



**Lot n° 1: SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND RESILIENCE**

DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT

Evaluation of

UNDP

“Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen II (ERRY II)”

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ACRONYMS

EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
ERRY	Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FFS	Farmer Field School
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International NGO
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
PUNO	Participating United Nations Organizations
SCMCHA	Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation
SFD	Social Fund for Development
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SIERY	Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience in Yemen
SPCRP	Social Protection for Community Resilience Project
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPM	Third-Party Monitoring
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VAPG	Village Agricultural Producers' Group
VCC	Village Cooperative Council
WFP	World Food Programme
WUA	Water Users Association

1 Introduction

The EU Delegation to Yemen is currently implementing projects within 4 major sectors:

- 1) Resilience including institutional, economic and people's resilience (12 contracts);
- 2) Social sectors: health and education (4 contracts);
- 3) Human Rights & Civil Society Organisations (4 contracts); and
- 4) Stabilisation (2 contracts).

Many projects include activities overlapping different sectors in order to provide the flexibility to adapt to the needs of the current humanitarian crisis.

Due to the security, logistical and operational obstacles that confront projects operating across frontlines and in all geographical areas in Yemen, Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) and evaluation support is seen as a necessity by EU. Therefore, EU has issued a contract for Third-party Monitoring & Evaluation of resilience projects in Yemen in the areas of migration, TVET and financial inclusion", which includes TPM as well as evaluation exercises.

The evaluation of United Nation Development Programme's (UNDP's) "Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen II" is part of these services. Annex 1 contains the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this assignment.

1.1 Context

This section provides a concise overview of the most recent information about the Yemen context, with specific focus on the sectors relevant to this assignment.

1.1.1 Yemen context

Yemen has gone through a devastating war and a terrible humanitarian crisis. This escalated in March 2015 when a Saudi-led military coalition intervened in Yemen, after the transitional process was derailed by the armed Ansar Allah (Houthis) group, who violently took control of the capital, Sana'a in September 2014.¹ Civilians all across the country have faced the consequences, with more than 20.7 million people – 66 percent of the population – estimated to need humanitarian assistance in 2021, 12.1 million people of whom are in acute need.²

The economy has deteriorated further in 2020/21 as a result of the fighting.³ In addition, the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic has also hit the Yemeni economy hard.⁴ The global COVID-19 turndown led to a sharp drop in remittances, the largest source of foreign currency and a lifeline for many families where 80 percent of people live below the poverty line. Moreover, the economy and the currency continued to collapse making the Yemeni Government unable to subsidize food and other commodities. Further, 90 percent of the food and commodities in Yemen are imported.

Even before 2020, the war had paralysed large parts of the public sector while the private sector has also suffered. Already by late 2015, half of the private sector companies had laid off staff or reduced salaries.⁵ Since then, the economy has shrunk by half, and more than 80 percent of Yemenis now live

¹ Boley, J., Evans, K. & others. (2017). *A Conflict Overlooked: Yemen in Crisis, Conflict Risk Diagnostic 2017*. Reliefweb, page 1. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1540_0.pdf [Accessed 26 May 2021].

² OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: Yemen. Page 6. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen_HNO_2021_Final.pdf [Accessed 26 May 2021].

³ OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview-Yemen

⁴ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview>

⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2020 Country Report — Yemen*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020.

below the poverty line. This collapse is most visible in loss of income, depreciation of the Yemeni Rial, loss of Government revenue, commercial import restrictions and rising commodity prices. More than 40 percent of Yemeni households are estimated to have lost their primary source of income, and jobs have become scarce.⁶ Opportunities for day labourers were minimal even before the war, and the war has only exacerbated unemployment rates.⁷

In June 2020, the Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock in his briefing to the United Nations Security Council on Yemen, warned of Yemen "falling off the cliff" as over the past months. The Yemeni Rial has declined against foreign currencies to the lowest rate since the war began in March 2015, registering 800 Rials to the US dollar, yet further declines have not been stopped.⁸ As the Rial loses its value against other currencies, prices are becoming extremely high, while people are not receiving salaries; thus, vegetables, food, cloths, goods, even services (including cooking gas, water, electricity) are piled in the marketplaces, as nobody can afford them.⁹

1.1.2 Poverty and employment in Yemen

Poverty in Yemen is a chronic phenomenon, increasing over the years. It is estimated that the poverty rate reached 76.9 percent in 2016. Estimates also show that the poverty rate jumped from 77.9 percent in 2017 and further to 78.8 percent in 2018. If the current situation continues to deteriorate with the economic decline and aggravated humanitarian conditions, poverty rates are likely to exceed 80 percent in 2020.¹⁰

In 290 out of 328 districts, less than 50 percent of the total population have access to sustainable livelihoods.¹¹ The lack of economic opportunities is seen as the main reason behind declining livelihoods for all population groups in the governorates and districts assessed. Suspension of salaries came second, while deteriorated livelihoods due to inflation came third. The absence of economic opportunities and the high proportion of youth among total population (60 percent), make livelihoods promotion an urgent matter.¹²

Women in Yemen are scarce among non-agricultural professional and technical workers (only 15 percent are female¹³). The Labour Force Survey carried out in 2013-2014 by the Yemeni government shows that the labour force participation rate is 65.8 percent for men and 6 percent for women.¹⁴ In the informal sector, less than 5 percent was female in 2007.¹⁵ If women are working in the informal sector, they are mainly employed in service provision and sales jobs at stores and markets.¹⁶ The proportion of employed persons with informal jobs is 81 percent, 83 percent women and 81 percent men.^{17,18}

⁶ OCHA, *Humanitarian Needs Overview-Yemen*, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2021, Issued February 2021

⁷ Semnani. S., (2019), *Yemen Urban Displacement in a Rural Society*, USAID, October 2019

⁸ <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-mark-28>

⁹ <https://www.france24.com/en/20200128-currency-crisis-brings-new-hardship-to-war-weary-yemen>

¹⁰ Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation Economic Studies & Forecasting Sector. (2020). *Yemen 2020 Socio-Economic, Issue (51) August 2020*. Page 4

¹¹ OCHA et al, (IOM, UNHCR), *MCLA Comprehensive Report 2018*, January 2019. See Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation Economic Studies & Forecasting Sector. (2020). *Yemen 2020 Socio-Economic, Issue (51) August 2020*. Page 6

¹² *ibid*

¹³ Yemen Labour Force Survey 2013-2014, Republic of Yemen, ILO, March 2015

¹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵ Mansur Omeira, *From informality to decent work in Yemen*, ILO, March 2013.

¹⁶ The Yemeni Center for Social Studies, *Women in the Informal Sector*, 2008

¹⁷ The concept of informal sector differs from informal employment, which refers to jobs as observation units as opposed to the concept of informal sector that refers to production units as observation units. Informal employment includes casual labour, limited time workers, daily wage labour, and self-enterprise.

¹⁸ Yemen Labour Force Survey 2013-2014, Republic of Yemen, ILO, March 2015

High unemployment rates and low job opportunities for youth including educated youth are among the major challenges facing the economy and development. This also contributes to undermining political and security stability in Yemen, given the limited capacity of the formal private sector. Unemployment rates have escalated since 2015, from 22.1 percent in 2015 to 32 percent in 2019 and further to 34 percent in 2020.

Reports show that the unemployment rate among young people remains very high, above 40 percent.¹⁹ Additionally, the suspension of salaries has led to income loss, more unemployed people and disruption of economic activities and livelihoods. Likewise, unemployment trends suggest that the rate will go up to 60 percent in 2019 and 2020, citing limited economic growth to create new jobs and absorb new entrants to the labour market.

1.1.3 Water scarcity and alternative energy

Yemen suffers from natural disasters and environmental degradation and hazards. This puts nearly 18 million people in need of water support across Yemen. Years of conflict, an economic crisis and existing water scarcity have left many communities without reliable access to the water they need to survive.²⁰

For a long time, Yemen has been considered one of the world's most water-poor countries, estimated to have the lowest water per capita availability globally. Water scarcity is partly due to dry weather conditions, exacerbated by recent climate change, as well as rapid population growth. Additionally, more and more groundwater is used for agriculture through rapid extraction (among other methods) for more water intensive crops such as qat. The result is that groundwater is now being depleted far quicker than it can be replenished.²¹

Even before the war Yemen regularly faced power cuts. As the war broke out the national grid collapsed in the early stages of the conflict in 2014 and is still not functioning well.²² Reportedly, diesel scarcity, war damage to major ports such as Al-Hudaydah, and a strict trade blockade caused fuel imports to drop to one percent of the monthly needed supply in September 2016.²³ The fuel shortages led to long electricity blackouts. To grapple with this diesel market instability Yemen has started to embrace solar energy. Markets for solar panels are booming to meet the basic needs of households. Solar energy has now spread to the health, education and agriculture sector.²⁴

1.2 COVID-19 in Yemen

While Yemen is already suffering from the worst humanitarian crisis in the world Covid-19 has increased Yemen's risk of deterioration. Besides its impact on peoples' health Covid-19 brings a serious economic crisis, and its impact is pushing the country to the brink of famine.²⁵

¹⁹ FAO, Technical Secretariat for Food Security, Latest Developments in Food Security in Yemen Report 2015. See Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation Economic Studies & Forecasting Sector. (2020). *Yemen 2020 Socio-Economic, Issue (51) August 2020*. Page 13

²⁰ UNICEF Yemen. 19 May 2020. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/yemen/stories/water-essential-lifeline> [Accessed 12 June 2021].

²¹ OCHA. 2021. *Humanitarian Needs Overview: Yemen*. Page 45. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Yemen_HNO_2021_Final.pdf [Accessed 12 June 2021].

²² Conflict and Environment Observatory. April 2021. *Report: Groundwater Depletion Clouds Yemen's Solar Energy Revolution*. Available at: <https://ceobs.org/groundwater-depletion-clouds-yemens-solar-energy-revolution/> [Accessed 12 June 2021].

²³ MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. 2020. Conflict Resilience of Water and Energy Supply Infrastructure: Insights from Yemen. Page 13. https://res.mdpi.com/d_attachment/water/water-12-03269/article_deploy/water-12-03269-v2.pdf [Accessed 12 June 2021].

²⁴ Conflict and Environment Observatory. April 2021. *Report: Groundwater Depletion Clouds Yemen's Solar Energy Revolution*

²⁵ UNDP. 2020. *The Strategic Framework for an Immediate Response to Covid-19 in Yemen (2020-2021)*.

The Strategic Framework for an Immediate Response to Covid-19 in Yemen (UNDP, 2020) states that Covid-19 threatens the Yemeni economy with a severe economic downturn from its direct and indirect effects. This is expected to impact the Yemeni economy directly through lower domestic supply and demand, but also indirectly through lower international oil prices in the global markets. As oil is the main source of income for the Yemeni government, the fiscal deficit has made salary payments more difficult.

Additionally, the global shock of Covid-19 has caused a steep decline in humanitarian support for Yemen. This can be attributed to tightening budgets of humanitarian responses as well as the decrease in oil revenues for Gulf Cooperation Council countries which are among the main funders for the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan.

1.2.1 Gender and women empowerment

The ongoing conflict in Yemen, as well as the complex humanitarian situation, have an impact on gender roles, gender relationships and women empowerment. People in Yemen have lost income and livelihoods, combined with rising prices and shortages of food and commodities. Women had to start seeking income generating activities outside of the home and men seem to be taking on or, at least sharing a small part of some of the domestic work within the home. Displacement has affected women's ownership especially of houses, land and assets including jewellery, animals and livestock.²⁶

According to the CARE Gender and Conflict Analysis,²⁷ women participated in 38 percent of decision-making. The household survey results, however, showed lower rates for decisions concerning access to health care, deciding to visit relatives, and whether children attended school. Decision-making in the community remained largely controlled by men. This is attributed to chronic gender inequalities that inhibit meaningful participation of women. Access to decision-making spaces was seen to be influenced by a woman's level of literacy, education, status in society status, and economic status.

Since the conflict, access to services and assistance has become a challenge, especially for women, whose movement are restricted by barriers based on traditions, culture, the lack of security, the need for ID documents as well as transportation costs. Access to safe water was identified as one of the biggest challenges for both men and women. Prior to the conflict, many homes had a water source, or an available water source nearby. However, now families have to collect water from alternative sources, often far from their house. This has increased the burden of work, particularly for women and girls, and has increased safety risks.²⁸

1.2.2 Policies and strategies

The Humanitarian Response Plan Yemen (HRP) (2021) follows the approach of integrating humanitarian, development, and peace support to respond to the current context in Yemen which poses multiple challenges. Such integrated support is essential to address the systemic causes of conflict and vulnerability and in strengthening resilience against recurrent shocks. In addition, the HRP (2020) adjusted operations in 2020 to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The HRP (2021) has three strategic objectives. Strategic Objective 2 is dedicated to overcoming hunger, prevent famine, malnutrition and restore livelihoods by providing food, livelihoods and nutrition assistance, increasing household incomes and resilience to shocks and advocating for measures that bring economic stability. The objective will target 16 million vulnerable people with estimated budget of \$2.26 billion.

Nonetheless, the HRP is severely underfunded.²⁹ The UN and other humanitarian actors developed a simple, but urgent response to Covid-19 under the Strategic Framework for an Immediate Response to

²⁶ Haneef., C. 2019. CARE Gender and Conflict Analysis Taiz and Aden Governorates, Republic of Yemen. CARE International. Switzerland. September 2019.

²⁷ ibid

²⁸ ibid

²⁹ UNDP. 2020. The Strategic Framework for an Immediate Response to Covid-19 in Yemen (2020-2021).

Covid-19 in Yemen (UNDP 2020). This includes: 1) protect the health system during the COVID-19 crisis; 2) protect people through social protection and basic services; 3) protect jobs, small and medium sized enterprises, and the vulnerable workers in the informal sector through economic recovery; 4) help guide the necessary surge in fiscal and financial stimuli to make the macroeconomic framework work for the most vulnerable while fostering sustainable development and strengthening multilateral and regional responses; 5) promote social cohesion, build trust through social dialogue and political engagement, and invest in community led resilience and response systems.

