

**REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**



**MID-TERM INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE LIBERIA EMERGENCY  
CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT (LECBS) AND TOKTEN PROJECTS**

**OSI**



**United Nations Development Programme**



**USAID**

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**ACRONYMS**

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BCE	Bureau of Customs and Exercise
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CBL	Central Bank of Liberia
CCA	Country Common Assessment
CMCO	Cash Management Committee
CSA	Civil Service Agency
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DEX	Direct Execution Modality
DFID	Department of International Development
EDF	European Development Fund
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FDA	Forestry Development Agency
FY	Fiscal Year
GAC	General Auditing Commission
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme
GFS	Government Finance Statistics
GOL	Government of Liberia
GC	Governance Commission
GRC	Governance Reform Commission
GSA	General Services Agency
HIPC	Heavy Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immune-Deficiency Virus
ICGL	International Contact Group for Liberia

IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPRS	Interim Poverty Reduction Poverty
JFK	John Fitzgerald Kennedy Memorial Hospital
LECAP	Liberia Expenditure Control and Accountability
LECBS	Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support
LIPA	Liberia Institute for Public Administration
LPRC	Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation
LRDC	Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee
LTC	Liberia Telecommunications Corporation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MLME	Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
NAO	National Authorizing Office
NEX	National Execution
NHDR	National (Liberia) Human Development Report
NIC	National Investment Commission
NPA	National Port Authority
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSI	Open Society Institute
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PC	Project Coordinator
PIC	Project Implementation Committee
PPCC	Procurement and Concessions Commission

PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RIA	Roberts International Airport
SES	Senior Executive Service
SMP	Staff Monitored Program
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
TB	Tuberculosis
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this mid-term independent evaluation mission is to assess the impact made in implementing the Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support (LECBS) and TOKTEN projects. The evaluation is expected to review the progress made by the projects with a view to ascertaining strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, potential threats as well as any lessons and suggestions for improvement. The specific evaluation objectives are contained in the attached terms of reference.

The LECBS and TOKTEN projects have been in operation for over two years now. The project documents require that a mid-course external evaluation of project activities be undertaken to provide progress data and information which will assist the Government of Liberia (GOL) and its partners in making informed decisions on the status of outcome and outputs and the continuation of activities.

The mission started early June 2008 and lasted approximately seven weeks, including field work, preparation and finalization of relevant reports. The evaluation was conducted by :

- Dr. Bruno Mukendi, Washington International Management Institute, International Consultant and Mission Leader
- Mr. George Wisner II, National Consultant
- Mr. Mark Marvey, National Consultant

The report consists of three main chapters excluding the executive summary and this introduction. The first chapter on National Development Context provides the background information on the projects with a view to highlighting the context that justifies their development and partners' initiatives on capacity building in Liberia. The second chapter discusses the outcome methodology that is applied to this study as well as the data collection methods used. The third chapter, which is the central focus of the report presents the findings, lessons learnt and recommendations.

This evaluation study could not have been possible without the commitment and active participation of representatives from various government ministries and agencies, civil society organizations and donor institutions. We are deeply grateful for their contribution. A special word of appreciation is given to the Civil Service Agency of the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Development Programme for all the support without which this mission could not have achieved its objective.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The evaluation documented significant progress made in strengthening institutional and human capacity through LECBS and TOKTEN projects. The Government of Liberia has been able to bring back home a significant number of high caliber professionals who have accelerated the preparation of key policy documents, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and the achievement of major reforms that have broadened the government base to promote economic efficiency, accountability and transparency. The regulatory frameworks have been significantly strengthened through the adoption of critical policies and strategies, laws and new management practices which have allowed the fostering of an enabling environment necessary for the stimulation of the economic recovery and social infrastructure rehabilitation.

As a result of the policies and efforts made by LECBS/TOKTEN beneficiaries in various agencies and institutions, public revenues are expanding at an unprecedented rate, and there is a considerable movement and interest in Liberia as investors, private foundations and donor agencies are coming back. The transformational changes underway have instilled international confidence in Liberia, and that could not have been possible without the commitment and the quality of work that has been accomplished in such a short period of time. The study recognizes the contributions from other capacity building initiatives in the country, but argues that the political commitment at the highest level of government together with the fiscal discipline and technical expertise brought about by the LECBS/TOKTEN professionals, have been critical in achieving these results.

Despite the important progress being made, considerable challenges still stand in the way toward making these two projects more effective instruments for institutional and human capacity development. These challenges and weaknesses are discussed in this report and provide the basis for the recommendations that are summarized below.

### **Major Recommendations**

1. TOKTEN: Revert at the end of the current project to the original TOKTEN Program design and develop and support local talents through the Senior Executive Service program (SES). Professionals who are serving currently under TOKTEN and wish to contribute further at the end of their contract can be considered with priority for SES which targets highly professional Liberian experts from both the Diaspora and in-country. The GOL and UNDP must inform them least three months before the expiration of their contracts of this possibility. They will still be



subject to competitive procedures set by the SES program, in addition to an evaluation of their individual performance report. This option that feeds the current project into the wider government capacity building program, offers a smooth transition strategy for ending its activities.

2. Lay emphasis on training and human resource development in both projects to ensure sustainability of reforms. Capacity creation needs not to be confused with capacity mobilization and utilization. Provisions should also be made through special trainings on leadership skills development to emphasize the acquisition of cultural and emotional intelligence competencies to help change negative mindsets and behaviours.
3. Switch from Direct Execution Modality to National Execution. Capacity building support can only be made sustainable when it is owned and nationally driven. As national capacity gaps are being filled, it is also time to allow nationals to learn by doing, which means shifting to National Execution (NEX).
4. Make the recruitment process in TOKTEN more open and objective by subjecting the post to competition. The PIC should encourage the beneficiary organizations to submit more than one candidate for a consulting assignment with the project.
5. UNDP should urgently recruit a Project Coordinator to serve both projects, with an additional Administrative Assistant to support LECBS.
6. PIC/PSC should take a more active role in project implementation to guarantee adherence to the prescribed processes and procedures for recruitment, reporting and extensions.
7. A request for extension in the case where there has been a change in the responsibilities or duties to be performed must be accompanied by a revised TOR.
8. PSC should bring in measures to make LECBS participants report their performance in line with project requirements. Reporting to the Cabinet could serve as an additional way of highlighting key achievements and challenges, and bridging the information gaps on the project within the government circle.

9. Monitoring and evaluation should be developed in ways to make performance consistent with the TOR and ensure the achievement of objectives. It must strengthen in-out communications with all project stakeholders, including beneficiaries, their organizations and the public.
10. Institute a results-based communication strategy that carefully use the media , project newsletter, and organization of special events/round table conferences facilitated among others by beneficiaries to communicate project results and the contributions being made by expatriate nationals and local professionals to the reconstruction and reform agenda of the government. The communication strategy must also include the diffusion of information on project goals, objectives, requirements, modes of operations and exit strategy.
11. Efforts should be made to secure sufficient financial resources before project implementation to avoid potential disruptions of project activities and achievement of prescribed objectives. The insecurity created by the lack of assurance of continuity of the project due to lack of funding, affects the morale and takes away beneficiaries' zeal to perform effectively.
12. The project designs and implementation should reflect gender sensitivity, and the implementation should be conscious of gender implications in terms of results to ensure that there is no imbalance in the capacity development in the country.

Further developments and specific areas of emphasis are discussed in the report.

### **MAJOR LESSONS**

- The personality of a country's leader can facilitate access to resources in difficult conditions. It is unlikely that a program like LECBS could have been funded as it is without President Sirleaf and the connections she has.
- Qualified Africans in the Diaspora, when well utilized, can become an effective instrument for reducing the cost of conventional technical assistance and accelerate economic development in Africa.
- Institutional and human capacity strengthening must go hand in hand with physical capacity improvements. Poor working conditions in host agencies and institutions tend to affect productivity.

- Performance monitoring and evaluation is made more difficult when a project involves high level political leaders.
- When beneficiaries to a program make more money than their colleagues and bosses, this can raise animosity and hamper collaboration in an environment where working and wage conditions are poor.
- Technical skill transfer is more effective for socioeconomic transformations when it is accompanied with supportive attitudinal and behavioral changes or competencies.
- While the recruitment in both projects reflects gender sensitivity to a certain extent, there is no evidence that gender parity or equity was a deliberate consideration in the project design and implementation.

## **I. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT**

### **1.1. BACKGROUND**

Having emerged from 14 years of violent conflict, Liberia remains challenged by huge capacity gaps created by human resource deficit which is traceable to the killing and fleeing of resourceful and key professionals and citizens. Following those years of turbulence accentuated by the breakdown in the rule of law, the country transitioned to constitutionalism and democracy in 2005 with the election of Africa's first democratically elected female president, H.E Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. President Sirleaf inherited an empty coffer to lead post-war reconstruction and development. The country's economy, which was also shattered by the war, needs to be revived, and this will invariably require considerable time and sweeping reforms in order to be able to improve in a significant way the productive base of the economy. One of the key challenges confronting the new government has been the availability of requisite human capacities to undertake reconstruction and development.

The severity of the human capacity need was highlighted both in President Sirleaf's January 16, 2006 inaugural address and the civil servants census report of 2005. In her address, the President mentioned the constraints faced by her Government in recruiting competent Liberians to take up public service positions because of low remuneration and bloated, inefficient ministries and agencies. The report of a census of civil servants which was conducted in 2005 backed the President concern. The report covering 33 agencies and institutions indicates that of the 19,635 persons interviewed only 12.5% had first degree and 1.9% post-graduate degrees.

The Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support (LECBS) and TOKTEN projects were conceived as transitional measures to bridge the institutional and human capacity gap. Both have been adapted to address the peculiar Liberian context as a post-conflict stabilization strategy to bring confidence and sanity into the public sector and enable the government to lay the foundation for an effective, efficient and transparent development administration.

### **1.2. PARTNERS' CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE**

The LECBS and TOKTEN projects are being implemented in partnership between the Government of Liberia, the United Nations Development Programme, the Open Society Institute and the United States Agency for International Development, which are currently providing support to these projects. While UNDP is involved in both projects,

the OSI participates in the LECBS and USAID in the TOKTEN. All these three institutions share a strong commitment to institutional and human capacity development of Liberia.

As an overarching capacity building institution, with expertise, specialized knowledge, diverse resource base and network, UNDP has been involved in capacity building efforts in Liberia for over forty years now. The support to the rebuilding and development agenda in the post-war period reflects the continuity of a comprehensive strategy intended to pave the way to a well-transformed and dedicated civil service capable of producing and distributing the desired development results to the people.

To that effect, UNDP supports various aspects of the reform program being currently pursued by the Government of Liberia, including the conduct and data analysis of the civil servants census, the review and finalization of the code of conduct for public officials and rules and procedures for the civil service as well as the development of a 10 Years National Capacity Development Strategy. UNDP is also providing support aimed at developing a national anti-corruption strategy as well as a strategy on decentralization with focus on capacity building. The agency also contributes through soft assistance and advocacy activities to fostering a comprehensive enabling environment for economic recovery, democratic governance and human development while disseminating ideas that are at the core of public sector reforms and capacity enhancement in Liberia.

On the other hand, the Open Society Institute, which is funded by George Soros through the Soros Foundation, has also been instrumental in providing the much needed support for capacity building. The Liberia Country Program is run through the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), a part of the global network of autonomous Soros Foundations. At the core of Liberia's capacity development drive is the central theme of public sector transparency and accountability which is only possible in open environments. Accordingly, the Open Society Initiative for West Africa seeks to support Liberia's post-conflict reconstruction agenda by working with government, non-governmental, inter-governmental and civil society organizations to build a society that promotes respect for and protection of human rights, encourage transparent, accountable and meaningful participatory democratic governance. The organization lends both financial and technical supports to the LECBS. Its financial commitment totalled US\$ 1 million.

The United States of America, a traditional partner of Liberia, has remained engaged with Liberia's transition in several ways, and its contribution covers several tiers, ranging from security sector reforms to health, democratic governance and rule of law, education and infrastructure development. Other supports are channelled through institutions such as the Peace Corps which is involved in education, in particular. USAID contributed US\$ 1

million to the TOKTEN program, which is geared towards improving public sector capacity and integrity in order to effectively respond to the needs of the citizenry, in an effort to consolidate peace and democracy.

### **1.2.1. Overview of the Projects Under Evaluation**

#### **A. TOKTEN**

TOKTEN is a global UNDP approach conceived as a means of reversing the brain drain in developing countries, especially those coming out of serious civil crisis where the need for skilled manpower to address the recovery and development challenges are critical. Typically, expatriate nationals are deployed for a short-term consultation on specific tasks in their countries of origin.

Liberia finds herself in a crisis situation following 14 years of violent conflict which forced most of the skilled manpower to flee the country. UNDP already supported a TOKTEN project for Liberia in the early years of the civil crisis. About 75 percent of those who were recruited under the project decided to stay although the renewed fighting resulted in the reduction of the number that stayed. This positive outcome encouraged the design of a new program.

The present TOKTEN project has three immediate objectives : (1) to bring home Liberian expatriate nationals to help in the nation building process, (2) to assist in revitalizing agencies and institutions in which they work, and (3) to build capacity. Its long-term goal is to consolidate democracy and peace building and to ensure sustainability of government operations through the availability of required human capacity in key sectors and institutions.

As far as the implementation arrangements are concerned, the TOKTEN project is being implemented under special arrangement, through the UNDP Direct Execution Modality (DEX). Under this modality, UNDP takes full responsibility for implementation, management and achievement of project objectives. However, the day-to-day management is done by a Project Management Unit headed by a Project Coordinator with an Administrative Assistant, both of whom were originally stationed at Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs(MPEA), but were relocated at the Civil Service Agency (CSA). This change followed a decision made by the Government of Liberia in July 2007 entrusting the CSA to head all capacity building initiatives.

