

# TERMINAL EVALUATION (TE) REPORT

July 2021

*Building Shoreline Resilience of Timor-Leste to Protect Local Communities & Their Livelihoods*

## Coastal Resilience Building (CRB) Project

GEF Project ID 5671 / UNDP PIMS 5330



Prepared by:

**Steve Raaymakers**

International Consultant Evaluator

With support from

**Eurico Ediana da Costa**

National Consultant Evaluator



## PROJECT DATA

<b>Project Title:</b>	<i>Building Shoreline Resilience of Timor-Leste to Protect Local Communities and Their Livelihoods Coastal Resilience Building (CRB) Project</i>	
<b>GEF Agency:</b>	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	
<b>GEF Project ID:</b>	5671	
<b>UNDP ID No.s:</b>	Project ID: 00097253. Atlas Award ID: 00092621. PIMS No.: 5330	
<b>Country:</b>	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste	
<b>GEF Cycle &amp; Trust Fund:</b>	GEF 6– Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	
<b>GEF LDCF Objectives:</b>	<p><u>LDCF Objective 1: Reduce the vulnerability of people, livelihoods, physical assets and natural systems to the adverse effect of climate change:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outcome 1.1: Vulnerability of physical assets and natural systems reduced.</li> <li>• Outcome 1.2: Livelihoods and sources of income of vulnerable populations diversified and strengthened.</li> </ul> <p><u>LDCF Objective 2: Strengthen institutional and technical capacities for effective climate change adaptation:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outcome 2.2: Access to improved climate information and early-warning systems enhanced at regional, national and local level.</li> </ul> <p><u>LDCF Objective 3: Integrate climate change adaptation into relevant policies, plans and associated processes:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outcome 3.2: Policies, plans and associated processes developed and strengthened to identify, prioritize and integrate adaptation strategies and measures.</li> </ul>	
<b>UNDAF Outcomes:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Outcome 1:</b> People of Timor-Leste, especially the most disadvantaged groups, benefit from inclusive and responsive quality health, education and other social services, and are more resilient to disasters and the impacts of climate change.</li> <li>• <b>Outcome 3:</b> Economic policies and programmes geared towards inclusive, sustainable and equitable growth and decent jobs.</li> </ul>	
<b>UNDP Strategic Plan Primary Outcome:</b>	<u>Outcome 1:</u> Growth and development are inclusive and sustainable, incorporating productive capacities that create employment and livelihoods for the poor and excluded	
<b>Expected CP Outcome(s):</b>	<p><u>Outcome 2:</u> Sustainable Development:  <u>Output 2.2:</u> Solutions developed at national and subnational level for sustainable management of natural resources, ecosystem services and waste.  <u>Output 2.3:</u> Scaled up action.</p>	
<b>CPAP/UNDAF Output(s):</b>	<p><u>Sub-Outcome 1.4:</u> People of Timor-Leste, particularly those living in rural areas vulnerable to disasters and the impacts of climate change, are more resilient and benefit from improved risk and sustainable environment management.  <u>Sub-Outcome 3.2:</u> Technical capacity enhanced to develop viable and sustainable agribusiness sub-sectors and value chains promoting local bio-diversity.</p>	
<b>Executing Partner:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF).</li> </ul>	
<b>Implementation Modality:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct Implementation Modality (DIM).</li> </ul>	
<b>Financing:</b>	<i>At endorsement (US\$)</i>	<i>At completion (US\$)</i>
GEF financing (LDCF):	7,000,000	TBA (to be assessed during the TE)
GoTL:	18,000,000	TBA
Other:	<b>13,644,402</b>	TBA
<b>Total Project Cost:</b>	<b>38,644,402</b>	TBA
<b>Planned project duration:</b>	48 months (4 years) + 1 <sup>st</sup> 9 month extension & 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2 month extension.	
<b>Project Start:</b>	Planned Start (in ProDoc): Jan 2016 / Actual Start (ProDoc Signature): Aug 2016	
<b>Mid Term Review (MTR) Date:</b>	Oct 2018 – Feb 2019	
<b>Terminal Evaluation (TE) Date:</b>	April – July 2021	
<b>Operational Closing Date:</b>	Original ProDoc: Dec 2019. 4 yrs from ProDoc sign: Aug 2020 1 <sup>st</sup> Ext: May 2021. 2 <sup>nd</sup> Ext: July 2021	

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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First and foremost the International Consultant (IC) would like to thank the National Consultant (NC), Mr Eurico Ediana da Costa, for his sterling efforts to gather essential information and interview key stakeholders in Timor-Leste, especially in the Project Site communities and to gain the views and perspectives about the project from local stakeholders. The ban on international travel due to the global Covid-19 pandemic precluded the IEC from visiting Timor-Leste, which made this Terminal Evaluation (TE) quite challenging. Without the on-ground efforts of the NEC this evaluation report would be less representative.

The efforts of Mr Octavio Fatima Carvalho Oliveira de e Araujo, the UNDP Communication and Monitoring & Evaluation Officer for the CRB Project, in supporting the TE with organizational, logistical and administrative arrangements, are very much appreciated.

The valuable guidance and inputs from the following key persons involved in the CRB Project are also highly appreciated:

- Mr Raimundo Mau - Chair of the CRB Project Board and Director General of Forestry, Coffee & Industrial Crops at Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries (MAF), Timor-Leste,
- Ms Munkhtuya Altangerel - Resident Representative, Ms Lazima Onta-Bhatta - Deputy Resident Representative, Ms Diana Lina Bernardo - Programme Specialist and all other team members at the UNDP Country Office in Timor-Leste,
- Ms Mariana Simões - Regional Technical Adviser (RTA) for Climate Change Adaptation at the UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub; and
- all of the other stakeholders listed in Annex 2 who took the time and effort to make inputs, either through questionnaire responses or direct interviews.

### Evaluation Quotes

*'Honest and transparent evaluation is the Mother of good performance.'*

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*"Forget the mistake – Remember the lesson."*

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*'The capacity to learn and improve is a gift . . .  
'The willingness to learn and improve is a choice.'*

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*'The true measure of success of a project is not . . .  
- how much money has been spent,  
- how many activities have been carried out,  
- how many documents have been produced; or  
- how many training courses or workshops have been held;  
but rather  
- whether or not the project has had the desired impact,  
in terms of actually improving people's lives on the ground.'*

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## ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

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APR	Annual Project Report
APRC	Asia-Pacific Regional Centre (UNDP Bangkok)
BWN	Building With Nature (Green Engineering)
CAS	Coastal Adaptation Strategies
CBO	Community Based Organization
CHM	Clearing House Mechanism
CMA	Coastal Management & Adaptation
CPD	Country Program Document (of UNDP)
CPRSIP	Coastal Protection and Resilience Strategy for Infrastructure Planning
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
CVA	Coastal Vulnerability Assessment
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality
EBM	Ecosystem Based Management
EMP	Environmental Management Plans
E&S	Environmental & Social
ESSPG	Environmental & Social Safeguards Policy & Guidelines
EU	European Union
FC	Field Coordinator (CRB project position)
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GCCA	Global Climate Change Adaptation program (of GIZ-EU)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIZ	German Corporation for International Cooperation
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
ICM	Integrated Coastal Management (includes catchment management)
IC	International Consultant (Evaluator)
IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
KOICA	Korean International Development Agency
LDC	Least Developed Country (specified by UN)
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund (of GEF)
LMMA	Locally Managed Marine Area
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries (Timor-Leste)
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning
MoA	Memorandum of Agreement
MTR	Mid Term Review
NAP-CC	National Adaptation Plan on Climate Change
NAP-CLD	National Action Plan to Combat Land Degradation
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy & Action Plan
NC	National Consultant (Evaluator)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIM	National Implementation Modality
NOP	National Ocean Policy
PB	Project Board
PIR	Project Implementation Review
PM	Project Manager
PMU	Project Management Unit
PRF	Project Results Framework
ProDoc	Project Document
QPR	Quarterly Progress Report
SAP	Strategic Action Plan
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SDP	(Timor-Leste) Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030

SEE	Secretary of State for Environment (Timor-Leste)
SEEWAY	UNDP Supporting Entrepreneurship and Employment for Women and Youth project
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SMAP	Shoreline Management & Adaptation Plan
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TL	Timor-Leste
ToR	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group

## TE REPORT STRUCTURE

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The TE report structure follows the chapters, sections and sub-sections listed in Annex 7 of the UNDP document “*Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects 2020*” (the TE Guidelines 2020).

## FORE-NOTE 1: TE CONSTRAINTS & LIMITATIONS

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1. It should be noted that the Terminal Evaluation (TE) was undertaken during the Covid-19 pandemic with international and domestic travel restrictions in place. As a result the International Consultant (IC), who is based in Cairns, Australia, could not travel to Timor-Leste to conduct face-to-face interviews or undertake physical verification visits to project sites. The National Consultant (NC), who is based Dili, was also restricted in his ability to travel domestically, and was only able to visit 11 sites in five Municipalities out of a total of 49 Aldeia's (hamlets) that hosted project sites across seven Municipalities. The Municipalities of Covalima and Viqueque could not be visited due to Covid.
2. As a result, except for some local interviews by the NC, most stakeholder interviews as listed in Annex 2 were conducted remotely using Skype or Zoom, often with poor internet connection causing cut-offs. This severely limited the ability of the IC to optimize the value of the interviews, and pursue various lines of enquiry, which would normally be possible in face-to-face interviews. Sites visits are also essential to effective evaluations and the inability of the IC to undertake any site visits, and reliance on a few visits by the NC, severely restricted TE coverage and rigour.
3. To supplement the above methods an Evaluation Questionnaire (EQ) (Annex 4) was emailed to over 50 project stakeholders, with 13 completed returns being received. Responses were mainly from UNDP project staff, the project Field Coordinators (FCs) and NGOs, with only a few from government and local communities. Most local government and community stakeholders in Timor Leste do not have email, so the NC took a hard copy of the EQ, including Tetum version, with him during site visits. The representativeness of the EQ responses is therefore limited, however, they still provide very useful insights on the performance of the project.
4. ***The findings of this TE should be considered in light of the limitations described above. The TE may have arrived at different findings and conclusions had the normal TE process, including full site visits, been possible.***

## FORE-NOTE 2: PROJECT EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

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1. While the objectives of the CRB project were extremely ambitious and while the UNDP Country Office (CO), Project Management Unit (PMU) and Government of Timor Leste (GoTL)(especially the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries - MAF), clearly had the best of intentions and made huge efforts to achieve all targets, project implementation was significantly constrained by a number of external factors that were outside of their control, as follows:
  - a) Between 2017 and mid-2018 Timor-Leste held two parliamentary elections plus the presidential election, which extensively hindered GoTL's participation in project execution at the national, local and community levels.
  - b) The elections resulted in major changes in the Government from early 2019 (both in terms of organizational structure and senior staff members), further impacting on the implementation of project activities.
  - c) The Covid-19 pandemic broke out in March 2020, with lockdowns and domestic travel restrictions commencing in February 2021, impeding the ability to undertake work across the 11 project municipalities.
  - d) The worst floods in Timor-Leste's history struck in April 2021, further preventing the ability to work at project sites and directly impacting on some activities, which are mostly located in low-lying, flood-prone coastal areas.
2. These factors certainly reduced the ability of UNDP, MAF and project partners to fully achieve all project targets, and have influenced some of the low ratings in this Terminal Evaluation (TE), without fault on the parties. However, the TE also finds that there were many aspects of the project that did not perform well, due to the actions, incorrect actions or lack of actions by the various parties, irrespective of the external constraints listed above.
3. ***In order to genuinely learn the lessons of this project and make improvements for future projects – which is the very purpose of this TE – it is vital that the parties do not use the external constraints listed above as an excuse for the project's various under-performances. Rather, all parties should fully embrace and act upon the findings, lessons and recommendations of this TE. Otherwise there is no point in undertaking TE exercises such as this.***

## 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### 1.1 Overall TE Finding

1. Overall the Terminal Evaluation (TE) finds that the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing integrated coastal management (ICM), mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal climate change adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste. Major beneficial achievements of the project include, *inter alia*:
  - a) Being the first-ever large-scale ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation project in Timor-Leste, implemented at a critical time when the coastal zone is under increasing pressure, including from global climate change impacts, and when mangroves are being rapidly destroyed by a combination of drivers.
  - b) Making a significant contribution to raising awareness about ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation at all levels nationally, and firmly establishing these issues on the national agenda.
  - c) Undertaking a comprehensive national coastal vulnerability assessment and national mangrove mapping survey, and establishing a national GIS database as a baseline for future monitoring, planning and policy.
  - d) Building the skills and capacity of GoTL, the University of Timor-Leste (UNITL), local-level governments, local NGOs and community groups across seven municipalities in ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation and planting, mangrove-supportive livelihoods and project development, management and reporting.
  
2. However, despite the significant positive contributions and beneficial achievements, the TE finds that the project has suffered a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies, including *inter alia*:
  - a) A low rate of achievement of Targets and Outputs, ranging from only 28% achieved for Outcome Targets to only 60% achieved for project Outputs (see section 4.3.1) (Note: To be considered 'satisfactory', GEF projects are expected to fully achieve at least 80% of their Targets by project end).
  - b) Some of the main technical activities have not been successful (see section 4.3.1) – including many, if not most, of the mangrove planting efforts and livelihood activities, which suffer from some serious limitations. Some of the fencing and tarabandu regulations have not been effective. Three of the four eco-tourism facilities suffer significant issues, and the geo-engineering interventions may cause negative impacts.
  - c) The plethora of ICM strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project are highly convoluted and confused, suffer technical deficiencies, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to GoTL and have not been formally approved/adopted by GoTL for implementation.
  - d) While the project has made some progress in supporting GoTL to establish institutional arrangements for mangrove conservation, including a new mangrove branch in MAF, effective, permanent, whole-of-government, national- and local-level ICM governance arrangements have not yet been established. While the project has implemented some measures to support the post-project continuity and sustainability of a few specific project elements, there is no overall plan to ensure the continuity and sustainability of project outputs and benefits, and many are likely to simply collapse post-project, with some already doing so.
  
3. Unfortunately, despite the significant beneficial achievements of the project, the TE finds that due to the significant weaknesses and deficiencies, the overall project rating at end of project could be assessed as 'Unsatisfactory'. However, due to the external factors outlined in Fore-Note 2, and considering there were some positive achievements, the TE concludes that the overall evaluation rating is '**Moderately Unsatisfactory**'.
  
4. The TE makes a number of recommendations moving forward, including a recommendation for an urgent need for a targeted, follow up ICM project, which builds upon, fills the gaps and learns the lessons from the CRB project. **Both UNDP and GoTL are strongly encouraged to fully embrace and act upon the findings, lessons and recommendations of this TE, especially relating to those elements of the project that are found to be less than satisfactory.**

## 1.2 Evaluation Ratings

Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)	Rating	Reasons for Rating (summary points only – pls refer relevant sections of the report as indicated for details)
M&E design at entry:	<b>5 (Satisfactory)</b> (Refer section 4.2.5).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ProDoc contains a properly developed M&amp;E plan in accordance with UNDP-GEF requirements.</li> </ul>
M&E Plan Implementation:	<b>2 (Unsatisfactory)</b> (Refer section 4.2.5).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M&amp;E was missing the ‘learning’ component, i.e. M&amp;E should be Monitoring, Evaluation &amp; Learning (MEL) – with feedback loops to ensure that corrective actions are taken.</li> <li>PMU did not properly address some M&amp;E reporting requirements, including lessons learnt compilation and co-finance monitoring &amp; reporting.</li> <li>PIRs did not specifically and quantitatively report against PRF targets and indicators – tendency towards activity-based rather than results-based reporting across the project.</li> <li>PIRs had tendency towards very verbose, long-winded, convoluted, ‘flowery’ narrative reporting, rather than hard, verifiable data on actual performance.</li> <li>When data was reported, not always supported by identification of data sources, analysis methods and means of verification.</li> <li>Project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time, nor same to assess effectiveness and potential impacts of other interventions such as geo-engineering.</li> <li>Project did not undertake livelihoods baseline surveys or quantitative data collection to allow M&amp;E of livelihood activities - very limited oversight of \$ to 109 livelihood groups.</li> <li>All project M&amp;E activities were heavily based on qualitative and subjective methods with very little quantitative, objective M&amp;E – which is a significant deficiency.</li> <li>Project did not undertake KAP surveys of stakeholders and public at beginning &amp; end, to allow M&amp;E of impact of awareness activities.</li> <li>MTR did not address some key issues including review of PRF and gender, management response to MTR not complete, and took 10 months (guidelines require 3 weeks).</li> <li>PMU did not update the GEF tracking tool at either the MTR or TE reporting point.</li> </ul>
<b>Overall Quality of M&amp;E</b>	<b>3 (Moderately Unsatisfactory)</b>	

Implementation & Execution (IE):	Rating	Reasons for Rating (summary points only – pls refer relevant sections of the report for details)
Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight:	<b>2 (Unsatisfactory)</b> (Refer section 4.2).	<p>Overall implementation and oversight by UNDP were strong for some issues but with significant some short-comings for other issues, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Delays to project inception and full PMU recruitment.</li> <li>Fairly high turnover of project staff and several key staff, including the PM/CTA and the vital FC positions, leaving to join another UNDP-managed project.</li> <li>Sometimes significant delays (months) with funds disbursement – especially for local-level activities – delaying overall project progress.</li> <li>Poor oversight and quality control of technical consultancies engaged by the project and of policy and technical documents and reports produced by the project.</li> <li>Poor oversight of the quality and success, effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of interventions such as fencing, mangrove planting, livelihoods and geo-engineering.</li> <li>Inadequate assessment and incorporation of socio-cultural concerns, including in relation to local-level traditional, customary practices, resulting in a project intervention being inconsistent with these and thus being rejected by and even sabotaged by local community at Suai Loro (the project did learn from this however).</li> <li>Poor quality control of infrastructure built by the project, resulting in potentially unsustainable and unsafe facilities that do not comply with basic engineering standards.</li> <li>Very limited oversight of \$ to livelihood groups – in fact the PMU could not even provide data on the amount of funds provided to most of the 109 groups - a serious concern.</li> <li>UNDP did not always act rapidly to identify root causes of delays and other problems to develop and implement corrective actions.</li> <li>Failure to track and report co-financing.</li> </ul>
Quality of Implementing Partner Execution:	<b>4 (Moderately Satisfactory)</b> (Refer section 4.2).	<p>Project was Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) by UNDP so MAF’s implementation role was limited. However, MAF was fully engaged, although with some short-comings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tendency to reactive management rather than proactive management.</li> <li>A tendency to focus on implementation of technical activities at the expense of more strategic, policy outputs and outcomes.</li> <li>Sometimes a low-level of engagement at the local-level, which varied from site to site.</li> </ul>

**FINAL REPORT**

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. **Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report** (UNDP PIMS 5330)

<b>Overall quality of IE:</b>	<b>3 (Moderately Unsatisfactory)</b>	
Assessment of Outcomes	Rating	Reasons for Rating (summary points only – pls refer relevant sections of the report for details)
Relevance:	<b>6 (Highly Satisfactory)</b>  (Refer section 4.3.2).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project is highly relevant to the SDGs, the GEF focal area (LDC) objectives and the UNDAF, UNDP SP and UNDP CPD.</li> <li>The project is highly relevant to national development and related policies and plans, including the TL SDP, NBSAP, NAP, NOP, NAP-CLD and others.</li> <li>The project is highly relevant to local community needs and priorities.</li> <li>The project components and activities directly address some of the major coastal adaptation and resilience and broader environmental issues, needs and priorities of TL, taking an integrated, ecosystem-based approach, and directly assisting communities.</li> <li>The livelihoods component is extremely relevant to addressing the root-causes of mangrove loss and general coastal degradation in TL.</li> </ul>
Effectiveness:	<b>1 (Highly Unsatisfactory)</b>  (Refer section 4.3.3).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>While the CRB project has delivered some significant beneficial achievements and made a significant positive contribution to advancing ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal climate change adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, the actual level of effectiveness has been quite low.</li> <li>Effectiveness is measured primarily by the degree to which the PRF objective, outcomes, outputs and targets are achieved by end of project, as well as by the ‘impact’ that the project has in improving the status quo.</li> <li>GEF projects are expected to achieve their objective, outcomes, outputs and targets by end of project, especially if two time-extensions are granted as in the case of the CRB project. Full achievement of at least 80% of all targets is required for a project to be assessed as ‘satisfactory’.</li> <li>Despite two time-extensions, achievement of PRF targets was very low for this project, as follows (refer section 4.3.1 and Tables 8 &amp; 9 below for details):             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Objective: Only partially achieved / Outcomes: Achieved: 2/7 (28%). Partially achieved: 3/7 (43%). Not achieved: 2/7 (29%). / Outputs: Achieved: 6/10 (60%). Partially achieved: 4/10 (40%). Not achieved: 2/10 (20%).</li> </ul> </li> <li>Despite two time-extensions a number of key outputs and activities will not be completed by the extended project end of July 2021</li> <li>Some of the technical activities undertaken by the project are already failing – e.g. reportedly many, if not most, of the mangrove planting efforts have not been successful, many, if not most, of the livelihood activities have not been successful and are unlikely to be viable/sustainable post project, one of the four eco-tourism projects is already abandoned and two others were not completed at time of TE, with physical infrastructure being of very poor quality and unlikely to be maintained/sustained in the long term, and the geo-engineering interventions may cause negative impacts (refer section 4.3.3 below).</li> <li>The plethora of CMA strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project are highly convoluted and confused, suffer significant technical deficiencies, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to and implemented by GoTL, and none have been formally approved/adopted by GoTL – overall, they are ineffective.</li> <li><b>Note:</b> While the 2020/21 Covid situation has been a major factor in the reduced levels of achievement, there are also UNDP-related factors including <i>inter alia</i> slow approval of local-level activities, delays to funds disbursements and shifting of most project staff including PM/CTA and FCs to another project at end of 2020.</li> <li>The project’s effectiveness has also been limited by an overwhelming focus on attempting to ‘tick off’ as many activities as possible, with insufficient attention to thorough planning and ensuring the quality, usefulness, sustainability and impact of the activities, and insufficient focus on more strategic, policy-level outcomes and impacts.</li> <li>It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the Project in delivering longer-term outcomes and impacts – which can only be assessed in years to come.</li> </ul>
Efficiency:	<b>2 (Unsatisfactory)</b>  (Refer section 4.3.4).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Efficiency is assessed by the value for money achieved by the project, the level of returns and positive benefit resulting from every dollar spent. There were some aspects of the project which were reportedly quite efficient, e.g.:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reportedly the cost per hectare of mangrove restoration achieved by the project is well below the average in other parts of the world. However the TE was not provided with quantitative data to support this claim. Cost calculations need to also factor in the end-result – was it successful? If not, the funds are not effective.</li> <li>Reportedly the project was able to achieve efficiencies by adopting a ‘learning by doing’ approach (‘on the job training’).</li> </ul> </li> <li>Overall the efficiency of the CRB project has been reduced by a number of factors, including:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project had a very high use of external consultancies, which produced of a number of reports and documents that are limited practical benefit, and used a significant part of the budget that could have been used for on-site activities at local level.</li> <li>Spreading funding to undertake project activities across 27 NGOs was inefficient as there was very wide range of capacities across NGOs with several failing / being cancelled or producing low quality and unsustainable outputs, including sub-standard infrastructure.</li> <li>As outlined above many of the mangrove planting efforts have not been successful which is inefficient / wasteful of funds and effort.</li> <li>Many of the livelihood projects have failed / been abandoned (however, UNDP is attempting to ensure sustainability of a few by linking with the SEEWAY Project).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

**FINAL REPORT**

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. **Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report** (UNDP PIMS 5330)

<b>Overall Project Outcome Rating:</b>	<b>2 (Moderately Unsatisfactory)</b> (NOTE: Although combining the ratings for Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency results in an Overall Outcome Rating of 'Unsatisfactory', due to the external factors outlined in Fore-Note 2, and considering there were some positive achievements of the project, the TE concludes that the overall evaluation rating is ' <b>Moderately Unsatisfactory</b> ').
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Sustainability	Rating	Reasons for Rating (summary points only – pls refer relevant sections of this report below for details)
Financial resources:	<b>1 (Unlikely)</b> (Refer section 4.3.5).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP / GoTL / MAF have not developed a documented Sustainability Plan with explicit allocation of financial resources to ensure continuity, sustainability and replication of project benefits into the future.</li> <li>• There is no evidence of allocation of funds in the Central State Budget for project-related activities moving forward.</li> <li>• There is no documented Maintenance Plan and associated financial resources for the ongoing, long-term maintenance of physical infrastructure that have been built by the project such as ecotourism facilities. This was reportedly discussed at June 2021 TWG (minutes not provided to the TE) and the livelihood consultant's B5 report (only provided to the TE on 15 July 2021 just as this TE report was to be submitted) outlines a plan to sustain and upscale the Hera centre at a cost of US\$1.2 million over five years, with no budget secured).</li> <li>• It appears that many, if not most, of the livelihood activities have not been successful and are unlikely to be financially viable/sustainable post-project, and the project has not developed an overall plan to address this (however, UNDP is attempting to ensure sustainability of a few of them by linking with the SEEWAY Project).</li> </ul>
Socio-political/economic:	<b>3 (Moderately Likely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There appears to be a high level of social and political support for the project outputs, outcomes and benefits.</li> </ul>
Institutional framework and governance:	<b>1 (Unlikely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There has been a positive change at MAF in that the Directorate of Forestry &amp; Watershed Management has been renamed the Directorate of Forestry, Watershed &amp; Mangroves Management, with supporting legal mandate and defined mangrove responsibilities, but as yet no allocation of necessary resources from the Central State Budget.</li> <li>• Overall, the project has not been effective in establishing the institutional framework and governance arrangements across GoTL that are needed to ensure the sustainability of project outputs, outcomes and benefits into the future, despite this being a key part of the overall project objective. Problems include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The plethora of CMA strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project, which are supposed to provide the basis for the institutional framework and governance arrangements, are highly convoluted and confused, suffer significant technical deficiencies, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to and implemented by GoTL, and none have been formally approved/adopted by GoTL.</li> <li>• There is no evidence that the other Directorates in MAF have had their roles, coordination and planning mechanisms clarified and mandated, as required to meet project output 1.4.</li> <li>• Just as important as internal institutional arrangements at MAF is the establishment of fully-functioning and sustainable, 'whole-of-government', national and local-level cross-sectoral coordination arrangements – the project has not be able to establish these on a permanent basis.</li> <li>• The PB and TWG have been very project-focused and there are no plans in place to evolve these into permanent, formalised CMA coordination mechanisms.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Environmental:	<b>2 (Moderately Unlikely)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite some site-level environmental benefits of the project, especially from mangrove planting, like other SIDS TL is subject to the overarching impacts of global climate change, and if these are not addressed by the global community, the small-scale benefits of such national-level projects may be overwhelmed by regional- and global-level environmental changes.</li> <li>• The likelihood of the environmental sustainability of project outcomes and outputs is reduced by the fact that, reportedly some of the fencing activities have not been effective, many, if not most, of the mangrove planting efforts have not been successful, and the geo-engineering interventions may cause negative impacts (refer section 4.3.3 below).</li> </ul>
<b>Overall Likelihood of Sustainability:</b>	<b>2 (Moderately Unlikely)</b>	

**FINAL REPORT**

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Rating Scores: Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, Implementation/Oversight, Execution, Relevance	Rating Scores: Sustainability
<p><b>6 = Highly Satisfactory (HS):</b> Exceeds expectations and/or no shortcomings.</p> <p><b>5 = Satisfactory (S):</b> Meets expectations and/or no or minor shortcomings.</p> <p><b>4 = Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> More or less meets expectations and/or some shortcomings.</p> <p><b>3 = Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> Somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings.</p> <p><b>2 = Unsatisfactory (U):</b> Substantially below expectations and/or major shortcomings.</p> <p><b>1 = Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> Severe shortcomings</p> <p><b>UA = Unable to Assess:</b> Available information does not allow an assessment.</p>	<p><b>4 = Likely (L):</b> Negligible risks to sustainability.</p> <p><b>3 = Moderately Likely (ML):</b> Moderate risks to sustainability.</p> <p><b>2 = Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> Significant risks to sustainability.</p> <p><b>1 = Unlikely (U):</b> Severe risks to sustainability.</p> <p><b>UA = Unable to Assess:</b> Unable to assess the expected incidence and magnitude of risks to sustainability.</p>

### 1.3 Summary Findings for Each Issue Assessed by the TE

**Note:** Due to the extremely complex nature of the CRB project and the comprehensiveness of this TE report, only the most significant, summary findings are listed here. It is important to review the main body of the report in detail to gain the full picture of the TE's assessment of the project. Relevant report sections are listed against each Summary Finding.

Summary findings are listed in the same order as each section under Chapter 4 of the report – 'Evaluation Findings'.

[Summary Findings – Project Design & Formulation](#) (refer section 4.1 for details):

- *The project appears to have been designed to directly address country and community needs and priorities as identified during project design consultations in Timor-Leste, and was both country- and community-driven.*
- *The project design was extremely ambitious and unusually complex and multifaceted. The project design overall could have been improved and strengthened if:
 
  - *It had focused on a smaller set of high-priority 'demonstration activities' at a smaller number of 'pilot sites', spread evenly and equitably throughout all 11 coastal municipalities, as the bases for replication and scaling-up across other sites in subsequent phases.*
  - *It had included an explicit activity to develop a documented and budgeted replication and sustainability plan before project end.**
- *The PRF suffers from a number of weaknesses, including:
 
  - *Its elements are not logically and coherently structured and linked.*
  - *It does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets are not aligned with the Outputs (reportedly this relates to the UNDP ProDoc / PRF template applicable at the time of project design - 2015).*
  - *Many of the Indicators and Targets are found to not meet the criteria of SMART.**
- *While Annex G1 of the ProDoc contains lessons from previous mangrove planting activities in TL (which were not learned from and applied during the CRB project), the ProDoc does not include an analysis of broader (non-mangrove) lessons learned from other relevant projects, and how these lessons have been incorporated into the project design.*
- *The Stakeholder Involvement Plan is not fully developed and is not supported by a thorough and comprehensive stakeholder analysis.*
- *The report by Larsen (2015) provided a strong bases for informing the gender responsiveness of the project design, however the actual project design was not strong enough in this regard – it could have been much more gender responsive if the PRF itself included gender targets and indicators under all project outcomes and outputs (the project did develop a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed – see section 4.3.7).*
- *Overall, the project design does not fully or properly address all of the main potential environmental and social impacts of the project.*
- *Because this is the TE stage (end of project), these findings cannot be addressed in the existing project, but provide lessons for future projects.*

[Summary Findings – Adaptive Management](#) (refer section 4.2.1 for details):

- *While UNDP and GoTL exhibited some capacity for adaptative management, there were some significant deficiencies in adaptive management, including slow investigation and identification of the root causes of various problems and delays that arose during the project, an extremely long, 10-month delay to issuing the management response to the MTR, and*

*incomplete management responses to the MTR, including some critical MTR recommendations.*

[Summary Findings – Actual Stakeholder Participation](#) (refer section 4.2.2 for details):

- *Overall the TE assesses that the project has undertaken some aspects of stakeholder participation and partnerships very well, and other aspects quite poorly.*
- *Stakeholder participation and partnerships were constrained by the lack of a fully developed stakeholder analysis and stakeholder involvement plan in the ProDoc, and reportedly, a tendency for project management to communicate in a one-way mode and not listen in return, especially at the local level.*

[Summary Findings – Project Finances & Financial Management](#) (refer section 4.2.3 for details):

Overall, given:

- *that the TE is not in a position to thoroughly assess the financial aspects of the project in detail,*
- *the relatively large GEF allocation (\$7 million),*
- *the fact that funding was dispersed by the project across an unusually large number of recipients, including local groups with limited capacity in financial management, and an unusually high number of consultancies,*
- *the fact that many project investments appear to have been ineffective – e.g. failed mangrove planting, failed fencing, failed livelihood activities and incomplete, poorly designed and built, and unsustainable eco-tourism infrastructure,*
- *the fact that the PMU could not provide data on the amount of funds provided to most of the 109 livelihood groups (a serious concern),*
- *the apparently extremely low returns on investment relative to funds provided for many of the activities, especially the livelihoods activities,*
- *what appears to be a lack of transparency and objective criteria for selecting sites and groups to receive project funds,*
- *some of the issues with project finances identified by the TE as outlined in section 4.2.3; and*
- *the fact that the project has not been subject to an external audit,*

*. . . it is recommended that at the end of the project, UNDP commission a highly detailed, forensic financial audit by independent, external auditors, including tracing all expenditure trails.*

[Summary Findings – Project Co-financing](#) (refer section 4.2.4 for details):

- *Despite the findings of the MTR, the PMU has not tracked and reported on co-financing since the MTR. The TE is therefore not able to assess this issue properly, and this is a significant deficiency with project implementation.*
- *There is a need to check the basis of the amount committed by MAF (\$18 million) for the reasons outlined in section 4.2.4 and assess if this translated into actual co-financing.*
- *There may be new projects since the ProDoc that could be added as new co-financing for the CRB project.*
- *It is recommended that the PMU complete Table 7.*

[Summary Findings – Monitoring & Evaluation](#) (refer section 4.2.5 for details):

- *The proposed M&E Plan as outlined in the ProDoc was satisfactory and contains the elements of a properly developed M&E plan in accordance with UNDP-GEF requirements.*
- *The M&E plan could have had a stronger ‘learning’ component, i.e. M&E should be MEL – with feedback loops to ensure that corrective actions are taken.*
- *Actual implementation of the M&E Plan was unsatisfactory, including:*

- *The PIRs do not specifically report against project Outputs – and contained a lot of padding with over-verbose, convoluted and ‘flowery’ narrative and a strong tendency towards activity-based reporting rather than results-based reporting using the PRF targets and indicators (the MTR also noted this).*
- *The ‘self-assessed’ PIR evaluation ratings were not fully consistent with MTR and TE findings, with a tendency towards being more positive than the supporting hard data might indicate.*
- *The PIRs reported on S&E issues in a superficial manner, and failed to identify, assess and report on key S&E issues.*
- *The PMU took 10 months to issue the management response to the MTR (in December 2019), leaving very little time to actually implement the MTR recommendations in the last planned year of the project (2020). The UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines require that the MTR management response should be completed within three weeks of receiving the Final MTR Report.*
- *The MTR management response also did not act on or fully address some of the MTR recommendations, including in relation to some significant project weaknesses.*
- *The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time, nor same to assess effectiveness and potential impacts of other interventions such as geo-engineering.*
- *The project did not undertake livelihoods baseline surveys or quantitative data collection to allow M&E of livelihood activities – and very limited oversight of the funds provided to the 109 livelihood groups.*
- *All project M&E activities were heavily based on qualitative and subjective methods with very little quantitative, objective M&E – which is a significant deficiency.*
- *The project did not undertake KAP surveys of stakeholders and public at beginning & end, to allow M&E of impact of awareness activities.*
- *The PMU did not update the GEF tracking tool at either the MTR or TE reporting point.*

[Summary Findings – UNDP Implementation & Oversight](#) (refer section 4.2.6 for details):

- *There were several strengths in UNDP’s implementation and oversight of the project based on its longstanding presence as a trusted development partner in Timor-Leste, however the TE identified a number of important areas where UNDP’s implementation and oversight were not as effective as they should have been, including inter alia:*
  - *Delays to project inception and full PMU recruitment.*
  - *Fairly high turnover of project staff and several key project staff, including the PM/CTA and the vital FC positions, leaving the project before its extended end to join another UNDP-managed project.*

*Sometimes significant delays (sometimes months) with approval of project proposals and funds disbursement – especially for local-level activities – delaying overall project progress.*
  - *Poor oversight and quality control of technical consultancies engaged by the project and of policy and technical documents and reports produced by the project.*
  - *Poor oversight of the quality and success, effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of interventions such as fencing, mangrove planting, livelihoods and geo-engineering.*

- *Inadequate incorporation of socio-cultural factors and concerns, including in relation to local-level traditional, cultural, customary practices at Suai Loro, resulting in the fencing intervention being inconsistent with these and thus being rejected by and even sabotaged by the local community (the project did learn from this).*
- *Poor quality control of infrastructure built by the project, especially in relation to eco-tourism, resulting in potentially unsustainable and unsafe facilities that do not comply with basic engineering standards.*
- *Failure to track and report co-financing.*
- *Significant deficiencies with implementation of the project's M&E Plan.*
- *These result in a rating of Unsatisfactory.*
- *It is strongly recommended that UNDP should look closely at the issues listed above and take action to improve project oversight mechanisms, to drastically improve the effectiveness of future projects.*

[Summary Findings – Implementing Partner \(MAF\) Implementation & Oversight](#) (refer section 4.2.7 for details):

- *Overall project execution by MAF was strong and fully engaged, including chairing the Project Board and actively assisting the PMU with on-site activities. However, the TE has identified a number of important areas where MAF's involvement could have been strengthened, including inter alia:*
  - *Tendency to reactive management rather than proactive management.*
  - *Sometimes non-compliance with UNDP reporting requirements, resulting in funds disbursement delays.*
  - *A tendency to focus on implementation of technical activities at the expense of more strategic, policy outputs and outcomes, including official adoption and implementation of policies, strategies and plans developed by the project.*
  - *Sometimes a low-level of engagement at the local-level, which varied from site to site.*
- *Several stakeholders reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts towards better coordination and cooperation with other ministries and directorates, and especially the Secretariat of State for Environment (SSE), under a stronger 'whole-of-government' approach.*
- *Several stakeholders also reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts to secure more substantive budget allocations from the Central State Budget for post-project continuity and sustainability of project-related outputs and outcomes.*
- *These result in a rating of Moderately Satisfactory.*

[Summary Findings – Progress Towards Objectives & Expected Outcomes](#) (refer section 4.3.1 for details):

- *UNDP projects that are funded by GEF are expected to achieve their planned Objectives, Outcomes and Outputs by project closing, with an achievement rate of at least 80% generally being considered necessary for the project to be considered 'satisfactory'.*
- *Overall the Terminal Evaluation (TE) finds that the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing integrated coastal management (ICM), mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal climate change adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, as outlined in section 4.3.1.*
- *However, despite these significant positive contributions and beneficial achievements, the TE finds that the project has a low rate of achievement of Targets and Outputs, as follows:*
  - *Objective Target: Only partially achieved.*

- *Outcomes: Achieved: 2/7 (28%). Partially achieved: 3/7 (43%). Not achieved: 2/7 (29%).*
- *Outputs: Achieved: 6/10 (60%). Partially achieved: 4/10 (40%). Not achieved: 2/10 (20%).*
- *The project has suffered a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies that have limited the achievement of Targets and Outputs, as outlined in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.*

Summary Findings – Relevance (refer section 4.3.2 for details):

- *The TE finds that:*
  - *The CRB project is highly relevant to all of the SDGs (see Table X), the GEF focal area (LDC) objectives and the UNDAF, UNDP SP and UNDP CPD.*
  - *The project is highly relevant to national development and related policies and plans, including the TL SDP, NBSAP, NAP, NOP, NAP-CLD and others.*
  - *The project is highly relevant to local community needs and priorities.*
  - *The project components and activities directly address some of the major coastal adaptation and resilience and broader environmental issues, needs and priorities of TL, taking an integrated, ecosystem-based approach, and directly assisting communities.*
  - *The livelihoods component is extremely relevant to addressing the root-causes of mangrove and general coastal degradation in TL.*
- *This results in an evaluation rating for relevance of ‘Highly Satisfactory’.*

Summary Findings – Effectiveness (refer section 4.3.3 for details):

- *While overall the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, and has delivered a number of useful and beneficial outputs, unfortunately the overall achievement rate for the CRB project, measured against the PRF, has been very low, despite two extensions to the project timeline. In this regard the project overall has not been very effective*
- *One of the main limitations on the project’s effectiveness is the fact that very unfortunately, many of the main technical activities undertaken by the project have failed, even before the project has ended. Examples of these and the likely underlying causes for failure are listed in Table 11, in section 4.3.3, along with recommendations to address these problems.*
- *The TE has serious concerns about some of the findings relating to effectiveness of the project, including inter alia:*
  - *The project did not ensure the quality, rigour, relevance and usefulness of most of the ICM strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project, and did not follow up to ensure that these were formally adopted by GoTL for implementation – they have just become the tragic cliché of ‘reports collecting dust on shelves’, which is not an effective use of GEF funds.*
  - *In some cases, there appears to have been a lack of full and thorough consultations with local communities to work within their long-standing traditional rights to access and use mangroves, and respect their cultural practices and traditional ‘tarabandu’ laws and sacred rites relating to coastal areas. The TE considers this to be a serious failing of the project, which breaches UNDP’s E&S policies, creates ill will amongst local communities and potentially affects future UNDP initiatives in these areas (e.g. Suai Loro, Covalima).*

- *Lack of proper planning, feasibility and impact assessment, detailed technical design, oversight, quality control and follow-up monitoring, evaluation and sustainability efforts for a number of significant activities, including fences, mangrove planting, livelihood activities and geo-engineering / hydrological interventions.*
- *The TE has heightened concerns about the effectiveness of five main aspects of the project in particular; i) measures to exclude livestock from mangroves, ii) mangrove-supportive livelihoods, iii) the eco-tourism infrastructure built by the project, iv) the geo-engineering interventions and v) the significant loss of mangroves at Tibar Bay, as per the mini-case studies in section 4.3.3.*
- *The severe shortcomings outlined above result in a TE finding for project effectiveness of Highly Unsatisfactory.*

#### Summary Findings – Efficiency (refer section 4.3.4 for details):

- *There were some aspects of the project which were reportedly quite efficient, however, overall the efficiency of the CRB project was reduced by a number of factors, including:*
  - *The project had a relatively high staff turnover, creating a start-stop effect to some project activities. The efficiency of the project was also affected by UNDP's decision to move key staff, including the PM/CTA and FCs, to another project at end of 2020, leaving the project without implementation capacity in the critical closing period.*
  - *The project spent US\$1.44 million on PMU staff salaries (including UN Volunteers), representing 20% of the GEF grant of \$7 million.*
  - *The project also commissioned an unusually high number of consultancies for a project of this scale. The TE identified a total of 29 consultancy and company contracts worth approximately US\$1.53 million. This is 22% of the total GEF allocation of \$7 million.*
  - *Combining the \$1.44 million spent on project salaries with the \$1.53 million spent on consultants and contracts comes to \$2.97 million, or 42% of the total \$7 million GEF grant, reducing the funds available for activities by GoTL and at local level. Some stakeholders stated that as the project supported seven municipalities, the \$7 million should have approached \$1 million for each municipality, and only a small percentage (<20%) should have gone for UNDP project management.*
  - *Many, if not most, of the consultancy outputs were of quite poor technical quality and unlikely to be of practical use to GoTL and local communities, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort.*
  - *Funding was spread to undertake activities across 27 NGOs, which was inefficient as there was very wide range of capacities across NGOs with several failing / being cancelled or producing low quality and unsustainable outputs, including sub-standard infrastructure.*
  - *Some of the mangrove fencing and many of the mangrove planting and livelihood activities have failed, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort.*
  - *Project efficiency was also constrained by combining the PM and CTA roles into one position. The complex nature of the project required a very high level of project management commitment with a dedicated PM, and the highly technical nature of the project required a dedicated CTA with strong scientific and technical expertise in ICM, mangrove ecosystems management and related subjects.*

#### Summary Findings – Sustainability (refer section 4.3.5 for details):

- *The TE rates the overall likelihood of sustainability for this project as “Moderately Unlikely”. The main reasons:*
  - *UNDP and GoTL have not developed a documented Sustainability Plan with explicit allocation of financial resources to ensure continuity, sustainability and replication of project benefits.*

- *There is also no documented Maintenance Plan and associated financial resources for the ongoing, long-term maintenance of physical facilities that have been built by the project.*
- *While there has been a positive change at MAF in that the Directorate of Forestry &*
- *Management has been renamed the Directorate of Forestry, Watershed & Mangroves Management, with supporting legal mandate and defined mangrove responsibilities, the project has not been effective in establishing the whole-of-government institutional framework and governance arrangements across GoTL that are needed to ensure the sustainability of project outputs, outcomes and benefits into the future, despite this being a key part of the overall project objective.*

Summary Findings – Country Ownership (refer section 4.3.6 for details):

- *The CRB project had a very high level of country ownership. A remaining gap in country ownership is documentary evidence of a commitment of financial resources by government for the ongoing replication and sustainability of project outcomes and outputs post-project.*

Summary Findings – Gender Equality & Empowerment of Women (refer section 4.3.7 for details):

- *The gender study undertaken during the project design phase (Larson (2015) provided a comprehensive overview of the gender setting in Timor-Leste in 2015, and identified gender issues that needed to be taken into account by the project.*
- *The project developed a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed. The project made special effort to work with women’s groups in the livelihoods activities.*
- *The PMU provided the data on participation in all CRB Project meetings, workshops, training and other project events segregated by gender, which shows that of all participants in all project activities, 73% were male and 27% were female, which is significantly short of a desired 50:50 ratio.*

Summary Findings – Other Crosscutting Issues (refer section 4.3.8 for details):

- *Overall the TE finds that all of the crosscutting issues are relevant and most have been well addressed by the project, except for improved governance and E&S impacts.*

Summary Findings – Overall Project Outcome Rating (refer section 4.3.11 for details):

- *The Overall Outcome Rating for the CRB project is **Moderately Satisfactory**.*

Assessment of Project Outcomes	Rating
Relevance (refer section 4.3.2):	Highly Satisfactory
Effectiveness (refer section 4.3.3):	Highly Unsatisfactory
Efficiency (refer section 4.3.4):	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Outcome:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory *

\*Although combining the ratings for Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency in accordance with the formula in the UNDP-GEF TE Guidelines results in an Overall Outcome Rating of ‘Unsatisfactory’, due to the external factors outlined in Fore-Note 2, and considering there were some positive achievements of the project, the TE concludes that the overall evaluation rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

## 1.4 Main Recommendations

**Note:** Due to the extremely complex nature of the CRB project and the comprehensiveness of this TE report, only the most significant, major recommendations are listed here. It is important to review the main body of the report in detail to gain the full picture of the TE's assessment of the project. Tables 8, 9 and 11 also contain activity-specific recommendations.

### Recommendation 1 – Tibar Bay Mangroves:

**URGENT:** This is the most urgent and highest priority recommendation to come out of this TE.

- There are serious issues in relation to Tibar Bay as described in the case study in [section 4.3.3.6](#). To address this situation it is recommended that:
  - UNDP should, at a higher level than the project (e.g. Resident Representative level), offer support to GoTL to form a united front between MAF and SEE, to again approach the Tibar Port and seek cooperation to implement the restoration plan, which is already prepared, and make use for the 16,000 seedlings already on site.
  - If cooperation from the port cannot be secured, then it is recommended that UNDP seek ways to support MAF and SEE to implement the restoration plan anyway, as it is understood that the impacted area is not controlled by the port.
  - Restoration efforts should focus immediately on the area that has been killed during port construction, and should focus on planting *Sonneratia alba*, which is the species that has been killed, and not other species such as *Rhizophora stylosa*, which would create a different habitat to what was there previously.
  - Relevant GoTL authorities should also be encouraged to take compliance and enforcement action against the port for not implementing its own EMP and, if proven, for causing the observed mangrove dieback.

### Recommendation 2 – National Governance & Institutional Arrangements:

- One of the most significant barriers to effective Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) and protection and sustainable management of mangroves in Timor-Leste is a lack of clear, formalised, 'whole-of-government', national governance and institutional arrangements. Unfortunately the CRB project has not been successful in establishing these arrangements, even though it was supposed to be the major focus of the overall project objective.
- It is recommended that GoTL establish clear 'whole-of-government' arrangements, through an ICM Working Group under the [National Ocean Policy \(NOP\)](#), for coordinating the mandates, roles and responsibilities of ALL relevant ministries and directorates in relation to improved ICM, including improved management of mangroves and other critical coastal habitats.
- It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to start [afresh](#), and to develop a [new National ICM Plan](#) under the auspices of the new [National Ocean Policy \(NOP\)](#) (which covers the coast & catchments).
- It is recommended that the new [National ICM Plan](#) should:
  - Include [infrastructure planning](#) as an essential and integrated component of the overall [National ICM Plan](#), and not as a separate Output.
  - Defines the coast as the area from the upper catchment boundary to the spring low tide mark.
  - Is based on the principles of ICZM.
  - Adopts a truly 'whole-of-government approach (based on the NOP).
  - Utilizes and integrates, into a single coordinated plan, relevant parts of the various ICM documents & plans developed by the CRB project where they are genuinely useful, and discards those that are not.
  - Adopts EBM, BWN and green engineering approaches.

- Builds directly on the foundations provided by the CRB project, including promoting mangrove-supportive livelihoods & CBERM.
- Is more clearly linked to the NPA.
- Contains a properly developed LogFrame PRF and M&E Plan.
- Contains properly developed implementation arrangements.
- It fully budgeted, both from GoTL and development partner sources.
- Is formally approved / adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.

#### Recommendation 3 – Livestock Impacts on Mangroves:

- Livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) grazing in mangrove areas is currently one of the main, if not ‘the’ main, negative impact on mangroves in Timor-Leste, as described in the case study in [section 4.3.3.2](#). The TE assesses that the main underlying cause of this problem is the fact that livestock are the most valuable sources of protein for local communities in Timor-Leste, and local communities do not have alternative grazing areas and feed sources other than mangrove areas.
- The livelihoods component of the CRB project failed to provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves. To be effective, the project needed to support the communities to develop viable and valuable alternatives to the current practice of grazing livestock in mangrove areas – which the project did not do.
- It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to local communities to improve mangrove-supportive livelihoods, which provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. which provide alternatives that have ‘net benefit’ compared to grazing livestock in mangroves areas.

#### Recommendation 4 – Mangrove-supportive Livelihoods:

- The livelihoods component of the CRB project suffered from a lack of baseline assessment, value-chain analysis, proper market analysis, business planning and management training, and as a result has been largely ineffective.
- It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and local communities to ensure that before any future activities to support mangrove-supportive livelihoods are commenced, proper baseline assessment, value-chain analysis of livelihood options, supported by proper market analysis, business planning and management training, are undertaken first.

#### Recommendation 5 – Eco-tourism infrastructure:

- The eco-tourism infrastructure that has been built with CRB project support suffers a number of very significant deficiencies and weaknesses, as described in the case study in [section 4.3.3.3](#). The very poor quality and safety standards of the eco-tourism facilities is an extremely serious concern, especially in a country subject to high seismic risk, and within a project that is supposed to be building resilience, including resilient infrastructure.
- There is a risk of people using the facilities being injured or worse, exposing UNDP to potential liability. It also raises the question as to why UNDP would engage in the construction of physical infrastructure when it has no expertise in this area, or why it would not engage a professional construction company to manage this component.
- It is recommended that UNDP should URGENTLY commission an expert review of all infrastructure that has been built by the project by appropriately qualified engineers/building inspectors, to identify risks and mitigation measures, and take action to implement these measures urgently.
- It is also recommended that UNDP might reevaluate if it should continue to get involved in building physical infrastructure in TL in future, given the potential risks and liability exposure, and considering the seismic risks in the country.

