End-of-Program & Lessons Learned Assessment of the
Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation Program (JUST)

Report 1. Project Number: P-000047

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REPORT STRUCTURE

This report “End-of-Program & Lessons Learned Assessment of the Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation Program (JUST)” consists of four parts:

- Report 1. Assessment Report
- Report 3. Case Studies and Social Order Component

Cover photo: The Government of Canada handing over one of two Mobile Justice Buses to the Ministry of Justice, January 29th 2020. Photo credit: GAC.

DISCLAIMER

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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGC</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Chambers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
<td>Canadian Bar Association</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based Organization</td>
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<td>CCDC</td>
<td>Caribbean Child Development Centre</td>
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<td>CAD</td>
<td>Court Administration Division</td>
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<td>CCDC</td>
<td>Caribbean Child Development Centre</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISOCA</td>
<td>Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse</td>
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<td>CISS</td>
<td>Case Information Statistical System</td>
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<td>CPO</td>
<td>Case Progression Officer</td>
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<td>CRIP</td>
<td>Court Reform Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>CSFPA</td>
<td>Child Protection and Family Services Agency</td>
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<td>CSJP</td>
<td>Citizen Security and Justice Program</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD</td>
<td>Chief Technical Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK/Aid)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice, Canada (also referred to as Justice Canada)</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Department of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FGDP</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIAP</td>
<td>Feminist International Assistance Policy</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>GE</td>
<td>Gender Equality</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>International Development Partner</td>
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<td>IMPACT</td>
<td>Improved Access to Justice in the Caribbean project</td>
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<td>IGDS</td>
<td>Institute for Gender and Development Studies (UWI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBA</td>
<td>Jamaican Bar Association (JamBar)</td>
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<td>JIS</td>
<td>Jamaica Information Service</td>
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<td>JRIP</td>
<td>Justice Reform Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>JRIU</td>
<td>Justice Reform Implementation Unit</td>
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<td>JTI</td>
<td>Justice Training Institute</td>
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<td>JURIS</td>
<td>Justice Reform Initiatives Support</td>
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<td>JUST</td>
<td>Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAPOP</td>
<td>Latin America Public Opinion Poll</td>
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<td>LM</td>
<td>Logic Model / Lay Magistrate</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPMS</td>
<td>Legislative Production Management System</td>
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<td>LRD</td>
<td>Legal Reform Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Municipal Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>MNS</td>
<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Office of the Children’s Advocate</td>
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<td>ODPP</td>
<td>Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>PAF</td>
<td>Performance Assessment Framework (of JRIP)</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Project (or Program) Implementation Proposal</td>
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<td>PMF</td>
<td>Performance Measurement Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<td>PTL</td>
<td>Project Team Leader (GAC Development Officer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALISES</td>
<td>Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (UWI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>TOC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSD</td>
<td>Victim Services Division</td>
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<td>WMW</td>
<td>Women’s Media Watch</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The JUST Program

In 2006, Canada co-financed a comprehensive assessment of Jamaica’s justice system. The 2007 report recommended a number of measures ‘for a holistic’ reform of the justice system. A 5-year plan (2009-2013) was articulated, describing priority actions and steps to strengthen and reform the justice system. This plan was used to articulate the Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation (JUST) program, which was meant to run from 2007-2011 but began operation in December 2011 for four years, later extended to December 2020. The overall aim of the JUST program was to contribute to the progressive strengthening of the justice system in Jamaica through the provision of technical legal assistance, capacity building and institutional strengthening. The program was designed in three components:

1. Technical-Legal Assistance: Department of Justice (DOJ) Canada provided support to MOJ, the ODPP and the Courts to address a wide range of matters to improve the management and implementation of their core business, utilizing Canadian and Jamaican technical experts and DOJ Personnel assigned to Jamaica.

2. Institutional Strengthening: The building of technical and result-based management capacity of the beneficiary agencies within the justice sector, through a number of priority actions integrated into the organisational structure, corporate plans and annual work programmes of these agencies. This component was implemented primarily by the Justice Reform Implementation Unit (JRIU), which was embedded in the MOJ, with technical support from the DOJ and oversight, project management and quality control support from the UNDP.

3. Social Order: The implementation of initiatives, primarily by NGOs, aimed at improving the capacity of women, men and youth to access justice information, advice and services, as well as improving the capacity of civil society representatives and legal professionals to participate in the justice reform process. This component was managed by the UNDP with the support of the GAC Project Coordinator.

The Ultimate Outcome of the JUST program is: A modernized justice system that engenders trust and confidence. Intermediate Outcomes: (1) A more efficient, transparent and gender-responsive functioning of the justice system in Jamaica; (2) Justice Services are more customer-focused and gender-responsive.

Immediate Outcomes: (a) Increased capacity of justice sector institutions to manage and implement their core business; (b) Improved capacity of male and female policy officers, in line ministries to develop legislative policy; (c) Increased equitable access by women, men and youth to legal information, legal advice and support services; and (d) Improved capacity of male and female civil society representatives and legal professionals to participate in the justice reform process.

Purpose of End of Program & Lessons Learned Assessment

During the course of the JUST program, significant M&E activities have already been carried out. Therefore, this exercise focuses on highlighting and analyzing key End-of-Program achievements (success factors, limitations and barriers) and assessing Lessons Learned. Further, the assessment team investigated the coherence of the intervention and evaluated the likelihood of sustainability of the key program achievements identified. The assessment has linked the key achievements and lessons learned.
to recommendations targeting various groups of stakeholders in the justice sector, including the MOJ, the Courts, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and international development partners.

The JUST program assessment followed a mixed methods approach, which gathered both quantitative and qualitative data. The assessment team developed a set of participatory research tools and conducted individual semi-guided interviews, participatory learning and appraisal (PLA) and Strength-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis in focus groups, administered questionnaires, developed case studies, carried out desk research and field visits/participant observations. In addition to collecting evidence, these techniques also captured the diverse opinions and perceptions of beneficiaries and justice sector stakeholders. Contextual information was also integrated.

Conclusions

COHERENCE: The JUST program was coherent with other pertinent national initiatives. The program achieved effective donor coordination avoiding duplication of effort and the various products of the program supported each other. A high level of harmonization was achieved which assisted in strengthening linkages not only between the different products but also between agencies affiliated to the justice system. The regret is that the social order component only started after the technical assistance work was finalized, resulting in only indirect linkages. Due to effective coordination, the JUST program not only fitted well with other development programs such as JSAT and CSJP, but actively supported the EU Budget Support Program, as well as the IDB-, USAID- and DFID-supported actions. The learnings are expected to be very useful for the regional IMPACT Justice and JURIST programs.

EFFECTIVENESS: Overall, the program has reached a high level of effectiveness. Over its long period of implementation (9 years for the institutional and 2 years for the social order component), the JUST Program has produced a number of outputs, outcomes and key achievements which contribute to its impact. 90% of the 140 targets listed under the 74 outputs have been produced (and several were far exceeded). With regard to the outcomes, 64% of the immediate outcome indicator targets and 50% of the intermediate outcome indicators were met by the end of project implementation.

Success factors that contributed to making the program effective include the length of the program (9 years) allowing for the re-organization of institutions and business processes, the establishment of the JRIU within the MOJ, continuous dialogue and consultations with all entities within the justice sector, ownership of products and processes, comprehensive training, respect for co-creation of products and study tours, introduction of RBM to the MOJ, a sector-wide PAF, input of ICT equipment and systems, communication planning, and effective donor coordination. There were also a number of limitations: implementation inertia in the GOJ, weak absorptive capacity reflecting human resource gaps, work overload, low paid staff, competent but over-stretched technical staff, high staff attrition, archaic processes, resistance to change, and customer service developments de-prioritized.

The program is promoting inclusiveness, and accessibility guidelines were prepared, but pertinent actions are only starting. Actions have been undertaken regarding the treatment of children in courts and persons with disabilities are now considered in the retrofitting of court houses and related facilities. Access to justice services in rural areas has improved significantly with the Mobile Justice Service Units.
SUSTAINABILITY: The GOJ and the courts were well-engaged in the implementation of the JUST program and developed ownership. Involvement of the wider public is just starting based on the activities of the Social Order component. CSOs have made limited progress in improving their skills and resources for addressing legislative and policy areas. Regarding the GOJ and the Judiciary, the benefits arising from the JUST program are integrated and owned by the institutions, providing an excellent basis for sustainability of the outputs and future achievements of the outcomes. Large numbers of justice sector personnel have been trained and have already applied these competencies and specific technical skills. Overall, the momentum for improving justice services is strong and is expected to be kept up by justice sector personnel at many levels as well as the society.

GENDER: The planned effect from the gender component could not be fully realized as the inputs occurred two years prior to the completion of the project instead of being mainstreamed from the inception. Overall the program, therefore, had a low level of gender responsiveness and little regard for gender equity. A gender analysis was done but was greatly unused; it did not inform the baseline for gender indicators, and gender milestones were not tracked. Although a budget and terms of references for an expert on a full-time basis were available, the required gender expertise was not mobilized due to resistance and bureaucracy in the leadership of the justice sector. The delivery of the social order gender training and sensitization was too late and too short. These needed to be repeated since socio-cultural norms are not written in law and require a consistent multi-faceted approach to have a level of impact. Gender-related strategies for sustainability were not introduced in the justice sector and no synergies were established for scaling gender initiatives.

Systems and manuals produced by the JUST program support the growing efficiency of the justice sector, however not as yet in the area of gender equity. With the introduction of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in 2017, the JUST program shifted the focus in its results framework from mere equality between women and men to a focus on intersectionality. While the shift was made, it was noted that the JUST program design pre-dated the FIAP and as such the expected gender results were not significant. Had there being a full-time gender expert on board, there could have been continuous improvements in the way forward to achieving the gender results.

Key Achievements

The assessment recognized 11 key achievements (KA):

GENERAL: KA 1: The JUST program was truly a catalyst for the reform of the entire justice system. KA 2: The JUST program helped the justice sector to recognize the importance of Results-based Management (RBM) and enabled the preparation of a costed outcome-based plan, owned by justice MDAs. KA 3: A sector-wide M&E framework was prepared, including a Citizen Scorecard. KA 4: The entire justice sector benefited from the extensive investment in ICT Infrastructure and technology, which was an essential component of modernizing the justice system.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE: KA 5: The JUST program enabled the fundamental restructuring of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and provided long-term support to its institutional strengthening. KA 6: Communication and visibility of the justice sector and the MOJ in particular, was hugely enhanced. KA 7: Through the sector coordination activities convened by the MOJ with the JRIU acting as the secretariat, the
partnerships between MOJ and the International Development Partners (IDP) were better structured to achieve maximum coordinated support to Jamaica’s efforts.

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (ODPP): KA 8:** A standardized knowledge-based Prosecutor’s Manual and Code of Conduct were produced and are well-used by prosecutors, clerks of court and other legal professionals.

**JUDICIAL BRANCH (THE COURTS): KA 9:** Court Case Management Reforms, including the introduction of Judicial Case Management Rules, a Case Information Statistics System and Case Progression Officers, were successfully developed and piloted in the Jamaica Court System, enabling the re-engineering of business processes.

**DRAFTING, LAW REFORM & LEGISLATIVE POLICY: KA 10:** Drafting and law reform were significantly improved by the JUST program, through introduction of new management systems within the OPC, the enhanced professional development training provided to drafters and legal officers, as well as the production of manuals and electronic systems.

**PEOPLE CENTERED JUSTICE: KA 11:** The launch of the Social Order component has brought a host of people-centered benefits to the justice system, through the targeted engagement of civil society in communications, public education and multi-agency partnerships.

**Lessons Learned**

**Lessons related to program design**
1. Given the complexities of the initiatives, the activities have to be sequenced carefully to generate wide-scale benefits to a large constituency, and allow for a strong chance of sustainability.
2. The embedding of the program implementation unit within a Ministry enables complementarity.
3. A complex management structure leads to inefficiencies in project coordination and sub-optimal governance outcomes.

**Lessons related to implementation methods**
4. Wide-scale inclusive participatory processes engender trust, ownership/buy in and sustainability to development initiatives. Participation is an iterative process that takes time and therefore consideration has to be given to the project’s timeline.
5. Capacity development should be a catalyst undergirding project implementation so that those who are implementing the reform acquire the required skills to transfer to others so that the reform process can be sustained.
6. A realistic M&E framework should have been agreed from project inception.
7. The citizen scorecard was a catalyst to new protocols and policies towards people centered justice, resulting in greater access to justice.
8. Records management is essential to institutional memory, maintenance of standards and smooth project management transition and should be an essential element of project design and implementation.
9. Competent Leaders from the country must be given the opportunity to lead justice reform. This will embed capacity development; early buy in from stakeholders; develop supporting network and sustainability of products. Project Manager sets the tone for project achievement.
Lessons related to technical aspects
10. Technical Assistance that is sensitive to local culture, analysis and expertise is crucial to ownership and the sustainability of products.
11. Any support for IT systems and equipment must be advanced with robust cyber security features.
12. Absence of active visibility for the program enhanced ownership of products and processes by the Jamaican justice sector entities.

Lessons related to gender
13. Building gender responsiveness into projects and programs takes time and the process is as important as the expected results and should not be rushed. Due process must be observed to consider local laws, existing policies and cultural nuances.
14. The JUST program experienced a lack of buy-in from the leadership of the justice sector for the proper integration of the gender dimension. Gender in Jamaica is controversial and needs innovation, champions and persistence.

Larger reform initiatives
15. A holistic, comprehensive and flexible approach to justice reform achieves successful outcomes with high chance of sustainability.
16. Multi-agency and multi-stakeholder approaches can the catalyst for project and sector development.

Institutional Reform
17. Reframing the organizational structure opens up space for new operational plans and new tools leading to systemic changes.
18. Regional co-ordination and harmonization in justice reform projects has to be planned and budgeted from the initial program design, if it is to be successful.

Promising Good Practices
1. Use a building block approach to Justice reform, with inclusive consultative iterative processes.
2. Produce manuals and supportive learning materials to accompany new processes.
3. Give adequate time to a Justice Reform program so that the process can take root and grow. Justice reform is a long term process; multi-faceted and requires changes in systems, procedures, legislation, organizational culture and attitudinal change in beneficiaries and providers.

Implementation Gaps
1. A Project unit (IRIU) must be consistently staffed in accordance to project support needs to ensure implementation and coordination success.
2. Lack of an Exit Strategy reduced the opportunity for JUST to share justice reform knowledge resources with all stakeholders.
Recommendations

**Program design and implementation:**

*Recommendations to GAC: 1:* Within the timeframe of a new project, GAC should include a Project Design Phase of 6-12 months prior to project start up.  
2: GAC should carry out an information capacity assessment at the start of new projects so that a data safety and security plan can be developed and one or more data repositories can be established.  
3: Capacity development should be planned based on a systems approach and be enabled to catalyze project implementation and innovation.  

*Recommendations to the MOJ and its Project Unit: 4:* The implementing agency should hire an M&E specialist early in project implementation. An initial budget must include baseline and other data requirements so that instruments such as the citizens’ scorecard can be administered as required.  
5: The MOJ should track gender progress and milestones, using the baseline for the gender indicators established by the Gender Analysis in 2013. MOJ needs to employ gender expertise to collaborate with its M&E team.  
6: The Project Unit should map key reform players throughout every stage of the reform process, analyze their roles and establish appropriate mechanisms for interaction.  
7: The Project Unit should identify as soon as possible a virtual repository or institution to house and archive JUST products, best practice data and publications, in order to ensure their continued availability.  
8: The Project Unit should hire a local change management expert to establish a roadmap detailing strategy and human resource needs for strategic and prioritized reform. The roadmap should describe capacity development needs to operationalize and strengthen new systems and enable the achievement of results at all levels.  

*Integrating gender issues:*

*Recommendation to the Project Unit: 9:* A deliberate effort should be made to target the leadership of the justice sector in gender-based analysis /intersectionality training for greater success in gender and justice reform.  

*Recommendation to GAC: 10:* Ensure collaboration with the national machinery on gender in new projects, engaging appropriate Government agencies, CSOs and academic institutions.  

*Other current GAC projects:*

*Recommendations to GAC: 11:* Future justice reform programs must be designed with inter-project collaboration or cohesiveness in mind, with involvement of implementing agencies.  
12: While structural impediments and the sovereignty of each State must be a consideration in deciding on possible focus areas for a regional project, GAC should establish a proactive fund which lends itself to initiating collaborative approaches. This fund would be strategic and foster activities that would allow cross fertilization of ideas whilst being catalytic in attaining the regional broader goal and objectives of the reform programs.
RÉSUMÉ

Le programme JUST

En 2006, le Canada a cofinancé une évaluation complète du système judiciaire jamaïcain. Le rapport de 2007 a recommandé un certain nombre de mesures "pour une réforme holistique" du système judiciaire. Un plan quinquennal (2009-2013) a été élaboré, décrivant les actions et mesures prioritaires pour renforcer et réformer le système judiciaire. Ce plan a été utilisé pour articuler le Programme des engagements de justice pour la transformation sociale (JUST), qui devait se dérouler de 2007 à 2011 mais qui a commencé à fonctionner en décembre 2011 pour une durée de quatre ans, prolongée ensuite jusqu'en décembre 2020. L'objectif général du programme JUST était de contribuer au renforcement progressif du système judiciaire en Jamaïque par la fourniture d'une assistance juridique technique, le renforcement des capacités et le renforcement institutionnel. Le programme a été conçu en trois volets :

1. Assistance technico-juridique : Le Département de la Justice (DOJ) du Canada a fourni un soutien au Ministère de la Justice (MOJ), au Bureau du Procureur général (ODPP) et aux tribunaux pour traiter un large éventail de questions afin d'améliorer la gestion et la mise en œuvre de leurs activités principales, en faisant appel à des experts techniques canadiens et jamaïcains et au personnel du DOJ affecté en Jamaïque.

