace from December 2018, the restrictions imposed on gatherings, and the suspicion with which groups of youth were treated, have all been constraints to this work and to efforts to empower youth, economically as well as politically.

4.3 Lessons Learned

Efforts to develop the skills and employability of youth must be rooted in analysis and a strategy that engages at the micro, meso and macro levels. Development efforts must also engage with wider private sector development to create demand for jobs and to support youth in accessing micro-finance and other services to establish and develop businesses. To some extent this was acknowledged in the DDS objective on increased access to employment. Experience in this sector since implies there needs to be considerably more analysis of market opportunities to inform the thematic focus of vocational training, matched with investment in economic sectors with greatest potential. Without this more holistic and market-driven approach, vocational training projects could fuel the frustration already felt by graduates who have gone through higher education but cannot find work.

As with private sector development more generally, there must also be a thorough political economy analysis, for example of youth institutions and their affiliations, to understand which are independent and which may have preferential access to services and to business opportunities through political patronage. Many youth CBOs have sprung up: to reach some of them, for example those representing more marginalized youth such as IDP youth, may require more creative and less traditional ways of working, for instance through social media. This may also require skills-building beyond conventional vocational training subjects, for example in leadership and representation, as indicated above.

In summary, vocational training and promotion of youth employment must be driven by a comprehensive strategy that agencies in this sector can get behind so that their work is more than the sum of its parts and is more effectively coordinated. This, in turn, should be informed by a comparative study of the different approaches to vocational training, to learn and build upon best practice examples. Such a strategy should be disaggregated for youth with different education levels, of different gender and for different ages.

VI. Governance and financing architecture

The DDS envisioned a comprehensive governance structure and financing mechanism to ensure adequate strategic oversight, coherence of national and international efforts, and resourcing of interventions. This was comprised essentially of a “Darfur Coordination Board for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development” (DCB) and a financing architecture that sought to align different funding mechanisms and instruments, including a dedicated ‘Darfur Facility’, against the DDS strategy and objectives. To date, the success in fulfilling this overall role and effectiveness of this architecture has been mixed. While the DCB was established, it met infrequently and was not able to effectively steer DDS implementation, nor ensure that it was prioritised as a key framework for the coordination of national and international efforts. The ambitions of the financing architecture also fell short, with only one component—the UN-funded window of the Darfur Facility—being established and operational. Overall, the absence of an effective governance and financing architecture compromised the implementation of the DDS and contributed to a number of the challenges outlined in Chapter III. Important lessons can be identified from this experience to inform efforts within a future DDS.

A. Governance and Coordination

The governance and coordination architecture of the DDS was composed of two components: the ‘Darfur Coordination Board for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development’ (DCB) and the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) that was established under the DDPD as the ‘principal instrument for the implementation of the agreement’. Together, these two structures were meant to ensure strategic oversight and coherence of national and international efforts in support of the DDS, while also providing a framework for technical and state level coordination, monitoring and support.

Role and mandate of the DCB: According to the DDS document, the DCB was intended to serve as the ‘apex political oversight body’ of the DDS. It was co-chaired by the Government of Sudan, the DRA, Government of Qatar and the United Nations. The functions of the DCB were to:

- Maintain alignment between DDS-funded activities and the overall Region’s priorities;
- Oversee the DDS implementation, integrating different funding channels, thus ensuring coherence and enabling the resolution of strategic issues or bottlenecks impacting its progress;
- Ensure coherent planning, monitoring and reporting among the different funding channels.¹²⁸

Role and mandate of the DRA: According to the DDPD, one of the core responsibilities of the DRA was to “play a central role in enhancing implementation, coordination and promotion of all post-conflict reconstruction and development projects and activities in Darfur, and be responsible for cooperation and coordination among the States of Darfur.” (DDPD, Article 10). As such, it was expected that the DRA would serve as the primary interlocutor to national and international stakeholders in the implementation of the DDS under the overall oversight of the DCB. Following the dissolution of the DRA in 2016, it was expected that the five commissions established as part of the DRA¹²⁹ would be responsible for GoS commitments within the DDPD, including on the DDS.

1. Challenges and constraints

During the 2013-2019 period, neither the DCB, DRA and following 2016 the five DDPD Commissions, were able to fully carry out their responsibilities. This essentially made the DDS a ‘ship without a rudder’, and contributed to the lack of alignment of national, state and international efforts with DDS objectives; inadequate

¹²⁸ Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013:127). ‘2013-2019 Developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.’ Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

¹²⁹ The five commissions consist of: the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF); Darfur Land Commission (DLC); Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission (VRRRC); Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (JTRC) and the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC).

oversight over and overall progress in DDS implementation; and lack of coordination across the three pillars. While several of the political, contextual and other factors highlighted in chapter III (chief among them the troubled implementation of the DDPD, continued conflict in Darfur and the international community's reluctance to engage with the GoS on development issues) contributed to the inadequacies of both the DCB and DRA, additional factors also played a significant role.

Darfur Coordination Board. According to interlocutors interviewed during this review the DCB, while operational during the 2013-2019 period, was not able to effectively carry out its functions due to a number of factors. Although the DCB was intended to meet twice a year, it was convened infrequently (for a total of XX meetings during the review period). This was due to organizational and logistical difficulties associated with convening the members (which included the Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar as one of the co-chairs). Meetings were also characterised by lack of adequate preparation and a highly general level of discussion and failed to address substantive issues related to DDS implementation. Attempts to enhance the effectiveness of the DDS, including establishment of a dedicated technical secretariat as well as an 'executive committee' to facilitate more in-depth management and oversight of the DDS, did not bear fruit. In 2016 state-level working groups on the DDS were established in each of the Darfur states to coordinate DDS-related interventions. While these were relatively successful in some states (notably North and West Darfur), they were limited to UNDF-financed projects.¹³⁰

Darfur Regional Authority. According to interlocutors interviewed during this review, the DRA never effectively carried out the DDS leadership and coordination functions as originally intended and foreseen in the DDPD. This was in part due to inadequate capacity within the DRA to undertake these and other DDPD mandated responsibilities, and also partly due to the overlap, confusion and tensions between the role of the DDPD, national line ministries and state governments (including the *Walis*) and agencies which were never resolved. While the DRA did engage substantially on projects financed through the GoS contribution to the DDS (over US\$2 billion), it demonstrated very limited interest in ensuring alignment with specific DDS objectives and priorities. An attempt to strengthen DRA capacity to specifically support DDS coordination and provision of technical assistance was made in 2014 through the development of a technical capacity development project to be financed through the UNDF. This was unfortunately rejected due to the donor's insistence that no capacity building or studies could be financed through its contribution.¹³¹ Following its dissolution in 2016, responsibility for GoS engagement with the DDS was transferred to the five DDPD Commissions, but the GoS Ministry of Finance also assumed the same responsibility.

2. Assessment

The lack of effectiveness of the DCB in providing oversight and managerial support for DDS implementation reflected both an absence of adequate political will among key stakeholders to prioritize the DDS, but also the absence of supporting structures which are considered indispensable in these contexts. At the very least, the DCB required a standing technical secretariat that would ensure that DCB meetings were properly prepared and informed by ongoing assessments and reviews of progress, challenges and gaps; and would link strategic and policy level discussions and decisions with work at technical and state levels.

The challenges faced by the DRA are not unique to Darfur and can be found in most post-crisis contexts where government and transitional capacities are weak, and competencies are in tension with the mandates of other national structures. An important opportunity to strengthen the DRA and other national actors in their engagement on the DDS was missed, insofar as the TCSP was rejected and no other sources of support were forthcoming from the international community. The only exception to this as far as the review could discern was the deployment, between 2014-2016, of a DDS Senior Technical Advisor financed by the EU, who provided

¹³⁰ Terms of Reference, *Darfur State Level Recovery and Development Coordination (DSRDC)*. Version of 14 July 2016.

