



BCRR II money-for-work beneficiary, Small-business and sheep farmer, Kongoussi-Burkina Faso. Photo: UNDP, Sep. 2020

BUILDING CAPACITIES FOR RESILIENT RECOVERY – PHASE 2 (BCRR II) END OF PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|------------|---|
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| BBB | build back better |
| BCCR II | Building Capacities for Resilient Recovery – Phase 2 |
| CB | Crisis Bureau, UNDP |
| CDMC | Central Disaster Management Committee, Lao PDR |
| CONASUR | Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation / National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation, Burkina Faso |
| DIM | Direct Implementation Modality |
| DRF | Disaster Recovery Framework |
| DRM | Disaster Risk Management |
| DRR | Disaster Risk Reduction |
| ENRRD | National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy, Cabo Verde |
| EU | European Union (represented by the European Commission) |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FAFA | Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (between EU - of which Luxembourg is a member country, and the United Nations) |
| FCAS | fragile and conflict-affected situations |
| GFDRR | Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IRP | International Recovery Platform |
| ILO | International Labor Organization |
| IPA | Innovations for Poverty Action, LuxDev |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
| LuxDev | Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NIM | National Implementation Modality |
| PAC | Programme Appraisal Committee, UNDP Headquarters |
| PD | Project Document (Agreement signed 12 April 2018) |
| PDNA | Post-Disaster Needs Assessment |
| Pre-DRP | Preparedness for Recovery global training package |
| RF | Recovery Framework |
| SNCPB | Serviço Nacional de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros / National Civil Protection and Fire Services, Cabo Verde |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UN Habitat | United Nations Human Settlements Programme |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UN Women | United Nations entity dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women |
| WBG | The World Bank Group |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Unless otherwise specified, all “\$” in the report means US\$.

A. BACKGROUND

1. Risk

Natural hazards - such as cyclones, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, droughts and similar, are everywhere around us. Hazards cannot be reduced and are not constrained by national or political boundaries. It is when natural extreme events meet with human settlements and land use that a disaster may follow. Disasters are the result of a combination of not only exposure to a particular hazard (natural or person-made) but also the conditions of vulnerability to being adversely affected. The degree of vulnerability may be mitigated by the capabilities of, and actions taken by institutions, communities and individuals to reduce and cope with the consequences of a shock. The potential risk of a disaster is therefore a complex relationship between the magnitude and probability of a hazard occurring and the underlying vulnerability of a society, as conceptualized in the following simple formula:

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Hazard (severity and frequency)} \times \text{Vulnerability (exposure and capacity)}$$

(UNISDR, 2009).

Changing climate, population growth, littoralization of settlements, and consequent increasing exposure to risk, all present significant challenges to populations in countries across the world. Globally in 2020, an estimated 218 million people were affected by 399 natural events (excluding the Covid-19 pandemic) that resulted in 15,286 deaths and caused estimated damage of \$173 billion.¹ More than half of all people who were affected by natural disasters lived in fragile or conflict-affected states, further exacerbating their underlying conditions of poverty, food insecurity and vulnerability.² Poverty is one of the strongest determinants of the extent of disaster risk – a disaster can destroy the already small asset base of a poor household and tear away at personal buffers to withstand future shocks. The poorest people, therefore, are often affected disproportionately by disaster events, particularly when more than one disaster occurs in a short period of time.

From early 2020 to mid-2021, the Covid-19 pandemic has added more than 185 million confirmed cases and more than four million deaths to the world's disaster burden. The impacts of the pandemic on health, well-being and economies have been enormous and are expected to continue for many more months to come.

2. Resilience

The term 'resilience' originally derived from the ecological sciences as a measure of the capacities of natural systems to absorb changes whilst still maintaining their core functions. In the social sciences, resilience has been defined as a measure of the capacities of communities to prepare for and withstand shocks and stresses from a range of different hazards, whether environmental, social, or economic (U.S. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System Program, 2007) and is now commonly understood to be "the

¹ Author generated query. Retrieved from: <https://public.emdat.be/data>

² For example, from 2016 to 2018 the Sahel region registered 64,343 people affected by natural disasters. In the same period, there were 127,477 displaced persons on the Sahel registers. (Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Rehabilitation, 2019)

ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a shock or stress in a timely and efficient manner” (Mitchell & Harris, 2012, p. 2).


Based on extensive work by the Rockefeller Foundation, an important characterization of resilience is the ability to ‘bounce back’ or the “capacity of any entity – an individual, a community, an organization, or a natural system – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2015, p. 3). Building capacities for resilience therefore requires a multi-layered approach to risk management and calls for developing “the policies, strategies and tools that empower individuals, communities and states to effectively manage their own layer of risk” (OECD, 2013, p. 1)

3. Recovery

Recovery encompasses coordinated efforts to effect the immediate-, medium- and long-term all-inclusive restoration of a disaster affected community or society. It is aimed at restoring the facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of all in the community, i.e., the multiple social, emotional, economic, environmental, and physical aspects of well-being. (Government of New Zealand, 2005; Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery, 2017; United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Recovery also aims, where appropriate, to make improvements by building back better or safer and thereby reducing future risk, lowering the vulnerability of people and assets, and increasing a community’s self-reliance. It is well documented, that build back better investments generate significant, long-term economic benefits. For example, studies have shown that every \$1 invested in making infrastructure more resilient results in savings of more than \$4 over the lifetime of the physical assets including post-disaster reconstruction costs (Hallegatte, Rentschler, & Rozenberg, 2019).

Therefore, recovery is an important part of the ‘4-Rs’ of risk management (i.e., reduction, readiness or preparedness, response and recovery.) Building resilience and reducing risk through preparedness and well-planned recovery provides measurable economic benefits and social stability. UNDRR estimates that every \$1 invested in prevention and risk reduction incorporated into recovery after an event can save up to \$15 in future post-disaster relief needs. Countries and communities that build their recovery capabilities over time can progressively reduce the impacts of disasters and lower the costs of short-term emergency response activities. The synergies provided by well-planned recovery can be illustrated as in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Incremental Benefits of Timely and Well-Planned Recovery



Source: Based on (Spiekermann, Kienberger, Norton, Briones, & Weichselgartner, 2015).

4. Resilient Recovery

Equitable, inclusive, and sustainable recovery does not happen by chance - it requires careful planning, implementation, and financing. To be effective, recovery interventions are those that help affected communities to address both early recovery needs and put in place institutional capabilities and resources to meet medium- to long-term human development and disaster risk reduction objectives.³ 'Resilient recovery' builds resilience during the recovery processes and promotes recovery as a means to sustainable development (Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2020). Proven methodologies have been developed and standardized over the past decade for carrying out foundation-stone post disaster needs assessments (PDNAs) and preparing associated disaster recovery frameworks (DRF). The methodologies also have been adapted for recovery and reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected countries and situations (FCAS). Several key lessons learnt for building resilient recovery are summarized below in Box 1.

Box 1: Lessons for Building Resilient Recovery

1. Ex-ante recovery planning (i.e., putting in place policies, standards, and institutional arrangements for managing recovery before a disaster strikes) can help ensure a more efficient and effective recovery process.
2. Post-disaster recovery must be linked to poverty alleviation and long-term development objectives, with improved service delivery and livelihood generation for vulnerable groups.
3. Recovery should be well coordinated and inclusive, with established roles and milestones for actors at all levels of government, the private sector, and civil society.
4. Building the capacity to conduct post-disaster needs assessments will provide information on baseline conditions and help to identify recovery priorities that lead to sustainable development.
5. Predictable and transparent financial mechanisms are necessary to ensure recovery plans can be implemented.

(Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery, 2015)

There is now a growing consensus that countries emerging from disasters or conflict situations need clearly formulated, coherent and nationally owned assessments and plans to implement effective and coordinated recovery efforts as they transition from immediate humanitarian crisis response measures to focus on medium- and longer-term recovery activities. Planning and implementing longer term and more human needs- and resource-based recovery is a specialized practice area and the technical and management skills needed for recovery are different from those of conventional disaster risk management skills and expertise practiced in earlier decades. In addition to the positive lessons learnt above, lessons are also emerging on practices to be avoided as they can undermine successful recovery efforts, as summarized in Box 2 below.

³ (Arenas, n.d.)

Box 2: What undermines successful recovery efforts?

- Recovery needs are not properly identified through a formal and comprehensive assessment process.
 - Recovery programming is ad hoc and is not informed by needs assessment.
 - Recovery interventions are not guided by an overarching recovery strategy and a clear set of priorities.
 - Recovery strategies do not consider vulnerabilities and cultural considerations.
 - Recovery is not supported by adequate financial resources. Disaster aid is typically provided for immediate humanitarian relief with few resources provided for longer-term recovery needs.
 - Recovery favors rebuilding infrastructure over socio-economic and household recovery needs.
 - Recovery efforts often fail to encourage local participation and ownership.
- (United Nations Development Programme, 2019, p. 7)

5. Preparedness for Resilient Recovery

From September 2014 through June 2017, UNDP with funding support from the Governments of Japan (\$2 million⁴) and Luxembourg (\$0.866 million), implemented the Preparedness for Resilient Recovery Project (PRRP). The PRRP was designed to develop capacities within countries with high-risk exposure to multiple natural and climate-related hazards and affected by conflict and/or economic instability. Specifically, it had the objectives to a) reduce the additional social and economic consequences of disasters due to poorly managed recovery processes; b) avoid increasing risk of future disasters; and c) restore the path to development enhanced resilience by 'building back better' (BBB). The project was implemented in five disaster prone countries of Angola, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Niger and Rwanda.

Many outputs were achieved under the PRRP in each of the five countries during the three-year implementation period. The final project report documented among other achievements, the strengthening of local institutions, policies and guidelines for recovery with national recovery frameworks adopted in Cabo Verde, Burkina Faso and Rwanda and under preparation in Niger. Training on the standardized PDNA and DRF methodologies was completed by over 1,300 participants from local and national governments and civil society, and a global Preparedness for Recovery (Pre-DRP) was tested in the five countries, thus improving national capabilities for conducting post disaster assessments. These strengths were subsequently put into practice when PDNAs were carried out after the 2016 floods in Ingall, Niger, the 2014-2015 volcanic eruption on Fogo, Cabo Verde, and the 2012-2016 drought in Angola.⁵

⁴ Funding provided through the UNDP Africa Regional Programme.

⁵ (Government of Japan and United Nations Development Programme, 2017)

B. BUILDING CAPACITIES FOR RESILIENT RECOVERY PROJECT PHASE II

1. Overview of Project Design and Implementation Arrangements

Building on the lessons of the PRRP, a Project Concept Note for the Building Capacities for Resilient Recovery Phase II (BCCR II) was approved by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in October 2017 and by UNDP's Headquarters Programme Appraisal Committee (PAC) on 16 March 2018. The Project Document agreement was signed by UNDP on 12 April 2018⁶. The BCCR II had an original budget of US\$1.816 million, of which US\$1.785 million (€1.5 million) was grant funding from the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and UNDP provided an amount of US\$30,642. The project was originally planned as a follow-on from the PRRP project in Burkina Faso and Niger (both characterized as high disaster risk and high institutional and social fragility states)⁷ to consolidate activities that had not been fully completed from the earlier PRRP phase. The BCRR II also extended its coverage to Myanmar and Lao PDR, both high disaster risk and low-income countries in Southeast Asia⁸.

In June 2018, shortly before the project became effective, a revised funding proposal was approved by the Government of Luxembourg. The approved revision increased the Government of Luxembourg's grant by €1.0 million to a total €2.5 million. The additional funding was for the purposes of:

- expanding the policy and institutional strengthening recovery-related activities planned under Outputs 1, 2 and 3, and enlarging the pool of experts in PDNA and DRF at country level by increased training of national and local level government staff, NGOs and civil society members;
- including Cabo Verde – high disaster risk, small island developing state off the West African coast with high poverty levels, to complete the capacity gaps remaining from the implementation of Phase I, and assist in operationalizing the Disaster recovery Framework, specifically for the ongoing drought affecting the country;
- providing additional staff capacity and technical support at UNDP headquarters and regional levels to ensure appropriate advisory and technical capacity to the expanded program in the five participating countries;
- expanding Output 4 activities including virtual exchanges, triangular knowledge exchange (Asia-Africa workshop and cross country study visits) and translation and dissemination of country documents and case studies;
- increasing the original project budget allocations to Laos and Myanmar which had not received support under Phase I.⁹

⁶ <https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/H70/signed%20final%20ProDoC%20-Building%20capacities%20for%20resilient%20recovery%20phase%202.pdf>

⁷ In these countries of the Sahel region, the impacts of climate change include higher temperatures (rising at 1.5 times the global average) and water scarcity resulting in lower crop yields and livestock productivity and affecting food security and prices, internally displacing populations, and increasing social tensions and conflict. The presence of violent extremist groups in the region present an ongoing threat to security and the two countries are designated as high institutional and social fragility states.

⁸ Low-middle income countries in Southeast Asia (with GNI per capita of US\$1,740 [Laos] and US\$1,190 [Myanmar] per year) that routinely are challenged by multiple hazard risks (cyclonic storms, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, forest fires, landslides, and epidemics) and resultant large annual economic and social losses.


⁹ Information note submitted by BCRR II Project Manager to the BCRR II Virtual Board Meeting on 12, June 2018; Proposal for the Government of Luxembourg, BCRR II, July 2018.

Table 1 below sets out the revised final allocation (June 2018) of project funds between the five countries and for the purposes of global coordination of the project.

Table 1: BCRR II Allocation of Grant Funds

| Country | Funds Allocated (US\$) |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| Burkina Faso | 391,914 |
| Niger | 391,914 |
| Lao PDR | 603,636 |
| Myanmar | 603,636 |
| Cabo Verde | 310,633 |
| Global coordination | 635,170 |
| TOTAL | 2,936,903 |

Figure 2: Distribution of BCRR II Funds



The BCRR II was to be implemented over three years, from January 2018 to December 2020. After initial delays in start-up (*see section D.3.a of the report*), the first-year implementation plan, - together with the revised funding and inclusion of Cabo Verde, was approved by the Project Board in June 2018. The Covid-19 pandemic that rapidly spread across the globe in early 2020 and is ongoing at the time of this report, caused unforeseen challenges to project implementation. On 9 May 2020, the Government of Luxembourg authorized a no-cost, five months' extension to 1 June 2021 for the Project closing date.

The final amount of Project funds expended by 31 May 2021 including commitments awaiting processing of final payments was \$ 2,672,138 or 91.5% and an undisbursed amount of \$264,765. (*See section D.3.c of the report for further details.*)

Project implementation and governance arrangements for Burkina Faso, Niger, Lao PDR and Myanmar were clearly described in the Global Project Document. Day to day management of the project was the responsibility of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Team of the Crisis Bureau (CB) of UNDP (New York)¹⁰. The UN's fiduciary controls (standard auditing, accounting and procurement controls and procedures) and reporting were to be ensured in the four countries in accordance with UNDP's Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) Under the DIM modality, UNDP is primary Project Implementing Partner and is responsible for overall management and accountability for project implementation. Implementing Partner staff are required to follow all UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP) including UNDP's Financial Regulations, Rules, and directives¹¹ when implementing the approved Annual workplans and disbursements are made against the approved workplans.

¹⁰ Formerly (at the time of Project design and prior to internal UNDP reorganization), implementation was by the Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Cluster in the Bureau for Policy and Program Support of UNDP.