2. Renforcement institutionnel : Le renforcement de la capacité de gestion technique et de gestion axée sur les résultats des agences bénéficiaires du secteur de la justice, par le biais d'un certain nombre d'actions prioritaires intégrées dans la structure organisationnelle, les plans d'entreprise et les programmes de travail annuels de ces agences. Cette composante a été mise en œuvre principalement par l'Unité de mise en œuvre de la réforme de la justice (JRIU) qui était intégrée au MOJ avec le soutien technique du DOJ et le soutien du PNUD en matière de supervision, de gestion de projet et de contrôle de la qualité.

3. Ordre social : La mise en œuvre d'initiatives, principalement par des ONG, visant à améliorer la capacité des femmes, des hommes et des jeunes à accéder aux informations, conseils et services en matière de justice, ainsi qu'à améliorer la capacité des représentants de la société civile et des professionnels du droit à participer au processus de réforme de la justice. Cette composante a été gérée par le PNUD avec le soutien du coordinateur du projet GAC.

Le résultat final du programme JUST est le suivant : Un système judiciaire modernisé qui suscite la confiance. Résultats intermédiaires : (1) Un fonctionnement plus efficace, plus transparent et plus sensible au genre du système judiciaire en Jamaïque ; (2) Des services de justice plus axés sur le client et plus respectueux de l'égalité des sexes. Résultats immédiats : (a) Capacité accrue des institutions du secteur de la justice à gérer et à mettre en œuvre leurs activités principales ; (b) Capacité accrue des agents politiques hommes et femmes, dans les ministères concernés à élaborer des politiques législatives ; (c) Accès plus équitable des femmes, des hommes et des jeunes à l'information juridique, aux conseils juridiques et aux services d'appui ; et (d) Capacité accrue des représentants de la société civile et des professionnels du droit, hommes et femmes, à participer au processus de réforme de la justice.
Objectif de l'évaluation de fin de programme et des leçons apprises

Au cours du programme JUST, d'importantes activités de suivi et d'évaluation ont déjà été réalisées. Par conséquent, cet exercice se concentre sur la mise en évidence et l'analyse des principales réalisations de fin de programme (facteurs de réussite, limites et obstacles) et des leçons apprises. En outre, l'équipe d'évaluation a examiné la cohérence de l'intervention et a évalué la probabilité de durabilité des principales réalisations du programme identifiées. L'évaluation a reliée les principales réalisations et les enseignements tirés aux recommandations ciblant divers groupes d'acteurs du secteur de la justice, notamment le MOJ, les tribunaux, Affaires mondiales Canada (GAC) et les partenaires internationaux du développement.

L'évaluation du programme JUST a suivi une approche de méthodes mixtes, qui a permis de recueillir des données à la fois quantitatives et qualitatives. L'équipe d'évaluation a mis au point un ensemble d'outils de recherche participative et a mené des entretiens individuels semi-guidés, l'apprentissage et de l'évaluation participatifs (PLA) et l'analyse des forces, faiblesses, opportunités et menaces (SWOT) dans des groupes de discussion, administré des questionnaires, élaboré des études de cas, effectué des recherches documentaires et des visites sur le terrain/observations des participants. Outre la collecte de preuves, ces techniques ont également permis de saisir les diverses opinions et perceptions des bénéficiaires et des acteurs du secteur de la justice. Des informations contextuelles ont également été intégrées.

Conclusions

COHÉRENCE : Le programme JUST était cohérent avec d'autres initiatives nationales pertinentes. Le programme a permis une coordination efficace des bailleurs de fonds en évitant les doubles emplois et les différents produits du programme se sont soutenus mutuellement. Un niveau élevé d'harmonisation a été atteint, ce qui a permis de renforcer les liens non seulement entre les différents produits, mais aussi entre les organismes affiliés au système judiciaire. Le regret est que le volet "ordre social" n'a commencé qu'après la finalisation du travail d'assistance technique, ce qui n'a permis d'établir que des liens indirects. Grâce à une coordination efficace, le programme JUST s'est non seulement bien adapté à d'autres programmes de développement tels que JSAT et CSJP, mais a également soutenu activement le programme d'aide budgétaire de l'UE, ainsi que les actions soutenues par la BID, l'USAID et le DFID. Les enseignements tirés devraient être très utiles pour les programmes régionaux IMPACT Justice et JURIST.

EFFICACITÉ : Dans l'ensemble, le programme a atteint un niveau élevé d'efficacité. Sur sa longue période de mise en œuvre (9 ans pour le volet institutionnel et 2 ans pour le volet "ordre social"), le programme JUST a produit un grand nombre de produits, de résultats et de réalisations clés qui contribuent à son impact. 90% des 140 cibles, énumérés sous les 74 résultats à court terme ont été atteints (et plusieurs ont été largement dépassés). En ce qui concerne les résultats à long terme, 64 % des cibles des indicateurs de résultats immédiats et 50 % des indicateurs de résultats intermédiaires ont été atteints à la fin de la mise en œuvre du projet.

Les facteurs de succès qui ont contribué à rendre le programme efficace comprennent la durée du programme (9 ans) permettant la réorganisation des processus institutionnels et opérationnels, l'établissement de l'JRIU au sein du MOJ, un dialogue et des consultations continus avec toutes les entités
du secteur de la justice, l’appropriation des produits et des processus, une formation complète, le respect de la co-création de produits et des voyages d'étude, l'introduction de la gestion basée sur les résultats (RBM) au sein du MOJ, un cadre d'évaluation du performance (PAF) sectoriel, l'apport d'équipements et de systèmes TIC, la planification de la communication et une coordination efficace des bailleurs de fonds. Il y avait également de limites : inertie de la mise en œuvre au sein du GOJ, faible capacité d'absorption reflétant le manque de ressources humaines, surcharge de travail, personnel mal payé, personnel technique compétent mais surchargé, forte attrition du personnel, processus archaïques, résistance au changement, et développement du service à la clientèle dé-priorisé.

Le programme promote l'inclusion, et des directives d'accessibilité ont été préparées, mais les actions pertinentes ne font que commencer. Des actions ont été entreprises concernant le traitement des enfants dans les tribunaux et les personnes handicapées sont désormais prises en compte dans la modernisation des palais de justice et des installations connexes. L'accès aux services de justice dans les zones rurales s'est considérablement amélioré grâce aux unités mobiles de service de justice.

DURABILITÉ : Le gouvernement et les tribunaux se sont bien engagés dans la mise en œuvre du programme JUST et en ont développé l'appropriation. La participation du grand public se fait que commencer, sur la base des activités de la composante "Ordre social". Les OSC ont fait des progrès limités dans l’amélioration de leurs compétences et de leurs ressources pour aborder les domaines législatifs et politiques. En ce qui concerne le gouvernement et le pouvoir judiciaire, les avantages découvrant du programme JUST sont intégrés et pris en charge par les institutions, ce qui constitue une excellente base pour la durabilité des résultats à court terme et la réalisation future des résultats à long terme. Un grand nombre de membres du personnel du secteur de la justice ont été formés et ont déjà appliqué ces compétences et ces aptitudes techniques spécifiques. Dans l'ensemble, la dynamique d'amélioration des services de justice est forte et devrait être maintenue par le personnel du secteur de la justice à de nombreux niveaux ainsi que par la société.

GENRE : L'effet prévu de la composante genre n'a pas pu être pleinement réalisé car les intrants ont eu lieu deux ans avant la fin du projet au lieu d'être intégrés dès le début. Dans l'ensemble, donc, le programme a été peu sensible à la dimension de genre et peu soucieux de l'équité entre les sexes. Une analyse de genre a été effectuée mais elle n'a pas été utilisée dans une large mesure ; elle n'a pas informé la base de référence des indicateurs de genre et les étapes de genre n'ont pas été suivies. Bien qu'un budget et un mandat pour un expert à plein temps soient disponibles, l'expertise requise en matière de genre n'a pas été mobilisée en raison de la résistance et de la bureaucratie à la tète du secteur de la justice. La formation et la sensibilisation aux questions de genre dans l’ordre social ont été dispensées trop tard et trop rapidement. Il a fallu les répéter car les normes socioculturelles nécessitent une approche cohérente à multiples facettes pour avoir un niveau d'impact. Le projet n'a pas réussi à faire comprendre à la population l'importance de la dimension de genre. Les stratégies de durabilité liées au genre n'ont pas été introduites dans le secteur de la justice et aucune synergie n'a été établie pour mettre à l'échelle les initiatives en matière de genre.

Les systèmes et les manuels produits par le programme JUST soutiennent l'efficacité croissante du secteur de la justice, mais pas encore dans le domaine de l'égalité des sexes. Avec l'introduction du FIAP en 2017, le programme JUST a déplacé l'accent de son cadre de résultats de la simple égalité entre les femmes et les hommes vers un accent sur l'inter-sectionnalité. Bien que ce changement ait été effectué, il a été noté
que la conception du programme JUST était antérieure au FIAP et que, par conséquent, les résultats attendus en matière d'égalité entre les sexes n'étaient pas significatifs. S'il y avait eu un expert en genre à plein temps à bord, il aurait pu y avoir des améliorations continues dans la voie à suivre pour atteindre les résultats en matière de genre.

Les réalisations clés

L'évaluation a reconnu 11 réalisations clés (KA) :

GENERALITÉS : KA 1 : Le programme JUST a véritablement été un catalyseur pour la réforme de l'ensemble du système judiciaire. KA 2 : Le programme JUST a aidé le secteur de la justice à reconnaître l'importance de la gestion axée sur les résultats (RBM) et a permis la préparation d'un plan chiffré basé sur les résultats, appartenant aux MDA de la justice. KA 3 : Un cadre de suivi et d'évaluation à l'échelle du secteur a été préparé, y compris une fiche d'évaluation des citoyens. KA 4 : L'ensemble du secteur de la justice a bénéficié d'un investissement important dans l'infrastructure et la technologie des TIC, qui a constitué un élément essentiel de la modernisation du système judiciaire.

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE : KA 5 : Le programme JUST a permis la restructuration fondamentale du ministère de la justice (MOJ) et a apporté un soutien à long terme à son renforcement institutionnel. KA 6 : La communication et la visibilité du secteur de la justice et du MOJ en particulier, ont été considérablement améliorées. KA 7 : Par le biais des activités de coordination sectorielle convoquées par le MOJ avec le JRIU agissant en tant que secrétariat, les partenariats entre MOJ et les partenaires internationaux de développement (IDP) ont été mieux structurés afin d'obtenir un soutien coordonné maximal aux efforts de la Jamaïque.

BUREAU DU PROCUREUR GÉNÉRAL (ODPP) : KA 8 : Un manuel du procureur et un code de conduite standardisés, basés sur les connaissances, ont été produits et sont bien utilisés par les procureurs, les greffiers et autres professionnels du droit.

LE POUVOIR JUDICIAIRE (LES TRIBUNAUX) : KA 9 : Les réformes de la gestion des cas judiciaires, y compris l'introduction de règles de gestion des cas judiciaires, d'un système statistique des cas et des agents d'avancement des dossiers, ont été élaborées et testées avec succès dans le système judiciaire jamaïcain, permettant la réingénierie des processus opérationnels.

RÉDACTION, RÉFORME DU DROIT ET POLITIQUE LÉGISLATIVE : KA 10 : La rédaction et la réforme du droit ont été considérablement améliorées par le programme JUST, grâce à l'introduction de nouveaux systèmes de gestion au sein de l'OPC, au renforcement de la formation professionnelle dispensée aux rédacteurs et aux juristes, ainsi qu'à la production de manuels et de systèmes électroniques.

LA JUSTICE AXÉE SUR LES PERSONNES : KA 11 : Le lancement de la composante "Ordre social" a apporté au système judiciaire une foule d'avantages axés sur les personnes, grâce à l'engagement ciblé de la société civile dans les communications, l'éducation du public et les partenariats multi-agences.
Les leçons apprises

Leçons liées à la conception des programmes
1. Étant donné la complexité des initiatives, les activités doivent être soigneusement séquencées pour générer des avantages à grande échelle pour un large public et permettre une forte chance de durabilité.
2. Intégrer l'unité de mise en œuvre du programme au sein d'un ministère qui permette la complémentarité.
3. Une structure de gestion complexe entraîne des inefficacités dans la coordination des projets et des résultats à long terme de gouvernance non-optimaux.

Leçons liées aux méthodes de mise en œuvre
4. Les processus participatifs inclusifs à grande échelle engendrent la confiance, l'appropriation et la durabilité des initiatives de développement. La participation est un processus itératif qui prend du temps et il faut donc tenir compte du calendrier du projet.
5. Le développement des capacités doit être un catalyseur à la base de la mise en œuvre du projet, afin que ceux qui mettent en œuvre la réforme, acquièrent les compétences requises pour les transférer à d'autres, de sorte que le processus de réforme puisse être soutenu.
6. Un cadre de suivi et d'évaluation réaliste doit avoir été convenu dès le début du projet.
7. La carte de pointage des citoyens a été un catalyseur de nouveaux protocoles et politiques en faveur d'une justice centrée sur les personnes, ce qui a permis d’améliorer l'accès à la justice.
8. La gestion des dossiers est essentielle à la mémoire institutionnelle, au maintien des normes et à la transition facile de la gestion de projet et devrait être un élément essentiel de la conception et de la mise en œuvre du projet.
9. Les dirigeants compétents du pays doivent avoir la possibilité de diriger la réforme de la justice. Cela permettra d'intégrer le développement des capacités, d'obtenir rapidement l'adhésion des parties prenantes, de développer le réseau de soutien et la durabilité des produits. Le chef de projet donne le ton pour la réalisation du projet.

Leçons liées aux aspects techniques
10. L'assistance technique qui tient compte de la culture, de l'analyse et de l'expertise locales, est essentielle à l'appropriation et à la durabilité des produits.
11. Tout support pour les systèmes et équipements informatiques doit être avancé avec de solides caractéristiques de cyber-sécurité.
12. L'absence de visibilité active du programme a renforcé l'appropriation des produits et des processus par les entités du secteur judiciaire jamaïcain.

Leçons liées au genre
13. Développer la sensibilité aux questions de genre dans les projets et programmes prend du temps et le processus est aussi important que les résultats attendus et ne doit pas être précipité. Il faut respecter les procédures en vigueur pour tenir compte des lois locales, des politiques existantes et des nuances culturelles.
Initiatives de réforme plus importantes

15. Une approche holistique, complet et flexible de la réforme de la justice permet d'obtenir des résultats à long terme fructueux avec de fortes chances de durabilité.

16. Les approches multi-agences et multi-acteurs peuvent servir de catalyseur pour le développement de projets et de secteurs.

Réforme institutionnelle

17. Le remaniement de la structure organisationnelle ouvre la voie à de nouveaux plans opérationnels et à de nouveaux outils conduisant à des changements systémiques

18. La coordination et l'harmonisation régionales des projets de réforme de la justice doivent être planifiées et budgétisées dès la conception initiale du programme, si elle doit réussir.

Bonnes pratiques prometteuses

1. Utiliser une approche modulaire de la réforme de la justice, avec des processus consultatifs itératifs inclusifs.

2. Produire des manuels et du matériel didactique de soutien pour accompagner les nouveaux processus.

3. Accorder suffisamment de temps à un programme de réforme de la justice pour que le processus puisse prendre racine et se développer. La réforme de la justice est un processus à long terme et de multiples facettes. Elle nécessite des changements dans les systèmes, les procédures, la législation, la culture organisationnelle et un changement d'attitude des bénéficiaires et des prestataires.

Lacunes de mise en œuvre

1. Une unité de projet (JRIU) doit être dotée en personnel de manière ininterrompu en fonction des besoins de soutien du projet, pour la réussite de la mise en œuvre et la coordination.

2. L'absence d'une stratégie de sortie a réduit la possibilité pour le JUST de partager les ressources de connaissances sur la réforme de la justice avec toutes les parties prenantes.

Recommandations

Conception et mise en œuvre du programme :

Recommandations au GAC : 1 : Dans le cadre d'un nouveau projet, le GAC devrait inclure une phase de conception de projet de 6 à 12 mois avant le démarrage du projet.

2 : Le GAC devrait procéder à une évaluation de la capacité d'information au début des nouveaux projets afin qu'un plan de sécurité et de sûreté des données puisse être élaboré et qu'un ou plusieurs dépôts de données puissent être créés.

3 : Le développement des capacités devrait être planifié sur la base d'une approche systémique et être capable de catalyser la mise en œuvre et l'innovation des projets.

Recommandations au MOJ et son unité de projet : 4 : L'agence de mise en œuvre doit engager un spécialiste en S&E dès le début de la mise en œuvre du projet. Un budget initial doit inclure des exigences
en matière de données de base et d'autres afin que des instruments tels que la carte de pointage des citoyens puisse être administrés comme il se doit.

5 : Le MOJ devrait suivre les progrès et les étapes de l'égalité des sexes, en utilisant la base de référence pour les indicateurs de genre établis par l'analyse de genre en 2013. Le MOJ doit faire appel à une expertise en matière de genre pour collaborer avec son équipe de suivi et d'évaluation.

