



Evaluation Report

Evaluation of Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) - Stronger for Libya Project – Phase 2

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24 June 2022

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Project information details

PROJECT/OUTCOME INFORMATION		
Project/outcome title	Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya	
Atlas ID	00094616	
Corporate outcome and output	<p>By late 2020, core government functions will be strengthened and Libyan institutions and civil society, at all levels, will be better able to respond to the needs of the people (Libyans, migrants and refugees) through transparent, inclusive gender-sensitive decision-making processes abiding by the democratic principles of division of power and rule of law</p> <p>By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on quality social services delivery for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities</p>	
Country	Libya	
Region	RBAS	
Date project document signed	10 December 2018	
Project dates	Start	Planned end
	1 January 2019	31 December 2021 (extended until August 31 2022)
Project budget	US \$ 92,892,924.23	
Project expenditure at the time of evaluation	US \$ 59.6 million (2019-2021)	
Funding source	14 donors including the Government of Libya, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America	
Implementing party	UNDP Libya, Direct Implementation Modality	
Evaluation Information		
Evaluation type (project/outcome/ thematic/country programme, etc.)	Project Evaluation	
Final/midterm review/ other	Final Review	

Timeframe of evaluation (Level of Effort)	40 days (1 April – 20 June 2022)
Date of the report	24 June 2022
Country of evaluation intervention	Libya

Acronyms

CPD	Country Program Document
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG)
DTG	Donor Technical Group
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GECOL	General Electricity Company of Libya
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GM	Gender Marker
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoL	Government of Libya
HoR	House of Representatives
HRBA	Human rights-based approach
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGSWG	Local Government Sub-Working Group
LibMAC	Libyan Mine Action Centre
LNA	Libyan National Army
LVG	Low Value Grant
LYD	Libyan Dinar
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

MoH	Ministry of Health
MoLG	Ministry of Local Governance
MoP	Ministry of Planning
NAPI	North Africa Policy Initiative
NCDC	National Center for Disease Control
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PAC	Project Appraisal Committee
PHC	Public Health Center
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PSAE	Preventing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
PWD	Persons With Disability
RR	Resident Representative
SARI	Severe Acute Respiratory Infection
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SFL	Stabilization Facility for Libya
SLCRRP	Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Project
SPP	Social Peace Partnership
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USD	United States Dollar
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

Executive Summary

Evaluation Objectives

The final evaluation of **Phase 2 of the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) - Stronger for Libya Project** took place between April and June 2022, and focused on the SFL's implementation during the period of January 2019 to December 2021. As per UNDP's Terms of Reference (ToR), it had two main objectives:

- To provide an independent assessment of the intervention achievements, constraints, performance and results, assess in particular the extent to which the changes embodied in the revised Project Document from January 2019 have been implemented in practice; and
- To generate lessons from the period beginning January 2019 to inform current and future programming in the context of COVID-19 and continued political instability in the country by identifying factors which facilitated or hindered delivery of results, both in terms of the external environment and those related to internal factors.

Intended Users

The evaluation report's primary audience are UNDP staff working on Libya and the 14 donors who have funded the SFL during the last six years. It is expected that UNDP staff will learn from and use the evaluation to inform future programming, decision making, at the country and corporate levels. The evaluation will play a key accountability function allowing its funding partners to better understand the extent to which the SFL has achieved its intended results.

Evaluation Context

Libya, with an estimated population of 6 million, continues to face myriad challenges in its transition to democratic rule in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Since 2011 central government authority has weakened considerably leading to the emergence of rival claimants to political legitimacy; the fragmentation of the security sector; and severe economic decline due to decreased oil production and exports linked both to the deteriorating political and security situation and the decline in oil prices. Libya's people have suffered the collapse of public services, especially education and health; higher prices through cuts to food and fuel subsidies; conflict-related loss of shelter and livelihoods; and major setbacks in ensuring the safety of citizens and the rule of law. According to the most recent United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs overview,¹ an estimated 823,000 people, including around 248,000 children, are in-need² of humanitarian assistance in Libya as a result of persisting political instability, conflict and insecurity, the breakdown of the rule of law, a deteriorating public sector and a dysfunctional economy.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation used a mixed methods approach to establish a robust evidence base. It combined an in-depth document review as well as 47 Key Informant Interviews. Data from documentation, interviews, and a

¹ <https://www.unocha.org/libya/about-ocha-libya>

² People in-need of assistance include internally displaced persons, returnees, non-displaced conflict affected people and host communities, and refugees and migrants.

debriefing workshop were coded and cross-referenced against the analysis framework. This enabled the evaluation to examine key themes from different perspectives. The evaluation is mostly based on qualitative analysis of information and, where feasible and available, quantitative data (e.g., allocated budgets, and outputs) were also assessed. Furthermore, the evaluation embedded gender, vulnerability, and human rights analysis in the evaluation design and analysis. These features were incorporated into the understanding of the evaluation questions, the development of the evaluation matrix, and subsequently included into the evaluation data collection tools.

The challenges relating to the socio-political context, as well as certain methodological constraints, presented a small number of evaluation limitations, including unavailability of outcome level monitoring data, incomplete documentation and high turnover of staff. Nevertheless, the evaluation expert succeeded in putting in place mitigating measure to ensure the validity of the findings.

Key Findings

Relevance and alignment

The SFL was fully aligned with UNDP's Strategic Plan and its Country Programme Document (CPD). It also contributed to achieving several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and was in line with national frameworks, in particular Law 59/2012 - the "Law on Decentralization". The SFL's ToC was valid at the local level, however, it is unclear to what extent the link from the local to the national level was realistic across the three different regions (East, West North), given their specific political and security contexts. Furthermore, the lack of internalization of the ToC across all groups of stakeholders (donor, government and UNDP staff) led to pressures on the SFL to deviate from its overall stabilization goal and not to follow the sequencing of outputs as envisioned in the ToC (Output 3 – Output 2 -Output 1). As a result, the SFL was able to support conflict management and contribute to stabilization mostly in those municipalities where it succeeded in basing Output 1 on Output 3. There is no evidence that Output 2 was linked to either of the other two outputs. The SFL demonstrated capacity to adapt to several external factors (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic, flooding in Ghat, donor priorities). However, this flexibility to use funds to respond to humanitarian crises, may also have distracted it from its stabilization focus. It also put pressure on the SFL to "broaden" rather than to "deepen" as was recommended by the Donor Technical Group (DTG) in several of its meetings. The SFL was able to respond to the needs of the communities through the participatory consultations it conducted which allowed the introduction of innovative interventions such as the provision of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support. However, there is weak evidence that the different needs of women and men were taken into consideration in the SFL's design.

Efficiency

The SFL's human resources were inadequate in terms of number and expertise to implement a large program such as the SFL, and in a context as complex and volatile as Libya. Furthermore, the gender breakdown was heavily skewed, with the SFL being predominantly staffed by men which affected its ability to fully integrate gender considerations into its design and implementation of activities. In addition, the SFL experienced several delays which led to its extension by eight months. In terms of processes, procurement – though significantly improved during Phase 2 – continued to experience several challenges which impacted the achievement of the three Outputs. Communication was not sufficiently strategic and, as a result, impacted both the linking of the local and national ToCs as well as the willingness of donors to continue contributing financially to the SFL. Outside of the DTG, coordination was mostly carried out in an ad hoc manner and at the local level. Weak coordination was due to several reasons including (i) a lack

of will of other bilaterally-funded projects because they had their own objectives and priorities; (ii) inexistence of a platform at the technical level to coordinate stabilization efforts; and (iii) delays in procurement which hindered effective coordination between different projects. The SFL's risk matrix was fit for purpose; however, it did not address environmental nor social risks (including gender-related ones). In addition, though there were several countermeasures identified in the risk matrix not all of which were implemented. Finally, the SFL lacked a complaints handling mechanism which would have allowed citizens to provide feedback.

Effectiveness

The SFL's logic was based on following a specific and interlinked sequence of Outputs. Due to several reasons, including a lack of internalization of the ToC, working in a siloed approach and pressure to show visible results, the SFL did not respect this sequencing. Originally, Output 1 was envisaged to be the "means" to achieve stabilization and not an "end" in itself. However, since it was easier to implement, was less politically sensitive and had more tangible results, UNDP's Senior Management played an important role in deviating from the ToC by focusing extensively on Output 1. As a consequence, reporting to donors and communicating SFL results emphasized mainly the delivery of infrastructure and equipment. Furthermore, and whereas the SFL's revised approach to Output 3 – building local capacity to carry out conflict analysis and management - was sound in principle, the time needed to build local capacity to the level necessary to implement this Output meant that the sequencing could not be respected. In addition, the timing of the transitioning from an international Implementing Partner to implementing through local CSOs contributed in a reduction in pace of activities of Output 3 at a critical moment. A bridging phase between the INGO-implemented Output 3 and the CSO takeover would have been beneficial. Regarding Output 2, it was implemented independently from Outputs 3 and 1 and the finalization of the municipal development plans was still ongoing at the time of the evaluation.

The M&E framework did not capture outcome level achievements so it was not possible to determine the extent to which the SFL's outcomes (if any) contributed to the achievement of the intended impact (stabilization goal). However, there are indications that the SFL succeeded in increasing legitimacy of institutions at the local level, especially in the municipalities which benefitted from participatory and inclusive processes. It is less clear to what extent the SFL was able to increase the legitimacy of national institutions and by extension linking the local and national ToCs. This was more the case in the Tripoli and Bani Walid municipalities due to their physical proximity to national institutions.

The SFL's effectiveness was also affected by several challenges, including travel restrictions and lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic, power cuts and unstable internet connection, political and security volatilities, difficulties in obtaining visas for international staff and remote management, and unreliable banking systems, all of which caused delays and/or reformatting of activities. While most factors that hindered the SFL's implementation were external, there were a few examples of internal factors that also had an impact (e.g., choice of government counterpart, heavy bureaucratic procedures and management style).

Sustainability

The SFL was externally driven, funded and implemented which jeopardized its long-term sustainability and institutionalization of its approach, in particular at the national level. Nevertheless, the SFL's sustainability is more likely where the SFL has succeeded in (i) developing local ownership due to community consultations and (ii) building municipal and CSO capacities. However, to ensure the continued

sustainability, replicability, and scalability, the SFL needed to mobilize additional financial resources from the Government of Libya, donor countries and/or the private sector – something it failed to do. Furthermore, the SFL did not put in place a phased exit strategy, nor did it clearly communicate to the targeted municipalities the end date of the project. Still, there is an opportunity to link up the SFL with the Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Project (SLRRCP) to ensure a gradual phasing out, at least in the municipalities where they overlap. The latter is essential since there is no indication that additional funding is forthcoming from donors or from the Government of Libya and municipalities do not have budget lines to cover running and maintenance costs which would jeopardize the sustainability of Output 1 results. Finally, the relationships that were developed at the local level through the SFL and which created trust and promoted dialogue among different groups is priceless and this “investment” should be sustained through other projects being implemented at the municipal level.

Cross-cutting issues

Overall, the SFL demonstrated modest gender equality and social inclusion results. This is mostly due to the fact that these are new issues in the context of Libya and insufficient UNDP human and financial resources were dedicated to ensure their mainstreaming. Nevertheless, UNDP’s IPs succeeded in having a good representation of women in their training activities and the SFL rehabilitated some infrastructure that targeted women in three municipalities. The SFL, by rehabilitating public infrastructure, assisted the poorer and more vulnerable segment of the population. It also succeeded in some instances to address human rights issues, in particular those related to lack of access of some ethnic groups to public services. Finally, persons with disability were only tangentially taken into consideration, mostly through ensuring their physical access to newly-rehabilitated public infrastructure. In a few municipalities, the SFL funded the rehabilitation of physiotherapy or psychosocial centers.

Overall Conclusions

The SFL was one of UNDP Libya’s flagship projects, which attracted substantial donor investments. It provided essential services with a wide outreach for Libyans and contributed to the achievement of several development goals. However, it missed the opportunity to develop into a multi-donor reconstruction fund due to several reasons including (i) senior management turnover and management style, (ii) a weak M&E framework which did not capture outcome level results, and (iii) a lack of a communication strategy. This, in turn, discouraged donors from contributing further to the SFL.

The SFL faced several tradeoffs including maintaining its stabilization focus versus addressing humanitarian needs across the different municipalities, keeping in mind that sometimes it was probably necessary to respond to humanitarian crisis in order not to further aggravate destabilization. It also had to consider selecting municipalities on the basis of either “deepening” or “broadening” its activities. The first would have allowed more in-depth intervention in strategically selected areas, especially since budget allocated per municipality was too small compared to the needs. While the latter would have permitted the SFL to reach a greater number of people/municipalities. Finally, another balance the SFL had to strike was between ensuring equal geographic representation and a common approach while at the same time there were important differences in the political context in each region which would have necessitated a more nuanced and tailored approach.

Lessons Learnt

The evaluation has drawn the five interlinked lessons below:

Context matters. The design of any project should be based on **a solid context analysis**, especially a project such as the SFL which has a political goal. While the SFL may be inspired by other stabilization funds implemented in conflict-affected countries, the Libyan context is very specific. However, a deeper analysis which feeds into the design of a stabilization fund is necessary at the onset in order to be reflected in its overall Theory of Change. Furthermore, a better understanding of the conflict dynamics at the local level and the **differences between one municipality and another** is essential to fine-tune the local ToC and to determine whether **different regional ToCs** are necessary for achieving stabilization and for linking the local to the national objectives. Context matters not only for designing the stabilization fund, but also in the operational aspects of implementation. In particular, **procurement procedures should be more flexible**, simpler and streamlined to take into context the complexity of the Libyan context. There are UNDP operational experiences (e.g., in Syria) which can be useful for the Libya Country Office to learn from and to adapt as appropriate. Furthermore, and to ensure that procurement is appropriate and fits the local context, **include the national Coordinators** in the review technical specifications. The **community consultations** contributed to better understand the context, and in some cases, succeeded in ensuring that “No Harm” was done. It is necessary that these **consultations are an iterative process** and need to be repeated, especially after a new municipal council is elected. If necessary, **separate consultations for women** in conservative municipalities should be organized to make sure that their voices are heard. Finally, and in order to ensure that a stabilization fund is sensitive to the context, **cross-cutting issues, including gender and persons with disabilities, have to be considered from the start and should be based on a solid analysis** to guide the design and implementation of the stabilization efforts.

People are the project. The people involved in a project can make or break it. The SFL was UNDP’s flagship program and its largest project in Libya. **UNDP’s Senior Management involvement is key** for (i) ensuring continued donor engagement, (ii) mobilizing additional resources, (iii) engaging with the Libyan authorities at the highest level (Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidential Council), (iv) following up on the implementation of the strategic review’s recommendations, and (iv) providing a healthy management style within UNDP. The high turnover of Senior Management during the project’s life was not conducive to achieving this. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that a project such as the SFL has **gender-balanced, appropriate and dedicated staff in terms of both numbers as well as technical expertise (conflict, gender, communications, M&E) from the start of and throughout the project**. In addition to recruitment of staff, building their capacity and understanding of both the project’s goals as well as technical issues is essential (e.g., ToCs, UNDP’s procurement process, gender and social inclusion). Finally, the importance of people engaged in the project is not limited to the UNDP side. **The selection of the members of the Municipal Task Forces well as the counterpart(s) at the national level are key for ensuring ownership and sustainability.**

Working in silos is ineffective. To increase the effectiveness of the SFL, more integration and coordination needed to take place. This should take place at different levels: (i) within SFL, within the three Outputs) and within one Output (e.g., linking Handicap International supported CSOs with UNITAR to build their organizational capacity building); **(ii) within UNDP** (e.g., appointing one UNDP Coordinator for all UNDP-implemented projects at the municipal level to act as an interlocutor with municipality and to better coordinate UNDP’s activities at the local level); **(iii) with other projects being implemented at the local level** (e.g., SCLRRP, other UN agencies and bilateral programs to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity); **and (iv) among the different national institutions both**

vertically (e.g., strengthening communication and work relationships between the central government and the local authorities) **as well as horizontally** (e.g., greater involvement of Tripoli based line ministries in the stabilization efforts led by different international actors).

Communication is key. In a project such as the SFL which has multiple donors and has political objectives, communication is essential to achieve its objects. Clear and timely communication needs to take place at all levels, including at the community level to ensure that No Harm is being done and that expectations are managed. Furthermore, at the local level, a **feedback mechanism** would allow citizens to provide feedback (both positive and negative) which would allow the project to take corrective measures. Such a mechanism could be included on a **SFL-dedicated webpage** which should be kept updated with all the information regarding activities to be implemented, budget and timeline. Furthermore, communication products - which **convert M&E technical reports into communication messages** – are necessary to demonstrate results, facilitate resource mobilization, and buy-in. **Strategic communication should focus on the objectives of SFL** - not only on money spent, equipment delivered and infrastructure rehabilitated (input/output) to maintain donor interest - in order to preserve and build upon the uniqueness of SFL. Finally, a **communication strategy** should be developed, resourced and staffed, implemented and monitored to ensure that the **political objective of enhancing legitimacy of Libyan institutions at the local and national level is achieved.**

What you count is what you get is what you sell. The M&E framework is essential to monitor financial inputs, outputs/activities, but more importantly outcome-level results. The SFL focused mostly at monitoring Output 1 (which was easier to count and quantify) than the other two Outputs. This led to two consequences: UNDP Senior Management focused more on the results related to rehabilitation of infrastructure than on those that were at least equally important for achieving stabilization: Outputs 2 and 3. Furthermore, by having the “numbers” for Output 1, UNDP used this information to communicate to donors its results and did not sufficiently demonstrate the achievement of stabilization outcomes, as a result, it was unable to convince donors that the SFL was achieving its stabilization goal which led to a decrease in donor funding. To capture such achievements, **the M&E framework should measure not only quantitative data but also use qualitative methodologies (e.g., complement quantitative surveys with FGD or the other methodologies such as Most Significant Change to collect “stories”).** Finally, the **M&E should inform the Communications** in order for the results and achievements to be communicated at different levels by using appropriate means of communications for each audience. In terms of financial monitoring, there should be **better financial management which provides financial information per municipality as well as per category of procurement and overhead costs.** In terms of learning from the monitoring process, an **iterative process around how the M&E information is linked to achieving the ToCs** (both at the local and national level) involving all stakeholders should be organized on an annual basis.

Recommendations

Given the limited time left before the end date of the SFL, and based on the findings above, the evaluation proposes the following programmatic recommendations addressed to UNDP SFL Project staff:

Implement communication activities targeting different audiences:

- Communicate clearly the end of project date with all local and national authorities
- Update the “Making an Impact – Stabilizing communities, Supporting Peace” document to cover the full implementation period of the SFL

- Capture outcome level through stories (the SFL could involve university students to collect stories and produce short videos/interviews)
- Develop a communication product specifically targeting the private sector
- Develop a communication product highlighting how the SFL has benefited women and persons with disabilities
- Produce a case study on the SFL's work in Sebha which showcases the effectiveness of linking Output 3 with Output 1
- If security allows it, organize a national closure workshop, bringing together the municipalities, implementing partners, Ministry of Local Governance and Ministry of Planning and the Presidential Council, the Prime Minister's Office and donors)

Establish linkages between the SFL and other projects to ensure sustainability of SFL investments:

- Use remaining SFL funds to cover some activities identified in the Municipal Plans developed; link with resilience project and private sector for continuity and sustainability
 - Present municipal development plan to all municipal council members and key municipal staff as well as to MoLG and key sectoral ministries to gain their continued support
 - Produce a checklist for municipalities regarding requirement for maintenance of infrastructure/equipment once SFL ends
 - Link CSOs whose capacity has been built by UNITAR with other projects so that they can apply the technical experience acquired
- Share information/communication products with targeted private sector companies to explore possibility of replicating/scaling up SFL activities in municipalities

A final recommendation addressed to UNDP Senior Management is to ensure that SFL gains are included in new Country Programme Document.

1. Introduction

This is the Evaluation Report for the **Final Evaluation of Phase 2 of the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) - Stronger for Libya Project** (hereinafter referred to as the “SFL”). The SFL’s intended outcome was a reduction in local conflicts and increase in local stability.³ It sought to support national and local actors, men, women and youth, in delivering peace dividends to the Libyan people. All stabilization activities aimed at supporting and strengthening the legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities; strengthening their capability to lead Libya to sustained peace; reducing the risk of further fragmentation of the Libyan State; and ultimately fostering national unity for all Libyans.

The evaluation has two main purposes: learning and accountability. Its primary audience are UNDP staff working on Libya and the 14 donors who have funded the SFL during the last six years. It is expected that UNDP staff will use the evaluation to inform future programming, decision making, and promote accountability. The evaluation will be an important learning exercise at the country and corporate levels. The evaluation will play a key accountability function for the funding partners to understand the extent to which the SFL has achieved its intended results.

The report is organised into nine sections. The first five cover the Libyan context (Section 2), followed by the description of the intervention (Section 3), the evaluation purpose, objective and scope (Section 4), the evaluation criteria (Section 5), and Section 6 presents the methodology used, including its limitations and mitigation measures. The next section presents the findings based on the Evaluation Questions (Section 7) followed by the main Conclusions (Section 8).

In addition, this final evaluation has been commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya to assess the second phase of the SFL (2019-2022) and to draw Lessons for future programming (Section 9) and offer operational recommendations that can be realistically implemented within the last months of the Project (Section 10).

2. Background and context⁴

Libya, with an estimated population of 6 million, continues to face myriad challenges in its transition to democratic rule in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Since 2011 central government authority has weakened considerably leading to the emergence of rival claimants to political legitimacy; the fragmentation of the security sector; and severe economic decline due to decreased oil production and exports linked both to the deteriorating political and security situation and the decline in oil prices. Libya’s people have suffered the collapse of public services, especially education and health; higher prices through cuts to food and fuel subsidies; conflict-related loss of shelter and livelihoods; and major setbacks in ensuring the safety of citizens and the rule of law.

The protracted crisis in Libya continues to be of grave concern with both Libyans and non-Libyans paying a high price for eleven years of instability and insecurity. According to the most recent OCHA overview,⁵

³ Project Document, p. 10

⁴ This section is taken from OCHA (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview, Libya, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022, Issued December 2021

⁵ <https://www.unocha.org/libya/about-ocha-libya>

an estimated 823,000 people, including around 248,000 children, are in-need⁶ of humanitarian assistance in Libya as a result of persisting political instability, conflict and insecurity, the breakdown of the rule of law, a deteriorating public sector and a dysfunctional economy. Approximately half of the people in need of humanitarian assistance are Libyans. Refugees and migrants in or transiting through Libya make up the other half. The majority of people in need are found in urban areas in the western and eastern regions of the country. However, many of the most severe needs are in the southern *mantikas*⁷ of Murzuq, Sebha and Al Kufra.

2.1 Political and security developments

After nearly a decade of hostilities and civil war, a Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army of the General Command of the Armed Forces was signed on 23 October 2020. The subsequent formation in March 2021 of the Government of National Unity (GNU) established a provisional governmental structure while striking a delicate balance between regional powers in the country. Although there has been an end to large-scale hostilities, portions of the ceasefire agreement remain unimplemented, namely the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. Table 1 provides the key developments between 2019 and 2021.

The political situation remains precarious, as administrative divisions and the nonalignment of policies have hampered progress in defining legal frameworks on electoral procedures and the unification of some Government administrative entities. The House of Representatives (HoR) did not approve the GNU proposed national budget for 2021. While expenditures for salaries were carried over, the government has implemented other initiatives financed through decree. However, the lack of an overarching budget has reportedly seriously hampered the work of line ministries and progress towards infrastructure rehabilitation and the ability to deliver basic services.

With the end of large-scale hostilities, a persistent security concern is the presence of explosive hazards, such as booby traps, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). These explosive hazards pose a significant risk to the safety and security of returning residents and have resulted in civilian casualties, including children, as well as humanitarian workers and security personnel tasked with clearing explosive hazards.

Table 1. Key Developments (2019-2021)

30 March 2019	Elections were held in nine municipalities in the south and west of the country on.
	In March 2019 in Tawergha, the Central Forces blocked access to Tawergha communities preventing the implementation of any activities planned to be held in the city in order to pressurize the GNA to speed-up the compensation payment agreed to be paid to both Misrata and Tawergha.
4 April 2019	The Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an offensive on Tripoli.
20 April 2019	Local elections were held in Ubari.

⁶ People in-need of assistance include internally displaced persons, returnees, non-displaced conflict affected people and host communities, and refugees and migrants.

⁷ *Mantika* (region) is administrative level 2 and *baladiya* (municipality) is administrative level 3.

27 April 2019	Municipal elections were held in Sebha. Four appeals against the results of the Sebha election resulted in the election being declared invalid in a judicial ruling. In early November 2019, the Court of First Instance of Sabha overturned three of the appeals.
28 May to 5 June 2019	During the second quarter of 2019, Ghat, a town of over 30,000 people, witnessed a wave of severe flooding.
4 January 2020	Libyan National Army (LNA) take over Sirt.
19 January 2020	First Berlin Conference took place.
	The elected Sebha council was restored to power in August 2020 following a court decision
Mid-August 2020	Municipal elections were held in Ghat.
3 September 2020	Elections were held in Misrata.
23 October 2020	A Ceasefire Agreement was signed between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army of the General Command of the Armed Forces.
10 March 2021	Government of National Unity – as a provisional government for Libya – formed.
23 June 2021	The Second Berlin Conference on Libya took place with participation of high representatives of the Governments of Germany, France, USA, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Algeria, Egypt, and others, as well as the United Nations (UN) and sought to strengthen the political roadmap towards finding solutions to unresolved legal, economic, and security issues.
30 July 2021	The reopening of the coastal road on 30 July was a critical development in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, directly benefitting the population due to the freer movement of commerce, greater access to medical and humanitarian services and family reunification spread across the former front lines.
9 July 2021 to 17 September 2021	Due to COVID-19, border between Libya and Tunis was closed for two months.
23 December 2021	National elections, scheduled for 24 December 2021, officially postponed and the new date is yet to be announced.

2.2 Economic and social-economic situation

The conflict, the impact of the blockade of the oil sector for much of 2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic have further debilitated the already weak economic situation in the country. With the ceasefire agreement in place, oil production and exports rebounded, though the state of oil production infrastructure - that has been neglected during the past decade of instability - has hampered production.

While the country's liquidity crisis persists, particularly in eastern and southern parts of the country, there has been some improvement in 2021. With the abolishment of the foreign exchange tax in January 2021, the gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates has narrowed significantly. While

the devaluation has improved macro-economic stability the adverse impact on purchasing power has been felt throughout the population, particularly affecting the most vulnerable. By June 2021, five months after the devaluation of the Libyan Dinar (LYD), the cost of the minimum expenditure basket (MEB) reduced by 0.4 per cent from December 2020 to May 2021, despite a spike in certain imported goods, however it remains 13 per cent higher than pre-COVID-19 levels in March 2020.⁸

2.3 COVID-19 Pandemic

Libya, as elsewhere in the world, struggled with the ongoing challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. A third wave of the pandemic in the second half of 2021, and the emergence of new variants, further exacerbated the already fragile health care facilities. In June 2021, a sharp increase by 660 per cent in the number of confirmed cases forced the Ministry of Health (MoH) to declare a public health state of emergency.

With the national budget yet to be approved, the lack of sufficient funding impacted health facilities' ability to remain fully operational, barely coping to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, with isolation centers and case management facilities overwhelmed and facing shortages in medical personnel and supplies, such as oxygen masks, oxygen tanks, medicine, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Health facilities across the country experienced temporary closures due to increasing transmission of COVID-19 among health workers, lack of PPE and other supplies. Of those remaining functioning, 880 per cent of public health care centers (PHC) did not have any of the essential medicines. By then end of September 2021, the Libyan National Center for Disease Control (NCDC) reported 340,084 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 4,651 deaths.⁹

Although more people are being vaccinated, the overall vaccination coverage remains low, with 18.5 per cent of the population having received the first dose by end September 2021, and only 2.8 per cent being fully vaccinated. The cumulative positivity rate has remained at 19.1 per cent since October 2020, with 3,721 cases per 100,000 population, however it cannot be generalized for all regions.¹⁰

3. Description of the intervention

Object. The object of the evaluation is **the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) - Stronger for Libya Project. Box 1 provides the key project information.**

Box 1. Project Information – Key Details

Project Title:	Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2)
Project Number:	Atlas Award ID 00094616
Implementing Partner:	Direct Implementation Modality (DIM)
Start Date:	01/01/2019
End Date:	31/12/2021

⁸ REACH Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMIMI) July 2021.

⁹ Although the national testing numbers are relatively high, most of the testing for COVID-19 is concentrated in the west. Limited testing capacity in the south and east has likely led to significant under-reporting (only laboratory-confirmed cases are included in official statistics). Moreover, the mortality surveillance system is weak and disease surveillance in many locations is inadequate. These factors mask the true extent of COVID-19 in the country.

¹⁰ WHO Update #31 Reporting period: 1-30 September 2021.

No Cost Extension Date:	31/08/2022
SFL Board Meeting Approval Date:	10/12/2018
Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) Meeting Date:	04/10/2018

Geographical coverage. The SFL is implemented in 24 municipalities, including 13 which are part of the city of Tripoli. Figure 1 shows the location of the municipalities which the SFL supported.

Figure 1. Municipalities Covered by SFL



Table 3 provides the SFL's geographic expansion between 2016 and 2018.

Table 3. Expansion of geographic coverage

Date	Locations covered	Number of locations covered
August 2016	Kikla, Ubari and Benghazi	3
December 2016	Sirte and Sebha	2
June 2017	Tripoli, Bani Walid, Derna, and Kufra	4
January 2018	Tawergha, Ghat and Ajdabiya	3
Total		12

Source: Terms of Reference

Project Oversight Structure. Oversight of the SFL was provided by its Project Board which guided also its strategic direction. During Phase 1, the Project Board was co-chaired by the nominated Representative of the Presidential Council and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). With the decoupling of UNDP, the co-chair became UNDP's Resident Representative (RR) during Phase 2.

Major fund-contributing partners were also included as members of the Project Board (see Annex 3 for Board's ToRs). In addition, a Donor Technical Group (DTG) was established and comprised of representatives from all the SFL donors, with the Government of Libya represented by the Ministry of Planning (MoP). The DTG was designated to monitor SFL implementation, to provide advice on emerging themes in SFL outcome and impact, and to identify opportunities for mutual support and synergy (see Annex 4 for ToRs).

Project's Desired Impact, Outcomes and Outputs. The SFL's stated impact was to contribute to stronger, legitimate, and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity. This will be measured principally by perceptions of the legitimacy of the state authorities, by progress with formal political processes that unite Libya, and by political and economic progress being more even across the country.

The SFL's desired Outcome was a reduction in local conflicts and increase in local stability. The SFL sought to contribute to local stability through achieving the consensus on local stabilization goals that are inclusive of all communities and population groups including youth, women and vulnerable and marginalized populations including people with disability.

The SFL had the three following Outputs:

Output 1 Basic service equipment and light infrastructure delivered to local expectations


Output 2 Immediate capacity support for municipalities and local service delivery partners provided

Output 3 Local conflict analysis, dialogue and mediation capacity strengthened

During Phase 2, and as a result of the strategic and operational review which was conducted in 2018, two important changes were introduced to the SFL: (i) a shift in the overall goal from "enhancing the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord (GNA)", to contributing to "stronger legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity"; and (ii) a shift from working "in conflict" to an approach working "on conflict" which led to an emphasis on the establishment of local stabilization goals in each municipality where the SFL operated. This shift in emphasis was also reflected in the revised Theory of Change (ToC).


SFL's Revised Theory of Change. The SFL Phase 2 introduced a revised ToC, which connected a national ToC to a local ToC. The two were linked through reinforcing and balancing loops to depict the kind of change processes described. In essence, the outcome of the local ToC fed into the impact sought at the national level (see Annex 5). The Local ToC, reflecting the flow of implementation from Output 3 to Output 2 and Output 1, is presented in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. SFL Local Theory of Change




Furthermore, for Phase 2, the SFL’s Board took a decision to “broaden” the SFL in five municipalities (see Figures 3 and 4 below) and to “deepen” it in six other locations.