¹³¹ The proposed DRA Technical Capacity Support Project (TCSP) was intended to: "implement a capacity development programme for the DRA Executive and critical Ministries and Commissions that will enable them, in the short-term to efficiently follow-up the implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) and, more specifically, its Foundational and Short-term (FaST) activities. In the long-term, the focus will be on institutional development, the objective being to ensure that the DRA has the necessary institutional capacity to follow up on the implementation and coordination of the DDPD and DDS with its Darfur State(s) and international development partners." UNDF Proposed Project 16 – DRA Capacity Support Project.

valuable support to the UNDF-financed projects and advice on strengthening DRA and DDS coordination capacities. The TCSP reflects clearly essential components that would have been needed to strengthen not only the institutional capacities of the DRA, but also establish and strengthen coordination, communication and support elements that were missing at DCB, pillar and state levels. These elements, which are now considered standard practice in most post-crisis peacebuilding and recovery strategies, were clearly captured in the outputs of the proposed TCSP, which are worth reproducing in their entirety:

- **Organization/Institutional Development:** *Technical, operational and institutional capacities of DRA governance structures (Ministries, Commissions and DRA Council) and business processes improved and strengthened;*
- **Project Planning & Monitoring:** *Information management and project mapping for the implementation and coordination of the DDS across its various phases including the Technical Secretariat of the Darfur Coordination Board (DCB) established and maintained;*
- **Information Management & Communication:** *Skills and capacities needed for proactive outreach, public relations and communication to promote engagement of DRA with Darfur communities, stakeholders and partners are in place. This includes ICT project mapping & DDS website/homepage support;*
- **Aid Management & Coordination:** *Effective implementation of aid management and accountability within the relevant DRA institutions, focusing on the Ministry of Finance and the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), are in place.*

The absence of a coordination framework at pillar or sectoral level, and the partially effective state-level coordination structures, constitute key factors contributing to the lack of programmatic alignment between the DDS objectives and subsequent development interventions, with the notable exception of the UNDF-financed projects (covered below). In the absence of any platform, under either the DCB or DRA, to facilitate information-sharing, joint priority setting, alignment and coordination of programmatic efforts, development partners utilised other fora or opted to design projects through bilateral consultation with their specific counterparts. This significantly weakened opportunities for effective alignment or reporting against the DDS and contributed to the fragmented nature of interventions across most sectors. Chapter V provides an overview of these alternative structures.

B. Financing Architecture and Funding

The DDS provided for a comprehensive financing architecture predicated on the coordination of financing from multiple ‘channels’ (funding instruments and sources) and a ‘Darfur Facility’ based on a twin pooled fund arrangement. In practice, very little of this architecture was established with the exception of the UN window of the proposed Darfur Facility, and overall, there was little effective coordination of national and international financing against DDS objectives and priorities. To date, an estimated US\$ 711.3 million has been mobilised in international peacebuilding and development funding for Darfur, and US\$ 350 million¹³² allocated by the GoS, against the US\$3.8 billion pledged in 2013 and the total DDS requirement of US\$7.245 billion.¹³³ The absence of a mechanism to align government, bilateral and other sources of financing against DDS priorities has resulted in a fragmentation of development efforts, contributing to the overall weak alignment of development interventions against the DDS overall. This section provides an overview of the progress, challenges and constraints in relation to the financing of the DDS.

1. The DDS Financing Architecture

¹³² US\$ 350 million was the total financial allocation by the GoS, but the actual programmable amount was considerably lower (an estimated 65-70% of the total) due to deductions related to financing costs, VAT, charges and fees, and supervision overhead. Source: Communications with DRDF staff, October 2019.

¹³³ This figure is derived from the mapping of donor development assistance and government financing that can be aligned directly or indirectly with DDS objectives and priorities. It is not exhaustive as not all development partners contributed information on financing flows. Moreover, it only includes financing that is explicitly labelled as development assistance, and excludes financing provided against humanitarian priorities and frameworks (which in some cases was also development-oriented).

The DDS envisaged the establishment of a ‘four-channel’ financing architecture intended to provide a basis for coordinating financing against DDS objectives and priorities under the overall purview of the DCB. These consisted of coordinated bilateral funding; government funding (through national budget and the DRDF); private investor funding; and the ‘Darfur Facility’. In principle, this approach reflected the emerging practice in financing of multi-stakeholder peacebuilding and recovery strategies which emphasises coherence and alignment across multiple financing instruments rather than a singular focus on a specific instrument (traditional multi-partner trust funds). The Darfur Facility envisioned in the DDS was intended to be comprised of two trust funds managed by the UN and World Bank respectively, linked by a common programmatic strategy to inform allocation priorities and progress reporting. Again, this reflected a practice utilised successfully in other countries.¹³⁴

The international donor conference organised in April 2013, at which the DDS was presented, resulted in pledges of US\$ 3.8 billion for Darfur, US\$ 2.75 billion of which was from the Government of Sudan. While falling short of the total financial requirement outlined in the DDS (see table below), it still represented an important amount and a signal of commitment to address peacebuilding and recovery in Darfur.

Figure 22		
Overview of DDS Funding Requirements		
DDS Pillar	Total Financial Requirements	Foundational & Short-term Activities
Pillar I: Governance, Justice & Reconciliation	\$845 million	\$25.50 million
Pillar II: Reconstruction	\$5,000 million	\$132.90 million
Pillar III: Economic Recovery	\$1,400 million	\$19.00 million
Total	\$7,245 million	\$177.40 million

Following the donor conference, however, limited progress was made in establishing the various elements of the financing architecture as originally foreseen in the DDS document. There are multiple reasons for this, including the lack of donor interest and engagement in the context of ongoing sanctions; lack of DRA willingness/capacity; and the lack of attention by the DCB to operational and implementation issues. While the UN window of the Darfur Facility (known as the UN Darfur Fund) was established early on, the World Bank window was never established. Furthermore, no progress was made to establish some form of broader concertation and coordination among different funding instruments and sources. Although a function attributed to the DCB, this mechanism was not effective as outlined in the previous section and suffered from the absence of a technical secretariat indispensable for managing this activity. As a result, and while there have been steady inflows of development financing for Darfur since 2013, very little of this was coordinated as part of a DDS financing strategy or overseen by the DCB or DRA. In the absence of a mechanism to track resource flows and facilitate dialogue on alignment, most of these resources were programmed through other mechanisms, as outlined previously.

2. Financial resources mobilised, 2013-2019

Between 2013-2019, financing for peacebuilding and development priorities in Darfur was provided through three main channels, with the extent to which specific DDS objectives and priorities were targeted varying widely. These include a) financing received through the UNDF; b) GoS financial contributions through the DRDF and federal budget; and c) bilateral funding sources and other instruments not directly related to the DDS.

UN Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction, and Development in Darfur (UNDF)

The UNDF was originally intended to serve as one window of the broader Darfur Facility, with a focus on provision of financing for the ‘foundational and short-term activities’ (FaST) identified in the DDS, but in

¹³⁴ The advantage of a multi-window financing facility is that it brings together functionally differentiated and specialized mechanisms under a common strategic umbrella, leveraging the strengths of individual instruments.

practice it functioned as a stand-alone fund, with a dedicated steering committee, programme framework and rules. To date, this multi-partner trust fund has received contributions from a single donor, Qatar, which allocated US\$ 88.5, constituting approximately half of the total FaST requirement. These funds were programmed between 2014-2015, with final approvals for 12 projects to be funded obtained in December 2015 – almost two years after the donor conference and launch of the DDS. To date, these constitute the only projects that were rigorously developed, vetted and monitored against DDS objectives and priorities.

Figure 24: Overview of Approved UNDF projects, by DDS Pillar

Projects	Lead Agency	Total budget
Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation		
Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace in Darfur	UNDP	5,550,000.00
Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Programme (DDR Programme)	UNDP	11,794,075.00
Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-existence in Darfur	UNDP	6,079,290.00
Pillar 2: Reconstruction		
Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points	UNOPS	11,618,210.00
Construction of Public Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings	UNHABITAT	5,300,000.00
Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Services in Darfur	UNICEF	10,807,000.00
Darfur Solar Electrification Project	UNDP	5,689,000.00
Upgrading and Rehabilitating Health Facilities , and Basic Health Services in Return Sites	WHO	13,076,470.00
Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees in Darfur	UNDP	5,050,000.00
Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) and improved access to employment opportunities for out-of-school children and youth	UNICEF	6,105,955.00
Pillar 3: Economic Recovery		
Microfinance for Young and Poor Producers in Rural Areas in Darfur	UNDP	2,500,000.00
Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities in Darfur	FAO	4,930,000.00
TOTAL		88,500,000.00

Government of Sudan Funds

The Government of Sudan pledged US\$ 2.75 billion in financing in support of peace, recovery and development priorities in Sudan, the majority of which was intended to be channelled through the DRDF under the overall purview of the DRA. Between 2013-2019, a total of 4.21 billion SDGs (amounting to approximately US\$ 350 million) were allocated in several tranches and used to finance a range of infrastructural projects. However, the actual programmable amount was considerably lower (an estimated 65-70% of the total) due to deductions related to financing costs, VAT, charges and fees, and supervision overhead.¹³⁵ Moreover, according to national and international stakeholders interviewed and documents received by the review team, most of these projects were not defined in relation to DDS priorities, but rather to a parallel infrastructure plan developed by the DRA prior to 2013. Very few of these projects are reported to have been coordinated with other interventions in the same sector. According to GoS data, 833 projects were financed and implemented, in most cases directly by the DRDF, with a focus on the rehabilitation or construction of small-scale facilities and infrastructure in health, education, water, transport, and police sectors. Some of the financing was also allocated to provision of food and non-food items.