The water policy developer in Yemen is the National Water Resources Authority, established in 1995. In 2002, Law No. 33 of 2002 – known as the "Water Law" – was promulgated. It was amended by Law No. 41 of 2006, but its by-laws were only issued in 2011, demonstrating the intensity of the debate around its implementation. Yemen's energy policy has largely been focused on diesel and gas electricity generation, which supplied cities, leaving most rural areas without any national links. Yemen has a lot of potential for renewable energy sources – namely, solar, wind and geothermal. Though the first steps are taken, the country still lacks administrative strategies to promote and regulate the use of sustainable energy resources.³⁰

Solar energy in Yemen might be a double-edged sword. While solar pumps improve access to water and save energy, solar energy for irrigation might lead to over-abstraction of groundwater and could add pressure to already stressed water resources. There are around 100,000 pumps in use in Yemen for irrigation purposes. Replacing diesel and electric powered pumps with solar pumps without clear rules and restrictions, particularly on qat farms, could lead to the expansion of the cultivation area and, hence, to an unforeseen increase in groundwater abstraction.³¹

1.3 Description of the subject under evaluation

1.3.1 Project details

The project "Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen II (ERRY II)" with the project code MIDEAST/2018/40734 and MIDEAST/2019/41456 is implemented and led by UNDP under indirect management, in consortium with International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

The budget of the project is Euro 46 million. Out of this amount, EUR 35 million is funded by the EU, EUR 10 million is funded by Sida and approximately EUR 1 million is co-financed by the United Nations. The project duration is three years, from 1 March 2019 to 28 February 2022.

The programme design was based on the experience of the Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen project (ERRY), including its Mid-Term Review, where interventions related to strengthening livelihoods opportunities and community assets and enhancing the local capacities had been perceived as highly relevant and critical.

The program aims to improve the food security and nutrition status of the targeted population, and to prevent vulnerable households from developing negative coping strategies and remaining dependent on humanitarian assistance.

³⁰ Aklan.M., Lackner.H. 2021. *Solar-Powered Irrigation In Yemen: Opportunities, Challenges And Policies*. Page 3-6. Available at: https://sanaacenter.org/files/Rethinking_Yemens_Economy-policy_brief_22.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2021]

³¹ ibid

1.3.2 Results framework

The logframe of this action is included in Annex 2. The overall objective of the action is

"to contribute to reduced vulnerability and strengthened resilience of crisis-affected communities in Yemen through the creation of sustainable livelihoods and improving access to basic services."

There is one specific objective (outcome) with three linked outputs and a number of activities (the most important ones reflected below) linked to each outcome area, namely:

Specific Objective: Crisis affected communities are better able to manage local risks and shocks for increased resilience and self-reliance

Output 1: Community livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience and self-reliance

Activity Result 1.1 (by FAO): *Skills developed, and food security improved for vulnerable farming households through agricultural value chain development.*

- Support farmers and women headed households to improve sorghum, millet, tomato, dairy products and selected value chains.
- Provision of veterinary services, development of feed resources capacity building to farmers
- Training of farmers and farmer associations on entrepreneurship skills

Activity Result 1.2 (by UNDP and WFP): *Livelihoods are stabilized, and community assets rehabilitated through labour intensive emergency employment for vulnerable households and individuals*

- Provide training to women engaged in rural agriculture on business development services, marketing skills, saving schemes, diversification of livelihoods.
- Provide labour intensive emergency employment for vulnerable households and individuals.
- Design and implement labour intensive Cash for Work identifying key community assets and social services for rehabilitation and engage and select beneficiaries.

Activity Result 1.3 (by UNDP, FAO and ILO): *Sustainable livelihoods opportunities are created in the post-cash for work phase to support self-employment through entrepreneurship development for vulnerable households and individuals*

- Strengthen training for the trainers and train business advisors in agricultural businesses, and in the viable businesses identified through the local market assessments
- Provide life skills and business development and vocational training in identified viable businesses and support business development (top up grant) and recovery.

Activity Result 1.4 (by ILO): *Sustainable livelihoods opportunities created in the post-cash for work phase support employability through on-the-job training*

- Provide competency-based technical skills training to cash-for-work beneficiaries interested in wage employment.

Activity Result 1.5 (by UNDP and ILO): *Capacity of the private sector is strengthened to contribute to emergency crisis response and job creation*

- Develop the capacity of the private sector through training and follow up support on how to develop and implement participatory local economic support establishment of local small and medium size enterprise (SME) networks and capacity-building.

Output 2: Vulnerable communities benefit from solar energy for sustainable livelihoods opportunities and enhanced social service delivery (UNDP)

Activity Result 2.1 (by UNDP): *Energy resilience of key basic services such as schools, health facilities, water and local administration offices is strengthened through improved access to reliable alternative sources of energy*

- Development of technical specifications and procurement of solar equipment
- Install solar energy systems for social services for improved services
- Install solar energy for vulnerable households
- Install solar energy systems for productive assets and community production facilities.

Activity Result 2.2 (by UNDP and ILO): *Women and youth play an active role in the provision of solar energy in their communities through solar microenterprises*

- Develop competency-based curricula based on the new and emerging youth and women-friendly solar technology occupations.
- Provide vocational solar skills training to technicians (women and youth)
- Promote solar micro business and business connection and networking among rural and urban dealers' communities.

Output 3: Communities and local authorities have enhanced capacities to respond to conflict and gender sensitive community priority needs

Activity Result 3.1 (by UNDP and FAO): *Water User Associations (WUA) established*

- Establish or revive Water User Associations (WUA)

Activity Result 3.2 (by UNDP): *Community-based organizations have enhanced capacities to develop conflict- and gender- sensitive community resilience plans reflecting community priority needs and actions*

- Insider Mediators (IM) recruited and trained based on specific criteria and vetted.
- Production of conflict analysis and conflict scans.
- Establishment of community committees and facilitation of community dialogues around priority conflicts by IMs with participation of communities
- Capacity building of partners on gender, conflict sensitive approach and social cohesion
- Establish/operationalise Village Cooperative Councils (VCC) through training and technical support
- Develop community resilience plans based on conflict scans and prioritisation for gender and conflict sensitive community initiatives
- Provide block grant based on community compact for 248 priority community initiative identified under Community Resilience Plans

Activity Result 3.3 (by UNDP): *Local authorities are better able to plan, monitor and coordinate gender- and conflict-sensitive resilience building, recovery priorities and response at the district level through a participatory approach*

- Conduct public service damage assessment by citizen and a develop citizen monitoring system.
- (Re) activate District Management Teams to restore minimum public service delivery
- Provide necessary technical capacity building support to local authorities for planning and implementation of the recovery plans
- Develop conflict and gender sensitive district recovery plans with monitoring framework and implement priority interventions

1.3.3 Other details of the intervention

ERRY II was designed whilst taking into consideration the lessons learned from its predecessor, ERRY I. The project was specifically designed to address problems of the Yemeni population related to conflict and increased vulnerability, increasing food insecurity, loss of livelihoods and increased unemployment rate, higher vulnerability of youth and women, high internal displacement, collapse of basic services and capacity of local institutions, lack of access to energy. To do so, the project consists of six components:

- Livelihood Component
- Solar Component
- Food Assistance for Assets Component
- Agricultural Value Chain Component
- Social Cohesion and Local Governance Component
- Skills and Entrepreneurship Employment Component

It will target 740,000 beneficiaries in sixteen districts in six governorates, namely Abyan, Hajjah, Hodeida, Lahj, Taiz and Sana'a. ERRY II aims at targeting the most vulnerable groups, notably unemployed youth, women, socially excluded and other marginalized groups, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and stressed host communities, households with highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, women-headed households, as well as people with disabilities and minority groups. Governorates have been selected based on accessibility, levels of food insecurity, potential for agriculture and presence of partner agencies.

1.4 Evaluation methodology and approach

The European Commission has established systematic and timely evaluation of its programmes and activities as a priority. The focus of its evaluations is on the assessment of achievements and on the quality and the results of Actions in the context of an evolving cooperation policy with an increasing emphasis on result-oriented approaches. Therefore, this evaluation will look for evidence of why, whether or how results were linked to the EU intervention under consideration and sought to identify the factors driving or hindering progress.

1.4.1 Evaluation criteria

The evaluation is based on a comprehensive analysis of project implementation along the five OECD-DAC evaluation criteria relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. Since the intervention is ongoing, the evaluation was treated as a mid-term evaluation and hence, impact was not assessed. As per consultation with the EUD, the evaluation team has made a strong effort to bring out lessons learned.

Up to now, there has not been any monitoring report of ERRY II under the TPM contract. Four monitoring assignments are planned or have been recently initiated.

1.4.2 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation has assessed the above-mentioned project for its implementation period from 1 March 2019 until the moment the data were collected (August 2021) and has looked into all activities of the project. Interviews have taken place with key stakeholders covering all five specifically targeted governorates in order to get a good overview. As for beneficiary interviews, to respond to time constraints, beneficiaries have been randomly sampled from two districts from governorates in the north and one in the south.

The evaluation has made an effort to consider whether, and if so how, gender equality and women empowerment had been considered in the identification/formulation documents and the extent to which they have been reflected in the implementation of the Action and its monitoring.

1.4.3 Methodology

The methodology is based on evaluation questions, which are grouped per DAC criterion, and which were agreed with EU preceding the data collection (Annex 3). Based on the evaluation questions, semi-structured questionnaires were developed for KIIs and surveys for beneficiary interviews (Annex 4). The KII questionnaires were sufficiently structured to allow synthesising and analysis of the data but leave room for the interviewers to adapt the questions to the area of interest and knowledge of the respondent.

The methodology includes a desk review of project documents (see Annex 5), key informant interviews (KIIs) with a representative sample of 30 key stakeholders, field surveys with 24 beneficiaries (approximately half of them being men and half women), and field observation from the three sampled governorates (see the table in section 1.5). The governorates proposed for data collection include one from the south (Abyan, proposed district Khanfir) and two from the north (Hodeida (proposed district Az Zuhrah)) and Taiz (proposed district Ash-Shamaytayn).³² Due to COVID-19 restrictions Focus Group Discussions will not be considered.

The assignment was implemented along the following phases:

- 1) The inception phase, which entailed compilation and review of documents relevant to the evaluation and identification of priority issues with assistance of the EUD. Furthermore, the issues and questions outlined in the ToR were studied to develop the approach of the evaluation. Tools and methodology were developed, and information gaps identified. The outcome of the desk review phase provided the team with a first insight into key issues and hypotheses to test in the next phase.
- 2) The field phase, during which interviews were held, and primary data collected. Team members from Particip located in the field in Yemen have collected data from beneficiaries at field level. Two national experts have conducted interviews with key informants (KIs) by phone or over internet.
- 3) The synthesis phase, where data were analysed and assessed as per evaluation questions and the DAC criteria. Based upon this analysis, the report was developed, containing findings, lessons learned, conclusions and recommendations. The national experts have developed a draft report, which was then finalised by the team leader.

This is the first draft of the evaluation report. After having received feedback, the team will adapt the report to the comments and suggestions of the EU and the Reference Group in an iterative manner, until the EU is satisfied with the contents. Thereupon, the final version of the report will be submitted.

1.5 Proposed respondents

On 8 June 2021, the evaluation had an introductory call with UNDP. Based on this consultation and the available documentation, a list of key respondents was drawn up, which can be found in Annex 6. UNDP provided the contact details of key stakeholders and respondents. The team has randomly sampled beneficiary respondents and key stakeholders, distributed over the various stakeholder groups.

1.6 Challenges, limitations and mitigations

In consultation with UNDP, the team had to interview beneficiaries by phone, since obtaining approval of SCAMCHA for on-site interviews is a complex process. In addition, as a result of the COVID pandemic, travelling was difficult or impossible. Conducting interviews by phone at least mitigated this constraint, as this limited the risk of spread of COVID. Nonetheless, even if a sufficient amount of food quality data has been collected, phone interviews do not offer the possibility of more in-depth interaction with the respondents and field observations.

³² For the purpose of having an alternative in requesting permission from SCAMCHA, district Bani Qa'is in governorate Hajjah will also be proposed.

Furthermore, the time and budget available were limited, and thus, no large-scale data collection could take place, and no statistically significant data could be produced. The number of interviewed beneficiaries was relatively low; hence their perceived challenges came out under various questions.

Lastly, it is assumed that interviewees sometimes tend to give socially acceptable answers, reply in a way that leads to conclusions matching their views or respond in a more positive way than is justifiable, since they desire the project to continue. The evaluation has made the utmost effort to ask semi-structured questions that were sufficiently open to avoid creating bias. Moreover, triangulation was used by comparing outcomes from interviewees from different backgrounds and with findings from the desk review.

1.7 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations of respondents was of utmost priority in determining appropriate methods and implementation. All information collected from interviews was treated as confidential, and respondents were informed about the confidentiality at the onset of each interview. Information was used solely for facilitation of the analysis. Respondents were not quoted in the report without their permission. Interviewees were approached respectfully, and the evaluators tried to use as little time as possible, in particular in interviews with the beneficiaries.

2 Evaluation Findings

2.1 Relevance

EQ 1: To what extent do the project objectives and design correspond to the needs and rights of the beneficiaries and the policies and priorities of partners at the different levels?

1.1 Were the most suitable beneficiaries targeted and how vulnerable were they? What were the targeting criteria? Is there a targeting strategy, if yes, what does it say?

A targeting strategy has been developed for ERRY II, identifying the criteria of the most vulnerable beneficiaries and their needs and constraints. The targeting criteria were revised, based on lessons learned from ERRY I. The project was found to target the most suitable beneficiaries based on this strategy. The strategy helps prioritizing the most vulnerable groups and the populations in need in geographical areas, which had the highest poverty indicators and the highest levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. The targeted vulnerable groups included IDPs, returnees and stressed host communities, households with high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, women-headed households, and people with disabilities. Many respondents from NGOs including Implementing Partners (IPs) stated that the ERRY II targeted those in need, including from remote geographical areas where no one had worked before, such as Sirar district in Abyan governorate.

