



UN JOINT RULE OF LAW PROGRAMME

SOMALILAND

MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT

FEBRUARY 2022

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Project Information

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Region	Africa	
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Project dates	Start	Planned end
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Project expenditure	As of October 2021: 2,479,180 USD	
Funding source	MPTF for Somaliland (EU and Sweden)	
Implementing party	MOI and HJC (signatories) + 11 partners	

Evaluation information

Evaluation type	Project	
Final/midterm	Midterm	
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	January 2020	December 2021
Evaluators	Monica Rispo (Rule of Law Consultant) with the support of Barbara Lilliu (Technical Consultant)	
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Disclaimer

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UN implementing partners, the EU, the Government of Sweden or any other party.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

A2J:	Access to Justice
ADR:	Alternative Dispute resolution
AGO:	Attorney General Office
CDI:	Criminal Investigation Department
CPD:	Country Programme Document
CRC:	Child Rights Convention
CSO:	Civil Society Organisations
DSA:	Daily Subsistence allowance
EU:	European Union
EUCAP:	European Union Capacity Building Mission
FCDO:	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
HACT:	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
ICCPR:	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDLO:	International Law Development Organization
JC:	Judicial Commission
JROLP:	Joint Rule of Law Programme
LL.M:	Legum Magister (Master of laws)
LoA:	Letter of Agreement
M&E:	Monitoring and Evaluation
MESAF:	Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Family
MOI:	Ministry of Interior
MOJ:	Ministry of Justice
MOPCA:	Ministry of
MPTE:	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NDP:	National Development Plan
NHRC:	National Human rights Commission
OECD:	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR:	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PUNO:	Participating United Nations Organisations
PVE:	Prevention of Violent Extremism
ROL:	Rule of Law
RRF:	Results and Resources Framework
SDG:	Sustainable Development Goal
SGBV:	Sexual and Gender Violence
SOLLA:	Somaliland Lawyers Association
SOP:	Standard Operating Procedure
SPU:	Special Police Unit
SSR:	Security Sector Reform
SWLA:	Somaliland Women Lawyers Association
TDR:	Traditional Dispute Resolution
TOR:	Terms of Reference
TOT:	Training of Trainers
UNODC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSDCF:	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNSOM:	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings for the mid-term evaluation of the “UN Joint Rule of Law Programme for Somaliland” (hereafter JROLP). The programme is funded by the EU and the Embassy of Sweden in Kenya for a budget of 5.5 million USD and is a joint initiative of UNDP, UNWOMEN and UNODC with the advisory contribution of UNSOM. The program has a total of 13 national implementing partners and was implemented from January 2020 to December 2021, with a no cost extension until June 2022.

The Midterm evaluation provides an independent assessment of the JROLP performance and captures learnings in view of an eventual future phase. The lead evaluator conducted a field mission to Somaliland from January 5th to 21st (40 meetings and 3 Focus Groups Discussions in Hargeisa and Burao).

Besides the mandated lockdown periods in early 2020, the COVID pandemic seems to have only partially affected the possibility to implement activities, although the team had to address significant logistical challenges related to online working modalities, restrictions on in person meetings and presence of international staff in the country.

Relevance

All project components are relevant for the government of Somaliland and in line with national and UN strategies; the relevant Sustainable Development Goals are reflected in all planning documents, but could have received more visibility at programme implementation level.

The JROLP is relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, with a stronger focus on governmental institutions versus the population and the civil society. Remarkable results were achieved in terms of SGBV response but for a deeper impact, gender transformative approaches should be considered. Successful results can be highlighted in terms of strengthening the legal and policy framework for people with disabilities and human rights are well mainstreamed across the JROLP. The issue of discrimination against minority clans could deserve more attention.

The “area based approach” is achieving some initial and promising results and, to further advance the process, an overall strategy aimed at identifying a model for the ROL Regional Hub is recommended.

The programme design process was highly participatory and inclusive, but excessively long. The Prodoc and RRF are intrinsically complex to the detriment of homogeneity and coherence. They have too many outputs and activities and are not fully supported by an integrated vision. The JROLP, and particularly the baseline, do not fully reflect the lessons learned and results achieved during the past 20 years of UNDP ROL interventions in Somaliland. A stronger institutional memory within UNDP would have filled this gap.

Coherence

Coordination among PUNOs shows some weaknesses at the level of design, budgeting, implementation and reporting. The partnership with UNSOM and all its Hargeisa-based Sections has been profitable and impactful at technical level. Basic coordination results are achieved, but would have been more impactful if UNWOMEN and UNODC had a regular presence of staff in Somaliland and the coordination role was recognized as a full-time job for an international staff. The JROLP is not perceived by Somalilanders as a “One UN joint programme”, but as a UNDP programme.

The extraordinary number of national partners (13 with a signed LoA) has negatively affected the overall quality of the partnerships and created a fierce competition to adjudicate financial allocations. Civil society organizations struggled to compete with more influential governmental institutions and saw a drastic reduction of funding compared to past UNDP interventions.

Coordination fora under the NDPII have achieved information sharing and avoided duplications, but have limited impact in terms of joint planning and common advocacy. To be noted as a promising practice the Coordination meetings organized by the MOJ in the regions.

Effectiveness

With the exception of the SGBV component, partners worked in a siloed approach and adopted different implementation strategies which generated different levels of effectiveness.

Some partners completed their activities with excellent results: SOLLA successfully built the capacity of lawyers, the NHRC effectively monitored the places of detention and the MOI contributed to the peaceful achievement of the 2021 elections.

The working model for the SGBV response led by Bahikoob is effective (although with limited reach in rural areas) and shows a good degree of cooperation with other actors, including the AGO, CID and SWLA.

Activities in support of the JC (mobile courts, inspections, case management) are achieving the planned results but are implemented as a mere continuation of past UNDP intervention with limited innovation and reflections on opportunities for improvements.

Legal aid is provided by SWLA and 3 Universities with some success (considered the limited resources available) however, they are not working under a clear model of intervention.

Some components have a concerning delay as they have not started as of January 2022 (construction of police stations/court buildings and the UNODC-led Parole and Probation component). Specific activities have achieved partial results but are on stand-by because of some limitations in the planning and implementation process (The “guidelines for legislative drafting” and the “TDR guidelines”).

The four activities implemented under the SSR component contribute to the overall objective of the JROLP, however there is not a strong complementarity with other activities under the other JROLP components.

Efficiency

An adaptive management approach (as opposed to the current linear approach) would be more suited to the complexities inherent both the JROLP and the Somaliland context.

The number of staff assigned to a complex programme as the JROLP is not adequate: UNWOMEN and UNODC do not have permanent staff in Somaliland and UNDP has only 3 staff in Hargeisa (although well supported by UNDP in Mogadishu on specific aspects). UNSOM has an adequate number of technical advisors who have been able to effectively contribute to the JROLP in their respective fields.

The “Embedded Advisors” model has ensured that national partners have timely and adequate availability of staff to deliver activities. The Advisors have circulated new ideas and approaches, however the capacity building and mentoring commitment does not seem to be fully understood. The UNDP team has made some efforts to ensure a better follow up of Embedded advisors, but they are still they working in isolation and with limited technical supervision.

Delays in payments have affected the implementation of the activities and the motivation of partners. The M&E system has improved with the support of UNDP; although it is still mainly focused on quantitative data, it allows to capture the required data for donor reporting.

Sustainability

The JROLP shows some elements of sustainability: project activities are mostly led by national actors with a good level of institutionalization, staff of national partners have improved their competences, the number of legal professionals is increasing. Some activities, in particular those with a longer history of operating the country (i.e. the mobile courts) or activities with limited budget implications (i.e. the coordination fora) would be able to continue without international support.

*The evaluation proposes a **set of recommendations** for consideration during the remaining timeframe of the JROLP, in addition to some recommendations for an eventual future phase of the programme.*

For the current JROLP recommendations are focused on aspects that would facilitate the achievement of expected results and consolidate lessons learned, in particular:

- Define the status and way forward for key ROL thematic areas, by organizing thematic “end of project workshops” with relevant partners;*
- Deepen the understanding of the local perception, with a few short thematic analyses aimed moving forward some of the JROLP activities currently on stand by, included the Parole and Probation component.*

For an eventual future phase of the JROLP recommendations are directed at improving the overall approach and implementation of the intervention and include:

- Improve the response to the needs of vulnerable groups*
- Strengthen the Area-Based approach*
- Improve planning and shift from M&E to MEL*
- Strengthen the JROLP operational aspects, in particular the human resources structure, Embedded Advisor’s model and the payment system*
- Go visual by introducing communication/reporting material that is visually appealing, user friendly and more oriented to communicate results for action.*

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to present the findings of the mid-term evaluation of the “*UN Joint Rule of Law Programme for Somaliland*” ([hereafter JROLP](#) and described in par. 2).

The report is structured into three parts: Section I presents a description of the methodology and a brief overview of key background factors that have influenced the implementation of the programme; Section II assesses the interventions against the criteria of relevance, coherence effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability; Section III presents the conclusions and the recommendations.

Section I: Overview of the intervention

§ 1 Key contextual factors

Below is a brief list of key contextual themes, trends and recurrent issues that arise from reports and data analyzed during the desk review¹. It is assumed that this information is shaping the development of the justice and security sectors and influencing the implementation of the programme and therefore will be taken into consideration throughout the evaluation process.

■ Clan-based society with a pluralistic legal system

Clan affiliation is the main element for self-identity in Somaliland: it matters for all functions of the society, even for the structure of the government. The relationship between clan, community and government is highly relevant for justice and security interventions; for example, the Upper House of Parliament (Guurti) is entirely composed of clan elders, whose conservative views on specific issues can make debates on reform processes challenging. Another complexity is the pluralistic legal framework of Somaliland which is a combination of three distinct legal traditions: statutory law, sharia law and customary law (Xeer). The majority of disputes are settled according to Xeer practices by the elders². Forum shopping is common and disputes may have different legal outcomes based on the authority addressed. The legal framework is fluid and constantly evolving, therefore justice and security sector reform processes need to be specifically tailored to the local context.

■ Decentralisation and economic development

Somaliland has achieved significant results in terms of promoting relative peace and stability, fighting terrorism and building a democratic system, despite its status as *de facto* State. In recent years, new infrastructures and private business have flourished in Hargeisa and the country expects further economic growth. Adherence to the rule of law will be a key factor to sustain this process.

In parallel, the government has launched a decentralisation process covering both the justice and security sectors and aiming at increasing administrative and financial powers to institutions based in the regions (i.e the Regional Appeal Courts and Attorney General’s Office in the regions). This will contribute to address the current problem of very limited presence of justice institutions in rural areas and security forces in the eastern regions.

The JROLP has a comparative advance to support the decentralisation process as the programme activities will be coordinated from the regions and expanded to the districts, in coordination with the UNDP Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery.

¹ Annex II

² ABA-ROLI, “*Access to justice assessment tool: baseline study in Somaliland*”, 2020

■ Male-dominated culture and strong prevalence of SGBV

The clan-based culture along with conservative social norms and religious beliefs, discriminate against women and girls; the gender gap is significant, with women disadvantaged compared to men in terms of access to work, political participation, education and justice³. Women and girls experience high rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). SGBV survivors face social stigma when seeking redress and many rape crimes are still resolved through customary compensation or marriage, when they are handled by elders⁴.

§ 2 Description of the evaluated intervention

The Impact objective of the JROLP aims to contribute to a “*more secure, peaceful and stable Somaliland*” by achieving the overall outcome of “*sustainable models developed for the effective delivery of rights-based, inclusive, accountable rule of law and security, being implemented across regions in Somaliland*”. The Results and Resources Framework (RRF) adopted in the Prodoc is structured around the five main Outputs listed below. Each Output has numerous sub-Outputs and a very high number of Activity Results (78 in total) which cover a wide range of thematic areas.

1. Rights-respecting and accountable basic **justice services** increased in piloted areas.
2. Rights-respecting and accountable basic **policing services** increased in piloted areas.
3. Parole and probation services to help the sustainable management of scarce **corrections facilities** developed and piloted.
4. **Security Sector Governance** enhanced.
5. **Coordination** of the rule of law and security sectors improved at leadership and delivery levels.

Due to budgetary changes and requirements from the donors, the programmatic documents have undergone some changes which are summarized below.

Original RRF (2019)	RRF under the Priorization plan (2020)	Log-frame for M&E (2020)
The original RRF adopted in November 2019 was developed for a budget of 7M USD with the understanding that the EU, Sweden and the Dutch governments would fund the Programme.	Due to the withdrawal of the Dutch donor, a new RRF was approved in March 2020 by the Steering Committee. The budget was reduced from 7 M to 5 M but the 5 Outputs and activities remained overall the same. <u>This is the reference document for the evaluation.</u>	Upon request of the EU, a specific Logframe was developed for monitoring purposes and is being used to report to the MPTF. It has 5 Components which reflect the 5 RRF Outputs and is divided into 10 Outputs.

³ 4KP, “*women’s and girls security and justice in Somaliland*”, 2021

⁴ Becky Carter “*Women’s and girl’s experiences of security and Justice in Somaliland*”, Institute of Development studies, Feb 2021

The *JROLP* was initially planned as a two-year intervention from **January 2020 to December 2021**, but received a no cost extension until June 2022 in light of the Covid-19 pandemic and related delays in implementation.

The programme is funded by the **EU and the Embassy of Sweden in Kenya** via a Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and is a joint initiative of three Participating United Nations Organisations (PUNO): UNDP, UNWOMEN and UNODC with the advisory contribution of UNSOM as a non-executing party.

The Prodoc is signed by **five national partners** who are members of the Steering Committee (MOI, MOJ, HJC, AGO and NHRC) with a total of **13 national implementing partners**⁵. During the implementation phase there were some changes in the composition of the Steering Committee and the implementing partners grew from 10 in 2020 and 13 in 2021 (see par 1.1).

The JROLP is operational in Hargeisa, Burao and Boroma.

The total approved budget for the JROL programme is **5.5 million USD**, of which 3,118,087 USD were received as of October 2021. As of November 2021, the total expenditure for the project was 2,479,180 USD (80% of the received funds).

§ 3 Implementation modality: the Letter of Agreement (LoA)

The delivery of most JROLP activities is ensured by national partners who receive cash advances via Letters of Agreement (LoA). As summarized in the table below, the JROLP organized two rounds of LoAs: one in 2020 for 10 partners and a total amount of 998.200 USD and one in 2021 for 13 partners and a total amount of 1.464. 922 USD. To be noted that civil society organizations were only included in 2021 (SOLLA and SWLA) with dedicated Responsible Party Agreements. A new partner, MOPCA was introduced in 2021.

As per UNDP regulations that don't allow extension of LoAs, in 2022 it seems that LoAs will only be signed with partners who have not completed the activities in 2021 by utilizing the balance resources from the original budget of the programme.

As of January 2022, only 5 partners had concluded all the activities. Some of the partners who completed the activities within the deadline of 31/12/21 (SOLLA, NHRC, SWLA, AGO, BAHIKOOB) felt that they will be penalized by the no cost extension as they would instead be ready to start working under a new LoA.

LOAs and RPA under JROLP (from January 2020 to June 2022)

	Partner	Duration	USD	Duration	USD
		2020		2021	
1	MESAF	01/10 -12/20	20.000	01/04 -12/21	19.600
2	MOPCA		0	01/06 -12/21	75.100
3	Ministry of Interior	01/08 -12/20	315.000	01/06 -12/21	342.142
4	Ministry of Justice	01/08 -12/20	142.000	01/06 -12/21	116.750

⁵ MESAF, MOPCA, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General, Bahikoob, Judicial Commission, NHRC, Amoud University, Burao University, Hargeisa University.

