Outcome Evaluation:
Conflict Prevention and Peace building

Conducted by an external and independent consultants’ team  
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Persons with whom the mission has inter-acted not only willingly engaged, but took a genuine interest in the purpose of the mission.

In terms of organization and logistics, the work undertaken by the mission team has been greatly facilitated by the Beirut and field-based staff of UNDP.

All this has greatly contributed to bringing this external and independent outcome evaluation to a conclusion.

Still, it is noted that the responsibility for the present report rests with the mission team. This report does, therefore, not necessarily reflect the official views of UNDP.
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Beirut Southern Suburbs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central Administration of Statistics</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>Council for Development and Reconstruction</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DAD</td>
<td>Development Assistance Data-base</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Aid</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon</td>
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<td>HRC</td>
<td>Higher Relief Council</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Finance Institutions</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>LAF</td>
<td>Lebanese Army Forces</td>
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<td>LMAC</td>
<td>Lebanese Mine Action Center</td>
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<td>LRTF</td>
<td>Lebanese Recovery Trust Fund</td>
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<td>LNMAP</td>
<td>Lebanese National Mine Action Program</td>
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<td>LPDC</td>
<td>Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Displaced</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MOSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>Naher El-Bared Camp</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>RRC</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Recovery Cell</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNMCC</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Coordination Center</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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Executive Summary

Introduction
The subject of this outcome evaluation is conflict prevention and peace-building as supported as part of UNDP’s 2nd Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Lebanon (2002-2008). The main purposes for undertaking this outcome evaluation are: learning lessons from recent UNDP and partner interventions/efforts related to conflict prevention and peace-building, establishing a firmer base for substantive programme accountability in the next phase as well as for informing the conceptualization of the next UNDP Country Programme for Lebanon. This evaluation was planned for 2006, but had to be postponed due to various exigencies.

As little evaluative evidence was readily available, the mission-team has had to spend considerable time on gathering, and validating, written and oral source-information and on designing a workable methodology. This included the development of a base-line and current-status assessment (including consideration of outstanding legacies of the 1975-90 civil war), as well as a programmatic definition of peace-building and state/nationhood-formation. Furthermore, the mission-team decided to organize its analysis of the various project and non-project support interventions around three portfolio clusters, namely: (a) Reconstruction and development, (b) Early recovery, and (c) Peace-building and related initiatives.

Assessment, findings and conclusions
The situation as has evolved more recently in Lebanon has witnessed dramatic setbacks and shocks. Politically and security-wise this has been most manifest since early 2005, aggravated by the 2006 war. These developments have negatively affected the country’s political-economy, economic growth and opportunities for improving human development. In retrospect, it can be said that the design of the CCF underestimated the importance of peace-building. In fact, donor agencies, including UNDP, have had to attune their priorities, strategies and actual support-interventions in view of the increasingly deteriorating situation in Lebanon. The potential effect of such interventions on peace-building has for the most part been offset by the absence of a consensual approach among the leading national factions.

Nevertheless, commendable achievements have been made in respect of each of the three (construed) UNDP peace-building portfolios during the period of review. This refers, above all, to the successful upstream support and leveraging had in placing poverty and regional-imbalances on the national policy-agenda. Moreover, this has been followed-through with region-specific downstream programmes. Additionally, a number of national-level reform interventions have been supported in promoting democratic governance. More specifically, the following achievements can be attributed to UNDP support and partnering:

Reconstruction and development: The earlier area-based support targeted at Baalbak/Hermel, and the subsequent area-specific projects for Mount-Lebanon, South-Lebanon and North-Lebanon (Akkar) have been the first of its their kind to pursue
multiple objectives as these relate to ameliorating the consequences of war and conflict as well as enhancing balanced regional development. With the exception of the overly ambitious Baalbek/Hermel project, all other projects are assessed to have had a discernable effect on improving living-conditions, instilling confidence among communities and local leadership, as well as by having provided foundational support for development-management and good-governance practices. Still, the case-by-case approach adopted in supporting municipalities and cooperatives has likely foreshortened the potential impact these projects could have had. Speculative as this is, but these projects – if adjusted over time - could have helped to generate more comprehensive socio-economic dynamics and investment-multipliers and to moderate inter-communal differences and tensions. Although these projects have been directed at the comparatively poorest regions, it is doubtful whether these projects have been effective in reaching the poorest and most vulnerable households within these regions. Furthermore, these projects have been found to be rather insensitive in terms of gender and ecologically sustainable development. Unfortunately, the rich experience that these projects have accrued has not been systematized such that it could have been utilized to inform policy, regulatory and institutional measures and adjustments.

Early recovery: This strand of support has clearly benefited from UNDP’s ongoing region-specific and national-level support, especially in facilitating and strengthening local and national leadership in coping with crises, forging local-national and international partnerships, and in addressing immediate material and logistical needs. This holds particularly true for the support-operations aimed at addressing the immediate aftermath of the 2006 war. This is being assessed as having been exemplary as regards the mix of activities, the capacity-enhancing mode of delivery and focus on those segments of the population that had been most affected. The kind of support provided to the Southern-Beirut suburbs could be capitalized on by extending UNDP support to (peri)urban areas.

Peace-building and related initiatives: This portfolio of highly diverse support-interventions can not be assessed uniformly, while some of these interventions have only recently begun. The projectised approach to Peace-building is to be queried and alternative approaches best be considered – taking lessons from the seemingly successful constituency-building approach being pursued in preparing the National Human Development Report. Other than that, the various project and non-project initiatives aimed at modernizing institutions of state and promoting democratic governance (in particular electoral reform) are found to be highly relevant and – potentially – impactful.

Programme performance, the interaction among the various UNDP portfolios appears to have been lackluster. Portfolio and programme-wide reporting and assessment has been scarce and of little analytical value, while project evaluations have been few and far in-between. In so far targets and indicators were developed, these appear to be confined to easy-deliverables. Accrued experience has remained foremost embodied by the staff concerned. Programme-level direction and oversight appears to have been ad hoc – at least until recently. Cost-efficiency appears to have been favorable as foremost national and local expertise and resources have been utilized.
Overall assessment: each of the UNDP portfolios related to peace-building are found to have been responsive and, for the most part, well attuned to addressing structural (outstanding civil war legacies) and emerging problems. This takes into account UNDP’s mandate and focal areas, its limited resources-base and the partnering it effectively has brokered. At the same time, the full potential of the region-specific reconstruction and development interventions may not have been duly tested – both directly (on the ground impact) and indirectly (informing policy-making). Still, UNDP has demonstrated a much needed degree of resilience in decelerating and re-accelerating its regular support-interventions, while intermittently assisting national and local authorities in coping with sudden crises. This high degree of flexibility in responding to sudden changes in circumstances and challenges would best be retained and reflected in the design of the next Country Programme.

Recommendations and perspective
Notwithstanding this – overall – positive outcome, it is to be queried in how far UNDP (and its partners) are presently guided by a strategy for transitioning from crisis-response and early-recovery to “sustainable recovery” (i.e. longer-term recovery, nationhood-formation and development). The main recommendation is, therefore, that UNDP adopt peace-building for human development as the overarching objective of its next Country Programme for Lebanon. This would comprise the following mutually-enforcing components:

(i) Continued support to central government in respect of a) governance reforms (in particular legislative, electoral and public administration reform – including decentralization), b) ongoing review of social-services provisioning and the design of a social development strategy, and, possibly c) discretionary-advisory services aimed at providing alternatives to IFI-‘instilled’ economic reforms.

(ii) More prominent and structured support to civil society actors, in particular by forging/facilitating “constructive coalitions”. In this respect, the mobilization and constituency-building as part of the NHDR-preparation could very well be consolidated/expanded, centered on a few forward-looking, positive and action-oriented advocacy/policy-issues. Beyond the current theme dealing with a citizen’s state, a next topic for rallying like-minded and peace-loving societal-forces could be a “2020” type of visioning of how best the energies of all Lebanese can be unleashed and made to work in unison.

(iii) Direct-impact, local-level support interventions across confessional-borders that build onto the various recovery and socio-economic development projects supported thus far, while capitalizing on the credibility earned due to the successful post-2006 early-recovery support. This is recommended for several reasons: (a) social mobilization and organization at the local level, but with (i) explicit emphasis on self-reliance, (ii) more inclusive and targeted support as regards the vulnerable and poor, and with dedicated attention given to gender and sustainable
use of natural resources and bio-diversity, and (iii) livelihood-orientation (rather than centered on small-scale community-infrastructure investments); 
(b) Approach this in a multi-tier manner (local, municipal, regional and national), involving: (i) participatory assessment/planning, (ii) larger-scale livelihoods and economic development projects, and (iii) private sector development. Such multi-tier approach would in fact fill a void – as the decentralization-agenda has become mute with little likelihood of its resuscitation in the immediate future; 
(c) Where-ever possible, engage with communities/municipalities that pertain to different religious-persuasions or political affiliation – with the aim to build trust and foster collaboration based on common real-life needs/aspirations, and; 
(d) In terms of coverage, reach-out not only to rural(-peripheral) areas, but also to urban and peri-urban settings (especially the Southern-Beirut suburbs). 
(e) Cooperation with other donors (WB and EU in particular) and consensus on employing one and the same approach and processes for engaging with local authorities and communities. 

UNDP’s demonstrated strength and value-addition as regards local-level approaches lies in conceiving, piloting and optimizing the conditions for upscaling novel approaches to community-driven reconstruction and development – not necessarily in maximizing geographical coverage. It is, thus, essential for these support-interventions to have built-in components for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management – geared towards drawing lessons and developing options for policy, regulatory and institutional adjustments. 

**Structure of the report**

Apart from an introduction that provides the background to this mission (chapter 1), the principal reference points for conducting this evaluation are presented in chapters 2 and 3. The mission’s assessment of the various UNDP peace-building portfolios is contained in chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 provide, respectively, the mission’s findings and conclusions, as well as the mission’s recommendations and perspective on future directions. 

In closing, the mission-team wishes to state that the assessed/appraised properties of UNDP support-interventions can not be judged against the efficacy of the actual state of nationhood and peace-building in Lebanon. The successful realization of this outcome can only be shouldered by national actors, where possible supported by the international community.
1. Introduction

1.1 Outcome-evaluation; case-background, purpose and standards

The present outcome-evaluation is focused on “Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Interventions”, as these had been envisaged as part of UNDP’s 2nd CCF for Lebanon covering the period 2002-6, or as had otherwise been instigated during this period. Since a number of these interventions were aimed at area-specific and participatory development, UNDP had amended the original mission TOR for it to include “Local Governance” as an additional focus. This outcome evaluation had originally been scheduled to take place as early as 2006 – it having had to be postponed due to over-riding priorities in responding to events affecting Lebanon since that date.

The main purposes for conducting this type of evaluation are to obtain learning from the interventions that UNDP has supported thus far, to provide substantive accountability to the Government of Lebanon and UNDP donors on programme performance and achievements, and to garner a perspective as regards the forthcoming UNDP Country Programme for Lebanon. Generally, outcome-evaluations are meant to assess the relative success that a selected number of support-interventions (projectised or otherwise) have had in furthering a particular reconstruction and/or development goal. The conclusions, lessons-learned, recommendations and perspective proffered by an outcome-evaluation should be substantiated by an assessment of:

- The relevance of such support-interventions,
- Their effectiveness in achieving stated objectives/outputs, but also as regards leveraging, networking and partnering had,
- The manner and extent that these interventions are of help in sustaining the desired outcome.

Like any other type of appraisal, the potential utility of outcome-evaluations critically hinges on meeting a number of standards. It is particularly important whether the results emanating from such type of evaluations can, in fact, be:

(a) Derived from, or validated against, evaluative evidence (in particular independent sources, documented or otherwise),
(b) Assessed against a preset programmatic framework that clearly specifies programme- and sub-programme level objectives and strategies, as well as pre-set targets/indicators to measure progress against, and
(c) Analyzed relative to an earlier-established baseline and end-status, while taking account of any significant change-factors that may have influenced the desired outcome in the meantime.