#### Recommendation 6 – Geo-engineering / hydrological interventions:

- The geo-engineering interventions supported by the CRB project may cause negative environmental and social impacts, as described in the case study in section 4.3.3.5.
- It is recommended that UNDP work with GoTL, local governments and communities to assess any potential negative impacts, including on groundwater resources, of the geo-engineering interventions that have been supported by the project, and to implement appropriate mitigation plans where necessary.
- It is also recommended that from now, GoTL and local governments prohibit any further geo-engineering interventions in mangrove areas, as the risks of negative impacts are too high, without rigorous scientific oversight.

#### Recommendation 7 – Mangrove planting:

- It is recommended that UNDP in cooperation with MAF undertake a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, statistically valid survey, by relevant scientific experts and not project staff, of the success (or otherwise) of the survival, mortality and growth rates at all mangrove planting sites, as an end-of-project status report and baseline for future, long-term monitoring. These should include quantitative survey data, full photographic catalogue and mapping on the national GIS system.
- It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to:
  - Improve livestock exclusion fencing, including maintenance and long-term sustainability.
  - Ensure that all future mangrove planting activities:
    - are properly planned and designed,
    - focus on rehabilitating genuinely degraded areas, and not on planting mangroves in areas that are not naturally colonized by mangroves,
    - use inappropriate species,
    - do not substantially change the natural habitats and ecology in some areas; and
    - are supported by a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time.

#### Recommendation 8 – Communication & awareness:

- It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to continue national and local-level education and awareness activities on mangroves and other coastal management and adaptation issues.
- It is recommended that for all future awareness activities carried out or supported by UNDP, on any issue, a proper Knowledge, Attitude & Practice (KAP) survey should be carried out at the beginning and end of the project so as to measure actual changes in KAP in relation to the project issue.

#### Recommendation 9 – Follow-up Phase 2 Project:

- There is an urgent need for a targeted, follow up ICM project, which builds upon, fills the gaps and learns the lessons from the CRB project, as outlined in this TE report.
- It is recommended that any such Phase 2 project give highest priority to Recommendations 2 to 8 above. Recommendation 1 requires immediate attention.

Recommendation 10 – Lessons for future projects:

- The TE identified a number of lessons from the CRB project and it is recommended that UNDP and GoTL take these on-board and apply them to all relevant future projects, as follows:
  - **Project design:** The CRB project suffered a number of design weaknesses including in relation to the Project Results Framework (PRF). The design was also extremely ambitious, complex and multifaceted, attempting to support an extremely wide-range of activities at a large number of sites, working through a large number of groups, while at the same time leaving out four important coastal municipalities. These factors hampered effective implementation. It is recommended that for all relevant future projects, UNDP and GoTL should:
    - Ensure that the project design has a strong, clear and well articulated PRF, with objectives, outcomes, outputs and activities that are logically linked in a properly developed Logical Framework hierarchy, and with targets and indicators that are SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound).
    - Adopt project designs that are focused on a smaller set of high-priority ‘demonstration activities’ at a smaller number of ‘pilot sites’, spread evenly and equitably throughout all municipalities, as the bases for replication and scaling-up across other sites in subsequent phases.
    - Include an explicit activity to develop a documented and budgeted replication and sustainability plan for post-project continuity of project outcomes and benefits, before project end.
  - **Project implementation – Activities vs Outcomes:** The PMU exhibited a tendency towards ad-hoc, activity-based project implementation, with insufficient attention to a more strategic, programmatic approach aimed at achieving the overall objectives and outcomes. This problem was also picked up in the MTR, which identified a tendency towards ‘activism’. It is recommended that when implementing future projects, UNDP and GoTL should:
    - Give greater focus to a more strategic, programmatic approach aimed at achieving the project’s overall objectives, outcomes and impacts.
    - Avoid the rush to ‘tick-off’ as many activities as possible, and focus more on achieving lasting, sustainable outputs, outcomes and real long-term benefits for Timor-Leste.
  - **Stakeholder engagement:** The project made concerted efforts to consult with local-level stakeholders on the planning and implementation of activities. However, the project prioritised working through local NGOs rather than local governments, thus dis-enfranchising local governments and creating dissatisfaction and even hostility to the project – which is a very negative outcome (this issue was also identified by the MTR). The TE also received reports from local stakeholders that communication was very much one-way from the project team, and they felt that they were not being listened to – this is a fatal flaw in stakeholder engagement. It is recommended that when implementing future projects, UNDP and GoTL should:
    - Give higher priority to working through and giving greater agency to local governments than NGOs.
    - Make greater efforts to listen to and act on the views of local stakeholders during community consultations.
  - **Social & environmental (S&E) safeguards:** The TE has serious concerns about the way that S&E safeguards were addressed by the project. The ProDoc failed to identify a range of S&E issues relating to the project. During implementation, S&E issues were ‘ticked off’ in the PIRs while missing serious issues, and completely ignored the main environmental issue identified in the ProDoc – acid sulphate soils. The project did not assess potential S&E impacts from fencing, mangrove planting and especially the geo-engineering interventions (see Recommendation 6 above). There was also a lack of full and thorough consultations with local communities to work within their long-standing traditional rights and respect their cultural practices. The TE considers this to be a serious failing of the project, which created ill will amongst local communities and potentially affects future UNDP initiatives. It is recommended that when implementing future projects, UNDP and GoTL should:
    - Give much greater attention to ensuring that the S&E safeguards are fully and thoroughly addressed in the project design.
    - Give much greater attention to complying with S&E safeguards during project implementation.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

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### 2.1 Purpose & Objectives of the TE

1. The TE was undertaken remotely by International Consultant (IC) Steve Raaymakers, with in-country support from National Consultant (NC) Eurico Ediana da Costa, subject to the Covid-related restrictions as outlined above.
2. The TE followed Terms of Reference (ToR) as issued by UNDP (Annex 1). In accordance with the ToR and the “*Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects 2020*” (the TE Guidelines 2020) the overall objectives of the TE are to:
  - a) Assess the achievement of project results against what was expected to be achieved (i.e. progress against the project’s outcome targets).
  - b) Draw lessons that can:
    - i) improve the sustainability of benefits from this project; and
    - ii) aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.
  - c) Assess the contribution and alignment of the project to relevant national development plan or environmental policies.
  - d) Assess the contribution of the project results towards the relevant outcomes and outputs of United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and UNDP Country Framework Document (CPD) for Timor-Leste.
  - e) Examine the use of funds and value for money.
  - f) Assess how cross cutting issues (including gender equality, right based approach, capacity development, poverty-environment nexus, crisis prevention and recovery, disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation as relevant) have been addressed by the project.

### 2.2 Scope of the TE

1. The TE assessed the project against the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the *TE Guidelines 2020*, and using evidence-based information that is **credible, reliable and useful**.
2. The TE assessed the entire project period from nominal commencement in August 2016 through to the end of the TE in May 2021, noting that with a second no-cost extension project activities will continue until mid July 2021 (two months past drafting of this TE report).
3. The geographic scope of the TE focused on the seven Municipalities where project activities were undertaken, these being, in alphabetical order; Bobonaro, Covalima, Dili, Liquica, Manatuto, Manufahi and Viqueque (Figure 1). There are two Municipalities which do not have coastlines and which were therefore not covered by the project – Aileu and Ermera. There are four Municipalities which do have coastlines but which were not covered by the project – Ainaro, Baucau, Lautem and Oecussi (the latter being an enclave in Indonesian West Timor) (Figure 1). It is understood that Ainaro was excluded because it does not have mangrove areas. The TE could not establish any reasons why Baucau, Lautem and Oecussi were excluded from the project, especially as all have significant mangrove resources.
4. As outlined above, due to Covid-19 restrictions the NC was only able to visit a restricted number of project sites in five Municipalities; Bobonaro, Dili, Liquica, Manatuto and Manufahi (Figure 1) (Table 1).
5. The technical scope of the TE focused on the three components (Outcomes) of the project and the technical activities carried out under each Outcome. In accordance with the guidelines, the TE evaluated implementation of the project,

and NOT the personal performance of individuals. However, where human factors contributed to TE findings, as is very often the case, these are identified in a generic way, with recommendations to address in future projects.

6. The scope included detailed review of a very wide range of documents and data relating to the project, under an enhanced desktop review phase, as outlined in section 2.3.4 below and listed in Annex 3.
7. In accordance with requirements the TE attempted to assess the key financial aspects of the project, including variances between planned and actual expenditures. However, this has not been able to be completed due to data constraints as outlined under section 2.3.8 below.
8. The TE was carried out over the period of 14 September through December 2020, and completed by end July 2021; including preparatory activities, desk review, consultation with stakeholders and completion of the TE report.
9. The IC was dependent on and assumed that all essential documents, data and information would be provided by the relevant parties in a timely manner. Unfortunately, there were delays in the provision of some items of data and information, and some information had still not been provided at the time of drafting this TE report.



**FIGURE 1:** Municipalities covered by the CRB project and visited by the NC during the evaluation

**TABLE 1:** Municipalities and sites visited by the NC during the evaluation

Visit Date	Municipality	Suco	Site	Project Activities at Site
07/05/21	Liquiça	Tibar	Tibar	Fences, mangrove planting, tara bandu.
07/05/21		Ulmera	Ulmera	Fences, tara bandu, livelihoods.
08/05/21		Vatuvou	Maubara	Mangrove planting, eco-tourism.
08/05/21	Bobonaro	Aidabaleten	Beacou	Fences, mangrove planting, livelihoods.
08/05/21		Palaka	Be Malae	Fences, mangrove planting, livelihoods.
09/05/21	Manufahi	Betano	Betano	Fences, livelihoods.
10/05/21		Clacuc	Clacuc	Fences, livelihoods.
10/05/21	Manatuto	Aubeon	Aubeon	Tara bandu, livelihoods.
19/05/21	Dili	Hera	Sukaer	Fences, mangrove planting, eco-tourism.
19/05/21		Sabuli	Behauk	Mangrove planting, tara bandu, livelihoods, eco-tourism, geo-engineering.
19/05/21		Sabuli	Wenunuk	Eco-tourism, fences

## 2.3 TE Methodology

1. The various methods used to undertake this TE are described in turn in sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.8 below.

### 2.3.1 Application of relevant guidelines & ethics

1. As outlined above the overall approach and methodology of the TE followed the *TE Guidelines 2020*.
2. The TE also followed:
  - a) The United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) *Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation, 2008*.
  - b) The UNEG *Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System, 2008*.
  - c) The United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in particular being sensitive to and addressing issues of discrimination and gender equality.
3. Signed Code of Conduct Forms for both the IC and the NC are contained in Annexes 7 and 8.

### 2.3.2 Remote methods & support from NEC

1. As outlined above, due to travel restrictions relating to Covid-19 the IC was not able to visit Timor-Leste and remote evaluation methods had to be used, including:
  - a) enhanced desk-top review of project-related documents and data (see section 2.3.4 below),
  - b) greater emphasis on the analysis of written responses from stakeholders using a questionnaire (see section 2.3.5 below),
  - c) interviewing stakeholders remotely by Skype, Zoom etc (see section 2.3.6 below); and
  - d) providing the PMU with standard data templates to complete and send back to the IC.

### 2.3.3 Inception Report & Inception Meeting

1. In accordance with normal procedures the TE commenced with the IC and NC drafting and submitting a Draft Inception Report to UNDP on 27 March 2021, which proposed refined methods, an updated workplan and schedule, an initial stakeholders list and more detailed data and information requirements.
2. An Inception Meeting was then held on 30 March 2021, between the IC in Cairns, Australia and the NC and UNDP program and project staff in Dili, Timor-Leste. The Inception Meeting was used to:
  - a) introduce all personnel and confirm roles, responsibilities and expectations,
  - b) allow the PMU to provide an overview of project status and progress,
  - c) jointly review the Draft Inception Report,
  - d) confirm data, information and support required by the TE; and
  - e) map out next steps for the TE.

3. The Draft Inception Report was slightly amended by the IC based on comments resulting from the Inception Meeting, and the Final Inception Report was submitted to UNDP.

### 2.3.4 Enhanced desktop review

1. While it is normal procedure for TE methods to include desktop review of all relevant documents and data, because it was not possible for the IC to undertake a country-mission, the desktop review phase was enhanced through more intense and more detailed assessment of documents and data. More time was allowed for this than is usual for standard TEs, with all key documents being reviewed at least twice.

2. The IC reviewed all relevant sources of information, including the Project Document, project reports – including Annual Project Reviews (APRs) and Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs), project budget revisions, Mid Term Review (MTR) Report, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the IEC considered useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents reviewed is contained in Annex 3.

### *2.3.5 Evaluation Questionnaire*

1. As outlined above, due to the need to rely on remote evaluation methods, the stakeholder engagement included sending a written Evaluation Questionnaire (EQ) (Annex 4) out to a broad, representative range of over 50 project stakeholders. This was emailed out to all stakeholders with an invitation to complete and send back to the IC by set dates, with several follow-ups and extensions. The NC also physically met with a number of additional stakeholders to obtain EQ responses.
2. In order to encourage frank and free feedback, questionnaire respondents were NOT required to identify themselves in the EQ, and all responses were treated as anonymous and fully confidential.
5. Thirteen completed EQs were received. Responses were mainly from UNDP project staff, the project Field Coordinators (FCs) and NGOs, with none from government or local communities. This limited the representativeness of the EQ responses. However, they still provide very useful insights on the performance of the project.
3. The EQ responses are analysed and reported in Annex 4. In order to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of respondents, the completed EQs are not presented in an Annex to this report but are kept on file by the IC.

### *2.3.6 Stakeholder consultations*

1. In addition to EQ responses, the stakeholder engagement included remote interviews with a broad, representative range of project stakeholders, as listed in Annex 2.
2. Except for some local-level interviews by the NC, most stakeholder interviews were conducted remotely using Skype or Zoom, often with poor internet connection causing breaks and cut-offs. This severely limited the ability of the NC to optimize the value of the interviews, and pursue various lines of enquiry, which would normally be possible in face-to-face interviews.

### *2.3.7 Site verification of physical project outputs*

1. Because the project included constructing / delivering a number of physical outputs in the seven municipalities, it was important for the TE methods to include site verification of these. As outlined above, the NC, who is based in Dili, was restricted in his ability to travel domestically, and was only able to visit a small sub-sample of the project sites (11 sites in five Municipalities out of a total of 100 sites across seven Municipalities). Project sites in the Municipalities of Covalima and Viqueque could not be visited. Sites visits are an essential component of effective evaluations and the inability of the IC to undertake any site visits at all, and reliance on a few restricted visits by the NC, severely restricted the coverage and rigour of the TE.

### *2.3.8 Assessment of financial data*

1. The TE attempted to assess the key financial aspects of the project, including variances between planned and actual expenditures, based on the budget and expenditure figures provided by the PMU as presented in Table 5 in section 4.2.3. The TE has no way of verifying the veracity of these figures and they are accepted at 'face value'.
2. Despite the fact that GEF requires projects to monitor and report co-financing, including comparing original co-financing commitments with what was actually achieved during the life of the project, supported by documentary evidence, the PMU was not able to do this. This issue was also being reported by the MTR. A full assessment of project co-financing could therefore not be undertaken by the TE (refer section 4.2.4).

## 2.4 Data Collection, Analysis & Triangulation

1. Data to support the TE was collected across a diverse range of indicators, as far as is available from the project, with three main types of information and data being collected and analysed, as follows:
  - a) Primary information and data was collected directly by the TE team, including the NC's restricted site verification visits, as described in section 2.3.7 above.
  - b) Secondary information and data was obtained from the full range of project-related documents and progress reports, including the APRs, PIRs, Project Progress Matrix (Table 14 in section 4.3.1), financial reports etc. This is labeled 'secondary' data because it is provided to the TE team by UNDP, the PMU and GoTL, and was not collected directly by the TE team. The TE team has limited means by which to verify the veracity of secondary data, and it is generally accepted at 'face value'.
  - c) Subjective information about the project was collected through the EQ responses and direct stakeholder interviews. This is labeled 'subjective' as it represents the views, perspective and opinions of people rather than hard, quantitative data. However, it still contributes a strong basis for the TE, including helping to verify any trends that are analysed from the quantitative data.
2. Wherever possible, data triangulation (use of multiple, cross-checked sources of information) was applied to verify and substantiate information reported and to help overcome bias that may arise from single sources of information. For example, if a stakeholder reported a certain view on an issue, the TE team would actively seek views on the same issue from other stakeholders during separate interviews, and the view was reported as an evaluation finding if three or more stakeholders share that view.
3. When stakeholders reported views on matters that can be checked in documents – the relevant documents were checked. Conversely, when a document reported certain findings, these were verified by discussing with stakeholders involved with production and/or review of the document.
4. When it was not possible to apply triangulation for some project parameters, due to lack of alternative data sources, for example finance and co-financing data, the reports provided by UNDP, the PMU or GoTL on such data, are accepted at 'face value'.
5. Wherever possible the analysis as presented in section 4 below integrates crosscutting issues and gender considerations, including assessing whether data provided by the project is disaggregated by gender and other relevant categories.

### 3. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

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#### 3.1 Development Context & Project Overview

[From ProDoc written in 2015]

1. Climate change is causing Timor-Leste to become hotter and drier, with increasingly variable rainfall –water, soils, and coastal areas are all sensitive to these changes. Riverine and catchment runoff from the country’s mostly steep terrain, with increasing deforestation and poor agricultural and catchment practices, causes significant soil erosion, increased incidence of landslides and flash flooding. This results in sedimentation of rivers and streams, and major impacts on riverine and coastal water quality, as well as the compromised health of coastal ecosystems (such as mangroves, coral reefs and seagrasses).
2. These pressures from upland areas, coupled with the rapidly rising sea level, are putting coastal communities (and the ecosystems and resources upon which they depend), particularly at risk. Over the past 2 decades, mangroves, which serve as a natural defense to the sea, have been severely degraded – leaving the country’s shoreline and coastal communities vulnerable to coastal inundation, erosion, salt water intrusion, and impacts of sea-borne natural hazards (e.g. waves, storm surges, and in extreme cases, small scale tsunamis).
3. The Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) faces the unique challenge of responding to these climate change impacts, while addressing the needs of a least developed country (LDC) with one of the most rapidly growing populations in the world. Conservative growth rate projections estimate that the population will more than double to 2.5million over the next 30 years. With approximately 40% of the population living in coastal areas, the GoTL is seeking to minimize adverse impacts of both, climate change and rapid population growth, on shoreline resilience and the achievement of its development goals.
4. The Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2011-2030 clearly articulates the long-term preferred situation of preserving an ecological balance to safeguard the sustainable development of the economy. The SDP stresses, in particular, the challenges of increased risk of flooding to low-lying coastal villages, as well as food shortages in the country in general, which climate change presents. The Timor-Leste National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) further emphasizes the need to specifically tailor adaptation support to those most vulnerable, particularly children and youth, and stresses the importance of reflecting those needs in development goals and aspirations of the country.
5. The *Building Shoreline Resilience of Timor-Leste to Protect Local Communities and their Livelihoods Project* (the Coastal Resilience Building or CRB project) is funded by the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and implemented by UNDP in close collaboration with GoTL through the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and Secretary of State for Environment; as well as working closely with international partners, academia, local NGOs, CSOs and private enterprise as the issues of coastal areas are complex and cross-sectoral. It employs an integrated approach, while tailoring activities to address the specific needs, challenges, and priorities of the Government of Timor-Leste.
6. The objective of the CRB project is **to strengthen resilience of coastal communities by the introduction of nature-based approaches to coastal protection**. Issues of coastal areas are complex and cross-sectoral. The project therefore employs an integrated approach, while tailoring activities to address specific needs, challenges and priorities.
7. The project supported extensive mangrove protection and restoration while addressing community pressures (such as felling for fuelwood, free grazing livestock, clearing of mangroves etc.) through measures such as fencing, local traditional regulations “tarabandu”, nursery establishment and plantation and promoting natural regeneration while support were provided to alternative mangrove-supportive livelihoods, as well as improve public awareness about the important role of coastal ecosystems in shoreline protection and climate change adaptation and mitigation. More than 4,775 hectares of mangroves have been mapped in 11 municipalities with 30 true species and 25 associates found. Added to that, more than 1,000 households benefitted from various types of alternative mangrove-supportive livelihoods.

8. The total GEF/LDCF financing for the project is USD 7 Million with an implementation period of 4 years, with two no-cost extensions – see below.
9. Degraded coastal watersheds, particularly upland areas exert pressures on the coastline through excess sedimentation, increased runoff and flash flood causing more erosion and prolonged inundations. Such broader landscape processes for greater coastal protection will also be addressed. The project is thus structured into 3 complementary outcomes:
  - Outcome 1: Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established.
  - Outcome 2: Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection.
  - Outcome 3: Integrated approaches to coastal adaptation adopted to contribute to protection of coastal populations and productive lands.
10. The lead partner in the project is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). As coastal management is cross-sectoral, various ministries will be engaged in implementation, as well as development partners, international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), academia and the private sector.

### 3.2 Project Start, Duration & Milestones

1. The key dates relating to the project are as follows:
  - a) Planned project duration: 48 months (4 years).
  - b) Two extensions (1 x 9 months and 1 x 2 months) taking project duration out to 59 months (almost 5 years).
  - c) Planned Start (as listed in ProDoc): January 2016
  - d) Actual Start (ProDoc Signing & Inception Workshop): August 2016.
  - e) Mid Term Review (MTR): October 2018 – February 2019.
  - f) Terminal Evaluation (TE): April – June 2021.
  - g) Operational Closing - Original planned (4 years from ProDoc signing): August 2020.
  - h) Operational Closing - First Extension: May 2021.
  - i) Operational Closing - Second Extension: July 2021.
2. Overall, because the start date was delayed and the implementation was also delayed, resulting in two no-cost extensions, the final closing is 11 months later than the original planned closing date.

### 3.3 Problems & Barriers that the Project Sought to Address

[From ProDoc written in 2015]

1. The project sought to address three main problems and barriers, as follows:
  - a) Insufficient policy framework and institutional capacity for climate-resilient coastal management.
  - b) Pressure from rapid population growth and economic development on mangroves.
  - c) Lack of adaptive capacity to respond to climate change.
2. These are described in turn in the following sub-sections.

#### 3.3.1 *Insufficient policy framework and institutional capacity for climate-resilient coastal management*

1. Timor-Leste is a young country, having restored independence in 2002 after 450 years as a colony of Portugal, 24 years of occupation by Indonesia and two years of UN transitional administration. Though Timor-Leste has a largely oral tradition, the GoTL is moving swiftly to establish the necessary frameworks and policies which foster development while protecting its natural resources.

2. In the context of coastal areas management, which are cross-sectoral, there is no obvious lead ministry and a mechanism to facilitate inter-ministerial dialogue is not defined. Decree-Law no. 6/2015 of 11 March 2015 - Organic Law of the VI Constitutional Government, details a revised institutional composition, hierarchy and structure. Responsibilities as they relate to potential impacts on coastal areas were as follows at time of ProDoc drafting (2015) (many of since changed):
- a) The **Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF)** is responsible for promoting agribusiness and fisheries, managing forest resources and water basins; monitoring and supervising fisheries and aquaculture; managing national parks and protected areas; ensuring the protection and conservation of nature and biodiversity; and monitoring the implementation of policies and of activities that are harmful to national fauna and flora
  - b) The **Ministry of Commerce, Industry and the Environment (MCIE)** is responsible for designing, implementing and evaluating the policies for trade, industry and the environment; evaluating and licensing projects for facilities, and the operation of commercial and industrial ventures; promoting, supporting and following-up the strategies to mainstream environmental issues into sectoral policies; undertaking strategic environmental assessments of policies, plans, programmes and legislation and coordinating the environmental impact assessment of project at the national level; and ensuring the adoption and monitoring of measures for the integrated control and prevention of pollution in facilities in general and during the environmental licensing procedures.
  - c) The **Ministry of Planning and Strategic Investments (MPSI)** is responsible for the design, coordination and evaluation of the policies, defined and adopted by the Council of Ministers for the promotion of the country's economic and social development, through strategic and integrated planning and the rationalization of available financial resources. Specifically, the ministry is responsible for the implementation of the Strategic Development Plan, as it pertains to infrastructure and urban planning, oil and mineral resources and territorial planning and management.
  - d) The **Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MPW)** is responsible for planning and carrying out works aimed at protecting, preserving and repairing bridges, roads, river banks and coastal areas, namely with a view to controlling flooding.
  - e) The **Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS)** is responsible for proposing and developing policies and strategies to manage the risk of natural disasters; and designing and implementing programmes for managing the risk of natural disasters
  - f) The **Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture (MTAC)** is responsible for designing, implementing and evaluating the policy for tourism; contributing to the development of the tourism sector and proposing relevant measures and public policies to that effect; providing opinions on information requests regarding the establishment of tourism ventures; qualifying and classifying tourism-related activities in the tourism sector; qualifying and classifying tourism-related activities in accordance with the law; and implementing and enforcing the legislation regarding the establishment, licensing and supervision of the operating conditions of tourism facilities.
  - g) The **Ministry of Justice** is responsible for the design, implementation, coordination, and evaluation of the policies defined and adopted by the Council of Ministers for justice, land and property, law and human rights. This includes organizing the cartography and land register of immovable property.
3. The pace of development and the ambitious targets of the SDP require effective coordination between ministries to ensure that development planning is conducive to the long term sustainability, including the protection and the continued benefits of Timor-Leste's coastal ecosystems. A national coastal management and adaptation plan could help define this, but there is currently no plan in place.
4. Within MAF, various directorates are engaged in activities that directly contribute to effective coastal management and to building shoreline resilience. Coordination across directorates with MAF is therefore also important to ensure that

the activities of one do not inadvertently affect the goals and targets of another. For instance, the goal of the 2012-2030 National Aquaculture Development Strategy (NADS) is that by 2030, aquaculture will contribute up to 40% of domestic fish supplies. The strategy seeks to ensure 'coordination with other line ministries/departments with regard to the use of land and water resources for aquaculture purposes and develop synergistic relationships between aquaculture and other water, land and natural resource management and conservation policies,' yet NADS does not specifically mention minimizing the impact on mangroves.

5. Further, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action plan (NBSAP) highlights that mangroves have been removed for the establishment of brackish water shrimp and/or fish ponds.
6. There are a significant number of INGOs, NGOs and faith-based organizations engaged in aquaculture development in Timor-Leste: WorldFish, Caritas Australia, CARE International, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), ChildFund, Hivos and MercyCorps, with financial support from various partners, including AusAID, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) the European Union (EU), FAO, JICA, NZAid, and USAID. There is not however a cohesive approach across ongoing activities informed by national guidelines, which adequately takes into account the vulnerable shoreline and the need to preserve of mangrove areas.
7. Maintenance of mangroves areas has been a challenge for MAF, with related public resource allocations remaining too low to undertake enforcement at the national to municipal level. Mangrove rehabilitation efforts have been largely projectized and fragmented – lacking in scale and short-term in nature. There are at least seven identified mangrove species in Timor-Leste, and habitat requirements are specific for each. Effective rehabilitation is complex as it requires an approach tailored to the location, both from a technical and social perspective. Previous rehabilitation efforts have largely failed due to a) lack of financial and human resources to maintain the sites after completion of the project, b) incorrect rehabilitation techniques respective to the site (e.g. species selection, poor understanding of the hydro-ecological requirements of mangroves), c) failure to adequately engage communities in rehabilitation efforts and long term maintenance and/or address community pressures on mangroves and d) ineffective or inadequate education/sensitization for communities on the benefits of mangroves.

### *3.3.2 Pressure from rapid population growth and economic development on mangroves*

1. Mangroves naturally respond to sea level rise by moving landward, provided there is space and conditions suitable, to thrive. If the mangroves do not have space to move landward, due to development, or are not able to thrive due to human factors (e.g. cutting, felling, etc.), mangrove coverage will diminish and narrow, and will eventually be lost – exposing coastal areas to the sea.
2. Mangroves shall be legally protected once the biodiversity decree-law is approved (currently it is only a draft) stating that wetlands and mangrove areas shall be protected in Timor-Leste. However, infrastructure development, human settlements, and land use are all contributing to the diminishing or narrowing effect on mangroves in Timor-Leste.
3. Rapid infrastructure development (including roads, ports and electricity plants), clear forest land and disturb and/or encroach on coastal habitats. Having only recently emerged from conflict, public spending is focused largely on reconstruction and development of critical infrastructure to support economic growth. Per the SDP, the GoTL plans to upgrade about 3,000km of roads and build/upgrade eight ports. Without proper assessments and consideration for coastal vulnerabilities, such large scale construction and expansion of infrastructure networks will inevitably result in the clearing of vegetation, likely contributing to erosion and making the coastal area more exposed and vulnerable.
4. Rapid population growth and migration towards the coasts in search of livelihood opportunities, as well as a history of conflict and internally displaced people (IDP), have resulted in informal settlements – putting pressure on mangrove areas. While there is an effort to protect mangroves and some sites by protected area status, enforcement is difficult as MAF does not have sufficient financial/human resources to cover the entire country, nor are they able to prevent settlement of communities in protected areas. Spatial planning laws and plans are lacking (though documents are currently in draft form) to prevent settlement in areas vulnerable to coastal flooding, or in areas that need protection to bolster the country's natural defenses. The lack of land tenure and property rights hinders community ownership near mangrove areas or any vested interest in maintaining this common good. Further, employment and income

generation potential, associated with mangrove rehabilitation, protection and sustainable management, has not been explored as part of the government programmes, suco development plans, investments or public-private partnership initiatives.

5. Consultations with coastal communities indicate knowledge of the importance of preserving mangroves to a) protect the coastline from storms and wave surges, b) prevent coastal erosion, and c) reduce saltwater intrusion. Fishing communities especially valued mangroves as breeding areas for reef fish. This was based on their own observations over time, but also indicative of successful efforts by government and development partners to raise awareness. However, mangrove coverage, even in areas where rehabilitation efforts were previously implemented, continues to face pressure from communities.
6. In addition to being cleared for settlement, communities also use mangroves for fuel wood and boat/home construction. In some cases, it is communities from upland that come to the coast for the wood. As the coastal community is often on public land (i.e. does not own the land), it is in a difficult position to prevent this from happening, even if they acknowledge the importance of mangroves to the coastal ecosystem. Relatively simple approaches to mangrove rehabilitation efforts, such as fencing to keep grazing animals away from mangrove seedlings, has also been difficult to maintain, due to the lack of successful exit strategies of mangrove rehabilitation projects.
7. Changing land use practices (particularly coastal salt production, coastal aquaculture, coastal rice production and intensification of agriculture,) have also led to a rapid degradation of natural, coastal protective (and shoreline defense) features such as mangrove forests, particularly along the north coast, but also along the southern coast of the country, exposing vulnerable, coastal communities to the risks of slow onset sea-level rise and sudden/extreme storm surges.
8. While Timor-Leste is an island, the potential for artisanal fishing to supplement the food supply is limited. The types of boats generally owned by communities are unsuitable and unsafe for fishing, due to the steep drop off (upto 3km) beyond the reef. With the very low current levels of fish consumption and fisheries production, aquaculture has been identified as a major national development priority to address food security and malnutrition. To this end, the NADS envisions a strong role for aquaculture, through increasing domestic fish supply and consumption, and sets ambitious national targets for aquaculture development. Under this development strategy, a total area of 2,515ha has already been identified for aquaculture development, with Metinaro, Manatuto, Same, Suai, Bobonaro and Viqueque, being identified as major districts suitable for aquaculture. Several of these sites, particularly Metinaro and Manatuto and Suai, contain some of the largest mangrove stands in Timor-Leste.

### *3.3.3 Lack of adaptive capacity to respond to climate change*

1. The 2014 Human Development Index (HDI) value for Timor-Leste was 0.620, ranking the country at 128 (of 187) on the global list. Peace has provided the needed space for development and growth, resulting in a significant HDI value increase, from 0.465 in 2000. However, 49.9% of the population is still below the poverty line, with women especially affected due to limited opportunities for decision-making and less access to economic opportunities. This is reflected in the stark difference in the purchasing power parity (PPP) between men and women. Per the 2014 HDR, the 2011 estimate gross national income per capita PPP for men was US\$13,582 and only US\$5,634 for women.
2. As part of PPG activities, a desk review of available research and stakeholder consultations were conducted to identify main areas of concern for women in Timor-Leste (see Annex G.2. of ProDoc). These include:
  - a) Low levels of education and literacy – 37% of women have never been to school, 30% have some primary education, 26% have some secondary education, and 2% have more than secondary education.
  - b) Dual workload burden – women are responsible for reproductive work and household duties, but equally responsible for productive work and sale of produce (e.g. from farming).
  - c) High fertility rates and high number of dependent children – 5.7 births per woman.
  - d) High maternal and child mortality, and malnutrition particularly of children.
  - e) Lack of inheritance and land ownership rights; resulting in financial dependence on husbands, inability to accumulate financial resources and proceed with potential business ideas and inability to escape domestic abuse and violence.

- f) Low decision-making rights in relation to major decisions and assets, within households and within the community.
  - g) Little-to-no acknowledgment of women as drivers of transformational change in the community and in society.
  - h) Cultural practices – e.g. *Barlake*, a negotiated contractual agreement between families (monetary or otherwise) for wives, which ultimately determines broader family relationship patterns – including property rights, children’s obligations to the family, and the role of women in the household.
3. Approximately 63% of households are engaged in crop production, and 40% live in coastal areas. As climate change continues to impact agricultural production and sea level rise, women will be especially affected due to their weaker economic and social position. These above findings indicate the need for tailored support which responds to the particular needs of women, in order to strengthen overall capacity to respond to climate change.
  4. The country’s high birth rate highlights the need to also tailor support to youth and young adults. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the population by both, age and gender. Timor-Leste has one of the youngest populations in the world; 2/3 of the total population is under 30, 1/2 under 20, and 40% under 15.
  5. This presents an incredible challenge for the GoTL to ensure that for youth and young adults a) public awareness on climate change and critical ecosystems is raised b) related education/training is accessible and c) economic/livelihood opportunities exist. By contrast, a lack of public awareness, access to education, and livelihood alternatives could result in the continuation of unsustainable practices by future generations, leading to further degradation of already fragile ecosystems.
  6. Groups with limited access to economic opportunities, such as women and youth, depend disproportionately on natural resources for their livelihoods, and are the most affected when these resources become degraded.

### 3.4 Development & Immediate Objectives & Expected Results of the Project

[From ProDoc written in 2015]

1. The objective of the project is **to strengthen resilience of coastal communities by the introduction of nature-based approaches to coastal protection**. The objective is achieved through three complementary outcomes.
2. Outcome 1 focuses on the policy framework and institutional capacity necessary for effective coastal management in the face of climate change.
3. Outcome 2 focuses on rehabilitating mangrove areas to restore Timor-Leste’s natural defenses to sea level rise and coastal erosion. Importantly, Outcome 2 also addresses the community pressures on mangrove areas by supporting livelihood alternatives, with particular focus on mangrove-supportive livelihoods, thereby incentivizing coastal communities to protect the essential mangrove stands and become the stewards of these natural defense systems.
4. As pressures on mangroves are not limited to activity in coastal areas, Outcome 3 focuses on the broader landscape to address erosion and excessive runoff from upland areas. Outcome 3 also explores innovative financial mechanisms to ensure long term sustainability of efforts.
5. The relationship between the project Objective, Outcomes and Outputs is shown in Table 2. Further details including Targets and Indicators under each Outcome are presented in Table (section 4.3.1) – the Project Progress Matrix, which is derived from the PRF in the ProDoc (Note: While the narrative in the ProDoc contains project Outputs, for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets in the PRF are not aligned with the Outputs (section 4.3.1) (reportedly this relates to the UNDP ProDoc-PRF template that was applicable in 2015).

**TABLE 2:** Relationship between the project Objective, Outcomes and Outputs

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>LDCF Project Objective</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">To strengthen resilience of coastal communities by the introduction of nature-based approaches to coastal protection</p>		
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established.</p>	<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection.</p>	<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Integrated approaches to coastal adaptation adopted to contribute to protection of coastal populations and productive lands.</p>
<p><u>Outputs:</u></p> <p>1.1 A comprehensive coastal management and adaptation plan developed and budgeted for the entire coast of Timor-Leste (as part and a direct contribution to NAP).</p> <p>1.2. Coastal protection and resilience strategy for infrastructure planning, adopted and budgeted.</p> <p>1.3. Technical skills (through specialized trainings), hardware (at least two sets of hydro-meteorological stations and wave gauges), methods (economic valuation and cost-benefit analysis), solid value-chain analysis of livelihood options, and software introduced to monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels.</p> <p>1.4. National Directorates under MAF NDAHE, NDFMFR, NDFMW, NDA and NDCN have their roles, coordination, and planning mechanisms clarified and enforced for improved management of mangrove and other critical coastal habitats (as emerges from NAP consultation process.</p>	<p><u>Outputs:</u></p> <p>2.1. At least 1000 ha of coastal mangroves and wetlands conserved or degraded mangrove areas rehabilitated through natural recruitment and restoration of hydrological regimes both in the northern and southern coasts with a direct employment of local coastal communities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restore and monitor mangroves, using natural, ecological approaches, including restoration of hydrological regimes, enhanced propagule dispersal and livestock control.</li> <li>• Establish maintenance protocols under MAF, with direct participation/employment of coastal communities, particularly women.</li> </ul> <p>2.2 Mangrove-supportive, diversified livelihoods/social businesses established in mangrove rehabilitation project sites, benefiting at least 1,000 households and empowering women.</p> <p>2.3. In project site sucos, development plans include mangrove-supportive livelihood support measures benefiting at least 25,000 people.</p>	<p><u>Outputs:</u></p> <p>3.1. Upstream watershed replantation to demonstrate risk reduction, (including reduction of excessive sediment loads) to downstream coastal waterways and areas.</p> <p>3.2. Coastal wetland restoration and groundwater recharge plans developed and initiated to increase storm water absorption capacity and buffer seawater intrusion.</p> <p>3.3. Based on economic valuation study of ecosystem services, infrastructure offset for coastal protection scheme (and other financial mechanisms, such as payment for ecosystem services - PES) devised to secure financial resources for coastal resilience.</p>

Note: While the narrative in the ProDoc contains project Outputs, for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets in the PRF are not aligned with the Outputs.

### 3.5 Main Stakeholders

1. The ProDoc contains a Stakeholder Involvement Plan and the main project stakeholders are those listed under section 3.3.1 above – which are not repeated here for sake of efficiency. Annex 2 also contains a list of stakeholders that were consulted during the TE.

### 3.6 Theory of Change

1. The project was designed over six years ago in 2015 before it was a requirement to include an explicit Theory of Change (ToC) in the design of GEF projects, and the ProDoc therefore does not contain an explicit ToC. However, the ProDoc does contain some basic elements of a ToC, including a clear definition of the problem to be addressed and its root causes, desired outcomes, an analysis of barriers and enablers for achieving outcomes, and consideration of how to address barriers.

## 4. TERMINAL EVALUATION FINDINGS

## 4.1 Project Design & Formulation

### 4.1.1 Project design overall

1. The project appears to have been designed to directly address country and community needs and priorities as identified during project design consultations in Timor-Leste and was both country- and community-driven.
2. The project design was extremely ambitious and unusually complex and multifaceted. As shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.7, the project attempted to support an extremely wide range of various activities at a large number of different sites (a total of 100 sites spread nationally across seven municipalities) and working through a large number of different community groups (127) and local NGOs (27). The extremely wide range of project activities included:
  - a) Various scientific and technical studies, including national Coastal Vulnerability Assessment (CVA), mangrove mapping survey on GIS, mangrove identification guidebook and mangrove planting guidelines (all of which provide very useful baselines and tools to support mangrove conservation in Timor-Leste moving forward).
  - b) Developing a plethora of ICM reports, policies, strategies and plans (which are not logically linked, are quite convoluted and confusing to the reader, suffer technical deficiencies and none of which have been formally adopted by GoTL for implementation).
  - c) Supporting local communities to build livestock exclusion fences to protect mangrove areas (some of which have not been successful).
  - d) Supporting local communities to develop mangrove nurseries and undertake mangrove-planting programs (many, if not most, of which have reportedly been unsuccessful, as outlined in section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
  - e) Supporting local communities to develop traditional natural resource management regulations (tara bandu) to prohibit livestock access to mangroves and harvesting of mangrove wood (some of which have reportedly been unsuccessful, as outlined in section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
  - f) Attempts to encourage natural mangrove colonization through geo-engineering works to allow tidal flow into back-mangrove areas (at two sites, which may actually be causing negative impacts, as outlined in section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
  - g) Supporting local communities to develop alternative mangrove-supportive livelihoods, to provide sources of income that replace current livelihood practices that harm mangroves (e.g. using mangroves as grazing areas for livestock, cutting mangroves for firewood and building wood). Even within the livelihoods component the range of activities that the project sought to support was large, including various horticulture activities, aquaculture, fisheries, handicrafts and ecotourism, spread across 112 different groups (many, if not most, of which have reportedly been unsuccessful - as outlined in section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
  - h) Demonstrating up-stream catchment erosion and sediment control measures through re-vegetation as outlined in section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
  - i) A very wide range of communication, education and awareness activities, including working through the existing Green Schools program to introduce a mangrove component, use of live-theatre, articles in the Lafaek magazine, radio coverage, local workshops and courses, exchange visits between sites and others (which reportedly has been the most successful part of the project, although there has not been any quantitative assessment of the impact of the awareness component, such as through a Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey at beginning and end).
3. The TE considers that inclusion of such a wide range of different activities across so many different sites and working through so many different community groups and NGOs was a weakness and a mistake in the project design. This caused the resources, time and efforts of the PMU and MAF to be spread very widely, making it difficult to ensure the

quality, completeness, usefulness, effectiveness, success and ongoing sustainability of any one activity. The project design may have been stronger if it had focused on a smaller set of high-priority 'demonstration activities' at a smaller number of 'pilot sites', spread evenly and equitably throughout all coastal municipalities (see below). This would have allowed the PMU and MAF to be much more focused and ensure that the activities were implemented properly, fully and sustainably, as the bases for replication and scaling-up across other sites in subsequent phases.

4. It is a given that the more broadly and thinly you spread a project, the less focused and effective project management and oversight will be – this is exemplified by the CRB project which has suffered an extraordinary lack of effective supervision and oversight of on-ground activities – due to trying to do too many different activities at too many sites.
5. As outlined in section 2.2 and shown on Figure 1 there are four municipalities with coastlines that were not covered by the project – Ainaro, Baucau, Lautem and Oecussi (the latter being an enclave in Indonesian West Timor). It is understood that Ainaro was excluded because it does not have mangrove areas, however according to the CVA its coast has "very high vulnerability, and could have benefited from non-mangrove related interventions. The TE could not establish any reasons why Baucau, Lautem and Oecussi were excluded from the project, especially as all have significant mangrove resources. The TE considers that exclusion of these four municipalities was a weakness and a mistake in the project design. Had the project adopted a more restricted, targeted and focused approach to the range and number of activities, demonstration activities could have been undertaken at pilot sites in all 11 of the coastal municipalities.
6. One significant gap in the project design is that it does not include an explicit activity to develop a documented and budgeted replication and sustainability plan before project end, which should ideally be a standard element of all project designs.
7. In summary, the project design overall could have been improved and strengthened if:
  - a) It had focused on a smaller set of high-priority 'demonstration activities' at a smaller number of 'pilot sites', spread evenly and equitably throughout all 11 coastal municipalities, as the bases for replication and scaling-up across other sites in subsequent phases.
  - b) It had included an explicit activity to develop a documented and budgeted replication and sustainability plan before project end.
8. Specific aspects of the project design are assessed in section 4.1.2 to 4.1.7 below.
9. Because this is the TE stage (end of project), these findings cannot be addressed in the existing project, but provide lessons for future projects.

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Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report (UNDP PIMS 5330)

TABLE 3.1: List of CRB project activities in Bobanaro Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
ATABAE	AIDABALETEN	Beacu	CBEMR; Tarabandu	4.78	UNDP Direct Support	CBEMR training	Fisheries; Horticulture	3	Training	NGO, MAF	Loan; Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
ATABAE	AIDABALETEN	Miguir				CBEMR training	Horticulture	1		UNDP, MAF	Material support provided						
ATABAE	AIDABALETEN	Sulilaran	CBEMR	6	UNDP Direct Support	CBEMR training	Fisheries	1		NGO	Loan	Clean water supply	UNDP	To be completed in 2021	Public awareness		
ATABAE	AIDABALETEN	Tutubaba													CBEMR Socialization; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
ATABAE	ATABAE	Ailok laran													CBEMR Socialization; Green school; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	Green School launched in Oct 2019
BALIBO	SANIRIN	Bemalai	CBEMR; Tarabandu	183.49	UNDP Direct Support												
BALIBO	SANIRIN	Subaleco					Horticulture	1	Training	NGO, MAF	Material support provided						
BALIBO	SANIRIN	Palaca					Horticulture; Loan & Saving	1	Training	NGO, MAF	Loan				CBEMR Socialization, Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
BALIBO	BATUGADE	Batugade Villa	CBEMR; Tarabandu	19.24	UNDP Direct Support							SLM	UNDP	Material support provided	CBEMR Socialization, Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
BALIBO	LEOLIMA	Duoderoc					Livestock	1		NGO	Loan				Theater	NGO	

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TABLE 3.2: List of CRB project activities in Dili Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS			
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remark	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	
METINARO	SABULI	Behauc	CBEMR, Tarabandu, hydrological restoration	98.71	NGO	CBEMR training provided in 2018; Hydrological restoration is ongoing	Horticulture ; Fisheries; Handicraft	4			NGO, MAF	Material support provided	Ecotourism	NGO	Timor Verde: Installation of 320 m boardwalk is in the process of completion by May 2021	CBEMR Socialization ; Theater	UNDP Direct support; NGO	
METINARO	DUYUNG SEREIA	Wenunuk	CBEMR	200	NGO	CBEMR training provided in 2018; 2021 intervention through a new NGO partner (FCOTI)	Chicken farming; fisheries; Youth on warehouse	3			UNDP	Material support provided; Some are not active	Ecotourism; Carbon sequestration	NGO	NGO (Rede Hasatil) from Phase II has been granted extension due to failure to meet previous deadlines; Installation of gazebos is still in the process of completion by May 2021			
METINARO	DUYUNG SEREIA	Birahu Matan											SLM, Water supply	UNDP	Comparative study at Quintal Portugal (Aileu) to learn about the planting of coffee, vanily, dragon fruit, and other trees; Established the community group nurseries for preparation of multi-purpose tree seedlings, training related to fruit tree nurseries production and asexual reproduction, SALT, and bioengineering and biofertilizers; Establishing a pilot site for community forest using Farmer			



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TABLE 3.3: List of CRB project activities in Covalima Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
TILOMAR	BEISEUC	Wetaba	CBEMR; Tarabandu	168.75	UNDP		Fisheries	1		NGO	Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization; Theatre; Gender awareness	UNDP; NGO	
TILOMAR	LALAWA	Ai oan	CBEMR; Tarabandu	11	UNDP		Horticulture	2		NGO, MAF	Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
TILOMAR	MAUDERMO	Onu-Laran					Horticulture	2	Horticulture training	NGO, MAF	Material support provided				Green School; CBEMR Socialization; Theatre;	UNDP; NGO	Launched in Sept 2019
TILOMAR	KASABAU	Coloama													CBEMR Socialization; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
SUAI	SUAI LORO	Suai Loro	CBEMR; Tarabandu	84.21	UNDP	Fence structure removed due to disagreement from local community; CBEMR training provided	Horticulture; Handicraft; Fisheries	7	Business & Horticulture training	NGO, MAF	Material support provided; Activities took place in a few aldeias				CBEMR Socialization; Theatre; Gender awareness	UNDP; NGO	
SUAI	BECO	Halic	CBEMR	300	UNDP	Fence is to be constructed and completed by May 2021	Welding; Horticulture; Livestock	2		UNDP; MAF	Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization; Theatre	UNDP; NGO	
SUAI	DEBOS	Lontale													CBEMR Socialization	UNDP	
SUAI	DEBOS	Tabacolot													CBEMR Socialization	UNDP	
ZUMALAI	RAIMEA	Berilaku													Theatre	NGO	

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TABLE 3.4: List of CRB project activities in Liquica Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
BAZARTETE	Motaulun	Mota Icut	CBEMR, Tarabandu	10.31	UNDP	CBEMR training provided	Cooperative kiosk	2	Training	NGO					CBEMR socialization	UNDP	
BAZARTETE	Ulmera	Mane Morin	CBEMR, Tarabandu	24.04	UNDP	CBEMR training provided	Fishpond; Horticulture; Carpentry; Sewing; Cooperative	6	Training	NGO, UNDP, MAF					CBEMR socialization; "One Child One Mangrove" campaign in 2017	UNDP	
BAZARTETE	Tibar	Fatunia	CBEMR	14.85	UNDP	CBEMR training provided; Fence structure collapsed due to natural forces (runoff) and dead poles (living fence); Activity to be restored in 2021 through partnership with Timor Port Authority								CBEMR Socialization; Gender awareness; "One Child One Mangrove" campaign in 2017	UNDP		
MAUBARA	Vatuvou		CBEMR, Tarabandu	62.14	UNDP; NGO	CBEMR training provided	Horticulture	2	Training	UNDP, MAF	Material support provided	SLM; Ecotourism	UNDP; NGO	Material support provided	CBEMR Socialization	UNDP	

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TABLE 3.5: List of CRB project activities in Manatuto Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
MANATUTO	MA'ABAT	Kampung Alor/Aitias	CBEMR	4.07			Fishpond	1	Training	UNDP; NGO					Theatre	NGO	
MANATUTO	AITEAS	Bi-Uac				CBEMR training provided								Training on reforestation & agroforestry	Theatre	NGO	
MANATUTO	SAU	Obrato													Theatre	NGO	
MANATUTO	ALILI	Belebato													Theatre	NGO	
MANATUTO	ALILI	Iun													Theatre	NGO	
MANATUTO	CRIBAS	Caunua										Water supply					
MANATUTO	CRIBAS	Ranac													Theatre	NGO	
NATARBORA	AUBEON	Bubur Laran					Livestock; Fishereis; Horticulture	4	Business training	UNDP, MAF	Material support provided				Theatre	NGO	
NATARBORA	UMA BOCO	Fehuk Rin				CBEMR training provided	Horticulture	1	Traning	UNDP, MAF	Material support provided	Rehab. & Conservation of Water Supply System	NGO	To be completed in 2021			
NATARBORA	BARIQUI	Caunua													Theatre	NGO	
NATARBORA	BARIQUI	Weubani													Theatre	NGO	
SOIBADA	SAMORO	Uma Kerek Leten													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	SAMORO	Uma Kerek Kraik													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	MANLALA	Manlala													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	MANLALA	Dauloroc													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	MANUFAHI	Teras													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	MANUFAHI	Manu-fahi													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	FATUMAKEREK	Lisuata Sasahi													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	LEOHAT	Malusun													Reforestation	NGO	
SOIBADA	LEOHAT	Leohat													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Diric Un													Reforestation	NGO	

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Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Torilaran													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Orlalan													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Fatulaun													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Diric Un													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Le'i													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	ORLALAN	Aimaulin													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	MANELIMA	Calohan													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	MANELIMA	Fatumanuc													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	MANELIMA	Lafulau													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	MANELIMA	Mane-Atun													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	BATARA	Are-Ain													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	BATARA	Balulin													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	BATARA	Wer-ulun													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	BATARA	Fatuha													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	FUNAR	Lawado													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	FUNAR	Bamatak													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	FUNAR	Fahilihun													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	SANANAIN	Waidarec													Reforestation	NGO	
LACLUBAR	SANANAIN	Tanusa													Reforestation	NGO	

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TABLE 3.6: List of CRB project activities in Manufahi Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: ECOTOURISM, SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remark	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
FATUBERLIU	CLACUC	Modomahut	CBEMR	652.77	UNDP Direct Support	Fencing is damaged	Horticulture; Fisheries; Saving & Loan; Livestock Management	5	Training	UNDP, NGO, MAF	Material support provided;				Theater	NGO	
FATUBERLIU	FATUKAHI	Fuquiran					Horticulture; Saving & Loan; Livestock Management	6	Training	UNDP, NGO, MAF	Material support provided;				Theater	NGO	
SAME	BETANO	Namdalak	CBEMR	58.2	UNDP Direct Support										Theater	NGO	
SAME	LETEFOHO	Manico					Horticulture; Fishpond	4	Training	NGO, MAF	Material support provided;				Theater	NGO	
SAME	BABULU	Lapuro													Theater	NGO	
SAME	TUTULURO	Bubolau													Theater	NGO	
ALAS	MAHAQUIDAN	We-masin	CBEMR	23.1	UNDP Direct Support												
ALAS	DOTIK	Wedaberek					Fisheries; Livestock Management	2	Training	UNDP Direct Support	Material support provided				Theater	NGO	
ALAS	DOTIC	Lakluan					Horticulture	1	Training	NGO, MAF	Material support provided				Theater	NGO	

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TABLE 3.7: List of CRB project activities in Viqueque Municipality (based on data provided by the PMU)

Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remark	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
UATUCARBAU	IRABIN DE BAIXO	Macaqui					Fisheries, horticulture, handicraft	3	Fishing training by MAF	UNDP, MAF	Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization	UNDP Direct support	
UATUCARBAU	UANIUMA	Uaniuma/Irabin de Baixo	CBEMR	103.93	UNDP Direct Support		Fisheries, horticulture	2	Fishing training by MAF; Theater performance	UNDP; MAF	Material support provided				CBEMR Socialization	UNDP Direct support	
VIQUEQUE	UMA WAIN LETEN	Webokurak	TARABANDU	53.53	UNDP Direct Support												
VIQUEQUE	LUCA	Kanlur										Irrigation	UNDP Direct Support	Rehabilitation of 200 m irrigation scheme to improve livelihood of local communities; The irrigation will provide water to 82 Ha padi field in Suco Luca; The work will be completed in May 2021;			
VIQUEQUE	CARAUBALO	Lamaclaran													CBEMR Socialization	UNDP Direct support	Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention
WATULARI	AFALOICAI	Uaicai										Water supply	NGO				
WATULARI	AFALOICAI	Dasuati										Water supply	NGO				
WATULARI	AFALOICAI	Ossocaiwa										Water supply	NGO				
WATULARI	MATAHOI	Maukiak													CBEMR Socialization; Theater	UNDP Direct support; NGO	Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention

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Post Admin	Suco	Aldeia	ACTIVITY 1: CBEMR, TARABANDU				ACTIVITY 2: LIVELIHOOD					ACTIVITY 3: SLM, WATER SUPPLY, IRRIGATION			ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS		
			Sub-activity	Area (Ha)	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remark	Sub-activity	Total Group #	Capacity Building/Public Awareness	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks	Sub-activity	UNDP Direct Support/NGOs (LVG)	Remarks
WATULARI	MATAHOI	Mauselok															Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention
WATULARI	VESSORU	Baha'o												Theater	NGO		Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention
WATULARI	UAITAME	Fohomano												Theater	NGO		Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention
WATULARI	MACADIQUE	Bobolaco												CBEMR Socialization; Theater	UNDP Direct suport; NGO		Not included in 32 Suco of project intervention

#### 4.1.2 Analysis of Project Results Framework

1. The PRF and related M&E plan form the backbone of any well-designed development project and if well formulated should provide powerful tools to support the successful management, monitoring and reporting of project implementation, including supporting the identification of any need for adaptive management responses. It is therefore important to assess the PRF when undertaking a TE.
1. The CRB ProDoc includes a Project Results Framework (PRF) (Table 4 below). While the PRF does contain most of the usual components of a normal PRF, including baseline description, outcome indicators, end-of-project targets, source of verification and risks, these are not logically and coherently structured and linked. A PRF is supposed to comprise a 'Logical Framework' (LogFrame) where project elements are organized into a logical, cascading, interlinked hierarchy, including, in cascading order from strategic to tactical (with variations depending on the system):
  - a) Impact: The overall strategic impact that the project will have once all elements are implemented – for major policy reform projects, such as EGR, impacts may not occur until years after project completion.
  - b) Objective: The strategic objective that the project seeks to achieve in order for the Impact to occur.
  - c) Outcomes: Policy, legal, governance, administrative, management, capacity and similar reforms, improvements and developments that are produced as a result of completion of the Activities and Outputs, and which in turn drive achievement of the Objective and Impact.
  - d) Outputs: Technical products and results from the activities, which drive and deliver all higher elements in the framework.
  - e) Activities: Tactical, technical actions, which are undertaken in order to produce the Outputs.
2. In order to be able to monitor, measure and manage achievement of each of these elements, an LFA also normally includes Targets – and these can be aligned with any level in the hierarchy, although Targets are usually more usefully assigned to the more tactical elements (Outcomes, Outputs or Activities). Targets should also be time-bound, e.g. by mid-project, be end-of-project, within five years of project-end etc.
3. To allow assessment of achievement, each Target should also be accompanied by Indicators – and these should be quantitative and measurable, against an established Baseline, with a stated source and means of verification.
4. The CRB PRF does not follow this logical, hierarchical framework – with the various elements being arranged incorrectly in the logical hierarchy. The various elements are not logically linked to the superior elements in the framework, making cross-referencing and monitoring of achievements against higher-level elements difficult. The PRF suffers from a number of other weaknesses, including *inter alia*:
  - a) As outlined above, while the narrative in the ProDoc contains project Outputs, for some reason the PRF does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets are not aligned with the Outputs. This is a significant weakness in the PRF as the Outputs relate more directly to the technical activities that are actually carried out on-the-ground by the prospect.
  - b) Because the PRF is also the basis for monitoring, evaluating, tracking and reporting the progress of project implementation, as part for the project M&E Plan, lack of Outputs in the PRF means that the PMU has not reported against Outputs in the Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) (reportedly this relates to the UNDP ProDoc-PRF template that was applicable in 2015).
  - c) Activities are also missing from the PRF, and it appears that the PMU has designed, developed and implemented project activities largely outside of the PRF framework.

