PBF PROJECT EVALUATION
SUPPORT TO MECHANISMS TO PREVENT AND
MANAGE CONFLICT DURING ELECTIONS

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

April 2022
# Project and Outcome Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project/outcome title</th>
<th>Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Atlas ID</td>
<td>00118864</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporate outcome and output</td>
<td>UNSDCF Outcome 1.2 Somalis, particularly women and youth, benefit from and participate in functional, inclusive, accountable and transparent democratic systems across all levels of government and governmental institutions. Output 1.4. Strengthened electoral institutions and systems for credible elections</td>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>Jubaland, South West State, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Puntland, Banadir Regional Administration</td>
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<td>28 November 2019</td>
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<td>28 February 2022</td>
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<td>Project expenditure at the time of evaluation</td>
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<td>Funding source</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>Implementing party</td>
<td>UNDP Somalia</td>
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## Evaluation Information

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<tr>
<td>Evaluator</td>
<td>Sue Nelson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluator contact information</td>
<td>c/o IESG Deputy Director, <a href="mailto:mary.cummins@undp.org">mary.cummins@undp.org</a></td>
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<td>Completion</td>
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<td>8 February 2022</td>
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### Acknowledgements

The evaluator wishes to thank all those who supported the implementation of this evaluation: the IESG and UNDP staff for their overall support and the provision of documentation/data; in particular to Ali Dhore for contacting more than 140 individuals to schedule meetings and gather information, to Anthony Howie for sharing his decade of experience in the Somali security sector and in-depth understanding of this project, and to Mary Cummins for her efficient oversight and management that ensured all available personnel were contacted and information provided, and to the national and international security sector professionals, Government officials and other stakeholders who took the time to share their views and experiences on the electoral security environment, institutions and project. The evaluator is also grateful to the Evaluation Reference Committee and those who provided comments on the preliminary findings and draft report which strengthened the report and its findings.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>ATMS</td>
<td>African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>BRA</td>
<td>Benadir Regional Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUILD</td>
<td>Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy project</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EISA</td>
<td>Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Folke Bernadotte Academy</td>
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<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>FEIT</td>
<td>Federal Electoral Implementation Team</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Member State</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>Integrated Electoral Support Group</td>
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<td>JESWG</td>
<td>Joint Electoral Security Working Group</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letters of Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MOIS</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Security</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Needs Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>NESC</td>
<td>National Elections Security Committee</td>
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<td>NESTF</td>
<td>National Elections Security Task Force</td>
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<td>NIEC</td>
<td>National Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>NJOC</td>
<td>National Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>RJOC</td>
<td>Regional Level JOC</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SEIT</td>
<td>State Electoral Implementation Team</td>
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<td>SESTF</td>
<td>Somali Electoral Security Task Force</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>SJOC</td>
<td>State Level JOC</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>Somali Police Force</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>TPM</td>
<td>Third Party Monitoring</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSOS</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office in Somalia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>US Dollar</td>
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<td>UNSOS</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office in Somalia</td>
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<td>VAWE</td>
<td>Violence Against Women in Elections</td>
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<td>WSD</td>
<td>Women’s Situation Desk</td>
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections (or “project”) was a USD 2.5 million project (December 2019 – February 2022) intended to support the establishment and functioning of the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) National Electoral Security Task Force (NESTF), chaired by the Somali Police Force (SPF) Commissioner, and the creation, equipping and training of a nationwide system of Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) located at the national (NJOC), state (SJOC) and regional (RJOC) levels. The overarching goal was to strengthen electoral security for a safe electoral environment for the anticipated 2020 universal suffrage elections. FGS/Federal Member States (FMS) political agreements in July and September 2020 replaced the direct elections with an indirect process and replaced the National Independent Elections Commission (NIEC) with ad hoc Federal and State Election Implementation Teams (FEIT/SEIT), and in May 2021 replaced the NESTF with the National Security Elections Committee (NESC) chaired by the Prime Minister

The project was funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and directly executed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through its Joint Integrated Electoral Support Group (IESG) with the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and in partnership with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Police and Sweden’s Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA).

UNDP Somalia commissioned this independent evaluation of the project, done in February - March 2022. It is intended to provide UNDP, PBF, project partners and stakeholders with an assessment of the project and its contribution to anticipated development results. Data was collected, analysed and validated through a desk review of available documentation, virtual interviews and questionnaires from key actors and participants. The evaluation findings are presented in this report.

FINDINGS

Relevance and coherency. The project was aligned with the United Nations (UN) mandate and goals for Somalia, the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), especially SDG 5 on Gender Equality, and SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, and the Somali national development plans and Somali Women’s Charter. It also aligned with important human rights principles and concepts such as gender equality, inclusive participation, respect for the rule of law and police neutrality.

Its intended goal of the delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020/2021 was highly relevant and essential for Somalia to move forward on its peace and state building path. National ownership varied widely during the project, affected directly by the larger FGS-FMS political relationships. The NESTF started off slowly with its Secretariat’s engagement strengthening just as the political negotiations replaced this technical body with the political level NESC. SPF interest declined afterwards, leaving implementation largely with each FMS/Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) police commissioner. Some were more substantially engaged than others, while some others noted a “demotivating” lack of allowances from the elections security budget. The most relevant cross-cutting issues were human rights, women’s participation and the prevention of violence against women in elections (VAWE), and ensuring electoral security extended to the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. These were primarily addressed through the training provided to the JOCs, the work done through the Women’s Situation Desks (WSDs) located within the JOCs.

Effectiveness. A number of factors directly affected project effectiveness including the lack of FGS/FMS consensus on federalism and the decentralization of policing; the change to the indirect process and the replacement of the NESTF and NIEC; the differing levels of FMS police development; chronic insecurity and Covid 19; expectations for allowances; the dedication of the project-related staff and partners, and the commitment of the FGS/FMS police for security and a safer elections environment.
Output 1: Functional secretariat supporting NESTF/NESC in place and operational. The project successfully supported the NESTF and its Secretariat, equipping its offices and facilitating its meeting and related travel costs. It also provided technical assistance (TA) through its Senior Advisor on its establishment, membership, tasks and development of the national elections security plan. This plan included the JOC concept. The NESTF was perceived as an important mechanism by the police commissioners interviewed, seeing it as a link where all states could discuss and plan election security matters. Despite a slow start, the NESTF Secretariat successfully worked with the police to appoint 20 persons per JOC (25 for the NJOC) and to allocate a dedicated JOC space which were prerequisites for the equipment. The NESC adopted an abbreviated revised version of the NESTF’s national elections security plan and retained the JOC concept. It was less active, requiring the project to work more directly with each JOC. The recently assigned NESC Focal Point seemed more engaged, and was instrumental in gaining SPF approval for the last JOC training done in February 2022 which had been pending since Fall.

The Advisor also provided valuable technical advice to the IESG, UNDP/UNSOM on elections security and through them to the broader international community.

Outputs 2-4: National and State/Regional JOCs established and equipped. The realization of the JOC concept was not easy nor fully implemented for the factors noted. The agreement among the FGS/FMS principals in the NESTF to implement a coordinated JOC system eroded after the change to the NESC. Each commissioner then implemented their own system without central coordination, as the NJOC never opened. This situation reflected the highly politicized environment and was beyond the control of the project or IESG.

All 12 JOCs were established, trained and equipped (Table 1). According to the interviews these were multi-agency; most included the national or state intelligence service, police and army. In some cases, it included ministries of women or defence, local administration and civil society organizations (CSOs), although mostly for the WSDs. The functioning and effectiveness of the 12 JOCs varied widely, largely dependent on the level of local ownership and police development, and FGS/FMS political dynamics. It appears that about a quarter of the JOCs did not function, including the NJOC, while others were open for polling days. A few others were more developed and used for a longer period of time, such as Puntland’s which seemed the most advanced.

The project provided the equipment to each JOC directly. The office furniture and ICT equipment ensured JOC staff had an equipped space to work. It also provided a handheld tactical radio system and the equipment needed for national and state-state reach which strengthened their communications capacity. The manufacturer provided training for SPF communications engineers increased their capacity to use the systems, teach others on their use, and to install the systems on their own. The equipment seemed appropriate to the context and appreciated by the police. Although the national system did not function without an operational NJOC, all JOCs now have this capacity, except for Kismayo which intended to install the equipment itself.

The project facilitated the training provided by AMISOM Police and SPF, providing input on the curriculum, printing the manuals and facilitating the logistics for the JOC trainees. The SPF covered the AMISOM non-presence area, and Puntland trainers attended the course so they could train their
own personnel. The training provided the basic information needed to operate a JOC for electoral security and covered the basics of JOC operations and the electoral process, and human rights issues such as equal rights, treatment of women and vulnerable groups, addressing VAWE and the role of the police in elections. This was followed up by the FBA training for WSD members which the participants and police saw as extremely useful. A refresher course on intelligence and reporting provided at the end was intended to reinforce the initial training which had been noted as needed.

The police appreciated the capacity building opportunities and asked for more in the interviews. Actual effectiveness of the trainings is largely unknown due to the lack of pre/post-training performance data. The project expected the AMISOM Police to follow up and mentor the JOCs after training. The extent this was done is unclear, but the need was evident in the evaluation interviews.

The WSD added value to the project with the FBA situating its assistance within its larger engagement on women and security. Intended to strengthen the police’s ability to respond to VAWE and empower women as a leading force for democratic and peaceful elections, the concept seemed largely accepted with a WSD in each JOC. The 50% women quota for the WSD and 30% for JOC staff seemed largely respected. The level of WSD development largely followed that of the JOCs overall, with Puntland seeming the most advanced. Its JOC and WSD were operational for the national elections as well as for its three pilot direct district level elections. Awareness levels of most JOCs and WSDs seemed low with no significant differences between the responses of men and women. Their actual effectiveness is largely unknown as no JOC/WSD reporting was available if done. Anecdotally some WSD desks said they received no complaints, while others were used to assist delegates at the polling locations. The FBA noted the need for more training and follow up, but felt that the bigger picture issues of JOC functionality needed to be resolved first for any training to be effective.

Efficiency and project management. The project had a quick start up but a slow initial implementation, waiting for the election process/dates to be set and for the NESTF to gear up. The project Security Advisor and National Officer were experienced security sector professionals, with the Advisor bringing the lessons of the 2016-2017 elections. UNDP directly implemented the project, situating it within the larger framework of the IESG which increased its technical and managerial capacity and extended its reach.

The project’s narrow activity focus required the contribution of others (AMISOM Police and FBA) to achieve its intended goals which was intended in its design. The PBF project provided the framework for these other efforts, giving them focus and a larger purpose, increasing the efficiencies and effectiveness of each. Implementation aspects were coordinated through the Joint Electoral Security Working Group (JESWG) chaired by the project Advisor. This arrangement worked well for the JESWG principals but was less clear for others, especially in the field. This became more problematic when the project became more directly engaged with each JOC after the end of the NESTF. Technical risks were managed effectively through the IESG and JESWG, although the political ones were beyond the control of the project or IESG.

Procurement was slow with some local purchases for office/ICT equipment taking more than 65 days, hampered by COVID-related supply issues, customs clearances, and undefined specifications on purchase orders. These were dispatched to the JOCs primarily by UN flights with the police expected to pick them up upon arrival at the airports. When they were not available, IESG Field Officers stepped in to receive and store the equipment until the police pick up. The radio equipment, purchased through a long-term UNDP contract with Motorola, was configured by its Kenyan partner BCE Systems which also provided the training and initial installations. The vocality box for the longer range radio system took more than three months for the required U.S. export certificate. Nevertheless all of the equipment was delivered and installed before the elections, but only because of the extensive political delays in setting the elections dates.
The project reported as required and monitored the equipment and status of the JOCs. The indicators were primarily activity-output based, with the degree of increased performance beyond these outputs largely unknown. Most JOCs reported no serious issues on election days, but at this point, it is not possible to attribute this to the project given the number of factors and actors engaged in the broader election security and anti-terrorism efforts. The project’s results framework and end-of-project status is provided in Attachment 1.

**Sustainability.** Sustainability is a concern for most JOCs which were not to the level of development needed to continue functions without continued support. The more developed JOCs, such as Puntland, are more likely to become integrated into the police stations as their permanent operations centre, than the others. The WSDs are likely to be integrated into some of the existing gender desks for the JOCs that are not continued. Capacity built by the project is likely to remain with the persons trained. The equipment appears to be safeguarded in police stations, most in the rooms designated as JOCs. Maintenance is likely to be an issue as the computers and radios will need periodic maintenance and updating of software.\(^1\) During the evaluation, the current NESC Advisor noted the value of regular JOC reporting and expressed the government’s intention to continue with their development so they will be ready for the expected (at this point) universal suffrage elections in 2026. During this evaluation, the former PBF Advisor was contracted by UNSOM to explore the JOCs possible integration into the UN’s Joint Police Programme that supports the new decentralized FGS/FMS policing model.

**Lessons Learned.** There were several lessons learned for this project, some of which are also applicable to other projects implemented during this politically volatile period. These include not under estimating the impact of unresolved political and state building issues on project implementation; the value of partnerships in implementing projects and the need to ensure that coordination and information sharing are balanced and strong at all levels particularly in a context of chronic insecurity, instability and uncertainty; the need to follow up training with hands-on mentoring especially when supporting institutional change; and resolving known systemic issues, such as allowances, in the project design phase and including their resolution in the project document signed by the government counterparts.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Strengthening the security forces ability to ensure safe elections, through coordinated planning, operations and communications, with a gender-sensitive and human rights approach is a best practice and highly relevant in a post-conflict state building environment, where security, the holding of periodic elections and a peaceful transfer of power are dominate concerns. The importance of this effort was not diminished by the adoption of an indirect process. The volatile political dynamics complicated project implementation, and its results would have likely been more substantial had the national level remained engaged. Nevertheless, the project directly strengthened the national elections security plan; introduced the JOC concept for elections security at national, state and regional levels, provided a WSD foundation for police and others to build on and address VAWE and other women’s security issues in their regular policing work; strengthened the FGS/FMS police communications systems; harmonized international assistance for electoral security through the JESWG; and strengthened related IESG/UNDP/UNSOM strategic planning with its advisory advice. It is possible that there were more results than what was noted during this evaluation due to the absence of outcome level data.

The project as designed could not have been implemented without being embedded in the larger IESG mechanism, and the AMISOM and FBA partnerships. The implementation aspects needed more development to ensure needed JOC follow up was done and to avoid confusion among others.

\(^1\) There is a two year warranty on the computers and radio hardware and five years for the software.
as to roles and responsibilities. Continued support is needed to maintain the gains made in most locations.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. Maintain IESG efforts to find post-project support for the operationalization of the JOCs with the Joint Police Programme or other relevant security sector initiative that would continue its support through the next elections due in 2026 with UNPOL support and guidance.

2. For the next electoral cycle, IESG should focus on programmatic aspects of election security such as elections integrity and strengthening the NIEC for its role in elections security, the prevention of violence and VAWE, and providing election-specific expertise for the UN on elections security.

3. Continue IESG close collaboration with UNPOL which is an essential actor with its NESC membership, field advisors, membership in the Joint Police Programme and close collaboration with FGS/FMS police and AMISOM. UNPOL should assign a part-time advisor to the IESG.

4. Start all UN support for elections security well in advance of the 2026 elections so that newly established mechanisms, such as JOCs, can be well established and operational before voter registration and the start of the electoral campaign. This is especially important if these are to be universal suffrage elections.

5. IESG and other UN efforts should take advantage of the field level coverage provided by UN field offices and regional security advisers and integrate their support into the design of future election security support activities. Include field gender advisors in VAWE efforts.

6. IESG should develop joint frameworks with partners for jointly-implemented activities, including a joint results framework. Produce fact sheets on the partnerships listing roles/responsibilities for easy reference for stakeholders and others, and to avoid confusion.

7. IESG and related projects should strengthen monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by requiring regular reporting from FGS/FMS partners on their activities and on the use and challenges of the mechanisms established.

8. IESG with the NESC should organize a lessons learned on the experiences of 2020-2022 with the main PBF project actors and partners to document best practices and make recommendations for future efforts in Somalia and similar post-conflict contexts.

2.1 Evaluation of the Support for Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project

**Introduction.** UNDP commissioned this evaluation of the Support for Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project (referred to hereafter as the “project” or “election security project”). It is intended to provide UNDP, PBF, project partners and stakeholders with an independent assessment of the PBF election security project and its contribution to its anticipated development results. It will be used to strengthen future programming and provide lessons learned for other programmes being implemented in similar circumstances.

The evaluation took place in February and March 2022, with the interviews conducted virtually due to the Covid 19 pandemic and the Somali security context. The evaluation was conducted by Sue Nelson, International Consultant, an expert in democratic governance and electoral assistance. It covered the entire project period from December 2019 through February 2022.

**Evaluation objectives and scope.** The objectives of the evaluation were to:

1. Assess the relevance, coherency, and appropriateness of the project to the most relevant peacebuilding issues, national priorities, SDGs including gender, and the UN assistance in Somalia, as well as the extent the project capitalized on the UN and AMISOM’s added value in country;
2. Analyze the project’s effectiveness, extent of project outputs, and factors affecting the achievement of project outcomes;

3. Review the extent of project contributions towards reducing conflict factors during elections, and promoting gender equity and women’s participation in peacebuilding processes and other cross-cutting issues such as social inclusion addressed during project planning and implementation;

4. Assess the quality of partnerships, national ownership, and sustainability vis-à-vis the project strategy, identify gaps and document lessons for future reference;

5. Evaluate the efficiency of project implementation, institutional arrangements, use of resources, management structure and operational systems; and,

6. Document good practices, innovations and lessons learned and provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

The evaluation scope included:

- Desk review of relevant documents, including the project documents and reporting, JOC training reports, NESC/NESTF and other meeting minutes, Letters of Agreement (LOA), observer reports, and available M&E data among others (Annex 1);

- Collecting information and perceptions of the project and its activities/results, on the functioning of the NESTF/NESC Secretariat, establishment of the JOCs and electoral security through virtual interviews and questionnaires with: the PBF/IESG staff, AMISOM Police, FBA, UNPOL, NESTF/NESC, police commissioners and JOC focal points, election donors, domestic observers, FEIT/SEIT members, and election delegates (Annex 2). Use of disaggregated data, including gender disaggregation, where available;

- Validating information collected through interviews, document reviews, use of additional data sources and third-party interviews. Ensuring women as well as men are equitably represented in the interview pool;

- Assessing the relevance/coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the project interventions, along with its management and implementation. Identifying the factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of results and the lessons learned/best practices of the project; and

- Validating the preliminary evaluation findings through discussion, interviews, and the Evaluation Reference Group’s feedback on the evaluation’s initial findings and draft report.

**Evaluation approach and methods.** The evaluation undertook a qualitative assessment of the relevance, coherency, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the PBF project assistance and the factors that affected project performance. It used mixed methods for analysis, synthesis, and drawing conclusions. This included trend analysis of key outcomes, analysis of key outcomes between observed outcome and project supported efforts, and validation through triangulation. It also assessed differences in responses based on gender, location and political context among other factors. Based on the information available and stakeholder perceptions, the evaluator made judgements on their value and the extent that these outputs contributed towards the achievement of the project’s intended outcomes.

Evaluation questions were tailored to the different institutions and roles in the sector with particular attention given to the country context and its effect on the project and its implementation. The complete matrix of evaluation questions is provided in Annex 3 along with the full evaluation methodology. However, some of the key questions included:

- How relevant was the support to the needs for electoral security, related national development goals, SDGs and the UN’s peacebuilding mandate?
• Did the project design and its implementation incorporate a conflict sensitive, human rights based approach, and did it mainstream a gender perspective?
• Did the project achieve its intended outputs of a functional NESTF Secretariat and JOCs?
• What were the key factors that affected the achievement of these outputs?
• What was the impact of the NESTF/NESC/JOCs on electoral security and indirect elections?
• What was the level of national ownership in the different project elements (NESTF/NESC/JOCs/WSDs) and for the prevention of electoral violence, including VAWE?
• What was the level of coordination among the JOCs and with the NESTF/NESC and broader communities affected by election-related violence including women and those marginalized?
• What was the quality of the technical, logistical and commodity support provided?
• How sustainable are the project results and what are the factors for this?
• Was the project flexible enough to adjust to the electoral and political changes and challenges?
• How effective and efficient was project management?
• How well did the project coordinate with its partners (AMISOM Police, FBA) and the broader electoral security environment and actors?
• What were the lessons learned and best practices?

The interview process was participatory with ample opportunities for the stakeholders to discuss the issues that most concerned them. The questions themselves were general enough to elicit a range of answers at the same time as directing the conversation to the areas under evaluation. All of the interviews were done on a confidential basis to encourage participation and frank answers.

The evaluator was directly recruited by UNDP and followed the principles outlined in the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. She maintained an impartial and professional view towards developing her findings, basing them on the evidence found and against the anticipated results listed in the project document. She was responsible for the delivery of the Inception Report, Draft and Final Evaluation Reports, and reported to the Evaluation Reference Group established by UNDP. Her terms of reference (TOR) are provided in Annex 4. UNDP/IESG supported the evaluation by providing the project documentation, background information and scheduling interviews.

The project’s results framework and intended outputs were clearly stated in the project document and followed for project reporting, which facilitated the evaluation. There was however limited data or reporting back from the JOCs on their establishment and functioning. This made it difficult to assess project performance beyond the achievement of activity outputs. This also increased the importance of the interviews with those working in and with the JOCs and NESTF/NESC at the state and headquarter levels. Obtaining interviews with some of the intended key Somali informants was difficult with a high percentage of no-shows for the first and sometimes second scheduled meetings. The PBF National Officer, who scheduled the interviews, was able to persevere in many cases and either successfully got the person, or found alternates within the JOCs or police. Nevertheless, some of the key Somali officials were not available during the evaluation including the SPF Commissioner. This was unfortunate as he was a key actor and could have provided the official SPF position on the NESTF and NJOC, as well as recommendations for future efforts. The availability issues also affected the ratio of men/women interviewed, resulting in a higher percentage of men being reached in the predominately male security sector.
The evaluator tried to mitigate these limitations by extending the interview period by more than a week, sending email questions to those who were unable to meet, speaking to others knowledgeable on the situation, and by developing short questionnaires to reach more interlocutors to get a more complete picture. This included questions for the JOC members attending the Mogadishu-based training in February 2022 on the status of their JOCs/WSDs and security context, as well as ones for the FEIT/SEITs, candidates/delegates and election observation groups on their awareness of the JOCs/WSDs and thoughts on the security situation. Although the questionnaires were administered on a random basis and reflected those who were reachable by phone or email, and is not a representative sample, it does provide some insight into their awareness of the JOCs/WSDs, and their security concerns. It also diversified the data sources and processes employed which strengthened inclusion in the evaluation and helped to validate the findings.