1.2 Mission planning, methodology and organization

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1 Country Cooperation Framework. UNDP’s CCF for Lebanon (2002-6, extended until 2008) is meant to be embedded as part of the United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF) for Lebanon that covers the same time period.
2 The mission TOR can be obtained from UNDP Lebanon.
Upon commencing its in-country assignment in January 2008, it soon became clear to the mission team that the above-indicated standards for optimizing the potential utility of the evaluation could not be fully met, since certain elements were either weakly developed (i.e. targets/indicators and reporting), inadequate (i.e. programme-level baseline) or absent (i.e. evaluative evidence for most projects). At the same time, the situation as has evolved in Lebanon over the last few years has witnessed dramatic events (such as a number of political assassinations and the increasingly dysfunctional status of governance institutions), devastating shocks (in particular the July-August war with Israel) and lingering or sudden crisis (most notably the Nahr el Bared camp emergency). These recent developments have severely affected the country’s political-economy, growth and distribution patterns, and opportunities for improving human development.

Several additional issues emerged during initial review of the mission TOR - most importantly:

a) The type of evaluation (i.e. outcome evaluation). This type of evaluation may prove to be pertinent as regards support-interventions that date back several years, but likely less so for more recent crisis-response interventions.

b) The focus of the evaluation (conflict prevention and peace-building, as well as local governance) in relation to the scope of the evaluation. As it appeared, of the 19 projects listed in the TOR, 11 are centered on reconstruction and/or local-level support, the remaining ones being concerned with national-level governance support. This is with the exception of three projects that are explicitly geared towards Peace-building.

Following consultation with UNDP management, the following was decided:

(i) The type and focus of this evaluation will remain unchanged – it being understood that the effects/impact of more recent projects may (as yet) not have a discernable bearing on the desired outcome,

(ii) National-level governance projects will be taking into account only in so far these were intended to have a more direct effect on peace-building, and

(iii) Instead, a selected number of former area-specific projects (supported by UNDP and other donors) will be reviewed – to the extent that these projects are assessed to have yielded lessons that are of help in shaping future programming directions.

Based on this pragmatic stance, the mission team re-examined the list of projects (or support-interventions) to be covered by the evaluation and found reason to cluster these by way of three “portfolios” (as shown in the summary table – Annex 1), namely:

1. Reconstruction and development
2. Early-recovery (post 2006)
3. Peace-building and related initiatives

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3 This situation is not an uncommon as regards the “first-generation” of UNDP-CCF outcome evaluations – as the underlying Results-based Management (RBM) concept and approach had only been recently introduced at the time of the design of these CCFs. Moreover, it appears that the UNDP-specific RBM-instrumentaria - as had been introduced at the time (i.e. MYFF, SRF, ROAR) - has meanwhile been largely altered.

4 The phrase “support-interventions” is favored as it more easily allows for capturing non-project support-initiatives.
Such distinction in substantive focus largely coincides with the extent that support-interventions are oriented towards specific regions (portfolios 1 and 2) or the national-level (portfolio 3), or can be considered to be more structural (portfolios 1 and 3) or ad hoc (portfolio 2) in nature and scope. The first portfolio comprises 4 interventions that pre-date 2006 (at least in terms of design) and that were aimed at addressing regional imbalances, other than recovery. The second covers most of the 2006 post-war early-recovery interventions supported by UNDP - as these, for the most part, were meant to facilitate the earliest possible return of displaced people. The third portfolio is a catch-all of diverse project and non-project interventions that deal with peace-building – either explicitly or indirectly.

Furthermore, the mission team determined the following to be the principal reference-points for conducting the outcome evaluation: (a) UNDP stated objectives and strategies, as contained in the UNDP 2nd CCF for Lebanon (Chapter 2.1), (b) The programmatic implications of the concepts of conflict prevention and peace-building (Chapter 2.2), (c) the baseline-situation and current status of the desired outcome (Chapter 3).

The mission’s assessment of UNDP’s outcome achievement is presented in Chapter 4. The subsequent chapters provide, respectively, the mission’s evaluative findings and conclusions (Chapter 5) and recommendations and perspective (Chapter 6).

The above referred management decisions and methodological considerations have helped to gear-up the time-scheduling and organization of the mission’s work - this in actual fact having been greatly facilitated by the office and project staff of UNDP Lebanon.

The mission team - comprising one international and one national consultant - undertook its in-country work from 14 January until 8 February 2008 (the international consultant having conducted initial desk review as of 31 December 2007).

2. Principal reference points for the outcome evaluation

2.1 UNDP 2nd CCF for Lebanon

One of the principal points of reference for this outcome evaluation is UNDP’s second Country Cooperation Framework for Lebanon (CCF) – as had originally been approved for the period 2002-2006. The CCF is premised on the “challenge … to develop a vision,
build capacities and enhance governance systems that meet the requirements of the country to meet the challenges of the third millennium”, as well as the need “to reduce disparities between regions and groups”. In line with the two goals agreed for the UNDAF, the CCF set out two strands of UNDP support-interventions, namely: “Institution-building support for policy- and decision-making” and “Empowerment at the local level”. The former includes a variety of support measures aimed at strengthening strategic planning as well as legislative reform and the upholding of the rule of law. The latter covers a number of initiatives aimed at integrated regional development, post-conflict reconstruction and development (i.e. Mount Lebanon and Southern Lebanon) and strengthening municipalities and local governance structures.

Of particular relevance to this outcome evaluation is the statement contained in the CCF that “Reconciliation and Peacebuilding will remain a critical dimension [for UNDP support-interventions] with democratic dialogue and participation in decision-making pursued especially within the context of local governance initiatives”. It is furthermore stated that “A core strategic objective of this CCF will be to cement the linkages between the two pillars of policy dimensions and applied reduction of disparities at the community level.”

In view of the changing and in many ways deteriorating situation in Lebanon, UNDP has had to attune its support-interventions such as to be responsive to emerging needs and priorities. It is of note that only 5 out of the 19 projects listed in the mission-TOR are referenced in the CCF document; all other projects having been initiated in response to needs/priorities that emerged subsequent to the approval and implementation of the CCF. This course of events has informed the decision to extend the CCF until 2008. While the next UNDAF and UN agency-specific Country Programmes are scheduled to commence in 2009, a new Common Country Assessment has been prepared in the meantime, as well as a 2007-2008 UN agencies Transition Recovery Strategy (both dated October 2007). The latter is meant as an interim programmatic framework that is to guide UN agencies in helping to realize some of the priorities agreed to at the Paris-III conference, in particular as these relate to the Government’s Social Action Plan.

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9 CCF, p.5. This intent is reiterated in the section dealing with “support to post-conflict reconstruction and development”. This programme-component was meant to cover “consolidation” of by then ongoing UNDP support to the displaced populations from Mount Lebanon and the reconstruction of the liberated South. This component is qualified as follows: “…the theme of peace consolidation will continue to guide UNDP’s activities … with special emphasis on youth, in addition to community-based rehabilitation and rebuilding institutional capacity at the local level”.

10 Quotations from the CCF, p6-7.

11 The transition strategy covers six “support areas”, namely: Recovery, coordination and local development; Health; Water, environment and sanitation; Education; MSEs, business and agricultural
2.2 Peace-building and State/Nationhood-formation: concepts

The continually precarious state of Lebanon’s political economy\(^\text{12}\) is seemingly intractable as it involves multiple and intricate issues, a longstanding case-history and a diverse range of actors (domestic, regional and global) - most of whom are being motivated by strongly-felt convictions and/or geo-political interest. Various attempts aimed at peace-building have been made in the past to help resolve the still fledgling state of state/nationhood-formation in Lebanon. This refers, most notably, to the 1989 Ta’ef-agreement, but also to more recent initiatives, in particularly the currently ongoing - but as yet inconclusive - initiative by the League of Arab Nations.

It is thus warranted to ascertain the programmatic meaning of the before-mentioned concepts - given the focus of this outcome evaluation. It is generally agreed that international peace-building efforts have so far been wanting for lack of an overall strategic and cohesive approach – the UN Secretary-General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace having been of hallmark importance in this respect. The ensuing debate on the nexus between peace-building (including conflict prevention) and state/nation-formation in post-conflict situations has remained rather inconclusive\(^\text{13}\). An internationally-agreed definition of peace-building is yet to emerge - notwithstanding the establishment of the UN Peace-building Commission\(^\text{14}\).

As nearly 40% of UNDP’s assistance world-wide (2005) is targeted at conflict-affected countries, its Executive Board commissioned an evaluation\(^\text{15}\) to assess “the extent to which UNDP performance has contributed to improving human security and addressing the structural conditions conducive to conflict so that a reoccurrence of armed conflict could be prevented”. The evaluation concludes that UNDP “…is uniquely positioned within the United Nations to address the structural conditions that lead to conflict. UNDP has played a pioneering role in developing new strategic responses to conflict and has introduced many innovative projects, especially community-based ones. Nevertheless, the evaluation identifies some challenges for UNDP. These include: need for systematic application of best practices in conflict areas; need for greater attention to civil society and gender; need for more experienced staff to be sent on missions to conflict-affected countries; and difficulty in obtaining information about what UNDP does and about project procedures. The evaluation also observes that the effectiveness of UNDP is

\(^{12}\)“Political economy” for the purpose of this mission is defined as the inter-play and resultant effect of economic, social and political factors on societal development.

\(^{13}\)In large part, this would seem to be due to the attempt to reconcile case-specific responses that significantly differ as regards the root/apparent causes of conflict, the triggers and manifestations of these conflicts and, in particular, the role of the state and the dynamics of nationhood-formation.

\(^{14}\)The UN Peace-building Commission was established as an outcome of the 2005 World Summit on Social and Sustainable Development (UNGA, Report on the Peacebuilding Commission 1st session, Juli 2007).

constrained somewhat by inefficiencies in inter-organization cooperation.” This particular document, however, fails to provide a more programmatic definition of what is involved in conflict prevention, peace-building and state/nationhood-formation.

Various working-definitions of these concepts do in fact exist. A more wholesome set of definitions of these concepts that seem to be well-matched with the purpose of this outcome evaluation would be:

Peace-building: Actions aimed at identifying and supporting national entities or actors that most likely will be amenable to - and instrumental in - brokering, strengthening or solidifying harmony and peace and in avoiding a regression into conflict. In order to resort such effect, a wide variety of post-conflict support-interventions may be required, ranging from conflict prevention, “humanitarian assistance, return of refugees, security sector reform, economic reconstruction [and adjustment], rebuilding of key government institutions, elections and political reforms, justice reform, and the establishment of foundations for long term development and social reconciliation, often in the context of international commitment to provide peacekeepers and funding.”

State/Nationhood-formation: “State-formation rests on three pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core function; their legitimacy and accountability; and ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance to generate income, employment and domestic revenues.” In analogy, Nationhood-formation in post-conflict situations would refer to the manner of engineering the state-civil society interface such as to foster security, stability and reconciliation in the short-term and consensus, democracy and good-governance practices in the longer-term.

Needless to say that State/Nationhood-formation is most critical for Conflict-prevention and enduring Peace-building.

3. Outline of the political-economy of post civil-war Lebanon

3.1 Rationale and background

Given the inadequacies found as regards basic evaluation-standards for conducting this outcome evaluation (see Chapter 1), the mission-team deemed it useful to attempt drawing a sketch of the political economy of Lebanon as this has evolved since the civil war. “Political economy” for the purpose of this mission is defined as the inter-play and

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16 For example: “strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur” (Lambourne, W, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation; Peace, Conflict and Development – Issue Four, April 2004).
19 The mission team is aware that such attempt will be open to all kinds of critique - as it is bound to be incomplete and - as, regards particular matters - possibly inaccurate or simply disputed. Still, without
resultant effect of economic, social and political factors on societal development. The present chapter is, therefore, meant to serve the dual purpose of setting a more comprehensive benchmark, as well as to outline and typify the current status of conflict prevention, peace-building and state-formation in Lebanon\textsuperscript{20}.

Other than having been extremely violent\textsuperscript{21}, the Lebanese civil war (1975–90) was very complex as it involved state and non-state actors as well as regional and international powers. It was fought by militias, most of which were organised across sectarian lines. Most of these militias were sponsored by Middle Eastern states some of which participated directly in the fighting and in occupying Lebanese territory, or indirectly in supporting and bankrolling militias and parties.

A peace settlement was reached among the warring factions in 1989/1990 in the form of the \textit{National Reconciliation Agreement}, also known as the \textit{Taif Agreement}\textsuperscript{22}. This agreement proved to be reasonably successful during the next few years in restoring normalcy and in effectuating the disarmament of most militias. It offered a new power sharing mechanism based on equal Muslim-Christian representation in the Parliament and in allocating top-ranking public positions. The Taif agreement thus helped to reinstate a consociational system based on religious and political affiliation.

