REVIEW OF THE DARFUR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2013-2019)

CONSOLIDATED REVIEW REPORT – VOLUME II

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Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
ARUS	Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan
BDCs	Business Development Centres
BERP	Basic Education Recovery Program
BHU	Basic Health Units
BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development
CAHWs	Community Animal Health Workers
CBO	Community Based Organization
CBRM	Community based conflict mechanism
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
CLTS	Community Led Total Sanitation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CTA	Civil Transactions Act
CTC	Central Trading Company
DCB	Darfur Co-ordination Board
DCPSF	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDRA	Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DDS	Darfur Development Strategy
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DIDC	Darfur-wide International Dialogue and Consultation
DJAM	Darfur Joint Assessment Mission
DLC	Darfur Land Commission
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DCPSCF	Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund
DRA	Darfur Regional Authority
DRDF	Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund
DSWG	Durable Solutions Working Group
ECG	Education Co-ordination Group
EPG	Education Partners Group
EU	European Union
EVC	Every Voice Counts
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization for the United Nations
FaST	Foundational and Short-Term Activities
FCPU	Family and Child Protection Units
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
FIC	Feinstein International Center (Tufts University)
FMOH	Federal Ministry of Health
GDMA	Greater Darfur Microfinance Apex
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrolment Rate
GIZ	German Corporation for International Co-operation
GLTN	Global Land Tenure Network
GoS	Government of Sudan
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IDP	Internally displaced persons
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRDS	Innovative Relief and Development Solutions
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
JPROL	Joint Programme for the Rule of Law & Human Rights
MFI	Micro-Finance Institutions
MIS	Management Information Systems
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MMTA	Market Monitoring and Trade Analysis
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NA	Native Administration
NCDs	Non-communicable Diseases
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHIF	National Health Insurance Fund
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Services
NNGOs	National Non-governmental Organizations
NR	Natural Resources
NRM	Natural Resource Management
O&M	Operations and maintenance
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PFM	Public Financial Management
PHC	Primary Health Care
PHCC	Primary Health Care Centers
PRCSP	Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace
PTAs	Parent Teacher Associations
PWG	Pillar working group
RRU	Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization
RRR	Returns, Recovery and Reintegration
RSF	Rapid Support Force
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDDRC	Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
SDG	Sustainable development goals
STDM	Social Tenure Domain Model
SERFAC	State Extension Research Farmer Advisory Council
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SHF	Sudan Humanitarian Fund
SIDA	Sustainable Integrated Development
SIP	Social Initiatives Program
SIPF	Sudan International Partners Forum
SLA	Savings and Loans Association
SLC	State Legislative Councils
SLF	State Liaison Function
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
SMoA	State Ministry of Agriculture
SSTL	State-Sponsored Terrorism List
SPF	Sudanese Police Force
TEP	Towards Enduring Peace Project
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Committee
TMC	Transitional Military Council
UHC	Universal Health Coverage
UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDF	UN Fund for Development, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UWA	Urban Water Administrations
VDC	Village Development Committee
VRRC	Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission
VSLA	Village Savings and Loans Association
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WEK	Wadi El Ku Project
WES	Water and Environmental Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Pillar 1: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation

I. Introduction

1. Overview

This review report for DDS Pillar 1, Governance, Justice and Reconciliation, is based on a mixed-methodology analysis conducted between March 2019 and August 2019. The review addressed:

- The evolution of the situation in Darfur related to the pillar sectoral focus;
- Progress in addressing key development challenges and priorities;
- Lessons and key challenges emerging for the next strategy;
- Preliminary identification of priorities for the next six years.

Pillar 1 of the 2013 DDS strategy is broad in scope, and addresses issues considered to be among the root causes of conflict in Darfur. It contains eleven objectives whose associated costed results framework forms the core of the Pillar Strategy. The objectives were roughly grouped into the four interrelated thematic areas in the DDS strategy: (i) Rule of law; (ii) Budget trends and fiscal management; (iii) Peace and security; (iv) Governance and accountability.

Findings in this report are organized into four thematic areas, which differ slightly from the original DDS thematic areas: (i) Governance and Accountability; (ii) Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding; (iii) Land; (iv) Rule of Law and Access to Justice. The review was informed by the original eleven objectives, which were grouped as follows:

Figure 1	
Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation	
Thematic areas	**Objectives**
Governance and accountability	• Strengthened local governance systems, structures and processes • Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level • Enhanced citizen participation in governance and service delivery • Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue • Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	• Reconciliation and conflict management process and mechanisms established People having access to a compensation system and compensation
Land	• Improved land registration/property system and related conflict resolution mechanisms
Rule of law and access to justice	• Improved access to justice (gender balanced) • Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilised armed forces (including special groups) • Security sector reform implemented (focused on police and prisons)

The DDS Pillar 1 strategy recognized that improved governance is critical to peace in Darfur, and requires the building of representative, responsive, and effective institutions. It included institutional strengthening and reform measures for the public delivery system at state level, local governance, and public financial management. Alongside such long-term development measures, the strategy envisaged activities focused on the early stages of recovery from conflict (peacebuilding, DDR, and compensation for loss of assets).

The DDS outlines assumptions which establish some of the enabling conditions necessary for realization of Pillar 1 objectives. These include the assumption that "*the political climate at the Federal level ...remain conducive to the implementation of the DDPD…*". Effective governance reform at the subnational level also requires, as the DDPD stipulated that "*a Federal system of government, with ..effective devolution of powers and a clear distribution of responsibilities to ensure fair and equitable participation by the citizens...*" should be in place.

Pillar 1 is interlinked with Pillars 2 and 3. Governance capacities and processes are required to ensure that infrastructure is appropriate to needs and can be maintained, and that basic services can be delivered effectively and sustainably. Economic recovery requires appropriate regulatory and revenue collection provisions. Strengthened institutions and evidence-based policy making and implementation is necessary across the many complex challenges Darfur faces.

2. Methodology

The work of the review was facilitated by formation of a Pillar Working Group (PWG) and three sub-groups, composed of stakeholders from UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and Government. The three sub-groups were: (i) Governance and Accountability; (ii) Rule of Law and Access to Justice (iii); and Peace and Reconciliation (including land).

The review was designed to have a highly participatory methodology. The methodology was revised in co-ordination with the PWG and sub-group co-leads in view of disruption caused by political events from April 2019. Evidence was gathered through thematic review notes completed by the sub-groups, based on a detailed questionnaire template; through interviews with project managers and subject matter experts, including stakeholders from UN agencies, INGO implementing partner organizations and academia; and through literature review of project documents, project evaluations, analyses and studies, and published reports and articles. A UNDP-led donor mapping, which was updated in co-ordination with the DDS Review Team, provided the basis for identifying development interventions aligned to Pillar 1.

Constraints and challenges affecting the review process included:

- Composition of sub-groups was self-selecting and not inclusive. It was oriented towards Khartoum representation and INGO and national NGO participation was limited. Government participation was limited due to the changing political context;
- Planned stakeholder workshops in Darfur and Khartoum, intended to complement review notes, were not possible. Pillar consultants made an initial visit to Darfur in March 2019, but interaction with Darfuri stakeholders was limited;
- The change in methodology part way through the review process meant that time was lost trying to mobilize sub-group members who were subsequently unavailable due to political events;
- The opportunity to triangulate data and evidence was limited;
- The scope of Pillar 1 is extremely broad. It was not possible to access and review documentation on all projects falling under Pillar 1, due to lack of time and access to key individuals and materials;
- There are limitations in evidence and data across a range of issues in Darfur. This is due to political and technical factors;
- DDS issues are interlinked, and development programs may contain multiple components, and not align directly to DDS pillars or objectives.

II. Situation Analysis

1. Governance and Accountability

1.1 Key developments since 2013

DDPD commitments as articulated in the DDS focus on: strengthening institutions and improving governance at regional, state and locality levels; streamlining budget and fiscal management structures and processes in Ministries and Localities for sustainability and growth; and supporting enhanced citizen participation. There has been limited progress towards these objectives. Systematic reform of the public delivery system and local governance institutions has not been implemented, and these remain characterized by weak capacities and poor institutional frameworks for service delivery. Although some islands of good practice have emerged within state level institutions, challenges are exacerbated by resource constraints[1]. No reform or streamlining of budget processes and fiscal management has taken place.

However, development efforts and the DDS: (i) have created an awareness among local and national actors that more has to be done if the objectives enshrined in the DDS are to be achieved; and (ii) sensitized active youth, women and local communities of IDPs that they have to be proactive and engage in the process of bringing change. Some progress in citizen participation has been supported through development of community-based organizations and governance mechanisms, including for management of natural resources.

This section provides an overview of key developments related to governance and accountability. It begins with analysis of center-periphery relations and key political dynamics which have shaped the governance context and functioning of institutions. It then groups findings broadly according to DDS areas of focus (public delivery systems and public financial management, local governance and citizen participation). Lastly, it provides a short narrative of events in 2019. It highlights key points emerging from the review and is not intended to be comprehensive.

Centre-periphery relations and key political dynamics

The dynamics of the relationship between the central government and Darfur have shaped all aspects of the formal governance system since 2013, and prospects for reform in the 5 Darfur states. The period from 2013 to 2019 saw security issues having top priority for the Khartoum authorities. The period witnessed major events[2] including the evolution of Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the clash between Khartoum and Musa Hilal, the success of Government forces in undermining the military capability of armed rebel groups, the ascendency of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as "Hemidti") eclipsing Musa Hilal, and campaigns for disarmament and collection of weapons.

The secession of South Sudan in 2011 marked a turning point not only in Sudan's recent political history but in centre-periphery relations inside the country. Calculations of political survival for the Khartoum regime were behind understandings between various national, regional and international actors to open a new era post-2011 by welcoming the new state of South Sudan and continuing to support gradual opening up and reform in Sudan, including commitment to resolving conflicts in Darfur and the two areas of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.

Khartoum's main concern in Darfur was to deflect the insistence of armed movements, native administration, civil society, women organizations, IDPs, and refugees to negotiate with Khartoum as one region[3]. Instead of creating a consensus among Darfur rebel groups and facing a united Darfurian side, the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement signed the Doha Document for Peace Darfur (DDPD) in Doha on 14 July 2011. Qatar and international donors pledged support to DPA and Darfur Development Strategy (DDS).

Dynamics and realities on the ground dictated a different course of action for all actors – the Khartoum government, rebel groups, regional states, Qatar, international actors. Key developments included:

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[1] See annual reports by Federal Chamber 2015-2019, Khartoum.

[2] Sudan Democracy First Group., (2017). سلاح امراء الحرب فى دافزر: زراعة الريح وحصاد العاصفة *Warlord Weapons in Darfur: Sowing Wind, Harvesting Avalanche*'. November 2017.

[3] El-Affendi, A., (2013). '*Islamism and the Sudanese State after Darfur: Soft State, Failed State or Black Hole State?*'. in Gunnar Sorbo and Abdelgaffar M. Ahmed (eds) Sudan Divided: Continuing Conflict in a Contested State, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. pp45-69.

- Severe fiscal crisis drove the government to intensify gold mining, with serious implications for Darfur, and the political economy;
- Khartoum succeeded in mending relations with neighbouring states, collecting arms from 2017, and achieving the strategic defeat and ending significant military threat from rebel group in most parts of Darfur other than Jebel Marra by 2016, following operations decisive summer from 2014 - 2016[4];
- The consequences of re-division of Darfur into five states, and the ending the myth of a single Darfur region. The Dar of the Fur is gone, and power bases have been fragmented, leaving states based on ethno-political forces[5];
- EU co-operation with the Sudan Government to control migration to Europe;
- The USA's continued co-operation with Sudan in anti-terrorism, and sanctions easing in 2017[6];
- Sudan's regional geo-political shifts (joining the Saudi-Emirates-Egyptian led coalition) paved the way for ascendency of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their leader Mohamed H. Hemdti to centre of power[7].

One outcome of these developments was to elevate Khartoum rulers as "first class political survivors", able to engineer a realignment of forces inside Darfur resulting in a "no-war, no-peace" from 2013-2019. This was the time during which the previous Khartoum regime effectively transformed from one-party rule to 'personalist autocracy' where the Presidency consolidated all powers in the hands of one person[8].

As far as governance of the five Darfur states is concerned, all government business has been coordinated through the Presidency, including finance, security, and land. Constitutional amendments in 2015, 2016 and 2017 legally sanctioned the intervention of the Presidency in appointing Walis (State Governors), authorization of state budgets and transfers from the centre, and controlling land legislation and ownership[9]. The Law of Federal Rule, approved by the President and the Council of Ministers in 2017, weakened state legislative organs and further eroded the powers of state governors. The 2015 constitutional amendments gave the central government direct control of natural resources across Sudan, significantly reducing states' control over their resources.

In the final analysis, constitutional amendments signaled a process of re-centralization, converting state institutions into nominal federal bodies, and appendages to the center[10]. These dynamics framed and shaped the formal governance system in the Darfur states under the previous administration. They left little scope for strategic reform, and constrained the functionality, and service orientation of the public delivery system, public financial management (PFM), local governance and even the native administration. The adoption of the Constitutional Declaration in August 2019 and subsequent formation of a new government for the transitional period in Sudan creates a new dispensation to address governance and accountability challenges.

Public delivery system and public financial management

A clear framework for institutional mandates at different levels of government and effective devolution of powers is still lacking. A number of sources note that there continues to be limited clarity and understanding of the roles and responsibilities of government authorities at different levels of government. For example, ambiguity in mandates and poor co-ordination between the central and state levels has led to duplication of taxes. Institutional frameworks in some sectors remain complicated and fragmentary. The devolution of responsibility for service delivery to sub-national administrations continued in theory, with responsibility at

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[4] UNHCR., (2019b). *'Sudan: Country Report, January 2019'*. (COI between 1 September 2017 and 2 December 2018). Country Report on Darfur.
[5] Meeting in El-Fashir with representatives of international organizations, 16 March 2019.
[6] Atta El-Battahani, 2017, Sudan Regime and post-US Sanctions: Reform, Recombinant or Failed/Collapsed State? Or Post-US Sanctions Sudan: Which Way? December 2017.
[7] Sudan Democracy First Group., (2017). سلاح امراء الحرب فى دافزر: زراعة الريح وحصاد العاصفة *Warlord Weapons in Darfur: Sowing Wind, Harvesting Avalanche*'. November 2017.
[8] More on this below; personalist reign is characterized by signs of narcissism and ego-centrism. (TRT World TV, Rexus Programme, 1 December 2017; For personalist regimes see: Escariba-Folch, Abel and Wright, J, 2010, Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers, International Studies Quarterly, 54, 335-359,
[9] Max Planck Foundation for International Law and Rule of Law., (2019). '*The 2005 Interim National Constitution of Sudan 2005 Amended in 2015, 2016 and* 2017'.
[10] ibid.

locality level for delivery of basic services, but this has not been backed up with adequate budgetary resources in practice,[11] and was undermined by the process of recentralization outlined above.

The public delivery system has been impacted by resource constraints. With limited revenues and fiscal transfers, state officials report that they have been unable to meet even the basic expenditures of wages, salaries, and social subsidies. Operations and maintenance (O&M) limitations have impacted the utilization of internationally funded infrastructure. Almost no government resources have been available for development. For instance, South Darfur state is reported not to have been allocated any budgetary resources for development for five years[12]. The budget of most line ministries decreased each year, while the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and security focused institutions remained strong[13]. The organizational autonomy of public agencies at the state and locality levels has eroded due to such factors, which have impacted on the delivery of public services, and on efforts to reform and strengthen state and locality administrations. A number of state level agencies are reportedly overstaffed. UN staff in South Darfur highlighted limitations in management information systems (MIS) and the institutional memory of state line ministries.

However, there are some examples of progress. In the health sector, service delivery has been supported by international development efforts, and there is evidence of some improvement in capacity for data collection and co-ordination. Implementation of the Federal Health Policy demonstrated co-operation between Federal and state levels. The Sudan Electricity Distribution Company has been highlighted as an example of an efficient organization, which has achieved a relatively high level of operational autonomy while still being owned by government and subject to many government requirements. Performance of the public delivery system also varies between the 5 Darfur states, with the newer states (Central and East Darfur) created by re-division reported to have weaker capacities.

Co-ordination between service delivery sectors and line ministries at state and locality level is a concern. Key informants for the review reported that planning of service delivery is not centralized and coordinated, due to limitations in Ministry of Finance Planning Departments.

Due to weak mobilization of other sources of revenue, the states have become increasingly dependent on transfers from the center. Centrally-controlled revenue allocations to the states have been scarce and irregular (and reportedly politically-motivated). The following table show that states in Darfur are dependent on transfers from the central government. This is not a one-year finding; it is a general trend for the period 2013-2019.

Figure 2

States' own Resources to Central Government Transfers for 2016 (Sudanese Pounds, millions)

States	Own resources	Central Transfer	Total budget	% own resources to central transfer
South Darfur	**317.79**	**659.50**	**977.29**	**%33**
Central Darfur	**53.20**	**477.10**	**530.30**	**%10**
North Darfur	**210.88**	**481.10**	**691.98**	**%30**
East Darfur	**141.56**	**212.09**	**353.65**	**%40**
West Darfur	**115.20**	**241.25**	**356.45**	**%32**
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Source: Federal Chamber, 2017, Percentage of own revenue to total

[11] El-Battahani, A., GadKareem, H., (2017). '*Governance and Fiscal of Decentralization in Sudan: Exploring the Political and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in an Unstable Polity'*. University of Bergen and CMI, Sudan Report no.1.

[12] ibid.

[13] Mahé, A, L., (2015). '*Thriving On Chaos: The War In Darfur And The Transformations Of The Authoritarian Coalition'*. Department of Political Science, University of Montreal, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research general conference, Montreal, 26-29 August 2015.

The central government transfer system is fragmented, unevenly applied, and suffers from widespread exemptions. There is no systematic relationship between actual transfers to states and poverty reduction,[14] or fair and equitable system of fiscal equalization. Fiscal decision-making autonomy of states and localities is limited and accountability is missing.

The sub-national revenue system in Darfur remains subject to severe challenges. It is reported to be complex, and lacking both appropriate co-ordination and communication between levels and stakeholders, and institutional capacities and oversight. Revenue mobilization at sub-national level in the Darfur states was reported to be very low, with variation between the five states, leaving inadequate and unevenly distributed own-revenues at state and locality levels.[15] The tax burden falls more on low income poor, without provision for enhancing accountable own-source revenue, or pro-poor, pro-peace, pro-productive or pro-gender equality budgeting.

Local governance

Limitations in the capacity of public authorities at locality level are a key challenge to service delivery to communities. In the health sector, for example, few localities have the required human resources structure present, constraining the ability to coordinate, plan and deliver services. There is variation among localities, with extremely limited capacity in remote regions. However, key informants for the review noted that there are individuals within state and locality public service sectors who were committed, knowledgeable, and actively supported development projects.

Some key informants for the DDS review described locality level governance as politicized and extractive in its focus, and involving complex and duplicative local taxation. In their approach to localities, security was the top priority for authorities at state and federal levels from 2013 - 2019. Walis who succeeded in maintaining security were highly regarded by Khartoum authorities, such as East Darfur state under the former Wali Anas Omer, credited with stabilizing the area. People had been unable to cultivate from 2013 - 2016 due to the Reizieghat- Ma'alia conflict. Only after Anas became Wali in 2017 and ended the role of warlords did the situation improve. Many activists were not happy with the heavy handed style of the Wali, and sought to protest his methods. However, the Wali was protected by President Al-Bashir, similarly to the Wali of South Darfur Adam El Faki (praised by the President who described the Wali as "his man"[16]). A critical gap remained with regard to the locality councils envisaged in the DDS strategy. These have only been established in Central Darfur, and are absent in other Darfur states.

The political agenda of ethnic-territorial localism defined the logic of the political marketplace, shaping the political dynamics of localities. According to De Waal, Sudanese peripheral movements historically displayed two contradictory features: one displaying the readiness of regional elites to succumb to material rewards offered by the centre of power, the other the anti-materialist and populist logic of ethnic particularism.[17] An example from East Darfur state shows localities are demarcated on the basis of tribalism more than territorialism. The table below illustrates these dynamics:

Figure 3:
East Darfur Localities
9 Localities
1. ElDaein Locality – North Sudan Railways considered as an independent sector; ElDaein – South Sudan Railways. Both 1 and 2 are dominated by Reizieghat

[14] El Shibly, M, M., (2013). '*Fiscal Transfers: Towards a Pro-Poor System'*. UNDP. Sudan. October.
[15] Some states were reported in 2016 to mobilize around 30% of total revenue, some less than 20%. UNDP., (2015). '*Revenue Mobilisation and Collection at Subnational Levels in Darfur States'*. UNDP.
[16] President al-Bashir in a public rally in Nyala, June 2018.
[17] De Waal, A., (2017). '*The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power, Polity'*. pp. 69-90.

2. Shiariyya Locality - North of state – dominated by Birgid, other groups also present
3. Yassin Locality – ElBigo (landowners – Hawakier owners), others include Tunger
4. Localitiy of Karinka – far North of state – Ma'alia
5. Locality of Adiela – far North of state – Ma'alia
6. AbuJabra locality - Reizieghat
7. Bahr el-Arab Locality - Reizieghat
8. Asalaya Locality - Reizieghat
9. El Fardoursse Locality - Reizieghat

Source: DDS team field research, 27-31 March 2019.

Citizen participation, the Native administration and community governance

A major indicator of accountability is the achievement of citizen-centered governance, through which citizens enjoy and exercise political and civil rights, and confer legitimacy to government through elections and referenda. The closed policy environment and highly securitized context in which the Sudan Government conducted public affairs in conflict-ridden regions such as Darfur from 2013 - 2019 curtailed progress in this regard[18]. Scope for citizen participation was constrained by violence, and denial of civil and political rights.

However, there was some evidence of growing awareness and a sense of rights-based entitlement among some communities such as IDPs and youth during the 2013 - 2019 period. There are youth leaders who are educated, aware of community issues, the region and international human rights, and who have benefited from awareness raising by NGOs and INGOs, and increased access to information through mobile phone networks where these are accessible.

The native administration remains influential and trusted, though youth structures may be becoming more influential in IDP camps. However, there has been an overall trend of long term of erosion of power of the native administration, and of its politicization. The system has been impacted by the division into 5 states. There has been a shift in the weight of governance from informal to formal structures, and new contestations of power.

Community level governance structures, some facilitated by international development partners, are present, for example focused on management of water resources and on dispute resolution. These have supported community capacities and social cohesion and resilience in some areas. However, some such bodies lack capacity and may be parallel to traditional mechanisms. They are not linked to higher levels of governance, nor do they provide a basis to engage with duty bearers, and claim entitlements. Overall, the community system "functions in pieces" and is fragmented,[19] and Government established community level governance structures may be politicized[20].

The Darfur conflict environment has allowed corruption to flourish. Though corruption is a product of a combination of factors, one major and determinant factor is the governance crisis. It is this governance crisis that has, among other factors, created an environment where state has almost ceased to exist as a neutral arbiter enforcing rule of law. Lack of accountability and highly securitized governance have given members of the ruling party, NCP, a free hand extort, embezzle and blackmail business circles, native leaders and citizens and

[18] For a background study see: Hassan, S, M., Ray, C, E., (2009). '*Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader'*. (eds) Ithaca-London.; El-Battahani, A., (2006). '*Towards a Typology and Periodization Schema of Conflicts in Darfur Region of Sudan*', in Leif Manger and AbdelGhaffar M Ahmed (eds), Understanding the Crisis in Darfur, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen; Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader.
[19] Field visits and meetings in El Fashir ,12-16 March 2019.
[20] Mahé, A, L., (2015). '*Thriving On Chaos: The War In Darfur And The Transformations Of The Authoritarian Coalition'*. Department of Political Science, University of Montreal, Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research general conference, Montreal, 26-29 August 2015.

make fortunes on which law kept a blind eye. Granting of official licenses and permission to set up business, exemption from taxes, kick-backs, and favoritism fed into a process of wealth making by army and security officers, party leaders, and regional politicians. These trends are further enhanced by the war economy and commercial and financial exchanges with regional lending, investment and other economic circles.

Events of 2019

Though events leading to the overthrow of the al-Bashir regime began in central Sudan, Darfur was present throughout, in particular when government authorities resorted to blaming all negative policies on conspiracies by Darfur rebels.

On 19 December 2018, a three-fold increase in bread prices led to public anger in the city of Atbara, which sits at the junction of the Nile and Atbara rivers, in northeastern Sudan. It was immediately followed by a series of protests from Khartoum to Darfur. The protest movement was spearheaded and orchestrated by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), with active support from doctors, university staff, teachers, engineers and other groupings. *Tasgut bas* ("just fall, that's all") is the slogan around which all protesters united, in addition to the demands listed in the "Freedom and Change" document, which called for a transition period to agree on new constitutional and political dispensations.

Haunted by the spectre of modern forces leading protests against authoritarian regimes, the leadership of the ruling party sought to deflect attention by recalling Darfur to public discourse. Officials paraded on TV screens youth from Darfur (alleged to belong to SLA-Abdelwaih), who were accused as the main inciters of violence. The response came loud from the streets of Atbara: *ya al-Onsri al-Magrour kul al-Balad Darfur* ("oh arrogant, racist, all the country is Darfur")[21].

Drawn from various professions and backgrounds, the SPA's concept of change has yet to be developed on issues such as promised political reforms and the specifics of change. The focus of the SPA's document "Freedom and Change" is the call for the restoration of democracy, and for the status of marginalized regions to be addressed[22].

[23]

Figure 4: Major Flashpoints for Protest in Sudan
Source: Middle East Eye., (2019). '*Sudan Uprising: Anything can Happen'*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-uprising-anything-can-happen (6 February 2019).

[21] Middle East Eye., (2019). '*Sudan Uprising: Anything can Happen'*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-uprising-anything-can-happen
[22] Mini Minawi, July 2019, al-Rakoba
[23] Middle East Eye., (2019). '*Sudan Uprising: Anything can Happen'*. Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-uprising-anything-can-happen

On 22 February 2019, President al-Bashir dissolved government, declared a state of emergency, appointed army officers as Walies (State Governors), and promised to fight corrupt elements, along with other measures intended to placate protesters. However, protesters continued to rally behind slogans, chanting "freedom, peace, justice" and "revolution is the people's choice" as they marched through the streets of the capital, managing to organize a sit-in on April 6 near the headquarters of the army. Popular mobilization continued, and Sudan's armed forces and security forces responded to protesters with tear gas and, at times, live ammunition, mowing down at least 30 people, according to government figures, and almost double that figure according to Human Rights organizations[24].

Eventually, on 11 April 2019, the First Vice President and Minister of Defense declared on radio and television the removal of President al-Bashir from power and the formation of a Transitional Military Council to run the country, before he himself was subsequently removed the following day by another senior officer under pressure from popular opposition to what they deemed an internal handover of power by different elements of the regime.

During the sit-in, youth groups from Darfur played an active role, highlighting sacrifices made by Darfurian people resisting the Inqaz regime. These events took place at a time when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were perceived to stand against former President al-Bashir. RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo was promoted to Deputy Chair of the Transitional Military Council which took over on 12 April 2019. This is a further complicating factor given the history of the RSF in the Darfur conflict. On August 19, the Transitional Military Council and Forces of Freedom and Change signed the Draft Constitutional Declaration for the Transitional Period, and the Sovereignty Council was formed as a collective head of state, with the appointment of Dr Abdulla Hamdok as Prime Minister. Darfur is represented by a civilian member of the Sovereignty Council.

The Constitutional Declaration establishes the nature of the Sudanese state for the transitional period as independent, sovereign, democratic, parliamentary, pluralist and decentralized, with rights and duties based on citizenship without discrimination due to race, religion, culture, sex, colour, gender, social or economic status, political opinion, disability, regional affiliation or any other cause.[25]

Chapter three outlines the responsibilities of the three levels of government within the decentralized state, Federal, regional/state and local, including that the local level should promote broad popular participation and express basic needs of citizens.[26] It also establishes that different levels of governance have both exclusive and shared competencies and powers, and resources, as determined by the law, and that until the geographical demarcation and distribution of powers and competencies between the levels of government is re-examined, the existing system shall remain in effect and executive governments shall be formed in the provinces, as determined by subsequent measures.

1.2 Current risks and threats

The lack of responsive governance institutions able to command public trust and legitimacy, represent the interests of different groups, balance competing claims, and ensure fair access to resources has been a dimension of conflict in Darfur. Poor governance contributes to conflict risks, inhibits development, and accelerates resource depletion. Conflict in Darfur is inextricably linked to state-building and governance of natural resources. Forming Localities on an ethnic or tribal basis carries risks of fragmentation and conflict.

Darfur faces complex challenges highlighted in the DDS pillar reports, for example security of land tenure, land occupation, sustainable management of natural resources, and urbanization. These require the collective efforts

[24]Middle East Eye., (2019). '*Sudan Uprising: Anything can Happen'.* Retrieved from: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-uprising-anything-can-happen

[25] Draft Constitutional Charter for 2019 Transitional Period, translation by International Idea, Chapter 1 General Provisions, Article 3

[26]Chapter 3 article 8 a) The federal level, which exercises its powers to protect the sovereignty of Sudan and the integrity of its territory, and promote the welfare of its people by exercising powers on the national level; (b) The regional or provincial level, which exercises its powers on the level of regions or provinces as prescribed by subsequent measures; (c) The local level, which promotes broad popular participation and express the basic needs of citizens, and the law determines its structures and powers. International Idea., (2019). '*Sudan Constitutional Declaration for the 2019 Transitional Period'. August.* Translated by International Idea.

of stakeholders, inclusive policy dialogue and implementation, resource mobilization, and institutional reform and innovation. Without improved governance, complex challenges cannot be effectively addressed.

2. Conflict Dynamics and Conflict Resolution

2.1 Key developments since 2013

The DDS committed to supporting peace and security in the Darfur region, including key DDPD commitments related to compensation and reconciliation processes. In the last three years there has been improvement in the security situation in most parts of Darfur, with decreased levels of violence following the strategic defeat of armed opposition groups by 2016. However, there has not been progress in higher level conflict resolution processes, including an inclusive peace agreement, and key DDPD commitments have been implemented, including those related to compensation. While a fragile social peace has developed, the situation is one of "no-war, no-peace" in which root causes of conflict have not been addressed, and risks of a return to widespread violence persist. The analysis below provides a brief overview of some key conflict dynamics and conflict resolution developments since 2013. It is not intended to be comprehensive.

Changing dynamics of conflict from 2013 - 2019

Conflicts in Darfur have a long history, with different cycles of conflicts over the past decades[27]. Root causes include conflict over resources, particularly claims over tenure, control and use of land and the related resources. Additional factors include ethnic divisions and the related differences in livelihood systems (farmers and pastoralists) among the Darfuri population by central government. Under-development and marginalization in access to infrastructure and essential services are key factors explaining the conflict between Darfur and the former ruling elite from Central Sudan, triggering the armed rebellion in 2003. The overall failure of the Government of Sudan to enable effective, transparent and just governance, and justice and rule of law are additional factors. In 2014, the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) published a conflict analysis which delineated the causes of conflicts in Darfur into two main categories: a) fundamental causes of conflicts (referring to conflicts over natural resources; political dimensions; and conflicts based on revenge); and b) circumstantial causes contributing to conflicts (referring to climate change and environmental deterioration. spread of weapons, armament of tribes, and negative impact of civil wars in neighboring countries)[28]. Other studies have developed classifications delineating various types, causes, actors and levels of conflicts[29], and the relevance of these studies is shown below in conflict patterns during the period of 2013-2019. Bromwich's analysis of the conflict explains the different levels and layers of the Darfur conflict and how they interact, and highlights the complexity of the conflict, and the need to avoid simplistic explanations.[30]

Figure 5

Major Conflicts in Darfur 2013-2019

	Conflict Event	Key Mobilizers	Motivation	Mobilization Mechanisms	Objectives of the Mobilization	Notes
2013	Conflict in Jebel Amer – North Darfur between the	Mahameed chiefs led by Musa Hilal, Commander of	Taking control of Jebel Amer and gold mining operations there.	Tribal meetings and WhatsApp messages.	Exploitation by the Mahameed of a government military force.	The Mahameed used deadly force, leading to the death of 400

[27] For example, see: Takana, Y., (2016). '*Conflicts over Resources in Darfur'*. CMI and University of Bergen.

[28] Darfur Regional Authority, 2014. Darfur Regional Authority (DRA)., (2013-2019). '*Developing Darfur: A Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy'*. UNAMID. World Bank. UNDP. African Development Fund. Qatar.

[29] For example see: El-Battahani, A., (2006). '*Towards a Typology and Periodization Schema of Conflicts in Darfur Region of Sudan*', in Leif Manger and AbdelGhaffar M Ahmed (eds), Understanding the Crisis in Darfur, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen; Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Critical Reader.;Takana, Y., (2016). '*Conflicts over Resources in Darfur'*. CMI and University of Bergen.

[30] Bromwich, B., (2017). 'Power, Contested Institutions and Land: Repoliticising Analysis of Natural Resources and Conflict in Darfur'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies.* DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2017.1403782.

	Mahameed (and other Abbala clans) and the Beni Hussein.	the Border Guards Force.			Mobilization of Mahameed youth. Taking control of the mining sites and forced displacement of the settled Beni Hussein	civilians from both tribes
2014	Offensive of the RSF against the JEM in Khor Dongo, South Darfur.	The government.	Intercept JEM forces returning from South Sudan to Darfur.	Meetings with tribal leaders in the area and direct military commands.	Recruit additional fighters. Ambush and annihilate JEM forces. Recover JEM's vehicles, weapons and equipment.	
2015	RSF Offensive on SLM/AW forces in Jebel Marra, West Darfur	The government.	Taking control of SLM/AW strongholds in Jebel Marra.	Government media agencies. Meetings with tribal leaders. Use of SAF's military force.	Use all military resources to evict SLM/AW and civilians perceived as loyal to the SLM/AW from Jebel Marra. Resettlement of their areas by Arab tribes loyal to the government and by the RSF.	Civilians displaced by the fighting are still in Sortoni camp, North West of Kabkabiya, North Darfur.
2016	Conflict between the Rezeigat and Ma'alya tribes, Daien, Adila, Abu Karinka, East Darfur.	The Rezeigat Tribe.	The Ma'aliya resented the domination of the Rezeigat of the recently created state of East Darfur. The Rezeigat objected to the government's allocation to the Mal'aliya of a full Nazara chieftain and of two Localities. Rezeigat sought to expel the Ma'aliya from east Darfur after they demanded half the positions in the new state.	Call to arms of all members of the Rezeigat tribe throughout Darfur.	Taking advantage of silence and inaction of the government, the Rezeigat evicted all Ma'alia traders, civil servants, students, etc. from Daein.	Some 500 people were killed on both sides. The army organized the evacuation of Ma'aliya from Daein. Both sides used government weapons in the fighting.
2017	Arms collections	The government - delegated to RSF to implement				Government declares success in arms collection
2018	RSF attack on Mustariha village, North Darfur.	The government.	The arrest of Musa Hilal and the dissolution of forces loyal to him.	Military mobilization. Messages and direct meetings with leaders of the tribes that are loyal to Musa Hilal.	Neutralizing the threat Musa Hilal posed to the government. Empowering the RSF and fully equipping it to neutralize the tribes that are loyal to Hilal.	The government exploited the power struggle between Hemeiti and Hilal. The two are relatives and both belonged to the "Janjaweed forces", and later to the Border Guard Forces.

Source: Compiled by DDS review team 2019.

The years from 2013 to 2016 saw a high frequency of violent conflicts in the Darfur region as RSF confronted armed rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) Abdel Wahid and Minni Minawi factions and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - head on with the intention of removing the military threat posed by these movements.



Figure 6: UNHCR, 2019, Sudan: Country Report, January 2019 (COI between 1 September 2017 and 2 December 2018), Country Report on Darfur.

Figure IV
Reported armed clashes between SAF and Darfurian rebel groups, 2013–2017



Figure V
Reported offensive air attacks in Darfur, 2013–2017



Figure 7 & 8: UNHCR., (2019b). *'Sudan: Country Report, January 2019'*. (COI between 1 September 2017 and 2 December 2018). Country Report on Darfur.

Strategic defeat of armed opposition forces by GoS forces during Operations Decisive Summer between 2014 - 2016 led to a ceasefire which has largely held since 2017. GoS consolidated control of most territory in Darfur, with the exception of the Jebel Marra area, where hostilities between GoS and the SLA Abdul Wahid faction continued. New displacements of civilians occurred from 2013 - 2016, and in the Jebel Marra region in 2018. While armed movements have not been wiped out, they have only limited capacity to pose serious military threats to government forces. Rebel groups remained divided. The SLA Abdul Wahid faction maintained support among some IDP communities due to its position on compensation.

Overall levels of violence in Darfur decreased between 2013 and 2019. Armed violence monitoring data for Darfur found that reported fatalities in armed conflict fell from 3996 in 2013 to 789 in 2017, with the most significant drop between 2016 - 2017.[31] Reduced conflict incidence in Darfur is partly attributed to RSF's weakening of armed rebel groups, an arms collection campaign and the visible role of RSF enforcing peace on all parties. At the community level, levels of inter-communal conflict diminished, and a "fragile social peace" has developed. This was reported to reflect people's desire to get on with life, and the role of some strategic infrastructure, alongside security measures. However, the situation remains one of "no-war, no-peace" in which the root causes of conflict have not been addressed, and risks of a return to violence persist[32]. It can be described as a negative peace, and a state of security shaped by conflict fatigue. In certain parts of Darfur, the situation remains tense, where minor incidents of confrontation at markets can quickly escalate.

Patterns of conflict and violence persist. Data from armed violence monitoring for 2017 illustrates the reported incidence of different forms of armed conflict as militia 39%, intercommunal 20%, criminal 20%, military 15% and UXO 6%.[33] People face complex patterns of exclusion, exploitation and violence related to consolidation of control of resources, including gold by RSF[34]. At the root of fragility is the political economy of an autocracy facing insolvency, and resorting to mining natural resources[35]. Khartoum's desperate need to compensate for loss of oil led to a shift in alliance from Musa Hilal to Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti to secure access to gold mines in North Darfur.

The period from 2013-2019 shows signs of variation in patterns and tempo of violent conflict within Darfur. Conflict variations in and between Darfur states are to some extent associated with cost-effective resource capture strategies: gold (North Darfur), fertile lands (Central, West Darfur and East), and minerals (South Darfur) by powerful armed actors allied to government forces. In 2017 North Darfur suffered the highest levels of violent conflict among the Darfur states, due to violence related to gold resources. Patterns of violence also included militia groups hampering return of IDPs, and incidence of harassment of farmers, in particular during harvest season. In East Darfur, the severity of conflict between Reizeighta and Ma'aliya groups prevented farmers cultivating in that area from 2014 – 2017, before being addressed by Wali Anas Omer as outlined in the governance analysis. In South Darfur contestation of land tenure by tribal groups shaped state and local politics leading to several incidents. Patterns of violence were reported to include harassment by RSF and militias preventing IDPs returning to villages and land occupation. In Central and West Darfur, land occupation is most severe.

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[31] UN Security Council., (2017:23). *'Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)'*. December. Reported fatalities from armed violence in Darfur, 2013–2017: 2013 – 3996 fatalities, 2014 – 2777 fatalities, 2015 – 2248 fatalities, 2016 – 2213 fatalities, 2017 – 3996 fatalities.

[32] Field visits and meetings in El Fashir 12-16 March 2019; and in El Daein 27-31 March 2019.

[33] UN Security Council., (2017). *'Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)'*. December. December. Militia = armed violence involving SAF and Darfurian rebel groups; intercommunal = armed violence between communities; criminal = armed violence by individuals or organized crime gangs; military = armed violence involving SAF and Darfurian rebel groups; UXO = incidents involving explosive remnants of war and unintended explosions in munitions sites.

[34] Sudan Democracy First Group., (2017). سلاح امراء الحرب فى دافزر: زراعة الريح وحصاد العاصفة *Warlord Weapons in Darfur: Sowing Wind, Harvesting Avalanche*'. November 2017.

[35] De Waal, A., (2019). '*Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis*'. Occasional Paper No.19. World Peace Foundation. Conflict Research Program. August. Somerville: MA.

Dynamics of conflict and violence affecting Darfur generally included the fact that possession of firearms – small arms and light weapons – remained widespread, despite weapons collection. Some have called it 'weapons down', rather than weapons collection as it became unacceptable to be seen carrying arms. A long tradition of carrying weapons among nomads, has been reinforced by periods of insecurity in Darfur's rural areas, and the ready availability of weapons resulting from many years of conflict in the region. The widespread possession of weapons increases the risk that disputes will escalate to violence. It makes it more difficult for the state to enforce the law[36].

Transnational dynamics include increased migration flows through Darfur from Chad and beyond and refugees from South Sudan. Darfur's porous borders make the region vulnerable to the smuggling of weapons and drugs, human trafficking, uncontrolled migration and the movement of terrorists. Sealing the borders is not a practical option, given their length and the nature of the terrain. As it is part of a federation, Darfur does not have complete authority over the right of entry.

Tribal, and intercommunal conflict over resources, in particular land and water remain widespread in Darfur. And uncertain land tenure and unsustainable management of natural resources remain threats to sustainable peace. There are several longstanding local disputes, which flare up periodically, despite efforts to negotiate lasting settlements. Tribal conflicts have political dimensions and links to elites, and may be impacted and manipulated by political dynamics at the center. Most clan disputes are in practice resolved through the intervention of mediators from other clans.[37] The main role of the security sector institutions, once violence breaks out or is threatened, is to provide the physical force to separate the two sides and maintain the peace while negotiations continue.

There are different levels and dynamics of conflict related to land, as summarized below:

- Disputes at community level, between farmers and herders, which take place at the level of producers;
- Tribal disputes over land ownership at higher levels. For example, in North Darfur the main intercommunal conflict is between Berti and Zayadia tribes over land ownership in Meliit, Malha and Korma localities.
- Situations of land occupation are a key challenge, which have come into focus as some IDP communities consider or attempt return to their villages of origin. Such situations have become more entrenched since 2013. The most intransigent situations are those of full occupation of villages and land which make return impossible. These are mostly in West and Central Darfur. Some new populations are from outside Sudan. In these situations, title is contested, and occupiers may refer to land as "liberated from rebels". There are reported to be a range of reasons for pastoralist communities to occupy land. These include loss of their land through conflict with other pastoralist groups, the desire to access education, and environmentally driven need for new grazing land.
- There are also cases where long-term conflict between groups over land has been aggravated by the war, and pastoralists decided to occupy the contested land.
- There are also situations where land is not occupied, but it is too insecure for farmers to work the land due to threats from other tribes. Such situations are present in South and North Darfur, where threats related to use of land and lack of services are primary barriers to return[38].
- There are instances of abusive and exploitative practices, and unequal power relations between groups, in the context of land occupations and returns. For example, a case of a farmer waiting until nighttime to use a water point, which he was unable to access during the day time due to threats, was cited to the review team[39]. There are also many examples of farmers having to pay 30% or more of their harvest to those 'controlling' the land, in return for their 'protection', as reported in the Pillar 3 report.

Land occupation remains a key barrier to IDPs and refugees returning to their places of origin. At present the capacities do not exist to manage large-scale returns in the context of land occupation and insecurity related challenges. Returns have tended to occur in locations where the challenges summarized above are not present.

[36] Field visits and Meetings in El Fashir 12-16 March 2019; and in ElDaein 27-31 March 2019.

[38] Field visits and meetings in ElFashir 12-16 March 2019; and in ElDaein 27-31 March 2019.
[39] Field visits and meetings in ElFashir 12-16 March 2019; and in ElDaein 27-31 March 2019.

Stakeholders in Nyala noted the growing impact of climate and environmental conflict risk factors. Environmental factors are linked to, but do not directly cause, conflict over land. Conflict tends to occur because the necessary governance, land use and dispute resolution processes are lacking. For example, in the absence of maps and clear laws, and because environmental factors affect productivity, communities may use maladaptive practices which trigger conflict, for example, shifting cultivation into grazing lands, blocking migration routes, or destroying crops[40].

Gender

Women bear the brunt of conflict, and suffer the most when livelihood is lost through displacement. Conflict in Darfur has been characterized by high levels of sexual and gender-based violence, which continued during the DDS period. A number of commitments have been made in Sudan regarding women's participation in public life, including in peace making. The DDPD enshrined gender-responsive provisions, including an increased role for women in the peace process. The Government endorsed the SDGs, including SDG 5 focused on achieving gender equality. As in many post-conflict settings, the participation of Sudanese women in the peace-building process has, however, been limited. The inclusion of women is critical for the achievement of a sustainable peace, and the Constitutional Declaration contains a number of important provisions.

Youth

Trends among the young generation vary between those who have grown up with conflict and displacement since 2003 and lean towards more radical, uncompromising politics, and those who live in urban centres and have been exposed to modern education and employment. The latter group, while tending to be less radical, still have no faith in the political establishment. Some young people have been prepared to join either armed rebel groups or Rapid Support Force to earn a living. Seeking a way out through migration outside Darfur and Sudan is also an alternative tried by many[41].

Conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms

Conflict resolution and reconciliation processes at higher levels have seen limited progress. Some leaders of armed groups and factions which are non-signatories of the DDPD engaged in the most recent national dialogue launched by the former President shortly before the uprising began in 2018. However, the lack of an inclusive peace agreement, and the failure of the parties to take forward key commitments, including those related to transitional justice and compensation (for harm and for loss of land and property) continues to mar prospects for stability and development in Darfur. While there have been efforts to bring together conflicting tribal and ethnic groups around common concerns such as land and water resources, these have consisted for the most part of fragmented initiatives not connected to broader political processes.

The withdrawal of the UNAMID peacekeeping mission is a key issue for protection, stabilisation and conflict resolution in Darfur. In 2017 and 2018, the UN and AU decided to significantly reduce UNAMID troops, close most bases, and reconfigure the remainder of the mission to focus on protection of civilians in the Jebel Marra where the human rights and protection concerns were greatest. Full withdrawal of the mission was recommended for 2020, providing key benchmarks were met. In June 2019, the UN Security Council decided to extend for four months the mandate of UNAMID until 30 October, and to "temporarily and exceptionally" extend the period for the mission's drawdown.[42] The Security Council is expected to consider the mandate of UNAMID on 30 October.

Structures, and stakeholder arrangements for conflict resolution at Federal, state and locality are present in Darfur. However, these have tended to be politicized and limited in effectiveness, with a strong peace

[40] Field visits and meetings in ElFashir 12-16 March 2019; and in ElDaein 27-31 March 2019.
[41] Field visits and meetings in ElFashir 12-16 March 2019; and in ElDaein 27-31 March 2019.
[42] United Nations., (2019b)., '*Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2479 (2019)'*. Retrieved from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13864.doc.htm

architecture lacking, and a wide array of stakeholders with a role in security management and conflict resolution. These include state level security structures and Walis/Governors, the Sudanese Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and the 6 Commissions established under the DRA. International development efforts have supported some local initiatives such as Crop Protection Committees and local peace committees in some areas. Tribal conferences have taken place to address conflicts in the Darfur states, as illustrated by the table below.

Figure 9

Tribal Conflicts and Peace Conferences in Darfur 2017

States	Conflicts and border disputes			Tribal conflicts			
	Parties to conflict	Causes of conflicts	Conflict resolution	Parties to conflict	Causes of conflicts	Tribal peace conferences	Outcome of tribal peace conferences
South Darfur	Geraida conflict between South and East states	Border dispute	A committee set up	Fellatta and Salamat	Security	One tribal conference	
Central Darfur	Central and South states	Border dispute	No peace efforts taken	Messeriyya and Salamat	Land ownership	Two tribal conferences	
North Darfur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
East Darfur				Reizeighat and Ma'aliya	Historical conflict	One peace conference	
West Darfur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Extracted from Federal Chamber, 2017

At the community level, though weakened by conflict, native administration and traditional *judiya* reconciliation mechanisms remain trusted and address many community level disputes. Development efforts have supported community based reconciliation mechanisms and capacities in some locations (see review of peace and development efforts. It is critical to strengthen existing community dispute resolution structures such as rural courts, and Judiya reconciliation mechanisms, rather than create parallel structures. However, community mechanisms lack institutional anchorage and linkage to higher level structures. They were intended to contribute to community stabilization and pave the way for negotiations at higher level. Diverse structures and processes exist at community level:

2019 saw significant developments related to peace and security in Darfur. The Constitutional Declaration signed on 17 August 2019 by the Transitional Military Council and Forces for Freedom and Change committed to devote the first six months of the newly formed government to address the root causes of conflict and reach a peace deal with rebel groups. Talks commenced in neighboring states. The Declaration creates a new dispensation for addressing conflict in Sudan, including Darfur. During past transitions in Sudan, Khartoum ruling elites never seriously addressed the root causes of conflict as necessary to secure lasting peace. When peace agreements were reached (notably, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, 2005-2011 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 2011 DDPD) root causes were never addressed and democratic governance structures were lacking. This time, in the post-April 2019 political environment, the intention is to negotiate lasting peace agreements, while at the same time opening up governance structure for participation, and accountability by engaging all stakeholders. Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration addresses issues related to achieving comprehensive peace. Commitments include addressing return of IDPs, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, release of prisoners of war, and ensuring transitional justice. Establishment of a peace commission is mandated by the Declaration.

2.1 Current risks and threats

Risks of return to conflict and increased levels of violence remain in Darfur. Root causes have not been addressed. 2019 has seen an increase in tensions between farmers and herders and inter-communal violence in some parts of Darfur. The security focused counterinsurgency model pursued by the previous administration suppressed conflict rather than creating sustainable solutions. UNAMID withdrawal from most areas of Darfur creates risks of increased violence, including specific security transition risks related to IDP camps, and reduces capacity for conflict resolution and protection.

3. Land Governance

3.1 Key developments since 2013

The DDPD committed to ensure equitable access to land by different users and security of land tenure. It includes specific commitment to recognition and protection of historical and traditional rights to land and incorporation of customary laws by all relevant levels of Government. The DDPD mandates development of land management structures for sustainable development and addressing environmental degradation. It includes provision for restitution of land and property to IDPs and for compensation for unlawful deprivation of land rights for all persons, including IDPs.

Progress towards DDPD land commitments has been limited. Legal reform has been initiated at State level, but not implemented at Federal or State level. A system of land tenure which can provide security, while being appropriate to patterns of dual and seasonal land use in Darfur has not been established. Land remains a key driver of conflict as outlined in the conflict analysis, and land occupation a primary barrier to return for IDPs.

This section is concerned with land governance (legal framework, tenure and allocation systems, institutional capacities and arrangements and dispute resolution). Livelihood and land use issues fall under Pillar 3. The situation in the 5 Darfur states varies, and there is no overall statistical data on land use, registration or occupation. This section gives a short overview of developments highlighted by the DDS review. Land issues in Darfur are highly complex, and the summary below is not intended to be comprehensive.

Land in Darfur is a cross-cutting issue with complex political, legal, technical, cultural, economic, environmental, demographic, social and gender dimensions. Land is a social asset that is crucial for cultural identity, political power and participation in decision-making and addressing vulnerability. The core challenge related to land can be framed as one of politics and governance. In the context of changing needs, patterns of production, demographics and climate, security of tenure and fair access to land must be ensured, and the needs of different groups, including women and the most vulnerable, addressed.

Legal and policy framework: The legal situation remains uncertain, ambiguous and plural, with "an overlapping combination of federal legislation, rules introduced by the judiciary, customary laws, and *Sharia* law".[43] The primary legislation governing land rights remains the Unregistered Land Act, 1970 (ULA). Despite the fact that a subsequent act (the Civil Transactions Act, or CTA) in 1984 has somewhat moderated its application its main provisions remain the same. This establishes the principle that the Government owns all land which is not formally registered. The ULA does not give legal force to customary land tenure systems *("hakura")*, under which the majority of people in Darfur use land. Although the 1984 CTA recognizes customary usufructuary rights, it does not reflect the characteristic dual, and seasonal use of land by different livelihood groups:

"*This insecure situation affects the different livelihood groups, those who cultivate the land and those who use the land for grazing in a cyclical manner. For the former it creates an ambiguous and uncertain tenure situation, and for the latter the legislation remains mute on their right".* [44]

[43] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. April.
[44] Ibid.

There have been legislative and policy developments since 2013. These have not, however, resolved the limitations of the legal framework or developed security of land tenure:

- A 2015 Federal constitutional amendment gave the Presidency jurisdiction over land, along with state authorities. This empowers the Presidency to offer land, including tracts of land to financial investors, without state approval. Sales of land for large-scale agribusiness have not so far taken place in Darfur, as they have in other parts of Sudan;

- From 2017, the Federal Government began implementing a policy of land registration. The 2011 Law of Organizations of Crop and Animal Production has been enacted. This encourages and legalizes land registration by individuals and groups if land is proven to be free from obstacles or conflicts. The Government deployed Legal Registries to the Darfur states;

- Under a DDS FaST Project,[45] draft state level legislation has been developed on land rights and tenure, based on stakeholder consultation, for each of the 5 states. The proposed legislation provides for hybrid land right systems combining customary and statutory systems, and for gradual recognition of customary *hakura* rights by statutory systems. The draft legislation has not yet been implemented because it has not been ratified by relevant legislative institutions ;

- Draft legislation related to migration routes has also been developed under an FAO EU-funded project.[46]

- Specific policy frameworks or legislation related to land occupation have not been adopted.

Land tenure and allocation: The land tenure situation in Darfur is complex and inconsistent.[47] Most communities continue to access and use land under the traditional *hakura* system, without formally registered land title. The *hakura* system tends to be trusted by communities, flexible, and, though under stress, evolved to reflect and permit dual usage and sharing of land by different user groups, which traditionally characterizes the Darfur context.[48] Limitations of the traditional system present in 2013 persist. The system is not standardized or transparent, and is highly dependent upon social relationships. It works well in situations of land abundance, in which it developed, but has become strained by changing patterns of land use and population density.[49] A source notes how changes to traditional land-use practices have led to competition and exclusion, and how conflict has eroded the capacity of the native administration.[50] Traditional systems inhibit development of land, as without formal title, micro credit cannot be accessed, and land cannot stand as collateral. Customary land rights are not documented or recognized by the formal statutory system.