Figure 3. SFL Phase 2 - Broadening Board Approved Locations (US\$ million)



Source: Stabilization Facility for Libya, Board Meeting, 18-07-2019

Figure 4. SFL Phase 2 – Deepening Approved Locations (US\$ million)



Source: Stabilization Facility for Libya, Board Meeting, 18-07-2019

4. Evaluation purpose, objective and scope

4.1 Evaluation purpose and objective

This final evaluation has a double purpose: accountability and learning. To address the accountability aspects, the evaluation seeks to demonstrate and understand the SFL's performance and delivery of results including how they were achieved, as well as assesses the supporting and constraining factors. It also considers how UNDP can learn from the SFL's achievements and weaknesses by documenting cases of these to support future planning and decision making.

Per the Terms of Reference (ToRs; see Annex 1), these two objectives are stated as follows:

- Provide an independent assessment of the intervention achievements, constraints, performance and results, assess in particular the extent to which the changes embodied in the revised Project Document from January 2019 have been implemented in practice; and
- Generate lessons from the period beginning January 2019 to inform current and future programming in the context of COVID-19 and continued political instability in the country by identifying factors which facilitated or hindered delivery of results, both in terms of the external environment and those related to internal factors.

4.2 Intended users

It is expected that this evaluation will be widely used by stakeholders who have been involved in the SFL's funding, design and implementation as per the ToRs and summarized in Table 2.

The primary audience of this evaluation are UNDP staff working on Libya and the 14 donors who have funded the SFL during the last six years.¹¹ In particular, staff directly involved in the implementation of activities will be able to use the evaluation's findings and recommendations as a basis to assess their interventions and as an opportunity to integrate some of its recommendations. Key stakeholders on the government side include the Presidency Council, the Ministry of Planning (MoP), state authorities including relevant line ministries, and municipalities as well as with the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC). Furthermore, this evaluation may prove useful to the SFL's local Implementing Partners (IPs) and may be a learning opportunity to improve their service delivery.

A secondary audience will be other donors who may be interested in funding stabilization programmes as well as other UN Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) implementing similar activities in Libya and who may also have an interest in learning from the SFL's experiences.

Table 2. Stakeholders and Use

	Stakeholders	Use
Primary Users	UNDP staff	UNDP staff will use the evaluation to inform future programming, decision making, and promote accountability. The evaluation will be an important learning exercise at the country and corporate levels.
	14 SFL donors	The evaluation will play a key accountability function for the funding partners to understand the extent to which the SFL has achieved its intended results.
	Line ministries	The Ministry of Planning (MoP) and, potentially, the Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG) may find this evaluation useful in terms of linking the central and local level planning and service delivery.
	Implementing partners (see Annex 2 for list of SFL implementing partners)	Implementing partners are key stakeholders who could use this evaluation to continue and improve the design and delivery of services at the local level.
Potential Users	Municipalities	Institutions at the local level (e.g., municipalities) are key interlocutors for the SFL. They ensure that design responds to needs and are important to involve in ensuring sustainability. This evaluation will guide them in better understanding how participatory, conflict-sensitive planning at the local level may benefit the communities and ensure stabilization,
	Other UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)	There are other organizations (e.g., United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Chemonics, GIZ etc.) and NGOs that are implementing stabilization and municipal development projects in Libya. These organizations could use this evaluation to continue and improve their services.

¹¹ When the Stabilization Facility was established in 2016, there were a total of 13 donors contributing to the Facility including the Government of Libya, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 2017, Denmark became a donor to the SFL project which brought the total number of donors to 14.

4.3 Evaluation scope

As per the ToRs, the evaluation focuses on Phase 2 which covered the period between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2021. It covers the three regions of Libya (East, West and South) and 12 cities.

5. Evaluation criteria and questions

As requested in the TORs, the evaluation responded to the four OECD DAC criteria of Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Sustainability. In addition, the evaluation examined cross-cutting issues which include gender, human rights and social inclusion of vulnerable people, including persons with disability (PWDs). Table 4 includes the Evaluation Criteria as outlined in the ToRs and the corresponding streamlined Evaluation Questions (EQs) which were approved during the Inception Phase. While the TORs did not request that Coherence be assessed as part of this evaluation, some aspects of coherence are touched upon in the discussion regarding coordination.

Table 4. Evaluation Criteria and Streamlined Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Criteria	Streamlined Evaluation Question
Validity of the design and relevance	To what extent are the SFL's strategy and Theory of Change valid and relevant to beneficiaries' assessed needs, country's policies and donors' priorities?
Efficiency of resources used	To what extent are the SFL resources (funds, human resources, time, etc.) optimally used and converted into intended outputs?
Effectiveness	To what extent were the SFL's expected outputs and outcomes achieved or are expected to be achieved?
Sustainability	To what extent the SFL's results are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn?
Cross-cutting issues	To what extent did the SFL incorporate aspects of "Leave no one behind", human rights and gender aspects and ensure the inclusion of the most vulnerable and marginalized?

6. Evaluation approach and methodology

6.1 Theory-Based Contribution Analysis

The evaluation used a theory-based approach. This was a significant component of the evaluation given the in-depth inquiry needed to understand the SFL's outcome areas. A theory-based approach allowed for exploration of the causal pathways between 'what' has been achieved, how it has been achieved, and 'why' it has been achieved. Equally, it also supported understanding the reasons for delayed or limited results. In the context of Libya and the COVID-19 pandemic, this was important because the SFL encountered significant challenges in implementing certain activities. Furthermore, the evaluation used this approach to examine the SFL's Theory of Change, i.e., what was intended to be achieved as well as its underlying assumptions. The evaluation was based on contribution analysis as the primary approach which was applied through the six steps set out below.

Steps 1 and 2: Clarified the EQs, develop an Evaluation Matrix and mapped the EQs onto the SFL's ToC.
Step 3: Gathered existing SFL data and evidence from UNDP and its partners, Annual Reports, minutes of meetings, and other key documentation. This was the main focus of the desk reviews.
Step 4: Used existing evidence to 'assemble the contribution story' – evidence on the results, assumptions and influence of other factors.
Step 5: Determined what additional evidence was needed to strengthen the contribution story and gathered new evidence through key informant interviews.
Step 6: Used new evidence to revise the contribution story and reassess its strengths and weaknesses, along with the relevance of other factors.

6.2 Mixed Methods

The evaluation is based on a mixed methods approach to establish a robust evidence base. This is informed by the evaluation matrix and combines an in-depth document review and key informant interviews (KIIs). Data from documentation, interviews, and a debriefing workshop were cross-referenced against the data analysis framework and coded. This enabled the evaluation expert to examine key themes from different perspectives. The evaluation is mostly based on qualitative analysis of information and, where feasible and available, also analyses quantitative data (e.g., allocated budgets, and outputs).

A Document Review and Content Analysis was carried out during the Inception Phase of the evaluation as the main form of secondary data collection which included (i) a literature review of grey and published literature relating to the Libyan context; and (ii) a desk review of background documents and secondary, quantitative data. Annex 6 includes an inventory of all documents and knowledge products that were reviewed. Findings from the document review were used to inform a stakeholder mapping exercise (see below). Financial and budget information tables were compiled to assist the evaluation expert in analyzing the EQ on Efficiency. Furthermore, and in order to respond to the EQ on Effectiveness, the evaluation expert prepared several Annexes which included the list of activities implemented under Output 1 and the COVID-19 related activities (Annex 7 and 8). Finally, the document review guided the evaluation in assessing the degree to which the SFL's objectives were aligned to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to UNDP's national and global policies and strategies.

A Stakeholder Mapping Tool was developed as part of the Inception Phase to understand the different institutions/organizations involved with the SFL (see Table 2 above). The stakeholder mapping supported the design of the evaluation questions and was one of the methods to ensure the triangulation of findings. Using the snowballing method, the expert identified the key UNDP staff, donors, government, NGOs and implementing partners, as well as other stakeholders who have collaborated with the SFL (see Annexes 2 and 9 for the list of stakeholders, including the CSOs). The proposed list of stakeholders included a cross-section of organizations – public, private and non-governmental – to capture a variety of perspectives. Furthermore, the consultant – by interviewing a diversity of stakeholders – captured feedback regarding both the design as well as implementation the SFL's activities as well as views that were both retrospective as well as forward-looking. The stakeholder list was shared with UNDP for validation and to ensure that no key stakeholder had been omitted.

Elaboration of the Evaluation Matrix. An evaluation matrix was developed (see Annex 10) and unpacked the five overall lines of inquiry proposed in the ToRs. It was refined as appropriate, against evaluation criteria, evaluation sub-questions, data sources, and data collection methods. Furthermore, a data analysis

framework was developed (including a coding structure) to organize and record evidence from document reviews and key informant interviews (KIIs) on an on-going basis.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were the main tool used for primary and qualitative data collection. KIIs were conducted using a multi-stakeholder approach to hold in-depth discussions with people who could shed light onto the evaluation's specific areas of inquiry. A total of 47 KIIs, including 15 women and 32 men, were conducted with staff from UNDP, government representatives at the national and local level, bilateral donor organizations, implementing partners including civil society organizations (CSOs), and other stakeholders such as local authorities from Bani Walid, Derna, Ghat, Sebha, and Tawergha (see Annex 11 for list of persons interviewed Annex 12 for evaluation sub-questions per category of stakeholder). Following this approach allowed the triangulation of data by building up a range of views about specific areas of focus from multiple sources. Furthermore, a KII protocol was developed in order to ensure that the evaluation expert adheres to UNEG Norms and Principles and ethical standards (see Annex 13 for the KII protocol). Written notes were taken during interviews which were coded to reference them. Finally, the KIIs were limited to around one hour long to ensure that there was no "interview fatigue".

Data analysis. Data from documentation and interviews were coded and cross-referenced against the analysis framework. This enabled the evaluation expert to examine key themes from different perspectives. The evaluation is mostly based on qualitative analysis of information and, where feasible and available, quantitative data (e.g., allocated budgets, and outputs) were also assessed

Debriefing with key stakeholders. At the end of the data collection phase, the evaluation expert organized a participatory debriefing with key UNDP staff and sharing preliminary observations and findings. Based on the feedback received, the expert drafted the evaluation report which was further refined and finalized based on comments and feedback received from current and former UNDP staff.

6.3 Sampling of municipalities

Based on several scoping meetings, three municipalities were selected to be examined in-depth: Tawergha (West), Derna (East) and Sebha (South). The selection of these municipalities was based on the following criteria: (i) geographical representation (one from each region); (ii) at least one that was included in the "deepening" category (Sebha); (iii) at least one that was in the "broadening" category (Derna and Tawergha); and (iv) at least one that was included under Output 2 (Derna).

6.4 Cross-cutting issues

The evaluation embedded gender, vulnerability, and human rights analysis in the evaluation design and analysis. These features were incorporated into the understanding of the evaluation questions, the development of the evaluation matrix, and subsequently incorporated into the evaluation data collection tools. Throughout the evaluation, the expert ensured that a human rights-based approach and gender sensitivity were followed:

- **Human rights-based approach (HRBA):** The evaluation expert followed a human rights-based approach which puts people at the center of the evaluation as rights holders. Furthermore, the evaluation also assessed the extent to which the needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations (e.g., persons with disabilities, tribal groups) have been addressed in order to ensure the principle of Leave No One Behind in accordance with the 2030 Agenda. Finally, the expert adhered to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) guidance on integrating human rights and gender equality in

evaluations, by looking at the extent to which both the results as well as the processes took into consideration human rights and gender equality.

- **Gender Sensitivity:** Throughout the evaluation, the consultant used a gender-sensitive approach. This was supported by the combined use of quantitative and qualitative data. This approach entailed examining how gender was incorporated into the SFL's actions (design, implementation and M&E), and the extent of women's and men's participation at all levels. The evaluation expert did this through (i) ensuring that women/men were equitably represented in the respondent/interview pool, (ii) disaggregating data by sex and age – where feasible; and (iii) by testing the Theory of Change/intervention logic to ensure that changes emanating from the SFL also supported women's access to basic services and rights.

6.5 Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Measures

This evaluation was conducted remotely and during the COVID-19 pandemic which further added to the risks that evaluations normally encounter. Table 5 below summarizes the limitations that the evaluation faced as well as mitigating measures that were followed to minimize them.

Table 5. Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Measures

Limitations	Mitigation Measures
Incomplete project documentation and access to gatekeepers/key informants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaised with UNDP (both in Tunisia and Libya) to facilitate access to participants for the KIIs • Requested UNDP to support access to stakeholders with an official introductory email • Factored public holidays (Ramadan and Eid el Fitr) into planning and logistics and extended data collection period • Rescheduled several meetings because of no-show • Used snowball method to obtain names/contact information for key stakeholders
Unavailability of information/ M&E reports regarding outcome level achievements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation consultant sought to assess extent of outcome level achievements through additional KIIs • Nevertheless, evaluation was unable to obtain accurate donor funding information nor expenditures per municipality during Phase 2
Home-based assignment complicated data collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation was conducted through remote means to avoid any problems associated to travel restrictions/ movement and COVID-19 • To minimize impact of poor internet connections, evaluation used various forms of electronic communication (WhatsApp, Zoom, Teams, etc.) with a range of external stakeholders • UNDP supported setting remote meetings at the municipal level
High turnover of staff meant that key informants lacked the requisite institutional memory to reflect on key questions and issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored evaluation questions and lines of inquiry during interviewing to obtain high quality information, based on informants' frame of reference and experience • Interviewed several former UNDP and donor staff which previously held key positions
Evaluation was insufficiently resourced (timing was too short and no national	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requested that additional consultant(s) be recruited to assist in the data collection (KIIs) and FGDs at the local level; however, this was not approved

consultant was envisaged to participate in the evaluation)	
Direct beneficiaries were not interviewed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation TORs did not envisage the recruitment of national consultants; as such it was not feasible to interview direct beneficiaries (due methodological as well as logistical issues, such as poor internet connection) • Evaluation interviewed CSOs and Implementing Partners to provide additional information to draw conclusions

7. Evaluation Findings

7.1 Relevance

7.1.1 Alignment with national development priorities, UNDP's Strategic Plan, and the SDGs

At the political level, the SFL is aligned with the UN Resolution 2510 (2020),¹² which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council and with the conclusions of the Second Berlin Conference on Libya 23 June 2021.¹³

The Government of Libya (GoL) has yet to develop a national development strategy and, therefore, lacks a framework within which to align and coordinate priority actions toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Nevertheless, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) developed the United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF, 2019-2020), a “light” high-level framework that uses the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs as the guiding logic of its results architecture which was approved by the government. **The SFL contributes towards the achievements of several SDGs**, including: SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goal) (see Table 6).

Table 6. Alignment of SFL-Funded Activities with SDGs

Sustainable Development Goal and Target	SFL activities
SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Rehabilitation of hospitals ✓ Supply of medical equipment ✓ Provision of complete COVID-19 testing kits ✓ Provision of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support Services (MHPSS)
Target 3.1 By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births	
Target 3.4 By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being	
SDG 4 Quality Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Provision of furniture and equipment to schools ✓ Rehabilitation of schools and universities ✓ Provision of prefabricated primary school

¹² <http://unscr.com/files/2020/02510.pdf>

¹³ https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2021_berlin_2_conclusions_final_-_eng.pdf

<p>Target 4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes</p> <p>Target 4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university</p>	
<p>SDG 5 Gender Equality</p> <p>Target 5.5 Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Rehabilitation of women's center and supply of IT equipment and furniture ✓ Inclusion of women in Municipal Task Force
<p>SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation</p> <p>Target 6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all</p> <p>Target 6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Provision of sewage trucks, water pumps, and generators for the water and sewage sector ✓ Provision of sewage pumps and water pipeline ✓ Supply of potable water tankers with trucker
<p>SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy</p> <p>Target 7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services</p> <p>7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Installation of street solar lighting ✓ Provision of generators to increase access to electricity ✓ Power cables supplied
<p>SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth</p> <p>Target 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Creation of job opportunities created through SFL's civil works
<p>SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities</p> <p>Target 11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Rehabilitation of Sport Center ✓ Provision of fire engine trucks and communications equipment, ✓ Provision of solar powered internet ✓ Supply of hydraulic cranes

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions Target 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels	✓ Elaboration of municipal development plans
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goal Target 17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships	✓ Participatory community consultations to develop stabilization goals ✓ Partnerships with national ministries and municipalities ✓ Partnerships with several implementing partners (INGOs and NGOs) ✓ Capacity building of CSOs

In addition, the SFL is fully aligned with UNDP Libya's Country Program Document (CPD) (2019-2020) and its two key outcomes: (i) effective, inclusive and accountable governance institutions; and (ii) inclusive access to public services and economic opportunities and their related outputs (see Table 7).

Table 7. SFL's Alignment with UNDP's Country Strategy

Outcome	Output	SFL alignment
1. By late 2020, core government functions will be strengthened and Libyan institutions and civil society, at all levels, will be better able to respond to the needs of the people (Libyans, migrants and refugees) through transparent, inclusive gender-sensitive decision-making processes abiding by the democratic principles of division of power and rule of law	Output 1.1 Space for national reconciliation is created addressing community needs and mutual interests 1.1.1 Percentage of community initiatives based on the dialogue agreements 1.1.2 Number of media professionals reached out for conflict-sensitive journalism and communication enhancement 1.1.3 Number of municipalities with conflict mediation capacity strengthened	By carrying out several participatory consultations at the local level to identify stabilization goals and to prioritize activities to be funded, the SFL is aligned with the CPD's Outcome 1 and its Output 1.1 Similarly, by providing training to municipal communication officers, the SFL is also aligned with the CPD's Outcome 1 and its Output 1.1
2. By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on quality social services delivery for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards	Output 2.1. Improved local public services and upgraded infrastructure to enhance accessibility and boost resilient local economic development, in targeted regions of the country Indicator 1.1.1. Number of municipalities supported for public service delivery	By supporting 24 municipalities and improving their service delivery, the SFL is aligned with the CPD's Outcome 2 and its Output 2.1

enhancing human security and reducing inequalities.	1.1.2. Number of people with improved access to public services in the ten targeted areas affected by conflict	
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Source: UNDP (2018). Country Program Document (CPD) for Libya (2019-2020), 29 June 2018

Finally, the SFL is in line with the Law 59/2012¹⁴ - the “Law on Decentralization” – which was adopted by the General National Congress in 2012. Article 25 specifies the duties that would be attributed to municipalities. Their duties are assigned to six main fields: taking care of civil registration; dealing with issues related to the municipal guards; regulating the local economy and slaughterhouses; managing local transport infrastructure; issuing licenses needed at the local level; monitoring environmental and health-related issues; and lastly, following up on projects launched at the local level in cooperation with ad hoc specialized administrative units.¹⁵ The Ministry of Planning also requested SFL to help formalize the establishment of local planning and development support structures within targeted municipalities to support the enactment of Law No. 59 on decentralization of the administration system and subsequent by-laws and regulations affecting the local level.¹⁶ Specifically, the SFL’s Output 2 is aligned with Law 59.¹⁷

7.1.2 Validity of Theory of Change (ToC)

There is a consensus among all stakeholders that the SFL’s Theory of Change (causal chain) is valid and that the flow from local engagement to get buy-in (Output 3), followed by capacity building of municipalities (Output 2), and the rehabilitation and equipping of public services (Output 1) is the right sequence to manage conflict and achieve stabilization.¹⁸ However, in its implementation, UNDP did not follow this sequence in most of the municipalities. This was mainly for two reasons: (i) working on Output 1 was easier, relatively faster and more visible; and (ii) there was a lack of understanding of the SFL’s ToC which had not been sufficiently internalized by Project staff, UNDP Senior Management and even by some donors.

As mentioned earlier, during Phase 2, two important changes were introduced to the SFL. The first was a shift in the overall goal from “enhancing the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord (GNA), to strengthening the “legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity”. The second was a shift from working “in conflict” to an approach working “on conflict”.¹⁹

Regarding the first goal, and **with a few exceptions, there was little evidence that the SFL strengthened the legitimacy of national institutions.** The SFL worked most closely with the Ministry of Health (MoH) to implement the health-related activities. In some municipalities, the SFL coordinated with the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) through which it delivered generators. Furthermore, per the minutes of the meetings and with the exception of MoP, none of the national institutions participated in a Board or DTG meeting. In addition, there was no strategic approach for engaging with national institutions nor a communication strategy to increase their legitimacy. As a result, the SFL was mostly associated with

¹⁴ <https://security-legislation.ly/ar/law/31807> [accessed 14 May 2022]

¹⁵ Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2019). Peace by Piece: Solving the Libyan Puzzle through Municipalities. KAS Regional Program South Mediterranean, Libya Brief, No. 8, p. 2

¹⁶ Annual Report 2021, p. 7

¹⁷ KII UNDP

¹⁸ KII Donors, UNDP staff, Coordinators

¹⁹ Wood, D and Wilson, G. (2018). The Stabilisation Facility for Libya, An independent strategic and operational review, June 2018

UNDP and not the national institutions (especially in the East). In the eastern municipalities, the SFL faced a dilemma: if it succeeded in increasing the local authorities' legitimacy, this would lead to strengthening the Libyan National Army (LNA), and not necessarily the GNA, so it was preferable that the SFL's interventions were linked to UNDP. This was also the case in contested municipalities in the south.²⁰

At the municipal level the SFL's focus was to ensure that local perception regarding government performance was enhanced through better provision of public service delivery, resulting in citizens having greater trust in their elected officials and the democratic process. **According to stakeholders, the SFL contributed to improving local service delivery which increased the legitimacy of local institutions. It was most successful in building this relationship between citizen and the municipal/local councils in the municipalities where these consultations were done following a participatory, bottom-up approach (e.g., Sebha) and where Output 1 activities were based on those implemented under Output 3. These consultations created trust (i) among participants from different socio-economic backgrounds, (ii) between citizens and the municipality, and (iii) between citizens/municipality and UNDP.**²¹ However, the link between the local and national institutions was not so evident. Regarding Output 2, there was no evidence that there were any interlinkages between this Output and the other two. It was implemented independently from Outputs 3 and 1 and did not follow the intended sequencing of the SFL's ToC. As a result, there was a missed opportunity to utilise the funding that was available under Output 1 to, at least, partially implement the Municipal plans that were developed under Output 2.

Regarding the second goal, the SFL, in consultation with the communities, identified a Local Stabilization Goal in each location (see Annex 14). However, the goals which were set were high-level and quite broad making it difficult to establish a clear correlation between the identified stabilization goal and the actual activities proposed or carried out. Furthermore, the achievement of these goals was not monitored. As a result, there was no evaluation evidence which demonstrated that the SFL's work on locally based stabilization was relevant to support political settlements, local or national.²² Furthermore, some stakeholders suggested that improving livelihoods and youth employment-generating activities under Output 1 were missing²³ and that such interventions could have contributed greatly towards achieving the local stabilization goals.²⁴

Finally, the SFL's ToC included several assumptions, which were not "necessary conditions for any change, or the underlying conditions or resources that need to exist for any planned change to occur. Rather, that the more these assumptions hold true the better the chances of greater success".²⁵ Table 8 lists the SFL's assumptions per the Project Document and additional ones proposed by the evaluation.

Table 8. ToC Assumptions

ToC Level	Assumptions per Project Document ²⁶	Additional Assumptions Proposed by Evaluation
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²⁰ KII IP

²¹ KII IP

²² There was evidence that local conflict analysis carried out under Output 3 contributed to the SFL's approach of doing "No Harm" (see Section on Effectiveness)

²³ "Livelihoods" and "youth employment" were not an objective or goal of SFL. The intention was that other UNDP programs would address livelihoods (such as the SLCRR project does).

²⁴ KII IP, UNDP

²⁵ Project Document, p. 13

²⁶ Project Document, pp. 45-48

Outcome to Impact	<p>National authorities align with the local authorities and the project goal</p> <p>National leadership of formal actors endorse the local deals</p> <p>An equitable fiscal distribution is implemented</p> <p>National resource flows to subnational level are adequate, equitable and sustainable</p>	<p>Coordination and collaboration between MoP and MoLG</p> <p>Greater involvement of national institutions, including Ministries of Health, Education, Public Works, GECOL, etc.</p> <p>Effective communications strategy is agreed and implemented</p> <p>All stakeholders have internalized the SFL's ToC</p>
Output 1 to Outcome	<p>National actors' role locally does not overwhelm local capacity for stabilization</p> <p>SFL can mobilize a substantial part of the community who wish for peace and commit to dialogue</p> <p>Communities, countries and regions are more stable when they have effective mechanisms in place to resolve conflicts peacefully</p> <p>Uncontrolled IDP returns are avoided</p> <p>Coordinated approach with humanitarians possible. In some instances, it may be necessary for initial quasi-humanitarian Output 1 delivery to be prioritized (e.g., Derna), thus reordering preferred methodological approach²⁷</p> <p>UNSMIL supports the approach</p> <p>Supply of equipment and civil works is to Libyan standards</p> <p>Corporate partners confirm permission to engage locally</p>	<p>Security situation is stable</p> <p>Coordination with other projects/actors at the national and municipal level</p> <p>Efficient procurement processes</p> <p>Change in Municipal/Local Councils does not affect implementation</p> <p>UNDP has sufficient staff capacity (number and expertise) to implement activities under this Output</p>
Output 2 to Outcome	<p>Municipalities and Local Partners Cooperate</p> <p>Engagement with Municipality maintained - but no major UNDP municipal capacity investments</p>	<p>Selection of Municipal Task Force members follows technical criteria</p>

²⁷ May require a project note on the circumstances when this may be needed and a protocol to agree with the Board

		<p>Ability of SFL/municipality to mobilize resources to implement Municipal Development Plan</p> <p>Sequencing of Outputs is respected as per Project Document</p> <p>UNDP has sufficient staff capacity (number and expertise) to implement activities under this Output</p>
Output 3 to Outcome	<p>SFL has the ability to mobilize a substantial part of the community who wish for peace and commit to dialogue</p> <p>Communities, countries and regions are more stable when they have effective mechanisms in place to resolve conflicts peacefully</p> <p>Includes Early Warning Systems</p>	<p>Ability of UNDP to identify and contract IPs to implement Output 3</p> <p>Security situation is stable</p> <p>Sequencing of Outputs is respected as per Project Document</p> <p>Trust in international organizations, NGOs and CSOs</p> <p>Management of expectations generated by SFL</p> <p>UNDP has sufficient staff capacity (number and expertise) to implement activities under this Output</p>

7.1.3 Relevance - Addressing needs

Through the participatory consultative meetings at the municipal level, the SFL was able to identify and prioritize communities' needs. Several stakeholders noted that consultations that took place during Phase 2 were more culturally appropriate and conflict-sensitive than those that were carried out during Phase 1 which were considered as top-down and less inclusive (especially in Tripoli and Bani Walid).^{28,29} In some municipalities Ajdabiya and Kufra and due to external factors, a consultation workshop to prioritize activities was organized only with local leaders.³⁰

²⁸ KII IP

²⁹ KII IP and several Coordinators

³⁰ IP, Coordinators

The SFL used different approaches to implement these participatory consultations, including an international consulting company (mainly in the West) and international individual consultant (mostly in the East) and a local CSO (in Sebha), with the latter being the most relevant. The Fezzan Libya Organization (FLO), a local CSO, led an iterative, participatory consultative approach which resulted in greater ownership and the identification and prioritization of relevant activities (see Box 2). However, initially, FLO also faced several challenges including (i) mistrust of NGOs/CSOs; (ii) consultation fatigue due to too many meetings and no concrete activities; (iii) time to build confidence since FLO members are mostly a young and women and were initially not taken seriously; (iv) COVID-19 forced FLO to carry out some activities online (sessions, survey etc.); and (v) once trust was built, this generated high expectations that FLO could address all the needs of the community and resolve all their problems.³¹

Box 2. Fezzan Libya Organization (FLO) in Sebha³² - an iterative, participatory consultative approach

FLO is a Libyan CSO whose capacity had been built over a long time by the United States Institute of Peace.³³ It ran several participatory and inclusive consultations with different members of the community in Sebha. FLO used an iterative process by organizing several town hall meetings with local authorities and community leaders. Finally, it held community meetings on a monthly basis. This bottoms-up approach allowed the identification of relevant activities that addressed the needs of all the community at the local level.

The provision of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) was a particularly relevant activity which addressed needs that were identified during the participatory consultation process in Tawergha, Derna and Sebha (see also Section on Effectiveness of Output 3).^{34,35} The SFL responded to identified needs by introducing MHPSS as a stabilization factor – though it was not part of the original design, demonstrating both relevance and adaptability.

A Gender and Security Assessment³⁶ covering Benghazi, Sirt and Ubari was completed in 2019 and was utilized by Peaceful Change Initiative (PCi) to design relevant gender-sensitive activities (see Section on Cross-cutting Issues). The assessment provided a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of gendered conflict drivers, inclusion and exclusion dynamics, and gendered needs and priorities for stabilization in each location.³⁷ However, **there was no evidence that it was used to inform the SFL programming as whole**, especially since collaboration with PCi ended in 2019.

The SFL implemented a participatory approach to adapt the Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) tool in Sirt³⁸ by ensuring that the tool was appropriate to the Libyan context and by assessing the capacity of municipality to deliver on their mandate as prescribed in national legislation.³⁹ However, the focus was shifted from the different municipalities to a concentration on the solid waste management sector, with a particular attention to the municipality of Sirt and the evaluation found no evidence that the OCA was utilized in other municipalities not even those targeted under Output 2.

³¹ KII IP

³² KII UNDP and IP

³³ KII UNDP

³⁴ KII UNDP

³⁵ DTG Meeting 15 January 2020

³⁶ PCi (2019). Gender and Security Assessment, Benghazi, Sirte, Ubari, May 2019

³⁷ Annual Report 2019, p. 18

³⁸ KII UNDP

³⁹ Annual Report 2019, p. 43

Finally, several stakeholders noted that the SFL was inspired by other UNDP-implemented stabilization funds (e.g., the one in Iraq⁴⁰) and did not take into considerations sufficiently the Libya context.⁴¹ This was partially due to the fact that a number of UNDP staff had worked previously in Iraq.^{42,43} As a result, and according to these stakeholders, the SFL's relevance to addressing the needs of the Libyan citizens was not as high as it could have been.

7.1.4 Adaptation

The SFL proved to be adaptable to respond to emergency situations. In 2020, the Project Board requested the SFL to support municipalities on COVID-19. As a result, **the SFL mobilized around \$ 2 million of its budget and adapted its implementation of activities to support target municipalities in responding to the pandemic.** Annex 8 includes the full list of COVID-19-related projects.

Both UNDP and its implementing partners also had to modify their modality of delivering training and consultation sessions as a result of COVID-19. Lockdowns and mobility restrictions in particular, resulted in the need to adapt and reformat certain activities such as training sessions and workshops to an online/hybrid format, with in-person activities taking place only whenever possible. In addition, during face-to-face activities, participants adhered to social distancing measures, and wearing of masks.⁴⁴ In addition, and to control the spread of COVID-19, several municipalities used sewage suction trucks, pesticide sprayers provided by SFL to spray disinfectant and to improve sanitization.⁴⁵

The SFL was flexible since it allowed UNDP to responding to the emergency situation in Ghat. The city was heavily affected by floods during the summer of 2019. Flooding disrupted delivery of basic services to residents and created conditions for potential disease outbreaks. UNDP supplied the municipality with four mobile pesticide sprayers through the SFL. The equipment contributed to improving public hygiene in the city through spraying to combat rodents, insects and mosquitoes breeding grounds.⁴⁶

In addition to adapting to emergency situation, the SFL responded to donors' request to target municipalities (e.g., Tawergha) that did not fulfill clearly the stabilization criteria and to shift SFL funds to other projects that were underfunded (e.g., the Political Dialogue – PD - Project).^{47,48}

While the adaptability and flexibility that the SFL demonstrated was essential to respond to the different crises, the shift of funds to address these emergency situations, mean that there were less

⁴⁰ The Funding Facility for Stabilization in Iraq had substantially greater funding, Iraqi institutions had greater capacity to implement and coordinate and Iraqi citizens had greater political awareness.