General targeting criteria were used by all UN partners under the ERRY II project to ensure vulnerable people were reached. Specific targeting criteria were then developed by each UN agency and used for each component, to ensure that the activities were suitable and feasible for participants. For example, the targeting criteria for the emergency employment intervention include youths between 18 and 40 years old and beneficiaries from households that have children. For ILO, the targeting criteria for beneficiaries, who participate in the apprenticeship or small business, include people above 18 years old with a basic education level, with a basic literacy level. Targeted groups for cereal, sorghum and millet value chain differ from livestock fattening beneficiaries. Dairy production's beneficiaries are all female small farmers. In livestock and crop value chains, small farmers or land holders are targeted, with a minimum of 30% women, youth and IDPs.

The Participating United Nations Organizations (PUNOs) inform their IPs about the number of beneficiaries, which they are supposed to reach with their intervention in each area. The IPs then select that number of beneficiaries among the most vulnerable people by engaging the community. A few KIs found that this approach, combining a predefined number of beneficiaries with a fixed budget, sometimes hampers addressing needs optimally, in favour of prioritising the exact number of planned beneficiaries.

Some local IPs conduct assessments for verification. The Village Cooperative Councils (VCCs) and local committees confirmed that participatory methods to identify and select the beneficiaries were used. For example, in Khanfar, youth, unemployed, poor people with necessary skills were targeted, while women were targeted by health awareness. The process was also found to partly depend on the integrity of the registrants (such as people who are nominated by the local council or under the votes of the community). Most government respondents said that they were not part of identifying the beneficiaries, but they confirmed that ERRY II targets the most underserved regions and the communities most in need.

A few KIs reported that IPs sometimes struggle, when the number of people in need in a certain location is larger than the numbers targeted by the PUNOs, which is the case in most locations. Also, sometimes the IPs have to ensure complementarity of activities for selected beneficiaries and find that beneficiaries are not always eligible for more than one activity. Verifying and adjusting the lists of beneficiaries then takes additional time.

The PUNOs had agreed at the onset to work in the same district and location to achieve synergy in order to maximise impact. At times, specific targeting criteria and characteristics of activities, or absence

of approval by the Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA) in the north, prevented the PUNOs from working in the same district. It also happened that the PUNOs worked in the same district but in different communities, so that the envisaged synergy could not take place.

Some of the targeting criteria were found to have an implicit risk of promoting unwanted results by some KIs. For example, the criteria of having a big family and pregnant women were said to potentially have encouraged families to increase their size, to ensure they were targeted by the ERRY I and II.

1.2 Is the collaboration and task distribution between collaborating UN partners and potential implementing partners adequate?

The task distribution among UN partners and implementing partners was based on the mandates, expertise, and experience of each agency, in relation to the project and its objectives. The plan for the task distribution was said to be based on the agreement that components and activities by each PUNO would be complemented by the other activities in every community (see also question 1.1), which happened only partly. Challenges that were faced, including permission issues, limited the synergy considerably, and finally, it only took place in eight districts out of 17.

The task distribution between international NGOs (INGOs) and local NGOs was found suboptimal by some KIs, because INGOs may be doing the same work in districts that local NGOs are doing in other districts. They believed that if the same work can be done by local NGOs and INGOs do not bring in any specific added value, more local NGOs can be given the chance to grow through such projects. A few KIs also stated that the role of Search for Common Ground (which focuses on conflict resolution and gender training only) is a good example of bringing specific knowledge to the project.

A few KIs reported that some of the tasks that need technical knowledge and skills, like agriculture, irrigation, and infrastructure, were distributed to INGOs and local NGOs that are not experts in the required field. A local authorities' respondents demonstrated their discontent with INGOs and local NGOs working in technical fields without sufficient expertise and without hiring experts with such expertise, in particular in the seed value chain. They said that a mistake can affect the livelihood of many farmers. Some IPs found that vendors brought seeds with poor or mixed quality, leading to inadequate crop growth.

The collaboration was based on the plan that the four UN organizations had developed at the design stage. There are some good examples of how the organizations complement each other. ILO and its local partners for instance targeted beneficiaries who worked on cash for assets with WFP. ILO provided the beneficiaries of the WFP with training and in-kind grants to start their own business, which helped them gather a more sustainable income. Also, FAO, UNDP and the IPs implement joint components such as solar energy. FAO identifies the need, and the beneficiaries with UNDP install the solar system. Training is also an example of a joint component between FAO and the ILO. FAO forms women's groups in each village, and each woman receive a cow and equipment. ILO then trains women on how to market their dairy products.

The four UN organizations also developed an M&E plan, where they can jointly monitor progress and measure achievements. The joint Coordination Unit holds monthly meetings and follows up with action points. The PUNOs share reports and conduct joint missions. There is also a sub-coordination level group, where they discuss challenges or delays and suggest alternatives. Many PUNOs and IP staff believed that the synergy approach has helped coordination, collaboration and task distribution improve when compared to the first phase, but nonetheless, there is also ample room for improvement. Some local authorities however found that the coordination with the local authorities still needs to be improved.

1.3 What kinds of assessments have been conducted, and were beneficiaries engaged? Has a gender analysis been conducted and has gender been considered in other assessments?

The design of ERRY II had relied on the lessons learned from ERRYI, on regular interaction with beneficiaries, and on joint missions by PUNOs. Also, a baseline assessment was conducted to provide benchmark data for measuring progress and effectiveness. During the implementation, some PUNOs

and their partners worked with local communities to draw plans, which included situation and problem analyses. Moreover, each PUNO conducted specific assessments for each component via IPs.

The assessment findings have been used to inform ERRY II. Some IPs stated that they usually conduct additional assessments including needs assessments, target group assessments, and market assessments. The majority of KII respondents confirmed that gender is always considered in all assessments.

Some local authorities participated in assessing community needs to develop village and sub-district resilience plans, a process that was supported by the Social Fund for Development (SFD), providing training in needs assessments and planning. According to many KIIs, the participatory development of such resilience plans with the communities can also be seen as an assessment. For example, three village-level and one district-level project were identified after a needs assessment was conducted. This included schools’ rehabilitation, construction of village roads and reforming of the water supply network; for the district-level project, a hangar for the industrial and technical institute was built.

Multiple capacity assessments were conducted but the findings did not always lead to adaptations to implementation. This included a local market without the capacity to provide solar tools for young entrepreneurs. Furthermore, an assessment into necessary skills for women revealed that they did not only need sewing skills, but also community development skills, which was not followed up. Also, environmental risk assessments had not been conducted as a basis to the multiple environment and climate change related activities, which had been implemented.

Some KIIs found that comprehensive needs assessments were lacking, and that the project only used voluntarily needs assessments focusing on certain topics, such as youth needs assessments by young people in the community. They found that pre-implementation assessments to design the project’s interventions and choose appropriate approaches were not sufficiently conducted.

Almost half of the beneficiaries stated that they had participated in the assessments (Table 1). The beneficiaries mentioned that the assessments were conducted by most PUNOs and their IPs. The beneficiaries, who were selected to participate in the survey, were involved in assessments related to skills and entrepreneurship, agriculture value chain, emergency employment, livelihood, social cohesion, solar energy, and local governance.

Table 1: Have you participated in any type of needs assessment for ERRY II?

Response	Male		Female		Total	
Yes	3	30.0%	9	64%	12	50%
No	7	70.0%	5	36%	12	50%
Don't know	0	0.0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	10	100%	14	100%	24	100%

The beneficiaries were asked about the most important challenge that they or their household had faced in the past years. Almost half of both men and women mentioned financial difficulties and their inability to provide the basic needs of their families.

Some KII respondents highlighted a number of issues regarding the conducting of needs assessments, which included the lack of technical knowledge, especially in agriculture in general and seeds in particular. Local authorities found that assessment and addressing of irrigation challenges, including repair of canals and pipes, needed more attention. They also said that the needs that came out in assessments could not always be incorporated into the ERRY II activities. For example, in some villages, there were too few classrooms in schools and roads, but the project was not able to address these needs.

1.4 What are the policies and strategies of government and humanitarian/development partners working on resilience? Is the ERRY II aligned to these?

ERRY II is aligned with the resilience related policies of the government, as well as with the policies and strategies of the EU and Yemen on resilience. Some PUNOs and IPs reported that they were not aware of the contents of resilience policy by government or humanitarian or development partners. There are a few policies at national level that are designed for components which are relevant to resilience.

Still, there are policies focusing on components that contribute to resilience, such as cash for work, that are known and used. UN organizations were perceived as being influential players in resilience, and

they work with other partners like SFD, which is one of the pioneer organizations in this field. One example of aligning such policies and strategies is that all the organizations working on cash for work pay the same daily rate.

A few local authority members stated that interventions are only acceptable if based on a local authority plan, but that IPs sometimes implement activities according to their own plans. A VCC member confirmed that most IPs implement the activities of ERRY II according to the resilience plan they prepared, but sometimes PUNOs and IPs also implement other activities with other projects without considering these resilience plans. It had happened a few times that PUNOs and their partners started to implement their activities even before developing the resilience plan.

1.5 How has ERRY II adapted itself to the changing context, i.e., the COVID pandemic, the conflict situation or natural disasters?

ERRY II has applied various measures to adapt to the changing context. For example, UNDP worked with IPs such as Search for Common Ground to analyse the conflict and train all partners on conflict sensitivity. For COVID-19, PUNOs and the IPs reported that they suspended many activities until they provided the protection measures and precautions for all components, such as wearing face masks, and safe distancing. Coordination meetings were held online. When on field visits, the organisations took all necessary precaution. Nonetheless, the level of coordination among partners has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic since the level of interaction was affected, and due to higher work pressure as a result of mitigation measures.

At the beginning of the COVID-19 breakout in 2020, the safety and protection requirements and equipment had not been available. Government and donors decided that the activities had to be discontinued until a budget for COVID-19 requirements was provided to IPs based on an approved COVID-19 related plan. Now, all activities are implemented under COVID-19 protocol. For example, IPs use soap and sterilizers, especially for cash-for-work beneficiaries; workers were divided into groups, safe social distancing in work sites was marked with phosphoric lines, awareness was raised, and some of the training workshops for young entrepreneurs were conducted online. In the field training schools, a protocol was developed, trained and adhered to, and safety tools were distributed to all farmers and engineers, as well as to women. Most meetings are currently still being held online.

1.6 Is the approach the most appropriate for the beneficiaries and local capacities?

ERRY II has seven areas of intervention,³³ which are all relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries and the targeted rural communities. The PUNOs and their IPs have demonstrated sufficient capacity to implement the project. The project being based on lessons learned from ERRY I and on first-hand experience of the beneficiaries on their needs during the conflict, makes it suitable to improve their resilience during the war. The increasing engagement of local NGOs and the SFD, with their long experience in community-based activities, was found beneficial to ensuring the most appropriate approaches were selected.

According to SFD, the target beneficiaries are able to select their priority intervention as the approach is fully bottom-up. The activities and approaches were seen as adapted to locally driven solutions and based on beneficiaries' insights. For example, women were allowed to work as a group for solar panels instead of individually based on their own request and this turned out to be one of the success stories. Also, the COVID-driven delay of shipments led to UNDP encouraging the local manufacture of some tools for ERRY II.

Some respondents found the role of government in the implementation too limited, and saw scope to improve this by strengthening complementarity. They also found that cross-collaboration between ERRY II activities and the other projects of the PUNOs could be enhanced. An example mentioned was for WFP to contract the projects producing dairy or food crops for their school feeding program.

³³ Cash for Work and Assets; crops and livestock value chains; micro-businesses; solar energy; social cohesion; local governance and skills development

Local authorities indicated that ERRY II has met a number of needs of the communities and made a positive change in living conditions. Nonetheless, since conditions are deteriorating for vulnerable people, notable for displaced people but also for the communities, the need for food assistance still persists. The allocated budget for ERRY II was perceived as insufficient in the face of existing and increasing needs. Also, some KIs found that certain priorities were overlooked, such as irrigation-related needs in a number of districts.

Among the beneficiaries, 83% found that ERRY II activities were suitable (table 2); all men were positive, whilst 71% of women agreed. Those who did not find the activities suitable, said that they had received training but no in-kind grants, that prices had increased, or that they had received too little animal feed.

Table 2: Were the ERRY II support/activities suitable for you?

Response	Male		Female		Total	
Yes	10	100%	10	71%	20	83%
No	0	0%	3	22%	3	13%
I did not participate in ERRY II	0	0%	1	7%	1	4%
Total	10	100%	14	100%	24	100%

When the beneficiaries were asked what else they would like to engage in that would be more suitable for them, 20% responded that they would like to continue training in the same projects. The others included campaigns raising awareness about the cleanliness of the environment, farming drills, manufacturing of cheese and dairy, awareness, education projects, goat farming, wool production using machines, and supporting IDPs.

When beneficiaries were asked if receiving an in-kind grant was the best option to address the challenges that they face, 79% agreed, again with a higher percentage of men (table 3). The 21% of the beneficiaries, who said that the grants were not the

Table 3: Was receiving an (in-kind) grant for you the best option to address the challenges?

Response	Male		Female		Total	
Yes	9	90%	10	71%	19	79%
No	1	10%	4	29%	5	21%
I did not participate in ERRY II	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	10	100%	15	100%	25	100%

best option to address the challenges they face, said that the (in-kind) grants were insufficient to make a living, for instance in terms of animal feed or receiving one sewing machine.

Some IPs said that many beneficiaries were not happy about the quantity that they received directly, such as the seeds, especially in the southern areas, where the agricultural holdings are bigger than the ones in the north. They also reported that some of the beneficiaries who worked in cash for work or cash for assets, were engaged less days than they had expected. Some said that the beneficiaries found that livestock support was less than what they expected from such organizations.

Table 4: Did anything happen that made it more difficult to implement what you have learned/acquired under ERRY II?