Since 2013, registration of land has proceeded in Darfur, tending to occur in and near urban areas and for land which can be irrigated. The proportion of land now registered is unclear, and may be around 1%.[51] The formal land registration process remains complex, lengthy and expensive, requiring multiple institutional certifications of non-contestation to establish title, and mapping of land plots. Farmers tend to be unaware of the process of registration, and to regard it as unnecessary, as they see the *hakura* system as providing tenure. An example of the challenges facing the registration process were highlighted by the DDS FaST Land project.[52] Farmers were

[45] Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-Existence in Darfur Project, discussed under review of peace and development efforts.
[46] Promoting the Provision of Legitimate Land Tenure Rights using VGGT Guidelines for Conflict-displaced Communities, including Small - scale Rural Farmers, pastoralists and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan Project
[47] UNDP (2016). *'Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur'.* November. UNDP: Sudan, referencing Oxfam Briefing Paper, '*We No Longer Share the Land'*, 21 April 2014.
[48] Sources refer to a symbiotic system, under which rights to land were non-exclusive with various overlapping rights and non-permanent land use as the norm. Oxfam, 2014, *We No Longer Share the Land, Briefing Paper 184, Oxfam. April.*
[49] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'.* April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. April.
[50] Oxfam., (2014)., '*We No Longer Share the Land'.* Briefing Paper 184. Oxfam. April. .
[51] Key informant estimates
[52] Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-Existence in Darfur Project

reportedly reluctant to register their land due to insecurity, and the presence of other people living on the land. The cost and length of the process and short validity of the registration certificate were also cited as challenges.[53]

While registration can offer security of tenure and collateral, it has implications for inter-communal relations, and for traditional patterns of dual use of land in Darfur, as it rules out the use of land for grazing. It appears also to be open to abuse. A case of land occupiers succeeding in registering title to illegally occupied land was cited to the review team.[54] As outlined in the review of development efforts section, UN-Habitat in collaboration with the Global Land Tenure Network (GLTN) under the DDS FaST land project has piloted a social tenure domain model (STDM) as an alternative, participatory approach to establishing title to land. It bridges the gap to represent people-to-land relationships independent of the level of formality, legality and technical accuracy.

Since 2013, sale of land appears to have increased in Darfur and now appears to occur with regularity in some areas. This is indicative of increased commoditisation of land, and changing patterns of land use as considered by Pillar 3, and is also linked to urbanisation. This development involves changes in production and power relations, and can involve risks related to patterns of exploitation and marginalization. Accurate data on the extent of sales is not available. A source provides an example, describing how in South Darfur, small farmers in communities with fertile land had sold their farms to small investors from Nyala, who then hired these same households (mostly women and some men) as agricultural day labour.[55]

Gender: For women, equal right to land is a human rights issue. Ownership of land and property extends capabilities, expands negotiating power, and addresses vulnerability. It is a critical factor in supporting social protection against gender-based violence. There are concerns related to women's land access and tenure under both formal and informal land tenure systems. The traditional system is patriarchal and discriminates against women, who are frequently the primary cultivators of land. However, international experience shows that formal registration processes may disadvantage women.[56]

Lack of awareness of land tenure rights is a concern in general, and for women in particular, in a context where land tenure systems tend to depend on Native administration leaders without registration services and archives.

Land administration: Institutional arrangements for addressing land issues remain chaotic, fragmentary and under-capacitated. Primary responsibility rests with State level Ministries of Agriculture (MoA), but other state level ministries are involved, without a clear institutional framework. Both formal and traditional (native administration) bodies play a role, but neither are empowered, and they are not adequately linked. Institutional responsibility at locality level lies with Departments of Agriculture. These should provide a critical link with the native administration, and offer accessibility to communities, but are understaffed and lack resources. In addition to the MoA, Ministries of Physical Planning (Land Department) and of Animal Resources have a role in land and natural resource governance. The Darfur Land Commission (DLC) with corresponding units in all five states has wide responsibilities under the DDPD, including land use planning, data collection, research, arbitration and compensation assessments.[57]

Institutional developments since 2013 include the operationalization of the DLC, and development of its land information resources and extensive research archives. The DLC conducted a natural resource mapping, discussed in the Pillar 3 report. However, the data remains unused due to contractual issues. The DLC also collected data on *hakura* land rights of farmers and pastoralists, but, as noted above, there was limited progress in reflecting these in legislation. Land Information Centers within Departments of Physical Planning were also

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[53] United Nations Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2018). '*Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-existence in Darfur'.* January-December. UNDF, UN-Habitat, FAO: Sudan.
[54] Key informant interview in Nyala
[55] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. April.
[56] See, for example, FAO., (2002). '*Gender and Access to Land'.* Retrieved from: http://www.fao.org/3/Y4308E/y4308e00.htm#Contents; The Hague Institute for Global Justice., (2014). '*Land Registration in Burundi'.* Retrieved from: https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/latest-insights/latest-insights/commentary/land-registration-in-burundi/
[57] DDPD., (2005). '*Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)':*Article 38.

developed. However, most information in the statutory system in Darfur remains paper-based, and only land records have been digitized. Most urban land archive information has been lost, and copies are missing.

There appear to have been some improvements in communication, and shared understanding of challenges among land-related stakeholders, supported by consultations under the DDS FaST project. Land Steering Committees have been established at state level.

Arbitration and dispute resolution structures: Formal and informal mechanisms for addressing land disputes exist, with some capacities developed since 2013, but limitations remain. These include:

- The formal civil justice system. The numbers of courts have increased to some extent since 2013, but the system remains under-capacitated and courts tend not to be present outside urban centers;
- Land Arbitration Committees recently established at locality level under the DDS FaST project;
- Rural courts integrated into the formal justice system[58] have increased in numbers, capacity and numbers of case resolved through UN support, though capacity and jurisdiction still have limitations; Traditional reconciliation mechanisms, native administration leaders and customary courts. While these tend to be trusted they tend to lack resources and infrastructure, leaving the traditional role of the native administration under-capacitated;
- Community-based conflict reconciliation mechanisms developed in some locations by development efforts address local land disputes.

Evidence suggests that native administration and community mechanisms manage to address a proportion of local land-related disputes. Some sources suggest a trend of changing community preferences for dispute resolution mechanisms towards use of formal mechanisms; others suggest continuing preference for recourse to traditional processes. As outlined in the conflict analysis, disputes over land remain a key driver of conflict. The lack of an equitable, accessible, effective governance system to ensure security of tenure while respecting customary land rights allows competition and maladaptive practices, which can trigger conflict. Land occupation is a barrier to IDP return. IDPs cannot prove title to land held under customary systems, and land administration capacity to address situations of occupation is lacking.

The Constitutional Declaration includes land among essential issues for peace negotiations and commitment for state agencies to adhere to relevant international standards for compensation and return of properties to displaced persons and refugees.[59]

3.2 Current risks and threats

There are interlinked risks related to land governance. These include risks related to conflict and security, deepening of exclusion and poverty in the context of unequal power relations, and land degradation and environmental impacts.

The complex and political nature of land governance and tenure and land occupation suggests that technical solutions have potential to worsen risks, if political dynamics are not fully considered. If there is no clear vision, strategy and process for socially appropriate reform and negotiation over political dimensions of land issues, conflict risks related to continuing land occupation and escalation of land disputes will remain. If return of IDPs proceeds, there are risks due to lack of capacity to address land-related issues that may arise.

In contexts of unequal power relations, exploitation of land governance provisions to marginalize vulnerable individuals and groups constitutes a risk. Government ownership of unregistered land (with jurisdiction now shared between the Presidency and State governments) makes possible the sale of large tracts of land. If this occurs, there are risks to inter-communal relations and social cohesion, and marginalization of communities.

[58] Town and Rural Courts Act 2004.
[59] International Idea., (2019). '*Sudan Constitutional Declaration for the 2019 Transitional Period'. August.* Translated by International Idea: Chapter 15, articles 68 (g) and 67 (j).

There is a risk that current traditional and formal systems of land administration are unable to meet the needs and expectations of Darfuri society as it evolves and emerges from conflict, in particular, the needs of women and youth.

The current land governance situation puts sustainable development at risk. The ability of development partners to work on an equitable and conflict-sensitive basis with different communities is affected, as the legal status of occupied land is uncertain. Without effective land governance and dispute resolution, the effects of climate change cannot be effectively managed and fair access to available resources ensured.

4. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

4.1 Key developments since 2013

DDPD commitments related to rule of law, human rights and access to justice include:

- GoS and state governments to guarantee effective enjoyment of all rights and freedoms enshrined in Sudan's Constitution and international human rights instruments to which Sudan is a party[60], without discrimination[61], and the security and safety of everyone in Darfur on the basis of the rule of law, equality and non-discrimination;
- Government to take measures to ensure civil and political rights including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and to form and take part in civil society organizations;[62]
- Parties to refrain from threatening citizens, or preventing their enjoyment of rights to freedom of expression, association, movement and peaceful assembly;[63]
- Broad reform of the justice system, increase in justice sector capacity and rights to due process and fair trial to be upheld.[64]

The DDPD committed the Government to the adoption of independent, impartial transitional justice mechanisms to ensure all perpetrators of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (IHL) are held accountable.[65]

In 2013, the DDS highlighted widespread, serious human rights and IHL violations, lack of access to justice and trust in justice institutions, and challenges related to community security and protection of civilians. Institutional concerns included lack of physical presence and capacity of police and justice institutions, lack of judicial independence and a disorganized, unrepresentative security sector, lacking professionalism, with responsibility for attacks against the population.

Systematic data to assess trends since 2013 is limited, including on access to justice and related barriers, and on citizen trust in justice and security institutions. This section provides a brief overview of some key developments as context for the review of peace and development efforts, but is not intended to be comprehensive. Progress towards DDPD commitments and addressing challenges identified in 2013 has been limited. There has been some increase in the physical presence of police and justice institutions, though this remains limited outside urban centers, and some indications of improved police, justice and corrections sector capacities. There are examples of women accessing justice for violence in the community, drawing on international support. The number of functioning rural courts has increased, along with their capacity and numbers of cases resolved.

However, Darfuris remain subject to grave human rights violations, and continue to suffer a lack of protection, security and access to justice. Violations included those by agents of the state and non-state actors, with impunity generally prevailing, in particular for abuses with political dimensions. Women continue to experience

[60] DDPD., (2005). '*Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)'.* DDPD article 1, Chapter 1.
[61] ibid. article 3, Chapter 1. Discrimination on any grounds including sex, race, colour, religion, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin or social status.
[62] Ibid. article 7, Chapter 1.
[63] ibid. article 8, Chapter 1.
[64] Ibid. articles 294 – 297, Chapter V.
[65] ibid. articles 276 – 293, Chapter V.

high levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), while IDPs and returnees are subject to patterns of abuse. Insecurity remains a barrier to returning to places of origin for IDPs. Structural constraints on rule of law include the lack of an institutional framework to define roles, responsibilities, limitations and powers for each security body. The predominance of the RSF shapes the security environment and can marginalize the Sudanese Police Force (SPF).

Human rights: Darfuri citizens, including women and children, continued to suffer grave violations of their human rights. Data extracted from UNAMID quarterly reports shows levels of human rights abuses have remained roughly consistent over the last 3 years, including conflict-related sexual violence.[66] Violations of human rights and IHL in the context of hostilities between GoS and armed opposition groups decreased from 2017 onwards, but continued to occur in the Jebel Marra region. In 2018 killing of civilians, burning of villages, and looting by Sudanese Armed Forces were reported, and hostilities resulted in new displacement of civilians.[67] The state of emergency allowed violations of rights including the right to freedom of movement. Further human rights concerns reported included abductions and arbitrary detention[68], and abuses against Darfuri students including excessive use of force, and torture and mistreatment during detention.[69]

Violations of the rights of women and girls were prevalent, and included conflict related sexual violence. Personal and physical security remains a primary concern for women in conflict affected areas, and UN reporting found that the limited presence of the police in rural areas left returnees, IDPs and women and children vulnerable, including to sexual violence[70]. Women and girls in IDP camps were reported to suffer systematic rights violations at community level.[71]

A number of sources reported human rights abuses against IDPs, returnees and farmers. In 2018 cases of violence against returnees in many areas of North Darfur were reported.[72] A recent study on migration of Darfuris to Europe revealed the systemic persecution faced by many IDPs and those of particular ethnic groups, which drove many of them to forced migration[73]. Exploitative practices, including extraction of protection fees for use of land, occurred against farmers, IDPs and returnees in some areas.[74] Perpetrators of abuses included members of the RSF and militias, and those with historic allegiances to elites. [75]

Child rights concerns include reports of child recruitment into armed groups. In 2017, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan detailed reports of recruitment and use of children by rebel groups, and noted an increase in reports of cases of sexual violence against children. A number of perpetrators have been prosecuted for such offences pursuant to the Sudan Child Law Act 2010.[76] In 2019, there were unverified reports of child recruitment into armed groups, especially in South Darfur.[77]

Community security: Sources highlighted challenges of insecurity facing communities, and the fact that insecurity remains a barrier to IDP return. The Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultations (DIDC) found that insecurity was one of the biggest concerns for communities in all five Darfur states, who were keen to see

[66] UNAMID., (2016-2019). '*SG Reports'.* UNAMID.
[67] Amnesty International., (2018). *'Sudan: Down-sized UN Mission for an Over-Sized Human Rights Crisis'.* June.
[68] ibid.
[69] UN Security Council., (2017). *'Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)'.* December.
[70] UNAMID., (2008-2018). '*Justice and Corrections Achievements and Impact, Darfur'.* Darfur.
[71] Bennett, K., de Lacey, C., (2018). 'Assessing the Value of Human Rights Based Interventions in Situations of Conflict: Community Outreach to Combat Violence against Women and Girls in Darfur, Sudan'. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*. 9, 2017. Pp. 534-549.
[72] Radio Dabanga, 20 June 2018
[73] Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair'.* Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.
[74] DDS review team interviews (Darfur Regional Authority (DRA)., (2013-2019). '*Developing Darfur: A Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy'.* UNAMID. World Bank. UNDP. African Development Fund. Qatar.)
[75] Sudan Tribune 2018
[76] UN Security Council., (2017). *'Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)'.* December.
[77] Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)., (2019). *Prioritized Plan: Sudan.* December. UN OCHA.

comprehensive disarmament and law and order restored.[78] Durable solutions profiling data from two IDP camps, and urban and peri-urban areas shows a majority of households do not report incidents to the police. Only 16%-25% of households experiencing a crime reported this to the police, due to lack of a nearby police station. Households also reported a cost associated with approaching the police, reporting this as "too expensive".[79] Poverty and access to electricity were reported as factors influencing people's feelings of safety.[80]

Profiling of communities for the durable solutions initiative found that security in place of origin was the main obstacle to return for IDPs.[81] Data also indicated greater levels of insecurity for those who are displaced, showing incidence of robbery at around 17% among IDPs, compared to 10% of non-IDP peri-urban residents.[82]

Access to justice: There are examples of progress in access to justice and to legal aid since 2013. Lawyers trained as paralegals through peace and development efforts supported women to take cases of violence in the community to civil, criminal and traditional courts.[83] There are indications that more cases of violence against women in the community are being reported. There is anecdotal evidence that awareness of rights has increased in recent years in some communities. INGO and UN stakeholders commented on increased awareness of rights and a sense of empowerment amongst women and youth in IDP camps during the DDS review. Legal aid has been made available to prisoners in 10 prisons through UN support.

However, these gains need to be considered in the light of multiple barriers faced by those seeking to access justice, including lack of courts and police provision in many areas outside urban centres, and prohibitive court fees in the formal justice sector. For women experiencing violence, including conflict-related sexual violence and SGBV, fear and trauma are constraints, in addition to lack of appropriate available service provision and female police investigators. The patriarchal nature of the traditional system is a further constraint for women seeking to access justice.

While people in Darfur have historically preferred to access traditional justice mechanisms, which have been weakened by conflict, there is some evidence of a shift towards preference for approaching the formal sector. One source described a pattern of "institutional bricolage", where formal and traditional systems of justice may reassert themselves in turn.[84] Durable solutions profiling found people tended to approach neighbours and village chiefs as dispute resolution mechanisms.

Institutional framework and legal developments: An appropriate Federal level legal framework to ensure rule of law, democratic policing and independence of the judiciary is lacking. Provision for immunity of states agents remains in force, shielding security forces from accountability. Provision for civilian oversight of the security sector is lacking, and the 2008 Police Act does not provide a sufficient basis for democratic, accountable civilian policing. At the Darfur state level, emergency legislation remains in force.

Security sector reform has not taken place since 2013. A clear cut institutional framework defining roles, responsibilities, limitations and powers for respective security sector institutions is still lacking. Statutory recognition of the RSF confirmed its consolidation as the dominant security force in the Darfur region. The RSF lacks civilian oversight and accountability, and functions as a counterinsurgency force.

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[78] United Nations., (2019)., '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps'*., UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.
[79] United Nations., (2019)., '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps'*., UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.
[80]Ibid.
[81] 78% of households in Abus Shouk camp and 91% in El Salam camp. United Nations., (2019)., '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps'*., UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.
[82] United Nations., (2019)., '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps'*., UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.
[83] Bennett, K., de Lacey, C., (2018). 'Assessing the Value of Human Rights Based Interventions in Situations of Conflict: Community Outreach to Combat Violence against Women and Girls in Darfur, Sudan'. *Journal of Human Rights Practice*. 9, 2017. Pp. 534-549.
[84] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. April.

Further limitations in the legal and institutional framework include the fact that the jurisdiction of rural courts remains limited, with the legal framework requiring reform. Prisons fall within the organizational structure of the police in Darfur, which has implications for the institutional capacity of the prison service, as prison officers do not graduate from a specialist prisons college.

Some legal reform measures have taken place since 2013. These included removal of the possibility of charging women with adultery in cases of alleged rape in 2015, a measure which responded to concerns of women's rights activists[85]. The criminal law framework, however, remains an impediment to justice for women survivors of violence.[86] Other legal reform measures included adoption by the Sudanese Parliament of a Legal Aid Act in 2017.

Security sector: Sources suggest that on the ground in Darfur the security sector remains somewhat disorganized, but with consolidation under RSF structures. RSF, border guards and militias were reported to have control on the ground outside of camps and towns, which limits the role of police as a security provider.[87] Security sector organisations may not respect designated roles, with security forces performing police functions, including arrest, detention, and investigation. NISS influenced processes which are the responsibility of police, including immigration and border management. The Sudanese Police Force (SPF) retains operational units, and powers to deploy alongside security forces.

Policing: There has been some increase in the presence of the Sudanese Police Force from 2013 – 2019. Numbers of police in the 5 Darfur states increased from around 13, 000[88] to 27, 102, and are now at the level of the UN internationally recommended ratio for the population.[89] However, this cannot be considered a reliable indicator of active deployment. Available police infrastructure increased, due to UN support. There are now 127 police stations and 241 police posts in 63 localities in Darfur. However, SPF presence continues to be limited in particular in rural areas as noted above, and concentrated in central urban areas.[90] Police stations tend to lack basic resources and equipment for operational policing.

Some provision to address needs of women and children has been developed. Family and Child Protection Units (FCPUs) are now established in all state capitals in Darfur, and in 10 additional localities, and child courts are established in all state capitals. Gender desks are established in some police stations. However, only 635 of 27 102 police personnel are women,[91] and women police personnel tend to be given limited roles. A lack of women police investigators, in particular, hinders women from coming forward to report cases of violence.

UNAMID, and some other stakeholders anecdotally report observing increased SPF professionalism and service orientation, and some increased public trust in SPF relative to other security bodies. However, not all police understand the principles of professional policing, and may lack appropriate skills. The SPF remain unable to hold perpetrators of many serious crimes and violations to account and to act in cases of unequal power relations and tribal disputes.

Lack of local structures for police oversight and accountability, and a gap between police and population persists, with weak public and police relations. A community policing model is yet to be established in Darfur. UNAMID is now supporting construction of community police centres in each state. The SPF has not been present in IDP camps, where policing has been delivered through UNAMID patrols, and community police

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[85] Amendment to the Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991.

[86] Benett and de Lacey. Cites failure to criminalize early marriage, FGM, and discriminatory provision in Muslim Personal Law Act 1991

[87] Baldo, S., (2017). '*Border Control from Hell'.* Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int ›.; and Tubiana, J., Warin, C., Saeneen, G.M., (2018) *'Multilateral Damage. The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes'.* CRU Report. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

[88] Darfur Regional Authority (DRA)., (2013-2019). '*Developing Darfur: A Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy'.* UNAMID. World Bank. UNDP. African Development Fund. Qatar.

[89] The UN recommends one police officer for every 450 citizens, so the current figure of 27102 SPF personnel is at the UN international recommended ratio as the population of Darfur is around 9.6 million.

[90] United Nations., (2019)., '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps'.*, UN Habitat. UNHCR. UNDP. WFP. UNICEF. OCHA. World Bank. JIPS.

[91] Data from UNAMID Police Component

volunteers. The SPF does not therefore meet the security and protection needs of IDPs. There is a particular gap, and lack of confidence between police and IDPs, in particular in large camps such as Kalma. People are unwilling to report to, and cooperate with, the criminal justice system, while the Government believes that the camps host criminal elements and armed opposition groups, and relations are fragile.

Justice sector: The physical presence of the formal justice sector, including courts, prosecution offices and rural courts increased somewhat during the reporting period, with support from UNAMID and UN agencies. Some areas with high prevalence of inter-communal violence benefit from enhanced presence and capacity of rural courts. There are now over 100 functioning rural courts, and over 350 rural court judges have been trained in mediation and adjudication of inter-communal disputes, with a focus on those related to land and natural resources. Resolution of civil cases has increased from under 100 in 2017 to over 2000 in 2018, and 1400 in the first half of 2019. However, jurisdiction of rural courts remains limited.

Some improvements in judicial proceedings were indicated by UNAMID trial monitoring, which found a positive trend in application of fair trial standards. For example, in East Darfur, increased case disposal, contributed to decreased pre-trial detention[92]. Opportunities for improved coherence in the justice sector and improvements in the functioning of the criminal justice chain were provided by state level criminal justice forums.

However, there are fundamental concerns related to the justice sector. Independence of the judiciary and prosecution service is still lacking, with a centralized culture and high rotation of staff. Presence of justice institutions, though increased, remained concentrated in urban areas, with limited provision in rural areas and areas of conflict which have acute justice needs. The criminal justice chain continues to have limitations, with necessary institutions not always present, and police sometimes conducting investigative functions which should be carried out by prosecutors.

Prisons: All 14 prisons in Darfur states have been refurbished, including health facilities and dormitories, child friendly spaces and visiting bays. Kutum prison, in an IDP return area reopened in 2018. As a result of UNAMID and UN agency support, a robust framework for the management of Darfur prisons has been developed, including an Inspection and Audit Guidance Manual, and eight Standard Operating Procedures now used in all prisons. UNAMID report that the Darfur prison service is increasingly composed of professional prison officers, recruited and trained by the Directorate of Prisons and Reform with an enhanced in-house training capacity of 40 officers. Legal aid desks have been established in 10 prisons, providing advice to over 550 pre-trial and convicted individuals.[93]

However, the prison sector continues to face severe challenges. These include extremely poor conditions in prisons, continuing weaknesses in infrastructure, overcrowding and inhumane treatment of prisoners, poor health-care services, and staff shortages. In 2016, prisons were considered to have failed to meet minimum international standards.[94]

Transitional justice: Limited progress occurred in the area of transitional justice and accountability for crimes in the context of armed conflict. Due to lack of political will and urgency, the Special Court for Darfur is not operational. The Office of the Special Prosecutor tripled its capacity, and in 2018 prosecuted two militia members responsible for an attack on Sortnoy IDP camp in which 8 IDPs were killed[95]. However, the office continues to focus disproportionately on opposition armed groups, and is not present in Zalingei, and conflict related sexual violence has not been addressed.

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): A five year DDR programme was established in 2014 by Presidential Decree, aligned to the DDPD. Security arrangements for DDPD signatory groups were generally implemented. 10250 combatants from armed opposition factions and groups who are signatories to the DDPD

[92] UNAMID., (2008-2018). '*Justice and Corrections Achievements and Impact Paper'.* Darfur.
[93] ibid.
[94] UNDP (2016). *'Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur'.* November. UNDP: Sudan.
[95] UNAMID., (2008-2018). '*Justice and Corrections Achievements and Impact Paper'.* Darfur.

were disarmed and demobilized by UNAMID and the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC)[96] from a target of 30, 000.[97] UNDP, in co-operation with the SDDRC organized reintegration assistance under a DDS FaST project for 3150 ex-combatants, (20% women), with evidence of trend towards social acceptance of combatants by communities, and ex combatants accessing economic opportunities.

In 2017, the DDR programme was extended to include civilian arms control and disarmament of all civilians in Darfur. Weapons collection from both militias and civilians by the RSF began in 2017, and is considered to have contributed to reduction in violence, open carrying of weapons, and militia activity.

However, constraints and risks related to DDR and weapons collection were noted. The lack of an inclusive peace agreement limits the effectiveness and impact of DDR, along with ongoing violence. Effective DDR should be linked to, and accompany security sector form which has been lacking. Potential risks for international donors related to supporting the DDR process were highlighted in 2015.[98] The weapons collection programme was not comprehensive, and was considered by some stakeholders to lack impartiality. Small arms and light weapons remain widespread.

The Constitutional Declaration establishes respect for human rights and rule of law as central to Sudan's transition. General provisions of the Declaration commit transitional authorities to uphold rule of law, accountability, and restitution of grievances and rights which have been denied. It includes a Rights and Freedoms Charter (Ch:14) and provides for legal reform to ensure independence of the judiciary (2/7/(5). Institutions which will enhance judicial independence are foreseen including the Superior Judicial Council.

4.2 Current risks and threats

Without reform of Federal level institutional and legal frameworks, rule of law, improved access to justice and community security are unlikely to be delivered. Rule of law requires that force is used lawfully, and that those mandated to use force should be accountable to the law, and to civilian oversight and scrutiny.

Lack of protection, rule of law and access to justice continues to put community, including women's security at risk and to limit their economic, social and political participation, there are protection and human rights risks related to UNAMID withdrawal. These include risks related to the lack of security transition arrangements for IDP camps where the SPF currently do not operate, and where policing has been conducted by community volunteers and UNAMID.

Limitations in public trust in police and justice institutions, and the gap between people and the police represent risks to stability and security. Limitations in impartial justice provision involve conflict related risks. for example, if those responsible for human rights abuses or illegal exploitative practices are not held accountable, relations between communities may deteriorate. Deficits in police and justice services in return areas involve particular risks. These include the risk of return not occurring, and of potential conflict if return does occur and capacity to address impartially violence is not available.

III. Review of Peace and Development Efforts Since 2013

1. Overview of interventions

[96] UN DARFUR FUND, Final Programme NARRATIVE reporting format REPORTING PERIOD: from January 2016 to December 2018, Darfur community based reintegration and stabilisation programme

[97] 30 000 figure from Panel of Experts report (UN Security Council., (2017). *'Letter from Panel of Experts on Sudan: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005)'.* December). However, news sources report a higher figure from the Sudanese Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Commission (SDDRC) in Darfur https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/31-000-ex-rebel-combatants-demobilised-so-far-darfur-ddr-commission

[98] Panel of Experts report (ibid) cites non paper by Bonn International Centre for Conversion in 2015.

This section examines development orientated funding in Darfur related to Pillar 1 themes of governance and accountability, peace-building and reconciliation, land, and rule of law and access to justice. Information is drawn from the UNDP-led donor mapping (updated in 2019 in the context of this Review), review notes completed by pillar working group sub-groups, literature review and bilateral interviews. Comprehensive data was difficult to obtain for several reasons:

- Data from government agencies was difficult to access, in particular after the events of 11 April, and GoS expenditure on state and locality level infrastructure rehabilitation is unclear;
- Co-ordination structures tend to be of limited effectiveness, and centralized tracking of donor initiatives is not established;
- There are challenges in determining which DDS pillar to allocate some projects to, in particular integrated projects which combine components from different DDS pillars.

Distribution of resources between Pillar 1 thematic areas:

Figure 10			
DDS Objective	**DDS-proposed Funding**	**Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 - 2019**	**Assessment of Government of Sudan Funding**
Governance and accountability	US$425 million	US$10.1 million	Data not available
Conflict resolution and peacebuilding	US$140 million	US$104.9 million	Data not available
Land governance	US$55 million	US$ 6.1 million	Data not available
Rule of law and access to justice, DDR	US$225 million	US$25.1 million	Data not available
Pillar 1 Total	**US$ 825 million**	**US$ 146.1 million**	

There has been limited development funding for Pillar 1 objectives, relative to the amount proposed by the DDS. Based on DDS FaST projects and projects aligned to Pillar 1 identified by the UNDP mapping exercise, the largest Pillar 1 expenditure was in the conflict resolution and peace-building thematic area. All expenditures were related to the DDS objective for reconciliation and conflict management processes, with no expenditures on compensation. Most development efforts related to reconciliation and conflict management processes were focused at the community level.

In the rule of law sector, UNAMID made significant contributions (providing inputs including infrastructure construction and rehabilitation and training for police and justice sector institutions). UN country team agencies working in UN State Liaison Function (SLF) transition structures in the Darfur states work alongside UNAMID and continue to focus on rule of law and human rights, alongside durable solutions and livelihoods. UNAMID and SLF programmatic funding for rule of law from 2017 – 2019 is included in rule of law expenditures in the donor mapping[99], in addition to other projects, which are mainly UN implemented.

A low level of actual expenditure compared to the amount proposed in the DDS took place in the thematic area of governance and accountability. Almost no envisaged activities to support systematic institutional reform were implemented. Some relevant expenditures occurred under pillar 2 basic services programming. Training of GoS stakeholders took place under a range of projects. These expenditures are not included in the governance and accountability mapping, although some aspects are discussed in relevant sections below.

A key finding of the DDS review relates to integrated programming models at community level. These combine tangible components such as infrastructure and livelihoods, with community governance or capacity development inputs in a range of ways. Such approaches make division between DDS pillars and themes

[99] $9,612,505 of which $8,624,294 was allocated for SLF and $987,880 through direct implementation by UNAMID, mainly in Jebel Marra area.

somewhat artificial. The need for integration of sectors at local level is reflected in the area based approach of UN SLF activities, and activities foreseen with UN Peacebuilding Fund support. Integrated programming models are found in projects included in the mapping for all 3 DDS pillars including:

- Community level peacebuilding initiatives, combining dispute resolution mechanisms or capacity development and community governance mechanisms with livelihoods, access to natural resources, or local infrastructure. Inputs are designed to address local drivers of conflict and disputes on an intercommunal basis (included in Pillar 1 peace-building and reconciliation subsector);
- Community stabilization projects which combine provision such as WASH, access to resources and livelihoods, with community engagement and community governance mechanisms. These have the primary objective of local stabilization and conflict prevention, although specific dispute resolution mechanisms may not be supported (included in Pillar 1 peace-building and reconciliation sub-sector);
- Projects under Pillars 2 and 3 focused on community infrastructure, natural resource management, or resilience, which support community governance structures, or community based organizations. (expenditure not included in Pillar 1, but governance dimensions considered in governance and accountability sub-theme).

1.1 Funding and programming structures

UN Funds: A large proportion of resources allocated to DDS pillar 1 aligned activities came from 2 UN non humanitarian funds, the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) and the UN Darfur Fund (UNDF). DCPSF is a multi-partner trust fund, established in 2007, with the objective of achieving local level peace and stability through a community based, bottom up approach. Current and past donors include Sweden, Norway, DFID, USAID and Switzerland.

The UNDF supported four DDS core FaST Pillar 1 aligned projects: (i) Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Co-Existence in Darfur (ii) Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace In Darfur; (iii) Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Programme (iv) Construction of Public Buildings/Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings Project, which included support for locality administrative infrastructure.

Bilateral funding: Bilateral donors to Pillar 1 aligned projects included the EU, which funded several citizen participation focused projects included under the governance and accountability theme and USAID, which funded a UN Women implemented project and the Towards Enduing Peace Project implemented by AECOM. Netherlands funded the Care implemented Every Voice Counts Project, and Canada funded the Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Darfur (JPROL).

Development bank funding: Two projects in Pillar 1 were funded by development banks. AFDB funded the Capacity Building for Enhancing Gender Participation in the Peace Process project (US$ 4.5 million), and the World Bank implemented the Sudan Peacebuilding for Development Project (US$ 8.5 million).

Programming approaches and mechanisms in pillar 1 included:

- Direct support to rule of law institutions (through provision of infrastructure and equipment);
- Training (and training of trainers) aimed at capacity development of police and justice sector staff implemented by UNAMID and UN agencies;
- Workshops and conferences implemented by UN agencies;
- Grant making to NGO and INGO implementing partners under governance and accountability, peacebuilding, and access to justice projects. Partners carried out activities including awareness raising, provision of legal aid, supporting community based organisations, community engagement and needs identification, and development of community governance mechanisms.

1.2 Alignment with DDS

Alignment of interventions to specific DDS objectives is considered under the sub-sections below. Projects were included in the review if they were 1) development-orientated and 2) directly or "indirectly" aligned with DDS high level objectives and underlying results framework. The strongest direct alignment under pillar 1 was in relation to DDS FaST projects, in particular the DDS land project, whose design was based explicitly on the DDS framework. Rule of law development efforts were largely aligned to the DDS framework.

Other than FaST projects, there was limited evidence of programming guided by the DDS. Interventions mapped as aligned to the DDS were not necessarily inspired by the DDS framework or designed to meet its objectives. For example, the DCPSF included in the DDS mapping pre-dated the DDS and has adapted its focus and outputs based on assessment of results and context. In effect, many projects included in the mapping can be regarded as only coincidentally aligned to DDS objectives.

Integrated programming models at community level can be considered only indirectly aligned to the DDS. The DDS envisaged support to community level conflict resolution mechanisms, but did not link these to tangible livelihoods or infrastructure inputs, or include plans for community governance mechanisms.

Key *gaps* in activities aligned to DDS objectives include:

- A lack of activities focused on systematic public administration reform and institutional strengthening under governance and accountability objectives (public delivery system, local governance, and public financial management);
- No implementation of activities on compensation, as proposed in the DDS and required by the DDPD;
- Limited peacebuilding and reconciliation activities above community level, e.g. at state and locality level, compared to community level programming.

2. Governance and Accountability

2.1 Overview

DDS objectives

The DDS outlined plans for US$425 million investment to meet the following governance and accountability and PFM objectives:

- Strengthened Local Governance Systems, Structures and Processes (US$115 million)
- Public delivery system that is appropriately staffed and managed at State and Locality level ($105 million)
- Improved budgeting and increased own source revenue (US$50 million)
- Intergovernmental transfers more transparent, efficient and equitable (US$45 million)
- Enhanced Citizen Participation in Governance and Service Delivery (US$110 million)

Measures envisaged in the 2013 results framework to achieve these objectives emphasized reform and strengthening of institutions and processes. They included:

- Functional and legal reviews and studies;
- A legal framework clarifying distribution of powers between levels of government;
- Development of guidelines (e.g. on clarification of revenue assignments between state and locality);
- Development of improved systems and procedures (e.g. for human resources management);
- Establishment of locality councils;
- Reform of the native administration;
- Construction of state and locality level administrative infrastructure;
- Capacity development measures;
- Planned interventions to increase citizen participation focused on provision of information and training of civil society.

Implemented activities

The review of DDS FaST and aligned projects shows that peace and development efforts since 2013 to address DDS governance, accountability and PFM objectives have been limited, notably with regard to systemic reform and strengthening of institutions. Mapping for the review allocated 7 projects to the Pillar 1 governance and accountability thematic area. These are all citizen participation focused, except for the DDS FaST Facilities project (locality level administrative infrastructure construction). Governance and accountability related programming identified by the mapping has a value of 10.1 US$ million. Activities relevant to DDS governance and accountability objectives took place under DDS pillars 2 and 3. These are not included in pillar 1 expenditures, but are discussed where possible in this section. Land governance activities are discussed in a separate section.

Public delivery system: There is very limited evidence of support to public administrative reform (PAR) *systematically* at the state and sub-national level in Darfur (such as merit-based recruitment, functional review, right-sizing, and performance management). There were no cross government PAR or civil service reform initiatives. Capacity assessments were conducted by the DRA prior to its dissolution in 2016. Some work on improvement of institutional processes took place under sector basic services initiatives aligned to Pillar 2:

- DfID, through two successive projects supported strengthening of capacity in Urban Water Administrations (UWAs), with the objective of developing a sustainable costs recovery model. Based on UWA institutional assessment by UNOPS and UNICEF[100] key challenges were diagnosed and initial capacity development support focused on development of performance monitoring;
- In the health sector, there were a small number of health systems capacity strengthening activities focused on the local decentralized health system, and the EU supported reform of the health insurance framework;
- In the context of service delivery activities, UNICEF provided some support to management and information systems.

Local governance reform: There is no evidence of activities to support structural reform and sustainable strengthening of locality level governance processes as envisaged in the DDS framework, despite the key role that local government is designated to play in basic service delivery. No systematic reform of the native administration and community level governance has been supported.

Representation, oversight and accountability: There were limited activities focused on strengthening legislative bodies, and oversight and accountability processes. The UN Joint Programme for the Rule of Law provided training to State Legislative Councils, including on their oversight role (Pillar 1 rule of law thematic area). Locality councils envisaged under the DDS exist only in Central Darfur. No evidence of activities focused on the internal accountability processes of executive bodies emerged during the review.

Public Financial Management (PFM): No development efforts aimed at improved PFM and resource mobilization in Darfur, as intended by DDS, were identified by mapping for the review.[101] UNDP recognized the need to support improved subnational revenue mobilization in Darfur, and conducted an assessment of the subnational tax administration, and key challenges. However, funding was not available for implementation of relevant activities.

Training, joint implementation and construction of locality administrative infrastructure: International partner capacity development efforts have tended to focus on training for staff in Government line Ministries and agencies. This was provided under projects in several sectors including delivery of basic services, DDR and natural resource management. Training has been complemented by provision of furniture, computers and other equipment to enhance operational effectiveness, and by study visits within Sudan and abroad. Examples of training include:

[100] Urban Water for Darfur Projects. Capacity assessments in Zalingei and El Fasher UWAs.
[101] No Darfur states were included in the World Bank Sudan Multi-Partner Fund piloted in North Kordofan, Red Sea, River Nile, and Sinnar supported. This supported increased state own state revenues and improved budget execution rates.

- UNDF FaST projects provided training to state line ministry employees. For example, staff from the Ministry of Finance and Planning in North Darfur were trained in project management and proposal writing. Under the FaST DDR project, 217 Government officials at national and subnational levels were trained in specialized courses including agriculture;
- The Wadi El Ku Catchment Management Project provided a sequence of trainings on integrated water resource management to stakeholders including those from Government line ministries and state legislative councils.

Joint implementation between UN agencies and government bodies took place under DDS FaST projects, enabling learning by doing. Locality and state level officials take part in committee structures supported by peace and development efforts, such as Crop Protection Committees, and consultations, for example over land reform.

Administrative infrastructure was provided at locality level through two DDS FaST projects aligned to Pillar 1: the Facilities Project, and the FaST DDR project. The Facilities project built packages of infrastructure in 5 localities, and additional buildings in other areas.

Citizen participation: The donor mapping identified 6 projects under the governance and accountability thematic which focus on citizen participation and support to civil society. These provide support to civil society including:

- Support to civil society advocacy;[102]
- Support to village level governance structures and citizen participation in these;[103]
- One project focused specifically on building organizational and managerial capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs) their networks, engagement with local authorities and skills related to natural resource governance.[104] Other projects provided skills to CSOs related to specific projects, and support to CSO networking.

Support to existing community level governance structures, or development of new structures to manage resources and infrastructure and address disputes took place under projects aligned to all three DDS pillars. Examples include:

- Water Management Committees and Water Resource Management Committees developed under the DfID supported Aqua for Darfur project (rural water infrastructure) aligned to Pillar 2;
- Support provided to existing structures such as Village Development Committees (VDCs), Popular Committees, Village Development Councils under the Care supported Every Voice Counts project, and to VDCs under a UNEP peacebuilding project, Promoting Peace over Natural Resources.
- The DDS FaST DDR project supported development of 5 community management committees for joint participatory planning and decision making;
- Development of community level dispute resolution and reconciliation committees discussed in review of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts below.

2.2 Progress and achievements

In terms of supporting strengthening of institutional capacity in the public delivery system, DfID monitoring processes introduced in UWAs led to some initial progress in performance management. Awareness of the importance of data for management purposes and collection of some reliable data emerged, although this not yet being optimized for management purposes.

[102] 'Enhanced role of Civil Society Organizations CSOs in promoting good governance and advocating for children's access to and use of social services in Sudan' implemented by Save the Children Sweden and funded by EU
[103] "Every Voice Counts" implemented by Care international and funded by the Netherlands
[104] SOS Sahel Sudan., European Union., (2016). *'Interim: Capacity Strengthening of CSOs in North Darfur State, Sudan'*. December.

Training in different projects has been valued by participants, who reported improved skills and individual capacities, and demonstrated increased confidence. Projects have provided government staff with exposure to new models of infrastructure and service delivery, and supported learning by doing through joint implementation.

Community governance structures have brought benefits, both tangible and intangible, including innovations in local forms of natural resource governance. These are important, in view of the links between limitations in governance structures to manage access to natural resources and conflict, and the need for processes which can support environmental sustainability. Some indicative results from community governance structures are summarized below:

- Projects developed collective capacities at community level. For example, VDCs supported by UNEP developed participatory community action plans. People gained confidence to articulate needs through participation in Aqua for Darfur project committees;
- Community governance models have proved an effective way to manage and maintain local infrastructure, including for access to water. They are reported to continue to function after project implementers withdraw in cases where this has been verified (although more follow up is needed) and communities gain resilience by taking responsibility for maintenance;
- Some community governance models have worked on an intercommunal basis bringing together different groups. The level of women and youth participation in existing structures was increased in some cases in areas of project operation.[105] There are instances of women becoming more confident in speaking out, and it was noted that their participation can change dynamics and bring integrity;
- There appears to be a conflict prevention effect from some inter communal structures which manage access to resources (see review of peacebuilding and conflict resolution development efforts).

There is evidence that projects increased civil society skills and capacity:

- Support to CSOs provided by SOS Sahel enhanced internal systems, professionalism and connection to grass roots, increased CSO membership by a rate of 45%,[106] and improved ability of organization members to participate in local governance structures. Those who had received training made up 60% of community representatives on Wadi El Ku project committees;[107]
- NGOs worked as implementing partners, gaining skills in a range of sectors, and understanding of how to identify and address community needs. Towards Enduring Peace (TEP) project evaluation suggests positive public perception of the capacity of TEP implementing partners;[108]
- Projects supported grass roots community based organisations (CBOs) to work on issues including peace-building and NRM, and supported the setting up of new CBOs;
- Projects increased networking and good practice sharing among implementers, CBOs, and community representatives. For example, TEPs encouraged sharing of advocacy lessons among women's organisations by visits across project locations;
- Projects are reported to have built CSO skills in supporting community participation, needs articulation and local development planning.[109]

Projects also increased interaction between CSOs and local authorities. An example of people supported by development efforts to seek entitlements from the state was provided by the UNEP Promoting Peace over

[105] For example, Care supported Every Voice Counts project reported that the project increased representation of women and youth in community structures' by 35% in VDCs, PC and sub-committees. Ayan, M., (2018). '*Mid-term review of Every Voice Counts Programme.'* Care International Switzerland in Sudan. September

[106] SOS Sahel Sudan., European Union., (2017). *'Project Evaluation Report: Capacity Strengthening of CSOs in North Darfur State, Sudan'.* December.

[107] Interview with project implementer

[108] Forcier Consulting LLC., (2017b). *'Mid-term evaluation of the "Towards Enduring Peace in Sudan" Program.*' Final report submitted to USAID. March.

[109]For example, SOS Sahel Sudan., European Union., (2017). *'Project Evaluation Report: Capacity Strengthening of CSOs in North Darfur State, Sudan'.* December.

Natural Resources project: A Village Development Council developed under the project advocated for midwifery support at the Ministry of Health.[110]

2.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Limited support to systematic public administration reform: Results from peace and development efforts in improving the functioning of public delivery system and local governance institutions in a sustainable way are extremely limited. Limited work on institutional reform reflects the political and Federal level governance environment. Institutional strengthening is difficult in absence of clear national frameworks for de-centralization and well-defined institution mandates. The security environment, and centralization measures outlined in the governance situation analysis were further constraints. At the state level, issues such as lack of institutional memory and high staff turnover made it difficult to work with GoS bodies.

However, limitations also appear to be due to the approach of development partners. It appears that potential entry points to support institutional capacity strengthening were not necessarily sought out. As the pillar 2 report notes, humanitarian funding dwarfed development initiatives. Most basic services interventions focused on service delivery, rather than improved policy and institutional frameworks and systems.

Development partners in basic service sectors tended to work on a project basis, and in an ad hoc way, sometimes at locality, level and sometimes at state level. Consistent and strategic sector approaches were lacking. This was reported to be due in part to limitations in the capacity of Ministry of Finance planning departments at state level to coordinate assistance and services sectors.

Sustainability, accountability and community engagement concerns: While training inputs provided skills, sustainable results at institutional level tended to be unclear. Results were limited by high staff turnover due to low salaries and Government practices of rotating staff between departments. There tended to be a lack of follow-up training, and of training for new staff.

The service delivery approach of development partners, who tended not to work through GoS systems can have consequences for governance capacities. In the health sector, 32% of services were delivered by INGOs or national NGOs, rather than through GoS systems, potentially increasing dependency on international support.[111]

A lack of oversight, accountability and community engagement processes affected the sustainability of development inputs. The capacities of State Legislative Councils to oversee expenditure and implementation of projects is limited, and locality councils are generally lacking. While there are community governance processes supported by development partners to maintain infrastructure, GoS capacity to develop community engagement routinely is lacking. The pillar 2 report notes sustainability concerns related to lack of community engagement processes for delivery of basic services.

The lack of GoS capacity, including operations and maintenance (O&M) provision, limited the sustainability of infrastructure inputs in basic services sectors. Unmaintained WASH infrastructure is common. See Pillar 2 report WASH and health sections.

Political and coherence constraints to citizen participation development efforts: The political and human rights context limited citizen engagement, and systematic work on supporting rights holders to hold government accountable, claim entitlements and participate in formal governance processes.

A systematic coordinated approach to developing civil society and community capacity was not apparent, and the activities appears somewhat fragmentary. Different models were used for community governance structures, with an apparent lack of opportunities for implementing partners to compare outcomes and share best practice.

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[110] UNEP (2018). '*Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report'* August. UNEP: Sudan.

[111] Source: PWG Health Sector Review Note, citing: WHO., (2013-2019)., *Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS),* multiple year data from 2013 to 2019.

While the review could not assess the village level context, it appears possible project supported structures could duplicate one another in some cases. Work with civil society generally seems to have focused on project specific skills, rather than building sustainable organizational capacity.

Community governance structures face sustainability challenges due to lack of linkages to formal governance bodies. Such mechanisms are not linked up to one another, and their contribution is fragmented and localized. The potential of such structures and citizens who have gained capacities is therefore not fully realized.

There has not been a systematic approach to engagement with the Native administration, although projects have worked extensively with representatives in sectors such as peacebuilding, livelihoods and NRM. Reform to address limitations of the traditional system, including those related to women's status has not been supported.

2.4 Learning

Public administration reform, and sustainable improvement in service delivery capacity requires political will, and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at state and locality. Ad hoc interventions have limited impact. Building improved governance and service delivery capacity at locality level is critical.

In a context where political constraints are present, there are "islands of excellence" and some institutional entry points where engagement is possible to support improvement of service delivery systems, as DfID work with UWA's demonstrates. Improving the functioning of institutions is a long term process, which needs to be based on holistic assessment of sector institutional frameworks and challenges and the role of different bodies.

Institutional frameworks and capacities, and accountability and community engagement dimensions are important across DDS pillars/sectors. For example, infrastructure needs to be integrated in functional government systems to be sustainable. Development efforts need to progressively transition to delivery through GoS systems, and capacity in GoS to coordinate sectors appears important.

In the complex Darfur environment, choices over infrastructure location can have implications for relations between groups and conflict dynamics, making systematic conflict risk assessment important. As Pillar 2 highlights, implementers have become more aware of such risks since 2013, and also of the potential for appropriate placement to enhance consensus building between groups.

Demand side activities to empower citizens to claim entitlements, articulate needs, and engage in accountability and oversight of government are essential to improving governance. Community structures and capacities, and CBOs developed to-date provide a starting point to develop more systematic approaches, subject to political context.

Community governance mechanisms alone cannot lead to sustainable development. They need to be linked to one another, and to higher level governance processes, and effective institutions. A more comprehensive framework for the native administration, and community and local governance systems is suggested, with appropriate linkages to higher levels of government. Review of the different approaches to community governance mechanisms might help identify lessons and a more sustainable approach.

Systematic measures to ensure inclusion of different groups, and the most vulnerable sectors of society is needed. The implications of working with native administration for the situation of women and youth, need to be assessed and considered.

2.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

There are no dedicated structures for co-ordination of development sector work on governance and PFM reform at Darfur or national level. Co-ordination arrangements for individual basic service sectors are outlined in the Pillar 2 report. These vary in effectiveness, with poor co-ordination in the WASH sector, but improvements in health sector co-ordination. However, there is no organized mechanism to share lessons across sectors. This

appears to reflect limitations in development co-ordination in Sudan, compared to that within the humanitarian system. For INGO and NGO implementing partners, the INGO forum provides a locus for co-ordination and information sharing, but it does not specifically address governance and accountability activities.

2.6 Alignment of efforts with the DDS

There were no programmes fully and directly aligned with DDS governance and accountability objectives and sub-objectives to improve public delivery systematically at state or locality level. Many projects provided training as a form of capacity development, one sub-objective of the DDS framework. DDS FaST Facilities and DDR projects were aligned to the sub-objective to build administrative infrastructure.

3. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

3.1 Overview of peace and development efforts

DDS objectives:
The DDS outlined plans for US$140 million investment to meet the following peace-building and reconciliation objectives:

- Reconciliation and conflict management processes and mechanisms established;
- People having access to a compensation system and compensation.

Sub objectives and outputs objectives included:

- Establishment of reconciliation and conflict management processes at three levels: Between Government forces and armed opposition; peace committees at state and locality level; and native administration and local mechanisms;
- Support to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Committee (TJRC) to function according to international standards;
- Participative state strategies on reconciliation.

Activities implemented:
Mapping for the review identified development and recovery programming implemented in the peace and reconciliation area with a value of US$104.9 million. All expenditure was related to the DDS reconciliation and conflict management processes objective. No activities related to compensation were implemented. The predominant focus of reconciliation and conflict management programming was at community level, where projects to support dispute resolution, stabilization and peacebuilding were implemented. Efforts to support locality and state level peace and reconciliation processes appear to have been less substantial and systematic. Expenditure related to reconciliation and conflict management processes in fact exceeded that planned by the DDS.

Projects in the conflict management sub-theme supported structures or capacity strengthening for dispute resolution, or were primarily aimed at conflict resolution and prevention, and addressing local drivers of conflict, and tended to focus on locations with particular conflict risks. Such community level projects are in fact integrated cross sector models as they include components such as livelihoods or local infrastructure, alongside conflict resolution support. Such tangible components aimed to address local drivers of conflict and build co-operation between groups, and were sometimes combined with community governance mechanisms to manage natural resources on a co-operative basis.

There are additional projects under pillars 2 and 3 which contribute to conflict prevention and stabilization. These are primarily focused on resilience, development of community infrastructure or natural resource management, but also reduce risks of resource based conflict, and support community committees to cooperatively manage resources. Projects may include a peacebuilding component alongside other primary objectives. For example, Taadoud (Pillar 3) is focused on resilience and livelihoods, but also supports peace committees. The DDS FaST land project supports land dispute resolution mechanisms. The AFDB Darfur Water

Project for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding (Pillar 2) aimed to contribute to sustainable recovery and lasting peace through ensuring equitable access to water resources.

No activities were implemented to develop compensation systems as required by the DDPD and planned by the DDS. Participative strategies on reconciliation at state level were not developed. Some capacity development support, including study tours, was provided to the TJRC by the DDS FaST project Promote Reconciliation and Coexistence for Sustainable Peace In Darfur (PRCSP project).

State and locality level structures for conflict resolution and peacebuilding: Activities to support reconciliation and conflict resolution above community level included those implemented by UNAMID and UN SLF structures, and those under specific projects. In some cases, activities to address conflict with political dimensions were implemented. However, some locality level work focused on community level resource conflicts which exceeded the geographic reach of individual community conflict management mechanisms. Examples highlighted by the review were:

- Crop Protection Committees. Based on a model used in El Fasher by FAO in 2011, UNAMID supported locality level committees in some parts of West and Central Darfur to address disputes over animal migratory routes. State level committees led by Walis functioned during the agricultural season. Committees focus on community level conflict, rather than higher level conflict with political dimensions;
- 8 Peace Justice and Reconciliation Centres in North, South and Central Darfur were constructed and equipped under the DDS FaST PRCSP project, with the TJRC as coordinator. Local NGOs provided mediation for community conflicts, women mediation networks were developed and community forums and peaceful coexistence conferences were held.
- Peace conferences took place, some with development partner support, with some instances of agreements over tribal disputes reached. The TJRC facilitated some events, and UNEP supported state level peacebuilding forums under the Promoting Peace over Natural Resources project. IOM workshops brought parties to inter-tribal conflict together and initiated dialogue. The Towards Enduring Peace project supported some state level peace committees. The Durable Solutions pilot supported concerted efforts by international and local stakeholders to resolve land occupation in Um Dukkun.
- Networking among DCPSF community level committees took place to a limited extent.

The Darfur-wide International Dialogue and Consultation process, conducted under DDPD commitments, involved community outreach and locality-level dialogues and consultations. Outcomes are expected to feed into State-Level consultations and a regional Conference.

Community level peacebuilding and reconciliation: Community level peacebuilding and conflict resolution received significant support from peace and development partners, as noted above. Information on all relevant initiatives was lacking. Four examples of initiatives in this area are outlined below.

- The Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF): DCPSF, a multi partner trust fund, is a significant initiative for community level peacebuilding in Darfur. DCPSF is in its second phase, extended to 2020. It works through grant making to implementing partners (currently 18) who adapt the DCPSF approach to develop community based conflict resolution mechanisms (CBRMs) and other inputs appropriate to local needs. DPCSF currently supports 97 community based reconciliation groups in the 5 states. ToRs and focus of the fund have been revised according to assessment and conflict analysis.[112] Outputs are:
    - Effective community-level conflict resolution and prevention platforms in place;
    - Co-operation between communities enhanced through shared livelihood assets and income generating opportunities;
    - Co-operation between competing communities over management of natural resources and access to basic social services increased;

[112] UNDP., (2018). '*Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund: Biannual Report 2018*'. UNDP. USAID. UKAID. Sweden. Swiss Agency for Development. Norwegian Embassy. June.

- A network of effective collaborative peacebuilding initiatives created and feeding into wider peace fora and Darfur peace processes.