Subsequently, the Lebanese government launched a post-conflict rehabilitation programme with the aim of reconstructing the war-torn country. The programme, known as the \textit{National Emergency and Reconstruction Plan (1990)}\textsuperscript{23}, was focussed on the following:

1. Rehabilitation and development of basic physical infrastructure,
2. A monetary stabilization policy to curb inflation and to strengthen confidence in the national currency, and
3. Control of the fiscal imbalances incurred due to the civil war and the subsequent reconstruction efforts.

The programme relied heavily on domestic and external borrowing. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) alone contracted US$ 7.94 billion worth of projects between 1992 and 2006, of which about 70\% (US$ 5.56 billion) has been disbursed\textsuperscript{24}. This brings the estimated total capital expenditures between 1992 and 2006

\textsuperscript{20} A brief description of major features of Lebanon, including a chronology of political events, can be found at the webpage of UNDP Lebanon: \url{http://www.undp.org.lb/about/AboutLebanon.cfm}

\textsuperscript{21} The fifteen-year Lebanese civil war has witnessed atrocities and massacres committed by all parties to the conflict. The war left more than 150,000 killed, 300,000 injured and around 800,000 displaced. The physical damages are estimated to have been some US$ 25 billion. See Dib, 2004.

\textsuperscript{22} See Krayem, 1997

\textsuperscript{23} This was succeeded by \textit{Horizon 2000 Plan}.

\textsuperscript{24} Council for Development and Reconstruction, Progress Report, September 2007. Capital expenditures disbursed by CDR may in fact vary in between 75\% and 80\% of total Government capital expenditures, since some ministries undertook investment projects on their own, without passing these through CDR.
to a figure of close to US$ 10 billion. This has further increased the public debt burden, this having reached about US$ 38 billion in August 2007\(^{25}\).

3.2 Determining factors, dynamics and trends

Notwithstanding the progress made since the end of the civil war, the post-Taif period has not proven to be a panacea. In fact, the reconstruction effort has been focused mainly on physical reconstruction - without this having been guided by a more encompassing strategy aimed at regenerating economy activity and forging domestic economic dynamics. Social development and concerns about inter-regional imbalances has, largely, been left unattended until recently.

The Horizon 2000 Plan envisaged an ascending trend in economic growth, with an average growth rate ranking between 8% and 9% (at constant prices) for the period 1995-2007. However, the actual growth rates registered during the post-war period have by far been inferior to the ones projected, as these have evolved over three consecutive phases:

1- Phase one (1993-1997) witnessed an average annual growth rate of about 6%, induced mainly by public investment in physical infrastructure, the resultant surge of the real estate sector and a relatively large increase in public and private consumption.

2- Phase two (1998-2002) registered a net decrease in growth rates – these having become even negative for 2000-2001. This deterioration can be attributed to the growing burden of public debt and the contraction of public and private investments because of the near-completion of physical reconstruction projects that heralded the end of the real estate boom.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (nominal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (real)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>3.0%</td>
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*Source: Lebanon’s Economic Account 1997-2002*

3- Phase three (2002-2005) saw, initially, a relative improvement in the overall macroeconomic framework following the Paris II conference (November 2002). This lasted for only two years (2003-2004) due to a relatively strong increase in private investment, especially FDI. This progressive trend was abruptly halted following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP growth in $ value and volume (2003-2006)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>1.6%</td>
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\(^{25}\) As per data published by the Central Bank of Lebanon
The July war of 2006 has had a further negative impact on GDP growth – this having been assessed\(^\text{26}\) to have contracted to some -5%. This contrasts sharply with the 5% and 6% growth projection for, respectively, 2006 and 2007 that had been predicted earlier.

In terms of governance, little progress appears to have been made in building effective institutions of state and in engendering genuine democratic governance. The steady deterioration of the political and security situation over the last three years underscores the need for re-thinking the efficacy of the Lebanese power-sharing mechanisms among the different interest groups. This has become all the more pressing as key institutions of state have - to varying degrees - become dysfunctional due to the political stalemate reached among the leading factions. This, in turn, has giving impetus to a politics-of-the-streets and a heightened degree of polarization between sectarian lines.\(^\text{27}\). Some of the major failures underlying the current political deadlock and the growing inter-communal animosities can be summed-up as follows:

i- The unwillingness or incapacity of the political establishment to agree on a more representative electoral system that meets popular consent - as was foreseen by the Taif Agreement. Instead the last four rounds of elections held between 2002 and 2005 have taken place based on gerrymandered electoral laws.

ii- The absence of any tangible progress towards de-confessionalising the political system. Eighteen years after the Taif Agreement, the envisaged establishment of a National Committee for Political Deconfessionalisation remains to be acted upon.

iii- The slow and hesitant progress towards designing and implementing administrative decentralisation and remedying regional imbalances - as this was stipulated in the Taif Agreement. This issue is closely related to the increasing polarization about the inter-communitarian balance of power.

In terms of social and political developments the following warrants highlighting. Extreme poverty in Lebanon is estimated to have declined to some 8% in 2004-2005 (as compared to 10% in 1997), although it is estimated to have increased to 8.4% in 2007 due to the dampening effects of the 2006 war on household consumption. Inequality is assessed to be moderate and comparable to other high-middle income countries when measured by the Gini-coefficient (which for Lebanon is currently estimated to stand at 0.36 in terms of real consumption). It is somewhat striking that 92% of aggregate

\footnotesize{\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
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\multicolumn{2}{|c|}{(nominal)} & \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{(real)} \\
\hline
GDP & 4.1% & 7.4% & 1.1% & -5.0% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
}


\textit{Source for the year 2006: Association of Banks in Lebanon}


\(^{27}\) In fact, Lebanon by now stands closer than ever to being qualified as a failed state (see Fund for Peace failed states index [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865]. Also compare the editorial of the Lebanese Daily Star newspaper of 7 February 2007 (“In Lebanese politics, it’s still 2006 – which was 1975”).
inequality can be explained by “within-governorate” inequality and only 8% to “inter-governorate” inequality.

The most recent, significant policy-statement by Government on social development is its Action Plan that was presented as part of Government’s reconstruction and reform measures at the January 2007 Paris III conference. Meanwhile, preparations are underway to design safety net measures and to address the various inefficiencies in extending health and education services. Beyond this Government is committed to develop a more overarching strategy for social development.

Other measures that are considered to be crucial for making more structural inroads towards offsetting regional imbalances and poverty – in particular decentralization and empowerment of local authorities and communities – have remained stalled, beyond the elections held for municipal councils.

Meanwhile, the sluggish growth and need to rationalize public expenditures has given rise to various forms of discontent – both organized (e.g. labour union actions) as well as more spontaneous (such as popular protests against the erratic supply of electricity). Informed observers point to the risk that these protests – genuine as these may be – can become increasingly embroiled with the escalating polarization that is currently unfolding along factional lines.

More fundamentally, Lebanon’s political economy continues to be driven by a long-standing and engrained ‘system’ of confession-based patronage and clientalism. This system permeates throughout all spheres of socio-economic life and politics – causing gross ineffectiveness in the provision of social services and, likely, a somewhat skewed allocation of treasury allocations and, possibly also, of externally-provided rehabilitation and development resources.

Poverty, regional disparities and marginalization can easily cause a (re-)generation of tensions and conflict that are latent or semi-manifest. It is, therefore, essential to address these root-causes of conflict, especially by means of addressing communal or regional grievances and by promoting equitability and socio-economic equality among all Lebanese. However, it could be alleged that none of these measures may prove to be effective as long as no consensual adjustments can be reached on sharing power among the various factions and without fundamental change being made to the country’s administrative and governance systems and actual practices.

3.3 Legacies hindering a sustainable peace
At least the following six ‘issues’ have - for the most part - persisted ever since the civil-war and are yet to be dully addressed and resolved, namely:
  - Sectarian/communal polarization and divisions

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29 Social Action Plan; Towards strengthening social safety nets and access to basic social services, Republic of Lebanon, January 2007.
• Hampered institutional reforms
• Regional Disparities
• Political Violence and Assassinations
• Interference and occupation by regional powers
• The Palestinian question and Palestinian refugees

These legacies continue to have a direct and indirect bearing on peace, security and development and are thus of major significance in shaping the future of Lebanon. A deeper understanding of these issues would seem to be crucial for arriving at a consensual approach in designing policies and programmes aimed at reconciliation, conflict prevention and the building of a sustainable peace in Lebanon. A further elaboration of these legacies is attached as Annex 2.

4. Assessment of UNDP support-interventions related to peace-building

The assessment of UNDP peace-building interventions in Lebanon follows the clustering of UNDP project and non-project support into three portfolios - as construed by the mission (see Chapter 1.2). This assessment is, furthermore, referenced to the working definition employed for peace-building (Chapter 2.2) and the analysis of Lebanon’s post civil-war political economy (Chapter 3). The various UNDP support-interventions meant to be covered by this outcome-evaluation are, thus, assessed as follows.

4.1 Reconstruction and development

Seven projects are found to have a common purpose in contributing towards the socio-economic reconstruction and development of Lebanon (See Annex 1 for a detailed listing of these projects). More specifically, these projects were meant to:

a) Offset the direct consequences of war and conflict, such as the reintegration of internally displaced people (Mount Lebanon) or the socio-economic rehabilitation of war-torn areas (South Lebanon),

b) Remedy the consequences of war and conflict, such as the collapse of state authority and the proliferation of illicit crops (Baalbeck-Hermel),

c) Stem social and economic deprivation (Akkar and the national ART GOLD project), or

d) Address specific purposes, such as de-mining and disaster management.

The projects under above (a) and (b) commenced at the time when UNDP’s supported the Ministry of Social Affairs in conducting a poverty mapping exercise (1998)30. This ground-breaking work, in conjunction with various advocacy and dialoguing initiatives, has proven to be successful in placing the issue of poverty and regional imbalances on the national policy-agenda31. These up-stream policy-oriented initiatives have does

30 This has meanwhile been followed through with the National survey of household living conditions ((2004) and the comparative mapping of living conditions between 1995 and 2004 (2006).
31 This, purportedly, in spite of initial reluctance expressed on the part of the highest office-bearers of the country at the time.
complemented and – in part - informed the geographical focus of down-stream operational support.

The first of these operational interventions was the Baalbeck/Hermel project that commenced its second-phase in 1997. Although originally meant as a post-conflict operation aimed at substituting illicit (hashish) crops, this project became more broadly focused on area-based, multi-sectoral and demand-driven support to alternative modes of livelihood and economic development, other than improvement of social-services provisioning. An evaluation of this project concluded its positive effect on consensus-building and conflict preventions. At the same time, the evaluation pointed out that the project had become overly ambitious in attempting to address multiple priorities and demands, whereas actual funding fell far short of what would be required. Moreover, the project would have suffered from various managerial short-comings. After having made several adjustments, the project was scaled-down and eventually closed-down.

Likely in reaction to this echeque, the subsequent, area-specific projects in Mount-Lebanon and South-Lebanon (2000 onwards) and in North-Lebanon (Akkar, having started in 2001) – have been designed much more modestly, in terms of both geographical-spread and sectoral-coverage. Still, all of these four UNDP supported interventions are acknowledged to have been the first of their kind to pursue multiple objectives in offsetting the consequences of war and conflict as well as in enhancing balanced regional development.

In terms of actual achievements and results, the Mount Lebanon, South Lebanon and Akkar projects are assessed to have had a notable effect on enabling post-conflict reconstruction and local development by:

(i) Augmenting the capacities of municipal authorities – prior and following the 1998 municipal elections – and in introducing good-governance practices for planning and carrying out micro-level public investment projects,

(ii) Instilling confidence among the populace and local leadership – this, possibly, even having yielded a certain measure of social-cohesion and solidarity, and

(iii) Enabling livelihoods opportunities, be it by way of supporting cooperatives in meeting critical investment or equipment needs (South and Akkar) or by arranging for agro-extension services (Mount Lebanon).

This can be ascertained in two ways, namely (a) by observing the physical outputs of these projects (mainly in the form of physical micro-investments), and (b) by reading the statements made by those most immediately involved (in particular local actors). Although this can not be substantiated, it would seem that these projects, especially the ones in Mount Lebanon (Chouf, Aley and Baabda) and South Lebanon (by now covering all cadas), have been successful in instilling trust and in creating a general atmosphere of stability. In both these conflict-affected regions, UNDP has successfully displayed its neutrality by building good relations with local community-actors across the board, irrespective of their religious, clan or political affiliation.