Response	Male		Female		Total	
Yes	1	10%	1	7%	2	8%
No	9	90%	12	86%	21	88%
I did not participate in ERRY II	0	0%	1	7%	1	4%
Don't know	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	10	100%	14	100%	24	100%

When the beneficiaries were asked if anything happened that made it more difficult to implement what they have learned or acquired under ERRY II, 88% answered no. Among the 8% percent who said yes, there were those saying that after training, they were not eligible for in-kind grants like sewing machines and did not have enough money to open new projects (table 4).

1.7 Is there a complaint mechanism for beneficiaries? Is it working well?

All PUNOs and IPs have a complaint mechanism, which includes toll free phone numbers, complaint boxes, and hotlines. The complaint mechanisms are usually managed by M&E staff in each organization. They also have a policy, which prescribes how to respond, based on the type of the complaint.

IPs perceived the main complaint to be related to targeting, as many people feel they are eligible, but only a fixed number is selected. The IPs found that even if those complaining people were mostly poor, they were not eligible according to ERRY II targeting criteria. A few IPs had received complaints regarding the work of some contractors, and they had conducted comprehensive investigation including field visits to assess this.

Most complaints go directly to a case manager and are treated as confidential. The community committees also receive complaints from citizens and discuss them with the local authority. A few local authorities and local committee members said that most of the beneficiaries are illiterate, so they are not fully aware of the complaints mechanism and what confidentiality means.

Beneficiaries were well aware of the existence of the mechanism (table 5) but did not use it frequently. Only a proportion of women had used it (29%) and among them, just a quarter found the response helpful.

Table 5: Knowledge about and use of complaint mechanism

Response	Male	Female
Know about mechanism	80%	86%
Do not know about mechanism	20%	14%
Launched a complaint	0%	29%
Did not launch a complaint	100%	71%
Response was helpful	0%	25%
Response was not helpful	0%	75%

1.8 Does ERRY II have any influence on conflict risks, conflict dynamics, violence, lack of human security and other dimensions of fragility?

Most respondents agreed that ERRY II had influenced conflict risks and dynamics. Training on conflict resolution is an important component of ERRY II and includes conflict analysis and finding solutions through the community. Also, ERRY II was perceived to have addressed lack of resources and services that is sometimes at the basis of conflicts, such as related to roads and water. The project solved disputes over water resources by working through Water Users Associations (WUAs). Other examples mentioned included stopping cross-border animal diseases, conducting awareness campaigns for the entire community on planting vegetables and sorghum for better nutrition, and addressing crop-damaging insects coming in from other fields.

The IPs agreed that though ERRY II positively influences the resilience of families, especially in agricultural practices and livestock, access to the market will only be pursued once the marketing plan is in force, for marketing dairy products and fertilizer production.

2.2 Coherence

EQ 2: To what extent is the project coherent with other relevant interventions at the local or supra-local level, financed by the EU or by other donors?

2.1 Do the implementing organisations coordinate sufficiently (internally and externally), to avoid duplication and overlap? Was complementarity observed?

Components of ERRY II were found to internally complement each other, and the design ensures maximum benefit for the beneficiaries and avoid duplication. Moreover, the targeted areas/district were selected carefully, so as not to overlap with or duplicate other projects. The IPs also ensure coordination in terms of providing support for various interventions. For example, the SFD is implementing the ERRY II Local Governance component, which is coordinated with the EU funded Social Protection for Community Resilience Project (SPCRP) and the Strengthening Institutional and Economic Resilience in Yemen (SIERY) Project as well as with governance-related projects funded by FCDO, GIZ and the

World Bank. ERRY II complemented these interventions by targeting vulnerable households and communities that had not been targeted by other projects with resilience and livelihood interventions.

Most PUNOs and IPs also found coordination to be addressed through their participation in the Food Security and Livelihood Cluster. The IPs confirmed that coordination takes place through attending regional food security and livelihood cluster meetings. Meetings with UN are conducted only bilaterally, with each UN agency separately. IP headquarters coordinates with each UN agency in Sana'a, while the field staff coordinates with the VCCs, local authority, and project's volunteers by conducting regular meetings, yet these meetings are also bilateral meetings.

2.2 To what extent is the action coherent with actions of other development partners?

Most KIs found the action is coherent with actions of others, including those funded by EU. ERRY II also works with staff from relevant ministries to ensure coherence of some components, like vocational training.

According to some government staff, there is a lack of institutional arrangement and partnership within the relevant ministries, if compared to the offices at governorate and district levels. Government and other KIs recommended the project to operate via official channels and frameworks to ensure effectiveness and quality from governmental cadre, who are experienced in such interventions.

Some KIs reported not to understand, why ERRY II did not work more closely with government agencies like the Ministry of Agriculture and the agricultural extension workers, who are specialists with experience, working in every village that ERRY II operates in. According to the project documents,³⁴ ERRY II has collaborated with this in its fight against animal disease outbreaks, as a campaign was carried out in close coordination with local authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture. There is no evidence however of a likewise collaboration in seed distribution and crop production.

A large part of the PUNOs' and IPs' work was found to be based on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, which aims to increase the coherence to address vulnerability before, during and after crises and ensure to increase the coordination to effectively meet the needs of the most vulnerable people. KIs however perceived, that the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach was not applied in some of the targeted districts, where the role of government in development and peace was limited.

2.3 What is the comparative advantage/ of the four UN agencies in implementing this intervention?

Each of the four PUNOs has a mandate and focus that is important to ERRY II and its component, and the agencies are mostly complementary. Under ERRY II, the task distribution was designed in such a way, that any potential overlap was avoided and the PUNOs were able to combine their particular strengths into a coherent programme.

KIs saw this engagement of four UN agencies, each with their own extensive knowledge and experience in the components that they are engaged in, as an important added value. The increasing engagement of local IP actors, who can help provide flexible and locally driven solutions, was cited as added value as well. This had enabled the project to test also innovative solutions such as a solar panel project led by female entrepreneurs. KIs also reported that ERRY II had reached out to areas where others did not, like the Sirar district. Moreover, the joint nature of ERRY II had allowed providing internally and externally complementary activities to targeted regions, communities and beneficiaries, even if the PUNOs had not managed that in all target districts.

³⁴ Progress Report. Supporting Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen (ERRY II). January-July 2021

2.3 Efficiency

EQ 3: To what extent are resources being efficiently allocated to achieve the expected results?

3.1 Has ERRY II faced any delays or postponements? What was the reason? What has been/is being done to mitigate this?

Most KI respondents said that a number of activities under ERRY II had initially faced delays and postponements for various reasons. One of the reasons was the delay of obtaining permission in areas in North Yemen. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic also caused delay, as was indicated under question 1.5. The PUNOs were able to apply mitigation measures in most cases though. An example brought up was that when cash for work activities were delayed so that beneficiaries could not be trained on time, their household members were trained in their place, so that both activities still benefited the same household.

IPs confirmed that delays were more significant in the north. Getting on-time project agreement from authorities in the north took more than eight months on average. This was more than expected and led to delays of up to two months even for simple activities. IPs found that such delays were unavoidable but were able to complete most of the activities on time by intensifying their work pace.

Other mitigation measures that were shared included replacing project, pending over a long-term landownership, with alternative projects from the VCC plan.

A few IPs said that they were delayed at the onset, because they had to sign two agreements, one for EU support and one for SIDA, and believed combining the procedure would make it easier to start the interventions on time.

3.2 Does ERRY II efficiently provide the expected services to the ultimate beneficiaries in an inclusive manner?

Each PUNO operates in accordance with its own regulations, rules, and procedures. And they have resources dedicated to results. ERRY II was perceived to efficiently provide the expected services to the ultimate beneficiaries and in an inclusive manner, as also emerges from the response to question 1.1. All PUNOs and IPs showed a high level of flexibility, which helped to efficiently provide the expected services. Some KIs stated that services were provided best, where PUNOs implemented their activities in a complementary manner, targeting the same communities and beneficiaries. This was for instance the case if beneficiaries received cash for work and subsequently received small grants and training to start their sustainable income.

Some IPs found that for instance solar energy and chairs provided to schools and health facilities efficiently served large groups of beneficiaries. VCCs reported that even though vulnerable beneficiaries had improved their lives considerably, it would have been even more efficient to focus strongly on rehabilitating agricultural land and terraces, building water barriers and dams, and fixing roads.

Some services did not meet expectations. One of these mentioned was an unfinished road in one of the villages, and also the distribution of low quality and low quantity seeds for farmers with large agricultural holdings. FAO said that they are aware of the issues facing distribution of seeds and they are working on it with authorities and IPs.

When beneficiaries were asked about their rating of ERRY II services, 79% rated it good (table 6). The beneficiaries who rated the services as limited or poor said they had only received small quantities of seed ten months ago, and that not all trainees had received sewing machines.

Table 6: How would you rate the services of ERRY II?

	Female	Male	Total
Good	79%	77%	78%
Limited	0%	15%	7%
Poor	21%	8%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%

3.3 Could ERRY II have used alternative options to decrease costs? Are other organisations using more cost-efficient methods?

Most KIs said that there many actors in Yemen implementing similar activities and even the PUNOs themselves implement similar activities, funded by other donors. Nonetheless, none of these interventions has a comprehensive design comparable to ERRY II. The majority said that it is difficult to compare costs, since these vary based on donors’ requirements and budget, the targeted areas, and whether the IP is local or international.

PUNOs and IPs among others try to increase cost efficiency through the in-kind contribution from local communities, which reduces the cost and ensures ownership at the same time.

All IPs use their own rates for trainers and experts. Some KIs said that local NGOs may face challenges due to the small budget, which does not allow them to pay the staff and trainers the same rate as others do. This hampers their access to good quality experts and experts being paid higher rates at INGOs is seen to potentially affect their credibility.

Some KIs reflected that the project cost can be reduced by reducing the number of INGOs that work as IPs, also because they charge relatively high overhead costs. Even if the work that INGOs and local NGOs do is the same (be it in different districts) and their work and reports have the same quality, the costs of INGOs are higher due to this overhead.

3.4 Did ERRY II have the right mix of human resources to support the action? If not, what capacity or expertise was insufficiently available?

ERRY II is seen as having the right mix of human resources to support the action by KIs. They said that the PUNOs have an adequate mix of international and national experts in terms of expertise and experience. The project also includes IPs, who have long and leading experience, such as SFD. Moreover, most of the IP staff is trained on relevant subjects. In relation to gender balance among staff and experts, all organizations involved in ERRY II have a policy that ensures equal rights and opportunities for women.

Table 7: Beneficiary rating of staff capacity/ knowledgeability

	Female	Male	Total
Good	93%	90%	92%
Limited	0%	10%	4%
Neutral	7%	0%	4%
Total	100%	100%	100%

When asked about their rating of the staff capacity and knowledgeability, beneficiaries were positive; 93% of women and 90% of men rated it as good. No reason was provided by those who gave a less favourable rating.

3.5 Do monitoring systems use gender and age-related disaggregation and gender-sensitive questions? Are monitoring systems inclusive when it comes to marginalized people (IDPs, returnees) and vulnerabilities?

ERRY II has a monitoring system, which produces regular technical and financial reports. The report provides a description of the implementation, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, and to what extent outputs and outcomes have been achieved against planned indicators. Findings are based on joint field visits.

The monitoring system uses gender and age-related disaggregation (and measures indicators of female-headed households). It also uses gender sensitive questions. TPM was hired to follow the progress of the ERRY II as well. The TPM finalized their first monitoring report in June 2021. The TPM monitoring includes data collection on marginalized people (IDPs, returnees) and vulnerabilities women-headed household, pregnant and lactating women.

PUNOs and IPs ensure that WUAs and VCCs include women members, as part of managing and monitoring the activities in the field. According to the progress report of the first half of 2021, the project has developed a new information management system with a stronger gender focus. The project conducted the micronarrative including gender impact, which is being monitored at three stages: baseline, midline, and end line. The micronarrative captures the effects of the project on women and men in terms of short stories. Furthermore, KAP surveys and longitudinal surveys are conducted.

3.6 Have the results of monitoring systems been analysed and used to inform adaptations to the action?

According to project managers, results of monitoring systems are regularly analysed and used to inform adaptations to the action, as per policy of the four UN organizations. For example, the TPM report was shared with all PUNOs who came out with a management response and made adaptations to the observations.

2.4 Effectiveness

EQ 4: To what extent are the project outputs achieved, what was their quality and how far are they contributing to achieve the expected results?
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4.1 To what extent has ERRY II currently achieved its planned objectives, outputs and outcomes? What was the quality?

The majority of KIs found that despite the earlier delays, the project has achieved most planned objectives, outputs and outcomes at this point in time and in the expected quality. Nonetheless, some outstanding issues remain. FAO is still behind on its plan because they can’t distribute seeds in North Yemen. During the last PUNO meetings, it was decided to reallocate \$90,000 from the FAO budget to UNDP as UNDP is about to finish all its targets and has space to contribute to the FAO target. The PUNOs understand the challenges that FAO faces, including getting the permission from the authorities.

Some IPs have already finished the activities based on their plan. Up to July 2021, almost 70% of the project achievements were met in the south in the area of value chain development, providing equipment and training to farmers, vaccination of livestock and farming and marketing production. In the north, there is still a delay because of the permission from the authorities. Some projects have not finished yet and KIs were not sure that they can be finished, such as a village-market joint road in Bani Qais district, Hajja, where only half has been paved.

4.2 What is the likelihood that planned objectives, outputs and outcomes will be fully achieved by ERRY II’s end date? Which ones are unlikely to be met? Why?

Most planned objectives, outputs and outcomes will be fully achieved by ERRY II’s end date. PUNOs and IPs believed that where there were currently delays or activities not yet implemented as per plan, alternatives and budget reallocations had already been put in place to rectify this. This included replacing the seed component with irrigation, which is still under negotiation with Sida and the local authorities.