- UNEP implemented the project Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan from 2016 to 2018, in 24 target villages in 5 areas in West and Central Darfur, through two National NGO partners, Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency (DDRA), and SOS Sahel. The project used a two track approach, which first focused on mitigating the drivers of natural resource-based conflicts (scarcity, governance, livelihoods) through a combination of physical interventions and addressing key community governance shortcomings. Secondly, it focused on building the conflict management capacity of local and state institutions through tailored trainings and improved co-ordination among user groups.

- IOM uses a model of community stabilization, involving community and local authority consultation to identify key needs and drivers of conflict, tangible inputs to address these and community mechanisms to manage infrastructure and natural resources. Two main projects (Joint Conflict Reduction Programme and Providing local infrastructure, and Empowerment for Cross Border Peace and Co-operation within Pastoralist and Sedentary Communities Projects in South and East Darfur), and additional short term projects have been implemented.

- Towards Enduring Peace (TEP), implemented by AECOM with USAID funding, aims to promote peace and stability and enabling conditions for sustainable development. It supports local peace capacities by reviving and strengthening existing networks or mechanisms, and strengthens civil society capacity, and increases community resilience. It provides local infrastructure, for example markets and electricity supply.

Projects use a range of approaches to support conflict resolution. The TEP project reactivates existing networks or structures and provides training rather than supporting committee structures. IOM stabilization projects focus on tangible needs, and community improvement committees which build community ownership. The DCPSF gives partners latitude to use approaches relevant to local context, but has tended to support community based reconciliation mechanisms (CBRMs). which are based on and reconstitute and adapt existing traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms (*Jouddiy*a). One DCPSF implementing partner supports establishment of community based organisations, rather than CBRMs, with the objective of increasing sustainability.

Gender: The AfDB funded a programme focused on supporting women's involvement in peacebuilding (US$4.5 million) which provided technical assistance and capacity building to enhance advocacy and participation in DIDC consultations.[113] UN Women worked under the DDS FaST PRCSP project to train women activists and develop networks. TEP, IOM projects and DCPSF integrate a focus on gender. DPSCF applies a gender lens across the fund through a Gender and Peace-building Initiative. This includes support to women's participation in CBRMs, women's groups, and networking among groups to develop advocacy.[114]

3.2 Progress and achievements

Community conflict and dispute resolution: Stakeholder interviews and evaluation data evidenced that community level peacebuilding activities have been effective in supporting resolution of community conflicts. DPSCF evaluation in 2017 found that 88% of conflicts submitted to project CBRMs were resolved. Some limitations in data were acknowledged, and data varied between West and South Darfur.[115] The UNEP final report on the Promoting Peace over Natural Resources Project found that 78% of conflicts reported at village level during the project period were resolved without escalation.[116]

[113] Capacity Building for Enhanced Gender Participation in Peace and Economic Activities Project implemented by Mamoun Beheiry Centre for Economic and Social Studies & Research in Africa
[114] DCPSF began to support participation of women more systematically from 2014 when it developed a gender strategy
[115] Forcier Consulting LLC., (2017). '*Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund Phase II Evaluation.'*. The evaluation noted that these figures may be high due to variation in sampling methods.
[116] UNEP., (2018). '*Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report'* August. UNEP: Sudan.

Development efforts increased capacities and skills. Training and awareness raising for a range of stakeholders on conflict dynamics, drivers and non-violent conflict resolution and mediation techniques have been conducted. For example, IOM and UNAMID provided conflict prevention training for local traditional mediators (*ajaweed)*, and native administration stakeholders in East and South Darfur. An NGO project implementer described how communication between herders and farmers had been developed, leading to rapid conflict resolution, with stakeholders having capacities to swiftly and proactively engage. TEP evaluation found that the project has strengthened existing networks and individual capacities, helping peace actors to be more aware of conflict drivers and how to respond to these.

While sustainability is a challenge for community level peace-building approaches in several respects (see limitations, challenges and constraints section below), DCPSF evaluation found that project supported CBRMs were still operational in all visited locations, including those where partner support had ended, with high levels of perceived legitimacy.

Conflict prevention and supporting co-operation: DCPSF evaluation found that CBRMs are felt by communities to reduce incidence of conflict in project locations. This suggests a conflict prevention and mitigation effect, alongside resolution of specific disputes. 83% of community members stated conflict had decreased due to CBRMs.

Data indicates that addressing tangible local drivers of conflict is effective in reducing violence. UNEP project reporting found that increased access to water combined with inclusive community governance processes may prevent violence. A perception survey showed that 92% of respondents perceived a reduction in conflict over water, 74% perceived a reduction in conflict over rangeland and 67% perceived a reduction in conflict over land, due to the project.[117]

Projects have brought together different groups in conflict resolution and community governance mechanisms, and in cooperative livelihood and economic activities. There is tentative evidence that DCPSF CBRMs have contributed to increased trust within and between communities, and some evidence of possible increases in economic interaction between communities from implementing partner activities.[118]

There is less systematic data to assess whether conflict resolution structures above community level, which are more limited, are effective in addressing conflict. In an example reported by an NGO implementing partner, a Crop Protection Committee established at locality level was effective in linking up community level committees, and addressing conflicts beyond the geographic reach of individual community committees.

Relevant community peace-building models: Peace-building activities appear to have been relevant to community needs. TEP evaluation found that communities saw project activities as relevant, tending to see material inputs as more important than conflict resolution activities. Inputs were reported by communities to have addressed urgent needs and local causes of conflict, such as lack of access to natural resources. DCPSF communities noted the complementarity of addressing immediate sources of conflict together with providing proactive conflict mitigation systems.

At the strategic level, while subject to the limitations outlined below, community stabilization and peacebuilding initiatives appear to have been relevant and appropriate in a context where:

- formal state capacities, and higher level political dialogue are limited. The need for stabilization activities is expected to become more critical as UNAMID withdraws;
- conflict has eroded trust, social capital and traditional reconciliation capacities.

Peace-building activities have tended to target areas with particular conflict risks. Locations selected for UN Peacebuilding Fund activities proved to be conflict hotspots during unrest in 2019, indicating effective approaches to identifying areas with conflict risks.

[117] UNEP., (2018). '*Promoting Peace over Natural Resources in Darfur and Kordofan Final Report'* August. UNEP: Sudan.
[118] Some challenges in attribution acknowledged.

Gender: A more systematic focus on gender has been developed in projects since 2013. Through emphasis on women's inclusion in projects such as TEP, IOM and DCPSF, women have gained access to traditionally male dominated areas of dispute resolution and become members of CBRMs. This is a positive trend, although numbers of women remains relatively low. Feedback from stakeholders highlighted that inclusion of women improves peacebuilding outcomes. This would confirm international research findings that involving women in peace processes increases chances of agreement and effective negotiations.

3.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Political constraints and lack of progress at higher levels: Progress in reconciliation and conflict resolution above the community level has been limited. Effective approaches to conflicts with political dimensions and to land occupation have generally not emerged. An effective peace architecture above community level is lacking, and higher level processes may not be linked to community processes.

A lack of political will to achieve peace on the part of the previous GoS, and politicization of some reconciliation processes was noted by key informants as a constraint to peace-building. Capacity constraints affected the TJRC, which has not been able to engage in reconciliation at the strategic level envisaged by the DDPD. As noted no progress occurred on compensation commitments.

Political dynamics affected the community level. Peace-building remained a sensitive issue, which may have inhibited community freedom to express views and engage. GoS was reported to have restricted access to some conflict prone communities. Politicization of the native administration was noted as a challenge to peace-building. Community level structures cannot address conflicts with political dimensions, or where unequal power relations are present.

It has proved challenging to link up community peace structures and capacities, which remain fragmented, with projects tending to operate as separate units. While 2 or 3 networks of DCPSF CBRMs have been set up, plus an early warning network, local peacebuilding has generally not led to structures at higher level which might reinforce community efforts.

Sustainability and inherent limitations of community-based stabilization: Community peacebuilding initiatives have reduced conflict in locations of operation, but have limitations which reflect the place of such interventions on the humanitarian and development continuum. Activities focus on early recovery, and were intended to *pave the way* for development and *reinforce* higher level peace making progress. Without progress at higher levels, peace-building and social cohesion gains in communities remain fragile and at risk. Events in 2019 demonstrate how national dynamics affect Darfur, and can aggravate inter communal tensions.

Community reconciliation mechanisms are not linked to formal governance structures, and lack enforcement mechanisms. The need for such mechanisms reflects limitations in governance and justice provision, and they cannot substitute for reform of local governance and native administration, or sustainably mediate and address the interests of different groups, and ensure fair access to resources. Peacebuilding projects are not vehicles for sustainable human development, and cannot deliver services at scale. They rely on communities and development actors, rather than the state as duty bearer to meet its obligations to ensure the welfare, safety, and human development of all Darfuris.

Community peace-building projects appear not to have reduced conflict beyond areas of operation, reflecting limited higher level structures to link up to. To address local causes of conflict across Darfur would require significant scale up of community work. While the DCPSF model has brought donor resources together, the overall extent of community peacebuilding work in Darfur remains relatively small. However, the fact that CBRMs remain active after projects conclude, and the range of training provided, suggests that the overall effect of programming may not have been captured.

Project level sustainability issues include some cases where implementers ignored the complexities of the native administration and value of pre-existing local conflict resolution mechanisms, and created weak parallel

structures. DPSF evaluation suggests evidence is mixed on whether CBRM decisions are considered binding over the longer term. Projects have sometimes been short term, making it difficult to develop community capacities and relationships which are essential and underpin progress.

Coherence and co-ordination: Synergies with development funding may not have been maximized and resources, including UNDF funds, may not been available to build on progress secured through peacebuilding activities. The TEP evaluation notes that potential is being created in communities that is not being used.

There are a proliferation of actors in the conflict resolution space. Co-ordination and lesson learning is not apparent at a strategic level, such as opportunities to systematically examine which approaches work best, shared needs identification and strategic planning. Even among DCPSF implementing partners, different approaches are not being rigorously compared. Outcomes, indicators and therefore M&E data are not aligned. There appears to be limited attempt to read across evaluations of two key initiatives by the same company.[119] Established implementing partners seem sometimes to patch together resources from different donor projects as they attempt to meet the needs of communities, rather than being empowered to work strategically.

Gender: Women's participation in DPCSF CBRMs remains relatively limited, at around 21 – 25%.[120] There are limitations to women's voice and influence within CBRMs. DCPSF evaluation found low participation of young women (4%).

3.4 Learning

Integrated approaches: Reconciliation and conflict prevention requires a mix of tangible outputs to address carefully identified community needs - infrastructure, economic opportunities and livelihoods – with dialogue and dispute resolution processes or capacities. There may be potential for integrated approaches to evolve further and become more strategic if lesson learning is stepped up, and integration with other sectors (such as basic services and livelihoods) increased. While adaptation to local context is key, there are indications of particularly effective contributions. Improving access to water (for both humans and animals) has proved effective in reducing resource-based conflict, with new water sources most valued by DCPSF communities.

Cooperative economic activities between different groups which link them in mutually beneficial exchanges can entrench a fragile social peace, and it will be important to build up inter-communal economic co-operation going forwards to entrench progress to date.

Ensuring local ownership, building relationships and context and conflict analysis: Effective support to peacebuilding should be based on what exists in the community, and community knowledge. It is important to listen exhaustively, relate to communities, ask how to solve issues, and respect community norms and values. For example, partners have designed projects with communities, consulting on how each stage should work, and keeping stakeholders informed to build ownership. While UNAMID withdrawal creates risks, it also creates opportunities for empowering local initiatives and ownership.

Conflict drivers and dynamics vary locally in Darfur, and basing interventions on regularly updated conflict analysis is important. DCPSF has used such assessments to revise and shape the focus of programming cycles.

Various approaches are used to develop conflict resolution capacity and structures, partly reflecting the need to adapt to different local contexts. However, most initiatives, including DPSCF focus on reconstituting, strengthening and adapting of existing *joudiyaa* mechanisms. These systems play an important role, and outcomes tend to hold weight. Stakeholders, however, also noted the limitations of traditional structures to contemporary conditions. Traditional mechanisms tend to exclude youth and women, and in some IDP communities, youth structures have become more important. Traditional mechanisms have been damaged by

[119] TEP and DCPSF evaluations were both done by Forcier consulting.
[120] Data from 2017 evaluation. Post 2016 DCPSF data has disaggregated CBRM membership giving the 21 – 25% figure, generally supported by household survey which estimated women's participation at 20% with a range of 4 – 43%.

conflict, and traditionally functioned within rather than across communities. Therefore, projects support adaptation of structures to be more inclusive and to work inter-communally.

There are, however, some differing views on which approaches to developing community capacity for conflict resolution are most effective. An established implementing partner which supports development of CBOs rather than committees viewed the CBRM approach as superficial. This appears to highlight two points: the need for continued lesson learning, and the fact that sustainable development of community governance structures will require reform of the native administration and new frameworks, once the context permits.

Gender, youth and inclusion: Underlying causes of women's exclusion from decision making, and the interconnections between socio-cultural norms, and economic and political inequalities need to be understood. Patriarchal cultural norms are felt to be a primary barrier to women's empowerment, which has implications for project design:

- Work with men to change entrenched biases is needed, and can promote social cohesion;
- Economic empowerment at household level may not lead to increased voice at community level. Structures that build collective capacity, combining economic empowerment, income generation and voice may be more effective. For example, a Women's Union established under DCPSF supported women to identify economic needs, discuss these with local authorities and make the community aware of women's economic role.

Norms and practices related to gender vary, with particular patterns of exclusion of women in some remote areas. As noted *jouddiya* systems are traditionally dominated by elderly men, with women traditionally excluded from conflict prevention efforts, development efforts seek to adapt mechanisms and include women, which requires that bias is systematically assessed.

Women tend to be strongly invested in peacebuilding, and more active than men. This may reflect the fact that despite their economic productivity, they are often excluded from control of resources, and experience specific vulnerabilities, for example when collecting firewood, and are strongly motivated to prevent violence.

The review found examples of youth dialogue, and new interactions between youth groups due to project activities. It is questionable however, whether peacebuilding work overall has recognized the extent to which youth can influence conflict dynamics, and their potential to support peace. DCPSF evaluation suggests youth involvement was relatively low, and that this correlated with lower acceptance of decisions of CBRMs.

Key informants highlighted the need for attention to marginalized sectors of the population, strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus and ensuring that priority is given to the people in the most vulnerable situations.

3.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

DCPSF forums at Darfur state level have provided a mechanism for information sharing among DPCSF implementing partners. Forums have sometimes expanded to include organisations working on other projects. There are no national level structures dedicated specifically to co-ordination of work in this area, and co-ordination takes place among donors on a bilateral basis.

3.6 Alignment to the DDS

DDS FaST PRCSP appears to have been the project most directly aligned to the DDS results framework for this thematic area, involving activities at community and higher levels and support to the TJRC. Other projects mapped onto specific DDS sub-objectives, in particular for development of local conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms. Such initiatives are only indirectly aligned to the DDS and differ from the approach the results framework suggested, as they integrate tangible inputs with conflict resolution mechanisms.

4. Land Governance

4.1 Overview

DDS objectives:
The DDS outlined plans for US$55 million investment to improve land registration systems and dispute resolution mechanisms. It set out an ambitious agenda including establishment of new bodies for issuing land titles (land registration committees), and resolving disputes (a special court), and for the DLC to become functional and representative. Planned outputs included policy making, legislation, and land administration capacity building.

Activities implemented:
Two projects specifically focused on land, for a total of US$ 6.1 million, were implemented. The DDS FaST Land Project focused mainly on land governance, and is the only initiative included under international financing for this theme, with a budget of US$6 million. [121] Migration route demarcation aspects of this project are considered under Pillar 3. The EU funded a FAO implemented project focused on land use, included under Pillar 3.[122] Other projects incorporate a focus on land dispute resolution. Pilot projects overseen by the Durable Solutions Working Group support processes to address land occupation.

4.1 Progress and achievements

The DDS FaST land project supported several developments noted in the situation analysis. This included drafting of amendments to state level legal frameworks for land, based on consultation among stakeholders, and written by a consultant. The FAO land project began development of legislation to address migration routes.

An approach to land dispute resolution was agreed through consultation under the DDS FaST land project. This determined that arbitration committees at locality level were the best tool for land dispute resolution.[123] 63 committees were set up at locality level, but implementation has not yet been assessed. Other projects supported dispute resolution capacities. Community peacebuilding mechanisms address land conflicts at the local level, and UN rule of law activities include construction and capacity building of rural courts.

Support to increased capacity of the DLC was provided through joint implementation, study visits and training. Institutional assessments of GoS line Ministries, including Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Physical Planning were conducted.

UN Habitat through the DDS FaST project improved the land title system in 51 return villages (these were villages not affected by serious conflicts related to occupation) through village sketch mapping and a social tenure domain model (STDM) pilot. This identified village boundaries and land use, and established that land was free of conflict. STDM uses a participatory community approach to clarifying ownership, and is less costly and bureaucratic than formal land registration.

International stakeholders supported some instances of resolution of land occupation disputes, including through processes supported by a durable solutions pilot project in Um Dukkun.

Data collection has been supported, including development of extensive research archives at the DLC. The FAO EU project mapped land tenure, governance, usage and conflict patterns providing a detailed evidence base.

The FaST project followed a people-centered approach and built communication among land stakeholders through consultation, in the context of the contentious political nature of land issues. For example, a multi-

[121] Strengthening Land Management for Peaceful Coexistence in Darfur, 2016 – 2019 jointly implemented by UNDP, FAO, UN Habitat
[122] Promoting the provision of legitimate land tenure rights using VGGT Guidelines for conflict-displaced communities, including small - scale rural farmers, pastoralists, and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan
[123] Arbitration aims to offer a halfway house between the judiciary and traditional and native administration mechanisms.

stakeholder conference led to recommendations, including on legislation and capacity building. Land Steering committees established at state level brought together stakeholders. Awareness raising activities informed and sensitized over 3,000 people under the FaST project. This included specific consultations with women.

4.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Development efforts and GoS have not been able to fully address the complexities and sensitivities of land issues, which have political and security aspects. Overall weaknesses in governance and policy making impacted on attempts to address land issues. These limit the possibility for clarity of vision, and systematic reform needed to address continuing challenges highlighted in the situation analysis, including:

- Unclear and overlapping legal frameworks;
- Lack of secure land tenure;
- Under capacitated administration, and lack of accessible land services at locality level;
- Persistence of land related conflict and land occupation;
- Limitations in capacity of dispute resolution mechanisms and access to justice;
- Lack of awareness of land rights among the population;
- Concerns related to women's access to land.

Crucially, insecurity of land tenure has not been addressed, and an appropriate hybrid land tenure system which can ensure respect for customary land rights has not been developed. The challenge of land occupation remains largely without effective political or technical solutions, and capacities do not exist within the current institutional configuration to support large scale return in areas where land is occupied, and new communities have become entrenched.

Capacity constraints in institutions, and frequent staff turnover presented a challenge to project implementation. The status of the DLC in the context of recent political upheaval is uncertain, and was affected by dissolution of the DRA.

There are challenges related to coherence, co-ordination, M&E and information resources:

- While information resources have grown, it appears these are not necessarily being shared and made use of by all stakeholders. A data gap on land occupation is a constraint, and use mapping data remains unavailable due to contractual issues;
- M&E of development efforts is insufficient, and is needed, for example, to understand whether new structures such as Land Arbitration Committees at locality level are effective and appropriate for community needs;
- Despite improvement, co-ordination and coherence of international efforts, and of UN agencies on land issues still has limitations, related to assessment and planning processes. A coordinated approach is needed to effectively address the political nature and complex scope of land issues, including in the context of returns.

4.4 Learning

The resources allocated to land governance have been relatively limited in comparison to the significance and complexity of issues involved. Focused efforts will be needed if political transition progresses to ensure prioritization of land concerns and land occupation. This will require alignment and coherence of donor and GoS efforts, political will and inclusive processes. Policy innovation appears necessary to address issues of land tenure, governance, occupation and dispute resolution, and lessons from other countries may be valuable.

Community participation and consultation, and awareness raising as a basis for reform are critical. The DDS FaST land project found that bottom up consultation, starting at village level with participatory sketch mapping,

linked to higher level activities is the best way to build confidence among land stakeholders and increase understanding.

A mixed system for land tenure is needed, to ensure recognition of land held under traditional systems, and to reflect patterns of dual usage of land. The risks and potentially negative consequences of registration need to be understood, and realism about the context, including the limitations of the formal legal system is required. Technical solutions can have risks if underlying political dynamics are not addressed. A long term and sequenced approach is suggested.

Access to land for the most vulnerable groups, and for women and youth needs specific focus and measures. Bias within formal and informal systems needs to be understood and addressed.

4.5 Organisation and co-ordination of national and international efforts

Co-ordination on land issues takes place among UN agencies within the framework of the FaST land project, and among Government stakeholders in land technical committees. No specific structures exist to coordinate with non-UN development partners.

4.6 Alignment with DDS

Activities implemented under the DDS FaST project were strongly aligned to the DDS objective and sub-objectives, with regard to supporting the DLC, developing dispute resolution structures, and draft legislation. There were no specific policy making activities as envisaged under sub-objectives, although legislative drafting was supported. Land related activities under other projects have tended to focus on individual elements of the DDS results framework.

5. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

5.1 Overview

DDS objectives:
The DDS outlined plans for 225m$ investment to meet the following rule of law and DDR objectives:

- Improved access to justice (Gender balanced);
- Security Sector Reform implemented (outputs focused on policing and prisons);
- Successful social and economic reintegration of demobilized armed forces (including special groups).

DDS outputs and sub-objectives included:

- Support to policing services with a focus on community policing, equipping of police stations and increasing the representativeness and ethnic and gender balance of the police. Pillar 2 included commitment to construction and rehabilitation of police stations and outposts in return areas;
- Increasing the presence, and strengthening the functioning of justice sector institutions (courts, prosecutor, customary courts), and legal aid and awareness raising for communities;
- Improvement of prison services with an emphasis on prisoner rehabilitation. Pillar 2 included commitment to rehabilitate or construct prisons;
- Planned DDR outputs included arms collection, review of small arms legislation, verification and monitoring of armed groups, with the objective of demobilizing armed groups and supporting the social acceptance, economic activity and positive perception of ex-combatants.

It is challenging to assess activities in this sector, due to limitations in evidence, the range of stakeholders which UN agencies work with, and methodological limitations of the DDS review. The overview of activities, progress and constraints below is based on available sources in the context of a broad review.

The mapping conducted for the review identified US$25.1 million of programming implemented in the rule of law sector compared to DDS envisaged expenditures of US$225 million. 9 rule of law projects were identified by the DDS mapping, including the DDS FaST DDR project. Programmatic funding for UNAMID and SLF from 2017 – 2019 is included in the mapping.[124]

International investment included activities conducted by UNAMID, and those implemented under specific projects. Arrangements for UNAMID drawdown and transition of activities to UN agencies under SLF structures in Darfur continue to prioritize police and justice sector support. Among UN agencies, UNAMID was the main contributor to rule of law sector development efforts, with limited capacities among other UN agencies. Overall, UN agencies remain predominant actors in the rule of law sector, working through local implementing partners in some areas such as access to justice. The sector donor base is limited. Donors are Canada, EU and USAID. Mapping highlighted two non UN implemented projects (the Women's Rights in Darfur Programme, and EU support to the Sudan Human Rights Commission).

The Joint Programme for the Rule of Law and Human Rights (JPROL), implemented by UNAMID, UNDP and UNICEF, included support to justice and police infrastructure construction, training for police and legal professionals, legal reform, and provision of legal aid and awareness raising. Other projects focus on specific institutions (two projects support the Sudanese Human Rights Commission), or addressing the justice sector needs of specific groups (women and children).

In line with respective mandates[125], the UN approach to policing and the justice sector has focused on supporting Government institutions to deliver justice and policing services, and has included a focus on priority return areas with high levels of inter-communal violence and criminality that fuel the conflict. Infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, and capacity development through training has been supported and equipment has also been provided to police and justice sector institutions. UN agencies work with many stakeholders - formal justice sector institutions (courts, prosecutors, rural courts, police), social workers, transitional justice institutions (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Special Court), native administration, bar association and other civil society groups. UNAMID and SLF development contributions in the rule of law sector accompany UN advocacy, human rights monitoring and protection interventions.

Policing: Support to policing has been delivered primarily through the police component of UNAMID. A UNAMID Memorandum of Understanding with the Sudanese Police Force (SPF)[126] established a basis for co-operation, monitoring and mentoring. Assistance has included construction and rehabilitation of police stations, posts, community policing centres, a forensic laboratory and a training centre. Construction sites were identified by SPF in discussion with UNAMID. Training of SPF trainers has been conducted on issues including Protection of Civilians, Criminal Investigation, Human Rights and Public Order Management. UNAMID supported development of Standard Operating Procedures on issues including Use of Force, and a Code of Conduct and Ethics. Non-lethal equipment, such as furniture, vehicles and IT has also been provided. Community policing was supported by UNAMID in IDP camps through training of volunteers, without SPF involvement. UNAMID, and the JPROL are now supporting construction of a community policing centres in the Darfur states.

The role of other UN agencies includes: UN Women training and awareness raising for SPF personnel in co-operation with UNAMID, including on legislative amendments related to rape and sexual harassment; UNFPA support to developing the response to SGBV, and UNDP co-operation with UNAMID on activities including training and equipping of Family and Child Protection Units.

Justice sector: Support to the justice sector, through UNAMID Rule of Law section and the JPROL focused on the re-establishment of the criminal justice service in return/settlement priority areas with high prevalence of conflict-related violence and criminality; strengthening the capacity of rural courts to mitigate and adjudicate

[124] $9,612,505 of which $8,624,294 were allocated for SLF and $987,880 through direct implementation by UNAMID, mainly in Jebel Marra area.
[125] UNAMID does not have a general rule of law support mandate.
[126] MoU in 2013, together with joint needs assessment.

inter-communal disputes, including those related to land and other conflict drivers; and enhancing the capacity of the Special Prosecutors to address destabilizing crimes. Support included construction of infrastructure, including district courts, prosecution offices and rural courts. Capacity development workshops and training have been conducted, including awareness raising on SGBV. Over 1,100 justice sector personnel and civil society representatives were trained in 2018 alone. The UN has also supported co-ordination within justice sector, and strengthening of the criminal justice chain, through state level criminal justice forums. Support to Rural Courts included training on legal issues and mediation skills, and development of a training manual. Support to the informal justice sector has also been provided through workshops for the native administration on gender issues.

Prisons: Support to prisons included work to develop a framework for prison management and inspection, building training capacity within the Directorate of Prisons and Reform, delivering training, and construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

Child rights: Under the JPROL and through a project on child release and reintegration, UNICEF has worked to combat child recruitment into armed forces, through support to legislative development, engagement with the Sudanese Armed Forces and RSF, and with the National Council for Child Welfare on advocacy.

Women's rights and the response to SGBV: UN rule of law sector development activities have integrated an emphasis on improving the police and justice sector response to SGBV through support to establishment of Gender Desks, and Family and Child Protection Units, and sensitization and training workshops for stakeholders including police, prosecutors and judges and social workers.

Access to justice: UN activities working with communities to increase access to justice have included support to Justice and Confidence Centres in IDP camps, and training of paralegals. The UN has also supported the setting up of legal aid desks in 10 prisons. Child protection networks have also been established.

The Women's Rights in Darfur Programme, implemented by the Darfur Bar Association, International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute at London University provided training to paralegals, built networks and supported outreach to advance access to legal mechanisms for women and girls, using a human rights based approach. It was funded by the Baring Foundation and John Ellerman International Development Trust.[127]

In the humanitarian sector, the protection response has included awareness raising for communities and strengthening of referral pathways to support victims of violence to access services. A Women's Protection Network was established under UNAMID Gender Advisory Unit mapped the specific needs of women in the context of conflict in Darfur. Activities are not included in the DDS mapping.

Transitional justice: UN agencies and UNAMID have provided support to the Office of Special Prosecutor for Darfur crimes, and Sudanese Human Rights Commission. This has included training of special prosecutors on investigative techniques and prosecution of serious crimes, including sexual and gender-based violence. In addition, over 123 members of civil society and women networks have been trained on how to monitor criminal proceedings and support accountability for the rule of law sector.

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): The DDS FaST Darfur Community Based Reintegration and Stabilization Programme provided support for reintegration of demobilized combatants, and also integrated measures to address small arms proliferation, and support to police and prisons. The project trained stakeholders including government officials, traditional and community leaders on SALW, and on development of community action plans. It provided economic reintegration assistance to ex-combatants, and supported community stabilization projects including schools and health centre construction, and quick impact projects to support at risk youth. Women and disabled ex-combatants were provided with specific support.

[127] Additional support for out of country workshops from Ford Foundation

5.2 Progress and achievements

Due to limitations in M&E and data collection, there is a limited evidence base to assess the extent to which UN activities improved community security and access to justice, or secured sustainable institutional capacity improvements. As outlined in the situation analysis, evidence of improvements in community security and accountability for human rights violations in Darfur is limited, and structural constraints to the rule of law remain.

Protection of rights: UN support to justice institutions contributed to concrete instances of rights being protected. The opening of the National Supreme Court Division for the Darfur States in 2017 led to the release of 512 low level offenders. Trial monitoring conducted by UNAMID of cases involving rape, sexual violence and other serious offences indicated a positive trend in the application of fair trial standards in judicial proceedings, reflecting training inputs.

Legal framework and policy and strategy development: The UN has supported improvements to the legal framework. This included support to legal reform to prevent the charging of women with adultery in cases of rape in 2015, noted in the situation analysis, addressing a priority concern for women's rights activists and their constituencies. Adoption of a strategic plan for Darfur Prisons for 2014 – 2018 was supported by the JPROL, and a framework for inspection and management developed as referenced in the situation analysis. A Legal Aid Act was adopted by the Sudanese National Parliament in 2017.

UNAMID and UN agencies have supported the development of police and justice sector institutional response mechanisms for SGBV and child rights violations, through Family and Child Protection Units and Gender desks. Training for legal professionals and police has raised awareness on SGBV.

Infrastructure and capacity development: The UN has supported an extension of the presence of the state in conflict affected areas through infrastructure construction and repair, done in co-ordination with training to support capacity development. While infrastructure and capacity development does not guarantee responsive service delivery or trust among citizens, some progress has been recorded in service delivery, and assets can be used once structural policing and justice concerns highlighted in the situation analysis are addressed. UN supported infrastructure development includes:

- Rehabilitation or construction of 89 police infrastructure sites (community policing centres, police stations, family and child protection centres, with 27 projects ongoing);
- Rehabilitation of 14 prison facilities;
- Family and Child Protection Units;
- District and rural courts - 9 district courts were rehabilitated and 21 out of 25 district courts and 27 prosecution offices re-opened.

As outlined in the situation analysis, UNAMID supported an increase in numbers of functioning rural courts and their adjudication of cases. The number of disputes resolved by rural courts (including disputes over land), has increased. A legal aid unit was established in the North Darfur Ministry of Justice.

UNAMID, and some other stakeholders, anecdotally report improved police professionalism, and an increased service orientation, reflecting training inputs. The training of trainers, development of training centres and SOPs creates a basis for continuing work to support development of responsive service provision.

Access to justice: UN inputs have resulted in increased paralegal capacity, with 90 community paralegals providing basic legal and referral services in five IDP camps since 2013. Legal aid desks established in prisons provided advice to over 550 pre-trial and convicted prisoners.

In terms of activities outside the UN, the Women's Rights Programme, while acknowledging attribution challenges, led to women accessing justice by taking cases to family, criminal and traditional courts, and to women seeking psychosocial support after experiencing assault. The programme also reported examples of

shifts in social norms indicating greater local capacity to address violations of women and girls' rights, and greater acceptance of women's equality. Formation of solidarity networks, communication between stakeholders, and supporting rights holders to identify how they wished to access justice supported this progress.

DDR: As outlined in the situation analysis, over 10,000 combatants from DDPD signatory armed groups were demobilized through assistance from the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and UNAMID, and 3,150 demobilized combatants were provided with reintegration assistance through the UNDP DDS FaST project. No final impact assessment was conducted, but anecdotal evidence suggests 80% of those reintegrated were actively self-employed or engaged in income generation, and thus dissuaded from re-joining armed groups or gangs. Anecdotal evidence, from accessible rural and urban areas suggests project activities contributed to positive perception of returning former combatants, with 50% reporting social acceptance. It is possible that the availability of alternative livelihoods provided through the DDR project was a factor which influenced smaller breakaway armed factions to become signatures to the DDPD. Community projects delivered local infrastructure improvements. An emphasis on gender issues, and on support to women ex-combatants proved training men on gender can change mindsets, and promoted social cohesion. Disabled ex-combatants were also provided with specific support.

5.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Rule of law development efforts have sought to support rapid development of capacities of the state to respond to urgent protection and justice needs, in the face of great contextual, political and financial constraints. These include the Darfur security environment where the RSF, or precursor militias continued to be dominant limiting the influence of the SPF, the centralized nature of Government institutions and centre periphery dynamics outlined in the situation analysis, and lack of Federal level security sector reform and appropriate legal frameworks for democratic policing, accountability and civilian oversight.

Such factors have limited outcomes from assistance. Powerful perpetrators of violence tend not to be held to account, improved legal frameworks may not be implemented in practice, institutions lack transparency, and trust and confidence in police and other criminal justice institutions is reported to remain low. Underlying limitations in criminal justice chain sector capacity, and in infrastructure provision outside urban centres are further challenges.

M&E, and systematic assessment of the outcomes and impact of UN contributions has been limited, as noted. This means there is a lack of data on improvements for justice users and on citizen perceptions of Government institutions. There also appears to have been limited systematic assessment of changes in performance of those who have received training within GoS bodies. There were differing views among key informants on UN support to police and justice sector, with some valuing support and noting positive change, while others saw limited value due to the Darfur security environment, and to legal and institutional frameworks for an accountable security sector not being in place.

Lack of political will on the part of GoS authorities to address impunity for human rights violations, including conflict-related sexual violence, by state and non-state actors was a challenge to development efforts. This inhibited progress in securing accountability for abuses, and strengthening relevant mechanisms and capacities, denying justice to affected communities and victims. Lack of political will on the part of GoS constrained support to transitional justice and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The former GoS only allowed support at the technical level, preventing the more strategic and political support needed to make the institution credible and not one-sided.

There were constraints to progress on addressing SGBV in the community, which included underlying contextual factors such as patriarchal norms and cultural values. Infrastructure was not always constructed with a gender sensitive focus and did not allow sufficient space for women police. Numbers of women police remain extremely limited which is a deterrent to women seeking justice.

While capacity for legal aid has been supported by the UN, there appears to have been more emphasis overall on the supply side and support to institutions than on building up the spaces, networks, capacities and referral pathways to support access to justice in communities.

DDS and UNAMID objectives for establishing community policing have not yet been achieved. The model of community policing developed by UNAMID in IDP camps was not adopted by the SPF. Security transition arrangements for IDP camps following UNAMID withdrawal remain uncertain. UNAMID efforts are now focused on developing community policing centres.

There have been operational constraints to UNAMID co-operation with SPF, including lack of commitment of SPF personnel to training in some cases, and highly centralized decision making within the force. The drawdown of UNAMID is ongoing, with sites being closed as the mission continues to work to deliver on its mandate, which creates challenges.

DDR: The impact of DDR activities was limited by the lack of an inclusive peace agreement, and security sector reform. Challenges encountered during DDR project implementation included resentment among communities over assistance being received by former combatants, which the project mitigated by providing support on a community basis. Many ex-combatants are IDPs, making provision of assistance difficult, including due to camp structures designed for humanitarian provision, and political and ethnic bias.

Implementation of DDR activities faced contextual and operational challenges, including limited GoS capacity (for example to deliver agricultural extension services), and limited CBO, NGO and native administration capacity, in particular in remote areas, where M&E was particularly difficult. Absorptive capacities in host communities were also limited.

5.4 Learning

The review emphasizes that a focus on promoting human rights and addressing impunity for abuses must be central to a future DDS and to development efforts in the rule of law sector. Efforts to promote accountability and reconciliation need to be integrated into policy and capacity development efforts. Following adoption of the Constitutional Declaration and formation of the transitional government, it is anticipated that increased political will to address rule of law and human rights challenges will be present.

Sustainable improvement to police and justice provision in Darfur requires in the long term Federal level legal and security sector reform, based on the concerns and priorities of citizens, and an appropriate legal framework, including for accountability and civilian oversight.

Further review and impact assessment of sector development efforts is suggested. Building the evidence base and M&E systems, and ensuring that service provision, and infrastructure inputs, are driven by community consultation and needs identification can support sustainability and responsiveness of service provision. This could help to ensure that infrastructure is accessible all those seeking to access justice, including women.

Community-based work to support access to justice, and support to legal aid could be scaled up, and community engagement and accountability processes emphasized. Sustainable outcomes in increasing access to justice need to be underpinned by building awareness of rights and capacity of individuals to become proactive drivers of change, empowered to claim rights and seek accountability.

Development assistance in the rule of law sector and engagement with rule of law sector institutions need careful risk conflict sensitivity and “do no harm” assessments. There are political dimensions to rule of law engagement in a complex environment that should inform and guide strategic and programmatic engagements. In a context where human rights violations occur, there can be potential human rights related risks.

In an environment where protection needs remain significant, the humanitarian development nexus is important. Alignment protection activities in the humanitarian sector with rule of law development activities to support

service delivery and access to justice is under consideration and appears important. Community protection networks were highlighted by some stakeholders as an approach to addressing protection need and supporting legal aid referrals.

DDS project experience suggests that DDR needs to be integrated in broad community security frameworks, including conflict transformation and security sector reform, and reintegration of ex combatants approached as part of broader economic recovery and livelihoods work.

5.5 Organisation and co-ordination of national and international efforts

Co-ordination for UN agencies contributing to rule of law was addressed through the setting up of a UN Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections in promoting the rule of law in Darfur. The SLF structures are intended to integrate the work of various UNCT agencies. The Protection cluster, led by UNHCR, provides a structure to coordinate protection activities which include support to referral pathways for people seeking to access justice.

5.6 Alignment with DDS

Activities supported by UN agencies and UNAMID in the rule of law sector have been largely aligned to DDS objectives and sub-objectives for policing and working with justice sector institutions. Construction of infrastructure took place as envisaged under Pillar 1, and Pillar 2 objectives for return areas. Training activities are also broadly in line with DDS objectives.

6. Conclusions

6.1 Relevance of the DDS

The Pillar 1 DDS framework was broadly relevant to identified needs. Better governance at state and locality levels, resourced by improved revenue collection, is widely acknowledged as a priority to deliver services and address root causes of conflict. Insecurity and vulnerability to violence demanded responsive justice and police provision, and high levels of mistrust and conflict required conflict resolution and reconciliation processes.

The 2013 framework was, however, ambitious in its aims for institutional reform. Lessons from other countries indicate that reform, restructuring and capacitation of institutions is a long term process. The DDS acknowledged that progress was contingent on political will, and a clear Federal framework for roles and responsibilities at different levels of government. These assumptions proved to be unrealistic.

The DDS framework laid out many ingredients for public sector reform. However, it did not articulate a clear, theory of change or a sequenced, contingent pathway to achieving higher level objectives and measurable change. It did not adequately specify which objectives were conditional on reform at Federal level.

The results framework did not sufficiently reflect the needs of women, or include measures to address structural inequalities and exclusion from decision making. It did not include a specific focus on youth, in terms of their participation, representation, or specific needs to be addressed by governance reform.

The design of the DDS did not appreciate the need for integrated ways of working, in particular at community level, where traditional structures integrate justice and governance functions, and where specific needs for tangible inputs vary and are linked to local conflict drivers of conflict.

The consolidated report (volume I of this review) outlines limitations in DDS implementation and co-ordination structures. While the DDS laid out relevant strategic priorities, it did not succeed in galvanizing coherent efforts or strengthening sector co-ordination architecture. The DDS was seen by some stakeholders as consisting only of the FaST projects, rather than as a framework to mobilize coordinated development efforts. NGOS and

INGOs tend to carry out their work with communities regardless of the DDS, with a focus on community needs. Perceptions of the DDS among civil society and youth are relevant to future DDS design. Young people, including IDPs, expressed criticism to the review team over the way in which DDS activities had been implemented, with a focus on delivery by UN agencies, and through engagement with the native administration. Youth focused structures in IDP camps, and skills and capacities of young people had not been engaged with.

6.2 Progress, constraints and lessons

Generally, programming and achievements in Pillar 1 sectors have been modest relative to DDS objectives. Recovery and development needs remain critical, as highlighted in the key developments section. Development orientated financing aligned with Pillar 1 objectives amounted to a small proportion of needs identified in the DDS (US$146.1 million). However, expenditure related to the DDS objective for reconciliation and conflict management mechanisms (in the conflict resolution and peace-building sector) significantly exceeded the planned DDS target, with programming mainly focused at the community level.

In the governance sector, progress in improving institutional systems and capacities in the public delivery system, local government and PFM institutions was extremely limited, although some good practice was developed in individual basic services sectors. In the rule of law sector, while political and contextual constraints limited impacts, UN assistance led to progress including increased numbers of rural courts and cases resolved, development of responses to SGBV, and legal reform. In the peacebuilding sector, no progress occurred on compensation. An effective locality and state level peace architecture, and processes to address root causes of conflict and critical issues such as land occupation were generally not developed.

Progress at community level was secured through integrated models which combined governance and dispute resolution mechanisms and capacities with tangible inputs such as infrastructure and livelihoods, designed to meet community needs and address local drivers of conflict. Results in locations of operation included effective processes for resolution of local disputes, which supported a fragile social peace, and reduction in overall levels of conflict. Interaction between groups, trust and social cohesion appears to have increased. Community governance mechanisms supported management of natural resources and collective capacities for participatory planning. Civil society skills and networks were developed, and new community based organisations set up. There are examples of inclusive participation and increased roles and voice for women and youth. Instances of women accessing justice through human rights based and paralegal support in the community emerged.

Limitations in programming and results reflected both the ambitious nature of DDS objectives, and the lack of an enabling environment. Key DDS assumptions proved to be unrealistic. Critical constraints included the political context, lack of an inclusive peace agreement between GoS and armed opposition and a governance model which prioritized control from the centre and regime survival. Lack of a clear framework for decentralization and for institutional mandates at different levels curtailed governance reform.

Limitations in donor coherence, and shared root causes analysis and strategic planning was a further factor, with support in some areas projectized and fragmented. Implementing partners sometimes tend patch together a response to community needs, filling gaps with different programme funds, rather than being empowered to work in a systematic way. Improved local conditions and capacities supported by community peacebuilding were not necessarily reinforced by larger, or development focused inputs.

Operational constraints included the economic crisis, limited implementing partner capacity and difficulties in access to remote areas. Improving M&E and impact assessment, and the design of outcomes and indicators appears to be a cross cutting need. A strong focus on the extent to which lives and institutions have been sustainably improved based on specific and measurable outcomes is not always evident.

Limited progress in support returning of IDP communities, reflected lack of progress in key Pillar 1 areas of focus. These included lack of political and technical solutions to land occupation, limitations in security and justice provision, and in capacities to coordinate and plan across basic services sectors.

The state remained unable to meet human needs and to ensure equitable access to resources, and responsive and accountable governance. Such capacity is necessary if impacts of environmental and demographic change are to be managed. These are governance challenges which need to be addressed by effective institutions. Systematic holistic reform of public delivery, local governance and PFM bodies, calibrated according to political conditions, to develop streamlined clear institutional frameworks and capacities is needed. This requires political will and a strategic sequenced approach from the centre, implemented at locality and state level; and harmonized development partner efforts, with transition to support through GoS systems. Improved capacity at locality level is critical, and co-ordination across basic service sectors.

The new political dispensation under the Constitutional Declaration mandates an increased focus on accountability processes, community engagement and empowering people to claim entitlements. Harmonized support to civil society and community governance would support this.

Building on results and lessons of integrated community models, and the knowledge of key I/NGO implementing partners (who have worked across sectors including peacebuilding and natural resources management) could lead to harmonized integrated approaches to sustainable development at community level, incorporating consensus and peacebuilding over natural resources and basic services. Inclusive work with all groups, on an area, possibly eco-systems basis is suggested. If political conditions permit, links between community development and institutional reform efforts can be built.

In line with Chapter 15 of the Constitutional Declaration, issues of land occupation and compensation need to be addressed through dialogue and negotiation processes above community level. Needs for protection, access to justice and responsive police and justice sector institutions remain critical. In the rule of law sector, Constitutional Declaration commitments endorse the centrality of human rights and accountability principles. Legal and institutional reform is needed to deliver impartial, independent institutions. An increased focus on access to justice in the community, and ensuring service provision is driven by community needs is suggested.

6.3 Cross cutting issues

Environment: Examples of innovation, in natural resource management and governance at community level are present, but appear to be lacking at higher levels. Integration of environmental, including National Adaptation Plan priorities into future development efforts, in particular governance reform is suggested.

Gender: Underlying socio-cultural norms restrict women's access to political, economic and cultural participation. Such structural factors underpinning exclusion from decision making and control of resources need to be understood, as a basis for gender mainstreaming and design of interventions. Examples from projects demonstrate the improved outcomes when women are empowered and engaged. Working with men to create awareness of gender issues has proved effective in changing mindsets.

Youth: Changing demographics, patterns of access to information, and acute challenges related to livelihoods, migration and security for youth highlight the need for an increased emphasis on youth issues for Pillar 1 sectors. Youth representatives articulated most strongly not their needs, but their wish to contribute to implementation of future DDS activities, highlighting the need to engage youth as agents of change and sustainable development.

IV. Analysis of needs and priorities

1. General recommendations

Sustainable peace requires systemic reform and institutional development: Weak governance and rule of law have been causes of conflict. Therefore, the capacities of the state need to be developed and organized to meet the needs of empowered citizens, and to use resources transparently, accountably and efficiently, in line with the terms of the Constitutional Declaration. Provision to manage natural resources sustainably and equitably is

needed. Reform requires holistic integrated systems approaches, incorporating reform of policy and institutional frameworks, and community and government capacity building.

However, this requires political will, Federal level action, long-term commitment, and harmonized international support, with development partner willingness to transition support to delivery through GoS systems. Institutional reform in pillar 1 sectors – governance, rule of law and land - is fundamentally political, and needs political and strategic support. Experience from fragile states indicates there are risks if reform is attempted prematurely, and does not take account of political dynamics. Progress, and scope for reform will depend on which scenario emerges at national and Darfur level.

Accountability and community based and integrated approaches: Integrated, inclusive area (possibly eco-system) based development for all groups, including returnee and host, nomad and farmers is suggested. This can be a basis for accountable local governance, inclusive access to basic services, and community engagement in development planning and managing infrastructure and natural resources (learning from existing community mechanisms). This can help to build consensus, co-operation and social cohesion around concrete shared benefits.

Shared analysis and theories of change: Nuanced understanding of local context, conflict risks, political economy, power relations and inequalities is needed, along with clear theories of change which set out step by step progress towards objectives.

Phasing and sequencing, and addressing immediate priorities: Under all scenarios, there will be risks of continuing violence, and humanitarian needs. Linked to national level peace negotiations mandated by the Constitutional Declaration, political processes at the Darfur level to address critical issues, including barriers to return are needed. Protection needs will remain acute, linked to decisions on UNAMID presence. Support to inclusive Darfur participation in transitional reform agendas may be addressed through other frameworks, but is a further possible area for DDS engagement.

The following principles were suggested by the review to guide the approach Pillar 1 sectors:

- Support processes owned by local stakeholders rather than separate projects;
- Phased, sequenced approach, realistic assumptions, and a clear pathway to higher level objectives;
- Evidence based demand driven programming, based on citizen priorities and consultation, shared root cause analyses, and M&E systems to assess whether tangible change for citizens is emerging;
- Conflict sensitivity, risk and do no harm assessments based on existing good practice;
- Inclusivity of women, youth, and all groups, including vulnerable and marginalized communities;
- Empowerment of youth as active agents of change and champions of development;
- Promote environmental and natural resource sustainability;
- Protect and guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- Accountability and transparency of DDS plans, expenditures and reporting.

2. Governance and Accountability

Systemic reform measures to consider which were highlighted by the review were **a clear streamlined institutional framework for mandates roles and responsibilities at different levels of Government** and for decentralization, appropriate to available resources. **Public administration reform** with a strategic sequenced approach from the center, implemented at state and locality level (including functional review, merit based recruitment, performance management, capacity development) is suggested. Arrangements and capacity to **plan and coordinate across basic service sectors** (for example within Ministry of Finance planning departments) need to be built up.

In less positive scenarios the approaches to the public delivery system may have to be more limited, with targeted support to shift development efforts towards delivery through GoS systems. Priority areas may include cross sector basic services co-ordination; growing 'islands of excellence' in basic service sectors where entry

points are available, based on holistic sector institutional assessments; ensuring critical posts at locality level are filled and increasing linkages between existing community governance mechanisms and local authorities.

Improved frameworks/arrangements for accountable **locality level governance,** appropriate to available resources and trends (environmental, demographic) are suggested. Increased capacities, including for planning, co-ordination, community engagement, and sector specific service delivery, and accessible services with simplified processes are needed. A more comprehensive agreement or framework for the **Native administration and community governance** which can support integrated sustainable development, participation and peacebuilding is suggested, as a basis for improved local governance. Review of support to civil society and community governance might be helpful, in addition to mapping existing community committees.

To improve public financial management and **increase resources,** streamlined fiscal transfers and simple, transparent central Government allocation criteria are needed, along with assistance to state and local governments to bolster sub-national revenue generation. Redesign of the subnational revenue structure, including to promote pro-poor taxation and sustainable economic growth is suggested.

Accountability, transparency and citizen participation are priorities established by the Constitutional Declaration. They need to be addressed by provision within public bodies, and possibly by right to information legislation.

Harmonized development partner support for citizen participation, civil society and independent media, based on needs assessment is also suggested. This can systematically support setting up new CSO and CBOs, development of organizational capacities, networks, advocacy agendas, and CSO work at grass roots to promote inclusive participation and social accountability processes.

Citizen-based governance and accountability also require devolution and locating policy planning in local agencies and incorporating locally-generated expertise into the policy design process, to enhance citizen ownership of the resulting policies. Political and economic decentralization can enhance democracy by providing avenues to power for new political actors, particularly youth and women.

3. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Develop the Darfur peace architecture and processes for political solutions to critical issues: Concerted efforts must take advantage of relative peace to tackle root causes of conflict and displacement, and address Constitutional Declaration Chapter 15 issues through inclusive political processes. Processes, forums and capacity for dialogue and reconciliation above community level (state, regional, locality), built from and linked to existing community mechanisms are suggested, with participation of civil society, women, youth Native administration, and elites.

Leverage capacities for peacebuilding, mediation and conflict analysis: Consider how to consolidate evidence, lessons, and capacities for conflict analysis and sensitivity assessment, and conflict resolution, including by strengthening networks of mediators and peace actors. Efforts should support the heritage of native administration, but also youth capacities and innovations, and women peace actors. Making sure lessons from effective Darfur conflict resolution cases, and from other countries which have gone through political transition are captured may be valuable.

Consolidate integrated community peacebuilding around concrete needs and economic co-operation: Based on lesson learning and context analysis, replicate and consider extending support for local dispute resolution, and for inter-communal economic, basic services, and livelihoods co-operation which can entrench peace and bring mutual benefit. Scaling up conflict resolution capacity may be possible by integrating conflict analysis and peace work into other programming.

4. Land Governance

Land is a cross cutting issue, and requires strengthened, well-designed stakeholder and co-ordination arrangements to ensure a clear vision and processes to address complex challenges. Political will, and resources will be needed to prioritize land issues during transition. Shared assessments, planning, root causes analysis and theory of change are suggested.

- *Ensure security of land tenure and appropriate legal frameworks*: Continued efforts to develop land rights and tenure systems which protect the interests of all groups including vulnerable communities are needed. A mixed system is suggested, ensuring recognition for customary land rights. International experience such as that related to starter titles and upgrading land rights incrementally over time can be drawn on.

- *Develop political and technical solutions to land occupation*: Land occupation needs to be addressed at a political level with a multi-stakeholder approach, inclusive transparent negotiation, recognizing unequal power relations, and related risks of violence. Possible measures include clarifying the land status of displaced people, delivery of land rights services in return areas, and practical step by step guides on resolving land disputes for IDPs who are afraid to go back.

- *Ensure inclusive public awareness on land rights:* Outreach and awareness raising on land rights, tenure and registration are needed, including specific engagement with women. Grass roots consultation should be built into reform processes, to make sure these lead to inclusive equitable solutions that reflect land use patterns, social context and needs of all groups.

- *Accessible land administration services*: Measures could include clarifying roles and responsibilities, and documenting customary and local land management practices for incorporation into statutory land administration. Simpler basic procedures (for planning, mapping, managing records) are needed for accessible, responsive locality land services, along with digitization of information. Practical tools for people to access services and information might include mobile phone records and mobile registration offices.

5. Rule of Law and access to Justice

In line with Constitutional Declaration commitments, human rights commitments should underpin rule of law sector development efforts. It is critical that a future DDS focuses on accountability for infringements; ending impunity for human rights violations and immunity of states agents; the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and of law enforcement bodies; civilian oversight of policing and security sector; and gender sensitive and responsive access to justice provision. Focusing on re-establishment of the criminal justice chain in return areas, and building trust and confidence in police and justice services is a priority.

Development of transitional justice processes, including accountability for serious crimes perpetrated during the conflict and conflict related sexual violence, should underpin reconciliation and sustained peacebuilding efforts. These need to be designed based on consultation with victims and communities.

Sustainable change will require political will and Federal level reform. In the long-term, subject to appropriate context and enabling conditions, reform priorities include security sector reform to deliver civilian oversight and a clear institutional framework defining roles, responsibilities, limitations and powers for security bodies.

Justice and law enforcement focused reforms are a priority, including reform of legal and institutional frameworks for prisons, and for rural courts and their jurisdiction. Subject to the wider security context, reform measures to improve delivery of policing services might development of merit based representative recruitment, increase numbers of women recruited, and development of formal conditions of service.

Building M&E systems, and the evidence base on community security and justice needs, and further review of the impact of programming to date is suggested. Police and justice services should be demand driven, based on

community engagement and priorities, and perception surveys to identify how trust in institutions might increase.

Scaling up work on legal aid and access to justice in the community is suggested, based on good practice and human rights models, driven by empowerment of citizens, including women, to develop referral mechanisms to institutions, supported by local and supra local networks. Protection remains a priority, in particular in view of UNAMID drawdown. Building community protection networks, linked to legal aid provision is suggested, along with integrated co-ordination structures for humanitarian protection and development stakeholders working on rule of law issues.

DDR will become an increasing need if an inclusive peace agreement is signed. The review highlighted possible areas of work including review of the DDR strategy to reflect new the new context, integrating DDR into wider development and livelihoods initiatives and strengthening the linkages between DDR and SSR and engaging ex-combatants for example as business mentors, extension service in far remote areas to promote social cohesion and acceptance.