⁴¹ KII Donors, UNDP

⁴² KII Donor

⁴³ KII UNDP

⁴⁴ Annual Report 2021, p. 20

⁴⁵ DTG Meeting 7 May 2020

⁴⁶ Annual Report 2019, p. 35

⁴⁷ KII UNDP

⁴⁸ "The Political Dialogue project, due to rapid developments leading to Berlin conference and post conference, was facing budget shortfalls to carry out the planned activities. As a faster way to resolve this gap, the possibility of utilizing SFL Output-3 contribution from Germany was discussed. This was further justified by the programmatic link of national unity component and institutional strengthening component of SFL with the Political Dialogue project. The German fund was shifted to the Political Dialogue project... It was very clear that UNDP Libya's activities should align with the outcome of the Berlin conference but at the same time it will always be equally important to preserve the specificity of these different projects." Source: DTG Minutes, February 2020

funds available to implement the originally prioritized activities to achieve the municipal stabilization goals.

7.2 Efficiency

7.2.1 Financial Resources

The estimated project budget for the SFL in Phase 1 was US\$ 40 million. By the end of the first phase (31 December 2018), total utilization of funds contributed to the SFL since its inception was US\$ 26.8 million. The total amount mobilized since the onset for both SFL Phases 1 and 2 is US\$ 95.4 million, leaving US\$ 68.6 million for Phase 2. The total amount projected for Phase 2 as per the project document was US\$92.9 million; therefore, **the funding gap in Phase 2 was US\$24.3 million (see Table 9 below) which the SFL was unable to mobilize.**⁴⁹

Table 9. Funds Received, Spent and Funding Gap

Total Funds Received since 2016 up to end of 2021 (a)	95.4 ⁵⁰
Funds Spent on Phase 1 between 2016 and 2018 (b)	26.8
Funds carried over to Phase 2 (c= a-b)	68.6
Projected / Budgeted Expenditure for Phase 2 as per the Project document (d)	92.9
Funding Gap (d-c)	24.3

The total number of donors since the start of the SFL was 14 donors (see Table 10). However, in Phase 2 the number of countries that funded the SFL decreased to nine and only four donors financed the SFL in 2021. According to several stakeholders, **donor funding dried up for several reasons: international funding was cut to address Covid 19 pandemic in their own countries; (ii) donor governments had different priorities and objectives; (iii) lack of understanding of the SFL's objectives and time required to deliver these objectives which led donors to be dissatisfied with the SFL's performance; (iv) GoL contributions did not materialize; and (v) donors lost trust due to lack of good UNDP leadership.**⁵¹ This was compounded by ineffective communication with the donors to demonstrate results at the outcome level, and in the case of some donors, the expectation - which did not materialize - that the GoL would contribute significantly to the SFL was also a disincentive to continue financing it.

Table 10. Donors' contribution to the SFL Phase 2

Donor	2019	2020	2021
European Union ⁵²	(78,874)	2,010,755 2,739,200	2,069,380
Germany		2,388,942	-217
Italy		542,888	

⁴⁹ Evaluation ToRs. These figures differ slightly from the ones included in the Annual Report 2021, p. 4

⁵⁰ EU contribution received in 2020 and 2021 under SUSC project amounted to US\$ 4,808,580. The amount is not added to this total for accounting purposes.

⁵¹ Several Kils

⁵² In 2020, the EU contributed US\$ 2,739,200 and in 2021, US\$ 2,069,380 under the SUSC project which amounted to US\$ 4,808,580. This amount is only reflected but not added to the total for donor contribution table in the 2021 Annual Report for accounting purposes.

Japan	2,410,521		2,880,287
Norway	1,348,921	519,697	581,249
South Korea	500,000	693,000	
Switzerland	(713)		50,000
United Kingdom		965,251	
USA	3,169,028	(8,826)	
Total	7,348,883	7,111,707	3,511,319

Source: Annual Report, 2021, p. 3

As mentioned earlier, in Phase 2, the SFL Board approved the “deepening” of the SFL in some municipalities and the “broadening” in others. Tables 11 and 12 provide the Board approved budget for each municipality as well as the delivery rate. The delivery rates vary significantly from one municipality to another due to different reasons. For example, Ajdabiya has a low delivery rate because the SFL was unable to carry out community consultations due to COVID-19. Around the same time, the funding shortfall was becoming evident. Without assurance of sufficient resources, the SFL decided not to move ahead with community consultations to generate priority list in order to avoid creating false expectations which could potentially lead to conflict. Similarly, in Kufra, a short list of investments, which was deemed critical and benefitting all (therefore conflict sensitive) was generated in quick consultation with key stakeholders. The SFL implemented some of the prioritized activities after further confirmation that they were conflict sensitive and benefited the whole community. Other activities were postponed until further consultations could endorse the selection. However, these consultations did not take place due to COVID-19 and, as a result, the activities were not implemented. In Bani Walid the low delivery rate is related to delays in procuring contractors to rehabilitate the university. Whereas in Sebha, the SFL spent more than was originally allocated due to an increase in price of solar lighting. Finally, the priority investment lists for Tawergha and Sirte were partially implemented.⁵³

Table 11. List of “broadening” municipalities and their delivery rate

Location	Board Approved Budget⁵⁴	Disbursed/ Committed/ or Estimated Amount⁵⁵	Balance	Delivery Rate
Ajdabiya	2,000,000	549,647	1,450,353	27.5
Derna	2,000,000	1,685,828	314,172	84.3
Ghat	2,500,000	2,783,160	-283,160	111.3
Kufra	2,000,000	1,183,212	816,788	59.2
Tawergha	3,000,000	2,758,546*	831,466	92.0
Total	11,500,000	8,960,392	2,539,608	77.9

*This includes US\$590,012 equipment support provided to Misrata

Table 12. List of “deepening” municipalities and their delivery rate

⁵³ UNDP staff and Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report (2021)

⁵⁴ The budget which was allocated by the Board is based on the projected budget in the Project Document and not the actual amount of funding that the SFL received.

⁵⁵ The amount disbursed/committed may also include funds disbursed for activities that were initiated during Phase 1.

Location	Board Approved Budget ⁵⁶	Disbursed/ Committed/ or Estimated Amount ⁵⁷	Balance	Delivery Rate
Bani Walid	1,000,000	250,413	749,587	25.0
Benghazi	4,000,000	2,935,709	1,064,291	73.4
Sebha	5,250,000	6,385,337	-1,135,337*	121.6
Sirt	3,000,000	1,685,262	1,314,738	56.2
Tripoli	8,000,000	5,170,175	2,829,825	64.6
Ubari	3,750,000	3,528,813	221,187	94.1
Total	25,000,000	19,955,709	5,044,291	79.8

*This noticeable overspending is due to change in actual amount of solar street lights project by well over a million than previously estimated. The actual amount of this contract is US\$ 3.35 million. After receiving this quote from vendor (Copenhagen), senior management advised SFL to go ahead as the project was deemed very important and the preliminary works carried out (surveys, field visits, estimations) had already raised expectations.

Table 13 provides funds utilization per output. As expected, Output 1 used the largest share of the funds, followed by Output 3 and then Output 2, the latter being the “soft” component of the SFL. In the case of Outputs 1 and 3, there was a significant decrease in fund utilization in 2021 whereas Output 2 maintained more or less the same delivery rate across Phase 2. According to some UNDP staff, the SFL budget was used to cover expenses in the UNDP country office (e.g., travel related to other projects, Country Office posts). However, no financial information was available to determine the distribution of expenditures per procurement category (goods, works, services) or to assess the overhead costs of the SFL. Information available was mostly related to the three Outputs and Project Management which was over 15 per cent of the total funds spent.

Table 13. Funds Utilization per Output (2019-2021)

	2019 ⁵⁸	2020 ⁵⁹	2021 ⁶⁰	Total	Percentage
Output 1	12,823,270	12,698,193	9,343,419	34,864,882	58.4%
Output 2	865,549	778,202	869,774	1,647,976	2.8%
Output 3	1,711,373	2,804,038	1,120,933	5,636,344	9.4%
Gender	605			605	0.0%
DPC	298,571	1,283,119	835,764	2,118,883	3.6%
GMS	1,600,510	1,583,095	987,545	2,570,640	4.3%
Political Dialogue (PD)		-	872,823	872,823	1.5%
PD GMS		-	72,253	72,253	0.1%
Project management	4,744,743	3,149,664	1,211,250	9,105,657	15.3%
Total	22,044,712	22,296,312	15,313,765	59,654,789	100.0%

Source: Annual Reports, 2020 and 2021 and UNDP Finance staff

⁵⁶ The budget which was allocated by the Board is based on the projected budget in the Project Document and not the actual amount of funding that the SFL received.

⁵⁷ The amount disbursed/committed may also include funds disbursed for activities that were initiated during Phase 1.

⁵⁸ Information for 2018 provided by UNDP finance staff in an email

⁵⁹ UNDP (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2020, p. 5

⁶⁰ UNDP (2022). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2021, p. 4

7.2.2 Human Resources

According to several stakeholders, the SFL – given its size and complexity - was not appropriately staffed, both in terms of number of staff as well as in their technical capacity. The Procurement Unit was overstretched due to insufficient number of staff to manage the large number of procurement of goods, works and services foreseen under the SFL and in a context as challenging as that of Libya.⁶¹ Similarly, though the importance of Communication and M&E was stressed in several Board and DTG meetings, they were neither properly resourced nor staffed. In addition, the Country Office did not have gender expertise and the Gender expert was recruited only in 2021 which had an impact on the degree that gender was mainstreamed into the SFL.⁶² Finally, stakeholders mentioned that some SFL staff lacked the necessary expertise to work on stabilization and/or knowledge of the Libyan context.

In some cases, the SFL succeeded in enhancing staff technical capacity which had a positive effect on the project's implementation. For example, UNDP's Engineering Unit's capacity was strengthened, and as a result, teams were able to do quality assurance and quality control.⁶³ Similarly, the SFL's technical capacity on political and security issues was enhanced through the inputs of the working group of experts established in 2019 (see Box 3). However, this technical support group seemed to have faded with the departure of the Stabilization Advisor and stopped meeting after the departure of the Coordinator for Output 3 (summer of 2021).

Box 3. Good practice - the Libya Analysis Support Panel

In December 2019, the SFL formed a working group of leading experts on political and security analysis in Libya. The working group included UNDP project managers, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Atlas Assistance, Whispering Bell, Libya Desk, Mercy Corps, Voluntas, the North Africa Policy Initiative (NAPI) and other independent political and security analysts. It was planned to conduct monthly meetings and produce a technical report to inform strategic level meetings which would be organized on a quarterly basis.

Source: DTG Meeting 15 January 2020 and KIIs

The high turnover of UNDP Senior Management affected negatively the SFL. Between 2016 and 2021, UNDP Libya had five different Resident Representatives (RR) which disrupted the dialogue with Government counterparts as well as with donors. A particularly disruptive period was the first 18 months of the SFL's Phase 2, which ended when both the RR and his Deputy were put on administrative leave before being replaced. Furthermore, the style of Senior Management affected morale and created an unhealthy work environment. In addition, the SFL Project Manager went on a "SURGE"⁶⁴ assignment for three months in Q2 2021 which also impacted the delivery of certain outputs (e.g., the evaluation report).

In terms of gender equality in human resources, the vast majority of SFL staff and coordinators were men. The SFL succeeded in recruiting only one female Coordinator in Benghazi. This may have created a gender bias in implementing activities. Furthermore, even though the SFL's risk matrix identified that

⁶¹ KII UNDP

⁶² KII UNDP

⁶³ KII UNDP

⁶⁴ SURGE is an initiative that was launched by UNDP (currently managed by the Crisis Response Unit) in 2006 to enhance UNDP's ability to respond quickly and effectively in the recovery phase following a conflict or natural disaster.

“reliance on male field staff leads to disempowerment of women within the project and in the community as a whole” (see Annex 15), UNDP did not succeed in increasing the number of female staff working on the SFL. UNDP continued to face challenges in recruiting female Coordinators due to several reasons (i) the conservative culture, (ii) women were unwilling to travel within Libya and overseas, and (iii) security reasons. However, according to some stakeholders, the SFL could have made a greater effort to recruit female Coordinators, especially in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi which are less conservative than other municipalities.

7.2.3 Processes

Three important processes impacted SFL’s efficiency as well as its effectiveness. These were its procurement, communication, and coordination processes.

Procurement

The procurement system used by UNDP is one of the best, and was further enhanced by a very robust check and balance system in place. A service center was established in 2019 to accelerate delivery. As a result, delivery almost doubled in 2019 compared to 2018.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the procurement processes followed by UNDP allowed it to minimize the risk of corruption and there were instances where procurement of services was suspended due to external interferences in the process.⁶⁶

However, the procurement processes were not designed for crisis countries which require greater flexibility (see Box 4 for challenges faced).⁶⁷ A fast-track procurement method, applicable in case of crisis countries, and forward planning could have helped tackle this challenge.⁶⁸

Lack of UNDP technical expertise in procuring certain items led to delays. For example, the procurement of medical equipment in Ubari faced significant challenges and lasted for several years due to a lot of back-and-forth process before finalizing the technical specifications. Primarily due to disparities between international and Libyan standards in case of medical equipment specification, coupled with this not being UNDP’s primary area of expertise, delivery of complex medical equipment was problematic and resulted in excessive delay. Furthermore, ‘end users’ (i.e., directors of hospitals and health centers) never had experience in defining specification since in the past equipment was procured at the national level. There were also difficulties to agree on the specifications of other sensitive or technical equipment like water pumps, sewage pumps, etc. This was further complicated by the training and capacity building needs required to ensure proper use of the equipment provided. Other equipment which required less technical expertise (e.g., solar panels, generators, etc.) was delivered faster and without unnecessary delays.⁶⁹ Coordinators mentioned that they were not involved in the identification of technical specifications that were appropriate to the Libyan market which also affected negatively the procurement and delivery processes.

Box 4. Challenges faced in the procurement and delivery process

⁶⁵ DTG Meeting 16 June 2020, p. 1

⁶⁶ KII Coordinator

⁶⁷ The independent review had recommended to “make maximum use of available derogations, fast track procedures, and simpler and shorter options for procuring services.” Source: Wood, D and Wilson, G. (2018). The Stabilisation Facility for Libya, An independent strategic and operational review, June 2018, p. 91

⁶⁸ DTG Meeting 1 August 2019

⁶⁹ DTG meeting 13 June 2019

- COVID-19-imposed curfews delayed rehabilitation of infrastructure because, due to lockdowns, contractors could not implement activities.
- Imports of goods took a longer time because of the global supply chain which was impacted by COVID-19. For example, prior to COVID-19, the timeframe to deliver an ambulance was between 3-6 months which was extended to around 9-12 months during the pandemic.
- High turnover of mayors and municipal staff meant that, in some instances, such as in Ubari, the new staff did not accept what had been agreed with the previous municipal council.
- Fluctuation in exchange rates led to re-launch of bidding process which caused delays.
- Due to the collapse of the banking system, Libyan suppliers of goods and services had to open bank accounts in neighboring countries.
- Limited market of NGOs and private sector companies willing to provide goods and services in Libya.
- Lack of capacity/knowledge of Libyan bidders regarding doing business with UNDP.
- Instability and insecurity meant more time was needed time to transport goods form one area to another (e.g., in one case, the militia confiscated the goods and UNDP had to negotiate to have them restituted).
- Promises made to municipalities by UNDP Senior Management to fund activities which were not included in the municipal list and not part of the procurement plan.

Source: KII UNDP, Municipal staff, Coordinators

Communication

Communication - though recognized as crucial for achieving the SFL's overall objective -was weak.

In the SFL, effective communication was essential for four reasons:

- to achieve the SFL's political objective of linking the local ToC to the national ToC;
- to ensure downward transparency (SFL → municipality/communities) by providing timely and updated information regarding project details (amounts allocated/ disbursed per municipality, end date of project, criteria for activities to be funded under the Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Project - SLCRR - and SFL, etc.)
- to ensure upward accountability (SFL→ donors/national authorities), in particular related to SFL outcomes (and not limited to output level information sharing); and
- to adhere to the “No Harm” principle (see Section on “unintended negative results”).

The SFL was supposed to develop a communication strategy by the end of 2019 and start applying it as of early 2020.⁷⁰ However, the strategy was not made available to the evaluation and, as a result, it was not possible to assess it. Furthermore, the production of quarterly communication brochures was discussed in the DTG, but they were not produced.⁷¹ In addition, the SFL did not implement the recommendation proposed by the independent review to establish a “dedicated SFL website with an intranet function”.⁷²

Nevertheless, the **SFL engaged with the municipalities and its achievements were communicated on the municipalities' Facebook pages.** As an example, in 2019, the Sirt Municipality published 21 posts

⁷⁰ DTG Meeting 14 November 2019

⁷¹ DTG Meeting 6 August 2020

⁷² Wood, D and Wilson, G. (2018). The Stabilisation Facility for Libya, An independent strategic and operational review, June 2018, p. 102

about the SFL on its page, receiving 389 comments (40 per cent positive; 39 per cent negative, and 21 per cent neutral). Similarly, the Facebook page of Bani Walid Municipality posted nine times about SFL in 2019, earning 133 comments (55 per cent positive, 33 per cent negative and 12 per cent neutral). Sebha Municipality published three posts that earned 421 likes and 22 comments of which 11 were positive and 11 neutral.⁷³

Since SFL communication at the municipal level was almost exclusively done through social media, this most likely prevented women's full access to information and participation in communicating their opinions. According to one study, in Libya only around 1 per cent of women engage on social media since they fear social backlash.⁷⁴ Finally, in 2020, the SFL produced a very useful document entitled "Making an Impact – Stabilizing communities, Supporting Peace" which summarized the SFL's achievements and results and linked them to the SDGs. However, this communication product was only produced once and was not updated. Table 14 includes the different communication items that the SF produced during Phase 2 and demonstrates that the number of products decreased significantly in 2022.

Table 14. SFL communication products in Phase 2

Communication product	2019	2020	2021	2022
Articles	1	2	2	1
Videos	11	10	9	0
Human interest stories	10	4	1	0
Social media posts	339	308	291	30
Press releases	7	13	4	0

Source: UNDP, May 2022

Finally, according to UNDP staff, the SFL received complaints via social media, some of which were addressed; however, the SFL did not have a complaints handling mechanisms which could track and produce statistics to capture the number/type/geographical location etc. of grievances.⁷⁵

Coordination

Coordination took place at several levels and with different degrees of effectiveness. Among donors, the DTG was a useful platform to share information and provide inputs.⁷⁶ However, several donors noted that coordination meetings in Phase 2 were less transparent and effective than those in Phase 1 and focused too much on the delivery of Output 1. Table 15 provides the number of meetings held per year which shows that in 2020 significantly more meetings were held. **The decreasing number of DTG meetings in 2021 and 2022 reflected the diminishing interest in the SFL.** In 2022, Senior Management opted for a review that would bring all donors together and not only focusing on SFL which also explains the reason why no DTG meetings were held so far during this year.

Table 15. Number of DTG Meetings per Year

2019	2020	2021 ⁷⁷	2022 (up to April 2022)

⁷³ Strategic Review # 5: Communications Strategy

⁷⁴ DTG Meeting 13 June 2019

⁷⁵ KII UNDP

⁷⁶ DTG Meeting 15 July 2020

⁷⁷ During the Project Manager's during his SURGE assignment, the Office in Charge did not organize any DTGs.

5	13	5	0
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Outside the SFL, the international community had established an “aid coordination” mechanism, - the Working Group on Local Governance to ensure coordination and avoid duplication. The Local Government Sub-Working Group (LGSWG) of the Governance Working Group, in particular, focused on ensuring coherent methodologies for development partners’ support to municipalities. There was no evidence of the SFL’s regular participation in the LGSWG’s meetings. In the DTG meetings, a discussion took place on better coordination and on whether a separate platform on “stabilization” should be set up; however, the decision was to use existing coordination mechanisms and not to create new ones.⁷⁸

Due to a lack of a formal coordination mechanisms regarding stabilization activities, the SFL coordinated in an *ad hoc* manner at both the horizontal al level (nationally with the MoP and other UN agencies) and vertically (between the municipalities and the national level). At the national level, the SFL engaged with the Ministry of Planning⁷⁹ – which was also represented in the DTG - as well as with other UN organizations to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication. For example, the SFL consulted UNICEF regarding potential local CSOs and sought its input/recommendations based on UNICEF’s prior collaboration with some of them.⁸⁰ The SFL also sought the technical expertise of MoH and WHO for identifying additional suppliers and to ensure quality of COVID-19 related procurement.⁸¹ In addition, the SFL ran through the health cluster the list of health-related interventions to ensure that there were no duplications.⁸² Furthermore, the SFL engaged with UNFPA, UNICEF and WHO to gain from their experience regarding MHPSS.⁸³ Finally, the SFL made sure that there was no overlap with UNICEF and WHO prior to signing the agreement with Handicap International.⁸⁴ Under Output 2, and on an ad hoc basis, the SFL coordinated with several other actors (e.g., GIZ, Crown Agents and the Italian Cooperation) to avoid any geographic overlap and duplication of efforts.⁸⁵

Also at the horizontal level, the SFL held several ad hoc coordination meetings at the municipal level with other organizations to ensure that their activities were complementary. For example, in Sirt, bi-monthly coordination meetings with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) resulted in the SFL rehabilitating part of a school and Chemonics another. Similarly, as a result of consultations with UNICEF, toilets in a school were divided between the SFL which rehabilitated the ones for male students and UNICEF which was in charge for the ones for female pupils.⁸⁶ In Sebha, the SFL coordinated with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the rehabilitation of wells.⁸⁷ It also complimented the International Committee of the Red Cross’ (ICRC) work by providing a mortuary freezer. Furthermore, the SFL also coordinated with the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) to ensure that the areas where SFL was carrying out rehabilitation of infrastructure were cleared of mines. Finally, though

⁷⁸ DTG Meeting of 12 February 2020

⁷⁹In the DTG Meeting of 12 February 2020, the MoP expressed the need to improve the coordination mechanism since it had become difficult to understand what is happening in all municipalities. The MoP announced that it was setting up a Gaiasoft platform into which partners will be required to provide information on their interventions regarding what, where, when, and for whom. This would not only help MoP but also the Libyan population, as a whole, to better understand what type of interventions were being implemented/planned. The platform would also provide an opportunity to scale up to include all government planning in the future. The UK supported MoP in setting up the platform, however it did not become operational since the MoP did not finance the platform once it was set up.

⁸⁰ DTG Meeting 1 August 2019

⁸¹ DTG Meeting 2 April 2020

⁸² DTG Meeting 4 June 2020

⁸³ DTG Meeting 15 January 2020

⁸⁴ DTG Meeting 15 January 2020

⁸⁵ UNDP KII

⁸⁶ KII UNDP

⁸⁷ DTG Meeting 14 November 2019

USIP was not funded by SFL, due to shared objectives in Ubari and Sebha, the SFL and USIP worked closely and collaborated on the capacity building of CSOs.⁸⁸ In Sebha, coordination took also place between the two UNDP projects (SLCRR and the SFL) for rehabilitating the female and male dorms in Sebha's university as well as for rehabilitating the Youth and Women Training Center (carried out by SFL) and furnishing and equipping it (SLCRR) (see Box 5).

Box 5. Coordination between the SFL and SLCRR

The SFL and SLCRR interventions overlapped in several municipalities and followed similar approaches. Vis-à-vis the municipality and citizens, there was no difference between the two projects since they were both seen as the “UNDP project”. The two projects succeeded in creating synergies and linkages with each other by sharing information and jointly implementing activities. For example, the SLCRR provided the list of prioritized interventions for Ajdabiya and Kufra to the SFL, and the latter funded some of the activities identified. Similarly, the Kikla municipal plan developed under the SFL has informed the SLCRR's livelihoods activities. In Kufra, two water wells were rehabilitated by the SFL and SLCRR, covering both Tebu and Tuareg areas thus following the “Do No Harm” approach.

However, it is to be noted that there are some differences between the SLCRR and the SFL. Per the SFL's design, and in order to achieve stabilization, in-depth community consultations were held. To implement them properly, these consultations required a certain amount of time, especially given the COVID-19 pandemic and security situation. Furthermore, the SFL Board had to approve activities and budget allocated per municipality which also was time-consuming. The SLCRR – being funded from one donor mainly – was relatively faster in terms of decision-making and, as a result, was able to implement activities at a quicker pace.

Source: KIIs with UNDP

Vertically, and to ensure better coordination between the municipal and national levels, the SFL's consultation processes, involved the municipal Director of Planning. This succeeded in ensuring that investments prioritized for SFL support also fit within the wider package which the Municipality submitted to the MoP through the MoLG. This worked best in the Western municipalities due to their proximity to the national authorities. For example, in Tripoli, the SFL was able to select schools that were not included in the government's investment plan.⁸⁹ Similarly, the SFL worked closely with the MoH to plan for the delivery of equipment for 65 Health Centers throughout Greater Tripoli.⁹⁰ In the East, meetings held in Benghazi were also an opportunity to identify projects which the Libyan authorities were in the process of contracting, and to agree on a coordination mechanism between UNDP, the Benghazi Municipality and the Benghazi Stabilization Committee.⁹¹

Finally, within the SFL, several IPs and Coordinators noted that there was insufficient coordination between the different SFL Outputs,⁹² with some IPs (implementing Output 3) stating they were unaware of what the other Outputs were about and that the Coordinators focused mostly on Output 1 and were not fully informed of what the other two Outputs were achieving in their municipalities. The Coordinators noted

⁸⁸ DTG Meeting 15 January 2020

⁸⁹ KII Coordinator Tripoli

⁹⁰ Annual Report 2019, p. 8

⁹¹ Annual Report 2019, p.15

⁹² KII Coordinator Tripoli

that this information sharing improved significantly in 2022; however this was too late since the SFL is ending in August 2022.

Notwithstanding, the above-mentioned efforts to coordinate horizontally and vertically with other projects and institutions, the lack of a formal coordination mechanism resulted in the SFL coordinating with other stakeholders in an ad hoc manner. This led donors to believe that there was duplication of activities, which in some cases was real and in others only perceived (see Box 6).⁹³

7.2.4 Timeliness

The SFL experienced several delays in implementation due to the following reasons: (i) lengthy procurement processes (see section on Procurement above), (ii) internal UNDP bureaucratic processes which slowed down the recruitment of staff UNDP,⁹⁴ the issuance of contracts for Outputs 2 and 3,⁹⁵ resulting programmatic delays (e.g., the dissemination and publicizing of the Kikla municipal plan is two years late which is counterproductive given that it is a five-year plan);⁹⁶ (iii) significant delays in transferring the Low Value Grants (LVG) to the selected CSOs under Output 3 which led to a drop in number of CSOs due to a loss of interest from their part (from the 34 initially selected to 13); and (iv) disruptions after UNDP was informed by its contract partner, Aktis Strategy, that the company was due to file for bankruptcy causing an interruption in SFL activities in Tripoli and Bani Walid.⁹⁷ As a result of these delays, the SFL was granted an eight-month no-cost extension until 31 August 2022.

Box 6. When delays in procurement affect coordination - a vicious cycle

Due to lengthy SFL procurement delays, other projects funded prioritized activity that were supposed to be implemented by the SFL. This led to a double negative effect: (i) further delays because the initial procurement plan had to be re-adjusted to implement another activity on the list of the municipality; and (ii) an impression of lack of coordination between the different projects vis-à-vis the donors which saw that an activity that was supposed to be funded by the SFL was being financed through another donor.

Furthermore, and in some cases, this created a lost opportunity for municipalities. When a municipality expected a certain activity to be funded/implemented by UNDP and another project proposed to finance the same activity, some municipalities turned down the offer from the other project (since it was expecting UNDP to realize it) which led to a missed opportunity for the municipality to have the activity implemented (especially when the SFL was unable to implement it or it experienced extensive delays in carrying it out).⁹⁸

Finally, delays affected citizens' trust in the municipal council as well as its credibility and therefore impacted negatively one of the SFL's objectives at the local level. This was aggravated by a lack of clear information regarding budgets and timeline of activities.⁹⁹

Source: Several KIIs (UNDP and Municipal staff, Coordinators)

⁹³ KII IP and Donor

⁹⁴ KII UNDP

⁹⁵ KIIs with several UNDP staff

⁹⁶ KII Coordinator

⁹⁷ Annual Report 2019, p. 18

⁹⁸ Municipal staff

⁹⁹ Municipal staff

7.2.5 Risk Matrix

The SFL's risk matrix (see Annex 15) is fit for purpose and addressed all the major risks (strategic, political, security, operational, programmatic and institutional). The risk log was monitored regularly and updated on an annual basis. However, the risk matrix did not address any environmental risks (which could result due to the rehabilitation of infrastructure), nor social risks (e.g., labor-related issues, women's role in peacebuilding, specific risks faced by women and young girls). Furthermore, the SFL did not establish a complaints handling mechanism. It relied on Coordinators to liaise with the end-users and beneficiaries for feedback by the local community. However, according to some stakeholders, there was insufficient monitoring and follow up mechanisms (e.g., it was reported that in one municipality the mayor sold the pesticide trucks).¹⁰⁰ Finally, though there were several countermeasures identified in the risk matrix not all of them were implemented (e.g., recruitment of more female staff, training on gender and Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse – PSEA, development of Communication Strategy).

7.3 Effectiveness

7.3.1 Results per Output

The SFL's M&E framework did not track outcome level results (see Section on M&E below). Furthermore, the evaluation expert was unable to interview direct beneficiaries. As a consequence, the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the SFL's achievements is based mostly on KIIs and document review. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the *extent* to which the SFL achieved these results (i.e., the degree to which the achievements under the three Outputs contributed to achieving stabilization).

Output 3: Local Conflict Analysis, Dialogue and Mediation Capacity Strengthened

The SFL's approach to implementing Output 3 had several challenges including (i) a lack of a clearly articulated vision for achieving this Output; (ii) a lack of monitoring of achievements and of communicating them downwards (to municipalities and citizens) and upward (to donors and national authorities); and (iii) extensive delays.¹⁰¹

Effectiveness of Dialogue and Mediation. In the first year of Phase 2, the SFL partnered with PCi to implement conflict resolution and mediation. PCi established Social Peace Partnerships (SPP) in Ubari, Sirt and Benghazi and delivered several trainings in peacebuilding design, risk mitigation and public communication. Over 20 rounds of training were organized by PCi, targeting a total of 80 participants with a particular focus on IDPs, women and youth. Over the course of the year, **the SFL noted considerable improvements in the capacities of the SPP in conflict analysis, facilitation and project design** (see Box 7 for effectiveness of SPP in Ubari).¹⁰²

Box 7. Effectiveness of Social Peace Partnership (SPP) in Ubari

¹⁰⁰ KII UNDP

¹⁰¹ Several KIIs with UNDP staff and Coordinators

¹⁰² Annual Report 2019, p. 19

In Ubari, the SPP engaged in mitigating the conflict risks associated with continuing tensions in the city and among different ethnic groups (Tebu, Tuareg and Aheli). For example, a group of marginalized young Tebu ex-fighters (known as the “Youth Coalition”), who lived on the edge of the city and did not feel fully represented, resented that the SFL’s contracts were being awarded mostly to Tuareg contractors. The “Youth Coalition”, attacked the SFL Coordinator in Ubari and some of the building sites where work was taking place, and ordered the works to stop. The SPP reached out to all parties concerned, and over some weeks brought the “Youth Coalition” into the process. The “Youth Coalition” signed a letter with each contractor agreeing that work could resume.