To ensure transparency and accountability in implementation, a Project Implementation Committee (PIC) is in place. The PIC comprises the Civil Service Agency as Chair, UNDP as co-Chair; the Ministries of Planning and State, Liberia Reconstruction

Development Committee (LRDC), the Governance Commission (GC), and the United States Agency for International Development (one of the donors). The PIC enjoys broad decision-making and oversight responsibilities: (1) adequately inform institutions and agencies of government of the existence of the program and requirements for accessing such support; (2) ensure that agencies provide justification for needed support and detailed terms of reference for the tasks to be undertaken; (3) publicize and solicit CVs on the basis of the TOR; (3) screen and select appropriate candidates, in consultations with requesting agencies and submit names to UNDP for recruitment and fielding; (4) ensure that required periodic and final reports on the work of the candidates are prepared and submitted by beneficiary agencies; (5) ensure that agencies have formulated programs and strategies, which will serve as the basis for providing support to these agencies; (6) ensure that outreach and sensitization about the project are undertaken, so that more qualified people benefit from the project; and (7) take corrective actions if performance of any selected candidate is found to be unsatisfactory consistent with the provisions of the contract.

The budget requirement is estimated at \$2,070,600, with UNDP providing \$350,000 and USAID, \$1 million. There is a funding gap of \$720,600. Additional funding is being sought to meet the project needs.

Key national institutions being revived through the project's support includes the JFK Memorial Hospital, Civil Service Agency, the University of Liberia, the Cuttington University College, the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Social Welfare, Education, Finance, State and Presidential Affairs, Planning and Economic Affairs, Commerce and Industry and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Commission (LRDC).

## **B. LIBERIA EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT PROJECT**

The Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support (LECBS) project was conceived by the Government of Liberia following separate meetings held by President Ellen Johnson - Sirleaf in March 2006 with the Open Society Institute (OSI) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The President expressed the serious human and institutional capacity weakness her government faced, noting that this was hampering the Government's reconstruction and development agenda. To address the problem, the President made specific requests to the two organizations for technical and financial assistance. In response to the President's request, the LECBS project was designed by the government with technical support from UNDP.

The main objectives of the LECBS are (1) to establish a repatriation fund aimed at attracting competent professionals from the Diaspora to take up strategic and policy-

oriented leadership positions in the public sector; and (2) to promote reform initiatives by providing assistance to the Government of Liberia in order to strengthen institutional capacity building and operational effectiveness.

The project was expected to run over an initial two year period after which it was expected that requisite capacity would have been developed within the Government of Liberia to sustain reforms in the public sector. The actual operations started in April 2006 and to date the amount \$3,253, 000 has been mobilized from UNDP (1 million) , OSI (\$2 million), and the Government of Liberia (\$253,000); an excess of \$879,730 of the total project budget of \$2,373,270. Given a surge in number of 40 professionals recruited on this project from its original number of 13 professionals increased the total budget. Additional funding of \$320,000 would still be required to complete the implementation of the project in March 2009.

The implementation modalities are the same as TOKTEN, except that instead of a PIC, LECBS has a Project Steering Committee (PSC).The PSC is composed of the Civil Service Agency, UNDP, MPEA and a representative of each contributing donor (OSI at the present). The PSC is expected to meet regularly and its main function is to evaluate progress, make necessary amendments and undertake operational planning. It is entrusted to make specific decisions about the funding of sub-projects. Actually, the TOKTEN secretariat is also in charge of the administration of the LECBS.

Contrary to the TOKTEN project, LECBS has a clear-cut exist strategy. It is expected that the GOL will increase its revenue collection by 1% of GDP every year during the duration of the project. Taking that into consideration, 100% of the salary supplements will be covered through donor contributions for Year 1, starting from March 2006. However, during Year 2, starting from March 2007, donor contributions will be needed for only 67% of the salaries, while the GOL picks up the remaining 33%. Upon completion, the project will feed into the broader national capacity building programme that is expected to support the country's wider reconstruction and development programme. It was expected that the GOL would be able to cover salaries in full, starting from March 2008, which does not seem to be the case.

Another specificity of the LECBS is that candidates are selected by the President of Liberia herself who channels them to the PSC, not for vetting, but processing.



### 1.3. OTHER CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS

- **Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP)**

The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) is a partnership between the Government of Liberia (GOL) and the international community to improve governance, enhance transparency and accountability, and lay a solid foundation for a sustainable peace. It was conceived in direct response to the concern of the GOL and international partners, (including the United Nations , the European Union , the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, the United States , the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank about the mismanagement of public resources during Liberia's post-conflict transition government and the threat it represented to the peace process. Following consultations between the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and the International Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL), the GEMAP Agreement was signed on September 9, 2005.

GEMAP is one of the fundamental pillars in the process of building good economic governance in Liberia. It entails the guaranteeing of the competent and judicious management of the country's resources in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, and responsive to people's needs. Through the GEMAP framework, Liberian institutions and international partners are putting systems in place to ensure that the funds from Liberia's institutions and natural resources flow into the government, that the government manages those funds well and transparently, and spends it effectively on rebuilding the country. Through this program, internationally-recruited advisors are posted in the financial offices of several key Liberian institutions, and work with Liberian leadership to establish transparent financial management systems. They are also supposed to train and build capacity of the Liberian staff, and report openly on their operations, revenue and spending. Many of these experts share co-signing authority so that no major transactions take place without being examined by both a Liberian manager and an international advisor.

To date, GEMAP advisors have and are still serving in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) Cash Management Committee (CMCO), the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL), the Bureau of Budget (BOB), Ministry of Lands, Mines, and Energy (MLME), the National Port Authority (NPA), Roberts International Airport (RIA), Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation (LPRC), the General Auditing Commission (GAC), the General Services Agency (GSA), Bureau of Customs and Excise (BCE), the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC), the Governance Commission (GC), and the Forestry Development Agency (FDA).

One of the major pillars is capacity building. Though anticipated to be the focus pillar for the transfer of knowledge and institutional capacity development, it appears to have received the least attention and support thus far. There is very little to point to in clear terms, as effective capacity development is less likely to result from the disjointed initiatives undertaken by experts assigned to various targeted ministries and agencies with very little or no support. Notwithstanding, there is marked differences with the reforms underway in the various GEMAP institutions. But, the question that these changes beg is whether or not, they are as a direct result of GEMAP or other initiatives geared towards similar end-capacity building. Revenue generation, debt management and waiver public procurement and public financial managements are among key focus of GEMAP that reflect marked improvements. At the same time, the political will at the highest level of government has contributed to ensure fiscal discipline and prudent financial management.

- **Senior Executive Service (SES)**

The Senior Executive Service was designed by the Government of Liberia to respond to technical competency and the leadership challenges that confront the Liberian civil service. It is expected to comprise of technically qualified, reform and change-driven, strongly ethical and professionally motivated individuals, who would bring instant credibility and capacity to the civil service and enable it implement reforms that will make such changes sustainable in the long-run.

The main objectives of the SES are to attract and retain qualified professionals with managerial skills for strategic decision making, to generate the massive but optimally balanced surge executive capacity needed to “jump start” government civil service reform effort and provide a creative platform for transforming the civil service into a more professional, effective and accountable organ of the democratic process.

As it can be seen, the intention is to reinforce the government’s capacity to catalyze and drive strategic reforms by building a nucleus of government leadership capacity in the public sector and the establishment of new standards for public service. More specifically, the SES is primarily about strengthening the executive management of government institutions through the injection of top notch professionals capable of spearheading and managing change in the public sector; reforming the administrative systems and procedures for effective human resource management, emphasizing merit, performance, service culture and result orientation and advancing the overall reform and development agenda through strategic placement of SES personnel in line ministries, department and agencies. The program is designed to serve as a building block for long-term capacity building and to drive a comprehensive reform in the civil service.

Through this program, the government plans to field 100 professionals in three consecutive rollouts commencing with a first batch of 21 to be followed by two batches of 49 and 30 respectively. Its initial three years cost which amounts to 9.7 million would be financed through a multi-donor support. Currently, contributors include: UNDP, World Bank, USAID, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Humanity United, and the Government of Liberia.

Posts considerations under this program will be consistent with national development plans and, hence, a number of current posts would require re-profiling. Interestingly, the SES is designed so as not to be implemented as a stand alone effort with expectations to be characterized by objectivity in decision making, impartiality, integrity, non-partisanship and transparency and accountability in actions and decisions as well.

- **Civil Service Right-Sizing Reform Program**

The Civil Service Right Sizing Reform program was initiated to confront the over-blotted size of government institutions resulting from overstaffing. The effort aimed principally to achieve a lean, efficient, effective and manageable civil service. It basically employed strategies that sought to get rid of ghost names on the payroll, review and revive leave policy, restore merit-based system, purge patronage, nepotism and cronyism; retrain and redeploy staffs, reinforce the implementation of code of conduct for public servants and redirect workers program.

This initiative has been funded through a US\$1 million grant from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which also covered support to the Governance Commission and Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA). Given the disparaging state of Liberia's educational system following years of violent arm conflicts, civil servants are limited in terms of skills and even specialized knowledge which undermines performance and make it difficult for them to qualify for positions of increasing difficulties and responsibility. With support from the WB, the Ministry of Finance, CSA, the University of Liberia, LIPA has initiated a Public financial Management training project for graduates who upon the completion of studies would be drafted into the civil service as financial managers. The first promotion is expected to graduate this coming

### **Conclusion**

The different initiatives enumerated above have strong similarities and have no doubt made improvements to national capacity in various areas and at different levels. For the most part, however, each has been undertaken as a stand alone with very little connectivity to the other. If everybody seems to be doing more or less the same thing, or

have the same intentions, the convergence of efforts can bring the synergy that would ultimately have a positive effect on human capacity surge in the country. To reverse this disconnect, there is a need to ensure proper coordination and allow for greater impact under a well-defined national program that is designed with reasonable certainty through a capacity assessment. It is indeed the intention of the 10 –Year National Capacity Building Program to bring together the disconnects among all capacity building initiatives.

## **II. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY**

### **2.1. Introduction to the Outcome Evaluation**

The increasing demand for development effectiveness has prompted a shift in emphasis from simply producing deliverables to issues regarding the relevance of development inputs and outputs in yielding discernable improvements in development conditions, and ultimately in people’s lives. This novel management approach requires a reorientation from the conventional input-output project evaluation model to the one that focuses on outcomes or changes achieved in the completion of outputs and the achievement of impacts, and are realized in partnership with other development actors.


An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome is or is not being achieved in a given context, and the role that partners have played in the process. It also helps to clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlight unintended positive and negative consequences, recommend actions to improve performance and lessons learned. Following UNDP’ s Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, this evaluation will therefore include four categories of analysis:

- (1) Assess the status of the outcome
- (2) Examine the factors affecting the outcome
- (3) Assess partners’ contributions to outcome
- (4) Assess partnership strategy for changing the outcome.

The findings will be structured according to these standard objectives of an outcome evaluation.

**FIGURE 1**

**THE RESULTS CHAIN**



## **2.2. Outcome Statement, Indicators, Baselines and Targets**

The projects under evaluation were designed in the traditional project logical framework with no explicit mention made about their intended outcomes, associated indicators, baselines and targets. Nor are they clearly stated in the Country Programme, Strategic Results Framework (SRF) or Country Cooperation Framework. In these conditions, the evaluation team agreed to deduct or construct the outcome based on a careful review of the aforementioned policy documents as well as the Country Common Assessment (CCA), the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the National Human Development Report 2006, project documents, the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The outcome and its dimensions are as follows:

**Intended Outcome:** The capacities of national institutions are built and strengthened in order to facilitate governance and public sector reforms and accelerate national reconstruction and post-conflict development agenda.

### **Outcome indicators:**

- National institutions revitalized through institutional capacity development
- Human capacity increased and strengthened

The outcome will be analyzed based on these two dimensions.

**Baseline (2005):** severe shortage of qualified manpower hampering the reform and reconstruction efforts, ineffective and inefficient institutions and systemic corruption.

**Targets:** capacity of key institutions strengthened to address key governance and public sector reform issues. Policy and planning instruments, strategies and management tools developed to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and transparency in government operations. Number of trained staff increased.

## **2.3. Data Collection Methods**

In order to address the four categories of analysis described above, the evaluation team opted for a triangulation of five (5) data collection methods, combining qualitative and quantitative aspects.

- 1) Documentary review: the team conducted a desk review of relevant documents and reports to familiarize itself with project and non-project activities and operations.
- 2) Individual interviews: the team held meetings with key stakeholders, including the members of the Project Steering Committee, Project Implementation Committee, beneficiaries and representatives of relevant donor agencies. A pre-designed interview guide was prepared to facilitate this process.
- 3) Focus group discussions: group meetings were held with beneficiaries and relevant members of civil society and organized groups to capture their views and perceptions on project operations and impacts based on pre-designed questionnaire guide. The focus groups meetings took place at the Civil Service Agency, the coordinating body for the two projects.
- 4) Surveys using two (2) pre-designed questionnaires: one questionnaire targeted the TOKTEN project beneficiaries with a view to capture the opinions of as many participants as possible, including those who did not participate in the focus group meetings. The other questionnaire was intended to those working in the environment of beneficiaries of both projects. The purpose of the surveys was not to perform any statistical analysis, which would have required more time and resources, but simply to access to as many sources of information on the concerned projects as possible.
- 5) Field visits: the mission had the opportunity to visit some institutions and public places to compare the information received from various sources with institutional and societal realities.

### **III. FINDINGS , LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **3.1. STATUS OF THE OUTCOME**

##### **3.1.1. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS REVITALIZED**

The outcome evaluation documents the progress made during the last two (2) years (2006-2007) in revitalizing national institutions by means of involving expatriate nationals and local professionals, and through their institutional capacity strengthening activities. The criteria or benchmarks against which we evaluate institutional capacity encompass changes brought about as result of policies, strategies, planning and management practices and tools and organizational culture which enable the institutions or the country to manage development functions more effectively, efficiently and sustainably. We use before and after intervention method to capture any changes.

When the new democratically elected government of Liberia assumed office in January 2006, it inherited weakened state institutions, as a result of the many years of political instability and violent conflict. The latter had virtually paralyzed all public institutions, in part due to the massive flight of human capacity and lack of essential tools, logistics and supplies.