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Particularly noteworthy as regards all three projects are the youth-centered interventions. Promising and worthwhile initiatives have been undertaken aimed at mobilizing and engaging youngsters at village and regional/district levels on issues such as citizenship and peaceful means of conflict resolution. Still, this particular component - as well as the one dealing with persons in the South who had been subjected to detention by Israel - would appear to be rather stand-alone and unconnected to the mainstream-support extended by these projects.

The credence achieved by these project-interventions has proven to be invaluable in helping to address the immediate aftermath of the 2006 war. This holds true particularly as regards the UNDP South Lebanon project. Although the South Lebanon project was about to be wound-down (pending an evaluation), it has proven to be most effective in providing various strands of support – including humanitarian, logistical, assessment-planning, coordination and early-recovery activities. Moreover, as the UNDP project office was converted into becoming a UN Resident Coordinator’s hub, it has seemingly been successful in sharing information and coordinating support activities, while providing entry to UN agencies and NGOs that had not been active in this region previously.

Notwithstanding this – overall – commendable record, it is to be noted that the management, backstopping and oversight of these three area-specific support-interventions may have neglected certain trade-offs. These are to be understood in terms of UNDP’s mandate and value-addition as this relates to local-level interventions. In this regard UNDP’s acknowledged strength is to conceptualize - and pilot - workable approaches to community-driven reconstruction and development, and to optimize the conditions for expanding such efforts. The eventual replication (horizontally) or upsaling (vertically) of such pilot-modules aimed at covering a more extensive geographical area is best left to Governments - where necessary supported by resource-endowed donors, such as International Financial Institutions or supra-national entities. It is, thus, essential for such UNDP support-interventions to have built-in components for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management – geared towards drawing lessons and developing options for policy, regulatory and institutional adjustments.

These ideal properties of UNDP local-level interventions contrast rather sharply with the case-by-case approach taken by the UNDP-Lebanon region-specific projects in collaborating with municipalities, other than with individual cooperatives and youth-groups. In this respect, these projects can be said to have been, foremost, activity/opportunity-oriented, rather than strategy-driven. Speculative as this is, these projects may have lost-out on their inherent-potential to generate more comprehensive socio-economic dynamics and investment-multipliers by aiming at livelihood and local-economic development (including private sector) support – instead of, predominantly,

33 In the case of Mount Lebanon, the mission was informed by local authorities that this region had offered temporary refuge to scores of families having been displaced from the South due to the 2006 war. Although no immediate inference could be ascertained, the culture and values espoused by the UNDP Mount Lebanon project may have proven to be critical in this respect – apart from the direct support the project has been able to provide.
micro-infrastructure investments. Although these projects have been serving the comparatively poorest regions of the country, it is doubtful whether these projects have succeeded in reaching-out to the most vulnerable and poor segments of the communities that have been supported. Other than that, it may very well be that the case-by-case approach adopted in collaborating with municipalities has left idle opportunities for engendering communal reconciliation and conflict-prevention across religious, clan or political divides. It also seems that these projects have been rather insensitive as regards gender and the sustainable use of natural resources as well as safeguarding bio-diversity. Lastly, there would appear to be ample scope for more close coordination – if not joined planning – with other donors, in particular the World Bank (Community Development Project) and the EU (Social Fund). The EU advised that it is allocating some E 18 million for N-Lebanon alone and its Social Fund facility appears to be covering the same type of activities as are being supported by the UNDP region-specific projects – with an additional funding-window in support of small and medium-size enterprise development.

In sum, it can be said that the UNDP region-specific projects have made significant inroads towards more comprehensive, decentralized development-management and good-governance practices – and thus peace-building. However, their effectiveness towards achieving such higher-level goals/outcome remains inconclusive.

In this respect, the strategy and operational approach intended by the UNDP-administered, multi-donor funded ART GOLD project may prove to be a ‘workable model’. This project - as is currently being launched through the UNDP regional project-offices - is akin to the earlier area-based approach that was attempted in Baalbeck/Hermel, albeit with the addition of a national and international dimension. Thus far the start-up of ART GOLD has been seemingly expeditious – as it could build onto the networking engineered by the still ongoing UNDP region-specific projects. This will prove to be by far more tedious and complex as ART GOLD is to expand its operations to communities that have thus far not been covered. Furthermore, the interaction with EU decentralized authorities needs to be carefully managed - especially if the principles of self-reliance and community-driven reconstruction and development are be adhered to.

As it stands, it would seem probable that the multi-donor - funded and steered - ART GOLD project may come to over-take the current UNDP-supported region-specific projects (as these are winding-down, with the exception of the Akkar project). Even if this were not to happen, than still due consideration will need to be given to the interaction and sharing of responsibilities (including accountability) between the ART GOLD management-team and the UNDP Country Office. As the ART GOLD project has been assigned first-line responsibility for implementation and operational management, the UNDP office will be in a position to progressively shift its attention to monitoring and analysis (including good working-practices), oversight and direction, as well as to

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34 Thus far funding is provided by Italy, though the mission was informed that additional donors would be interested to join.
35 The type of rather heavy-handed fly-in/out missions as have been experienced in South Lebanon could easily come to upset the process approach needed in building local capacity and ownership.
drawing lessons and identifying needs and options for designing, revising or reforming policies and regulatory measures. As such, this is a welcome perspective as it would enable the UNDP office to shift it focus from implementation-support to policy - in line with UNDP-corporate policy. Still, such *shift-in-gear* by having one single-large, self-managed and multi-partnered programme will need to be handled carefully and this transition would best be reviewed and assessed by UNDP senior management on a continuous-basis during the initial phase.\(^{36}\)

Whichever scenario may evolve, UNDP would do wise to consider ways and means of assigning more prominence to the involvement and role of government.\(^{37}\) In the same vein, UNDP may wish to more systematically seek opportunities for working with other UN agencies on particular issues/aspects of their interest and competence (e.g. youth and gender). Furthermore, it would seem warranted for donor-support to be inclusive of area-based development targeted at urban and peri-urban areas - given the high, and still increasing, urbanization ratio in Lebanon.\(^{38}\) Like is the case for rural interventions, such (peri-)urban support should have a built-in focus on peace-building – particularly aimed at strengthening the capacity of municipal authorities to harness inter-communal relations and to enhance its engagement with CBOs and grass-root organizations.

The support extended to the National Demining Office at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) is in the form of a Policy Advisory Unit. This project appears to be most effective in providing institution and capacity-building support. This has included the use of socio-economic factors to design an end-strategy for demining in Lebanon – with due attention given to restoring community life and livelihoods in war-affected regions. In South Lebanon, UNDP’s local level livelihood interventions would be coordinated with the Mine Action Coordination Center in South Lebanon (MACCL) – although the mission has not been able to ascertain the effectiveness of this coordination. In addition, and as a following-through of UNDP support in the wake of the 2006 war, an assessment of disaster management capacities of the government has been conducted – as a basis for future programme design.

4.2 Early-recovery support

There have been two recent instances where UNDP was called-upon, or took the initiative, to address crises of major significance as occurred in Lebanon during the period of review. This refers to the early response that UNDP undertook in the wake of the 2006 July-August war as well in respect of the 2007 Nahr el Bared camp crisis.

\(^{36}\) Lessons could be drawn from the experience gained by UNDP-Cambodia in overseeing and directing the CARERE-SEILA programme – as this evolved over the time-span of more than 15 years.

\(^{37}\) All the projects included in this portfolio-cluster are nationally executed projects (in partnership with the Council for Development and Reconstruction), except for the Support to the De-mining Office. Five of the projects have set-up a field office and field-based project team.

\(^{38}\) This UNDP portfolio is oriented to rural areas in Lebanon. ART GOLD – other than providing continual coverage of most of these rural areas – is focused, for the first time ever, on urban areas as regards Tripoli and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut.
Post 2006-war Early Recovery

The six weeks war that ensued between Israel and Lebanon during July-August 2006 caused some 1200 deaths, some 5000 people to be injured and nearly one million people (i.e. one-quarter of the national population) to be temporary displaced. The livelihoods of families occupying the nearly 107,000 houses that were damaged or destroyed was severely disrupted (affecting foremost shia communities). The direct damage from the war was estimated by Government to amount to some $2.8 billion. GDP output foregone is estimated by the World Bank\(^{39}\) to be as high as $2.3 billion. Two conferences were organized to help mobilize and coordinate international support\(^{40}\). About two-thirds of the support pledged at these conferences originated from Arab countries.

The various support-activities having been undertaken by UNDP in helping to stem the immediate fall-out of the 2006 war have been well documented\(^{41}\) and can thus be briefly summed-up as follows.

Other than having provided initial support to the humanitarian response\(^{42}\), the planning of UNDP’s contributions to early recovery started as the war was still unfolding. This comprised the following components:

(a) Facilitating and strengthening national and local leadership in leading the overall organization of the early recovery response. UNDP thus collaborated closely with the various Policy Advisory units that it is supporting in number of line ministries and, in particular, the one established within the Prime Minister’s Office. The latter was in part converted into a Reconstruction and Recovery Cell on the very same day that the cessation of hostilities was declared (i.e. 14 August 2006). This, in turn, yielded the following:

(b) The design of a package of “Quick Starting and High Impact Early Recovery projects. These include: (i) Rubble and debris removal by municipalities, (ii) Initial clean-up of the oil spill caused by the bombardment of the Jiyyeh power plant, (iii) Provision of basic assets to fishermen communities, (iv) Basic repair and re-equipping of local-government premises, such as to help reactivate public


\(^{40}\) Stockholm, August 2006 (early recovery) and Paris, January 2007 (reconstruction and reform).

\(^{41}\) UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War. This also contains a succinct summary of the various direct and indirect effects this war has had in terms of human loss and suffering, public infrastructure and services, economic damage and losses, and environmental impact. Hyperlink: http://www.undp.org.lb/PROFORMA.pdf

\(^{42}\) As off the second day of the war, UNDP provided added capacity to the High Relief Committee - i.e. the government entity in charge of organizing and coordinating the national humanitarian relief efforts. This included the setting-up of an information system that enabled tracking of displacement, casualties and damage incurred and hence the planning of the responses needed, as well as the issuance of daily situation reports. UNDP also facilitated a temporary presence of non-resident UN humanitarian Agencies, in particular WFP (which helped to devise “humanitarian corridors” for safely transporting relief supplies within Lebanon and “safe passages” of relief supplies into Lebanon) and OCHA (including the setting-up of UN agency humanitarian portfolio groups, the coordinated preparation of a Flash Appeal and a UN logistics Plan). In addition to providing modest relief supplies to affected communities, the UNDP sub-offices in Aley (Mount Lebanon) and Tyre (South) assisted municipalities in pre-planning the handling of relief supplies to displaced populations or affected communities.
services, and (v) The before-mentioned strengthening of national leadership in managing the early stage of recovery. This has yielded, among other support, the setting-up of a “Development Assistance Base” (DAD) and a multi-donor Trust Fund for mobilizing and administering donor contributions to early recovery (i.e. the Lebanese Recovery Trust Fund - LRTF).

(c) A number of post-conflict needs-assessments and surveys meant to facilitate the eventual transitioning from early to longer-term recovery, taking into account considerations of equity and regional imbalances. Meanwhile three such assessments/surveys have been completed, namely: Rapid assessment of environmental damage to “green” reconstruction and recovery (with the Ministry of Environment), Sub-sample survey relative to the 2004 multi-purpose household survey (with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Central Administration of Statistics], and a sub-sample survey relative to the 2004 SME survey (with the Consultation and Research Institute and the ILO).

(d) The conversion of UNDP project-offices into UN Resident Coordinator hubs (to facilitate multiple UN agencies’ presence and local-level coordination) in Tyre (Southern Lebanon) and Tripoli (Northern Lebanon) and with additional hubs established in Chtaurah (Bekaa”) and the municipalities of Chiyah/Haret Hreik (covering the Southern suburb of Beirut). This has greatly facilitated direct support to local authorities in conducting damage-assessment (e.g. Southern Lebanon damage assessment database), prioritization of requirements and action plans, other than rallying and coordinating international support by UN agencies and NGOs.

Going by all accounts of those consulted by the mission, and by its own observations and assessment, the various strands of early recovery support by UNDP are assessed to have been exemplary. This can be substantiated as follows:

UNDP has provided a most timely and fairly comprehensive, multi-focused package of support - as this has included: (i) early assessment and planning, thus helping national and local level leadership “to focus and structure” their early-recovery response, (ii) facilitation of the inter-facing between different government agencies, municipalities and civil society actors (including CBOs), (iii) acting as a conduit for mobilizing and coordinating externally-provided support, as well as the safeguarding of substantive and financial accountability (LRTF and DAD).