Source: Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report (2019) and KIIs

By the end of 2019, and for several reasons, the SFL’s restructured its way of working with Output 3 from a relationship with local bodies mediated through PCi to a direct relationship with local CSOs with support from an international partner (UNITAR). The idea behind restructuring Output 3’s partnership model was to establish a locally-led and sustainable mechanism of conflict resolution. However, the transition was not smooth: the contractual arrangement with PCi ended in 2019 and there was a time lag until the agreement with UNITAR was in place.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the capacity building of CSOs required time until they reached the necessary level to offer their conflict analysis skills.¹⁰⁴ In the meantime, the SFL could no longer avail from PCi’s considerable technical capacities and its ability to implement in several municipalities.

A total of 34 local CSOs in all regions and cities where SFL was present were selected to take part in the UNITAR training.¹⁰⁵ Notwithstanding UNITAR’s flexibility,¹⁰⁶ due to extensive delays, a shift from face-to face to online training, and the insignificant amount of the Low Value Grants (LVG), several CSOs dropped out of the activity and only 14 local CSOs completed the training.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, according to some participants, not all topics were appropriate to the Libyan context and not all the trainers were equally effective.¹⁰⁸

According to UNITAR and some of the CSOs who participated in this activity, the results achieved included the following: (i) better understanding of conflict management, (ii) networking among CSOs, (iii) learning how to approach with donors and write proposals, and (iv) improved organizational capacity, especially of smaller CSOs.¹⁰⁹ To ensure continued CSO engagement, knowledge retention and exchange, UNITAR maintained a learning platform¹¹⁰ which provided access to learning materials and networking.¹¹¹

Finally, and due to the extensive delays in transferring the Low Value Grants (LVG) to the CSOs so that they can carry out local conflict analysis, the evaluation was neither able to assess the LVGs’ effectiveness nor the CSOs’ capacities to carry out such analysis.

¹⁰³ KII UNDP

¹⁰⁴ This was further delayed due to the challenges associated with funding the CSOs to carry out these analyses (see Section on External Factors)

¹⁰⁵ Annual Report 2020, p. 10

¹⁰⁶ See section on External Factors (under Effectiveness)

¹⁰⁷ KII Coordinator

¹⁰⁸ KII Coordinator

¹⁰⁹ KII IP and CSO

¹¹⁰ <https://learnatunitar.org>

¹¹¹ Annual Report 2021, p. 6

Effectiveness of local conflict analysis. The SFL faced challenges in identifying international partners to conflict analysis to cover East/West/South. It succeeded recruiting only in partnering with one INGO (Promediation) to implement the conflict analysis and community consultations in the South.¹¹² In some cases, the SFL used the conflict-sensitive operational advice offered by Promediation (e.g., in Kufra, the location of COVID-19 isolation ward was moved to ensure greater access by all members of the community and to avoid conflict.¹¹³ Another example is in Sebha which faced operational challenges. When the expected 30 generators were not delivered in one go, in order not to deepen the divisions within the city, community members were asked to be prioritize the distribution areas. As a result, a prioritization list was created which was endorsed by the municipality and respected by all.¹¹⁴)

Table 16. Examples of conflict analysis

Municipality	Activity
Ghat	In Ghat, local CSO partner “ I am Libyan My Son Is a Foreigner ” has taken a key role with successful efforts to ensure conflict sensitivity of the SFL’s interventions. The partner conducted three key technical consultations and two town hall meetings in early 2020 to address concerns over the fair and equal distribution of equipment and infrastructure intended for the rehabilitation of the water sector. ¹¹⁵
Sebha	FLO in Sebha and its surrounding areas. The partnership is based on conflict analysis, dialogue facilitation and building the organization’s capacity to provide peaceful mediation in local conflicts.
Ghat, Ubari, Sebha and Kufra	INGO Promediation in the South of Libya conducted conflict analyses, facilitated dialogue between target groups, provided mediation services, and support SFL’s community consultations.

Finally, also under this Output and in order to respond to demands that communities expressed during consultation, the SFL partnered with Handicap International (HI) to provide **Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support (MHPSS)**. Direct MHPSS services were provided to people in communities who had suffered from the effects of conflict and trauma. Significant numbers were reached through a hotline in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misurata operation centers (see Table 17). According to HI, the **results achieved were twofold: beneficiaries gained a better understanding of mental health issues, and they developed positive coping mechanisms.**

Table 17. Number of Persons Benefitting from MHPSS Sessions

Municipality	Female	Male	Total	Percentage Female
Benghazi	85	63	148	57.4%
Misrata	191	144	335	57.0%
Tripoli	156	111	267	58.4%
Grand Total	432	318	750	57.6%

Source: Handicap International, Mental health and psychosocial support response in Libya, Final Report, Reporting Period: 15/07/2020 – 31/10/2021

¹¹² KII UNDP

¹¹³ KII Coordinator and IP

¹¹⁴ DTG Meeting 28 April 2021

¹¹⁵ The evaluation attempted to meet with the CSO but was not successful

In terms of addressing a Board recommendation for ensuring sustainability and local ownership, three CSOs specializing in MHPSS were identified. However, HI was able to deliver technical training to only two of them.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, there was no linkages made between the HI-assisted CSOs and those supported by UNITAR. As a result, **the two CSOs working on MHPSS did not receive any organizational capacity development which was a missed opportunity and limited the effectiveness of this activity.**

Output 2: Immediate Capacity Support for Municipalities and Local Service Delivery Partners Provided

Though this Output has suffered delays, the SFL is on track to achieve this Output by the end-of-Project date by developing the municipal development plans in Bani Walid, Derna, and Ghat. However, there is no evidence that the municipalities have the necessary capacities or will be able to mobilize sufficient resources to implement these plans.

Under Output 2, the SFL supported selected municipalities to develop a priority-oriented, five-year plan to move from post-conflict to a development phase using a participatory methodology. The selection criteria for the targeted municipalities were: population range, geographic representation (East, West, South), and interest expressed by municipality (see Annex 16 for selection criteria).¹¹⁷ In order to develop these plans, the SFL established a Municipal Task Force which included representatives from the municipality and CSOs, and aimed at having both an age diversity and gender balance (see Annex 17 for Task Force ToRs). In the case where the Task Force included a member of the Municipal Council (such as in Bai Walid), stakeholders noted that this facilitated the funding of some of the activities in the municipal development plan through the budget allocated by the central authorities, which was not the case in other municipalities (e.g., Ghat).

Initially, in July 2019, the SFL provided support to Kikla to develop its local development and resource mobilization plan and which was finalized in early 2020. **In 2020, the methodology and approach developed for Kikla, was replicated in the municipalities of Bani Walid and Derna, and Ghat.**¹¹⁸ A detailed plan for the roll out was developed for the three municipalities to produce the final plans by mid-2021.

The results achieved by the SFL under this Output include the following; (i) Task Force's capacity was built gradually through on-the-job training and learning by doing; (ii) confidence between municipalities and CSOs was established; and (iii) a new channel of communication and collaboration between municipalities and community members around concrete initiatives was created.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, preparing a participatory municipal development plan is a technical exercise around public service delivery. It is relevant to everyone in the community regardless of their political and/or ethnic affiliation. This contributed to decreasing conflict, especially in municipalities where the citizens had a certain political leaning and the appointed municipal staff another (e.g., Bani Walid).¹²⁰

Effectiveness of Output 2 could not be fully assessed because it is a function of the extent to which the municipal plan is (i) funded and (ii) implemented. Kikla developed a resource mobilization plan but at

¹¹⁶ Bila Hudud and Women Youth Empowerment Forum (both in Tripoli)

¹¹⁷ KII UNDP

¹¹⁸ Initially, Sebha was selected in the South however it was replaced by Ghat because of the lack of interest by the Sebha municipality at that time

¹¹⁹ KII UNDP and Coordinators

¹²⁰ KII UNDP

the time of the evaluation it still had not succeeded in mobilizing funding to implement some of the activities identified. The municipal plans of the other three municipalities were still being finalized by the time of the evaluation. Several stakeholders pointed out that should the municipal plans that are currently under development not be funded and/or the activities identified not be implemented, this would cause trust and credibility issues between citizens and the municipal council, thus potentially contributing to destabilization at the local level.¹²¹

Furthermore, the Field Coordinators were following up mostly on Output 1 activities and did not sufficiently monitor Output 2. The SFL did not have a national technical expert who could follow up on this Output. Such an expert could have also provided continued technical assistance to the three municipalities on a more continuous basis, especially since the international expert was unable to travel to Libya. As a result, there were instances where the SFL selection criteria for Task Force membership were not always followed. **Some Task members were selected on the basis of their personal relationships and did not have the appropriate qualifications to participate in the Task Force which decreased the Task Force's effectiveness.**^{122,123}

Finally, Output 2 did not envisage building the capacity of municipal staff to deliver the plan, to improve the quality of services delivered and the necessary "soft skills" to deal with the public.

Output 1: Basic Service Equipment and Light Infrastructure Delivered to Local Expectations

Under Output 1, of the initial 394 initiatives identified and prioritized for all the municipalities, the SFL succeeded in implementing 370, i.e., almost 94 per cent. The shortfall is due to several reasons: (i) lack of funding, (ii) challenges in procurement (e.g., rehabilitating universities in Bani Walid), (iii) conflict (e.g., in Sirt, some equipment prioritized during Phase 1 were not procured in Phase 2 as the risk was considered substantial given the ongoing conflict in the area), and (iv) lack of proper community consultation (e.g., in Kufra).

Though almost 74 per cent of the activities were identified during Phase 1 (273 projects), the majority of projects (52.4 per cent) were started in Phase 2 (194 projects).¹²⁴ Furthermore, the number of activities completed /pending completion during Phase 2 is 273 representing 73.8 per cent of all of the SFL's interventions and, thus, demonstrating that the SFL became more efficient in its second phase (see Annex 7).

The SFL supported immediate stabilization initiatives to provide quick rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. It funded several key sectors (education, health, energy, solid waste, water and sanitation and municipal services) by rehabilitating infrastructure and providing vehicles and equipment to the targeted municipalities for both Phase 1 and 2.¹²⁵ Annex 7 provides the number of projects implemented per municipality. Figures 5 and 6 provide the percentage of the budget allocated and number of projects per sector. Almost 72 per cent of the projects were in the education and health sectors.

¹²¹ Municipal Council


¹²² KII Coordinator

¹²³ KII UNDP

¹²⁴ These percentages are skewed because the projects in Tripoli - which had the largest number of projects identified/implemented in the SFL – were identified during Phase 1.

¹²⁵ A breakdown for only Phase 2 was difficult to generate since several projects had started during Phase 1 and completed in Phase 2.


Figure 5. Percentage of Budget Allocated by Sector



Note: COVID-19 interventions are not included in the Figure above

Source: UNDP, April 2022

Figure 6. Number of projects by sector



Note 1: The number of projects include completed, are currently underway, and those in process of procurement

Note 2: COVID-19 interventions are not included in the Figure above

Source: UNDP, April 2022

According to most stakeholders,¹²⁶ the SFL succeeded in improving public service delivery and had several outcome-level achievements:

¹²⁶ KILs with UNDP, Coordinators, Municipal staff

- ✓ **Greater sense of security and revitalization of economic activity.** Provision of solar street lighting in In Benghazi, Kufra, Sebha, Tawergha and Ubari, generated a sense of security, allowed citizens to remain out on the streets after sunset and revitalized economic activity by permitting shops to remain open for longer hours.^{127, 128, 129}
- ✓ **Greater access to quality education.** Rehabilitation of schools allowed a greater number of students to enroll and improved the teacher/student ratio in classroom.
- ✓ **Greater access to potable water.** Provision of generators residents – especially those living on higher floors – permitted residents to pump water to their homes.
- ✓ **Improved public hygiene.** Provision of garbage trucks contributed to improving hygiene (e.g., prior to the SFL, one municipality stated that, though they had the manpower to collect the garbage, their efforts were limited because the municipality did not own garbage trucks).
- ✓ **Improved public health.** Rehabilitating and equipping health centers provision of fire engines and ambulances contributed to saving lives. It also facilitated the provision of home-based care for COVID-19 patients (which was replicated by MoH in other municipalities).¹³⁰ It also allowed the Derna Municipality to transport citizens from the Egyptian/Libyan border to quarantine centers.
- ✓ **Stabilization of communities.** By making more public services available in the smaller municipalities, the SFL succeeded in “stabilizing” these areas by incentivizing their inhabitants to remain in their communities and not migrate to the larger cities (e.g., Tripoli) to obtain such services. As a result, not only the citizens remained in their communities, they also did not increase the social pressure on the larger cities.

7.3.2 M&E Framework

The SFL’s M&E framework was inadequate, did not capture all the output level results, and did not monitor outcome level achievements in Phase 2. The Results Framework in the Project Document did not establish targets for any of the activities/outputs. They were all left “to be determined” at a later stage.¹³¹ The “Results Framework Indicators and Progress to Date” section in the Annual Reports identified annual targets, however it was not updated and the indicators did not capture several activities (e.g., UNITAR’s capacity building of CSOs, HI’s provision of MHPSS, preparation of municipal development plans, etc.) while other indicators that monitored activities that ceased to exist were maintained (e.g., conducting satisfaction surveys). In addition, at the output level, the information gleaned from the Annual Reports indicates that there may be inaccuracies (see Annex 18). For example, the output reported for 3.2 for 2019 and 2020 is identical (both years report that 133 beneficiaries were reached in four municipalities divided into 99 men; 34 women and 28 youth).¹³²

Furthermore, several monitoring instruments that were originally envisaged were either not implemented or discontinued. For example, the Value for Money study was not carried out though it was planned and budgeted for. Neither was the independent strategic and operational review which was planned

¹²⁷ Annual Report, p. 40

¹²⁸ KII Municipal Council

¹²⁹ Annual Report 2019, p. 41

¹³⁰ Municipal Staff

¹³¹ Project Document, pp. 24-26

¹³² From a probability point of view, it is nearly impossible to have the exact number of beneficiaries and sex-disaggregated number identical from one year to another.

in 2020.¹³³ The perception survey was discontinued in Phase 2 due to cost reasons¹³⁴ and to several challenges faced (see Box 8), which affected reporting on certain indicators.^{135,136} Furthermore, while “stabilization” goals were established for each municipality, there were no accompanying indicators to measure progress towards achieving these goals – albeit they are long-term objectives and are not easily measured. The SFL did not complement its quantitative monitoring with qualitative methodologies which could have provided more granular information at the local level (e.g., through Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries or by using methodologies such as Most Significant Change). **As a result, the SFL was unable to demonstrate progress towards the objectives of both the local and national ToCs.**

Box 8. Challenges with using a quantitative satisfaction survey to monitor outcomes

Relying exclusively on a perception survey to monitor outcome level indicators has several challenges:

- Necessity to have baseline data against which to measure change
- Relatively expensive to carry out and ambitious data collection, especially in the Libyan context
- Difficult to prove attribution of shift in perceptions since there are other interventions taking place in the same area
- In areas where SFL was being implemented, higher expectations were created which may have led to greater disappointment (than in areas where the SFL was not present and therefore expectations had not been created)
- Focus on quantitative and not qualitative data since the perception surveys were not complemented with targeted Focus Group Discussions
- Perceptions did not change significantly over time; however, this does not necessarily mean that outcomes were not achieved

Source: KIIs and Voluntas Reports

Some of the monitoring data was sex-disaggregated (e.g., number of beneficiaries reached by Handicap International and UNITAR. Perception surveys reached women and men in equal numbers and women were interviewed by women¹³⁷). However, **none of the reports capture the different categories of vulnerable groups, such as persons with disabilities.**

The SFL missed the opportunity to fully link up the M&E information with communication and to develop several communication products targeting different stakeholders. In particular, several donors questioned the SFL’s value-for-money and neither monitoring nor communication products were able to respond adequately to these queries. Furthermore, the perception survey carried out by Voluntas was quite technical and quantitative and was not converted into easily-digestible messages/information catering to different audiences.¹³⁸

¹³³ According to UNDP project staff, at the end of 2018, the SFL team prepared the ToRs for conducting the Value for Money assessment and submitted them for approval to the RR. At the beginning of 2019, the office had to move to Tunis due to security reasons. The assessment preparation was delayed. Later on, the team re-submitted the ToRs to DRR who did not provide her approval to proceed.

¹³⁴ Senior Management considered that the cost/benefit of doing such surveys was too high.

¹³⁵ Annual Report 2021, p. 2

¹³⁶ KII UNDP

¹³⁷ KII UNDP, and Voluntas (2019). UNDP Perception Survey for the Stabilization Facility for Libya. Findings for SFL I: Benghazi, Bayda, Kikla, Sabha, Ubari; SFL II: Tripoli, Kufra, Bani Walid, November 2019

¹³⁸ KII IP

7.3.3 External/Internal Factors that Hindered/Enabled the SFL

The SFL faced several challenges as a result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, power cuts and unstable internet connection, political and security volatilities, difficulties in obtaining visas for international staff and remote management, and unreliable banking systems, all of which caused delays and/or reformatting of activities. While most factors that hindered the SFL's implementation were external, there were a few examples of internal factors that also had an impact (e.g., UNDP's bureaucratic procedures, choice of government counterpart and communication).

External factors

Several external factors affected the SFL's implementation, including the following:

- **Political developments in certain municipalities affected the SFL's achievements.** For example, in 2020, the Bani Walid plan development did not progress as those of other municipalities under Output 2 due to political turbulence within the municipality and between the municipality and the central government.¹³⁹ Similarly, the takeover of Sirt by the LAAF in early 2020, led to putting on hold the Organizational Capacity Assessment and the establishment of a Steering Committee.¹⁴⁰
- **Challenges related to working with NGOs.** Staff of international NGOs (INGOs) had difficulties obtaining visas which led INGOs to deliver some activities remotely and, as a result, the services provided were not as effective. For example, as part of Output 3, UNDP's partner Handicap International faced difficulties in obtaining visas for its international staff to provide MHPSS consultations on the ground and train local psychosocial workers.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the Civil Society Coalition approved only two of the three CSOs which were supposed to be trained by HI on MHPSS, and as a consequence, the results were less than what was originally planned.¹⁴²
- **Lack of security.** Security developments around the country posed significant logistical and security challenges for the SFL to ensure the safe and complete delivery of equipment needed for the restoration of key services including access to water and electricity.¹⁴³ Furthermore, clashes in Southern Tripoli and other parts of the country posed serious threats to many civilians, including SFL's staff on the ground.¹⁴⁴ As a result, UNDP international staff numbers were first reduced in Tripoli then moved to work remotely from Tunis.¹⁴⁵
- **COVID-19 pandemic.** The pandemic affected the delivery of the SFL's three outputs. COVID-19-imposed travel restrictions had an impact on some community consultations which could not take place nor could stabilization goals be identified (e.g., in Kufra, Ajdabiya, ¹⁴⁶ Tawergha¹⁴⁷). Similarly, training of the Municipal Task Force (Outcome 2) faced challenges because of travel restrictions due to COVID-19 and most training was done online¹⁴⁸. Virtual meetings were difficult

¹³⁹ Annual Report 2020, p. 15

¹⁴⁰ Annual Report 2020, p. 17

¹⁴¹ Annual Report 2021, pp 20-21

¹⁴² KII IP

¹⁴³ Annual Report 2019, p. 14

¹⁴⁴ Annual Report 2019, p. 8

¹⁴⁵ Annual Report 2019, p. 8

¹⁴⁶ Annual Report 2021, p. 21

¹⁴⁷ In 2020, the third consultation for Tawergha was cancelled due to travel restrictions related to COVID-19 thus unable to identify final priority investments to be covered by SFL (source: Stabilization Facility for Libya, Board Meeting, PPT, 21 July 2020)

¹⁴⁸ KII IP

to hold because of weak internet and electricity outages (see Box 9).¹⁴⁹ In addition, COVID-19 lockdowns also slowed down rehabilitation of infrastructure because workers could not go to work. Finally, several IP staff caught COVID-19 which also had an impact on their delivery of services.

Box 9. Several external factors that impacted the effectiveness of capacity building activities

Effectiveness of training sessions was a function of (i) their timing (less effective during Ramadan), (ii) mode of delivery (remote training less effective than face-to-face), (iii) weak internet connection and frequent power cuts.¹⁵⁰ While this did not hinder the SFL's Output 2 to build the capacity of municipal staff to develop a municipal plan, it impacted Output 3 since several CSOs dropped out of the UNITAR training once they realized that the sessions would be held online.¹⁵¹

- **Banking challenges.** Due to difficulties and delays faced by CSOs in opening a bank account, compounded with the suspension of international transactions by the Libyan Central Bank, at the time of the evaluation, the majority of the CSOs (under Output 3) were still waiting for receiving the Low Value Grants (LVGs).¹⁵²
- **Choice of government counterpart.** While the SFL was directly implemented by UNDP, its national government counterpart was the Ministry of Planning, specifically the Director of International Relations and not the Director of Planning. However, the Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG) is the ministry that oversees municipalities and is the one through which municipal development plans have to pass through prior to being submitted to the Ministry of Planning for funding. Whereas, all other projects being implemented at the local level had the MoLG as their official counterpart. The SFL did not include regularly the MoLG into the DTG¹⁵³ which could have improved potentially both coordination (among the different ministries as at the national level as well as with the other projects being implemented locally). The interaction with MoLG was limited to a few ad hoc meetings that were held with MoLG to discuss Output 2 and to its participation in some Board meetings.
- **Flexibility of implementing partner.** UNITAR demonstrated great flexibility and organized the same training sessions several times in order to allow participants to connect when they had electricity. This was appreciated by both UNDP and CSOs, particularly challenging during the summer time when there were more frequent power cuts.¹⁵⁴

Internal factors

In addition, internal factors to UNDP also had an influence on the SFL's results, including the following:

- **Establishment of trust between the municipality/local communities and UNDP.** Several coordinators mentioned that the SFL was the first "foreign" initiative to enter the municipality. It was also the first time the communities had an experience with UN agencies and international NGOs. As such, initially there was a lack of trust which the SFL Coordinators, in particular,

¹⁴⁹ KII UNDP

¹⁵⁰ Several KIIs UNDP

¹⁵¹ KII IP and UNDP

¹⁵² Annual Report 2021, p. 6

¹⁵³ According to minutes of DTG meetings, the MoLG participated only twice in these meetings

¹⁵⁴ KIIs UNDP and IP

succeeded in building over time. Furthermore, the field visits by UNDP Senior Management – which demonstrated interest at the high level - also had a positive effect on relations with the municipal councils who had never before received international officials. However, those municipalities that were not visited by any UNDP staff, neither at the Senior Management nor the programmatic level, such as Bani Walid, felt that they were somewhat neglected.¹⁵⁵

- **Unclear communication caused frustration and increased distrust.** IPs and Coordinators noted that last minute changes in organization of training (shifting from face-to-face to online, cancelling last minute travel of participants to Tunis¹⁵⁶) caused a lot of frustration among participants, leading to a decrease in the SFL's efficiency and effectiveness since a lower number of CSOs benefitted from the training. It also put a strain on the training experts who had to re-adjust the mode of delivery and content of the training at the last moment.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, the fragile trust that Coordinators succeeded in establishing with both municipal staff as well as with the community at large was broken when Senior Management would visit a municipality and make promises to fund activities that UNDP could not fulfill.¹⁵⁸ Finally, the lack of clear communication meant that the municipalities still had not been informed of the SFL's end date by the time of the evaluation.
- **Heavy UNDP bureaucratic procedures.** Several stakeholders mentioned that UNDP's slow and heavy bureaucratic procedures - especially interpreting/applying them in the "most conservative" way¹⁵⁹ - have had an impact on the SFL's efficiency as well as effectiveness. Approvals for travel arrangements, recruiting staff, issuing contracts, paying invoices, etc. took an excessive amount of time. The lack of flexibility in the interpretation of rules and procedures is not conducive to implementing a large project such as the SFL in a context as complex and volatile as that of Libya.

7.3.4 Unintended positive results

Stakeholders noted a few unintended positive results, including the greater affordability of public services, a shift in attitude towards women, and greater demand for MHPSS. As a result of the provision of vehicles and equipment the cost of public services decreased. For example, according to Coordinators, the cost of calling an ambulance decreased by 70 per cent in Misrata due to the availability of a greater number of ambulances provided by the SFL. Similarly, the price of water decreased in Bani Walid due to the water pumps which were provided by the SFL.¹⁶⁰

In a context where there is stigma and suspension vis-à-vis working with CSOs and women, in Sebha, FLO was able to establish a relationship of trust and, as a result, could work closely and effectively with the municipality. Female staff of FLO have also succeeded in shifting the perception of women in the community and, as a result, there is a greater acceptance and willingness of collaborating with its female staff which originally had faced challenges.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁵ KII Municipal staff

¹⁵⁶ This was the case with Ajdabiya.

¹⁵⁷ KIIs IP, Coordinators, UNDP

¹⁵⁸ KII UNDP, Coordinators

¹⁵⁹ KII UNDP

¹⁶⁰ This information was provided during a KII with UNDP; however, there are no studies/reports that demonstrate this

¹⁶¹ KII UNDP and IP

Finally, there was an unexpected and positive consequence of HI's provision of MHPSS services and raising awareness regarding mental health issues. As a result of its interventions, HI received a request from the Ministry of Social Affairs to train its staff which was not originally foreseen in the planned activities.¹⁶²

7.3.5 Unintended negative results

Lack of clear and transparent communication raised expectations and created unintended consequences, leading even to increasing tensions within some communities. For example, the SFL provided Tawergha with one ambulance. This information was tweeted extensively, giving the impression that the SFL had purchased several ambulances. As a result, members of the community suspected that the ambulances were stolen since they only received one ambulance. Another example is in Sebha where the municipality was promised 30 generators but was provided with only 20 which created a difficult situation for the Coordinator who had to deal with the decrease in trust and disappointment vis-a-vis the SFL.¹⁶³ Similarly, several municipal staff noted that the participatory methodology used to develop the municipal plans have raised citizens' expectations regarding the implementation of the activities which have been included in these plans. Municipal staff raised their concerns that these plans should be funded – even if partially – otherwise, there is a risk of breaking the trust that was built between the communities and the municipalities and between the communities and UNDP.¹⁶⁴

7.4 Sustainability

The SFL's long-term sustainability is a function of the degree of ownership at the local and national level, the continuity of funding, the degree to which the capacity of different actors has been built and the sustainability of its three specific outputs.

7.4.1 Ownership

The SFL succeeded in creating ownership at the local level; however, there was no evidence that such ownership was generated at the national level. Local ownership was crucial to resolve conflicts as well as to ensure sustainability, in particular when the Municipal Council changed. When there was a conflict at the local level related to the implementation of activities under Output 1, the local community intervened to resolve the issue due to a high degree of ownership which was a result of the participatory consultations that generated the list of prioritized activities. For example, in Sebha, when there was a clash in opinion regarding the location of solar street lights, the community solved the problem by deciding that the lights would be installed on the main street. Similarly, when there was a disagreement regarding the selection of the site where the UNESCO library would be established, again it was the community that addressed and resolved the issue.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, the shift to an Output 3-led approach has contributed to greater political and social sustainability of investment packages. The high degree of ownership by the local civil society organizations - generated by their participation in consultation meetings - was crucial for ensuring sustainability at the local level when the Municipal Council changed (as a result of elections or due to

¹⁶² KII IP

¹⁶³ KII UNDP

¹⁶⁴ KII several Municipal staff and Coordinators

¹⁶⁵ KII IP

switching sides in the conflict).¹⁶⁶ When in, some cases, Municipal Councils attempted to modify the list of previously established activities, CSOs prevented the change in priorities.¹⁶⁷

At the national level, **there was insufficient high-level political engagement with the Prime Minister's Office and the Presidential Council.** Furthermore, while the SFL was designed at central level, prioritization and implementation of activities happened at the local level which took the credit and gained in visibility. In addition, the SFL was implemented directly by UNDP with very little involvement by the Libyan authorities. As a result, **there was no incentive for the national level to be involved, feel ownership, and financially support the SFL.**¹⁶⁸ Finally, there was insufficient institutional linking of certain activities with the relevant line ministries which jeopardizes institutional ownership and their long-term sustainability. For example, the MoH was not sufficiently involved in the MHPSS interventions and, as such, according to the SFL's IP, there may not be sufficient human resources allocated to carry forward the activities that were introduced by the SFL.

7.4.2 Funding

The Government of Libya (GoL) did not contribute financially to the SFL during Phase 2¹⁶⁹, notwithstanding several assurances made during DTG meetings that such funding was forthcoming.¹⁷⁰ According to different stakeholders, there were several reasons for this, including: (i) bureaucratic procedures which prevented the request for funding from the Ministry of Planning from being processed; and (ii) political reasons which led government staff – at the national and local level – as well as ordinary citizens to expect that donor countries should finance the rehabilitation/reconstruction of infrastructure (“destruction was caused by the West, and it should be the West that pays for the reconstruction”).¹⁷¹ In addition, **donor funding has gradually decreased over time** (see Table 10 above), partly due to the lack of government contribution, which donors expected to be at least 50 per cent of the SFL budget.¹⁷²

The SFL attempted but was not successful in attracting private sector funding and to set up public-private partnerships. The SFL prepared concept notes and proposals targeting the private sector (e.g., Al Baraka Bank and Libyana) however resources were not mobilized. According to several Coordinators, such financing from the private sector could ensure the sustainability (and scalability as mentioned below) of certain activities.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, municipal budgets do not include a budget line to ensure the sustainability of SFL activities (e.g., for renewing internet subscription for the computer lab or for purchasing spare parts should equipment/vehicles need to be repaired, etc.)¹⁷³ which will affect the long-term sustainability of some SFL-funded activities.

All these factors: unavailability of national funding, lack of sufficient engagement with the private sector, and lack of the necessary allocation of funds at the municipal level will severely limit the SFL's sustainability.

¹⁶⁶ KII Coordinators

¹⁶⁷ KII Coordinator

¹⁶⁸ KII Donor

¹⁶⁹ GoL provided US\$ 5 million in Phase 1

¹⁷⁰ Several DTG Meeting Minutes

¹⁷¹ KII Government, several Coordinators

¹⁷² Several DTG Meeting Minutes

¹⁷³ Municipal Council

7.4.3 Capacity building

The capacity building of different stakeholders will contribute to the SFL's sustainability. The SFL delivered trainings to several municipal and CSO staff on different topics (e.g., engineering, project cycle, procurement, communication, conflict analysis, municipal planning, and MHPSS). These included the following:

- **Engineering concepts.** To enhance the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the SFL International Engineer coordinated with the World Health Organization (WHO) to organize training for three MoP and 16 project engineers working in Sebha, Ubari, Bani Walid, Sirt and Tawergha to become certified on Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) treatment facility design.¹⁷⁴
- **Project management skills.** MoP and SFL engineers based in Tripoli participated in a five-day training on focused on building skills in project planning and monitoring.¹⁷⁵ A total of six engineers participated in the training with five passing the test and receiving Prince 2 certification (one engineer had difficulties related to English language).¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Public Works staff were trained on the Project Cycle, including procurement and engineering aspects, which were also applied in the SLCRR.¹⁷⁷
- **Communication skills.** The SFL has provided communication skills training to municipal communication officers. However, stakeholders noted that the training was mostly focused on COVID-19 and was not fully effective to address the SFL communication requirements.¹⁷⁸
- **Conflict analysis.** As mentioned earlier, both PCi and UNITAR delivered training on conflict analysis, peace building, and conflict risk mitigation. These trainings were attended by interested IDPs, women, youth and CSOs in several municipalities.
- **Municipal planning.** Under Output 2, the SFL provide on-the-job training for the members of the Municipal Task Force which is a skill that can be utilized for future planning exercises.
- **Technical training on MHPSS.** As mentioned above, Handicap International trained the staff of two local CSOs on delivering MHPSS services as well as Ministry of Social Affairs employees.