4.3 Does ERRY II have indications for early impact or indicating that future impact is likely to be achieved?

A number of early impacts were already observed by KI respondents. Improving the livelihood of the beneficiaries was one of the perceived early impacts. ILO for example found that income has improved for 70% of the beneficiaries, who had received training on small projects. Another early impact is the increased ability of the local community to analyse the conflict, to come up with solutions for conflict resolution, and to implement projects to address the conflict. The ability of the local communities to organize through local committees at different levels and develop resilience plans based on the current situation and prioritize their need is another sign of early impact. Some said that empowering women is an impact, as the women-led solar project is one the success stories of the project.

Early indications are found in beneficiary success stories notably in dairy, for 90% of women who were trained in the processes of dairy production, producing and marketing cheese and yogurt. Many interventions in the dairy sector have led to improvement of the income of the (mostly female) beneficiaries. Examples provided were FAO’s investment in a local farmer, who supplies the village dairy production centres with additional milk. In these centres, women work in groups and to process their own cows’ milk, supplemented by the farmer’s milk.

A gabion project in Abyan, which watered 4,000-5,000 acres, benefited many families, and improved their income. Cash for work projects were seen as providing the workers not only with cash, but also with long-term working skills. Some of them now are skillful masters, getting a daily labour rate of YR 4,000, compared to YR 2,000 before the project. Some beneficiaries said that they paid off their debts, other built roofs for their damaged houses, while others bought motorcycles to serve as local taxi and earn income. Children as well benefited from rehabilitating schools and classroom furniture.

When the beneficiaries were asked if participation had any effect on them and/or their household in financial terms, 75% responded positively (Table 8).

Table 8: Effect of the participation in ERRY II as perceived by beneficiaries

	Female	Male	Total
Yes, we are better off	71%	80%	75%
No	29%	20%	25%
Total	100%	100%	100%

The reasons beneficiaries gave for positive effects included their and their household’s better financial situation, the situation in the communities in terms of water and roads, and their increased skills and capacities. Annex 7 contains a sample of the responses given by beneficiaries.

When beneficiaries were asked if they and their family were able to live a decent life through the ERRY II support, 71% was positive (Table 9). The 29% who were less positive said that they were still in need of food and money, and that they had not received sewing machines.

When the beneficiaries were asked if they were able to generate sufficient income with the grant, 50% of women and 70% of men answered positively (Table 10). This was attributed among others to the project helping beneficiaries create capital, buy equipment, get trained and own a business (see also Annex 7 for a list of responses).

Table 9: Beneficiaries’ perceived ability to live a decent life

	Female	Male	Total
Yes	64%	80%	71%
No	36%	20%	29%
Don’t know	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Table 10: Beneficiaries’ perceived ability to generate a better income through ERRY II

	Female	Male	Total
Yes	50%	70%	58%
No	43%	20%	33%
Don’t know	7%	10%	9%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Those who were not able to generate a sufficient income also provided reasons. They said it was related to their work being of voluntary nature, to the income being improved but not enough, to the support being solar panels for the school, and to getting too little animal feed and not getting a sewing machine.

4.4 To what extent are result inclusive for all vulnerable groups, including from a gender perspective?

Most KIs found that the results were inclusive for all identified vulnerable groups through the ERRY II targeting criteria, which prioritised such groups. Local authorities confirmed that vulnerable groups benefited from district and village projects, for instance because their children go to school along with other community children. Women benefited from water and health facilities projects, young men and women from cash for work and cash for assets and farmers from agriculture, irrigation and livestock interventions either directly or indirectly as the project targeted the whole community’s resilience. Women IDPs also benefited from cash for work, as was illustrated from an example in AzZahrah where a female IDP established a small grocery store in her village.

A few KIs observed that deviations from selection methods sometimes led to decreased inclusivity. They mentioned among others the selection depending on pre-lists of PUNOs or IPs, involvement of local authorities such as Aqels and Sheikhs, and engagement of NGOs who had limited knowledge of the interventional areas.

4.5 Were there any positive or negative unintended effects?

Empowering local NGOs to be IPs for PUNOs was seen as an unintended positive effect, other positive effects were seen as planned results of ERRY II.

Some KIs noticed a negative effect in women being selected for the first stage but ineligible for the second stage of an activity. They thought that this may discourage them and their families in future, where it is already difficult to equally engage women to begin with. They came up with an example where a trained woman appeared not eligible for a sewing machine, and her father said: *"I knew that I should not have allowed you to get out of the house, you are a shame, and your place is the house not go out and fail us"*. It was understood that there are reasons behind eligibility, but the KIs thought that such sensitive gender issues should be treated with exceptional care.

A few KIs thought that one of the negative unintended effects could be that some families try to increase the number of children or have a pregnant woman in the household to be eligible for the support, which might affect the well-being of mothers and children. They based that on their observation, that the number of pregnant women had increased, and many families have children at an age of less than one year. They found that this could have been avoided by, instead of targeting large families, using the proportion of children in school as a criterion, or mothers breastfeeding up to two years.

A few KIs stated that some seed distribution had a negative impact, since they were brought in from outside the regions, which had caused genetic changes. Approval of the governorate's agriculture research center was therefore brought up as essential.

4.6 What factors have driven results, and what factors have hampered achieving results?

In general, results were perceived as being driven by the synergy approach, the capacity, experience and expertise of PUNOs and their partners. Also, the engagement of local NGOs to find locally owned solutions and the close work with local communities and authorities has contributed to driving results. Moreover, lessons learned from ERRY I have helped address challenges and include the best solutions from the onset. Hampering factors were authorities' lengthy approval procedures, especially in the north, and COVID-19 related challenges.

2.5 Sustainability

EQ 5: Is an appropriate exit strategy planned and implemented? To what extent are context-specific factors addressed by this strategy?

5.1 Does ERRY II avail of a documented exit strategy? What is its quality? To what extent is it gender sensitive? Was it developed in a participatory manner, and if so, which stakeholders had been involved? Is it being implemented?

The majority of the PUNOs said though there is no formal exit strategy, a sustainability strategy exists. ERRY II was designed to enable beneficiaries to be independent and not rely on humanitarian assistance only. Some PUNOs and IPs found that working with the relevant ministries and other partners should ensure the project's sustainability.

One of the local IPs said that as a local NGO, they are trying to develop a sustainable vision and plan for livestock dairy production. This process is still an idea, which will be discussed with women farmer groups, and in three months a consultative workshop will be held. Some KIs reported that cash for work and cash for assets components have a sustainability and exit plan which focuses on delegating the responsibility of community assets' maintenance to the VCCs, while IPs provide needed equipment for maintenance.

Despite all this firm believe in activities on the ground, as reflected above, being firmly anchored in sustainability, there is no documented exit strategy. Some KIs voiced ideas on what such exit strategy should entail, but the development process has not even started.

5.2 To what extent and how has the capacity of beneficiaries and stakeholders increased under ERRY II? Does it enable them to sustain results obtained under ERRY II?

The majority of KIs found that the capacity of beneficiaries and stakeholders had increased under ERRY II. The beneficiaries participated in vocational training including on micro-business and maintaining solar panels with ILO and UNDP and their IPs. Beneficiaries also received training on maintaining road and water projects by WFP and UNDP, and farmers were trained in maintenance by FAO. Even without a documented strategy, maintenance of infrastructure was a standard part of the project by working with community committees, and solar panels need little financial input in the coming years, whilst they allow beneficiaries and communities large savings on diesel consumption.

Local NGOs’ capacity has been built by PUNOs on different topics, including cash for work and training on micro-business by UNDP. ILO trained their local NGOs on micro-business and its global curriculum. FAO trained its local partners on programming and administration skills. Many respondents from local NGOs confirmed that their capacity strengthened under ERRY II, which included engagement in field activities and preparing proposals, though they perceived it as not sufficient yet.

The increased capacity of the community was seen as most important. This was achieved through forming local committees, preparing resilience plans and implementing the construction or rehabilitation of assets like gabions, lighting, water pipes, schools and health facilities. Capacity building of youth beneficiaries in solar energy was seen as valuable too.

Some KIs perceived that the project had built the capacity of the relevant ministries, for example, regarding agriculture value, quality outputs, office administration, and extension approach. FAO also has a training program for field implementers (master training).

5.3 Are funds needed the phasing out and to continuations of services post-project? Are these budgeted and available, or have sources been identified?

KIs from the PUNOs, IPs, local communities, and local authorities said that the need for funds to phase out depends on the activity. Budgets for maintenance for instance were developed together with community committees.

For supporting individual beneficiaries to sustain their income after the project, UNDP has realized that it is important for the beneficiaries who received in-kind grants to start their micro-business, to connect with a microfinance institution to take loans to sustain and expand their project.

5.4 Can the results of ERRY II be maintained by beneficiaries if economic or other external factors change? Are solutions provided by the project suitable for longer-term?

Some of KIs found that most of the ERRY II results will be maintained by beneficiaries even if economic or other external factors change, because many communities developed resilience plans to address such changes. Moreover, most of the training that beneficiaries obtained addressed maintaining the results during the challenging times and conflict. Nonetheless, if beneficiaries get injured or sick, and lose their income for a long time, this is also a threat as there is no fallback mechanism. A few KIs found it only moderately likely that beneficiaries can maintain the results.

This is because the situation in Yemen is really complicated, and thus, only beneficiaries who have access to resources like access to markets or loans probably can maintain the project results. A few KIs also said that maintaining results cannot be achieved unless the project continues for at least two years. A few said that the war, the currency collapse, the high prices, and the unavailability of materials in the market are outside factors that present continuous risk and obstacles to maintaining the micro-business.

Table 11: Do you think you will be able to continue the work/business you have started under the project?

	Female	Male	Total
Yes	86%	90%	88%
No	14%	10%	12%
Don’t know	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Some KIs perceived that especially in agriculture and irrigation, there will be no sustainable results if ERRY II discontinues. For example, even though new techniques like pipe irrigation and solar energy are beneficial, this is new to Yemen, and it takes time to set up an entire sustainable system.

Beneficiaries were positive about their chances to continue the business with 88% perceived to be able to do so (Table 11). The 12% that did not trust their ability to continue, brought up their lack of money, not having livestock to apply their learning and not having seeds to plant.

When beneficiaries were asked if they think of anything external can happen and force you to stop their work/business, half of the women and men said no, and 13% did not know. The remaining 37% brought up external factors like corona, diseases, conflict, climate related issues and deteriorating economic conditions.

5.5 To what extent have the government and the private sector been involved in ensuring sustainability of ERRY II?

Some KIs found that the role of government in ERRY II has decreased after ERRY I, due to a change in implementation modality in favour of NGOs. In ERRY I, agricultural offices had the capacity to provide extensionists for 2,400 beneficiaries. In ERRY II, local NGOs appeared not to have the capacity (yet) to cover the 21,000 beneficiaries that are currently assisted with similar activities, and they had to contract agricultural office's extensionists, leading to higher operational expenses.

According to VCCs, the private sector at the community and village level contributed especially to community initiatives and village projects, for example by building classes by contributing with part of the budget. The government on the other hand contributed at district level in paving the roads and added to the community's contribution with 10% - 20% of the budget.

Some government KIs reported that in order to ensure sustainability, the government's role should be stronger than supervision only.

5.6 How far has resilience of the various beneficiaries increased to shocks and pressure?

INGOs found that they had managed to support many families, which will remain resilient only as long as the project continues, but that the conflict is still too damaging to the economic situation for them to remain resilient.

A few KIs stated that during implementation of the project, they could measure the resilience by the short-term improvement in the livelihood of the beneficiaries and the implementation of the resilience plans. However, there are no studies conducted to measure how far increased resilience will continue after the project. WFP conducted impact evaluation studies, but only for the components they work on.

5.7 How far and how successfully has environmental sustainability and climate change been considered under ERRY II?

ERRY II has had an impressive focus on environment and climate change. The project has supported climate friendly equipment and other environment friendly projects. The solar component under ERRY II has improved access to renewable solar energy in communities, which has contributed to environmental sustainability. This benefited 105,000 individuals in selected schools, health centres and districts in Hajjah, Hodeidah and Taizz. The development of solar solutions for productive assets and communities' production facilities has just started.

Other measures taken included using debris in market reconstruction instead of dumping it. Also, ERRY II is piloting Waste, Water, Wind, Work and Women with initiatives for water desalination to promote the sustainable utilization of groundwater and other environment friendly components. In agricultural activities, hydroponic and biodegradable solutions were included.

VCCs believe mitigating environment risks through ERRY work against drought and desertification had contributed not only to better environment but also increased resilience.

A number of activities in ERRY II, which have contributed to environmental sustainability and climate change, were highlighted by the PUNOs. These included providing technical and institutional support to

WUAs established during ERRY I, by developing a mechanism to facilitate dialogues for water resource management, and sustainable crop production systems that require lower water input. Farmers' capacity and awareness to reduce groundwater exploitation had been strengthened. ERRY II works with WUAs to rehabilitate irrigation canals and equipping with solar pumps for irrigation in those communities.

During Farmer Field School sessions and other community trainings, awareness on environmental management and efficient use of water for agricultural practices is raised. Food for Asset activities on water and soil conservation, water harvesting, and building gabions contribute to environmental sustainability.

3 Conclusion and Recommendations

3.1 Conclusions

ERRY II is a joint programme implemented in Yemen, based on seven components.³⁵ ERRY II is implemented by four UN agencies and their international and local NGO partners. The relevance of the project was found good, as it addressed the needs to build resilience of vulnerable communities and households at local level and contributed to addressing the humanitarian needs in Yemen, aligned to national frameworks, be it that there are only few in place. The ERRY II design was found suitable to help people shift to resilience, so that they can meet their own food needs without relying on humanitarian aid.

The four agencies, based upon lessons learned from the preceding ERRY I, had acknowledged the need to operate in a truly joint manner and strive for synergy. This intended synergy, however, maximising impact in targeted communities by offering various forms of support in the same locations, did not always work well. This led to PUNOs working in different communities under the same districts or even in different districts. In 9 out of 17 districts, the synergy did not occur as planned. Moreover, complementarity between ERRY II and other interventions implemented by PUNOs was not always exploited, and the role of local authorities was seen as important but nonetheless limited.