6 : L'unité de projet doit recenser les principaux acteurs de la réforme à chaque étape du processus, analyser leur rôle et établir des mécanismes d'interaction appropriés.

7 : L’unité de projet doit identifier dès que possible un dépôt ou une institution virtuelle pour héberger et archiver les produits du JUST, les données sur les meilleures pratiques et les publications, afin de garantir leur disponibilité continue.

8 : L'unité de projet devrait engager un expert local en gestion du changement pour établir une feuille de route détaillant la stratégie et les besoins en ressources humaines pour une réforme stratégique et priorisée. La feuille de route devrait décrire les besoins en matière de développement des capacités pour rendre opérationnels et renforcer les nouveaux systèmes et permettre l'obtention de résultats à tous les niveaux.

Intégrer les questions de genre :

Recommandation à l'unité de projet : 9 : Un effort délibéré devrait être fait pour cibler le leadership du secteur de la justice dans la formation à l'analyse de genre/inter-sectionnalité, pour une plus grande réussite de la réforme de la justice et du genre.

Recommandation au GAC : 10 : Assurer la collaboration dans les nouveaux projets avec le mécanisme national sur le genre, en engageant les organismes gouvernementaux, les OSC et les institutions universitaires appropriés.

Autres projets actuels du GAC :

Recommandations au GAC : 11 : Les futurs programmes de réforme de la justice doivent être conçus dans un esprit de collaboration ou de cohésion entre les projets, avec la participation des organismes d'exécution.

12 : Alors que les obstacles structurels et la souveraineté de chaque État doivent être pris en considération pour décider des domaines d'intervention possibles d'un projet régional, le GAC devrait créer un fonds proactif qui peut initier d'approches collaboratives. Ce fonds serait stratégique et favoriserait les activités qui permettraient une fertilisation croisée des idées tout en étant un catalyseur pour atteindre le but et les objectifs régionaux plus larges des programmes de réforme.
1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

JUSTICE REFORM IN JAMAICA

Building a secure, cohesive and just society is a national priority for the Government of Jamaica (GOJ). Vision 2030 Jamaica – National Development Plan and the series of companion Medium Term Socio-Economic Policy Frameworks (MTF) articulate this commitment from its start in 2009. At that time, the justice system could be characterized as extremely inefficient, due to being under-resourced for the huge demands at hand, outdated technology and practices, inadequate infrastructure and insufficient attention paid to the various users of the system. The system also lacked proper monitoring of its functions, suffered inadequate management arrangements, demonstrated gaps in capacity and low participation by the society at large to build a more just society. These challenges led to slow court procedures, lengthy delays in disposing of cases, inconsistent enforcement of laws and legal processes, diminishing confidence in the rule of law and a rise in street justice and human right abuses.

In 2006, Canada co-financed the Justice System Reform Task Force (JSRTF), which undertook a comprehensive assessment of Jamaica’s justice system. Its 2007 report recommended a number of measures ‘for a holistic’ reform of the justice system. A 5-year plan (2009-2013), the Jamaica Justice System Reform Policy Agenda Framework (JJSRPAF) was articulated in 2009, which described priority actions and steps required to strengthen and reform the justice system. This report contributed to the scoping of the Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation (JUST) program, which was planned earlier through a year-long consultation and prioritization process with stakeholders. JUST was meant to run from 2007-2011 but began operation in December 2011 for four years, later extended to December 2020.

As a result, over a long period of time, the JUST program has worked to support the transformation of the justice system by underscoring the importance of justice for all and a justice system that is transparent, accessible, inclusive, accountable, affordable, flexible and fair. The program also aimed at infusing a stronger gender responsiveness into the justice system, equitable access to formal or informal justice services, increased reach of justice services for citizens, support to child and vulnerable witnesses and improved women’s and marginalized people’s depth of legal awareness.

PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSMENT

The JUST End of Program/Lessons Learned assessment is meant to be a strategic tool for the continuity of the work towards a modernized justice system in Jamaica that engenders trust and confidence. During the course of the JUST program, significant M&E activities were carried out, including a mid-term operational review, a 2019 update of the JUST Performance Monitoring Framework (PMF), a Citizen Scorecard, the Sustainability Report Card and the production of cumulative outcome data. Therefore, this exercise focuses on highlighting and analyzing key End-of-Program achievements (success factors, limitations and barriers) and assessing Lessons Learned. Further, the assessment team investigated the coherence of the intervention and evaluated the likelihood of sustainability of the key program achievements identified.
The assessment team linked the key achievements and lessons learned to recommendations targeting various groups of stakeholders in the justice sector, including the Ministry of Justice, the Courts, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), international development partners and others. The Terms of Reference of this assessment have been attached in Annex 1 to this report.

2. Description of the JUST Program

Introduction

The Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation (JUST) program began operation in December 2011 for an initial four-year period (2011-2015). It was subsequently extended, for a number of reasons, to March 2020. Due to COVID-19, a final extension was granted to December 2020. The JUST program was initiated and funded by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) as a bilateral project in Jamaica. The Program was designed to be implemented by the Department of Justice Canada (DOJ) and the Justice Reform Implementation Unit (JRIU) embedded within the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Jamaica, supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Management arrangements changed over the course of the program and a full-time Project Manager/Coordinator was contracted in 2017 by GAC to ensure better reporting and greater coordination between the implementing agencies and the NGOs to be engaged under the Social Order component.

The initial beneficiaries included the MOJ, its departments and agencies, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) as well as the Courts. A social order component was also part of the design of the project and added justice sector Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and academia to the implementing partners and beneficiaries. The main phase of Technical Assistance (TA) provided by DOJ ended in 2017, however TA was also provided in 2018 when the actual implementation of the social order component started.

Structure of the JUST Program

The overall aim of the JUST program was to contribute to the progressive strengthening of the justice system in Jamaica through the provision of technical legal assistance, capacity building and institutional strengthening. The program was designed in three components:

1. **Technical-Legal Assistance**: Department of Justice (DOJ) Canada provided support to MOJ, the ODPP and the Courts to address a wide range of matters to improve the management and implementation of their core business, utilizing Canadian and Jamaican technical experts and DOJ Personnel assigned to Jamaica.

2. **Institutional Strengthening**: The building of technical and result-based management capacity of the beneficiary agencies within the justice sector, through a number of priority actions integrated into the organisational structure, corporate plans and annual work programmes of these agencies. This component was implemented primarily by the Justice Reform Implementation Unit (JRIU), which was embedded in the MOJ, with technical support from the DOJ and UNDP.

3. **Social Order**: The implementation of initiatives, primarily by NGOs, aimed at improving the capacity of women, men and youth to access justice information, advice and services, as well as improving the
capacity of civil society representatives and legal professionals to participate in the justice reform process. This component was managed by the UNDP with the support of the GAC Project Coordinator. All three components were supported by the UNDP, which partnered with Canada to provide quality management, procurement, contract management and related support services to the JUST Program.

**EXPECTED RESULTS OF THE JUST PROGRAM**

The **Ultimate Outcome** of the JUST program is: A modernized justice system that engenders trust and confidence. **Intermediate Outcomes**: (1) A more efficient, transparent and gender-responsive functioning of the justice system in Jamaica; (2) Justice Services are more customer-focused and gender-responsive. **Immediate Outcomes**: (a) Increased capacity of justice sector institutions to manage and implement their core business; (b) Improved capacity of male and female policy officers, in line ministries to develop legislative policy; (c) Increased equitable access by women, men and youth to legal information, legal advice and support services; and (d) Improved capacity of male and female civil society representatives and legal professionals to participate in the justice reform process.

**3. METHODOLOGY FOR THE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT**

**CHOSEN APPROACH**

The program assessment followed a mixed methods approach, which gathered both quantitative and qualitative data. The assessment team developed a set of participatory research tools and conducted individual semi-guided interviews, participatory learning and appraisal (PLA) and Strength-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis in focus groups, administered questionnaires, developed case studies, carried out desk research and field visits/participant observations. In addition to collecting evidence, these techniques also captured the diverse opinions and perceptions of beneficiaries and justice sector stakeholders. Further, contextual information was also integrated.

**METHODOLOGY**

The main work of the **inception phase** included:

1. **Familiarization and information meeting.** This meeting between the Assessment Team and the GAC Project Team Leader (PTL) was held on June 30, 2020. Due to commitments of the Assessment Team and COVID-19, it was decided that the assessment would be carried out between August 15, 2020 and January 15, 2021.
2. **Stakeholder Analysis and Prioritization.** The team reviewed the various stakeholders to assess their participation in specific research methodologies.
3. **Preparation of research instruments.** The team prepared the following tools:
   a. **Assessment matrix.** The matrix of 21 research questions (and related data collection methods, data sources, sample sizes) is attached as **Annex 5 in Report 4 “Reference Annexes”**. It summarizes all elements of the methodology.
b. **Theory of Change.** The Assessment Team developed a Theory of Change (TOC) for the JUST program (see *Annex 6 in Report 4*). The TOC focuses on mapping the changes which cause the generation of outputs, immediate outcomes, intermediate outcomes and the ultimate outcome, and for this presents: (1) assumptions and risks; (2) drivers of change; and (3) key stakeholders. The TOC was used throughout the assessment process to investigate why specific choices were made and how those choices influenced the achievement of gender results.

c. **Guide for individual and group interviews.** Sample questions for interviews were prepared, as listed in *Annex 7 of Report 4*. The team utilized prepared PowerPoint presentations as well.

d. **Gender Responsiveness Tool.** This tool, used throughout the assessment, is attached as *Annex 8 in Report 4*.

e. **Questionnaires for Users and for Beneficiaries.** Two quantitative research instruments were developed, targeting beneficiaries of the JUST Program as well as users of the justice system. Quantitative surveys were done on-line as well as face-to-face. The instruments are appended in Report 2, “*Quantitative Research and Analysis.*”

f. **Plan for Focus Group Discussions (FGD).** FGDs were planned to be done with five different audiences: Justices of the Peace (JP); Case Progression Officers (CPO); Statisticians and Data Entry Officers (DEO); Youth; and Community-based Organizations (CBO). See Report 3 “*Case Studies.*”

The main activities of the implementation phase were:

1. **Implementation of interviews.** Individual semi-guided interviews were conducted with project personnel and stakeholders, mostly based on suggestions by the GAC PTL. The interviews were principally done through on-line software (Zoom, Teams and Skype). The interviewees are listed in Report 1, *Annex 2*.

2. **Preparation of Case studies.** The assessment team prepared evidence in case study format to illustrate selected distinct achievements of the JUST program in detail. See Report 3 “*Case Studies on key achievements of the JUST Program.*”

3. **Status Report on outputs and outcomes.** The team set up an Outcome and Output Results Table for the JUST program in its entirety, based on the Logic Model and Performance Measurement Framework (PMF). The outputs have been arranged under categories and in a following order, according to the TOC. The level of achievement of outputs and outcomes, as at end of program, is presented in *Annex 3 in Report 4, “Reference Annexes”.*

4. **Implementation of surveys,** see Report: 2 “*Quantitative Research and Analysis.*”

5. **Focus Group Discussions.** 11 FGDs have been convened, 8 through on-line software. Three face to face FG discussions held with the youth in Denham Town and one with a Women’s group in St. Mary. The reports are included in Report 3, “*Case Studies and Assessment of Social Order Component.*”

6. **Field Observations.** A field observation guide was prepared. One result, the Clarendon Parish Court, is reported in *Annex 4, included in Report 4, Reference Annexes.*

7. **Comprehensive desk review.** The Assessment Team reviewed a large quantity of documents, as listed in *Annex 9 (Report 4, Reference Annexes).*

With regard to the reporting phase, the assessment team first prepared a draft Assessment Report, while still continuing with quantitative data collection and some FGDs. The report was subsequently updated through use of additional data as well as feedback from GAC. The Assessment Report is accompanied by
a PowerPoint presentation, which highlights the main findings, lessons learned and targeted recommendations. Profiles of the assessment team members are presented in Annex 10, Report 4. Reference Annexes.

LIMITATIONS

COVID 19 affected the assessment process in many ways and created several limitations: (a) Interviews and focus groups had to be done virtually; only 1 face to face interview was carried out, although several days of face to face survey interviews were done, as well as a few “physical” focus groups; (b) With increased number of professionals working from home, and schools on-line, online connectivity challenges were encountered, which at times derailed set times for interviews; (c) Background sounds created hearing difficulties which challenged the levels of comfort to speak; (d) Finding the right tone without shouting was a challenge, especially when conversations were carried out in rainy conditions; (e) Many interviewees were in offices which presented issues of confidentiality if a conversation was overheard. In some instances, the office equipment was unable to connect to the interview platform and therefore cell phones had to be used. On more than one occasion focus group conversations were carried out on-line and phone simultaneously; (f) At home conversations were often disrupted by competing distractions such as dealing with personal family issues; (g) There were numerous incorrect telephone numbers for those working in the courts and challenges getting through to the courts and many other stakeholders.

The quantitative survey was employed physically as well as online. The application used to develop it has the capacity to solve issues prior to its launching. Although several tests were administered to ensure that all the built-in validations for the survey were accurate, there was no opportunity due to lack of time to pretest the instrument in the field. As such errors that were found whilst administering the instrument could not be addressed anymore as the instrument was already launched and active.

Research shows that Web-based evaluation/assessment surveys response rates tend to be low (on average 30-40 percent), further compounded by other dynamics including culture. Jamaicans are not cultured or adapted to be responsive to surveys. Accessibility to a stable affordable internet connection in addition to the overall capacity in the use of applications and technology also contribute to the low response rate. Emailed surveys often ended up in spam or were returned due to incorrect email addresses.

The Beneficiary instrument was very detailed and time-consuming, especially for persons who were involved in several areas of the program. The target respondents for the Beneficiary module of the survey are primarily professionals whose jobs do not have much downtime. This impacted the beneficiary respondents as they had limited opportunities to complete the survey instrument.
4. RESULTS / FINDINGS

The findings presented in this chapter are organized following the main assessment criteria provided in the Term of Reference: (a) Coherence; (b) Effectiveness; and (c) Sustainability. Additionally, a section has been introduced relating to gender responsiveness, while gender dimensions are further integrated into each of these sections covering the criteria. The findings are further guided by the research questions for the assessment (see Report 4. Annex 5 in the Reference Annexes).

COHERENCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION

Coherence is defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “Compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution. Whilst internal coherence addresses the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out by the same institution/government, external coherence considers the consistency of the intervention with other interventions in the same context.” ¹ This definition includes complementarity, harmonization and co-ordination with others, and the extent to which the intervention adds value, while avoiding duplication of effort.

Internal Coherence

As early as 2006, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) demonstrated a commitment at both national and sector level to build a secure, cohesive and just society through prioritizing reform of the justice system in its national development planning. Through the Canadian Bar Association, and with partial funding provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Justice System Reform Task Force was commissioned to undertake a comprehensive review and assessment of the justice system. The task force 2007 report recommended a number of measures ‘for a holistic’ reform of the Jamaica justice system. Priorities from the wider report were identified by stakeholders and key recommendations for their implementation were compiled in the (2009-2013) Jamaica Justice System Reform Policy Agenda Framework (JJSRPAF). Among other things, there was a call for better coordination among the International Development Partners (IDPs) in order to increase the sustainability and impact of justice reform interventions sponsored by them. Following the expiration of JJSRPAF, in 2015 a follow up plan, the Justice Reform Implementation Plan (JRIP) 2015-2020 was adopted by Cabinet.

Prior to the JUST program, there was no national framework for justice reform. Justice sector entities had individual linkages with donors; for instance, the ODPP received support under the DOJ’s Technical Assistance program and the Courts received assistance from the EU with the clearing of the backlog of cases under the Justice, Security, Accountability, Transparency (JSAT) Project. While there may not have been any observed duplication of efforts, stakeholders confirmed that there was no evidence of collaboration between the agencies in the quest for justice reform.

JRIP included recommendations from: (a) the above-mentioned Task Force (2007); (b) Vision 2030 National Outcome 6 “Effective Governance” and National goal #2 “The Jamaican Society is Secure,

Cohesive and Just” and its accompanying medium-term policy framework (MTF); (c) priorities of GOJ’s strategic business plans; (d) the JUST PMF, which at the time was the most detailed iteration of MDA modernization and reform goals in the justice sector; and (e) the SDGs. JRIP was synchronized with the JUST program implementation objectives and indicators.

**External Coherence**

JRIP was the catalyst to incorporate the justice reform funding by IDPs such as the International Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INL) of the US Embassy, the EU Delegation, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), UNICEF and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). JRIP detailed 68 activities, broken down into seven strategic costed priority objectives, which were subsequently subsumed by IDPs engaged in justice reform. The seven objectives of JRIP and IDP involvement can be illustrated as presented in **TABLE 1**.

**TABLE 1: DONOR HARMONIZATION UNDER JRIP OBJECTIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JRIP Objectives</th>
<th>JUST/ GAC</th>
<th>EU JSAT2/11th EDF Program</th>
<th>IDB, GAC CSJP3 III, UK/DFID</th>
<th>GoJ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Fair and Timely Case Resolution</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Improved Access to Justice</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: A strong judiciary and workforce</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Strengthened linkages between justice sector</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Establishing a Sound Court Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Implementing a social component to the delivery of justice</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Strengthened Public Trust and Confidence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As stated in JRIP, these seven objectives added to and incorporated the major objectives being undertaken by the justice sector and IDPs, namely:

1. Management of the inventory of cases;
2. Reduction of case backlog in the courts;
3. Strengthening of legislation and the legislative process;
4. Retooling and capacity development of major institutions within the justice system;

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2 Justice, Security, Accountability, Transparency Project.
3 Citizen Security and Justice Program.
5. Introduction of other institutions – such as the National Human Rights Institute – and the development of a Social Component to support improved access to justice at the community level and increased “public trust and confidence” in the justice system.