During the period under review (March 2006- 2007), LECBS/TOKTEN projects have succeeded in attracting to Liberia a total of 77 highly qualified Liberians , mostly from the Diaspora, and deployed them into the public sector in various capacities ranging from Cabinet ministers, their principal deputies, heads of public agencies, consultants to ministries, University Professors, medical doctors, economists, engineers and management specialists (List in Annexes 2 and 3). Through the work of these Liberians, regulatory frameworks have been significantly strengthened with the adoption of critical policies and strategies, laws and new management practices which have allowed the fostering of an enabling environment necessary for the stimulation of the economic recovery and social infrastructure rehabilitation.

We outline in this Section the changes (outcomes) brought about by these new regulatory frameworks, while the actual policies and strategies which caused these changes to happen will be discussed under the section entitled Key Contributions.



**a) Increased Public Revenues**

The revenue estimates of the country have substantially increased from US\$ 80 million in 2005/2006 to \$199.38 million in 2007/2008, an increase of over 149 percent. Vendors as well as civil servants are getting paid on time. One hundred and fifty million Euros is earmarked for development from 2008-2013 under EDF 10 (European Development Fund). No outstanding EDF 9 project was lost. A debt cancellation of about \$1 billion, after reaching the HIPC decision point for the first time in over 20 years, bringing the country into good status standing with its major creditors.

**b) Improved Access to and Delivery of Services**

Unnecessary bureaucratic bottlenecks which clogged the budgeting system and slowed down the process in getting budgetary allotment has been minimized by reducing the number of signatures required to process allotment applications; timeframe required to complete the process has been shortened. Bureaucratic red tapes, rent-seeking and other forms of corruptions has been almost eliminated. Timely disbursement of funds to facilitate government operations and meet set deliverables now ensured. The process required now to complete the allotment application is about 2 days instead of 2 weeks. Government parastatals receive disbursement on time once they follow the procedure. There is no rent-seeking to perform service.

**c) Increased Private Sector Investment Opportunities**

Liberia is on the path to becoming again an attractive investment location. In 2007, twenty (20) project proposals from the private sector with an investment size of US \$97million were processed. These investments had the capacity to create an estimated 2,033 jobs in the agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and service sectors of the economy. Moreover, following the 2007 Investment Promotion Forum in Washington, DC, over US\$100 million in new financing proposals for Liberia was brought to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).<sup>1</sup> Ancelott Metal has begun a 1.5 billion investment in the iron ore mining industry, bringing the country's entire investment portfolio to nearly US\$2 billion.

**d) Improved Health Sector Conditions**

When the war ended in 2003, the JFK Memorial Hospital, the only tertiary institution of the country, had an estimated bed occupancy rate of less than 20 percent in what was

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<sup>1</sup> National Investment Commission, 2007 Annual Report.

once described as a place where one goes to die. Today, the hospital's bed occupancy rate surpasses 100 percent. Nearly 12,000 outpatient visits were recorded in the first quarter of 2007 compared to 11,643 for the entire year of 2006, an increase of 97 % in admission rate.

345 health facilities were brought into functionality throughout the country. 81% coverage in immunization nationwide. 122 doctors are serving the country (of which 51 Liberians). There is a growing awareness for an integrated and multi-sector approaches to the fight against HIV/AIDS.

**e) Improvements in the Civil Service**

The elimination of “ghost names” (people whose name continue to remain on the official payroll long after they have died or left public service) from the payroll. Between 2006 when the government came into office and December 31, 2007, a total of 12,300 names were purged, representing 26% reduction in the overall wage bill of Government. The number includes some ghosts and payroll reduction through attrition.) Disaggregating this figure shows that in 2005, the active workforce was 44,702; in 2006 it was reduced to 36,268; and in 2007 to 31,900. The 26% payroll reduction contributed to a savings to taxpayers of nearly US\$ 4 million. It has also resulted into improved coordination and efficiency in key government functionaries.<sup>2</sup>

A Baseline salary for civil servants has been gradually increasing from US\$ 15.00 in 2005 to US\$ 30 in FY 2006/07 to US\$ 55 in FY 2007/08. The current budget has proposed another increase to US\$ 70 for FY 2008/09. Budgetary allocation for civil service employees' payroll has been increased for FY 2008/09 by 9.5 million. This excludes an additional US\$ 500,000.00 allocated for rural employees in the health, education and agricultural areas. As result, a gradual morale boost especially for middle level and baseline employees, potentially leading to marginal increase in productivity level.

**f) Quality Improvements in the Higher Education System**

In 2005, there were 51 higher educational institutions and universities on the books, many of them sub-standard or physically non-existent. A minimum criterion was then put in place by which to conduct an initial assessment of these institutions. As a result, 28 institutions were closed due to non-compliance with minimum standard. Currently, only 13 institutions are operating in the country with the capacity to grant degrees.

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<sup>2</sup> Civil Service Agency , 2007 Annual Report.

There is growing awareness to decentralize the higher education system in line with the government 's decentralization policy. As a result, decisions have been made to open three regional colleges in Voijama, Lofa County in the Northwest; Saniquelle, Nimba County in the Central region; and Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County in the eastern region. The Colleges will provide AA degrees to students in several disciplines in Business, Liberal Arts, Education and Agriculture.

The William V. S. Tubman Technical College in Maryland County will open by the end of the year after nearly two decades of closure as a result of the civil war. A new curriculum is being developed. Unlike in the past when it operated on the AA level, the curriculum is being upgraded to a BA/BSC level.

The quality of education is reportedly on the rise in some departments of the University of Liberia ( for example: Agriculture and Forestry Department) and at the Cuttington University College due, in part to the infusion of new courses, advanced degree teachers, up-dated books and documentation, , new information technologies (especially at the Cuttington University College) and faculty exchange programs.

It is worth noting that while most of the programs in the higher education have been thought of prior to 2005 as an overall scheme to revitalize the higher education system of the country, it was until recently with the appointment of the LECBS professional as Director of Higher Education and the leadership of the Minister of Education who is also a LECBS beneficiary that the process was implemented and in many instances policies were clarified.

### 3.1.2. **HUMAN CAPACITY INCREASED AND STRENGTHENED**

There is little evidence to advance that the projects under review helped to increase in systematic way the stock of human skills, besides the availability of expatriate nationals and local professionals. The available data indicates that three cadres were trained in Leadership from the Ministries of Commerce, Defense and Agriculture, respectively. One person in Engineering, and one on Capacity Building from the MPEA.

The candidate in Engineering, Mr. James Dorbor Jallah, former Dean of the Arthur Barclay Business College, Stella Maris Polytechnic , just completed his Master Degree in Engineering with emphasis on Logistics and Supplies Chain Management at the University of Zaragoza in Spain. This candidate was exceptional as he graduated with high honors and was offered two awards to do his Ph.D. at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Boston, USA and secondly with the Vrije University in Amsterdam.

Various workshops (CSA, Education) were also organized for staff members. These training opportunities might have strengthened the performance capacities of the participants. LECBS/TOKTEN beneficiaries also reported mentoring and coaching activities in their institutions, but it is hard to assess the contributions to capacity enhancement of such isolated activities. Table 1 gives illustrations of some innovative concepts introduced and the capacities created.

**TABLE 1**  
**ILLUSTRATIONS OF SOME INNOVATIVE CONCEPTS INTRODUCED AND CAPACITY CREATED**

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES	CAPACITY CREATED
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Citizen participation in the budgeting process (MoF)</li> <li>- Alignment of sector funding requests to specific objectives and poverty reduction targets (MoF)</li> <li>- Establishing a sense of direction to guide purposeful actions ( in almost all involved institutions)</li> <li>- Finding alternative ways to solving problems in the public sector ( JFK, MoPW, MoF, University of Liberia)</li> <li>- Interactive Web sites (NIC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Participatory Development and Management</li> <li>- Performance Budgeting</li> <li>- Strategic Planning</li> <li>- Public Private Partnership</li> <li>- Capacity of actors to access to information and to learn anytime and anywhere.</li> </ul>

In academic institutions where training is the primary mission like at the University of Liberia and the Cuttington University College, various innovations have been reported, which might have very positive implications on learning. In the latter institution for

example, textbooks have been introduced to expose students to different theoretical foundations and perspectives, as opposed to the popular way in Liberia to learn only from the instructor's syllabus. Internet facilities are available for students and faculty, the latter having each a computer in the office. In both institutions, curricula are being revised to adjust to market needs and evolving technological, environmental, economic and sociopolitical conditions; new visiting professors are brought in to fill gaps. These initiatives will definitely have a positive impact on the quality of education received by students.

### **3.2. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OUTCOME**

The influencing factors are the conditions beyond partners' control that can influence positively or negatively the outcome. Positive influences can be construed as opportunities for outcome enhancement while negatives constitute potential environmental threats that may impinge on the long-term viability of the outcome. The evaluation team considers political factors discussed below as having positive influences and the rest of the factors as having a negative impact on outcome.

#### **3.2.1. Political Factors**

The return to peace after more than two decades of violent conflict and the perceived political stability after the coming to power of a democratically elected government, have been the driving forces for all societal actors to engage in the process of national reconstruction and development. This new stable and secure environment has created the conditions for Liberians to unite and rebuilt their nation.

LECBS/TOKTEN were introduced at a time the country badly needs technical capacity to support the newly democratic state of Liberia. Enthusiasm and hope were and are still high among Liberians within the country and in the Diaspora. Many Liberians overseas are waiting for an opportunity to return home to make any contribution. This explains the high interest in the projects among expatriate and local nationals who have come to know about them.

In addition, the international cooperation bodies that have assisted Liberia in finding peaceful solutions, ending the war and organizing democratic elections, are displaying great willingness to continue to support the country through the post-conflict phase of reconstruction and development. Generous funding was secured through UNDP, USAID, OSI and other institutions. Under the 150-Day Action Plan, an estimated US\$ 65 million was committed by development partners and the Government of Liberia for deepening capacity (iPRS, pp. A2-3). Most of this was centered on the economic revitalization under the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme

(GEMAP) and other major capacity building interventions such as LECBS, TOKTEN and SES.

### 3.2.2. Cultural and Attitudinal Factors

If the above institutional and political factors wield positive influences on the outcome, cultural processes tend to act in the opposite direction. Liberia has successfully won the physical or military war; it now faces the challenge of winning another type of war, equally important, that is psychological and mental in nature. Reconstruction and sustainable development require a change of mindset in terms of adopting new ways of thinking and doing things and taking full responsibility for own development.

Serious attitudinal problems hamper entrepreneurial management to the point that those who are attempting to introduce innovative approaches become quickly disenchanted. For example, in the Ministry of Education, in accordance with the performance management philosophy, a TOKTEN participant requested all his staff to report every Friday in an ad hoc meeting what they have done throughout the week. Subsequently, Friday became “a sick leave day” for most staff members for fear of reporting no results. There is a lot of work to do, yet civil servants prefer to turn around, talk about football or simply sleep on their desks.

This is what Dr. Robert Dennis, another TOKTEN beneficiary, who is Chief Medical Officer at the JFK Memorial Hospital has to say:

“ It has been difficult for people to break old habits. To get staff to understand that they have to plan, to know what is their daily intake so that we can plan for the future, therefore, they have to keep the records, has not been easy”.

One LECBS beneficiary with the Finance Ministry declares that “ convincing people to pay taxes has not been easy. When they are in the USA they pay, but when they arrive home, they don’t want to do it. We have to educate and sensitize our people so that they understand that paying taxes is good for their country and it is the only way to sustain reforms. But this is not going to happen overnight”.

Everyone the mission has encountered recognizes poor attitudes and indiscipline (as well as poor attendance) to constitute a daunting task in the reform efforts. The attitude toward government property and assets is reportedly negative. Public property can be misused

just because it does not belong to anyone. Similarly, the paternalistic mentality according to which the government should do everything seems widespread, even in colleges. Students expect the government to pay their tuition and professing the contrary could become a ground for protests. People don't feel that they should take responsibility for their lives. The question then is how performance in government be perfected in a context in which people refuse to take responsibility for their actions

It is true that written reports and instructions will not effect mental changes. There is an urgent need for systematic popular mobilization campaigns spearheaded by the President herself and all officials of public and private institutions, leading by example coupled with a review of school curriculum to impart civic and patriotic values.

### 3.2.3. Governance and Administrative Factors

The inherited pattern of centralization still stands in the way of effective development administration. Every small decision is referred to the boss at the top, leaving lower and middle-level managers in a state of idleness. People hesitate to take responsibility even for minor matters.

At another level, the centralization of infrastructure facilities around Monrovia and its surrounding counties, at the expense of the rest of the country, makes some aspects of the reform agenda more difficult to achieve. The mission was told that when someone graduates from an academic institution in Monrovia, the tendency has often been to reject employment in rural areas. Few existing private institutions like Cuttington College, despite its success in attracting visiting professors from abroad, experiences difficulties in employing available Liberians, owing to its location. The proposed decentralization of higher education through the creation of three regional colleges in counties constitutes a step in the right direction.

It should be added that the motivation level in the civil service is generally low, raising the question of sustainability of any donor-funded project. Even though civil service salaries have been increased and are paid regularly, they still not match the cost of living. This state of affairs explains the popularity of extramuros activities to compensate for low wages in the public sector. The consequence is inevitably low productivity.

On the other hand, bureaucratic corruption is cited as an unending hindrance to economic development. In spite of the fact that over 90 percent of our respondents recognize that

corruption and mismanagement of public resources is decreasing, they are also quick to add that rent-seeking behaviors are pervasive. Corruption seems to be attributed no so much to greediness, but to poor salary conditions and cultural expectations regarding the holders of public positions. Accordingly, it is essential to come up with a comprehensive anti-corruption and national integrity building strategy taking into account all the facets of corruption in the Liberian society.

#### 3.2.4. Economic Factors

Although the Liberian economy is showing signs of recovery, the road is still long for it to generate enough resources to adequately respond to rising expectations of its population. Revenues have indeed skyrocketed due to improved management of the economy and revenue collection. The revenue intake for FY 2008/2009 is projected at \$276,767,955. At the same time, expenditures will further increase in the light of growing national reconstruction and development needs as highlighted in the PRS. This predicament raises the question of how fast the government will be able to accumulate sufficient wealth to substantially improve the living conditions of its employees, thereby inducing motivation for higher productivity.