5	Attorney General	01/08 -12/20	50.200	01/06 -12/21	147.900
6	Bahikoob	01/08 -12/20	146.000	01/06 -12/21	90.100
7	Judicial Commission	01/08 -12/20	165.000	01/06 -12/21	412.000
8	NHRC	01/08 -12/20	40.000	01/06 -12/21	65.050
9	Amoud University	01/08 -12/20	30.000	01/04 -12/21	28.800
10	Burao University	01/08 -12/20	30.000	01/04 -12/21	28.800
11	Hargeisa University	01/08 -12/20	60.000	01/04 -12/21	49.600
1	SOLLA	0	0	01/06 -12/21	24.680
2	SAWLA	0	0	01/06 -12/21	64.400
Total USD per year:			998.200		1.464.922

§ 4 Evaluation scope and objectives

The JROLP Mid-term evaluation covers the period August 2020- December 2021 and aims to provide an independent assessment of its performance as well as to capture emerging learnings. As per TOR, specific objectives include the documentation of *“progress made as cumulative progress since inception of the programme and information on how the COVID pandemic has impacted programme delivery”*.

Progress of results were assessed against the Logframe adopted in May 2020 (all Outputs) under the so-called Prioritization Plan⁶ instead of the Results and Resources Framework approved with the Prodoc signed on 06/11/2019.

As emerged during the Inception Phase, and in consideration of the COVID pandemic’s negative impact on programme delivery and the over-ambitious Results Framework, it was agreed with UNDP that the evaluation would also be an opportunity for reflection on ways to re-focus the programme on specific priority areas. This would lay the foundations for an eventual revision of the Work Plan for the remaining period of the project cycle (until June 2022).

The **primary users** of the evaluation report will be the three PUNOs (UNDP, UNWOMEN and UNODC), UNSOM, the two donors (UE and Sweden), the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and the five national partners signatory of the Prodoc and members of the Steering Committee (MOI, MOJ, JC, AGO and NHRC). In a common learning approach, the evaluation could also be disseminated among **secondary users**, namely national implementing partners and relevant actors in the justice and security sector.

§ 5. Evaluation methodology and data analysis

The midterm evaluation was conducted between December 2021 and February 2022 by a Rule of Law Consultant (Ms Monica Rispo) with the support of a Technical consultant (Ms Barbara Lilliu).

The evaluation process was designed to maximize broad involvement of the main actors, including programme staff, partners and relevant informants through a field visit and remote interviews.

As specified in the Inception report, the theoretical framework outlining the standards of reference for this evaluation is based on the guiding principles and quality standards defined for UNDP evaluations

⁶ A detailed description of the Prioritization phase can be found in paragraph 2.1.5

and on the OECD/DAC criteria of **relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**. These have been enriched by adding the notions of adaptability and flexibility to encompass the challenges of the implementation context, including Covid-19 restrictions. Gender equality, inclusivity and human rights, reflecting the “leave no one behind” principle, have been considered through a mainstreamed approach.

The overall methodology draws from programme-driven data generated throughout the monitoring of each project activity, supplemented by the employment of additional qualitative methods designed to capture evidence, insights, views and inputs from the diverse actors and stakeholders involved in the programme.

The data collection process was systemized through the **Evaluation Matrix** (Annex III) developed on the basis of the evaluation questions listed in the ToR.

The mid-term evaluation methodology rests on the activities and steps illustrated in the diagram below:

4-Step Evaluation Methodology






1. Inception Phase (Desk review): Review of programme’s technical documentation and secondary sources (see the list of consulted literature in Annex II). These materials were instrumental to define the evaluation methodological approach, work plan and data-gathering tools.

2. Consultation and Data Gathering: A qualitative approach was used to gather feedback from all target groups. The international Rule of Law consultant conducted a mission to Somaliland from Jan 5th to 21st with meetings in Hargeisa and a two day’s field visit to Burao. A total of 40 meetings were conducted with key informants selected in consultation with UNDP staff (31 meetings in person and 9 remotely). In addition, 3 Focus Groups discussions were conducted with a total number of 42 participants, both men and women. (see the list of consulted persons in Annex I). Key informants included representatives of the justice and security institutions, civil society organizations, international partners, donors as well as beneficiaries and PUNO/UNSOM staff.

Target groups, tools, locations, and sampling are illustrated in the infographics below.

Gender, human rights and disabilities were mainstreamed across the evaluation and related question were asked to all key informants.

Hargeisa	Burao	Remote
		
55 Key Informants Interviews 2 Focus groups Discussions (23 persons)	6 Key Informants Interviews 1 Focus groups Discussions (19 persons)	10 Online Key Informants Interviews

3. Data Analysis: The methodology adopted for the data analysis was mainly categorization and coding. The evaluation team analysed and triangulated the data gathered from interviews and focus groups discussions with the information from reviewed documentation to identify significant patterns. The coding and the subsequent analysis was carried out on the basis of frequency: for example, how many respondents will have a “similar” answer or stated similar ideas, and how could those then be logically understood and labelled building a logical chain of evidence. The categories were then grouped under the evaluation criteria and specifically for the effectiveness criterion under the four main JROLP components. The “RRF under the prioritization plan” coupled with the “M&E Logframe” (see par. 2) were key tools to assess progress against results.

4. Report Drafting: The evaluation findings were officially presented on the 31st of January 2022 through a PowerPoint presentation during an online meeting with 12 participants, including programme leads, staff and donors. The draft report was then shared for comments, which were integrated in this final version.

Some **limitations** have affected the evaluation, in particular the limited timeframe for the field mission coupled with transportation constraints did not allow to visit Boroma; activities in Burao are the same as in Boroma so the evaluator managed to deduct some findings with the support of the UNDP Team. The successive revision of the RRF and related M&E Logframe, required some efforts to identify the reference documents for the evaluation. The fact that some Outputs were merged from the original RRF and new indicators were introduced in the M&E Logframe combined with the high number of activities (78) and indicators (58), did not allow to present a specific table to assess in detail each indicator and activity. The effectiveness criterion is assessed in a narrative form for each Output (par. 4) and reference is made to the status of implementation under the 2021 Annual Report developed by the UNDP team.

The JROL programme started at a time of major changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which impacted on the overall implementation and forced to work, especially in 2020, in a constantly changing context. According to local key informants, besides the mandated lockdown periods in early 2020, the COVID-19 situation seems to have only partially affected the possibility to work regularly in the field.

Perceptions of health risks by international and national actors appear to be different, generating two levels of understanding and coping strategies. The international approach is often defined as “*too cautious*” or interpreted as a “*convenient excuse*” by local stakeholders. The Covid-19 pandemic indeed impacted in different ways, but, as often repeated by many stakeholders, for Somalilanders life went back to normal much earlier than for internationals especially if compared to other countries.

The table below summarizes how key informants reported on the impact of COVID:



Online modalities: not a viable solution

A total shift to online modalities was very challenging, especially for the national institutions. UNDP tried using online platforms to conduct meetings with partners such as the MOJ, or for Justice sector coordination meetings but connection issues, short attention span and unavailability of people made it unsuccessful. This translated into a prolonged hiatus of the activities, in particular the sectorial coordination, until it was possible to resume in person working modalities, which was in mid-2021.



Restrictions on in person meetings and other activities

Once implementation resumed, the COVID restrictions impacted on the organization of training and meetings. A list of participants is requested in advance to ensure that the venue allows respecting of social distancing and there is a limit of 20 people per room. The JC representative explained that the number of persons per car for mobile courts is limited, therefore more vehicles have to be used.



High impact on international staff

Most of the international staff from PUNOs and UNSOM was relocated out of the country during the lockdown and the following months. Additionally, it was impossible for consultants to travel to Somaliland and several partners had a lot of COVID infected staff at the same time (e.g. the Baahi-koob Center located in Hargeisa hospital), which further delayed project activities.

In 2020 the COVID pandemic delayed the implementation of most activities, including the postponement of decisional processes which affected the disbursement of funds to national implementing partners.



The JROLP demonstrated adaptability and introduced awareness raising activities for the prevention of Covid-19 through TV, radio and billboards in addition to the provision of hand washing and cleaning materials for prisons across Somaliland.

Lessons learned could consider the promotion of hybrid implementation models (both online and in-person) supported by a strong investment in high-tech literacy.

Section II: Evaluation Findings

§ 2 RELEVANCE

§ 2.1 Relevance to UN and national justice and security sector priorities

Key informants repeatedly acknowledged the relevance of JROLP's support to the justice and security sector. The relevance of the intervention is grounded in the objectives of the "Governance Pillar" of the National Development Plan II (2017-2021), in particular the outcome *"increase effectiveness and efficiency of rule of law at the national level and ensure equal access to justice for all"*.

The NDPII structure mirrors the Sustainable Development Goal system with SDG 16 (peace Justice and strong institutions), SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 10 (reduced inequalities) being the key goals around which the Governance Pillar and the JROLP are developed. The SDG language is less present at programme implementation level: visibility of SDGs (i.e icons) does not seem to be promoted, even for activities organized by government institutions.

The JROLP is aligned with the UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) and in particular with programme priority 2 *"enhanced security, rule of law and access to justice"* as well as the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) with reference to the *"Security and Rule of Law"* pillar. Both documents are reflected in the JROLP in terms of emphasis on supporting women, girls, and the most vulnerable groups.

§ 2.2 Relevance to the needs of the population, in particular of vulnerable groups

The JROLP is formally reflecting the needs of the population in terms of strengthening the quality of services provided to the most vulnerable groups. The focus on human rights and gender justice, integrated in a more holistic approach, as mentioned in the Prodoc is surely to be praised. However, at implementation level it appears that too much emphasis is on programmatic boxes to be ticked rather than on real transformative processes. The perception of key informants was often that the JROLP prioritizes the needs of the institutions over those of the population. Empowerment and inclusion of the population, in particular vulnerable groups, is key to achieve transformational change.

The following paragraphs explore more in detail how the programme envisaged gender, disabilities, minorities and human rights in its formulation and implementation.

a) Gender

The JROLP Prodoc states that gender equality is mainstreamed throughout the implementation of the activities; it is further specified that the program promotes women representation and participation in all activities.

An analysis of the reporting documents and discussions with key informants, confirms that the programme **supported various efforts to promote gender equality**.

Technical support was provided to propose that the Electoral Law would include quota for women in the 2021 elections as well as to denounce the discriminatory provisions in the 'Rape, Fornication and

Other Related Offences Bill (No 78 of 2020)⁷ in cooperation with civil society under the coordination of the National Human Rights Commission. The JROLP continued to prioritize the increase of women in the legal profession and to strengthen the capacities of formal justice and security actors to support SGBV prevention and response services. The legal aid provider supported by the programme registered a significant number of legal services for women and girls, including awareness in the communities by paralegals. (for more details on these activities see paragraph 4.4 and 4.5; a reflection of the role of UNWOMEN is available in pa. 3.1)

Although the above-mentioned achievements are important and highly relevant to the Somaliland context, they are just a first step. To achieve a deeper impact, the programme should consider the employment of a **more gender transformative approach**.

It is indeed important to support the access of more women into the legal professions: as of January 2022 there are 20 female prosecutors out of 62 and 47 female lawyers out of 250. However, these efforts are compromised when these women have children or get married as they normally have to move out from the workforce. Moreover, due to religious principles rooted in Islamic law, women are not able to become judges. Not a single woman was elected in the 2021 parliamentary elections, even if there were 13 female candidates. Women police officers are not allowed to carry a gun and women prosecutors and lawyers are not assigned to the most serious cases.

Patriarchal norms and clan dynamics still play a pivotal role in Somaliland society which means that ticking the programmatic box through engaging women in trainings, or providing quota in elections or dedicated scholarships is not enough without working on power dynamics and transformative approaches at individual and community level. This would entail not only improving women's access to legal professions, but also helping communities to understand and challenge the social norms that perpetuate inequalities between men and women in decision making processes. As explained by some key informants from CSOs there is a need for a long term commitment to foster a conducive environment for more women to exercise their agency.



Therefore, PUNOs under the leadership of UNWOMEN, should further strategize on gender transformative approaches; as a starting point, they could be applied to awareness raising activities.

b) Disabilities

The JROLP is achieving successful results in terms of strengthening the **legal and policy framework** for people with disabilities.

During the design phase of the programme, UNSOM Human Rights ensured the inclusion of disability rights and an LoA was subsequently signed with Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs and Family (MEASF) in addition to supporting, for 6 months, a competent and motivated “embedded advisor” at the Ministry's Disability Department.

Due to budget limitations (20.000 USD) these efforts were however limited to the preparation of a draft Disability Bill, which has been finalized and is expected to be submitted to the Cabinet. The process has been inclusive of civil society organizations working in the field (i.e Somaliland National Disability Forum) and consultations have been extended to the regions, with workshops held in Boroma and Borao. The Bill has been developed on the basis of the 2012 Policy on disabilities.

Discussions with key informants highlighted that very few legal aid providers have adopted specific policies on disabilities and even when such tools are available there are difficulties in the practical

⁷ <https://sihanet.org/joint-statement-the-sexual-offences-bill-must-be-urgently-revived/>

implementation. For example, SWLA allows on an *ad hoc* basis, the waiving of legal fees and supports transportation or typing of legal documents for persons with mental disabilities. Environmental barriers to access courts have been mentioned as major challenges for persons with mobility and visual impairments. Some justice officials explained that, if possible, in such situations they try to organize the hearing in the courtyard or an area that is accessible to people with physical disabilities.



JROLP should continue to support initiatives to promote disability rights in close cooperation with UNSOM Human Rights. It is however recommended to **shift the focus on the operationalization** of the Disability Bill with initiatives aimed at: a) piloting dedicated justice services, including legal aid, for people with disabilities b) building the capacities of CSO and government institutions to mainstream disabilities across their policies c) raise awareness among the population about disability rights.

c) Minorities

Although not formally included as one of the key mainstreamed elements, the issue of discrimination against minority clans deserves attention.

The Somaliland cultural and socio-political system are based on the clan system, whereby the majority clans (the Hawiye, Rahanweyn, Dir, and Daarood) dominate over the minority clans (Bantu, Yibir and Gaboye)⁸.

In Somaliland the Gaboye, which comprises people practicing specific non-pastoralist occupations such as market-selling, domestic work, cooking and tea-selling, is the largest minority group.

The Gaboye minority do not benefit from a traditional clan structure that affords them some degree of protection. They are discriminated against by the formal system: *“police, who tend to be from the majority clans, side with stronger clans”*. The majority of people do not interact with them, they are not educated and discriminated against. It’s a problem that people don’t want to acknowledge.

In recent years the perception towards minorities is gradually changing among younger people (for example a candidate from a minority clan was elected in the 2021 Parliamentary elections with a large number of votes), but overall discrimination remains.



Considering its focus to expand services to vulnerable people, the JROLP should **pay more attention to the issue of minority clans**. The need to promote the rights of women from minority clans, who experience multiple-discrimination on the account of their gender and minority status, is evident. Although addressing these aspects would require a long term approach to create an environment of respect and protection of these vulnerable groups, a first step could be to acknowledge that the issue requires attention and try to reach out to these minorities through available legal aid and SGBV services.

d) Human Rights

Human rights are well mainstreamed across the JROLP.

Several key informants confirmed that trainings included a human rights module and reported efforts to monitor human rights violations, such as the MOJ led initiative to develop harmonized SOPs for prison inspections. This has been possible as a result of the support offered by UNSOM Human Rights section and their effective synergy with OHCHR, as well as in the excellent work carried out by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), as detailed in paragraph 4.12.

⁸ Abdihakim Barre Warsame “*Ethnic Prejudice and Discrimination of Somali Minority groups- the image of the other as an enemy*”, 2020

§ 2.3 Geographical coverage and area-based approach

In addition to Hargeisa, the JROLP is also operational in the regions Boroma and Burao.