Other financing (bilateral and multilateral)

Based on the donor mapping conducted by the United Nations in 2017-2018 and updated within the context of the DDS review exercise, a total of US\$ 711.3 million in international development assistance was allocated directly or indirectly against DDS objectives and priorities. This includes only assistance formally denoted as ‘development’ assistance, and does not include financial contributions tagged as humanitarian or explicitly allocated against the HRP. As the table below illustrates, 18 bilateral and multilateral donors contributed funding

¹³⁵ Source: Communications with DRDF staff, October 2019.

during the 2013-2019 period, amounting to 10 per cent of the total funding requirement of the 2013-2019 DDS. Of this amount, approximately 18.4 per cent was channelled through trust funds (comprising of the UNDF, as outlined in the previous section, and the DCPSF, through which US\$ 42.6 million was allocated), with the remainder allocated bilaterally to specific implementing partners. As highlighted in table 23, international funding accounted for a relatively small percentage of pillar-specific financial needs, with only 17 per cent of pillar 1 requirements met; 8 per cent of pillar 2 requirements; and 12 per cent of pillar 3 requirements.

International Financing – Overview

Figure 23			
Distribution of International Development-Oriented Funding			
DDS Pillar & Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)	& of total funding proposed
Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation			
Governance and accountability	\$425 million	\$10.1 million	2
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	\$140 million	\$104.9 million	76
Land governance	\$55 million	\$6.1 million	11
Rule of law and access to justice	\$225 million	\$25.1 million	11
Pillar I Total	\$845 million	\$146.1 million	17
Pillar II: Reconstruction			
Basic Services	\$1.72 billion	\$367 million	21
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization	\$255 million	\$8.5 million	3
Transport & Energy Infrastructure	\$3.025 billion	\$17.3 million	1
Pillar II Total	\$ 5 billion	\$392.8 million	8
Pillar III: Economic Recovery			
Economy, Business & Trade	\$ 340 million	\$28 million	8
Natural Resources	\$ 265 million	\$33 million	12
Rural Livelihoods	\$ 675 million	\$82.6 million	12
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	\$ 120 million	\$28.8 million	24
Pillar III Total	\$1.4 billion	\$172.4 million	12
DDS Grand Total	\$ 7.245 billion	\$711.3 million	10

Overview of Development Assistance to Darfur, 2013-2019

Row Labels	Sum of Budget USD
Canada	3,964,278
EU	57,025,224
France	298,220
Germany	70,794,758
Italy	17,595,016
Japan	14,340,500
MDBs (WB/AFDB)	46,705,900
Netherlands	19,215,050
Norway	9,679,056
Qatar	170,680,604
Qatar&EU	2,617,600
Republic of Korea	2,375,000

Sweden	12,039,921
Switzerland	3,916,130
Turkey	110,133,622
UK	129,556,493
UNAMID	9,612,505
USA	30,778,967
Grand Total	711,328,844

3. Assessment

While the DDS financing approach and architecture as outlined in the DDS document was conceptually sound, and in many ways reflects current best practice for multi-stakeholder peacebuilding and recovery strategies, it was not operationalised as intended. Two major reasons explain this:

First, the financing architecture was not articulated in organizational and structural terms. It was assumed that the DCB would provide an overarching coordination function in relation to financing from the four channels, but no attempt was made following the launch of the DDS and donor conference to describe what this entailed and to formalize it through agreement with the principal stakeholders and donor community. As experience in other countries, this function requires a dedicated management, coordination and reporting capacity with clearly defined responsibilities, commitment to take it forward, and resources to enable it function sustainably. None of these were defined or established.

Second, there appears to have been a general reluctance and absence of willingness to formally allocate financing against the DDS or through dedicated financing structures. It is telling in this regard that the UNDF only received financing through one donor – Qatar – while most donors continued to provide financing through established bilateral channels or through facilities and funds that pre-dated the DDS (for instance the DCSPF). The absence of donor engagement in the financing architecture of the DDS essentially meant it was a non-starter. While most of the development aid flows to Darfur can be directly or indirectly aligned to DDS objectives and priorities as the analysis of progress in the three pillars contained in Chapter V describes, very little of it was coordinated or prioritised with specific reference to the DDS. The absence of willingness and commitment to support the DDS financing architecture is also reflected in how the GoS allocated and channelled its own resources, which was through a parallel plan to the DDS and through the DRDF, as opposed to the proposed Darfur Facility as originally intended.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Overarching Conclusions and Recommendations

In 2013 when the DDS was launched there was considerable optimism that the DDPD could herald the start of transition to peace and development in Darfur. The DDS reflected this optimism in the ambitiousness of its objectives and approach, which were predicated on a comprehensive strategy for addressing root causes of conflict, inequality and underdevelopment. Unfortunately, the DDPD did not live up to expectations of serving as an all-encompassing framework for peace, and 2013-2019 period was marked by continued conflict, violence and insecurity and an environment that was not conducive for large-scale governance, institutional and economic reforms and programmes. Although numerous development-oriented interventions were implemented in Darfur during this period, the DDS failed to serve as a principal reference and framework to guide efforts, for the reasons which have been outlined in the previous chapters. Only 8% of the financial requirements foreseen in the DDS were actually met through international assistance. With the current transition in Sudan and prospects for peace in Darfur once more at the forefront of national and international efforts, this experience provides valuable lessons. This chapter provides a number of recommendations to inform future discussions and the development of a future DDS.

1. Framing and Scope of the DDS

A future DDS should be calibrated to the prevailing political, social and economic context, and based on an in-depth understanding of constraints and opportunities. In the context of Darfur, transition to development will be a long-term process beset by significant challenges. As a short to medium-term strategy and framework, the DDS should be framed on the basis of the most urgent priorities and what can be realistically achieved during this time frame. A future DDS should be closely aligned to political and peacebuilding initiatives and be framed as an instrument to support associated outcomes. A future DDS should not aim to provide a comprehensive and long-term ‘masterplan’ for recovery and development, but rather offer a roadmap for addressing urgent recovery and development needs critical for strengthening resilience, promoting peacebuilding and laying foundations for longer-term development and institution building.

Ensuring longer-term accountability for peacebuilding and recovery priorities, while linking these to national systems, reforms and policies is critical. As the experience in Darfur and other countries has demonstrated, linking a peacebuilding and recovery strategy to a single peace plan can undermine national and international ownership and engagement, particularly if the peace plan in question does not succeed or is abandoned. In contexts like Darfur, achieving a comprehensive peace and political settlement often entails a long-term process. While ensuring appropriate linkages with future peace processes and transition arrangements, a future DDS should have an independent anchoring in broader national and international frameworks and commitments.

2. Engaging Stakeholders

More extensive consultations, with all Darfuri stakeholders should be organized during the design and implementation phases. This will help to both obtain broad stakeholder participation and inputs on needs and priorities, as well as in the review and validation of draft strategies and programmes, both of which are essential to fostering and sustaining engagement, awareness and buy-in. Facilitating participation of those actors marginalized and most affected by the conflict should be a priority. During the implementation phase, consideration should be placed on translating high level strategies and objectives into state and local level plans, preferably through integration with existing state and local level planning processes. This is key to ensuring broad participation in planning processes and securing engagement in the implementation of subsequent interventions.

The future DDS should take into account how policy, legal and other prerequisites for reforms can be clearly defined and how these will be implemented by the government, supported by the international community.

Although the DDS, through the FaST component, envisioned foundational activities aimed at providing an evidence base, strengthening capacities and delivering short-term ‘peace dividends’, there was no clear strategy for addressing the policy, legislative and regulatory prerequisites for many of the priorities articulated across the three pillars. While these were identified as activities that needed to be implemented, the DDS offered limited guidance on how this was to be achieved. Beyond this, attention should also be paid to how a future DDS can be directly integrated into national and state level plans, ministerial programmes and budgetary processes.

As the experience of other countries has highlighted, it is essential that a future national body for the DDS be accorded with a clear legal and institutional mandate. Although the DRA was supposed to have led DDS efforts and served as the principal interlocutor for coordinating international engagement, this did not materialize due to inadequate capacity; ambiguities in its role and relationship to other government bodies; and its dissolution in 2016. A future national body for the DDS should be linked to the executive with cross-governmental authority; possess sufficient institutional capacity to undertake the range of coordination, technical and representational functions (including through dedicated capacity development assistance from the international community); and be established for the duration of the peacebuilding and recovery plan, with transition of competencies to other government bodies fixed through milestones relating to achievement of DDS strategic objectives and outcomes.