6. Cross cutting issues

Gender

- The Constitutional Declaration includes commitments to advance women's participation and protect their rights. Cross cutting inclusion of women in policy and decision making, in line with provisions including Chapter 15, article 67 c and d; and Chapter 2, article 7 (7) is needed.
- Empowerment of women to claim rights and build organizational capacities, networks and advocacy agendas, based on root cause analysis of exclusion and inequalities;
- Programme design should include a gender analysis at the inception phase, and training for staff to address gender issues, promote participation and mainstream gender perspectives.

Youth

- Map existing youth structures and capacities, and consult youth on how to enhance their role in peacebuilding, and governance and address key challenges through policy reform.
- Engage youth as change agents for sustainable development activities.

Annex: Capital transfers to Darfur 2015-2019 (Development)

January-December 2015 – Millions of SDG

Item	Allocated	Actual	% of actual to allocated	Remarks
Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development	1,856,4	303	%16.3	
Darfur compensations	62,2	1	%0.8	
DDS	50,4	48	%96	
Additional Funds to Darfur states	170,4	45	%26,4	
Projects – not defined (not clear if Darfur is included)	1,132,8	226	%20	

Source: Extracted from Commission for Financial Allocation,2015,

January-December 2016 – Millions of SDG

Item	Allocated	Actual	% of actual to allocated	Remarks
Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development	2,064,01	702,86	%34.05	
Darfur compensations	50		%0.00	
DDS	60.00	32,48	%54.14	
Additional Funds to Darfur states	385.00	55,64	%14.45	
Projects – not defined (not clear if Darfur is included)	171,00	611	%52.23	

Source: Extracted from Commission for Financial Allocation,2016,

January-December 2017 – Millions of SDG

Item	Allocated	Actual	% of actual to allocated	Remarks
Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development	871.2	459	%52.7	
Darfur compensations	-	-	-	
DDS	54.1	7.3	%13.4	
Additional Funds to Darfur states	201.7	92.7	%46	
Projects – not defined (not clear if Darfur is included)	504.6	270.4	%53.6	

Source: Extracted from Commission for Financial Allocation,2017,

January-December 2018 – Millions of SDG

Item	Allocated	Actual	% of actual to allocated	Remarks
Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development	1,218,90	409,1	%33.6	
Darfur compensations	-	-	-	
DDS	85.00	15.52	%18.3	
Additional Funds to Darfur states	250.00	120,64	%48.3	
Projects – not defined (not clear if Darfur is included)	23.90	347.94	%1,544.8	

Source: Extracted from Commission for Financial Allocation,2018,

January-December 2019– Millions of SDG

Item	Allocated	Actual	% of actual to allocated	Remarks
Darfur Fund for Reconstruction and Development	312.81	79.58	%25	
Darfur compensations	-	-	-	
DDS	13,00	-	%0.00	
Additional Funds to Darfur states	-	-	-	
Projects – not defined (not clear if Darfur is included)	1,304,88	1,159,92	%89	

Source: Extracted from Commission for Financial Allocation,2019,

Spending on Education and Health 2015-2019

	Education	Health
2015	Allocation of 1% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of improving schools, teachers, training; later raised to 2%	Allocation of 1% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of specialists, midwifes, training, medical machines, later raised to 2%
2016	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of improving schools, teachers, training.	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of specialists, midwifes, training, medical machines.
2017	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of improving schools, teachers, training.	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of specialists, midwifes, training, medical machines
2018	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of

	improving schools, teachers, training.	specialists, midwifes, training, medical machines
2019	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of improving schools, teachers, training.	Allocation of 2% current transfers (التحويلات الجارية) to spend of specialists, midwifes, training, medical machines

Source: Source: Federal Chamber, Annual Reports, 2015-2019, Khartoum

Pillar 2: Reconstruction

I. Introduction

1. Overview

The primary goal of the DDS's Reconstruction Pillar was to "support the recovery and stabilisation of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life have been severely disrupted". The Reconstruction Pillar (also known as Pillar 2) attempted to forward these aims by presenting a strategy that included development objectives in three "thematic areas":

- Basic Services, which included WASH, health and nutrition, and education;
- Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization; and,
- Transportation and Energy Infrastructure.

As the current DDS expires at the end of 2019, this Pillar Review—conducted as part of the "DDS Review and Refresh Process"—examines the past six years of developments in the above sectors to gather evidence and lessons learned to help inform future development planning in Darfur. The review was conducted using a mixed methodology that centred around the formation of a Pillar Working Group (PWG), chaired by the Government of Sudan's Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission and UNICEF, and composed of a range of stakeholders from the Government, the United Nations, international and national Non-Governmental Organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector. A consultant team facilitated the work of the PWG and complemented the Group's analysis via multiple key informant interviews and a detailed literature review.

Key findings of the Review, discussed in greater detail below, include the following:

- Most of the goals for Pillar 2 presented in the current DDS were wholly or partially unrealized. This is partly due to the fact that development-oriented financing for Pillar 2 objectives amounted to only a fraction of the total needs identified in the current DDS budget (less than 7.8% of the total required). It also reflects the lack of a conducive environment for many of the investments and reforms that would have been necessary for significant progress in the Pillar 2 sectors. As a result, humanitarian funding (which has not been accounted for in the following analysis) continued to play a predominant role in meeting needs related to Pillar 2—particularly with respect to basic services. This helped to address short-term requirements of Darfur populations, but insufficiently laid the groundwork for sustainable development in the sectors. As a result, the recovery and long-term development needs in each of Pillar 2's thematic areas remain critical.
- The ambitious and—in hindsight—overly optimistic planning that characterized the DDS is particularly apparent in several prominent areas of Pillar 2. For example, the DDS' strong assumption that there would be rapid, large-scale returns to areas of origin following the signing of the DDPD did not occur. The number of IDPs in protracted displacement is nearly the same as in 2013, owing largely to the fact that key pre-conditions for returns (primarily security, access to land and basic services) in many areas have not been met. In addition, current trends also highlight that the number of IDPs who will choose to stay in the current areas of urban displacement will be significant, a fact which was recognized but underemphasized in the current DDS's plans. Similarly, much of Pillar 2's proposed programming was centered on a massive, public works campaign to deliver dramatically improved transport, energy and WASH infrastructure across the five states. Only a very small fraction of international and government financing needed for this work was ever mobilized. Moreover, even if the billions of dollars in funding required for these works would have materialized, the ability of communities and local and state government to absorb, appropriate and sustainably manage these investments in such a short time is questionable
- The division of the DDS into short-term FaST programming and longer-term priorities make good sense in theory, particularly for Pillar 2's infrastructure-related sectors. However, while the DDS envisioned these short-term projects taking place within one year to 18 months, many took multiple years to launch and then

complete, given the complexities of working in Darfur. This is another example of the more realistic approach to planning that needs to be taken into account for future programming.

- Despite the challenges noted above, a handful of innovative development projects in several sectors under Pillar 2, including WASH infrastructure, Road repair, Health, and Education, provide a template for how high-impact and cost-effective development-oriented programming in infrastructure and basic services could be carried out at scale. Looking forward, programming for Pillar 2 in a future DDS should also be more realistic about the quantity of near-term funds that would be available for development programming in Darfur, prioritizing more modestly scaled, integrated interventions.
- As opposed to the large, stand-alone public works campaign envisioned in the current DDS, infrastructure investments should be closely integrated into area-based and community-driven programs linked to other sectors across all three Pillars. This will both ensure that given infrastructure outlays contribute to broader development goals and that there is a greater likelihood of being sustainably managed. This applies to infrastructure related to basic services (WASH, education and health), as well as transport and energy-related infrastructure.
- For returns programming, a future DDS should recognize that holistic, multi-sectoral programming over longer periods of time will likely be necessary to address the root causes currently impeding large-scale returns. Progress on the displacement issue will require significant increases in multi-year, multi-sectoral funding. Lessons from the few successful projects in the sphere highlight that achieving durable solutions takes time and resources, and funding needs to be adjusted to meet these realities on the ground. To do so effectively, returns programming should be integrated as a transversal theme throughout peacebuilding, livelihoods and natural resources management initiatives. This will facilitate a shift away from viewing returns as a one-off assistance package, and instead recognize returns as a longer-term development outcome that needs to be carefully fostered through a multi-sectoral approach, if it is to be durable. A future DDS should also anticipate and plan for a significant percentage of IDP households preferring to integrate within the urban areas in which they have been living for the past decade or more. Proactive, pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure and urban planning can ensure that cities and towns in Darfur are able to not just manage this integration but improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike.
- Finally, a strengthened knowledge base for Pillar 2 sectors is also critical. An updated census is badly needed to inform basic services programming, as mentioned by a number of informants across sectors during the Review. Similarly, improved displacement programming needs to be based on accurate intentions data, and a scaling up of the Durable Solutions Working Group's experiences with IDP profiling should thus be explored.

2. Pillar review objectives and organisation

This Review of the DDS Reconstruction Pillar is based on a mixed-methodology analysis conducted between March 2019 and July 2019. The review was launched as part of the "DDS Review and Refresh Process". The goals of the Review were to analyse:

(i) The evolution of the situation in Darfur as it pertains to the sectoral focus of the Pillar;
(ii) Progress in addressing key development challenges and priorities in this context;
(iii) Lessons and key challenges emerging for the next strategy; and,
(iv) Preliminary identification of priorities for the next six years.

The Reconstruction Pillar has a number of disparate sectors contained within it, which demanded outreach to a wide range of stakeholders and a broad review of available project documents and literature in order to successfully complete the analysis. Specifically, the Pillar contains eight high-level objectives, whose associated results frameworks and budgets form the core of the Pillar Strategy. These objectives were grouped into the following three interrelated *thematic areas* in the original DDS[128]:

- Basic Services;
- Returns, Reintegration, and Urbanization (RRU); and,
- Infrastructure Development.

[128] Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013:84). *'2013-2019 developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.'* Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

The Review was facilitated by the formation of a Pillar Working Group (PWG) composed of representatives from the Government of Sudan, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and academia, and co-chaired by the Government's Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission (VRRC) and UNICEF. Two members of the Review Consulting Team facilitated the work of the PWG, overseeing all aspects of the process.

The Consulting Team completed an initial sensitization mission to all five Darfur states in March to introduce a wide range of stakeholders to the process and to begin to gather information. At a kick-off meeting in Khartoum on March 21, 2019, the PWG was formally convened, bringing together all actors interested in contributing to the review. At the meeting it was agreed to organize the group into the following sub-groups in order to facilitate the analysis. These were based on the existing organization of the DDS into the same three thematic areas above, given that three categories were used in the original DDS and that participants unanimously agreed they remained relevant for structuring the Review.

Figure 11
Sub-group 1: Access to Basic Services Focal point = UNICEF
Increase access to improved water sources and sanitation (WASH)
Enhance access to and utilisation of comprehensive health and nutrition services
Improved access to and quality of education
Sub-group 2: Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization (RRU) Focal point = IOM & UNDP, with support from RCO/Durable Solutions
Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees
Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur
Improved access to quality urban housing and services
Sub-group 3: Infrastructure Development Focal point = UNOPS
Increase access to electricity services
Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services

3. Methodology

The original methodology, developed in conjunction with the other pillar leads in March 2019, called for each of the above sub-groups to conduct a number of tasks, including: collating and review relevant data and documentation; completing a rapid situation analysis to identify key trends and emerging needs related to the Pillar; conducting a strategic review of peace and development efforts since 2013; and compiling a preliminary identification of strategic needs and priorities.

Following the kick-off meeting, the sub-groups began to convene in person as well as remotely. However, a number of challenges were encountered throughout the process, necessitating several adjustments to the methodology during the course of the Review process. Beginning in early April, travel within Khartoum for meetings began to grow more difficult, leading to the cancelation of several Pillar sub-group meetings. With the political situation further deteriorating, communications between members of the PWG became more and more difficult, and face-to-face were eventually abandoned in April. Ultimately, the Infrastructure sub-group was able to convene twice, the Basic Services group once, while the RRU group was not able to meet in person. Access problems also meant the cancelling of a series of participatory workshops in both Darfur and Khartoum, during which members of the PWG would have provided detailed inputs into the Review process.

Obtaining information from Government of Sudan partners (even in March and early April) was also difficult, and Government participation completely dropped off after April 11. More generally, finding any studies or

data sets that could provide a comprehensive accounting of all development-oriented projects proved daunting, highlighting the lack of comprehensive project tracking in Darfur and the fragmented nature of information in all of the Pillar's sectors.

In response, the Pillar Review team, in close co-ordination with the PWG co-leads, adjusted the methodology to incorporate the following tasks into the Review:

- Over two dozen bilateral interviews with project managers and subject matter experts, in-person and over the phone;
- A detailed desktop review of project design documents, project evaluations, analyses and studies, and published reports and articles;
- Mining of the UNDP-led donor mapping exercise, in order to develop a broader picture of development interventions over the past six years; and,
- The drafting of a detailed questionnaire that was used to help guide the drafting of Review Notes on specific sectoral topics within each sub-group. In total, the Pillar 2 PWG completed seven Review Notes: WASH (lead drafter UNICEF); Health (lead drafter WHO); Nutrition (lead drafter UNICEF); Education (lead drafter UNICEF); Returns (lead drafter IOM); Durable Solutions (lead drafter Durable Solutions Advisor, UN RCO); Urbanization (lead drafter UN-Habitat).

II. Situation Analysis

1. Basic Services

As noted above, the Basic Services thematic area contains three high-level objectives, covering the WASH, Health and Nutrition, and Education sectors.

1.1 Key Developments Since 2013

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

Water continues to be a central factor in Darfur's struggle to develop. Extremely poor water and sanitation conditions throughout the region have spurred years of interventions from both humanitarian and development actors. Despite this programming, however, the water and sanitation situation remains extremely challenging throughout Darfur, albeit with some important variability between states. According to the most recent Darfur-wide data available, only about half of the population has access to improved water sources[129]. This situation may have improved since 2014, although the extent of any improvement in not yet known given gaps in data available for the sector[130]. Water functionality is another WASH issue affecting all the states, with the worst performing region (West Darfur) recording a functionality rate of just 47% (see table below). Open defecation is yet another problem, with all Darfur states except East Darfur exceeding the national average of prevalence of open defecation; Central Darfur, North Darfur and South Darfur have some of the highest rates in the country, with over 40% of the population practicing open defecation[131]. There have been ongoing efforts by sector actors to address open defecation practices, but a major scale-up is still needed and sanitation coverage continues to be low.

[129] Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)., UNICEF Sudan., (2016). '*Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 of Sudan, Final Report.*' February. Khartoum: UNICEF and Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Catholic Relief Services., (undated). '*Taadoud II – Transition to Development. Project Overview Factsheet.*'

[130] The upcoming release of the Simple, Spatial, Survey Method (S3M) data in fall 2019 should shed additional light on trends in the WASH sector since 2013

[131] UNICEF Sudan., Government of Sudan., (2018). *'National road map: Sanitation for all in Sudan. Making Sudan open defecation free by 2022'*. November. Retrieved from: https://www.unicef.org/sudan/reports/national-road-map-sanitation-all-sudan

WASH in schools and health facilities is a particular concern. Access rates must be improved across Darfur, although there is high variation between states and between urban and rural areas, as evidenced in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Access to WASH facilities in Schools and Health Centres[132]

State	Area	School Access to BASIC water (%)	School Access to BASIC Sanaitation (%)	Health/Nut. Centres Access to BASIC water (%)	Health/Nut. Centres Access to BASIC sanitation (%)
	Rural	55.0	53.0	62.9	48.8
	Urban	59.0	67.0	65.0	65.0
North Darfur	Total	**56.0**	**62.9**	**60.0**	**58.3**
	Rural	54.9	35.9	15.9	43.8
	Urban	41.0	55.0	23.0	68.0
South Darfur	Total	**51.0**	**41.2**	**17.0**	**47.7**
	Rural	28.6	68.0	23.1	65.4
	Urban	57.0	75.0	35.0	78.0
East Darfur	Total	**33.0**	**69.0**	**26.3**	**68.0**
	Rural	7.1	33.5	15.9	37.5
	Urban	30.0	60.0	75.0	55.0
West Darfur	Total	**15.0**	**42.5**	**42.5**	**45.1**
	Rural	30.3	63.7	18.9	54.7
	Urban	25.0	75.0	28.0	62.0
Central Darfur	Total	**29.0**	**67.0**	**23.0**	**58.0**

A generally improving security situation in recent years has made access to isolated regions easier, increasing both humanitarian and longer-term WASH assistance to additional populations. PWG members cited this increased access as an important development in the sector; the impact of this increased WASH coverage should become clearer with the new S3M data.

The sustainability of international WASH assistance is a major concern. Ongoing discrepancies in the supply of water in IDP camps versus vulnerable non-camp populations discussed in the current DDS strategy persist, with IDPs receiving water that is often cheaper than standard rates in nearby towns (or even completely free)—a situation that is inherently unsustainable. Fortunately, the PWG WASH sector Review Note indicated recent positive trends in terms of communities showing more flexibility and acceptance of making monetary and in-kind contributions to ensure maintenance of the WASH systems and infrastructure they have received, including a greater willingness to pay increased tariffs and meet social responsibilities associated with WASH.

Political and institutional issues also impact sustainability considerations in the WASH sector. The Pillar Review identified a general lack of clarity—and thus accountability—in the roles and responsibilities between the various authorities dealing with water and sanitation interventions. The State Water Corporations have confused lines of authority between the National Water Corporation on the one hand, and both WES and Localities on the other. This leads to the lack of a clear regulatory framework, politicized decision-making, and waste of extremely limited resources. These problems exacerbate an already acute human resources capacity gap within various government institutions.

Finally, water management at the community level remains a critical issue. Both the State Water Corporations and communities have limited capacities to sustain and effectively operate and manage water sources. Revenues from water collected within communities are often used to maintain other service facilities in the community (such as schools and clinics), compromising the sustainability of these water sources as a result.

[132] Source: PWG WASH Sector Review Note, citing Draft State SDG6 Plans

Health & Nutrition

The conflict in Darfur has had enormous impacts on the region's health system and resulted in a significant disruption of the provision of health and nutrition services, particularly for populations in security-compromised and inaccessible areas. The previous DDS cited a long list of challenges in nearly every area of the sector, with health and nutrition indicators for Darfur consistently among the worst in Sudan. Six years later, key indicators for the health and nutrition sector in Darfur still fall far short of international guidelines, and glaring problems remain. Nevertheless, tentative—if uneven—progress has been achieved in areas such as improving access to child and maternal health services and enhancing access to health facilities for underserved and disadvantaged populations. At the same time, average trends hide important variations between and within states that must be taken into consideration when considering future intervention strategies. Specifically, the two newest Darfur states (Central Darfur and East Darfur) often display lower overall indicators given their generally weaker administrative capacities and smaller infrastructure base. Similarly, rural and more remote areas continue to suffer poorer health outcomes than urban areas across the five states.

The Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) has a leading role in policy and stewardship in the sector, while responsibility for delivery of public services is largely led by states and their localities. Sectors and agencies such as police, military health services and the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) are among key actors in the health sector. In Darfur and other areas affected by conflict, NGOs (both national and international) have been playing a substantial role in service delivery; in 2019 they were providing 32% of all health services in the region[133]. This crowded and constantly shifting context has resulted in an uncoordinated patchwork of services, with gaps in some states and duplication in others.

A variety of external factors have deeply affected the health sector in Darfur since 2013. On the positive side, the improvement of the security situation has resulted in better access to areas (primarily Jebel Marra) that were not accessible in the past few years, helping increase coverage for significant numbers of people. Offsetting these positive developments, however, is the fact that a number of emergencies and outbreaks throughout the intervening period required reallocation of resources (financial, human, etc.) on the part of both the Government and INGOs in order to respond, taking away from longer-term health sector aims. An example is the acute water diarrhoea outbreak in 2016-2017. The eruption of violence in South Sudan and massive influx of South Sudanese refugees into Darfur since early 2015 has also put enormous pressures on the already fragile health system. Finally, the protracted displacement of large numbers of IDPs throughout Darfur (see below) continues to strain the health sector.

The economic downturn that started in 2017 and civil unrest that subsequently began in 2018 has also had deep impacts on health and nutrition. Increasing inflation, a rising cost of living, shortages of fuel and cash liquidity problems have all negatively affected basic livelihoods and health services, population movements (and attendant risks of public health threats), and food security. Already vulnerable and disadvantaged populations are most at risk.

Health Governance

At both a national and Darfur state level, there has been some progress over the past six years in the health governance sphere. According to PWG participants, this is attributable to several factors, including: the development of a new long-term National Health Policy; improved alignment of national health priorities though the "One Health Plan approach"; and relative improvements in collaboration and co-ordination at the national and sub-national level, including in Darfur.

However, the overall management and organizational capacities of the health system in Darfur remain insufficient, particularly at the local level. The most important hindrances to health leadership functions, especially at the states and locality levels, are the limited budgets for management and development, lack of control over financial resources and the fragmentation of these resources, and the acute shortage in trained health cadres. Low motivation among managerial staff due to the above constraints, combined with low remuneration, contribute to the high turnover and frequent vacancies in management positions.

[133] Source: PWG Health Sector Review Note, citing: WHO-Sudan (2013-2019). Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS), multiple year data from 2013 to 2019

Access to Health Services

As in the previous DDS, access to healthcare remains a major problem in Darfur. In 2018, due to of lack funding and human resources, 24% of the 1,229 health facilities in the five Darfur States were not functional, compared to 23% in 2014[134].

Human Resources for Health gaps exist at multiple levels of the healthcare system in Darfur. The personnel gaps are relatively minimal at the Rural Hospital level, increase at the Primary Health Care Centres (PHCC) level, and grow much larger at the Basic Health Units (BHUs) level. The unequal distribution of the personnel between urban and rural health facilities remains an unresolved challenge. Underlying factors for this dynamic include unavailability of qualified health workers in the rural areas, lack of training institutions that can regularly produce health cadres, rapid turnover of staff as health workers search for better opportunities in urban areas, and the absence of retention mechanisms.

NGOs are an important part of the health delivery ecosystem in Darfur, given the high levels of humanitarian funding that have flowed to the sector for more than a decade. They provide important services for extending health access to underserved populations, and have also proven critical in helping respond quickly and effectively to repeated health emergencies over the past six years. For example, partners played a crucial role in responding to the Acute Watery Diarrhoea outbreak in 2016-2017 that affected many parts of Sudan, including Darfur, providing timely technical assistance, medical supplies, services and logistical support[135]. However, as discussed below, the ubiquity of NGO health service providers also raises substantial questions about sustainability of health access and service delivery in the region, given the entrenched dependency on external aid that these services have engendered.

Communicable and Non-Communicable Diseases

In general, the epidemiological profile in Darfur is similar to other parts of Sudan, and is dominated by communicable diseases that are frequently exacerbated by natural disasters. However, with changes in socio-economic and lifestyle conditions, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are being recognized as important contributors to the overall disease burden. Malaria is the leading cause of outpatient visits, followed by pneumonia and other respiratory infections, diabetes and hypertension. NCDs services are provided mainly in the hospitals of main cities, but infrequently elsewhere. There have been recent efforts to integrate NCDs and mental health at the primary care level, but these have been inadequately sustained due to gaps in human resources, lack of adequate equipment and treatment facilities.

Education

Despite important investments in Darfur schools in recent years, education in Darfur still faces numerous challenges. In terms of access, the total number of schools has increased as has the number of children accessing school, but other key indicators, such as Gross Enrolment Rate (GER), have largely stagnated. This highlights that the capacity of basic and secondary schools are still inadequate to accommodate all eligible students, as well as the increasing problem of high dropout rates, both of which poses a major challenge for achieving universal basic education in Darfur,

[134] PWG Health Sector Review Note, citing WHO-Sudan (2013-2019). Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS), multiple year data from 2013 to 2019

[135] PWG Health Sector Review Note, citing WHO (2018), Independent Evaluation of The Response of the Government of Sudan to an outbreak of AWD



Figure 13: Gross Enrolments in Darfur 2012-2017, by State[136]

The quality of education in Darfur schools is another key concern, and poor performance in this area is driven by multiple factors, including inadequate learning environments, extremely uneven teacher distribution and capacities, and overall lack of resources available for the sector's operation and improvement.

Issues of teacher availability and distribution in Darfur are somewhat compensated by a high prevalence of volunteer teachers. According to the national Draft Education Sector Analysis[137], volunteer teachers in Darfur states have contributed to an increase in pupil-to-teacher ratios more than any elsewhere in Sudan. For example, 23% of teachers in basic education are volunteers in South Darfur, compared to 13% in the whole of Sudan[138] . This helps overcome the difficulties of providing teachers in remote regions of Darfur. However, this dynamic also has implications for educational quality, as many volunteers lack adequate training and operational support.

The National Learning Assessment (NLA) conducted in 2014 measured students' inability to read familiar words. Darfur states were among the worst performers (see below), with the three worst results in the country being Central Darfur, West Darfur and East Darfur. The NLA was the first and only assessment of its kind, and as such updated data Darfur-wide data on education quality is not yet available. However, this chart shows the low baseline from which education programming efforts in Darfur are starting.

[136] Source: PWG Education Sector Review Note, citing: Sudan Federal of Ministry of Education (2012-2017), Annual Statistical Books.
[137] Sudan Federal Ministry of Education (2018:49). '*Draft Education Sector Analysis*'. February.
[138] Ibid: 131



Figure 14: Proportion of learners who cannot read familiar words[139]

1.2 Current risks and threats

WASH

Environmental factors related to irreversible groundwater depletion, lower levels of rainfall, and general climate change vulnerability all have the strong potential to exacerbate WASH challenges in communities throughout Darfur.

Migration to urban areas—both from conflict-related displacement and also because of general economic migration—threatens to further overwhelm urban water and sanitation services in Darfur's rapidly growing cities.

WASH sector shortcomings, in turn, directly impact health. There is a constant threat of new water-born disease outbreaks in both urban and rural areas due to WASH service delivery failing to keep pace with rapid population growth.

Health & Nutrition

The health sector in Darfur faces a number of internal structural and external challenges. The protracted IDP crisis and the influx of South Sudanese continue to strain the system, and will do so until durable solutions are found for these extremely vulnerable populations. Moreover, with possible decreases in humanitarian funding, INGOs and NNGOs ability to help cover many of the most acute needs will dwindle, leaving a serious gap in healthcare delivery unless a combination of additional development financing, Government of Sudan support and improved systems efficiencies are able to fill it.

Darfur also has a high-level of vulnerability to public health threats and emergencies. Greater Darfur shares long borders with South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya, and there is an increasing movement of refugees and returnees to and from Darfur and these countries. This exposes Darfur states to an array of communicable and epidemic-prone diseases and other non-infectious hazards, which its current health system is inadequate to handle.

Education

Significant population mobility in Darfur—as a result of internal displacement, refugee inflows, and economic migration—puts pressure on educational institutions and threatens to reduce various educational outcomes. It is also one contributor to out of school children, which is a pressing problem in Darfur. Inadequate public financing for education threatens to undermine sustainability of any short-term gins in the sector.

[139] Source: Sudan Federal Ministry of Education., (2019a:42). *Basic Education Recovery Project (BERP)*. Biannual Progress Report for the period ended 31 December 2018. Khartoum – Sudan February 2019.

2. Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization

2.1 Key Developments Since 2013

Returns & Reintegration

According to the most recent UN OCHA figures, there are currently approximately 1.86 million IDPs in Sudan, 1.64 million of whom reside in one of the five Darfur states[140]. There was a spike in new displacements between 2013 and 2016, attributable to the renewal of fighting between government and rebel movements, particularly in the Jebel Merra area and its surroundings, but since mid-2016 the security situation has improved significantly and new displacements have decreased to the lowest levels since the start of the crisis. At the same time, *protracted* Displacement of large numbers of IDPs remains one of the defining features of the current Darfur context, with hundreds of thousands of IDP households having been displaced for over a decade.

Figure 15. Number of People Newly Displaced in Darfur, Per Year (2003-2018)[141]



It is important to note that the figures above represent officially registered IDPs, who are located in approximately 60 Government of Sudan-recognized camps[142]. In addition, an unknown number of unregistered IDPs are located in host communities and remain uncounted in this total. While politically sensitive and insufficiently researched, some estimates place the number of unregistered IDPs as high as 500,000, living in over 100 host communities and spontaneous settlements[143].

In addition to IDPs, the years of conflict in Darfur have also led to the displacement of Darfuris to neighbouring Chad. UNCHR estimates that there are currently 338,185 Sudanese refugees in Chad[144] (the vast majority of who are from Darfur). These registered refugees have lived in 11 refugee camps for the past 15 years[145].

Tellingly, the official tallies of Darfuri IDPs and refugees noted above remain largely unchanged from the figures quoted in the 2013 DDS: 1.7 million IDPs and 288,000 refugees[146].

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[140] UN OCHA., (2019a). "*Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, as of 01 March 2019.*" Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-01-march-2019

[141] UN OCHA., (2019b:7). *"Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, Draft as of 08 Jan 2019."*

[142] UN OCHA., (2018a). "*Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview, 1 February 2018'*. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-darfur-humanitarian-overview-1-february-2018.

[143] UN News., (2018). "'*Durable solutions' needed for durable peace in Darfur, UN envoy tells Security Council*". Retrieved from: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009402.

[144] UNHCR., (2019). "*Sudan: Voluntary Repatriation Dashboard. Sudanese Refugee Returnees from Chad, as of 31 Mar 2019.*" Retrieved from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67677

[145] UN OCHA., (2019b:32). *"Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, Draft as of 08 Jan 2019."*

[146] Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013:16). *'2013-2019 developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.'* Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

Returns

While returns data remains patchy, multiple sources indicate that a limited number of both IDP and refugee returns occurred between 2013 and 2019, a trend largely attributable to the improved security context. According to recent OCHA figures, a total of 315,000 IDPs and refugee are estimated to have returned as of March 2019.

Figure 16. IDPs and IDP and Refugee Returnees, by State[147]



For refugee returns, a tripartite agreement signed between Sudan, Chad and UNHCR in 2017 has resulted in a total of 3,819 "facilitated" returns, since 2018. An unconfirmed number of Sudanese refugees in Chad have also returned without assistance, with Joint Assessment missions recently conducted by HAC and IOM estimating this figure at 164,000 unfacilitated refugee returns[148].

A complicated set of variables places competing pressures on IDP and refugee households when they weigh their options to return to their areas of origin, including lack of security, underlying land conflicts, land occupation, and better access to basic services and government administrative services in IDP camps and urban settings than in areas of return.

The issue of so-called "seasonal returns" presents a microcosm of the complicated issue of displacement in Darfur. These seasonal returns are undertaken by one or more members of the household, allowing them to cultivate crops during the rainy season for consumption and sale, and to maintain linkages with their homes in order to keep the land productive and to help avoid their former holdings from being controlled by other groups. In interviews during the review process, IDP leaders and project implementers described different arrangements between IDP seasonal returnees and the current occupiers of land that allow IDPs to access for circumscribed periods of time to the land in return for share cropping, payment of land rent, and provision of labour. While many key informants during the Review noted an increase in seasonal returns, it is generally agreed that "*large-scale durable returns have, for the most part, not occurred*"[149] and that the conditions are still not conducive for such returns. Despite improvements, security still remains a fundamental concern for many IDPs, who cite it as a key reason why they still do not go back to their lands. For example, in a recent IDP profiling exercise that collected detailed data on IDP household views and intentions in two large urban camps in El Fasher, security in place of origin was cited as the main obstacle for return by 78% in one camp and 91% in the other[150].

[147] Source: UN OCHA., (2019a). "*Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, as of 01 March 2019.*" Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-01-march-2019

[148] UN OCHA., (2019b:32). *"Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019, Draft as of 08 Jan 2019*."

[149] UN OCHA., (2018b:9). *"Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018"*. Retrieved from: https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/

[150] Durable Solutions., (2018:6). *'Update on the Profiling and Durable Solutions Process in El Fasher'*. December.

Moreover, 63% of the respondents across the two camps reported that they thought it would be "impossible to claim back their homes and land," highlighting the major impediments to return[151].

Linked to these seasonal returns are issues surrounding land and land occupation, which remain one of the most sensitive topics in the region, particularly in West and Central Darfur. Reliable information is largely lacking on land occupations, and because of its sensitive and highly political nature, insufficient research has been conducted or released on the topic. Land and the complicated dynamics surrounding it are discussed in greater detail in the Pillar 1 Review Report.

Insufficient political will, which is a critical requirement for comprehensively addressing the root causes of displacement, is a constant threat to the returns process. As noted in the recent IDP Profiling Analysis, "*reaching durable solutions for IDPs is a complex process and requires political will and leadership (IDP Profiling)*[152]. Unfortunately, many of these conditions have not been met during the period 2013-2019. Examples include compensation for lost property (a major commitment of the DDPD, which remains unmet and a source of political tension; this is discussed in more detail in Pillar 1), and the granting of plots and formal access to services to urban IDPs.

Urbanization and Urban Integration

Another emerging dynamic related to displacement is the growing body of evidence highlighting that a significant number of IDP households prefer to permanently remain in their current urban or peri-urban locations. With displacement for many families stretching back a decade or more, new livelihoods strategies, new habits and new sociocultural preferences have developed, particularly in the new generation that has been born and raised in camps. As a result, recent in-depth IDP profiling data in several large camps shows that 51% of IDP households actually prefer to remain in the camp, versus 41% that are hoping to return to their place of origin[153] . The remainder intend to relocate to another area. Additional research is needed to assess the extent to which these findings are generalizable to other IDP contexts.

At the same time, the number of IDPs families formally integrated into urban areas is extremely limited. Most IDP camps in Darfur have continued to become more and more and permanent in nature, with towns growing up around them, but these camps still lack the official legal status and official connection to basic services. The risk thus grows with each passing year that these de facto neighborhoods continue to be left out of the urban fabric, reinforcing their reliance on humanitarian aid and threatening their ability to become sustainable, livable settlements in the long term.

2.2 Current risks and threats

While the situation over the past three to four years has been relatively stable, the re-emergence of violence or conflict in Darfur is all too possible. This could easily set off additional waves of displacement and make returns even more difficult. For those already displaced, there are a number of risks from a deteriorating economic situation, including rising food prices and resulting food insecurity, and declining levels of humanitarian assistance. The effects of climate change and environmental degradation are additional stressors that could make some areas less conducive to returns, as water sources and agricultural livelihoods are negatively effected by irregular rainfall and rising temperatures.

Rapidly growing urbanization rates are putting further pressure on Darfur's urban centres. Currently, more than 40% of the population of Darfur is estimated to live in urban areas[154] . This represents a significant increase since 2002, when the urban population represented an estimated 20% of the total population[155],and this figure

[151] Ibid: 9
[152] Durable Solutions., (2018:15). *'Update on the Profiling and Durable Solutions Process in El Fasher'*. December
[153] ibid: 34
[154] United Nations Human Settlements Programme., (2015:10). "*Regional Spatial Planning Strategy of Darfur. Peacebuilding, Recovery and Development of Darfur: The Urban Factor*." Nairobi: UN Habitat.
[155] Ibid:37

will likely only continue to grow, with environmental, demographic, economic and security pressures in the region. Increasing urbanization constitutes one of the primary challenges facing Darfur, because it requires heavy investments in infrastructure, housing and social services in urban areas that are often beyond the current ability of public authorities and have been relatively neglected by international assistance, as discussed below. More than half of Darfur's population live within or in the vicinity of the region's three major cities of El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina[156] . This small triangle within Darfur represents a key intervention area for future programming.

3. Transportation and Energy Infrastructure

3.1 Key Developments Since 2013

Obtaining updated information regarding the state of infrastructure in Darfur is difficult. Available data, however, makes clear that Darfur continues to suffer from a critical infrastructure deficit[157]. This deficit is thanks to a lack of investment stretching back decades, the damage and deferred maintenance resulting from the conflict, a growing (particularly urban) population that has accelerated demands for services, and the inability of either the Government of Sudan or international donor investment to keep pace with these trends.

Discussions with key informants in Darfur during the Review process' inception visits revealed that investment in infrastructure facilities and services is a prerequisite for progress in other sectors, such as agriculture and agro-industry, as well as basic service delivery.

Transportation

Poor transportation infrastructure creates enormous challenges for Darfur, including long distances to markets, stagnation of the rural economy and limited opportunities for employment. The protracted conflict since 2003 and the consequent erosion of governance and investment have aggravated a long-running infrastructure deficit that pre-dated the current crisis.

Road Transport

Darfur has one of the poorest road networks in the country. Of the 12,000 kilometres of roads surveyed in 2012, only 200 kilometres (1.7%) were asphalted and only 100 kilometres (<1 %) were gravelled, with the rest made of dirt tracks that frequently become impassable in the rainy season[158]. The PWG sub-group on infrastructure provided unconfirmed estimates that the length of paved roads had increased to 950 kilometres by 2019—500 kilometres of which was attributable to the recently completed El Ingaz road. However, even with this nearly five-fold increase in paved roads, 80% of Darfur's road network would still be unpaved.

Air & Rail Transport

Air and rail were important features of the current DDS (see discussion below). However, given the fact that few if any international actors work in these sectors and that data collection from Government officials has been challenging, the information presented on these sectors in this Review is limited. If investments in the air and rail sectors are considered in a future DDS, additional up-to-date information from Government of Sudan technical offices—and possibly via new dedicated studies—will be necessary to provide a more complete picture.

There is currently only one railway servicing Darfur, connecting Nyala to Babanousa in West Kordofan. It was reported to be in a state of disrepair, but was undergoing rehabilitation in 2016[159]. In the area of civil aviation, there are functioning regional airports in three of the state capitals: Nyala (South Darfur) El Fasher (North

[156] Ibid: 10
[157] See primarily African Development Bank Group., (2016). *'Sudan: Darfur Infrastructure Development Report. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group'*. Retrieved from: *https://www.afdb.org › uploads › afdb › Documents › Knowledge › Sudan...*
[158] ibid:7-9
[159] ibid: 12

Darfur), and Geneina (West Darfur). These are complemented by a handful of mini airports, used mainly for humanitarian purposes[160]. A State Corporation under the Ministry of Transport operates these airports. Over the past six years, UNAMID was reported to have provided a number of critical upgrades to several of these airports, including air traffic control equipment[161].

Energy

Energy access is severely restricted throughout Darfur. The region is not connected to the national grid[162], although plans to do so via a transmission line extending from Babanousa to Adila-Ed Daein-Nyala-El Faser have been in the works but have suffered from lack of funding (African Development Bank Group, 2016, p. 25). Stand-alone diesel generators in each of the five state capitals supply most of the limited amount of electricity that is available in the region. These stations are run by Sudan Thermal Generation Company, which is part of the Government-controlled Sudan Electricity Holding Company. Given the shortcomings of the electrical grid, there is also a lucrative—but haphazard—private sector for small-scale energy generation and distribution. The overall result is extremely high rates for consumers, and a majority of the Darfur population completely lacking access to electricity.

The absence of modern energy services causes serious development challenges for Darfur, and is cited as a root cause of poverty and an impediment to essential basic and administrative services[163]. It also leads to a high reliance on biomass for household energy needs, which both contributes to deforestation and environmental degradation and increases the household burden for biomass collection that falls inordinately on women and girls.

A recently completed World Bank study on power sector dynamics is currently under review by the Government, which should shed additional light on the energy sector in Darfur and Sudan-wide.

3.2 Current risks and threats

Darfur's isolation is one of the main drivers of its underdevelopment, and this has far-reaching consequences for access to basic services, and economic vibrancy. Failure to invest in transportation infrastructure will thus have deleterious impacts on the region's overall development trajectory, as well as households' access to markets, basic services, and their overall resilience.

The economic crisis—and in particular the increased costs for imported fossil fuels—have the potential to cause even greater disruptions to Darfur's troubled electricity sector, driving up costs for consumers and further eroding the limited electricity access that does exist in the region.

The current economic crisis also makes capital investment projects in both the energy and transport sectors costlier and riskier, reducing the likelihood that the Government on its own will increase the pace of infrastructure investment. In parallel, the continued inability of Sudan to access multilateral development financing from institutions such as the African Development Bank and the World Bank means that traditional avenues for beginning to redress the infrastructure deficit remain out of reach.

III. Review of peace and development efforts since 2013

1. Overview of Interventions

[160] ibid:10
[161] ibid:10
[162] ibid: 17
[163] African Development Bank Group., (2016:20). *'Sudan: Darfur Infrastructure Development Report. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group'*. Retrieved from: *https://www.afdb.org › uploads › afdb › Documents › Knowledge › Sudan...*

The review below examines *development-oriented* funding in Darfur related to Pillar 2 objectives. The information included in this overview is drawn from the UNDP-led donor mapping, the PWG consultation process, over two dozen bilateral interviews with key informants in the sectors related to Pillar 2, and a detailed literature review.

Comprehensive data was difficult to gather during this process for several reasons. First, accessing information from Government agencies was extremely challenging, thanks to generally poor recordkeeping and fragmented data collection, and the increased difficulties in communicating with Government counterparts leading up to and following the events of April 11, 2019. Secondly, despite the many donors and international NGOs present in Darfur over the past decade, no centralized tracking systems for development investments or outputs—either by region or by sector—were identified during the Review that could be mined for validated, comprehensive data. Finally, other than DDS/FaST projects, interventions did not appear to adhere to the DDS' three-pillar structure, nor did they use the DDS results framework in either their design or their monitoring. This made retroactively accounting for progress against DDS-defined indicators difficult.

As a result, the cumulative funding totals and list of projects presented in the following sections are not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, they provide an illustrative overview of relative levels of funding and general programming trends for each of the Pillar's thematic areas over the past six years.

1.1 Funding and Programming Structures

As the table below illustrates, there was a pronounced lack of development-oriented bilateral and multi-lateral funding for sectors related to Pillar 2, relative to the extremely ambitious plans in the DDS and the major development challenges in Darfur. Moreover, as discussed below, the programming that was undertaken was relatively fragmented and uncoordinated, based on individual donor priorities as opposed to a coherent whole-of-Darfur approach as envisioned in the DDS.

It should be noted that a major unknown in this illustrative accounting relates to Government of Sudan funding that is attributable to the Pillar 2 objectives. Given the Government's active role in several transportation, energy, and water infrastructure projects, as well as its involvement in the health and education sectors, Government commitments to Pillar 2 sectors were likely substantial.

Figure 17: Distribution of International Development-Oriented Funding and Assessment of Government Investments, by DDS Objective

DDS Thematic Area	DDS-proposed Funding	Estimated Actual International Funding (2013 – 2019)	Assessment of Government of Sudan Funding
Basic Services			
WASH	US$1.08 billion	US$73.1 million	Medium
Health	US$290 million	US$148.8 million	Medium
Education	US$350 million	US$54.2 million	Medium
Cross/ Multi-Sectoral	No allocation	US$91 million	
Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization			
Returns	US$140 million	US$8.5 million	Low
Urbanization	US$115 million	<US $1 million	Low
Transport & Energy Infrastructure			
Transport Infrastructure	US$2.025 billion	US$11.6 million	High
Energy Infrastructure	US$1 billion	US$5.7 million	Medium
Grand Total	**US$ 5 billion**	**US$392.8**	

The largest international investments in Pillar 2 sectors were dedicated to Health (although this total was heavily skewed by the US$110 million Turkish investment in the Nyala Teaching Hospital), WASH (owing primarily

to two large DFID programs) and Education (primarily due to the Global Partnership for Education's large Basic Education Recovery Program).

The smallest international funding flows were directed to the Transport and Energy Infrastructure. In fact, only two donor-financed projects in this thematic area were identified, and both were relatively small in size. On the other hand, the Pillar review estimates that this sector enjoyed the highest total investments from the Government. International support for these types of large-scale infrastructure activities would traditionally be the focus of multi-lateral development banks, but as a result of the sanctions regime and overall political situation in Sudan, these funding sources were largely unavailable to support development efforts in the region.

The "Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization" objective received the second-lowest overall funding total. This is partly a reflection of the fact that most of the funding that was allocated for this sector came from short-term humanitarian sources, which were not included in the Review's funding analysis. It likely also owes to the lack of a conducive environment for large-scale returns.

1.2 Funding and Programming Typologies

Donor mandates and preferences seem to have driven the funding breakdown presented above, as opposed to being influenced by the DDS' Results Framework or proposed budget.

There were three broad types of funding flowing towards Pillar 2 objectives identified in the Review:

- *DDS/FaST Projects.* These short- to medium-term projects were spread across the various Pillar 2 objectives, reflecting the fact that they were based on the DDS structure and were funded through the Qatari Government's contribution to the DDS-aligned UN Darfur Fund. A total of US$61.8 million was dedicated to DDS/FaST projects associated with Pillar 2[164].
- *Bilateral funding.* The review identified a relatively small amount of bilateral funding associated with Pillar 2, reflecting the donor community's overall reluctance to engage in longer-term development financing for Darfur over the past six years, as well as their lack of engagement in large-scale infrastructure programming that is a major feature of the Pillar 2 strategy. DFID, Turkey[165], EU and Japan were the primary contributors to this total[166].
- *Development Banks and associated funds.* The involvement of multi-lateral development banks in Darfur has been relatively low, owing to the political and legal dynamics referenced above. The World Bank-administered Global Partnership for Education fund investment in Darfur and the AfDB's Darfur Water Project for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding were the only two projects in this category identified under Pillar 2.

1.3 Alignment with the DDS

Projects were included in this Review if they met two main criteria: 1) they were development-oriented, as defined by the donor in the UNDP-led mapping exercise and/or as assessed as such by the PWG or Review consultants; and, 2) directly or "indirectly" aligned with the DDS high-level objectives and its underlying results framework. The only truly directly aligned projects identified under Pillar 2 were the DDS/FaST projects, whose design was based directly on the logic of the DDS, and which tracked progress against the specific objectives and outputs defined in the Strategy.

Beyond the FaST projects, the Review found little evidence that other programming was guided by the DDS in a direct way, reinforcing anecdotal reports received by the Review consultants that the DDS suffered from a lack of buy-in from both donors and government.

However, because the DDS' plans for Pillar 2 were crafted both very broadly—encompassing a vast range of different potential programming areas—and with little specificity of how this programming would be carried

[164] Some FAST projects span multiple Pillars, but for the purposes of this cumulative total the entire budget of a given FAST project was counted if any part of the project contributed to Pillar 2 objectives.
[165] Turkey's contribution to Pillar 2 objectives is solely for the Nyala Teaching Hospital.
[166] Qatari government commitments are categorized under the DDS/FAST projects.

out, virtually all other projects in Pillar 2-related sectors can be considered as *coincidentally* aligned with the broad aims of the Strategy. In the case of these indirectly aligned projects, the potential value-added of the DDS as a unifying framework allowing for co-ordination, synergies and standardization of projects were not realized. How the indirectly alignment played out in practice is addressed in each of the sector discussions below.

2. Basic Services

2.1 WASH: Overview

In the WASH sector, the DDS envisioned over US$1 billion in investments to achieve the high-level objective of "**Increased access to improved water sources and sanitation".** The DDS' plan to achieve this aim involved a massive increase in water and sanitation infrastructure in both urban and rural areas, as well as a small amount of complementary plans for improving policies, operations and maintenance and hygiene promotion. The anticipated results of this investment were to provide water to 5.6 million rural residents, 1.7 million urban residents, and 17.8 million livestock, along with sanitation services for 2.1 million Darfuris[167].

2.1.1 Progress and achievements

While the scale of development in the WASH sector envisioned in the DDS was far from being achieved, some investment and associated results have occurred since 2013. Several agriculture- and livestock-oriented water projects are included in the financial tally below, but are discussed in more detail under Pillar 3.

Figure 18: Total WASH Sector Investments Identified During the Review			
Project	**Donor**	**Amount[168]**	**Key Objectives / Results**

[167] Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013). *'2013-2019 developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.'* Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

[168] Calculations were based off detailed mapping of donor projects during DDS time period of 2013-2019For all projects reported in foreign currencies, the USD conversation was calculated based off the project start date. Where a month and date was not available, the year average was used. Where no date information was available, the October 2nd, 2019 rate was used.

Increased access to and use of sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services underpinned by improved integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Darfur	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$10.8 million	Completed project that provided 250,000 conflict-affected people in return villages and rural areas in the five Darfur states with gender-sensitive and sustainable improved drinking water and sanitation services [169]
Sustain Darfur (Aqua 4 Darfur)	DFID	US$23.4 million	Ongoing project that focuses on the improved management of water resources in rural areas in Darfur through the application of IWRM principles in the establishment of catchment-level water committees and the rehabilitation and construction of water infrastructure (including drinking water points, sanitation facilities and recharge infrastructure).
Urban Water 4 Darfur	DFID	US$18.7 million	Ongoing project that focuses on master planning of urban water and sanitation systems, operations support to government, and the construction of WASH infrastructure to provide sustainable and more equitable access to water in the cities of El Fasher and Zalengei. The project includes a first-of-its-kind effort to integrate Darfuri IDP camps into the existing municipal water system.
Darfur Water Project for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding	AFDB	US$3.7 million	Completed project focused on the installation of small-scale water infrastructure (boreholes, hand pumps, water yards, hafirs, and small dams) in six communities. It also developed detailed investment plans for water networks in 25 towns across Darfur [170]
Enhancing the Contribution of Local Actors to Sustainable Development and to the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals	EU	US$718,958	Completed project building the capacity of government and communities to improve management of small-scale WASH infrastructure in two towns (Um Dukhun and Bindisi) in Central Darfur and surrounding rural areas.
Tawila Dam Rehabilitation	USAID	US$1.9 million	Rehabilitation of the Tawila Dam, with the goal of improving daily water access for approximately 70,000 people, mainly IDPs.
Darfur Urban Water Supply Project	DFID	US$10.8 million	
TOTAL		**US$73.1 million**	

In addition to the projects in the above table, several other initiatives were identified during the review process that dealt with the WASH sector, but for which detailed project and budget information was not available. These projects have thus been excluded in the funding total above:

- The DRDF's investment in 115 separate borehole and water infrastructure projects[171];

[169] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). *'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018.*' From UNICEF.

[170] African Development Bank Group., (2018). *'Soudan Darfur Water Project for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, Project Completion Report (PCR).'*

[171] Darfur Reconstruction & Development Fund (DRDF)., (2019). '*Presentation by the DRDF General Secretary at DDS Review and Refresh Inception Workshop.*', March. DRDF: Khartoum.

- Additional Government of Sudan investments in the urban water networks in Nyala, Geneina and El Fasher;
- A US$12,500,000 Japanese government-funded project entitled "Strengthening Peace Through the Improvement of Public Services in Three Darfur State" and focusing on integrated basic services investments in health, water and sanitation, and M&E (but for which a breakdown of funding across the sectors was not available).
- The Qatari government's substantial investment in "service hubs" in 15 model villages, which included an unspecified amount of WASH infrastructure in each location[172]. This initiative is discussed in more detail in Pillar 3.

Relative to both the anticipated funding levels for the WASH sector in the DDS, and humanitarian investments in WASH, which totalled US$141 million for all of Sudan between 2013 and 2019[173], accomplishments in this sector have been minimal, consisting of just a handful of development-oriented projects. Primarily as a result of this limited funding, the investments listed above have had only a modest impact on the severe WASH-sector challenges across Darfur. This is particularly true given that some of the largest projects (including the two DFID initiatives cited above) have not yet been completed.

Nevertheless, several of the projects have provided scalable models for sustainably and cost-effectively improving WASH in Darfur in the future. Through the Aqua 4 Darfur project, for example, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles are being applied in the selection and management of water resources to cover multiple interrelated community water needs, including domestic, livelihood and food security requirements. As noted in the Review Note produced by the PWG, WASH objectives benefit strongly from this link to broader issues and sectors. In addition, the heavy emphasis on community ownership and buy-in has the potential to contribute to greater sustainability of the investments and gains made within the project.

Similarly, the Urban Water 4 Darfur project has provided a template not just for generally improving drinking water access in Darfur's rapidly expanding urban centres, but for normalizing water service delivery in IDP camps by integrating them into the municipal service delivery system. If successful, this could provide a template for reducing community tensions, strengthening trust between clients (i.e. citizens) and service providers (i.e. local and national government), ensuring holistic management of scarce water resources in the cities, and facilitating the transition away from long-standing but unsustainable water provisioning in IDP camps.

Per PWG members, another area of accomplishment over the past six years is in the sanitation sphere. Until recently, this area of programming was largely restricted to IDP camps and return villages, but it is being expanded. Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) achievements are still low, but there is an increased scale of programming with the launch of the National Roadmap to make Sudan Open Defecation Free by 2022. Hygiene promotion interventions have largely been confined to IDP/refugee settings, but broader-based programming has increased thanks to the DFID-funded Urban Water for Darfur project, where Tippy Taps have been introduced by UNICEF as a cost effective solution to promote hand-washing at scale in the towns of El Fasher and Zalingei.

2.1.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Sustainability. At the community level there is often lack of adequate community engagement or ownership needed to maintain water facilities. Government, at the locality level, lacks the technical, organizational or financial capacity to effectively respond. And even where capacity does exist, insufficient cost recovery means that the overall system requires external subsidies to function adequately. Indeed, recent analyses have shown that the cost recovery ratio for State Water Corporation services in three of the 4 main towns (El Fasher,

[172] This multi-sectoral program totalled $72 million, and was originally categorized as a Pillar 3-associated program in the UNDP donor mapping exercise. Detailed information regarding the program was not available at the time of this Review, but basic services do appear to make up a significant part of its overall budget and objectives.
[173] Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

Zalingei, Geneina and Nyala) in the Darfur States were between 45% to 66%[174]. In terms of environmental sustainability, analyses have found that many new water infrastructure investments are cited and designed only taking into account the needs in the target zone, and not the larger catchment[175].

Entrenched Behaviours. Entrenched sanitation behaviours will require a large-scale and sustained effort to change, if targets to achieve Open Defecation Free communities across Darfur are to be realized. Given funding priorities, the bulk of hygiene awareness campaigns to date have targeted the IDP and refugee population, but need to be expanded into all communities in the region.

Lack of Data. High-quality research into the hydrological, engineering and socioeconomic variables related to water resources and use of existing systems is generally not available. This hinders the effective exploitation of limited water resources and contributes to misspent development funds.

Operational Hurdles. Bilateral interviews with implementers identified a range of challenges in the day-to-day operations of many of the projects cited above, resulting in delays and cost-overruns. These include lack of adequately skilled private contractors, especially for more technical jobs; ongoing fuel shortages and cash liquidity issues; and new importation rules and customs fees.

2.1.4 Learning

Several key lessons-learned for future WASH programming emerged from the literature review, the PWG Review Note, and interviews with key informants.