The so-called “area based approach” aims to promote the expansion to the regions, which is a priority for both the JROLP and the government of Somaliland, in the light of the recent decentralization policy. The objective is to develop two operational Hubs: one in Boroma covering the Western regions of Somaliland and one in Burao covering the Eastern regions. In the long term they would become the base for operations in nearby regions. As mentioned in the Prodoc, the rationale behind this approach is to ensure the provision *“of improved basic rule of law services to the marginalised and vulnerable, particularly those living outside the urban areas”*.

The establishment of dedicated Hubs to support the work in remote regions is highly relevant also to facilitate the oversight role of JROLP staff. Due to the security situation, internal travel for UN staff is extremely costly and all Agencies and UNSOM, only have offices in Hargeisa. The estimated budget for a field trip is about 300 USD per day considered that a UN convoy requires 6 police officers for which the UN needs to provide DSA, cars and fuel. An effective area based model would still require UN staff to travel to the regions, but to a more limited extent.

The UNDP Team Leader explains that the area-based approach is an innovation introduced by the JROLP. It is however to be noted that this is not the first time the UNDP supports rule of law services outside Hargeisa; the JROLP lays its foundation on past UNDP interventions which supported legal aid providers and security actors both in Boroma and Borao. In particular UNDP supported the establishment of the Bahikoob centers, including the opening of two sub-offices in Borama and Borao in 2014. In 2012, UNDP was supporting 22 legal aid centers across all 6 regions, including Sool. It is recommended to review the lessons learned generated from these experiences.

Under the JROLP the “area based approach” is achieving some **initial and promising results**. To be noted the support to the regional offices of at least 3 legal aid organizations (SOLLA, SWLA, Bahaikoob), the support to several institutions to conduct monitoring mission in the regions, the mobile courts and the construction of police stations and the related community policing activities. Particularly noteworthy is fact that the JROPL has been able to mobilize the MOJ to conduct, for the first time, coordination meetings in Borao and Borama. The SOLLA representative in Burao praised this initiative for having achieved to promote information sharing, but recommended to ensure that it is organized more regularly. The AGO in Burao is organizing coordination meetings for criminal justice actors. Finally, many consultations organized under different JROLP activities (i.e workshops on TDR, the draft Media law and the draft Disability law) were also held in Borama and Burao to include the regional perspective.



Feedback from key informants and comparative analysis with similar initiatives in other countries allowed to consolidate the following recommendations to achieve an effective ROL Hub in the regions:

- **Address the issue of the lack of transportation** to reach the remote areas. Most organisations referred that are manly working in the main cities: some are only travel as far as 5/6 km others are reaching a maximum of 60 km. The main reason is the lack of transportation; key informants in Burao unanimously recommended that JROLP should include transportation incentives, reimbursement of fuel and/or car rentals to allow them to increase awareness sessions and other services in remote areas. In parallel, the community based paralegal network should be strengthened in their capacities and increased in numbers.

- An MOI representative positively commented on the “area-based approach” but recommended to **expand services also in regions near the borders** with Puntland and Djibouti where the security situation is still volatile.
- Continue to ensure that **representatives from regions are included in all workshops** or/and that workshops are also replicated in the regional Hubs.
- The current “area-based approach” is in its early stage of development; the above mentioned achievements are yet fragmented and do not operate in synergy. Based on these initial achievements, it is recommended to launch a consultation process to **develop an overall strategy aimed at identifying a model for the ROL Regional Hub**. Relevant actors should be mapped and their respective roles identified; referrals, synergies and local coordination mechanisms as well as linkages with Hargeisa clarified. A physical space could be created so that participating actors could meet in person and be encouraged to act as a group. The regional Hub could serve as planning and coordination forum under the MOJ but also as a center for service delivery (either by referrals or by direct provision of legal services). Based on the needs in each region, the ROL Regional Hub could offer to the population different typologies of legal services ranging from legal representation, advice, information and awareness, referrals to SGBV centers etc. Tailored models could be developed for particular regions, e.g in the Sool region could require a service to monitor and report on protection risks associated with armed violence and conflict. Participating actors should be broadly identified and include institutions, CSOs, elders, communities. Initially the regional Hub could have a specific focus on the provision of legal aid services and then gradually expand other ROL areas. Practical interlinkages with other development projects in the same region should be defined, included with the UNDP Decentralisation project.

§ 2.4 Adequacy of project design and intervention logic

Key informants unanimously agreed that the JROLP design process was **highly participatory and inclusive**. Several workshops were organized to gather inputs from all parties involved. The process required continuous discussion and, in its final stages, validation and endorsement by the donors. UNDP is to be credited for the efforts dedicated to this process, including for hiring a consultant to consolidate the inputs received. However, the process was also perceived by all key informants as **excessively long** because it was developed over the span of almost two years.

It was also brought to the evaluation attention that partners expectations were not well managed. The process was overly optimistic and in its attempt to accommodate each party’s feedback. It generated a Prodoc and related Results and Resources Framework (RRF) which are **intrinsically complex to the detriment of homogeneity and coherence**.

The end result was a RRF that mirrors the complexities of the co-design process: it has **too many elements (outputs and activities)** and is not fully supported by an integrated vision and approach.

In the final stages of the design process the Dutch government decided not to fund the programme so the JROLP budget was reduced from 7M to 5M. Consequently, the so-called “Prioritization exercise” was initiated with a new round of consultations which produced a new Results and Resources Framework (RRF). This opportunity to reduce the activities, harmonize the intervention logic and re-focus the programme, was however missed. The Steering Committee (SC) chose to maintain the same components and activities and only operate some budgetary cuts along the lines of a re-allocation rather than going through an effective prioritization exercise (all JROLP components were reduced indicatively by 30% except the SSR and Coordination that saw almost a 50% reduction in their budget).

This theoretical set up largely influenced the implementation phase during which most of the programme activities have developed in siloes rather than in synergy, reflecting the technical division per outputs and the lost linkages among the activities.

Several comments were gathered over the structure of the programmatic documents and especially the RRF.

It is acknowledged that the Prioritization Exercise introduced some few improvements. However, the new RRF still has 10 outputs (whose formulation reminds more of outcomes rather than output) and several indicators for each output and activity in addition to those of the main outcome and impact. This makes the monitoring of progress a burden in terms of amount and quality of data required; the process is further complicated by the partner's differences in data literacy and collection methodologies and tools (see paragraph 5.4 for more details on the M&E system).



The formulation of some sex-disaggregated indicators at the activity level is to be praised; however, well-structured logframes should cover more than the number of participants in the activities to objectively grasp multidimensionality and gender mainstreaming. This is a process that should start from the programme design level and be woven throughout implementation and M&E, which is why the inclusion of the M&E department in the upcoming design of the future phase of the JROPL should be considered.

Finally, the **JROLP baseline** raises some concerns considering that most of the values in the RRF were set at zero notwithstanding a wealth of information was available from previous UNDP interventions, and many current activities are just a continuation of the previous ones.

§ 2.5 Legacy of past Interventions

The JROLP refers to past lessons learned in the introduction of the Prodoc, but in the implementation phase it does not seem to acknowledge and build on the results achieved during past UNDP interventions in Somaliland. As summarized in the table below, the UN system and in particular UNDP has been present in the country to support the ROL sector for almost 20 years.

**20 years of UNDP support of the ROL in Somaliland
(from 2002 to 2021)**

	YEARS	ROL Projects covering Somaliland
UNDP ROLS programmes	2002 - 2005	Phase I: Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme
	2006 - 2008	Phase II: Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme
	2009 - 2011	Phase III: Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme
UNDP Bridge & Inception Projects	2012 - 2015	Bridge & Inception: Access to Justice project
	2012 - 2015	Bridge & Inception: Civilian police project
Joint UN ROL Programme (MPTF)	2015 - 2018	Phase I: The Somalia & Somaliland Joint Rule of Law Programme (JROLP with 9 UN partner organizations)
	2020 - 2021	Phase II: Joint ROL programme for Somaliland (3 UN partner Organisations)

Numerous partners recalled that UNDP's engagement in past interventions was quite different. The UNDP national project staff recalled that UNDP had fewer partners, a bigger team to support the interventions (3 internationals and 4 nationals staff in 2014 only for the A2J project), two distinct projects (A2J and community policing) and apparently less financial resources. The working modalities were more focused on capacity building with opportunities for lessons learned and exchange of ideas. A rapid review of old project documents confirms that many of the current JROLP activities are a continuation of past interventions (legal aid, mobile courts, judicial inspections, SGBV, university law clinics, scholarships). In such areas the JROLP support has just continued as in the past with limited attention to innovation.



The JROLP would have greatly benefited from a **stronger institutional memory** within UNDP; this would have saved time and ensured a continuity in the approach.

Finally, it would have been important to give more consideration in the design phase of the JROLP to the recommendations from the final evaluation of the joint ROL for Somalia and Somaliland, which had anticipated some of the weaknesses that are highlighted in this report⁹.

⁹ "The Programme has been too broad and over-ambitious ... JROLP was seen as a wish-list, with no strategy behind ... a high priority on reporting of numbers at output level, without requisite emphasis on outcomes ... it would be more beneficial to focus on fewer activities that have a greater impact" Del Mese in, "Joint ROL programme evaluation, UNDP Somalia", 2017,

§ 3: COHERENCE

§ 3.1 Coordination among PUNOs and with UNSOM

a) Coordination among PUNOs

Despite positive working relations among staff from the three Agencies, coordination among PUNOs shows some weaknesses at the level of design, budgeting, implementation and reporting.

The programme was not designed with a strong commitment to the notion of joint programming. The RRF appears structured around thematic areas assigned to each Agency. While it is commonly understood that UNODC is responsible for Output 3 (corrections) the role of UNWOMEN remains less clear. The UNWOMEN Country Director clarifies that, due to budget constraints, UNWOMEN's contribution to the JROLP is limited to Activity result 1.4.1. which covers the support to women associations with the objective to increase the number of female legal professionals. For a joint programme grounded in SDG5, a stronger role of UNWOMEN could have been expected in terms of ensuring the gender responsiveness of the whole programme.

Budget allocations among the three agencies are quite unbalanced; the majority of the total budget is managed by UNDP (88%), followed by UNODC (10%); UNWOMEN only manages 2 % of the budget, for which it is indeed unrealistic to expect a more active role than the implementation of activity 1.4.1.

As pointed out by the MPTF manager, also the reporting appears compiled by each Agency instead of presenting a common narrative.

The most significant coordination challenges have emerged at implementation level, in particular:



UNWOMEN and UNODC have not been able to ensure a **regular presence of UN staff in Somaliland**, which has affected communication and implementation. Since the beginning of the programme UNWOMEN has temporarily closed its office in Hargeisa and the activities are managed from Nairobi and Mogadishu. UNODC do not have an office in Somaliland, but operates from Nairobi with the support at technical level from two seconded staff from the Swedish Probation Office. These are highly experienced and motivated professionals, but have no decisional powers which remain at Nairobi level.



As explained in par. 5.1, the **coordination of a complex programme as the JROLP should entail a full time job** assigned to a dedicated international staff with solid management capacities and should be separated from technical roles.



Probably because of previous UNDP ROL projects in Somaliland, the vast majority of national partners did **not perceive JROLP as a “One UN joint programme”**, but continued to view it as a UNDP programme. Numerous stakeholders reported they had never met with either UNODC or UNWOMEN. Several visibility materials (billboards, caps, brochures) only carried the UNDP logo, despite mentioning a “joint UN” programme. For future interventions it could be suggested to identify a name for the programme that resonates with the local culture without reference to the supporting Agencies. For example, the UNDP ROL programme in Palestine is a joint

UNDP, UNWOMEN and UNICEF intervention but it is called and widely known as “the Sawasya programme” (meaning equality in Arabic).



Activities are **implemented in a siloed approach** instead of being organized jointly. For example, the NHRC has achieved remarkable results in prison monitoring, but they do not seem to have been involved or consulted in the different activities that UNODC has organized for the Custodial corps, e.g. the study on conditions of inmates in Hargeisa prison.



Coordination has only occurred bilaterally with UNDP, but all Agencies agreed on the need of a **dedicated PUNO meeting** to discuss issues at technical level, including for learning purposes.



UN Agencies follow **different administrative procedures** which has created some misunderstandings with national partners. (See for example par. 4.10 for the case of UNODC and MOJ on the signature of an LoA for the Probation and Parole scheme)

b) Coordination with UNSOM

The partnership with UNSOM and all its Hargeisa-based Sections has been **profitable and impactful at technical level**. As highlighted by the UNDP Head of Office, the co-location of office space in UNCC has greatly facilitated the communication and the implementation of joint activities.

All UNSOM technical advisors (Police, Human Rights, Corrections and Judicial Affairs) have contributed to the JROLP by providing trainings in several workshops or by providing technical advice in processes aimed at drafting policies, guidelines or manuals. UNSOM has been able to provide competent and motivated advisors who have personally engaged to advance JROLP and managed to adapt to the flexible framework and achieve results.

For the police component the UNSOM adviser has been instrumental in mobilizing the participation of additional partners as EUCAP for the SPU and electoral security trainings. The Human Rights Advisor also ensured a regular support to the NHRC for other activities under the UNSOM mandate. This presence has probably strengthened the role of the Commission and indirectly contributed to achieve the remarkable results described in par. 4.12

Output 4 covering the SSR component is being implemented under the leadership of the UNSOM SSR team based in Mogadishu and analyzed in par. 4.11



In both the RFF and AWP, the technical contribution expected from UNSOM remains vague and limited to mention “UNSOM/UNDP” under almost all activities. It may be suggested to better specify, eventually in a dedicated document, what specific activities are expected from UNSOM. This would also allow to better capture for visibility purposes the technical contribution from UNSOM.

§ 3.2 Partnerships with national justice and security institutions

One of the complexities of the JROLP is related to its high number of national partners, some of which have strong influence in the internal power dynamics. JROLP (specifically UNDP) has as many as **13 national partners** with active LoAs: 4 Ministries (MOJ, MOI, MOPCA, MEASF) 2 Justice institutions (AGO,

JC) 3 Universities (Amoud, Borao, Hargeisa), 2 civil society organizations (SOLLA, SAWLA) 2 semi-governmental institutions (Bahikoob, NHRC).

Almost 40% of the budget allocated for LoAs is assigned to the Ministry of Interior, who also has the leadership of the JROLP. One of the key informants defined the Steering Committee as a “semi-cabinet”. In this already crowded arena, a new partner (MOPCA) was included in the 2nd year of the program, with a significant budget allocation and with limited relevance to strictly justice and security activities.

As illustrated in par. 1.1 the UNDP administrative arrangements are based on the signature of Letters of Agreements (LoA) that ensure cash-advances to each of the 13 Partners. This system has generated a fierce competition among national partners to adjudicate the highest financial allocation. Numerous key informants complained about the reduction of their budget compared to previous UNDP interventions and questioned the participation of some actors as well as the usefulness of some activities. The vast majority shared the concern that the JROLP has too many partners, many of which have received an insufficient budget to achieve meaningful results.

The situation of partners from the **civil society is of particular concern**. All legal aid providers (SOLLA, University of Hargeisa, Amoud and Burao, SWLA and Bahikoob - a semi-governmental body) have complained about a drastic reduction of funding compared to past UNDP interventions. They are not participating nor represented in the Steering Committee and are in a weaker position *vis à vis* the more influential governmental institutions. One of the embedded advisors explains that civil societies are represented in the Steering Committee by the Ministry of Justice, which is not advisable to preserve the independence of the organizations. During negotiations for LoAs, PUNOs and donors should therefore pay particular attention to ensure a fair distribution of resources among civil society organizations and government institutions.

Dynamics with institutional partners are further complicated by internal frictions, sensitiveness around mandates and an overall a fluid environment where the legal and policy framework is still being defined. With reference to institutional partners UNDP has not been able to navigate this complex environment: one key informant summarized the views shared by several stakeholders that “*instead of solving conflicts, UNDP seems to be fuelling them*”. Institutional partners mentioned many times during the evaluation the issue of confusion over how to proceed and who should act to advance specific activities as well as a few misunderstandings about the roles of each institution.

