FINAL REPORT

Mid-Term Evaluation of the Country Programme Document (CPD), UNDP South Sudan

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Dr. Craig Naumann & Batali Geoffrey
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Dr. Craig NAUMANN (International Consultant)

Batali Geoffrey (National Consultant)

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List of Acronyms

ADB – African Development Bank
AFPs – Agencies, Funds and Programmes
AWP – Annual Work Plan
ARCSS – Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CCA – Common Country Assessment
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
COTAL – Council of Traditional Authority Leaders in South Sudan
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRSV – Conflict-related sexual violence
CPD – Country Programme Document
CSO – Civil society organization
CTRH – Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing
CVE – Countering Violent Extremism
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DaO – Delivering as One
DHIS2 – District Health Information System (Version 2)
DIM – Direct implementation modality
DPO – Department of Peace Operations
ECC – Emergency Call Centres
EQ – Evaluation Query
FTP – Financial and Technical Partner
GBV – Gender-Based Violence
GEF – Global Environmental Facility
GEWE – Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment
GFP – Global Focal Point
GoSS – Government of South Sudan
HACT – Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
HDI – Human Development Index
HDPN – Humanitarian-development-peace nexus
HLRF – High-Level Revitalization Forum
HNA – Humanitarian Needs Assessment
HRBA – Human Rights Based Approach
HRP – Humanitarian Response Plan
IC – International Consultant
ICPE – Independent Country Programme Evaluation
IDPs – Internally Displaced People
IFI – International Financial Institution
IEO – Independent Evaluation Office
IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF – International Monetary Fund
iMRV – Integrated Measurement, Reporting and Verification
JP – Joint Programme
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
MEL – Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
MGCSW – Ministry of Gender, Child, and Social Welfare
MoE – Ministry of Environment
MoFP – Ministry of Finance and Planning
MoH – Ministry of Health
MoHA – Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
MoJCA – Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs
MoLPSHRD – Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development
MTE – Mid-term evaluation
NAC – National Audit Chamber
NAP – National Adaptation Plan
NBS – National Bureau of Statistics
NCRC – National Constitutional Review Commission
NDC – National Determined Contribution
NDS – National Development Strategy
NGO – Non-governmental organization
NIM – National implementation modality
NWOW – New Way of Working
NTLI – National Transformative Leadership Institute
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OROLSI – Office of Rule-of-Law and Security Institutions
PaCC – Peace and Community Cohesion
PBF – Peace Building Fund
PCRC – Police and community relationship committee
PCS – Public Services Commission
PFRR – Partnership for Recovery and Resilience
PIP – Project Initiation Plan
PPC – Political Parties Council
PSEA – Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PTSD – Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
RARCSS – Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
RoAR – Results-oriented Annual Report
RoL – Rule of Law
RSRTF – Reconciliation, Stabilization, and Resilience Trust Fund
SCORE – Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index
SDR – Special Drawing Rights
SERP – Socioeconomic Response Plan (to COVID-19)
SSPRC – South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission
SSR – Security sector reform
STARR – Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience
ToC – Theory of Change
TGONU – Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan
TJ – Transitional Justice
ToR – Terms of Reference
UN – United Nations
UN(SD)CF – United Nations (Sustainable Development) Cooperation Framework
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNEG – United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN Women – United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UoJ – University of Juba
WPS – Women, Peace and Security
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Executive Summary

MTE Background and Context

South Sudan is facing a complex inter-linked set of development challenges, including persistent conflict and fragility, recurrent naturally and human-induced systemic shocks and stressors (conflict-induced IDP/refugee flows, drought, flash floods, locust plague, Covid-19), weak institutions, and economic instability. The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was designed to restore a permanent ceasefire, but violence kept reoccurring over the following years as a sustainable settlement of the conflict could not be reached. In December 2017, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s Heads of State, and South Sudan's Government convened a High-Level Revitalization Forum with the parties of the ARCSS to restore a permanent ceasefire and agree on a revised and realistic timeline for implementation of the peace agreement. The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018 foresaw institutional reforms and a 35% quota for women's participation in decision making. In early 2020, a unity deal was reached by the warring factions and a coalition government, the "Transitional Government of National Unity" was formed. It faces a context in which basic democratic attributes such as fundamental rights, checks on government, impartial administration, and civil society participation have been declining in recent years.

Due to the above-mentioned conflagration of concurrent crises, South Sudan currently faces a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. Over the past years, South Sudan was consistently ranked among the lowest, if not the lowest, in the UN World Happiness Report and the Global Peace Index. It also had the third-highest score on the American Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index. By early 2019, South Sudan remained in a serious humanitarian crisis due to the cumulative effects of years of conflict and violence against civilians, which had destroyed people’s livelihoods and forced about 4 million people (at least 35% of the population) to flee their homes – almost 2 million inside and more than 2.25 million outside of the country. Floods and locusts have further worsened living conditions for millions of South Sudanese. The country has massive development needs, from building basic infrastructure, to developing education and health services, and building institutions. South Sudan has only limited access to affordable public international financing streams.

Poverty levels are expected to remain extremely high, with about 82 percent of the population in South Sudan below the USD1.90 poverty line (2011 purchasing power parity). More than 87 percent of the working population are classified as vulnerably employed, i.e., engaged as unpaid family workers and own-account workers. Up to 95 per cent of the population depend on climate-sensitive sectors for their livelihood, including agriculture, forestry, wildlife resources, and fisheries. In 2019, proceeds from oil exports accounted for 98 percent of exports and about 90% of budget revenue, further compressing the already limited space for fiscal policy action. Over past years, about 80% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. In recent years, the vagaries of the oil price on international markets further undermined the South Sudanese economy, in addition to the impact of the insecurity on overall economic output or productiveness, and productivity. By late 2019, South Sudan remained among the poorest countries in the world and four out of five South Sudanese still live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. Outside the oil sector, livelihoods are concentrated in agriculture.

4 South Sudan currently counts at least 1.7m IDPs within its borders, while by July 2021 there were 2,255,277 South Sudanese refugees scattered across neighbouring countries. https://www.unhcr.org/south-sudan-emergency.html
The South Sudanese context calls for a simultaneous, integrated and holistic response to humanitarian, recovery, and development needs. High levels of poverty, fragile statehood combine with an extreme vulnerability to climate shocks given that the majority of livelihoods depend on incomes from agricultural activities. Over the past years, the estimated number of people to be classified as food secure has constantly risen. The scale and severity of acute food insecurity in South Sudan has now reached both the highest recorded absolute numbers and relative proportions since 2014. In fact, the country is now facing its highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition since independence 10 years ago. This requires sustained humanitarian food assistance to save lives and protect livelihoods. While in late 2018 the figure stood at an estimated 6m people (about 55% of the population), by May 2021 the absolute total had risen to 7.2m which corresponds to slightly above 60% of the current population size. The country is marked by a high degree of gender inequality including high prevalence of Gender-Based Violence. Patriarchism and gender bias are highly prevalent, keeping girls and women in a subordinate position. Patriarchal stereotypes about gender roles are reflected in related customary practices resulting in gender inequality starting at the household level. Conflict during the civil war years exacerbated this situation. In spite of the establishment of peace agreements signed in 2015 and 2018, civil conflict persisted during recent years across the country, and inter-communal conflicts were a continuing facet of this period of relative peace.

MTE’s Purpose and Scope

UNDP South Sudan’s Country Programme Document (CPD) which was originally designed to cover the period 2019-2021 is likely to receive a one-year extension until end 2022. The CPD supports Government-led efforts to eradicate poverty and build resilience to crises and shocks, while safeguarding development gains. Implementation of the CPD started in 01-2019. The evaluation was pitched at the general results level to assess the CPD’s design, scope, implementation status and overall capacity to achieve expected outcomes. The mid-term evaluation (MTE) covers the period 01-2019 until 12-2020. MTE objectives include: 1. Review the extent to which relevant outputs have contributed to each outcome and identify and review the contributing (or hindering) factors to the effectiveness of UNDP’s contribution; 2. Assess the mechanisms/methods by which outputs led to the achievement of the specified outcomes; 3. Assess the relevance of UNDP’s contributions, including applied strategies and partnerships towards each outcome, considering the emerging development challenges and opportunities; 4. Provide key recommendations and directions for the ongoing country programme implementation as well as the next country programme cycle.

The MTE assessed the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and (early) impact of UNDP’s development assistance. Based on findings and related conclusions including best practices and challenges, the MTE provides evidence-based recommendations. As such, the CPD serves an important accountability function, in that it provides national stakeholders and partners with an independent and impartial assessment of UNDP’s work in South Sudan. In addition, the MTE of the UNDP South Sudan CPD was also meant to serve as a building block for the Independent Country Programme Evaluation carried out by UNDP’s Independent Evaluation Office. The CPD is aligned with South Sudan Vision 2040, ARCSS, NDS 2018-2021, Africa Vision 2063, Agenda 2030, UNMISS mandate, UNCF 2019-2021, and the UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021. The CPD has 3 interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely: a) strengthened peace infrastructures, and accountable governance; b) inclusive and risk-informed economic development; and c) strengthened institutional and community resilience.

Geographically, the Country Programme works in all Administrative Areas of South Sudan and numerous counties. UN partner agencies, funds and programmes/entities include the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations

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6 https://reliefweb.int/disaster/ce-2015-000183-ssd
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Gender Entity (UN Women) etc. Key donors comprise Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; and the AfDB, GCF, GEF, the Global Fund, IGAD, and PBF, RSRTF. National partner entities include, among others, the Ministry of Finance and Planning (national level and State ministries) and a number of relevant line ministries including MGSW, MoE, MoH, MoHA, MoJCA, MoLPSHRD, MYSC, MoFP, NAC, NBS, NCRC, National Police and Corrections institutions, national think tanks, PCS, PPC, SSACC, SSHF, universities, and national CSOs and CBOs.

Methodology and Data Sources

The MTE was carried out in accordance with UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards of Evaluation and Ethical Standards as well as OECD/DAC evaluation principles and guidelines and fully compliant with the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2006). The MTE captured and analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data. In total, interviews were held among 89 key informants (54 male/34 female; or 62% male and 38% of female interviewees). Field-level visits were carried out in a sample of selected states including i. Juba/Central Equatoria, ii. Torit/Eastern Equatoria, iii. Rumbek/Lakes, iv. Aweil/Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. The data used for analysis came from various primary and secondary sources. Whenever possible, opportunities for data triangulation were seized for cross-validation purposes (including consistency checks of quantitative figures or alleged trends, comparing causal relationships presented by different stakeholders to spot potential bias in qualitative data incl. suggested action to be taken etc.). Key evaluation criteria were answered in line with relevant guidelines, standards and definitions set by the IEO, OECD-DAC, and UNEG. An evaluation matrix with detailed evaluation questions addressed the following criteria:

- Relevance (extent to which the CPD’s intended output and outcomes are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of intended beneficiaries).
- Coherence (compatibility of CPD with other interventions in South Sudan to understand whether they support or undermine the programme, and vice versa; incl. internal coherence and external coherence);
- Effectiveness (progress against planned results at output and outcome level).
- Efficiency (how economically were resources/inputs (funds, expertise, equipment, time, etc.) converted into results);
- Sustainability (likelihood of successful continuation of programme/project implementation after external development assistance has come to an end);
- Impact (transformative, structural change at the level of knowledge, attitude, behaviours and practices going deeper than, and beyond, mere surface-level adjustments).

Key Findings and Conclusions

a. Key achievements and best practices under the evaluation criterion of CPD relevance included: i. The CPD is well aligned with South Sudan’s NDS structure and intent; ii. The CPD’s pillar design articulates a solid and robust model of a nexus-inspired mix of strategic interventions; iii. Using the project initiation plan (PIP) modality seems a promising avenue for the South Sudanese context to test out ideas that could be scaled up and blossom into full-fledged programmes if they prove successful.

Related key challenges to be mentioned include: i. Conditions are still such that a potential switch from a DIM to NIM modality cannot be considered anytime soon and requires massive investments (way beyond the GEMS initiative designed to support the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) during the transitional period mandated; ii. The difficult terrain and recurrent insecurity are clear operational limitations in terms of geographical/territorial reach among NGOs, CSOs and Government services; iii. The limited geographical area(s) of coverage in terms of rule-of-law, security, justice and corrections, as well as basic social services’

See Annex 7.9 A. and B. for sampling strategy and criteria applied.
delivery and presence of the Government Authorities is, at the same time, a cause and an effect of the absence of the rule-of-law resulting in lawlessness and protracted armed violence.

b. Coherence-related key achievements and best practices were: i. The CPD echoes the HDP nexus approach and presents an integrated ensemble of programmatic outputs that are coherently interlinked with relevant strategic frameworks including the NDS, UNCF, HRP; ii. UNDP’s activities under CPD Outcome 1 are well articulated with UNMISS’ substantive thematic remit and the working relationship with the Mission is well developed; iii. The revitalization of UNDP’s environmental portfolio filled a previously existing gap.

In terms of key challenges, the following was noted:

i. Internal programmatic coherence and related work processes (within UNDP, across internal work units) are not optimal throughout and there seems to be some potential for streamlining programmatic design, in-house communication and the coordination of work flows.

ii. While progress in this regard has been registered in the recent past, UNDP still has a tendency to work in internal silos, even within the same project.

iii. UNDP is still in the process of rebuilding its former strategic position and reputation as key player in the area of environmental/climate change/renewable energies; and the UN and the country as a whole lost valuable time due to the UNDP CO management’s decision in 2014, to close down its related portfolio and leave the entire responsibility to UNEP.

iv. While UNDP has positioned its CPD to build resilience both systemically and socio-economically, structurally the “aid machinery” and related pattern or even culture of funding has been biased in favour of humanitarian activities which limited the relative availability of financial resources for investments into sustainable development.

c. With regard to CPD effectiveness, key achievements and best practices comprised: i. Overall, the CPD registered above-average progress in implementing activities and achieving set targets at more than satisfactory levels, on average; ii. UNDP’s convenor role was borne out in its ability to help UNMISS mobilize a vast array of stakeholders to participate in peacebuilding negotiation track processes; iii. Across both CPD Outcomes and related CPD pillars, UNDP entered into productive partnerships with a number of other UNCT entities including UN Women, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNMISS; iv. PBF re-eligibility was recently ensured thanks to collaborative efforts made possible through inter-agency partnerships; v. Gender-specific sub-targets were mostly reached if not surpassed.

Effectiveness-related key challenges included:

i. Implementation progress of interventions under CPD Outcome 1 (“Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels”) were significantly hampered by contextual delays to the constitutional and peacebuilding processes beyond the direct influence of the UN, such as the fact that a Government of national Unity could only be formed after lengthy delays, in early 2020, while intercommunal tensions would regularly flare up over recent years and levels of violence were on the rise across the country, in 2020.9

ii. The Covid-19 pandemic slowed down the implementation of activities across the board and required adaptive partial retooling of interventions and repurposing of resources, specifically affecting Outputs 1.3. (“Key governance institutions are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process”) and 1.4. (“Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyse progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions”), in a negative way.

iii. The remoteness and lacking infrastructure in the countryside make it difficult for UNDP to ensure an equal reach of its interventions in the geographical sense, and results in a bias towards urban centres and their vicinities. Transport by road or air is difficult and costly due to the poor road network, underdeveloped and expensive air travel, heavy rains causing floods etc. All these factors combined make some of the geographical locations inaccessible, especially during the rainy season. Furthermore, these factors negatively affect the ability of the UN as a whole to provide services to remote locations which is hence a general challenge in the South Sudanese context.

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d. Key achievements and best practices under the evaluation criterion of efficiency include the following observations: i. Resource mobilization capacity proved to be strong; ii. Time-bound targets were quite often met early and performance levels often met or in some cases even exceeded set targets; iii. Gross and net budget absorption capacity reached more than satisfactory rates pretty much across the board. Key challenges comprised:

i. Overall, longer-term development work is still in direct competition with short-term humanitarian support, and there is need for a deeper articulation of HRP design and implementation processes as well as funding flows, vis-à-vis a more sustainable HDPN approach.

ii. The South Sudanese operational context is characterized by high costs of doing business due to the compounded effects of high levels of insecurity, the pronounced need to import goods and services including human capacity, the remoteness of many targeted locations compounded by inaccessibility during the rainy season, etc.

iii. There are some (relatively minor) concerns regarding the SMARTness of CPD indicator statements and the horizontal coherence between indicator formulations, baseline data and targets.

Total CPD resources mobilized during the first two years of implementation (i.e., 2019+2020) amounted to $227,870,970 equalling 86.6% of the indicative CPD planned resources for the entire CPD 2019-2021 budget of $263,100,000. In terms of the CPD’s share of the UNCF, the planned figure ($263.1m) represented 40.8% of the UNCF total budget volume. The budget actually mobilized during the first two years of the CPD cycle amounted to 35.3% of the total projected UNCF budget for 2019-2021 (UNCF 2019-2021 $645,000,000); whereas it covered 56.3% of the projected UNCF budget for 2019-2020 ($405,000,000). In terms of overall CPD budget absorption (gross and net “burn rate”), UNDP South Sudan showed good levels of performance. During the first two years of the programme cycle (i.e., until end 2020) UNDP steadily hovered around a solid 85% of budget uptake in terms of expenditure vs. actual allocations. Monies spent against actually mobilized funds stood at more than 70% per year and overall (73.3% for 2019 and 2020, combined). Allocations against mobilized funds reached more than 85% per year, as well as combined for the two years which indicates UNDP South Sudan’s ability to deliver on operational aspects of planned project implementation. By end 2020, total expenditures made up some 63.5% of the total planned three-year CPD budget.

e. Under the evaluation criterion of sustainability, key achievements and best practices included: i. The underlying logic of the capacity building approach used for the GEMS (cascade approach rather than "mirroring"/one-on-one tutoring) appears promising; ii. The Project Initiation Plan (PIP) project design modality qualifies as best practice that should be replicated on a larger scale to test out innovative solutions; iii. Overall, the strategic choice of linking a strong anti-poverty and skills building approach under Outcome 2 with the peacebuilding focus (social cohesion, conflict mitigation and resolution, reconciliation, A2J) of Outcome 1 constitute a sustainable recovery package.

Related key challenges were:

i. In the recent past, there was an unfortunate pattern of complete overhaul of civil service staff following changes in political leadership, which negatively affected institutional memory and capacity.

ii. The actual level of capacities is sometimes lower than originally assessed, by UNDP, which results in too high a threshold of training interventions that exceeds basic demand and thus created a gap between the bulk of capacity training needs and expectations and the higher-level management training on offer.

iii. Limited understanding of programme/project design processes results in limited actual involvement of Government institutions during the design phase, resulting in false expectations and subsequent frustrations among GoSS staff and entities about construed “unmet promises” (examples: GEMS and trade projects). This lowers levels of buy-in and appropriation of GoSS stakeholders and represents a missed opportunity in terms of capacity building. In addition, this creates unnecessary, actually unfounded and thus avoidable friction and frustration between GoSS and UNDP staff.
iv. In terms of capacity building of the administration, the issue of whether and how to re-train the cohorts of experienced, older Arabic-speaking civil servants “inherited” from pre-independence days, so they can (also) function in the current, mostly English-speaking professional environment needs to be carefully studied and different options ought to be costed (including hidden opportunity costs on social cohesion if staff were to be laid off and replaced etc.).

v. Perceived delays in fund administration have resulted in considerable levels of frustration among IPs (MoTI, BCSSCAC etc.), sometimes culminating in disruption of service (community police/ECC abandoning positions).

f. Key achievements and best practices that can be linked to (potential early) impact included: (i.) Support to the National Dialogue as successful first-ever grass roots consultative process in South Sudan; (ii.) support provided to strengthening the peace infrastructure including the establishment of a ground-breaking conflict early warning and response system; (iii.) support to the NDS design led to the desired result; (iv.) Improvement of public financial management landscape; (v.) UNDP successfully dispensed its convening role for the SSHF; (vi.) The Aweil Safety Net is a promising example of an HDPN project model; (vii.) Initiation of important gender equality and women’s empowerment advancements; (viii.) UNDP was instrumental in orchestrating the integrated response to the COVID-19 pandemic through coordinating the design and implementation of the SERP.

Key challenges included: i. Low levels of institutional capacity and service delivery which undermines trust in the GoSS; ii. Corruption, embezzlement and state revenue challenges compounded by the economic crisis; iii. The multiple shocks and crises (conflict, climate change, Covid-19 etc.).

Recommendations

The report presents a total of 35 recommendations across five categories comprising: 1) M&E, knowledge management, RBM (6 recommendations); 2) Capacity Development (14 recommendations); 3) Miscellaneous ideas for specific sub-projects and/or key interventions to enhance the CPD portfolio’s general relevance and coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, sustainability, and impact (15 key recommendations). They comprise of different types and categories of suggestions including recommendations for upstream work (policies/strategies, laws etc.), systemic design and capacity building/development, and investments into enhancing service provision via investments into “hard” components (such as infrastructure for prisons etc.). An abbreviated version of the recommendations follows below (detailed version including rationale can be found at the end of the main body of the report):

**M&E, knowledge management, RBM**

1. Spell out a coherent architecture of interrelated narrative Theories of Change at the level of CPD Outcomes, Outputs and projects.
2. Design clear exit strategies at the project level, as well as related investments.
3. Introduce a standard approach for measuring the effect of capacity development interventions at the individual and collective/institutional level.
4. Reach out to UNDP Somalia (RoL programme platform) to learn more about the possibilities of building on best practices of the Somalia Joint Justice Programme’s SDG16+ A2J community-level M&E model.
5. Identify lessons (to be) learned from the PfRR platform approach to replicate and scale up related best practices.
6. Fix technical issues with RF indicators (horizontal coherence between statement, baseline, target formulation, metadata etc.).

**Capacity Development**

7. Sensitize incoming Government about the direct and indirect costs caused by a complete overhaul of civil service staff.
8. The socio-linguistic issue (pros and cons/opportunity costs of investing, or not investing, into training Arabic-speaking civil servant cohorts so they become conversant in English) needs to be carefully studied and different options ought to be costed.

9. Support lower-threshold, large scale basic skills training interventions (computer literacy, basic typewriting etc.) specifically for civil servants to reduce the gap between the bulk of actually existing demand / training needs and the higher-level management training on offer (cf. no. 8 & no. 35).

10. Consider testing a sustained on-the-job training approach recruiting dedicated committed junior professionals and building their skills and sense of ownership and involvement, through a blend of on-site tutoring, intense short-term courses and study visits, and giving them an opportunity to fully own the development path of their respective unit/department.  

11. Carry out hands-on training of technical staff and managers in PFM institutions such as the Central Bank and the National Auditor’s Office to build HACT capacity.

12. Consider broadening the scope and scale of the civil service training centre by linking up with the National Transformative Leadership Institute (NTLI).

13. Increase the levels of intervention of Government institutions in program/project implementation esp. at the initial design of needs assessments, design stage, costing etc.) to ensure buy-in and build related technical capacities, if needed.

14. Introduce access to start-up capital through micro-credit scheme for training course graduates; as well as higher-level training for best performers.

15. Team up with other UN agencies to design a joint capacity development strategy to reduce duplications and increase efficiencies and synergies in training provision (Joint UN-Governmental Capacity Development Strategy following Malawian approach).

16. Advocate among IFIs to provide additional infrastructure support for basic service delivery that cannot be addressed via GEMS or PFM support.

17. Scale up investments into the technical, financial and RBM/M&E capacity of partner CSOs.

18. Expand the relative scope and weight of University of Juba (School of Public Service, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, NTLI etc.) beyond currently existing levels, in policy research and capacity building of public sector institutions, including Ministries and Parliament.

19. Launch a first phase of interrelated applied action research studies (e.g., socio-economic cost of dowry, waste-to-value for green jobs and energy production, pop music/rap and social cohesion etc.) actively tapping into existing projects for data collection and testing out innovative modalities (linked to no. 18).

20. Advocate for a strategic shift to development financing of triple HDP nexus interventions designed to strengthen resilience, gradually moving away from the comparative focus on conventional life-saving support through emergency response (via the HRP).

Miscellaneous ideas to enhance design of CPD’s project portfolio

21. Invest into sports as engine of nation and peace-building and general social cohesion.

22. Support the reform and actual enactment of laws to address discrimination and ensure legal protection of vulnerable groups.


24. Boost overall capacity and skills of justice sector staff through training on gender including but not limited to SGBV/CRSV; conflict mitigation and resolution; PTSD and forensics capacity.

25. Invest into digital case file management systems in the justice sector.


27. Design on-line content and service delivery solutions to facilitate access to legal aid and counsel.

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10 Following the Somalia Parliamentary Secretariat’s best practice of a home-grown, comparatively quick and inexpensive, low risk approach of “breeding excellence in local leadership” and qualifies as regional if not continental best practice of nationally owned leadership training (contacts: UNDP Somalia programme management/RoL-JJP).
28. Scale up investments into building separate prison cells/blocks for female detainees and reformatory centers to ensure segregation of adults from juveniles.
29. Scale up and further equip safe shelters for SGBV survivors and enhance the quality of service provision in Safe Houses within police stations.
30. Leverage the modality of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections modality to greater extent.
31. Intensify support to the national peacebuilding, reconciliation and constitutional processes in close coordination with UNMISS.
32. Add to, and deepen existing synergies between programme/project components and interventions in the areas of RoL, DDR, SSR, TJ, Community Security and Arms Control.
33. Scope out design features of a mine action project, to build on the current UNMAS/UNMISS project, to provide (civilian) policy oversight and quality assurance of mine action implementation.
34. Strengthen the application of HRBA as one of the five UN programming principles.
35. As exit strategy and/or bridging arrangement, use the short-term project initiation plan (PIP) modality to bundle projects struggling to phase out or which are in need of continuation and/or transitioning into a new revised design.
Background and Context

South Sudan is facing a complex inter-linked set of development challenges, including persistent conflict and fragility, recurrent naturally and human-induced systemic shocks and stress, weak institutions and economic instability. Following several decades of civil war against the government in Khartoum, South Sudan became semi-autonomous by virtue of signing the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) with Sudan, in 2005. South Sudan finally reached full statehood on 9 July 2011, after 98.83% of the population voted for independence in the January 2011 referendum. South Sudan has a population of slightly above 12 million, mostly comprised of Nilotics peoples. The country ranks among one of the demographically youngest nations in the world, with 73.6% in the age bracket 0-24 years. South Sudan is a member of the United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and is a party to the Geneva Conventions. South Sudan experienced some seven years of civil war from 2013 until 2020 with different phases of conflict that peaked in late 2013 and mid-2016, characterized by high levels of violence and large humanitarian emergencies. This culminated in the near collapse of the country’s economy and social structure, leading to widespread development challenges. A key factor of the violence was intra-state competition between ethnic groups.

Initially limited to in-fighting between loyal and mutinous soldiers, the conflict soon developed into full-fledged violence also targeting civilians, including atrocities such as massacres and rape. The South Sudanese army played a central role in this conflict as it is responsible for most civilian deaths. While the exact amount of fatalities remains unclear, eye witnesses stated that tens of thousands were killed. The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was designed to restore a permanent ceasefire, but violence re-flared over the following years as a sustainable settlement of the conflict could not be reached. In 2018, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Heads of State, and South Sudan’s Government convened a High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) with the parties of the ARCSS to restore a permanent ceasefire and agree on a revised and realistic timeline for the ARCSS’ implementation. After having navigated a number of obstacles and challenges linked to the terminology applied and interpretation of the wording of the ARCSS, the HLRF eventually resulted in the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS), which entails provisions for institutional reform and a 35% quota for women’s participation in decision making.

In February 2020, a unity deal was reached by the warring factions and a coalition government, the “Transitional Government of National Unity” (TGoNU) was formed. The Revitalised TGoNU faces a context in which basic democratic attributes such as fundamental rights, checks on government, impartial administration, and civil society participation have been declining in recent years. By late 2020, nearly 17,000 civilian and uniformed peacekeepers were serving with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to protect civilians and help build durable peace in the country. Due to a conflagration of concurrent afflictions (conflict-induced IDP/refugee flows, drought, flash floods, locust plague, Covid-19), South Sudan currently faces a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. Over the past years, South Sudan was consistently ranked among the lowest, if not the lowest, in the UN World Happiness Report and the Global Peace Index. It also had the third-highest score on the American Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index. South Sudan’s

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14 Mass rape and killings in South Sudan may constitute war crimes, says UN | Sexual violence | The Guardian
15 https://www.google.com/search?q=civil+war+south+sudan+2019&rlz=1C1AVFC_enDE880DE903&oq=civil+war+South+Sudan&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0j0i22i30l8.8532j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
19 https://countryeconomy.com/demography/global-peace-index/south-sudan
20 https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/
human development index (HDI) value for 2019 was 0.433 - positioning it as a low human development country at 185th out of 189 countries and territories. South Sudan's HDI only slightly moved beyond the level it had reached in 2011 (0.430) after eight years, in 2019. Throughout the past years, due to multiple factors including expansionary spending on security forces, declining revenue following declining oil prices, the negative effect of insecurity on educational participation and key health metrics (maternal and neo-natal health, longevity) the country struggled to move forward following the slump it experienced in 2012, when its absolute HDI value decreased by 3.3% (from 0.430 in 2011 to 0.397, the following year). By early 2019, South Sudan remained in a serious humanitarian crisis due to the cumulative effects of years of conflict and violence against civilians, which had destroyed people's livelihoods and forced more than 4 million people (about 38% of the population) to flee their homes – some 2 million inside and over 2.2 million outside of the country.