Need for Holistic Planning. Planning for all of the uses of scarce water resources in a community—for human consumption, as well as for livestock and agriculture—can help reduce tensions and ensure sustainability. IWRM's use of catchment-based water management committees, for example, helps bring different users around the table and equitably and transparently plan for multiple demands on the resource. PWG members recommended that WASH actors more fully embed this way of thinking in their programming.

Importance of Conflict Sensitivity. By rehabbing or constructing in a zone where land occupation has occurred, a number of WASH implementers have found that there is a risk of legitimizing or reinforcing the occupation, thereby raising tensions. This risk needs to be carefully considered before and during project implementation. Convening representative, participatory bodies, such as catchment management committees, that take into account past displacement, current occupation, and current and future returns have proven helpful in dealing with such dynamics.

Operations & Maintenance Considerations Should be Paramount. Multiple evaluations have shown that Darfur is littered with broken down WASH infrastructure. How to ensure repair and upkeep of vital water resources is thus something that continues to demand concerted thought and planning. One reason for frequent failures is that these pumps and other construction projects were treated as a stand-alone resource, as opposed to a part of a "larger, integrated system of natural resources with long-standing management systems,"[176] that should be incorporated into project planning. In addition, operations and management plans need to be based on a sound analysis of the current market and administrative context. Rather than short-term facilitation of maintenance that is wholly owned by the project (and is thus unlikely to be sustainable after the assistance ends) WASH infrastructure should be chosen, cited and implemented to match the capacities of the private sector and governance entities in the zone.

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[174] Sudan Federal Ministry of Health., Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation and Electricity., (2017:16). "*Contextual Analysis – Drinking Water Safety in Sudan*.' December.
[175] Van Dalen, D., L. Rolf., (2018). "*Taadoud Water Resources".* January.
[176] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016:11). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

Gender considerations. Men, women, boys and girls have different use profiles for water and sanitation, and gender sensitivity thus needs to be taken into account when planning for WASH programming. For example, lack of adequate gender-segregated sanitation facilities, including for menstrual hygiene management, disproportionately affect girls' enrolment and attendance in schools[177]. Addressing this by engaging the voices of multiple stakeholders during the design of any intervention is a best practice identified in the PWG review.

Cost and Sustainability Benefits of Rehabilitating Existing Infrastructure. In a number of rural areas, pre-existing water infrastructure has been abandoned for many years and has thus fallen into disrepair. Seeking out this infrastructure to rehabilitate, as opposed to prioritize new construction, is a cost-effective way to rebuild water access in areas of return. It also has the potential to increase sustainability, as this is by definition infrastructure that had been used by and successfully maintained by residents prior to the conflict. The Aqua 4 Darfur program, for example, has made this approach central to their programming, and was highlighted by the PWG members as an emerging best practice.

2.1.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

There are many groups active in the WASH sector in Darfur, including multiple government offices, several UN agencies, and dozens of international NGOs, national NGOs, private sector firms, and community-based organizations. Given the number of stakeholders and because of relatively weak government capacity at the Federal and State levels, co-ordination in the sector has been a challenge. PWG members reported the main forum for co-ordination in the sector was the WASH Cluster, led by Drinking Water and Sanitation Unit (DWSU) at the Ministry of Water and Electricity Resources, and co-chaired by UNICEF. This is by definition, mainly focused on humanitarian aspects of WASH programming. For development programming, PWG members reported only ad hoc, project-oriented co-ordination—between the Federal, State and locality levels, as well as between individual international implementers and relevant line ministries. DFID and UNEP have, however, recently re-launched a national IWRM working group, which may help provide improved co-ordination in both the sector as a whole and in Darfur in particular[178].

2.1.6 Alignment of efforts with the DDS

Only one of the project identified during the Review (the DDS/FaST project on "Increased access to and use of WASH services") can be considered as directly aligned with the DDS. However, the other projects assessed demonstrated significant overlap with the objectives and outputs envisioned in the Strategy. This is likely due to the fact that the DDS's treatment of WASH is both broad in terms of the types of programming needed (i.e. increase water supply for millions of people), and not very specific in how that programming would be carried out.

To the extent that it outlines the scale of the needs in the WASH sector, the plans presented in the DDS were useful in presenting the scale and scope of the interventions needed. However, the DDS' overwhelming focus on hard infrastructure is both unrealistic in terms of the nature and amounts of funding likely to be available in the near-term context, and insufficiently emphasizes the supporting governance systems that need to be carefully designed and implemented alongside hard infrastructure for it to be successful.

2.2 Health and Nutrition: Overview

The DDS proposed allocating US$290 million[179] over six years to achieve the high-level objective of "**Enhancing access to and utilization of comprehensive health and nutrition services**".
Primary sub-objectives under this objective included:

- Constructing and rehabilitating health facilities;

[177] Source: Pillar 2 PWG, WASH Review Note
[178] Personal communication with DFID Rural Water 4 Sudan program manager
[179] Note that this figure is listed in the final DDS, but that it does not appear to match the published Basic Services Technical Working Group report, which cites $255 million for the health sector.

- Improving human resources for health, in terms of both staff and management;
- Improving pharmaceutical supply systems, including systematic procurement of medicines; and,
- Subsidizing the enrolment of poor families in the N.H.I.

Over half of the proposed budget seems to have been dedicated to construction or rehabilitation of health facilities, with the remainder split across staff employment costs, ongoing recurring costs (including subsidization of pharmaceutical purchases and National Health Insurance enrolments), and a relatively small (US$10 million) proposed investment in health systems strengthening. It is unclear from the DDS and the underlying Technical Working Group report which portions of these investments were intended to be covered by development partners, and which were expected to be absorbed by the Government of Sudan. The inclusion of recurrent costs raises questions about sustainability, as discussed below.

2.2.1 Progress and achievements

The following table (Figure 19) includes the projects assessed in the review, for which Darfur-specific funding information was available.

Figure 19. Total Health & Nutrition Sector Investments Identified During the Review

Project	Donor	Amount[180]	Key Objectives / Results
Commence Upgrading and Rehabilitating the Existing Health Facilities and Basic Health Services in Selected Return Sites in Five Darfur States	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$13.1 million	Completed project that focused on infrastructure upgrading, staff training and provision of equipment in 30 health facilities across five states (20 in urban centres and areas of protracted displacement, and 10 in return areas). Over 3 million Darfuris are estimated to be in the facilities' catchment areas, and thus benefited directly or indirectly from the upgrades (UNDF, 2019b)
Strengthening Resilience for IDPs, Returnees and Host Communities	EU	US$6.2 million	Ongoing health systems strengthening project in six localities, which focuses on support to state- and locality-level government health offices, and support to community health committees.
Improve the reproductive health status of vulnerable populations in Darfur, Sudan	EU	US$1.8 million	Completed project supporting health services capacity building to improve the maternal and child health status of vulnerable populations in North, West and Central Darfur.
Nyala Sudan-Turkey Training and Research Hospital	Turkey	US$110 million	Information not available[181]
Prevention and response to GBV in Darfur: Building institutional capacities and community mobilization	Italy	US$683,500S	

[180] Calculations were based off detailed mapping of donor projects during DDS time period of 2013-2019For all projects reported in foreign currencies, the USD conversation was calculated based off the project start date. Where a month and date was not available, the year average was used. Where no date information was available, the October 2nd, 2019 rate was used.

[181] Project included in UNDP-led donor mapping, but additional information regarding the project was not available during the Review process

and stigma reduction for sustainable response			
"Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus: Strengthening a Decentralized Health System for protracted displaced populations in North and South Darfur (HealthPro)"	Italy	US$11,000,000	
Rehabilitation of Nyala's Paediatric Hospital run by the INGO Emergency	Italy	US$275,000	
Support for the improvement of the "International Health Regulation" System in the Republic of Sudan	Italy	US$1,141,800	
Provision of essential reproductive health and sexual and gender based violence services to vulnerable migrants, particularly women and youth, in Sudan	Italy	US$1,135,998	
Prevention and response to GBV in Darfur: Building capacity for sustainable response	Italy	US$518,718	
Nationwide projects, for which Darfur-specific financials were not available			
Strengthening the Decentralized Health System to attain Universal Health Coverage in five states in Sudan	Japan	US$500,000	This project includes investments in West Darfur and Central Darfur, along with three other states in the rest of Sudan (WHO, 2018b). Additional information not available.
Enhancing Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights and preventing Gender Based Violence among refugees and internally displaced populations in South and North Darfur, North Kordufan, Gedarif, Sennar, and Gezira states in Sudan.	Germany	US$688,200	Information not available
Reducing the burden of tuberculosis	Norway	US$1.8 million	Information not available
Grand Total		US$148.8 million	

In addition to the above list of projects, there were a number of significant investments that were identified during the review process, but for which complete funding data was not available. These include the following:

- The Government of Sudan's Primary Health Care (PHC) expansion project represents some of the largest Government support to PHC in decades[182], and aims to reduce inequity by providing quality PHC services to underserved and disadvantaged populations. It focuses mainly on health facilities construction and health workforce training. In Darfur States, investments have resulted in the construction of 135 family health centres and 194 family health units. Moreover, 5,641 community midwives, 2,473 community health workers and 789 medical assistants were trained.[183]
- DRDF-funded construction of 108 health units and 62 health centres across the five states[184].
- A US$12.5 million Japanese government project on "Strengthening Peace Through the Improvement of Public Services in Three Darfur State," and focusing on integrated basic services investments in health, water and sanitation, and M&E (breakdown of funding across these sectors was unavailable during the Review).
- The Qatari government's substantial investment in "service hubs" in 15 model villages, which included an unspecified amount of health infrastructure in the form of rural hospitals in each location. This initiative is discussed in more detail in Pillar 3.

Collectively, the projects above have resulted in an increase in health infrastructure in Darfur over the past six years. However, because of shortfalls in funding relative to the health sector budget originally planned for in the DDS, these results fell well short of DDS targets. In addition, none of the provisions for ongoing recurrent costs envisioned in the DDS were captured by the projects listed above.

Moreover, the sustainability of the investments—particularly those related to infrastructure—and the overall capacity of the health systems in Darfur remain in question. The role of the humanitarian sector in Darfur's health system is directly linked to concerns regarding sustainability, as humanitarian spending in the sector has dwarfed development-oriented interventions over the past six years. Indeed, Sudan-wide humanitarian funding for the sector captured by UN OCHA between 2013 and 2019 totalled over US$182 million[185]. In 2019, NGOs—financed primarily by humanitarian funding streams—are currently responsible for approximately 1/3 of the primary health care services in Darfur[186]. As a result, observers have characterized the Darfur health sector as being stuck in a humanitarian response mode that needs to move towards longer-term development programming, but which lacks both the national capacity and the development funding to do so[187].

Fortunately, efforts like the EU-funded systems strengthening project implemented by International Medical Corps and Concern represent important forays into scaling up longer-term development assistance for health care in the Darfur region, and away from ongoing humanitarian health funding. Taking these kinds of approaches to scale will be critical if the Darfur health sector is able to sustainably develop.

In terms of policy efforts in the sector, one of the most important developments was the revision of the National Health Strategy in 2017, with the new strategy covering the period 2017-2030. The new plan is guiding health system reform towards the goal of attaining Universal Health Coverage (UHC), and focuses on two areas: 1) addressing social determinants of health through adopting multi-sectoral approaches that take health into consideration in policies and decisions of different sectors (the "Health in All Policies" approach) to achieve healthy lives and wellbeing for all people living in Sudan; and, 2) Investing in health system resilience that is able to function in all contexts, including in situations of emergency and fragility. This change reflects a general shift towards a more holistic conception of health in the Government's approach to the sector, both nationally and in Darfur.

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[182] Per PWG Health Sector Review Note

[183] PWG Health Review Note, citing Sudan Federal Ministry of Health., (2018). "*PHC Expansion Progress Report, Federal Ministry of Health*" (in Arabic). May.

[184] Darfur Reconstruction & Development Fund (DRDF)., (2019). '*Presentation by the DRDF General Secretary at DDS Review and Refresh Inception Workshop*.', March. DRDF: Khartoum.

[185] Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

[186] PWG Health Review Note, citing WHO-Sudan (2013-2019). Health Resources Availability and Monitoring Systems (HeRAMS), multiple year data from 2013 to 2019

[187] Trithart, A., (2019). "*Stuck in Crisis: The Humanitarian Response to Sudan's Health Emergency*," International Peace Institute. April. Retrieved from: https://www.ipinst.org/2019/04/stuck-in-crisis-the-humanitarian-response-to-sudans-health-emergency.

2.2.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Despite the progress noted above, a number of near-term constraints impacted the sector. For example, efforts to improve access to and quality of healthcare services were hamstrung by inadequate capacities of the local decentralized health system. In some areas the local level of health administration is present but incompletely staffed and resourced; in other zones, particularly in the newer states or in underserved return areas, it is completely absent. Shortages and inequitable distribution of the health workforce, particularly for rural and remote areas, and a lack of retention mechanisms and arrangements in these locations are a defining feature of the healthcare system that has yet to be planned for—let alone successfully overcome—in Darfur. Management information systems are also poor, undercutting policy reform efforts that require good data to drive informed-decision making. Indeed, fragmented poorly coordinated and predominantly paper-based health information system with limited use of technologies and innovations. This critical missing piece in the healthcare delivery chain offsets other gains in terms of improved health sector leadership and policymaking and investments in infrastructure.

There are also broader problems with the governance system, in terms of lack of clarity and accountability around implementation and enforcement of policies. As a result, positive progress in Khartoum and the state capitals made on health sector leadership frequently does not result in change on the ground.

2.2.4 Learning

Ensuring the Sustainability of Infrastructure. The construction and rehabbing of facilities, particularly in a constrained funding situation, demands careful consideration regarding targeting. As with other Pillar 2 sectors, hard infrastructure is useful but costly, and incorrect placement has led to underutilization, lack of maintenance and ultimately ineffective expenditures, according to interviews in the field with implementers and feedback from the PWG. Sustainability of health infrastructure investments thus require a well-coordinated and multi-sectoral approach if the multi-faceted determinants of health and health challenges are to be adequately addressed during their construction.

Importance of Community Buy-in. Community is also critical, and there is a need to improve and strengthen community health systems and establish and/or strengthen mechanisms for effective community engagement. Locality-level government health structures contain a specific role for Community Engagement, but according to the PWG members but additional efforts to help fill these posts, train the personnel, establish clear policies for community engagement, and provide sufficient resources for these staff to do their work are needed in many areas of Darfur.

The Growing Burden of Non-Communicable Disease. Finally, health experts are increasingly recognizing the growing importance of non-communicable diseases, including mental health and disabilities, in Darfur and the need to better take these diseases into account in future programming.

2.2.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

According to the PWG Health Review Note, co-ordination has improved significantly at national and sub-national level over the past few years. The National Health Sector Co-ordination Council, chaired by the Head of State, was established in 2016 to enhance policy coherence and improve co-ordination between different ministries and governmental entities involved in the health sector. The Health Sector Partners Forum, also begun in 2016, is chaired by the Minister of Health, and is a platform for health partners and stakeholders to improve alignment with national priorities and ensure harmonization. It includes representatives from different constituencies including government, development partners, humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations, and the private sector. The Forum has replaced different fragmented fora in the sector, and provides international actors a firm point of anchorage for their activities. At the same time, there are varying levels of success with this co-ordination across and within states, with newer states like Central Darfur possessing less capacity.

2.2.6 Alignment of efforts with the DDS

As with other sectors, most of the development-oriented programming in the health sector was not *directly* aligned with the DDS. One exception in the health sector is the UNDF FaST project on health facilities construction, implemented by WHO and other UN agency partners. At the same time, there is *coincidental* alignment between a number of the development-oriented health programs listed above and the broad objectives and sub-objectives in the DDS. The Government of Sudan's investments in health facility construction and rehabilitation through the National PHC program is an example of this indirect, coincidental alignment.

Finally, the handful of projects linked to health systems strengthening and addressing particular health issues (e.g. reproductive health, tuberculosis, etc.) were also indirectly aligned with the DDS. However, while these projects broadly contribute to the DDS' objective of enhancing access to health services, they do not apply the same logic as the DDS of a rapid and broad geographical scale-up of the entire primary health care apparatus in Darfur.
The DDS approach to the health sector was oriented towards a massive, one-time infusion of resources to blanket Darfur with an immediately improved set of standardized health services. This was to have been achieved primarily through investments in hard infrastructure, as well as providing funds for recurring costs associated with of supply chains and subsidies for low-income households. As discussed below, an increased focus on overall health systems strengthening—as opposed to individual inputs, like infrastructure or recurring costs—in a future DDS could help achieve more lasting results while better conforming to the current funding context.

2.3 Education: Overview

The DDS proposed a total of US$350 million in investments **to "improve access to and quality of education"**[188]. Interestingly, unlike other sectors within Pillar 2, Education in the DDS seems to have been less focused on hard infrastructure activities, and more on equipping and running schools, and subsidizing the education of vulnerable populations. For example, a total of approximately US$110 million was envisioned for school feeding, schooling costs for out of school children and youth, and provision of textbooks and school supplies.

This is likely partly due to the fact that the DDS plan was meant to complement the four-year Basic Education Recovery Program (BERP), which had been signed shortly before the drafting of the DDS and which had a large component on school construction.

2.3.1 Progress and achievements

The following projects were included in the UNDP donor mapping and assessed in the Review.

Figure 20: Total Education Sector Investments Identified During the Review			
Project	**Donor**	**Amount[189]**	**Key Objectives / Results**

[188] There is an apparent disconnect between the overall total allocation for Education ($350 million) listed in the final DDS document, and the amount listed in the Annexed Basic Services Technical Working Group report Results Framework ($138 million)
[189] When necessary, amounts in original currency have been converted to USD using current exchange rates (August 11, 2019, www.xe.com)

Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$6.1 million	The project promoted access to education for out-of-school children, reaching a total of 40,705 children (19,171 girls and 21,534 boys). This was accomplished through community sensitization and enrolment campaigns, teacher training for 843 ALP facilitators, and the provision of safe, accessible and enabling learning environments through the construction of 55 ALP units (each consisting of two classrooms, one teachers office, and gender sensitive latrines)[190]
Basic Education Recovery Project (BERP)	Global Partnership for Education / World Bank	US$30 million[191]	Over 500 classrooms constructed across Darfur, with 855 schools benefiting from school grants. See below for more information on this high-impact project[192]
Primary Education Programme for Darfur	EU	US$6.5 million	Information not available[193]
Grant to finance the implementation of a project in the field of education	Qatar	US$1.6 million	Information not available[194]
South Sudanese Refugee Education	UK	US$.6 million	
Prospects Partnership	Netherlands	US$5.5 million	
Nationwide projects, for which Darfur-specific financials were not available			
Assisting Regional Universities in Sudan" (ARUS)	Norway	US$2.9 million	Project included support to Nyala University, in addition to other higher education institutions elsewhere in Sudan.
Grand Total		**US$54.2 million**	

Additional projects, for which disaggregated Darfur-specific funding data was not available, include the following:

- The DDS-FaST project on "Construction of Public Buildings/facilities and housing in return sites" included construction of four schools in return areas within South Darfur and East Darfur[195];
- DRDF investments in the education sectors, including the construction or rehabilitation of 308 primary schools, 40 secondary schools, 18 teachers' residences, and 6 university halls[196]
- The Qatari government's substantial investment in "service hubs" in 15 model villages, which included an unspecified amount of school infrastructure in each location. This initiative is discussed in more detail in Pillar 3.

[190] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019c). '*Construction of Public Buildings/facilities and housing in return sites. Final Programme1 Narrative Reporting Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018.*' From UN-Habitat.
[191] The Sudan wide funding total for BERP was $76.5 million; per an interview with World Bank project manager, approximately $30 million of this total was dedicated to Darfur.
[192] Sudan Federal Ministry of Education., (2019b). *'Education Sector Strategic Plan, 2018/19 – 2022/23'*. January.
[193] Project included in UNDP-led donor mapping, but additional information regarding the project was not available during the Review process
[194] Project included in UNDP-led donor mapping, but additional information regarding the project was not available during the Review process
[195] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019d). '*Increased access to and use of sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene (wash) services underpinned by improved integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Darfur. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format, Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018'*. From Unicef.
[196] Darfur Reconstruction & Development Fund (DRDF)., (2019). '*Presentation by the DRDF General Secretary at DDS Review and Refresh Inception Workshop*.', March. DRDF: Khartoum.

The small number of projects and the fact that project documentation was unavailable for several initiatives made review of this sector particularly challenging. Other than the Global Partnership for Education's BERP (see below) development-oriented investments in the sector were modest. Some progress on addressing the issue of out of school children and youth was made via the Qatari-funded FaST project on Accelerated Learning. However, the total enrolment of 40,000 out-of-school youth is still minimal relative to the over 900,000 children out of school in Darfur estimated by the Ministry of Education in 2013[197].

School construction was a common feature of the two projects for which documentation was available, highlighting the importance of improving the learning environment to combat increasing school dropout rates that have contributed to a stagnating Gross Enrolment rate. As with infrastructure investments in other sectors, however, the sustainability of these bricks-and-mortar centric investments are very much in question, with lack of qualified teachers, learning materials, and overall education sector management processes all undercutting the impact of new and rehabilitated schools.

Figure 21: Profile of the Basic Education Recovery Project (BERP)[198]

By far the largest investment—and impact—in the sector was achieved through the Basic Education Recovery project (BERP), which has well documented and impressive results that provide important lessons for the rest of the sector moving forward. Pre-dating the design of the DDS, this US$76.5M nationwide project worked in all five Darfur states between 2012 and 2018, investing a total of roughly US$30 million in Darfur, primarily on school construction. This construction, completed through an innovative community-contracting model, resulted in the opening of 508 school classrooms across Darfur. 855 schools in Darfur also benefited from school grants, which helped Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) directly manage grants of 10,000SDG to cover schools' operating costs, supplies, and salaries. By having these grants directly managed by the community, buy-in was increased. Finally, the BERP also invested heavily in data collection in the education sector, including conducting the first-ever National Learning Assessment in 2014 and developing a "Rapid Survey" school census that conducted four rounds of nation-wide data collection in order to improve the country's education management information system. The lessons-learned from the program provide a blueprint for future evidence-based programming in the sector.

2.3.2 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Education projects assessed in this Review faced a number of challenges over the past six years. Overall, there are extremely limited technical capacities in the state Ministries of Education and high staff turnover. This problem is even more severe at the local level, with a major lack of teachers in rural Darfur. This makes capacity building extremely difficult, and threatens sustainability of any interventions in the sector.

As noted in the ALP final report[199], projects also face challenges in improving education outcomes for vulnerable populations given that they are apt to move in and out of the target zones. This is particularly true for IDP, refugee and Out-of-School youth, but applies for Darfur as a whole as well—in particular in rural areas.

Like in other sectors, projects involving construction faced operational issues with security access, fuel shortages, and lack of qualified contractors.

[197] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2015:2). *'Joint Project Document: Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), including life-skills and improved access to employment opportunities for out-of-school children and youth'*. January. Khartoum: UNDF.
[198] Sources = Sudan Federal Ministry of Education (2019b); interview with World Bank BERP Project Manager.
[199] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019c). '*Construction of Public Buildings/facilities and housing in return sites. Final Programme1 Narrative Reporting Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018.*' From UN-Habitat.

2.3.3 Learning

Working through Government Systems Reinforces Sustainability. Instead of using intermediate service providers to conduct the trainings and cash distributions related to its school grants systems, the BERP initiative piloted the use of locality administrators. This increased engagement from government officials, and with it ownership and overall sustainability of the completed structures also increased.

Community Construction of Schools. Community contributions to school construction are a common practice in Darfur. Building on this, BERP experimented with community construction grants, in which the local education committee directly received funds and oversaw the construction of schools in their communities. A detailed procurement manual and standardized Bills of Quantity and designs were developed to ensure quality. The results were significant savings and increased community ownership and buy-in compared with the conventional procurement approach also tested in the Program[200]. This model has the potential to be replicated in future construction of schools and other small-scale infrastructure (such as health clinics) across Darfur.

2.3.4 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

In 2014 the BERP project and UNICEF established a development-focused forum under the leadership of the Ministry of Education that gathers donors together on a quarterly basis to discuss country-wide sectoral developments. This Education Co-ordination Group (ECG), "strengthens co-operation amongst partners and promotes country ownership through information sharing and policy dialogue.[201]" In addition, a related Education Partners Group (EPG), composed of donors and actors such as UNICEF, harmonizes partners' interventions in the education sector and interacts with the Government through the ECG. Given the lack of development-oriented programming in the sector, however, another primary forum for education co-ordination is the Education Cluster managed by UN OCHA.

2.3.5 Alignment of efforts with the DDS

As a FaST project, the ALP was directly aligned with the DDS, contributing to the DDS FaST framework goals of increasing the number of out-of-school youth having access to accelerated learning. The BERP project was taken into account during the design of the DDS and was meant to be complementary to the strategy; its objectives and modalities, including school construction, and provision of learning materials, are thus quite similar to the DDS objectives, even though its design predates the DDS.

Overall the activities undertaken within the projects listed above address DDS targets in the Education sector, but funding shortfalls meant that many of the intended achievements were not reached. One discrepancy between the DDS and subsequent programs was that completed programs focused predominantly on primary and secondary education, while the DDS also emphasized investments in pre-school and universities.

The content of the DDS' education strategy remains generally relevant today, presenting a fairly well-balanced and sensible—if ambitious—set of recommendations for the sector. One potential gap is on wider sectoral reform and capacity building; the DDS mentions training programs, but these are not necessarily situated within a larger framework for sustainable capacity building for the broader system. Addressing this in a future DDS should be a priority of the Government and Donors. Lessons from the BERP project can be drawn upon to quickly and effectively achieve targets in the sector moving forward.

3. Returns

[200] Interview with World Bank BERP project manager
[201] Terms of Reference, Education Partners' Group (EPG) in Sudan, undated.

3.1 Overview

Addressing displacement was a major concern for both the DDPD and the DDS. To respond to this important issue, the DDS proposed three interrelated high-level objectives:

- **"Successful social and economic reintegration of returnees"**
- **"Improved quality of urban environment and access to planned land for residents in major towns of Darfur"**
- **"Improved access to quality urban housing and services"**

A total of US$255 million was estimated as being required to achieve these aims—US$140 million for returns to rural areas, and a total of US$115 million for the two urban-related objectives.

Given discrepancies[202] between the funding amounts listed for these objectives in the final DDS and the detailed costed results frameworks included in the DDS' Thematic Working Group on Returns, Reintegration and Urbanization annex, it is not possible to determine the exact breakdown of proposed budgets across these three objectives. However, it is clear is that the DDS assumed that a large number of rural returns of both IDPs and refugees would occur over the six-year time period, and proposed supporting them using two main types of interventions:

- Directly facilitated returns for both IDPs and refugees, involving activities such as go-see visits, facilitated transportation to the areas of return, and short-term reintegration packages; and,
- Construction of security facilities in areas of return, including police stations and prisons.

Strikingly, despite the DDS' focus on transition from humanitarian to recovery and development programming, the proposed interventions in the Returns sector were relatively short-term in nature, and were apparently meant to join up with other, longer-term, investments in other sectors across the three Pillars. The implications of this siloed approach to returns will be discussed in more detail below.

The urbanization objectives in the current DDS were focused primarily on the following:

- A housing construction fund providing "self-help" housing subsidies to 41,000 households. This represented the largest single planned expenditure in the urbanization sector; and,
- A series of relatively low-cost assessments, urban planning efforts and capacity building initiatives to ensure that the tools and frameworks necessary to manage high rates of growth throughout Darfur's urban centres were firmly in place.

The vast majority of this funding was reserved for the housing fund. Interestingly, the DDS' plans for urban integration were not linked to other types of assistance to IDP households, such as urban livelihoods support.

3.2 Progress and achievements

Returns and Reintegration

Below is a list of the small number of development-oriented projects related to returns, reintegration and urbanization identified during the review process. This list excludes humanitarian funding, which (through the Returns, Recovery and Reintegration, or "RRR", sector) was a primary source of non-development funding for returns between 2013-2019, with total Sudan-wide RRR funding documented by UN OCHA estimated at US$19.9 million[203]. The list below also excludes a number of short-term integrated programming initiatives (often funded through humanitarian sources) that implicitly link to the issue of returns via investments in areas of return, but which are primarily associated with livelihoods, resilience, peacebuilding/conflict resolution, and access to basic services. As discussed in the "Analysis of Needs and Priorities" section below, a future DDS should consider treating returns as a transversal issue across all Pillars, as opposed to a standalone topic.

[202] For example, while the DDS objective for "social and economic reintegration of returnees" was $140 million in the final DDS, the TWG Results Framework total was $70.9 million

[203] Authors' calculations, based on data from Financial Tracking Service, 2019

Figure 22: Total Returns Sector Investments Identified During the Review			
Project	**Donor**	**Amount[204]**	**Key Objectives / Results**
Promotion of Sustainable Return and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees in Darfur	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$5 million	Led by UNDP, this integrated project focused on a wide-ranging set of activities to promote returns of both IDPs and refugees in three localities in North, West and Central Darfur. Interventions included construction of three police stations and three schools, direct reintegration assistance to a small number of returnee households, livelihoods promotion activities, and capacity building for the VRRC and the RRR Cluster, and co-funding for the IDP Profiling Analysis in El Fasher[205].
Enhancing Sustainable Reintegration of IDP and Refugee Returnees while Promoting Community Cohesion through the Provision of Livelihoods, Basic Infrastructure and Services in Darfur	Japan	US$600,000	The project builds on ongoing humanitarian interventions in return areas being carried out by IOM, and will focus on two to three localities in North and South Darfur and provide integrated socio-economic interventions of livelihood assistance, basic services (community health and WASH) and infrastructure.
Sudan: Enhancing the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants	Italy	US$2.8 million	Sudan: Enhancing the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants
TOTAL		US$8.5 million	

In addition to the interventions above, several other projects were identified during the Review that are related to the issue of returns, but for which disaggregated funding data regarding their returns-related components was not available. These include:

- UNHCR's voluntary repatriation of Darfuri refugees living in Chad, which has resulted in the facilitated return of 3,819 individuals since 2018[206]. In addition to return transport to Darfur, UNHCR provides returnees with temporary household reintegration assistance to meet immediate shelter and food needs, and engages in small-scale community investments (including basic services, livelihoods support, security, and peacebuilding). This work has been partially funded via the DDS FaST project (which reported 353 refugees repatriated thanks to the project), as well as other unspecified sources.
- DRDF, UNAMID and UNDP-led projects constructed police infrastructure assets, an activity which was categorized as falling under the DDS' objective on Returns, as discussed above. For example, DRDF reported constructing 63 police infrastructure assets[207]. These projects are described in more detail in the Pillar 1 Review Report.
- The Qatari government's substantial investment in "service hubs" in 15 model villages, which included construction of police stations in each location. This initiative is discussed in more detail in Pillar 3.

[204] Calculations were based off detailed mapping of donor projects during DDS time period of 2013-2019For all projects reported in foreign currencies, the USD conversation was calculated based off the project start date. Where a month and date was not available, the year average was used. Where no date information was available, the October 2nd, 2019 rate was used.
[205] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019e). '*Livelihoods Project. Final Project Report. January 2016 to December 2018*', from FAO.
[206] UNHCR., (2019). "*Sudan: Voluntary Repatriation Dashboard. Sudanese Refugee Returnees from Chad, as of 31 Mar 2019.*" Retrieved from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67677
[207] Darfur Reconstruction & Development Fund (DRDF)., (2019). '*Presentation by the DRDF General Secretary at DDS Review and Refresh Inception Workshop.*', March. DRDF: Khartoum.

- The Durable Solutions Pilot Initiative, led by Government of Sudan and the UN Resident Coordinator's office, has developed four "Durable Solutions Plan of Action" in four communities in Um Dukhun locality, as a test case for durable solutions programming in return areas. However, other than a small amount of short-term humanitarian funding from the Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), no financing to operationalize the plans has materialized[208], underscoring the general lack of longer-term development-oriented funding for the sector.

Assessing the impact of the projects listed above on the number of durable returns was challenging, given a lack of detailed data on the projects, as well as the highly complex and fluid displacement context, which inhibits gauging the impact of any one project on the returns decision-making of a specific household or community. Nevertheless, given the relatively low number of verified returns (whether or not they are attributable to specific programming) and the high levels of households known to still be in protracted displacement, it is clear that Government of Sudan and international efforts to promote returns have to date had a negligible impact on the overall displacement situation. One primary reason for this is the marked lack of funding. Without significantly higher amounts of resources available, supporting the durable return of hundreds of thousands of displaced households is simply not possible. Another factor in the lack of demonstrable results, however, can be attributed to the approach used by many of the projects above. Given their relatively short-time frames and patchwork of loosely coordinated investments that are not anchored in efforts to systematically address underlying barriers to return, many of the projects examined are by definition not able to achieve durable returns. The implications of this finding for a future DDS will be further discussed in the section below on Analysis of Needs and Priorities.

Figure 23: Profile on DFID's Taadoud Project

The DFID-funded Taadoud I and Taadoud II projects are large-scale, multi-year integrated projects that aim to "build the resilience of returnee and vulnerable communities through equitable governance and sustainable access to natural resources, strengthened household livelihoods and improved household nutritional status, and facilitate returns and reintegration." (CRS, undated factsheet). Because these projects are primarily related to resilience and livelihoods, and have only a tertiary focus on returns, they have been included in Pillar 3's financial accounting. However, the Taadoud projects provide a possible model for how returns might be promoted in a more holistic, systematic and ultimately more durable manner.

A two-phase, eight-year project funded by DFID and implemented by a consortium of NGOs led by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Taadoud has combined long-term livelihoods and natural resources management with an implied[209] focus on returns in a way that is unique across the projects surveyed. The first phase of the project directly supported 63,000 households in 242 communities to improve their agricultural livelihoods, personal savings and health and nutrition. Taadoud is extending this work to target over 175,000 conflict-affected households in all five Darfur states (CRS, undated factsheet). While not exclusively a returns program, Taadoud I focused on returnees and returnee villages, whereas Taadoud has expanded its focus to include entire populations within catchment areas where returns are prevalent, thus also including other groups, including pastoralists[210]. Returns under this project are promoted through a "pull" approach anchored around sustained investments in the areas of return, as opposed to direct facilitation of households from camps to areas of return, as envisioned in the DDS Strategy. Rather than one-off offers of assistance, or a one-time series of infrastructure construction projects, the investments are made in close consultation and partnership

[208] Unpublished working draft of the "Sudan Durable Solutions Strategy"

[209] For more info, see Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019a). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

[210] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019:2). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. April.

with community and government structures, greatly reinforcing sustainability. Directly integrating returns programming within long-term, participatory and multi-sectoral projects like Taadoud thus has the potential for more durable and cost-effective means of addressing displacement in Darfur in a future DDS.

Urbanization and Local integration

Remarkably little programming has been completed related to urbanization and local integration over the past six years. Multi-sectoral urban planning efforts and investments in affordable housing as envisioned by the DDS have been largely non-existent, leaving major gaps in the ability of local, regional and national authorities to proactively plan for and accommodate ongoing urban growth. The handful of programs associated with these DDS objectives that were identified in the Review were the following:

- Under the DDS-FaST project, "Construction of Public Facilities and Housing in Return Sites and Urban Settings," a small investment in 40 self-help housing grants for low-income households in urban settings was made. This is a far cry from the 41,000 housing grants anticipated in the DDS, reflecting lack of funding for the sector, but also the absence of a coherent policy framework provided by the Government of Sudan that would facilitate formal integration of IDPs into the the cities in which they have lived for many years. This project also financed the establishment of two "urban observatories" within the Ministry of Planning in El Fasher and Nyala. The objective of this effort was to strengthen urban capacities to collect, select, manage, and apply indicators and other information in policy analysis, urban planning and urban development. This project is included in the financial totals of the Returns Sector above.
- As part of the Durable Solutions Pilot Initiative in El Fasher, the Government of Sudan, the World Bank, and the UN Country Team developed urban spatial profiling plans for the city that present solutions for integrating IDPs in Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps into the urban fabric.

Beyond these small investments, there have been complementary (and more sizable) efforts to plan for improved basic services in several cities. Most prominently, urban master plans for both water and sanitation and related infrastructure investments have been developed as part of DFID's Aqua 4 Darfur project in Zalingei and El Fasher, and the AFDB Darfur Water Project for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, both discussed in the WASH section above.

3.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

The sector has faced a number of internal and external constraints that have contributed to the lack of progress in the returns sector.

Funding Shortfalls. There has been a general lack of funding for returns-oriented activities, as evidenced by the less than US$10 million for programming with a specific focus on returns that was identified in the Review. This is partly due to the absence of a conducive environment for returns, discussed above, that defined much of the 2013-2019 period, and which likely cooled donor interest in supporting returns programming. However, even where needs have been clearly identified and well-designed plans for responding to them developed, funding has often failed to materialize. For example, the Durable Solutions Working Group held a series of consultations in 2018 in Um Dukhun locality as part of its pilot initiatives, resulting in the development of four communities "Plans of Action" that laid out activities to help the returnees overcome their obstacles to durable solutions. The plans were meant to galvanise the international community to support the durable solution process, but in spite some short-term interventions funded by the SHF, longer-term projects to support solutions have as of yet not materialized.

Interestingly, the lack of funding for returns programming also appears to extend to humanitarian-oriented efforts. As noted by the co-lead of the RRR sector, one of their key roles is to conduct verification missions to villages of return, and then "graduate" these assessments to full returns/durable solutions programming.

However, every year a number of assessments are conducted and needs are identified, but funding gaps prevent the RRR sector members from fully responding[211].

Co-ordination. The area-based and multi-sectoral approach to returns and promoting durable solutions requires a high degree of co-ordination, but interviewees and PWG members noted that it was often challenging to bring the full array of partners together to plan and implement together. Organizations tend prefer to propose projects and have them funded independently of other efforts on the ground, rather than taking the time to collaboratively prepare a full array of projects for a certain area, and which can cover the full humanitarian-peace-development spectrum. In these situations, donor processes, including a current preference for short-term, humanitarian-oriented programming, and organizations' own self-interest can tend to work against the development of returns interventions that truly meets the needs of returnees, prospective returnees, and host communities.

Policy Constraints. Recently, the Government of Sudan has reiterated support for durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, and the desire to help displaced households choose the option (return to area of origin, relocate, or integrate locally) that is best for them. However, lack of clarity of what this will mean in practice around difficult issues such as land occupation, compensation, and access to land in urban settings frustrates progress. Unlocking donor resources is thus predicated on clear and meaningful steps by the Government to define returns and reintegration plans and policies.

More broadly, contrary to what was anticipated in the DDS, no Government-led compensation program was launched and no compensation paid (see Pillar 1 for a more detailed discussion of this issue). The lack of movement on this hot-button topic provided another headwind for returns, and continues to be a political impediment to large-scale returns.

3.4 Learning

Tackling Root Causes of Displacement. Research on the Taadoud project detailed the importance of addressing access to land and water. The lessons from this project clearly highlight that household's recoveries in areas of origin will be severely—if not fatally —undermined if they are not able to regain access to their former lands[212]. This sets a high bar for durable solutions in many areas and demands realism about what will and will not be possible in terms of large-scale durable returns in the near- to medium-term.

Water Access as a Key Tool for Leveraging Returns. The importance of water as one of *the* most critical natural resources in Darfur is discussed in detail elsewhere in this review report, but its direct relationship to returns is worth emphasizing. Several implementers in the returns sector noted during interviews that their primary entry point for community planning, conflict resolution and increased resilience was through increasing the availability and equitable management of water resources. More of this vital resource helps "grow the pie" in resource-constrained settings and—if carefully programmed—both decrease tensions and increase economic opportunities. This in turn creates a more conducive and sustainable environment for returns.

Importance of Accurate Intentions Data for Planning. The recently completed IDP Profiling Initiative undertaken by the Durable Solutions Working Group (DSWG) DSWG, with support from the World Bank and the Government of Sudan, has for the first time provided detailed, high-quality data on IDP intentions, needs, and living situations in Darfur. The study, conducted in two large-scale camps in El Fasher comprising a combined 80,083 individuals, highlights that approximately 50% of camp residents prefer to stay in their current location and fully integrate locally[213]. The study also showed that ongoing lack of security in return areas and the inability to reclaim lost land and property remain major impediments to returns for the estimated 40% of

[211] Key informant interview with UNDP RRR Sector Lead.
[212] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.
[213] Durable Solutions., (2019). '*Progress Towards Durable Solutions in Abu Shouk and El Salam IDP Camps, North Darfur, Sudan'*. UKAID. World Bank. UNSUDAN. Retrieved from: http://sd.one.un.org/

returnees who do want to go back[214]. This type of data is essential for the development of effective, evidence-based programming on returns. The implications of these figures for future planning are explored later in this Review.

Focusing Returns Programming on Entire Communities. According to PWG members and interviewees with several project practitioners, experience has shown that community cohesion is enhanced when both returnees and host communities are incorporated into returns-related programming, as opposed to focusing exclusively on returnees. A more inclusive approach to beneficiary targeting helps prevent community tensions and can tend to facilitate more even sustainable development in the zone. This in turn has a greater chance of resulting in lasting "pull" effects to resettlement in the community, as opposed to potentially divisive and ephemeral short-term incentives provided only to returnees.

3.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

There has been an ongoing evolution in co-ordination in the Returns sector over the past six years. The Returns, Recovery and Reintegration (RRR) Sector was established in 2013, under the leadership of UNDP and as part of the humanitarian cluster system. The Sector is co-led by IOM, UNDP and CRS, and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) is the government counterpart. Since its inception, the RRR has advocated for multi-sectoral, area-based approaches that focus on the *immediate* needs of returnees[215]. Given its position within the Humanitarian Cluster system, the RRR is able to access resources through various humanitarian funding streams, including CERF and the Sudan Humanitarian Fund.

Beginning in 2017, a complementary DSWG was created, which has been pushing a number of co-ordination and learning initiatives designed to further promote well-coordinated durable solutions options for displaced households. The DSWG falls under the overall umbrella of Collective Outcomes, a feature of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus in which funding for humanitarian, peace and development projects should be seamless and not in separate 'envelopes'. It was established by the UN Resident Coordinator's office in order to strengthen co-ordination and thinking around durable solution, which was perceived as a key development and peace issue for Darfur and Sudan as a whole. To date, the DSWG has focused on broader thought leadership, through convening meetings, advocating for donor funding and policy changes, and the drafting of a forthcoming Durable Solutions Strategy. Importantly, as noted above, the DSWG has also overseen the launching of pilots (one urban and one rural) to develop scalable models for future programming based on best-practices that have been adapted to the Darfur context. An important focus of the DWSG has been not just on returns to rural areas, but on local integration within urban areas, through pilot activities conducted in close co-ordination with the government in El Fasher.

Together, these two coordinating structures were directly relevant for DDS-aligned programming in the Returns sector. However, additional strengthening and formalization of their roles will be necessary to adequately support scaled-up programming to address displacement. In particular, unified advocacy and policymaking will be required if knotty issues like allocation of urban plots and rural land occupation are to be adequately addressed. The potential for the new Durable Solutions strategy to form the basis for this strengthened co-ordination system is discussed below.

3.6 Alignment to the DDS

The returns projects identified above were generally aligned with the DDS. However, several small but important discrepancies can be noted. First, while the DDS focused much of the proposed budget for returns on providing short-term, direct assistance to households, the implemented projects tended to reserve this for only vulnerable households. In addition, the DDS appears to have anticipated returns projects joining up with investments in the same areas made by other projects/sectors, in reality the programs that were implemented

[214] Ibid.
[215] Early Recovery., (2019). '*Sudan Country Page'*. Retrieved from: http://earlyrecovery.global/country/sudan.

tended to combine assistance into one multi-sectoral, area-based approach. Finally, while the DDS anticipated facilitating returns starting from the point of displacement and by targeting "spontaneous return areas"; in practice, most projects surveyed took a reactive approach, only targeting an area once returns were verified to be occurring there.

The extremely small amount of funding for urban integration also aligned with DDS plans the urban sector, focused on urban planning and housing grants for displaced households wishing to remain in their current location.

The paucity of funding for the overall RRU sector meant that the vast majority of the targets for returns and urban integration remain unmet. As an example, the DDS budget assumed 280,000 refugee returnees[216], but only 3,819 have been achieved to date[217]. For urbanization, a total of 41,000 self-help housing construction grants in urban areas were also envisioned[218], with only 40 identified as completed by the Review. Similarly, none of the urban and regional plans across the five states anticipated by the DDS were undertaken.

Overall, the logic of the returns sector in the DDS was built on a highly optimistic assumption of mass returns of both IDPs and refugees. The DDS text even expresses worry about the need to move quickly with training programs for IDPs in the first 12 months of the strategy period before they leave the camps and there is a "a scattering [of IDPs] to their villages."[219]. With the benefit of six years of hindsight, it is now evident that the prerequisites for large-scale, permanent returns are not yet in place. Moreover, these preconditions depend on resolving deeply entrenched root causes of conflict and displacement that development programming on its own—without substantial political will on the part of the Government to underpin it—may be unable to solve.

This optimism extends to the modality of interventions that the DDS proscribed, which is defined by direct interventions into the return process by the government and aid agencies that directly facilitate a one-time shift in status of beneficiary households from "displaced" to "returned and reintegrated". In reality, displacement in Darfur is fluid and non-binary, with many displaced households engaged in seasonal returns, or multi-nodal living arrangements as a way to maximize their resilience. Several successful programs have flipped the logic for addressing displacement, creating pull factors within rural communities and areas of origin, but not trying to directly intervene in the return decision. This likely represents a more cost-effective, more sustainable and generally more realistic response to the existing displacement context.

Finally, given the fact that preconditions for widespread returns do not yet exist and that as many as half of all IDPs prefer to integrate into their current location, the DDS' focus on urban integration needs to be made even more prominent in future programming.

4. Transportation and Energy Infrastructure

4.1 Overview

Infrastructure Development was the single largest focus of the DDS, with over US$3 billion of the total US$7 billion price tag devoted to transport (US$2.025 billion) and energy (US$1.080 billion) infrastructure.

Programming in these areas was captured under the following high-level objectives:

- **Improved physical access to goods, markets and administrative and social services (**i.e. small- and large-scale transport infrastructure); and,

[216] Source: Unpublished re-costing of the DDS' TWG 5 (Returns, Reintegration & Urbanization) Results Framework
[217] UNHCR., (2019). "*Sudan: Voluntary Repatriation Dashboard. Sudanese Refugee Returnees from Chad, as of 31 Mar 2019.*" Retrieved from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67677
[218] ibid.
[219] Symonds, P., M. Zimmermann, and M. Adams., (2013:103). *'2013-2019 developing Darfur: A recovery and reconstruction strategy.'* Edited by Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. Khartoum: Darfur Regional Authority.

- **Increased access to electricity services.**

Transport included not just roads (US$1.087 billion), but also rail (US$780 million) and civil aviation (US$115 million), while energy investments centred on power plants and transmission lines[220]. The proposed interventions under these two high-level objectives overwhelmingly focus on hardware, as opposed to supporting activities such as technical studies, regulatory reform or improved management systems. For example, all but US$5 million of the US$2 billion for transportation was expected to go towards construction.[221]

4.2 Progress and achievements

More than any other sector within the DDS, there was a gap between the aspirations of the Strategy with respect to transport and energy infrastructure, and what was actually completed. This was primarily due to the enormous shortfall in funding, relative to the extremely ambitious aims set out for these sectors. International support for these activities would traditionally be the focus of development banks, and this did not materialize for a variety of political reasons discussed above. This situation was then exacerbated by the Government of Sudan's own fiscal problems, which meant that its contributions to the DDS, which would have been expected to include significant investments in transportation and electricity, were reduced.

In total, only two internationally supported projects for this sector were identified during the Review.

Figure 24: Total Transportation & Energy Sector Investments Identified During the Review

Project	Donor	Amount	Key results
Rehabilitation/Construction of Access Roads and Crossing Points	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$11.6 million	Implemented by UNOPS, the project designed and constructed 23 road drainage structures at key choke points on rural feeder roads throughout the five Darfur states. The project also completed a socio-economic and transportation needs study for all five states, selected priority feeder roads based on this assessment, and completed investment-ready designs for 10 roads totalling 367 km[222].
Darfur Solar Electrification Project	Qatar / DDS FaST Project	US$5.7 million	The recently completed project (for which final evaluations are not yet available) was intended to install solar PV systems in 70 villages (benefiting a total of 7,000 households) at community sites like schools, health clinics, police stations, and for street lighting. In addition, the project endeavoured to provide community trainings to increase capacity to repair and maintain the systems, and improvement of the enabling environment for solar through a financing mechanism and partnerships with the government and other entities[223].
Total		US$17.3 million	

[220] Unpublished re-costing of the TWG 7 (Infrastructure) Results Framework
[221] Ibid.
[222] Source = Interview with UNOPS Project Manager for DDS FAST Roads Project; internal UNOPS Fact Sheet
[223] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2016). *'Joint Project Document: Darfur Solar Electrification Project. Khartoum'*, February 2016. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018. From FAO.

In addition to the projects above, the Government of Sudan has invested a significant amount of funding in transportation and energy, although details on these initiatives were not available to the Review team. These include:

- Completion of the El Ingaz road, connecting Omdurman to El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina. The majority of this work far predates the DDS, with work having begun in 1995. However, the first connection between Omdurman and El Fasher was only completed in November 2014, and the work on the linkages between El Fasher and the other two state capitals have been ongoing[224]. See below for more information.
- The National Electricity Corporation construction of a 30MW power plant in Nyala, opened in 2018[225], which the Government has touted as helping drive increased dynamism of small-scale industry in the city.
- The rehabilitation of the infrastructure and paving of the taxiway of the Nyala airport[226].
- The Qatari government's substantial investment in "service hubs" in 15 model villages, which included an unspecified amount of energy infrastructure in each location. This initiative is discussed in more detail in Pillar 3.

Given the lack of investment in these sectors, the overall impact of the minimal amount of programming is modest at best. In the electricity sector in particular, the investments made by both national and international sources have likely proven insufficient to overcome increasing urbanization and demand for electricity, and higher costs of imported fuel. The forthcoming World Bank study on Sudan's electricity sector will hopefully shed additional light on the key bottlenecks in the sector, and propose areas for both infrastructure investments and sector policy reform.

Investments in road infrastructure—while falling far short of the totals foreseen in the DDS— seem to have had some demonstrable positive effects. Indeed, the recently activity in the road sector represents an important step forward for the region. As noted by Taadoud study[227], "Road construction efforts in Darfur have been much more apparent within the past four or five years than at any other time in its history." The case of the El Ingaz road provides an example of the major changes that better connectivity in Darfur can have in an area that has been historically severely cut off from the rest of Sudan. Construction of the road began in 1995 and it took until November 2014 for the Khartoum-El Fashir sector to be completed[228]. The work in the other sectors (Nyala-Geneina; Kass - Zalingei; El Fasher - Manawashi, a distance of around 100 km on the El Fasher to Nyala road) is ongoing but very slowly[229]. While this project predates the DDS, its impact on the region has been substantial, including an improved security situation, more stable supplies of commodities in the region, a boosting of the livestock trade between Darfur and Central Sudan, and a general revitalization of the agricultural sector[230]; the effects of this project are discussed in more detail in Pillar 3. Field interviews conducted by the Review team in Geneina confirmed these findings, with key informants repeatedly citing the largely positive impacts of the road on the local economy. While not directly related to the DDS given that it began before 2013, the story of the El Ingaz road and its far reaching benefits highlights the impact that road infrastructure can have in Darfur. On a more limited scale, the DDS FaST project has also reported positive impact in the communities, with spot improvements of choke points on rural roads helping ensure that producers have year-round access to markets, boosting livelihoods[231]. The cascading benefits and high value-for-money of investing in transport infrastructure in Darfur in the coming years is discussed in more detail below.

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[224] DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2017). '*Trade Flows and the El Ingaz Road.'* Issue Paper, MMTA project. March.
[225] Dams Implementation Unit (DIU)., (2019). 'Nyala Electricity Provides 20 Megawatts to Factories'. Retrieved from: hhtp://www.diu.gov.sd/en/home/pages/show/864.
[226] Source = PWG Review Note on Urbanization
[227] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016:59). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.
[228] DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2017). '*Trade Flows and the El Ingaz Road.'* Issue Paper, MMTA project. March.
[229] Ibid.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Interview with UNOPS Project Manager for DDS FAST Roads Project.

4.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Lack of Funding. The single biggest constraint of progress in the energy and transportation sectors over the past six years has been the lack of funding relative to the need. Financial resources available from all sources (both the Government of Sudan and international donors) were just a sliver of the approximately US$3 billion called for in the DDS for these two sectors.

Challenge Operating Environment for Capital Investment Projects. According to interviews with implementers, the difficult security and economic situation has been particularly challenging for large, high-cost infrastructure. Operating in remote regions for long periods of time with long supply chains and valuable equipment makes projects of this type particularly susceptible to security concerns. Similarly, the cash liquidity problems, high inflation rates, importation hurdles and fuel shortages that have affected all programs in Darfur have been particularly hard on infrastructure projects' timelines and budgets.

4.4 Learning

Conclusions regarding lessons-learned in these sectors remains limited in this sector, given the dearth of investments and lack of evaluations on the projects that have been completed. In general, however, there is clear evidence that infrastructure, including particularly road infrastructure, has the ability for large development impacts for many facets of life in Darfur. As noted in the Taadoud program's operational research, "*Not only does this better infrastructure improve resilience through better market linkages that should reduce the severest price spikes, but it also increases access to services. In one village, households reported that, prior to the road paving, if someone was ill, it could take several days to get them to a hospital. Now, they said they could call a driver in El Geneina who would come to pick the person up, and they could be at a large hospital within a few hours. In some areas, households now commute between large towns like El Geneina and their villages on a weekly basis, facilitating income streams in both locations, and allowing them to maintain a household in El Geneina, where they felt crop storage was safer. Finally, easier travel to Khartoum and other cities reduces the financial barriers of migrating for labor"*[232].

4.5 Organisation and co-ordination of national and international efforts

Given lack of donor involvement in the area, co-ordination reported by the few actors engaged in the sector was conducted directly with State and Federal authorities on a project-level basis. In the road sector, State-level ministries are responsible for working in towns, on activities such as road paving and urban bridges. Roads and bridges outside of city limits falls under the Federal ministry.

UNOPS project managers working on the roads project described very little planning capacity or detailed on the part of the government at the state level, given limited capacity and high staff turnover within Government of Sudan offices[233].