This resulted in 98 persons reached, 34% of these women. About 62% of the total were Somali security personnel or those involved in the electoral process as administrators, candidates, delegates or observers. The remainder were the international/national peacekeeping mission personnel, trainers, development actors and donors as outlined in Table 2.

The evaluation findings are organized in this report according to the criteria stipulated in the terms of reference: relevance, coherency, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. It includes discussions of the electoral security project’s contributions towards the achievement of the main outputs as intended in its project document which are covered in the section on effectiveness. It also looks at the impact of the political context on the relevance and effectiveness of the project and its implications for future programming. Issues of project management and implementation are covered in the section on efficiency. The evaluation report closes with the lessons learned and best practices, and the assessment’s main conclusions and recommendations.

2.2 Electoral and security context

Peace, security and elections in Somalia have not been easy to secure and deliver. After decades of conflict, Somalia started a democratic transition to a federal government which remains incomplete. The country is still operating under the 2012 provisional constitution with unresolved issues of federalism and the division of power between the FGS and the FMS. Indirect parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestone</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>2020 Political roadmap</td>
<td>Universal suffrage elections</td>
<td>Endorsed by Council of Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dhusamareb process</td>
<td>July 2020 Indirect election</td>
<td>Political decision for indirect 4.5 process. NIEC to administer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September 2020 agreement</td>
<td>Parliament: Dec 2020 President: Feb 2021</td>
<td>Political agreement on election dates. Elections to be administered by ad hoc electoral committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation to extend mandates by 2 years</td>
<td>April 2021</td>
<td>Replaced agreement 17 September with universal process within 2 years and extended terms of parliament and president until then. Rejected by Upper House.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia on streets</td>
<td>April 2021</td>
<td>Violent clashes in Mogadishu 25 April. Annulled extension mandates 27 April. Prime Minister tasked to organize indirect elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS- FMS agreement</td>
<td>27 May 2021</td>
<td>Agreement on way forward 27 May 2021 with indirect parliamentary elections to start July 2021, presidential elections 10 October 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper House elections</td>
<td>July 2021 -</td>
<td>Indirect elections held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House of the People elections</td>
<td>November 2021-</td>
<td>Indirect elections started, deadline to finish extended to 15 March 2021.</td>
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</table>
were held in 2012 and 2016 under a clan system of delegated voters. The 2020 elections were to be universal suffrage elections as were those in 2016, however these were replaced by a July 2020 political agreement for an indirect process. A September 2020 agreement replaced the NIEC, which the IESG and international community had been supporting since 2015, with the temporary FEIT/SEIT and continuing political disputes spilled over into fighting in the streets of Mogadishu in April 2021 with a final agreement reached in May 2021 that replaced the NESTF with the NESC. Although the May 2021 agreement anticipated parliamentary elections in July - September 2021 and the presidential in October 2021, the parliamentary elections were still not yet completed as of the end of the PBF project in February 2022.

Somalia continues to have serious security challenges with armed attacks from the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, persistent clan rivalries and political disputes that often spiral into violence. Al-Shabaab is intent on disrupting the electoral process, threatening electoral delegates that participate in the elections, bombing near electoral sites and killing others. These threats continued throughout the electoral process and as recently as March 2022, it again threatened to assassinate delegates and parliamentarians in the Benadir region which includes the capital Mogadishu. The UN Human Rights and Protection Group documented 58 civilian casualties (22 killed, 36 injured) related to the elections in Bossaso (Puntland) and Beletweyne (HirShabelle) over a six day period in February 2022 and 50 persons were killed in twin attacks on 23 March 2022.

Elections security in Somalia is led by the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS), supported by the Ministry of Defence and AMISOM, with support from the United Nations and other international partners. The Federal Somali police are overseen by the MOIS with the SPF Commissioner designated as the operational commander for all national electoral security operations. Each state has its own state police under the federal system and new policing model. These are at different levels of implementation.

Policing in Jubaland is still split between the state police in the capital area, and the federal police in the region of Garbahaaarey. This is a major source of dispute for Jubaland and affected implementation of the project in these areas. Puntland is more advanced institutionally at the state level than other states. It has already held its own direct local elections in three pilot districts, and its police force is well established. The three central states are more aligned with the FGS and their state police forces are more nascent and still developing.

In the 2016 elections women were intimidated and harassed, affecting their participation in the process. Women are among the most marginalized in the electoral and political processes, and vulnerable to gender-based violence, including VAVE and are unlikely to report incidents to the police. Although the Somali legal framework provides for gender equality, this is not respected in practice as women are excluded from, or under-represented in, decision making which is dominated by male clan elders. The 30% quota for women in parliament and government included in the

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2 This 4.5 clan system gives an equal quota of parliamentary seats to the four major clans and half that to everyone else who is not a member of those groups (the “minority” clans). The clan appointed delegates then vote for their representatives.

3 The MPs elect the president

4 The Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia from May 2019 provides a snapshot of the security environment at the start of the project. It notes pre-electoral violence in the state election in the South West killed four persons including a member of the State Assembly, the lack of inclusivity in the Puntland State Assembly where only one woman had been elected, the Galmudug State Assembly protests over federal involvement in state politics resulting in the attempted takeover of the Galmudug presidential compound from local clan militias by federal agencies, and increased attacks from Al-Shabaab on government officials, security forces and other locations. It noted 77 attacks using improvised explosive devises in March 2019 and an increase in mortar fire with some targeting the UN compound in Mogadishu injuring three UN consultants among other locations hit.

5 UN, Weekly Electoral Update Somalia, 21-27 February 2022, pps 2-3, and IESG information

6 AMISOM, Police Training and Development Department, Draft Election Security Training Manual, p 14
September 2020 agreement has not been enacted into law. However, 24% of 2016-elected Members of Parliament (MPs) were women due to a 30% quota used at the time.7 The recommendation from the experience of 2016 was to “develop and apply security arrangements to better protect women participating in the electoral process.”8 CSOs, women’s rights groups, the international community and others consistently advocated for the quota throughout the process including for the electoral committees and the JOCs supported by the PBF project. It appeared to have been largely met by the JOCs, but for elected office, it appears it will be closer to 20-21% of the MPs when the elections are completed.

The different security forces were assigned areas of responsibility for the 2020 elections. The inner area around polling sites (Area Four or “inner tier”) and the security of the delegates, candidates and election committees was under the responsibility of the Somali Police and AMISOM Police. In Puntland, it was the Puntland forces, Police, Darwish, and Intelligence, while in Jubaland, this was under the Jubaland Police and AMISOM Police (Box 1).9 The number of forces for election security in each state was intended to be 1,000, with 500 in Benadir.10

2.3 Support for election security

AMISOM has provided the large-scale security assistance to Somalia since 2007 in accordance with its UN Security Council mandates. It will transition to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in April 2022 for a phased handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces as prescribed in the Somalia Transition Plan. This transition recognizes the evolution of the situation in Somalia and the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and that military action needs to be accompanied by a stabilisation and governance approach with security sector reform, peacebuilding and reconstruction. This will reconfigure AMISOM to support Somali security efforts to be fully responsible for security by the end of 2023. For the 2021 elections, AMISOM was authorized by the Security Council to support the “election preparation and provide support for the SSF to provide security for the process and other critical infrastructure.”11

The UN has had a mission mandate in Somalia since 2012 to work with the FGS and FMS to support peacebuilding and state-building, including electoral and security support. This mandate was continued for the 2020 electoral process in Security Council Resolution 2540 (2020).12 The UN electoral assistance is provided through the joint UNDP/UNSOM IESG. The PBF project was situated within this group.

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7 USAID/Somalia Gender Assessment 2020, Final Report, p viii
9 NESTF, National Security Plan (draft), p 12
10 Ibid, p 14
11 UN Security Council, Resolution 2568 (2021)
12 UN Security Council, Resolution 2540 (2020)
The UN Police have been supporting federal and state police and their line ministries and security coordination bodies in the field of policing. They are also assisting the police implement the New Policing Model in line with the *Somali Transition Plan* which will also integrate regional forces into Somali security institutions and deepen that federal system. Among other tasks it works with AMISOM Police on its mentoring and training of Somali Police, and with them helped establish gender desks within some police stations, and provided mentoring to the Somali police that included gender and the protection of women. UNPOL has Police Advisors in almost every state and is on the executive board of the Joint Police Programme and a member of the NESTF/NESC.

The United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOs) provided equipment and mission support services to AMISOM, UNSOM and Somali Security Forces “to make them more effective in supporting peace and stability efforts in Somalia.” It was part of the internal JESWG, chaired by the project Advisor, as it transported the equipment provided by the project to airports near the JOCs.

The UN’s Joint Police Programme (2018-2022), implemented by UNDP and the UN Office of Project Support (UNOPS) supports the federal and state police to implement the New Policing Model. This project provides equipment and training to strengthen policing and develop the federal police system.

The FBA, the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development, supports security sector reform and women, peace and security efforts in Somalia. Among other assistance, it supported the development and training of the Women’s Situation Desks within the JOCs in coordination with this project and AMISOM Police.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID)’s bilateral programme, *Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy* (BUILD) project supported domestic observation during the electoral process, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) monitored election conflict.

The NESC developed a USD 5.3 million election security budget for the 2021 elections which it presented to donors. This included USD 4.3 million for staff allowances and transport of security staff, USD 0.811 million for equipment and material, and 15% for contingencies. The international community was already funding various aspects of security sector reform, and had committed to funding other parts of the electoral process, and looked to the Government to cover these costs. According to interviews, the Government committed to using the candidate fees, estimated to reach USD 2.2 million to cover the election security costs. The budget was reportedly reduced to around USD 2 million but information on its funding status and use for the JOCs was not available during the timeframe of the evaluation.

### 2.4 Support for Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project

The *Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project* (December 2019 – February 2022) was a USD 2.5 million project designed to support the FGS to *deliver a safe environment for the electoral processes in 2020/2021*. It intended to do this through technical and

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13 UN Police Somalia, [Police | UNSOM (unmissions.org)]
14 UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 July from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, S/2021/668, 19 July 2021, p 3
15 UNSOM About, [About | UNSOS (unmissions.org)]
16 PBF Project data. Amounts are rounded. As a note, an earlier budget for USD 17 million included USD 12.7 million for allowance for 5,640 security personnel for 30 days. PBF/IESG Analysis of National Security Plan and Budget Oct. 2020
17 PBF Project, [Briefing Memo for Project Evaluator], 18 November 2021 and UNSOM, [Elections Security Update Powerpoint, July – September 2021]
secretarial support for the NESTF that was to be established to plan and coordinate election security to prevent violence, including Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and to manage gender sensitive responses to violent incidents. These efforts were to be implemented through the creation of a nationwide system of JOCs located at the national, state and regional levels that the project would help to create, equip and train.

The project was originally designed when universal suffrage elections were anticipated and expected to be administered by the NIEC. The project was since adapted to support the indirect election model that was adopted and administered by the ad-hoc FEIT/SEIT and the replacement of the NESTF, which had been chaired by the Somali Police Commissioner, by the NESC chaired by the Prime Minister.

The extended electoral calendar required a no-cost time extension for the project from its original end date of July 2021 to 28 February 2022. The project was fully funded by the PBF, and the anticipated project budget is illustrated in Table 4.19

To accomplish its objectives, the electoral security project focused on achieving four main outputs:

1. **NESTF and IESG supported, with the NESTF Secretariat within the Ministry of Internal Security staffed and resourced, as well as the IESG Electoral Security Team** which was to manage this project in a way that benefited men and women within the institutions and their stakeholders. (Output 1).

2. **NJOC established and supported,** Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified NJOC support requirements (staff, resources), NJOC staff trained and mentored which also addressed gender differential issues related to participation, empowerment and protection. (Output 2).

3. **SJOC established and supported,** Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified their support requirements (staff, resources), trained and mentored SJOC staff with gender differential issues addressed related to participation, empowerment, and protection. (Output 3).

4. **RJOC established and supported.** Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified support their requirements (staff, resources) with staff trained and mentored. (Output 4).

The project intended to mainstream gender in project implementation by requiring a 30% participation rate of women in the JOCs and a 50% male-female ratio for the WSDs. Cross cutting issues were to be primarily covered in the AMISOM Police training which was expected to include “gender and human rights sensitive refresher training for security forces to further enhance their

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18 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, Project Document
19 The estimated budget and expenditures tables used in the report are for illustrative purposes only. Planned expenditures are based on the amounts used in the project document. Activity areas varied according to the output. For the NESTF, Activity 1 was its resourcing, Activity 3 was training material. Activity 2 was the cost for support to the IESG to manage the project, and for the purposes of the evaluation has been pulled out from the Output 1 budget charts and labeled as “TA” to better illustrate the actual levels of assistance going to the NESTF/NESC. For Outputs 2-4, Activity 1 was workshops, Activity 2 resourcing the JOCs, Activity 3 was training. The UNDP line item was for programmatic costs.
understanding of gender differential issues in facilitating safe elections for all.” The project document also noted the complementary UN joint programme on Women’s Political Participation which included an output to mitigate violence against women in political, state formation, peacebuilding and elections.20

As the elections were originally expected to be universal suffrage, ensuring security so that all groups could participate and exercise their political rights regardless of their gender, physical ability, and societal position was important. However, this target group shrunk dramatically with the adoption of the indirect electoral process where only a limited number of clan representatives voted in the 11 voting centres nationwide as discussed in the findings section of the report.

The PDF project was managed by UNDP through its joint electoral assistance programme with UNSOM, the IESG. The Project Document was signed by the MOIS and implemented through the IESG mechanism and its main partners, initially the NESTAMP and its Secretariat initially and afterwards the NESC. It was executed through a direct execution modality by UNDP, with LOAs provided to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and NIEC to facilitate some of logistical arrangements for the meetings and trainings. The project itself was led by a Senior Election Security Advisor, and a National Officer, with the support of a seconded United Kingdom (UK) military officer to the IESG. IESG itself has approximately 50 staff.

The PBF project benefited from the direct supervisory support of the IESG Deputy Chief Electoral Advisor (UNDP) and the Chief Electoral Operations Advisor (UNSOM) as well as supported by the IESG Project Manager (UNDP) and the UNDP/IESG finance team and administrative team, as well as various gender advisors (UNDP/IESG and others).

IESG coordinated the PBF-funded activities within the larger electoral security efforts within Somalia, including those provided by AMISOM and UNPOL. Sweden, through the FBA, and provided technical expertise and training to support these efforts.

The project board of the UN Joint Electoral Support Programme (which IESG implemented) also served as project board for the PBF project with the addition of PBF and MOIS representatives. It met quarterly or more frequently as needed. The Board was to provide quality assurance supported by UNDP’s Programme Oversight and Quality Assurance Unit for monitoring and oversight.

3. EVALUATION FINDINGS

3.1 Relevance and coherency

This section looks at the relevance and coherency of the project to the Somali peacebuilding context, UN Somalia mandate, UN/PBF goals, national plans and SDGs; as well as to the project’s intended outputs and activities. Design issues and the project’s theory of change are also included.

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20 Project Document, pps 27-28
The project’s intended goal of the delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020/2021 was highly relevant and essential for Somalia to move forward on its peace and state building path. In the Somali context, marked by protracted armed conflict and political clashes, security was a key determinant for where, when and if voter registration and voting could take place, if at all. It affected who could participate and how inclusive the process could be. Even without universal suffrage elections, the goal of a peaceful transfer of power through the implementation of the politically-agreed indirect process, was an important step in moving forward and maintaining peace. The importance of the elections to achieving a stable Somalia was highlighted in the Somali National Development Plan (2020-2024) as well as the extent of the security threats to achieving this goal (insecurity stemming from the threat of terrorism, inability to register all eligible voters due to insecurity, and low levels of security in some areas of the country). It was also in line with the Somali Women’s Charter that called for equal participation of women and zero tolerance for gender-based violence.

The project’s goal was in line with the UN electoral mandate for Somalia to provide political, operational, logistical and technical support to the FGS for the delivery of inclusive, peaceful, free and fair one-person-one-vote elections in 2020/2021, to the UN/PBF and relevant national plans and priorities (Box 3). The goal also aligned with the objectives of the SDGs, most notably SDG 5 on Gender Equality by including mechanisms within the JOCs to deal with violence against women in elections and to increase the safe space for them to participate through the improved security environment, and SDG 16 Peace Justice and Strong Institutions in its support to strengthen police planning and coordination mechanisms and related capacity building. It also aligned with important human rights principles and concepts such as respect for the rule of law and police neutrality.

The project design was based on the experience of the election security support provided for the previous elections held in 2016-2017. That assistance helped establish and support the Somali Electoral Security Task Force (SESTF) which developed the national elections security plan for those elections. This gave the responsibility for elections security to the police, with the support of other security forces. It also supported the establishment of Joint Security Committees at voting centre levels to coordinate local security planning and operations.

The 2017 UN Electoral Needs Assessment (NAM) felt this model provided “a template of what can be achieved through a genuine joint approach with buy-in from all stakeholders” and recommended that it be retained, strengthened and used for the 2020 elections. These elections were expected to require more extensive planning and better coordination than 2016 because of the number of polling locations that would be needed for a universal suffrage election vs. the six

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24 This mandate was later extended to include the indirect process
25 UN Electoral Assistance Division, *Electoral Needs Assessment Somalia, 2017* p 18
locations used in 2016-2017. The NAM also recommended that the IESG, through its security unit, represent UNSOM at the joint security meetings once established, and that this support should start well in advance of the voter registration period expected at the time in 2019/2020.26

The development of joint intelligence mechanisms to share information and intelligence was also one of the lessons documented by the SETSF: *There is full agreement that intelligence should have been better shared but that proved difficult to do without the appropriate mechanism to do so. Good intelligence is not only a necessity for elections security, but is a necessity for all joint operations. The FGS needs to take the initiative, and, with the assistance of donors and partners, establish a mechanism through which intelligence can be collated and shared.*27

The PBF project design reflected the 2016 model and its lessons learned. It envisioned reinstituting the joint electoral security task force at the national level, developing the national electoral security plan with the participation of the FMS, and expanding the concept of local level planning to the tactical level through the establishment of joint operations centres to coordinate local joint operations and planning to improve police management of violence and its prevention.

This model directly corresponds to the outputs and activities outlined in the project document. These outputs provide a logical framework for what needed to be done to create a pyramid planning, command and communications structure with policy guidance determined at the top for the system and reporting flowing in both directions and among the states. The theory of change articulated in the project document focused primarily on the need to establish the national mechanism to provide the strategic guidance for elections security (Output 1). It states:

“If a functional NESTF is established, then preventive measures against election-related violence can be rolled out, because the NESTF will be able to provide strategic direction and guidance to support FGS and FMS security institutions to deliver security for the electoral activities to enable them to take place in safe environments, thereby enhancing the integrity, inclusivity and credibility of the elections, realized with minimal or no violations committed by security forces.”28

Expanding the theory of change to include the areas supported under Outputs 2, 3 and 4 would strengthen the theory of change as it then justifies the assistance to the JOCs and explains how that support would contribute to a safe elections environment. For example:

*If* national election security planning and coordination is strengthened through the re-establishment and empowering of the national elections security task force to provide strategic planning and guidance for the security forces and their partners on electoral security, and

*If* joint operations centres are established, trained and equipped at national, state and regional levels that coordinate and plan security efforts within their local areas, and communicate among them and with the national centre, and

*If* these joint operations centres operate with a gender and human rights perspective, address reports of violence against women in elections and protect human rights;

*Then* “elections security will be provided in a [more] coherent and coordinated manner at the national, member state level and the regional levels to [help] ensure that electoral activities take place in safe environments, thereby enhancing the integrity, inclusivity and credibility of the elections.”29

26 Ibid, p 32
28 The “then” statement is from the Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections, *Project Document*, p 5
29 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, *Project Document*, Outcome Box, p 2
This then provides the larger programmatic vision and rationale for the project and justifies why the other activities were chosen. Within this larger vision, the project’s narrow activity focus on providing national secretariat support, technical advice, some equipment and training facilitation, made achieving the intended outcome dependent on the development of a larger partnership of assistance and FGS/FMS/police willingness and ability to own and implement the JOC concept and establish a functioning system.

The project document was broadly written, which gave the project the flexibility to adapt to the evolving nature of the electoral processes and its inputs and partnerships. It noted the intended partnership with AMISOM Police to provide the JOC training, and with a to-be-determined partnership with a women’s participation programme. This aspect enabled the FBA, which had been looking for a mechanism to engage the security forces on gender, to support the WSD concept adding significant value to the JOC design. This resulted in a synergistic and mutually supportive effort using the comparative advantage of each agency, which provided for a more comprehensive package of assistance than would have been possible by any one project alone.

The level of national ownership over the NESTF concept and JOCs varied widely over the course of the project and between the different levels and states. The SPF and FGS police departments appreciated the NESTF and the ability to meet and discuss election security issues, and the NESTF Secretariat worked to realize the JOC concept. This interest in national level coordination dissipated with the replacement of this more technical body with that of the NESC which had higher level discussions and not the same level of technical security engagement.

At the JOC level, the office and communications equipment and training provided were also widely appreciated and directly relevant to the needs of the police in setting up the JOCs and for their security operations in general. Ownership in operating the JOC though was problematic in some cases. Some of this is likely attributable to the dissolution of the NESTF which removed the SPF Commissioner as Chair, especially for the NJOC. However, many of the Somalis interviewed attributed this to the lack of funding for the JOC workers, which seemed to be expected and without it lacked “motivation.” The Government’s election security budget included a line item for allowances which apparently were not provided.