In 2019, the number of people who required humanitarian or protection assistance stood at 7 million (or 63.5% of the population), the same as a year before, with women and children the most affected. About 2.2 million children were estimated to be out of school with nearly 600,000 pregnant and lactating women acutely malnourished. In 2019, 50% of the population was projected to be severely food insecure. Over the past few years, floods and locusts have further worsened living conditions for millions of South Sudanese. The 2021 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) actually identified 8.3 million people, including refugees, in need of humanitarian assistance across the country, marking an 800,000-person increase in absolute numbers from the 7.5 million people in need in 2020. The country has massive development needs, from building basic infrastructure, to developing education and health services, and building institutions. South Sudan has only limited access to affordable public international financing streams. Poverty levels are expected to remain extremely high, with about 82 percent of the population in South Sudan below the USD 1.90 poverty line (2011 purchasing power parity).

More than 87 percent of the working population are classified as vulnerably employed, i.e., engaged as unpaid family workers and own-account workers. Up to 95 per cent of the population depend on climate-sensitive sectors for their livelihood, including agriculture, forestry, wildlife resources, and fisheries. Climate-induced pressure on rural livelihoods likely contributes to unemployment and idleness among youth which exposes especially the young male population to being lured into joining irregular militias or armed opposition groups. In 2019, proceeds from oil exports accounted for 98 percent of exports and about 90% of budget revenue, further compressing the already limited space for fiscal policy action. The exchange rate is depreciating, contributing to higher inflation. Also, over the past years, about 80% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil. In recent years, the vagaries of the oil price on international markets further undermined the South Sudanese economy, in addition to the impact of the insecurity on overall economic output or productiveness, and productivity.

The security situation and the decline in global oil prices since 2016 negatively affected the economy, leading to high unemployment (50% youth unemployment) and debt distress. Since 2017, the Government invested heavily in the security sector. This expansionary fiscal spending fuelled inflation (117% in December 2017) and caused the South Sudan pound (SSP) to decline from SSP 1.513 to SSP 131 to the US dollar. The high national debt (62.1% of GDP in 2017) limits the country’s access to additional funding for development projects. However, as a member of the

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21 | Human Development Reports (undp.org)
23 https://www.unhcr.org/south-sudan-emergency.html
25 Locust swarms: South Sudan latest to be hit by invasion - BBC News (Feb 19, 2021)
29 South Sudan Economy 2020, CIA World Factbook (theodora.com)
East African Community (EAC), South Sudan has the potential to increase food security and develop its markets, provided that peace can be durably restored and sustained. By late 2019, despite the positive economic achievements, South Sudan remained among the poorest countries in the world and four out of five South Sudanese still live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. Outside the oil sector, livelihoods are concentrated in agriculture. Low levels of income and productivity explain low levels of GDP, as well as a dramatic decline over recent years. According to the IMF, while in 2011, GDP per capita calculated as purchasing power parity, had stood at USD3,100, it had slid to USD865 in 2017. Outside the oil sector, which boosts the national average figures presented above, livelihoods are concentrated in low productive, unpaid agriculture and pastoralists work.

The South Sudanese context calls for a simultaneous, integrated and holistic response to humanitarian, recovery, and development needs. High levels of poverty, fragile statehood combine with an extreme vulnerability to climate shocks given that the majority of livelihoods depend on incomes from agricultural activities. Climate change and environmental degradation already have severe effects on livelihoods and this trend will exacerbate in the near to middle future. In South Sudan, median temperatures have increased faster than in other countries in eastern Africa. Since the mid-1970s, overall rainfalls declined by up to 20 per cent, while also becoming more variable and thus unpredictable, in terms of intensity and patterns of periodicity. If and when there is rainfall, it can cause flash floods or unleash a destructive force of precipitation. Other than that, there are periods of prolonged drought with scorching temperatures and absence of rains. Areas receiving adequate rain for livestock and farming have declined, affecting agricultural and natural resource-based livelihoods. Over 56 per cent of the population is already vulnerable to drought and flood shocks. An estimated 6 million people (or 49 per cent of the population) are afflicted by food insecurity. South Sudan currently counts 1.7 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) within its borders, while almost 2.3 million South Sudanese have fled their country and are scattered across neighbouring countries including Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya etc.

Increasingly, IDPs and refugees are “created” by natural factors rather than human causes (ethnic strife, protracted conflict, civil war). Limited availability and lack of access to health services are key factors explaining why South Sudan occupies the last rank worldwide in terms of under-five mortality (90.7 deaths per 1,000 live births) and maternal mortality (789 deaths per 100,000 live births).

(source: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/southsudan)

30 South_Sudan_country_note.pdf (afdb.org)
31 South Sudan Economic Analysis Shows Growth Promise Amid Fragility (worldbank.org)
32 GDP per capita (GDP as per current prices) is listed at USD 306.7 in the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018; UNICEF-South-Sudan-National-Budget-Brief-2019.pdf (mofep-grss.org)
34 Resource competition and climate change hampering South Sudan peace and development (unep.org)
births). The COVID-19 crisis is more than a health crisis. People in South Sudan have suffered illness and death from the pandemic, although the toll is difficult to fully assess, given limited testing capacity. Beyond the impact on health, South Sudan has also been hit hard by the sharp decline in oil prices during the pandemic. The pandemic has affected movement within the country and thus has negatively impacted on economic activities across the board, access to basic services including the health and education system, access-to-justice. Likewise, humanitarian operations are affected through a temporary suspension of activities and delays to the supply chain, with negative consequences on the distribution of supplies. In-country and cross-border restrictions have adversely affected the availability and price levels of food stuffs and other basic amenities. This adversely affects the urban population, in particular, which cannot rely on growing their own food. Even more severe food insecurity was forecasted for the arid season. Desert locust swarms arriving from the Arabian peninsula pose an additional threat to food security and livelihoods throughout the country. The country is marked by a high degree of gender inequality including high prevalence of Gender-Based Violence (GBV). Patriarchism and gender bias are highly prevalent, keeping girls and women in a subordinate position. Patriarchal stereotypes about gender roles are reflected in related customary practices resulting in gender inequality starting at the household level (widespread acceptance of GBV, boys more likely to be sent to school and to be kept enrolled even during times of economic hardship, early marriage for girls etc.). Conflict during the civil war years exacerbated this situation. In spite of the establishment of a new peace agreement in 2015, civil conflict persisted across the country, and inter-communal conflicts were a continuing facet of this period of relative peace.

Conflicts between communities would typically result from localized tensions about cattle grazing grounds, access to water and cattle raiding as a means to accumulate wealth. Alongside these acts of stock rustling, abductions of women and children were also perpetrated; which would often trigger revenge killings committed by the victimized community. This lead to a spiral of revenge attacks and the perpetuation of insecurity. In July 2016, the ethnic civil conflict then re-ignited during an outbreak of violence in Juba City. The following years were marked by almost constant unrest which eroded the education and political systems and deteriorated the local economy, leaving little to no institutional structures to deliver services or facilitate decision-making. This, combined with frequent famines and other crises, further aggravated the situation of extreme poverty and insecurity in the country, especially for women and girls. All those elements contributed to limited capacity and participation of women in decision making and productive activities. Women remain underrepresented in all positions of leadership across all sectors, including political participation and positions of decision making in the administration.

Women and girls are also disadvantaged in terms of access to healthcare and to economic resources. There are also considerable gender differentials in terms of gender rights, access to human rights and access to justice. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to conflict-induced sexual and gender-based violence. Women, girls, and children make up the majority of IDPs and are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. In 2018, armed groups from all sides still continued to recruit and use children as young as age 12, with the highest levels of recruitment, use, and re-recruitment of children documented in several regional states (incl. Unity, Greater Equatoria area, Upper Nile, and Jonglei). The national army of South Sudan and a variety of different armed opposition groups forcibly abducted children from their homes, schools, and communities.

36 https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-019-0239-4 (Researching violence against women and girls in South Sudan: ethical and safety considerations and strategies)
37 South Sudan Gender Analysis: A snapshot situation analysis of the differential impact of the humanitarian crisis on women, girls, men and boys in South Sudan - South Sudan | ReliefWeb
It was estimated that by 2018 a large number of children still continued to be armed, and to fight, as part of local community defense forces, thus perpetuating inter- and intra-communal violence. Children affiliated with armed groups performed active combat roles, perpetuated violence against civilians, recruited other children, and performed operational support roles in logistics, transport, sentry duty, as cooks, porters, spies, and bodyguards to senior officers. Especially girls fell victim of SGBV acts as they were forced into becoming concubines for male combatants. The government’s ability to deliver aid, provide education, and address the worst forms of child labor were impaired by ongoing conflict. In 2018, e.g., armed groups carried out at least 18 attacks on schools across the country and in more than 26 cases verified by the UN, schools were occupied and used for military purposes. This prevented some 32,500 children from going to school, in 2018, alone. By 2018, as many as 2.4 million children—72 percent of the school-age population—were not attending school, and only an estimated 1 in 13 children was expected to complete a full cycle of primary education barring a marked improvement in the situation. South Sudan’s Constitution and the Child Act foresee free primary education and the education budget significantly increased for the 2018/2019 school year. However, in practice, many families must contribute school fees to pay teacher salaries and other related costs, which can be prohibitively expensive for many if not most households.

Other barriers to education include low levels of birth registration, chronic food insecurity, poor infrastructure, social reintegration for demilitarized youth, ongoing insecurity, fear of abduction or violence in route to schools, long distances to schools in rural areas, unpaid teacher salaries which leads to truancy by teaching staff, and a shortage of qualified teachers. From 2017 to 2020, the relative annual population growth increased from 0.6% per year (2017-2018) to 1.7% (2020-2021), reaching a total of almost 11.4m in January 2021. This implies that over the coming half-decade, a massive surge of children eligible for enrollment at primary school level will need to be catered for lest they become a “lost” generation, education-wise. If the relative growth of annual demographic increases were to continue then latest by 2024, the country will have an annual population growth rate of about 3%. Not matching the increase in children with highly increased capacities to provide them with access to, at the very least, a basic school education, would spell doom for the socio-economic development of the country in the mid-term future. This implies the need to heavily invest in physical infrastructure including school building, text books, school equipment etc. as well as the teaching force.

2. MTE's Purpose and Scope

UNDP commissions independent Midterm CPD Evaluations to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of its contributions to development results at the country level. It is meant to provide valuable lessons, best practices and make recommendations to inform the implementation of the programme for the remaining period of programme implementation. UNDP South Sudan’s Country Programme Document (CPD) which was originally designed to cover the period 2019-2021 is now expected to soon receive a one-year extension beyond 2021 given that a one-year extension of the UNCF was just granted until end 2022. The CPD’s principal objective is to support Government-led efforts to build societal/socio-economic, environmental and institutional resilience to crises and shocks (incl. access to justice, rule-of-law, security and human rights-related aspects) while safeguarding development gains; while contributing to the sustainable eradication of poverty in all its forms and dimensions thus keeping people out of poverty.

43 https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/SSD/south-sudan/population-growth-rate
The programme focuses on three interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars: (a) strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance; (b) inclusive, risk-informed economic development; and (c) strengthened institutional and community resilience. Implementation of the CPD started in January 2019. The CPD has by now been implemented for a period of more than two years. In line with corporate policy and the CPD’s M&E plan, the CPD has by now become eligible for a mandatory independent mid-term evaluation. The evaluation was pitched at the general results level to assess the CPD’s design, scope, implementation status and overall capacity to achieve expected outcomes. As such, all CPD Outcomes were looked at, with a focus on progress against country programme-level Output indicators. While flagship projects and activities were analyzed, in particular, not every single project could be fully covered, especially during field visits.

The mid-term evaluation covers the period of 24 months spanning from January 2019 to December 2020, with a focus on the actual implementation of the programme rather than initial ramp-up activities. Data collection and analysis were conducted during the period April to June 2021. The MTE serves as a comprehensive assessment of the contributions of the country programme outputs towards achieving CPD outcomes, with the following objectives:

1. Review the extent to which relevant outputs have contributed to each outcome and identify and review the contributing (or hindering) factors to the effectiveness of UNDP’s contribution.
2. Assess the mechanisms/methods by which outputs led to the achievement of the specified outcomes.
3. Assess the relevance of UNDP’s contributions, including applied strategies and partnerships towards each outcome, considering the emerging development challenges and opportunities (if and which programme processes, e.g. strategic partnerships and linkages are critical in producing the intended outcome);
4. Provide key recommendations and directions for the ongoing country programme implementation as well as the next country programme cycle by advising on what to strengthen in, or add to, or reduce in the new programme (2023+).

The MTE assessed UNDP programme support (what did UNDP do?), the approach of programmes (were UNDP programmes appropriate for achieving national results?), the process of contribution (how did the contribution occur?), and the significance of the contribution (what was the specific contribution and did UNDP accomplish its intended objectives?). In line with UNDP South Sudan Evaluation Plan, the CPD evaluation was conducted to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and (early) impact of UNDP’s development assistance; and to come up with findings and related conclusions including lessons learned and best practices, and extract evidence-based recommendations. As such, the CPD serves an important accountability function, in that it provides national stakeholders and partners with an independent and impartial assessment of UNDP’s work in South Sudan.

In addition, the MTE of the UNDP South Sudan CPD was also meant to serve as a building block for the Independent Country Programme Evaluation (ICPE) to be carried out by the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), which is currently on-going and now overlapping. The MTE team shared notes and audio recordings from field interviews and ICPE evaluators listened in on a number of MTE interviews. The CPD’s programmatic structure and priorities build on progress achieved and lessons learnt during the previous programme cycle. UNDP’s country programme is aligned with South Sudan Vision 2040, ARCSS, NDS 2018-2021, Africa Vision 2063, Agenda 2030, UNMISS mandate, UNCF 2019-2021, and the UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021. The country programme focuses on three interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars, namely: a) strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance; b) inclusive and risk-informed economic, development; and c) strengthened institutional and community resilience.

Geographically, the Country Programme works in all ten States of South Sudan and numerous counties. UN partner agencies, funds and programmes/entities include the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the United Nations Fund for

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44 Country programme document for South Sudan (2019-2021)
Population Activities (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Gender Entity (UN Women) etc. Key donors comprise Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; and the AfDB, GCF, GEF, the Global Fund, IGAD, and PBF. National partner entities include, among others, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Finance (national level and State ministries), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministry of Peacebuilding, Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture, MGCSW MoLPSHRD, BCSSAC, DDRC, NAC, NBS, NCRC, National Police and Corrections institutions, national think tanks, PCS, PPC, SSACC, SSHF, SSSPC, universities, and national CSOs and CBOs?

Major thematic and cross-cutting programme components comprise objectives, results and related activities were designed to strengthen peace infrastructures; build capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, foster community cohesion, protect citizen’s rights, increase access to justice, enhance governance accountability, recover local economies, implement climate change adaptation solutions and strengthen government capacities and capabilities. The CPD’s first

Outcome area combines CPD Pillar 1 – “Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance” (Outputs 1.1.-1.4) is aligned with the UNCF and UNDP SP areas respectively linked to sustained peace and stability as well as high-level upstream support under CPD Pillar 3 “Strengthened institutional and community resilience”, in view of strengthening resilience against shocks and crises (incl. man-made and natural disasters). Meanwhile, the 2nd part of the results framework (Outputs 2.1-2.4) combines CPD Pillars 2 - “Inclusive and risk informed economic development” and the grassroots-level components of Pillar 3.

The mid-term evaluation addressed the “classic” UNEG/OECD-DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability; as well as the dimensions of coherence and (initial) signs for (potential) early impact of CPD programme/project interventions. As such, the evaluation does not differ from an end-of-programme cycle, or “summative”, end-of-cycle evaluation. However, the fundamental difference here is that a formative (i.e., mid-term) evaluation is less meant to come up with a final verdict but rather suggest ways on how challenges, issues and weaknesses can be rectified along the way and identified strengths and opportunities could be capitalized on and potentially scaled up, during the remaining implementation period under the country programme’s life cycle. Still, this Mid-Term Evaluation of the South Sudan CPD set out to determine the extent to which the Programme objectives as outlined in the project document have been achieved. In cases where the performance against planned milestones or preliminary targets was sub-optimal, the mid-term evaluation attempted to identify the roadblocks and barriers preventing programme/project implementation from moving forward. Likewise, the MTE probed for hints and ideas to accelerate and/or enhance the quality of implementation even in cases of activities that were implemented according to the initial plan. Possible gaps, challenges and lessons learnt for the scope, design and implementation modalities of the CPD were also looked into.

Synergies and catalytic effects realized, be they planned for or unforeseen, were duly noted. Similarly, unforeseen negative effects were also recorded. Data-driven observations and findings served as evidence for the MTE to present actionable recommendations to enhance the performance levels of CPD-related interventions at programme/project level. Moreover, the MTE collated and analyzed lessons learnt, challenges faced and best practices obtained during the CPD implementation period to inform the remaining period, or second half of the de facto four-year CPD implementation (up to December 2022, after the initially planned 36-month programme period was extended to 48 months through a one-year extension beyond 2021). The MTE assessed the programmes’ design, scope, implementation status and the capacity to achieve the expected outcomes. In view of the fact that the MTE is prospective, i.e. forward looking, it captured lessons learnt and provides information on the nature, extent and where possible, the potential impact and sustainability of the CPD. Given the complexity of the CPD, the limited timeframe and relatively limited human resources available (one national counterpart) for the evaluation team, the MTE largely focused on the outcome level of CPD results. The emphasis on lessons learned speaks to the issue of understanding what has and what has not worked, and to use related insights generated as a guide for future planning. The MTE assessed the performance of the programmes against planned results; and gauged the preliminary indications of potential impact and
sustainability of results including the contribution to capacity development and achievement of sustainable development goals.

With regards to the alignment of the CPD to overarching results frameworks (SDGs, Agenda 2063, NDS, CF etc.) but also in terms of the internal results architecture of the CPD, the logic and “finishing” of the CPD results architecture was reviewed in the vertical sense of the results chain (macro-objectives at the national and international level which the CPD outcomes contribute to, CPD outputs contributing to outcomes etc.). Within the results framework logic of the CPD, the articulation of results with indicators was closely analyzed and discussed. Furthermore, the MTE assessed the effectiveness of the chosen implementation strategy. This included the implementation modalities, the targeting of IPs, and the financial arrangements including elements of national execution, if applicable; as well as co-financing under CPD arrangements (including co-financing/implementation by non-UN entities, if applicable).

It also looked at issues of coordination, partnership arrangements, institutional strengthening, beneficiary participation, replication and sustainability of the programme. The evaluation included a comprehensive critical review of the CPD’s overall and Outcome/Output-specific ToCs, and critically review related assumptions made at the beginning of the programmes development process. The MTE also assessed whether the programme’s results are on track; capacities have been built, and cross cutting issues of gender and human rights have been addressed. It also assessed whether the programme’s implementation strategy can be optimized and, if applicable, recommends areas for strategic and tactical improvement and learning. The mid-term evaluation further checked for the existence of interfaces or areas of overlap between the CPD and other programs implemented by UN and non-UN partners, in view of possibly tapping into areas of potential, or latent/dormant obvious synergies. The findings and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation are meant to inform UNDP management including IEO and UNMISS/UNCT-internal stakeholders; as well as key UNDP South Sudan internal and external stakeholders including the Government of South Sudan, civil society, and the community of financial and technical partner institutions.

3. Methodology and Data Sources

The midterm evaluation of the CPD was carried out in accordance with UNEG Evaluation Norms and Standards of Evaluation and Ethical Standards as well as OECD/DAC evaluation principles and guidelines and fully compliant with the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2006). The MTE captured and analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data. The MTE was carried out through participation of relevant stakeholders groups. Data collected was disaggregated (by sex, age and location), where applicable and possible. The data used for analysis came from various primary and secondary sources. In order to use existing sources/information and avoid duplication, secondary data was mainly collected from various information sources through a continuous comprehensive desk review that included the analysis of relevant documents, information, data/statistics, triangulation of different studies etc. Primary data was collected from stakeholder key informants through interviews, discussions and other formal and informal consultative processes. The literature review was based on UNDP CPD-related documents including programme/project documents (Prodocs, reports, AWPs, MoUs etc.) and other relevant UN and GoSS documentation; as well as relevant studies and research reports. In addition, relevant web links, studies, and survey and evaluation reports and sectoral studies and evaluations were consulted, where applicable.

In terms of the tools applied and data collected, overall, a mix of quantitative and qualitative data was captured. Whenever possible, opportunities for data triangulation were seized for cross-validation purposes. For example, this included consistency checks of quantitative figures or alleged trends, comparing causal relationships presented by different stakeholders to spot potential bias in qualitative data incl. suggested action to be taken etc. In addition, stakeholders were given the opportunity to vet the draft report and provide comments and additional information, suggest edits, rectify erroneous information and wrong conclusions or interpretations of data etc. This allowed for trends, hypotheses and tentative statements to be tested. The scheduling of interviews
and selection of interlocutors took into account the gender and social inclusion perspective. Other than the backward-looking part of the analysis which analyzes the ground so far covered, the forward-looking component provides recommendations for the remainder of the CPD implementation period. Aspects covered in this part comprise the strategic positioning of UNDP, fundraising/resource mobilization-related issues, as well as suggestions related to CPD programme/project design (e.g., about amending/adding/dropping specific outcomes or outputs/key activities; about mainstreaming of capacity building, RBM, the gender dimension, sustainability etc.).

Under the evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and (early) impact, the following key evaluation criteria were answered in line with relevant guidelines, standards and definitions set by the IEO, OECD-DAC, and UNEG (cf. evaluation matrix further below for the detailed evaluation questions etc.):

- Relevance (extent to which the CPD’s intended output and outcomes are consistent with national and local policies and development priorities and the needs of intended beneficiaries);
- Coherence (compatibility of CPD with other interventions in South Sudan to understand whether they support or undermine the programme, and vice versa; incl. internal coherence and external coherence);
- Effectiveness (progress against planned results at output and outcome level);
- Efficiency (how economically were resources/inputs (funds, expertise, equipment, time, etc.) converted into results);
- Sustainability (likelihood of successful continuation of programme/project implementation after external development assistance has come to an end);
- Impact (transformative, structural change at the level of knowledge, attitude, behaviours and practices going deeper than, and beyond, mere surface-level adjustments).

In total, interviews were held among 89 key informants (55 male/34 female; or 62% male and 38% of female interviewees). Whenever qualitative data pointed towards examples for (early) impact, the related data was also captured and analysed. For the assessment of all the above criteria, the CPD’s theory of change played a critical role as anchor and reference point when evaluating, in particular, the programme’s relevance, coherence and sustainability.

4. Challenges and Limitations encountered

The following list of challenges encountered by the mission concentrate on factors that affected data collection and analytical work foreseen to various degrees; and discusses the countermeasures applied to prevent or mitigate any negative effects.

i. Challenge faced: The Covid-19 pandemic prevented the international consultant from traveling to South Sudan during the data collection phase. Field visits were thus carried out by a national expert who took notes and subsequently shared them along with key observations, with the international consultant. The process of data collection via key informant interviews carried out by the national consultant was also affected by the rules of social distancing and limited the duration of interviews especially when sitting down in a closed office environment. – Mitigation measures: To allow for actual on-site data collection at field level, including requisite oral or written translation services from local languages to English, if and when required, a national expert was hired to support the IC. Throughout the MTE process, primary-level data collection heavily relied on virtual tools for data collection (zoom, Teams etc. for virtual interviews). The division of labour consisted in the national expert conducting the vast majority of field level-based interviews, by himself; with the IC mostly concentrating on interviews with international and national key informants in Juba including but not limited to UN agency staff, NGO and civil society staff based in Juba with the national consultant participating whenever indicated and/or feasible, time-wise. Likewise, whenever possible, the IC would participate in meetings with some key informant interviews organized by the national consultant.
ii. **Challenge faced:** The accessibility of computers and smart technology (smart-phones etc.) and potentially low levels of computer literacy, as well as connectivity issues (power failures/black-outs) slowed down the planned data collection process, specifically at the level of government counterparts, CSOs and end-level beneficiaries. - **Mitigation measures:** Since in many cases, Government staff (incl. those not home-based but showing up for work at the office) could not be interviewed at a distance due to the lack of access to suitable equipment or other issues such as power cuts etc., the majority of GoSS-level interviews were conducted by the national expert, in following the interview guide as well as additional oral and/or written preparatory guidance for interviews, specifically tailored by the IC. In addition, the national expert made recordings of the interviews and shared related audio files with the IC, after the session.

iii. **Challenge faced:** In addition, some areas were declared inaccessible due to flooding, impracticable roads, elevated risk levels due to tensions or outright fighting, flights not being on time or not operating as planned and getting cancelled etc. This hindered field level access including travel within regions. In addition, limited time called for careful and selective planning of sites that could be visited. - **Mitigation measures:** To mitigate this risk, a sample of regions was designed, taking into account both the type of interlocutors and projects present in the regions, as well as the logical dimensions in terms of frequency of flights, absence of violence, practicability of roads etc. (cf. the sampling plan in the Annex section).

iv. **Challenge faced:** In a limited number of cases there was no or only incomplete status quo (or baseline) data available and/or no clear indication of data source or responsible data provider, milestones, year the baseline data (as opposed to report/publication) is from etc.) esp. for higher level qualitative metrics. - **Mitigation measures:** Identification of proxy indicator(s) and collection of related data; triangulation and deductive tentative data reconstruction (“connecting the dots” in interrupted time series trend curves etc.); extrapolation from partial (geographically/space-wise or chronologically/time-wise) incomplete data against specific indicators.

vi. **Challenge faced/counter-measures applied:** Due to various factors (sickness, duty travel, leave of absence etc.), some designated interlocutors were not available during the allotted timeframe for MTE interviews. - **Mitigation measures:** In those cases where identified interviewees were temporarily unavailable or, as in one case, had left their previous position and declared themselves not available for an interview, their deputy/officer in charge, the “next in-line” or peer was contacted and asked to replace them, as interviewee. In addition, written feedback served as additional option in cases where interlocutors indicated they needed to check with their colleagues to provide detailed technical feedback.

vii. **Challenge faced/counter-measures applied:** Financial data shared with the consultants cannot be easily disaggregated across CPD Outputs and Outcomes since they include negative values, direct budget lines reflecting donor contributions that are not clearly earmarked so that they can easily be analyzed. - **Mitigation measures:** Financial analysis cannot go beyond overall comprehensive analysis unless detailed data can be made accessible.

5. **Key Findings and Conclusions**

5.1 **Relevance**

[Relevance: The extent to which the CPD’s intended output and outcomes are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of targeted beneficiaries.]

**a. Conclusions & lessons learned**

**Key achievements and best practices:**
The CPD is well aligned with South Sudan’s NDS structure and related governmental policy and planning frameworks.

The CPD’s pillar design articulates a solid and robust model of a nexus-inspired mix of strategic interventions.

Using the project initiation plan (PIP) modality seems a promising avenue for the South Sudanese context to test out ideas that could be scaled up and blossom into full-fledged programmes if they prove successful.

Key challenges:

i. While UNDP is committed to following Government-led efforts to fight poverty and build resilience to crises and shocks, a switch from a DIM to NIM modality still requires considerable investments into building sustainable Government capacity to lead these strategic initiatives.

ii. Due to the difficult terrain and recurrent insecurity there are clear operational limitations in terms of UNDP CO’s geographical/territorial reach among NGOs, CSOs and Government services.

iii. The limited coverage in terms of governance (RoLSHR etc.) and basic social service-related delivery and presence of the Authorities is, at the same time, a cause and an effect of the absence of the rule-of-law resulting in lawlessness and protracted armed violence.

b. Findings

Evaluation Query (EQ) 1. To what extent is the programme in line with UNDP’s mandate and national priorities; and to what extent is UNDP’s engagement a reflection of strategic considerations, including UNDP's role in the development context and its comparative advantage?

The CPD is well aligned both with the NDS 2018-2021 including five of its six strategic deliverables which flow from the relevant pillars of the overarching framework “South Sudan Vision 2040: Towards freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all”;

The CPD consists of 3 pillars and 2 Outcomes. While the CPD’s Outcome 1 is equivalent with CPD Pillar 1 (“Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable governance”), Outcome 2 consists of two pillars, namely CDP Pillar 2: “Inclusive and Risk Informed Economic Development” and CDP Pillar 3: “Strengthened Institutional and Community Resilience” (cf. graphic display of the CPD results structure and alignment logic under Annex 7.6. “ToC & Result Chains”).

CPD Outcome 1 is aligned with the Vision 2040 and NDS goals/objectives and strategic deliverables related to peace consolidation and overall stabilization including the return of the displaced, enforcement of the rule of law and access to justice. Therefore, the first CPD outcome contributes to UNCF’s Outcome 1 / “Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable

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46 Namely, the pillars b) building a prosperous, productive and innovative nation, c) building a compassionate and tolerant nation, d) building free, just and peaceful nation, e) building a democratic and accountable nation, f) building a safe, secure and healthy nation; and h) building a united and proud nation (http://www.mofep-grss.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/NDS-4-Print-Sept-5-2018.pdf; p. 12).
governance at the national, state and local levels”. At corporate level, the UNDP 2018-2021 SP’s related high level goal is SP Outcome 3: “Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises”. Overall, the key SDG the CPD Outcome 1 contributes to first and foremost is SDG16: “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”.

Meanwhile, CPD Outcome 2 is aligned with the national priorities related to community and household level food security, promoting environmentally sustainable access to energy and climate change adaptation, as well as building resilient livelihoods and creating inclusive sustainable employment opportunities thereby contributing to risk-informed economic development. The second CPD Outcome is thus contributing to the related UNCF outcome 2: “Local economies are recovered and conditions and coping strategies are improved to end severe food insecurity”. The related UNDP Strategic Plan outcome is “Advance poverty eradication in all its forms and dimensions” (SP Outcome 1). The sustainable development goals CPD Outcome 2 is primarily contributing to are SDG 1 (“No Poverty”), SDG 2 (“Zero Hunger”) and SDG 8 (“Economic Growth”).