Given the integral involvement of Canada in the assessment of the justice reform plans and the implementation of the JUST program, the JUST Project Steering Committee (PSC) in its meeting of June 19, 2013, mandated “that donor co-ordination should be carried out by the Justice Reform Implementation Unit (JRIU) to maximize efficiency and ensure effective utilization of all resources for justice system reform.” This mandate resulted in the MOJ convening seven quarterly justice sector donor co-ordination meetings between 2016-2019 with the JRIU acting as the secretariat. These meetings comprised IDPs and the PIOJ as GOJ’s donor support coordinating partner and ensured the harmonization of justice programming through:

1. Scheduling of integrated work programs to assist co-ordination between IDPs;
2. Targeted synergies and collaboration between IDPs in implementation, to avoid duplication;
3. Maximization of efficiency of donor resources spent;
4. Sharing of information through program updates;
5. Internal assessment of JRIP’s performance, to plug gaps and provide solutions.

JRIP and the JUST program, therefore, were aligned and complementary. JRIP was financed by the Budget Support Program of the EU/BSP which supported infrastructure development, while the JUST focused primarily on processes. With the establishment of the JRIU within MOJ to administer the JUST program, all justice reform activities became better coordinated between donor agencies and implementers. This brought a high level of harmonization and cohesiveness and has helped to strengthen the linkages across the justice sector. Stakeholders offered suggestions on the package of interventions and sought clarification where needed. Linkages were identified between the interventions, greatly helping to accelerate achievements of the JUST program. For example, in discussions related to the development of the Electronic Case Management System (ECMS), it was mentioned that the software being used by a Ministry of National Security IDB funded project, could also be used for this effort. Moreover, the ECMS, although designated for the Courts, could be linked to the prosecutorial arm of the justice system and eventually incorporate e-filing by attorneys. Many outputs were funded by several development partners. With the synchronization or coordination by the JRIU, products better supported each other, synergies and linkages were acted upon.

Justice professionals interviewed pointed out that the JRIP framework was largely realized through JUST. However, from all indications, there were different levels of donor collaboration in justice reform areas, including for instance backlog reduction, capacity development, legal aid services, child diversion services. Of importance is that the donor coordinating meetings organized by the MOJ resulted in monitored concentrated program activities reflecting complementarity in collaborative efforts. As the secretariat for the donor co-ordination meetings, the JRIU enabled the synchronization of donor efforts, and products of different partners being supported. It was expected that the JRIU embedded in the MOU would continue after JUST to galvanize donors around justice reform. Synergies and linkages were identified and acted upon; duplication of efforts were avoided. All of these have indicated cohesiveness in the efforts for reform of the justice system. This lends credence to the theory that the harmonization of partner program and structured approaches are critical in ensuring synergies and can contribute to cohesiveness.
The IMPACT Justice and JURIST Regional Projects

GAC’s regional projects IMPACT Justice (2014-2023) and JURIST (2013-2022), though not directly involved in the bilateral JUST program, are covered by internal coherence. Like the JUST program, these fall under Canada’s 2007 Strategy for the Americas (CARICOM) with thematic priorities of sustainable economic growth and security. The GAC’s Caribbean themes of gender equality and the environment are aligned to this strategy.

The regional projects have independent engagements with Jamaican institutions such as the MOJ, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Information (MOEYI), the judicial fraternity and civil society organizations in areas such as legislative law reform, gender sensitization and restorative practices training which have contributed to the justice reform process in Jamaica.

Between 2016 and 2018 the JURIST project hosted several training workshops in Jamaica. These included gender training for judicial officers in Jamaica and the training of parish and supreme court judges in the use of gender equality protocol for the achievement of more gender sensitive adjudication. The IMPACT project also contributed by assisting the GOJ with drafting of a Model Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) Bill and has worked with the MOJ and MOEYI to conducted training in Restorative Practices in schools.

The JUST program and IMPACT and JURIST projects were aligned through GAC’s Regional program in the Caribbean. Whilst all three operated independently, there was collaboration between them but not coherence in terms of the work plans. Nonetheless, efforts were made at harmonization during the June 11, 2019 PSC meeting of the JUST Program, where the IMPACT and JURIST Project Management Team sought to identify potential opportunities for continued funding of GOJ reform initiatives that were started by the JUST Program, but not as yet completed. Discussions also ensued on potential insertion areas of programming where JUST made progress. The GAC JUST Project Coordinator attended a reflection workshop in Trinidad and Tobago where some lessons learned from JUST implementation were shared with sector leaders throughout the Caribbean, including representatives from the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), CARICOM, beneficiary agencies from the public and private aspects of the Justice sector who partnered with the IMPACT Justice and JURIST projects.

The JUST Program has also supplied documentation to a knowledge management portal being developed by the JURIST project that will house knowledge products on justice reform. As such this is expected to benefit Caribbean counterpart agencies. Further collaboration was however stymied as the June 11, 2019 meeting was the final PSC of the JUST. The collaborative efforts detailed above, augur well for future involvement or collaboration in a project similar to the JUST Program.

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4 Justice Reform in CARICOM: Analysis and Programming Options Prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency by J. Mark Stiles and Dennis Darby
**Gender Responsiveness of the JUST Program**

In 2008, during the development stages of the JUST program (2008) a gender equality program was defined by the Global Affairs Canada (GAC) Policy on Gender Equality (GE) to underpin the JUST Program. The goal of this policy was to support the achievement of equality between women and men to ensure sustainable development. In 2011, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) approved the Jamaica National Policy on Gender Equality (NPGE). The NPGE provided guidance to various sectors on how to mainstream gender in their policies, programs and projects.

Subsequently, in 2014, a Gender Review\(^5\) of the JUST Program provided ten (10) recommendations\(^6\) to enhance the efforts of achieving gender equality in the justice system in Jamaica.

By 2017, GAC adopted the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP). This Policy became the guide for the Social Order component of the JUST program, promoting a shift in the results matrix from mere equality between women and men to a focus on intersectionality. Other factors, such as socio-economic conditions, age, disability impact the engagement of men and women in the justice sector were considered in this way.

While gender was not a key element in the institutional strengthening component of the JUST Program, it was mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the social order component. The gender responsiveness tool (see Report 4. Annex 8) was administered to both the institutional strengthening component and social order components.

**Mind-set on Gender**

During the assessment, there was a constant reminder by senior justice sector representatives that the justice sector does not have a “gender problem.” This mind-set was developed and supported because a

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\(^6\) Ten (10) recommendations from J. Williams Gender Review of the JUST Program:

1. Gender is to mainstream or integrated in policies, plans and programmes as well as training manuals
2. There needs to be a gender focal point in the Ministry of Justice and other agencies that do not currently have one, this could influence the justice sector’s gender planning processes and action plan activities
3. Constant review of legislation to ensure that emerging gender issues are taken into account
4. Address the current backlog of cases in the court system
5. Speed up the legislative process
6. Provide adequate funding and staffing to the deficient areas
7. Provide gender training for all levels in the justice system. The JTI is to be equipped to carry out this function
8. Ensure that the Courts and other sectors of the justice system are user-friendly
9. Provide gender budgeting where applicable (gender responsive budgeting –GRB, is government planning, programming and budgeting that contribute to the advancement of gender equality and the fulfilment of women’s rights. It entails identifying and reflecting needed interventions to address gender gaps in sector and local government policies, plans and budget. GRB also aims to analyse the gender-differentiated impact of revenue-raising policies and the allocation of domestic resources and Official Development Assistance (ODA). GRB initiatives seek to create enabling policy frameworks, build capacity and strengthen monitoring mechanisms to support accountability to women.
10. Factor environment assessment into consideration
few women have broken the “glass ceiling” in the justice sector to attain some of the highest held positions such as permanent secretary, director of public prosecution, chief justice and public defender. Traditionally been held by men, with women being appointed to these positions, it is implied that gender issues would automatically resolve itself. A few even suggested that men should be supported because more women than men are represented in the justice sector.

This viewpoint is problematic because among technocrats in the justice sector, there is shared pride of women who have institutional power in the system. Sex disaggregated data support the visibility of female users of the justice system and increased the inclusion of their needs in the justice sector. However, having women in leadership positions and more women in any particular sector, does not equate to gender equality and gender responsiveness. The capacity development in gender and justice would be an entry point for delineating gender nuances and justice sector professionals having a gender lens when executing their duties.

**Institutional Strengthening Component**

A gender review (2014) was completed of the functioning of the justice system, however, it did not explore the socio-cultural nuances that fuel the unequal power dynamics between men and women and the people who access justice services. Men, women, youth and Persons with Disabilities (PWD) were integral in the consultative process for the development of policies and laws, however, it could not be determined if recommendations from this review were adopted.

A citizens’ scorecard survey was administered in 2014 which was comprehensive and provided baseline data on the people centered approach to justice. This scorecard had full representation of intersectionality which was very detailed and provided the basis for sex disaggregated data at the court level. The “gender and youth strategy was either cancelled or subsumed into the work of other projects or beneficiary activities” according to the JUST Annual Narrative Report 2018/2019. However, throughout the assessment, a number of things could not be verified as subsumed into the work of other projects or beneficiary activities: gender analysis being a step in the policy development cycle; a gender strategy for the justice sector; a youth strategy for the justice sector; and the ongoing capacity development around gender responsiveness.

**Social Order Component**

The social order component reflects the people centered approach to the delivery of justice services. It operationalized itself in areas such as training material, care spaces in the courts, witness care program and the mobile justice unit among other things. Notwithstanding the achievements of the JUST Program, there were some opportunities, limitations and barriers, to gender equality, gender equity and gender responsiveness.

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7 WMW 2020 Training Report included topics such as “On Di Road Together-A Sensitization Session to introduce the intersections of social issues which impact Access to Justice” for users of the justice system and for Justice Sector Workers, topics included Justice Foundations, People-SMART Approaches for Diverse Needs, Justice At Work: Potholes in Accessing Justice, Criteria for People-SMART Services, Data Matters! and What Does Good Justice Look Like?
Based on observation of and interviews with justice service users, there was a clear presence of gender power dynamics. This was as a result of citizens not knowing their basic human rights and the laws of the land. In Denham Town, males reported being powerless in terms of what the legal procedure was for detention under the special crime measures being implemented in that community. They were not aware of the intervention of a Justice of the Peace in the process as stipulated by the Law Reform (Zones of Special Operation ZOSO) - Special Security and Community Development Measures Act, 2017. According to Reports by Jamaica’s Public Defender, as at January 2021, 1406 persons were detained in ZOSO areas, of which 582 came from Mount Salem; 722 from Denham Town and 102 from August Town. Unfortunately, this data is not sex disaggregated.

Two Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were conducted with males aged sixteen and older in Denham Town. All participants had been detained at least once for more than 24 hours and stated that due process was not followed. Four shared that they were detained for up to 72 hours and then released. They lost their income and their dignity because of the abuse of power by the security forces and absence of protection by the justice sector. The ZOSO Act gives great importance to JPs but reportedly they are not a part of the intervention in this community when persons are detained.

Based on observation on January 22, 2021 of the Mobile Justice Unit visiting Denham Town, thirty-eight persons accessed the services; 30 needed to see the lawyer. The majority (21) of the persons sought help with expungement. The expungement process can be lengthy for a number of reasons. Once an individual is imprisoned for at least 2 years, there is an additional five (5) year wait to apply for an expungement. If a person is imprisoned for 5 years or more, then there is a 10 year wait before an application for expungement can be made. This further exacerbated the barriers for males from this community to obtaining legitimate means of earning an income, since often a police record is required. Some respondents explained how they were exploited when they tried to pay illicitly to expedite their expungement case. This presented a

"Mi live a Jamaica and don’t even know the laws and mi rights, everything seem like a big secret... Jamaica need fi inform di youth dem ‘bout justice”

FIGURE 1: Reason to seek aid from the Mobile Justice Unit.

21 of 30 persons seek help for expungement in 1 day - Mobile Justice Unit - Denham Town

8 Section 16 - Arrest or Detention, Part 2a “where a person is arrested or detained under this act, that person shall forthwith be taken before a Justice of the Peace who shall determine whether or not there is reasonable grounds for the arrest or detention. Part 3a “If a JP is satisfied that the arrest or detention of any person is reasonably required in the interest of justice he may, having regard to such further investigation as may be necessary, order that a) the person shall be remanded in custody for a period not exceeding twenty-four hours, (b) at the expiration of the period of twenty-four hours, the person shall be taken before a Judge of a Parish Court."
direct link with justice and the security sector. One young male expressed that he knows more about foreign “USA”, than Jamaican justice system because of the media. He said it felt like the laws are a big secret in Jamaica.

In St. Mary, there was a shift in the gender power dynamics where the women were severely impacted. Intimate partner violence and family violence due to land disputes are prevalent in this parish and women are mainly the victims. Based on observation of the eighteen (18) cases brought to the Mobile Justice Unit on January 28, 2021, 9 of these were land related while 6 were divorce/family violence related. A FGD was conducted at the St. Mary Parish Court with 5 women who all were involved in cases of intimate partner and/or family violence. They shared the frustration with the processes in the court system. Users lose time and income and they argued that it cost even more to seek justice through the court system. All this increased their vulnerability. (see Report 3. Case Studies)

Some of these cases could be addressed at the community level through the intervention of JPs. Notably, the JPs use a logbook to document cases but it is not evident that it improves solutions in the justice sector or in alternate dispute resolution (ADR). If the book was being used to collect data, then it would inform how resources are allocated. While JPs in St. Mary need capacity to address family and intimate partner violence, those in Denham Town need more capacity to address detention and expungement.

The JUST program developed some culturally relevant communication materials through the Court Administration Division (CAD). An analysis of the adverts indicated that while informative, they had the potential of reinforcing the gender stereotypes of males of a particular demography as perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). While more men are in conflict with the law according to the statistics, the advert on Protection Order depicts an image of an abusive male adorned in large jewelry, tattoo, and pants below the waist as the perpetrator. This image typically represents males from the lower socio-economic communities. Stereotypical imagery is problematic because intimate partner violence cuts across class, age and race. Additionally, there was a missed opportunity for the JUST to bring to the fore female perpetrators of IPV. Irrespective of the data, which show that females are the primary victims of IPV, there are also men who are being abused and continue to suffer in silence due to the same stereotype that depicts males as the aggressors. Males who report these cases of women as the perpetrators are oftentimes ridicule by law enforcement officers. An advert could help to change the narrative. Similarly, men are not the only perpetrators of child sexual abuse, but there is a general acceptance of early sex for boys as opposed to girls. This was a missed opportunity to reinforce gender equality that exist in our laws.

While there was some success in the gender results on the JUST program, it would be prudent to bring a Gender Expert from early on to examine the gender dynamics through a gender analysis. Not having a gender expert on board, there were several missed opportunities.

Effectiveness of the Development Intervention

OECD/DAC defines effectiveness as the extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups. DAC further explains
that in addition to considering ‘results’ and ‘differential results,’ interventions influenced across different groups count as well.

**TABLE 2: Percentages of achievement of outcome and output targets of the JUST program.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Targets Planned</th>
<th>Number of Targets Achieved&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ultimate Outcome</strong></td>
<td>1 Outcome with 4 indicators</td>
<td>The GAC Monitor considers two indicators not measurable. The other two indicators have not been met (0%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>2 Outcomes with 8 indicators</td>
<td>The GAC Monitor considers one indicator not measurable. Of the 7 indicators left, 3 were met and 1 partially (all in the institutional component; the indicators for social order have not been met as yet) (50% met).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immediate Outcomes</strong></td>
<td>4 Outcomes with 24 indicators</td>
<td>The GAC Monitor considers two indicators not measurable. Of the 22 indicators left, 13 were met, 2 partially and 7 were not met. (64% met).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
<td>74 outputs with 85 indicators and 140 targets.</td>
<td>126 targets achieved, 14 not achieved (90% met).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Annex 3 (Report 4.) for details.

At first, the JUST Program was intended to be implemented as a Technical Legal Assistance project, coordinated by the Department of Justice Canada. In 2011 the project was restructured to focus on two major components: Institutional Strengthening and Social Order. Technical assistance activities would benefit the Institutional Strengthening component. Institutional strengthening took off in 2012, but due to various reasons, the social order component was only started in 2018-2019. At that time, the Canadian technical assistance had mostly come to an end.

Over its long period of implementation (9 years for the institutional and 2 years for the social order component), the JUST Program has produced a number of outputs, outcomes and key achievements which contribute to its impact. Overall, the program has reached a high level of effectiveness. **Table 2,** which is based on the detailed Annex 3 (Report 4.), shows that at the time of writing, 90% of the 140 targets listed under the 74 outputs have been produced (and several were far exceeded). With regard to the outcomes, 64% of the immediate outcome indicator targets were met and 50% of the intermediate outcome indicators. <sup>10</sup>The project has been contributing to the ultimate outcome, which may be achieved beyond the project.

The following section lists 11 key achievements of the JUST program.

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<sup>9</sup> Partial achievement is counted as 50%.

<sup>10</sup> These are provisional figures. Due to delays occasioned by COVID-19, the Final Report of the JUST Program is now expected to be done in early 2021, which may change the figures.
Key achievement 1: The JUST program was truly a catalyst for the reform of the entire justice system.

