ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION
RWANDA

Evaluation Office, May 2008
United Nations Development Programme
The Evaluation Office of UNDP conducts independent country-level evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs). These assess the relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP support and its contributions to a country’s development over a given period of time. The aim of the ADR is to generate lessons that can strengthen programming at the country level and contribute to the organization’s effectiveness and accountability.

The ADR conducted recently in Rwanda covered the period 2000 to 2006. This corresponded to the final two years of the UNDP Country Cooperation Framework for 1997-2001 and the entire Country Cooperation Framework for 2002-2006. The timing of the ADR allowed the Evaluation Office to provide recommendations to the country office as it developed its third Country Cooperation Framework, approved by the Executive Board in September 2007. The ADR also offered guidance to the country office as it begins its key role in the ‘One UN’ pilot recently launched in Rwanda.

The Rwanda ADR is important for other reasons as well. Rwanda occupies a unique position in the middle of the heavily populated western Great Lakes region. The government has made great strides in restoring stability and economic growth to the country, but it remains a volatile country at the heart of a volatile region. This makes Rwanda’s partnership with the UN family all the more important. As the ADR points out, the relationship between UNDP and the Government of Rwanda has evolved quickly in recent years. This is likely to continue thanks to the Government of Rwanda’s vigorous alignment and harmonization of its international support.

The ADR concluded that the UNDP country office in Rwanda has an effective working relationship with the Government of Rwanda, which considers UNDP contributions to be highly relevant. However, results have been diminished by the sometimes less-than-optimal delivery of UNDP services. This is a problem with many UNDP country offices. While UNDP has made considerable progress towards a more sustainable long-term development approach, it still suffers from being dispersed across too many thematic areas. This impedes UNDP efforts to improve programme administration and technical expertise in core areas.

The ADR recommends that UNDP sharpen the focus of its Rwanda programme, concentrating on those areas within the second United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) where UNDP will be able to bring the most added value while strengthening its corresponding in-house capacities. For example, if environment is to be retained as one of two areas of focus for UNDP under the new UNDAF, then the country office should improve its contributions to the growing national dialogue on the critical interactions among environment, development and poverty.

The ADR suggests dialogues with the government about expanding UNDP partnerships with Rwandan civil society organizations and about ensuring the effective operation of the justice system at all levels. The situation in Rwanda’s crowded rural areas and in surrounding countries will be critical in determining Rwanda’s development options, and UNDP needs to consider these dimensions.

UNDP Rwanda works hard to ensure national ownership and to help the government harmonize and align support from development partners. Ownership and sustainable results can be strengthened with more systematic on-the-job training. While autonomous project implementation units have helped UNDP Rwanda deliver results, they also impede national ownership and sustainability and should be phased out in coming years.
UNDP is poised to play an important leadership role in Rwanda’s ‘One UN’ pilot. In this, it will be important for UNDP to ensure that other members of the UN country team and other development partners in Rwanda understand UNDP Rwanda’s role in any given situation. UNDP should focus on roles where it can achieve maximum coherence and synergies with the programmes of partner agencies.

A number of people contributed to this evaluation, particularly the evaluation team composed of Betty Bigombe, Team Leader, Klaus Talvela, International Evaluation Specialist and Samuel Rugabirwa, National Evaluation Specialist. We would also like to thank Elizabeth Lang for her background research and Concepcion Cole and Anish Pradhan for their administrative support.

Research and preparation for the evaluation was also completed thanks to the collaboration of the UNDP country office staff in Rwanda, led by Resident Representative Moustapha Soumare.

This report would not have been possible without the commitment and support of the Government of Rwanda. In particular, the evaluation team would like to thank the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for its time and insights as the government focal point for the evaluation. The team is also indebted to representatives from civil society and non-governmental organizations, universities, donor countries and the UN country team, including those from the international financial institutions, who generously gave their time and frank views.

I hope that the findings and recommendations of this report will assist UNDP in responding to the country’s challenges and provide broader lessons that may be of relevance to UNDP and its partners internationally.

Saraswathi Menon
Director, Evaluation Office
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<td>ACU</td>
<td>Aid Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>ADR</td>
<td>Assessment of Development Results</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EDPRS(P)</td>
<td>Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Paper)</td>
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<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based Violence</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<td>GoR</td>
<td>Government of Rwanda</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Association for Technical Cooperation (German Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MIFOTRA</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service and Labour</td>
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<td>MINJUST</td>
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<td>MINITERE</td>
<td>Ministry of Land, Environment, Water, Forestry and Natural Resources</td>
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<td>MOPAN</td>
<td>Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NHRDR</td>
<td>National Human Development Report</td>
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<td>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>Poverty Environment Initiative</td>
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<td>TOKTEN</td>
<td>Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals</td>
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<td>TRAC</td>
<td>Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (UNDP budget)</td>
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<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Trade and Development</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Community for Africa</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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This report presents the results of an independent assessment of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contributions to development results in Rwanda during the period 2000 to 2006. Field work undertaken by the UNDP Evaluation Office consisted of a preliminary scoping mission in October 2006 and a full evaluation mission in January and February 2007. This timing allowed the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) recommendations to be considered in the development of the new UNDP Country Programme Document for Rwanda, presented to the UNDP Executive Board in September 2007.

The evaluation team gathered a wide range of data, validating perceptions derived from these data with additional qualitative and quantitative data and analyses. More than 110 stakeholder interviews were conducted with direct beneficiaries and senior government officials, officers of UNDP and other UN organizations active in Rwanda, other development partners with relations to UNDP in Rwanda, representatives of civil society organizations active in Rwanda and other key informants with no direct involvement in UNDP activities.

The fundamental evaluation questions were: What are UNDP Rwanda’s main achievements in its areas of intervention? What have been/what should be UNDP Rwanda’s core roles and focus? What are the capacities of UNDP Rwanda? How much coherence and synergy is achieved among UNDP Rwanda’s programming areas?

Contributions to Rwandan development were assessed in the five areas of focus for UNDP support: the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, responding to HIV/AIDS, and environment and energy.

**MDGs and poverty reduction:** UNDP’s project portfolio in general is moving ‘upstream’, towards supporting central and regional level government institutions. Field-level UNDP interventions have not been evaluated enough and there are few data on the poverty reduction results of UNDP interventions among local populations. While difficult to assess, information available to the evaluation suggests that UNDP interventions at field level are relevant, but their impact is limited in quantitative terms.

Support to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning is one of the largest UNDP interventions in Rwanda. The ministry finds the support comprehensive and adequate in relation to government priorities. UNDP efforts to develop capacity in this ministry have been fairly successful and some UNDP initiatives, such as the TOKTEN project, have been innovative. UNDP support to the Ministry of Infrastructure (from 2005 to 2007) to formulate a National Information and Communications Infrastructure plan and e-Government Programme constitutes important groundwork, though the effects to date are difficult to assess.

UNDP prepared the MDG Status Report of 2003 together with the Government of Rwanda. Its publication generated much publicity and helped raise national awareness of the MDGs. Since then, the MDGs have been present in the development dialogue but not always in a systematic and organized manner. Key government documents emphasize economic factors much more than do the MDGs. UNDP contributed to a new MDG follow-up report prepared in 2007 by managing a basket fund for the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.

**Democratic governance:** Most of UNDP disparate contributions in this area have been well targeted and government stakeholders consider them particularly relevant. The effects of UNDP contributions have not yet fully materialized due to a number of strategic and administrative...
difficulties. The attainment of targeted outcomes has been influenced by diverse factors and has been partially satisfactory.

_Crisis prevention and recovery_: UNDP results in this area have been mixed. Its activities are not without risk and these risks need to be carefully assessed. Yet this is also one of the areas where a neutral UN organization like UNDP has its greatest comparative advantage. UNDP should continue to help the Government of Rwanda address ongoing challenges, especially those related to the promotion and protection of human rights.

_Responding to HIV/AIDS_: There is a lack of reliable data on UNDP results in this area. UNDP expenditures in the sector are not large in relation to national needs, though a substantial portion of UNDP’s core resources has been devoted to Rwanda’s HIV/AIDS response. Additional funds have been mobilized from the African Development Bank. UNDP’s comparative advantage in this area vis-à-vis other UN organizations will need to be more clearly elaborated.

_Environment and energy_: Recent UNDP support has made modest contributions to its targeted outcome in this area, though evaluation information is, once again, unavailable. The ADR confirmed UNDP contributions to the elaboration of strategies, most notably through support for the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) process, but not yet to the adoption or implementation of these strategies. UNDP has also helped the government make environmental concerns more visible. The Poverty Environment Initiative, for example, helps ensure that the Government of Rwanda’s emerging EDPRS will be a sustainable development strategy.

**UNDP Rwanda’s performance was also assessed in several cross-cutting areas:** These included areas of particular concern for the Government of Rwanda and other development partners: aid coordination; institutional capacity development; gender mainstreaming; environment; and two issues of particular concern for UNDP, the coherence and synergies within UNDP thematic programmes and between UNDP programmes and other UN organization programmes, and the effectiveness of UNDP monitoring and evaluation. UNDP Rwanda’s most impressive results have occurred in those areas where the Government of Rwanda is also relatively strong: aid coordination and gender mainstreaming. Results in other areas, such as institutional capacity development, promoting environment as a cross-cutting issue, monitoring and evaluation of UNDP support, and achievement of coherence and synergies among UNDP and UN programmes have been more mixed.

Aid coordination, harmonization and alignment are particularly strong in Rwanda due to strong government leadership and UNDP support in these areas has been highly effective.

While gender-specific projects have been undertaken, with impressive results, there is little direct evidence that gender issues and their impact on project beneficiaries are systematically taken into account in other UNDP supported projects. It is hoped that UNDP Rwanda’s recent gender audit will enable it to correct this anomaly.

Many UNDP contributions to helping government partners develop capacities were cited during the evaluation, but there is no systematic approach to capacity development or to measuring progress towards well defined capacity development objectives. UNDP Rwanda’s decision to support the emerging ‘National Integrated Skills Development Policy’ and a national capacity development strategy to be closely linked to the EDPRS is a promising development.

The Poverty Environment Initiative, implemented jointly by UNDP and United Nations Environment Programme, has provided environmental input into the frameworks being developed for EDPRS in agriculture, health, water and sanitation, justice, private-sector development, social protection, environment, gender, social protection and HIV/AIDS. While this cross-sectoral analysis offers guidance for orienting these sectors, it is too early to assess the development results of this work.
Senior management of the country office views the creation of a monitoring strategy and tools as a priority for strengthening UNDP capacity. UNDP Rwanda’s efforts in this area need to be synchronized with and supported by UNDP Headquarters. Development of methodologies and tools should be accompanied by strengthening of human resources.

The greatest coherence among the five UNDP programming areas is among those units working on different dimensions of governance. The member agencies of the UN country team aim to ensure complementarities and avoid duplication through regular meetings of heads of UN organizations and a Rwanda UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) task force established to define UN-wide strategic outputs, coordinate efforts at the project and programme level and promote joint programming. Some UN organizations observed that UNDP gets involved in areas where it does not have the capacity or expertise, such as demographic data collection.

Conclusions: The country office in Rwanda has effective working relationships with the Government of Rwanda, and the government considers UNDP contributions to be very relevant. However, UNDP contributions have sometimes been delivered with less-than-optimal efficiency, particularly in governance and environment. The main problems have been shortcomings in programme administration, management and financing.

Overall, UNDP has made important progress towards a more sustainable long-term development approach, though several UNDP projects still play gap-filling roles. The dispersion of the programme across many small projects in multiple thematic areas impedes efforts to improve the quality of programme administration and technical expertise in core areas.

With UNDP support, Rwanda and its development partners have made considerable progress in the harmonization and alignment of development cooperation and their experience should be of interest to the international community.

Systematic performance monitoring is lacking in most UNDP interventions. This has a direct negative impact on their relevance and efficiency.

External factors that will greatly shape UNDP’s strategic environment in coming years are the new architecture of aid, including the ‘One UN’ approach being piloted in Rwanda, and regional and national stability. Participation in the One UN reform pilot will enhance the status of UNDP in Rwanda. It will also place greater pressure on the country office to improve its performance and to address areas of chronic weakness shared by many UNDP country offices, such as human resource management, administrative and technical services, and monitoring and evaluation. Partners in and outside the UN system in Rwanda expect more clarity from UNDP regarding the nature of its role in Rwanda.

The situation in Rwanda’s crowded rural areas and in surrounding countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, will remain critical determinants of Rwanda’s stability. UNDP Rwanda must stay well informed of these dimensions of Rwandan reality.

Lessons learned: Strong government ownership and leadership greatly accelerate progress towards effective alignment and harmonization of international cooperation.

Systematic capacity development, including training and skills transfer, needs to be an integral part of any project, regardless of its technical contents or institutional set-up.

Chronic administrative and management deficiencies, if not addressed effectively, can undermine partners’ faith in the country office’s capacity to provide high quality support.

Recommendations: If environment is to be retained as one of two areas of focus for UNDP under the new UNDAF, then the country office needs to enhance its capacity to provide strong technical and policy support and to participate effectively and consistently in the national dialogue on environment, development and poverty.
UNDP should launch a dialogue with the Government of Rwanda with the aim of expanding UNDP partnerships with Rwandan civil society organizations. UNDP also needs to ensure an ongoing dialogue and careful monitoring in response to reports of tensions surrounding the operations of the Gacaca system.\footnote{The Gacaca judicial system is a modified form of traditional justice being applied to suit the current situation facing Rwandan society. Gacaca courts are modelled on traditional dispute settlement methods used by Rwandans in the past.}

Project designs need to be based on initial analyses of problems and clear objectives defined together with stakeholders. Project documents should follow UNDP guidelines as well as international standards. The role of steering committees in project design should be clarified and strengthened with the objective of enhancing national ownership and sustainability.

With support from headquarters, the country office needs to establish a robust, functional monitoring and evaluation system that systematically generates ‘lessons learned’ then ensures these are reflected in programme management and design decisions.

National ownership and the sustainability of results should be strengthened by ensuring that on-the-job training and skills transfer activities figure prominently in the terms of reference of all technical assistance contracted by UNDP Rwanda.

Autonomous project implementation units can impede national ownership and sustainability. They should be replaced, where possible, with technical assistance that works directly within government institutions, using and adapting their systems and mechanisms for project management. The country office should prepare a strategy to phase out autonomous project implementation units in collaboration with the concerned government institutions and development partners.

The results of the gender audit should be used to raise the profile on gender in UNDP Rwanda’s portfolio from an ‘incidental concern’ to a core issue. This should build on UNDP successful support to women politicians in Rwanda.

UNDP should sharpen the focus of their programme, concentrating on areas within the second UNDAF framework where UNDP can bring the most value added while strengthening corresponding in-house capacities. The country office needs to strengthen their human resource planning and management, with headquarters’ support. The country office also needs to improve its capacity for ensuring that clear and useful financial information can be shared with the government and cost-sharing partners in a timely and effective manner.

UNDP should help the Government of Rwanda foster harmonization and alignment among those development partners still pursuing the project approach. UNDP should explore the option of facilitating pooling of technical assistance from different development partners.

UNDP needs to clearly identify its role in each context where it intervenes, ensuring that other members of the UN country team and other development partners in Rwanda understand what role UNDP Rwanda is playing in any given situation. UNDP should focus on roles where it can achieve maximum coherence and synergies with the programmes of partner agencies.

UNDP can help the Government of Rwanda enhance national and regional stability. In the context of One UN, the country office should look for opportunities to play non-traditional roles in UNDP areas of focus. For example, it should consider options for strengthening cross-border programming links that might help stabilize the Kivu region. Nationally, UNDP should continue its support for strengthening the rule of law and the decentralization process. Enhanced ties between UNDP and Rwanda’s civil society organizations are needed to improve UNDP capacities in these areas.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

UNDP’s programme of support to Rwanda over the period assessed—between 2000 and 2006—was characterized by continued, rapid transition. The UNDP Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for the period 1997 to 2000 was extended through 2001. In this period, the UNDP played a broad range of roles defined by the diverse needs of a ‘post-emergency response’. In the second CCF, which covered 2002 to 2006, UNDP focused on supporting government efforts to re-start longer term development processes. The third CCF, which was being developed at the time of the evaluation, will be aligned with and guided by a strong second generation national Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)—the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)—and by Rwanda’s designation as one of the pilot countries for UN reform.

1.1 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This report presents the results of an Assessment of Development Results (ADR) in Rwanda undertaken by the UNDP Evaluation Office in January and February 2007. ADRs provide independent assessments of UNDP contributions to development results with particular emphasis on assessing the relevance and effectiveness of the UNDP CCFs. The Rwanda ADR focused on UNDP contributions in the period 2000 to 2006.

The overall objectives of an ADR are to:

- Support the Administrator’s accountability to the Executive Board and serve as a vehicle for quality assurance of UNDP interventions at the country level
- Generate lessons from the experience to inform current and future programming at the country and corporate levels
- Provide stakeholders in Rwanda an objective assessment of results that have been achieved through UNDP support and partnerships with other key actors for the past five to seven years

ADRs also strengthen UNDP strategic positioning in the country, offering timely and relevant information on the agency’s comparative strengths and weaknesses for consideration during preparation of UNDP country programmes. In addition, ADRs are expected to enhance UNDP partnership with the government, to benefit various stakeholders at the country level and to allow UNDP to contribute to its development results in a more efficient manner.

This ADR in Rwanda has taken place in parallel with the preparation of the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the UNDP Country Programme Document for Rwanda, which was to be presented to the UNDP Executive Board in September 2007.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

ADR preparation is guided by principles of transparency, meaningful consultation with stakeholders, impartiality, quality, professionalism, timeliness and utility. A key role of the ADR is to assess credible links between UNDP efforts and national development results. It is also important to assess the individual programme and non-programme activities of the UNDP, both as a reality check and as a means of assessing various ‘links’ in the results chain. ADRs therefore involve a methodology that ranges from examining ‘big picture’ country strategies to ‘bottom up’ sampling of project and non-project activities and results.

The evaluation in Rwanda employed a variety of data collection methods, including desk reviews, stakeholder interviews, focus group meetings and
selected site visits. In addition, the evaluation team reviewed recent analyses of the country’s ongoing process of formulating and reviewing their national PRS, as well as a range of documents including several project evaluations, government documents, independent academic research papers and books (documents reviewed are listed in Annex A). A short scoping mission carried out by the UNDP task manager with support from the UNDP country office in Kigali helped the team sharpen the focus of the evaluation.

A researcher in the Evaluation Office carried out background research and identified key documents in a thorough and systematic manner prior to the full evaluation mission. A full ADR team carried out a three-week field mission to Rwanda in January 2007. Four separate visits to project sites in northern, eastern, western and southern Rwanda complemented meetings and interviews in Kigali with stakeholders from the Government of Rwanda (GoR), international development partners, UN organizations and civil society (a list of stakeholders met is provided in Annex B). At the end of the evaluation mission, the ADR team prepared and presented preliminary findings to the UNDP country office.

The evaluation team analyzed the situation of UNDP Rwanda on the principle of triangulation: verifying and validating perceptions derived from a wide range of primary and secondary sources with additional qualitative and quantitative data and further analyses. A similarly wide range of informants was consulted, including direct beneficiaries and senior government officials, development partners with various relations to UNDP Rwanda and other key informants with no direct involvement in UNDP activities. The key evaluation questions guiding the analysis, finalized after consultations with stakeholders during the scoping mission, are listed in Box 1. A more complete matrix of evaluation questions is provided in Annex C.

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**Box 1. Key evaluation questions**

**What are UNDP Rwanda’s main achievements in its areas of intervention?**
- How have these achievements been realized?
- How have these achievements contributed to Rwanda’s development results?

**What are/what should be UNDP Rwanda’s core roles and focus?**
- Do UNDP Rwanda’s roles and identity need to be more clearly defined? Do they need to be re-defined?
- Is UNDP Rwanda involved in too wide a range of activities? What causes UNDP Rwanda to extend into new areas? What are the costs and benefits of doing so?
- Does UNDP Rwanda need to focus more sharply on a fewer number of areas of real comparative advantage?
- What are UNDP Rwanda’s areas of true comparative advantage?

**What are the capacities of UNDP Rwanda?**
- What does UNDP Rwanda do best?
- What does it do least well?
- Does UNDP Rwanda have serious gaps or weaknesses in its capacity? If so, what are their causes, their consequences and their solutions?

**How much coherence and synergy is achieved among UNDP Rwanda’s programming areas?**
- How well do the different programming units support or reinforce each other?
- Do the different programming areas share common, mutually reinforcing approaches, for example, to capacity development and to support for decentralization?

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2 The evaluation evidence available from UNDP Rwanda was limited to six project evaluations and no outcome evaluations. The ADR team was informed that at least nine project or outcome evaluations are planned for 2007.
Chapter 2

COUNTRY CONTEXT

2.1 GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Rwanda is a landlocked country in the Great Lakes region of central Africa covering roughly 25,000 square kilometers of land and 1,400 square kilometers of water.

Rwanda’s population was estimated at slightly more than 9 million people in mid 2006. The current population growth rate is estimated at 3.5 percent per year while the population density is the highest in Africa, at 350 people per square kilometer, and more than 450 people per square kilometer of arable land.

The political, social and economic context of Rwanda is profoundly affected by the civil war of the early 1990s and genocide of 1994 and the country continues to deal with the consequences. Whether considering demographic trends, issues of land ownership or penal-code reform, the background of devastation and horror impinges on the consciousness of all concerned. Even 13 years after the genocide, there is an unspoken assumption often underlying discussions of the nation’s future to the effect that Rwanda cannot be considered an ordinary country.

A transitional ‘government of national unity’ established after the genocide of 1994 took extensive crisis prevention measures in the spirit of ‘never again’. It introduced fundamental changes that would open doors for reconciliation and help the country to move forward and build a new nation whose citizens could live in harmony and prosperity.

The country adopted a multiparty system, which has continued since the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. The Rwandan Patriotic Front is the ruling party. It was an important actor in the political discourse throughout the transitional period and has continued to play this role since the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections. These elections marked the conclusion of the nine-year transition to open party political activity at all levels. While Rwanda has made remarkable progress in the democratic process, the process could mature further through the empowering of political parties, civil society and the private sector.

Rwanda has gone through many positive developments despite its turbulent history. For example, women have entered Rwanda’s political and administrative institutions in impressive percentages. They now occupy half the seats in the National Assembly and almost one third of the portfolios in the new government.

Regional peace and stability is an issue of major concern to the GoR and its partners. Rwanda lies at the centre of a very densely populated region that encompasses Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivu region of the eastern Congo and south-western Uganda. This area shares very similar languages, a common culture and a long history of socio-economic and politico-military interaction. Rwanda’s stability is intimately linked with the stability of this broader region and vice-versa.

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2.2 ECONOMIC SITUATION—
RECOVERY AND TRENDS

Rwanda’s economy is agrarian. Agriculture employs almost 80 percent of the population, accounting for more than 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and more than 70 percent of exports. Apart from unexploited gas reserves beneath Lake Kivu, Rwanda is poorly endowed with mineral resources. Subsistence food production is the dominant activity in the agriculture sector. Production of coffee and tea for export is still modest.