Civil society organizations expressed satisfaction about the partnership with UNDP, but raised the issue of budget limitations to achieve meaningful results. Some of them mentioned that compared to past UNDP interventions, there are less technical exchanges with UNDP and the work is mainly focused on the documentation and the reporting for the financial contribution. This is understandable due to the small size of the UNDP team; for the future additional staff (or a closer support from UNSOM advisors) would allow to re-introduce a more sustainable approach to partnerships.

§ 3.3 Sectorial coordination (output 9) and complementarities with other actors

Several *fora* aiming at coordinating activities in support of the justice and security sector are available in Somaliland, in particular:

- **Three working groups under the Governance Pillar of the NDPII:** “Justice & human rights”, “Security sector” and “Juvenile justice”.

The JROLP supports the running costs (included staffing) of the three working groups (60.000 USD) and UNDP co-chairs, with MOI and MOJ, the two first working groups. Meetings are held

on a quarterly basis and are attended by international and national justice and security actors (36 participants in the June 2021 Justice meeting).

This evaluation captured mixed feedback on the effectiveness of the coordination. One informant reported it was very effective, another one commented that “*without UNDP we would have worked more in isolation*”. Several key informants recognized the valuable contribution of the working groups in achieving information sharing and avoid duplications, but observed that the impact was limited in terms of joint planning and common advocacy objectives. Some informants recommended for the future that meetings should be more interactive and bottlenecks should also be discussed and addressed. The huge number of participants was also mentioned as an obstacle to effective discussions.

Considered the significant budgetary contribution of the JROLP to sectorial coordination (compared to other countries), a stronger impact of the working groups could have been expected. It is however acknowledged that COVID had a disruptive impact on all coordination mechanisms, in particular when they shifted to (less effective) online modalities as illustrated in par. 1.2. To be noted also that for UNDP the coordination role could not be assigned to a dedicated staff but had to be ensured by the already overloaded UNDP Project Manager.

For the next phase of the JROLP, consideration could be given to transfer the organizational and financial responsibility for the Working Groups entirely to the national partners. Until the end of the JROLP the focus should be on developing a common understanding of the joint planning and joint advocacy role that the Working Groups could play.

- **MOJ Legal Aid coordination meetings.** This initiative promoted some promising practices. Firstly, the replication the meetings in the regions: for the first time the MOJ organised the A2J meetings on a quarterly basis also in Borama and Burao. Key informants also noted that the meetings produced interesting presentations from Civil Society Organisations.
- **FCDO-led ROL Justice and Security coordination meeting.** This forum was only attended by international actors and occurred online until February 2021 on a monthly basis. It was reported as an effective and well organized forum.

Due to time constraints, this evaluation did not manage to interview all the relevant international development partners in the ROL sector to assess **bilateral complementarities**.

Some level of coordination was found between UNDP and OXFAM in supporting mobile courts activities: a schedule of hearings with locations and dates is shared to avoid duplication. In addition, resources have been put together for a concerted effort of mutual interest, i.e the consultant hired for the legal aid Bill.

Pact/USAID expects that efforts to cooperate more effectively with JROLP will develop as soon as the worst phase of the COVID pandemic will be over, in particular to coordinate available resources, such as paralegals.

As highlighted in par. 4.3, a closer coordination with FCDO would have ensured a more coherent common framework to support the JC.

§ 4. EFFECTIVENESS

§ 4.1 Legislative Drafting

Output 1

JROLP is supporting the development of SOPs to regulate the legislative drafting process. This is an innovative and relevant initiative, considered that a clear procedure is not yet available. Despite notable efforts with partial achievements and the contribution of knowledgeable national consultants, the process has been on stand-by since October 2021.

The activities to develop the SOPs are split across two LoAs with 2 different Ministries in a framework that does not appear very clear and shows some overlaps. The MOJ received 23.000 USD to achieve the target of “SOP/ guidelines developed and approved by Council of Minister, and 3 related workshops” and “30 legal officers trained on legislative drafting”. MOPCA was allocated 16.000 USD to ensure that “the legislative drafting SOP are approved by the Council of Ministers” and to “train 30 officers on legal drafting techniques”.

The two Ministers have cooperative working relations, however for the future preference should be given to solutions where responsibilities for a set of activities are clearly established under one leading partner.

The MOJ legislative drafting consultant has developed the SOPs and conducted three consultative workshops (included in the regions), of which the last one in October 2021. The SOP a 16-page document that do not however contain a description of the process for legislative drafting in Somaliland but a generic analysis of the context, the rationale and some suggested steps to achieve the process. The rest of the document contains the “Legislative Drafting Guidelines for Africa”.

After the October workshop the process stalled. Apparently the consultative process did not manage to find a consensus on which Ministry/Institution should lead the legislative drafting process. The Solicitor General Office, supported by other key informants, claims to have the mandate to oversee the quality of all draft legislations including the submission to cabinet. The Deputy Solicitor expressed severe complaints about the JROLP support to legislative drafting, claiming that the office has not been invited to the workshops and just given the SOP for comments at the end of the process.

The MOPCA intends to set up a Consultation and Drafting Unit, for which the MOPCA Advisor explained “the office space is ready and we have the expertise”.

The LoA with MOJ also lists among its targets a “Consultation and Drafting Unit established and operational” without specifying under which institution. UNDP staff explained that the Unit will be set up in the institution agreed in the Legislative Drafting SOPs, which however have not clarified this crucial point.



Considering that the SOP has not yet been finalized and the confusion around the Consultation and Drafting Unit, it is advised to organize a “**Reassessment workshop**” aimed at ascertaining the actual situation, acknowledge the work achieved and the related lessons learned and jointly determine the best course of action to finalize the activity. The workshop should be fully inclusive and eventually managed by an independent consultant (not affiliated to any Ministry). The objective should be to clarify the overall legislative drafting model for Somaliland, with a primary focus on deciding if Somaliland wishes a centralized or a decentralized (in each Ministry) model and the roles/responsibilities of the relevant institutions. After an agreement is found on this crucial step it should be possible to finalize the Guidelines (under the leadership of the designated authority) and design in detail the legislative drafting process.

§ 4.2 Traditional Dispute Resolution (TRD) policy and guidelines

Output 2

Under the 2021 LoA, the MOJ has been assigned the responsibility to develop the “guidelines for Traditional Dispute Resolution (TDR)” and conduct 3 related workshops with the support of an embedded advisor (total budget 21.000 USD). The draft guidelines were submitted in December 2021 and the workshops were conducted in the same month.

The activity raises a number of concerns, some of which may explain why the guidelines are not moving forward to the final approval stage.

- **Confusion on the notions of TRD and ADR.** Key informants seem to agree that TRD involves the solution of inter-clan disputes performed by elders (Akel houses) based on traditional mechanisms (Xeer) and under the oversight of the Ministry of Interior. On the contrary Alternative Dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism seem to refer to dispute resolution among two individuals using modern techniques. It remains however unclear if the adjudicators in the two system are the same “elders”, and what are the typologies of cases adjudicated. IDLO is implementing a project to establish ADR Centers across Somaliland in cooperation with the MOJ; it was not possible to organise an interview during the evaluation but it is highly recommended to coordinate with IDLO to plan the way forward of this initiative.
- **Unclear competences of MOJ and MOI over dispute resolution.** The Director of the MOI Department of “Peace Building and Traditional leaders” explained that his office oversees 3.000 elders who solve disputes in the so-called Akel houses. Decisions are registered with the HJC for enforcement (70 cases in Burao in 2021). As an example, he mentioned that the MOI was currently involved in solving an inter-clan dispute involving the killing of 150 persons in the areas on the border with Puntland. The Director complained that his office had not been adequately involved in the process led by the MOJ. He also expressed interest in organising trainings on Human Rights for the 3.000 elders overseen by his Department. In the light of the MOI competence over TDR, it remains unclear what would be the added value of having an additional layer of dispute resolution mechanisms supported by the MOJ.
- **Some aspects of the draft Guidelines would need to be fine-tuned from a legal perspective.** For example, the Guidelines propose that ADR centers cover “*decisions over civil disputes between two or more individual persons that may be remedied by awarding monetary damages or restitution*” but then they include “domestic violence”, which is clearly a criminal case. The linkage with formal courts and the role of lawyers should be better clarified in order to avoid any risk that ADR centers become a parallel Justice System for civil cases. Also it would be important to assess how the rights of vulnerable groups would be protected by ADR adjudicators. The Guidelines are only available in English, which represents an obstacle to a comfortable discussion during the consultation workshops, so it is recommended to translate them in Somali. Considered that these legal-technical aspects would also have an impact on the work of other international actors as IDLO, a forum to address them could be the NDP working group on Justice and Human rights.



Considering the sensitivity of the issues at stake and in the light of the “do no harm principle”, it is recommended to devote some additional time to finalize the implementation of this (extremely relevant) activity and better understand the context.

For example, an assessment study, including a gender and vulnerability assessment, could be developed by a joint national and international team of experts and in close cooperation with IDLO and the 2 relevant Ministries (MOJ and MOI). Consideration could also be given to other ADR projects developed in the region.

When available structures/processes, power dynamics and needs are clear, a “Reassessment workshop” could be organized to discuss how to fine-tune the guidelines based on the new information and the lessons learned from the previous phase.

§ 4.3 HJC: mobile courts, inspections and case management

Output 3

The JC has received JROLP support under 2 successive LoAs: the first one for 165.000 and the second one for 412.000 USD, in addition to 3 embedded Advisor and Coordinators for 9 months.

The JC expressed satisfaction explaining that UNDP’s support was highly respectful of the JC priorities, which is understandable as the support does not involve controversial aspects but is just a contribution

to running costs for 3 activities: **a) mobile courts, b) judicial inspection and c) manual case management**. These are three initiatives that were launched 10 years ago with the support of UNDP and now have become continuous activities that the JC is running on its own and would continue if UNDP's support stopped. The JC embedded advisor explained that in 2021 *"almost 90% of the annual budget for mobile courts came from the government"*. This is a remarkable result, which also triggers a reflection on whether for an eventual future phase, the JROLP should consider some changes in the support of the JC, and in particular to mobile courts, in terms of shifting from operational to technical support aimed at improving the quality of the services.

a) FCDO Criminal Justice Advisor explained that the JC has also received significant support from FCDO until 2020 to establish an **electronic case management system**, to update the code of conduct and establish the inspection committee. It is unclear how FCDO and JROLP support were coordinated and the impression is that there were some overlaps. For example, it is unclear why the JC is requesting to upgrade the UNDP supported manual case management (currently operational in all courts across Somaliland) to an electronic case management, knowing that FCDO has already provided the server, the terminals in Hargeisa (included a terminal with limited access for the AGO and the prisons) as well as the required trainings for staff.

The manual case management is the continuation of a successful initiative piloted by UNDP in 2015; it is currently fully operational in all regions with UNDP's contribution for the required stationary. The UNDP M&E officers explained that the biggest gap remains data collection and analysis. Simple tools to be filled manually at local level to be included in an excel database at Supreme Court level have been developed and validated by the local partners. It is recommended to explore further how this initiative is linked up with the FCDO support and compare which data is captured by the two systems.

b) Also activities 1.3.1.2 of the LoA covering the *"design and support the implementation of a judiciary inspection and disciplinary scheme"* appears to be also falling under the scope of the support provided by FCDO. To be noted that *"in 2014 a total number of 122 complains were received and 7 judges were dismissed"* under the UNDP supported complaint mechanism; it would be important to also analyze how the system has evolved until 2021 to capture lessons learned¹⁰.

c) Overall the support to **mobile courts** consists in a contribution to the running costs (fuel, stationary, perdiem). Below are some points for consideration for future support. Some were already suggested in the 2013 Mobile courts report and in the 2015 evaluation of the UNDP A2J project.

- A key justification for supporting mobile courts in JROLP was to expand their **area of intervention**, however it remains unclear how this is occurring. The mobile court coordinator should provide a closer follow up of this aspect and a clear overview of the new areas on intervention should be available. Given the lack of justice services in remote and insecure regions as Sool, it would have been expected from UNDP a more focused support towards these difficult areas.
- The relevance of mobile courts to ensure justice in remote locations continues to be acknowledged despite in the last years the number of district courts have increased; the District Court's jurisdiction is limited to 3 million shilling and max 3 years of sentence, so numerous first instance cases have to be referred to the Regional Courts. The UNDP Team Leader explains however that Mobile courts **only cover Appeal Cases**. Also in 2014 almost 50% of mobile cases consisted in Appeals, but this was found to be a consequence of a shortcoming in the system,

¹⁰ A team of 4 HJC Inspectors was established in 2012 with the mandate to evaluate the performance of the judges, the justice services as well as the quality of the verdicts in all 6 regions of Somaliland. In parallel, UNDP supported the HJC to develop the "Judicial Code of Conduct", which is the reference document that the Inspection team is tasked to enforce.

more than a reflection of the needs of court users. In 2014 most Mobile Courts were held “to review the decisions of lower courts because these are considered inadequate”. It would be therefore suggested to conduct a more in depth analysis with some reflections on whether lower courts should also be supported with capacity building to improve their performance, while allowing Mobile courts to also take up first instance cases that exceed the jurisdiction of District Courts.

- As confirmed by the Appeal judge in Burao, since 2013, **mobile courts continue to be organized “on demand”**, when a case arises and a request is received. The model presents some shortcomings in both financial and logistical terms, so it would be recommended to explore the possibility of setting up mobile courts “on circuit”, at least in areas where justice and police institutions are present.
- A **strategy for Mobile Courts** is not available but would be useful to better define the framework for the initiative. The Strategy would allow prioritizing areas of intervention and typology of cases and also defining key issues such as court fees exemption policies for civil cases or the role of mobile courts in verifying pretrial detention cases. Also the issue of the composition could be standardized. According to HJC staff in Hargeisa a mobile court could be composed of as many as 28 members, excluding lawyers and prosecutors. The number was on the contrary much lower in Burao. The AGO, both in Hargeisa and Burao, raised the concern that the budget for mobile courts is managed by the JC so they only receive the per diems as a reimbursement and with significant delays.
- The JROLP log-frame under the Prioritization Plan introduced indicator 3.2 to measure the establishment of **SGBV mobile courts**, but this option was rightly rejected by the Chief Justice and is currently on hold. This aspect was already discussed in the 2014 evaluation report and is recalled, as still actual, in Footnote # 11 for easy reference.¹¹

§ 4.4 SGBV Centres: a good example of referral pathway

Output 4

To strengthen the capacity to respond to Gender Based Violence the programme supports three SGBV centers, the **Baahi-koob one-stop centers**, managed by the Hargeisa Group Hospital in Burao, Borama and Hargeisa. Baahi-Koob is a semi-governmental body established by UNDP in 2008 in Hargeisa and expanded in 2014 in Borama and Burao. The center in Hargeisa is the headquarters and has a supervisory role on the work of the other centers.

Bahikoob is ensuring, free of charge, a wide range of services to SGBV survivors, including medical, psychosocial and legal support. The centers completed all the activities under the two JROLP LoAs (for

¹¹ “Lessons learned from the UNDP-supported MCs in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the notion of gender mobile courts was originally developed, show that they are effective in increasing the number of SGBV cases, but also have negative side effects that should be considered. From a general human rights perspective, gender MCs may discriminate the right to access justice of non-SGBV victims in remote areas where formal courts are not present and consequently create a two-tier justice system. More specifically to the DRC context, it was noted that such courts proved to have negative implications on the independence of judges as donor policies pressured them to prioritise SGBV cases with the additional consequence of producing exceptionally high conviction rates. Moreover, in a context like Somaliland where the stigma from rape is much stronger than in DRC due to religious and cultural factors, a gender MC might not be the most appropriate measure to effectively fight impunity for rape. Other, less explicit, mechanisms might be more suitable to promoting the prosecution of SGBV in rural areas, where the focus should be on gradually changing cultural and social behaviours and avoiding quick-fixes such as justice mechanisms that might be misperceived by the communities. MCs should certainly continue to pursue SGBV cases, but alongside others in an unostentatious approach and in complementarity with a massive awareness raising campaign”. in “UNDP support to Mobile Courts, Country report #3: Somalia”, Monica Rispo, 2014

a total budget of 236.100 USD): they supported a total of 908 SGBV survivors (598 in 2020 and 316 in 2021). Bahikoob is also funded by other international partners, in particular UNICEF as the majority of cases involve minors.

