ETHIOPIA:
Final Evaluation of
UNDP Programme

Submitted to:
United Nations
Capital Development
Fund

Final
Evaluation Report

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“The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the view of the United Nations Capital Development Fund, its Executive Board or the United Nations Member States. This is an independent publication of UNCDF and reflects the views of its authors.”
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Benishangul-Gumuz Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoARD</td>
<td>Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoCB</td>
<td>Bureau of Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoCBC</td>
<td>Bureau of Capacity Building and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoE</td>
<td>Bureau of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoFED</td>
<td>Bureau of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoH</td>
<td>Regional Bureau of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoWR</td>
<td>Bureau of Water Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSE</td>
<td>Barefoot Solar Engineer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Assessment</td>
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<td>CCE</td>
<td>Community Capacity Enhancement'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Frame Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>CSRP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>District Level Decentralization Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETD</td>
<td>Ethiopian Birr</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDRE</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FET</td>
<td>Final Evaluation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoE</td>
<td>Government of Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGA</td>
<td>Income Generating Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Kebele Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDC</td>
<td>Kebele Development Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWGs</td>
<td>Kebele Women' Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Local Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIG</td>
<td>Local Investment Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB</td>
<td>Ministry of Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Federal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEX</td>
<td>National Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Project Coordinator</td>
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<td>NUNVS</td>
<td>National United Nations Volunteers</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Protection of Basic Services</td>
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<td>PCDP</td>
<td>Pastoral Community Development Programme</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>Participatory Rural Appraisal</td>
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<td>PSCAP</td>
<td>Public Sector Capacity Building Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>Pupil Teacher Ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPC</td>
<td>Regional Project Coordinator</td>
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<td>SDPRP</td>
<td>Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNNP</td>
<td>Southern Nations Nationalities and People</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector Wide Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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</table>
WB  World Bank
WC  Woreda Cabinet
WDC  Woreda Development Committee
1. PROJECT SUMMARY

Country: Ethiopia

ATLAS Programme Number: 00012477

Programme Title: Civil Service Reform Strategy and Implementation Plan for Decentralized Service Delivery in the Emerging Regions

Program Component: Decentralisation

Executing Agency: MoFED- Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

Implementing Agencies: MoFA- Ministry of Federal Affairs; Regional Governments and Capacity Building Bureaux of 4 Emerging Regions of Afar; Benishangul Gumuz; Gambella and Somali; Woredas Administrative Council and Local Communities

Programme Approval Date: 2003

Programme Start Date: January 2004

Programme End Date: December 2006

Total Programme Cost: USD 3.5 million

Financing Breakdown: USD 3.5 million (TRAC)

Final Evaluation Date: February 2007
2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation is undertaken on behalf of the UNDP as a final evaluation of the decentralisation component of the programme ‘Civil Service Reform Strategy and Implementation Plan for Decentralised Service Delivery in the Emerging Regions of Ethiopia’.

The mission’s understanding of the purpose of this evaluation is that, given the pilot nature of the programme, a primary focus is on the institutional capacity of the woredas and kebeles to manage and implement projects and programmes, implementation of small scale infrastructural projects, and the potential to upscale the programme to regional levels. In addition it is understood that the UNDP seeks a strategic review of its pilot intervention that will enable it to assess the potential to replicate an alternative approach for decentralized service delivery, support national decentralization policies, and assess its comparative advantages in donor support.

More specifically, the purpose of the evaluation, elaborated in the Terms of Reference is:¹

a. To assist the recipient Government, beneficiaries, and the concerned co-financing partners, to understand the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and impact of the programme, the sustainability of programme results, the level of satisfaction of programme stakeholders and beneficiaries with the results, and whether UNDP was effectively positioned and partnered to achieve maximum impact;

b. To contribute to UNDP and partners’ learning from programme experience.

c. To help programme stakeholders assess the value and opportunity for broader replication of the programme.

d. To help programme stakeholders determine the need for follow-up on the intervention, and general direction for the future course of the programme.

e. To ensure accountability for results to the programme’s financial backers, stakeholders and beneficiaries.

f. To comply with the requirement of the programme document/funding agreement and UNDP Evaluation Policy.

¹ See Annex 1
3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The Final Evaluation was conducted from 29 January to 27 February 2007 (in country) at the end of the 3-year programme implementation cycle.

3.1. Methodology and Tools used

The Final Evaluation Team (FET) used the following evaluation methodologies and tools:

i. Literature review;

ii. In-country customization of evaluation tools and questionnaires based on the generic ToR provided by UNCDF and the Evaluation Manual provided by ECIAfrica. These were submitted to UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer for comment prior to use;

iii. Briefing Sessions (x8);

iv. Combined Briefing/Key Informant Interviews (x12);

v. Key Informant Interviews (x18)\(^2\);

vi. Focus Group Discussions (x14);

vii. General Observations and Project Site Visits (x18);

viii. Regional level de-briefing sessions (with Regional Presidents and Heads of Capacity Building Bureaus (x5); and

ix. End off mission de-briefing session with national stakeholders (including Ethiopia’s UNDP Country Office and relevant stakeholders – x1);

x. A post-mission “global” de-briefing telephone conference session with UNDP and UNCDF (including participants from the UNCDF office in New York, UNDP Country Office in Ethiopia; and members of ECIAfrica’s Project Management Unit and Final Evaluation Team – x1).

A total of 183 respondents were interviewed (including FGD’s). All interviews and discussions were noted down by hand and typed-up for easy reference, although it should be observed that these records are confidential and therefore not available for general circulation.

3.2. Work Plan

The mission was conducted over a four week period\(^3\). The first week was conducted in Addis Ababa for initial briefings of the FET by the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), and Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA), executing and implementing agents of the programme, respectively. The following weeks were spent in the implementation areas of the programme (6 days in Benishangul-Gumuz; 3 days in Gambella;\(^4\) 6

\(^2\) For detailed list of Interviews and Site visits see Annex 2

\(^3\) See Annex 5 for the final work plan

\(^4\) Undertaken by the local consultant. The international consultant proceeded to Addis Abba.
days in Afar; and 7 days in Somali\(^5\)) The last four days of the mission was undertaken in Addis Ababa in preparation for a debriefing of the UNDP Resident Representative and the national stakeholder feedback meeting.

Given time and resource constraints, the evaluation did not include all districts or areas where the UNDP programme is implemented. The following sample Woredas and Kebeles were selected by UNDP/MoFA for the final evaluation. According to the UNCDF/UNDP Programme Officer selection criteria used were ‘agreed upon by MoFED and MoFA and according to existing formula and initial survey carried out by the project, including accessibility and population.’

**Table 1: Areas selected for final evaluation\(^6\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Benishangul-Gumuz</th>
<th>Gambella(^7)</th>
<th>Afar</th>
<th>Somali</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woreda</td>
<td>1. Menge</td>
<td>1. Itang</td>
<td>1. Dubti</td>
<td>1. Shinnille</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Asaita</td>
<td>2. Jijjiga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Awash</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3. Methodological issues encountered

The FET recognizes that the evaluation methodology had some constraints and limitations, i.e.:

- The original Terms of Reference (ToR) intended this evaluation to be a *joint* assessment of the UNDP final evaluation and UNCDF’s mid-term evaluation on its Local Development Projects (LDPs). However, it was subsequently divided into two separate and distinct missions.
- Under normal UNDP practice, as per The Evaluation Policy of UNDP\(^8\), a Final Evaluation is preceded by a Mid-Term Evaluation. The absence of a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE)\(^9\) placed an

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\(^5\) Because of the vast areas covered in Somali and to optimise time, the local consultant went to Shinnille woreda (4 days) and the international consultant to Jijjiga woreda (3 days).

\(^6\) See Annex 8 for programme pilot areas.

\(^7\) In the original Terms of Reference (ToR), the regional state of Gambella was not targeted for evaluation purposes; however, the ToR was amended to include Gambella, on the insistence of MoFED during the first week of the mission, since it was the only region not included in the ToR for elevation purposes. Its original exclusion appears to have been because of security concerns and the safety of the FET.

\(^8\) Executive Board of the UNDP and the UNPF – June 2006, Geneva.

\(^9\) In this instance, the first draft of the TOR for the evaluation of the UNDP programme in Ethiopia indicated that since the inception of the programme, no Mid-Term Evaluation had been undertaken “due to problems encountered in the implementation of the activities, with particular regard to the Regions of Somali and Gambella... [and] ... specifically, problems related to suspected mismanagement of funds have been reported in Somali Region, while in Gambella the
additional research burden on the FET since common issues that form part of a MTE had to be investigated as part of the Final Evaluation without the relevant material necessarily being available. An MTE would typically have covered issues ranging from what has been achieved in the start-up and expansion phase; realistic recommendations on how to realign the expected results, management structure, etc.; to external and internal constraints and/or unintended negative effects, which might impede the successful implementation of the programme.

- The in-country revision of the ToR to include Gambella Regional State led to a change of workplan, with the result that less time could be spent in Addis Ababa for follow-up interviews and for fieldwork in Afar, and concomitant additional costs for air travel.

- Some key informants, such as the UNDP Programme Assistant who has been involved in the programme since its inception, were excluded from the interview list in the workplan. In addition, a rather important key informant, the UN Team Leader (MoFED), declined to be interviewed by the FET since he did not want to “influence” the FET’s findings.

- The FET experienced serious difficulties in accessing up-to-date financial records disaggregated by region, woreda, kebele and project levels. Besides numerous requests, in-country and post mission, such detailed information has not been made available to the FET. This has seriously reduced the FET’s capacity to undertake an analysis of the cost effectiveness of operations.  

- There appears to be a lack of institutional memory and paper-trail with regard to the programme. For example, the UNDP Head of the Governance Unit was unable to answer critical questions relating to the programme since she has been in office for only about 2 years. UNDP, MoFA, MoFED, Regional States and Woredas officials could not provide the FET with documents critical to the evaluation, such as detailed quarterly workplans. The FET could not find a single location where all programme documents were kept. This dilutes the depth of the final evaluation findings and recommendations.

### 3.4. Team Composition

The FET consisted of the Team Leader, Mr. Mike Meyer, the international consultant and expert on decentralization and policy issues, and Mr. Dereje Dejene, the local consultant who is a gender and participation expert.

During the mission both members attended all Briefings, Interviews, Focus Group Discussions in Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar. Because of time constraints, it was decided that the local consultant

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10 According to the UNCDF/UNDP Programme Officer disaggregated data should be available at regional and MoFA level. UNDP financial system aggregate data according to Regional and Financial disbursement. However this could not be obtained by the FET.
should cover the (added) mission to Gambella, whilst the team leader should proceed to Addis Ababa to conduct Key Informant Interviews. In Somali a similar approach was followed because of the vast distances between pilot kebeles and woredas. The team leader covered the mission in the area of Jijiga woreda, and the local consultant covered the mission in the area of Shinille woreda. In most instances, especially at kebele level, the local consultant acted as translator since most respondents could only speak Amharic. In other instances, especially in Benishangul-Gumuz, the team had to acquire an additional translator fluent in Arabic. The Team Leader of the FET is concerned that some information might have been lost in translation: English – Amharic – Arabic – Amharic - English.
4. **PROGRAMME PROFILE**

This section provides the programme **country context** (socio-economic status, policy and institutional environment); **programme summary** (programme hypothesis; intervention strategy; any major strategic changes adopted during implementation; intended results; scope and location of the programme; broader context within which the programme is located and its scale and scope relative to this broader context; expected added value of programme; and partnerships as foreseen in programme document; and **programme status** (implementation, financial).

4.1. **Country Context**

With an estimated population of 80 million (2007), a population growth rate of 2.16% per annum and a per capita income of US$ 100, Ethiopia is amongst the poorest of the least-developed countries. Although the country’s 1.13 million square kilometres are endowed with natural resources, only about 15% has been developed. The population distribution is rather skewed with 85% rural dwellers subject to poor services and public infrastructure (roads, sanitation, water, health and education services), and poor environmental management. An estimated 50% of the population lives in absolute poverty. In addition, many Ethiopians continue to be vulnerable to natural and man-made catastrophes such as droughts, diseases, conflicts and there are few income-earning opportunities available to them. Coupled with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, weak physical infrastructure, inadequate human and institutional capacities continue to limit Ethiopia’s progress towards sustainable development and poverty reduction.

While skills and literacy rates are low, considerable progress has been made in the past decade and once the present government came to power there has been substantial progress in the provision of basic social services.11 While the general availability of skilled candidates for recruitment into the public administration has been low, the decentralization process initiated by the new 1994 Constitution has increased the demand for such personnel. Regional and Woreda administrative institutions and organizations have been created with new and expanded mandates, while provision of sufficient numbers of (and particularly suitably qualified) staff has been inadequate. Transfers of available staff from federal to regional (and later to woreda) levels may have weakened some institutions, but will have contributed to increasing the available trained human resources in the regional institutions. Alongside this is an increase in the number of third level institutions, especially universities at the regional level with 29,581 graduates from universities in the public and private sector in 200/05 compared to 7,448 in 1994/95.12 Notwithstanding the progress there is a huge need to address structural institutional capacity problems that have come from decades of neglect.

Decentralization in Ethiopia has followed a two-phased approach. During 2002 the more advanced and populous regions of Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional States, were the first to implement decentralization reforms, followed by the four


emerging regions, which have been the last to implement decentralization and devolution of powers to woredas. The following discussion gives a background of the policy environment and developments leading up to, and supporting Ethiopia’s drive towards decentralisation.

Reform of Public Sector Management was initiated with the launch of the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) in 1996, in parallel to the first phase of decentralization to the regions. The CSRP was designed to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of public institutions, while seeking to build on the bureaucracy’s reputation for discipline and compliance. It included components such as (i) an Expenditure Management and Control Project (EMCP), (ii) Human Resource Management, (iii) top management systems, (iv) ethics, and (v) service delivery. The findings of the World Bank (2005) were that the implementation of the CSRP proved cumbersome, partly due to its attempt to plan the entire process and ‘get it right the first time,’ and partly because the executing office was understaffed and over controlled, and that only the EMCP made significant progress, with the important Human Resource Management component virtually ignored. This created impatience and frustration within the civil service as well as in the public at large. This initial experience, combined with the capacity problems experienced in implementing the sector development programs in health and education, not least at the regional level, changed the government’s approach to reform of public sector management in the direction of increased capacity building.\(^\text{13}\)

In 2001, the Government launched a comprehensive National Capacity Building Programme (NCPB), which is designed to strengthen working systems, improve organizational effectiveness, and rapidly develop human resources in the public sector. A ‘super’ ministry, the Ministry of Capacity Building (MCB), was established to provide policy direction, coordination, and implementation support. Counterpart Capacity Building Bureaus were created in the regions to support capacity building efforts at sub-national levels. Five of the NCPB 14 sub-programs are directly concerned with promoting the durability, efficiency, and accountability of Ethiopia’s ongoing public sector transformation process. The NCPB represents a key pillar of the Government’s management strategy for supporting institutional transformation at the federal, regional, and local levels which are reflected in Ethiopia’s PRSP, known as the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (2005/06 to 2009/10).

In support of the poverty reduction strategy, the GoE embarked on a rather ambitious 5-year national Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCP) in 2004/5 initially funded by the World Bank and DFID, to address major gaps in national capacity. In order to access funding, the nine regions of Ethiopia and two city administrations have drafted and refined five-year Action Plans and strategies, in line with the six federal level sub-programme components of PSCP.\(^\text{14}\)

In terms of institutional and implementation arrangements,\(^\text{15}\) the primary stakeholders who are involved in the project are: UNDP, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED),

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\(^{14}\) (i) Civil Service Reform; (ii) District-Level Decentralised Service Delivery; (iii) Information and Communications Technologies; (iv) Justice System Reform; (v) Tax Reform; (vi) Urban Management.

