**UNDP Global Programme** onStrengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development

(Phase III)

**Report on**

**Interim Evaluation**

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

A2J Access to justice

ADR Alternative dispute resolution

CAR Central African Republic

CO Country Office (UNDP)

CTA Chief Technical Advisor

DPO Department for Peace Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General

EU European Union

GFP Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections

GANHRI Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions

GPN Global Policy Network of UNDP

GP(3) Global Programme (Phase 3)

HRBA Human rights-based approach

HQ Headquarters

INL Bureau of International Narcoticsand Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S. State Department)

IIAG Ibrahim Index of African Governance

ISACS International Small Arms Control Standards

ISSAT International Security Sector Advisory Team

JJP Joint Justice Programme (Somalia)

JP Joint Programme

LNOB Leave No One Behind

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MPTF Multi-Partner Trust Fund

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OROLSI Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions

PBF Peacebuilding Fund (of UN)

Prodoc Project Document

P-CVE Preventing and countering violent extremism

RBM Results-based management

RCO Resident Coordinator’s Office

RO Regional Office

ROAR Results Oriented Annual Report

ROL Rule of law

ROLSHR Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights

RR Resident Representative (UNDP)

SALIENT The Saving Lives Entity

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

SG Secretary General (of the UN)

SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SP Strategic Plan

SSR Security Sector Reform

TOR Terms of Reference

UN United Nations

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNISS United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel

UNODA United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service

UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

UNV UN Volunteers

U.S. United States of America

# Executive Summary

1. ***Programme Background***

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has long recognized that strong commitments to the rule of law, security and human rights are imperative to achieving and sustaining peace and building resilience. These commitments entered a new phase in 2008 when the *Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (the GP)* commenced. Ever since, UNDP has been providing targeted assistance to countries threatened or affected by crisis or other types of fragility (in addition to its work in other contexts). Substantive thematic areas covered by the GP have always included rule of law (ROL), justice and security. Under its latest iteration, the third phase which started in 2016, the programme expanded to explicitly include the area of human rights (previously covered by a separate “Global Human Rights Strengthening Programme” from 2009 – 2014, which was not limited to crisis affected contexts). The Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights (ROLSHR) team situated within the UNDP Crisis Bureau leads the implementation of the third phase of the Global Programme for Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development” (GP3), which is the subject of this evaluation*.*

Seven interlinked thematic areas underpin the GP’s third phase: Political Engagement; Institution Building; Community Security; Human Rights Systems; Access to Justice; Transitional Justice; and Gender Justice. The GP seeks to assist UNDP Country Offices in developing and implementing comprehensive interventions that respond rapidly and effectively to needs on the ground in these areas, providing direct financial and technical support to approximately 40 country contexts as well as regional level initiatives. In addition, the GP team has a significant responsibility to lead and support policy development and guidance to internal and external partners and forms the basis for multiple global and policy development initiatives.

The GP has a range of substantive partners. Notably, the GP/ROLSHR team leads UNDP’s engagement with the Department of Peace Operations as joint managers of theGlobal Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP). The objective of the GFP arrangement is to facilitate UN entities to “deliver as one” on programming related to police, justice, and corrections, by overcoming systemic fragmentation and working together in the pursuit of shared goals. The GP, from the outset, has served as the host entity to operationalize the GFP.

Major donor partners of the GP include the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others. Total funding has amounted to approximately $167 million from 2016 to 2019.

1. ***Evaluation Objectives and Methodology***

This interim evaluation of GP Phase 3 aims to inform UNDP and its partners of lessons learned, results achieved and areas for improvements to ensure proper implementation and performance through the end of this programmatic phase in December 2021, and to feed into development of the anticipated fourth phase (2022-2026). This evaluation has aimed to assess the GP’s progress towards results and objectives, focusing on the period from January 2016 to December 2019, and to provide insights on the following elements:

* The ability of UNDP to function as an effective provider of ROLSHR programming support.
* The ability of the GP to leverage UNDP’s role as an international policy maker and thought leader on ROLSHR.
* The effectiveness and achievements of UNDP in forging interagency cooperation and implementation across the UN system.
* The GP’s contributions to UNDP’s Integrated Results and Resources Framework for the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2021 UNDP Strategic Plan.
* The ability of the current GP structure to manage finances and operations, meet partner expectations, and respond to the needs of priority countries.

The evaluation team of two experienced consultants was guided by the six evaluation criteria recommended by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. The evaluators organized the key evaluation questions and objectives in the Terms of Reference (TOR) based on those criteria, and the findings and conclusions of this report are presented according to that structure (with effectiveness and impact combined).

The evaluation captured and analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data. Secondary data was collected through a continuous comprehensive desk review process, including analysis of relevant global and country level documents, data/statistics, and previous evaluations and reviews. The evaluators gathered primary data through direct engagement with a wide range of stakeholders through semi-structured interviews. Informants included staff of UNDP at global, regional and country levels (including but not limited to GP and GFP teams), other UN entities, government and non-government counterparts in targeted countries, and key GP bilateral donors. Overall, 158 individuals were interviewed (84 male, 74 female).

The TOR stipulated that six unspecified countries would be the subject of “case studies”. The evaluation team initially designed a sampling process to identify a list of countries for consideration, however, the studied countries were ultimately determined by GP management in consultation with ROLSHR Focal Points and regional hub colleagues with final approval from the the Project Board. The countries were: Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Colombia, and Pakistan. The studies were designed as “instrumental” case studies to obtain insights into broader issues relevant to the GP, as compared to in-depth individual evaluations of country level programming. Selection of informants at global/regional level was largely guided by the GP management team. For country case studies, the informant selection process started with suggestions from the Focal Points responsible for those countries, which were fleshed out via consultations with in-country UNDP staff. The objective was to engage a broad spectrum of entities/persons capable of providing informed perspectives across the evaluative areas of interest.

The significant amount of data generated via the above-described interviews and meetings was summarized and analyzed using the six OECD evaluation criteria. Triangulation allowed a deeper understanding of the perspectives of diverse respondents and verification of findings from different sources. As well, the evaluation team attempted to analyze progress towards targets for the 17 output indicators and change in the five outcome level indicators, which rely on internationally recognized ranking and scoring systems. However, the scope of analysis was constrained by issues with the quality of data and meaningfulness of the output indicators, and limited information and relevance in relation to the outcome level indicators.

The evaluation team encountered various challenges and limitations, which included:

* The global scope and thematic complexity of the GP represented a challenge to comprehensive evaluation of four years of implementation, especially with an evaluation team of only two members with limited contract days.
* The period under evaluation was January 2016 to December 2019. Some informants were no longer available or found it hard to recall the earlier years and/or to distinguish between pre- and post-2020. In fact, developments after 2019 were relevant to impact and sustainability, and examination of GP’s business processes required consideration of the current situation. This made it necessary to also discuss and review data related to 2020.
* Due to Covid-19 travel constraints, the entire mission was home-based. Evaluators could not visit any programme contexts or meet in person with interlocutors at field or headquarters level. This made it more difficult to obtain a clear understanding of each context and to establish rapport with informants, and posed challenges in terms of interview timing. As well, this was an obstacle to engaging with end beneficiaries.
* The GP’s Theory of Change was only briefly diagrammed in the 2015 Prodoc, and the results chain was never defined to show causal linkages and underlying assumptions. This constrained assessment of results, especially in relation to effectiveness and impact.
1. ***Key Findings and Conclusions***

**Relevance**: ***Is the Global Programme doing “the right things”?***

**The GP platform has helped UNDP to position itself in a leading role in the niche of ROLSHR and to sustain donor attention on crisis and fragile contexts; this was seen on global level and in most case study countries. It was found that the GP provides a flexible and relatively fast source of seed funding as well as technical support, primarily directed to UNDP Country Offices, which makes few demands on recipients and meets needs that other funding sources cannot fulfil. Moreover, the GP and wider ROLSHR team of UNDP are widely recognized globally and in-country for their ability to mobilize funds, provide complementary expertise, and design/administer relevant projects in the ROLSHR sector.**

**In spite of those positive aspects, there are concerns that the high-profile global role of the GP may be overshadowing UNDP and donor attention to more stable countries with significant needs that are precluded from GP access (though the GP team sometimes facilitates access to other donors). In addition, the thought leadership and policy role of UNDP’s ROLSHR team is perceived as less prominent than in the past at global level, and the GP in particular has devoted little attention to evidence-based learning and related knowledge management.**

**Coherence: *How well does the Programme fit (and coordinate) with other actors and interventions?***

Overall, the GP and wider ROLSHR team are providing services and support that are complementary to other key actors and making consistent efforts to coordinate and seek collaboration within the UN system, especially via the GFP mechanism. However, tensions and potentially growing rivalry between UNDP and the Department of Peace Operations are a source of concern, and interoperability remains a challenge for certain UN-UN partnerships. GP-supported programming in country was reasonably well coordinated with other donors as well as national counterparts and included various examples of direct collaboration with other UN entities. The GFP is adding value by bringing together key UN players in the ROLSHR sector, although it remains relatively little known and understood. The GP has been an adequate host for the GFP to date.

There is considerable ambiguity at global and country levels around how the GP differs from or fits into the wider work of the ROLSHR team, including in what contexts the GP can intervene, which may undermine coordination efforts and overall coherence. There is evidence that the de-linking of Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative functions could have some negative side effects on UN-internal coherence, including on the GP/GFP.

**Efficiency – *How well are resources used and operations managed?***

This criterion is where the GP demonstrates its most serious challenges, primarily in relation to results-based management. The performance indicators and the overall results framework are not well designed, have been poorly implemented, and do not generate particularly useful information. There has not yet been a systematic attempt to measure outcomes, and output tracking is severely limited in both design and execution. In addition, although GP annual reports narrate an impressive array of activities and outputs across targeted contexts, the contribution made by GP inputs is not clearly explained. The reports tend to conflate inputs, outputs and outcomes of overall UNDP ROLSHR programming with those that could realistically be linked to the relatively modest financial contributions of the GP.

Although in theory, GP attention in Phase 3 was to focus on a priority list of 32 countries (with exceptions for emerging needs), its resources have been spread over a much larger number of contexts. Prioritization processes are unclear and undocumented, both geographically and thematically across the GP’s seven thematic areas. The process for allocating funds was found to be a relatively easy and quick way for UNDP teams to flexibly access modest amounts for short-term needs, which is widely appreciated. However, the process is characterized by a complex array of criteria and priorities that are not clearly and systematically defined and applied to funding decisions. The GP/ROLSHR team was found to be insufficiently staffed, given the vast scope of programming and level of funding.

**Effectiveness/Impact – *Are objectives being achieved or is progress being made? What has changed?***

Reaching conclusions about the overall effectiveness and impact of the GP is hampered by the weak monitoring data and blending of GP activities/results with those of the UNDP more broadly. However, positive changes linked to the GP include effective global partnerships and regional programming, in addition to the country-specific results on which the case studies focused. In those countries, GP-supported interventions have produced a range of positive ROLSHR outcomes. Levels of donor satisfaction with the GP appear relatively high, though tempered by doubts about how accurately and clearly GP results are being tracked and reported.

GP seed funding has been applied in diverse ways, primarily chosen at country level by UNDP Country Offices. It often appears to have contributed to subsequent new programming and more significant funding for UNDP as well as UN joint programmes, complemented by the efforts of the GFP. However, there is not sufficient data to permit thorough analysis of these catalytic effects on the global level (either percentage of funding allocations that produce catalytic effects, or the monetary value of catalytic effects).

**Sustainability** – *Will the* ***benefits*** *last? Will the GP platform itself endure?*

The GP at global level has maintained a steady base of donor support in Phase 3, due to its close attention to donor interests and feedback, emphasis on country-level support, and diverse list of achievements in its annual reports. However, the Programme is highly dependent on two funding sources: the International Bureau for Narcotics and Legal Affairs (INL, which earmarks all funds for contexts and projects that they identify) and the Netherlands government (80% earmark for their priority geographic areas). Mobilization of funds at country level has been positively influenced by GP technical and financial support in all case study countries, although total catalytic effects are difficult to assess or quantify. The short term and modest amount of GP funding are not always conducive to stimulating longer-term change, though repeated funding alleviated this issue.

Challenges include that the management of INL funding requires the devotion of significant GP staff time, while the fees they pay for those services are only 8% of the managed funds (GMS), which have all been passed on to the COs implementing the funded interventions. There is a risk of this undermining the GP team’s ability to effectively handle the full gamut of tasks on their plate.

Key factors affecting fundraising success as well as sustainability of results include the level of donor interest in the country, and the prevailing security and political environment. With a focus on fragile and crisis-affected contexts, the deterioration of security or political conditions is a risk factor for GP achieving longer term impact; while the GP’s ability to provide strategic support to sustain peace in more stable contexts is restricted—in large part because they are not the priority of the GP’s current core donors.

1. ***Recommendations***

**Overall Programme Design**

* + - 1. Elaborate a comprehensive Theory of Change to underpin the future development of the GP, explicitly including the entire UNDP ROLSHR team’s scope of work.
1. Continue to offer flexible support to ROLSHR programming and teams in need around the world, with timely provision of seed funding and/or technical advice.
2. Consider increasing the focus of GP programming, staffing/standing capacity, and knowledge products in emergent subject areas (e.g., the implications of digitalization regarding human rights (including access to justice, access to information, equal voices and participation in democratic processes, etc.); climate justice; business and human rights; cyber-crime and hate speech.

**Programme Governance and Staffing**

1. Review the GP governance structure, including the Project Board’s role and composition.
2. Review the staffing structure with a view to bolstering the core GP management team and clarifying the division of labor between headquarters and regions.
3. Revisit the mandate, role and weight of regional offices and hubs in GP business processes to enhance approaches to complex RoL and SDG16+ programming challenges.

**Country Support Priorities and Methods**

1. Base future GP targeting of contexts on the basis of evidence of effectiveness (including likelihood of catalytic effects), rather than pre-selecting a list of priority countries.
2. Clarify and streamline pipeline funding procedures, including enhanced transparency and more strategic approaches.

**Results-Based Management**

1. Invest in results-based management systems and reporting by the GP and the supported Country Offices.
2. Eliminate or reform monitoring practices and indicators that do not add specific value for measurement and management of GP results and focus efforts on fewer data points that will generate useful information.
3. Increase GP’s contribution to ROLSHR knowledge management and thought leadership, in collaboration with other key actors such as the GPN.

**Coherence and Collaboration** (including GFP)

1. Enhance GP/GFP design features to support improved coherence and optimize effectiveness and reach of the GFP.

**Other Recommendations**

1. Modify the arrangement with INL to enhance sustainability and results-based management.
2. Increase the focus on supporting design and implementation of ROLSHR interventions based on locally accepted and established customary/traditional mechanisms that are based on human rights principles.

# Programme **Background**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has long recognized that strong commitments to the rule of law, security and human rights are imperative to achieving and sustaining peace and building resilience, as well as to realizing the vision now set forth in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). These commitments entered a new phase in 2008 when the *Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations* commenced. Previously, UNDP had supported justice and security projects across a handful of contexts. However, since the Global Programme (GP) was launched, the breadth and depth of UNDP’s engagement in fostering the rule of law, justice and security in crisis and fragile contexts has expanded considerably.

With an in-country presence before, during and after conflict or crisis, UNDP via the GP has been providing targeted assistance to countries threatened or affected by crisis or other types of fragility (in addition to its work in other contexts). Since 2008, the UNDP’s Global Programme has been the main operational and financial instrument for the organization’s engagement on rule of law in crisis-affected contexts. Drawing on UNDP’s most innovative rule of law initiatives, it seeks to expand such support to assist UNDP Country Offices (COs) in developing and implementing comprehensive interventions that respond rapidly and effectively to the needs on the ground. To this end, the Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights (ROLSHR) team situated within the UNDP Crisis Bureau plays a leading role, most recently through the third phase of the GP, officially called the Global Programme for Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development.

Since 2016, the GP expanded to explicitly include the area of human rights, which was previously covered by a separate “Global Human Rights Strengthening Programme” from 2009 – 2014, which was not limited to crisis affected contexts. Considering the majority of Country Offices have integrated their human rights and rule of law work, GP’s Phase 3 amalgamated both global programmes into one mechanism.

The third phase of the Global Programme (GP) was a five-year commitment which commenced in 2016 and was later extended to December 2021. The GP, implemented by the UNDP ROLSHR team, provides direct financial and technical support to over 40 countries and has a significant responsibility to lead and support policy development and guidance to internal and external partners, particularly in the context of the SDG and Sustaining Peace agendas.

As outlined in the Phase 3 Project Document (“Prodoc”), seven interlinked thematic areas form the blueprint for the GP’s engagement: Political Engagement; Institution Building; Community Security; Human Rights Systems; Access to Justice; Transitional Justice; and Gender Justice. Those broad themes are defined in more detail as programme outputs in the GP Results Framework, as follows:

1. A political environment that strengthens rule of law and human rights is further enabled.

2. Capable justice and security institutions are established and strengthened to increase and improve service delivery in crisis-affected and transitional settings.

3. Comprehensive community security approaches are developed, strengthened, and/or applied.

4. National human rights systems are strengthened and made more effective in promoting and protecting human rights.

5. Access to justice for all is increased – particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups, including minorities – and discrimination, exclusion and other drivers.

6. Transitional justice processes and/or mechanisms are promoted in conflict-affected contexts.

7. Human rights, access to justice, and security for women and girls are increased.

The GP Phase 3 Theory of Change (shown in *Annex 2*: Global Programme Phase III Theory of Change*)* presents the overarching programme goal and those seven outputs in diagram form.An additional cross-cutting output appears in the Results Framework: *8. High quality programming is assured through improved quality assurance processes, mainstreamed human rights in programming, and strengthening of external partnerships*.

The GP/ROLSHR team supports diverse initiatives related to those thematic areas at the global, regional and country levels, and has dedicated focal points within the team to maintain regular contact with UNDP Country Offices across its portfolio. Currently the GP is being implemented in five regions: Europe-Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia Pacific, Africa, Arab States, and Latin America/Caribbean. The majority of priority contexts and funded Country Offices are in sub-Saharan Africa.

The GP forms the basis for multiple global and policy development initiatives and has a range of substantive partners, including the Tri-Partite Partnership (TPP) with the Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to support National Human Rights Institutions; and recently, the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) via The Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT)[[1]](#footnote-2). The GP/ROLSHR team also leads UNDP’s engagement with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) as joint managers of theGlobal Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP), which was established in 2012. The objective of the GFP arrangement is to facilitate UN entities to “deliver as one” on rule of law, specifically programming related to police, justice and corrections, by overcoming systemic fragmentation and working together in the pursuit of shared goals. The GP, from the outset, served as the host entity to operationalize the GFP, which is described in more detail in the text box below.

Major donor partners of the GP during the evaluated period include the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (U.S.), among others.[[2]](#footnote-3) In addition, the GP has developed partnerships with several international entities to strengthen the technical capacities of the UNDP team and to support the GFP via staffing contributions. Total Programme funding has amounted to approximately $167 million over the four years from 2016 to 2019 (about half earmarked for specific country programming by the U.S. Government, as described in the Sustainability section of this report.)

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| --- |
| **The Global Focal Point**The GFP for Police, Justice and Corrections is a coordinated UN approach to promote joint delivery of support in crisis situations. The GFP mechanism strives to respond effectively to requests for complex and politically nuanced assistance by bringing together the operational expertise of the Department for Peace Operations (DPO) and UNDP’s programming, on the ground support and institution-building skills. It also draws on the expertise of GFP partners such as UN Women, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). GFP coordinating platforms and working group arrangements at headquarters (HQ) and in the field actively seek ways to increase UN coherence, align support with national development plans, serve as a single entry-point for host governments, reduce competition and overlap, and channel increased resources from donors for joint programming. GFP facilitates joint assessments, planning, and programming; rapid deployment of expertise and joint delivery; joint knowledge and training; and joint fundraising efforts for country programmes. These efforts have been made possible by the institutionalized cooperation of the key GFP partners that have combined their efforts and resources through GFP working procedures. The GFP operates in different settings including Prevention and/or Sustaining Peace; Conflict and Post-Conflict; and Transitions. As of 2020, the GFP was actively supporting initiatives in 24 countries including 10 high-conflict contexts such as Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen, as well as sustaining peace and transition contexts. |

# Methodology

## ****Evaluation Purpose and Audience****

**As outlined in the Evaluation Terms of Reference (TOR, shown in** *Annex 11*: Terms of Reference for Evaluation**), t**his evaluation’s main purpose is to draw out lessons learned, results achieved and areas for improvements or required actions to ensure proper implementation and performance of the GP through the end of this phase in December 2021, as well as to inform development of the fourth phase of the Global Programme (2022-2026).

## ****Evaluation Objectives****

This evaluation has aimed to assess the performance of the GP in achieving its intended results and meeting its objectives, including at the outcome and impact level under Phase 3. The evaluation is focused on the period from January 2016 to December 2019, and aims to provide insights on:

* The ability of UNDP to function as an effective provider of ROLSHR programming support; in particular, the extent to which the GP is able to respond to the needs of UNDP Country Offices; UN Resident Coordinator Offices; UN Country Teams; and peacekeeping missions as relevant.
* The ability of the GP to leverage UNDP’s role as an international policy maker and thought leader on rule of law, security and human rights.
* The effectiveness and achievements of UNDP in forging interagency cooperation and implementation across the UN system vis a vis the GFP, the Tripartite Partnership to Support NHRIs, and other important initiatives, including with UN Women, UNODC, etc.
* The GP’s contributions to UNDP’s Integrated Results and Resources Framework for the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2021 UNDP Strategic Plan.
* The ability of the current GP structure to manage finances and operations, meet partner expectations, and respond to the needs of priority countries.

Although 2020 and early 2021 have not been specifically analyzed by the evaluation, and therefore the GP’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic was not studied in any detail, for certain purposes the evaluation has of necessity taken that period into account.

## Evaluation Criteria and Standards

The evaluation team based the evaluation on the six evaluation criteria recommended by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as recent guidance on the application of those criteria. The evaluators reviewed the key evaluation questions and objectives in the TOR with this in mind and allocated them among the criteria. Certain evaluation questions were re-phrased and several added to ensure adequate attention to all six criteria. The final set of questions was used to develop the Evaluation Matrix (*Annex 1*: Evaluation Matrix), including key sources and methods for each sub-set of questions.  The methodology was designed in line with the Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the United Nations System (2016) and UNDP Evaluation Guidelines (2019 update).

## Data Collection Methods and Sources

**Data types**

The evaluation team captured and analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data. To take advantage of existing information, **secondary data** was collected from various sources through a continuous comprehensive desk review process, including analysis of relevant global and country level documents, data/statistics, previous evaluations and reviews, etc. The desk review included documentation identified by the GP management team as well as other sources pinpointed by the evaluation team. A list of key documents reviewed for the evaluation is included in *Annex 10*: Documents Reviewed for Evaluation.

The evaluators gathered **primary data** through engagement of a wide range of relevant stakeholders both within and beyond the UN system. The team used individual interviews and small group discussions for this purpose, as outlined below. In line with the TOR, informants included staff of UNDP at global, regional and country levels (including but not limited to GP and GFP teams), other UN entities, government and non-government counterparts in targeted countries, and key GP bilateral donors. A full list of informants is included in *Annex 8: Report on Interviews for* EvaluationOverall, the evaluators met with 158 persons in total (84 male, 74 female), including: 41 informants at global/programme level (11 male, 30 female); and 117 persons related to country level case studies (73 male, 44 female).

**Figure 1. Map of Informant Locations and Case Study Countries**



**Methods for Collecting Primary Data**

The principal method for gathering primary data was semi-structured interviews conducted by one or both evaluators. Remote data collection was used exclusively by the evaluation team due to restrictions on travel related to the Coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19). The evaluators assured informants of the confidentiality of all communications, to ensure frank discussion and open sharing of perspectives. Recording of interviews was used in certain cases with permission of participating informants. That data was supplemented by written inputs from stakeholders who were not able to participate in those meetings, or who wished to share additional information after their interviews. In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) was simultaneously conducting an evaluation for the GP that would interview a similar set of national stakeholders, a collaborative data collection strategy was adopted to avoid overburdening informants and duplicating efforts.[[3]](#footnote-4)

Interview questions were based on detailed protocols or guides based on the Evaluation Matrix and tailored for different categories of respondents. Interviews for country case studies were conducted by the evaluator taking the lead on each respective country, while most interviews at global level involved both evaluators to ensure complete capture of data and promote shared understanding of data for later analysis. The evaluation team conducted interviews in English, French and Spanish languages, and used translation support to carry out several interviews in Russian. A sample of interview protocols is included in *Annex 9*: Sample of Interview Guides.

**Selection of Informants**

Selection of informants for interviews and group discussions at global/regional level was largely guided by the GP management team, who identified a list of 27 entities and associated individuals to be prioritized by the evaluators. From that list, the evaluators carried out 25 interviews; nine other interviews were added by the evaluation team to provide supplementary information at this level.

For country case studies, the selection process started with initial suggestions from the GP Focal Points responsible for those countries (usually based in regional hubs), which was fleshed out via consultations with in-country UNDP staff. The objective was to engage a broad spectrum of entities/persons capable of providing informed perspectives across the evaluative areas of interest, while also paying attention to gender balance and social inclusion. Although the plan (as outlined in the Inception Report) was for the evaluators to choose their preferred informants from a longer list of potential informants for each country, that was not feasible in all cases due to time pressures and the remote process; this entailed a heavier reliance on the Country Office recommendations.

**Case studies of six countries: sampling method and approach**

The evaluation TOR specified that six unspecified countries would be the subject of “case studies”. The evaluation team initially designed a basic sampling process and proposed a list of countries for consideration. However, the final set of case study countries was ultimately determined by the GP management team in consultation with ROLSHR Focal Points and regional hub colleagues with final approval from the GP Project Board. The countries selected were: Kyrgyzstan, Somalia, CAR, Burkina Faso, Colombia, and Pakistan.

With the limited time available, it was not feasible to conduct in-depth or comprehensive case studies, therefore these were designed as “instrumental” case studies to obtain insights into broader issues. The case studies aimed to identify similarities and differences among countries, leading to conclusions about potential applicability of experiences to other countries as well as significance for the GP as a whole. If several initiatives were funded between 2016-19 in a case study country, one or two specific projects was selected for closer examination and additional interviews. Several country-level evaluations had already been carried out by ISSAT for the GP, producing reports that were valuable sources of secondary data; a summary of the relevant findings and recommendations of ISSAT’s evaluation reports is presented in *Annex 5*: Summary of ISSAT Evaluations.

In addition to the case studies, Niger and Albania were selected by GP management as sample countries where the GP had not actively provided support in Phase 3. The evaluators liaised with the relevant GP Focal Points to discuss the situation of each country and identify potential informants. Interviews focused on current and former UNDP and other Country Office staff responsible for ROLSHR or related thematic areas, and/or overall strategic decision-making. The evaluators designed and posed a limited set of questions to elucidate the recent engagement of UNDP and other UN entities in ROLSHR, to gauge the knowledge among key Country Office staff about the GP and GFP, to verify any technical or financial support provided by GP, and to explore the potential for future collaboration. The findings are presented in a separate text box in the *Country Level Findings on Effectiveness and Impact*.

## Data Analysis Methods

**Qualitative Data Analysis**

The significant amount of data generated via the above-described interviews and meetings was summarized and analyzed using a matrix organized by the six core OECD evaluation criteria. This matrix captured the most significant information from each data collection event, noting the source and coding data based on important themes emerging from interview notes. Triangulation enabled the evaluation team to gain a deeper understanding of the perspectives of diverse respondents, and to cross-check findings emerging from different data collection methods and sources to identify correlations and differences.

**Analysis of Indicator and Financial Data**

The evaluation team attempted to analyze progress to date towards achieving targets for GP output indicators (17 reported on by the GP as of 2019) and change in the five outcome level indicators defined in the Prodoc, which rely on internationally recognized ranking and scoring systems. However, analysis quickly gave rise to reservations about the quality of data and meaningfulness of the output indicators as a measure of GP results (further described in *Annex 3: Analysis of Results-Based Management*). Moreover, it was found that the outcome level indicators have not to date been tracked or reported on by the GP. The evaluators managed to source some data for these indicators directly from the international bodies producing those scores, but it was found that in many cases values were non-existent or not updated.

Regarding financial analyses, some planned analyses (such as comparing average fund absorption rates against average progress against set indicator targets) could not be carried out, mainly due to the technical issues related to Outcome/Output indicators described above and in Annex 3.

## Limitations and Mitigation

The evaluation team encountered various challenges and limitations during the evaluation process, both expected and unexpected. The most significant limitations are outlined below.