The Bahikoob staff is paid by the government, but the JROLP provides incentives to 9 officers to complement their salaries, mainly to ensure 24/7 services, in addition to funding an Embedded Advisor as Coordinator of the Hargeisa Center. To be noted that the JROLP is supporting the presence of officers from the Police Criminal Investigation Department (CDI) in the Centers, which is an excellent solution to ensure timely and adequate investigation of SGBV cases.

Key informants expressed entire satisfaction for the work carried out by the centers.

In addition to the services provided to SGBV survivors, major achievements included the update of the SoP for reporting lines and the model to develop SGBV centers in the country.

The coordination and referral system put in place was also praised. The centers coordinate closely with the Attorney General Office (AGO) for cases that are brought before courts and to ensure legal representation for the victim. Bahikoob also refer and receive cases from SWLA.

The centers provide solid data and valuable insight of their work through their reports. Reports from the regions are sent on a monthly basis to Hargeisa. For the JROLP they mainly provide quantitative data, but they also conduct additional qualitative research that provide very useful information on vulnerabilities, disabilities, family status and covid-19 elements from the SGBV perspective. Indeed, a good practice that needs to be highlighted.



The following challenges and recommendations for improvement emerged from the interviews.

■ **The percentage of the cases that go to court is low.** Considering that minors are involved, the cases are considered as family matters and they are being dealt through traditional mediation. This brings up several issues because most traditional leaders have limited knowledge of human rights and often provide solutions that do not have the best interest of the child (art 3 CRC) in mind.

Another important issue is social stigma: women do not want to proceed further because they are afraid of being stigmatized. Therefore, for those who do not want to go to court the centers provide medical treatment and psychological support and their files are kept in the center's archives, in case they change their mind and decide to proceed with the full iter on a later stage.

■ **Survivors are arriving to the centers too late,** sometimes even one week after the violence occurred. This is due to various reasons: transportation costs, long distances and lack of awareness. People do not always realize they suffered an abuse; sometimes this happens at a later stage when from the clinical point of view there is not much to be done. Bahikoob staff is aware that it would be important to strengthen SGBV awareness and promote the the services provided by the Centers at community level, but this is currently not possible due to lack of staff and funding. A solution to reduce costs and maximise impact could be to strengthen coordination with SWLA in particular with their paralegal networks in the communities (IDP camps in the cities), which is nonetheless very limited as explained in par. 4.6. Additionally, more funding for transportation should be considered. As the coordinator of the center in Burao pointed out, it would be important to reach out directly to people in remote locations to provide initial support when needed instead of waiting for them to reach the centers when it is too late.

The JROLP supports the Attorney General Office (AGO) to respond to SGBV cases with a focus on capacity building for the Prosecutors and continuing the support the specialized SGBV Units for women and children (in Hargeisa and the regions) established under previous UNDP interventions. The total amount of the two LOAs under the JROLP is 198.100 USD and all activities have been successfully finalized as of December 2021.

For the capacity building component, trainings on human rights, juvenile justice, fair trial as well as SGBV investigation and prosecution were organized. Two training manuals on prosecution and investigation of SGBV/Juvenile cases were developed with the support of a consultant. Key informants at the AGO expressed satisfaction about this achievement. The overall process was described as participatory and inclusive, including inputs from UNDP and UNFPA. However, the dissemination and the practical usage of the manuals is currently very limited because there are not enough funds to translate these documents into Somali and proceed with their publication. Considering the prevalence of SGBV cases in Somaliland (the situation is worsening and harassment is reported on a daily basis, even in the market), these manuals should be operationalized as soon as possible, also to provide more sustainability to the results achieved so far.

As for SGBV coordination, the Women and Children SGBV units provide technical support, on the job training and coordinate data collection on the SGBV cases from the regions. For this purpose, they were provided by two vehicles by the JROLP to monitor places of detention, police stations and to participate in mobile courts.

Data is collected through a case management system, intensively supported by UNDP, and quarterly follow ups are produced to collect number and typology of cases. One of the main challenges reported was that they are still working on Excel sheets which makes the system unpractical. As of January 2022, the AGO dealt with 188 SGBV cases, of which most were acts of lust (unappropriated touching). The number of children involved in these cases was 54.



Besides working in close cooperation with the Baahi-koob centers, the AGO also supports yearly coordination meetings for the criminal justice actors (police, court and legal aid providers). These were described by key informants as a good instrument and it was suggested to increase their frequency to twice a year to improve information sharing and to discuss challenges in dealing with SGBV cases.

Finally, it was recommended to establish specialized Units for children and women also police stations and courts.

The Somaliland Women Lawyers Association (SWLA) was established in 2007 with the support of UNDP. They work in priority on women's and children's rights and have offices in Hargeisa, Burao, Gabile and Boroma (forthcoming) with a small network of 7 paralegals. SWLA is the key partner of UNWOMEN and under the JROLP their target is to increase women legal professionals. UNDP seems however to be the only UN agency of reference during implementation (i.e. visibility material only has the logo of UNDP and SWLA)

Under the JROLP and as set forth in an LoA for 67,400 USD, SWLA has implemented (and completed in December 2021) the following activities:

- **the recruitment and training of female paralegals** (3 in Burao, 3 in Boroma and 1 in Hargeisa) in a view of strengthening SGBV referral pathway and legal aid services
- **the internship programme for 5 law graduates** (2 men, 3 women) in the SWLA office in Hargeisa under the supervision of a mentor.

SWLA Paralegals and Interns highlighted that under the JROLP they acquired practical experience. In particular, they appreciated the theoretical and practical trainings on how to conduct mediations. Recommendations for improvement included: facilitate access to police stations, increase funds for transportation (for clients to reach the center or courts) as well as awareness raising actions (they only go as far as 5/6 km from the main cities due to lack of transportation). It was explained that in IDPs camps, they are often mistaken for UNDP employees and people approach them to request financial support or non-legal information.

These issues could be addressed with some mitigation actions such as better clarification of their role or the issuance of official letters to facilitate access to police stations.



To be noted as a promising practice, **the two-tier approach** to legal aid adopted by SWLA: Paralegals (community members with no legal background) perform basic tasks at community level and Interns (law graduates) assist the lawyers with technical-legal tasks. This framework could be further developed to better clarify roles and the definition of the term “paralegal”; the number of interns and paralegals should be increased and lawyers should be included, or/and referrals to other organizations (i.e Solla) should be strengthened.



A **model for paralegalism** in Somaliland should be discussed at national level to ensure that all legal aid providers adopt a common understanding of the role of paralegals. In particular, this activity should be developed in synergy with other actors, such as Pact/USAID that supports a network of 46 paralegals in Somaliland. In the long term UNDP could promote the development of paralegals as an independent body based on the model adopted in Sierra Leone where paralegals are recognized in the Legal Aid Bill and become accredited after a 6 months training.



Internships are recognized as key contributions to increase the number of legal professionals. Some of the key informants met during the evaluation mission were former law students and graduate interns supported by UNDP. Under the JROLP however the number of internships is quite limited compared to past UNDP interventions (In 2015 UNDP supported 25 interns in justice institutions).

In the long term, Interns could be supported at the end of the Internship to open a cabinet in remote regions where there is a limited number of lawyers.

§ 4.7 Solla: capacity building of lawyers

Output 6

Solla is a civil society organization that is likely to become the official Bar Association in Somaliland. They have Offices in 6 regions and 251 registered lawyers (out of around 300 lawyers practicing in Somaliland), of which 57 are women. In recent years a step forward toward their recognition as Bar Association has been the establishment of the “*national committee for the license and discipline of lawyers*”.

Under the JROLP, Solla implemented, with the support of a competent short term consultant, a successful initiative aimed at building the capacities of affiliated lawyers. A comprehensive training needs assessment with the involvement of 90 lawyers was followed by a series of workshops in Hargeisa Borama and Borao for 90 lawyers. The trainings were also an opportunity to discuss gaps and other

needs; for example, it emerged that a code of conduct for lawyers should be developed.



For the future, it is recommended to re-activate (as in past UNDP interventions) the financial support for the provision of legal aid services with a particular focus on legal representation before courts. The chair of SOLLA also recommended funding to conclude the above-mentioned training cycle, increase women lawyers and highlighted the need to facilitate access of lawyers to police stations.

§ 4.8 University Law Clinics and Scholarships

Output 6

The JROLP continued the partnership launched by UNDP past interventions with 3 Universities (in Hargeisa, Burao and Borama) to provide legal aid services, via University Law Clinics. The University of Hargeisa is also supported to revise the law school curriculum and to run a scholarship programme.

a) University law clinics

The law clinic of the Hargeisa University was established with the support of UNDP in 2003, it has 2 offices and is staffed with 2 lawyers to provide legal representation, 2 paralegals to assist the lawyers and visit places of detention and 40 junior students to deliver legal awareness sessions. The majority of the cases are brought by women and consist of family issues (child custody, alimony, SGBV).

The Director explained that due to the significant decrease in funding (from 150K in the past to only 30K under the JROLP) the law clinic is unable to take up all the referred cases nor to travel to the regions as they did in the past.



It is recommended to clarify the notion of “university law clinic” and ensure that the three Universities supported under the JROLP apply the same model and work under common objectives. The University of Hargeisa adopted a hybrid model where students are only providing legal awareness while legal advice and representation is provided by professional lawyers and paralegals who graduated from the University. University law clinics should be based on student-centered methodologies, including the practical work of students on real legal representation cases under the supervision of academics and lawyers.

b) Scholarship

UNDP has supported scholarships in partnership with Universities since 2002. In the past Scholarships were offered to law students¹² but under the JROLP the scholarships are only at master level for law graduates enrolled in an LL.M course. The shift may be justified by the increased number of law graduates in recent years, but for eventual future interventions it is recommended to conduct a needs assessment and eventually continue to reserve some scholarships to law students, at least for women and persons from minority clans.

Under the JROLP, the University of Hargeisa granted scholarships to 30 LL.M students (10 in 2021 and

20 in 2020) some of which were already working for justice institutions, which is an effective strategy to strengthen institutional capacities.

c) Review of Law Curriculum

As per LoA, the University of Hargeisa was responsible for updating the law curriculum (developed in 2012 with the support of UNDP) and organize a workshop. The University of Hargeisa was expected to

¹² From 2002 to 2015, UNDP and the University of Hargeisa have supported 526 Scholarships for law graduates (women: 112), in Rispo “*Evaluation of UNDP Access to Justice project in Somalia and Somaliland*”, 2015.

lead the process with the objective to extend the revised curriculum to the University of Amoud and Burao.

A “Two-Day Validation Workshop on the Curriculum” was organized on the 29th and 30th of December 2021. The workshop report does not illustrate the key standard outcomes of a curriculum review (compulsory and elective subjects, teaching methods, practical professional skills etc), so it remains unclear how the law curriculum is revised. The workshop appears as an excellent initial discussion with students and teaching staff to launch the curriculum review, however the process would need to be finalized in the remaining 5 months of the JROLP to ensure that “one law graduation curriculum is reviewed” with the support of a Technical Advisor as per Activity Result 1.4.5.

The UNDP Team Leader expressed concern about the fact that the planned Advisor (3 months) was not recruited as of January 2022.

§ 4.9 Support to MOI for Electoral Security

Output 7

Somaliland took an important step towards democracy with the 2021 parliamentary and local councils elections, which were held for the first time in, respectively, 15 and 10 years. The JROLP has successfully contributed to the peaceful achievements of these events by supporting the MOI to ensure the security of 2700 polling stations across Somaliland (not one single security incident was recorded).

Funds to achieve this result were diverted from other project activities in support of the MOI, in particular the whole training component for police officers had to be cancelled. Considering the success of the initiative and the fact that local partners regarded this as the highest priority, the diversion of funds was well justified and also showed a certain degree of flexibility from the JROLP. It is recommended to plan an increased number of trainings for the next phase of the JROL or eventually to explore possibilities to deliver some trainings (ideally in a TOT approach) at minimum costs with the support of UNSOM advisors before the end of the project.

The initiative included 3 sets of activities:

- **A pre-electoral risk assessment** was conducted in each of the 6 regions to assess the security risks related to elections. This was an exemplary way of planning the initiative and supporting decision making processes at higher levels.
- **10,000 police officers were trained** in a two-tiered TOT approach in Hargeisa and then at regional and district levels. This is an excellent model for capacity building on specific technical issues.
- **Communication equipment** (radio, repeaters, walkie-talkies) was provided.



The success of the electoral security initiative was also a result of the excellent coordination among international partners: advisors from all UNSOM sections and in particular the police advisor actively contributed, as well as EUPCAP experts.

The initiative gave particular attention to include special modules on the protection of vulnerable groups (including women candidates).

The electoral security initiative is a good example of how the JROLP has been able to perform well when an initiative was based on a straightforward linear approach: the objective was clearly stated, roles were established, few partners were involved.

Outcome 3 of the JROLP is implemented under the leadership of UNODC in partnership with the Ministry of Justice and the Custodial Corps Department. Activities under Output 3 include: 1) develop and pilot parole and probation services 2) deliver trainings for custodial corps managers 3) conduct a PVE feasibility study.



Under **Activity 1**, UNODC has developed a **PVE study**. The study, titled *“Study on the conditions for rehabilitation and reintegration of inmates in Hargeisa Central Prison”*, was conducted by the two officers of the Swedish Prison and Probation Service in Hargeisa in cooperation with their research unit in Sweden. An official presentation was held in Hargeisa in April 2021.



Activity 2 is on track. Two training modules are being conducted in the framework of the **“Developing Managers Programme”** which started in 2014. The 4 weeks’ module for 14 junior Custodial Corps managers (2 women and 12 men, from different clans) was conducted by two Probation Experts from the Swedish Prison and Probation Office and were successfully completed in April 2021. One of the participants commented that *“After the training on human rights I know that I can actually use words rather than force”*. The activity is to be noted for its sustainable approach: after the course in Hargeisa, the trainers conducted follow up visits in the different prisons for mentorship activities and to verify how the trainees were using the newly acquired skills. The 2 weeks’ module for Senior Managers is planned for 2022 (Q1).



Activity 3: Probation and parole

The establishment and piloting of a “probation and parole system” based on the prison law of 2017 is the activity that raises most concerns in terms of delays and timeline for completion. This component has a significant budget (300.000 USD) but as of January 2022 its implementation has not yet started. MOJ, Custodial Corps and other key information complained about the lack of progress and expressed concern about the delay in the parole and probation component.

Several reasons have been identified for the implementation delays.

From a substantial point of view, some key informants raised the concern that Parole could yet be *“a step too far for the Somaliland system”*. Somalilanders still have a punitive approach to justice: a Custodial Corps Officer and a Community Police Officer explained that if a person is sentenced to jail it would be difficult for the community to accept an early release; in such cases they would fear for the security of the person released. An FCDO Advisor added that, for the same reasons, in Somaliland there is limited interest in bail, although it is provided for in the law. The UNSOM Corrections Adviser highlighted that a parole system, if adequately explained, would be supported by the communities in Somaliland: owing to the so-called “neighborhood watch approach” the population would contribute to ensure that parolees would be sent back to custody if they violate the conditions of their parole. Also the NHRC Commissioner believes in the possibility of established parole and probation schemes, but insisted on the need for preliminary awareness raising and discussions both at the level of Custodial Corps and the population.