At the same time, most of the police interviewed liked the JOC concept, and thought it would help to improve their operations. Several of these talked about wanting to use the experience and equipment provided in their everyday police operations or to expand it to other locations within their state. The caveat in almost all of these places, except for Puntland, was that this was largely dependent on funding.

Some of the security professionals interviewed from outside the project and Somali police questioned the relevance of the JOC system and/or activities selected (equipment and training) in the current context. They felt the relationships among Somali security providers involved complex political considerations on the ground and their system were not ones of coordinating networks. They also felt introducing institutional change was a long-term process that could not be effected within the short timeframe of an election project and required more than equipment or training. The project/IESG disagreed with this perception that a JOC was not appropriate to the context. They see it as a capability that developed and developing police forces use. The relevance of a JOC system in Somalia is currently being bolstered by AMISOM and UNSOS support to the military to develop a JOC

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30 The project/IESG was clear in all of the records in its dealing with the Government, that its assistance was in kind and not in cash, and that it was the responsibility of the Government to fund the election security budget.
system with the Somali armed forces across the country which is expected to be in place in mid-2022.\textsuperscript{31}

Everyone did agree however that the relevance and effectiveness of the design could not be compared across the regions and individual JOCs as each had their own context and complexities as in some cases, such as Puntland, the state police had adopted the concept and at the time of the evaluation were planning on expanding it across their state for use in their local elections next year.

\textbf{3.2 Effectiveness}

This section starts by identifying some of the key factors found that affected project effectiveness, and continues with the findings on project performance. For ease of reporting purposes, the evaluation findings for the JOCs (Outputs 2-4) are consolidated in this report as the project’s support for the JOCs was equitable and consistent across the national, state and regional levels. Cross cutting issues are covered at the end of the section.

\textbf{Key factors}

The PBF project was directly impacted by the very challenging political and security context within Somalia and other factors, some of which progressively worsened over the period of the elections. These directly affected the effectiveness of the project as well as its efficiency, relevance, coherence, and sustainability. Some of these were:

- \textit{The lack of consensus on Somalia’s governmental system and federalism among the states and with the federal government.} This resulted in protracted political disputes between the FGS and FMS leadership and within FGS leadership which at times deteriorated into violence, significantly delaying the elections and setting the election dates within the states. It also affected how the different police forces interacted and communicated with each other and with the federal police. It impacted on how the project implemented its trainings and installed its communications equipment, with federal trainers/engineers not allowed in some areas, and one state not allowing the federally managed JOC within its state to participate in most trainings.

- \textit{The change from direct to indirect elections and change of project counterparts.} The NIEC, which had been an integral part of election security planning at national and field levels with the police and IESG officers was replaced by the newly created FEIT/SEITS, and the NESTF, whose Secretariat was steadily working on election security planning by May 2021, was replaced by the NESC. This left an initial vacuum at technical levels requiring the development of new working relationships and clarification of the UN mandate which had been to support universal suffrage elections. It also required the project to deal more directly with each state and assume a greater coordination role for the JOC assistance. It also changed the dynamics of FGS-FMS coordination on elections security, raising it to the political level, leaving the police commissioners to implement their own JOC systems.

- \textit{Insecurity.} Security was the focus for the project but the project itself was directly affected by the security context. It limited where international/national staff and partners could travel within the country and within towns, limiting and in some cases preventing access to some JOCs, and complicating the deployment of equipment and trainings.

- \textit{Differences in police development among the states.} The state police were at different levels of development which affected their ability to adopt and institute a new system such as a JOC and networking with others on security. For instance, Puntland had an established state

\textsuperscript{31}The project also notes that a type of JOC was established in 2017 for the big electoral events (elections and swearing in of the President and MPs) at the Airport Police Station with the SSF, AMISOM and UN present.
police system, while Galmudug is only now working on the transition to a state police force and had federal police there during the elections.

- **Elections security budget and allowance issues.** The FGS developed a security budget which included allowances for JOC workers. The international community expected the Government to fund the budget which it indicated it would cover from the candidate fees. However, the Somalis interviewed consistently raised the issue of the lack of funds for the JOCs or JOC staff, attributing it as a main reason for the limited or non-functioning of some JOCs.

- **Integration of the PBF efforts within the IESG.** The PBF staff worked within the IESG which had a large staff, range of expertise, and relationships at different technical and policy levels. Its staff were located at national and regional levels. This gave the project a much larger management and implementation capacity, and extended its reach enabling the project to accomplish much more than it could have on its own.

- **Dedication and experience of PBF staff and partners.** The Security Advisor had worked on Somalia since 2012, including the 2016 elections, and the National Officer had worked on the Joint Police Programme. AMISOM Police and UNPOL were able to provide valuable peer experience at national and state levels, with AMISOM providing peer training, and both present on the policy-level NESTF/NESC. The three groups closely coordinated at the strategic planning level and helped find solutions for the challenges faced during implementation.

- **Commitment of the FGS/FMS police for elections security and safe elections, and ownership of the SPF Communications Department in the development of the tactical communications system.** Even though not all JOCs operated, the police were dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of their communities and to addressing the security threats to the elections. They participated in the NESTF and project-assisted trainings, and allocated space, time and effort to election security coordination. The engagement of the SPF Communications Department with the project/IESG and the radio manufacturer Motorola and its Kenyan partner BCE Systems reflected a constructive and genuine partnership that resulted in a tailored and context appropriate communications system for the FGS/FMS JOCs.

- **Covid 19.** The pandemic directly affected the project and its activities, adding an additional layer of constraints onto an already restrictive working environment. UN staff were severely restricted in their movement, and national staff were not allowed into the main UN compound for a good part of the project. Much of the work was done remotely. This complicated and delayed the receipt, deployment and set up of the equipment. It also increased the cost of goods and transport.

### 3.2.1 Output 1. Functional Secretariat supporting NESTF/NESC in place and operational

The objective for Output 1 was NESTF [later NESC] and IESG supported, with the NESTF Secretariat within the Ministry of Internal Security staffed and resourced, as well as the IESG Electoral Security Team which was to manage this project in a way that benefited men and women within the institutions and their stakeholders. The project intended to accomplish this by staffing and resourcing the NESTF [later NESC] Secretariat within the MOIS (Output 1.1), and staffing and resourcing the UN IESG Electoral Security Team within IESG to manage this project (Output 1.2). It also intended to print and translate training material (Output 1.3). As Output 1.2 covers project management, these aspects are covered in Section 3.3 on efficiency. However, as the project also

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32 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, Project Document, p 7
played an advisory role on electoral security to the IESG and others, that aspect of Output 1.2 is covered here in the section on technical assistance.

**Output 1.1 Support to the NESTF and NESC Secretariat**

To achieve Output 1.1, the project intended to support the development of the NESTF Secretariat [later NESC Secretariat] by providing office and ICT equipment to the staff assigned by the MOIS, and supporting meeting costs and technical assistance as needed. The NESTF was seen as a partner and as a beneficiary of the project as it would be the national entity responsible for election security planning and coordination. The NESTF was expected to be inclusive with senior representatives from the FMS and BRA along with senior officials from the FGS security institutions. This was also expected to include representatives from the NIEC, UN and AMISOM. The NESTF was expected to extend the project’s reach to the state and regional levels through its establishment of the National JOC (Output 2).

Output 1.3 was to translate and print the training materials that AMISOM would use in its JOC training.

The anticipated budget for the activities for Outputs 1.1 and 1.3 was USD 172,479. This was about 7% of the planned project budget. Actual expenditures as of the end of November 2021 were about USD 125,500 or about 10% of all project expenditures (Table 5).

The evaluation found that the project provided the basic resources needed by the Secretariat to do its work (office furniture, computers, and covering meeting-related costs) and with the pandemic, provided high quality internet access and zoom licenses to the NESTF (and JOCs) to enable their continued functioning. It had intended to cover the cost of two national officers for the Secretariat, but as the UK funded a national advisor for the NESC, this was not needed.

The first NESTF meeting coincided with the start of this PBF project in December 2019 (Table 6). Initial discussions focused on membership for the NESTF and the role the security ministries should play. The ultimate decision (March 2020) was for the NESTF chair and BRA/FMS representatives to be the police commissioners. This allowed the meetings to move forward despite the political tensions as the police focused more on the practical issues of joint electoral security. The NESTF also debated the elections security plan which included the JOC concept that the NESTF Secretariat had produced with significant project input. This was not formally approved before its replacement by the NESC, although the NESTF Secretariat had already tasked the BRA and FMS police forces to identify their JOC office space and staff.

The NESTF startup was slow. The project/IESG and others consistently advocated for more regular meetings and for it to take the decisions needed to move security planning and establishment of the

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33 NESTF meeting notes, 9 March 2020
34 Email 27 July 2020 from the PBF Senior Electoral Advisor to Capt. Sadlk
The slowness was attributed to the initial changes in its part time secretariat staff, the impact of Covid 19 which distracted police attention from the NESTF to the needs of policing in a pandemic, and to the unresolved political issues around the elections with most police commissioners taking a wait and see approach. The Chair of the NESTF ultimately suspended its operations and meetings until a political decision was made on the elections. However, the NESTF Secretariat continued functioning and its work was reportedly gaining momentum and finding its path when the political agreement in May 2021 resulted in its replacement by an OPM-led NESC.

The NESTF was seen as an important mechanism by the different police commissioners interviewed (Box 4). They saw it as a link where all states could discuss election security matters and develop policy. They felt it was a good mechanism regardless of the type of election adopted, and some asked for it to continue.

The NESC was not as active and was perceived in a more political light than the NESTF. The project’s 2021 annual report noted the limited planning and coordination done by the end of 2021 which was well after the start date of the elections. The NESC did issue a reduced version of the draft NESTF national security plan. This maintained the JOCs concept but replaced the FGS Police Commissioner with the Prime Minister for the chair of the NESC.

The same secretarial support was offered to the OPM, although by September 2021 it was still without a secretariat or active focal point. The OPM declined the offer for equipment, explaining to the evaluator that OPM uses its own encrypted system. The project was able to provide support for meetings through an existing UNDP/IESG LOA with the OPM which gave them access to funds to cover these costs. This was done to facilitate their work as well as to avoid perceptions that any delays might be due to the lack of international support. There were discussions on the PBF budget with both committees to inform them that the support was in kind and was not financial or budget support.

The more recently assigned NESC focal point seemed more engaged and committed to the JOC system in the evaluation interview. He noted the value of a networked system that could report security information up the chain to a central location on a regular basis. He was instrumental in gaining SPF approval for the February 2022 intelligence training which had been pending for months. He justified the current arrangements for the NESC, feeling it reflected the broader security environment at the policy level by including the ministries responsible for security and defense, and said it met quarterly and continued implementing

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35 According to the evaluation interviews, project meeting notes and reporting  
36 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, Progress Report, 2020, p 4 and evaluation interviews  
37 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, Progress Report 2021, p7 which reported that the NESTF Secretariat was functioning well and had increased to 12 persons  
38 According to interviews, and Project Document’s No Cost Time Extension  
39 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, Progress Report 2021, p 4
the workplans from the NESTF and state security committees with which it worked directly, while the tactical security planning was done in the JOCs.

The NESC shift placed the responsibility for the technical coordination of election security to the individual police commissioners. Without an operating national JOC, that should have picked up that joint technical coordination role, the JOCs were established unilaterally by each police commissioner, reflecting their individual political and security environments. The three central states (South West, HirShabelle and Galmudug) were more engaged with the FGS police and commissioner, while Puntland and Jubaland acted more independently. Garbahaarey was the most affected in the circumstance as it was the focus of a political dispute between Jubaland and the FGS over its jurisdiction. As the federal police were in control of the region and the JOC, the state did not agree with some of the project support (training) offered for Garbahaarey which it blocked.

These differences relate to unresolved issues of Somali federalism and federal resistance to the new decentralized policing model which UNPOL and the UN’s Joint Police Programme is helping to implement. One of the elements that made the NESTF more functional than the NESC was the MOIS agreement to let the federal police commissioner be in charge thus distancing the political bodies from the technical work of policing the elections which was not the case for the NESC.

This NESC shift also left a vacuum for monitoring the JOCs’ establishment and following up on their functioning as the NESTF Secretariat had been expected to play a major role. The project and its partners tried to fill the gap and mitigate its impact by interfacing more directly with each JOC. However, as noted in Outputs 2-4, this was limited with the resources available within the project and partners, and by the security and covid context.

**Technical assistance.** The project’s Senior Security Advisor and National Officer provided valuable advisory services on election security to the NESTF Secretariat, IESG, UNSOM/UNDP and through them to the NESTF/NESC, JOCs, donors, other partners and stakeholders. With the AMISOM Police Election Security Advisor, they were the driving factors behind the development of the JOC concept and its operationalization. Along with IESG and UNPOL, they were able to operate within the politically complex and polarized environment to provide expert advice that was perceived as constructive and impartial. This was important in the highly politicized context.

The project Advisor provided substantial input to the NESTF Secretariat on the development of the national security plan and provided a joint technical paper on the draft plan with the AMISOM Police Advisor. According to the security professionals interviewed, this helped develop a more comprehensive national plan. It was drawn from the 2016 national security plan and strengthened with the incorporation of its lessons learned. The NESC took over the draft once it was constituted and adopted a paired down version, keeping its main lines and the JOC concept.
Once the plan was adopted, the Advisor/IESG advocated for the BRA/FMS police commissioners to develop operational plans for their JOC locations with the AMISOM Police. This was reportedly done to varying degrees. The Advisor also provided input into the JOC training programme developed by AMISOM Police and by the FBA for the WSD training.

The Advisor also provided briefing materials on the JOC system and electoral security situation for IESG and UNSOM use, some of which was used by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in his policy level discussions with the Government, police and international community. Although UNSOM had a large Security Management Team in place, the Advisor provided insight on the elements related to the electoral process and its particular security needs. The Advisor also ensured the establishment and management of the JESWG mechanism with the international agencies working on elections security assistance, resulting in the close coordination of the efforts at the central level as discussed in Section 3.3 on Efficiency.

### 3.2.2 Outputs 2, 3 and 4: JOCs established and supported

The objectives for Outputs 2, 3 and 4 were similar with the national JOC to receive additional attention for its national coordination and reporting role. These goals were (N/S/R) JOCs established and supported, development and capacity building plan completed that identified (N/S/R) JOC support requirements (Outputs 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1) and (N/S/R) JOC staff trained and mentored which also addressed gender differential issues related to participation, empowerment and protection (Outputs 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2).40

The project originally intended to undertake a capacity assessment of each JOC to determine their needs but after the decision for an indirect process with 11 voting locations, it decided to treat all JOCs on an equal basis in terms of training and equipment provided. This would avoid any perceptions of favouritism or bias which was important in the politicized and often polarized context.

The gender aspects were to be incorporated into the training provided to the JOC staff by the AMISOM Police with a partnership to be determined during implementation with an organization focusing on women’s participation. This was filled by the FBA which agreed to support the concept of a Women’s Situation Desk within each JOC. This was adopted by the project and NESTF and for which the FBA provided the training, facilitated by the project.

The JOCs were to be established by the relevant FGS/FMS police force by allocating office space and assigning 20 staff (25 for the NJOC), 30% of which were expected to be women. Four of these (two women and two men) were to be assigned to the WSD desk. The project intention was for the JOCs to be located inside the police stations and for them to remain there after the elections for the police’s continued use for operations and planning.

The budget for Output 2 was USD 85,000, Output 3 was USD 309,000 and Output 4 USD 689,747. Together, this was about 43% of the planned project budget. Expenditures as of November 2021 were USD 85,978 (Output 2), USD 233,213 (Output 3) and USD 536,661 (Output 4) (Table 7).41 This was about 46% of all project expenditures.

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40 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project *Project Document*, p 7

Realization of the JOC concept was not easy nor fully implemented. The agreement among FGS/FMS principals in the NESTF to implement a coordinated JOC system eroded after the change to the NESC. The NJOC would have filled this missing technical coordination role but since it never operated, each police commissioner established their own JOC system. This situation reflected the highly politicized electoral and FGS/FMS political environment, and was beyond the control of the project.

Project support did result in the establishment of 11 JOCs and 1 National JOC, with equipment and assigned staff at regional, state and national levels that received JOC and WSD training. According to the interviews, the JOCs were multi-agency, most often including the national or state intelligence service, police and army which was the intention of the project and NESTF. The anticipated participation of the FEIT/SEITs in the JOCs was not evident in the interviews (Table 8). This might have been because their interaction was directly with the police chiefs or through another means. There were reports of some CSO engagement as well as local/state administration in the JOCs, especially for the WSD in some cases.

The functioning and effectiveness of the 12 locations varied widely. It seemed largely dependent on the level of local ownership and police development, and FGS/FMS political dynamics. It appears that about a quarter did not function, including the National JOC, while others only opened on polling day(s). A few others were more developed and used for a longer period of time. This is summarized in Table 9. The √ for operational status means it was open for the election day(s) although some were open for longer.42

Each JOC had its own characteristics beyond the 20 persons assigned and equipment received according to the interviews and available documentation.43 For instance, in Beletweyne

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42 Project data.
(HirShabelle), the JOC was comprised of the police, CSOs and local administration and was only operational for polling. The police said they coordinated with AMISOM and the army outside the JOC as the JOC was only for the police. They put the equipment in the polling site for election day, primarily for planning purposes, and then returned it to the police station afterwards. A main security concern for HirShabelle beyond Al-Shabaab, was what they characterized as political disputes, where some seats had more candidates than others which they stated created conflict and needed a political solution.

The Galkayo JOC (Galmudug) included a mix of military, national intelligence agency and police. The police had the lead and filled the majority of the JOC positions. The JOC was not in the police headquarters, but at the regional command commissioners’ office for the elections, and they moved some equipment to the polling site for election day. The extent of its operations is uncertain as the information received was conflicting and ranged from having been open since it was equipped, to if it starts, it will be useful. Their presence was noted at the polls and they used the WSD there to support voters (delegates) needing special assistance. The police said this was at the SEIT request which saw the police as neutral and best placed to assist delegates. The JOC in Dhusamareb (Galmudug) was reportedly working, and included the military. They said they are still using the JOC for a weekly security coordination meeting with all security forces, noting that this was useful because the JOC staff was there with the security information.

In Kismayo (Jubaland), the JOC included the Jubaland intelligence agency, army, and police. There were reportedly two other JOCs in Kismayo - one for army operations and one for intelligence. The police said these were folded into the police JOC for the elections. They reported starting off strong, but noted the heart of the JOC was missing, wanting a hotline and stronger internet connections for the closed circuit TV system that they had purchased on their own to bolster their JOC capacity. Al-Shabaab was reported as their biggest security challenge. The JOC in Garbahaarey (Jubaland) said the JOC was not yet in use as the elections had not yet started there, but others noted that they were not operational because they had not been included in the initial AMISOM training - blocked by Kismayo because of the Jubaland - FGS issues. The police in Garbahaarey saw the lack of proper knowledge and team work as their main challenge, and were included in the WSD and JOC Commanders training.

The JOCs in Puntland seemed the most functional and had an active WSD. Information on the SWS was mixed and conflicting for Baraawe, although the police said the equipment was useful. The polling site in Baraawe was attacked by Al-Shabaab mortar fire that killed four and injured nine. The JOC in Baidoa was set up outside the AMISOM protected area where the delegates registered, and after UN insistence that the JOC be set up in the protected area, they split the equipment between that site and a JOC room that they partially set up in the police station.

43 Information from data collected by project and others and from the evaluation interviews. More information on each JOC is available in the project’s narrative progress reports.
The JOC in Benadir and the national JOC allocated the required staff and office space, and installed the equipment. The project also rehabilitated the NJOC at SPF request to make it more habitable as an office. However, neither JOC opened. Had the NJOC functioned, it is likely it would have strengthened the uniformity of the JOCs and their operations through its regular collection and aggregation of information from the JOCs and the regular dissemination of information through the project provided radios. The Somalis interview attributed the nonfunctioning of both locations to the lack of funding for staff. The project and IESG are of the view however, that this was largely related to the political issues following the establishment of the NESC.

The lack of an apparent elections security budget for the JOCs was raised consistently in the interviews with Somalis. Characterized as demotivating, some said they could not ask staff, especially those from other agencies, to undertake these extra duties, many of which they said were 24/7, without some renumeration. Some said they had received no funding for elections security or JOC running costs, such as the internet needed for the ICT equipment. This issue was also noted in a mid-2021 project memo on operationalizing the JOCs where the “failure to pay JOC staff pledged allowance may be contributing to a lack of JOC staff participation.”

The project felt it had covered the JOC operational cost by providing six SIM cards and dongles for each JOC, intended to provide for 50GB of internet data and phone for three months if used as intended. It also expected full-time salaried police staff to be assigned to the JOC as their permanent position as agreed to by the police in the NESTF, and that other agencies would second salaried staff to work in the JOCs during the election period. IESG/project records and meeting notes show that the project and international community had consistently informed the NESTF/NESC that their support for this effort was in kind– equipment, training and advisory services, and that funds for the JOCs were a governmental responsibility to be covered from the government’s election security budget.

The issue of funding has been a recurrent issue for electoral security and was one of the areas covered in the 2017 SETSF lessons learned. According to IESG, the situation for government salaries had improved with the economic recovery, and payments had become more regularized and digitized. Before this, some donors had provided a stipend of USD 100 to the SPF and army to top up their low salaries, done through a third party. When FGS revenues increased, these stipends stopped to the SPF and are now paid to state police in Jubaland, South West State, Hirsabelle and soon in Galmudug. IESG notes that there were no recorded walk outs or mutinies over the nonpayment of SPF salaries during the elections, which was noted as a risk in the project risk matrix. With Somalia

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44 PBF Project, Briefing Memo for Project Evaluator, p 2
45 Evaluation interviews as well as project correspondence and the NESTF meeting notes reviewed
46 The lessons learned noted the need to “train, equip and sustain security forces” which were expected to be paid a normal salary and provided with a “modest stipend (USD 10) to top up the modest salaries.” However, the “security personnel were not paid during the elections which remains a source of much discontent, and does not respect the sterling work security forces do to keep the elections safe.” It also noted the need to “agree [to an] election budget and secure the funding.” The initial 2016 security budget was USD 12 million but was reduced to USD 2 million to cover food, equipment and a stipend. Although the FGS agreed to fund this, it only provided USD 200,000 which was disbursed to the regions, and the lack of funds was a “very contentious issue for the FMSs in particular.” SETSF Lessons Learned Report, pps 4-5
classified as the second most corrupt country in the world on the Corruption Perception Index,\textsuperscript{47} the diversion of resources and focus of JOCs to other security activities were also identified as risks. In these cases, the trainers were to monitor and raise the issues at FMS joint security meetings, with the NIEC and NESTF to be advised and to engage with local officials to mitigate the issues.\textsuperscript{48}

The lack of NIEC engagement in these elections was a factor as it would have likely monitored the funding of the elections budget and its allocation for election security more closely than the temporary FEIT/SEITs due to the amount of IESG training it had received over the years and number of IESG advisors working with it at national and state levels. They could have provided the follow up with the NESTF/NESC on the government funding for their election security needs. But without this, and a more engaged NESC on these types of issues, it remains a lingering issue that spoilers could exploit for political reasons or that could adversely affect the 2026 elections if the election security budget issues are not resolved before that process starts.