- d) Many of the Indicators and Targets are found to not meet the criteria of SMART (specific, measurable, achievable and time-bound). Of particular note is that none of the Indicators in the PRF have any time reference at all, i.e. they are not time-bound.
  - e) Additionally, the time-reference for all Targets in the PRF is 'end-of-project', with no sub-targets at different stages of the project, e.g. end of year one targets, end of year two targets etc (for each Outcome and Output) (reportedly this relates to the UNDP ProDoc-PRF template that was applicable in 2015). The inclusion of sub-targets would have been more useful for tracking progress as the project progressed.
  - f) Indicators and Targets are not sequentially numbered and linked to the Outcomes by the numbering (nor linked to the Outputs, which as outlined above are missing from the PRF).
2. Overall, the PRF is found to be one of the weakest examples of a PRF that the IC has reviewed across over 20 projects that he has evaluated and designed. Its weaknesses almost certainly contributed to some of the significant challenges that were encountered during project implementation, as it did not provide a clear, complete and logical framework to guide project implementation, M&E and adaptive management. This perhaps contributed to the PMU's tendency to focus more on ad-hoc, activity-based project implementation, with insufficient attention to a more strategic approach aimed at driving the activities towards achieving the project's overall outcomes and impacts. This problem was also picked up in the MTR, which identified a tendency towards 'activism' – a rush to 'tick-off' as many activities as possible at the expense of achieving lasting, sustainable outputs, outcomes and real benefits for Timor-Leste.
3. It would be useful for relevant UNDP staff (those involved in the design, development, management and monitoring and evaluation of such projects) to be provided with some formal training in project design and management, including in the development and use of PRFs and linked M&E plans as project planning, management and monitoring tools.
4. It is recommended that the design of future projects should give more careful consideration to ensuring a strong, clear and well articulated PRF and supporting M&E plan, as these provide powerful tools for managing and monitoring project implementation.

**TABLE 4: Project Results Framework (PRF) (from UNDP ProDoc)**

Note: The second Indicator & Target under Outcome 1, in 'red' text, were not in the ProDoc PRF and were added later by the project.

<p>This project will contribute to achieving the following Country Programme Outcome as defined in CPAP/CPD or UNDAF:</p> <p><b>UNDAF Outcome 1: People of Timor-Leste, especially the most disadvantaged groups, benefit from inclusive and responsive quality health, education and other social services, and are more resilient to disasters and the impacts of climate change.</b>  <u>Sub-Outcome 1.4.</u> People of Timor-Leste, particularly those living in rural areas vulnerable to disasters and the impacts of climate change, are more resilient and benefit from improved risk and sustainable environment management</p> <p><b>UNDAF Outcome 3: Economic policies and programmes geared towards inclusive, sustainable and equitable growth and decent jobs</b>  <u>Sub-Outcome 3.2.</u> Technical capacity enhanced to develop viable and sustainable agribusiness sub-sectors and value chains promoting local bio-diversity</p>
<p><b>Country Programme and/or UNDAF Outcome Indicators:</b>                  UNDAF 1.4.1. Number of evidence-based climate change risk/vulnerability assessment reports and policy recommendation documents, timely disseminated                  UNDAF 3.2.3. Ha of degraded mangrove areas rehabilitated</p>
<p><b>Primary applicable UNDP Strategic Plan Outcomes:</b>                  Outcome 1: Growth and development are inclusive and sustainable, incorporating productive capacities that create employment and livelihoods for the poor and excluded</p>
<p><b>Applicable SOF (LDCF) Strategic Objective and Program:</b>                  Objective 1: Reduce the vulnerability of people, livelihoods, physical assets and natural systems to the adverse effects of climate change                  Objective 2: Strengthen institutional and technical capacities for effective climate change adaptation                  Objective 3: Integrate climate change adaptation into relevant policies, plans and associated processes</p>
<p><b>Applicable LDCF Expected Outcomes:</b>                  Outcome 1.1: Vulnerability of physical assets and natural systems reduced                  Outcome 1.2: Livelihood and sources of income of vulnerable populations diversified and strengthened                  Outcome 3.2: Policies, plans and associated processes developed and strengthened to identify, prioritize and integrate adaptation strategies and measures</p>
<p><b>Applicable LDCF Outcome Indicators:</b>                  Indicator 2: Type and extent of assets strengthened and/or better managed to withstand the effects of climate change                  Indicator 3: Population benefiting from the adoption of diversified, climate-resilient livelihood options                  Indicator 12: Regional, national and sector-wide policies, plans and processes developed and strengthened to identify, prioritize and integrate adaptation strategies and measures</p>

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	Indicator	Baseline	Targets End of Project	Source of Verification	Risks
<b>Project Objective<sup>1</sup></b> To strengthen resilience of coastal communities by the introduction of nature-based approaches to coastal protection	Regional, national and sector-wide policies, plans and processes developed and strengthened to identify, prioritize and integrate adaptation strategies and measures. (LDCF Indicator 12).	This is currently no coastal protection and resilience strategy for infrastructure planning in place.	Coastal protection and resilience strategy for infrastructure planning endorsed.	Inter-ministerial meeting minutes.	Coordination among the various directorates at the concerned ministries will remain limited and preclude an agreement over a consensus-based, multi-sectoral and integrated coastal management and adaptation plan.
<b>Outcome 1<sup>2</sup></b> Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established	SOP for directorates under MAF, developed and approved.	Efforts across MAF directorates are not effectively coordinated to ensure the protection and rehabilitation of mangrove areas.	SOP for coordinated approach to protect mangrove areas designed and successfully tested.	MAF TWG established. MAF TWG meeting. minutes. Project Reports. Independent Evaluations.	Ineffective coordination among the various MAF directorates, result in policies and plans which inadvertently impact the mangrove rehabilitation targets.
Note: This Indicator & Target were not in the ProDoc PRF and were added later by the project.	Number of people with access to improved climate information services.	0 - tidal information not regularly collected to inform coastal planning including mangrove reforestation efforts (2016).	26,000 people have access to improved climate information services.	Monitoring reports, documentation.	None listed.
<b>Outcome 2</b> Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection	Type and extent of assets strengthened and/or better managed to withstand the effects of climate change (UNDAF Indicator 3.2.3, LDCF Indicator 2).	~1,300ha in Timor-Leste (2005) - these figures will be updated once the 2014 high resolution aerial photographs are analyzed, followed by ground truthing, to calculate more current mangrove coverage, especially in sites selected for project intervention.	1,000ha protected or re-afforested using CBEMR.	Ground truthing at the midterm and end of the project to assess actual mangrove coverage.  Regular project site visits by project manager and experts.	Mangrove protection and re-afforestation efforts result in low survival rates.  Rehabilitated mangrove areas are eventually degraded after the project close.  Protection and re-afforestation efforts result in increases in the crocodile population.

<sup>1</sup> Objective (Atlas output) monitored quarterly ERBM and annually in APR/PIR

<sup>2</sup> All outcomes monitored annually in the APR/PIR. It is highly recommended not to have more than 4 outcomes.

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	Indicator	Baseline	Targets End of Project	Source of Verification	Risks
	Number of population / households benefiting from the adoption of diversified, climate-resilient livelihood options (LDCF Indicator 3).	0 – project will introduce livelihood options, which contribute to protection and re-forestation efforts and/or relieve community pressure on mangroves.	1,000 households benefiting from mangrove-supportive livelihoods (estimated at 5000 people, 5/household).  (30% of support will target women specifically).	Community training, investment in livelihood inputs. Surveys. Annual Reports. Independent Evaluations.	Communities are reluctant to adopt new land use practices and mangrove-supportive livelihood options due to, perceived risks to their income stability, and uncertainties over the market demand, and continue with activities which degrade mangrove areas.
	% change in household income, as a result of mangrove-supportive livelihoods activities implemented by the project.	Baseline study to be conducted at start of project to assess current household income levels (see Annex H – Randomized Control Trials).	Positive % change in household income, specifically in households where women are engaged in mangrove-supportive livelihoods supported by the project (see Annex H – Randomized Control Trials).	Survey data (see Annex H).	Communities are reluctant to adopt new land use practices and mangrove-supportive livelihood options due to, perceived risks to their income stability, and uncertainties over the market demand, and continue with activities which degrade mangrove areas.
<b>Outcome 3</b> Integrated approaches to coastal adaptation adopted to contribute to protection of coastal populations and productive lands	Number of funding mechanisms in support of improved coastal watershed management.	Potential revenue streams identified in NBSAP, as well as PPG assessment, but not yet explored or tested.	At least one financing mechanism or plan with committed resources extending at least 2 years after the project end date.	Budget detailing costs of mangrove protection, re-forestation priorities, going forward (beyond the scope of the project).  Funds (public and other) earmarked for mangrove and watershed protection activities.	Failure to identify viable revenue streams or secure funding for long term maintenance of mangrove areas and coastal watershed management.
	% target population aware of role of mangroves in coastal protection and coastal watershed protection.	There is little-to-no educational or public awareness material, especially targeted at youth, about the role of mangroves in coastal ecosystems.	Approximately 250,000 people area reached through various public awareness raising means.	Print material, videos (TV), community events to raise public awareness about the role of mangroves and broader watersheds in coastal protection, reaching especially youth and school-aged population in coastal areas. Surveys and community interviews on behavioural change. Annual Reports. Independent Evaluations.	Communication materials are not tailored to audiences or delivered in method appropriate to ensure outreach.

#### 4.1.3 Assumptions & risks

1. The ProDoc has a dedicated section on assumptions and risks (section 2.5 of the ProDoc) and the TE assesses this to be well developed and reflective of the actual situation in Timor-Leste. It includes a clear table listing each risk, rating each in terms of likely impact and probability, and specifying mitigation measures for each, consistent with best practice. However, these are not clearly linked to the PRF Outcomes or the project Outputs, which is a deficiency.

#### 4.1.4 Lessons from & linkages to other relevant projects incorporated into project design

1. Section 2.3.1 of the ProDoc provides a comprehensive description of linkages to other relevant programs and projects in Timor-Leste, including by GoTL, development partners and NGOs, and identifies several of these as being part of the co-financing contribution to the CRB project. The TE assesses that this aspect of the project design is well developed.
2. While Annex G1 of the ProDoc contains lessons from previous mangrove planting activities in TL (which were not learned from and applied during the CRB project), the ProDoc does not include an analysis of broader (non-mangrove) lessons learned from other relevant projects, and how these lessons have been incorporated into the project design.
3. The ProDoc also does not include lessons from other relevant projects in neighbouring countries (e.g. the Million Mangroves project which is active in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia – [www.millionmangroves.com](http://www.millionmangroves.com)). This issue was also pointed out by the MTR and is a significant weakness in the project design.

#### 4.1.5 Planned stakeholder participation

1. Section 2.9 of the ProDoc is titled ‘Stakeholder Involvement Plan’ however it only provides some narrative describing various stakeholders that are relevant to each project Outcome, and stating that they will be consulted, without detailing any actual plan on how – the mechanism – these stakeholders will be involved.
2. Section 2.9 states that the steering committees/technical working groups for both the Tibar Bay Port and Tasi Mane (south coast gas infrastructure) projects would be important stakeholders for Outcome 2. However, as far as could be determined by the TE, the project did not engage effectively with either of these during the project, reflecting that lack of an actual plan for stakeholder involvement.
3. Very critically, the Stakeholder Involvement Plan does not lay out a procedure for engaging with and involving local- and community-level stakeholders.
4. The Stakeholder Involvement Plan is also not supported by a thorough and comprehensive stakeholder analysis, which is an essential starting point for any such plan, and should be a standard annex for any ProDoc.
5. The ProDoc does have an Annex 9 - also titled ‘Stakeholder Involvement Plan’, which is simply a table listing project Outcomes and Outputs in one column and ‘potential’ stakeholders in the second column, again without any actual plan on how – the mechanism – these stakeholders will be involved.
6. The TE assesses that overall, the planned stakeholder participation aspects of the project design, as described in the ProDoc, are very poorly developed.

#### 4.1.6 Gender responsiveness of project design

1. As part of the project design process UNDP commissioned a gender study – Larson (2015) *Gender Report for Building Shoreline Resilience of Timor-Leste to Protect Local Communities and Their Livelihoods*, with cost-sharing support from the USAID-Adapt project. The report was the result of a desk review, consultations with government and focus group discussions with communities. It provided a comprehensive overview of the gender setting in Timor-Leste in 2015, and identified gender issues that needed to be taken into account by the project. The main findings of the report are summarized in Annex G.2 of the ProDoc.

2. The ProDoc itself does not have an explicit, dedicated section outlining a plan for how gender and social inclusion considerations will be addressed by the project, except to state that a Gender Specialist would be recruited by the project to:
  - a) Ensure that consultations capture the views of women, are gathered from women in a manner that does not put them at risk; and that selected livelihood interventions are implemented in a gender-sensitive manner and prioritize benefit to, and empowerment of, women.
  - b) Ensure implementation of, and compliance with, the UNDP gender policy in general and the Gender Action Plan (GAP) to be developed for the project, to effectively integrate gender concerns into the implementation of project activities, including strategies to ensure participation of women in the implementation of various project components and activities (the project developed a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed (refer also section 4.3.7 below).
3. The ProDoc also states that the Economist engaged by the project would design gender-disaggregated household survey guidelines and instruments in close consultation with the Project Manager, considering as well inputs from experts engaged during the PPG stage (i.e. the Larson 2015 report).
4. Specific gender elements are included in only two end-of-project Targets in the PRF, both under Outcome 2: Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection, as follows (Target numbers are added by the TE, these are lacking in the PRF):
  - a) Target 2.2: 1000 households benefiting from mangrove-supportive livelihoods (estimated at 5000 people, 5/households) ~30 % of support will target woman specifically.
  - b) Target 2.3: Positive % income change in household income, specifically in households where women are engaged in mangrove-supportive livelihoods supported by the project.
  - c) None of the Indicators in the PRF include gender elements.
  - d) Of the 10 project Outputs described in the ProDoc narrative (which as outlined above are not included in the PRF), only one includes a gender element:
  - e) Output 2.2: Mangrove-supportive, diversified livelihoods/social businesses established in mangrove rehabilitation project sites, benefiting at least 1,000 households and empowering women.
5. The TE considers this to be inadequate. Overall, the TE assesses that the report by Larsen (2015) provided a strong bases for informing the gender responsiveness of the project design, however the actual project design was not strong enough in this regard – it could have been much more gender responsive if:
  - a) The PRF included gender targets and indicators under all project outcomes and outputs.
  - b) The ProDoc included an explicit, dedicated section outlining a plan for how gender and social inclusion considerations will be addressed by the project

#### 4.1.7 Social & environmental safeguards

1. The ProDoc has a dedicated section on compliance with UNDP safeguards policies (section 2.10 of the ProDoc) and a completed social and environmental screening (SESP) in Annex E.
2. These are found to be quite superficial and focus mainly on one environmental issue only – potential exposure of acidic sulphate soils from earthworks and geo-engineering carried out by the project.
3. There is no assessment of other potential significant impacts such as large-scale alteration of coastal environments and

habitats from mangrove planting, potential saltwater intrusion to groundwater resources from proposed engineering works, and potential impacts of tree cutting to provide timber for fence building.

4. The ProDoc also does not provide any plans to assess, prevent, mitigate and manage any such impacts.
5. The potential social impacts of project interventions including efforts to change livelihood practices away from those that have been practiced traditionally possibly for centuries are not properly addressed.

Summary Findings - Project Design & Formulation:

- *The project appears to have been designed to directly address country and community needs and priorities as identified during project design consultations in Timor-Leste, and was both country- and community-driven.*
- *The project design was extremely ambitious and unusually complex and multifaceted. The project design overall could have been improved and strengthened if:*
  - *It had focused on a smaller set of high-priority ‘demonstration activities’ at a smaller number of ‘pilot sites’, spread evenly and equitably throughout all 11 coastal municipalities, as the bases for replication and scaling-up across other sites in subsequent phases.*
  - *It had included an explicit activity to develop a documented and budgeted replication and sustainability plan before project end.*
- *The PRF suffers from a number of weaknesses, including:*
  - *Its elements are not logically and coherently structured and linked.*
  - *It does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets are not aligned with the Outputs (reportedly this relates to the UNDP ProDoc / PRF template applicable at the time of project design - 2015).*
  - *Many of the Indicators and Targets are found to not meet the criteria of SMART.*
- *While Annex G1 of the ProDoc contains lessons from previous mangrove planting activities in TL (which were not learned from and applied during the CRB project), the ProDoc does not include an analysis of broader (non-mangrove) lessons learned from other relevant projects, and how these lessons have been incorporated into the project design.*
- *The Stakeholder Involvement Plan is not fully developed and is not supported by a thorough and comprehensive stakeholder analysis.*
- *The report by Larsen (2015) provided a strong bases for informing the gender responsiveness of the project design, however the actual project design was not strong enough in this regard – it could have been much more gender responsive if the PRF itself included gender targets and indicators under all project outcomes and outputs (the project did develop a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed – see section 4.3.7).*
- *Overall, the project design does not fully or properly address all of the main potential environmental and social impacts of the project.*
- *Because this is the TE stage (end of project), these findings cannot be addressed in the existing project, but provide lessons for future projects.*

## 4.2 Project Implementation

### 4.2.1 Adaptive management

1. The project implementers (UNDP and GoTL) exhibited some capacity for adaptive management and corrective actions in order to overcome barriers and problems in relation to some issues that arose during project implementation, including taking action to try and recover from the delayed project start, acting on feedback from Project Board members and project stakeholders, and acting on most of the MTR recommendations.
2. However, there were also some significant failings in adaptive management, including the fact there was a massive 10 month delay between submission of the MTR report in February 2019 and the issue of the management response by the PMU in December 2019, leaving very little time to actually implement the MTR recommendations in the last planned year of the project (2020). The UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines (UNDP 2014) require that the MTR management response should be completed within three weeks of receiving the Final MTR Report! (Figure 3 of the UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines). Clearly, the 10-month delay that occurred with responding to this MTR is not an example of good adaptive management.
3. The management response also did not act on or fully address some of the MTR recommendations, including *inter alia*:
  - Recommendation 13 - Recommending that each livelihood support project should be planned comprehensively with the professional support of a specialist including a very clear business plan. As far as the TE can assess, none of the livelihood activities supported by the project have a clear business plan, and as a result, reportedly, most of them have not been successful / will not be sustained post-project.
  - Recommendation 21 - Relating to failure of the social and environmental (S&E) management aspects of the project. As far as the TE can assess, deficiencies with the S&E aspects of the project remain up to project end.
  - Recommendation 22 – Recommending that the project should not support NGOs to assume the role of local governments and the need for local governments to be involved in a way that reinforces their sense of responsibility over community development and environment protection and coastal management. As far as the TE can assess, the project has continued to prioritise working through local NGOs rather than local governments, further dis-enfranchising local governments and creating dissatisfaction and even hostility to the project – which is a very negative outcome and counter-productive to the project’s objectives.
  - Recommendation 23 – Recommending that the project review and take on the lessons and best practices learned from previous relevant projects (across all issues). As far as the TE can assess, this has not been done up to TE, and may be one of the reasons that this project has suffered so many problems – it has not effectively learned from previous projects.
4. As for all projects the MTR represents a significant opportunity to assess progress with project implementation, to identify areas where progress is not on track, and to recommend adaptive management and corrective actions to get the project back in track. While the project did address most of the MTR recommendations, it did not address some of the key recommendations, as outlined above, thus limiting the effectiveness of the MTR as a valuable adaptive management tool.

#### Summary Findings - Adaptive Management:

- *While UNDP and GoTL exhibited some capacity for adaptive management, there were some significant deficiencies in adaptive management, including slow investigation and identification of the root causes of various problems and delays that arose during the project, an extremely long, 10-month delay to issuing the management response to the MTR, and incomplete management responses to the MTR, including some critical MTR recommendations.*

### 4.2.2 Actual stakeholder participation & partnerships

1. The TE assesses that the project has undertaken some aspects of stakeholder participation and partnerships very well, and other aspects quite poorly, constrained by the lack of a fully developed stakeholder analysis and stakeholder involvement plan in the ProDoc, as outlined under section 4.1.5 above.
2. The Project Board (PB) has provided the main high-level mechanism for partnership coordination, and met twice each year in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and only once (December) in 2020, with one last meeting planned before the extended project end in July 2021. Review of PB meeting minutes and feedback from members indicates that the PB operated effectively. However, there is a need to evolve the PB from a temporary project-based group into an ongoing, permanent, National ICM Coordination Committee or similar, ideally under the auspices of the National Ocean Policy (NOP).
3. Subsidiary to the PB was a Technical Working Group (TWG), tasked with handling more technical and operational aspects of project implementation, including coordinating stakeholder participation and partnerships at the technical level. This was supposed to have been formed at the beginning of the project but was not formed until July 2020, almost at the end of the project, and almost 1.5 years after the MTR had identified this gap in February 2019. This very long delay in forming the TWG. Reportedly the TWG TOR was submitted to MAF in mid-2018, however, it took MAF several months to respond around mid-2019, possibly due to the post election government reorganization.
4. The project established several effective partnerships at the national level, including with the Green Schools program to introduce mangrove education in schools, and with the Lafaek magazine published by Care International to promote articles to raise awareness of coastal management and mangrove conservation issues.
5. Other partnerships were not successful, including with the Tibar Port and Tasi Mane (south coast gas infrastructure) projects as outlined under 4.1.5 above.
6. There may also have been scope for greater cooperation, coordination and joint activities with regional initiatives such as the *Partnerships for Environmental Management in the Seas of East Asia* (PEMSEA), the UNDP-GEF *Arafura-Timor Sea Ecosystem Action* (ATSEA) project Phase II and the FAO-GEF *Indonesian Seas Large Marine Ecosystem* (ISLME) project, all of which are undertaking relevant activities in Timor-Leste. As the latter two are GEF projects, the GEF Secretariat would expect such cooperation.
7. The project made significant efforts at stakeholder participation and partnerships at the local level, working with 127 different community groups and 27 different NGOs to implement mangrove planting programs, mangrove supportive livelihoods and related activities, and making concerted efforts to consult with local-level stakeholders on the planning and implementation of activities.
8. However, as outlined under above, the project prioritised working through local NGOs rather than local governments, thus dis-enfranchising local governments and creating dissatisfaction and even hostility to the project – which is a very negative outcome and counter-productive to the project’s objectives.
9. The TE also received reports from local-community stakeholders that while project management did make efforts to hold local-level meetings, often the communication was very much one-way from the project team, and the local-community stakeholders felt like they were not being listened to – this is a fatal flaw in stakeholder engagement.

Summary Findings - Actual Stakeholder Participation:

- *Overall the TE assesses that the project has undertaken some aspects of stakeholder participation and partnerships very well, and other aspects quite poorly.*
- *Stakeholder participation and partnerships were constrained by the lack of a fully developed stakeholder analysis and stakeholder involvement plan in the ProDoc, and reportedly, a tendency for project management to communicate in a one-way mode and not listen in return, especially at the local level.*

### 4.2.3 Project finances & financial management

1. As outlined in section 1.1 above, the project had a total grant from the GEF Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) of US\$7 million, which is administered by the UNDP CO and therefore a subject of this TE. This is a large sum of money by any standards, and was dispersed by the project across an unusually large number of recipients, including 27 local NGOs and **127** community groups who have limited capacity in financial management, and also for payment of an unusually high number of consultancies for a project of this scale (the TE identified a total of 29 consultancy and company contracts worth approximately US\$1.53 million (light green shading in Table 5). This is 22% of the total GEF allocation of \$7 million, and more than the \$1.44 million spent on PMU salaries – see below) (light apricot shading in Table 5). Given these factors it is important that the financial aspects of the project are closely evaluated.
2. It should be noted that the two evaluators (IC and NC) are not accountants or financial auditors, and are not in a position to thoroughly assess the financial aspects of the project in detail. The evaluators have simply reviewed the data provided by the PMU and accepted this at face value - there is no way for the evaluators to assess the veracity of this data.
3. Normally the PMU would provide the evaluators with copies of all of the project's Combined Delivery Reports (CDRs) that are prepared annually by UNDP. For some reason for this project the CDRs have not been provided. This further constrains the ability for the evaluators to assess the financial aspects of the project.
4. The annual, self-assessed Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) do not contain detailed financial reporting and only present summary data on cumulative disbursement totals. Three PIRs were provided to the TE, for 2018, 2019 and 2020 - and these reports the following:
  - 2018: Only 33.56% of the approved budget for that year had been disbursed.
  - 2019: Only 50.27% of the approved budget for that year had been disbursed.
  - 2020: Only 70.40% of the approved budget for that year had been disbursed.
5. The project did not complete PIRs for 2016 and 2017 as the project started in August 2016 and, reportedly, PIRs are only required for the financial years following from 1<sup>st</sup> July.

Because the project was implemented directly by UNDP under the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM), it has not been subject to any external financial audits, as would be required for a project that is implemented by GoTL under the National Implementation Modality (NIM). The UNDP CO advised that in 2020, an internal audit was conducted for the whole CO by the UNDP Office of Audit and Investigation. Transactions made by various projects were randomly audited. Reportedly no specific audit findings were mentioned against the CRB project. The TE was not provided with a copy of that report.

6. Given the significant lack of financial data provided to the TE as outlined above, the TE provided the PMU with a template budget table based on the UNDP-ATLAS budget allocations against project outcomes and activities. This included blank columns for planned budget, actual expenditure and expenditure rate (actual expenditure as a % of planned budget) for each year of the project. The PMU was asked to complete the table, and the returned table is presented in Table 5 below. This is the only detailed financial data that has provided to the TE, and as with other data provided by the PMU, cannot be verified by the TE and is accepted at face value.
7. It should be noted that the PMU provided some minor additions and changes to Table 5 however these were provided in piece-meal fashion rather than a fresh version of the whole table. Overall they do not change the general findings, and the TE consultants do not have expertise in financial analysis matters more the time to spend on such details – it is recommended that these issues should be assessed by relevant financial experts. The TE just provides some general observations from Table 5 as follows:
  - a) As highlighted in yellow in Table 5, there are a very large number of line items where actual expenditure was

way in excess of the planned budget, including many where the planned budget for that item was zero but expenditure was extremely high. For example, in 2017 for item '72100 Contractual Services - Companies', there was zero planned budget but an actual expenditure of \$125,965, and in 2018 for item '72300 Materials and Goods', there was zero planned budget but an actual expenditure of \$123,557, amongst many others as highlighted in yellow in Table 5. This creates a situation where the rate of expenditure is way in excess of the planned budget for many line items, and raises serious questions about the accuracy of the PMU's planning process, where the unbudgeted funds were sourced / reallocated from for those items, and whether the budget allocations against line items in the ATLAS budget are correct and reliable.

**(Note:** For column 3 under each year – expenditure rate, the PMU appears to have entered the wrong formula, missing the decimal point which appears to give an exaggerated expenditure rate by two orders of magnitude – this needs to be checked and corrected if necessary).

- b) What is particularly concerning about Table 5 is that despite the fact that the majority of rows in the far right hand column (which lists total expenditure rates for the whole project period), the expenditure is positive – i.e. in excess of the planned budget (in many cases way in excess), the project total expenditure rate in the bottom right hand box is still 89% (i.e. less than 100% of the total project budget). This is impossible if over-expenditures in the right hand boxes above are mostly positives (over-expenditures), and needs to be explained by UNDP.
  - c) There are some unusually high and low and unusually high expenditures allocated to some line items which do not make sense. For example in 2020 for item '71200 International Consultant', there was zero planned budget but an actual expenditure of \$103,008 – this seems to a large amount for a consultant, while in 2018 for item '72100 Contractual Services - Companies', there was zero planned budget but an actual expenditure of \$760, which seems a very low amount for a contractual service from a company. Again, this raises questions about whether budget allocations against line items in the ATLAS budget are correct and reliable, or just used to 'balance' out expenditure.
  - d) A striking feature of Table 5 is that it shows that the total expenditure on PMU salaries (line item 63100) combined with UN volunteers (line item 71500) (which are in effect project staff) was \$1.44 million (light apricot shading in Table 5). This represents 20% of the total \$7 million project budget. Somewhat unusually, PMU salaries are spread across several project Outcomes rather than grouped under the PMU budget component – the reason for this is not clear to the TE, and again raises questions about whether budget allocations against line items in the ATLAS budget are correct and reliable, or just used to 'balance' out expenditure.
  - e) Combining the \$1.44 million spent on project salaries with the \$1.53 million spent on consultants and contracts comes to \$2.97 million, or 42% of the total \$7 million GEF allocation.
8. The TE has particular concerns about several other aspects relating to project finances, including, *inter alia*:
- a) the fact that funding was dispersed by the project across an unusually large number of recipients, including local groups with limited capacity in financial management, and an unusually high number of consultancies,
  - b) what appears to be a lack of transparency and objective criteria for selecting sites and groups to receive project funds,
  - c) the PMU could not (or would not) provide data on the amount of funds provided to most of the 109 livelihood groups (a serious concern) (see section 4.3.3 and Annex 5); and
  - d) the apparently extremely low returns on investment relative to funds provided for many of the activities, especially the livelihoods activities (see section 4.3.3 and Annex 5).
9. With regard to financial management processes, nearly all parties consulted during the TE reported that delays in the disbursement of funds from UNDP to project activities, including to local NGOs and community groups, was a significant

cause of delays with project implementation, with some delays reportedly lasting months – preventing project activities from being implemented, and delaying the entire project.

Summary Findings - Project Finances & Financial Management:

*Overall, given:*

- *that the TE is not in a position to thoroughly assess the financial aspects of the project in detail,*
- *the relatively large GEF allocation (\$7 million),*
- *the fact that funding was dispersed by the project across an unusually large number of recipients, including local groups with limited capacity in financial management, and an unusually high number of consultancies,*
- *what appears to be a lack of transparency and objective criteria for selecting sites and groups to receive project funds,*
- *the fact that many project investments appear to have been ineffective – e.g. failed mangrove planting, failed livelihood activities and incomplete, poorly designed and built, and unsustainable eco-tourism infrastructure,*
- *the fact that the PMU could not provide data on the amount of funds provided to most of the 109 livelihood groups (a serious concern),*
- *the apparently extremely low returns on investment relative to funds provided for many of the activities, especially the livelihoods activities,*
- *some of the issues with project finances identified by the TE as outlined in section 4.2.3; and*
- *the fact that the project has not been subject to an external audit,*

*. . . it is recommended that at the end of the project, UNDP commission a highly detailed, forensic financial audit by independent, external auditors, including tracing all expenditure trails.*

FINAL REPORT

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report (UNDP PIMS 5330)

TABLE 5: CRB Project Terminal Evaluation – Budget versus Actual Expenditure Table (data provided by the PMU).

NOTE: The PMU provided some minor additions and changes to this table, however these were in piece-meal fashion rather than a fresh version of the whole table. Overall they do not change the general findings.

1= Planned Budget. 2 = Actual Expenditure. 3 = % Expenditure Rate (2 as a % of 1).

Light green shading = consultancies & contracts. Light apricot shading = staff costs. Yellow shading = actual expenditure when there is no planned budget.

PRF Outcome	Atlas Code	ATLAS Budget Description	From Prodoc	2016 (US)			2017 (US)			2018 (US)			2019 (US)			2020 (US)			2021 (US)			Total (2016 - 2021)			% (Actual Expenditure s/Original Budget)
				1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	
Outcome 1:	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	200,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	(5,000.00)	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	(5,000.00)	0.00	0%	0%
Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established	71200	International Consultants	50,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	20,000.00	19,375.00	97%	80,000.00	41,532.92	52%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	100,000.00	60,907.92	61%	122%
	71300	Local Consultants	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	15,000.00	2,825.00	19%	9,000.00	2,942.24	33%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	24,000.00	5,767.24	24%	576724%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	45,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	180,000.00	0.00	0%	155,538.00	53,985.00	35%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	335,538.00	53,985.00	16%	120%
	75700	Workshop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	9,500.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	1,000.00	0.00	0%	10,500.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	100,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	125,965.00	12596500%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	125,965.00	12596500%	126%
	61300	Salary Costs – IP Staff	160,000.00	37,351.48	7,764.02	21%	40,000.00	98,979.55	247%	40,000.00	107,960.07	270%	10,000.00	103,444.67	1034%	0.00	71,763.87	7176387.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	127,351.48	389,912.18	306%	244%
	71200	International Consultants	40,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	23,520.00	52,783.22	224%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	23,520.00	52,783.22	224%	132%
	71300	Local Consultants	30,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71400	Contractual Services – Individ	0.00	1,537.39	1,537.39	100%	20,000.00	19,181.89	96%	0.00	9,349.80	934980%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	21,537.39	30,069.08	140%	3006908%
	71600	Travel	0.00	9,958.54	9,655.00	97%	2,500.00	5,719.64	229%	0.00	3,526.00	352600%	4,000.00	4,110.80	103%	16,000.00	237.60	1.5%	0.00	0.00	0%	32,458.54	23,249.04	72%	2324904%
	72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	0.00	72.49	72.49	100%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	72.49	72.49	100%	7249%
	72800	Information Technology Equipmt	0.00	1,355.00	1,355.00	100%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	60,623.60	6062360%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	(73,788.60)	100%	1,355.00	61,978.60	4574%	6197860%	
	73100	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	3,240.00	324000%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	3,240.00	324000%	324000%
	74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	0.00	1,042.20	1,042.20	100%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	1,042.20	1,042.20	100%	104220%
	75700	Training, Workshops and Confer	75,000.00	132.00	132.00	100%	15,000.00	18,519.25	123%	15,000.00	3,734.00	25%	0.00	753.01	75301%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	30,132.00	23,138.26	77%	31%
	72300	Materials & Goods	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	100,000.00	8,763.99	9%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	43,914.20	4391420%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	100,000.00	52,678.19	53%	5267819%
	72200	Equipment and Furniture	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72600	Grant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72800	Information Technology Equipmt	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	11,810.00	1181000%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	11,810.00	1181000%	1181000%
	Total Outcome 1			700,000.00	51,449.10	21,558.10	42%	372,500.00	311,554.32	84%	305,538.00	222,912.79	73%	56,020.00	268,571.74	479%	16,000.00	72,001.47	450%	1,000.00	(73,788.60)	-7379%	802,507.10	896,598.42	112%
Outcome 2:	71200	International Consultants	200,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	20,000.00	20,627.20	103%	20,000.00	20,627.20	103%	10%
	75700	Workshop	120,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71200	International Consultants	70,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	170,000.00	95,030.74	56%	25,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	91,851.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	286,851.00	95,030.74	33%	136%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	1,330,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	90,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	12,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	102,000.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	1,200,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71200	International Consultant	40,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71200	International Consultant	70,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	60,000.00	20,991.53	35%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	60,000.00	20,991.53	35%	30%
	71200	International Consultant	50,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	7,516.00	751600%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	110,524.89	11052489%	221%
	71300	Local Consultants	60,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	26,500.00	38,049.53	144%	0.00	0.00	0%	28,000.00	22,847.35	81.6%	19,200.00	19,445.83	101%	73,700.00	80,342.71	109%	134%
	71400	Contractual Services – Individ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	200.00	962.24	481%	0.00	5,532.83	553283%	159,100.00	21,018.66	13%	40,098.98	6,196.86	15.5%	48,692.00	2,214.24	5%	248,090.98	35,924.83	14%	3592483%
	71500	UN Volunteers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	53,943.80	5394380%	70,000.00	45,873.59	66%	34,119.81	34,086.77	99.9%	0.00	0.00	0%	104,119.81	133,904.16	129%	13390416%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	100,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	760.00	76000%	0.00	0.00	0%	95,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	95,000.00	760.00	1%	1%
	74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	200,000.00	514.40	514.40	100%	0.00	0.00	0%	38,500.00	22,578.28	59%	4,498.00	0.00	0%	0.00	23,782.08	100%	0.00	0.00	0%	43,512.40	46,874.76	108%	23%
	74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	80,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	10,000.00	8,470.45	85%	0.00	0.00	0%	2,141.28	214128%	48,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	13,700.00	9,379.50	68%	71,700.00	19,991.23	28%	25%
	72200	Equipment and Furniture	85,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	19,665.03	1966503%	0.00	1,725.00	172500%	0.00	125.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3,630.00	33,945.03	3394503%	40%
	72300	Materials & Goods	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	2,500.00	9,766.14	391%	0.00	123,557.95	12355795%	168,000.00	110,000.38	65%	269,745.00	282,245.65	104.6%	223,942.72	141,756.85	63%	664,187.72	667,326.97	100%	66732697%
	72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	140.00	14000%	0.00	99.04	9904%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	239.04	23904%	23904%	
	72500	Supplies	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	6,000.00	3,764.00	63%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	87.50	8750%	0.00	0.00	0%	88.00	8800%	6,000.00	3,939.50	66%	393950%	
	72600	Grant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	223,184.50	192,785.00	86%	462,245.00	85,958.55	19%	220,500.00	58,023.19	26%	441,144.00	81,610.92	18.5%	40,000.00	40,000.00	100%	1,387,073.50	458,377.66	33%	45837766%
	72800	Information Technology Equipmt	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	500.00	260.00	52%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	66,338.60	6633860%	500.00	6633860%
	73100	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	804.25	80425%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	3,951.44	395144%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	4,755.69	475569%	475569%
	73400	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	300.00	663.60	221%	2,500.00	1,430.50	57%	0.00	9,62											

FINAL REPORT

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report (UNDP PIMS 5330)

PRF Outcome	Atlas Code	ATLAS Budget Description	From Prodoc	2016 (US)			2017 (US)			2018 (US)			2019 (US)			2020 (US)			2021 (US)			Total (2016 - 2021)			% (Actual Expenditure s/Original Budget)
				1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	
Outcome 3:	71200	International Consultants	50,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	220,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	214.42	100%	220,000.00	214.42	0%	0%
	61200	Salary Costs – GS Staff	120,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	30,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	30,000.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	150,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71200	International Consultant	60,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	59,330.00	58,173.17	98.1%	0.00	0.00	0%	59,330.00	58,173.17	98%	97%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	410,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	85,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	85,000.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72100	Contractual Services – Companies	300,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	92,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	92,000.00	0.00	0%	0%
	71200	International Consultants	60,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	18,511.88	1851188%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	18,511.88	1851188%	31%
	71400	Contractual Services - Individ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	50,000.00	121,677.18	243%	180,000.00	176,656.78	98%	64,800.00	183,656.78	283%	73,789.00	180,569.21	244.7%	52,289.53	42,017.24	80%	420,878.53	704,870.84	167%	70487084%
	71500	UN Volunteers	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	15,479.62	1547962%	0.00	8,220.24	822024%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	23,699.86	2369986%	2369986%
	71600	Travel	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	21,091.20	2109120%	36,500.00	17,827.16	49%	13,150.00	19,720.91	150.0%	5,000.00	4,962.80	99%	54,650.00	63,602.07	116%	100%
	72200	Equipment and Furniture	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	7,000.00	700000%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	7,913.00	100.0%	0.00	200.00	20000%	0.00	15,113.00	15113000%	15113000%
	72300	Materials & Goods	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	2,631.40	263140%	40,000.00	57,299.20	143%	83,000.00	38,356.93	46%	82,588.00	61,907.25	75.0%	5,590.00	34,182.40	611%	211,178.00	194,377.18	92%	100%	
	72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	6,826.09	682609%	0.00	471.17	47117%	0.00	19,343.76	100.0%	0.00	3,115.13	311513%	0.00	29,756.15	2975615%	2975615%
	72500	Supplies	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	628.01	62801%	0.00	111.00	11100%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	739.01	73901%	73901%
	72600	Grant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	180,000.00	75,363.39	42%	0.00	213,799.33	0%	45,884.00	122,347.98	266.6%	0.00	0.00	0%	225,884.00	411,510.70	182%	100%
	72800	Information Technology Equipmt	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	55,826.04	100.0%	0.00	7,450.00	745000%	0.00	63,276.04	6327604%	6327604%
	73100	Rental & Maintenance-Premises	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	13,894.27	100.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	13,894.27	1389427%	1389427%
	73400	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	105.00	100%	0.00	415.42	41542%	0.00	5,757.60	100.0%	0.00	1,740.16	174016%	0.00	8,018.18	801818%	801818%
	74200	Audio Visual&Print Prod Costs	159,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	30,000.00	16,043.90	53%	20,000.00	14,917.45	75%	29,200.00	19,894.72	68%	0.00	34,463.81	100.0%	2,500.00	26,979.94	2697994%	81,700.00	112,299.82	137%	71%
	74300	Contributions	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	5,763.05	576305%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	1,561.00	100.0%	0.00	(988.86)	-98886%	0.00	6,335.19	633519%	633519%
	74500	Miscellaneous Expenses	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	15,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	300.00	30000%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	2,014.72	100.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	15,000.00	2,314.72	15%	231472%
	74700	Transport, Shipping and handle	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00	0.00	0%	0.00	750.00	75000%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00	750.00	15%	75000%
	75700	Training, Workshops and Confer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	26,535.31	2653531%	35,000.00	78,049.65	223%	49,101.82	17,020.65	35%	27,750.00	8,257.00	29.8%	2,500.00	222.00	9%	114,351.82	130,084.61	114%	13008461%
	71300	Local Consultants	360,000.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	25,500.00	3,505.69	14%	28,000.00	23,909.90	85.4%	0.00	360.00	36000%	53,500.00	27,775.59	52%	8%
	61300	Salary Costs – IP Staff	300,000.00	4,086.31	4,086.31	100%	75,000.00	52,094.57	69%	75,000.00	56,821.28	76%	48,000.00	52,262.65	109%	111,524.00	38,125.57	34.2%	0.00	0.00	0%	313,610.31	203,390.38	65%	68%
		<b>Total Outcome 3</b>	<b>1,969,000.00</b>	<b>4,086.31</b>	<b>4,086.31</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>290,000.00</b>	<b>218,982.36</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>530,000.00</b>	<b>517,344.37</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>648,101.82</b>	<b>574,053.62</b>	<b>89%</b>	<b>442,015.00</b>	<b>653,785.19</b>	<b>147.9%</b>	<b>67,879.53</b>	<b>120,455.23</b>	<b>177%</b>	<b>1,982,082.66</b>	<b>2,088,707.08</b>	<b>106%</b>	<b>106%</b>
	61300	Salary Costs – IP Staff	0.00	1,225.92	4,305.88	351%	15,000.00	33,582.17	224%	15,000.00	44,064.02	294%	6,000.00	17,213.05	287%	0.00	11,706.22	100.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	37,225.92	110,871.34	298%	11087134%
	64300	Staff Mgmt Costs - IP Staff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	973.36	100%	0.00	973.36	97336%	97336%
	71300	Local Consultants	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	729.48	72948%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	729.48	72948%	72948%
	71400	Contractual Services - Individ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	16,540.00	0.00	0%	0.00	7,039.82	703982%	30,571.00	1,109.71	3.6%	8,312.75	18,359.69	221%	55,423.75	26,509.22	48%	2650922%
	71600	Travel	66,160.00	74.40	0.00	0%	16,540.00	16,362.04	99%	0.00	14,483.44	1448344%	13,000.00	1,862.28	14%	4,500.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	34,114.40	32,707.76	96%	49%
	72200	Equipment and Furniture	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	1,700.00	1,648.20	97%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	1,700.00	1,648.20	97%	164820%
	72300	Materials & Goods	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	858.53	85853%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	858.53	85853%	85853%
	72400	Communic & Audio Visual Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	20,000.00	6,750.45	34%	0.00	9,729.46	972946%	0.00	21,102.82	2110282%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	20,000.00	37,582.73	188%	3758273%
	72500	Supplies	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00	2,342.90	47%	0.00	92.80	9280%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	440.75	100.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00	2,876.45	58%	287645%
	73100	Rental and maintenance-premise	106,160.00	1,320.00	1,320.00	100%	16,540.00	8,005.09	48%	26,540.00	5,234.11	20%	11,842.18	6,620.61	56%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	56,242.18	21,179.81	38%	20%
	73400	Rental & Maint of Other Equip	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	1,272.30	127230%	0.00	4,460.09	446009%	0.00	1,651.20	165120%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	235.00	23500%	0.00	7,618.59	761859%	761859%
	73500	Reimbursement Costs	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	1,109.71	110971%	0.00	(1,109.71)	100.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0%
	72800	Information Tech Equipment	63,160.00	265.00	265.00	100%	9,540.00	5,178.00	54%	24,237.32	8,902.50	37%	14,540.00	5,140.23	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	48,582.32	19,485.73	40%	31%
	74500	UNDP Cost Recovery - Miscellaneous Expenses	35,520.00	1,319.98	1,319.98	100%	15,000.00	7,121.00	47%	4,707.18	12,238.94	260%	0.00	392.01	39201%	0.00	18,559.40	100.0%	0.00	(15,752.32)	-1575232%	21,027.16	23,879.01	114%	67%
	75700	Training, Workshops and Confer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	2,869.00	286900%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	2,869.00	286900%	286900%
	74700	Transport, Shipping and handle	0.00	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00	2,518.46	50%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0%	0.00	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0%	5,000.00			

#### 4.2.4 Project co-financing

1. Before considering the co-financing aspects of the project it is useful to first consider some relevant definitions and requirements under the *GEF Updated Co-financing Policy 2018* (GEF 2018a) and the *GEF Guidelines on Co-financing* (GEF 2018b), as follows:
  - a) Co-financing means financing that is additional to the GEF Project Financing, and that supports the implementation of a GEF-financed project or program and the achievement of its objectives.
  - b) Investment Mobilized means co-financing that excludes recurrent expenditures (e.g. day-to-day operational budgets of government agencies that are project partners).
2. The ProDoc identifies nearly US\$32 million in co-financing for the CRB project, as shown in Table 6. Analysis of Table 6 highlights a number of issues, as follows:
  - a) The purported \$18 million contribution under the MAF Midterm Operational Plan (MTOP) 2014-2018 requires clarification. The MTOP focuses on development of the agriculture sector and the corporate development of MAF itself, although it does include a program on natural resource conservation and management, which is stated as requiring \$23.5 million, not \$18 million. The \$18 million is identified separately in the MTOP as the budget required for the corporate development of MAF. It is not clear why \$18 million is listed as the co-financing contribution to the CRB project from MAF when the MTOP identifies that its natural resource conservation and management program requires a budget of \$23.5 million.
  - b) It should be noted that the figures in the MTOP are only budget estimates, they are amounts that MAF 'wishes to get', but do not represent actual allocations to MAF from the central State budget. It is therefore misleading to list any amounts from the MTOP as co-financing. The actual amounts committed to CRB-relevant programs at MAF during the CRB project period are the amounts that should be listed as co-financing, supported by documentary evidence (e.g. budget and expenditure figures from MAF Annual Reports).
  - c) The timeframes for each co-financing source do not coincide directly with the CRB timeframe (2016-2020/21), they all start and end earlier (MAF MTOP ended 2018, GIZ-EU GCCA ended 2018, KOICA ended 2017 and WorldFish ended 2019). There may be new projects since these projects ended that could be added as new co-financing for the CRB project.
3. The ProDoc did not include the Tibar Bay Port and the Tasi Mane (south coast gas infrastructure) projects has sources of co-financing, despite the fact that both projects have prepared Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), which include mitigation measures, offsets and restoration targets for mangroves and other coastal systems. These EMPs represented valuable opportunities for the project to leverage significant additional co-financing for project activities and to demonstrate effective partnerships with the private sector, which is a high priority for GEF (but which the project has performed poorly on).
4. The GEF Co-financing Policy & Guidelines require that projects should track and report co-financing in the MTR and TE reports. This includes providing information on the actual amounts, sources and types of co-financing mobilized, compared to what was committed in the ProDoc, and identifying any changes from the expected amounts, sources and types of co-financing since GEF approval, supported by documentary evidence.
5. The MTR report did not report on the level of co-financing achieved at time of the MTR, and found that the PMU did not meet with all co-financing partners regularly in order to coordinate complimentary activity planning and align co-financing commitments with the CRB annual work plans.
6. For the TE the PMU was not able to provide any details of actual amounts, sources and types of co-financing mobilized, compared to what was committed in the ProDoc. Despite the findings of the MTR, the PMU has not tracked and reported on co-financing since the MTR. The TE is therefore not able to assess this issue properly, and this is a significant deficiency with project implementation.