The evaluator witnessed a limited understanding of the notions Probation and Parole: with the exception of a lawyer, all key informants confused parole/probation with presidential pardon or diversion for juveniles. Finally, a Custodial Corps Officer recommended addressing the basic needs of

inmates (vocational trainings, rehabilitation programmes to reduce re-offenders, training for custodial corps) before working on Probation and Parole.

In conclusion a parole and probation scheme remains relevant for Somaliland but would require a comprehensive consultation and awareness raising process, that would not be possible to achieve in the 5 remaining months of the JROLP.

The probation component also faced some **practical obstacles**.

At the beginning of the programme there was some confusion about the roles of UNODC and UNSOM, because in 2019 UNSOM had supported the MOJ to develop a draft Regulation on Probation.

The biggest challenge was however the mandatory condition from the MOJ to work under the framework of an LoA, which was not possible for UNODC as the LoA mechanism is not provided for by the Agency's regulations. This discussion continued for almost two years and only in December 2021 UNODC received the internal approval to sign an LoA in addition to the standard Implementing Partner Agreement.

The absence of a UNODC office in Somaliland was also mentioned as a cause for delays. Particularly in the early stages of establishing these new legal mechanisms and considering the extensive consultations required with national partners, it is recommended to assign a dedicated UNODC staff with decisional powers in Hargeisa. Permanent staff can also better contribute to advocacy efforts; for example, during the last Ramadan, the UNDP staff in Hargeisa managed to advocate for the release of 938 inmates from prisons across Somaliland via a Presidential pardon.



Some **recommendations for the way forward** were discussed with key informants. It was agreed, also with the UNODC management in Nairobi during the online presentation of the Evaluation Findings, that it will not be possible to achieve the planned targets of setting up the Parole Board and piloting the schemes in Hargeisa and Gabiley.

The Parole and Probation component would therefore need to be re-framed. The following activities could be considered for implementation in the remaining 5 months of the programme:

- **Finalize the policy and legal framework for parole and/or probation.** It is highly recommended to adopt a participative approach with adequate time for national consultations and avoid top-down approaches based on pre-packaged documents delivered by international consultants with limited knowledge of the Somaliland context.
- **Complement the policy and legal framework with a series of consultations on parole and probation** with key groups of interest (communities, CSO, justice and security institutions..) to better understand the socio-cultural implications of a parole and probation scheme and to explain the concept. The outcome of the consultations could be consolidated in a report that would represent a feasibility study from a socio-cultural perspective. The three Probation officers currently on duty in Hargeisa with UNSOM and the Swedish probation office/UNODC would have the competences and the knowledge of the context to lead this exercise.
- **Conduct a desk review of the previous experiences** on Parole and Probation in the region.
- **Divert some of the funding to address the needs of inmates**, in particular vocational trainings, rehabilitation programmes to reduce re-offenders, training for custodial corps, equipment of prisons, legal aid services.

Output 9 of the JROLP covers the Security Sector reform. It is implemented by the UNSOM SSR team based in Mogadishu and Nairobi with some support from the UNSOM Judicial Affairs Advisor in Hargeisa (only for Activity 9.2). As already observed for UNWOMEN and UNODC, the absence of permanent staff in Somaliland is not ideal to ensure an effective and timely implementation of the activities, in particular for those that require extensive consultations with a large number of national partners. (i.e Activity 9.4)

The SSR component includes four activities, as detailed below:



The Somaliland threat assessment for the security, economic, social and other sectors. The activity is highly relevant for the development of the NDPIII, because the identification of the national priorities will be based on the findings of this assessment. The scope of the exercise is broader than the JROLP (it is not only limited to the justice and security sectors), and justified because there are no other projects addressing this need. An international partner raised some concerns about the timeline for this activity: NDPII ended in December 2021, but the threat assessment that will inform the NDPIII is not yet finalized. UNSOM SSR explained the delays are due to COVID and the freezing of funds in early 2020. Challenges included the high number of Ministries involved and delays in working with the highly centralized Ministry of Interior. Stronger support from the JROLP coordinator could have facilitated the activity, but the necessary National consultants are now contracted and supporting data analysis. The SSR team has undertaken multiple engagements for the Task Force and they provided an overview of the theoretical framework for threat assessment, also in an international comparative approach.



Trainings for the armed forces courts. The activity has not started (due to COVID according to the SSR Team Leader), but national partners in Hargeisa expressed interest in the initiative. The UNDP Team expressed some concern on their ability to effectively support the trainings considered that working with Armed Forces as it would be a new area for UNDP in Somaliland. The SSR Team Leader confirmed that the activity *“will proceed in 2022 and focus on increasing awareness of human rights and gender related issues, building on similar training undertaken prior to the start of the JROLP”*.

Supporting Military Justice is indeed relevant for the promotion of the ROL in Somaliland, however this would require a strategically designed approach based at least on a rapid training needs assessment, which does appear overambitious for the short timeframe remaining to implement the JROLP and the limited network within Military Courts that UNDP (new to this field in Somaliland) and UNSOM SSR (based in MOG) could offer to rapidly achieve effective results. It is acknowledged that the the SSR UNSOM team has the technical capacities to successfully deliver the trainings, however consideration should also be given to other elements (included the opportunity of adding another partner to the JROLP) which should have been discussed in the planning phase of the programme.



Trainings for the parliamentary commissions on civilian oversight of security institutions will commence in 2022. The SSR team explained that the trainings have a different focus compared to those delivered by MOPCA for the same target

group, and had not started in 2021 as a decision had been made that the training should be given to the new Members of Parliament.



Support to draft Maritime legislation, with a focus on territorial waters. This activity is still in the early stages with the recruitment of an international consultant ongoing. Legislative drafting is a lengthy processes and requires extensive consultations (especially for a sensitive issue as territorial waters in Somaliland). As such, the activity will focus on offering comments of proposed legislation in order to finalize the activity before the end of June 2022. This activity was not included in the Priorization Plan, but was introduced upon suggestion of the Somaliland Government following the cancellation of activities as the rightsizing initiative, which was already implemented by FCDO.

Overall the SSR component has limited, but important linkages with the rest of the programme; it indeed contributes to the overall objective of the JROLP (ensuring that Somaliland is more secure and that rule of law institutions are more accountable), noting that there is not a strong complementarity with other activities under different JROLP components.

§ 4.12 NHRC: prison monitoring, freedom of expression and civic education No Output

Under two LoAs (for a total budget of 100.000 USD) and with the support of 3 Embedded Advisors, the Somaliland National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) successfully finalized in December 2021 the implementation of the 3 human rights-centered activities described below:

1

Monitoring of places of detention

In 2020 and 2021, the NHRC was able to monitor 11 police stations and 5 prisons. Detailed findings from the monitoring missions are available in comprehensive reports. **In prisons** the major concern was the detention of men and women for owing debt (in violation of article 11 ICCPR). 27 people, some of whom had finished their sentence, were detained because they could not pay their debts. This finding led to some advocacy and the organization of a workshop following which 11 persons were released in 2019 and 10 in 2020. For the future it may be considered to conduct a comprehensive study to collect baseline information and explore legal solutions to prevent the criminalisation of debt.

Other findings from the prison monitoring missions include: a) no adequate segregation between man and women and between adults and juveniles b) no educational activities for juveniles and c) lengthy investigation procedures which imply that detainees overstay in pre-trial detention, with evident impact on the overcrowding of prisons.

2

Freedom of expression

A series of trainings, included in the regions, were organized on the Media Law. The 3 workshops that brought together for the first time police officers and journalists to discuss freedom of expression are to be noted for the coordination effort and their relevance. NHRC staff pointed out that when they started this project the arbitrary detention of journalist was three times more. In 2020 the situation slightly improved due to the awareness raised and capacity building of journalists, included to prevent shaming through media.

Civic education in schools

This pillar included two typologies of pilot-trainings. The first one targeted 2 schools in Hargeisa, for a total of 330 students, and covered gender, SGBV and human rights. Given its success, the NHRC has been asked to extend it to other schools. The second trainings focused on civic education and targeted 60 secondary school teachers in 11 schools in Hargeisa. The aim was also to promote the inclusion of civic education in the school curriculum. A manual for teachers training is only available in English and would need to be translated in Somali.

The pilot initiative was very successfully according to both the participants and the NHRC, however before extending it to other schools a reflection among PUNOs is recommended in order to strategically discuss if this initiative is not overstressing the already broad objective of the JROLP. If trainings in schools is maintained as an activity, it could be envisaged to delegate it to civil society organizations. This would allow the NHRC to deliver trainings on human rights for more sensitive target groups. Also it is recommended to define synergies with the civic education trainings delivered by MOPCA under the JROLP and of course with UNICEF.

The NHRC actively contributed to the development of the “**SOPs for prison inspection**” under the leadership of the MoJ. A widely consultative process allowed all relevant stakeholders to contribute to the drafting process, according to their expertise. Key informants from the NHRC considered the process participatory and the initiative useful. However, they believed that for practical reasons they should also be allowed to use the NHRC templates as they are better tailored to their more specific requirements and methodology for prison inspection. This was confirmed by the UNSOM Human Rights Advisor.



Having a shared tool is certainly the preferred option to facilitate data comparison. Acknowledging that each actor has its own element to monitor, it is recommended to at least aligning the tools for prison inspection to provide coherence to data collection and methodologies.

§ 4.13

Constructions

Output 7, 3, 4

The JROLP supports the AGO, the JC and the Police with the construction of 8 police stations across Somaliland, 2 court buildings in Hargeisa and Burao, 1 AGO building in Gabiley for a total budget of 545.000 USD.

All three national partners complained about the delay in the construction works, which as of January 2022 had not started.

COVID has partially contributed to the delay, but the main reason is the discussion around the procurement system that should be adopted. In past UNDP interventions all construction works would be procured directly by UNDP, but under the JROLP, at the request of the national partners and with the endorsement of the UNDP operations team in Mogadishu, it was decided to manage the construction works under the national procurement system. This required a series of consultations to agree on a common framework aimed at identifying adequate risk management mechanisms and a mitigation plan to ensure compliance to UNDP standards and regulations.



The new approach is undoubtedly promoting a stronger national ownership, but the delays in the process are concerning, especially considering that the 5 months left before the end of JROLP will be barely sufficient to complete the construction works.

§ 5. EFFICIENCY

§ 5.1

Human Resources

The number of staff assigned to a complex programme as the JROLP is not adequate.

In addition to the absence of UNWOMEN and UNODC staff based in Somaliland, the UNDP team in Hargeisa is too small. It is composed of one international staff who covers the role of Team Leader (as well as Technical Justice Advisor in addition to ensuring the coordination with PUNOs and UNSOM) and 2 national staff (a Rule of Law Officer and a Finance Officer). The Hargeisa team is effectively supported (also with missions to Somaliland) by the UNDP team in Mogadishu on specific aspects (strategic oversight, finance, procurement, M&E).

The UNSOM has on the contrary an adequate number of technical advisors who have been able to effectively contribute to the JROLP in their respective fields.

The “embedded advisors” discussed below could have addressed some of the JROLP staffing gaps if they were more closely managed.

In addition to effective management, the JROLP requires extensive coordination both at national and international level, but also different sets of technical competences to adequately support the justice and security components. For eventual future interventions it is recommended to acknowledge that the coordination role expected from UNDP in complex programmes is a **time-consuming and sensitive role that should be separated from the technical roles**. As explained below, the national Coordinator (embedded advisor) contributed to advance the JROPL, but not in terms of coordination.

To be more effective the UNDP JROLP team in Hargeisa could have been composed of an international coordinator with solid management skills supported by two technical teams: one for the justice component and one for the security component. The implementation of Justice and Security interventions require different skill-sets, so each of them should be headed by an international technical staff and supported by an adequate number of national staff with eventually a team of well-managed embedded advisors.

The above mentioned staffing issues (exacerbated by the COVID restrictions) are affecting the implementation of the programme; during the evaluation five national partners expressly requested a change in management at Hargeisa level.

Adaptive management v. linear management

An **adaptive management** approach (as opposed to the current linear approach) would be more suited to the complexities inherent both the JROLP and the Somaliland context. As confirmed by a few national partners, the JROLP staff is mainly focused on the day-to day running of the project; one key informant commented that *“the only thing they (UNDP) want is reports, indicators and data”*. Adopting a **linear management style** – simple planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation- was not efficient and occasionally detrimental. The programme suffered from this implementation arrangement in terms of shared vision, clear strategic direction for all partners and efficiency.



Therefore, this evaluation supports a shift towards adaptive management which, under conditions of uncertainties and evident complexities, would be more appropriate and effective. Adaptive management promotes flexible decision making compared to more traditional approaches; it allows increasing knowledge and learning and promotes better understanding of local needs and international requirements for an effective cooperation, which was a missing element of this programme. Reflection spaces with partners and target groups will surely maximize the potential impact of the JROL programme.

§ 5.2 Embedded Advisors

To ensure the delivery of the activities under the different LoA, the JROLP has established a pool of national Advisors embedded in the relevant institutions.

There are two typologies of Advisors: technical Advisors provide the legal-technical expertise required to implement the LoAs, whereas administrative advisors provide support for the financial and reporting aspects. The advisors are identified and contracted by the national institutions, but they are paid and report to UNDP. Some Technical advisors are recruited for the whole duration of the LoA to perform continuous tasks (i.e the Mobile courts coordinator) whereas other perform delivery-based tasks (i.a. the legal drafting advisor). The Embedded advisors receive a salary ranging from 1.000 to 3.000 USD per month, which in some cases is in addition to the salary they receive from the government institution.

In 2021 UNDP supported a total number of 22 technical advisors, as detailed in the table below.

#	Partner	Title of Embedded TECHNICAL Advisor	Salary	Contract
			2021	
1	MOJ	ADR Advisor with judicial background	1500	3 months
2	MOJ	Technical Advisor Drafting	1500	3 months
3	MOJ	Legal Aid Coordinator	1500	9 months
4	MOPCA	Advisor for civil laws reform	2000	3 months
5	MOPCA	Advisor for criminal law reforms	2000	3 months
6	MOPCA	Advisor for civic education	1500	6 months
7	MOPCA	Legislative drafting Adviser	1500	6 months
8	JC (SC)	Inspection Technical advisor	1500	9 months
9	JC (SC)	Mobile court coordinator	1500	9 months
10	JC (SC)	Training Manual development experts	1500	9 months
11	AGO	SGBV Technical Adviser	1500	9 months
12	AGO	SGBV case management Coordinator	1500	9 months
13	MESAF	Advisor and Coordinator on disability	1500	6 months
14	MOI	Community Police Advisor	1500	9 months
15	MOI	Police Technical Advisor	1500	9 months
16	MOI	JROLP Programme Coordinator	3000	9 months
17	NHRC	Prison and police inspection advisor	1500	6 months
18	NHRC	Media advisor	1500	9 months
19	SWLA	Advisor mentoring	2000	1 month
20	SWLA	Training Advisor	2000	1 month
21	SOLLA	Capacity Development trainer	2000	6 months
22	Baahi-Koob	Coordinator	1500	9 months

Overall this is a relevant model to ensure that implementing partners have timely and adequate availability of staff to deliver the LoA activities. The recourse to Technical Advisers seems more justified than to Administrative Advisers. It is understandable that partner institutions may not have among their employees the highly specialized skills required to perform some of the LoA activities. However, it would be expected that administrative staff is available and would only need to be regularly trained on UNDP rules and regulations.

In terms of achievements, the results are variable. Some Technical Advisers (i.e the NHRC advisors) have significantly contributed to the success of the activities, other (i.e legislative drafting advisors) had more complex tasks in a controversial context and ambitious targets, so their impact is less evident. In these latter cases, it is suggested to set up a team of national and international consultants. Alternatively, a dedicated person in UNDP should be available to provide technical oversight of the Advisers.