The timely preparation and presentation of the quick-delivery early-recovery package as an adjunct to the Government’s early recovery plan presented at the August 2006 Stockholm Conference. This has enabled donors to dedicate early-recovery funding, once the LRTF had been effectively established. The inclusion of the social action plan as part and parcel of Government’s reconstruction and reform programme to the January 2007 Paris III conference has, most likely, contributed to broadening the international cooperation agenda with respect to Lebanon beyond solely reconstruction and reform.

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43 This DAD is an adaptable tool for aid coordination and management - originally devised for Afghanistan and utilized at other occasions (e.g. post-tsunami support in Sri Lanka).
44 As expressed by one of the mayors consulted by the mission.
The on-ground support provided – as this helped to instill confidence among local authorities and the populace in joining forces, in helping action planning and by strengthening implementation capabilities. This refers, most particularly, to Southern-Lebanon and the Southern-Beirut suburbs. As regards the latter, the mission was informed by local authorities that UNDP was the very first agency to have contacted them just days following the cessation of hostilities.

Though modest in size, the package of quick-delivery support has indeed been found highly impactful by the local authority representatives consulted by the mission. It has been particularly appreciated that - other than rubble clearance (which was a first priority anyway) - the prioritization of subsequent rehabilitation and recovery support by UNDP was left to the municipalities themselves. It was also highlighted that municipalities had gained precious time by being allowed to utilize UNDP-standard contracting and procurement regulation.

UNDP’s ability to call on various national and local networks in planning and seeing-through its post-2006 early recovery operations has yielded a number of “invisibles”. Clearly, the manner in which in situ and hands-on support was provided has helped confidence-building, the instilling of partnerships, as well as direction and capacitation – this having been expressed or inferred by various national and local actors consulted by the mission.

As mentioned, it is of note that the Government and UNDP have meanwhile decided on following-through the issue of disaster mitigation, prevention, preparedness and response; an initial assessment of national disaster management capacities is - in fact - about to be finalized.

It is to be mentioned that little to no response was received by the mission to its query as to which UNDP contributions could have been provided better or what UNDP might have done alternatively or in addition to what it has in fact provided. Still, a few critical notes are warranted, namely:

a) Time was obviously of the essence in planning and carrying-forward the early response. It is, therefore, to be appreciated that initial consultations held about local-level damage-assessment, needs-prioritization and delivery-modalities of early support was basically confined between Mayors, council members - as happened to be available - and UNDP staffers. However, as time passed-by, and as community-life more or less resumed its normal course, it might have been considered to bias the trade-off between expedient-delivery and more participatory assessment/planning-approaches in favor of the latter.

b) In particular as regards Southern Lebanon, possible opportunities for upscaling community-infrastructure or productive investments may have been left idle as preference was assigned to expanding the basic support package to nearly all municipalities (including those not covered previously) – this motivated on the grounds of equity and conflict prevention.
c) Evidence has been found that a number of early-recovery activities have helped to \textit{build-back-better}. Apart from various micro-level community infrastructures, this refers in particular to the introduction of solar heating – an initiative that is due to be up-scaled nationally. It is, however, not clear in how far this principle of disaster-economics has been given systematic attention – and thus which opportunities may meanwhile be foregone.

\textbf{Nahr El Bared Camp (NBC) crisis}

UNDP’s involvement in the NBC crisis has come about in two ways. First, UNDP has technically supported UNRWA during the relief phase - particularly as concerns UNRWA’s flash and emergency appeals, as well as in the preparation of the refugees return plan. Such type of support to UNRWA has been continued in support of the planning of the recovery phase and addressing particular matters, such as mine action and rubble recycling. The recovery plan includes a focus on enhancing the living conditions of the Lebanese communities that reside in vicinity of the NBC camp-area and who were affected by the NBC struggle. Second, UNDP has actively supported the Government in preparing for the NBC donor conference that was held in September 2007. More continuously, UNDP is supporting the Government’s Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee in the form of technical and logistical support (see 4.3).

UNDP’s involvement during and after the NBC crisis is the first time ever that UNDP has become involved with the affairs of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Until then, this had been considered to be the exclusive domain of UNRWA – given its mandate to provide social, educational and health services to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In fact, it is to UNDP’s credit – and thanks to Government’s blessing - that by now a more systematic inter-face has been established between UNRWA and the UN development system in Lebanon.

The NBC reconstruction plan is currently at an advanced stage of preparation and operational activities are foreseen to commence over the next few months. Given the complexities involved in having to accommodate the needs and wishes of both the refugees and local populace, and given the prevailing tensions, it is crucial for the recovery work to have an built-in focus on peace-building. This could, possibly, be pursued in the form of developing a participatory regional development strategy/plan that reflects priorities as commonly agreed among both Palestinian and Lebanese communities.

\textbf{4.3 Peace-building and related initiatives}

Five projects have been grouped together as part of this \textit{upstream} portfolio cluster – as construed by the mission team (see Annex 1)\textsuperscript{45}. These support interventions are geared towards institutional reform for enhancing democratic governance as well as dealing with

\textsuperscript{45} One project (Electoral Reform) is executed directly by UNDP, all the other projects are executed by Government or the Parliament.
national challenges to peace-building. This entails different strands of activities, mostly in the form of policy advice and technical assistance, institution and capacity building, as well as advocacy, awareness raising and constituency-building centered on a number of critical themes.

From the perspective of this outcome evaluation, these support-interventions can be said to deal with matters that are at the very heart of building the foundations for a sustainable peace in Lebanon. These interventions can thus be assessed from the following angles.

**National-level Challenges to Peace**

Two projects directly relate to some of the key issues in promoting a more sustainable peace in Lebanon, namely the National Human Development Report (NHDR) and the Peace-building Strategy project (PBS).

The PBS project was launched in June 2007 and although preparatory activities are by now at an advanced stage, this project is yet to become fully operational. It is meant to address underlying causes of conflict, to help galvanize the still tensed relationships within Lebanese society and to capacitate a cross-section of societal institutions and actors on a number of topics related to peace-building. This includes, inter alia, stock-taking and dialogue on the diverse versions of narrative history; the fostering of a sense of collective identity; the promotion of a culture of tolerance and acceptance (including a Summer School for conflict prevention and transformation\(^{46}\)) aimed at municipalities and high schools, as well as other peace-building activities involving the media (“peace journalism”), NGOs and political parties. In addition, the project aims to establish an early-warning system and associated indicators to help monitor and predict impending conflicts.

The underlying intent and conceptualization of this project is most commendable. It is a novel attempt at dealing with a broad range of peace-building issues involving a cross-section of (state and societal) institutions and actors, other than the populace at large. The project thus constitutes a first genuine attempt to implant peace-building as part of the overall UNDP country programme - as this is meant to help realize a range of peace building dimensions (as defined in chapter 2.2).

The mission wishes to make two observations. The first concerns how best to deal with the various risks that are inherent in pursuing such multi-foci and multi-partnered approach (as these risks are acknowledged in the project document and by those directly involved in its implementation and backstopping). Without wishing to second-guess the rationale for packaging and implementing this initiative as a stand-alone project, alternative approaches could have been considered. This could be by infusing or incorporating the various peace-building activities as part of other ongoing projects (as is,\(^{46}\) The Summer School on Conflict Prevention and Transformation was launched in 2004, as a stand alone activity under the UN Resident Coordinator’s office. Since then two sessions have been held – involving foremost students and youth. This initiative aims at raising awareness on concepts such as tolerance, peaceful resolution of conflicts, understanding and forgiveness. This activity has now been incorporated as part of the PBS project.)
indeed, in part, intended as regards municipalities), or more directly - to do so as part of initiatives being undertaken or intended by interested governmental or civil society agencies. In either case, there may be still be need for a knowledge-management resource and steering capacity – and then probably best embedded as part of the UNDP office. The merit of such alternative approach would be to somewhat even-out the manifold risks - thus avoiding a situation whereby difficulties encountered with one particular activity may cause the entire project to be halted. The second observation concerns the opportunity – or otherwise the sequencing - of some of the intended project-activities, in particular the ones dealing with “identity” and “historical narratives”. Both these issues are likely to be highly contentious; taking-up these issues head-on may unnecessarily jeopardize the entire project.

In this context, it would be useful to take lessons from the experience gained in preparing the NHDR. The theme selected for the NHDR is “Towards a citizens’ state” – this being a fundamental issue in the light of the prevailing communal tensions and political polarization. In fact, this issue is likely to deal to some extent with “identity”, but then functionally-oriented towards articulating rights and obligations of the country’s citizens and what this requires in terms of improving governance modalities. Moreover, the NHDR (admittedly: projectized) initiative is being pursued in a highly participatory and consultative manner – in fact, what seems to be taking place is the building of constituencies around themes/issues of common interest. This is evidenced by, among other initiatives, the teaming-up of various stakeholders, including the Ministry of Education, to undertake an assessment of democratic and citizenship values, attitudes and actions amongst 14 year olds in Lebanon, the 101 stories to tell initiative, and support to the Assabil NGO that runs a network of public libraries and media channels. The challenge will be how this constituency-formation can be consolidated and made to become self-propelling once the NHDR will have been published and, as intended, widely disseminated. A further dedicated effort in this respect would seem to be most warranted, not only in seeing-through some of the recommendations emanating from this year’s NHDR, but also by incorporating additional action-research and constituency-building themes for which common interest can found or fostered among various coalitions of societal actors.

Institutional reform for enhancing democratic governance
Systems and processes aimed at guarantying broad and inclusive representation and dialogue are vital to ensuring a stable and vibrant polity. This is all the more important in a consociation-type of system that – in the case of Lebanon - is based on the representation of eighteen sectarian communities. In this respect two sets of UNDP support-interventions stand-out from the perspective of peace-building, as these comprise:

a) Support to the Electoral Reform Commission in preparing a comprehensive proposal for reforming the electoral law, the electoral system and actual processes. UNDP has also facilitated broad dissemination of the Commission’s report, and the organization of district-level meetings and workshops to raise awareness on the draft electoral law
b) Various types of technical-advisory support to the Parliament, including the facilitation of dialogue-sessions among the parliament’s membership and between these and societal actors. These support-activities are believed to have had a positive impacted on the capacities of the Parliament, while promoting good governance practices. Parliamentarians and Parliament staff have been provided with exposure and international experience on ways and means to enhance power-sharing – including a UNDP-facilitated session by general assembly with international experts in the field of consociational democracy.

These support-interventions have helped to stimulate dialogue and to involve a wider audience in issues that were previously considered to be of an elitist nature. A case in point is the involvement of civil society representatives in various activities and dialogue sessions organized in the Parliament. Albeit as yet not institutionalized, these initiatives bring to the Parliament a notion of openness to the wider society.

Though Parliamentary proceedings have been halted since November 2007, UNDP stands ready to gear-up its various support-interventions as and when this will prove to be opportune. In the meantime, there may be merit in organizing advocacy and dialogue activities with civil society actors centered on reinstating the role of “the Parliament as a guarantor of dialogue and national reconciliation, considering that the Parliament is the most appropriate venue to hold the national dialogue between various confessional and political categories in Lebanon”.

Inroads to resolving the plight of the Palestinian refugees
Until recently, UNDP nor any other agencies of the UN development system had been involved in matters related to the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This is, likely, due to both the stance taken by the Lebanese government regarding the status of these refugees, as well UN-internal considerations - given the mandate being exercised UNRWA.

Following the establishment by government of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) in October 2005 - at the Prime Minister’s Office, UNDP was requested and agreed to provide technical and logistical support to the LDPC in operationalizing its mandate. This mandate covers a range of issues, in particular: improved living conditions of Palestinian refugees (social, economic, legal and security aspects) who reside in and outside camps in Lebanon; initiation of a dialogue to deal with the issue of arms inside and outside the camps; and assessing ways and means of establishing diplomatic relations and representation between Lebanon and Palestine.

UNDP’s support to the LPDC appears to be perceived positively by those most immediately involved in dealing with the various issues and concerns related to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This support has proven to be of particular significance during the Nahr El Bared Camp crisis that erupted just as the LPDC came into being.