The service sector contributes approximately 39 percent of GDP and employs roughly 6.5 percent of the working population. Within this sector, wholesale and retail trade as well as public administration account for approximately 50 percent of services. The economic contribution of tourism, while growing rapidly, remains marginal.

The industrial sector makes up 20 percent of the GDP and employs slightly less than 2 percent of the working population. Manufacturing constitutes the most important source of industrial activity, accounting for almost 12 percent of GDP while construction accounts for another 8 percent.

The percentage of Rwandans living in poverty has decreased from 60.4 percent in 2000-2001 to 56.9 percent in 2005-2006. As a result of the country’s high population growth rate, this progress has been overshadowed by an increase in the absolute number of people living in poverty, increasing from 4.8 million to 5.4 million persons during the same period. Poverty in Rwanda is mainly a rural phenomenon: while the population is 83 percent rural, 92 percent of the poor live in rural areas. There are also significant inequalities within and between rural provinces.

2.2.1 SOUND MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS

Rwanda’s economic growth was rapid in the years following the genocide, largely due to determined economic policy, the ‘catch-up’ effect (due to starting from a very low baseline in 1994) and relatively high aid flows. Economic growth has been more modest in recent years. For 2007, the GoR forecast for GDP growth is 6.0 percent (Table 1).

Fitch Ratings has assigned a ‘B–’ foreign currency rating to Rwanda with a Positive Outlook. According to Fitch Ratings, Rwanda’s rating is supported by a good track record of macroeconomic management and reforms, and the receipt of substantial bilateral and multilateral debt relief in 2005 and 2006.

2.2.2 TRADE ISSUES

Despite an increase in goods exports in the last two years, Rwanda struggles with a chronic trade deficit. Imports have risen sharply since 2004, largely as result of the increasing costs of imported fuel and energy. The GoR is actively seeking ways to increase domestic energy production, such as exploitation of methane deposits of the Lake Kivu.

Despite strong market-oriented policies, Rwanda’s economy is not yet well integrated into regional and global markets. Its landlocked position, deficient infrastructure and small domestic market with limited purchasing power have held back foreign direct investments. At the same time, a strong national currency, buoyed by the high level of development assistance, has favoured imports and discouraged exports.

Official economic statistics do not fully record trade by the informal sector, which constitutes a significant proportion of economic activity in

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7 Ibid.
Rwanda. It is particularly significant in regions adjacent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, where Rwanda has an important trade surplus in both goods and services. Other positive signs include imports of capital goods in last two years that have grown faster than imports of consumption goods.

Much hope is placed on the integration into the East African Community, which was planned for completion in 2007. While the GoR admits that adjustment to competition from the larger economies of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda will be challenging, it is convinced that long-term gains will outweigh the costs.

2.2.3 INVESTMENT NEEDS
Rwanda's ambitious economic policy goals imply vast investments in economic and social infrastructure, as stipulated in their Long-term Investment Framework/Portfolio (see Table 2) and EDPRS.

As the Long-term Investment Framework/Portfolio document points out, securing financing is one of the country's biggest challenges.10 Official

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**Table 1. Key economic data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (million)</strong></td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>9.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nominal GDP (Rwf billion)</strong></td>
<td>676.1</td>
<td>741.9</td>
<td>781.5</td>
<td>955.2</td>
<td>1,137.9</td>
<td>1,327.1</td>
<td>1,583.0</td>
<td>1,838.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real GDP (Rwf billion)</strong></td>
<td>683.8</td>
<td>741.8</td>
<td>823.0</td>
<td>825.4</td>
<td>868.8</td>
<td>930.4</td>
<td>981.1</td>
<td>1,039.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real GDP growth (% annual change)</strong></td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nominal GDP per capita (USD)</strong></td>
<td>207.80</td>
<td>203.31</td>
<td>202.24</td>
<td>212.68</td>
<td>230.86</td>
<td>269.92</td>
<td>316.71</td>
<td>361.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Price inflation (% annual change)</strong></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Export of goods (USD million)</strong></td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>176.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Import of goods (USD million)</strong></td>
<td>-226.9</td>
<td>-226</td>
<td>-207.9</td>
<td>-237.2</td>
<td>-278.5</td>
<td>-361.9</td>
<td>-446.4</td>
<td>-589.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current account balance (USD million) (% of GDP, including Official Transfers)</strong></td>
<td>-114.9</td>
<td>-98</td>
<td>-105.9</td>
<td>-104.7</td>
<td>-31.4</td>
<td>-57.7</td>
<td>-207.3</td>
<td>-226.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exchange rate</strong></td>
<td>390.02</td>
<td>443.09</td>
<td>475.37</td>
<td>537.91</td>
<td>574.63</td>
<td>557.81</td>
<td>551.76</td>
<td>547.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
development assistance, which ranges from $400 million to $500 million annually, currently covers more than half of the GoR’s budget and most of their capital investment budget. Debt relief has been received through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, fiscal performance has improved and the share of grant aid in Rwanda’s overall Official Development Assistance is expected to increase. But these sources alone cannot cover investment requirements in the coming years. Even with a higher targeted level of revenue mobilization, the annual resource gap to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) would average approximately $1,000 million during the period 2009 to 2020.

2.3 SOCIAL SITUATION—INDICATORS AND TRENDS

The legacy of the 1994 genocide and the armed conflict that preceded it continue to weigh heavily on the social and economic recovery of the country. These events impoverished Rwandans and increased their vulnerability, particularly among the widows and orphans of the genocide, recently returned refugees, resettled internally displaced persons and the families of detained suspects of genocide related crimes. These problems, combined with very high rural population densities and small farm sizes, have left many Rwandan communities unable to provide adequately for their poorest and most vulnerable groups.

Vulnerable people, such as women-headed and child-headed households, are generally at greater risk of being poor than other groups. Almost 25 percent of Rwandan households were headed by women in 2006 and 0.7 percent were headed by children. An encouraging decline in poverty rates has been registered, however, in households that are headed by women, from 66 percent in 2001 to 60 percent in 2006.

2.3.1 HEALTH

Health care infrastructure was badly damaged during the early 1990s. It has since been rebuilt although the health status of Rwandans remains poor. Mental health problems, due largely to the horrors of the genocide and its aftermath, are prevalent in a society that is not equipped to deal with these problems. Preventable diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria remain a burden on Rwandan economy both in terms of direct costs to the poor and vulnerable households and in terms of loss of labour and labour productivity.

Recent key indicators from the health sector are still stark. Between 2000 and 2005, under-five mortality decreased from 196 per 1,000 births to 152 per 1,000, recovering to pre-war levels. A child born into a poor (bottom quintile) family has a one in five chance of dying before reaching the age of five—twice as high as for a child born into a rich (top quintile) family. Malaria has become the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Rwanda and children under the age of five account for 35 percent of all malaria related deaths. HIV prevalence among women in Kigali is 8.6 percent, meaning that a woman living in Kigali is eight times more likely to get infected with HIV as a man living in the northern province.

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12 Ibid.
Table 3 reflects Rwanda’s health indicators compared to other countries in the region. On average, there is less than one public hospital per 200,000 people. Churches operate nearly half the country’s health care centres and district hospitals. In the commercial private sector, there is a single tertiary hospital in Kigali and a scattering of private clinics. An estimated 87 percent of the population has access to health care, among the highest in the East Africa region, although there are only two doctors and two paramedics per 100,000 people and access is skewed in favour of urban areas where less than 15 percent of the population lives. Overall, Rwanda’s health indicators (particularly maternal and child mortality) remain poor, and some of the MDG targets remain challenging.

### 2.3.2 HIV/AIDS

The most recent findings on HIV/AIDS prevalence are from the Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey of 2005, which observed an adult prevalence rate of 3.0 percent nationally, with marked variations between the sexes: 2.3 percent males; 3.6 percent females, and by residence: 2.2 percent rural and 7.6 percent urban. Since 2003, Rwanda has made significant progress in revising strategies to fight HIV/AIDS. The national response is characterized by a multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary, decentralized and

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community-based approach. Several key policy statements have been developed and clarified, particularly involving new aspects of the epidemic after the national plan 2002-2006 was made. Key policy statements have been developed for orphans and other vulnerable children 2002-2004, anti-retroviral therapy 2004, HIV/AIDS in the workplace, and for condoms 2005. In addition, a national HIV/AIDS policy document encompassing all policies was drafted 2005.\(^{16}\)

Despite strong commitment and proactive initiatives by the government of Rwanda, challenges to combat the disease remain. For example, prevention of mother to child transmission programme monitoring reports showed that the percentage of infected infants born to HIV-infected mothers has increased from 9.5 percent in 2003 to 11.0 percent in 2005. The programme data also revealed that there has been an increase in the number of pregnant women seeking care and provided with Nevirapine for prevention of infection to newborns from 14.2 percent in 2003 to 27.8 percent in 2005.\(^{17}\)

The government objective is to reduce mother to child transmission of HIV by 50 percent by 2010 by increasing the percentage of health care facilities offering mother to child transmission services.

2.3.3 CHILD MORTALITY
According to the latest MDG country report,\(^ {18}\) a 22.4 percent reduction in infant mortality has been achieved between 2000 and 2005, bringing infant mortality rates to 86 per 1,000 live births, roughly their level in 1992.

2.3.4 MATERNAL HEALTH
The national MDG objective is to reduce the maternal mortality rate by three quarters, from 611 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 153 in 2015. In 2000 the maternal mortality rate was 1,071, by 2005 the rate had declined to 750 per 100,000 live births a reduction of nearly 30 percent.\(^ {19}\)

2.3.5 MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES
Over the past decade malaria has become a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Rwanda with roughly one million cases of malaria reported in the past five years, making malaria one of the leading causes of death. However the malaria case fatality rate has declined from 9.3 percent in 2001 to 2.9 percent in 2006 in the general population, and declined in children under five from 10.1 percent in 2001 to 2 percent in 2006.\(^ {20}\)

2.3.6 EDUCATION
The government of Rwanda considers education critical for achieving sustainable economic growth and development. In its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the government puts quality basic education for all as its first priority. The Rwanda 2020 vision statement calls for universal adult literacy by 2020. It aims to ensure that all Rwandan citizens will acquire basic primary education by 2010 and that significant improvement will be shown in secondary and tertiary education.

To achieve the above objective, the government provides free mandatory primary education for all children and conducts awareness campaigns to encourage parents to send their children to school. This has resulted in a steady increase in primary school enrolment rates from 87 percent in 2003 to 95 percent in 2006.\(^ {21}\) While the increase in numbers of primary schools and classrooms did not keep pace with this rapid growth in student population, the number of teachers

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Ibid. The same source reports that there was an estimated 7.5 percent reduction in the proportion of infants born with HIV as a result of anti retroviral treatment for prevention of mother to child transmission between 2003 and 2005.
\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
\(^{21}\) Ibid.
grew even more rapidly, reducing the student teacher ratio from 60:1 to roughly 54:1 in this period. Gender equality in primary and secondary enrolment has also remained good, though this indicator has not been as encouraging at the tertiary level in the recent years.

2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION—CHALLENGES AND TRENDS

Land scarcity drives environmental degradation while environmental degradation exacerbates the effects of land scarcity: Rwanda’s population density is more typical of south or East Asia than sub-Saharan Africa. With close to 350 people per square kilometre, it is the highest in Africa and among the highest in the world. The median population growth projection foreseen in the national census of 2002 has the overall population growing at an average of 2.5 percent for at least 20 years—from 8.1 million in 2002 to 13.4 million in 2022. Rural populations are projected to grow more slowly than urban populations, but are still expected to increase from 6.8 million in 2002 to 9.5 million in 2022. Rwanda’s population is around 83 percent rural and this population is highly dependent on subsistence agriculture. Virtually all rural Rwandans use biomass fuels, mostly firewood, as their principal energy source. Levels of fertilizer use and cash crop production are very low.

The rugged topography of the country, often referred to as the ‘Land of a Thousand Hills’, greatly increases the threat of soil erosion. It is estimated that half the country’s farmland suffers moderate to severe erosion. Increasing intensity of agricultural land use and ongoing gradual agricultural transformation further increases the threat of soil degradation. Cultivation has been pushed onto seasonally flooded bottomlands and steep, fragile slopes previously devoted to grazing and woodlots. Fallow periods are declining. When hundreds of thousands of rural Rwandans were either killed or forced to flee their homes in 1994, one result was the widespread neglect of many anti-erosion structures across the countryside.

Traditional land tenure systems exacerbate problems of fragmentation of agricultural land, further driving land degradation. High demand for wood (and charcoal) for domestic fuel, industry and construction maintains pressure on the country’s limited forest resources, which are mostly plantations of exotic tree species and a diminishing area of natural forest reserve. An estimated 50.2 percent of Rwanda’s forest cover was lost between 1990 and 2005.

Low rural incomes limit communities’ capacities for improving their water and sanitation services while high levels of rural poverty and population density put increasing pressures on land and water resources. The use of Rwanda’s valley bottom marshes for agriculture has expanded quickly in recent years, with little planning or control. Subject to the same land tenure regime as dry lands, marsh lands are being sub-divided into progressively smaller plots, with little or no attention paid to the affect of this transformation on local water supplies or the need to carefully manage these highly productive, sensitive sites.

22 Ibid.
Urban environmental problems in Rwanda are less critical but increasing. While the country’s urban population is only 17 percent of the overall population, it is growing more than twice as fast as the country’s population as a whole. Rwanda’s urban population is projected to grow from 1.4 million in 2002 to 3.8 million in 2022. This will strain waste management capacities in particular. This strain will be most severe in the capital Kigali, which accounts for roughly half of the country’s overall urban population.

The government’s response to environmental challenges, until recently at least, has been limited. Budgetary support for environmental management—estimated at less than 1 percent of government budgets in the first PRS period—has been inadequate. Institutional and administrative capacities at the central and local government levels are similarly inadequate. These inadequacies are reflected in modest policy and legislative instruments related to environment and resource management and limited capacity for coordination and enforcement of policies and regulations.

These environmental management challenges, combined with Rwanda’s other daunting development challenges, resulted in the 2003 ‘MDG Status Report’ for Rwanda assessing the country’s prospects for ensuring environmental sustainability as "unlikely." The more recent 2007 MDG Country Report for Rwanda, issued following the evaluation mission, does not directly assess the likelihood of achieving this goal.

2.5 RWANDAN NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Along with rehabilitation and economic development, the GoR has focused much of its effort on addressing the consequences of the genocide and the institutional problems that were deemed responsible for the genocide.

2.5.1 LONG TERM RWANDAN DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES ARTICULATED IN VISION 2020

Vision 2020 was conceived to provide a basis for a new start to build peace and prosperity in the 21st Century. It regards national reconciliation, domestic and regional security, good governance and economic transformation as key to achieving its ambitious goals.

Vision 2020 calls for the achievement of the MDGs and for moving Rwanda out of underdevelopment and poverty. Its targets for 2020 include: a GDP per capita of $900, an increase from $230 in 2000; a reduction in the incidence of poverty from 60 percent to 25 percent; an increase in life expectancy from 49 years to 65 years; and an increase in adult literacy from 48 percent to 90 percent. Other key objectives include:

- Good political and economic governance
- Rural economic transformation
- Development of services and manufacturing
- Human resource development
- Development and promotion of the private sector
- Regional and international economic integration
- Poverty reduction

Through extensive national consultations, the GoR has also identified reform of the constitution, legal system and judiciary as national priorities.

2.6 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION—FOCUS, CHALLENGES, COORDINATION, HARMONIZATION

Official Development Assistance continues to play a large socio-economic role in Rwanda. After peaking in the mid-1990s, volumes fell abruptly in the late 1990s then rose more gradually in this decade (see Figure 1). According to the GoR, in 2005 Official Development Assistance to Rwanda was just less than $500 million, representing 23 percent of the GDP. This amounted to $55 per capita, compared with an average in Sub-Saharan Africa of approximately $25 per capita. Official Development Assistance accounts for more than half of the GoR’s annual budgets and...
more than 90 percent of its capital investment budgets. Annual Official Development Assistance by 2006 and 2007 would amount to between $500 million and $600 million per year.

Most of this aid comes from a relatively limited group of development partners. In 2005, the seven biggest sources of funding were the World Bank, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the African Development Bank, the United States, the UN system and Sweden.

In the past 12 years, the strategy and focus of development assistance in Rwanda has changed substantially. In the years following the genocide, attention focused on emergency activities, humanitarian aid and reconstruction. At the beginning of the century focus shifted to more long-term development programmes, and in the past several years, aid policy has increasingly converged around the principles of ownership, coordination, alignment and harmonization.

In recent years, Rwanda has become one of the front line countries in the ‘new architecture of aid’, shaped by principles defined in MDGs, the Monterrey Consensus, the Rome Declaration on Harmonization and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability. In July 2006, the GoR adopted a Development Assistance Policy that draws heavily on the principles of the Paris Declaration and the related international process. Rwanda’s policy identifies un-earmarked budget support as GoR’s preferred modality for external assistance, followed by sector budget support and stand-alone projects. It further stipulates that stand-alone projects must be on-budget and on-plan. The GoR also prefers that donor resources be pooled rather than earmarked for individual projects.

While clearly preferring programme-based modalities, the GoR wants to maintain a balanced aid portfolio. General budget support (GBS) is currently approximately 40 percent of all disbursed Official Development Assistance. It may increase, but the government also sees risks involved in this modality, such as increased conditionality and potential fluctuations in

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**Figure 1. Official development assistance received by Rwanda, 1990-2004**

![Graph showing official development assistance received by Rwanda, 1990-2004](image)

volume. A recent evaluation of GBS concluded that, taking account both flow-of-funds and other effects, GBS has had a positive effect on the non-income dimensions of poverty reduction, such as access to basic services. The public-action strategies that GBS supports have only recently begun to focus more directly on growth and poverty reduction through increasing income. A key sustainability issue is the political nature of Rwanda’s development assistance and GBS in particular, reflecting the country’s recent history and complex geopolitical situation.

2.6.1 AID POLICY—COORDINATION, HARMONIZATION AND ALIGNMENT

A key element of GoR’s Aid Policy is their Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment framework, designed in consultation with the development partners and other stakeholders. In addition to modality issues, the Aid Policy also sets explicit objectives for:

- Ensuring that aid flows are aligned to national priorities
- Strengthening capacities for coordinated support
- Using the country’s public finance management and procurement systems
- Avoiding parallel programme implementation units
- Increasing the predictability of aid flows
- Using common arrangements or procedures (programme-based approach)
- Increasing the use of joint field missions and joint country analytic work
- Strengthening mutual accountability

The GoR’s Aid Policy relies heavily on the programme-based approach and related instruments. While this is coherent with the best practices of the international community, experience from other countries calls attention to some inherent risks of the programme-based approach including: the tendency towards administration-driven centralism at the expense of service delivery at local levels, and the risk of overemphasizing the role of the public sector, with little involvement of private actors and the civil society. At present, the roles of and linkages with the private sector are not clearly elaborated in Rwanda’s Aid Policy.

The Aid Policy includes a comprehensive structural set-up that emphasizes the GoR’s ownership of the process. A Cabinet-level Aid Policy Implementation Committee consists of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), Office of the President, the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC), the National AIDS Control Commission and the Human Resources and Institutional Capacity Development Agency. This committee provides high-level oversight and strategic direction.

2.6.2 EXTERNAL FINANCE UNIT AT MINECOFIN

The External Finance Unit of MINECOFIN works with the GoR and development partners to coordinate and manage external aid. It is also the Technical Secretariat of the Aid Policy Implementation Committee. Until the end of 2008, the External Finance Unit will be supported by an Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), financed by a basket fund from seven donors and managed by UNDP Rwanda.

2.6.3 SECTORAL CLUSTERS

At the sectoral level, the dialogue between the GoR and donors is organized in round tables called ‘clusters’. Currently, 11 clusters operate. Each has a designated lead ministry and a lead donor. Some clusters also include members from civil society. The clusters meet every one to three months and their agendas are typically concerned

29 Ibid.
with sector policies and strategies, sector plans and sector budgets.

The experience of working in clusters is fairly new and their performance appears to be uneven. Capacity building is included as an element in the strategies of all clusters. When preparing their strategies, these sectoral working groups are expected to analyze their own capacity implications.

2.6.4 PROGRAMME-BASED APPROACHES

According to the External Finance Unit, introducing programme-based approaches to line ministries has been difficult. Some ministries prefer to stay with the familiar project approach, without taking account of the Aid Policy. The External Finance Unit deals with this dilemma through a High Level Committee composed of officials from various sectors. Problems exist among the development partners as well. For example, the Minister of MINECOFIN is empowered to sign all aid contracts, but a major development partner recently signed a financing agreement directly with the Supreme Court.

2.6.5 GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN AID COORDINATION

The GoR plays an effective role in aid coordination, despite the capacity problems of the public sector, exercising clear ownership and leadership of external assistance. Key policy areas have been explicitly defined at central and sectoral levels and the GoR political leaders endorse them actively. In most sectors, there is a single GoR organization in charge and others acknowledge its leadership. The task of the lead ministry is facilitated by the fact that one of the development partners is assigned as the lead donor in the sector and they work together. The overall structure of development assistance has been designed in consensus with the development partners and they all participate actively. Challenges remain in defining adequate mechanisms for stakeholder participation and consultation, in particular regarding non-state actors. More systematic and efficient performance monitoring is needed to ensure the relevance of policies.

2.6.6 ALIGNMENT AND HARMONIZATION—PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

Alignment\textsuperscript{30} is relatively good in Rwanda and has progressed enormously since the latter half of the 1990s when most of the cooperation was based on donor-defined modalities and stand-alone interventions. In 2006,\textsuperscript{31} half of Rwanda’s aid was reported on the GoR budget: 69 percent was disbursed in the fiscal year for which it was scheduled, and approximately 41 percent relied on public finance management systems of the GoR. This latter figure corresponds with the proportion of the GBS in Rwanda’s aid receipts.

Yet much remains to be done. While all Rwanda’s development partners are signatories of the Paris Declaration, some of them have had difficulty converting the alignment principles into operational practices. The persistence of parallel project implementation units are examples of this. Out of 48 project implementation units in 2006, UNDP finances 23 and the World Bank 11. While the development partners generally support the GoR’s poverty reduction strategies and other key development policies and sectoral strategies, there is ongoing debate regarding underlying assumptions, such as the relative emphasis on economic growth and the role of civil society.

Although the Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment structure offers an opportunity for mutual assessment of progress, no comprehensive

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\textsuperscript{30} According to OECD/DAC, alignment refers to the commitment made by donors to adjust their support with the strategies, plans, institutions, procedures and systems of the partner country (government-donor relationship), thus progressing towards more flexible aid modalities. Harmonization is the commitment by donors to rationalize and coordinate their multiple activities so that the collective aid effectiveness is maximized under the leadership of the partner country (donor-donor relationship). Source: OECD/DAC, ‘Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery’, Paris, France, 2003.

and systematic mechanisms for this purpose have yet been defined. The Budget Support Harmonization Group does undertake joint sectoral reviews. Further development of midterm expenditure frameworks and public finance management systems will probably enhance the operationalization of alignment.