7.4.4 Sustainability of outputs

Sustainability of Output 3. Under this Output, local peace structures were established which have proved to be sustainable in some municipalities. For example, in Sebha, the Fezzan Charter for Peaceful Coexistence and Social Cohesion which was adopted by the municipality and presented to all social components of the south in April 2019.¹⁷⁹ According to the Annual Report (2019), it held several meetings and began working on a sustainability plan to be able to operate independently from PCi.¹⁸⁰ In Benghazi,

¹⁷⁴ Annual Report 2020, p. 18

¹⁷⁵ Prince 2 Project Management training

¹⁷⁶ Annual Report 2020, p. 19

¹⁷⁷ KII UNDP

¹⁷⁸ DTG Meeting 14 September 2021

¹⁷⁹ Annual Report 2019, p. 14

¹⁸⁰ Annual Report 2019, p. 15

building on the positive experience, the Social Peace Partnership (SPP) and the local councils agreed to establish a permanent body which would enhance regular communication and coordination on stabilization issues and would act as a social accountability mechanism to monitor work delivered by the SFL and the Benghazi Stabilization Committee. Thus, a Coordination Working Group was formed and continues to be regularly convened by the Benghazi SPP. However, the SPP's that were established in Sirt and Ubari, while still functioning as not as effective because several of their members have dropped out.

Sustainability of Output 2. The sustainability of this output is contingent on the successful mobilization of resources to implement the municipal development plans. The SFL is assisting the municipalities in developing a funding plan; however, there is no evidence that this will lead to additional resources. The experience of Kikla - which developed a marketing plan and video - demonstrates that it will be challenging for the other three municipalities to identify other sources of funding.

Sustainability of Output 1. To ensure the sustainability of goods and works implemented under this Output, the SFL introduced handover forms in Phase 2 and officially handed them over to the municipality after the latter signed a document that it would be responsible for their maintenance. In addition, the SFL delivered on-the-job training for end users at the municipal level so that they could do maintenance once the project ends. Furthermore, in Phase 2, the SFL introduced in its procurement contractors a Defect Liability Period (DLP) as a warranty period.¹⁸¹ In some municipalities, the SFL succeeded in building the local capacity to ensure maintenance of SFL-funded activities. For example, in Sebha, the SFL contractor delivered on-the-job training to GECOL's lighting team to install, operate and maintain the solar lighting system. As a result, GECOL was able to repair a number of poles damaged as a result of armed clashes in the city by using spare parts provided by the SFL. For the most part, stakeholders reported that the rehabilitated infrastructure (e.g., schools and health facilities) continue to be used for their intended purposes. Similarly, with the equipment and vehicles are utilized as intended. Since the evaluation was carried out remotely and no meetings were held with beneficiaries residing in the targeted municipalities, it was unable to verify this information independently. However, in some instances, municipalities face a double challenge to ensure their sustainability. In most cases, the **municipality's budget does not include a budget line to cover the maintenance and running costs SFL-funded activities** (e.g., the computer lab in Tawergha is no longer functioning since no budget was allocated to renew the internet subscription).¹⁸² **In addition, the municipality lacks the technical know-how to maintain the infrastructure and the SFL** (e.g., in Benghazi during a field visit, it was found that the solar lights which were installed were not functioning).¹⁸³

7.4.5 Replicability

The SFL concept was replicated in other projects implemented by both UNDP and other organizations. According to UNDP staff, USAID contacted the SFL to discuss its Theory of Change (ToC) so it could be replicated in the Libya Transition Initiative - the project implemented by Chemonics. Similarly, the EU requested that the Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Project (SLCRR) be inspired by the SFL ToC.¹⁸⁴

The Kikla Municipal Medium Term Development Plan was replicated in Bani Walid, Derna, and Ghat in Phase 2. The same methodology and approach developed for Kikla in Phase 1 - that included the

¹⁸¹ KII Mohamad Ali

¹⁸² KII Municipal Council, Coordinator

¹⁸³ KII UNDP

¹⁸⁴ KII UNDP

creation of a local Task Force made up of key representatives from the municipality - was applied in Phase 2 in three additional municipalities in order to produce their own municipal development plan.^{185,186}

7.4.6 Scalability

There were a few instances where SFL interventions led to the scalability of activities by either the private or public sector. In Tripoli, some municipalities created a “crisis unit” (e.g., Abu Salim and Tajoura) to carry out monitoring of activities and to attract funding from other sources, including oil companies to scale up activities.¹⁸⁷ In Bani Walid, the private sector funded additional departments in a hospital (e.g., obstetrics and nephrology departments) which had been partially rehabilitated by the SFL.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, the MoH in Tripoli - complemented the SFL assistance to rehabilitate the medical supply warehouses - by establishing a central pharmacy which serviced Bani Walid and other neighboring municipalities with medical supplies and equipment.

Finally, **the SFL created a demand for scalability: several coordinators mentioned that neighboring municipalities requested that the SFL implement activities also in their localities.** For example, in Benghazi, PCi conducted consultations, which aimed to assess the work of the SFL implemented during Phase 1 and identify new investments for the second phase. The consultations were facilitated by the Benghazi Social Peace Partnership (SPP) in close cooperation with the Local Councils of different neighborhoods of Benghazi. Inspired by the outcome of the consultations, other Local Councils in neighboring areas expressed their interest and willingness to hold similar meetings. As a result, an extra consultation session – which was not originally planned - was organized in the Nahr district.¹⁸⁹

7.4.7 Exit strategy

The SFL does not have an exit plan nor has it formally communicated to the municipalities the end date of the Project. The five-year municipal development plans being developed in Bani Walid, Derna, Ghat and Kikla are the closest to being part of a transitional strategy. However, as mentioned already, this would be contingent on the municipalities’ success to mobilize resources to implement those plans. UNDP has developed a Concept Note for providing Technical Assistance for Local Area Transformation (TALAT, see Box 10), which - if financed - could be a way to build on the SFL and to ensure continuity of support to the municipalities. In late 2021, UNDP initiated a restructuring of its country program around three pillars, including one on Local Peacebuilding and Livelihoods where both the SFL and the SLCCRP are included. This is an opportunity to link the two projects and for the SLCCRP to continue to finance some of the SFL’s activities¹⁹⁰ once the SFL officially closes in August 2022.

Box 10. Technical Assistance for Local Area Transformation TALAT

¹⁸⁵ Annual Report 2020, p. 12

¹⁸⁶ KII UNDP and Municipal staff

¹⁸⁷ KII Coordinator

¹⁸⁸ KII Coordinator

¹⁸⁹ Annual Report 2019, p. 11

¹⁹⁰ This could take place in the municipalities where there is a geographic overlap between the two projects, and especially for the funding of some of the activities identified and costed in the five-year municipal development plans produced under Output 2.

TALAT is designed to form a bridge to support for a post-transition Government which is able to deliver public goods across the whole of its territory. This offers a transition period in which the externally-funded delivery of capital investment¹⁹¹ (e.g., SFL, EU-funded SLCRR and SUSC) operates for a while alongside MoP capital budget delivery. The share of external funding would gradually taper and that of domestic spending would grow, within a shared program focused on supporting the social bargain within the local area and delivering a peace dividend from the national Government. TALAT would (i) modernize procurement and contracting systems for stabilization; (ii) put in place adaptable monitoring systems for implementation and effectiveness; and (iii) establish strategic communications systems for two-way citizen engagement.

Source: UNDP Libya: Technical Assistance for Local Area Transformation (TALAT) Draft Concept for Substantive Co-Creation, Draft Concept Note, 22 January 2022

7.5 Cross-cutting issues

The cross-cutting issues addressing vulnerable people, gender, persons with disability (PWD) are newly introduced concepts in the Libyan context. As such, the SFL had modest results in mainstreaming these transversal questions across its three Outputs. The sections below discuss in greater detail what the SFL was able to achieve in addressing these cross-cutting issues.

7.5.1 Leave No One Behind

The SFL did not have a specific strategy to target the poor or vulnerable since its primary focus was on stabilizing communities and managing conflicts. However, by improving access to public social services (such as health and education), it reached the population with limited income (since the richer citizens tend to go to private services).¹⁹²

Furthermore, the participation of CSOs in the consultation workshops which selected and prioritized the activities limited the tendency of elite capture. In some municipalities, these consultations helped to change the initial selected locations that benefitted more the municipal council members and less the wider population within the municipality.¹⁹³

7.5.2 Gender

Most stakeholders admitted that SFL's approach to gender equality was weak and that the SFL did not address sufficiently women's needs.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Notably Stabilisation Facility for Libya (SFL), Support for Local Community Resilience and Recovery (SLCRR), Towards National Reconciliation for Libya (TNRL), Local elections Project (LEP), Stabilisation to Recovery Transition (START), and Stability, Unity, Social Cohesion (SUSC).

¹⁹² KII Coordinator

¹⁹³ KII Coordinator

¹⁹⁴ Several UNDP staff and Coordinators

According to the Gender Specialist, the SFL was given an overall Gender Marker 2¹⁹⁵ which was generous given that gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) were not a "significant objective" in the SFL. However, a Gender Marker 1 – as it was originally ranked per the Project Document - would have been more appropriate.¹⁹⁶

Insufficient gender resources were allocated to the SFL. The UNDP gender expert was recruited in January 2021 – the last year of the Project. Prior to that date the SFL did not benefit from gender expertise. In addition, SFL Project staff were predominantly men and the SFL succeeded in recruiting only one female Coordinator even though the Risk Matrix explicitly stated that "reliance on male field staff leads to disempowerment of women within the program and the community as a whole" (See Annex 15).

A Gender Action Plan (not dated) was developed and there is no evidence that any follow up was made to ensure that it was implemented (see Annex 20). A report of the Gender and Inclusion audit of the Country Office program and projects stated that "with a 0 percent trackable budget delivery to women, the SFL was far behind in achieving its aims". In April 2021, a Gender Mainstreaming Meeting was held between the newly recruited Gender specialist and SFL Project staff. It noted that "there is no gender analysis of the situation in the project, nor are there any assessments or studies from a gender perspective. The focus is very limited with regard to gender mainstreaming, and it is limited only to the numerical participation of women in project activities without focusing on aspects of gender inequality and trying to address them through the project".¹⁹⁷ It concluded that a follow-up meeting to measure progress in implementing the gender action plan; however, there is no evidence that such meeting took place.

Nevertheless, there was some evidence that effort was made to ensure that gender equality was included in the implementation of the SFL's three Outputs. For example, in Output 3, women were included in the consultation processes and in one municipality's stabilization goal. Ubari's stated that its goal was "ensuring equal access for all community members, especially women, youth and other marginalized groups".¹⁹⁸ In some municipalities, it proved impossible to have effective female participation in the Social Peace Partnership. To address this challenge, the SFL, through its implementing partner, the PCi, established women-only forums, through which to feed women's perceptions and concerns into the Partnership's work.¹⁹⁹ In addition, around 46 percent of the participants in the training delivered by UNITAR were women (see Annex 19). Similarly, almost 58 percent of beneficiaries of MHPSS provided by Handicap International were women (see Table 17 above).

In 2019, and at the start of Phase 2, a Gender and Security Assessment covering Benghazi, Sirt and Ubari was carried out by PCi which provided a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of gendered conflict drivers, inclusion and exclusion dynamics, and gendered needs and priorities for stabilization in each location.²⁰⁰ Based on this assessment a Women and Youth Grants scheme was launched in 2019 in these three municipalities as part of the SFL's objectives to raising the representation and meaningful participation of women and young people in the decision-making processes. A Request for Proposal was

¹⁹⁵ Gender Marker (GM) 2 Advancing gender equality is a significant objective but not the principal reason to undertake this project. Gender is reflected in the Conflict Analysis, Implementation/Activities, the Results Framework and the Budget. A GM2 project is a strongly gender mainstreamed project.

¹⁹⁶ Gender Marker 1 Gender is integrated in the conflict analysis and findings from it ensure that the project does no harm and is not reinforcing gender inequality, but gender equality is not a significant objective of this project or addressed in the interventions. A GM 1 project is not considered a well mainstreamed project but does not contribute to gender inequality.

¹⁹⁷ Minutes of the Gender Mainstreaming Meeting with SFL project, p. 3

¹⁹⁸ SFL City Briefs Quarter 2, March 2022 <https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/library/Sustainabledevelopment/City-Briefs-Stabilization-Facility-for-Libya.html> [accessed on 8 March 2022]

¹⁹⁹ Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report (2019)

²⁰⁰ Annual Report, 2019, p. 18

issued in partnership with PCi and the SPPs encouraging project for funding activities which would strengthen local conflict management and social accountability mechanisms; contribute to social cohesion; improve service delivery and provide livelihood opportunities. Table 18 includes the list of activities that were selected and implemented. With the end of the contractual relationship between the SFL and PCi, this initiative was discontinued in 2020.

Table 18. Training initiatives for women and youth in Ubari

Barbers' training	72 youth certified as barbers	Provision of equipment for training center where three rounds of trainings were organized in partnership with the "Benghazi Barbers Union"
"Female peacebuilding parliamentarians"	20 active women between the ages of 25-50	Workshop on governance, citizenship, political participation and public policies.
"My Craft"	40 women	40 women trained in the areas of e-marketing, SME business management, 3-D design and handicraft production

Source: Annual Report, 2019, p. 19

In Output 2, the ToRs of the Municipal Task Force specified that the Task Force should include one or two women (if possible) as a result the three Task Forces had female representatives (see Annex 17 for Municipal Task Force membership criteria).^{201,202} Also, and interestingly, one of the municipalities (Bani Walid) used a female voice to produce the video to market its municipal plan. Finally, through Output 1 the SFL implemented specific activities that targeted women in three municipalities (see Table 19).

Table 19. Municipalities where SFL activities targeted women

Municipality	Activity targeting women
Sebha	Rehabilitation of Training Center for Youth and Women to provide practical skills to women, which help them to improve the economic conditions for themselves and their households ²⁰³ Renovation of the Al-Akaber Literacy School to teach elderly to read, write and memorize the Qur'an. Equipping the Al-Akaber School with a sewing workshop, cooking equipment, and a meeting room to train women on sewing and knitting, food making, and providing a place for women's activities
Tripoli	Rehabilitation of Al-Jala Women's Hospital to improve health provision to women Installation of solar power system for sewing classrooms in the Libyan-Korean Center Rehabilitation of the women's section in the Omar Asker Hospital
Ubari	Rehabilitation of Women's Center and providing furniture and IT equipment; as a result, the number of women who frequented the center increased ²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Derna, Bani Walid and Gha.; Kikla's Task Force which was set up under Phase 1 did not include a female representative

²⁰² Kils UNDP staff, Coordinator, Municipal Task Force

²⁰³ Annual Report 2019, p. 27

²⁰⁴ KII IP

Source: SFL City Briefs Quarter 2, March 2022

<https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/library/Sustainabledevelopment/City-Briefs-Stabilization-Facility-for-Libya.html> [accessed on 8 March 2022]

Notwithstanding the above examples, the SFL missed several opportunities to ensure that women fully benefitted from the SFL's different interventions. For example, though Output 1 rehabilitated critical infrastructure which was expected to benefit women and men equally, the SFL did not assess whether women had difficulty accessing these services. In some cases, the SFL did not fund the implementation of a prioritized activity which would have benefitted women. This was the case in Tawergha where the women's center was not financed.²⁰⁵ In 2021, a joint workshop on the role of civil society in promoting peace conducted with representatives of the Zuway and Tebu communities in Kufra did not include any female participants.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, Kikla's Municipal Task Force members were all male.

Finally, the Gender Action Plan foresaw that "all partners and targeted communities need to be fully informed about the UN Preventing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (PSEA) policy and reporting mechanisms need to be put in place". However, no evidence was found that this took place.

7.5.3 Human rights

The conflict analysis reports produced by the SFL's partners guided SFL's interventions in some municipalities and produced information which led to addressing human rights and discrimination issues. For example, in Tawergha, the SFL worked closely with UNSMIL to ensure that human rights were taken into consideration and the principal of "Do No Harm" was applied.²⁰⁷ In Sebha, the SFL rehabilitated a youth center and which brought together young people from different ethnic minorities as well as those who did not have a legal status.²⁰⁸ In addition, several IPs mentioned that they endeavored to ensure that ethnic minorities were represented in community consultations. Furthermore, procurement processes became more sensitive to these issues following the Strategic and Operational Review which recommended to "use conflict sensitive procurement of goods, services and civil works to help manage community tensions and improve the benefits accruing to the local economy".²⁰⁹ Finally the category of migrants is a sensitive issue in Libya and was not broached by the SFL.²¹⁰

7.5.4 Persons with Disability

The SFL addressed the needs of Persons with Disability in different ways, directly through rehabilitation of infrastructure, and, indirectly, through the community mapping exercises and by coordinating with the demining activities (as a preventive measure). However, there is limited evidence that the SFL adopted the twin-track approach.²¹¹

²⁰⁵ KII Municipal Council

²⁰⁶ Annual Report 2021, p. 5

²⁰⁷ KII UNDP

²⁰⁸ KII IP

²⁰⁹ KII UNDP and Wood, D and Wilson, G. (2018). The Stabilisation Facility for Libya, An independent strategic and operational review, June 2018, p. 91

²¹⁰ KII Donor

²¹¹ The twin-track approach combines mainstream programs and projects that are inclusive of persons with disabilities as well as programs and projects that are *targeted* towards persons with disabilities. It is an essential element of any strategy that seeks to

Support to Persons with Disability (PWD) was considered in the SFL by ensuring that rehabilitated infrastructure (schools and hospitals) was accessible to persons with physical disabilities. Furthermore, the mapping exercise which was carried by the Task Force in the four municipalities (under Output 2), also considered Persons with Disability's needs.²¹² Finally, and as a preventive measure to decrease the risk of mine injury which might result in creating physical disability, the SFL coordinated at the local level in and in an ad hoc manner with NGOs to clear areas targeted by the SFL and prior to any infrastructure rehabilitation.²¹³ However, some stakeholders noted that the SFL did not coordinate sufficiently on mine action at the national level.²¹⁴

The only municipality that specifically identified supporting persons with disability was Tawergha.²¹⁵ However, the SFL did not fund the activity that had been prioritized during community consultations since it was covered by another project.²¹⁶ Similarly, according to the Annual Report (2019), the Project team met with a representative of the PWD in Sirt to discuss the needs of this community. Based on the consultations, the SFL had planned to rehabilitate and possibly procure equipment to support the Rehabilitation Center in Sirt;²¹⁷ however there is no evidence that this was achieved. Nevertheless, the SFL, did support several activities that benefitted persons with disabilities, including rehabilitating a physiotherapy center as well as a psychosocial center in Sebha and a mental health center in Tawergha.²¹⁸ It also rehabilitated the prosthetics department in Abo Salim hospital in Tripoli.

8. Conclusions

Overall Conclusions

The SFL was one of UNDP Libya's flagship projects, which attracted substantial donor investments. It provided essential services with a wide outreach for Libyans and contributed to the achievement of several development goals. However, it missed the opportunity to develop into a multi-donor reconstruction fund due to several reasons including (i) senior management turnover and management style, (ii) a weak M&E framework which did not capture outcome level results, and (iii) a lack of a communication strategy. This, in turn, discouraged donors from contributing further to the SFL.

The SFL faced several tradeoffs including maintaining its stabilization focus versus addressing humanitarian needs across the different municipalities, keeping in mind that sometimes it was probably necessary to respond to humanitarian crisis in order not to further aggravate destabilization. It also had to consider selecting municipalities on the basis of either "deepening" or "broadening" its activities. The first would have allowed more in-depth intervention in strategically selected areas, especially since budget allocated per municipality was too small compared to the needs. While the latter would have permitted the

mainstream disability inclusion successfully. Also, see chapter 9 of the Technical Notes. Entity Accountability Framework. United Nations Disability and Inclusion Strategy:

<https://www.un.org/en/disabilitystrategy/resources>

²¹² KII UNDP

²¹³ KII Donor

²¹⁴ KII Donor

²¹⁵ SFL City Briefs Quarter 2, March 2022 <https://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/library/Sustainabledevelopment/City-Briefs-Stabilization-Facility-for-Libya.html> [accessed on 8 March 2022]

²¹⁶ KII Municipal Council

²¹⁷ Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report (2019)

²¹⁸ KII UNDP

SFL to reach a greater number of people/municipalities. Finally, another balance the SFL had to strike was between ensuring equal geographic representation and a common approach while at the same time there were important differences in the political context in each region which would have necessitated a more nuanced and tailored approach.

Relevance and alignment

The SFL was fully aligned with UNDP's Strategic Plan and its CPD. It also contributed to achieving several SDGs and was in line with national frameworks, in particular the "Law on Decentralization". The SFL's ToC was valid at the local level, however, it is unclear to what extent the link from the local to the national level was realistic across the three different regions, given their specific political and security contexts. Furthermore, the lack of internalization of the ToC across all groups of stakeholders (donor, government and UNDP staff) led to pressures on the SFL to deviate from its overall stabilization goal and not to follow the sequencing of outputs as envisioned in the ToC (Output 3 – Output 2 -Output 1). As a result, the SFL was able to support conflict management and contribute to stabilization mostly in those municipalities where it succeeded in basing Output 1 on Output 3. There is no evidence that Output 2 was linked to either of the other two outputs. The SFL demonstrated capacity to adapt to several external factors (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic, flooding in Ghat, donor priorities). However, this flexibility to use funds to respond to humanitarian crises, may also have affected its stabilization focus. It also put pressure on the SFL to "broaden" rather than to "deepen" as was recommended by the DTG in several meetings. The SFL was able to respond to the needs of the communities through the participatory consultations it conducted which allowed the introduction of innovative interventions such as the provision of MHPSS. However, there is weak evidence that the different needs of women and men were taken into consideration in the SFL's design.

Efficiency

The SFL's human resources were inadequate in terms of number and expertise to implement a large program such as the SFL, in a context as complex and volatile as Libya. Furthermore, the gender breakdown was heavily skewed, with the SFL being predominantly staffed by men which affected its ability to fully integrate gender considerations into its design and implementation of activities. In addition, the SFL experienced several delays which led to its extension by eight months. In terms of processes, procurement – though significantly improved during Phase 2 – continued to experience several challenges which impacted the achievement of the three Outputs. Communication was not sufficiently strategic and, as a result, impacted both the linking of the local and national ToCs as well as the willingness of donors to continue contributing financially to the SFL. Outside of the DTG, coordination was mostly carried out in an ad hoc manner and at the local level. Weak coordination was due to several reasons including (i) a lack of will of other bilaterally projects because they had their own objectives and priorities; (ii) inexistence of a platform at the technical level to coordinate stabilization efforts; and (iii) delays in procurement which hindered effective coordination between different projects. The SFL's risk matrix was fit for purpose, however it did not address environmental nor social risks (including gender-related ones). In addition, though there were several countermeasures identified in the risk matrix not all of which were implemented. Finally, the SFL lacked a complaints handling mechanism which would have allowed citizens to provide feedback.

Effectiveness

The SFL's logic was based on following a specific and interlinked sequence of Outputs. Due to several reasons, including a lack of internalization of the ToC, working in a siloed approach and pressure to show visible results, the SFL did not respect this sequencing. Originally, Output 1 was envisaged to be the "means" to achieve stabilization and not an end in itself. However, since it was easier to implement, was less politically sensitive and had more tangible results, UNDP's Senior Management played an important role in deviating from the ToC by focusing extensively on Output 1. As a consequence, reporting to donors and communicating SFL results emphasized mainly the delivery of infrastructure and equipment. Furthermore, and whereas the SFL's revised approach to Output 3 – building local capacity to carry out conflict analysis and management - was sound in principle, the time needed to build local capacity to the level necessary to implement this Output meant that the sequencing could not be respected. In addition, the timing of the transitioning from PCi to the local CSOs contributed in a reduction in pace of activities of Output 3 at a critical moment.²¹⁹ A bridging phase between the INGO-implemented Output 3 and the CSO takeover would have been beneficial. Regarding Output 2, it was implemented independently from Outputs 3 and 1 and the finalization of the municipal development plans was still ongoing at the time of the evaluation.

The M&E framework did not capture outcome level achievements so it was not possible to determine the extent to which the SFL's outcomes (if any) contributed to the achievement of the intended impact (stabilization goal). However, there are indications that the SFL succeeded in increasing legitimacy of institutions at the local level, especially in the municipalities which benefitted from participatory and inclusive processes. It is less clear to what extent the SFL was able to increase the legitimacy of national institutions and by extension linking the local and national ToCs. This was more the case in the Tripoli and Bani Walid municipalities due to their physical proximity to national institutions.

The SFL's effectiveness was also affected by several challenges, including the travel restrictions and lockdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic, power cuts and unstable internet connection, political and security volatilities, difficulties in obtaining visas for international staff and remote management, and unreliable banking systems, all of which caused delays and/or reformatting of activities. While most factors that hindered the SFL's implementation were external, there were a few examples of internal factors that also had an impact (e.g., choice of government counterpart, heavy bureaucratic procedures and management style).

Sustainability

The SFL was externally driven, funded and implemented which jeopardized its long-term sustainability and institutionalization of its approach, in particular at the national level. Nevertheless, the SFL's sustainability is more likely where the SFL has succeeded in (i) developing local ownership due to community consultations and (ii) building municipal and CSO capacities. However, to ensure the continued sustainability, replicability, and scalability, the SFL needed to mobilize additional financial resources from the Government of Libya, donor countries and/or the private sector – something it failed to do. Furthermore, the SFL did not put in place a phased exit strategy, nor did it clearly communicate to the targeted municipalities the end date of the project. Still, there is an opportunity to link up the SFL with the SLRRCP to ensure a gradual phasing out, at least in the municipalities where they overlap. The latter is essential since there is no indication that additional funding is forthcoming from donors or from the Government of Libya and municipalities do not have budget lines to cover running and maintenance costs which would jeopardize the sustainability of Output 1 results. Finally, the relationships that were developed at the local

²¹⁹ KII UNDP

level through the SFL and which created trust and promoted dialogue among different groups is priceless and this “investment” should be sustained through other projects being implemented at the municipal level.

Cross-cutting issues

Overall, the SFL demonstrated modest gender equality and social inclusion results. This is mostly due to the fact that these are new issues in the context of Libya and insufficient UNDP human and financial resources were dedicated to ensure their mainstreaming. Nevertheless, UNDP’s IPs succeeded in having a good representation of women in their training activities and the SFL rehabilitated some infrastructure that targeted women in three municipalities. The SFL, by rehabilitating public infrastructure, assisted the poorer and more vulnerable segment of the population. It also succeeded in some instances to address human rights issues, in particular those related to lack of access of some ethnic groups to public services. Finally, persons with disability were only tangentially taken into consideration, mostly through ensuring their physical access to newly-rehabilitated public infrastructure.

9. Lessons Learnt

Based on the above analysis, the evaluation has drawn the five interlinked lessons below:

Context matters. The design of any project should be based on **a solid context analysis**, especially a project such as the SFL which has a political goal. While the SFL may be inspired by other stabilization funds implemented in conflict-affected countries, the Libyan context is very specific. However, a deeper analysis which feeds into the design of a stabilization fund is necessary at the onset in order to be reflected in its overall Theory of Change. Furthermore, a better understanding of the conflict dynamics at the local level and the **differences between one municipality and another** is essential to fine-tune the local ToC and to determine whether **different regional ToCs** are necessary for achieving stabilization and for linking the local to the national objectives. Context matters not only for designing the stabilization fund, but also in the operational aspects of implementation. In particular, **procurement procedures should be more flexible**, simpler and streamlined to take into context the complexity of the Libyan context. There are UNDP operational experiences (e.g., in Syria) which can be useful for the Libya Country Office to learn from and to adapt as appropriate. Furthermore, and to ensure that procurement is appropriate and fits the local context, **include the national Coordinators** in the review technical specifications. The **community consultations** contributed to better understand the context, and in some cases, succeeded in ensuring that “No Harm” was done. It is necessary that these **consultations are an iterative process** and need to be repeated, especially after a new municipal council is elected. If necessary, **separate consultations for women** in conservative municipalities should be organized to make sure that their voices are heard. Finally, and in order to ensure that a stabilization fund is sensitive to the context, **cross-cutting issues, including gender and persons with disabilities, have to be considered from the start and should be based on a solid analysis** to guide the design and implementation of the stabilization efforts.

People are the project. The people involved in a project can make or break it. The SFL was UNDP’s flagship program and its largest project in Libya. **UNDP’s Senior Management involvement is key** for (i) ensuring continued donor engagement, (ii) mobilizing additional resources, (iii) engaging with the Libyan authorities at the highest level (Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidential Council), (iv) following up on the implementation of the strategic review’s recommendations, and (iv) providing a healthy management style within UNDP. The high turnover of Senior Management during the project’s life was not conducive

to achieving this. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that a project such as the SFL has **gender-balanced, appropriate and dedicated staff in terms of both numbers as well as technical expertise (conflict, gender, communications, M&E) from the start of and throughout the project.** In addition to recruitment of staff, building their capacity and understanding of both the project's goals as well as technical issues is essential (e.g., ToCs, UNDP's procurement process, gender and social inclusion). Finally, the importance of people engaged in the project is not limited to the UNDP side. **The selection of the members of the Municipal Task Forces well as the counterpart(s) at the national level are key for ensuring ownership and sustainability.**

Working in silos is ineffective. To increase the effectiveness of the SFL, more integration and coordination needed to take place. This should take place at different levels: (i) within SFL, within the three Outputs) and within one Output (e.g., linking Handicap International supported CSOs with UNITAR to build their organizational capacity building); **(ii) within UNDP** (e.g., appointing one UNDP Coordinator for all UNDP-implemented projects at the municipal level to act as an interlocutor with municipality and to better coordinate UNDP's activities at the local level); **(iii) with other projects being implemented at the local level** (e.g., SCLRRP, other UN agencies and bilateral programs to avoid duplication and ensure complementarity); **and (iv) among the different national institutions both vertically** (e.g., strengthening communication and work relationships between the central government and the local authorities) **as well as horizontally** (e.g., greater involvement of Tripoli based line ministries in the stabilization efforts led by different international actors).

Communication is key. In a project such as the SFL which has multiple donors and has political objectives, communication is essential to achieve its objects. Clear and timely communication needs to take place at all levels, including at the community level to ensure that No Harm is being done and that expectations are managed. Furthermore, at the local level, a **feedback mechanism** would allow citizens to provide feedback (both positive and negative) which would allow the project to take corrective measures. Such a mechanism could be included on a **SFL-dedicated webpage** which should be kept updated with all the information regarding activities to be implemented, budget and timeline. Furthermore, communication products - which **convert M&E technical reports into communication messages** – are necessary to demonstrate results, facilitate resource mobilization, and buy-in. **Strategic communication should focus on the objectives of SFL** - not only on money spent, equipment delivered and infrastructure rehabilitated (input/output) to maintain donor interest - in order to preserve and build upon the uniqueness of SFL. Finally, a **communication strategy** should be developed, resourced and staffed, implemented and monitored to ensure that the **political objective of enhancing legitimacy of Libyan institutions at the local and national level is achieved.**

What you count is what you get is what you sell. The M&E framework is essential to monitor financial inputs, outputs/activities, but more importantly outcome-level results. The SFL focused mostly at monitoring Output 1 (which was easier to count and quantify) than the other two Outputs. This led to two consequences: UNDP Senior Management focused more on the results related to rehabilitation of infrastructure than on those that were at least equally important for achieving stabilization: Outputs 2 and 3. Furthermore, by having the “numbers” for Output 1, UNDP used this information to communicate to donors its results and did not sufficiently demonstrate the achievement of stabilization outcomes, as a result, it was unable to convince donors that the SFL was achieving its stabilization goal which led to a decrease in donor funding. To capture such achievements, **the M&E framework should measure not only quantitative data but also use qualitative methodologies (e.g., complement quantitative surveys with**

FGD or the other methodologies such as Most Significant Change²²⁰ to collect “stories”). Finally, the **M&E should inform the Communications** in order for the results and achievements to be communicated at different levels by using appropriate means of communications for each audience.²²¹ In terms of financial monitoring, there should be **better financial management which provides financial information per municipality as well as per category of procurement and overhead costs**. In terms of learning from the monitoring process, an **iterative process around how the M&E information is linked to achieving the ToCs** (both at the local and national level) involving all stakeholders should be organized on an annual basis.