SUCCESS FACTORS: Due to the specific Canadian approach of building trust, exercising flexibility and the long period of implementation, the JUST program was the basis of a major transformation of the justice sector. The processes initiated by the JUST program distinctly catalyzed the reform agenda implemented by the MOJ. Interventions of the JUST Program contributed to MOJ’s increased capacity to develop policy papers, which were submitted to Cabinet. MOJ, ODPP, the courts and civil society participated in the collaborative and inclusive design of the initiatives of the JUST program. Many differences of opinion were brought forward and adjustments between all stakeholders were made. There was a genuine effort to learn and to make justice reform happen as technical expertise was taken respectfully as co-creators without the transference of Canada. Respondents spoke of the highly respected indigenous knowledge and expertise, which was incorporated into all interventions.

FIGURE 2: Theory of Change for the JUST Program.

The interventions can be brought together into five groups, as described in the Theory of Change (ToC) for the JUST Program. The full ToC is described in Annex 6 (Report 4. Reference Annexes); its diagram is depicted in Figure 2. Outputs in the areas of planning, research and analysis, and MIS and M&E across the different entities in the justice sector, are the basis for the change sought. These outputs feed into the generation of training activities and the production of manuals, as well as the enhanced knowledge
management and customer service. Essential to the success of the program was the creation of the Justice Reform Implementing Unit (JRIU), a coordination and monitoring unit part of MOJ, funded by GAC.

After a false start\textsuperscript{11}, the program was substantially re-designed through extensive consultation with all stakeholders, allowing for cohesiveness in coordination between the GOJ and DOJ. In 2011, the revised Program Implementation Plan (PIP), inclusive of a collaborative risk management/mitigation strategy, was submitted to the Project Steering Committee (PSC) for adoption. Subsequently, implementation started in 2012, with a focus on the institutional strengthening component. UNDP was contracted to carry out procurement and provide quality assurance.

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: Initially the processes were unstructured: Justice Canada provided Technical Assistance to the GOJ; however, GOJ’s institutions suffered from Implementation inertia and weak absorptive capacity reflecting human resource gaps, work overload, low paid staff, over-stretched technical staff, high staff attrition, and archaic processes. Respondents remarked that the GOJ had a culture of planning but not a culture of implementation. These institutions needed resources to assist in streamlining work between and within institutions. The JUST program initially was not designed to impact these issues.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: Although the National Policy on Gender Equality (NPGE) spoke of justice transformation, it was not fully taken up in the re-design and implementation of the JUST program. The JUST program was informed by and reflective of Jamaican and Canadian gender policies but relevant activities were eventually cancelled due to lack of uptake by the GOJ. In the later years of the program, the Social Order component was used to more fully express a gender component to justice analysis and transformation.

Key achievement 2: The JUST program helped the justice sector to recognize the importance of Results-based Management (RBM) and enabled the preparation of a costed outcome-based plan, owned by justice MDAs.

SUCCESS FACTORS: The redesign of the JUST program and its subsequent implementation helped the various entities in the justice sector to get oriented to RBM. The focus on costing outputs demonstrated clear benefits (and outcomes were costed by bringing output costs together). The JUST Program facilitated the production of an overarching strategy and broad implementation framework for the justice sector that would respond to the problems which were identified in its initial phase. MOJ coordinated the production of the Justice Reform Implementation Plan 2015-2020 (JRIP), which provided the framework for JUST and other donors to contribute to justice reform results. The clarification of potential roles of donors helped structure MOJ’s partnerships and coordination mechanisms, in particular for effective institutional strengthening.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: Although a gender expert was costed, the MOJ did not follow through on the recruitment. With such strong focus on gender responsive plus throughout the JUST program, it was very unfortunate that a gender expert was not employed to lead this process over JUST duration. The rejection of a gender expert by the leadership of the MOJ was a direct correlation to the

\textsuperscript{11} The JUST program should have started in 2009 as a four-year purely Technical Assistance effort by DOJ. However, due to regulations preventing DOJ to make procurements in Jamaica, the start was delayed.
wider problematic socio-cultural norm of Jamaica that trivializes gender and intersectionality. Had the gender expert on-boarded, this person could have guided the gender in the RBM process for the justice sector, increasing the likelihood of gender-sensitive indicators being developed in the PMF and tracked to determine if the gender results were being achieved and what corrective measures could be implemented, if needed.

**Key achievement 3: A sector-wide M&E framework was prepared, including a Citizen Scorecard.**

**SUCCESS FACTORS:** When JRIU was established, M&E was meant to be one of its central functions, in addition to business process reviewing and developing costed plans for any approved recommendation. JRIU would take new goals and initiatives, fit them as actionable items into MOJ budgets and measure progress against MOJ performance standards (e.g. corporate plans). A Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) was initialized early during implementation of the JUST program. It was finalized in 2019 by the GAC Monitor.

JUST was the most important *conceptualizer of justice reform*. Earlier, Canada supported the JJRTF which resulting document was turned into a 5-year plan. JRIP, was a clear strategic planning framework, owned by the GOJ, which used the JUST program indicators and results. A sector-wide Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) was developed for that plan in 2017. The PAF of JRIP was indirectly related to the PMF of the JUST program. The Citizen scorecard was developed by JRIU to gather data on what citizens think of the justice system. This concrete tool continues to be particularly beneficial in enabling the judiciary to be guided by data in the reflection of its customers/users.

**LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS:** JRIU was generally understaffed and initially did not have a M&E expert. The M&E functionality appeared to have been sidelined. Procurement processes took much time whilst not all activities approved for financing by the MOJ were part of the adopted work plan. In the final years, funds were limited and the JRIU, therefore, had to undertake activities of the PMF in the least expensive way within the limited timeframe prior to closure of the project. The MOJ did not have sufficient research capabilities and was dependent on crime surveys such as LAPOP which did not measure progress of the actual activities in the JUST program.

The indicators in the PMF were beneficiary (department) oriented output indicators. The first 2010 baseline became irrelevant because the sector wasn't measuring its progress. The JUST program 2016 Operational Assessment was prepared following a particular RBM philosophy that Canada was using: outcomes were seen as an amalgamation of outputs. Impact was not measured, only the accumulation of outputs.

**GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS:** The Citizen Scorecard presented a detailed approach to access to and administration of justice in Jamaica. The gender responsive plus was mainstreamed and highlighted some of the socio-cultural nuances in the justice sector. A sector-wide M&E framework was prepared but did not reflect a gender baseline. There was no structured guide available to the JUST program on how to approach, implement and measure gender responsive plus. Resistance to gender by the leadership and the lack of technical support to advocate for gender representation in the M&E framework prevented the measurement of progress regarding this dimension. Additionally, there was no local example of a justice sector wide M&E framework that mainstreamed gender to which the JUST could model. Further, there was no evidence that local resources were tapped into such as IGDS and BGA.
Key achievement 4: The entire justice sector benefited from the extensive investment in ICT Infrastructure and technology, which was an essential component of modernizing the justice system.

SUCCESS FACTORS: The justice sector received significant input of computer and ICT equipment. This enabled the implementation of the courts’ statistics and case management programs and facilitated the modernization of key processes in the different branches of the Ministry. Many computers provided were deployed for data entry, administrative and customer service, court administration, etc. Other examples of this ongoing activity include the possibility for audiovisual connections to the courts, the scanning and digitizing of paper documents (establishing digital archives), the use of CISS and LPMS, as well as monitoring data on each manager’s desktop.

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: Although much equipment was provided by the JUST Program, the supporting structures have not always been established and will have to be strengthened over coming years.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: The justice sector commenced sex disaggregation of data under the JUST program. This provided an enabling environment for the sector to conduct basic gender analysis of data in the courts and other units within the justice sector.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Key achievement 5: The JUST program enabled the fundamental restructuring of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and provided long-term support to its institutional strengthening.

SUCCESS FACTORS: The reframing of the MOJ structure was reported to be one of the best achievements of the project. At the start of the JUST program, the organizational structure of MOJ did not serve its functions well. Based on an organizational review, JRIU developed a corporate profile of the MOJ, an organizational structure with unit descriptions, job descriptions, core competency standards, as well as a stepped plan to transform the Ministry for its stated role. In 2015, the MOJ was able to finalize its new structure and submit it to the Ministry of Finance and Public Service (MOFPS) for approval, which was given in February 2016. At the same time, the MOJ became much leaner and effective because the majority of staff moved from the former CMS (managed by the Ministry) to the new Court Administrative Division (CAD), which was brought under the supervision of the Chief Justice. With the strengthening of the role of the courts, MOJ now only has responsibility for the court infrastructure.

Another important area of improvement was the establishment of the Justice Policy and Governance Division within MOJ. Many of the policies that the ministry developed were in essence security policies, rather than justice oriented ones. A MOJ policy arm was non-existent before, but through Canadian technical assistance, this was achieved. The impetus was provided by a study tour to Canada, organized by JUST in February 2018. During this 10-day tour, MOJ personnel viewed, among other things, the organization of DOJ's policy development areas. Through collaborative efforts with DOJ, the tour also produced a policy manual for MOJ which became the reference manual for training new staff. The number of legal officers within the MOJ has greatly expanded compared to 10 years ago due to the reform process.

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: With the design of the new structure, it took effort to get buy in from the MOFPS. Altogether, although there were long delays, all elements related to the strengthening of MOJ were eventually achieved.
Key achievement 6: Communication and visibility of the justice sector and the MOJ in particular, was hugely enhanced.

SUCCESS FACTORS: In order to benefit the MOJ, the JRIU included a communication specialist and budget. A communication plan was developed by JRIU and shared with the MOJ Public Relations (PR) Unit. It was tested within various PR units throughout the sector. The plan has been very effective and has helped to increase MOJ’s visibility. The EU, National Integrity Action (NIA) and various other donors supported parts of the plan. Under the JUST program, in particular under the social order component, many pamphlets, posters (published in print media), and radio air time were produced. The visibility of MOJ is a priority for the current Minister and he aims to increase it further. The Ministry is now active on social media and organizes town hall sessions on topics such as Restorative Justice, Child diversion, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) etc. Data are being produced and shared on various issues (child diversion, expungement applications, marriage licenses issued, in short many areas that can be quantified).

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: It was reported that some senior staff do not make themselves easily available for media interviews, communication and visibility events. Units should strategize and decide how to apply the communication plan. Explicit TORs should be provided to contractors developing material to ensure clarity on output and reduce production time.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: PanMedia produced useful infographics and motion graphics which promoted a number of culturally relevant gender issues. The infographics were produced using feedback from stakeholders, through focus groups or comments on prior results. Materials included posters, braille, print, mobile applications, websites, smart board/computer kiosk, etc. Gender issues that were represented include how to get a divorce, child sexual abuse, intimate partner violence (IPV), and child physical abuse and where to contact for help. Of note, the contact number was tried for three days at various times of the day and did not answer. This raised the question of accessibility of information for men, women and children.

Key achievement 7: Through the sector coordination activities convened by the MOJ with the JRIU acting as the secretariat, the partnerships between MOJ and the International Development Partners (IDP) were better structured to achieve maximum coordinated support to Jamaica’s efforts.

SUCCESS FACTORS: The establishment of the JRIU provided a platform for IDP coordination and integration. At times, the JRIU was the primary coordination, implementation and reporting entity for several projects other than the JUST Program. Through the JUST program, donors could see clearly how to contribute to solving a problem. Earlier, donors were e.g. providing computer equipment, but not providing the systems. As explained in the coherence section before, the cohesiveness between GOJ and DOJ after the redesign of the program played a key role. The PSC and donor coordination meetings were important tools for coordination.

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: Procurement and financial accountability were very time-consuming processes. UNDP did much of the procurement, but within MOJ it generally was done internally by JRIU and the unit did not have a procurement officer for a substantial part of the program. As such, much project time was taken up by planning and reporting. The JUST program staff had to report to GAC, UNDP and GOJ in three currencies and different fiscal years.
DOJ did not have the legal capacity to contract implementing agencies in the country. Therefore, another institution had to be involved; in this case UNDP. Its engagement increased the reporting load of the JRIU and slowed down implementation processes.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: Development agencies shifted their focus from women’s empowerment to gender equality and gender responsiveness. This shift was not always well communicated by the JRIU to the justice sector professionals. Canada’s Gender Equality policy aims to – 1) advance women’s equal participation with men as decision makers in shaping the sustainable development of their societies; 2) support women and girls in the realization of their full human rights; and 3) reduce gender inequalities in access to and control over the resources and benefits of development. This needed special focus in the project management team, along with a gender advocate within the MOJ.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (ODPP)

Key achievement 8: A standardized knowledge-based Prosecutor’s Manual and Code of Conduct were produced and are well-used by prosecutors, clerks of court and other legal professionals.

SUCCESS FACTORS: A Prosecutor’s Manual, including Disclosure Protocol and Code of Professional Conduct, was completed in 2015. It helped to enhance performance of personnel of the ODPP. The Code of Conduct, outlining the rules arising from a prosecutor’s responsibility as a civil servant and a member of the bar, as well as other ethical considerations particular to the prosecutor, were included as first chapter in Prosecutor’s Manual for Jamaica.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: All documents developed by the technical legal assistance were gender-neutral. Accessibility guidelines were prepared. Intersectionality was not used much in Jamaica before 2017, but now it is mainstreamed in the development programs: more than one type of disability or realization that PWD may have other factors in life which create problems. Disabled women have multiple issues, such as race, LGBTQ, socio-economic conditions. During the witness care conference, presentations were made regarding International good practices in respect to care for witnesses (especially in sexual assault cases).

JUDICIAL BRANCH (THE COURTS)

Key achievement 9: Court Case Management Reforms, including the introduction of Judicial Case Management Rules, a Case Information Statistics System and Case Progression Officers, were successfully developed and piloted in the Jamaica Court System, enabling the re-engineering of business processes.

SUCCESS FACTORS: Criminal case management rules for Supreme Court and Parish Courts were revised and developed under the JUST and later piloted in the Half-Way Tree (HWT) Parish Court. Drafting the rules was a long process: participatory consultations with prosecution, defense bar and courts took place in order to ensure that they were acceptable to all parties and would work well in the Jamaican courts. These rules were developed further, but (by end 2017) funds were low so the process is yet to be finalized. The extremely high adjournment rate of cases was the chief problem addressed by these rules. In other words, the hearing certainty rate was very low (20-30%); lawyers couldn’t determine definitively whether their hearing was going ahead on a given date.
In 2013, the case load was unknown (estimated between 4,000 and 400,000). The Case Information and Statistical System (CISS), (see Report 3 Case study), made the data available and it was realized that a whole range of inter-connected areas had to become more effective. The criminal case management rules, therefore, improved hearing date certainty and reduced the number of unnecessary adjournments (such an adjournment is one that takes place when no substantive action has been put on file).

In addition to the hearing certainty rate, the case clearance rate was only 80% (with every 100 new proceedings, only 80 were disposed of); the backlog was going up all the time. The clearance rate was improved through implementing the criminal case management rules. Through CISS, areas are identified that need attention: it would be advantageous to efficiency to create a specialized sexual offenses court, because data have clarified that sexual offences are taking a huge amount of time in all the courts.12

The introduction of Case Progression Officers (CPO) has fundamentally improved the efficiency of the court proceedings, significantly reducing adjournments. Six Case progression officer posts were funded by JUST (these posts didn't exist prior to JUST but are vital to assist the court in the judicial case management of the proceedings). By 2017 there were 17 such officers in the parish courts and supreme court paid through CAD with supporting Job description and training manual (see Report 3. Case Studies).

LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: The criminal case management rules, as well as the CPOs, were more successfully introduced in the Parish Courts than in the Supreme Court. Respondents explained that lower level courts are more open to change, as higher level courts generally are more formalized.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: The documents prepared were gender neutral. Gender assessment/analysis on the justice sector was done in 2013/2014 but was not used to inform any gender responsive work. Gender sensitivity issues were one area in which the public identified that court personnel should be more sensitized in, in order to better serve the public. Some gender training was conducted by the JURIST project, the Caribbean Court of Justice and the IMPACT Project. Sex disaggregated data is being collected by the courts.

Notably, most court buildings are older, with not much provisions for children or persons with disabilities. The Disabilities Act (still in its infancy stage) will carry some requirements, which would impact on purpose-built facilities. Child Protection and Family Services Agency (CPFSA) officers are present in the courts from a social work perspective, to help with court procedures. CPFSA has set up a multi-agency collaboration and posted two officers at the Centre for Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA) so that children won’t have to be interviewed twice and doctors are also on-call.

DRAFTING, LAW REFORM & LEGISLATIVE POLICY

Key achievement 10: Drafting and law reform were significantly improved by the JUST program, through introduction of new management systems within the OPC, the enhanced professional development training provided to drafters and legal officers, as well as the production of manuals and electronic systems.

SUCCESS FACTORS: Enhanced and comprehensive training was provided, including the attendance of officers at overseas conferences, resulting in network linkages, opportunities to make presentations and

12 This was done in Antigua and Barbuda, supported by the JURIST project.
international exposure. Respondents also agreed that it acted as a major motivator for the staff. Several officers of the Legal Research Department (LRD) attended a Conference of the International Society for Reform of Criminal Law in Canada. They presented a paper there and one officer is now on the Board of this Society. This promotes the sharing of understanding of what has worked and what has not.