The Public Finance Management Action Plan and Organic Budget Law, both adopted in 2006, as well as procurement reforms are significant landmarks in strengthening public financial management. The evaluation of the GBS in Rwanda notes that the Partnership GBS has played a significant role in improving public finance management systems. In particular, Partnership GBS technical assistance and policy dialogue have contributed greatly to public finance management system development and, more generally, to the systemic capacity of government.32

The donor community in Rwanda acknowledges the importance of the harmonization process. Nevertheless, operationalizing harmonization poses challenges. According to a 2006 survey on the Paris Declaration and Aid Effectiveness in Rwanda,33 programme-based approaches and related modalities are applied only in the education sector. On average, 13 percent of donor missions were undertaken jointly. In country analytic work, collective efforts were more common, covering approximately half of all country analysis undertaken.

The patterns in providing technical assistance still have to be clarified to ensure that it is provided on a demand-driven basis and according to the country’s needs. Some donors are cautious with the GBS because it is politically vulnerable. They believe donor governments are less likely to cancel funding to sectoral activities than to GBS. This concern was also highlighted in the evaluation of GBS in Rwanda.34

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This section summarizes Rwandan priorities and key programmes and UNDP contributions to Rwandan achievements in the five areas of focus for UNDP support: the MDGs and poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, responding to HIV/AIDS, and environment and energy. UNDP support in each area is outlined and the results of this support are analyzed.

3.1 ACHIEVING THE MDGs AND REDUCING POVERTY

3.1.1 RWANDAN PRIORITIES IN ACHIEVING MDGs AND REDUCING POVERTY

Rwanda’s Vision 2020 aims to transform the country from a low-income to a middle-income country by 2020. It defines the following six pillars for development:

- Reconstruction of the nation and its social capital
- Transformation of agriculture
- Development of an efficient private sector
- Comprehensive human resources development
- Infrastructural development
- Promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation

Rwanda’s first PRSP (2002-2005) was very much in line with their Vision 2020. Through stakeholder consultations, it identified six broad priority areas. Ranked in descending order of importance, these were: rural development and agricultural transformation, human development, economic infrastructure, governance, private sector development, and institutional capacity building.

In formulating both these policies, the GoR has emphasized the MDGs. The MDGs have been perceived as serving the same purpose as Vision 2020 and sometimes even as a subset of the Vision 2020 objectives.

An independent evaluation of the PRSP 2002-2005 found the PRSP to be relevant to Rwanda’s development needs, although its treatment of poverty issues could have been more comprehensive. Stakeholders appreciated the transparency of the PRS preparation process, although the process could have been more participatory while still ensuring ownership by MINECOFIN. Stakeholders also valued the public sector reforms called for in the PRS although lack of capacity limited their implementation. The absence of reliable monitoring data made it difficult not only to assess impacts but also to adjust policies in an effective and sustainable manner.35

A second-generation PRS—the EDPRS—was prepared following the evaluation mission. The EDPRS is the medium-term overall policy framework for 2008-2012. It will draw on Vision 2020 and the MDGs and be complementary with the Long-term Investment Framework/Plan. Sectoral policies and strategies will be synchronized with the EDPRS. Key elements of the EPPRS are:

- A public investment programme aimed at systematically reducing the operational costs of business and increasing national capacities to innovate and strengthen the financial sector
- Various measures to “release the productive capacity of the poor in rural areas,” such as public works, promotion of cooperatives, credit packages and direct support

“Building on Rwanda’s reputation for a low incidence of corruption” and a regional comparative advantage in soft infrastructure

The EDPRS is to be implemented through government investments intended “to maintain momentum in the social sectors, education, health and water and sanitation while also targeting agriculture, transport, information and communication technology, energy, housing and urban development, good governance and rule of law, proper land use management and environmental protection.”

The GoR, with UNDP support, prepared an MDG Status Report in 2003 analyzing the likelihood that Rwanda would achieve the MDGs by the target year of 2015. The report was valuable to policy debate and was used in the preparatory process for the EDPRS.

A ‘Preliminary Poverty Update Report’ was published in December 2006 presenting findings of the second Integrated Living Conditions Survey conducted in 2005-2006. Data from this survey was to greatly facilitate the preparation of the 2007 MDG Status Report (published after this evaluation took place). While the survey did not monitor all the PRSP or MDG parameters, a comparison of the results of the second Integrated Household Survey on Living Conditions with those of the first (conducted in 2000-2001), allowed analysis of changes in Rwandan development indicators. The two surveys interviewed approximately 6,900 and 6,400 households respectively and provided nationally representative estimates. They revealed the following changes over this period:

- Consumption per capita grew in real terms an average of 3.0 percent per year.
- The percentage of population living in poverty declined from 60.4 to 56.9 percent.
- The number of Rwandans living in poverty increased from 4.8 million to 5.4 million.
- Inequality has increased: The Gini coefficient increased from 0.47 to 0.51.
- Primary school enrolment increased from 74 to 86 percent.
- Secondary school net enrolment increased from 7 to 10 percent.
- The number of households with access to safe drinking water remained unchanged at 64 percent.
- The percentage of adult workers employed mostly in agriculture fell from 88 to 80 percent.
- The proportion of households owning livestock increased from 60 to 71 percent.
- The share of agricultural households using chemical fertilizers increased from 5 to 11 percent.

3.1.1 UNDP RWANDA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO ACHIEVING MDGs AND REDUCING POVERTY

UNDP linked its interventions related to achievement of MDGs and reduction of poverty through a focus on two development outcomes:

- “Ministry of Finance able to effectively monitor poverty trends and formulate policies, strategies and plans to address poverty in Rwanda.”
- “National Human Development Report (NHDR) prepared addressing national priority issues.”

At the UNDP country office, the Strategic Planning and Economic Management Unit is in charge of these outcomes. Its most important partner institution has been MINECOFIN,
though projects have also been implemented through the Ministry of Commerce (MINICOM), the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) and the Rwandan Secretariat of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

UNDP strategic collaboration with MINECOFIN started in the mid-1990s and continued into this decade with a series of projects that provide complementary forms of support:

- The ‘Formulation of National Poverty Strategy’ Project (1999-2005), with a budget of $914,223 for the period, was financed through TRAC funding and was managed by the UNDP with direct execution modality.
- The ‘Support to Poverty Reduction Strategy Implementation and Aid Coordination’ Project (2002-2005) with a budget of $1,199,689 from TRAC was implemented by MINECOFIN.
- The ‘Interim Support Project to MINECOFIN Capacity Building Initiatives 2005’ received $734,835 from TRAC and was implemented by MINECOFIN. This project was a bridging phase between preceding and subsequent projects.
- The ‘Implementation of the Strategic Development Plan and Establishment of a SWAP [Sector Wide Approach] for Economic Governance’ Project (2006-2008) has a budget of $6,130,709 co-financed by UNDP-TRAC (19.6 percent), Department for International Development (DFID) (71.9 percent) and the European Commission (8.5 percent). It is implemented by MINECOFIN. The project focuses on capacity building. Comprehensive technical assistance and training are delivered in all main areas of MINECOFIN, with an emphasis in skills transfer. The ultimate goal of the project is to support establishment of a Sector-Wide Approach Programme to donor support for economic governance allowing for a merging of the two basket funds within MINECOFIN currently financed by different development partners.

Only the ‘Support to Poverty Reduction Strategy Implementation and Aid Coordination’ project has been evaluated. The evaluation report published in May 2005 concludes that the project was relevant, fairly efficient, had positive impacts, and was relatively sustainable, thanks to investments in capacity development.

In addition to the projects mentioned above, UNDP supported MINECOFIN through ‘Support to Rwanda’s Special Initiatives for Poverty Reduction’ Project with a budget of $785,000 from UNDP-TRAC funds for years 2005-2006. The project consisted mainly of contributions to the organization of the Sixth African Governance Forum, organized in Kigali in May 2006 and preparation of the NHDR still underway.

The ‘Support to the National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda’ Project will be financed by a UNDP managed basket fund. Its $11.5 million budget is provided by DFID, European Commission and the World Bank. The project is expected to start in 2007 and will last three years. The project will assist in developing and strengthening a permanent statistical capacity in Rwanda. Until recently, most of the activities in this field have been donor-driven, ad hoc systems.

The ‘MINICOM Capacity Building Project’ launched in September 2006 with a duration of two years and a budget of $545,885 is financed by United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and implemented by MINICOM. Its objective is to promote Rwanda’s participation in global and regional markets. For this purpose, it has carried out the Diagnostic Integrated Trade Study. Main components relate to capacity building through studies, training and technical assistance.

‘Support to the Implementation of the Rwanda TOKTEN [Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals] Volunteer Programme’ is being implemented by the Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) with a budget for the period 2005-2007 of $307,500, of which half is UNDP-TRAC funds and the other half
from the Government of Japan. The project aims to use capacities of Rwandan professionals living in diaspora, mainly in North America. So far, it has organized two-month assignments for 28 individuals. According to the Ministry, the project has had very positive results and its main challenge is the financial sustainability.

The ‘Support to MININFRA in ICT [Information and Communications Technology] Policy and e-Government’ project had a budget of $545,885 for the period 2005-2006, financed from UNDP-TRAC funds. MINIFRA implemented the project. The project had three components: preparation of a national ICT plan, participation in the world ICT summit, and creation of an information kiosk for rural areas. The Ministry is exploring the possibility of a new phase, focusing more on implementation issues. While there is no monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information to assess the project’s impact, MININFRA looks upon it very positively. Limitations in funding and project management skills were seen as the main challenges.

The ‘Support to the Implementation of NEPAD Programme in Rwanda’ project covers the years 2005-2007 and has a budget of $2,426,050 co-financed by UNDP-TRAC and DFID. The project is conceived to strengthen the Rwandan Secretariat of the NEPAD. Its main achievement has been to contribute to the African Peer Review Mechanism that reviewed Rwanda’s performance and published its report in 2006. The purpose of the Peer Review Mechanism is to identify African best practices for mutual learning, identify governance gaps, and propose an action plan and timeline to bridge gaps. The outcomes of the Rwanda African Peer Review Mechanism have been key inputs into the development of Rwanda’s EDPRS, currently underway.

There is clear recognition of UNDP contribution to the socio-economic development of Rwanda at various levels in the GoR. The most frequently cited areas of achievement are capacity building (material inputs, training and studies) and aid coordination. GoR appreciates not only UNDP outcomes but also its modus operandi. UNDP is said to be flexible and responsive to the government’s needs and its operations are well aligned with government policies. According to many GoR officials, UNDP stands out from other donors in this respect.

A number of partners expressed concerns regarding UNDP operations, including the proliferation of small projects with limited budgets that are often difficult to ascertain. Partners also reported finding UNDP administrative procedures complicated and bureaucratic, with relatively high transaction costs. The respective roles and responsibilities of different UN organizations were not always clear and this also created confusion for some partners. UNDP does not always make optimal use of its technical advisory capacities, because much time must be devoted to project management tasks.

In summary, UNDP capacity development results with MINECOFIN have been significant. Some capacity building initiatives (such as the TOKTEN project) have even been innovative. UNDP support to MININFRA from 2005-2007 to formulate a National Information and Communications Infrastructure plan and e-Government Programme constitutes important groundwork, though its effects to date are still difficult to assess.

In general, field-level interventions by the UNDP have not been evaluated enough and there is little collection of evidence on the impact of UNDP interventions among local populations. Information available to the evaluation suggests that UNDP interventions are relevant, but their impact is limited in quantitative terms.

The UNDP project portfolio is increasingly moving ‘upstream’, towards supporting central and regional level government institutions. This means that the impact among local populations is becoming indirect and even more difficult to assess. According to various non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, including the Rwandan Association of Local Government...
Authorities, UNDP support at the local level is not seen much because UNDP mainly works through central government.

Overall support to MINECOFIN is one of UNDP’s largest interventions in Rwanda. The Ministry appreciates the comprehensiveness of this support and considers UNDP activities adequate in relation to GoR priorities. As the bulk of inputs are in training and technical assistance, sustainability of its effects should be a primary concern.

3.1.3 UNDP RWANDA AND THE MDGs

There has been an informal alignment between UNDP strategy and the MDGs that has been expressed in various plans over the years. Nevertheless, the mid-term review of the UNDP CCF in 2004 found that CCF for 2002-2006 makes no specific mention of the MDGs, despite the fact that UNDP and the UN system are required to contribute to their attainment and report on progress towards reaching them.

UNDP prepared the MDG Status Report of 2003 together with the GoR. Its publication generated much publicity and has helped raise national awareness of the MDGs. Since then, the MDGs have been present in the development dialogue but not always in a systematic and organized manner. While the MDGs are commonly perceived in Rwanda as universal goals, some interlocutors questioned the significance of their role in the GoR’s development strategy. The MDGs emphasize the social sectors, while official development policy in Rwanda stresses economic growth. Key government documents, such as Vision 2020 and the Long-term Investment Framework/Plan, emphasize economic factors much more than the MDGs do. Concerns were also expressed regarding the high costs of attaining the MDGs.

A new MDG follow-up report was prepared following the evaluation teams visit. UNDP has made a valuable contribution to this MDG analysis by managing the basket fund that supports the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda.

Annex D assesses factors affecting Rwanda’s attainment of development outcomes related to the MDGs and poverty reduction. These outcomes projected by UNDP are fairly narrow in scope and their attainment does not necessarily translate into poverty reduction if other key conditions, such as economic growth and pro-poor spending, are not also met. The first targeted outcome—related to monitoring poverty trends and formulating policies, strategies and programmes to address them—has been largely completed. UNDP has made a significant contribution to this outcome. The second outcome—preparation of the NHDR—has not been fully achieved as the end product has not been published on schedule. The most recent Rwanda NHDR available at the time of the evaluation dated from 1999. A new NHDR was subsequently published during 2007.

3.2 FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

3.2.1 RWANDA’S KEY PRIORITIES IN FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

In the aftermath of the horrific events of 1994, reform and modernization of public administration became a central concern. Since then, the GoR has undertaken a number of measures to address key issues such as the country’s institutional and legal framework and human resource requirements. An abiding difficulty has been severe capacity deficiencies—manifested in practically all sectors and levels of public administration. Consequently, capacity development has become a key theme in virtually all public-sector initiatives. The GoR has undertaken several initiatives, and numerous donors have supported them through different interventions. During the evaluation period, capacity development for good governance has been a central element in the UNDP programme portfolio.

Governance issues have been a key element of the GoR agenda since the 1990s. They are defined as priorities in both Rwanda’s Vision 2020 and the 2002-2005 PRSP. Among governance issues, decentralization is seen as a strategic approach for enhancing public service delivery and
reducing poverty. With this purpose, the government adopted a policy of decentralization in 2000. Originally, it was conceived for a period of 15 years and was to be implemented in three consecutive phases: institutional set-up from 2000 to 2003, consolidation from 2004 to 2008, and optimization from 2009 to 2015. As a result of resource and capacity problems among the decentralized structures, the implementation schedule was revised: a first phase from 2001-2005 was devoted to decentralization of general administration, a second phase from 2006-2011 focuses on decentralization of sectoral services to the district level and local tax collection, and a third phase in 2012-2018 will consolidate and strengthen capacities at the local level.

A general institutional framework for the implementation of decentralization was created in the first phase. The MINALOC and its Decentralization Management Unit were assigned as the executors of the process. A Common Development Fund was established to finance development investments of the decentralized entities and to channel donor funding for this purpose. The Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities was created to represent the interests of the districts. MINECOFIN has since become more active in the current phase of the decentralization. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Unit of MINECOFIN coordinates local taxation. It channels 5 percent of the national budget to the districts and transfers funds earmarked for the districts.

Rwanda’s decentralization policy is delivered through the Decentralization Implementation Programme. Several donors financed it, and UNDP has had a key role in its management and capacity development. The approach of the Decentralization Implementation Programme, sometimes seen as too centralized and supply-driven, is being reviewed. It is now viewed as one element of a broader Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework that includes other actions for the years 2007-2011. The Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework has strong links with the EDPRS.

A self-evaluation during the EDPRS preparatory work identified the following achievements of the first phase of decentralization:

- Laws and policies have been elaborated relating to elections, administrative functions, community development, and fiscal and financial decentralization.
- Administrative and financial management structures and procedures have been put in place.
- Local elections are held regularly.
- The establishment of the Common Development Fund has facilitated the financing of several local government initiatives. Districts are now regularly preparing project proposals for submission to the Fund.
- Donor confidence is being gained through the establishment of a structure targeting the coordination of the decentralization process.
- The Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities is ensuring advocacy and lobbying.
- Districts have been regularly preparing their annual budgets.
- Fiscal and financial decentralization policy and transfers have been introduced to progressively match the increase in district responsibilities.39

However, according to the same source, important challenges remain, including:

- Low fiscal potential in local governments
- Weak financial potential and revenues
- Poor service delivery
- Weak institutional coordination
- Un-coordinated and un-harmonized financial support

The decentralization process is a work in progress. While partners acknowledge that decentralization per se is appropriate, they also agree it needs careful follow up to ensure the desired results. Newly appointed administrators in districts and at other levels need sufficient support and time to ensure effective delivery of services as required.

3.2.2 UNDP KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

UNDP interventions in fostering democratic governance have been designed to contribute to the following outcomes in Rwanda:

- “Legal and institutional frameworks that enable free, fair, transparent and sustainable elections at all levels in place”
- “Local governments able to assume their responsibilities in Planning and Service Delivery and the Ministry of Local Government able to provide effective oversight and guidance for the decentralization process in Rwanda”
- “Rwanda’s public service reform programme effectively implemented for greater public sector efficiency and Parliament able to realize the representative and oversight duties of elected members”40

3.2.3 UNDP SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (MINALOC)

The Governance Unit of the UNDP country office, together with various government institutions, has implemented a number of projects and programmes to support these outcomes. Collaboration with MINALOC started in 2000 and has included the following projects:

The ‘Support to Decentralization’ project was implemented in 2000-2004 with a UNDP-TRAC funded budget of $806,685 combined with a Swiss trust fund of $388,000 and a Dutch trust fund of $1,797,825. The implementing agency was MINALOC.

The ‘Support to the Process of Peace, Decentralization and Poverty Reduction in Rwanda’ project was implemented by MINALOC in 2004 with a UNDP-TTF financed budget of $100,000. It was the preparatory phase of the ‘Support to Decentralization Implementation Programme (DIP-5)’, which will extend from 2005 to 2009. UNDP finances $1,000,000 of this project budget that includes other sources of funding, administered by other donor organizations.

The ‘Support to Decentralization and Community Development of Byumba’ project will continue from 2004 to 2008 with a total budget of $6,650,000 of which United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) finances 86 percent and UNDP-TRAC the remaining 14 percent.

3.2.4 UNDP SUPPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND LABOUR (MIFOTRA)

MIFOTRA implemented the ‘Support to Public Service Reform’ project from 2000 to 2004 with a UNDP-TRAC budget of $903,000 and a trust fund of the Netherlands of $1,850,300. Projects components included modernization of government operations and methods, organizational restructuring of the government, and institutional strengthening and capacity building. A key area was strengthening the capacity of the Rwanda Institute of Administration and Management to design and deliver high-quality training to civil servants in all facets of public management. The same Ministry implemented ‘Support to Public Administration’ in 2005-2006 with a total budget of $400,000 financed by UNDP-TRAC.

3.2.5 UNDP SUPPORT FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT PARTNERS

The ‘Technical Assistance for 2003 Elections’ project was implemented by the National Electoral

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Commission and financed by a UNDP-managed basket fund. Its budget of $4,676,874 was funded by the European Commission (46 percent), DFID (22 percent), Belgium (12 percent), UNDP-TRAC (10 percent) and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) (10 percent under the title of General Elections Support).

The National Electoral Council also implemented a project of ‘Support to the 2006 Elections’ in 2005-2006 with a budget of $1,269,565 financed by DFID (68 percent) and UNDP-TRAC (32 percent).

The first phase of a project for ‘Good Governance for Poverty Reduction’ was financed in 2003-2005 by a Norwegian trust fund of $1,295,750. It was implemented by the Parliament of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), Centre for Conflict Management of the University of Rwanda, and the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST). A second phase in 2005-2007 with a budget of $1,065,410 is financed by NORAD and UNDP-TRAC and is directed to NURC (36 percent), the Parliament (50 percent) and the Women Parliamentarians (14 percent).

A project of ‘Capacity Building for the Ombudsman Office’ in 2007-2008 has a budget of $350,000 financed by United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF). At the writing of this report, the project had not yet started its operations.

Lack of systematic monitoring, largely due to an absence of related systems and mechanisms, makes it difficult to confirm how well outputs may have contributed to outcomes in these projects. Only a few projects have been evaluated according to normal standards of the project cycle management.

3.2.6 UNDP SUPPORT FOR JUDICIARY REFORM

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s judiciary was faced with an alarming lack of competent human resources, equipment and infrastructure. The subsequent reform of the judiciary has been guided by the principle that a functional justice sector is essential for the establishment of good governance and democracy, as well as for long-term peace and political stability. A sound judicial system was also seen as a central building block for economic development and poverty reduction. The government’s main objective has been to set up a judicial system that supports good governance and development, where laws are properly enacted and applied by an objective and independent judiciary that enforces sanctions to prevent and punish violations and to fight against genocidal ideology, while ensuring respect for the law and citizens’ rights.

Reforms in the legal sector have ranged from constitutional review to review of existing legal institutions and creation of new ones. These reforms were conceived and owned by the government of Rwanda. The reform has seen the promulgation of legislation that established new courts, procedures, structures and standards including, academic and professional qualifications as well as regulatory and administrative frameworks.

UNDP support to the justice sector emphasized improved access to justice for the poor and strengthening the capacities of various national and local institutions to deliver justice. As co-chair of the Justice Sector Coordinating Group, UNDP supported MINIJUST to develop their harmonization agenda for the justice sector, which brings together other government institutions, development partners and civil society organizations in the areas of justice, human rights, reconciliation and law and order for the purposes of exchanging information and harmonizing efforts. Further support included:

- For the Supreme Court, supporting the development of a strategic plan for the court, rehabilitating 70 provincial and district court houses, sponsoring comparative study tours abroad for judges of the Supreme Court and District Courts, and providing of transports to judges to travel to provincial and districts courts to dispense judgement.
- For MINIJUST, training civil servants from different ministries working in legislative
departments in drafting legislation, training MINJUST staff in basic ICT applications, and elaborating a Legal Assistance Strategy in collaboration with MINJUST in line with the Access to the Poor programme.

- Support to the National Human Rights Commission (discussed in the following section).