The project had developed and used a well working targeting criteria, which had led to selecting the most vulnerable people at project level and the most suitable vulnerable people at components level. This was confirmed by half of the beneficiaries saying that their main challenge was being in financial difficulties and not being able to provide for their families, with ERRY II being designed to address basic needs. The approach was perceived as bottom-up, leading to beneficiaries being able to select their priority needs to be addressed.

Various types of assessments are used to inform ERRY II, even if some respondents observed that these were mainly smaller scale assessments, and that a comprehensive pre-implementation assessment was lacking. Nonetheless, the assessments were reasonably participatory, with almost half of beneficiaries having participated. There is no evidence, however, of strong assessments, having affected planning in an effective manner. Capacity assessments were done at various levels but did not lead to adaptations in the implementation. Even though gender is considered in the various assessment, there has not been a specific gender analysis.

There is no overall resilience policy, though cash for work approaches for instance are well aligned among the various implementers. ERRY II in general uses participatory resilience plans as a basis for implementation, but it happens that they start implementing before such plan is developed, and complementarity with other interventions is not always considered.

ERRY II adapted well to the changing context, firstly by adhering to conflict-sensitive programming, and secondly by developing and adhering to COVID-19 protocols, without having them affecting

³⁵ Cash for Work and Assets; crops and livestock value chains; micro-businesses; solar energy; social cohesion; local governance and skills development

implementation severely. Also, the integrated related to response to conflict and gender sensitive priorities including formation of WUAs were good assets to the community and helped adapting to changes as well.

Coherence was seen as reasonable, internally as well as external. Internally, the design had foreseen a strong coherence, but the reality had turned out slightly differently. Collaboration and coordination among the PUNOs and IDPs were found better than under ERRY I, as a result of the plan to achieve synergy. But even though a number of good examples were identified, most respondents found that this could be much further strengthened. ERRYII uses INGOs as well as local NGOs for the same type of work, with the same quality outputs and results. Local NGOs on the other hand were seen as much stronger in their ability to identify and implement innovative and locally acceptable solutions. It was observed that if local NGOs appear to be able to do this work just as well, a good opportunity for gradual localisation was found to present itself.

Internal and external coordination of ERRY II was found quite good, apart from the coordination between IPs and UN which was perceived as only taking place bilaterally with each UN agency. Also, it was observed that coordination and collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture was limited, focusing mostly on livestock and much less so on seed distribution and crop production. The Ministry's agricultural extensionists were not used as selected partners any longer.

Efficiency of ERRY II was found good. Most services were provided efficiently and in the quality that was expected, and often based on local solutions. The activities have not faced much delay, and if delay was faced, for instance on account of long SCMCHA approval procedures for the north and the COVID-19 related challenges, the implementers were flexible enough to find mitigation measures. The project is seen as efficiently implemented in terms of cost and quality of human resources, and the monitoring is of good quality and gender sensitive. The capacity and knowledge of project staff was rated high, by KIs as well as beneficiaries.

ERRY II is already perceived as demonstrating some forms of early impact, which include enhanced resilience, income and skills of beneficiaries, and demonstrated capacity and skills of communities. Beneficiaries themselves were reasonably positive as well, as 58% said they receive a better income because of ERRY II, and 71% find that the project has contributed to a decent life.

When it comes to environmental sustainability and climate change, ERRY II has been very active in including measures and activities as well as piloting innovative solutions. Also, supported by ERRY II, solar panels already emerged in many communities and are foreseen in others. An environmental risk assessment however was not included as a basis for these activities.

Many respondents found that sustainability had been well considered in the approach and activities of ERRY II. Capacity building of partners, communities and beneficiaries is seen as a strong contributor to sustainability. Nonetheless, there is no documented exit strategy. Most of the respondents from all categories believed that beneficiaries would be able to continue implementing their acquired skills and knowledge even under the difficult situation as it is. The skills and knowledge will continue to be available to them and their businesses are based on local needs. Maintenance mechanisms have been set up for local infrastructure and solar panels needs little investment but provide important savings. A minority cited the conflict, the climate and deteriorating economic conditions and personal risk of loss of income due to sickness or injury as potential threats to sustainability and lasting resilience.

3.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: For the PUNOs to assess the possibilities to fully pursue the intended synergy and adapt implementation accordingly

The evaluation team would like to bring out this recommendation as most important and urgent. The design of ERRY II brought out synergy at the community level as essential to ensure comparative advantages would be used to achieve the best results. Even though this was achieved partly, it only happened in eight districts, for various reasons.

It is recommended that ERRY II assesses, what challenges have led to the synergy having happened only partly or not at all in some locations. Based on the results, ERRY II should develop a strategy, that outlines how synergy can be truly achieved, and how challenges can be addressed and avoided from the onset, be it in terms of locations, beneficiary capacities of IPs. Before initialising activities in a new location, for instance, ERRY II needs to make sure that beneficiary households are eligible for all activities and IPs avail of the right capacity and knowledge. Good practice for planning and coordination approaches for resilience projects can be explored to serve as an example.

Following this, the synergy should be monitored, and adaptations made, as soon as only one of the PUNOs and their IPs appear to be implementing an activity or component. A shared database of the beneficiaries accessible by all IPs, which includes essential information would help operationalise the synergies and contribute to avoid potential issues of ineligibility. ERRY II also needs to find a way for their monitoring system to capture results of synergised efforts, so as to demonstrate the strong effects and encourage IPs to make it happen.

Recommendation 2: For ERRY II to further improve external and internal planning and coordination

The four PUNOs had regular bilateral meetings with their IPs, and they had a joint coordination unit for the project and its monitoring. It is recommended though, that coordination with the IPs does not take place bilaterally, but with all four PUNOs. In order to do so, the PUNOs may set up a group of people who are responsible for this internal coordination and meet with the IPs on a regular basis in the capital. Such mechanism will help promote the above-mentioned synergy, allow IPs to communicate with all PUNOs and find solutions for challenges in an efficient manner. Technical experts should also be included to enable addressing technical subjects in an in-depth manner. As part of the coordination between PUNOs, it is recommended to assess whether ERRY II activities can be linked to other interventions that are implemented by (one of the) the PUNOs.

Externally, it is recommended that ERRY II explore potential ways to extend the reach of its work with focus on developing inter-partner local and national level coordination and relationships with those it has not yet engaged with and consider forming platforms for coordination that include all formal and informal partners. Local authorities came up various times as a stakeholder that would require stronger coordination from ERRY II.

Recommendation 3: For EU and the PUNOs to allow a stronger role for local NGOs under ERRY II

ERRY II engages INGOs and local NGOs, and the work of both was perceived as very good. Local NGOs were seen as more cost-efficient though, and having more access to local sites, more knowledge of the people, the area and the language, and being better able to find locally driven solutions. It is therefore recommended to increase the proportion of local NGOs where possible.

This needs to be coupled with stronger coordination between IPs and capacity building, in line with the resilience framework that focuses on building local and rural capacities at the community level and enhancing structures that are accessible for local communities. Such an approach could help the PUNOs to gradually move to an approach that also includes not only NGOs that are based in Sana'a, but also those that reside in the project locations.

Recommendation 4: For ERRY II to re-engage agricultural extensionists in their crop related activities

Extensionists reportedly had been engaged directly in ERRY I, but no longer in ERRY II, even if IPs still requested their input indirectly. Though it is understood that the implementation modality has changed under ERRY II in favour of NGOs, the role of government extensionists can be beneficial to the project when it comes to seed distribution and crop production. Moreover, such approach presents an opportunity to help strengthen gender equality, by encouraging women to enrol into such training and engaging female extensionists for the project, which is most suitable for female ERRY II participants as well.

In the evaluation, issues with seed quality came up a number of times. FAO is the designated agency for such activities and collaborates strongly with the Ministry of Agriculture and is working to resolve the issue. It is therefore important for both FAO as an agency, responsible for quality standards of distributed seeds, and for the results of ERRY II. Furthermore, engaging extensionists has the potential to increase sustainability, as extensionists can continue the work, including through Farmer Field Schools, after ERRY II (and/or ERRY III) have phased out.

Recommendation 5: For the PUNOs to develop an exit strategy in a participatory manner, document and implement it

The evaluation observed that, even though sustainability had been strongly considered for the various components and activities and was promising, there is no documented exit strategy. If the EU and PUNOs embark on an ERRY III project, it is strongly recommended for the PUNOs to develop and document an exit strategy.

This strategy should be developed in a participatory manner, engaging all partners and also beneficiaries. It should describe how sustainability will be ensured, what will be the handover strategy and what are the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders engaged in implementing the exit strategy and in implementing any post-finalisation support. The exit strategy should be gender, climate and conflict sensitive, and its implementation needs to be regularly monitored.

If ERRY III is to be conceived, the design can again be improved based on lessons from ERRY II and gather more learning through M&E and specific studies. Ultimately, this could inform national and localized planning phase, based on the OCHA-IASC resilience framework.

3.3 Lessons Learnt

The team identified an important lesson learned from ERRY II, related to innovation in humanitarian context. Innovation has been identified under the Grand Bargain as an important focus to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian aid. Still, many actors perceive themselves hampered by the difficult context they work in and the observation that innovations are "only" project based. In ERRY II, which operates in one of the most difficult contexts in the world, it has appeared possible to pilot and integrate a number of innovations successfully. This was driven by the approaches and solutions being fully locally owned and providing benefits for the end users. There were a number of innovations to promote environment sustainability, which will need some follow-up to be fully integrated, but yet already demonstrate potential. When it comes to solar energy in particular, this is already working very well and is suitable for and appreciated by the targeted communities and beneficiaries.

Furthermore, the approach and the project components can be seen as a pilot for resilience approach in Yemen, noting that has not been done before, and it contains many assets for further development. If considering the OCHA-IASC resilience framework and the OECD criteria, this approach has a considerable potential toward the triple nexus in Yemen.

4 Annexes

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference for Third-Party Monitoring and evaluation for EU-funded projects in Yemen, of which ERRY II is one, will be separately submitted. For ERRY II, the ToR requested one evaluation.

Annex 2. Logframe

Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
Outcome: Crisis affected communities are better able to manage local risks and shocks for increased resilience	Resilience			All subsequent activities	
	Average targeted communities’ level of resilience (disaggregated by district)	1.8 (on a scale of 10) in 2016 ³⁶	2.8 by 2022 (level before the start of the conflict)		Survey, FGDs
	Average level of targeted rural communities/HHs with improved absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacity to cope up with crisis	TBD when baseline is complete	Will be set after baseline assessment		FGDs, KIIs, Documents Review
	% of targeted communities reporting reduction in frequency of conflicts	TBD	Will be set after baseline assessment		Annual reviews, mid-term reviews, evaluation
	Livelihood & Food Security				
Average level of improved livelihoods and income in targeted communities (disaggregated by district)	28% ³⁷	TBD when baseline is completed			

³⁶ ERRY Baseline Study, 2017. COBRA Resilience measurement framework applied to targeted districts.

³⁷ ERRY Baseline Study, 2017

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
	% of households with acceptable food consumption score - nutrition (FCS-N)	TBD when baseline is complete	80%		
	% of decrease of households' crisis coping strategies	TBD when baseline is completed	10%		
Output 1: Community livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience	# of farmers provided with inputs to improve sorghum/millet, tomato, and coffee value chains (disaggregated by gender)	10,000 in 2018	25,250 (19,000 sorghum/ millet; 5,900 tomato; 350 coffee) by 2022, (30% women)	1.1: Skills developed, and food security improved for vulnerable farming households (FAO and ILO) 1.1.1 Identification of key agricultural value chain opportunities through market assessment and participatory community validation (FAO) 1.1.2 Support to farmers to improve sorghum/millet value chain through provision of improved seeds and capacity building (FAO) 1.1.3 Support to farmers to improve tomato value chain development through provision of improved seeds, fertilizers, marketing and capacity building (FAO)	PUNOs Monitoring Data, IPs Progress Reports, field visit monitoring reports, distribution lists, during- and post-distribution monitoring
	# of farmers benefited from FFS (disaggregated by gender)	7,495 small holders in 2018	6,500 by 2022, (50% women)	1.1.4 Support to farmers to improve livestock productivity through provision and development of feed resources, fodders and capacity building (FAO) 1.1.5 Support to farmers to improve livestock productivity through provision of veterinary services and vaccination campaign (FAO)	
	# of dairy producers supported with inputs (disaggregated by gender)	2,206 in 2018	6,000 by 2022, (90% women)	1.1.6 Support to dairy smallholders to improve milk value chain production through provision of small dairy equipment, marketing and capacity building, including empowering women-headed households for processing and marketing of improved traditional dairy products (FAO) 1.1.7 Support to farmers to improve coffee value chain productivity and quality (FAO)	
	# of farmers trained on sorghum/millet, tomato, milk and coffee value chains, livestock fattening and health, dairy product processing and marketing (disaggregated by gender)	10,000 in 2018	25,000 by 2022, (50% women)	1.1.8 Empowering female-headed households' development of small-scale backyard sheep/ goat fattening businesses, through provision of small equipment, feeds, vaccines, drugs, marketing facilities and capacity building (FAO)	
Output 1: Community					