\(^{15}\) See National Execution (NEX) Modality
Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA), Regional State Capacity Building and Coordination Bureaus, Woreda Administration and Capacity Building Offices, Development Committees organized at Woreda level, Kebele Administrations, Kebele Development Committees and the individual communities.\textsuperscript{16}

In terms of institutional and implementation arrangements,\textsuperscript{17} the primary stakeholders who are involved in the project are: UNDP, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA), Regional State Capacity Building and Coordination Bureaus, Woreda Administration and Capacity Building Offices, Development Committees organized at Woreda level, Kebele Administrations, Kebele Development Committees and the individual communities.\textsuperscript{18} A flowchart demonstrating the execution and coordination arrangements of the programme implementation is presented in Figure 1 below.

\textsuperscript{16} In the context of this evaluation, communities refer to inhabitants of kebeles and villages.

\textsuperscript{17} See National Execution (NEX) Modality

\textsuperscript{18} In the context of this evaluation, communities refer to inhabitants of kebeles and villages.
Figure 1: Flowchart for Program Execution

- UNDP Country Office
- Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (Department of Multilateral Cooperation)
- Ministry of Federal Affairs
  - National (UNDP) Programme Coordinator
- Regional Bureau of Capacity Building and Coordination - Regional (UNDP) Programme Coordinator
- Woreda Council and Government
- Woreda Capacity Building Offices – Woreda (UNDP) Programme Coordinator
- Woreda Government Line Office
- Woreda Finance and Economic Development
- Woreda Development Committee
- Kebele Development Committee
- Civil Society/NGOs
- Community Representatives
MoFED is the Executing Agency. The Department of Multilateral Cooperation is responsible for channelling funds and coordination of the programme at federal level. Besides its active involvement in the planning process, the Department authorizes financial disbursements based on agreed upon working procedures and manuals, such as the National Execution procedural manual (NEX)\(^{19}\) of UNDP assisted projects.

UNDP is required to provide financial and technical support for the implementation of the project. UNDP releases funds based on approved work plans and submitted financial reports. UNDP in collaboration with MoFA and MoFED monitors the output, impact and outcome of the project. On the basis of experiences gained in the pilot testing, it was intended for UNDP to mobilize resources from other development partners so that the implementation of the project can be up scaled to all Woredas and Kebeles of the four emerging regions.

For ease of coordination and execution of community initiated projects, MoFA, through the Coordinating Office of the UNDP, is in charge of coordinating regional bureaus or offices that have responsibility for executing UNDP assisted community initiated projects. Accordingly, MoFA coordinates and oversees the activities of Capacity Building Bureaus with respect to UNDP assisted projects, which are being undertaken in the four emerging regions.

**Regional Bureaus of Capacity Building and Coordination** in the emerging regions are tasked to execute the Decentralization and Governance Programme. Accordingly, the Bureaus coordinate and closely monitor and evaluate the implementation of community initiated micro-projects.

**Woreda Offices of Capacity Building** are required to provide the required technical support for the implementation of the project at kebele level.

**Woreda Development Committees**: The number of members of the Committee varies depending on the nature of activities to be undertaken in the different communities within a certain Woreda. WDCs are responsible to direct and facilitate conditions for the proper implementation of community level project components.

**Kebele Development Committees**: A Kebele Development Committee of ten members is formed at community level, which acts as an implementing agent of project components to be undertaken within the geographical area of the community.

In addition, because of severe capacity constraints and to secure the effective implementation and coordination of the programme, UNDP/MOFA appointed one National Programme Coordinator, based in Addis Ababa (MoFA); four Regional Programme Coordinators (based in the Regional Bureaus of Capacity Building and Coordination), and ten Woreda Programme Coordinators (based in the Woreda Offices of Capacity Building and Coordination).

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\(^{19}\) The purpose of this procedural manual is to provide National Execution programme/project staff, regional authorities, relevant government staff and officials, UNDP staff, NGOs and other national agencies with a set of systematic policy and procedural guidelines to the basic concepts of National Execution (NEX) and the procedures necessary to design, execute and implement UNDP funded programmes/projects.
4.2. Programme Summary

This section provides the programme’s Results Framework (no reference is made to a logical framework), a synopsis of the programme hypothesis; intervention strategy; intended results; scope and location of the programme; broader context within which the programme is located and its scale and scope relative to this broader context; expected added value of the programme, and partnerships as foreseen in the programme document.

Two Results Frameworks were presented to the FET by UNDP Ethiopia Country Office. First, a Results Framework which forms part of the Terms of Reference, and second, a more detailed Results Framework that forms part of the Project Support Document (see Annex 5). It was indicated by the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer that the logframe which forms part of the Terms of Reference was used for implementation purposes.

For evaluation purposes, the FET was requested to use the log frame presented in the Terms of Reference. It should be noted that this is not common UNDP programme implementation or evaluation practice, since there is no subsequent amendment or rider to the Project Support Document to justify such an outcome and the FET was not able to elicit an explanation from its interviews to explain this discrepancy.

The following key interrelated components form the core of the programme results:

I. A Multi-Pronged Innovative/Alternative Service Delivery approach;
II. Gender Mainstreaming Component;
III. HIV/AIDS Mainstreaming Component;
IV. Top Management Systems Component.

The implementation of the decentralization programme activities have mainly fallen into components I, II and IV above, i.e.:

Two mainstream Federal, Regional, Woreda and Kebele level capacity building interventions to achieve the intended programme results can be identified, i.e. training and community infrastructural micro-projects.

Training:

1. Short-term trainings in different subjects to woreda officials, civil servants, and communities
2. Conferences and workshops that address the needs of the local communities
3. Local and out country study tour programs
4. Recruitment programme staff

20 According to the Head of Governance – UNDP – Ethiopia, some training on HIV/AIDS has taken place at Regional and Woreda Levels. Since UNDP has a dedicated programme focusing on HIV/AIDS, it was decided not to focus on this modality, however, no project amendment was made and no riders could be found.
5. Procurement of office and field equipment to regional bureaus of capacity building and woreda sector offices

4.2.1. Community level projects

As a first step towards programme implementation, local consultants were appointed by UNDP during 2004/2005 to draft Community Project Proposals for all implementation areas. The sectoral distribution of the projects identified at community level includes:

1. Health (human and animal)
2. Education
3. Water
4. Residence houses (for teachers and health workers)
5. Solar lighting (only Benishangul-Gumuz region)
6. Income generating activities

The table below shows the Results Framework as provided for in the ToR.
### Table 2: Results Framework (As part of Terms of Reference)

**Goal:** To improve decentralized public service delivery in the Emerging Regions.

**Under the intended outcome:** To enhance institutional capacity, working systems and human capital in an integrated and coordinated way at woreda and kebele levels to ensure the efficient implementation of the democratization and decentralization process, empowerment and good governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended outcome</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To enhance institutional capacity, working systems and human capital in an</td>
<td>1. A Multi-Pronged Innovative/Alternative Public Service Delivery</td>
<td>a. Barefoot approaches being implemented by the communities themselves and the communities defining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrated and coordinated way at woreda and kebele levels to ensure the</td>
<td>Approach Adopted, including:</td>
<td>what assistance they would need from the college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>efficient implementation of the democratization and decentralization process,</td>
<td>a. Barefoot Approach Promoted towards integrated rural development</td>
<td>b. Communities tapping into knowledge of other communities by implementing community-based projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empowerment and good governance</td>
<td>b. Twinning arrangements established and knowledge shared among local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. National UN Volunteers and Community Development Agents Deployed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Client-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation System for public service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>delivery institutionalised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gender considerations become increasingly apparent in all tiers of</td>
<td>a. Number of innovative schemes supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public service and in the design, planning and implementation of</td>
<td>b. Budget allocated to support enhanced female participation in the programme (and employment in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community-based development initiatives, including:</td>
<td>Civil Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Gender training provided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovative schemes for facilitating women participation in the civil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>service developed and supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Capacity and Capabilities of Top Managers and Leaders at Federal and</td>
<td>a. Number of elected leaders and top management in place at woreda level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Level Further Enhanced for Effective Decision-Making and</td>
<td>b. Number of Elected Leaders and top management trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Guidance towards improved Public Service Delivery:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Top management trained on new systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Top management attend study tours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Number of elected leaders and top management in place at woreda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Number of Elected Leaders and top management trained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of vacancies filled in woredas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, although no mention is made in both the PSD and ToR to a programme hypothesis, it is understood by the FET that the ‘programme hypothesis’ relates to the following assertion in the PSD:

“By design, PSCAP places certain conditionalities, including ‘statutory minimum requirements’ in terms of systems and procedures which would need to be fulfilled before regions can access funding. Moreover, it appears that disbursement will be linked to performance, so the weaker and less developed regions may see their share (or at least a portion of their share) being redistributed to those regions that have greater capacity to use the PSCAP funds. Ironically, the emerging regions which are least likely to meet the PSCAP conditionalities for support perhaps have the greatest need for capacity building and ameliorated public service delivery.

As a response, the UNDP supported intervention in decentralized public service delivery is expected to strengthen productive partnerships between public sector and civil society for local development and governance and ultimately enhance the capacity of the emerging regions to a level where they can derive greater benefits from increased funding under PSCAP as well as other relevant national development programmes.” (See Annex 6)

According to the PSD and ToR: “The fundamental rationale for the program is the recognition by government that it cannot achieve the objectives of promoting development, reducing poverty, and strengthening democracy set out in the SDPRP simply through its own institutions, agencies and programs but must work in close collaboration with other development actors. This represents a shift in thinking from previous eras, and a change in the ‘rules of the game’ from one where the government is compelled to solely drive the development process to a situation where promoting development involves a partnership between government, the private sector and civil society. Under-pinning this rationale is the recognition that most civil society organizations in Ethiopia are currently weak, fragmented and disparate, and that, in order for civil society organizations to play the more effective role that the SDPRP envisages, significant investments will be required to build their capacity. To the extent that community based groups are expected to identify, design, implement, and report on community-based development projects for enhanced decentralized service delivery, the current programme aims to provide appropriate capacity building support to local communities and CSOs in the emerging regions.”

To this end the UNDP worked together with relevant regional and local governments (woredas and kebeles) and a NGO (Barefoot College-India) in refining and replicating alternative and innovative approaches for decentralized capacity development for public service delivery, including the “Barefoot Approach” which has trained community members in solar electrification in India.

At woreda level, where basic social services are almost non-existent, it is recognized that the creation of new systems and procedures for improved performance will be necessary but not sufficient. The emerging regions simply have too many rudimentary constraints in their development to effectively take advantage of the wider capacity building reforms on offer, such as

21 The preparation of a more expansive and comprehensive programme for Capacity Building of Civil Society Organizations is currently underway, led by the Ministry of Capacity Building. The eventual implementation of such a programme is expected to be catalytic in terms of narrowing the gap of public service delivery in the most remote regions.
PSCAP. These basic gaps and constraints must be addressed if these regions are to fulfill their roles in promoting economic and social development at the decentralized level.

The PSD notes that: “ Whereas much of the past achievements of the UNDP supporting the CSRP and SDPRP were largely confined to improvement of systems and processes at federal level, the current focus of support almost exclusively targets the four emerging/least developed regions (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali). The main objective is to significantly improve decentralized public service delivery, which is consistent with the aims of the Civil Service Reform and Decentralization sub-components of PSCAP." While UNDP indicated that, through this programme, “it is committed to contribute to the overarching goals of PSCAP, the UNDP supported interventions on civil service reform and decentralization will be jointly carried out largely within 10 pilot woredas in the emerging regions, as agreed with the GoE. As a distinct departure from past practice, significant emphasis will be placed on building the capacity of local communities to identify and solve their own development problems, thereby reducing the traditional reliance on civil servants who will continue to be scarce and/or lack sufficient capacity to serve the communities (primary clients) in the short to medium-term.”

The rationale for this shift of emphasis can be attributed to:22 “… a number of lessons drawn by UNDP from its previous involvement in supporting the decentralization and capacity building activities are to continue with support to decentralization and planning but extend interventions to include grass root level communities at sub-district level. Within the frameworks of SDPRP, PSCAP and CSRP, the main approach of the proposed project is to provide facilitation, coordination and financial support for the grass root level pilot community groups so as to take a driving seat in making decisions on their own affairs through identification and prioritization of their needs, design the solutions in terms of projects for addressing their prioritized needs, allocate resources (internal and external) for the implementation of their projects, effectively and transparently manage the implementation and operation of their projects.”

At the same time, according to the PSD: “The UNDP programme falls within the national overall objective of accelerated public sector reform and capacity enhancement for improved service delivery. It incorporates 4 main components: (1) National Capacity Development; (2) Support to the civil service delivery; (3) Tax system and revenue collection reform programme; (4) Decentralization. The overall objective of the intervention strategy is to develop the capacity of the public service at federal and regional levels to a point where they can effectively and efficiently plan and promote development activities for poverty reduction and democratization process. In addition the programme envisaged that any successful approaches and achievements within the emerging regions in terms of innovative modes of decentralized public service delivery may be

22 See: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in partnership with the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) and Bureau of Capacity Building and Coordination (BoCBC) of the Afar National Regional State - Project Title: Support to Community Level Decentralization (CLD) in Afar National Regional State (a Pilot project to be tested in six kebeles of three woredas) - Final Draft Document. September 2005.
adopted by the respective regional governments and up-scaled through PSCAP and GoE resources on a demand-driven basis.\footnote{23}

The above “shift in emphasis” and overall objective of the intervention strategy” might appear contradictory since it seems on the one hand to be suggest building the capacity of the local communities to reduce reliance on civil servants, and on the other, it states that the aim of the programme is to build the capacity of the civil service to provide service delivery. However it can also be argued that the approaches are not contradictory since building capacity of local communities can be seen as crucial in improving and increasing service delivery. It is through empowering local communities that we can make government structures more accountable and more efficient in service delivery.

The PSD makes no reference to the possibility for this programme to influence decentralised policy initiatives. From the PSD it is evident that the programme’s \textit{intended result} was not to influence national or regional policy reforms directly, but rather to support policy implementation (with particular reference to support PSCAP interventions in the emerging regions). However, UNDP indicates in the ToR that: “with regard to the intervention strategy, given the limited resources and pilot role of UNDP, it has been envisaged that any successful approaches and achievements within the emerging regions in terms of innovative modes of decentralized public service delivery may be adopted by the respective regional governments and up-scaled through PSCAP and GoE resources, on a demand-driven basis.” This in itself shows that the programme intends to have an indirect impact and influence on regional and national policy.

PSCAP is a potential US$ 400 million multi-donor initiative, spearheaded by the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and the World Bank. PSCAP is an ambitious multi-sectoral reform programme, encompassing not just civil service reform, but also decentralization, urban management, tax reform, justice sector reform and ICT development.

PSCAP constitutes core public sector programmes which set the scope for strategic intervention in building capacity in the public sector over five years with the following specific aims:

- Strengthening and building capacity in the core public sector.
- Reinforcing on-going priority activities and providing a framework for more vigorous intervention in public sector capacity needs for sustainable growth, poverty reduction and good governance.
- Interfacing with the private sector through challenging demands for positive response and efficient service delivery, transparency and accountability.
- Confronting the challenges of globalisation by playing a pivotal role in terms of competence, efficiency, transparency and accountability.