Key Rwandan results that UNDP has contributed towards include:

- Rwanda now has a functioning Supreme Court, a High Court, the courts of Grand Instance and the courts of Lower Instance. Judges and registrars staff these courts.
- Appointment in the judiciary is transparent and goes through several processes to ensure competence in the delivery of justice and protection of human rights.
- An estimated 99 percent of legal staff is qualified—compared with the 5 percent level of qualified staff in 1995.
- Provincial and district courts have been rebuilt and equipped. Judges and magistrates have been trained. At the time of the evaluation, it was not possible to establish whether the numbers of newly trained judges are sufficient to handle the number of court cases, especially at the district and provincial levels.

All officials consulted believe that UNDP support to the justice sector has had a very positive impact. Training provided to judges, magistrates and court bailiffs has immensely enhanced their ability to perform and has improved their self-esteem. Though no figures were available, it was reported that service delivery has improved and the rebuilding of the courthouses and provision of equipment has motivated the judges, magistrates and other staff members. These activities have given credibility to the system by providing accessible justice to the poor who could not otherwise afford to travel to access justice or to defend themselves.

In this support to the justice system, UNDP responded to one of the government’s most critical priorities. The view of all interviewed was that UNDP has been a valuable partner in the process, responding in a timely manner, exercising flexibility and responding in a demand-driven fashion.

Despite the good relationship between GoR officials and UNDP, there were also consistent complaints about inadequate resources and failure to inform the government in a timely manner about the availability of funds. Country office difficulties with fund mobilization can impede their ability to inform their government counterparts of the exact funds available at the time of project planning. This diminishes the government’s ability to make medium and long-term plans, while increasing their reliance on short-term planning. The GoR made it clear they would like to see UNDP exercise greater transparency in this respect.

3.2.7 UNDP SUPPORT FOR DECENTRALIZATION

UNDP support to decentralization started in 2000 when the GoR first adopted its decentralization policy. This support has continued through various phases and is one of the largest interventions of the UNDP’s Governance Unit. MINALOC appreciates this support and is keen to ensure it will continue when the decentralization strategy enters its third phase in 2012.

In many ways, the second phase of Rwanda’s decentralization programme, which is now taking place, will be the test of the whole policy. This new phase will be wider in scope, involving many more actors than the first phase. It aims to mobilize resources and services and target them directly to local governments and communities. In this context, the outcomes of UNDP support are likely to mature slowly and depend on a number of factors, such as capacities at sub-national levels, allocation of resources to local governments and communities, relevance of district and local development plans vis-a-vis needs and priorities of the populations, as well as complementarity with other funding sources.

Decentralization of the line ministries is a particularly challenging dimension of the overall
decentralization process. Fiscal decentralization, in particular, poses challenges but some progress has been noted. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture has decided to channel 30 percent of its budget through district administrations. However, effective coordination of the decentralization process will likely require a more exact definition of the respective roles of MINALOC and MINECOFIN.

### 3.2.8 UNDP SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS IN 2003 AND 2006

UNDP was instrumental in supporting the national elections in 2003 and municipal elections in 2006. The National Electoral Commission hopes that this UNDP support will continue through the parliamentary elections in 2008 and presidential elections in 2010. Concerns were expressed to the evaluation team by different partners involved in the election process regarding limitations on the involvement of political parties and in technical aspects of the elections, yet both elections were considered to have been reasonably fair and transparent overall.

The National Electoral Commission considers UNDP support vital in strengthening democracy in Rwanda. This support started through a UNDP-managed basket fund for the 2003 elections. UNDP was criticized by some basket fund contributors, who deemed UNDP accounting and reporting to have been insufficient and slow. According to UNDP, the problem was mostly a technical one, because the accounting system did not track the use of the individual contributions of different donors. The development partners’ concerns at that time reduced the scope of a similar basket fund used to support the 2006 elections.

### 3.2.9 UNDP SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM

The outcome of UNDP support to public sector reform appears to have been modest. There is a need to more precisely define the scope of this support. The Mid-Term Review of the UNDP support for public sector reform with MIFOTRA\(^\text{41}\) concluded that:

- The Rwanda Institute of Administration and Management’s institutional capacity is better than at the beginning of the project, but it is still not professionally and financially sustainable nor does it consistently deliver high quality programmes.
- The managerial skills of almost 900 Rwandan civil servants have been upgraded but only to the extent that they attended training programmes. No assessment has been made about the learning and capability enhancement that may have taken place.
- A common management culture in the Rwandan Public Service is far from evident and civil service reforms are yet to trickle down to the district level, though the project has helped establish a legal basis for decentralization and prepare a plan for internal organizational structures for agencies at the central level.

The Mid-Term Review found both positive and negative unintended results. There is no evidence of how the lessons from this review have been taken into account.

Most GoR stakeholders, such as MIFOTRA, give UNDP credit for its capacity building. MIFOTRA sees UNDP as the first donor in this area, characterizing UNDP support as having been ‘permanent’ whereas other donor contributions were ‘periodic’.

Technical assistance has been a major input in several projects. In many cases, skills transfer has not been sufficiently emphasized and the outputs produced by consultants have not led to sustainable increases in institutional capacities. Some development partners consider that UNDP advisory capacity has not always been adequate. According to them, some of their UNDP advisors in decentralization have not had sufficient experience or expertise in the issues they dealt with.

3.2.10 UNDP SUPPORT FOR DECENTRALIZED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

UNDP support for decentralization and community development in Byumba addresses needs and priorities of the target groups at the local level. The district administration of Gicumbi appreciated the support from UNDP. It believes that family incomes have increased, district tax income has increased, capacities have been improved, and administrative systems are stronger. The financial support channelled through District Development Plans not only contributes to local investment but also strengthens management systems and increases local ownership of the actions. The Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities stressed the importance of supporting local governments through finance for their own development plans, which is the strategy of the project in Gicumbi/Rulindo. The micro-projects at the community level have improved cattle breeding, stoves, road construction, repair and maintenance of terraces and water supplies.

GoR partners appreciate the responsiveness and flexibility of UNDP programmes. Their relevance has been enhanced through the participatory approach followed during project preparation. Normally, project ideas come from the government, and this ensures their relevance to the GoR. They are then analyzed with stakeholders to make sure they match the strategic objectives of all parties. Most of the target groups within the government perceive UNDP programmes as highly relevant.

3.2.11 CONCERNS REGARDING UNDP SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

There is a general appreciation that UNDP has made major contributions in capacity building (e.g. at MIFOTRA). The Supreme Court estimates that people’s confidence in justice has improved as a result. However, some criticize that capacity development activities have been excessively focused on training, carried out in a scattered fashion, use a high number of external consultants, and do not always have a lasting effect. Some critics recognize that, in many cases, the problem may have been in the Rwandan government’s limited capacity to absorb capacity development support.

Sustainability issues receive little attention in UNDP supported interventions. The national execution modality mechanism is expected to promote national ownership and sustainability but, in practice, this does not always occur. Only a subset of the few available project evaluations have explicitly dealt with sustainability.

In certain areas, the capacity building for decentralization is not yet sustainable. In the Gicumbi project, for example, the District administration is assisted by a project coordination unit. If the latter disappeared, the District would have difficulty managing a direct relationship with the donors.

While capacity development is identified as a priority area of focus, capacity deficiencies at all levels of Rwandan administration diminish the impact of UNDP contributions.

While most current UNDP projects are managed through the national execution modality mechanism, they are not entirely integrated into the GoR administrative structures. Virtually every project has a technical secretariat or project management unit in charge of its administration, and the capacities of beneficiary institutions remains a major challenge. Skills transfer occurs to a limited degree, and it is not systematically included in the terms of reference of all the technical assistance. Financial sustainability is weak in almost every intervention as GoR activities continue to be highly dependant on donor funding.

Capacity building efforts could have a positive impact on sustainability, but this is not guaranteed. Excessive focus on training and consultancies, often with little attention paid to institutional and organizational development issues, may diminish the impact of capacity development activities. This may be the case in projects such as ‘Support to MINECOFIN’ and the ‘MINICOM
Capacity Building Project. The final evaluation of the ‘Support to Poverty Reduction Strategy Implementation and Aid Coordination’ Project in 2005 concluded that the project’s results and impact were seriously compromised because of dependence on over-paid local technical assistance and lack of stability in human resources. Considering the high proportion of technical assistance in other projects, it is possible that this problem is widespread.

In summary, UNDP’s disparate contributions in this area have been correctly directed and GoR stakeholders consider them particularly relevant. The effects of UNDP contributions have not yet materialized fully due to a number of strategic and administrative difficulties. The attainment of outcomes has been partially satisfactory. Factors that influence the attainment of UNDP contributions to expected development outcomes in the area of democratic governance are presented in Annex D.

3.3 CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

Rwanda’s devastation in 1994 was intimately linked with governance. The Rwandan system of government has historically been highly centralized, undemocratic and characterized by:

- The exclusion of the majority of the population from decision-making processes that concern their lives and livelihoods
- The accumulation of political and economic power in the centre
- The concentration of power in one person at local and national levels
- The absence of transparency and accountability
- Passivity, lack of initiative and dependency among the majority of the population, due to the excessive centralization of power and exclusion from participation
- Little participation by women or youth in the running of political, economic and administrative affairs

The post genocide government of Rwanda has resolved to address these issues. Its efforts to promote good governance through decentralization and democratization, for example, are seen as means to reconcile the Rwandan people while fighting poverty.

3.3.1 RWANDA’S PRIORITIES FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY

The government has enacted reforms and established institutions to help prevent future crises. Measures have included improvement of the justice system in the country through establishment of the Gacaca courts, as well as establishment of the Commission of Human Rights and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.

3.3.2 GACACA COURTS

The Gacaca courts are believed to be solving more cases than the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the ordinary courts in the country. The Gacaca jurisdiction was established with support from various partners, with UNDP support starting in 2005. The Gacaca judicial system is a modified form of traditional justice being applied to suit the current situation facing Rwandan society. Gacaca courts are modelled on traditional dispute settlement methods used by Rwandans in the past.

After the genocide, the government of Rwanda was faced with more than 120,000 genocide suspects in detention, crowded into prisons that had been built to house about a quarter of that number; the prisons did not have adequate space or sanitation facilities. At the same time, the judicial system was in disarray with a considerable number of lawyers killed and others having fled the country during the genocide. One study noted that, at the pace cases were moving in the classical judiciary in Rwanda, “it would take at least a hundred years to try all suspects.”

42 Ballabola, Stella, ‘Perceptions about the Gacaca Law in Rwanda,’ Centre for Conflict Management, Butare, Rwanda.
Another way was needed for dealing with these cases, plus there was a desire to allow communities affected by the genocide to actively participate in the justice process. This gave birth to the Gacaca judicial system. It is supposed to speed up the process of justice and combine two elements in a way that they are not usually combined in the formal judicial system: punitive measures and reconciliation. While the highest priority genocide suspects are still tried by the classic judicial system, the Gacaca system tries others accused of lesser crimes. Gacaca emphasizes community participation, revealing the truth, confession and seeking forgiveness. The Gacaca tribunals are therefore seen as a community-level truth and reconciliation process that enhance unity at local and national levels. They have also sped up the process of bringing genocide suspects to justice. Gacaca, as it was conceived, represented a potentially effective means of dealing with the tremendous backlog of cases.

### 3.3.3 UNDP SUPPORT TO GACACA COURTS

UNDP support to the National Secretariat for the Gacaca Jurisdictions has involved:

- Training and sensitization for Gacaca judges on various new laws
- Training on the use of an electronic data collection system, the ‘Village Area Network’, with the objective of collecting and disseminating information from trials throughout the country

In light of concerns raised prior to, during and after the evaluation mission, UNDP may want to conduct an independent assessment of the effectiveness of its support to Gacaca and examine the possibility of providing support to the GoR to rectify some of the issues that have been raised. Concerns that have been identified include, *inter alia*, the fairness of the proceedings, the objectivity and consistency of sentencing, the extent to which the process contributes to reconciliation, the adequacy of witness protection, the level of public motivation, and allegations of complicity of Gacaca judges in the genocide. If such anomalies exist, then they could lead to a perception that UNDP Rwanda support is contributing to a miscarriage of justice rather than its strengthening.

### 3.3.4 NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (NURC)

NURC was established to deal with conflict within Rwandan society and to lead national efforts to promote the unity and reconciliation that are considered essential for sustainable human development and lasting peace. The civil war and genocide vastly increased mistrust and divisions in Rwandan society. Many victims of genocide now live in the same area as the perpetrators and suspected perpetrators of genocide and do not trust them. The GoR realized that a national unity dialogue had to be encouraged in Rwanda’s communities. Thus NURC was established and tasked with the responsibility to promote dialogue among Rwandan society. Its mandate includes:

- Prepare and coordinate the national programme for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation.
- Develop and enact ways to restore and consolidate unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.
- Educate and mobilize the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation.
- Carry out research, organize debates, disseminate ideas and make publications relating to peace, national unity and reconciliation.
- Make proposals on measures that can eradicate divisions among Rwandans and reinforce national unity and reconciliation.
- Denounce and fight against acts, writings, and utterances that promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia.

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Produce an annual report, and other reports as necessary, on the situation of national unity and reconciliation.

After the recovery phase, reconciliation is now a key feature of the GoR's agenda. All national institutions are required to include reconciliation activities in their strategies and development plans. Peace and reconciliation are now integrated in most sector policies.

NURC has participated in the poverty assessment process to mainstream reconciliation and unity in the EDPRS. The process has helped to sharpen stakeholders’ focus on linkages between the different challenges faced by the country and to build consensus about the strategies and actions needed and how to monitor and evaluate their results. NURC has also been involved in integrating returning refugees. Between 1999 and 2000, NURC integrated 300,000 orphans with extended families and well-wishers country-wide. The integration of orphans is a means to advance unity and reconciliation, as many of the children had no direct surviving relatives.

NURC also closely monitors Gacaca courts. It has organized meetings between released perpetrators, including released prisoners, and survivors. It has also hosted national summits on unity and reconciliation. Community-based reconciliation associations are being created and supported. It is also developing a new history curriculum for schools together with the National Museum of Rwanda and the National University of Rwanda and other stakeholders.

**3.3.5 UNDP SUPPORT TO NURC**

UNDP has helped NURC organize successful training programmes, seminars and workshops aimed at promoting unity and reconciliation. The Evaluation and Assessment of NURC recommends that NURC provide more direct support to practical activities that promote coexistence and shared values to guarantee better results, such as community-based income generating activities, community-based reconciliation associations, clubs and support groups. NURC has invested substantially in seminars and consultations. While these are useful, it is not easy to measure their impact and it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the ideas discussed are internalized, applied or adapted.

The evaluation further recommends that more effort be made to involve young people in the reconciliation agenda, to empower them to shape it and to become peace managers in their own right.

The evaluation report questioned the sustainability of the results of current programmes. UNDP must help NURC enhance the sustainability and broader ownership of support for unity and reconciliation. In other words, support needs to extend beyond seminars.

UNDP is now supporting NURC to ensure appropriate and effective integration of peace and reconciliation in the EDPRS 2008-2012. The project is meant to raise awareness of the role of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda's development and foster a common understanding on key issues.

**3.3.6 RWANDAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (RHRC)**

The Rwandan Human Rights Commission (RHRC) was established by law in 1999 with a mandate to ensure that all citizens of Rwanda enjoy their fundamental human rights as described in the constitution. The Commission is tasked with sensitization of Rwandans about their rights to justice. It receives complaints from the population and investigates breaches of law, then takes necessary action. It also monitors issues related to good governance like the Gacaca judiciary, among other things.

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From this evaluation, it is clear that RHRC has achieved much and its capacity has improved immensely. It has created widespread awareness of human rights issues in the country largely through seminars and consultations at different levels and offices at provincial and district levels. However, despite these achievements, RHRC needs to be further strengthened.

3.3.7 UNDP SUPPORT TO RHRC

UNDP has helped the RHRC efficiently promote and protect human rights in line with the UN Paris Principles for establishing National Human Rights Institutions. The objective of this support was to increase the capacity of a national system to promote and protect human rights by creating a coordination framework for human rights activities in the country, in collaboration with civil society organizations and development partners. The objective of this coordination was to provide a mechanism for dialogue and exchange of information and to develop synergy in joint promotional activities. Joint activities have included capacity building, UN Treaty Body reporting, human rights awareness campaigns, elaboration of a National Human Rights Action Plan, and mobilization of funds. UNDP is represented in a committee mandated by the broader Coordination Framework to encourage the coordination and harmonization agenda.

The most recent UN support to the RHRC was implemented under an agreement between the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights and UNDP Rwanda in 2002-2003. UNDP acted as the in-country implementing agency for the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). This project was followed with two other projects that were implemented jointly by Office of the High Commission and UNDP.

An evaluation\(^46\) of the first phase of the project criticized the project for being too ambitious in scope. The evaluation noted RHRC’s project management problems. It also found that a high turnover of project staff was adversely affecting project implementation, that the timeframe for project implementation was unrealistic, and that UNDP was unable to properly monitor its implementation. Finally, it commented on UNDP inability to mobilize resources for the project, which caused a shortfall in the funding of the project. These critiques were taken into consideration in designing the second and third phases of support.

In summary, UNDP results in this challenging, critical area have been mixed. Its activities are not without risk and these risks need to be carefully assessed. Nevertheless, it is also one of the areas where a neutral UN organization like UNDP has its greatest comparative advantage. UNDP could usefully continue to help the GoR address ongoing challenges related to the promotion and protection of human rights. This could be done, for example, with support for proactive campaigns to promote human rights and support for human rights protection mechanisms. Similarly, UNDP could play a valuable role in helping RHRC develop its partnerships with civil society and programmes of support to other actors such as the media, police, judiciary, military and prison services.

3.4 HIV/AIDS

3.4.1 RWANDA’S RESPONSE TO HIV/AIDS

In response to the regional pandemic, the government is implementing a multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS plan of action that involves various agencies from the private and public sectors and civil society. National AIDS control programmes include specific activities targeting persons infected with HIV or affected by HIV/AIDS, as well as high risk populations. The government’s strategy includes an aggressive programme of information, education and communication, testing and counselling, promotion of protective devices, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases, prevention of mother-to-child transmission, care

of people with HIV/AIDS, research and development, and regional collaboration in the campaign against HIV/AIDS.

3.4.2 UNDP SUPPORT TO HIV/AIDS

Since 2000, UNDP has supported the GoR in fighting HIV/AIDS. The evaluation of Rwanda’s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program found that UNDP supports activities that have been prioritized by the government and where UNDP has comparative advantages. These include:

- Establishment, equipment, capacity development and policy development support for the National AIDS Control Commission
- Support for decentralized HIV/AIDS responses at provincial, district, and local government levels
- Strengthening capacities of associations of HIV/AIDS infected or affected people
- Support for the elaboration of HIV/AIDS related policies and mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into EDPRS
- Coordination and development of partnerships, this included planning reporting, data analysis, mapping of interventions for the improvement of information systems, harmonization and standardization of trainings, coordination of the national response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and elaboration of a coordination mechanism
- Alleviation of socio-economic impact among HIV/AIDS infected people
- Support to civil society organizations (for example faith based organizations) in their response to HIV/AIDS

3.4.3 KEY RESULTS OF UNDP ENGAGEMENT IN HIV/AIDS

UNDP has made significant contributions to a number of outcomes, including moving HIV/AIDS from a health issue to a development issue. Although this shift was part of a global change, UNDP is credited with advocating and helping to mainstream the county’s response to the pandemic into the national development agenda. For example, it is now included in the EDPRS. Because HIV/AIDS deepens poverty and widens inequalities at every level, mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the PRS is a significant contribution. But there are also new risks. For example, the recent growth in external financial resources and resulting prominence of treatment enhance the danger that preventive approaches to combating the epidemic may receive less attention.

UNDP has also contributed to a greater commitment among partners towards promoting policies, strategies, structures and processes that shape the national response. The following outcomes stand out: changing national policies and strategic framework for managing HIV/AIDS; decentralizing HIV/AIDS institutions; and increasing the voice of civil society organizations and vulnerable groups in advocacy, participation and improving their socio-economic status through income generation activities.

The strong relationship UNDP enjoys with the government helped influence their approach to AIDS related governance issues.

Gender and HIV/AIDS are inextricably linked. Gender inequity is a key factor in the HIV/AIDS epidemics among women and young girls in particular. Several UNDP initiatives have positive influences on gender dynamics. It was difficult to establish the extent to which UNDP initiatives have influenced gender-related issues concerning HIV/AIDS, but there appears to be a lack of systematic attention to gender issues in the implementation of UNDP projects.

However some UNDP initiatives have promoted

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48 Discussions with local leaders in Butare, for example, revealed that while these projects cited impressive sounding results, there was clearly a lack of attention to gender issue. One project, for example, run by a local NGO supported by UNDP Rwanabubu, (Youth Association), did not have a single woman working on the project. This may have been an exception, but it created an impression that there is lack of attention to implementation of some of UNDP projects.
recognition of the roles and rights of women, of people living with HIV/AIDS and of civil society organizations in governance and in multi-sectoral responses.

In summary, total UNDP spending in this sector is not large in relation to needs and there is a lack of reliable data on results. Nevertheless a substantial portion of UNDP’s relatively modest core resources has been devoted to Rwanda’s HIV/AIDS response and additional funds have been mobilized from the African Development Bank. If UNDP remains active in this area, then it should develop a coherent approach to leveraging partners’ resources with the goal of achieving the scale of investment required if the various projects are to achieve their targeted outcomes. UNDP comparative advantage in this area vis-à-vis other UN organizations will also need to be more clearly elaborated.

3.5 ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

3.5.1 RWANDA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES

The reconstruction of post-war Rwanda’s capacity for environmental governance began with the creation of the Ministry of Land, Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources (MINITERE) in 1999. Much of MINITERE’s operational responsibilities have now been transferred to the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority, which has a mandate to oversee management of the country’s land, environment, water and forests. The Rwanda Environmental Management Authority has grown from an office of four people to several dozen staff in the past several years. However, it remains understaffed and under-skilled in relation to the country’s evolving needs and the emerging regulatory and policy framework.

Rwanda’s Vision 2020 strategy recognizes the imperative to ensure the environmental sustainability of development. This imperative did not emerge as clearly in the country’s first PRSP where environment was treated as a cross-cutting issue but marginalized de facto. During the first PRS, environmental issues were not priorities, for example, little analysis was done of the critical links between rural environmental degradation and rural poverty. As a result, environmental management received less than 1 percent of the government’s budget under the first PRSP.

However, environmental sustainability concerns are emerging more clearly in the succeeding strategy—the EDPRS that is currently being developed. Rwanda’s decision makers are more aware of the economic costs of different forms of environmental degradation, water and energy inefficient technologies, poor soil and water management, water pollution, etc. Environmental management has emerged as a real development issue for decision makers and, from the perspective of the MINITERE at least, increasing numbers of senior management understand the complex dynamic relationship between environmental degradation and economic performance.