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47 See project document
48 Previously known as the "Lebanese Working Group dealing with Palestinian Refugee Affairs".
4.4 Overall programme performance and efficiency

The design and operations of UNDP support-interventions in Lebanon do not appear to have been guided by an explicit strategy on how best peace-building can be pursued. Certain targets and indicators as regards peace-building are in fact contained in the UNDP’s Strategic Results Framework for 2006 and 2007. These, however, are found to be rather ad hoc - confined as most of these are to ‘deliverables’ that could be safely expected in advancing individual projects on a year to year basis.

Operationally, the interaction among the various portfolios of UNDP support-interventions would appear to have been lackluster, at best49. Programme-management wise, there does not appear to have been any form of systematic inter-face until recently. No evidence has been encountered of CCF-level progress-monitoring or review in respect of the Peace-building Outcome50. Progress reporting at the level of individual projects is scanty - and, in so far available, it is found to have little to no analytical content or depth. This is somewhat different in the case of the post-2006 early-recovery projects that - being foremost co-funded - simply needed to comply with donor-imposed reporting requirements. Save for one mid-term and one final evaluation in respect of two projects that commenced operations prior to 2002, no such reviews or assessments have been found for any of the projects having started at a later date. As regards the post-2006 early recovery package, a fairly elaborate and synthesized account has been prepared - although seemingly more for the purpose of public information rather than analysis and learning.

Area-specific projects are void of a policy-component, while upstream projects would not seem to draw on the experience gained by field projects. One initiative stands-out positively, namely the dialoguing between the full parliament membership with local authorities and civil society actors on regional development51. The presence of UNDP at both up and downstream levels has, as a matter of fact, yielded significant learning by its staff as they have dealt with a diverse range of situations and exigencies, as well as drawn-on various networks that they have been able to forge or access. This learning, however, has remained foremost embodied by these individual staff. There would as yet not appear to be a more systematic programme-wide use of knowledge management techniques. This is all the more warranted given the richness of experiences gained with different dimensions of peace-building and nationhood-formation in Lebanon. A cross-fertilization of these experiences would not only benefit local and national actors, but will undoubtedly also be of use internationally.

49 This would appear to have hardly changed following the transformation of UNDP local project offices into RC regional-hubs (and the establishment of three more such hubs) during the second half of 2006. Still, these hubs (in particular the one in Tyre) have proven to be useful for sharing information and coordinated liaison with local government, while facilitating entry of for UN agencies and NGOs that had not earlier operated in these regions.
50 The present outcome evaluation is only the second of its kind, a similar exercise having just recently been concluded in respect of UNDP environmental portfolio.
51 Going by the account of UNDP staffers, this initiative would have been prepared and facilitated among both office and field-based staff.
The mission has not been able to systematically assess the issue of cost-efficiency in delivering operational support. Still, this issue would not appear to be of any particular concern for at least two reasons. Firstly, UNDP has been able to draw on foremost national/local capabilities and resources. This is particularly true as regards the post-2006 early-recovery operations. In this case, UNDP standard regulation for contracting and procurement has ensured not only cost-efficiency, but also timeliness of the early-recovery response. Secondly, until recently UNDP has had to operate with a rather limited administrative budget – necessitating an all-hands-on-deck mode of operations, particularly in responding to crisis-situations. This situation has certainly assured a high degree of economy, though it has put a huge strain on the rather small staff-contingent.

5 Findings and Conclusions

5.1 Relevance

In retrospect, it can be said that the objectives and programmatic thrust of UNDP’s 2nd CCF for Lebanon (as designed and approved in 2001-2) are reflective of the overall positive aspirations that prevailed during the first half of the current decennium. Preventive development and Peace-building – though acknowledged to be a “critical dimension” of UNDP’s support role – were thus assigned secondary importance. In fact, a strategy to effectively incorporate peace-building as part of the overall CCF, or its main components, was left inexplicit.

The situation as has meanwhile evolved in Lebanon has witnessed dramatic setbacks and shocks - most manifestly so since early 2005. These developments have seriously affected the country’s political-economy, growth and distribution patterns, and opportunities for improving human development. Moreover, whatever had been achieved in terms of national reconciliation has come to be severely tested by the socio-political polarization that appears to be mounting, if not escalating, at present. In fact, this situation has put Lebanon on a sliding-scale and many express the fear that it could easily give rise to major turmoil akin to what has been experienced earlier-on during Lebanon’s still nascent history as a nation-state.

This begs the question as to whether the significance of peace-building has been underestimated at the time of designing the CCF. Although it could be argued that this has – at least in part – indeed been the case, it seems to be more pertinent to assess the issue of relevance in terms of the support-interventions that UNDP and partners have actually been pursuing during the period of review. Based on the portfolio performance-assessment presented in the previous chapter, the following can be concluded in terms of relevance for each of the portfolios of UNDP support-interventions.

Although the CCF lacks a more elaborate strategy on peace-building, the various strands of support that have meanwhile been undertaken have in fact dealt with almost all of the outstanding legacies emanating from Lebanon’s civil war (as analyzed in chapter 2.3).

52 As confirmed by senior UNDP staff having been involved in the formulation of the CCF at the time.
What appears to be the most outstanding achievement in terms of relevancy is UNDP’s two-track support aimed at offsetting regional imbalances in terms of socio-economic wellbeing. On the one hand, this involved support to poverty mapping (1998), the conducting of a household survey (2004) and poverty analysis (2007). This has, undeniably, helped to firmly place the issue of inter-personal and regional inequity on the national policy-agenda. The current commitment to alleviating poverty and regional imbalances and to promoting social development is evidenced by Government’s presentation of a Social Action Plan, as integral part of its reform and reconstruction programme, at the Paris-III conference.

This successful *upstream* support, and leveraging had, by UNDP has – on the other hand - been followed-through with on-the-ground operational project-interventions (portfolio 1). Although the effectiveness of these interventions is to be criticized somewhat (see section 4.2), these *downstream* interventions are acknowledged to have been the first of its kind in Lebanon to have pursued multiple and inter-twined objectives as these relate to socio-economic rehabilitation and development, equitable growth and conflict prevention.

In turn, these in-field operations (especially in Southern Lebanon) have proven to be most helpful for UNDP to provide lead-support to emerging or sudden crises. Also this strand of support (portfolio 2) has proven to be highly relevant, especially in facilitating and strengthening national and local leadership in coping with these crises, forging local-national and international partnerships and in stemming immediate material and logistical needs. This holds particularly true for the support-package and operations aimed at stemming the immediate aftermath of the 2006 war - this being assessed as having been exemplary.

The relevance and potential impact of portfolio 3 support-interventions can not be assessed uniformly. On the one hand, the projectised approach to Peace-building (and earlier activity-based initiatives) is to be queried, given the inherent risks that such projectised approach entail - certainly when compared to the constituency-building approach taken in preparing the current NHDR. On the other hand, the various project and non-project initiatives aimed at modernizing institutions of state and at promoting democratic-governance processes (in particular electoral reform) are found to be highly relevant and – potentially – impactful. The ultimate efficacy of these governance support initiatives depends, inevitably, on the willingness of the political establishment to use these inputs in a consensual and constructive manner as well as on effectiveness of advocacy and lobbying initiatives by civil society actors.

Overall, the mission finds the various UNDP portfolios related to peace-building have been responsive and - for the most part - well attuned to addressing structural and emerging priorities. This takes into account UNDP’s mandate and focal areas, its limited resources-base and the partnering it effectively has brokered. In fact, UNDP has demonstrated a much needed degree of resilience (i) in decelerating its regular support-interventions at times of crisis, (ii) while providing almost instant support to the national
and local authorities in managing the immediate fall-out of sudden crises, and subsequently (iii) to re-accelerate its overall support-portfolio to the extent that national counterparts are in a position to, once again, devote their attention to this.

It is, however, to be queried in how far UNDP (and its partners) are at present guided by a strategy for transitioning from crisis-response and early-recovery to “sustainable recovery” (i.e. medium to longer-term recovery and development)\(^\text{53}\). A point in case is the UNDP programme for socio-economic rehabilitation of Southern Lebanon. Having been operational for almost a decade, it had been intended to evaluate – and, possibly, reorient – this programme. This intent was overtaken by the 2006 war and its aftermath. In this respect the programme has in fact been of critical importance in providing various strands of support – not least thanks to its long-standing presence, networking and accumulated capabilities. Currently, this programme is, basically, winding-down its regular-development as well as post-2006 early-recovery support, while providing entry for the newly introduced ART GOLD project. In so doing, it has provided \textit{more of the same} type of support (as it had originally been designed to provide). As a matter of fact, the project has by now successfully reached-out to almost all municipalities present in this region. Commendable as this achievement is - in and of itself – the project could, alternatively, have been utilized for develop and test experimental approaches aimed at deepening and/or upscaling reconstruction and development such as to generate more comprehensive and long-lasting effects and impact. The same considerations would seem to hold true of the Akkar region-specific project. It may thus still be worthwhile to proceed with an evaluation and reprogramming of both these projects, as had been intended earlier-on as regards the South-Lebanon project, taking into account the recommendations put forward by the present outcome evaluation.

5.2 Efficacy

Undeniably, the overall situation and perspective as regards Lebanon’s political economy is presently bleak and rather worrisome. With what measure, therefore, can the efficacy (i.e. effectiveness, utility and sustained effects) of UNDP support be appraised as it was meant to positively impact on peace-building - and, by extension: state/nation-formation? Taken at \textit{face-value}, the conclusion would be that donor-contributions (including UNDP’s) have proven to be impotent in turning the tide of the increasingly adverse developments, and underlying dynamics, as have - once again - become most manifest in Lebanon.

\(^{53}\) The Transitional Strategy, as prepared among the UN agencies in Lebanon (October 2007), would appear to be foremost a collation of ongoing or intended short-term support-activities by individual UN agencies. Timely and commendable as this initiative is, the strategy would not seem to offer much by way of a substantive (let be a comprehensive) strategy, while it lacks cohesion. Moreover, in reality, there would appear to be few, if any, truly collaborative support-interventions among UN agencies that can be qualified as being transitional or strategic. Nevertheless, there would appear to be certain opportunities for developing issue-specific common strategies, such as regards peace-building among youngsters and the design and experimentation of more gender-sensitive approaches in the context of post-conflict regeneration and development.
Nevertheless, when examined more closely, various UNDP-supported interventions can be said to have been effective and useful - albeit to varying degrees. Still, the combined impact of these interventions and their, eventual, durability are yet to be proven - dependent as this is on the stance taken by various (sub-)national and inter-national actors.

Reconstruction and development

As regards this portfolio of UNDP support-interventions, various positive effects can be discerned in terms of ameliorating living-conditions, instilling confidence and brother/sister-hood, as well as by having provided foundational support to area-based development-management and good-governance practices. With the benefit of hindsight, this may to a certain extent be due to the cheque of the 1997-2000 Baalbeck-Hermel project – as this was meant to have become a model for area-wide, multi-sectoral and demand-driven support. An evaluation \(^{54}\) of this project concluded that it appeared to have been designed in an overly-ambitious manner, other than it having been left under-sourced while – apparently – mal-managed. The subsequent region-based projects in respect of Southern-Lebanon and, later, Akkar were thus - purposefully - kept modest, both sectorally and (at least initially) in terms of geo-coverage.

These two projects are appraised to have been reasonably effective in creating local-level capacity for planning and overseeing relatively small-scale investment projects – as these have been foremost geared towards infrastructure and the provisioning of vital equipment for the benefit of municipalities or cooperatives. In various instances, this has helped to attract and absorb funding-contributions by third parties. As regards municipalities, it is however to be seriously questioned whether the identification and selection of these micro-investments has in fact been truly participatory – as consultations have for the most part remained confined to the elected councils. It is also to be queried whether these investments have accrued any benefit for the most poor and vulnerable \(^{55}\). It could also be asserted that the manner in which these sub-national projects have been managed, and overseen, has caused them to be spread-too-thin \(^{56}\).

Moreover, the partnering with municipalities and cooperatives on a case-by-case basis has left idle the potential of these projects to generate more comprehensive dynamics and multipliers. Certain initiatives have been taken (especially in Akkar) in the form of multiple-stakeholder consultations aimed at identifying area-wide constraints and strategic opportunities. This, however, does not appear to have yielded a critical mass or tangible results, while project interventions have remained activity-based. Likewise, certain inroads have been made towards engaging private sector operators (especially in Southern Lebanon) – still the projects have had little effect on invigorating private sector development in an orchestrated manner. Furthermore, the case-by-case approach may

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\(^{54}\) See UNDP, Evaluation of the UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck-El Hermel, March/April 2000

\(^{55}\) In fact, it is to be feared that several of the investment projects have been captured by local elites – although the mission has not been able to ascertain this.