Under the CPD’s Outcome 1, related CPD Outputs are designed to reestablish and foster social cohesion, the rule of law and peaceful co-existence at intra- and intercommunity level. Thus, the integrated set of Outputs cover a comprehensive suite of complementary interventions including, i.a.:
-Output 1.1 / “Strengthened communities and local-level institutions’ capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, management of resource-based conflicts and community cohesion” (A2J & RoL Project; Peace and Community Cohesion (PaCC) project phase I &II);
-Output 1.2 / “Institutional capacities and customary mechanisms at all levels strengthened to monitor, promote and protect citizen’s rights and increase access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups and SGBV survivors” (Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Right project);
-Output 1.3 / “Key governance institutions” are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process (GEMS). Output 1.4 addresses cross-sectorial capacity development of government institutions to integrate high-level agreements and obligations, and ensure related evidence-based accountability.

CPD Pillar 2: “Inclusive and Risk Informed Economic Development” consists of Output 2.4. “National and subnational governments’ capacities developed for tax and trade policy harmonization, revenue diversification, and expansion of fiscal space and more transparent utilization of public resources”. Relevant projects are the Trade capacity building project; SS support to PFM; and the Non-oil revenue mobilization and accountability in South Sudan project. Meanwhile, CPD Pillar 3: “Strengthened Institutional and Community Resilience” comprises three outputs (2.1-2.3), namely: Output 2.1. Increased access to emergency assistance, alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for families in conflict and disaster-prone communities (Youth employment and empowerment, Recovery & Resilience programme); Output 2.2. National and subnational institutions have capacities to formulate and implement inclusive, sustainable energy and climate change adaptation solutions (Climate Change, Environment, Disaster Risk Management & Renewable Energy programme); Output 2.3. Capacities at national and subnational levels strengthened to deliver HIV and related services to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity (Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria).

Under the CPD’s second pillar, UNDP is responsible for facilitating the coordination of South Sudan Humanitarian fund clusters. This includes the Education Cluster, Protection Cluster, WASH Cluster, Nutrition Cluster, NFT & CCCM Cluster, Food Security and Livelihood Cluster, and the Logistics Cluster. Other than that, as overall cross-cutting general coordination support covering all three CPD pillars under the two Outcomes, the UNDP CPD received regional programmatic and general management support through such strategic interventions as the Africa regional project, the Accelerator lab network, and the project on “Equality group formation to SDGs” and “Strengthening Africa’s engagement for global development”. Stakeholders agreed that at the current juncture in the peacebuilding process, South Sudan is still at the tipping point between the risk of potentially sliding back into conflict on the one hand, and reaching a solid enough plateau of stabilization. If the currently fragile situation can be further stabilized this would allow a switch to
an exclusive focus on conventional post-crisis recovery mode from which to move on to a conventional developmental approach within a medium-term time horizon.

The CPD’s strong emphasis on building resilience to natural as well as man-made shocks is deeply grounded in, and informed by, the logic of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Given UNDP’s corporate mission, mandate and comparative advantage, it is well placed to tackle the complex challenge of providing an integrated package of support in the areas of building the State’s capacity to ensure economic development and good governance including, i.a., boosting administrative capacity in public financial management, planning strategic initiatives to eradicate poverty, fostering peace and social cohesion through programme support in the areas of rule-of-law, access to justice, human rights, peacebuilding and reconciliation, and enhancing access to integrated health services e.g. (HIV/TB/COVID-19) for improved productivity etc.

EQ 2. To what extent was the theory of change presented in the outcome model a relevant and appropriate vision in which to base the programme?

Overall, the design of the CPD is well aligned with the strategic needs of the country and its related strategic development plan’s structure. It is further well aligned with the UNCF. In terms of the alignment with the SP, there is a direct alignment with the design logic of SP Outcome areas and the related comparative advantage of UNDP vis-à-vis other UNCT member agencies. The only Output that somewhat sticks out from the inter-connected set of projects and related results in this regard is Output 1.4 / “Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyze progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions”. The related CPD-specific intervention at project level is “Evidence for economic and social transformation of South Sudan”. The Output statement’s wording exactly mirrors the pivotal “underlying solution” of the corporate SP’s Outcome 1 (see the central box 1.1.1. in the below diagram which stems from the official SP ToC document), and thus would normally have been placed under the CPD’s second Outcome area.

(Source: Page 15 of the “UNDP SP 2018-2021 Theory of Change”; Figure 3: Outcome 1 – Solution Pathway)
It is assumed that the rationale for shifting the related CPD Output to the first CPD Pillar and Outcome area was to lump together all interventions designed to stave off strategic shocks including through higher-level upstream work at the level of policy frameworks (including multi-party peace agreements, constitution-making processes etc.), a category which the Paris Convention also belongs to. This logic actually makes sense from an HDP nexus vantage point which acknowledges that climate change-induced negative effects are not only undermining livelihoods but are increasingly also becoming one of the most important underlying structural root causes of conflicts in Sahelian countries with strong transhuman agro-pastoralist population groups. In this respect, the configuration of the CPD Outputs is actually more advanced than the SP. This being said, the specific CPD interventions and the related Output would also have found a good fit under one if not both other CPD pillars. In addition, Output 1.4. has a strong common denominator with the other Outputs under Outcome 1 in that all emphasize the intent and implementation approach of (institutional) capacity building and accountability, with resonates with SDG 16’s focus on well-managed, accountable public institutions.

Through its second CPD Pillar, UNDP South Sudan provides general coordination support to SSHF SA2’s various clusters (incl. the Education Cluster, Protection Cluster, WASH Cluster, Nutrition Cluster, NFT & CCCM Cluster, Food Security and Livelihood Cluster, and the Logistics Cluster). Whereas UNDP does not get involved in operational service delivery which is handled by specialized agencies with an exclusive or strongly pronounced partial humanitarian mandate (such as WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF etc.), it plays an important role in the humanitarian arena through its comparative advantage as cross-cutting high-level interlocutor and neutral facilitator between different stakeholders, and its access to top-level governmental interlocutors across the board thanks to its leading role among UNCT member agencies in the Governance, economic development and peacebuilding portfolios. Even following the RC/RR de-linking UNDP remains a key interlocutor for UN Missions, and South Sudan is no exception in this regard. Given the strong working relationship between the Mission and UNDP, and in view of the importance of the nexus approach echoed via the CPD architectural logic, it makes sense to place UNDP in this role rather than framing it as a purely humanitarian OCHA-led affair.

EQ 3. To what extent was UNDP’s selected method of delivery appropriate to the development context and issues in the country?

As described above, the design of CPD’s architectural set-up is well aligned with the Government’s policy and planning frameworks in that it supports Government-led efforts to fight poverty and build resilience to crises and shocks. Just as other UN agencies do, UNDP uses the direct implementation modality (DIM) rather than transferring funds to Government coffers for the State’s Treasury to run the financial side of programme implementation. This was a logical choice given the context faced in South Sudan, which is characterized by fragile institutions and still limited systemic capacity across most sectors, including at central government level. In some instances, DIM is even a donor-imposed condition to address accountability issues identified during an audit.

For example, the GF under its “Additional Safeguard Policy” (ASP) requires direct implementation where there are significant accountability problems until sustainable capacities can be built in the mid- to long term. Therefore, the DIM-based approach can be deemed appropriate and still adequate for building the requisite State capacity which has only started and will take time. A future switch from the DIM to NIM modality is not likely to happen in the near future since it requires further investment into building sustainable Government capacity. In fragile settings recovering from protracted conflict, State capacity is normally lacking and South Sudan is no exception in this regard. In such situations, there is a constant risk for international partners to crowd out the administration in terms of running service delivery and related managerial processes, rather than helping to rebuild systemic capacity. Outsourcing tasks and assignments to consultants is often a necessity but over the long run not sustainable (cf. a more detailed discussion further below under the “Sustainability” section).
UND P, as the entire UN presence, needs to work itself out of the job by building national capacity and finally hand over. The DIM modality is therefore accompanied by the harmonized approach to cash transfers (HACT) which is standard in high-risk, low capacity environments. This is not in itself a contradiction but actually underpinning the capacity building logic, since UNDP (along with other UN agencies such as UNICEF) provides related financial management training support through its core staff via PIP support as well as subsequent specific, tailored project support to the relevant counterparts among the administration, in view of building the capacity that will allow the future switch from DIM to NIM. Since the capacity of the governmental institutions remain a major concern, the CPD actually provides significant inputs meant to revamp the institutional capacity for service delivery and ensuring good governance. Therefore, a lot of the operational emphasis had to be put on the shoulders of NGOs, including a fair number of national outfits. UNDP operations are based on an annual budget cycle. The operational cycle of one year (twelve months) which is fixed as limit for NGO implementation contracts is seen as far too short for NGOs to implement comprehensive programmes. However, the contracts are renewable and engaging CSOs on an annual basis helps accountability by inducing an element of transparent and fair competition among fund recipients (IPs) based on comparative performance (quantity and quality of outputs, timeliness, budget absorption, quality of book keeping etc.). NGOs thus continue to receive UNDP support based on their objectively verifiable performance.

For the CSOs to work, several steps are involved – establishing trust and acceptance, building awareness, developing capabilities for planned tasks, mentoring and tutoring, monitoring performance, and consolidating gains. Given the conditions in the country, including challenges with access, mobility and high levels of mistrust among communities, these tasks cannot be effectively undertaken and completed within a one year period. Therefore, they need to tailor solutions that are somewhat limited and often can only be partial. However, in order to achieve transformative change, including a change in behaviour and attitudes, longer-term investments are required that go beyond short-term support of not more than one year. Furthermore, the UNDP grant to IPs (NGOs/CSOs) is normally provided in two installments of not more than USD 40,000 per tranche to be used for implementing community level interventions.47 Many CSOs interviewed expressed the concern that the grant indirectly restricts them to operate in and around the cities where they are located. Operating in areas outside the cities is thus often hampered and limited in scope, frequency and duration due to high operational costs (“doing business costs”) incl. expenses for transportation (car and truck hire, fuel and insurance costs to carry out field level missions and monitoring trips, transport equipment/supplies etc.). For example, outside Bentiu, the daily cost of a vehicle rental is around USD 300 without fuel costs. Since many NGOs have limited funds, purchasing their own fleet of vehicles is not an option.

Among the sample of interviewed national experts (incl. NGO staff/personnel, civil society expert members, university professors etc.) the vast majority displayed very competitive levels of technical capacity and theoretical managerial acumen. Quite a few of NGO cadres are (former) diaspora who underwent higher-level education in Uganda, Kenya, the UK etc. In this respect, the only critique would actually be that existing local expertise especially among academia (universities, think tanks etc.) is potentially underutilized by UNDP. On the other hand, the evaluation team found evidence that UNDP did a solid job in building the capacity of implementing partners’ (i.e., local CSO) staff operating in the field. For example, UNDP state coordinators make it a habit of always checking on the progress of work, guiding CSO staff on how to conduct assessments, carrying out monitoring and write technical reports. Also, NGOs are often invited to participate in specific training sessions and workshops to boost or further develop specific technical skills.

47 N.B.: The STARR unit claimed they provided funds of up to US 500,000 to NGOs but it remained unclear whether the indicated amount was split among several NGOs or allotted as single award to one NGO, only. UNDP applies a risk management approach when selecting IPs and determining the financial volume of grants they are entrusted with. NGOs applying for UNDP IP grants have to undergo a HACT assessment or else can apply through the Small Grants programme. Previously, UNDP gave grants for only 3 months in some cases. Now that the NGOs’ capacity levels have improved (including through due diligence and spot-checking) several NGOs that have been working with UNDP for a longer period (2016+) graduated to one-year grants. However, newcomers still need to first prove they are capable of respecting the financial rules and regulations while respecting timelines and meeting quality standards.
EQ 4. How did the country programme promote UNDP principles of gender equality, human rights and human development?

The CPD’s first Outcome area combines CPD Pillar 1 – “Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance” (Outputs 1.1.-1.4) is aligned with the UNCF and UNDP SP areas respectively linked to sustained peace and stability as well as high-level upstream support under CPD Pillar 3 “Strengthened institutional and community resilience”, in view of strengthening resilience against shocks and crises (incl. man-made and natural disasters). This first part of the CPD results matrix squarely sits across the HDP nexus. Meanwhile, the 2nd part of the results framework (Outputs 2.1-2.4) combines CPD Pillars 2 - “Inclusive and risk informed economic development” and the grassroots-level components of Pillar 3. Thus, the CPD encapsulates a coherent offer addressing the dimensions of human development as well as (basic) human rights and access to services.

Coordination-related and normative, regulatory facets of UNDP’s mandate and activities play a crucial role in informing and thus shaping the design and implementation-related aspects of public policies, forming alliances between contributing parties etc. This is of specific importance in thematic areas where UNDP collaborates with, supports, and is supported by, UNMISS. Specific common areas in this regard are the on-going coordinated support to the revitalized peace process (ARCSS), support to bolster institutional capacity and accountability, rule-of-law, access-to-justice, truth and reconciliation-related peacebuilding work etc. In view of the New Way of Working, UNDP is a key player strategically positioned at the heart of the triple nexus, linking the developmental, humanitarian and political dimensions. Other than the development-political leg of the nexus, UNDP is a key actor in the area of the humanitarian-development nexus.

Gender equality and women’s empowerment is core to UNDP’s interventions in South Sudan. This is in line with the UNDP global gender equality strategy and the 8-point agenda on Women and Girls in crisis. The country office’s approach to gender mainstreaming includes supporting the empowerment of women and girls through specific interventions and addressing gender concerns in developing, planning, implementing and evaluating all policies and programmes. UNDP also provides several processes and measurements for both encouraging and monitoring the mainstreaming of gender into programmes and operations such as the use of gender markers. In terms of gender capacity, the country office has a gender analyst who supports gender mainstreaming within the country office. Further support and guidance in this regard is provided by a P5 project advisor/manager. In addition, UNDP has an integrated gender focal point team that also provides support on gender related issues such as the gender seal certification process. UNDP also has two dedicated staff to represent the agency on, and contribute to the work of, the UN interagency PSEA task force.

The Country office’s gender equality strategy (2019-2021) is aligned with the cooperate gender strategy, the strategy has a workplan which was not fully implemented and is now due for review since a number of projects have entered into a second phase such as the PACC and A2J. The UNDP country office received the Bronze Gender Seal Certification in 2017 for its contribution towards national gender equality goals through strengthening mechanisms for prompt, coordinated responses to SGBV, and increasing access to justice and empowerment for women, notwithstanding the challenging context. The certificate expired on December 2019 and the office strives to achieve a higher rating (silver or gold) during the next round of certification. The gender dimension is now officially integrated into conflict assessments, after assessment questions and the related methodology were systematically reviewed through a gender lens. The (in-house) UNDP Gender Technical WG is currently engaged in carrying out a mapping exercise of Gender capacity at the institutional level across the public sector. Initial results of the study which is a co-production with the University of Juba, are showing that there is a big gender gap that needs to be addressed. Related findings are expected to inform the suite of on-going projects, as well as the programming of the next CPD cycle’s offer.

UNDP manages its gender support to the government through the abovementioned internal coordination bodies but also, as a participating member, through the sector PWG currently chaired by the Ambassador of Norway with UN Women as co-chair. UNDP actively collaborates with
UNFPA and, specifically, UN Women. Last year’s co-organized Women’s Day event which was streamed online was a huge success that garnered a stand-out high attendance. Another partner with regards to GEWE work is UNMISS who also contribute to peace and community cohesion-related work and under the GFP/Global Programme (RoLSHR/Phase III)-backed A2J project (including mobile courts etc.). UNDP actively participates in GBV cluster meetings led by UN Women but due to the Covid-19 pandemic these did not take place throughout the last year.

A new forum to address SGBV (incl. policing) is now being set up by UNMISS. The Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare is the main interlocutor in terms of GEWE-work at State level, with whom UNDP maintains a strong and productive work relationship. Here, UNDP supported the review of the NDS to emphasize integrated gender mainstreaming across the various sectors. UNDP also supported the design of the gender strategy and the NAP for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in support of the WPS agenda. UNDP’s angle of operational GEWE support is bottom-up, e.g., in the form of SGBV-related work at community level and gender mainstreaming of the security sector reform-related work (SSR) jointly with UN Women, via the PaCC and A2J projects. Through social support groups at community level, UNDP organizes grassroots level discussions on topics such as how to prevent SGBV as an element of PSEA (Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse).

Through the PaCC project under the Peace and Governance pillar of the CPD, UNDP pursues a community-based bottom-up approach to peacebuilding by strengthening social cohesion at community level, including the signing of (inter)community “Peace Agreements” via selected communities in more than five geographic clusters. Further, through this project, UNDP carries out gender mainstreaming trainings in collaboration with UN Women. A stand-out initiative was the high-level process to revitalize the Peace Agreement which saw members of the local women’s coalition participate in related peace talks, with the Women’s Coalition finally becoming a co-signatory of the peace agreement in line with WPS precepts.

To address the lack of skills and in recognition of the critical role of economic empowerment for raising the profile and engagement of women in decision-making processes, UNDP’s Recovery and Resilience Programme provides affirmative action to women by undertaking specialized skills development training focusing on the development of agricultural value chains and entrepreneurship. Under the Recovery and Resilience programme, about 69% of 4,581 youth whose skills sets were developed in 22 trades were women.

Another stand-out GEWE partnership is UNDP’s alliance with the University of Juba which runs a Women’s transformational leadership programme. The university provides mentors to UNDP PaCC’s mentorship development programme for current and aspiring young women leaders through such activities as experiential learning for political aspirants etc. Furthermore, UNDP supports the University in running a special ICT project to support young women and girls in programming and IT skills training, which resulted in the formation of the “GoGirls” association, a group of ICT-savvy young women (cf. further below under the chapter on “Impact”, additional details about the support UNDP provided to the GoGirls initiative via its Accelerator Lab). Another best practice would be the peanut butter-making agricultural value chain project in Aweil (Lake Region) which was designed to boost grassroots-level economic cohesion.

Since the launch of the 1990 Human Development report, UNDP continues to support countries to adopt a human development approach. In South Sudan, the CO holds annual policy sessions on each year’s global human development report in an attempt to disseminate policy recommendations of the report. In 2020, UNDP held a policy discussion on the global human development report discussing the applicability of the global theme on how disasters impact inequality, for South Sudan. This sparked interest among members of the Economic cluster on the importance of considering the significance of the environment for economic development.
5.2 Coherence

[Coherence: The compatibility of the CPD with other interventions in South Sudan to understand whether they support or undermine the programme, and vice versa; incl. internal coherence and external coherence.]

a. Conclusions & lessons learned

Key achievements and best practices:

i. The CPD echoes the HDP nexus approach and presents an integrated ensemble of programmatic outputs that are coherently interlinked with relevant strategic frameworks including the NDS, UNCF, HRP.

ii. UNDP’s activities under CPD Outcome 1 are well articulated with UNMISS’ substantive thematic remit and the working relationship with the Mission is well developed.

iii. The revitalization of UNDP’s environmental portfolio filled a previously existing gap.

Key challenges:

i. Internal programmatic coherence and related work processes (within UNDP, across internal work units) are not optimal throughout and there seems to be quite some potential for streamlining programmatic design, in-house communication and the coordination of work flows.

ii. While progress in this regard has been registered in the recent past, UNDP still has a tendency to work in internal siloes, even within the same project.

iii. UNDP is still in the process of rebuilding its former strategic position and reputation as key player in the area of environmental/climate change/renewable energies; and the UN and the country as a whole lost valuable time due to the UNDP CO management’s decision in 2014 to close down its related portfolio and leave the entire responsibility to UNEP.

iv. While UNDP has positioned its CPD to build resilience both systemically and socio-economically, structurally the “aid machinery” and related pattern or even culture of funding remained biased towards humanitarian activities which has limited the relative availability of financial resources for investments into sustainable development.

b. Findings

EQ 5. How were institutional overarching frameworks, such as the UNMISS mandate, the SS-HRP or the UNCF, reflected in the underlying UNDP South Sudan country strategy?

Taken together, the CPD pillars focus on implementing coping strategies to ensure (1) peacebuilding, social cohesion and reconciliation in view of ushering in trust in the social contract between the population, amongst each other and vis-à-vis the State machinery; as well as (2) food security and advance poverty eradication at the community and household levels while addressing recurrent natural shocks and protracted man-made crises through mitigatory measures and building systemic and societal resilience. Bringing its coordination and convening function to bear to stabilize the country through peacebuilding, constitution-making and reconciliation efforts, UNDP plays a vital partnership role vis-à-vis UNMISS.
Furthermore, UNDP plays a crucial strategic role in supporting the funding and implementation of the South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) as the Managing Agent of the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund/Country Based Pooled Fund (SSHF-CBPF). The inter-linked UNCF Outcomes on Peacebuilding and poverty eradication (Outcomes 1 and 2, respectively) are mirrored via the CPD Outcomes, with the SSHF support being lodged within the outcome focusing on poverty eradication. Peacebuilding-related interventions at community level (negotiated agreements between migrant herders and villages etc.) also explicitly address the HDPN since one of the major root causes of inter-ethnic strife is linked to competition over grazing grounds and watering holes for cattle.

**EQ 6. What was the nature of UNDP’s engagement with UNMISS and how has it evolved after the delinking (complementarity vs. rivalry; UN coordination vs. UNDP’s integrator role)?**

Stakeholders from among both entities (UNDP and UNMISS) agreed that the working relationship is very robust and has improved markedly over the past years. This being said, some minor recurrent frictions might appear every now and then between Mission Departments and UNCT agencies, funds and programmes including UNDP, but this is judged to be more an issue of clashing personalities or management styles between individuals rather than a genuine institutional issue. While during interviews held, a few anecdotes about UNDP not acting in an inclusive manner and treating specialized agencies as rivals rather than partners did come up, the opposite was also true and actually outweighed the negative assessment both in quantity and substance. Some isolated events were mentioned when the UNMISS Gender Unit apparently failed to properly coordinate with UN agencies. Also, a few incidents of UNMISS staff claiming credit for work done by others caused frustrations among UN agency staff.

All in all, however, the level of coordination is good. UNMISS is an integrated Mission setting and the UNCT’s UNCF is coordinated with the Mission’s country assistance strategy. There are frequent joint meetings at Principals’ level while at working level there is constant technical calibration and coordination of who does what. The RCO and UNDP share the same premises (UNDP hosting the latter) and all UN agency staff (including UNDP management and programme officers) as well as UNMISS staff interviewed agreed there is a good relationship between UNCT AFP’s including UNDP and the RCO/Mission, with “all forming one team”. UNDP plays a crucial role in articulating the spheres of the political/peace fulcrum of the nexus and the development-humanitarian pivot.

As a point in case to illustrate this relationship, UNDP provides the UN Senior Management Team with weekly development and economic updates to inform the entire UN system which helps to ensure that the collective work is well articulated and coordinated and addresses pressing national priorities. In this respect, UNDP is indispensable for the HDPN not only in South Sudan, but in any given Mission context, since the only agency (potentially) capable of linking up all relevant actors, thanks to its integrator role between humanitarian actors and UNMISS.

Following the de-linking of the RR and RC/HC functions, no significant negative effect in the sense of heightened rivalries was perceived. Rather, the de-linking seems to have had a positive effect since prior to de-linking UNDP was perceived by other agencies to have privileged access to information and funding. However, some informants commented that any such potential advantages UNDP might have enjoyed were more than outweighed by the effective burden of having to ensure coordination of development work via the UNCT as well as humanitarian work via OCHA, which put an undue strain on UNDP to the point of hampering its ability to effortlessly fill its agency role.

**EQ 7. To what extent did UNDP contribute to strengthening national policies/programmes that would positively impact vulnerable territories and populations?**

Substantive action to rekindle the constitution making process started in 2018 but only moved forward as of 2020, i.e. as of the 2nd year of CPD implementation. UNDP contributed to this intermediate success, always striving to ensure that national level solutions could be designed and implemented through regional stakeholders. A formal constitutional review process was launched in May 2021. The Constitution will obviously guide all other national policies, strategies, frameworks and action plans. UNDP’s support in this regard is well articulated with the overall support by the
Mission and the UNCT through the UNCF, including UNMISS’ related strategic roadmap. In terms of related joint programming to ensure UN-internal coherence and jointness, UNDP has been leading the technical process to set up an integrated work plan for the constitution making process with UNDP leading the process. Over the coming two years and thus until the end of the current extended CPD (and UNCF) life cycle, the constitutional process will be extended to the sub-national level, through stakeholder awareness sessions in regions. UNDP will team up with UNMISS, UN Women and Unesco for this effort and link the constitutional work stream to other related peace processes, using UNMISS office presence in 10 regions of the country. In doing so, they will closely coordinate their work with, and outsource a considerable amount of operational “leg work”, to local NGOs thus ensuring outreach, inclusiveness, participation, representativeness and proper communication to ensure full involvement of, and get the buy-in from, different local stakeholder groups.

A lot of the planned CPD support to many key State institutions remained on stand-by for quite some time or could not reach full capacity during the persistent transition phase of the peace agreement. The volume and intensity of technical CPD support had been projected to be considerably ramped up once the R-TGoNU was formed. For instance, the mainstreaming of gender in the public service reform could only commence as planned at national and State level due to delays in the formation of the national unity government which only took place in February 2020. Meanwhile, support to transitional justice that had started in 2018 also ran into some roadblocks and thus stalled for about two years before it resumed in 2020. In terms of support to localized peace mechanisms which are designed to complement the national peace accord, 17 local mechanisms on peace and reconciliation had been set by end 2020 covering all conflict clusters.

Related work included supporting the national peace dialogue process during a period of three years starting from grassroots consultations to regional dialogues culminating in a national dialogue conference. Moreover, UNDP supported the Council of Traditional Authority Leaders in South Sudan (COTAL), local level peace committees, the peace and reconciliation commission, the finalization of the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE); and organized joint migration conferences, peace actor’s coordination forums and other similar mechanisms. In addition, a Civilian Disarmament Strategy for South Sudan was developed and to be disseminated in 2021. Moreover, 22 migration agreements between migrating pastoralist tribes and host communities were signed and implemented, which made a positive impact on keeping the peace and silencing the gun in and among vulnerable populations especially in remote rural areas.

In addition to supporting the peace process and constitutional work, the CPD worked towards mainstreaming the SDGs across different levels and constituencies including the various subnational governments, private sector institutions and CSOs, in view of integrating the SD Goals and other international frameworks in their respective strategic frameworks, work plans and budgets. These efforts, too, suffered considerable delays due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Inspired by the SDGs, the design process of the National Development Strategy (NDS) is actively being supported by UNDP. The NDS is, in fact, a key result that UNDP can claim as key success of its strategic coordination support.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the NDS integrated gender as a cross-cutting issue to ensure mainstreaming in stakeholder plans. At the level of national policies which, at least in theory, should benefit all citizens across all socio-economic strata, thanks to UNDP support, a total of three tax policies were enacted in 2019. Due to the change in state boundaries, UNDP will have to engage with the new state governments on the enactment of tax and trade policies in 2021 and beyond. This could not have been done in 2020 due to the delay in the appointment of state officials. Other than that, a specific State Revenue Act was enacted ensuring that taxes are properly collected and forwarded to the appropriate state agency for inclusive budgeting.

Also, six unified tax systems were completed in the former states of Jubek, Aweil, Gbudue, Torit, Jonglei and Gogrial. In three regional states, State Revenue Authority (SRA) offices are supported and structured in such a way that the source of non-oil revenue is diversified according to local value addition specificities (i.e., aligned with the profile and characteristics of specific local trades,
commerce, industries including produce and artisanal products). This increases the tax base and revenue, potentially for the greater good (through investments into infrastructure, basic social services, the provision of RoL services including courts, security/police capacity etc.). The reconstitution of state boundaries implies that the State Revenue Authority Act and related governing structures in the unified tax systems will need to be revised to reflect new state boundaries and institutions. It is planned to expand the work on unified tax systems to four additional states (to cover the entire country) once states officials will have been appointed and once construction work of SRA Offices is completed. Furthermore, UNDP’s macroeconomic work is coherent with the efforts of other IFIs such as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF. In this context, it is particularly worthwhile mentioning UNDP’s support provided in the framework of public financial management reform and capacity building efforts.

In the realm of environmental and climate change-related activities, UNDP supported the development of critical policy documents, overarching frameworks and specialized systems that allow the Government of South Sudan to comply with its commitments to international partners under the Paris Agreement. Other than supporting the drafting of the South Sudan National Development Strategy including its climate and environment-related planning, the South Sudan National Determined Contribution (NDC) was revised to officially lock in commitments in line with the provisions of the Paris Agreement in view of reaching the country’s ambition to be a net-zero carbon emitter. UNDP also supported the development of the First South Sudan National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a policy document that outlines a strategic investment plan for climate change adaptation by the country. In addition, UNDP supported the establishment of (i.) a system to capture greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and operationalize, track, verify, and report on the specific climate actions including mitigation and adaptation priorities under NAP and NDC; as well as (ii.) the South Sudan Integrated Measurement, Reporting and Verification (IMRV) system to support the Ministry of Environment.

Moreover, UNDP led a socio-economic impact assessment of COVID-19 to gauge the pandemic’s implications for the NDS and the SDGs. Thanks to UNDP support, over 225,000 among the most vulnerable conflict-affected people benefitted from anti-Covid measures included support to local women and youth to produce 5,000 liters of liquid soap and 1,000 bars of soap, 161 handwashing stations being set up across 30 counties etc. In addition, UNDP established 8 production facilities across 6 states that produced and distributed more than 1,000,000 reusable face masks to frontline and security personnel, government personnel, market vendors, IDPs, PWDs, and other vulnerable population groups to protect them from and diminish the spread of the COVID-19 virus; and to ensure the continued delivery of basic services as per established national protocols. The support provided by UNDP benefitted about 700 unemployed tailors (79% women) whose livelihoods were impacted by the pandemic and has generated interest and support from partners leading to the production of a total of more than 3 million reusable face masks. To date, this makes it the biggest face mask production initiative in the country.