¹¹ UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules (2012). Retrieved from: <https://poppp.undp.org>
The full Program and Operations Policies and Procedures can be found at: <https://poppp.undp.org/SitePages/POPPRoot.aspx>

In accordance with UNDP's DIM guidelines, a "Responsible Party" - defined as a government, NGO, or Agency of the UN System may be selected to act on behalf of the UNDP on the basis of a written agreement or contract to purchase goods or provide services using the project budget. All Responsible Parties are directly accountable to UNDP in accordance with the terms of their agreement or contract with UNDP. Thus, for example, on 11 November 2018, UNDP signed a PTA with the Burkina Faso Ministry of Women, National Solidarity and Family (MFSNF) authorizing the Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CONASUR) as an implementing partner and with an initial budget of \$58,356.72 to hire a Project Analyst and a National Coordinator to support effective project implementation in the country.¹² In 2020 the agreement covered CONASUR implementing activities under outputs 1 and 3, in part to facilitate access to parts of the country where travel restrictions were in force.¹³ In Lao PDR, the Responsible Party was identified as the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare¹⁴ with support from the UNDP Country Office.¹⁵

In terms of the separate Project Document prepared for Cabo Verde's participation in the Project, the initial project implementation period was a short 17 months (13 November 2018 through 1 April 2020, but, as in the case of the global project, the Project closing date was extended to 31 May 2021. The Cabo Verde Project Document specified the approval of UNDP's National Implementation Modality (NIM) whereby the Government of Cabo Verde, through the Serviço Nacional de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros, Ministério da Administração Interna (SNPCB, National Civil Protection and Fire Services, Ministry of Internal Administration) was the implementing partner. In compliance with rules and regulations under UNDP's NIM modality, the national management capacities were pre-audited as a condition of approval. National government institutions in Cabo Verde were found to have adequate public fund management controls and governance mechanisms, monitoring procedures, e-governance systems and the Court of Auditors' check and balances system (Tribunal de Contas) in place to underwrite the SNPCB's implementation responsibilities and direct control of project funds.¹⁶

Every country was to have a dedicated Project Manager (in some cases funded by the Project or shared funding with a related project). A global Project Manager was appointed within the UNDP Recovery Team to coordinate and monitor overall project implementation, provide oversight and technical assistance, and to undertake reporting and information sharing between stakeholders in all five countries. Activities implemented at the national level were delivered by the relevant UNDP Country Offices in consultation with the headquarters-based Recovery Team and specialists in UNDP's Regional Bureaux for Africa (Addis Ababa) and for Asia (Bangkok). UNDP made use of its roster of international and national consultants for technical inputs to be contracted in as needed. National UN Volunteers (UNVs) were hired in several cases to support implementation at the sub-national level. (*See section D.0*).

¹² PNUD, MFSNF. 2018. 'PTA du Projet de Renforcement de Capacites Nationales de Resilience'.

¹³ O. Ouedraogo, personal communication, 22 June 2021.

¹⁴ Responsibility for coordination of disaster risk reduction and recovery was moved from the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (cited in the global Project Document) to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 20xx.

¹⁵ The UNDP Country Office staff characterized this as National Implementation Modality but the evaluation could not find evidence of the date, reasons for or any prior authorization provided to change the modality from DIM to NIM in Laos.

¹⁶ (United Nations Development Programme; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Government of Cabo Verde, 2018)

2. Project Objective

The objective of the BCRR II Project was “to contribute to building the resilience of countries in the face of disasters by strengthening national capacities to plan and manage recovery processes in a sustainable and inclusive manner (“Build Back Better”).¹⁷

3. Project Output Areas

The BCRR II Project Documents identified four **main outputs** as leading to the achievement of the Project objective, namely:

Output 1: Strengthened national policy, institutional and financial frameworks and mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes.

Output 2: Enhanced technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation.

Output 3: Enhanced national capacities for implementing recovery at community level.

Output 4: Improved knowledge products, technological applications and South-South exchange for recovery management.

The Project Documents set out results frameworks for the four countries in the global project and for Cabo Verde with data collection plans for monitoring and evaluating the Project against annual targets for all outputs. Outputs of the Project and emerging risks were to be monitored and reported on through quarterly progress tracking.¹⁸ Annual lessons learned to inform management decisions and Annual Project Reports were to be compiled and presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders.¹⁹ When the revised funding proposal was approved in 2018 - increasing the original grant amount from €1.5 million to €2.5 million and expanding the activities funded in the four global countries, the results framework for the global project should have been updated with new targets but the evaluation has not found evidence of a revised framework²⁰ (*discussed further in section D.4.*)

4. Theory of Change

As set out in the two Project Documents, the change expected through the BCR II was that governments of the participating countries are prepared to manage future recovery processes in an effective, sustainable, and inclusive way. Strengthened capacities and systems to plan and manage recovery processes would enhance the resilience of the countries and the communities in the face of disasters through building back better and safer and a swift return to sustainable development pathways. The main

¹⁷ (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 11)

¹⁸ (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 27)


¹⁹ The EC/UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) provides an overarching framework for all agreements between EU member states and UNDP. The FAFA requires that the annual reports at a minimum include:

- summary and context of the Project
- activities carried out during the reporting period
- difficulties encountered and measures taken to overcome problems
- changes introduced in implementation
- achievements/results by using indicators
- work plan for the following period.

²⁰ (J. Shone, personal communication, 15 June 2021; S. Arcone, personal communication, 18 June 2021; O. Ouedraogo, personal communication, 22 June 2021; A. Ousseini Ali, personal communication, 2 July 2021; C. Yaiche, personal communication, 2 July 2021; R. Missal, personal communication, 20 July 2021).

elements of the Project's theory of change as reflected in the results frameworks have been summarized by the evaluation in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: BCRR II Project Theory of Change²¹



C. END OF PROJECT EVALUATION PURPOSE, APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

The BCRR II Project Documents call for a final, end of Project (EOP) Evaluation to be organized in consultation with key stakeholders²² but do not provide details of what the evaluation is to encompass. The overarching Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (as amended²³) for agreements between EU member states including the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and UNDP sets out several considerations that are relevant to the EOP Evaluation, most notably that:

- The spirit of the partnership is to help achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, and to ensure the most effective and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance in the context of the increasing humanitarian needs worldwide.
- All activities undertaken by EU/UN partnerships should be directed towards achieving results: humanitarian, developmental or otherwise with a corresponding shift away from solely examining inputs and activities. Performance measures should be based on objectives that are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-based.
- Simplified administration of, and information generated by, UN Actions.

²¹ The Theory of Change in Figure 1 is derived from the text in the PD (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 11). A more generalized ToC diagram is also available in Annex 1 of the PD.

²² (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 29); (United Nations Development Programme; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Government of Cabo Verde, 2018, p. 33)

²³ The FAFA has subsequently been amended twice in 2014 and 2018 to reflect changes in each of the organizations' regulatory frameworks.

The Government of Luxembourg prioritizes achieving impact with its overseas development assistance and recommends that “We design and evaluate solutions and **mobilize and support decision-makers to use the evidence**, leading to better programs and policies **for the poor**”²⁴ (emphasis added).

The objective of the EOP Evaluation as set out in the Consultant’s Terms of Reference (TOR) is to “assess the overall capacity of the program to build the resilience of the five project countries in the face of disasters by strengthening their national capacities to plan and manage recovery processes in a sustainable and inclusive manner” and “**assess the relevance, impact, effectiveness and sustainability** of the activities conducted under the four outputs in the five target countries” (emphasis added).

Specifically, the evaluation should:

1. Assess the **effectiveness and quality of programmatic activities** under the four outputs with a focus on
 - technical quality of the design,
 - capacity to plan and deliver on budget,
 - balance of delivery among the four outputs,
 - technical cooperation between stakeholders in planning and implementation,
 - capacities of country offices to monitor and evaluate project progress,
 - capacity of country offices and headquarters to respond and adapt to unforeseen circumstances (including the Covid 19 pandemic),
 - resource and allocation vis-à-vis the expected results (i.e., efficiency),
 - identifying best practices, and
 - identifying challenges faced and evaluating solutions adopted.
2. Identify **lessons learnt** to inform the design of a potential future BCRR III project.
3. Review the **communications products** developed by the project and assess their relevance in supporting the resilience of targeted countries.
4. Assess the effectiveness of the **management arrangements and coordination** among the partners in the implementation of the project.

2. Approach

Evaluations may be broadly classified as either accountability-oriented or learning-oriented. Throughout implementation, the UNDP Project Board has provided accountability oversight of the project. The evaluation has confirmed that accountability of project funds were systematically monitored by well-established internal (ATLAS) and external auditing procedures as required by the UNDP’s Financial Regulations and Rules (2012) and directives²⁵ and no financial management issues of serious concern have been found during the evaluation to indicate otherwise. In one instance where the Government of Burkina Faso – as a Responsible Party to the Project, made use of Project funds outside of the approved annual workplan although with approval of the UNDP Country Office, this was flagged by the Global Project Manager and funds were returned to the project before the Project closing date.


²⁴ (Government of Luxembourg, 2021)

²⁵ A. Nigam, personal communication, 26 August 2021.

Therefore, the evaluation has adopted a learning-oriented approach. It has been based in part on facilitated self-reflection and reaching conclusions and recommendations by the Project stakeholders themselves through in-depth interviews and survey questions.

Figure 4 below provides the framework that has been used to carry out the evaluation and explains the meaning of key terms used in the evaluation. Cross-cutting considerations are applied throughout, including the Government of Luxembourg's emphasis on reaching the poor and improved and evidence-informed governance, and considerations of gender equality and women's empowerment, inclusion of the needs and priorities of the most vulnerable, livelihood benefits, and environmental sustainability.

Figure 4: BCRR II EOP Evaluation Framework



3. Methodology

The Evaluation made use of a desk-based, iterative methodology using primarily qualitative and some limited quantitative data, and stakeholder opinions. These were collected and iteratively analyzed to generate emerging findings in each of the four main parts of the assessment (*see above*). The Project Midterm and Annual Reports reported on outputs by individual country and so rather than repeating an exhaustive listing by country, the EOP evaluation findings are presented as an overview of the entire (five country) project with country specific references used to highlight findings and recommendations.

The evaluation was carried out as follows:

1. During the Inception Phase, background and project documents were collated and reviewed (*Annex 1*) and an initial orientation meeting was provided by the Project Manager.²⁶ The


²⁶ Ms. Charlotte Yaiche, Program Manager, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery for Building Resilience Team, Crisis Bureau, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS), UNDP.

evaluator prepared a Theory of Change for the project based on the details in the global Project Document (*Figure 3 above*).

2. As no final Project results framework with revised targets was available, and the framework has not been used or populated in the Mid-year or Annual Progress Reports of 2019 and 2020. The Reports and Annual Workplans in the main describe inputs provided and processes (e.g., consultation meeting with x number of people; facilitator hire), but not the final output against the planned target. There is no consolidated table matching all indicators and revised targets with actual achievements for every country. Therefore, the evaluation aggregated the multiple activities implemented in the countries under the global indicators for each output (Outputs 1-4). The most important activities/inputs for achieving the indicators have been reviewed, and assumptions made in the project design. These have been summarized in the form of a Project results chain which was a guide for carrying out the evaluation interviews, surveys and final assessment of effectiveness (*Figure 7 at the end of this section*).
3. Project outputs were collated from the mid-year and annual progress reports and country reports and documents provided to the evaluator (*Annex 1*), and attendance at a BCRR II Review Workshop organized by the Project Manager. Completion of activities under each output were reviewed for each of the countries and the findings are presented in a summary graphic for each country where achieved/not achieved is shown by 'traffic light' coding (*Annex 2*).
4. The evaluation carried out one-on-one, semi-structured interviews by Zoom in English or French and used descriptive, causal, synthesis, and action questions. The interviews were with key stakeholders from the UNDP Recovery Team, the Project Manager and DRM/Environment staff in the UN Country Offices. The evaluator was invited to participate in, and the evaluation benefitted from, the presentations and discussions at the Project Peer-to-Peer Workshop (23-24 June 2021) convened by the Global Project Manager (*Annex 3*).
5. A voluntary, anonymous, structured questionnaire tailored to different groups of respondents was administered online in English and French and sent to all country stakeholders, including UNDP staff and roster experts who had provided inputs to the project. The survey was used to complement the findings of the semi-structured interviews. Within the time constraints of the Evaluation and work disruptions associated with the pandemic, this voluntary online survey proved to be an efficient means of obtaining a wider cross-section of views and provided invaluable supplementary insights into the project. A total of 30 responses²⁷ was received from staff of UNDP and other UN or external support agencies (37%), consultants (36%), staff of central, provincial or local governments (22%) and representatives of NGOs or civil society (5%) (*Figure 5*).


²⁷ Of which 22 fully completed the survey, five finished the survey but did not answer all questions, and three opened but did not complete the survey.

Figure 5: Profile of Respondents to Key Stakeholder Online Survey



The types of inputs provided to the Project ranged from technical advice and sector expertise, project management and oversight functions, and training and capacity building (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Types of Inputs Provided on BCRR II by Online Survey Respondents



4. Other Considerations in the Evaluation

Quality considerations

The BCRR II Project Manager and the Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Team in the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP reviewed and provided detailed feedback on the draft BCRR II Evaluation Report before it was finalized.

Ethical considerations and crosscutting issues.

With respect to research ethics, the notes from all interviews and responses to surveys are held by the BCRR II evaluation consultant and are confidential. The evaluation report does not attribute views or direct quotes to individuals from the online survey that would allow the respondents to be identified. At the outset of all interviews and the on-line survey, the evaluator ensured that the prospective respondents understood these terms and provided their informed consent to begin the survey. It was essential that participants felt comfortable expressing their opinions about the Project, without concern

that they or a potential future project might lose support because of the evaluation process. To ensure independence, no members of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery Team were present in the interviews. To ensure that the different priorities and opinions of different people were heard, the views of women and men stakeholders were obtained.

Communicating Evaluation findings

Sharing of the BCRR II Evaluation findings and recommendations will be carried out by circulating the draft Report for feedback from the Recovery Team and Technical Advisors. The final Report is to be submitted to and discussed with the Project Advisory Board by the Recovery Team. No information has been included in the Report that could prevent the release of the report to outside parties by the UNDP.

Limitations of the Evaluation methodology

The annual and end of year targets to assess achievement of project indicators were not revised upwards when the project funding was increased from €1.5 million to €2.5 million. Therefore, the assessments in Annex 2 for Niger, Burkina Faso, Myanmar and Lao PDR are with respect to the original activities, targets and funds set out in the last available Global Project Document signed on 12 April 2018. Assessments of implementation progress (*section D3*) have been made against planned and actual annual expenditures for the full €2.5 million.


The evaluation was carried out from May-July 2021 when there were stringent limitations on international travel because of the global coronavirus pandemic. Therefore, the evaluation was desk-based, and the evaluator has not been able to travel to any of the participating countries and field verify any of the self-reporting provided by the project implementing staff. However, every effort has been made to cross-check responses between different stakeholders and by comparing the one-on-one interviews and the online survey responses. The pandemic also made it challenging to follow up with staff working from home, in some cases with limited or difficult internet connections, and in some cases themselves ill. Staff in all five UNDP Country Offices and the global Recovery Team who routinely worked on the Project were personally interviewed and their views and insights have been incorporated in the evaluation.

A limitation of the evaluation was that members of the public and communities who are the final Project beneficiaries were not personally interviewed. However, e-mailed invitations in English and French and a reminder to participate in the online survey were sent to a sample of these beneficiaries as represented by different levels of government and civil society. Responses were received from staff of Government ministries (18%), staff of provincial/state or local governments (5%) and representatives from one or more civil society organizations (5%) and these views are included in the valuation analyses, findings and recommendations.²⁸

Self-reporting instruments (interviews and the on-line survey) are subject to social desirability bias, particularly when respondents are asked about controversial issues. Individuals tasked with implementing or providing management or training on the Project, for example, may have been reluctant to point out negative aspects of the Project if they felt that this might reflect poorly on either their own or a colleague's performance. The on-line survey results and reading of Project documents were used to cross-check and supplement the findings from the one-on-one interviews to overcome inherent biases.

²⁸ As the online survey was anonymous, respondent details such as e-mail address or ISP were purposefully not tracked.

Figure 7: BCRR II Results Chain Summarized from the Project Document to Guide the Evaluation Interviews and Survey Questions



D. END OF PROJECT EVALUATION FINDINGS

1. Relevance²⁹

Summary

The relevance of the Project is assessed as High.

Countries that build their recovery capabilities over time can progressively reduce the impacts of disasters and lower the costs of short-term emergency response activities. Estimates suggest that for every \$1 invested in risk reduction and preparedness including through well planned and executed post-disaster recovery, there are savings of \$15 in future post-disaster crises.

The increasing severity and, in cases, frequency of extreme weather events associated with climate change are adding to the five countries' already high hazard risk profiles. Furthermore, in each of the five country-situations of ongoing medium intensity conflict and/or high institutional and social fragility, external shocks such as extreme weather events or slow onset droughts exacerbate the underlying vulnerabilities of communities and households, threatening physical and social assets, leading to losses of livelihoods, displacing large numbers of the population, and pushing increasing numbers of individuals and households into poverty and the ongoing risk of conflict.

The BCRR II Project design was based on sound principles and a comprehensive set of four output areas aimed at putting in place evidence-informed national policies, institutional arrangements, financial mechanisms, and technical capacities for planning and managing recovery at national and community levels before a disaster strikes. The four Outputs, two stand out in terms of relevance assessed by commitment of government counterparts and impact on beneficiaries. Firstly, the training in equitable and inclusive recovery that was scaled out under Output 2 and built up the local pool of experts was particularly relevant when national, provincial/regional, and local government leaders and technical experts were tested in real-time following disasters. Secondly, if well targeted, the types of short-term, low-cost incremental recovery activities implemented under the relatively small BCRR II project Output 3 demonstrated the relevance of supporting recovery in each of the countries in the face of the constraints imposed by unknown climate and fragility futures. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp relief the relevance and need for inclusive recovery approaches promoted by BCRR II, particularly in fragile and conflict afflicted situations.