\footnote{23 The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - United Nations Development Programme - Civil Service Reform Strategy and Implementation Plan for Decentralized Service Delivery in the Emerging Regions - This project document is an elaboration of Components T02A (Civil Service Reform) and T04 (Decentralization) of the signed Programme Support Document, “Support to Public Sector Capacity Building and Reform Programme”}
• Providing strategic support to regional focal points involved in capacity building to promote and enhance their contribution to Ethiopia's effective participation in the global economy.

• Providing a framework for collaborative endeavours with bilateral and multilateral agencies for maximum impact on the country's capacity needs for sustainable growth, poverty reduction and good governance.

• Strengthening the MCB as a centre of excellence with an appropriate mix of professional skills to enhance the intervention in capacity building at the national, regional and sectoral levels.

The District Level Decentralization Programme (DLDP) is one of the PSCAP Sub-Programmes which plays a role in the current decentralization policy of the GoE. The objective of the DLDP is to deepen the devolution of power to the lower tiers of sub-national governments; to institutionalize decision-making processes at the grassroots level with a view to enhancing local participation; to promote good governance; and to improve decentralized service delivery. From the sub-program objective it is clear that it also has linkages with the Civil Service Reform Programme, Urban Management, and Tax System Reform sub-programmes.  

4.2.2. Scope and location of the programme

The emerging regions covered by the programme are Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, and Gambella regions. Woredas were selected from the four emerging regions. The selection of the woredas was the responsibility of regional states. Interviews with all Regional Presidents indicated that selection criteria were merely based on targeting the poorest of the poor woredas and kebeles, with limited access to basic infrastructure. Accordingly, a total of 27 rural kebeles were selected from the ten pilot woredas in the regions.

The four ‘emerging’ (or least developed) regions lie on two opposite ends of the country: the east (Somali and Afar) and the west (Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella) with pastoral communities in the former and agro-pastoral communities in the latter. Harsh conditions exist in both, inadequate access to water leading to nomadic lifestyles, high prevalence of malaria and sleeping sickness. Literacy levels are low, particularly in the pastoral regions. The emerging regions are characterized by small, scattered and nomadic populations, making it rather difficult to provide basic public services. Most of the areas are spatially remote and inaccessible because of poor or no infrastructure and hardly any basic social services such as schools, clinics, access to water, agricultural extension, etc. In addition, the regions (particularly in the west) are ethnically diverse and prone to ethnic conflict which has a negative bearing on project piloting.

The primary stakeholders of the program are the citizens of Ethiopia, particularly those living in the selected woredas of the 4 emerging regions (see the Table below). Civil servants are secondary stakeholders who also benefit from improved management, planning, and facilitation skills, enhanced understanding and implementation of client-oriented service delivery, and an enabling

24 See: PSCAP JSM, March 27- April 12 - District Level Decentralization Program Progress Review (not dated)
institutional and physical environment better positioned to assist them, particularly in the emerging regions, to effectively carry out their duties.\textsuperscript{25}
Table 3: Pilot regions and woredas selected for UNDP supported intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Woreda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Assaita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Shinille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul-Gumuz</td>
<td>Belo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Abobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dubti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jijiga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Menge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belojiganfoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3. Programme Status

This section deals with the programme status quo in terms of implementation and expenditure, based on programme reports. The table below shows a summary of pre-mission programme outputs, indicators and progress as provided by the UNDP.

Table 4: Pre-mission programme status - outputs, indicators and progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A Multi-Pronged Innovative/Alternative Public Service Delivery Approach Adopted in the Emerging Regions, including:</td>
<td>a. Barefoot approaches being implemented by the communities themselves and the communities defining what assistance they would need from the college</td>
<td>a. (1) woredas and kebeles trained on participatory planning; budgeting; good governance and project management (for the kebeles committees); (2) pilot woredas provided with office equipment/furniture; (3) transparent budget ceiling/allocation agreed between Regions; woredas and kebeles (according to the agreed formula 14:44 (woreda’s capacity building grant): 40 (kebeles capital investments)) ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Communities tapping into knowledge of other communities by implementing community-based projects</td>
<td>b. (1) A contractual commitment signed by 4 presidents of the Emerging Regions; (2) 34 selected community members trained in India as barefoot engineers, and –as results- (3)17 villages solar-electrified in the 4 Emerging regions, using renewable and sustainable energy; (4) Study-tours organised for Emerging Regions to Tigray (on solar energy-Barefoot College)) and Amhara Region to the UNCDF LDP on LG Public Expenditure Management (2 more visits to Amhara Region and SSNPR are planned starting from September 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Number of National United Nations Volunteers (NUNVs) deployed</td>
<td>c. 25 NUNVs recruited to address capacity shortages, and to support the Regional Bureaus of Capacity Building in managing decentralisation and civil service reform activities and coordinating UNDP and PSCAP programs; 1 Woreda Coordinator and Community Mobilisers deployed in each target woreda and kebele;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Client based M&amp;E system in place.</td>
<td>d. No progress reported by UNDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender considerations become increasingly apparent in all tiers of public service and in the design, planning and implementation of community-based development initiatives, including:</td>
<td>a. Number of innovative schemes supported</td>
<td>a. Woreda and Kebele officials trained on gender mainstreaming (activity planned to start from September in Afar Region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Budget allocated to support enhanced female participation in the programme (and employment in the Civil</td>
<td>b. Gender equality at community level promoted ensuring women participation in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>− training carried out in India for 34 selected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information obtained from the Terms of Reference. No other documentary verifiable information could be obtained from UNDP.
### Outputs Indicators Progress to date

| a. Gender training provided               | a. Number of elected leaders and top management in place at woreda level | a. Managerial skills of 17 regional officials (Bureaux of Capacity Building) strengthened through 3-year distance-learning MBA funded by UNDP (in progress) |
| b. Innovative schemes for facilitating women participation (in the civil service) developed and supported | b. Number of Elected Leaders and top management trained | b. Study tour on decentralization to South Africa; Swaziland and China organized for Federal and Regional Senior officials (planned in August-September 2006) |
|                                          | c. Number of vacancies filled in woredas                              |                                                 |

As the aim of the program is to devolve power and resources to the grass root levels, consensus was reached between MoFED, UNDP, MoFA and the regions, to allocate the bulk of the budget to woredas and kebeles: out of the total budget allocated, 86% was allocated to the pilot woreda and to the rural kebeles, while the remaining 14% was allocated for regional coordination. At the woreda level, 40% of the budget was allocated to implement community initiated development projects in the rural pilot kebeles while the remaining 46% was used for the woreda capacity building.

The situation in Somali is slightly different from the other regions. After alleged mismanagement of resources at woreda level (which proved to be unfounded after a commission of enquiry), the regional government decided to reallocate the 86% project budget, whereby the budget allocated for community-based projects increased from 40% to 77%, with the woreda budget reduced from 46% to 11%.

According to the UNDP Programme Coordinator’s (MoFA) ‘Terminal Report: Decentralization Project - 15 January 2007’: “UNDP allocated USD 5.2 Million for executing the decentralization programme in the four emerging regions. Out of the allocated budget, 1 Million Dollars was utilized for preparatory assistance. The budget was utilized to procure 5 field vehicles, motorcycles, and other office equipment to the four regions and the coordination unit in the MoFA. The remaining USD 4.2 Million was allocated to the regions based on the formula of the House of Federation.”

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28 No vehicle was procured for MoFA.

29 The House of the Federation is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. The House has the power to interpret the constitution, decide on the issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self determination including the right to secession, strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states, determine the division of revenue to the States and the like. Source: http://www.ethiopar.net/type/English/genifo/geninfo.html
According to the index, the biggest share of the budget was allocated to Somali and Afar region. The allocation of the budget, according to UNDP Programme Coordinator; Terms of Reference and UNDP Programme Officer respectively, is showed in the following tables below:

### Table 5: Allocation of budget per region/institution (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Institution</th>
<th>Final Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>1,890,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul-Gumuz</td>
<td>510,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFA (for coordination)</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Programme Coordinator – MoFA - 2007

### Table 6: Summary of the project’s financial performance (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initially allocated</th>
<th>Revised Allocated</th>
<th>Budget (IIQ 2006)</th>
<th>Spent to date (IIQ 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>634,537</td>
<td>39,687</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,606,128</td>
<td>1,015,298</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,283,087</td>
<td>442,965</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>3,523,752</td>
<td>1,497,950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Terms of Reference - 2006

### Table 7: Budget allocation and total expenditure (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>446,772</td>
<td>252,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,276,615</td>
<td>1,543,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>852,822</td>
<td>806,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,576,209</td>
<td>3,602,245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Programme Officer - 2007

In addition to the budget figures provided by MoFA, UNDP provided the FET with two rather contradictory sets of budget figures. Table 6 shows expenditure provided in the ToR, whereas Table 7 shows what UNDP provided following additional requests by the FET for a detailed updated financial breakdown of programme expenditure, disaggregated by year, quarter, federal, regional, woreda and kebele level, with a further breakdown for capacity building training programmes and the various small infrastructural projects by sector.  

Table 5 above shows final budget allocations per region, without a yearly breakdown by allocation and expenditure. In the first instance the total allocated budget differs from the total amount allocated in terms of the PSD (3.5 million USD). Although tables 6 and 7 show a relative similar amount in terms of ‘revised allocation’ and ‘allocation’, there is a huge difference in terms of yearly

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30 It should be noted that the combined delivery report showed in Table 7, as given to the FET after the mission was completed, include the latest (March 2007) data sets and direct payments carried out by UNDP on behalf of the project, which in turn also explain the variance in terms of delivery targets.
and total expenditure. The FET finds it almost impossible to interpret these tables in any meaningful way except for the fact that both table 6 and 7 show expenditure.
5. **KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS**

5.1. **Results Achievement Measured Against Development Objectives**

The intended outcome of the programme is “To enhance institutional capacity, working systems and human capital in an integrated and coordinated way at woreda and kebele levels to ensure the efficient implementation of the democratization and decentralisation process, empowerment and good governance.” In addition, two mainstream Federal, Regional, Woreda and Kebele level capacity building interventions to achieve the intended programme results can be identified, i.e. training and community infrastructural projects. Against this background, this section provides key findings measured against the programme’s development objectives and outputs.

5.1.1. **Progress of the programme in terms of output achievement**

The following table provides a summary of programme outputs and indicators as per the log-frame, and the actual achievements, based on the findings of the FTE.
Table 8: Summary of programme outputs as per the Results Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Actual Situation (degree to which it has been achieved)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A Multi-Pronged Innovative/Alternative Public Service Delivery Approach Adopted in the Emerging Regions, including:</td>
<td>a) Barefoot Approach implemented by the communities themselves and the communities defining what assistance they would need from the college</td>
<td>After the ‘Tilonia Declaration’ and Memorandum of Understanding (contract agreement) signed between Barefoot College and 4 presidents of the Emerging Regions¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>i. Barefoot Approach implemented by the communities themselves and the communities defining what assistance they would need from the college</td>
<td>i. 34 (17F) selected community members trained in India as Barefoot Solar Engineers (BSEs). This is followed by supply of solar panel by Barefoot College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. Installation of solar panel, by BSEs with the assistance of Barefoot College in 16 of the 17 targeted villages, benefited 50-90 households per village in the 4 Emerging regions.</td>
<td>ii. Installation of solar panel, by BSEs with the assistance of Barefoot College in 16 of the 17 targeted villages, benefited 50-90 households per village in the 4 Emerging regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii. At the time of the evaluation, all BSE's interviewed indicated that no more assistance or contact exists between the communities/BSE and Barefoot College²</td>
<td>iii. At the time of the evaluation, all BSE's interviewed indicated that no more assistance or contact exists between the communities/BSE and Barefoot College²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iv. No application of Rain Water Harvesting was reported by all BSE's interviewed.</td>
<td>iv. No application of Rain Water Harvesting was reported by all BSE's interviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Twinning arrangements established and knowledge shared among local communities within Ethiopia for community-based initiatives</td>
<td>b) Communities tapping into knowledge of other communities by implementing community-based projects.</td>
<td>b) Local study tour program to Tigray, Amhara and Southern National and Nationalities (SNNP) regions; and training on participatory planning; budgeting; good governance and project management were organized for 67 Woreda officials and community members. The tours enhanced interest in decentralization among woreda staff and promoted a self-help attitude among community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) National UN Volunteers and Community Development Agents Deployed</td>
<td>c) Number of NUNVs deployed.</td>
<td>c) 4 Regional coordinator and 10 Woreda Coordinators were employed by the programme. No NUNVs deployed by this programme, except for the Programme Coordinator within MoFA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Client-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation System for public service delivery institutionalized</td>
<td>d) Client based M&amp;E system in place.</td>
<td>d) Client based M&amp;E system has not been implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gender considerations become increasingly apparent in all tiers of public service and in the design, planning and implementation of community-based development</td>
<td>a) Number of innovative schemes supported</td>
<td>a) Gender equality at community level promoted:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Budget allocated to support enhanced female participation in the programme (and employment</td>
<td>o Training on gender equality and roles of women in development was provided for 120 people drawn from women group of Sabure village and Woreda &amp; Kebele officials in Afar Region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiatives, including:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) <strong>Gender training provided</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Innovative schemes for facilitating women participation (in the civil service) developed and supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in the Civil Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of elected leaders and top management in place at woreda level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Elected Leaders and top management trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of vacancies filled in woredas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Actual Situation (degree to which it has been achieved)

- Half of the 34 BSE trained in India, and now working as solar engineers, are women.
- Only 1 (at most 3) of the Kebele Development Committee (KDC) members and management of community projects (e.g. water projects) is a woman.
- b) Women are empowered to own and manage Income Generating Schemes (e.g. Flour mills, Cooperative Shop) established with the support of the budget allocated by the project. 13 Grain mills and 11 Coop shops constructed.

The budget allocated to enhance female participation in the program ranges from about 5% in BGR to over 25% in Afar.

### 3. Capacity and Capabilities of Top Managers and Leaders at Federal and Regional Level Further Enhanced for Effective Decision-Making and Overall Guidance towards improved Public Service Delivery:

- a) Top management trained on new systems.
- b) Top management attend study tours

- a) Managerial skills strengthening was started for 26 regional officials of the four emerging regions and experts from MoFA through 3-year distance-learning for MBA using the fund from UNDP. Presently, 19 students are, reportedly, attending the program while the rest quit the training for various reasons. One civil servant from the emerging region is back in the office after his 2 years of study in South Africa for his master's degree.

- b) Training on budgeting, planning and human resource management conducted for 141 woreda political leaders and 181 civil servants in Afar region, for 130 (out of which 33 are women) in Gambella region. A workshop on Human rights and democracy was conducted for 41 woreda officials and community leaders in Gambella region. Training on decentralization, good governance, and related issues organized for elected leaders and elders-154 in Gambella region, 54 in BGR. A public conference on local governance and community empowerment conducted for 496 people in Somali region.

- c) Study tours on barefoot approach to India, and on decentralization to South Africa and China organized for 11 Federal and Regional Senior officials.

- d) There is no information as to the number of vacancies filled in the woredas, except for woreda coordinators that were hired by the project budget.
The agreement (as per the Contract Agreement for Development Services between Regional State of Somali and Barefoot College (India), 2004) was for the regions to:

- Select communities (kebeles) with 30 households each to be solar electrified and 2 trainees, unemployed and illiterate or semi-illiterate (preferably 1 woman) per kebele
- Pay for a set contract price of 1,000 (One thousand) US Dollars per house (30) per kebeles electrified with fixed solar units, plus 150 US dollars per mobile solar lanterns (10) per kebele.
- Pay 1,800 (One thousand eight hundred) US Dollars per trainee to be trained at the Barefoot college, Tilona, India.
- Cover the cost of travels to India and return for the trainee and other associated cost 6-month training in loco

for the community to:

- Endorse the selection of 2 trainees (one man and one woman), and support family of the trainee while the trainee is in India,
- Provide space for workshop and committed to contributing to the sustainability of the solar electrification of the community either in kind or cash

for Barefoot College agrees to:

- Train two people from each of the target kebeles as Barefoot Solar Engineers (BSE) and Barefoot Architects on Roof Rain Water Harvesting within six months of their arrival to the College.
- Provide equipment (solar panels, fixed lighting and mobile lanterns units) and spare parts to last no less than three years to electrify each house in each of the selected kebeles.