Securing sustained stakeholder engagement and commitment throughout the planning and implementation of a future DDS will be essential to its success. The DDS was undermined by inadequate national and international stakeholder engagement and commitment, as manifested in the absence of national leadership, alignment of interventions and the limited progress made in operationalising its governance and financing architecture. A clear political strategy as part of the DDS design process is needed aimed at securing consensus on the key strategy, policy and institutional aspects of the strategy, as well as the development of a framework to establish clear accountabilities and responsibilities for implementation. With respect to the latter, some form of mutual accountability framework or ‘compact’ could be considered to define and formalize international and national stakeholder commitments in the implementation of a future DDS.

3. Strategic and Programmatic Approach

Pillar-specific objectives should be defined in relation to an over-arching theory of change that explains what changes are expected, the assumptions and conditions that need to be met, and the sequence of actions and interventions that are needed in this regard. This is essential if a ‘shopping list’ approach to defining pillar or sectoral priorities is to be avoided. Providing a causal logic to the presentation of objectives and how these need to be addressed provides a basis for both prioritising interventions and coordinating national and international efforts in this regard. It also provides a clear framework for monitoring and reporting on progress and outcomes. Pillar and sectoral strategies and interventions should be built around the short to medium term timeframe of the DDS, phasing programs over time. Typically, these can be divided into shorter-term interventions, with a focus on strengthening resilience and initiating preparatory activities for longer-term interventions, as well as medium-term interventions requiring longer lead times for implementation and achievement of results (normally corresponding to longer-term systemic development outcomes). This type of sequencing of strategies is essential in contexts such as Darfur, where conditions and capacities are likely not to exist in the short-term for larger-scale systemic development interventions.

Ensuring a more integrated approach to developing pillar and sectoral strategies, departing from an understanding of overarching priorities and the different sectoral dimensions inherent in addressing or achieving complex changes is needed. A key structural constraint of the DDS was the absence of a coordination framework that facilitated development of cross-pillar and cross-sectoral programming. Development of pillar strategies should explicitly include linkages to other pillars and sectors, particularly where impact or outcomes depend on changes across two or more sectors/pillars. For some issues, for instance key cross-cutting and transversal issues such as gender, youth, land and conflict management, consideration should be given to stand-alone strategies within the DDS which provide an overview of how interventions across different pillars/sectors need to be combined to achieve needed change and outcomes.

A future DDS should be based on the assumption that conditions and needs will invariably change and evolve over a six-year period. As a linear plan, based on fixed assumptions and conditions, the DDS did not have the flexibility needed to accommodate Darfur's highly dynamic and volatile context. Going forward, the strategy should also be designed as an adaptable and dynamic framework, which takes into account both possible changes to post-conflict and transition timeframes, and facilitates responsiveness to risks and changing circumstances. This will allow stakeholders to continuously adjust priorities and programmes as well as better manage risks to the strategy – both in terms of preventing them (which links to the political strategy accompanying DDS implementation) and mitigating them. Assumptions - including conditions that need to be in place to enable certain interventions or outcomes - should also be addressed in a dynamic manner, notably through the inclusion of scenario-based planning and the flexibility to adjust and revise strategies accordingly.

4. Governance and Coordination

The next DDS process should include a provision, not only for undertaking the assessment and developing the strategy, but also for piloting the early stages of its implementation. This can include the continuation of the team responsible for development of the DDS, with responsibilities reconfigured towards implementation, as well as the prioritisation, by the DCB or its equivalent, of essential 'start-up' activities. These could include planning (development of more detailed pillar, sectoral or state-level plans); programme development and design; strengthening of institutional capacities; and establishment of key monitoring and tracking mechanisms. These arrangements are essential to avoid the loss of momentum that occurred in the current DDS following its launch and the lack of clear vision on how it was going to be translated into programmatic, organizational and financial reality.

A future DDS should have a support system built into the governance structure, with adequate support from the international community. High level advisory and strategic bodies ('apex' bodies) require a support structure if they are able to carry out their functions effectively. At the minimum this should consist of an adequately staffed and resourced technical secretariat with delegated coordination, monitoring and supervision responsibilities. It should also consist of a technical level body that is responsible for ensuring movement across the pillars in the coordination and alignment of efforts. It should not be automatically assumed that national coordination structures can carry out the entirety of these functions, particularly in the early stages of implementation, as illustrated through the limited governance of the DCB, which hindered the implementation of the DDS. Provision is often needed for international assistance.

Financing arrangements in a future DDS should reflect broad stakeholder consensus and commitment. The principle upon which the DDS financing architecture was based—the need for a holistic approach to financing that focused on engendering coherence and alignment on common priorities across funding instruments was sound, but never articulated or operationalized. There are a number of lessons learned that can be applied from other countries with respect to how this can be done. At the minimum, this can entail the establishment of a 'funding board' consisting of key donors and linked to the DCB, with the remit for facilitating dialogue on alignment. Moreover, the multi-window Darfur Facility as originally envisioned is also sound, and an approach which has proven to be useful in contexts like Darfur which require financing across a range of specialized instruments. A key recommendation is to ensure that these mechanisms do not find expression in a document alone, but emerge from and reflect the consensus of a formal deliberation and agreement among national and international partners.

B. Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

1. General recommendations

Sustainable peace requires systemic reform and institutional development: Weak governance and rule of law have been causes of conflict. Therefore, the capacities of the state need to be developed and organized to meet the needs of empowered citizens, and to use resources transparently, accountably and efficiently, in line with the terms of the Constitutional Declaration. Provision to manage natural resources sustainably and equitably is needed. Reform requires holistic integrated systems approaches, incorporating reform of policy and

institutional frameworks, and community and government capacity building. However, this requires political will, Federal level action, long-term commitment, and harmonized international support, with development partner willingness to transition support to delivery through GoS systems. Progress will depend on which scenario emerges at national and Darfur level.

Accountability and community based and integrated approaches: Integrated, inclusive area (possibly ecosystem) based development for all groups, including returnee and host, nomad and farmers is suggested. This can be a basis for accountable local governance, inclusive access to basic services, and community engagement in development planning and managing infrastructure and natural resources (learning from existing community mechanisms). This can help to build consensus, cooperation and social cohesion around concrete shared benefits.

Shared analysis and theories of change: Nuanced understanding of local context, conflict risks, political economy, power relations and inequalities is needed, along with clear theories of change which set out step by step progress towards objectives.

Phasing and sequencing, and addressing immediate priorities: Under all scenarios, there are uncertainties, risks of continuing violence, and humanitarian needs. Linked to national level peace negotiations mandated by the Constitutional Declaration, political processes at the Darfur level to address critical issues, including barriers to return are needed. Protection needs will remain acute, linked to decisions on UNAMID presence. Support to inclusive Darfur participation in transitional reform agendas, and transitional bodies required under the Constitutional Declaration may be addressed through other frameworks, but is a further possible area for DDS engagement.

2. Governance and Accountability

Systemic reform measures highlighted by the review were **a clear streamlined institutional framework for mandates roles and responsibilities at different levels of Government and for decentralization**, appropriate to available resources. **Public administration reform** with a strategic sequenced approach from the center, implemented at state and locality level (including functional review, merit based recruitment, performance management, capacity development) is suggested. Arrangements and capacity to **plan and coordinate across basic service sectors** (for example within Ministry of Finance planning departments) need to be built up.

In less positive scenarios the approaches to the public delivery system may have to be more limited, with targeted support to shift development efforts towards delivery through GoS systems. Priority areas may include cross sector basic services coordination; growing 'islands of excellence' in basic service sectors where entry points are available; ensuring critical posts at locality level are filled and increasing linkages between existing community governance mechanisms and local authorities.

Improved frameworks and arrangements for accountable **locality level governance**, appropriate to available resources and trends (environmental, demographic) are suggested. Increased capacities, including for planning, coordination, community engagement, and sector specific service delivery, and accessible services with simplified processes are needed. A more comprehensive agreement or framework for the **Native Administration and community governance** which can support integrated sustainable development, participation and peacebuilding is suggested, as a basis for improved local governance.

To **increase resources**, streamlined fiscal transfers and simple, transparent central Government allocation criteria are needed, along with assistance to state and local governments to bolster sub-national revenue generation. Redesign of the subnational revenue structure, including to promote pro-poor taxation and sustainable economic growth is suggested.