There has been progress in capacity development, particularly with the creation of environmental and land use laws and regulations. The country also recently launched an ambitious process of developing decentralized environmental management capacities. A powerful indicator of the commitment to developing this local capacity is in the engagements made to the President of Rwanda by each district political head. In 30 districts, the district heads have committed to specific environmental management targets and actions, such as soil conservation measures, tree planting, improved stoves and so on. Each district budget will now include at least 100 million francs (roughly $180,000) for soil conservation as well as reforestation budgets. However, many local governments will be hard pressed to mobilize the human resources necessary to deliver effectively on these commitments.

49 Recently renamed the Ministry of Land, Environment, Forestry, Water and Mines.
3.5.2 UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Growing support from UNDP Rwanda for different types of environmental management activities is a good example of the agency’s rapidly evolving relationship with the GoR. Environment did not appear in either the first or second CCFs, nor does it appear in the 2002-2006 UNDAF. Yet environment now figures prominently in the draft UNDAF for the period 2008-2011.

Support for refugees and returnees during the first CCF, mostly support to the MINALOC for resettling displaced populations, continued during the second CCF, when it was eventually encompassed within an emerging environment portfolio. These activities were a continuation of earlier work in resettling and providing sustainable livelihoods for returnees in the late 1990s. These projects contributed significantly to UNDP Rwanda’s targeted development outcome of “Comprehensive and sustainable reintegration programmes for IDPs [internally displaced persons], returning refugees and ex-combatants elaborated and in place at national and local levels.”

Support for resettlement and reintegration in Gisenyi and Kibuye provinces (now both within the newly formed Western Province) under the second CCF assisted returning populations in achieving long-term socio-economic integration. Development of new communities included construction of permanent residences with water and energy supply, environmental management protection activities such as hillside terracing, provision of basic social infrastructure including health and education services, and income-generation opportunities.

In Gisenyi, 3,500 families were resettled into permanent communities; 625 families were resettled in Kibuye. These people had been living in primitive temporary camps for years, with support from the World Food Programme (WFP). This earlier generation of ‘sustainable livelihood’ projects met the priority needs of marginal populations, but there are concerns about the longer-term sustainability of new communities. For example, one of two settlements supported in Kibuye still didn’t have a potable water supply at the time of this evaluation. Local government bodies trained to support these new communities have been assigned to new jurisdictions with the latest decentralization.

Major components of these resettlement projects were focused on energy, including household woodlots to provide alternate energy sources and protect forest resources, especially the natural forests of protected areas. They introduced improved wood stoves and supported experiments in solar energy and household level rainwater harvesting. They also supported improved soil management practices such as different forms of terracing and anti-erosion hedges.

3.5.3 NEW FORMS OF SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY IN THE SECOND CCF

UNDP support in environmental management has evolved since 2002 in response to evolving national priorities and increased demand from the GoR. UNDP Rwanda has been able to make substantive contributions to development outcomes in large part as a result of strong government leadership and strong support from United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and Global Environment Facility (GEF) partners, as well as from UNDP regional technical advisors in Nairobi.

While UNDP Rwanda is not currently recognized as being a major contributor to Rwandan environment efforts, the GoR clearly values UNDP’s recent support in this area. MINITERE particularly values UNDP contributions to identifying and highlighting problems and to helping develop a conceptual framework that helped mobilizing resources from the African Development Bank and the Netherlands.

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Since 2002, UNDP support has diversified into a range of activities in environmental and resource management. UNDP support was instrumental, for example, in developing the country’s new Environmental Law in 2005, as well as the national environmental impact assessment regulation and guidelines and Land Use Law. UNDP also helped the GoR define their policy for developing decentralized environmental management capacities and capacities of central government institutions.

Limited UNDP Rwanda support in these latter areas gave rise to a larger initiative, the Decentralized Environmental Management Project supported through UNDP and an institutional capacity development programme, mostly in awareness building for improved environmental and natural resource management, financed directly by African Development Bank.

The Decentralized Environmental Management Project, with Dutch and Swedish financial support supplementing UNDP seed money, has supported district governments in the western province to mainstream environmental issues into their plans. It also funds projects by local governments and other groups. The project has supported community-based pilot projects to promote more energy efficient cooking stoves, agro-forestry and improved soil management in three districts of the western province. The improved stoves are in use in 95 percent of households in these districts, where they have resulted in 50 percent reductions in fuel wood consumption.

The Decentralized Environmental Management Project suffered from weak management and problems with procurement issues early in the project. Unlike the Poverty Environment Initiative (PEI) discussed below, the project has had little technical backup from the UNDP regional resource centre in Nairobi. It was originally hoped the Decentralized Environmental Management Project would focus its work around protected areas in order to directly complement a GEF project, but this hasn’t transpired. There has been talk of an evaluation of the project, but this has not yet taken place.

The PEI aims to enhance sound environmental management in poverty reduction efforts, sustainable economic growth and Rwanda’s achievement of the MDGs. With strong UNEP support, PEI has helped the Rwanda Environmental Management Authority promote the mainstreaming of environment into the country’s new EDPRS (Box 2).

All government agencies and partners will be obliged to align their work with the EDPRS, so it is critical to have solid, tangible environmental objectives in the EDPRS, both as a cross-cutting issue (see section 4.4) and as a ‘sector’ with its own EDPRS programme. Environment is now lodged within one of the 12 EDPRS sector working groups. Environmental analysis in support of the EDPRS process also includes a range of studies on the economic costs of environmental degradation, a review of the poverty and environment nexus within the EDPRS, the development

**Box 2. Environmental objectives in Rwanda’s EDPRS**

*There are several environmental targets in the EDPRS. Five critically degraded ecosystems will be mapped, assessed and rehabilitated from the current 50% to 80% in 2012 as part of the Integrated Management of Critical Ecosystems (IMCE) project. Rehabilitated ecosystems will contribute to an increase in hydro-electric power generation as in the case of the Ntaruka station which is presently operating below capacity due to a drastic decline in water levels within the Rugezi wetland. Restored wetlands will provide water for irrigation, and both wetlands and protected forest areas, such as Nyungwe, will promote income generation from tourism. Moreover, a land use and management master plan will be developed by 2008.

It is planned to increase the proportion of protected areas for biodiversity preservation from 8% to 10% in 2012. Forest and agro-forest coverage is scheduled to increase from 20% to 23% of total surface land area, and annual wood consumption is due to be reduced by 30% from the 2002 figure. Soil erosion and soil fertility decline will be reduced by 24% over the EDPRS period....“*  

of advocacy tools and a pilot ‘integrated ecosystem assessment’ in Bugesera district.\textsuperscript{52}

UNDP Rwanda has not been a source of policy advice in the PEI’s work with the EDPRS. This advice is provided by UNEP. GoR partners described UNDP’s role—apart from giving UNEP an operational capacity in the country that it otherwise lacks—as helping the Rwandans to translate this emerging policy into practice and to make sure the policy will have a concrete impact.

UNEP has secured financing from the Irish government for a second phase of PEI, to begin in 2007. This will focus on developing national and local capacities for sustainable environmental management within the framework of the EDPRS. As mentioned, it has been proposed that PEI work closely with the Decentralized Environmental Management Project at local levels, building on their respective experience. Both would need to carefully take stock of this experience before launching into such a venture.

After a long planning and approval process, a project titled ‘Strengthening Biodiversity Conservation Capacity in Forest Protected Area System of Rwanda’ started in early 2007 with GEF financing. The project will focus on Virunga and Nyungwe Parks and will complement earlier work done in the western province to reduce the pressure of returning refugee populations on biodiversity resources.

Support from UNDP channelled through UN HABITAT to the MININFRA has supported formulation of Rwanda’s Urban Development Policy, where environmental management concerns figure throughout, as well as limited capacity development at the district level.

Finally, UNDP is the official co-chair of the Environment and Land Use sub-group within the Agriculture and Natural Resources cluster—the structure used in Rwanda to promote more effective government coordination of donor initiatives. The development partners did not find UNDP played a very visible role in this forum, from which UNDP was often absent.

In summary, recent UNDP support has made modest contributions to its targeted outcome in this area.\textsuperscript{53} As this support is recent, there is a lack of evaluation information. Based on the primary information reviewed and extensive interviews, this evaluation can confirm UNDP contribution to the elaboration of strategies, most notably through UNDP contribution to the EDPRS process, but not to their adoption or implementation.

The Rwanda Environmental Management Authority has a very extensive mandate as Rwanda’s implementing agency for environmental initiatives and environmental advisor to national and local governments. It needs more support if it is to deliver effectively on this mandate. The GoR feels that UNDP has helped them make environmental concerns more visible. But they also believe that if UNDP is to have environment as one of its core areas of focus, then it will need to be a stronger advocate and provide more substantial support from its own core resources.

Environment figures prominently in the new UNDAF where UNDP is slated to take the lead in two of five focal areas: governance and environment. Yet UNDP Rwanda’s internal capacity to provide technical support and have an authoritative voice in environment related policy dialogue remains limited. The country office has not invested in the human resources needed to play a consistently prominent role in the national dialogue on environment and, at the time of the evaluation, was not giving substantive technical support to the environment portfolio. This may explain, for example, the weak linkages between the Decentralized Environmental Management Project and the first phase of PEI, and UNDP’s low profile as co-chair of the Environment Cluster.


\textsuperscript{53} “National strategies and programmes for sustainable development, integrating economic, social and environmental issues as well as access to water and energy, elaborated, adopted and effectively implemented.” In: UNDP Rwanda, \textit{Annual Report 2005}, Kigali, 2006.
In addition to the core development results summarized in Chapter 3, the evaluation also considered how the UNDP programme in Rwanda is contributing to a number of cross-cutting issues. This section first describes the cross-cutting issues of general concern for the GoR and its partners: aid coordination, institutional capacity development, gender mainstreaming and environment. Then it focuses on two other cross-cutting issues of particular concern for UNDP: the coherence and synergies achieved between UNDP’s thematic programmes and between UNDP programmes and those of other UN organizations, and the effectiveness of UNDP M&E of its programmes.

UNDP Rwanda’s results in these six cross-cutting issues are mixed. The most impressive results have occurred in those areas where the GoR is also relatively strong: aid coordination and gender mainstreaming. Results in institutional capacity development, promoting the environment as a cross-cutting issue, M&E of UNDP support, and achieving coherence and synergies among UNDP and UN programmes have all been more mixed. Results in capacity development, environment and M&E are likely to improve in light of recent initiatives by the country office.

4.1 AID COORDINATION

UNDP’s role in aid coordination in Rwanda reflects the frameworks of international and national aid that have emerged in recent years: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability and the GoR’s Aid Policy, which was adopted by the Cabinet in July 2006. The GoR’s Aid Policy draws heavily on the international process and is intended to ensure undisputable national leadership and a commonly approved agenda. Rwanda’s comprehensive and practical Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment Framework offers valuable lessons to the international development community.

UNDP support for aid coordination in Rwanda aims to contribute to the following development outcome of “Improved government capacity for leading the aid coordination, harmonization and alignment process for improved efficiency and poverty impact of aid.”

UNDP contribution to aid coordination takes place mainly through the Resident Coordinator and the ACU. The Resident Coordinator is the co-chair of the Development Partners Coordination Group and the ACU supports the External Finance Unit of MINECOFIN.

4.1.1 AID COORDINATION UNIT

The ACU is managed by UNDP through a basket fund financed by DFID, Sweden, the Netherlands, UNDP, Canada, Switzerland and Belgium. Representatives from the basket fund contributors and the GoR form its steering committee. In 2008, the ACU’s set-up as a separate unit will end and it will be integrated into UNDP’s broader programme of support to MINECOFIN. An external evaluation of ACU is foreseen in 2007.

The ACU works in three areas. First, it functions as the secretariat for aid coordination and manages the aid coordination basket fund. Second, it assists the GoR in developing its capacity for aid coordination. Third, it develops tools for policy management.

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ACU’s achievements include:

- Support to the development of an aid coordination system in Rwanda
- Strengthening the capacity of the External Finance Unit in managing the aid coordination process and mobilizing resources for the phasing out of the ACU by the end of 2007
- Support to the creation of the Development Assistance Database
- Support to the definition of the GoR Aid Policy

UNDP support to aid coordination has made significant contributions to national efforts to harmonize and coordinate aid flows in the country. The government and other development partners appreciate this and pointed out that the process builds trust and reinforces dialogue, supports national ownership and leadership, and provides clear rules and guidelines on delivering aid to the country. The UNDP contribution has been possible because the GoR and the development partners have promoted and respected the Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment Framework. At the same time, UNDP and its ACU have contributed to the development and strengthening of the framework.

Three strategic factors stand out. First, much effort has been invested in building trust, which has been reinforced through dialogue and forums. Second, the importance of government ownership and leadership has been understood and supported by all parties. Third, clear rules have been established. The Budget Support Group first prepared explicit partnership principles and now they are defined in the GoR Aid Policy.

UNDP has also contributed to aid coordination at the cluster level. It co-chairs three sector groups: Justice, Environment and Land Use Management, and Capacity Building and Public Sector Reform.

Paradoxically, UNDP Rwanda’s strength in aid coordination entails challenges for the country office. While the UNDP caters to the Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment process, it has had difficulties in aligning its own operations. The ‘One UN’ reform pilot in Rwanda and the alignment of UNDAF with national strategies should provide an opportunity to tackle issues such as:

- UNDP data initially submitted ranked low in the data quality assessment of the Development Assistance Database (it has been improving recently).
- A large proportion of UNDP funded projects still have their own parallel project implementation units.
- The predictability of UNDP funding could be improved.
- In many cases, UN organizations require their own reporting format.

Coordination of development assistance is a promising focal area in the UNDP portfolio. This is recognized in the country office paper on UNDP Rwanda Strategic Positioning.55 Building aid coordination capacity will be a critical step. It will also be critical for UNDP to institutionalize the key lessons that have emerged from its most successful coordination experiences in Rwanda, including the need to help the national government own their own coordination functions by establishing:

- A sustainable dialogue process
- Effective and practical tools to operate and monitor the coordination process
- A robust negotiation capacity within the coordination unit

Aid coordination activities will need to be careful not to lose sight of the fact that, by definition, aid coordination capacity should be strengthened principally within the government, not in a development partner agency.

The aid coordination, harmonization and alignment process is particularly strong in Rwanda due to strong government leadership, government development policies that development partners consider credible, clear GoR Aid Policy, coordination of the process by MINECOFIN and the effective work of the ACU, as well as the limited number of development partners and good consensus among them in the Rwandan context.

Almost all development partners recognize that UNDP and ACU have played instrumental roles in donor coordination. UNDP’s role stems from the situation in the 1990s when most development partners did not have representation or significant delivery capacity in Rwanda and thus channelled their contributions through the UNDP. Other contributing factors are UNDP’s perceived neutrality and its capacity to provide short-term expertise in a wide range of areas. UNDP also occupies a trusted position in coordinating between the government and its development partners.

An assessment of factors influencing the attainment of the UNDP expected outcomes in aid coordination is presented in Annex E. UNDP support in this area has been highly effective and aid coordination, alignment and harmonization in Rwanda might not have progressed to their current level without UNDP involvement. UNDP’s contribution to aid coordination demonstrates that significant effects do not necessarily depend on voluminous funding, but on skill and understanding of the context combined with a vision, commitment and adequate expertise.

4.2 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

4.2.1 RWANDA’S PRIORITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

As in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, capacity development is a key requirement across virtually all sectors in Rwanda. The civil war and genocide of the 1990s left the country with vast gaps in human and institutional capacity. Capacity needs remain significant as the government embarks on the implementation of ambitious policies, including decentralization.

Rwanda’s labour market is very fluid and well trained professionals are highly mobile. Many young graduates assume important positions with little relevant experience. Government agencies are constantly at risk of losing trained people to international organizations and NGOs. This situation underlines the importance and the challenges of institutional capacity development, and the need for coherent strategies for capacity development at the institutional and national levels. Rwanda is planning to develop a comprehensive capacity development strategy, discussed below.

With the new decentralization policy in force in Rwanda, there is a clear delineation of responsibilities: policies and overall direction are defined by the central government, the five provincial governments are responsible for coordinating activities within their jurisdictions, and the 30 district level governments are responsible for leading implementation of governmental activities at the local level. This leaves local governments with massive capacity development needs, such as the need to build capacities to implement local environmental and resource management programmes in collaboration with the productive and infrastructure sectors.

Another critical need at all levels of GoR is for more effective M&E of results. All three levels of the government need to develop capacity to lead and participate fully in continuous monitoring and joint evaluation exercises. This is needed especially to minimize the danger of ‘donor dominated’ approaches to M&E.

4.2.2 UNDP SUPPORT TO INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Many UNDP contributions to developing the capacities of government partners were cited during the evaluation, but there is no systematic approach to capacity development or to measuring progress towards well defined capacity development objectives. This issue was raised repeatedly in the project evaluations carried out by UNDP Rwanda between 2000 and 2006. It makes it impossible to rigorously verify UNDP’s capacity development contributions.
Many UNDP projects have made or are making contributions to institutional capacity development, but these are very weakly measured. Contributions include early support for the development of the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology, ongoing support to development of MINECOFIN’s aid coordination capacity, and training programmes including training of Gacaca judges, high court judges and parliamentarians. UNDP has also supported defining policy for developing decentralized environmental management capacities in the western province through the Decentralized Environmental Management Project.

But UNDP Rwanda has no explicit capacity development strategy, other than its recent support for the government’s incipient strategy. It also does not have any formal system for measuring short or medium term GoR and/or UNDP Rwanda capacity development results. The country office has now outlined a preliminary strategy for capacity building that defines principles and lists activities, but it still lacks key elements of a strategy, such as objectives, expected outcomes, resources and a timeframe.

Some capacity development activities earlier in the evaluation period, such as salary supplements for MINECOFIN staff, stretch the definition of institutional capacity development, particularly when they are not situated within a coherent institutional capacity development framework. More recent capacity development with MINECOFIN is being closely tied to specific tasks and on-the-job training with occasional short-term formal training events. Yet there is still no systematic focus on capacity development and no systematic approach to retaining capacities that are developed.

While some projects, the PEI for example, pair national consultants with international consultants to develop the former’s capacities, this is not done systematically by UNDP Rwanda. Other projects, such as the current programme of support to MINICOM, still hire large numbers of international consultants who work alone. Some capacity development institutions in Rwanda expressed concern that UNDP Rwanda’s actions belie its rhetoric. Despite its discourse about capacity development as a country-led process, some partners find UNDP Rwanda still has a supply driven approach to capacity development.

The most promising development has been UNDP Rwanda’s recent decision to support the GoR in developing a ‘National Integrated Skills Development Policy’ and a national capacity development strategy that will be closely linked to the EDPRS currently being prepared.

This more systematic approach to capacity development should allow the government to achieve greater synergies among its capacity development initiatives by sharing and coordinating facilities, approaches and so on in diverse areas such as decentralized resource and environmental management, health and education services. A more systematic approach could also help the government better foresee and minimize the disruption to its capacities wrought by other emerging policies.

### 4.3 GENDER MAINSTREAMING

The GoR has demonstrated exceptional commitment to gender promotion and equality—women have been promoted to positions of visibility and responsibility at all levels. This commitment has been incorporated into the Constitution, the Rwanda Vision 2020 strategy, the PRSP and other government plans, which clearly stipulate that ensuring gender equality and women’s political, social and economic empowerment is an overarching national concern and that discrepancies in gender equality should be addressed by all actors in society at all levels.

A law that eliminates gender discrimination on inheritance rights was promulgated in late 1999. In 2000, the cabinet adopted a five-year gender action plan, the Comprehensive Action Plan for the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women. Women’s political representation has increased significantly, most notably in the Parliament where 48 percent of the current
representatives are women. Seats are also reserved for elected women representatives in local councils and their executive committees.

Rwandan national authorities actively promote women, including through the institution of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, which is mandated to spearhead the elimination of gender imbalances in all sectors. In addition, local chapters of the National Women’s Council are operational.

The government sees gender equality as a cross-cutting issue. Therefore gender is being mainstreamed into the current EDPRS, and checklists have been developed to ensure this.

The GoR also considers gender-based violence (GBV) to be a hindrance to development and a bill on GBV has now been passed through Parliament. To ensure implementation of measures to reduce GBV, a strong partnership has been developed with law enforcement agencies. The police force has established GBV desks at all levels in the country to record reports on GBV and take necessary action.

In education, the gender gap is rapidly narrowing, especially in primary and secondary education. In combating HIV/AIDS, attention is being given to women to stop mother-to-child transmission, to promote anti-retroviral treatment and to promote income generation activities.

Despite these notable achievements, gender gaps remain in Rwanda, especially in the rural areas. The Human Development Report 2005 ranked Rwanda 122 out of 140 countries in the gender-related development index. Female-earned income amounts to 62 percent of male-earned income.

4.3.1 UNDP SUPPORT TO GENDER MAINSTREAMING

UNDP is committed to promoting gender equality in Rwanda, spending roughly $500,000 annually on gender-related activities. UNDP resources are committed through different units to fund various activities. For example, support to women parliamentarians was channelled through the governance programme in the country office, which supported capacity building including computer training. UNDP also donated a substantial amount of money for the global conference on Gender, Nation Building and the Role of Parliaments that took place February 2007 in Kigali.

Some UNDP Rwanda projects are run in partnership with UNIFEM, for example, UNDP funded the project ‘Enhancing Protection from Gender Based Violence and Strengthening Capacity in the Ministry of Gender’ that was implemented by UNIFEM.

UNDP is also playing a key role in the gender team that has been tasked with mainstreaming gender issues into the EDPRS.

UNDP joined an on-going initiative to audit several international bilateral and multilateral organizations on gender. The objective of the Gender Audit Project is to put in place a mechanism for on-going benchmarking and peer review of organizational behaviour that will contribute to improved gender equality in Rwanda. It also aims to develop a self-assessment methodology that will enable organizations to identify good practices and areas of improvement that will form the basis for an action plan for improved performance on gender equality.

Key UNDP contributions to Rwanda’s gender results have included:

- Support to women parliamentarians that boosted their self-esteem—Rwanda’s women law makers now feel they are on equal footing with their male counterparts.
- Provision of computers that have added to women parliamentarians’ knowledge and efficiency and improved their networking on issues of shared vision across the world.
- Support for giving Rwandan women a ‘voice’ on the issue of GBV, including a partnership with the police force and a clear message that GBV will not be tolerated.
Support to the National Commission for Elections for civic education to women to help them participate during local elections. This has resulted in an increase in numbers of women elected at national levels.

The challenge of protecting women and children from human rights violations still exists.

While gender-specific projects have been undertaken, there is little direct evidence that gender issues and their impact on project beneficiaries are systematically taken into account in UNDP supported projects. One example is the resettlement of internally displaced persons in Gisenyi, where gender concerns were not mainstreamed in the project. This also occurred in an HIV/AIDS project in Butare, where women were excluded. Stakeholders have expressed the view that gender is an incidental concern and a specific gender focus was limited to only certain UNDP supported projects. It is hoped that the gender audit will enable UNDP to correct this anomaly.