Provide technical backstopping in the solar electrification of the target kebeles, as required.

It should be noted that according to the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer, “the project has organised a final workshop participated by Barefoot Engineers and facilitated by BC India to establish an association of Ethiopian Barefoot engineers. During the workshop one international NGO has been also involved in supporting the association.”

Annexures 11 and 12 illustrate all the detailed training programmes undertaken per region and all community based infrastructural projects, including their status and functionality.
From the table it can be seen that all intended activities were not achieved. The exceptions, which are serious, are the following:

- there is no more assistance or contact between the communities/BSE and the Barefoot College;
- no application of Rain Water Harvesting was reported by all stakeholders interviewed;
- no NUNVs were deployed by the decentralisation component of the programme except for the Program Coordinator within MoFA;\(^3\)
- the Client based M&E system has not been implemented;
- only 1 (at most 3) of the Kebele Development Committees (KDC) members and management committee of community projects (e.g. water projects) is a woman; and
- the FTE could not obtain any evidence as to the number of vacancies filled in the woredas, except for woreda programme coordinators that were hired and paid from the programme budget.

5.1.2. Progress of the program in terms of attaining its objectives

Given output achievement and related delivery of inputs and activities, this section deals with the evidence that the programme has or is likely to attain its immediate and development objectives, with specific focus on what the evidence/potential is that the programme will achieve its intended contribution to:

- Alleviate programme-relevant dimensions of poverty
- Improve access to infrastructure and services
- Achieve more equitable participation and distribution of benefits across gender, ethnic and socio-economic groups
- Improve the management of natural resources (in relation to the promoted Barefoot Approach)
- Influencing policy reforms and implementation that support effective decentralization
- Replication of the approach by Government and/or other donors.

Finding 1: Alleviating programme-relevant dimensions of poverty

All FGD and key informant interview respondents at national, regional, woreda and kebele interviewed on the question of poverty alleviation, were in agreement that most pilot interventions have the potential to contribute to the alleviation of poverty.

Particularly in the eastern regions, agricultural productivity enhancement through irrigation and procurement of tractors (Afar and Somali) is portrayed by all stakeholders as “important interventions to alleviate poverty.” In addition, although a limited number of households benefited from this intervention, since it is a pilot intervention, and since there is no verifiable data available.

\(^3\) It should be noted that this is a component of a larger programme, where UNVs have been deployed at Regional level.
to quantify an increase in productivity, the community and government officials at woreda and regional levels maintain that productivity levels have increased.

“Although agricultural technology demonstration benefited only 20 households that were engaged in the interventions, it has dramatically improved their situation. The 20 households are no more buying grain”.

Other outcomes of the programme such as Income Generating Activities (IGA) (flour mills, bee hives, and cooperative shops), have the potential to contribute to poverty alleviation. According to the Head of Capacity Building Bureau in Gambella: “Women used to pound grain for a day to prepare food or travel long distance to get to a flour mill - now there is a flour mill at their gate or village. They have less drudgery and now use their time spent for pounding/travelling for more productive purposes”

From the six infrastructural project interventions, 10 out of 14 FGDs unanimously confirmed that agricultural productivity enhancement through irrigation and procurement of tractors, and IGAs have the strongest potential to alleviate poverty.

“Earlier we have been digging our crop plots by hand as the result we are producing minimal. Now using water and tractor we are planning to form cooperative and produce fruits, vegetables and cereals. This will improve our situation. This will sustain benefits of community. But water well is without pump. To make our dream realistic we need budget to be released soon”

However, it should be emphasised that it is premature to draw any definite conclusions on the impact of the programme on poverty alleviation measured in terms of improved income/consumption and reduction of malnutrition, etc, since some interventions were implemented only last year, and because there is no reliable data to measure progress against.

**Finding 2: Improving access to infrastructure and services**

The evidence gathered by the team indicates that most pilot projects such as schools, access to potable water, health posts, veterinary posts, flour mills; and installation of solar lights (which are operational), have improved, or will when complete improve, beneficiaries’ access to infrastructure and services.

However, the FET noted that, that besides solar energy projects, 50% (9 out of 18) of pilot projects visited are not yet operational. The table below gives a breakdown of projects visited and their status.

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32 See interview notes taken at Sabure Kebele, Awash Fantale Woreda, Afar Region during focus group discussion with KA & KDC members, Feb 16, 2007

33 Health (human and animal); Education; Water; Residence houses (for teachers and health workers); Solar lighting; Income generating activities

34 See interview notes taken at Harawa Kebele, Shinnelle Woreda, Somali Region during focus group discussion with KA & KDC members, Feb 20, 2007
Table 9: Facilities and Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Woreda</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Menge</td>
<td>Fatsako</td>
<td>Health post</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Menge</td>
<td>Tumat Jibron</td>
<td>Health post</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Jikawo</td>
<td>Badel</td>
<td>Vet post</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambella</td>
<td>Jikawo</td>
<td>Badel</td>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Dubti</td>
<td>Debel</td>
<td>Flour mill</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Dubti</td>
<td>Debel</td>
<td>Coop shop</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Dubti</td>
<td>Debel</td>
<td>Irrigation pump</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Asaita</td>
<td>Handeg</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Asaita</td>
<td>Handeg</td>
<td>Flour mill</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Asaita</td>
<td>Handeg</td>
<td>Coop shop</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Awash</td>
<td>Sabure</td>
<td>Coop shop</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Awash</td>
<td>Sabure</td>
<td>Flour mill</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Awash</td>
<td>Sabure</td>
<td>Irrigation pump</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>Awash</td>
<td>Sabure</td>
<td>Health post</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Shinnile</td>
<td>Harawa</td>
<td>Water well and pump for irrigation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Shinnile</td>
<td>Harawa</td>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>Shinnile</td>
<td>Barak</td>
<td>Health post</td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All beneficiary households in pilot kebeles visited (FGDs) reported a rather dramatic improved quality of life due to solar light installation. As reported by community members, solar power has reduced the time needed for collecting fuel wood for lighting purposes, time and money spend on buying Kerosene from distant towns, and enabled children to read at night. In Afar it was reported that solar lights, particularly mobile solar lanterns have improved services offered by Traditional Birth Attendants, during social ceremonies/occasions, and during a wake period for the deceased.

“We benefit a lot from solar lights, it gave us light all the night, especially when the children are sick or have some problem, it lessen our burden of collecting fuel wood, and we enjoy eating food in the lights, which we had been eating without seeing it whether there is mud or food inside.”

From relevant regional and woreda respondents, all were in agreement that the expansion of existing schools (additional class rooms), or upgrading of schools from non-formal to formal schools, enabled more children to attend school, and according to most respondents where solar energy is provided to schools, more learners are able to attend (night) school. Potable water supply has also been reported by all respondents to reduced time and energy required to fetch water from distant locations.

Annexure 11 shows all implemented community development projects in the emerging regions and their functionality. From a list of 104 combined planned infrastructural activities, 66.6% are fully operational, 30.7% are partially operational, and 11.4% are not operational. Conversely, according to the UNDP Program Coordinator (MoFA): “… almost all of the projects are ready to start their operation. From the projects that are implemented in the target rural kebeles, on average a total of...

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35 Women participant of a focus group discussion at Fatsako Kebele, BGR.
130,000 people residing in the target kebeles and nearby communities will be directly benefiting from the programme.\(^{36}\)

Our overall assessment in terms of improved access to infrastructure and services by beneficiary communities and individuals points to the fact that whether the projects are operational or not, there is a sense of appreciation and optimism.

**Finding 3: Achieving more equitable participation and distribution of benefits across ethnic and gender groups**

*The FET found it unlikely that the programme will have succeeded in the equitable participation and distribution of benefits across ethnic groups in the pilot areas, and also it had not succeeded in securing equitable participation across gender groups and the empowerment/rights of women to determine their own choices.*

Although the issue of ethnicity was not raised in the PSD, it was recognised by all key informant interviews at regional level that the intervention activities at woredas and kebeles were selected to ensure equitable distribution of benefits among different ethnic/clan groups, specifically in BGR, Gambella and Somali. However, a desk-top analysis by the FET on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups in the pilot areas showed that to some extent ethnic/clan minorities in the emerging regions appears to be ‘disregarded’, and that the larger ethnic groups/clans attracted the attention of regional governments. For example, the FET established that the two woredas selected in BGR are located within the Gumuz and Berta ethnic groups’ geographical location, which are ethnic majorities in the region, whereas Shinasha, Omo, and Komo, which constitute ethnic minorities, are noticeably not included. In Gambella for example, among the five indigenous ethnic groups, the project is located in Aguna and Newier, the dominant ethnic group, whereas ethnic minorities such as the Mezhenger, Opo and Komo are not included. Similarly, in Somali the project is located in the dominant clan woredas.

In terms of the PSD, “gender considerations become increasingly apparent in all tiers of public service and in the design, planning and implementation of community-based development initiatives, including: a) Gender training provided and b) Innovative schemes for facilitating women’s participation in the civil service developed and supported.” The way that this was generally perceived and implemented in the programme was in terms of ‘women’s empowerment’, as defined by UNDP: “Women’s empowerment has five components: women’s sense of self-worth; their right to have and to determine choices; their right to have access to opportunities and resources; their right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change to create a more just social and economic order, nationally and internationally.”\(^{37}\)


\(^{37}\) See: UNITED NATIONS POPULATION INFORMATION NETWORK (POPIN) UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) - GUIDELINES ON WOMENS EMPOWERMENT FOR THE UN RESIDENT COORDINATOR SYSTEM. Source: [www.un.org/ popin/unfpa/taskforce/guide/iatfwemp.gdl.html](http://www.un.org/popin/unfpa/taskforce/guide/iatfwemp.gdl.html)
Training on gender equality and roles of women in development was provided for 120 people drawn from women groups of Sabure village and Woreda and Kebele officials in Afar Region. Half of the 34 BSE trained in India, and now working as solar engineers, are women. The programme succeeded to empower women to own and manage Income Generating Activities (e.g. Grain Mills and Cooperative Shops) established with the support of the budget allocated by the project (13 Grain Mills and 11 Cooperative Shops were constructed).

Without exception, during all key informant interviews and FGDs where gender issues were discussed, respondents were in agreement that both women and men were given an equal opportunity to participate in the planning process. However, in 90% of FGDs, ones where only women were present, it was emphasised that men generally dominated the planning and final decision-making process, particularly in Afar and Somali, where there still appears to be a deeply rooted culture of marginalization of women in leadership and decision-making processes. As a prominent Somali regional official noted: “This issue is a cultural thing – women are too busy with other things to participate – they need to support the men more than anything else.” Our findings show that only 1 (at most 3) of the Kebele Development Committee (KDC) members and management of community projects (e.g. water projects) is a woman. This clearly shows that the programme has not succeeded to secure equitable participation across gender groups and the empowerment/right of women to determine their own choices.

Conversely, of particular significance is the finding of the FET that 75% of community, woreda and regional respondents were of the opinion that women benefited more than men from the interventions/projects. This finding is rather not surprising, given the nature of the programme design and interventions (i.e. to benefit the ‘broader community’ and to benefit women), and the socio-economic context within the emerging regions (i.e. the marginalization of women). In addition, it was noted during almost all (90%) key informant interviews and FGD’s at woreda and kebele levels that both officials and community members confirmed that flour mills and cooperative shops which are exclusively owned and managed by women, solar lights (limited to beneficiaries only), potable water supply, and health posts, are benefiting women more than men.

Despite evidence that women had little opportunity to participate in decision-making as opposed to men, the programme design, and activities undertaken, effectively secured that women benefit more from the programme in terms of activities undertaken.

**Finding 4: Improving the management of natural resources (in relation to the promoted Barefoot Approach)**

The FET found that improvement in natural resource management, which was, inter alia, the intention behind adopting the ‘Barefoot College’ approach, is limited since the majority of community members still use wood and fossil fuels for lighting purposes. At the same time, the majority of households rely on wood for cooking and thermal purposes.

The skills taught and promoted by the ‘Barefoot College’ in India are aimed at providing the basic services villagers need: safe drinking water, sanitation, education, and health care. The College is a non-formal training institute where young men and women are taught practical skills by village teachers, many of whom have no formal qualifications. Teaching and learning are based on the day-to-day needs of villagers. In addition it promotes solar energy for lighting purposes to improve natural resource management – the use of solar battery powered lighting instead of wood or fossil fuels. In addition, the ‘Barefoot Approach’ promotes an integrated developmental approach to
access to drinking water; rainwater harvesting; solar power; night schools; health centers; environment; housing; income generation; traditional media; peoples action and women’s groups.  

‘Barefoot College’ agreements and signed contracts with the emerging regions clearly state that the intention was to “train two people from each of the target kebeles as Barefoot Solar Engineers (BSE) and Barefoot Architects on Roof Rain Water Harvesting (RRWH) within six months.” The intended RRWH activity have ‘vanished’ according to the UNDP Head of Governance Unit, since they attempted to involve other donor agencies as a partner in this venture “but nothing came of it”. The installation and maintenance of solar lights by BSE’s was the only contractual ‘Barefoot Approach’ activity promoted. This intervention has reportedly reduced the use of Kerosene (especially in Afar, Somali, and BGR) and the use of wood in all regions.

Some improvement in the management of natural resources can be seen as a positive, however in a limited way. This is merely because a small number of households (2-3%) per village gained access to solar technology. Therefore, improvement in natural resource management, which was, inter alia, the intention of adopting the ‘Barefoot College’ approach, is limited since the majority of community members still use wood and fossil fuels for lighting purposes. At the same time, the majority of households rely on wood for cooking and thermal purposes.

Finding 5: Influence on policy reforms and implementation that support effective decentralization:

In line with the PSD, programme outputs have focused on emerging regions to support implementation rather than to influence policy directly. However, the FET’s analysis of the pilot nature of the programme, and its concomitant intention for successful approaches within the emerging regions to be adopted by regional governments and up-scaled through PSCAP and GoE resources, shows that the programme also intended to have an indirect impact and influence on regional and national policy.

The intended outcome of this programme in support of decentralisation policies and capacity development is to enhance institutional capacity, working systems and human capital in an integrated and coordinated way at woreda and kebele levels to ensure the efficient implementation of the democratization and decentralization process, empowerment and good governance, with particular focus on women empowerment.

In terms of enhanced institutional capacity, the programme provided short-term trainings to woreda officials, civil servants, and communities; conferences and workshops; and local and out-country study tour programmes, to support the GoE decentralisation drive. A total of 6013 delegates attended such training interventions. Annexure 12 shows the various training interventions at federal, regional and community levels. All regional, woreda officials and community members

38 See: www.barefootcollege.org.

39 This activity appears to have ‘vanished’ according to the UNDP Head of Governance Unit, since they attempted to involve other development agencies as a partner in this venture “but nothing came of it”.

40 The “Barefoot” approach refers to experience of the Barefoot College, an Indian NGO established in 1972 with the conviction that solutions to rural problems lie within the community.
interviewed expressed the view that they have benefited from all training activities in a manner that improved their relevant capacities. Most (about 55%) of respondents indicated that they need further and more in-depth training on modalities that they already received training on.