* The global scope and thematic complexity of the GP represented a challenge to comprehensive evaluation of four years of implementation, especially with an evaluation team of only two members with limited contract days (100 in total). The list of evaluation questions was very long and ambitious, with 36 separate questions and sub-questions in the final Evaluation Matrix covering issues at global/programme level as well as country level. The evaluators strove to manage this challenge by clearly dividing responsibilities, defining a limited scope for the country case studies, and organizing the questions under the OECD criteria.
* The four-year period under evaluation started in January 2016 and ended in December 2019, about one year prior to commencement of this evaluation. Some relevant informants were no longer available, and some found it hard to recall the situation and events early in that period, and/or to distinguish between pre-2020 and thereafter. However, it was soon realized that developments after 2019 were relevant in relation to longer term impact and sustainability, and moreover, examination of business processes and other elements of the GP required consideration of the current situation. This entailed discussion and review of data related to 2020 to ensure a complete response to the TOR.
* Due to Covid-19 travel constraints, the evaluators could not visit any programme contexts or meet in person with interlocutors at field or headquarters level. This made it more difficult to obtain a clear understanding of each context and to establish rapport with informants, and posed challenges in terms of interview timing due to time zone differences. As well, the need to use virtual data collection methods combined with time constraints were an obstacle to engaging with end beneficiaries of GP-supported programming at community level. This was offset by taking an extremely flexible approach to interview scheduling and accepting written responses to questions in certain circumstances.
* The selection of case study countries for the evaluation was determined by the GP Project Board, who are members of each UNDP Regional Bureau, in consultation with GP management. It is therefore possible that these selection processes were subject to some bias, which may have affected the resulting country level data.
* The GP’s Theory of Change was only briefly diagrammed (as shown in *Annex 2*: Global Programme Phase III Theory of Change) in the 2015 Prodoc[[4]](#footnote-5), and subsequent efforts at elaboration with external support did not ultimately produce a comprehensive Theory of Change. This meant that the results chain was never defined in a detailed manner to show causal linkages and underlying assumptions. This constrained the evaluators’ ability to thoroughly assess programme results, and especially limited the analysis of effectiveness and impact.
* The five outcome indicators defined in the Prodoc, all linked to international scoring country mechanisms, have not been tracked and reported on by the GP to date. Moreover, the output indicators were found to have limited value in terms of measuring GP results at global level (as explained further in *Annex 3: Analysis of Results-Based Management*). This also hampered the evaluation’s assessment of effectiveness and impact.
* In the absence of any clear definition of “catalytic effect” and related processes and tools to assess or calculate the catalytic effects of GP support, the evaluators concentrated on collecting and verifying qualitative, anecdotal evidence of positive financial and non-financial effects that followed (and could realistically be related to) GP technical and/or financial inputs on country level.
* GP3 began under one UNDP Strategic Plan (2014-17) and has continued under another (2018-21), which required some indicators to be changed after two years of implementation. This posed challenges to consistency of tracking and reporting of results, which also affected the evaluators’ analysis of indicator data since 2016.
* Linking expenditures of GP-provided funds with results at country level, as initially planned, proved difficult for various reasons, including the way that use of GP funds is tracked and the way that related results are reported. Therefore, the focus under the efficiency criterion was put on other elements such as monitoring, reporting, business processes, and knowledge management.
* Other than UNDP staff, and some personnel of other UN entities, in-country informants were not aware of the GP at all and thus could make no link between specific UNDP activities in that country and the GP (as also noted in ISSAT reports to GP management). The evaluators were cognizant of this possibility and tailored interview questions accordingly, which in most cases allowed for linking of informants’ views with GP support. This challenge was even more notable with respect to the GFP, which many country level informants (including UN staff) had not heard of or did not understand.

#  Findings and Conclusions

This section is organized according to the OECD criteria. For each criterion, overarching conclusions are presented first; these are derived from the totality of specific findings that follow. Subsequently, findings for evaluation questions at the global or programme-wide level are discussed, primarily informed by interviews with headquarters and regionally based informants and review of GP documentation. Those are followed by findings directly related to evaluation questions at the country level, based primarily on data collected from informants in the six case study countries and documents provided by them. This order of presentation is repeated for each evaluation criterion.

Unless otherwise specified, findings at country level are drawn from the cumulative interviews conducted and documents reviewed in relation to the six case study countries. Segments referring to specific case studies draw on data about country level programming that received financial and/or non-financial GP-support at some point, including during planning or inception phase.

## ****Relevance**: *Is the Global Programme doing “the right things”?***

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| **Conclusions on Relevance**  |
| **Key achievements:*** The GP platform has helped UNDP to position itself in a leading role in the niche of ROLSHR and to sustain donor attention on crisis and fragile contexts; this was seen on global level and in most case study countries.
* The GP provides a flexible and relatively fast source of seed funding as well as technical support, primarily directed to UNDP Country Offices, that makes few demands on recipient countries and meets needs that other funding sources cannot fulfil.
* The GP and wider ROLSHR team of UNDP are widely recognized globally and in-country for their ability to mobilize funds, provide complementary expertise, and design/administer relevant projects in the ROLSHR sector.

**Primary challenges:*** The high-profile global role of the GP may be overshadowing UNDP and donor attention to more stable countries with significant needs for support that are not able to access GP services (though at times the team plays a linking role to facilitate access of COs to other donors).
* The thought leadership and policy role of UNDP’s ROLSHR team is perceived as less prominent than in the past on global level, and the GP in particular has devoted little attention to building, documenting and disseminating an evidence base of learning from the wealth of experience being accumulated.
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## Programme/Global Level Findings on Relevance

***Evaluation Questions***

* *How has the GP Phase 3 affected UNDP’s relevance and recognition as an international player in the ROL/Security/Human rights fields, especially in complex contexts?*
* *What has been the contribution of GP3 to the Sustaining Peace and Prevention agendas of the Secretary-General?*

The GP has a significant programming scope in Phase 3, which has been broadened from earlier phases that focused more narrowly on rule of law. As described above in Programme Background, this phase was designed to encompass seven inter-related thematic areas, including human rights and citizen security, as well as political aspects related to ROLSHR. According to the Phase 3 Prodoc: “*this Global Programme is placed wholly at the disposal of the UN system with its ability to deliver assistance aligned to national priorities; mobilize and leverage resources for joined up implementation; and generate knowledge and top-notch analysis to serve the highest levels of decision-making*.”

Informants of this evaluation generally agreed that GP3 has been performing a relevant role within UNDP and more broadly within the ROLSHR sector. Those interviewed within and outside UNDP saw the Programme’s focus on fragile and crisis-affected contexts as appropriate, noting that this is an appealing factor for many bilateral donors that place a high priority on assisting those countries. They recognized the considerable ability of GP3 and UNDP to mobilize funds in support of ROLSHR in fragile and crisis-affected contexts, to provide competent expertise in these subject areas, and to design and administer relevant projects and programmes—including at country and regional levels.

GP3 is viewed as a flexible and relatively fast source of funding, with a strong focus on country level that was described as quite unusual for a global programme in the UN system. Based on review of GP documents, more than $19 million of seed funding was allocated to at least 46 individual countries (and several regional projects) to meet ROLSHR needs between 2017 and 2019, with a maximum annual amount per country of $500,000. The Programme is widely seen as meeting various country level needs (as detailed later in this report) and thereby contributing to a range of results—especially when combined with expert technical inputs from HQ and regional offices, both via field missions and remote assistance.

To assess relevance of country targeting, the evaluators conducted documentary review of the different contexts supported by GP3, focusing on financial flows via the GP funding pipeline. [[5]](#footnote-6) It was found that the “priority list” of 30 countries identified in the Prodoc[[6]](#footnote-7) has been very flexibly defined and applied; in fact, between 2017 and 2019 about one-third of GP pipeline funding to country offices was allocated to 18 countries not on that list, and four priority countries were not funded at all in the 2016-19 period under evaluation.[[7]](#footnote-8) Interviewees on the ROLSHR team pointed out that a defined priority list was appealing to donors and allowed the Programme to report GP indicator results for a fixed set of countries throughout Phase 3, while the flexible approach to targeting meant that the Programme was able to support whichever contexts were deemed appropriate at a particular point in time.[[8]](#footnote-9) Some informants from outside the team indicated that this made it difficult for UNDP COs and other stakeholders to know which countries were eligible for GP support at any given time.

Although the GP’s *Guidelines on Funding Allocations 2020* specify that all countries/contexts receiving funding from the Global Programme must be considered fragile or crisis-affected, those terms are nowhere defined, and the degree of relative fragility or stability does not appear to be considered in the pipeline allocation process. However, the GP management team indicated that all countries funded by the GP from 2016-19 demonstrated some degree of fragility, crisis or conflict. Some informants raised the concern that contexts with a high level of societal violence are not adequately taken into account by the GP focus to date on post-conflict or conflict-prone country settings, and geographic areas outside of sub-Saharan Africa receive less attention due to earmarking of funds by GP donors (as discussed under Sustainability).

The evaluators found substantial primary and secondary data indicating that GP3 has helped UNDP to position itself in a leading role in the niche of ROLSHR, and to sustain donor attention on the sector. At the same time, informants in several UN entities cautioned that this central position could be at risk if UNDP does not proactively capitalize on opportunities for greater synergy with other bodies, such as the Peacebuilding Fund and the World Bank. The World Bank is seen as expanding its presence in the ROLSHR sector, including significant related research and policy on the global level, while the UNDP ROLSHR team (including GP) appears to have reduced its attention in this area; multiple external informants expressed doubts about UNDP’s continued thought leadership in this sector. This observation was echoed by various UNDP current and former staff, who considered that Phase 3 in particular has not paid sufficient attention to building the ROLSHR evidence base and producing technical guidance, taking advantage of the rich experience in GP-supported countries and beyond. Although outside the temporal scope of this evaluation, the production by the ROLSHR team of several short thematic publications in response to the Covid-19 pandemic was noted as a positive step.

The relative importance and inter-relationship of the seven key thematic areas (so-called outputs) of GP3 does not emerge clearly in the Prodoc, neither in the Theory of Change diagram nor elsewhere. However, interviews and document review suggested that certain subject areas receive more attention (e.g., effective justice institutions) than others (e.g., citizen security), and that conflict prevention as defined in the Sustaining Peace and Prevention agendas of the Secretary-General (SG) has not yet been clearly incorporated in the GP’s approaches. As well, the human rights mandate of GP3 has a significant emphasis on working with and in support of national human rights institutions, a scope considered by some as excessively narrow.

That said, the GP has also included support to Universal Periodic Review processes in priority countries and others, a major new initiative on Business and Human Rights emerged during Phase 3. Although not specifically anticipated by the Prodoc, this initiative has already attracted significant funding in the Asia-Pacific region and was identified as a potential growth area for Phase 4. Multiple informants urged that the GP look to ramp up its involvement in less traditional justice issues that are rapidly gaining recognition and importance, such as climate justice, digitalization (as both opportunity and threat to rights and justice), cyber crime, and hate speech (although others sounded a more cautionary note about “UNDP trying to do everything”).

As noted in the Programme Description above, the GP has acted as “host” for the Global Focal Point on Rule of Law since its inception. In terms of relevance, the majority of informants at global level considered the GP and GFP to be complementary to each other and felt that this hosting arrangement had strengthened the GP during Phase 3—especially in relation to UN mission and transitional settings. However, it was underlined that UNDP’s dominant role so far in fundraising for the GFP was a potential risk factor for maintaining a balanced relationship with DPO. More generally, informants considered that GP3 has been a useful platform to engage in and mobilize funding for key partnerships with other UN entities (and beyond) such as the long-standing Tri-Partite Partnership with OHCHR and GANHRI, and the relatively new SALIENT collaboration with UNODA.

**Spotlight on National Human Rights Institutions**

UNDP has partnered since 2011 with OHCHR and the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) in the strategic Tripartite Partnership (TPP) to Support National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI), as one strategy for supporting NHRIs globally. GANHRI is mandated to support the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs in all regions of the world, in line with the United Nations Paris Principles. The TPP-NHRIs aims to strengthen NHRIs in their capacity to promote and protect human rights, individually and through their regional and global networks. The Global Programme/ROLSHR team has provided significant financial and technical support to the TPP during Phase 3. According to TPP publications, the partnership has enabled more coherent and coordinated UN system-wide support to NHRIs. The TPP has been recognized by the UN SG, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council as an example of good practice.[[9]](#footnote-10)

The three partners agreed in 2016 on a vision for scaling up joint support to NHRIs, as well as GANHRI itself and its four NHRI regional networks, and in early 2017 formalized their shared commitment to take the partnership “to the field”. Under this agreement, donor contributions to the TPP’s work are administered by UNDP’s Global Programme. Since then, the GP has served as funding channel for approximately $600,000 of funding from Norway for the first two years of in-country implementation in 16 countries. Among other activities, the TPP has supported the NHRIs in The Gambia and Mali to fulfil their mandate in areas such as strategic planning, improving response capacity to human rights violations, reporting to human rights mechanisms, and civil society engagement.

In addition, the GP provided three annual grants of $150,000 each to GANHRI from 2016 – 2019, primarily to support its organizational development as well as advocacy work representing NHRI interests at global level. Along with technical advice from the UNDP ROLSHR team, this was reported to have positive impact on the international recognition and organizational capacity of GANHRI, though further fundraising is now required as the ceiling for low value grants was reached. As well, UNDP’s Regional Hub in Istanbul has been supporting the development of a three-year road map on regional cooperation among NHRIs in Central Asia through facilitation of a series of regional consultations and trainings. This collaborative effort was specifically praised by interviewed stakeholders in Kyrgyzstan, as a means of increasing collaboration among Ombudsmen across the region, via capacity building and improved channels of communications.

## Country Level Findings on Relevance

***Evaluation Question:***

* *To what extent has GP3 support (technical, financial, operational, strategic) been relevant and responsive to the needs and priorities of key UN stakeholders in country (UNDP COs, UN Resident Coordinator Offices (RCOs); UN Country Teams (UNCT); and peacekeeping Missions as relevant) as well as key national counterparts?*

GP3 lays special emphasis on providing support at country level, in GP and/or GFP priority contexts and beyond, in different ways including technical, financial, operational assistance and/or strategic advice. Via the country case studies, the evaluation has found evidence indicating GP relevance in that it successfully addressed and thus was responsive to specific needs and priorities of UNDP COs, UN Resident Coordinator Offices and Country Teams; and peacekeeping Missions, as well as key national counterparts.

GP’s relatively modest funding allocations proved relevant to serve purposes across a span of various constellations, from stop-gap funding and bridging arrangements to catalytic seed funding. All six case study countries yielded evidence of GP3’s role as a strategic stepping-stone to introduce, scale up or consolidate ROLSHR work that otherwise might have been suspended or overlooked. The following are specific examples describing the relevance of GP support in different case study countries during the period under evaluation.

**Kyrgyzstan** benefited from several GP allocations, initially receiving resources to hire a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) who went on to successfully design and establish a comprehensive ROLSHR portfolio at country level. Later strategic GP support helped to implement long-term judicial reforms, introduce legal aid services, and set up a restorative justice pilot project. All these investments were highly relevant and useful, according to in-country informants from UNDP, other UN entities, and national counterparts. Technical expertise of the UNDP team (including the Istanbul-based Focal Point) and financial inputs from the GP are valued by government and civil society actors, with the only caveat being concerns over sustainability due to lack of other interested donors and the recent political crisis. Overall, GP support helped the UNDP CO to solidify its position as a key protagonist in the ROLSHR sector, in which relatively few international actors are engaged.

In **Colombia**, three years of GP funding in 2016-18 focused on upgrading the ROLSHR team’s skills and expertise (including initial support for the CTA’s salary) and funding small activities selected by the team to fill programming gaps and try out new approaches. In-country UNDP staff described this as a highly suitable strategic approach, given the extensive ROLSHR portfolio and the highly complex and competitive country and donor environment of Colombia. Although not visible to external stakeholders as related to GP support, several remarked on how strong capacity during the relevant period had allowed the UNDP team to effectively design, adapt and oversee a complex set of interventions in the sector, while sustaining and developing valuable relationships. Interviewees affirmed the importance of “keeping a seat at the table” for UNDP, which could quickly lose its strategic position or relevance in a certain thematic area if inactive for even a year. Generally, UNDP’s ROLSHR work was seen as responsive to local priorities and sensitive to the fragile conditions prevailing in Colombia.

“*To have a say here is not possible with small money. But a capable team can use GP inputs to leverage other sources, build a portfolio…in that way, one can generate results with small money*”. ~ UNDP Colombia staff

In **Pakistan**, the GP allocated pipeline funding only once during 2016-19, although the Focal Point in Bangkok has regularly provided technical advice to the ROLSHR team (and INL funding via the GP has been significant). Notably, the GP stepped in to provide bridge funding to fill what would have been a long gap in activities in Balochistan, after a bilateral donor terminated its financial support to implement a provincial ROL Roadmap developed with UNDP, UNODC and UN Women. GP funding enabled UNDP to keep up its presence in the province, boost its profile, and consolidate contacts, including a range of government and civil society entities. Those counterparts agreed that GP-supported activities were in line with local needs defined in the recently completed comprehensive Roadmap, and relevant to provide a kick-start to Roadmap implementation.

In **Burkina Faso**, the GP provided strategic funding for the CTA/ROLSHR’s salary and an access to justice (A2J) pilot project that served as stepping-stone for subsequent portfolio growth. In addition, the GP contributed to the SG’s Sustaining Peace Agenda mission through deployment of a sector expert. That multi-entity mission provided planning support that led to consolidation of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) project. That was followed by the new UNDP flagship programme combining RoL and social cohesion (“COSED” project). COSED was designed as an integrated holistic platform to ensure synergies, reduce transaction costs, achieve higher levels of impact. Social cohesion is a key additional dimension taking the approach beyond conventional RoL approaches. This innovative formula is presently being groomed for sub-regional up-scaling based on the Burkina Faso blueprint, with interest shown by COs in both Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso is unusual as a de facto mission context with complex programming needs including cross-sectoral nexus challenges (cross-border prevention and countering violent extremism (P-CVE), A2J for displaced persons, climate justice etc.) resulting in a complex donor landscape. The comparative attractiveness of GP funding is currently rather low since it is overshadowed by high levels of donor interest to fund RoL-related activities.

In the **CAR**, GP3 provided seed funding to a sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)/A2J project for vulnerable communities, addressing a critical funding gap in a way that was both timely and responsive to national/local needs and priorities. The design, establishment and functioning of the Special Criminal Court has been heavily supported by GP/GFP high-level strategic policy and planning, international coordination and operational ramp-up support. CAR is a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping mission context where the GFP modality proved of particularly high relevance.

In **Somalia**, the GP supported development of innovative approaches and best practices through two funding rounds in 2017 and 2018. This included: a) a strategic assessment leading to design of the SSR Joint Programme (JP) run by an integrated UNDP-Mission team; and b) piloting of an innovative SDG16 monitoring laboratory that is collecting data at community level. The SSR project is of regional and potentially global relevance in that it is run by an integrated team supporting civilian governance (!) in and for the security sector. The SDG16 pilot responds to CO and UNDP corporate interests in testing innovative ways of gauging the effects of ROLSHR interventions among end beneficiaries and communities. Moreover, the GFP mechanism was reported as a relevant stepping-stone and “think tank” for key ROLSHR initiatives such as the Joint Justice Programme (JJP) including alternative dispute resolution centers; and responded to external and UN-internal calls for enhanced coordination among UNCT member entities.

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| **Spotlight on SDG16 Monitoring in Somalia** In 2018, the SDG16 Monitoring & Evaluation Project for Somalia was initiated to measure the impact of the UN’s and international community’s investment in rule of law. Since inception, the project has focused on developing innovative methodologies for monitoring the sector in this fragile context, as well as making sustainable contributions to Somalia’s data landscape through capacity-building. To date, the project has conducted pilot assessments relating to A2J, SGBV, and sentencing in detention, and enabled the Ministry of Justice to collect and analyze data for SDG16 Target 3 indicators. Over 50 civil servants in Somali ROL institutions have participated in training aimed to address the substantial gap in data and monitoring capacity. Since 2020, these trainings have continued virtually throughout Somalia’s Federal Member States.In response to Covid-19, the SDG16 M&E Project developed an assessment in partnership with the Ministry of Justice, to measure the wide-ranging effects of the pandemic on the justice and security sectors. The aim of the survey was to capture the shifts in the landscape in the wake of Covid-19, highlighting three aspects: * perceptions of and behavior towards justice and security institutions
* impact on the pandemic on existing justice and security services
* insights of what citizens want from their justice institutions.

The survey used experimental conjoint methodology, asking respondents to imagine they needed to take a case to a justice institution, and offering two hypothetical institutions to help determine what motivates people to choose one institution over another. Key preliminary findings suggest that women are exposed or witness violence more than men. Further, interviewees confirmed that the highest level of trust of the communities are towards their religious leaders, while trust in the police and clan elders is much lower. The survey also confirmed that what most people expect from a justice institution is the enforcement of decisions/resolution of the dispute. |

## ****Coherence**: *How well does the Programme fit (and coordinate) with other actors and interventions?***

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| **Conclusions on Coherence** |
| **Key achievements:*** **Overall, the GP and wider ROLSHR team are providing services and support that are complementary to other key actors in the sector and making consistent efforts to coordinate and seek collaboration within the UN system, especially via the GFP mechanism. However, tensions and potentially growing rivalry between UNDP and DPO were a source of some concern, and interoperability remains a challenge for certain UN-UN partnerships.**
* **GP-supported programming in country was reasonably well coordinated with other donors as well as national counterparts and included various examples of direct collaboration with other UN entities—although actual joint programmes were relatively rare in the case study countries.**
* The GFP is adding value through its efforts at HQ level to bring together key UN players in the ROLSHR sector, and GP has been an adequate host for the GFP to date. However, the **GFP is little known/understood at country level, and even poorly understood by senior staff of UN agencies at global level.**
* **At country level, bolstering of team capacity via financing and GP Focal Point expertise has helped to ensure compliance with UNDP corporate standards of practice and consistency with technical guidelines, and supported analytical assessments to feed into programme design and innovation.**

**Primary challenges:*** **There is considerable ambiguity at global and country levels around how the GP differs from or fits into the wider work of the ROLSHR team, including in what contexts the GP can intervene, which may undermine coordination efforts and overall coherence of the Programme.**
* **The de-linking of the Resident Coordinator (RC) and Resident Representative (RR) functions can have some negative side effects on UN-internal coherence including on the GP/GFP, particularly in non-mission settings.**
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## Programme/Global Level Findings on Coherence

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent has GP3 promoted coordination and partnership with national counterparts, donor partners, and across the UN system?*
* *How effectively has GP3 supported joint engagement across the UN pillars?*
* *How effective has the GP3 been as a platform for financially and operationally supporting the GFP for Rule of Law (with DPO and other UN partners)?*

With respect to external coherence, informants generally viewed GP support to fragile and crisis-affected contexts as complementary to what other key actors and programmes are doing in relation to those situations (filling a certain niche, as described under Relevance above). It was repeatedly mentioned that GP supports COs and their programming “*in a way that other funding sources cannot or will not support*”, referring to its flexibility, comparatively rapid response capacity, and combined offer of technical and financial assistance in the ROLSHR sector.

Although this evaluation could not comprehensively investigate the GP’s external relations, interviews with relevant stakeholders indicated that coordination with the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is relatively smooth and overlaps are limited, and no major concerns were raised regarding relations and coherence with key UN entities such as UNODC, UN Women, OHCHR, and UNHCR (inter alia). That said, concerns were raised by various interviewees about a competitive and sometimes tense relationship with the DPO, especially in view of the recent decision to roll out their offer of “system-wide service provision” to non-mission contexts, in addition to their long-established role in UN mission contexts. This “rivalry” was noted by informants to be influencing relations at HQ level as well as in contexts where both UNDP and DPO are engaged in ROLSHR work.

In terms of internal coherence of GP3 within UNDP, the evaluators found considerable ambiguity in attempting to distinguish the GP’s work from the wider work of the UNDP ROLSHR team, in which the GP resides. (This issue as it relates to GP/UNDP monitoring and reporting is further discussed in *Annex 3*: Analysis of Results-Based Management.) Although this integration means that GP is not operating in a separate silo, which is a plus, informants raised concerns about lack of clarity in division of responsibilities—especially in relation to how the ROLSHR team responds to needs and opportunities arising in contexts that are not classified as fragile or crisis-affected. It was felt that procedures and communications could be improved to ensure stakeholders understand exactly what the GP can offer and to whom, and to systematically refer countries not qualified for GP support to other more suitable programmes or entities.

There appears to be no overarching Theory of Change or other conceptual framework that demonstrates the interconnections and complementarities between GP and non-GP ROLSHR programming and describes the differences of their mandates and targeted contexts. Although the organigramme for the ROLSHR team shows several staff as assigned entirely to the GP, in reality the picture is complex, as individuals across the team contribute significantly to the GP in diverse ways as part of their wider duties, operating either at HQ or from regional hubs/offices.

With respect to the GFP, it is generally seen as an important mechanism for connecting the GP with other key actors in the sector and advancing coherence among them. While informants expressed mixed opinions on the optimal institutional arrangement for the GFP, observing both pros and cons of the current setup, overall they saw the GP as an adequate “host” to support the operations and funding of GFP, and considered this hosting arrangement as a plus for the Programme itself. Most informants at global level view GFP as adding value through its efforts at HQ level to bring together key UN players in the ROLSHR sector, especially in relation to peacekeeping and transition contexts. They highlighted GFP’s contribution to shifting the focus for those contexts to longer term planning and interventions by UNDP and DPO, and by other GFP partners. It is worth noting that some global level interviewees had a weak understanding of the GFP, including its relationship with the GP.

Informants pointed out that reports on implementation of GFP-funded activities have to date followed regular UNDP GP requirements: the reports are prepared by UNDP CO staff and are generally shared within UNDP only. This was explained as a consequence of GFP essentially being funded by the GP until 2020, because it lacked its own resources to allocate to countries. Informants commented that this resulted in the views of other GFP partners not being reflected in the reports, and DPO GFP managers had little visibility of the reporting. A distinct reporting practice exists in relation to reporting to the GFP’s key donor, the government of the United Kingdom, for whom a separate GFP report is prepared that includes inputs from DPO (including the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, OROLSI) and the field, and is cleared by all GFP managers before submission.

## Country Level Findings on Coherence

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent has GP3 promoted coordination and partnership with national counterparts, donor partners, and across the UN system?*
* *To what extent has GP3 support at country level been consistent with UNDP corporate standards of practice (e.g., prioritizing Leave No One Behind (LNOB), people-centered human rights-based, nationally-owned, based on analytical assessment, adapted to country context, gender sensitive and conflict-sensitive, supportive of innovation)?*

While the case studies have shown evidence that previous tensions or poor coordination among UN entities have been successfully alleviated if not overcome in certain cases, there is also evidence that rivalries (among UN entities, in particular UNDP and the Mission, and between UNDP and the de-linked RCO) persist at various levels in some countries. It was reported that especially in non-mission settings, the de-linking of the Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative functions [[10]](#footnote-11) together with the introduction/expansion of “system-wide service provision”[[11]](#footnote-12) has added layers of complexity. Also, UN system interoperability issues have been seen to negatively affect RoL implementation, especially in Mission settings. As further explained in Annex 7, the administrative and support systems across the Organization (in particular, between UNDP and UN Missions) are not compatible, and personnel contracted by one UN entity do not have access to the systems of others. In one example, a staff mobilized via the DPO stand-by facility in Brindisi (Italy) as interim ROL CTA was seriously hampered in her work since she lacked the necessary contractual credentials (in terms of password attribution, etc.) to access UNDP’s ATLAS system, the platform used for managerial tasks such as performance appraisals, recruitment, financial/budgetary management, and contracts.

GFP has a very important role to play in ensuring coherence in mission settings, since the interventions of UNDP and DPO are interfacing and potentially overlapping in those countries, with DPO operating under a (renewable) short term mandate. The GFP mechanism follows the general logic of Delivering-as-One, only with a specific thematic focus on RoLSHR. Approaches designed to ensure internal coherence include integrated offices and organigrammes with single-line reporting and oversight, joint programming including JPs, strategic inter-agency retreats etc. There is sometimes limited awareness of GFP, its purpose, its services, etc. even among technical UNCT staff affecting “uptake” – possibly exacerbated by language barriers in francophone countries (and others). In more than one country, GFP focal points were not enthusiastic about the added value of the approach.