Last but not least, UNDP, together with UNMISS and UNHCR, provided leadership in the development and finalization of the National Action Plan for Return, Reintegration, and Recovery which spells out the principles, framework and actions needed for the safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return and reintegration of about 4 million displaced population.

**EQ 8. To what extent did UNDP’s programme choices enable support to further the humanitarian development nexus and/or to innovative processes for improved economies for families and communities in conflict?**

Among UN AFPs/UNCT members, UNDP is placed closest to the Mission’s overall coordination role and programmatic work both by its corporate mandate and by virtue of its history as hosting the RC function prior to the recent de-linking. Also, due to its convening power across different sectors it is bound to play a particular role in terms of articulating and implementing integrated HDPN solutions. Among UNCT members involved in the HD sub-leg (safety net etc.) UNDP, apart from UN Women, is the only entity that explicitly interacts with UNMISS through joint activities. While OCHA is formally supervised by the DSRGS-RC-HC, UNDP played a crucial coordinating role as managing agent of the SSHF until the end of 2019 when, as part of a global agreement
between the two entities, this role was transferred to OCHA. It is interesting to note in this context that the 2020 HRP which set out to support US$ 6.1 million of the most vulnerable people, had a projected budget volume costed at of US$ 1.3 billion thus doubling the 3-year UNCF budget of US$ 650m and towering above the related 3-year UNCF budget for the related Priority Area no. 2 (“Improving food security and recovering local economies”) which stood at US$ 210m for the entire three years of the UNCF period. This translates into a yearly average budget of US$ 70m which represents a meagre 5.38% of the HRP budget. The CPD budget of US$ 263.1m (2019-2021) also pales in comparison since the three-year CPD budget only covers 20.23% of the HRP’s annual budget). While according to some sources, since early 2020 the nexus paradigm has taken center stage in many high-level fora, it remains to be seen to what extent the next generation of strategic frameworks, policies, strategies, work plans, programme/project designs will fully mainstream and reflect the nexus logic, and if and how the related budget volumes will overcome the above-mentioned structural imbalance.

In a context of recurrent patterns connecting climate change and food (in)security-induced pressure acting as conflict vector and root cause (due to increased competition over scarce resources including arable land, water, cattle etc.) there is need to revisit the relative weight of investments that go into conventional “simplest” life saving support (food hand-outs etc.). Strategically, the relative financial weight of investments into resilience including preventative and mitigatory measures is still insufficient, in a comparative sense. For example, increased investments into climate resilient agriculture are needed (including appropriate crop varieties, infrastructure and skills for watershed management to prevent flooding, irrigation schemes etc.). According to observers, in general, though, humanitarian actors in South Sudan are still keeping their distance from the Mission out of concerns that their reputation as neutral and impartial partners might be tainted.

UNDP’s research and policy work has provided evidence on trends in the economic sector and this has in turn informed planning and programming of the Humanitarian Coordination Team. The UNDP Economic Advisory role has been often harnessed by the HCT in discussing topical economic sector-related reforms and implications on humanitarian programming. This was the case in 2020 during the fast depreciation of the SSP against the US$ and its implications on humanitarian support, especially direct cash transfers.

The UNDP management in 2014, (upon recommendation of the former head of UNDP’s environmental portfolio) had decided to significantly scale down the scope and scale of its environmental portfolio, counting on UNEP to fill the gap. Under the current CPD, the portfolio was resuscitated through the establishment of the STARR unit (Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience) which was handed the responsibility of implementing Outputs 2.1 and 2.2 (Recovery and Resilience project; Watershed Approaches for Climate Resilience in Agro-pastoralism; Climate Change, Environment and DRM). While it is widely acknowledged that UNDP has managed to make huge strides in revamping its clout in the thematic areas of environmental/DRM work, the related UNCF Results Group is still co-led by WFP and FAO since UNEP is an NRA and UNDP was until recently considered by other entities to (still) be lacking the capacity to assume a leadership role in the domain of environmental and DRM-related work. Since the previous UNDP leadership team had dissolved the CO’s environmental unit and handed over the entire portfolio to UNEP in 2017, UNDP has spent the early years of the present CPD cycle to rebuild its footprint across the sector. Key UNDP staff is confident that the agency has now regained its leadership position esp. in view of the continuous portfolio growth over recent years, and UNDP’s role in the design of the NDC, NAP, and imRV.

As a matter of fact, different funding windows are at present being tapped into and UNDP closely collaborates with UNEP in ramping up a whole suite of joint undertakings. For instance, UNDP is currently engaged in designing a joint work plan for the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) which comes with a grant of $3m. In terms of the joint work carried out with UNEP, it is in general still too early to see substantive results on the ground given that the activities focus on upstream policy-related issues and related inputs (e.g., the GEF project on UNFCCC access, capacity building on national biodiversity, NAP, land degradation etc.). UNDP and UNEP also collaborate on joint projects addressing climate change, environment and DRM, NDC (nationally determined
contribution) and watershed approaches for climate resilience in agro-pastoralism. Through strategic engagement and partnership, STARR recently managed to secure funding for, and launch a US$ 9 million project with UNEP and GEF on climate adaptation ("Strengthening the capacity of government and communities in South Sudan to adapt to climate change"). In addition, another funding request for US$ 9 million to implement watershed development has been submitted to the GEF for approval. This particular sub-set of CPD initiatives has the most explicit link to the HDP nexus in that they address the issues of resilient livelihoods and climate change-induced migration (humanitarian-development leg of the nexus) as well as the increasingly important angle of climate change as conflict driver (triple nexus). This shows how intrinsically Outcome 2 is linked to the content and intent of Outcome 1, which addresses the governance, reconciliation and RoL-side of these interconnected issues.

In terms of UNDP’s engagement in addressing the triple nexus with partners other than UNEP, the practice of community level peace agreements between migrant and sedentary communities marks an innovative practice of managing conflict dynamics between cattle herders and peasants. Arguably, the almost two dozen related agreements signed by now have spared countless lives, given that increasingly cattle herders (as well as vigilante groups and youth militias) are carrying small arms including assault rifles and machine guns such as Kalashnikovs etc.

The stand-out CPD initiatives designed to provide short and long-term employment opportunities for juvenile heads of vulnerable, food insecure households are the and the "Youth Employment and Empowerment through Private Sector and Value Chain Development"; and the "Enhancing social protection and agriculture value chain through Stabilization and Resilience-Building" (STARR) Project targeting 3,500 youth-led households to increase their economic resilience through enhancing their agricultural production and productivity. The project is based on the premise that climate change, famines and inter-community tensions are increasingly interlinked and rarely caused by one factor alone, but rather by a combination of shocks, stresses and underlying structural constraints and deficits. Therefore, increased famine risks are seen as the result of a complex interplay between conflict, environmental shocks and structurally fragile social, economic and governance systems. In recognizing the need to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus particularly in the remote northern border region of Aweil, UNDP and other development and humanitarian partners started this recovery and stabilization project aiming to build community resilience, enhance protection mechanisms particularly for women and children and improve access to basic services providing social safety nets to reduce vulnerabilities.

The initial joint programming in Aweil on social safety nets and stabilization was designed to serve as an adaptable blueprint for similar initiatives in South Sudan on recovery and resilience. The Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PIRR) framework coordinated by UNDP brought supporting and funding agencies, the state leadership and the community together to cushion communities from shocks. The PIRR Framework aims to harness synergies between humanitarian and development interventions targeting food security as well sustainable and resilient livelihoods; enhancing of capacities of local institutions and communities to recover, absorb and withstand economic shocks; strengthening local and national mechanisms for peacebuilding, reconciliation and social cohesion as well as restoring community trust. PIRR has grown into the main platform and mechanism in South Sudan for focused dialogue, deepened accountability, joint advocacy and engagement on actions geared towards the achievement of a set of commitments geared towards the operationalization of the paradigm shift from emergency to recovery and resilience. Comprised of the main donors in South Sudan (US, UK, EU, Netherlands, Japan, etc.), NGOs (represented by NGO Forum), and UN agencies (AFPs and UNMISS), the PIRR provides for joint programming and the convergence of programmes and actions to address food insecurity, reduce vulnerability and build resilience against multiple shocks and stresses through a four-pillar approach that enhances the relevant resilience capacities: Rebuilding trust in people and institutions (Adaptive Capacity); Reestablishing access to basic social services (Absorptive Capacity); Restoring productive

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48 South Sudan is one of less than 10 countries world-wide where UNEP directly implements projects on the ground, along with Afghanistan, Haiti etc. In South Sudan, UNEP actually uses UNDP as implementor and managing party. In this regard, it is a win-win for both entities given that UNDP’s presence on the ground and corporate mandate to (also) address climate change-related/DRM/renewable energy issues is combined with UNEP’s technical expertise.
UNDP is leading in the coordination of all PfRR partners in 3 of the 4 partnership areas/states targeted under the PfRR.

While Aweil is constantly under the threat of flooding, it has huge agricultural potential and is also well positioned geographically to benefit from cross-border trade and other economic activities associated from being a border town. Since 2020, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has imperiled gains in resilience so far achieved due to the general slowing down of economic activities. UNDP serves as main coordinator of all UN agencies through the so-called “Area Reference Group” which serves as platform bringing together all stakeholders including UN agencies (UNICEF, UNWFP, UNMISS etc.) to coordinate their activities and brainstorm on specific challenges in the areas of education and economic shocks and how to best address them, together. UNDP supports the social safety net to provide at least temporary employment to 1,750 households in Aweil who were affected by the floods. Similarly, WFP targets 2,500 households while UNICEF provided educational support to flood victims.

EQ 9. To what extent were UN agency partnerships (GFP, JPs, joint programming etc.) forged to enable a coherent programme response?

Under both Outcomes, there are positive examples of joint programming or JPs involving UNMISS, UNESCO, UN Women and UNFPA under Outcome 1; and OCHA and the Global Fund under Outcome 2. Similarly, through its Global Fund-related work, UNDP maintains synergies with key partners such as the USG-PEPFAR for optimal provision of health services across the 10 states by promoting complementarities and avoiding duplications. The partnership between UNDP and UNICEF was instrumental in securing resources from the SDG Fund for the implementation of a project on “strengthened national and subnational public financial management (PFM) mechanisms in South Sudan for increased budget allocations to social service sectors”. The aim of the project is to enhance sustainable financing strategies and investments to accelerate SDG achievement.

The partnership between UNDP and UNICEF under the guidance of the RCO has ensured coherent programming on PFM at the local level. The two agencies jointly deliver a training programme, mutually undertake communication activities, organize joint missions to the States and collaborate to strengthen PFM processes at the local level. They also co-fund a Joint Partnerships and Resource Mobilisation Officer. In addition, UNDP has provided leadership in the development and implementation of a flagship UN Joint Programme on Recovery and Resilience in Yambio with a total projected budget of US$ 54 million (of which US$ 22.5 million are funded, so far). In addition, it brought together 3 agencies (WFP, UNICEF, FAO) in the implementation of the Stabilization and Resilience-Building Project that was implemented in Aweil.

While it is acknowledged that UNDP does well in mobilizing sub-sector specific specialized technical expertise related to such issues as promoting community cohesion etc. for project-related work, there is a perception among partner entities that in some cases this results in the negative side effect of UNDP-internal “silo building” resulting in communication gaps within UNDP. A related example that was mentioned more than once refers to two UNDP sub-units or teams (those working on community cohesion and A2J, respectively) contributing to the same PBF joint project. Specifically in the area of RoL, security and human rights-related work, it needs to be mentioned that it did not appear as if the Global Focal Point (GFP) approach was too well known or understood by stakeholders which implies that the potential this mechanism holds is not fully leveraged. As a matter of fact, since the arrangement remains insufficiently understood and received strong push back from UN entities, the UNCT has recently taken action (in May 2021) by setting up a Focal Points Network for Rule of Law staff across the UN system modelled on the GFP.

5.3 Effectiveness

[Effectiveness: Progress against planned results at output and outcome level.]

The MTE assessed UNDP programme support (what did UNDP do), and the significance of the contribution (what is the contribution - did UNDP accomplish its intended objectives).
a. Conclusions & lessons learned

Key achievements and best practices:

i. Overall, the CPD registered above-average progress in implementing activities and achieving set targets at satisfactory levels, on average.

ii. UNDP’s convenor role was borne out in its ability to help UNMISS mobilize a vast array of stakeholders to participate in peacebuilding negotiation track processes.

iii. Across both CPD Outcomes and related CPD pillars, UNDP entered into productive partnerships with a number of other UNCT entities including UN Women, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNMISS.

iv. PBF re-eligibility was recently ensured thanks to collaborative efforts made possible through inter-agency partnerships.

v. Gender-specific sub-targets were mostly reached if not surpassed.

Key challenges:

i. Implementation progress of interventions under Outcome 1 were significantly hampered by contextual delays to the constitutional and peacebuilding processes beyond the direct influence of the UN, such as the fact that a Government of national Unity could only be formed after lengthy delays, in early 2020, while intercommunal tensions would regularly flare up over recent years and levels of violence were actually on the rise across the country, in 2020.

ii. The Covid-19 pandemic slowed down the implementation of activities across the board and required adaptive partial retooling of interventions and repurposing of resources, specifically affecting Outputs 1.3. (“Key governance institutions are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process”) and 1.4. (“Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyses progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions”) in a negative way.

iii. The remoteness and lacking infrastructure in the countryside make it difficult for UNDP to ensure an equal reach of its interventions in the geographical sense, and results in a bias towards urban centres and their vicinities. Transport by road or air is difficult and costly due to the poor road network, underdeveloped and expensive air travel, heavy rains causing floods etc. All these factors combined make some of the geographical locations inaccessible, esp. during the rainy season. Furthermore, these factors negatively affect the ability of the UN as a whole to provide services to remote locations which is hence a general challenge in the South Sudanese context.

b. Findings

EQ 10. To what extent have outcomes been achieved or has progress been made toward their achievement?

Following the UNSDCF guidance, UNCF Outcomes also serve as CPD Outcomes. Given the CPD’s alignment with UNCF Outcomes 1 and 2, respectively, the top level indicators gauge public trust in the peace process, progress with the High-Level Revitalization Forum, peacebuilding and the constitution-making process; as well as food consumption-related measures. Whereas overall
performance against the first set of high-level indicators is somewhat stalling but there is reason to remain at least cautiously confident, the food consumption-related poverty measures have obviously taken a blow inflicted by the Covid-19 pandemic. While CoVID-19 slowed down the overall pace and progress of implementation, it is also true that the project quickly adapted to the new realities. E.g., the PaCC project conducted an assessment and made recommendations on how to adapt the project to the new realities, thus showing responsiveness to the unforeseen obstacle which the pandemic constitutes. A similar example of reactivity was that UNDP adapted its work with CSOs to ensure a better reach of remote areas. In this regard, the project work plans specifically focus on undertaking a maximum amount of activities during the dry season. During these six months, all efforts are made to finish all relevant infrastructure-related work.

It can be assumed that specifically single female-headed households and women and girls, in general, have suffered the most from increased levels of food insecurity and the spike in food prices. This unfortunate turn of event is reflected in the UNCF’s risk assessment which foresaw as a possible scenario that macro-economic stability may not improve, resulting in perpetuated tensions, grievances and diminished opportunities for recovery and return. The following analysis concentrates on the level of attributable higher-level results as reflected by the set of CPD Outputs, since in an operational setting with 18 UNCT members this will allow for a fairer assessment of UNDP’s actual performance against promised delivery.

EQ 11. How have corresponding outputs delivered by UNDP affected the outcomes, and in what ways have they not been effective?

As explained above, the CPD consists of 3 pillars and 2 Outcomes including CPD Pillar 1: Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable governance, CPD Pillar 2: Inclusive and Risk Informed Economic Development, and CPD Pillar3: Strengthened Institutional and Community Resilience. The following overview presents the findings of a detailed comparison of actual performance against set indicator final targets (-end 2021) by the end of 2020. Each indicator underwent scrutiny and was awarded a performance assessment in the form of a colour coded categorization. The complete set of indicators and related planned performance targets is presented in the Annex section (Annex 7.2 for the detailed progress overview; annex 7.7 showing the original CPD results framework). A “highly satisfactory” (green colour code) was earned if actual performance met or exceeded the 2021 target by end 2020, whereas a verdict of “satisfactory/on track” (orange colour code) was announced in cases where the target was all but reached or significant progress against the target value could be registered. Performances against indicator targets that remained at sub-par level in the sense of barely any progress or no progress at all were assessed as being “unsatisfactory” (red coding). Averages per Output and Outcome were calculated based on individual marks allotted to the respective sub-sets of specific indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th># of Indicators</th>
<th>Highly satisfactory</th>
<th>Satisfactory (on track)</th>
<th>Unsatisfactory</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1 total</td>
<td>13x</td>
<td>9x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(1x no data)</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2 total</td>
<td>10x</td>
<td>7x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>0x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total (CPD)</td>
<td>22x (+1x no data)</td>
<td>16x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis shows that overall, CPD implementation is well on track. Outcome 1 (Peace process)
garnered 9 highly satisfactory ratings and 1 satisfactory (“on track”) mark, as well as 3 unsatisfactory verdicts against its individual indicators resulting in two Outputs (1.1 and 1.2) rated as highly satisfactory and the remainder as satisfactory, on average; whereas Outcome 2 (Eradicate poverty) earned 7 x green and 2 x orange for its indicators, with three outputs (2.1, 2.3., 2.4) earning full marks while one (2.2) had progressed moderately well. Overall, Outcome 1 received an almost fully satisfactory mark whereas Outcome 2 garnered a complete “highly satisfactory”. The combined total of indicators received a fully satisfactory average mark (16x highly satisfactory, 3x satisfactory and 3x unsatisfactory; with 5/8 CPD Outputs “green” and 3/8 rated “orange”).

EQ 12. What has been the contribution of partners and other organizations to the outcome, and how effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to achieving the outcome?

UNMISS, UNESCO, UN Women and UNFPA were the entities partnering with UNDP under Outcome 1, whereas under Outcome 2 UNDP collaborated with OCHA, UNEP, and the Global Fund. Overall, the partnering entities acknowledged that having teamed up with UNDP was very important and had resulted in adding value to overall UNCF efforts, while it also helped UNDP in achieving their own corporate targets under the CPD. Across the board, the echo was positive in the sense that cooperative work practices with various entities prevail and are the rule rather than the exception. In some cases, it was pointed that in the past (prior to the current CPD and UNCF iteration), there might have been some concerns in terms of competition and rivalry but that things have evolved for the better, meanwhile.

For example, in terms of UNMISS-UNDP cooperation, positive effects highlighted included that technical and strategic support to peacebuilding and economic recovery efforts benefitted from technical support, coordination services and good offices provided by UNDP, including UNDP facilitating access to specific government institutions and stakeholder groups including those that previously had not been so comfortable in working with the Mission. This proved of high importance in terms of work on the national dialogue which involved complementary work via the R-ARCSS official peace track led by UNMISS and, in addition to that, in the context of a parallel internal peace track operating in the period 2016-2020 in which all opposition groups including those based abroad (with the exception of the two most important groups participating in the primary official negotiation track) also participated.

In terms of GEWE-related work, UNDP collaborates with UN Women under Outcome 1 on promoting the WPS agenda through the implementation of community-level Peace Agreements, gender mainstreaming of the SSR via PBF JP (UNDP & UN Women) and supporting access to justice via the Peace & Community Cohesion Project. UNDP interacts with other UN entities involved in the constitution making process through the UNCT and joint support to promoting the rule of law. For instance, UNDP collaborates with UNMISS Rule of Law colleagues on providing support to access to justice initiatives. Similarly, UNDP provides justice services for displaced populations together with UNHCR; while supporting access to justice for SGBV survivors together with UNFPA through a joint programme on SGBV. UNDP also runs a joint project together with UNICEF and OHCHR on breaking the cycles of violence at community level. UNDP has benefitted from UNMISS’ Human Rights Division’s monitoring efforts covering the deployment of mobile courts and trials through other courts (e.g., GBV Courts). Related findings and recommendations have helped UNDP to strengthen the quality of justice outcomes by ensuring that those who need legal representation, including the accused, are provided with such support. This upholds the principle that all sides to a case have the right to be heard. Last but not least, in cases of capital punishment, UNDP could step in to advocate against the death sentence being upheld and effectively applied.

Furthermore, with regards to peacebuilding efforts under Outcome 1, UNDP is, according to one stakeholder, “doing a good job in reaching out to other agencies and collaborating”. A related example would be UNDP’s collaboration with UNESCO in terms of joint media support through the development of media platforms including community radio stations as a key development tool, with both agencies tapping into their respective comparative advantages to jointly deliver a product that the agencies would not have been able to deliver without the other. The collaboration, which actually precedes the present CPD cycle, started in 2016, and has a focus on building journalistic
skills in conflict-sensitive reporting. In general, in order to address the delays in the transitional peace process throughout 2019, UNDP continued to intervene to mitigate the risks related to the delay. UNDP thus provided valuable support to the High Level Committee that was established by the President to investigate the cause to the flare-up in violence linked to the conflict in the Jonglei and Greater Pibor Administrative areas.

EQ 13. What are the positive or negative, intended or unintended, changes brought about by UNDP's work? & EQ 14. What was the contribution of UNDP to youth empowerment development processes?

UNDP staff stressed during interviews that in programming and during implementation, they are always systematically keeping an eye on ensuring the inclusive participation of women’s groups, youth groups, the disabled etc., in line with LNOB principles. This is also kept in mind when selecting partner agencies in the design of JPs etc. Other than the Safety net intervention in Aweil which also builds resilience among youth-led households by providing support to strengthen livelihoods, other specific stand-out youth-centered projects under the CPD are the job skills training component of the PaCC project and the activities supported at University of Juba targeting girl students to instill transformative leadership skills among selected female students. Other bigger on-going initiatives are YEEP and SYESIP. Overall, there were only a few unintended negative effects of the CPD, at project level. For instance, the Community police support resulted in some cases in “volunteers” developing a mindset of undue expectations with regards to “promised” salaries. Also, capacity building support provided to some Ministries in some cases resulted in staff complaining that they did not receive the expected top-up to their regular salary. Similarly, NGOs and ministries also catering to the youth would complain about lacking investments into infrastructure and equipment.49

One interviewed UN staff commented that receiving letters of menace by youth groups (insisting their members be given jobs in UN compounds and/or projects, or be added to the list of beneficiaries) was almost “normal” and to be expected at field level where the UN ranks among the sole potential employers and potential source of income for many youth. The most vocal and aggressive among disenfranchised youth being male adolescents, such frustrations sometimes get channelled into such, often politically or ethnically charged, aggressive requests. The UNMISS field offices and UNDP try to address these issues at the local level through measures such as mobilizing national UN staff hailing from concerned communities as mediators, but there are limitations to this approach. Hence, UNDP also actually engages with the state government and the youth directly, whenever feasible (a related example is the YEEP project which co-designed joint resolutions together with local youth, to address their concerns and resolve the problem).

UNDP tries to do its best to ensure equality by fighting and minimizing any perceived ethnic bias but obviously, any “affirmative action” in favour of any particular group would run counter to the universal values espoused by the UN and, in the worst case, set a precedence which could serve as incentive for warlords (“big men”) relying on youth to form their militia, to set their own rules and impose them as regulatory framework and conditions, on the UN. This is precisely the reason why, in order to prevent a politicization of UN staff positions, key management positions are reserved for, and filled with, expatriate experts so that UN staff is perceived as neutral and impartial.

UNDP and the UN as a whole have come to realize that in South Sudan, economic recovery and the creation of employment opportunities are key to peacebuilding and ensuring lasting...

From a conceptual point of view, any given type of intervention that is preceded by some sort of selective process of filtering and determining the final set of beneficiaries entitled to receive support, also entails the risk of the non-selected feeling treated unjustly and sometimes openly expressing related frustrations. While this is certainly less the case or even unknown for such activities as Global Fund interventions (to fight HIV, malaria, tuberculosis), A2J support for SGBV survivors or any other type of service that can be construed as “negative” selection or potential stigmatization, there will always be projects that also at least have elements of a “positive” selection where being part of the beneficiary group is seen as a privilege or advantage (e.g., being selected as GEMS beneficiary). This implies that related complaints about perceived unjust treatment, in most cases put forward by individuals or groups/entities for not having been selected, might actually not be warranted; e.g., if selection criteria were not met by the complaining non-beneficiary individual(s).
sustainable social cohesion and peace. This implies that peacebuilding activities can only take you so far. Once minimum thresholds of peace have been reached then jobs need to be created to give the youth a future. Structurally, at the current point, in all likelihood, many jobs still depend on the economy of war including warlordism, militias, cattle rustling etc. This conflict-based economy needs to transition to a regular, civilian model, and UNDP along with other actors will remain called upon to promote this process for probably quite some time beyond the end of the current CPD cycle.

**EQ 15. To what extent did the outcomes achieved benefit women and men equally?**

In as far as the key results related to the peacebuilding and reconciliation processes are concerned, the achievements equally benefitted women and men in that they do not differentiate between gender categories since targeting society at large regardless of age, gender, educational level, religion, clan affiliation and other identity markers. For instance, the 18 national and local mechanisms on peace and reconciliation in place in 2020 in all conflict clusters including the establishment and operationalization of national and regional peace dialogues, peace committees, peace and reconciliation commission, joint migration conferences, peace actor’s coordination forums and other similar mechanisms benefitted everybody. Likewise, the development of the Civilian Disarmament Strategy for South Sudan which was disseminated in the first quarter of 2021 also benefitted both the entirety of male and female citizens.

With regard to gender specific targets, in general, the set proportion of female beneficiaries was mostly met if not exceeded. As a case in point, 66% female SGBV cases reported to authorities received judgment in the formal justice system while the target stood at 50% female cases, by end 2020 (indicator 1.2.1.). Similarly, 48.6% of indigent persons provided with legal aid services were women against a 30% target (indicator 1.2.3.); 74% of SGBV survivors benefitting from victim redress mechanisms including through transitional justice mechanisms were women against a projected target of 40%; 4,846 individuals (68% women), a figure way above the set target of some 330, were reached with entrepreneurship and skills development under the sustainable livelihoods skills, community-based skills and vocational skills training initiative covering various vocations including agribusiness, tailoring, hairdressing, food preparation, agriculture among other areas; and 28% of female eligible recipients vs. a set target of 24.8% received antiretroviral treatment.

### 5.4 Efficiency

**[Efficiency: The degree to which resources (funds, expertise, equipment, time, etc.) provided as inputs were economically used and converted into results.]**

**a. Conclusions & lessons learned**

**Key achievements and best practices:**

i. Resource mobilization capacity proved to be strong.

ii. Time-bound targets were quite often met early and performance levels not seldom exceeded set (final) targets.

iii. Gross and net budget absorption capacity reached more than satisfactory rates pretty much across the board.

**Key challenges:**
i. **Overall, longer-term development work is still in direct competition with short-term humanitarian support, and there is need for a deeper articulation of HRP design and implementation processes as well as funding flows, vis-à-vis a more sustainable HDPN approach.**

ii. **The South Sudanese operational context is characterized by high costs of doing business due to the compounded effects of high levels of insecurity, the pronounced need to import goods and services including human capacity, the remoteness of many targeted locations compounded by inaccessibility during the rainy season, etc.**

iii. **There are some (relatively minor) concerns regarding the design of some indicators.**

### b. Findings

**EQ 16. To what extent have programme outputs benefitted from economic use of resources?**

Total CPD resources mobilized during the first two years of implementation (i.e., 2019+2020) amounted to $227,870,970 equalling 86.6% of the indicative CPD planned resources for the entire CPD 2019-2021 budget of $263,100,000. In terms of the CPD’s share of the UNCF, the planned figure ($263.1m) represented 40.8% of the UNCF total budget volume. The budget actually mobilized during the first two years of the CPD cycle amounted to 35.3% of the total projected UNCF budget for 2019-2021 (UNCF 2019-2021 $645.000.000); whereas it covered 56.3% of the projected UNCF budget for 2019-2020 ($405.000.000). Other than its ability to raise resources and not only reach but likely, in the end, exceed budget targets in terms of resource mobilization, these figures reflect UNDP’s outstanding importance among UNCT member entities and as key strategic Government partner. Last but not least, it reflects high levels of trust and satisfaction with previous performance among the community of development partners as key funders of the CPD. This was factored into the budget design which shows that “other” (to be mobilized) funds make up more than 95% of the total CPD budgetary volume ($252.9m of $263.1m).