Purpose

The relevance of the Project is evaluated as the extent to which the Project development objective was valid or aimed at the right things, at the time of design and under any changes in conditions during implementation and at the end of the Project. It is assessed by three measures, namely:

- The importance of and commitment to building resilience through strengthening national capacities for planning and managing recovery,
- The impact on project beneficiaries defined in the Project Document, and
- Ongoing relevance under Covid-19 conditions.

²⁹ Relevance is assessed on a four-point scale of: Negligible, Modest, Substantial, High.

Commentary and Analysis

a. Importance of and commitment to building resilience through strengthening national capacities for planning and managing recovery

The Project objective was to contribute to building resilience of the participating countries in the face of disasters by **strengthening national capacities to plan and manage recovery processes in a sustainable and inclusive manner** (build back better). The Project Document defined recovery as “The medium and longer-term rebuilding and sustainable restoration of resilient critical infrastructures, services, housing, facilities and livelihoods required for full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and Build Back Better, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk”.

The five BCRR II countries are in two of the most disaster-prone zones in the world namely Africa and Southeast Asia, and are periodically afflicted by floods, droughts, cyclones, seismic eruptions, fire, landslides or locust infestations. The natural hazard risk setting of the countries is further exacerbated by ongoing political instability and extremism leading to population displacement. For example, UNOCHA reports that violence has led to the displacement of more than one million people in Burkina Faso in the past two years, and an estimated 206,000 people have been displaced internally in Myanmar in the past six months. In the case of Cabo Verde, the country is at risk of external shocks due to its small and isolated economy compounding its natural hazard risk profile.³⁰ In the most recent World Risk Report (2020) - because of exposure, vulnerability, susceptibility, lack of coping capacities and lack of adaptive capacities, the BCRR II participating countries were classified as ‘very high’ (Cabo Verde³¹, Niger and Burkina Faso³²) to medium (Myanmar) and only Lao PDR³³ as ‘low’. In 2021, Burkina Faso, Myanmar and Niger are all designated as ‘medium-intensity conflict’ situations and Lao PDR as a ‘high institutional and social fragility’ state (World Bank Group, 2021).

Faced with multiple and routinely occurring disasters, development pathways in the countries are frequently interrupted by short-term crises and the need for emergency response efforts. The disaster risk management institutions in countries such as Niger are highly fragmented³⁴ or in the case of the Southeast Asian countries, the institutions lack clear mandates and the resources needed for leading and managing recovery across sectors. However, more recently there is a growing awareness and commitment by the governments of the need to undertake reforms to build institutional capacity at the national and local levels and address underlying disaster risk factors. In 2018, at the start of BCRR II, the five countries identified national stakeholders and organized project initiation meetings to present the products and results of the Phase I project and to discuss the expected outcomes of Phase II. The meetings contributed to building a deeper understanding of recovery among local stakeholders³⁵ but clearly this is an issue needing ongoing reinforcement.

³⁰ The 2016 World Risk Report ranked Cabo Verde 31st out of 171 countries in terms of risk to natural disasters and ranked the country as the 64th most vulnerable country, 92nd in terms of lack of coping capacities, and 43rd in terms of lack of adaptive capacities. (Welle & Birkmann, 2016).

³¹ Cabo Verde experienced severe drought in 2018 and 2019, agricultural plague in 2019 and flash floods in 2020.

³² In opening a BCRR II regional training workshop at Mohoun Loop, Burkina Faso in August 2019, the Minister of Women, National Solidarity, Family and Humanitarian Action highlighted that eleven of Burkina Faso's 13 regions had been affected by the 2019 floods, with more than 1 million people forced to move because of insecurity.

³³ It is worth noting that Lao PDR experienced annual flood events over the course of BCRR II. The 2018 floods affected two and a half thousand villages and an estimated 619,000 people and an initial damage estimate of 619 billion kin; the 2019 floods affected over 1,500 villages and 765,000 people in six provinces; and the 2020 floods associated with tropical storm Noul 11 affected several provinces and resulted in the evacuation of 200,000 people.

³⁴ A. Ousseini Ali, personal communication, 2 July 2021.

³⁵ BCRR II Annual Report 2018.

The ongoing importance or relevance of the BCRR II project objective “to contribute to building the resilience of countries in the face of disasters by strengthening national capacities to plan and manage recovery processes in a sustainable and inclusive manner Build Back Better)” is assessed as high in each of the five countries. Firstly, the project contributes towards the participating countries’ global commitments, for example, in achieving several of the Sustainable Development Goals including SDG #5 (Gender), SDG #13 (Climate Action) and SDG #17 (Partnerships for the Goals).³⁶

Secondly, there is a strong economic case to be made for a focus on recovery approaches after frequent disasters that characterize the countries. For example, following three consecutive disasters in 2018,³⁷ the Laos 2018 PDNA valued the total effects of the floods at an estimated \$372 million and decline of 2.01% of annual GDP. In Cabo Verde, there was a drought in 2018-19, agricultural plague in 2019 and flash floods in 2020. All countries have felt the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020/21. UNDRR has estimated that for every \$1 invested in risk reduction and preparedness including through well planned and executed recovery, there are savings of \$15 in future post-disaster crises. Savings of this magnitude would be of great benefit to the low and lower middle-income countries. Finally, countries that build their recovery capabilities not only lower the costs of and efforts needed for short-term emergency response but also can progressively reduce the impacts of future disasters (*see Figure 1 in section A3 above*).

BCRR II project design was based on four pillars from well-documented lessons learnt in Phase I and from UNDP experiences elsewhere (*see Box 1 and Box 2 in section A3 above*), namely:

- strengthened national policy, institutional arrangements, and financing mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery (output 1);
- enhanced technical capacities for recovery planning and implementation (output 2);
- enhanced national capacities for implementing recovery at community level (output 3); and
- improved knowledge products and exchanges (output 4).

All UNDP Country Office staff interviewed for the evaluation confirmed the severe disruptions caused by multiple disasters in each of the countries. Those interviewed and respondents in the online survey also commented positively on the level of government involvement in Project activities, in particular at the levels of regional and local governments which are at the front-line of catastrophic events and the partnerships or synergies with other projects (*see section D.3.c*).

Commitment at the central government level was more variable. For example, ownership from government counterparts in Niger and Myanmar was high in the early stages of the Project (because of the Phase I successes by Niger and as Myanmar had been co-chair of the ASEAN DRR Working Group shortly before the project started). However, especially for Output 1 there were shortfalls at the national level, for example:

- institutional reforms promoted by the Project for recovery in Burkina Faso were not finally achieved,
- improved policies and guidelines in Laos were prepared but not finally implemented because of no budgets being provided,

³⁶ Government of Lao PDR holds a pre-consultation on Disaster Recovery Framework in view of the Round Table Implementation Meeting 2019. (2019). Lao PDR. <https://laopdr.un.org/en/35777-government-lao-pdr-holds-pre-consultation-disaster-recovery-framework-view-round-table>.

³⁷ In 2018, Laos was affected by three consecutive disasters: the Son-Tinh storm that breached Xe pien-Xe Nam Noy hydropower saddle dam causing flash flooding, and followed by the storm Bebinca in August.

- adaptation of PDNA tools to the country situation were prepared at regional level in Niger but not at the national level due to a lack of technical expertise,
- National Disaster Recovery Guidelines in Myanmar were not finally approved, and
- although the Serviço Nacional de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros (SNPCB) was responsible for national implementation in Cabo Verde (NIM), the government relied heavily on the UNDP Country Office for support.


Approaches to policy preparation and approvals that used a bottom-up or learning by doing approach tended to be more successful and helped to engage government counterparts. For example, Government interest was high for the training on new technologies (such as a PDNA field data capture app in Niger), the adaptation of global tool and guidelines to country-specific contexts (Laos, Myanmar, Niger), and the preparation of sector guidelines.

b. Project beneficiaries

As a second measure of relevance, the evaluation reviewed the extent to which BCRR II provided benefits and of what sort to different stakeholders, including communities. The Project Document identifies the “project beneficiaries [as UNDP] Regional Bureaus and Country Offices” (p. 57) and that “women and youth will be the primary beneficiaries of community-level income generating activities for recovery” (p. 62).

In the online survey, 69% of all respondents stated that they had personally learnt a lot of new knowledge or skills in recovery planning and management from working on the Project and 31% had learnt a little (*Figure 8*). Of the 39% of respondents who worked for UNDP (including Country Offices and Regional Bureaux) or other UN agencies, an even higher 83% had learnt a lot on the Project and 17% a little, indicating that the Project’s relevance was high among this subset of beneficiaries.


Figure 8: Online survey respondents who had learnt new knowledge or skills in recovery planning and



The survey respondents were invited to rank in order of priority who they thought had been the main beneficiaries of the Project. The ranked order by all respondents was firstly (equally ranked) national and regional/provincial/local governments and their staff, second ranked were NGOs or community organizations, and third ranked were poor communities affected by disasters. Regarding whom among the community members were the main beneficiaries, respondents ranked the leaders of the communities first, followed by men in the community, and thirdly women in the community.

When considering the differences in Project beneficiaries, stakeholders were asked about the risks of the Project activities creating tensions in communities by benefitting some groups but not others. A little more than half of survey respondents (58%) did not think that the Project created tensions in communities but a significant 41% cautioned that tensions had been created or that they could not be sure because there had been limited beneficiary impact analyses. As outreach was very limited at regional and local level and as the Project’s focus had been on influencing the national government at the strategic level, it is recommended in the future that senior and specialist UN staff and national staff supplement Country Office staff to establish relationships with relevant government agencies working directly with communities for implementing this type of activity.

Figure 9: Online respondents' views on whether tensions were created in communities because the Project benefited some groups but not others



The evaluation did not find any systematic or standardized beneficiary impact surveys used by the five countries for community-level primary beneficiaries. It is recommended that low cost, standard beneficiary impact surveys be included in any future similar project. For example, a simple but well-structured monitoring report (Sept. 2020) on the financial support provided by 10 community organizations through

the Project to post-disaster affected communities in the North-Central and North Regions of Burkina Faso captured useful insights into the positive impacts for the beneficiaries of the Project at a community level. Through careful, criteria-linked targeting of potential beneficiaries (*see section D.2 below*) a total of 100 beneficiaries (of whom 78 were women) were selected for Project support and closely monitored by the community organizations (10 households per organization). The vulnerable (27%), disaster affected (13%), and internally displaced persons from terrorist attacks and threats (60%) were provided with small grants of 80,000 CFA francs (~US\$145) each. To monitor the beneficiaries (by home visits to check the viability of the activities and impact on the beneficiary), each of the community organizations received 150,000 CFA francs (~US\$272), and each of the seven associated provincial DPFSNFAH authorities³⁸ received a further 125,000 CFA francs (~US\$227) to monitor the community organizations. The types of small businesses undertaken by the beneficiary households are provided in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Community-Level Supported Small Business Recovery, North-Central and North Regions, Burkina Faso, 2020

| Business Sector | No. Beneficiaries | Percent of Total |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Commerce | 55 | 55 % |
| Livestock breeding | 34 | 34 % |
| Agriculture | 7 | 7 % |
| Handicrafts | 2 | 2 % |
| Restauranting (<i>Restauration</i>) | 2 | 2 % |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 |

The findings of the monitoring report underscored the relevance of even modest support and the positive impact of the well targeted small grants for vulnerable beneficiaries and their families.

c. Ongoing relevance³⁹ under Covid-19 conditions


The Covid-19 pandemic that rapidly spread across the globe starting early 2020 and ongoing at the time of this report, has caused the largest global economic contraction in eight decades, triggered rising levels in poverty and disrupted the way countries and people work. From early 2020 to mid-2021, the Covid-19 pandemic has added more than 216.9 million confirmed cases and more than 4.5

³⁸ DPFSNFAH: Directeurs provinciaux de la Femme, de la Solidarité Nationale, de la Famille et de l'Action Humanitaire. The seven provinces supported by the Project were Samentenga, Ioroum, Namentenga, Bam, Zondoma, Yatenga and Passore.

³⁹ The impact of Covid-19 on implementation of the Project is discussed in section D.3.a. Efficiency.

million deaths to the world’s disaster burden. The impacts of the pandemic on health, well-being and economies of the five BCRR II participating countries have been enormous and are expected to continue for many more months to come (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Deaths and Cases of Covid-19 in BCRR II Participating Countries (30 August 2021)



The pandemic is unfolding in the Sahel and West Africa countries at the same time as the region faces a food crisis and high levels of insecurity. UNOCHA reports that in Burkina Faso – a country that before the pandemic traditionally had experienced chronic food shortages and nutritional

insecurity, there is now “a unprecedented humanitarian emergency” as a result of the pandemic and compounded by a sharp deterioration in the security situation in the country’s northern and eastern regions. UNOCHA estimates that humanitarian needs in Burkina Faso are the highest since 2018, with 3.5 million people in need of assistance. The impact on women and girls is severe. For example, two thirds of women in West Africa work in the food sector in precarious jobs with little or no social protection and now are facing additional hardship due to pandemic mobility restrictions and closure of borders that limit trade. Prior to the pandemic, education for girls was difficult; for example, a high 39% out of school rate for girls of primary school age in Niger, 22% in Burkina Faso and 7% in Cabo Verde. With school closures due to Covid-19, access is further reduced, and the children’s development disrupted.⁴⁰

The inclusive and gender-sensitive recovery planning approaches and skills promoted through BCRR II may contribute towards planning and formulating recovery policies in the Covid-19 context. Two thirds of online survey respondents agreed strongly (11%) or somewhat (56%) that the skills and knowledge promoted by the Project for planning and implementing recovery had been or likely would be used in their countries in the Covid-19 context.⁴¹

Experiences from Myanmar illustrate how the Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp relief the relevance and need for inclusive recovery approaches promoted by BCRR II, particularly in fragile and conflict afflicted situations. For example, in mid-2020 baseline information in priority sectors was collected in Myanmar to help inform the Government’s future recovery efforts. The Project also provided inputs to Pillar 5: Social cohesion and community resilience as part of the UN Framework for the Socio-Economic Response in Myanmar and issues related to recovery and the humanitarian development-peace nexus were integrated into UNDP-Myanmar’s Humanitarian Response Plan and addendum on Covid-19.

⁴⁰ coronavirus-west-africa - Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat. (2020). Oecd.org. <https://www.oecd.org/swac/coronavirus-west-africa/>

⁴¹ One respondent recommended that as the countries are permanently operating under disasters – not least the global pandemic , the ‘post disaster’ PDNA and DRF tools should be updated and refocused to reflect new global realities.

More directly, following a request from the countries and with approval of the Government of Luxembourg, in May 2020 an amount of \$110,000 was repurposed from earlier BCRR II activities to newly emerging priorities and to support national response and recovery from Covid-19 impacts, as summarized in Table 3 below.

Table 3: BCRR II repurposed funds for Covid-19 response and recovery activities

| Country | Amount | Original activity | Covid-19 repurposed activity |
|------------|----------|---|--|
| Lao PDR | \$41,000 | Output 3. Communities supported have funds available for recovery (\$52,630) | 683 cash grants (44% women) to returning migrant workers and 483 cash for work participants (25% women, youths and elderly) for road maintenance and flood drainage small works in Bolikhamxay and Saravane provinces. |
| Niger | \$30,000 | Output 1. Two new micro-insurance products developed and tested (\$11,900). One national plan for recovery financing adopted. | Covid-19 public awareness, and provision of hygiene kits and handwashing devices in Tanda commune. |
| Cabo Verde | \$30,000 | Output 1.2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.1.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. | Training and awareness for 120 young leaders from youth associations (60% women) in Covid-19 rapid response, assessments, and communication. Install community washbasins in 50 neighborhoods in Praia, Santa Cruz and Mindelo. |

2. Effectiveness⁴²

Summary

The effectiveness of the Project is assessed as Modest-Substantial.

The effectiveness of the Project is evaluated as the extent to which the Project activities as designed and implemented resulted in sufficient incentives to national governments to fully commit to, plan, manage and fund sustainable and inclusive post-disaster recovery processes at national and community-levels. The effectiveness rating reviewed whether the main Project-funded activities under each of the Output areas were successfully/partially/not completed as compared to the planned targets. All countries came close to meeting and in some cases exceeded the targets set for enhancing technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation (Output 2) and for enhancing capacities for implementing recovery at the community-level (Output 3). However, the rating was not finally fully Substantial because the Project fell short in making similar achievements with respect to strengthened national policy, institutional and financial frameworks and mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes (Output 1) and in fully meeting planned targets for improved knowledge products, technological applications and South-South exchanges for recovery management (Output 4). Some of the shortfalls may be attributed the challenges created by the Covid-19 pandemic but there were markers before 2020 that targets were not on track and the request for extension itself was not based on a realistic time-bound action plan for completing all outstanding activities and making full use of all Project funds, with 9% of funds (\$264,765) unspent at the end of the Project.