Accountability, transparency and citizen participation are priorities established by the Constitutional Declaration. They need to be addressed by provision within public bodies, and possibly by right to information legislation. Harmonized development partner support for citizen participation, civil society and independent media, based on needs assessment is also needed. This can systematically support setting up new CSO and

CBOs, development of organizational capacities, networks, advocacy agendas, and CSO work at grass roots to promote inclusive participation and social accountability processes.

Citizen-based governance and accountability also require devolution and locating policy planning in local agencies and incorporating locally-generated expertise into the policy design process, to enhance citizen ownership of the resulting policies. Political and economic decentralization can enhance democracy by providing avenues to power for new political actors, particularly youth and women.

3. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Develop the Darfur peace architecture and processes for political solutions to critical issues: Concerted efforts must take advantage of relative peace to tackle root causes of conflict and displacement, and address Constitutional Declaration Chapter 15 issues through inclusive political processes. Processes, forums and capacity for dialogue and reconciliation above community level (state, regional, locality), built from and linked to existing community mechanisms are suggested, with participation of civil society, women, youth Native Administration, and elites.

Leverage capacities for peacebuilding, mediation and conflict analysis: Consider how to consolidate evidence, lessons, and capacities for conflict analysis and sensitivity assessment, and conflict resolution, including by strengthening networks of mediators and peace actors. Efforts should support the heritage of native administration, but also youth capacities and innovations, and women peace actors. Making sure lessons from effective Darfur conflict resolution cases, and from other countries which have gone through political transition are captured may be valuable.

Consolidate integrated community peacebuilding around concrete needs and economic cooperation: Based on lesson learning and context analysis, replicate and consider extending support for local dispute resolution, and for inter-communal economic, basic services, and livelihoods cooperation which can entrench peace and bring mutual benefit. Scaling up conflict resolution capacity may be possible by integrating conflict analysis and peace work into other programming.

4. Land Governance

Land is a cross cutting issue, and requires strengthened, well-designed stakeholder and coordination arrangements to ensure a clear vision and processes to address complex challenges. Political will, and resources will be needed to prioritize land issues during transition. Shared assessments, planning, root causes analysis and theory of change are suggested.

- *Ensure security of land tenure and appropriate legal frameworks:* Continued efforts to develop land rights and tenure systems which protect the interests of all groups including vulnerable communities are needed. A mixed system is suggested, ensuring recognition for customary land rights. International experience such as that related to starter titles and upgrading land rights incrementally over time can be drawn on.
- *Develop political and technical solutions to land occupation:* Land occupation needs to be addressed at a political level with a multi-stakeholder approach, inclusive transparent negotiation, recognizing unequal power relations, and related risks of violence. Possible measures include clarifying the land status of displaced people, delivery of land rights services in return areas, and practical step by step guides on resolving land disputes for IDPs who are afraid to go back.
- *Ensure inclusive public awareness on land rights:* Outreach and awareness raising on land rights, tenure and registration are needed, including specific engagement with women. Grass roots consultation should be built into reform processes, to make sure these lead to inclusive equitable solutions that reflect land use patterns, social context and needs of all groups.

- *Accessible land administration services*: Measures could include clarifying roles and responsibilities, and documenting customary and local land management practices for incorporation into statutory land administration. Simpler basic procedures (for planning, mapping, managing records) are needed for accessible, responsive locality land services, along with digitization of information. Practical tools for people to access services and information might include mobile phone records and mobile registration offices.

5. Rule of Law and access to Justice

In line with Constitutional Declaration commitments, human rights commitments should underpin rule of law sector development efforts. It is critical that a future DDS focuses on accountability for infringements; ending impunity for human rights violations and immunity of states agents; the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and of law enforcement bodies; civilian oversight of policing and security sector; and gender sensitive and responsive access to justice provision. Focusing on re-establishment of the criminal justice chain in return areas, and building trust and confidence in police and justice services is a priority.

Development of transitional justice processes, including accountability for serious crimes perpetrated during the conflict and conflict related sexual violence, should underpin reconciliation and sustained peacebuilding efforts. These need to be designed based on consultation with victims and communities.

Sustainable change will require political will and Federal level reform. In the long-term subject to appropriate context and enabling conditions, reform priorities include security sector reform to deliver civilian oversight and a clear institutional framework defining roles, responsibilities, limitations and powers for security bodies. Justice and law enforcement focused reforms are a priority, including reform of legal and institutional frameworks for prisons, and for rural courts and their jurisdiction. Subject to the wider security context, reform measures to improve delivery of policing services might include measures such as merit based representative recruitment, measures to increase numbers of women recruited and development of formal conditions of service.

Building M&E systems and the evidence base on community security and justice needs, and further review and impact assessment of sector development efforts is suggested. Police and justice services should be demand driven, based on community engagement and priorities, and perception surveys to identify how trust in institutions might increase.

Scaling up work on legal aid and access to justice in the community is suggested, based on good practice and human rights models, driven by empowerment of citizens, including women to develop referral mechanisms to institutions, supported by local and supra local networks. Protection remains a priority, in particular in view of UNAMID drawdown. Building community protection networks, linked to legal aid provision is suggested, along with integrated coordination structures for humanitarian protection and development stakeholders working on rule of law issues.

6. Cross-cutting issues

Gender:

- Support inclusion of women in policy and decision making processes, including for conflict resolution and peace-building, in line with Constitutional Declaration provisions including Chapter 15, article 67 (c) and (d); and Chapter 2, article 7 (7).
- Empower women CSOs and leaders to build capacities, networks and advocacy agendas, based on root cause analysis of exclusion and inequalities;
- Program design should include a gender analysis at the inception phase, and training for staff to address gender issues, promote participation and mainstream gender perspectives.

Youth:

- Map existing youth structures and capacities, and consult youth including on how to increase their role in peacebuilding and address key youth challenges through policy making;

- Engage youth as change agents for sustainable development activities.

C. Reconstruction

1. General Recommendations

Holistic, long-term approaches need to be adopted within a realistic framework. Given the enormous budget of the previous Reconstruction Pillar, and the uncertain funding context facing Darfur moving forward, large-scale public works initiatives like the kind envisioned in the DDS need to be carefully prioritized, taking into account the of Government of Sudan priorities, as well as donor programming preferences. The Pillar’s current focus on one-off construction projects should be adjusted to treat the constituent sectors as integrated systems, incorporating policy and regulatory reform, government and community capacity building and incentivizing sustainable market-based solutions. This applies for both basic services, as well as the transport and energy sectors. Examples from the Urban Water 4 Darfur project provide one model for service and utility strengthening that takes this “blended” approach, and which could be adapted to other sectors. In such an approach, infrastructure would not be an end in-and-of-itself, but instead one implementation methodology among several that together contribute to sectoral development goals.

Area-based programming is critical for achieving high-impact, cost-effective development in widely dispersed return areas. When applied across all sectors of Pillar 2, such an approach will help in achieving results at scale, even with limited capacities and funding. Areas with high population densities—such as the triangle formed by Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina, in which over half of Darfur’s population lives—and areas with a high number of returns are good candidates for targeting.

Planning and implementation of basic services interventions needs to coordinate across funding streams by operationalizing Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus (HDPN) principles. This will entail better linkages between emergency interventions and recovery and development programming. This would entail an orderly and sustainable handoff of delivery of basic services in camps and return areas from humanitarian-based operations to government- and community-led systems that are supported and improved (but not wholly maintained) by development funding. The efforts to integrate selected IDP camps into municipal systems—as is being done under the Water 4 Darfur project—is a good example of this effort in practice.

2. Basic Services

General recommendations

Across the three sectors, policy reform to clarify overlapping mandates between the Federal, State and locality levels would help ensure more cost-effective and sustainable use of limited resources. This however needs sustained political will to be successful. This is particularly necessary at the locality level, where low capacity most directly impacts sustainability of investments. A related key priority is for standardized and evidence-based capacity building efforts of government officials responsible for service delivery of various basic services.

There is a need for better prioritization of investments in basic services hardware, particularly in return areas. Significant amounts of both humanitarian and development funding have been directed to return areas, but interviews with multiple key informants bemoaned a lack of coordination and transparent targeting, and thus a frequent suboptimal use of scarce resources. Service delivery across basic services sectors must be joined up and contribute to a “whole of community approach” as part of multi-actor and area-based programming. Without this, the impact of any one project risks being diluted and offset by gaps in other sectors. Better access to services—particularly water—can serve as a hook for consensus building in return areas. In this way, infrastructure and service investments are a carrot that helps create a space for dialogue, and then benefits from improved community management of the infrastructure, thereby improving sustainability.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

- In the WASH arena, the scaling up of WASH as a component of IWRM activities should be a top priority. The approach has already shown promise and it can be used as the backbone for community engagement and empowerment around WASH planning and implementation. IWRM can also help inform water facility siting and facilitate the equitable use of water by multiple users.
- WASH infrastructure investments should be used as an incentive to bring partners together and as an entry point for conflict resolution. The rehabilitation of existing water facilities should be prioritized over new construction whenever possible. Urban WASH infrastructure should also be strongly considered in future programming decisions; urban areas have a potentially higher IDP caseload, activities can be scaled more quickly, and there is significant unmet need in Darfur's growing urban centers.