Total government expenditure, including grants, has not exceeded \$85 million since 2000, translating into per capita spending of about \$25, one of the lowest in the world. The 2006-2007 budget was projected at \$130 million, a 60 percent increase over the previous year, with at least 15 percent devoted to poverty reduction activities. Inflation, which jumped to 15 percent in 2003, subsequently subsided to around 6 percent, although there are new pressures from rising prices as the economy rebounds (iPRS, pp.2). Years of mismanagement have left Liberia with a huge external debt burden, estimated at about \$3, 7 billion as of mid-2005, equivalent to an astonishing 800 percent of GDP and 3, 000 percent of exports. Domestic debt and non-salary arrears are estimated at about \$700, a significant part of which is owed to the banking system, including the Central Bank of Liberia.

In addition to the driving forces that have facilitated the outcome and the negative influences which threaten its efficacy and sustainability, there are challenges that must be addressed to ensure continuity and operational effectiveness. Among those are:

- The need to mobilize additional resources to accommodate more expatriate nationals and local professionals to adequately respond to the capacity challenges being faced by the Government.
- The need for line ministries and agencies to create conducive working environment for project partners or beneficiaries office space, logistics.



### 3.3. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS/OUTPUTS

Nearly all strategic outputs were accomplished with contributions from both projects. A table (Table 2) is used to separate wherever possible the source of outputs while keeping in mind the crosscutting nature of some of them. The linkages between outputs and outcome is indicated in the following section. A separate section deals with the issue of the attribution of strategic outputs to LECBS/TOKTEN professionals and outcome.

#### 3.3.1. STRATEGIC OUTPUTS

##### 3.3.1.1. A coherent development vision and integrated institutional approaches to poverty reduction

An interim poverty reduction strategy (iPRS) was prepared and laid the foundation for the preparation of a poverty reduction strategy (PRS). The iPRS and the PRS have facilitated the renewal of confidence in Liberia by the international community and are the basis for reconstruction planning, resource mobilization and debt waivers.

A product of intersectoral effort spearheaded by the Ministers of Finance, Planning and Public Works, all LECBS beneficiaries and with an active involvement from virtually all other LECBS /TOKTEN professionals, this strategy provides the framework for recovery, development and sectoral planning and resource mobilization, including private sector investment. Both the iPRS and PRS present a critical diagnostic of issues and articulate priority interventions to be pursued by the Government and other stakeholders over the period July 2006 through June 2008 (iPRS) and July 2008 through July 2011 (PRS). Key priorities are clearly framed focusing on strategic areas for nation rebuilding and economic take-off: (a) consolidate the peace by advancing the reform of the security sector through the development of sound overall policy and legislated institution restructuring, (b) revitalize agriculture by stimulating traditional export sectors such as rubber and tree crops and laying the basis for national food security by supporting resettlement of farmers and providing needed seeds, tools and revitalized extension services, (c) rebuild the economic and social infrastructure, with emphasis on the nation's road network, (d) promote good governance and the rule of law by enhancing public financial management systems and strengthening the pillars of integrity as a means of fighting corruption and improving systems of accountability, and (e) strengthen the environment for private growth through reform of the tax and incentive systems and by minimizing red tape and unnecessary regulations.

In line with these priorities, both strategy documents are restructured around four components or pillars to facilitate implementation : Pillar I: Enhancing National Security, Pillar II: Revitalizing the Economy, Pillar III: Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law and Pillar IV: Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering Basic Services

The PRS draws very heavily from lessons learned during the formulation and implementation of the iPRS. What makes the document unique compared to most poverty reduction papers in Africa, reflecting the experience and expertise of the preparers, is that it goes beyond strategy formulation to lay out practical steps for its effective implementation. Emphasis is put on sustained and strong political commitment, building of strategic partnerships, effective mobilization and utilization of resources and robust monitoring and evaluation systems . To facilitate the latter, each strategic area (pillar) concludes with a performance matrix delineating the strategic objective, indicators, delivery date and responsible lead agency or ministry. A number of cross-cutting considerations such as gender, environment, youth and HIV/AIDS are incorporated in the document. Estimates of financial costs of activities, taking into account the national budgeting framework are presented.

A salient feature of both the iPRS and the PRS remains their participatory approach consistent with the commitment of the new leadership to engage all spheres of society (public and private sectors, civil society, women and community-based organizations) in policy formulation and execution.

There is a strong evidence that LECBS/TOKTEN professionals have not only called for the formulation of these strategic documents to guide national reconstruction planning and reform agenda, they have equally accelerated their preparation and execution.

### **3.3.1.2. Macro-economic stability, prudent financial management and use of public resources, and restored donor confidence**

Building on the experience and expertise of the new LECBS/TOKTEN state managers, the government was able in a very short period of time compared to other African countries, to make significant improvements in public finances and in monetary and exchange rate policies , paving the way to full restoration of normalized relations with the IMF in March 2008. Some of the major policies and strategies include:

- Implementation of the IMF Staff Monitored Program (SMP) which set the stage for debt forgiveness
- Implementation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), leading to new expenditure control mechanisms, strengthening of enforcement and collection of custom duties and other taxes,

improvement of the procurement system, and establishment of a framework for transparency, accountability and efficiency.

- Introduction of a cash-based balanced budget
- Integration in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), leading to the strengthening of accountability and transparency in managing funds generated through natural resource-based activities.
- Introduction of a legislation to limit the discretion of the Government to change budget allocations between ministries and agencies without approval of the Legislature to a cumulative total of 30 percent. The latter was recently approved by the legislature after reducing the threshold to twenty percent.

It is important to underscore the steps made to turn the budget into an effective instrument of government policy. Since 2006, there has been a significant move away from the traditional input-oriented budget to a firmly output and policy-driven budget. While the FY2007/2008 budget was based on the deliverables of the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS), the FY2008/2009 budget is under-girded by the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), a much expanded and long-term sequel to the iPRS. Similar to the iPRS framework, the PRS has assigned to various spending entities responsibilities for delivering on specific targets grouped under the four sector pillars of the strategy (Peace and Security, Economic Revitalization, Strengthening Governance and Rule of Law and Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivering Basic Services). What is important to note is that the expenditure priorities for the spending entities in the budget are ranked in such a way that their PRS deliverables take preeminence over other agency-specific objectives.

In addition, there is an enumeration of measurable program objectives for each organizational units and departments (or programs) of spending entities. For each program, there is a delineation of progress in the previous fiscal year. The segment on measurable objective is intended to facilitate performance measurement for subsequent year funding, and to keep a program-budget focus while the government builds capacity for full transition to program budgeting.

In the process of standardizing the expenditure codes to serve as the launching point towards the full automation of the budget process, the Liberia Expenditure Control and Accountability Program (LECAP) was introduced to ensure that the Bureau of the Budget and the Ministry of Finance have the same source data for budget execution. To make LECAP feasible, the existing expenditure codes at the time were harmonized, i.e. each item of expenditure was assigned a unique description and numerical code. Though it represented a major step towards eliminating duplications and overlaps, LECAP's main limitation is reportedly that the classification and coding system on which it is based has become obsolete and arbitrary.

To improve the budget classification and bring it on par internationally, the Bureau of the Budget has produced a preliminary version of the GOL Chart of Accounts under the title Budget Classification: Objects of Expenditure Glossary. The chart of accounts eliminates all overlapping and duplicating titles, object codes and ambiguous descriptions, and it complies with the internationally standardized Government Finance Statistics (GFS). This is significant for the future adoption of an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS).

On the process side, the veil of secrecy around the budget process in the past has been removed, thus creating a public understanding and appreciation of the budget and also inspiring public confidence in the process and accountability for those administering the budget. Efforts have been made to involve civil society inputs in the budget formulation process. One of the major changes the members of civil society the mission interviewed were proud to bring to our attention was their involvement in the budget process. Some confessed not to know anything about the budget the way they do know. All this because the budget process as well as the finished document are published in the media. There is also an open budget hearing and debate at both the national legislature and within civil society.

The results of all these interactions and feedbacks are obviously the improvement in access to and delivery of services as stated in the outcome section above.

### **3.3.1.3. Establishment of additional national planning and aid coordination frameworks**

In addition to their contributions to the PRS and iPRS which set the vision for reconstruction planning and development, LECBS/TOKTEN participants within the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, have provided leadership in devising additional mechanisms for improving aid coordination and resource mobilization. Some of these mechanisms include:

- Establishment of a participatory consultative framework and a deepened poverty diagnostics resulting in an increase in the availability of national data through CWIQ and PPA;
- Alignment of both donors and government initiatives with the national reconstruction and development agenda as well as coordination between the different actors and their activities, all aligned with the PRS;
- Signing and endorsement of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF National Indicative Programme
- Establishment of regulatory frameworks for Civil Society Organizations (CSO)

- Development of a national aid coordination and development assistance tool, with key actors being LRDC, MPEA and LIGIS, and support to the organization of the Partners' Forum in Washington D.C. in February 2007;
- Leadership in the formulation of a national capacity development strategy and action plan to provide an overall framework and ensure structure and coherence to the various capacity building initiatives implemented in Liberia.
- Establishment of a link between local level priorities (through the County Development Agendas) with the national development agenda (the PRS).

#### **3.3.1.4. Establishment of a private sector enabling environment**

The Chairman of the National Investment Commission and Economic Advisor to the President is a LECBS partner and his policy coordinator participates in the TOKTEN program. They have launched important reforms that have culminated in the reinvention of the National Investment Commission and the creation of a more friendly private sector environment in Liberia. Indeed, the 1975 investment code of Liberia, overtaken by time and numerous challenges imposed by market conditions, was revised to address said conditions and challenges.

The new Code eliminates the constraints that impede the expeditious appraisal and approval of investment incentive contracts. The 2000 Tax Code of Liberia was also revised in conjunction with the Finance Ministry to remove the uncertainties and subjectivities of granting investment incentives via ad-hoc negotiations. Additionally, the 100 % waiver of duty on raw materials, machinery, spare parts and packaging materials for manufacturers was extended to mining and agriculture. Additional capital allowances under the Tax Code automatically are given for special incentives such as job creation, local value added and incentives for location in order to encourage the decentralization of investments. The revisions also provide a reduction from 35% to 30% in maximum corporate tax rate for all investors in Liberia, bringing the country in line with competitive tax rates in the Sub-region.

#### **3.3.1.5. Strengthening of mechanisms for trade and commerce development**

The Ministry of Commerce of Industry (MOCI) has undertaken 21 key business reforms that make business registration easy and fast, reduce prospects for fraud and corruption through the establishment of a number of administrative measures that remove unnecessary bottle necks and ensure transparency, check and balance.

The Ministry is currently developing a national business registry that will enable online business registration. It has also changed the business registration time from January-March of each year. Businesses can now re-register after a year. Meanwhile, the MOCI

has, in collaboration with the chamber of commerce and the business community, revised the 1973 price determination mark up price; it has also in consultation with stakeholders developed a comprehensive policy on intellectual property rights with the aim of improving revenue flows, while providing leadership for the structuring and strengthening of loose associations.

The Ministry has initiated a public private dialogue that promotes constructive exchanges between the members of the business community/ private sector and government official for the advancement of the business climate. Similarly, the MOCI has set up committees on essential commodities such as gasoline, rice, cement and building materials for the monitoring of prices relative to these goods so as to inform the Ministry on how to position itself considering global inflationary trends.

In order to ensure standards in marketed commodities, the Ministry is currently setting up testing facility at the MOPW which is expected to be completed by December 2008 or early January of 2009, to ensure that goods conform to international and local standards. In this regard, two employees from the department of standards, who have received training, are currently conducting sensitization on the initiative.

Preceding the moves indicated above, the MOCI has taken some steps to improve performance and ensure institutional focus. The Ministry has reduced its work force at the Free Port of Monrovia and has developed comprehensive terms of reference and work plans for all positions within the Ministry for 2008 and 2009 respectively.

#### **3.3.1.6. Reforms of the health sector and medical establishments**

The health sector has more TOKTEN professionals than any other institution or agency (05) in the country and the top leadership participates in the LECBS. This situation is wholly understandable: Liberia has only 51 medical doctors, most of them over 50 years old. If no training is envisioned, in 10 years there will be a more serious shortage of doctors. Liberia has no paediatricians when over 60% of the population are young. There are only four dentists for the whole country. Improvements of access to health care and control of HIV/AIDS are also among the major challenges.

LECBS/TOKTEN professionals have helped to build the foundation for expanding access to basic health care of acceptable quality and establishing the building blocks of an effective health care delivery system. They are also involved in rehabilitating medical institutions and in training personnel. Some of the major achievements that have been made to date include:

- Development of a national health policy and strategic plan aimed at increasing the provision of basic health package. The operational and integrated framework for implementing the policy is based on four key components: 1) Basic Package of Health Services; 2) Human Resources for Health; 3) Infrastructure Development and 4) Support Systems. The Basic Package of Health Services was officially launched on November 14, 2007 and is being operationalized by the Ministry incrementally to become functional in 70% of existing health facilities by the end of 2008.
- Establishment of NACP to broaden the response to HIV/AIDS
- Establishment of HIV/AIDS Unit at JFK
- Rehabilitation of the JFK Memorial Hospital
- Institutionalization of system changes at the JFK Memorial Hospital
- Establishment of a Cancer Program at the JFK
- Contacts with the Government of Ghana and South Africa to assist in training Liberian medical personnel
- Establishment of linkages with medical doctors and professors, especially from the USA to come to teach and share experiences with Liberians.

#### 3.3.1.7. **Reforms of the higher education system**

The tertiary educational system has been confronted with a number of challenges of which, a shortage of advanced degree holders among teachers, an outdated curriculum, inadequate textbooks, poor quality programs being offered at some institutions, weak capacity for governance and management and very limited access to new information technologies. During the war, over 28 institutions were created, dispensed training and delivered diplomas without accreditation. LECBS/TOKTEN professionals brought in the higher education system have produced the following results:

- Establishment of a minimum standard for operation of higher education institutions in Liberia
- Proposals for expanding higher education to rural areas
- Strengthening of the National Commission for Higher Education
- Harmonizing higher education standard with the rest of the West Region of Africa
- Offering a proposal to revise the College of Agriculture and Forestry curriculum of the University of Liberia in accordance with the University's Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 to help address food insecurity problems by providing manpower for agricultural and natural resource development.
- Revision of the curriculum of the Business Department at the Cuttington University College.
- Provision of textbooks, computers and establishment of internet services at Cuttington University College.