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
livelihoods and productive assets are improved to strengthen resilience	# of farmers trained on entrepreneurship skills and financial literacy		1,200	1.1.9 Empowerment of rural small-scale private entrepreneurs (SSEs) to have better access to markets (FAO) 1.1.10 Upgrading skills and knowledge of farmers/women through a comprehensive training programme, FFS, extension materials and demonstration to be developed side-by-side with project activities and with the delivery of inputs (FAO)	
	# of rural farmers associations providing training to upgrade members' technical and entrepreneurship skill		80	1.1.11 Train rural farmers and rural farmer associations on entrepreneurship skills, market information and financial literacy in selected value chains and related sectors to provide effective avenues to upgrade members' technical and entrepreneurship skills (ILO + FAO)	
	Proportion of the targeted beneficiaries reporting increase in their income due to agriculture value chain support		70%	1.1.12 Provide training to women engaged in rural agriculture on business development services, marketing skills, savings schemes, diversification of livelihoods based on ILO/FAO-developed GET Ahead for Women in Enterprise: Training Package and Resource Kit (ILO + FAO).	
Output 1: Community livelihoods and productive assets are	# of participants in Food/Cash for Assets interventions	2,800 individuals by 2018 through ERRY	12,950 (30% women)	1.2: Livelihoods are stabilized, and community assets rehabilitated through providing short-term income support for vulnerable households and individuals (WFP and UNDP) 1.2.1 Validate selection criteria, select vulnerable beneficiaries and community assets for rehabilitation in coordination with VCC, communities and targeted district representative bodies (WFP) 1.2.2 Conduct baseline surveys for target beneficiaries and community assets (WFP) 1.2.3 Implement Food for Asset activities and community asset rehabilitation (WFP)	PUNO Monitoring Data, IPs Progress Reports CfW Impact Survey
	# of beneficiaries benefitting from FFA cash/food transfers	33,912 individuals by 2018 through ERRY	90,650 individuals by 20121		
	Proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base through FFA using Asset Benefit Index	0	50%		
	# of community-based assets restored and/or established (disaggregated by type)	371 assets by 2018	325	1.2.4 Carry out screening and validating of community asset rehabilitation projects through environmental protection criteria (WFP)	

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
improved to strengthen resilience	Total amount of cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries	USD 5,903,359 by 2018 through ERRY I	USD 6,992,500	1.2.5 Monitor community asset rehabilitation and cash delivery to ensure quality standards are met (WFP)	
	# of community Market assets restored through 3x6	0 in 2018	70 by 2020	1.2.6 Design and implement labour intensive CfW activities identifying key community market assets to be restored; engage and select beneficiaries in consultation with communities, VCC and local authorities (UNDP).	
	# of beneficiaries participating in CFW activities through 3x6	0 in 2018	9,550 individuals 35% women & marginalized		
improved to strengthen resilience	# of beneficiaries who received business development and life skills training	2,693 in 2018	9,550 by 2021	1.3: Sustainable livelihoods opportunities are created in the post-cash for work phase to support self-employment through entrepreneurship development for vulnerable households and individuals (UNDP, FAO and ILO) 1.3.1 Provide life skills, business development and vocational training for identified viable businesses (UNDP) 1.3.2 Provide post-cash for work technical training to farmers on promising crop/livestock value chains (FAO)	Annual reviews, mid-term reviews, evaluation, IPs and PUNO progress reports
	% of beneficiaries who are able to graduate to sustainable livelihoods as a result of post-CfW activities of self-employment and employability		70%		
	# of ToTs trained on business training packages (MFB & semiliterate)	53	125	1.3.3 Strengthen training of the trainers and train business advisors adapting ILO's Start and Improve Your Business (SiYB) for entrepreneurs in agricultural businesses and viable businesses identified through the local market assessments (ILO) 1.3.4 Finalize and institutionalize adapted MFB & semiliterate packages; at least five national master trainers are certified (ILO)	
	# of microbusinesses established and operational after 6 months	1,624 by 2018	4,974 (35% women, youth) by 2021	1.3.5 Conduct market assessment (integrating gender- and conflict-sensitivity) to identify viable social business demands in a conflict context (UNDP) 1.3.6 Support business development and recovery with top up grants, generating multiple impacts and job opportunities (UNDP)	

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
	# of targeted beneficiaries who have improved access to income, business competency and have improved their livelihoods (disaggregated by gender & age)	1,728 (70% of the targeted)	4,836 (90% of the targeted) by 2021		
	# of trainees with improved employability skills through informal apprenticeship scheme	600 in 2018	2,000 trainees	1.4: Sustainable livelihoods opportunities area created in the post-Cash for Work phase to support employability through on-the-job training (ILO). 1.4.1 Develop a laddered capacity building package to link cash for work beneficiaries with sustainable economic opportunities 1.4.2 Provide competency-based technical skills training to cash-for-work beneficiaries interested in wage employment 1.4.3 Conduct competency-based assessment and certification of the beneficiaries 1.4.4 Link the beneficiaries to jobs through job placement opportunities in collaboration with private sector 1.4.5 Provide follow up mentorship training to beneficiaries	PUNO Monitoring Data, IPs Progress Reports
	% of vulnerable youth/women reporting improved income at least three months after completion of the training	60%	70%		
	# of individuals from private sector and government institutions at district and governorate level build their capacity to develop and implement participatory business continuity planning	0	90	1.5: Private sector capacity is strengthened to contribute to emergency crisis response and job creation (UNDP, ILO, FAO) 1.5.1 Develop the capacity of the private sector through training and follow up support on participatory business continuity planning at district and governorate levels based on ILO local economic recovery guidelines and global practice (ILO) 1.5.2 Rapid Business capacity assessment for micro and small business associations for Hajjah and Lahj (UNDP)	PUNO Monitoring Data, IPs Progress Reports distribution lists, during- and post- distribution monitoring, field visit monitoring reports
	# of SME networks supported by the programme reporting improvement in their capacity	2 networks by 2018	4 networks by 2022	1.5.3 Support establishment of local SME networks and capacity building via Chambers of Commerce to share information and engage on coordination and planning at the local level (District Recovery and Resilience Plans) and identify diversification opportunities (UNDP)	
	# of households provided with small-scale productive assets and training on marketing	0 in 2018	1,000 by 2022, including 40% female-	1.5.4 Reinforce and promote pilot rural small-scale entrepreneurs (SSEs) supported by the Programme (milk collectors; women-headed households producing home-processed healthy traditional dairy products, women-headed households with backyard sheep/goat fattening businesses, producers of feed and fodder, coffee producers and sorghum seed producers) with productive assets and training on marketing (FAO, ILO)	

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
			headed households		
Output2: Vulnerable communities benefit from solar energy solutions for sustainable livelihoods opportunities and enhanced social service delivery	# of public institution facilities (health, education and district offices) supported with solar systems % of targeted public institution facilities (health, schools and district offices) and systems (water) have resumed and improved critical services	210 by 2018 through ERRY I	182 by 2022 70% by 2022	2.1 Energy resilience of key basic services (schools, health facilities, water, local administration offices) strengthened through improved access to reliable alternative sources of energy (UNDP) 2.1.1 Mapping of solar energy gaps and priorities for social services (households, productive assets, health facilities, WASH, schools, and district offices), mainstreaming gender considerations (UNDP) 2.1.2 Install solar energy systems for social services to improve service delivery and reinforce livelihoods of vulnerable communities (UNDP)	PUNOs monitoring data, IP progress reports
	# of community productive assets (MSME) supported through introduction of solar energy	19 by 2018 through ERRY I	41 by 2022	2.1.4 Develop solar energy solutions for productive assets and community production facilities to reinforce livelihood resilience of vulnerable rural communities (UNDP)	Annual reviews, mid-term reviews, evaluation, IPs and PUNO progress reports
	# of HHs supported through introduction of solar energy (disaggregated by female-headed households)	5600 by 2018 through ERRY I	11,000 by 2022	2.1.3 Install solar energy for vulnerable households (UNDP)	
	% of trained and certified women and youth in solar system installation who have adopted solar innovation		60% by 2022 (700 trainees)	2.1.5 Capacity building and awareness training of communities on solar applications and use of solar energy, and for engagement of youth and women in community and district (UNDP)	
	# of solar micro-enterprises established (disaggregated by gender)	200 micro businesses in 2018	400 micro business by 2022 (60% women, youth)	2.2 Women and youth play an active role in the provision of solar energy in their communities through solar microenterprises (UNDP, ILO) 2.2.1 Promote solar microbusiness, business connection and networking among rural and urban dealers’ communities, including youth and women (UNDP)	Annual reviews, mid-term reviews, evaluation, IPs and PUNO

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
			&marginalized)		progress reports
	# of trainees reporting improvement in their employability skills in solar energy micro-enterprises	0 in 2018	250	2.2.2 Develop competency-based curricula based on the new and emerging youth- and women-friendly solar technology occupations (ILO) 2.2.3 Provide vocational solar skills training to technicians (women and youth) in order for them to play an active role in the provision of solar energy in their communities through solar microenterprises (ILO)	
	% of targeted MSME have benefitted through solar energy solutions	0 in 2018	70% by 2022	2.2.4 Enhance solar energy capacity building, including vocational training on solar energy application uses, specifications design, installation and maintenance through microbusiness associations and private sector (UNDP)	
	% of solar entrepreneurs who are able to access financial institutions and have expanded their businesses for profit	0 in 2018	20% by 2021		
Output 3: Communities and local authorities have enhanced capacities to respond to conflict and gender sensitive priorities needs	# of WUAs supported to promote efficient water and land management	15 in 2018	60 by 2022	3.1 Water User Associations (WUA) established (FAO) 3.1.1 Support 30 WUAs by strengthening the existing fifteen (15) WUAs established during ERRY Phase-I and creation / reactivation of 15 WUAs for efficient water and land management (FAO) 3.1.2 Out of total 30 WUAs, support 20 WUAs using wells with 20 water solar pumps and irrigation kits to promote efficient irrigation techniques for crops / vegetables and fodders (productive assets) (FAO + UNDP) 3.1.3 Establish 30 pilot irrigation within targeted WUAs under LoAs to implement activities aimed at the maintenance and rehabilitation of irrigation canals in order to demonstrate water saving technologies to farming communities (FAO)	IPs Progress Reports
	# of insider mediators recruited and trained to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution (disaggregated by gender) % of target communities with improved access to basic services due to	229 in 2018 60%	120 IMs by 2022 (30% women) 70%	3.2: Community-based organizations have enhanced capacities to develop conflict- and gender- sensitive community resilience plans reflecting community priority needs and actions (UNDP) 3.2.1 Insider mediators recruited and trained based on specific criteria and vetted by IPs, LC representatives and other community leaders and VCCs (UNDP)	PUNO monitoring data, IP progress reports Annual reviews, mid-

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
Output 3: Communities and local authorities have enhanced capacities to respond to conflict and gender sensitive priorities needs	conflict mitigating interventions			3.2.2 Capacity building of partners (implementing partners, VCCs, LCs/DMTs and PUNOs) on gender, conflict sensitive approaches and social cohesion (UNDP)	term reviews, evaluation, IP and PUNO progress reports
	# of gender-sensitive conflict analysis conducted	4 by 2018	7 by 2022	3.2.3 Conflict analysis and scans produced with engagement of DMTs, VCCs, IMs and community representatives, including four validation workshops (UNDP)	
	# of selected priority interventions identified under the community resilience plans which have been implemented (disaggregated by village and sub-district) % target communities have enhanced service delivery support through participatory approach (LG)	0 60%	135 and 53 respectively 70%	3.2.4 Provide block grants based on community compact for priority community initiative identified under community resilience plans (UNDP)	
	# of SDCs established and operational # of conflict-mitigating initiatives supported	0	49 31	3.2.5 Community committees established, and community dialogues facilitated by IMs around priority conflicts, with participation of community, VCC and LCs/DMTs to implement small-scale block grants (UNDP) 3.2.6 VCCs established and operational through training and technical support (UNDP)	
	# of community resilience plans developed (and operationalized) at sub-district level	0	49	3.2.7 Develop community resilience plans based on conflict scans, prioritizing gender- and conflict- sensitive community initiatives (UNDP)	
	# and % of targeted local authorities that are able to revitalize service delivery by implementing and	8 in 2018	8 in 2022	3.3: Local authorities are better able to plan, monitor and coordinate gender- and conflict-sensitive resilience and recovery priorities and respond at the district level through a participatory approach (UNDP) 3.3.1 Conduct public service damage assessment by citizen and a develop citizen monitoring systems in target districts (UNDP)	PUNO monitoring data, IP progress reports

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Intended Outcome / Output	Indicators	Baselines incl. ref year)	Targets	Immediate Results & Indicative Activities	Sources and means of verification
	operationalizing recovery plans			3.3.2 Organize meetings with communities and local authorities to showcase priority interventions on conflict-sensitive livelihoods, solar and self-help interventions (including those from conflict resolution) with all key stakeholders (UNDP) 3.3.3 Develop conflict- and gender-sensitive district recovery plans with monitoring framework and implement priority interventions (UNDP)	Annual reviews, mid-term reviews, evaluation, IP and PUNO progress reports
	# of DMTs reactivated to restore public service delivery	8 in 2018	8 in 2020	3.3.4 (Re)activate district management teams to restore minimum public service delivery (UNDP)	
	# of local authority members trained on planning and development	80 in 2018	200 in 2020	3.3.5 Provide technical capacity building to local authorities to plan and implement recovery plans (UNDP)	

Annex 3. Evaluation questions

1. Relevance

To what extent do the project objectives and design correspond to the needs and rights of the beneficiaries and the policies and priorities of partners at the different levels?

- 1.1. Were the most suitable beneficiaries targeted and how vulnerable were they? What were the targeting criteria? Is there a targeting strategy, if yes, what does it say?
- 1.2. Is the collaboration and task distribution between collaborating UN partners and potential implementing partners adequate?
- 1.3. What kinds of assessments have been conducted? Have beneficiaries been engaged in the assessment? Has a gender analysis been conducted and has gender been considered in other assessments? Have the assessment /analysis findings been used to inform the ERRY II? If not, why not?
- 1.4. What are the policies and strategies of government and humanitarian/development partners working on resilience? Is the ERRY II aligned to these?
- 1.5. How has ERRY II adapted itself to the changing context, i.e., the COVID pandemic, the conflict situation or natural disasters?
- 1.6. Is the approach/implementation method the most appropriate for the beneficiaries and local capacities?
- 1.7. Is there a complaint mechanism for beneficiaries? Is it working well?
- 1.8. Does ERRY II have any influence on conflict risks, conflict dynamics, violence, lack of human security and other dimensions of fragility?

2. Coherence

To what extent is the project coherent with other relevant interventions at the local or supra-local level, financed by the EU or by other donors?