In addition to direct assistance to the PSCAP process (in 2006, UNDP and MoFED assisted the emerging regions in Government Disbursement Records),\textsuperscript{41} the programme appears to have had little (if any) influence on policy formulation and reforms during its implementation phase, but rather supported existing reforms (specifically the decentralisation component of PSCAP) through innovative service delivery interventions. These include the “Barefoot Approach” with interventions such as solar energy for lighting purposes and ‘back-stopping’ through the direct employment of a National Programme Coordinator (based in MoFA), four Regional Programme Coordinators (based in the respective Regional Bureaus for Capacity Building), and 10 Woreda Programme Coordinators. In addition, the programme reached lower administrative tiers of Government (woredas and kebeles) not reached by PSCAP by providing training and equipment at Federal and Regional Level.

Finding 6: Replication of the programme approach by government /other donors

In terms of replicating the UNDP programme approach, the FET found that since this programme was, by design, meant to be a bottom-up endeavour, the real needs of the intended community beneficiaries have not been addressed; rather, a top-down approach was undertaken. The FET found that the actual programme implementation does not reflect the needs identified by communities during the needs analysis assessment process. With particular reference to solar energy, implementation was supply driven (top-down); Particularly in Somali and Afar regions, solar energy was considered a luxury or an enhancement need which did not form part of the communities’ original basic needs identification.

The UNDP programme was a pilot which sought to test ways of building capacity of local government and communities to undertake various forms of development that would improve the infrastructure and services in these areas and their accessibility to the poor in particular. The programme activities as set out in the PSD that were particularly experimental, are the intended active engagement of the programme with relevant NGO and donor partners (in refining and replicating alternative and innovative approaches for decentralized capacity development for public service delivery), the solar energy and Roof Rain Water Harvesting components of the 'Barefoot Approach', and 'Community Capacity Enhancement' (CCE)\textsuperscript{42}. However, the programme failed to

\textsuperscript{41} See Final Evaluation ToR: Annex 1

\textsuperscript{42} See: UNDP: LEADERSHIP FOR RESULTS - UNDP’s Response to HIV/AIDS: COMMUNITY CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK HIV/AIDS GROUP • BUREAU FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY • 2005: “The Community Capacity Enhancement programme, known as CCE, addresses the underlying causes of HIV/AIDS, be they power relations, gender issues, stigma or discrimination. It also focuses on the issues of testing, treatment and care. Most community programmes dealing with HIV/AIDS rightly concentrate on awareness-raising and discussion. The CCE programme does this too. But it goes deeper, getting to the heart of why the epidemic is spreading and, through an interactive dialogue known as Community Conversations, enables community decision-making and action. The CCE programme is an integral part of UNDP’s Leadership for Results Programme. In addition Community Conversations are the main methodology used in the Community Capacity Enhancement (CCE) programme. This programme, in turn, is an integral part of UNDP’s Leadership for Results programme. Community Capacity Enhancement, along with programmes
both partner with any NGO’s or donors and implement Roof Rain Water Harvesting, and the CCE was never implemented. None of the key informants interviewed knew what Roof Rain Water Harvesting and CCE were all about, or that it formed part of the PSD, and why it has been neglected as a planned activity.

Given the limited resources of UNDP, it was envisaged that “any successful approaches and achievements within the emerging regions in terms of innovative modes of decentralized public service delivery may be adopted by the respective regional governments and up-scaled through PSCAP and GoE resources, on a demand-driven basis.”

As a first step towards programme implementation, consultants were appointed during 2004/2005 to undertake a needs assessment in the emerging regions, pilot woredas and kebeles, which formed the basis of project interventions. The main objective was to identify the selected communities’ priority needs. The FET found that such commissioned research established training as an “identified needs” intervention, but rather peculiarly, excluded an analysis of capacity-gaps to support the nature of training interventions provided, which, under normal circumstances, would be a prerequisite in terms of what kind of training is required.

Annex 9 gives a detailed account of the original baseline needs identified by the respective pilot communities, vis-à-vis the project outcomes. The essence of Annexure 9 is that that although the basic needs identified by the programme have been implemented to a large extent, so-called ‘committed interventions’, such as solar lighting have been prioritised by the programme management as priority needs. In addition, it shows that out of the four emerging regions’ needs analyses, none of the communities prioritised solar energy as a need. However, except for Benishangul-Gumuz, the so-called ‘committed intervention’ preceded the needs analysis modality and has been incorporated as part of community needs. The consultant of the Community/Kebele Development Project Document cautioned that: “Many activities are already accomplished or being undertaken. Two people from each kebele are taking training in India in Leadership Development, Arts and Media, and Development Planning and Implementation, are a set of initiatives that are mutually reinforcing. Each programme is linked to the others and unfolds in a systematic way over a three-year period. This programming link is not accidental. It is part of a strategy to take CCE to scale and multiply its effectiveness. The Leadership Development Programme, for example, focuses on enhancing leadership potential at all levels of society to reverse the epidemic. The programme involves a six – to nine – month programme, integrating new tools, frameworks and models into leadership activities. Many of these same tools and frameworks have been integrated into the Community Conversations process. Furthermore, it is required that a substantial number of the CCE trainers go through the Leadership Development Programme. This will enhance common understanding, build strategic partnership and develop competencies.”

43 The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia - United Nations Development Programme - Civil Service Reform Strategy and Implementation Plan for Decentralized Service Delivery in the Emerging Regions - This project document is an elaboration of Components T02A (Civil Service Reform) and T04 (Decentralization) of the signed Programme Support Document, “Support to Public Sector Capacity Building and Reform Programme”

44 See four individual regional research documents were drafted, entitled “Support to Community Level Decentralization (CLD) in Afar/Somali/Benishangul-Gumuz National Regional State.

45 See Terms of Reference for consultants.

operational aspects of the solar electricity. Procurement issues are already handled as items are largely to be imported from the organization where the people are taking training. The major activities to be undertaken are construction of the electric house and installation of the system. However, it is also important to take care of activities that should be undertaken to make the system operational and to sustain the service. Type of services to be rendered, operational and maintenance costs and sources of financing, as well as rights and responsibilities of users should be clearly spelt out.”

In this respect the FET found convincing evidence that it would be unlikely and risky for the ‘Barefoot Approach’, in terms of the household solar lighting intervention, to be replicated or expanded. Besides the fact of the high costs involved in piloting (USD 920.45 per household - see Annex 10 for a detailed cost benefit analysis of solar energy as provided by the programme) and replicating photovoltaic technology, it was found to be unaffordable to government, regions, woredas and kebeles (without external assistance). In addition, our findings on the harmful side-effects and impact of unequal distribution of solar lights (in which they were piloted with a small % of households, leading to the division of communities and potential for resource based conflict), militates against a piecemeal application to other households.

Finding 7: Assessment of the performance of the programme with regards to relevant country CCF/CPAP/UNDAF results framework indicators and targets

According to the UNDP, 47 lessons learned from CCF-1 confirm that: (1) UNDP has played, and can continue to play, a major role in capacity building, but the concept needs to be widened beyond training; (2) The need exists to sharpen focus and inter-linkages within and between programmes to promote synergies; (3) Continued balance between macro policy and community interventions has to be maintained so that programmes can be pro-poor and those direct beneficiaries can be involved in implementation; (4) Partnership and support to sector development programmes should continue; (5) National Execution (NEX) has been instrumental in promoting national ownership and speed in programme implementation. The NEX however, needs further refining to enhance the participation of other national institutions in programme implementation and for delegation of responsibility to lower administrative levels in the regions.

On the programme level, the lessons learned are: (1) The need to reinforce and deepen the reform processes in the federal and regional institutions. (2) Commence the establishment of systems and procedures under the Civil Service Reform Programme recommend a shift in focus to the implementation of key reforms. (3) Continue with support for decentralization and planning but extend interventions to include communities at woreda (district) and kebele (village) levels.

Since the programme falls under CCF-2, in which these lessons were absorbed, this programme particularly adopted and integrated the principle to ‘continue with support to decentralization and planning and to extend interventions to include communities at woreda and kebele levels.’

47 See Final Evaluation Draft and Final Terms of Reference.
The Table below shows the linkage between a selected range of relevant CPAP expected outcomes and indicators for the period 2002-2006, and an assessment by the FET on programme performance against such variables.
Table 10: CPAP results framework indicators and programme performance targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPAP Expected Outcome(s)/ Indicator(s)</th>
<th>Programme Performance in terms of the FET analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved capacities of key institutions of central, regional and local governments and communities engaged in planning, budgeting, resource allocation, disbursement and utilization</td>
<td>Increased capacity at pilot woredas and kebeles engaged in planning, budgeting, resource allocation, disbursement and utilization. The degree of capacity development differs from region – woreda and kebele (very little if any capacity building in Somali – woredas received only ICT training – kebeles received none)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased capacity of woreda/kebele administration in planning and resource management; improved capacity of people’s (including youth/women) participation in the development process; improved capacity of grassroots NGO/CBO’s in partnering with government bodies; improved provision of basic services in the selected communities</td>
<td>Increased capacity of woreda/kebele administrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved capacities of women (programme results not focused on youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No improved capacities of grassroots NGO/CBO’s and partnering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved provision of basic services in the selected communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above shows that the programme has, to a limited extent, complied with CPAP. In terms of capacity building only three of the four emerging regions benefited from the programme intervention, and no capacity building for NGO/CBO's have been undertaken.


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Table 11: UNDAF results framework indicators and targets

**FOOD SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT** - *Strategic programme areas of intervention engaged in:*

- Production of improved crop varieties
- Empowering women and resource-poor households through awareness creation, institution, and building of organization, decreasing of environmental hardships and creating opportunities for targeted income generation activities, and alleviating women's workload such as collection of water and firewood and animal dung, milling services, etc.
- Promoting and supporting small-scale irrigation for the productive use of marginal lands, particularly in the dry zones of the country

**PROVIDE ACCESS TO BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES** – *Strategic programme areas of intervention engaged in:*

- Advocate the development of gender-sensitive policies and programmes.
- Support the construction of facilities of accepted standard as well as their rehabilitation, particularly in emerging regions and pastoral areas;
- Allocating resources to reduce gender imbalances.
- Promoting community involvement in the planning, design, implementation, provision, and management of social services
- Advocating the development of targeted programmes to eliminate cultural, social and economic barriers that prevent women and girls from benefiting existing services
- Supporting efforts to promote the active involvement of communities, particularly women in the planning and management of service delivery in general, and in activities designed to enhance female participation and use of social services in particular;
- Promoting efficient support systems in the areas of education - curriculum improvements, and improving learning environment of schools

It is evident that the programme has complied with interventions towards sustainable agricultural development (especially in Afar and Somali), and made a small contribution (or has the potential) to provide access to basic social services.

Finding 8: Consistency with government decentralisation support initiatives (PSCAP/DLDP)

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50 (PSCAP) - Public Sector Capacity Building Program; (DLDP) - District Level Decentralization. DLDP is one of the PSCAP Sub-Programmes which plays a role in the current decentralization policy of the government. The objective of
The FET found that by and large the programme is consistent with GoE decentralisation initiatives, directly through support, and indirectly to inform policy initiatives.

PSCAP has provided a common framework for the implementation of its six inter-related programs, which include CSRP and District Level Decentralization. These components are implemented in emerging regions, with the support of UNDP, by Bureaus of Capacity Building and Coordination and therefore capacity building related training interventions (of various forms) included within the Civil Service Reform Programme and training programmes incorporated in the decentralization component on governance and other issues directly supplement each other.

During the start of the programme it was indicated that:51 “decentralization does not seem to be taking place at woreda, kebele and community levels. The Federal DLDP Office indicated that despite legal frameworks for decentralized woreda governments, by 2004 it was found that woredas continued to depend partially on zonal and regional governments. Thus, it was noted that woreda decentralization has not been fully translated into action due to lack of capacity associated with administrative and personnel problems as well as meagre revenue base. Woredas also lacked a well-functioning organizational structure and faced an acute shortage of skilled personnel, office space and equipment to effectively discharge their constitutional responsibilities. It was also found that the process of democratic participation and consultation was not fully in place, and systems and procedures for decentralized service delivery had not been developed to ensure good governance.” At the same time, as indicated by the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer, it is important to note that “in some of the emerging Regions (such as Benishangul), still there is no legal framework on decentralisation.”

In the emerging regions of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali, DLDP is coordinated by the Ministry of Capacity Building in close partnership with the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The MoFA is assisting the emerging regions in coming up with PSCAP Action Plans where DLDP is one of the components. In these regions, DLDP started in 2004. Woreda restructuring as per the provisions of the revised constitutions of the regions had been considered as a precondition for starting the PSCAP process.

Regional and woreda consultations made in 2003 by UNDP and the Government showed that these regions have serious development problems that include: lack of committed and qualified leadership, inadequate woreda administration system as a whole (lack of guidelines, procedures, unclear responsibilities and relations, lack of staff in general, etc), underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate services, serious shortage of qualified civil servants and very high employees turnover, serious budget constraints, and lack of community consultations and participation.

The sub-program is to deepen the devolution of power to the lower tiers of sub-national governments, to institutionalize decision-making processes at the grassroots level with a view to enhance local participation, to promote good governance, and to improve decentralized service delivery. From the sub-programme objective it is clear that the sub-program has linkages with the Civil Service Reform (CSRP), Urban Management (UMCBP), and Tax System Reform (TSRP) sub-programs. See: PSCAP JSM, March 27- April 12 - District Level Decentralization Program Progress Review (not dated)

This pilot programme was intended to do more than just support national policy, but also to experiment with modalities of decentralisation that would be workable in these poor regions. Our findings show that the programme’s consistency to PSCP/DLDP also relates to:

- **Support**: Focus on decentralisation component and capacity building for good governance;
- **Additionality**: Strengthen emerging regions’ capacity to access PSCP funding – Most regional bureaus indicated that through training, their capacities have been enhanced to access PSCP funds (however, this could not be quantified);
- **Complementarity**: UNDP funding modalities directly benefit emerging regions’ woredas and kebeles ability to access funding for training and small infrastructural projects

**Finding 9: Programme results monitoring system validation by evidence**

The FET could not find any significant compliance to the intended Client-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation System for public service delivery, which was to measure changes in behaviour/practice and benefits to the client, based on client and expert agreed objectively verifiable indicators and means of verifications.

This section provides a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of the programmes monitoring system and the way in which the programme management structures validated their intended outcomes by evaluative evidence.

The FET perceives Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) as a mechanism through which conditions are facilitated for the realization of the intended project objectives and outcomes within the limits of the proposed time and budget. This could become possible through implementing a M&E system that facilitates the proper functioning of the implementation process: namely, that inputs are delivered on time and within a reasonably acceptable range of the proposed cost; activities are performed on time and in a technically acceptable standard; and thereby the intended outputs are achieved or conditions are created for their achievement in the subsequent time. Annexure 10 provides for a detailed description of what is expected by NEX in terms of M&E mechanisms and reporting requirements.

The PSD requires the design and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation system that will cascade from central to regional and woreda levels, and that specific and quantitative data should be gathered at frequent intervals at the lowest levels and shall be disaggregated by gender and integrated at regional levels to inform decision making. In addition, a narrative and qualitative results-based report shall be prepared by each component office and submitted to MoFA on a quarterly basis. Moreover, the PSD states that monitoring visits would be undertaken at different levels. The concerned staff of UNDP and the project implementing agencies are required to undertake, preferably jointly with MoFA (the coordinating agency), monitoring visits to programme implementation sites at least once a year.