4.4 ENVIRONMENT AS A CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE

4.4.1 RWANDA’S PRIORITIES IN ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENT AS A CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE

Treating environment as a cross-cutting theme was not a successful approach during the implementation of Rwanda’s first PRS. The plan had been to explicitly address environment as a cross-cutting theme and integrate principles of sound environmental management into the policies of key sectors such as agriculture, industry and infrastructure. This did not meet expectations, as noted in the final evaluation of the PRS: “Environmental considerations have yet to be integrated systematically across different areas of government policy, and the linkages between environment and land use policies and the reduction of poverty have been insufficiently analyzed.”

Today, the GoR is committed to addressing environmental challenges, both from the perspective of a sector (see section 3.6) and as a cross-cutting issue. In the second generation PRS, the EDPRS, environment will appear both as a sector and as a cross-cutting issue.

4.4.2 UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENT AS A CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE

The principal UNDP initiative has been PEI’s recent reviews of key sectors’ logical framework analyses for the EDPRS. This kind of systematic analysis of environmental issues in key socio-economic sectors was not done for the first PRSP. The PEI has now provided environmental input into the frameworks being developed for EDPRS in agriculture, health, water and sanitation, justice, private-sector development, social protection, environment, gender, social protection and HIV/AIDS. This cross-sectoral analysis offers important guidance for orienting these sectors, though it is too early to assess the development results of this work.

A critical capacity weakness identified during the PEI is the lack of awareness of environmental challenges among Rwandan sectoral specialists and analysts. Examples include highly trained development economists who have little or no notion of the environmental consequences and challenges associated with different economic activities such as agricultural intensification and irrigation, highway and dam construction, and so on. Understanding of the fundamental environmental challenges facing the country tends to be better developed at decentralized levels.

For PEI’s analytic work to have the desired results, government decision makers will need to commit to making decisions based on the PEI analysis. Yet the work of the PEI in support of the EDPRS process is challenged by the limited buy-in to the process from technical specialists in other sectors in the government. This constraint

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is illustrated, for example, by PEI’s difficulties in obtaining GoR’s information on budgets allocated to environmental management activities in the different sectors. This example illustrates why UNDP Rwanda will need a far stronger voice on environment issues if the office is to retain environment as one of its two principal areas of programming.

4.5 COHERENCE AND SYNERGIES AMONG UNDP AND UN PROGRAMMES

4.5.1 COHERENCE AND SYNERGIES AMONG UNDP PROGRAMMES

The greatest coherence among the five UNDP programming areas, where there appears to be the frequent interaction and active collaboration needed to achieve real synergies, is among those units working on different dimensions of governance. Activities of the Governance Unit; Strategic Planning and Economic Management Unit; the Justice, HIV-AIDS and Gender Unit; and the ACU converge synergistically, for example, in support to decentralization. The Justice, HIV-AIDS and Gender Unit’s gender strategy is also expected to enhance the activities of the other units.

The Sustainable Livelihoods Unit has had less success in achieving coherence and synergies with the other units. This is a drawback for a group that aims to help the GoR promote environment as a cross-cutting dimension of all development activities. The relative isolation of the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit was illustrated by their inability to participate fully in economic analysis related to the ‘Millennium Project’, despite the extensive environmental economic analysis being carried out under the auspices of the PEI. This situation may have been due in part to human resource constraints, which again highlights the need for the country office to strengthen this unit if environment is to be one of UNDP Rwanda’s two principal areas of focus in the next programming period.

Greater synergies could be achieved among all the programming groups if they shared more well defined and rigorous approaches to capacity development and to M&E. This would allow these units to contribute jointly, for example, to achieving capacity development targets set with the GoR, then to measure progress towards these targets through shared M&E systems and to share lessons emerging from these processes.

4.5.2 COHERENCE AND SYNERGIES BETWEEN UNDP AND OTHER UN ORGANIZATIONS

Collaboration between UNDP and other UN systems are ensured by the Resident Coordinator, who is also the UNDP Resident Representative. Within the framework of the UNDAF, the UN country team (UNCT) outline their strategies to ensure complementarities and avoid duplication. Collaboration within the UNCT is achieved through:

- Regular Heads of Agencies’ meetings
- A Rwanda UNDAF task force established to draw up all UNDAF Strategic Outputs, coordinate efforts at the level of projects and programmes, and promote joint programming

The UNCT initiated the preparation of the new UNDAF to cover the period 2008-2012 during a three-day UNDAF Strategic Prioritization Retreat in December 2006. It was decided that the elaboration of the new UNDAF would be suspended for a year to allow the completion of Rwanda’s EDPRS in order to ensure a high degree of coherence between the UNCT’s programmes and the government’s development agenda.

**Economic management:** UNDP works in partnership with the other UN organizations to support the government in improving economic governance. In the second CCF for Rwanda, UNDP supported the government’s economic and financial management structures in collaboration with UNICEF, UNFPA, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and UNESCO.

**Environment:** The PEI is the UNDP’s and UNEP’s joint initiative to support the government’s efforts to mainstream environmental management in the EDPRS. This initiative has been a valuable source of lessons that should be of value in the emerging One UN pilot in Rwanda, discussed in section 5.3.
**HIV/AIDS:** In combating HIV/AIDS, UNDP collaborated with UNAIDS, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, UNECA, UNHCR, and WFP. While UNDP played a valuable role in resource mobilization and coordination of HIV/AIDS activities, many observers believed it should have taken a back seat in actual implementation and allowed UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, and WFP to play more visible roles.

Population data is being collected by UNDP, funded by DFID. UNFPA feels that this is their mandate and UNFPA should be conducting the data collection. DFID reiterated the same concern. Here again, UNDP needs to more clearly explain their comparative advantage in this area vis-à-vis other UN organizations.

**Gender:** UNDP collaborated closely with UNIFEM, who reports that without the strong relationship that exists between UNIFEM and the UNDP country office, little would have been achieved in the promotion of gender equality and equality. Together, they delivered impressive results during the second Country Cooperation Framework—from support to widows of war and genocide to capacity development for women parliamentarians (see details in section 4.3).

**Justice and human rights:** UNDP collaborates with UNHCR, UNHRC, UNICEF, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to support MINJJUST, bringing together all actors in the areas of justice, human rights, and law and harmonizing their efforts. These projects were conceived as part of Good Governance for Poverty Reduction Programme. There is wide recognition by various stakeholders that valuable synergies have been achieved in this programme.

**Concerns of UN organizations:** Various UN organizations expressed concerns that UNDP overshadows other UN organizations even when it collaborates with them, getting involved in areas where it does not have the capacity or expertise, such as demographic data collection (part of the UNFPA mandate). Coherence and synergies among UNDP and the rest of the UNCT should be enhanced through the One UN reform pilot to be carried out in Rwanda (discussed in section 5.3).

**Coherence and synergies between UNDP and Rwandan civil society:** While UNDP has impressive partnerships with the government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, and UNCT, UNDP could do far more to build partnerships and explore possible synergies with Rwandan NGOs and civil society organizations. This is especially true at the decentralized level, where these kinds of partners could usefully play a more active role in the delivery of social programmes, for example.

### 4.6 MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF UNDP PROGRAMMES

The discussion on strategic positioning of UNDP Rwanda (section 5) emphasizes the role of performance monitoring. Systematic and rational guidance of UNDP Rwanda’s wide-ranging programme portfolio calls for an objective system for measuring outcomes and the factors contributing to and limiting them. Weaknesses in the area of M&E diminish UNDP capacity in partnerships with the GoR and the development partners. The EDPRS process further underlines the importance of this issue. This new PRS will require performance monitoring by each sector group using a limited set of shared performance indicators.

Currently, the UNDP country office does not have a comprehensive, operational performance monitoring system. The existing Monitoring Framework for UNDP Rwanda outlines responsibilities as well as tools and methods at activity, project, sector, and country office levels, but this framework is not fully operational. A country office memo on the subject states that “monitoring tools are currently available but misunderstandings of their application and use are resulting in work duplication and inefficiency.”

One example of non-operational performance monitoring is a self-evaluation of the Programme Results 2005 that assessed achievements related to six ‘drivers’: developing national capacities,
enhancing national ownership, advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment, seeking South-South solutions, promoting gender equality and forging partnerships. This 'self-evaluation' simply followed guidelines provided by UNDP headquarters and seems to have been mostly a pro forma exercise done to meet bureaucratic requirements imposed by headquarters.

Notwithstanding the lack of systematic performance monitoring, the UNDP country office has undertaken a number of useful assessment exercises. A mid-term review of the CCF 2002-2006 was carried out in 2004 that included a number of recommendations relevant to MDGs, national policy context and programmes, PRSP, and the UNDAF, as well as to project implementation and human resources development. The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), an informal network of donors, carried out a peer assessment of a number of multilateral organizations operating in Rwanda in 2004 including UNDP, focusing particularly on UNDP’s national and inter-agency partnerships.

UNDP project-level M&E relies on indicators stipulated in project documents and related logical frameworks. In several cases (for example, UNDP support to MINECOFIN) indicators have been defined only at the outcome level and how they are to be measured is not described. A number of evaluation reports refer to insufficient monitoring information (for example, the mid-term review of the project Support to Capacity Building and Civil Service Reform in Rwanda). In some cases, such as support to resettlement in the Western Province, co-funding agencies have separate M&E arrangements. In other cases, the monitoring capacities of partner institutions have been weak and projects have been encouraged to explicitly strengthen these. At MINECOFIN, for example, the donors’ group has pointed to the need for further strengthening of capacities for compiling, analyzing and sharing of development data.

Project-level monitoring has focused mostly on inputs and activities, and to a lesser extent, on results and outcomes. These more strategic parameters are also addressed in evaluations but, due to irregularity of external assessments, their analysis has not been systematically incorporated in strategic decision making. Some of the project evaluations simply focus on minor operational issues and pay little attention to strategic questions (for example, the mid-term review of Support to Good Governance and Poverty Reduction).

Initial support to the Rwandan National Institute of Statistics will consist of a multi-donor basket fund, managed by UNDP. It could potentially have a large impact on Rwanda’s capacity for performance monitoring. If the Rwandan National Institute of Statistics meets expectations by providing relevant and reliable data in a timely manner, then it will vastly improve the quality of indicator data available and enhance the objectivity of dialogue between the government and its development partners.

The senior management of the country office sees the creation of a monitoring strategy and tools as a priority area for strengthening UNDP capacity. The large number of projects administered by several management units and frequent rotations in staff underline the need to strengthen the UNDP country office institutional memory. At the same time, performance monitoring is a concern in other country offices and at UNDP Headquarters. UNDP Rwanda’s efforts in this area could significantly benefit from synchronization with and support from UNDP Headquarters. Development of methodologies and tools needs to be accompanied by strengthening of human resources, in which training plays a key part. The preparation of the new UNDAF creates an opportunity for improving the focus and streamlining the M&E functions of the whole UN family.

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In the absence of comprehensive and continuous performance monitoring and with only a small number of projects having been evaluated (see Annex G), UNDP contributions to development are difficult to measure. In some areas, such as in governance, UNDP contributions relate to complex processes where linking outcomes to specific outputs can be difficult though not impossible. Until recently, UNDP contribution has been largely in reconstructing basic material capacities. In many cases, it is too soon to assess strategic impacts.
5.1 UNDP AND RWANDA’S DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

UNDP programmes are highly relevant to GoR’s needs. Numerous senior actors in the Rwandan government and public administration confirmed the high degree of coherence of UNDP programmes with their government’s needs.

The current debate on Rwanda’s development strategy focuses on the emerging EDPRS, where there are two important trends: the promotion of non-agricultural economic growth and social protection.

Partners’ and observers’ assessments of Rwanda’s development policy vary significantly. All agree that the government is in a hurry, obliging its international partners to work hard to keep up with them. Some consider GoR’s development policy too ambitious and not sufficiently realistic. However, many agree that GoR displays a strong commitment to development issues in general.

Until 2006, UNDP’s key strategy instruments were the first CCF 1998-2001 (of which this evaluation covers only last two years), the second CCF 2002-2006 and the first UNDAF. A mid-term review of the second CCF in 2004 concluded that while many of the UNDP programmes are relevant to GoR policies, the linkage between the second CCF and key government plans is not well articulated. Conversely, there are several indications of a high degree of relevance:

- The current UNDAF preparation process draws clearly on the concurrent EDPRS process. With operationalization of the One UN reform and the designation of Rwanda as a pilot country, the UNDAF has gained in importance and many expectations are attached to the new UNDAF, currently in preparation.

- Capacity building is one of the key areas of the GoR’s development strategy. It is also a central element in UNDP support, though an element that is still not sufficiently well structured (see section 4.2).

- Rwanda’s National Capacity Building Programme was initiated in 2002 with UNDP support and led to the creation of the Human Resources and Institutional Development Agency. The Agency has been assigned a central role in GoR capacity building strategy, although it is not currently supported by UNDP.

5.1.1 ONGOING ADJUSTMENTS TO UNDP STRATEGY

The CCF for 1998-2000 was extended until the end of 2001 to harmonize with the government’s PRS process and the programming cycle of all other UN organizations in Rwanda. The CCF for 2002-2006 was the object of a mid-term review in 2004, but the CCF was not explicitly adjusted to reflect this review’s recommendations. Changing Rwandan needs and priorities are reflected instead in newer strategy documents. Thus the emerging UNDAF draws its direction from both the UN Reform and the EDPRS.

Examples of UNDP programmes of the second CCF that are highly relevant to GoR policy priorities include: support for the External Finance Unit, the PRS and EDPRS processes; the development of environmental policy and integration of environmental concerns into the EDPRS; capacity development in the justice sector; and the decentralization process.

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Numerous GoR testimonials confirmed that UNDP programmes are demand-driven and meeting the needs of GoR plans. Their effect is diminished by weaknesses in project implementation and constraints and unpredictability in UNDP financing.

UNDP’s approach in the first half of the evaluation period was not entirely based on an explicit and coherent strategy, notwithstanding statements in some of their strategy documents. The approach stemmed from the post-1994 situation in which emergency response, gap filling and reconstruction operations prevailed. It is largely for this reason that many stakeholders now criticize UNDP for following a strategy that is driven by discrete projects and funding opportunities.

Today, there is an embryonic process of strategy definition in the country office that reflects the need to make more detailed and concrete strategies for key issues, such as human resources management, and cross-cutting issues like gender, environment, M&E and capacity development. Above all, there is an effort underway to define UNDP’s strategic position in the Rwandan development context in future years.

UNDP anticipation of and response to changes in the Rwandan development context has varied over the years. Until 2001, UNDP’s role was largely focused on reconstruction and gap filling. Since 2001, UNDP has focused increasingly on development support activities and has established the current programme units. Aid coordination has played a growing role since 2005.

The country office’s implementation capacities and approaches have fluctuated during the evaluation period, largely as a result of the attention given by the senior management to these issues. Since 2002-2003 internal capacity development has been dealt with more systematically, although much remains to be done. The country office Learning Plan of 2006 defines training needs for 26 employees of the Operations Department and 19 employees of the Programmes Department. The areas of training needs range from administrative systems (Atlas) to English and French languages, ICT skills, procurement procedures, and project cycle management.

### 5.1.2 NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

The country office needs a comprehensive and practical strategy. Currently, there is a need to identify and analyze those changes that are likely to affect UNDP in coming years. The emerging internal strategy definition process needs to be consolidated in this regard. While the current UNDAF process is vital for the whole UNCT, it will not provide all the answers that UNDP Rwanda needs. Based on fundamental guidelines, such as the MDGs and the UNDAF, the country office needs a comprehensive and practical strategy framework that can help it strengthen links between its broad policy orientations and its operational systems and mechanisms. This will help the UNDP country office reinforce and maintain its competitiveness in the current Rwandan context in which UNDP contributions, like those of other development partners, will be under increasing scrutiny to determine what they add to Rwanda’s development process.

### 5.2 UNDP’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS IN RWANDA

Most GoR representatives express a high degree of confidence in UNDP as a partner. For example, MINALOC believes that UNDP enjoys much good will within the government and contributes to Rwanda’s development through general support as well as with specific inputs. UNDP is further appreciated for being uncomplicated and a good interlocutor. For example, according to MINALOC, other donors sometimes try to impose their models of decentralization that are not always appropriate for Rwanda. There is also a perception among some government officials that the country office’s relative autonomy in decision making gives it an advantage over some development partners that need to consult their head offices for most decisions.

Another example is from a district mayor visited in the north of Rwanda’s Western Province who
reported that UNDP had been a good partner, a good communicator, a good collaborator and a good listener who understood their problems. The MOPAN study of 2004\(^{59}\) concluded that the UNDP programme in Rwanda is configured to deliver its corporate mandate and is doing so with increasing efficiency.

Strong government leadership has enabled UNDP to effectively exercise its role as a donor coordinator. However, many GoR representatives express concerns about UNDP management capacities and limited financial resources. Several government officials pointed out that UNDP administrative systems and procedures often don’t match with its intended strategic scope. Operations are often short-sighted and managed in an *ad hoc* manner. Changes in personnel cause stop-and-go effects in operations. Some government partners find that the activities of UNDP projects seem to be more administration-driven rather than development based. Government officials often reported that they don’t know the budget of projects they are working on. Some GoR officials expressed disappointment that steering committees formed in various projects didn’t play more active roles in decision making.

UNDP does not fit in the conventional category of donor in Rwanda. Numerous actors emphasized that UNDP is not a donor like the others. There are a number of distinct elements to UNDP Rwanda’s identity, including: facilitator, aid coordinator, implementing agency, resource mobilizer and advocate.

UNDP support is currently channeled almost exclusively through the government and support to Rwandan civil society organizations has been minimal. While several NGOs did benefit from UNDP support to the 2003 elections, there are no specific arrangements to form partnerships with civil society organizations and they tend to see UNDP as a partner of the government, not theirs. Civil society organizations, in general, play vital roles in strengthening democracy and increasing the equity of socio-economic development. Therefore support to them should be part of the UNDP support to a country.

Partnerships with several development partners illustrate UNDP Rwanda’s way of working. While there is a general trust in UNDP as a partner, some partners expressed concerns about UNDP’s vague strategic focus, weak administrative capacity, insufficient financial resources and instability of human resources, particularly in senior advisory positions. Several still refer to UNDP’s weak performance in managing the basket fund for the elections of 2003.

UNDP’s key partners raised the following concerns when asked to analyze UNDP management of their development funds:

- Lack of focus and priorities in the UNDP portfolio causes their internal resources (financial and human) to be spread too widely and thinly
- Weaknesses in management capacities, systems and procedures, as well as in technical capacities in some units, for example in the Sustainable Livelihoods Unit
- Insufficient permanent policy and technical capacity within the country office—much of the available advisory capacity is being misused in project management and administrative purposes
- Limited capacities to lead sustained policy dialogues with the government

In aid coordination, there is general trust in UNDP capacity, both from the government and among the donors. The MOPAN assessment of 2004 concluded that UNDP is a strong advocate of donor harmonization in Rwanda and has provided significant leadership and administrative support for efforts so far. However, UNDP’s own operations are not always consistent with

good practices. For example, UNDP provides parallel funding in cases where basket funds exist and UNDP information sharing with other development partners has not always been proactive.

Donor coordination and a privileged relationship with the government are widely seen as UNDP’s main comparative advantages in Rwanda. UNDP has been effective in using these strengths in its strategic positioning. However, weaknesses discussed in other sections of this report diminish the positive impact of the partnerships.

While all donors recognize UNDP’s closeness to the government, some regard this as an important advantage while others see risks in this relationship. Some observers perceive UNDP as unacceptably biased because of its strong link with the government and weak links with civil society organizations. Some development partners recognize UNDP impartiality as an asset, but believe that UNDP does not exercise sufficient political influence over the GoR. Corruption, for example, is a delicate issue that is tackled by UNDP from a purely technical point of view but not politically. Bilateral agencies are more inclined to raise such sensitive issues, though UNDP is in a better position to do so.

UNDP effectiveness in strategic partnerships is reflected in its capacity to mobilize resources from various sources of funding (Table 4), as well as in the high degree of relevance attributed by the government to UNDP activities. The country office has made efforts to systematically and explicitly analyze its comparative advantages in Rwanda. The result was a suggestion of how to organize UNDP services into the three categories proposed by the UN reform team: core services, niche services and overlapping services.

5.2.1 UNDP RWANDA AND THE CHANGING ARCHITECTURE OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

UNDP also needs to respond to the challenges brought about by changes in the architecture of aid. The current situation is somewhat paradoxical. While the UN leads the process of aid coordination, alignment and harmonization, it has problems in aligning itself. For example, UNDP development assistance was ranked as low quality (although it has since improved), it maintains a high number of parallel project management units, funding is unpredictable, and it requires its own reporting formats. The One UN reform pilot in Rwanda and UNDAF-related strategy revision are important opportunities for improvement in these areas.

The GoR has shown strong leadership in relation to its development partners. It is capable of managing complex processes, such as the EDPRS. With its capacity continuously increasing, GoR is likely to assume more donor coordination functions, some of which are currently taken care of by the UNDP. This will have significant implications for UNDP operations because it concerns an area that many currently see as UNDP’s main area of comparative advantage.

Bringing various donors together has been one of the UNDP strengths since the 1990s and synergies between UNDP supported programmes and those of other development partners have been especially clear in resource mobilization. In most projects supported by the UNDP, there is more than one source of funding. Co-financed projects have evolved into basket funds, which are a key

<p>| Table 4. Resource mobilization by UNDP country office units, 2000-2006 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GU</th>
<th>SPEMU</th>
<th>JHAGU</th>
<th>SLU</th>
<th>ACU (2005–7)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$17,269,281</td>
<td>$6,172,338</td>
<td>$6,016,250</td>
<td>$4,090,358</td>
<td>$2,564,059</td>
<td>$36,112,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Rwanda

Note: GU indicates Governance Unit; SPEMU, Strategic Planning and Economic Management Unit; JHAGU, Justice, HIV-AIDS and Gender Unit; SLU, Sustainable Livelihoods Unit; ACU, Aid Coordination Unit.

element in the harmonization process and for reducing transaction costs.

Co-financing can bring about clear synergy gains. While UNDP may manage entire projects, its own funding is often only a minor share of the total budget, insufficient to ensure all the necessary investments. For example, the programme in support of the Supreme Court required means of transportation in rural areas. This could be financed only because a sufficient contribution was made available by the Netherlands.

Other important examples of synergies achieved are in the UNDP/DFID partnership that has taken place in many areas and is likely to be strengthened in the next CCF. DFID envisages a Memorandum of Understanding to define the areas and principles of partnership with UNDP. They have identified three prospective areas of collaboration: economic planning, governance, and aid coordination and harmonization.

There is scope for broader collaboration and related synergies. For example, one of the major sources of support to capacity building is the Multi-sector Capacity Building Programme project, of which the World Bank is the biggest single source of financing. The Human Resources and Institutional Development Agency believes the initiative would benefit greatly if UNDP were to join the project's supporters.