⁴² Effectiveness is assessed on a four-point scale of: Negligible, Modest, Substantial, High.

Purpose

The effectiveness of the Project is assessed regarding the extent to which planned activities and outputs were fully implemented and in a timely way to achieve the Project objective, i.e., *Were the right things done right?* Effectiveness is assessed against the four Outputs defined in the Project Document, namely:

- Output #1: Strengthened national policy, institutional and financial frameworks, and mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes,
- Output #2: Enhanced technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation,
- Output #3: Enhanced national capacities for implementing recovery at community level, and
- Output #4: Improved knowledge products, technological applications and South-South exchange for recovery management.

Commentary and Analysis

The Project's inputs (funds, human resources and activities) were implemented under four output areas. The Project Documents had Results Frameworks with indicators under each Output and targets against which progress to achieving the Output could be monitored. The 2018 Annual Report for Niger and the end of Project financial reporting for Myanmar reported progress under the relevant indicators but in the main, the frameworks were not used or populated in the Mid-year or Annual Progress Reports. Similarly, whilst the Annual Workplans for each country provided information of planned activities and budget allocations but did not report on the completion or achievement of activities in the previous year, making an assessment of the achievement of targets for each of the multiple indicators difficult to ascertain.

Therefore, the evaluation aggregated the multiple activities implemented in the countries under the global indicators for each output (*Figure 7*) and reviewed the achievement of each output based on interviews with UNDP Country Office staff and extracted from descriptions in the Mid-year and Annual Reports. The findings of the assessment of effectiveness are provided below and should be read in conjunction with Annex 2. Annex 2 provides a summary graphic for each country to illustrate with 'traffic light' coding which indicators were largely achieved (completed), partially achieved or ongoing, or not achieved (*Annex 2*).

a. National policy, institutional and financial frameworks for recovery

Output #1: Strengthened national policy, institutional and financial frameworks, and mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes (24% of approved workplan budgets)

The project had three intermediate global outcome indicators to measure the success towards achieving Output #1, namely:

1. The number of countries with baseline information for recovery practice in place, useful to enhance recovery institutional arrangements and policies.
2. The number of countries that developed or revised their policies to support recovery processes.
3. The number of countries that established institutional arrangements, financing mechanisms, M&E procedures and partnerships for recovery.

Under Output 1, the countries focused on developing or revising policies to support recovery processes and to review and establish institutional reforms for recovery. Main activities funded by the Project were facilitated consultation meetings and workshops of national stakeholders to discuss and reach consensus on recovery policy (for example, three thematic group meetings and 24 stakeholder

consultations in Myanmar), or consultative workshops to assign institutional responsibilities that previously were fragmented across numerous agencies (for example, consultation meetings in three Regions in Niger), and where feasible to prepare draft Laws. After three and a half years of Project support (six years in the cases of Niger, Burkina Faso and Cabo Verde which participated in Phase I support), achievement of Output 1 was less than planned and in particular, all countries failed to successfully adopt or put in place financing mechanisms for sustainable recovery.

- In Cabo Verde, the Project contributed to the review and improvement of institutional arrangements for recovery (Agriculture, Infrastructure and Housing, and Land Use Planning and Management) and final approval by the Council of Ministers of national ex ante Disaster Recovery Framework, but there was little focus on financing mechanisms or putting in place monitoring and evaluation procedures for recovery. Cabo Verde was able to finalize and start implementation of a project-supported Communication Strategy for short-, medium- and long-term actions and a gender strategy for integrating gender considerations into recovery plans.
- In Myanmar the Project supported a large number of inter-agency consultation meetings to review the institutional arrangements and mandates for recovery and prepare a draft recovery policy but after the disruptions of February 2021, the National Recovery Framework was not finally completed and options for financing post disaster recovery and funding arrangements for emergency response/recovery were still ongoing when the Project closed.
- In Laos, a policy and guidelines for coordinating and managing recovery (National Guidelines for Disaster Recovery) were adopted and the Disaster Management Law was passed in June 2019 and clearly sets out the institutional responsibilities and arrangements for disaster preparedness, response and recovery. However, options for financing post disaster recovery and the establishment of a monitoring systems framework for recovery were not achieved.
- Niger made early progress in undertaking a feasibility study on options for insurance for agro-pastoralists and the Project also facilitated consultations with the private sector, but new micro-insurance products were not finally developed and tested by insurance and micro-credit providers by the end of the Project and the adoption of a national plan for recovery financing has not been achieved.
- In Burkina Faso, the institutional reforms for recovery promoted by the Project were not agreed to by the Government and efforts to establish a single model agency for DM or approve a single law on DM were not achieved.

Respondents in the online survey were similarly cautious in their views of whether the Project had helped to strengthen the national policies, institutions and funding mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes in their countries. Only 58% responded that the Project had helped “a little” and 16% stated that their country was worse off or the same on this output before and after the Project.

A binding constraint for implementing recovery that was strongly highlighted by all stakeholders interviewed was the lack of funding available in any of the low- middle-income countries for implementing recovery plans. Under Output 1 activities, only Niger and Myanmar explicitly carried out studies into options for financing mechanisms and developed roadmaps for more detailed investigations.⁴³ It is recommended that a future focus for support should build on and include more

⁴³ In the case of Niger, a planned feasibility study into operationalizing commercial insurance and micro-credit for agro-pastoralists was cancelled in 2020 and the funding reallocated towards Covid-19 response activities in Tanda commune, including providing handwashing devices and hygiene sanitation kits to villagers.

detailed feasibility studies for all countries – appropriate to each country-context, a suite of practical financial instruments for recovery, at both community (including for example, micro-insurance, savings clubs, matching grants) and national levels (including for example, parametric/index-based risk insurance and transfer mechanisms, budgetary support for recovery funds).

There was varied emphasis on activities to support countries put in place baseline information for recovery practice. Cabo Verde had received separate funding support through UNISDR and subsequently the World Bank for establishing and maintaining a National Disaster Observatory and the BCRR II Project supported limited training of SNPCB staff on use of the platform. Efforts are underway in Lao PDR to re-establish the LaoDi (damage and losses) database although the transfer of data between the formerly responsible Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to the now responsible Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare resulted in delays. In Myanmar, a well-structured, spreadsheet database was finalized in March 2021 as part of the Myanmar National Guidelines for Post Disaster Needs Assessments. It provides a single, standardized data platform of pre-disaster statistics (from the most recently available official government statistics to facilitate future PDNAs, particularly in relation to key socio-economic indicators, such as on health, education, poverty, and livelihoods. In all countries and particularly those such as Burkina Faso and Niger with no single data platforms, it is recommended that future linkages be made through consultations and stakeholder awareness raising with several well-maintained sector databases that could be of use for PDNA/DRF teams, for example, the WHO-supported Country Health Systems Surveillance platform (CHeSS) and ILO-supported database of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation (NATLEX).

b. Technical capacities for recovery

Output #2: Enhanced technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation. **(19% of approved workplan budgets)**

The project had four intermediate outcome indicators to measure the success towards achieving Output #2, namely:

1. The number of PDNA/DRF rosters of experts available and ready to be deployed.
2. The number of countries with PDNA/DRF guidelines and tools developed, refined and/or adapted and tested.
3. The number of PDNA sectoral guides developed per participating country.
4. The number of countries that adopted simplified procurement procedures for post-disaster recovery.

One of the most successfully achieved activities under Output 2 included the large number of PDNA/DRF training workshops at national, regional/provincial and/or district commune levels. All countries met and, in some cases, well-exceeded the planned targets for the number of people to be trained and number of sectoral guidelines to be prepared. In Niger, for example, a total of 310 people were trained by the Project in two national workshops (Niamey and Dosso, 60 people), two regional workshops (Dosso and Zinder, 70 people), three Departmental workshops (Ingall, Goya and Guidan Roumdji, 100 people), and three communal workshops (Ingall, Tchadoua and N'dounga, 80 people), exceeding the target of 210 people. In most of the countries too, the workshop-based training was complemented by several field and real-time simulations in conducting PDNAs and preparing recovery frameworks by sub-national government staff (provincial or district governments).⁴⁴ Not only were

⁴⁴ 63% of online survey respondents reported that the country(ies) that they had worked in over the past three years, had made use of the Disaster Recovery Framework Guidelines either in reality or as a simulation/mock run.

new trainees provided the training but there were several good practices in new areas that it is recommended be included and more actively disseminated in the future. These include, for example, gender mainstreaming in Laos and Cabo Verde based on prepared and approved gender guidelines for PDNAs, and the introduction of well-tested principles for strengthening social resilience (reducing inequalities and marginalization of groups), initiating reconciliation, and peacebuilding where feasible, as part of the recovery planning training in humanitarian crisis situations in West Africa (*Box 3*).

Box 3: Strengthening social resilience in recovery planning training

In Burkina Faso, the CORESUR Training Workshops in Disaster and Humanitarian Crisis Management in the provinces provided an overview of the 30 guiding principles in four protection groupings for the movement of people within their own countries, namely:


- Protection of civil and political rights related to the right to life, security, physical well-being, and family unity.
- Protecting social and political rights related to access to food, shelter, health, and primary education.
- Protection of economic and social rights related to housing, land and property, livelihoods, access to secondary education and university.
- Protection of civil and political rights related to personal documentation, freedom of movement, expression, opinion and religion, and the right to vote. This module was supplemented by a tool used to record IDPs.

Notable progress also was made in meeting or exceeding the targets for preparing sectoral guidelines specifically adapted to each country situation, typically for agriculture, livestock, housing, education, economic and transport sectors.

In the online survey, respondents were asked to comment on whether they thought the Project had helped to improve the technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation for example, of government staff,

local consultants, able to easily call on international experts. Some 92% of respondents commented positively that the project had helped a lot (50%) or a little bit (42%) (*Figure 11*). This was physically demonstrated in, for example, the case of Laos PDR where the Government led a high quality PDNA in November 2020.

Figure 11: Online survey respondents - Technical capacities for recovery planning and implementation



Respondents commented that national and local staff had been provided with opportunities to enhance their skills, although unfortunately this declined in the last year of the Project due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Others commented on the fact that whilst most government departments had

plentiful experience and expertise in post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Project and associated training had increased staff awareness and knowledge of the importance of recovery and had helped to clarify the roles and responsibilities in recovery planning and implementation. Respondents also pointed out that BCRR II was one of several other projects and support to countries in staff training and so, if well-coordinated, contributed to the collective lessons and progress.

Less successful, was the adoption of simplified procurement procedures for post-disaster recovery which was not explored in any detail by the participating countries. Whilst some countries and external support partners such as the World Bank Group and Asian Development Bank do have simplified procurement procedures in place for disaster/emergency response activities, simplified procedures for medium- and long-term recovery would likely fall outside the bounds of financial management regulations in most countries, and the more so in fragile and conflict affected situations. It is recommended that the use of simplified procurement procedures for recovery activities not be promoted unless based on prior, detailed, risk-based financial management and procurement assessments of the country systems.

c. [National capacities for implementing recovery at community level](#)

Output #3: Enhanced national capacities for implementing recovery at community level. **(13% of approved workplan budgets)**

The project had three intermediate outcome indicators to measure the success towards achieving Output #3, namely:

1. The number of countries with community level post-disaster recovery plans.
2. The percent of women and youth (as a percent of the total participants) who were trained in resilient technologies per training.
3. The number of countries with established funds to support community level recovery.

All stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation and 100% of the respondents to the online survey stated that they believed the Project had contributed towards strengthening the capacities for implementing recovery at a community level⁴⁵ (*Figure 12 overleaf*).

Project activities in Myanmar and Laos demonstrated that good working relations with subnational authorities and capacity building of local authorities in preparing state-level recovery plans, even if not finally officially endorsed, have the potential for coordinated and effective recovery interventions. For example, implementing the Mon State Recovery Plan following the 2019 floods in Myanmar, provided the guidelines and foundations for a community-based recovery Fund and implementing activities that benefitted 2,300 villagers from cash for work schemes, 13,199 villagers from dredging and hauling works, 1,600 farmers from fuel voucher distribution, and training for community members in basic flood DRM and preparedness, although the outcome would have been further strengthened by more systematic monitoring of implementation.

⁴⁵ Risk reduction was also a focus of training in some of the countries. For example, in Cabo Verde several capacity building workshops were held on the ENNRD (National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy) and carrying out detailed urban risk assessments (DURA). In Niger, decentralized disaster management structures were established and trained, including 11 Vulnerability Monitoring Observatories and 22 Community Early Warning and Response Units.

The Project support for training local builders in low cost, resilient house construction techniques -such as raised floors, clay and aggregate reinforced mortar, met or significantly exceeded the numbers of people trained. For example, 145 community masons trained in Burkina Faso compared to the target of 120.



Similar achievements were made regarding Project support for post-disaster livelihoods recovery. For example, responding to the needs of returned migrants in Bolikhamxay and Saravani districts in Lao PDR⁴⁶, the Project reallocated funds to provide cash grants to 483 households for small flood mitigation works. In Mon, Myanmar, 2,300 people (against a target of 200 people) implemented community-based projects through a community recovery fund and guidelines established by the Project.


In Niger, 110 women and 100 youths were supported to establish two market garden sites of 2ha each fitted with small-scale irrigation and submersible pumps and linked to a marketing app.

In Burkina Faso, the Government wished to change the activity of rebuilding community level infrastructure by vulnerable people affected by disasters to infrastructure by internally displaced people. As this change had not been approved by UNDP-HQ, the Government was requested to return the funds which it did before the Project closed and this activity was not completed. The preparation of guidelines for establishing and operating a revolving community recovery fund also was not achieved.

Several of those interviewed reflected that the training had raised awareness about recovery management practices at community level but cautioned (and it is recommended that any future support take into account) that the training for community disaster management committees and district level local governments had been piecemeal at times, too focused on response and early

warning systems, limited in coverage due to funding constraints, and not sufficiently intensive.

Figure 12: Degree to which Project helped to improve capacities for implementing recovery at community level



The impact of the small grants on the affected individuals was noted with pride by all those interviewed for the evaluation. Many of those interviewed and several reports from the field identified that Project funds were extremely limited in comparison to the scale of need and called for higher levels of external support in the future. However, the purpose of Output 3 was to enhance national capacities for

implementing recovery at community level⁴⁷ including working with governments to build political will for and technical capacities to put in place practical options for establishing and sustaining community recovery funds used for and administered by clear, transparent, and efficient eligibility criteria and

⁴⁶ Migrant workers returning from Thailand when borders were closed, and jobs lost as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.

⁴⁷ (R. Misal, personal communication, 20 July 2021)

operating procedures and in partnership with either local governments and/or NGOs and civil society groups. It is recommended that several good practices could have been more systematically documented by the Project and disseminated within and between the countries to consolidate the lessons learnt from BCRR II experiences for the future (*see for example, Box 4*).

Box 4: Good practice selection criteria for livelihoods recovery small grants

The Ouahigouya, Northern Region, Burkina Faso monitoring report (Sept-2020) provides useful insights into the clear, criteria-linked targeting of potential beneficiaries selected for Project support and closely monitored by 10 community organizations. The small grants finally supported livelihoods recovery for the vulnerable (27%), disaster affected (13%), and internally displaced persons as a result of terrorist attacks and threats (60%).

Le ciblage des bénéficiaires a été faite de façon concertée entre les DPFSNFAH et les organisation communautaires. Les acteurs ont exploité leurs données en matière de ménages vulnérables et ménages victimes de catastrophes dont ils disposaient. A cette catégorie de bénéficiaires, s'ajoutent les données enregistrées sur les personnes déplacées internes (PDI) consécutives aux attaques et menaces terroristes. Toutes choses qui nous ont permis d'identifier de façon objective et judicieuse, les ménages les plus vulnérables concernés par le relèvement post catastrophe. / *Recipient targeting was done in a concerted manner between DPFSNFAH and community organizations. Actors used their data on vulnerable households and disaster-affected households. In addition to this category of beneficiaries, there is recorded data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) because of terrorist attacks and threats. All things that have allowed us to identify objectively and judiciously, the most vulnerable households affected by post-disaster recovery.*

Criteria agreed following several iterative consultations for the selection of the « Argent contre travail » / "Money for Work" beneficiaries:

Le bénéficiaire doit entre autres être / *the beneficiary must, among other things, be:*

- victime d'une catastrophe ou de crise humanitaire / *the victim of a disaster or humanitarian crisis*
- vulnérable / *vulnerable,*
- apte à mener une activité génératrice de revenus *able to carry out an income-generating activity,*
- de bonne moralité / *good-natured,*
- détenteur d'une pièce d'identité / *have an identity document,*
- être âgé de 18 à 70 ans / *be between the ages of 18 and 70.*

d. Knowledge products, innovations and exchange for recovery management

Output #4: Improved knowledge products, technological applications and South-South exchange for recovery management. **(17% of approved workplan budgets)**

The project had three intermediate outcome indicators to measure the success towards achieving Output #4, namely:

1. The number of knowledge products developed and disseminated including lessons learned.
2. The number of South-South exchanges promoted among participating countries and/or regions.
3. The number of country-tailored mobile applications to support PDNAs and recovering monitoring.