10. Recommendations

Given the limited time left before the end date of the SFL, and based on the findings above, the evaluation proposes the following programmatic recommendations addressed to UNDP SFL Project staff:

Implement communication activities targeting different audiences:

- Communicate clearly the end of project date with all local and national authorities
- Update the “Making an Impact – Stabilizing communities, Supporting Peace” document to cover the full implementation period of the SFL
- Capture outcome level through stories (the SFL could involve university students to collect stories and produce short videos/interviews)
- Develop a communication product specifically targeting the private sector
- Develop a communication product highlighting how the SFL has benefited women and persons with disabilities
- Produce a case study on the SFL’s work in Sebha which showcases the effectiveness of linking Output 3 with Output 1
- If security allows it, organize a national closure workshop, bringing together the municipalities, implementing partners, MoLG and MoP and the Presidential Council, the Prime Minister’s Office and donors)

Establish linkages between the SFL and other projects to ensure sustainability of SFL investments:

- Use remaining SFL funds to cover some activities identified in the Municipal Plans developed; link with resilience project and private sector for continuity and sustainability
 - Present municipal development plan to all municipal council members and key municipal staff as well as to MoLG and key sectoral ministries to gain their continued support
 - Produce a checklist for municipalities regarding requirement for maintenance of infrastructure/equipment once SFL ends
 - Link CSOs whose capacity has been built by UNITAR with other projects so that they can apply the technical experience acquired
- Share information/communication products with targeted private sector companies to explore possibility of replicating/scaling up SFL activities in municipalities

A final recommendation addressed to UNDP Senior Management is to ensure that SFL gains are included in new CPD and mobilize resources for TALAT.

²²⁰ [Most-significant-change.pdf \(intrac.org\)](#)

²²¹ The production of “digestible” M&E information could also be included in the contract of the firm doing M&E.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE
INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT
FINAL EVALUATION OF STABILIZATION FACILITY FOR LIBYA - STRONGER
FOR LIBYA PROJECT**

REF.:	IC-UNDP-22-003
Dated:	February 3, 2022
Office:	UNDP Libya
Description of the assignment:	Final Evaluation of Stabilization Facility for Libya - Stronger for Libya Project
Project name:	Country Office UNDP Libya
Reports to:	Deputy Resident Representative Programme
Type of Appointment:	Individual Consultant (International)
Duty Station:	Homebased
Duration of the contract:	40 working days
Expected start date:	February 21, 2022

The proposal should be submitted by email to tenders.ly@undp.org no later than **February 13, 2022, at 15:00 hours Tripoli**, Libyan time ref. www.greenwichmeantime.com.

Any request for clarification must be sent in writing, or by standard electronic communication to the address or email address: procurement.ly@undp.org. UNDP Libya Procurement Unit will respond in writing or by standard electronic mail and will send written copies of the response, including an explanation of the query without identifying the source of inquiry, to all consultants who express their interest.

I. Background and context:

i. Stabilization activities are based on a gender-aware conflict analysis, quick needs assessments, and consultations with local authorities and other relevant local stakeholders. The **final Project Evaluation - Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL)** supports national and local actors, men, women and youth, in delivering peace dividends to the Libyan people. All stabilization activities aim at supporting and strengthening the legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities; strengthening their capability to lead Libya to sustained peace; reducing the risk of further fragmentation of the Libyan State; and ultimately fostering national unity for all Libyans. The project supports inclusive governance structures, thus laying the groundwork for lasting reconciliation as well as sustained reconstruction and development. The Impact to which the SFL contributes is stronger legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity.

Alignment with Country Program Document CPD outcome (s)

Project/Outcome Information

Project/outcome title Independent Project Evaluation - Stabilization Facility for Libya - Stronger for Libya

Corporate outcome and output

UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2022: **Outcome 3-** Strengthen resilience to shocks and crises
UN Strategic Framework for Libya (2019-2020) and the Country Program Document (CPD):
Overarching Objective - By late 2020, Libyan institutions' capacities at all levels are strengthened thus ensuring accountability, transparency and provision of equitable and quality social services addressing vulnerability and participation gaps and encouraging economic recovery towards a diversified and inclusive model.

Outcome 1. By late 2020, core government functions will be strengthened and Libyan institutions and civil society, at all levels, will be better able to respond to the needs of the people (Libyans, migrants and refugees) through transparent, inclusive gender-sensitive decision-making processes abiding by the democratic principles of division of power and rule of law.

Outcome 3. By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on **quality social services delivery** for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities.

Project Outcome/ UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD) Outputs:

Output 1.1 Space for national reconciliation is created addressing community needs and mutual interests.

Output 1.6. Mechanisms for civil society participation are in place.

Output 3.1. Improved local public services and upgraded infrastructure to enhance accessibility and boost resilient local economic development, in targeted regions of the country.

Country Libya

Region Arab States

Date project document signed

Project dates Start 1 January 2019 **Planned end** 31 December 2021

Project budget \$ 92,892,924.23

Project expenditure at the time of evaluation \$ 62,208,248

Funding source Fourteen (14) Donors, including Libya, Canada, Denmark, European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

Implementing party UNDP

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Sustainable Development Goals 5, 10 and 16

ii. Project Outcomes

The Stabilization Facility for Libya was established in May 2016. In the Board meeting in August 2016, the Board approved the project to commence operations in Kikla, Ubari and Benghazi. This was followed by approval to expand operations to Sirte and Sebha in December 2016. By June 2017, the SFL was also mandated to expand to Tripoli, Bani Walid, Derna, and Kufra. In January 2018, the Board approved expansion to Tawergha, Ghat and Ajdabiya, dependent upon safe access to each area and adequate financial resourcing. In the same Board meeting, the project end date was extended to 31 December 2018.

The SFL Board requested a strategic and operational review of the Facility which was conducted in the first semester of 2018. Recommendations of the consultants were discussed extensively and during the last semester of 2018, a Project Document was prepared for the 2nd phase of the SFL covering a three-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021.

There were two important changes to the Facility as a result of the review: the first was a shift in the overall goal from “enhancing the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord (GNA), to contribute to “stronger legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity”. The second was a shift from working “in conflict” to an approach working “on conflict” which led to an emphasis on the establishment of local stabilization goals in each municipality where the Facility operates. This shift in emphasis is reflected in the section below which presents the flow of implementation from Output 3 to Output 2 and Output 1.

In the second phase which covers the period 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021, the Stabilization Facility intends to contribute to the UNDP Libya country programme goal of reduced conflict and unified governance arrangements in Libya. The **Impact to which the SFL will contribute is stronger legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity**. This is being measured principally by perceptions of the legitimacy of the state authorities, by progress with formal political processes that unite Libya, and by political and economic progress being more even across the country.

SFL intends to reduce local conflicts and increase local stability; “the **Outcome for which the SFL will manage is a reduction in local conflicts and increase in local stability**”. This was expected to require that local stabilization goals are agreed, sufficiently inclusive of all communities, and are on course for achievement. This is intended to be assessed by local communities, reported through local peace structures that are fully inclusive with women and youth empowered to participate meaningfully, and verified by the SFL’s independent third party monitoring contractor.²²²

iii. Project Scope.

Since its inception, the Facility has been mandated to work in the three regions of Libya (East, West and South). In the 2nd phase of the Stabilization Facility (1 January 2019 – 31 December 2021), five streams of activity, implemented in each municipality, and approved by the Board:

²²² UNDP had contracted a third part firm to measure the change in the public perception on the legitimacy and the performance of the internationally recognized government. A separate contract was advertised for panel and on-site monitoring of the effect of SFL interventions of local stabilization goals.

1. Establishment and/or support to an inclusive local peace structure, involving the municipality, local social actors and relevant national service delivery agencies, working together to identify a realistic local stabilisation goal, informed by a gender-sensitive conflict analysis that informs discussions and agreement on a plausible path toward reaching that goal, including a list of priority investments for SFL, national budget, and other agencies;
 2. Support for capacity in municipalities and local branches of national service delivery agencies through participation in the process plus short-term surge capacity (e.g. in inclusive planning or budgeting) where required;
 3. Delivery of the identified priority investments relevant to SFL;
 4. Continued support for trust-enhancing relationships within and between communities, reflecting the specific needs of women and also drawing on their potential contributions to stability, including where possible municipalities reaching out to neighbors where tensions persist;
 5. Support for enhanced capacity to develop and deliver an effective communications strategy at local and national level; and
- Additionally, SFL intends to contribute to enhanced capacity for monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL)

iv. Geographic context (the specific areas that the project cover e.g. region)

The Stabilization Facility for Libya was established in May 2016. In the Board meeting in August 2016, the Board approved the project to commence operations in Kikla, Ubari and Benghazi. This was followed by approval to expand operations to Sirte and Sebha in December 2016. By June 2017, the SFL was also mandated to expand to Tripoli, Bani Walid, Derna, and Kufra. In January 2018, the Board approved expansion to Tawergha, Ghat and Ajdabiya, dependent upon safe access to each area and adequate financial resourcing. In the same Board meeting, the project end date was extended to 31 December 2018.

v. Project Stakeholders

Key stakeholders on the government side include the Presidency Council, state authorities including relevant line ministries, and municipalities as well as with the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC). The SFL also has a number of partnerships with local and international NGOs providing support in the area of Output 3 (conflict reduction).

vi. Project Beneficiaries

The SFL seeks to bring about change in the lives of Libyan citizens in the East, West and South of the country. The

Board has identified specific criteria for the selection of municipalities where the SFL will operate, the most important of which are:

1. Geographic balance to cover areas from the East, South and West Libya;
2. Functioning local authority structure in place in the municipality;
3. Commitment by the local authority to peace and political process;
4. Area affected by and/or prone to conflict and high level of vulnerable population;
5. Catalytic value of the intervention; as well as

6. Sufficient security for effective implementation

vii. Project Donors

When the Stabilization Facility was established in 2016, there were a total of 13 donors contributing to the Facility including the Government of Libya, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 2017, Denmark became a donor to the SFL project which is now funded by 14 donors including the Government of Libya.

viii. Project Budget and delivery

The estimated project budget for the SFL in phase 1 was US \$40 million. By the end of the first phase (31 December 2018), total utilization of funds contributed to the Stabilization Facility since its inception was **\$ 28,713,833**. This includes expenditures of \$28,371,023 and additional commitments of \$ 342,810 leaving a remaining balance of just over \$ 11.28 million.

The Total amount mobilized since the onset for both SFL phase 1 & 2 is \$ 95.9 million. The amount utilized under Phase 1 was 28.4 million, leaving \$67.5 million for phase 2. The Total amount projected for phase 2 as per the project document is \$92.9 million; therefore, the funding gap as of October 2021 is \$25.4 million.

ix. Project link to governmental strategies/ priorities

Libya has yet to develop a national development strategy and therefore lacks a framework within which to align and coordinate priority actions toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The SFL is linked to the United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF) specially for **Outcome 1** (“By late 2020, **core government functions** will be strengthened and Libyan institutions and Civil Society, at all levels, will be better able to respond to the needs of the people (Libyans, migrants and refugees) through transparent, inclusive gender sensitive decision-making processes abiding by the democratic principles of division of power and rule of law.”) and its **Outcome 3**: By late 2020, relevant Libyan institutions improved their capacity to design, develop and implement social policies that focus on **quality social services delivery** for all women and girls, men and boys (including vulnerable groups, migrants and refugees) in Libya towards enhancing human security and reducing inequalities.

x. Project work with youth, gender, and human rights

SFL seeks to contribute to local stability through achieving the consensus on local stabilisation goals that are inclusive of all communities and population groups including youth, women and vulnerable populations including people with disability. This is intended to be

assessed by local communities, reported through local peace structures that are fully inclusive with women and youth empowered to participate meaningfully.

Stabilisation activities are thus based on a gender-aware conflict analysis, quick needs assessments, and consultations with local authorities and other relevant local stakeholders. The SFL supports national and local actors, men, women and youth, in delivering peace dividends to the Libyan people.

II. Scope of work

i. The overall objectives of the Evaluation

The overall objective of the evaluation is to assess the extent to which SFL has contributed to its intended Impact to promote stronger legitimate and internationally recognized state authorities and national unity. The evaluation will review and assess implementation to date identifying whether changes identified in the 2018 SFL Review were included and completed. Through this process, it is important to highlight the unintended consequences (both positive and negative) of implementation to date. The evaluation should also provide an assessment of the extent to which project outcome and outputs were achieved. The evaluation should provide recommendations for action to be taken during the remaining period of the 2nd phase (ending 31 December 2021²²³) and for actions to be taken in 2022.

The TOR is designed to guide the conduct of an independent evaluation (IE). This TOR seeks to strengthen and improve the project's intervention by examining, amongst other things, the delivery of the program, the quality of its implementation and the organizational context, personnel, structures and procedure; and examining the project theory of change by testing the relationship between goals, activities, outcomes and wider context.

ii. The specific objectives of the evaluation

1. Review the performance of the Project in achieving the Outputs as per the Project Document and their contributions to Outcome and Impact.
2. By providing an objective assessment of the intervention achievements, constraints, performance and results, assess in particular the extent to which the changes embodied in the revised Project Document from January 2019 have been implemented in practice,
3. Generate lessons from the period beginning **January 2019** to inform current and future programming in the context of Covid-19 and continued political instability in the country by identifying factors which facilitated or hindered delivery of results, both in terms of the external environment and those related to internal factors.
4. Document and record the lessons identified at various implementation stages. This should include but not be limited to assessing the strengths and weaknesses in different stages of the project, design, management, coordination, human resource, and financial resources;
5. Assess the appropriateness of the Project strategy to reach the intended Outcome and Impact, including the realism of the revised Theory of Change;

²²³ Or 31st August 2022 if the SFL Board grants a no-cost extension

6. Define the extent to which the Project addressed cross cutting issues including gender, conflict sensitivity;
7. Identify and assess the project's response mechanisms and adaptability to unforeseen external and internal factors;
8. Identify whether past results represent enough foundation for future progress;
9. Provide clear, focused recommendations to suggest effective and realistic new and adaptive strategies by UNDP and partners during the 1) the current phase and 2) during a new phase, if agreed upon by all relevant counterparts.
10. Generate lessons from the period beginning January 2019 regarding the degree to which project implementation responded to the needs of women, girls and boys and the challenges faced by the project to ensure women, girls and boys are involved in benefits generated.

A. Scope of the Evaluation

The independent evaluation will focus on the 2nd phase of the Stabilization Facility project which started 1 January 2019 and covers the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021.

Evaluation criteria and key guiding questions:

In assessing the Project, the evaluation will take into consideration the following evaluative dimensions and questions:

I. The validity of the Design and Relevance:

The extent to which the project strategy, proposed activities and expected Outputs, Outcome and Impact are justified and remain relevant to beneficiaries' assessed needs, country's policies and donor's priorities. More specifically, the relevance of the project should be assessed through the following questions:

- *To what extent was the intervention in line with national development priorities, country programme outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and the SDGs?*
- *To what extent is the intervention strategically relevant to fulfil its political objective as stated in the Project Document?*
- *Is the SFL's Theory of Change – national and local – valid? What changes, further assumptions or additional risk management might be required to give it greater purchase?*
- *Is there evaluation evidence which indicates that SFL's work on locally based stabilization (though an instrument like the SFL) is relevant to support political settlements, local or national?*
- *To what extent are the revised objectives for the 2nd phase of the Facility still relevant given the continued political instability, Libya's financial crisis, and the impact of COVID-19 pandemic?*
- *Has the SFL provided a relevant response to the COVID crisis?*
- *To what extent has SFL adapted and responded to any factors affecting its implementation? Has the project put in place a mechanism to understand and design specific interventions to address the issues of women, girls and boys?*

- *Has the project put in place a mechanism to understand and design specific interventions to address the issues of women, girls and boys?*

II. Efficiency of resource used

The extent to which the project resources (funds, expertise/human resources, time, etc.) are optimally used and converted into intended outputs. More specifically, the efficiency of the project should be assessed through the following guiding questions:

- To what extent has the SFL adopted the changes in structure, processes and methodology set out in the project document for the 2nd phase?
- Have the new structures, processes and methodologies been efficient in delivering project Outputs?
- To what extent has SFL adapted to the COVID-19 emergency to ensure efficiency in implementation?
- To what extent have SFL's communications efforts contributed to efficient implementation? Are the resources for communication (with donors, with Government, with Libyan citizens, and with donor taxpayers) appropriate? Has the project communicated the perspective of women in their role in peacebuilding? Has the project been able to communicate benefits for women and girls?
- Is SFL's risk matrix fit for purpose? Is the risk management approach appropriate?
- Does the risk matrix include or distinguish issues as relates to women in their role in peacebuilding and the specific risks faced by women and young girls?
- To what extent has there been an economical use of financial and human resources? Have resources (funds, male and female staff, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve outcomes?
- To what extent do the M&E systems utilized by UNDP ensure effective and efficient project management?

III. Effectiveness

Effectiveness the extent to which the project's expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved or are expected to be achieved. Factors contributing to or detracting from the achievement of the project desired results and objectives should also be included in the assessment. More specifically, the effectiveness of the project should be assessed through the following guiding questions:

- Is the sequence of Output 3-Output 2-Output 1 being reflected in practice? Is it working effectively?
- Are there trade-offs (e.g. with speed of visible delivery) which might merit revisiting the concept or its implementation?
- Has the SFL's revised approach to Output 3 been sound in principle? Has it worked? What factors have made it more or less effective?
- What has affected the extent to which delivery of the SFL's Outputs has led to achievement of the project's Outcome?
- How far as achievement of the project's Outcome contributed to achievement of the intended Impact?

- What factors have influenced the ability of SFL to deliver its results? Has the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic affected implementation of project activities?
- To what extent has the SFL provided a relevant response to the COVID crisis? In what ways has the pandemic affected overall implementation?
- Has the project responded effectively to the specific needs of women, girls and boys, especially with regards to the identification of stabilization goals and the identification of priority investments in support of stabilization goals (Output 1)?

IV. Sustainability of the Project.

In assessing the sustainability of the Project, the evaluation will look at the positive and negative changes produced by the Project's development interventions, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. It will also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of peacebuilding and reconciliation conditions.

On sustainability, the evaluation will measure the likeliness of project's results continuing after donor funding has been withdrawn. Some of the key questions will include:

- To what extent did the Project contribute to the advance on reconciliation and dialogue among the community leaders in Libya?
- To what extent was sustainability considered in the planning and execution of the Project's activities? To what extent is there evidence of sustainability of results?
- To what extent are the SFL's approach and results likely to be replicated and scaled up by national partners?
- To what extent has the Project modified its approach to respond to the needs of the municipalities to address the Covid-19 pandemic?
- Have the resources of the SFL been sufficient to contribute to meeting the needs of the municipalities regarding Covid-19?
- Has the project been able to efficiently deliver interventions to address Covid-19 pandemic?

Evaluation of Cross-Cutting Issues:

Leave no one behind and gender aspects will be considered well in evaluation questions as well the evaluation process. Gender analysis, including gender disaggregated data need to be incorporated in the evaluation.

Leave no one behind:

- To what extent have the research and monitoring of Stabilization Facility for Libya been inclusive in terms of capturing the situation of the most vulnerable and marginalized part of the Libya population, vulnerable for incitement of conflict.
- To what extent has Stabilization Facility for Libya civil society and youth engagement been able to include and reach the most vulnerable and marginalized part of the Libya population, vulnerable for incitement of violence.

Gender Equality:

- To what extent has Stabilization Facility for Libya and other national stakeholders' capacity been strengthened in better promoting and protecting women's rights?

- To what extent have gender equality and the empowerment of women been addressed in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project?
- Is there gender marker data assigned to this project representative of reality?
- To what extent has the project promoted positive changes in gender equality and the empowerment of women? Were there any unintended effects?
- To what extent was the management structure outlined in the project document efficient to generate the expected results? To what extent were the resources used to address inequalities in general, and gender issues in particular?
- To what extent will targeted men, women and vulnerable people benefit from the project interventions in the long term? To what extent will financial and economic resources be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the project?

Human rights

- To what extent have poor, indigenous and physically challenged, women, men and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups benefited from the work of UNDP in the country?

Disability

- Were persons with disabilities consulted and meaningfully involved in programme planning and implementation?
- What proportion of the beneficiaries of a programme were persons with disabilities?
- What barriers did persons with disabilities face?
- Was a twin-track approach adopted?²²⁴

Way forward

- Have any good practices, success stories, lessons learned, or transferable examples been identified? Please describe and document them.
- Based on the achievements to the date, provide forward looking programmatic recommendations for UNDP to continue this project with foresight approach

V. Proposed Methodology

Based on UNDP guidelines for evaluations (*UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results* and the *UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*), and in consultation with UNDP Libya CO, the evaluation will be inclusive and participatory, involving all principal stakeholders into the analysis. The evaluation will consider the social, political, security and economic context which affects the overall performance of the outcome achievements. During this evaluative exercise, the evaluation reference group is expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis.

It is strongly suggested that the evaluation should use a mixed method approach – collecting and analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data using multiple sources in order to draw valid and

²²⁴ The twin-track approach combines mainstream programmes and projects that are inclusive of persons with disabilities as well as programmes and projects that are *targeted* towards persons with disabilities. It is an essential element of any strategy that seeks to mainstream disability inclusion successfully. Also, see chapter 9 of the Technical Notes. Entity Accountability Framework. United Nations Disability and Inclusion Strategy: <https://www.un.org/en/disabilitystrategy/resources>

evidence-based findings and conclusions and practical recommendations. The evaluation consultant is expected not only to conduct specific online surveys to collect quantitative/qualitative data but also is highly encouraged to review all relevant reports providing quantitative data collected by Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya.

However, the evaluation consultant is expected to propose and determine a sound evaluation design and methodology (including detailed methodology to answer each evaluation question) and submit it to UNDP in the inception report following a review of all key relevant documents and meeting with UNDP. Final decisions about the specific design and methods for the evaluation will be made through consultation among UNDP, the consultant and key stakeholders about what is appropriate and feasible to meet the evaluation purpose and objectives as well as answer the evaluation questions, given limitations of budget, time and data. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with stakeholders. All stakeholder meetings will be organized virtually for primary data collection given the current COVID-19 pandemic.

I. Data Collection, Data Review and Analysis:

The evaluation methodology will adhere to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms & Standards. The evaluation will be carried out by an independent evaluation consultant. The evaluation consultant should adopt an integrated approach involving a combination of online data collection and analysis tools to generate concrete evidence to substantiate all findings. Evidence obtained and used to assess the results of UNDP support should be triangulated from a variety of sources, including verifiable data on indicator achievement, existing reports, evaluations and technical papers, stakeholder interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), surveys and site visits where/when possible.

Methods to be used by the evaluation consultant to collect and analyze the required data shall include but not be limited to:

Desk Review: This should include a review of inter alia

- Project document
- Result Framework/M&E Framework
- Project Quality Assurance Report
- Annual Work Plans
- Annual Reports
- Highlights of Project Board meetings
- Studies relating to the country context and situation
- Interviews with project staff, present and past;
- Virtual Interviews with an adequately gender representation among involved key stakeholders including government line ministries, development partners, civil society and other relevant partners through a participatory and transparent process;
- Online/virtual Consultations with beneficiaries through interviews and/ or focus group discussions;
- Survey and/ or questionnaires where appropriate;
- Triangulation of information collected from different sources/methods to enhance the validity of the findings.

- Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders including UNDP, Government partners, UN colleagues, development partners, CSOs, youths, so on: Development of evaluation questions around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and designed for different stakeholders to be interviewed
 - Online/Virtual Key informant interviews with relevant stakeholders from government agencies, donors, UN Agencies, youth groups and CSOs supported by Stabilization Facility for Libya.
 - All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity. The final evaluation report should not assign specific comments of individuals
 - Analysis of Stabilization Facility for Libya Project funding, budgets and expenditure generated from Atlas.
 - Analysis and interpretation of qualitative and quantitative data available from various credible sources.
 - Data review and analysis of monitoring and other data sources and methods: ensure maximum validity, reliability of data (quality) and promote use; the evaluation consultant will ensure triangulation of the various data sources
 - Data and evidence will be triangulated with multiple sources to address evaluation questions. The final methodological approach including interview schedule and data to be used in the evaluation should be clearly outlined in the inception report and fully discussed and agreed between UNDP, stakeholders and the consultant.
- The evaluation is expected to use a variety of data sources, primary, secondary, qualitative, quantitative, etc. to be extracted through surveys, storytelling, focus group discussions, face to face interviews, participatory methods, desk reviews, etc. conducted with a variety of partners. A transparent and participatory multi-stakeholder approach should be followed for data collection from government partners, community members, private sector, UN agencies, multilateral organizations, etc.

Evidence will be provided for every claim generated by the evaluation and data will be triangulated to ensure validity.

An evaluation matrix or other methods can be used to map the data and triangulate the available evidence.

Gender and Human Rights-based Approach

As part of the requirement, evaluation must include an assessment of the extent to which the design, implementation, and results of the project have incorporated gender equality perspective and rights-based approach. The evaluators are requested to review UNEG's Guidance in Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation during the inception phase.²²⁵ In addition, the evaluation must focus on expected and achieved gender accomplishments, critically examining the presumed causal chains, processes, and attainment of results, as well as the contextual factors that enhanced or impeded the achievement of results. In addition, the methodology used in the final evaluation, including data collection and analysis methods should be human rights and gender-sensitive to the greatest extent possible, with evaluation data and findings disaggregated by sex, ethnicity, age, etc. Detailed analysis on disaggregated data will be undertaken as part of final evaluation from which findings are consolidated to make

²²⁵ http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=980

recommendations and identify lessons learned for enhanced gender-responsive and rights-based approach of the project. These evaluation approach and methodology should consider different types of groups in the Stabilization Facility for Libya project intervention – women, youth, minorities, and vulnerable groups.

Due to travel restrictions imposed globally and internally by Covid-19 pandemic, the work will be done remotely using different mediums (Zoom, WhatsApp, Microsoft teams, etc.) to conduct the evaluation. FGDs in Libya will be limited in number in order to conform with country restrictions on public meetings and gatherings.

II. Evaluation Cons

The evaluator must be independent to the project's implementation or monitoring phases. The international consultant will perform the following tasks:

- Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis) for the report;
- Provide UNDP with data collection tools in advance for UNDP feedback to ensure realistic application in the field.
- Ensure full responsibility for the drafting and finalization of the report
- Ensure UNDP feedback on inception and final report is considered in final versions, always under the basis of an independent evaluation.
- Finalize the whole evaluation report and engage in debriefing with UNDP.

III. Deliverables and timeline

The deliverables are summarized in the table below:

The detailed evaluation workplan will be agreed upon between the UNDP and the selected International Consultant.

Due to travel restrictions as a result of the Covid-19 Pandemic, the consultancy will be home-based.

The Consultant is expected to commence the assignment on 21 Feb 2022. The assignment and final deliverable are expected to be completed, no later than 15 April 2022, with the detail as described in the below table:

Deliverables Workdays Completion deadline

Phase One: Desk review and inception report

Meeting briefing with UNDP (project manager and project staff as needed) At the time of contract signing

Sharing of the relevant documentation with the evaluation reference group

At the time of contract signing

Desk review, Evaluation design, methodology and updated workplan including the list of stakeholders to be interviewed

Submission of the inception report

(10 pages maximum)-Comments and approval of inception report

7 working
days
February 2022

Phase Two: Data-collection

Consultations, in-depth interviews, and focus groups online meetings
Zoom, WhatsApp, Microsoft teams, etc. Within two weeks of contract
signing

Debriefing to UNDP and key stakeholders
17 days

1 day
March 2022

Phase Three: Evaluation report writing

Preparation of draft evaluation report (50 pages maximum excluding
annexes), executive summary (4-5 pages)

Draft report submission

Consolidated UNDP and stakeholder comments to the draft report -
Within two weeks of submission of the draft evaluation report

Debriefing with UNDP - Within one week of receipt of comments

Finalization of the evaluation report incorporating additions and
comments provided by project staff and UNDP country office - Within
one week of final debriefing

Submission of the final evaluation report to UNDP country office (50
pages maximum excluding executive summary and annexes) - Within
one week of final debriefing

9 days

1 day

5 days

April 2022

Total 40 days

Expected deliverables

The consultant is expected to deliver the following outputs:

1. Evaluation inception report (up to 10 pages). The consultant will commence the evaluation process with a desk review and preliminary analysis of the available information provided by UNDP. Based on the ToR, initial meetings with the UNDP and the desk review, the consultant should develop an inception report which will be around 10 pages in length and will elaborate evaluation methodologies, including how each evaluation question will be answered along with proposed methods, proposed sources of data, and data collection and analysis procedures.

The inception report will include the evaluation matrix. UNDP will review the inception report and provide useful comments for improvement. This report will serve as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the evaluation consultant and UNDP. The inception

report, containing the proposed the theory of change, and evaluation methodology should be carried out following and based on preliminary discussions with UNDP. The inception report should include an evaluation matrix presenting the evaluation questions, data sources, data collection, analysis tools and methods to be used. The inception report should detail the specific timing for evaluation activities and deliverables and propose specific site visits and stakeholders to be interviewed (this element can be shared with UNDP well in advance). The inception report should be endorsed by UNDP in consultation with the relevant government partners before the evaluation starts (before any formal evaluation interviews, or survey distribution). **(See the inception report template in Annex E and special instructions on creating a google drive in bullet #4).**

2. **Kick-off meeting.** Evaluators will give an overall presentation about the evaluation, including the evaluator approach, work plans and other necessary elements during the kick-off meeting. Evaluators can seek further clarification and expectations of UNDP and the Government partner in the kick-off meeting.

3. **Evaluation debriefings.** Immediately following the evaluation, the evaluation consultant is required to present a preliminary debriefing of findings to UNDP, key government partners and other development partners (Evaluation Reference Group).

Draft evaluation and final evaluation reports (max 50 pages including executive summary).

The draft evaluation report will contain the same sections as the final report and shall follow the structure outlined in Annex 3/ Evaluation Report Template and Quality Standards (Page 49-53) of Section 4/ Evaluation Implementation of UNDP Evaluation Guideline (2019).²²⁶ The international consultant will include both, the inception and the final evaluation reports, in a google drive for the different reviewers to provide written comments on these google drive word documents). UNDP and other designated government representative and key stakeholders in the evaluation will review the draft inception and evaluation report providing comments within this google drive file for the evaluator to address them within an agreed period of time. The consultant will address the required content (as agreed in the TOR and inception report) and quality criteria as outlined in these guidelines. The draft report will ensure that each evaluation question is answered with in-depth analysis of information and back up the arguments with credible quantitative and/or qualitative evidence.

4. Presentation/Debriefing/Audit Trial. Comments and changes by the evaluators in response to the draft report should be retained by the evaluators to show how they have addressed comments.

5. A meeting will be organized with key stakeholders including UNDP and designated government representative and key stakeholders to present findings, conclusions and recommendations. Final evaluation report (see final evaluation template in the Annex F).

The final report will incorporate comments and feedbacks from the stakeholders including the feedback provided during the Presentation/Debriefing meeting. Other relevant documents (i.e. data collection tools, questionnaires, datasets, if any) need to be submitted as well.

Disbursement of payments

Lumpsum payment linked to deliverables, and Payment for aforementioned deliverables are subject to certification of deliverable/s report approved by Supervisor, Deputy Resident Representative Programme UNDP Libya. In line with the UNDP's financial regulations, when

²²⁶ Evaluation Report Template and Quality Standards of UNDP Evaluation Guideline (2019), Section 4 : Evaluation Implementation, available at <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/>

determined by the Country Office and/or the consultant that a deliverable or service cannot be satisfactorily completed due to the impact of COVID-19 and limitations to the evaluation, that deliverable or service will not be paid. Due to the current COVID-19 situation and its implications, a partial payment may be considered if the consultant invested time towards the deliverable but was unable to complete to circumstances beyond his/her control.