Moving forward, thought needs to be given to the elections security needs and budget for the anticipated universal suffrage elections in 2026. As noted in the SESTF lessons learned, security for one-person-one-vote elections will be more expensive, and an elections security budget will need to be developed and funded well in advance of any election event.

The visibility and information available on the JOCs and WSD seemed limited. Although some of the JOCs were reported to have provided a telephone number to delegates and candidates during their registration in some locations, and each WSD was told during training to develop a plan on engaging and contacting CSOs and others, this was not apparent in some of the interviews and questionnaire responses, with a general lack of awareness on the JOCs, especially for the candidates and delegations (Table 11).\textsuperscript{49} Even some of the police and UN field level staff interviewed only seemed to have a general notion despite the briefings in the NESTF for the police and weekly meetings with IESG field staff.

Strengthening the visibility and the amount of public information available on the JOCs would be useful for future efforts, and help to extend their reach and their more effective use by election participants, voters and others. Infographics on the JOCs, on who does what and how and how to contact them, as well as a fact sheet on the different streams and organizations helping to support the JOCs, could be developed and distributed during trainings and meetings, and posted at the relevant field offices, police stations and JOCs, as well as distributed to the media for their coverage of elections security.

**Equipment.** The project intended to equip all 12 JOCs with office equipment and vehicles so the JOCs would be ready for staff use. The equipment was expected to remain within each JOC after the elections for their continued use by the police as an operations centre. The project/IESG decided in February 2020 to purchase radio networks instead of the intended vehicles, as the Joint Police Programme was not providing radios.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Delegate / Candidates Concerns & Awareness} & Security concerns & Security problems during elections & Aware of JOC & Aware WSD \\
\hline
Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
No & No & No & No & No & No & No & No & No & No & No \\
Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly & Partly \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Delegate / Candidates Concerns & Awareness}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{48} Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections, \textit{Project Document, Risk Matrix}, p 13
\textsuperscript{49} The questionnaire data collected for the evaluation by the Evaluator, National Officer and IESG Field Officers reflects the perceptions of the individuals contacted and is not a representative sample. However, it does give an indication of their main concerns and awareness levels of the JOCs and WSD. Other polling data on the electoral process and elections security was not available at the time of this evaluation.
as had been assumed at the time of the project design.\textsuperscript{50} The project spent about USD 789,000 on equipment with about 10% of that spent on the NJOC and the remainder for the 11 state and regional JOCs.\textsuperscript{51}

The project met its equipment objective. Despite the challenges as detailed in Section 3.3 on implementation. The equipment was procured, delivered to each JOC and installed. This included desks, chairs, filing cabinets, generator, computers, a printer, projector, 4G Dongle, SIM cards and office supplies (paper, power cords, flip chart, pens, notebooks and waste paper baskets). The project also provided a turn-key tactical radio system to each JOC (Phase 1) supplemented by a system to extend their communications capacity to the national and state-state levels (Phase 2).

The equipment provided seemed appropriate and appreciated by the police, especially the communications systems which could provide a secure communications network for each JOC and tie into a national network. This second level did not appear to have been used but the capacity now exists at every JOC except Kismayo. Due to FGS/FMS political tensions, Jubaland did not allow the SPF communications team to install the network, opting instead to do its own installation.

The purchase of radio networks was a strategic choice. Good communications are essential for good security operations, and allow for better command and control over people on the ground, and coordination with others. In Phase 1, the project provided 12 site radios and 240 handheld sets and training on the programming and use of the sets. It was characterized as an entire tactical radio system with walkie talkies, repeaters, masts, antennas, battery backup, and charging systems. According to the manufacturer, the range for the radio system was about 50 kilometres, depending on the line of site available from the antenna and if it were placed on a tall building which would give it more range.

The digital walkie talkie system was relatively new for the police forces. According to the manufacturer’s trainers (BCE), some of the police had basic knowledge on hand held radios, but as the tactical system was software based, they provided training to the SPF communication engineers so that they could understand the system and be able to train others on its use.

Although BCE had pretested and preconfigured the equipment, it still required fleet mapping and police understanding of how the mapping determines the system’s programming. It helped develop the fleet map for Mogadishu which was more complicated than for the remote sites as Mogadishu also needed to create the national channel to relay communications to the other 11 sites. The BCE training seemed appropriate for the context, training 14 SPF engineers on the system and setting up two systems to demonstrate the process. It then monitored the SPF while it set up a third site before the SPF engineers then went on to install the rest of the systems and train the JOCs on their own.

Most of the installations were done in October- November 2021, with the last (Bossaso in Puntland) in February 2022.\textsuperscript{52} This did not allow time for some JOCs to practice using the system before the

\textsuperscript{50} Project/IESG, Note to the file on modalities and adjustments to funded support from the PBF elections security project, 20 February 2020.
\textsuperscript{51} Project Financial Report, December 2019 – 15 November 2021
\textsuperscript{52} Interviews with Motorola and BCE. The original planned installation date was August-September 2021.
elections. The BCE training however did seem effective, as the SPF engineers successfully set up functioning systems in the remaining JOCs.

Phase 2 was the addition of the vocality boxes to enable the interstate and national communications. Delivery of this system was delayed as it took time (60 days) for the supplier to get the export license needed to ship this type of technology from the U.S. to some countries, including Somalia. This was a more complicated system than Phase 1, needing configuration upon installation. BCE installed three systems while training the SPF engineers, and stayed for another few days to ensure the engineers had no issues once they started installing the remaining systems on their own.

There seemed to be a good working relationship between the project/IESG, SPF and Motorola/BCE on the development and deployment of this communications package. BCE said it was still in contact with the engineers and was helping them remotely with any issues encountered even though the contract was completed. The SPF Communications Department saw the system as an upgrade to the analog systems used, and valued its encryption ability which enabled sensitive police communications to remain secure. One of the issues raised by some of the users was the funds needed to cover internet costs and that the modem system (dongles) provided needed a higher quality internet service which cost more than what was provided. In response, the project stated that the six dongles and sim card for three months equated to 50GB internet data top up. They also noted that the dongles could have been monopolized by a few and not shared equitably within the JOCs.53

A missing element for the SPF at this point in time was a dispatch console for each JOC to track the location of the officers with the radios dispatched as now they only have voice contact. They said they are currently in discussions with UNDP over this issue. For the project/IESG, the Phase 2 element of the project was already an add-on provided at SPF request.

The actual use of the equipment provided is largely unknown and most information is anecdotal. Some is based on the photos provided by the JOC Focal Points or others that visited that location. In the JOC at Garowe (Box 9), the equipment still looks unused, but the date of the photo is unknown. The equipment for the elections in some of the JOCs that did not operate was still used for election security. In the case of Benadir for example, they reported using the hand held radios on election day, which the JOC focal point checked out of the locked JOC room in the morning, and returned at the end of the day. In other locations, the equipment was taken to the polling site and used there and then returned afterwards to the police station or other location. The Phase 2 radio equipment for Kismayo is being held by the SPF until there is political agreement for its installation.

Training. The project partnered with AMISOM Police which provided the main JOC training. Project support was limited to an advisory role on the curriculum, printing of the manuals, and facilitating the logistics for the JOC participants to attend the trainings. The AMISOM Police initially expected their training costs to be covered under the UNSOS budget but UNSOS ultimately determined that the course did not meet their funding criteria. UNPOL then successfully submitted a project proposal to cover the AMISOM training costs to the Trust Fund for Peace and Reconciliation which supports the comprehensive peace and reconciliation process, including election support. The Trust Fund

53 Project/IESG email clarifications to the evaluator, 26 March 2022
provided the USD 148,629 requested for AMISOM Police to train the 245 staff assigned to the JOCs to familiarize them with the JOC system and increase their capacity to manage election security incidents.

The objectives for the initial training were: 1) **Participants will have increased capacity to satisfactory manage security issues within their jurisdiction during the federal election process;** 2) **Coordination will be strengthened among the participants assigned to election security tasks in the cities the JOCs are located;** and 3) **Participants will have a better understanding of how human rights laws and standards are applied in the security context in the lead up to, during and post elections in Somalia.**

This was to be a joint AMISOM Police-SPF training with SPF trainers delivering the training in areas where AMISOM was not present (Table 12). The course covered the basics of elections security including election management, election security threats, the role of the JOCs in elections as well as guidance on security arrangements for women and other vulnerable groups, and human rights principles in election security management.

The human rights elements of the trainings covered the role of the police in the observance and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, which discusses the respect for and protection of human rights including women and persons with disabilities when questioned by police, including the right to have an interpreter for the hearing impaired, the protection of internally displaced persons, and of vulnerable persons from discriminatory arrest and detention. There is an entire section on the WSD, its function and dealing with issues such as VAVE. It provides information on the main human rights instruments including UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The manual itself is gendered, referring to “the men and women” of the police forces.

A follow-on refresher course was provided at the end of the PBF project focusing on intelligence collection, analysis and reporting, also provided by AMISOM Police.

Participants appeared to value the peer-to-peer training, many asked for additional training in the evaluation interviews. Puntland did its own training by sending its trainers to the AMISOM Police training in Mogadishu, and then its trainers trained its own staff. This is useful as it builds the capacity of the police force trainers as well as strengthens the state police’s ability to replicate the course and extend its reach.

The AMISOM Police training was followed up by WSD training provided by the FBA to the four WSD members of each JOC. This was value added to the project which met the gender activity in its results framework to conduct gender and human rights sensitive refresher training for security forces to further enhance the understanding of gender differential issues in facilitating safe elections for all through the AMISOM Police training which had specific sections on human rights, gender and violence against women in elections. The human rights element was another of the lessons learned from the 2016 elections which noted the need to “improve human rights and elections education to

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54 UNSOM, **Project Proposal, Joint Operation Centre (JOC) Training on Election Security at the Federal and Federal Member State Level**, p 3
55 AMISOM Police and Training Department, **Draft Election Security Training Manual**, 2021
56 Intelligence Collection, Analysis & Reporting Training. Training data in the table provided by the project.
57 AMISOM Police Training and Development Department, **Election Security Training Manual (Draft)**, p 63
strengthen the impartial role of the security forces and to handle violations.”

A number of human rights violations had occurred in those elections, some by security forces. For the 2021 elections, domestic observers noted that the electoral process in all the states observed until then (November 2021) was “largely in accordance with regulations, as well as the election officials and security forces also acting largely in accordance with procedures.”

As a note, trust in police had improved in Somalia since the 2016 elections. Survey data is limited but a 2020 BUILD poll, which predates project-related assistance, found that the army and police were the most trusted institutions in the country at 81% and 77% respectively. This was up from 2016 when the army was at 71% and the police at 70%.

The effectiveness of the training is unknown due to the lack of post-training performance data or before/after testing results from training. However, an issue noted in interviews for all the trainings was the widely different levels of knowledge among participants, making the trainings less effective for some. This is a systemic issue in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery and was not unique to this project which was also limited in its efforts by the context and time.

The intelligence training done at the end of the project was questioned by several of those interviewed, noting that no one was monitoring to see if what was trained on previously was being implemented, and asking about the need to conduct trainings when elections were ongoing, especially since these were to be the same people that were needed to staff the JOCs. Some police commissioners interviewed also noted the timing, saying they only sent a few persons because of it. At the same time, the project had only requested 10 persons per JOC to attend the training which they felt should have left sufficient staff remaining at each JOC to cover their work, assuming they were fully staffed. The elections were also completed in some locations and it was training that the police had requested and could use in their regular work as well as for the next election. As this training had not been authorized by the SPF commissioner until February, it had not been possible to do it earlier.

From the interviews, it was evident that the trainings were the first step of a longer process of establishing the JOCs that then needed programmatic follow up to help them implement what they had learned in training and to develop into an effective, well-functioning command and control operations centre as discussed in Section 3.3 on Implementation. This was especially noted for areas without the more established state police that could provide more of the follow up themselves. This likely would have been less noticeable, but still needed, had there been the more active participation of the NESC/NJOC that would have provided continuing guidance and follow up. As noted by one police commissioner “people did not understand what to do. This training is just the

58 SESTF, Op Cit, p 6.
60 USAID/Somalia, Somali Perceptions Survey: Key findings on the emerging Federal States, Mogadishu and Puntland
61 These comments were from those working on the assistance side, not from the training participants.
beginning.” This sentiment was echoed by others, including international security professionals that had visited some of the JOCs.

Another factor noted for the capacity building elements was that in some locations, not everyone who attended the JOC trainings worked in the JOCs. The project estimates that about 30% of the JOC staff in some locations were changed after training.62 Those interviewed speculated that some went anticipating payments of some sort for the training or JOC work which were not provided. One of the areas where this was visible to those who visited the JOCs or collected information on them was the limited ability for some staff to use the computers provided despite the competency noted in the first groups trained. This was mentioned in the project’s JOC status update (21 December 2021) for Kismayo and Beletwewayne which stated that no one could use the computers and they needed/requested computer training, as well as for Jowhar which needed refresher training. This was also noted as a need by several of the other JOC Focal Points/Police Commissioners interviewed. Adding a basic course on computer use into any future JOC training programmes would likely be very useful to some of the police forces to facilitate their operations and enable the more effective use of the project-provided IT tools.

Women’s Situation Desk. This element was proposed by IESG and developed by FBA in coordination with the project and approved by the NESTF to be one of the desks in the JOC (Box 11). The FBA had a wider engagement with the women’s networks and agencies working on women and security in elections within which it situated its WSD assistance. As this is separate, it is not part of the PBF project evaluation. However, as the WSD was an integral part of the JOC system and the PBF staff contributed to the JOC WSD concept and facilitated the JOC staff to attend the FBA training, the information gathered on the WSD is noted here.

According to the project/IESG briefing material on the JOCs, the WSD objective was to ensure that reports and complaints against women are received and properly responded to by security forces.63 The intention was for all JOCs to be equipped with a WSD to document and respond to VAVE. According to the AMISOM training manual, its goals were 1) to respond to and report cases of VAVE including sexual violence, Somali women candidates, voters, civic leaders and journalists are made aware of and actively use security resources made available to them, strong women’s participation that is not impeded by targeted violence or other civil or criminal violations, as well as 2) to empower women as a leading force for democratic and peaceful elections especially women in the SPF and women in civil society.64

The WSD was to be composed of four of the 20 JOC staff members, with half of them men and half women. The intent of the 50-50 split was not to drain the police women from the police stations and from regular policing work. The desks were intended to take complaints on violence against women in the elections and refer them to the appropriate authorities for action, whether it be the criminal police department, ministries of women, CSOs or others.

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62 According to information gathered by the project. There appeared to have been no changes to the staff in Garowe, Bosaso, Kismayo and Benadir.
63 IESG Powerpoint on Engagement Platforms for the Indirect Elections, 9 Feb 2021
64 AMISOM Police and Training Department, Draft Election Security Training Manual, 2021 p 41
The WSD concept seemed widely accepted and was found in all of the JOCs. It seemed from the interviews that the JOCs respected the two women and two men desk requirement. The FBA three-day training, done by an international expert supported by Swedish UNPOL Advisors, appeared well done. The WSD staff were trained in two batches. The first group was reportedly not as engaged as the second which was said to have impaired its effectiveness. This was addressed for the second group by notifying the participants that a test was required to receive a course certificate, and this group was said then to have been more actively engaged throughout the course.65

Some of the WSDs were more developed than others. This corresponded in large part to the effectiveness of the JOC itself and to the activeness of the police forces and their engagement with other agencies on women’s issues. The states with the more established state institutions, such as Puntland, also seemed to have the most developed WSDs. The Puntland JOC and WSD were operational, not only for the national elections, but for its three pilot direct district elections, and their WSD included representatives from the ministries for women and defense. They stated this was new for them; they had a women’s desk before in police stations, but this was mostly on paper.

The actual effectiveness of the WSD and its work is unknown beyond limited anecdotal information. No actual reporting on the number of incidents, activities, etc. was available on this, or for any of the JOC activities, during the evaluation. Some of the desks said they received no complaints. Others, such as Galkayo as noted, put the WSD staff at the polling location to assist voters and others.

The FBA noted the need for more training and follow-up for the WSD, but felt that the bigger picture issues of JOC functionality needed to be resolved first in this election for any training to be effective. The issue of funding was also raised by the Somalis interviewed, with some WSDs reporting having no money for staff, some of which were not police, or money allocated for operations, such as to establish a hotline. Some regions apparently had hotlines already although most of the ones mentioned in interviews seemed to be managed by CSO run women’s situation rooms. There did seem to be communications between some of the WSD and the women’s situation rooms if existing. The project noted that the WSDs should have had access to one of the project-provided sim cards.

Awareness levels on both the JOCs and the WSD seemed low (Tables 8 and 11). There was no difference visible between the answers of the male and female respondents. None of the candidates/delegates reached with the questionnaire were aware of the WSD- male or female. When asked about this, one of the WSD members replied: “All know we have WSD, elders to candidates. We advocate and are visible.” One of the domestic observer groups said they were aware of the JOCs and could name its locations in their state, as well as the WSD, but described the WSD work in terms of the polling station, checking in women delegates, candidates, observers and the media and showing them where to sit. When asked if they were useful the answer was no,

65 According to interviews

**Box 12: Perceptions of WSD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The WSD is one of the key mechanisms to ensure women get their quota and avoid violence.</td>
<td>FMS WSD Staff Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s a wonderful programme. Before men would not bring women to vote.</td>
<td>FMS Police Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The WSD’s main problem was the lack of communications. People too busy to go visit there. Too complicated.</td>
<td>FMS JOC Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The WSD officers are led by a female captain. They provide support to women candidates if they need advice. Now working perfectly and they are doing a good job.</td>
<td>FMS Police Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The WSD shows women have equal rights with men.</td>
<td>FMS JOC Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The WSD was trained but had no money. Our JOC team is 40% women.</td>
<td>FMS JOC Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As an observer, I didn’t learn anything about the Women’s Desk at all.</td>
<td>Domestic Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The women’s JOC was operational; however it came across a lot of resistance from very unreceptive delegates and committee members.</td>
<td>SEIT Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
according to their observers they were “used at anyone’s command.” As with the rest of the JOC operations, linkages with UNSOM field offices were limited. Most IESG and UNSOM field officers had a general idea of what they were, but not the specifics, including the UNSOM gender advisor interviewed.

According to the FBA their goal was to move the discussion forward on gender in the security sector and violence against women, and saw this as a short term effort towards long term capacity building. They hope this will provide a foundation for the planning process for the 2026 elections. This goal seems to have been accomplished. As noted by one WSD staffer, “the WSD did not exist in the last election, and now it does.” The concept of having a desk to deal with VAWE seems to have rooted in many of the JOC locations, with most seeing it as a good experience, and wanting to continue it after the elections within their police forces.

Cross-cutting issues. The most relevant cross cutting issues for this project were the issues of human rights, women’s participation and the prevention of VAWE, and ensuring electoral security extended to the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. The project expected to address these issues as previously noted through the sensitizing training of the JOC members done by the AMISOM Police and their inclusion in the standard operating procedures that AMISOM police shared with the JOCs, as well as through the work done by the WSDs, as discussed in those sections.

The project input into the original National Security Plan draft (2020) resulted in a section on the Protection of Women which looked at the lessons learned from 2016 and the need to strengthen security for women, and the measures that needed to be taken to better protect women in the 2020/2021 elections. This included the need for awareness raising activities (done outside of this project), establishing the WSDs, taking security measures to better protect women delegates and ensuring registration and polling locations were safe for women. The plan also included an entire Annex on Guidance on Security Arrangements for Women. It made no mention of other vulnerable or marginalized groups or persons with disabilities. There was, however, an emphasis on human rights, focusing both on the avoidance of human rights abuses by the security forces as well as having them respect the human rights of the communities they were protecting. The revised version passed by the NESC made almost no mention of these issues, only noting in a one line sentence that the security for women (among other election participants) needed to be ensured.

There were no significant differences in the evaluation responses to the questions about elections security between men and women respondents, the main differences were based on location. Almost all worried about pre-election violence from Al-Shabaab followed by clan-related violence. Many felt safe on election day, again depending on their location. Most felt the tight security

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66 State level domestic observation group response to emailed questions.
67 NESTF, National Election Security Plan 2020, p 6-7
68 Ibid, p 6

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**Box 13: Perceptions on Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biggest Concern</th>
<th>Male Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I was worried about Clan conflicts and Al-Shabaab attacks during the election, but nothing happened.</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I was fearing Al-Shabaab attacks and threats on election participation.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Male SEIT Official</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The biggest physical security concern was before and during the election. We worried about the terrorists attacking election sites or polling centres, and we even feared for ourselves since they were targeting electoral management bodies.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female SEIT Official</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My biggest concern was personal security and I had a lot of fear that there would be an explosion that would do bodily harm.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Male SEIT Official</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security concerns were addressed because the security officials took actions to prevent risk or security problems before the elections started and in the polling places selected.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Female SEIT Official</th>
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<tr>
<td>Not all, especially after the elections when we will have to go back to our homes yet threats have been lodged against members of the committee.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Male SEIT Official</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I faced no threat during the election itself.</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Female Candidate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They should enhance collaboration between the security forces, community and other stakeholders including the candidates and delegates to gain collective responsibility on election security.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Male Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If Concerns Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel that a lot has been done. I had no worries.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Female FEIT Official</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>
arrangements for the polling sites had limited the opportunities for trouble during voting (Box 13).
As noted, there were also no noticeable differences in awareness on the JOCs or WSD between the
men and women respondents. Again the main differences depended on their locations and how
active those JOCs had been.