In **Kyrgyzstan**, the GP’s funding to hire an experienced CTA in 2015-16 provided a strong anchor for the UNDP ROLSHR team to develop its portfolio and forge lasting links with other key actors and programmes. Based on consultations led by the CTA, UNDP identified its strategic niche and gradually assumed a lead role in all ROLSHR-related donor coordination and government relations. Generally, UNDP programming is seen as complementary of other interventions and part of a coherent division of labor among key donors. With respect to the 2019-2020 GP-funded project specifically analyzed by the evaluation, it was co-funded by INL based on consultations between the teams in country, with funding passed through the GP as an earmarked contribution. There was no involvement of GFP or other UN entities in that project; in fact, reservations were expressed about the cost-benefit of GFP and joint programmes generally, with one UNCT staff commenting:

*“Other UN entities here are like little brothers to UNDP. A JP would be less effective, more complicated… GP is much easier, no need to engage formally with other entities to get those funds”.*

Experienced CTAs on the team contributed to UNDP standards and practices being well-known and applied, though they appreciated specific guidance from the GP Focal Point in Istanbul on issues such as civic space and gender, and noted the added value of experts at HQ and regional level.

In **Colombia**, GP funds were not used specifically to support inter-UN cooperation and the GFP has not been active, although generally interagency work by UNDP is seen as effective. There may have been less need for GFP-supported coordination since the Colombia Mission focuses on verification issues, resulting in less overlap and potential for tensions about leadership and roles than in peacekeeping mission settings. The UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund already strongly encourages joint programming, though UNDP staff doubted this was always the best approach. The CTA and team have facilitated positive connections with other UN entities, government and civil society. UNDP has worked hand-in-hand with OHCHR, notably during ramp-up of the special criminal court and selection of civil society organizations (CSOs) to represent victims. UNODC and UNDP have recently overcome trust issues to forge a new relationship based on respect for each other’s key competencies; they now have joint programming in the field of local access to justice, which is highly appreciated by the Ministry of Justice.

CSOs remarked on how UNDP is accompanying them rather than simply providing funding and monitoring: *“It is a joint effort, so we all arrive at expected results. They organized meetings to share experiences across organizations who are representing victims. These exchanges were a good strategy.”)* These findings are corroborated by ISSAT’s country study, which identified a “*coherent holistic approach, relevant to context and adaptable*” and interventions that “*contributed to linkages across peacebuilding initiatives at local level, mainly involving civil society and local government, and national level*”.

In **Pakistan**, with respect to the specific intervention in Balochistan that was studied, external coherence was ensured through close coordination with the Balochistan government and legal profession as well as with theBureau of International Narcoticsand Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the U.S Government, which funded distinct but complementary activities in a similar time frame. UNDP has actively collaborated with UN Women and UNODC throughout the project’s life span, and injection of GP funds allowed that partnership to be reinvigorated after the core funder had withdrawn. The experience showed how these agencies can work together effectively, but there remains a common resistance to the JP approach due to reluctance to share control and deal with procedural barriers. Thus, although collaboration will continue, the new European Union (EU) funding for the work in Balochistan will provide independent funding to each agency. A JP was explored with involvement of the GFP team to develop a similar Roadmap in Gilgit-Baltistan. However, GP/GFP seed funding limits were seen as too low for more than one agency to establish its presence in that region. Some stakeholders criticized the lack of information about the GFP mechanism: “*GFP should be closer to country level: Nobody really knows about it on the ground in UN family, only the experts*”.

In **Burkina Faso**, the UNDP ROLSHR portfolio includes upstream policy support and capacity building measures in support of national institutions like the Ministry of Justice. In terms of UN-internal coordination, UNDP has established strong relationships with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and UNODC, integrating to the point of inserting their in-country activities into the UNDP annual work plan. UNDP offered both agencies co-location status, hosting their staff when on mission to Burkina Faso. UNDP’s COSED programme incorporates an innovative holistic formula integrating RoL and social cohesion; as noted above, this model is being considered for replication in neighboring countries, which would promote programmatic coherence within the sub-region. Although COSED seems inherently suited for an integrated multi-agency approach, it remains a single-agency, UNDP-only programme. GFP stakeholders voiced concerns about this, and several UNDP staff acknowledged that not incorporating other agencies in the design was probably a misstep.

The case study brought to the fore UN-internal governance and management issues triggered by the de-linking of the RC and RR functions. Prior to the de-linking, internal coherence was stronger; a senior UNDP SSR advisor with a direct reporting line to the RC used to supervise UNDP ROL project staff and was thus at least indirectly involved in programme management. With the de-linking, this connection was severed. The RCO argues that human rights and social cohesion are cross cutting issues under the remit of UN internal coordination, and as such claims a convening role for the GFP. Meanwhile, UNDP are at this point not actively pursuing the GFP agenda either in terms of funding or other support since there is no real incentive to do so. Therefore, for the time being the GFP mechanism remains dormant in Burkina Faso. Social cohesion and mainstreaming human rights across ROLSHR are at the center of the discussion about how to frame the nexus/New Way of Working and operationalize the peace(building) and security architecture in this context. Coherence could be improved via clear rules and standard operating procedures (SOPs) or at least, general guidance on who is convening the GFP.

In **CAR,** similarly to Somalia, the external perception of coherence between UN ROLSHR stakeholders benefits from the donors being aware of both the GP and GFP. However, in terms of genuine internal coherence, there are serious concerns that “*the Mission and UNDP at times seem to be speaking two different languages*”, as one informant put it. UN cross-agency coordination in support of the hybrid Special Criminal Court has been quite poor, with informants commenting on unclear division of responsibilities, differences in perception, divergent approaches embedded in disparate organizational cultures, etc.

The ISSAT 2018 evaluation found that UN informants recognized the added value of GP in advocacy and mobilization of resources, but low visibility of GP’s high-level policy support meant that stakeholders were not aware of any effect on coherence or coordination. CAR is infamous among GFP insiders for the interoperability challenges faced by an expert deployed from the Standing Capacity from Brindisi, detailed to temporarily serve as ROL CTA but not able to utilize the ATLAS system due to access set-up issues.

In **Somalia,** stakeholders including UNDP, other UN entities, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)/RC (Development), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), DPO-OROLSI, as well as key national counterparts generally acknowledged the vital nature of UNDP’s coordination function via its broadly defined RoL portfolio. Somalia is one of the stand-out global test beds for the GFP mechanism. GFP has demonstrated positive impact on UN-internal collaboration across the ROLSHR portfolio with a strong focus on joint programmes. The Joint Justice Programme (JJP) counts UNDP, UNSOM, UN Women, UNICEF and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) among its partners. As well, the GP-supported SDG16+ monitoring project and small arms survey were deliberately designed through a holistic prism to overcome traditional silo logic. However, a key lesson learned from the previous RoL programme was that cross-agency collaboration can be overdone by crowding too many stakeholders under the umbrella of one overly complex JP. During the recent completed programme cycle, the pendulum swung back in the opposite direction of creating siloes, e.g., in the justice chain where Courts, Police and Corrections work got severed from one another.

Senior UN management acknowledged the persistent challenge of “scatteredness” and even potential over-abundance of UNCT-wide RoL programming elements in an extremely complex environment with very high operational costs, marked by regional and clan interests conflicting with centralized State building attempts, shifting alliances across states, large areas inaccessible, several (quasi-)statal entities, etc.). Both UNSOM and UNDP are committed to enhancing programmatic coherence by linking ROLSHR work with interventions in Inclusive Governance to overcome UN siloes. In terms of interoperability and implementation of GFP, Somalia has historically had various challenges (as detailed in *Annex 7: Challenges related to GFP in Somalia (2013-14)*. Some stakeholders insisted there was still a major gap between the institutional cultures of the Mission and UNCT.

## ****Efficiency** – *How well are resources used and operations managed?***

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| **Conclusions on Efficiency** |
| This criterion is where the GP demonstrates its most serious challenges, primarily in relation to results-based management, and more specifically, in terms of weak monitoring and reporting systems and practices at Programme/global level (also reflected at country level). The intertwined difficulties are multiple:* The GP3 performance indicators and the overall results framework are not well designed, have been poorly implemented, and do not generate particularly useful information. Notably, there is no systematic attempt to measure outcomes of the Programme, and output tracking is severely limited in both design and execution.
* GP annual reports are the primary vehicle for external and internal sharing of results, and while they narrate an impressive array of activities and outputs across targeted contexts, the contribution made by GP inputs (financial or otherwise) is not clearly explained. In effect, these reports tend to conflate inputs, outputs and outcomes of overall UNDP programming in ROLSHR with those that could realistically be linked to the relatively modest financial contributions of the GP.
* Although in theory, GP3 attention was to focus on a priority list of 32 countries (with exceptions for emerging needs), its finite human and financial resources have in reality been spread over a much larger number of contexts. Prioritization processes are unclear and undocumented, both geographically and thematically across seven thematic areas outlined in the Prodoc.
* The process for allocating funds to COs is undoubtedly the GP’s most important business process. It is a relatively easy and quick way for UNDP teams in certain countries to flexibly access modest amounts for short-term needs, which is widely appreciated. However, the process is characterized by a complex array of criteria and priorities that are not clearly and systematically defined and applied to select COs and regional projects for funding. The GP would benefit from a detailed decision tree setting out who is responsible for vetting or selection at each step and the factors guiding those decisions at each level, specifically including broader strategic objectives of the GP.
* The GP/ROLSHR team is insufficiently staffed, given the current vast scope of worldwide programming and level of funding being managed. This poses various risks, including: increased staff turnover, sidelining of countries in need that escape the attention of stretched Focal Points, continuation of unsystematic results-based management and funding allocation processes, and insufficient use of lessons learned to inform decision-making. The burden of work is exacerbated for the tiny GP team of two (at present) by also managing the significant flow of INL earmarked funding, which does not augment the resources available to cover HQ staff.
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## Programme/Global Level Findings on Efficiency

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent have GP3’s management, operational, financial and administrative systems and structures (including SOPs, business processes) affected programme implementation?*
* *Are existing SOPs helpful or would additional or better guidance be useful; if so, how could they be improved?*
* *Does GP3 have the required resources (human and financial) to achieve its objectives?*
* *To what extent has GP3 management met its key donors’ expectations?*
* *To what extent does GP3 integrate results-based management?*
* *How well has Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning been carried out in GP3?*
* *How effectively has GP3 contributed to results outlined in the UNDP Integrated Results and Resources Framework (2014-17) and Strategic Plan (2018-21)?*
* *What have been the efficiencies and synergies, or negative and unintended consequences, if any, of the GP also managing non-pipeline, earmarked funding streams on behalf of non-GP funding vehicles?  (discussed under Sustainability due to cross-cutting nature of this question)*

In collecting and analyzing data for this criterion, the evaluators faced a particular challenge in obtaining a clear picture of the operational side of GP in the early years of Phase 3, due to staff turnover and limited documentation from that time. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the focus of this analysis is on recent and/or current procedures, systems, and operations.

1. **Business processes and SOPs**

The most significant business process of the GP is its direct funding allocation to requesting countries (known as the “pipeline”), which is coordinated by the HQ team two or three times per year. Between 2017 and 2019, more than $18 million was awarded to at least 46 individual UNDP country offices via this process, plus approximately $1 million for regional projects. In all, about 38% of contributions to the GP were channeled to countries in this way.[[12]](#footnote-13) The 68 allocations to country offices are subject to a maximum of $500,000 but averaged $280,000 during that period. (See *Annex 6*: List of GP Pipeline Funding Allocations for the full list of country allocations from 2017-19.)

The related SOP shared by the GP team with the evaluators is the Guidelines on Funding Decisions and Allocations (2020 version), which briefly sets out parameters for funding via the pipeline, as follows: *Distribution of unearmarked funds will be determined by the Project Board.... All decisions regarding the distribution of catalytic funding or deployment of field capacities will be in line with the principles of* ***need*** *(the requirement of resources to achieve results or goals),* ***performance*** *(the effectiveness of previous resource utilization), and* ***transparency*** *(clarity of workplan and programme implementation processes).* The Guidelines document goes on to outline the procedure for requesting funds in general terms, including the requirement that submissions must include reference to joint work across the UN system, even if it is not a joint project as such. In addition, templates with six narrative sections are provided for country teams to submit their requests for funding. The evaluators noted that the Guidelines provide only a brief sketch of the complex pipeline process and realized through interviews that various other factors are considered at several stages in making these funding decisions (as described below).

Generally, UNDP COs view the application process as relatively easy, flexible and quick, though there were concerns about transparency of the decision-making process (e.g., no reasons given for a request not being funded or only partially funded, lack of clarity about who makes those decisions.) Staff at HQ and regional offices explained that requests are typically based on ideas generated by individual COs (less often, from a regional office/hub), which are carefully vetted by the respective Focal Point responsible for those countries to assess their suitability for funding and priority level, before being forwarded to the GP management team for further vetting. Factors described by Focal Points and management team members as relevant in their vetting of potential and submitted funding requests included country team capacity, existing potential for catalytic effects in the donor environment, the number of previous allocations, proportion of those allocations already spent, results achieved with previous funding, current fragility or instability, etc. The current (2021) funding request form requires applicants to explain the current context in terms of fragility as well as potential catalytic effects, but the other factors related to capacity and previous allocations are not included. Those are informally assessed by the Focal Point initially (who may decide that the CO should not put forward a request at that time), and later by the GP management team if the request advances to that stage.

Although all these factors are subject to highly varied interpretation and application, they are not described in detail in any GP documentation, nor does there appear to be a standardized procedure or full list of specific criteria to guide the prioritization or vetting process by different members of the GP team. One area of ambiguity is related to “gender marking”: while the request template asks applicants to verify that the project “*Meets the minimum threshold of 15% of total resources dedicated to gender-related activities*”, it appears that UNDP corporate threshold is not being enforced by GP when budgets are later submitted. As well, it is unclear how the “jointness” requirement has been applied in practice, especially when funding is aimed at hiring/retaining a key technical ROLSHR staff member.

The final stage in the process is approval by the Project Board[[13]](#footnote-14), which according to documents and interviews consists of a relatively brief review of a list of 10-15 funding requests tailored by the GP management team to fit the total amount available for that round. Board members and GP staff indicated that although the Board has the authority to reject any request, in practice this has been very rare. There is no voting process; rather, the practice is for Board members to vet the requests emanating from COs in their respective regions, consulting with their regional and country teams as needed. As one Board member remarked: “*we have an understanding that each region will get a proportion*.” Informants did not mention any process whereby the Board would assess the merits of the entire list of requests or weigh the overall priorities of the GP or UNDP on a strategic or global level. Although the current request format asks which of the seven key GP thematic areas is most closely related to the proposed funding, the distribution of funding among those areas is not tracked over time nor does it affect funding decisions, potentially leading to an unintentionally imbalanced approach.

Informants familiar with the pipeline allocation process had varying perspectives, perhaps influenced by their respective roles in the process and/or the time period of their involvement. Advantages mentioned included the flexible nature of the process, the minimization of competition among countries or regions, and the prominent role of experienced and knowledgeable Focal Points in ensuring quality and relevance of the funding allocations. Some key staff consider that the process is defined clearly enough to fulfil its purpose while maintaining flexibility. On the other hand, highlighted disadvantages included the process being highly subjective/unsystematic and thus vulnerable to personal influences and staffing changes, the selection/vetting criteria not being fully and clearly documented and shared with COs, Focal Points having insufficient time to fully assess the potential applicant countries in their respective portfolios, and funding decisions not being explained to those who submitted requests.

With respect to the standard one-year duration of funding via the pipeline, informants viewed this as reasonable in relation to the amount of funding. The need for flexibility to extend the duration was highlighted repeatedly, in light of the instability and other factors at play in the targeted contexts, although most informants indicated that the Programme had accommodated their extension requests. Although the funding amount was considered modest, especially in countries with major donor presence and programming in the ROLSHR sector, it was generally seen as adequate to fulfil the purpose of catalytic funding. An exception to this was mentioned by a Project Board Member: the maximum of $500,000 limits the realistic possibility of joint implementation by more than one UN entity. This was vividly demonstrated by the Pakistan case study, where a promising joint undertaking was undertaken by UNDP alone, because the cost of several partners operating in a new remote province was too high for the GP allocation.

With respect to the transfer of allocated funds to UNDP COs, informants in HQ and in country commented that this is relatively fast and efficient now that the GP is able to operate via the Funding Windows structure. In the first years of Phase 3 the transfer of funds was problematic and slow in many cases, but this has now been resolved internally by UNDP. However, transferring funds from UNDP to some other UN entities remains virtually impossible due to ongoing interoperability challenges (especially between Umoja and Atlas systems). This is a particular challenge for GFP, as described in the text box below.

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| **GFP Processes in Evolution**Since 2019, GFP has its own resources for direct funding support of field level projects/activities (previously, general GP funds were used). However, GFP funds still cannot easily be sent directly to a Mission due to the serious interoperability issues noted above. This hampers GFP JPs without UNDP as participating entity, thus limiting the potential scope of GFP. Specifically, funds transfers by UNDP to other UN agencies that use systems other than ATLAS cannot be carried out easily; and require signing of an inter-agency agreement. In fact, the GFP team indicated it was very rare to receive a request that does not include UNDP. The theoretical alternative of using a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) at country level was mentioned by several informants, to allow other UN entities to engage more efficiently and effectively. This modality could support a more participatory and transparent GFP model transcending the current UNDP-DPO controlled mechanism; however, the threshold of $5 million per year is an obstacle to use of MPTFs for this purpose. Moreover, certain donors do not allow their funds to be transferred to other entities or trust funds. GFP funding to field-level collaborative interventions has until recently been subject to a two-tier approval system: requests for GFP funding were reviewed and agreed by the GFP managers, but also had to go through the internal GP approval process before funding could be disbursed. There was no formal interaction between the two processes and *de facto* the formal UNDP GP approval (by the Project Board) was the one relevant to allocation of funding. In 2020, a parallel GFP pipeline process was established, which allows for increased input by the GFP managers in determining funding priorities. In early 2021, a more tailored proposal process was introduced: a separate supplementary form for GFP funding requests is now shared with COs and Mission staff, by UNDP and DPO respectively; proposals received by the GFP’s dedicated staff are then shared with GFP managers; and final selected proposals submitted to the GP Project Board are now clearly marked GFP. This was highlighted by relevant staff as a significant improvement over past procedures.  |

1. **Measurement and Reporting of Results**

Given the importance of this subject and space limitations of the report, a comprehensive discussion of the GP’s results-based management is presented in *Annex 3*: Analysis of Results-Based Management*,* specifically focusing on monitoring tools and reporting approaches and responding in more depth to several Evaluation Questions. The evaluation team has emphasized monitoring by HQ and country teams as it relates to the overarching results measurement system of the GP itself, as compared to project-specific monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting by individual CO’s. The key findings and conclusions are as follows:

* Outcome level indicators: the six indicators based on several international scoring systems have not been tracked by GP3, and in any event would be of limited utility to clearly capture Programme outcomes with any degree of attribution.
* Output indicators: 17 indicators presently being reported on annually: eight derived from UNDP Strategic Plan, and nine specifically for GP3. A year-by-year analysis of indicator targets and results is presented in *Annex 4: Analysis of GP Output Indicator Data 2016-19*, along with brief evaluator comments on each indicator. Although a general positive trend across indicators was reported, the following issues undermine the usefulness of this data in understanding GP3 results and measuring change over time:
	+ only countries on the GP priority list defined in 2015 are tracked, but those countries account for only about two-thirds of total funding allocated by GP from 2017 to 2019;
	+ although Strategic Plan indicators are explained in detail via methodological notes, no written definitions or explanations were found to guide measurement of GP-specific indicators, which could therefore be interpreted in different ways by those responsible for reporting;
	+ it is not clear whether and to what extent reporting countries are taking into account UNDP’s contribution to the indicator data, and how UNDP’s non-GP support can be distinguished from GP support;
	+ many examples were found of targets for individual indicators being set significantly below the previous year’s actual achievement.

As a combined result of these challenges, the evaluators have serious concerns about the quality, consistency and reliability of the indicator data, and more broadly the utilization of the results framework as a tool for GP3 management and reporting. These concerns were shared by various informants in the ROLSHR team and COs.

*“If we know ROL reform is complicated and linked to power and hard to predict, why write indicators that do not tell us anything? Why count institutions?” ~* ROLSHR team member

*“We try to use existing Country Office reporting and Focal Points to put the pieces together rather than demand in-depth reports. A better balance could be struck – to invest in CO capacity is something we can give them in exchange for the extra work.” ~* ROLSHR team member

Looking at GP reporting more generally, the annual reports are the Programme’s primary vehicle for sharing information about its activities, initiatives, funding and results. These are publicly available and directed primarily at external audiences, though UNDP staff also use them as a key source of information. The reports contain an impressive range of information about disparate interventions around the world, largely sourced from GP-supported country offices. While useful to understand the breadth and depth of overall UNDP ROLSHR-related programming, the reports do not clearly differentiate GP-supported activities and outcomes from other UNDP efforts, which makes it difficult to trace what contribution has been made by GP, via funding, technical assistance or other inputs. Together with the indicator monitoring challenges, this lack of “traceability” led some informants to express doubts about the quality of the results-based management processes and information products that are meant to ensure the GP’s accountability.

*“I have not seen a strong focus by GP on evaluations, to see what is working and what is not. We are smart at setting indicators that we are going to reach… but that does not show impact.* *It is not easy to measure results in this sector, but we can do better.” ~* UN agency staff

*“Everyone wants it, but nobody wants to pay for it*.” ~ Former UNDP staff (referring to enhanced RBM and monitoring)

1. **Information and Knowledge Management**

A common theme that emerged in interviews with various UNDP staff involved in GP3 was the need for a more robust system for identifying, documenting and sharing lessons learned if something did not work out or needed improvement (or indeed, had to be discontinued or dramatically reworked). Donors and other external informants corroborated this view from their perspective, noting that GP3 annual reporting and annual meeting processes have been largely focused on success stories, with some describing them as “public relations exercises” that are lacking in strategic value. Although some certainly acknowledged the importance of reporting results and impacts, and thereby highlighting what is working, there was widespread agreement that the GP (and the wider ROLSHR team) could do much more to capitalize on learning at the ground level. However, it was acknowledged that the SparkBlue online consultations in 2020 were a step in the right direction of drawing out both positive and negative experiences.[[14]](#footnote-15) Country level informants commented on the need for reporting procedures to draw out this learning, as well as more regular opportunities for exchange of experience with counterparts from other countries.

*“We often do not have leverage to make changes at country level with this small money, but we can take risks, invest in new areas of work. I think donors are happy to hear about strategic approach, not just to implement a few activities. But there are not good systems for capture of those results.” ~* UNCT staff

*“GP wants to be a thought leader, but for that we need evidence!” ~* Former ROLSHR team member

ISSAT’s 2018 interim report expressed significant concern on this point, as follows: “*UNDP has a real opportunity through its Global Programme system to coordinate knowledge development across its programmes on what works in the effective reform of security and justice systems. This is an area where the global community is still struggling to build an evidence base, and the Global Programme could enhance its added value by early identification of such examples, by promoting such approaches generally in its projects, and by ensuring that these projects have the high-quality monitoring they need in order to demonstrate what aspects were successful and should be replicated.”*

The recent establishment of UNDP’s Global Policy Network (GPN) was highlighted by several informants as a key development that would complement the role of the GP and others in capturing and sharing knowledge, and should play an increasingly significant role in policy and thought leadership as well as facilitating access to existing UNDP-internal corporate worldwide knowledge and expertise within and beyond UNDP. This was described as an opportunity for the GP in Phase 4 to enhance its own knowledge management practices and become a core contributor to the GPN.

Internally, some informants raised concerns about general information management within the team, including difficulties in finding data about past GP funding and technical assistance provided to specific countries, as well as more general but essential information about those contexts. This was seen as especially challenging given the relatively high turnover of staff and gaps in the organigramme that are often exacerbated by slow UNDP recruitment processes. It was recognized that Focal Points generally have a solid understanding of the country level contexts assigned to them, but their knowledge is often “in their heads” only, and not systematically captured and shared across the team. This was attributed in part to the heavy workload of the team overall, including Focal Points, who are responsible for up to eight countries each.

Various informants at regional and country level raised concerns about the paucity of ROLSHR technical guidance documents, thematic reports and other publications in UN languages other than English. Specifically, in the context of francophone Africa, it was noted that even basic explanatory information about the GP and GFP (including internal documents such as SOPs) is not usually available in French. This was described as problematic for UNDP personnel who are not completely fluent in English, especially if they are charged with explaining the GP and GFP to national stakeholders and others.

1. **Human Resources**

While an in-depth analysis of the complex set of human resources that supports the GP is beyond the evaluation’s scope, various internal and external informants provided their perspectives on the GP staffing, usually in broader terms that encompassed the entire ROLSHR team. In general, the team (including those at HQ and Focal Points in regional hubs) is seen as technically skilled and knowledgeable, and their depth and breadth of field experience was repeatedly remarked upon as impressive and atypical at HQ level. Informants recognized the inherent challenge for a relatively small team to have full coverage of a range of thematic areas, plus geographic/regional knowledge, as well as relevant language capacities. In spite of that challenge, it was felt overall that the team’s skillset is suitable and they are doing an admirable job of meeting a high level of demand from many directions (donors, UNDP corporate structures, COs, regional hubs, etc.)

Only three positions are designated fully as GP staff: one Project Manager (P3), one Administrative Assistant/Program Associate (G6), and one Learning and Advocacy officer (P2, vacant for the past year). However, the entire ROLSHR team is (to widely varying extents) involved in GP implementation, in addition to other duties. Although the most recent organigramme theoretically includes 44 posts based in HQ and six regional hubs, at least seven posts are vacant, and the total includes various part time staff, several consultants, seconded staff, temporary assignments, and volunteers. It was reported that considerable difficulties had faced the team in achieving a full staffing complement, due to long vacancies, funding constraints and other internal factors. Team members pointed to the GP’s previous phase and other comparable programmes as having better staffing structures, notably with more management capability. One informant familiar with the staffing pattern commented: “*They are spreading themselves far too thin, and not spending enough time on management at global level*.” On the other hand, the evaluators heard of donor wariness of concentrating too much staffing (and associated costs) in HQ.

*“Focal Points play a key role in seeing the bigger picture of supported countries, they are in position to track and document effects. The structure has helped make GP successful. However, when there is a lot of turnover or confusion or gap in who is handling each country, this can create problems.” ~* ROLSHR team member

There has never been a position dedicated to M&E/learning, either for the GP or for the wider ROLSHR team. Instead, those tasks have been combined with other functions such as advocacy, communications and knowledge management, which have resulted in an untenable scope of work for a single person. The GP post that is currently described as “Learning and Advocacy” has been vacant for a year, which has left only two full-time staff responsible for all key tasks related to the programmatic and financial management of GP3. In addition, the GFP “core team” (currently three people) has experienced relatively high turnover and depended in large part on secondments and UN Volunteers to support its operations. Informants noted that this team had been fully staffed for only eight months in the last four years, hampering consolidation of the GFP platform.

## Country Level Findings on Efficiency

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent have the GP3’s management, operational, financial and administrative systems and structures (including SOPs and business processes) been effective in supporting implementation at country level?*
* *To what extent have GP3-awarded funds been absorbed on a timely basis?*
* *What have been the correlation patterns between delivery rate (fund absorption: expenditures/ available resources) and progress against indicator targets?*
* *What is the quality of GP3-related Monitoring & Reporting, Evaluation and Knowledge Management at field level?*
* *To what extent is a standard M&E/Knowledge Management approach applied across all GP3 countries (common database, M&E reference guidelines with clear and unambiguous meta data definitions etc.)?*
* *Are standardized systems, norms, tools, processes and practices “owned” and applied by country level staff; or is there room for improvement (and if so, where/ how)?*

***N.B. To minimize repetition, the analysis under this criterion blends elements from different country studies, because observations were mostly similar and have been touched on already in the preceding global findings. However, notable comments and situations arising in specific countries are highlighted as relevant.***

The funding request and review process allows COs to take the initiative in requesting GP funds to meet eligible needs, though Focal Points usually provide technical support and guidance on what to prioritize and how to present the request to boost their chances of approval. The Focal Point responsible for monitoring each country/context and supporting their needs may be situated in regional hubs or HQ, depending on the situation. In some cases, Focal Points would trigger specific proposals by making suggestions to COs. As one CO staff noted: *“We don’t have to do much work at concept stage, until we get assurance of funding”.* After that approval, COs develop detailed annual work plans and budgets for entry into the ATLAS system and signoff by GP management.