- Introduction of new courses at the University of Liberia and Cuttington University College.
- Strengthening of external relations for research, exchange programs and resource mobilization in both universities.

#### 3.3.1.8. **Reforms of the Civil Service**

The reform of the civil service is a crucial first step in addressing the human capacity situation of the Government. A number of initiatives have been taken :

- **Restructuring and rightsizing:** create a lean government in which mandates and functions of ministries and agencies are clarified, organizational structures rationalized and staffing configuration and competencies are appropriately aligned.
- **Pay and pension reforms:** a compensation package that attracts, retains and contributes to the motivation of Civil Service employees to be productive in the implementation of their roles and responsibilities and properly rewarded upon retirement.
- **Drafting of the Code of Conduct for public officials and revised rules and regulations for civil service ; updating of the civil service code.**
- **Civil Service reform awareness and sensitization campaigns in all 15 counties**
- **Contribution to the formulation of national anticorruption strategy**
- **Contribution to the draft proposal for the 10 year National Capacity Building Strategy**



TABLE 2

## OUTPUT PER PROJECT

LECBS	TOKTEN
<p>Number of participants: 40 of which 10 females</p>	<p>Number of expatriate nationals: 22            Number of local professionals: 15  <u>Total: 37 of which 6 females</u></p>
<p><u>REVITALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING</u></p>	<p><u>REVITALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING</u></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formulation of the Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (crosscutting sectoral contribution)</li> <li>• Formulation of the Government’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy-iPRS (crosscutting sectoral contribution)</li> <li>• Establishment of regulatory frameworks for Civil Society Organizations –CSO</li> <li>• Development of a national aid coordination and development assistance management tool , with key actors being LRSC, MPEA and LISGIS</li> <li>• Coordination and organization of the Partners’ Forum in Washington, DC in February 2007 (crosscutting)</li> <li>• Effective implementation of the Interim Commitment Control for vouchers payments, as benchmarked under the IMF Staff-Monitored Programme (MoF)</li> <li>• Revenue target of the government and IMF-SMP realized, resulting in improved revenue performance (MoF)</li> <li>• Development of Preliminary Multi-year Spending Framework (MoF)</li> <li>• Introduction of the voucher and cash flow system to ensure on-time payments to vendors and suppliers (MoF)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A set of recommendations provided for the establishment of the Civil Service Pension System</li> <li>• All Liberia and Telecommunication (LTC) salary arrears , retirement benefits and severance packages paid.</li> <li>• Asset/network audit of LTC completed</li> <li>• Completion of management reviews and needs assessment of the financial management and Procurement Management Divisions of the Ministry of Public Works</li> <li>• Establishment of an internal cash management committee in the MoW.</li> <li>• Consolidated National Education Policy created out of the three previously existing policies (Education for All, Girl Education Policy and Education Master Plan)</li> <li>• Agreement signed with USTDA for Mt. Coffee Hydro Plant reconstruction assessment (Ministry of Energy)</li> <li>• Facilitating contract negotiations with donors for continued emergency electricity supply through the country( Ministry of Energy)</li> <li>• Management review and needs assessment of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare completed.</li> <li>• Renovation of the JFK Hospital</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successful posting of all prosecutors in all circuit courts throughout the country, thus facilitating and speeding up the adjudication of cases on dockets (MoJ)</li> <li>• Awareness campaign against “Mob Justice” and “Trial by Ordeal” (MOJ)</li> <li>• Liberia’s Investment Guide produced and distributed (NIC)</li> <li>• Resources mobilized for private sector development (NIC)</li> <li>• Review of tax and investment codes to encourage private sector development (NIC and MoF)</li> <li>• Establishment of Price Monitoring Portal and Consumer Protection Unit within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry</li> <li>• A finalized project proposal for the development of a 10 year National Capacity Development Strategy (CSA)</li> <li>• Operationalization of the County Development Agenda project via national consultations in all 15 counties (MPEA)</li> <li>• Right-sizing and Civil Service awareness and sensitization in all 15 counties (Civil Service Agency)</li> <li>• Streamlining of Government’s payroll (CSA)</li> <li>• Enhanced revenue collection</li> <li>• Draft proposal for a 10-year National Capacity Development Strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reorganization of Emergency Care Services and 24-hour short stay now available</li> <li>• New infectious diseases clinic opened for HIV, TB and Hepatitis.</li> <li>• Drafting of a HIV/AIDS Strategy combining awareness, prevention and treatment.</li> <li>• Drafting of a national communication campaign strategy to fight HIV/AIDS</li> <li>• Revitalization of the import Statistics Unit (Commerce)</li> <li>• Liberia’s admission to AGOA</li> <li>• Contributions made to the drafting of the Veteran’s Act</li> <li>• The Liberia Public-Private Dialogue Framework established by MOCI in collaboration with the IFC and NIC</li> </ul>
<p><u>HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 people trained-Harvard Education Leadership Program (Ministries of Commerce, Defense and Agriculture)</li> <li>• 1 person- Education grant-Polytechnic University</li> <li>• 1 person- Workshop on Capacity Building in Accra (MPEA)</li> </ul>	<p><u>HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senior staff development training for the Ministry of Education staff on educational leadership, human and material resource management</li> <li>• Workshop on Strategic Management (CSA)</li> </ul>

### 3.3.2. **OUTPUTS LINKAGE TO OUTCOME AND IMPACT**

After two years of project execution, it is hard to expect miracles. But when the projects are put in the right perspective of a post-conflict society, one can advance that important milestones have been accomplished. To test that hypothesis, the mission examined the potential impact of some strategic outputs on the outcome or capacity improvement in Liberia. Time and data availability could not permit us to look into all the sectors involved in project activities.

As shown on Table 3, the strategic outputs are deemed to have a very significant impact on institutional capacity improvement in Liberia. For example, the iPRS and PRS produced with a crucial involvement of LECBS/TOKTEN, have a very significant impact on institutional capacity in the sense that they set the vision for reconstruction and development in post-war Liberia. They helped define the issues, strategies, programmatic actions and cost estimates as well as key implementation challenges to be addressed toward recovery, good governance and human development.

A similar reasoning can be applied to all the efforts made at the macroeconomic and sector or agency level aimed at improving financial management and budgeting. For the sake of analysis, we regrouped all these efforts under one strategic output category called : “New financial management and budgeting frameworks established”. Here again we felt justified in saying that the outputs have a very significant impact on institutional capacity improvement. All finance-related policies described under “Strategic Outputs” and summarized in Table 3 by “new financial management and budgeting frameworks established”, have ameliorated transparency, efficiency, accountability and effectiveness in macroeconomic and financial planning, control and management, leading to increased public revenues and renewed donor confidence .

It is also fair to argue that the policies initiated and implemented by LECBS/TOKTEN professionals are having a positive impact on poverty alleviation. While the full impacts of these outputs on human conditions are still to be determined, available data and information seem to suggest a steady economic progress which will ultimately help reduce poverty and accelerate human development.

To be sure, LECBS/TOKTEN prudent macroeconomic policies not only generated revenues, but kept inflation under control ( estimated at 7% at the year end 2007) and secured improved real GDP growth which, from rock bottom -1 % level in 2003 was estimated to reach the 9,5 % mark at the end of 2008. The real GDP growth rate by the end of 2007 stood at 7.9%. This growth was boosted by agriculture, construction, logging, mining and the services sectors. At the current level of almost \$ 200 million , the annual national budget has more than doubled from the \$80 million for the 2003/2004.

Although Liberia still faces considerable challenges, there are reasons to believe that human conditions are improving. People are repainting their houses, markets are being replenished with food, pharmacies and medical centers have medications, hospitals like JFK are testing and counseling for HIV/AIDS and administering anti-retroviral drugs to those positive patients who are eligible, etc. Life is back and hope seems to be resurrected.

**TABLE 3****OUTPUT-OUTCOME LINKAGE AND IMPACT**

<b>STRATEGIC OUTPUTS</b>	<b>OUTPUT LINKAGE TO OUTCOME</b>	<b>IMPACT ON OUTCOME<sup>3</sup></b>
Government's iPRS and PRS formulated	A comprehensive assessment of issues providing an integrated strategic vision and methodology for reconstruction, development or reform agenda	Very significant
New financial management and budgeting frameworks established	Improved mechanisms, processes and tools for transparent, accountable and efficient financial control, management and budgeting	Very significant
Investment and tax code reviewed	Refined regulatory frameworks to promote trade and private sector development	Very significant
The 10 <sup>th</sup> EDO Country Strategic Paper and National Indicative Program produced and endorsed	A comprehensive framework for aid programming and negotiation with the European Union	Very significant
Project proposal for the development of a 10 year National Capacity Development Strategy finalized	A comprehensive approach for addressing national capacity constraints	Very significant
National anticorruption strategy formulated	A comprehensive legal framework for combating corruption	Very significant
52 professionals attracted and engaged in the reform process	Building of institutional and human capacity	Very significant

<sup>3</sup> We have adopted a three-tier ranking consisting of very significant, significant and modest.

### **3.3.3. CONCLUSION: OUTPUT-OUTCOME ATTRIBUTION**

Although LECBS/TOKTEN participants have been instrumental in initiating and implementing changes, one cannot attribute all the progress made exclusively to their presence. For one, through the GEMAP, the government is taking full benefit of the presence of internationally recruited experts in order to facilitate human and institutional capacity building for economic and financial management. The Senior Executive Service program, being steered by the government is also contributing to national capacity enhancement. Notwithstanding these observations, expatriate nationals and local professionals brought in through LECBS and TOKTEN projects are playing a catalytic role in the revitalization process.

If one were to consider how Liberia got to the HIPC decision point and focus on the huge debt burden, one would realize that it took sweeping reforms, dedication, sacrifice and ingenuity of professionals brought home under the TOKTEN/LECBS to reverse the public financial management system accentuated by haemorrhages of public funds, thereby restoring the integrity of government and put it in a better position to pursue set reconstruction and development goals. There is no denying that the move of Liberia to achieve in a relatively short time, the level of debt waivers and the attainment of the HIPC decision point regime is purely unprecedented. It is not evident, however, that the government could have done the same with increased speed and efficacy in the absence of these expatriates, the majority of whom continue to work hard, often leaving offices by 8:00 or even 9:00 pm.

Another factor to consider when reviewing the potential impact of the professionals brought in the projects is the European Development Fund (EDF). When the new government took over, the EDF compact 9 was about to be cancelled. In fact, the Country did not have a National Authorizing Office (NAO), which was essential for making the country's case for development assistance and designing appropriate projects once approvals were granted. Liberia's case was channelled through the Ivorian NAO. But again, because of the level of skills, connections and sophistication brought home by the LECBS/TOKEN professionals within the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, it took no time to firstly make the case for Liberia to have her own NAO and to set up a functional and effective one, afterwards. These fresh moves not only enabled Liberia gain a recommitment of the EDF 9, but have also resulted in the approval of EDF 10, which gives the Country access to about 140 million Euros, which it needs in order to facilitate recovery programs.

### 3.4. PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY

The LECBS/TOKTEN projects are collaborative efforts between the Government of Liberia and its partners, including the United Nations Development Programme, the United States Agency for International Development and the Open Society Institute, who are currently providing support to the initiatives. These projects are implemented through the Direct Execution Modality by UNDP.

However, arrangements were made to facilitate the involvement and collaboration of key partners with a view to ensuring project relevance and sustainability. A Project Implementation Committee (PIC) was created as part of the TOKTEN design with broad decision-making, coordination and oversight responsibilities. Efforts are made through the PIC to facilitate dialogues between partners on issues of common interest. The PIC includes the Civil Service Agency as Chair, UNDP, co-chair, Ministry of State, member, one or two representatives of donors (at the present, USAID). Representatives of beneficiary agencies are invited as per need basis.

**If the PIC as a participatory and coordinating mechanism is widely welcomed, it is rather its efficacy that is being questioned.** The meetings, which constitute its major communication tools, are sporadic and follow-up and coordination tasks are poorly executed, if not at all.

The LECBS project design includes a provision for a similar inclusive mechanism under the name of Project Steering Committee.

**The relationships between donor agencies and national institutions, on the one hand, and among donors themselves, on the other hand, seem excellent.** Donors continue to support GOL's resource mobilization initiatives. This was exemplified with the Aid Mobilization and Investment Promotion Forum held in Washington DC in February 2007, which was reportedly successful for the country. The donor community has also played an advocacy role in the most recent donor conference on Liberia's PRS in Germany (June 2008 ) during which Liberia received substantial debt cancellations from the host country and the US government. UNDP and the UN system in particular, were instrumental in the preparation of this round-table conference.

Notwithstanding these collaborative efforts, **a general problem still remains the lack of coordination and monitoring, due in part to the outcry ineffectiveness of project secretariat.** The dismissal of the TOKTEN project Coordinator for lack of performance and UNDP's difficulties in filling the position, have virtually deprived the

project of a focal technical point for documenting results, communicating with partners or beneficiaries and advising management bodies (PIC and PSC) on matters of importance.

### **3.5. RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF OUTPUTS**

#### **3.5.1. RELEVANCE OF OUTPUTS TO OUTCOME**

The issue of output relevance addresses the question of whether achieved outputs are pertinent to national priorities and needs. The National Human Development Report 2006 as well as the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy recognize that the shortage of qualified manpower for the task of national reconstruction and development constitutes the foremost critical challenge facing Liberia. Of the devastating effects of the long and protracted conflict was the death of hundreds of skilled professionals and technicians and the massive exodus of thousands and lack of required incentives in the public sector to even attract those who are locally available due to the poor state of the economy .

In addition, one of the most important preconditions for accessing to foreign aid resources necessary for reconstruction is public sector reforms in order to facilitate transparent and accountable policy formulation , good service delivery and resource management. The support provided through LECBS/TOKTEN to bring back home professional expatriate Liberians constitutes a logical response to harness institutional capacity development and promote public sector reforms.