Guidance documents were produced by the Canadian Bar Association and by local consultants, including a guide for legislative drafting. The experts within OPC, though overwhelmed, were anxious about external officers drafting, because they feared it would not be up to their standards and protocols, and OPC staff would have to redo it. The review was a long process, since many views had to be included. However, between all the lawyers in Canada and Jamaica, there was lots of respect and alignment.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: The Drafting Manual and Legislative Policy Manual identified gender based analysis parameters for research and makes reference to gender responsive legislative development.

PEOPLE CENTERED JUSTICE

Key achievement 11: The launch of the Social Order component has brought a host of people-centered benefits to the justice system, through the targeted engagement of civil society in communications, public education and multi-agency partnerships. (see also Report 3. Case studies)

SUCCESS FACTORS: The social order component started implementation during the latter part of 2019, less than 18 months prior to the official completion of the JUST program. Despite this late start, there are already some major achievements, e.g. the provision of justice information to citizens through artificial intelligence (AI) online (even though not fully operational). This AI utility is known as Stacey and possesses the capabilities to answer questions about citizens’ rights and other justice service needs, once questions and possible responses are programmed. This particular output has increased citizens’ access to justice information at their convenience.

A legal education manual was developed for citizens and published, providing access to information on how the justice system works for them. Also, a structured training manual now exists for JPs, focused on gender responsiveness. Policy Papers were also produced; these have been well researched, are comprehensive and have proven to be a very useful resource for CSO’s advocacy.

Moreover, a total of four hundred and forty (440) citizens from across all fourteen parishes participated in Social Context sensitization and gender-responsiveness sessions about the justice system and how it should work for the people. Participants represented diverse groups, including, justice-sector stakeholders/CSOs; Women’s rights organizations; Community groups; High school/Tertiary students (youth), Police cadet instructors; and Centre for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse (CISOCA).

The Jamaica Bar Association (JBA) has benefited with infrastructure support, as well as ICT resources. The Canadian Bar Association assisted the JBA to develop their virtual training capabilities, particularly aimed at its members. Of note is that member education may relate to the people-centered justice as well as court issues. Much debate took place around criminal case management, as are mediation, notification, virtualization of court process, protocols, e-filing, etc.
LIMITATIONS/BARRIERS: The fact that the social order component started only in 2018-19 resulted in major difficulties to generate enough depth of the activities and diminished its potential reach and impact. At the community level, youths that were interviewed and those most affected by the inequalities in the justice system, alluded to the fact that the law and the rights of the people is in a language they do not understand. The JUST program under the Social Order Component started a public education campaign at the end of the program, however, timing is important in getting the message across to the most vulnerable.

GENDER ANALYSIS/GENDER RESPONSIVENESS: The Social Order component was the element of the JUST program to consider and discuss intrinsic bias and inequalities that are pervasive in the society. The extensive reach of the gender sensitization training and workshops across the island is commendable, however, it seemed rushed. Due to the timeframe in which this important work was executed, there was not sufficient room for follow up sessions for reinforcement and providing benefits to more agencies beyond the JTI. Based on the interviews conducted, the gender training enables person to identify gender biases and understand concepts in gender. However, most individuals (including JPs) were not able to transfer the knowledge to their daily functions.

LIKELIHOOD OF SUSTAINABILITY OF KEY PROGRAM RESULTS

The JUST program has made significant inroads into the ongoing modernization of Jamaica’s Justice system with evidence suggesting strong possibilities of its Technical Legal Assistance and Institutional procedures being sustained. Sustainability in this review means the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to be continued. Given the broad range of activities and project duration; project documents and primary data from JUST beneficiary agencies were examined to explain varying levels of sustainability. Documents examined include but not limited to the Performance Management Framework (PMF); Just sustainability Report Card, Annual reports and the GAC Project Monitor’s final report.

An analysis of the PMF revealed that a participatory iterative process was used with a reliance on consistent analysis of the project’s environment in its development and implementation. Despite the many assessments and iterations of the PMF from 2011, its ultimate outcome linked to CIDA’s revised Caribbean Regional Program to reflect a new immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcome between 2011-14; there were challenges surrounding its application. Primarily, the PMF was not being used to track

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results; many beneficiaries did not have the required baseline data to track its indicators; was unaware of
the need to track PMF indicators; indicators were perceived as institutionally irrelevant or specific and
there was unfamiliarity with its RBM mechanism process in the MOJ. There was also disconnect between
reported outputs and JUST planned outcomes and between the PIP’s log-frame and what was being
implemented. Phillip Rawkin’s mid-term operational review (2016) concluded that whilst the overall
project objectives remained sound and relevant the indicators were not rigorously selected and could not
achieve its outcomes. Causes of these issues, revolved around a weak governance structure which created
confusion as to who should be monitoring results at the outcome level in the absence of the required
baseline data. Secondly, the absence of M&E specialist in the JRIU; an M&E Specialist became employed
January 2017- May 29, 2020 and GAC’s Project Monitor from July 2017- March 2020. There was therefore
a lack of clear monitoring and evaluation to track desired or expected changes; and the varying levels of
preparation for the intervention affected outcome in the first and second phase of the project.

These issues reflected a vacuum in the overall directives and coordination of JUST in the first and second
phase of the project as partners concentrated on their components in silos, resulting in ‘mission creep’ as
the JUST became used as a large fund rather than an integrated cohesive programme\(^{14}\). Project
beneficiaries maintained that what became the norm was request to JUST for project funds outside of
JUST’s boundaries to complete sets of parallel activities rather than sets of strategic outputs aimed at
achievement of the ultimate outcome. Resolution was found at the June 21, 2016 Project Steering
Committee (PSC) where the decision to update the PMF was made. From July 2017 – June 2019 a
participatory process involving the main partners, UNDP, JRIU, Justice Canada and beneficiaries was
mobilized to modify the PMF in an evolving participating process.

JUST M&E Officer and GAC’s Project Monitor reported that this participatory process first concentrated
on the immediate outcome increased capacity of Justice sector entities to manage and implement their
core function. This enabled the orientation of beneficiaries to RBM and the logic model; beneficiaries to
operationalize their institution’s activities to relatable indicators that would institutionalize revised outputs; thereby improving efficiency and effectiveness in institution’s performance.

Beneficiaries further iteratively validated changes in indicator outputs and measurements to reflect advances in Justice reform and adjusted to the remaining time in the implementation of JUST. The JUST 2014 immediate Outcomes remained and was supported with data such as court statistics, the citizen scorecard to strengthen outputs and the Performance Management Appraisal System (PMAS) frameworks. The culmination of these activities and inputs enabled outputs

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Holistic Work Processes: Beneficiaries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Work processes are linked to strategic plans with measurable KPI’s and appraisal systems;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Processes have built in objectivity with proven efficiencies and effectiveness that have become normalized;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Use of data for decision making has become engrained in work processes and is now an acceptable way of carrying out daily processes;</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Procedure manuals and protocols are used as reference points; can be updated; tools are there for new persons to come in and continue the work; knowledge transfer is enabled; knowledge processes are not lost;</td>
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<td>5. The sector now has a broad skill base</td>
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\(^{14}\) PSC Minutes: June 21, 2016
to contribute to the institutionalization of the immediate outcomes.

PMF Outputs, such as the sector wide monitoring and evaluation framework, were co-created over two years which produced strategic plans, performance measurements and appraisal systems to key beneficiary agencies. These strategic plans were not only reflected in JUST PMF but became translatable to GOJ’s performance management systems thereby assuring continued reference and sustainability after JUST’s PMF.

GAC’s Annual Report (p.25 2019-20) noted that „Just initiatives that involved needs assessment, an approved strategic document (a strategy, plan, rules) and multi-faceted capacity building (training, mentoring, reference manual, etc.) followed by periods of application and refinement have the highest degree of sustainability. Outputs that were “one-off” products didn’t always complement other outputs to advance toward an outcome. Sustainability however has a myriad of variables. The JUST draft Sustainability Report Card (JSRC) aimed at assessing the overall sustainability of key outputs used institutionalization or the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability

16 PMF Presentation: PSC June 2019: Change to Immediate Outcome 1 Indicator: For all institutional beneficiaries (Courts, ODPP, MOJ, LRD and OPC) Number of justice sector entities with gender responsive plans and systems including strategic/business/corporate plans was replaced for the ODPP to frequency of Crown Counsel’s (disaggregated by sex, age and years of service) use of the prosecution manual (for research, for oral advocacy) also % of defence counsel who agree Crown Counsel make timely disclosure

as its benchmark for sustainability using the extent to which dimensions of institutional ownership, technical knowledge; organizational reform and financial resources has taken root. This is demonstrated in Table 5 below.

An analysis of JSRC revealed a strong correlation between those initiatives reflecting promising sustainability and those products completed by March 2018. Specifically in the Technical Legal Assistance Component; the immediate outcome of increased capacity of the Justice Sector Entities to Manage and Implement their core business; and intermediate outcome .. A more efficient, transparent and gender responsive functioning of the justice system in Jamaica and sustainability reflected good achievement outcomes. There were a number of intervening variables that impacted achievement and sustainability, chief amongst them the implementing modality (the DOJ under the supervision of successive Chief Justices implemented the Technical Legal Assistance Component and Court related activities); the shifting focus of the PMF completed in 2014 and reshaped from 2017 June 2019 causing changes in some product outputs16. Some outputs were not completed or removed. Some indicators required baseline data and

Inclusive Enabling Technical Assistance: Beneficiaries

1. Jamaica was co-creators of the achievements in an inclusive empowering partnership;
2. We were co-creators of the JUST products; our expertise ensured that the products are culturally specific and fit for Jamaican purpose;
3. The ground work was given acceptance and recognized informal reports;
4. Investment in people as a major resource;
5. There are training institutions equipped to upgrade the sector.
6. Ownership of the products is apparent;
7. The project’s win is the people’s win... the people have invested their effort into something successful.
were replaced by indicators more relevant to the mandate of the institution; other indicators were replaced to ensure accurate measurement of outcome statements; some removed for more effective use of resources; or to deepen on going activities.

The Technical Legal Assistance Component was completed by March 2018 leaving the Institutional Component to be implemented through the JRIU. Some 76 technical reports and products supporting implementation outputs in the MOJ (15); Prosecution Services (13); Judiciary and the Courts (33); drafting and Law reform (5) and legislative Reform (3)\(^\text{17}\) were completed. These knowledge documents strengthened product outputs; supported training; maintenance of consistent standards and heighten possibilities for product sustainability.

Among the products detailed as having high possibility for sustainability in the JSRC; GAC’s and JUST annual report for 2018/19 were institutional procedures; the practices in the criminal justice system and to a lesser extent the people oriented initiatives. For example, in the MOJ the completion of the corporate profile and accompanying 30 new positions within a new justice Policy and Governance Division. This division relieved the Legal Reform department (LRD) from carrying out justice policy work to concentrate on related law reform. Similarly, the strengthening of the LRD came through a strategic review which assessed its resources, governance and processes and made recommendations for improvement to operations and organizational arrangements. Important also was

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### Beneficiaries: People Centered Initiatives

- Witness Conferences started the conversation it raised consciousness; gave a voice to practitioners and the speechless; enabled multi-stakeholder co-ordination, opened space for wider participation; created inter linkages; allowed for alignment of positions; enabled a harmonized and coordinated approach; facilitated knowledge exchange and transfer; and a blue print for moving forward;
- Knowledge evolved from the conference;
- People centered justice reform brought awareness and exposure to international best practice to the forefront.

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### Beneficiaries’ Enabling Organizational Culture

1. JUST has transformed how Justice Partners do business and interact (behavioural change);
2. All Partners have a single vision with aligned processes and strategy to enable achievement;
3. Single vision for the Justice sector with a chief advocate and supporting expertise;
4. There is the strong will of the beneficiaries to achieve and a set of champions determined to bring the vision to reality;
5. MOJ was equipped with the skill set to drive the modernization process and now has the capacity to do so;
6. There is an Institutional framework to sustain program existence;
7. Changing mindset; a new culture of successful implementation and a willingness to change;
8. MOJ’s has an adaptive culture;
9. There is internal and external co-ordination;
10. Knowledge transfer has become automatic in the organization’s operations and culture.

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\(^\text{17}\) DOJ (Annex 2) Final Report Revised 2018
the automated drafting templates; workflow management systems and knowledge management.

With regard to the judiciary and the courts technical assistance was given in the development of the governance structure for the GOJ’s Court Management Services Division (CMS) created in 2008 by the GOJ; Review of the Court Structure; Case flow implementation plan to improve case flow management; backlog inventory through the production of inventory tracking sheet which later morphed into the Case Inventory Statistical System (CISS) supported by case flow and statistics training (70 court staff trained) and training for 16 Court Progression Officers. (see Report 3, case studies.).

The ODPP was also strengthened through the development of the Human Resource Development Management Framework (HRDM) completed in 2016 which served to optimize the organizational structure and functions of the ODPP; supported by the Code of Conduct and Prosecutor’s Manual which set standards for decision making. Some 30 Prosecutors were also trained on the HRDM policies. These products were completed with adequate time for institutionalization thereby reflecting high achievement of JUST’s immediate and Intermediate Outcomes.

### TABLE 3. Beneficiaries Explanation for JUST levels of sustainability

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood of high sustainability</th>
<th>Likelihood of low to medium sustainability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Experienced strong support from internal and external beneficiaries</td>
<td>1. Unsecured funding resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Institutionalized through finance and other resources from MOJ</td>
<td>2. Outside of JUST implementation schedule</td>
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<td>3. Institutionalized leadership available</td>
<td>3. Had limited capacity development</td>
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<td>4. Has technical skills aligned to work processes</td>
<td>4. Need adjusted staff functions</td>
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<td>5. Documented proof of efficiency and effectiveness</td>
<td>5. Need assigned human resource to optimize use e.g buses</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Have experienced the full cycle of policy development</td>
<td>6. Need inclusion in GOJ’s operational plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Created new positions to optimize usage</td>
<td>7. Multiple agency responsibility</td>
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</table>

The people centered justice initiatives came later under the Social Order Component (2018/19) and was implemented through the UNDP as a new Director was not recruited at the JRIU, reducing its coordination and monitoring capacity to one program manager. These initiatives e.g. customer service; mobile justice information service; social context sensitization training; witness care services were delayed or negatively impacted by the need for institutional ownership; pending new laws or policy; need for models to be applied; training to be replicated; additional financial resources needed; procurement issues and COVID
19; preventing full implementation and efforts for institutionalization within the duration of the JUST program. As such weak to medium sustainability is expected. (see Report 3. Case Studies).

**Table 4: JUST Sustainability Report Card: Likelihood of sustainability of selected Key achievements.**

| Immediate Outcome 1: Increased Capacity of Justice Sector Entities to Manage and Implement their Core Business (High Likelihood of sustainability) |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Selected key achievements** | **Institutional ownership /products approved and distributed** | **Technical knowledge/evidence of new skills acquired** | **Organizational /positions filled** | **Financial support provided** |
| Justice Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Framework | • Court Strategic Plan developed | • Case Information and Statistical System (CISS) | • Job descriptions | Roles subsumed within Court Administrative Division (CAD) |
| Legal reform Department (LRD) | • Strategic and operational plans | • Appraisal Systems | • Case Progression Officers |  |
| Office of Parliament of Public Prosecution (ODPP) | • CPO Process Manual | • Key performance indicators | Statisticians |  |
| Parliamentary Council (PC) | • Training manuals | • Performance management frameworks | Data entry Clerks |  |
| • CISS deployed in Circuit Court, Family Courts, Tax Courts | • ICT resources | • New Job descriptions |  |
| | | • Core competencies | • Core competency standards used in recruitment of staff |
| | | • Policy Division | • New Job descriptions |
| | | • Policy Manuals | • Core competency standards used in recruitment of staff |
| | | • Performance standards | • Study Tour |
| New Organizational Structure and Corporate Profile of MOJ | • Workflow management processes | • Specialized legal Officers trained | • New Job descriptions | Positions subsumed by CAD |
| | • Knowledge management systems | • Process management system | Internal systems repairs |
| | • Training Manual | • ICT resources | carried out in house |
| | • Process Manuals | • Over 90 Policy Officers trained in the usage of the LPMS |  |
| | | • Expertise of CAD staff to design and implement |  |

| Legislative Production Management System (LPMS) | • Workflow management processes | • Specialized legal Officers trained | • New Job descriptions | Internal systems repairs |
| LRD, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (OPC), Attorney General Chambers | • Knowledge management systems | • Process management system | carried out in house |
| | • Training Manual | • ICT resources |  |
| | • Process Manuals | • Over 90 Policy Officers trained in the usage of the LPMS |  |
| | | • Expertise of CAD staff to design and implement |  |

| Intermediate Outcome 2: A more efficient, transparent and gender responsive functioning of the justice system in Jamaica (low – medium likelihood of sustainability) |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **People Centred-Justice** | • Mobile legal Aid | Mobile Legal Aid Clinics | Bus Driver Research Officer | MOJ |
| • Legal Aid Council | Data collection | 4 Lawyers |  |


Reasons given for high sustainability given by beneficiaries and JUST monitors stated that the key achievements were reflective of the institution’s needs and thinking; was embedded personally and across agencies in MOJ such as the corporate planning unit; the policy unit, Human Resource Development Unit and had placed skills in the sector that could be utilized daily to improve personal capacity. Importantly, the process of reframing the PMF allowed for personal and institutional ownership. Additionally, knowledge documents enable records management; ensured replication of processes, transference of knowledge and maintenance of institutional memory (see Table 3). Capacity was therefore developed at the personal, organization, institutional and policy level.