From the domestic observer reports it seems that there was limited competition for the Upper
House elections, with a large number of the opposing candidates dropping out of the race on
election day. Nevertheless, women received about 26 of the Upper House seats.69 As of 21 February
2022, with 165 House of the People seats elected out of 275, 38 women had been elected, which
was about 23% of those elected. These were short of the 30% quota advocated by the project/IESG
and many others, and which had been adopted by the government as a recommendation, but not as
a legislative requirement.

3.3 Efficiency and project management

This section starts by looking at project implementation and coordination, and continues with the
findings on project management, reporting, and monitoring and evaluation.

3.3.1. Project implementation

The project had an immediate start up as the IESG was already working with the NIEC on issues of
election security and attending the preparatory meetings the NIEC chaired with the police and
others. UNDP was able to quickly recruit the Elections Security Advisor and National Officer who
were working on other Somali security sector programmes. This was efficient as they already knew
the situation in country, had existing relationships in the security sector and did not need time to get
up to speed. The Advisor had also worked on election security in the 2016-2017 electoral process
and was able to effectively use that experience in the project design and during implementation
which was especially valuable with the challenges facing this project.

The project concept was straightforward; support the establishment and functioning of the national
election security planning and coordination body and the JOC structure, equip them and facilitate
JOC staff participation in AMISOM-delivered training on their roles and responsibilities. This should
have made it easy to implement. However, implementation was not straightforward or easy for all
of the factors noted throughout the evaluation report. The project was in standby planning and
preparation mode for much of its life due to the time it took the FGS/FMS to reach a political
agreement that actually resulted in the holding of indirect elections. That final agreement was only
reached two months before the end of this 21-month project, requiring a six month no-cost time
extension.

The project used that time to provide advisory services to the NESTF Secretariat and on the national
security plan, establish the equipment lists, obtain the JOC staff lists and locations, procure and
distribute the equipment, plan trainings with the AMISOM Police, gain the participation of the FBA
and develop the WSD concept. But political delays and issues still dogged project implementation
after the May 2021 agreement with, for example, the SPF approval for the intelligence security
training that was received in the last months of the project.

UNDP implemented the programme with a direct implementation modality and situated it as noted
within the IESG. The project’s broad objective but narrow activity focus required the contribution of
other assistance providers to achieve its intended goals. The PBF project provided a framework for
these other efforts and gave them focus and a larger purpose. The Adviser/IESG successfully
integrated these different assistance streams into a coordinated package of support that increased
the efficiencies and effectiveness of each. However, the implementation aspects for how the

69 Nala Ogaada, Preliminary Statement, Observations on Somalia’s Indirect Elections, December 9, 2021
different outputs and ultimate goal of the project would be achieved were limited to a one paragraph summary of the project in the project document, with the details left for the annual workplans. These workplans were also general in nature. More specific activity implementation plans were developed, such as for the deployment of the equipment, as the project progressed. These were more detailed and included tasks for AMISOM Police, FBA and at times UNPOL in addition to the NESTF/NESC and FGS/FMS police forces/JOCs.

These relationships and the implementation aspects between the project/IESG, AMISOM Police and the FBA in support of the election security effort were not otherwise formalized and were based largely on mutual understanding and coordination at the Mogadishu level through the NESTF Secretariat when it was operational, and the JESWG when not. The principals worked well together, planned the activities together, and were mutually supportive. The roles and implementation aspects however were not as clear to new persons or replacements, or to the field officers who were called on at times for logistical support or asked to find out the status of the JOCs. They found the different strings harder to follow and pick up and said they learned through participating in the work and seeing how it operated.

Making the programmatic relationships and responsibilities more explicit in the future would strengthen programme implementation and coherence. This aspect was noted in the project’s mid-2021 analysis on how to operationalize the JOCs which discussed the need for a rapid assessment to determine their current status which could be “undertaken by AMISOM and UN police advisors as part of an agreed assessment process. IESG has requested this before but this now needs to be formalized into a process with a deadline.” Ensuring all the holes were filled and followed up on in these types of partnerships could be done in the future through the use of joint project documents, an exchange of letters and/or developing a shared, more detailed, annual workplan.

As discussed, the change to the NESC upended the planned implementation and monitoring role that the NESTF Secretariat was expected to perform, and required the project to work more directly with the FMS/BRA to operationalize and follow up on the JOCs. The PBF project was not staffed for this task, but being embedded within the larger UNDP/UNSOM IESG structure provided it with a larger work force to assist with the effort both at the headquarters and field levels.

The project effectively leveraged IESG support at the national level, but made more limited use of its field staff. This was intentional according to the project. They felt the IESG field officers’ main role was to support elections administration and expected that they would be fully occupied with the electoral management body during the election. They also stated that they were not security experts.

Following up security preparations and operations is definitely the purview of security professionals which the project expected the AMISOM and UN Police Advisers would do. However, actual mentoring appeared minimal in most places.\textsuperscript{70} The PBF National Office and the UK IESG officer undertook some field visits, but this was limited due to their workload and security and covid

\textsuperscript{70} According to evaluation interviews and some project notes.
restrictions. At the same time, the IESG had a nationwide system of field officers that could have been used more systematically to strengthen project implementation and coordination at the field level; to follow up with AMISOM and UNPOL on the mentoring of the JOCs, on the installation of the equipment and to identify issues that needed attention.

Most of the IESG field officers interviewed felt they could have been more effectively used if they had been more integrated into the overall effort from the start. Although they participated in weekly briefings which the headquarters felt were comprehensive, the field officers felt this was mostly on logistics. They found their intermittent use confusing and most said they were unsure of their role. They stated they had been actively engaged in the security efforts at state levels through their work with the local NIEC office and its engagement with the security forces in their areas. Once the NIEC was replaced by SEITs, the dynamics changed and they were unsure then who their counterparts were for the security issues since it took some time for the SEITs to form and function. This uncertainty was also noted by some of the UNPOL advisors.71

The project acknowledges their initial ad hoc use and the confusion caused it said when UNSOS sent a shipment out a few times without informing the project – which it said it rectified. However, a lessons learned done up by one of the field offices will be useful for the design and implementation of future efforts.72

UNDP’s use of existing LOAs with the OPM and NIEC to make the logistical arrangements for project-funded meetings (OPM), and to facilitate travel arrangements for training (NIEC) was efficient. Both institutions knew UNDP administrative and financial requirements and the NIEC was willing to assist in this task which facilitated project efforts. The use of LOAs is UNDP Somalia’s regular practice due to the difficulty of UNDP implementing some activities directly in the restricted security context. In this case, USD 30,000 was added to the NIEC LOA and USD 80,000 to the OPM LOA to cover these costs (Table 13). Both institutions had been audited previously by independent auditing firms and were found to be generally satisfactory.

Procurement. UNDP purchased the equipment directly. The office equipment, computers and supplies were purchased locally, and the radio system internationally through a long term agreement with Motorola. The procurement process was marked by lengthy processing times that were well documented by the project as well as by external delays caused by Covid, custom clearances and other factors beyond project control. Local vendors also had difficulties delivering some items such as generators that they had to source from overseas all of which contributed to the delays. As an example, it took 66 days to complete the UNDP procurement process for the office supplies and ICT for the NESTF Secretariat and 46 days for it to be delivered by the vendor. This caused issues for the project and IESG with the NESTF Secretariat which was waiting for the

71 One noted, “we need to be clearer on who is doing what, there is much confusion here. Nobody knows what their roles are.”

72 IESG Field Office Jowhar, JOC Materials Delivery process, Lessons Learned and Best Practices Observed from Phase 1, 22 March 2021. This noted the need to strengthen vertical communications from headquarters to the field and horizontally within the different actors at field level. The solution listed was for the IESG to inform the field offices when shipments were being dispatched, and for them to regularly check with MOVCON on the progress of the shipments; the need to keep the teams on the ground informed (including UNPOL and AMISOM Police); and to confirm the availability of the JOC Focal Point to receive the material, and be present at the airfield wherever possible to ensure the necessary forms were completed and pictures taken for the record.
equipment according to project reporting. The procurement process for the JOC generators took 68 days and 66 days for it to be delivered by the vendor.

Some of the delays were attributed as well to undefined specifications (office furniture, software) which slowed the purchase order process. Delivering the materials within country was also time consuming. The NESTF had difficulty communicating with the JOC Focal Points on the delivery dates. Cargo had to wait on the availability on UNSOS air transport, with some of the consignments to hard to reach areas (Galkayo, Bossaso, Garbahaarey, Dhuusarmaareb) off loaded at regional hubs for onward transport by helicopter. Another factor for Puntland was that material being transported there required customs clearances which took time.

The project developed an equipment roll out plan that sent the equipment out in two phases which was endorsed and jointly managed by the NESTF Secretariat. The project saw this plan as an important tool to manage the deliveries as it ensured NESTF engagement by laying out its obligations and timelines to help ensure timely delivery to the JOCs.

The use of UNSOS air transport was free on a space-available basis which was cost effective for the project but required advanced planning and contingency planning. Transport was not always immediately available, and on a few occasions cargo was dispatched without prior notice. In these cases, or when the JOC focal point was not available, the IESG Field Officers were requested to pick up the equipment and arrange for its storage and/or delivery to the JOC.

The SPF Communications Department arranged for the installation of the Motorola radios with the initial support from BCE for training and configuration. The BCE trainers were able to configure the radio equipment during their quarantine upon arrival and trained SPF communication engineers on the job while installing the first few radio sets. The SPF then deployed and installed the radios in all of the sites but Kismayo as noted. There were no major implementation issues raised except for delays in receipt of the radios from the manufacturer in Europe and the time it took to get the export permit from the U.S. for the vocality box.

Despite the problems, the project was still able to procure and distribute the equipment before the indirect elections started, but only because of the extent of the political delays in setting the elections dates. Had the dates been set earlier though it is likely that UNDP would have expedited election specific procurements given the importance of its assistance and those events.

**Coordination.** The UN mandate includes a coordination role for the IESG for international electoral support to Somalia. The project participated in the regular IESG election assistance coordination meetings and meetings with donors, and provided updates on the project and elections security situation. Coordination for the implementation aspects of the project was done through the weekly meeting of the Joint Electoral Security Working Group. This group had been established before the start of this project to coordinate assistance elements, and was merged into the work of the NESTF once its Secretariat became active to ensure a Somali led process and ownership. It was restarted after it became clear to the JESWG members that the NESG was not picking up the more active coordination role played by the NESTF, and wanting to ensure that the UN could deliver on its pledges of support for elections security. The JESWG meetings continued throughout the PBF project, led by the PBF/IESG Elections Security Advisor. It included representatives from the PBF/IESG, UNSOS, AMISOM Police, UNPOL, the UN Joint Police Programme (UNDP) and the FBA.

One of the key foci of the JESWG was the delivery of the equipment and training to the police for elections security to ensure efforts were coordinated and to avoid gaps or duplication. This mechanism ensured there was good coordination of international support for the JOC establishment at the strategic planning and implementation level among key partners. This increased the

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73 PBF Project, *Lessons Learned from Procurement and Rollout of Joint Operations Centres’ Equipment*, p 2
74 Ibid, p 3
effectiveness and efficiency of the efforts. This group met regularly and reportedly worked well together which was essential given the interdependence and complementary of the different efforts. Coordination at field levels though needed thought and strengthening.

**Risk Management.** The project identified 10 areas of risk in its Risk Matrix. Four were high risk (Lack of office facilities for JOCs, insufficient women staff, diversion of project resources from planning/coordination and FGS/FMS tensions derailing the process) and six were medium risk (Lack of FGS/FMS support and buy in before start up, lack of staff for JOCs, incompetent JOC staff, uneven results from training/development, misappropriation of resources and lack of AMISOM trainers and mentors). The risk that FGS/FMS tensions resulting in violence that can potentially derail the process did occur and delayed the process for several years, only pulling back from the brink after fighting broke out in the capital in 2021. The project mitigated its impact by leaving the political resolution of the problems through the UN good offices, and followed the UN security rules and guidelines while continuing project preparations by getting the police to allocate space and personnel for the JOCs, procuring and distributing the equipment with the technically-based NESTF Secretariat.

There was buy-in for the project at its start, although initially slow, however, the risk of the political actors taking over electoral security coordination was not identified as a risk and was a key factor that directly and adversely affected project implementation and its results. According to the project, the level of political dysfunction, interference and infighting that occurred in the 2019-2022 electoral process was significantly worse than the experience of 2016-2017, and this level of risk was not anticipated when the project was designed in 2019. However, given the NESTF/NESC experience, this type of risk should be included in future projects with its probability ranked as high as well as its potential impact.

It is notable that the nine out of the 10 risks identified were to be mitigated by other actors than the project or IESG. Most notably the NESTF, FGS/FMS security forces and AMISOM. Only the FGS/FMS tensions derailing the process had a role noted for IESG— to closely monitor security development and develop continuity plans. Although the project noted that its security support was always going to be collaborative with the other actors mandated to support elections security (AMISOM, UNSOS, UNPOL), there are usually a range of actions that a project can undertake itself to mitigate some of the risks to its own project implementation, and these should be included in future risk matrices and programme designs. Even without noting it in the matrix, the project did take several technical measures to avoid or mitigate some of the risks identified. This included waiting to deliver equipment until the police allocated the space and personnel for the JOCs to operate, ensuring IESG Field Officers were present to pick up the material at the airports if the JOC Focal Point was not available to do so, by providing instructions that the communications equipment boxes were not to be opened until installed by the SPF communications personnel, and by closely coordinating with others through the IESG and JESWG.

The risk of uneven results with JOCs, classified as medium risk also occurred. The mitigation was to be done through the NESTF based on early feedback from trainers and police. The feedback mechanisms in these cases needed significant strengthening along with the mentoring as noted, and a fallback mechanism needed to be developed to replace and rectify these issues in the absence of a more active NESC secretariat.

**3.3.2. Project management**

Management of the project was done by the two full-time PBF staff with the part-time help of the IESG Deputy Electoral Advisor, the IESG Project Manager, the IESG M&E/Operations expert, IESG logistic experts, the IESG procurement officer, and the UNSOM Movement Control staff. Although

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75 Project Document, pps 12-13
some of this time was budgeted for in the project document and workplans, they were primarily covered by other IESG funding. Most management costs, including the cost for the two full-time staff were covered in the project budget as Activity 1.2 under Output 1 (NESTF) labelled “Staff and resource the UN IESG Electoral Security Team within IESG to manage this project.” As noted, for the purposes of this evaluation report, those costs were pulled out from Output 1 in the budget charts and labelled separately as “TA” costs.

The project budget did not seem to change significantly throughout the project as reflected in the almost unchanged budget used in the project’s no-cost amendment signed in September 2021. This is despite the change to the indirect process and the reduction in number of RJOCs anticipated to be assisted from 15 to 6 and the change in equipment from 17 vehicles to the tactical radios.76

The original budget for project management and staffing, including staff premises and medical, and other direct costs such as security support, M&E and oversight, office support, and common services was USD 1,290,753. This was broken out in the financial reporting to PBF with actual expenditures as of 15 November 2021 for staffing and resourcing IESG at USD 858,406, and indirect support costs at USD 72,241. (Table 14).

Almost 20% of programme costs (USD 485,997) were allocated towards gender equality and women’s empowerment.77 This seems logical considering the increased security concerns around women in the elections, and in particular the female delegates and candidates who were also targets of Al-Shabaab. The project also expended resources to help create the WSD within the JOC system and facilitate the FBA training specifically focused on addressing VAWE and helping to empower women’s political participation through strengthened police attention and response to incidents. The JOC training elements facilitated also included sections on how security forces treat citizens, and women during the electoral period, on VAWE, and on equal political rights and women’s political participation.

The project was well integrated into the IESG, and the IESG itself was a well-integrated team programmatically as well as technically, and considered as one of the best UN integration models for electoral assistance according to its 2021 evaluation.78 The PBF and IESG team worked seamlessly on the project-funded efforts and seemed well organized, knowledgeable, and experienced in supporting post-conflict elections and its security. They had a good working relationship with the international and Somali partners. They tailored the timing for their work to the evolving electoral calendar and the UN’s response to those events, and to the changes in national election security coordination bodies and contacts.

UNDP undertook due diligence for the implementation of this project. The provision of the equipment was dependent on the allocation of space for each JOC by the respective police forces and the names for all 20 staff that would work in the centre. This requirement was met before the equipment was dispatched. Signed receipts of delivery were required for all shipments and are in the project files. Expenses claimed against the LOA were checked against the meeting and travel schedule of the NESTF/NESC and participants.

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76 According to the project’s 20 February 2020 Note to the File the cost for the planned 17 vehicles was roughly the same costs as the tactical radio system.

77 UNDP, PBF Financial Report December 2019 – November 2021

UNDP transferred the title to each JOC before transport and it took precautions to ensure the equipment would not be pilfered before the JOCs were operational so that it could be used as intended. It dispatched the radios with instructions for them not to be unpacked until they were installed in the JOC by the SPF communications engineers. In addition, the NESTF was expected to do periodic inspections of the JOCs to ensure the staff and equipment were there according to the plans.  

The project documented all of its activities in meeting notes, notes to the file and email exchanges. These are still available, left by the former Advisor as electronic files with the IESG. It was difficult at times to find specific bits of information due to the sheer volume of information, however, the former Advisor also left an Elections Security Brief for the Evaluation which provided an overview of the project, its implementation, and its outputs as of November 2021 which was extremely useful. The IESG is also developing a shared filing system which previously had separate systems for UNDP and UNSOM hires. Once that system is established with shared folders and common filing systems, this should help facilitate document searches.

The project used the existing Project Board from the UN Joint Electoral Support Programme, which funded much of the IESG work and managed the international electoral basket fund, as its board mechanism by adding representatives from the PBF and MOIS as Board Members. Those board meetings were held regularly and increased in frequency as the electoral calendar progressed. The Board meeting minutes show that the Board was supportive of adding the WSD to the JOC support, and that the MOIS representative raised the issue of financial support for electoral security in them, which the IESG responded were not included in the electoral basket fund for the indirect elections. It also noted that the donors saw the importance of election security but expected its “budget to be covered by existing programs/resources (e.g. PBF support to the Secretariat and JOCs).”

Project branding of PBF-funded materials and activities seemed appropriate, and included the PBF logo. The NESTF/NESC received national attention

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79 Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, JOC Equipment Rollout Plan, March 2021
80 IESG, Minutes Project Board Meeting, Electoral Support Project, 16 December 2019, p 3
due to its nature and membership, however, the visibility of the JOC-level efforts outside of those immediately concerned was low as noted. The IESG did included coverage of the project’s trainings, equipment delivery, etc. in its IESG newsletters (Box 15) which was widely distributed to the donors and Somali partners, as well as posted on the UN’s Twitter and other social media accounts (Box 16). The security assistance activities were also regularly covered in the UN Secretary General Reports on the Situation in Somalia. AMISOM press releases on the AMISOM Police JOC trainings seemed well covered by the African press.81

3.3.3. Project reporting

Project reporting followed the standard requirements for PBF reporting, and was done on a semi-annual basis. It covered the project activities, highlighted key achievements, and updated the project results framework with the progress made for each of its four main outputs and their activity areas. It also includes short sections covering other PBF required reporting areas, such as gender equality and women’s empowerment, and cross cutting issues such as monitoring and evaluation. Financial reports were provided with the progress reports with expenditures listed by the outputs and activity areas used in the workplans. The reports are not dated but it appears they were done in a timely manner.

The reports also provide an overview of the political/electoral developments during the reporting period and a good analysis of the constraints facing the implementation of the project and the holding of the elections. This was essential to understand project progress and challenges. The 2021 semi-annual report provides a table of on the status of the equipment delivery to each JOC. This provided a useful visual snapshot for the situation at the time. The table was not updated or reused for the 2021 annual report which would have been helpful as that could have shown the progress made in a glance since the last report. The project did keep a power point slide on the status of the JOCs which included the training, equipment and operating status. Replicating that in the reporting for any future efforts would provide a useful visual summary and updates for the progress reports.

3.3.4. Monitoring and evaluation

The project kept records for all of its activities, documenting meetings attended with meeting notes or in email recaps to others with the information. It kept track of the efforts at national level to develop the elections security task forces, their secretariats, and the national elections security plan. It documented this status in various reports, briefing materials and talking points for project/IESG and UNSOM use at the programmatic and policy levels.

It monitored the allocation of space and personnel for the JOCs through the NESTF Secretariat and closely tracked the deployment of the project funded equipment to the JOCs, requiring signed receipts for their delivery. It asked the UN and AMISOM Police to check on their status when visiting the areas as well as the IESG field officers to collect data from the JOC focal points.

The National Officer and seconded UK Advisor to the IESG made several visits to accessible areas to monitor their establishment. However, in person monitoring was severely constrained by the security context and Covid restrictions. The project relied on the NESTF, AMISOM Police and UNPOL for most of the monitoring but received no definite reports on this. Verbal information provided by the police or JOC focal points was often sketchy and unreliable in some cases making its actual status uncertain in some cases. Monitoring and data collection issues could have been alleviated to some extent had the NJOC functioned as intended, and collected, aggregated, analyzed and followed up

81 For example, “AMISOM trains South West State police security elections,” 9 October 2021, Horn Observer, and “African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intensifies training of Somali Police in elections security,” 18 August 2021 on training in HirShabelle, Business Insider Africa
on the regular incident reporting that was expected from all JOCs, as well as that expected by the NESC Secretariat. It is also likely there would have been much closer monitoring had the NIEC still been responsible for election administration as it had already been coordinating on elections security with the police at national and field levels with IESG support before it was replaced by the temporary bodies that did not have that experience or relationships.

In this context, a more systematic use of the UNSOM field offices, and IESG field officers for data collection could have strengthened the M&E aspects. A draft JOC Operational Check List and Guide for IESG Field Office visits to JOCs was developed but did not appear to have been used. The purpose stated in the draft was to serve as a broad guide and talking points for the Field Offices when engaging the JOCs. This could have formed the basis for a regular monitoring and mentoring programme for the JOCs by AMISOM/UN Police to advise on their set up and functioning, and for their field office collection of data had it been used as such. It was well thought out and listed the roles of the different desks, the equipment that should be there, asks if there is a routine to provide situational reports, the type of planning being done and if there’s liaison staff from other agencies.