**The outputs and outcome under review are, therefore, in line with and support national development priorities.**

#### **3.5.2. EFFECTIVENESS OF OUTPUTS IN ACHIEVING PROJECT OBJECTIVES**

The question of effectiveness requires that we ask whether the projects under review have achieved their assigned objectives. In order to answer this question, the evaluation first examined the project Results Matrix (see Tables 4 and 5) focusing on substantive outputs.



**TABLE 4****TOKTEN RESULTS MATRIX**

Objectives	Planned Outputs	Planned Output Indicators	Executed Outputs	Status of Outputs	Level of Objective Achievement <sup>4</sup>
1 Bring home Liberian expatriate nationals to help in the nation building	Expatriate Nationals placed in line ministries and agencies	21 candidates recruited and providing required services with proficiency	22 recruited	Completed	Very Satisfactory
	Local professional recruited	At least 16 local professionals recruited	15 national professionals recruited	Completed	Very Satisfactory
2 Ensure that institutions and agencies where these expatriate nationals are assigned are revitalized and very productive.	No planned outputs- Individual outputs per terms of reference	No indicators	See executed outputs on Table 2	Partially completed	Satisfactory
3. Help build and strengthen physical and immediate capacity for effective execution of functions.	Training and coaching on the job	No indicators	See Table 2	Incomplete	Inadequate

<sup>4</sup> We have adopted a three-tier ranking consisting of very satisfactory, satisfactory and inadequate.

**TABLE 5**  
**LECBS RESULTS MATRIX**

Objective	Planned Outputs	Planned Output Indicators	Executed Outputs	Status of Outputs	Level of Objective Achievement <sup>5</sup>
Assist the government in the implementation of its package of governance reforms	Attract competent Liberians to join the public service sector in critical leadership positions, using the project to supplement the salaries of the selected civil servants at the executive level	13 candidates initially, then 40 expert positions filled	40 recruited	Completed	Very Satisfactory
	Government institutional capacity and operational effectiveness in key reform areas strengthened	No indicators	See executed outputs in Table 2	Completed	Very Satisfactory
	Short-term Training and coaching on the job	No indicators	See Table 2	Incomplete	Inadequate

<sup>5</sup> We have adopted a three-tier ranking consisting of very satisfactory, satisfactory and inadequate.

The evaluation team considers that **the objectives of the two projects are being met.** The Government of Liberia has been able to bring back home some high caliber professionals and there is an increasing evidence that some of them will stay home ( given the increasing number of extensions). LECBS/TOKETN have accelerated the preparation of key policy documents, including the PRS and the achievement of major reforms that have broadened the government base to promote economic efficiency, accountability, transparency and enabling environment.

As a results, public revenues are expanding at an unprecedented rate, and there is considerable movement and interest in Liberia as investors, private foundations and donor agencies are coming back. The transformational efforts underway have instilled the confidence of the international community in Liberia, and that could not have been possible without the commitment and the quality of work that has been accomplished in such a short period of time. The challenge now is to maintain the systems and procedures that have been created, to quickly learn from implementation and to popularize knowledge through well-organized and results-based training programs.

As for training itself, the team views it as the weakest project link. There is no convincing evidence of an effective and systematic knowledge transfer taking place, owing in part to the fact that beneficiaries are expected to deliver on some specific results within a short time frame. Training too, is a whole function that needs adequate resources and proper organization, which are not incorporated in the designs of the projects under review.

### **3.5.3. EFFICIENCY OF PROJECTS WITH A VIEW TO OUTPUTS AND OUTCOME**

The LECBS/TOKTEN present a mixed picture of performance in achieving outputs. A very high turnover rate in administrative and management personnel has virtually hampered the effective performance monitoring and coordination as well as a timely execution of activities. The Project Coordinator who is responsible for the administration of the projects, has stayed at her post for less than a year. The Administrative Assistant post has remained vacant for several months, and here too, the projects are on their second Administrative Assistant. One of the consequences, especially for TOKTEN, is a severe lack of programming which leads to excessive commitments (acceptance of new beneficiaries into the program or extension of contracts ) not supported by a realistic assessment of the short and mid-term project resource mobilization capacity. Seven TOKTEN beneficiaries whose contracts have expired, are currently working without pay,

awaiting the confirmation of their renewals, which are contingent upon future resource mobilization prospects.

Administrative and financial backstopping by UNDP looks satisfactory and up to standards. Annual reports are prepared for each project ( 2006 and 2007) and give the status of each in terms of achievements and budget. Cash disbursements and outstanding balances are highlighted in the Resource Flow and Expenditure Chart to alert participating funding agencies on the resource status of each project. Whether the information generated in these annual reports is used in substantive and technical decision making, apart from resource mobilization, is not clear. A gloomy financial situation of the LECBS triggered an internal mid-term evaluation of this project in February 2008 to provide a basis for further funding of activities.

It is worth noting that LECBS/TOKTEN have been executed with relatively modest resources compared to the quality of human inputs involved and outputs achieved. Studies on technical assistance show that highly qualified international experts are usually expensive. However, in this case, expatriate nationals, some of whom with impressive track record, are performing services at a minimal cost.

**From an efficiency point of view, the evaluation team considers that the process of transforming inputs into outputs and outcome has been cost -effective.**

#### 3.5.4. SUSTAINABILITY OF OUTPUTS

LECBS/TOKEN have recruited people with integrity and the salary supplements have assisted greatly in putting them beyond the vulnerabilities and temptations to indulge in corrupt practices. The degree of openness and accountability, their personalities and characters have brought a lot to bear on their positions and reforms they have engineered. But whether or not the systems that have been put in place will be sustained even if they leave is a question of who succeeds them and what the government does to induce public sector integrity on the one hand, and on the other to deter unwholesome practices in the public sector. In other words, whether or not the capacities that are being created will be sustained or will wither away, will primarily depend on the quality of working conditions, starting with living wages to attract talented people and keep them focused on their public assignments.

A smooth continuity of the program and its outputs also requires that there exist harmonious relations among staff members so that they can closely cooperate in the furtherance of public mission. Yet, there is hidden animosity created by salary differentials between LECBS/TOKTEN expatriate nationals and local professionals, on

the one hand, and other nationals not participating in the program, on the other hand. In the interviews, several local and even expatriate beneficiaries persistently questioned the logic behind salary differentials between professionals with the same qualifications, just on the basis of residence. This situation, if not redressed, can act as a disincentive to long-term productivity.

Development must be internally driven for it to be sustainable. Liberians must come to terms with their own conscience. The PRS is not just another paper to mobilize external resources, but a means to fashion a more prosperous society for all. Many of our respondents complained about lack of cooperation from their colleagues and other staff members. The problem of negative mindsets is deplored by all as discussed in this report. Many people consider that coming to work is a synonymous of sitting on own desk, reading newspapers or simply sleeping. The main reason still is no adequate remuneration. How can one be paid if she/he is not working and how can a government get money if most of its people resent work? In these conditions, capacity building efforts will yield little results.

### **3.6. FACTORS AFFECTING EFFECTIVE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTPUT ACHIEVEMENT**

#### **3.6.1. The absence of an effective secretariat makes management and coordination difficult in the implementation of the projects**

The project document of TOKTEN allows for the appointment of a Project Coordinator (PC) within a secretariat to coordinate the day-to-day operations of the project. The major function of the PC is to manage the day-to-day project matters, act as the clearinghouse for the PIC and ensure effective operations of its duties. The PC is also expected to keep an active database of beneficiaries and serve as the focal point of communication between the project, program participants and beneficiary institutions, ensuring that project activities are proceeding normally and enabling conditions are created in beneficiary agencies and institutions for effective execution of the terms of reference. The PC ensures that the information on which PIC decisions are made is timely available and to the best of his/her knowledge is credible.

The project design of the LECBS on the other hand does not allow for a Project Coordinator, but leaves such monitoring function to the Project Steering Committee.

Indeed, a Project Coordinator was recruited in 2006 by the PIC and dismissed for incompetence by the same PIC within less than a year after the initiation of activities. Since then, UNDP has not been successful in finding and recruiting a well-qualified PC. One candidate rejected the offer purportedly based on salary conditions. With the absence of a Project Coordinator, the responsibility for both projects has largely devolved on an overly burdened bureaucracy at the CSA. Consequently, effective monitoring and evaluation has been practically impossible though they form the crust of capturing deliverables, giving feedbacks to both beneficiaries and their host institutions, as well as determining the basis for extensions of what should be service contracts.

#### **3.6.2. Ineffective monitoring and evaluation**

Being the consequence of point 1, project monitoring and evaluation reveals three major deficiencies: (a) the inability to track project activities, to follow up with beneficiaries and their sponsoring institutions to ensure that work is executed as planned and conditions are created for smooth implementation of activities; (b) the inability to ensure that performance reports are prepared as per instructions and submitted to the PIC through the Secretariat on time; and (c) the inability to provide appropriate information and feedback in a timely manner to beneficiaries and host institutions on project

philosophy, objectives, procedural requirements, performance and other relevant matters. It follows several negative consequences:

- **Lack of understanding of the requirements of the projects by beneficiaries and their institutions.** Problems such as non-submission of performance report forms or how to fill them out, ignorance of the procedures for extension or non-extension, how to write the terms of reference, ignorance of where to submit a report or find information on project-related questions are widespread and can be traceable to lack of communication with participating professionals and their organizations. The team was told by some beneficiaries that they were not informed that the duration of their tenure was limited to six months, renewal on condition up to 18 months. Such misunderstanding could have been avoided if an orientation meeting was held once candidates were fielded. It is of course understood that the duration of the contract is specified in the TOR, but one can simply ignore or forget it if the message is not reinforced. Only one induction/orientation meeting was conducted at the start of the project with the PC.
- **Lack of an organized data bank and information on project activities and achievements.** The symptoms of this deficiency are pervasive: minutes of the PIC meetings not easily accessible; since its inception in 2006, TOKTEN has attracted 37 beneficiaries, yet the mission saw and reviewed less than a dozen of performance reports, including quarterly performance and end-of-assignment reports; no organized data bank with information on beneficiaries and their references (apart from payroll data), and no access to major technical reports and documents to which beneficiaries have contributed.
- **Lack of information sharing mechanism to capitalize on knowledge and expertise in the project.** TOKTEN beneficiaries are generally among the best in their field of their expertise. The desire to offer them the opportunity to come together was vividly expressed by most respondents. Unfortunately, the project has so far failed to promote communication between beneficiaries to advance knowledge on what they can do as a group for Liberia and share views on the reforms they are called to support. The mission learned that

### 3.6.3. **Inability by the Project Implementation Committee/PSC to effectively carry out its duties**

This deficiency is in part a consequence of points 1 and 2 above. It appears that the work of the PIC has centered on the selection of candidates and processing of extensions without supportive mechanisms to ensure that (1) the credentials presented at recruitment are authentic (2) resources are available to cover additional expenses and (3) verifiable results are achieved before authorizing extensions.

For example, some PIC members the mission has encountered complained about the poor quality of some of the performance reports submitted by the beneficiaries. There are also suspicions that some credentials might be faked. This situation calls for a review of existing recruitment procedures to include background and reference checks.

On the other hand, **appointments are regularly made without consideration to the absorptive capacity of the project. Candidates are then asked to wait until resources become available, leaving the impression of total disorganization. Even when the PIC is not sure about future resource availability to the project, it still implicitly accepts contract extensions by not responding to ad hoc requests from beneficiary institutions.** As we were preparing this report, seven contract extensions are still pending, the candidates continue to work and the persistent silence from the PIC has fortified their belief that good news is forthcoming.

Moreover, **the extension procedure in place seems to suggest that the contract extension is almost automatic once a positive recommendation is made by the relevant supervising authority.** Contract extensions are typically based on the so-called performance reports and letters of expression of interest and recommendation from the beneficiary institution. The implicit logic is to trust the judgement made by the supervisor even if subjective considerations might have permeated such judgment. Since one of the statutory responsibilities of the PIC is to ensure that agencies/ministries have formulated programmes and strategies, which will serve as the basis for providing support to these agencies, the PIC could add to its contract extension criteria the attachment of the agency program and strategies. This would play as an incentive for them to prepare such programs and strategies with the support of TOKTEN beneficiaries, at the same time allow the PIC to assess the consistency between submitted TOR or extension proposals and agency programs.



**The terms of reference on which the PIC's selection and extension decisions are based are not formulated in ways that facilitate performance measurement and completion of activities within the prescribed time frame of the tenure.** For one, the deliverables don't lend themselves to easy measurement, translating into difficulty in assessing whether performance has been achieved or not. If a deliverable is "Planning framework available", this is obviously misleading, because it can be interpreted in different ways not necessarily related to strategic outputs. The deliverable section must contain at least two columns, one with the description of each output, another with the indicators or criteria against which the achievement can be evaluated. Furthermore, the evaluation team considers that most TOR are too broad to be completed within a 6 month period. The need for extension is implicitly contained in the original TOR.

**Little feedback is given on performance reports, which leads some of our respondents to believe that the PIC's interest is in fielding experts and not in the work they are performing (performance reports are urged to ensure the continuity of payment and not so much to establish whether progress has been made and learn from it).** In some reports, for example, the supervisors, instead of showing specific contributions made by the beneficiary, verse into laudatory discourse which ends up with a request for extension. A report of this type should be sent back to the originating institution with detailed comments for corrections. This will give the signal that the PIC cares about the substantive content of the submitted performance reports.

**There is no systematic effort to improve performance report writing so that the results of the projects can be clearly substantiated. Many of the performance reports are too general.** Some examples of contributions made to national reforms can clarify this point. A report stated as contribution: "I participated in a conference on trade" ; but the author does not say how much this contributed to the national reform agenda. Another report says: "I prepared a work plan for the Ministry"; but the author does not say what contribution the work plan made in terms of institutional improvement. Still another report states: "I reviewed the status of squatters in the Industrial Free Zone Park; but does not show what the result of the review was. Such reports make it difficult to assess the outcomes of interventions.

On the other hand, the PIC has not been able to adequately inform institutions of government about the existence of the program and requirements for accessing to its support. Some high-ranking officials within the Ministry of Finance participating in the LECBS were surprised to learn from the evaluation mission about the availability of TOKTEN to local professionals. Almost all people the team interviewed stated that the program is not well known, both in and outside the country.