Using these JSRC dimensions and feedback from JUST beneficiaries a variety of reasons for JUST’s sustainability was also revealed. When JUST beneficiaries were asked: Do you think JUST products will be sustained if so ..Why? Their answers were consistently positive as they described the inclusive participatory approaches; enabling inclusive enabling technical assistance that contributed to developing both personal and organizational capacity whilst producing beneficial products; enabling holistic work processes and an enabling organizational culture equipped to manage justice reform moving forward (see pop boxes above).

5. LESSONS LEARNED, GOOD PRACTICES AND IMPLEMENTATION GAPS

LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned below intend to guide the development of future justice reform initiatives in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean.

Lessons derived from assumptions applied by JUST program partners

Lessons related to program design

1. Given the complexities of the initiatives, the activities have to be sequenced carefully to generate wide-scale benefits to a large constituency, and allow for a strong chance of sustainability.

The Social Order Component was a catalyst for people centered justice and if it would have been mainstreamed throughout the entire JUST Program, more synergy, integration of knowledge and early
policy changes would have occurred. This component enabled informal and formal access to justice through CSOs, JPs, justice service buses, thereby providing capacity development, advocacy and justice services to a wide cross section of marginalized groups and those most excluded. If users would have been included from inception through Social Context Training, more intersectionality issues would have been highlighted and the reform process would have been validated by a wider cross section of users. The people issues must be addressed in alignment with the technical and institutional components...it makes a difference to the impact. It allows the people to appreciate what is happening, walk with you and take ownership and buy in.

2. The embedding of the program implementation unit within a Ministry enables complementarity.
The location of the JRIU within the MOJ was important to project progress. It was uniquely positioned to fuse internal and external partners and strengthen MOJ capacity. Different departments could work together with ease on products such as the M&E and PMF plans. Beneficiaries of JUST maintained that it was not only the coordinating unit but a place where advocates could speak on behalf of the project... It was an anchor; an intermediary for all major justice reform players embedded in the MOJ. JRIU was the driver, facilitating the work within the organization. it was not an appendage because it was absorbed in the structure. Capacity existed in the MOJ to carry the reform

3. A complex management structure leads to inefficiencies in project coordination and sub-optimal governance outcomes.
Multiple layers of management create multiple layers of administration, reporting relationships/cycles and multiple work programs juxtaposed on one project. There must be synergy and complementarity that facilitates efficient reporting, serving effective management of resources and the achievement of successful project outcomes. The same holds for continuity of leadership support. The continuity of support from Chief Justices across political administrations for the program led to the mobilization of court administrators and supporting staff to work towards achievement of the vision for justice reform.

4. Wide-scale inclusive participatory processes engender trust, ownership/buy in and sustainability to development initiatives. Participation is an iterative process that takes time and therefore consideration has to be given to the project’s timeline.
JUST demonstrated that participation is most impactful when it is an iterative process that allows beneficiaries and users to have structured opportunities for providing input at different stages of the program. The participatory and inclusive processes used throughout JUST were crucial in gaining stakeholders perspective, and their voices were reflective in the PMF. There was a sense of ownership that enabled overriding of frictions, since it was not imposed but planned together. The quarterly reflection meetings allowed for operationalization of JUST, centralized stakeholder involvement and retained partnership and continual communication between stakeholders. Inclusivity allowed stakeholders to gain understanding of what they do and what they can do together....
5. **Capacity development should be the catalyst undergirding project implementation so that those who are implementing the reform acquire the required skills to transfer to others so that the reform process can be sustained**

Capacity development cannot be just training but should be an array of approaches that gives understanding of the current status and what reform is needed. This knowledge should enable beneficiaries to make knowledge based decisions. Capacity development is therefore not a one off training but a program for delivering sustained justice reform. A systems approach to capacity development must be mainstreamed into all project activities from project inception. *This would mean embedding the core competencies that the reform ultimately need at three levels; staff’s professional needs, the organizational and institutional needs.* It should enable a wide cross section of implementers to have the multiplicity of change management and project management skills; inclusive of M&E skills to develop full-some understanding of project requirements and arrive at a cohesive mindset that can propel the accomplishment of project outcome. This would enable an empowered cadre of professionals capable of carrying out project management effectively.

6. **A realistic M&E framework should be agreed upon from project inception.**

There was a disconnect between the initial PIP and the PMF as finally established, with diverse demands for outputs not connected to project outcomes. Consensus on the targets to be met was lacking initially. Project risk factors and mitigation strategies were not closely monitored and addressed in a timely manner. As a result, the JUST was hampered by inimical relationships between project implementers. This blurred objectivity, prevented, or delayed project outputs such as a gender specialist being employed, thereby minimizing the effectiveness of JUST. The early adoption of an agreed M&E framework would have assisted implementers to establish inclusive participatory processes that enable reflection on the changing social and institutional circumstances.

7. **The citizen scorecard was a catalyst to new protocols and policies towards people centered justice, resulting in greater access to justice.**

The Citizen’s scorecard created space for citizens to assess the justice system. The empirical data revealed how people felt about the justice system. Their voices became the foundation for actions, new protocols and policy decisions such as the improvement in customer service through customer service kiosk and care space in courts. The scorecard therefore added to the body of knowledge on where the reform process should go and opened another space for support to people centered justice.

8. **Records management is essential to institutional memory, maintenance of standards and smooth project management transition and should be an essential element of project design and implementation.**

Seventy-six (76) technical reports and products supporting implementation outputs were completed by 2018 when the Technical Legal Component came to an end. The practice of storing publications on CDs and flash drives, instead of in a designated database, did not augur well for easy archiving or retrieval of these documents. The institutionalization of processes, including training of new staff, could also be hampered without the knowledge documents produced.
9. Competent Leaders from the country must be given the opportunity to lead justice reform. This will embed capacity development; enable early buy in from stakeholders; develop supporting network and sustainability of products. Project Manager sets the tone for project achievement. Competence in project management and familiarity with court operations is crucial. These competences include knowledge of local landscape; knowledge of the crucial stakeholders; experience in and being known in the Justice Sector as a champion and having respect within the sector. Beneficiaries described the staff at the JRIU as having credible technical and professional qualifications with the competencies and respect required to enable the project to move towards achieving its goal

**Lessons related to technical aspects**

10. Technical Assistance that is sensitive to local culture, analysis and expertise is crucial to ownership and the sustainability of products.

JUST beneficiaries spoke to the courtesies and professional conduct of the assigned Technical experts who ..took Canadian expertise with them but did not transplant Canada into Jamaica. GAC listened was the sentiment. The experts gave credit to local capacity, the ground work was given acceptance, the technical assistance was participatory; inclusive and written report credited the Jamaican expertise. The products were therefore co-created, owned and is sustainable. The Technical experts were described as having a high level of expertise in their respective areas, embedded in assigned departments; visited frequently and communicated continually while away. They invested in learning from the people employed and were willing to share their knowledge whilst learning from local experts; as in the development of the Criminal Case Management Rules where workshops were held to determine what was needed to strengthen the rules in the supreme court and extend its application to the Parish Courts.

11. Any support for IT systems and equipment must be advanced with robust cyber security features.

The requisite level of IT expertise must be assured in the ministries. An adequate level of training of personnel to protect systems against cyberattacks must be provided.

12. Absence of active visibility for the program enhanced ownership of products and processes by the Jamaican justice sector entities.

Whilst JUST gave support to the MOJ’s communication strategy, a visibility strategy for the JUST program was absent. As a result, many of the project’s products are not identified as JUST products but rather as Jamaican justice sector achievements.

**Lessons related to gender**

13. Building gender responsiveness into projects and programs takes time and the process is as important as the expected results and should not be rushed. Due process must be observed to consider local laws, existing policies and cultural nuances.

There was no common understanding of what gender meant in the context of this Jamaican program. Additionally, while Canada shared its gender policy and best practices with Jamaica, these are not immediately applicable. Canada has a feminist policy, while Jamaica has a Gender Equality Policy. Although the policy frameworks may be comparable, the useful integration of aspects into program activities needs to be a consultative process. The capacity development on gender which the JUST Program managed to implement, was insufficient to bring relevant stakeholders on the same page.
14. The JUST program experienced a lack of buy-in from the leadership of the justice sector for the proper integration of the gender dimension. Gender in Jamaica is controversial and needs innovation, champions and persistence.

There was some level of resistance to employ the budgeted gender specialist and boost the gender programming within JUST. Jamaica’s intersectional reality has to be taken into consideration when making people centered decisions on justice. A “social inclusion” rather than a “gender” expert may have improved the results by leading the process. Altogether, a common understanding of gender in the context of the program was not achieved and structural changes regarding gender were not prepared.

Lessons derived from assumptions related to larger reform initiatives

15. A holistic, comprehensive and flexible approach to justice reform achieves successful outcomes with high chance of sustainability.

JUST key interventions had forward and backward linkages to national and institutional problem areas and available donor expertise in areas such as backlog reduction, case management and case-flow management. The interventions highlighted relatable areas where solutions and development of future plans could be implemented and institutionalized. The technical and administrative capacity of the MOJ, its departments and agencies such as ODPP, the courts and Court Management Services (CMS) were first targeted to improve effectiveness. The intention was to modernize the institutions’ administration and the operations of the Justice sector through the use of technical expertise; training and exposure to best practices in targeted study tours thereby achieving long lasting change. JUST used a building block approach to Justice reform. The assessment of the justice system facilitated a credible holistic justice reform program with opportunities for several donors to make an impact. Whilst JRIP provided the implementing framework, JUST provided the vehicle for consistent collaboration by opening the door in donor coordination meetings for other donors to build on the block. This eliminated competition for ‘successful outputs’ by IDPs and maximized efficiency and effectiveness in project outcome. This collaborative effort allowed all stakeholders to strengthen their program activities, share expertise; disseminate information, maximize donor funds, promote networking and establish contacts for beneficiaries. This collaborative approach augurs well for Caribbean States that are trying to modernize critical social sectors.

16. Multi-agency and multi-stakeholder approaches can be the catalyst for project and sector development

The JUST program was an inclusive framework, with the legislative and judicial branches of government, CSOs, academia and the wider public participating in the justice reform process. In embracing a multi-stakeholder approach, it allowed for wider perspectives on what a justice system, that works for all, looks like. CSOs were better equipped for advocacy; the courts were equipped with both technical support and social context training to improve the quality of customer service that the public deserves. The multi-agency approach emanating from the Witness conference enabled a cross fertilization of ideas and a harmonized coordinated approach to sector development. The principle of leaving no-one behind was exemplified with the inclusion of the disabled community and access to justice service materials in braille as well as training with sign language interpreters (gender responsive plus).
Institutional Reform

17. Reframing the organizational structure opens up space for new operational plans and new tools leading to systemic changes.

MOJ was described as having a nonplus…. structure which could not take them where they wanted to go, as such it was a hindrance to reforming the justice system. Reorganization of the corporate structure Impacted the operations of the Ministry. The reframing of the organizational profile allowed for demonstration of what a Justice ministry should be, through the positioning of the right expertise in the right positions to make the required changes needed. After capacities were created then the MOJ could function. It could therefore then be the nucleus and catalyst for the reform agenda.

18. Regional co-ordination and harmonization in justice reform projects has to be planned and budgeted from the initial program design, if it is to be successful.

On September 7, 2016 the first meeting between IMPACT Justice, the JURIST Project and the JUST Project convened and a number of initiatives were discussed for collaboration. These discussions were furthered in other meetings including the June 14, 2019 and February 6, 2020. At the June 14 meeting a detailed list of activities was suggested for collaboration between the three projects and the decision taken to exchange letters outlining the areas where collaboration would take place; it was also suggested that a WhatsApp group be formed for continual dialogue. Similarly, the February 6, 2020 meeting outlined incompleted areas of the JUST projects that could be built on by IMPACT and JURIST. Reports are that the exchange of letters did not happen, however the WhatsApp group operated and there were successful areas of collaboration between the three projects. However, the projects agreed that they could have worked closer if the correct tone had been set from the beginning. Given this assertion more effort would be needed at program design to enable the kind of harmonization that could maximize funding and the achievement of short and long term goal collaboratively.

PROMISING GOOD PRACTICES

1. Use a building block approach to Justice reform, with inclusive consultative iterative processes. These enable continued stakeholder buy in and maintain trust and confidence in the project. The JUST program facilitated a credible holistic justice reform program with opportunities for several donors to make an impact. Whilst JRIP provided the implementing framework, JUST was the vehicle for consistent collaboration, allowing donors and stakeholders to build on each other’s efforts. Competition by IDPs for ‘successful outputs’ was eliminated, efficiency and effectiveness were maximized. This collaborative approach augurs well for Caribbean States that are aiming to modernize critical social sectors. Hearing all the voices for buy-in is essential in building ownership and sustainable partnerships across pertinent sectors.

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18 Prof. Velma Newton, CBE SCM: IMPACT Regional Project Director: correspondence
19 IMPACT correspondence February 8th, 2021
2. **Produce manuals and supportive learning materials to accompany new processes.**
The JUST program developed several knowledge products/ manuals designed to guide processes. These helped to develop capacity on a continual basis, if made accessible to staff members and continually reviewed for upgrading so that world standards are maintained.

3. **Give adequate time to a Justice Reform program so that the process can take root and grow.** Justice reform is a long term process; multi-faceted and requires changes in systems, procedures, legislation, organizational culture and attitudinal change in beneficiaries and providers.

### IMPLEMENTATION GAPS

1. **A Project unit (JRIU) must be consistently staffed in accordance to project support needs to ensure implementation and coordination success.**
   Although the human resources needed by the JRIU were budgeted and recruitment took place as planned, the required staff was not installed when needed. The inability to provide required staff such as a procurement officer and a gender specialist hindered the achievement of project outputs and project progress; enabled the loss of project momentum; distortion and loss in institutional memory and knowledge products. The annual report dated March 2020 pointed out that work processes undertaken by the JUST Program Manager for the Social Order component had to be completed by UNDP and GAC as the capacity was not available in the JRIU. Likewise work products under the institutional component were not monitored for institutionalization. Also Case management rules that were accepted by the Chief Justice should have been reviewed and approved by the Court Rules Committee. Institutionalization of a JUST product that was crucial to sustainability of the project was therefore hindered.

2. **Lack of an Exit Strategy reduced the opportunity for JUST to share justice reform knowledge resources with all stakeholders.**
The most recent JUST Program Manager demitted office in August 2019, leaving the JRIU with only the M&E specialist until March 2020, which was the planned project completion date. With the closure of JRIU and the lack of an exit strategy to ensure document security and delivery of project records to the right entities, a gap was created in knowledge transfer. There are valuable knowledge documents on Justice reform, e.g. protocols, manuals, legislative assessments and legislation. If located, the results and products of the JUST program may still be shared with pertinent national, regional and international entities.

### 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### CONCLUSIONS
The JUST program has in a variety of ways contributed to a modernized justice system in Jamaica. From providing a high quantity of ICT equipment, through re-engineering of business processes and the re-organization of major entities in the justice sector, the program has created an enabling environment for justice reform. Eleven key achievements and a number of lessons learned are described in this report as well as in **Report 3** (case studies).
COHERENCE: The JUST program was coherent with other pertinent national initiatives. The program achieved effective donor coordination avoiding duplication of effort and the various products of the program supported each other. A high level of harmonization was achieved which assisted in strengthening linkages not only between the different products but also between agencies affiliated to the justice system. The regret is that the social order component only started after the technical assistance work was finalized, resulting in only indirect linkages. Due to effective coordination, the JUST program not only fitted well with other development programs such as JSAT and CSJP, but actively supported the EU Budget Support Program, as well as the IDB-, USAID- and DFID-supported actions. The learnings are expected to be very useful for the regional IMPACT Justice and JURIST programs. Systems and manuals produced by the JUST program support the growing efficiency of the justice sector, however not as yet in the area of gender equity. Although FIAP guided the JUST program by shifting the results framework from mere equality between women and men to a focus on intersectionality, its strategies were not supported and there is little coherence with regional and international gender policies.

EFFECTIVENESS: Initially, the JUST program was designed by DOJ Canada in 2007 based on an inclusive consultation with many stakeholders across the island. It was thoroughly redesigned, in collaboration with beneficiaries, which brought an initial PIP together in 2011. The PSC was an important and successful participatory element during implementation.

Success factors that contributed to making the program effective include the length of the program (9 years) allowing for the re-organization of institutions and business processes, the establishment of the JRIU within the MOJ with the intention of the JRIU being sustained to continue the reform process, continuous dialogue and consultations with all entities within the justice sector, ownership of products and processes, comprehensive training, respect for co-creation of products and study tours, introduction of RBM to the government, sector-wide PAF, input of ICT equipment and systems, communication planning, and effective donor coordination. There were also a number of limitations: implementation inertia in the GOJ, weak absorptive capacity reflecting human resource gaps, work overload, low paid staff, competent but over-stretched technical staff, high staff attrition, archaic processes, resistance to change, and customer service developments de-prioritized.

The program is promoting inclusiveness, and accessibility guidelines were prepared, but pertinent actions are only starting. Actions have been undertaken regarding the treatment of children in courts and persons with disabilities which are now considered in the retrofitting of court houses and related facilities. Access to justice services in rural areas has improved significantly with the Mobile Justice Service Units.