In addition, with regard to monitoring and evaluation procedures, guidelines would have been provided to the pilot kebeles’ community and women’s groups by the Regional Capacity Building and Coordination Bureaus through pilot woredas’ Capacity Building and Coordination Offices - harmonized with the NEX. Accordingly, the community steering committee should have monitored the day-to-day activities of sub-projects implementation, assessed whether sub-project inputs are being delivered and used as intended to create outputs, collected data and generated information to guide community management decisions and identify problems or implementation delays for
corrective action. The Pilot kebeles’ community and women’s groups received the necessary technical support from Regional Bureau of Capacity Building and Coordination through the pilot woredas’ Capacity Building and Coordination Offices on monitoring the process of sub-project implementation and progress report preparation.

The pilot kebeles’ community and women’s groups were responsible for preparing (based on the collected day-to-day monitoring data) and submitting quarterly progress reports to the pilot kebeles’ Administrations and to the pilot woredas’ Capacity Building and Coordination Offices. However, because of capacity constraints, especially at woreda (finance) level and other unforeseen external factors such as a lack of reliable transport and ICT, in many instances regular reporting requirements were not achieved. From kebele level, there appears to be little evidence of required regular reporting from KDC to KA, and reporting from KA to Woreda level - be it verbal or written (due to a lack of report writing skills, guidance and monitoring). At the same time, because of delays in budget disbursements, as the Chairperson of Tumat Jibrona Kebele of BGR said: “There is no report or action plan submitted to woreda as the priorities set in the previous year are not yet implemented.” Our findings also show that about 70% of the respondents in other regions held the same view. However, from a different perspective, as observed by the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer: “… it should be noted that this is motivated by the delay in receiving financial and progress reports.”

There appears to be regular visits by UNDP-PC (MoFA) to the regions; RPC’s to Woredas, and Woreda Programme Coordinators (WPC) to Kebeles to follow-up activities and solve problems occurred in the implementation process. Over a three year period, the UNDP Programme Coordinator (MoFA) made 15 visits to the programme implementing areas (average of 5 visits per annum); the Regional Programme Coordinators made 12 visits to programme implementing areas in Benishangul-Gumuz (average of 4 visits per annum); 24 visits in Somali (average of 8 visits per annum); 8 visits in Gambella (average of 2.7 visits per annum); and 26 visits in Afar (average of 8.7 visits per annum). Given that the Programme Coordinators were full-time employees, the FET is of the opinion that more visits could have been undertaken.

At the same time, most missions were not properly documented. The feedback, in most instances, was limited to verbal communication - on site, or by telephone. Written feedback was infrequent – leaving the programme with limited institutional memory. As a result, the FET found that the programme monitoring system failed its intended objective by merely undertaking sporadic monitoring and reporting activities (Woreda-Region-MoFA-MoFED-UNDP).

**Finding 10: Other critical issues relating to the programme results areas**

The programme focused on emerging regions, which have only recently been given the opportunity towards autonomy through the devolution of powers and functions at all levels, except for aspects relating to central government such as competencies relating defence etc.. During the lifetime of the programme, the only significant change in terms of the programme environment, as noted by the WB, was the post-election violence which resulted in a number of development
partners’ not being able to provide further assistance to the GoE through General Budget Support (GBS).  

UNDP budget and disbursement modalities appear to have had a competitive advantage to absorb political uncertainties as it is not GBS based in that it makes use of Channel 2 funding. At the same time there is indication, provided by all relevant regional, woreda and kebele respondents interviewed, that the programme has succeeded in a rather short period to expedite the commitment towards the concept of decentralisation and democratisation at regional, woreda and kebele levels to secure political buy-in and to create a relative degree of capacity through a bottom-up approach.

In addition, in order to optimize coordination between the CSRP sub-components in the emerging regions and the larger PSCAP initiative, during April 2006 UNDP participated in a multi-donor PSCAP joint supervision mission to the emerging regions. Participants in the joint supervision mission included representatives of the GoE, DFID, EC, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Germany, and World Bank. During the mission UNDP had the opportunity of assessing mutual comparative advantages for an enhanced future collaboration. With regard to the decentralization activities, UNDP/DLDP assessed competitive advantages were identified. By providing additional support to the emerging regions, the UNDP programme has the advantage in ensuring that lower capacity regions do not fall behind the national and/or regional agenda, and that has special expertise in dealing with very poor and marginalised regions that other donors do not have. The following key issues relating to the criticality of the programme were identified:

- Increased flexibility allows UNDP to respond more quickly to the needs of counterpart communities. For example, submitting Statements of Expenditure is a bottleneck preventing some regions from replenishing PSCAP funds. During 2006 UNDP and MoFED assisted the emerging regions in preparing their Government Disbursement Records to ensure that funds would be replenished and programmes implemented. MoFA is assigned the responsibility for assisting the emerging regions, and is currently UNDP’s counterpart for the decentralization program: “For the specific purpose of implementing planned civil service reform measures, it is recommended that for the next programme cycle attention will be given to targeted skills upgrading efforts in terms of training and re-training all civil servants from the most senior to the most junior employees as part of their professional life, so MoFA can better assist in DLDP implementation”. However, it should also be noted that this is not necessarily an added value since the programme should also assist regional and local government to access PSCAP/larger programmes’ funds provided through channel 1, more than offering an easier alternative.

52 This is a sum of money given directly to the Government within the framework of an agreed poverty reduction strategy and objectives, but not earmarked for specific purposes. See: THE PROTECTION OF BASIC SERVICES PROJECT (PBS) IN BRIEF – World Bank – 22 March 2006.

The UNDP pilot programme targets kebeles, allowing more grassroots level participation and can disburse through the regions directly to woredas (who are already managing own funds) and kebeles. In a decentralization programme: “… this is a distinct advantage because it allows the woredas and kebeles the opportunity to manage their own funds. PSCAP funding can only be used for training, and regional officials have informed that the transfers to woredas from Treasury are insufficient to allow communities to make capital investments.”

**Finding 11: Comparative programme effectiveness and efficiency**

The FET finds it almost impossible to give an informed assessment of the relative effectiveness and efficiency (cost-benefit and value for money) of the programme strategy, compared to other strategies pursued by the Government e.g. PSCAP, and other donors or actors to achieve the same outcomes, because of a severe lack of detailed financial information relating to the programme, and the mere fact that, because of availability and time constraints, the FET only had the opportunity to hold discussions with the WB and GTZ.

However, in terms of key informant interviews, FGD’s and general observation, it appears that the programme proved to be relatively effective in creating awareness and interest in decentralized service delivery among regional, woreda and kebele stakeholders, and there is confirmation that impetus was created among the community for self-reliance, ownership, participation, and women empowerment.

In some implementing locations the cost of putting facilities in place was reduced, since some communities contributed their labour and offered locally available materials. This was particularly found where the project used locally produced mud blocks (in Afar) and semi-skilled community workers (in Somali) to build schools, health posts, and solar houses/workshops. For example, in the Afar region the RPC reported that: “PCDP allocated up to ETB 300,000 – 400,000 to build a school, whereas a fraction of this (ETB 80,000) was used by the project using locally available materials.”

In addition, according to the Head of Capacity Building Bureau in Afar region: “Planning and implementation at Kebele level has enhanced the understanding of decentralization and good governance … Now we have understanding of decentralization in practice. We have seen villagers can plan implement by themselves. We learnt how to do big things with small money using locally available material. The other kebeles, where such project is not implemented, is not capacitated as that of target kebeles of the project.” This opinion was complemented by the BGR Capacity Building Bureau Head and former Regional Program Coordinator who observed that: “Enhanced participation of the community, enhanced sense of ownership, together with improved access to infrastructure and services’ are the major achievement of this program.” This was also witnessed during field visits and discussion with the community groups and woreda authorities. The FET found that an elevated need was articulated among the communities for self-reliance, ownership, participation, and women empowerment, because of the programmes’ inherent participatory and decentralised approach to service delivery, and its extensive training interventions in most regions (except Somali). The strategy of linking capacity building with community based infrastructure appears to be the key factor that contributed to the success of the programme in this regard, which was not formerly attended to by government in these areas.

However, a key issue that emerged is that the cost of installing solar panels imported from India, which amounts to an estimated 1000 USD per household (which include opportunity costs such as...
travel, accommodation, workshops, study tours, import taxes and inland transport), was prohibitively high. At the same time it was considered an added intervention and not part of the pilot communities' real needs.

The training of illiterate/semi-literate selected community members at the Barefoot College in India appears to be not cost effective since it could have been conducted in-country more cheaply and within a shorter period of time. Also, trainees commented that language barriers which existed for the first 3 months (out of a total of 6 months), until a translator was recruited from Ethiopia, enabled them to understand very little.

“The communication was only by signs, especially for most of the women. While men get trained and practicing solar lights line setup we women were focusing on handcrafts- because we don’t read and write. SPV and BICB control board is for those who read and write.”

Although Barefoot Solar Engineers (BSE’s) were found to be capable at installation and maintenance, it is rather regrettable that their knowledge cannot be ‘upgraded’ through reading as they are not literate, nor transferred to others as they are not trained to train others. All BSE’s interviewed during field visits, when asked ‘how confident they are to promote solar technology if a new panel or the whole package comes from different country?’—all respondents confirmed that “it requires different training.”

Finding 12: Unintended negative effects of programme outcomes

In terms of projects, the most visible unintended negative finding by the FET was found to be the provision of solar lights to a small number of pilot households, which not only divided communities, but created antagonism and potential resource based conflict. No general criteria were established to select pilot households beneficiaries.

For example, in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions a more practical approach was undertaken by communities to select pilot households. Criteria included random sampling, and if a recipient was a family member of another, then one of them had to be excluded. Conversely, in the eastern regions of Afar and Somali, it was widely reported that few selection criteria were used. It was merely “a snatch and grab” and “first come first served” situation. At the same time, in most areas the selection of target households/users has been carried out according to their willingness to pay a monthly fee to sustain the salaries of the Barefoot Engineers, which was agreed to/with the Kebele Development Committees.

An encouraging observation in all implementing areas was that there appeared to be no visible form of nepotism in the allocation of solar lights and panels to community members. At the same time, it cannot be overemphasized that most respondents felt (at regional, woreda and kebele levels) that they will be under severe pressure if no more solar panels are supplied to the community (especially in western regions).

For example, particularly in the western regions (BGR and Gambella), it was alleged by non-beneficiaries that they will “burn down” the dwellings of those that received “the light” if they do not acquire it as well. At the same time woreda officials claimed that they will be “crucified” by some if

54 Said Awatif, BSE of Fatsako Kebele, BGR.
they are not in the position to duplicate this pilot intervention. Generally, beneficiaries in BGR and Gambella showed little empathy towards non-beneficiaries’ grievances in the sense that “we will not share with others” – “if they turn on us, we will not kill them, but we will call in the militia.”

However, in the eastern regions of Afar and Somali, which are intrinsically pastoral societies and “… usually well organized in terms of decision-making and division of responsibilities…very effective in ensuring survival for a number of years… [and have] traditional practices of community mobilization [that] could easily be geared towards poverty reduction endeavours”\(^{55}\), attitudes and perceptions towards the ‘novelty’ of solar lights were rather different. Sentiments describing community attitudes towards solar energy ranged from the articulation of axioms such as: \(^{56}\) “A Hyena walked into the village and we asked him if he wants shoes – he said yes and we gave him shoes – when he came back one day we asked him if we can get our shoes back – he said yes, because before we gave him shoes he did not need them.”, and “If you compare the pilot kebeles with tractors and solar lights with other kebeles, it is like the one knows about honey and the taste and the other one does not – the person who tasted the honey start looking for more – they have tasted the honey and will never stop looking.”

**Finding 13: Satisfaction levels of programme stakeholders**

Through interviews, focus group discussions and general observation, the FET found that taken the views of all respondents, the following most significant satisfaction levels can be generalised:

Regional and woreda authorities expressed satisfaction with:

- Enhanced participation of the community
- Enhanced community sense of ownership
- Improved access to infrastructure and services to communities
- Introduction of solar technologies

Regional and woreda authorities expressed dissatisfaction with:

- ‘Unilateral’ budget revisions/cuts by UNDP/MoFED
- Delayed disbursements of funds to implementation areas
- Unpaid salaries to RPC’s and WPC’s (Somali and Afar)
- Unilateral change of community priorities/projects to some areas


\(^{56}\) Focus Group Discussion – Jijiga Woreda – Farahodle Kebele and KII, and Jijiga Woreda Officials.
• Lack of official response from UNDP/MoFED in grievances such as delayed disbursements and budget cuts, and priority changes/exclusion

57 At the same time, the UNDP/UNCDF Programme Officer notes that: …according to NEX modalities – well-known by the Regions, quarterly advances to implementing agencies can be released only against 75% of delivery of advanced funds. In the case of the Regions, delays in the submission of Financial Reports and unclear outstanding advances have negatively impacted on programme delivery.
Communities expressed satisfaction with:

- Their involvement in the planning and implementation process of the project
- Improved access to infrastructure and services.  
- Introduction of solar lights for those that get access to it - for some “it is like ‘opening the eyes of a blind person’” (Afar) – for others “it is perceived as an enhancement need - a technology that makes their village to be seen like urban centre” (Somali).

Communities expressed dissatisfaction with:

- Not having the luxury of solar lights (the possibility that solar lights might not extended to all households).
- Delayed disbursements of funds to implantation areas.
- Unilateral change of community priorities/projects in some areas.
- ‘Unilateral’ budget revisions/cuts by UNDP/MoFED.

Finding 13: Additional critical issues relating to planning and results achievement  

This section deals with operations and maintenance, quality of participation in different phases of planning and infrastructure delivery. The key focus here is on the planning and implementation process and its strengths and weaknesses as encountered by the FET. The Table below summarises the strengths and weaknesses identified from the planning and implementation process of the programme.