UNDP used its Third Party Monitoring (TPM) to verify the status of the JOC equipment, training and functioning. This was done in October 2021 and covered the period January - June 2021. The TPM provided a useful check on the project and validated the work it had done up to that point. It confirmed the receipt of the office equipment and furniture in all of the JOCs, and the Motorola radio training provided during the period monitored. It also verified that all JOC staff had been appointed, that they met the 30% threshold for women members and reported that no JOCs during their timeframe were operating. The reasons given to them by the Somalis interviewed were “pending issues such as drafting their terms of reference and setting the remuneration package.” It also noted the “weak or lack of coordination between Puntland and Jubaland JOCs which was

Box 17: Lessons Learned

- Don’t underestimate the impact of unresolved political and state building issues, including the division of power between federal and state police, on the security sector institutions and on the provision and coordination of electoral security.
- Need for systematic follow up for newly established entities to ensure understanding and proper functioning, and for the timely identification and addressing of issues that affect their operationalization and performance.
- Start the transition to the post-project phase as envisioned in the project document well before the end of the project to ensure the continued functioning and development of any new entities developed by a project.
- Resolve known systemic issues, such as allowance demands, in the project design discussions with counterparts and include that resolution in the project document. Ensure wide dissemination of that information among Somali partners at all levels to deter and minimize groundless expectations.
- Make the best use of UN field resources in the delivery of nationwide activities such as this, for programmatic and logistic support as well as for M&E. Assign a locally-based mentor for each JOC at the end of training for follow-up and hands-on support.
- List the government’s contribution to the project in the project document, whether in kind or financial, to promote and maintain national ownership in project efforts, especially at national level if the project is intended to be coordinated and managed by a national body.
- Ensure coordination, information sharing and partnerships are balanced and strong at all levels, vertically as well as horizontally, which is especially needed in a context of chronic insecurity, instability and uncertainty over the electoral process.
- Fast track procurement for election-related materials and start these processes well in advance of the elections.
attributed to the political stalemate between political actors." The project took note of these findings but felt the main issues were political, and reported that Puntland had resolved the issue with Jubaland and went on to have functional JOCs.

AMISOM Police produced training reports for each of their trainings. These provided a summary of the training, the names and gender of the participants, and the trainer’s view of its effectiveness. Data did not appear to have been collected that could help measure the effectiveness of the training in terms of increased skills or knowledge. As the JOC concept was new in terms of a police-managed joint operations centre, the anticipated baseline level was likely quite low and would have varied considerably between the different JOC trainees. Any follow-up trainings anticipated in the future should include short pre- and post-tests to give an indication as to their level of understanding of the information covered, and to measure any increase in knowledge.

The project did undertake several lessons learned during the process which were well documented. The lessons on procurement and the roll out of the equipment were thorough and provide practical recommendations and actions that will be useful for any equipment purchased and deployed for election support in the future.

The project developed an M&E framework in the project document that it used consistently in its reporting and monitoring during project implementation. It was based on the project’s efforts to establish and support the NESTF/NESC and JOCs with the target of functioning institutions, with a baseline of no JOCs, and no secretariat. The indicators were primarily activity output based and focused on the number of staff appointed and trained, and percentage of equipment delivered. These measure the achievement of project activities, but by themselves do not indicate the results of those activities; what the JOCs did with that equipment or training, and how that improved electoral security coordination and safety.

The outcome level target was a functional Secretariat with 100% staffed with indicators of annual workplans and budgets, trained staff, and meeting agendas and minutes. These would measure the achievement of Output 1.1 Functional Secretariat supporting NESTF in place and operational but give no indication of whether the project achieved its intended outcome of the delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020-2021. As the focus of this project was on “safe” elections, with the safety then contributing to more inclusive and credible processes, more meaningful indicators would measure the increased level of security sector coordination and electoral safety that resulted from the project’s assistance.

Future M&E plans could be strengthened with the addition of some performance based indicators in addition to the activity outputs that could demonstrate the level of functioning and the results of the project’s efforts on the election security environment, participation in the process and improved coordination among security elements. It could also measure the reduction in violence against women in elections or increase in reporting of incidents on VAWE. These indicators would also need definitions, such as what ‘functioning’ entailed and how that would be measured.

As the AMISOM Police, UNPOL, the FBA and PBF/IESG all contributed to the development and ultimate functioning of the JOCs, thought should be given for future efforts to developing a shared results framework for these types of joint efforts. This would provide a common frame of reference and programmatic focus among the different partners and could help capture the actual changes resulting from the combined assistance, as well as helping to ensure that some elements, such as mentoring and follow-up, do not fall through the cracks.

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82 Research Care Africa, Third Party Monitoring Report of Security Programme, p 26
3.4 Sustainability

This section looks at the sustainability prospects for the election security outputs achieved by the project.

The project design expected the JOCs and coordination systems developed with project support to be maintained within the national and state police offices where the JOCs were established, and within the MOIS for the NESTF. This assumed a functional NESTF/NESC and NJOC throughout the project and functioning JOCs at state and regional levels by the end of the project. Given the political disruptions and reduced national level participation in the JOC effort, and the limited functioning of many JOCs, sustainability is a concern without continued assistance and mentoring. This is an issue that the former PBF-funded security advisor was contracted by UNSOM to address. During the evaluation he was exploring its possible integration into the UN’s Joint Police Programme that is supporting the new FGS/FMS policing model.

The more recently appointed NESC Advisor was cognizant of the value of the regular reporting that a functional national system could provide. He expressed the government’s intention to continue with the development of the JOCs, with donor support, so that they would be ready for the 2026 elections which they expect (at this point) to be universal suffrage. This is something that UNPOL and the IESG should explore now to capitalize on the current FGS interest. However, once the JOC assistance is taken over by the Joint Police Programme or other entity, they should work with UNPOL and the OPM on these issues to ensure that their programme can support these efforts, with IESG kept informed through the JESWG.

At the current time, the JOCs that are the most likely to continue are those within the more well established police forces, such as Puntland’s and which were more functional during the election period. Puntland has already used the JOCs in its three pilot direct district elections and the police indicated their intention to continue their use and to expand the JOC system to other police stations within the state for the rest of the district elections and beyond. Kismayo also discussed keeping theirs appreciating the joint operations aspects, while Dhusarmareb stated they will have state

Box 18: Best Practices

- Using the issue of elections security as an issue that FGS and FMS can work on together at the technical level to solve important issues that they are responsible for, even if it’s just for planning.
- Keeping the coordination of the technical efforts for election security at technical levels, especially in a polarized and highly politicized environment, which encouraged police participation and ownership despite the political tensions.
- Building strong partnerships and coordinated efforts at the strategic planning level to help ensure activities are implemented despite the highly challenging political, security, logistical and health context.
- Integrating a smaller component into the efforts of the main UN entity responsible for elections support effectively provides a larger framework of support for the implementation of the assistance at programmatic and policy levels, while still maintaining the donor identity and objectives for the work.
- Serving as a catalyst for other efforts by providing a common focus, objective and structure for different streams of assistance which increased the effectiveness and results of all.
- Building a project on the lessons learned of the previous ones.
- Dedicated a desk within a joint operations centre for VAWE and staffing it with a male and female officers, providing them with specialized training for their work and connecting them to relevant local authorities/institutions and CSOs.
- Empowering project participants by providing them with the means to accomplish their work. In this case, it was the equipment and knowledge gained from training that was perceived by the police as empowering.
elections in a year and asked about continuing support so they can maintain their gains until then.

The use of a WSD appeared to be more fully rooted and is likely to be integrated into some of the police stations' existing gender desks even if they do not continue with a JOC structure. In Puntland, the police expect to train 100 women on WSD to empower them and to put one in every police station in the state. It stated that it already had the budget for this and “we are law enforcement officers. We can’t allow discrimination. We have to protect everyone’s rights.” The FBA is planning to help in this process for nine districts for their 2022 regional/local elections, providing a two-day workshop with UNPOL in May 2022 and a network dialogue with relevant stakeholders. The other JOCs were not that advanced in their thinking or planning in the interviews.

Project-funded equipment appeared to be safeguarded in the police stations, most in the rooms designated as JOCs. Not all of the equipment appeared to have been used and maintenance is likely to be an issue in the future, as the computer and radio equipment will need periodic maintenance and updating of software. Not all of the police departments were sure about the future for the JOCs and reiterating the project’s vision for the long-term use of the JOCs would be useful for some of them. For instance, the police in Dhusarmareb asked for guidance on the disposition of the equipment now that the elections were over. They want to hand it over to their criminal investigation department although they also mentioned wanting to keep the JOC until their state elections next year. Even though UNDP gave the title to each JOC for the equipment, it would still be helpful now at the end of the project for UNPOL and IESG to work with the NESC Focal Point to provide an update to all the JOCs on the situation - informing them that the project has ended, what is expected now of the JOCs, and who they should contact now for support and information.

The IESG has asked the SPF that the Tactical Communications Working Group, which the PBF Security Advisor facilitated with Motorola and the SPF Communications Department, to now be chaired by the Director of the SPF Communications Department. They also suggested that representatives from UNPOL and AMISOM Police be invited to join the working group which will deal with warranty issues for the radio hardware and software and remote support to assist with SPF engineer trouble shooting of the equipment in the future.

Capacity built by the project and its partners is likely to remain with the persons who participated in the training. In cases where trainers were trained, they should be able to replicate the trainings in the future. This was notable in Puntland, which intends to use its trainers to train other police stations on the functioning of a JOC and the WSD. The SPF engineers, which were trained by Motorola, are career police staff and that capacity can be expected to remain within their communications department.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

1. Strengthening the security forces ability to ensure safe elections, through coordinated planning, operations and communications, with a gender sensitive and human rights approach, are best practices and highly relevant in a post-conflict state-building environment, where security and the holding of periodic elections and a peaceful transfer of power remain dominant concerns.

2. The importance of the effort was not diminished by the adoption of an indirect process. This should have made the concept easier to implement given the reduced number of polling locations. However, it was significantly and adversely affected by the Somali political and electoral dynamics and unresolved issues of federalism. Had the national level operated, or

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83 IESG information
the NIEC remained in charge of election administration, the outcome of the project was likely to have been more substantial.

3. The project filled the niche of police coordination for inner tier security, which was unlikely to have been funded otherwise with donors already committed for other aspects of the elections. It served as a catalyst and a focus for other support to the police for elections security that otherwise would have been disjointed and more generalized. This includes the JOC training and support for VAWE. This strengthened the efforts of each, and significantly strengthened the larger effort. The missing element was a more consistent follow up and mentoring for each JOC to support its establishment and functioning.

4. Although the national system did not materialize and the JOCs are at different levels of functionality from not opened to operating, the project:
   - directly influenced and strengthened the development of the national elections security plan through its support and technical expertise to the NESTF and its Secretariat.
   - introduced the JOC concept for elections security at national, state and regional levels, gained police commissioners’ commitment for the concept through the NESTF, and strengthened the capacity of the police to set up and manage a JOC and its operations through its provision of equipment and facilitation of training. All had staff assigned and equipment set up, with several serving their purpose on election day. This set the precedent for the next election which should make implementation of a JOC system for 2026 easier. This will be especially important if those elections are universal suffrage.
   - established the concept of a woman’s situation desk within a joint operations centre, which even though was likely not fully utilized as intended, provides a foundation that the police and others can build on to address VAWE and other women’s security issues in their regular work.
   - strengthened FGS/FMS police communications for electoral security (and beyond) through the provision of the tactical radio systems and vocality boxes to the JOCs which upgraded and extended their communications range and its security. These tactical radios were used on election days to strengthen electoral security.
   - strengthened the strategic planning, risk assessments and contingency planning done by the IESG (and through them UNSOM/UNDP) for its assistance to electoral security and to the electoral process in general through the provision of timely and useful technical advice on the electoral security context and the measures that needed to be taken in that regard.
   - harmonized international support for the JOC concept through its establishment and management of the JESWG that closely coordinated election specific assistance for the inner-tier (polling locations) security zones.

5. The issue of funding for JOCs, and especially the unmet expectation for allowances, likely affected the implementation of the project. Even if exaggerated, the issue is still festering and needs government resolution to avoid similar problems in the next elections.

6. The project as designed could not have been implemented without being embedded in the larger IESG mechanism which provided the larger electoral assistance and management framework that a two-person project needed, and the partnerships with AMISOM and FBA that provided the complementary elements needed to reach the project’s goals of a functional JOC system and a safer elections environment. However, leaving these relationships at a shared understanding level worked in the tightly coordinated central level,
but left some of the key aspects, such as what mentoring or monitoring entailed, open to interpretation, especially as it moved away from the central levels towards the dispersed JOCs during implementation, affecting project performance at the outcome level.

7. The project M&E framework captured the project’s outputs, but needed strengthening to capture the outcome level results. Monitoring efforts also needed significant strengthening due in part to the absence of the NJOC/NESC in this area, but also in terms of using the M&E data collected programmatically within the JESWG to strengthen the overall efforts given their interdependence.

8. Sustainability of the progress made is an issue without continued support. The seeds were set, but the political issues around the development of a federal police system and implementing the new police model need to be resolved for a national JOC system to become functional and sustainable. In the near term, any sustainability is likely to be within the individual states/JOCs or if follow on assistance is provided by a security support project on a timely basis.

4.2. Recommendations

1. Maintain IESG efforts to find post-project support for the operationalization of the JOCs with the Joint Police Programme or other relevant security sector initiative. That programme should ensure continued support for the state police that want to carry on with their JOCs, such as Puntland and Galmudug, so they can be operational for their state elections. This assistance should continue through the next elections due in 2026 with UNPOL support and guidance.

2. For the next electoral cycle, IESG should focus on the more programmatic elements of elections security, such as elections integrity and strengthening the NIEC for its role in ensuring elections security, and the prevention of violence during the process, including issues of VAWE. IESG should also contribute the inclusive electoral process perspective to the human rights/elections components in security sector personnel trainings for the 2026 process, and provide election-specific expertise for the UN for elections security.

3. IESG should continue its close collaboration with UNPOL for any future elections security support endeavors. UNPOL is an essential actor with its NESC membership, UN Police advisors in the field, membership in the Joint Police Programme and close collaboration with federal/state police forces and AMISOM Police. The UN should provide a part-time UNPOL Advisor for IESG.

4. All UN support for elections security should start well in advance of the 2026 elections so that mechanisms, such as the JOCs or national coordination bodies, it can be well established and operational before voter registration and the start of the electoral campaign and remain active through the announcement of the results and inauguration of the newly elected officials. This is especially important if these elections are to be universal suffrage.

5. IESG and other UN efforts working on these issues in the future should take advantage of the field level coverage provided by the UN field offices and regional security advisers and integrate their support into the design of election security support activities. Include the gender advisors at field level in the efforts involved with addressing VAWE and women’s electoral participation.

6. IESG should develop joint frameworks with partners for jointly-implemented activities including a joint results framework. Produce a fact sheet on the broader partnership with the roles/responsibilities clearly delineated for distribution within each partnership for easy reference, to help avoid confusion at field and home office levels, and to inform other related actors and programmes.
7. IESG and other projects working on these issues should strengthen M&E by requiring regular reporting from FGS-FMS partners (in the PBF project case - the police/NESC) on their activities, and on the use and challenges of the newly created institutions (such as the JOCs). This is especially relevant when the national level is not fulfilling its collection and aggregation role, but it should be a basic part of project implementation, management and monitoring.

8. IESG with the NESC should organize a lessons learned for the experiences of 2020-2022 with the PBF project partners, participants and stakeholders to document the best practices and make recommendations for future efforts in similar post-conflict contexts. Among others:
   - the impact of political dynamics on technical operational planning and communications, and how this can best be addressed;
   - where elections security coordination efforts should be grounded and how authority for the technical establishment of JOCs should be delegated;
   - funding and staffing for the operations of the JOCs and the extent these costs were covered by the Government, and the impact of this if there were gaps;
   - what additional programming should be provided to ensure the development, operation and sustainability aspects for joint centers such as these; and
   - coordination between the different mission and donor programmes (beyond the JESWG) in the security sector for election security support including that provided through IESG for these elections.
## Attachment 1: Results table with end of project status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Indicators</th>
<th>Indicator Baseline</th>
<th>End of project Indicator Target</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings on End of Project Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong> The delivery of safe, inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020/2021</td>
<td>1.1: Annual workplan + budget; Trained staff with TORs; Agendas + minutes of meetings A functioning Secretariat to support the NESTF, supported by a UN project team.</td>
<td>No previous or current Secretariat or project team</td>
<td>Functioning Secretariat with 100% staff (min.30% women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1</strong> Functional Secretariat supporting NESTF in place and operational</td>
<td>1.1.1: # staff appointed + resources as per plan; # issued as per plan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%, (30% women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2: # Training material developed</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>100% material developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2</strong> Establish and Support the NJOC</td>
<td>1.2.1: NJOC is staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function</td>
<td>No experience of a NJOC</td>
<td>A functioning NJOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3</strong> Establish and support the SJOCs (6)</td>
<td>1.3.1: SJOC are staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function</td>
<td>No experience of SJOCs</td>
<td>6 functioning SJOCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.4</strong> Establish and support the RJOCs (5)</td>
<td>1.4.1: RJOC are staffed, trained and resourced enabling it to function</td>
<td>No experience of RJOCs</td>
<td>6 Functioning RJOC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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84 Results table outputs, indicators, baseline and targets are those used in the project’s 2021 Annual Report, pp s 10-12
Annex 1: Documents

AMISOM

AMISOM and Somalia security forces establish Joint Operations Centres across Somalia and start specialized trainings to secure national elections, 7 September 2021

AMISOM and Somalia security forces establish Joint Operations Centres across Somalia and start specialised trainings to secure national elections - AMISOM (amisom-au.org)


Federal Government of Somalia


The Somali Women’s Charter and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Synergies and next steps for implementation, Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, and Somali Women Forging Alliances to Safeguard Equal Rights for All, 2020

Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project

Annual and Semi-Annual Progress Reports 2020 and 2021
Annual Workplans 2020-2022
Briefing memo for Project Evaluator, 18 November 2021
Elections 2020/21 Election, Analysis of National Security Plan and Budget, October 2020
Email clarifications from IESG to the evaluator, 26 March 2020
Email from the PBF Senior Electoral Advisor to Capt. Sadik, 27 July 2020
Email on UN IESG Budget to Support NESTF Secretariat, from PBF Project Advisor to NESTF, Captain Sadik, 27 July 2020
Email on UN IESG Budget to Support NESTF Secretariat, from PBF Project Advisor to NESTF, General Ahmed and Capt. Sadik, 31 March 2020
Financial reports, December 2019 - November 2021
JOC Equipment Rollout Plan, March 2021
Lessons Learned from Procurement and Rollout of Joint Operations Centres’ Equipment, 2021
Lessons/Recommendations, (distribution of equipment), 21 May 2021
M&E Plan, 2021 (Table)
Note to file, Request for a No-Cost Exxtension of the PBF Project, Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections, Undated
Note to File, Request for No-Cost Extension of the PBF Project (Draft). Undated
Note to the file on modalities and adjustments to funded support from the PBF elections security project, 20 February 2020
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Project Document, Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, No Cost Time Extension, September 2021
Project Document, Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project, 2019
Somalia 2020/21 Elections, Analysis of National Security Plan and Budget, 2020
Transfer of Title of Assets from the United Nations Development Programme to the JOCs (one per centre), 2021

Motorola Solutions
Project Report for “Vocality RoIP for the Somalia Elections, 16 December 2021

Nala Ogaada

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Draft Minutes of the National Electoral Security Task Force Meeting held 15-18 March 2020
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NESC

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Horn Observer, AMISOM trains South West State police security elections, 9 October 2021, Horn Observer, AMISOM trains South West State police on securing elections (hornobserver.com)
Horn Observer, Somali Police commanders trained to effectively secure elections, November 26, 2021, Somali Police commanders trained to effectively secure elections (hornobserver.com)

SESTSF

Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index, 2021

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Somalia, Country Fact Sheet | UN Women Data Hub

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Letter dated 19 July from the Permanent Representatives of Ireland, Mexico and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, S/2021/668
Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, May 2021, S/2019/3
Resolution 2461 (March 2019)
Resolution 2592 (2021, S/RES/2592 (2021)
Resolution, 2568 (2021), S/RES/2568, 12 March 2021
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United Nations Electoral Assistance Division
United Nations Electoral Needs Assessment Missions to Somalia, March 2017 and May 2018
UNDP/UNSOM Joint Programme for Support to Universal Suffrage in the Federal Republic of Somalia (IESG)

AMISOM-UN Joint Comments on NESTF Draft Elections Security Plan 2020/21, 26 October 2020
IESG Field Office Jowhar, JOC Materials Delivery Process, Lessons Learned and Best Practices Observed from Phase 1, 22 March 2021
IESG Newsletter, Election security preparedness, Women’s Situation desks Aug-Sept 2021
IESG Newsletters, Election security preparedness, June 2021 - January 2022,
JESWG Meeting Minutes, 2021
Minutes Project Board Meeting, 16 December 2019
PowerPoint on Engagement Platforms for the Indirect Elections, 9 February 2021
Project Board Meeting Minutes, Sample 2020 - 2021
Somalia 2020/21 Elections, Analysis of National Security Plan and Budget, 26 October 2020

UNDP Somalia
Extracts from IRRF – Inclusive Politics
Extracts from ROAR 2019 and 2020 for Outcome 1: Deeping federalism and state-building, supporting conflict resolution and reconciliation, and preparing for universal elections
Joint Police Programme, Project Factsheet - Joint Police Programme (JPP) (undp.org)

UNSOM
Project Proposal, Joint Operations Centre (JOC) Training on Election Security at the Federal and Federal Member State Level, UNPOL on behalf AMISOM 2021
UN Police Somalia, Police | UNSOM (unmissions.org)
UNSOM About, About | UNSOS (unmissions.org)
UNSOM, Elections Security Update PowerPoint, July – September 2021
Twitter, UNSOM (@UNSomalia) / Twitter
Weekly Electoral Update Somalia, 21-27 February 2022