Health and Nutrition

- In terms of health governance, there is a need to strengthen effective leadership, good governance and accountability of the local health system in each of Darfur's five states.
- For access to health services, there needs to be continued improvement in equitable coverage and accessibility of quality integrated health care services.
- The capabilities of the health and community systems to adapt, absorb and transform in response to different types of emergencies must be enhanced.

Education

- Developing tools and techniques for sustainably and cost-effectively tackling the urban-rural divide in education in Darfur is a major priority, as is supporting capacity building of the frontline service providers at the locality level, including education managers, inspectors and statistical officers. Through community awareness campaigns, targeted construction or rehabilitation of schools and WASH Facilities, and cash assistance for poor children and households, continued improvements in access to education is possible.

3. Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization

- To overcome the piecemeal approach that has characterized much of the programming in the Returns sector, better prioritization of intervention zones and area-based coordination amongst actors is needed, with a clear lead agency in each zone working closely with the community and Government authorities to rationalize and systematize returns programming.
- There must also be coordinated policy engagement and advocacy vis-à-vis the Government around the root causes of displacement. Without political solutions to issues such as land occupation, compensation and control over natural resources, the possibility of larger-scale, durable returns remain remote.
- Future programming should address the fact that an increasing body of evidence indicates that many IDPs - particularly young people - are unlikely to return to their rural areas of origin, and will instead elect to remain in the urbanized settings that they have called home for many years. While not without its challenges, integrating IDP camps into their existing communities in terms of land and housing rights, access to general municipal services, full citizen participation, and providing tailored urban livelihoods options could provide cost-effective, durable solutions for hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Nascent Government of Sudan policies regarding integrating camp populations into existing urban centres should thus be supported, guided and capitalized upon with both technical and political support. Household-level assistance could be joined with pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure, service delivery and urban planning, helping improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike.
- The proposed Durable Solutions Methodology includes strategies for improving programming on both rural returns and urban integration and could thus provide the foundation for addressing displacement in a future DDS. The draft methodology proposes a standardized approach to providing durable solutions to IDPs and returning refugees, recognizing that piecemeal investments have led to little substantive change in the situation of displaced populations, returnees and host communities. This new framework—based on international best practices—takes into account not just short-term needs, but also dispute resolution, housing, land and property issues, access to basic services and livelihoods. If sufficiently supported by the GoS and reinforced by donors, the strategy could form the basis for a coordinated, holistic approach to grappling with displacement situation in Darfur. It could also help provide a platform for coordinated policy

engagement with the Government focused on addressing underlying political barriers to both returns and local integration.

- Beyond new approaches and better coordination, progress on the displacement issue will require significant increases in multi-year, multi-sectoral funding. Lessons from the few successful projects in the sphere highlight that achieving durable solutions takes time and resources, and funding needs to be adjusted to meet these realities on the ground. To do so effectively, returns programming should be integrated as a transversal theme throughout peacebuilding, livelihoods and natural resources management initiatives. This will facilitate a shift away from viewing returns as a one-off assistance package, and instead recognize returns as a longer-term development outcome that needs to be carefully fostered through a multi-sectoral approach, if it is to be durable.

4. Transportation and Energy

- Darfur's long-standing isolation from the rest of Sudan, as well as poor internal transport networks, negatively impact multiples areas of life for its residents. Results from recently completed projects like the FaST road improvement initiative and the Government's completion of the long-awaited El Ingaz road (discussed above and in Pillar 3) highlight the wide ranging positive effects that improved road infrastructure can have on local economies, household livelihoods and resilience, access to basic services, security and social cohesion. Serious consideration needs to be given to continuing to invest in spot improvements and crossings, agricultural feeder roads, and linkages between towns and state capitals.
- Realism regarding available funding is needed when making future plans in the sector. The scale of the road construction envisioned in the current DDS may not be possible in the near term and to help prioritize transportation planning is needed, starting with the operationalization of the 10 feeder roads and Darfur-wide choke points that UNOPS has assessed and completed full design documents for under the FaST roads project.
- Careful planning given available development funds is also needed when considering air and rail transport. While a prominent feature of the current DDS, more data on costs and potential impacts of investments in these areas would be needed before development funding is directed towards these sectors.
- In addition to transport, there is a need to explore ways to cost-effectively and sustainably increase electrical connections for low-income households and small businesses in urban areas. The catalytic effect of electricity for economic activity has been demonstrated in a number of other countries, and the Review Consultants received anecdotal reports of a similar dynamic happening in Nyala following energy sector investments there by the Government. A generally similar process for extending electricity services and strengthening energy sector operations and maintenance as that being used to improve the urban water system in El Fasher by DFID could be employed in cities throughout Darfur.

D. Economic Recovery

1. General Recommendations

The Sudanese economic crisis has impacted all sectors and constrained the success of many development interventions. Taking account of the implications of the macroeconomic context is essential in future planning, to ensure realistic targets are set and creative and appropriate ways of implementation are found.

The learning from each different component of Pillar 3 underlines the importance of a systemic approach, whether (i) natural resource management and catchment-based management systems, (ii) a market systems approach to developing trade, and or (iii) a holistic and market-driven approach youth employment. One-year 'humanitarian-type' grants, which remains the funding model for many donors, are much too short for such work, and inappropriate for community-based development programming.

Current levels of food insecurity and hardship are unlikely to fall significantly in the short-term, and for some communities are based on structural inequality. The scale of economic reform required to address Sudan's economic crisis is massive and estimated to take 3 to 5 years to implement. Although not foreseen in the current

DDS, social protection to the poorest and most vulnerable during that period is imperative and is key to the humanitarian-development nexus and to reducing large-scale annual humanitarian programming.

2. Economy, Business and Trade

Based on the experience of development efforts in the last six years, key areas for investment likely to have the most significant positive impact on economic, trade and business development include:

- Investment in value chain work, in sectors identified as having greatest economic potential, supported by thorough and systemic market analysis is needed. This should focus on: improving the quality of production of some of Darfur's major agricultural commodities, such as groundnuts and livestock, to increase its market value, and in some cases, potential for export; agro-processing and adding value to Darfur's agricultural commodities within the Darfur region; the expansion of savings and loans associations (of producers or small-scale traders) through which capital can be provided in the form of a revolving fund.
- Continued paving of feeder and other roads on major trade routes, to facilitate market integration and trade flows.
- The private-public partnership model for economic development should be explored and expanded further, based on experience and good practice to date.
- Efforts to promote entrepreneurial hubs in Darfur state capitals should be stepped up, drawing on Khartoum experience
- A well-informed strategy for private sector development should be formulated, to guide and bring greater coherence to the various efforts to promote business and entrepreneurship.
- A strategy for microfinance, envisaged in the DDS but never completed, should be developed, and microfinance facilities stepped up.

3. Natural Resource Management

- The database built by the natural resource mapping project under the Darfur Land Commission should be completed and deliverables made available, as a matter of urgency, to inform policy formulation, and program planning.
- A water information system should be established across Darfur, to update existing data and to provide ongoing monitoring of wadi catchment systems and rainfall
- Programming should be based on an ecosystems approach, for example designed around water catchment areas, and expanded
- Woodless construction should be promoted as part of any returns package
- There is an opportunity to explore how the East Darfur legislative model for natural resource management could be replicated/ adapted for other Darfur states
- State-level policies should include clear guidance on how to demarcate livestock migration routes, based on concepts of human interaction and negotiation between farming and pastoral communities rather than engineering verification and fixing of a physical road map
- State-level policies should regulate artisanal gold-mining to protect the environment, and to impose health and safety regulations.

4. Rural Livelihoods

- There is a need to rebuild agriculture and livestock extension services, with the overall objective of boosting the level and quality of agricultural and livestock production e.g.: improving animal breeds to ensure better quality and suitability to the environment
- Resilience programming across rural areas should be deepened and expanded, based on integrated, community-based programming rather than single-sector interventions:
 - better recognizing the merging and integration of different livelihood systems
 - rebalancing programming to ensure pastoralists are better included
 - taking account of power dynamics and addressing exploitative practices

- promoting food security through increased productivity using appropriate technological packages
- paying attention to services and infrastructure to stimulate multiplier effects on livelihoods and on the local economy.