The UNDP team highlights that the performance of most administrative Advisers is quite limited. In some cases, the UNDP Finance officer prepares all the paperwork and the Advisers just ensure that documents are signed.

The UNDP team has made some efforts to ensure a better follow up of Embedded advisors. In 2021 the number of Advisers was reduced (from 2 to only 1 administrative Advisor per Ministry), payments became deliverable- based and a new reporting schedule was introduced, with monthly instead of quarterly reports. A spot check on a few monthly reports indicate that a standard template is not available and their quality is very irregular: some are very detailed and even include pictures, other are just a one-page list of activities. It is recommended to standardize the reporting template and ensure that it is developed in a results based approach.

To be noted as a good coordination practice, the fact that reports are shared with PUNOs, although comments are rarely made, apparently because the content is too technical

The following aspects could be improved:

- The presence of Embedded Advisers has certainly circulated new ideas and approaches, however, the **capacity building and mentoring** component does not seem to be fully understood by most institutions and Advisers. UNDP expects that Embedded Advisers also contribute to strengthen the overall capacities of the institution where they work. Very few Advisers confirmed that they conducted mentoring and on the job trainings for their colleagues. (i.e. the Police advisor is regularly travelling to police stations in the regions to support in the preparation of work-plans). It is recommended to promote a better understanding of this aspect and to include in the contracts some reference to this task which is inherent to the role of Embedded advisors.
- Embedded Advisers **work in isolation** from each other. The FGD conducted with 14 Advisers was the first time they met all together; one of them commented *"I have not met 80% of the persons around this table"*. Advisers expressed interest in meeting on a quarterly basis to share ideas, lessons learned and address common issues. These would also be opportunities to include a short presentation with a thematic focus on substantial issues on which advisors are working.
- According to a UNDP staff, having an Embedded advisor in an office has occasionally created some **tensions and rivalries** with the rest of the staff; some staff feel demotivated to work because of the high salary received by Embedded Advisers. It is recommended to ensure adequate communication around the role of Embedded Advisers and to ensure that they are receiving a salary that is in line with the local market. Several complaints were raised against the Advisor with the role of JROLP Coordinator. Although he is recognized a remarkable contribution in removing bottlenecks to strategically advance the programme, he has not been able to effectively coordinate the JROLP at the level of implementation.



To strengthen sustainability, UNDP could require the co-financing of the Embedded Advisors by the institution (at least the Administrative advisors) and negotiate that they will have a prospect of employment by the institution at the end of JROLP.

§ 5.3

Financial Resources

Delays in payments was the most cited complaint by national and international partners.

Several reasons were mentioned to explain the delays. All key informants agreed that LoAs are approved too late in the year (in August for 2020 and in June for 2021), meaning that partners have only few months to spend the allocated funds and the whole “reporting-release of funds” chain is disrupted. The discussion on the annual work-plan and LoA should happen at the end of November of the previous year. The UNDP Team Leader added that reports from some partners are not up to the required standards so there is a lot of time wasted in back and forth for integrations. Other partners submit reports too late to allow UNDP to process the payments before the closing of the financial year. Only three or four partners have received the 3rd instalment as of January 2022, the rest were unable to report before the end of the year so a new LoA will have to be signed to complete the pending activities. The UNSOM Police Advisor said that the MOI report for the second quarter (April-June) was only accepted in late November, which is when the new funds became available.

Some key informants highlighted that when the duration of the LoA is as short as 6 months (instead of 12), the payments and related reporting should occur in only 2 installments (instead of 3). Finally, the UNDP team in Mogadishu highlighted that funds arrive with much delay from the MPTF.

Some partners, as the JC, complained about the **funding gaps** and recommended letting them know in advance if UNDP and donors are not going to support the activities any longer because the government could eventually allocate funds from the State budget.



UNDP has solid mechanisms in place to ensure financial transparency and accountability, which sometimes may have generated additional frustrations among national partners.

In addition to Audits carried out by private companies, UNDP also hired KPMG to conduct two to three spot checks per year for all partners (review of relevant financial documentation with a focus on cash advance and direct payment transactions, approval processes and internal controls). All national partners must undergo a HACT assessment before signing an LoA. Finally, the process for signing off payment requires several levels of approvals.

§ 5.4

M&E System

The M&E system is reflecting the complexities and partners’ methodological differences explored throughout this report.

The data collection varied in quality and details according to the capacity of national partners. It took a great deal of work to harmonize the collection tools, especially for the legal aid providers. Specifically, each partner was using different formats and collecting data for different categories of beneficiaries with no consistent disaggregation of data.

To strengthen the overall system, programme staff organized some meetings with each of the national partners to understand their challenges in terms of reporting. Some of the changes, made after the

meetings, aimed at standardizing data collection tools – producing excel sheets with simple disaggregation to be filled - to improve reporting. However, these tools mostly tackled quantitative data, which was a necessary initial step to get the data collection in shape. Programme staff explained that qualitative data collection is a long process which will take more time and affirmed that they reached a point where data is coming in for all the indicators which will allow them to report on most of the indicators.

It is worth noting that the quality of the data coming from the Bahikoob SGBV centers was of good quality. They have a good level of data literacy, due to the fact that they are working with many donors/partners and have a good monitoring system and database in place. This will facilitate the upcoming survey to get feedback from SGBV survivors on the process they go through at the police and prosecution level and which will inform the indicators (level of satisfaction with the services) required at impact level.

The next steps, rightly envisaged by UNDP, to improve the M&E system will be to start using dashboards and other visuals and continue strengthening the data literacy of partners to be able to gather qualitative data. Several key informants confirmed that that this was a gap to be filled.

Annual donor reports were described as lacking analysis on strategic results that would allow more reflection on the implementation strategy and way forward. Indeed, there is a need to include these learning components, as well as starting to share data analysis with partners and not only with donors. A shift from M&E toward MEL, which will include space for reflection is an important aspect that the programme should consider. It is worth exploring the possibility to expand on the quarterly coordination meetings to include reflections on data and networking opportunities.



It might be useful to add to the reporting some **visual tools** such as Network Mapping to trace connections between partners and other actors (useful to understand the multidimension of the impact), and data visualization to convey the information in a more captivating way. Further, the use of Most Significant Change (MSC) techniques such as participatory video or Photovoice to collect perception of target groups, such as SGBV survivors is advised. These qualitative participatory practices are flexible and easily adaptable also to complex contexts or sensitive target groups; they will enhance sharing, reflection opportunities and sense of ownership.

§ 6. SUSTAINABILITY

This evaluation has identified some elements for sustainability, which vary to different degrees across the JROLP components and can be broadly summarized in the points below.

The JROLP has invested in **building the capacities** of national partners in terms of technical skills, motivation and engagement. In addition to the dedicated training program for SOLLA lawyers, the scheme to support Embedded Advisors in several institutions is to be noted. This latter initiative, analyzed in par. 5.2, has contributed to bring an initial change in attitudes and mindset towards the main themes of the programme among the staff of national partners. The scheme was also an opportunity to strengthen national ownership as institutions could benefit from the technical contributions of highly qualified national professionals.

However, the initiative also presents some limitations to its sustainability, mainly in relation to financial aspects. Considered that all Embedded Advisors are paid by the JROLP, in the future PUNOs should promote discussions with national partners to define how to gradually transfer the partial or full cost of Embedded Advisors (at least the Administrative Advisors) to the recurrent budget of each institution. Discussions could also aim at negotiating that Advisors will have a prospect of employment by the institution at the end of program (e.g the most skilled committed Advisors could be selected and offered an employment opportunity)

Meanwhile PUNOs should ensure that the incentives are more in line with the local market than it is currently the case.

The initiative could also become more sustainable if the technical oversight of the Advisors by UNDP could be strengthened, with more opportunities to discuss lessons learned and share achievements among advisors

At the systemic level, numerous initiatives were implemented to strengthen structures and procedures for partner institutions. (i.e the TDR policy, the legislative drafting SOP). This approach is promoting a **good level of institutionalization** which will facilitate the continuation of the activities without the support of the JROLP. To be noted that in most cases the procedures were developed with the contribution of national consultants with significant national ownership.

Some areas have achieved initial steps in this direction: for example, a comprehensive set of M&E tools has been developed (see par. 5.4) but, to strengthen sustainability, they could be complemented by specific guidelines on how to use them (easy formats such as short videos in Somali for example) so that the skills developed through time would be capitalized. In other areas the procedures developed (i.e TDR guidelines) seem quite complex and could raise some concerns on the capacity of institutions to absorb them. To guarantee that these efforts are sustainable, detailed roll out plans should be agreed and followed up.

Learning on the few effective models developed by the JROLP should be promoted in view of replication. For example, the mentoring model applied to Interns (see par. 4.6) could be extended to institutions. The effective network linking up different institutions for SGBV response (Baahi-Koob centers – AGO and Police) could be replicated in other areas. Overall institutional knowledge could be strengthened by promoting more opportunities to collect and analyze lessons learned.

Finally, a closer follow up of sustainability issues throughout the programme cycle would have been facilitated by the inclusion in the Prodoc during the planning phase of a “**sustainability strategy**” and an “assessment of risks” with a focus on those affecting sustainability. Also in the second year of the project an “**exit strategy**”, especially for the Outputs that will not be supported under an eventual new programme, would have advanced a joint discussion with national partners on sustainability.

Section 3: Conclusions & Recommendations

§ 1

Conclusions

Overall the implementation of the JROLP is affected by an over-ambitious RRF with too many activities not framed under a common vision and too many partners, many of which have received an insufficient budget to achieve meaningful results.

The findings detailed in the previous paragraphs are consolidated below for each evaluation criterion.

Relevance

- ✓ All programme components are aligned with the NDPII, SDGs, and PUNOs strategies; they are relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, with a stronger focus on governmental institutions versus the population and the civil society.
- ✓ Human rights are well mainstreamed, but minority clans are not targeted as vulnerable group. The policy and legal framework for disabilities is strengthened. Despite remarkable achievements in the SGBV response and the prevalence of legal aid services for women, overall the JROLP lacks gender transformative approaches.
- ✓ The Area Based Approach is achieving some initial results in the regions, but they are not framed under a clear strategy and have yet a limited reach of rural populations.
- ✓ The design process was highly participatory and inclusive, but excessively long. The RRF is intrinsically complex with too many outputs and activities to the detriment of coherence and an integrated vision.
- ✓ The JROLP is designed and implemented with limited reference to lessons learned and results achieved during the past 20 years of UNDP ROL interventions in Somaliland.

Coherence



Coordination among PUNOs shows some weaknesses at the level of design, budgeting, implementation and reporting. The partnership with UNSOM and all its Hargeisa-based Sections has been profitable and impactful at technical level. Basic coordination results are achieved, but would have been more impactful if UNWOMEN and UNODC had a regular presence of staff in Somaliland and the coordination role was recognized as a full-time job for an international staff. The JROLP is not perceived by Somalilanders as a “One UN joint programme”, but as a UNDP programme.



The extraordinary number of national partners (13 with a signed LoA) has negatively affected the overall quality of the partnerships and created a fierce competition to adjudicate financial allocations. Civil society organizations struggled to compete with more influential governmental institutions and saw a drastic reduction of funding compared to past UNDP interventions.



Coordination *fora* under the NDPII have achieved information sharing and avoided duplications, but have limited impact in terms of joint planning and common advocacy. To be noted as a promising practice the Coordination meetings organized by the MOJ in the regions.

Effectiveness

With the exception of the SGBV component, partners worked in a siloed approach and adopted different implementation strategies which generated different levels of effectiveness:



Some partners completed their activities with excellent results: SOLLA effectively built the capacity of lawyers, the NHRC effectively monitored the places of detention and the MOI contributed to the peaceful achievements of the 2021 elections by training 10.000 police officers across Somaliland.



The working model for the SGBV response led by Bahikoob is effective (although with limited reach in rural areas) and shows a good degree of cooperation with other actors, including the AGO, CID and SWLA. Bahikoob adopts a holistic approach to survivors' support. Both Bahikoob and the AGO SGBV Units have a good case management/data collection systems and well supervised offices in the regions.



Activities in support of the JC (mobile courts, inspections, case management) are achieving the planned results but are implemented as a mere continuation of past UNDP intervention with limited innovation and reflections on opportunities for improvements.



Legal aid is provided by SWLA and 3 Universities with some success, considered the limited resources available. However, they are not working under a clear model of intervention; University Law Clinics are not student-centered, there is not a common understanding of paralegalism, awareness raising is not coordinated.



The construction of police stations/court buildings as well as the Parole and Probation component have a concerning delay, as they have not started as of January 2022.



The “guidelines for legislative drafting” and the “TDR guidelines” were implemented without a preliminary analysis of the context and power dynamics, which determined some confusion on the roles of the involved Ministries and the consequent stalling of the activities.



The four activities implemented under the SSR component contribute to the overall objective of the JROLP, however there is not a strong complementarity with other activities under the other JROLP components.

Efficiency



The number of staff assigned to a complex programme as the JROLP is not adequate: UNWOMEN and UNODC do not have permanent staff in Somaliland and UNDP has only 3 staff in Hargeisa (although well supported by UNDP in Mogadishu on specific aspects). UNSOM has on the contrary an adequate number of technical advisors who have been able to effectively contribute to the JROLP in their respective fields.



An adaptive management approach (as opposed to the current linear approach) would be more suited to the complexities inherent both the JROLP and the Somaliland context.



The “Embedded Advisors” model has ensured that national partners have timely and adequate availability of staff to deliver activities. The Advisors have circulated new ideas and approaches, however the capacity building and mentoring commitment does not seem

to be fully understood. The UNDP team has made some efforts to ensure a better follow up of Embedded advisors, but they are still they working in isolation and with limited technical supervision.



Delays in payments (the most cited complaint by national and international partners) have affected the implementation of the activities and the motivation of partners.



The M&E system has improved with the support of UNDP; although it is still mainly focused on quantitative data, it allows to capture the required data for donor reporting.

Sustainability



The JROLP shows some elements of sustainability: project activities are mostly led by national actors, staff of national partners have improved their competences, the number of legal professionals is increasing. Some activities, in particular those with a longer history of operating the country (i.e. the mobile courts) or activities with limited budget implications (i.e. the coordination fora) would be able to continue without international support.

§ 2 Recommendations

The table below summarizes the key recommendations further detailed throughout the report. The Priority column indicates if the recommendation should be implemented before the closure of the JROLP, under an eventual NEW programme, or in both cases.