USAID/Somalia
Gender Assessment 2020, Final Report, 2020
Somali Perceptions Survey: Key findings on the emerging Federal States, Mogadishu and Puntland, 2016
Annex 2: Persons interviewed

African Union Mission to Somalia
ACP Tony Placid, AMISOM Police Election Security Advisor and Head of Training
Ibrahim Barrie, AMISOM Police by email

Delegates/Candidates (Questionnaire)
Mohamed Ahmed Hosh, MP Candidate, Galmudug
Abdulkadir Mohamud Haji Abdi, Delegate, Galmudug
Hassan Ali Ahmed, Delegate, Galmudug
Murayad Ali Farah, Delegate, Galmudug
Bashir Abdi Mohamed, Elected MP, Bari Region, Puntland
Abdullahi Farah Mire, Elected MP, Bari Region, Puntland
Nagwo Mohamed Ali, Delegate, Bari Region, Puntland
Fartun Muse Osman, Delegate, Bari Region, Puntland

Domestic Election Observers
Ibrahim Haji, Domestic observation, South West, Human Life Development Initiative, (questionnaire)
Zahra Mohamed Ahmed, Domestic observation, Somali Women Development Centre, Jubaland (questionnaire)

Creative Associates, Inc.
Terence Hoverter, Chief of Party, Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) Project

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
Antonetta Hamandishe, Elections Conflict Monitoring (questionnaire)

European Union
Maria Groeneveld, Governance Programme Manager, EU Delegation to Somalia

FEIT and SEIT Members (Questionnaire)
Mohamed Hassan, Former Chairman, FEIT, Mogadishu
Liban Ahmed Hassan, Head of Logistics and Procurement FIET, Mogadishu
Abdiwali Mohamud Elmi, Administration and Finance, FEIT, Mogadishu
Saido Mohamed Muscid, International Relations FEIT, Mogadishu
Mohamed Qassim, SEIT Galmudug
Ahmed Dini, SEIT HirShabelle
Ahmed Rukke Yusuf, SEIT Jubaland
Cabdi Hiis Udan, Head of Finance FEIT Kismayo
Ahmed Abdi, Member, SEIT Puntland
Caynaanshe Yusuf, Deputy Chair, SEIT Puntland
Farhia Hussein Mohamud, Member, SEIT Puntland
Muse Cabdiqaadir Ducaale, Administration and Finance, SEIT Puntland
Khadar Harrir Hussein, Chairperson, SEIT Somaliland
Abdullahi Abdulmutalib, SEIT South West
Yussuf Abdulkadir Mohamed, SEIT SW

Folke Bernadotte Academy
Magnus Bellander, Project Manager, Somalia
Paulina Schaber, Desk Officer Security Sector Reform Unit, Somalia

Germany
Sasha Kienzle, Deputy Ambassador to Somalia, German Embassy, Nairobi
Integrated Electoral Support Group
Deryck Fritz, IESG Director (UNSOM)
Mary Cummins, IESG Deputy Director (UNDP/UNSOM Joint Programme)
Marc Dickinson, Senior Electoral Officer- Operations (UNSOM)
Eva Bounegru, UNDP/UNSOM Joint Programme Project Manager (2021-2022)
Irfan Mahmood, UNDP/UNSOM Joint Programme Project Manager (2019-2021)
Krizstina Boszo, Field Officer Coordinator, (UNSOM)
Capt. Alex Payne, SO3 Transition, UK Military Adviser to IESG (2021-22)
Capt. Lara Dixon, SO3 Transition, UK Military Adviser to IESG (2022)
Ismail Abdullahi Mohamed, Procurement Officer (UNDP/UNSOM Joint Programme)
Anne Marie Ndihokubwayo, Electoral Officer Jowher (UNSOM)
Arlyn Recla, Electoral Officer Puntland (UNSOM)
Humphrey Shitokubwayo, Electoral Officer Jowher (UNSOM)
Arlyn Recla, Electoral Officer Puntland (UNSOM)

Joint Police Programme
Ibrahim Mohamed, Team Leader, Joint Police Programme, UNDP

National Independent Electoral Commission
Zuheira Abdiwahab, Director of Administration and Finance
Mohamed Abdiarim Keylie, Finance Manager

NESTF and NESC Members
Liban Hussein, Advisor to National Police Commissioner
Abdulkadir Hussein Moalim, Electoral Security Advisor, NESC Coordinator, Office of the Prime Minister

Somali Security Sector and JOC Members
Brigadier General Abdikarim, Director Communications, Somali Police Force
Lt. Safia Dalmar, National Focal Point, Women’s Security Desk, Somali Police Force
Major Abdifatah Moalim, JOC Focal Point, Benadir
Abdullahi Isse, Police, JOC Benadir (questionnaire)
Ahmed Ali Hassan, JOC Member, Police Headquarters, Benadir (questionnaire)
Jeelle Xasan Maxamed, Police headquarters, Benadir (questionnaire)
Mohamed Yusuf Mohamed, Armed Forces, Benadir JOC (questionnaire)
Col. Hassan Mohamed Ibrahim “Kaafi,” Deputy Commissioner of HSS-Police, Johwar, JOC Focal Point, Beletweyne, Hirshebelle
Abdishakur Ahmed Mohamed, JOC. Civil society member, Beletweyne, Hirshebelle (questionnaire)
Cabdi Mumin Elmi, Administration Spokesperson, JOC Beletweyne, Hirshebelle (questionnaire)
Kaaho Abdule Mumin, Gender Officer, Beletweyne, Hirshebelle (questionnaire)
Sharmarke Axmad Peakooy, Police Officer, Beletweyne, Hirshebelle (questionnaire)
Mohamed Ali, Adviser to Police Commissioner, Galmudug
Asad Dfiomm Bediriye, JOC Member Galkayo, Galmudug (questionnaire)
Idiris Abdikarim Nur, JOC Member, National Intelligence and Security Agency, Galkayo, Galmudug (questionnaire)
General Mohaed Abdi Sheikh, Police Commissioner Jubaland
Abdishukri Ahmed, Police Officer, Gabaharey, Jubaland (questionnaire)
Lt. Col. Abdulkadir Omar Bihi, Gabaharey First Region Police Commissioner
Mohamed Jama Gaiye, Gabaharey City Police Commissioner
Mohamed Hussein Kusow, District Administration, Garbaharey, Jubaland (questionnaire)
Caamir Cabd Santur, JOC Focal Point, Kismayo, Jubaland  
Col. Ahmed Abdi Sugulle, Assistant Police Commissioner, Puntland State Police  
Col. Mohamed Abdi Ahmed, Head of Training and Planning, Puntland State Police  
Asiyo Mohamed, Puntland Ministry of Security, Gender Advisor, Member WSDs Garowe and Bossaso JOCs, Puntland  
Lulu Nor, Director General Puntland Ministry of Women and Human Rights, Member WSDs Garowe and Bossaso JOCs, Puntland  
Ayan Nuur Muse, JOC Staff Member, Bosaso, Puntland (questionnaire)  
Basma Omar, Secretary, Bosaso JOC, Puntland (questionnaire)  
Mohamed Abdirizak Omar, Major, Police, JOC Bosaso Puntland (questionnaire)  
Muna Abdullahi Maxmud, JOC Staff Member, Bosaso, Puntland (questionnaire)  
Fortune Hamad, Puntland State Police, Officer, Member JOC, WSD, Garowe, Puntland  
Fadumo Gawoo Cusman, Police JOC Baraawe, South West (questionnaire)  
Ibrahim Adan Ali, JOC Member, Police Officer/CID, Baraawe, South West (questionnaire)  
Yahye Hajji Mohamed, JOC Member, Police Officer, Baraawe, South West (questionnaire)  

**Suppliers**
Jean Remillard, Project Manager, Motorola Solutions UK Limited, provision of tactical radios  
Mzuri Mwakidedi, BCE, Kenya. Trainers and installers of Motorola radio systems  

**Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections**
Anthony Howe, Senior Security Advisor  
Ali Dhore, Project Officer  

**Peacebuilding Fund**
Jörg Stahlhut, Peacebuilding Fund Coordinator, Integrated Office of the UN DSRSG/RC/HC for Somalia  
Fadumo Mumin, Monitoring and Evaluation, Peacebuilding Fund  

**UNSOM**
Abdimajid ali Mohamed, Associate Gender Affairs Officer, UNSOM, SWS Regional Office, Baidoa  
Gerard Smith, Senior UN Police Adviser and Officer in Charge, UNSOM Police Section, Member JESWG  
Chief Inspector, Antje Habermann, Police Adviser, Mogadishu/Galmudug, Rule of Law and Securities Group, UNSOM  
Snr. Superintendent Eunice Githure, Police Adviser, Puntland State  
Anne-Karin Maria Davidsson, UNPOL Police Adviser  
Det. Chief Inspector Piia Mustonen, Police Adviser, South West State  
Dep. Superintendent Rabinendra Singh, Police Advisor, HirShabelle State  
Chief Inspector Zeldah Manyanye, Police Adviser, Jubaland State
Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology

1. Introduction
This Evaluation Inception Plan was developed based on the Terms of Reference (TOR) prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) for the independent evaluation of the PBF project Support Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections (referred to hereafter as the “PBF project” or “the project”); UNDP and PBF evaluation policy and guidelines; and an initial review of available project documents and reporting. Comments received from the Evaluation Reference Group (ERC) on the Draft Inception Report were incorporated into this Final Evaluation Inception Report.

1.1. Purpose for the Project Evaluation
The purpose for this project evaluation is to provide UNDP, the PBF, project partners and stakeholders with an independent assessment of the PBF electoral security project, its performance and contribution to its anticipated development results. The PBF project is a 27 month USD 2.5 million project intended to support a safe environment in Somalia for the electoral processes in 2020/2021.

Specifically, this evaluation will:

1. Assess the relevance, coherency, and appropriateness of the PBF project to: the key drivers of conflict and most relevant peacebuilding issues; its alignment with the National Peacebuilding Policy and national priorities of Somalia; and if it used a conflict-sensitive approach. Also to assess the extent it capitalized on the UN and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM’s) added value in country; and the degree it addressed cross cutting issues such as conflict and gender-sensitivity in its approach and activities.

2. Analyze the project’s effectiveness, and the extent of its contribution to reducing conflict factors in Somalia during elections, and whether it helped to advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in particular SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

3. Assess if project support promoted the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), allowed for a specific focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding processes, and if it was accountable to gender equity;

4. Evaluate the efficiency of project implementation, institutional arrangements, use of resources, management structure and operational systems;

5. Document good practices, innovations and lessons learned emerging from the project and provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

1.2 Background and context
The Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project (December 2019 – February 2022) was designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia’s (FGS) National Electoral Security Task Force (NESTF), chaired by the national police commissioner, for election security planning and coordination, and to create, equip and train a nationwide system of Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) located at the national (NJOC), state (SJOC) and regional (RJOC) levels. It was based on the lessons learned from the 2016-2017 electoral process for better command, control and coordination of electoral security.

The project was originally designed when universal suffrage elections were anticipated and expected to be administered by the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC). The project has since been adapted to support the indirect election model that is administered by ad hoc national/state electoral committees as agreed to during tense Somali political negotiations in 2020 and 2021. The
Final Evaluation Report, Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections

political agreement of 27 May 2021 replaced the NESTF by a National Security Committee (NESC) chaired by the Prime Minister.

The overarching goal of the electoral security project was to set up the national, state and regional structure of JOCs with the national level body providing the strategic direction for the JOCs for electoral security and coordinating the efforts of the Somali Security Forces (SSF). The project provided equipment, training and mentoring to establish the JOCs and accomplish its intended outputs (below). These were expected to contribute to the overall outcome of the project which is the delivery of a safe environment for the electoral process in 2020/2021.

The four outputs are:

1. NESTF and IESG supported, with the NESTF Secretariat within the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS) staffed and resourced, as well as the IESG Electoral Security Team which was to manage this project in a way that benefited men and women within the institutions and their stakeholders. (Output 1).

2. NJOC established and supported, Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified NJOC support requirements (staff, resources), NJOC staff trained and mentored which also addressed gender differential issues related to participation, empowerment and protection. (Output 2).

3. SJOC established and supported, Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified their support requirements (staff, resources), trained and mentored SJOC staff with gender differential issues addressed related to participation, empowerment and protection. (Output 3).

4. RJOC established and supported. Development and Capacity Building Plan completed that identified support their requirements (staff, resources) with staff trained and mentored. (Output 4).

The project held a special focus on enhancing the protection of women in elections, which was delivered with the support of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). The project also provided electoral security expertise with the PBF project advisor serving as the Electoral Security Advisor for the UN’s Integrated Electoral Support Group (IESG). The IESG is comprised of staff, volunteers and consultants funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and the PBF and has the mandate for the UN’s electoral assistance to the country.

The project was integrated into the IESG and was executed through a direct implementation modality (DIM) managed by UNDP Somalia, and through a Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). IESG coordinated the PBF-funded activities with the larger electoral security efforts within Somalia, including AMISOM, the UN police (UNPol), and the United Nations Support Office (UNSOS) which provides support to the AMISOM, UNSOM and the SSF efforts for peace and stability in Somalia.85 It also coordinated with the training that was supported by the Joint Police Programme (JPP), implemented by UNDP with UNSOM and the UN Project Office (UNOPS). A feature of the project was the in-kind support provided by Sweden through FBA which provided technical expertise and training to establish a Women’s Situation Desk (WSD) within each JOC.

The PBF project was led by the Senior Elections Security Advisor with the support of a National Officer, and with the support of a seconded United Kingdom (UK) military officer to the IESG. They were responsible for the day-to-day management and decision-making for the project supported by

85 About us, UNSOS, Working for peace in Somalia, About | UNSOS (unmissions.org)
the IESG Project Manager (UNDP), the IESG Deputy Chief Electoral Adviser (UNDP), the IESG Chief Electoral Operations Advisor (UNSOM) and two Senior Gender Advisers (UNDP/UNSOM). Policy level decisions were made by the IESG Project Board comprised of senior representatives from the NIEC, UNSOM, UNDP, IESG, PBF, donors and the MOIS. UNDP has the managerial responsibilities for the project and provides quality assurance.

### 1.3 Scope of the project evaluation

This independent evaluation will:

- Undertake a review of relevant documents, including the project documents and reporting, Board Meeting minutes and training reports, Letters of Agreement, project and project-funded products, and available monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data.

- Undertake discussions with the IESG, UNDP, international/national/subnational project partners and beneficiaries, donors, and others working on the electoral processes and electoral security on the project’s design, implementation, performance, challenges, lessons learned and best practices. This will include verification of the status of the JOCs (equipment, staffing, use and issues).

- Assess the relevance/coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and results of the project along with its theory of change and its validity given the experiences the political dynamics and security situation on the ground.

- Assess the qualitative and quantitative data available on the progress made and results achieved, especially in terms of its contribution to supporting the establishment of the JOCs at national and subnational levels, preventing conflict during elections, and strengthening electoral security.

- Identify the factors that facilitated or hindered the achievement of the project’s strategic outcomes and outputs, and the lessons learned/best practices of the project.

- Validate preliminary evaluation findings through discussion, interviews, and the evaluation debriefing of initial findings.

- Provide a report on the evaluation’s main findings and recommendations that can inform future electoral security assistance programming.

The evaluation will cover the project from its start in December 2019 to its completion in February 2022.

### 2. Methodology

#### 2.1 Evaluation criteria and questions

With the evaluations scope detailed in Section 1.3 in mind, the evaluator will seek to answer the following questions in addition to the questions provided in the TOR on relevance/coherency, efficiency effectiveness, sustainability and ownership, gender equality and risk tolerance, innovation and disability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Main Questions</th>
<th>Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Data Sources &amp; Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Functional Secretariat supporting ESIG and NESTF/NESC in place and operational | • Was a functional Secretariat established for the IESG? Who staffed it? What was its main role and how effective was it?  
• Was a functional Secretariat established for the NESTF and NESC? Who staffed it? What were their main roles and how effective were they?  
• What were the factors that affected the functioning of the Secretariats? Were these adequately factored into the project design and addressed during implementation? Why or why not?  
• How did Covid 19 and the enduring political disputes affect the establishment and functioning of the Secretariats and NESTF/NESC, and the support provided by the PBF project?  
• What was the level of national ownership for the NESTF/NESC Secretariat? | • How strategic was the PBF support to the electoral security needs of the IESG, NESTF and NESC?  
• What was the quality of the technical, commodity and logistical support provided by the PBF project to the Secretariats? Was it timely? Were there issues or lessons learned?  
• Were Secretariat staff trained? By whom and on what? Are they still with the Secretariats? Was there a gender balance in training among participants and trainers?  
• How sustainable is the institutional capacity built within the NESTF/NESC Secretariats?  
• How often did the NESTF/NESC meet? Were there issues about meeting? Why? | • Key informant interviews of NESTF/NESC staff/members, JOCS, PBF/IESG/UNDP/UNSOM/UNPOL/JESWG staff, other relevant UN agencies, programmes and projects, donors, police officers, candidates/polling administrators and observers (see more complete list in Annex 1)  
• Review of key documents and reports from the key informants listed above, including project documents and reporting, available PBF/IESG, NESTF/NESC, JEWSG reports, observation reports, reports of the UN Secretary General and other reporting on the Somali electoral process  
• Analysis of project products (such as analytical assessments) |
| NJOC established and supported | • Did it fulfil the anticipated functions of a NJOC? What products were produced? Were they useful and used? What was the NESTF/NESC impact on electoral security or reducing the potential for electoral conflict?  
• What were the factors that facilitated or hindered NESTF/NESC’s development & PBF support to it? Were these adequately factored into the project design and during implementation?  
• Is the NESC well situated to manage electoral security for the remainder of the indirect elections? Why or why not? What are its main strengths and challenges? Do you expect it to have a role for the universal suffrage elections | • How strategic was the PBF support to the electoral security needs of the NESTF and NESC?  
• What was the quality of technical assistance and commodity support provided by the PBF project to the NESTF/NESC? Was it appropriate and timely? Issues or lessons learned?  
• How sustainable is the institutional capacity built within the NESTF/NESC?  
• What are the perceptions of the NESTF/NESC capacity and performance by other electoral stakeholders and security personnel?  
• What was the impact of the NESTF/NESC on electoral security or reducing the potential for electoral conflict? | • Same as above for interviews, document reviews and analysis |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Main Questions</th>
<th>Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Data Sources &amp; Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SJOCs established and supported</td>
<td>• How many SJOCs were established and are functioning? At what levels? Did they receive all of the anticipated equipment and are they adequately staffed? Do they include all the key actors for electoral security?</td>
<td>• How strategic was the PBF support to the electoral security needs at the state level?</td>
<td>• Same as above for interviews with the addition of more state and regional level key informants from the same groups, including AMISON trainers, IESG field office staff, UNPOL field staff, WSD staff, local candidates/delegates, observers, state police and JOC members</td>
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| RJOCs established and supported | • How many RJOCs were established and are functioning? At what levels? Did they receive all of the anticipated equipment and are they adequately staffed? Do they include all the key actors for electoral security at regional levels?  
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• What was the quality of technical, logistical and commodity support provided by the PBF project to the RJOCs? Was it appropriate and timely? Issues or lessons learned?  
• Were the members of the RJOCs trained? Who were the trainers and what was the curriculum? Was the training gender sensitive? Did training topics such as Violence Against Women in Elections and human rights?  
• How did they coordinate with the project?  
• How sustainable is the institutional capacity built within the RJOCs? | • Key informant interviews (same groups as state level) with persons living/working at the regional level.  
• Review of similar documentation available at regional level including photos of RJOCs and trainings, regional training reports and other relevant regional level data that might be available. |
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<td>• What are the perceptions of the RJOCs and their capacity and performance by other electoral stakeholders and security personnel at regional, state and national levels?</td>
<td>Interviews with PBF/UNDP/IESG project management, procurement, M&amp;E, administrative and programmatic staff; JESWG members, donors, PBF, other related programmes and projects, project beneficiaries and stakeholders (in addition to others listed above)</td>
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### Outputs

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| • What were the lessons learned and best practices? Were there any lost opportunities or unintended consequences?  
• Were project resources used effectively and were they adequate for the needs?  
• How visible was the project/donors and was this level of visibility appropriate?  
• How well was the project coordinated with the broader electoral security environment and actors? Who ensured that coordination? What were the lessons and best practices?  
• How effective were the IESG, UNDP, UNSOM and others in providing support for this PBF project, including its implementation, coordination, policy support and quality assurance?  
• Did the project design and implementation incorporate a conflict sensitive, mitigation, human rights based approach and a gender equality perspective?  
| • Did the project staff and experts hired have the level of expertise and experience needed for the position and post-conflict context?  
• Did the project have an adequate M&E plan and indicators that could capture its performance and outputs? Was this plan implemented and data collected, aggregated, reported and used to improve project efforts?  
• What was the quality of reporting? Was it sufficient for the project/IESG, PBF and donors’ needs? Did reporting reflect project efforts for gender sensitivity and for Persons with Disabilities and other marginalized groups?  
• How did Covid 19 affect project implementation and management? Was it able to cope effectively? Were there any unforeseen consequences from this situation?  
|
2.2. Approach
In answering the evaluation questions, the evaluator will use mixed methods for analysis, synthesis and drawing conclusions. These include: trend analysis of key outcomes, analysis of associations between observed outcome and project supported efforts, assessment of the relevance, coherency, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and results of the PBF assistance and validation through triangulation (validation discussions with UNDP, IESG, donors, project staff and other national/international partners/beneficiaries, and by information provided in the documents reviewed.) As a result, based on the information available and stakeholder perceptions, the evaluator will make judgments on their value and the extent that these outputs contributed towards the achievement of the PBF electoral security project’s intended outcomes.

The questions outlined in Section 2.1 are specific yet general enough to allow for flexibility in questioning as well as to allow for flexibility in responses. This will enable the respondents to voice their own issues and concerns and to ensure a participatory approach. The evaluator will start by asking brief general questions before going into the specific evaluation questions. Sensitive questions will be asked at the end of the interview after a rapport has developed between the interviewer and person(s) being interviewed. Issues identified in discussions will be followed up with additional questions to that individual/group, as well as by questions to other informants to corroborate the information as needed.