7. Table 7 provides a format for tracking and reporting co-financing at MTR and TE stages, and it is recommended that the PMU complete this table. This should include identifying and adding any new, additional co-financing sources that may have been secured since the ProDoc was drafted.

Summary Findings - Project Co-financing:

- *Despite the findings of the MTR, the PMU has not tracked and reported on co-financing since the MTR. The TE is therefore not able to assess this issue properly, and this is a significant deficiency with project implementation.*
- *There is a need to check the basis of the amount committed by MAF (\$18 million) for the reasons outlined in section 4.2.4 and assess if this translated into actual co-financing..*
- *There may be new projects since the ProDoc that could be added as new co-financing for the CRB project.*
- *It is recommended that the PMU complete Table 7.*

**TABLE 6: Co-financing commitments at ProDoc signing August 2016**

Source Category	Source & Brief Description	Type	Amount (US\$)
Host Government	<b>MAF: Midterm Operational Plan (MTO) <u>2014-2018</u>.</b> Note: The MTO focuses on development of the agriculture sector and development of MAF itself, although it does include a program on natural resource conservation and management, which is stated as requiring \$23.5 million, not \$18 million. \$18 million is identified separately in the MTO as the budget required for the corporate development of MAF – see note below. *	Grant/In Kind	*18,000,000
Bilateral	<b>GIZ - EU GCCA:</b> Climate focused project with catchment management activities in Seical River watershed, <u>2013-2018</u> .	Grant	2,340,000
Bilateral	<b>KOICA:</b> Support for aquaculture development <u>2014-2017</u> .	Grant	6,000,000
IGO	<b>WorldFish:</b> Has also supported aquaculture and development of fish-feed businesses, which relate to the livelihoods component of CRB (various components from <u>Dec 2013 to Dec 2019</u> ).	Grant	5,304,402
<b>Total Co-financing:</b>			<b>31,644,402</b>

\*It is not clear why \$18 million is listed as the co-financing contribution to the CRB project from MAF when the MTO identifies that its natural resource conservation and management program requires a budget of \$23.5 million. It should be noted that the figures in the MTO are only budget estimates, they are amounts that MAF ‘wishes to get’, but do not represent actual allocations to MAF from the central State budget. It is therefore misleading to list any amounts from the MTO as co-financing. The actual amounts committed to CRB-relevant programs at MAF during the CRB project period are the amounts that should be listed as co-financing, supported by documentary evidence (e.g. budget and expenditure figures from MAF Annual Reports).

**TABLE 7: Committed versus actual co-financing achieved up to TE [PMU should complete this]**

Source Type	Source & Brief Description	Category	Committed (US\$)	Actual (US\$)*	Difference (at project end)
Host Government	<b>MAF:</b> Midterm Operational Plan (MTOP) <u>2014-2018</u> .	Grant/In Kind	18,000,000		
Bilateral	<b>GIZ - EU GCCA:</b> Climate focused project with catchment manngement activities in Seical River watershed, <u>2013-2018</u> .	Grant	2,340,000	1,246,000 (from MoF's Aid Transparency Portal)	- 1,094,000
Bilateral	<b>KOICA:</b> Support for aquaculture development <u>2014-2017</u> .	Grant	6,000,000	6,505,289.62 (from MoF's Aid Transparency Portal)	+ 505,289.62
IGO	<b>WorldFish:</b> Has also supported aquaculture and development of fish-feed businesses, which relate to the livelihoods component of CRB (various components from <u>Dec 2013 to Dec 2019</u> ).	Grant	5,304,402		
Others (new since ProDoc)					
Add as required					
<b>Totals:</b>			<b>31,644,402</b>		

\*Actual co-financing achieved should be supported by documentary evidence.

## 4.2.5 Monitoring & evaluation

### 4.2.5.1 Design at entry

1. The TE assesses that the proposed Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Plan, as outlined in section 6 of the ProDoc, was satisfactory and embraced the essential elements of effective M&E, including requirements for:
  - a) Inception Workshop & Inception Report.
  - b) Quarterly monitoring of progress in the UNDP Enhanced Results Based Management Platform, updating of the risk log in ATLAS and identification of risks as critical when the impact and probability were high, to be included in the Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs).
  - c) Annual monitoring of progress, including against the Targets and Indicators in the PRF, in the Annual Progress Reports (APRs) and Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs) (however the value of these were limited by that fact that the PRF did not include project Outputs, and thus the APRs and PIRs did not address progress against Outputs in any detail).
  - d) Periodic Monitoring through surveys and site visits by the UNDP CO and the UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub based on the agreed schedule in the project's Inception Report/Annual Work Plan, to assess firsthand project progress. Other members of the Project Board were to join these visits. A Field Visit Report/Back-To-Office Report (BTOR) was to be prepared by the CO and circulated no less than one month after the visit to the project team and Project Board members.
  - e) Mid Term Review (MTR) in accordance with the UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines & Terminal Evaluation (TE) in accordance with the UNDP-GEF TE Guidelines (this report).

- f) Completion of the relevant GEF Tracking Tool (provided by PMU but not completed at MTR or TE periods).
2. The M&E Plan in section 6 of the ProDoc also included communications and visibility requirements, including full compliance with UNDP's Branding Guidelines and the GEF's Communication and Visibility Guidelines.
  3. The M&E Plan could have been improved if it included a more explicit 'learning' component, with better-developed feedback loops where the lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation are acted upon through adaptive management and corrective action in a timely manner. In other words, the M&E Plan should have been an 'MEL Plan' (Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning).

Evaluation Rating: Satisfactory.

#### 4.2.5.2 Implementation

1. The TE assesses that actual implementation of the M&E Plan was unsatisfactory, including:
  - a) The PIRs do not specifically report against project Outputs – and contained a lot of padding with over-verbose, convoluted and 'flowery' narrative and a strong tendency towards activity-based reporting rather than results-based reporting using the PRF targets and indicators (the MTR also noted this).
  - b) The 'self-assessed' PIR evaluation ratings were not fully consistent with MTR and TE findings, with a tendency towards being more positive than the supporting hard data might indicate.
  - c) The PIRs reported on S&E issues in a superficial manner, and failed to identify, assess and report on key S&E issues.
  - d) The PMU took 10 months to issue the management response to the MTR (in December 2019), leaving very little time to actually implement the MTR recommendations in the last planned year of the project (2020). The UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines require that the MTR management response should be completed within three weeks of receiving the Final MTR Report.
  - e) The MTR management response also did not act on or fully address some of the MTR recommendations, including in relation to some significant project weaknesses.
  - f) The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time, nor same to assess effectiveness and potential impacts of other interventions such as geo-engineering.
  - g) The project did not undertake livelihoods baseline surveys or quantitative data collection to allow M&E of livelihood activities – and very limited oversight of the funds provided to the 109 livelihood groups.
  - h) All project M&E activities were heavily based on qualitative and subjective methods with very little quantitative, objective M&E – which is a significant deficiency.
  - i) The project did not undertake KAP surveys of stakeholders and public at beginning & end, to allow M&E of impact of awareness activities.
  - j) The PMU did not update the GEF tracking tool at either the MTR or TE reporting point.
2. Considering that effective MEL should be taken seriously and is vital to the success of any project, these deficiencies are considered to be significant by the TE.

Evaluation Rating: Unsatisfactory.

#### 4.2.5.3 Overall assessment

1. Considering the above, combining a satisfactory M&E design with unsatisfactory implementation, and considering that effective M&E should be taken seriously and is vital to the success of any project, the assessment of the TE is that overall M&E of the project was moderately unsatisfactory.

Evaluation Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory.

#### Summary Findings - Monitoring & Evaluation:

- *The proposed M&E Plan as outlined in the ProDoc was satisfactory and contains the elements of a properly developed M&E plan in accordance with UNDP-GEF requirements.*
- *The M&E plan could have had a stronger ‘learning’ component, i.e. M&E should be MEL – with feedback loops to ensure that corrective actions are taken.*
- *Actual implementation of the M&E Plan was unsatisfactory, including:*
  - *The PIRs do not specifically report against project Outputs – and contained a lot of padding with over-verbose, convoluted and ‘flowery’ narrative and a strong tendency towards activity-based reporting rather than results-based reporting using the PRF targets and indicators (the MTR also noted this).*
  - *The ‘self-assessed’ PIR evaluation ratings were not fully consistent with MTR and TE findings, with a tendency towards being more positive than the supporting hard data might indicate.*
  - *The PIRs reported on S&E issues in a superficial manner, and failed to identify, assess and report on key S&E issues.*
  - *The PMU took 10 months to issue the management response to the MTR (in December 2019), leaving very little time to actually implement the MTR recommendations in the last planned year of the project (2020). The UNDP-GEF MTR Guidelines require that the MTR management response should be completed within three weeks of receiving the Final MTR Report.*
  - *The MTR management response also did not act on or fully address some of the MTR recommendations, including in relation to some significant project weaknesses.*
  - *The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time, nor same to assess effectiveness and potential impacts of other interventions such as geo-engineering.*
  - *The project did not undertake livelihoods baseline surveys or quantitative data collection to allow M&E of livelihood activities – and very limited oversight of the funds provided to the 109 livelihood groups.*
  - *All project M&E activities were heavily based on qualitative and subjective methods with very little quantitative, objective M&E – which is a significant deficiency.*
  - *The project did not undertake KAP surveys of stakeholders and public at beginning & end, to allow M&E of impact of awareness activities.*
  - *The PMU did not update the GEF tracking tool at either the MTR or TE reporting point.*

#### 4.2.6 UNDP implementation & oversight

1. This project was implemented directly by the UNDP Country Office (CO) under the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM), with the PMU being employed by and housed at the CO, and with the GoTL Implementing Partner – MAF – playing a supporting role.
2. Several stakeholders including from GoTL and NGOs stated that UNDP is a long-established and trusted development partner in Timor-Leste with well-developed project management processes and procedures, and an excellent understanding of the political, socioeconomic, cultural, environmental and development setting in the country, which makes UNDP a strong project implementer.
3. Some positive aspects of UNDP's implementation of the project identified by the TE, based mainly on feedback from stakeholders, include strong engagement in all aspects of the project from design and inception onwards, providing good levels of support to GoTL and other stakeholders ranging from high-level strategic issues to detailed technical and administrative issues.
4. However, the TE identified a number of important areas where UNDP's implementation and oversight were not as effective as they should have been, including *inter alia*:
  - a) There were delays to project inception and full PMU recruitment.
  - b) There was fairly high turnover of project staff, with several key project staff, including the PM/CTA and the vital FC positions, leaving the project before its extended end to join another UNDP-managed project, thus leaving the extended CRB project without sufficient staff to complete project implementation (see Table 12 in section 4.3.4). It is very clear to the TE that the few remaining staff, especially the Comms/M&E Officer and Finance & Operations Officer have done their very best to carry the load, but they have had to bear very heavy burden of workload which is not fair and reasonable, or effective. E.g. there were several occasions during the TE when the Comms/M&E Officer was not able to respond to TE requests (through no fault of his own), because he was doing other tasks – being spread too thinly. This is not acceptable as the M&E Officer is supposed to be able to fully support the TE. Very oddly, despite critical staff like PM/CTA and FCs leaving, UNDP kept no less than three drivers on the project payroll into the extended periods – the TE does not believe that this can be justified and it is questionable use of GEF funds to provide the CO with three drivers when actual project activities still remain unimplemented. UNDP needs to learn from this serious mistake – while the UNDP business model drives COs to keep taking on as many new projects as possible, existing projects should be fully completed before staff move on to new projects, and project extensions must include extension of key staff contracts, to allow all work to be completed properly.
  - c) Nearly all stakeholders that were interviewed reported that there were sometimes significant delays (sometimes months) with approval of project proposals and funds disbursement – especially for local-level activities – delaying overall project progress.
  - d) The PMU exercised poor oversight and quality control of consultancies and policy and technical documents and reports produced by the project. In reviewing all consultancy reports commissioned by the project, the TE found that most were of such a poor technical standard that they were unlikely to be of any practical use to the project, GoTL and other project beneficiaries. The PMU appeared to be more focused on just 'ticking off' that consultancies has been undertaken, than ensuring that the deliverables and outputs were actually useful to the project, GoTL and other beneficiaries. None of the ICM strategies and plans developed by the project were formally adopted by GoTL for implementation, reflecting their poor technical standard and lack of relevance and usefulness.
  - e) There was poor oversight of the quality and success, effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of on-site interventions such as fencing, mangrove planting and geo-engineering, resulting in failure and lack of sustainability of many of these activities, as outlined in section 4.3.3.
  - f) There was inadequate incorporation of socio-cultural factors and concerns, including in relation to local-level traditional, cultural, customary practices at Suai Loro, resulting in the fencing intervention being inconsistent

with these and thus being rejected by and even sabotaged by the local community (the project did learn from this).

- g) There was poor quality control of infrastructure built by the project, especially in relation to eco-tourism, resulting in potentially unsustainable and unsafe facilities that do not comply with basic engineering standards, as outlined in section 4.3.3.
  - h) UNDP did not always act rapidly to identify root causes of delays and other problems to develop and implement corrective actions, as outlined in section 4.3.3.
  - i) The project did not track and report co-financing, as required by GEF co-financing policy and guidelines.
  - j) There were significant deficiencies with implementation of the project's M&E Plan, as outlined in section 4.2.5 above.
5. These are significant issues that have resulted in a generally low-rate of overall project achievement (see section 4.3.1 below), and cause the Evaluation Rating for UNDP's implementation and oversight of the project to be rated at Unsatisfactory. *It is strongly recommended that UNDP should look closely at the issues listed above and take action to improve project oversight mechanisms, to drastically improve the effectiveness of future projects.*

Evaluation Rating: Unsatisfactory.

#### Summary Findings - UNDP Implementation & Oversight:

- *There were several strengths in UNDP's implementation and oversight of the project based on its longstanding presence as a trusted development partner in Timor-Leste, however the TE identified a number of important areas where UNDP's implementation and oversight were not as effective as they should have been, including inter alia:*
  - *Delays to project inception and full PMU recruitment.*
  - *Fairly high turnover of project staff and allowing several key project staff, including the PM/CTA and the vital FC positions, leaving the project before its extended end to join another UNDP-managed project.*
  - *Sometimes significant delays (sometimes months) with approval of project proposals and funds disbursement – especially for local-level activities – delaying overall project progress.*
  - *Poor quality control of policy and technical documents and reports produced by the project, resulting in none of the strategies and plans developed by the project being formally adopted by GoTL for implementation.*
  - *Poor oversight of the quality and success, effectiveness, impacts and sustainability of on-site interventions such as fencing, mangrove planting and geo-engineering, resulting in failure and lack of sustainability of many of these activities.*
  - *Inadequate incorporation of socio-cultural factors and concerns, including in relation to local-level traditional, cultural, customary practices at Suai Loro, resulting in the fencing intervention being inconsistent with these and thus being rejected by and even sabotaged by the local community (the project did learn from this).*
  - *Poor quality control of infrastructure built by the project, especially in relation to eco-tourism, resulting in potentially unsustainable and unsafe facilities that do not comply with basic engineering standards.*
  - *Failure to track and report co-financing.*
  - *Significant deficiencies with implementation of the project's M&E Plan.*

- *These result in a rating of Unsatisfactory.*
- *It is strongly recommended that UNDP should look closely at the issues listed above and take action to improve project oversight mechanisms, to drastically improve the effectiveness of future projects.*

#### 4.2.7 Implementing Partner (MAF) implementation & oversight

1. Because the CRB project was implemented under DIM, MAF's role in actual implementation was limited. However, for its role, overall project execution by MAF was strong and fully engaged, including chairing the Project Board and actively assisting the PMU with on-site activities.
2. However, the TE has identified a number of important areas where MAF's involvement could have been strengthened, including *inter alia*:
  - a) Tendency to reactive management rather than proactive management.
  - b) A tendency to focus on implementation of technical activities at the expense of more strategic, policy outputs and outcomes, including official adoption and implementation of policies, strategies and plans developed by the project.
  - c) Sometimes a low-level of engagement at the local-level, which varied from site to site.
3. Several stakeholders reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts towards better coordination and cooperation with other ministries and directorates, and especially the Secretariat of State for Environment (SSE), under a stronger 'whole-of-government' approach.
4. Several stakeholders also reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts to secure more substantive budget allocations from the central State budget for post-project continuity and sustainability of project-related outputs and outcomes.

Evaluation Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.

#### Summary Findings – Implementing Partner (MAF) Implementation & Oversight:

- *Overall project execution by MAF was strong and fully engaged, including chairing the Project Board and actively assisting the PMU with on-site activities. However, the TE has identified a number of important areas where MAF's involvement could have been strengthened, including inter alia:*
  - *Tendency to reactive management rather than proactive management.*
  - *A tendency to focus on implementation of technical activities at the expense of more strategic, policy outputs and outcomes, including official adoption and implementation of policies, strategies and plans developed by the project.*
  - *Sometimes a low-level of engagement at the local-level, which varied from site to site.*
- *Several stakeholders reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts towards better coordination and cooperation with other ministries and directorates, and especially the Secretariat of State for Environment (SSE), under a stronger 'whole-of-government' approach.*
- *Several stakeholders also reported that they felt that MAF could have made greater efforts to secure more substantive budget allocations from the central State budget for post-project continuity and sustainability of project-related outputs and outcomes.*
- *These result in a rating of Moderately Satisfactory.*

## 4.3 Project Results & Impacts

### 4.3.1 Progress towards objective & expected outcomes <sup>[17]</sup><sub>[18]</sub>

1. UNDP projects that are funded by GEF are expected to achieve their planned Objectives, Outcomes and Outputs by project closing, with an achievement rate of at least 80% generally being considered necessary for the project to be considered 'satisfactory'.
2. The TE includes an assessment of the achievement of planned end of project targets as set out in the ProDoc PRF, as presented in Tables 8 and 9.
3. Overall, the Terminal Evaluation (TE) finds that the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing integrated coastal management (ICM), mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal climate change adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste. Major beneficial achievements of the project include, *inter alia*:
  - a) Being the first-ever large-scale ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation project in Timor-Leste, implemented at a critical time when the coastal zone is under increasing pressure, including from global climate change impacts, and when mangroves are being rapidly destroyed by a combination of drivers.
  - b) Making a significant contribution to raising awareness about ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation at all levels nationally, and firmly establishing these issues on the national agenda.
  - c) Undertaking a comprehensive national mapping survey of mangroves, and establishing a national GIS mangrove database at the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries (MAF), as a baseline for future monitoring.
  - d) Undertaking a comprehensive national coastal vulnerability assessment, to inform ICM policy and planning.
  - e) Building the knowledge, skills and capacity of MAF, other government agencies, the University of Timor-Leste (UNITL), local-level governments, local NGOs and community groups across seven Municipalities in ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation, mangrove planting, mangrove supportive livelihoods and project development, management and reporting.
4. However, despite these significant positive contributions and beneficial achievements, the TE finds that the project has a low rate of achievement of Targets and Outputs, as follows (achievement rates are derived from Tables 8 and 9, which include the TE reasons for each assessment and recommendations to address each):
  - a) Objective Target: Only partially achieved.
  - b) Outcomes: Achieved: 2/7 (28%). Partially achieved: 3/7 (43%). Not achieved: 2/7 (29%).
  - c) Outputs: Achieved: 6/10 (60%). Partially achieved: 3/10 (30%). Not achieved: 3/10 (30%).

(Note: To be considered 'satisfactory', GEF projects are expected to fully achieve at least 80% of their Targets).

5. The project has suffered a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies that have limited the achievement of Targets and Outputs, including *inter alia*:
  - a) As outlined in section 4.3.3, some of the main technical activities undertaken by the project have failed – including many, if not most, of the mangrove planting efforts and livelihood activities. Fencing and tarabandu regulations have not always been effective at excluding livestock from mangroves. Three of the four eco-tourism infrastructure sites are of very poor quality, incomplete and unlikely to be sustained, and the geo-engineering 'hydrological interventions may cause negative impacts.
  - b) Based on technical review by the TE-IC and feedback from senior GoTL stakeholders, the plethora of ICM

strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project are highly convoluted and confused, suffer technical deficiencies, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to GoTL and have not been formally approved/adopted by GoTL for implementation.

- c) While there has been a positive change at MAF in that the Directorate of Forestry & Watershed Management has been renamed the Directorate of Forestry, Watershed & Mangroves Management, with supporting legal mandate and defined mangrove responsibilities, the project has not established effective, permanent, whole-of-government, national- and local-level governance and institutional arrangements for coordinating ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation.
  - d) While there are some attempts to ensure sustainability of a few activities e.g. by linking some of the livelihood activities with the SEEWAY Project, the project has not developed an overall plan to ensure the continuity and sustainability of project outputs and benefits, and most are likely to simply collapse post-project, with many already doing so, as outlined in section 4.3.3.
6. These issues are discussed in more detail in sections 4.3.3. - Effectiveness and 4.3.4 – Efficiency, including some of the main underlying causes of these issues.

Summary Findings - Progress Towards Objectives & Expected Outcomes:

- *UNDP projects that are funded by GEF are expected to achieve their planned Objectives, Outcomes and Outputs by project closing, with an achievement rate of at least 80% generally being considered necessary for the project to be considered 'satisfactory'.*
- *Overall, the Terminal Evaluation (TE) finds that the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing integrated coastal management (ICM), mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal climate change adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, as outlined in section 4.3.1.*
- *However, despite these significant positive contributions and beneficial achievements, the TE finds that the project has a low rate of achievement of Targets and Outputs, as follows:*
  - *Objective Target: Only partially achieved.*
  - *Outcomes: Achieved: 2/7 (28%). Partially achieved: 3/7 (43%). Not achieved: 2/7 (29%).*
  - *Outputs: Achieved: 6/10 (60%). Partially achieved: 4/10 (40%). Not achieved: 2/10 (20%).*
- *The project has suffered a number of significant weaknesses and deficiencies that have limited the achievement of Targets and Outputs, as outlined in sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.*

**TABLE 8: Achievement Status for End of Project Targets at May 2021 as assessed by the TE**

**Notes:**

- Project Objective, Outcomes, Indicators and End of Project Targets are extracted from the ProDoc PRF
- Systematic numbering of the Indicators & Targets has been added by the TE, these are lacking from the PRF.
- While the narrative in the UNDP ProDoc contains Project Outputs, for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Outputs, and the Indicators and Targets are not aligned with the Outputs.
- Therefore, in order to avoid confusion by adding the Outputs in this Table, the Achievement Status for Outputs is presented separately in Table X.
- Objective Target: Only partially achieved. Outcomes: Achieved: 2/7 (28%). Partially achieved: 3/7 (43%). Not achieved: 2/7 (29%).

■ = Target achieved. ■ = Target only partially achieved. ■ = Target not achieved. |

Project Objective & Outcomes	Project Indicator	End of Project Target	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
<p><b>Project Objective:</b> To strengthen resilience of coastal communities by the introduction of nature-based approaches to coastal protection:</p>	<p><b>Objective Indicator:</b> Regional, national and sector-wide policies, plans and processes developed and strengthened to identify, prioritize and integrate adaptation strategies and measures (LDCF Indicator 12).</p>	<p><b>Objective Target:</b> Coastal protection and resilience strategy for infrastructure planning endorsed.</p>	<p><b>Objective Target only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has developed a plethora of somewhat confusing Coastal Management &amp; Adaptation (CMA) documents &amp; plans inc.:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global CAD Feb 2018 CVA.</li> <li>• Global CAD Feb 2018 CAS.</li> <li>• Anon. May 2019 CPRISP.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Draft Recs on Guages.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Policy Framework.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 SMAP-SAP.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Draft ToR &amp; SoP for CHM on SMAP.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• It is not clear how all of these relate to each other, esp. the CAS, CPRISP, Policy Framework, SMAP-SAP &amp; Draft ToR, and they are poorly coordinated, inconsistent and incoherent, with differing and confusing titles, terminologies, scope and coverage etc.</li> <li>• Several focus only on the shoreline (the tidal zone where the land meets the sea), and not the full coastal zone from the upper catchment boundary to the sea.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The current plethora of CMA documents &amp; plans is extremely messy and confusing with many suffering significant deficiencies.</li> <li>• None having been formally approved or adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.</li> <li>• It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to start <u>afresh</u>, and to develop a <u>new National CMA Plan</u> under the auspices of the new <u>National Ocean Policy (NOP)</u> (which covers the coast &amp; catchments).</li> <li>• It is recommended that the new <u>National CMA Plan</u>:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include <u>infrastructure planning</u> as an essential and integrated component of the overall <u>National CMA Plan</u>, and not as a separate Output.</li> <li>• Defines the coast as the area from the upper catchment boundary to the spring low tide mark.</li> <li>• Is based on the principles of ICZM.</li> <li>• Adopts a truly ‘whole-of-government approach (based on the NOP).</li> <li>• Utilizes and integrates, into a single coordinated plan, relevant parts of the various CMA documents &amp; plans</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

FINAL REPORT

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report (UNDP PIMS 5330)

Project Objective & Outcomes	Project Indicator	End of Project Target	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some suffer technical deficiencies/poor quality control, still being labelled 'draft', with no indication of 'final approval' status.</li> <li>Many of their contents do not seem well suited to the Timor-Leste context and are unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> <li>The CAS, CPRISP, Policy Framework, SMAP-SAP &amp; Draft ToR all have overlapping elements as well as gaps and inconsistencies and it is not clear which of these is supposed to fulfill achievement of the Objective Target.</li> <li>The CPRISP seems to most closely fit the Objective Target, however: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It suffers a no. of technical deficiencies as reviewed by TE-IC.</li> <li>It has not been formally approved by Council of Ministers as an official GoTL plan for implementation by relevant agencies.</li> <li>It is not budgeted.</li> <li>It is not clearly linked to nor referenced in the NAP.</li> <li>It is unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>developed by the CRB project where they are genuinely useful, and discards those that are not.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adopts EBM, BWN and green engineering approaches.</li> <li>Builds directly on the foundations provided by the CRB project, including promoting mangrove-supportive livelihoods &amp; CBERM.</li> <li>Is more clearly linked to the NPA.</li> <li>Contains a properly developed LogFrame PRF and M&amp;E Plan.</li> <li>Contains properly developed implementation arrangements.</li> <li>It fully budgeted, both from GoTL and development partner sources.</li> <li>Is formally approved / adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established:</p>	<p><b>Indicator 1.1:</b> SOP for Directorates under MAF developed and approved.</p>	<p><b>Target 1.1:</b> SOP for coordinated approach to protect mangrove areas designed and successfully tested.</p>	<p><b>Target not achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE team has not seen any such SOP for Directorates under MAF that provides a coordinated approach to protect mangroves, nor any evidence that this has been 'successfully tested' as required by Target 1.1 or that it has been 'approved' by GoTL for official implementation as required by Indicator 1.1.</li> <li>Amongst the plethora of CMA documents developed by the project as outlined against the Objective Target above, there is a <u>Draft SMAP-SAP ToR &amp; SoP for CHM on SMAP</u>. However this document: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>suffers a no. of deficiencies as reviewed by TE-IC.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that the new <u>National CMA Plan</u> recommended against Objective Target above include <u>SOP</u> for coordinated approach to protect mangrove areas as an essential and integrated component of the overall <u>National CMA Plan</u>, and not as a separate Output.</li> </ul>

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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• is a very confused and unwieldy and does not set a SoP for Directorates under MAF as required by the Indicator 1.1,</li> <li>• does not provide a coordinated approach to protect mangrove areas,</li> <li>• has not been successfully tested as required by Target 1.1,</li> <li>• is still only in Draft form and has not been formally approved by Council of Ministers as an official GoTL plan for implementation by relevant agencies; and</li> <li>• is unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> </ul>	
	<p><b>Indicator 1.2:</b> Number of people with access to improved climate information services.</p>	<p><b>Traget 1.2:</b> 26,000 people have access to improved climate information services.</p>	<p><b>Target not achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has not established any mechanism at all to provide people with access to improved <u>climate information</u> services.</li> <li>• The project installed 18 RSET-MH benchmarks in three municipalities (Dili, Covalima and Bobonaro) in 2019, however these are used to collect data relating to <u>sedimentation</u> rates, not <u>climate</u> information. To be fully useful they also require supporting data from Tide Guages, which have not been installed by the project.</li> <li>• It is not clear why the 18 RSETs were installed in only three municipalities, and not spread more representatively across all seven municipalities where the project was active.</li> <li>• There does not appear to be any documented plan for post-project, ongoing maintenance and operation of the RSETs and collection, analysis and reporting of data for use by GoTL in policy planning and mangrove management.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL (National Directorate of Meteorology &amp; Geophysics, not MAF) to implement and operate the suite of hydro-meteorological stations and tide gauges, with supporting software, required to monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels, with mechanisms to ensure that reports are publically available to all people of Timor-Leste.</li> </ul>

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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under Output 1.3, which relates to this Target the project was supposed to install <u>hydro-meteorological stations</u> and <u>tide gauges</u>, which would meet the requirement of Target 1.2 relating to <u>climate information</u>, however this has not been achieved.</li> <li>Under Output 1.3, which relates to this Target the project was also supposed to introduce <u>software</u> (to GoTL) to <u>monitor climate change induced coastal change</u> and to <u>plan management responses at policy levels</u>, however this has not been achieved.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection:</p>	<p><b>Indicator 2.1:</b> Type and extent of assets strengthened and/or better managed to withstand the effects of climate change.</p>	<p><b>Target 2.1:</b> 2300 Ha protected and re-afforested using CBEMR.</p>	<p><b>Target only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project claims that to May 2021 it has protected and restored <u>2,210 Ha</u> of mangroves and plans to fence a further <u>300 Ha</u> in Covalima in Q2 2021, thereby exceeding the target.</li> <li>It is necessary to consider how the area in Ha is measured and calculated. The project was not able to clarify the technical criteria and methods used to measure the number of Ha that it claims to have protected and restored, or produce any GIS maps showing the results of any quantitative assessment of these areas. The numbers provided therefore cannot be verified.</li> <li>It is also necessary to consider what is actually meant by “protected” and “restored”. The project supported four main types of interventions in this regard: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><u>Fencing</u> to exclude livestock (cows, goats &amp; pigs) from mangrove areas.</li> <li>Support to local communities to declare new <u>tara bandu regulations</u> to protect mangroves – prohibiting the community from allowing their livestock to graze in mangrove areas, prohibiting the cutting of mangrove wood etc.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve livestock exclusion fencing, including maintenance and long-term sustainability.</li> <li>Prohibit any further geo-engineering interventions in mangrove areas, as the risks of negative impacts are too high, without rigorous scientific oversight.</li> <li>Ensure that all future mangrove planting activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>are properly planned and designed,</li> <li>focus on rehabilitating genuinely degraded areas, and not on planting mangroves in areas that are not naturally colonized by mangroves,</li> <li>use inappropriate species,</li> <li>do not substantially change the natural habitats and ecology in some areas; and</li> <li>are supported by a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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Project Objective & Outcomes	Project Indicator	End of Project Target	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Mass planting</u> of mangrove seedlings raised in nurseries.</li> <li>• <u>Geo-engineering</u> (digging of trenches) to allow increased tidal-inflow in an attempt to encourage natural mangrove colonization.</li> <li>• Reportedly, many of the fences have failed and livestock are again damaging mangrove areas – meaning they are not actually “protected” (refer section 4.3.3).</li> <li>• Reportedly, in some areas the new tara bandu regulations are not being enforced at the local-level, and have not stopped access by livestock and mangrove exploitation at some sites.</li> <li>• One of the main factors that has contributed to the failure of the project interventions to protect mangrove areas from livestock and human exploitation has been the failure of the project’s livelihoods component to provide viable alternative livelihoods that provide benefits that are at least equal to those provided to local communities by letting their livestock access mangrove areas (see section 4.3.3 and assessment of Target 2.2 below).</li> <li>• Reportedly, many (possibly most) of the mangrove planting efforts (part of “restoration) have not survived. Reportedly, the failure to exclude livestock has been a major factor, as goats and cows have a preference for eating mangrove seedlings (see section 4.3.3).</li> <li>• Additionally, the TE has concerns that the mangrove planting may be poorly conceived, planned and designed, and is not focussed on rehabilitating degraded areas, but is planting mangroves in areas that are not naturally colonized by mangroves, may be using inappropriate species, and may be substantially changing the natural habitats and ecology in some areas.</li> </ul>	

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Project Objective & Outcomes	Project Indicator	End of Project Target	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has not implemented a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time. It is therefore not possible to assess whether this Target has been achieved with any quantitative certainty.</li> <li>With regard to the geo-engineering interventions, as far as the TE could determine this was not based on rigorous scientific design and did not include EIA. The dug channels are straight trenches and bear no resemblance at all to topographic and hydrological contours found naturally in mangrove areas. It is possible that these geo-engineering works may actually cause negative impacts, including exposure of acid sulphate soils and dieback and loss of mangroves, potentially reducing achievement of the Target. They may also cause saltwater contamination of groundwater resources.</li> <li>The project has not implemented a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success or potential impacts of the geo-engineering at all sites over time - it is therefore not possible to assess whether this intervention contributes to or detracts from the Target with any quantitative certainty.</li> </ul>	
	<p><b>Indicator 2.2:</b> Number of households benefiting from the adoption of diversified, climate-resilient livelihood options, with at least 30 % of total households member are women.</p>	<p><b>Target 2.2:</b> 1000 households benefiting from mangrove-supportive livelihoods (estimated at 5000 people, 5/households) ~30 % of support will target woman specifically.</p>	<p><b>Target only partially achieved.</b> Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project claims that <u>2,229 households</u> representing <u>4,841 individuals</u> in seven municipalities have benefitted from mangrove-supportive livelihoods, of which <u>50%</u> are female.</li> <li>Even if the numbers reported by the project are correct, reportedly many, perhaps even most, of the livelihood activities have failed and will not be</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to ensure that <u>before</u> any future activities to support mangrove-supportive livelihoods are commenced, proper value-chain analysis of livelihood options, supported my proper market analysis, business planning and management training, are undertaken <u>first</u>.</li> <li>It is recommended that if in future, UNDP is to support any activities that involve building any form of infrastructure and physical facilities, there is rigorous application of proper engineering design, minimum</li> </ul>

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			<p>sustained post-project for a variety of reasons – refer section 4.3.3– so this number has not been fully achieved in terms of ongoing benefits.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The livelihoods component of the project has been beset with a plethora of problems and deficiencies, including being implemented on an ad-hoc basis without an overall strategy or site plans and without proper baseline assessment, market and value-chain analysis and business planning and management training and support.</li> <li>The eco-tourism element of the livelihoods component also has a number of serious deficiencies. At the time of the TE one site – Wenunuk – had already been abandoned before completion and construction had not been completed at two of the other three sites, with only a few weeks to go to project-end. There are also serious deficiencies with engineering design, quality of materials and construction standards, safety and long-term maintenance and sustainability at all sites</li> <li>Refer section 4.3.3 of TE report for details.</li> </ul>	<p>building and safety standards, quality of materials and construction methods and long-term maintenance and sustainability of the infrastructure / facilities.</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 2.3:</b> Number of households benefiting from the adoption of diversified, climate-resilient livelihood options, with at least 30 % of total households member are woman.</p>	<p><b>Target 2.3:</b> Positive % income change in household income, specifically in households where women are engaged in mangrove-supportive livelihoods supported by the project.</p>	<p><b>Target only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project claims that a post-intervention assessment of 127 mangrove and livelihood groups, representing a total of 2,229 households, which have been receiving training and material supports from the project, indicates that 74 groups representing a total of 910 households (roughly 41%) have an increase in household income.</li> <li>Despite requests from the TE, the project has not provided any reports showing quantitative data and calculations used to determine these findings. The numbers provided are derived from subjective,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that in future projects UNDP ensure proper baseline and <a href="#">objective, quantitative data collection for such activities</a>.</li> </ul>

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Project Objective & Outcomes	Project Indicator	End of Project Target	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
			<p>qualitative interviews only, with no baseline, and therefore cannot be verified.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Without access to the data and analysis, it is not clear to the TE what constitutes a 'group', and how this relates to 2,229 or 910 households.</li> <li>It is noted that a pre-intervention livelihood baseline assessment was not carried out.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Integrated approaches to coastal adaptation adopted to contribute to protection of coastal populations and productive lands:</p>	<p><b>Indicator 3.1:</b> Number of funding mechanisms in support of improved coastal watershed management.</p>	<p><b>Target 3.1:</b> At least one financing mechanism or plan with committed resources extending at least 2 years after the project end date.</p>	<p><b>Target achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has actually supported development of more than one (actually four) financing mechanisms, as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Visitor fees for ecotourism facility at one site.</li> <li>User fees for freshwater supply at one site.</li> <li>Carbon offset payments for mangrove protection – small pilot study at one site.</li> <li>Scoping paper of PES potential in TL.</li> </ul> </li> <li>The Target could have been assessed as "Exceeded", however the TE has not seen any plans for any of the four activities listed above to be sustained post-project and extend for at least 2 years, as required by the Target.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to build on the PES and carbon offset pilot activities supported by the project, to develop and implement a fully functioning, national-level <i>infrastructure offset scheme to secure financial resources for coastal resilience</i>.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Indicator 3.2:</b> Target population aware of role of mangroves in coastal protection and benefited from coastal watershed protection.</p>	<p><b>Target 3.2:</b> Approximately 250,000 people reached through various public awareness raising means.</p>	<p><b>Target achieved</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has not undertaken a quantitative assessment of actual total numbers of people that it has reached through public awareness raising, and is not able to provide any solid, verifiable data on this Target in terms of overall total.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to continue national and local-level education and awareness activities on mangroves and other coastal management and adaptation issues.</li> <li>It is recommended that for all future awareness activities carried out or supported by UNDP, on any issue, a proper KAP survey should be carried out at the beginning and end of the project so as to measure actual changes in KAP in relation to the project issue.</li> </ul>

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			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• However, based on the fact that TL has a total population of 1.3 million, the wide range of awareness activities carried out by the project, and the typical reach, circulation and participation rates of the various awareness activities nationally, it is almost certain that the number of 250,000, which represents only 19% of the national population, would have been exceeded.</li> <li>• It should be noted that while &gt;250,000 people might have been “reached”, this does not necessarily mean that their level of awareness about mangroves has increased and that their knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) in relation to mangroves has actually changed. The project did not undertake KAP surveys at beginning and end to measure changes in KAP, so this cannot be assessed.</li> </ul>	

**TABLE 9: Achievement Status of Project Outputs at May 2021 as assessed by the TE**

- Project Outputs are extracted from the narrative in the UNDP ProDoc – for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Project Outputs.
- Outputs: Achieved: 6/10 (60%). Partially achieved: 4/10 (40%). Not achieved: 2/10 (20%).

■ = Output achieved. ■ = Output only partially achieved. ■ = Output not achieved.

Project Outcome	Project Output From narrative of UNDP ProDoc – for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Project Outputs.	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Policy framework and institutional capacity for climate resilient coastal management established:</p>	<p><b>Output 1.1:</b> A comprehensive <u>coastal management and adaptation (CMA) plan</u> developed and budgeted for the entire coast of Timor-Leste (as part and a direct contribution to the NAP):</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has developed a plethora of somewhat confusing ICM documents &amp; plans inc.:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global CAD Feb 2018 CVA.</li> <li>• Global CAD Feb 2018 CAS.</li> <li>• Anon. May 2019 CPRSIP.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Draft Recs on Guages.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Policy Framework.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 SMAP-SAP.</li> <li>• McCue Feb 2020 Draft ToR &amp; SoP for CHM on SMAP.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• It is not clear how all of these relate to each other, esp. the CAS, CPRISP, Policy Framework, SMAP-SAP &amp; Draft ToR, and they are poorly coordinated, inconsistent and incoherent, with differing and confusing titles, terminologies, scope and coverage etc.</li> <li>• Several focus only on the shoreline (the tidal zone where the land meets the sea), and not the full coastal zone from the upper catchment boundary to the sea.</li> <li>• Some suffer technical deficiencies/poor quality control, still being labelled ‘draft’, with no indication of ‘final approval’ status.</li> <li>• Many of their contents do not seem well suited to the Timor-Leste context and are unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The current plethora of CMA documents &amp; plans is extremely messy and confusing with many suffering significant deficiencies.</li> <li>• None having been formally approved or adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.</li> <li>• It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to start <u>afresh</u>, and to develop a <u>new National ICM Plan</u> under the auspices of the new <u>National Ocean Policy (NOP)</u> (which covers the coast &amp; catchments).</li> <li>• It is recommended that the new <u>National ICM Plan</u>:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines the coast as the area from the upper catchment boundary to the spring low tide mark.</li> <li>• Is based on the principles of ICZM.</li> <li>• Adopts a truly ‘whole-of-government approach (based on the NOP).</li> <li>• Utilizes and integrates, into a single coordinated plan, relevant parts of the various ICM documents &amp; plans developed by the CRB project where they are genuinely useful, and discards those that are not.</li> <li>• Adopts EBM, BWN and green engineering approaches.</li> <li>• Builds directly on the foundations provided by the CRB project, including promoting mangrove-supportive livelihoods &amp; CBERM.</li> <li>• Is more clearly linked to the NPA.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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Project Outcome	Project Output From narrative of UNDP ProDoc – for some reason the ProDoc PRF does not include the Project Outputs.	TE Assessment at May 2021 + reasons for assessment Based on review of all evidence available to the TE team.	Recommended Action post-CRB project
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The CAS, CPRISP, Policy Framework, SMAP-SAP &amp; Draft ToR all have overlapping elements as well as gaps and inconsistencies and it is not clear which of these is supposed to fulfil achievement of Output 1.1</li> <li>The SMAP-SAP seems to most closely fit Output 1.1, however:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It suffers a no. of deficiencies as reviewed by the TE-IC.</li> <li>It has not been formally approved by Council of Ministers as an official GoTL plan for implementation by relevant agencies.</li> <li>It is not budgeted.</li> <li>It is not clearly linked to nor referenced in the NAP.</li> <li>It is unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contains a properly developed LogFrame PRF and M&amp;E Plan.</li> <li>Contains properly developed implementation arrangements.</li> <li>It fully budgeted, both from GoTL and development partner sources.</li> <li>Is formally approved / adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 1.2:</b> Coastal protection and resilience strategy for <u>infrastructure planning</u>, adopted and budgeted:</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per the general comments for Output 1.1 above.</li> <li>The CPRISP seems to most closely fit Output 1.2, however:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It suffers a no. of deficiencies as reviewed by the TE-IC..</li> <li>It has not been formally approved by Council of Ministers as an official GoTL plan for implementation by relevant agencies.</li> <li>It is not budgeted.</li> <li>It is not clearly linked to nor referenced in the NAP.</li> <li>It is unlikely to be of any practical benefit to or actually implemented by GoTL.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that the new <u>National CMA Plan</u> recommended against Output 1.1 above include <u>infrastructure planning</u> as an essential and integrated component of the overall <u>National CMA Plan</u>, and not as a separate Output.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 1.3:</b> <u>Technical skills</u> (through specialized trainings), hardware (at least two sets of <u>hydro-meteorological</u> stations and <u>wave gauges</u>), methods (economic valuation and cost-benefit analysis) and solid <u>value-chain analysis</u> of <u>livelihood</u> options, and <u>software introduced</u> to</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has conducted a range of training on a number of different issues for a range of target audiences, and has</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to:</li> <li>Implement and operate the suite of hydro-meteorological stations and tide gauges (at Directorate of Meteorology, not MAF), with</li> </ul>

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	<p><u>monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels:</u></p> <p>(Note: It is assumed that ‘wave gauges’ actually means ‘tide gauges’, as the former is not really relevant to the project objectives. There are many such technical errors in the ProDoc which indicates that the ProDoc drafters were not supported by relevant technical expertise).</p>	<p>certainly contributed to improving technical skills in some areas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• However, this Output has not been fully achieved in that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hydro-meteorological stations and wave or tide gauges have not been implemented at all, only RSETs to measure sedimentation levels, but not supported by tide gauges, which is required.</li> <li>• At time of TE, solid value-chain analysis of livelihood options had not been completed, even though this should have been an essential first step for the livelihoods component at the start of the project (at the time of the TE a ‘catch up’ study on this issue was being completed by a consultant, however despite requests from the TE, no report was provided to the TE, and this comes way to late at the end of the project to be of any practical use to the project.</li> <li>• As far as could be assessed by the TE, no software has been introduced to GoTL to monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>supporting software, required to monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure that <u>before</u> any future activities to support mangrove-supportive livelihoods are commenced, proper value-chain analysis of livelihood options, supported by proper market analysis, business planning and management training, are undertaken <u>first</u>.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 1.4:</b> Forestry, Protected Areas, Aquaculture and Fisheries Directorates under the <u>Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries</u> have their <u>roles, coordination, and planning mechanisms clarified and enforced for improved management of mangrove</u> and other critical coastal habitats (as emerges from NAP consultation process):</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <u>Forestry &amp; Watershed Management Directorate</u> of MAF has been renamed the <u>Forestry, Watershed &amp; Mangrove Management Directorate</u>, with mandate and defined roles responsibilities, but as yet no allocation of necessary resources.</li> <li>• There is no evidence that the other Directorates listed under Output 1.4 have had their roles, coordination and planning mechanisms clarified and enforced, as required to meet the output.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is recommended that GoTL undertake a ‘whole of government review’ to clarify and confirm the mandates, roles and responsibilities of ALL relevant ministries and directorates, not only MAF, in relation to improved integrated coastal management (ICM), including improved management of mangroves and other critical coastal habitats.</li> <li>• It is recommended that GoTL establish clear ‘whole-of-government’ arrangements, through an ICM Working Group under the NOP, for coordinating the mandates, roles and responsibilities of ALL relevant ministries and directorates in relation to improved ICM, including</li> </ul>

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of the NAP (2020) indicates that it contains nothing at all on clarifying and enforcing the roles, coordination and planning mechanisms of the various MAF Directorates, for improved management of mangrove and other critical coastal habitats, as required by the output.</li> </ul>	<p>improved management of mangroves and other critical coastal habitats.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection:</p>	<p><b>Output 2.1:</b> At least 1000 ha of coastal mangroves and wetlands conserved or degraded mangrove areas rehabilitated through natural recruitment and restoration of hydrological regimes both in the northern and southern coasts with a direct employment of local coastal communities:</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output 2.1 explicitly focuses on conserving mangroves and rehabilitating degraded areas through natural recruitment and restoration of hydrological regimes, and does not even mention planting mangroves.</li> <li>The main mechanisms that the project has used to conserve mangroves are fencing to exclude livestock, and new tarabandu regulations that ‘protect’ mangroves. However, some of the fences have failed and livestock are again damaging mangrove areas, and in some cases the new tarabandu regulations are not being complied with – meaning that the mangroves are not actually being ‘conserved’ (refer section 4.3.3)</li> <li>In terms of rehabilitating degraded areas through natural recruitment, the project has supported attempts to restore hydrological regimes at 2 sites, however these appear to be poorly planned and designed, not preceded by proper EIA, not consistent with BWN, and may actually cause negative impacts (refer section 4.3.3).</li> <li>The main effort of the project on this issue has been mass planting of new mangrove seedlings, which as outlined above is not actually part of Output 2.1 (or any other Output). The TE has concerns that the mangrove planting may be poorly conceived, planned and designed, and is not focussed on rehabilitating degraded areas, but is planting mangroves in areas that are not naturally colonized by mangroves, may be</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve livestock exclusion fencing, including maintenance and long-term sustainability.</li> <li>Prohibit any further geo-engineering interventions in mangrove areas, as the risks of negative impacts are too high, without rigorous scientific oversight.</li> <li>Ensure that all future mangrove planting activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>are properly planned and designed,</li> <li>focus on rehabilitating genuinely degraded areas, and not on planting mangroves in areas that are not naturally colonized by mangroves,</li> <li>use inappropriate species,</li> <li>do not substantially change the natural habitats and ecology in some areas; and</li> <li>are supported by a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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		<p>using inappropriate species, and may be substantially changing the natural habitats and ecology in some areas.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In addition, many of the mangrove planting efforts have not survived, and the project has not implemented a rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time - It is therefore not possible to assess whether the success or otherwise of the mass planting efforts with any quantitative certainty.</li> </ul>	
	<p><b>Output 2.2:</b> Mangrove-supportive, diversified livelihoods/social businesses established in mangrove rehabilitation project sites, benefiting at least 1,000 households and empowering women:</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reportedly many, perhaps even most, of the livelihood activities have failed and will not be sustained post-project for a variety of reasons – refer section 4.3.3 – the Output number has not been fully achieved.</li> <li>The livelihoods component of the project has been implemented on an ad-hoc basis without an overall strategy or site plans and without proper baseline assessment, market and value-chain analysis and business planning and management training and support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to ensure that <u>before</u> any future activities to support mangrove-supportive livelihoods are commenced, proper value-chain analysis of livelihood options, supported by proper market analysis, business planning and management training, are undertaken <u>first</u>.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 2.3:</b> In project site sucos, development plans include mangrove-supportive livelihood support measures benefiting at least 25,000 people:</p>	<p><b>Output not achieved.</b></p> <p>Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has not been provided with any copies of Suco Development Plans developed with support from the project that address this Output.</li> <li>The livelihoods component of the project has been implemented on an ad-hoc basis without an overall strategy or site plans and without proper baseline assessment, market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per Output 2.2.</li> </ul>

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		and value-chain analysis and business planning and management training and support.	
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Integrated approaches to coastal adaptation adopted to contribute to protection of coastal populations and productive lands:</p>	<p><b>Output 3.1:</b> Upstream watershed replantation demonstrate risk reduction, (including reduction of excessive sediment loads) to downstream coastal waterways and areas:</p>	<p><b>Output achieved.</b> Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has supported upstream watershed replantation activities at 41 sites (refer section 4.3.3).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to scale up and replicate upstream watershed replantation activities.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 3.2:</b> Coastal wetland restoration and groundwater recharge plans developed and initiated to increase storm water absorption capacity and buffer seawater intrusion:</p>	<p><b>Output not achieved.</b> Reasons for assessment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has not been provided with any examples of groundwater recharge plans that have been developed by the project for any sites, to increase storm water absorption capacity and buffer seawater intrusion.</li> <li>In fact some of the geo-engineering interventions that have been supported by the project to increase tidal inflow at some mangrove sites, through the digging of trenches, might actually increase seawater intrusion into and salt contamination of groundwater resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to develop and implement groundwater recharge plans, to increase storm water absorption capacity and buffer seawater intrusion.</li> <li>It is recommended that UNDP work with GoTL, local governments and communities to assess any potential negative impacts, including on groundwater resources, of the geo-engineering interventions that have been supported by the project, and to implement appropriate mitigation plans where necessary.</li> <li>It is recommended that from now, GoTL and local governments prohibit any further geo-engineering interventions in mangrove areas, as the risks of negative impacts are too high, without rigorous scientific oversight.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Output 3.3:</b> Based on economic valuation study of ecosystem services, infrastructure offset for coastal protection scheme (and other financial mechanisms, such as payment for ecosystem</p>	<p><b>Output only partially achieved.</b> Reasons for assessment:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to build on the PES and carbon offset pilot activities supported by the project, to develop and implement a fully functioning, national-level infrastructure offset</li> </ul>

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	services - PES) devised to secure financial resources for coastal resilience:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has supported a small scoping study on PES and a small pilot project on carbon offset payments for protecting mangroves.</li> <li>• However, these have not been up-scaled and translated into a fully functioning, national-level infrastructure offset scheme to secure financial resources for coastal resilience.</li> </ul>	scheme to secure financial resources for coastal resilience.