**Meetings constitute the means through which the management bodies can address the critical issues affecting the project and imprint a new direction. However, meetings are rarely held and poor attendance is deplored.** Based on our review of a number of minutes, the PSC hold one (1) meeting in 2006, 3 in 2007 and 2 in 2008, which is insufficient given the complexity of the project. Selection of candidates and contract extension dominate discussions. According to one donor agency representative participating in these meetings, there is less discussion, some members operating on a non-objection mode. The issues related to performance are rarely discussed, especially when it comes to the review of quarterly and end-of-assignment reports. Only in one (1) meeting of the PSC held on April 9, 2007 where a critical review of performance reports took place. The reports submitted by the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Justice and the Chairman of the National Investment Commission were discussed in depth, focusing on the relationships between achievements and outcomes.

#### 3.6.4. **Political considerations affect the performance of projects**

The Liberian Human Development Report of 2006 cited some reasons why past capacity building initiatives had not been successful. One of the reasons stated is that from a governance perspective, many reforms were targeted at improvements in the public sector management and capacity building, but little effort was directed at examining the socio-political environment for reforms. Historically, a highly centralized power structure and a client-patron political system in Liberia inhibited good governance, transparency and accountability. It rather promoted a culture where loyalty stood over competence and where political power was used to access economic opportunities for the patron, his family and his associates.

While this may not altogether be the case, there is a risk that a semblance of this could factor in under the current project design and implementation. Those recruited under the LECBS are all appointed by the President. This includes a large pool of Cabinet Ministers who are accountable only to her. This situation makes it difficult for any project secretariat to keep track or monitor the performance of these beneficiaries since they may feel obligated to report only to the President.

This is not to suggest that all LECBS beneficiaries don't comply with the reporting requirements. The mission reviewed a performance report by the Minister of Youth; the PSC's meeting of April 9, 2007 reviewed in depth four (4) reports submitted by the Ministers of Finance, Planning, Justice and the Chairman of the National Investment Commission.

Notwithstanding some exceptions, the general perception is that the LECBS participants don't submit reports to the PSC. They feel answerable to the President, and as such, they

have no business to transact with the PSC, except if they have problems with their salary supplements which are administered by UNDP.

One can also assume that it is the PSC that has failed to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the reporting procedures. Some minutes of its own meeting indicate that the President is interested in seeing that the project move forward smoothly while maintaining accountability and reporting in line with the project document (Minutes of the LECBS meeting, August 9, 2007).

It could equally be that the political nature of their portfolio may include some sensitivity bordering on national security, or other considerations which might make them reluctant to disclose, or share in a technical report. Moreover, the President, as the recommender of potential beneficiaries makes it difficult to set an objective standard for selection since doing so may easily be seen as questioning her wisdom.

**A number of interviewees have highlighted the lack of competition and objective standards in the selection of candidates in both projects, implying that political considerations and other forms of relationships, rather than qualifications/experiences seems to cloud the recruitment process.**

In addition, the overly emphasized confidentiality of the projects are creating grapevines which have the proclivity to counteract the achievements under the initiatives. The need to break this impasse is critical to future communications of impacts and gains made as a result of these vital capacity development schemes. Information about these projects seems at a minimum even among senior members in government circles.

### **3.6.5. The absence of a conducive work environment constitutes a permanent threat to effective performance by beneficiaries**

Agencies and institutions that are selected to benefit from the projects were expected to ensure that consultants have the required environment and facilities for effectiveness in the discharge of their duties. Yet, many participants have consistently complained about poor working conditions, in some cases not conducive to minimal performance (lack of desk, chairs, computer, electricity, etc.). A TOKTEN scholar with the Agriculture and Forestry Department of the University of Liberia was and is still teaching his Rural Sociology class in a University garden.

On the other hand, there exist considerable animosity and frustrations in some agencies and institutions caused by salary differentials between project participants and other staff members. In one focus group meeting, TOKTEN professionals themselves persistently

questioned the logic behind the difference in salary between expatriate nationals and locally-recruited professionals. Uncooperative behaviours inevitably result from these feelings.

### 3.7. PROJECT DESIGN ISSUES

The team has identified five (5) design-related issues:

- The TOKTEN concept is a global UNDP mechanism for tapping on expatriate national who had migrated to other countries and achieved professional success abroad, and mobilize them to undertake short-term consultancies in their countries of origin. The main thrust of the program is to deliver specific outputs within a short period of time. In Liberia, however, TOKTEN is being used for long term service posts, rather than on the delivery of particular outputs for which the beneficiaries can be evaluated.. The current project design does not leave room for actual evaluation, because performance monitoring is weak and the terms of reference often inconsistent with the responsibilities that are normally assumed by beneficiaries after several extended periods. In this sense, the evaluation team considers that the TOKTEN Program has been abused.
- LECBS/TOKTEN were conceived as short-term transitional measures to bridge the human capacity gaps created by a devastating civil war. They are intended to facilitate the recruitment of professional expatriate nationals as well as those locally available to serve in key capacities in the government and national institutions so as to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in public sector operations. The projects are expected to build institutional capacity and transfer knowledge in order to accelerate the reform agenda of the government. In other words, capacity building is the major goal of these projects. However, there were no effective knowledge transfer because people were required to achieve a specific deliverable and within a specific time. Moreover, the resources necessary to facilitate active or actual knowledge transfer have been largely absent. No provision was made for organized training programs. One cannot say that because I am a professional with great compatibilities and I work here, so automatically all others who work closely with me, but from different rooms would have their capacities enhanced in any significant way because of our interactions. It is true that some things might rob of them. This can be likened on to a carpenter brought in to fix a number of tables in a specified time. His focus will definitely be on discharging his responsibilities. Though the shop assistants may learn a little bit of this and that, but not enough to make a table themselves. The evaluation team believes that the projects may have been intended to build capacities, but their

designs do not allow for that to occur. They are more of capacity mobilization and utilization initiatives than capacity building.

- The TOKTEN project was designed for 18 months taking into consideration the special circumstances and needs of the country and the need to give the government time to be able to absorb the cost of retaining the skilled human resources it requires. The activities and outputs to achieve project objectives were, therefore, scaled up to the terminal month of operations. To scale down project implementation to six month would inevitably affect the achievement of initial objectives, unless the project is reconfigured . It is also important to keep in mind the multitask nature of the assignment.
- The need for skilled manpower to address the serious recovery and development challenges is felt everywhere in Liberia, including in the productive sectors in the 15 counties. The territorial administration, the basis of sustainable development is also in need of strengthening. However, LECBS/TOKTEN project designs limit the capacity for reconstruction and development to Monrovia only, giving credence to the urban bias thesis in African development policy .
- The TOKTEN project assumed that beneficiary agencies and organizations will provide facilities and acceptable working environment to their consultants. At the same time, the same project recognizes that the capacities of all organizations were devastated during the war. How the project expected them to fulfill their mandates in the absence of any budgetary support? Providing technical assistance without necessary supporting tools can easily amount to a waste of resources.

### 3.8. LESSONS

- The personality of a country's leader can facilitate access to resources in difficult conditions. It is unlikely that a program like LECBS could have been funded as it is without President Sirleaf and the connections she has.
- Qualified Africans in the Diaspora, when well utilized, can become an effective instrument for reducing the cost of conventional technical assistance and accelerate economic development in Africa.
- Institutional and human capacity strengthening must go hand in hand with physical capacity improvements. Poor working conditions in host agencies and institutions tend to affect productivity.

- Performance monitoring and evaluation is made more difficult when a project involves high level political leaders.
- Technical skill transfer is more effective for socioeconomic transformations when it is accompanied with supportive attitudinal and behavioral changes or competencies.
- While the recruitment in both projects reflects gender sensitivity to a certain extent, there is no evidence that gender parity or equity was a deliberate consideration in the project design and implementation.

### 3.9. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The evaluation documented significant progress made in strengthening institutional and human capacity through LECBS and TOKTEN projects. The Government of Liberia has been able to bring back home a significant number of high caliber professionals who has accelerated the preparation of key policy documents, including the PRS and the achievement of major reforms that have broadened the government base to promote economic efficiency, accountability and transparency. The regulatory frameworks have been significantly strengthened through the adoption of critical policies and strategies, laws and new management practices which have allowed the fostering of an enabling environment necessary for the stimulation of the economic recovery and social infrastructure rehabilitation.

As a result of the policies and efforts made by LECBS/TOKTEN beneficiaries in various agencies and institutions, public revenues are expanding at an unprecedented rate and there is a considerable movement and interest in Liberia as investors, private foundations and donor agencies are coming back. The transformational changes underway have instilled confidence of the international community in Liberia, and that could not have been possible without the commitment and the quality of work that has been accomplished in such a short period of time.

The study recognizes the contributions from other capacity building initiatives in the country, but argues that the political commitment at the highest level of government together with the fiscal discipline and technical expertise brought about by the LECBS/TOKTEN professionals, have been critical in achieving these results.

Despite these important achievements, considerable challenges still stand in the way toward making these two projects more effective instruments for institutional and human

capacity development. These challenges and other constraints examined in this report provide the basis for the recommendations that follow.

### **3.10. RECOMMENDATIONS**

For the sake of clarity, the recommendations cover three (3) areas: project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

#### **A. PROJECT DESIGN**

##### **1. TOKTEN: Revert at the end of current project to the original TOKTEN Program design that has proven its merits worldwide and develop and support local talents through the Senior Executive Service program (SES)**

The global TOKTEN approach requires that candidates be deployed for a short period of time (not exceeding six months) for a specific consulting assignment supported by performance-based terms of reference. TOKTEN must not fund long-term service posts.

Professionals who are serving currently under TOKTEN and wish to contribute with their contribution at the end of the project can be considered with priority for SES which targets highly professional Liberian experts from both the Diaspora and in-country.

The GOL and UNDP must inform them least three months before the expiration of their contracts of this possibility. They will still be subject to competitive procedures set by the SES program, in addition to an evaluation of their individual performance report. This option that feeds the current project into the wider government capacity building program, offers a smooth transition strategy for ending its activities.

##### **2. Lay emphasis on training and human resource development in both projects to ensure sustainability of reforms**

The use of the word “capacity building” in generic terms tends to create confusion. In the case of Liberia, technical skill transfer through well-organized training programs and reputed educational institutions offers more prospects for success in a country where only 14,4% of the civil service corps have a graduate degree or above. Capacity creation needs not to be confused with capacity mobilization and utilization or retention. Provisions should be made to address through training the issues related to cultural change and emotional intelligence to impart behavioural skills.

### **3. Switch from Direct Execution Modality to National Execution**

Capacity building support can only be made sustainable when it is owned and nationally driven. UNDP's Direct Execution Modality (DEM) has been used to operate LECBS/TOKTEN. As national capacity gaps are being filled, it is also time to allow nationals to learn by doing, which means shifting to National Execution (NEX).

### **4. TOKTEN: Make the recruitment process more open and objective by subjecting the post to competition**

Require institutions requesting professional assistance under the project to notify the PIC of the post they wish to fill and accompany said notice with a TOR, which the PIC would then consider and if approved, proceed to recruit professionals on a more competitive basis, ensuring that candidates' credentials are scrutinized and verified. And that further more, it matches the TOR.

## **B. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION**

### **1. UNDP should urgently recruit a Project Coordinator (PC) to serve both projects**

The salary level seems to be the main factor rendering the position unattractive. Given the increased and cumulated responsibilities (the Project Coordinator supervising both projects), justifications can be found to accommodate UNDP national personnel salary regulations.

Once recruited, the Project Coordinator must have, in addition to the normal orientation, substantive meetings with UNDP, CSA and PIC/PSC to emphasize the importance of the post and expectations, especially with regard to sensitivity of some aspects of the projects, monitoring and evaluation and communication with beneficiaries and their institutions.

If this option of making the PC responsible for TOKTEN and LECBS is pursued, consideration can be also given to augmenting the staff by one additional Administrative Assistant. In this case, each project will have one (1) Administrative Assistant, both of them reporting to the PC.



**2. PIC/PSC should take a more active role in project implementation to guarantee adherence to the prescribed processes and procedures for recruitment, reporting and extensions**

The PIC/PSC should :

- Ensure that the TOR submitted by agencies and institutions are formulated in specific terms, that performance can be measured and that they are realistic given the duration of tenure.
- Promote constructive debates on issues before it and avoid to operate on expediency and non-objection mode.
- Improve report writing to facilitate performance assessment, especially in regard to the contribution of achieved outputs to higher institutional objectives. Therefore, the TOR must be clear on both outputs to be completed and the indicators or criteria which will show that they have been indeed achieved.
- Take concrete punitive measures to obtain compliance with performance reporting.
- Organize its work through regular meetings and minimize the number of emergency meetings.
- Show more interest in the work of the committee by regularly attending meetings.
- Reserve more discussion time to project performance and any factors affecting it.
- Use multiple sources of information to ensure that candidates recommended for extension have indeed made the contribution that is attributed to them.
- Ensure timely notification of termination or extension to the beneficiary and his/her organization.
- Hold quarterly or bi-annual retreats to identify key achievements, challenges and opportunities and way forward so as to promote smooth implementation.

**3. The PIC/PSC should make a deliberate effort to ensure gender balance in recruitment and skill transfer**

The project designs and implementation should reflect gender sensitivity, and the implementation should be conscious of gender implications in terms of results to ensure that there is no imbalance in the capacity development in the country.