UNDP needs to prepare and adapt to the changing approaches of its key partners who are increasingly moving towards programme-based approach modalities, such as direct budget support. UNDP Rwanda should develop the permanent capacity and expertise required for these new approaches. This task will require coordinated inputs not only from the country office but also from higher levels in UNDP. In the short term, UNDP should improve in those areas where most partners perceive weaknesses, particularly its uneven project design and management capacities (including M&E functions) and technical expertise. If UNDP is able to respond to its internal capacity challenges, then it should be able to adapt to anticipated changes in demand from the GoR.

5.3 UNDP AND UN REFORM IN RWANDA

Recent recommendations for UN reform call for UN organizations to integrate their planning and programming in order to achieve an optimal portfolio mix, enabling the UNCT to produce the best possible response to existing needs by building on the specific competencies of each UN organization throughout their partner countries’ policy cycles. This adjustment will require needs and capacity analyses, as well as comparative advantage analysis to determine how each UN organization can best fit into a unified UN delivery team in each country.

Rwanda has been chosen as one of four African countries to pilot this new approach. Participation in Rwanda’s pilot for UN reform will enhance UNDP Rwanda’s status with the GoR and with the development partners. It will also place greater demands on the country office and generate greater expectations of improved performance and overcoming weaknesses that the country office shares with many other UNDP country offices—weak human resource management, uneven and constantly changing quality of technical and administrative capacities, and inadequate M&E.

The reform is also expected to bring better coordination, collaboration and outcomes among UN organizations. This process has been launched and the UNCT’s draft UNDAF for Rwanda is well coordinated with the emerging EDPRS. Playing a lead role in the implementation of the UN reform will require UNDP Rwanda to demonstrate greater consistency and transparency, as well as a careful, sustained effort to build understanding, confidence and trust among members of the United Nations in Rwanda.

5.3.1 UN REFORM AND UNDP’S EVOLVING ROLE IN RWANDA

Rwanda’s selection as a pilot country for the One UN reform presents the country office with an opportunity. It will be demanding and risky, yet there is potentially much to be gained from it. To succeed, the country office needs to be guided by
clear and transparent planning and monitoring mechanisms. Key development partners in Rwanda, such as DFID, are interested in supporting UNDP and the broader UN system in this pilot. In return, they expect convincing demonstrations of UNDP capacities for sound and well focused programme administration and policy guidance.

An important challenge, for example, will be to improve financial management processes to the point where the country office can produce simple, synoptic reports to meet a wide range of demands in a timely manner. Reporting, in general, and financial reporting, in particular, are areas where development partners have found UNDP Rwanda at its weakest.

UNDP Rwanda’s role in the UN reform pilot will benefit from the government’s perception that the UNDP is the lead UN organization in the country and that UNDP can be counted on to help them align the UN organizations with the government’s priorities while drawing on the real comparative advantages of each organization. The UNCT should identify concrete areas where they can work with government partners to enhance collaboration and coordination among UN organizations in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating their support. There is unanimous agreement among international partners, and many within the country office, that UNDP should focus its energy and resources on a narrower range of activities and do these better in the next CCF.

There is still a great deal to do before UN organizations work together consistently as well coordinated partners. The organizations will need to be convinced that they can trust UNDP to play a lead role in UN reform without undermining the position of other UN organizations. Some organizations will need more proof of the benefits of closer collaboration and that these benefits outweigh perceived threats and costs, such as loss of resources and independence of action for their individual organizations.

UNDP Rwanda’s experience in facilitating aid coordination among international partners will help them to play a lead role in coordinating the One UN reform pilot, especially the critical role of building trust among partners. Trust building and enhanced collaboration will require more clarity about what UNDP and the other UN organizations actually do in Rwanda and how they do it. For example, UNDP should begin to share the results of UNDP work with the EDPRS more systematically with UN organizations.

More clarity and consistency will be required from UNDP Rwanda in general and from the office of the Resident Representative/Resident Coordinator in particular. It must be clear when the UNDP is acting on the behalf of the UN system as a whole and when it is acting on behalf of UNDP in particular. As long as the UN Resident Coordinator and the UNDP Resident Representative are embodied in the same person, this distinction will be very important, as it is an abiding source of confusion (and therefore lack of confidence) among other UN organizations. There is need for more clarity and transparency in communicating with other UN organizations regarding the Resident Coordinator’s budget and how it is used, versus the Resident Representative’s budget and how it is used. Clarity and transparency will be critical as well during negotiations of contribution agreements with major partners, such as DFID following the finalization of the EDPRS and UNDAF expected later in 2007. For example, will DFID sign its upcoming Memorandum of Understanding with UNDP or with the UN system in Rwanda? Whatever decision is taken will have to be clearly explained and justified to the other UN organizations.

There are valuable experiences to build on, for example the collaboration with UNEP on the PEI. This underlined the need for UNDP’s own administrative capacities to be strengthened if it is to play a pivotal role in the delivery of the overall UN programme of support to Rwanda’s development. In many ways, the PEI saw UNDP and UNEP occupying their respective areas of comparative advantage: UNEP provided strong technical support and UNDP provided in-country
operational capacity for financial management and procurement. But UNDP Rwanda and UNEP did not find it easy to work with one another and the PEI did not find it easy to work with the country office.

5.4 UNDP RWANDA’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND CAPACITIES

This report confirms UNDP’s ‘privileged’ position as one of the GoR’s most trusted partners. UNDP has proven its ability to respond throughout the post genocide period—from the period of emergency, through the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, up to the current effort of long term development. The shared perception within the government is that UNDP responds to their priority needs in a timely and demand-driven manner, has been very flexible when the needs arise and has provided leadership in the coordination of aid.

UNDP is contributing to the implementation of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 and the Rwanda PRS. UNDP contribution in the areas of democratic governance, socio-economic policy and economic management, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the promotion of gender equality and the protection of the environment—which are in line with government priorities—have helped the country achieve real gains in recent years.

UNDP has a different status from other development partners in Rwanda and a unique comparative advantage in the Rwandan context based on its neutrality—both among donors and between donors and partner governments—and based on its normative role when following up on internationally agreed development goals including the MDGs. It has privileged access to national policy makers and commensurate potential to work on sensitive issues and to provide independent advice on emerging issues.

5.4.1 CAPACITY ISSUES

Conversely, the UNDP country office suffers from limited human and financial resources. They lack the necessary critical mass of professional staff to match the range of activities in which UNDP is involved. There is a high rate of staff turnover and, until recently, the office of the Resident Representative was occupied for months by temporary officers on a stop-gap basis. The importance of having adequate and qualified personnel who are not under constant pressure from routine administrative work cannot be overstated.

Ad-hoc arrangements have been more the rule than the exception in the Rwanda country office due to the frequent turnover of professional staff. The country office has five international staff, eight national professionals, and a handful of short-term interns and national support staff. It is very difficult for this kind of country office to function to its full potential without more continuity among its professional staff.

5.5 UNDP’S EVOLVING ROLE IN RWANDA

UNDP’s role in Rwanda continues to evolve rapidly. The first CCF 1998-2001 was still a programme of post-emergency response. UNDP was involved in a vast array of sectors. The second CCF in 2002-2006 was the first ‘development’ oriented programme in the post-war period and more focused, though still broad in scope given the modest resources available to UNDP Rwanda. It was the first ‘development’ oriented programme in the post-war period. The emerging third CCF promises to be both well integrated within the new UNDAF and to have a more focused strategy. UNDP programming will be concentrated in one area of ongoing concern—strengthening capacities for good governance—and one area of emerging concern—ensuring the environmental sustainability of Rwanda’s socio-economic development.

Even as UNDP Rwanda’s role in the country continues to evolve rapidly, UNDP continues to be a privileged and trusted partner of the government. At the time of the evaluation, 2007 was promising to be a challenging year with the EDPRS, UNDAF and UN reform all converging. This convergence would likely place heavy demands on UNDP Rwanda’s limited capacities.
Key factors likely to influence UNDP Rwanda’s role in Rwanda over the next UNDAF period and beyond are the One UN reform and UNDP Rwanda’s evolving role within the UN system. Others include:

- Rwanda’s Vision 2020, the emerging EDPRS and UNDP ability to define a sustainable niche in their delivery, given the changing architecture of aid in Rwanda
- The rural-urban divide in Rwanda and UNDP ability to help GoR bridge this widening gap
- National political stability and UNDP capacity to help GoR maintain political stability while promoting equity and democratic reform
- Regional stability and UNDP capacity to play a constructive role within the UN system in promoting regional dialogue and harmony

5.5.1 DEFINING A SUSTAINABLE NICHE IN THE DELIVERY OF RWANDA’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

Some government partners, for example the environment agencies, expressed concerns about UNDP Rwanda’s administrative and technical capacities. However, others did not express concern and appreciated UNDP flexibility in responding to their requests. International partners and the country office’s own officers expressed concerns about the dispersion of UNDP Rwanda’s programmes.

UNDP Rwanda’s emerging role in the One UN reform pilot will enhance its status among government partners, but the country office will need to work hard to define and play a relevant role in the rapidly changing context of aid in Rwanda. UNDP will need to demonstrate a high degree of effectiveness and adaptability if it is to continue to have a credible niche in a context where GBS now constitutes almost half of Official Development Assistance in Rwanda. While the UNDP clearly has a privileged relationship with the government, it also has significant deficiencies—described elsewhere in this evaluation—that need to be addressed.

The use of GBS is expanding in Rwanda and similar instruments are increasing in importance at the sectoral level. The government’s capacity for managing these processes is steadily improving. UNDP Rwanda will need to avoid finding itself in competition with government partners, rather than in support of their coordination functions. UNDP will need to define new niches, building on the UNDAF process that has outlined UNDP’s broad future orientations, and credibly occupy them with real expertise in well defined areas of focus.

Partners in Rwanda underlined the need for UNDP to be more transparent, to provide clearer and more timely reporting, and to enhance the reliability of the core resources they bring to the table. Improvements in these areas can strengthen the country office’s credibility and its capacity to collaborate with partners.

UNDP in Rwanda plays more than one role: donor, facilitator, spokesperson, catalyst, special government partner, and so on. It needs to be clear which role it is playing at any given moment. Claims to a given role in a given context should be transparent and plausible. For example, if UNDP is to maintain a credible role as spokesperson for the international community, then it needs to demonstrate that its close relationship with the GoR does not compromise its capacity to assess government actions (or inactions) with sufficient objectivity.

The One UN reform pilot will highlight the importance of playing a clear and transparent role within the UN family as well. UNDP’s role within the UNDAF must be elaborated upon in a CCF that lays out, for the benefit of all partners, its guiding vision and strategy for achieving it in the context of the One UN approach.

Sharpening the focus of the UNDP Rwanda programme will make it easier to enhance the consistency of its technical expertise in core areas, another need mentioned frequently by international and government partners. A more focused UNDP programme can be administered more
efficiently, but it can only be achieved with stronger human resource management. It should avoid, for example, using highly qualified technical or policy specialists to implement procurement procedures, or having generalist managers participate in policy dialogues where more highly qualified sectoral specialists are needed. Both problems have been recurrent in recent years, damaging staff morale and UNDP Rwanda’s delivery capacity and reputation.

5.5.2 THE WIDENING GAP BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL
Another issue raised by a number of international and government partners as well as civil society organizations was the need for UNDP Rwanda to ‘stay in touch’ with the reality of Rwandan development outside the capital and other major towns. Rwanda’s rapidly growing agrarian population inhabits a crowded rural landscape with few economic opportunities and a bitter legacy of socio-political division. Since 1994, many Rwandans have returned from surrounding countries and issues of land ownership and tenure continue to cause concern. Developments in the impoverished rural areas will play a critical role in determining Rwanda’s long term stability. There is a perception among many partners that the UNDP programme has become more focused on upstream activities in Kigali, even when these are related to decentralization. This entails the risk that UNDP and its capacity for sound policy advice could be compromised if it doesn’t maintain a clear and up-to-date understanding of conditions in the countryside, where 85 percent of the population lives.

After its people, land is Rwanda’s most important asset and a cornerstone of the economy. Rwandan social and cultural traditions are closely tied to the land. Growing numbers of landless people, livestock herds and urban-rural inequality all exacerbate tensions surrounding rural land scarcity. In this context, it is critical for UNDP Rwanda to stay well informed on efforts to enhance the quality of health, education, basic infrastructure, and services and agriculture-sector support at local levels outside Rwanda’s major centres. Staying informed about the effectiveness of efforts to empower local populations and other dimensions of decentralization will only be possible with improved M&E systems. Together with the government and international partners, the efficacy of all activities supported by UNDP—such as support for decentralization, support for decentralized environmental management, and support for decentralized justice systems—need to be systematically and reliably measured. A stronger dialogue with Rwanda’s civil society organizations would help to strengthen the country office’s capacity to track evolving conditions in rural areas.

5.5.3 MAINTAINING POLITICAL AND REGIONAL STABILITY WHILE PROMOTING EQUITY AND DEMOCRACY
Whatever happens in Rwanda over the coming decades will have consequences far beyond its own borders. While still economically marginal, the country is at the centre of the western Great Lakes region, one of Africa’s densest and most volatile populations. As the world saw in the late 1990s and early 2000s, events in Rwanda have tremendous effects on the neighbouring countries. The security situation in Rwanda, while vastly improved, was still being carefully monitored at the time of the evaluation. The same can be said for the western Great Lakes region more generally, particularly eastern Congo.

The GoR’s approach to regional issues has been highly proactive in recent years. Regional integration is a key pillar of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 and late in 2006, Rwanda (along with Burundi) was provisionally accepted into the East Africa Community, an established regional
trade association of neighbours to the east. This membership presents both opportunities and challenges. In the short term, Rwanda risks being swamped with goods from its larger eastern neighbours, but the GoR is betting that East Africa Community accession will stimulate the development of trade, infrastructure, tourism and so on while allowing Rwanda to define a lucrative niche for itself as an intermediary between the three original East Africa Community countries and the resource-rich francophone region west of Lake Kivu.

Many analysts would suggest that, if Rwanda is to derive the expected benefits from regional integration, it will have to take on this role of bridge between the eastern Congo and the East Africa Community. Otherwise it faces considerable risk of remaining a backwater of the community, with much cost to local industries that can’t compete and little commensurate longer-term benefit. This analysis underlines Rwanda’s strong national interest in ensuring stability in the Congo and its strong vested interest in the ongoing success of UN peacekeeping efforts there. In its evolving role at the centre of a single UN, UNDP Rwanda may be called upon to play some non-traditional roles, helping to strengthen functional links across the border for example, between a range of UN supported initiatives and other initiatives that serve to strengthen the Congo’s delicate stability.
Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 CONCLUSIONS

6.1.1 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
The UNDP country office has effective working relationships with the GoR and the government considers UNDP contributions to be very relevant. However, highly relevant UNDP contributions have sometimes been delivered with less-than-optimal efficiency, particularly in governance and environment. The main problems have been shortcomings in programme administration, management and financing.

UNDP support for poverty reduction has been increasingly upstream-oriented and geared towards institutional support and policy development while direct, field-level interventions have diminished. UNDP and UNEP support should help GoR ensure that their emerging EDPRS will effectively be a ‘sustainable development strategy’.

Overall, UNDP has made significant progress towards a more sustainable long-term development approach, though several UNDP projects still play gap-filling roles. The dispersion of the UNDP programme across many small projects in multiple thematic areas impedes efforts to improve the quality of programme administration and technical expertise in its core areas.

6.1.2 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
With UNDP support, Rwanda and its development partners have made considerable progress in the harmonization and alignment of international cooperation and their experience should be of interest to the international community.

Systematic performance monitoring is lacking in most UNDP interventions. This has a direct negative impact on their relevance and efficiency.

6.1.3 STRATEGIC POSITIONING
External factors that will most significantly shape UNDP’s strategic environment in future years are the new architecture of aid, including the One UN approach being piloted in Rwanda, and regional and national stability. Participation in the pilot for UN reform will enhance the status of UNDP in Rwanda but also place greater pressure on the country office to improve its performance and address areas of chronic weakness across the UNDP system related to human resource management, administrative and technical services, and monitoring and evaluation. Partners within and outside the UN system in Rwanda expect more clarity from UNDP regarding the nature of its role in Rwanda. The situation in Rwanda’s crowded rural areas and in surrounding countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, will continue to be critical determinants of the country’s long term stability. UNDP Rwanda must stay well informed of these dimensions of Rwandan reality.

6.2 LESSONS LEARNED

6.2.1 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
Strong government ownership and leadership greatly accelerate progress towards effective alignment and harmonization of international cooperation.

6.2.2 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
Systematic capacity development, including training and skills transfer, needs to be an integral part of any project, regardless of its technical contents or institutional set-up.

6.2.3 STRATEGIC POSITIONING
Chronic administrative and management deficiencies, if not addressed effectively, can undermine partners’ faith in the country office’s capacity to provide high quality support.
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

6.3.1 DEVELOPMENT RESULTS
If environment is to be retained as one of two areas of focus for UNDP under the new UNDAF, then the country office needs to enhance its capacity to provide strong technical and policy support and to participate effectively and consistently in the national dialogue on interactions among environment, development and poverty.

UNDP should launch a dialogue with the GoR with the aim of expanding UNDP partnerships with Rwandan civil society organizations.

UNDP needs to ensure an ongoing dialogue and careful monitoring in response to reports of tensions surrounding the operations of the Gacaca system.

Project designs need to be consistently based on initial analyses of problems and clear objectives defined together with stakeholders. Project documents should consistently follow UNDP guidelines as well as international norms and standards. The role of steering committees in project design should be clarified and strengthened with the objective of enhancing national ownership and sustainability.

6.3.2 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
With support from headquarters, the country office needs to establish a robust, functional M&E system that systematically generates ‘lessons learned’ then ensures these are reflected in programme management and design decisions.

National ownership and the sustainability of results should be strengthened by ensuring that on-the-job training and skills transfer activities figure prominently in the terms of reference of all technical assistance contracted by UNDP Rwanda.

Separate, autonomous project implementation units can impede national ownership and sustainability. They should be replaced, where possible, with technical assistance that works directly within government institutions—using and adapting their systems and mechanisms for project management. The country office should prepare a strategy to phase out autonomous project implementation units in collaboration with the concerned GoR institutions and development partners.

The results of the gender audit should be used to raise the profile on gender in UNDP Rwanda’s portfolio, from an ‘incidental concern’ to a core issue. This should build on the UNDP successful support to Rwanda’s women politicians.

6.3.3 STRATEGIC POSITIONING
UNDP should sharpen the focus of their programme, concentrating on areas within the second UNDAF framework where UNDP can bring the most value added while strengthening corresponding in-house capacities. The country office needs to strengthen their human resource planning and management, with headquarters’ support.

The country office also needs to improve its capacity for ensuring that clear and useful financial information can be shared with government and cost sharing partners in a timely and effective manner.

UNDP should help GoR to foster harmonization and alignment among those development partners that pursue the project approach, building on UNDP Rwanda’s experience in aid coordination. UNDP should explore the options for assuming a facilitator’s role to support the pooling of technical assistance from different development partners.

UNDP needs to clearly identify its role in each context where it intervenes, ensuring that other members of the UNCT and other development partners in Rwanda understand what role UNDP Rwanda is playing in any given situation. UNDP needs to focus on roles where it can achieve maximum coherence and synergies with the programmes of these partners.
UNDP should look for ways to help GoR enhance national and regional stability. The country office should look for opportunities to play non-traditional roles within UNDP’s areas of focus, in the context of One UN. For example, they should consider options for helping to strengthen cross-border programming links that can contribute to the stabilization of the Kivu region. Nationally, UNDP should continue support to strengthening the rule of law and the decentralization process. Enhanced ties between UNDP and Rwandan civil society are needed to improve UNDP capacities in these areas.
Annex A

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UN COORDINATION


Annex B
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Kananura, Paul, Executive Secretary, Transparency Rwanda

Ndahumba, Jean Baptiste, Executive Secretary, Rwanda Rw’Ubu Center for Orphan and Vulnerable Children

Edwin, Mitchell, Former Project Manager, Decentralized Environmental Management Project, Lima, Peru
## Annex C