The global Project Document (p. 19) stated that at a minimum, the following knowledge products would be developed and disseminated:


- i) Drought guidelines, which would include information on monitoring droughts, water management for drinking, for livestock and for irrigation, land and natural resources management, and sustainable agricultural practices. The guidelines would define roles for national government and community level recovery.
- ii) Recovery guidelines which will include aspects of repair and reconstruction of community infrastructure, individual households, replacement of livelihoods assets and floods preparedness at community level.
- iii) Systematization of Best Practices in Public-private partnerships on implementing effective recovery and compendium of best practices on technological innovation for recovery.
- iv) Financing options for Recovery.

Numerous new and innovative materials were produced under BCRR II. To name but a few, Laos and Cabo Verde achieved their targets for documenting successful recovery experiences and guidelines for drought and floods recovery including the early warning initiative in Laos being showcased by the UNV department on their website in 2019.⁴⁸ Other interesting materials included the project support for a water management assessment for flood prevention and water scarcity in Kyaikmaraw Township, Mon Stet, Myanmar and prepared an animated video on risk informed recovery and BBB that was subsequently shared at an ASEAN Ministerial meeting on disaster management and that also triggered a request from Kayin State for similar support. Cabo Verde collated some 40 technical and scientific documents relating to disaster risk reduction in the country from 1996-2019 and ranked the documents in order of importance. Around 20 stakeholders (mayors, beneficiaries, and technical experts) each from Niger and Burkina Faso benefitted from study tours to Benin in 2019 to learn from that country's past experiences in post-disaster recovery, civil protection and relocation of IDPs, and to learn about supporting activities along the entire value chain in livelihoods recovery. New mobile apps were developed (Laos and Niger) and tested for use in PDNAs and recovery projects, and a comprehensive study of recovery financing options was undertaken in Niger. Among other major events, the Global coordination component, in collaboration with the World Bank's Global facility for Disaster Risk Reduction, UNDRR and the European Commission successfully convened the 4th World Reconstruction Conference in Geneva Switzerland (May 13-14, 2019) attended by more than 1,000 participants from national and local governments, civil society, private sector and academia.

However, less successful were that evidence-based, communications plans and materials for knowledge sharing experience were not completed as planned by Niger and Burkina Faso. In Myanmar, a document outlining options to finance post disaster recovery with indicative amount funding for emergency response/recovery had been prepared in draft but not yet been approved by the end of the Project. The evaluation also did not find any significant final knowledge products on public-private partnerships, widespread use of technological innovations, or substantive financing options and recommendations for recovery, and it is recommended that these are important areas that should be considered in the future. The majority (66%) of respondents in the online survey stated that knowledge products, technological applications, and South-South exchange for recovery were only a little bit improved (33%), were the same (25%) or were worse (8%) before and after the Project (*Figure 13 overleaf*).

⁴⁸ <https://www.unv.org/Success-stories/un-volunteer-helps-prepare-communities-lao-pdr-climate-related-disasters>

Figure 13: Contributions made by the Project to knowledge products, innovations, and exchange (online survey responses)



Overall, the evaluation found that the knowledge products prepared through the Project and documents prepared for implementation purposes (for example, TORs for training or preparing sector guidelines, good practice formats for monitoring site visits and Annual Reports, and similar) could have been more systematically collated and shared between the five participating countries. Purposeful knowledge and information sharing between the countries was an area of opportunity that the Project managers could have incorporated earlier and several stakeholders commented that it was only in the final six months of the Project that learning between countries was actively encouraged and facilitated. It is recommended for the future that a cloud-sharing repository of Project documents be established and maintained for easier internal sharing of knowledge between the participating countries on recovery and for project management. An internal sharing mechanism would also simplify real-time Project monitoring under ongoing travel restrictions and facilitate visibility for the external support partner.

e. Global coordination

The global coordination component accounted for **22% of the Project's originally planned total budget and 18.7% of total expenditures (excluding GMS) at the end of the Project**. Activities implemented under the Project included specialist technical support from HQ, Project and recovery-related communications, global and regional workshops, and HQ administrative support including financial management and procurement support.

From mid-2018 through 2019, UNDP Headquarters and UNDP's Regional Bureaus in Bangkok and Nairobi provided technical support to all countries to ensure the quality of technical documents, guidelines and frameworks that were being developed, under4took regional harmonization and support to south-south cooperation (for example the country visits to Benin by Niger and Burkina Faso) and sharing of lessons learned and enhancing the visibility of the Project by preparing a communications plan. In 2020/21, desk-based support continued, and Housing Recovery Guidelines were completed in 2021. Due to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, the country support missions, a global Training of Trainers and regional workshops and South-South exchanges on Recovery

preparedness and best practices were postponed and ultimately not fully achieved. The Recovery Team at UNDP HQ and the Regional Bureaus did continue to provide technical support missions remotely. The global team also was impacted by loss of staff (three staff members in six months) which slowed the planning and implementation of planned knowledge products.

f. Planned to Actual expenditures

Table 4 overleaf provides a summary of the Project funds allocated by country at the start of the Project (Planned) and at the end of the Project (Actuals as of May 31, 2021, plus commitments with final payments under processing). By making use of annually approved workplans, expenditures at the end of the Project were reasonably well aligned with the originally planned country allocations. However, even with the five-month extension of the Project closing date to accommodate the delays caused by Covid-19, at the end of the Project, the overall disbursement was 91%, with an amount of \$264,765 not spent. The biggest shortfalls in expenditure were in Burkina Faso (93%), Lao PDR (90%) and Global coordination (79%). In part, the shortfalls may be attributed to the challenges created by the Covid-19 pandemic but there were markers before 2020 that targets were not on track (*see section 3. Efficiency below*). It is recommended that in the future, requests for extending a Project closing date should be accompanied by a realistic time-bound action plan for completing all outstanding activities and including a partial reallocation of funds to other Outputs or countries to make full use of remaining Project funds.

Table 4: Planned to Actual Expenditures, 2018-2021 (US\$ and % of Total)

| Country | Total Budget (3.3 years) | | | Actual Expenditures (US\$) | | | | Committed | End of Project | | Undisbursed |
|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--|----------------|
| | Original Budget (US\$) | Final Budget (US\$) | Final Budget (% of Total) | 1-Jan - 31-Dec 2018 | 1-Jan - 31-Dec 2019 | 1-Jan - 31-Dec 2020 | 1-Jan - 31-May 2021 | Awaiting Expenditure (US\$) | Total Expenditures (US\$) | Total Expenditures (% of Final Budget) | (US\$) |
| Burkina Faso | 275,462 | 391,914 | 13.3% | 0 | 157,725 | 186,280 | 19,356 | 0.00 | 363,360 | 92.7% | 28,554 |
| Niger | 275,464 | 391,914 | 13.3% | 85640 | 102,707 | 122,993 | 40,961 | 20,706 | 373,007 | 95.2% | 18,907 |
| Laos | 385,646 | 603,636 | 20.6% | 69,118 | 146,367 | 246,668 | 49,743 | 30,157 | 542,052 | 89.8% | 61,584 |
| Myanmar | 385,648 | 603,636 | 20.6% | 120,212 | 264,375 | 133,308 | 35,889 | 26,830 | 580,614 | 96.2% | 23,022 |
| Cabo Verde | - | 310,633 | 10.6% | 13,804 | 133,162 | 137,052 | 29,200 | 0.00 | 313,217 | 100.8% | (- 2,584) |
| Global Coordination | 330,556 | 635,170 | 21.6% | 43744 | 316,358 | 73,548 | 17,635 | 48,603 | 499,887 | 78.7% | 135,283 |
| TOTAL | 1,652,776 | 2,936,903 | 100.0% | 332,517 | 1,120,694 | 899,848 | 192,784 | 126,296 | 2,672,138 | 91.0% | 264,765 |

Table 5 below provides an approximate summary of the Project funds allocated by output at the start of the Project (Original Budget) in comparison to the allocations made on the approved Annual Workplans submitted by each country.⁴⁹

Table 5: Allocation of Project Funds by Outputs

| Output | Original Budget (US\$) | Original Budget (%) | Approved Workplans (US\$) | Approved Workplans (%) |
|--|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| Output 1 | 318,381 | 18% | 894,213 | 24% |
| Output 2 | 371,395 | 21% | 710,603 | 19% |
| Output 3 | 331,499 | 19% | 469,691 | 13% |
| Output 4 | 245,101 | 14% | 621,135 | 17% |
| Global Coordination (Global project mgt & coordn and Output 4) | 330,556 | 19% | 1,006,051 | 27% |
| Project mgt & coordination (in countries) | 437,878 | 25% | | |
| UNDP GMS | 132,222 | 7% | Included above | |
| Total | 1,901,546 | 100% | 3,701,693 | 100% |

Of note is that the country workplans increasingly budgeted for activities under Outputs 1 and 4 and decreased annual amounts for Outputs 2 and 3, even as the achievements in Outputs 1 and 4 fell behind the originally planned targets. It is recommended for future projects that stronger and regular monitoring of targets be used throughout implementation, so that and gaps between funds being allocated and targets being achieved can be identified in a timely way and corrective adjustments be made, including for example, closer oversight by a Global project manager and/or reallocation of funds to better performing output areas (in the BCRR II case, Outputs 2 and 3).

3. Efficiency⁵⁰

Summary

The efficiency of the Project is assessed as Modest-Substantial.

The efficiency of the Project was evaluated as the extent to which the resources were used in the best possible way to meet the Project's objective. The Project's Country Office management and coordination costs were a relatively high 24% of the small project's total costs and the global project management and coordination costs (excluding Output 4) were an additional 10% of the original budget to cover the costs of three to five activities implemented per country per year. The costs could be justified when considering the geographic extent of the Project, namely, covering five participating countries of which two countries are in West Africa, two in Southeast Asia and a remote small island

⁴⁹ Note that the evaluation has been unable to find a revised budget broken down by Output when the additional €1 million was added to the Project in the first year. Also, actual expenditures are available by country (Table 4) but not by Output. Therefore, the Original Budget breakdown is used albeit noting that the total of all years' approved workplans (\$3,701,693) is greater than the Project Budget (\$2,936,903).

⁵⁰ Efficiency is assessed on a four-point scale of: Negligible, Modest, Substantial, High.

developing state and the high disaster risk and high institutional and social fragility of the states. High staff turnover at UNDP HQ and difficulties in retaining staff in the Country Offices led to delays in implementation progress. The Project was well coordinated with and collaborated with other sector projects and actors. The Global Team Recovery Advisors and Program Manager provided timely specialist and just-in-time support to Country Office staff although it did not respond at a large enough scale to transition to virtual support and to reallocate underutilized funds previously earmarked for travel towards successful in-country activities under Outputs 2 and 3 in the final 12 months once the reduced travel regime of the Covid-19 pandemic became obvious. A Substantial rating for efficiency was downgraded by the evaluation to Modest because the monitoring of the Project was weak.

Purpose

The efficiency of the Project was evaluated as the extent to which the resources were used in the best possible way to achieve the Project objective taking into account the operational, financial and procurement processes used, and the role by and within UNDP for coordination, collaboration and consistency. “Were the actual costs for achieving the objective warranted?” Efficiency is assessed against the five measures, namely:

- Implementation progress
- The impact of Covid-19 on implementation progress
- Project management costs
- Collaboration, coordination and consistency
- Monitoring and reporting.

Commentary and Analysis


a. Implementation progress

Implementation of the Project activities was managed by means of annual workplans prepared by the UNDP Country Offices in close consultation with the country Governments and approved by the Project Board and Global Team. Table 6 below provides a summary of the annual planned versus actual expenditures by country in each of the three and a half years of implementation (2018-mid-2021). Figure 14 overleaf is a graphic representation for easier reading of the planned versus annual expenditures. In the figure, the circles represent the workplan amounts approved for each year in each country and the vertical bars represent the actual expenditures.

Table 6: Planned vs. Actual Expenditures by Country, 2018-2021 (US\$)

| Country | 2018 | | 2019 | | 2020 | | 2021 | |
|---------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual |
| Burkina Faso | 122,679 | - | 177,223 | 157,725 | 242,714 | 186,280 | 71,722 | 19,355 |
| Niger | 134,982 | 85,640 | 188,514 | 102,707 | 207,792 | 122,993 | 84,564 | 61,667 |
| Lao PDR | 126,636 | 69,118 | 182,604 | 146,367 | 362,550 | 246,668 | 92,511 | 79,900 |
| Myanmar | 129,104 | 120,212 | 289,598 | 264,375 | 193,640 | 133,308 | 77,127 | 62,719 |
| Cabo Verde | 95,836 | 13,804 | 151,200 | 133,162 | 146,502 | 137,052 | 76,299 | 29,200 |
| Global Coordn | 218,808 | 43,744 | 366,120 | 316,358 | 284,391 | 73,547 | 136,732 | 66,238 |
| Total | 828,045 | 332,517 | 1,355,259 | 1,120,694 | 1,437,588 | 899,848 | 538,955 | 319,079 |

Figure 14: Planned vs. Actual Annual Expenditures



From Table 6 and Figure 14, in 2018 Niger, Laos and Myanmar were close to achieving their planned activities which was the more notable because the Project effectively launched only in June 2018 and so there were only six-months' implementation in the first year. The Project was slow to launch in Burkina Faso because the national project documents had to be adapted to the content of a larger DRR program already under implementation. In the case of Cabo Verde, the national documents took a long time to finalize due to local staff shortages. In both countries, the Project documents were finally only signed in November 2018, thus effectively reducing the implementation period by nearly one year, a lag that Burkina Faso found difficult to catch up and where the early delays were compounded by the country's ongoing humanitarian crises triggered in 2019 and 2020 with the number of internally displaced people reaching one million by mid-2020. As can be seen in Table 7 below, even though Burkina's workplan was drastically reduced for the remaining two months in 2018, actual expenditures in that year finally were zero.

Table 7: Burkina Faso: 2018 Budget and Revised Budget to Actual Expenditure

| Country | Total Budget (3.3 years) (US\$) | | Approved Annual Workplan | | Actual Expenditures (US\$) |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| | Original Budget (US\$) | Final Budget incl GMS (US\$) | 12-Jun-2018-19* | Revsd Nov 2018 | 1-Jan - 31-Dec 2018 |
| Burkina Faso | 275,462 | 391,914 | 122,679 | 58,357 | - |
| Output 1 | 61,880 | | 8,588 | 14,426 | |
| Output 2 | 19,040 | | 49,072 | 17,850 | |
| Output 3 | 77,350 | | 24,536 | 9,520 | |
| Output 4 | 23,800 | | 12,268 | 12,238 | |
| Project management & coordn | 93,392 | | 28,216 | 4,323 | |

In 2019, implementation progress picked up and was satisfactory in all countries except for some emerging challenges in Niger. Notable achievements included, for example:

- in Myanmar the National Disaster Recovery Guidelines were under active preparation, and the Project provided financial, logistical and technical support to the 34th meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management in Mandalay (chaired by Myanmar) and the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management in Naypyidaw, both highlighting the importance of effective mechanisms, policies and adequate funding for recovery;
- in Laos the Disaster Management Law was passed by Parliament;
- in Burkina Faso two PDNA training events, cash for work for people affected by flash floods, and a study trip to Benin were successfully completed;
- in Cabo Verde the first Communications Strategy and Action Plan for Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction was prepared and adopted; and
- in Niger, an exchange visit by market gardeners to Benin was carried out, expanded support was provided for arable and irrigated lands for two villages affected by drought, three Vulnerability Monitoring Observatories and six community-based early warning and emergency response centers were established, an IT application initiated in 2018 was used for collecting baseline pre-disaster data in the agricultural, housing and health sectors, and an in-depth study was undertaken on identifying public and private funding mechanisms for post-disaster recovery. However, expenditures in Niger were less than planned with ongoing challenges encountered by the Project because of the fragmentation of the national institutions responsible for DRM and Recovery that led to slow progress in output 1 activities.