**Indicative resources as per CPD (2019-2021)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2019-2021</th>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>Outcome 2</th>
<th>Total CPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>$5,263,500</td>
<td>$4,945,500</td>
<td>$10,209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$83,500,000</td>
<td>$169,391,000</td>
<td>$252,891,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$88,763,500</td>
<td>$174,336,500</td>
<td>$263,100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of overall CPD budget absorption (gross and net “burn rate”), UNDP South Sudan showed very decent levels of performance as can be seen in the tables hereunder. During the first two years of the programme cycle (i.e., until end 2020) UNDP steadily hovered around a solid 85% of budget uptake in terms of expenditure vs. actual allocations. Monies spent against actually mobilized funds stood at more than 70% per year and overall (73.3% for 2019 and 2020, combined). Allocations against mobilized funds reached more than 85% per year, as well as combined for the two years which indicates UNDP South Sudan’s ability to deliver on operational aspects of planned project implementation. By end 2021, total expenditures made up some 63.5% of the total planned three-year CPD budget.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Resources Mobilized</th>
<th>Total Allocations</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td>$144,136,241</td>
<td>$122,958,402</td>
<td>$103,144,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
<td>$83,734,729</td>
<td>$74,347,715</td>
<td>$63,881,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019 + 2020</strong></td>
<td>$227,870,970</td>
<td>$197,306,117</td>
<td>$167,026,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allocated/ mobilized</th>
<th>Spent/ mobilized</th>
<th>Spent/ allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019</strong></td>
<td>85,3%</td>
<td>71,6%</td>
<td>83,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2020</strong></td>
<td>88,8%</td>
<td>76,3%</td>
<td>85,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2019 + 2020</strong></td>
<td>86,6%</td>
<td>73,3%</td>
<td>84,7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EQ 17. To what extent were quality outputs delivered on time?**

As can be seen in annex 7.2 ("Progress Overview Table"), while some indicators are still lagging behind or are progressing towards fully reaching set targets, there is a certain number of indicators that have met and/or exceeded targets on or before time. For example, under Output 1.1 (Strengthened communities and local-level institutions capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, management of resource-based conflicts and community cohesion), 22 migration agreements (against target of 12) between migrating pastoralist tribes and host communities had been signed and implemented, by end 2020, and the final two-year target had actually already been well surpassed by the end of the first year of implementation (18 agreements reached by December 2019).

Likewise, the number of national and local peace and reconciliation mechanisms in place had reached 15 (exceeding the final set target by 3) by end 2019 and 18 by end 2020. Also, under Output 1.2 (Institutional capacities and customary mechanisms at all levels strengthened to monitor, promote and protect citizen's rights and increase access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups and SGBV survivors) the set cumulative target of 12 police and community relationship committees established and operational at community level, was well exceeded by end 2019 (41) and reached 73 by end 2020. Output indicators 2.1.1 ("Number of people reached with lifesaving and emergency support services") and 2.1.2 ("Number of people reached with entrepreneurship and skills development, emergency employment and business support services") had exceeded their respective final year 2021 targets already, by end 2020. Finally, Indicator 2.3.1. (Coverage of tuberculosis, HIV and AIDS services disaggregated by sex, and type of service) also showed quite spectacular results reaching and exceeding time-bound targets across the board.

**EQ 18. To what extent were partnership modalities conducive to the delivery of outputs?**

As of 2020, to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, UNDP played a leading role in countering and controlling the COVID-19 pandemic through an integrated socioeconomic response (the SERP plan designed and implemented jointly with the RCO) including, among others, such diverse activities as sensitization, support related to nutrition and food security for vulnerable populations, the provision of health equipment, and the development of joint knowledge products through partnerships with South Sudanese academia. The SERP as such is a multi-agency platform drawing on the comparative advantages of UNCT members.
Formal or informal partnerships with other UN entities were entered into, inter alia, with UNMISS, UNEP, UNESCO, UN Women, UNFPA, WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF and OCHA. Partnerships with civil society included several dozen NGOs/CSOs as well as the Universities of Juba and Rumbek. At the institutional level, partnerships were entered into with a number of key ministries and State entities including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Planning and Finance and state level revenue authorities, the National police, justice and corrections institutions, the Independent Human Rights Commission, the public service commission, the Ministry of Labour and Public Service and Human Resource Development, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, the National Constitutional Review Commission, the Political Parties Council, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the South Sudan Humanitarian board, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Gender, the Ministry of Health etc.

Crucial processes supported through these partnerships included the NDS design, support to national SDG-related planning processes, the peace agreement and constitutional processes, truth, reconciliation and healing (done jointly by UNDP and OHCHR), support to strengthening community committees such as PCRCs (by UNDP, UNPOL and JICA), coordination support to the SSHF and high-level climate change-related support (NDS, Paris process etc.), and UNDP-backed UNFPA support (as sub-recipient under GF interventions) for expanded access to prevention and treatment services in favour of vulnerable key target populations (Female Sex Workers and their clients). In terms of gender-specific support provided, UNDP could show gender mainstreaming in the SSR as a stand-out best practice. Other crucial activities included the strengthening of justice sector capacities (SGBV/CRSV-related A2J etc.) and support to female leadership and women’s participation in WPS. Through its WPS activities, UNDP also provided police and justice support to female survivors of CRSV/SGBV. UNDP entered into a JP with UNICEF to address negative social norms; and collaborated with UNFPA through a PBF-sponsored JP on preventing and addressing SGBV. Through this JP, essential and comprehensive multi-sectoral services were provided in line with the UN Essential Services Guidelines for SGBV, incl. SGBV Safe Houses and one stop centers with integrated legal support and referrals to police and justice services). UNDP also ran a JP together with UNICEF on addressing negative social norms. UNDP also collaborates with the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs on law reform, the deployment of mobile courts, legal aid, and support to strengthening prosecutorial services. Together with UNMISS, UNDP worked on the Legal Aid Bill which seeks to address justice barriers faced by vulnerable groups including SGBV survivors.

A crucial innovative partnership modality is the NWOW/HDPN-inspired PIRR (Partnership for Recovery and Resilience) which was formally established in March 2018. The Partnership brings together 100+ stakeholders including donors, NGO/CSOs, national and state-level Authorities, and UN entities including UNDP as a key member alongside WB, DFID, USAID, UNMISS and other UNCT members. PIRR champions local ownership and integrates conflict sensitivity and flexibility in all aspects of its work, allowing it to develop new, inclusive ways of doing business to better help communities adapt and cope with the multiple shocks they face. The PFRR intervenes through its four pillars which are: i. Restore productive capacities, ii. access to basic services, iii. nurture effective partnerships; and iv. rebuild trust in people and institutions to facilitate a bottom-up approach in view of increased resilience and reduced vulnerability at community level. The PIRR embraces the principle of area-based programming to design evidence-based customized solutions to area-specific challenges and related needs (e.g., the Aweil Safety Net). This is underpinned by a strong focus on advocacy, knowledge management and learning, and data driven solutions. In 2019 and 2021, UNDP helped lead the organization of the PIRR Annual Learning Forum ensuring that its fora are not only used as platforms for knowledge sharing but also as a key mechanism for channeling the perspectives and needs of communities for a more effective and efficient response.

The delivery of results of key processes such as peace consolidation, ensuring the rule-of-law, revamping the national economy etc. is largely dependent on the capacity and ability of national institutions that UNDP is partnering with. Depending on the relative institutional strength and maturity of the various partnering institutions, these partnerships come with an inherent, at least
slight inbuilt double bind or dilemma in that the nominal Authority sometimes lacks the requisite capacity which at the same time is in the early days of still being ramped-up and further developed by UNDP (through the GEMS project etc.). Hence, the authority of tutelage is often at the same time the beneficiary and recipient of capacity development support, which implies that the requisite systemic and procedural capacity might still be somewhat lacking to lead complex processes to fruition. This points towards the limitations of the level of responsibility mirrored by the difference between attribution (of specific Outputs that UNDP is fully in control of) and contribution (to higher-level Outcomes where UNDP cannot be held solely responsible but can also not fully claim success, if applicable). Some stakeholders were of the opinion that especially for the political processes supported by UNDP in the realm of the peace consolidation and constitution making processes, there was still a lack of proper mechanisms, policies or laws in place to ensure that UNDP work will have a proper and lasting, sustainable impact.

Other than that, key challenges still standing in the way of lasting delivery of outputs include the following:

- Persistent negative social norms including the practice of early marriage, a low literacy rate among women, inequalities in decision making, a high incidence of SGBV etc. Also, decision making below highest levels of public sector decision making are relevant (at community level, in households);
- Low capacity of CSOs/NGOs who serve as IPs who are often themselves in need of prior training for more complex tasks such as substantive assessments for GEWE (e.g., SGBV, A2J/courts) etc.;
- Covid-19 increased incidence of SGBV (domestic violence) and a related culture of silence, with victims/survivors sometimes forced to marry the perpetrator;
- Particularly in Jonglei state, frequent expansive flooding negatively impacts on project implementation;
- Other than staff capacity-related issues, state entities esp. in the regions also lack basic equipment and infrastructure;
- There is a major language-related issue since the “old guard” of civil servants who were educated and inducted as civil servants during the pre-independence regime only master Arabic (rather than English) as administrative/professional tool of communication;
- Frequent turn-over of key administrative staff due to a culture of exchanging civil servants by newly appointed top management who is politically appointed, which saps institutional memory and capacity investments into staff capacity.

**EQ 19. To what extent did monitoring systems provide management with a stream of data that allowed it to learn and adjust implementation accordingly?**

Especially in the justice sector, the absence of a digital case management system undermines systemic performance and the quality of service delivery. Best practices in the area of monitoring and learning would be the contribution of partners to KM studies and assessments especially in the field of the PBF-supported SGBV JP where the four participating organizations all contributed to M&E work in Bor and Aweil. Some non-UNDP interviewees pointed out that as of recently, they could note a keen interest in improving M&E. For instance, there is an on-going recent initiative to enhance the gender sensitivity of M&E within UNDP. As part of this process, existing gender assessment tools were revised. Similarly, PfRR-specific M&E tools were recently gender mainstreamed. Along the same vein, some stakeholders intimated that they would anticipate interest among stakeholders (incl. donors) to experiment with a novel format of joint sessions between GEWE and M&E groups with possible inclusion of the Communication group; be it at UNDP, UNCF or NDS-PWG level. personnel… even together with Communications group.

UNCF Outcome indicators that serve as CPD Outcome indicators depend on higher-order statistical capacity. Related capacity building is the domain of UNFPA rather than UNDP, with the exception of SDG (localization) support. The predominant role of the humanitarian crisis and related programming response both via the UN and other stakeholders has had, and keeps having, an impact on the comparative space and available financial funding for development efforts, affecting the relative weight and visibility of the UNDP CPD and its respective projects under the CPD. Pinning down the concrete impact of UNDP’s programme/project activities, especially when it comes to discerning UNDP’s relative contributions to high-level results that many other different
actors at the country level are also contributing to, remains a challenge. Moreover, other than tangible programme results that come with a “price tag” in the sense of a clear budget line for related “hard” outputs, there is the dimension of catalytic, “soft” support through behind-the-scenes advocacy, UNDP supporting UNMISS’ diplomatic efforts of good offices or brokering alliances or agreements etc. The political-developmental nexus is linked to contributions to higher-level processes and results, including the more elusive or intangible effects of “leverage” and political catalytic effects.

Regarding process-oriented day-to-day reporting on and monitoring of field-level project implementation including service delivery via NGO/CSOs, UNDP carries out spot-checking while basic M&E processes are carried out by the IPs, themselves. Data is then consolidated by programme officers and aggregated at corporate level by specialized M&E staff who are supervised by CO programme management. Under the YEEP, the constant monitoring of costs, outputs and results has allowed STARR to appreciate the cost-effectiveness of different implementation modalities (via UN agencies vs. NGOs). This informed the Project Board’s decision to shift to an implementation modality that utilizes national CSOs through a clear national capacity building approach. The PIRR platform and Safety Nets initiative have a strong focus on M&E and might serve as corporate best practice "case study" to learn from (to replicate and/or scale useful processes and systems), across the board. Across the board, the missing link has been a standardized methodology allowing to monitor and track the actual effects of capacity building investments. This would require a corporate investment (possibly beyond the CO level), but simple perception based qualitative data streams would be an alternative to building more complex, objective systems. Arguably, the subjective approach is even superior since the sense of empowerment that comes with successful capacity building interventions is best gauged by the beneficiaries, themselves, who also have the (qualitative) concrete anecdotal data as well as, potentially, quantified specifics output metrics (before-after data on changes in through-put, input-output, revenue and profit etc.) at hand to “objectify” the change.

In terms of the indicator framework’s indicators and related reporting practices, the following critical remarks need to be made:
(a) The differentiation between gross and net values (non-accumulated yearly and accumulated multi-year and baseline-plus-yearly results) not always clearly observed;
(b) There is no comprehensive system in place to measure gains in systemic capacity;
(c) Under Indicator 1.1.1 it is not clear why the target is “12” since the number of regions adds up to 8 (6+2), only;
(d) For Indicator 1.1.2 meta-data are lacking about target values (12x regional) and how the aspect of capacity development (“strengthened”) is (to be) measured;
(e) Output 1.2 includes customary mechanisms whereas indicators not mention the latter (indicator 1.2.1 is about the formal system, only);
(f) Under Output 1.3 / Indicator 1.3.1 there are questions surrounding the target value of the intended quantity of institutions (7 + 8 regional legislative assemblies = 15; or 31 as mentioned in the footnote referring to electoral management bodies);
(g) Under Indicator 1.2.2, the target was set at 10 community-level committees whereas, over the time span of the CPD, a much higher final target could have been set;
(h) Under Footnote 32, meta data is lacking (data source and/or methodology used for score attribution).

5.5 Sustainability

[Sustainability: The likelihood of successful continuation of programme/project implementation after external development assistance has come to an end.]

a. Conclusions & lessons learned

Key achievements and best practices:
i. The underlying logic of the capacity building approach used for the GEMS (cascade approach rather than "mirroring"/one-on-one tutoring) appears promising.

ii. The PIP approach qualifies as best practice that should be replicated on a larger scale to test out innovative solutions.

iii. Overall, the strategic choice of linking a strong anti-poverty and skills building approach under Outcome 2 with the peacebuilding focus (social cohesion, conflict mitigation and resolution, reconciliation, A2J) of Outcome 1 constitute a sustainable recovery package.

Key challenges:

i. In the recent past, there was an unfortunate pattern of complete overhaul of civil service staff following changes in political leadership, which negatively affected institutional memory and capacity.

ii. The actual level of capacities is sometimes lower than originally assessed, by UNDP, which results in too high a threshold of training interventions that exceeds basic demand and thus created a gap between the bulk of capacity training needs and expectations and the higher-level management training on offer.

iii. Limited understanding of program/project design processes (esp. the GEMS & trade projects) by Government institutions, resulting in limited levels of involvement and unfounded expectations; which negatively affects the degree of buy-in and appropriation, creates unnecessary GoSS-UNDP friction and mutual frustration, and represents a missed opportunity in terms of capacity building.

iv. In terms of capacity building of the administration, the linguistic issue (Arabic as language in civil service or not) needs to be carefully studied and different options ought to be costed (including hidden opportunity costs on social cohesion if staff were to be laid off and replaced etc.).

v. Perceived delays in fund administration have resulted in considerable levels of frustration among IPs (MoTI, BCSSCAC etc.), sometimes culminating in disruption of service (community police/ECC abandoning positions).

b. Findings

EQ 20. What indications are there that the outcomes will be sustained, e.g., through requisite capacities (systems, structure, staff, etc.)? & EQ 21. To what extent has a sustainability strategy, including capacity development of key national stakeholders, been developed or implemented?

Capacity building was mainstreamed across the CPD. The STARR project, to cite but one example, used an innovative capacity development approach including infra-level rehabilitation and upgrading, enhancement of vocational instructors’ skills, and standardization of vocational training modules to GOSS standards and content, in view of ensuring enhanced delivery of vital vocational skills training. In terms of explicit investments into training activities through the CPD, UNDP spent a combined total of $4.7m on training beneficiaries, in 2019 and 2020 ($2.6m in 2019; $2.1m in 2020). These costs included DSA (overnight, meal and transportation costs), equipment, rental costs for venues etc. By mid-2021, this figure had reached about $5.3m which translates into some 2% of the overall projected CPD budget. In reality, though, the investments made into building local capacity go way beyond this amount of money since capacity building is mainstreamed across the entire CPD including investments into infrastructure, equipment, indirect skills transfer, direct skills transfer through modalities other than trainings and workshops, UNDP staff time and whole units.
such as the Accelerator Lab whose purpose is to promote innovative programming ultimately serving sustainable capacity development.

While it is difficult to ascertain to what extent skills were effectively transferred, absorbed and understood, and are actually ultimately put into practical use by recipients of any such activities, there are a range of interventions that were specifically designed to transfer skills and build local expertise. Such activities include the contribution of the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) who are teamed up with local staff along specific lines of work such as twinning arrangements among medical staff and other professions. UNDP also mobilized the expertise of its staff involved in operations, administrative and financial tasks to build the capacity of national counterparts (HACT and related assessments, auditing, comptrolling etc.). In addition, the PFM work entails an important amount of direct capacity building work of civil service staff and related systems building.

The administrative apparatus is riddled with continuously scare resources. By law, a certain proportion of revenue generated by the country’s petroleum resources should go to communities which in principle should provide for a solid resource base to rebuild infrastructure, purchase basic equipment, put civil servants on the pay-roll to provide basic social services etc. However, the revenue from oil sales is minimal due to the fact that the price per barrel of crude has crashed due to the Covid-induced global economic slump. Because of the Covid-crisis and the associated lockdowns, the world economy currently experiences its worst slump in peacetime since the great depression of the 1930s and South Sudan’s economy is not spared from the crisis.

In the absence of oil revenue the state coffers are running a deficit against projections and the payment of salaries is badly affected, which undermines civil servants’ motivation levels and affects performance in service delivery. In addition, there is a marked lack of accountability and transparency in the oil sector. Due to sector-specific inefficiencies including corruption, some companies have left the country altogether in recent months. Linked to this, there is a general wariness among the population that the totality of the limited revenues effectively generated will be used for the common good. The energies sector is not the only one where responsible state institutions suffer from very low capacity levels. There are even fears that the inability of the Government to solve such as issues as major land conflicts, related conflict levels could escalate and become an actual driver of renewed conflict with people taking the law in their own hands.

While there are some concerns about the sustainability of using consultants for specific assignments in cases where time is of the essence, requisite capacity cannot be quickly built and is not readily available among existing staff (or candidates for regular employment from the local/national labour pool), there are hardly any other options. Likewise, if national consultants are not available then the only remaining option is to hire an international consultant. To overcome and complement the traditional approach of injecting short-term expertise through consultants for specific tasks such as writing draft policy documents and strategies etc., UNDP is now investing into a more systematic and what is deemed to be a much more sustainable approach, via the GEMS project which started in August 2019. UNDP uses a blend of direct implementation and building capacity with a view to the GOSS taking over the lead in implementation. The GEMS initiative was designed to support the transitional period by building sustainable Government capacity within the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) mandated, among other things to implement the revitalized peace agreement with a renewed promise of no return to war, reintegrate refugees and internally displaced persons, undertake legal and institutional reforms, enforce accountable economic governance and improve service delivery to citizens.

The GEMS project builds on previous IGAD-financed projects that were run before, with the crucial difference that rather than using the twinning approach used under IGAD, the so-called special skills experts (SSE) under GEMS are mostly South Sudanese, apart from some expatriate
experts. The project was designed in such a way that the experts could be national or international. To support on-the-job training, the project also provides support to the rehabilitation of the public service training center of the Government, other than providing public training sessions based on a revised public service master curriculum. (Meanwhile, capacity building of the political leadership is supported through the Political Party Commission.) The GEMS project is not primarily dealing with bringing any changes to the public service as such. Its focus is, rather, on building and consolidating requisite skills needed to fulfill the Peace Agreement. It is therefore not so much concerned with setting up detailed structures regarding a reform of the public service, at large. While during IGAD-backed projects the risk and end result often was that the “twinned expert” would not build but effectively, fill or replace the desired capacity and end up doing the actual job in lieu of empowering the local staff to do so, over time.

Under the GEMS project’s approach, the expert trainers are not meant to enter into “twinning” or one-on-one mentorship arrangement but rather, build the capacity of entire teams of civil servants. The logic is that through general provision of capacity development there would even be a positive effect on the speed of the Peace Agreement, since appeasing factions by showing that the civil service is beginning to gain traction and the State machinery has matured to the point of being ready to shift from resilience, recovery and stabilization to a full-fledged development logic. One third of the GEMS budget supports 52 special skills expert slots (split into two brackets, one covering issues of democratic governance and the other one addressing the economic governance side) to be placed among 26 GoSS entities including ministries, state institutions, agencies etc. Each special skills experts is supposed to train 5-6 mid- to senior level staff called “change agents” who in turn will become in-house on-the-job mentors who provide training of members of public service working inside Ministries and Departments. Hence, the GEMS project is intrinsically embracing a cascade approach which arguably makes it more cost efficient and impactful. The GEMS project can provide specialized training to hire trainers that will run training courses.

Currently, discussions are on-going with the state institution responsible for the TVET- VCTs to use some of their facilities to run courses while the key campus of the administrative training center that was completely destroyed by fighting is still being refurbished. Meanwhile, many civil servants are in need of basic training such as typewriting and computer classes. The GEMS project does not have a budget line for providing this kind of training support or purchasing any equipment such as laptop computers, for that matter. Similarly, the change agents identified to benefit from GEMS training are supposed to be equipped by the GoSS. Moreover, the GEMS project is not primarily dealing with bringing any changes to the public service as such. Its focus is, rather, on building and consolidating requisite skills needed to fulfill the Peace Agreement. It is therefore not so much concerned with setting up detailed structures regarding a reform of the public service, at large.

Also, the issue of lacking infrastructure, derelict equipment or the absence of sometimes even most basic office supplies esp. in the regions, compounded by frequent payroll interruptions mean that even if the GEMS approach were to be effectively scaled and in the sense of successfully building staff capacity, to ensure the delivery of public service there would still be need for some heavy-weight financiers such as the AfDB or WB to come in and provide the costly infrastructure and payroll support, in addition to a PFM reform, since these remain major obstacles that are not even tackled by GEMS.

It is yet too early to declare whether the GEMS approach actually works as foreseen since for the time being, the speed of implementation is lagging behind. There remains a big gap between the

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50 Currently, all the individuals contracted as SSes are from South Sudan, while international experts only intervene intermittently on a case-by-base basis via the Virtual Economic Support Team which is a complementary remote support mechanism.

51 In this regard, the concern was voiced that a twinning approach following the classic mentor-mentee bilateral training model might have been a better choice since more straightforward and cutting out the risk factor of to what extent the “change agents” actually act as such (by providing quality training services to their peers including at the regional State level, which might effectively be beyond control of UNDP since the trained staff are public servants who do not answer directly to the UN but to their own in-house leadership).
planned and the actually available GEMS project budget. Due to delays in the overall peace
dialogue, activities started with more than a year of a delay, in June of 2020, only. By mid-2021,
the hiring process to fill the special skills agent positions was still on-going. From UNDP’s vantage
point, a key issue seems to be that at least in some cases, the actual level of actual capacities was
actually lower than originally assessed. This resulted in too high a threshold of training interventions
exceeding basic demands. The GEMS design might actually have placed the second step before
the first, creating a gap between the bulk of massive general capacity training needs and
expectations and the limited higher-level management training on offer. Be that as it may, through
the foreseen provision of 12 GEMS change agents to key institutions dealing with economic
development-specific issues, specialized training to implement the extractive industries initiative
(EITI) as well as support in economic statistics and operating the aid management system is
foreseen once it becomes fully functional. (Related to this, the Public Financial Oversight
Committee is supposed to be supported through PFM support provided through the CPD. Even
though this capacity support comes more in the form of capacity replacement rather than capacity
development, it has been gaining decent traction, recently.) Since the price of crude oil dropped
the Government has been facing dire financial problems.

UNDP was often approached to pay for renting buildings for administrative offices or purchase gas
for generators etc. to maintain basic operational ability. Due to the way the project budgets are
structured it was not possible to honour any such requests, which led to frustrations on the part of
GoSS. Similarly, the payment of basic equipment and provision of basic training courses could not
be provided, particularly through GEMS, since the project was designed to serve a different
purpose. UNDP PFM support did allow GoSS, however, to access additional revenue from non-oil
revenue sources such as customs duties and taxes which are now being collected. Also, not least
thanks to UNDP support, the GoSS could now access fresh cash by accessing replenished Special
Drawing Rights (SDR).

Based on information shared by Government stakeholders, the following key observations can be
made in view of how they perceive existing challenges in view of sustainability:

- Limited degree of involvement of Government institutions in program design and
  subsequent project implementation, with some state ministries claiming they had not been
  sufficiently consulted esp. during the design stage (example: needs assessment informing the
  Youth empowerment project);
- Government institutions are only given the task of carrying out project activities which
  causes delays in delivery;
- Neglect of the capacity development aspect for government staff especially in terms of
  obtaining buy-in and ownership, which also hampers full shared accountability for results;
- Lack of adequate infrastructure combined with the conflict situation is not conducive to
  service delivery not is it particularly sustainable;
- Lack of equipment including transportation vehicles;
- Unsustainably high cost of moving staff;
- Low human capital and need for long-term capacity development;
- Linguistic rift between old generation of “pre-independence” civil servants and young
generation proficient in English;
- Delayed salary payments negatively affected the productivity of the employees virtually
  across all sectors. A striking example in this respect are the Emergency Call Centres (ECCs)
established in Wau and Juba by UNDP A2J were heavily disrupted (in the words of some
government stakeholders, services had collapsed because all trained police officers who were
supposed to operate the radio rooms abandoned their positions because they had not been paid
in 7 months).

In all fairness it must be added here that the sometimes harsh criticism voiced by some Ministry
staff apparently arises from false expectations since for quite a few of the mentioned challenges,
UNDP is not at all or only partially responsible since outside of the UN(DP)’s control and/or
mandate. A certain number of misinterpretations or misunderstandings seem to have cropped up
since the beginning of the CPD and this, notwithstanding the level of involvement of GOSS in
Despite explanations and sharing information on workplans for example, institutions still continued to write letters (even sometimes wrongly advised by a few UNDP staff themselves) to make requests outside the scope of co-designed, co-validated and co-implemented project documents and/or the AWP. This resulted in inefficiencies including unnecessary friction and general frustration, adding the stress factor on the UNDP staff who need to constantly manage those expectations. The appropriate cure could be enhanced communication and capacity development including, if possible, strengthening the level of involvement of GoSS counterparts in project design, and implementation, including monitoring, oversight and handling of complaints. Obviously, (high) staff turnover is likely another important factor that also contributes to the abovementioned issues. In the current “seller’s market” (i.e., a scarcity of goods, buyers’ limited choice, and high prices) characterized by a limited pool of qualified candidates, there is relatively high staff volatility caused by upward mobility, addressing general staff attrition requires a systemic approach coordinated across sectors and stakeholders.

An important cross-cutting concern (related to the above issue of the need to manage expectations) that needs to be better addressed than currently being the case is the design of a clear exit strategy, as well as related investments. This would be linked to the design of assessments, the entry point and underlying logic (or theory of change) and the type and group/recipient of trainings. Other than a clear focus of training on-the-job, what is currently missing is a standardized approach to measure if/how trainings have had any effect or impact, at all. While the short-term project initiation plan (PIP) modality was put to use in terms of operational work linked to building capacity in the domain of HACT, this approach is also well suited to ensure a sustainable stop gap exit strategy coming in towards the final phase of a project cycle if it becomes clear that a bridging arrangement is required to avoid a brusque unsustainable end to a project without any phase-out allowing for proper hand-over or the modelling of a new, subsequent project phase to build on previous, initial investments. For instance, any loose ends of projects that did not have a proper phase-out strategy or that due to delays or other reasons are struggling to phase out in spite of the existence of an exit strategy on paper, could be bundled into a packaged project of “Enablers”. In South Sudan, a PIP set up to help the Ministry of Finance to design their Strategic Plan was picked up by the PFM portfolio. This has by now blossomed into the birth of a GoSS procurement body working with different ministries including MoFA. The full-fledged unit’s staff are now preparing their international CIPS level 1 certification.

Nevertheless, GoSS capacity in terms of operational and financial management across the board still remains very low and there is need for UNDP to change gears, in this regard. Hands-on training of technical staff and managers in PFM institutions such as the Central Bank and the National Auditor’s Office to build HACT capacity etc. is needed for unless this capacity exists the projects’ will not be able to implement their exit strategy other than in theory. Currently, the situation is such that several rounds of micro-assessments show limited progress: basic data management capacity remains very low with almost no standardized digital record keeping or archives, no databases or computerized systems, and very limited human resource capacity and skills. Hence, carrying out a macro-assessment does not make sense and is actually not possible. Meanwhile, opportunities to better articulate interventions carried out under GEMS and PFM, who have the same target group or at least substantial overlap, seem to have been missed, which in turn affects overall sustainability of interventions in this area. Similarly, potential synergies between PaCC (under Outcome 1) and STARR (under Outcome 2) that use similar capacity development approaches might become more sustainable if there was a more coherent capacity development strategy underpinning such approaches across the CPD.

EQ 22. Did UNDP programmes provide viable models that had the potential for scaling? What are the factors that facilitated the adoption/ scaling up of UNDP’s initiatives?

To ensure national ownership of programme processes, the CPD attempted to put special emphasis on its engagement at the sub-national and community levels. Under the UNDP PaCC project, the evaluators observed that the Bureau of Security and Small Arms Control had the ownership of the project, and was fully engaged in the planning and implementation of activities though the project funds were under UNDP control and management. The government institutions
received new leadership after the R-TGONU was formed in February 2020. UNDP sustained the existing partnerships particularly with the relevant line ministry who considered them as the partner of choice. However, key informants noted that every time there was a change in administration, the entire state civil administration would also be overhauled, thereby affecting institutional memory and capacity. At community level, UNDP works with existing structures, including CSOs who are key partners to deliver programmes where UNDP does not have a strong presence or no direct footprint at all, and who can thus provide an institutional basis for sustainability. While it is a bit early to make a strong related recommendation since lessons still need to be learned, a project with a potentially viable model for scaling is the triple nexus-type PIRR joint programme in Awiel which started half a year ago (early 2021). Under the PIRR, Smile Again Africa Development Organization (SAADDO) is UNDP’s implementing partner (IP) for social safety net activities, and where other participating UN agencies also had implementing partners involved. Additionally, UNDP strengthened its working relationship on the rule of law with other UN partners through joint work with UNMISS on mobile courts; UNPOL on community policing; UN Women on gender mainstreaming in Security Sector reforms and UNICEF on justice for children.