COs in case study countries pointed out that in terms of financial procedures, the current modality of transferring monies via ATLAS works very smoothly, which has resolved past delays and cumbersome procedures when the GP did not have access to the Funding Windows system. No specific issues were raised with respect to existing UNDP-internal financial management related to GP funding. As soon as the GP transfer is received, fiduciary responsibility passes to the CO, which thereby owns the funds and can manage spending in line with intended usage. In most cases, financial records show that allocated GP funds were ultimately spent by COs, although no-cost extensions were reportedly common. Due to the specifics of this financial management system combined with minimal GP reporting demands, it was not possible for the evaluation team to track delivery/absorption rates compared to specific results of funded activities.

The high level of flexibility in the use of GP funding is valued by country teams, who mentioned situations arising after approval of their funding request and work plans that required a shift of financial or programmatic focus and/or extension of the project. Such changes were easy to get authorized by GP once justification was provided. Although generally viewed as responsive compared to other donor processes, a few CO informants criticized the GP pipeline process for being slow in reaching and communicating their decisions on requests. Others pointed out that *“we get very little information from GP/ROL team and the process is not systematic; we are not sure how much money is available so we ask for $500,000, but maybe there is only $200,000 available. Later we have to figure out how to spend that smaller amount without any reasons given by management. We usually get less than we request, so we pitch for a bit more.”*

One CO expressed concerns that their Focal Point in the regional office served as a kind of gatekeeper, with control over information flows between CO and decision-makers in HQ, noting: “*We are not sure if messages reach all the way up. HQ should study leveraging capacity of projects… instead of limiting us at proposal stage. They should hear our case before deciding– often we do not receive any feedback, at all*”). On the other hand, one regional hub team pointed out that given the evolving need for cross-border ROLSHR programming, the current funding mechanism should be revamped to better accommodate the needs of complex multi-country crises.

Despite the possibility of extension, the short duration of 12 months for implementation of GP funding was seen by most CO staff as problematic. It was criticized for creating uncertainty and greater risk of funding gaps, necessitating additional effort to repeatedly submit requests. Since unspent GP funds are a significant factor against approval of a new funding request, this inevitably leads to gaps in meeting ongoing needs. Informants commented that the one-year duration creates pressure to implement activities quickly, and tangible results are difficult to produce in such a short time. Numerous stakeholders said that a longer duration from the outset would facilitate longer term planning. UNDP staff in Pakistan pointed out that specifically for activities with the government, the timeline is a major challenge since the administrative bureaucracy “*can sometimes be very slow*”.

With regards to the inter-related areas of RBM, M&E, and reporting, CO staff were mostly critical. Many expressed concerns about reporting on global indicators that are irrelevant for their work and often not linked to the specific results of GP-supported projects. The relative advantage of (also) having to report against corporate UNDP Strategic Plan indicators using the standardized Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) system is that this type of reporting is not that time consuming. Although these indicators aim to collect and collate standardized data across all UNDP contexts, CO informants did not see any specific added value of collecting or reporting such data, in the sense of informing decision-making or otherwise.

While not desirous of onerous GP monitoring and reporting requirements, some CO informants considered that the current system is very loosely structured and infrequent (narrative reporting is only required for the annual report). One staff member remarked that COs could take advantage of this, as follows:

*“Reporting could be made more robust, accountable. If I were in HQ, I would like to know more about how funds are being utilized. A mid-year update would be suitable”.*

Informants generally agreed that catalytic effects of GP support go beyond generation of additional funding and can take years to appear; COs felt that more could be done to define, capture and report on such effects, including through qualitative techniques.  A promising pilot for improved monitoring is the GP-funded SDG16 M&E project in Somalia, which experiments with community level representative sampling approaches and has started to look into comparative monitoring (treatment vs. non-treatment experimental design).

CO teams repeatedly mentioned that current GP monitoring and reporting mechanisms are not geared to include lessons learned from initiatives that failed, including times when anticipated catalytic effects do not occur. As one informant said:

*“At the end of each year, we report on outputs. But the real effects take more time. Hence, we need to improve our knowledge management and reflection, have more open exchanges on what does not work. That needs meetings across countries to reflect in an honest way on what has not worked and how problems have been or can be overcome.”*

## ****Effectiveness/Impact** – A*re objectives being achieved or is progress being made? What has changed due to this Programme?***

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| **Conclusions on Effectiveness and Impact** |
| **Key achievements:*** Positive changes linked to the GP can be perceived in relation to the seven priority areas of the Programme. Those include effective global partnerships and regional programming, in addition to the country-specific results on which the case studies focused.
* Results of technical support are particularly notable in the design of new and expanded interventions based on solid analysis of the specific context combined with knowledge of global best practices and UNDP corporate standards. In the case study countries, although thorough analysis of programming was beyond this evaluation’s scope, GP-supported interventions have produced a range of positive ROLSHR outcomes (and no negative effects were identified).
* GP seed funding has been applied in diverse ways, primarily identified at country level by UNDP Country Offices. It often appears to have contributed to subsequent new programming and more significant funding for UNDP as well as UN joint programmes, complemented by the efforts of the GFP. However, there is not sufficient data to permit thorough analysis of these catalytic effects on the global level (either percentage of funding allocations that produce catalytic effects, or the monetary value of catalytic effects).
* Levels of satisfaction with GP3 appear relatively high within the core group of donors, though this is tempered by doubts about how accurately and clearly GP results are being tracked and reported, and specifically the linkages between their investments in GP3 and the (alleged) successes described in the annual reports.

**Primary challenges:*** Reaching conclusions about the overall effectiveness and impact of the GP in this phase is hampered by the paucity of systematic and relevant monitoring data, and the blending of GP activities/results with those of the UNDP more broadly.
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## Programme/Global Level Findings on Effectiveness and Impact

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent has GP3 programming achieved its intended results, especially at the outcome and impact levels?*
* *What significant lessons learned, best practices and innovations have the potential to be scaled up to inform GP3-supported policy development?*
* *To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s corporate offer on ROLSHR globally in Phase 3? (e.g. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications)*

Given that the GP devotes most of its resources and efforts on supporting work at country/context level, the primary evidence of effectiveness and added value is found there via Programme documentation and the country case studies, which are discussed in more depth below. Overall, the evaluation found considerable narrative evidence via reports and interviews of positive effects in both priority countries and other contexts that have benefited from GP support in Phase 3.

Technical advice and support from the GP/ROLSHR team was regularly mentioned as having contributed to these outcomes, notably in the design of new or expanded ROLSHR programming. One significant example of strategic coordinated guidance and policy support from the ROLSHR team in designing and establishing innovative interventions is the Special Criminal Court in CAR. As well, the combination of seed funding and technical expertise was described as a useful modality to launch a sensitive line of work in a small-scale way that is less worrisome to the host government than a major new intervention promoted by an external actor.

With respect to pipeline funding allocations, the evaluators learned of a variety of ways in which GP had contributed to strengthened ROLSHR effectiveness in targeted countries, notably including (but not limited to) the following:

* + larger programmes launched with other funding sources after GP provided pilot or seed funding, as exemplified by the major COSED initiative in Burkina Faso, and significant new programming based on the Rule of Law Roadmap in Pakistan;
	+ stronger ROLSHR strategies and portfolios developed by bringing more experienced and technically qualified staff on board and maintaining a stable team, observed in several countries including Colombia; and
	+ gaps in programme funding met so that important initiatives (especially in a specific thematic or geographic niche) could be continued until additional resources were identified, for example in Kyrgyzstan and in CAR.

*“In countries like East Timor, very small money can make a difference, the ROL programme can be kept going between funding from other donors. Two times we almost had to stop working, but GP funds helped to provide continuity. Nobody else could have done this. GP saved the Timor ROL program in 2019. Since then, two more donors have come on board.” ~* ROLSHR team member

*“Country offices sometimes need strong technical leadership to get started in an effective way, access more funding. This is often hard to do with the available staff. Usually the GP investment in an international technical advisor pays off with new funding attracted.” ~* ROLSHR team member

The GP Prodoc and reporting consistently refer to “catalytic effects” as the key rationale behind the relatively small funds channeled to countries and regions, and indeed, examples abound of changes following GP support that could fall within that term. There is significant anecdotal evidence of COs generating more significant funding and programming, including with inputs from other donors and/or national counterparts, after receiving GP technical or financial support. However, the interviews and document review did not point to any clear definition or shared understanding of what constitutes “catalytic effect” for this Programme. It was learned that the PBF also places a high priority on achieving catalytic effects with its investments, and has done significant work in recent years to define what this means in the PBF context and attempt to quantify their catalytic effects in monetary “dollar for dollar” terms.[[15]](#footnote-16) Efforts in a similar direction were made at the outset of GP3 but were discontinued, reportedly due to the complexity of reliably linking subsequent generation of ROLSHR funding to the different GP interventions over time. As informants mentioned, new sources of funding may often emerge more than one year after a GP support intervention, and causal connections can be hard to clearly establish.

*“How are catalytic effects captured and documented?? Good question, it is not systematic. I used to produce a report after each mission, which would capture changes in that country, but now (in 2020) the system has fallen aside because we are not able to travel.” ~* ROLSHR team member

The absence of a programme-wide system of measurement and reporting on this aspect makes it difficult to evaluate the overall “catalytic effect” of GP3. Programme monitoring and reporting does not include methods to systematically capture and present data on catalytic effects over time (e.g., non-priority countries only report to GP for the year in which they received funding, which may not reflect subsequent effects). Programme reports and interviews did not mention attempts to analyze trends in catalytic effects across contexts or across years, which could help inform decisions about optimal duration of funding, amounts, types of investments, etc. As a corollary, there is only anecdotal evidence of allocations that have NOT led to any sustained effort or measurable change, which does not appear to have been systematically analyzed.

The unsystematic measurement of catalytic effects is symptomatic of the wider challenges of GP3 results-based management, as described under Efficiency and detailed in *Annex 3: Analysis of Results-Based Management.* This is corroborated by ISSAT’s comments in their 2018 report to GP management: “*Successful flexible and adaptive programming depends on strong programme management, including ensuring a clear idea of what the aims are, identifying and understanding the measures and milestones to show progress towards those aims, regular and realistic outcomes-based reporting, and the time to periodically reassess the project Theory of Change to understand what was learnt and thus why and how the project should adapt. The absence of such management undermines the whole approach, and leaves a programme lacking the evidence to justify and explain any changes. This makes the longer term aggregation of impact impossible to demonstrate, and puts at risk the sustainment of any achievements.”*

Enquiries with several key donors indicated that the core group of funding partners has been generally satisfied with the performance of GP3, which is corroborated by the fact that funding flows have been stable during this Phase. The GP management team is highly responsive to donor concerns and questions, and consultation and communication with the donor group was described as unusually frequent compared to other global initiatives. However, as noted above, donors voiced reservations about how well the Programme reporting reflects their investments in the GP and enables an overall cost-benefit analysis, and several recommended deeper strategic consultations on a timely basis.

*“The donors appreciate the Programme because they can channel significant funds, and get a single report with high quality assurance. It is easy, transparent, they know they will get results. The team puts heavy focus on country offices and donor relations, which has been effective.” ~* ROLSHR team member

It is pertinent to reiterate here that the Theory of Change in the Prodoc was never fully elaborated to define the expected results, causal pathways and assumptions underlying the GP3 design. Combined with the above-described constraints in monitoring and reporting systems, there are significant challenges for analyzing and measuring change influenced by the Programme in a concrete or tangible way at global level, across countries and across years.

## Country Level Findings on Effectiveness and Impact

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent has GP3-supported programming achieved its intended results?*
* *What significant lessons learned, best practices and innovations have emerged from GP3 programming?*
* *To what extent has GP3 contributed to improving the overall ROLSHR situation in priority countries?*
* *What examples of potential or early impact can be identified?*
* *To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s offer on ROLSHR in the field in Phase 3? (e.g. flexible funding, expertise, comprehensive programming, coordination with UN system)*

The evaluation found strong evidence that comparatively low-volume funds of $100,000 to $300,000 can go a long way and have a significant leveraging effect, creating what country level staff perceive as relatively uncommon and much-needed maneuvering space for CO ROLSHR teams. This includes the latitude and related opportunities provided through the simple initial effect of “buying time” which allows those teams to establish or consolidate connections, stay on the scene, position themselves in the overall landscape by defining or shaping their niche in the field of ROLSHR, draft programme/project designs, etc.

What can be described as catalytic effects of GP (in the sense of related investments or expanded programming after GP financial or technical support) were reported in all case study countries, although those effects were extremely diverse, sometimes hard to measure or link to the GP, and did not necessarily flow from every investment. Overall, GP’s modest funding has proven useful in a variety of contexts, if invested strategically – from mission contexts of ongoing conflict with huge donor presence to relatively stable non-mission contexts with few donors and small UNDP portfolio.

In terms of effects on the country level ROLSHR situation, these are somewhat more difficult to attribute to the limited GP support, given the complexity of the sector and multiple actors involved, even in a smaller context such as Kyrgyzstan. It was not feasible for this evaluation to investigate sufficiently to clarify these causal relationships. However, case study data points to multiple examples of positive results flowing from UNDP-led country level strategies and specific programming to which the GP has contributed, either in financial or technical terms. These range from innovative new tools and continuation of vital services to support SGBV victims (e.g., Colombia and CAR), to operationalization and replication of a consultative roadmap method for planning government and donor investments in the ROL sector (e.g., Pakistan).

At the end of this section, comparative information about Albania and Niger is presented, to complement the data about case study countries.

In **Kyrgyzstan**, GP seed funding helped to catalyze substantial development of the ROL portfolio, while cementing UNDP’s credibility and relations with other donors, government and UN entities. Though relatively small, the repeated injections of funds showed multiple benefits. *“It makes more difference here than in many places”* according to one informant, since the country is small and few donors are interested in ROLSHR. Complemented in 2019 by $400,000 from INL earmarked support via GP, the combined funds allowed UNDP to undertake a significant set of activities at a key moment in major judicial reforms, although it is too early to predict the overall impact. The GP had a direct positive effect on protection of vulnerable populations at risk of rights violations and without access to the justice system, by flexibly allowing budgetary reallocations to innovate in response to the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic. This was highly valued by the CO team and other stakeholders, with one commenting: “*Other donors refused to adjust work plans for Covid. This was important to provide continued legal aid service during pandemic*”.

*“GP staff at HQ watch what we do, but do not second guess us: They do not question whether we have identified the right priorities, their attitude is supportive.” ~* UNDPCountry Office staff

In terms of catalytic effects, the GP enabled UNDP to help develop the Unified Registry of Violations. Based on initial analytical work funded by the GP, a multi-stakeholder expert group managed to raise a half million Euros from the EU to fully implement the registry. This registry is an example of innovative practice via partnership with the Ministry of Interior, which is expected to be instrumental for protecting citizens’ rights and safety, ensuring accountability of law enforcement and public officials, and effectively recording, tracking and processing penalties for violations.

In **Colombia**, the GP had positive effects on ensuring integrated development of the complex UNDP ROLSHR portfolio and helping to fill key staffing gaps. The RoL CTA is now fully funded through project funding. ISSAT’s 2018 evaluation of UNDP’s overall ROLSHR work in Colombia observed contributions to significant changes in policy and legislation, and found that GP support to internal restructuring would be key to supporting the transition to peace in a coherent integrated manner. New initiatives were subsequently piloted and new partnerships formed (including with UNODC), as indirect benefits of the strengthened team capacity. In spite of major funding available in the ROLSHR sector in Colombia, the evidence shows that strategically invested GP seed funds can have meaningful catalytic effects. However, those effects are not guaranteed, the link to GP is indirect and not visible to external stakeholders, and even successes are not necessarily captured in team reporting. As one key staff remarked: “*We planted seeds without knowing whether they would grow or not*”.

One specific example of delayed catalytic effect has led to a promising new approach to combating SGBV. The ROLSHR team sourced GP funds in 2018 for an expert to assess bottlenecks in attention to SGBV victims, worked to build relations with relevant government counterparts, developed a joint strategy, and finally conducted a brief pilot in 2020. Later, the Ministry of Justice adopted the approach and is now rolling it out across the country with government resources. Notable cases of impact on end beneficiaries were also described by informants. UNDP-supported CSOs representing victims of civil war crimes pointed to promising early results: the first step of presenting an incident report has given a voice and some solace to victims’ families, and some reports gave rise to new cases or higher prioritization. UNDP collaboration with national transitional justice mechanisms have led to thousands of victims being accredited, although there remains a long road ahead, with the so-called “macro-cases” not yet heard by the special jurisdiction.

In **Pakistan**, GP seed funding was used in a highly strategic fashion at a pivotal moment, enabling UNDP to invest in a carefully selected set of interventions in Balochistan province, including renovation of a library for prosecutors, several major workshops, and support to alternative dispute resolution services. These somewhat disparate investments in conjunction with various justice stakeholders effectively served as the means to an end, as compared to achieving any specific results. In the wake of a major donor withdrawal, the GP funding was sufficient to kick start ROL Roadmap activities, stay engaged with government and the legal profession, and raise UNDP’s profile. This helped establish UNDP in a leadership role in terms of ROLSHR in Balochistan, and thus the “default option” for future donors. Although timing was delayed, there is evidence of a strong causal relation between GP funding and the substantive amount of recently secured EU funding (6.5 million Euros) for a significant new programme that will include Balochistan.

*“The Global Programme funding was a lifeline, not only for Balochistan but the entire ROL programme in Pakistan in a very tight funding period. Thanks to them and one other donor, we were able to stay active in the province.” ~* ROLSHR team member

Also worthy of mention is the recent GP funding to replicate the ROL Roadmap process in the remote area of Gilgit-Baltistan. Of the $500,000 requested from GP, the CO received $300,000 for this pilot. Due to territorial disputes and logistical challenges, the donor community has made little investment in this area. This will be an opportunity for UNDP to establish itself in an underserved geographical zone and potentially pave the way for other international actors to follow up with much-needed services to the population.

In **Burkina Faso**, the GP funding for the CTA salary and an A2J pilot project including mobile courts proved to be effective, as they laid the groundwork for subsequent consolidation of the ROLSHR portfolio. The CO also received planning and project design support from GP’s HQ team, notably including design of the COSED flagship programme. The innovative design was based on recommendations of a multi-agency mission with support from UNDP, OHCHR, and DPO-OROLSI. Although implementation is still in early stages, the model has gained a lot of traction and following early funding from Sweden, now other donors are also contributing substantial amounts (including a 20 million Euro contribution by Germany in December 2020). The original budget of $15 million has by now doubled to around $30 million.

In the **Central African Republic**, the GP’s financial support helped in keeping the legal clinics in Bangui and Bossangoa afloat under further funding could be mobilized from the PBF. These clinics, managed by the national Association of Women Jurists, provide essential services to the population. Nine locations are now operational providing community level services through lawyers, psychosocial agents and paralegals. Also, the HQ team provided massive support in design of the stand-out Special Criminal Court project; while not perfect, the Court has key features such as its hybrid structure of national and international judges working together that lend it characteristics of a global pilot.

In addition, GP provided strategic seed funding to SDG16+ perception surveys on peace, justice and security and to the Voluntary National Report presented at the High Level Political Forum in 2019; this allowed UNDP and the Government of CAR to attract donor attention at global level. Funding for the Court over the past three years (4.5 million Euros from the EU and 1 million Euros from the Netherlands) was attributable to this exposure. The Joint Programme on human rights-related criminal justice and relaunch of the justice system was a successful GFP-supported endeavor, which has combined the forces of UNDP with the UN Mission and UN Women and attracted in excess of $20 million since 2014.

In **Somalia**, GP support to funding a small arms survey culminated in an integrated SSR programme jointly implemented by UNDP with UNSOM, while the GP-backed SDG16 M&E pilot is gradually gaining traction and showing promising early results. There are a number of stand-out GFP-related results including UN-internal collaboration across the ROLSHR portfolio with a strong focus on the JP modality. The multi-partner JJP promoted by the GFP (described under Coherence) has contributed to on-going federalization, state and institution building and support to the formal justice sector. The JJP, with UNDP, UNSOM, UN Women, UNICEF and IDLO among its contributing partners, has contributed to on-going federalization, state and institution building and support to the formal justice sector; and provided support to developing new institutions and basic service delivery in the Federal Member States.

The JJP focuses on ‘bottom-up’, community driven security and justice initiatives, designed to complement the ‘top-down’ capacity building of State institutions and the operation of the formal justice system. The delivery of basic services to the communities to increase access to justice, particularly for women, children and displaced populations, has shown promising results in protecting women’s and girls’ human rights and providing a user-friendly alternative to Al-Shabab courts.

**Comparative Snapshot:**

**Contexts without Global Programme Support**

The TOR for this evaluation included brief assessments of knowledge about and interest in the Global Programme, in two countries not targeted by GP financial support during Phase 3. Niger and Albania were selected for this purpose. Although a full comparative study was beyond the evaluation scope, the evaluators briefly investigated the recent engagement of UNDP and other UN entities in the ROLSHR sector, gauged the awareness of key country team staff about the GP and GFP, identified any technical assistance provided by GP3, and explored the needs and challenges related to future collaboration with the GP. Interviews focused on current and former UNDP and other CO staff responsible for ROLSHR or related thematic areas, and/or involved in overall strategic decision-making.

***Albania***

UNDP Albania has a small but active ROLSHR team managing a modest portfolio of activities, primarily in the realm of A2J and legal aid for vulnerable populations. The team benefited from significant technical advice from the GP/ROLSHR team Focal Point in the Istanbul regional hub to: 1) design an A2J survey in 2016-17, and 2) make inputs to new legal aid legislation. These activities assisted UNDP to carve out a solid niche in A2J, and helped the government to create a legal aid directorate charged with overseeing implementation of the new law. Bilateral funding from a new donor (Austria) was secured to continue work on access to justice, replacing earlier donors. This evidence suggests some catalytic effects of GP-related technical support.

The CO’s ROLSHR team is reasonably aware of the GP thanks to regional meetings and temporary duty by one staffer with the ROLSHR team in New York, but has limited understanding of which countries can obtain GP funding (and on what conditions) and of the GFP mechanism. Justice reform is a high priority throughout the Balkans as countries seek to boost their chances for eventual EU membership. Additional UNDP investments in the ROL sector could strengthen Albania’s EU candidacy and promote social stability, complementing EU and U.S. Government funding for institutional reforms in what informants described as a politically tense and potentially fragile environment. No specific obstacles to GP support were identified.

*“ROLSHR issues are not only for countries in conflict. All countries on the development path have serious needs. I am not sure if GP could intervene here, but UNDP could play a bigger role in the world to support countries like Albania struggling with ROLSHR challenges.” ~* UNDPAlbania staff

***Niger***

UNDP Niger has a wide array of ROLSHR projects including peacebuilding, security sector reform, justice sector governance, and human rights, among others. Niger was part of a regional stabilization programme for the Lake Chad Basin, along with three neighboring countries, which received GP technical and financial support ($400,000 in 2019). UNDP Niger is currently involved in design discussions for the sub-regional “Liptako Gourma” programme that would include Burkina Faso and Mali. Analysis to inform that programme design was funded by the PBF across the three countries. UNDP’s regional emphasis is driven by a complex set of trans-border conflict drivers, ranging from climate change effects on livelihoods to traditional herder/farmer clashes. Unlike Albania, key CO staff had not heard of either the GP or the GFP, although the CTA was aware of the DPO-OROLSI standing police capacity based in Brindisi. They expressed keen interest in the GP/GFP, requesting an orientation session and information materials (ideally in French).

Informants described a volatile situation both in country and in neighboring areas, with significant needs for ROLSHR strengthening and growing interest among bilateral and multilateral donors (especially in the security sector). Challenges for effective support by the GP include the diverse set of local, regional and international actors already engaged in a complex array of country and regional level interventions. Moreover, the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) governance structure does not follow the logic of a comprehensive RoLSHR cluster, but rather separates governance from security issues. These factors could hamper effective coordination and complicate identification of a niche for GP that could generate results with a small contribution.

## ****Sustainability**** – *Will the* ***benefits*** *last? Will the GP platform itself endure?*

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| **Conclusions on Sustainability** |
| **Key achievements:*** The GP at global level has maintained a steady base of donor support in Phase 3, in large part due to its superior attention to donor interests and feedback, its appealing emphasis on country-level support, and the diverse list of achievements in its annual reports. However, the Programme is highly dependent on two funding sources: INL (all earmarked funds) and the Netherlands government (with a softer 80% earmark).
* Mobilization of funds at country level has been positively influenced by GP technical and financial support in all case study countries, although total catalytic effects are difficult to assess. The short-term nature and modest amount of GP funding to COs are not always conducive to stimulating longer-term change, though repeated funding alleviated this issue.

**Primary challenges:*** The management of INL earmarked funding requires the devotion of significant GP staff time at HQ, while the fees paid for those services are nominal at only 8% of the managed funds, which have all been passed on by UNDP to the COs implementing the funded interventions. There is a risk of this arrangement undermining the ability of the HQ team to effectively handle the full gamut of tasks on their plate, while arguably generating minimal benefits.
* Key factors affecting fundraising success as well as general sustainability of results include the level of donor interest/presence in the country, and the prevailing security and political environment. With a focus on fragile and crisis-affected contexts, the deterioration of security or political conditions will inevitably be a risk factor for achieving longer term impact with GP interventions. On the other hand, the GP’s ability to provide strategic support to sustain peace in more stable contexts (such as Albania) is restricted—in large part because they are not the priority of the GP’s current core donors.
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## Programme/Global Level Findings on Sustainability

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent has the GP been able to mobilize resources in Phase 3 to support ROLSHR programming?*
* *What factors have influenced the success of ongoing GP-led resource mobilization efforts?*
* *To what extent is the current practice of funneling earmarked non-GP external funding streams through the GP office sustainable?*

The Global Programme is seen as a highly successful platform for mobilization of funds from bilateral donors for ROLSHR programming in fragile and crisis-affected countries. The GP focus on providing flexible financial and/or substantive technical support to countries is seen as unusual, and described as the “secret of its success” by more than one informant, citing the high proportion of resources directly channeled to country offices. This is greatly appreciated by COs as well as the GP’s major donors, and its funding stream is considered with a certain amount of envy by other UN entities. The Programme is viewed as the central pillar of the ROLSHR team and appears to be firmly established within the UNDP Crisis Bureau, where the entire team was relocated during Phase 3 as part of a broader internal reorganization process.

Phase 3 of the GP has enjoyed a fairly stable level of donor contributions, fluctuating between annual total of $24 million to $36 million (once multi-year contributions are spread across the relevant years). There was no clear upward or downward trend of funding since 2016 based on analysis of the annual reports. The Programme relies on a relatively small cohort of donors (seven in most years), which could represent a risk to sustainability. In the last three years, the Netherlands has contributed about 30% of the total received by GP from external sources, while the funding channeled through the GP by the U.S. Department of State/INL constitutes around 50% of annual donor contributions. The latter funding is strictly earmarked for COs and interventions chosen by INL and is not available for core GP expenses and activities, including the pipeline for country allocations. (More detailed information on the INL-GP arrangement is found in the text box at the end of this sub-section.) If that INL funding is taken out of the equation, the Netherlands share is close to 50% of annual donor contributions. This translates into a significant level of GP dependency on two income sources.

While the INL funding is “hard earmarked”, the Dutch financing also comes with constraints: a “soft earmark” requires that 80% of those funds be used to cover expenses related to their priority contexts, including the Middle East, North Africa, Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes, Sahel-Mali, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Combining the two, up to 85% of donor contributions to the GP from 2016 to 2019 have been earmarked. This was described as hampering the ability of the ROLSHR team of experts at HQ and regional levels to flexibly prioritize contexts based on overarching strategy and evolving needs, and to adequately fund HQ costs. The Dutch earmark has visibly affected allocation of pipeline funds, of which 43% went to sub-Saharan African contexts between 2017 and 2019, including nine countries not on the GP priority list (compared to only 11% for Latin America and the Caribbean). GP staff highlighted the ongoing difficulty of raising funds for programming in Central America, Eastern Europe, and transition settings such as Sudan.

*“The prevention aspect needs attention as well. How can these interventions contribute to prevention of conflicts and violations of human rights? This would generate more sustainability for UNDP.” ~* UN entity representative

Some informants remarked that the GP’s reliance on bilateral donor stabilization funds, which are often short term in nature, could weaken the longer term development focus that should be backbone of UNDP interventions. As mentioned earlier, this type of funding source does imply certain constraints: the limitation to countries affected by crisis or conflict (especially mission contexts) to the exclusion of others that may have equally important ROLSHR needs, and the lower priority often given to human rights-focused interventions by donor bodies focused on those contexts.