Thereafter, in 2020, implementation progress was significantly slower than planned in all countries, mainly attributed to disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic from March/April 2020 onwards (*discussed in section 3b below*). A similar pattern is seen with respect to the Global coordination component which – other than in 2019, saw significantly lower actual expenditures than those planned. The global team was impacted throughout by loss of staff (three staff members in six months) including Project Managers (three over the three-and-a-half-year duration) which slowed the planning and implementation of planned knowledge products and led to loss of institutional memory and in some cases continuity and timeliness of technical support possible from the very limited number of staff.

According to several stakeholders interviewed additional factors that contributed to delays were slow responses from HQ staff for support in reviewing technical documents and preparing TORs for recovery specialist inputs, and the difficulties in contracting. Considering the lack of available national experts in recovery, the Project had to rely heavily on rosters of experts established by the Crisis Bureau at UNDP HQ. Sometimes, the outputs provided by consultants were not to an acceptable standard and required numerous reviews and rewriting of documents.⁵¹ Procurement of quality, specialist inputs is a challenge faced by many small projects and in smaller, remote countries. It is recommended for future projects that the following might help to obviate these challenges and allow for more efficient project implementation. Firstly, it is worthwhile to spend time and effort on preparing clear, unambiguous, and outputs-linked terms of reference (TOR) for all activities. Given that the five countries each were implementing similar activities, standardized ‘model’ TORs could be shared among participating countries so that UNDP or Government staff could refine the standard set

⁵¹ From the consultants’ perspective, several expressed concern at poor communications and the lack of support for their field work from the Country Offices including issues such as providing covering introductions, assistance with local logistics, translations, and similar, which distracted from them achieving their technical inputs.

to their circumstances. Secondly, before sending out requests for expressions of interest (REOI) to consultants UNDP pre-qualified Roster of Experts, the responsible staff should cross-check that the skill sets of the shortlisted consultants match the requirements of the TOR. For example, whilst all consultants on the Roster have qualifications and experience in DRM, some may have unique sector experience, some may be more experienced in report and guideline writing and others in face to face or online training. Thirdly, as UNDP projects typically are implemented in terms of pre-approved annual workplans, early pre-alerts could be sent to a long list of consultants on the timing of upcoming activities and inviting them to respond as to their availability and interest before being sent an REOI. This would provide advance notice to individual consultants about the forthcoming opportunities and for them to block out the time needed to undertake the inputs to a high standard. Finally, when requesting expressions of interest, individual consultants could be asked to submit examples of recent relevant work to demonstrate their written and communication skills.

b. Impact of Covid-19 On implementation progress

From early 2020 to mid-2021, the Covid-19 pandemic has added more than 216.9 million confirmed cases and more than 4.5 million deaths to the world's disaster burden and greatly impacting the economies, health and well-being of the BCRR II participating countries. In May 2020, an amount of \$110,000 was repurposed from the Project activities to newly emerging priorities to support national response and recovery from Covid-19 impacts in Lao PDR, Niger, and Cabo Verde (*see section 1c*). The pandemic also had a major impact on the implementation pace of all activities in 2020 and 2021 even though the countries adjusted wherever possible to making use of online communications and meetings and maximizing the inputs of local consultants and government counterpart staff where possible.

The Project closing date was extended by five months to May 31, 2021. The rationale for the extension was to offset the delays by the pandemic but with the benefit of hindsight, a six-month extension for delayed implementation in 2018 plus 5-6 months for the pandemic could have been justified i.e., a 12-month extension. In the event, in 2021 the approved five-month work plans aimed at spending all remaining funds were overly ambitious with only Laos and Myanmar able to complete most of the planned activities but without final high-level endorsement within the countries before the closing date. In Cabo Verde the pandemic related restrictions on travel and group meetings prevented the implementation of activities under Outputs 3 and 4 but the revision of the Legal Framework and Institutional Mechanisms for Disaster Recovery (Output 1) and the development of the National Guidelines for Disaster Recovery in Cape Verde (Output 2) were achieved and the move to online communications provided an opportunity for greater involvement by stakeholders dispersed on outer islands in the consultation meetings. In Niger, training activities, meetings, workshops, field visits and South-South exchanges could not take place. In Burkina Faso, in addition to the Covid-19 restrictions, implementation progress was hindered in both 2020 and 2021 due to the humanitarian crisis that became the focus of the Government's priorities, and the holding of presidential and legislative elections (November 2020) which meant the rescheduling of some of the 2020 activities to the already ambitious 2021 work plan.

The Global component similarly was impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic and associated travel restrictions. In the first half of 2020, the component spent less than 3% of its planned annual allocation when the regional workshops on Recovery Preparedness and best practices had to be postponed, and technical support missions from HQ and regional Bureaus to the countries were conducted remotely and not in-person (and therefore no travel expenses were incurred). The pandemic and the reduced staff number in the global team resulted in some of the originally planned knowledge products and South-South exchanges being cancelled.

c. Project management costs.

As discussed in section B.3, the global Project Document set out the original Project budgeted workplan for the four countries in a total Project cost of €1.5 million. The workplan provided a detailed breakdown of the Project management costs for each of the countries, the global team, and the UNDP Global Management Services (GMS) fee of 8% of Project costs. Total Project management costs per the original global Project Document were a high 35% of the relatively small project's total costs excluding the 8% UNDP GMS fee. When the revised funding proposal was approved in 2018, increasing the original grant amount to €2.5 million, the revised Project management costs (if any) for each of the countries in the global Project was not documented. By taking into account that the additional funds were allocated for expanded activities under Outputs 1-4 (including GMS), Cabo Verde, and increases in the Global Team budget for Project monitoring and coordination,⁵² the final project management costs as a percent of total costs have been estimated by the evaluation, as shown in Table 8 below. Based on the estimate, the overall Project management costs were still a relatively high 24% of total. Country Office Project management and coordination budgets ranged from 26% (Cabo Verde) to 15% (Myanmar) for the three to five activities implemented per year in each country. The Global coordination budget (excluding GMS 8%) was an additional 10% of the total Project costs.

Table 8: Project Management Costs : Total Costs (estimated final)

| | Original Project Costs (US\$) | Final Project Costs (US\$) | Of which, Final Project Mgt. Costs, est. (US\$) | Project Mgt. Costs as % of Total, est. (US\$) |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | 275,462 | 391,914 | 93,392 | 24% |
| Niger | 275,464 | 391,914 | 69,594 | 18% |
| Laos | 385,646 | 603,636 | 107,545 | 18% |
| Myanmar | 385,648 | 603,636 | 88,148 | 15% |
| Cabo Verde | - | 310,633 | 79,199 | 26% |
| Global (excl. GMS) | 330,556 | 635,170 | 259,156 | 9% |
| <i>Subtotal</i> | <i>1,652,776</i> | | <i>697,034</i> | <i>24%</i> |
| GMS 8% | 132,222 | | | |
| Total | 1,784,998 | 2,936,903 | | |

The high project management fees were justified for several reasons. Firstly, the high travel costs for coordinating and implementing the Project over a wide geographic extent with the five participating countries located in West Africa (Niger and Burkina Faso), in Southeast Asia (Laos PDR and Myanmar) and a remote small island developing state (Cabo Verde). Secondly, as discussed in the introduction to the evaluation, recovery is a specialized technical field of expertise, and in addition to the country office staff and consultants, an additional layer of technical support was required from the Global team and HQ-based Program Manager for specialist reviews of project outputs and just-in-time support for the various activities being implemented.

Finally, all the BCRR II countries are characterized as medium conflict affected and/or high institutional fragility, requiring frequent and close attention by Country office staff and project managers, Regional Bureau staff, and the Global Project Manager and the UNDP HQ financial manager.

⁵² Information note submitted by BCRR II Project Manager to the BCRR II Virtual Board Meeting on 12, June 2018; Proposal for the Government of Luxembourg, BCRR II, July 2018.

Two thirds of the online survey respondents recorded that the Global Team Advisors and Project Manager had provided the management, coordination and technical support/quality assurance that had been expected and that had helped the country-based respondent to work effectively on their project activities. Several commented favorably on the regular communications provided and that even during the pandemic, virtual meetings with the HQ Team had been possible to discuss the activities and difficulties encountered to find solutions. A minority (9%) felt that projects were likely to be more successful if management decisions were made in country as the centralized decision making had led to frustrating delays. (The remaining 27% had not had occasion to interact with the Global team).

Half the respondents commented similarly favorably regarding the Regional Bureaus. The other half of respondents had either had no contact with the hubs or stated that collaboration with the regional offices had dwindled over time or that their review of documents was not always well coordinated with the advice being received from the global team. It is recommended that there should be a clearer setting out of roles and responsibilities between the three tiers in any future project. Government and NGO staff who responded to the online survey generally were positive regarding their relations with the UNDP Country Officers, and, for example, the technical support for monitoring, reviewing and providing quality assurance for the Project supported outputs.

d. Collaboration and Coordination

Overall, there was good collaboration and synergies between BCRR II and other sector actors. For example, at the outset (in 2018) PDNA training in Laos, Myanmar and Niger was organized in collaboration with other UN agencies and in Laos the sectoral assessments benefited from the expertise provided by the World Bank, EU, FAO, ILO, WHO and UNICEF. The UN Volunteer system was used to provide country-level support in recovery interventions including project management (Laos and Myanmar). In several countries, notably Lao PDR, Niger and Cabo Verde, efforts were made to engage with the private sector, for example using the national telecommunication providers for early warning messaging systems (Laos) and insurance providers for assessing feasible options for micro-insurance (Niger). The Project in Myanmar coordinated with the Asian Development Bank to support the Government prepare National Disaster Recovery Guidelines, although finalizing the Guidelines before the BCRR II closing date was not realized and the Project had little control over the preparation schedule of the separately contracted consultants. The World Bank GFDRR provided support to Niger and Burkina Faso on the development of financing mechanisms. In Cabo Verde, the Project coordinated closely with several other larger Projects including providing training for Government staff responsible for a separately funded National Disaster Observatory (UNISDR). Under the Covid-19 pandemic circumstances there were further positive examples of inter-agency cooperation. For example, the Project coordinated with the IOM in Lao PDR to identify migrant workers returning from Thailand to Laos under the cash-for-work (livelihoods recovery) activity. In Myanmar the Project collaborated with Helvetas, IUCN and the Mon Women's Organization to deliver community-based recovery training for 433 participants from local authorities and communities and coordinated with the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center for the adaptation of the PDNA methodology in Myanmar.

e. Monitoring and reporting

The efficiency rating of the Project has been downgraded by the evaluation because of weak monitoring and results reporting by the Project. According to the Project Documents, the outputs of the Project and emerging risks were to be monitored and reported by quarterly progress tracking,⁵³ annual lessons learned were to be written up to inform management decisions, and Annual Project

⁵³ (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 27)

Reports were to be compiled and presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, including the achievements and results by using indicators.⁵⁴ When the additional funding proposal was approved in 2018, a revised results framework with new targets for outputs under the global project appears not to have been updated for the four countries and was not available for the end of Project evaluation.

Consolidated Project Annual Reports were produced regularly. However, there was no systematic monitoring of the Project against indicators in the results framework and no clear and routine reporting on progress towards achieving the targets specified under each output at the start of the Project or any amended targets during implementation, for example following the reallocation of funds in Cabo Verde, Lao PDR and Niger for Covid-19 response activities.

As discussed in section 1, planning and implementing longer term and more human needs- and resource-based recovery is a specialized practice area and the technical and management skills needed for recovery are different from those of conventional disaster risk management skills. The evaluation interviews and discussions found that ‘resilience’ and ‘resilient recovery’ lack a confirmed, common understanding even among the DRM staff implementing the BCR II Project. Furthermore, there has been a high turnover of staff during the BCRR II implementation which has meant a loss of institutional memory for the widespread Project. There have been four different Program Managers over the three-and-a-half-year Project and 54% of respondents to the online survey had worked for less than two years on the Project. It is recommended as crucial for a future project that indicators that are practical and actionable be used to guide implementation so that DR staff, government policy makers, and political leaders in the diverse participating countries share a common understanding of the specific outcomes they should be aiming for and are able to monitor the progress of implementation and the achievement of the Project’s recovery objective.

It is recommended therefore, that for a future project, a strong monitoring/results framework with targets under each output should be prepared at the start of the Project, used routinely throughout implementation, and updated if necessary at the midterm review, as a means of accurately measuring project implementation progress and progress towards achieving the Project objective. The responsibilities for recording progress against the different indicators also should be clearly assigned to either Country Office (recommended) or global Project Manager and, where possible, all results should be gender disaggregated.

⁵⁴ The EC/UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) provides an overarching framework for all agreements between EU member states and UNDP. The FAFA requires that the annual reports at a minimum include:

- summary and context of the Project
- activities carried out during the reporting period
- difficulties encountered and measures taken to overcome problems
- changes introduced in implementation
- **achievements/results by using indicators**
- work plan for the following period.

4. Sustainability⁵⁵

The sustainability of the Project investments is assessed as Moderately Likely.

Sustainability is assessed as the likelihood that the Project investments and activities will continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. There are moderate risks to sustainability, but at least some outcomes are expected to be sustained after Project closing.

Purpose

The sustainability of the Project was evaluated as the likely ability of the project funded activities and interventions to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. Sustainability is assessed against three measures of risk, namely:

- Financial risks to sustainability
- Socio-economic risks to sustainability
- Institutional and governance risks to sustainability.

Commentary and Analysis

a. Financial risks to sustainability

Stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation all identified that one of the main conditions that needed to be in place for the type of change supported by the Project (i.e., for the countries to successfully plan and implement medium and long term, more human needs- and resource-based recovery) was finance. The lack of countries' own financial and economic resources to sustain the Project's outcomes after it closes is assessed as high risk. Despite the efforts made during implementation for preparing financial options for government-led or private sector insurance-led, there were no long-term measures adopted by the country Governments to establish and ensure annual budget provisions for national post-disaster recovery funds. However, the financial risk rating is mitigated by two factors. Firstly, there were promising practices for establishing sub-national (provincial) recovery funds (Lao and Myanmar). Secondly, given the well-documented evidence that every \$1 invested in risk reduction and preparedness including through well planned and executed post-disaster recovery, there are savings of \$15 in future post-disaster crises, the ongoing medium intensity conflict and/or high institutional and social fragility of the countries, a strong case could be made for follow-on funding from external support partner(s) and in particular for labor-intensive small works and cash-for-work activities that could contribute towards recovery of livelihoods in a post-Covid-19 time.

b. Socio-economic risks to sustainability

Two thirds of respondents to the online survey thought that the governments in their countries were better prepared to manage future recovery processes in an effective, sustainable and inclusive way and half thought that this was either all or somewhat due to the Project. The level of stakeholder ownership over project planning, resources and project benefits and support of the project's long-term objectives is assessed by the evaluation as variable between the countries (for example, high in Cabo Verde but decreased in Myanmar in the aftermath of February 2021). The strongest levels of commitment were achieved at subnational levels of government and by communities themselves. Monitoring of household level beneficiaries – for example, trained in improved construction techniques or recipients of small livelihoods and cash-for-work grants, highlighted the positive and


⁵⁵ Sustainability is assessed on a four-point scale of: Likely, Moderately Likely, Moderately Unlikely, and Unlikely.

sustainable impact of the small grants for the vulnerable beneficiaries and their families. Most beneficiaries had been able to expand or diversify their initial activities (for example, by purchasing small animals) and almost all stated that they were able to meet their and their family's basic needs without relying on third parties or social services (*see Box 5*).

Box 5: Financial support provided by 10 community organizations through the Project to post-disaster affected communities in the North-Central and North Regions of Burkina Faso.

Through careful, criteria-linked targeting of potential beneficiaries a total of 100 beneficiaries (of whom 78 were women) were selected for Project support and closely monitored by the community organizations (10 households per organization). The vulnerable (27%), disaster affected (13%), and internally displaced persons because of terrorist attacks and threats (60%) were provided with small grants of 80,000 CFA francs (~US\$145) each. To monitor the beneficiaries (by home visits to check the viability of the activities and impact on the beneficiary), each of the community organizations received 150,000 CFA francs (~US\$272), and each of the seven associated provincial DPFSNFAH authorities¹ received a further 125,000 CFA francs (~US\$227) to monitor the community organizations.

The home visit monitoring underscored the positive and sustainable impact of the small grants for the vulnerable beneficiaries and their families. Most beneficiaries had been able to expand or diversify their initial activities (for example, by purchasing small animals) and almost all stated that they were able to meet their and their family's basic needs without relying on third parties or social services. One of the beneficiaries in Yatenga province had bought a cart and was able to distribute and sell drinking water. The monitoring report found that most beneficiaries felt more confident and able to act from their own resources to meet their basic needs and went on to report that some – who had lost everything, had managed to regain their self-esteem, and hope to live for others.