### 4.3.2 Relevance


1. The CRB project is the first-ever large-scale ICM and mangrove ecosystem conservation project in Timor-Leste, implemented at a critical time when the coastal zone is under increasing pressure, including from global climate change impacts, and when mangroves are being rapidly destroyed by a combination of drivers. The TE finds that:
  - a) The CRB project is highly relevant to all of the SDGs (see Table 10), the GEF focal area (LDC) objectives and the UNDAF, UNDP SP and UNDP CPD.
  - b) The project is highly relevant to national development and related policies and plans, including the TL SDP, NBSAP, NAP, NOP, NAP-CLD and others.
  - c) The project is highly relevant to local community needs and priorities.
  - d) The project components and activities directly address some of the major coastal adaptation and resilience and broader environmental issues, needs and priorities of TL, taking an integrated, ecosystem-based approach, and directly assisting communities.
  - e) The livelihoods component is extremely relevant to addressing the root-causes of mangrove and general coastal degradation in TL.

Evaluation Rating: Highly Satisfactory.

#### Summary Findings - Relevance:

- *The TE finds that:*
  - *The CRB project is highly relevant to all of the SDGs (see Table 10), the GEF focal area (LDC) objectives and the UNDAF, UNDP SP and UNDP CPD.*
  - *The project is highly relevant to national development and related policies and plans, including the TL SDP, NBSAP, NAP, NOP, NAP-CLD and others.*
  - *The project is highly relevant to local community needs and priorities.*
  - *The project components and activities directly address some of the major coastal adaptation and resilience and broader environmental issues, needs and priorities of TL, taking an integrated, ecosystem-based approach, and directly assisting communities.*
  - *The livelihoods component is extremely relevant to addressing the root-causes of mangrove and general coastal degradation in TL.*
- *This results in an evaluation rating for relevance of 'Highly Satisfactory'.*

**TABLE 10: Relevance of the SDGs to the CRB project**

SDG	Relevance to CRB Project
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainable livelihoods that address and prevent poverty are dependent on a healthy, sustainable environment – including land, coastal and marine.</li> <li>• The livelihoods component of the project directly addressed poverty.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TL’s long-term food security is directly linked to environmental resources through traditional subsistence agriculture, fishing and collection of seafood.</li> <li>• The livelihoods component of the project directly addressed food security.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Healthy people need a healthy environment.</li> <li>• Good health is strongly linked to SDGs 1 and 2, and also to SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achieving an ecologically sustainable future requires a well-educated population.</li> <li>• A population that is educated about the environment is more committed to protecting it.</li> <li>• The CRB project was very active on education, including partnering with the Green Schools program.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An ecologically sustainable future can only be achieved with the full and equal participation of all gender groups.</li> <li>• The CRB project made significant efforts at gender equality in project activities, but did not develop an overall Gender Action Plan.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water security and adequate sanitation remain significant challenges in TL and are not only essential to human health and wellbeing (SDG 3) but fundamentally underpin all aspects of environmental health and sustainability.</li> <li>• The CRB project supported some minor activities relating to clean water and sanitation.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant (but not a part of the CRB project):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continuing the push to expand renewable energy sources, especially solar, wind and ocean energy, is essential if GoTL is to become truly ecologically (and economically) sustainable.</li> <li>• Providing local communities with alternatives to cutting mangroves for fire wood would have major benefits in protecting mangroves.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As per SDG 1.</li> <li>• Ensuring that the ecosystem services that are provided by the environment are well protected and sustainably managed is vital to jobs and economic growth of the nation.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant (but not significant part of the CRB project):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Environmental infrastructure is needed in order to address environmental issues, including waste management facilities, sewerage treatment plants and water treatment facilities.</li> <li>• The CRB project only addressed infrastructure in a small way (e.g. eco-tourism facilities, which have not been well implemented).</li> </ul>

SDG	Relevance to CRB Project
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An ecologically sustainable future can only be achieved with the full and equal participation of, and equal flow of benefits to, all sectors of society.</li> <li>• The CRB project included criteria to ensure that certain activities addressed inequalities, for example identification of households for participation in livelihoods projects.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing, unplanned and poorly managed urbanization and over-crowding without adequate services and facilities is an emerging environmental problem in TL.</li> <li>• Overall, the various components of the CRB project all assist in the quest for more sustainable communities.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An ecologically sustainable future can only be achieved with a complete shift to a circular economy.</li> <li>• This is especially the case for SIDS like TL, which are increasingly dependent on the importation of consumable materials, which create intractable waste management and pollution problems.</li> <li>• While not an explicit part of the CRB project, the livelihood activities assist with this SDG.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Climate change is the most significant externally imposed environmental issue, potentially threatening TL as a viable, sustainable nation in the long-term.</li> <li>• An explicit part of the CRB project was to assist in building increased coastal resilience to climate change.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The nation's most significant environmental (and economic) resources and values are marine, including coral reef and coastal and pelagic fisheries.</li> <li>• Protecting mangroves is vital to this SDG.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mangroves exist at the land-water interface.</li> <li>• Land is subject to a wide range of environmental pressures and stresses on terrestrial ecosystems.</li> <li>• The CRB project included a small component on sustainable land use in coastal catchments.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace and justice include environmental governance.</li> <li>• When peace, justice and environmental governance are lacking in a country, there is an increased tendency towards uncontrolled and unsustainable exploitation of environmental resources.</li> <li>• The overall objective of the CRB project included improving coastal zone governance in GoTL, which unfortunately was not achieved.</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Directly relevant:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The future sustainability of TL cannot be secured without effective partnerships to achieve all SDGs in a cooperative and collaborative manner.</li> </ul>

### 4.3.3 Effectiveness

#### 4.3.3.1 General assessment of project effectiveness

1. The effectiveness of a project is the extent to which the project's objectives, outcomes and targets are achieved, and whether or not the project's technical activities have been successfully completed and are effective in achieving their purpose and making progress towards the project's ultimate outcomes and impact.
2. As outlined in section 4.3.1 above, while overall the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, and has delivered a number of useful and beneficial outputs, unfortunately the overall achievement rate for the CRB project, measured against the PRF, has been very low, despite two extensions to the project timeline. In this regard the project overall has not been very effective (refer section 4.3 1, which is not repeated here).
3. One of the main limitations on the project's effectiveness is the fact that very unfortunately, many of the main technical activities undertaken by the project have failed, even before the project has ended. Examples of these and the likely underlying causes for failure are listed in Table 11 along with recommendations to address these problems. Figures 2 to 19 illustrate the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of many of the project activities.
4. Table 11 assesses **11** technical activities undertaken by the project. It should be noted there were a number of other technical activities undertaken by the project, which are not assessed due to the limitations and constraints on the TE caused by Covid-19. However, these 11 activities represent the major areas of investment of the GEF funds. Analysis of Table 11 finds that:
  - a) **Two** of the activities were highly effective (National mangrove mapping and Coastal vulnerability assessment),
  - b) **Four** of the activities were only partially effective, with significant elements that were not effective (Livestock exclusion fencing around mangroves, Planting mangroves, Tarabandu to protect mangroves, Mangrove-supportive livelihoods and Support to develop eco-tourism),
  - c) **One** of the activities were not effective (Climate monitoring & information); and
  - d) **Two** of the activities could not be assessed by the TE, due to lack of available information (Geo-engineering and Catchment replanting & sediment control); and one of these may cause negative impacts (Geo-engineering).
5. The TE has serious concerns about some of the findings relating to the effectiveness of the project, including *inter alia*:
  - a) The project did not ensure the quality, rigour, relevance and usefulness of most of the ICM strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project, and did not follow up to ensure that these were formally adopted by GoTL for implementation – they have just become the tragic cliché of '*reports collecting dust on shelves*', which is not an effective use of GEF funds.
  - b) In some cases, there appears to have been a lack of full and thorough consultations with local communities to work within their long-standing traditional rights to access and use mangroves, and respect their cultural practices and traditional 'tarabandu' laws and sacred rites relating to coastal areas. The TE considers this to be a serious failing of the project, which breaches UNDP's E&S policies, creates ill will amongst local communities and potentially affects future UNDP initiatives in these areas (e.g. Suai Loro at Covalima – although the project did learn from this).
  - c) Lack of proper planning, feasibility and impact assessment, detailed technical design, oversight, quality control and follow-up monitoring, evaluation and sustainability efforts for a number of significant activities, including fences, mangrove planting and livelihood activities.

6. The TE has heightened concerns about the effectiveness of five main aspects of the project in particular; i) measures to exclude livestock from mangroves, ii) mangrove-supportive livelihoods, iii) the eco-tourism infrastructure built by the project, iv) the geo-engineering interventions and v) the significant loss of mangroves at Tibar Bay, as per the following mini-case studies.

#### 4.3.3.2 Effectiveness case study - Measures to exclude livestock from mangroves

1. Livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) are the most valuable sources of protein for local communities in Timor-Leste, and many communities keep significant numbers of these animals. In many coastal areas local communities do not have adequate grazing land or feed-sources for their livestock, and they are allowed to roam freely in mangrove areas where they graze on the mangrove leaves, especially the fresh new shoots of young mangrove seedlings (Figure 2).
2. Livestock is currently one of the main, if not 'the' main, negative impacts on mangroves in Timor-Leste. Grazing by cattle and goats prevents natural regeneration, and was a significant cause of mortality of seedlings in the replanted areas. The hooves of livestock also compact the mangrove mud, preventing aeration and causing anoxic conditions in the mud and killing mangroves. Pigs forage for food in the mangrove mud – causing erosion and physical disturbance. Feces from livestock pollute tidal waters.
3. Building fences to exclude livestock and protect mangroves was therefore a significant project activity, being carried out at 20 sites across 7 municipalities (Table 3.1 to 3.7). Annex 5 contains an overall assessment of fencing activities at all sites. Annex 5, PMU reports and feedback from local community stakeholders and direct observations by the NC indicate that, for at-least five of these sites the fences built by the project have not been effective (Figures 3 & 4) (however, the project has implemented a fence repair program in the last year of the project, including strengthening with steel poles).
4. In some cases fences have been purposely broken through or completely removed by local communities, who place much higher value in their livestock as a source of protein, than on preserving mangroves, which in their eyes provide much lower benefits than livestock.
5. It was reported that in one case – Suai Loro, the local community saw the fences as an imposition on their long-standing traditional rights to access and use mangroves, and a breach of cultural practices, which prohibit building physical structures in mangroves.
6. The TE assesses that the main underlying causes that reduced the effectiveness of the livestock exclusion fencing were as follows:
  - a) Use of low quality materials that degrade rapidly under prevailing environmental conditions. It is understood that in the latter stages of the project the building of "living fences" was trialed – where the fence posts are live tree shoots which grow over time and preclude the need for replacement – i.e. a form of 'hedge'. The NC was not able to assess these during site visits, although reports are that some were successful and others were not. SAs outlined above, at some sites steel poles have also been added (refer also Annex 5). It is understood that the PMU implemented a fence inspection and maintenance program after the MTR raised this issue, but it is not clear to the TE if there are arrangements in place to continue with long-term inspections and maintenance of all fences post-project.
  - b) Lack of full and thorough consultations with local communities to work within their long-standing traditional rights to access and use mangroves, and respect their cultural practices and traditional 'Tara Bandu' laws relating to mangroves. Overall the TE questions whether UNDP followed correct cultural practice to declare Tara Bandu, which should be through the Uma Lisan (traditional clan groups) and Lia Nain (traditional leaders) - rather than through local councils – who are government. The local government may have just declared Tara Bandu in return for the project payment. However, if it does not have formal sanction from the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain it is unlikely to be enforced and effective. Also, traditionally, Bandu is a seasonal natural resource management tool – with a 'closed' period (Tara Bandu) when the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain declare a prohibition on resource use, and an open season (Loke Bandu) when some resource use may be allowed, depending on

season and community needs. It appears that the CRB project's support for Tara Bandu did not include the traditional Loke Bandu component. The project may have in fact corrupted the traditional Tara Bandu process through its approach that did not follow the traditional cultural process and offered payment.

- c) Perhaps most importantly, failure of the livelihoods component to provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. there was no incentive through 'net benefit' to the communities' livelihoods in excluding their livestock from mangroves areas. To be effective, the project needed to support the communities to develop viable and valuable alternatives to the current practice of grazing them in mangrove areas – which it did not do. While **having more income does not guarantee that grazing in mangroves will stop – other mechanisms are also needed like fencing and alternative grazing options - if alternative income is less than the value of livestock, and if there are no alternative grazing options, there is no incentive to stop livestock grazing in mangroves – and it will continue. Several stakeholders including senior MAF, local MAF and local stakeholders made this point. In fact senior MAF stressed this as one of 'the main' problems with the project (see also 4.3.3.3 below).**
7. It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to improve livestock exclusion fencing, including maintenance and long-term sustainability.
  8. It is recommended that for all future projects, UNDP should make every effort to:
    - a) ensure full and effective consultations with local communities,
    - b) work within their long-standing traditional rights respect their cultural practices and traditional 'tarabandu' laws; and
    - c) comply in full with UNDP's own E&S policies on these matters.
  9. It is also recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to local communities to improve mangrove-supportive livelihoods, which provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. which provide 'net benefit' to the communities' livelihoods in excluding their livestock from mangroves areas.
  10. Please refer Annex 5 for more detailed assessment of all 20 of the fencing activities.



**FIGURE 2:** Livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) are the most valuable sources of protein for local communities in Timor-Leste. In many coastal areas local communities do not have adequate grazing land or feed-sources for their livestock, and they are allowed to roam freely in mangrove areas where they graze on the mangrove leaves, especially the fresh new shoots of young seedlings. Livestock are currently one of the main, if not ‘the’ main, negative impacts on mangroves in Timor-Leste. Grazing by cattle and goats prevents natural regeneration. The hooves of livestock also compact the mangrove mud, preventing aeration and causing anoxic conditions in the mud and killing mangroves. Pigs forage for food in the mangrove mud – causing erosion and physical disturbance (top left). Feces from livestock pollute tidal waters. Actions to exclude livestock from mangroves should be a very high priority. These examples are at Tibar Bay (images: Raaymakers)



**FIGURE 3:** Many of the livestock exclusion fences that have been built by the CRB project have not been effective, due to the use of low-quality, non-durable materials. This example is at Wenunuk. However the project did implement a repair program in the last year of the project (image: da Costa)



**FIGURE 4:** In some cases, fences have been purposely broken through or completely removed by local communities, who place much higher value in their livestock as a source of protein, than on preserving mangroves. This example is at Wenunuk (image: da Costa)

#### 4.3.3.3 Effectiveness case study - Mangrove supportive livelihoods

1. Annex 5 contains an overall assessment of livelihood activities at all 109 sites. The project made a significant effort to support local communities to develop mangrove-supportive livelihoods of 109 separate groups across 7 municipalities, including various horticulture activities, aquaculture, fisheries, handicrafts, building kiosks, eating houses and other small businesses, and ecotourism (see 4.3.3.4 below). Unfortunately, the livelihoods component of the CRB project suffered from a lack of baseline assessment, value-chain analysis, proper market analysis, business planning and management training, and as a result has been largely ineffective, as detailed in Annex 5.
2. The main problem was that the project focused on technical training (e.g. how to plant and grow bananas or dragon fruit) or just building facilities (e.g. a coffee kiosk or eating house) without any market analysis, supply chain analysis, business planning, logistical arrangements to get produce to market, training of business operators in the basics of business management etc. Some examples include, amongst others:
  - a) At one site in Manufahi the community was supported to plant and grow large numbers of bananas even though there is already ample supply of bananas to the market in Timor-Leste. The project selected a low-value banana species that is used for cooking (fried banana, ‘pisang goreng’ or ‘hudi sona’), which is already very common in Timor-Leste, when there is high demand for another type that is rarer and higher value, used to make ‘Dellos’ brand canned banana drinks. The community advised that had the project supported growing the ‘Dellos’ banana the business would have been more viable. This reflects lack of market research and planning by the project. The project support did not include post-growing activities like packing and transport to market. As a result, the banana plantations are now abandoned (Figure 5).
  - b) In another case in Liquica infrastructure comprising concrete poles to grow the climbing Dragon Fruit plants were built but have been affected by recent floods. Most project activities are in low-lying coastal areas, which are naturally vulnerable to flooding in TL. The project carried out a comprehensive national, GIS-based Coastal Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) and this should have been used to assist the planning and siting of project activities (Figure 6).
  - c) In another case at Clacuc in Manufahi two outboard motors were provided to a community that does not have boats to use them on, and the motors are just being stored, unused.
  - d) At another site in Metinaro the project built several BBQ fish stalls all in a row next to each other, without considering how competition between each stall would affect their business viability, and without considering where supplies of fish, firewood etc would come from, who the target market is and whether the customer base would be sufficient to sustain business. The stalls now stand unused – a complete waste of GEF funds

(NOTE: during the same time period other community-developed BBQ kiosks along the roads both east and west of Dili were conducting brisk business – NC Pers. Obs.) (Figure 7).

- e) At another site at Beacou in Bobanaro the project built an eating-house without a business plan and it now stands unused. **The local stakeholders advised that the restaurant ceased to operate well before the Covid restrictions – due to lack of business plan and business management arrangements – which should have been part of the livelihood support provided by the project. At the time of the NC’s visit - this site was not in lockdown - people within the area were free to use the restaurant if it was operating** (Figure 8).
3. The overall result is that many of the livelihood initiatives have already been abandoned (see Figures 5 to 8) and others are unlikely to be viable and sustained post-project. This represents a very concerning waste of GEF funds and project effort – and reflects poorly on UNDP’s oversight of the project. The CO has recommended that the new SEEWAY project, which is just commencing, seek to support ongoing sustainability of some of the CRB livelihoods groups where possible – although this is only likely to benefit a handful of the 109 groups that were part of CRB.
  4. It is recommended that UNDP learn the very serious lessons from the failure of the livelihoods component and ensure that for any future projects that include such activities, there is proper baseline assessment, value-chain analysis, market analysis, business planning and management training.
  5. Please refer Annex 5 for more detailed assessment of all 109 of the livelihood activities.



**FIGURE 5:** *Abandoned banana plantation in Manufahi being overgrown by creepers – supported by the project without proper market analysis and business planning (image: da Costa)*



**FIGURE 6:** *Dragon Fruit plantation in Liquica showing the concrete poles used to grow the climbing plants – impacted by recent floods. Most project activities are in low-lying coastal areas, which are naturally vulnerable to flooding in TL. The project carried out a comprehensive national, GIS-based Coastal Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) and this should have been used to assist the planning and siting of project activities (image: da Costa)*



**FIGURES 7A & B:** *The failed BBQ fish stalls built by the project in Metinaro without proper market analysis and business planning. The top image clearly shows the very poor design standards and low quality, non-durable building materials used. These do not represent ‘resilient infrastructure’ – which is supposed to be a key focus on the CRB project. They are also located right on the mangrove fringe, in an area that could be better suited to re-forestation (NOTE: during the same time period other community-developed BBQ kiosks along the roads both east and west of Dili were conducting brisk business – NC Pers. Obs.) (images: da Costa)*



**FIGURE 8:** *The failed eating-house built by the project in Bobonaro – an empty structure no-longer used. The local stakeholders advised that the restaurant ceased to operate well before the Covid restrictions – due to lack of business plan and business management arrangements – which should have been part of the livelihood support provided by the project. At the time of the NC’s visit / this photo - this site was not in lockdown - people within the area were free to use the restaurant if it was operating (image: da Costa)*

#### 4.3.3.4 Effectiveness case study - Eco-tourism infrastructure

1. As part of the livelihoods component the project has supported the construction of eco-tourism facilities at four sites (Hera, Sabuli and Wenunuk in Dili Municipality and Maubara in Liquica Municipality) (all basically board-walks, view points, gazebos and kiosks), which are intended to help create alternative mangrove-friendly livelihoods and further assist with raising awareness.
2. This coincides with the Ministry of Tourism's #HauNiaTimor campaign to promote domestic tourism, and representatives from other municipalities who visited these sites as part of in-country exchange learning expressed interest in building similar facilities (Suai, Atauro, Bobonaro).
3. Annex 5 contains an overall assessment of the eco-tourism activities at all four sites. The TE finds that the facility at Lagoa Maubara in Liquica Municipality is successful, the facilities are well designed and built, and this site provides a model for other sites. Unfortunately, despite the best of intentions by the project, the eco-tourism facilities at the three sites in Dili Municipality suffer several significant deficiencies (Figures 9 to 12). Firstly it is not clear to the TE why the project funded the building of three facilities right next door to each other in the same municipality. This raises questions about the criteria used by the project to select sites and whether the investment of project funds was equitable across municipalities. The funds used for one of the three facilities in Dili could have gone to another municipality that had expressed interest in eco-tourism.
4. At the time of the TE one site – Wenunuk – had already been abandoned before completion and construction had not been completed on the other three sites, with only a few weeks to go to project-end. There are also serious deficiencies with engineering design, quality of materials and construction standards, safety and long-term maintenance and sustainability at all sites. The very poor quality and safety standards of the eco-tourism facilities is an extremely serious concern, especially in a country subject to high seismic risk, and within a project that is supposed to be building resilience, including resilient infrastructure.
5. There is a risk of people using the facilities being injured or worse, exposing UNDP to potential liability. It also raises the question as to why UNDP would engage in the construction of physical infrastructure when it has no expertise in this area, and why it would not engage a professional construction company to manage this component.
6. The TE assesses that the main underlying causes that reduced the effectiveness of the eco-tourism activities were as follows:
  - a) Lack of proper design and planning of infrastructure to ensure compliance with basic engineering construction, quality and safety standards and use of durable, safe building materials.
  - b) Reliance on local NGOs with limited to no experience and expertise in construction projects to undertake the construction.
  - c) Lack of oversight and quality control by UNDP, using appropriately qualified engineers/building inspectors, of the construction process to ensure compliance with the design plans and with basic engineering construction, quality, and safety standards. While the project did engage an NC 'engineer' to supposedly oversee these activities, review of his report by the TE finds that it is of extremely poor technical standard, is self-contradictory and confused throughout, does not address its own ToR properly, and does nothing to address the actual problem at hand. In fact it is so bad that the TE questions how the project could justify paying that consultant for the work. Additionally, the end result – what is actually built – is what matters – and that speaks for itself. This is another striking example of lack of proper project oversight by the PMU and CO.
7. It is recommended that UNDP should URGENTLY commission an expert review of all infrastructure that has been built by the project by appropriately qualified engineers/building inspectors, to identify risks and mitigation measures, and take action to implement these measures urgently.
8. It is also recommended that in future UNDP should consider not getting involved in building physical infrastructure in TL, given the potential risks and liability exposure, and considering the seismic risks in the country.

9. Please refer Annex 5 for more detailed assessment of all four of the eco-tourism activities.



**FIGURES 9A & B:** *The 'boardwalk to nowhere'. Example of ecotourism infrastructure built by the project in Metinaro – still not completed at the time of the TE with only a few weeks to go until project close (images: top in 2020 - CRB project, bottom in June 2021 - da Costa)*



**FIGURES 10A & B:** *The uncompleted and now abandoned eco-tourism facilities built by the project at Wenunuk in Metinaro. Apart from illustrating the waste of GEF funds by not being completed and utilized, the bottom image shows the non-durable materials and low standard of construction methods (images: da Costa)*



**FIGURE 11:** The toilet block installed by the CRB project at the eco-tourism site in Hera. Reportedly this is completely non-functional due to lack of water supply from the tank shown in Figure 12. Note also the poor construction standards and building debris left lying around the site (bottom right) – which is not acceptable for an ‘environmental’ project. This is an example of poor design, planning and construction oversight by the project (image: da Costa)



**FIGURE 12:** The water tank installed by the CRB project at the eco-tourism site in Hera to supply the toilet block shown in Figure 11. Reportedly this is completely non-functional because is not sited correctly to allow gravity-fed water supply. This is another example of poor design, planning and construction oversight by the project (image: da Costa)

4.3.3.5 Effectiveness case study - Geo-engineering / hydrological interventions

1. The geo-engineering interventions involved the digging of trenches through inter-tidal areas in an attempt to allow tidal inflow and encourage natural recolonization by mangroves into currently bare areas, at two sites (Sabuli in Dili Municipality and Maubara in Liquica Municipality). The TE holds serious concerns that these trenches may actually cause negative impacts, as follows (Figure 13):
  - a) At Sabuli it involved the digging of straight channels that in no-way emulate natural tidal flows.
  - b) They may alter the hydrodynamics and sediment dynamics in ways that may actually cause dieback of existing mangroves.
  - c) They may also expose acid-sulphate soils – which can cause a range of negative environmental impacts (this issue that was highlighted in the ProDoc SESP but ignored by the PMU during implementation – which is a serious oversight).
  - d) They may cause saltwater intrusion and salt contamination of valuable freshwater groundwater supplies.
  - e) It appears that the project did not undertake any form of EIA or detailed design planning to ensure that these interventions did / do not cause negative impacts. This is may be a breach of UNDP’s E&S policies.
  - f) The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the effectiveness and potential impacts of the geo-engineering interventions.
  
2. Please refer Annex 5 for more detailed assessment of the two geo-engineering activities.



**FIGURES 13A & B:** *Examples of the geo-engineering works funded by the project at Sabuli, Metinaro (images: da Costa)*

#### 4.3.3.6 Effectiveness case study - Significant loss of mangroves at Tibar Bay

1. As outlined in sections 4.1.5 and 4.2.2 above it was intended that the project would work cooperatively with both the Tibar Bay Port and the Tasi Mane (south coast gas infrastructure) projects on mangrove protection, management and restoration. Both of these intended partnerships were very important for the following reasons:
  - a) The Tibar Bay Port and Tasi Mane projects are the two most significant, major coastal infrastructure projects in Timor-Leste, with significant environmental impacts. The CRB project was supposed to have a major focus on assisting GoTL to improve the planning and management of coastal infrastructure projects to reduce environmental impacts, including on mangroves and other coastal systems.
  - b) Both projects had prepared Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), which include mitigation measures, offsets and restoration targets for mangroves and other coastal systems. These EMPs represented valuable opportunities for the project to leverage significant additional co-financing for project activities and to demonstrate effective partnerships with the private sector, which is a high priority for GEF (but which the project has performed poorly on).
  - c) In the case of Tasi Mani, the PMU reported that because the development footprint does not infringe on mangroves (not confirmed by TE), they did not approach them to cooperate. The TE considers this to be a lost opportunity – the Tasi Mane project is a major gas infrastructure project with a broad range of impacts on the coastal and marine environments of the south coast, and could have still become a valuable co-financing partner for the CRB project.
  - d) In the case of the Tibar Bay Port EMP, this included restoring an equivalent area of any mangrove as impacted by the port and assisting with restoration and sustainable management of all remaining mangroves, including assisting the local communities in this regard, presenting an excellent alignment with the CRB and opportunity for close cooperation.
2. Cooperating with the Tibar Bay Port in particular should have been a very high priority for the CRB project, as prior to the port construction the bay contained 20 ha of the only remaining climax community of large, mature ‘apple mangrove’ (*Sonneratia alba*) forests left in Timor-Leste.
3. Before the port construction this forest comprised an estimated 1,600 large mature trees with heights in excess of 30 m and trunk circumferences up 5 m plus, the largest trees of any mangrove sites in Timor-Leste, and may be many decades, even centuries old (Figure 14). The Tibar Bay mangroves are an ecologically unique community of all the mangrove areas in Timor-Leste and should be a high priority conservation site of national significance (Raaymakers et al 2013, Alongi et al 2012).
4. Unfortunately, the project did not form effective partnerships or cooperative arrangements with either the Tibar Bay Port or Tasi Mane projects. The project held two meetings with officials from Tibar Bay port, one in November 2020 and one in June 2020, established a CBEMR group and nursery, with 16,000 seedlings being raised, and prepared a detailed restoration plan for the area. However, for reasons that are not understood by the TE, the project has not able to get the Tibar Bay port to cooperate, and it is understood that the port has not implemented its own EMP.
5. Again, for reasons that are not understood by the TE, the CRB project has also not implemented the restoration plan that it developed for the Tibar Bay. None of the 16,000 seedlings have been planted and the project intends to use these at another site. The TE considers this to be a serious mistake, for the reasons outlined below.
6. There is an urgent need for a major mangrove restoration effort at Tibar Bay and an immediate demand to use the mangrove seedlings at that site. It is unfathomable to the TE why the project would decide to take the seedlings elsewhere, when Tibar Bay is such a high priority area.
7. Of very serious concern is that during the CRB project period, since construction of the port began, there has been total dieback of approximately 30% of the mature *Sonneratia alba* mangroves at Tibar Bay, along the south-west coast of the

bay immediately adjacent to the port construction site (Figures 15 to 19). This is a major loss of national ecological significance, given the importance and value this mangrove areas as outlined above.

- Local community members advised the TE that there have been multiple spills of diesel oil from the construction barges and vessels involved in the port construction, which have drifted into the mangroves. The appearance of the dead mangroves is consistent with the effects of diesel toxicity. Analysis of Google Earth images also indicates that construction of the port access road may have altered sediment inputs to this area, adding to the impact.

**Urgent, high-priority recommendations:**

- To address the tragic situation at Tibar Bay it is recommended that UNDP should, at a higher level than the project (e.g. Resident Representative level), offer support to GoTL to form a united front between MAF and SEE, to again approach the Tibar Port and seek cooperation to implement the restoration plan, which is already prepared, and make use for the 16,000 seedlings already on site. If cooperation from the port cannot be secured, then it is recommended that UNDP support GoTL to implement the restoration plan anyway, as it is understood that the impacted area is not controlled by the port.
- It is recommended that restoration efforts should focus immediately on the area that has been killed during port construction, and should focus on planting *Sonneratia alba*, which is the species that has been killed, and not other species such as *Rhizophora stylosa*, which would create a different habitat to what was there previously.
- It is also recommended that relevant GoTL authorities should take compliance and enforcement action against the port for not implementing its own EMP and, if proven, for causing the observed mangrove dieback.




**FIGURES 14A to D:** Prior to the port construction Tibar Bay contained 20 ha of the only remaining climax community of large, mature ‘apple mangrove’ (*Sonneratia alba*) forests left in Timor-Leste. This forest comprised an estimated 1,600 large mature trees with heights in excess of 30 m and trunk circumferences up to 5 m plus, the largest trees of any mangrove sites in Timor-Leste. The Tibar Bay mangroves are an ecologically unique community in Timor-Leste and should be a high priority conservation site of national significance (images: Raaymakers)



**FIGURES 15A & B:** Tibar Bay before and during port construction. Note the fully intact mangrove forest along the coast on the right of the top image. Note the large numbers of construction vessels in the lower image (dredgers, barges and various work boats). Local community members advised the TE that there have been multiple spills of diesel oil from the construction barges and vessels involved in the port construction, which have drifted into the mangroves. Note also the extensive sediment plumes from the dredging – which will have negative impacts on the seagrasses and coral reefs of Tibar Bay. It appears that the port has not implemented its own EMP and no environmental controls are apparent (images: top- Raaymakers, bottom – port linkedin post)



**FIGURES 16A & B:** *Of very serious concern is that during the CRB project period, since construction of the port began, there has been total dieback of approximately 30% of the mature *Sonneratia alba* mangroves at Tibar Bay, along the south-west coast of the bay immediately adjacent to the port construction site. This is a major loss of national ecological significance, given the importance and value this mangrove areas as outlined above.*



**FIGURE 17:** Possible causes of the mangrove dieback at Tibar Bay. Local community members advised the TE that there have been multiple spills of diesel oil from the construction barges and vessels involved in the port construction, which have drifted into the mangroves. The appearance of the dead mangroves (see Figures 18 and 19) is consistent with the effects of diesel toxicity. Analysis of the images also indicates that construction of the port access road may have altered sediment inputs to this area, adding to the impact (see Figure 20)



**FIGURES 18:** Possible additional cause of the mangrove dieback at Tibar Bay



**FIGURES 19A to 19C:** Images of the mangrove dieback at Tibar Bay. Large, mature, apex-community of *Sonneratia alba* forest totally killed. The appearance of the dead mangroves is consistent with the effects of diesel toxicity (images: CRB project)

#### 4.3.3.6 Summary of project effectiveness

1. The severe shortcomings outlined above result in a TE finding for project effectiveness of Highly Unsatisfactory. The possible underlying causes and recommendations to address these issues are presented in Table 11. Figures 2 to 19 illustrate the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of many of the project activities.

Evaluation Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory.

##### Summary Findings - Effectiveness:

- *While overall the CRB project has made a significant positive contribution to advancing ICM, mangrove ecosystem conservation and coastal adaptation and resilience in Timor-Leste, and has delivered a number of useful and beneficial outputs, unfortunately the overall achievement rate for the CRB project, measured against the PRF, has been very low, despite two extensions to the project timeline. In this regard the project overall has not been very effective*
- *One of the main limitations on the project's effectiveness is the fact that very unfortunately, many of the main technical activities undertaken by the project have failed, even before the project has ended. Examples of these and the likely underlying causes for failure are listed in Table 11, in section 4.3.3, along with recommendations to address these problems.*
- *The TE has serious concerns about some of the findings relating to the effectiveness of the project, including inter alia:*
  - *The project did not ensure the quality, rigour, relevance and usefulness of most of the ICM strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project, and did not follow up to ensure that these were formally adopted by GoTL for implementation – they have just become the tragic cliché of ‘reports collecting dust on shelves’, which is not an effective use of GEF funds.*
  - *In some cases, there appears to have been a lack of full and thorough consultations with local communities to work within their long-standing traditional rights to access and use mangroves, and respect their cultural practices and traditional ‘tarabandu’ laws and sacred rites relating to coastal areas. The TE considers this to be a serious failing of the project, which breaches UNDP’s E&S policies, creates ill will amongst local communities and potentially affects future UNDP initiatives in these areas (e.g. Covalima).*
  - *Lack of proper planning, feasibility and impact assessment, detailed technical design, oversight, quality control and follow-up monitoring, evaluation and sustainability efforts for a number of significant activities, including fences, mangrove planting and livelihood activities.*
- *The TE has heightened concerns about the effectiveness of five main aspects of the project in particular; i) measures to exclude livestock from mangroves, ii) mangrove-supportive livelihoods, iii) the eco-tourism infrastructure built by the project, iv) the geo-engineering interventions and v) the significant loss of mangroves at Tibar Bay, as per the mini-case studies in sections 4.3.3.2 to 4.3.3.6.*
- *The severe shortcomings outlined above result in a TE finding for project effectiveness of Highly Unsatisfactory.*

**TABLE 11: TE Assessment of the effectiveness of the project’s main technical activities**

Annex 5 contains a more detailed analysis of the technical site activities at all sites.

\* Numbering is simply sequential and not linked to PRF etc. \*\*Many of these are the same as in Tables 8 & 9– Consolidated Recommendations are grouped in section 1.4 for ease of management response.

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
<p><b>1. Establish national governance &amp; institutional framework for ICM &amp; mangrove conservation &amp; management:</b></p>	<p><b>Partially effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing a national governance and institutional framework for ICM &amp; mangrove conservation &amp; management was the major focus of the overall project objective but unfortunately has not been effectively achieved.</li> <li>There has been a positive change at MAF in that the Directorate of Forestry &amp; Watershed Management has been renamed the Directorate of Forestry, Watershed &amp; Mangroves Management, with supporting legal mandate and defined mangrove responsibilities, but as yet no allocation of necessary resources from the Central State Budget.</li> <li>“Whole of government” ICM governance &amp; institutional arrangements with supporting mandate and resources have not been established.</li> <li>The project did produce a plethora of ICM strategies, plans and related documents as listed below, however apart from the excellent reports by Global CAD, most of these are highly convoluted and confused, poorly linked, poorly drafted, suffer technical deficiencies, are not suited to the TL context, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to GoTL and have <u>not</u> been formally approved/adopted by GoTL for implementation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Both the PMU and MAF appear to have given higher priority to implementing technical activities at the expense of more strategic, policy outputs and outcomes (the MTR also noted this).</li> <li>The PMU does not appear to have planned the design and delivery of the ICM strategies, plans and related documents in a logical, coordinated manner, which directly reflects and addresses the needs of GoTL.</li> <li>The PMU appears to have just focused on “getting reports done” without ensuring the quality, rigour, relevance and usefulness of most of the ICM strategies, plans and related documents (apart from those by Global CAD which are high quality).</li> <li>The project did not follow up to ensure that ICM strategies, plans and related documents were formally adopted by GoTL for implementation – they have just become the tragic cliché of “reports collecting dust on shelves”.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to start <u>afresh</u>, and to develop a <u>new National ICM Plan</u> under the auspices of the new <u>National Ocean Policy (NOP)</u> (which covers the coast &amp; catchments).</li> <li>It is recommended that the new <u>National ICM Plan</u>:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defines the coast as the area from the upper catchment boundary to the spring low tide mark.</li> <li>Is based on the principles of ICZM.</li> <li>Adopts a truly ‘whole-of-government approach (based on the NOP).</li> <li>Utilizes and integrates, into a single coordinated plan, relevant parts of the various ICM documents &amp; plans developed by the CRB project where they are genuinely useful, and discards those that are not.</li> <li>Adopts EBM, BWN and green engineering approaches.</li> <li>Builds directly on the foundations provided by the CRB project, including promoting mangrove-supportive livelihoods &amp; CBERM.</li> <li>Is more clearly linked to the NPA.</li> <li>Contains a properly developed LogFrame PRF and M&amp;E Plan.</li> <li>Contains properly developed implementation arrangements.</li> <li>It fully budgeted, both from GoTL and development partner sources.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	<p>List of ICM strategies, plans and related documents produced by the project:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Global CAD Feb 2018, Coastal Vulnerability Assessment (CVA)</u>.</li> <li>• <u>Global CAD Feb 2018, Coastal Adaptation Strategies (CAS)</u>.</li> <li>• <u>Youvel, May 2019, Coastal Protection and Resilience Strategy for Infrastructure Planning (CPRSIP)</u>.</li> <li>• <u>McCue Feb 2020, Draft Recommendations for technical feasibility of locating wave, tide and sea level recording stations</u> (Gauge Report).</li> <li>• <u>McCue Feb 2020, Shoreline Management Adaptation Planning - Policy Framework 2020 -2030 (SMP-PF)</u>.</li> <li>• <u>McCue Feb 2020, Shoreline Management Adaptation Planning Strategic Action Plan &amp; Road Map (SMAP-SAP)</u>.</li> <li>• <u>McCue Feb 2020, Draft Terms of Reference and Standard Operating Procedures for a Clearing House Mechanism on Shoreline Management Adaptation &amp; Planning (CHM-SMAP)</u>.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is formally approved / adopted by GoTL for actual implementation.</li> <li>• It is recommended that GoTL establish clear ‘whole-of-government’ arrangements, through an ICM Working Group under the NOP, for coordinating the mandates, roles and responsibilities of ALL relevant ministries and directorates in relation to improved ICM, including improved management of mangroves and other critical coastal habitats.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. National mangrove mapping:</b></p>	<p><b>Highly effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project supported a comprehensive national mapping survey of mangroves, and established a national GIS mangrove database at MAF, as a baseline for future monitoring.</li> <li>• The TE assesses this activity to be highly effective and is one of the both successful and useful outputs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE understand that this activity has been successful and effective due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong support from MAF.</li> <li>• Engaging highly skilled and capable consultants who delivered a quality product (in contrast to some of the other consultancies where the quality of outputs was quite poor – esp. the various ICM plans).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is recommended that MAF ensure the long-term maintenance and operation of the national GIS mangrove database, as a baseline for future monitoring.</li> </ul>

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	of the project.		
<p><b>3. Coastal vulnerability assessment (CVA):</b></p>	<p><b>Highly effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project commissioned a comprehensive national coastal vulnerability assessment (CVA), to inform ICM policy and planning.</li> <li>The TE assesses this activity to be highly effective and along with the national mangrove mapping is one of the both successful and useful outputs of the project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE understands that this activity has been successful and effective due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strong support from MAF.</li> <li>Engaging highly skilled and capable consultants who delivered a quality product (in contrast to some of the other consultancies where the quality of outputs was quite poor – esp. the various ICM plans).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that MAF and other GoTL ministries and directorates use the CVA to inform the new <u>National ICM Plan</u> recommend above, and to inform coastal management and infrastructure policy and planning generally.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Climate monitoring &amp; information:</b></p>	<p><b>Not effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project has not established any mechanism at all to provide people with access to improved <u>climate information</u> services.</li> <li>The project installed 18 RSET-MH benchmarks in three municipalities (Dili, Covalima and Bobonaro) in 2019, however these are used to collect data relating to <u>sedimentation</u> rates, not <u>climate</u> information. To be fully useful they also require supporting data from Tide Guages, which have not been installed by the project.</li> <li>It is not clear why the 18 RSETs were installed in only three municipalities, and not spread more representatively across all seven municipalities where the project was active.</li> <li>There does not appear to be any documented plan for post-project, ongoing maintenance and operation of the RSETs and collection, analysis and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE could not fully establish the reasons why this activity was not effective. Some possible explanations include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MAF does not really have the technical expertise or mandate for this issue – would have more relevant to work with the National Directorate of Meteorology &amp; Geophysics on this activity.</li> <li>This activity was poorly addressed in the project design, including insufficient budget allocation for the types of equipment needed (orders of magnitude less than what was required), possibly reflecting that the ProDoc developers were not technically proficient in these issues.</li> <li>Lack of technical expertise on these issues in the PMU (the PMU commissioned no-less than three separate consultancy reports on this activity, one by Griffith University, one by Global CAD and one by McCue – wasting funds that could have been used for implementation).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL (National Directorate of Meteorology &amp; Geophysics, not MAF) to implement and operate the suite of hydro-meteorological stations and tide gauges, with supporting software, required to monitor climate change induced coastal change and to plan management responses at policy levels, with mechanisms to ensure that reports are publically available to all people of Timor-Leste.</li> </ul>

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	<p>reporting of data for use by GoTL in policy planning and mangrove management.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under Output 1.3, which relates to this Target (refer Table 9 the project was supposed to install <u>hydro-meteorological</u> stations and <u>tide gauges</u>, which would meet the requirement of Target 1.2 relating to <u>climate information</u>, however this has not been achieved.</li> <li>Under Output 1.3, which relates to this Target (refer Table 9 the project was also supposed to introduce <u>software</u> (to GoTL) to <u>monitor climate change induced coastal change</u> and to <u>plan management responses</u> at <u>policy levels</u>, however this has not been achieved.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Failure to identify, link with and benefit from other relevant initiatives in Timor-Leste, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing tide gauge at Dili Port (the project did look at the Dili Port gauge but did not enter into cooperative arrangements).</li> <li>The GIZ - EU GCCA project, which includes setting up a climate monitoring system (the project did identify the GCCA project as a source of parallel funding, but mainly in relation to watershed restoration and not climate monitoring and information).</li> <li>The Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO International Climate Change Adaptation Initiative, which has been monitoring sea level rise, ocean temperature and extreme weather events in Timor-Leste, in cooperation with GoTL.</li> <li>NOAA's Coral Reef Watch program, which includes monitoring and modeling of climate impacts on coastal and marine systems in Timor-Leste.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
<p><b>5. Livestock exclusion fencing around mangroves:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of all 20 fencing sites.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Partially effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) are the most valuable sources of protein for local communities in TL, and many communities keep significant numbers of these animals.</li> <li>In many coastal areas local communities do not have adequate grazing land or feed-sources for their livestock, and they are allowed to roam freely in mangrove areas where they graze on the mangrove leaves, especially the fresh new shoots of young mangrove seedlings.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE assesses that the main underlying causes that reduced the effectiveness of the livestock exclusion fencing were as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of low quality materials that degrade rapidly under prevailing environmental conditions. It is understood that in the latter stages of the project the building of "living fences" was trialed – where the fence posts are live tree shoots which grow over time and preclude the need for replacement – i.e. a form of 'hedge'. The NC was not able to assess these during site visits. Many fences were also strengthened with steel poles.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local governments and communities to improve livestock exclusion fencing, including maintenance and long-term sustainability.</li> <li>It is recommended that for all future projects, UNDP make every effort to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ensure full and effective consultations with local communities,</li> <li>work within their long-standing traditional rights respect their cultural practices and traditional 'tarabandu' laws.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Livestock is one of the main negative impacts on mangroves in TL. Grazing by cattle and goats prevents natural regeneration, and was a significant cause of mortality of seedlings in the replanted areas.</li> <li>• The hooves of livestock also compact the mangrove mud, preventing aeration and causing anoxic conditions in the mud and killing mangroves. Pigs forage for food in the mangrove mud – causing erosion and physical disturbance. Feces from livestock pollute tidal waters.</li> <li>• Building fences to exclude livestock and protect mangroves was therefore a significant project activity, being carried out at 20 sites across 7 municipalities (Annex 5).</li> <li>• However, feedback from local community stakeholders and direct observations by the NC indicate that some of the fences built by the project have not been effective. Many have broken down naturally over time due to use of low-quality, degradable materials and lack of follow-up inspection and maintenance.</li> <li>• In some cases fences have been purposely broken through or completely removed by local communities, who place much higher value in their livestock as a source of protein, than on preserving mangroves, which in their eyes provide much lower benefits than livestock.</li> <li>• The project did implement a fencing repair program in the last year.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure of the livelihoods component (see below) to provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. there was no incentive through ‘net benefit’ to the communities’ livelihoods in excluding their livestock from mangroves areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to local communities to improve mangrove-supportive livelihoods, which provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. which provide ‘net benefit’ to the communities’ livelihoods in excluding their livestock from mangroves areas.</li> </ul>
6. Planting mangroves:	Partially effective:		

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of all 14 planting sites.</li> </ul>	<p><i>(with significant elements that were not effective)</i></p> <p>Planting mangroves was a major focus of the project and included the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Producing a <i>Mangroves Field Identification Manual for Timor-Leste</i> in 2018. This is fairly limited in scope, content and utility, is not professionally ‘finished’ and published – and is fairly low quality compared to similar ID manuals that are readily available in the region and could have been used as models.</li> <li>Producing a <i>Mangrove Ecosystem Restoration Guidelines for Timor-Leste</i> in 2017. This is of much better technical quality than the <i>Field Identification Manual</i> described above, but again does not appear to be professionally ‘finished’ and published. It does contain recommendations that may actually cause negative impacts, including geo-engineering. A simple, diagrammatic version in Tetum would be more useful to local communities.</li> <li>Producing a <i>National Mangrove Restoration &amp; Action Plan for Timor-Leste 2021</i>. This was produced very late in the project (the last year), when it should have been produced at start of the project as an initial planning document to guide the overall mangrove planting component of the project. As such it is retrospective and thus of limited value. The project itself simply does not have the time and resources to implement its recommended actions, and it seems highly unlikely that MAF will allocate post-project resources for its implementation. It also suffers from some technical quality issues, and contains recommendations that may actually cause negative impacts, including geo-engineering. It is</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE assesses that the main underlying causes that reduced the effectiveness of the mangrove planting component were as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PMU did not exercise sufficient quality control to ensure a high technical standard of the <i>Mangroves Field Identification Manual</i>, and follow-up to ensure that it was professionally ‘finished’ and published, or look at similar ID manuals that are readily available in the region and could have been used as models.</li> <li>The PMU did not follow-up to ensure that the <i>Mangrove Ecosystem Restoration Guidelines</i> were professionally ‘finished’ and published, or develop a simple, diagrammatic version in Tetum that would be more useful to local communities.</li> <li>The project did not produce the <i>National Mangrove Restoration &amp; Action Plan for Timor-Leste 2020</i> until the last year of the project, when it is too late to be of any practical use and is likely to become just another report ‘collecting dust on the shelf’.</li> <li>The project did not prepare any detailed mangrove planting plans, on paper, for each site, which address the essential factors listed in the left column.</li> <li>The fencing activities described under 5 above were not always effective, causing livestock to destroy many of the planted areas.</li> <li>The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Undertake expert review, improve, professionally ‘finish’ and publish the <i>Mangroves Field Identification Manual</i>.</li> <li>Undertake expert review, improve, professionally ‘finish’ and publish the <i>Mangrove Ecosystem Restoration Guidelines</i>, and develop a simple, diagrammatic version in Tetum that would be more useful to local communities.</li> <li>The project did not produce the <i>National Mangrove Restoration &amp; Action Plan for Timor-Leste 2020</i> until the last year of the project, when it is too late to be of any practical use and is likely to become just another report ‘collecting dust on the shelf’.</li> <li>Develop and implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all existng project sites over time.</li> <li>It is recommended that for sall future similar projects, UNDP should: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prepare any detailed mangrove planting plans, on paper, for each site, which address the essential factors listed in the left column.</li> <li>Develop and implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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	<p>likely to become just another report 'collecting dust on the shelf'.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supporting the establishment of mangrove nurseries and planting programs at 14 sites across 7 municipalities (Annex 5). The TE has identified a number of issues with this component as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There do not appear to be any detailed mangrove planting plans, on paper, developed for each site, which address essential factors such as selection of the most suitable areas for planting, selection of the best species mix, designing the planting to improve ecological values, avoiding negative changes to the local environment, and maximizing chances of success. It appears that the project has focused on the easiest species to grow (<i>Rhizophora stylosa</i>), and just planted these en-mass in any available open areas – without considering the above factors.</li> <li>• Reportedly, many, if not most, of the mangrove planting activities have not been successful, with low survival rates, and destruction by livestock reportedly being one of the main problems (see 5 above).</li> <li>• The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the success of the mangrove planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all sites over time. The project could not provide the TE with a scientifically based report with proper quantitative data on this issue for each site. The TE considers this to be a significant failing of the</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<p>planting in terms of mortality, survival and growth rates at all new sites over time.</p>