Institutional Arrangement

The consultant will work in close collaboration with the Management Support Unit of the Libya CO and will report and submit deliverables to the Deputy Resident Representative (P) of UNDP Libya for review and approval.

Responsibilities of evaluator

The Consultant will

- Lead the development and finalization of the inception report that will include elaboration of how each evaluation question will be answered along with proposed methods, proposed sources of data, and data collection and analysis procedures.
- Lead the entire evaluation process, including communicating all required information
- Finalize the research design and questions based on the feedback and complete inception report
- Lead the designing of tools and data collection;
- Lead the data collection, analysis and interpretation;
- Lead the development of the draft evaluation report;
- Lead and finalize the evaluation report;
- Lead the presentation of initial findings and de-brief;
- Lead the evaluation in planning, execution and reporting, inception workshop, kick off and feedback meeting, debriefings;
- Oversee the division of labor within the review reference group to ensure compliance with the Final Evaluation TOR;
- Utilize best practice evaluation methodologies;
- Conduct of data gathering activities: desk review, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions etc.
- Be responsible for data analysis, draft and final report preparation, consolidation and submission, and presenting the findings
- Submit draft evaluation report
- Address UNDP feedback and adjust first final report draft
- Submit final evaluation report revised
- The Consultant will use his/her own equipment and software.

Responsibilities of UNDP

This evaluation is commissioned by UNDP Libya. The Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Libya will be responsible for managing the evaluation throughout the entire process and ERG will provide necessary support in day-to-day operation of evaluation. The International consultant will work under the overall supervision of the Deputy Resident Representative,

UNDP Libya. The international consultant will lead the evaluation. The consultant will report to and work under supervision of the Deputy Resident Representative. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) will be established, made up of representatives of the donors to the Stabilization Facility and national counterparts. The ERG will perform advisory role throughout the evaluation process and will provide advice on the ToRs, including the appropriateness of evaluation questions and methodology, will support the evaluation in its analysis of existing evidence by facilitating access and providing inputs, and will discuss the preliminary findings of the evaluation.

The ERG will provide feedback to the evaluation report which should be addressed by the evaluator. The ERG will also provide input to the development of the management responses and key actions recommended by the evaluation.

Evaluation ethics.

Evaluation consultant will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'.

This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation'. The consultant must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The consultant must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected.

The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses with the express authorization of UNDP and partners. A code of conduct must be signed by the evaluator (s).

Travel Plan

N/A

IV. Duty Station

Homebased

V. Contract duration

The duration of the contract will be 40 working days as per the above deliverables.

VI. Qualifications and Experience

Education:

At least Master's degree in social sciences, development studies, international development or other relevant disciplines, with proven track record in programme development and advanced social research.

Experience:

- Minimum of (07) seven years of social or development experience and solid experience in programme development and implementation related to UNDP practice areas. Substantive knowledge in UNDP practice areas required, including Democratic Governance and Resilience and Recovery.
- Minimum of (3) three years of proven drafting skills (with sample of writing report and substantive knowledge of development issues in UNDP practice areas.
- Minimum of (02) two years of experience working in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region.

Language:

- Proficient in English language, spoken and written. Spoken Arabic is a must.

VII. Competencies:

Corporate Competencies:

Integrity, professionalism, and respect for diversity.

Functional Competencies:

- Ability to think conceptually and flexibly, capacity to adapt, innovate, and propose multiple options.
- Prior experience in undertaking UNDP evaluations
- Proven ability to deliver quality output including reports writing and making presentation under tight deadlines.
- Familiarity and working experience on the development issues and context in the Crisis country would be the asset.
- Familiarity with UNDP or UN operations will be advantageous.
- Commitment to respecting deadlines and the delivery of outputs within the agreed timeframe.
- Fair and transparent decision making; calculated risk-taking

VIII. Documents to be included When Submitting the Proposals

Consultant shall submit the following documents:

- Applicants must submit a duly completed and signed Annex II Offeror's letter to UNDP confirming interest and availability for the Individual Contractor (IC) assignment.

IX. Financial proposal

Lump sum contract

The financial proposal shall specify a total lump sum amount, and payment terms around specific and measurable qualitative and quantitative) deliverables (i.e. whether payments fall in instalments or upon completion of the entire contract). Payments are based upon delivery of the services specified in the TOR. In order to assist the requesting unit in the comparison of financial proposals, the financial proposal will include a breakdown of this lump sum amount.

The Consultant will be responsible for all personal administrative expenses associated with undertaking this assignment.

Evaluation of applicants

The award of the contract shall be made to the individual consultant whose offer has been evaluated and determined

as:

- Only those applications which are responsive and compliant will be evaluated.
- Offers will be evaluated according to the Combined Scoring method – where the technical criteria will be weighted at 70% and the financial offer will be weighted at 30%.
- Only candidates obtaining a minimum of 49 points (70% of the total technical points) would be considered for the Financial Evaluation.
- The financial proposal shall specify an all-inclusive lumpsum payment linked to deliverables.
- The top applicant with the Highest Combined Scores and accepted UNDP's General Terms and Conditions will be awarded the IC contract.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

Technical evaluation (70 points). 70 POINTS

Academic

Requirement

At least Master's degree in social sciences, development studies, international development or other relevant disciplines, with proven track record in programme development and advanced social research

10 Points

Experience

Minimum of (07) seven years of social or development experience and solid experience in programme development and implementation related to UNDP practice areas. Substantive knowledge in UNDP practice areas required, including Democratic Governance and Resilience and Recovery.

35 Points

Minimum of (3) three years of proven drafting skills (with sample of writing report and substantive knowledge of development issues in UNDP practice areas.

15 Points

Minimum of (02) two years of experience working in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region.

10 Points

Financial Evaluation

MAX 30 POINTS

Candidates obtaining a minimum of 49 points over 70 points would be considered for the Financial Evaluation - 30 points

Lowest Price will be qualified with the maximum of 30 points. Higher prices will be qualified according to

the following calculation:

FE= Financial Evaluation

LFP = Lowest Financial Proposal

FPI= Financial Proposal of bidder i

FINAL EVALUATION: TECHNICAL + FINANCIAL MAX 100 POINTS

For selected candidate the detail information to be provided on request with additional information below:

A. Document to be reviewed (PRODOC and Previous reviews)

B. Key stakeholders and partners

C. Evaluation matrix

D. Schedule of tasks, milestone and deliverables

E. Inception report template (see below) OR follow the link: Inception report content outline

F. Annex: Required format for the evaluation report.

The final report must include, but not necessarily be limited to, the elements outlined in the quality criteria for evaluation reports. Follow the link: [Evaluation report template and quality standards](#)

FE = LFP x 30

FPI

Annex 2. Stakeholder mapping

Type of Stakeholder	Organization
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DRR • Project Manager (acting and former) • Stabilization Advisor • Finance Officer • Communications Officer • Gender Officer • Reporting Officer • Information Management Officer • Field Coordinators
Donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU • Germany • UK
Organizations working on stabilization/municipal development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNSMIL • Chemonics • GiZ • Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)
Ministries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Planning • Ministry of Local Governance
Local authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal council of Derna, Sebha and Tawergha • Task force of Ghat, Derna and Bani Walid
Implementing Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voluntas • UNITAR • Promediation • ATWAR • FLO • Handicap International • Peaceful Change
CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Annex 8
Other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Wood • Muhammad Khadim (Outcome 2 consultant) • Mehdi Bchir (Outcome 3 consultant)

Annex 3. SFL Project Board Terms of Reference

The SFL Project Board serves as the overall governance structure of the Facility. The Board provides strategic direction to and oversight of the Facility and ensures that the interventions funded through the Facility are in line with agreed priorities.

The Project Board is co-chaired by the nominated Representative of the Presidential Council and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). Other representatives of the Libyan Government may be invited by the Representative of the Libyan Government or his delegate on an ad-hoc basis when needed. This may include the Supreme Council on Local Administration, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Local Government, a line Ministry of concern or other relevant stakeholders.

Major fund-contributing partners will also be members of the Project Board, as agreed with the co-chairs. The United Nations has one vote, the Libyan Government one vote, and each donor one vote. Smaller donors whose contributions fall below the threshold will jointly have one vote and will be requested to rotate their membership.

Relevant UNDP and UNSMIL political/security section staff may also participate in the Board meetings, at the invitation of either co-Chair. However, the vote of the UN remains with the UN co-chair.

Every effort will be made to seek consensus in the Board decision-making. In case consensus cannot be reached, decisions will be taken by majority vote of the attending Project Board members, and in case of any dispute, decisions will be guided by the co-chairs. All decisions shall require the agreement of both co-chairs.

The SFL Board responsibilities include:

- Monitor SFL's progress towards the approved strategic objectives and performance against the Annual Work Plan (AWP), and guide its strategic direction in light of changing circumstances;
- Review and approve any significant changes to the programme documentation.
- Approve the AWP and budget;
- Approve SFL programme funding;²²⁷
- Provide commitment to and endorsement of SFL programme objectives and strategic communications;
- Provide relevant political support for appropriate SFL objectives, as requested by the Board;
- Define an acceptable risk profile for the programme and own resolution of specific strategic risks and issues within the programme, including an annual review of risk appetite;

²²⁷ Reallocation within the broad directions set by the Board (e.g., within the health sector in a city) would be determined by UNDP in consultation with MoP. If a city requires significantly less (or more) resources to achieve agreed goals, or if progress becomes impossible, UNDP will consult the Board.

- Resolve dependencies with other donor funded programmes and projects outside the programme;
- Support the application of and compliance with UN operating standards;
- Agree the strategic communications approach and ensure appropriate communication about the project takes place with relevant stakeholders; and
- Sign off on successful delivery at closure of programme.

The Board will meet at least twice a year. Decisions which do not bear on strategic direction, significant changes in policy, or major financial resource shifts, may be submitted to the Board for decision by correspondence under a silence procedure; such decisions should always be discussed in the Donor Technical Group before submission to the Board by correspondence.

Annex 4. Donor Technical Group Terms of Reference

GENERAL

The Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) works to bridge the critical period of transition from initial period of humanitarian relief towards mid- and long-term structural and sector-specific support. It includes interventions at the municipal level that seek to strengthen national unity and reinforce state authorities for all Libyans through support to local stability. The SFL is Libyan-led, with the Chair of the Presidency Council or his representative chairing the Board jointly with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, and the activities being implemented in cooperation with Libyan (local) authorities. The SFL is limited to specific localities depending on available funding but must be scalable to reach across the entire state territory.

The SFL supports three activity sets, each with a dedicated output:

Output 1: Light Infrastructure Rehabilitation;

Output 2: Capacity Boost; and

Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity.

At the municipal level, these outputs support the overarching SFL strategy by working toward agreed local stabilisation goals, whose achievement will be supported through the provision of peace dividends for communities through the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, building the capacity of local authorities to address the needs of their population, and enhancing local mediation and conflict resolution capacities.

In each municipality which the SFL works, it has, or will have, a partner organisation which conducts and updates conflict analyses, enables the formation of a local peace structure and helps to strengthen it, facilitates agreement on a local stabilisation goal and continued review of progress towards it, and builds local capacity to monitor conflict risks and manage those that arise.

The SFL Donor Technical Group (DTG) is comprised of representatives from all the donors to the Facility, with the Government of Libya represented by the Ministry of Planning (MoP). The Technical Group is designated to monitor SFL implementation, to provide advice on emerging themes in SFL outcome and impact, and to identify opportunities for mutual support and synergy. DTG members may identify themes on which they would like a future DTG meeting to reflect; they may ask UNDP to produce a relevant paper if appropriate.

OBJECTIVES

1. **Share** information on related programs from the SFL donors, and coordinate these in order to identify synergies and avoid duplications, and to make sure the respective goals align to the overall SFL objective.
2. **Discuss** implementation of the SFL, with special attention to scaling up SFL interventions and addressing gaps in service delivery;

3. **Provide** technical advice and support around key stabilisation themes, and identify areas where Board political support could be needed to deliver SFL objectives;
4. **Analyse** rationale for SFL interventions and choice of priority locations for intervention;
5. **Ensure** that standards of quality and international best-practices are mainstreamed throughout the design and implementation of SFL activities;
6. **Facilitate** sharing of information on stabilisation-related activities across related programmes; and
7. **Communicate** to the international community and other partners the specific role of the SFL, to increase awareness and understanding of the programme and prevent confusion with *e.g.* humanitarian emergency assistance or long-term reconstruction programmes.

COMPOSITION

The DTG will be chaired by the SFL Project Manager or his/her designate, and consist of representatives of SFL donors at the technical level. Each donor will designate a DTG member and alternate, and strive to ensure consistency of representation during their tenure of office.

- SFL Project Manager (or designate)
- Representative from the Libyan Ministry of Planning
- 4 SFL donors (and any other donors that may contribute to the Facility)

CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

1. **Meetings.** DTG meetings will be held on the first Thursday of every month unless otherwise advised, and will be convened by the Chair.
2. **Agenda, meeting preparations, minutes of the meetings.** The Chair will prepare the agenda. The Chair will also compile and distribute all relevant information in advance of the meeting.
3. **Participation of non-Members.** The Chair may invite to the meetings any person(s) not a member of the DTG whose participation may be useful for discussion of any agenda item.

Annex 5. Theory of Change

Local Theory of Change	
Output 3	<p>IF we have viable local partners; IF we have a feasible/viable relationship with the Municipality; AND if we develop a shared understanding of local conflict dynamics; AND if we develop a shared understanding of possible local peace settlements/deals, AND if trust enhancing relationships between key actors either exist or can be supported; AND if concerns relating to protection, gender and inclusion are considered during the prioritization and sequencing of activities; AND if we enhance the capacity of the Municipality and partners through the process; THEN we can develop and agree a stabilization goal and a shared map/compass to get there, and identify what needs to be done</p>
Output 2	<p>AND THEN IF the SFL</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • continues to support local conflict management processes effectively; • continues effective support for trust building; and • continues effective capacity support for the Municipality and partners in national service agencies;
Output 1	<p>AND national partners in national service agencies allow engagement locally; AND the SFL delivers civil works and equipment that meet local expectations; AND an effective communications strategy is agreed with all partners and successfully implemented;</p> <p>THEN the SFL is more likely to make a positive contribution to local stabilization, cohesion and local conflict resolution efforts (=> OUTCOME)</p>

The Local Theory of Change is expected to feed into the National one in order to contribute to impact as described below:

The National Theory of Change

IF national level state authorities and their agencies are less fragmented, more cohesive and perform better;

IF there is an increase in positive connections between the central and the local through local authorities; and

IF there is evident symbolic inter-city service connections, and these connections are visible and communicated;

AND there is a reduction in local conflicts and disagreements;

THEN this will strengthen public trust in (or credibility of) internationally recognized state authorities and foster national unity for all Libyan (=> **IMPACT**).

Annex 6. References

Aktis (2017). Stabilization Facility for Libya Project Conflict and Needs Assessment Final Report - Bani Walid October 2017

DTG Meeting, 1 August 2019

DTG Meeting, 11 July 2019

DTG Meeting, 12 September 2019

DTG Meeting, 13 June 2019

DTG Meeting, 14 November 2019

DTG Meeting, 14 September 2021

DTG Meeting, 15 January 2020

DTG Meeting, 15 July 2020

DTG Meeting, 16 December 2020

DTG Meeting, 16 June 2020

DTG Meeting, 17 September 2020

DTG Meeting, 18 February 2021

DTG Meeting, 18 November 2021

DTG Meeting, 2 April 2020

DTG Meeting, 24 June 2020

DTG Meeting, 26 October 2020

DTG Meeting, 3 December 2020

DTG Meeting, 4 June 2020

DTG Meeting, 6 August 2020

DTG Meeting, 6 February 2020

DTG Meeting, 7 May 2020

DTG Meeting, 7 October 2021

DTG Meeting, 7 October 2021

DTG Meeting, 8 April 2021

Fezzan Libya Organization (2020). Activity 1.2 Conflict Mapping for Sebha, Libya, December 2020

Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report, 2019

Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report, 2021

OCHA (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview, Libya, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022, Issued December 2021

Promediation (2020). Field-based conflict assessment - Support to the SFL engagement in South of Libya Ubari, Ghat, Sebha & Kufra, November 2020

UNDP (2018). Project Document - Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2)

UNDP (2019). Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) Project Board Meeting, Minutes of 10th Board Meeting, 18th July 2019

UNDP (2019). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Board Meeting, 18-07-2019

UNDP (2020). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2019

UNDP (2020). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Board Meeting Presentation, 21 July 2020

UNDP (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2020

UNDP (2022). Minutes - Retreat, Stabilization Facility for Libya, 28 February - 1 March 2022, Tunis

UNDP (2022). Stabilization Facility for Libya, Annual Report, 1 January – 31 December 2021

UNITAR (2020). Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2). Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity, Progress Report – Start to 18 November 2020

UNITAR (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2). Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity, Progress Report – 1 April – 30 September 2021

UNITAR (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2). Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity, Progress Report – 1 October – 31 December 2021

UNITAR (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2). Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity, Progress Report – 19 November 2020 - 20 January 2021

UNITAR (2021). Stabilization Facility for Libya – Stronger for Libya (SFL2). Output 3: Local Peace Structures and Conflict Management Capacity, Progress Report – 1 October – 31 December 2021

Voluntas (2019). UNDP Perception Survey for the Stabilization Facility for Libya. Findings for SFL I: Benghazi, Bayda, Kikla, Sabha, Ubari; SFL II: Tripoli, Kufra, Bani Walid, November 2019

Voluntas (2020). Perception Survey for the Stabilization Facility for Libya, Round VI SFL I and Round IV SFL II, May 2020

Wood, D and Wilson, G. (2018). The Stabilisation Facility for Libya, An independent strategic and operational review, June 2018

Annex 7. Number of activities implemented under Output 1

Column		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Municipalities		Total number of projects planned (Phase 1 and 2) (B+C) or (D+H)	Projects listed (identified) under Phase 1	Projects listed (identified) under Phase 2 (Broadening/Deepening)	Total number of projects completed till date (E+F)	Number of projects completed by 31 Dec 2018	Number of projects completed in Phase 2 – on/after 1 Jan 2019 (these may have started in Phase 1 but the importance is that they were completed in Phase 2)	Number of projects started in Phase 2 (implemented on/after Jan 2019)	Pending completion
AJDABIYA	2	2		2	2		2	2	
BANI WALID	29	26	23	3	26	8	18	11	
BENGHAZI	40	40	31	9	40	30	10	9	
DERNA	8	8		8	7		7	7	1
GHAT	15	12		12	12		12	12	
KIKLA	19	19	19		19	18	1		
KUFRA	9	3		3	2		2	3	1
SEBHA	30	29	10	19	25	4	21	21	4
SIRT	45	35	23	12	28	11	17	16	7
TAWERGHA	17	17		17	15		15	17	2
TRIPOLI	157	157	151	6	154	12	142	90	3
UBARI	23	22	16	6	21	14	7	6	1
TOTAL	394	370	273	97	351	97	254	194	19

Annex 8. COVID-19 Support Provided by SFL in 2021²²⁸

	Activity	Municipality
1	Provision of testing kits (Cepheid and its cartridges)	Distributed by MoH to Sebha, Kufra, Tripoli, and Ghat
2	Provision of 42 ICU Ventilators to be distributed in coordination with WHO and MoH	Distributed in coordination with WHO and MoH
3	Transportation of Nasopharyngeal swabs and COVID 19 PCR reagents	Tripoli
4	Supply and installation of Oxygen facility “inhalation supply” or Medical Gas Plant	Bent Baya
5	Support for local PPE production through provision of raw materials and machinery for a local small manufacturing enterprise	Tripoli
6	Support the rehabilitation of diabetes healthcare facility and convert it to fully equipped isolation facility ²²⁹	Bani Walid
7	Support the establishment and provide equipment for 20 beds isolation facility	Kufra
8	Support the establishment and provide equipment for 20 beds isolation facility	Benghazi
9	Provision Medical equipment	Ghat
10	Construction and equipment of an isolation unit with a capacity of 20 beds as a preventive and precautionary measure	Derna
11	Provision of medical equipment; Supply of two cold rooms to store COVID-19 vaccinations	Sebha
12	Provision of medical equipment	Ajdabiya
13	Supply and Installation of 30 KW Hybrid Solar Power System for Libyan Korean Centre	Tripoli
14	Supply and Installation of Medical Oxygen Generator Facility Benghazi, Libya	Benghazi
15	Supply and installation of Medical Oxygen Generator Facility for Tajoura Cardiology Hospital	Tripoli
16	Supply and installation of Medical Oxygen Generator Facility for Souq Al-Khamis Alqarawi Hospital in Al-Khums City ²³⁰	Tripoli

²²⁸ Annual Report 2021, p. 27

²²⁹ Rehabilitation of Bani Walid General Hospital was contracted under regular SFL activities. It is reflected in list of Bani Walid interventions. In agreement with contractor and end users, the same contract was used to rehabilitate diabetes facility to serve as isolation facility.

²³⁰ Due to limited funds, this activity has not been included in 2022 AWP.

Annex 9. List of CSOs/NGOs to which a LVG was provided

The National Organization for the Voice of Libyan Youth	Sebha	المنظمة الوطنية لصوت الشباب الليبي
Azjar Association for Awareness and Culture	Ubari	جمعية ازجر للتوعية و الثقافة
Women Tadamon Organization for Advocacy (Solidarity)	Murzuq	التضامن لمناصرة قضايا المرأة
Permanent Peace Foundation for Development	Benghazi	مؤسسة السلام الدائم للتنمية
Ather Organization for Development and Empowerment	Sebha	منظمة اثر للتنمية والتمكين
Mizan Organization for Development and Development	Benghazi	منظمة ميزان للتنمية والتطوير
Nana Marn National Association	Tripoli	جمعية نانا مارن الاهلية
Libyan Association for National Reconciliation and Charitable Activities	Tripoli	الجمعية الليبية للمصالحة الوطنية والأعمال الخيرية
I am Libyan My Son is Foreigner Association for Civil and Charitable Work	Ghat	جمعية ليبية وابني غريب للعمل الأهلي والخيري
Tanmia 360	Benghazi	تنمية 360
Horizons Association for Dialogue (AFEK)	Sirt	مؤسسة آفاق الحوار
Maggas Organization to Support Youth and Sustainable Development	Tawergha	منظمة مقاس لدعم الشباب والتنمية المستدامة
Libya Foundation for Sustainable Development	Misurata	مؤسسة ليبيا للتنمية المستدامة

Note: Dihia Civil Society Organization in Kikla dropped out

Annex 10. Evaluation Matrix

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
VALIDITY OF THE DESIGN AND RELEVANCE				
EQ 1. To what extent is the SFL's strategy and Theory of Change are valid and relevant to beneficiaries' assessed needs, country's policies and donor's priorities?				
1.1 To what extent was the intervention in line with national development priorities, country programme outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and the SDGs?	To what extent is the SFL aligned with national priorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of consultative process with government / public actors during the design and implementation of the interventions ✓ Degree to which SFL's initiatives are aligned with the national strategies (overlap of objectives and outcomes) ✓ Degree that revised objectives for the 2nd phase of the Facility are aligned with national priorities at the central and local level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant national laws, policies, strategies and plans on the matter • UNDP staff involved in interventions • UNDP staff • Government staff (national and municipal) • Donors 	Document review KIIs
	To what extent is the SFL aligned with UN strategies (UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2022, Country Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Degree to which SFL activities overlap with UNDP's Strategic Plan ✓ Degree to which SFL activities are aligned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP Strategic Plan • Country Program 	Document review KIIs

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
	Document (CPD), UN Strategic Framework for Libya (2019-2020), and SDGs)?	within the SDG goals and targets?	Document (CPD) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Strategic Framework for Libya • SDGs 	
1.2 Is the SFL's Theory of Change – national and local – valid?	Is the SFL's Theory of Change – national and local – valid?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Evidence that the causal chain is valid ✓ Evidence that the sequence of Output 3-Output 2-Output 1 is being followed ✓ Evidence than the assumptions are valid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theories of Change • Results Framework • Monitoring reports • UNDP staff • Government staff (national and municipal) • Donors 	Document review KIIs
1.3 To what extent did the SFL design respond to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries, and continue to do so as circumstances changed? (Especially within the context of COVID-19)?	To what extent did the SFL carry out needs assessments to identify the priorities of women/men and girls/boys?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of needs assessments at country level ✓ Existence of mechanism to understand and design specific interventions to address the issues of women/men and girls/boys 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF Strategic and Programme Documentation 	Document review
	To what extent has the SFL adapted to respond to the changing contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of specific analysis that has 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP and partner 	Document review KIIs

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
	(e.g., COVID-19, security issues, political issues, etc.) and the needs of the target population?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> assessed the changing context ✓ Specific changes that have been introduced during the implementation of the interventions because of changes detected in the context-needs analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> programme documentation • UNDP and partner staff involved in interventions • Government staff (national and municipal) 	
EFFICIENCY OF RESOURCES USED				
EQ 2. To what extent are the SFL resources (funds, expertise/human resources, time, etc.) optimally used and converted into intended outputs?				
2.1 To what extent has the SFL made the best use of resources to achieve outputs and deliver results?	To what extent has the SFL made the best use of financial resources to deliver results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Overall budget for SFL Phase 2 and per municipality ✓ Budget per Output ✓ Expenditures on Project activities/municipality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programmatic and financial documentation • UNDP staff involved in interventions • UNDP Finance & Administration staff 	Document review KIIs
	To what extent have the human resources been adequate to achieve the expected products and results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Number and gender of human resources involved in the management and implementation of SFL interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programmatic and financial documentation • UNDP staff involved in interventions 	Document review KIIs

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
2.2 To what extent has the SFL been able to deliver in a timely fashion?	Did the SFL experience any delays and what were the mitigating actions put in place?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Length of delays experienced in achieving planned activities/outputs ✓ Existence of mitigating activities implemented to address delays 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programmatic documentation • UNDP staff involved in SFL activities • Partners' staff 	Document review KIIs
2.3 To what extent did the SFL processes contribute to efficient implementation?	To what extent has the SFL adopted the changes in structure, processes and methodology set out in the project document for the 2nd phase?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Number of recommendations from Phase 1 incorporated in Phase 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review of SFL Phase 1 • SFL Project Document for Phase 2 • UNDP staff 	Document review KIIs
	To what extent is the SFL's risk matrix fit for purpose?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Type and number of risks included in the matrix ✓ Risks identified that are specific to women and girls 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk Matrix • UNDP staff 	Document review KIIs
	To what extent have SFL's communications efforts contributed to efficient implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Amount of resources allocated ✓ for communication activities ✓ Communication messages produced (e.g., women's role in peacebuilding? benefits for women/men and girls/boys) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication staff • Communication reports and statistics • Communication budget • Donors • Government counterpart 	Document review KIIs
EFFECTIVENESS				

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
EQ 3. To what extent were the SFL's expected outputs and outcomes achieved or are expected to be achieved?				
3.1 To what extent has the SFL achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and planned results?	To what extent has the SFL achieved its planned outputs?	✓ Ratio of achievement vs. planned of outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP M&E staff • Project monitoring reports/Annual Reports 	Document review
	To what extent have basic services and light infrastructure been restored (Outcome 1)?	✓ Number and type of basic infrastructure restored per municipality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP programme staff • UNDP M&E staff • Government counterpart • Project monitoring reports 	Document review KIIs FGDs (if feasible)
	To what extent have the capacities of municipalities and local partners been built (Outcome 2)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Examples of strengthened capacities/municipality ✓ Sex-disaggregated number of persons trained ✓ Type of training offered 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP programme staff • UNDP M&E staff • Implementing partners • Municipal staff 	Document review KIIs FGDs (if feasible)
	To what extent have local conflict analysis, dialogue and mediation capacity been strengthened (Outcome 3)?	✓ Examples of strengthened implementation of health policies per country	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNICEF programme staff • UNICEF M&E staff • Government counterparts 	Document review KIIs FGDs (if feasible)

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy documents 	
	To what extent does the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system measure progress in achieving planned products and expected results of activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of programmatic documents that include objectives, results, products, activities, and inputs ✓ Existence of process and results indicators in programme documents ✓ Number and type of indicators (disaggregated by sex, age, and other variables) ✓ Existence of tools to collect data and information ✓ Frequency of data and information collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP and partner programme documentation (• Monitoring reports • UNDP staff involved in interventions • M&E Officer • Government counterparts • Implementing partners 	<p>Document review</p> <p>KIIs</p>
3.2 To what extent did the SFL achieve the results related to addressing COVID-19?	To what extent has the SFL been able to deliver COVID-19 related interventions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Number of COVID-19 related interventions/ municipality ✓ Budget allocated for COVID-19 interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP and partner programme documentation • Monitoring reports • UNDP staff involved in interventions • M&E Officer 	<p>Document review</p> <p>KIIs</p>

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government counterparts 	
3.3 What were the enabling and constraining factors (and mitigating strategies) that supported the achievement of SFL results?	What were the enabling factors that supported the achievement of SFL results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of internal enabling factors (staffing, motivation of staff, etc.) ✓ Existence of external enabling factors (capacities of partners, government ownership, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP staff involved in the interventions Government counterparts Implementing partners 	Document review KIIs
	What were the constraining factors (and mitigating strategies) that hindered the achievement of SFL results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of internal constraining factors (processes, resources, capacities, etc.) ✓ Existence of external constraining factors (e.g., capacities of partners, COVID-19, political crisis, etc.) ✓ Mitigating strategies implemented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP staff involved in the interventions Government counterparts Implementing partners 	Document review KIIs
SUSTAINABILITY				
EQ 4. To what the SFL's results are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn?				
4.1 To what extent is there evidence of sustainability of results?	To what extent was sustainability considered in the planning and execution of the SFL's activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Number and type of systems (policies, procedures, capacities) put in place ensure sustainability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programmatic documentation UNDP staff involved in the interventions Government counterparts 	Document review KIIs

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
	<p>To what extent did the Project contribute to the advance on reconciliation and dialogue among the community leaders in Libya?</p> <p><u>This question is not evaluable since no information is available to address it.</u></p>	n/a	n/a	n/a
4.2 To what extent are the SFL's approach and results likely to be replicated and scaled up by national partners?	To what extent did other actors replicate SFL interventions/approaches?	✓ Examples of replicability of SFL interventions/approaches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government counterparts • Implementing partners 	KIIs
	To what extent did other actors scale SFL interventions/approaches?	✓ Examples of scalability of SFL interventions/approaches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government counterparts • Implementing partners 	KIIs
4.3 Were there any unintended results (positive or negative) from SFL implementation?	Were there any unintended positive results from SFL implementation?	✓ Existence of unplanned positive effects generated from the interventions carried out	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project monitoring reports • Project documentation • Monitoring reports • UNDP staff involved in interventions 	<p>Document review</p> <p>KIIs</p>

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government counterparts Implementing partners 	
	Were there any unintended negative results from SFL implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence and analysis of unplanned negative effects generated from the interventions carried out ✓ Existence of mitigation strategies of the negative effects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programmatic documentation Monitoring reports UNDP staff involved in interventions Government counterparts Implementing partners 	Document review KIIs
CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES				
EQ 5. To what extent did the SFL incorporate aspects of “Leave no one behind”, human rights and gender aspects and ensure the inclusion of the most vulnerable and marginalized?				
5.1 To what extent was gender equality, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) integrated and effectively addressed by the SFL?	To what extent did UNDP take gender, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL’s design?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Existence of gender and social inclusion assessments to inform design ✓ Involvement of UNDP Gender focal points in the design ✓ SFL gender marker ✓ Inclusion of youth and marginalized groups into consultations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme documentation UNDP staff involved in interventions Gender focal point Government counterparts Implementing partners 	Document review KIIs FGDs (If feasible)