Informants at global and country level also emphasized that the short duration of GP funding support could undermine sustainability of results, especially if catalytic effects cannot be generated quickly. They pointed to the risk that new initiatives in particular will not survive after only one year of seed funding, which could have neutral or even negative effects, and underlined the need for closer ongoing monitoring to generate more learning on this subject. Informants expressed differing views on whether the $500,000 ceiling on GP annual allocations was positive or negative in terms of sustainability, although some advocated for an increase.

*“The programmatic footprint is a bit small, ad hoc, with islands of projects in various countries; it is difficult to see how GP can contribute to long-term results with such small funds of one year duration.” ~* GP funding partner

*“The (Global Programme) approach is quite efficient. It is more sustainable than throwing a lot of money at a project; donors establish many things in that way that do not last.” ~* UN entity representative

**Spotlight on INL**

The evaluators made a specific point of enquiring into the “efficiencies and synergies, negative and unintended consequences” of the Programme’s relationship with INL (the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. Department of State), as mandated by the evaluation TOR. Study of this aspect of the GP was supported by interviews at headquarters and country case study levels, as well as limited document review.

According to its website, the INL mission is “to keep Americans safe by countering crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad”. [[16]](#footnote-17) Staffed to a considerable extent by law enforcement professionals, the bureau supports a wide range of interventions around the world. They often contract U.S. American or international agencies—including UNDP—with presence in the field to implement related activities. In the past, the practice was for INL to contract directly with UNDP Country Offices, but this was considered by INL management as cumbersome and time-consuming, especially in terms of reporting.

This situation led INL to seek a more streamlined modality for these funding streams. Since 2016, UNDP and INL have implemented an agreement whereby INL can channel unlimited amounts to UNDP Country Offices through the Global Programme. This arrangement is not described in the Prodoc or detailed in annual reports (other than financial annexes that list donor contributions and contexts where INL funds were channeled), but it plays an important role in the GP’s ongoing operations. Between 2016 and 2019, INL funding amounted to more than $63 million, constituting around 50% of annual donor contributions to the Global Programme.

Essentially, the GP provides financial and oversight services, and ensures INL reporting and other regulatory requirements are met by the implementing Country Offices. INL pays the standard General Management Services (GMS) fee of 8% of the amount of funds transferred, which is retained at the CO level. The GP/ROLSHR team’s involvement in these funding decisions has been highly variable: at times the funds have simply been passed through the GP to the Country Office with no discussion or input, especially in the first years of this arrangement or in situations where GP was not actively supporting the funded office/country. However, in some cases there is active consultation between the GP team, the Country Office, and the INL decentralized teams who approve new projects in their respective regions. The Programme always has the right to refuse to fund a specific intervention, for example if it does not fit the overall objectives of the GP. In a few (exceptional) cases the GP exercised this right.

The activities funded by INL via the Global Programme range from construction of police training academies in Pakistan to community security programming in Moldova. The linkages with GP interventions are variable. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, INL was actually co-funder of a judicial reform project with pipeline funding from the GP. In Pakistan, INL intervened to fund infrastructure for enhanced law enforcement in Balochistan while GP supported rule of law development in the same province. In Burkina Faso, INL contributed $1.5 million in 2020 to the SSR project, the CTA of which has been funded by GP. In CAR, INL is the main donor of UNDP’s ROL portfolio. Most of the $20 million received in the past six years was spent on hard infrastructure including buildings, equipment, and vehicles, whereas UNDP used PBF funding to cover “soft” aspects like legal aid clinics, capacity development and sensitization. Financing offered to build a shooting range for the police was rejected by UNDP since not aligned with the CO’s priorities.

Informants highlighted that the INL funding was in many situations meeting needs recognized by the ROLSHR team (in country and/or at headquarters/regional level), and thereby allowing the GP to use its limited resources for other purposes in the same or other contexts. On the other hand, the GP has no “official” influence over the use of INL funds, and thus cannot always apply its internal expertise to assess these interventions, although each has been agreed upon by the Country Office in question. Given the annual volume of funding (see below), it would be difficult for the ROLSHR team to effectively engage in these decisions on a consistent basis. The risk is that the team enables programming that is not aligned with best practices, or otherwise unsuitable.

*“There are no SOPs on how to ensure joint programming*

*or complementarity of INL vs. non-INL funds” ~* ROLSHR team member

The evidence indicates that INL is highly satisfied with this arrangement, and the amounts channeled via the GP have been consistently high, ranging from $11 million to $24 million per year during 2016-19. The GMS fee of 8% is reportedly low compared to the percentages typically levied by implementers of U.S. Government programming. The workload associated with the average of 10 new INL-funded interventions per year consumes a significant amount of time of the small GP team, especially due to certain specific U.S. Government rules. The GP team has to provide significant guidance to a large contingent of Country Offices to ensure that they understand and comply with all INL-specific requirements. However, the 8% fee (amounting to more than $5 million over four years) is entirely passed on to Country Offices, to support their operations. This led some informants to query the cost-benefit of this arrangement for the Global Programme and ROLSHR team more broadly.

## Country Level Findings on Sustainability

***Evaluation Questions:***

* *To what extent are any positive changes influenced by the GP3 likely to be sustained in priority countries?*
* *What factors are likely to influence sustainability of change at country level?*
* *To what extent has GP3 been able to identify or mobilize resources to continue new/improved practices, systems and activities?*

Overall, at country level it was reported that the support from GP had contributed to sustainability in several distinct ways. The effect mentioned most often was helping UNDP to sustain its position and/or programming in the country, by bolstering ROLSHR staffing (both technical and managerial), providing short-term bridge funding while other resources were sought, and other inputs described in previous sections. Secondly, it was noted that the GP had contributed to programming developed with strong buy-in and collaboration of government stakeholders, which was seen as conducive to longer term impact. COs and other informants also highlighted that various initiatives supported either technical or financially by GP had shown positive signs of sustainable benefits for the target population itself, such as alternative dispute resolution services in Somalia and Kyrgyzstan. However, definitive findings on sustainability of these diverse undertakings would require additional study and closer monitoring.

In terms of resource mobilization, each case study country showed evidence of positive fundraising results (including from national and sub-national governments) linked to a previous strategic injection of GP funds. Those catalytic effects, while difficult to quantify exactly, are described in more detail under Effectiveness. The key factor affecting resource mobilization as a means to sustainability was identified as the level of donor interest/presence in the particular country, in particular their commitment to investing in ROLSHR, which was highly variable. The very short-term nature and modest amount of GP funding was observed as a limitation on significant longer-term change, though this was alleviated by repeated funding allocations in contexts such as Colombia and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, prevailing security conditions and political turmoil are significant factors—which can work in two opposing directions, as increased fragility or conflict can put a country “on the map” and help attract additional resources (e.g., Burkina Faso), but at the same time they can hamper the continuation and expansion of ROLSHR initiatives already in place, thus threatening sustainability of previous gains.

In **Kyrgyzstan**, GP funding helped UNDP maintain its privileged access to national policy shapers and decision makers during a critical period. Due to the small number of donors interested in ROLSHR work, continuous GP financial support was described by the CO team as crucial to filling gaps. They commented that the donor situation has changed since 2016, making it more difficult to catalyze funds in the one year provided by GP seed funding. This indicates that the effects of GP are hard to sustain in this context.

Beyond the funding situation, the impact of UNDP‘s work has been threatened by 2020’s political turmoil, which may delay or even reverse the sweeping judicial reforms and undermine other positive results to which GP has contributed. The process still needs to be seen through, by revising codes, making corrections of law enforcement practices, and harmonizing legislation. By focusing on these systemic issues rather than on service delivery, even though the amounts are modest and durations are short, GP support is seen as promoting the sustainability of UNDP‘s interventions. On the other hand, activities led by CSOs were noted as particularly vulnerable to discontinuation if further funding could not be secured on a timely basis. Potential availability of funding for the sector has increased of late, ironically due to the country edging closer to crisis/conflict.

In **Colombia**, the CO did not identify any funds from other sources that were directly linked with GP funding. Nevertheless, the GP funding was seen as critical in enabling UNDP to remain involved in strategic discussions with national stakeholders in various sub-sectors of the complex ROLSHR scene. UNDP is engaged as key actor in multiple long-term interventions with significant donor and government support. However, there will always remain gaps to be bridged between projects and associated challenges in funding a full complement of staff. UNDP Colombia has applied GP funding to install capacity on sustainable basis and develop an integrated portfolio, which responds to ISSAT evaluation recommendations from 2018 that perceived the lack of an overarching strategic approach. Some stakeholders pointed to ongoing fragility and high levels of violence in country, underlining the need for UNDP to stay engaged in transitional justice and related issues of citizen security. They commented that the credibility and legitimacy (and continued engagement) of UNDP were important for ensuring the trust of victims and their families in the ongoing transitional justice processes.

In **Pakistan**, the CO underlined that GP support had boosted sustainability of UNDP’s ongoing work in several ways, as mentioned in the Effectiveness section above. One member of the ROLSHR team commented:

*“The Global Programme funding was a lifeline, not only for Balochistan but the entire ROL programme in Pakistan in a very tight funding period. Thanks to them and one other donor, we were able to stay active in the province.”*

Inputs by GP have assured the continuation of a major new line of work in Balochistan, which may well have ripple effects in another region as UNDP aims to replicate the ROL Roadmap approach. The level of government commitment in Balochistan is high, including dedication of state funds, which bodes well for sustainability of that investment (as does the subsequent funding commitment by the EU). Informants attributed the high level of political will at least in part to the timely interventions supported by GP to maintain momentum during a funding gap.

In **Burkina Faso**, a country that benefited from the SG’s Sustaining Peace Agenda, the CO has a strong programme platform and the ROLSHR team is well endowed with strong technical and managerial capacities, which bode well for sustainability of the UNDP sectoral presence. Donor interest to fund related activities has been increasing and is likely to be sustained in the mid-term future due to the worsening security situation. At the level of root causes, ROLSHR challenges are deeply intertwined with complex nexus-type, cross-sector challenges, including climate change-induced pressure on livelihoods and related phenomena of internal and cross-border migration, climate justice issues, increased exposure of vulnerable women and girls to risks of SGBV, and increased likelihood of young unemployed men becoming involved in unlawful economic activities, including networks of radical jihadism.

The combination of these factors puts UNDP in a strong position to consolidate and even expand its ROLSHR portfolio. However, a risk is posed by internal coordination issues that severely affect the UN-internal environment of (joint) programming and programmatic coherence. The flagship COSED programme is a stand-alone UNDP project rather than a JP. The related debate crystallizes issues surrounding leadership and UN-internal coordination including GFP (described under Coherence) that need to be resolved quickly to enhance sustainability of UNDP’s work. The Ministry of Justice and Civil Rights would benefit from sustained support to revamping the institution’s internal structure and business processes. Finally, UNDP’s support to enhancing the human and institutional capacity of civil society (groups supporting human rights and SGBV work, in particular, via related umbrella associations) is recognized as a highly sustainable practice, by concerned beneficiaries and stakeholders.

In the **Central African Republic**, GFP partners jointly supported restoration of the country’s criminal justice and security institutions during the evaluated period, including operationalization of the national Special Criminal Court. These efforts focused on the extension of state authority, the fight against impunity and bolstering the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. GFP partners provided support to the HQ-based Reference Group on the rule of law and the fight against impunity in CAR to garner political and financial support for the Special Court and other rule of law initiatives. Overall, stakeholders agreed that the GP/GFP supported highly relevant work and achieved respectable results considering the difficult operating conditions. With regards to the Court, while positive signs for sustainability were registered especially with regards to supporting civil society and building capacity of local judges, project insiders pointed out a lack of coordination between participating UN entities that could undermine sustainability.

In the recent past, opportunities to strengthen the Court’s accountability linked to performance-based contractual arrangements and remuneration packages of international judges were not seized by UNDP. This points to the need to clarify roles and responsibilities among UNDP and DPO as JP partners, as recommended by ISSAT’s mid-term evaluation in 2018. As well, there is room for improvement in broadening general public ownership of the Court. A strong exit/handover strategy, aimed at integrating the court in the fabric of the national justice sector rather than remaining on its fringes as a “UN-driven project”, would strengthen overall sustainability. Recent security issues due to electoral turmoil have recently put ROLSHR advances to the test.

In **Somalia**, if one looks past the minor ongoing inter-agency turf battles, the UN-internal ROLSHR governance structures, internal logic, financing streams, staffing and programme portfolio appear quite sustainable. The GFP modality has generated some successes and is constantly being improved on by in-country partners. However, the overriding challenge is that the UN as a whole, throughout its presence, has almost exclusively been focusing on a top-down, centralized institution building and state-building approach, in a context that puts a high premium on clan affiliation and regional loyalties. This casts doubt on the sustainability of UNDP’s ROL portfolio, especially as statutory/formal courts continue to struggle with issues such as lack of user friendliness and trust issues (due to perceived or actual clan bias, corruption etc.).

Conversely, promising innovative ROL projects supported by UNDP have built on the principle of socio-culturally embedded normative principles and customary mechanisms. For instance, the grassroots A2J component of the JJP is piloting “alternative dispute resolution (ADR) centers”. Their approaches combine features of customary “xeer” law with elements of gender and human rights mainstreaming; they have met with huge public acclaim and have strong potential for upscaling beyond the current few dozen centers. The bottom-up, socio-culturally embedded nature of the ADR centers is highlighted as best practice in terms of sustainability, but in terms of overall sustainability, there is need to take into account the wider landscape. A large proportion of the young generation of Somalis has been born and raised in areas not controlled by the Government, but rather by Al Shabaab. Military analysts presently concur that the conflict cannot be won by military means, and in this context, a truly sustainable approach to ROLSHR has yet to be found.

# Recommendations

**Overall Programme Design**

* + - 1. **Elaborate a comprehensive Theory of Change to underpin the future development of the GP, explicitly including the entire UNDP ROLSHR team’s scope of work**. This Theory should define the strategy for bolstering ROLSHR in fragile and crisis-affected countries/regions as well as other contexts, and identify priorities among thematic areas to systematically guide the allocation of resources.
1. **Continue to offer flexible support to ROLSHR programming and teams in need around the world, with timely provision of seed funding and/or technical advice.**
	1. This should include the types of support that have been found effective (by this evaluation and other analysis) at country or regional level, such as bridging gaps in funding for ongoing projects, launching pilot activities of various kinds, and hiring or retaining key technical staff (local or international).
	2. In consultation with Focal Points and key CO staff, consider creating a separate expedited pipeline process that could authorize smaller amounts (up to $25,000) for COs with a proven track record to meet emergency needs or experiment with new ideas.
2. **Consider increasing the focus of GP programming, staffing/standing capacity, and knowledge products in the following emerging subject areas** (in close collaboration with related UN entities to make optimal use of specialized expertise and maintain clear allocation of lead responsibility):
	1. effects of digitalization on human rights/access to justice, access to information, equal voices and participation in democratic processes, etc.
	2. climate justice
	3. business and human rights (already in early implementation)
	4. cyber-crime and hate speech

**Programme Governance and Staffing**

1. **Review the Programme’s governance structure**, including the role and composition of the Project Board.
2. **Review the staffing structure,** especially with a view to bolstering the core GP management team and clarifying the division of labor between HQ/regions.
3. **Revisit the mandate, role and weight of regional structures** (ROs, regional hubs) in GP business processes, including proposal making, fund management, oversight, etc.; in view of enhancing complex RoL and SDG16+ programming challenges (including nexus-type transborder/(sub)regional programmes including P-CVE, inclusive governance etc.)

**Country Support Priorities and Methods**

1. **Base future Programme targeting on the basis of evidence of effectiveness, rather than pre-selecting a list of priority countries.**
	1. As part of Phase 4 planning, conduct a comprehensive review of existing evidence (this report, country or project evaluation reports, annual reports, etc.) of where GP support has and has not been able to contribute to significant and sustainable results, with a view to identifying key success/failure factors that should strongly influence Phase 4 country targeting (as well as the criteria for pipeline funding).
	2. Critically assess the pros and cons of the priority country listing, with a view to either eliminating or clarifying this concept, which has been of limited utility in Phase 3. If a listing is maintained for Phase 4 (or established on an annual basis), the word “priority” should be replaced with a more accurate descriptor, and the exact significance of the list should be clarified and broadly disseminated along with the briefing document on GP funding and support.
2. **Clarify procedures and enhance transparency and strategic approach of pipeline funding allocations**
	1. Document and systematize the entire request and approval procedure in detail as an SOP, with established criteria for single and multi-country requests (including any different rules applying to GFP requests), and clearly defined steps and responsibilities. (Flexibility can be maintained by having mandatory and optional criteria, and allowing waivers as needed.)
	2. Make the process more transparent, including openly shared funding purpose and conditions, country eligibility, selection criteria, funding schedules, and feedback to countries whose requests are not approved, etc. This should include a short briefing document on GP/GFP funding that is communicated globally to Resident Coordinators, UNDP Resident Representatives, and key UNDP staff, in all main UN languages.
	3. Review the funding criteria and review role of the Project Board carefully as part of Phase 4 design, to maximize impact of these modest investments on country/regional level and on the overall objectives of the GP. For example, the potential catalytic effect of seed funding should be prioritized, and the balance among the core thematic areas of the Programme should be monitored and funding awarded to advance strategic interests or neglected areas.

**Results-Based Management**

1. **Invest more attention and resources in results-based management systems and reporting by the GP and the supported Country Offices**
	1. Improve the clarity and utility of indicator monitoring and annual reporting by delineating the GP’s role in the broader picture of UNDP programming in ROLSHR, to minimize conflation and promote transparency. This includes the contents as well as the “branding” of the annual reports, whether published as documents or in interactive online format.
	2. Enhance systems and methods for identification and sharing of lessons learned and “what did not work”, including by reincorporating that as a specific element in annual country reporting, and ensuring adequate attention in annual meetings and other internal exchange opportunities.
	3. Invest in building M&E capacity of country teams (as well as national counterparts, to the extent possible), including SDG16+ data collection capacity, capitalizing on the findings of the ISSAT evaluations in relation to effective in-country monitoring methods.
	4. Pilot the use of country-based third parties (from civil society, private sector or government) that can efficiently collect and analyze data to feed into results-based management of the Global Programme and UNDP, as well as SDG16, especially in conflict-affected contexts where mobility and access is constrained by security concerns, and where UNDP Country Office capacity is limited.
	5. Ensure the continuous engagement at headquarters of at least one experienced staff member or consultant dedicated to M&E, to support GP and country teams with RBM processes. This role should not continue to be combined with various other demanding duties such as reporting, advocacy and communications.
2. **Eliminate or reform monitoring practices and indicators that do not add specific value for measurement and management of GP results, and focus RBM efforts on a few data points that will generate useful information for and about the Programme.**
	1. Report as needed on UNDP corporate indicators, but focus on reliably measuring meaningful customized indicators that relate ONLY to the support provided by GP (or enable disaggregation of the results of that support).
	2. Design of future GP-specific monitoring tools should be informed by a consultative process including technical guidance by M&E specialists, and consider both quantitative and qualitative measures. Tracking of catalytic effects should be a high priority, potentially via an annual/biannual study of a subset of countries to assess degree/type of catalytic and other effects of GP support, which would generate information for management and reporting, including decision-making on future funding based on those successes and failures. Work on defining and measuring catalytic effects should be informed by the extensive efforts of the PBF in this regard over the last 10 years.
	3. Conduct more analysis of newly-introduced GP-specific performance metrics to inform annual reports and for overall management of the Programme, including trends across countries, regions and years. This would enable the GP to find and present better evidence of impact over time, as well as identify challenges and needed adaptations.
	4. Negotiate with donors (and/or retain a proportion of INL fees) to fund creation of an “M&E window” within the GP Phase 4 to enable consistent prioritization of results measurement. This window should prioritize the testing of SDG16 data collection instruments at community level (Somalia approach), including incorporation of non-treatment communities to generate comparative data. This would advance the possibility of introducing true RBM for ROLSHR work at country level, serving as an incentive to CO programme/project staff to invest themselves in ensuring data quality.
	5. Make indicator monitoring more inclusive of ALL contexts receiving substantive GP support (ideally including all those funded via GP in last two years), rather than limiting to a pre-selected subset of countries. If universal annual monitoring is not feasible, then a random sample could be used as a proxy.
	6. For customized GP indicators, create indicator descriptions/methodological notes to guide headquarters and country staff on their interpretation and application, and ensure that key staff in COs understand how to report on these GP indicators.
	7. Adapt the data reported for mandatory UNDP corporate indicators to better reflect the results of the GP, for example: if a corporate indicator requires the GP to report the number of countries meeting a certain criterion, a sub-indicator could capture the percentage of GP-supported countries that meet that criterion out of all GP-supported countries. This would help show the effects of GP support with minimal extra monitoring effort.
3. **Increase GP contribution to ROLSHR knowledge management and thought leadership, in collaboration with other key actors such as the GPN.**
	1. GP should organize regular structured opportunities for internal reflection and exchanges of experience among UNDP Country Offices, regional hubs and headquarters. These should take a constructive yet critical approach including analysis of what has not worked and how problems have been overcome, in addition to success stories. These processes will contribute to developing the body of evidence on ROLSHR assistance, but more specifically and urgently, feed into Phase 4 design and implementation.
	2. Encourage more South-South exchanges of experiences and expertise, including allocation of funding to enable learning/experience-sharing visits by key country programme staff to other countries and regions.

**Coherence and collaboration (including GFP)**

1. **Enhance GP/GFP design features to support improved coherence and optimize effectiveness and reach of the GFP**
2. Revisit the overall governance set-up, including study of the pros and cons of the following theoretically existing options: I. a) GFP as currently defined using GP Phase 4 as vehicle; I. b) GFP remains within GP, but with a separate GFP funding window; II.) GFP de-linked from GP (parallel mechanism/programme or even office, with stronger role for non-UNDP/DPO entities); III.) OneUN JP as new vehicle for GFP, outside UNDP.
3. Widen membership/attendance base of GFP governance structure and country level platform, by ensuring systematic inclusion of UNEP, UN Counter-Terrorism Organization, etc. so that interfacing aspects (climate justice, P-CVE) are taken into account and future collaboration can be deepened.
4. Ensure stability of GFP Core Team staffing to strengthen their ability to effectively coordinate partners and manage the new funding flows to countries.
5. Establish joint reporting modalities for GFP funding, which include all participating entities in gathering inputs to reporting and sharing of reports.
6. Coordinate global level fundraising efforts between and across UNDP and DPO, more evenly sharing responsibility and accountability for raising GFP funding.
7. At country and regional levels, raise profile of GP/GFP and share information including in French (at minimum) to ensure broader awareness of the support it can provide. Consider a specific communication/sensitization campaign on GFP (what it is, how it works, how to apply for funds etc.); by jointly organizing and conducting meetings with GFP managers or GFP presentations in the RR induction; sensitizing COs and field staff about the GFP, stressing the importance of integrated, coordinated and joint support by helping shift incentives and change behavior and organizational culture on the ground.
8. Advocate for a high-level executive task force to resolve GP/GFP interoperability issues (Mission/OROLSI – UNCT).
9. Strengthen collaboration between UNDP and OROLSI in non-mission settings. The new phase of GP could include the testing of partnerships in non-mission settings, such as the secondment of expertise, the coordination of rule of law priorities on the ground, and joint fundraising at country level.
10. Conduct or advocate for a detailed study of the consequences of the de-linking for UN country level coherence in ROLSHR, with objectives to include development of clear guidance with respect to allocation of responsibilities for convening and overseeing the GFP in country.
11. Develop guidance for in-country GFP Teams for how to design and manage ROLSHR programming in the context of post-Mission transition, building on lessons learned from relevant contexts (including in-depth case study on Haiti).

**Other Recommendations**

1. **Modify the arrangement with INL to enhance sustainability and results-based management**
	1. Negotiate to augment the management fees paid by INL, by demonstrating the significant value added by the GP team and the associated workload of such a major flow of funding, with reference to typical rates paid to other implementing partners of the U.S. Government.
	2. Pursue a more balanced division of the INL fees that recognizes the essential role played by the GP team, rather than channeling the totality of fees to Country Offices. These resources could assist in boosting the capacity of the headquarters team to support M&E functions, among others.
2. **Increase the focus on supporting design and implementation of ROLSHR interventions based on locally accepted and established customary/traditional mechanisms**, starting with research on socio-culturally embedded practices for conflict prevention, dispute resolution and access to justice, ensuring that interventions are based on human rights principles.