### MATRIX OF EVALUATION QUESTIONS

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<tr>
<th>Performance Area</th>
<th>Key Issue</th>
<th>Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Data Sources and Review Tools</th>
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</table>
| 1. Programme results | 1.1 Effectiveness in delivering development results | GENERAL QUESTIONS ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN  
1.1.1 What are the main contributions to development for which UNDP is recognized in Rwanda?  
1.1.2 To what extent is UNDP being recognized for contributing to significant development outcomes in Rwanda in each of its practice and cross-cutting areas?  
1.1.3 To what extent, and how, do these contributions relate to the intended outcomes that UNDP has strived to achieve?  
1.1.4 Were there any unintended results or consequences from the work during this period?  
1.1.5 What are the implications of any mismatch with what was intended?  
1.1.6 Is progress on track to enable UNDP to achieve its intended results as planned?  
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS EMERGED IN SCOPING MISSION  
1.1.7 Higher level results? How well are outputs contributing to outcomes, outcomes to objectives? E.g.:  
- Were the 2003 and 2006 elections fair and transparent?  
- Does UNDP support to GoR to work with rural courts have an impact? For example, in numbers of people processed, numbers of new laws promulgated and the effects of these? Effects of support to the Gacaca traditional justice system? Reactions to these results from the survivor versus non-survivor communities?  
- Effects of UNDP support to GoR’s successive decentralization policies? Are these policies sufficiently well planned and supported? Decentralized offices given sufficient technical and budgetary support and capacity development to assume their new roles? Proper assessment of needs at decentralized levels?  
- Effective monitoring mechanisms in place, e.g., to inform budget allocation systems? To measure level of satisfaction of local needs? Are the rapid successive changes in the organization of decentralization creating confusion?  
- Public sector reform: Is it addressing the right issues? What kind of analysis has guided programme planning and activities? What legal changes have emerged? What exposure have they had to analogous issues and responses in comparable countries? |  
- Documented analyses of national development changes and achievements in Rwanda  
- MDGRs, NHDRs, CCA and other relevant national reports  
- National FYPs and other development strategies  
- UNDP programme documents  
- Supplementary preparatory studies  
- Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)  
- RTM reports  
- Expert opinion survey  
- Key informant interviews  
- District administrator interviews  
- CO team interviews  
- Focus group discussions  
- Field visit observations  
- Stakeholder workshops |
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<tr>
<td>1. Programme results</td>
<td>1.2 Factors influencing the achievement of development results</td>
<td><strong>GENERAL QUESTIONS</strong>&lt;br&gt;ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN&lt;br&gt;1.2.1 To what extent has UNDP been <strong>responsive to national and local needs and priorities</strong>?&lt;br&gt;1.2.2 To what extent has UNDP been <strong>effective in maximizing its comparative advantage and niche</strong> to deliver its results?&lt;br&gt;1.2.3 To what extent does UNDP use a <strong>clear, coherent and appropriate strategy to maximize opportunities</strong> to contribute to development in Rwanda?&lt;br&gt;1.2.4 To what extent do the <strong>programme assumptions and key drivers for its priorities</strong> improve its chances of delivering the most effective and relevant results?&lt;br&gt;1.2.5 To what extent has UNDP been effective in <strong>maximizing the synergies</strong> between the component parts of its programme and organization to deliver the results?&lt;br&gt;1.2.6 To what extent, and how have the <strong>range and quality of its partnerships</strong> influenced the achievement of results? To what extent has UNDP been effective in making use of the <strong>opportunities for harmonization</strong> of its efforts with those of potential partners?&lt;br&gt;1.2.7 To what extent, and how, have the <strong>implementation capacity and approach</strong> of the CO influenced UNDP’s contribution to development results?&lt;br&gt;1.2.8 To what extent, and how has <strong>UNDP’s strategic position in Rwanda</strong> affected its achievements?&lt;br&gt;1.2.9 What other conditions and factors have had a significant influence on the achievement of UNDP’s development results?</td>
<td>▪ Has support to Parliament facilitated anonymity of voting there? Value of the lessons emerging?&lt;br&gt;▪ How much skill transfer has taken place, for example, in technical assistance support for economic planning?&lt;br&gt;1.1.8 Are all five units achieving satisfactory results? If not, why not? Are the activities of some units too dispersed over too many different types of activities (110 active projects, $8 million annual budget, five units of which a couple are not very internally coherent, e.g., JHAG)? How could the operations of the CO be better organized/rationalized?&lt;br&gt;1.1.9 What are the impacts of UNDP’s interventions among local populations (particularly in relation to the goals of poverty reduction and improved governance)?&lt;br&gt;1.1.10 How has the UNDP contributed to the development of the capacities of partner institutions and more specifically to the development of their human resources?&lt;br&gt;1.1.11 Are UNDP programmes responding to the real needs of target groups?</td>
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<td>Performance Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC QUESTIONS EMERGED IN SCOPING MISSION</td>
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<td>1.2.10</td>
<td>What are UNDP Rwanda's capacity limitations? Does it suffer from a weak institutional framework? Does it have effective systems for learning from experience and effective quality control norms? Does it take the time to establish and then consistently meet performance standards?</td>
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<td>1.2.11</td>
<td>Where is the UNDP Rwanda programme realizing opportunities for synergies among the five programming units? E.g., through a coherent and mutually reinforcing approach to supporting decentralization?</td>
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<td>1.2.12</td>
<td>What is UNDP Rwanda's real capacity to provide policy advice on governance and other issues? Has it brought to bear high-quality policy analysis and advice?</td>
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<td>1.2.13</td>
<td>How much is the continuity, coherence, competence and direction of UNDP Rwanda's programme planning and delivery dependent on individuals, starting with the Resident Representative? How much does it suffer from the effects of frequent personnel changes? How might this issue be addressed?</td>
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<td>1.2.14</td>
<td>Are problems of continuity and long-term coherence exacerbated by chronic vagaries and uncertainties in staffing, enhancing the rate of loss of the best human resources (i.e., those with the best opportunities to seek alternative opportunities)?</td>
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<td>1.2.15</td>
<td>Where should UNDP Rwanda's programme focus? How could it narrow this focus on to a more easily manageable portfolio?</td>
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<td>1.2.16</td>
<td>Are UNDP's budgets sufficient to meet the needs of its government partners?</td>
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<td>1.2.17</td>
<td>Is the UNDP approach too broad, its activities too spread out? Should it concentrate its activities more, to have greater and more tangible impacts and visibility, in relation to other donors?</td>
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<td>1.2.18</td>
<td>How efficient/rapid/flexible are UNDP's decision-making and approval processes during the project development stage, compared with expectations of partners?</td>
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<td>1.2.19</td>
<td>Does UNDP have the necessary capacity, human resources especially, to meet its own responsibilities?</td>
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<td>1.2.20</td>
<td>Does UNDP respond effectively and quickly enough to recommendations emerging from mid-term evaluations?</td>
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<td>1.2.21</td>
<td>How well does UNDP follow up to determine the longer term sustainability of its interventions and results perhaps a year or two after the end of projects, for example?</td>
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<td>1.2.22</td>
<td>Is there a problem of lack of continuity of UNDP staff working on national programmes? What does UNDP do to help meet programmes' needs for stability and continuity?</td>
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- Field visit observations
- Stakeholder workshops
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<tr>
<td>1. Programme results</td>
<td>1.3 Sustainability of development results</td>
<td><strong>GENERAL QUESTIONS</strong> ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN&lt;br&gt;1.3.1 To what extent will the intended results of UNDP remain relevant within the changing context of development in Rwanda? &lt;br&gt;1.3.2 Does UNDP have effective strategies in place to increase the likelihood of lasting effects from its development contributions? &lt;br&gt;1.3.3 Are there any socio-cultural, political, economic or other aspects that may endanger the sustainability of the results and benefits of the work of UNDP? &lt;br&gt;1.3.4 Do adequate systemic, technical and financial capacities and commitments exist within key role players to capitalize on UNDP’s contributions to development?&lt;br&gt;<strong>SPECIFIC QUESTIONS</strong> EMERGED IN SCOPING MISSION&lt;br&gt;1.3.5 How well are GoR’s needs being met with UNDP support, such as the Integrated Support Project to MINECOFIN? &lt;br&gt;1.3.6 What conclusions can be drawn from data available at MINECOFIN? &lt;br&gt;1.3.7 What is UNDP’s capacity/fitness to respond to unforeseen needs that emerge during project implementation? (For example, the Ministry of Justice)</td>
<td>• UNDP programme documents&lt;br&gt;• National FYPs and other development strategies&lt;br&gt;• Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)&lt;br&gt;• Expert opinion survey&lt;br&gt;• Key informant interviews&lt;br&gt;• District administrator interviews&lt;br&gt;• CO team interviews&lt;br&gt;• Focus group discussions&lt;br&gt;• Stakeholder workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Strategic positioning</td>
<td>2.1 Relevance</td>
<td><strong>GENERAL QUESTIONS</strong> ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN&lt;br&gt;2.1.1 To what extent have UNDP’s programmes been relevant to Rwanda’s most pressing national needs?&lt;br&gt;2.1.2 To what extent have UNDP’s programmes been relevant to the GoR’s national development goals and strategies?</td>
<td>• UNDP and UNDAF programme documents&lt;br&gt;• MDGRs, NHDRs, CCA and other relevant national reports</td>
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</table>
| 2. Strategic positioning | 2.2 Responsive-ness | **GENERAL QUESTIONS** ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN  
2.2.1 To what extent and in what manner (ad hoc, planned, strategic, cautious, etc.; building partnerships, coordinating, piloting, etc.) has UNDP anticipated and responded to significant changes in the development context relevant to its areas of intervention?  
2.2.2 To what extent and in what manner has UNDP been able to capitalize on opportunities and emerging issues? To what extent has this affected its ability to focus on its own goals and vision?  
2.2.3 How effectively and in what manner has UNDP anticipated and dealt with problems and constraints?  
2.2.4 To what extent were timely and adequate adjustments made to the CCF, SRF and MYFF to reflect changing needs and priorities? **SPECIFIC QUESTIONS** EMERGED IN SCOPING MISSION  
2.2.5 Does GoR have faith in UNDP as a partner? If not why not?  
2.2.6 Do UNDP Rwanda’s government and donor partners have a clear vision of UNDP’s role in Rwanda? How does this correspond with UNDP Rwanda’s self image and strategy?  
2.2.7 Where there is lack of clarity about UNDP’s role, what kinds of problems does this engender? How should this issue be addressed in the future? | - National FYPs and other development strategies  
- Supplementary preparatory studies  
- Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)  
- RTM reports  
- Expert opinion survey  
- Key informant interviews  
- District administrator interviews  
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<td>2. Strategic positioning</td>
<td>2.3 Alignment with MDGs</td>
<td>ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN</td>
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<td>2.3.1 To what extent are the CCF, SRF and MYFF <strong>strategically linked</strong> to the achievement of the MDGs?</td>
<td>UNDP programme documents</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.3.2 To what extent have <strong>partnerships</strong> been formed to address the MDGs? Are mechanisms in place for collaboration and knowledge sharing?</td>
<td>MDGRs</td>
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<td>2.3.3 To what extent has UNDP been active in <strong>raising national awareness</strong> around the MDGs?</td>
<td>National FYPs and other development strategies</td>
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<td>2.3.4 To what extent is UNDP supporting the <strong>monitoring of progress and preparing MDG reports</strong>?</td>
<td>Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)</td>
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<td><strong>Supplementary preparatory studies</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Expert opinion survey</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Key informant interviews</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Stakeholder workshops</strong></td>
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<td>2. Strategic positioning</td>
<td>2.4 Alignment with the UN system</td>
<td>ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN</td>
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<td>2.4.1 How relevant are the intended SRF and MYFF outcomes to the <strong>intended results of the UN system</strong> as expressed in UNDAF?</td>
<td>UNDP and UNDAF programme documents</td>
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<td>2.4.2 How effectively is UNDP <strong>contributing to UNDAF goals</strong>?</td>
<td>Supplementary preparatory studies</td>
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<td>2.4.3 How effective is the <strong>cooperation strategy with other UN agencies</strong> within these addressed areas?</td>
<td>Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)</td>
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<td>2.4.4 To what extent are <strong>major programmes designed in active coordination</strong> with other UN agencies?</td>
<td>RTM reports</td>
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<td>2.4.5 To what extent is UNDP active in <strong>areas not indicated in the UNDAF</strong>? What are the implications of this?</td>
<td>Expert opinion survey</td>
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<td>2.4.6 How effectively has UNDP <strong>leveraged the resources of others</strong> towards results?</td>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
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<td><strong>Focus group discussions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Strategic positioning</td>
<td>2.5 Partnerships</td>
<td><strong>GENERAL QUESTIONS</strong> ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN</td>
<td>■ National FYPs and other development strategies</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.5.1 Given the existing relationships between the GoR and donors; CSOs, NGOs, the private sector and donors; and donors, how well is UNDP positioned to contribute to development in Rwanda? Does it have a unique role compared to those of other donors?</td>
<td>■ Supplementary preparatory studies, including map and analysis of development partnerships</td>
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<td>2.5.2 What are the key development funding modalities used in Rwanda and how effective are those of UNDP?</td>
<td>■ Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)</td>
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<td>2.5.3 To what extent is UNDP playing a role in promoting coordination between the GoR and donors, donors, and CSOs and donors?</td>
<td>■ Expert opinion survey</td>
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<td>2.5.4 What are the implications for UNDP of the anticipated changes in the donor environment over the next 5 to 10 years?</td>
<td>■ Key informant interviews</td>
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<td>2.5.5 What are the implications for UNDP of the large amounts of donor funding from non-resident agencies flowing into Rwanda?</td>
<td>■ Focus group discussions</td>
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<td>2.5.6 To what extent has UNDP leveraged support and funding of partners and donors? What were mitigating and constraining factors?</td>
<td>■ Stakeholder workshops</td>
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<td><strong>SPECIFIC QUESTIONS</strong> Erupted in Scoping Mission</td>
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<td>2.5.7 Do donors trust UNDP as a partner? If not, why not?</td>
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<td>2.5.8 What do donors perceive as UNDP Rwanda’s primary strengths and comparative advantages?</td>
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<td>2.5.9 What is the ‘UNDP brand’ in Rwanda? What should it be? E.g., governance? MDGs? Capacity development? Systems development? Facilitating dialogue(s) between GoR and international community?</td>
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<td>2.5.10 Perceptions of UNDP Rwanda’s main weaknesses, e.g.:</td>
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<td>■ Is UNDP spread too thin?</td>
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<td>■ Is it too close to GoR and not sufficiently neutral?</td>
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<td>■ Is there a necessary level of impartiality to ensure effective aid coordination?</td>
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<td>■ Does UNDP’s close relationship with GoR erode the value of its advice?</td>
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<td>■ Does the Resident Coordinator devote too much time to UN reform at the expense of UNDP?</td>
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<td>2.5.11 Does UNDP need a Resident Representative separate from Resident Coordinator?</td>
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<td>2.5.12 Are synergies being achieved between UNDP supported programmes and those of other international partners? How can greater synergies be achieved? Examples?</td>
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<td>2.5.13 UNDP and World Bank support to developing internet capacities at the district level?</td>
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<td>2.5.14 How well are the 10 ‘development clusters’ functioning? What contributes to their relative strengths and weaknesses? What are UNDP Rwanda’s contributions and how could these be enhanced?</td>
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</table>
| 2. Strategic positioning | 2.6 Factors influencing UNDP’s position | **GENERAL QUESTIONS** ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN  
2.6.1 What were the key internal and external influences on UNDP’s ability to respond to and position itself in changing contexts?  
2.6.2 To what extent and how effectively is UNDP’s position in Rwanda guided by a clear-cut vision and strategy?  
2.6.3 Does UNDP have adequate and effective technical and administrative capacity and systems to play its perceived and intended role in Rwanda?  
2.6.4 To what extent, and how, are policy and administrative constraints affecting UNDP’s position and role in Rwanda?  
2.6.5 To what extent, and how, have UNDP’s development contributions affected its position and role in Rwanda?  
2.6.6 To what extent is UNDP contributing to effective learning and knowledge sharing among development partners and programme participants?  
2.6.7 To what extent, and how, has UNDP’s partnership approach influenced its position and role in Rwanda? |  
- Supplementary preparatory studies  
- Progress and evaluation reports (including ROAR, MYFF)  
- Expert opinion survey  
- Key informant interviews  
- District administrator interviews  
- CO team interviews  
- Focus group discussions  
- Stakeholder workshops |
| 2. Strategic positioning | 2.7 Future role and positioning | **GENERAL QUESTIONS** ADAPTED FROM ADR IN BHUTAN  
2.7.1 What are the key external factors most likely to have a significant influence on UNDP’s future role and position in Rwanda over the next 5 to 10 years?  
2.7.2 What are the key emerging areas of support that would become significant for UNDP over the next 5 to 10 years?  
2.7.3 What lessons and good practice will help UNDP determine and play its most effective role in Rwanda?  
2.7.4 How should UNDP adjust its areas of work and strategies to be best positioned in Rwanda to fulfill its mission? |  
- Country documents, including FYPs  
- Key informants  
- Focus group discussions  
- ADR analysis  
- Stakeholder workshops |

Notes: ADR indicates Assessment of Development Results; CCA, Common Country Assessment; CCF, Country Cooperation Framework; CO, Country Office; FYP, Fiscal-Year Plan; CSO, Civil Society Organization; DP, Development Partner; GoR, Government of Rwanda; MDGR, Millennium Development Goals Report; MYFF, Multi-Year Funding Framework; NHDR, National Human Development Report; NGO, Non-governmental Organization; ROAR, Results-Oriented Annual Report; RTM, Round Table Meeting; SRF, Strategic Results Framework; UNDAF, United Nations Development Assistance Framework.
### 1. Outcomes related to the MDGs and poverty reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Factors Supporting the Achievement</th>
<th>Challenges Related to the Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance able to effectively monitor poverty trends and formulate policies, strategies and plans to address poverty in Rwanda.</td>
<td>- Strong leadership and policy orientation of GoR/MINECOFIN.</td>
<td>- Little involvement of civil society.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Harmonized and aligned contribution by several development partners through a basket fund.</td>
<td>- Important development partners (World Bank, Belgium) do not contribute through the basket fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Important financial volume of the contribution increases the potential of a significant impact.</td>
<td>- High volumes of external technical assistance may decrease the sustainability of the contribution.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- Increasing capacity of NISR.</td>
<td>- Outcome relates to complicated processes that may pose important challenges in administration and management of the contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- PRSP has been evaluated and there is significant experience to formulate EDPRS.</td>
<td>- Little effort in incorporation of cross-cutting issues such as gender.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- APRM by NEPAD has made a substantial contribution to policy formulation.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Clear linkage between MDGs and GoR policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHDR prepared addressing national priority issues.</td>
<td>- Important background and preparatory work has been done.</td>
<td>- NHDR has not been published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- NHDR preparatory process has involved a number of national stakeholders.</td>
<td>- Potential NHDR contributions to national policy dialogue diminished due to delays in publication.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2. Outcomes related to democratic governance in Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Factors Supporting the Achievement</th>
<th>Challenges Related to the Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Legal and institutional frameworks that enable free, fair, transparent and sustainable elections at all levels in place. | Support to the National Electoral Commission has been vital in conducting the elections in 2003 and 2006.  
Existence of and long-term relationship with the NEC.  
Comprehensive electoral mechanism is in place.  
Capacity to implement local level elections exists.  
Joint development partner contribution to the electoral process through a basket fund.  
Involvement of several CSOs in the electoral process.  
Special attention paid to female voters. | Electoral code has not yet been adopted by the GoR.  
NEC's continuing dependence on donor support may diminish the sustainability of the outcome.  
Inadequate management of the basket fund of 2003 elections decreased the perspective of development partner collaboration. |
| Local governments able to assume their responsibilities in planning and service delivery and MINALOC able to provide effective oversight and guidance for the decentralization process in Rwanda. | Long-term and wide-ranging support to MINALOC.  
Direct support to district and local governments and communities through targeted projects.  
Support to sub-national governments is allocated through their own development plans. | Possible lack of relevance in the GoR decentralization policy and strategy may decrease the potential of the UNDP support.  
Upstreaming of UNDP interventions may diminish the impact at local level.  
Impact-oriented contribution to the decentralization process may be reduced to institutional support to MINALOC.  
Key development partners in the sector don’t agree on certain strategic aspects.  
Administrative and project management difficulties have brought about increases in transaction costs.  
Little involvement of CSOs in UNDP's support to the sector. |
| Rwanda's public service reform programme effectively implemented for greater public sector efficiency and Parliament able to realize the representative and oversight duties of elected members. | Capacity building of the public administration is highly relevant to the GoR.  
UNDP has provided important material support and training to key institutions of public service.  
Although not yet commenced, the support to Ombudsman's Office has the potential to improve efficiency and transparency of the public service. | Public service reform is a highly political issue in which several key issues are beyond a donor's influence.  
Division of UNDP's support to several institutions may have reduced its strategic focus.  
Administrative difficulties have reduced the effect of UNDP contributions. |

Annex E

FACTORS INFLUENCING UNDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO AID COORDINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Factors Supporting the Achievement</th>
<th>Challenges Related to the Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved government capacity for leading the aid coordination, harmonization and alignment process for improved efficiency and poverty impact of aid.</td>
<td>MINECOFIN/EFU will assume the key role in aid coordination starting 2008.</td>
<td>Some of the UNDP’s practices are not in line with ACHA principles.</td>
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<td>UNDP contributed to the preparation of the GoR Aid Policy.</td>
<td>In most line ministries, the ACHA principles have not yet been entirely operationalized.</td>
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<td>Harmonized collaboration between key development partners through a basket fund.</td>
<td>UNDP may have difficulties in maintaining its expertise in ACHA issues as the respective capacities of the GoR and other development partners grow.</td>
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<td>Existence and functioning of the DPCG and cluster round tables.</td>
<td>Concentration of ACHA operations in MINECOFIN as well as the deep-rooted project approach may dilute a wider operationalization of alignment and harmonization.</td>
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<td>CSOs participate in activities of the ACHA framework, thus improving their involvement in policy dialogue.</td>
<td>M&amp;E of the aid coordination is not yet completely functional.</td>
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<td>Development Assistance Database and baseline survey on aid effectiveness strengthen the GoR capacity in aid coordination.</td>
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<td>Development partners Web site is an effective tool in sharing and disseminating information.</td>
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<td>Exchange and collaboration with OECD-DAC and other countries.</td>
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<td>High significance of the UNDP contribution to aid coordination is generally acknowledged.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: ACHA indicates Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment; CSO, Civil Society Organization; DP, Development Partner; DPCG, Development Partners Coordination Group; EFU, External Finance Unit; GoR, Government of Rwanda; M&E, Monitoring and Evaluation; MINECOFIN, Ministry of Economics and Finance; OECD-DAC, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee.
Since last year, the CO has decided to move from this restricted vision of CD and the fragmented ‘stop and go’ nature of interventions and start developing a long term strategy:

In September 2006, the CO, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Planning, the Ministry of Public Service and Labour and the Human Resources and Institutional Development Agency, UNDP organized a National Workshop on capacity building. The main objective of the workshop was to provide a forum for capacity building stakeholders in all the key sectors of the economy to have a common view on ‘capacity’, appreciate its importance, and work closely to ensure that it’s a major ingredient in the components of the EDPRS.

SKILLS AUDIT
This study is being undertaken by the Ministry in Charge of Public Service (MIFOTRA) and the World Bank. It will concentrate on individual skills (professionals per sector) gaps like the number of physicians available, those who are needed for the next EDPRS, etc. The objective of this assignment is to identify gaps in critical skills required to deliver on priority programmes under the PRSP Capacity Development.

INITIATIVES MAPPING
It is meant to be a mapping exercise of the current capacity development interventions in the country: projects and current initiatives in the area of capacity development, source of funding, amount/budget allocated, activities, actors, implementation arrangements, monitoring/evaluation mechanism, duration, etc. UNDP is assisting Human Resources and Institutional Development Agency to carry out the mapping.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT
This initiative is being carried out by UNDP as well and it should focus on institutional capacity gaps like systems, procedures, manuals, legal policy frameworks, partnership, etc. It has been decided that an important element of the Needs Assessment will be a capacity gap assessment and a subsequent elaboration of a capacity support and building strategy, which will run in parallel to the Economic Development for Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), now being designed.

Using the above analyses, UNDP and the World Bank will assist the Rwandan Government to develop a National Integrated Skills Development Policy and a Global CD National Strategy, that lays strategic measures of filling the gaps and continuously addressing, in a sustainable manner, means and methods of strategic development of individual and institutional capacity aimed at promoting economic, and employment growth and social development that are commensurate with the Government of Rwanda Development Goals. The strategies will then guide all development programmes.

Annex G

UNDP RWANDA EVALUATION COVERAGE, 2000–2006

In the Governance Unit, only three projects have been evaluated in the period 2000–2006:

- Mid-term Review of the Support to Capacity Building and Civil Service Reform in Rwanda, August 2003
- Mid-term Report of Good Governance and Poverty Reduction, no date
- Evaluation and Impact Assessment of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), December 2005

The Governance Unit plans five project evaluations to take place in 2007 and one in 2008.

Among the projects managed by the Strategic Planning and Economic Management Unit, three evaluations are foreseen in 2007. So far only one has been evaluated:

- Support to Formulation of National Poverty Strategy

In the Justice, HIV/AIDS and Gender Unit, one project has been evaluated to date:

- Capacity Development for Strengthening of National Response to HIV/AIDS in Rwanda (Mid-term Review)

Full evaluation of HIV project support to National Council for the Struggle Against AIDS will be done in 2007.

The Sustainable Livelihoods Unit has undertaken the following:

- Mid-term review of the Resettlement and Reintegration Projects in Gisenyi and Kibuye Provinces
- Final evaluation of Food Security Initiative through Small-scale Dairy Development in Rwanda

The Aid Coordination Unit is expected to be the object of an external evaluation in 2007.