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58 “Although some of the infrastructure is not functioning we are really satisfied by having it here, as we hope it will start functioning soon, as long as the facility that might cost much is put in place”, said community of Tumat-Jibrona of BGR

59 Under this section the ToR requires an evaluation of any other critical issues relating to results achievement (for example, time and cost effectiveness of infrastructure delivery, quality of infrastructure, operations and maintenance, provision for recurrent costs, quality of participation in different phases of planning and infrastructure delivery, linkages between investment planning and budgeting and from local to regional/national planning frameworks, local resource mobilisation, local governance culture and accountability, etc.). Most of this has been covered under section 4.1.
Table 12: Strengths and weaknesses of the planning and implementation process of the programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>• Strength</th>
<th>• Weakness</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Process:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Priority was set based on community</td>
<td>• The provision of solar lights was supply-driven (top-down).</td>
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<tr>
<td>interests with particular focus on women</td>
<td>• The negative social impact of the solar light provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>participation.</td>
<td>was not considered during the planning and implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Woreda council reportedly authenticated</td>
<td>• Assessment of financial viability and capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>the plans and confirmed that the</td>
<td>utilization of some of the interventions - e.g. flour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interventions also fall within the five</td>
<td>mills, tractors, borehole for Irrigation, was not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year plan of the woredas.</td>
<td>accompanied by viability studies/considerations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plan was communicated to woreda sector</td>
<td>• Maintenance of project deliverables not distinctly defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offices and follow-up actions, e.g.</td>
<td>• Lack of exit strategy and asset management</td>
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<tr>
<td>assigning personnel to the facilities and</td>
<td>and maintenance plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>follow-up on the effective utilization of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>infrastructure.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation Process:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Community leadership for development (KDC)</td>
<td>• No uniform guidelines or by-laws by which community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is institutionalized at kebele level and</td>
<td>leadership for development is governed</td>
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<tr>
<td>functional.</td>
<td>• No uniform guidelines or by-laws by which the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resources go to the community, including</td>
<td>women’s cooperative group is managed</td>
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<tr>
<td>bank accounts in case of Somali being</td>
<td>• No rational/logical guidelines/criteria by which solar</td>
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<tr>
<td>managed by the KDC (with woreda support)</td>
<td>light (pilot) beneficiaries were selected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Indigenous knowledge systems, skills and</td>
<td>• In some instances activities/interventions were not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labour were used to deliver services</td>
<td>logically sequenced to maximize benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Women participated in implementation</td>
<td>• In most instances, women were denied the right to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>process more than men (can be construed</td>
<td>participate in, and benefit from activities which paid</td>
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<td>as a negative in some areas)</td>
<td>wages.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• No intervention for change management</td>
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5.2. Sustainability of Results

This section explores programme sustainability in terms of the Barefoot Approach; independent programme sustainability; availability of external funding to sustain, expand and replicate the programme; and the viability of the exit strategy as proposed by the programme. Sustainability is understood as: “The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major
development assistance has been completed, the probability of continued long-term benefits, and the resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.\textsuperscript{60}

Key points to note from this definition are:

- The focus is on sustaining the flow of benefits into the future rather than on sustainable programs or projects.
- Projects are by definition not sustainable as they are a defined investment with a start and finish date.
- The concept of sustainable benefits does not necessarily mean the continuation of donor-funded activities.
- Managing sustainability is a process aimed at maximizing the flow of benefits.
- Managing sustainability should be an ongoing process and needs to be reviewed and updated.
- Maintaining benefit flows after major external funding is completed, assumes that stakeholders (government, community groups, or others) will provide an appropriate level of financial, technical and managerial resources.

5.2.1. Sustainability of the ‘Barefoot Approach’

Since the ‘Barefoot Approach’ promoted by the programme gave particular focus to the provision of solar energy for lighting purposes on a pilot basis, the sustainability of the Barefoot Approach was found to be rather questionable, as discussed in more detail under section 4.1.2.6 above – ‘Replication of the programme approach by government/other donors’. The FET found that it would be unlikely for the ‘Barefoot Approach’, in terms of the household solar lighting intervention, to be replicated or expanded or for it to become sustainable, because of the unrealistically high costs involved in piloting (USD 920.45 per household - see Annexure 9 for a detailed cost benefit analysis of solar energy as provided by the programme). At the same time the extension and sustainability of this project is found to be unaffordable to government, regions, woredas and kebeles (without external assistance). In addition, the FTE’s findings on the harmful side-effects and impact of unequal distribution of solar lights described above.

5.2.2. Independent programme sustainability

Different prospects and statements of intent on the sustainability of the various interventions were observed by the FET and confirmed during key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions:

- Health, education, agriculture and water related interventions will be sustained and maintained by regional and woreda bureaus/offices and KDCs.
- In addition, according to Women’s Group FGD’s conducted, it was confirmed that IGA related interventions such as flour mills and cooperative shops will be operated, sustained and

\textsuperscript{60} OECD/DAC (2002)-Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management
maintained by community groups (women cooperatives), provided that they will receive technical support from the local cooperative promotion offices.

- However, the sustainability of solar energy is uncertain because of its cost, limited lifespan, and the negative impact on social harmony.

In addition, besides clearly indicating their willingness to manage the implementation of the project through their respective development committee members (established in each community), the people in the selected communities has shown their commitment towards covering part of the project cost. They were found to be convinced that this would create a sense of ownership. Depending on the nature of the project, communities decided to contribute either in cash or in kind. For example, in the case of the procurement of a tractor (Somali), respondents explained their willingness to contribute as much as 15 percent in cash to the total cost. This is to be made available through the use of an innovative means of mobilizing the fund. According to the community, which identified the purchase of a tractor, it may not be viable to elicit the promise a direct financial contribution from every household. In lieu of a cash contribution, they proposed to leave aside part of the communal land and cultivate temporary crops such as cereals through labour inputs from all community members and sell the produce to cover their financial contribution. In other projects, communities will participate in terms of the contribution of local materials, labour and skills.

In terms of operation and maintenance, community members will pay on average 50 ETB per hour to rent a tractor from the KDC. A driver/mechanic has been appointed and gets 5 ETB per hour. The rest of the money is being kept by the KDC for other operation and maintenance costs. When community members do not make use of the tractor, it is being rented to other kebeles/villages at 70 ETB per hour. The same driver is being used and his accommodation and meals must be provided for by those renting the tractor. However, these are appealing ideas and shows good intent, but they are no guarantee of sustainability.

5.2.3. Availability of external funding to sustain, expand and replicate

Regional officials confirmed that recurrent costs of health, water and education related interventions will be covered by Regional Sector Bureaus, however the expansion and replication of solar energy are generally not seen as viable or as a priority need (especially in Afar and Somali).

Financial sustainability is yet to be seen in terms of government's/community's ability to meet recurrent cost of financing requirements:

- Recurrent cost of health and education related interventions will, if policy is to be believed, be covered by Sector Bureaus. The same is true both for its expansion and replication, although

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government has a limited capital budget (5-10% of the total budget or ~0.25 to 1 million per woreda in the emerging regions);

- Expansions and replication of solar lights at the cost of USD 1,000 per household is unrealistic. Making solar lights available to all rural households, for example - about 50,000 rural households of Gambella will require ~ ETB 500 million which is about twice of the annual budget of Gambella Region. Reaching the remaining households of Menge Woreda, BGR, which have about 7,700 households will require the woreda to spend all its capital budget on solar lights installation for the next 100 years, given their capital budget of ETB +/-0.5 million per annum. In addition, all regional governments indicated that they do not have the required funding to up-scale solar energy in their regions because it is not only a priority need, but also because of a lack of funding.

5.2.4. Exit strategy

The Project Support Document, National Execution (NEX) modality, and workplans are silent on a programme exit strategy, except for the mentioned possibility that “the regions and GoE might duplicate and replicate the programme if it proves to be successful.” The FTE is of the opinion that this is rather unsettling since, although this was merely a pilot project, most regions, woredas and communities showed concern in the event of this programme not being replicated and expanded.

With regard to the intervention strategy, given the limited resources and pilot role of UNDP, it has been envisaged that any successful approaches and achievements within the emerging regions in terms of innovative modes of decentralized public service delivery may be adopted by the respective regional governments and up-scaled through PSCAP and GoE resources, on a demand-driven basis.

All regions, woredas and kebeles showed surprise that the programme might be discontinued. Particularly woreda officials and communities were under the impression that since this is a pilot project, all activities, especially solar lighting, will by default, be up-scaled by the UNDP. It is reasonable to assume that this might be a cause of a lack of managing expectations in terms of expansion and replication.

Summary of key findings on programme sustainability:

- The programme will not be economically sustainable without future UNDP support because of limited resources available at woreda level for disbursement to kebeles – most woredas’ budgets are limited to about 10% for capital investment projects at kebele level – 90% of their budgets are earmarked for recurrent expenditure. At the same time, neither the GoE nor regions have the financial capacity to expand and replicate innovative approaches to service delivery such as solar lights;

- With particular reference to the provision of solar lights to a fraction (sample) of pilot kebele households, it appears that in terms of social dynamics and sustainability the project had a detrimental impact on community cohesion and created the potential for impending community hostility and conflict. This could have been an implementation/project management issue and the potential for expanding this element of the programme was not addressed sufficiently. However, such sentiments differ in terms of degree within regional implementation areas and between regions. For example, we found that the regions of Benishangul and Gambella are a
great deal more prone to community division and hostility than that of Afar and Somali (who appear to be more practical and realistic in terms of piloting, acceptance and sharing);

- The PSD and workplans are silent on a programme exit strategy, except for the possibility that the regions and GoE might replicate the programme if it proved successful. Since the programme is considered a large success by all pilot kebeles, rising expectations were created among communities (and woredas) that the programme will by default continue, expanded and replicated;

- The programme caters for two ‘social groups’ in terms of projects – projects focused on women groups (Cooperative Shop; Grain Mill; income generating activities), and projects focused on a ‘wider’ group (Education; Health; Agriculture; Water Supply; and Solar Power). Most certainly women benefit most from both – projects that focus on women are self explanatory, and with regard to ‘wider’ projects, the relatively few women involved in the project benefitted the most since they decrease drudgery in terms of the long distances travelled to fetch water and wood; limit the negative side effects of child birth in darkness; and lead to healthier children (less water borne diseases), etc;

- The understanding and acceptance of decentralization at the local level can be achieved in a rather short period of time. This is not only due to training but also the link created with the implementation of ‘real’ development projects that created participation by all, visible and concrete results, and a strong sense of ownership;

- The decentralized nature of the programme modalities had a positive effect on top level (MoFA and Regions) commitment, engagement, and political buy-in, which also secure future sustainability and the choice of UNDP as a preferred partner in development;

- The budgetary and financial modalities of the UNDP through Channel 2 budgeting is also more flexible and preferred by all emerging regions. However this is the way donors have been working for the last 20 years; establishing parallel funding modalities and this needs to be revised. WB (PSCAP) for example follows Channel 1 budgeting procedures which are perceived by the regions and woredas as rigid, complex, time consuming and therefore not feasible for ODA programme and project implementation with a limited 3-5 year timeframe (however, UNDP is in the process of phasing out Channel 2 funding towards Channel 1 funding modalities)

- To sustain and improve its competitive advantage the UNDP needs to actively pursue partnerships (because of its relatively small budget) to promote and deepen decentralization through pro-poor modalities and additionalities such as complimentary small infrastructure and capital investment projects;

- Because of unilateral budget cuts and changed priorities on the side of UNDP/MoFA, it appears that good relations between MoFA and MoFED might have been blemished to some extent. At the same time, it also appears that MoFA/UNDP relations with the emerging regions have become questionable because of this;

- The continuation of the programme in any form will not be sustainable in the medium term without the continued assistance of the UNDP (including UNDP partners). Besides the inability of the GoE or regional government to replicate/expand the programme because of severe
capital budget constraints, an issue of concern is that neither the PSD, MOU's nor NEX provided clear modalities on an exit strategy of this pilot programme;

• Capacity building in terms of systems to increase efficiency (office equipment and furniture) was satisfactory in the woredas of Shinille and Jijiga;

• However there still remain huge capacity gaps at regional, woreda, and kebele levels;

• Regional governments received little capacity building in terms of training – PSCAP funds have been used for training which falls under the 6 sectors covered by PSCAP only;

• There is certainly a need for supplementary training that focuses on sectors not covered by PSCAP components, such as focused training on education, health and pastoral issues. UNDP can provide additionality to PSCAP here, without the possibility of avoidable duplication;

• It appears that the biggest capacity gap in the Somali pilot areas lies at the woreda level. This is primarily to the change of programme budget allocations (decided upon by the regional government) between regional/woreda/kebele levels (in response to alleged misappropriation of funds by woredas at the start of the programme – see below), which resulted in a smaller allocation to woredas. The need for the regional government to redefine the budget formula allocation in order to enhance woreda capacity is therefore desirable – to be initiated and implemented by the region itself.

5.3. Factors Affecting Successful Implementation and Results Achievement

This section gives a summary of key factors impeding the successful implementation of programme activities, with particular reference to external factors; programme related factors including programme design (relevance and quality), institutional and implementation arrangement, programme factors; and technical backstopping.

5.3.1. External Factors

• The policy environment in terms of budget allocations to the emerging regions (problems with access to PSCAP funding)62 is not conducive for accelerated decentralisation efforts and places an additional burden on UNDP’s already limited resource base;

• High turnover of competent staff at regional and woreda level which impeded on programme continuity in terms of institutional memory and a well archived paper trial;

• Inability to attract qualified staff to the impoverished emerging regions (especially at woreda level) because of harsh climatic conditions and a lack of basic infrastructure;

• Lack of leadership and a resistance to change and innovation (e.g. prevailing cultural and traditional practices towards women and their marginalisation in development);

• Lack of ODA partnerships and coordination;

• Prevalence of HIV/AIDS, e.g. – national average = 6.6% - Benishangul = 8.5%; Somali = 19%;

62 See section 3.2 above.
• Extreme poverty, poor health, illiteracy, high infant mortality, low life expectancy, inequalities, unemployment, Chat63 dependency, marginalisation by previous regimes, isolation, drudgery, single parent households;

• Natural disasters, conflict and political instability

5.3.2. Programme Related Factors

Programme design – relevance and quality

Except for the ‘Barefoot College’ (solar) modality, the programme logic, design and strategy appears optimal to achieve the desired programme objectives/outputs, given the national/local context and the needs to be addressed. Some key positive and negative issues include:

• Gender issues were adequately addressed in programme design;

• The programme appears to be relatively well rooted in and effectively integrated with national strategies (e.g. poverty reduction strategy) and UN planning and results frameworks (CCA, UNDAF);

• The Barefoot College rainwater harvesting modality has not been implemented (was part of Tilonia Agreement and the four Regional Barefoot Contracts);

• The HIV/AIDS and M&E modalities have not been satisfactorily addressed;

• Asset management and maintenance issues not addressed;

• Programme design excluded a detailed and viable exit strategy;

• Partnerships and additional resource mobilisation were not pursued.

• Despite evidence that women had little opportunity to participate in decision-making as opposed to men, the programme design effectively secured that women benefit more from the programme in terms of activities undertaken.

• The FET found that since this programme was by design meant to be a bottom-up endeavour, the real needs of the intended community beneficiaries have not been addressed, and that a rather top-down approach was undertaken. The FET found that actual programme implementation does not reflect the needs identified by communities during the needs analysis assessment process.

Institutional and implementation arrangements:

The primary stakeholders which played a role and influenced the project, starting from inception to implementation include: UNDP, MoFED, MoFA, the Regional State Capacity Building and Coordination Bureaus, the respective Woreda Administration and Capacity Building offices, Development Committees organized at the Woreda level, Kebele Administrations, Kebele Development Committees and the communities. Annexure 10 provides a detailed assessment on

63 A prohibited narcotic in most of the western and less developed countries. It accounts for about 8% of national exports.
what is expected by NEX in terms of M&E mechanisms and reporting requirements. In summary, the following reflects the FET’s key findings in this regard.

**Key findings on institutional and implementation arrangements:**

- The UNDP Head of the Governance Unit and the responsible Programme Officers, and the UNDP Project Coordinator at MoFA indicated, inter alia, a lack of capacity to run a programme of this wide geographical spread; high turnover of programme staff which results in a lack/absence of institutional memory; weak monitoring and evaluation systems; lack of integration with other UNDP programme activities; lack of direct interaction with regions; and lack of response to regional/woreda/kebele grievances;

- Again, another unexpected externality to successful project implementation was the unilateral decision by MoFED/UNDP to cut the budget to the regions, and the scrapping of some identified and planned community development projects.