# Annexes

## Annex 1: Evaluation Matrix

| **Reframed Evaluation Questions** | **Key Sources and Methods** |
| --- | --- |
| **Relevance** |  |
| **Programme/Global level:**1. How has the GP Phase 3 (GP3) affected UNDP’s relevance and recognition as an international player in the ROL/Security/HR fields, especially in complex contexts? 1.1. What has been the contribution of GP3 to the Sustaining Peace and Prevention agendas of the Secretary-General? | Individual interviews with GP staff in headquarters (HQ) and regional hubs, donors, GP Project Board, GFP focal points in participating entities, DPO, other UN partner agencies, and major donors to GP3 |
| **Country level:**2. To what extent has GP3 support (technical, financial, operational, strategic) been relevant and responsive to the needs and priorities of key UN stakeholders in country, (UNDP Country Offices, UN Resident Coordinator Offices; UN Country Teams (UNCT); and peacekeeping Missions as relevant) as well as key national counterparts.  | Individual and/or group interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs, representatives of relevant UN entities participating in and contributing to GP/GFP implementation in countries selected for sample, key national counterparts in case study countries; Desk review of documents related to funded project design and implementation, technical assistance inputs, review of GP country-level evaluations, GFP reviews, UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) |
| **Coherence** |  |
| **Programme/Global level:**3. To what extent has GP3 promoted coordination and partnership with national counterparts, donor partners, and across the UN system? 3.1. How effectively has GP3 supported joint engagement across the UN pillars? 3.2. How effective has the GP3 been as a platform for financially and operationally supporting the GFP for Rule of Law (with DPO and other UN partners)? | Individual interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs, GFP global/RO-level managers and technical staff (incl. country-level correspondents/focal points), GP Project Board, donor representatives, key national counterparts in case study countries, DPO, other UN partner agencies; Desk review of GP Prodoc and annual reports, documents related to joint programming and partnerships, 2018 Review of GFP |
| **Country level**:4. To what extent has GP3 support at country level been consistent with UNDP corporate standards of practice? (e.g., prioritizing Leave No One Behind, human rights-based, nationally-owned, based on analytical assessment, adapted to country context, gender sensitive and conflict-sensitive, supportive of innovation)5. To what extent has GP3 promoted coordination and partnership with national counterparts, donor partners, and across the UN system? | Individual and/or group interviews with GP staff (incl. UNDP and other UN entities participating under GFP), donor representatives, key national counterparts such as national governments and civil society organizations in countries selected for sample; Desk review of documents related to funded project design and implementation, technical assistance inputs, review of GP country-level evaluations |
| **Effectiveness** |  |
| **Programme/Global level:**6. To what extent has GP3 programming achieved its intended results, especially at the outcome and impact levels?6.1. How effectively has GP3 contributed to results outlined in the UNDP Integrated Results and Resources Framework (2014-17) and Strategic Plan (2018-21)? 7. What significant lessons learned, best practices and innovations have the potential to be scaled up to inform GP3-supported policy development?  | Individual interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs, donors, GFP staff, GP Project Board, donor representatives, DPO, other UN partner agencies; Desk review of GP3 Prodoc and annual reports, including quantitative analysis of indicator data at global level, review of GP country-level evaluations |
| **Country level**:8. To what extent has GP3-supported programming achieved its intended results? 9. What significant lessons learned, best practices and innovations have emerged from GP3 programming? | Individual and/or group interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs (incl. GP/GFP focal points among other non-UNDP UN entities), UNDP Country Office staff, donor representatives, key national counterparts such as national governments and civil society organizations in countries selected for sample; Desk review of country project reports, including quantitative analysis of indicator data of selected projects in sample countries, review of GP country-level evaluations;Observation (remote) of any relevant events or activities in sample countries |
| **Efficiency** |  |
| **Programme/ Global level**:10. To what extent have GP3’s management, operational, financial and administrative systems and structures (including SOPs, business processes, and management of earmarked and non-earmarked funds) affected programme implementation?  10.1 Are existing SOPs helpful or would additional or better guidance be useful; if so, how could they be improved? 11. What have been the efficiencies and synergies, or negative and unintended consequences, if any, of the GP also managing non-pipeline, earmarked funding streams on behalf of non-GP funding vehicles?   12. Does GP3 have the required resources (human and financial) to achieve its objectives? If not, where is more investment needed? 13. To what extent has GP3 management met its key donors’ expectations?  14. How well has Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning been carried out in GP3? 14.1. To what extent does GP3 integrate results-based management? | Individual and/or group interviews with GP technical staff as well as administrative/finance and M&E staff in HQ and regional hubs, UNDP GP HQ and regionally based staff (incl. UNDP and other participating agencies’ GFP focal points or correspondents), donor representatives incl. staff at HQ and in donor country capitals; Desk review of GP global management consolidated reports, including quantitative analysis of global GP portfolio data (and triangulation with indicator-related progress data, review of GP portfolio-related reports) |
| **Country level**: 15. To what extent have the GP3’s management, operational, financial and administrative systems and structures (including SOPs and business processes) been effective in supporting implementation at country level? 16. To what extent have GP3-awarded funds been absorbed on a timely basis? 17. What have been the correlation patterns between delivery rate (fund absorption: expenditures/ available resources) and progress against indicator targets? 18. What is the quality of GP3-related Monitoring & Reporting, Evaluation and Knowledge Management at field level? 18.1 To what extent is a standard M&E/Knowledge Management approach applied across all GP3 countries (common database, M&E reference guidelines with clear and unambiguous meta data definitions etc.)? 18.2 Are standardized systems, norms, tools, processes and practices “owned” and applied by country level staff; or is there room for improvement (and if so, where/ how)? | Individual and/or group interviews with relevant GP/GFP staff at country level (incl. UNDP Country Office and GFP participating entities’ technical staff as well as administrative/finance and M&E staff), country-level donor representatives, key national counterparts such as national governments and civil society organizations in countries selected for sample; Desk review of country project reports, including quantitative analysis of indicator data of selected projects in sample countries, review of GP country-level evaluations as relevant |
| **Impact** |  |
| **Programme/Global level:**19. To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s corporate offer on ROLSHR globally in Phase 3? (e.g. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications) | Individual interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs, donors, GFP staff, GP Project Board, donor representatives, DPO, UNDP staff in charge of strategic plan design and management/M&E, HQ/Regional office-based UNDP signature solution/Innovation Lab managers, other UN partner agencies;  Desk review of GP annual reports and previous cycle evaluations, GP3 Prodoc, UNDP Strategic Plans 2014-2017 and 2018-2021, global strategic plan-level thematic or area-specific programme and learning/knowledge management reports, GP Outcome-level indicator sources including internal as well as external indices and rankings (Mo Ibrahim index of Governance, SDG16 data etc.) |
| **Country level**:20.To what extent has GP3 contributed to improving the overall ROLSHR situation in priority countries? 20.1. What examples of potential or early impact can be identified? 21. To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s offer on ROLSHR in the field in Phase 3? (e.g. flexible funding, expertise, comprehensive programming, coordination with UN system) | Individual and/or group interviews with GP staff in HQ and regional hubs, UNDP Country Office staff, other UNCT AFPs and Mission staff (GFP focal points/correspondents etc.; DSRSGs, Resident Coordinators/Representatives, etc., Resident Coordinator Office managers and coordination staff), donor representatives, key national counterparts in countries selected for sample, civil society and private sector representatives, if applicable and it can be organized by country staff also specific programme/project beneficiaries (stand-out success stories etc.); Desk review of country project reports, including qualitative evidence of impact in selected projects in sample countries, review of GP country-level evaluations |
| **Sustainability** |  |
| **Programme/Global level:**22. To what extent has the GP been able to mobilize resources (in addition to seed funding) in Phase 3 to support ROLSHR programming? 22.1 What factors have influenced the success of ongoing GP-led resource mobilization efforts? 23. To what extent is the current practice of funneling earmarked non-GP external funding streams through the GP office sustainable?    | Individual interviews with GP programme and administrative/finance officers in HQ and regional hubs (focus on technical and knowledge management staff incl. global and regional Innovation Lab staff), GPN focal points and liaison officers, GP donors (technical experts and managers), including donor representatives using GP as pass-through mechanism, HQ and regional office GFP managers/regional correspondents, GP Project Board, DPO, other UN partner agencies; Desk review of GP3 and GFP annual reports, including related quantitative and qualitative data |
| **Country level**:24. To what extent are any positive changes influenced by the GP3 likely to be sustained in priority countries? 24.1 What factors are likely to influence sustainability of change at country level?25. To what extent has GP3 been able to identify or mobilize resources to continue new/improved practices, systems and activities? | Individual and/or group interviews with GP staff at country level (incl. GFP lead agency correspondent(s) and UNCT member agency GFP focal points, where applicable), UNDP Country Office programme staff as well as administrative, finance and M&E staff, country-level donor representatives, key national counterparts in countries selected for sample; Desk review of country project reports, including qualitative and quantitative data on GP-related resource mobilization in sample countries, review of GP country-level evaluations |

## Annex 2: Global Programme Phase III Theory of Change



## Annex 3: Analysis of Results-Based Management

This analysis has been prepared in accordance with the mandate for this evaluation to assess the Global Programme’s efficiency, effectiveness, and impact, all of which are closely tied to the establishment and implementation of effective systems and tools for results-based management (RBM), and more specifically for monitoring and reporting of results. This section also provides analysis in response to the following specific evaluation questions.

**Evaluation Questions at Global Level**

14. How well has Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning been carried out in GP3?

14.1. To what extent does GP3 integrate results-based management?

19. To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s corporate offer on ROLSHR globally in Phase 3? (e.g. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications)

**Evaluation Questions at Country Level**

18. What is the quality of GP3-related Monitoring & Reporting, Evaluation and Knowledge Management at field level?

18.1 To what extent is a standard M&E/Knowledge Management approach applied across all GP3 countries (common database, M&E reference guidelines with clear and unambiguous meta data definitions etc.)?

18.2 Are standardized systems, norms, tools, processes and practices “owned” and applied by country level staff; or is there room for improvement (and if so, where/ how)?

As noted in the Methodology section, this evaluation has paid attention to analyzing progress towards targets for GP output indicators and towards change in the five outcome level indicators defined in the Prodoc. Analysis of the six case study countries also included brief review of M&E frameworks and tools used at country level, complemented by review of the five country-level evaluations carried out by ISSAT since 2017 under contract with the GP. Highlights of those evaluations are set out in Annex 5 to this evaluation report.

While varied in scope, each ISSAT evaluation included some analysis of monitoring and reporting tools and systems, with a view to identifying both strong and weak practices at country level that could inform GP and wider UNDP approaches to ROLSHR results management. To date, ISSAT has delivered two synthesis reports to GP management, which have also helped to inform this evaluation. While the ISSAT evaluations focused on monitoring of ROLSHR projects and programmes at country level, this evaluation emphasized monitoring by HQ and country teams as it relates to the overarching results measurement system of the GP itself (consistent with the evaluation TOR.)

**Outcome Level**

At outcome level, the Prodoc specified six indicators based on five international scoring systems or mechanisms by which the GP would aim to measure the higher-level results of Phase 3, by applying those measures to the GP3 priority countries. All six indicators and mechanisms are listed in the table below, however, it was only possible for the evaluators to find data for three indicators that could be compared to the baselines. Only 55.8% of the baseline values for these scoring mechanisms were identified in the Prodoc (Annex 4), no targets for change in these scores were set by GP, and the GP annual reporting since 2016 has not included any reference to these indicators. The evaluators were informed by GP staff that efforts to track these indicators were not pursued, as the team decided they would not be suitable to capture programme outcomes on a yearly basis and would be reviewed at the end of the GP3 programme cycle.

We have attempted in Table 1 below to briefly compare the most recent available data with baselines for the 30 priority countries listed in the Prodoc (later increased to 32). These show mixed results, as noted in the final column; the World Justice Project score for rule of law denotes a largely positive trend in priority countries during this period, while a high level of variation was seen in the other two mechanisms that could be analyzed. However, any attribution of improvements in scores (or lack thereof) to support by the GP (and even assessment of contribution by GP) is tenuous in the view of the evaluators, primarily due to the GP structure that entails a relatively insignificant investment by GP3 in each individual country. Any change in scores would undoubtedly be due to the influence of many diverse factors at play in each country, of which GP support would be only one. Therefore, the evaluators did not proceed further with analysis of this data.

In conclusion, the results framework is not able to provide any clear evidence that would assist in measuring GP results in Phase 3 at outcome level.

**Table 1. Comparison of 2015 baselines to most recent data on outcome indicators**

| **Outcome Indicator** | **Year** | **# countries reported** | **Summary of Changes** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Safety and Rule of Law Score[[17]](#footnote-18)** | 2015 | 13 | Cannot be analyzed because the country scores and scoring parameters found on IIAG site do not match up with baselines in Prodoc |
| 2019 | n/a |
| **IIAG Participation and Human Rights Score**  | 2015 | 13 |
| 2019 | n/a |
| **World Justice Project Rule of Law Score[[18]](#footnote-19)** | 2015 | 13 | Of 13 GP priority countries with baseline and 2019 data, 8 improved, 4 no change, 1 deteriorated |
| 2020 | 16 |
| **Global Peace Index Rank**  | 2015 | 29 | Of 29 GP priority countries with baseline and 2020 data, 13 improved, 2 no change, 14 deteriorated |
| 2020 | 29 |
| **Transparency International Corruption Perception Score[[19]](#footnote-20)** | 2015 | 28 | Of 28 GP priority countries with baseline and 2019 data, 18 improved, 1 no change, 9 deteriorated |
| 2019 | 29 |
| **International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) Score** |   |   | This indicator could not be analyzed, as no evidence was found that the anticipated ISACS system was established |

**Output Level**

The original GP3 results framework lists 19 output indicators, which were to be measured on an annual basis. Each annual report since 2016 has provided figures to indicate the current status of these indicators, which cut across all eight outputs defined by the programme. When UNDP adopted a new Strategic Plan in 2018, two indicators were removed from this framework and several were adjusted to better align with the revised UNDP indicators. Eight of the 17 current indicators are derived from the UNDP Strategic Plan, while nine were developed specifically for the GP3. Overall, 12 of 17 indicators require the GP to report by counting countries/contexts that “qualified” or met the criteria of that indicator in the relevant year.

It is important to underline that **only countries on the GP priority country list** are tracked by these indicators and included in reporting, although those countries represent just over half of the countries financially supported by the GP in Phase 3. (See Table 2 below.) This is a significant cross-cutting constraint on the utility of this output monitoring system, as the results being captured and reported are only reflecting change in certain selected contexts – some of which were not even funded in the relevant period.

**Table 2. Key Data on GP Funding Allocations to Countries, 2017-19[[20]](#footnote-21)**

|  | **Contexts on GP Priority List** | **Contexts not on GP Priority List** | **Total** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| # of funding allocations | 44 (65%) | 24 | 68 |
| # of countries funded  | 28 (61%) | 18 | 46 |
| Amount of funding allocated | **$12,179,832 (66%)** | **$6,270,500 (34%)** | **$18,575,332** |

1. **Review of Output Indicators**

As noted in the Inception Report of this evaluation, the output indicators could be open to varying interpretations, but they are not defined in the Results Framework itself, nor in any annex to the Prodoc or GP3 reports. The evaluators learned that the indicators under the Strategic Plan are supported by detailed methodological notes available to users of the UNDP Intranet; five of those methodological notes apply to the eight GP indicators linked to the Strategic Plan.[[21]](#footnote-22) Those notes contain considerable detail on how to understand and use the indicators in question to assess each country’s “Yes or No” status (or other analysis). These explanations point out that for a country to be “counted”, there must have been UNDP support related to that particular thematic area (e.g. legal aid, human rights institutions).

However, the evaluators found no evidence of similar (or any) written definitions or methodological guidance for the other nine indicators that are not derived from the Strategic Plan (SP). This was corroborated via interviews and email exchanges with current and former UNDP staff, several of whom (in HQ and the field) indicated confusion over how to understand the indicators and correctly complete the reporting forms in relation to GP output indicators. None of those staff mentioned the methodological notes, though they may have been aware of them. GP indicators do not explicitly require that UNDP have made some contribution or had active programming in that year on that thematic area of intervention in that country; this condition may or may not have been clear to those responsible for reporting at country level, but no documentation of this was found by the evaluators. Nevertheless, even if this condition of UNDP contribution were consistently applied in reporting on those indicators, it would be difficult to establish the link with actual support by the GP, because the reported results often relate to UNDP programming that has multiple funding sources. .

An example of how a seemingly “simple” GP indicator could be construed in vastly differing ways by those charged with reporting on each country (whether they be country office staff or GP focal points), in the absence of definitional and methodological guidance, is as follows:

Indicator 5.3 *Number of contexts with active access to justice and/or legal aid programmes in place at the community level*

* what does it mean for a programme to be “active”?
* what does “in place” mean: what if the programme is ongoing but UNDP support ended more than a year ago? what if the programme stopped in mid-year?
* what kinds of programmes are included? what about a mediation project? are alternative dispute resolution centres and customary/traditional mechanisms to be included or not?
* what is “at the community level”? does it have to be rural? what about a hotline service, operated from a central location?

Arguably, indicator 5.1 “*Number of additional people who have access to justice*” is even more problematic, although it closely matches up with a corporate SP indicator (2.2.3.2.A) and is thus supported by a methodological note. The previous version of the related SP indicator measured “*Total number of people who have access to legal aid services*.” However, in spite of that change to much broader wording, the methodological note appears to substantially narrow the meaning by stating that access to informal justice mechanisms should NOT be considered from 2018 onwards, because their effectiveness cannot be gauged. However, it does not define clearly which of a wide variety of justice mechanisms (e.g. legal aid centres, mobile legal clinics, alternative dispute resolution services, traditional courts, transitional courts) are thereby included and excluded. Also, in contexts in which court records are not computerized or record-keeping is weak, it would be difficult to reliably differentiate additional beneficiaries from previous (one-time or repetitive) service recipients. Although UNDP staff indicated that supplementary guidance was given to country offices by the GP team to support measurement of this indicator, they also indicated a low level of confidence in the data.

Considering these issues of interpretation of GP output indicators, the evaluators have serious concerns about the quality, consistency and reliability of the data that is being reported against them across programme countries.

1. **Implementation of Results Framework**

In addition, the evaluation found evidence of problems in the way that the results framework is being used and reporting is carried out, including difficulties with how and when annual targets are set and reviewed. (Although annual targets were set in the Prodoc for about half of the indicators, they were adjusted prior to publication of the 2018 and 2019 annual reports, which present different targets. Therefore, the evaluators focused on those updated targets.) For 11 of 17 indicators, the 2019 target was below the 2018 level of achievement (significantly less in eight cases), which renders irrelevant any comparison of achievements versus targets. Thus, it has little meaning when the 2019 annual report indicates that a certain target has been “achieved”, and that 82% of global targets have been met. Four examples of similarly significant gaps appear between 2017 actual results and 2018 targets in the 2018 annual report.

For 2020 reporting, the focal points for priority countries were asked to collect data from relevant country offices indicating whether each output indicator “is true” for the respective contexts. No additional justification or information was apparently requested to support the responses for each context, and there was lack of clarity about which countries were required to report. Although it is not clear exactly how data was collected in the past, this process seems far from rigorous, especially if detailed written guidance is not available to those responsible for reporting or submitting the data.

Although these indicators are presented in reporting as GP specific indicators and measurement is confined to GP priority countries, they appear to be measured in a way that includes outputs related to any UNDP-supported ROLSHR activities or programmes in those countries – *whether or not there is any link to GP support*. Therefore, while movement on these indicators may provide some indication of UNDP ROLSHR outputs overall, they can be misleading if the reader believes that they reflect outputs linked to the GP, specifically. Indeed, some countries reported in the indicators may have received no support at all from the GP in that year, as indicated in Table 2 above.

1. **Output Indicator Trends**

The table in Annex 4 presents the GP output indicator data, including baselines set in 2015 and annual data drawn from the 2019 Annual Report. Where available, annual targets are also included. A review of the data indicates that for all but three of the current indicators, there has been an upward trend; in many cases, increases have been significant, doubling or tripling the baseline figures. While this suggests that more priority countries are meeting indicator thresholds and thus moving in a positive direction, the evaluators are reluctant to draw conclusions due to the methodological and definitional constraints described above.

**Reporting of Results**

The programme uses annual reports as its primary vehicle for sharing information about its activities, initiatives, funding and results. These are publicly available and appear to be directed primarily at external audiences (outside of the UNDP ROLSHR personnel at HQ and country level), however, these reports also serve as a key source of information for UNDP personnel, according to internal informants. Indeed, an impressive range of information about disparate interventions around the world is collected for and presented in these reports, thanks to inputs from UNDP country offices around the world. The GP uses the annual reporting process as the primary avenue for GP-supported country offices to update headquarters on how funding and technical support from GP have made a difference in their respective contexts—no other narrative reporting is required by the programme management, to avoid adding to the existing reporting burden at country level.

While recognizing the wealth of information provided by the annual reports, the evaluators found that it was not always possible in reading the narrative content to differentiate between what the Global Programme had directly supported in some way, and what UNDP as a whole had supported in the same countries and contexts. Although there is some annual variation, the Global Programme is scarcely mentioned in the lengthy passages on country-level achievements, although the GP focus emerges primarily in the finance section and indicator reporting. This contrasts with the fact that the report titles and introductory passages repeatedly refer to the Global Programme as the focus of these reports.

Enquiries with the GP management team indicated several reasons for the decision to present combined results in this manner: the difficulty in some cases to separate GP-related results from other closely connected UNDP results at country level; the silo effect or lack of larger SDG-wide coherence that might result from such separate reporting; and the absence of a suitable stand-alone global vehicle for results of UNDP ROLSHR programming that are not related to the GP. While the evaluators do not take issue with the advantages of combining this reporting in one annual information product, there is at least one major disadvantage (as noted in the Methodology Limitations section): throughout most of the report narratives, it is not possible to disentangle the results (or even activities) linked to the GP from everything else UNDP has done in the ROLSHR sector in that year. When considered alongside the indicator monitoring challenges, this significantly limits the readers’ ability to discern the effectiveness of the GP from these reports. Mainly due to these reasons, some informants among the programme’s key donors expressed doubts about the quality of the processes and end products that are meant to ensure the GP’s accountability.

Moreover, multiple informants within and outside of UNDP commented that the reports since 2017 are almost entirely focused on the activities and positive outputs of GP and UNDP programming, and appear to be platforms for public relations rather than vehicles for full and transparent information sharing. The evaluators observed that the annual reports make little effort to analyze the wealth of country-level information in a way that would identify trends or patterns (e.g. comparing countries, or previous years), or generate cross-cutting findings or learning. The reports make no attempt to interpret the output indicator data for any single year or across the years.

Although the 2016 country profiles included a dedicated space for challenges and lessons learned, that practice was discontinued in the 2017 report. With few exceptions, the subsequent reports consist primarily of success stories – which aligns with the information that country teams were recently asked to provide for the 2020 annual report: “top 3 results” in narrative form and “3 key results” in quantitative data.[[22]](#footnote-23) Although some country office staff were appreciative of the minimalist GP reporting requirements, given the relatively modest funding being allocated, several interviewees voiced concerns that important information was not being captured by the programme due to the one-year time lag between reports, lack of specific attention to catalytic effects, and lack of enquiry into challenges and lessons learned (i.e. what is NOT working, as well as what is working).

## Annex 4: Analysis of GP Output Indicator Data 2016-19

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Indicator** | **Baseline** | **BL Year** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** |  | **2019** |  | **Comments by****Evaluators** | **Key Evidence** | **Footnotes** |
|  |  | **per 2019****report** |  | **Prodoc****target** | **Actual** | **Report****target** | **Actual** | **Report target** | **Actual** | **Report Target** | **Actual** |  |  |  |
| **Output 1: A political environment that strengthens rule of law and human rights is further enabled.** |  |
|  | 1.1 Number of contexts with improved capacities for oversight and/or governance mechanisms inthe security sector | 7 | 2015 | n/a | 9 | 8 | 14 | 7 | 20 | 13 | 22 | Significant increase (3X baseline), 2019 target set lower than2018, but exceeded | IRRF Indicator 2.2.3.3 RoLSHRReporting | IRRF Indicator 2.2.3.3 measures “Number of additional contexts with strengthened capacities for governance and oversight of rule of lawinstitutions” |
|  | 1.2 Joint programmes in place to increase the impact of UN system delivery in creating political spaces for the development of justice, security and human rightsinstitutions | 5 | 2015 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 15 | 8 | 32 | 11 | 37 | Significant increase in #JPs (more than 3X), well above targets (several set below the previous year's actual). SP indicator wording is verydifferent. | RoLSHRReportingIRRF Indicator 3.2.2.1.D | IRRF Indicator 3.2.2.1.D measures “Number of contexts with national and local systems restored or adopted following crises: utilizing joint UN approaches to rebuilding rule of law and justicesector institutions and services” |
| **Output 2: Capable justice and security institutions are established and strengthened to increase and improve service delivery in crisis-affected and transitional settings.** |  |
|  | 2.1 Number of contexts where justice and security services reach out to an increasing and/or more inclusive number of people | 24 | 2015 | 22 | 26 | 26 | 28 | 25 | 29 | 27 | **31** | Slight increase from high baseline, which raises question of utility of indicator | RoLSHRReporting |  |
|  | 2.2 Number of contexts with national-level security strategies that are developed through a participatory process, comply with human rights standards, and/or support reducing armed violence and promote control of small arms | 6 | 2016 | 5 | 6 | 6 | *7* | *6* | 8 | 8 | **10** | Steady increase, targets met or exceeded | RoLSHRReporting | Baselines for Global Programme indicators not previously reported on were determined following the first year of Phase 3 implementation and reporting (2016). Thus, baselines and actuals for the year of 2016 are the same for thisindicator. |
| **Output 3: Comprehensive community security approaches are developed, strengthened, and/or applied.** |  |  |
|  | 3.1 Number of contexts where gender-sensitive, evidence-based security strategies for reducing armed violence and/or controlling small arms are in operation at the community level | 6 | 2015 | n/a | 7 | 9 | *8* | *7* | 16 | 7 | **15** | Steady increase (2X baseline), 2019 target set lower than 2018, but exceeded | IRRF Indicator 3.2.2.1.CRoLSHRReporting | IRRF Indicator 3.2.2.1.C measures “Number of contexts with national and local systems restored or adopted following crises: community-oriented security services and oversight mechanisms” |
|  | 3.2 Number of contexts with community-oriented policing programmes developed and/or operational | 7 | 2015 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 19 | 13 | 19 | Significant increase, 2019 target set lower than 2018, but exceeded | RoLSHRReporting |  |
| **Output 4: National human rights systems are strengthened and made more effective in promoting and protecting human rights.** |  |  |
|  | 4.1 Number of contexts with strengthened operational institutions supporting the fulfillment of nationally and internationally ratified human rights obligations | 10 | 2015 | n/a | 12 | 16 | 18 | 9 | 24 | 12 | **24** | Significant increase (2X baseline), 2019 target set lower than 2018, but exceeded | IRRF Indicator 2.2.3.1RoLSHRReporting | IRRF Indicator 2.2.3.1 measures “Number of additional contexts with strengthened institutions and systems supporting fulfilment of nationally and internationally ratified human rights obligations: rule of law and justice, and human rights” |

## Annex 5: Summary of ISSAT Evaluations

ISSAT has supported the Global Programme to achieve its planned results by conducting a series of evaluations aimed at building an evidence base for the range of interventions conducted under the GP, tracking in-country progress and helping identify good practices from specific implementations which can then be disseminated and potentially enrich Country Programmes in different countries/ regions. The broad purpose of the evaluations by ISSAT is to contribute to UNDP guidelines for a system capable of a consistent approach to monitoring progress of the GP. The evaluations strive to draw accumulated knowledge, good practice and identify lessons from the Rule of Law projects, identifying what has been achieved, what aspects could usefully be considered by other Country Programmes, and what types of evidence contribute to knowledge of Country Programme success.

The table below presents the GP3 interim evaluation team’s interpretation of the key findings and recommendations of the five evaluation reports completed by ISSAT by the time this evaluation. It should be noted that the GP contribution to the programmes evaluated by ISSAT was highly variable.

**Cross-cutting findings related to GP, identified by GP3 evaluators**

* Programming was relevant to needs in country, though the GP role or contribution was often not visible or not well understood by informants.
* Heavy focus was placed by projects on activity implementation with less attention to strategy and sustainability.
* Weak design and implementation of results monitoring was observed in all cases except Palestine.
* UN partner coordination was highly variable, including both good and very bad examples.
* Seed funding by GP worked well as catalyst for one component in Jordan, appears to have helped lay foundation for major joint programme in Guinea Bissau after mission drawdown, and contributed to establishment of Special Criminal Court in CAR. Findings are unclear for other countries; in Colombia, no specific project was funded by GP, and in Palestine it appears that no direct GP funding was provided to the studied projects.

**Cross-cutting recommendations identified by GP3 evaluators**

* Strengthen programme management capacity and enhance monitoring systems, especially considering the Palestine example;
* Ensure UN partner roles and procedures are clearly defined and agreed, especially in mission contexts;
* Work with local entities to develop and complement their statistics collection role.