4.6 Alignment with DDS

The two DDS/FaST projects identified under this sector were directly aligned with the DDS. Government programming was indirectly aligned, in that it corresponded to the overall goal of increasing transportation and energy infrastructure in the zone. However, as in the other sectors, the alignment of Government investments seemed coincidental, with no indication that this was done as a result of or in co-ordination with the DDS. Interviews with donor and UN key informants reinforced this impression, noting that the Government at both the federal and state levels tended to view the DDS as a donor-led activity that was not linked to their plans or priorities. For example, the Government road projects that were completed during the 2013-2019 period had

[232] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016:60). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.
[233] Interview with UNOPS Project Manager for DDS FAST Roads Project.

already been planned and were ongoing for many years, predating the DDS. The extent to which the DDS took into account the El Ingaz road works in its own planning and budgeting is unclear.

As noted above, the DDS proposed a massive series of infrastructure investments in the transportation and energy sector, totalling over US$3 billion. While it is irrefutable that infrastructure is badly needed, the feasibility and wisdom of focusing so much of the budget within the DDS on these sectors can in hindsight be questioned on several fronts. First, the donor appetite that would have been necessary for investments at this scale does not seem to have been present within the political climate. Making matters more difficult, the ongoing sanctions regime made lending from multi-lateral development banks for infrastructure projects impossible, at least in the first few years of the plan. Finally, the security situation did not improve as anticipated, making big-ticket projects in such an uncertain context much less practical or politically feasible. Shifting emphasis within the infrastructure, recognizing both their importance and the constraints, would thus be necessary in a future DDS.

IV. Analysis of needs and priorities

1. Basic Services

Increasing the continued low rates of access to basic services in Darfur should be a key component of any future DDS. Across the three sectors, there is a need for policy reform to clarify overlapping mandates between the Federal, State and locality levels. This would help ensure more cost-effective and sustainable use of limited resources. This needs sustained political will, however, to be successful. As donors in Darfur continue to transition from humanitarian to development-oriented programming, sustainability considerations demand standardized and evidence-based capacity building efforts for government officials responsible for service delivery. This is particularly necessary at the locality level, where low capacity most directly impacts sustainability of investments. Failing to address this link in the service delivery chain will serve to undermine any other investments made in basic services. Finally, each of the sectors needs to better prioritize investments in basic service infrastructure and delivery in returnee villages. Significant amounts of both humanitarian and development funding have been directed to return areas, but interviews with multiple key informants bemoaned a lack of co-ordination and transparent citing, and thus a frequent suboptimal use of scarce resources. Service delivery across basic services sectors must be joined up and contribute to a “whole of community approach” as part of multi-actor and area-based programming. Without this, the impact of any one project risks being diluted and offset by gaps in other sectors.

Beyond these general issues, specific needs and priorities per sector are discussed below.

WASH

The scaling up of WASH as a component of IWRM activities should be a top priority. Per the PWG WASH Review note, this approach has already shown promise and can be used as the backbone for community engagement and empowerment around WASH planning and implementation. IWRM can also help inform water facility siting and conjunctive use of water among multiple users.

When considering WASH infrastructure, sustainability, cost-effectiveness and links to other sectors must be prioritized. A number of projects have shown that investments in water infrastructure in particular can be used as a carrot to bring partners together and as an entry point for conflict resolution in returns areas, and this should continue to be developed and expanded upon. To ensure cost-efficiency, the rehabilitation of existing water facilities should be prioritized over new construction whenever possible. Moving forward, WASH infrastructure investments should be predicated on a solid understanding of the complex array of systems that help define the infrastructure’s long-term sustainability, and measures to strengthen these systems should be part and parcel of any investments in hard infrastructure. This includes strengthening community management of operations and maintenance of water facilities. Such efforts will help ensure the longevity and the cost-effectiveness of these projects. Finally, findings from the review of both the WASH and Returns sectors show that that urban WASH infrastructure should be strongly considered in future programming decisions. These areas have a potentially

higher IDP caseload, activities can be scaled more quickly, and there is significant unmet need in Darfur's growing urban centres. The DFID Urban Water 4 Darfur project provides a solid template for doing so in other cities and towns. At the same time, careful planning must be conducted in projects of this type to avoid higher land prices resulting from such investments potentially leading to evictions of IDPs or uncontrolled pull effects into these areas.

In addition to infrastructure, several "software" interventions should also be prioritized. Scaling-up sanitation and behaviour change communication interventions to complement hardware investments have resulted in cost-effective results. And creating an enabling environment for private sector participation, especially in the area of provision of WASH facilities in Public places, sanitation marketing, water supply provision, and innovation.

Health & Nutrition

The current DDS, as noted above, focused largely on hard infrastructure in the healthcare sector, and also planned to cover various recurring costs. Moving forward, PWG members noted the need for an increased focused on systems-level issues. In particular, they identified three high-level objectives. The first relates to health governance, and entails strengthening effective leadership, good governance and accountability of the local health system in Darfur States. This would involve the following outputs:

- Developing and implementing evidence-based health policies, plans and guidelines;
- Establishing Health Management Teams in all localities;
- Developing community accountability and engagement frameworks; and,
- Strengthening co-ordination arrangements, including cross-border mechanisms.

The second objective deals with access to health services, and the need for continued improvement in equitable coverage and accessibility of quality integrated health care services. This would entail:

- Health facilities and blood banks constructed, renovated and/or equipped, focusing on underserved and return locations;
- A package of integrated healthcare services that include mental health and other NCDs, and promotes maternal, child and adolescents' health developed;
- A package of integrated health facility and community-based interventions to control/eliminate priority communicable disease and NTDs implemented;
- Efficient referral, ambulance system and emergency medical care developed and implemented
- An increased proportion of vulnerable populations (including poor households, IDPs, returnees and refugees) covered by prepayment arrangements (health insurance).

Finally, to respond to the health emergencies that will undoubtedly effect Darfur in the coming years, the capabilities of the health and community systems to adapt, absorb and transform in response to different types of emergencies must be enhanced. This should involve:

- Scaling up and strengthening surveillance and EWARN systems, focusing on areas and groups with high vulnerability; and,
- Establishing and equipping Health and Community Rapid Response Teams to effectively respond to health risks, emergencies and outbreaks.

Education

Priority areas for investment identified in the PWG Education note include:

- Supporting capacity building of the frontline services providers at the locality level including education managers, inspectors and statistical officers;
- Developing tools and techniques for sustainably and cost-effectively tackling the urban-rural divide in education in Darfur; and,
- Continued improvements to access to education are needed. This can be accomplished through community awareness campaigns, targeted construction and rehabilitation of schools and WASH Facilities, and cash assistance for poor children/households to increase demand for education services.

Implications for humanitarian-development-peace nexus

- A critical issue for Darfur's development is the orderly and sustainable handoff of service delivery in camps and return areas from humanitarian-based operations to government- and community-led systems that are supported and improved (but not wholly maintained) by development funding. The efforts to integrate selected IDP camps into municipal systems—as is being done under the Water 4 Darfur project—is a good example of this effort in practice. Similar transitions from humanitarian-based health and education service delivery models are also needed.
- Better access to services—in particular water—can serve as a platform for consensus building in return areas. In this way, infrastructure investments can serve as a carrot that helps create a space for dialogue in a community. Building on this dynamic across programs and funding envelopes has the potential to pay large dividends.

  Area-based collaboration across sectors, particularly in return zones, is critical for development in Darfur. Similarly, planning and implementation of basic services interventions needs to coordinate across funding streams by operationalizing Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus (HDPN) principles. This will entail better linkages between emergency interventions and recovery and development programming.

2. Returns

To overcome the piecemeal approach that has characterized much of the programming in the returns sector, better prioritization of intervention zones and area-based co-ordination amongst actors is needed. This will require a clear lead agency in each zone working closely with the community and local and regional authorities to rationalize and systematize returns programming. There must also be coordinated policy engagement and advocacy vis-à-vis the Government around some of the root causes of displacement; without political solutions to hot-button issues such as land occupation, compensation and control over natural resources, the possibility for larger-scale, durable returns remain remote.

Future programming to address displacement in Darfur must also address the fact that an increasing body of evidence indicates that many IDPs—particularly young people—are unlikely to return to their rural areas of origin, and will instead elect to remain in the urbanized settings that have called home for many years. While not without its challenges, integrating IDP camps into their existing communities in terms of land and housing rights, access to general municipal services, full citizen participation, and providing tailored urban livelihoods options could provide cost-effective, durable solutions for hundreds of thousands of IDPs. Nascent Government of Sudan policies regarding integrating camp populations into existing urban centers should thus be supported, guided and capitalized upon with both technical and political support. Household level assistance could be joined with pro-poor investments in urban infrastructure, service delivery and urban planning, helping improve lives for IDPs and host communities alike.

Beyond new approaches and better co-ordination, progress on displacement in Darfur will require significant increases in multi-year, multi-sectoral funding. Lessons from the few successful projects in the sphere highlight that achieving durable solutions takes time and resources, and funding needs to be adjusted to meet these realities on the ground. To do so effectively, returns programming should be integrated as a transversal theme throughout peacebuilding, livelihoods and natural resources management initiatives. This will facilitate a shift away from viewing returns as a one-off assistance package, and instead recognize returns as a longer-term development outcome that needs to be carefully fostered through a multi-sectoral approach, if it is to be durable.

The proposed Durable Solutions Methodology includes strategies for improving programming on both rural returns and urban integration, and could thus provide a strong foundation for comprehensively addressing the issues noted above in a future DDS. A draft of the methodology is currently awaiting final approval by key stakeholders within the UN and the Government. It proposes a standardized approach to providing durable solutions to IDPs and returning refugees, recognizing that piecemeal investments have led to little substantive change in the situation of displaced populations, returnees and host communities. This new framework—based on international best practices—takes into account not just short-term needs, but also dispute resolution, housing, land and property issues, access to basic services and livelihoods. If sufficiently supported by the GoS and reinforced by donors, the strategy could form the basis for a coordinated, holistic approach to grappling

with displacement situation in Darfur. It could also help provide a platform for coordinated policy engagement with the Government focused on addressing underlying political barriers to both returns and local integration.

Implications for humanitarian-development-peace nexus

- In many areas of Darfur, addressing returns needs to be addressed as a multi-year, multi-sectoral effort that reflects the complexities of the social, economic and political forces at play, beyond a one-time provision of assistance to returnees. Humanitarian activities in a given area thus need to be both linked to one another, and closely tied to longer-term development programming.
- Returns programming will also need to link to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, given that land occupation and overall lack of security remain major impediments to those households wishing to return.
- Careful attention needs to be paid to the impacts of humanitarian programming on returns decisions of households. Food, water, health and education assistance in IDP camps remain pull factors for families, and as a result this important emergency-oriented programming can work at cross-purposes to returns programming if not carefully calibrated. Increased co-ordination and data sharing between humanitarian and development actors on these issues is badly needed to ensure that IDPs short-, medium- and long-term needs are responsibly met.

3. Transportation and Energy Infrastructure

Darfur's long-standing isolation from the rest of Sudan, as well as poor internal transport networks negatively impact multiple aspects of life for its residents. Results from recently completed projects like the FaST road improvement initiative and the Government's completion of the long-awaited El Ingaz road (discussed above and in Pillar 3) highlight the wide ranging positive effects that improved road infrastructure can have on local economies, household livelihoods and resilience, access to basic services, security and social cohesion. As noted in Fitzpatrick et al.[234] when discussing the positive impacts of infrastructure and service delivery, including roads, "*the multiplying effect of investment in infrastructure is sometimes neglected in favor of 'capacity-building' activities such as training and demonstrations with minimal physical inputs. There still remains a strong need to improve the quality of existing services and infrastructure*"[235]. Serious consideration thus needs to be given to continuing to invest in spot improvements and crossings, agricultural feeder roads, and linkages between towns and state capitals. At the same time, realism regarding available funding is needed when making future plans in the sector. The scale of the road construction envisioned in the current DDS may not be possible in the near term and to help prioritize, transportation planning is needed. A good start would be the operationalization of the 10 feeder roads and Darfur-wide choke points that UNOPS has assessed and completed full design documents for under the FaST roads project.

Careful planning given available development funds is also needed when considering air and rail transport. While a prominent feature of the current DDS, more data on costs and potential impacts of investments in these areas would be needed before funding is directed towards these sectors.

In addition to transport, there is also a need to explore ways to cost-effectively and sustainably increase electrical connections for low-income households and small businesses in urban areas. The catalytic effect of increased access to electricity on local economies has been amply demonstrated in a number of other countries. An infrastructure upgrading and service delivery approach generally similar to that being used for urban water in El Fasher could be envisioned for electricity. High capital costs and political constraints involved in adjusting electricity tariffs will, however, have to be carefully considered.

[234] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.
[235] Ibid.

Finally, there is a need to examine off-grid household energy supplies for rural areas. According to the AFDB's Infrastructure Report, the Government has already undertaken a pilot for solar home systems[236]. The feasibility and scalability of these systems should be further explored.

Implications for humanitarian-development-peace nexus

While not always considered as a tool to address displacement or insecurity, better transportation infrastructure could be an important medium-term component of broader efforts to promote returns and increase development in remote areas, alongside more traditional assistance approaches like improved governance and basic services infrastructure.

[236] African Development Bank Group., (2016). *'Sudan: Darfur Infrastructure Development Report. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group'*. Retrieved from: *https://www.afdb.org › uploads › afdb › Documents › Knowledge › Sudan...*

Pillar 3: Economic Recovery

I. Introduction

1. Overview

The main objective of Pillar 3, on economic recovery, is described as contributing positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development through a three-pronged approach:

(1) **Support to key livelihoods,** centered on crop and livestock production, and enhanced agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements

(2) **Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services**, centered on facilitating a conducive business enabling environment, institutional capacity and private sector development

(3) **Sustainability of productive sectors through natural resource management**, with a focus on land, forest resources and water

This is translated into seven objectives (each with a number of sub-objectives and outputs), as follows:

1) Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements
2) Improved crop and livestock production and productivity
3) Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development
4) Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity
5) Increased access to employment opportunities
6) Increased access to financial services
7) Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources

This review of Pillar 3 has been organized according to the three thematic areas described above, expanded to reflect the current reality in Darfur and Sudan. Thus:

a) 'Increasing access to key livelihoods and financial services' has been expanded into **'Economy, business and trade'**, addressing objectives 3), 4) and 6). The macroeconomic context is given prominence in view of the impact and consequences of the current economic crisis
b) **'Natural resource management'** carries the same title and covers objective 7)
c) 'Support to key livelihoods' has been subdivided into **rural livelihoods**, addressing objectives 1) and 2), and **urban livelihoods**, addressing objective 5). Using the livelihoods lens encourages a people-centric focus, and reflects how programming has been organised
d) An additional subject area has been added, on **poverty, food security and social safety nets**. Although this does not relate directly to the original DDS objectives, it is judged to be of sufficient importance to merit its own sub-section, as proposed by participants in the DDS review inception workshop in Khartoum in March 2019.

2. Methodology

The methodology first designed for this review process was a highly consultative and participatory one. Three sub-groups were set up for Pillar 3:

- sub-group 1 on natural resource management
- sub-group 2 on 'Increased access to financial services', and 'Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity'
- sub-group 3 on livelihoods: 'employment; value chains; crop and livestock production, productivity and policies'

The review was to be carried out through work done by the sub-groups, and in a series of workshops to be held in Khartoum and in each of the five Darfur states.

With the political events and volatility in Sudan in the last few months, triggering the evacuation of many international staff, the methodology has been adapted. It was no longer possible for the international members of the review team to travel to Khartoum or for the consultations to be carried out in Darfur. Some members of the sub-groups were unable to meet in person or to dedicate time to the review. The methodology therefore changed. Wherever possible, sub-group members prepared and shared their submissions and documents. But the review drew more heavily on a review of documentation and literature, on over 20 key informant interviews with stakeholders in Darfur, Khartoum and internationally (many carried out remotely), and on the findings of the review team's preliminary consultations in Darfur in March 2019.

Constraints and challenges to the review process include:

- Composition of sub-groups was self-selecting and was not inclusive. It was oriented towards Khartoum representation and INGO and national NGO participation was limited. Government participation was also very limited due to the changing political context
- The logistical constraints meant a lack of interaction with Darfuri stakeholders. The review is therefore much less participatory than was originally envisaged
- It was not possible to access and review documentation on all projects falling under Pillar 3, due to lack of time and lack of access to key individuals and materials
- The change in methodology part way through the review process meant that time was lost trying to mobilise sub-group members who were subsequently unavailable (e.g. left the country, were drawn into emergency programming)
- The opportunity to triangulate data and evidence has been very limited
- The majority of projects identified as contributing to Pillar 3 objectives in the donor mapping exercise are integrated multi-sectoral projects. This poses a practical constraint to a financial analysis of development funding according to the sectoral DDS objectives over the last six years

II. Situation Analysis

1. Economy, Business and Trade

1.1 Key developments since 2013

Agriculture has always been a major contributor to Sudan's GDP, even during the petroleum years before the secession of South Sudan. It is estimated to contribute a third of the country's GDP. Since the fall in oil revenues it has also become a major contributor to export earnings, driven in particular by livestock exports[237]. In 2018, livestock accounted for US$832.4 million of export earnings, gold was the next largest contributor at US$832.2 million, followed by sesame at US$576.2 million. Darfur accounts for one-quarter to one-third of Sudan's livestock resources[238] and makes a substantial contribution to Sudan's cash crop production, producing around one-third to one-half of the national groundnut harvest and almost a third of gum Arabic production[239][240][241].

[237] Behnke, R., (2012). '*The Economics of Pastoral Livestock Production and Its Contribution to the Wider Economy of Sudan*' Working Paper, Feinstein International Center & UNEP, June. Retrieved from: *https://fic.tufts.edu › assets › Working-Paper-Econ-of-Pastoral-Livestock1*

[238] See Buchanan-Smith et al (2012) which explains that such estimates should be treated with caution as the last livestock census was carried out in 1975

[239] Note that this figure does not include the substantial informal cross-border trade in gum Arabic from Darfur into Chad

[240] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

[241] UNDP., (2017). '*Promoting Commodity Value Chains for Peace and Recovery in Darfur. A Darfur-focussed Value Chain Mapping Analysis for Groundnuts, Sesame, Gum Arabic and Livestock'*. UNDP DLRP.

Indeed, the Darfur region has long been recognized as having great economic potential, as noted by the DJAM[242] report on private sector development in 2012 which concluded that there was considerable scope for economic revival given Darfur's natural resource endowments, its livestock and agricultural wealth, and the potential for agro-industries. For this economic potential to be realized requires an enabling business environment.

1.1.2 Business Enabling Environment

Macro-economic context:
The macro-economic context has a major impact on the business enabling environment in Darfur[243]. The period between 2013 and end of 2017 has been described as a 'stable but dysfunctional equilibrium'. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 dealt an economic blow to Sudan with the sudden loss of 75% of its oil reserves and revenue. This impacted the Balance of Payments, triggered foreign exchange shortages and inflation shot up to between 30 and 40% between 2012 and 2014[244][245]. Without any major economic adjustments but instead the continuation of mass subsidies (for example on fuel and wheat), Sudan's economy deteriorated further. Since 2018, the country has been in the grip of a much more severe economic crisis. A massive trade deficit of US$3 billion has triggered more severe foreign exchange shortages. The federal government's response was to increase the money supply by 74%. Inflation peaked at 73% in December 2018. See Figure 1. Between 2017 and 2019 the currency has devalued by 150% but is still regarded as overvalued[246], complicated by the application of numerous different official exchange rates which generally favour the importation of consumer goods such as wheat, and undermine the competitiveness of agricultural exports. In recent years government policy set the exchange rate for agricultural exports at a less favorable rate than gold. These examples of government policy put the agricultural sector at a relative disadvantage and have major distortionary consequences, for instance encouraging the consumption of imported wheat over locally-produced sorghum and millet[247].

[242] Thematic Working Group (TWG)., (2012). '*Situational analysis. The Private Sector in Darfur: A New Growth Strategy for Recovery and Development*'. DJAM. Retrieved from:
darfurconference.com › sites › default › files › files › 9 - Thematic Worki...
[243] Most of this analysis of the current macroeonomic context is based on presentations made at one of the Berlin Group meetings in 2019
[244] World Bank., (2019b/D) 'Shocks and Household Welfare in Sudan'. *Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa*. June.
[245] In parts of Darfur eg South Darfur, inflation was over 50% (Central Bank of Sudan)
[246] The official exchange rate at the time of writing is 45SDG per USD while the parallel market rate is 68-70SDG per USD, and is steadily depreciating
[247] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf



Figure 25: Inflation rate and official exchange rate in Sudan – 2017/18
Source: CBS (for inflation rate) and Central Bank of Sudan (for exchange rate), as quoted in 2019 CFSAM (FAO, 2019)

In 2018 the country began to run out of SDGs as well as hard currency. The government imposed a limit on how much could be withdrawn from banks: varying between SDG 500 and SDG 2000 per day, but frequently constrained by banks running out of cash completely. While this temporarily slowed inflation, it had a crippling effect on business. The government's response to the crisis by printing more money and notes of larger denomination has simply fueled inflation since. In June 2019 inflation was running at 48%. The current economic context is now described as an 'accelerating downward spiral' unlikely to be mitigated by the latest bailout from governments in the Middle East. Political unrest and four weeks' long shutdown of the internet in June 2019 has damaged the economy further.

A defining feature of the political economy of Sudan is the interconnectedness and intertwining of political and economic interests, described by de Waal[248] as rentierism in the political marketplace, based first on oil until 2011 and subsequently on gold. During 30 years of the NCP's rule, Sudan's ruling political elite has captured the most profitable business sectors and trade. The kleptocratic nature of the former regime is now widely acknowledged. Indeed, calls to dismantle the 'deep state' have been central to the revolution. As de Waal explains: 'Dismantling the deep state actually means taking on many of the bigger monopoly providers in the so-called private sector such as telecoms, construction, oil, and banking and liberalising these sectors, in the context of lifting sanctions and allowing normal, non-political businessmen to take on the business'[249]. As described below, this has taken on a particular dynamic in conflict-ridden Darfur. Such vested interests make economic reform a formidable task.

In short, the macro-economic context is not conducive to investment, business development nor growth, in Sudan generally and in Darfur in particular. It has been appropriately described as a 'deals-based economy', where deals can be understood as personalized relationships between businesses on the one hand and political leaders or the bureaucracy on the other. This is how business is done, rather than according to *de jure* rules set by the state[250]. Sudan's ranking in the World Bank's Doing Business Survey has fallen from 154 in 2011 to 162 in 2019[251].

[248] De Waal, A., (2019). '*Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis*'. Occasional Paper No.19. World Peace Foundation. Conflict Research Program. August. Somerville: MA.
[249] African Business., (2019). *'The Challenge of Dismantling Sudan's Deep State'*. Retrieved from: https://africanbusinessmagazine.com/region/north-africa/the-challenge-of-dismantling-sudans-deep-state/
[250] See work by 'Effective States and Inclusive Development', http://www.effective-states.org/ based on Kar-Sen
[251] https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/sudan

1.1.3 Business Enabling Environment in Darfur

Darfur's traders have long been renowned for their entrepreneurialism and for the penetration of Darfuri trading networks across Sudan. The Darfur conflict and the many constraints traders have faced in the last 16 years have tested their entrepreneurialism and ingenuity to the limits. Some of the macro-economic challenges described above are exacerbated at the Darfur level which has suffered from structural political and economic marginalization for decades. One of the most visible reminders has been the extremely limited investment in transport infrastructure[252]. As long ago as 1989, construction of a paved road connecting Darfur to Central Sudan was identified as the single most important intervention to contribute to improved food security in Darfur. This paved road – the El Ingaz road - was only completed some 25 years later, at the end of 2014 (see below).

The penetration of the deep state and intertwining of political and economic interests described above have manifested in Darfur during the protracted conflict through the involvement of the state security institutions in resource extraction, production and trade in some of Darfur's most productive sectors. This ranges from the army's involvement in trading hard woods from Darfur early in the conflict (UNEP, 2008), to the RSF's control of some of Darfur's most lucrative gold mines, in smuggling and in their engagement in trafficking of migrants from Darfur into Libya[253]. Understanding the extent of this political (and at times war) economy, the competition between security institutions, and the discrimination experienced by the business interests of particular ethnic groups (see section 3.4.1.3 below) is essential to understanding the functioning of Darfur's economy and its constraints. A further distortion has been government intervention, sometimes through its security institutions and their preferential access to business, in the trade of certain agricultural commodities produced in Darfur that are destined for export, driven by the urgent and growing need for foreign exchange[254].

Other factors negatively impacting the business environment in Darfur include:

1) *Insecurity*: this has many negative consequences for the business environment, including disruption to production and trade, looting of assets, and increased transport costs associated with changing trade routes and protection payments. There is also evidence that large traders and companies operating out of Central Sudan are likely to withdraw their business interests from Darfur to Omdurman during periods of insecurity, which leaves Darfuri businesses and traders to carry the risks of transportation to Central Sudan, and/ or businesses in Central Sudan shift their source of supply to more secure states. For example, the centre of gravity of the groundnut trade in western Sudan shifted from Nyala to El Obeid in North Kordofan[255]. On the other hand, improved security in many parts of Darfur in the last couple of years boosted business and trade. As described by one private sector operator interviewed for this review: 'markets became busy… movement of people and goods became easy without military protected convoys'

2) *High levels of taxation and the imposition of fees*: locality authorities are increasingly dependent on raising revenue to pay for the services for which they are now responsible, which has resulted in the imposition of numerous taxes on local businesses and trade. For many of the conflict years this has been exacerbated by the payment of informal fees at the numerous checkpoints along Darfur's trading routes. One private sector representative, interviewed for this review, described local taxes and fees sometimes reaching 50% of the cost of the product, although more typically around 10 to 25%. With little evidence of how the revenue is re-invested into improved infrastructure and services, there are high levels of resentment amongst traders who pursue tax-evasive strategies. (In 2012, taxation levels on groundnuts were 11 times higher in Darfur than in Gedaref state[256]).

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[252] Buchanan-Smith, M., and A. A. Fadul. (2008). '*Adaptation and Devastation: The Impact of Conflict on Trade and Markets in Darfur. Findings of a Scoping Study*.' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA.

[253] Tubiana, J., Warin, C., Saeneen, G.M., (2018) *'Multilateral Damage. The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes'*. CRU Report. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

[254] This was reported by a private sector company interviewed for this review, which was unable to buy direct from farmers in the last year as companies linked to members of the TMC had preferential access.

[255] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

[256] Ibid.

3) *Lack of fuel and frequent power cuts*: this has been an ongoing issue throughout the conflict years, and was at least partially responsible for the decline in large-scale agro-processing plants in Darfur, for example groundnut mills in Nyala, as well as artisanal businesses such as blacksmiths and welders. However, new generators in El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala have considerably improved the reliability of power supplies in each of those state capitals. The current shortage of foreign exchange has exacerbated fuel shortages and triggered large increases in transportation costs.

4) *Lack of cash*: as much of Darfur's economy is informal and cash-based, this has had severe consequences. In 2012/13 lack of liquidity limited the capacity of groundnut traders to absorb a bumper crop[257]. The consequences in the last year have been much more extreme. Goods in Darfur are now traded at two different prices – a lower price for cash and a higher price for cheques. In El Fasher in early August 2019, for example a 50 kg sack of cement cost SDG 550-600 for payment in cash, and SDG 650-700 for payment by cheque. The cost of a tonne of shelled groundnuts in El Fasher in August 2019 was 5% higher if payment was made by cheque. The livestock trade has been particularly badly affected by the liquidity crisis as described in section 2.1.1.3 below

The urban economy, especially in Darfur's state capitals, has been boosted by the large-scale presence of the international community, in the form of peacekeeping troops and also aid organisations. This fueled a construction boom (with disastrous environmental consequences – see UNEP, 2008), caused house rental prices to soar, has been an important source of employment (see also 2.1.1.4) and has had a multiplier effect on the retail, service and labour markets[258]. But the short-term and distortionary nature of this economic boom is evident as UNAMID withdraws, for example in El Fasher where house rents have plummeted, and shops and restaurants have closed. The economic impact of UNAMID's withdrawal is likely to be much greater than the economic impact of the NGO expulsion in 2009 when wage rates fell.

1.1.4 Access to Financial Services

Access to formal sources of credit are generally low across Sudan, with a high dependence on family loans (World Bank, 2019c). While entrepreneurs can access seed funding from family and friends to start a business, the subsequent lack of financial services means they can rarely get the thousands of dollars they need to scale up. Informal credit arrangements that had been widely used between traders in Darfur pre-conflict, for example in the form of delayed payments based on high levels of trust, declined as the risks of trading rose and as distrust between ethnic groups deepened[259].

In the early years of the Darfur conflict much of the formal banking service was withdrawn due to insecurity and high levels of risk. In the major urban economic hubs, banking services have resumed and the number of branches has actually increased. There are now 21 bank branches in Nyala (compared with seven before the conflict) and 18 in El Fasher. But large areas are poorly served. In West Darfur, for example, there is no single bank branch outside El Geneina[260].

Although formal financing opportunities exist in Darfur, credit is hard to access. Despite encouragement from the Central Bank of Sudan to consider non-traditional forms of collateral, this appears to have had little impact and there has been a tendency to 'over-collateralize' loans using guarantees such as insurance and conventional

[257] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

[258] See, for example, Buchanan-Smith, M., and McElhinney, H., with Bagadi, H., Rahman, M.A., Dawalbeit, Amira., Dawalbeit, Awatif., Khalil, M., and Abdalla, B.E.D. (2011). '*City Limits. Urbanisation and Vulnerability in Sudan. Nyala Case Study'*. HPG, ODI. January. Retrieved from: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6515.pdf.

[259] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

[260] Information based on key informant interview with microfinance specialist

physical collateral[261]. The 2012 DJAM[262] report explains constraints on collateral, which do not seem to have improved since. It also describes how bank financing has been diverted during the conflict years, away from agricultural production and agro-processing into local trade, reflecting assessments of risk and profitability[263].

Key informants from the private sector describe how gaining access to credit depends upon personal connections, again reflecting the characteristics of a 'deals-based economy'. In the case of Darfur this is likely to mean political connections and alignment with the former regime. A trade study carried out in 2014 revealed that none of the many traders interviewed in Darfur had accessed credit from formal institutions during the conflict years. Indeed, many were reluctant to explore that option because of the conflict-associated risks of trading and fear of defaulting. Yet they cited lack of capital and lack of access to credit as major constraints to their businesses[264]. On the one hand the well-documented high costs of trading associated with the conflict mean that traders require more capital and therefore greater access to credit. On the other hand, it is increasingly hard to access, and traders are reluctant to take the risk. This is a major constraining factor, both for traders trying to maintain their level of business and especially those trying to scale up.

Access to credit and to trading institutions such as Chambers of Commerce are even more limited for female compared with male traders (ibid), despite the fact that large numbers of women have entered the market as petty traders of agricultural products during the conflict years (see below). In a recent study on entrepreneurship, women identified lack of finance as well as harassment as major constraints[265].

1.1.5 Agricultural Trade and Value Add

As described below, agricultural production fell during the first decade of the conflict due to insecurity, and has been highly volatile since (see graphs in section 2.3.1.3), negatively impacting agricultural trade. Other trends in the agricultural trade in Darfur, worth noting, include:

1) The high adaptability and responsiveness of traders to the changing context, for example frequently changing trading routes and even means of transport (for example from large trucks to smaller four-wheel drive vehicles) in response to changing conflict dynamics, and succeeding to maintain trade flows across some conflict lines, for example from rebel-held parts of Jebel Marra to Darfur state capitals and beyond
2) The much increased costs of trading associated with the conflict, particularly evident in rising transport costs and high levels of taxation and informal fees paid along trade routes. Transport costs rose from 100 to 1000% for cash crop and cereal trading[266] [267].
3) Yet the increased volume of trade in agricultural commodities out of Darfur, directly related to the completion of the El Ingaz road between Darfur and Central Sudan (see section 3.3.1 below)
4) Deteriorating quality of some of Darfur's cash crops, particularly groundnuts:

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[261] Hansen, L. and A. Khojali., (2010). '*Championing the Coping Economy: An Assessment of the Microfinance Market in Darfur: Gaps and Opportunities'*. Final Report for UNDP/Sudan, IOM and the Feinstein International Center, June.
[262] Thematic Working Group (TWG)., (2012). '*Situational analysis. The Private Sector in Darfur: A New Growth Strategy for Recovery and Development*'. DJAM. Retrieved from:
darfurconference.com › sites › default › files › files › 9 - Thematic Worki...
[263] Thematic Working Group (TWG)., (2012). '*Situational analysis. The Private Sector in Darfur: A New Growth Strategy for Recovery and Development*'. DJAM. Retrieved from:
darfurconference.com › sites › default › files › files › 9 - Thematic Worki...
[264] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf
[265] GIZ., (2018). 'Labour Market Assessment'
[266]Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.
[267] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

a. as they are now mostly shelled manually by farmers close to the point of production to reduce the bulk and therefore the cost of transportation, yet this practice is more likely to crush the groundnuts than if mechanical means are used, and soil is now entering the groundnut sacks
b. with high aflatoxin levels due to low awareness and poor post-harvesting and storage practices, while agricultural extension services have more or less collapsed

5) A shift in agro-processing, particularly of groundnuts, as the number of large-scale groundnut oil processing plants owned and run by Darfuri businesses fell[268], for example in Nyala where it used to be the second most important industry. Instead, the number of small-scale agro-processors has proliferated, using more basic machinery and producing poorer quality groundnut oil and groundnut cake. At the same time, at least one large investor from Central Sudan has entered the market – see section 3.3.1 below. This implies a 'missing middle' in the sector, associated with a shift from groundnuts being traded and sold outside Darfur (with the exception of DarFood), to more localized agro-processing to meet the demand for groundnut oil in Darfur's towns
6) The importance of cross-border trade, particularly from West Darfur into Chad, from South and East Darfur into South Sudan, and into the Central African Republic. Although impossible to quantify as it is mainly informal, this is important for cereals, livestock and gum Arabic. As relations have improved, between Sudan and Chad, trade has normalized, indeed flourished in recent years (see below)

The untapped potential for boosting production and trade in Darfur's main agricultural commodities has been highlighted and promoted in a number of studies and exercises[269], but as section 3.3 below describes, progress is so far very limited. The exception may be the livestock trade, and especially the trade in sheep due to a buoyant regional and national market[270]. The leather industry in Darfur is also an area of growth[271]. During the conflict years a thriving leather trade has developed between Darfur and West African countries, especially Nigeria. However, the livestock sector appears to have been badly affected by the shortage of cash, the main means of payment in Darfur's livestock markets, although evidence so far is anecdotal. A key informant interviewee described the impact in Idd El Fursan, a major livestock market in South Darfur, in December 2018. Around 200 to 250 head of cattle are usually sold per market day in Idd El Fursan, raising SDG 6,000 to 7,000 in levies for the locality authority. In December 2018, only 30 to 50 head of cattle were sold per market day and the locality's revenues had fallen to SDG 2,000 to 2,500. The most recent CFSAM report shows the number of sheep exported from Sudan had more than halved in the January to September period in 2018 compared with 2017[272], although this deserves further investigation to establish the reasons.

1.1.6 Employment Levels

Figures on unemployment levels in Sudan, let alone Darfur, vary widely between sources. For example the EU Trust Fund for Africa puts unemployment levels at 20% in 2018 while the World Bank puts it at 13%[273]. These variations can partly be explained by varying definitions of 'employment', but both figures appear low given the current economic context in Sudan. A recent assessment in Darfur puts the unemployment rate at 52%: 36% of men unemployed and 68% of women unemployed. Unofficial estimates put the youth unemployment rate in Darfur at 75%[274].

The official data may be more useful for identifying trends than for the accuracy of the figures. These show that Darfur has a substantially higher rate of participation of women in the workforce than the national average, and that female labour force participation increased in Darfur between 2009 and 2014. Somewhat surprisingly it shows a fall in youth unemployment in Darfur between 2009 and 2014 although urban youth unemployment

[268] Contributing factors have been the unreliable and erratic power supply to operate machinery, the high cost of imported spare parts, the high cost of transportation, high levels of taxation and limited availability of credit
[269] For example by the Tufts suite of trade studies, UNDP's value chain analysis, and by the World Bank
[270] Suleiman, H. and Young, H. (2019) '*Transforming Pastoralist Mobility in West Darfur: Understanding Continuity and Change'*. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2019.
[271] See Buchanan-Smith et al (2011)
[272] FAO., (2019a). '*FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan. Special Report'*. 14 March.
[273] CEFE International., (2019). '*Entrepreneurship Promotion Strategy for the cities Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina – A Concept Note for GIZ Sudan.'*
[274] GIZ., (2017). ‚*Beschäftigungsinitiative Süddarfur: Berufliche Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen für Flüchtlinge'*. Binnenvertriebene und Aufnahmegemeinden in Nyala, Süddarfur, Sudan.

rose in Sudan overall during the same time period[275]. Also of note, more educated Sudanese were less likely to be employed in 2014 compared with 2009, most likely reflecting changes in the labour market and fewer employment opportunities for those with higher educational levels. Another factor may be the fall in wages with more educated people looking only for better paid and highly skilled jobs rather than low paid and low skilled jobs.

1.2 Current risks and threats

There are three main threats to economic and business development in Darfur, that are interlinked. First, the current economic crisis and prospect that it is likely to continue as the cash bailout from the Middle East and revenue from gold cover some recurrent expenditure but do not address the fundamental macroeconomic imbalances.

Second, the nature of the political economy in Sudan generally, and war economy in Darfur in particular, is a major obstacle to economic reform. There may be little motivation amongst some members of the transitional government who are benefiting from the *status quo* to address the fundamental issues, but instead the rentier-based economic system continues, distorting the economy and used politically to buy loyalty [276].

Third, and linked to both both of these factors, political instability continues or indeed worsens, with an increase in violent conflict within Darfur, hindering trade, the production of agricultural commodities on which it is based, and pushing up the costs of doing business.

2. Natural Resources

2.1 Key developments since 2013

The relationship between competition over natural resources and conflict has been a source of much debate in recent years, in which the Darfur case has featured prominently. Scarcity has often been cited as a causal factor of conflict[277]. Competition over natural resources, especially land has frequently been cited as a contributing factor to the Darfur conflict. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that no single factor can be solely responsible for a complex conflict like that of Darfur's. Rather different contributing factors have intertwined at many different levels [278].

Climate related environmental change can severely affect people who are dependent on renewable natural resources for their livelihoods. It may decrease the availability or quality of freshwater, degrade grazing lands, kill livestock, and damage cropland. The negative impact on people's livelihoods is particularly acute in Darfur because a significant proportion of the population is dependent on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism. When these environmental changes interact with other pressures on livelihoods, such as political marginalization or inequitable land distribution, groups may be more likely to resort to violent conflict or to secure access to natural resources by force.

Many pronouncements are made about desertification and climate change affecting the Darfur region, but these are not always evidence-based, nor do they stand up to scrutiny. Sound and long-term analysis of the available data is essential. Tufts analysis, made on this basis, shows that vegetation trends have generally remained stable in the Darfur region over the twentieth century, despite large decadal variations; there has been a slight fall in

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[275] World Bank., (2019a/C). '*The Labour Market and Poverty in Sudan'*. Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa. May.
[276] De Waal, A., (2019). '*Sudan: A Political Marketplace Framework Analysis*'. Occasional Paper No.19. World Peace Foundation. Conflict Research Program. August. Somerville: MA.
[277] Kuznar, L. A., Sedlmeyer, R., (2005). '*Conflictive Violence in Darfur: An Agent-Based Model of Pastoral Nomad/Sedentary Peasant Interaction*'. Mathematical Anthropology and Cultural Theory, Volume 1(8), Retrieved from: http://www.mathematicalanthropology.org.
[278] Bromwich, B., (2017). 'Power, Contested Institutions and Land: Repoliticising Analysis of Natural Resources and Conflict in Darfur'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies.* DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2017.1403782.

mean annual precipitation over the last 100 years, most pronounced in North Darfur State and less so in southern Darfur states; meanwhile temperature in the Darfur region has significantly increased in the last 40 years[279].

Darfur's water resources depend largely on annual runoffs. Water supplies in Darfur are related to four geological features:
· The Nubian sandstone
· Areas of volcanic intrusion
· Wadis
· Drainage basins.

Where groundwater is inaccessible, water supplies depend on various forms of runoff such as hafirs and shallow wells. During the early conflict years many water installations suffered damage or lack of maintenance. Conversely, areas which hosted large numbers of IDPs (especially near urban centres) have witnessed a sharp rise in the number of wells, boreholes and other water harvesting practices. This is mainly due to the fact that urban centres have boosted the demand for horticultural production (see section 2.3 below). At the same time IDPs adopted diversification strategies to livelihood activities thereby exploiting any available options to engage in horticultural activities in their immediate surrounding. While there is no comprehensive updated study of the availability of water resources in greater Darfur since the inception of the DDS it is generally understood that conditions have not changed drastically in terms of supply. Meanwhile the demand side has undoubtedly increased. For this reason, many projects have aimed at improving water management practices through training communities to manage their own water resources in addition to addressing potential and actual conflict over natural resources (for example, the Wadi El-Ku and East Darfur natural resource projects – see below).

A recent study by the University of Khartoum's Water Research Unit under the title 'Darfur Catchment Mapping and Water Resources Assessment' indicates that Darfur's water resources are adequate for its development objectives. The study covered four big Wadi catchment areas in Darfur, namely Azum, El Ku, Kaja, and Nyala. The results obtained using the Runoff Coefficient method showed that there is high surface water resource potential in the four catchments. Future projected demand up to 2030 represents only about 22% of the available water resources, indicating that there is still huge potential which could be developed for agriculture.

The hakura system created in the 18th century by the Darfur sultans lies at the heart of the traditional land tenure system that is predominantly operative as *de facto* in the region despite central government legislation. Although sedentary farming communities have the upper hand in managing access to land, the system is based on the belief that farmers and pastoralists have equal rights to benefit from available natural resources, and for communal ownership and usage of grazing land. Both camel and cattle breeders traditionally practice transhumance. Specific, demarcated and legitimated transhumance routes (*marahil*) were followed, although the traditional system has come under increasing strain over the last few decades. Since the outbreak of war these routes have been altered in many places. With many farmers staying as IDPs in camps, pastoralists used land evacuated by those IDPs, and have not always resumed their traditional transhumance systems. Conflict also severely restricted the movement of some pastoralist communities, for example in areas north of Kutum. The eviction of land occupiers is a very sensitive issue, especially in West and Central Darfur, and in Kabkabiya and Kutum in North Darfur. The settlement by pastoralists of this vacated land, first identified during the 2006 DJAM, was again highlighted during the 2012 consultations as a major issue that continues to complicate the return of many displaced people. The situation is still the same in 2019, as reflected by IDP representatives with whom DDS review team members met during field visits to all five Darfur states in March and April 2019.

Wide areas of Darfur have unresolved conflict over the control of land, connected to a large degree with the ongoing displacement of more than 2.5 million people. Resolution of these conflicts is only likely to be viable within a broader process in which contested institutions around land and natural resources are addressed. While these issues need addressing within Darfur they are also deeply related to national and regional political dynamics. All analysts agree that land and resource tenure is the main underlying factor of conflict and peace in Darfur. There are two basic views on how tenure can be reformed: one is that traditional institutions and

[279] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

tenure systems ought to be the starting point; the other is that traditional institutions are so weak, or that they are outdated to the point that they can no longer play that role. The Darfur Land Commission which was first established after the Abuja peace agreement in 2006 has been further revitalized in the DDPD and has consequently been given a significant role in the DDS. The Darfur Land Commission which was first established after the Abuja peace agreement in 2006 was revitalized in the DDPD and has consequently been given a significant role in the DDS. It has developed comprehensive plans for reforming land administration by a) documenting customary tenure practices all over the region in preparation of aligning them with formal law according to DDPD requirements; b) supporting registration of farmland under the auspices of the respective state-level Ministries of Agriculture; c) starting to establish land dispute arbitration committees and training the members; d) implementing a project for natural resource and land use mapping. However, most of these activities have not have not reached their final stage whereby the results can be delivered. Moreover, some sources have noticed that legislation pertaining to the demarcation of livestock migration routes, which is a DDS objective, has already been drafted.[280]

Forests and range represent another important element of natural resources. In fact, grazing is the most important resource provided by forests. Although central government legislation stipulates that 25% of land should be gazetted as forest[281], the reality is nowhere near that target. Another stark reality is that all gazetted forests near urban centres have either been severely damaged or disappeared altogether after the outbreak of the conflict. Excessive utilization of land and forests alike have been associated with environmental degradation near densely populated areas. However, while producers are often blamed for environmental degradation, in turn associated with the overgrazing of livestock, or farmers blamed for cropping and exhausting the soil, or both for overexploitation and clearance of forests for firewood and charcoal making, Young et al[282] make the important point that: 'The real problem lies in multiple governance failures across all levels'. One piece of good news is that natural resources away from urban areas have actually recovered significantly from the state of degradation they were in before the conflict. Both range and forest resources have much improved in more or less abandoned, or depopulated areas. However, this could be reversed where IDPs return to their original areas if they resume traditional methods of construction that can be environmentally damaging. Until now the use of woodless construction remains in an experimental phase, for example with only a few constructed rooms for demonstration purposes in El Fasher and Nyala.

More nuanced analysis of localized conflict is required, in terms of finding an appropriate explanation. What is often identified as localized farmer-herder conflict related to competition over natural resources – expansion of cultivated land, blocking of livestock migration corridors, competition for water resources – may be inter-tribal conflict linked to political capital at regional or national level politics.[283][284]

A major change in natural resource management is that almost all natural resources in Darfur, including water, cultivable land, forestry products, fodder and hay, are now commoditized. Market-based systems now co-exist alongside customary institutions for managing land and other resources. This has created an institutional plurality. It is now common that fertile land along wadis serving urban markets is sold. For example, in Hashaba in South Darfur urban investors have bought the wadi land from small farmers who now work on the farms as daily labourers rather than as owners[285]. Similar developments have taken place in the Wadi El-Ku basin near El Fasher. These have implications for growing inequality. Commoditization of natural resources also contributes to increasing competition and conflict over former shared resources, for example herders must now

[280] See section 3.3.1 of Pillar 1 report.
[281] The most recently promulgated act is the Law of Forests and Renewable Natural Resources declared in 2002.
[282] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.
[283] Abdel-Kareem, Z M and Abdul-Jalil M A (2015) 'Contested Land Rights and Conflicts in Mornei (West Darfur): Scarcity of Resources or Crises of Governance?' in Cassiari, Barbara, Munzoul Assal & Ireton, Francois (Eds). *Multidimensional Change in Sudan (1989-2011): Reshaping Livelihoods, Conflicts and Identities*. Berghahn Books: New York & London: 69-86.

[284] Bromwich, B., (2017). 'Power, Contested Institutions and Land: Repoliticising Analysis of Natural Resources and Conflict in Darfur'. *Journal of Eastern African Studies.* DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2017.1403782.
[285] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

purchase crop residues in dry years, pushing up prices, as farmers now collect crop residues for their own use or for sale; and manure is now sold to brick kilns[286].

2.1 Current Risks and Threats

The current situation regarding natural resource management requires plans for sustainable intervention plans to charter the way forward. Some risks in this regard include the following:

- The recently introduced agricultural land registration system may lead to escalated commoditization of land in some areas.
- Under the current legislation large tracts of land can be registered or leased to large scale national or international business operators to the exclusion of indigenous communities.
- The continuous long absence of farmers from their land and its continued exploitation by newcomers may ultimately lead to the legitimization of occupation.
- Overgrazing in areas around blocked migration routes.
- The lack of trust between pastoralist and farming communities is a major constraint to co-operation in participatory natural resource management programmes.
- The demarcation of livestock migration routes in the absence of sedentary farming communities will only refuel conflict later on.

3. Rural Livelihoods

3.1 Key Developments since 2013

Since the DDS was first drafted a considerable body of operational research (linked to programming) has built up on how rural livelihoods have changed and are continuing to adapt to the dynamic context in Darfur[287]. The first sub-section, 3.1.2, captures and summarizes the findings of this research and learning, which have implications for how rural development efforts are programmed. Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 review the policy and institutional context, and trends in crop and livestock production and productivity respectively

3.1.2 Overview of rural livelihoods and agricultural production systems, and how they have changed

Despite the disruption and destruction of livelihoods during 16 years of conflict, livelihood systems still depend primarily on rainfed cultivation and raising livestock, both of which are adapted to extreme rainfall variability[288]. However, the major constraint to almost all rural livelihoods has been the loss of freedom of movement during the conflict years. This affects farmers' ability to access productive resources in terms of agricultural land for cultivation, livestock producers' ability to access grazing resources, as well as overall access to employment and to markets[289]. As noted in the last DDS, this has forced households to resort to coping responses, some of which are new, and many of which are damaging or unsustainable, and have undermined the resilience of rural livelihoods to rainfall variability[290].

For example, farming communities used to rely on shifting cultivation and the geographical distribution of fields to manage climate unpredictability. The risk of insecurity in travelling to more distant fields, shortages of

[286] ibid.
[287] Much of this work has been done by Tufts University in collaboration with partners such as the University of Gezira and NGOs such as CRS in the Taadoud project.
[288] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.
[289] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.
[290] Ibid.

cultivable land and changes in land tenure meant these strategies were no longer possible. As a result, land has been subject to continuous farming without fallow periods. Adaptations to shocks, including conflict, include the intensification of land use around villages, inter-cropping and reliance on more irrigated agriculture where households have access to suitable land and water[291].

There has been a noticeable increase in dry season small-scale irrigated fruit and vegetable production on land near wadis, especially since 2008. This is partly in response to the rapid increase in the urban population which has stimulated demand for market garden produce. The production of, and trade in tomatoes and onions was identified in 2014 as an area of growth in an otherwise contracting economy[292]. Traditionally irrigated fruit and vegetable production has been the domain of women. But there is evidence of men becoming more engaged in this form of cultivation as the economic returns have increased. Women may still comprise the majority of the work force, but men have started to invest and engage in this as a business opportunity[293]. The growth in dry season irrigated agriculture is also causing friction in some areas with animal herders who are dependent in the dry season on water from wadis for their livestock, but who may no longer have access because of the expansion of irrigated cultivation[294].

Nomadic communities have also made adaptations. Young and Ismail[295] describe how the trend towards nomadic sedentarisation, which started decades ago after the drought and famine in the mid-1980s, has accelerated during the conflict. Although they may still practice transhumant pastoralism, the range of livelihood activities in which they are engaged has increased, especially for those who have settled close to urban areas. Many pastoralists, especially women, are now more engaged in rainfed farming, but lack the skills and experience, and may therefore have to rely upon paid agricultural labour. Newly settled women lack the social networks to gain employment through daily laboring, so are more likely to be engaged in extractive activities such as gathering firewood for sale. There is also evidence of the changing composition of livestock herds, from camel and cattle to sheep. This is partly in response to a thriving regional, national and export market in sheep; they are also less likely to be looted. However, sheep can be a more costly form of livestock to rear as they are more vulnerable to disease[296]. In other areas, for example Kulbus locality in West Darfur, agro-pastoralists have adapted their livelihoods more towards farming in the last decade because of livestock looting.

An important finding of all of this work is that conflict and other factors:

> *'have played a major role in undermining the relationships and former integration (of different livelihood systems). These include: the diversification of livelihood activities, which results in all households seemingly practicing the same few livelihood activities; market competition driving agricultural production and growth of dry season cash crops and investments in sheep; the commoditization of shared natural resources, especially land, water, manure, fodder and crop residues; and the decline or failure of natural resource institutions that sustain these former symbiotic relationships'*[297]

The extent to which rural livelihoods have been impacted by the conflict, and the extent to which they have recovered, if at all, is highly context-specific and therefore varies greatly from one place to another[298]. For example, in the Kulbus area of West Darfur settled villages had lost almost all their physical assets in the early

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[291] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

[292] DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2014), '*A Study of Production and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: North and West Darfur.'* February. Khartoum: DDR.

[293] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

[294] Ibid.

[295] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

[296] Suleiman, H. and Young, H. (2019) '*Transforming Pastoralist Mobility in West Darfur: Understanding Continuity and Change'*. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2019.

[297] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019:339). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

[298] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

months of the conflict in 2003, but by 2010 had regained access to their fields and were cultivating again, which was key to their recovery although they still had smaller livestock herds. In parts of East Darfur livelihoods were much less affected by the wider conflict but were impacted by more localized inter-tribal conflict. The main threats to their livelihoods were similar to the pre-conflict period: birds, pests and low rainfall. Meanwhile in parts of South Darfur households had recovered their livelihoods a few years after the conflict began in 2003, but then suffered major setbacks from tribal conflict in 2013 and 2014 which meant they could not benefit from the good harvest of 2014/15. These households have now developed two income streams from two different residences: in the rainy season they depend upon crop cultivation and collecting palm leaves in their villages, in the dry season their income stream depends upon urban livelihood strategies in the camps and cities[299]. This may be a common pattern for many IDP households which engage in seasonal return and depend upon seasonal rural livelihood strategies.

Access to secondary markets and to trade are crucial to Darfuri livelihoods, to their food security, resilience and their ability to recover[300]. This may have intensified as aspects of the economy become more commercialized with increased urbanization and recently with the greater integration of Darfur's markets with Central Sudan (see section 3.3). Better-off households engage with markets through investment strategies in particular commodities, such as livestock or irrigated fruit and vegetable production. Poorer households depend upon markets for a range of income-generating activities such as casual labour, the collection and sale of firewood and grasses, and the production and sale of charcoal[301]. Proximity to regional markets within Darfur thus makes a big difference to livelihood opportunities and prosperity[302].

Also key to household resilience is human capital. For example, having an absent male family member, or a chronically sick family member reduce the resilience of a household[303]. This has implications for households that have migrant sons not yet sending back remittances. See below. Rural youth are increasingly drawn to towns for dry season work opportunities, and to gold mining and the armed services or militias [304]. There is evidence that women are disproportionately carrying the workload in rural households. To some extent this has always been the case, but patterns of livelihood diversification during the conflict years as well as out-migration of men has exacerbated this in farming and livestock-herding communities.

Tufts research shows that nomadic communities are now generally better off than farming communities in terms of asset ownership, for example size of livestock herds, and access to fields. But there is greater inequality within nomadic communities compared with farming and former displaced communities. Nomadic female-headed households with no livestock or access to land, surviving on marginal daily laboring, are amongst the most vulnerable. Also, there is a severe lack of development within nomadic communities compared with farming communities, evident in poorer educational and literacy levels, and exceptionally high maternal mortality. This is partly linked to a lack of services, and is a major source of grievance with implications for the future stability of Darfur[305].

3.1.3 Agriculture and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements

Nationally, rainfed agriculture and livestock have been sorely neglected at policy level for years, if not decades. With the secession of South Sudan and the Sudan government's loss of oil revenues, there was the promise of a renewed focus on agricultural policy at national level, for example with the Agricultural Revival Programme, but with limited impact and success. Macro-economic stabilization objectives have consistently been given

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[299] ibid.