- 2.1. Does the beneficiary coordinate sufficiently in terms of providing support (internally with implementing partners and externally), to avoid duplication and overlap?
- 2.2. To what extent is the action coherent with actions of other development partners (including EU and inter-agency) and government?
- 2.3. What is the comparative advantage/added value of the four UN agencies in implementing this intervention?
- 2.4. Is ERRY II/its beneficiaries likely to benefit or benefiting from complementarity/synergies with other interventions funded by the EU and other entities (donors, public and private)

3. Efficiency

To what extent are resources being efficiently allocated to achieve the expected results?

- 3.1. Has ERRY II faced any delays or postponements? What was the reason? What has been/is being done to mitigate this?
- 3.2. Does ERRY II efficiently provide the expected services to the ultimate beneficiaries in an inclusive manner?
- 3.3. What other actors in Yemen implement similar interventions? How do the costs of these interventions compare to the costs of ERRY II?
- 3.4. Could ERRY II have used alternative options to decrease costs?
- 3.5. Did ERRY II have the right mix of human resources to support the action? If not, what capacity or expertise was insufficiently available, including adequate and sufficient female staff and gender experts?
- 3.6. Do monitoring systems use gender and age-related disaggregation and gender-sensitive questions? Are monitoring systems inclusive when it comes to marginalized people (IDPs, returnees) and vulnerabilities women-headed household, pregnant and lactating women)?

- 3.7. Have the results of monitoring systems been analysed and used to inform adaptations to the action?

4. Effectiveness

To what extent are the project outputs achieved, what was their quality and how far are they contributing to achieve the expected results?

- 4.1. To what extent has ERRY II currently achieved its planned objectives, outputs and outcomes? What was the quality?
- 4.2. What is the likelihood that planned objectives, outputs and outcomes will be fully achieved by ERRY II's end date? Which ones are unlikely to be met? Why?
- 4.3. Are there indications for early impact or that such impact is likely to be achieved?
- 4.4. To what extent are results inclusive for all vulnerable groups, including from a gender perspective?
- 4.5. Were there any positive or negative unintended effects?
- 4.6. What factors have driven results, and what factors have hampered achieving results? Results will be disaggregated by vulnerable people, boys/girls, women and men.

5. Sustainability

Is an appropriate exit strategy planned and implemented? To what extent are context-specific factors addressed by this strategy?

- 5.1. Does ERRY II avail of a documented exit strategy? What is its quality? To what extent is it gender-sensitive? Was it developed in a participatory manner, and if so, which stakeholders had been involved? Is it being implemented?
- 5.2. To what extent and how has the capacity of beneficiaries and stakeholders increased under ERRY II? Does it enable them to sustain results obtained under ERRY II?
- 5.3. Are funds needed the phasing out and to continuations of services post-project? Are these budgeted and available, or have sources been identified?
- 5.4. Can the results of ERRY II be maintained by beneficiaries if economic or other external factors change? Are solutions provided by the project suitable for longer-term?
- 5.5. To what extent have the Government and the private sector been involved in ensuring sustainability of ERRY II?
- 5.6. How far has resilience of the various beneficiaries increased to shocks and pressure?
- 5.7. How far and how successfully has environmental sustainability and climate change been considered under ERRY II?

Annex 4. Questionnaires for various target groups

The below protocol is proposing strategic/formal questions drawn directly from the Evaluation Questions. It will be used for all semi-structured interviews. Questions will be selected or elaborated, given the respondent’s role, organization, and relationship with UNDP. In total, it is expected that the interview will not take more than 60 minutes.

Efforts will be made to engage appropriately and respectfully with participants, upholding the principles of confidentiality and anonymity; dignity and diversity; human rights; gender equality; and the avoidance of harm, as per UNEG Ethics standards.³⁸

Introduction: purpose, process, outcome

Thank you for agreeing to meet with us. We will try not to take more than an hour or so of your time.

My name is

I am part of a team recruited by the European Union to look into the evaluation of the “*Support Resilient Livelihoods and Food Security in Yemen (ERRY II)*” implemented by UNDP and partners.

I should emphasise, however, that I do not work for the EU and that I am an independent consultant.

We are genuinely interested in what you have to say, and will be taking notes so that we capture your views. There is no audio recording. The notes will only be seen by our team and will not be shared with anyone else.

All information is confidential, and you will never be quoted in the report/ have your name attached or referenced to any statement.

Is that all ok with you?

Can we start by asking your name and role in your organisation? How long have you been working in that role?

What type of relationship do you/your organisation have with UNDP and the mentioned project?

³⁸ Norms and Standards for Evaluation, UNEG 2017

Template for respondents with relationship to Implementing Partner

Name interviewer:		Date:
Name respondent:		Designation:
Gender:		Organisation:
Governorate:		Engagement with ERRY II:
Location:		
1.1	<p>What were the targeting criteria?</p> <p>Is there a targeting strategy, if yes, what does it say?</p> <p>Do you think the targeting helped including the most vulnerable people? If yes, why? If not, why not?</p>	
1.2	<p>How are the tasks between the four UN agencies and their implementing partners divided?</p> <p>Do you think this is adequate? Are there gaps?</p>	
1.3	<p>What kinds of assessments have been conducted?</p> <p>(Probe for gender sensitive needs assessment, a market assessment, and a conflict analysis)</p> <p>What were the findings?</p> <p>Have these findings been used to inform the intervention? If no, why not?</p>	
1.4	<p>Do you know of any policies and strategies of development and humanitarian partners or government agencies in the area of youth entrepreneurship and financial inclusion exist?</p> <p>If yes, which ones?</p> <p>Has the project taken them into consideration? If yes, how? If not, what is missing?</p>	
1.5	<p>Do you think the project has adapted to challenges like the COVID pandemic, the conflict situation or natural disasters?</p> <p>If yes, how?</p> <p>If not, what were the gaps? What should have been done?</p>	
1.6	<p>Do you think that ERRY’s approach and activities are the most suitable for beneficiaries and local capacities?</p>	

	If not, what could have been different?	
1.7	Do you know about the complaint mechanism under the Customer Relation Management (CRM) Do people use it? Is feedback used to make required adjustments?	
1.8	Do you think ERRY II helps or has the potential to help mitigating conflict risks, conflict dynamics, violence, lack of human security and other dimensions of fragility?	
2.1	Are you aware of any coordination mechanisms or working groups that UNDP and partner UN agencies participate in? What do they address?	
2.2	Are there other projects that are similar to this one (EU, UN, government, others)? If so, which ones? If yes do you think there is any collaboration between these projects? Do you think there is duplication or overlap?	
2.3	Do you think UNDP and its partner agencies are the best organisations in implementing this intervention? If yes, why so? If not, why not?	
2.4	Is there any synergy or complementarity that you can think of with other interventions that may benefit ERRY II beneficiaries?	
3.1	Did ERRY II face any delays or postponement? If yes, what and when, and what was the reason? Could it have been avoided? Was anything done to correct the delay?	
3.2	Does the project efficiently provide the expected service to the ultimate beneficiaries? If not, what could have been done better?	
3.3	What other actors in Yemen implement similar interventions? Do you know how the costs of these interventions compare to the costs of this project?	
3.4	Can you think of alternative options that the project could have used to decrease costs?	
3.5	Did the project have the right staff on board to support the action (also in terms of	

	female staff/gender experts)? If not, what capacity or expertise was insufficiently available?	
3.6	Does the monitoring system use gender and age-related disaggregation, measure inclusiveness and does it have gender-sensitive questions?	
3.7	Have the results of monitoring systems been analysed and used to inform adaptations to the action?	
4.1	To what extent has ERRY II currently achieved its planned objectives, outputs and outcomes?	
4.2	What is the likelihood that planned objectives, outputs and outcomes will be fully achieved by the project’s end date? Which ones are unlikely to be met?	
4.3	Are there indications for early impact or that such impact is likely to be achieved?	
4.4	Do you think all vulnerable groups (IDPs, returnees, women headed households etc) had equal access to the project activities?	
4.5	Were there any positive or negative unintended effects? If yes, which ones?	
4.6	What factors have driven results, and what factors have hampered achieving results?	
5.1	Does the project avail of a documented exit strategy? What is its quality? Will it be implemented? Have you been/are you involved in the design/implementation?	
5.2	Has the capacity of stakeholders and beneficiaries changed as a result of ERRY II? If yes, how? If yes, will the increased capacity help to sustain ERRY II results?	
5.3	Are funds needed the phasing out and to continuations of services post-project? Are these budgeted and available, or have sources been identified?	
5.4	Can the results of the project be maintained by beneficiaries if economic or other external factors change?	
5.5	Have government and private sector been engaged in ERRY II to ensure sustainability? If yes, how did it contribute? If no, what are the gaps?	

The below protocol is proposing questions drawn directly from the Evaluation Questions. It will be used for all surveys with beneficiaries. Most questions are close ended, with a view open ended questions for clarification purpose

In total, it is expected that the interview will not take more than 60 minutes.

Efforts will be made to engage appropriately and respectfully with participants, upholding the principles of confidentiality and anonymity; dignity and diversity; human rights; gender equality; and the avoidance of harm, as per UNEG Ethics standards.³⁹

Introduction: purpose, process, outcome

Thank you for agreeing to meet with us. We will try not to take more than an hour or so of your time.

My name is

I am part of a team recruited by the European Union to look into the evaluation of the “*Support to youth's entrepreneurship and financial inclusion project*” implemented by Silatech and partners

I should emphasise, however, that I do not work for the EU and that I am an independent consultant.

We are genuinely interested in what you have to say, and will be taking notes so that we capture your views. There is no audio recording. The notes will only be seen by our team and will not be shared with anyone else.

All information is confidential, and you will never be quoted in the report/ have your name attached or referenced to any statement.

Is that all ok with you?

Can we start by asking your name, age and gender?

How have you been engaged with Silatech and the mentioned project?

³⁹ Norms and Standards for Evaluation, UNEG 2017

Template for beneficiary respondents

Name interviewer:		Date:
Age respondent:		Business or work:
Gender:		Engagement in project:
Governorate:		
Location:		
1.1	What ERRY II related activity/ activities have you participated in?	<input type="checkbox"/>
1.3	Please name the most important challenge that you/your household has faced in the past year.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
	Have you participated in any assessment for ERRY II?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Don't know
1.3	If yes, what was it about?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
1.3	Was receiving a grant for you the best option to address the above challenge??	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I did not participate in ERRY II <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
1.5	If not, why not?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
1.5	Did anything happen that made it more difficult to implement what you have learned/acquired under ERRY II??	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I did not participate in ERRY II <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
1.6	If yes, what was it?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
1.6	(Probe for COVID, conflict, disease, family circumstances)	
	Do you think the ERRY II support/activities were suitable for you?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Partly <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I did not participate in ERRY II <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know
	If not, or partly, can you give a reason?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
3.2	What else would you have like to engage in, that was more suitable for you?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
1.7		
3.2	Do you know whether a complaint mechanism exists?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

	Have you ever used it?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know
	If yes, did you get feedback?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes, it was helpful <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, but it was not helpful <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know <input type="checkbox"/> N.a.
	How would you rate the services of ERRY II? Interviewees to explain who the implementing agencies are so that respondents understands	<input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral <input type="checkbox"/> Limited <input type="checkbox"/> Poor <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know <input type="checkbox"/> N.a.
	If limited or poor, can you describe what was not so good?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
4.3 4.1	How would you rate the capacity and knowledgeability of the staff that you were engaged with?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral <input type="checkbox"/> Limited <input type="checkbox"/> Poor <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know <input type="checkbox"/> N.a.
	If limited or poor, can you describe what was not so good?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
	Did participation have any effect on you and/or your household?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes, we are better off <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, we are worse off <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I don’t know <input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable
	If yes, can you give a reason?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
4.8	Are you and your family able to live a decent live?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know
	If no, what needs do you still have?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

4.3	Were you able to generate a better income through ERRY II?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> I did not get a grant <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know
	If yes, how?	<input type="checkbox"/>
	If not, why not?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
5.6	Do you think you will be able to continue the work/business you have started under the project?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Partly <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Don’t know <input type="checkbox"/> N.a.
	If no or partly to the above, what is the reason?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
5.5	Can you think of anything external that can happen, that would force you to stop your work/business? (Probe for conflict, disease, natural disasters, economic circumstances, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
	Related to your observation above, what is your plan if this happens?	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

Annex 5. Bibliography

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Annex 6. List of respondents

Name	M	F	Total
PUNOs (project managers, M&E officers, national coordinators)	9	0	9
JCU (project managers, M&E officers)	2	0	2
IPs/ Local NGOs	4	4	8
IPs/ International NGOs	3	2	5
Community & LA Stakeholders	10	2	12
SFD	1	0	1
Beneficiaries	10	14	24
Total	39	22	61

Annex 7. Beneficiary responses to various questions

The reasons for positive effects of ERRY II as perceived by beneficiaries:

- Because of the income, I have a project now.
- Easy access for cars to homes because of the road.
- Financially improved family income
- I used to be a daily wage labourer, but now I'm doing well
- In terms of raising livestock as required
- The source of income has improved as my income has increased on a daily basis
- Through what we learned; I was able to work with people with cash for work
- Have light at night and day
- Better income and easy getting living supplies
- Currently, I am a woman who is financially independent
- The amount of benefit for me and my family
- Improve my financial situation
- The confidence of the parents increased, and I, as a girl, could not leave the house for long distances, but now I can.
- The financial situation of the family has improved
- The situation has improved so that it alleviates the suffering of people in terms of using the bathrooms, and it is well
- There is a material effect – positive

How did the project help beneficiaries to generate an income?

- The project has created capital for me, and I have made financial gains through this project
- Helped us to buy farm tillers and other farming equipment
- I worked with people and got paid for my work
- Own farmer business
- Through getting trained in project
- Through being trained in project about how to raise livestock well
- Through getting trained in project about to how to fix mobile phones
- By spending the money then teaching my children as another project
- I benefited financially and morally and gained experience
- My family situation improved or covered completely
- Through being trained in project
- Through buying and selling
- Through the generated natural resource