Notwithstanding some tensions in relations between National counterparts and its UN partners including UNDP over mainly (comparatively, relatively petty) financial and administrative issues, UNDP has continued to engage the government across the CPD’s Outcome areas and programmatic pillars. For example, UNDP continues to work with the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP) to ensure sustainability of public finances across all levels of government and provide economic advisory services. Other key line ministries are also regularly consulted and engaged in programme planning. However, the national partner faces a huge capacity shortfall in skills and resources that consequently limits their involvement. For example, in Torit, UNDP (A2J) supported SSPS with capacity building of GBV police officers and constructed a Special Protection Unit for GBV cases. However, during the field visit, the officials noted that they did not have adequate and appropriate office equipment such as computers for record keeping, access to internet nor basic office supplies such as stationery. While this information is certainly relevant since it is evident that such shortages seriously hamper their ability to effectively discharge their official mandate, it is also important to place this in context: For often it is the role of government rather than UNDP’s responsibility to provide the missing material items under any given UNDP project. Due to budgetary constraints the purchases committed to at the beginning of a project as part of the inputs to be provided under the Prodoc to ramp up and/or support the implementation of project activities, sometimes fail to be followed through with.

**EQ.23. To what extent are policy and regulatory frameworks in place that will support the continuation of benefits?**

CPD development of policies and strategies embrace a broad view of sustainability. For example, UNDP provided technical advisory support for the NDS formulation to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue to ensure that all stakeholders involved in the implementation of the NDS (government, partners, civil society and private sector) mainstreaming in stakeholder plans. Gender mainstreaming in agency and sector plans will create demand for gender disaggregated data and inform gender-based budgeting. The CPD pillars all include upstream policy components including supporting the national revitalized peace agreement, subsequent constitution making that will lead to elections, adherence to climate change-related frameworks, public financial management (PFM) policy and related national econometric statistics and participating in regional trade and economic frameworks, among others. These frameworks and high-level platforms, taken together, form a solid scaffolding to build post-recovery work on. UNDP supports the South Sudanese government in building a peaceful society by promoting the rule of law and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, as a trusted partner working across sectors, with multiple stakeholders and important joint UN ventures, often on sensitive issues. Since UNDP sees youth as powerful agents of change it advocates for the inclusive participation of youth in decision-making and governance at all levels, which implies a lasting effect of the interventions assuming the youth will mature to become senior leaders, over time.

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52 According to one source, some related skills development components are now about to be scaled up with support AfDB.
While UNDP’s and other’s efforts to install solar panels are laudable, investing into additional availability of electrical power and computer gear which comes as guiding stars to the CPD’s Outcome structure. UNDP is currently developing an integrated framework on climate change, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and energy that brings together UNDP’s work in these areas and maximizes synergies. For example, UNDP supports the Ministry of Environment in implementing the three international conventions on combatting desertification, safeguarding biological diversity and on mitigating effects of and reducing the scale of, climate change. UNDP has set the organizational foundation for delivering on these highly integrated areas of work and pursues a joint approach that affords opportunities in securing development gains and building resilient societies to withstand the multiple challenges posed by rapidly increasing exposure to disaster and climate change risks.

UNDP’s A2J support has contributed to establishing and/or enhancing policy and regulatory frameworks in a number of different areas including legal aid, security sector laws, an anti-GBV law to address conflict-related sexual violence and SGBV, family law etc. The ongoing discussions related to the constitutional review and judicial reforms will result in the introduction of policy frameworks that are of critical importance to advancing the WPS agenda, judicial independence, people centered justice reforms, and legal pluralism. An overriding concern not only but particularly in the legal sector, is the need to shift from paper-based administrative business processes to digitalization. This is an opportunity but also has its own specific challenges, in the South Sudanese context. For instance, in the justice sector, the introduction of a case management system is badly needed. However, for the time being, there is no such system in place. Also, in general, the number of computers is limited, there are no proper back-ups and anti-virus firewalls to protect sensitive data, power generators are lacking. While UNDP’s and other’s efforts to install solar panels are laudable, investing into additional availability of electrical power and computer gear which comes to mind as immediate potential quick-fix solution, would not automatically solve systemic capacity issues.

First and foremost, the capacity of staff needs to be improved. Introducing ICT technology to the workplace in and by itself is not sufficient since obviously, the staff also need to be able to use such equipment. Here, it must be noted that justice chain actors have in the past been provided ICT equipment but this has not translated into improved justice delivery. While a basic case management system was put in place it was never automated. The need remains to build a culture of accountability to enhance staff performance and overall institutional performance levels; and to introduce service quality principles and set performance standards based on quantitative and qualitative indicators that the actors can be held accountable against. In this regard, training staff in using computers and programming related databases is not as straightforward as it might seem given that in South Sudan, a considerable number of staff are not fluent in English but rather, in Arabic. Operating in Arabic alphabet and script would require a workaround for software and hardware (such as interfaces in both languages, software and keyboards according to the language of the user etc.). After all, a considerable number of especially mid-level, senior civil servants joined the ranks of the administration prior to independence and thus received their training in Arabic. Whereas “Juba Arabic” serves as vernacular and is widely utilized even among the younger generation, officially, Arabic is not an official national language of South Sudan.

However, since English now serves as the sole official language the goal is now for all civil servants to be able to conduct business in English. The linguistic issue is complex and calls for differentiated solutions. Retraining Arabic-speaking civil servants, esp. if they are older, to a skills level needed to carry out professional administrative record keeping, interaction with clients/customers etc. would likely take a long time and require substantive financial means. On the other hand, any training comes with direct and indirect costs attached to it. Training time also comes with its own opportunity costs since at least part of it would need to be carried out during office hours through an in-service training modality. In cases where there would not be a sufficient number of replacements to substitute the trainees during office hours, this would impact on the quantity of staff on duty which would likely negatively affect service performance levels. In services such as prisons where the ability to communicate with inmates is essential, the language barrier is a serious issue. Even from a broader standpoint, a situation in which the staff running the prisons is Arabic-
speaking and inmates might not (or vice versa), is unfortunate. Intuitively, it seems more sustainable to invest into junior staff (incl. new recruits) that are fluent in English rather than providing language training to non-English speaking staff. In following the suggestion of some stakeholders, hiring a cohort of new young recruits fluent in English (“putting fresh blood into the system”, as one informant put it) would follow the logic of (linguistically) anglicizing the administration. Relegating Arabic-speakers to back office jobs would not be an option under such a scenario. Also, there might actually be at least a small clientele (parts of society) esp. among the older segments of the population who share a similar background and thus speak Arabic rather than English.

This being said, retiring Arabic-speaking staff wholesale is likely not viable since this might create a rift even at the level of social cohesion possibly leading to disgruntlement, frustration and loss of livelihoods for the concerned and their families. Due to the absence of an attractive retirement incentive (“golden hand-shake”) or pension scheme for civil servants they likely would not be leaving, voluntarily. Hence, before any larger cohorts of Arabic-speaking civil servants were to be laid off a pension scheme might be called for, to avoid frictions. Hence, a hybrid approach incl. retraining the younger staff, using Arabic-speaking staff for specific tasks that actually require Arabic skills, or teaming them up with English-speakers (with whom they share a common 3rd language) for specific tasks (e.g., for police officers, such as patrolling/policing etc.) could be considered. Either way, the current programme design of related CPD support does not foresee any capacity development components for English language training, nor for basic office skills such as computer usage and typing, for that matter. This would need to be rectified if the staff devoid of such skills were to be fully capacitated and thereby, more fully integrated into the machinery.

EQ 24. What are the critical factors for the consolidation of local-level outcomes of UNDP support?

The country-wide presence of UNDP with offices located in regional State capitals across the country allow to implement adjusted solutions that are adapted to the specific profile and demand at sub-regional level. Local-level outcomes are consolidated by virtue of tailored solutions such as the safety net project specifically tailored for the needs of Aweil. UNDP does not use a cookie-cutter approach but rather implements a mix of projects as per regionally adapted needs. Also, a number of policy-centric national level interventions are further broken down to the level of regional states. Related examples of tailored solutions include:

-1) Apart from the national peace and reconciliation mechanism, 17 local mechanisms on peace and reconciliation have been established by 2020 in all conflict clusters including the operationalization of local-level peace dialogues, peace actor’s coordination fora and a Civilian Disarmament Strategy;  
-2) 68 new police and community relationship committees were established and operational at community level bringing the total to a cumulative total of 73;  
-3) A total projected number of 6 subnational governments, 4 private sector institutions and 10 CSOs are projected to integrate nationally identified SDGs and other international frameworks in their plans and budgets (N.B.: The establishment of the transitional government process and COVID-19 restrictions have been stalling the functioning of the government structures. Still, these aforementioned key stakeholders already participated in the NDS review process.)  
-4) In addition to having supported the finalization of the national-level South Sudan National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a policy document whose objective outlines the strategic investment plan for climate change adaptation at national level, several subnational climate change adaptation and mitigation plans are being developed and implemented;  
-5) In terms of PFM support, UNDP supports the diversification of revenues collected at state level and presently, Revenue authority reports are being prepared by the Ministry of Finance (by May 2021, data collection in the states was carried out with support by the National Bureau of Statistics to collect and classify revenue collection data on taxpayers in three target states; also, the tax office in Aweil is structured according to the profile of tax sources);
6) 3 State revenue acts were enacted in 2019 and unified tax systems established in 6 former States.

To ensure the rule of law country-wide including remote areas, justice services provided through traditional leaders who adjudicate cases at the community level are highly relevant to ensure access to justice, across the country including and especially in the most remote areas. The vast majority of community members obtain justice through such mechanisms. Linked to this is legal aid provision at the community level through CSOs and community paralegals who are mostly women. In addition the deployment of Mobile Courts to locations in the state to handle cases that are listed from county courts is a good practice on taking justice services closer to the people at the local level. It has the ripple effect of also reducing case backlog and prison congestion. A key lesson in this regard is to ensure that there is rationalisation of core justice services at the local level for justice delivery to be more impactful and felt by those who need it most. Therefore, police, investigation, prosecution, adjudication and legal aid services should all be made available in close proximity to address the multiple barriers of justice people face in South Sudan.

EQ 25. How judicious and sustainable do the partnership agreements/arrangements appear and to what extent have CPD partners committed to providing continuing support?

The collaboration with UN partners through JPs received high marks by stakeholders even though some critical remarks were made about the following: i. the need to completely overcome inter-UN agency rivalries and turf battles about the scope of agency mandates; ii. UNDP having a tendency to work in internal siloes; iii. smaller agencies (esp. NRAs) sometimes “not being treated as equals” by not always receiving vital information—e.g., about critical meetings and workshops, deadlines to comment on drafts, planned interventions—on time; iv. the need for continued cognizance of how to leverage respective agency strengths to be more intentional in scoping out who is best positioned to do what so as to fully tap into potential synergies, esp. in implementing the Peace Agreement.

The partnerships with CSOs work well, by and large, in spite of the general criticism mentioned by most NGOs interviewed, about funding cycles that are too short for designing and implementing durable solutions. The best practices in terms of HDPN/N WOW multi-partner platforms are the SSHF and the Partnership for Recovery and Resilience. While UNDP leverages its convener role with access to all relevant partners as managing agent of the fund, the PfRR serves to support economically and environmentally sustainable livelihoods, medium and long-term employment and inclusive economic growth by putting in place the building blocks to build a country’s resilience and ability to cope with unavoidable shocks by way of tailor-made integrated solutions, e.g. the social safety net in Aweil.

In the area of peacebuilding and democratic governance, UNDP played a major role in ensuring that PBF re-eligibility has recently been ensured which will immediately serve the purpose of constitution building, and transitional justice through support to the establishment and functioning of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing (CTRH). In this regard, UNDP collaborated strongly with UNMISS. Other valuable partnerships in the sphere of good governance and GEWE were entered into with UNESCO (communication aspects) and UN Women (SGBV etc.). UN Women and UNESCO, in particular, stressed the high level of collaboration and coordination. Key specific initiatives and entry points pursued mostly through partnerships include:

- Strengthening of legal framework, policies and institutional capacities that govern the extractives sector;
- Assisting in the formulation of the NDS and sectorial development planning strategies, policies and plans to ensure they incorporate interventions that promote inclusive sustainable development and poverty reduction;
• Strengthening institutional capacity to design, coordinate, implement and monitor national vision documents and development plans, and associated policy reforms;
• Supporting livelihoods (through IGA support via PCRC/ PaCC, PIRR, YEEP project etc.);
• Stabilizing disaster- and conflict-affected individuals, communities and societies to ensure that relief, recovery and development form a holistic and inter-linked programmatic continuum (e.g., via the PCRC project under PaCC).

EQ 26. How will concerns for gender equality, human rights and human development be taken forward by primary stakeholders?

UNDP, just like agencies such as UNICEF and FAO/WFP who have a dual developmental and humanitarian mandate, have an important role to play to ensure resilience and recovery from man-made as well as natural crises creating flows of refugees and/or IDPs. In South Sudan, where recent peace agreements never lasted too long, there has been a near constant need for humanitarian support over the past years; esp. since other than lingering high levels of conflict that keep flaring up in different pockets, there have been natural disasters such as climate change-induced flooding, locust infestations, and the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2020, the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) for which UNDP serves as managing agent, allocated US$62.4 million to a total of 63 humanitarian partners, through the standard and reserve allocation windows. The allocations enabled the delivery of timely, coordinated and principled assistance to 1.5 million most vulnerable people throughout the territory of South Sudan. Support was provided through the procurement of COVID-19 protective equipments in May and the support of flood response activities, as well as a scaled-up response to the most food insecure areas of the country.

Multi-cluster humanitarian programming was introduced to promote coordination thus enabling partners to deliver a comprehensive package of services through complementary activities, resulting in more effective utilization of services as well as heightened cost effectiveness. Enhanced SSHF partnership and mentorship approaches were explored, including partner sub-contracting and longer project life cycles to increase the level of sustainability of interventions. All these approaches will be upheld throughout 2021 and beyond given that COVID-19 is entering a new wave through the Indian delta variant, climate change effects are intensifying and locust pests have also been reappearing regularly and repetitively over recent years. The SSHF will keep promoting localization by channeling $20.6 million or 33 per cent of the allocated funds to national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Given the protracted nature of recurrent or latent conflicts (i.a., linked to cattle rustling, herder-farmer conflicts, retribution for child abduction etc.), UNDP will continue to collaborate with UNMISS, UN Women and UNESCO, on issues such as peace consolidation and conflict resolution. Through support to UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, there is an interface with UN Women in the peacebuilding and conflict resolution domain. Under the PBF JP to strengthen the dialogue for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan, started in 2020, UNDP acts as convening agency. Under the PBF Joint Project with OHCHR and UNHCHR on truth telling, reconciliation and healing, UNDP plays a similar role.

Other than the gender mainstreaming of corporate M&E as well as the UNCF’s M&E systems, carried out jointly with UN Women, UNDP systematically ensures the participation of women’s groups, youth groups, the disabled etc., in designing projects and determining beneficiaries. For gender-specific issues, relevant fora UNDP will participate in to carry forward the above-mentioned initiatives include the UNCF Results Group 4 co-chaired by UNDP, the Gender Humanitarian Coordination Group, the WPS TWG, the Gender Protection Group etc.

Regarding human rights work, UNDP supports the Human Rights Commission and a citizens’ taskforce to monitor the human rights aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Recommendations were made during the monitoring exercise to the High Level Task Force to address human rights issues and a final report was also drafted to inform subsequent waves of the pandemic. UNDP, OHCHR and UNW have supported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Gender to prepare reports to Treaty Bodies like the Committee on CEDAW and the UPR report to the Human Rights Council on the state of human rights in South Sudan. The reports have stimulated discussion and provided forward looking recommendations that government and CSOs
are implementing with the support of the UN and the international community. Strengthening of the national human rights machinery both through support to the human rights commission and human rights CSOs has seen some progress so far, albeit on a small scale. An area that UNDP could try to strengthen is the application of the human rights based approach (HRBA) as one of the five UN programming principles. HRBA is evidently also an important guiding principle for peacebuilding and development work. Improving the quality of both processes would allow UNDP to more clearly demonstrate how it is contributing to the realisation of human rights through its different units, portfolios and projects.

As mentioned earlier, UNDP South Sudan organizes policy sessions on an annual basis to present the yearly global human development report in view of discussing implications for South Sudan and disseminating relevant related policy recommendations that stem from or are informed by, the report. In the spring of 2020, as harbinger to the global pandemic that would begin to really hit the country in the weeks following the event, UNDP held a policy discussion on the global HDR discussing the applicability of the global theme on how disasters impact inequality. In 2020, the topic of the report was “COVID-19 and Human Development”.

5.6 Impact

[Impact: Transformative, structural change at the level of knowledge, attitude, behaviours and practices going deeper than, and beyond, mere surface-level adjustments.]

a. Conclusions & lessons learned

Key achievements and best practices:

i. Support to the National Dialogue as successful first-ever grass roots consultative process in South Sudan.

ii. Support provided to strengthening the peace infrastructure including the establishment of a ground-breaking conflict early warning and response system.

iii. The support to the NDS design led to the desired result.

iv. Improvement of public financial management landscape.

v. UNDP successfully dispensed its convening role for the SSHF.

vi. The Aweil Safety Net is a promising example of an HDNP project model.

vii. Initiation of important gender equality and women’s empowerment advancements.

viii. UNDP was instrumental in orchestrating the integrated response to the COVID-19 pandemic through coordinating the design and implementation of the SERP.

Key challenges:

i. Low levels of institutional capacity and service delivery undermine trust in the GoSS.

ii. Corruption, embezzlement and state revenue challenges compounded by the economic crisis.

iii. The multiple shocks and crises (conflict, climate change, Covid-19 etc.).

b. Findings

EQ 27. Are there any indications for (potential) impact triggered by the CPD? & EQ 28. Have there been any (potentially) quick-impact game changing effects that can be directly or indirectly linked to the CPD programme/projects (attribution or contribution/indirect effects via catalytic chain of events that were willingly or unwittingly triggered by CPD programme/Project interventions)?

Arguably, the National Dialogue as successful first-ever grass roots consultative process in South Sudan classifies under the category of positive impact, along with the support provided to strengthening the peace infrastructure including the establishment of an innovative early warning and response system, in that these are key building blocks to building and consolidating durable peace and stabilization laying the foundational cornerstones for sustainable development. Other than that, the evidence from stakeholders from both in and outside of UNDP suggests that it is too early to attribute any genuine impact to interventions, so far. However, there are a number of key enabling processes or intermediary results that deserve to be highlighted since qualifying for the category of potential or likely impact and, as such, can be listed as best practice(s). These include:

(a) CPD support to IGAD’s civil service’s capacity initiative under which Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda seconded experienced civil servants as support officers to South Sudan where they were paired with counterparts across a range of national institutions and sectors to rapidly develop core government capacity through a coaching and mentoring scheme;
(b) Through the PBF JP, UNDP contributed to starting a critical conversation on gender issues in the security sector (via SSR support) what has traditionally been, up to this point, a male-dominated space that was “gender blind”;
(c) UNDP, together with UNMISS, UN Women and UNESCO, ensured that PBF re-eligibility has now been ensured which is important in view of supporting the process of building a constitution which would be a key building block for lasting peace;
(d) Together with UNHCR, UNDP ensured PBF re-eligibility by drafting a project document (worth US$4m) designed to address truth, reconciliation and healing aspects of transitional justice; and by ensuring continued funding for a PBF project with OHCHR and UNICEF on breaking cycles of violence;
(e) Access to justice was provided specifically to the vulnerable, through 25 mobile courts jointly supported together with UNMISS and UNHCR;
(f) A coordinated programmatic response to SGBV (including protection, health, psychosocial, legal and police support) was provided together with UNFPA, UN Women and UNICEF;
(g) The GEMS project supports the Ministry of Public Service’s Commission for Salary and Remuneration to design a public service payroll system to curb the salary racket scheme (currently, there are many “ghost” public servants that do not exist or do not work, but for whom somebody is collecting a pay);
(h) The nascent tax system has made huge strides thanks to CPD support: UNDP PFM support allowed the GoSS to access additional revenue from non-oil revenue sources such as customs duties and taxes which are now being collected;
(i) Also, not least thanks to UNDP support, the GoSS could now access fresh cash by accessing replenished Special Drawing Rights (which, however, if solely used for paying off debts, will not serve to sustainably restructure the economy);
(j) The GEMS project is providing support to get the aid management system up and running;
(k) UNDP partnered with UNAIDS and WHO to design the HIV stigma index, do related trainings and produce an HIV stigma report, supporting HIV-affected women to openly talk about their capacity development needs (prior to this, these women had been afraid to attend trainings due to their HIV-positive status);
(l) As part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, UNDP supported MOH to upgrade the district health information system (DHIS2) and relevant Laboratory Information System applications through customization and enhanced interoperability to bolster relevant data
management capacities (including testing/case investigation, case confirmation and tracking, capacity development for data managers from CHDs and HF s to report quality routine health data into the system for enhanced decision making; retooling of key tools such as case investigation/case management forms linked to the COVID-19 DHIS2 Tracker, exploring and providing the opportunities to link the DHIS 2 to other systems in view of moving towards an integrated health data management system);

(m) At the community level, the UNDP-brokered Peace agreements have contributed to keep the peace and potentially saved a considerable number of lives;

(n) Transformational women’s leadership initiatives are building a base of aspiring female political leaders;

(o) CPD-supported inter-agency partnerships and community groups are now embracing a male gender championship approach (e.g., the Peace Coordinator in Bara Kazal appointed by the community is a male gender champion);

(p) In the area of A2J, UNDP carried out a mapping of relevant bodies of customary law and designed an advocacy and training tool for transitional justice that different partners are working with;

(q) Similarly, UNDP’s overall contribution to the PfRR (incl. the Safety Net model used in Aweil) and, on a larger scale, the SSHF and the peace process have helped to stabilize the country by putting it on the right track, prevent further conflict as well as address and mitigate humanitarian needs thereby (at least indirectly) saving lives;

(r) Together with UNESCO, UNDP designed a toolkit on conflict and gender sensitive reporting and trained about 350 grassroots-level radio journalists living and working in marginalized communities, on such issues as conflict resolution and the use of editorial guidelines to promote the use of responsible language, which has shown a tangible positive impact according to stakeholders since the incidence of hate speech being used during radio programmes has much decreased;

(s) The above-mentioned toolkit is now being used to train staff in-house by beneficiaries and journalists and a practical training-of-trainers cascade approach is being rolled out for journalists from selected media houses following the validation of the toolkit by the Media Development Institute;

(t) UNDP led the design of the integrated socioeconomic response to the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{54} It can be assumed that this response has already made a tremendous impact in reducing the death toll and the overall socioeconomic damage of the pandemic. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of lives saved, the magnitude of GDP loss averted etc., it is evident that in the South Sudanese context the pandemic would have most likely unleashed a “perfect storm” has it not been checked through a coordinated response, at all. As a matter of fact, South Sudan’s multi-dimensional vulnerability characterized by its under-resourced health care system, an extremely high poverty rate, widespread and high rates of malnourishment, the large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the country’s weak justice system and gender inequality, all contributed to exacerbating the socioeconomic/health crisis. Also, even before COVID-19 hit the country, South Sudan had already been afflicted by widespread sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Further compounding the crisis, and in addition to these structural barriers, the pandemic could not have arrived at a more untimely moment barring all-out civil war; for the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity had only been in office for a short time and remains caught up in post-conflict transition. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the pandemic, violence has spiked in places like Jonglei, where hundreds of civilians have been killed and at least 60,000 individuals have been displaced. Major reforms are still pending and further delays well into 2022 and even beyond cannot be ruled out but are, in fact, very likely. Other hindering factors include the heavy rainy season(s) complicating access to rural communities and hampering food distribution during times when there are both floods

and locusts present across large swathes the country. The curfew, limiting movement or social distancing to contain the pandemic, while indispensable to control the spread and damage of the virus in causing loss of lives, have resulted in the loss of income and jobs, and decreased production including loss of earnings for individuals, companies, and the State. UNDP’s coordination support provided to the UNCT has resulted in a programmatic retooling that is likely to have at least some positive mid- to long-term structural effects thanks to the principle of rebuilding better which is mainstreamed across the SERP. The contribution to saving lives is unfathomable. While the retooling of the CPD shows flexibility and responsiveness, determining specific results and the impact of the SERP require an altogether separate evaluation exercise that should wait at least a few more months so that the duration of the implementation period looked at is somewhat more consistent than currently the case.

(u) UNDP’s Accelerator Lab supported a promising CSO (the “GoGirls” ICT Initiative) which came up with an innovative solution to fight the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic (see text box below).
EQ 29. What has been the impact of the programme on the SDGs, in particular SDG16/Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; but also SDG5/Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; SDG10/Reduce inequality within and among countries

Notwithstanding the successful conclusion of the National Dialogue as grassroots consultative process and the introduction of a peace infrastructure including a conflict early warning and response system, South Sudan’s fragile post-conflict stabilization environment still has to be characterized as an on-going complex humanitarian emergency characterized by recurrent acute crises with conflicts frequently flaring up at the regional and local level. A high percentage of the population remains in need of basic amenities such as food, access to clean water and power, access to shelter and housing etc.). Hence, the overall policy needs to focus on resilience building and recovery since it would be premature to shift to an all-out focus on development issues. Governance systems are still weak and have actually recently deteriorated due to the ongoing economic crisis and prolonged conflict situation which has been affecting large swathes of the country. Stakeholders observed that the incidence of vulnerability was on the increase while the level of public service delivery remains virtually non-existent particularly at the local level. Related documentary evidence also supports the scenario that there is an increase in vulnerability.

In terms of the above-mentioned SDGs, major thematic and cross-cutting programme components were designed to strengthen peace infrastructures; build capacity to foster peaceful coexistence; foster community cohesion; protect citizen's rights; increase access to justice; enhance governance accountability; recover local economies; implement climate change adaptation solutions and strengthen government capacities and capabilities. Through the CPD, UNDP as the main UN development organization with a broad sustainable mandate works to eradicate poverty while protecting and helping the government institutions to develop strong policies, skills, partnership and sustainable development. Although achieving the SDGs requires a greater role of creativity, know-how, technology and financial resources, the CDP’s impact on the SSDGs comprises:

- Strengthened relevant national institutions through capacity building support: although the capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda was limited, advances were achieved in the form of (supporting the design of) the National Development Strategy (NDS) and integrating gender as a cross-cutting issue by ensuring mainstreaming in stakeholder plans.
- Promoted and enforced nondiscriminatory laws and policies for sustainable: The CPD has improved presence and operational capacity for the SSNPS and the NPSSS through infrastructure development police stations and prison facilities. For example, the programme supported infrastructure development of the Torit central prison through construction of class rooms and toilets. Although the CPD gave full support to law sectors, several challenges were put forward by the partners. For example, at Torit police station, there is no vehicle available to carry out policing operations.
- Promoted Rule of Law at National and state level and ensure access to Justice: The CPD advanced policy actions through Rule of Law forums, CP continued to facilitate the Rule of Law Forums in six states as a coordination platform for representatives from among the justice actors, state legislature, civil society, UNMISS and UN agencies to address rule of law challenges. In all the states visited, the evaluators observed that the Rule of Law meetings were still sustained and community outreaches were very effective. For example, In Torit, an outreach that was conducted targeting the youth “gangs” following reports on increased in crime managed to decrease youth crimes youth in area.
- End abuse, exploitation and all forms of violence to vulnerable groups: The CPD has increased the paths to deliver justice and legal aid services GBV and Juvenile Courts established. Through the CSOs the UNDP established auxiliary help desks situated at
police stations, used mobile legal clinics, engaged community volunteers, strengthened their links with Specialized Police Units, Women and Girls-friendly spaces and other relevant government institutions ensuring that vulnerable groups could report their cases easily and receive speedy and timely investigation and processing of cases. This was accompanied by UNDP supported capacity building of 90 judges, investigators, prosecutors, social workers and customary chiefs in Juba, Bor and Aweil on how to conduct fair investigation, prosecution and prevention of GBV related cases.

- Women's agency: One of the biggest challenges related to traditional gender roles and negative cultural traditions remains the limited involvement of women in the public space and women’s tendency to remain in the background and not speaking up, publicly. This is being addressed by providing specialized training to aspiring young female leaders and supporting male gender champions who can help in paving the way to GEWE. In addition, radio stations and women’s clubs are a good instrument to address this and UNDP has contributed to improving women's “free speech” and involvement in public discourse(s), through related CPD interventions.

6. Recommendations

**MEL (M&E, knowledge management, RBM)**

1. Spell out a coherent architecture of interrelated narrative Theories of Change at the level of CPD Outcomes, Outputs and projects to identify projects and interventions that could/should be merged.

2. An important cross-cutting concern that needs to be better addressed than currently being the case is the design of clear exit strategies at the project level, as well as related investments. This would be linked to the design of assessments, the entry point and underlying logic (or theory of change) and the type and group/recipients of trainings.

3. Introduce a standard approach (incl. a strong qualitative beneficiary level component) of measuring the effect of capacity development interventions at the individual and collective/institutional level (in line with the standardized institutional maturity classification and job description/ToR as per the respective per civil service job category).

4. Reach out to UNDP Somalia (RoL programme platform) to learn more about the possibilities of building on on best practices of the Somalia Joint Justice Programme's SDG16+ A2J community-level M&E mode55 (experimental community level research through continuous panel studies to gauge perception change surrounding trust and confidence in the social contract, subjective safety and security levels, satisfaction with A2J and governance performance and other complex measures requiring qualitative M&E tools and processes (to be linked to GP-RoLSHR Phase4 M&E; plugged into South Sudan’s Accelerator Lab work of applied digitalization in support of programme delivery, and UoJ’s initiative to strengthen its strategic foresight and research/think tank capacities).