# /Agency	Recommendation	Priority
R1		
PUNOs DONORS	Improve the response to the needs of vulnerable groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Under the leadership of UNWOMEN, consider the employment of gender transformative approaches ✓ Shift the focus on the operationalization of the Disability Bill and develop services for disabled people ✓ Include the needs of minority clans, in particular Gaboye women. ✓ Strengthen the role of civil society organizations (increase funds and representation in SC) 	NEW NEW NEW BOTH
R2		
PUNOs IP	Strengthen the Area-Based approach <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ develop an overall strategy aimed at identifying a model for the ROL Regional Hub, to <i>inter alia</i> address issues reported during the evaluation (lack of transportation to reach rural areas, expansion of services near border with Puntland and Djibouti) 	JROLP

R3		
UNDP	Improve planning and shift from M&E to MEL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Develop a RRF with a reduced number of Outputs/Activities and partners (maximum 3 Outcomes defined in a Results Based Approach, not by thematic areas), linked to a theory of change and reflecting a shared strategic vision ✓ Conduct needs assessments and desk reviews of past interventions to develop a solid baseline and to strengthen institutional memory ✓ Strengthen donor reporting with analysis on impact level results and based on adaptable complexity-tracking indicators ✓ Develop an exit strategy, in particular for the Outputs that will not be supported under an eventual new programme 	NEW NEW BOTH JROLP
R4		
UNDP IP UNSOM	Define the status and way forward for key ROL thematic areas, by organizing the following thematic “end of project workshops” with relevant partners: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Mobile courts (only appeal cases? Circuit or “on demand”? strategy? Expansion to remote and insecure regions?) ✓ Paralegalism (Definitions? which national model? What status for paralegals) ✓ Legal aid (national legal aid strategy?) ✓ Internships & Scholarships (master level? how to support Interns to start a professional activity?) ✓ University law clinics (how to ensure they are student-centred? What model for Somaliland?) 	JROLP JROLP JROLP JROLP JROLP
R5		
UNDP IP UNODC	Deepen the understanding of the local perception, with a few short thematic analyses aimed moving forward the following JROLP activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Legislative drafting process ✓ TDR guidelines ✓ The socio-cultural implications of Parole and Probation 	JROLP JROLP JROLP
R5		
UNODC	In parallel with R5, re-frame and start the Parole and Probation component, with the following activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Conduct a desk review of the previous experiences on Parole and Probation in the region ✓ Finalize the policy and legal framework for parole and/or probation. ✓ Divert some of the funding to address the needs of inmates, in particular women in Gabiley prison. 	JROLP JROLP JROLP
R7		
UNDP	Strengthen the JROLP operational aspects (human resources structure, Embedded Advisor’s model and LoA payment system): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Increase staff for the UNDP ROL team and separate the Coordination role from the technical advisory roles. 	NEW

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Ensure permanent presence of UNWOMEN and UNODC in Somaliland ✓ Promote opportunities for exchanges for Embedded advisors, better understanding of their capacity building role, improve follow up (standard reporting template), appoint a dedicated staff in UNDP to provide technical oversight ✓ Address delays in payments and anticipate the signature of LoA to the previous year. 	NEW JROLP BOTH
R8		
PUNOs IP	<p>Continue to promote national ownership:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Increase opportunities for technical exchanges with and among partners ✓ Evaluate which activities may be transferred to national partners (NDPIII Working Groups? Running costs for mobile courts?) ✓ Consider co-financing the Embedded Advisors by the institution (at least the Administrative advisors) and a prospect of employment 	JROLP JROLP NEW
R9		
PUNOs	<p>Go visual & anticipate future emergency restrictions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ promote hybrid implementation models (online and in-person) ✓ stronger investment in high-tech literacy for partners ✓ produce visually appealing reports, thematic briefs, presentations, videos (dashboards and other visual tools) to address both donors and target groups ✓ redesign the M&E to be more user friendly and more oriented to communicate results for action (e.g., through real time dashboards) 	NEW NEW NEW NEW

ANNEX I LIST OF INTERVIEWED PERSONS

- **Abdisalam Farah**, Technical Specialist and Coordinator, UNDP
- **Alice Marie Ngezahayo**, Corrections Adviser, UNSOM
- **Barkhad Isak**, Judge at Appeal Court, Borao
- **Borao Focus Group Discussion**: 19 participants from Community police, legal aid providers, elders, SGBV network, University
- **FGD with civil society organizations**: National Human rights center, Nagad, SOLLA, SWLA, Center for Democracy and governance, Somaliland Disability Forum, SONSAF
- **FGD with Embedded Advisors**: NHRC, SWLA, BAHIKOOB, AGO, University of Hargeisa, MESAF, HJC, MOI
- **Hamse Khayre**, Programme Officer, A2J programme, Pact/USAID
- **Hassan Adan Ahmed**, Attorney General with 5 members of his team, AGO Hargeisa
- **Hassan Awale**, Chairperson, with Khadar Mohamed Ahmed, Adviser for capacity building and 4 members, Somaliland lawyers association (SOLLA)
- **Helen Knipe**, Criminal Justice Advisor, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)
- **Hiba Mohamoud Ali**, Director, with 5 interns and 1 paralegal, Somaliland Women's lawyers association (SWLA)
- **Hon. Minister Mohamed Haji Adan Elmi**, Minister, with 2 Policy Advisors, Director of finance, Director of planning, Director General, Ministry of Parliament Relations and Constitutional Affairs
- **Hon.Minister Saleebaan Warsame Guleid** with Director General **Ahmed** and Director of planning **Yasin Abdi**, Ministry of Justice
- **Hussein Jama**, Deputy Solicitor General
- **Jama Du'ale**, Deputy Attorney General, Borao
- **Jeff Sims**, Team Leader with 2 SSR Officers, 2 Maritime Officers, 1 judicial affairs officer, UNSOM SSR team
- **Josef Wiklund**, Police adviser, UNSOM
- **Josefine Pettersson**, Prison Mentor and **Annette Warmann**, Global Maritime Crime Programme, UNODC
- **Kazuyo Mitsuhashi**, Programme Officer, Global Maritime Crime Programme, UNODC
- **Mariam**, Supervisor for cases workers and **Mohammed Ali Ibrahim**, Finance and Admin manager, Bahikoob Center
- **Mathias Kjær**, Head of Office, DANIDA
- **Mohamed Abkor Mohamed**, Director of Legal aid clinic, University of Hargeisa
- **Mohamed Ahmed Ismail**, JROPL Coordinator/Advisor, Ministry of Interior
- **Mohamed Barud Ali**, Commissioner, with 3 Advisors (prison monitoring, freedom of expression, civic education), National Human Rights Commission
- **Mohammed Abdi**, Administration and Finance officer, UNDP
- **Mohamoud Hussein Farah**, Dean of Hargeisa University
- **Mostapha Ismail Abdi**, Director of Peace Building and Traditional leaders, Ministry of Interior
- **Ms. Raho**, Head of office, Bahikoob Center Burao
- **Nasir Aydiid** Deputy Minister with DG for Security, Focal point for Electoral security, Focal point for community police **Mohamed Osman Yusuf**, Ministry of Interior:

- **Nasuru Magomu**, Judicial Affairs Adviser, UNSOM
- **Osman**, liaison officer and focal point for the JROLP, Custodial corps, MOJ
- **Peter Nordstom**, Senior Trust Fund Manager, UN Resident Coordinator Office, Nairobi.
- **Robin Frost**, M&E Officer for ROL Portfolio, UNDP
- **Sadiq Syed** Country Programme Manager and **Abdelkadir Ahmed** National Rule of Law officer, UNWOMAN
- **Samira Hassan**, Head of Office, Somaliland Office, UNDP
- **Sarah Ismail** Director of Finance and Administration with **Sharmakia Yusuf Farah** Mobile Court Coordinator and **Dayib Muhumed Nur** Technical advisor, Judicial Commission
- **Sharmarke Hussein**, Project Manager, Oxfam
- **Simon Strachan**, Head of Integrated Office, UNSOM
- **Veronique Geffroy**, Programme Manager, Police & Rule of Law, EU Delegation to Somalia and Somaliland
- **Yusuf Iman**, Head of Region/Burao and **Abdishakur Ali Mohamed** Secretary of Regional Office, Somaliland Lawyers Association (SOLLA)
- **Zafar Gondal**, Team leader UN Joint Programme and Technical Specialist – Justice, UNDP

ANNEX II LIST OF LITERATURE REVIEWED

#	Articles, reports, assessments
1	4KP , <i>women's and girls security and justice in Somaliland</i> , 2021
2	ABA-ROLI , Access to justice assessment tool: baseline study in Somaliland 2020
3	Academy for Peace and Development , <i>Hybrid security and governance in Somaliland</i> , 2017
4	American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative <i>Expanding Access to Justice Program: Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia</i> . 2020
5	Center for International Cooperation , Review of the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, 2018
6	DCAF , Needs assessment of Somaliland CSO, 2019
7	DefendDefenders , lawyers and human rights defenders in Somalia/Somaliland, 2019
8	Erica Harper , <i>Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Analysis</i> . Expanding Access to Justice Program, American Bar Association & Pact Kenya. 2020
9	FAO , <i>An Analysis of Legal Issues Related to Land in Somaliland</i> , 2016
10	Heritage institute <i>Alone, Poor and Bewildered: women Struggling for Justice in Somaliland</i> , 2021
11	Heritage institute , rebuilding Somalia's broken judiciary 2021
12	Horizon institute , The State of the Judiciary in Somaliland, 2016
13	IDLO , <i>Evaluating the Effectiveness of Legal Empowerment Approaches to Customary Law Reform in Somaliland and Puntland</i> , unknown year
14	IDLO , Working with traditional leaders in Somalia 2011
15	Joakim Gundel (2020). <i>Alternative Dispute Resolution Initiatives in Somalia</i> . Expanding Access to Justice Program, American Bar Association & Pact Kenya.
16	Lawyers-as-HRDs-in Somalia and Somaliland 2019
17	NAGAAD Somaliland Gender Gap Assessment 2019
18	Progressio , Nobody likes women except God, GBV in Somaliland, 2017
19	Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia , 2017
21	Saferworld , report on SDG16, 2018
22	SDG 16 coalition , improving access to justice in Somaliland, 2019 (for HLPF)
23	SDG 16 coalition , Somaliland civil society, 2019
24	Rayale Siham, <i>Somaliland's Experience with justice and security-sector reform</i> , 2021
25	Thomson Reuters foundation , Somaliland, the law and FGM, 2018
26	USAID Gender equality and social inclusion analysis, 2019
#	Government documents
27	Government of Somaliland's National Development Plan II 2017-2021
28	Agenda 2030: Voluntary National Review ("progress towards the 2030 Agenda"), 2020
29	Universal Periodic Review, May 2021 (Civil Society submission for Somaliland)
32	Somaliland National Vision 2030, December 2011
33	Ministry of Justice strategic plan 2018-2020
34	Draft Judiciary Strategic plan 2018 -2021
35	Somaliland Police priority needs, Jan 2020
36	Somaliland National Human Rights Commission, Annual Report, 2020
#	UN and UNDP strategic documents

37	UNDP Strategic Plan
38	UN Cooperation Framework for Somalia
39	Project Document <i>“Joint Rule of Law Programme for Somaliland”</i>
40	JROLP documentation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans • Monitoring mission reports • Project progress report: semi-annual (January 2021-June 2021) • Annual report Jan (2020-december 2020) • Project board minutes • Results-Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) • Project knowledge products • Reports (embedded advisors, workshops)

EVALUATION MATRIX¹³
1. RELEVANCE

The extent to which the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries', global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.

	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
Q.1.1.	To what extent are the planned outputs contributing towards the achievement of UN priorities (UNDP Strategic Plan for Somaliland, UN Cooperation Framework, Sustainable Development Goal 16 and 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic relevance of the programme - Level of alignment with SDGs 	UNDP SP and UNSF, Project document, VNR	Request CO
Q.1.2.	How relevant is the project to the priorities of the Somaliland government (NDP II 2017-2021, Vision for 2030, sectorial strategies)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences between UNDP strategies and national priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strategies, - reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Online research - Interviews
Q. 1.3	<p>How does the project reflect the needs of the target groups and the “leave no one behind” principle in relation to its different components?</p> <p>Human Rights</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent are human rights considerations included in the project design and implementation? <p>Gender equality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent is the programme promoting women’s participation and improved the active participation of women? How adequate was the gender results planning in the programme? <p>Social Inclusion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How is the programme considering the needs of the vulnerable and disadvantaged (included persons with disabilities)? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of participation of the target population (i.e. beneficiaries and relevant stakeholders) in the design of the project - Level of integration of HRBA in the design of the programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project document - reports, - articles, - gvt statistics <p>key informants</p>	Analysis and interviews
Q.1.4.	How relevant is the geographical coverage of the programme and what is its added value in terms of reaching the regions ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attitude of respondents towards the area based approach 	key informants, statistics	Interviews

¹³ Based on the revised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria

Q.1.5.	Was the design of the project adequate in terms of ensuring that activities, outputs and outcomes are well aligned in the results framework and in the ToC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of participation of stakeholders in design process of stakeholders - Adequacy of logframe and indicators - Existence of NA or baseline 	Project document	Request CO & interviews with UNDP staff
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2. COHERENCE (*Partnership and cooperation*)

The compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.

	QUESTIONS	INDICATORS	DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
Q.2.1.	How has the programme been effective in coordination among PUNOs (UNWOMEN, UNODC and UNDP) and with UNSOM advisors and political office in Hargeisa?	- Level of coordination among UN partners	key informants	Interviews
Q.2.2	How has the programme been effective in coordinating with other UNDP projects in Somaliland? (Parliament Project and Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG)?	- Level of coordination and inter-linkages between the various programmes within UNDP	key informants	Interviews
Q.2.3.	Are there current or potential complementarities or overlaps with non-UN implementing agencies (FCDO, USAID..) or other UN Agencies? With other UNDP/UNWOMEN/UNODC projects in Somalia?	- Level of coordination and inter-linkages between the various programmes of development partners	key informants	Interviews

3. EFFECTIVENESS

The extent to which the intervention achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results, including any differential results across groups.

	QUESTIONS		DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
Q.3.1.	To what extent are the four Programme components on track (Justice, Policing, Corrections and SSR) in the light of the five thematic areas listed in § 2.1 of the Inception Report? What are the major factors influencing the implementation of their outputs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - N and type of activities implemented - Level of integration between components - Number of trainings 	key informants monitoring reports	Request CO Interviews
Q.3.2.	In which areas does the programme have the greatest and least achievements?	- N of factors hindering achievements	key informants	Interviews
Q.3.3.	What lessons, both positive and negative, can be learned from the first period of implementation of the programme? Are they documented on a continual basis and shared with	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level of integration of lessons learned from previous interventions - Type of monitoring in place to collect and 	key informants	Interviews

	appropriate parties? Have lessons learned from the past phases of the ROL intervention in Somaliland (2002-2018) been taken into consideration?	capitalize on lessons learned		
Q.3.4.	How is the area-based approach in Burao and Borama contributing to the achievements of the programme?	- Attitude of respondents towards the area based approach	key informants	Interviews
Q.3.5.	How is gender mainstreaming and gender-based programming being reflected in programme delivery?	- N of gender sensitive material produced - Level of gender sensitive inclusion in activities	key informants	Interviews
4. EFFICIENCY <i>The extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way and reflects operational efficiency.</i>				
	QUESTIONS		DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
Q.4.1.	To what extent were the human and financial resources and inputs converted to outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner?	- Adequacy of human and financial resources displayed	Financial documents	Request CO
Q.4.2.	To what extent is the programme management structure as outlined in the programme document efficient in generating the expected results?	- Adequacy of implementation strategies and managements structures	key informants	Interviews
Q.4.3.	Is the M&E system a useful programme management tool which allows for an assessment of programme outcomes and outputs?	- Respondents satisfaction towards the monitoring system and its usefulness	Project docs, , UNDP staff	Interviews
Q.4.4.	Does the programme ensure that models developed are coherent with the limited local financial resources?	- Level of adequacy of implementation models within financial availability	Key informants	Interviews
Q.4.5.	Are the programme inputs and benefits being fairly distributed amongst different genders and communities while increasing access for the most vulnerable?	- Level of satisfaction of respondents	Key informants	Interviews
5. SUSTAINABILITY <i>The extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to continue.</i>				
	QUESTIONS		DATA SOURCES	DATA COLLECTION
Q.5.1.	To what extent has the ownership of key stakeholders been sought and institutionalized?	- Perception of stakeholders towards ownership	Key informants	interview
Q.5.2.	Have the advisors placed in the implementing partners contributed toward capacity of the institutions? Do	- Level of corporate knowledge sustainability	Key informants	interview

	the government institutions have plans to recruit the advisors?			
Q.5.3.	To what extent does the programme have a well-designed and well-planned exit strategy?	- N of exit strategy documents	Project documents	Request CO
Q.5.4.	To what extent will human, financial, and economic resources be available at the end of the programme to sustain the results achieved?	- Level of financial sustainability	Key informants	interview
Q.5.5.	Do the legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes within which the programme operates pose risks that may jeopardize sustainability of programme results?	- Level of institutional sustainability	Key informants Documents	interview