- Regardless of official correspondence to MoFA from the regions – and from MoFA to MoFED and UNDP, regarding budget cuts and scrapping of community projects, no official feedback has been received from MoFED/UNDP – this clouds the relationship between programme beneficiaries, responsible federal agent (MoFED) and UNDP. As mentioned by senior regional officials: “UNDP must change their attitude in that they are not donors – but that they are our partner” … “UNDP should believe in decentralization and practice what they preach – they should not decide on the fate of the people at grassroots level – this is also true for MoFED’s attitude to the programme as well” … “We need full transparency between MoFA / MoFED / UNDP / Regions / Woredas / Kebeles;”

- Such lack of transparency in Somali for example, culminated in an increasing loss of faith in UNDP credibility as a development partner. For example, in response to an urgent request from Somali region for clarification and immediate disbursement of outstanding funds, the MoFA Minister of State requested MoFED and UNDP to release funds in order to finalize outstanding projects and projects planned. In addition he wrote that: “Failure to do so may negatively influence the credibility of the future UNDP supported programmes that will be implemented in the emerging regions;”

- According to the Somali RPC, the lack of transparency and timely release of budgets also negatively affected good intra-regional governmental relations. “We (the region) could not give any informed response to the queries and demands of woredas and kebeles for the non-disbursement of funds and budget reallocation and priority community project cuts. Kebeles lost confidence in woredas, region and MoFED/UNDP – woredas lost confidence in region and MoFED/UNDP – and region lost confidence in MoFED and UNDP (as a preferred partner in development);”

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64 See letter from MoFA to MoFED to SPSCBP Programme Coordinator – Mr. Admassu Nebebe – CC State Minister (MoFED) and UNDP Resident Representative – dated 24 October 2006
• In addition, it appears that because of this issue, good relations between MoFA and MoFED have been spoiled to some extent. At the same time, it also appears that MoFA/UNDP relations have become questionable because of this;

• The UNDP Programme Coordinator (MoFA) indicated that he received no technical assistance from UNDP. In addition he indicated that he has received little support from MoFED;

• With regard to the effectiveness of Regional Programme Coordinators in the implementation in reporting progress and lessons from the areas it was mentioned that:65 “They reported on a quarterly basis. We had some problems with reporting – in particular with regard to woreda quarterly financial reports – not timeously submitted and not up to standard – this affected and delayed the whole reporting process from Regions, MoFA and to MoFED/UNDP – [this might explain partially MoFED/UNDP budget revisions at the beginning of 2006]”. However, it was indicated by most regional presidents, heads of capacity building bureaus, and woreda officials interviewed, that capacity was still in its infancy at woreda level, and financial officers which belong to a pool system, the “UNDP programme activities were added on their already busy work schedule – without any additional incentives. Thus, if budget cuts were a result of this, it was based on external impediments to the programme – and not inherent and direct related programme variables that resulted in a failure to report and spend allocated budgets timeously;”

• The programme created a formal and informal networking mechanism between kebele, woreda and regional levels, which increased good governance and relatively sound governmental relations (intra-regional and inter-regional levels), and brought government closer to the people and vice versa;

• During the 2005 election some officials involved in the coordination and implementation modalities of the programme were also involved in the election process – this affected the speedy implementation of the programme to some degree;

• External impediments also differ from region to region – Dubti Woreda, for example, had a severe flood during the implementation process, which literally brought the programme to a halt – Gambella region faced serious difficulties in terms of implementation, monitoring and evaluation because of conflict and political instability;

• In addition, although also a result of the flawed programme design, the remoteness of some pilot woredas and kebeles such as Gode (Somali) impacted negatively on project implementation;

On inter-governmental relations in terms of programme funding flow and communication:

• The chain of control appears too long – from kebele - woreda – region – MoFA – MoFED/UNDP;

65 Key Informant Interview with: UNDP Programme Coordinator (MoFA) Date- 24 Feb 2007
• Most severe bottleneck appears to be at MoFED/UNDP level - “MoFED and UNDP has the ‘power’ to overrule local and regional priorities and to change allocated budgets without consultation and negotiation with MoFA and the regional government;”

• “We have requested, in writing (refer to copies of letters from region and MoFA) for concrete explanations for non-compliance in terms of allocated budget disbursement – we had no official response from MoFA/UNDP to date – not official or even verbal – “they are sidestepping and ignoring us” – we did not request ‘additional’ funds – just what we were promised and allocated in writing;”

• “Besides the existence of the agreed upon NEX modality it appears to us that inter-governmental relations in terms of project funding are not transparent and clouded by politics – we are being excluded;”

Programme management
To increase the synergy between the Decentralization Programme and Civil Service Reform Programme it has been decided to establish a joint steering committee for the two programmes, however, this did not materialize. The proposed steering committee should have included regional presidents and the committee should have met quarterly and having a quarterly report made available to them for discussion. The current practice (asking for reports) is task oriented, rather than results-based. Poor financial management (delay in reporting from the woreda levels) has resulted in implementation failure. Lack of division of labour, weak internal control of settlement of advance, poor expenditure reporting, non-compliance with tax laws, absence of monthly bank reconciliation and verification, etc, are among some of the weaknesses observed by independent auditors.

Technical backstopping
• There appears to be a strong need to upscale and downstream technical backstopping – especially at woreda level – such as a dedicated finance officer, agricultural engineers, etc.;

• Technical assistance and backstopping from programme partners were limited to visits to supervise accomplished activities and to solve problems emanating from project implementation, however, primarily through informal means such as verbal communication.

• The support of a consultant to draft a community development project plan based on community priorities is seen to be advantageous. However, the process limited the opportunity of competent woreda officials to be part of the consultant team. The consultant or staff who have expertise in Participatory Learning and Actions (PLA) should have at least trained woreda staff and provided additional coaching and mentoring.

5.4. Strategic Positioning and Partnerships
5.4.1. Optimum positioning and leveraging of comparative advantage of UNDP
It appears that UNDP, through its decentralized programme approach, is the only agency providing support in the emerging regions directly to kebeles/communities through grass-roots participatory and decision-making modalities. Besides serious complaints about UNDP not responding to grievances relating to budget cuts, from regional, woreda and kebele respondents, there still remains strong evidence that most of the pilot regions, woredas and kebeles favour the UNDP as
their preferred development partner compared to agencies such as the WB (PSCAP) which follows a more centralized approach to development planning and implementation, and which this programme aims to support in terms of innovative and complementary approaches to decentralised service delivery activities.

For this programme to position itself optimally, and to leverage its own (UNDP) comparative advantages, it is worth noting how the WB in Ethiopia considers their comparative advantage in terms of policy and implementation. In an interview with the WB by the FET, it was indicated that their comparative advantages pivot around issues such as: “We go directly through the government system; Government is pooling resources in the amount of USD 137 million which secures ownership and sustainability; PSCAP is a programme which was initiated by government’s Capacity Development Strategy – we are in line with government thinking; and we implement at a regional level.” At the same time, the WB indicated that their comparative disadvantages include the fact that: “The programme is too big – we deal with 20 agencies and 20 projects; WB must coordinate all – we do all the work of the pool-funders – at the same time we are also accountable to them – the only way to deal with this is through the anticipated Technical Assistance Secretariat – at WB country office level we need to recruit and secure Procurement Specialists as well to assist.” By implication, the scope and small scale nature of the UNDP programme appears to be of advantage.

UNDP’s decentralised grass-roots implementation interventions proved to be instrumental in creating local ownership and approval at regional, woreda and community levels, which, in turn increases the sustainability of UNDP’s future country involvement. The decentralized nature of the programme interventions had a positive effect on top level (MoFA and Regions) commitment, engagement, and political buy-in, which also secure future sustainability and the choice of UNDP as a preferred partner in development.

5.5. Future UNDP Role

Immediate areas of recommendation are:

On-going activities and future community based facilities

- The on-going construction activities and furnishing and initial supply of drugs to the health posts (clinics) has to be speeded-up to make the investment made so far usable to the community;

- Reaching all households in the current target woredas or even the target kebeles with solar lights is going to be very expensive, if the technology continues to be imported from Barefoot College of India. Therefore, UNDP has to search for alternative sources of solar power, and at least try to reach all households of the current target kebeles to reconcile the divided community. Any future rural household technology promotion has to be based on the principle of offering the community a basket of choice instead of top-down, supply driven promotion of technology. This needs to be done in cooperation with the Rural Technology Promotion Units to ensure ‘best-fit’ and sustainability;

- Future community projects have to be appraised and entertained based on thorough needs and the possibility of measurable changes. The major criterion has to be the level of community commitment and efforts made to promote self-help development. Investments in community
based facilities are the major link between the duty bearer (the woreda government) and the right holders (community) to come together in dialogue. Capacity building with community based development interventions will facilitate learning by means of action.

**On capacity enhancement support to Woredas**

- The design of training courses should be preceded by capacity-gap analyses to ensure effectiveness and efficiency.

- Future training and experience exchange should include supervisors, which is necessary to reinforce application of all the trainings and changes need to be inculcated, especially in education, health and agricultural development related interventions of the government;

- Almost all regions are highly interested in improving their farming systems and agricultural productivity of rural communities. This need was particularly highlighted by the regional presidents of BGR, Gambella, Capacity Building Bureau Head of Afar, and District Administrator of Somali. Therefore, it is imperative to assist the regions and the woredas to have agricultural technology extension and mechanization service centers. This will also ensure the use of agricultural equipment to its full capacity and sustainability of the service.

- Since most Woreda Offices are still below an average level regarding operational planning capacity, staff composition and capability, programme implementation capacity and planning systems; minor investment in this area, in the form of further training, and placement of NUNVs holding a Bachelors Degree and also Diploma with some experience will secure enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.

- The improvement of the poor of physical infrastructure (such as buildings and office space) and technological infrastructure (such as computers, applications, network, and internet/e-mail), as part of the Woreda capacity development plan, need to be done in partnership with the government or other capacity building agencies, as it requires large investment.

**On enhancing community capacity to manage self-help development**

- Enhancement of local capacity is a concept that is closely related to empowering the local community’s say in deciding on actions and situations that influence their destiny. For genuine and empowering participation, the terms and conditions of community participation should have to be discussed first and agreed upon before deciding on the community’s participates and contribution to the implementation of future interventions in the project;

- By-laws are found to be a key tool to guide the work of KDC and Cooperatives to promote ‘self-help’ development. Once it is signed by the members it serve as written commitment to work efficiently and effectively towards maximum development of the community and its members, to ensure that there is no discrimination against women and other social groups on any ground. It is therefore suggested for by-laws to be implemented by woreda and kebele administrations.
6. LESSONS

- The FET found that the reality and context at grassroots level dictates that there must be appreciation for the fact that Ethiopia, and in particular the emerging regions, is ethnically diverse and historically and contemporarily prone to ethnocentrism. As a result, any form of intervention that might spark a negative social dynamic or resource based conflict must be avoided in future interventions.

- It is possible to train semi-illiterate rural people on solar light system and rainwater harvesting, but this is very costly.

- Communities can successfully manage project funds that are allocated to address their needs with some technical support from the woreda or the region.

- There are Pastoralists who have a keen interest to engage in farming if they are fully supported.

- The burden of rural women can be relieved by developing projects that support their income.

- It takes time to change the mindset at different levels of government and convince them that rural communities can manage funds allocated by the government or NGOs to local development programs.
7. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section provides key recommendations on the strategic positioning and partnerships and the future role of UNDP’s intervention strategy.

7.1.1. **Strategic positioning and partnerships**

- Since UNDP’s budget is limited and rather small compared to other ODA’s, UNDP should, as part of their mandate, pursue partnerships in a more vigorous manner to upscale and expand their activities in the emerging regions.

- Since UNDP is not essentially mandated to pursue capital infrastructural projects (unlike UNCDF), and given the urgent need for infrastructural investment in the emerging regions and pilot kebeles, there is need to partner with the UNCDF, other ODA’s and NGO’s which are geared towards community infrastructural investment programmes.

7.1.2. **Future UNDP role**

- The Government of Ethiopia and the World Bank have been preparing a project known as Decentralized Fiscal Support for a Local Investment Grant (DFS-LIG). In addition, the WB also anticipates the implementation of a project on the Protection of Basic Services (PBS). It is suggested that it would be ideal for high-level talks between UNDP and WB to mobilise additional resources for infrastructure development in the UNDP’s pilot areas in the emerging regions. Of importance to note here is that both LIG and PBS will be subject to strict performance conditionalities attached to funding and disbursements (emerging regions already struggle with PSCAP conditionalities).

- Focus on Kebele – Firstly, strengthen capacities at existing pilot kebeles in providing expanded training and basic infrastructural projects. As a further additionality to PSCAP, there is need to focus more on Health and Education training modalities.

- Therefore, it is recommended that future focus of development intervention should be directed at the existing woreda and particularly kebele pilot areas.

- Strengthen and deepen existing development interventions in the implementation areas to create successful ‘models’ of decentralized integrated rural development – which in turn will act as an added incentive to attract multiple partners in order to expand and replicate the programme in the emerging regions.

- There is need for UNDP to focus on additionalities – identify the sectors and necessary activities to deepen decentralization in the emerging regions. At the same time, it is necessary not only to support but also find additionalities to realize the GoE PSCAP/DLDP philosophy in a more accessible and visible manner and where it is most needed (at kebele level in the emerging regions).
8. RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM BENISHANGUL GUMUZ REGION

a. The fact that the report failed to disaggregate observations by region made it difficult to pinpoint achievements and challenges specific to each region.

The only reason why the report failed to disaggregate regional observations in order to show regional disparities is that the evaluation team, as part of their terms of reference, worked on a random sample in each region and not all projects were assessed - therefore making it impossible to give a full picture on intra-regional challenges and achievements. This obviously follows that in terms of our given methodology (sampling) inter-regional disparities could not be addressed either. At the same time one can argue that financial disbursements to the various regions/ woredas and kebeles could have been used as some kind of indicator here. This could not be done either since the evaluation team could not get any detailed disaggregated financials from UNDP or GoE, as discussed in detail in the reports.

b. The assertion in the report that the objective of “achieving more equitable participation and distribution of benefits across ethnic and gender group” failed to materialise because of excluding woredas from minority groups (page 27) is unfounded and is due to lack of knowledge on the part of the evaluators of realities in the region. This is because despite the fact that inhabitants of the two woredas (Berta and Gumuz) represent the largest ethnic groups, they are at the same time the most vulnerable to poverty as compared to other ethnic groups. Their selection is therefore justifiable.

Their selection is certainly justifiable since one of the selection criteria was vulnerability. However, it must be understood that the intention of the evaluations team’s assertion is not to imply that minority ethnic groups have been deliberately excluded by the regional governments. It merely attempts in a rather clinical manner to answer the question on whether a more equitable participation and distribution of benefits across ethnic groups have been achieved. The reality is that minority groups have by default been excluded in BGR. Again, this is certainly not intended to discredit the regional government. It is merely a project design issue.

c. The reason why one of the programme activities (rain water harvesting) was not implemented is due to the fact that this particular activity did not reflect the priority needs of the target communities as there is adequate rain and rivers in the region.

According to the Tilonia Agreement and the four Regional Barefoot Contracts signed with the Barefoot College, all regions agreed to the implementation of solar power and rainwater harvesting. This is the reason for the evaluation team’s assertion.

d. It is not true as indicated on page 28 of the report that health post construction in Fatseko and Jaberna villages of Menge woreda (district) has not been carried out. Both health posts have in fact been constructed.

The report does not indicate in any manner that the health posts have not been constructed. It clearly states that they were not “operational” at the time of the evaluation (see p. 26 of main report). This means that they were not stocked and staffed. At the same time, as indicated in the footnote of the main report (p. 4) – “Although some of the infrastructure is not functioning we are really satisfied by having it here, as we hope it will start functioning soon…”, said community of Tumat-Jibrona of BGR.
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE
ANNEX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS
ANNEX 3: FINAL EVALUATION WORK PLAN
ANNEX 4: DRAFT MINUTES - NATIONAL DEBRIEFING SESSION
ANNEX 5: PROJECT LOG-FRAME
ANNEX 6: PROJECT SUPPORT DOCUMENT
ANNEX 7: SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY PROJECTS IDENTIFIED PER REGION
ANNEX 8: COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF SOLAR ELECTRIFICATION
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