(Photo: Small-business and sheep farmer-BCRR II "Money for work" activity beneficiary, Kongoussi-Burkina Faso. UNDP, September 2020)

Excerpt from monitoring report on Project financial support to post-disaster affected communities in the North-Central and North Regions of Burkina Faso (September 2020):

<< Un autre aspect est que les bénéficiaires se sentent plus en confiance par ce qu'ils peuvent agir eux-mêmes à partir de leurs propres ressources pour la satisfaction de certains besoins élémentaires. Ils ont retrouvé l'estime de soi pour certains et l'espoir de vivre pour d'autres (PDI); eux qui, avaient tout perdu et paraissaient comme des laisser pour compte >>

c. Institutional and governance risks to sustainability

The Project successfully trained many hundreds of staff of central and subnational governments, NGOs and UNDP and other agencies in the principles and practical application of equitable, inclusive and sustainable PDNA and DRF approaches (all countries), supported the preparation of pre-disaster baseline data and vulnerability assessments (Niger, Cabo Verde, Myanmar, Lao), preparation of sectoral guidelines and other knowledge products appropriate specific country settings, and facilitated extensive consensus building consultations for preparation (if not final adoption) of national disaster Recovery Frameworks. The technical knowledge transfer has helped to develop a large base of human resource capacity in each country for self-sufficient planning and execution of evidence-informed, transparent needs assessments and recovery frameworks that is likely to be sustained after the Project closing.

5. Outcome - Achievement of Project Objective⁵⁶

Summary

The outcome or achievement of the Project objective is assessed as Satisfactory.

Purpose

The outcome of the Project is an overall assessment of whether the Project objective has been achieved. i.e., “Were the right things done right and efficiently and sustainably?” Outcome is measured as: Relevance + Effectiveness + Efficiency + Sustainability.

Commentary and Analysis

The objective of the BCRR II Project was “to contribute to building the resilience of countries in the face of disasters by strengthening national capacities to plan and manage recovery processes in a sustainable and inclusive manner (“Build Back Better”).⁵⁷

The relevance of the Project is assessed as High. The Project design was based on sound principles and a comprehensive set of four output areas aimed at putting in place evidence-informed national policies, institutional arrangements, financial mechanisms, and technical capacities for planning and managing recovery at national and community levels before a disaster strikes. The four Outputs, two stand out in terms of relevance assessed by commitment of government counterparts and impact on beneficiaries. Firstly, the training in equitable and inclusive recovery that was scaled out under Output 2 and built up the local pool of experts was particularly relevant when national, provincial/regional, and local government leaders and technical experts were tested in real-time following disasters. Secondly, if well targeted, the types of short-term, low-cost incremental recovery activities implemented under the relatively small BCRR II project Output 3 demonstrated the relevance of supporting recovery in each of the countries in the face of the constraints imposed by unknown climate and fragility futures. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp relief the relevance and need for inclusive recovery approaches promoted by BCRR II, particularly in fragile and conflict afflicted situations.

The effectiveness of the Project is assessed as Modest-Substantial. All countries came close to meeting and in some cases exceeded the targets set for enhancing technical capacities in recovery planning and implementation (Output 2) and for enhancing capacities for implementing recovery at the community-level (Output 3). However, the rating was not finally fully Substantial because the Project fell short in making similar achievements with respect to strengthened national policy, institutional and financial frameworks and mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery processes (Output 1) and in fully meeting planned targets for improved knowledge products, technological applications and South-South exchanges for recovery management (Output 4). Some of the shortfalls may be attributed the challenges created by the Covid-19 pandemic but there were markers before 2020 that targets were not on track and the request for extension itself was not based on a realistic time-bound action plan for completing all outstanding activities and making full use of all Project funds, with 9% of funds (\$264,765) unspent at the end of the Project.

⁵⁶ Outcome is assessed on a scale of: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately satisfactory, Moderately unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory and Highly unsatisfactory.

⁵⁷ (United Nations Development Programme, 2018, p. 11)


The efficiency of the Project is assessed as Modest-Substantial. The Project's Country Office management and coordination costs were a relatively high 24% of the small project's total costs and the global project management and coordination costs (excluding Output 4) were an additional 10% of the original budget to cover the costs of three to five activities implemented per country per year. The costs could be justified when considering the geographic extent of the Project and the high disaster risk and high institutional and social fragility of the states. High staff turnover at UNDP HQ and difficulties in retaining staff in the Country Offices led to delays in implementation progress. The Project was well coordinated with and collaborated with other sector projects and actors. The Global Team Recovery Advisors and Program Manager provided timely specialist and just-in-time support to Country Office staff although it did not respond at a large enough scale to transition to virtual support and to reallocate underutilized funds previously earmarked for travel towards successful in-country activities under Outputs 2 and 3 in the final 12 months once the reduced travel regime of the Covid-19 pandemic became obvious. A Substantial rating for efficiency was downgraded by the evaluation to Modest because the monitoring of the Project's achievements/results by using indicators was weak.

The sustainability of the Project is assessed as Moderately Likely. There are moderate risks to sustainability, but at least some outcomes are expected to be sustained after Project closing.

Therefore, the overall outcome or achievement of the Project objective is assessed as Satisfactory.

The conclusion reached by the evaluation was similar to the final assessment reached by Project stakeholders. Two thirds of respondents to the online survey thought that the governments in their countries were a lot or a little bit better prepared to manage future recovery processes in an effective, sustainable and inclusive way and half thought that this was either all or somewhat due to the BCRR II Project (*Figure 15*). Of those that answered yes, 18% thought this success was entirely due and 45% thought it partly due to the BCRR II Project.

Figure 15: Online survey responses to "Is the Government in the country you work in better prepared to manage future recovery processes in an effective, sustainable and inclusive way?"



E. LESSONS LEARNED

Several important lessons were learned from the BCRR II Project as summarized below:

1. ***Even relatively small projects aimed at building resilience and reducing risk through preparedness and well-planned recovery processes can provide national and subnational governments, communities and individuals in countries that are conflict-affected or with high institutional and social fragility, with important tools needed to manage risk at their own level and to withstand future shocks.*** UNDRR estimates that every \$1 invested in prevention and risk reduction incorporated into recovery after an event can save up to \$15 in future post-disaster relief needs. The BCRR II Project demonstrated several examples of how central and sub-national governments and communities in conflict affected and high institutional social fragility settings, can meaningfully engage in activities that incrementally and cumulatively built local level agency for recovery over time. This support ranged from facilitating the consensus building needed for eventual high-level approval of a Legal Framework and Institutional Mechanisms for Post-Disaster Recovery in the small island developing state Cabo Verde; to self-sufficient in-country capacities for undertaking thorough and inclusive post-disaster needs assessments to a high standard in Lao PDR; to preparing and implementing sub-national (state level) build back better recovery planning and community-based recovery interventions for flood affected communities in Myanmar; to establishing small-scale irrigation schemes for women's livelihoods in Niger; to implementing transparent and inclusive beneficiary targeting for small livelihoods recovery and poverty alleviation grants in Burkina Faso for disaster affected and displaced persons.
2. ***Small projects with constrained funding stretched thinly across multiple countries should be designed to have a clear but limited focus in two to three output areas where maximum impact can be achieved.*** The BCRR II Project was designed to strengthen national capacities for planning and managing resilient recovery in five countries across four outputs⁵⁸. With limited human and financial resources for implementation, it was not possible finally to achieve equal progress on all four output areas. The areas of focus that most consistently achieved traction with country counterparts, appear to be sustainable over time, and changed behaviors on the ground for inclusive recovery were (i) Output 2 - in particular, strengthening the sub-national tiers of government for recovery planning (for example in Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cabo Verde) and through mass PDNA/DRF training and refresher training, and developing sectoral guidelines and operating procedures for planning recovery adapted to local circumstances and translated into national languages in all countries; and (ii) Output 3 - for example, using learning by doing approaches for training large number of local artisans in low cost resilient house construction techniques and cash-for-work small grants in Niger, Burkina Faso and Lao PDR. The findings of a Burkina Faso monitoring report underscored the relevance of even modest support and positive impact of the well targeted small grants for the vulnerable beneficiaries and their families. Activities under Output 1 – aimed at strengthening national policies, strategies and financing mechanisms, did assist to build inter-agency coordination and a degree of consensus building but, except for Cabo Verde, the policies were never finally adopted into law and recommended institutional reforms and funding mechanisms were not finally adopted. The planned outputs were

⁵⁸ Namely:

Output 1: Strengthened national policy, institutional arrangements, and financing mechanisms to plan and implement sustainable recovery.

Output 2: Enhanced technical capacities for recovery planning and implementation.

Output 3: Enhanced national capacities for implementing recovery at community level.

Output 4: Improved knowledge products and exchanges.

beyond the reach and time available for the BCRR II project, even in Burkina Faso and Niger which had both participated in an earlier phase of the project. Output 4 generated several new and useful knowledge products including for example, at the global level the preparation of housing guidelines, but more could have been done by Project managers at country and global levels to systematically coordinate and facilitate intra- and inter-country knowledge sharing and learning.

3. ***In countries that are conflict-affected or with high institutional and social fragility, project management and coordination costs are high but worthwhile***, allowing for frequent and close attention Country office staff and project managers, Regional Bureau staff, and the Global Project Managers. Recovery is a specialized technical field of expertise, and in addition to the country office staff and consultants, an additional layer of technical support from the Global team and HQ-based Program Manager enables specialist reviews of project outputs and just-in-time support for the various activities being implemented.
4. ***A project monitoring and evaluation system based on a well-designed, practical, results framework with measurable indicators and targets that is regularly filled in and reported on throughout implementation⁵⁹ by all levels of project implementing staff is fundamental to achieving equitable, inclusive, and sustainable recovery processes.*** ‘Resilience’ and ‘resilient recovery’ are not terms that are widely understood even by DRM experts. Resilient recovery does not happen by chance - it requires careful planning, implementation, and financing. Therefore, a shared, common understanding of what is meant by ‘resilient recovery’ needs to be established early on among the staff of project implementing agencies and government counterparts and reinforced throughout the life of the project. A results framework - with indicators and annual targets, should be prepared and agreed at the start of any project to ensure that implementation progress towards achieving the project objective can be verifiably measured and corrective actions taken when activities are off-track. It is also used to justify and provide transparency to any changes that are approved during project implementation and to guard against piecemeal changes and, if needed, provide the evidence for extending or scaling up additional future external support.
5. ***Whether UNDP’s Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) or National Implementation Modality (NIM) is used for project implementation, an appropriate, detailed project operational (or administration) manual of procedures should be prepared and provided to all implementing staff.*** With the high turnover of staff at both global and country offices, there is a high risk of piecemeal changes made to project activities and with insufficient records to document the reasons for the changes and the approvals provided. Whilst the evaluation has not found any instances of misuse of funds, best practice for implementing projects, and in particular in fragile and conflict affected situations where institutional capacities are thinly spread, projects should prepare operational manual to guide staff in the approved procedures for putting forward requests for changes and for recording the decisions made including any new risk mitigation measures to be put in place and monitored. A Project Operational Manual describes the essential administrative and management requirements to implement the project on time, within budget, and in accordance with the policies and procedures of the participating country’s government and the external support partner. The Manual should include references to all available templates and instructions.

⁵⁹ The BCRR II Project document specifies tracking results progress on a quarterly basis unless otherwise specified by the indicator and to review and make course corrections at least annually.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been made throughout the above Evaluation Report towards ensuring that a future project might be more effective and efficient, remains relevant and can be sustained. The recommendations are summarized below.

1. Achieving Resilient Recovery

Page 19: When considering the differences in Project beneficiaries, stakeholders were asked about the risks of the Project activities creating tensions in communities by benefitting some groups but not others. As outreach was very limited at regional and local level and as the Project's focus had been on influencing the national government at the strategic level, **it is recommended** in the future that senior and specialist UN staff and national staff supplement Country Office staff to establish relationships with relevant government agencies working directly with communities for implementing this type of activity.

Page 20: The evaluation did not find any systematic or standardized beneficiary impact surveys used by the five countries for community-level primary beneficiaries. **It is recommended** that low cost, standard beneficiary impact surveys be included in any future similar project.

Page 24: A binding constraint for implementing recovery was the lack of funding available in any of the low- middle-income countries for implementing recovery plans. **It is recommended** that a future focus for support should build on and include more detailed feasibility studies for all countries – appropriate to each country-context, a suite of practical financial instruments for recovery, at both community (including for example, micro-insurance, savings clubs, matching grants) and national levels (including for example, parametric/index-based risk insurance and transfer mechanisms, budgetary support for recovery funds).

Page 25: In all countries and particularly those such as Burkina Faso and Niger with no single data platforms, **it is recommended** that future linkages be made through consultations and stakeholder awareness raising with several well-maintained sector databases that could be of use for PDNA/DRF teams, for example, the WHO-supported Country Health Systems Surveillance platform (CHeSS) and ILO-supported database of national labour, social security and related human rights legislation (NATLEX).

Page 26: The workshop-based training was complemented by several field and real-time simulations in conducting PDNAs and preparing recovery frameworks by sub-national government staff (provincial or district governments). Not only were new trainees provided the training but there were several good practices in new areas that **it is recommended** be included and more actively disseminated in the future. These include, for example, gender mainstreaming in Laos and Cabo Verde based on prepared and approved gender guidelines for PDNAs, and the introduction of well-tested principles for strengthening social resilience (reducing inequalities and marginalization of groups), initiating reconciliation, and peacebuilding where feasible, as part of the recovery planning training in humanitarian crisis situations in West Africa.

Page 28: Several of those interviewed reflected that the training had raised awareness about recovery management practices at community level but cautioned (and **it is recommended** that any future support take into account) that the training for community disaster management committees and district level local governments had been piecemeal at times, too focused on response and early warning systems, limited in coverage due to funding constraints, and not sufficiently intensive.

Page 28: The purpose of Output 3 was to enhance national capacities for implementing recovery at community level including working with governments to build political will for and technical capacities to put in place practical options for establishing and sustaining community recovery funds used for and administered by clear, transparent, and efficient eligibility criteria and operating procedures and in partnership with either local governments and/or NGOs and civil society groups. **It is recommended** that several good practices could have been more systematically documented by the Project and disseminated within and between the countries to consolidate the lessons learnt from BCRR II experiences for the future.

Page 30: The evaluation did not find any significant final knowledge products on public-private partnerships, widespread use of technological innovations, or substantive financing options and recommendations for recovery, and **it is recommended** that these are important areas that should be considered in the future.

Page 31: Purposeful knowledge and information sharing between the countries was an area of opportunity that the Project managers could have incorporated earlier and several stakeholders commented that it was only in the final six months of the Project that learning between countries was actively encouraged and facilitated. **It is recommended** for the future that a cloud-sharing repository of Project documents be established and maintained for easier internal sharing of knowledge between the participating countries on recovery and for project management. An internal sharing mechanism would also simplify real-time Project monitoring under ongoing travel restrictions and facilitate visibility for the external support partner.

2. Strengthening Project Implementation Arrangements

Page 27: Whilst some countries and external support partners such as the World Bank Group and Asian Development Bank have simplified procurement procedures in place for disaster/emergency response activities, simplified procedures for medium- and long-term recovery would likely fall outside the bounds of financial management regulations in most countries, and the more so in fragile and conflict affected situations. **It is recommended** that the use of simplified procurement procedures for recovery activities not be promoted unless based on prior, detailed, risk-based financial management and procurement assessments of the country systems.

Page 32: Even with the five-month extension of the Project closing date to accommodate the delays caused by Covid-19, at the end of the Project, the overall disbursement was 91%, with an amount of \$264,765 not spent. In part, the shortfalls may be attributed to the challenges created by the Covid-19 pandemic but there were markers before 2020 that targets were not on track. **It is recommended** that in the future, requests for extending a Project closing date should be accompanied by a realistic time-bound action plan for completing all outstanding activities and including a partial reallocation of funds to other Outputs or countries to make full use of remaining Project funds.

Page 34: The country workplans increasingly budgeted for activities under Outputs 1 and 4 and decreased annual amounts for Outputs 2 and 3, even as the achievements in Outputs 1 and 4 fell behind the originally planned targets. It is recommended for future projects that stronger and regular monitoring of targets be used throughout implementation, so that and gaps between funds being allocated and targets being achieved can be identified in a timely way and corrective adjustments be made, including for example, closer oversight by a Global project manager and/or reallocation of funds to better performing output areas (in the BCRR II case, Outputs 2 and 3).