Evaluation questions will be tailored to the different institutions, their mandate and role in the project and/or sector. Particular attention will be given to the country context and its effect on the project, implementation challenges, political constraints, programmatic content and value, timeliness of assistance, changing contexts and sustainability of efforts. The evaluator will interview IESG members/project staff, UNDP, project partners (UNPol, AMISOM Police, SSF), Folke Bernadotte and staff from the NESTF and NESC Secretariats, and members from the 12 JOCs including those from the Women’s Situation Desk. An initial list of key informants to be contacted is provided in Annex 1. Efforts will be made to ensure a balance of men and women in the interview list. This list will be fleshed out during the evaluation process as those interviewed suggest others who might have a particular insight or be available for interview where others may not.

The evaluator is an international expert directly recruited by UNDP. The evaluator will maintain an impartial and professional view towards developing her findings, and will base them on the evidence found and against the anticipated results listed in the project document. The evaluator is responsible for the delivery of the Inception Report, Draft and Final Reports, and will report to the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG). UNDP/IESG will ensure the delivery of project and related documents and will assist with the scheduling of interviews and any translations needed.

2.3 Data sources, processing and measuring results
The evaluation will use both primary and secondary data and a variety of data collection methods to gather the information needed to conduct the work. This is expected to include:

- Desk study and review of relevant documents and reporting, as well as available secondary data. Key project documents will be provided by the project, UNDP and IESG. These are expected to include the project document and reporting, LOAs with implementing partners and their reporting, JOC training records, observer reports, IESG newsletters, Board minutes, lessons learned, and other relevant documentation and plans, and available project M&E data and progress reporting, among others.

- Interviews with project staff, electoral and security experts, donors, NESTF/NESC/JOC staff, participants in the electoral process and other stakeholders. A preliminary list of key informants is provided in Annex 1. Given the limitations on travel due to Covid 19 and security, all interviews will be done virtually. In addition to those reached through video conferencing, some informants may be contacted directly by email and asked to respond to
a few questions to ensure a good representation of the different project stakeholders and beneficiaries are included in the data collection process.

- Analysis of the data collected with the main findings extrapolated by the project outcome and four output areas. The evaluator will synthesize these findings into the main points that will be discussed in the evaluation’s debriefing and Evaluation Report. An illustrative table of contents for the report is provided in Annex 2.

The evaluator will use her professional judgment to assess the information collected and to answer the evaluation questions. Findings will be based on the evidence found and results will be measured in terms of the expected results outlined in the project document, results and resources framework and M&E plans, as well as by the participants’ perceptions of the project and the evaluator’s assessment of the results found. Attribution of results directly to the PBF project may not be possible in some cases due to the integrated nature of the security assistance and international efforts in support of the electoral and political processes which may have contributed to some of the same outcomes. However, where direct correlations seem evident, this will be noted in the Evaluation Report.

All information gathered will be treated as confidential and the Evaluation Report will not identify individual responses unless it has consent from that individual to use the information publicly. The Evaluation Report will follow UNDP standards for independent evaluation reporting.

2.4 Evaluability analysis

The results framework for the electoral security project is outlined in the project document and provides the outputs and illustrative activities for how the project intended to achieve those outputs. The theory of change is based on the assumption that by establishing, equipping and training a cascading system of election security command and control centers, election security would be strengthened and be better able to provide a safe environment for the electoral processes in 2020/2021. The addition of the Women Situation Desk was to add to its ability to address violence against women during the electoral process and to be more responsive to gendered needs. The intended outputs are clear and project reporting follows the project’s results framework and reports by outputs. This facilitates the project evaluation.

There appears to be limited reporting back from the JOCs on their establishment and use. This increases the importance of the interviews from those working with and in the JOCs in the field and the qualitative data that the evaluation will be able to collect. The contact information is available for the NESTF/NESC/JOC focal points, SSF, IESG and UNPOL staff in the JOC areas from which information can be gathered on the JOCs’ status, issues and effectiveness. Assuming these key informants are available and willing to be interviewed, there should not be any major issues with the interview parts of the process and collecting information on the status of the JOCs. The project will support the contacting of the individuals for evaluation interviews and in generating back-up names in case some key informants on the initial interview list are not available.

3. Programme of Work

3.1 Phases and calendar of work

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<td>Phase 1: Review of background documents and draft Inception Report: 8 - 22 February 2022</td>
<td>- Desk review of relevant program documents</td>
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<td>- Planning and scheduling of interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 – 20 February</td>
<td>- Submission of draft Inception Report</td>
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<td>19 February</td>
<td>- Receive ERG comments on draft Inception Report</td>
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3.2. Evaluation deliverables
The main outputs of the PBF electoral security project evaluation are:

- This Evaluation Inception Report which describes the overall approach to the evaluation, including methodology, work plan and proposed structure of the Evaluation Report. The Evaluation Inception Report will be submitted electronically.

- Preliminary findings to be presented during a debriefing meeting at the end of the interview phase. The overview of preliminary findings will be submitted electronically.

- Draft Evaluation Report of not more than 45 pages, including an executive summary, that presents the Evaluation’s main findings on the project, conclusions, and recommendations. This report will follow UNDP’s standard guidelines for independent project evaluation reports. It will include a stand-alone Executive Summary of not more than 4 pages. A draft table of contents is provided in Annex 2 to this Inception Report. This draft Evaluation Report will be submitted electronically.

- Final Evaluation Report of not more than 45 pages, excluding annexes. The final report will present the evaluation’s overall findings, practical and actionable recommendations, lessons learned and conclusions. The report and its main findings will be presented virtually to the ERG, UNDP, IESG, donors and other key stakeholders as organized by UNDP.
Annex 4: Terms of Reference

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Somalia is emerging from decades of conflict and the organization of the country’s first ‘one person, one vote’ elections (now expected to be in 2024) is a tremendous paradigm shift. UN electoral assistance to Somalia is in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council and the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). UN Security Council Resolution 2461 underscored “the importance of UNSOM’s political and technical support, as well as operational and logistical support, in collaboration with UNSOS, to the Federal Government of Somalia for the delivery of inclusive, peaceful, free and fair one-person-one-vote elections in 2020/2021, in particular support to the NIEC at national and sub-national levels to fulfil its constitutional mandate, in line with its Strategic Plan for 2017–2021”. Somalia has committed itself to a number of international and regional treaties with key human rights standards, including those in reference to genuine universal suffrage elections and the citizen’s right to be elected by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.

The project contributes to the UN Somalia Strategic Framework Priority 1: Deepening federalism and state-building, supporting conflict resolution and reconciliation, and preparing for universal elections. Outcome 1.3: Preparations for 2020/2021 universal elections are completed. The project supports Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16: “promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provision of access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels”.

SDG 16 – target 6: “Development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” SDG 16 – target 7: “Assurance of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels”.

Initially, the constitutionally mandated National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) was to conduct the elections. In early 2020 the chair of the NIEC presented a timeline for one-person-one-vote elections which did not receive endorsement from national stakeholders. This led to disagreements and disputes until 17 September when there was agreement by the National Consultative Council (NCC), on an indirect elections model. In general terms the agreement provided for the members state parliaments to elect the members for the Upper House, and for colleges of 101 delegates to elect the 275 members of the House of the People. But this Agreement failed due to further political disagreements and disputes; refer to more information on the why this agreement failed. After considerable national and international pressure, on 27 May 2021 the NCC agreed on the conditions and process for indirect elections that were largely based on the 17 September 2020 Agreement but with a new Prime Minister appointed to oversee the conduct of the elections with new elections committees. The process has continued to be characterized by delays caused by political disagreements among political actors about the composition of the ad hoc electoral committees appointed to conduct the elections. The process eventually got started in late July of 2021, with elections for the 54-member Upper House. Voters in this election were the federal member state parliaments. These elections concluded in mid-November 2021 and resulted in 26% women being elected. The election for the House of the People is more complex, with 275 seats, each elected by 1010 voters called delegates, selected by committees of clan elders and civil society members.

1 Hereby referred to as the PBF project.
Electoral violence remained a major concern that could drastically derail the 2021 elections. The high tempo of recent security incidents and loss of life were a constant reminder of the security challenges for the safe conduct of electoral activities. One of the main lessons about security from the 2016-17 elections was the need for better capacity to plan, coordinate and manage elections security to prevent and manage electoral violence. To prevent and manage elections-related violence in 2019-2021 mechanisms were established to plan and coordinate security to prevent violence and to manage the response to violent incidents. In September 2019 the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) established the National Electoral Security Task Force (NESTF) supported by a Secretariat which first met in December 2019. To enhance the planning and coordination capacities the PBF project equipped 12 Joint electoral Operations Centres (JOCs), a national JOC and one in each of the cities where elections were conducted. The JOCs were aligned with the named elections cities from the 17 September 2020 Agreement on elections; refer to below list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jubaland</th>
<th>SWS</th>
<th>Hirshabelle</th>
<th>Galmudug</th>
<th>Puntland</th>
<th>Banadir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kismayo</td>
<td>Baidoa</td>
<td>Jowhar</td>
<td>Dhusamareeb</td>
<td>Garoowe</td>
<td>Mogadishu x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbahaarey</td>
<td>Baraawe</td>
<td>Beletweyne</td>
<td>Galkayo</td>
<td>Bossaso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to coordinating a harmonized security approach, these JOCs also had an important effect of connecting the federal and state elections committees and the FGS and FMS security institutions with civil society and other electoral stakeholders, to build trust, confidence and cooperation ahead of elections.

The PBF project funded the NESTF’s four meetings that were hold over 2019 and 2020, and the project provided equipment and funded operating costs for the Secretariat for the NESTF. In early 2021 the political disagreements and disputes, some of which turned to violence, meant that the 17 September Agreement was null and void. UN support for elections security was paused to add to the pressure from all quarters, national and international, for the FGS and FMS leadership to agree on the elections which resulted in the 27 May 2021 Agreement. One change included in the 27 May Agreement was replacing the NESTF with a new National Elections Security Committee (NESC) chaired by the Prime Minister, with members being the federal and member state Police Commissioners, and the AMISOM and UN Police Commissioners. The project then supported the NESC meetings, the first on 13-15 September and the second on 2 October 2021, a new but small and ineffective NESC Secretariat, and resumed and completed the rollout of the remaining JOC equipment. Therefore, there have been a raft of stakeholders in this PBF project the main ones being NESTF Secretariat, NESC Secretariat, IESG, UNDP Somalia procurement and finance units, UNSOM Police Unit, AMISOM Police, and Sweden’s Folke Bernadotte Academy, and the staff of the 12 Joint Operations Centres.

**Project Outputs**

The project will deliver against four outputs:

Output 1. Support the NESTF and IESG. Staff and resource the NESTF Secretariat within the MOIS, and staff and resource the UN IESG Electoral Security Team within IESG to manage this project in a way which will benefit men and women within the institutions and their stakeholders.

Output 2. Establish and Support the NJOC. Produce a Development & Capacity Building Plan (ID&CBP) to identify support requirements, including the staff and resources for the NJOC, and to

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train and mentor NJOC staff which also address gender differential issues related to participation, empowerment and protection.

Output 3. Establish and Support the SJOCs. Produce a Development & Capacity Building Plan (ID&CBP) to identify support requirements, including the staff and resources for the SJOCs, and to train and mentor SJOCs’ staff which also address gender differential requirements.

Output 4. Establish and Support the RJOCs. Produce a Development & Capacity Building Plan (ID&CBP) to identify support requirements, including the staff and resources for the RJOCs, and to train and mentor RJOCs’ staff.

Project/Outcome Information

• Project/outcome title. Support to Mechanisms to Prevent and Manage Conflict During Elections Project Atlas ID 00118864
• Corporate outcome and output. The overall outcome of the project is the delivery of a safe environment for the electoral process in 2020/2021.
• Country - Somalia. Regions - Jubaland; Southwest State; Hirshabelle; Galmudug; Puntland; Banadir Regional Administration.
• Date project document signed 28 November 2019
• Project dates - Start 1 December 2019 Planned end 28 February 2022 Project budget - USD 2,500,000
• Project expenditure at the time of evaluation [TBA closer to time TORs are to be advertised, noting request for no cost extension to 28 February 2022]
• Funding source - PBF Implementing party – UNDP.

PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

The primary purpose of this evaluation is to assess the extent to which the project achieved its strategic outcome with an added focus on whether the project interventions have reduced the risk of conflict during national elections in Somalia. The evaluation shall determine the projects overall added value to peacebuilding in Somalia, in the areas of planning, coordination and management of elections security, and of the prevention and management of electoral violence and particularly against women. The evaluation must provide concrete findings and actionable recommendations to the programme management, partners and the donor. The evaluation shall also provide key lessons learned in the project and highlight areas where the project performed less effectively than anticipated.

Objectives of the evaluation:

Assess the relevance and appropriateness of the project in terms of: 1) addressing key drivers of conflict and the most relevant peacebuilding issues; 2) alignment with National Peacebuilding Policy and national priorities of Somalia; 3) whether the project capitalized on the UN’s and AMISOM’s added value in country Somalia; and 4) the degree to which the project addressed cross-cutting issues such as conflict and gender-sensitivity in Somalia;

Assess to what extent the PBF project has made a concrete contribution to reducing a conflict factor in Somalia. With respect to PBF’s contribution, the evaluation may evaluate whether the project helped advance achievement of the SDGs, and in particular SDG 16;

Evaluate the project’s efficiency, including its implementation strategy, institutional arrangements as well as its management and operational systems and value for money;

Assess whether the support provided by the PBF has promoted the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS), allowed a specific focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding processes, and whether it was accountable to gender equality;

Assess whether the project has been implemented through a conflict-sensitive approach;
Document good practices, innovations and lessons emerging from the project; Provide actionable recommendations for future programming.

**SCOPE OF THE PROJECT EVALUATION**

The evaluation team shall undertake the specific tasks listed below:

- Verify through field visit the establishment of all Joint Operations Centres in all targeted locations; National, Regional and State levels.
- Evaluate the whole results chain from project indicators, outputs, outcomes, and immediate impacts with regards to activities achieved by the project.
- Evaluate the project’s theory of change specifically, the conceptual, technical and policy underpinnings of the project design and compare with experiences on the ground.
- Evaluate the degree to which the activities contributed to achieving the project’s strategic outcomes, specifically identifying the contributing factors to achievement of outputs/outcomes and contributing factors to failure to achieve outputs/outcomes. This will serve to enhance evidence-based learning to inform future programming.
- Evaluate project performance against its ability to achieve conflict prevention during elections and contextual peacebuilding changes in targeted areas.

A shared folder will be provided to the evaluator with all the relevant documents which will include but not be limited to key meeting minutes and notes, key activity reports, key security plans, current lessons learned reports, and key correspondence.

**Evaluation Questions within specific OECD-DAC criteria RELEVANCE/ COHERENCE:**

- Was the project relevant in addressing conflict drivers and factors for peace identified in a conflict analysis? If there were significant contextual shifts, did the project goals and approach remain relevant?
- Was the project appropriate and strategic to the main peacebuilding goals and challenges in the country at the time of the PBF project’s design? Did relevance continue throughout implementation?
- Was the project relevant to the UN’s peacebuilding mandate and the SDGs, in particular SDG 16? Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project?
- Was the project well-timed to address a conflict factor or capitalize on a specific window of opportunity?
- Did the project’s theory of change clearly articulate assumptions about why the project approach is expected to produce the desired change? Was the theory of change grounded in evidence?
- To what extent did the PBF project complement work among different entities, especially with other UN actors? To what degree were the project’s design, implementation, monitoring and reporting aligned with that of other projects supporting Somalia’s elections.
- How were stakeholders involved in the project’s design and implementation?

**EFFICIENCY:**

- How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between the two implementing agencies and with stakeholders)?
- Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
How efficient and successful was the project’s implementation approach, including procurement, number of implementing partners and other activities?

How efficiently did the project use the project board?

How well did the project collect and use data to monitor results? How effectively was updated data used to manage the project?

Were there delays to project implementation? Did these delays create missed opportunities to address time-sensitive peacebuilding opportunities?

How well did the project team communicate with implementing partners, stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress?

Overall, did the PBF project provide value for money? Have resources been used efficiently?

To what extent did the PBF project ensure synergies within different programs of UN agencies and other implementing organizations and donor with the same portfolio?

**EFFECTIVENESS:**

To what extent did the PBF project achieve its intended objectives and contribute to the project’s strategic vision?

To what extent did the PBF project substantively mainstream a gender and support gender-responsive peacebuilding?

How appropriate and clear was the PBF project’s targeting strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?

**SUSTAINABILITY & OWNERSHIP:**

To what extent did the PBF project contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in nationally owned strategic plans, legislative agendas and policies?

Did the intervention design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting national/local ownership, use of national capacity etc.) to support positive changes in peacebuilding after the end of the project?

How strong is the commitment of the Government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF support and continuing initiatives, especially in the prevention and management of electoral violence and particularly against women?

How has the project enhanced and contributed to the development of national capacity in order to reduce the risk of conflict during national elections in Somalia?

**GENDER equality**

Did the project consider the different challenges, opportunities, constraints and capacities of women, men, girls and boys in project design (including within the conflict analysis, outcome statements and results frameworks) and implementation?

Were the commitments made in the project proposal to gender-responsive peacebuilding, particularly with respect to the budget, realized throughout implementation?

**RISK-TOLERANCE AND INNOVATION:**

Were risks adequately monitored and mitigated?

How novel or innovative was the project approach? Can lessons be drawn to inform similar approaches elsewhere?

**Disability**

Were persons with disabilities consulted and meaningfully involved in programme planning and implementation?
METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

As of 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global pandemic as the new coronavirus rapidly spread to all regions of the world. Travel to and in the country is constrained by a combination of COVID-19 and the ongoing conflict. If it is not possible to travel to or within the country for the evaluation then the evaluation team should develop a methodology that takes this into account the conduct of the evaluation virtually and remotely, including the use of remote interview methods and extended desk reviews, data analysis, surveys and evaluation questionnaires. This should be detailed in the Inception report and agreed with the Evaluation Manager.

If all or part of the evaluation is to be carried out virtually then consideration should be taken for stakeholder availability, ability or willingness to be interviewed remotely. In addition, their accessibility to the internet/computer may be an issue as many government and national counterparts may be working from home. These limitations must be reflected in the evaluation report.

The evaluation will employ a combination of both qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods including:

- The evaluation will be summative and will employ a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide/verify the substance of the findings. Proposals submitted by prospective consultants should outline a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information.

- Proposals should be clear on the specific role each of the various methodological approaches plays in helping to address each of the evaluation questions.

- The methodologies for data collection may include but not necessarily be limited to:
  - Desk review of key documents.
  - Key informant interviews (KIs) and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with major stakeholders including country PBF team, officials from key stakeholders in elections security which include the NESTF Secretariat, NESC Secretariat, IESG, UNDP Somalia procurement and finance units, UNSOM Police Unit, AMISOM Police, and Sweden’s Folke Bernadotte, and the staff of the 12 Joint Operations Centres. All stakeholders have men and women who were engaged or supported by the PBF project and so equal numbers of both should be interviewed.
  - Beneficiary/communities and stakeholder perception surveys to feed into outcomes.
  - Systematic review of monitoring data and internal assessments and evaluations.
  - Systematic review of existing, relevant data at the outcome or country context level.
  - Systematic review of all the relevant project documentation including project documents, annual work-plans, project coordination meeting reports and project progress reports.
  - Observations of the 12 Joint Operations Centres.

DELIVERABLES

**Inception Report:** The consultant evaluator will prepare an Inception Report to further refine the evaluation questions and detail the methodological approach, including data collection instruments, in consultation with the PBF technical team. The Inception report must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF prior to commencement of data collection in the field.

The inception report should include the following key elements:
Background and context, illustrating the understanding of the project/outcome to be evaluated.

Evaluation objective, purpose and scope. A clear statement of the objectives of the evaluation and the main aspects or elements of the initiative to be examined.

Evaluation criteria and questions. The criteria the evaluation will use to assess performance and rationale. The stakeholders to be met and interview questions should be included and agreed, as well as a proposed schedule for field visits.

Evaluability analysis. Illustrates the evaluability analysis based on formal (clear outputs, indicators, baselines, data) and substantive (identification of problem addressed, theory of change, results framework) approaches, and the implications for the proposed methodology.

Cross-cutting issues. Provide details of how cross-cutting issues will be evaluated, considered and analysed throughout the evaluation. The description should specify how methods for data collection and analysis will integrate gender considerations, ensure that data collected is disaggregated by sex and other relevant categories, and employ a diverse range of data sources and processes to ensure the inclusion of diverse stakeholders, including the most vulnerable where appropriate.

Evaluation approach and methodology, highlighting the conceptual models to be adopted, and describing the data collection methods, sources and analytical approaches to be employed, including the rationale for their selection (how they will inform the evaluation) and their limitations; data-collection tools, instruments, and protocols; and discussing their reliability and validity for the evaluation and the sampling plan.

Evaluation matrix, identifying the key evaluation questions and how they will be answered through the selected methods.

A revised schedule of key milestones, deliverables and responsibilities, including the evaluation phases (data collection, data analysis and reporting).

Detailed resource requirements tied to evaluation activities and deliverables detailed in the workplan. Include specific assistance required from UNDP, such as providing arrangements for visiting particular field offices or sites.

Outline of the draft/final report as detailed in the guidelines and ensuring quality and usability (outlined below). The agreed report outline should meet the quality standards outlined in these guidelines and the quality assessment requirements outlined in section 6 of the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines.

**Presentation/validation** of preliminary findings to relevant in-country stakeholders and PBF

**Final evaluation report:** The consultant evaluator will prepare the final evaluation report based on PBF’s evaluation report template. The first draft of the final report will be shared with an Evaluation Reference Group, composed of representatives of all direct fund recipients and the PBF (at a minimum), for their comments. The final accepted version of the report will reflect ERG’s comments. The Final Report must be approved by both the evaluation manager and the PBF.

**Evaluation ethics**

“This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees, and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation.

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88 Annex 2 in the Guidelines outlines different data collection methods