This is critical as returns accelerate, long-term or seasonally, putting pressure on existing communities. This calls for a clear strategy, both at the local level but also across Darfur, drawing on good practice example.

- More attention should be given to improving markets, marketing facilities and access to markets.
- Participatory based livelihood enhancement projects are likely to have more impact one people feel secure and able to access markets to sell their products.

5. Urban Livelihoods and Employment

- Vocational training and support to youth entrepreneurship needs to be stepped up and better coordinated drawing on good practice examples, to inform a future strategy on vocational training and youth employment. This must be rooted in analysis and a strategy that engages at the micro, meso and macro levels, is market-driven, and is based on extensive consultation with a wide range of different youth groups. It also needs to link with efforts to mainstream general/academic education.
- State-level councils for Vocational Training should be established, clarifying institutional responsibility for Vocational Training.

ANNEX I: DDS Pillars and Overarching Objectives by Thematic-area:

Figure 25			
Thematic-Area	Overarching Objectives		
Pillar I: Governance, Justice & Reconciliation			
Governance & Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes • Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level • Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery • Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue • Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable 		
Peacebuilding & Conflict Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established 		
Land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms • People having access to a compensation system and compensation 		
Rule of Law & Access to Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved access to justice (Gender balanced) • Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised armed forces (including special groups) • Security Sector Reform implemented 		
Pillar II: Reconstruction			
Basic Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation • Enhance access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services • Improved access to and quality of education 		
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees • Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur • Improved access to quality urban housing and services 		
Infrastructure Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access to electricity services • Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services 		
Pillar III: Economic Recovery			
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Overarching Objectives</th> <th>Sub-Objectives</th> </tr> </thead> </table>	Overarching Objectives	Sub-Objectives
Overarching Objectives	Sub-Objectives		

Economy, Business & Trade	Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Animals traded in the market, by type of livestock • Products undergoing value addition processing • People employed in value addition activities • Producer-market linkages established • Additional income for beneficiaries from Income Generating Activities
	Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectors with tax incentives for investment • Public-private partnerships signed • Sectoral investment strategies (agribusiness, leather and tourism) developed
	Increase access to financial services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lines of credit provided • Micro-finance strategy for Darfur completed • States covered by the Credit Information Bureau • States with a Central Bank • Micro-finance institutions supported • Village Savings Loan Association (VSLA) formed
Natural Resources	Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water Resources Management Information System (MIS) developed and up to date • Functioning meteorological stations • Land use plans approved • Major catchment management plans agreed • Functioning water-user committees • Rehabilitated nurseries • Forestry and environmental laws reviewed and developed • Locality mapping of forestry areas completed • Development of Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in partnership with national program • Wildlife laws and reserve areas established and protected • Integration of early warning system into a comprehensive government strategy for natural resources management
Rural Livelihoods	Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements	

	Improved crop and livestock production and productivity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feasibility studies on rehabilitation of existing Agricultural Development Projects in accordance with para 174, Article 31 of DDPD • Production of key crops • Productivity of key crops • Average herd size per household
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	Increased access to employment opportunities (gender-balanced)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Students finding a job after completion of vocational training • Additional people employed by supported businesses
Poverty, Food Security & Social Safety Nets		

ANNEX II: DDS Project and Donor Financing Matrix

Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation			
Thematic Area I: Governance and Accountability			
Project	Donor	Amount Allocated	DDS Proposed Funding
Capacity strengthening of CSOs in North Darfur	EU	\$588,239	
Rights of People Living with HIV/AIDS	EU	\$149,020	
Promotion of blind/visually impaired people Rights in Education and Rehabilitation services through community mobilization for Social Inclusion	EU	\$555,559	
Enhanced role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in promoting good governance and advocating for children's access to and use of social services in Sudan	EU	\$565,390	
Advancing the Contribution and Stewardship of Civil Society Organizations in Inclusive Local Development	EU	\$530,722	
Every Voice Counts	Netherlands	\$2,368,522	
Construction of Public Buildings/Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings	Qatar	\$5,300,000	
Governance and Accountability Total		\$10,057,452	\$425 mil
Thematic Area II: Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution			
Support to Peace efforts and Reconciliation through Dialogue in Darfur	EU	\$1,700,000	
Providing local infrastructure and Empowerment for Cross Border Peace and Cooperation (CBPC) within Pastoralist and Sedentary Communities	EU	\$2,614,396	
Promoting Peace over Natural Resources	EU	\$4,483,689	
Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace In Darfur	Qatar	\$5,550,000	
Support to Peace efforts and Reconciliation through Dialogue in Darfur	Qatar	\$917,600	
The international center for sport security (ICSS)	Qatar	\$109,755	
Capacity Building for Enhancing Gender Participation in the Peace Process	AFDB	\$4,500,000	
Towards Enduring Peace	USAID	\$26,200,000	
Sudan Peacebuilding for Development Project (SPDP) Phase Two	WBG	\$8,500,000	
Darfur Internal Dialogue (DIDC)	Qatar & EU	\$2,617,600	
Building Constituencies for Peaceful Change in Sudan	Netherlands	\$6,759,962	
Darfur Peace Stability Fund (DCPSF)	MPTF	\$42,633,429	
Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Total		\$104,886,431	\$140 mil

Thematic Area III: Rule of Law and Access to Justice			
Child release and reintegration in Sudan			
Capacity building of the: The Sudan National Human Rights Commission (SNHRC)	EU	\$103,268	
Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Program (DDR Program)	Qatar	\$11,794,075	
Promoting and Protecting Women's Rights in Darfur	USAID	\$586,265	
Strengthening Capacity of Sudan National Human Rights Commission	Canada	\$27,887	
Joint Program for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur	Canada	\$856,391	
Rights of Persons with disability in Sudan, leaving no one behind	EU	\$555,559	
Women's Rights in Darfur Program - Baring Foundation and John Ellerman International Development Trust		\$391,175	
UNAMID and SLF Rule of Law Programmatic Funding		\$9,612,505	
Rule of Law Total		\$25,099,276	\$225 mil
Thematic Area IV: Land			
Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-Existence in Darfur	Qatar	6,079,290	
Land Total		6,079,290	\$55 mil
Pillar I Grand Total		\$146,122,449	\$845 mil

Pillar II: Reconstruction			
Thematic Area I: Basic Services			
Basic Services: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)			
Project	Donor	Amount	DDS Proposed Funding
Sustain Darfur	UK	\$23,418,000	
Urban Water for Darfur	UK	\$18,684,000	
Darfur Urban Water Supply Project	UK	\$10,797,600	
Darfur Water Project	AFDB	\$3,705,900	
Darfur Water Program	Qatar	\$3,000,000	
Tawila Dam Rehabilitation	USA	\$1,928,967	

Enhancing the contribution of local actors to sustainable development and to the achievement of the MDGs	EU	\$718,958	
Increased Access to and Use of Sustainable Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Services in Darfur	Qatar	\$10,807,000	
Basic Services: WASH Total		\$73,060,425	\$1.08 bil
Basic Services: Health and Nutrition			
Strengthening the Decentralized Health System to attain Universal Health Coverage in five states in Sudan	Japan	\$500,000	
Enhancing Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights and preventing Gender Based Violence among refugees and internally displaced populations in South and North Darfur, North Kordufan, Gedarif, Sennar, and Gezira states In Sudan.	Germany	\$688,200	
Reducing the burden of tuberculosis	Norway	\$1,825,185	
Upgrading and Rehabilitating Health Facilities, and Basic Health Services in Return Sites	Qatar	\$13,076,470	
Support for the improvement of the “International Health Regulation” System in the Republic of Sudan	Italy	\$1,141,800	
Provision of essential reproductive health and sexual and gender based violence services to vulnerable migrants, particularly women and youth, in Sudan	Italy	\$1,135,998	
Prevention and response to GBV in Darfur: Building capacity for sustainable response	Italy	\$518,718	
Prevention and response to GBV in Darfur: Building institutional capacities and community mobilization and stigma reduction for sustainable response	Italy	\$683,500S	
Strengthening Resilience for IDPs, Returnees and Host Communities	EU	\$6,168,928	
Nyala Sudan-Turkey Training and Research Hospital	Turkey	\$110,000,000	
Strengthening the Decentralized Health System to attain Universal Health Coverage in five states in Sudan	Japan	\$500,000	
"Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus: Strengthening a Decentralized Health System for protracted displaced populations in North and South Darfur (HealthPro)"	Italy	\$11,000,000	
Rehabilitation of Nyala's Paediatric Hospital run by the INGO Emergency	Italy	\$275,000	
Improve the reproductive health status of vulnerable populations in Darfur, Sudan	EU	\$1,817,005	
Health & Nutrition Total		\$148,830,804	\$290 mil
Basic Services: Education			
Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	\$6,105,955	