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	project.		
<p><b>7. Tarabandu to protect mangroves:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of all 11 Tara Bandu sites.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Partially effective:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TL has an ancient, strong and enduring system of traditional natural resource management practices – Tara Bandu – under which certain areas and practices can be prohibited, allowed or otherwise controlled through customary declarations, which often involve ceremony and sacred rites according to strict cultural protocols.</li> <li>The project has supported local communities to declare tarabandu controls banning livestock from mangrove areas and prohibiting cutting of mangrove wood etc at 11 sites across 7 municipalities.</li> <li>Reportedly, some of these have been effective while others have not, and despite the tara bandu the previous mangrove-destructive practices have continued.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE questions whether UNDP followed correct cultural practice to declare the Tara Bandu, which should be through the Uma Lisan (traditional clan groups) and Lia Nain (traditional leaders) - rather than through local councils – who are government.</li> <li>The local government may have just declared Tara Bandu in return for the project payment. However, if it does not have formal sanction from the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain it is unlikely to be enforced and effective.</li> <li>Also, traditionally, Bandu is a seasonal natural resource management tool – with a ‘closed’ period (Tara Bandu) when the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain declare a prohibition on resource use and an open season (Loke Bandu) when some resource use may be allowed, depending on season and community needs.</li> <li>It appears that the CRB project’s support for Tara Bandu did not include the traditional Loke Bandu component.</li> <li>The project may have in fact corrupted the traditional Tara Bandu process through its approach that did not follow the traditional cultural process and offered payment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL, local government and local communities to conduct follow-up socialization and rules enforcement activities at the project sites where new tarabandu rules have been supported.</li> <li>It is recommended that for any future UNDP projects that include use of tarabandu, UNDP should ensure that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is full and thorough consultation with local communities and especially their leaders to ensure that the new tarabandu declarations follow the correct cultural protocols and approvals.</li> <li>The activities cover the complete process beyond initial tarabandu rule declaration, especially community socialization, and if necessary, rules enforcement activities.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>8. Geo-engineering to encourage natural mangrove colonization:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of the two geo-engineering sites.</li> </ul>	<p><b>TE cannot assess:</b> <i>May cause negative impacts</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project supported geo-engineering (the digging of trenches through inter-tidal areas) in an attempt to allow tidal inflow and encourage natural recolonization by mangroves into currently bare areas, at two sites (Sabuli in Dili Municipality and Vatuvou in Liquica Municipality).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE is deeply concerned that the project did not undertake any form of EIA or detailed design planning to ensure that these interventions did / do not cause negative impacts, and did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on their effectiveness and potential impacts.</li> <li>The underlying cause of this failure appears to be lack of attention, oversight and assumption of responsibility by UNDFP /PMU – which is a serious issue.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP work with GoTL, local governments and communities to assess any potential negative impacts, including on groundwater resources, of the geo-engineering interventions that have been supported by the project, and to implement appropriate mitigation plans where necessary.</li> <li>It is recommended that from now, GoTL and local governments prohibit any further geo-engineering</li> </ul>

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE does not have any data to allow an assessment of the effectiveness of these two interventions and holds serious concerns that they may actually cause negative impacts, as follows:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sabuli involved the digging of straight channels that in no-way emulate natural tidal flows in unmodified mangrove areas.</li> <li>• They may alter the hydrodynamics and sediment dynamics in ways that may actually cause dieback of existing mangroves.</li> <li>• They may expose acid-sulphate soils – which can cause a range of negative environmental impacts (an issue that was highlighted in the ProDoc SESP but ignored by the PMU during implementation – which is a serious oversight).</li> <li>• They may cause saltwater intrusion and salt contamination of valuable freshwater groundwater supplies.</li> <li>• It appears that the project did not undertake any form of EIA or detailed design planning to ensure that these interventions did / do not cause negative impacts. This is a serious breach of UNDP’s E&amp;S policies and guidelines.</li> <li>• The project did not implement a scientifically rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the effectiveness and potential impacts of the geo-engineering interventions.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<p>interventions in mangrove areas, as the risks of negative impacts are too high, without rigorous scientific oversight.</p>
	<p><b>Partially effective :</b></p>		

Technical Activity*	TE Assessment of Effectiveness	Underlying Causes	Recommendations**
<p><b>9. Mangrove-supportive livelihoods to relieve exploitative pressures on mangroves:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of the all-109 livelihood groups.</li> </ul>	<p><i>(with significant elements that were not effective)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reportedly many, perhaps even most, of the livelihood activities have failed and will not be sustained post-project.</li> <li>Many of the livelihoods activities have failed / been abandoned even before the project has ended. This is a seriously concerning waste of valuable GEF investment.</li> <li>The livelihoods component did not provide communities with food security benefits that are at least equal to or greater than the protein-supply value of allowing their livestock to continue to graze in mangroves – i.e. there was no incentive through ‘net benefit’ to the communities’ livelihoods in excluding their livestock from mangroves areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The livelihoods component of the project has been implemented on an ad-hoc basis without an overall strategy or site plans and without proper baseline assessment, market and value-chain analysis and business planning and management training and support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to provide further post-project support to GoTL to ensure that <u>before</u> any future activities to support mangrove-supportive livelihoods are commenced, proper value-chain analysis of livelihood options, supported my proper market analysis, business planning and management training, are undertaken <u>first</u>.</li> </ul>
<p><b>10. Support to develop eco-tourism (sub-set of 9).</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of the four eco-tourism sites.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Partially effective:</b> <i>(with significant elements that were not effective)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE finds that the facility at Lagoa Maubara in Liquica Municipality is successful, the facilities are well designed and built, and this site provides a model for other sites.</li> <li>Unfortunately, despite the best of intentions by the project, the eco-tourism facilities at the three sites in Dili Municipality suffer several significant deficiencies (Figures 9 to 12).</li> <li>Firstly it is not clear to the TE why the project funded the building of three facilities right next door to each</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE assesses that the main underlying causes that reduced the effectiveness of the eco-tourism activities were as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of proper design and planning of infrastructure to ensure compliance with basic engineering construction, quality and safety standards and use of durable, safe building materials.</li> <li>Reliance on local NGOs with limited to no experience and expertise in construction projects to undertake the construction.</li> <li>Lack of oversight and quality control by UNDP, using appropriately qualified engineers/building inspectors,</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The very poor quality and safety standards of the eco-tourism facilities is an extremely serious concern, especially in a country subject to high seismic risk, and within a project that is supposed to be building resilience, including resilient infrastructure.</li> <li>There is a risk of people using the facilities being injured or worse, exposing UNDP to potential liability. It also raises the question as to why UNDFP would engage in the construction of physical infrastructure when it has no expertise in this area, or why it would not engage a professional construction company to manage this component.</li> </ul>

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	<p>other in the same municipality. This raises questions about the criteria used by the project to select sites and whether the investment of project funds was equitable across municipalities. The funds used for one of the three facilities in Dili could have gone to another municipality that had expressed interest in eco-tourism.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the time of the TE one site – Wenunuk – had already been abandoned before completion and construction had not been completed on the other three sites, with only a few weeks to go to project-end. There are also serious deficiencies with engineering design, quality of materials and construction standards, safety and long-term maintenance and sustainability at all sites.</li> </ul>	<p>of the construction process to ensure compliance with the design plans and with basic engineering construction, quality and safety standards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommend that UNDP should URGENTLY commission an expert review of all infrastructure that has been built by the project by appropriately qualified engineers/building inspectors, to identify risks and mitigation measures, and take action to implement these measures urgently.</li> <li>It is also recommended that UNDP should avoid getting involved in building physical infrastructure in TL in future, given the potential risks and liability exposure, and considering the seismic risks in the country.</li> </ul>
<p><b>11. Catchment replanting &amp; sediment control:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refer also Annex 5 for detailed assessment of the 45 SLM sites.</li> </ul>	<p><b>TE cannot assess:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE did not visit any of the SLM sites and the assessments provided by the PMU comprise very brief, self-reporting progress presentations from NGOs, with no independent, objective, quantitative assessments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cannot assess.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP undertake an independent review of the effectiveness of the catchment replanting and sediment control activities at the 45 sites, and identify and act on any lessons learned.</li> </ul>

#### 4.3.4 Efficiency

1. Efficiency is assessed by the value for money that was achieved by the project, the level of returns and positive benefit resulting from every dollar spent. There were some aspects of the project which were reportedly quite efficient, e.g.:
  - a) Reportedly the cost per hectare of mangrove restoration achieved by the project is well below the average in other parts of the world. However the TE was not provided with quantitative data to support this claim. Cost calculations need to also factor in the end-result – was it successful? If not, the funds are wasted.
  - b) Reportedly the project was able to achieve efficiencies by adopting a ‘learning by doing’ approach (‘on the job training’).
  
2. However, overall the efficiency of the CRB project was reduced by a number of factors, including:
  - a) The project had a relatively high staff turnover (Table 12), creating a start-stop effect to some project activities.
  - b) As outlined in section 4.2.3, the project spent US\$1.44 million on PMU staff salaries (including UN Volunteers), representing 20% of the GEF grant of \$7 million.
  - c) The project also commissioned an unusually high number of consultancies for a project of this scale. The TE identified a total of 29 consultancy and company contracts (Table 13) worth approximately US\$1.53 million. This is 22% of the total GEF allocation of \$7 million.
  - d) Combining the \$1.44 million spent on project salaries with the \$1.53 million spent on consultants and contracts comes to \$2.97 million, or 42% of the total \$7 million GEF grant, reducing the funds available for activities by GoTL and at local level. Several stakeholders that were consulted during the TE argued that a greater proportion of funds should have been used to support government and local-level activities. Some stated that as the project supported seven municipalities, the \$7 million should have approached \$1 million for each municipality, and only a small percentage (<20%) should have gone for UNDP project management.
  - e) Many, if not most, of the consultancy outputs were of quite poor technical quality and unlikely to be of practical use to GoTL and local communities, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort. Many stakeholders that were consulted during the TE expressed strong dissatisfaction with the high use of consultants and the lack of relevance and usefulness of many of their outputs.
  - f) Funding was spread to undertake activities across >30 NGOs, which was inefficient as there was very wide range of capacities across NGOs with several failing / being cancelled or producing low quality and unsustainable outputs, including sub-standard infrastructure.
  - g) As outlined above many of the mangrove fencing, mangrove planting and livelihood activities have failed, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort.
  - h) Project efficiency was also constrained by combining the PM and CTA roles into one position. The complex nature of the project required a very high level of project management commitment with a dedicated PM, and the highly technical nature of the project required a dedicated CTA with strong scientific and technical expertise in ICM, mangrove ecosystems management and related subjects. The TE considers that it was not efficient for the project to bring in temporary ICM, mangrove restoration and other experts on a sporadic, disjointed consultancy bases - this expertise should have been available full time in the PMU through the CTA.
  - i) UNDP was not able to implement a functional system to pay the cost of fuel and maintenance for the FCs’ motorcycles, with all FCs reporting that they had to purchase fuel and get the motorcycles serviced with their own money – which is not acceptable for project work. Additionally, reportedly UNDP did not pay the FCs DSA for trips to Dili from their municipalities, and project management pushed drivers to drive fast over very long-

distance to and from municipalities in the same day, in order to avoid having to pay overnight DSA – creating safety risks.

- j) The efficiency of the project was also affected by UNDP's decision to move most key staff, including the PM/CTA and FCs, to another project at the end of 2020, leaving the project with insufficient implementation capacity in the critical closing period. Very oddly, despite moving these key staff away from the CRB project, UNDP kept no less than three 'drivers' on the CRB project payroll (Figure X). The TE cannot ascertain any justification what-so-ever for three drivers up to project end, when critical staff members were moved on. This raises the possibility that the CO might be using project funds to pay drivers for general CO duties – which is not acceptable use of GEF funds.

3. These significant limitations on project efficiency result in an evaluation rating of Unsatisfactory.

Evaluation Rating: Unsatisfactory.

Summary Findings - Efficiency:

- *There were some aspects of the project which were reportedly quite efficient, however, overall the efficiency of the CRB project was reduced by a number of factors, including:*
  - *The project had a relatively high staff turnover, creating a start-stop effect to some project activities.*
  - *The project spent US\$1.44 million on PMU staff salaries (including UN Volunteers), representing 20% of the GEF grant of \$7 million.*
  - *The project also commissioned an unusually high number of consultancies for a project of this scale. The TE identified a total of 29 consultancy and company contracts worth approximately US\$1.53 million. This is 22% of the total GEF allocation of \$7 million.*
  - *Combining the \$1.44 million spent on project salaries with the \$1.53 million spent on consultants and contracts comes to \$2.97 million, or 42% of the total \$7 million GEF grant, reducing the funds available for activities by GoTL and at local level. Some stakeholders stated that as the project supported seven municipalities, the \$7 million should have approached \$1 million for each municipality, and only a small percentage (<20%) should have gone for UNDP project management.*
  - *Many, if not most, of the consultancy outputs were of quite poor technical quality and unlikely to be of practical use to GoTL and local communities, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort.*
  - *Funding was spread to undertake activities across >30 NGOs, which was inefficient as there was very wide range of capacities across NGOs with several failing / being cancelled or producing low quality and unsustainable outputs, including sub-standard infrastructure.*
  - *Many of the mangrove fencing, mangrove planting and livelihood activities have failed, which is inefficient and wasteful of funds and effort.*
  - *Project efficiency was also constrained by combining the PM and CTA roles into one position. The complex nature of the project required a very high level of project management commitment with a dedicated PM, and the highly technical nature of the project required a dedicated CTA with strong scientific and technical expertise in ICM, mangrove ecosystems management and related subjects.*
  - *The efficiency of the project was also affected by UNDP's decision to move most key staff, including the PM/CTA and FCs, to another project at the end of 2020, leaving the project with insufficient implementation capacity in the critical closing period.*





### 4.3.5 Sustainability

#### 4.3.5.1 Financial sustainability

1. One of the most important measures of success of a project is whether its outcomes and benefits will be replicated and sustainable, and this requires allocation of adequate post-project financial resources. Unfortunately, the TE could not find any evidence that there will be financial sustainability of project outcomes and benefits:
  - a) UNDP / GoTL / MAF have not developed a documented Sustainability Plan with explicit allocation of financial resources to ensure continuity, sustainability and replication of project benefits into the future.
  - b) There is no evidence of allocation of funds in the central State budget for project-related activities moving forward.
  - c) There is no documented Maintenance Plan and associated financial resources for the ongoing, long-term maintenance of physical infrastructure that have been built by the project such as ecotourism facilities.
  - d) It appears that many, if not most, of the livelihood activities have not been successful and are unlikely to be financially viable/sustainable post-project, and the project has not developed any plans to address this.

Evaluation Rating: Unlikely.

#### 4.3.5.2 Socio-political sustainability

1. There appears to be a high level of social and political support for the project's outputs, outcomes and benefits and there have been various 'statements of intent' by MAF and other stakeholders of a wish to continue to implement CRB-related activities into the future, even if these are not yet backed up with documented and budgeted replication, sustainability and maintenance plans.

Evaluation Rating: Moderately Likely.

#### 4.3.5.3 Institutional & governance sustainability

1. Overall, the project has not been effective in establishing the institutional framework and governance arrangements across GoTL that are needed to ensure the sustainability of project outputs, outcomes and benefits into the future, despite this being a key part of the overall project objective. Problems include:
  - a) The plethora of CMA strategies, plans and related documents developed by the project, which are supposed to provide the basis for the institutional framework and governance arrangements, are highly convoluted and confused, suffer significant technical deficiencies, are unlikely to be of practical benefit to and implemented by GoTL, and none have been formally approved/adopted by GoTL for implementation.
  - b) There has been a positive change at MAF in that the Directorate of Forestry & Watershed Management has been renamed the Directorate of Forestry, Watershed & Mangroves Management, with supporting legal mandate and defined mangrove responsibilities, but as yet no allocation of necessary resources from the Central State Budget.
  - c) There is no evidence that the other Directorates in MAF have had their roles, coordination and planning mechanisms clarified and mandated, as required to meet project output 1.4.
  - d) Just as important as internal institutional arrangements at MAF is the establishment of fully-functioning and sustainable, 'whole-of-government', national and local-level cross-sectoral coordination arrangements – the project has not be able to establish these on a permanent basis.

- e) The PB and TWG have been very project-focused and there are no plans in place to evolve these into permanent, formalised CMA coordination mechanisms. It is recommended that the PB or TWG be evolved from temporary project-based groups into an ongoing, permanent, National ICM Coordination Committee or similar, ideally under the auspices of the National Ocean Policy (NOP).

Evaluation Rating: Unlikely.

#### 4.3.5.4 Environmental sustainability

1. Despite some site-level environmental benefits of the project, especially from mangrove planting, like other SIDS Timor-Leste is subject to the overarching impacts of global climate change, and if these are not addressed by the global community, the small-scale benefits of such national-level projects may be overwhelmed by regional- and global-level environmental changes.
2. The likelihood of the environmental sustainability of project outcomes and outputs is reduced by the fact that, reportedly many, if not most, of the fencing activities have not been effective, many, if not most, of the mangrove planting efforts have not been successful, and the geo-engineering interventions may cause negative impacts (refer section 4.3.3).

Evaluation rating: Moderately Unlikely.

#### 4.3.5.5 Overall sustainability

1. Combining the TE assessments of likely financial, socio-political, institutional and governance and environmental sustainability as described above results in an assessment of overall sustainability of moderately unlikely.

Overall Evaluation Rating: Moderately Unlikely.

#### Summary Findings - Sustainability:

- *The TE rates the overall likelihood of sustainability for this project as “Moderately Unlikely”. The main reasons:*
  - *UNDP and GoTL have not developed a documented Sustainability Plan with explicit allocation of financial resources to ensure continuity, sustainability and replication of project benefits.*
  - *There is also no documented Maintenance Plan and associated financial resources for the ongoing, long-term maintenance of physical facilities that have been built by the project.*
  - *The project has not been effective in establishing the ‘whole-of-government’ institutional framework and governance arrangements across GoTL that are needed to ensure the sustainability of project outputs, outcomes and benefits into the future, despite this being a key part of the overall project objective.*

#### 4.3.6 Country ownership

1. As outlined in section 4.1 - Project Design and section 4.3.2 - Relevance, the CRB project had a very high level of country ownership, the project design was strongly linked to national sectoral and development plans, and relevant country representatives were actively involved in project identification, planning and implementation.
2. A remaining gap in country ownership is documentary evidence of a commitment of financial resources by government for the ongoing replication and sustainability of project outcomes and outputs post-project.

#### Summary Findings - Country Ownership:

- *The CRB project had a very high level of country ownership. A remaining gap in country ownership is documentary evidence of a commitment of financial resources by government for the ongoing replication and sustainability of project outcomes and outputs post-project.*

#### 4.3.7 Gender equality & empowerment of women

1. As outlined in section 4.1.6, the gender study undertaken during the project design phase (Larson (2015) provided a comprehensive overview of the gender setting in Timor-Leste in 2015, and identified gender issues that needed to be taken into account by the project.
2. The ProDoc itself does not have an explicit, dedicated section outlining a plan for how gender and social inclusion considerations will be addressed by the project, except to state that a Gender Specialist would be recruited by the project to:
  - a) Ensure that consultations capture the views of women, are gathered from women in a manner that does not put them at risk; and that selected livelihood interventions are implemented in a gender-sensitive manner and prioritize benefit to, and empowerment of, women.
  - b) Ensure implementation of, and compliance with, the UNDP gender policy in general and the Gender Action Plan (GAP) to be developed for the project, to effectively integrate gender concerns into the implementation of project activities.
3. Specific gender elements are included in only two end-of-project Targets in the PRF, both under Outcome 2: Mangrove-supportive livelihoods established to incentivize mangrove rehabilitation and protection, as follows (Target numbers are added by the TE, these are lacking in the PRF):
  - a) Target 2.2: *1000 households benefiting from mangrove-supportive livelihoods (estimated at 5000 people, 5/households) ~30 % of support will target woman specifically.*
  - b) Target 2.3: *Positive % income change in household income, specifically in households where women are engaged in mangrove-supportive livelihoods supported by the project.*
4. None of the Indicators in the PRF include gender elements.
5. Of the 10 project Outputs described in the ProDoc narrative (which as outlined above are not included in the PRF), only one includes a gender element: Output 2.2: Mangrove-supportive, diversified livelihoods/social businesses established in mangrove rehabilitation project sites, benefiting at least 1,000 households and empowering women.
6. The project developed a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed. The project made special effort to work with women's groups in the livelihoods activities.
7. The PMU provided the data on participation in all CRB Project meetings, workshops, training & other project events showing segregated by gender, which shows that of all participants in all project activities, 73% were male and 27% were female, which is significantly short of a desired 50:50 ratio.

#### Summary Findings - Gender Equality & Empowerment of Women:

- *The gender study undertaken during the project design phase (Larson (2015) provided a comprehensive overview of the gender setting in Timor-Leste in 2015, and identified gender issues that needed to be taken into account by the project.*
- *The project developed a Gender Action Plan and also a Gender Training Manual in 2018, which are assessed by the TE to be very well developed. The project made special effort to work with women's groups in the livelihoods activities.*
- *The PMU provided the data on participation in all CRB Project meetings, workshops, training & other project events showing segregated by gender, which shows that of all participants in all project activities, 73% were male and 27% were female, which is significantly short of a desired 50:50 ratio.*

#### 4.3.8 Other cross-cutting issues

1. In addition to gender and the empowerment of women there are a number of other crosscutting issues that it is useful to assess when evaluating projects, including:
  - a) The SDGs (already addressed in section 4.3.2 above).
  - b) Poverty alleviation.
  - c) Improved governance.
  - d) Climate change mitigation and adaptation.
  - e) Disaster prevention and recovery.
  - f) Human rights.
  - g) Social and environmental (E&S) impacts.
2. Each of these is assessed in relation to the project in Table X.

#### Summary Findings - Other Crosscutting Issues:

- Overall the TE finds that all of the crosscutting issues are relevant and most have been well addressed by the project, except for improved governance and E&S impacts.

**TABLE 15: Assessment of cross-cutting issues in relation to the CRB project**

Cross-cutting issue	TE assessment in relation to R2R Nauru Project
Poverty alleviation: (As per SDG 1 in Table 10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainable livelihoods that address and prevent poverty are dependent on a healthy, sustainable environment – including land, coastal and marine.</li> <li>• The livelihoods component of the project directly addressed poverty.</li> </ul>
Improved governance. (As per SDG 16 in Table 10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall, the project has not been effective in establishing the institutional framework and governance arrangements across GoTL that are needed to ensure the sustainability of project outputs, outcomes and benefits into the future, despite this being a key part of the overall project objective.</li> </ul>
Climate change mitigation and adaptation: (As per SDG 13 in Table 10)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Climate change issues underpin the entire rationale for the CRB project.</li> </ul>
Disaster prevention and recovery:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Building increased resilience to disasters is a key element of the CRB project's entire focus to build coastal resilience to climate change.</li> </ul>
Human rights:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• While not an explicit part of the CRB project, overall the various components of the project all assist in addressing human rights, including through supporting livelihoods and the gender and social inclusiveness aspects.</li> </ul>
E&S impacts:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has not addressed E&amp;S issues very well and several project interventions and activities may cause negative E&amp;S impacts.</li> </ul>

#### 4.3.9 Overall Project Outcome Rating

1. According to the UNDP-GEF TE Guidelines 2020, the calculation of the Overall Outcome Rating is based on the ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, of which relevance and effectiveness are the most critical, and applying the following three constraints:
  - a) The rating on relevance will determine whether the Overall Outcome Rating will be in the unsatisfactory range (moderately unsatisfactory to highly unsatisfactory = unsatisfactory range). If the relevance rating is in the unsatisfactory range then the Overall Outcome Rating will be in the unsatisfactory range as well. However, where the relevance rating is in the satisfactory range (highly satisfactory to moderately satisfactory), the Overall Outcome Rating could, depending on its effectiveness and efficiency rating, be either in the satisfactory range or in the unsatisfactory range.
  - b) The Overall Outcome Rating cannot be higher than the effectiveness rating.
  - c) The Overall Outcome Rating cannot be higher than the average rating of effectiveness and efficiency.
2. Applying the above to the CRB project results in an Overall Outcome Rating of **Unsatisfactory**, as shown in Table X.

**TABLE 16:** Overall Project Outcome Rating

Assessment of Project Outcomes	Rating
Relevance (refer section 4.3.2):	Highly Satisfactory
Effectiveness (refer section 4.3.3):	Highly Unsatisfactory
Efficiency (refer section 4.3.4):	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Outcome:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory *

\*Although combining the ratings for Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency in accordance with the formula in the UNDP-GEF TE Guidelines results in an Overall Outcome Rating of 'Unsatisfactory', due to the external factors outlined in Fore-Note 2, and considering there were some positive achievements of the project, the TE concludes that the overall evaluation rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

## 5. Summary Findings & Recommendations

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- These are presented in Chapter 1 - Executive Summary and are not repeated here in order to keep the size of the document manageable.

## ANNEX 1: TE ToR

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To keep the size of this report manageable – please refer ToR as separate document.

## ANNEX 2: List of Stakeholders Interviewed

### UNDP

Name	Position	Organization
Diana Lina Bernardo	Programme Specialist	UNDP CO
Mariana Simoes	Regional Technical Adviser - Climate Change	UNDP APRO
Devindranauth Bissoon	Ex CTA/PM	UNDP PMU
Roni Pati Tpoi	Officer in Charge - CRB project & FC Dili	UNDP PMU
Ermezinda Soares Freitas	Finance and Operation Officer	UNDP PMU
Octavio de Araujo	Communication and M&E Officer	UNDP PMU
Juliana da Silva Hau	Grant Finance and Admin Associate	UNDP PMU
Dolgion Aldar	Livelihood Specialist	Consultant
Cesario Amaral	Junior Livelihood Consultant	UNDP PMU
Reinaldo da Costa	Engineer	UNDP PMU
Jesuino Neves	Architect	UNDP PMU
Petonilo (Pete) Munez Jr.	GIS Specialist	UNDP PMU
Daniel Tomas	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU
Leonel Bere	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU
Jose Antonio Pinto	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU
Mario Benevides	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU
Domingos de Jesus Sarmento	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU
Jose Nunes	Ex Field Coordinator	UNDP PMU

### National Government

Name	Position	Organization
Raimundo Mau (Chair)	DG Forestry, Coffee, and Industrial Crops	MAF
João Carlos Soares	Diretor Geral Ambiente	SEA
Maria Odete do Ceu Guterres	Director General of Forestry	MAF
Rui dos Reis Pires	Director Nacional da Proteccao e Recuperacao da Biodiversidade	SEA
Joao Antalmo Freitas	Director Nacional Nature Conservation and Protected Area	MAF
Adalfredo do Rosario Ferreira	National Director of Forestry and Watershed Management	MAF
Amencia Machado Fernandes	National Director of Center of Education for Environmental Information	SEA
Aleixo Leonito Amaral	Director of Department of Marine Science and Fisheries	UNTL
Pedro Pinto	Chief of Department of Protected Areas	MAF
Claudino Ninas Sabais	National Director of Research, Statistic and Geographic Information	MAF
Jacinto Ribeiro dos Santos	Chief of Department for Environment, General Directorate of Environment	SEA
Deolindo	National Director of Research and Development	MAF

### NGOs

Note – The project worked with a total of 27 NGOs, only two were interviewed - this is a significant gap in the TE. However – 6 NGOs submitted completed EQs.

Name	Position	Organization	Role in Project
Elio Antonio da Costa	Program Manager	Timor Verde	CRB project manager
Alito Rosa	Director	KFF	

**Local Government & Communities**

Name	Position	Organization	Role in Project
Henrique da Costa	Chief of CBERM	Community	CBERM implementation supervisor
Xefe Aldeia (Tibar)	Xefe Aldeia	Suku Council	Tara Bandu
Agapito Pereira	Member of CEBRM	Community	Nursery
Leonardo Barbosa	Member of CEBRM	Community	Nursery
Helder	Chief of the group	Grupo Hadomi Ai Parapa	CRB implementation supervisor
Kela Santos Soares	Member	Grupo Hadomi Ai Parapa	Finance and project management
Community (Ulmera)	Member	Ulmera community	Nursery, planting, and livelihood
Xefe Aldeia Beacou	Xefe Aldeia	Suku Council	Chief of CBERM
Community 1 (Beacou)	CRB Worker	Community	Supervisor of nursery and planting
Community 2 (Beacou)	CRB Worker	Community	Building, nursery, fences, etc
Domingos da Costa	Xefe Suku	Suku Council	Leading the project implementation
Julio Sarmiento	CBERM	Community	Planting, livelihood, and fences
Leo	CBERM	Community	CRB implementation supervisor

## ANNEX 3: List of Documents Reviewed

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### GEF Documents:

- GEF focal area strategic Programme Objectives (BD, LD & IW).
- GEF Project Identification Form (PIF).
- GEF CEO Endorsement.
- GEF Tracking Tool (provided by but not updated by PMU at MTR and TE reporting periods).

### UNDP Documents:

- UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).
- UNDP Country Program Document (CPD).

### Project-related Documents:

- UNDP Project Document (ProDoc).
- Project Inception Workshop Report.
- Project Board and Technical Working Group meeting minutes.
- Midterm Review Report (MTR).
- Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIRs).
- Annual Progress Reports (APRs).
- Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs).
- Project budget, broken out by outcomes and outputs.
- Financial Data including Combined Delivery Reports (CDR) (not provided by PMU).
- Technical reports from subcontracts and consultancies.
- Technical reports and similar outputs produced by the Project itself.
- Sample of project communications materials, brochures, posters, etc.

## ANNEX 4: Evaluation Questionnaire Response Analysis

## NOTES:

- The EQ was emailed out to over 50 project stakeholders, with 13 completed returns being received.
- Responses were mainly from UNDP project staff, the project Field Coordinators (FCs) and NGOs, with none from government or local communities. This limited the representativeness of the EQ responses.
- However, they still provide very useful insights on the performance of the project.

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES (This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)
<b>1. Relevance of the Project:</b>	
1.1 Is the project relevant to the needs of Timor -Leste?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly relevant.</li> <li>• TL is highly vulnerable to climate induced hazards including sea level rise, storm surges, coastal flooding among others.</li> <li>• There has been significant loss of mangroves in TL in recent decades – reportedly 80% loss from 9,000 ha in 1940s.</li> <li>• Causes of mangrove loss include large-scale clearing during Indonesian times to create fish ponds and other coastal land-uses, local exploitation for fire wood, building wood, livestock grazing etc, and recent major infrastructure development projects (ports, coastal roads etc).</li> <li>• CRB supports major national policies, plans and targets in alignment with MEAs, including inter alia: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SDP 2011 - 2030.</li> <li>• INDCs under the Paris Agreement.</li> <li>• National Adaptation Plan.</li> <li>• Land Degradation Neutrality targets under UNCCD.</li> <li>• Diversifying livelihoods beyond fossil fuel (oil) revenue and coffee production / subsistence rainfed agriculture.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
1.2 Is the project relevant to the needs of your organization?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly relevant to needs of numerous organizations in GoTL working on climate change adaptation, sustainable management of natural resources, resilient ecosystems and socioeconomic development.</li> <li>• Several NGOs reported that being involved in implementation of project activities provided very valuable experience to learn and improve skills in proposal writing and project planning, management and monitoring and reporting, which strengthens their capacity to implement future projects. Several NGOs reported that “the process was just as important as the product”.</li> </ul>
1.3 Is the project relevant to the needs of your community?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly relevant.</li> <li>• There are 99 sucos interfacing directly with the sea and another 22 that extend from the coastline to 20 meters above MSL elevation i.e. 121 sucos considered as coastal in TL.</li> <li>• Among the 99 sucos there are 66 that have mangrove ecosystems.</li> <li>• In addition their biodiversity, ecological, coastal protection, blue carbon and socioeconomic values mangroves also have high cultural significance and values in TL, as evident from lessons learned in the project implementation where traditional ceremonies are required before any physical intervention or activity can be implemented.</li> <li>• In addition to coastal mangroves, at some sites the project undertook activities to assist sustainable landuse in catchment areas, including riparian tree planting to address erosion and sedimentation, as relevant to certain communities.</li> </ul>
1.4 Other comments on relevance:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CRB project was designed and implemented at a critical time period when mangroves in TL were rapidly being destroyed through a combination of major drivers.</li> <li>• There have been no previous efforts in TL of this scale and magnitude to address the destruction and loss of this important ecosystem.</li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The scale and magnitude of mangrove degradation and destruction may have been much greater during the project period without the project, especially in the 7 municipalities where the project undertook physical interventions.</li> <li>• The public awareness programs may have also had some impact on those municipalities that were not targeted for physical intervention (although there is no data to support this).</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>2. Effectiveness:</u></b></p>	
<p>2.1 Was the project effective in meeting its objectives &amp; targets?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall project implementation was quite slow, with a delayed start, and two extensions being granted past the original planned end date of Dec 2019, one to May 2021 and one to July 2021 (in 2020/21 Covid 19 was a factor causing delays, although prior to that project implementation rate was still quite slow against planned targets).</li> <li>• Most objectives and targets have been achieved or will be achieved by project end, although there are several significant non-achievements and under-achievements as outlined in section X of the TE report.</li> <li>• The MTR recommendations introduced additional activities that were simultaneously pursued without additional resources, indicating good adaptive management capacity at the PMU.</li> <li>• The project has improved the knowledge and skills of local authorities, local communities and NGOs across a range of issues, including the importance and value of mangroves, mangrove restoration techniques, sustainable land-use, alternative mangrove-friendly livelihoods and project proposal writing, project management and project reporting.</li> </ul>
<p>2.2 How was the project most effective?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This is the first major effort to protect coastal ecosystems and especially mangroves in TL. As such, it is understandable that not all aspects were fully effective, as the project is also a learning process, however some of the most effective aspects were:</li> <li>• Comprehensive national mapping of mangroves including validation through ground surveys, providing a more complete and up to date inventory of mangroves for all coastal municipalities, expanding previous estimates of national mangrove area, hosted on NM3R system at MAF. This provides a mapping baseline for future monitoring of changes in mangroves at each site, municipality and nationally, and for future projects and interventions to build upon.</li> <li>• Major effort to raise national and local-level awareness about the value of mangroves and the need to protect and manage them sustainably.</li> <li>• Using drama/theatre by NGO Timor-Leste Art Film' and linking with GoTL 'Green Schools' program were reported as highly effective awareness activities.</li> <li>• More than 20 CBMM Groups were supported across the seven municipalities, comprising more than 300 members, with Women playing an important role.</li> <li>• Major effort to equip local-level communities with the knowledge, skills and tools, including nursery facilities, to undertake mangrove restoration (the project paid community groups UDS\$1 per mangrove seedling - to establish nursery, collect the seed, grow the seedling for 6 months and plant in degraded sites. However, unfortunately many of the actual mangrove restoration efforts have not been successful, with high rates of mortality of seedlings and other problems – see section X of the TE report).</li> <li>• The payment model helped communities to have alternative, mangrove-friendly income, including during Covid-19, and provide an incentive to not resort to mangrove destructive practices such as cutting the mangroves for fuel wood, expanding livestock and encouraging free grazing animals (although despite the project these activities have returned at some project sites).</li> <li>• For the first time TL now has four mangrove eco-tourism sites (Hera in Dili Municipality, Wenunuk and Sabuli in Metinaro Municipality and Maubara in Liquica Municipality) (all basically board-walks, view points, gazebos and kiosks), which are intended to help create alternative mangrove-friendly livelihoods and further assist with raising awareness.</li> <li>• This coincides with the Ministry of Tourism's #HauNiaTimor campaign to promote domestic tourism, and representatives from other municipalities who visited these sites as part of in-country exchange learning expressed interest in building similar</li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES (This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)
	<p>facilities (Suai, Atauro, Bobonaro).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Given the interest in eco-tourism, the government has proposed allocation of funds in the state budget for similar facilities around the country.</li> <li>Despite the positive responses - at time of the TE one site – Wenunuk – had already been abandoned before completion and construction had not been completed on the other three sites, with only a few weeks to go to project-end. There are also serious deficiencies with engineering design, quality of materials and construction standards, safety and long-term maintenance and sustainability at all sites).</li> </ul>
<p>2.3 How could the effectiveness of the project been improved?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A wide range of project activities were spread across numerous local sites in 7 municipalities, spreading effort, increasing admin and management demands and reducing effectiveness.</li> <li>Effectiveness could have been improved by narrowing the focus of the physical interventions and the number of sites/municipalities targeted, adopting more of a pilot-demonstration site approach, for replication at other sites later.</li> <li>Ironically at some sites effectiveness was constrained by traditional cultural beliefs in the sanctity of mangroves and traditional natural resource management practices (Tara Bandu) which, while designed to protect mangroves, prohibited or reversed physical interventions by the project that were also designed to protect mangroves, such as fencing g to exclude livestock.</li> <li>There was reluctance in some communities to give up their traditional practices such as cutting and burning and allowing livestock to graze in mangroves – with cultural beliefs and traditional practices being cited as justification for this.</li> <li>Livestock (cattle, goats and pigs) accessing mangrove areas is one of the main negative impacts on mangroves in TL. The leaves, especially of mangrove seedlings, are a source of green feed for cattle and goats – and their grazing prevents natural regeneration, and was a significant cause of mortality in the replanted areas. Their hooves also compact the mangrove mud, preventing aeration and causing anoxic conditions in the mud and killing mangroves. Pigs forage for food in the mangrove mud – causing erosion and physical disturbance. Feces from all livestock pollute tidal waters.</li> <li>It was reported that for most communities, despite significant project investment in raising awareness, building livestock exclusion fences and declaring strict Tara Bandu against allowing livestock into mangrove areas, the communities rapidly returned to allowing livestock into mangroves.</li> <li>This probably reflects the vital role that livestock (cattle, goats, pigs) play in the protein security of local communities, which cannot be replaced to the same level by other protein sources, their very high value relative to alternative, mangrove-friendly livelihoods, and the lack of alternative feeding areas for livestock, especially during drought periods.</li> <li>These factors are practical realities that the project was unable to address effectively – more innovative solutions that provided alternatives with at least the same, if not higher value returns than allowing livestock to use mangroves should have been explored.</li> <li>At some sites the project supported ‘bioengineering’ interventions, mainly the digging of channels, ostensibly to enhance tidal flows to promote natural mangrove generation. It is not clear to the TE that proper engineering and environmental impact assessment undertake for these activities - and photographs show that some involved the digging of straight channels that in no-way emulate natural tidal flows in unmodified mangrove areas. They may also expose acid-sulphate soils – which can cause a range of negative environmental impacts. There is concern that these engineering works may not be effective in achieving their stated objectives, and may in fact cause net negative impacts.</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Efficiency:</b></p>	
<p>3.1 Did the project use funding, resources and personnel efficiently?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project had a very high use of external consultancies, which used a significant part of the budget that could have been used for on-site activities at local level.</li> <li>Reportedly the cost per hectare of mangrove restoration and conservation achieved by the project is well below the average in other parts of the world (however the TE was not provided with quantitative data to support this claim).</li> <li>The project was able to achieve efficiencies by adopting a ‘learning by doing’</li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES (This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)
	<p>approach ('on the job training'), driven by the fact that national and local partners had no previous experience and skills sets in relevant areas.</p>
<p>3.2 Were there any wasteful or inefficient practices in the way that the project was implemented?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spreading funding to undertake project activities across 27 NGOs was inefficient as there was very wide range of capacities across NGOs with several failing / being cancelled or producing low quality and unsustainable outputs, including sub-standard infrastructure.</li> <li>• As outlined above many of the mangrove planting efforts have not been unsuccessful with high mortality of seedlings – for a variety of reasons – which is also inefficient / wasteful of funds and effort.</li> <li>• As outlined above many of the physical facilities built by the project have serious deficiencies with engineering design, quality of materials and construction standards, safety and long-term maintenance and sustainability.</li> <li>• Many of the fences built by the project have fallen into disrepair / are no longer functional, especially those built in the early stages – which is wasteful. Reportedly rates paid to communities for fencing were inconsistent. Reportedly in 2019 detailed site assessment and condition surveys were undertaken with proposal for a more sustainable approach to fencing – including a unified payment rate and so-called 'living fences' where the upright posts are live seedlings of straight-growing, upright species that preclude the need to replace fence-posts over time. It is not clear to the TE to what extent this was rolled-out and how effective it was.</li> <li>• While the project endeavoured to support communities to develop alternative, mangrove-friendly livelihoods, including horticulture, fishponds, fisheries groups, livestock, cooperative kiosks and small restaurants, many aspects of the alternative livelihoods component were highly wasteful and inefficient due to a focus on technical training only (e.g. how to plant and grow bananas or dragon fruit) or just building facilities (e.g. a coffee kiosk or eating house) without any market analysis, supply chain analysis, business planning, logistical arrangements to get produce to market, training of business operators in the basics of business management etc).</li> <li>• In one case two outboard motors were provided to a community that does not have boats to use them on.</li> <li>• As a result many of the livelihood projects have failed / been abandoned – which is a complete waste of GEF funds.</li> <li>• It was reported that at some mangrove nurseries supported by the project, mangrove seedlings were germinated and grown but were not planted out in the field – which is inefficient and wasteful.</li> </ul>
<p>3.3 How could the efficiency of the project have been improved?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It would have been more efficient and less wasteful to partner with just 3 to 4 larger NGOs who could prove an established history of previous successful project implementation capacity through a more rigorous selection process.</li> <li>• The efficiency (and effectiveness) of the mangrove planting efforts could have been improved with greater attention to measures to ensure much higher survival rates of seedlings, including more scientific assessment of site conditions for suitability for planting, better protection of seedlings from grazing and more attention to post-planting monitoring and maintenance.</li> <li>• The efficiency (and effectiveness) of the physical facilities built by the project would have been improved by ensuring proper engineering design, higher quality of materials and construction standards, proper safety provisions and long-term maintenance and sustainability arrangements.</li> <li>• The efficiency (and effectiveness) of fencing would have been improved with greater attention to better design, construction, maintenance and sustainability, as well as unified payment rates, right from the beginning of the project.</li> <li>• The efficiency (and effectiveness) of the alternative livelihoods component would have been improved by first undertaking proper market analysis, supply chain analysis, business planning, logistical arrangements to get produce to market, training of business operators in the basics of business management etc, before proceeding with any livelihood-building activity.</li> <li>• Efficiency (and effectiveness) could have been improved by making less use of external consultancies and freeing up more budget for on-site activities at local level.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Sustainability:</b></p>	

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES (This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)
<p>4.1 Do you think that the project outcomes will be continued and sustained after the Project has closed?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need at least a 15 to 20 year sustained intervention and funding to resolve chronic and deeply rooted problems of mangrove loss and degradation in TL. A one-off, short term project is not a solution.</li> <li>• Sustainability of project outcomes will very much depend on allocation of funding and resources for follow-up activities by GoTL in the State annual budgets, which is not yet assured.</li> <li>• Sustainability of project outcomes will be assisted by the fact that the project has raised the profile of mangroves across all sectors in TL.</li> <li>• The project’s significant awareness campaign as well as involvement of &gt;30 NGOs and &gt;20 CBMM Groups in a range of technical activities has most likely significantly raised awareness about the importance and value of mangrove and the need to protect them and manage them sustainably. However, the project did not undertake any Knowledge, Attitude &amp; Practice (KAP) survey at the beginning and again at the end, so there is no quantitative data to prove that awareness has actually increased and that attitudes and practices have actually improved over time.</li> <li>• Reportedly, the project has assisted introduction of new, strict Tara Bandu regulations for mangrove protection in 12 communities (although the TE could not verify this).</li> <li>• Other positive signals of the likely sustainability of project outcomes is the fact that MAF has created an explicit focus on mangroves in its organizational structure, , and the UNTL is expanding its efforts on mangrove teaching, research and monitoring.</li> <li>• Digital and data sustainability is the responsibility of the SDI/Mangrove Sustainability lab in MAF.</li> <li>• However, there are also some significant negative signals on the likely sustainability of project outcomes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As outlined above many of the project’s efforts at replanting mangroves, building infrastructure (including eco-tourism facilities and fences), and building alternative livelihoods have already failed, have been abandoned or are unlikely to be sustained post-project.</li> <li>• Also, the ICM plans developed under Component 1 of the project has not been formally adopted by GoTL and there do not appear to be any arrangements in place for its implementation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• There were reports that cutting of timber to provide posts for mangrove fencing depleted forest resources in other areas, without proper consultation with relevant parties.</li> </ul>
<p>4.2 What are main barriers to continuity and sustainability that need to be overcome? (e.g. financial, institutional, technical capacity, community ownership, etc):</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of ongoing, long-term funding, including from GoTL.</li> <li>• Lack of baseline assessments, business planning and business management for alternative livelihoods, meaning that many of the alternative livelihood activities are not viable and have not continued /will not continue.</li> <li>• Ongoing need for capacity building and training at all levels for all subject areas covered by the project.</li> <li>• Lack of community ownership of project initiatives in some communities.</li> <li>• Fencing materials (local wood, bamboo etc) degrade rapidly – need to use more long-lasting materials such as concrete fence posts and steel wire.</li> </ul>
<p>4.3 What would you recommend to improve sustainability of the project benefits after it ends?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased allocation of budget and resources for mangrove protection and management by GoTL, including for MAF staff and Forest Guards to continue the mangrove protection and management activities.</li> <li>• Establishment and full resourcing of a permanent mangrove unit in MAF (within GD of Forestry), staffed by personnel with relevant skills and capacity, and linked to the Mangrove/GIS laboratory.</li> </ul>
<p><b>5. Impact:</b></p>	
<p>5.1 Has the project helped to reduce environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has definitely helped to reduce environmental stress and improve ecological status of mangroves in TL, and to contribute to climate change mitigation, adaptation and resilience.</li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Efforts have been undertaken to conserve 2,300 hectares of mangroves (although their ongoing, long-term conservation is not guaranteed).</li> <li>• Additional mangroves have been planted to expand the total mangrove area (although as outlined above at many sites survival rates have been low).</li> <li>• Piloting of Carbon Offset (by NGO F-COTI) is an important initiative as outlined in the PES roadmap for TL. This will provide important lessons for future replication and scale up.</li> <li>• Overall, the main constraint on the ecological benefits of the project is, reportedly, the fact that many communities rapidly returned to allowing livestock into mangroves, as outlined under EQ 2.3 above.</li> <li>• Also, the project to not address environmental stress in non-mangrove coastal areas, which are also suffering a range of impacts.</li> </ul>
<p>5.2 Has the project improved the daily lives of local communities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project was specifically designed to improve the daily lives of local communities by protecting and sustaining the ecosystem services and benefits that they obtain from mangroves, by involving them directly, with payments, in project activities (planting mangroves, building fences etc) and by assisting them to develop alternative, mangrove-friendly livelihoods.</li> <li>• However, as outlined above many of these activities, and especially efforts to develop alternative livelihoods, have not been successful.</li> <li>• At the time of the TE there was no quantitative data and analysis available to indicate whether or not the project has actually improved the daily lives of local communities relative to the pre-project socioeconomic baseline – in fact it appears that the pre-project baseline was not established.</li> </ul>
<p>5.3 Has the project improved government coordination, planning and decision making in relation to protection of mangroves and coastal management:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project has definitely helped to improve government coordination, planning and decision making in relation to protection of mangroves and coastal management.</li> <li>• For the first time in TL there has been inter-ministerial dialogue and coordination, including through the Project Board and the Inter-ministerial TWG.</li> <li>• There is a need to continue and sustain the TWG as a permanent coordination mechanism post-project. Other development partners involved in the implementation of similar initiatives should also be a part of this TWG.</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>6. Project Implementation:</u></b></p>	
<p>6.1 What did UNDP do well as the project implementer?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP is a long-established and trusted development partner in TL and many stakeholders expressed confidence and satisfaction with UNDP’s role as it has well-developed structures, mechanisms, processes and relationships with GoTL and other partners, and is generally seen as being an impartial and fair ‘honest broker’ in international development.</li> </ul>
<p>6.2 How could UNDP improve as the project implementer?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite overall positive views of UNDP as a development partner, many stakeholders identified many areas where they felt that UNDP could improve as a project implementer, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinating better with local governments and MAF at local level.</li> <li>• Substantially speeding up procurement, proposal approval and funds disbursement processes, which in some cases were reportedly delayed by months. In some cases NGOs that submitted proposals were not consulted properly about their proposals, there were delays in receiving updates from UNDP and decisions were communicated suddenly and often very late.</li> <li>• In some cases MAF personnel on site visits did not receive DSA from UNDP until well after the visits, and there were reports of FC being threatened by community when payment for work completed was delayed.</li> <li>• Significantly improving the quality, consistency and clarity of advice, guidance and support to project partners, especially at local level.</li> <li>• Giving much greater attention to pre-activity assessments, baseline data, consultations and planning, to ensure that project activities are properly designed, fit-for-purpose, relevant and acceptable to local settings, stakeholders and cultural contexts and likely to succeed and be sustained.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exercising a much higher degree of governance and oversight of project partners, especially NGOs and CBMM Groups, and undertaking more rigorous site inspections and physical verifications to ensure that project activities, facilities and other outputs meet minimum standards.</li> <li>• Significantly reducing the high rate of turnover of project staff, especially technical advisers, and seeking to ensure more consistent and continuous staff support for project activities, including right through to the extended project end (most staff left the project at end of December 2020, leaving the extension to July 2021 under-supported).</li> <li>• In addition to the focus on technical, site-level activities, also giving attention to more strategic, policy-level outcomes, including actual adoption and implementation of the relevant national-level policies, strategies and action plans by GoTL.</li> <li>• UNDP was not able to implement a functional system to pay the cost of fuel and maintenance for the FCs' motorcycles, with all FCs reporting that they had to purchase fuel with their own money – which is not acceptable for project work.</li> <li>• UNDP did not pay FCs DSA for trips to Dili from their municipalities.</li> <li>• Reports that project management pushed drivers to drive fast over very long-distance to and from municipalities in the same day, in order to avoid having to pay overnight DSA – creating safety risks.</li> </ul>
<p>6.3 What did MAF do well as project implementing partner?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAF was heavily engaged in project implementation including at local level.</li> <li>• Some reports that at some sites MAF support was not fully engaged at local level, and requests from MAF for greater funds from the project to assist MAF in providing its supporting activities in the field.</li> </ul>
<p>6.4 How could MAF improve as project implementing partner?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for more engagement by MAF at local level.</li> <li>• Need to formally adopt and implement the policies, strategies and action plans developed by the project.</li> <li>• Could have been better coordination with and involvement of SSE.</li> <li>• MAF could work more closely with international NGOs.</li> </ul>
<p><b>7. Communication &amp; Consultation:</b> In your view how effective was the project at communication and consultation with key stakeholders? What was done well and what could have been done better?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project was effective in bringing together an extremely wide-range of stakeholders including various GoTL ministries, development partners, local NGOs, CGOs, community, academia, private sector etc.</li> <li>• Such engagement spanned from the Presidential level to the most remote small rural community, and included the President's National Mangrove Plantation Day event (in March 2020) with the participation of the President of the Republic, Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, FFDL and other high-level government representatives. Other special events and days include World Mangrove Day, World Environment Day etc.</li> <li>• The project FCs made significant efforts to ensure good communication and consultation with key stakeholders at the local level, but reportedly were not always well supported by project management staff or MAF.</li> <li>• Local stakeholders reported that there were often delays in communication from project management staff to local implementers on key decisions required to make progress with activities, which caused implementation delays.</li> <li>• Some reports from local levels that communication by project management staff was sometimes 'one-way' and did not 'listen' to local stakeholders enough.</li> </ul>
<p><b>8. Main Project Strengths:</b> In your view what are the main strengths of the project?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The main strengths of the projects are <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aiming directly to the grass-root community.</li> <li>• Aiming to improve community's quality of life and increase the resiliency of the community living along the coastal lines.</li> <li>• Aiming to improve and restore nature.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• The project was effective in bringing together an extremely wide-range of stakeholders from national to local levels, as above.</li> <li>• Major effort to increase the profile of mangroves in TL and raise awareness of their importance and values and need for protection and sustainable management.</li> <li>• Updated and improved national mapping of mangroves and establishment of GIS</li> </ul>

EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">(This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)</p>
	<p>and data management at MAF, for long-term benefits.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drafting of three key national documents on mangroves, (although these need to be formally adopted and implemented).</li> <li>• Efforts have been undertaken to conserve 2,300 hectares of mangroves (although their ongoing, long-term conservation is not guaranteed).</li> <li>• Training and capacity-building of MAF, UNTL, NGOs, local communities and others in various aspects of mangrove conservation and management, including mangrove restoration to expand the total mangrove area - although as outlined above at many sites survival rates have been low).</li> </ul>
<p><b>9. Main Project Weaknesses:</b> In your view what are the main weaknesses of the project?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perhaps too bureaucratic and lacking in pragmatism and flexibility. The project could be more flexible to changing circumstances based on local needs.</li> <li>• Sometimes very slow procurement, proposal approval and funds disbursement processes, which in some cases were reportedly delayed by months, reportedly poor time management by project management staff and delays in communication from project management staff to local implementers on key decisions required to make progress with activities, which caused implementation delays.</li> <li>• Lack of quality, consistency and clarity of advice, guidance and support to project partners, especially at local level.</li> <li>• Not enough attention to pre-activity assessments, baseline data, consultations and planning, to ensure that project activities were properly designed, fit-for-purpose, relevant and acceptable to local settings, stakeholders and cultural contexts and likely to succeed and be sustained.</li> <li>• Lack of business planning and business management training and arrangements for alternative livelihoods.</li> <li>• Insufficient governance and oversight of project partners, especially NGOs and CBMM Groups, and lack of rigorous site inspections and physical verifications to ensure that project activities, facilities and other outputs meet minimum standards.</li> <li>• Lack of rigorous, quantitative monitoring of key project parameters, including KAP survey and mangrove planting survival rates.</li> <li>• Unusually high reliance on external consultants on intermittent, disjointed engagements, when core roles such as ‘Mangrove Adviser’ and ‘Livelihoods Adviser’ should have ideally been core project positions engaged throughout the full project time-line.</li> <li>• High rate of turnover of project staff, especially technical advisers, and most staff leaving the project at end of December 2020, leaving the extension to July 2021 under-supported.</li> <li>• Some individuals in project management unit being overloaded with work, having to take responsibility for multiple tasks.</li> <li>• Too much focus on technical, site-level activities, and insufficient attention on more strategic, policy-level outcomes, including actual adoption and implementation of the relevant national-level policies, strategies and action plans by GoTL.</li> <li>• Late start of the livelihood component and the absence of baseline data on the beneficiaries to determine if livelihoods have been improved.</li> <li>• Some stakeholders reported that the project was too focused on non-physical activities such as surveys, assessments, training and meetings, which reduced physical activities that have pragmatic, tangible benefits in the field.</li> <li>• MAF did not engage enough at local level.</li> </ul>
<p><b>10. Other Points / Recommendations:</b> Please feel free to make any additional points and recommendations about the project:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moving forward there needs to be a much more comprehensive and well planned effort to develop alternative mangrove-friendly livelihoods that are actually viable as businesses – especially to address the ongoing practice of allowing livestock to use mangrove areas.</li> <li>• Also need to focus more on physical activities that have pragmatic, tangible benefits in the field, and less on studies, surveys, assessments, meetings etc.</li> <li>• The best practices of the project need to be replicated in those municipalities that did not receive support under the project, to address continued mangrove destruction in those areas.</li> <li>• Ensure that funding and resources are allocated to build on the momentum gained and the capacities built to prioritize mangrove conservation and sustainable management nationally into the future.</li> </ul>

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<b>EVALUATION QUESTION (EQ)</b>	<b>CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF ALL RESPONSES</b> (This is a summary of responses in terms of the major issues raised across all respondents, and not a direct repetition of all responses)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Work towards drafting, passing and implementing a National Law for the protection of mangroves, similar to laws in the neighbouring countries where destruction of mangroves is prohibited, with heavy penalties (Australia, Indonesia).</li><li>• Some NGOs such as FCOTI (which works on carbon offsets through forestry including mangroves) could have played much more significant roles but were engaged only towards the end of the project at quite a small scale.</li><li>• NGOs will keep on implementing activities with or without this UNDP project. In short building NGOs capacity is important for the sake of sustainability.</li><li>• Need to continue support for drama/theatre and linking with GoTL 'Green Schools' program as highly effective awareness activities.</li></ul>

## ANNEX 5: ACTIVITY ACHIEVEMENT TABLES

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## Annex 5.1: CRB Activity Achievements - Fencing

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

### NOTES:

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining 'success' of the fencing activities.
- The TE considers that, if fencing is not effective at excluding livestock from mangrove areas, e.g. due to gaps or breaks, it is 'not successful'.
- The project undertook monitoring of fencing using GPS points and measure tapes to assess fence condition along 50 m sections. However, the TE has not seen the results presented in a single, integrated, annual fence status report, supported by photos of each section, for all sites. Raw data is presented in Excel spread sheets without overall analysis and interpretation in a report.
- Other reports on the fencing activities are ad hoc and not systematic and are reported inconsistently in a range of formats, including BTORs, NGO activity reports, random photos sent by FCs etc – and do not provide hard data or scientific evidence of fencing effectiveness.
- This limits the ability to assess the overall success of the fencing activities.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	1. Beacou	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Live fencing destroyed by flood.</li> <li>• Lack of field support.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>• BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>• BTOR from Field mission in May 2021.</li> </ul>	<p>TE questions why project did not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support repair of destroyed fence (the PMU advised that repair was planned for 2021 AWP but not enough budget and time).</li> <li>• Identify &amp; address the root cause of lack of field support (it seems that local field support at this site is linked to payment - the PMU advises that the Xefe Suco proposed that the project could pay local guards, but this is not sustainable once project ends).</li> </ul>
	2. Sulilaran	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most live poles died.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sulilaran Fence Monitoring July 2020.</li> <li>• NETIL Final Report_LVG Phase III 2021</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• July 2020 report identified cause of poles dying being their location in tidal inundation zone.</li> <li>• This is poor planning &amp; design.</li> <li>• Report recommended moving the fences to dryer ground.</li> <li>• TE questions why this was not done (PMU advised that NETIL reconstructed 500 m of fence, including some metal poles, in Sulilaran in 2020, but no monitoring of this in 2021 due to lockdown and time constraints).</li> </ul>
	3. Batugade	PMU: S TE: Q (see notes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Live poles had signs of growth.</li> <li>• Good cohesion within the group.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>• Payment and verification February 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• While BTOR has 1 photo showing successful fence growth, it is only one spot and not</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<p>necessarily representative of the entire fence-line. It therefore does not constitute evidence of fencing success at this site.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The results of the GPS/50m section monitoring are not presented as evidence for this site.</li> <li>Given lack of complete evidence of success TE = Q.</li> </ul>
	4. Bemal'ai	PMU: S TE: Q (see notes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence repaired and strengthened with metal poles in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO NETIL's report.</li> <li>Site visit during TE mission (see note).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TE has not seen any NGO NETIL 'report', only photos that show repairs and strengthening with metal poles at a couple of locations – not the whole fence.</li> <li>PMU advises that repairs and strengthening with metal poles was completed in April 2021 but due to Covid travel constraints PMU has not undertaken M&amp;E.</li> <li>During TE mission the NC did not observe any fence at Bemal'ai with metal poles.</li> <li>Given lack of complete evidence of success TE = Q.</li> </ul>
Covalima	5. Wetaba/ Besauk	PMU: S TE: NS (see notes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No reasons given by PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>2019_BTOR Mangrove Monitoring at Covalima_27-29.09.19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The two reports cited do not actually contain any evidence of success of fencing at this site.</li> <li>In fact the second report states that fencing was only along a short section and much of the mangrove area was still open and being damaged by livestock – i.e. fencing 'not successful'.</li> <li>No reports given for 2020 and 2021.</li> <li>PMU has provided 3 photos (undated), which presumably show fencing at this site, however TE cannot confirm this and they do not show the whole fence.</li> <li>Given lack of complete evidence of success and 2019 report that fencing not complete, TE = NS.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
	6. Lalawa	PMU: S TE: Q (see notes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Photos from FC monitoring to PMU Whatsapp group early 2020</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Three photos provided.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>'2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima' states that fencing is needed at Lalawa to protect planned mangrove planting.</li> <li>PMU has provided 3 photos (undated), which presumably show fencing at this site, however TE cannot confirm this and they do not show the whole fence.</li> <li>(NOTE: Sharing 3 undated, unreferenced photos via a Whatsapp group does not constitute systematic, quantitative monitoring of fence success)</li> <li>Given lack of complete evidence of success and 2019 report that fencing is needed, TE = Q.</li> </ul>
	7. Suai Loro	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community removed the fences due to strict cultural rules in the area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>2019 BTOR Fence Monitoring_02-04 May 2019.</li> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fact that the CRB project actually constructed fences that were against local cultural rules, resulting in direct action by the community to remove them, is an example of poor planning and inadequate consultation with the local community.</li> <li>This is inexcusable in a UNDP project that is supposed to be working at the local level in cooperation with communities.</li> <li><b><i>It is recommended that the CO investigate how this was allowed to occur, and ensure that the lessons are applied to avoid such problems in future projects.</i></b></li> </ul>
Dili	8. Sabuli	PMU: PS TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Live poles showed no sign of growth, but sections are still strong.</li> <li>Repaired and strengthened with metal poles in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supporting evidence in column 5 is from 2019.</li> <li>There are also photos from Timor Verde from 2021, which show the repairs and strengthening of the fence to a high standard – TE assesses as 'successful'.</li> </ul>
	9. Wenunuk/ RH	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Live poles did not survive.</li> <li>Many sections collapsed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wenunuk Fence Condition Survey August 2020.</li> </ul>	<p>TE questions why project did not:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify &amp; address the root cause of why the poles did not survive .</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support repair of the collapsed sections (the PMU advised that repair was planned for 2021 AWP but not enough budget and time).</li> </ul>
	10. Wenunuk/ FCOTI	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Live poles indicated signs of growth.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR of FCOTI Spot Check in February 2021.</li> <li>Photos 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TE has assessed the evidence provided and agrees with PMU assessment that fencing is 'successful' at this site.</li> </ul>
	11. Hera	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence repaired and strengthened with metal poles.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>NGO KFF's 2021 Report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agree with PMU – 2021 photos show repairs and strengthening of the fence to a high standard – provides a model for other sites.</li> </ul>
Liquica	12. Ulmera	PMU: NS TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence repair work with poles required</li> <li>Community groups are committed to maintenance work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>Field Mission 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE considers Ulmera to be highly successful in mangrove planting (in fact a model for other sites), however TE has not seen any evidence that fencing has been successful.</li> <li>The reports listed in column 5 do not present verifiable evidence (e.g. photos) of successful fencing at Ulmera.</li> <li>The 2020 Fence Monitoring Report for Ulmera (Excel) (not referenced under column 5) identified a number of problems with fencing at Ulmera.</li> <li>The PMU advised that in the AWP 2021, the plan was to reconstruct some sections with metal poles but insufficient budget, so community took initiative to repair the section themselves, but without metal poles.</li> <li>While this is an excellent example of community commitment, the PMU provided 2 photos that show the fence is quite low-quality/unlikely to be durable, TE = Q.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
	13. Maubara	PMU: S TE: S (but see notes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence repaired and strengthened with metal poles in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019 BTOR Mangrove Nursery_CBEMR_13-15Feb 2019.</li> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>NETIL 2021 Report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The reports listed in column 5 do not present verifiable evidence (e.g. photos) of successful fencing at Maubara.</li> <li>The TE has not seen any 'NETIL 2021 Report' – just some photos, none of which show fencing.</li> <li>The '2020 Fence Monitoring Report for Maubara' (Excel) (not referenced under column 5) identified a number of problems with fencing at Maubara – although according to the 'Fence Completion Checklist Maubara June 2020' (also not referenced under column 5) these appear to have been addressed.</li> <li>TE therefore agrees with PMU assessment as 'successful'.</li> </ul>
	14. Tibar	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No live fences survived.</li> <li>Mostly destroyed by stormwater during floods.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence monitoring.</li> <li>Site visit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE considers Tibar to be the least successful of all CRB project sites, for all activities.</li> <li>It is recommend that UNDP should investigate the root causes of why Tibar was not successful, and learn and apply the lessons for future activities and projects.</li> </ul>
	15. Motaulun	PMU: No entry. TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> </ul>
Manatuto	16. Kampung Alor	PMU: PS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Live fences did not survive.</li> <li>A few sections destroyed by waves and stormwater.</li> <li>Natural waterways create barrier for livestock encroachment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR JMV.</li> <li>BTOR TE Mission.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Destroyed sections allow livestock access to mangroves – cannot be classified as PS – if livestock can get through then fence is NS.</li> <li>TE questions why project did not support repair of the destroyed sections (the PMU advised that repair was planned for 2021 AWP but not enough budget and time).</li> <li>As fence not repaired = NS.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Manufahi	17. Betano / Namdalak	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good cooperation with local leaders and community members.</li> <li>• Living fence survived.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2019_BTOR Betanu fence nursery_10-12.04.2019.</li> <li>• BTOR JMV Nov 2020.</li> <li>• BTOR TE Mission May 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agree with PMU – review of the reports and photos indicates that fencing at these sites in Manufahi has been built to a high standard.</li> </ul>
	18. Mahaquidan	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Living fence survived.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTOR - Manufahi 28 October 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agree with PMU – review of the reports and photos indicates that fencing at these sites in Manufahi has been built to a high standard.</li> </ul>
	19. Clacuc / Fatukahi	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sections of fences damaged.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTOR JMV Nov 2020.</li> <li>• BTOR TE mission.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TE questions why project did not support repair of the damaged sections.</li> <li>• The PMU advised that this site is a thick forest, isolated from community settlement. Although fence is NS, the forest provides a buffer for the mangroves, and helps prevent livestock grazing in the mangroves - therefore not prioritised for repair.</li> </ul>
Viqueque	20. Uaniuma / Irabin de Baixo	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fence repaired.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2019_BTOR Field Trip Viqueque &amp; Bobonaro_27-28 Feb &amp; 1st March 2019.</li> <li>• 2019 BTOR Fence Monitoring_02-04 May 2019.</li> <li>• Photos from field activity in 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• '2019_BTOR Field Trip Viqueque &amp; Bobonaro_27-28 Feb &amp; 1st March 2019' does not provide evidence of successful fencing.</li> <li>• '2019 BTOR Fence Monitoring_02-04 May 2019' refers to fencing undertaken at these sites, and identifies the need for repairs, but does not include photos.</li> <li>• PMU has provided 2photos (undated), which presumably show fencing at this site, however TE cannot confirm this and they do not show the whole fence.</li> <li>• The PMU advised that repair was planned for 2021 AWP but not enough budget and time)</li> <li>• Given lack of complete evidence of success, TE = Q.</li> </ul>

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**S** = Successful. **PS** = Partially Successful. **NS** = Not Successful. **Q** = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 20)**

**PMU:**    **S = 10** (50%).        **PS = 2** (10%).        **NS = 6** (30%).        **Q = 0** (0%).        **No score = 2** (10%)

**TE:**        **S = 6** (30%).        **PS = 0** (0%).        **NS = 9** (45%).        **Q = 5** (25%)

## Annex 5.2: CRB Activity Achievements – Mangrove Planting

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

### NOTES:

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the mangrove planting activities.
- The TE considers that if survival rate of planted mangrove seedlings is <30% (>70% mortality) for a particular site, it is ‘not successful’, or if there is no quantitative data to allow reliable assessment of survival rate, it is ‘not successful’ or a least ‘questionable’, depending on circumstances (Note: In neighbouring Indonesia the expected standard survival rate for mangrove planting is 80-90% - Ilman Pers. Comms).
- The project only implemented ad hoc, irregular, qualitative spot checks of mangrove planting activities, with reports for each site spread across various BTORs and other reports.
- The project did not implement a systematic, comprehensive, quantitative, photo- and map-based monitoring program, to measure survival/mortality and growth rates of planted mangrove seedlings, using standardised scientific methods across all sites, and feeding into a single, integrated, annual mangrove planting report for all sites. This severely limits the ability of assess the overall success of the mangrove planting activities, and is a major deficiency with the project’s M&E plan.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	1. Beacou	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>• BTOR TE Field Mission.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TE mission found &lt;2% survival rate of planted mangrove seedlings at Beacou.</li> <li>• TE questions why project did not identify &amp; address the root cause of why mangrove planting at Beacou was not successful.</li> </ul>
	2. Bemalai	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fencing repaired in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO Netil 2021 Report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under column 4 PMU states that fencing was repaired.</li> <li>• Fencing is not a measure of success of mangrove planting, even with repaired fences, mortality of mangrove seedlings can occur.</li> <li>• The ‘NGO Netil 2021 Report’ does not provide evidence of the success or otherwise of mangrove planting at this site .</li> <li>• TE has only been provided with 2 photos showing community planting very small mangrove seedlings – photo metadata indicates April 2021.</li> <li>• The PMU has not provided scientific evidence of the success of mangrove planting at this site = Q.</li> </ul>
	3. Batugade	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fence is intact.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2019_BTOR Field Trip Viqueque &amp; Bobonaro_27-28 Feb &amp; 1st March 2019.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under column 4 PMU states that fence is intact.</li> <li>• Fencing is not a measure of success of mangrove planting, even with intact fences, mortality of mangrove seedlings can occur.</li> <li>• Evidence given under column 5 is over 2 years old (2019) and does not contain any report on success of mangrove planting at that site – it just contains an assessment of natural site conditions.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence is given on any planting taking place at that site, nor on survival rate of mangrove seedlings that may have been planted since the March 2019 BTOR.</li> </ul>
	4. Sulilاران	PMU: No input. TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Data to be provided</li> <li>No data provided.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> </ul>
Covalima	5. Suai Loro	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although living fence removed, mangrove planting still has high survival rates.</li> <li>No presence of pigs, the most predominant livestock in the area, as they has all died due to African swine flu.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima.</li> <li>2019_BTOR Mangrove Monitoring at Covalima_27-29.09.19.</li> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The '2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima' does not contain any evidence at all of the success of mangrove planting at Suai Loro. It predates the planting, and identifies barriers to successful planting such as lack of space.</li> <li>The '2019_BTOR Mangrove Monitoring at Covalima_27-29.09.19' also does not contain any evidence at all of the success of mangrove planting at Suai Loro. It reports on monitoring of natural mangrove condition and states that the mangroves show constant pressure from animal grazing and cutting for fuel wood, and high levels of garbage and pollution.</li> <li>The latest evidence cited – 'BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020' does not support the PMU's claim that mangrove planting has been successful with high survival rates at this site – on the contrary it states that '<i>... planted mangrove seedlings are <b>not</b> in the healthiest condition</i>'.</li> <li>No evidence is provided to support claim that there are no pigs. In any case cattle and goats are the greater threat to mangrove seedlings.</li> <li>Overall, none of the evidence cited by the PMU supports the PMU's claim that mangrove planting has been successful with high survival rates at this site, in fact all of the evidence indicates that it is not successful = NS.</li> </ul>
	6. Beco	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Site located far away from residential area.</li> <li>Forest density and wetland area provide natural barrier for livestock intrusion.</li> <li>Full support from community members,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR_Suai_050820_Best_Practice.</li> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>Field Photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reasons cited under column 4 are not measures of success of mangrove planting, even with these factors present, mortality of mangrove seedlings can occur.</li> <li>The 'BTOR_Suai_050820_Best_Practice' does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Beco – it just mentions that nursery has been established, does not contain verifiable evidence of this (e.g. photos), and contains nothing on actual planting of seedlings in the field and their survival rates.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
			local constituents and cultural leaders.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 'BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit' also does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Beco – it just mentions that 60,000 seedlings have been raised in the nursery and planting started, but contains nothing on their survival rates etc.</li> <li>The report mentions ongoing land conflict with a private entity and lack of knowledge as challenges to the implementation of project activities.</li> <li>The 'Field Photos' mentioned under column 5 have not been provided to the TE.</li> </ul>
Dili	7. Sabuli	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planting Monitoring in October.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TE has not been provided with any report on the 'Planting Monitoring in October' cited under column 5. Year is not specified.</li> <li>TE questions why project did not identify &amp; address the root cause of why mangrove planting at Sabuli was not successful.</li> </ul>
	8. Hera	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence is intact and strengthened.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under column 4 PMU states that fence is intact and strengthened.</li> <li>Fencing is not a measure of success of mangrove planting, even with intact and strengthened fences, mortality of mangrove seedlings can occur.</li> <li>The PMU has not provided scientific evidence of the success of mangrove planting at this site = NS.</li> </ul>
	9. Cristo Rei	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> <li>TE questions why project did not identify &amp; address the root cause of why mangrove planting at Cristo Rei was not successful.</li> </ul>
Liquica	10. Ulmera	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020 JMV BTOR.</li> <li>2021 Field mission photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The '2020 JMV BTOR 2020' does not support the PMU's claim that mangrove planting has been successful at this site – on the contrary it states that '<i>... planted mangrove seedlings are <u>not</u> in the healthiest condition</i>'.</li> <li>A July 2020 report (not cited by PMU under column 5) indicates high mortality of planted seedlings over an area of ~1ha at Ulmera, with photos of dead and dying seedlings, but there is no quantitative analysis of survival/mortality rates.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2021 photos show planting of mangrove seedlings in March 2021 and apparently good growth of previously planted mangroves in April and then June 2021 (date of planting not indicated) – but there is no quantitative analysis and reporting of survival rates and growth rates.</li> <li>• The above is an example of the ad hoc, uncoordinated, non-scientific approach taken by the project to monitoring the success of the mangrove planting activities. There is no systematic, standardised approach with quantitative analysis and reporting using proper scientific methods.</li> </ul>
	11. Maubara	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2020 JMV BTOR.</li> <li>• 2021 Field mission photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The '2020 JMV BTOR 2020' does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Maubara.</li> <li>• The TE has not been provided with any '2021 Field mission photos' showing the success or otherwise of mangrove planting at Maubara.</li> <li>• The PMU has not provided scientific evidence of the success of mangrove planting at this site = Q.</li> </ul>
	12. Tibar	PMU: NS (only ~1,150) TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2020 JMV BTOR.</li> <li>• 2021 Field mission photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE mission found that initial planting of 1,150 seedlings at Tibar completely failed, due mainly to livestock grazing.</li> <li>• The TE was advised that remaining seedlings from the nursery will be planted at another site – for reasons that are unclear to the TE.</li> <li>• There is an urgent need for mangrove restoration at Tibar and these seedlings should be planted there.</li> <li>• The community was also engaged to cut poles for fence posts but these have been left to weather and degrade without being used, which is wasteful.</li> <li>• There are many other problems at Tibar and the TE considers Tibar to be the least successful of all CRB project sites, for all activities.</li> <li>• It is recommended that UNDP should investigate the root causes of why Tibar was not successful, and learn and apply the lessons for future activities and projects.</li> </ul>
Manatuto	13. Kampung Alor	PMU: PS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2020 JMV BTOR.</li> <li>• 2021 Field mission.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The '2020 JMV BTOR 2020' does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Kampung Alor.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has not been provided with any report of a '2021 Field mission' that assesses the success of mangrove planting at Kampung Alor.</li> <li>The PMU has not provided scientific evidence of the success or even partial success of mangrove planting at this site = NS.</li> </ul>
<b>Manufahi</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	14. Uaniuma/ Irabin de Baixo	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular monitoring of biophysical conditions.</li> <li>High survival rate.</li> <li>Fencing repaired in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019_BTOR Field Trip Viqueque &amp; Bobonaro_27-28 Feb &amp; 1st March 2019.</li> <li>2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Viqueque.</li> <li>2019_BTOR Mangrove Monitoring at Viqueque_06-09.08.2019.</li> <li>Field photos 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The '2019_BTOR Field Trip Viqueque &amp; Bobonaro_27-28 Feb &amp; 1st March 2019' does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Uaniuma/Irabin de Baixo – it pre-dates any planting.</li> <li>The '2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Viqueque' reports a 95% survival rate for 3,000 seedlings planted at a creek near the nursery, but does not provide any quantitative data or photographic evidence to support this claim, and also states that seedlings were stressed and 'planting density' was not maintained, which contradicts the 95% survival claim.</li> <li>The '2019_BTOR Mangrove Monitoring at Viqueque_06-09.08.2019' does not contain any evidence of the success of mangrove planting at Uaniuma/Irabin de Baixo. The monitoring assessed zonation of existing natural mangroves and salinity measurements only.</li> <li>The PMU has provided 1 photo (undated), which shows a group of people walking amongst a few mangrove seedlings - presumably at this site. The mangrove seedlings appear to have been planted in substrate that may not be suitable for mangrove survival, with some seedlings already yellowing. This photo does not provide evidence of the survival of mangrove planting at this site.</li> <li>The PMU has not provided scientific evidence of the success of mangrove planting at this site, and the single photo provided indicates planting at a non-viable site = NS.</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 14)**

PMU: S = 8 (57%). PS = 1 (7%). NS = 4 (29%). Q = 0 (0%). No score = 1 (7%)  
 TE: S = 0 (0%). PS = 0 (0%). NS = 10 (71%). Q = 4 (29%)

### Annex 5.3: CRB Activity Achievements - Mangrove Supportive Livelihoods

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in **Blue** entered by TE]. **S** = Successful. **PS** = Potentially Successful. **NS** = Not Successful.

#### NOTES:

- The data in this table was entered by the PMU from three main sources:
  - *Community Group Profile Data Set\_CA: Developed in late 2019* (this a very large Excel spread sheet which simply lists various data relating to each group, without analysis or interpretation).
  - *NGO Activity Monitoring Report conducted in 2020* (copy not provided to TE, so cannot assess).
  - *Livelihood Assessment 2020-2021* (full report not provided to TE, only another Excel spread sheet with various data relating to each group, without analysis or interpretation).
- From 2017 to 2020, the livelihood intervention included a large number of groups (109 as listed in this table). The criteria used by the project to select these groups are not clear to the TE.
- The PMU advised that in 2020-2021, the strategy was shifted to focus on 45 groups – and concentrated more on skills and coordination rather than physical inputs. The PMU did not differentiate these 45 groups in this table – so the TE does not know which ones they are.
- The PMU advised that the criteria for selecting the 45 groups were group cohesion, group leadership, activities that had potential for women’s economic empowerment, and groups that have shown positive results based on information from Suco Chiefs, Field Coordinators and NGOs. The TE notes that these selection criteria are highly subjective – which is a concern – they should include objective criteria and quantitative assessment of group performance.
- As far as could be determined by the TE, the CRB project did not develop a single business viability assessment or business plan for any of the 112 livelihood activities that it supported – a major deficiency.
- The TE was not provided with basic business records – e.g. simple account book – for any of the livelihoods activities. It appears that the project did not require any of the activities to maintain even the most basic account records / book keeping – which is another major deficiency. M&E of the livelihood activities appears to be based on qualitative interviews with stakeholders without hard financial data collection.
- The assessment of the success of the livelihood activities was severely constrained by a lack of baseline assessment of pre-intervention income data, which was also identified as a gap by the MTR report.
- In the table the PMU frequently refers to ‘income’ increasing, decreasing etc, but does not specify if ‘income’ means gross turnover or profit cleared after expenses, and also does not provide details on how changes in income were measured, noting the lack of pre-intervention baseline data.
- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the livelihood activities, and did not implement a systematic process for measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- *A significant concern stemming from the Livelihoods Achievements Table is that UNDP was not able to provide dollar values for the funds provided to the majority of the 112 livelihood groups that were supported by the project (column 4 of the table). The TE pushed on this issue and was told that the data is not available. This is a major deficiency – it is incomprehensible that a GEF project would fund 112 community groups and NGOs and not be able to report how much was provided to each group and NGO. This highlights the need for an independent, forensic financial audit, including tracking of all expenditure trails.*
- *Considering the points above the TE has serious concerns about how the large number of livelihood interventions were selected, designed, planned, implemented, managed, monitored and evaluated.*
- The TE considers that if there is no evidence that a livelihood activity for a particular site is sustainable and will continue as a viable activity post-project (such as a business plan), it is ‘not successful’ (NS).

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MANGROVE-SUPPORTIVE LIVELIHOODS [All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Potentially Successful. NS = Not Successful.

1. Site / Group	2. How did the CRB project support this activity?	3. \$ value of CRB support	4. Success	5. Likelihood of post-CRB continuity / sustainability	6. Reasons/ bases for 3 & 4	7. Supporting Evidence	8. TE Comments
<b>BOBONARO MUNICIPALITY</b> (10 groups)							
1. SUMAK: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Material support (pump, seeds, crowbars, machetes, spades, nails, wheel barrows, handsprays, hoses).</li> <li>Technical &amp; Agribusiness Training.</li> </ul>	\$4,000	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of continuity/ sustainability.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that women’s group used income from mangrove planting to buy seeds and diversified from selling livestock and petrol into horticulture, reportedly significantly increasing income.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
2. Ailok Laran: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture and aquaculture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HALARAE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Material support (vegetable seeds, machetes, crowbars, spades, shovels, hoes, watering cans).</li> <li>Horticulture training.</li> </ul>	\$500	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of continuity/ sustainability.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that women’s group reduced dependence on husbands and slightly increased income.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
3. Batugade/ Lookou: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing and ecotourism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing boat &amp; 1500cc engine.</li> <li>Cement for building road to access ecotourism facility.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of continuity/ sustainability.</li> <li>TE has not seen ongoing plan for maintaining the boat and engine.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income increased.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity/ sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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1. Site / Group	2. How did the CRB project support this activity?	3. \$ value of CRB support	4. Success	5. Likelihood of post-CRB continuity / sustainability	6. Reasons/ bases for 3 & 4	7. Supporting Evidence	8. TE Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fisheries and ecotourism training.</li> </ul>	support & involved capex.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Building road to access ecotourism facility does not make sense as Batugade is not one of the project's ecotourism sites.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>what period or for how many people.</li> <li>PMU states that group did 'marketing' through their children.</li> <li>It is not clear to TE what the children marketed or to who – and raises potential child labour issues.</li> <li>PMU states that group plans to develop ecotourism using income from mangrove planting, loan and support from Conservation International (CI).</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>However, given the groups stated intentions and ongoing support from CI the TE assesses as 'potentially successful' (PS).</li> </ul>
<p>4. Biacoe: (restaurant group)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restaurant.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>		No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support & involved constructing a substantive building.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not Likely.</li> <li>Restaurant already non-operational since early 2020.</li> <li>Lack of agreement on business management arrangements between group members.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	As listed under 4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearly not successful as already non-operational.</li> <li>However, with helpful intervention, a proper business plan could be developed to get this facility up and running.</li> <li>Recommended that UNDP seek to find ways to assist with this so as not to waste the project investment in building the restaurant.</li> </ul>
<p>5. Omaresi:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seed packets for horticulture.</li> <li>Horticulture and agribusiness training.</li> </ul>	\$500	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of continuity/ sustainability.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that women's group received gender empowerment training. They used to cultivate crops but with small yield. After horticulture training their income reportedly increased slightly.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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1. Site / Group	2. How did the CRB project support this activity?	3. \$ value of CRB support	4. Success	5. Likelihood of post-CRB continuity / sustainability	6. Reasons/ bases for 3 & 4	7. Supporting Evidence	8. TE Comments
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> </ul>		
6. Duaderok: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Materials to enlarge the livestock coop.</li> </ul>	\$3,000	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence of continuity/ sustainability.</li> <li>No business plan seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU reports that no income was earned.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>CRB_Livelihood_Assessment_2019</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence what the \$3K of projects funds was actually spent on.</li> <li>No apparent return on the \$3K investment.</li> </ul>
7. Legoa Maria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HALARAE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture and agriculture training</li> </ul>	\$2,500	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there is likely to be high market demand for the groups' produce from community and schools.</li> <li>PMU does not state what produce is and what evidence there is that predicts such demand (e.g. a market analysis).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that Group converted previously infertile land into horticulture land.</li> <li>PMU does not state 'how' infertile land was converted into fertile land or provide evidence that this was achieved.</li> <li>PMU states that the group's income increased.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
8. Ono Oan Maudeku: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FEEO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seeds.</li> <li>Horticulture and agriculture training</li> </ul>	\$5,000	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as CI and FAO have ongoing projects with the group.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that some group members attended previous livelihood projects, are activated and have good group cohesion (although evidence of this is not provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that because CI and FAO remain involved with this group the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable = PS.</li> </ul>

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9. Nubadak: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FEEO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Farming technics training.</li> <li>Production of pesticide and organic fertilizer.</li> <li>Providing seeds and materials.</li> </ul>	\$3,800	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity and sustainability is likely (although evidence of this is not provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income has increased, selling their vegetables to the market with income of no more than 40 dollar per harvest.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> <li>No data on how many harvests.</li> <li>With a project investment of \$3,800, the group would need to sell 95 harvests at \$40 each just to break even. Assuming 2 harvests per year and the harvests are sustained year after year, 47.5 years would be needed just to cover the \$3,800.</li> <li>This is clearly not a viable investment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO activity monitoring report 2020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability.</li> <li>The reported return on project investment is not a viable business.</li> <li>= NS.</li> </ul>
10. Haburas Foun: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FEEO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fees for live fence construction.</li> <li>Vegetable seeds.</li> <li>Polibags.</li> <li>Water tank.</li> <li>Water hose.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>None.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of assessment means this group should be targeted for audit.</li> </ul>
<b>COVALIMA MUNICIPALITY (16 Groups)</b>							
1. Mudanca: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to grow kangkung, yard-long beans, tomatoes &amp; Chinese cabbage.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there have been 2 harvests and cites a figure of \$160.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or</li> </ul>

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1. Site / Group	2. How did the CRB project support this activity?	3. \$ value of CRB support	4. Success	5. Likelihood of post-CRB continuity / sustainability	6. Reasons/ bases for 3 & 4	7. Supporting Evidence	8. TE Comments
		funded this through NGO.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not explained if \$160 is income per harvest or for both harvests, and how many people this is shared across - as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> <li>No evidence that harvests will continue.</li> </ul>		evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.
<p>2. Betama (Belu Tasi Mane):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishpond and horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water cans, seeds, water pump, handsprayer, hose and watering can.</li> <li>Fish food milling machine.</li> <li>Support to grow lettuce, Chinese cabbage &amp; tomatoes.</li> <li>Horticulture production training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group has already been operational since 2017 and reportedly has no constraints with market access.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income significantly increased.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> <li>PMU states that group changed its products, increased production areas and established contacts with buyers especially for selling fish feed – with support of local MAF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that because group has already been operational since 2017 and has support of local MAF the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable = PS.</li> </ul>
<p>3. Grupu Aileba:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water pump, watering cans, shovels, hoes, sickles &amp; handsprayers.</li> <li>Support to grow eggplants, tomatoes, yard-long bean, kangkung and bitter gourd.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there has been 1 harvest and cites a figure of \$300.</li> <li>Not explained exactly what the \$300 relates to - as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> <li>No evidence that harvests will continue.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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<p>4. Kaduta (Kakuk Duut Tahu):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handicraft - coconut shell products.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial support to build shelter and electrical wiring to the location.</li> <li>Horticulture production training in using organic pesticide.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group has necessary equipment and sustainable customers (although evidence of this is not provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income slightly increased.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> <li>PMU states that group took the initiative to seek training and market info, change its products to suit market, invest in processing equipment and establish contact with buyers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the points in column 5 = PS.</li> </ul>
<p>5. Uma Ninin:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tais / Traditional fabric weaving.</li> <li>Supported by NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cement, sand, palm leaf stalks, nails (presumably for building to house the activity).</li> <li>Cloth, needle and sewing threads.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At time of assessment in Q4 2019, no income was earned.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>6. Fulan Naroman:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tais / Traditional fabric woven.</li> <li>Supported by NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sewing threads, rope and futus for each member 10 pcs.</li> <li>Linked with IADE for Base Game Training – training farmers who cannot read and write using game and participatory methods (as this training is for farmers and this</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group now has a workspace (building) and established customers, and making tais is there only source of income – so likely to continue .</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU sates:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women only group of 10 members.</li> <li>Most members are illiterate and only cash source is making tais.</li> <li>Have sold tais to development projects with their logos in Dili.</li> <li>Just before COVID sold to Dili through exhibition activities.</li> <li>10 tais sold per month each earning \$40.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the points in columns 4 &amp; 5 = PS.</li> </ul>

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	activity relates to weaving, not farming, TE does not understand the link).				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(although evidence of this is not provided. Also not clear how many months and if \$40 is per tai, per group member, per month, total etc – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data).</li> </ul>		
7. Romansa: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported by NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water pump, shovels, sickles, hoes, waterpipes.</li> <li>Support to grow kangkung, yard-long bean, tomato, Chinese cabbage and eggplants.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU reports that less people buy the group's products and there are no links to market.</li> <li>The TE assesses that latter is an issue for many of the groups – CRB project did not support with market analysis up-front and with building logistics chains to markets - this was a significant deficiency of the project.</li> </ul>	CRB_Livelihood_Assessment_2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
8. Koko Forsa: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Fini Esperance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to grow mung beans, Chinese cabbage, kangkung and yard-long beans.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as harvest was successful and group membership numbers reportedly increased (although evidence of either of these is not provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there have been 4 harvests of watermelon, 1 of corn and 1 of feremungu (?).</li> <li>PMU cites a figure of \$500-\$600, and states that this attracted additional group members.</li> <li>Not explained exactly what the \$500-\$600 relates to (per harvest, per product, per person or total?).</li> <li>Additional group members may dilute the income spread.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No evidence that harvests will continue.</li> </ul>		
9. GECH: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Fini Esperance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water cans, hoes, water pump, watertank.</li> <li>Support to grow onions, Chinese cabbage &amp; kangkung.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU reports no income in the rainy season, as the area became waterlogged, and lack of knowledge to run business.</li> <li>The TE assesses that the latter is an issue for many of the groups – CRB project did not support groups with basic business planning and management skills, which should be an essential starting point for any livelihood activity. This was a significant deficiency of the project.</li> </ul>	CRB_Livelihood_Assessment_2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
10. Jokika: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Welding.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provision of materials - light steel of 2x2, 3x3, 4x4, 2x4, 2x3, 5x10, 8x8, 4x6, 10x10cm, painting inks with colour black, blue, green, gold, brown, white, pink, orange; steel bar 8mm, steel bar 6mm, cement, electricity installation, tools and equipment and zinc welding rods.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity not likely.</li> <li>An unspecified issue evolved amongst the group members (male youth).</li> <li>Reportedly the issue has been solved, but the activity has not re-started.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per 4.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CRB_Livelihood_Assessment_2019</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
		No \$ figure provided by	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income increased slightly.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects</li> </ul>

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<p>11. CCM (Cooperativa Cesar Maulaca):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture &amp; livestock.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish commercial piggery and poultry facility.</li> <li>Water pump, water tank, electricity cable, electrical outlets, lamps, hoses, faucets and buckets.</li> <li>Eco-friendly pig feed production materials.</li> <li>Horticulture: pest medication, hoes, shovels, machetes, sickles, crowbars, pest watering tank, selling bags for vegetables, nails, wooden beams of 5x7, 5x10 and cement.</li> <li>Cash for bricks, pigs, chickens &amp; transport.</li> </ul>	<p>PMU even though this was direct project support.</p>		<p>market linkage with restaurants and shops established (although evidence of either of these is not provided).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people.</li> </ul>	<p>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</p>	<p>for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the significant effort made by the group to (reportedly) establish the piggery &amp; poultry facility, which hopefully the group would not want to see wasted = PS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recommended that UNDFP should verify that the piggery &amp; poultry facility are fully operational.</li> </ul>
<p>12. SAHENA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Fini Esperance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing boat, boat engine, fishing nets, fishhooks, cool box.</li> <li>Fish processing training.</li> </ul>	<p>No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.</p>	<p>PMU: NS TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group indicated a willingness to continue, however boat was destroyed by waves (TE questions why project did not assist group to secure location for the boat – to ensure continuity).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that when operational the group earned \$200/month shared between 10 members (although evidence of this is not provided and it is not clear for how many months - as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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13. Nare Nare: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Fini Esperance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Materials to support livestock facilities: Nails, wooden beams of size 5x7, 5x10, cement.</li> <li>Support to grow vegetables, yard-long beans, mung beans, salak.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the time of assessment, no income was earned.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
14. Sosiadade Kampo: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO HLT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to grow vegetables, including irrigation.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<p>PMU states that group is selling to local market and direct to Dili (but no details of what they are selling, how much, hoe often, income generated etc).</p> <p>PMU states that group has started saving and loan activities (but no details of what these activities actually are and how they assist the business).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO activity monitoring report 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
15. Matadalan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water pump, electrical wiring installed in horticulture location, resource rehabilitation, seeds, horticulture tools, handsprayer, hoses.</li> <li>Horticulture production training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group is likely to remain active and continue to maintain water supply (although no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CRB livelihood consultant visited in July 2021 and states that group is still active with horticulture activity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR_Suai_050 820_Best_Practice.</li> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the report from the CRB livelihood consultant's visit in July 2021 = PS.</li> </ul>

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16. Tossikun: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>(not stated if direct support or via NGO).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing boat engine or freezer or cool box (TE does not understand why 'or' is used by the PMU – project should be 'certain' what support they provided).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there is likely to be high demand for fish from Chinese companies and communities in Suai.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Income decreased due to pandemic (TE does not understand this as selling fish to local community in Sua should not be affected)</li> <li>No market initiative was undertaken.</li> <li>The TE assesses that the latter is an issue for many of the groups – CRB project did not support with market analysis up-front and with building logistics chains to markets - this was a significant deficiency of the project.</li> <li>TE was advised that project provided 2 boat engines but no boat – which is probably the real reason why this activity was NS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<b>DILI MUNICIPALITY</b> (15 groups)							
1. Hamoris: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handicraft.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The group received materials to construct handicraft facility; however the house was not fully constructed because materials were not fully provided (explanation for this not provided to TE).</li> </ul>	\$2,870	PMU: NS TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group has become inactive however CRB livelihoods consultant advises that the group reactivates whenever an order for their products comes in.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No reasons given.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the report from the CRB livelihood consultant that the group reactivates whenever an order for their products comes in = PS.</li> </ul>
2. Moris Diak:		\$8,660	PMU: S				

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing boat &amp; outboard motor.</li> </ul>		TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the activity is reportedly generating income (although no evidence of this provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group earns \$20-30 per week.</li> <li>No hard data evidence of this and over how many weeks.</li> <li>It is not clear if this is turnover or profit after expenses (e.g. fuel and motor and boat maintenance).</li> <li>With a project investment of \$8,660 and reported median earnings of \$25/week the group would need 346.4 weeks, or 6.7 years, with guaranteed minimum income per week every week, just to break even, and start making a return on the investment.</li> <li>This is clearly not a viable investment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability.</li> <li>The reported return on project investment is not a viable business.</li> <li>= NS.</li> </ul>
<p>3. Rungu Ranga:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing nets, hooks &amp; floats.</li> </ul>	\$8,660 (this is a very large sum for nets, hooks and floats, when group above got boat and motor for this amount).	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income slightly increased (although no evidence provided).</li> <li>CRB livelihood consultant states that group has started to build a central selling point where all local fishermen can deliver their fish for sale to traders from Dili. This is a form of horizontal value chain coordination – with fisher groups aggregating produce to attract traders.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the report from the CRB livelihood consultant that the group has started building a central selling point = PS.</li> <li>It remains unclear what the \$8,660 in project funds was actually spent on and it is recommended that this should be subject to external audit.</li> </ul>

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<p>4. Youth group:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock management.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fingerlings &amp; butcher training on chicken farm management.</li> <li>(‘fingerlings’ do not make sense in context of chicken farm – ‘fingerlings’ are baby fish).</li> </ul>	\$4,678	<p>PMU: S TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income slightly increased (although no evidence provided).</li> <li>PMU states that youth group worked with NGO KFF in the Hera mangrove learning center and coffee stalls.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>B5 report on best practice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>The entries in the various columns are contradictory, stating that the activity involved butcher training, chicken farm management, ‘fingerlings’ (baby fish), youth working in eco-tourism centre and coffee stalls etc – these are wide ranging activities and raise doubts about the veracity of what was actually supported at this site.</li> <li>It remains unclear what the \$4,678 in project funds was actually spent on and it is recommended that this should be subject to external audit.</li> <li>The B5 report cited in column 7 assesses the Hera mangrove learning centre and not the activities listed in columns 1 &amp; 2.</li> <li>The B5 report is both qualitative and subjective only, and does not present hard data or evidence of increase in income or f continuity / sustainability.</li> </ul>
<p>5. Buka Moris:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing and horticulture.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dragon fruit seedlings.</li> <li>Training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even	<p>PMU: S TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is unlikely as no market initiative and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU sates that group comprises 5 women and</li> </ul>	2020-2021 livelihood assessment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or</li> </ul>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>		though this was direct project support.		<p>group is not operational (this is contradicted by PMU entries in column 5).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<p>they planted dragon fruits in 2019.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At time of revisit in 2020, dragon fruit seedlings were sold to other farmers for \$1 each, supplementing household income.</li> </ul>		evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.
<p>6. Oan Kiak:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handicraft</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project provided construction materials to build the group a house for handicraft activity.</li> <li>However, not fully constructed as the materials were not fully provided.</li> <li>TE recommends that the reasons for this should be investigated.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	<p>PMU: NS</p> <p>TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states no longer active.</li> </ul>	PMU states no longer active.	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No longer active = NS.</li> <li>TE notes that it appears that some project funds were used to start construction of building but not completed – for unspecified reasons. This is a waste of GEF funds – it is recommended that this should be subject to external audit.</li> </ul>
<p>7. SECAR</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<p>The project was planning to build a warehouse for the group (unemployed youth) but this did not proceed, reportedly due to lack of support from the group.</p> <p>TE is not aware if any project funds spent – this should be clarified.</p>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	<p>PMU: NS</p> <p>TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states no longer active.</li> </ul>	PMU states no longer active.	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No longer active = NS.</li> </ul>

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8. Feto Hortikultura: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture - women's group.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Timor Verde.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seedlings.</li> <li>Rehabilitation of existing water borehole to support drip irrigation.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely given drip irrigation is rehabilitated.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states \$50 per harvest and group still active.</li> <li>No supporting data including how many harvests to date.</li> <li>CRB livelihood consultant recently conducted interview with xefe suco Wenunuk and he confirmed activities of NGO Timor Verde to date.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable given the report from the CRB livelihood consultant = PS.</li> <li>However, \$50/harvest spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
9. Moris Foun: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Timor Verde.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing nets, hooks &amp; life vests.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group earns \$50-70 per week.</li> <li>No supporting data including how many weeks to date.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
10. Homan Behukir: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handcraft.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Timor Verde.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction materials to build a shelter (6 x 6 meter) for the group's activity.</li> <li>Chairs and desks.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states handicraft group sold baskets for UNDP Emergency food relief program and Cash for work program.</li> <li>Sell products based on order.</li> <li>No supporting data including rates of income generated.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that the group responds to orders when they arise = PS.</li> <li>Recommend that UNDP verify that shelter has been built ad group continues to be active.</li> </ul>
11. Homan Akadiru Laran: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Handcraft.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction materials to build a shelter (6 x 6 meter) for the group's activity.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states handicraft group sold baskets for UNDP Emergency food relief program and Cash for work program.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that the group</li> </ul>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supported via NGO Timor Verde.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chairs and desks.</li> </ul>	funded this through NGO.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sell products based on order.</li> <li>No supporting data including rates of income generated.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>responds to orders when they arise = PS.</li> <li>Recommend that UNDP verify that shelter has been built and group continues to be active.</li> </ul>
<p>12. Hakiak Ikan/Hadomi Ai-Parapa:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aquaculture.</li> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>		No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is high demand for fish products.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group started selling (fish/crabs?) to supermarket and Chinese restaurants in Dili at \$5 per kilo.</li> <li>No supporting data including no. kilos or what period and rates of income generated.</li> <li>PMU reports that group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wants to diversify into fresh water fish.</li> <li>Took market initiatives.</li> <li>Sought training.</li> <li>Invested in equipment (refrigerator to freeze fish).</li> <li>Established contacts with buyers.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	2020-2021 livelihood assessment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in column 6 = PS.</li> </ul>
<p>13. Uaro Ana Furus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engagement with the group in Q4 2020.</li> <li>No assessment conducted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	PMU: No entry TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data = NS.</li> <li>TE questions why CRB project engaged with new livelihood groups in Q4 2020 when the project was scheduled to end Dec 2020 and Covid was in play.</li> <li>At that late stage the project should have focused fully on completing all existing activities, not starting new</li> </ul>