5. Identify lessons (to be) learned from the PfRR platform approach to replicate and scale up related best practices esp. in terms of the HDPN architecture and M&E processes and systems, across other CPD projects.

6. Fix technical issues with RF indicators (check targets, add meta-data where missing, in particular add RoL and A2J-related indicators to better capture and gauge all the support provided to peacebuilding initiatives including constitution making, transitional justice, work in support of mobilizing customary mechanisms for A2J etc.).

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55 Relevant contacts: UNDP SOM RoLSHR CTA: doel.mukerjee@undp.org; UNDP DRR: jacqueline.olweya@undp.org; SDG16 M&E Lab SOM: rose.forlan@undp.org; UNDP HQ RoLSHR-GP Secretariat: alexander.meierhans@undp.org.
7. Sensitize incoming Government about the direct and indirect costs caused by a complete overhaul of civil service staff, in order to reduce the loss in institutional memory and capacity, temporary loss in performance, the need to reinvest in training etc.

8. The linguistic issue (Arabic as language in civil service or not) needs to be carefully studied and different options ought to be costed (including hidden opportunity costs on social cohesion if staff were to be laid off and replaced etc.).

9. Support lower-threshold, large scale basic skills training interventions (computer literacy, basic typewriting etc.) specifically for civil servants to reduce the gap between the bulk of actually existing demand / training needs and the higher-level management training on offer (cf. no. 8 & no. 35).

10. Consider testing the on-the-job training approach according to the Somalia Parliamentary Secretariat best practice (hiring motivated bright young graduates and professionals, train them from scratch through a mix of high-intensity “shock treatment/swim-or-sink” real-life exposure, mentoring/coaching/tutoring, out-of-country training; thereby ensuring they grow into the job and “own” it thus also significantly reducing the risk of a brain drain).

11. Carry out hands-on training of technical staff and managers in PFM institutions such as the Central Bank and the National Auditor’s Office to build HACT capacity.

12. Consider broadening the scope and scale of the civil service training centre to turn it into an administrative center of excellence including for civil society, by linking up with the National Transformatifive Leadership Institute (NTLI).

13. Increase the levels of intervention of Government institutions in program/project implementation esp. at the initial design of needs assessments, design stage, costing etc.) to ensure buy-in and build related technical capacities, if needed.

14. Introduce access to start-up capital through micro-credit scheme for training course graduates; as well as higher-level training for best performers.

15. Team up with other UN agencies to design a joint capacity development strategy to reduce duplications and increase efficiencies and synergies in training provision (Joint UN-Governmental Capacity Development Strategy following Malawian approach).

16. To financial partners: Financiers such as the AfDB or WB to come in and provide the costly infrastructure support, since these remain major obstacles to service delivery that cannot be addressed via GEMS or PFM support.

17. Scale up on-going investment into strengthening the technical, financial and RBM/M&E capacity of partner CSOs (specifically, PaCC’s M&E training for CSO partners, manual on internal operating and board governance for CSO and Government counterparts etc.).

18. Expand and deepen the relative scope and weight of the University of Juba (School of Public Service, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, NTLI etc.) in policy research and capacity building of public sector institutions, including Ministries and Parliament, beyond currently existing levels via PaCC.

19. Linked to no. 18: Carry out the following applied action research studies by maximizing the approach of actively tapping into existing projects for data collection and testing out innovative modalities:
   a) Socio-economic opportunity costs of dowry (and early marriage) as conflict drivers (link to cattle rustling, frustration among youth etc.);
   b) Child abduction as conflict driver, as well as socio-cultural, public health and nutrition-related reasons (Jonglei State/Murle etc.) (together with WHO and FAO) (research study to identify root causes and provide evidence, or else dispel related myths/stereotypes (“impotence caused by HIV and malnutrition” etc.)... followed up by a project design to address root causes (nutrition, medical treatment, if applicable);
   c) Biogas-solar-wind... integrated renewable energy solutions for mini-grids in off-grid communities/municipalities, including as energy provider for hospitals/dispensaries (cold chambers, surgical theatres etc.);

56 Cf. Somalia Parliamentary Secretariat’s best practice of a home-grown, comparatively quick and inexpensive, low risk way of “breeding excellence in local leadership” and qualifies a regional if not continental best practice of nationally owned leadership training). Contacts: First two colleagues mentioned under footnote 55.
d) Recycling and waste-to-value pilot to test out IGA and energy production (link to inter-community youth/women’s groups activities under PBF etc.) using fermentation technology to produce biogas and organic fertilizer/terra preta, composting, plastic-to-building-materials, capturing gas from landfills etc.

e) In the mid-term, once the government-building and constitution-making processes have been finalized, massively scale up the comparative weight of economic governance interventions including anti-corruption work (beyond the current scope of GEMS and Trade Capacity activities).

f) Establish a baseline (in view of follow-up monitoring as key GEWE indicator) of women’s participation in payam and boma-level community management and political leadership fora (incl. PACC councils, elders’ council etc.);

g) Admin/civil service academy/institute to add in-service training modules (RBM; NTLI male gender champions/gender mainstreaming unless already the case);

h) Use the power of pop music to promote social cohesion (via PaCC, PBF projects, Accelerator Lab etc.):
   i. Team up with popular hip-hop and rap artists to broaden the scope of anti-hate speech;
   ii. Organize free-style hip-hop contests at regional level (add to wrestling component of NGO’s community-level social mobilization interventions);
   iii. Target artists/musicians to educate them on negative effects of using hate speech demeaning specific tribes; produce online content in JubArabic and other main languages and disseminate content via social media to maximize reach among youth (the angle of UNESCO’s related interventions is targeting traditional journalists, only);

i) Ramp up PTSD treatment capacity by investing into a related medical research and training programme (feeding into item no. 23 & 24);

j) Invest in forensics capacity by investing into a related medical research and training programme (SGBV/CRVS etc.) (feeding into item no. 23 & 24).

20. Advocate for, and sensitize stakeholders in favour of embracing, a strategic shift to development financing of triple HDN nexus interventions designed to strengthen resilience, gradually moving away from the comparative focus on conventional life-saving support through emergency response (via the HRP). This could be done through co-hosting a conference or retreat on the HDP nexus together with UoJ and the UNCT including OCHA; organizing joint meetings with humanitarian cluster/development sector partners and setting up joint humanitarian-development SWGs/TWGs; establishing an HDP road map including practical technical steps of more articulated strategic planning of the next CCA/UNSDCF and subsequent CPD design; mainstreaming resilience into the next HRP(s) etc. (cf. Libya joint HNA/CCA roadmap for the HRP 2018 and SF 2018-2019 design).

Miscellaneous ideas to enhance the design of the CPD programme portfolio

21. Following the example of the “integrated, post-conflict” Ivory Coast football team (Drogba etc.), link youth sports/wrestling support to a system of regional academies feeding into a national wrestling training centre and team(s) (for both men and women, youth and adult categories) as engine of nation building and general social cohesion. Linked to this, add female wrestling to the social cohesion sports and sensitization events. As a South-South activity, organize exchange visits (organizers/sports coaches/association representatives) with Senegal, inviting Senegalese male and female star wrestlers to participate in showcase events. Provide support to South Sudanese sports association/National Olympic Committee (wrestling chapter).

22. Support the reform and actual enactment of laws to address discrimination and ensure legal protection of vulnerable groups;
23. Support judicial/justice reform addressing sector-wide coordination and complementarity to achieve equitable distribution of justice services in a way that builds public confidence in the state and addresses access to justice for CRSV/SGBV survivors, land disputes etc.
24. Boost overall capacity and skills of justice sector staff through training on gender including but not limited to SGBV/CRSV; conflict mitigation and resolution; PTSD and forensics capacity.
25. Invest into digital case file management systems in the justice sector.
27. Design on-line content and service delivery solutions to facilitate access to legal aid and counsel (incl. indigent support), general legal literacy and sensitization about citizen’s rights and obligations, online portals for reporting issues of concern or specific security-related incidents to the Authorities, online formats for preliminary stages including pre-discovery or hearings etc. (cf. GoGirls ICT Initiative, suggested collaboration with/think tank at UoJ).
28. Scale up investments into building separate prison cells/blocks for female detainees and reformatory centers to ensure segregation of adults from juveniles youth cells.
29. Scale up and further equip safe shelters for SGBV survivors and enhance the quality of service provision in Safe Houses within police stations (including training police staff in gender sensitive approaches, and ramp-up of PTSD and forensics capacity to address the lack of public confidence in the police’s ability to provide satisfactory services to survivors).
30. Leverage the modality of the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections modality to greater extent via the newly established GFP agency network, in view of restoring justice and security for conflict-affected people.
31. Intensify support to the national peacebuilding, reconciliation and constitutional processes in close coordination with UNMISS.
32. Add to, and deepen existing synergies between programme/project components and interventions in the areas of RoL, DDR, SSR, TJ, Community Security and Arms Control, to support RTGoNU in designing and setting policies, plans, programs, and activities to provide safety, security, and justice to its civilian population and thereby foster the social contract, as well as public trust and confidence in the national Authorities.
33. Scope out design features of a mine action project, to build on the current UNMAS/UNMISS project, to provide (civilian) policy oversight and quality assurance of mine action implementation (incl. clearing UXOs/unexploded ordinance, integrated border management etc.).
34. Strengthen the application of the human rights based approach (HRBA) as one of the five UN programming principles. Improving the quality of this process would allow UNDP to more clearly demonstrate how it is contributing to the realisation of human rights through its different units, portfolios and projects.
35. As exit strategy and/or bridging arrangement, use the short-term project initiation plan (PIP) modality to bundle projects struggling to phase out or which are in need of continuation and/or transitioning into a new revised design, to lead them towards a revised follow-up project phase (incl. the testing of new modalities of newly merged interventions and/or projects). For instance, any loose ends of projects that did not have a proper phase-out strategy or that due to delays or other reasons are struggling to phase out in spite of the existence of an exit strategy on paper, could be packaged into an “Enablers” project.
### 7. Annexes

#### 7.1 MTE Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I - Literature review &amp; Mission ramp-up</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception report submitted for review</td>
<td>2 Feb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hiring of National Consultant (Contract Signature)</td>
<td>3 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design of the tentative data collection plan (as part of revised IR)</td>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>7 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design of the detailed data collection plan</td>
<td>8 Mar</td>
<td>10 Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presentation of the evaluation approach to the ERG</td>
<td>18 Mar</td>
<td>18 Mar</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II - Data collection (Key stakeholder interviews &amp; field visits)</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. UNDP/ UNCT members &amp; UNMISS staff</td>
<td>1 Apr</td>
<td>25 Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Government Institutions (Juba)</td>
<td>5 Apr</td>
<td>30 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Field Visits of project sites/beneficiary institutions, CSOs/NGOs and individual beneficiaries</td>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>30 Apr</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III – Data Analysis and close-out</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of data collection/ report drafting phase</td>
<td>1 Jun</td>
<td>20 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft CPD Mid-Term Evaluation Report</td>
<td>21 Jun</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Presentation at the validation Workshop with key stakeholders (partners and beneficiaries)</td>
<td>26 Jun</td>
<td>26 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final CPD Mid-term Evaluation Report and a separate lessons learned report extracted from the full report</td>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>30 Jun</td>
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</table>
## 7.2 Progress Overview Table

### CPD Output 1.1 Strengthened communities and local-level institutions capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, management of resource-based conflicts and community cohesion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1.1. Number of local-level agreements for conflict prevention and promotion of social cohesion under implementation</td>
<td>Baseline: 4 Targets: 12 Data source: Project reports</td>
<td>18 migration conferences resulting in the signing of new migration agreements between migrating pastoralist tribes and host communities conducted in 2019 in different border communities</td>
<td>22 migration agreements between migrating pastoralist tribes and host communities signed and implemented</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.1.2. Number of national infrastructures for peace established or strengthened, with UNDP support</td>
<td>Baseline: 4 Targets: 12 Data source: Project reports</td>
<td>15 national and local mechanisms on peace and reconciliation in place in 2019 in all conflict clusters. This include the national dialogue, peace committees, peace and reconciliation commission, joint migration conferences, COTAL, peace dialogues, peace actor’s coordination forums and other similar mechanisms established, and operationalized</td>
<td>18 national and local mechanisms on peace and reconciliation in place in 2020 in all conflict clusters. This includes the finalization of the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE), national dialogue, peace committees, peace and reconciliation commission, joint migration conferences, COTAL, peace dialogues, peace actor’s coordination forums and other similar mechanisms established and operationalized. A Civilian Disarmament Strategy for South Sudan has been developed and will be disseminated in the first quarter of 2021</td>
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</table>

### Output 1.2. Institutional capacities and customary mechanisms at all levels strengthened to monitor, promote and protect citizen’s rights and increase access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups and SGBV survivors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.1. Number of GBV cases reported to authorities receiving judgment in the formal justice system</td>
<td>Baseline: 1,324 (58% women) Targets: 4,000 (50% women) Data source: Rule of law institutions reports</td>
<td>517 (76 percent female). Cumulative number: 1,841 (80 percent female)</td>
<td>2,720 (66 percent female)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.2. Number of police and community relationship committees established and operational at community level</td>
<td>Baseline: 5 Target: 12 Data source: Project reports, independent evaluation</td>
<td>36 new PCRCs have been established Cumulative number: 41</td>
<td>68 new PCRCs have been established Cumulative number: 73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.3.</td>
<td>Number of indigent persons provided with legal aid services, disaggregated by sex</td>
<td>Baseline: 220 (68 females, 152 males)</td>
<td>Target: 5,000 (1,500 females, 3,500 males)</td>
<td>Data source: Ministry of justice reports, project reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.2.4.</td>
<td>Number of SGBV survivors benefitting from victim redress mechanisms, including on transitional justice</td>
<td>Baseline: 125 (50 females, 75 males)</td>
<td>Target: 2,000 (800 females, 1200 males)</td>
<td>Data source: Project reports, institutional reports</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Output 1.3. Key governance institutions are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.3.1.</td>
<td>Extent to which governance institutions have requisite capacities and independence to deliver reforms and core functions</td>
<td>Baseline: 1</td>
<td>Target: 3</td>
<td>Data source: Relevant institutions report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.3.2.</td>
<td>Number of institutional frameworks implemented to promote the participation of women and marginalized groups in reform processes</td>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
<td>Target: 6</td>
<td>Data source: Reform progress report, Project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1.3.3.</td>
<td>Number of national South-South and triangular cooperation partnerships delivering measurable and sustainable benefits</td>
<td>Baseline: 1</td>
<td>Target: 4</td>
<td>Data source: Project progress and evaluation report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not achieved due to delay in recruitment and deployment of International SSEs, due with restrictions associated with COVID-19
Output 1.4. Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyses progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.4.1.</strong></td>
<td>One development framework was formulated. The National Development Strategy (NDS) integrated gender as a cross-cutting issue to ensure mainstreaming in stakeholder plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NDS review process is started to align it with the provision of the revitalized agreement and the priorities of the transitional government. Gender provision of the revitalized agreement is included in the revision process. In addition, FY 2020/2021 national budget is prepared with UNDP support which is the first since FY 2013/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.4.2.</strong></td>
<td>One private sector institution (Equity Bank) integrated the SDGs and the NDS in its plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The establishment of the transitional government process and COVID-19 restriction on the functioning of the government structures affected the progress. Despite the fact key stakeholders provided their priorities and included in the NDS review process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.4.3.</strong></td>
<td>Nine (9) tools and knowledge products were developed and applied to mainstream the Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNDP supported the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 assessment in South Sudan, including implications for the NDS and the SDGs. MoFP convened a high-level policy dialogue between government and development partners on the finding of the assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.4.4.</strong></td>
<td>Four (4) institutions provided data to inform progress towards the Goals: Ministry of Finance &amp; Planning, Bank of South Sudan, Ministry of Petroleum, National Bureau of Statistics</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The project supports MoFP to analyse data to produce the quarterly fiscal outturn reports. In addition to this, UNDP A2J in partnership with MOJCA is now carrying out a justice gap assessment that will generate data on access to justice disaggregated by gender, key population group and location that will help South Sudan to report on its commitments under SDG 16.3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Output 2.1. Increased access to emergency assistance, alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for families in conflict and disaster prone communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.1.1.</strong> Number of people reached with lifesaving and emergency support services disaggregated by sex.</td>
<td>Baseline: 1.6 million (56% female) Target: 1.8 million (50% female) Data source: Project reports, Independent evaluation</td>
<td>Data missing</td>
<td>2,665,000 Prevented infection of COVID-19 to over 225,000 most vulnerable conflict-affected people by working with local women and youth to produce 5,000l liquid soap and 1,000 bars of soap. Set up 161 handwashing stations across 30 counties Protected more than 830,000 frontlines, security personnel, government personnel, market vendors, IDPs, PWDs, and vulnerable population from the spread of the virus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.1.2.</strong> Number of people reached with entrepreneurship and skills development, emergency employment and business support services (N.B.: This indicator reflects regular support in states/communities. Reported figures do not include inmates who received technical and vocational training through UNDP's A2J support, while serving a prison term.)</td>
<td>Baseline: 200 (60% female) Target: 333 (60% women) Data source: Project reports, Independent evaluation</td>
<td>317 (54% female) were provided with entrepreneurship and livelihood skills in the areas of agribusiness, carpentry, tailoring, plumbing, electricity, and computer literacy) in Bentiu, and Aweil locations</td>
<td>216 Youths (41% women) acquired marketable skills in various vocations including computer operations, plumbing, electricity, carpentry and tailoring. 4,846 (68% women) people reached with entrepreneurship and skills development under the sustainable livelihoods skills, community- based skills and vocational skills training in various vocations which include agribusiness, tailoring, hairdressing, food preparation, agriculture among other areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.1.3.</strong> Number of people benefitting from jobs and improved livelihoods in crisis or post-crisis settings, disaggregated by sex.</td>
<td>Baseline: 1,031 (81% female) Target: 1,323 (49% women) Data source: Project reports, Independent evaluation</td>
<td>314 (7% female) people are benefitting from jobs and improved livelihood. For example, in Malakal, through partnership with Japan to renovate the Upper Nile University, 301 people (5% females, 95% men) are benefitting from employment as construction site workers and three women entrepreneurs are running their small food kiosks. 0 jobs (4 females) were gainfully employed as a result of the jobs and careers fares that were conducted by</td>
<td>1,184 (41% women) persons gainfully employed in various trades. 448 (79% females) people gained employment in the facemask initiative; 60 sustainable livelihoods skills graduates have gained employment in various trades. 340 persons were engaged in construction and rehabilitation work in UNU; 116 persons got jobs from the job fairs whereas 107 jobs were created by newly established businesses of the skills training graduates; 113 students were engaged for work-related learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Output 2.2. National and subnational institutions have capacities to formulate and implement inclusive, sustainable energy and climate change adaptation solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.1. Number of national and subnational climate change adaptation and mitigation plans developed and implemented.</td>
<td>Baseline: 0 Target: 6 Data source: Ministry of Environment reports</td>
<td>UNDP supported the revision of South Sudan National Determined contribution (NDCs) which is a policy document for climate mitigation and adaptation commitments</td>
<td>UNDP supported the finalization of the First South Sudan National Adaptation Plan (NAP), a policy document whose objective outlines the strategic investment plan for climate change adaptation by the country. Additionally, UNDP supported the establishment of the South Sudan Integrated Measurement, Reporting and Verification (IMRV) under coordination of the Ministry of Environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data missing

Output 2.3. Capacities at national and subnational levels strengthened to deliver HIV and related services to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline (2018) and final target (2021)</th>
<th>By end 2019</th>
<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.3.1. Coverage of tuberculosis, HIV and AIDS services disaggregated by sex, and type of service: (a) Tuberculosis treatment Baseline: 80 per cent (sex disaggregation under way) Target: 85 per cent Data source: Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>95.52%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Antiretroviral treatment Baseline: 11 per cent (sex disaggregation under way) Target: 24.8 per cent</td>
<td>Total: 19 percent Male: 15.4 percent Female: 21.0 percent</td>
<td>Total 21% Male: 14% Female: 28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Behavioral change information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.3.2</th>
<th>Number of people tested for HIV who received their results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(disaggregated by HIV test status and gender) Data source: Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports</td>
<td>Total (2020): 222,191 Male: 80,192 Female: 138,551 (half-year achievement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Output 2.4. National and subnational governments’ capacities developed for tax and trade policy harmonization, revenue diversification, and expansion of fiscal space and more transparent utilization of public resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>By end 2020</th>
<th>Progress rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.4.1.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree 34 of diversification of revenues collected at state level</td>
<td>Baseline: 1 Target: 3 Data source: Revenue authority reports, Ministry of Finance reports</td>
<td>Data collection in the states are ongoing with National Bureau of Statistics to collect and classify data on taxpayers in three target states, which will increase the knowledge about revenue collection in the states</td>
<td>3 states SRA offices are supported and structured in such a way that the source of non-oil revenue is diversified. For instance, the tax office in Aweil are structured based on the sources of tax (verification team, check point team, tax officers in different ministries...) and these diversities the source and thereby increased the income</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.4.2.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of state governments with functioning gender responsive tax and trade policy</td>
<td>Baseline: Tax policy: 4; trade policy: 0 Target: tax policy 10; Trade policy:3 Data source: Revenue authority reports, Ministry of Finance reports</td>
<td>3 tax policies had been enacted in 2019. Due to the change in state boundaries, the project will engage with the new state governments on the enactment of tax and trade policies in 2021 and beyond. This could not have been done in 2020 due to the delay in the appointment of state officials</td>
<td>1 State Revenue Acts have been enacted ensuring that taxes are properly collected and forwarded to the appropriate state agency for inclusive budgeting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.4.3.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states with unified tax systems</td>
<td>Baseline: 1 Target: 3 Data source: Revenue authority reports, Ministry of Finance reports</td>
<td>6 states had unified tax systems by 2019 Six unified tax systems completed in the former states of Jubek, Aweil, Gbudue, Torit, Jonglei and Gogrial. These are now the state capitals in the six new, reconstituted states. However, the reconstitution of the states implies that the SRA ACT and governing structures in the unified tax systems must be repeated to reflect new state boundaries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and institutions. With funding from Japan, the plan is to expand the work on unified tax systems to four additional states (to cover the entire country) once states officials are appointed and construction work of SRA Offices are completed.

*Unsatisfactory*  *Satisfactory (“on track”)*  *Highly Satisfactory*  *No data*

### 7.3 Overview of Key Informant Interviews held

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Samuel Doe</td>
<td>Resident Rep</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Christy Ahenkora</td>
<td>Dep. Res Rep - Programs</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rose Baguma</td>
<td>Head of Finance</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Judy Wakahiu</td>
<td>Programme Advisor/Manager</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kymberly Bays</td>
<td>Comms and Innovation Analyst</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Margaret Mathiang</td>
<td>Gender Analyst</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ernest Yeboah</td>
<td>Program Management specialist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Fatmata Sesay</td>
<td>Senior Economist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Allan Poston</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jose Manzano</td>
<td>Senior Program Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Daniel Kir</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Blaise Karibushi</td>
<td>Project Coordination Advisor</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Walusungu Lulukile</td>
<td>Field coordinator YEEP</td>
<td>UNDP (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Adebayo Alowodolu</td>
<td>RoL Specialist</td>
<td>UNDP (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dol Bhusal</td>
<td>State Coordinator</td>
<td>UNDP (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dominic Anyanga</td>
<td>Program Analyst (PaCC)</td>
<td>UNDP (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Daniel Deng</td>
<td>State Coordinator (RR)</td>
<td>UNDP (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>George Kadimba</td>
<td>RoL Specialist</td>
<td>UNDP (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Theresa Loro</td>
<td>Field Coordinator</td>
<td>UNIDO (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Basher Aligelle</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Officer</td>
<td>UNMISS (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Mabior Ayuel Wol</td>
<td>Field coordinator</td>
<td>UNIDO (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ndubisi Obiorah</td>
<td>Senior Political Affairs Officer</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Doreen Loboka</td>
<td>Communication Officer</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Esther Soma</td>
<td>WPS Specialist</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Martin Dramani</td>
<td>Country Programme Focal Point</td>
<td>UNEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector and Academia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>John Akec</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor</td>
<td>UNIV. of Juba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>DVC. Prof Pauline Riak</td>
<td>Deputy Vice Chancellor</td>
<td>UNIV. of Rumbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Dr. Angelina Amattijo B.</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>NTLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Geramano Okello</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>VCT(Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Deng Simon Akuei</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Ministry/Agency/Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Lilli Kilita</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>Chamber of Commerce (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ocum Karlo</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>MoFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>James Tipo</td>
<td>Director General - HRD</td>
<td>MoPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Hon. Stephen Par Kuol</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>MoPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hon. Chuol Rambang</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>SPPRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Esther Ikere</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>MoGC &amp; SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Gen. Andrew Kuol</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>BCSSAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Gen. James Dak Karlo</td>
<td>Deputy Director Community Policing</td>
<td>SSNPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Maj. Anthony Oliver L.</td>
<td>Director Public Relations</td>
<td>SPSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Justice Kulang Macuor</td>
<td>Judge in Court of Appeal</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>David Batali</td>
<td>GEF Operational Focal point</td>
<td>Min. of Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Hon. Ms. Mary Pitia</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Hon. Kuac Wol</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth &amp; Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Augustine Kenyi</td>
<td>NIU Coordinator</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Agak Achuil Lual</td>
<td>EIF Focal Point</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Alison E.</td>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Deng Dau</td>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Government Officials (National level)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ministry/Agency/Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Abraham Lat</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>Judiciary (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Deng Ajin Dau</td>
<td>Warrant Officer (SPU)</td>
<td>SSNPS (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Stephen Ihude Oduho</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Min. of trade &amp; Industry (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Dominica Vitali</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>MoGC &amp; SW (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Mayang Arur</td>
<td>General Director</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Betty Konyio</td>
<td>Warrant Officer (SPU)</td>
<td>SSNPS (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Justin Kilopas Tokuru</td>
<td>Chief Inspector of Police</td>
<td>SSNPS (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Adolof Philip</td>
<td>Chairman Police Community</td>
<td>SSNPS (Torit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Government Officials (Regional State level)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>William Bior Daniel</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>VOSDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Ruben Ateng</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>VOSDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Anyanzo Charles Jacob</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>(HUMAIES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Stephen Tangun</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>STO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Angellina Nyajima</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>HRSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Wanga Emmanuel</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>RDAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Yien Chuol</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>UNYMPDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Rev. James Baak Nhial</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>SMARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Losike Albert Koteen</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>OPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Deng William Makur</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CIPAD (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Grang Ateng Deng</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Empower Youth Africa (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Rombe Elias Dickson</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
<td>ART (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Alfred Ater</td>
<td>Field Officer</td>
<td>FACE (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Isaac Kuac</td>
<td>Field Coordinator</td>
<td>VOSDO (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Elijah Mabior</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>PCRC (Rumbek)</td>
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</table>

**Implementing Partners (IP) and Beneficiaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>William Bior Daniel</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>VOSDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Ruben Ateng</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>VOSDO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Anyanzo Charles Jacob</td>
<td>Program Manager</td>
<td>(HUMAIES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Stephen Tangun</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>STO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Angellina Nyajima</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>HRSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Wanga Emmanuel</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>RDAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Yien Chuol</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>UNYMPDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Rev. James Baak Nhial</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>SMARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Losike Albert Koteen</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>OPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Deng William Makur</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>CIPAD (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Grang Ateng Deng</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Empower Youth Africa (Aweil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Rombe Elias Dickson</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
<td>ART (Torit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Alfred Ater</td>
<td>Field Officer</td>
<td>FACE (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Isaac Kuac</td>
<td>Field Coordinator</td>
<td>VOSDO (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Elijah Mabior</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>PCRC (Rumbek)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4 Documents reviewed

(N.B.: This list is a non-inclusive list indicating a selection of the most relevant documents consulted.)