\(^{56}\) In fact, some of those consulted by the mission were of the opinion that the planning-support provided by these projects would be an overkill in view of the very limited volume of investment support that could be granted or otherwise mobilized from other sources.
have curtailed the potential impact these projects could have had on moderating or reconciling intra/inter-communal differences across confessional/political divides - as these do exist within their geo-areas of intervention. The youth-centered peace-building component of these projects – though being promising by all accounts – appears for the most part to have been left unrelated to the project’s mainstream support (as this was geared to, mainly, micro-investment planning by municipalities and cooperatives).

Lastly, the projects appear to have contributed little by way of informing policy, regulatory or institutional measures or adjustments – as these are in fact needed (e.g. rural finance, social and productive support services, regulatory provisions governing cooperatives, certain measures aimed at fiscal devolution/decentralization as regards municipalities, etc.). This is not to suggest that valuable experience and lessons would not have been gained. On the contrary, project staff are found to be most knowledgeable and experienced while having sound ideas on how the effectiveness of their project could be further enhanced. This embodied knowledge has, however, not (as yet) been documented and analyzed for more general use or for designing and piloting more strategy-driven, area-wide approaches. To enable this, these projects should have an inbuilt and dedicated capacity for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management – which is to be mirrored at the level of the UNDP Country Programme at large.

**Early-recovery**
This portfolio of UNDP response interventions – as assessed in the previous chapter - is reflective of the various crises that have come to beset Lebanon over the last decade, in particular the following.

The Mount Lebanon displacement programme is appraised to have been reasonably effective\(^{57}\) and – given the absence of further conflict or major incidents – to have had a durable, contributory effect. An overall appraisal of the project’s efficacy is to take into account the more general pattern of semi-permanent internal migration in Lebanon. In this connection, officials and stakeholders who had been involved with this project in the past made a strong plea for follow-through support aimed at local economic development – such as to stem the migratory flow.

The post-2006 early response and recovery package of UNDP has been found effective in supporting local and national level assessment, planning and coordination. This has, indeed, facilitated the earliest-possible and save return of internally displaced and the resumption of *normal life*. Clearly, the earlier interventions (Mount Lebanon, but in particular also the South-Lebanon programme) have provided UNDP with trust, networking and access (across confessional divides). These earlier interventions have thus helped to shape UNDP’s capability to pro-actively plan and carry-forward multiple strands of planning and operational support to early recovery. Going by all accounts, the hands-on and comprehensive support-role it has played has clearly boosted UNDP’s standing and credibility as a development partner in Lebanon.

\(^{57}\) [Reference MtRw]
UNDP’s involvement in dealing with the NBC issue appears to receive general acclaim – both institutionally (by having engineered a workable inter-face among the various UN organizational mandates), operationally (by means of having assisted assessment and planning in an effective manner), other than by means of coordination and resource mobilization. As on-the-ground support is yet to be implemented, the efficacy of this support-intervention remains as yet to be seen.

Peace-building and related initiatives
Again the variance is greatest when appraising the effectiveness of this particular UNDP portfolio. UNDP is found to be well (if not, in some cases, uniquely) placed to provide lead-support or play a brokerage-role in: (a) advocating particular priority-issues (e.g. the ongoing constituency-building on the issue of citizenship58), (b) supporting governance-related reform measures (in particular the set of recommendations put forward by the National Commission on Electoral Reform), other than (c) initiating and backstopping dialoguing sessions among the Parliament-membership and between this and local authorities and civil society actors (on such topics as decentralization, reconciliation and reconstruction, and regional disparities/development), as well as other such sort of initiatives59

Though highly relevant, most of these initiatives (especially parliamentary dialogues) have remained largely inconclusive for the time being - in part because of their infant-pilot nature, but mostly because of the dysfunctional state of the Parliament for over more than a year by now.

The stand-alone, projectized initiative that is explicitly focused on the theme of peace-building is yet to become fully operational. The eventual efficacy of such initiative could possibly be enhanced, if it were to be housed among an alliance of like-minded civil-society institutions and geared towards constituency-building – with UNDP providing low-profile technical backstopping. Specific topics to be dealt with would best be positively phrased and made forward-looking, such as a “2020” type of dialogue on how best energies of the Lebanese populace can be unleashed and harnessed in unison and for the benefit of all. Contentious issues such as “identity” would best be left for a later stage or left altogether for others to deal with (e.g. academic research).

Overall
It is to be concluded that the various portfolios of UNDP’s up and down-stream support as these relate to peace-building have – grosso modo - proven to be effective and useful in achieving particular outputs and in making significant headway towards achieving specific project-level objectives. In so doing, these interventions have in fact contributed to dealing with most of the still outstanding legacies of the civil war (as analyzed in chapter 3). However, in most cases, it remains to be seen whether these individual achievements will have a durable effect and can be sustained.

58 This being undertaken as part of the ongoing preparations of the NHDR: “Towards a citizen’s State”.
59 For instance, the rallying of what may become a youth-Environment ‘caucus’ that resulted in a Declaration “…..”.
The overall, combined effect of these various support-interventions on the outcome of peace-building can not be ascertained – or substantiated - by any measure other than the appreciation expressed by UNDP’s manifold partners and stakeholders in Lebanon. Going by all accounts, UNDP has become a genuinely appreciated partner – both for countering immediate post-crisis exigencies, as well as for helping to think-along about the longer-term perspective of development and piece as regards Lebanon.

Given the nature of this evaluation exercise (i.e. outcome-orientation), the question needs to be raised as to whether UNDP could have done better? When posing this question to the various persons met by the mission-team this yielded little to no response – noting that only few of the (non-UNDP) respondents proved to be knowledgeable about the totality of UNDP support-interventions in Lebanon. Speculative as this is, but it may be assumed that the efficacy of UNDP’s support-interventions could have benefited from having had a more explicit and elaborate strategy regarding peace-building and state/nationhood-formation. Such strategy – in conjunction with more hands-on programme-level direction and oversight - might have helped to better inter-relate the various strands of support towards peace-building, other than possibly have generated certain synergies and cost-efficiencies.

6. Recommendations and Future Directions

The mission’s main recommendation is meant to respond the question: how best can external support be utilized at this critical junction of Lebanon’s existence as a nation-state such as to help soothe the political-deadlock, to avoid possible conflict and to stem a possible regression in human development? This can not be addressed by means of business-as-usual approach.

Clearly, the evolving country situation calls for an integral-cohesive approach to reconciliation, recovery and conflict-prevention, tallied with enabling governance support (democratic-governance and state/nationhood-formation). The mission’s main recommendation is, therefore, for UNDP to adopt peace-building as the overarching objective for its forthcoming Country Programme in Lebanon. This should be accompanied by a programme strategy that will ensure that this objective will permeate through all support-interventions.

Such strategy could be substantiated along the following three-track – but integrated – approach (the following includes portfolio specific recommendations as made or inferred in chapters 3 and 4):

(i) Continued support to government at central level on a) priority governance reforms (in particular legislative, electoral and public admin reform – including decentralization), b) ongoing review of social-services provisioning (and beyond this the design of an overall social development strategy), and, possibly c)

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60 This could be positively phrased as: “A sustainable peace to benefit human development for all”.
discretionary-advisory services aimed at providing alternatives to the IFI-‘instilled’ economic reforms.

The need for such fundamental adjustments is becoming ever so greater, but at the same time these are becoming increasingly difficult to attain - and if pursued callously, then possibly rendering adverse effect.

Although presently the margins for success appear to be marginal at best (and may, in fact, even be narrowing), this strand of support is principally meant to keep these reform issues on the policy-agenda and to move these forward as-and-when this may prove possible.

(ii) **More prominent support to civil society entities**, in particular by forging/facilitating “constructive coalitions”. In this respect, the mobilization and constituency-building as part of the NHDR preparation may very well prove to be a platform that best be consolidated/expanded - centered on a few forward-looking, constructive and action-oriented advocacy/policy-issues\(^6\).

Beyond the current theme dealing with a citizen’s state, a next topic for rallying like-minded and peace-loving societal-forces could be a “2020” type of common-visioning of how best the productive and creative energies of all Lebanese can be best unleashed and made to work in unison.

In so doing, UNDP would keep the lowest profile possible, but where necessary/solicited offer backstopping, advice, international-experiences/practices and ‘twinning’-opportunities etc., as well as - where necessary/opportune - a “safe-haven under the blue flag”.

(iii) **Direct-impact, area-based support-interventions across confessional-boundaries.** This would build onto the various recovery and socio-economic development projects supported thus far – while capitalizing on the credibility earned due to the successful early-recovery support in the wake of the 2006 war. This strand of support is motivated for different reasons:

(a) As undertaken: social mobilization and organization at the local level, but with (i) explicit emphasis on self-reliance (i.e. the *mindset and culture* of working together in enhancing the wellbeing of the community/larger area by making the best possible use of available capacities and resources – supplemented by external support where absolutely necessary) and (ii) more inclusive and targeted (vulnerable, poor) social mobilization, and with dedicated attention given to gender and sustainable use of natural resources and bio-diversity, and (iii) from hereon livelihood-orientation to be favored over small-scale community-infrastructure investments. Such approach should keep with CDR-CDD principles

\(^6\) Drawing on international experience; Egypt having been referenced in this respect.
- in particular: local ownership and management, inclusiveness and participation, transparency and accountability\(^6\).

(b) As intended by ARTGOLD: approach this in a multi-tier manner, involving: (i) demand-driven, participatory assessment/planning involving a representative sample of public, private and communal actors, (ii) private sector development, and (iii) larger-scale economic development projects (especially those with multipliers in terms of creating employment/income and attracting additional, private investments).

(c) Where-ever possible, cluster villages/municipalities having different religious-persuasion or political affiliation (rather than going by administrative boundaries) – with the aim to build trust and collaboration on common needs/aspirations. This would also contribute towards conflict-prevention/mediation, reconciliation – in a more organic/indirect manner (instead of making this an explicit and, possibly, disputed focus).

(d) In terms of coverage, this be undertaken not only in rural(-peripheral) areas, but also urban and peri-urban. Particular attention is warranted for the Southern-Beirut suburbs/municipalities – as are currently, indeed, included under ARTGOLD.

(e) Furthermore, such multi-tier approach would in fact fill a void – as the decentralization-agenda has become mute, and likely can not be sensibly revived in the short to medium term. It is thus essential for these support-interventions to have in-built components for M&E&KM – particularly geared towards drawing lessons and developing options for policy, regulatory and institutional-reform measures, as may be found needed/desired.

Clearly, UNDP’s demonstrated strength and value-addition as regards local-level approaches lies in conceiving, piloting and optimizing the conditions for upscaling novel approaches to community-driven reconstruction and development – not necessarily in maximizing geographical coverage. It is, thus, essential for these support-interventions to have built-in components for monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management – geared towards drawing lessons and developing options for policy, regulatory and institutional adjustments.

(f) Seek agreement with other major donors involved in local-level interventions on employing the same mechanisms and processes for engaging with local actors – where possible agreeing on how the various donor contributions can be made supplementary to one another (e.g. initial consultations had between the EU and ART GOLD).

\(^6\) Learning from Experience: Community-driven Development Approaches in Conflict-affected Countries, Concept Paper, K. Maynard (undated); Community-driven Conflict Recovery: From Reconstruction to Development, Discussion paper, K. Maynard (undated)
This area-based strand of support would best be *packaged* as one programme (instead of stand-alone projects), with common objectives, strategy, activity-sets and an integrated management structure. Obviously, such unitary approach should allow for a certain degree of flexibility in responding to region-specific needs and demands. In this regard, the framework-approach offered by the ART GOLD project offers a promising opportunity; although this needs to be carefully appraised (as indicated in chapter 4.1).