Basic Education Recovery Project (BERP) - Global Partnership for Education / World Bank	GPE/WB	\$30,000,000 ¹³⁶	
Primary Education Programme for Darfur	EU	\$6,549,370	
Grant to finance the implementation of a project in the field of education	Qatar	\$1,550,849	
Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan” (ARUS)	Norway	\$2,859,456	
South Sudanese Refugee Education	UK	\$1,620,000	
Prospects Partnership	Netherlands	\$5,500,000	
Education Total		\$54,185,630	\$350 mil
Basic Services Cross/Multi-Sectoral Projects			
Qatar Initiative for the Development of Darfur	Qatar	\$75,200,000	
The Project for Strengthening Peace Through the Improvement of Public Services in Three Darfur State	Japan	\$12,500,000	
Fostering Sustainable Development and Access to Basic Services in Central Darfur through Community Driven Recovery and Safety (CDRS) Approaches	EU	\$3,267,995	
Multi-Sectoral Total		\$90,967,995	\$0 mil
Basic Services Total		\$367,044,854	\$1.72 bil
Thematic Area II: Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization			
Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees in Darfur	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	\$5,050,000	
Sudan: Enhancing the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants	Italy	\$2,840,000	
Enhancing Sustainable Reintegration of IDP and Refugee Returnees while Promoting Community Cohesion through the Provision of Livelihoods, Basic Infrastructure and Services in Darfur	Japan	\$600,000	
Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization Total		\$8,490,000	\$255 mil
Thematic Area III: Transport and Energy Infrastructure			
Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	\$11,618,210	
Darfur Solar Electrification Project	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	\$5,689,000	

¹³⁶ The Sudan wide funding total for BERP was \$76.5 million; per an interview with World Bank project manager, approximately \$30 million of this total was dedicated to Darfur.

Transport and Energy Infrastructure Total		\$17,307,210	3.025 bil
Pillar II Grand Total		\$392,842,064	\$5 bil

Pillar III: Economic Recovery

Thematic Area I: Natural Resource Management

Project	Donor	Amount	DDS Proposed Funding
Promoting the provision of legitimate land tenure rights using VGGT Guidelines for conflict-displaced communities, including small - scale rural farmers , pastoralists , and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan, implemented by FAO	EU	\$3,921,594	
Support to the nomad and sedentary food unsecured communities in Um Baru locality, North Darfur	EU	\$2,875,835	
Adapt for Environmental and Climate Resilience in Sudan	UK	\$13,010,000	
Wadi El Ku Phase I, implemented by UN agencies	EU	\$8,568,180	
Natural Resource Management For Sustainable Livelihoods in East Darfur (2) (NRMP2), implemented by the UN agencies	EU		
Natural Resource Management Total		\$32,963,609	\$265 mil

Thematic Area II: Rural Livelihoods

Towards improved food security and livelihoods within conflict-affected communities of Central Darfur, implemented by Triangle	EU	\$1,307,198	
Improving the Food Security of Vulnerable Conflict-Affected Households in West Darfur, implemented by Concern	EU	\$1,307,198	
South Darfur Livelihoods and Agricultural Infrastructure Development Project, implemented by World Vision International	German government	\$11,470,000	
Darfur Livelihoods Recovery Programme, and L4P, implemented by UNDP	Swiss government	\$1,003,490	
Taadoud Phase II (Resilience Programme), implemented by a consortium of NGOs and Tufts University	DFID, UK government	\$29,923,000	
Taadoud: Transition for Development Phase I	UK	\$9,840,000	
Improving Community Resilience in the Face of Conflicts and Environmental Shocks, implemented by AECOM	USAID	\$1,250,000	
Strengthening Human Security and Resilience of Conflict-Affected Host Communities and Villages of Return in North Darfur,	Germany	\$3,929,858	

Amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire et sécurisation des moyens d'existence des ménages paysans vulnérables affectés par les conflits, implemented by Triangle	French government	\$298,220	
Stability Through Resilience, implemented by ZOA and World Relief	Netherlands government	\$4,586,566	
Livelihood and Economic Empowerment Project, implemented by QRCS	Qatar	\$2,000,000	
Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities in Darfur, implemented by FAO	Qatar	\$4,930,000	
Mitigate the effect of El Nino for host and IDP population in North Darfur	EU	\$3,699,370	
Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change in Sudan	Canada	\$3,080,000	
Sustainable Improvement of Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods through Increased Production, Resilience and Health Services as an Approach of Integrated Development in Central Darfur, Sudan	Germany	\$3,850,000	
Darfur Seed Distribution Project, implemented by Government of Sudan	Turkey	\$133,662	
Rural Livelihoods Total		\$82,608,522	\$675 mil
Thematic Area IV: Urban Livelihoods and Youth Employment			
Employment initiative South Darfur: Vocational qualification for refugees, IDPs and host communities in Nyala, implemented by GIZ	Germany	\$13,060,300	
Youth Employment for Success	Germany	\$12,617,000	
Strategy for economic empowerment In the Greater Darfur Region	Qatar	\$320,000	
Youth Volunteers Supporting Peace and Recovery in Darfur, implemented by UNDP	Japan	\$740,500	
Youth Volunteers Supporting Peace and Recovery in Darfur Project (Phase - IV), implemented by UNDP	Korea	\$2,375,500	
Urban Livelihoods Total		\$28,792,800	\$120 mil
Thematic Area IV: Economy, Business and Trade			
Microfinance for Young and Poor Producers in Rural Areas in Darfur, implemented by UNDP	Qatar	\$2,500,000	
Study the Economic Empowerment Strategy for Darfuf	Qatar	\$320,000	
Support Reconstruction Darfur	Germany	\$6,882,000	
Support on Reconstruction in Darfur	Germany	\$11,800,000	
Strengthening Capacities for the Reconstruction in Darfur, implemented by GIZ	Germany	\$6,497,400	
Economy, Business and Trade Total		\$27,999,400	\$340 mil
Pillar III: Grand Total		\$172,364,331	\$1.4 bil

	Proposed Funding	Actual Funding
DDS Grand Total	\$7.245 billion	\$711.3 million

ANNEX III: DDS Distribution of International Development Oriented Funding

Figure 27		
Distribution of International Development-Oriented Funding		
DDS Pillar & Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)
Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation		
Governance and accountability	\$425 million	\$10.1 million
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	\$140 million	\$104.91 million
Land governance	\$55 million	\$6.1 million
Rule of law and access to justice	\$225 million	\$25.1 million
Pillar I Total	\$845 million	\$146.1million
Pillar II: Reconstruction		
Basic Services	\$1.72 billion	\$367 million
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization	\$255 million	\$8.5 million
Transport & Energy Infrastructure	\$3.025 billion	\$17.3 million
Pillar II Total	\$ 5 billion	\$392.8 million
Pillar III: Economic Recovery		
Economy, Business & Trade	\$ 340 million	\$28 million
Natural Resources	\$ 265 million	\$33 million
Rural Livelihoods	\$ 675 million	\$82.6 million
Urban Livelihoods & Youth Employment	\$ 120 million	\$28.8 million
Pillar III Total	\$1.4 billion	\$172.4 million
DDS Grand Total	\$ 7.245 billion	\$711.3 million

ANNEX IV: Pillar III: Previous and Current Organizational Mapping

Figure 28		
DDS Pillar III: Economic Recovery: Organizational Structure		
Three-Pronged Approach:		Current Pillar Organization Mapped against Previous Structure
I	Support to key livelihoods, centered on crop and livestock production, and enhanced agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements	Sub-divided into two components: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural Livelihoods • Urban Livelihoods
II	Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services, centered on facilitating a conducive business enabling environment, institutional capacity and private sector development	Economy, Business & Trade
III	Sustainability of productive sectors through natural resource management, with a focus on land, forest resources and water	Natural Resource Management
		Infrastructure as it directly relates to Pillar III objectives
Previous Objectives		Current Thematic Area Mapping
I	Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements	Rural Livelihoods
II	Improved crop and livestock production and productivity	Rural Livelihoods
III	Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development	Economy, Business & Trade
IV	Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity	Economy, Business & Trade
V	Increased access to employment opportunities	Urban Livelihoods
VI	Increased access to financial services	Economy, Business & Trade
VII	Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources	Natural Resource Management

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