1. Hope for Restoration South Sudan: Civil Society Organization Success Story, Peace and Community Cohesion Project (PaCC) 2021, draft
2. Human Must Access Essentials: Presentation for Youth Peace SACCO groups 2021, draft
4. Letter of Agreement between UNDP and country coordinating mechanism south Sudan on the implementation of “capacity building governance and oversight of health systems in south Sudan” 2018
5. One Million Youth SDG Partnership in South Sudan between UNDP and Equity Bank 2019-2024
6. Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index for South Sudan Policy Report; Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development October 2020
7. South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) 2019
8. South Sudan Initial National Adaptation Plan Draft 0.0 2020
11. UNDP Peace and Community Cohesion (PaCC) Project Document 2020-2024
12. UNDP Peace and Community Cohesion Projects Annual Report Final 2020
13. UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021
15. UNDP South Sudan Annual Report 2019
16. UNDP Evidence for Economic and Social Transformation of South Sudan Annual report 2020
18. UNDP Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights in South Sudan 2020-March 2023
19. UNDP Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights strengthening program in South Sudan Jan-Dec 2020 Report
23. UNDP Results Oriented Annual Report - SSD – 2020
24. UNDP Recovery & Resilience Program 1st Quarter (Jan-March 2020)
25. UNDP AfDB NORMA Annual report Jan-Dec 2020
27. UNDP IGAD Annual Report 2016
28. UNDP IGAD Annual Report 2017
29. UNDP IGAD Annual Report 2018
30. UNDP IGAD Multi-Year 2013-2020
32. UNDP Final Report Public Financial Management 2019
33. UNDP Project Document Management South Sudan 2016-2020
34. UNDP Governance and Economic Management Support (GEMS) Project quarter Two Progress report 2020
35. UNDP (GEMS) Annual Work Plan Jan-Dec 2020
36. UNDP Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria project Annual Report 2019
37. UNDP Third-Party cost sharing Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (Donor), 2015
38. UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa Project document 2014-2017
39. UNDP Multi-Country Project Document 2019-20121
40. UNDP Project Document South Sudan 2017-20218
41. UNDP Annual Work Plan Resilience and Recovery Project 2017
42. South Sudan NDS 2018-2021 document
### 7.5 Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criterion</th>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</th>
<th>Method(s) for Data Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relevance            | To what extent is the programme in line with UNDP’s mandate and national priorities; and to what extent is UNDP’s engagement a reflection of strategic considerations, including UNDP’s role in the development context and its comparative advantage? | - National statistical data sets such as household and living standards survey etc.  
- Key informant interviews  
- Mapping of results chains to assess degree of articulation and alignment of CPD outputs with CPD/CF/SP outcomes | - Data triangulation across different data sources: type of data (quantitative/qualitative, i.e. statistical data from various reports or surveys etc. vs. oral data from stakeholder interviews  
- Critique of ToC underlying design of results chain (still relevant? holding up against RBM logic etc.?) |
<p>|                      | To what extent was the theory of change presented in the outcome model a relevant and appropriate vision in which to base the programme? |  |  |
|                      | To what extent was UNDP’s selected method of delivery appropriate to the development context and issues in the country? |  |  |
|                      | How did the programme promote UNDP principles of gender equality, human rights and human development? |  |  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criterion</th>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</th>
<th>Method(s) for Data Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>How were institutional overarching frameworks, such as the UNMISS mandate, the SS-HRP or the UNCF, reflected in the underlying UNDP South Sudan country strategy?</td>
<td>-Mapping of result architecture (projects against CPD pillars, CF Result Groups/Goals, NDS Outcomes etc.)</td>
<td>-Mapping of result chains articulation both in the vertical and horizontal sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the nature of UNDP’s engagement with UNMISS and how has it evolved after the delinking (complementarity vs. rivalry; UN coordination vs. UNDP’s integrator role)?</td>
<td>-Mapping of projects in space and time</td>
<td>-Quantitative and qualitative dimension of partnerships (how many partners, duration and volume of financial support, catalytic effects both in monetary and non-monetary sense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did UNDP contribute to strengthening national policies/programmes that would positively impact vulnerable territories and populations?</td>
<td>-Mapping of concrete interlinkages between UNDP-CPD projects, across UN agencies, across FTPs etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did UNDP’s programme choices enable support to further the humanitarian development nexus and/or to innovative processes for improved economies for families and communities in conflict?</td>
<td>-Qualitative interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were UN agency partnerships (GFP, JPs, joint programming etc.) forged to enable a coherent programme response?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation criterion</td>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</td>
<td>Method(s) for Data Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>To what extent have outcomes been achieved or has progress been made toward their achievement?</td>
<td>-Quantitative analysis of progress against CPD result indicators (esp. at Output level since clear attribution possible)</td>
<td>-Trend curves mapping data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How have corresponding outputs delivered by UNDP affected the outcomes, and in what ways have they not been effective?</td>
<td>-Mapping of geographical and time spread</td>
<td>-Triangulation of data across respective types, categories and data sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What has been the contribution of partners and other organizations to the outcome, and how effective have UNDP partnerships been in contributing to achieving the outcome?</td>
<td>-Semi-structured interview guidelines and questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the positive or negative, intended or unintended, changes brought about by UNDP’s work?</td>
<td>-Tools for tracking and assessing performance of cross-cutting issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What was the contribution of UNDP to youth empowerment development processes?</td>
<td>-Ranking tool (Likaert scale)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did the outcomes achieved benefit women and men equally?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation criterion</td>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</td>
<td>Method(s) for Data Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>To what extent have programme outputs benefitted from economic use of resources?</td>
<td>- Financial expenditure analysis; also, and especially, in relation to the actual implementation progress against planned results (measured by respective performance indicators) = Analysis of financial data (expenditure/absorption rate etc.): budget allocations, expenditure/agency/category of expenditure/CPD Output/CPD project activity; all by year and cumulative total</td>
<td>- Calculating quantitative efficiency metrics (input vs. output and relative cost)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were quality outputs delivered on time?</td>
<td>- Tailored interview questions to different groups and categories of key informants (GoSS IP and UN senior managerial and technical Programme and A/F staff etc.); incl. individual interviews and focus group discussions</td>
<td>- Comparative inquisitive analysis guided by cost effectiveness concerns (cf. related key questions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent were partnership modalities conducive to the delivery of outputs?</td>
<td>- Cross-country/regional comparison of costs for similar activities (per unit of output and according to scope/scale)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did monitoring systems provide management with a stream of data that allowed it to learn and adjust implementation accordingly?</td>
<td>- Analysis of existence, quality and usage of M&amp;E systems and processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation criterion</td>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</td>
<td>Method(s) for Data Analysis</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Sustainability**   | What indications are there that the outcomes will be sustained, e.g., through requisite capacities (systems, structure, staff, etc.)? | -Analysis of risk log and phase-out plan/exit strategy  
-Gender and social inclusion analysis | -Projection tool for 2021/2022 (synergy with analysis of effectiveness dimension) |
|                      | To what extent has a sustainability strategy, including capacity development of key national stakeholders, been developed or implemented? | -Document Review  
-Key informants at IP level and among stakeholder institutions (incl. PUNOs), INGOs etc.  
-Direct observation (visual evidence?)  | -Triangulation of qualitative data from various sources (based on desk review and discussions) |
<p>|                      | Did UNDP programmes provide viable models that had the potential for scaling? What are the factors that facilitated the adoption/ scaling up of UNDP’s initiatives? | | |
|                      | To what extent are policy and regulatory frameworks in place that will support the continuation of benefits? | | |
|                      | What are the critical factors for the consolidation of local-level outcomes of UNDP support? | | |
|                      | How judicious and sustainable do the partnership agreements/arrangements appear and to what extent have CPD partners committed to providing continuing support? | | |
|                      | How will concerns for gender equality, human rights and human development be taken forward by primary stakeholders? | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Evaluation criterion</strong></th>
<th><strong>Key Questions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Data Collection Method(s)/Tool(s)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Method(s) for Data Analysis</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Are there any indications for (potential) impact triggered by the CPD?</td>
<td>-(Early) Impact screening and peace building and social cohesion</td>
<td>-Systematically sifting through body of literature to extract concrete evidence/human interest stories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Most significant changes garnered from formal and informal (key informant or beneficiary) interviews and desk review; including intangible dimension of coordination/normative support (qualitative catalytic effects etc.)</td>
<td>-Analysis of narrative/qualitative data collected through key informant interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-If applicable, triangulation of qualitative with quantitative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have there been any (potentially) quick-impact game changing effects that can be directly or indirectly linked to the CPD programme/projects (attribution or contribution/ indirect effects via catalytic chain of events that were willingly or unwittingly triggered by CPD programme/Project interventions)?</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>What has been the impact of the programme on the SDGs, in particular SDG16/Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; but also SDG5/Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; SDG10/Reduce inequality within and among countries etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CPD results structure & alignment logic

(“3 interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars”)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National priority: Consolidate peace: return the displaced, enforce the law, silence the guns; Stabilize and revitalize the national economy</th>
<th>National priority: Secure food, improved food security and livelihoods.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNCF outcome 1: Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels.</td>
<td>UNCF outcome 2: Local economies are recovered and conditions and coping strategies are improved to end severe food insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises.</td>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan outcome 1: Advance poverty eradication in all its forms and dimensions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CPD Pillar 1. Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1.1</th>
<th>Output 1.2: Institutional capacities and customary mechanisms at all levels strengthened to monitor, promote and protect citizen’s rights and increase access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups and SGBV survivors.</th>
<th>Output 1.3: Key governance institutions are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process.</th>
<th>Output 1.4: Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyse progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>Increased access to emergency assistance, alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for families in conflict and disaster-prone communities.</td>
<td>Output 2.2: National and subnational institutions have capacities to formulate and implement inclusive, sustainable energy and climate change adaptation solutions.</td>
<td>Output 2.3: Capacities at national and subnational levels strengthened to deliver HIV and related services to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.4</td>
<td>National and subnational governments capacities developed for tax and trade policy harmonization, revenue diversification, expansion of fiscal space and transparent utilization of public resources.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### SSHF SA2

**Management and Regional projects (Accelerator Labs, Implementation of SDGs, Strengthening African Engagement in Global Development/ Regional Project)**
National Priority: Consolidate peace, return the displaced, enforce the law, silence the gun; Stabilize and revitalize the national economy

UNCF Outcome 1: Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels

UNDP SP Outcome 3: Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises

CDP Pillar 1: Strengthened peace infrastructure and accountable governance

Output 1.1 Strengthened communities and local-level institutions’ capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, management of resource-based conflicts and community cohesion

Output 1.2 Institutional capacities and customary mechanisms at all levels strengthened to monitor, promote and protect citizen's rights and increase access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups and SGBV survivors

Output 1.3 Key governance institutions are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process

Output 1.4 Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyze progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions

Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Right project

A2J&RoLP project
PaCC project phase I & II

GEMS

Evidence for economic and social transformation of South Sudan
**National Priority:** Secure food, improved food security and livelihoods

**UNCF outcome 2:** Local economies are recovered and conditions and coping strategies are improved to end severe food insecurity.

**UNDP Strategic Plan outcome 1:** Advance poverty eradication in all its forms and dimensions

**CDP Pillar 3: Strengthened Institutional and Community Resilience**

**Output 2.1:** Increased access to emergency assistance, alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for families in conflict and disaster prone communities

- Youth employment and value chain development
- Resilience & recovery program

**Output 2.2:** National and subnational institutions have capacities to formulate and implement inclusive, sustainable energy and climate change adaptation solutions

- Climate change adaptation & renewable energy project

**Output 2.3:** Capacities at national and subnational levels strengthened to deliver HIV and related services to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity

- Global funding to fight AIDS & Tuberculosis & Malaria

**Output 2.4:** National and subnational governments’ capacities developed for tax and trade policy harmonization, revenue diversification, and expansion of fiscal space and more transparent utilization of public resources

- Trade capacity building project
- SS support to PFM
- Non-oil revenue mobilization and accountability in South

**CDP Pillar 2: Inclusive and Risk Informed Economic Development**
Management & Regional

Africa regional project
Accelerator lab network
Equality group formation to SDGs
Strengthening Africa engagement
global development

SSHF SA2

### 7.7. CPD Results framework

**Annex. Results and resources framework for South Sudan (2019-2021)**

**National priority:** Consolidate peace: return the displaced, enforce the law, silence the guns; Stabilize and revitalize the national economy.

**UNCF outcome 1:** Strengthened peace infrastructures and accountable governance at the national, state and local levels.

**UNDP Strategic Plan outcome 3:** Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCF outcome indicators, baselines, and targets</th>
<th>Data source, frequency of data collection, and responsibilities</th>
<th>Indicative country programme outputs&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Major partners / Partnership frameworks</th>
<th>Indicative resources by outcome (United States dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Indicator 1.1.** Percentage of individual respondents with confidence in peace and security disaggregated by gender.  
Baseline: 47.4% (46.6% male and 48.7% female)  
Target: 60% (58% male and 62% female) | Perception survey, social cohesion and reconciliation (SCORE) index (periodic, UNDP)  
Independent evaluations (periodic, UNDP)  
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee report (annual, UNDP)  
National institutions’ reports (periodic, UNDP)  
Independent evaluations (periodic, UNDP)  
National and state strategic planning/budget | Output 1.1. Strengthened communities and local-level institutions capacity to foster peaceful coexistence, management of resource-based conflicts and community cohesion.  
Indicator 1.1.1. Number of local-level agreements for conflict prevention and promotion of social cohesion under implementation.  
Baseline: 4  
Target: 12  
Data source: Project reports  
Frequency: Periodic | UNMISS, UN-Women, UNESCO  
National think tanks  
Japan, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Peacebuilding Fund | Regular: 5,263,300  
Other: 83,500,000 |
| **Indicator 1.2.** Number of agreed governance and security reforms implemented.  
Baseline: Governance: 3<sup>30</sup>  
Security: 6  
Target: Governance: 15  
Security: 3 | | | |
| **Indicator 1.3.** Number of national and subnational development policies, plans, budgets that are Goal-aligned, inclusive and utilize gender disaggregated data.  
Baseline: 1  
Target: 5 | | | |

<sup>39</sup> TBD.

<sup>30</sup> NDS, Transitional Legislative Assembly and Transition Government of National Unity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Periodic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1.2.2.</strong> Number of police and community relationship committees established and operational at community level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong> 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data source:</strong> Project reports, independent evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency:</strong> Annual, periodic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator 1.2.3.** Number of indigent persons provided with legal aid services, disaggregated by sex.

**Baseline:** 220 (68 female, 152 males)
**Target:** 5,000 (1,500 females, 3,500 males)
**Data source:** Ministry of justice reports, project reports
**Frequency:** Annual, quarterly

**Indicator 1.2.4.** Number of SCBV survivors benefitting from victim redress mechanisms, including on transitional justice.

**Baseline:** 125 (50 females, 75 males)
**Target:** 2,000 (800 females, 1,200 males)
**Data source:** Project reports, institutional reports
**Frequency:** Annual

**Output 1.3.** Key governance institutions\(^{31}\) are enabled to perform core functions in line with the New Deal and the outcome of the peace process.

**Indicator 1.3.1.** Extent\(^{32}\) to which governance institutions have requisite capacities and independence to deliver reforms and core functions.\(^{33}\)

**Baseline:** 1
**Target:** 3
**Data source:** Relevant institutions report
**Frequency:** Annual

**Indicator 1.3.2.** Number of institutional frameworks implemented to promote the participation of women and marginalized groups in reform processes.

**Baseline:** 0
**Target:** 2
**Data source:** Reform progress report, Project reports
**Frequency:** Annual

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\(^{31}\) National constitution-making body, legislature, electoral management bodies and key accountability mechanisms prioritized by the HLRF, National Dialogue and other peace processes.

\(^{32}\) Scale: 1: limited capacity; 2: some capacity; 3: high capacity.

\(^{33}\) Including public service delivery, safety and security, and representation and oversight.
### Indicator 1.3.3.
Number of national South-South and triangular cooperation partnerships delivering measurable and sustainable benefits.
- **Baseline:** 1
- **Target:** 4
- **Data source:** Project progress and evaluation reports
- **Frequency:** Annual

### Output 1.4.
Capacities developed across the whole of government to integrate the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement and other international agreements, and to analyse progress towards the Goals, using innovative and data-driven solutions.

**Indicator 1.4.1.** Number of gender responsive, risk and data-informed development frameworks, including disaster risk reduction and early warning systems in place.
- **Target:** 0
- **Baseline:** 8
- **Data source:** National, state planning/budget documents
- **Frequency:** periodic

**Indicator 1.4.2.** Number of subnational governments, private sector institutions and CSOs integrating the Goals and other international frameworks in their plans and budgets.
- **Baseline:** 3 (3 subnational governments; 0 private sector; 0 CSOs)
- **Target:** 20 (6 subnational governments, 4 private sectors, 10 CSOs)
- **Data source:** National, state, CSO, private sector planning/budget documents
- **Frequency:** periodic

**Indicator 1.4.3.** Number of tools and country knowledge products developed and applied to mainstream the Goals.
- **Baseline:** 2
- **Target:** 20
- **Data source:** Project reports, Independent evaluations
- **Frequency:** Annual

**Indicator 1.4.4.** Number of national institutions providing disaggregated data to monitor progress towards the Goals.
- **Baseline:** 1

### Countries
- Japan, Norway, Sweden, ADB, GCF, GEF
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2.1. Number of new HIV infections per 1,000 uninfected populations, by sex, age and key populations.</th>
<th>Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports (annual, UNDP)</th>
<th>Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports (annual, UNDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 1.34/1,000 (sex and age disaggregation to be done)</td>
<td>Output 2.1. Increased access to emergency assistance, alternative livelihood and employment opportunities for families in conflict and disaster-prone communities.</td>
<td>Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan, Humanitarian Fund board, OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: 1.1/1,000</td>
<td>Indicator 2.1.1. Number of people reached with life-saving and emergency support services disaggregated by sex.</td>
<td>Regular: 4,945,500 Other: 169,391,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2. Percentage of targeted communities using 11 coping strategies or below; Coping strategy index, disaggregated by sex of household head.</td>
<td>Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and disaster management reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 9.4</td>
<td>Target: &lt;9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.3. Number of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises utilizing supplier development platforms for inclusive and sustainable value chains.</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
<td>Target: 300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1.2. Number of people reached with entrepreneurship and skills development, emergency employment and business support services.</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 200 (60% female)</td>
<td>Target: 1,200 (60% female)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.1.3. Number of people benefiting from jobs and improved livelihoods in crisis or post-crisis settings, disaggregated by sex.</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 1.031 (81.9% female)</td>
<td>Target: 5,000 (60% female)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.2. National and subnational institutions have capacities to formulate and implement inclusive, sustainable energy and climate change adaptation solutions.</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2.2.1. Number of national and subnational climate change adaptation and mitigation plans developed and implemented.</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 0</td>
<td>Target: 6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data source: Ministry of Environment reports</td>
<td>GEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data source: Minister of Environment reports</td>
<td>GCF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data source: Ministry of Environment reports</td>
<td>Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudan, Humanitarian Fund board, OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency: Annual</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2.2.2.</strong> Number and proportion of crisis-affected people with energy access restored, disaggregated by sex of head of household and other relevant characteristics.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong> TBD</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Data source:</strong> Ministry Humanitarian Affairs, disaster management reports</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency:</strong> Annual</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 2.3.** Capacities at national and subnational levels strengthened to deliver HIV and related services to reduce vulnerability and enhance productivity.

**Indicator 2.3.1.** Coverage of tuberculosis, HIV and AIDS services disaggregated by sex, and type of service:

(a) **Tuberculosis treatment**
- **Baseline:** 80 per cent (sex disaggregation under way)
- **Target:** 85 per cent

(b) **Antiretroviral treatment**
- **Baseline:** 11 per cent (sex disaggregation under way)
- **Target:** 24.8 per cent

(c) **Behavioural change information**
- **Baseline:** 442,392 (55% female)
- **Target:** 994,713 (55% female)

**Data source:** Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports

**Frequency:** Annual

**Indicator 2.3.2** Number of people tested for HIV who received their results

**Baseline:** 248,126

**Target:** 291,715 (disaggregated by HIV test status and gender)

**Data source:** Ministry of Health, Global Fund annual and review reports

**Frequency:** Annual

**Output 2.4.** National and subnational governments' capacities developed for tax and trade policy harmonization, revenue diversification, expansion of fiscal space and more transparent utilization of public resources.

**Output 2.4.** The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Ministry of Health

**Output 2.4.** African Development Bank, Japan

National and state ministries of finance, NHS, universities and CSOs
### Indicator 2.4.1. Degree of diversification of revenues collected at state level

**Baseline:** 1  
**Target:** 3  
**Data source:** Revenue authority reports, Ministry of Finance reports  
**Frequency:** Annual

### Indicator 2.4.2. Number of state governments with functioning gender-responsive tax and trade policy

**Baseline:** tax policy: 4; trade policy: 0  
**Target:** tax policy: 10; Trade policy: 3  
**Data source:** State government revenue and Ministry of Finance reports  
**Frequency:** Annual

### Indicator 2.4.3. Number of states with unified tax systems

**Baseline:** 1  
**Target:** 3  
**Data source:** State government revenue and Ministry of Finance reports  
**Frequency:** Annual

---

## 7.8. Budget Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Resources Mobilized</td>
<td>Current Year Budget allocated</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.325.485)</td>
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<td>Accelerator Lab – South Sudan</td>
<td>268.073</td>
<td>268.073</td>
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<td>123764</td>
<td>Climate Change; Environment and DRM</td>
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<td>Community Security and Arms Control Programme</td>
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<td>90861</td>
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<td>South Sudan Direct Project Costs</td>
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<td>Strengthening Operational Capacities of GoSS Institution</td>
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<td>127551</td>
<td>Support to Access to Justice; Security and Human Rights</td>
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<td>72625</td>
<td>Support to Democracy and Participation</td>
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<td>72642</td>
<td>Support to Public Administration</td>
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<td>105603</td>
<td>Trade Capacity Building Project</td>
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<td>126314</td>
<td>Watershed Approaches for Climate Resilience in Agro-past</td>
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<td>Grand Total</td>
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<td>144.136.241</td>
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7.9. CPD MTE Data Collection Schedule

A. Map highlighting the selected locations


Geographical balance with all CPD Outcomes, Pillars and Outputs/projects covered. Comparative data (same projects in different States) also part of sample.
### Unselected Regions and Rationale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location(s)</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Reason(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Malakal     | Upper Nile  | No UNDP office coordination  
 Insecurity                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Bentiu      | Unity       | Massive floods  
 Insecurity  
 No network connectivity                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Bor         | Jonglei     | Massive floods and many remote project locations that could not easily be reached even under regular conditions  
 Insecurity                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Yambio      | Western Equatoria | Similar project activities can be found in Torit                                                                                                                                                          |
| Wau         | Northern Bahr-el | All in Bahr-el Ghazal region with Aweil  
 Similar information can be obtained in Aweil which also shows better examples of the nexus (DPH)                                                                                                         |
| Kuajok      | Warrap      | No UNDP coordination Office  
 Only one current project active                                                                                                                                                                           |
### C. Detailed Mapping of Projects to be visited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project Locations</th>
<th>Manager's Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Email address</th>
<th>Phone number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cross Cutting</td>
<td>Senior Management</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Samuel Doe</td>
<td>Resident Rep</td>
<td><a href="mailto:samuel.doe@undp.org">samuel.doe@undp.org</a></td>
<td>+211 920 694 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Operational Capacities of GoSS Institutions</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Rose Baguma</td>
<td>Head of Finance</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rose.baguma@undp.org">rose.baguma@undp.org</a></td>
<td>+211 920 580 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Margaret Mathiang</td>
<td>Gender Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:margaret.matiang@undp.org">margaret.matiang@undp.org</a></td>
<td>+211925660802,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications and Accelerator Lab</td>
<td>Juba: Central Equatoria with field visits</td>
<td>Kymberly Bays</td>
<td>Comms and Innovation Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:kymberly.bays@undp.org">kymberly.bays@undp.org</a></td>
<td>+211920580239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSHF SA2 (Cluster coord.); Gender; regional projects (Equality group formation to SDGs/Strengthening Africa engagement global development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outcome 1</td>
<td>Access to Justice and Rule of Law (Outcome 1.1)</td>
<td>Aweil-Northern Bal el, Ghazel, Bor-Jonglei State, Juba: Central Equatoria, Torit: Eastern Equatoria, Yambio: Western Equatoria, Wau- Western Bal el, Ghazel, Malakal (CSOs): Upper Nile state, Bentiu (CSO)-Unity State</td>
<td>Evelyn Edroma Ernest Yeboa Andrew Shuruma</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) Program Management Specialist Team Leader</td>
<td><a href="mailto:evelyn.edroma@undp.org">evelyn.edroma@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:ernest.yeboa@undp.org">ernest.yeboa@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:andrew.shuruma@undp.org">andrew.shuruma@undp.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening (Outcome 1.2)</td>
<td>Bor coordination office/Cluster, Torit coordination office/Cluster, Rumbek coordination office/Cluster, Aweil coordination office/Cluster, Bentiu coordination office/Cluster, Kuajok coordination office/Cluster, Malakal coordination office/Cluster, Juba office</td>
<td>Judy Wakahiu Andrew Shuruma Chrysantus Ayangafac</td>
<td>Programme Advisor/Manager Team Leader CTA Peacebuilding</td>
<td><a href="mailto:judy.wakahiu@undp.org">judy.wakahiu@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:andre.shuruma@undp.org">andre.shuruma@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:chrysantus.ayangafac@undp.org">chrysantus.ayangafac@undp.org</a></td>
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<td>Peace and Community Cohesion II (Outcome 1.2)</td>
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<td>Local Govt. Capacity Development for Service Delivery (Outcome 1.1)</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project Locations</th>
<th>Manager's Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Email address</th>
<th>Phone number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1</td>
<td>Evidence for Econ &amp; Social Transformation of S. Sudan (Output 2.4/CPF Pillar 2?)</td>
<td>Juba: Central Equatoria</td>
<td>Fatmata Sesay Theophilus Addey</td>
<td>Senior Economist; Economic Specialist; National Economist</td>
<td><a href="mailto:fatmata.sesay@undp.org">fatmata.sesay@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:theophilus.addey@undp.org">theophilus.addey@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:gabriel.atem@undp.org">gabriel.atem@undp.org</a></td>
<td>+211929779104, +211920580221, +211925912602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Sudan Support to Public Financial Management (Output 2.4/CPF Pillar 2?)</td>
<td>All states of SS</td>
<td>Fatmata Sesay Atem Kordzo Sedegah</td>
<td>Senior Economist; National Economist Project Specialist</td>
<td><a href="mailto:fatmata.sesay@undp.org">fatmata.sesay@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:gabriel.atem@undp.org">gabriel.atem@undp.org</a> kordzo@<a href="mailto:sedegah@undp.org">sedegah@undp.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governance &amp; Economic Management Support (GEMS) (Outputs 1.3 &amp; 1.4)</td>
<td>Juba: Central Equatoria</td>
<td>Andrew Shuruma Allan Poston James Angok Charles Locker</td>
<td>Team Leader Program Manager Program Management Specialist Program Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:andrew.shuruma@undp.org">andrew.shuruma@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:allan.poston@undp.org">allan.poston@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:james.angok@undp.org">james.angok@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:charles.locker@undp.org">charles.locker@undp.org</a></td>
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<td>Jose Manzano Daniel Kir David Maker</td>
<td>Senior Program Advisor Team Leader; Programme Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jose.manzano@undp.org">jose.manzano@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:daniel.kir@undp.org">daniel.kir@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:david.maker@undp.org">david.maker@undp.org</a></td>
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<td><a href="mailto:jose.manzano@undp.org">jose.manzano@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:daniel.kir@undp.org">daniel.kir@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:david.maker@undp.org">david.maker@undp.org</a></td>
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<td>Watershed Approaches for Climate Resilience in Agro-pastoralism (Output 2.2)</td>
<td>Juba: Central Equatoria</td>
<td>Jose Manzano Daniel Kir David Maker</td>
<td>Senior Program Advisor Team Leader; Programme Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jose.manzano@undp.org">jose.manzano@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:daniel.kir@undp.org">daniel.kir@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:david.maker@undp.org">david.maker@undp.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Climate Change, Environment and DRM (Output 2.2)</td>
<td>Juba: Central Equatoria</td>
<td>Jose Manzano Daniel Kir David Maker</td>
<td>Senior Program Advisor Team Leader; Programme Analyst</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jose.manzano@undp.org">jose.manzano@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:daniel.kir@undp.org">daniel.kir@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:david.maker@undp.org">david.maker@undp.org</a></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Global Fund (Output 2.3)</td>
<td>All states of SS</td>
<td>Blaise Karibushi Karin Nasheya</td>
<td>Project Coordination Advisor Project Manager</td>
<td><a href="mailto:blaise.karibushi@undp.org">blaise.karibushi@undp.org</a> <a href="mailto:karin.nasheya@undp.org">karin.nasheya@undp.org</a></td>
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### D. Projects to be covered (visits in regions where applicable & accessible)

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>cross-cutting</td>
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<td>Equality group formation to SDGs/Strengthening Africa engagement global development</td>
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<td>Communications and Accelerator Lab (with field visits)</td>
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<td>SSHF SA2 (Cluster coordination); Gender</td>
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<td>Climate Change, Environment and DRM</td>
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<td>Peace and Community Cohesion Project (PaCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Access to Justice and Rule of Law</td>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening</td>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence for Economic &amp; Social Transformation of S. Sudan</td>
<td>Output 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Sudan Support to Public Financial Management</strong></td>
<td>Output 2.4 CPD Pillar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recovery and Resilience</td>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Torit</strong></td>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening</td>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Community Cohesion Project (PaCC) (Cluster)</td>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Community Cohesion II (Cluster)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan Support to Public Financial Management</td>
<td>Output 2.4/CPD Pillar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Fund</td>
<td>Output 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery and Resilience</td>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aweil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Output 2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recovery and Resilience</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rumbek</strong></td>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Global Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recovery and Resilience</td>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
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## E. Tentative Schedule for Data Collection in Juba and selected regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Institution(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30th Mar</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMISS \ UN WOMEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Apr</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td></td>
<td>MoFP \ MoPS \ SSPRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr</td>
<td>Juba</td>
<td></td>
<td>Min Gender, Child and Social Welfare \ BCSSAC \ South Sudan National Police Service \ MoFAIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Prison Service of South Sudan \ Judiciary of South Sudan \ Rural Development Action Aid (RDAA) \ Upper Nile Youth Mobilization for Peace and Development Agency (UNYMPDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organization for Peace, Relief and Development (OPRD) \ Juba university \ Hope Restoration South Sudan (HRSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-up (snowballing)/ pending issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13th - 30th April: Lead consultant continues with data collection in Juba and coordinates with National consultant who will start data collection in regional States as of the 3rd week of April covering the three locations of Rumbek, Torit, Aweil.

### Itinerary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th - 16th April</td>
<td>Rumbek (Lakes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th - 23rd April</td>
<td>Torit (Eastern Equatoria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th - 30th April</td>
<td>Aweil (Northern Bahr el-Ghazal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.10. ToR

UNDP Jobs - 95511- UNDP CPD-2019-2021 Mid Term Evaluation