[300] Research shows access to markets is associated with indicators of food security such as Individual Dietary Diversity Scores for women, and coping strategies index scores. See: Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

[301] ibid.

[302] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

[303] ibid.

[304] ibid.

[305] ibid.

primacy over poverty reduction or employment generation[306]. As a result, agricultural policy and implementation has mainly favoured horizontal expansion of the semi-mechanized agricultural sector and the irrigated sector rather than supporting the rainfed agriculture sector which is the main system for crop production in Darfur. Efforts to address declining productivity have been limited[307].

Policy is also highly fragmented and often contradictory. Thus, although agriculture is officially tax-exempt, in practice production and trade are subject to high levels of taxes and fees at state and locality level, as explained in Section 1.1.3. The enforcement of regulations that relate to quality control of agricultural production tend to be observed only when collection of fees or taxes is applicable. As a result, regulations related to agricultural, environmental and health issues (for example aflatoxin in relation to groundnuts) are poorly enforced. There is a lack of resources and lack of political will[308].

Agricultural trade policy in Sudan is also highly fragmented. The decline in competitiveness of Sudan's agricultural exports is at least partly associated with lack of quality control. This is critical for groundnut exports, now destined for China and Far Eastern markets rather than European markets, and for livestock exports.

On a more positive note, the Federal 2018 Livestock Policy has been welcomed as representing a major shift in recognizing the contribution of pastoralism to the economy[309]. Developed as part of a consultative process and building on available evidence, it recognizes the importance of mobility to livestock production.

In 2011 a new act was passed – the Agricultural and Livestock Professional Organization Act – replacing the 1992 Agricultural and Livestock Practices Act. The 2011 Act establishes the legal basis for new autonomous producers' organizations, with the stated aim of raising agricultural and livestock productivity[310]. By 2018 21,200 organisations had registered under the Act across Sudan, 86% representing crop producers and only 14% representing livestock producers. In the five Darfur states only 20 producer organisations had registered, out of which two have a livestock focus (cattle and poultry)[311]. The limited progress in Darfur is at least partly attributed to unresolved issues of land tenure[312]. Generally, the eco-system for producer organisations is described as 'very fragile'[313], related to lack of information, limited access to credit, poor infrastructure and lack of technology or extension support. The performance of the producer organisations is widely acknowledged to have been weak, also reflecting low organisational and technical capacity[314].

Overall, there is often 'a gap between policy and project implementation, with a wide array of stakeholders often unaware of changes in national policies or lacking the resources to apply them'[315]. This observation applies to the 2011 Agricultural and Livestock Professional Organizational Act.

3.1.4 Crop and livestock production and productivity

Crop production and productivity

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[306] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

[307] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

[308] UNDP., (2017). '*Promoting Commodity Value Chains for Peace and Recovery in Darfur. A Darfur-focussed Value Chain Mapping Analysis for Groundnuts, Sesame, Gum Arabic and Livestock'*. UNDP DLRP.

[309] For example, it characterizes rangelands as 'the mainstay of the development of the livestock sector' (Republic of Sudan 2018: xiii), as quoted in Behnke et al, 2018

[310] Ministry of Agriculture., (2018). '*Legal Report. Producers Organizations Legal Framework in Sudan*'. Prepared by Legal Consultant for the Ministry of Agriculture. December.

[311] FAO., (2018a). '*Strengthening Producer Organisations in Sudan: Literature Review, mapping and profiling'*

[312] Key informant interview

[313] ibid.

[314] FAO., (2019b). *'GIEWS Country Brief: Sudan 29-March-2019'*. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giews-country-brief-sudan-29-march-2019

[315] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019a). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

As most of Darfur's crop production is rainfed, annual production fluctuates widely, dependent on highly variable rainfall levels and distribution. Conflict and insecurity have been major factors affecting area cultivated and total production in the last 16 years. Cereal production plummeted in the early years of the conflict although there has been some recovery since.

In the last seven years there have been three years of better cereal production: 2012/13, 2016/17 and 2018/19, mainly due to good rainfall, although in 2012/13 heavy rain caused flash flooding and some damage to crops, for example in North Darfur. 2013/14 was a particularly bad year for cereal production in Darfur. The rains were poor and insecurity affected many major cereal-producing areas including the Wadi Salih area in Central Darfur and large parts of South and East Darfur. 2015/16 was again a poor year for cereal production, due to a combination El Nino-induced drought, and insecurity.
See Figures 26 and 27.

2018/19 has been a bumper harvest across Sudan. Not only were the rains good but improved security meant there was a significant increase in area planted and harvested across all five Darfur states. Substantial numbers of IDPs engaged in seasonal return to cultivate. It is also reported that soil fertility had increased in fields that had been left uncropped for several years due to insecurity: yields increased significantly. 2018 millet production hit record levels in Sudan with Darfur accounting for more than 60% of the national harvest[316]. The area planted to millet in 2018 in the greater Darfur region was 65% greater than in 2017. The area planted to sorghum more than doubled in North Darfur compared with the previous year and increased by 70% in West Darfur[317] (As explained in Section 2.5, however, this has not translated into reduced cereal prices or much-improved market availability).

Figure 26: Production of Millet in the Five Darfur States 2012/13 to 2018/19



Sources: Federal Ministry of Agriculture for 2012/13 to 2017/18; CFSAM for 2018/19

[316] From GIEWS: FAO., (2019b). *'GIEWS Country Brief: Sudan 29-March-2019'*. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giews-country-brief-sudan-29-march-2019
[317] FAO., (2019a). '*FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan. Special Report'*. 14 March.

Figure 27: Production of sorghum in the five Darfur states: 2012/13 to 2018/19



Sources: Federal Ministry of Agriculture for 2012/13 to 2017/18; CFSAM for 2018/19

Figure 28: Area cultivated of millet in the five Darfur states: 2012/13 to 2018/19



Sources: Federal Ministry of Agriculture for 2012/13 to 2017/18; CFSAM for 2018/19

The ways in which the conflict has impacted cereal production trends include:

1) Reduced area planted in some years, for example in 2013, due to insecurity. See Figure 28. A general trend of individual farmers cultivating smaller areas when it is not safe to access more distant fields
2) A significant shift from millet to sorghum production over the last 16 years, partly due to changing consumption patterns away from millet encouraged by a decade of (predominantly) sorghum food, partly because sorghum is being grown by some households as a cash crop, and partly because sorghum stalks are increasingly used as livestock fodder since livestock mobility has been constrained
3) A general shortage of agricultural labour associated with young men leaving to work in artisanal gold mining and recruited by militias, reflected in rising agricultural wage rates

4) Women bearing more of the burden of cereal cultivation, partly because men are engaged in other activities such as artisanal gold mining and labour migration, and partly because women have taken the risk of going into the fields where they may be harassed but are less likely to be attacked and killed by armed militias compared with men[318 319]).

While the seasonal return of IDPs to farm has been widely welcomed and seen as a key factor boosting the area under production, especially in 2018/19, the extremely exploitative conditions under which households in some areas are having to cultivate must not be overlooked. This has been documented throughout the 16 years of the conflict[320]. What is concerning is the extent to which it has continued. In the Kebkabiya area, for example, in 2019 farmers must still pay 30% of their harvest as 'protection payments' to pastoralist groups[321]. Such exploitative practices are also known to be continuing in parts of West Darfur and Central Darfur.

Nationwide there has been a 30-year trend of declining productivity of cereal crops in Sudan, particularly sorghum and millet. This is attributed to continuous cultivation without fallow periods causing soil quality to decline, and the expansion of cereal production into increasingly marginal land[322]. Above all there has been a lack of investment in rainfed cereal production and lack of agricultural services.

Figure 29: Production of groundnuts in the five Darfur states: 2012/13 to 2018/19



Sources: Federal Ministry of Agriculture for 2012/13 to 2017/18; CFSAM for 2018/19

Groundnuts are Darfur's principle cash crop. Also rainfed, production varies widely year to year. See Figure 29. Apart from insecurity, three other factors have had a major impact on groundnut production in the last six to seven years. First, the 'cobweb' effect whereby farmers respond to price signals of the previous year, for example there was a surge in groundnut production in 2012/13 in response to high prices in 2011/12, but the

[318] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur*', Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

[319] See: Tufts University., (2019). *'Markets and Trade in Darfur'*. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/research-item/markets-and-trade-in-darfur/

[320] See, for example, Jaspars, S., O'Callaghan, S., (2008). "*Challenging Choices: Protection and Livelihoods in Darfur. A review of the Danish Refugee Council's programme in West Darfur". HPG Working Paper*. London: ODI, Danish Refugee Council.

[321] Personal communication, senior researcher

[322] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur*', Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf

market was unable to absorb the bumper crop, prices fell and farmers switched out of groundnuts the following year. Second, groundnut production in Darfur has suffered from labour shortages as the people of South Sudan – the main laborers on groundnut farms in South and East Darfur – left Darfur after secession, and as young Darfuri men engaged in opportunistic gold prospecting. This has pushed up the costs of production. Third, the import of cheap cooking oil into Sudan pushed the price of local groundnut oil down, for example in 2016[323]. Nevertheless, as with cereal production, the 2018/19 agricultural season produced a bumper harvest. As with cereal production, the lack of research and extension means that groundnut productivity has been on a downwards trend for at least the last decade. But groundnuts have proved to be a relatively conflict-resistant crop: they are less vulnerable to being grazed by livestock because the nuts are underground, are less vulnerable to pests and can withstand breaks in the rainy season better than cereals[324]. This contrasts with sesame. Although sesame has become an important export crop for Sudan as the international price has risen, it is a particularly conflict-sensitive crop as it must be harvested at exactly the right moment of maturity, which is not compatible with insecurity and unpredictable access to farmers' fields. Darfur's sesame market has not been well-integrated into the market in Central Sudan, and most sesame grown in Darfur is for local consumption[325].

Livestock

Livestock production trends are harder to track as there are major data gaps, for example on livestock numbers or distribution although livestock numbers are generally reported to be increasing [326327]. As described above, the composition of herds is changing in response to market demand for sheep and the high economic return for sheep[328]. The long and favorable rainy season in 2018 resulted in greatly improved water availability and pasture, thus benefiting livestock production, but with little granularity in the analysis[329].

3.2 Current risks and threats

There are three major threats to agricultural production and to rural livelihoods.

- First, climate change and climate variability are a major threat to production. At the time of writing, the late start to the rainy season in 2019 is concerning and potentially a threat to crop and livestock production in the coming twelve months although the 2019 rainy season was forecast to be above average[330].

- Second, the fragility of the current situation means that insecurity continues to be a major threat. The gains in 2018/19 in terms of increased area under crop production could be quickly undone if insecurity reduces the seasonal return of IDPs. After two years of relatively good rainfall and reduced incidence of localized conflict, an unknown factor is whether a year of poor rainfall will trigger more localized conflict between herders and farmers competing over limited resources in terms of water and grazing.

- Third, the impact of the economic crisis is a threat if, for example, farmers decide to switch to more subsistence-oriented agriculture in the face of extremely high food prices and rampant inflation.

In the absence of well-functioning agricultural and extension services, pests and disease are ongoing risks.

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[323] See:Tufts University., (2016). *'Six Month Trade and Market Bulletin: South Darfur'*. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Darfur-Markets-and-Trade-6-month-Bulletin-for-South-Darfur.pdf

[324] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Krätli, S., O.H. Eldirani, H. Young, et al. (2013). '*Standing Wealth. Pastoralist Livestock Production and Local Livelihood in Sudan'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, UNEP, SOS Sahel Sudan, Ministry of Animal Resources Fisheries and Range, Nomad Development Council, Khartoum.

[327] Young, H., Ismail, M.A., (2019). '*Complexity, Continuity and Change: Livelihood Resilience in the Darfur Region of Sudan'*. DOI:10.1111/disa.12337

[328] ibid.

[329] FAO., (2019a). '*FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan. Special Report'*. 14 March.

[330] See, for example: Fews Net., (2019). *'Social Unrest and Deteriorating Macroeconomic Conditions Drive High Food Assistance Needs'*. Retrieved from: http://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2019

4. Urban Livelihoods and Youth Employment

a. Key developments since 2013

4.1.1 Overview of urban livelihoods, and how they have changed

The conflict in Darfur is associated with a dramatic change in settlement pattern and rapid urbanization, in turn triggered by large-scale displacement. Most of Darfur's main towns, and especially its state capitals, have tripled in size since 2003. The livelihoods of the displaced went through a major transition, from income predominantly based on agricultural produce and livestock pre-conflict, to a more urbanized income dependent on casual labour, trade and small and micro-enterprises. But the links between urban and rural livelihoods are still strong[331]. Poorer urban households cultivate to reduce their dependence on the market for staples and some may travel to rural areas for agricultural labour opportunities. Wealthier urban households pay laborers to cultivate large tracts of land or to raise livestock. Some better-off households have invested in the new growth areas in urban economies associated with rapid urbanization, such as dairy farming and market gardening. The parts of the Darfur urban economies that are not directly linked to agricultural production and trade depend on either servicing these producers (for example, providing transport, basic services, blacksmiths), or selling to them. IDPs, most of whom have become assimilated into the towns and into the urban economy, are often returning seasonally to their farms to cultivate.

Although urban areas in Darfur, particularly state capitals, have become major economic hubs, this does not mean that everybody is benefiting, nor that there is adequate work to employ the greatly increased numbers of unskilled labour, and indeed skilled labour with the greatly increased number of graduates[332]. A number of studies have highlighted the intense competition for the same limited livelihood opportunities for the displaced and urban poor[333][334]. A general trend in Darfur's state capitals has been a large increase in petty traders of agricultural produce, for example of cereals and groundnuts, dominated by women. Yet each trader is handling smaller quantities than in the pre-conflict years as the retail market has become more competitive. Meanwhile in some sectors the number of wholesalers and large-scale traders has fallen, for example in groundnut milling and cereal trading between states. This implies a kind of 'flattening' of the market as it absorbs large numbers of unskilled workers with very limited resources, while the challenges and risks of larger-scale business and trading increased during the conflict years, and are also constrained by the unmet demand for capital. The recent profiling exercise carried out in El Fasher by the Durable Solutions team concludes that IDPs in Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps are only marginally more vulnerable than residents living in peri-urban areas of El Fasher[335]. They all face the same day-to-day livelihood and employment challenges. Whether this can be generalized to other Darfur towns requires further investigation.

For the professional and better-educated living in urban areas, humanitarian organisations and UNAMID have been an important source of direct employment, and have had a major multiplier impact on the wider economy, as described in section 2.2.1.1 above. Many of these opportunities are now disappearing with the withdrawal of UNAMID.

Available evidence indicates that women may be shouldering the greatest burden within urban households, for example seeking casual work, or engaging in petty trading in a highly competitive labour market. Yet women may be squeezed out of economic activities that start to generate high returns, in particular irrigated market gardening which has traditionally been their domain[336]. They have also faced daily protection risks associated

[331] Personal communication, Merry Fitzpatrick, Tufts University researcher on the Taadoud project
[332] Buchanan-Smith, M., and McElhinney, H., with Bagadi, H., Rahman, M.A., Dawalbeit, Amira., Dawalbeit, Awatif., Khalil, M., and Abdalla, B.E.D. (2011). '*City Limits. Urbanisation and Vulnerability in Sudan. Nyala Case Study'*. HPG, ODI. January. Retrieved from: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6515.pdf.
[333] Young, H., Jacobsen, K., (2010). 'No way back? Adaptation and Urbanisation of IDP Livelihoods, Darfur 2006 to 2008'. *Development and Change.* 44(1), pp.125-145. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12003
[334] UNEP 2008 – NOT ON REFERENCE LIST
[335] Durable Solutions., (2018). *'Update on the Profiling and Durable Solutions Process in El Fasher'*. December.
[336] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019a). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

with some livelihood strategies, for example venturing out of towns to collect firewood and grasses, or for charcoal production. In the absence of sons and husbands who have joined the military and militias, or who have migrated, many women are now also carrying increased social responsibilities [337][338].

4.1.2 Youth, employment and migration

Sudan has an exceptionally young population. Within Sudan, Darfur has the highest percentage of young people compared with other regions: 60% of the population are under 25[339].

The DDS identified the 'double disadvantage' of youth that are cut off from families' traditional livelihoods, and are least prepared for pursuing alternative options. Sport was highlighted as a way of engaging them productively, and to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. Work since then shows the much deeper and more fundamental issues facing the youth of Sudan, especially Darfuri youth, including major issues of disenfranchisement, disillusion and despair[340]. This implies a rather different approach is needed to supporting and engaging youth.

There has been a significant increase in higher education opportunities for youth in Darfur during the conflict years. See Figure 29. This has been accompanied by a growing awareness of the importance of education amongst IDPs who may have better access to education facilities in the camps than in the rural areas they came from[341]. But many graduates struggle to find employment. Darfuri youth from the many ethnic groups associated with the rebel movements in Darfur (for example the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit) face serious discrimination in the job market, especially in the civil service, but also in the business environment where connections with government officials are often key to success[342]. Youth appear to have higher aspirations than previous generations and are less prepared than their parents to endure discrimination[343] [344]. This may be partly a consequence of higher education levels and partly a result of greater international exposure, for example through the internet and social media. All of this explains why youth have been leading the revolution and calling for political change in Sudan.

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[337] Young, H., Jacobsen, K., (2010). 'No way back? Adaptation and Urbanisation of IDP Livelihoods, Darfur 2006 to 2008'. *Development and Change.* 44(1), pp.125-145. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12003

[338] Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.'* Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

[339] World Bank., (2019c). '*The Labour Market and Poverty in Sudan'*. Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa. May.

[340] Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.'* Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

[341] Ali, O. M. O. Mahmoud, A. M., (2016). '*From Temporary Emergency Shelter to an Urbanised Neighbourhood: The Abou Shook IDP camp in North Darfur, Sudan'*. Working Paper Number 3.

[342]Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.'* Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

[343] ibid.

[344] Bakhit, M., (2014). '*Identity and Lifestyle Construction in Multi-ethnic Shantytowns. A Case Study of Al-Baraka Community in Khartoum'*. Sudan Munster: University of Bayreuth.

Figure 30: Increase in university graduates in Darfur



Source: Jaspars and Buchanan-Smith (2018), from data provided by the individual universities

Faced with bleak employment prospects or of successfully setting up their own businesses, many young men have instead turned to high risk activities associated with the war economy. These include gold mining within Sudan and farther afield, in Niger and Chad, and joining the RSF to fight for Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen[345]. Key informants interviewed for the review also expressed concern about the sexual exploitation of young women, and the involvement of youth in drug dealing. Youth from Arab groups have been particularly targeted for recruitment into the military and militias, especially into the RSF. They have not benefitted from higher education to the same extent as non-Arab groups[346].

There has been an increase in the numbers of Sudanese, predominantly Darfuris, migrating to Europe since 2013, peaking between 2014 and 2016[347]. The causes are multiple and complex. For many young Darfuris, attack, arrest and harassment by government forces, paramilitary groups and militia were the primary reason for leaving. In other words, this was forced migration linked to systemic persecution of Darfuris of particular ethnic groups. It was also due to a loss of livelihoods associated with displacement, loss of land, discrimination and limited freedom of movement. Migration to Europe reflects the limited opportunities for traditional labour migration to other countries in the region, for example to Libya, South Sudan and Egypt. As a result, young Darfuri men of particular ethnic groups - Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and other non-Arab ethnic groups – are now migrating irregularly to Europe. However, there are very few young men from Arab ethnic groups migrating to Europe. This pattern may exacerbate the deepening divide between the education and employment potential of youth from Arab and non-Arab groups, with long-term consequences for peace and stability in Darfur[348].

This recent outflow of young Darfuri men to Europe has consequences for families and communities left behind. On the positive side, if the migrant makes it safely and is granted asylum, this may result in flows of remittances that can be used by the family, for example for the education of younger siblings, or for the community, for example for investment in public infrastructure such as wells and clinics. But there can also be a high cost to families, for example if they have to pay a ransom if their relative is taken hostage in Libya, or if they lose the

[345] Headteachers describe losing large numbers of youth to RSF recruitment.
[346] Young, H., Jacobsen, K., (2010). 'No way back? Adaptation and Urbanisation of IDP Livelihoods, Darfur 2006 to 2008'. *Development and Change.* 44(1), pp.125-145. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12003
[347] Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.'* Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.
[348] Ibid.

earning power of their young men, temporarily or permanently as many do not make it. There can also be a high cost to communities that lose an important source of labour and of self-defense in conflict-ridden Darfur[349].

b. Current risks and threats

Risks and threats to urban livelihoods are closely tied to the urban economy. Unemployment, failed businesses and bankruptcies may increase in the current economic crisis. Future employment prospects also depend upon future security and stability.

Darfuri youth played a major role in the revolution. The extent to which their participation has given them a sense of the possibility of political change in which they can play a part, and has therefore stemmed migration out of the country in recent months is unclear. But if the promise of political change dissipates and the transition fails, there is the very real prospect of much increased outflows of young men into neighbouring countries and eventually to Europe.

V. Poverty, Food Security and Social Safety Nets

5.1 Key developments since 2013

Darfur is the region of Sudan that has highest levels of poverty and inequality: the poverty rate is 51.09%, ranging from 46% in East Darfur to 61% in Central Darfur[350]. Shocks and disasters other than conflict are endemic to Darfur, for example floods and drought in 2013, drought in 2015, and flash floods in North Darfur in 2019. The effect of shocks on consumption per capita are more pronounced in the Darfur region than a number of other parts of Sudan[351].

Conflict and displacement have turned many cereal producers into consumers dependent on the market for their food security[352]. They are particularly vulnerable to hyper-inflation. Indeed, inflation, scarcity of basic goods and cash liquidity problems have decreased the purchasing power of the most vulnerable[353].

Although 2018/19 was a bumper harvest across most of Sudan, cereal prices, especially sorghum, have soared to record levels. See Figures 31 and 32. Prices began to rise in late 2017, and continued to increase sharply and unseasonably in 2018. This is due to a number of factors. Rising prices of inputs and fuel, in turn related to the sharp depreciation of the Sudanese pound, severely inflated agricultural production costs. Some large-scale traders are holding onto their stocks as a more reliable form of saving than the rapidly depreciating Sudanese currency, so the market availability of cereals is low. Cash shortages are hindering consumer purchases, and the reduction of wheat subsidies in January 2018 increased demand for sorghum and millet as substitutes[354]. Livestock prices have also risen, but not at the same rate as cereal prices. The livestock to cereal terms of trade have therefore deteriorated, below the five-year average. The labour wage to sorghum terms of trade have also deteriorated well below average[355]. These are all indications of deteriorating food insecurity which will have implications for what is possible and appropriate in terms of development programming, at least for the coming year.

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[349] ibid.
[350] World Bank., (2019b). 'Mapping Poverty in Sudan'. *Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa*. June.
[351] World Bank., (2019d) 'Shocks and Household Welfare in Sudan'. *Poverty and Equity Global Practice in Africa*. June.
[352] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A., Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I, Zakaria, M., Kaja, Z.Y., Aldou, E.-H.A., Abdulmawla, M. I.H., Hassan, A.A., Elkarim, Y.A.. M., James, L. and Jaspars, S. (2014). '*Against the Grain: The Cereal Trade in Darfur'*, Feinstein International Center,Tufts University. December. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/Cereal_trade_Darfur_V3_online3.pdf
[353] According to WFP and FAO
[354] FAO., (2019b). *'GIEWS Country Brief: Sudan 29-March-2019'.* Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/giews-country-brief-sudan-29-march-2019
[355] Fews Net., (2019). *'Social Unrest and Deteriorating Macroeconomic Conditions Drive High Food Assistance Needs'.* Retrieved from: http://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/food-security-outlook/june-2019

Figure 31: Millet retail price, El Fasher



Source: FEWSNET

Figure 32: Sorghum retail price, Nyala



Source: FEWSNET

WFP estimates that average monthly per capita household expenditure has increased 117% compared to 2017. More than half the population are spending at least 75% of their expenditure on food. WFP's assessments also show an upwards trend in the percentage of food insecure IDPs in each of the Darfur states over the last six years. See Figure 33.

Figure 33: Food insecurity amongst IDPs in the five Darfur states



Source:

Source: WFP VAM

In recent years, federal government has attempted to improve its social protection system, and established the Social Initiatives Program (SIP) in 2012, the largest component of which is a cash transfer. But targeting remains a problem. In 2016 the government launched a new social safety net programme, Shamel, which includes the basic SIP component and added new components to support livelihoods such as basic service delivery in water,

health, and education. However, inflation has eroded the value of cash transfers to households. Coverage of Darfur by these programmes has not been quantified, but is believed to be poor.

5.2 Current risks and threats

The current and continuing economic crisis is one of the major threats to household food security and to poverty. The negative consequences will be greatly increased if the 2019/20 harvest is a poor one.

III. Review of peace and development efforts since 2013

1. Overview of interventions

1.1 Funding and programming structures

The DDS identified an ambitious list of Foundational and Short-Term activities to be completed or established in the first 12 months. These ranged from a large number of studies, reviews and feasibility assessments, to the drafting of strategies such as the microfinance strategy, to setting the foundation for institutional arrangements for development, and some concrete interventions such as the rehabilitation of water facilities as the 'peace dividend'. In reality, few of these were implemented.

Funding for Pillar 3 related programming has come mainly from three different sources:

- UNDF-funded projects: according to UNDP's donor mapping, the UNDF has funded seven projects contributing to Pillar 3 objectives. The most directly relevant are:
  1) 'Microfinance for Young and Poor Producers in Rural Areas in Darfur', implemented by UNDP
  2) The 'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), including life-skills and improved access to employment opportunities for out-of-school children and youth', implemented by UNICEF and UNDP; and
  3) 'Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities in Darfur', implemented by FAO, ILO and UNOPS

  Implementation of these projects have taken much longer than originally envisaged.

- Funding from bilateral and multilateral (EU) donors: this accounts for the majority of funding for programming that relates to Pillar 3, although as described below, very little of this – with the exemption of Germany (BMZ, German Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development) -directly aligns with the Pillar 3 objectives. At least 12 donors are funding programmes that relate to Pillar 3 objectives. Qatar is the largest donor, followed by the Governments of Germany and the UK.
- Development Banks: this is a very small stream of funding from the African Development Bank

According to information made available to the DDS review team, a total of 30 projects contribute to Pillar 3, and approximately $172.4 million has been allocated to projects that relate to Pillar 3 objectives.

Figure 34: Funding that has contributed to Pillar 3 objectives since 2013

Thematic focus	Funding where thematic focus area is primary	As percentage of total funding related to Pillar 3 objectives	Funding where thematic focus is secondary* (NB does not indicate	Comments
Rural livelihoods: Integrated livelihoods/ resilience/ community stabilization programming	US$82.6 million	48%	US$14.75 million	

Natural Resource Management	US$ 331 million	19%	US$ 7.36 million	
Urban livelihoods & youth employment: • Urban livelihoods • Vocational Training & youth employment	US$ 6.61 million US$15.22 million S-total: US$28.8 million	4% 8%		Some of the integrated livelihoods programming funding is believed to have been spent on urban livelihoods Some of the funding for youth employment to be spent up to 2022
Economy business & trade Micro-finance Infrastructure	US$ 2.45 million US$85.59 S-total: US$28	16%		Some of the integrated livelihoods programming funding spent on microfinance and value chains Some data on market monitoring missing from donor mapping US$74.2 million is for one project, funded by Qatar, for service hubs associated with model villages
Total	US$172.4 million	100%		

* Only a proportion of this funding likely to have been allocated to integrated livelihoods/ resilience/ community stabilization programming, but it has not been possible to identify that proportion
** These figures for investment in NRM are indicative as much of the integrated livelihoods programming in the row above also relates to NRM[356]

'Livelihoods/ resilience/ community stabilization', account for 48% of the funding for Pillar 3 activities between 2015 and 2021. These are almost always integrated multi-sectoral projects. 8% of funds are allocated to vocational training, only 4% to urban livelihoods (although this is likely to be an underestimate as some of the integrated programme funding will have been allocated to urban livelihoods) and 1% to microfinance (although, as noted below, many of the livelihoods projects include a microfinance component). The largest share of Pillar 3 projects captured in UNDP's mapping is for infrastructure, 44%, as identified by the donor as contributing to economic recovery. These classifications do not map easily onto Pillar 3 objectives. Only the UNDF-funded projects followed the DDS logic. All other programming appears to have been determined by the respective funder's programming approach and assessment of need.

As noted in other pillar review reports there is considerable overlap between pillars, and projects cannot be neatly classified as one pillar or another, especially integrated development projects. Natural resource management and livelihoods development will almost always contain elements of conflict management and peace-building, thus overlapping with Pillar 1. Land tenure and land management are central to work on both pillars. Similarly, rural and urban infrastructure, which appears to fit under Pillar 2, is often a part of Pillar 3 community-based projects.

The concentration of funding on livelihoods and resilience programming reflects a global shift in the aid paradigm rather than the influence of the DDS. Resilience programming is the latest in more than three decades of efforts to bridge the divide between humanitarian and development programming. It shifts the focus from reducing vulnerability to building resilience to overcome the cycle of recurrent crises and humanitarian response. This shift has been very evident in the last decade in Darfur where aid programming has swung from life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection to resilience.

[356] Sources: UNDP donor mapping, updated with some subsequent donor submissions. (To be finalised – work in progress)

However, there is no shared definition of resilience in aid programming in Sudan, and some projects do not appear to define it at all. The Taadoud project proposes two ways of considering resilience:

a) Development resilience, focused on the social resilience of communities: household capacities, response to shocks, speed of recovery etc.
   Socio-ecological resilience, focused on the functioning of a socio-ecological system, in which conditions are unpredictable as a result of environmental variability. Relates to natural resource management [357]

Thus, by definition, these are integrated multi-sectoral projects.

Implementing more developmental projects under Pillar 3 requires a significant shift in the *modus operandi* from humanitarian programming. For example, it requires more focus on strengthening institutions, working more closely in partnership with government, and building relations with and supporting communities over time. This can be challenging for agencies steeped in over a decade of humanitarian programming and principles in a highly politicized conflict environment[358].

1.2 Alignment to DDS

As evident from the description above, there has been little direct alignment between projects tackling economic recovery and Pillar 3 objectives. There are a number of reasons for this:

First, many assumptions made about the trajectory of the post-DDPD period did not materialize in terms of peace and stability. As one senior UN official explained, the situation actually got worse in 2014/15. Fundamentally, some of the root causes and underlying issues related to the conflict were not addressed. Conflict over land is the prime example. This hampered progress in other areas, particularly related to rural livelihoods. In the words of an experienced NGO director: 'the land issue is complicated and mostly nothing has been done about it. It is just assumed'.

Second and related, some stakeholders have commented that a five-year strategy was long and overly ambitious in a highly volatile context. According to stakeholders in Darfur, it was not sufficiently informed by the realities on the ground, nor by agency capacity in Darfur which had been seriously depleted after the NGO expulsions in 2009[359]. Yet the objectives were highly ambitious. Implementation of the DDS 'collided with the rock of reality on the ground', according to one national NGO director. And there was a lack of flexibility in implementation. Projects designed early in the DDS period were guided by accessibility at that time. But with greater security other areas opened up and IDPs returned, but rarely could projects be adapted to the new needs and reality.

Third, the objectives of the DDS have been described as very general. A number of Pillar 3 objectives could apply to a peaceful context, or be part of a Master Plan, for example the objective to improve crop and livestock production and productivity. They were not sufficiently tailored to the specific context of Darfur. The way the Pillar 3 objectives have been articulated also imply a sectoral approach to programming and does not take into account the multi-sectoral integrated development programming that has prevailed in Darfur.

Fourth, the feedback from state level within Darfur is that the DDS was a top-down process and produced a top-down document. Neither line ministry officials, UN staff or NGOs felt a sense of ownership or engagement with the DDS. At a meeting of international and national NGOs in El Fasher in March 2019 it was striking how few were familiar with the DDS, or were even aware of its existence. Pinning implementation of the DDS to the DRA created a structural problem. Line ministries at state level describe how they were not involved in the

[357] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.
[358] ibid.
[359] According to a senior humanitarian official, in 2018/19 there was only a quarter of the agency staff present in Darfur compared with 2009.

selection of projects, resulting in some duplication. When the DRA was dissolved, political will to implement the DDS dissipated, and the hand-over of projects to line ministries took time. In El Fasher line ministry officials described their role as supervisory rather than implementational.

Nevertheless, the analysis underpinning the DDS was seen to be useful to some stakeholders as a basic reference for programme planning purposes, for highlighting underlying problems and for revealing how the combined task force of donors and government saw the priorities in 2012/13. The German government, through their implementing agency GIZ, for example, made a conscious decision to align its work to Pillar 3 when designing its Darfur programme in 2015 and 2017, and specifically to the objective of employment creation. But they also found that the economic situation had drastically changed since the DDS had been drafted, and some of the infrastructure that was said to exist, such as vocational training centres, had been co-opted for other purposes.

The consequence of all of this has been a lack of overall strategy and vision driving economic recovery efforts in Darfur. While there has been considerable investment and numerous relevant projects, they often lack coherence and co-ordination between each other, as described below.

2. Economy, Business and Trade

2.1 Overview

This section reviews development efforts intended to promote economic and private sector development, and to enhance trade. It relates specifically to three of the Pillar 3 objectives. See Figure 35:

Figure 35: Pillar 3 objectives, sub-objectives and outputs related to economy, business and trade

OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND SUB-OBJECTIVES	OUTPUTS
Improved value chains in livestock, agriculture and livelihoods development • Animals traded in the market, by type of livestock • Products undergoing value addition processing • People employed in value addition activities • Producer-market linkages established • Additional income for beneficiaries from Income Generating Activities	• Value chains analysis and development plan completed • Farmers trained on cooperative management, micro-enterprise development, marketing post-harvest handling and value addition • Functioning market information systems • Animal slaughter houses established • Livestock tannery factories established • Standard livestock markets established • Pilot processing plants (fruits and vegetables) constructed • Pilot grain stores constructed • Producer associations/cooperatives established • People with access to Income Generating Activities
Improved business enabling environment and institutional capacity • Sectors with tax incentives for investment • Public-private partnerships signed • Sectoral investment strategies (agribusiness, leather and tourism) developed	• Private sector promotion centres established • Legal and regulatory framework for private sector investments revised • Establishment of Investment Climate and Promotion Units in State Ministries of Commerce/Finance • Public-Private Dialogue Platform established • Diaspora network established • Markets and trading posts rehabilitated/ constructed • Industrial area and export processing zone developed • Border trade management procedures and structures revised • Border facilities rehabilitated
Increase access to financial services • Lines of credit provided • Micro-finance strategy for Darfur completed • States covered by the Credit Information Bureau • States with a Central Bank • Micro-finance institutions supported • Village Savings Loan Association (VSLA) formed	• Lines of credit provided • Micro-finance strategy for Darfur completed • States covered by the Credit Information Bureau • States with a Central Bank • Micro-finance institutions (MFI) supported • Village Savings Loan Association (VSLA) formed

As noted above, for Darfur's economic potential to be realized there must be an enabling business environment, one of the DDS Pillar 3 objectives. Yet as also described above, the business environment in the last six years has mostly been a 'disabling' one, in large part due to the macroeconomic context and macroeconomic policy. Few of the DDS sub-objectives intended to improve the business enabling environment in Darfur were implemented. More progress has been made in meeting the DDS objective of improving value chains, although this has been on a very small-scale compared with the potential and the outputs envisaged. The most relevant projects, on improved market information and analysis, and on strengthening producer-market linkages, had already begun before the DDS was formulated, although they were since expanded. The completion of the paved El Ingaz road connecting the greater Darfur region to Central Sudan has arguably had the greatest positive impact on trade and Darfur's economy in the last six years although it was not a specific objective of the DDS[360]. There has been some funding of initiatives to strengthen the private sector in Darfur, but again on a very small-scale, especially compared with the ambitious sub-objectives of Pillar 3, and only in the last couple of years. There have been a small number of valuable experiments in public-private partnerships; these provide rich learning and indicate the potential for further engagement between development actors and Sudan's corporate sector. Some limited progress has been made in improving access to financial services, mostly through the provision and management of revolving funds at community level - VSLAs. Overall, however, the DDS objectives and ambition for microfinance are way behind schedule. Little had been achieved by 2019 although there is a large unmet demand and potential for microfinance, ranging from support for rural producers to capital needed for SMEs in urban areas.

In short, the three DDS objectives above, and their sub-objectives, were highly ambitious and few of the outputs have been achieved. The objectives were based on an assumption that there would be an immediate and sustained improvement in security and a conducive macro-economic context, neither of which transpired, and took little or no account of the deeply entrenched political economy in Darfur.

2.2 Progress and achievements

In terms of improved value chains and boosting agricultural trade in Darfur, the completed paving of the El Ingaz road, a vital artery connecting the five states in Darfur to Central Sudan and to each other, has had one of the greatest impacts in the last six years, although this was not a specific objective in Pillar 3 (nor was it specifically identified in Pillar 2 objectives). See Figure 36. Darfur's markets are now much better-integrated than ever before. However, it is worth noting that the transportation costs from Central Sudan to Darfur are higher than from Darfur to Central Sudan, implying that the volume of trade westwards is greater than the volume of trade into Central Sudan, and that there is an opportunity to boost the latter[361]. The general improvement in security along many of Darfur's major trade routes since around 2014, has also been a boost to the FaSTer, safer, and therefore cheaper flow of trade in many parts of Darfur.

Figure 36: Impact of completion of the El Ingaz road

Some of the positive economic benefits of completion of the El Ingaz road include:

A reduction in transportation costs ranging from 25 to 40%, and in transportation time (cut by half from El Fasher to Omdurman). This is a major boost for trade in perishable commodities such as fruit (e.g. oranges from Jebel Marra and watermelons from Saraf Omra) and vegetables (e.g. tomatoes from Kutum and El Fasher).

Livestock trucked from state capitals in Darfur to Central Sudan over a period of one to two days, compared with 45 to 60 days it used to take to move livestock 'on the hoof' which also incurred numerous levies at locality level. This has greatly boosted the trade in livestock, especially sheep and cattle to Central Sudan.

[360] It should be noted that recent flooding has destroyed some parts of the road close to Khartoum

[361] DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2017). '*Trade Flows and the El Ingaz Road.'* Issue Paper, MMTA project. March.

Improved security for the transportation of goods and people, in turn contributing to reduced transport costs, as trucks move FaST and frequently along the paved road and are therefore less vulnerable to being held up; with the construction of police stations around the main towns; and with improved mobile phone communications.

Boosting the (mainly informal) cross-border trade, in both directions, for example between West, North and Central Darfur and Chad, in sheep and other agricultural commodities, and in manufactured goods.

Reducing and stabilizing the price and availability of many commodities coming from Central Sudan, such as cement, flour and sugar.

Making Darfur more accessible for investment and business development by large-scale private sector companies from Central Sudan[362].

There have been a number of projects focused on developing trade, markets and the value chain. Some of these are informational, for example the 'Market Monitoring and Trade Analysis' (MMTA) project run by DDRA through a network of over 40 community-based organisations. This highly localized model enabled the project to monitor over 70 markets on a weekly basis across all five Darfur states, at times when access was not available to international actors, drawing on local knowledge and experience. The project performed a food security early warning function that was relied upon by government and international agencies. Adopting a systemic approach to market monitoring and analysis, the project identified market blockages as well as opportunities and was used by some agencies in their programme planning. DDRA's monthly and quarterly bulletins were complemented by three in-depth trade studies, led by Tufts University (FIC), into the livestock trade, cash crop trade and cereal trade respectively. These explored the impact of the conflict and macroeconomic policy context on trade in Darfur, deepening analysis beyond prices to market organization, trade routes etc. The studies made policy recommendations and identified economic opportunities, some of which were taken up by other actors. The project, which began in 2010 ended in 2016.

UNDP has pioneered work in Darfur on value chains under the Darfur Livelihoods and Recovery Programme (DLRP) which began in 2011 in all five Darfur states, underpinned by market analysis. Initially focused on honey, hides and skins, hibiscus, sorghum and groundnuts, the project has recently been expanded to gum Arabic, sesame and livestock, setting up producer associations and Savings and Loans Associations (SLAs) to access credit facilities. Direct beneficiaries are reported to have doubled their income over two years (DLRP, 2018). Out of the first five commodities the project covered, groundnuts and honey production and processing showed the highest income earning potential[363]. Just over 50% of those participating in the project are women. FAO, UNOPS and ILO have also engaged in value chain work, funded by the UNDF, focused on horticulture, agribusiness and access to business development centres (BDCs), training beneficiaries in business and technical skills. A particularly interesting achievement was a tax waiver for value chain activities involving youth, negotiated by UNDP in South and West Darfur.

Since 2015 GIZ has been working to strengthen the private sector in El Fasher, El Geneina and most recently (2017) in Nyala, as part of its employment promotion programme, with a particular focus on strengthening structures and systems. For example, it assisted the Small Industry and Crafts Union in El Geneina and El Fasher to establish a unit for business development services (BDS) unit and a membership management system featuring close to 5,000 craftsmen/women across North and West Darfur. Members were subsequently trained in financial management and accounting, and were familiarized with microfinance services. Female members from selected sectors (the leather producers and small restaurant owners) received both technical and business skills training. GIZ carried out a labour market assessment in 2018 in collaboration with local organisations

[362] DDRA., SOS Sahel International UK., Tufts FIC., (2017). '*Trade Flows and the El Ingaz Road.'* Issue Paper, MMTA project. March.
[363] Turkawi, A., (2018). '*UNDP Darfur Livelihood Recovery Project. Final evaluation of project phase*'. September. Retrieved from: *https://erc.undp.org › evaluation › documents › download*

including the VTCs and the Department of Labour in Nyala, El Geineina and El Fasher. This provided a solid start to establishing a functioning labour market information system, including training and coaching, data collection and processing as well as development of digital tools and equipment. It has also generated important information about potential growth areas in different cities. These include the blacksmith sector and their female counterparts as potters, repair of electrical appliances, welding, car mechanics and electrics, and food processing across Darfur. Specific market potential was also identified for leather and food processing in Geneina, as well as perfume production, air conditioning and renewable energy in Nyala[364].

There have been a small number of projects based on public-private partnership principles, in the more profitable sectors of Darfur's economy. Two of these target groundnut production and processing. In 2012/13 UNDP, the Dal Group and the Ministry of Agriculture in South Darfur carried out a pilot project to support high quality groundnut production, free of aflatoxin, for livestock fodder for dairy farming in Khartoum[365]. More recently, in 2017 the Samil Group embarked on a project to promote groundnut production and processing in Ed Daien, in collaboration with state government, the Nilain Bank, and with funding from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). Both examples demonstrate the potential of this model. See Figure 37:

Figure 37: DarFood – a public-private partnership in East Darfur

In 2017 the Samil Group established the DarFood plant in Ed Daien, East Darfur. The project targets four groundnut producing areas around Ed Daien, and is implemented in close co-ordination with the State Ministry of Agriculture which verifies land ownership rights and issues land registration certificates for farmers before they can engage in any contractual agreement with the company, thus avoiding areas where land ownership is contested. A small number of female farmers is involved. The partnership also involves Nilain Bank which provides microfinance for buying equipment and inputs. Farmers (some of whom are ex-combatants) are grouped into producer cooperatives that are provided with improved seed and related inputs, machinery and tools, extension services and credit. The groundnuts are sold to DarFood at the prevailing market price in Ed Daien, where they are processed and shipped to Khartoum for the production of PlumpyNut (for therapeutic feeding), and PlumpySup (for supplementary feeding) for the treatment of malnourished children. For the first year the principles of the '*musharaka'* banking were applied, whereby the proceeds were shared as follows: 55% for the bank; 30% for the farmer; 15% for the company. In the next season the *Igara* finance system has been applied, adjusted in the farmers' favour, to: 45% for the bank; 40% for the farmer; 15% for the company. In the first year only six farmers were prepared to engage in the project, with a total of 300 feddans. By 2018 450 farmers had engaged, with a total of 7,000 feddans – a positive indicator. The Samil Group has plans to develop an environmental component to the project, for example planting shelter belts around farms and promoting organic methods of fertilization.

Source: interviews with members of the Samil Group, in Ed Daien and in Khartoum

Shortage of capital and lack of access to credit is a major constraint for both farmers and traders, many of whom struggle to provide collateral. The DDPD stipulated that a microfinance system should be established in Darfur to help support income generating activities for less privileged groups using non-conventional methods. Initially a rural bank specializing in microfinance operations was proposed. The thinking then shifted towards establishing an umbrella microfinance corporation. Eventually, at the end of 2017, a decision was taken to establish a limited liability government-owned company. After numerous delays the license for the Darfur Alkubra Microfinance Development Company was granted in August 2018. The company is jointly owned by the Ministry of Finance (15%), the Central Bank of Sudan (10%) and the five Darfur state government (15% each). Working alongside existing microfinance corporations at state level (that were established in line with federal policy), the new company has three mandated areas: (1) the provision of technical support, (2) increasing the capital of state microfinance institutions, and (3) seeking additional funding sources. Although the

[364] GIZ., (2018). 'Labour Market Assessment'

[365] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

Government of Sudan is committed in the DDPD to making US$ 100 million available, so far the company has received less than 1% of that pledge.

While progress in terms of formal institutions and an overall strategy for microfinance for Darfur has been extremely slow, international agencies have, to some extent, stepped into the breach. One of the more significant initiatives targeting rural producers is the UNDF-funded UNDP project – 'Microfinance for Young and Poor Producers in Rural Areas in Darfur' – with a budget of US$2.35 million over 2 years. It has aimed to raise awareness of microfinance opportunities, has set up and trained almost 700 Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA), (now registered as community-based organisations [CBOs] with HAC so they have the required legal status to access formal sources of credit), and has trained microfinance actors. The VSLAs have a 56% female membership. There is a close link between UNDP's value chain work and its microfinance work.

Business Development Centres have also been set up in each of the five Darfur states to serve as microfinance hubs. The project reports that it has linked 1,700 beneficiaries to commercial banks and microfinance institutions. Businesses supported through the project range from trading and fattening lamb and goats, to food processing, to the purchase of grain threshers and groundnut mills by returning IDPs.

In collaboration with the government's new Microfinance Development Company, the project is now piloting a mobile phone based system for providing microfinance in North Darfur – the Microfinance Core System[366]. And it has supported the company to set up an internet-based system based on the Kenyan model. Trialed in early 2019, this came to an abrupt halt, however, when the internet was closed down due to the political unrest in recent months. Alternative approaches are now being explored.

A number of other agencies, often INGOs, have also set up savings and loans associations at community level with revolving funds. These are usually part of larger projects. For example, the Taadoud project set up Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILCs) in communities in West Darfur. These are regarded as having played a beneficial role in recovery by using capital for joint investments and increasing households' income and generating wealth in the form of livestock, new types of seed or equipment[367]. UNDP's DLRP also set up SLAs at community level.

In urban areas (El Fasher and El Geneina) GIZ's approach has been to connect the finance sector with the small industry sector through a series of workshops to overcome some of the obstacles described above, where those in need of credit do not have the contacts and connections to access it, and to promote transparency. This has enabled some young craftsmen/women who would not otherwise have access to credit, to gain access.

In the field of entrepreneurship promotion, UNDP and GIZ have worked with youth organisations in Darfur's capitals to develop attractive business development services such as ICT courses, entrepreneurship awareness campaigns as well as radio shows. Linkages to Khartoum based start-up networks have been fostered to facilitate structural exchange and learning on how to establish and run a business. Further, GIZ assisted the Small Industry and Crafts Union in El Geneina and El Fasher to establish a unit for business development services.

Other examples of positive interventions include UNDP's investment in solar power which has boosted small-scale enterprises such as grinding mills and pumps for irrigation, at a time when fuel is in very short supply and can bring small and medium scale businesses to a halt.

2.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

One of the biggest obstacles to efforts to promote economic development, business and trade in Darfur in the last six years has been the wider macro-economic context, and in particular the current economic crisis described

[366] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). *'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018*.' From UNICEF.

[367] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

above. The liquidity crisis is crippling businesses, large and small, as are high rates of inflation. Very high rates of taxation and fees imposed by local authorities is another major constraint to economic development. Frequently mentioned in interviews with private sector companies, it is a disincentive to effective public-private partnerships. There is no evidence of any sectors with tax incentives for investment, despite this being one of the sub-objectives of the DDS Pillar 3.

Sudan's political economy is a second major obstacle. This has manifested in a number of different ways. Serious delays in the establishment of the Darfur microfinance company is associated with lack of political will amongst the ruling elite in Central Sudan to support development in Darfur. This is indicative of the long-running political, economic and structural marginalization of Darfur. Vested political and economic interests in Central Sudan may also explain the failure to establish a functioning slaughter house in the Darfur region, despite this being one of Sudan's main livestock producing areas, and an intended output of Pillar 3. The livestock trade in Sudan is currently controlled from Omdurman, and improved slaughter facilities in Darfur would draw business away from Central Sudan[368].

The engagement of security institutions in the most productive sectors of the economy, on preferential terms, has also been a challenge to some international and national projects. Market information rapidly becomes politically valuable and may be sensitive; this can hamper economic assessments and market monitoring. Similarly some international agencies have reported the challenge of working with formal institutions at state level, which should have a predominantly economic function but have been captured by the ruling elite and thus have become politicized. By definition these institutions exclude many marginalized groups which are likely to be the target beneficiaries of internationally-funded development projects. Agencies must find creative ways of maintaining a relationship with these gatekeeper institutions yet also reaching their target beneficiaries.

Combined, these are major threats to the longer-term sustainability of national and international efforts to boost economic development. No sectoral investment strategies have been developed, despite this being a sub-objective of the DDS Pillar 3.

Federal government launched a nationwide initiative on microfinance in 2008, with the establishment of a Microfinance Unit in the Central Bank of Sudan, and encouragement to commercial banks to allocate at least 12% of their portfolio to microfinance[369]. This has made very little difference in Darfur. As mentioned above, in a high risk conflict environment traders are reluctant to take on loans at the high interest rates on offer because of the risks of defaulting, and many would not qualify anyway in terms of the collateral required.

Agencies have commented upon the relatively small amounts of funding available for developmental work, for example on value chains, when the potential is great. In addition, funding is often provided on short term grant cycles, sometimes a year at a time, yet work to develop and support the private sector, including value chains, requires a longer-term commitment, for example to engage in and influence the institutional and policy context. Shifting mindsets and approaches to becoming more 'market-oriented' after more than a decade of humanitarian programming is reported as a challenge by a number of agencies.

At a more immediate practical level, project implementation has been hampered by shortages of currency at the banks, fuel shortages, civil unrest and its direct impact on transportation and trade flows. A number of projects have fallen behind schedule as a result. The pilot project on groundnut production mentioned above, implemented in South Darfur by Dal Group in collaboration with UNDP, foundered in 2013/14 which was a drought year.

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[368] Buchanan-Smith, M., Abdulla Fadul, A.J., with Tahir, A.R. and Aklilu, Y., (2012). *'On the Hoof. Livestock Trade in Darfur'. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan.* September. Retrieved from: http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/2012/on-the-hoof-livestock-trade-in-darfur.

[369] Buchanan-Smith, M., Fadul, A.J.A.,Tahir, A.R., Ismail, M.A., Ahmed, N.I., Adam, M.I.G., Kaja, Z.Y., Eissa, A.M.A., Mohamed, M.A.M. and Jumma, A.H.H.M., (2013). '*Taking Root: The Cash Crop Trade in Darfur' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and UNEP, Sudan*. November. Retrieved from: http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/taking-root/.

2.4 Learning

A key learning from work in this area is the importance of taking a system-wide approach when promoting trade and business development. This means carrying out a stakeholder and eco-system analysis, and including a thorough political economy analysis of the sector to be supported, not only to inform how a proposed intervention should be implemented, but also to identify key points of leverage and potential blockages, constraints and risk of co-option by political interests. The complex political economy of trade and business in Sudan, and in Darfur in particular, makes this an imperative.

In a context in which government has weak capacity and very limited resources there is an important role for public-private partnerships as envisaged in the DDS. The example of the DarFood project (see Box 2) demonstrates this well: government has a regulatory function to play (in this case land registration), and/ or a technical function (in this case agricultural extension), but the private sector has the economic incentive, the business skills and knowledge as well as some of the funds to work with producers and to link them to the market, for example through agro-processing. A tripartite arrangement with an aid organization can play an important role in providing the initial funding, the facilitation and promotion of wider development principles, for example around inclusivity. Exploring how insurance can protect public-private partnerships is also a learning emerging from experience so far.

Business Development Centres have been established in a number of Darfur states. On the one hand these are set up to be as self-contained and self-supporting as possible. On the other hand they appear to be handed over to government authorities[370]. Whether this is an appropriate long-term strategy deserves further investigation, noting that many of the more successful business and entrepreneurial hubs in Khartoum are now run by the private sector.

Another important learning concerns how to build durable structures in a market system while also generating 'quick wins'. Agency experience indicates that a participatory approach from the outset may be the best approach, for example involving young people who are looking for employment in preparatory work such as a labour market analysis, through which they gain data collection and analysis skills, *and* are exposed directly to a deeper understanding of the market. GIZ staff describe this approach as key to success in an environment where there is pressure to create immediate benefits while working on structural change.

There is considerable potential to expand value chain programming, based on results so far, targeting areas of economic growth such as the groundnut and livestock sectors. Continued paving of roads along major trade routes, including feeder roads, strengthens market integration and generates multiplier effects on livelihoods and the economy[371].

In terms of improving access to financial services, there are good practice examples to be drawn upon, but much agency experience is disparate and there appears to have been limited learning and exchange across organisations. However, the experience of VSLAs, for example in many INGO projects and set up by UNDP, demonstrate the relevance and importance of 'group solidarity' as collateral and as a method of guaranteeing repayment rather than traditional forms of collateral such as physical property which rules out so many traders and small businesses. Well-supported VSLAs have much potential for the introduction of revolving funds to support production and small-scale trading.

2.5 Organization & co-ordination of national and international efforts

For each project reviewed, the respective international organization has a working relationship with the relevant government line ministry(ies) at state level. For example, GIZ is working closely with the Department of Labour under the respective state Ministry of Finance, and with the small industry and crafts union. They also support the Supreme Council for Vocational Trainings and Apprenticeship /SCVTA) to improve co-ordination and

[370] As described in the final project report for the UNDP/ UNICEF 'Accelerated Learning Programme' (ALP)

[371] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

standardization in the sector. But beyond these individual project-based arrangements, co-ordination in this sector is extremely weak.