SUSTAINABILITY: The GOJ and the courts were well-engaged in the implementation of the JUST program and developed ownership. Involvement of the wider public is just starting based on the activities of the Social Order component. CSOs have made limited progress in improving their skills and resources for addressing legislative and policy areas. Regarding the GOJ and the Judiciary, the benefits arising from the JUST program are integrated and owned by the institutions, providing an excellent basis for sustainability of the outputs and future achievements of the outcomes. Large numbers of justice sector personnel have been trained and have already applied these competencies and specific technical skills. However, gender-related strategies for sustainability were not introduced in the justice sector and no synergies were established for scaling gender initiatives. Overall though, the momentum for improving justice services is strong and is expected to be kept up by justice sector personnel at many levels as well as the society.
GENDER: The planned effect from the gender component could not be fully realized as the inputs occurred two years prior to the completion of the project instead of being mainstreamed from the inception. Overall the program, therefore, had a low level of gender responsiveness and little regard for gender equity. A gender analysis was done but was greatly unused; it did not inform the baseline for gender indicators, and gender milestones were not tracked. Although a budget and terms of references for an expert on a full time basis were available, the required gender expertise was not mobilized due to resistance and bureaucracy in the leadership of the justice sector. The delivery of the social order gender training and sensitization was too late and too short. These needed to be repeated since socio-cultural norms are not written in law and require a consistent multi-faceted approach to have a level of impact. Gender-related strategies for sustainability were not introduced in the justice sector and no synergies were established for scaling gender initiatives.

Systems and manuals produced by the JUST program support the growing efficiency of the justice sector, however not as yet in the area of gender equity. With the introduction of the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) in 2017, the JUST program shifted the focus in its results framework from mere equality between women and men to a focus on intersectionality. While the shift was made, it was noted that the JUST program design pre-dated the FIAP and as such the expected gender results were not significant. Had there being a fulltime gender expert on board, there could have been continuous improvements in the way forward to achieving the gender results.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Program design and implementation**

*Recommendations to GAC:*

Starting a large complex project without all preparations (‘hitting the ground running’) reduces efficiency, effectiveness and the quality of program outputs because structure and protocols are not necessarily in place. Project Managers often find themselves using ‘the ride and whistle’ approach.

**Recommendation 1: Within the timeframe of a new project, GAC should include a Project Design Phase of 6-12 months prior to project start up.** The objectives of this phase is to: (a) Reassess and analyze the social and economic reform environment; (b) Map and establish contact with key stakeholders; (c) Operationalize project mandate, risk and mitigating factors with stakeholders; consultants; (d) Mobilize technical resources; (e) Establish infrastructure for implementing and managing the reform project including but not limited to:

1. Develop a comprehensive management and human resource plan project;
2. Developing the Performance Management Framework (Log-frame); the PIP; Annual Work plan; communication plan; records management plan;
3. Undertake/ prepare TORs for required baseline studies;
4. Develop required MOUs for project execution partners;
5. Development of a multi-agency strategy; protocol;
6. Project Steering and sectorial Committee;
7. Development of a participatory approach strategy/ framework;
8. Development of a capacity development policy/framework;
9. Early training in M&E;
10. Introduction to Gender based analysis (other cross cutting themes); and
11. The development of a roadmap for implementation of key recommended reforms.

**Recommendation 2:** GAC should carry out an information capacity assessment at the start of new projects so that a data safety and security plan and be developed and one or more data repositories can be established. Amongst other things this assessment should review storage methods, accessibility, retention methods, security factors and governance structure. It should be reviewed periodically.

With regard to capacity development, mainstreaming a systems approach could be very useful in a complex program such as Justice Reform (see also **Lesson 6**). This would mean embedding the core competencies that the reform ultimately need at the levels of staff’s professional needs and institutional needs. It should enable a wide cross section of implementers to have the multiplicity of change management and project management skills, inclusive of M&E skills.

**Recommendation 3:** Capacity development should be planned based on a systems approach and be enabled to catalyze project implementation and innovation.

**Recommendations to the MOJ and its Project Unit:**

M&E frameworks to track performance should be in place from the start of the program, including appropriate baseline information. Baseline data and available statistics will also be crucial to ensure indicators can be measured locally and internationally. Measurable indicators need to be established to enable tracking project progress. It will also ensure that evidence based decision making takes place; risks are mitigated, change and ongoing improvements are made. Monitoring activities for the collection of reliable data also need to take off from early in the project. It is therefore crucial to have the expertise of an M&E specialist on board at the start of the program. Of importance also is the use of a participatory inclusive process in the development of monitoring tools to ensure that consensus, ownership and joint learning takes place.

**Recommendation 4:** The implementing unit should hire an M&E specialist early in project implementation. An initial budget must include baseline and other data requirements so that instruments such as the citizens’ scorecard can be administered as required.

**Recommendation 5:** The implementing unit should track gender progress and milestones, using the baseline for the gender indicators established by the Gender Analysis in 2013. The implementing unit needs to employ gender expertise to collaborate with its M&E team.

A program needs solid internal and external relations with stakeholders to be successful. For a justice reform program, the implementing ministry must build coalitions with bar associations, professional organizations, law schools, universities, civil society, women’s/gender and disability organizations. Many of these give voice to the voiceless for changing or validating policies in justice reform. This will strengthen and provide feedback mechanisms throughout the reform process. The Social Context sensitization training carried out by Women Media Watch (WMW) in the social order component enabled participation of over 440 men, women, youth and special-needs groups from various parishes, civil society groups and justice entities, aimed at improving the quality of services they provide. Similarly, other CSOs that
participated in the social order component were described as being competent in their area of expertise and had the ability to deliver sustainable products.

**Recommendation 6:** The Project Unit should map key reform players throughout every stage of the reform process, analyze their roles and establish appropriate mechanisms for interaction.

At the IMPACT Justice PMC Meeting in June 2019, it was reported that no database existed for the JUST knowledge documents. Instead these publications were being stored on CDs and flash drives. Consideration for a sustainability plan which would entail a more dynamic approach was seen as the way forward. This was not realized, see **Lesson 19**. Whilst the door was opened for JUST publications to be uploaded to the JURIST Knowledge Management System hosted at the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), this would only be accessible by GAC and other development partners.

**Recommendation 7:** The Project Unit should identify as soon as possible a virtual repository or institution to house and archive JUST products, best practice data and publications, in order to ensure their continued availability.

Justice reform requires institutional change, which often is political as it requires change in power and authority dynamics. For this reason, change management processes will be required (carried out by a change management expert), along with diagnosing a realistic institutional/sector assessment. Included in this assessment must be: an evaluation of the sufficiency and weaknesses of systems; human and financial resources and strategies being employed to allow for delivery of required services. The analysis should also take into account the absorptive capacity of the institution to implement successfully the reform process and cross cutting themes such as gender.

**Recommendation 8:** The Project Unit should hire a local change management expert to establish a roadmap detailing strategy and human resource needs for strategic and prioritized reform. The roadmap should describe capacity development needs to operationalize and strengthen new systems and enable the achievement of results at all levels.

**Integrating gender issues**

**Recommendations to the Project Unit:**

Training in gender responsiveness and social context issues is an important part of the capacity development of justice services stakeholders for them to deliver justice services that are customer friendly and gender responsive. Frequent discussions should be initiated with male and female leaders on patriarchal norms, heteronormativity and change strategies; challenge sexist and condescending attitudes; establish a cadre of influential males to support the gender initiative in a bid to change the narrative that gender means women. E.g. Some of the men interviewed felt there isn’t a gender problem in the justice sector because more women are employed there than men.

**Recommendation 9:** A deliberate effort should be made to target the leadership of the justice sector in gender-based analysis/intersectionality training, for greater success in gender and justice reform.

**Recommendation to GAC:**

The national machinery on gender should be included as stakeholders and/or implementers in new projects. In Jamaica these include specifically the Bureau of Gender Affairs and the Institute for Gender
and Development Studies (IGDS). Engaging these local entities supports the sustainability measures for gender in a structured way that is tied to the national plans for gender and justice.

**Recommendation 10:** Ensure collaboration with the national machinery on gender in new projects, engaging appropriate Government agencies, CSOs and academic institutions.

**Other current GAC projects**

**Recommendations to GAC:**

While several attempts were made to structure the collaborative efforts between IMPACT, JURIST and JUST, it would appear that this did not come to full fruition, during the life of JUST. At the IMPACT Justice PMC Meeting June 11, 2019 several possible areas were identified in which all three projects could collaborate. Similarly, at the near completion of JUST the IMPACT Justice PMC Meeting on February 6, 2020, JUST shared progress made in a number of areas which were incomplete and for which there was the possibility for IMPACT and JURIST to build on. These included areas such as the programs dealing with disabilities in the social order component. Whilst some collaboration was carried out, this was not considered cohesive as the projects were straight jacketed by initial designs and as such were constrained by their own work plans. Areas where collaboration could take place must be planned for, such as case backlogs, the most frequently expressed impediment to justice in CARICOM countries by far. More synergies would also allow for consolidation of human and financial resources, efficiency, create opportunities for other justice reform initiatives to be built on and achieve the best impact in the short and long term.

**Recommendation 11:** Future justice reform programs must be designed with inter-project collaboration or cohesiveness in mind, the implementing agencies should be involved in this process

**Recommendation 12:** While structural impediments and the sovereignty of each State must be a consideration in deciding on possible focus areas for a regional project, GAC should establish a proactive fund which lends itself to initiating collaborative approaches. This fund would be strategic and foster activities that would allow cross fertilization of ideas whilst being catalytic in attaining the regional broader goal and objectives of the reform programs.

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20 Professor Velma Newton: Minutes of IMPACT Justice Project Management Committee Meeting: February 6, 2020
ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT

1. Background, Rationale, Purpose and Specific Objectives of the Assessment
The End of Program and Lessons Learned Assessment for the Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation (JUST) Program has been commissioned at this point in time due to its imminent closure (March 2020).

1.1 Background to the Consultancy:
The Justice Undertakings for Social Transformation Program (JUST) is a Global Affairs Canada (GAC)-initiated project. It is an exception to GAC’s predominately regional programming strategy for the Caribbean, in that the JUST operates bilaterally in Jamaica only. The program was initially intended to run for 4 years (2008-2012). However, due to administrative and legal issues that affected the capacity of the selected executing agency to implement the program, it had to be restructured and only began operations in December 2011, with an extension granted to 2019/20.

The implementation design for the re-structured program was a complex one, with two separate implementing partners, Department of Justice Canada, and the UNDP Jamaica Mission (2011 onwards), a plethora of beneficiaries including the Ministry of Justice, their departments and agencies as well as the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Courts. Initially, when there was no overarching executing agency or coordinator in place, the GAC PTL provided guidance and assistance to the implementing agencies. This arrangement was not sustainable, as this role required a full-time focus.

In 2015, GAC decided to conduct an Operational Review of the program, 4 years after the re-scoping. The main purpose of the review was to gain insight into the appropriateness and/or adaptability of the implementation approach, management systems and partnership structures used by the program; and to identify and assess progress towards the intended outcomes and impact, as well as sustainability, amongst other objectives. A recommendation arising from the review indicated the critical need to contract an overall Project Manager to coordinate and bring cohesion to the disparate elements of the JUST program, especially in light of the forthcoming role of civil society organizations (CSOs). As part of the approved implementation design the final component of the JUST (Social Order) required the program to contract several local CSOs to implement various initiatives engaging with civil society around issues of justice reform.

In 2017, a full time Project Manager/Coordinator was contracted by GAC to bring a results-based management approach, and coherence amongst all implementing partners. Additionally, a Project Monitor was contracted to review, adjust and update the PMF, assist the program in obtaining results and improve linkages with the GAC regional justice sector projects. In 2018/19, several NGO sub-awardees were contracted to support Social Order initiatives, through the UNDP implementing Partner.

22 The JUST is a program with multiple initiatives or projects implemented by a variety of partners; however, with DFATD/GAC a development initiative is referred to as a project and thus internal functions and mechanisms use the term project rather than program.

23 The Ministry of Justice also played a role as implementer within their MDAs, thus being both beneficiary & implementing partner.
The JUST program is slated to close on March 31st 2020, and given the complexities of the program there are some strategic lessons to be learned, and areas that could be leveraged for current and future programming of GAC.

1.2 Rationale:
The rationale to conduct an End of Program and Lessons Learned Assessment instead of a traditional summative evaluation is based on the significant monitoring and evaluating (M&E) work already done within the JUST, and that is continuing in this final month of the program. Examples of M&E activities include:

1. A mid-term Operational Review was conducted in 2015/16 – with follow-up on the recommendations
2. The GAC Project Monitor has updated the JUST PMF (outcome indicators in the institutional component and all indicators of the social order component) and initiated data collection processes from the various justice sector institutions and CSO implementers.
3. The GAC Project Manager has been reporting using cumulative outcome data.
4. The GAC Project Monitor is in process of developing a JUST ‘Sustainability Report Card’ as requested by the PTL for purposes of tracking sustainability of selected processes: institutional and social order components; and to support forward planning.
5. The Ministry of Justice is developing a sustainability strategy.
6. The UNDP conducts regular quality assessments and audits as part of their roles and responsibilities.

Based on the above it is proposed that an assessment, prioritising the identification of major achievements to analyze success factors and lessons learned would be best use of time and money. This knowledge would be essential for future programming in justice reform at the bilateral level in Jamaica, as well as to inform the current and future programming of the regional GAC justice projects – IMPACT Justice and JURIST.

1.3 Purpose:
The purpose of the End of Program & Lessons Learned Assessment is to have a product that serves the purposes of accountability, learning and decision-making. The Assessment seeks to:

- Account for major development results to stakeholders (including local partners and beneficiaries) as well as GAC, IDPs, and other interested parties.
- Inform decision-making for current projects/programs focused on justice reform in the Caribbean program/region.
- Guide the development of future justice reform initiatives in Jamaica and the Caribbean program/region.

The intended end users of this assessment are the direct beneficiaries of the program - the Jamaican Justice Sector Partners, Implementing Partners (UNDP, Justice Canada, selected CSOs), GAC JUST Program team, and GAC’s Caribbean program team – (in particular the Justice Sector team and Project Team Leader (PTL) of the regional IMPACT Justice and JURIST projects, and their program teams.

1.4 Specific Objectives and Scope of Work of the End of Program & Lessons Learned Assessment
The specific objectives of the assessment are the following:
1. Assess the effectiveness of the development intervention in terms of:
   a) Identification of success factors of key achievements in each component, and as possible, the enabling environment factors that contributed to them.
   b) Identification of limitations and/or barriers that hindered the achievement of selected program initiatives.
   c) Conduct a targeted gender analysis within the scope of the identified limitations/barriers, and the extent to which each limitation/barrier affected the ability of the program to be ‘Gender-Responsive’.

2. Assess the likelihood of sustainability of key program results, based on a review and analysis of:
   a) The JUST PMF
   b) The JUST ‘Sustainability Report Card’
   c) The JUST Annual Reports
   d) The GAC Project Monitor’s final report and selected Mission and Quarterly Reflection Reports
   e) The GAC Project Manager narrative progress reports, and the End of Project Report (if available)
   f) The extent to which the MOJ sustainability strategy (if completed) supports the likelihood of continued institutionalisation of program interventions

3. Assess the intervention for Coherence, specifically:
   a) Assess for Internal coherence – assessing the extent to which the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and –
      ➢ Other government of Jamaica (particularly the Ministry of Justice) initiatives (policy, programmes)
      ➢ Other GAC justice reform interventions with a footprint in Jamaica (IMPACT Justice, JURIST)
   b) Assess for External Coherence – with particular focus on existence and levels of harmonisation and the extent to which duplication has been avoided, or not with:
      ➢ Other IDP supported justice reform interventions (e.g. EU, USAID, DFID)

4. Based on the assessment of the effectiveness, sustainability and coherence of JUST achievements, identify Lessons Learned from the JUST that will be useful for other justice reform initiatives.
   a) Identify the lessons derived from the assumptions applied by the JUST partners during implementation in terms of implementation methods and technical aspects (and the accuracy of those assumptions).

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24 The consultant will be expected to determine key achievements to focus this aspect of the assessment during the inception phase.
b) Ensure lessons learned consider the accuracy of assumptions related to institutional reform, capacity building, people-centered access to justice, and gender responsive justice.

c) Link lessons learned to promising good practices involving justice sector institutions and civil society in justice reform.

5. Provide a set of Recommendations based on a comprehensive analysis of findings and lessons learned, specifically aligned to:

   a) Recommendations based on programming design, implementation success factors and limitations in order to inform future programming in the Justice Reform sector in Jamaica.

   b) Recommendations related toward an improvement in integrating Gender issues in future justice reform interventions. Specifically, Gender Equality, Gender Equity, and Gender Responsiveness, as relevant, given the distinctiveness of the Justice Sector.

   c) Recommendations for current GAC26 Justice Reform regional projects, in particular those that have a footprint in Jamaica. These should be based on (i) Lessons Learned, (ii) program implementation gaps with particular focus on harmonisation and coordination, (iii) promising good practices; and (iv) potential for leveraging (specific) JUST interventions for further continuity and sustainability of GAC’s work in Justice Reform in the Caribbean.

Further sub-sections of the ToR briefly described the context of the development intervention, details of the development intervention being assessed, the intervention logic and stakeholders.

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26 Other IDP initiatives (e.g. EU/JRIP2) may also benefit as determined by the GAC PTL.
### ANNEX 2: LISTS OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND PARTICIPANTS IN FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

#### Persons interviewed

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### Participants in FGDs

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<tr>
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<td>Statisticians/DEO</td>
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<td>Shanique Davis</td>
<td>St. Ann Parish Court</td>
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