**Table 3. Key Findings and Recommendations of ISSAT Evaluations**

| **Country, Year** | **Evaluation Focus** | **Key Findings (+/- or neutral/mixed \*)** | **Key Recommendations** | **Other comments relevant to 2020 GP evaluation** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Red font in this table denotes content specifically related to the GP and/or the Global Focal Point. |
| Guinea Bissau, pilot GP evaluation folded into wider UNDP final evaluation, 2017 | Rule of Law and Justice Project (2014-2016) – begun under GP Phase 2 1) National institutions play a role in creating a sustainable security environment, through effective and efficient justice and security provision; 2) The justice system provides better services and improves access for vulnerable groups. | + highly relevant + good results in justice actor capacity building, via local institution+ access to justice component – helped to expand offer of legal aid+ consistent efforts on sustainability, though stymied for the most part by context factors- overambitious considering time framework and challenging environment. - project lacked clear Theory of Change- low levels of execution, limited contribution to outcomes in project design.- justice sector coordination component – little progress due to institutions and politics, this weakness on governance means weak accountability- expectations on joint programming not met, the dynamic with UNIOGBIS “did not lend itself to take full advantage of the significant support awarded by the GFP”\* of 3 GP2 goals, 1 met fully (quick response to country needs for ROL support), 1 not (UN coordination and integration role) and 1 unclear (policy and knowledge products related to country)\* M&E design was good, but execution lacking, so results hard to assess. Measuring whether benefits are proportional to the efforts invested was problematic. | \* RoL&J could benefit from closer support and scrutiny provided by the GP/RoL on the M&E front and overall programme implementation\* direct attention to political and structural factors that are key to ROL progress in long run\* GP has to further assess, articulate and frame in policy, guidance, protocols and procedures the modalities of interaction within the context of Special Political Missions \* Commitment must remain unabated to the new Joint Programme (2017), GP and GFP should remain closely involved in support and oversight during implementation \* GFP and GP should assist to clarify the remit of UNDP by coordinating with relevant partners on how to clearly integrate police and corrections reform within holistic justice system reform \* GP has to better understand how a refocus on mediation and prevention reflects on the inherently political dimension of justice reform.  | Context: major gaps in collaboration and coordination between UNDP and UNIOGBIS.The RoL&J project did not make use of the full potential of GFP, which is both cause and consequence of the project being designed and implemented in a gap of joint ROL programming.Ultimately, the RoL&J, born of UNDP programmatic courage to keep continuity on access to justice and secure dividends on capacity building, helped to hold the ground for a robust, holistic intervention expected to start in 2017 under a joint UN programme |
| Jordan, final project evaluation, 2017 | Project on Enhancing community security and access to justice in host communities and other fragile areas 2015-18 - begun under GP Phase 2, developed and designed with support of GP, seed fund $1M from BPPS | + project has been flexible and politically aware+ some innovation observed+ contributed to legal reform, vital role, and good results of direct service delivery, reduced barriers to women reporting abuse+ security element has attracted new funding ($15M, link to P-CVE)- limited programme management and oversight, components weakly linked, very scanty monitoring and reporting- A2J not well funded, had to scale back due to funding suspension, donors still focused on humanitarian side\* results on security hard to discern, as small player in big field, govt progress minimal but solid work with CSOs\* coordination fine with UN Women and UNICEF, not good with UNODC, though also working on police | \* A2J needs more investment, to ensure progress is maintained (GP should fund since not priority for CO/donors)\* better stakeholder mapping\* link A2J and security components more strongly in design\* continue involvement in legal aid to mitigate ongoing risks and challenges on model\* restrict size of future programming to be manageable by small team\* continue support to CBOs to develop capacity, be able to deliver ongoing services\* the area most in need of greater effort and investment is monitoring of project outcomes - GP requests for info were not met, led to funding cuts*\** GP should consider strengthening its capability to provide programme management expertise to support country teams. GP provides clear capability to design and assessment phases, but has not consistently supported implementation as successfully. | ISSAT uses TOC approach – able to reconstruct, but not used by team to guide project, and reality did not match original TOC, not updatedGP commended for supporting push for access to justice and assisting the CO in developing and implementing a programme beyond focus on humanitarian crisis. Seed funding from BPPS worked well as catalyst for security elements of project due to context, though A2J work was generally more effective |
| CAR, mid- term project evaluation,2018 | Joint Project of Support to Special Criminal Court (CPS) - UNDP, MINUSCA[[23]](#footnote-24), UN Women and UN Volunteers (UNV), mid term evaluation mandated by UNDP CAR, focus on 2016-2018  | + highly relevant objectives+ activities have been completed or are underway+ good results considering the difficult operating conditions+ positive signs for sustainability, linked to civil society and capacity building of judges- lack of flexibility/adaptation could be obstacle for future functioning of court (first part of project focused on establishment)- autonomy of court is questionable…- management and monitoring are weak in generating knowledge for strategy - problems of staffing, delays- coordination very poor, no clear division of responsibilities, overlaps, some due to different visions of partners, lack of clear theory of change at MINUSCA and UNDP, gaps in info sharing, etc. + Value added by GP is evident in the area of advocacy and mobilization of resources at international level\* Support by GP is less clear at country level, as no activities were directly funded, and stakeholders were not able to mention any effect on coherence and knowledge management  | \* Develop a common strategic approach - a joint annual UNDP-MINUSCA-UNV-UN Women-UNODC roadmap (with role allocation)**\*** Broaden governance structure of the special court beyond UN entities, engage local justice actors more actively, and develop handover strategy for longer term continuity\* Clarify the role and responsibilities of project partner\* Restore strategic role of the project's governance bodies\* Review and formalize planning, monitoring and reporting mechanisms - strengthening information sharing and indicators\* Develop a strategy to strengthen impact of the project on the wider justice system to prevent the court's isolation\* Strengthen the role of the court itself in project, to become a full-fledged player rather than mere beneficiary | Interviews showed difficulty for stakeholders to identify precisely what the GP is, its role and its added value.  |
| Colombia, meta-evaluation of portfolio, 2018 | Rule of Law components of UNDP Country Programme (2015-19 cycle), on strategic level, considering 13 projects and programmes. Remit includes: “Analyse the extent to which GP efforts improved implementation of ROL projects”  | + Overall programme has achieved a remarkable amount within limited period. The design and steering of projects show awareness of political landscape+ UNDP support to changes in policy and legislation or to development of normative and institutional frameworks+ coherent holistic approach, relevant to context and adaptable+ intervention contributed to linkages across peacebuilding initiatives at local level, mainly involving civil society and local government, and national level- lack of overarching strategy for complex reasons, affected learning processes- unclear whether the current set of activities can be scaled up into a coherent new system of restorative justice- weak linkages among various projects in portfolio, operating in siloes- M&E system focused on outputs and limited when generating learning. Outcome indicators not measured in most cases. - monitoring was largel limited to tracking projects and use of resources.- inconsistencies between indicators in CPD and in projects, results cannot be aggregated to inform CPD indicators+ GP support has initiated an internal restructuring that will be key to supporting transition to peace in a coherent integrated manner\* not much activity yet under Initiation Plan funded by GP, due to delays in implementation, so little to evaluate\* local informants not able to comment on GP contributions or distinguish them from other elements of programme | \* UNDP should build structures and processes for internal monitoring and coordination to ensure that the Strategy for Peace is effectively implemented; \* UNDP needs to improve outcome monitoring processes to enable adaptation through implementation and guarantee strategic coherence \* The evaluation confirmed the importance and relevance of activities under Initiation Plan. However, UNDP should conduct a review aimed at refocusing activities on basic building blocks to support the outcome to be achieved, and prepare transition from direct implementation to national implementation\* Implement the recommendations and build on good practices identified in recent Review of the Gender Equality Portfolio. No recommendations specific to GP | Thanks to GP support, a Program Officer- Rule of Law could be recruited to oversee the portfolio and reinforce coordination between clusters. In addition, a UNDP democratic dialogue unit has been established, under leadership of the Democratic Governance cluster with participation of staff from the Sustainable Peace area. |
| Palestine mid-term programme evaluation, 2020 | Sawasya II programme “Promoting the Rule of Law in Palestine”, second phase of a joint national level programme that now integrates UNDP, UN Women and UNICEF, with various donors. Secondary purpose to provide evidence to GP of monitoring good practices at country level to inform strategic monitoring guidance for UNDP RoL programmes | + Programme is a critical element of support to improving the access and delivery of justice to the Palestinian community.+ Programme efforts have resulted greater coordination and cooperation between Palestinian justice system organisations+ improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of the Palestinian formal justice system+ programme’s central role in donor community, strength in developing evidence base for justice needs and performance, has positioned it well to influence overall direction of justice reform + improvements in functioning of courts, prosecutors and police to provide adequate services to women and girls+ strong efforts to provide better access to justice by strengthening civil society’s provision of legal aid and advice- fundamental contextual issues - political will to reform has been variable, and financial hardship has left the state unable to adequately fund the justice system | \* Palestinian state capacity to provide adequate justice remains limited, cannot be improved rapidly, and requires ongoing support. Thus, programme efforts should continue.\* Explore options to integrate UNODC and UNFPA into programme, to holistically reflect UN work in sector and include remaining major UN actors with extant justice sector programmes\* Maintain and develop current processes for internal project learning.\* Sawasya II has successfully implemented its monitoring framework, and is collecting data suitable for demonstrating outcomes and guiding implementation. The resourcing aspects around monitoring and the integration of monitoring focused activities into project work are both worthy of greater analysis by the GP, as they suggest potential pathways to improve monitoring in other country contexts. | Sawasya II has a solid level of programme staffing, and is better resourced than many comparable GP efforts.The programme has consistently implemented the most developed and effective monitoring system that the evaluators have encountered in programmes supported by the GP, addressing a fundamental data issue that has constrained most of these programmes. While partly due to the strength of Palestinian systems, much credit should accrue to the programme management and staff. |

## Annex 6: List of GP Pipeline Funding Allocations

**Table 4. GP Allocations of Funds to Individual Countries, 2017-19**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Region** | **GFP** | **Pipeline Round** | **Country** (yellow indicates GP priority countries) | **Allocated amount** |
| Africa | GFP | Round 1, 2017 | Burkina Faso |  250,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2017 | Burundi |  300,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 1, 2017 | Cote d'Ivoire |  250,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 1, 2017 | El Salvador |  283,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2017 | Guinea (Conakry) |  350,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 1, 2017 | Kosovo |  200,000  |
| Arab States | GFP | Round 1, 2017 | Sudan |  300,000  |
| Arab States | GFP | Ad-hoc/Round 2, 2017 | Syria |  200,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 2, 2017 | Afghanistan |  350,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 2, 2017 | Burkina Faso |  250,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 2, 2017 | Colombia |  100,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 2, 2017 | DRC |  300,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 2, 2017 | The Gambia |  250,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 2, 2017 | Iraq |  300,000  |
| Arab States | GFP | Round 2, 2017 | Libya |  500,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 2, 2017 | Myanmar |  107,456  |
| Africa |   | Round 2, 2017 | Nigeria |  400,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 2, 2017 | Tunisia |  150,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 3, 2017 | Tunisia  |  200,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 3, 2017 | Somalia |  368,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 3, 2017 | Palestine |  500,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 3, 2017 | Colombia |  200,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 1, 2018 | Bangladesh |  400,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 1, 2018 | CAR |  100,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 1, 2018 | Somalia |  239,160  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2018 | Uganda |  150,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 1, 2018 | Venezuela |  275,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2018 | Zimbabwe |  150,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Ad-hoc/Round 1, 2018 | Mali |  302,112  |
| LAC |   | Round 2, 2018 | Colombia |  300,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 2, 2018 | Kosovo |  230,104  |
| Africa |   | Round 2, 2018 | Ethiopia |  350,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 2, 2018 | Nigeria |  400,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 2, 2018 | Pakistan (2 projects) |  283,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 2, 2018 | South Sudan |  500,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 2, 2018 | Turkey |  300,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 3, 2018 | Côte d’Ivoire |  200,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 3, 2018 | DRC |  450,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 3, 2018 | Guatemala |  300,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 3, 2018 | Jordan |  85,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 3, 2018 | Maldives |  200,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 3, 2018 | Sierra Leone |  400,000  |
| Arab States | GFP | Round 3, 2018 | Syria/ARB |  300,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 3, 2018 | Tajikistan |  450,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 1, 2019 | DRC |  250,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2019 | Ethiopia |  212,500  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2019 | Guinea (Conakry) |  300,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 1, 2019 | Kyrgyz Republic |  300,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 1, 2019 | Lebanon |  175,000  |
| Arab States | GFP | Round 1, 2019 | Libya |  500,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 1, 2019 | Myanmar |  400,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 1, 2019 | Nepal |  300,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 1, 2019 | Sri Lanka |  300,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 1, 2019 | Uzbekistan |  250,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 1, 2019 | Zimbabwe |  250,000  |
| Africa | GFP | NHRI ad hoc | Gambia |  100,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 2, 2019 ad hoc | Nigeria |  300,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 2, 2019  | Armenia |  100,000  |
| Africa |   | Round 2, 2019  | Cameroon |  250,000  |
| LAC | GFP | Round 2, 2019  | Haiti |  190,000  |
| LAC |   | Round 2, 2019  | Honduras |  250,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 2, 2019  | Kosovo |  150,000  |
| Africa | GFP | Round 2, 2019  | Mali |  300,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 2, 2019  | Pakistan |  300,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 2, 2019  | Palestine |  350,000  |
| Asia Pacific |   | Round 2, 2019  | Timor-Leste |  100,000  |
| Arab States |   | Round 2, 2019  | Tunisia |  250,000  |
| ECIS |   | Round 2, 2019  | Ukraine |  100,000  |
|   |   | TOTAL |   |  18,450,332  |

## Annex 7: Challenges related to GFP in Somalia (2013-14)[[24]](#footnote-25)

**Background**

In light of the Decision of the Secretary-General to establish the UN Global Focal Point for Rule of Law[[25]](#footnote-26) and following the recommendation of the Secretary-General for a new UN integrated approach to support peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia[[26]](#footnote-27), endorsed by Security Council resolution 2102 (2013)[[27]](#footnote-28), the joint UNDP/DPA/DPKO Technical Assessment Mission that deployed to Somalia in 2013 recommended establishment of a joint UN Police Unit and a UN Joint Justice and Corrections Section. This decision was taken to facilitate joint delivery based on comparative advantages, capitalize on synergies, and provide national stakeholders with a single entry point for UN support to strengthening the respective sectors. At present, it comprises UNDP and UNSOM integrated staff and UNODC and UNOPS co-located personnel. Other UN entities are invited to join and have expressed interest. This is likely to happen particularly once the UN Joint Rule of Law Programme in Somalia is endorsed and funded through the UN Multi Partner Trust Fund.

**Observations**

In establishing the joint sections, many successes have been achieved in the implementation of the GFP arrangement, but a number of challenges also emerged, the most pertinent of which are outlined below.

* When it was decided to establish two P-5 UNDP positions in the UNSOM budget (Senior Police Advisor and Senior Rule of Law Adviser), the required human resources, financial and IT mechanisms to effectively implement this arrangement were not in place[[28]](#footnote-29) nor was there sufficient guidance on processes and procedures. As an interim solution identified in May 2014, the selected candidates are hired on UNDP contract and seconded to UNSOM as part of a reimbursable loan agreement. However, a sustainable solution remains outstanding.
* Currently, UNDP-contracted staff in the joint UN Police Unit in Somalia do not report to the Police Commissioner. With the recruitment of the P-5 Senior Police Advisor, there will be a reporting line through him. However, there is no DPKO/DPA guidance on reporting lines in joint units.
* The administrative and support systems across the Organization are not compatible, and personnel contracted by one UN entity do not have access to the systems of the others, in particular with regard to performance appraisal, recruitment, finances, and issuing contracts. Whether access to both systems should be permitted, or the roles and responsibilities of the P-5 positions reviewed, should be further considered.
* While UNDP reports to its donors on a quarterly basis within a calendar year, UNSOM reports to the Security Council every 120 days, with the first report due on 25 September 2014, and the results based budgeting framework at the end of the calendar year. This results in dual reporting obligations for the joint sections, on different schedules.
* The uncertainty about whether, when and which parts of a programme will be financed by donors results in planning challenges in terms of which Mission capacity will be required at what time to implement joint activities, and hence what Mission capacity can be allocated for other tasks.
* Different decision-making processes for UNDP and UNSOM-contracted personnel about working from home and relocation due to security threats created challenges on the joint sections’ work as co-located teams.
* Staff contracted by one UN entity are not allowed to drive vehicles of another. In light of the general shortage of available vehicles, this results in considerable logistical challenges.
* The ‘delivery as one’ imperative needs to be balanced against the maintenance of UNDP’s identity and approach to the integration as a partnership. This needs to be further discussed in relation to ensuring visibility of UNDP in engagement with counterparts, development partners and other stakeholders, noting that UNDP will have a longer term future of engagement in contrast to the mission. This matter also applies to the rest of the UNCT and will also need to be discussed within the context of the new UN Joint Rule of Law Programme.
* Under the integrated arrangements, responsibility for delivering against Donor Agreements needs further discussion. It is UNDP that enters into the financial agreement with Donors and has the full responsibility to deliver and report against these agreements.
* The integrated approach through the GFP is not limited to the planning stage. Identifying projects, recruiting project staff and implementation of projects is not an exclusive agency task; recruitment and implementation should be the responsibility of the integrated unit, while maintaining clear reporting requirements to the holding agency.
* Both UNSOM and UNDP have mandates throughout Somalia and the presence of each varies. The UNDP Access to Justice and Civilian Policing Project covers all of Somalia, and the UNDP Mogadishu-based Project Manager/P5 is responsible for both delivering against the entire Somalia annual work plan and managing the teams in all locations. UNSOM covers the regional offices, headed by political affairs officers. Some issues remaining to be addressed are the prioritization of workloads depending on presence in different areas, the need to establish appropriate linkages and reporting lines if applicable to UNSOM regional heads of office and UNDP Sub-Office management/supervisory arrangements.

**Recommendations**

* The GFP at Headquarters, in consultation with DPA, DPKO and in-country UN leadership, and based on the recommendation of personnel in joint sections, should develop clear guidance on recruitment processes (funding arrangements, development of terms of reference, recruitment process, etc.), reporting lines and performance appraisal systems in joint sections. Arrangements related to human resources, finances, budget and logistics must be in place before establishing joint sections.
* DFS, UNDP, DPKO and DPA and other UN entities should find practical solutions to the administrative, IT and logistical challenges outlined above. The medium-term goal should be a compatibility requirement for all UN entities.
* UN entities should align their security-related decision-making processes on working from home and relocating personnel.
* Further discussion at the country-level and at Headquarters is required on the following issues:
* Responsibilities related to identifying projects, recruiting project staff, implementing projects and delivering against Donor Agreements;
* Challenges resulting from operating within differing regional boundaries; and
* The maintenance of identity and visibility of UN entities in joint sections, in particular in respect to donors.

## Annex 8: Report on Interviews for Evaluation

**Summary of Interviews**

Between 28 January and 6 April 2021, the evaluation team of Craig Naumann and Melanie Reimer interviewed a diverse range of individuals for the primary data collection component of the evaluation. In the vast majority of cases, the interview was held with a single informant (where multiple persons participated in the same meeting, they are listed in the same cell of the tables below). In all, the team collected primary data from:

* 158 persons in total (84 male, 74 female)
* 41 at global level (11 male, 30 female)
* 117 persons at/related to country level case studies (73 male, 44 female)

**Global/headquarters informants**

The interviews in this category spanned a wide range of global or headquarters-level stakeholders, with a significant focus on current and former members of the UNDP ROLSHR Global Programme (GP) team itself, representatives of other UN entities, and key funding partners. Most of these individuals/institutions were identified for interview based on recommendations of the GP management team. Of the original list of 22 recommendations, the team has successfully interviewed 20, most of whom were interviewed by both evaluators working in tandem. In addition, the team has met with representatives of four GP funding partners.

| **Affiliation/Employer** | **Name** | **Position/Role** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **UNDP Staff and Consultants** |
| UNDP | Katy Thompson  | ROLSHR Team Lead |
| UNDP | Sarah Rattray | Global Policy Specialist for Human Rights, Tripartite Partnership focal point  |
| UNDP | Livio Sarandrea  | Crisis Prevention and Rule of Law Specialist, Business and Human Rights focal point, Bangkok Regional Hub, focal point for Pakistan |
| UNDP | Simon Ridley  | Regional rule of law, human rights and conflict prevention advisor  |
| UNDP | Ainura Bekkoenova  | Rule of Law Specialist in Istanbul Regional Hub, Focal Point for Kyrgyzstan and Albania, also interviewed for case studies |
| UNDP | Sofiène Bacha | Focal point for Burkina Faso and CAR, also interviewed related to those case studies |
| UNDP | Alexandra Meierhans | GP Project Manager |
| UNDP | Ciara DiSeta | GP Programme Associate |
| UNDP | Lin Cao | RB Asia Pacific, GP Project Board member |
| UNDP | Challa Getachew | RB Africa, GP Project Board member |
| UNDP | Gloria Manzotti | Focal Point for Colombia, Panama Regional Hub, also interviewed for that case study |
| Oslo Governance Center | Aparna Basnyat | Senior Research and Policy Advisor, SDG16 |
| UNDP consultant | Christi Sletten | former GP Project Manager  |
| UNDP consultant | Chelsea Shelton | former Learning and Knowledge Management Analyst, GP team |
| UNDP consultant | Leanne McKay | Phase 4 design and strategy consultant |
| **Other UN entities** |
| EOSG | Alejandro Alvarez | former GP team lead, now Chief of RoL with EOSG  |
| UNODC | Anna Giudice | Programme manager at UNODC Justice Section |
| UNODA | Fiona Simpson  | Focal point for SALIENT partnership |
| DPO | Robert Pulver | One of three GFP managers, Chief of Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service |
| UN Women | Emily Kenney (in lieu of Paivi Kannisto) | Policy specialist on transitional justice |
| PBSO | Marcus Lenzen  | Senior Adviser, Peacebuilding Policy and Programmes |
| UNHCR | Marije van Kempen (written submission) | Rule of Law Cluster Coordinator  |
| Pathfinders – Justice Task Force (SDG16) | Maaike de Langen | Programme lead - Justice for all  |
| **Funding partners** |
| Netherlands | Marieke Wierda | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Netherlands | Eveline de Bruijn, Barbara Chalghaf | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| UK | Stacy J. Weld-Blundell, Lydia O’Connor | Senior Policy Adviser - UK Mission to the United Nations; Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Sweden | Peter Linnér, Katarina Zinn, Anette Dahlström, Helena Bådagård  | Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Unit for Peace and Human Security) / Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) |
| Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)  | Arianna Barcham, Julianna Cavano  | Foreign Affairs Officers; Office of Global Programs and Policy (INL), United States Department of State |
| **Other** |
| ISSAT | Patrick Hagan | Deputy Director |
| Global Focal Point | Andrea Ernudd, Giorgia Tortora, Yagiz Oztepe | Core team of GFP |
| GANHRI\* | Ileana Bello, Katharina Rose | Operations Manager, Geneva Representative |
| OHCHR\* | Vladlen Stefanov  | Chief of National Institutions and Regional Mechanisms section  |

**Country case study informants**

The following list identifies the individuals interviewed for purposes of the country case studies, organized by country of relevance. The evaluators were able to meet or exceed the targets set in the inception report for all countries. The total informants engaged by the evaluators, including individual interviews and focus group discussions, is as follows:

* + Burkina Faso - 17
	+ Central African Republic[[29]](#footnote-30) - 19
	+ Colombia - 13
	+ Kyrgyzstan - 19
	+ Pakistan[[30]](#footnote-31) - 16
	+ Somalia - 23

It is worth noting that several UNDP staff listed above on the global informant list were also highly relevant to the country case studies, as designated ROLSHR team focal points or other staff with valuable perspectives on these countries. The evaluators also interviewed selected informants from two countries not recently funded by the Global Programme, to gather data about their past experience and future needs. The number of participating individuals for those contexts was:

* + Albania - 4
	+ Niger - 6

| **Affiliation/Employer** | **Name** | **Position/Role** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Kyrgyzstan**  |
| UNDP | Simone Boneschi | CTA for ROL programme |
| UNDP | Louise Chamberlain, Erkina Urazbaeva | Resident Representative,Head of Governance and Peacebuilding |
| UNDP | Zhenishbek Arzymatov, Gulnura Toleeva,Nurzhan Alymkanova, Daniyar Shaildaev | Senior Advisor on Strengthening Parliament Democracy and Rule of Law,Rule of Law Coordinator,Communication Specialist, Legal expert |
| OHCHR | Erkin Isakulov  | Co-chair of the Rule of Law and Human Rights Working group |
| UNICEF | Lucio Sarandrea | Former CTA for ROL programme |
| Expert Working Group | Gulmira Mamatkerimova, Leila Sydykova | Expert Working Group on Monitoring of Judicial and Legal Reform |
| Civil Society partners | Bakirov Artur, Kozhoyarova Gulsina, Suiunalieva Burul | President of the Association of Legal Clinics of Kyrgyzstan,Chairperson of the Supervisory Board of the Republican Community of Mediators,President of Public Fund “Social services development fund” |
| Prosecutor General’s Office | Moldobaev Azamat  | Head of the Training Center for Prosecutor-Investigative Officers |
| Ministry of Justice | Kalbekov Akjol  | Director of Free Legal Coordination Center |
| European Union  | Nicola Scaramuzzo  | Head of ROL Programme |
| INL (U.S. Dept. of State) | Elnura Kudaibergenova, Cory Spiller | Legal Specialist,Unidentified position |
| **Pakistan** |
| UNDP | Arshid Jan | Programme Specialist, ROL |
| UNDP | Jakhongir Khaydarov | Programme Manager, ROL |
| UNDP | Kaiser Ishaque | Assistant Resident Representative, Democratic Governance Unit |
| UNDP | Zulfaqir Durrani | Head of UNDP office, Quetta, Balochistan |
| UNDP | Sadia Hanif,Idrees Hayat,Asad Haroon | Programme Officer DG Unit,Law Enforcement Specialist,Prosecution Specialist |
| UN Women | Yasir Khan | Programme Officer |
| UNODC | Waqas Shah | Programme Manager (Prosecution and Judiciary) |
| Prosecutor General Office, Balochistan   | Nasar Ullah | Deputy Prosecutor General  |
| Balochistan Judicial Academy | Nazar Muhammad Kakar | Director |
| Balochistan Police | Aurangzeb | Deputy Secretary Training |
| Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan | Abdul Basit Jasra | Deputy Secretary |
| Bar Council of Balochistan | Zarghoona Barech | Advocate |
| Family Planning Association  | Dr. Rasheeda Panezai | President |
| INL (Dept of State) | Anonymous | Police and Anti-Narcotics Specialist |
| **Colombia** |
| UNDP | Jairo Matallana | CTA for ROLSHR programming |
| UNDP | Alejandro Pacheco | Deputy Resident Representative |
| UNODC | David Álamos | Director of PROJUST Programme  |
| OHCHR (OACNUDH) | David Medina | Coordinator of Transitional Justice |
| UN Resident Coordinator’s Office | Pontus Ohrstedt | Chief of Resident Coordinator’s office |
| Special Criminal Jurisdiction (JEP) | Claudia Erazo | Head of Victim Defense Department of Autonomous System for Counselling and Defense of Victims (SAAD)  |
| Special Criminal Jurisdiction (JEP) | Harvey Suárez | Deputy Executive Director  |
| Ministry of Justice | Carlos José Gonzalez | Director of Alternative Methods of Conflict Resolution  |
| Ministry of Justice | Tatiana Romero | Coordinator of Group for Strengthening Justice related to Gender Issues |
| Civil society partners | Franklin Castañeda, Irene Lopez, Francisco Cabal  | Comité De Solidaridad Con Los Presos Políticos,Organización Yira Castro |
| Multi-Partner Trust Fund | Alice Beccaro | Coordinator and Technical Secretary for Sustaining Peace in Colombia |
| **Somalia** |
| UNSOM | Adam Abdelmoula  | DSRSG/RC/HC |
| UNDP | Jocelyn Mason  | Resident Representative |
| UNDP | Jacquiy Olweya | Deputy Resident Representative |
| UNDP | Doel Mukerjee  | RoL CTA |
| UNDP | Ruth Pfleiderer | RoL Unit Operations Manager |
| UNDP | Helen Olafsdottir | Team leader of the Somalia  Joint Security Sector Governance Programme (JSSGP) |
| UNSOM  | Virginie Blanchard | RoLSIG Programme Advisor; UNSOM Joint Justice Programme (JJP) focal point |
| UNDP | Rose Foran  | Head of SDG 16 Unit |
| UNDP | Anthony Howie | Elections Security Advisor |
| UNSOM | Mitch Dufresne,Damian Klauss | Chief Joint Justice and Corrections Service (JJCS); Principal Rule of Law Officer; Rule of Law & Security Institutions Group (ROLSIG) |
| UNSOM | Marco Carmignani  | Director of ROLSIG |
| UNSOM | Jeff Sims | Head of SSR Unit Strategic Security/Maritime Adviser; UNSOM-UNDP Integrated Security Sector Reform Section; ROLSIG |
| UNSOM | Marta Duro | JSSGP Officer |
| UN Women | Dr. Sadiq Sadeq, Abdilkadir Noor Mohd | Country Office Manager;JJP Focal Point |
| UNICEF | Brendan Ross | Child Protection Officer |
| IDLO | Adam-Shirwa Jama, Abdullahi Yusuf Mohd | Country Director,Senior Access-to-Justice Programme Manager |
| Ministry Justice (Federal Government of Somalia – FGS) | Ibrahim Abdullahi Adan, Yusuf Ali Mohamed  | Strategic Policy & Monitoring Advisor (Consultant) ; Director General, MOJ  |
| EU, Netherlands, Sweden | Veronique Geoffroy, Elin Hilwig, Sophie Omoro | Donors’ RoL desk officers (UN focal points) |
| **Burkina Faso**  |
| UNDP | Isabelle Tschan | DRR |
| UNDP | Mahamane Ousmane | CTA RoLSHR |
| UNDP | Hortence Mpako Foaleng, Dieudonné Kini, Losséni Cissé | SSR Project Lead;Project Staff |
| UNDP | Ernest Bamou, Hervé Kouraogo | Strategy and Policy Advice Unit (Chief of Unit, Programme Officer) |
| RCO | Metsi Makhetha | Resident Coordinator |
| RCO staff | Gedeon Behiguim, Angélique Nguedjeu, Antonio Menendez De Zubillaga | PBF, DPA, OHCHR/SSR Advisor |
| Ministry of Justice | Sébastien Daila (following consultation with: Kafando Hawa Kanazue, Adama Sawodogo, Théophile Sawodogo, Amadou Kantagba)  | Director of Criminal Affairs Department (Direction des affaires pénales et du Sceau) |
| IOM | Ouélo Emane | Programme Manager |
| UNMAS | Philippe Renard | Country programme manager |
| National Democratic Institute  | Koné Abdoulaye | SSR Project Implementing Partner (NGO) |
| CSO Platform on Security Sector Governance and Reform | Ali Traoré, Pascaline Compaoré | Director, Principal Programme Officer |
| **Central African Republic** |
| UNDP | Antje Kraft  | Former Justice and Human Rights Specialist - ROLSHR GP Team, Chief Technical Advisor Rule of Law & JP Manager in CAR |
| UNDP  | Alpha Amadou Bah | M&E |
| UNDP | Houssem Ishak | SSR Specialist |
| MINUSCA  | Elodie Cantier Aristide | RESA-PSJ Unit 2017-2019, Justice and Corrections Service (JCS) |
| MINUSCA  | Fortuné Dako | Deputy Chief of Unit (Judicial Investigations and Prosecutions Unit / « Unité Enquêtes & Appui aux juridictions et aux poursuites »), Justice and Corrections Service (JCS) |
| DPO-OROLSI | Mark Devereux | CAR Desk Officer, JCS |
| DPO-OROLSI | Renaud Galand | Judicial Affairs Officer, JCS, Former CAR Desk Officer  |
| MINUSCA  | Ingrid Jeunhomme | Head of JCS |
| UNDP  | Paulin Kalamba | Architect |
| MINUSCA  | Blanchard Kangbeto | UNPOL Planning Officer |
| Avocats Sans Frontières | Myriam Khaldi | Programme Officer |
| UN Women, INL | Marie Kindblom-Tornell | Former Programme Officer |
| UNDP  | Frederick Lamy | Former Programme Officer |
| INL  | Jean Mondésir | Former staff |
| MINUSCA JCS | Gisèle Samvura | Former UNDP Programme Officer |
| UNDP  | Hanan Talbi | Former CTA Justice |
| MINUSCA | Charles Zocli | Focal point ; Former UNPOL Officer |
| ISSAT | Isabelle Dutour | Evaluator |
| European Union | Arsène Sendé | UN-RoLSHR Liaison Officer (Consultant) |
| **Albania** |
| UNDP | Edlira Papavangjeli,Envesa Hodzic-Kovac | Programme Manager, Rights and Justice; Desk Officer in Istanbul Regional Hub |
| UNDP | Entela Lako,Vladimir Malkaj  | Programme Specialist,Programme Officer for Governance and Rule of Law |
| **Niger** |
| UNDP | Diana Louise Ofwona | Resident Representative |
| UNDP | Abdoulaye Baldé  | CTA RoL |
| UNDP | Aziza Albachir (scheduled for next week) | CTA Stabilization |
| UNDP | Njoya Tikoum,Marion Volkmann, Wali Ndiaye | Director of Dakar Regional Hub for Western and Central Africa ;ROL Specialist ; Peace and Development advisor |
| UNDP  | Clément Hamon | Global Programme Focal point  |