Pages 37-38: Considering the lack of available national experts in recovery, the Project had to rely heavily on rosters of experts established by the Crisis Bureau at UNDP HQ. Sometimes, the outputs provided by consultants were not to an acceptable standard and required numerous reviews and rewriting of documents. **It is recommended** for future projects that:

1. It is worthwhile to spend time and effort on preparing clear, unambiguous, and outputs-linked terms of reference (TOR) for all activities. Standardized 'model' TORs could be shared among participating countries so that UNDP or Government staff could refine the standard set to their circumstances.
2. Before sending out requests for expressions of interest (REOI) to consultants UNDP pre-qualified Roster of Experts, the responsible staff should cross-check that the skill sets of the shortlisted consultants match the requirements of the TOR. For example, whilst all consultants on the Roster have qualifications and experience in DRM, some may have unique sector experience, some may be more experienced in report and guideline writing and others in face to face or online training.
3. As UNDP projects typically are implemented in terms of pre-approved annual workplans, early pre-alerts could be sent to a long list of consultants on the timing of upcoming activities and inviting them to respond as to their availability and interest before being sent an REOI.
4. When requesting expressions of interest, individual consultants could be asked to submit examples of recent relevant work to demonstrate their written and communication skills.

Page 40: It is recommended that there should be a clearer setting out of roles and responsibilities between the three tiers in any future project (Global tea, Regional Bureaus, Country Offices).

Page 41: Planning and implementing longer term and more human needs- and resource-based recovery is a specialized practice area and the technical and management skills needed for recovery are different from those of conventional disaster risk management skills. Also, there has been a high turnover of staff during the BCRR II implementation which has meant a loss of institutional memory for the widespread Project. **It is recommended** as crucial for a future project that indicators that are practical and actionable be used to guide implementation so that DR staff, government policy makers, and political leaders in the diverse participating countries share a common understanding of the specific outcomes they should be aiming for and are able to monitor the progress of implementation and the achievement of the Project's recovery objective. **It is also recommended** that a strong monitoring/results framework with targets under each output should be prepared at the start of the Project, used routinely throughout implementation, and updated if necessary at the midterm review, as a means of accurately measuring project implementation progress and progress towards achieving the Project objective. The responsibilities for recording progress against the different indicators also should be clearly assigned to either Country Office (recommended) or global Project Manager and, where possible, all results should be gender disaggregated.

Page 47: Whether UNDP's Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) or National Implementation Modality (NIM) is used for project implementation, an appropriate, detailed project operational (or administration) manual of procedures should be prepared and provided to all implementing staff. A Project Operational Manual describes the essential administrative and management requirements to implement the project on time, within budget, and in accordance with the policies and procedures of the participating country's government and the external support partner. The Manual should include references to all available templates and instructions.

Glossary⁶⁰

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Agency | People's individual and collective ability to act individually or collectively to further their own interests – capacity to make their own choices. |
| Build back better | An approach to recovery and reconstruction aimed at reducing vulnerability and improving living conditions in order to better withstand future shocks. |
| Capacity | The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organization that can be used to achieve agreed goals. |
| Disaster | A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. |
| Disaster risk reduction | The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. |
| Early recovery | A process that seeks to catalyze sustainable development opportunities by generating self-sustaining processes for post-disaster recovery. It encompasses livelihoods, shelter, governance, environment, and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations and addresses underlying risks that contributed to the crisis. |
| Effective recovery | Achieving the intended outcomes of medium to long term recovery such as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and recreating sustainable livelihood and income generating opportunities. |
| Reconstruction | The medium and long-term rebuilding, restoration and improvement, where possible of facilities, livelihoods, and living conditions of disaster affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors. Focused primarily on the construction or replacement of damaged physical structures, and the restoration of local services and infrastructure. |
| Recovery | The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions (health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities) of disaster-affected communities or society, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors by aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”. |

⁶⁰ The definition of commonly used disaster-related terms in the Glossary have been derived from several sources including Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2015; United Nations

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Recovery framework | A pragmatic, sequenced, prioritized, programmatic, yet living (and flexible) action plan that ensures resilient recovery after a disaster |
| Resilience | The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. |
| Resilient recovery | Builds resilience during recovery and promotes resilience in regular development. Resilient Recovery is a means to sustainable development. rebuild in resilient, inclusive, and sustainable ways that leave no one behind. |
| Response | Actions taken directly before, during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. (Focused on immediate and short-term needs. Sometimes also called disaster relief.) |

Annex 1: List of Documents

General Background

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Country Documents

Burkina Faso

Draft 0 PLAN MULTIRISQUE 19-21 achevé 9-12-2019.

Output 1:

P1_Compte rendu remise matériel_après formation.docx
P1_Compte rendu remise matériel_après formation_en
P1_Publication_Express du Faso_Formation des maçons
P1_Rapport de formation du CORESUR BMH.docx
P1_Rapport de formation du CORESUR BMH_eng.docx
P1_Rapport_atelier_CORESUR Sahel.docx
P1_Rapport_atelier_CORESUR Sahel_eng.docx

Output 2:

P2_Rapport_formation_PDNA_Kaya.docx
P2_Rapport_formation_PDNA_Kaya-eng.docx
P2_Rapport_formation_PDNA_Ouaga.docx
P2_Rapport_formation_PDNA_Ouaga-eng.docx

Output 3:

P3_Rapport rencontre d'échanges_OHG.docx
P3_Rapport rencontre d'échanges_OHG_eng.docx
P3_Rapport_Missions de suivi.docx
P3_Rapport_Missions de suivi_eng.docx
P3_Rapport_FORMATION_Maçons_Fada et Ouaga.docx
P3_Rapport_FORMATION_Maçons_Fada et Ouaga.pdf
P3_Rapport_Formation_Maçons_Fada et Ouaga_eng-vg.docx
P3_Rapport_FORMATION_Maçons_Kaya et Bobo.docx
P3_Rapport_FORMATION_Maçons_Kaya et Bobo.pdf

Output 4:

P4_Rapport Mission Benin VP.docx

Niger

Project Reports:

Projet de Stratégie Nationale de Relèvement durable du Niger(VFF).pdf
Rapport Atelier Assurance Agricole Indicielle.pdf
Rapport atelier du 11 au 13 novembre 2020 à Niamey.pdf
Rapport final Application mobile.pdf
Rapport final étude sur les mécanismes de financement-atelier validation 24-08-2020.pdf

PDNA assessments

Cabo Verde

Disaster Risk Profile-Cabo Verde-
GFDRR_2019.pdf

DURA.pdf

ENRRD_Estratégia Nacional de Redução de Riscos de L
QuadroRecuperacaoPosDesastre_Final.pdf

Project Reports:

BCRR II_Compiled Report 2018.pdf

BCRR II_End of Year Report 2019.pdf

BCRR II_End of Year Report 2020.pdf

Cabo Verde Country Annual Report LuxProjectPhaseII 2018

Cabo Verde Country Annual Report LuxProjectPhaseII 2019

Cape Verde Country Annual Report LuxProjectPhaseII 2020

Output1:

Comunication docs

Relatorio Final_ revisão quadro juridico.pdf

Output 2:

Diretrizes Nacionais para PDNA_Guia Geral_04Maio.p

OND-GEOPORTAL-Manual de Formação QGIS.pdf

OND-GEOPORTAL-Manual de GEOSERVER.pdf

PDNA Cabo Verde.pdf

Output 3:

Fotos-Formação Pos Des Marc 2019

Boa_Vista_Relatório_Atelier de socialização_Boa Vist

Fogo_Brava_Relatório_Atelier de socialização_18_10

Santo Antão_SaoVicente_Relatório_Atelier de social

SãoNicolau_Relatório_Atelier de socialização_18_10.

Output 4:

Resumo docs_UNICV_20190819.xlxs

Lao PDR

Output1:

1.2 national guidance

1.5 disaster monitoring system framework

Output 2:

Sector recovery guidelines:

CC_CCDraft1.2.docx

CC_Conflict_draft1.2.docx

CC_COVID 19_draft1.2.docx

CC_Disability_draft1.2..docx

CC_DRMdraft1.2..docx

CC_Gender_draft1.2.docx

CC_Governance_draft1.2..docx

CC_Protection_draft1.2..docx

CC_UXO_draft1.2..docx

Community Participation Guideline1.2.docx

EducationDraft1.docx

HealthDraft1.docx

HousingDraft1.docx

LivelihoodsDraft1.docx

PPCommunity.pptx

PPCrossCutting.pptx

PPEducationSector.pptx

PPHealthSector.pptx

PPHousingSector.pptx

PPLivelihoodsSector.pptx

PPSocialSector.pptx

Output 3:

3.1 2 recovery plans

BCRRII COVID19 Response and Recovery

BRRII Cash4Work for Recovery

Livelihood Empowerment Training for Recovery

Output 4:

4.2 floods and drought recovery

IDDR 2019

IDDR2020

M&E for Recovery System

Myanmar

General:

Action_Plan_on_Disaster_Risk_Reduction-MIMU_2017.PDF

Disaster Risk Reduction-MYA-Status Report_2020.pdf

Output1:

Final PDNA Baseline dbase (23March2021).xlsx

Output 2:

PDNA Case Study_Mon State_Jan2-2018.docx


Draft report on PDNA training_PDNA rollout.docx

Training Report_Mon State (draft).docx


Annex 2: Graphical Representation of BCRR II Achievements of Outputs by Country⁶¹

⁶¹ Based on self-reporting by the UNDP Country Office staff and extracted from Mid-year and Annual Reports. The majority of reporting was not linked to the Project results framework and actual target achieved for each indicator was difficult to accurately confirm.


1. Burkina Faso




2. Niger




3. Lao PDR



4. Myanmar



5. Cabo Verde



Annex 3: List of People Consulted

1. People Interviewed and Met

| Name | Location | Title/Role on BCRR II |
|---------------------|--------------------|---|
| Rita Missal | NYHQ | Recovery Advisor a.i., Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery for Building Resilience Team, Crisis Bureau, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) |
| Charlotte Yaiche | NYHQ /France | Programme Manager, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery for Building Resilience Team, Crisis Bureau, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) |
| Samuel Akeru | Kenya, UNDP | Global Disaster Recovery Specialist, Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery for Building Resilience Team |
| Abha Nigam | NYHQ | Human Resources Manager |
| Oussimane Ouedraogo | Burkina Faso, UNDP | Coordonnateur Projet Resilience |
| Celestin Zongo | Burkina Faso | DRR Team Leader |
| Maria Benchimol | Cape Verde, UNDP | Programme Specialist Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Portfolio Leader |
| Sonia Lopes | Cape Verde, UNDP | Programme Analyst – Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction, Project Support |
| Ali Ousseini Ali | Niger, UNDP | Assistant de projet Crises et Catastrophes, Project focal |
| Justin Shone | Lao PDR, UNDP | Team Leader, Natural Resources Management and Climate Change, DRR and UXO. |
| Serena Arcone | Myanmar, UNDP | Disaster Resilience and Recovery Specialist |
| Kareff Rafisura | Myanmar, UNDP | Governance for Sustainable Recovery |

2. People invited to participate in on-line survey⁶²

| Name | Location | Title/Role on BCRR II |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Rita Missal | NYHQ | Recovery Advisor a.i. |
| Charlotte Yaiche | NYHQ /France | Programme Manager |
| Jeannette Fernandez Castro | Panama Regional Hub | DRR Team leader |
| Shairi Mathur | Bangkok Regional Hub | Programme Specialist |
| Stephanie Afonso | Luxembourg mission | Former BCRR II Project Manager |
| Oussimane Ouedraogo | Burkina Faso, UNDP | Coordonnateur Projet Resilience |
| Celestin Zongo | Burkina Faso | Analyste Gestion Risques et Catastrophes |
| Tapsoba Wendépeingré Simon | Burkina Faso | Consultant – Civil Engineer – training of masons |
| Maria Benchimol | Cape Verde, UNDP | Programme Specialist Energy, Environment and Climate Change |
| Sonia Lopes | Cape Verde, UNDP | Programme Analyst – Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction |
| Renaldo Rodrigues | | Serviço Nacional de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros (SNPCB) / Ministério da Administração Interna |
| Jeremias Cabral | | |
| Antero Lopes | | |
| Agencia Cabo Verdiana de Imagem (ACI) | Cape Verde | National Consultant - Preparation of a Communication Strategy |
| Carla Carvalho | Cape Verde | National Consultant - Gender approach and project integration |

⁶² Responses purposefully anonymous.

| Name | Location | Title/Role on BCRR II |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| Ilídio Cruz | Cape Verde | National Consultant - - Review of the Legal Framework and Institutional Mechanisms for Disaster Recovery |
| Federica Pilia | Cape Verde | International Consultant for Developing Cabo Verde National Recovery |
| Luisa Cristina Borges | Cape Verde | National Consultant - Legislation on building fires |
| Adilson Cabral | Cape Verde | National Disaster Observatory (OND) (National) |
| Ali Ousseini Ali | Niger, UNDP | |
| Illya Miko | Niger | Consultant pour l'étude sur les mécanismes de financement du relèvement au Niger |
| Amadou Barré Cheffou | Niger | Consultant pour l'élaboration de la stratégie nationale de relèvement durable au Niger : |
| Abdoul Salam | Niger | Consultant pour le développement de l'application mobile pour la collecte et l'analyse des données PDNA |
| Justin Shone | Lao PDR, UNDP | Team Leader |
| Shutong Ren | Lao PDR, UNDP | Programme Analyst |
| Mr. Sivilay Keobountham | Lao PDR | National consultant - developed the floods and droughts recovery guidelines. |
| Mr. Keopphet Phumphone, | Lao PDR | National consultant - translated the national recovery guideline, sectoral recovery guidelines, and recovery action plan, and to consultate with line ministries. |
| Mr. Ross Hardy | Lao PDR | International consultant - developed the sectoral recovery guidelines and disaster recovery E&M system framework. |
| Mr. Sudhir Kumar | Lao PDR | International consultant – developed the national recovery guideline. |
| Serena Arcone | Myanmar, UNDP | Disaster Resilience and Recovery Specialist |
| Mr. Wai Yar Lin Zin | Myanmar, UNDP | National Disaster Recovery Officer |
| Mr. Phyo Thu | | National Recovery Coordination Assistant in Mon State |
| Seint Seint Aye | | Social & Environmental Safeguards and DRR Advisor |
| Mr. John Ievers | International Consultant | International Consultant - Desk review of the literatures, available recovery frameworks, strategies and practices in the Asia Pacific and other regions |
| Ms. Rumana Kabir | International Consultant | International Consultant - Development of Myanmar National Disaster Recovery Guidelines (MNDRG) |
| Ms. Monica Trujillo | International Consultant | International Consultant - Myanmar National Guidelines for Post-Disaster Needs Assessment & Finalization of MNDRG |
| Mr. Matthias Mollet | International Consultant | International Consultant - Development of PDNA Guides for Agriculture Sector & Agriculture Sector Recovery Guides |
| Mr. Osmar Velasco | International Consultant | International Consultant - Development of Sectorial PDNA Guides for Education, Housing, Transport and Health Sectors |
| Mr. Jasper van der Werff ten Bosch | International Consultant | International Consultant - Assessment of Floods and Water Scarcity in Kyaikmaraw Township, Myanmar & Development of Knowledge Product (developed narrative/script for short animation on Flood Risk Management, droughts and land use transition) |

| Name | Location | Title/Role on BCRR II |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Mr. Salai Hsan Myat Htoo | National Consultant | National Consultant - Video animation and voice-over for "Flood Risk Management, Droughts and Land Use" along with the recovery concept in Myanmar |
| Reda Hassan | Communication Specialist | Development of a project video for visibility purposes |

3. Attendees at Peer-to-Peer Workshop (23-24 June 2021)

Ms. Charlotte Yaiche, BCRR II Project Manager, UNDP Global Team
 Ms. Abha Nigam, UNDP Global Team
 Mr. Sanny Ramos Jegillos, UNDP Practice Coordinator for Asia Pacific region
 Mr. Oussimane Ouedrago, UNDP Burkina Faso Country Office
 Mr. Celestin Zongo, UNDP Burkina Faso Country Office
 Mr. Jaroslava Ouzka
 Mr. Justin Shone, UNDP, Lao PDR Country Office
 Ms. Maria Eugenia Mahiques
 Ms. Maria Fernanda Rosales
 Ms. Serena Arcone, UNDP Myanmar Country Office
 Ms. Maria Celeste Benchimol, UNDP Cabo Verde Country Office
 Ms. Sonia Lopes, UNDP Cabo Verde Country Office
 Mr. Wai Zin, UNDP Myanmar Country Office
 Mr. Ali Ousseini Ali, UNDP Niger Country Office.