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							ones that cannot be completed by project end, esp. given Covid. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This is poor project planning and management.</li> </ul>
14. Tara Bandu Youth Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engagement with the group in Q4 2020.</li> <li>No assessment conducted.</li> </ul>	No data.	No data.	PMU: No entry TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data = NS.</li> <li>TE questions why CRB project engaged with new livelihood groups in Q4 2020 when the project was scheduled to end Dec 2020 and Covid was in play.</li> <li>At that late stage the project should have focused fully on completing all existing activities, not starting new ones that cannot be completed by project end, esp. given Covid.</li> <li>This is poor project planning and management.</li> </ul>
15. Atauro Pescas Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Engagement with the group in Q4 2020.</li> <li>No assessment conducted.</li> </ul>	No data.	No data.	PMU: No entry TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data = NS.</li> <li>TE questions why CRB project engaged with new livelihood groups in Q4 2020 when the project was scheduled to end Dec 2020 and Covid was in play.</li> <li>At that late stage the project should have focused fully on completing all existing activities, not starting new ones that cannot be completed by project end, esp. given Covid.</li> <li>This is poor project planning and management.</li> </ul>

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<b>LIQUICA MUNICIPALITY (27 groups)</b>							
1. Hadia Moris: • Horticulture. • Direct support from CRB project.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seedlings.</li> <li>Water access (drill waterwell &amp; support water pump and water tank of 1 m3).</li> <li>Watering cans &amp; hose.</li> <li>Dragon fruit cultivation materials.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely due to project providing irrigation water.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group changed from livestock to horticulture and income increased slightly.</li> <li>TE finds it unlikely that horticulture would provide higher income than livestock, and no data is presented to support the claim.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> <li>B5 report on best practice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on the B5 report cited in column 7 = PS.</li> <li>However, the B5 report is both qualitative and subjective only, and does not present hard data or evidence of increase in income or f continuity / sustainability.</li> </ul>
2. Laktolu Namu: • Horticulture. • Direct support from CRB project.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seed packets.</li> <li>Water access (water pump and water tank of 1m3).</li> <li>Water cans &amp; hose.</li> <li>Agribusiness training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states \$50 per harvest/person, on average 2 harvests/month.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this and no info on number of months – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
3. Kuluhun: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Aplimentec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bar, cement and sand for water storage.</li> <li>Seeds</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the they are reportedly generating income.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states they earned \$70.00 dollar per harvest.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this and no info on number of harvests etc – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that they may be generating income = PS.</li> <li>However, \$70/harvest spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>

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4. Ailok Loran: • No details.	No data.	No data.	PMU: No entry TE: NS	• No data.	• No data.	• No data.	• No data = NS. • TE questions why no data.
5. Ailok Laran 2: • No details. • Supported via NGO Aplimentec.	No data.	No data.	PMU: No entry TE: NS	• No data.	• No data.	• No data.	• No data = NS. • TE questions why no data.
6. Kadus Puu: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Aplimentec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bars, cement and sand for water storage.</li> <li>Seeds</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as they are reportedly generating income.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states they earned \$30.00 dollar per harvest.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this and no info on number of harvests etc – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	• Matrix for NGO_Phase II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that they may be generating income = PS.</li> <li>However, \$30/harvest spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
7. Ekali: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Aplimentec.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bars, cement and sand for water storage.</li> <li>Seeds</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that due to pest infestation, the group only earned \$25.00 per harvest.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this and no info on number of harvests etc – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	• Matrix for NGO_Phase II	• The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.
8. Raiklaran: • Horticulture.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bars,</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even	PMU: S TE: PS	• PMU states that continuity is likely as	• PMU states they earned \$100 per harvest.	• 07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.	• Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity & sustainability

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supported via NGO Aplimentec.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cement and sand for water storage.</li> <li>Seeds</li> </ul>	though project funded this through NGO.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>they are reportedly generating income.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No hard data evidence to support this and no info on number of harvests etc – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>may be reasonable based on report that they may be generating income = PS.</li> <li>However, \$100/harvest spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
<p>9. Hisik Kosar:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Aplimentec.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bars, cement and sand for water storage.</li> <li>Seeds</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as they are reportedly generating income.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that they harvested three times and the total income is only \$60.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>\$60 for three harvests across a group of people is not a successful business.</li> </ul>
<p>10. Mota laran</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture</li> <li>Supported via NGO Aplimentec</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bars, cement and sand for water storage.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the group harvested and sold some produce (but does not state what was harvested, how many harvests, how much income generated etc).</li> <li>PMU states that community advised they were grateful for the support but faced pest issues, esp. in rainy season.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>11. Grupu karpinteiro / Suimau:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carpentry.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FUNDEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carpentry equipment.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the group earned \$200-300 per month (but does not state how many months and number of people this is spread across, and no data to support this).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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12. Grupo Alfaiati: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tailoring.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction materials to build a small selter of 3 x 3 meter to do the activity.</li> <li>Sewing machine (2 units).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is ongoing demand for their product (esp. school uniforms).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that women’s sewing group make products per customer orders (local people and school uniform) with weekly income of \$30-50 (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that they make and sell school uniforms – for which there is demand every year = PS.</li> <li>However, \$30-50/week spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
13. Coffee Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coffee grinding.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction materials to build a small selter of 3 x 3 meter to do the activity.</li> <li>Coffee grinding machine.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is ongoing demand for ground coffee and the group has formed a cooperative.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the sell both to local market and get orders from Dili with a weekly income of \$50 (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that there is ongoing demand for ground coffee = PS.</li> <li>However, \$50/week spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
14. Neran Buras: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selling food and beverages.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FUNDEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Products to sell in the kiosk (Big Cola, Noodles, Deho, Sardine, etc).</li> <li>The TE queries if this implies that CRB project funds are used by the group to buy products wholesale, which they then sell retail – if this is the</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PMU states that the kiosk generates \$100-150 income per week (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> <li>No details on who owns the kiosk, who the income goes to, and how costs including purchase of wholesale goods are covered.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>TE has concerns about this activity as outlined in the columns to left.</li> <li>This should be investigated and subject to external audit.</li> </ul>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>case it is a totally inappropriate use of GEF funds – need to check this.</li> </ul>						
15. Grupo horticultura: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FUNDEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seed packets, water cans and water hoses.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states they sell to local people and market in Dili, and earn \$50 per harvest with 2 harvests per month.</li> <li>No hard data evidence to support this, no details on number of months, number of group members that the \$50 is spread across etc.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
16. Hadomi Aiparapa: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetable seedlings, water cans, hoses, dragon fruit seeds, materials and cement.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as group has experience, ambition, family support and sustainable customers (however no evidence is provided for any of this).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income has increased.</li> <li>No hard data evidence that income increased or by how much and over what period or for how many people – as with most of the livelihood figures, PMU could not provide supporting data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
17. Ulmera_Salma un Furak: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No details on activity type.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fencing, Nursery, Plantation.</li> <li>No details on what kind of nursery or plantation – if this is for mangrove planting then should not be in this table.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite scoring the activity as ‘S’ the PMU states that continuity is not likely as the group members themselves advise that they don’t know if they will continue operating.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the group (mostly men) used savings, loan and support from CRB project and MAF to expand their fish pond, but are concerned about lack of fish food availability and fishpond management.</li> </ul>	2020-2021 livelihood assessment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>Info about the activity is incomplete / unclear.</li> <li>Reportedly the group itself says that it may not continue.</li> </ul>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Column 5 mentions 'fish pond' which is not consistent with above.</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>			
18. Kiosk Kiik: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selling food and beverages.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FUNDEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Products to sell in the kiosk (Big Cola, Noodles, Deho, Sardine, etc).</li> <li>The TE queries if this implies that CRB project funds are used by the group to buy products wholesale, which they then sell retail – if this is the case it is a totally inappropriate use of GEF funds – need to check this.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PMU states that the kiosk generates \$40-50 income per week for women's group (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> <li>No details on who owns the kiosk, who the income goes to, and how costs including purchase of wholesale goods are covered.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>TE has concerns about this activity as outlined in the columns to left.</li> <li>This should be investigated and subject to external audit.</li> </ul>
19. Grupo Kiosk Komunitade: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selling food and beverages.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FUNDEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Products to sell in the kiosk (Big Cola, Noodles, Deho, Sardine, etc).</li> <li>The TE queries if this implies that CRB project funds are used by the group to buy products wholesale, which they then sell retail – if this is the case it is a totally inappropriate use of GEF funds – need to check this.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PMU states that the kiosk generates \$40-50 income per week for women's group (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> <li>No details on who owns the kiosk, who the income goes to, and how costs including purchase of wholesale goods are covered.</li> </ul>	Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>TE has concerns about this activity as outlined in the columns to left.</li> <li>This should be investigated and subject to external audit.</li> </ul>

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20. Fini ba Moris: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Hader.	• Water tank, crowbars, forks, watering cans, carts, hoses, vegetable seeds.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite scoring the activity as 'NS' the PMU states that continuity is likely as the group has been established since Indonesian times, and been receiving support from various NGOs.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states group is active and has savings and loan, but income is low (no hard data evidence to support this).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report.</li> <li>19092020; Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
21. Hadia Futuru: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Hader.	• Water tank, crowbars, forks, watering cans, carts, hoses, vegetable seeds.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group has been established since Indonesian times, and been receiving support from various NGOs.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states that group is active and continues planting.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
22. Moris Foun: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO Hader.	• Water tank, crowbars, forks, watering cans, cart, hoses, vegetable seeds.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group is under direct lead of Xefe aldeia and has active members.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased. They sold vegetables twice and earned \$170 (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>\$170 for two harvests (\$85/harvest) spread across a group may not be sufficient to maintain production.</li> </ul>
23. Buka Moris: • Horticulture dragon fruit.	• No entry from PMU.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even	PMU: Too early - new group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In dry and hard to access water area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report. 19092020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or</li> </ul>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supported by NGO Hader.</li> </ul>		though project funded this through NGO.	TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.
24. Lekiran: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO NETIL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No entry from PMU.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite scoring the activity as 'S' the PMU states that continuity is not likely as the group is not operational - farmers save cash at home with no intention to invest in the cooperative.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite stating that the group is not operational, the PMU states that income increased with traders in Dili buying all products - watermelon, long beans and tomatoes (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>Entries by PMU are contradictory.</li> </ul>
25. Halibur: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO NETIL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No entry from PMU.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely because the group reports that although market demand changes due to seasons, they always manage to sell products.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased and group has regular customers (no hard data evidence to support this).</li> </ul>	2020-2021 livelihood assessment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report by the group itself that always manages to sell products = PS.</li> </ul>
26. Tibulai Raihun: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Aplimentec.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water hose, hoes, forks, watering cans, digging bas, cement and sand for water storage.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as they are reportedly generating income.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income increased - they harvested twice and earned \$40 in 2019 (\$20 per harvest spread across a group in one year two years ago does not seem to be a viable business).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report_19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>The earnings reported (\$20 per harvest spread across a group in one year) do not seem to be a viable business.</li> </ul>

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					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the horticulture activity has changed the group's lives gradually, compared to previous conditions when most of the group members depended on government subsidy (no evidence is provided to support this and the extremely low level of income reported does not support this claim).</li> <li>PMU states that group requested additional support (additional water tank, tunnel(?) and mulching film or plastic cover).</li> </ul>		
27. Vatunao: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nursery.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Aplimentec.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build nursery centre, poli-bags and seedlings.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the group:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Built the nursery with size 120 m2.</li> <li>Prepared various plants such as vetiver grass, mahogany and ai saria.</li> <li>Planted 200 trees over 2 ha around water spring at Borloa.</li> </ul> </li> <li>This appears to be an SLM project not a livelihoods project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This appears to be an SLM project not a livelihoods project = N/A.</li> </ul>
MANATUTO MUNICIPALITY (6 groups)							
			PMU: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>			

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1. Naroman Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock (chickens).</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, cement, zinc, triplex, wire, nails, electricity accessories, lamp, hatcher bottles, medicines, poli pipe.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group earns \$100 per harvest (no hard data evidence to support this) (not clear what 'harvest' refers to – this is a 'chicken' project).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
2. Diclindun Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, steel bars, cements, zinc, wooden beams, nails.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group attended business training organized by IADE, gaining basic business understanding using 7-day training KIN.</li> <li>No evidence of how the materials provided were used, any crops produced or increased income.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
3. Fishing Group - Betane Diak: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing net &amp; hooks, nylon rope, ankor rope 8mm, signal lamp, safety gear and pipe (?).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group attended business training organized by IADE, gaining basic business understanding using 7-day training KIN module.</li> <li>No evidence of how the materials provided were used, any fisheries production or increased income.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IADE training report (not seen by TE).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
4. Bufallo Group - We Aitui: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, wooden beams, cement, zinc, nails, wire, pipes, triplex, steel bars, hoes, machetes, curved sickles, tarpaulines, rakes.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group attended business training organized by IADE, gaining basic business understanding using 7-day training KIN.</li> <li>No evidence of how the materials provided were</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IADE training report (not seen by TE).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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					used, any crops produced or increased income.		
5. Grupo Fatubela: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture, Nursery and Agroforestry.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Moris Foun.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Funds for livefence construction, vegetable seeds, polibags, water tank, water hose.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is short-term market for horticulture products and long-term market for agroforestry products (fruits and timber).</li> <li>PMU states that agroforestry will be the focus of the group's activity.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group is starting by selling horticulture products with a view to agroforestry in future as trees start to mature.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that group has long-term focus on agroforestry = PS.</li> </ul>
6. Grupo Rembor: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture, Nursery and Agroforestry</li> <li>Supported via NGO Moris Foun.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Funds for livefence construction, vegetable seeds, polibags, water tank, water hose</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is short-term market for horticulture products and long-term market for agroforestry products (fruits and timber).</li> <li>PMU states that agroforestry will be the focus of the group's activity.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group is starting by selling horticulture products with a view to agroforestry in future as trees start to mature.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that group has long-term focus on agroforestry = PS.</li> </ul>
<b>MANUFAHI MUNICIPALITY (20 groups)</b>							
1. Mukit Rai Oan:			PMU: NS				

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Hader.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kangkung, tomato, eggplantss, beans, lettuces.</li> <li>Horticulture training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is not likely as the group has dispersed already.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased slightly before group dispersed (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group already dispersed = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>2. Halerik Tais Mane:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing spear, fishing line, cable, snakehead, silk cloth, swivel, hook, cool box and freezer.</li> <li>Boat engine and maintenance training from MAF.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as there is high demand for fish products, especially in immediate local market during Covid restrictions on movement.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based likely ongoing local demand for fish products = PS.</li> </ul>
<p>3. Grupo Modomahut 1:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing net, cement, sands, rocks, steel bar; fishery and agribusiness training.</li> <li>(not clear to TE what the cement, sands, rocks &amp; steel bars are for in fishing project).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>4. Hakdat (Hametin Agricultura Knua):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO NETIL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese cabbage, watermelon, tomato, yard-long bean, chilli, ginger, turmeric, dragon fruit, rambutan,</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as group is operational with 25 active members.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states group income increased significantly (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>B5 Best practice report.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>

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	<p>pineapple &amp; papaya.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saving and loan scheme support.</li> </ul>						
<p>5. HATAMA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fishing.</li> <li>• Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Snakehead, nylon yarn, fishing hooks, life vests,, rope 6mm, 8mm, anchor rope, fishing net.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No data.</li> <li>• No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>6. LATAMA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Livestock management.</li> <li>• Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Net, nails, zinc, steel box, canal (?), steel, cement.</li> <li>• TE is not clear how these inputs support livestock management.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No data.</li> <li>• No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>7. Fatukahi / Fatu Mutin:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Horticulture.</li> <li>• Supported via NGO NETIL.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kangkung, eggplant, tofu, breadfruit, dragon fruit, rambutan, pineapple.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states that if market size does not increase, then group might not continue.</li> <li>• No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> <li>• PMU states group changed types of planting – to include pineapple, breadfruit, dragon fruit, rambutan for commercial sale.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>8. Hahu Moris</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aquaculture</li> <li>• Supported via NGO RYA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fish ‘seeds’ (juveniles?).</li> <li>• Materials for irrigation channel rehabilitation and fishpond construction.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states that continuity not likely as group members dropped from 14 to 4.</li> <li>• No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMU states no market activity yet.</li> <li>• Project supported 2 fishponds but half of fish ‘seedlings’ (juveniles?) died due to lack of fish farming skills.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>• Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2021, fishpond training was organized for the group - no follow-up monitoring since due to Covid.</li> </ul>		
9. Haburas Merbuti: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agroforestry.</li> <li>Supported via NGO RYA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Polibags, water tank and water hose and build green house.</li> <li>Rambutan, orange, poinsettia, vetiver and casuarina; seedling for agroforestry and reforestation.</li> <li>Dry organic compost.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: Too early. TE: PS (returns take many years).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too early to assess.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states that group has not earned income yet. Multiples trees planted including fruit trees that would benefit group in long term – moringga, rambutan, orange trees.	07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020. Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on report that group has long-term focus on agroforestry = PS.</li> </ul>
10. Fohaan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture (greenhouse farming).</li> <li>Supported via NGO RYA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seeds, greenhouse materials, pipes, water tanks.</li> <li>Training relating to farming techniques.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as indoor (greenhouse) farming allows more frequent harvests.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states income currently low but community is happy with the activity as allows more frequent harvests and they recommended to provide more greenhouses to other groups.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
11. Hariku: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO RYA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seeds, greenhouse materials, pipes, water tanks.</li> <li>Training relating to farming techniques.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as indoor (greenhouse) farming allows more frequent harvests.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states this is introduction of indoor farming. First attempt was not entirely successful due to pests. Group then participated in further horticulture training to deal with pests.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
12. Ailebo Laran:			PMU: S				

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training, deposit box, stamp seal, ink, members book, pencils, ruler and coins (?).</li> <li>Seedlings.</li> <li>Distribute chicken, pigs and goats.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as group is highly motivated, operates independently and has Invested in processing equipment (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> <li>PMU states saving and loans activity is successful (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment. Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
<p>13. Hakiak no Haburas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock/ Piggery.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training, deposit box, stamp seal, ink, members book, pencils, ruler and coins (?).</li> <li>Seedlings.</li> <li>2 pigs (male &amp; female).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: Too early TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states the group has not sold pigs to market in 2020.</li> <li>Number of pigs has still not achieved the target.</li> <li>PMU states saving and loans activity is successful (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
<p>14. Haburas Ambiente:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training, deposit box, stamp seal, ink, member book, pencils, ruler and coins (?).</li> <li>Water pipe, pump, water tank, hose.</li> <li>Vegetable seeds.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is not likely as group as planting has not started and no product sold to market at time of monitoring.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per 4.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<p>15. Fini:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supporte via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training, deposit box, stamp seal, ink, member book,</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite scoring the activity as 'S' the PMU states that continuity is not likely as group members report that</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased (no evidence provided).</li> <li>PMU states that group:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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	<p>pencils, ruler and coins (?).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plastic water pipe, pump, water tank, water hose.</li> <li>Vegetable seeds.</li> </ul>	funded this through NGO.		<p>they do not know if they will continue.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sought training from MAF.</li> <li>Bought fish 'seeds' (juveniles?)(relevance to horticulture not clear).</li> <li>Established sustainable customers (if this is the case why does the group say that it may not continue?).</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fact that group itself reports that it may not continue does not bode well.</li> </ul>
<p>16. Tanerai:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock (chickens).</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training, livestock (1 roster and 7 hens), deposit box, stamp seal, ink, member book, pencils, ruler and coins (?).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: Too early TE: Too early.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that at time of monitoring, the group had not started selling products.</li> <li>PMU states saving and loans activity is successful (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	07_LVG_Preliminary_Report_19092020. Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too early to assess.</li> </ul>
<p>17. Unidade:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock (piggery).</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 pigs (1 male, 1 female); Saving &amp; loan training, deposit box, stamp seal, ink, member book, pencils, ruler and coins (?).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: Too early TE: Too early.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that at time of monitoring, the group had not started selling products.</li> <li>PMU states saving and loans activity is successful (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too early to assess.</li> </ul>
<p>18. Haburas Fumar:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO FFHF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saving &amp; loan training; deposit box, stamp seal, ink, member book, pencils, ruler and coins (?). plastic pipe, pump, water tank, water hose, vegetable seeds.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: Too early TE: Too early.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that at time of monitoring, the group had not started selling products.</li> <li>PMU states saving and loans activity is successful (no evidence provided).</li> <li>Group wanted to sell organic compost to Loja</li> </ul>	Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020; Horticulture training report.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Too early to assess.</li> </ul>

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					Agi Agricultura. Attended organic compost training.		
19. Hamalatate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The group was supported in Phase 1 with water tank, well and linkage with MAF extensionists.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: No entry. TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that at time of visit in 2020, group has modern horticulture technique, in cooperation with MAF pilots new products – e.g. potatoes to grow in similar climate and soil condition. Water is still being used for all horticulture activity.</li> <li>No evidence provided.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
20. Modomahot: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is not likely as group's main focus was mangrove fencing.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group's income from horticulture decreased due to priority focus on mangrove fencing.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
<b>VIQUEQUE MUNICIPALITY</b> (18 groups) (for some reason the PMU did not list 3 so = 15)							
1. Rofao, Centro Pescas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing materials.</li> <li>Fishing &amp; fish processing training</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that the time of assessment, the group had not increased income.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
2. Lawadare, Centro Pesca: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing materials.</li> <li>Fishing &amp; fish processing training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as group is a member of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group received fish training from MAF.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability</li> </ul>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>		direct project support.		national fishery cooperative. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Group earning \$500 per month (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>		may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 & 6= PS. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
3. Hanare Natureza: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, pipes, hoses, vegetable seeds, tarpaulins, wheelbarrows, zinc, cement, steel bars.</li> <li>Horticulture production training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: S TE: PS	PMU states that continuity is likely as group has: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sought market information. Established contacts with buyers.</li> <li>Sought training.</li> <li>Increased area under production.</li> <li>(no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that income has increased (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
4. Kakuak Rai Nain 1: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, cement, tarpaulins, wheelbarrows, vegetable seeds, pipes.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although the PMU scores as NS also states that continuity is likely due to reported willingness from the group (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that at the time of assessment in Q4 of 2019 and Q3 2020, the group had not increased income.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
5. Kakuak Rai Nain 2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sewing.</li> <li>Direct support from CRB project.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sand, rocks, steel bar, zinc, palm leaf stalks; sewing threads (producing tablecloths).</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though this was direct project support.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that handicraft group sells tablecloths. But due to COVID-19 restaurants and events stalled.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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6. Lawadare: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vegetables seeds (?).</li> <li>Fish processing training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although the PMU scores as NS also states that continuity is likely due to reported willingness from the group (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No information on income change provided during assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020-2021 livelihood assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
7. Love Timor: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Piggery and horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO CIACS.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 pigpen, 1 store house and 24 pigs.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is not likely as the group's request from support could not be met as the project doesn't have time and resources.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that NGO built one pigpen and 1 store house for the group.</li> <li>All 24 pigs died due to African Swine Flu.</li> <li>No market activity during assessment in Q4 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
8. Adarai, Centro Pesca: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Selling fish.</li> <li>No details if direct support or via NGO.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fish preservation material (freezer, knives, machetes, fish drying equipment). Technical and financial training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states income increased slightly (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Group Profile Data Set_CA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
9. Suco Fatudere Fishing Group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fishing.</li> <li>Supported via NGO Kolega da Paz (KDP).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Training in fish drying technique; 1 cooling machine, 1 dryer tool.</li> <li>Fish processing training.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states that fish drying and processing technique were introduced; Fish storage cooling machine and dryer tools provided but no market activity during assessment in Q4 of 2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO activity monitoring report 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>

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10. Lakadi: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO ANF.	• Water pump, water tank, seed packets, spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No data.</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group adopted open farming system.</li> <li>During assessment in Q4 2020, group has 1 harvest and sold on local market total income \$70 (no evidence provided).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> </ul>
11. Calma: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO ANF.	• Water pump, water tank, seed packets, spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that continuity is likely as the group's increased income is reportedly significant (\$1k/harvest).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that group income increased, earning \$3000 after 3 harvests (no evidence provided) (this figure is very high compared to all others cited and if correct bodes well for this group – should check what are they selling/why so profitable?).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> <li>If correct could be model for other groups.</li> </ul>
12. Weleu: • Horticulture. • Supported via NGO ANF.	• Water pump, water tank, seed packets, spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: NS TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although the PMU scores as NS and access to market is limited, PMU also states that continuity is likely as group indicates willingness to continue (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that harvest was affected by flood and horticulture training with raised beds was organized in 2021 to address this.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Although evidence is lacking TE accepts that the prospects for continuity &amp; sustainability may be reasonable based on entries in columns 5 &amp; 6= PS.</li> <li>This should be checked.</li> </ul>
13. SP4: • Horticulture.	• Water pump, water tank, seed packets,	No \$ figure provided by PMU even	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that while group is active harvesting and selling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that there is no information if income increased or not.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or</li> </ul>

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1. Site / Group	2. How did the CRB project support this activity?	3. \$ value of CRB support	4. Success	5. Likelihood of post-CRB continuity / sustainability	6. Reasons/ bases for 3 & 4	7. Supporting Evidence	8. TE Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Supported via NGO ANF.</li> </ul>	spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.	though project funded this through NGO.		products they might stop if there is no market. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Market access is a problem and sometimes there is surplus products with no customers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.
14 Halerik: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO ANF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water pump, water tank, seed packets, spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that this is an active and motivated group (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states that group harvested successfully and earned \$200 (no evidence provided).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>Earnings very low.</li> </ul>
15. Hatutan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Horticulture.</li> <li>Supported via NGO ANF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water pump, water tank, seed packets, spray cans, farming forks, hoes, hoses.</li> </ul>	No \$ figure provided by PMU even though project funded this through NGO.	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PMU states that this is an active and motivated group (no evidence provided).</li> <li>No business plan or business records seen by TE.</li> </ul>	PMU states that group harvested successfully and earned \$160 (no evidence provided).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>07_LVG_Preliminary_Report 19092020.</li> <li>Matrix for NGO_Phase II_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The supporting evidence does not provide proof of increase in income or evidence of continuity / sustainability = NS.</li> <li>Earnings very low.</li> </ul>

3 more groups not listed by PMU to make 18 for Viqueque. Total No. groups = 112 although three not listed for Viqueque so **Total = 109**.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 109)** S = Successful. PS = Potentially Successful. NS = Not Successful.

**PMU:** S = 69 (63%). PS = 0 (0%). NS = 28 (26%). Too early to assess = 7 (6%). No score = 5 (5%).  
**TE:** S = 0 (0%). PS = 31 (28%). NS = 74 (68%). Too early to assess = 3 (3%). No score = 0 (0%). N/A = 1 (1%) (1 activity listed is an SLM activity - no. 27 under Liquica).

NOTE: The TE found zero activities to be successful (S), based on the fact that none of them were supported by quantitative data or similar verifiable, objective evidence of a real increase in income, and/or likelihood of continuity and sustainability, post-CRB project. Even for those that the TE assessed as potentially successful (PS), quantitative, objective evidence was lacking and the TE gave credit and leeway for qualitative and subjective evidence that appeared to be stronger than for other activities (such as observations by the project's Livelihoods Consultant engaged towards the end of the project). This resulted in the TE assessing some activities to be PS when the PMU had assessed them as being not successful (NS) based on earlier reports.

### Annex 5.4: CRB Activity Achievements – Eco-tourism

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

NOTE:

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the eco-tourism activities, and did not implement a systematic process of measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- The TE considers that if there is no evidence that eco-tourism facilities and activities for a particular site are durable, resilient, sustainable and viable post-project, it is ‘not successful’.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
<b>Bobonaro</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Covalima</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Dili</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE questions why 3 of the 4 eco-tourism sites supported by the project are located in Dili Municipality when other Municipalities expressed interest in eco-tourism facilities.</li> <li>• This raises questions about the selection criteria and transparency and fairness of the site selection process used by UNDP.</li> </ul>	1. Mangrove Ecotourism and Learning Center at Cristo Rei, Hera. NGO: KFF	PMU: S TE: PS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Installation of 50 m boardwalk with handrail.</li> <li>• Installation of natural path.</li> <li>• 2 units of VIP toilet.</li> <li>• Water tanks and supply system.</li> <li>• View/photo spot completed in the second week of June.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>• KFF Presentation/Report.</li> <li>• Photos</li> <li>• .</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some aspects of the facility at Hera have been successfully completed as follows:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Photo spot on hill.</li> <li>• Viewing platform on hill.</li> <li>• Gazebo on end of boardwalk and boardwalk itself.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• However, there are also significant aspects of the Hera facilities that are not successful, as follows:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The NGO and community reported delays to payments from UNDP.</li> <li>• NGO reported that design and construction oversight support from UNDP engineer was not adequate.</li> <li>• Standards of materials and construction are poor and not durable, resilient and sustainable.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Toilets and water tank incomplete and do not work.</li> <li>The concrete steps to the view/photo spot are extremely steep, not built to basic standards for steps (e.g. 'rise to going ratio') and only usable by young, fit people.</li> <li>There is conflict between the NGO and Xefe Aldeia with the latter demanding payment for his support.</li> <li>The TE therefore assesses as PS.</li> </ul>
	<p>2. Mangrove Ecotourism site in Sabuli, Metinaro. NGO: Timor Verde</p>	<p>PMU: S TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Installation of 320 m boardwalk almost completed.</li> <li>Next step is installation of handrails. Constructed was delayed due to Covid-19 restrictions and tidal conditions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>Timor Verde Presentation.</li> <li>Photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The first plan from UNDP was to build boardwalk from bamboo but changed to wood, wasting \$3K of GEF funds.</li> <li>TE requested evidence that the boardwalk is being completed by project end, but evidence not provided by PMU.</li> <li>At time of TE mission (June 2021) the boardwalk was far from complete with the project due to end in July.</li> <li>There is conflict between the NGO and Suku Council with the latter demanding that the facility should be under their control.</li> <li>There are concerns that if responsibility is transferred from NGO to Suku Council</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<p>sustainability of the facility will be negatively affected.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The BBQ kiosks built at the site are non-functional / abandoned, with no supporting business plan, representing another waste of GEF funds.</li> <li>(note that other 'private' BBQ kiosk businesses along the Dili to Beacou road and Dili to Bobanaro road have remained active and viable during 2020-2021 – highlighting the poor business planning for the CRB BBQ kiosks at Sabuli).</li> </ul>
	<p>3. Mangrove Ecotourism site in Wenunuk, Metinaro. NGO: Hasatil</p>	<p>PMU: NS TE: NS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TE mission identified that construction of gazebos and other infrastructure at this site was of very low quality, was not completed and abandoned by the NGO before completion, wasting GEF funds.</li> <li>This represents poor project management, supervision &amp; oversight by UNDP. It is recommended that UNDP should investigate the root causes of why Wenunuk was not successful, and learn and apply the lessons for future activities and projects.</li> <li>This site is also very close to the Sabuli site and the TE questions why the project elected to fund two sites right next to each other in the same local government area (Metinaro).</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There is also a third site in Dili Municipality (at Hera), when other Municipalities expressed interest in eco-tourism facilities.</li> <li>This raises questions about the selection criteria and transparency and fairness of the site selection process used by UNDP.</li> </ul>
<b>Liquica</b>	4. Mangrove Ecotourism site at Lagoa Maubara. NGO: NETIL Foundation.	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 x gazeboes, benches &amp; photo spot installed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR 2020 Joint Monitoring Visit.</li> <li>BTOR 2021 Field Mission.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TE agrees with PMU assessment.</li> <li>Facilities at Lago Maubara are built to a much higher standard than at the other sites and likely to be more durable, resilient and sustainable.</li> <li>This site provides a model for such facilities that other sites can follow.</li> </ul>
<b>Manatuto</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Manufahi</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 4)**

PMU: S = 3 (75%). PS = 0 (0%). NS = 0 (0%). Q = 0 (0%). No score = 1 (25%)  
 TE: S = 1 (25%). PS = 1 (0%). NS = 2 (75%). Q = 0 (0%)

## Annex 5.5: CRB Activity Achievements - Tara Bandu

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

### NOTE:

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining 'success' of the Tara Bandu activities, and did not implement a systematic process for measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- The TE considers that if the evidence indicates that a Tara Bandu activity for a particular site has not been effective in protecting mangroves, it is 'not successful'. If there no supporting evidence = 'questionable'

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	1. Aidabaleten/Beacou	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Livestock continues to encroach the area.</li> <li>No local initiative from community members to fix the fences unless project provides financial incentive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>Field Mission 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It is recommended that UNDP should investigate the root causes of why Tara Bandu was not successful at this site, and learn and apply the lessons for future activities and projects.</li> </ul>
	2. Sanirin/Bemalai	PMU: NS TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No supporting evidence provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> </ul>
	3. Batugade	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from community.</li> <li>No reports of human or livestock intrusion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 'BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020' does not contain any evidence at all of the success of Tara Bandu activities at Batugade.</li> </ul>
Covalima	4. Suai Loro	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fence is removed but it doesn't mean tara bandu rule is abolished</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR_Suai_050820_Best_Practice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 'BTOR_Suai_050820_Best_Practice' does not contain any evidence at all of the success of Tara Bandu activities at Suai Loro.</li> <li>The CRB project actually constructed fences that were against local cultural rules, resulting in direct action by the community to remove them, is an example of poor planning and inadequate consultation with the local community.</li> <li>While removal of the fence does not necessarily mean that the community has not accepted the Tara Badu supported by the project, their rejection and removal of the fence means that any prohibition on livestock entering mangrove areas will not be effective, meaning that the Tara Bandu is not effective.</li> </ul>
	5. Besauk	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The '2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima' states that an event was held to declare Tara Bandu at Beasuk.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project paid the local government \$2K for this.</li> <li>There is no evidence presented that the Tara Bandu has been effective at this site since it was declared.</li> <li>The TE questions whether UNDP followed correct cultural practice to declare the Tara Bandu, which should be through the Uma Lisan (traditional clan groups) and Lia Nain (traditional leaders) - rather than through local councils – who are government.</li> <li>The local government may have just declared Tara Bandu in return for the project payment. However, if it does not have formal sanction from the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain it is unlikely to be enforced and effective.</li> <li>Also, traditionally, Bandu is a seasonal natural resource management tool – with a ‘closed’ period (Tara Bandu) when the Uma Lisan / Lia Nain declare a prohibition on resource use and an open season (Loke Bandu) when some resource use may be allowed, depending on season and community needs.</li> <li>It appears that the CRB project’s support for Tara Bandu did not include the traditional Loke Bandu component.</li> <li>The project may have in fact corrupted the traditional Tara Bandu process through its approach that did not follow the traditional cultural process and offered payment.</li> </ul>
	6. Lalawa	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2019_BTOR Field Trip Report-Covalima.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per 5. Besauk - Q.</li> </ul>
Dili	7. Sabuli	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only occasional reporting of livestock encroachment due to damaged fence.</li> <li>Fenced repaired in 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Field observation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>‘Field observation’ by who, when, where is report?</li> <li>No supporting evidence provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> </ul>
Liquica	8. Ulmera	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>BTOR Field Mission 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The ‘BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020’ does not contain any evidence at all of the success of Tara Bandu activities at Ulmera.</li> <li>The TE is not aware of the report ‘BTOR Field Mission 2021’ and whether this contains any evidence that Tara Bandu has been effective at this site.</li> </ul>

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1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
	9. Vatovou	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from community.</li> <li>No reports of human or livestock intrusion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Joint Monitoring Visit 2020.</li> <li>BTOR Field Mission 2021.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per 8. Ulmera.</li> </ul>
<b>Manatuto</b>	10. Aubeon	PMU: S TE: NS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from community.</li> <li>No reports of human or livestock intrusion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No input from PMU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No supporting evidence provided by PMU so TE assesses as NS.</li> </ul>
<b>Manufahi</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	11. Webokurak	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support from community.</li> <li>No reports of human or livestock intrusion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FC's report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has not seen the 'FC's report' or any other evidence that Tara Bandu has been effective at this site.</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 11)**

PMU: S = 9 (80%). PS = 0 (0%). NS = 2 (20%). Q = 0 (%). No score = 0 (0%)  
 TE: S = 0 (0%). PS = 0 (0%). NS = 5 (45%). Q = 6 (55%)

## Annex 5.6: CRB Activity Achievements - Geo-Engineering

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

NOTE:

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the geo-engineering activities, and did not implement a systematic process for measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- The TE considers that if the evidence indicates that a geo-engineering activity for a particular site has not been effective in re-generating mangroves, or has the potential to cause negative impacts, it is ‘not successful’.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>
Covalima	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>
Dili	1. Sabuli	PMU: Too early to assess. TE: Too early to assess. TE is concerned about potential negative impacts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Activity took place recently.</li> <li>• No immediate result is observed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO Timor Verde’s report.</li> <li>• Field activity photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE has not been provided with any report from NGO Timor Verde on this activity.</li> <li>• The only field photos that the TE has on this activity were taken by the NC during the TE site visit June 2021.</li> <li>• The TE holds serious concerns that the geo-engineering intervention at Sabuli may actually cause negative impacts, as follows:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It involved the digging of straight channels that in no-way emulate natural tidal flows.</li> <li>• It may alter the hydrodynamics and sediment dynamics in ways that may actually cause dieback of existing mangroves.</li> <li>• It may expose acid-sulphate soils – which can cause a range of negative environmental impacts (this issue that was highlighted in the ProDoc SESP but ignored by the PMU during implementation – which is a serious oversight).</li> <li>• It may cause saltwater intrusion and salt contamination of valuable freshwater groundwater supplies</li> <li>• It appears that the project did not undertake any form of EIA or detailed design planning to ensure that these interventions did / do not cause negative impacts. This is may be a breach of UNDP’s E&amp;S policies.</li> <li>• The project did not implement a scientifically</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

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					rigorous, quantitative, ongoing monitoring program to assess and report on the effectiveness and potential impacts of the geo-engineering interventions.
<b>Liquica</b>	2. Lagoa Maubara	PMU: Too early to assess. TE: Too early to assess. TE is concerned about potential negative impacts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Activity took place recently.</li> <li>No immediate result is observed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO NETIL's report.</li> <li>Field activity photos.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has not been provided with any report from NGO NETIL on this activity.</li> <li>The TE has seen field photos on this activity identified as April 2021.</li> <li>Concerns as per 1. Sabuli.</li> <li>However at least at Maubara the engineered channels have been dug to follow more natural, curving contours, which may be more effective than the artificial, totally straight channels that were dug at Sabuli.</li> <li>However, some of the channel has been dug through an area that is already subject to tidal inundation, and may therefore be a wasted effort.</li> </ul>
<b>Manatuto</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Manufahi</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No sites</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 2)**

- No scores as too early to assess – any natural mangrove recolonization that might occur as a result of these interventions may take a few years to manifest.
- It is recommended that UNDP and MAF should ensure that there is follow-up, post-project monitoring of these two sites, including to assess any potential negative impacts.

## Annex 5.7: CRB Activity Achievements - SLM

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**NOTE:**

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the SLM activities, and did not implement a systematic process of measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- The TE considers that if survival rate of planted tree seedlings is <30% (>70% mortality) for a particular site, it is ‘not successful’, or if there is no quantitative data to allow reliable assessment of survival rate, it is ‘not successful’ or a least ‘questionable’, depending on circumstances.
- The project only implemented ad hoc, irregular, qualitative spot checks of SLM activities, with reports for each site spread across various BTORs and also relying on qualitative reports from the NGOs themselves.
- The project did not implement a systematic, comprehensive, quantitative, photo- and map-based monitoring program, to measure survival/mortality and growth rates of planted tree seedlings, using standardised scientific methods across all sites, and feeding into a single, integrated, annual mangrove planting report for all sites. This severely limits the ability of assess the overall success of the tree planting activities, and is a major deficiency with the project’s M&E plan.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	1. Batugade	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protection of riverbed with living poles.</li> <li>• High survival rate.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pictures to be provided by PMU.</li> <li>• Pictures not provided.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No supporting evidence provided by PMU so TE assesses as Q.</li> </ul>
Covalima	No sites	No sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No sites</li> </ul>
Dili	2. Mantelalao	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planted tree near water source area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_Alfa_Star_Mantelalao_2019</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cited reported is just a PowerPoint presentation from the NGO itself, not in English, and just with photos and dot points about their activities.</li> <li>• From an evaluation perspective this does not constitute a proper monitoring report on the success or otherwise of the activity - which should be undertaken by UNDP as part of the project M&amp;E plan, not by the NGOs themselves.</li> <li>• The report does not contain evidence of the success of the activity (e.g. quantitative data on the survival and growth rates of trees planted).</li> <li>• TE therefore assesses as Q.</li> </ul>
	3. Koalau 1	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>• Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cited report states that 14,500 trees were planted in three sucos and shows photos of some planting activities.</li> <li>• 14,500 seems like a high number and there is no way for the TE to verify from the written report that this is correct.</li> </ul>

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					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This occurred in March –May 2021 so it is too early to assess the success of the activity (survival and growth rates), and no post planting monitoring has been conducted since. TE therefore considers that it is too early to assess.</li> <li>It is recommended that UNDP and MAF should ensure that there is follow-up, post-project monitoring of this site.</li> </ul>
4. Koalau 2	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>	
5. Sukalau	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>	
6. Fila Bee ba Tua	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>	
7. Lemorana	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>	
8. Bouluk Fugira	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reforestation of Dili’s catchment area.</li> <li>Implemented in 2021, despite long</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>	

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			delay due to Covid-19.		
	9. Fatunaba	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation of Dili's catchment area.</li> <li>• Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>
	10. Nahaek	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation of Dili's catchment area.</li> <li>• Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>
	11. Auro-Ana	PMU: S TE: Too early to assess	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reforestation of Dili's catchment area.</li> <li>• Implemented in 2021, despite long delay due to Covid-19.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_PERMATIL_DILI_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As per site 3 Koalau 1 above.</li> </ul>
Liquica	12. SLM Lagoa Maubara	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completion of stone-line bunds and establishment of hedgerows.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Album: SLM Lagoa Maubara – 2020</li> <li>• D6_Final Report SLM</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Based on the evidence presented the TE considers SLM at this site as 'successful'.</li> </ul>
	13. Motaulun	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planted more than 1100 sapling in the spring area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO_Netil_Motaulun_2019</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cited reported is just a PowerPoint presentation from the NGO itself, not in English, and just with photos and dot points about their activities.</li> <li>• From an evaluation perspective this does not constitute a proper monitoring report on the success or otherwise of the activity - which should be undertaken by UNDP as part of the project M&amp;E plan, not by the NGOs themselves.</li> <li>• The report does not contain evidence of the success of the activity after completion.</li> <li>• TE therefore assesses as Q.</li> </ul>

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Manatuto	14. Rembor/Fatubela	PMU: PS TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low survival rate (only 1200/1600 saplings survived).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_Moris_Foun_Manatuto_2020.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 13 Motaulan above.</li> </ul>
Manatuto	15. Uma Kerek Leten	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The report cited does not contain quantitative monitoring data or scientific evidence on survival and growth rates of planted trees.</li> <li>TE therefore assesses as 'questionable'.</li> </ul>
	16. Uma Kerek Kraik	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
	17. Manlala	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
	18. Dauloroc	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> <li>Fence is intact.</li> <li>Great cooperation with community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Manatuto 05 March 2021.</li> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 'BTOR Manatuto 05 March 2021' reports 80-90% survival rate of saplings at 5 sites in Manatuto but does not contain any quantitative survey data or photographic evidence to support this claim.</li> <li>The 2<sup>nd</sup> cited report does not contain quantitative monitoring data or scientific evidence on survival and growth rates of planted trees.</li> <li>TE therefore assesses as 'questionable'.</li> </ul>
	19. Teras	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
	20. Manu-fahi	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
	21. Lisuata Sasahi	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> <li>Fence is intact.</li> <li>Great cooperation with community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Manatuto 05 March 2021.</li> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 18 Dauloroc above.</li> </ul>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>		

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22. Malusun	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
23. Leohat	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
24. Diric Un 1	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> <li>Fence is intact.</li> <li>Great cooperation with community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Manatuto 05 March 2021.</li> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 18 Dauloroc above.</li> </ul>
25. Torilaran	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
26. Orlalan	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
27. Fatulaun	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
28. Diric Un 2	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> <li>Fence is intact.</li> <li>Great cooperation with community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BTOR Manatuto 05 March 2021.</li> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 18 Dauloroc above.</li> </ul>
29. Le'i	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
30. Aimaulin	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
31. Calohan	PMU: S		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>

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		TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>		
32. No entry from PMU.		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
33. Lafulau		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
34. Mane-Atun		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
35. Are-Ain		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
36. Balulin		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
37. Wer-ulun		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
38. Fatuha		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
39. Lawado		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
40. Bamatak		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
41. Fahilihun		PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
42. Waidarec		PMU: S		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>

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		TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>		
	43. Tanusa	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most saplings survive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FCOTI_Manatuto_2021.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 15 Uma Kerek Leten above.</li> </ul>
<b>Manufahi</b>	44. Letefoho	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2040 seedlings prepared to be planted in 2 Ha area.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_Rya_Manufahi_2020.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The cited reported is just a PowerPoint presentation from the NGO itself, not in English, and just with photos and dot points about their activities.</li> <li>From an evaluation perspective this does not constitute a proper monitoring report on the success or otherwise of the activity - which should be undertaken by UNDP as part of the project M&amp;E plan, not by the NGOs themselves.</li> <li>The report does not contain evidence of the success of the activity after completion.</li> <li>TE therefore assesses as Q.</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	45. Uma Uain Leten	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Planting tree and vetiver grass to prevent erosion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_KDP_Viqueque_2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 44 Letefoho above.</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 45)**

<b>PMU:</b>	<b>S = 45</b> (100%)	<b>PS = 0</b> (0%)	<b>NS = 0</b> (0%)	<b>Q = 0</b> (0%)	<b>No score = 0</b> (0%)
<b>TE:</b>	<b>S = 1</b> (2%)	<b>PS = 0</b> (0%)	<b>NS = 0</b> (0%)	<b>Q = 35</b> (78%)	<b>Too early to assess = 9</b> (20%)

## Annex 5.8: CRB Activity Achievements – Water Security

[All text in the table in Black entered by PMU. All text in Blue entered by TE]. S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**NOTE:**

- The CRB project did not develop standard criteria for determining ‘success’ of the water security activities, and did not implement a systematic process of measuring the effectiveness of these activities.
- The TE considers that if the evidence indicates that a water security activity for a particular site has not been effective in improving water security, it is ‘not successful’.

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
Bobonaro	1. Sulilaran	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water supply system including:</li> <li>• 60m3 reservoir.</li> <li>• Transmission &amp; distribution networks.</li> <li>• Onsite household storage facilities.</li> <li>• Water piped/distributed to communities’ residence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• See Photos in Sulilaran Water Supply 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cited photos show some people standing around a small concrete water tank and an electric fuse box plus a large corrugated iron water tank – they do not provide verifiable proof that the facilities have been successfully commissioned and are operating effectively.</li> <li>• There is no post-commissioning ‘engineers’ inspection report to verify this.</li> <li>• TE assesses as Q.</li> </ul>
	2. Erkina	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fully functional water supply system installed and commissioned.</li> <li>• Reservoir and distribution to restaurants.</li> <li>• Part of livelihood support for households in this coastal community.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports and TE mission should have get this since they have photos of the restaurant and visited this site.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE mission did not visit restaurant at Erkina, only at Atabae, Biacou.</li> <li>• The NC did not observe water system.</li> </ul>
Dili	3. Birahu Mata	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Water source protection and water supply system supporting community livelihood.</li> <li>• Installation work completed and commissioned on World Environment Day June 2020.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NGO Alfa Star Mantelelao 2019 ppt.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The cited reported is just a PowerPoint presentation from the NGO itself, not in English, and just with photos and dot points about their activities.</li> <li>• From an evaluation</li> </ul>

**FINAL REPORT**

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. **Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report** (UNDP PIMS 5330)

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<p>perspective this does not constitute a proper monitoring report on the success or otherwise of the activity - which should be undertaken by UNDP as part of the project M&amp;E plan, not by the NGOs themselves.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The report does not contain evidence of the success of the activity after completion.</li> <li>TE therefore assesses as Q.</li> </ul>
<b>Liquica</b>	4. Aldeia Vatunao	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Installation work completed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_Aplimentec_Vatunao_2019 ppt.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 – Birahu Mata.</li> </ul>
	5. Mota Ulun	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spring protection and distribution network competed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_Netil_Motaulun_2019 ppt.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 – Birahu Mata</li> </ul>
<b>Manatuto</b>	6. Cribas	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Installation completed and is functioning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_Leobalu_Cribas_2019 ppt.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 – Birahu Mata</li> </ul>
	7. Uma Boco	PMU: S TE: S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Installation completed and is functioning.</li> <li>Support to coastal livelihood to households.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Album: Alfa Star Water Supply Manatuto.</li> <li>NGO_Alfa_Star_Uma_Boco.pdf</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The album shows photos of the water system being installed and functioning after installation = S.</li> </ul>
<b>Viqueque</b>	8. Afaloicai	PMU: S TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Installation completed and is functioning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>NGO_FHTL_Afaloicai_2019.pptx</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As per site 3 – Birahu Mata</li> </ul>
	9. Luca	PMU: No entry TE: Q	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water conservation and irrigation facilities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deliverable # 8-Reinaldo Soares_Engineering Consultant.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The TE has reviewed this report and finds it to be of very poor quality, confused, self contradictory and unreliable.</li> </ul>

**FINAL REPORT**

Raaymakers, S & da Costa, E, July 2021. **Timor-Leste CRB Project -Terminal Evaluation (TE) Report** (UNDP PIMS 5330)

1. Municipality	2. Site	3. Success (S, PS, NS or Q)	4. Reasons / bases for 3	5. Supporting Evidence	6. TE Notes
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The TE is of the view that consultants that produce reports of such poor quality should not have been paid for the deliverable unless it was improved.</li> <li>• This represents poor oversight by UNDP.</li> </ul>

S = Successful. PS = Partially Successful. NS = Not Successful. Q = Questionable.

**Overall success scores (Total sites = 9)**

<b>PMU:</b>	<b>S = 9 (100%)</b>	<b>PS = 0 (0%)</b>	<b>NS = 0 (0%)</b>	<b>Q = 0 (0%)</b>	<b>No score = 0 (0%)</b>
<b>TE:</b>	<b>S = 1 (11%)</b>	<b>PS = 0 (0%)</b>	<b>NS = 0 (0%)</b>	<b>Q = 8 (89%)</b>	

## ANNEX 6: Updated GEF Tracking Tools

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- GEF Tracking Tool provided by PMU has not been updated at the MTR and TE reporting periods, so no point inserting here. This is a failure of the project's M&E system.

## ANNEX 7: TE Consultant Code of Conduct Agreement Form - Raaymakers

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

### Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>3</sup>

#### Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System


**Name of Consultant:** Steve Raaymakers

**Name of Consultancy Organization** (where relevant): EcoStrategic Consultants

**I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.**

Signed at *Cairns, Australia* on *29 March 2021*

Signature:



<sup>3</sup>[www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct)

## ANNEX 8: TE Consultant Code of Conduct Agreement Form - da Costa

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

### Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>4</sup>

#### Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

**Name of Consultant:** Eurico Ediana da Costa

**Name of Consultancy Organization** (where relevant): N/a

**I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.**

Signed at Dili, Timor-Leste on 29 March 2021

Signature:



<sup>4</sup>[www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct)

## ANNEX 9: Signed TE Report Clearance Form

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### TE Report Clearance Form

**Terminal Evaluation Report for: UNDFP-GEF Timor-Leste CRB Project**

**Project ID:** 00097253. **Atlas Award ID:** 00092621**PIMS No.:** 5330

**Reviewed and Cleared By:**

**Commissioning Unit (M&E Focal Point)**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

\_\_\_\_\_

**Regional Technical Advisor**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date:

\_\_\_\_\_