On microfinance UNDP is working closely with government. The Greater Darfur Microfinance Apex (GDMA) was supposed to provide a platform to oversee the microfinance sector in the Darfur States, linked to the DRA. With the dissolution of the DRA the Apex took years to get off the ground. It now has a very small staff presence in four of the five Darfur states, and extremely limited capacity, although with UNDP support it now has a business plan. Within the GDMA the Microfinance Core System was recently established, also supported by UNDP. This is an integrated IT platform intended to enable microfinance institutions in Darfur to consolidate, share and manage information on microfinance activities across the region. But awareness of these system-wide and institutional developments appears low amongst NGOs implementing VSLAs. For example, some are not even aware of the presence of the Darfur Microfinance Company. In short, community level SLAs are poorly linked to institutional microfinance and there is currently no effective co-ordination mechanism for work on microfinance.

There are relatively few international actors engaged directly in private sector development, but co-ordination and exchange of experience and learning between them appears limited. The main forum bringing the Sudanese corporate sector together with development actors is the UN Global Compact local platform, at national level, chaired by the Haggar Group, but it is not clear if this is used to share experience of projects at the Darfur level. The social enterprise 249 Start-up in Khartoum has established a thriving network of young entrepreneurs, with which GIZ is now working to strengthen and expand their network into Darfur.

The Food Security and Livelihoods cluster should be the main co-ordination forum for value chain and markets work, but in practice has a more humanitarian focus, on livelihood provisioning through the distribution of assets such as seeds and tools rather than livelihood development.

Meanwhile at the macroeconomic level some of the usual platforms for international actors to coordinate around macroeconomic reform, such as the HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Country) debt relief initiative, are constrained by Sudan's presence on the State-Sponsored Terrorism List (SSTL). There are concerns that the current piecemeal approach by international actors to promote and support macroeconomic policy reform will see Sudan drift further into economic decline, and that co-ordination within the international community must be urgently stepped up, for example through the Sudan International Partners Forum (SIPF) and Collective Outcomes[372]. To at least partially address this the IFC is proposing a High Level meeting for Sudan, bringing together the transitional government, private sector and international development actors, to discuss and agree upon an economic recovery plan that can support private sector led growth.

3 Natural Resources

3.1 Overview of peace and development efforts

According to the DDS document the sustainable management of land will include the demarcation of nomadic routes and restoration of pasture areas with improved seeds. Sustainable forest resource management will involve reforestation, community forest management and rehabilitation of the gum Arabic industry. Sustainable management of water will be ensured through measures that include: promoting the systematic capture of rainfall (bunding and harvesting) and the protection of river banks against erosion. Figure 38 shows the objectives, sub-objectives and outputs:

Figure 38: **Pillar 3 objectives, sub-objectives and outputs related to natural resource management**

Objectives and sub-objectives	Key Outputs

[372] According to presentations and discussions at the Berlin Group meeting

Sustainable management of water, land and forest resources • Water Resources Management Information System (MIS) developed and up to date • Functioning meteorological stations • Land use plans approved • Major catchment management plans agreed • Functioning water-user committees • Rehabilitated nurseries • Forestry and environmental laws reviewed and developed • Locality mapping of forestry areas completed • Development of Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in partnership with national programme • Wild life laws and reserve areas established and protected • Integration of early warning system into a comprehensive government strategy for natural resources management • Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for projects with major impact on the environment carried out	• Area under sustainable land management • Beneficiaries adopting Sustainable Land Management techniques • Area under reforestation • Gum Arabic area rehabilitated • Area under community forestry management • River banks protected against erosion • Nomadic routes demarcated • Pasture area renovated with improved pasture species • People using alternative energy sources • Fire lines opened • Community environmental management plans developed and supported

Implemented projects mostly tried to address the stated objectives but few were able to satisfy all outputs for various reasons. Importantly, all projects established institutional frameworks/platforms for engaging with target communities in the form of CBOs or have strengthened existing ones. Working with the community is the key element for sustainability for any development process. To some extent this was foreseen in the DDS which refers to outputs such as community environmental management plans and water-user committees, although the objectives and outputs were predominantly articulated in technical terms. Integration is the other important element but which most projects could not achieve for various reasons that are explained in the section on limitations. However, the DDS document itself did not articulate the integration dimension clearly. NRM can in fact be considered a cross-cutting theme and as such should be reflected in all projects.

3.2 Progress and achievements

Since natural resources are at the heart of Darfur's economy it is inevitable that natural resource management becomes a component in almost every project being implemented in Darfur, in other words it is a cross-cutting issue. In this section only projects that primarily address the stated NRM objectives in the DDS are considered here. Five projects have been reviewed. Although there may be other relevant projects, information and documentation were not made available.

The first project reviewed is the 'Wadi El Ku Catchment Management Project' (WEK) which is funded by the EU and implemented in North Darfur by UNEP. The core project objectives are: improved farming livelihoods through better natural resource management, and reduced conflict. Building the capacity of North Darfur State government institutions to sustainably manage natural resources and reduce the risks associated with drought is at the heart of the project. Institutional support, IWRM policy guidance, capacity building and piloting new approaches are key elements of WEK planning and implementation. The evaluation report (2017) shows that the key livelihoods impact of the project is increased water availability for horticultural crops and greatly increased sales to local and urban markets. The survey curried out at the end of the first project phase (2013-2016) showed that the majority of respondents had increased their agricultural production. Surplus horticultural production had even been taken to Central Sudan for sale according to some reports. The main achievement of the project has been in capacity building. A total of 3,511 persons have participated in different training activities. The project helped establish a Water Users' Forum. The institutional sustainability of water and

natural resources management through the Forum is a major innovation for IWRM in Sudan. However, the evaluation noted that the community representation in the Forum is relatively weak, not only numerically (1/3 local community versus 2/3 town-based) but also because local community members are less present (and possibly culturally less vocal in a mixed group).[373] The main issue raised here is that because of its proximity to the main town in North Darfur investment in irrigated agriculture has been spearheaded by urban-based people, many of whom are the educated elite working in government departments. This clearly raises issues of social equality that such projects must address.

The second project 'Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Livelihoods in East Darfur' is also funded by the EU and implemented by UNOPS. It is designed to contribute to improved livelihoods and poverty alleviation of conflict-affected populations by helping to ensure that natural resources are more sustainably and productively used. In pursuing this purpose, the project attempted to deliver three results:

(1) Policies guiding the use of natural resources are formulated, adapted to local requirements, and implemented at the local level
(2) Rehabilitated and newly constructed water points to ensure sustainable and quality water supply
(3) Local beneficiaries applying techniques that contribute to more sustainable and productive use of natural resources

The project was implemented through a partnership between UNOPS, UNEP, and selected NGOs present in East Darfur, working closely with participating communities, customary institutions, and state government. UNEP mainly dealt with the soft component of the project that centers around training, advocacy for legislation and institutional capacity-building. The project area consists of three localities (Ad-Dean, Adila and Baher Al-Arab). A total of five water yards and one hafir have been built. Each water facility includes separate access for humans and animals to ensure better health standards. With each water facility a vegetable farm and a nursery have been established in order to popularize vegetable growing and for nutritional benefits..[374]

The project succeeded in lobbying relevant stakeholders to pass legislation concerning shared management of water facilities. It also succeeded in forming a new co-ordination and policy-making body at the state level, the Council for Co-ordination and Management of Natural Resources in East Darfur. In addition, there is a task force and a technical committee where officials from line ministries participate. In 2018, 625 feddans of *hashab* (gum Arabic) have been planted in reserved forests with people's participation who also have special access to the forest. A training component was included, according to which participants from targeted communities have been trained in a variety of topics such as fire management, community environmental action planning, drip irrigation, forest and nursery establishment.[375]

An EU funded project implemented by COOPI entitled 'Support to the nomad and sedentary food unsecured communities in Um Baru locality, North Darfur', has a major NRM component. The project strategy focused on improving household resilience to recurrent shocks (droughts and conflict between farmers and pastoralists around water access and management) through increasing local capacities to manage natural resources in a sustainable way. The intervention is based on three main results:

1) Improved access to natural resources for cultivation and livestock for 2,500 people.;
2) Increased productive assets, inputs and services through food production assistance and diversification for 5,000 households;
3) Improved natural resource management through community, government and CBO capacity-building.

It is worth noting that this project location represents an exceptional context where the majority of returnees have been refugees in Chad. Furthermore, all of the local population belong to the same ethnic group of Zaghawa without the presence of any 'land occupiers' from outside the community. Both farmers and pastoralists essentially share the same ethnic background. This means land conflict issues are reduced to incidents of dispute over farm boundaries and the like. The project achieved the objectives and results planned, reached the targeted farmers and pastoralists with low incomes, and fulfilled the planned coverage of 5,909 households (2,000 in

[373] Wadi El Ku Catchment Management Project - Final Report, 2017.
[374] UNEP, Khartoum. NRMP2 annual report 2018.
[375] ibid

agriculture and 3,909 in livestock), improving the living conditions of the beneficiary households and revitalizing the local economy, in particular through rehabilitation of the Orschi dam and the creation and capacity-building of VSLAs. It established a simple and clear intervention logic, even if not sufficiently supported by an effective monitoring system. The argument is made that ownership shown by the beneficiaries is a result of the participatory approach used by the project, guaranteeing sustainability in the medium term, if adequately supported by national and local authorities and by donors.[376]The project was designed to be broadly in line with DDS objectives and is intended for replication in a second phase according to its final evaluation.

An EU funded project implemented by FAO is entitled 'Promoting the provision of legitimate land tenure rights using VGGT Guidelines for conflict-displaced communities, including small - scale rural farmers, pastoralists, and IDPs in the Greater Darfur region of Sudan'. This project belongs to the FaST category which should have been implemented within the first year of the DDS, but due to various obstacles it has come into operation only at the end of 2018. It has produced a baseline survey against which subsequent implemented projects are supposed to be judged. The study identified four localities in each of the five Darfur states where the survey has been carried out. The most important conclusion of the study is that food insecurity is common, and it describes the reason: most households that participated in the study indicated that they do not have stored cereals as they used to in the past. Now they buy from the market to supplement what they have produced from their own farms. The level of IDP returns in different areas varies from one locality to another. The results of the study are not conclusive in this regard because the teams depended only on data provided to them by the voluntary returns commission.[377] Despite the presence of land tenure problems in most locations, confidence in the traditional institutions of land administration (mainly the native administration) is still strong. . However, the delay in launching the project has affected the utilisation and usefulness of its results in planning and executing other projects that could have benefited from the insights.

The DFID funded project implemented by a consortium of INGOs in different Darfur states, entitled 'Taadoud II: Transition to Development', also has a major NRM component. The project is well aligned with DDS objectives in its general understanding but tries to go beyond it using a more integrative approach. The main logic of the project is based on the complementary relationship between the two most important livelihood activity sectors in Darfur: farming and livestock production. A learning document produced by the project's Operational Research arm states that: 'The integration between these two sub-systems as part of a wider regional system is critical to their peaceful co-management of natural resources. Their relationship and interactions have at times involved co-operation and complementarities and, at other times, competition and conflict. Both sub-systems have well-rehearsed strategies for dealing with the unpredictability of the rains'[378]. The project identified the importance of the institutional basis of NRM and tried to address it accordingly. Institutions are considered critical for regulating and managing access to natural resources, which in turn helps create sustainable livelihoods, prevents depletion or degradation of resources, and safeguard the peaceful co-management of common property resources at communal and intercommunal levels. Thus, situated in an integrative context NRM mediates all livelihood activities. The project as implemented in different contexts (South, Central and West Darfur) tried to develop the capacity of communities for NRM and consequently achieve improved productivity in major livelihood sectors as well as reduce conflict through more co-operation. The Taadoud project is reviewed in more detail in section 4 below.

Many other projects designed to develop livelihoods and promote peacebuilding include natural resource management components, the effects of which cannot be easily reflected here. Such projects include those funded by the DCPSF (Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund) which actually preceded the DDS and the SOS-Sahel Sudan project in North Darfur. These projects include training and community capacity-building through establishing CBOs or empowering those already existing in order to handle different problems in a more integrative manner.

[376] See project document: COOPI, Support to the Nomad and Sedentary Food Unsecured Communities in Um Baru Locality, North Darfur, Final Evaluation, February 2018.
[377] More detailed treatment of the returns issue is found in sections 3.2 and 4.4 of Pillar 2 DDS review report.
[378] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b: 3). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

The overall progress achieved in this thematic area in relation to the stated DDS objectives on natural resource management is rather modest although all projects report varying degrees of success. The main reason behind such an assessment is the limited spread and proportion of the population that has benefited from each project in relation to the total population of the area. Another factor is the lack of integration with other projects in the same location or inclusivity of all relevant institutions. The short time frame of project implementation also imposes limitations on measuring the impact of project activities (mostly not exceeding three years). This last point is significant if we consider that NRM programmes mostly deal with communal capacity building of institutions and skills promotion of individual actors. Both activities require behavior change which by definition requires more time to achieve and embed compared with change in infrastructure, for example.

3.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Some of the most common limitations faced by NRM projects can be described as follows:

1. HAC always constitutes a hurdle for project implementation because they insist on checking all steps despite their lack of expertise in most project thematic areas.
2. There is a general agreement that many staff in government ministries are less qualified than in the past and this affects the level of co-operation and can lead to problems of slow approval of permits.
3. The high turnover of government officials affected co-ordination with official bodies.
4. Many government officials expect material rewards for their participation in project activities. Some of them actually envy NGO staff for getting high salaries and accordingly they try to solicit favors or otherwise delay project implementation procedures.[379]
5. Many citizens also expect material rewards for participating in training functions although they are supposed to be beneficiaries. This seems to be a consequence of what has been practiced by some NGOs in the past, particularly in humanitarian programming.
6. Sometimes local conflicts can erupt suddenly in which case projects suffer. The stark example is the Malia-Rizaigat conflict that has affected the NRM project activities in east Darfur for some time because of lack of access.
7. The issue of equal access to project resources cannot be taken for granted because sometimes certain groups are excluded (for lack of sensitivity rather than design). The WEK project is a good example of this. Despite the success achieved in some areas, its non-inclusivity of downstream water users represents a threat for sustainability. Also in the WEK project pastoralists have not been adequately engaged in the Forum which seems to be dominated by urban people from El-Fashir. The fact that the overall benefit is for wealthier farmers with resources to use water pumps may tilt the balance of the project to their favour.

3.4 Learning

One of the key learnings is the importance of a holistic and integrated approach to natural resource management. For example:

> 'To be both effective and sustainable, an integrated catchment-based management system that connects with national policy and institutions needs to accompany any large-scale water-related infrastructure'[380]

In particular, it is important to learn from the disconnect that has sometimes existed between the administration of water and its natural catchment system. That has happened because government has managed water along administrative lines rather than according to hydro-geological zones. And INGOs and communities have focused on managing water resources at the community level without considering the larger environmental or downstream impacts. WEK is a good example, downstream users have not been included in the project and now there is a water shortage downstream.

Interventions that increase the availability of water without considering the institutions that mediate access of different groups can create their own problems. As the learning document for the Taadoud II project concludes:

[379] Personal communication with a senior expert in East Darfur.

[380] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b: 5). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

'Increasing availability of water without consideration of these mediating institutions can lead to the destruction of the water sources or conflict over them. Increasing availability of water while strengthening inclusive local institutions linked to supporting state and national institutions can increase the productivity, health, and stability of the region'.[381]

The same learning document points out that technical plans need to take into account the unintended impacts on the environment, while supporting the social aspects to support equitable access and participation in management of the systems through the institutions regulating the water sources. For example, the increase in irrigated vegetable cultivation has led to tension between the vegetable cultivators and farmers as it has blocked access to the wadis for pastoralists to water and feed their animals[382].Once again, WEK illustrates this challenge.

An important issue that commonly shows up in the design of many NRM projects is the issue of demarcation of livestock migration routes, considered a contentious issue behind most interethnic conflicts involving traditional sedentary farmers and mobile herders. This issue has come up continuously in studies about the conflict in Darfur. Most recommendations have called for demarcation as the most effective way of preventing conflict. The idea of demarcation is less contested as a recommendation but the way many projects try to apply it is problematic. First, most of these activities were carried out in the absence of the full return of IDPs; their participation as stakeholders have been secured either by transporting representatives from the camps or by inviting native administrators to participate on behalf of their people. Either way the process does not satisfy measures of inclusivity. The other problem is that many projects spend funds to manufacture cement poles to be erected in a linear fashion along the migration route after being documented via GPS, reflecting the misperception that a migration route is a geographical space that can be firmly fixed through engineering methods. Such practice is insensitive to ecological variability and also misses the point that the whole process is embedded in social relations and negotiation between communities and as such reflects a problem of governance par excellence.[383]

New ideas regarding NRM need to be introduced at the grassroots level in order to get full currency. The idea of reseeding pastures and planting private forests proved to be useful in East Darfur where the project also facilitated the formation of state-level and locality-level institutions that allowed for wider participation of all stakeholders in NRM processes. This is an example that needs to be replicated elsewhere. The idea of a co-ordination body with official and citizen representation is a positive solution for inclusive NRM. Experience has shown that the rich and powerful members of the community tend to dominate newly formed project institutions. Such tendencies should be checked to avoid excluding the needy who are actually the most important target groups of development projects. Men still dominate communal institutions: it is important that the participation of women in development projects is vigorously supported.

3.5 Organisation & co-ordination of national and international efforts

According to NGO workers, most projects suffer from some common features pertaining to co-ordination:

1. The multiplicity of project studies does not show that any project necessarily benefits from studies performed by others. More often new studies are commissioned that start from the beginning rather than from where others ended up. The wealth of information available in various specialized government departments is often overlooked.
2. In order for projects to contribute to real development, they are supposed to be aligned with an overall strategic plan of the specific state or relevant federal institution. Either way, lack of strategic development and vision at state and federal levels, and lack of co-ordination with such entities create a gap.
3. Many times the co-ordination between national and state level institutions is not efficient because it has to go through the mediating body of the Bureau of Federal Governance. This applies most significantly to forest and wild life sectors as an example. The net effect is the delay in implementation schedules.

[381] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019a: 49). '*Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. A Feinstein International Center desk study'*. April. Boston: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
[382] Ibid.
[383] This is based on project studies and key informant interviews, full reference will be provided later.

4. There is evidence that co-ordination between UN organizations is not as smooth as it should be. Many UN staff admit having a difficult time coordinating with colleagues in another UN organization.[384]
5. As some of the DDS objectives actually fall under the jurisdiction of related federal institutions (such as the National Forestry Corporation) it was not possible to make any progress without good co-ordination with those institutions. This means longer procedures leading to delays in implementation schedules.

4 Rural Livelihoods

4.1 Overview

As mentioned above, 24% of donor funding that relates to Pillar 3 is for projects and programmes focused on developing rural livelihoods and promoting resilience and food security. Many of these relate to the DDS objective on 'improved crop and livestock production and productivity' – see Figure 39. This is usually articulated in project documents as promoting resilience at community level, and almost all these projects have a much broader focus and wider range of objectives, for example with a natural resource component related to peace-building, infrastructural components, and/ or socio-economic components. The integrated nature of many of these projects mean there is considerable overlap with Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 objectives. Integrated community-based development programming has been widely promoted in Darfur by donors and implementing agencies as an appropriate developmental approach generating multiplier effects. This integrated approach was not evident in the way the DDS was articulated.

A number of rural livelihood project activities relate directly to DDS outputs under 'improved crop and livestock production and productivity', for example the production and distribution of certified seeds, livestock vaccination, and the training of Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs). What is missing in this Pillar 3 objective is any consideration of the relationships and power dynamics between different producer groups in rural areas, or guidance on targeting strategies. Yet these are essential in a conflict/ post-conflict environment in which control over, and access to natural resources has been a major fault line. Instead, objectives, sub-objectives and outputs are articulated in a technically neutral way, for example: 'average herd size per household', or 'area of cultivation of main oil and horticultural crops', without consideration of the distribution of livestock ownership, nor who has access to agricultural land. In practice programming has been more nuanced, but has followed biases established in the early years of the humanitarian response, targeting sedentary farmers and agro-pastoralists. Engagement with pastoralists has been very limited with little attention paid to the integration of livelihood systems. Some exploitative arrangements between different producer groups have been largely overlooked.

A few projects have contributed to improved institutional arrangements for agriculture and livestock, one of the other Pillar 3 objectives, for example in their engagement with state level line ministries, or more commonly in promoting community-based extension practices. There has been much less engagement with, and progress made in improving agricultural and livestock policies, with the exception of the new federal 2018 livestock policy mentioned above. Instead, the fragmentation of policy and frequent contradictions between them have continued.

Nevertheless, there is considerable learning and insights from resilience and rural livelihood programming in the last few years in Darfur. But the cross-fertilization of experience and learning between projects has been severely hampered by weak co-ordination. The general sense amongst practitioners is that Pillar 3 of the DDS failed to provide a common vision or strategy for the development of rural livelihoods.

Figure 39: Pillar 3 objectives, sub-objectives and outputs related to rural livelihoods

OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND SUB-OBJECTIVES	OUTPUTS

[384] Personal communication with a senior expert.

Improved agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements	• Harmonised legislation and regulations on crop agriculture, livestock, trade and market information • Formulation of State Agriculture Extension Policy Guidelines by State Ministry of Agriculture (SMoA) • State Extension Research Farmer Advisory Council (SERFAC) established • Farmers Field Schools (FFS) at farm level established • Field extension agents trained and based in Localities • State food security resource information system developed and operational • Agricultural extension/ resource centres constructed/rehabilitated • Private veterinary clinics and mobile clinics established
Improved crop and livestock production and productivity • Feasibility studies on rehabilitation of existing Agricultural Development Projects in accordance with para 174, Article 31 of DDPD • Production of key crops • Productivity of key crops • Average herd size per household	**Agriculture**: • Area of cultivation of main oil and horticultural crops • Area under mechanised farming for food crops • Area provided with irrigation and drainage services • Water users provided with new/improved irrigation and drainage services • Certified seeds produced and distributed • Farmers benefitting from extension services • IDPs, returnees and host farmers benefiting from agricultural implements/packages **Livestock:** • Pasture area planted using selected seeds • Livestock heads vaccinated • Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) trained • Beneficiaries receiving veterinary and/or livestock extension services and training

4.2 Progress and achievements

The projects and programmes designed to develop rural livelihoods and build resilience range from single projects run by individual national or international NGOs, such as Triangle and SOS Sahel, usually targeting communities within one or two neighbouring localities, to larger scale projects like Taadoud, implemented by a consortium of 6 INGOs working with communities across all five Darfur states. UN projects, such as the UNDF-funded project on 'Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities in Darfur', have usually been implemented by two to three UN agencies coming together and working closely with state ministries, also engaging NGOs. While a few projects are focused almost entirely on crop and livestock production, most have adopted a more integrated approach. AECOM, for example, has implemented a community resilience project in two localities in North Darfur, combining: (i) the strengthening of peacebuilding capacities at local level (ii) the improvement of natural resource management to reduce friction between users, and (iii) increased resilience of food production systems and food security in support of livelihoods. The Taadoud project includes a health and nutrition component. Strengthening and diversifying sources of income and food is a common aim amongst resilience projects as they attempt to promote transition away from humanitarian action[385]. Rehabilitating rural infrastructure, for example hafirs and wells, often features as a component of rural livelihood projects. FAO staff, report that the rehabilitation of hafirs, construction of subsurface dams and rehabilitation of shallow wells are amongst the key achievements of the UNDF-funded 'Recovery of Livelihoods of Vulnerable Farming and Pastoral Communities in Darfur' project.

Most livelihood and resilience programming implemented so far targets sedentary farmers and agro-pastoralists. Projects are often working with a combination of host communities, returnees and IDPs. There is much less work targeting and supporting pastoralist groups.

A number of projects have included a strong element of experimentation and learning. The Taadoud project, for example, has a significant operational research component run by Tufts University. AECOM's project in North

[385] See, for example, the Taadoud Fact Sheet

Darfur is a pilot to trial different approaches and interventions. This reflects the fact that resilience programming is new to, and remains untested in protracted crisis contexts[386].

There are a range of activities that are common across many of the rural livelihood resilience projects, including:

(1) The distribution of improved seed, ranging from cereals to groundnuts and cowpeas, to vegetable seeds, intended to boost production by being higher-yielding, earlier maturing, and/ or more drought resilient. Projects mostly report positive results[387]. Some of the work is being done in collaboration with the Agricultural Research Stations at state level, for example FAO's work on livelihood recovery which is also addressing seed production: over 1,000 farmers have now been trained as certified crop seed producers in South, West, Central and North Darfur states, working with the respective Agricultural Research Station
(2) The establishment of demonstration plots and farmer field schools, to support farmers in improved crop production
(3) The introduction of intermediate technology such as animal traction and water pumps, to increase production, and the promotion of improved water harvesting techniques
(4) The distribution of small livestock, usually goats and poultry
(5) Environmental activities such as the clearance of fire-lines, the planting of trees and spreading seed for pasture

Some agencies particularly emphasise the software activities in their projects, specifically:

(1) SOS Sahel has formed and strengthened CBOs, regarding this as essential to long-term sustainability, learning from the experience and successes of development work in North Darfur in the pre-conflict era
(2) Strengthening community-based conflict resolution mechanisms is a feature of a number of the community-oriented projects, including the Taadoud project. AECOM formed 10 peace committees in its North Darfur project, as a result of which it reports a high level of success in resolving potentially serious disputes between different groups[388]. Triangle has been supporting the Peace Committee in Bindizi locality in Central Darfur since 2005. Representing 16 tribes from the area the Committee has played an important role mediating between herders entering the area and farmers[389]
(3) Setting up savings and loans associations with a revolving microfinance fund has been another important component of a number of projects, often targeting women. There are some success stories associated with this work, for example of female farmers in Kondebei in Sirba locality in West Darfur, who have developed small plots for irrigated vegetable production, now supplying El Geneina market with onions[390]

The most significant work targeting livestock herders has been done by FAO, reported to be reaching some pastoralists as well as agro-pastoralists. Activities include:

(1) Training Community Animal Health Workers and equipping them with veterinary supplies and kits, under the supervision of government veterinarians, using a cost recovery approach. The revenue generated has funded the establishment of three drug stores and a training centre
(2) Vaccinating and treating cattle, camels, sheep and goats against a range of epidemic and endemic diseases
(3) Training in improved livestock husbandry through pastoralist field schools

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[386] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.
[387] FAO reports increased productivity of 70 to 200% UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). *'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018*.' From UNICEF.
[388] Osman, A.K., Salih, I.A., Tahir, A.M., (2018). '*Improving Community Resilience in the Face of Conflicts and Environmental Shocks in Millit and Um-Kaddada Localities in North Darfur State. Final Report'*. TEPS/ USAID. April.
[389] Triangle., (2017). '*Towards Improved Food Security and Livelihoods within Conflict-Affected Communities of Central Darfur*. Interim Narrative Report. Year 3'.
[390] Personal communication: AECOM

(4) The distribution of animal concentrate feed and mineral licks, in co-operation with Dal Food to boost milk and meat production, in particular targeting small-holder female-headed pastoralist households[391]

What is striking about all of these activities is the extent to which international and national agencies are stepping in to provide agriculture extension services for both crops and livestock, government extension services having more or less collapsed during the conflict years. While some projects are working directly with agriculture extension officers of line ministries, there is an interesting move to develop community-level extension workers and animal health workers as a means of reaching rural households and rural communities. Both strategies are challenged by issues of sustainability once project funding ends[392].

Improved security in Darfur in the last couple of years has encouraged some limited engagement of the private sector in agricultural production. For example, the CTC group established an Agricultural Technology Transfer Center in Nyala to serve South Darfur State – its ninth centre in Sudan but first in the Darfur region.

4.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Programming has tended to categorise the rural population by their livelihood groups, either as pastoralists or farmers, with a major focus on farming households, and very few projects meaningfully engaged with pastoralist households. This does not yet reflect the merging of production systems within households described above, for example that 'traditional' pastoralists are now more engaged in agricultural production (Young et al, 2019b).

Transitioning from humanitarian to more developmental ways of working is a major challenge for the following reasons:

(1) Some grants for rural livelihoods and resilience work are being made on a one-year timeframe when a longer-term perspective and engagement are required to develop holistic community-based approaches to rural development with any prospect of sustainability
(2) The unpredictability of rainfall in Darfur means that little progress may be made in a drought year, and some modes of operating may have to revert to being more humanitarian and service-oriented in such circumstances – another reason for the need for a longer timeframe on rural livelihood projects
(3) Years of protracted conflict have impoverished rural communities on many levels, in terms of weakened community organization, lack of services and damaged or destroyed infrastructure. Development from this baseline is challenging and will take time
(4) Agencies that do both humanitarian and more developmental work can struggle to protect and maintain their development work as their emergency work is prioritized

Agencies have faced many practical and logistical challenges in this kind of programming, including:

(i) Restricted access to communities because of insecurity in a highly volatile context
(ii) HAC rules and authorization restricting and/ or delaying access to communities, a particular issue for time-sensitive field visits to coincide with particular agricultural practices, like sowing
(iii) Cash shortages and fuel shortages delaying implementation, and cash shortages a particular constraint for income-generating activities
(iv) Time spent on administrative tasks such as annual renewal of technical agreements with line ministries

As a result, implementation has often been delayed and fallen behind schedule.

[391] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). *'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018.*' From UNICEF.

[392] According to one key informant interviewee, Ministry staff working with NGO projects are often rotated by their department to ensure as many as possible benefit from incentives or *per diems* provided by the respective NGO, to supplement their very meagre salary, but posing a challenge to continuity. Community-recruited extension workers are unlikely to continue their role if dependent upon other members of the community paying them, although cost recovery approaches for CAHWs that provide drugs may one way around this.

4.4 Learning

Rural livelihoods and the context in which they are operating are highly dynamic. Households have made many adaptations during the conflict years. These need to be well-understood and tracked to inform programming, for example with a dedicated operational research/ analysis component in livelihood projects, drawing on the Taadoud model. Yet the ongoing threat to rural livelihoods is from climate change as well as conflict. FAO reports that 'rain fed farmers are convinced that business as usual cannot continue anymore (due to climate change). The farming system should be adapted to the prevailing rainfall situation'[393]. Programming must therefore take these multiple threats into account.

Tufts researchers propose focusing on 'what people do for a living and the integration between livelihood sub-systems', rather than the dichotomy between them[394]. This is an important learning for future development programming to support rural livelihoods, which must start with an understanding of livelihoods, their complexity, how they are adapting and transforming to a dynamic and changing context, and the integration between livelihoods. Thus, livelihoods and resilience programming which has so far focused mainly on settled farmers must be extended to pastoralists as well. Inclusive programming also means engaging women and youth, centrally, in community projects.

As the 'technical sophistication' and economic rationale of livestock production migratory systems in Darfur have now been well-researched and are better understood, this learning should also inform future programming, for example, 'sympathetic and effective governance to mediate … interactions' between farmers and pastoralists'[395]. A practical example of this is treating animal migration routes as a negotiated relationship between communities along the route, rather than interpreting them as fixed and demarcated corridors, as discussed above.

Addressing the power dynamics and how they are negotiated between different groups is essential to livelihoods and resilience programming. Support to local peace committees is one way of achieving this, often focused on managing negotiations and potential disputes when livestock herders enter agricultural farmland. However, an aspect that has attracted remarkably little attention to date is the exploitative practices that some farmers are subject to during the production season, where they have to pay substantial amounts, usually in-kind, to groups controlling the area where their farms are located.

Agency experience indicates that holistic community-based programming, with a long-term perspective, is key to supporting and developing rural livelihoods. Some agencies recommend a six-month inception period to get to know target communities, build relations and design the project in a consultative manner. Community ownership is key to sustainability. Strengthening community-level structures and embedding agricultural knowledge and extension services within communities is an important counterbalance to weak government capacity.

The value of an integrated approach to community development that pays attention to services and infrastructure, is the multiplication effect on livelihoods and on the local economy of developing water points, roads and markets as well as finding ways to increase production and income. This is critical as returns accelerate, long-term or seasonally, putting pressure on existing communities. This calls for a clear strategy, both at the local level but also across Darfur, drawing on good practice examples.

Yet the high risk of failure of development efforts to support rural livelihoods must be acknowledged. By definition there has to be much trial and error in these kinds of projects aiming to strengthen livelihoods and

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[393] UN Darfur Fund (UNDF)., (2019a). *'Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP), Including Life-Skills and Improved Access to Employment Opportunities for Out-Of-School Children and Youth. Final Programme Narrative Reporting Format Reporting Period: From January 2016 To December 2018*.' From UNICEF.

[394] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.

[395] Behnke, R., Idriss, A.E., Robinson, S., Suleiman, H.M., Young H., (2018). '*The Seasonal Imperative: Environmental Drivers of Livestock Mobility in East Darfur, Sudan'*. Draft

their resilience in a context of protracted crisis. Taking risks, learning and adapting must be encouraged, especially by funders.

4.5 Organisation & co-ordination of national and international efforts

All projects coordinate with the respective line ministries at state level, which usually means the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry National Corporation, Range and Pasture Department, and Department of Social Welfare. To some extent this can promote linkages between projects, but agencies have faced challenges in working with technical government departments which have very weak capacity and no clear strategy. There is often a lack of co-ordination between different government departments, with HAC playing a central role in monitoring and approving projects. The high turnover of government officials also hinders continuity. Some agencies report political interference at locality level.

The Food Security and Livelihoods cluster plays an important co-ordination role, at state and at federal levels, although there is a sense that co-ordination of this more developmental work is much weaker than its humanitarian counterpart. A number of agencies implementing projects have talked of the lack of an overall vision and strategy for rural development and resilience programming.

Where co-ordination is strongest is within projects, for example the Taadoud project that brings together 6 INGOs, 12 national NGOs and Tufts University as the research organization. But there is clearly a need for much stronger and more strategic co-ordination between projects.

5. Urban Livelihoods and Youth Employment

a. Overview

Development efforts to support urban livelihoods are closely linked to private sector development efforts as described above, and also relate to the Pillar 3 objective on employment opportunities. See Figure 45. This section therefore focuses on projects targeting youth employment. So far these are few in number and small in terms of overall funding, yet the need is huge. The immense gap between development interventions to promote employment, and especially youth employment in the last six years, and the need was clearly articulated by youth groups during the limited consultation the review team was able to carry out in Darfur's state capitals in March 2019.

The projects that are addressing vocational training and employment in Darfur are contributing to all of the DDS sub-objectives and outputs as articulated in Figure 40, but these sub-objectives and outputs belie the complexity and challenges of work in this area. Once again, conflict/ post-conflict considerations and analysis of which youth groups have access to training, employment and government-aligned institutions are critical to inclusive programming that reaches marginalized groups. Agency awareness of these issues varies. While projects have supported Vocational Training Centres and Youth Centres, their capacity and sustainability are fundamentally affected by the weakness and political economy of the wider institutional environment. The importance of providing support beyond training, to help trainees find jobs and establish businesses, is well-recognised by many projects, although data on the success rate in achieving this longer-term, and on the gendered impact, are scarce. The disabling business environment described above is a major constraint.

Following the integrated development model pursued by many agencies in Darfur, some employment-related programming has multiple objectives. A number of projects also have a peace-building component.

Figure 40: Pillar 3 objectives, sub-objectives and outputs related to employment

OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND SUB-OBJECTIVES	OUTPUTS
Increased access to employment opportunities (gender-balanced)	• Students completing vocational training measures • Vocational Training Centres established and functioning

• Students finding a job after completion of vocational training • Additional people employed by supported businesses	• Business benefiting from the Grant Innovation Facility or business incubators • Business development service providers for medium and small enterprises (MSE) created/ supported

5.2 Progress and achievements

Most work targeting youth has focused on vocational training and is urban-based, implemented by a range of agencies including AECOM, GIZ, UNICEF, JICA, COOPI and DRC. Some youth projects have peace-building and empowerment as their overall objective but include a livelihoods/ employment dimension, for example, UNDP's project 'Youth Volunteers Supporting Peace and Recovery in Darfur', which has a stronger focus on rural youth.

Different agencies have adopted slightly different approaches in terms of:

1) Focus on training and employment of youth versus a more systemic and conflict-sensitive approach. GIZ has adopted the latter, implementing a demand-oriented dual approach to vocational training and employment promotion, working to strengthen private sector companies and the relevant state and federal institutions, alike (for example the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship to strengthen their capacity to develop and certify market oriented short-courses, combining technical with business skills in their curricula or carry out labour market assessments), carrying out stakeholder and ecosystem mappings, strengthening the skills and capacity of managers and teachers in public vocational training institutes as well as strengthening the service provision of private sector organisations like craft unions for their accredited companies, and running events to raise awareness of the importance of vocational training and entrepreneurship, particularly for women including in non-traditional sectors.
2) Focus on the software and institutional capacity versus the physical infrastructure of youth centres. AECOM, for example, has built youth centres in some state capitals
3) The extent to which the agency provides business services and support to trainees to help them enter the market when their classroom training is completed. UNDP, for example, has provided start-up grants. GIZ's support to vocational training includes on-the-job training, apprenticeship programmes and internships
4) Working with existing, well-connected organisations such as the Youth Union or Women's Union versus working with emerging independent youth organisations. GIZ, for example, has been working through self-organised youth hubs in Darfur's state capitals. Often set up by university graduates, these hubs have registered as companies and see themselves playing an incubator role for start-up enterprises, providing a range of services including access to the internet.

The success rate of vocational training in terms of follow-up employment requires further investigation. AECOM, which has been working with school drop-outs, reports that there have been good levels of subsequent employment after the training, and that some trainees grouped together to start their own business, for example in construction. UNDP reports that 43% of their youth volunteers are formally employed and have established their own business. While the vocational training projects target both men and women – UNDP report more or less equal numbers of males and females in the Youth Volunteer project, and the UNDP/ UNICEF ALP project similarly reports more or less equal enrolment of males and females – it has not been possible to find an analysis of the relative impact, short and long-term, on men and women. This is another area that deserves follow-up.

5.3 Limitations, challenges and constraints

Despite these efforts, youth groups met by the review team in different Darfur state capitals lamented the very limited support available to them. Considering the number of youth in Darfur, the high level of unemployment and sense of disenfranchisement many experience, the few projects that do exist are providing support on a very small scale compared with the need.

There are major constraints in the wider institutional context. Proposed state-level councils for Vocational Training have not yet been established (although there are plans by GIZ to support this endeavor) and there is a lack of government funds for vocational training, for example to pay teachers, for school management and for supervision by the state-level Departments of Labour. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that technical and vocational training and education (TVET) remains a contested field, for which different ministries claim responsibility when international support is offered, but are much less visible when it comes to maintaining structures through salaries and facilities.

The capture of formal institutions – even those that do not have an overtly political function – by the ruling NCP under the former regime has been described above. This also affects youth organisations, and the Youth Union in particular. As a result, some agencies have chosen to work with independent youth organisations where possible. One such independent youth organization described the scrutiny it has been subjected to, by security institutions, which impacts how it must conduct its affairs. As the political unrest and demonstrations gathered pace from December 2018, the restrictions imposed on gatherings, and the suspicion with which groups of youth were treated, have all been constraints to this work and to efforts to empower youth, economically as well as politically.

Other more immediate and practical challenges include the unfavorable macro-economic context for business, described above, with cash shortages, rampant inflation and lack of fuel.

5.4 Learning

Echoing the learning documented above, efforts to develop the skills and employability of youth must be rooted in analysis and a strategy that engages at the micro, meso and macro levels. Just providing vocational training is not enough. Development efforts must also engage with wider private sector development to create demand for jobs and to support youth in accessing micro-finance and other services to establish and develop businesses. To some extent this was acknowledged in the DDS objective on increased access to employment. Experience in this sector since, implies there needs to be considerably more analysis of market opportunities to inform the thematic focus of vocational training, matched with investment in economic sectors with greatest potential. Without this more holistic and market-driven approach, vocational training projects could fuel the frustration already felt by graduates who have gone through higher education but cannot find work. GIZ's labour market analysis is a valuable source of information in this regard, as described above.

Youth interviewed in El Fasher during the DDS review identified areas for future support, including: support in turning income gained from gold mining or from fighting in Yemen, into productive assets, and support in bridging the inter-generational gap so that they are better represented and have a stronger voice in opposition movements. Interestingly, the sectors with growth potential do not necessarily coincide with the sectors youth strive to work in. Welding for example, which absorbs much of the carpentry work (furniture production) due to shortage of wood, has significant growth potential; yet, the majority of youth reported this to be an unattractive sector to work in. Skills training should therefore not only be geared towards market demand but also meet and encourage the interest of youth.

As with private sector development more generally, there must be a thorough political economy analysis, for example of youth institutions, chambers of commerce and their affiliations, to understand which may have preferential access to services and to business opportunities through political patronage. Many youth CBOs have sprung up: to reach some of them, for example those representing more marginalized youth such as IDP youth, may require more creative and less traditional ways of working. Supporting informal networks for example, including through social media, strengthens the interaction and learning between aspiring young entrepreneurs in Darfuri cities and start-ups in the capital. This may also require skills-building beyond conventional vocational training subjects, for example in leadership and representation, as indicated above. Social media and radio sessions to announce training opportunities or share findings about market opportunities have proven to reach beneficiaries successfully regardless of their affiliations.

This may also require skills-building beyond conventional vocational training subjects, for example in leadership and representation, as indicated above.

In summary, vocational training and promotion of youth employment must be driven by a comprehensive strategy that agencies in this sector can get behind so that their work is more than the sum of its parts and is more effectively coordinated. This, in turn, should be informed by a comparative study of the different approaches to vocational training, to learn and build upon best practice examples. Such a strategy should be disaggregated for youth with different education levels, of different gender and for different ages.

Although vocational training and youth employment promotion may appear to be an attractive strategy for curbing the outmigration of Darfuri youth, for example to Europe, the Darfur migration study concluded that there is no compelling evidence that such livelihood projects are having a significant effect in deterring youth from leaving. To do so would require a more fundamental approach to addressing the unresolved structural causes of the conflict and the political drivers of migration[396].

5.5 Organisation & co-ordination of national and international efforts

Co-ordination of international and national efforts to promote youth employment is weak. Some agencies like GIZ are working with the Supreme Council for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship at federal level in an effort to follow national standards, but without state-level equivalents and with poor capacity, government's ability to coordinate is extremely limited.

In this vacuum it may be up to the individual vocational training institutes and youth centres to coordinate between the different offers of international and national support they receive. For example, the premises of the Alimtidad Youth Centre in El Geneina were started by WarChild in 2010 and subsequently completed by UNICEF. The vocational training module was implemented by UNICEF, Concern & PlanSudan, and GIZ has carried out a labour market survey in the town.

6. Conclusions

Generally, the programming and achievements in the last six years that relate to Pillar 3 have been very modest compared with the DDS objectives. Not only were the objectives overly ambitious, but the fact that the DDPD did not deliver the peace and stability that was promised, or address the underlying causes of the conflict, is another major reason. The lack of conflict sensitivity in the way that Pillar 3 objectives were articulated is striking: there is little reference to power dynamics, crucial in a post-conflict environment. Instead, most of the objectives are expressed in predominantly technical terms with little or no direct reference to the livelihoods of different groups. Projects have varied in their analysis of the prevailing political economy in Darfur, and in how they have taken account of this to reach marginalized groups. Some agencies have demonstrated much greater conflict sensitivity than others. A sound understanding of the political economy in Darfur (and in Sudan more widely) is essential.

The learning from each different component of Pillar 3 underlines the importance of a systemic approach, whether natural resource management and catchment-based management systems, a market systems approach to developing trade, or a holistic and market-driven approach youth employment. One-year 'humanitarian-type' grants are much too short for such work, and inappropriate for community-based development programming, although this has been the funding model of some donors. Other donors like Germany and the UK are providing funding over 5 years or more.

Agencies have experienced multiple setbacks in implementation, ranging from restricted access to cash shortages. Many projects have been badly delayed. The challenges of shifting from humanitarian to development programming have also been a factor, requiring different skillsets and different mindsets, both on

[396] Jaspars, S. and Buchanan Smith, M., (2018). '*Darfuri migration from Sudan to Europe. From displacement to despair.*' Joint study by REF (SOAS) and HPG. London: Overseas Development Institute.

the part of agencies but also the communities they are working with who may have been the recipients of years of relief hand-outs.

The weakness of co-ordination structures and processes across every sector covered by this review is striking and was frequently raised by key informant interviewees. The DDS framework and structure identified priorities for economic recovery but did not contribute to a coherence of vision and strategy on economic recovery, nor significantly strengthen the co-ordination architecture.

The depth and seriousness of the economic crisis has had a major impact on all sectors of the economy and on the prospects for economic growth in Darfur. This has impacted and constrained the success of many development interventions. Taking account of the implications of the macroeconomic context is essential in future planning, to ensure realistic targets are set and creative and appropriate ways of implementation are found.

Yet within these constraints there are areas of economic growth in Darfur that deserve attention and warrant investment. Many of these relate to the agricultural economy, for example peri-urban market gardening, opportunities for increased agro-processing, particularly of groundnuts, but also of perishable commodities including tomatoes, other vegetables and fruit. Others relate to the service economy in urban areas. Rebuilding and supporting markets and trade is critical to economic recovery and to economic growth in Darfur, at the macro, meso and micro levels. Improved road infrastructure could play a major role, building on the gains already made with the El Ingaz road (currently in need of repair after recent flood damage). However, the shortage of capital for Darfuri businesses and entrepreneurs, from the micro to the macro levels is a major constraint.

Well-planned and executed public-private partnerships offer considerable potential for boosting the livelihoods of rural producers as well as urban-based agro-processors. There is a small but growing body of experience to draw upon in this respect.

Natural resources – land especially – are key to all livelihood strategies in Darfur. The rate of recovery is directly related to access to natural resources and power relations. Understanding differential access to natural resources and power imbalances, and then finding ways of addressing them at local level, identifying and understanding mutual interests, are fundamental to interventions associated with natural resource management[397]. There are opportunities to learn from good practice examples as well as from the challenges some projects have faced. Particularly concerning are the exploitative practices under which some farmers must cultivate, which do not appear to be well-documented on an ongoing basis, nor addressed sixteen years into the conflict.

A future DDS, and the projects it spawns, should draw upon the insights into rural livelihoods and how they have adapted and changed/ are continuing to change in the dynamic context of Darfur. The Tufts and Taadoud project learning offers much in this respect. It highlights the merging of production systems within households, for example as 'traditional' pastoralists engage more in agricultural production. And it warns against 'the unhelpful labelling of communities or groups as either "sedentary farmers" or "nomads" (which) has enforced dividing lines associated with wider conflicts. This language continues to put people in opposition to one another', rather than exploring how their livelihood systems are integrated[398]. 'Much remains to be done in relation to promoting policy and programme approaches that support the continuity and integration between livelihood specialisations' (ibid).

Tufts research also shows that the two livelihood systems of rainfed cultivation and raising livestock are the principal drivers of recovery, and yield high returns in proportion to the effort and investment required, especially in good years, and are likely to have more positive impact than investments in alternative lower return activities that are more subject to competition[399]. Recovery requires rebuilding of livelihood assets, especially

[397] Young, H., Fitzpatrick, M., Marshak, A., Radday, A., Staro, F., Venkat, A., (2019b). *'Lessons for Taadoud II: Improving Natural Resource Management. Summary of a Feinstein International Center desk study'*. Feinstein International Center Tufts University. April.
[398] ibid.
[399] Fitzpatrick, M., Young, H., Daoud,, S.A., Saeed, A.M., Rasheid, S., Beheiry, A. Elmagboul, N.S.E., (2016). '*Risk and Returns: Household Priorities for Resilient Livelihoods in Darfur. In support of the Taadoud Transition to Development Project'*. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Retrieved from: https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/TUFTS_1618_Risk_Returns_V8_online.pdf.

social and human capital, for example through investment in basic services such as health and education, and infrastructure. The multiplying effect of investment in infrastructure has sometimes been neglected in favour of capacity-building activities such as training with minimal physical inputs[400]. The most appropriate approach to rural development appears to be an integrated one, across sectors.

There is a huge unmet need for working with youth, especially in urban areas. Current vocational training and youth employment projects are operating on a small-scale compared with the overall need. In rural areas the improved provision of services and employment opportunities are necessary for youth to remain. Fundamental change is needed, economically and politically, for youth to see a more vibrant and optimistic future, in which they can politically engage, and can earn a livelihood.

IV. Analysis of needs and priorities

This pillar is about building livelihoods – rural and urban – with a particular focus on poverty alleviation. It is also about promoting private sector development and entrepreneurship in an inclusive way where there is potential for economic growth and development. All of this must be underpinned by principles of:

- Sustainable natural resource management
- Inclusivity, with a particular focus on promoting gender equality and working across generations and across different groups (ethnic, livelihood-based and others)
- Recognition of the integration of different rural livelihood systems
- Engagement of youth from all backgrounds
- Conflict sensitivity
- Thorough analysis and understanding of the political economy
- Addressing institutional capacity
- Vertical and horizontal co-ordination between various actors at planning and implementation levels

It is imperative that needs and priorities should be assessed according to people's perspective. This requires that they participate in identifying priorities. The final outcome should also be informed by evidence, past experience and learning captured in this DDS review and beyond, as well as learning from other contexts. Above all, it must be firmly rooted in reality and in the current context.

There is also a need for a central repository to be established for the numerous studies and documentation related to livelihoods and economic recovery, to ensure current sources of knowledge and experience are widely available, and to reduce duplication between agencies/ projects

The following sections set out a preliminary analysis of needs and priorities for each sub-section that relates to Pillar 3.

1. Economy, Business and Trade

1.1 Needs and priorities,

Based on the experience of development efforts in the last six years, key areas for investment likely to have the most significant positive impact on economic, trade and business development include:

- Further investment in value chain work in sectors identified as having greatest economic potential, supported by thorough and systemic market analysis. This should particularly focus on:
    - Improving the quality of production of some of Darfur's major agricultural commodities, such as groundnuts and livestock, to increase its market value, and in some cases, potential for export

[400] ibid.

- Agro-processing and adding value to Darfur's agricultural commodities within the Darfur region, for example:
    - supporting small-scale agro-processors of groundnuts in Darfur's state capitals to produce higher quality oil and also groundnut cake for the local meat fattening industry and for trading with Central Sudan
    - developing agro-processing of fruit and vegetables produced in Darfur to promote year-round trade over seasonal trade in fresh produce
    - Exploring how cold storage facilities and transportation could extend the shelf-life of agricultural commodities e.g. fruit and vegetables
- The expansion of savings and loans associations (of producers and of small-scale traders) through which capital can be provided in the form of a revolving fund, a cross-agency study of experience in setting up and Savings and Loans Associations should be carried out to inform expansion of this work

Traders and entrepreneurs can take advantage of the fact that transportation costs from Darfur to Central Sudan are lower than the other direction, implying unused transportation capacity.

- Continued paving of feeder and other roads on major trade routes, to facilitate market integration and trade flows
- The private-public partnership model for economic development should be explored and expanded further, informed by experience and good practice to date
- The ongoing plans by the Islamic Development Bank to extend the railway line from Sudan to Ndjamena and beyond will give a major boost to Darfur's contribution to regional trading activities.
- A well-informed strategy for private sector development should be formulated, to guide and bring greater coherence to the various efforts to promote business and entrepreneurship
- A strategy for microfinance, envisaged in the DDS but never completed, should be developed based on recognition of non-traditional forms of collateral, including collective forms of collateral based on group solidarity e.g. cooperatives, and microfinance facilities stepped up
- Efforts to promote entrepreneurial hubs in Darfur state capitals should be stepped up, drawing on Khartoum experience
- In terms of institutional and policy reform:
    - Reform of taxation at state level (related to reform at federal level) to reduce the burden of fees and taxes on trade, especially trade in agricultural commodities, to boost economic activity
    - In line with national policy, to promote foreign investment, develop Darfur-level policies to encourage foreign investment (on fair terms) in Darfur's most productive sectors, while also developing Darfur's private sector

1.2 Implications for humanitarian-development-peace nexus

The boosting of business in Darfur, based on sectors with economic potential, should be a driver for economic recovery and reduce aid dependency should comprehensive peace become a reality.

2. Natural Resources

2.1 Needs and priorities

- The database built by the natural resource mapping project under the Darfur Land Commission should be completed and deliverables made available, as a matter of urgency, to inform policy formulation, and programme planning.
- A water information system should be established across Darfur, to update existing data and to provide ongoing monitoring of wadi catchment systems and rainfall
- There is an opportunity to explore how the East Darfur legislative model for natural resource management could be replicated/ adapted for other Darfur states
- State-level policies should include clear guidance on how to demarcate livestock migration routes, based on concepts of human interaction and negotiation between farming and pastoral communities rather than engineering verification and fixing of a physical road map

- State-level policies should regulate artisanal gold-mining to protect the environment, and to impose health and safety regulations
- Programming should be based on an ecosystems approach e.g. designed around water catchment areas, and expanded
- Woodless construction should be promoted as part of any returns package

3. Rural Livelihoods

3.1 Needs and priorities

- There is a need to rebuild agriculture and livestock extension services, with the overall objective of boosting the level and quality of agricultural and livestock production e.g.: improving animal breeds to ensure better quality and suitability to the environment

- Resilience programming across rural areas should be deepened and expanded, based on integrated, community-based programming rather than single-sector interventions:
  - better recognizing the merging and integration of different livelihood systems
  - rebalancing programming to ensure pastoralists are better included
  - taking account of power dynamics and addressing exploitative practices
  - promoting food security through increased productivity using appropriate technological packages
  - paying attention to services and infrastructure to stimulate multiplier effects on livelihoods and on the local economy.

  This is critical as returns accelerate, long-term or seasonally, putting pressure on existing communities. This calls for a clear strategy, both at the local level but also across Darfur, drawing on good practice examples

  - Road construction is a great multiplier for all livelihood projects. Agricultural and livestock producers respond rapidly to opportunities provided by improved transportation, in terms of increasing production, diversification and trade.

More attention should be given to improving markets, marketing facilities and access to markets.

4. Urban Livelihoods and Youth Employment

4.1 Needs and priorities

- Vocational training and support to youth entrepreneurship needs to be stepped up and better coordinated drawing on good practice examples, to inform a future strategy on vocational training and youth employment. This must be rooted in analysis and a strategy that engages at the micro, meso and macro levels, is market-driven, and is based on extensive consultation with a wide range of different youth groups. It also needs to link with efforts to mainstream general/academic education.
- State-level councils for Vocational Training should be established, clarifying institutional responsibility for Vocational Training

5. Poverty, Food Security and Social Safety Nets

5.1 Needs and priorities

- Current levels of food insecurity and hardship are unlikely to fall significantly in the short-term, and for some communities are based on structural inequality. The scale of economic reform required to address Sudan's economic crisis is massive, and estimated to take 3 to 5 years to implement. Providing social protection to the poorest and most vulnerable during that period is imperative, but must be informed by a sound understanding of customary systems for social protection, to ensure these are complemented or

supported rather than replaced by external social protection programmes. This is key to the humanitarian-development nexus and to reducing large-scale annual humanitarian programming.

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