In closing, let it be reiterated that the assessed/appraised properties of UNDP conflict prevention and peace-building interventions in Lebanon (in particular as concerns its relevance, effectiveness and sustainability) can not be judged against the efficacy of the actual state of nationhood and peace-building in Lebanon – as this has become even more unsettling over the last few years. The successful realization of this outcome can only be shouldered by the national actors involved, where possible supported by the international community.
### Annex 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>Funding volume</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Expend %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


### 1. Socio-economic recovery and development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Rehabilitation programme for Southern Lebanon</td>
<td>UNDP - CDR - UNTFHS</td>
<td>6,175,000</td>
<td>2000 - 2007</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration and Socio-economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced</td>
<td>Min of Displaced - CDR - UNDP - Norway</td>
<td>4,300,000</td>
<td>1994 - 2006</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkar regional development</td>
<td>CDR - UNDP</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>2001 - 2008</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Demining Office</td>
<td>UNDP - DFID - Sweden</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>2003 - 2010</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ART GOLD</td>
<td>Italy - Catalan</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>2007 - 2010</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Disaster Management capacities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>35,025,000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Post-2006 Early Recovery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of Municipal basic services</td>
<td>Sweden - ECHO - Brazil - Japan</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery of Lives and Livelihoods</td>
<td>Sweden - ECHO - CIDA - Austria</td>
<td>9,400,000</td>
<td>2007 - 2008</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early recovery Public Administration - Civil Defense</td>
<td>Sweden - France</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2009</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO Recovery and Reconstruction cell</td>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict oil spill clean-up</td>
<td>UNDP - CIDA - Monaco - OCHA - Japan</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2007</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid environmental assessment</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2007</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery in Nahr el. Bared camp and surrounding communities</td>
<td>UNDP - Italy - UNRWA</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>24,600,000</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Peace-building and related support interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace-building: a strategy for conflict prevention</td>
<td>UNDP - SIDA</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
<td>2007 - 2010</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing national capacity for human development (NHDR)</td>
<td>UNDP - CDR</td>
<td>395,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the structures of the Lebanese parliament</td>
<td>UNDP - Belgium - Parliament</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1999 - 2010</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating Human Rights and the MDGs in the legislative process</td>
<td></td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>2006 - 2008</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance to the Lebanese Working Group on Palestinian Refugees</td>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>2007 - 2010</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance for Electoral Reform</td>
<td>Belgium - EU - Canada - UK - Netherlands - Switzerland</td>
<td>935,000</td>
<td>2005 - 2008</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer School on conflict prevention and transformation</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4,875,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>64,500,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Legacies hindering a sustainable peace in Lebanon

At least the following issues are considered to be major variables for offsetting the recurring tensions and conflict as continue to be experienced in Lebanon.

1. **Sectarian/communal polarization and divisions**
   Post-conflict national reconciliation would appear to have never been seriously addressed during post-Taif era. There were no truth commission or public apologies. Initiatives by civil society actors to address the memory of war or its commemoration have not found any resonance by government. Until today, there is no state policy to commemorate the war or even a day of remembrance of the war and its victims. As a matter of fact, profound confessional rifts still exist and society would still seem to be thoroughly fragmented along clan, regional, social and ideological lines. This seemingly indifferent approach towards national reconciliation is at odds with the principles underlying post-conflict peace-building.

2. **Hampered institutional reforms**
   The Lebanese state still lacks credible and strong institutions. This can to a significant extent be attributed to the still prevailing patronage-clientele system and its inherent rationale in perpetuating both sectarianism and weak state institutions. It can be expected that the more recent state of political instability and insecurity will nurture and fortify this system of patronage and enforced allegiance – thus being a major constraint to reconciliation and democratization. Notwithstanding various initiatives undertaken during the last 15 years aimed at reforming public sector institutions, the success of these reforms remains relatively modest, save for a few exceptions (such as the Ministry of Finance).

3. **Regional Disparities**
   Although poverty indicators show an improvement at the national level, disparities remain between regions. The latest study on poverty in Lebanon, undertaken by UNDP63 shows that 7.9% of the population live in extreme poverty below the extreme poverty line calculated at $2.4 per person per day. This portion of the population, equivalent to about 300,000 individuals, cannot meet their most basic needs for survival (food and non-food). When looking at the upper poverty line of $4 per capita per day, 28.5% of total residents are considered poor. One of the most prominent features of poverty in Lebanon is its disparity among regions. As shown in the figure below, poverty levels are least significant in Beirut where extreme poverty is 0.67% and overall poverty is 5.18%. In the governorate of North Lebanon however, extreme poverty levels are as high as 17.75% and overall poverty reaches 52.27%. Intra-regional disparities are also be discerned, with significant differences in poverty levels between specific areas within each governorate.

---

63 Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon, UNDP, 2007
Poverty, social disparities and marginalization are significant factors that can (re-) generate and fuel tensions and conflict. It is, therefore, essential to address this potential root-cause of conflict, especially by means of dealing with communal or regional grievances and by promoting social equality among all Lebanese. In this respect, forging a national vision and action plan for achieving economic growth and social equity remains to be of utmost importance.

4. Political Violence and Assassinations

Since ratification of the Taif Agreement in 1990/1 to the present, about 28 attacks killed or maimed politicians and journalists – apart from scores of innocent bystanders. No Middle Eastern country has accumulated such a bleak record of unsolved political violence. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 was a watershed and was followed by a string of assassinations targeted at leading politicians, journalists, senior military and security personnel. This wave of politically-motivated violence over the last three years is most unsettling for the populace, as it is reminiscent of the violence experienced in the past.

Source: Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon, Republic of Lebanon and UNDP, 2007

[64] See Knudsen and Yassin, forthcoming
5. “Neighbourhood” interference
Regional interference in Lebanon’s internal affair has had its major impact on the nation’s stability. Regional powers’ meddling in internal affairs moved far beyond establishing the interest of these neighbouring countries into extreme forms such as military occupation and aggressions. For instance, the Israeli occupation of parts of South Lebanon for more than 22 years had led to perpetual tensions along Lebanon’s southern border. The long-lasting stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah escalated in a devastating 34-day war in July-August 2006, inflicting serious direct (loss of human life and destruction of assets) and indirect damages (reduction in production and services, and thus income).

Another case is Syria’s perceived role in the region as relates to Lebanon. The unsettled relationship between the two nations goes back to the French Mandate period in 1920s-40s when Syria hesitantly accepted Lebanon’s conception as a nation-state. Through the civil war period, Syria was politically and militarily involved in Lebanon. Its role was stepped-up after Taif to become a stabilizing force with a disproportionate influence by Syria on decision-making in Lebanese affairs. Although Syria ended its military presence in the aftermath of Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination, the relationship between the two countries remains tense, with Syria refusing to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon.

6. The Palestinian question and Palestinian refugees
The number of registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is estimated to be around 400,000 (or roughly about 10% of the total population residing in Lebanon), half of which live inside make-shift settlements known as camps. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon encounter the most precarious situation, as they are being barred access to the Lebanese official labor market, while being exposed to the economic down-turn of the Lebanese economy.

Fearing that the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon would distort the confessional balance, the subsequent governments in Lebanon have, hitherto, shied away from addressing their legal status since their arrival in 1948. This has amplified their socio-economic vulnerability. It created as well a semi-autonomous status inside their camps where militias from various Palestinian factions compete to maintain security. This has made the camps hideouts for militants wanted by the Lebanese authorities. The most serious security threat is the camps’ sheltering of militants from radical Islamic factions.
### Annex 3: Mission itinerary and persons met

#### Wednesday 16 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00-11:30</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>Asma Kurdahi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNFPA Assistant Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30-13:00</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Edgard Chehab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-15:00</td>
<td>UNDP Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-16:00</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Maha Damaj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Pablo Ruiz, Recovery Advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Thursday 17 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:45-11:00</td>
<td>LPDC</td>
<td>Ambassador Khalil Makkawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Joanna Nassar- Project Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-13:30</td>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Wafaa Charafeldin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30-14:30</td>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Ramzi Naaman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amal Karaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-16:00</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Hassan Krayem, Policy specialist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Friday 18 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:45-09:45</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>Sven Bertlessen, Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:45</td>
<td>Peace Building Project: a Strategy for Conflict Prevention in Lebanon</td>
<td>Joe Haddad, Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00-12:30</td>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Rayya el Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs/ UNDP</td>
<td>Sawsan Masri, Deputy Project Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Monday 21 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00-10:00</td>
<td>UNRCO</td>
<td>Fernando Hiraldo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Persons Met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>Mine Action</td>
<td>Colonel Mohammad Fahmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allan Poston, CTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-16:00</td>
<td>Lebanese Center for Policy Studies</td>
<td>Oussama Safa, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30-17:30</td>
<td>UNDP Artgold project</td>
<td>Luigi Cafiero, CTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30-19:30</td>
<td>Arab NGOs Network for Development</td>
<td>Ziad Abd El Samad</td>
</tr>
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**Tuesday 22 January 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:45-12:30</td>
<td>PM Office</td>
<td>Ghassan Taher and Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:30</td>
<td>UNDP Programme Staff</td>
<td>Zena Ali Ahmad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-16:00</td>
<td>World Bank Community Development</td>
<td>Stephano Mocchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>WB Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-17:00</td>
<td>OHCR</td>
<td>[meeting did not materialize]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30-18:30</td>
<td>NHDR Project</td>
<td>Maha Yehya, NHDR Project Manager</td>
</tr>
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**Wednesday 23 January 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full day</td>
<td>UNDP Projects/ South Coops and NGOs;</td>
<td>Muhammad Mukallid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jihad al Binaa’</td>
<td>and South Lebanon Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mohammad El-Hajj</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Friday 25 January 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Half day</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon Project</td>
<td>Walid Attallah, Project Manager</td>
</tr>
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### Monday 28 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Half day</td>
<td>Beirut Southern Suburb</td>
<td>Hisham Nasserddine, Former DG of Ministry of Displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rogers Ashi, Mayor of Moukhtara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jean Harb, Head of Local Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sylva Hamieh / Head of Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Edmond Gharios, Mayor of Chiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad Htoum, Deputy Mayor of Haret Hreik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Monday 28 January 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full day</td>
<td>UNDP Projects/ North</td>
<td>Abdallah Muhieddine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad Jahjah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Committee of Kherbet Shar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Union of Cooperatives in Joumeh</td>
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### Tuesday 29 January 2008

<table>
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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:30-09:30</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Stephane Jacquemet, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-11:00</td>
<td>Italian Cooperation</td>
<td>Fabio Melloni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Giorgia De Paoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>Spanish Cooperation</td>
<td>Irene Bernabeu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Wednesday 30 January 2008

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<th>Persons Met</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:45</td>
<td>UN Special Coordinator office</td>
<td>Diego Zorrilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00-13:00</td>
<td>Mr. Yves De San (Former UNDP-RR)</td>
<td>Martin Yttervik, Counsellor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30-14:30</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Friday 1 February 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Persons Met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00 - 13:00</td>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Kamal Hamdan and Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>15:00 - 16:00</td>
<td>EU Mission</td>
<td>Jussi Narvi</td>
</tr>
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<td>Joseph Piazza d'Olmo</td>
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<td>Bruno Montariol</td>
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<td>18:30 - 19:00</td>
<td>Canada International Cooperation: CIDA</td>
<td>Marie Claude Grenon (by telcon)</td>
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Annex 4: Documents reviewed


Central Bank of Lebanon, Lebanon’s Economic Account 1997-2002


Dib, Kamal, Warlords and Merchants: the Lebanese business and political establishment. Reading, Ithaca Press, 2004


OECD/DAC, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, 2005


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Sirois, Marc, In Lebanese Politics, it’s still 2006 – which was 1975, The Daily Star 7.02.2008

UNDP and Consultation and Research Institute, Mid-term Evaluation of the Project for the Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced (UN-RSRD), July 2001

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65 In addition to various UNDP project-related documentation.
UNDP and Republic of Lebanon, Second Country Cooperation Framework for Lebanon, 2002


UNDP, Evaluation of the UNDP/UNDCP Programme in Baalbeck-El Hermel, March/April 2000
UNDP, Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Programme Support to Governance Reform in Lebanon, September 2004

UNDP, UNDP’s Participation in Lebanon’s Recovery in the Aftermath of the July 2006 War, 2007

Annex 5: Consultants’ short CVs

André Klap (the Netherlands, Masters of Economics) was a staff member of the United Nations Development Programme for twenty years, having served as Deputy Representative in Nigeria, Cambodia, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Prior to this he was engaged in academic research on land reform in Latin America. For the last five years, he directs a consultancy firm (http://www.ajkconsulting.nl/) that aims to foster partnerships with non-profit international development agencies. He can be contacted at info@ajkconsulting.nl

Nasser Yassin (Lebanon, PhD in Planning Studies) has been working for more than 10 years as a practitioner and researcher in the fields of development planning, environment and security in Lebanon, the UK and the EU. He has worked as a consultant to a number of international organizations such as the World Bank, USAID and UNDP as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations. He is currently an Associate Fellow with the Hague-based Institute for Environmental Security and has an affiliate position with Norwegian Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). He can be contacted at nasser.yassin@gmail.com