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
		✓ Inclusion of persons with disabilities in consultations		
	To what extent did UNDP take gender, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL's implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Specific training delivered on gender issues to UNDP/implementing partners staff and counterparts ✓ Existence of communication messages that address gender and social inclusion differences ✓ Existence of different implementation approaches to reach girls/boys, mothers/fathers ✓ Existence of specific activities targeting socially excluded groups (such as persons with disabilities, youth, women/girls, etc.) ✓ Use of twin-track approach to deliver services to persons with disability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme documentation • UNDP staff involved in interventions • Gender focal point • Government counterparts • Implementing partners 	<p>Document review</p> <p>KIIs</p> <p>FGDs (If feasible)</p>
	To what extent did UNDP take gender and	✓ Sex-disaggregated data on training	• Annual Reports	Document review

EQs	Lines of Inquiry	Indicators	Data Sources	Data Collection Techniques
	social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL's monitoring?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Sex and age disaggregated data on service delivery ✓ Number of beneficiaries who are persons with disabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring reports • M&E focal point 	KIIs

Annex 11. List of Persons Met

	Last Name	First Name	Title	Organization	Sex
1	HEYA	Yuka	Project Manager (acting)	UNDP	F
2	MANANDHAR	Rohan	Information Management Specialist	UNDP	M
3	CASTRO	Craig	Project Manager	UNDP (former)	M
4	RUNDELL	Peter	Stabilization Advisor	UNDP (former)	M
5	PICCIONE	Paola	Program Manger	UNDP	F
6	MANSURI	Basma	Finance Officer	UNDP	F
7	BARGHUTI	Aml		UNDP	M
8	ABDULLOEV	Shohrukh	Procurement Specialist	UNDP	M
9	ELBOAISHI	Khadija	Gender Analyst	UNDP	F
10	ABAR	Ahmad	Comms	UNDP (former)	M
11	OMAR	Jamal	Coordinator in Sebha, Ghat, Ubari (also output 2)	UNDP	M
12	QADERMAL	Mohammad Ali	Lead: Output 1	UNDP	M
13	ELAUJALLI	Lujain	Lead: Outputs 2 and 3	UNDP	F
14	MOUSA	Haitham	Coordinator in Tawergha, Misurata	UNDP	M
15	ALPOTTE	Algaddafi	Coordinator in Sirte	UNDP	M
16	AJAJ	Hisham	Coordinator in Bani Walid (also output 2)	UNDP	M
17	OMRAN	Omar	Coordinator in Kikla (also output 2)	UNDP	M
18	DHIEM	Ala	Coordinator in Tripoli	UNDP	M
19	ALHODIRI	Bushra	President & Operations Manager	Fezzan Libya Organization (FLO)	F
20	JUST	Fleur	Chief Executive Officer	PCI	F
21	BELGASIM	Beshar	Libya Country Manager	PCi	M
22	MOJICA-AURELIO	Viviana	Recovery and Resilience Team Leader, Division for Peace	UNITAR	F
23	CORZO	Jimena	Consultant	UNITAR	F
24	GHIGGIA	Giulia	Program Manager - Libya	Promediation	F
25	ATTAL	Benjamin	Program Manager - Libya	Promediation	M
26	KADHIM	Muhammad	Senior Municipal Planning Consultant	UNDP	M
27	KJÆRUM	Alexander	Head of Policy	Voluntas (former)	M
28	PEDERSEN	Niklas	Partner and Senior Advisor	Voluntas	M
29	FEIST	Chris		UK Embassy (former)	M

	Last Name	First Name	Title	Organization	Sex
30	HOVERS	Mary	Program Manager Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights	EU Delegation Libya (former)	F
31	SANTUCCIONE	Lucia	Program Manager Migration	EU Delegation Libya	F
32	GHARSALLAOUI	Karim		Embassy of Germany (former)	M
33	BCHIR	Mehdi	Senior Stabilization Advisor (Output 3 Lead)	UNDP (former)	M
34	DAOUD	Rani	Head Programme of Decentralization	GiZ	M
35	SCHOLZ	Anke	Cluster Coordinator for Libya	GiZ	F
36	CHEATHAM	Andrew	Donor Relations Specialist	UNDP (former)	M
36	AL-ANSARI	Muhammad	Municipal Council Advisor	Sebha Municipality	M
37	MAHREZ	Muhammad	Head of Projects Department	Sebha Municipality	M
38	ABDULLAH	Amdawi	Director of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality	Derna Municipality	M
39	NASR	Elham	Legal member of the municipality	Derna Municipality	F
40	BOU FARES	Zakaria	Responsible for Public Relations	Derna Municipality	M
41	SALAMA	Tariq	Undersecretary of the Municipal Council Office	Derna Municipality	M
42	MUJAHID	Fawzia	Representative of the Woman	Tawergha Municipality	F
43	JIBRIL	Faraj	Civil society organizations representative	Tawergha Municipality	M
44	AL-KANTARI	Khaled	Director of the Projects Office	Tawergha Municipality	M
45	AL-SHAKSHAK	Abd al-Rahman	Mayor	Tawergha Municipality	M
46					M
47					M

Annex 12. Evaluation questions per type of stakeholder

Lines of Inquiry	UNDP Staff	Field Coordinators	Donors	Implementing Partners	Ministry/ Municipal staff	Other Organizations
1.1 To what extent was the intervention in line with national development priorities, country programme outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and the SDGs?						
To what extent is the SFL aligned with national priorities?	X				X	
To what extent is the SFL aligned with UN strategies (UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2022, Country Program Document (CPD), UN Strategic Framework for Libya (2019-2020), and SDGs)?	X					
1.2 Is the SFL's Theory of Change – national and local – valid?						
Is the SFL's Theory of Change – national and local – valid?	X		X	X	X	X
1.3 To what extent did the SFL design respond to the needs and priorities of beneficiaries, and continue to do so as circumstances changed? (Especially within the context of COVID-19)?						
To what extent did the SFL carry out needs assessments to identify the priorities of women/men and girls/boys?	X			X	X	
To what extent has the SFL adapted to respond to the changing contexts (e.g., COVID-19, security issues, political issues, etc.) and the needs of the target population?	X	X		X	X	
2.1 To what extent has the SFL made the best use of resources to achieve outputs and deliver results?						
To what extent has the SFL made the best use of financial resources to deliver results?	X		X			

Lines of Inquiry	UNDP Staff	Field Coordinators	Donors	Implementing Partners	Ministry/ Municipal staff	Other Organizations
To what extent have the human resources been adequate to achieve the expected products and results?	X	X				
2.2 To what extent has the SFL been able to deliver in a timely fashion?						
Did the SFL experience any delays and what were the mitigating actions put in place?	X	X		X	X	
2.3 To what extent did the SFL processes contribute to efficient implementation?						
To what extent has the SFL adopted the changes in structure, processes and methodology set out in the project document for the 2nd phase?	X		X		X	X
To what extent is the SFL's risk matrix fit for purpose?						
To what extent have SFL's communications efforts contributed to efficient implementation?	X		X		X	X
3.1 To what extent has the SFL achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and planned results?						
To what extent has the SFL achieved its planned outputs?	X	X	X		X	
To what extent have basic services and light infrastructure been restored (Outcome 1)?	X	X	X		X	
To what extent have the capacities of municipalities and local partners been built (Outcome 2)?	X	X			X	X
To what extent have local conflict analysis, dialogue and mediation capacity been strengthened (Outcome 3)?	X	X		X	X	X
To what extent does the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system measure progress in achieving planned products and expected results of activities?	X		X			
3.2 To what extent did the SFL achieve the results related to addressing COVID-19?						

Lines of Inquiry	UNDP Staff	Field Coordinators	Donors	Implementing Partners	Ministry/ Municipal staff	Other Organizations
To what extent has the SFL been able to deliver COVID-19 related interventions?	X	X		X	X	
3.3 What were the enabling and constraining factors (and mitigating strategies) that supported the achievement of SFL results?						
What were the enabling factors that supported the achievement of SFL results?	X	X	X	X	X	X
What were the constraining factors (and mitigating strategies) that hindered the achievement of SFL results?	X	X	X	X	X	X
4.1 To what extent is there evidence of sustainability of results?						
To what extent was sustainability considered in the planning and execution of the SFL's activities?	X				X	X
To what extent did the Project contribute to the advance on reconciliation and dialogue among the community leaders in Libya? <u>This question is not evaluable since no information is available to address it.</u>	X			X	X	X
4.2 To what extent are the SFL's approach and results likely to be replicated and scaled up by national partners?						
To what extent did other actors replicate SFL interventions/approaches?			X	X	X	X
To what extent did other actors scale SFL interventions/approaches?			X	X	X	X
4.3 Were there any unintended results (positive or negative) from SFL implementation?						
Were there any unintended positive results from SFL implementation?	X	X		X	X	

Lines of Inquiry	UNDP Staff	Field Coordinators	Donors	Implementing Partners	Ministry/Municipal staff	Other Organizations
Were there any unintended negative results from SFL implementation?	X	X		X	X	
5.1 To what extent was gender equality, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) integrated and effectively addressed by the SFL?						
To what extent did UNDP take gender, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL's design?	X	X		X	X	
To what extent did UNDP take gender, human rights and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL's implementation?	X	X		X	X	
To what extent did UNDP take gender and social inclusion (vulnerable, PWDs etc.) into consideration in the SFL's monitoring?	X	X		X	X	

Annex 13. KII interview protocol

Note 1: The interviews are estimated to around 60 minutes. In the case of some other actors (M&E officer and finance/administration staff) they will not last longer than 30 minutes.

Note 2: The team does not identify any risk or discomfort that may result from participating in it beyond the fatigue of talking for 60-90 minutes.

Note 3: The Matrix in Annex XX presents the questions which will be asked to each category of stakeholder following the introduction.

Acknowledgments and Presentation of the Team:

Hello, my name is _____. I am an independent consultant recruited by UNDP to carry out the evaluation of the **Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) - Stronger for Libya Project**. The objective of this study is to understand the performance of the Programme and the reasons behind it in order to maximise its potential to achieve the expected results during the residual implementation time. We want to thank you for accepting the invitation to participate in this conversation, which will be of great importance for the evaluation we are conducting. The interview will take about 60 minutes to complete.

Presentation of the Interview and Work Methodology

We would like to clarify that participation in this evaluation is voluntary and no incentive be offered.

All interviews are confidential. The information will be used only in an aggregate form in our report and cannot be attributed to the people interviewed. No interviewee will be identified, except as part of a relationship or list of people interviewed, which will be included at the end of the evaluation document.

Participation is completely voluntary. You have every right to decide to participate or not. You will be asked the following question before starting the survey: Are you willing to participate?

In case of questions or complaints about this evaluation, you can contact the UNDP: Ms. Yuka Hera, Program Manager. She may be reached via email (yuka.hera@undp.org) or on her mobile number (+216 24 747 906).

I have some questions to guide our conversation. In the case that there is something that you feel is beyond your experience or knowledge, please let me know. To help the evaluation team remember our conversation today, I will be taking some handwritten notes. However, I will not be recording (audio) the meeting and will not take any photos.

Before we begin, do you have any questions or concerns related to the assessment or this interview?

Annex 14. Stabilization Goals per Municipality

Municipality	Stabilization Goal
AJDABIYA	Due to COVID-19 and budget restrictions, community consultations in Ajdabiya were put on hold, and stabilization goals could not be defined.
BANI WALID	Urgent public infrastructures rehabilitated and equipment supplied to build bridges between communities and promote peace with an idea of "One Libya".
BENGHAZI	Developed through UNDP assessments and analysis as locations in the East have limited for civilian engagement. Restoration of public trust in the local authorities through improved public services delivery, increased civic engagement in the city rehabilitation and improved livelihoods.
DERNA	Derna becomes a beacon for science, culture and sport within a framework of coexistence of all its various cultural components with all views being met with acceptance.
GHAT	Disaster relief: SFL began its engagement with Ghat in June 2019 to provide urgent response to devastating destruction and displacement caused by flooding.
KIKLA	Reinforce the Zintan-Kikla peace deal through restoration of public services to encourage IDPs to return to Kikla.
KUFRA	Due to COVID-19 and budget restrictions, community consultations in Kufra were put on hold, and stabilization goals could not be defined.
SEBHA	Improve social cohesion to achieve community consensus on legitimate paths to non-violent conflict mediation, avoiding division and conflict to promote prosperity in the region, development through dialogue and local government service to all social components.
SIRT	Respond to the urgent service needs of all community groups, inclusive process to develop a shared and set of priorities for stabilization, improve the working relationships between local and national governing to allow the final integrated plans and activities to be implemented.
TAWERGHA	Sustainable return of displaced communities who have not found attractive alternatives through restoration of basic services presenting a barrier to return, provision of mental health and psycho-social support for returnees, and livelihood support.
TRIPOLI	Reconstruction and peacebuilding inclusively supported in the 13 municipalities of the Greater Tripoli area with an enhanced working relationship between mayors and central administration.
UBARI	Encourage the return of IDPs to Ubari and the local peace agreement through improvements to public services and infrastructure ensuring equal access for all community members, especially women, youth and other marginalized groups. "Stocktake" and dialogue sessions in June 2019 resulted in updated priorities.

Annex 15. Risk Matrix

Description	Consequence	Type	Countermeasures / Management response	Baseline Dec. 2018
1. LPA bodies unwilling or unable to take Pol advantage of SFL opportunities	Failure to foster national unity or demonstrate effectiveness of state authorities	Strategic	Close liaison with senior advisors to help state authorities to reap potential benefits. Active communication of the roles of PC, GNA and other state authorities towards goals of stronger legitimate state authorities and national unity.	Erosion of PC and GNA capacity to engage, following April assault on Tripoli.
2. Lack of engagement of semi-public state bodies or tardiness in participation	Failure to demonstrate national unity through these bodies	Strategic	Senior Policy engagement with management of these bodies. Demonstration by example of the advantages to them of engagement with SFL.	GMMRA engage in nationally unifying way. GECOL remains united, engages with SFL at high level. GSC engage at local level only.
3. Failure to deliver project activities undermines position of UNSMIL and UNDP within Libya	Rejection of UN family, including UNDP, undermines state authorities whom UN recognizes	Strategic	UNDP and UNSMIL to ensure project actions are realistic and delivered; SRSG to ensure one UN approach to lever wider UN contributions; project team to manage expectations.	UNDP remains welcomed, especially where SFL operates. UNSMIL unable to leverage this gain.
4. Adverse public reaction to international support to legitimate state authorities	Popular rejection of local and national state authorities undermines local stabilization	Political	UNDP and relevant representative of the PC working on a revised visibility and Communications Strategy; all activities will be properly communicated according to the new Strategy to be approved by the Board; UNDP	No Board-approved Strategy, but positive media reception.

Description	Consequence	Type	Countermeasures / Management response	Baseline Dec. 2018
	and national unity.		implementing media response based on emerging needs.	
5. Deterioration in security situation negatively affects project delivery.	Unable to complete Output 1 projects	Security	UNDSS will work proactively to identify potential risk; Project team continually assesses situation and makes recommendations to project board on appropriate adjustments to project activities.	Effective Output 3 effort has prevented barriers to Output 1.
6. Safety and security threats to technical advisors.	Unable to deliver Important advice, leading to impaired delivery	Operational	UNDP to recalibrate Duty of Care expected from contractors in Libya; UNDP continually assess security situation within contracted and other supported institutions and adapt project activities accordingly.	DoC attention has accompanied relocation of international staff.
7. Resource Mobilization does not succeed in fully funding all project activities.	Some deliverables will be unaffordable	Financial	Activities can still be started within Libya in the first agreed three locations plus new sites included whilst the team and UNDP management will continue to raise additional funds.	Risk remains, but activities being pursued nevertheless
8. Third party contractors are unable to identify suitably qualified personnel for Libya	Some activities will not be delivered	Operational	Company has so far proved good capacity in identifying qualified candidates. UNDP can utilize HQ rosters to provide additional candidates as necessary. Project team includes strong monitoring arrangements within contract. Alternative partnerships/ providers will be explored to mitigate impact.	Good-quality staff have been found for almost all posts.
9. Recruitment and deployment of qualified project staff takes longer than expected.	Some activities will be delayed, possibly critically	Operational	UNDP utilizes fast-track recruitment processes in line with UNDP rules and regulations; UNDP ATLAS E-tendering system to come online in early 2019;	Continued delays experienced, though plans in place to address them.

Description	Consequence	Type	Countermeasures / Management response	Baseline Dec. 2018
			expansion of dedicated HR and Procurement Staff.	
10. Reduced scope of participation of moderate community members in project prioritisation	Trust enhancing relationships cannot be built, local stabilization is prevented, and national unity impaired.	Programmatic	UNDP team build ownership of a shared set of principles that define stakeholder group membership and limits unwanted elements from infiltrating decision-making processes; Identify radical groups operating within target communities and their linkages to existing bodies and initiatives within the community. Sense-check the viability of working separately from these groups; where possible encourage economic opportunities, through basic service delivery, that can reduce recruitment of youth to radical groups; if necessary, prepare for (and threaten) withdrawal if ‘spoilers’ dominate.	Output 3 reformulation has generated inclusive consultations in difficult cities (e.g. Sebha, Sirt). Spoilers have steered clear of SFL.
11. Over-reliance on Field Coordinators and Engineers for all aspects of outputs, reducing control of outputs and outcomes	Reduced quality of interventions	Programmatic	Build strong cohort of field staff who can raise awareness of good governance practice; Create robust reporting framework for all field staffs; Comprehensive capacity building process for all field officers; Provision of tools to make decision-making clear; Responsibility given only to those field staff who demonstrate ability to operate effectively; Ensure direct communication between all parties during key stages of programme implementation (including MoU signing and project approval); encourage an open relationship between	Reporting (including enhanced 3rd party M&E) indicates continued high-quality delivery of Output 1.

Description	Consequence	Type	Countermeasures / Management response	Baseline Dec. 2018
			Field Staff and programme staff; vet field staff in all cases.	
12. Support to individual communities undermines ongoing intercommunity initiatives	Local stabilization goals not achieved	Programmatic	Provide incentives that bring communities together (e.g. greater funding for communities that pool funding); Provide additional funding for inter-community programmes – support communities to seek other funding sources that can complement SFL funds; work with local municipalities/ councils to identify linkages between communities and opportunities for collaboration between target communities; Identify points of tension within a community particularly around shared resources with other communities.	Output 3 consultations have emphasized inclusion and shared resources across communities. Tawergha has demonstrated scope to work across inter-city divides.
13. Reliance on male field staff leads to disempowerment of women within the programme and the community as a whole	Key perspectives on local stabilization are omitted; Opportunities for local stabilization are missed.	Programmatic	Develop materials for field staff on gender issues and how to identify and respond to them; Ensure women members of the Community are able to participate in the project identification process; Identify opportunities for recruiting female field staff who can work with male field officers to engage with women in the community; Identify mechanisms with the community to ensure female participation in meetings; Provide incentives to communities to prioritise basic services that specifically target the needs of women and girls within the community;	Gender balance of staff remains a problem. WNLP pilot identified to enhance gender impact, but currently delayed.

Description	Consequence	Type	Countermeasures / Management response	Baseline Dec. 2018
			Provide support for women across different communities to work together on shared issues of concern.	
14. Complexity of lessons system, and demands on SFL team, undermine delivery	Key activities are not delivered	Programmatic	Develop clear ToRs for MEL system to ensure proportionate demands on delivery team; develop strong communications between delivery and MEL teams; invest in SFL team dynamics.	Recruitment of 3rd party MEL consultants delayed. Simplified system only so far.
15. Corruption and Embezzlement. Economic breakdown has encouraged a black market. Gaps in the audit trail. Lack of transparency and accountability in partners	Reduced value for money; reduced delivery of local stabilization	Institutional	Adherence to all UNDP FARs; Develop clear procedures/ regulations for procurement and payment covering several potential scenarios; 3rd party verification; Standard contracts for local partners whereby photos / reports are acceptable in lieu of receipts for the audit trail; Ensure capacity building and training in project cycle management for community organizations.	No indication of impropriety or loss of value for money.

Annex 16. Mode of Engagement - Site Selection²³¹

Following the SFL Strategic Review and subsequent Board decision, UNDP has reappraised the SFL's criteria for selecting interventions. For deeper impact, the SFL will narrow the geographic scope of its engagement. Where appropriate, the Board will consider 'regional' stabilisation plans to group locations with interlinked strategic goals and conflict dynamics.

The target locations are selected jointly by the Board Members of the SFL in dialogue with the State and local authorities. Criteria for the selection of locations includes the following:

1. Geographic balance to cover areas from the East, South and West Libya;
2. Functioning local authority structure in place in the municipality;
3. Commitment by the local authority to peace and political process;
4. Area affected by and/or prone to conflict and high level of vulnerable population;
5. Identified needs can be addressed through quick-impact interventions;
6. Stable enough security situation for implementation of activities to take place; and
7. Highest potential impact or catalytic value of the interventions.

Given the advice in the Review on focusing more tightly, SFL will initially operate in the cities it is already supporting, plus possibly Tawergha and Derna when support is feasible and conflict-reducing.

SFL will not open up in new locations initially, other than perhaps in Tawergha where an initial assessment was conducted before the July 2018 Board meeting. The "reset" processes for Sirte and Sebha will be a first call on resources. SFL then proposes to deepen its engagement in other existing locations. New locations for SFL such as Kufra, Ajdabya, and Ghat, have been approved by the Board for operation in due course; detailed Board guidance will be sought before SFL starts work in any new location.

²³¹ Project Document, p. 56

Annex 17. Terms of Reference of Municipal Task Force

Terms of Reference of Municipal Task Force 13 June 2020

Responsibilities:

- Preparation of the development plan in its entirety by working in the municipality and in an internal manner decided by the work team itself.
- Communication with the expert charged with supervising the work in order to complete the plan according to the methodology and timetable that will be
- Presentation, discussion and follow-up at the beginning and during the various stages of work.
- Liaison with the mayor of the municipality, the municipal council and representatives of the local community segments during the process of preparing the plan.
- Communication with the relevant central authorities, as needed, during the process of preparing the plan.

Qualifications:

- To be a resident of the municipality.
- To be able to read and write.
- To be prepared for volunteer work with self-motivation and without financial compensation throughout the period of preparing the plan.
- Two (at least) of the team members must have a university degree and who are proficient in working on basic business applications on the (Word and Excel) on a computer, such as Word or Excel
- It is preferable for some team members to be fluent in English

Team composition:

- 5-7 people with an appropriate mix of municipal and local employees.
- The presence of the female component through one or two members (if possible).
- The presence of an appropriate age diversity among the team members (it is recommended that the team's ages range between 25 and 60 years).
- After its formation, the team will elect a "coordinator" who will be the link between the work team, the expert, and the stabilization support fund program in Libya.
- The team can, when needed, seek the assistance of people with certain skills and for temporary periods during the period of preparing the plan.

Team formation style:

The mayor – in agreement with the municipal council – will issue an order establishing and naming the Task Force members in an impartial manner that takes into account the interests of the municipality and represents - as much as possible - segments of the local community.

Work modality:

During the next few months, the expert will be contacted through video communication software, due to the prevailing conditions in Libya and because of the COVID-19 pandemic that is currently sweeping the world, which prevents the possibility of travel or direct communication

at the work site in the municipality, and if circumstances improve in a way that allow travel, communication - in addition to communication through visual communication software - will be through meetings held in Tunisia (all costs covered by the SFL) at the beginning and end of each of the main stages of work. Should the working conditions, return to normal, so the work will be through direct communication with the expert, in addition to the other means mentioned above as needed.

Annex 18. Targets vs achievements per year (2019-2021)

Output 1: Basic Service Equipment and Light Infrastructure Delivered to Local Expectations						
Indicator	Target (2019)	Achieved (2019)	Target (2020)	Achieved (2020)	Target (2021)	Achieved (2021)
1.1 # of civil works projects completed	15	59	28	33	49	26
1.2. Of those familiar with SFL projects, the % who indicated the completed civil works projects met their expectations (Disaggregated data noting age and sex)	60%	N/A, Monitoring Impact and Outcome Theory of Change to begin in Q 2 2020	60% (6/9 services)	Benghazi: 7/9 services Kufra: 8/9 services Kikla: 5/9 services Tripoli: 1/9 services Bani Walid: 3/9 services Sebha: 2/9 services Ubari: 2/9 services	60%	n/a
1.3. # of equipment (goods) delivered	15	23	26	81	21	13
1.4. Of those familiar with SFL projects, the % who indicated the equipment/goods delivered met their expectations (Disaggregated data noting age and sex)	60%	N/A, Monitoring Impact and Outcome Theory of Change to begin in Q 2 2020	60% (6/9 services)	Combined with target 1.2 above	60%	n/a
Output 2: Immediate Capacity Support for Municipalities and Local Service Delivery Partners Provided						
Indicator	Target (2019)	Achieved (2019)	Target (2020)	Achieved (2020)	Target (2021)	Achieved (2021)

2.1. # of stabilization plans developed utilizing a participatory approach involving local stakeholders (i.e. NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, women's groups and peace centres, and youth, community and marginalized groups) with municipalities and local partners in targeted areas of SFL support	1	3	4	2	2	0
2.2. # of stabilization plans implemented utilizing a participatory approach involving local stakeholders (i.e. NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, women's groups and peace centres, and youth, community and marginalized groups) by municipalities and local partners in targeted areas of SFL support	1	3 (Completed for Benghazi, Sebha and Sirt during the period)	11	9	11	9
2.3. The performance of municipalities on the Organizational Capacity Assessment 2 (OCA) Framework (Scale 1-4)	1	1	2	0	3	1
2.4. The performance of agencies on the OCA Framework (Scale 1-4)	1	2	1	2	1	0
Output 3: Local Conflict Analysis, Dialogue and Mediation Capacity Strengthened						
Indicator	Target (2019)	Achieved (2019)	Target (2020)	Achieved (2020)	Target (2021)	Achieved (2021)
3.1. Degree of municipal authorities and local peace structure satisfaction with the conflict resolution support provided by SFL (5 = very high, 4 = high, 3 = fair, 2 = low, 1 = very low) (Disaggregated data noting: sex and age)	3	N/A, Monitoring Impact and Outcome Theory of Change to begin in Q 2 2020	3	n/a	3	n/a

3.2. # of women, men, and youth involved in local conflict resolution efforts in targeted areas of SFL support	30 (in Ubari, Benghazi and Sirt)	133 (in 4 municipalities Men: 99 (74%) Women: 34 (26%) Youth: 28 (21%))	30 (in Ubari, Benghazi and Sirt)	133 (in 4 municipalities Men: 99 (74%) Women: 34 (26%) Youth: 28 (21%))	At least 30 in each municipality where SFL operates	n/a
3.3. Bi-annually, # of local peace structures which have (a) updated their own local mechanism for conflict risk warning (weight 40%); (b) linked it with the municipality stabilization plan once that exists (35%); and (c) participated in the conflict analysis update by the RPA (or ontract) partner (25%)	TBD, based on Voluntas findings	N/A, Monitoring Impact and Outcome Theory of Change to begin in Q 2 2020	TBD based on Voluntas findings	n/a	TBD, based on Voluntas findings	n/a
3.4. # of stabilization goals developed	2 municipalities	3 municipalities	2 municipalities	2 municipalities	2 municipalities	0 municipalities

Annex 19. UNITAR Training Beneficiaries

Event type	Implemented training workshops and project mid-term events and conferences until March 2022	Total number of CSOs attending	Total Number of Participants attending	Number of Women	Number of Males	Percentage Women
Training Workshops	Training 1: Conflict Analysis and Stakeholder Mapping	25	25	13	12	52%
	Training 2: Proposal Writing: Introduction to Basic Project Concepts	27	27	13	14	48%
	Training 3: Monitoring & Evaluation Framework - Logical Framework	21	21	11	10	53%
	Training 4: Project Implementation and Financial Management	18	18	9	9	50%
	Training 5: Conflict Reduction Strategy Design TOT	15	15	7	8	47%
	Training 6: Financial and Technical Reporting on Project 1	13	13	7	6	54%
	Training 7: Conflict Management: Conflict Prevention, Conflict resolution and transformation	14	14	7	7	50%

	Training 8: Strategic Communications towards donors and local communities	14	14	5	9	36%
	Training 9: Logical Framework and Project Rationale	20	23	7	16	
Total			170	79	91	46%

Annex 20. SFL Gender Action Plan

Data collection, statistics and indicators	This remains an issue within the current circumstances as no reliable disaggregated data could be obtained from official source of information. UNDP SFL continues to collect data such as the number of beneficiaries (disaggregated) from the ground through the project coordinators, but it remains estimated data.
Women's participation in decision- making and public life	The project benefits men and women equally as it rehabilitates critical infrastructure (basic services) that benefit all residents in the community, though care will be taken to ensure this takes place in reality. Thus, special attention has been given to women's groups in the needs assessment phase to make sure that concerns of women and girls are given a priority in the rehabilitation works. Young women and men and women are encouraged to participate in local peace structures which will give them a voice in the selection of priorities for rehabilitation and conflict mediation processes supported by the project. In some case SFL works with displaced persons. Vulnerabilities and risks for displaced people differs greatly between men and women, partly because of socially constructed gender
Gender, job opportunities and local businesses development	The SFL has supported the people of Ubari (South of Libya) to establish a "Women's Center" to provide space for women of all communities in Ubari (Tebu, Tuareg & Arab) to conduct activities such as vocational training and open dialogues. The SFL granted a community based local peace structure known as the Social Peace Partnership (SPP) a grant to provide sewing equipment for the "Women's Center" in Ubari to enhance further the role of women in the City. The SPP organized a sewing business training and a course in handicrafts as well as cultural day under the label "Peace Through Her". This was an activity that brought together members of all tribes, encouraging social peace and improvement of relationships with some of the community's marginalized groups. Moreover, the SFL's local partner conducted in the same "Women's Center" a three-month training course from August to October 2018. This course brought together 60 women from the Tebu, Tuareg and Arab tribes to work and learn together in harmony, despite their differences, in a space where that they would not have otherwise met.
Policies on gender equality and women's rights	<p>The SFL is therefore not a women-specific project. However, careful gender-sensitive design helps both to ensure that SFL interventions provide maximum benefit to women in their specific local contexts, and to draw on women's agency to enhance local peace processes. Since women constitute half the population of Libya, this is an important aspect of inclusivity for SFL. With this in mind, the SFL and its Board members have identified three interventions to enhance the impact of stabilization on women's voice and agency, and the impact of women's voice and agency on local peace processes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A gender review workshop to identify the key barriers to women's participation in public life in each location, to inform further interventions;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A gender challenge function to enhance the voice of women in existing “Output 3” community mobilization and conflict analysis and mitigation efforts, and their impact on women locally; A pilot of Women’s Networks for Local Peace (WNLP) in Fezzan, using a hub-and-spoke model based on Sebha with Ubari.
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Annex 21. Contributions received per donor per year (2016-2021)

Donor Countries	Total	2016 - 2018	2019	2020	2021
Canada	1,115,242	1,115,242			
Denmark	1,530,456	1,530,456			
EU	12,893,333	10,961,451	-78,874	2,010,755 2,739,200	2,069,380 ²³²
France	2,036,464	2,036,464			
Germany	34,345,743	31,957,018		2,388,942	-217
Italy	2,755,278	2,212,389		542,888	
Japan	9,392,426	4,101,618	2,410,521		2,880,287
Libya	4,999,836	4,999,836			
Netherlands	3,309,344	3,309,344			
Norway	5,925,035	3,475,169	1,348,921	519,697	581,249
South Korea	4,193,000	3,000,000	500,000	693,000	
Switzerland	800,000	750,713	-713		50,000
United Kingdom	4,119,028	3,153,777		965,251	
USA	7,991,174	4,830,972	3,169,028	-8,826	
Grand Total	95,406,357	77,434,448	7,348,883	7,111,707	3,511,319

²³² EU contribution received in 2020 and 2021 under SUSC project amounted to US\$ 4,808,580. The amount is not added to the total for accounting purposes.