## Annex 9: Sample of Interview Guides

1. ***Questions for Global Programme/ROLSHR team staff***
2. What were the roles that you played with the ROLSHR unit and GP in particular, during which years?
3. What would you describe as the key added value of the Global Programme?
	1. what are its primary strengths? (allow option to limit to his/her period with GP)
	2. what are its main weaknesses?
	3. What were the key expectations of GP main donors … and to what extent has GP3 management met those expectations?
4. How clearly does the Theory of Change in the Prodoc demonstrate the results sought by GP3? Are there gaps or disconnects? Assumptions that have not held true?
5. How does the GP differ from the regular RoL/SDG16 work done by UNDP (and Missions)?
6. Is GP support used more as a booster/catalyst, a complementary mechanism, to fill gaps, for testing out new innovative ideas… or all of the above?
7. Is GP programme mobilization mainly demand- or supply-side driven, or both? Any differences in this regard between i. GP, GFP, non-GP; ii. earmarked vs. pipeline?
8. Was there a difference between the original intent (ToC) and how the GP was/is used, in real life? Also, were there/are there any trends regarding a. and b. that evolved over the years)?
9. How has GP3 affected UNDP’s recognition in the ROLSHR sector globally?
	1. To what extent and in what ways has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s corporate offer on ROLSHR globally in Phase 3? (e.g. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications)
10. How effectively has GP3 supported joint engagement across the UN pillars?
	1. How effective has the GP3 been as a platform for financially and operationally supporting the GFP for Rule of Law (with DPO and other UN partners)? aka - usefulness and any drawbacks of the GFP mechanism
	2. To what extent is the GP complementary to the PBF and what are the dynamics between these two platforms in terms of synergies, catalytic effects, but potentially also rivalry!?
11. What factors have influenced the success of ongoing GP-led resource mobilization efforts?
	1. Has the idea of “seed funding” to catalyze other investments been successful? Why or why not?
	2. How could limited amounts of funding have more impact?
12. What do you see as the pros and cons of using GP as pass-through mechanism for earmarked funds such as those from INL?
13. What are achievements and challenges on operations side of GP?
	1. where are the key bottlenecks in that area?
	2. what effect have those had on effectiveness of GP investments?
14. M&E challenges have been alluded to – including country level capacity. What are key issues and their impact on GP?
15. Ideas on what should be enhanced/added in GP Ph. 4
16. Recommendations of other key informants that we should consider, documents to be reviewed, avenues of investigation
17. ***Questions for UN entities (global level)***
18. What has been your interaction (and that of your organization) with the GP, during which years?
	1. How has the relationship changed over time?
19. What is the added value of this Global Programme (if any)?
	1. How does the GP differ from the regular RoL/SDG16 work done by UNDP (and Missions)?
	2. what are its primary strengths and weaknesses?
	3. How does this GP differ from other global programmes and initiatives?
	4. Is the GFP adding any value in terms of inter-agency coordination/collaboration and if so, how?
	5. Vis-à-vis the PBF, is the GP always complementary or have there been incidents of “overlap” and rivalry?
20. Has the GP affected UNDP’s recognition/role in the ROLSHR sector globally in last five years?
	1. Has the GP modality added value to UNDP’s corporate offer on ROLSHR globally? If so, in what specific ways? (e.g. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications)
	2. What has been the contribution of GP3 to the Sustaining Peace and Prevention agendas of the Secretary-General?
	3. Has the GP had any negative effects? on global or country level?
21. How effectively has GP3 supported joint engagement:
	1. across different entities/agencies-funds-programmes within the UN (at HQ, regional and country level);
	2. across the “nexus” of political, development and humanitarian work; and
	3. vis-à-vis international donors
	4. What about coordination and partnership with national counterparts and donor partners?
22. To what extent is the GP complementary to the ROL/SHR work of your organization (and others)? What are the dynamics across these platforms/entities in terms of synergies, catalytic effects, but potentially also rivalry!?
	1. How have these been affected by recent structural changes in the UN system?
	2. How effective has GP3 been as a platform for financially and operationally supporting the GFP for Rule of Law (with DPO and other UN partners)? (usefulness and any drawbacks of the GFP mechanism)
23. Is GP financial support to countries/contexts used more as a booster/catalyst, a complementary mechanism, to fill gaps, for testing out new innovative ideas… or all of the above?
24. What is your view of GP’s work on resource mobilization for the ROLSHR sector?
	1. To what extent has the idea of “seed funding” to catalyze other investments been successful? What has affected its success/failure?
	2. How could limited amounts of funding per country have more impact?
25. To what extent have GP3’s management, operational, financial and administrative systems and structures positively or negatively affected programme implementation?  (SOPs, business processes, management of funds, etc.)
	1. are there any key bottlenecks (describe these and respective effects)?
	2. What about best practices and lessons learned (describe these and their effects)?
26. How effectively does GP and broader UNDP reporting on ROLSHR present the results of the programming? (Has this evolved since 2015?)
	1. To what extent does GP3 integrate results-based management?
	2. Follow-up: Do you see the value of a comprehensive ToC? please explain!
	3. How could monitoring and reporting be improved or clarified?
	4. -Could KM and organizational learning be enhanced, and if so, how: and what role does the GP play in and for, the GPN/Global Policy Network?
27. Ideas on what should be enhanced/added in GP Ph. 4 – what should be the focus of the GP, considering its comparative strengths and the related work of other entities?
28. Recommendations of other key informants that we should consider, documents to be reviewed, avenues of investigation…
29. ***Questions for National Stakeholders (Case Study Countries)***

(The following standard questions were adapted considerably to suit each context and each informant.)

1. What is your role in the \_\_\_ and how long have you held that position?
2. What is the scope of your/your entity’s involvement in ROLSHR in (country)?
	1. what major areas of activity?
	2. with which partners – national and otherwise?
3. What has been your interaction with the UNDP during those years?
4. How do you see the relevance of the UNDP’s \_\_\_ ROL project or activity?
	1. does it respond to priorities of country? how do you know?
	2. how do you perceive the national commitment to this project?
	3. does it complement what others are doing? build on what was done before?
	4. has it been flexible to respond to changing situations?
5. What do you think of the quality of UNDP’s approach and implementation?
	1. Is the project consistent with technical best practices? both design and implementation?
	2. have any new lessons emerged, new effective practices?
	3. Is it consistent with gender equity and respect for human rights?
	4. Do you see any elements of innovation?
	5. what could be improved?
6. What has changed as a result of the UNDP’s work on this project?
	1. can we already see any long term change, something sustainable?
	2. what will affect sustainability?
	3. have any new resources been identified or mobilized to continue the UNDP’s short term investment in this project? (ask for details – could be donor, government, etc.)
	4. what else is needed to ensure that these positive changes are not reversed?
7. How do you see the coordination by UNDP with other UN entities?
	1. what about with other donors and with government?
	2. Is UNDP a focal point or leader of coordination bodies?
	3. Examples of positive coordination, or overlaps/confusion/competition?
8. Ideas on what should be enhanced/added future UNDP programming in ROLSHR, considering its comparative strengths and the related work of other entities?
9. Recommendations of other key informants that we should consider, avenues of investigation…

## Annex 10: Documents Reviewed for Evaluation

**UNDP Documents**

* Prodoc for Global Programme Phase 3, 2015
* Prodoc for Global Programme Phase 2, 2011
* Global Programme annual reports 2016-2019
* UNDP Strategic Plans, 2014-17 and 2018-21
* Outcome summary report from online consultations on “The Future We Want To See: Re-imagining Rule Of Law, Security and Human Rights and the Inclusive Social Contract”
* Pipeline funding request templates (annex for and GFP-specific requests), 2021
* Pipeline allocations table by country, 2017-2020
* Pipeline requests and approvals lists, 1st quarter 2017 and January 2021
* Donor contribution table, 2016-2020
* ROLSHR Team Organigramme, as of 2020
* ROLSHR Focal Points table
* Note on Financial Architecture of GP3, 2017
* Standard Operating Procedures: Donor Contribution Agreements, 2020
* Standard Operating Procedures: Funding Allocations and Financial Authorizations, 2020
* Guidelines on Funding Decisions and Allocations, 2020
* Phase 3 GP and GFP priority country lists
* Annual GFP highlights brochures, 2019 and 2020
* Access to Justice Practice Note, 2004
* UNDP Practitioner’s Guide, Programming for Justice: Access for All, 2005
* Various guidance notes and thematic publications related to Covid-19 situation, 2020
* Results Oriented Analysis Report (ROAR) Guidance Note, updated 2018
* Methodological Notes for various UNDP Strategic Plan IRRF indicators, 2015 and 2018
* Terms of Reference for Global Programme Project Board and Partner Advisory Group, November 2016
* GP Partners Advisory Group meeting minutes, 1 July 2020
* Terms of Reference for Clingendael Institute for “Developing a theory of change for RoLJSHR Global Programme Phase 3”, 2016, and Report by Clingendael Institute, 2017
* Terms of Reference for various ROLSHR team staff positions
* Why, what and how to measure? A user’s guide to measuring rule of law, justice and security programmes, UNDP, undated
* UNDP Evaluation Guidelines, 2019
* Various documents related to UNDP ROLSHR programming in case study countries, including but not limited to: Country Programme Documents, project documents for relevant interventions, reports to donors, GP funding request documents, annual workplans, etc.

**Other Documents**

* Review of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice, and Corrections, August 2018
* ISSAT reports on country evaluations in Colombia, CAR, Jordan, Palestine and Guinea Bissau, and terms of reference for second CAR evaluation (in process)
* ISSAT interim reports to GP management, 2018 and 2019
* United Nations Rule of Law Indicators, Implementation Guide and Tools, first edition 2011
* Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund: A Concept Note for the UNPBF Advisory Group: Final Draft, 2010
* Peacebuilding Fund Strategy 2020-24
* Peacebuilding Fund Guidance Note on Gender Marker Scoring, 2019
* Peacebuilding Fund concept note template, 2018
* Standard Operating Procedures for the Management Committee of the Tri-Partite Partnership to support National Human Rights Institutions, 2018
* Tri-Partite Partnership to support National Human Rights Institutions brochure, 2018
* Global Alliance for Reporting Progress on Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies brochure, undated
* **The Evolving Role of Rule of Law Support in UN Peace Operations, article b**y Robert A. Pulver
* Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations rule of law activities, July 2019
* Working with the United Nations in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations: A Resource Note for World Bank Staff, 2015
* Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, The Roadmap for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies – A Call to Action to Change our World, 2019

## Annex 11: Terms of Reference for Evaluation

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| --- |
| **ROLSHR GP Mid Term Evaluation, CB/UNDP** |
| **Objective:** The purpose of this procurement exercise is to contract two individual consultants who will conduct a mid-term evaluation of Phase III of the Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development and will produce a comprehensive analytical report. The Mid Term evaluation itself is being undertaken to inform UNDP and its partners of lessons learned, results achieved and areas for improvements, and will also inform the development of the fourth phase of the Global Programme.**Background:** With an in-country presence before, during and after conflict or crisis, UNDP expects to provide increased assistance in providing rule of law, justice, security and human rights assistance to countries threatened or affected by crisis and fragility. In order to meet these demands, UNDP’s Global Policy Network (GPN) has made rule of law a priority area for programmatic support and policy development.To this end, the Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights (RoLSHR) team in the UNDP Crisis Bureau has bolstered its capacity to provide support to the field and articulated in a Global Programme for Strengthening the Rule of Law and Human Rights for Sustaining Peace and Fostering Development. UNDP’s Global Programme has been the main operational and financial instrument for UNDP globally to engage on rule of law in crisis-affected contexts. Drawing on some of UNDP’s most innovative rule of law programmes, it seeks to expand such experiences to assist UNDP Country Offices to develop multi-year, comprehensive rule of law programmes that respond rapidly and effectively to the needs on the ground. The Global Programme is currently in its third phase, which commenced in 2016 and was given a 1-year extension; the current phase ends in December 2021.The RoLSHR programme and team now directly provide support to roughly 40 countries and have increasing responsibility to lead and support policy development and guidance in rule of law related areas, especially in the context of the SDG and Sustaining Peace agendas. The RoLSHR team also leads UNDP’s engagement with DPO, as the Global Focal Point of Justice, Police and Corrections (GFP), which was established in 2012. The ROLSHR programme also engages with OHCHR and the Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) through the Tripartite Partnership to Support National Human Rights Institutions; with UNHCR to support rule of law and local governance solutions for displaced populations; and the Team of Experts (TOE) on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict; and recently launched The Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT) with UNODA.7 key interlinked programme areas form the blueprint for UNDP’s engagement on RoL and human rights assistance:1. Political Engagement
2. Institution Building
3. Community Security
4. Human Rights Systems
5. Access to Justice
6. Transitional Justice
7. Gender Justice

Current donor partners of the Global Programme include the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States among others. In the last two years, the Global Programme has enhanced partnerships with Sweden’s Folke Bernadotte Academy and Prison and Probation Service, the Ministry of Justice of Japan, and the UNV programme to strengthen the technical capacities within the UNDP team and to support the GFP.      The third phase of the Global Programme commenced implementation in October 2016. The programme engages in multiple rule of law and human rights initiatives at the country level and regularly receives positive feedback from the Country Teams on the ground. It also forms the basis for multiple global and policy development initiatives and has a broad range of substantive partners. The Global Programme management team periodically reviews and adjusts the standard operating procedures of the programme to address any inefficiencies in the programme implementation.Currently the Global Programme is being implemented in the following five regions: Europe, Asia Pacific, Africa, Arab States, Latin America/Americas, with the majority of priority contexts located in Africa.The Global Programme has also engaged DCAF - International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) to undertake various country evaluations to support the development of enhanced M&E capabilities.  The core component of support from ISSAT to UNDP’s Global Programme is the conduct of high quality learning evaluations of individual country level programmes. As such, each evaluation will engage with the specific context and activities of the programme, and identify what has been achieved, what aspects could usefully be considered by other programmes, and what types of evidence contribute to knowledge of programme success.Three ISSAT evaluations have been undertaken in Colombia, Guinea Bissau and Central African Republic and several others such as Palestine are currently in preparation phase. These evaluations will feed into the mid-term evaluation to highlight impact, added value and lessons learned from the specific country settings and the Global Programme overall. |
| Duties and Responsibilities |
| **Purpose and audience:**This mid-term evaluation is being undertaken to inform UNDP and its partners of lessons learned, results achieved and areas for improvements. The finding of this mid-term evaluation will inform the development of the fourth phase of the Global Programme along with the final evaluation.**Evaluation Objectives:**The main purpose of this this mid-term evaluation is to draw out lessons learned and identify further support and/or action needed to ensure proper implementation and performance of the Global Programme through the end of this programmatic phase in December 2021, as well as to develop the methodology/measurement framework that will be used for both the mid-term and final evaluation.1. This mid-term evaluation is being undertaken to assess the performance of the Global Programme in achieving its intended results as stated in the above programme areas, as well in meeting its objectives, specifically also at the outcome level and impact achieved. The mid-term evaluation will review the Global Programme from January 2016-December 2019. Furthermore, this evaluation will inform the development of the fourth phase of the programme starting in January 2022.
2. Additionally, this mid-term evaluation will provide general insights on:
* The ability of UNDP to function as an effective provider of rule of law, security and human rights programming support; in particular, the extent to which the Global Programme is able to respond to the needs of UNDP Country Offices; UN Resident Coordinator Offices; UNCTs; and peacekeeping Missions as relevant.
* The ability of the Global Programme to leverage UNDP’s role as an international policy maker and thought leader on rule of law, security and human rights.
* The effectiveness and achievements of UNDP in forging interagency cooperation and implementation across the UN system vis a vis the Global Focal Point, the Tripartite Partnership to Support NHRIs, and other important initiatives, including with UN Women, UNODC, etc.
* The Global Programme’s contributions to UNDP’s Integrated Results and Resources Framework for the 2014-2017 and the 2018-2021 UNDP Strategic Plan.
* The ability of the current structure of the Global Programme to manage finances and operations, meet partner expectations, and respond to the needs of priority countries.

**General Evaluation Questions:** The mid-term evaluation will cover the period January 2016 – December 2019 and shall cover the following central evaluation focus areas:At the country level:* Programmatic support: Has the Global Programme’s technical, financial, operational and strategic support been relevant and responsive to the needs and priorities of UNDP Country Offices in the field to engage on rule of law, security and human rights programming?
* Added value: Has the Global Programme modality added value to UNDP’s offer on rule of law, security and human rights in the field and in what way i.e. in flexible funding, expertise, comprehensive programming, coordination with the UN system, etc.?
* Impact: To what extent has the Global Programme contributed to improving the overall rule of law, security and human rights situation in priority countries? What examples can be shared?
* Way of working: How consistent has Global Programme support been with UNDP corporate standards of practice (e.g., prioritizing Leave No One Behind, human rights-based, nationally-owned, based on analytical assessment, adapted to country context, gender sensitive and conflict-sensitive, supportive of innovation)?  How sustainable are the results?
* Lessons learned: Identify lessons learned, best practices and innovative approaches at the field level that can inform other programmatic engagements supported by the Global Programme.

At the global level:* Coordination and partnership: To what extent has the Global Programme promoted coordination and partnership with national counterparts, donor partners, and across the UN system? How does the Global Programme support joint engagement across the UN pillars? Is the Global Programme an effective platform for financially and operationally supporting the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law (with DPO and other UN partners)?
* Strategic positioning and policy development: How has the Global Programme shaped UNDP's relevance as an international leader and/or partner in the rule of law and human rights field(s)? Is UNDP recognized as a key actor on rule of law, security and human rights programming in complex contexts and what has the impact of this been on the organization? What is the contribution of the Global Programme to the Sustaining Peace and Prevention agendas of the Secretary-General?
* Added value: To what extent has UNDP leveraged the Global Programme to strengthen or add value to its corporate offer on rule of law, security and human rights, i.e. influencing strategic plan priorities, contributing to signature solutions through comprehensive programming, strengthening corporate monitoring, reporting, quality assurance, and communications, etc.?
* Lessons learned: Identify lessons learned, best practices and innovative approaches from the field that can be scaled up to inform Global Programme-supported policy development.

At the programme management level:* Are the management, operational, financial and administrative structures, including SOPs and business processes of the Global Programme fit for purpose? Where are the current challenges and what improvements could be made?
* Does the Global Programme have the required resources (human and financial) to achieve its intended programme objectives? If not, where is more investment needed?
* Does the Global Programme management meet partners’ expectations? If not, what can be done to facilitate this?
* Is the trajectory of the Global Programme sustainable, assuming it should stay or grow beyond its current portfolio?  What else might be needed to ensure the Global Programme can continue to perform at a high-level?
* Is the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning capacity in the Global Programme sufficient and how could it be improved? How does the Global programme integrate results-based management?

**Scope of Work:** This evaluation will be carried out by a team of two consultants with the support of the Global Programme management team and with the UNDP Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights team in New York and in the Regional Hubs as necessary. The evaluators will jointly undertake the following tasks:* Consult with the Global Programme management team in New York on the scope of work, methodology and country case studies to be selected;
* Draft the inception report outlining the evaluation methodology as well as interview and mission plan and schedule (each consultant should be expected to travel to three countries each (Dependent on COVID-19 travel restrictions and UN guidance);
* Develop the research questions and interview questionnaires based on the agreed evaluation plan and methodology;
* Conduct interviews with the relevant UN colleagues (including UNDP staff, DPO/OROLSI and GFP entities), donors, Resident Representatives, and other selected stakeholders;
* Undertake (virtual and where possible in person) missions to the selected countries to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme at the country level, including through interviews with stakeholders, partners and other relevant actors.
* Conduct phone interviews with at least two countries agreed with the Global Programme management that do not currently receive Global Programme support to assess needs in these countries;
* Draft the evaluation report based on the findings for the review of the Global Programme management team;
* Consult with the Global Programme management team and adjust the report based on feedback;
* Submit final evaluation report to the Global Programme Management team.

**Management Arrangements and Reporting:** The consultant will report to the Global Programme Project Manager and will liaise with the whole ROLSHR team during the assignment.**General Methodology:** The evaluators will rely mainly on the following methods for obtaining the necessary information: * Desk review of relevant programme and policy documents; Summary and outcome document of the Consultations for the Future We Want to See – Re-imaging Rule of law, Security and Human Rights
* Interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and partners (including but not limited to UNDP HQ, regional and country level colleagues, GFP partners as relevant such as DPO, UN Women, EOSG, etc., and key partners in government and civil society);
* Direct observation via missions to three countries with initiatives supported by the Global Programme (Dependent on COVID-19 travel restrictions and UN Guidance).
 |

1. More information is available at this link: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/salient/> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The full list of GP donors during the period under evaluation is: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UNDP Core Resources, United Kingdom, United States/INL, United States Department of State, and UNHCR. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. In CAR, local stakeholder interviews were carried out by local experts contracted by ISSAT. To ensure that their data could also effectively inform this evaluation, the GP3 evaluation team closely vetted the ISSAT methodology and data collection tools (including the interviewee list, evaluation matrix, and key elements of interview template). The interview data subsequently shared by ISSAT was taken into account by this evaluation to complement other primary and secondary data in relation to CAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The Prodoc included this footnote: “a comprehensive, evidence-based Theory of Change to underscore the Global Programme is currently under formulation in partnership with the Clingendael Institute.” However, a revised theory of change has not been completed as of the time of this evaluation. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. It was not possible to assess to what extent these countries have been prioritized for technical assistance, as there is no programme-wide system to document this type of GP service (which countries, how often, type of advice/expertise, source of advice, outcomes, etc.) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. The original list of 30 contexts in the Prodoc list, developed in consultation with the Project Board, was: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea (Conakry), Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo (UN Administered Territory),50 Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen. The list was subsequently expanded to 32 with the addition of Jordan and Lebanon. According to the Prodoc: “*These priority countries and territories have been selected based on previous government request for UNDP engagement on rule of law and/or human rights strengthening, as well the countries on the agenda of the Security Council, as well as demonstrated needs for: Sector-wide planning and engagement; Targeted financial support and strong technical investment from UNDP and UN partners; Donor coordination to guarantee maximum aid effectiveness; Sustained commitment and engagement with national and community-level stakeholders to ensure lasting, transformational change*.” [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The four priority countries that had not previously received a funding allocation (Yemen, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) were included in the pipeline financing of 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. The Prodoc contemplated this targeting flexibility, as follows: “*Phase 3… will focus on strengthening country-level technical support and seed-funding to a designated set of 30 priority countries and territories..*.”, going on to state that “…*UNDP maintains the capability to designate funding through the Global Programme to non-priority [contexts] upon request and as deemed necessary – for instance, special development situations requiring rapid and targeted support, or smaller monetary investments. The Global Programme will also support regional-level programming that responds to country priorities on rule of law”*. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. For example, [in October 2020 at the 45th session of the Human Rights Council: Resolutions, decisions and President’s statements](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session45/Pages/ResDecStat.aspx). A/HRC/RES/45/22 Preambular paragraph: *"Welcoming efforts to strengthen United Nations system-wide coordination in support of national human rights institutions and their networks, including the tripartite partnership between the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the High Commissioner and the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions,2 and encouraging further cooperation in this regard between United Nations mechanisms and processes and with national human rights institutions, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions and its regional networks*" [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. In May 2018 the UN General Assembly approved a set of changes for “repositioning” the UN development system, including reforms to the RC system. The changes and accompanying new funding scheme aim to ensure the RC system is independent from any UN agency, more transparent and accountable to Member States, and fully dedicated to the 2030 Agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Under the new peace and security architecture, OROLSI is mandated to serve as a UN system-wide service provider for mission and non-mission settings and on all issues related to rule of law and security institutions. It works closely with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, particularly the Peacebuilding Support Office and the regional structure, as well as with the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Operational Support and other United Nations entities, including through inter-agency arrangements such as the GFP. Thematic policy issues covered by OROLSI include: Prevention of Violent Extremism & Counter-Terrorism (PVE-CT); Sustaining Peace; Conflict Prevention; Women, Peace and Security; Youth, Peace and Security; and, Communications. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. These calculations do not include INL earmarked funding handled by the GP in this period. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. The Project Board is chaired by the Head of the ROLSHR team, and comprised of representatives from each of the UNDP Regional Bureaus and the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. A sample of these multilingual discussions facilitated by the ROLSHR team can be viewed at this link: <https://www.sparkblue.org/GlobalprogrammeROLSHR/discussion/reflecting-undps-focus-rule-law-security-and-human-rights-what-has> [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. For more information, see the PBF’s 2020-2024 Strategy, available for download at <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund/documents/investments>. More detailed recent guidance on measuring catalytic effects was mentioned by informants, but not available to the evaluators in time for this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. General information about the INL is available at <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs/> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is an annual statistical assessment of the quality of governance in every African country. As such, scores are not calculated for countries located on other continents. Scores range from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. In 2015, scores and rankings were available for 102 countries across 8 primary rule of law indicators and 47 sub-factors. Scores range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). For more information, see http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. According to the Transparency International website, “A country or territory’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).” [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Allocation data was recorded in a different way in 2016 and thus has not been included in this table. Allocations to regional projects are also not included, to limit this particular analysis to country-specific funding. Regional allocations have included funds channeled to COs in both GP priority and non-priority countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. SP Indicator 2.2.3.3 - similar to GP indicator 1.1; SP Indicator 3.2.2.1 - adapted to GP indicators 1.2, 3.1 and 6.2; SP Indicator 1.6.2.2 - adapted to GP 7.2 and 7.3; SP Indicator 2.2.3.1 - similar to GP 4.1; SP Indicator 2.2.3.2 - similar to GP 5.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. These phrases are drawn from the narrative reporting template sent by GP management in March 2021 to focal points for distribution to country offices, which did not request any information related to challenges, problems or lessons learned. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Sourced from UNSOM/OROLSI staff in 2021 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Decision 2013/2 of the United Nations Secretary-General, Policy Committee on 29 January 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. S/2013/69 para. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. In para. 2 b) (ii), the Security Council decided that support to the police, justice and corrections institutions should be provided within the framework of the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Terms of reference were developed, consulted widely and agreed. The decision was made to advertise the positions on the UNDP website and the funding for the positions to come from the UNSOM budget. After a full recruitment process, candidates were selected; however, there were no feasible human resources and financial arrangements in place to recruit the selected candidates. These issues were not resolved by April 2014, with a decision made to move ahead with the recruitments without the planned financial agreements in place. By this time the candidate selected for the Senior Police Advisor decided on employment elsewhere, and the candidate selected for the Senior Rule of Law Advisor was contracted by UNDP for 12 months to commence 1 July 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Data collection among stakeholders in the Central African Republic heavily relied on interviews carried out by local survey experts contracted by ISSAT-DCAF as part of an ongoing country-level evaluation for the Global Programme. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. In the case of Pakistan, where the time difference and short working hours of some informants made it difficult to arrange interviews, some data collection was done via exchange of emails and/or Whatsapp audio responses. These methods enabled a high response rate from a wide cross-section of informants, although the inputs received were less in-depth compared to oral interviews. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)