### C. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The PC and the PIC/PSC should:

- Ensure that a data base that links professionals serving on the two projects is established to allow ease of orientation, professional interactions and sharing of ideas and information.
- Hold induction workshops to explain project goals, objectives and requirements with respect to performance reporting, extension and termination of service and other project-related issues.
- Make visits to the beneficiary organizations to assess working conditions, discuss with relevant authorities, or to determine the level of satisfaction with the beneficiary. Performance should be the fulcrum of attention throughout the duration in tenure, not just at the end of a quarter or assignment.
- Invite beneficiaries to prepare and make public presentations of technical questions of high national interest related to their specialization and make sure that all participants in the program attend. Among invitees, should figure representatives of civil society organizations.
- Prepare and circulate a simple newsletter (monthly or bi-monthly) with project events, and use it as a reminder for the submission of reports and other matters of importance. The newsletter should be sent primarily to beneficiaries, their organizations, members of management bodies (PIC/PSC) and other institutions deemed relevant.
- Open an interactive web site with application form built-in. Make sure when you advertise the projects, you show critical areas of needs such as paediatrics and dentistry.
- Devise a results-based communication strategy whose main parameters are discussed below:

Any effective communication depends on three major interconnected components : message (message strategy), audience (audience strategy ) and channel choice (channel choice strategy). The message strategy revolves around what the communicator wants the audience to know and how it should be delivered to have a great impact on the audience. The audience strategy involves knowing what the audience exactly needs in terms of information and at what level of specificity. The message is tailored in such a way that it can be understood and accepted by the audience. The channel choice strategy concerns the means through which the message will be communicated to have a maximum impact on the targeted audience.

The projects' goal is to inform the public on the various capacity building initiatives taken by the government with a view to rebuilding the economy. The centrality of the message should be on specific results achieved or being achieved through the mobilization and utilization of Liberians throughout the world. Examples: increase in the public revenue intake, anticorruption measures taken and applied, improvements in financial control and management, etc. The point here is to show that these improvements have been made possible thanks to the sacrifices by a group of Liberians who have decided to come back home and join the President to accelerate the reform agenda. The public may wish to know how much these individuals are paid. One should here balance the need for confidentiality regarding salary matters and the requirements for transparency as underscored in the reforms. The information can still be given, but in general or approximation or range terms. The message can be continued to say that the reforms are being funded by our partners such as UNDP, OSI, USAID who are sustaining these individuals with salary supplements.

The channel choice will vary depending on the nature of the public that is being sought, since it will not be the same all the times (general public, civil servants, rural dwellers, women organizations, labour unions, youth groups, etc) . The general rule is to combine several means of communication to reach a greater impact: questions-answer discussions prepared in advance on radio (very effective channel in reaching more people, including those in rural areas), round table discussions with presentations made by beneficiaries on key questions of national interest and sponsored for example by the University of Liberia, periodic appearances in the press (TV, radio, newspapers) by the Project Coordinator, Chair or members of the management bodies speaking to the results of both programs; special events under the umbrella of Capacity Building and Development Management in Liberia theme where presentations are made by officials of government, representatives of donor institutions, beneficiaries, etc. Another channel choice will be the production of a newsletter once per quarter targeted to groups such as public ,private and non-governmental organizations in the country.

## ANNEX 1

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

Mid-term Independent Evaluation of the Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support (LECBS) Project and the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Project

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#### Background

The fourteen years of civil war and a quarter century of political instability in Liberia left state institutions and civil authority severely weakened and incapacitated. The productive sector of the economy was completely paralyzed and infrastructure and basic services were severely disrupted as well. The result was massive human capital flight into foreign lands for improved living conditions. This was explicitly highlighted by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in her January 16, 2006 inaugural address to the nation. Specifically, the President highlighted the constraints faced by her Government in recruiting competent Liberians to take up public service positions because of low remuneration and bloated, inefficient ministries and agencies.

As such, the Government in collaboration with UNDP and other development partners designed a number of emergency capacity building initiatives to strengthen public sector service delivery. The LECBS and TOKTEN Projects happen to be two of these multi-pronged capacity development initiatives. As for the LECBS project, it was designed to assist the Government of Liberia in the implementation of its package of governance reforms, which was to be achieved through the following two outputs: *a) Assistance to the Government in administering of salary supplements and b) Assistance to the Government of Liberia to Strengthen Institutional Capacity Building and Operational Effectiveness*. Whereas, the TOKTEN project was designed to technically support the Government's reconstruction and development agenda and help alleviate the impact of brain drain the country has experienced over the years of conflict and political instability. In essence, the TOKTEN project hires expatriate nationals and local professionals for a limited amount of time to temporarily fill key specified technical posts in various sector ministries, agencies and institutions.

While UNDP and other partners do not typically engage in supplementing the salaries of government officials in their country programme operations, which are key components of the LECBS and TOKTEN projects, understanding the extenuating circumstances faced by the present Government, an exception was made. Lessons learned from similar

exceptional cases such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Afghanistan, Sudan and Cambodia were essential in the design and formulation of the projects.

In addition, with the renewed commitment by the Administration to fight corruption and undertake a series of major reforms, specifically the restructuring of the Government and the civil service and more broadly strengthening of governance capacities, the establishments of the LECBS and TOKTEN projects are justified. The projects complement the institutional and technical assistance already underway through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), Civil Service Capacity Building Project, the Senior Executive Service and other sector specific capacity building initiatives. They are also integral part of national capacity building efforts expected to address more holistically all dimensions of the national capacity building needs for reconstruction and development. The ultimate aim is to ensure transparency and accountability in the governance of all government institutions and activities, while simultaneously discouraging and rooting out corrupt practices rife in the public sector.

### **Purpose of evaluation**

As outlined in the signed project documents for LECBS and TOKTEN projects, mid-term output evaluations on projects activities form the basis for receiving further funding from donor partners through UNDP. Understanding the significant need for the continuation of these projects, such an evaluation is required to assess the projects' impact and progress thus far. The report is also expected to have a gender analysis component, assessing the impact of the projects on both men and women as well as its impact on poverty reduction. It may be worthwhile to also review the gender balance in terms of recruiting candidates. After one complete year of implementation, this evaluation will be particularly useful in revising, if need be, the mechanisms of implementation and coordination of the projects.

### **Subject of the Evaluation**

The LECBS project has two major components, including **repatriation fund and reform initiatives**. The former is intended to attract competent Liberians to join the public sector in pivotal leadership positions, utilizing the project to supplement the salaries of these Liberians. To date, twenty-nine (29) have been repatriated under the project and are serving in key ministries and agencies of Government such as, Ministries of Finance, Public Works, Commerce and Industry, State/Executive Mansion, Justice, Planning & Economic Affairs, Labour, Information, Culture & Tourism, Lands, Mines and Energy, Central Agriculture Research Institute, Bureau of General Auditing, Liberia Reconstruction Development Committee, National Investment Commission, University

of Liberia and the Liberia National Police. Under the institutional reform initiatives, the project provides support to the Government of Liberia in launching and implementing priority reforms, such as public sector reform; aid coordination and management; providing technical and logistical support to line ministries and agencies; conducting training, seminars and workshops, studies and assessments; etc. To date, six (6) proposals from three (3) line ministries and agencies have been approved by a Project Steering Committee (PSC) and fully implemented.

As for the TOKTEN project, its focus is to recruit and repatriate 20 Liberian nationals from the diaspora and 15 local professionals to support nation building through the revitalization of government institutions. Its long term objective is to consolidate democracy and peace building and ensure the sustainability of government operations through the availability of required human capacity in key sectors and institutions. Once assigned in the institutions, the professionals are expected to build capacity as well. To date, a total of 37 professionals have been recruited and posted in key ministries and agencies such as JFK Hospital (the only tertiary health institution in Monrovia), Civil Service Agency, University of Liberia, Cuttington University College, National Investment Commission, Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Justice, Public Works, Health, Planning and Economic Affairs, Finance, State/LRDC, and Commerce and Industry. Of this number, 25 are expatriate nationals while remaining 12 are local professionals.

For oversight responsibility for the LECBS, a Project Steering Committee (PSC) is in place, while a Project Implementation Committee (PIC) is in place for the TOKTEN project. In Both cases, the Civil Service Agency serves as Chair while UNDP serves as Co-Chair. Other members for the PSC are the ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, State/Liberia Reconstruction Development Committee and OSIWA (representative of OSI). For the PIC, the other members are the ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, State/Liberia Reconstruction Development and the Governance Commission. Quarterly meetings are held in both cases with virtual meetings when the need arises.

### **Evaluation Objectives**

The evaluation is expected to specifically address the following broad objectives:

1. Asses the design of the projects and determine their continued relevance within the current national context

2. Assess the progress in key reform areas and highlight lessons learnt and recommend key actions that could be taken to facilitate progress by sector constituent partners.
3. Assess the effectiveness of the implementation arrangements and highlight any related capacity issue
4. Assess the implementation modalities and their effectiveness in the delivery of outputs
5. Evaluate the partnership arrangements and their operational effectiveness relative to the timely delivery of outputs.
6. Ascertain the usefulness and impact of the capacity building component, strengthened governance and anti-corruption activities within national institutions and the national reform agenda
7. Review and assess the progress made by the projects with a view of determining strengths and weaknesses and opportunities and threats as well as suggestions for improvements.
8. Identify external risks which may have implications for the projects implementation
9. Elaborate the achievements and shortcomings of both the repatriation fund component and institutional capacity building components of the projects
10. Evaluate public perceptions and opinions of the projects and present innovative ways to improve public awareness and/or public relations campaign.
11. Assess the financial procedures currently applied in the implementation of the projects and the financial sustainability for the remaining project period
12. Determine the progress to date against the total two-year stated outputs and deliverables for the LECBS project and the 18-months outputs and deliverables for the TOKTEN project.
13. Evaluate the role and performance of the Projects Secretariat
14. Evaluate the role and performance of the PSC/PIC

### **Evaluation Methodology**

Based on the objectives mentioned above, the lead consultant will propose a methodology and plan for this assignment, which will be approved by the PSC/PIC and UNDP Liberia CO Senior Management. A design matrix approach relating objectives and/or outcomes of indicators, study questions, data required to measure indicators, data sources and collection methods that allow triangulation of data and information often ensures adequate attention is given to all study objectives.

However, it is recommended that the methodology should take into account the following, namely;

- Strategic Results Framework (SRF) for a description of the intended results, the baseline for the results and the indicators and benchmarks used. Obtain information from the country office gathered through monitoring and reporting on the outcomes. This will help inform the evaluation of whether change has taken place.
- Examination of contextual information and baselines contained in project documents
- Validation of information about the status of the results that is culled from contextual sources such as the SRF or monitoring reports. To do this, the consultant(s) may use interviews or questionnaires during the evaluation that seek key respondents' perceptions on a number of issues, including their perception of whether an outcome has changed.
- Probing the pre-selected outcome indicators, go beyond these to explore other possible outcome indicators, and determine whether the indicators have actually been continuously tracked.
- Undertake a constructive critique of the outcome formulation itself (and the associated indicators). This is integral to the scope of outcome evaluation. The consultants can and should make recommendations on how the outcome statement can be improved in terms of conceptual clarity, credibility of association with UNDP operations and prospects for gathering of evidence.
- Desk review of existing documents and materials such as support documents, evaluations, assessments, and a variety of temporal and focused reports. In particular it will review mission, project reports, the annual reports and the consultant's technical assessment reports.
- Interviews with key informants including gathering the information on what the projects have achieved with regard to the outcome and strategies used.
- Field visits to selected institutions and briefing and debriefing sessions with the PSC/PIC, the Government and UNDP as well as donors and partners.

During the outcome evaluation, the evaluators are expected to apply the following methodology for data collection and analysis:

- Desk review of relevant documents (project documents, review reports –minutes of meetings, performance evaluation reports) and prepared work plans
- Discussions with the Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) of UNDP Country Office;
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with the PSC, UNDP and the Government
- Interviews with beneficiaries, participating ministries and agencies, PSC/PIC members, donors and UNDP, gathering information on achievements versus objectives.
- Consultation meetings.



- Hold briefing session with UNDP, PSC and the relevant Ministries on the findings and recommendations for the future.
- Prepare a draft report.
- Brief SPU/UNDP, PSC/PIC and Government of Liberia on findings and recommendations of the mission
- Revise draft report taking into account discussions held.
- Prepare and submit final report to the UNDP Country Office for onward transmission to the PSC/PIC

### **Expected Products**

The consultant(s) will produce a report (in line with UNDP evaluation report format and quality control checklist for its content), with an executive summary describing key findings and recommendations. The assessment will entail, *inter alia*:

1) A report containing (Hard copy, a soft copy in MS Word and Acrobat reader, Times New Roman, Size 12, Single Spacing):

- Executive summary
- Introduction, description of the evaluation methodology
- An analysis of key interactions (the outcome, substantive influences, UNDP's contribution and how UNDP works with other relevant actors) and associations between variables measuring the outcome,
- Key lessons learnt from the project, highlighting key factors that might hamper the impact the reconstruction and development process in Liberia and suggesting possible recommendations,
- Conceptual Framework of the project in terms of future programming and policy
- Assumptions made during the evaluation and study limitations, and
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Annexes: TORs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc

2) Provide a draft report before leaving Liberia, and submit a final report within one week

3) Debrief UNDP, PSC/PIC members, Government of Liberia, and other development partners in Liberia

### **UNDP Obligations**

UNDP will:

- Provide the consultants with all the necessary support (not under the consultant's control) to ensure that the consultant(s) undertake the study with reasonable efficiency.
- Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the consultant(s) during the evaluation process.
- Collect comprehensive background documentation and inform partners and selected project counterparts.
- Meet all travel related costs to project sites as part of the project evaluation cost.
- Support and identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the evaluation.
- The SPU staff members will be responsible for liaising with partners, logistical backstopping and providing relevant documentation and feedback to the evaluation team
- Organize inception meeting between the consultants, partners and stakeholders, including Government prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.

### **Composition, Skills and Experience of the Evaluation Team**

The evaluation team shall consist of three consultants: an International consultant (team leader) and two national consultants, one to serve as focal person for each project. The national consultants will facilitate initial data collection prior to arrival of the Team/Lead evaluator. The Team Leader (International) will have the responsibility for the overall co-ordination of the evaluation and for the overall quality and timely submission of the evaluation report to the UNDP Liberia Country Office.

### **Consultant profile**

- Possesses advanced university degree, demonstrate strong understanding of the Post-conflict development concepts and prior experience in programming in a post-conflict setting
- Proven experience of a minimum of 15 years at the international level, preferably with UN experience
- Proven knowledge of evaluation methodology and tools and demonstrate solid experience in evaluation
- Strong knowledge of the political, cultural and economic situation in West Africa
- Excellent writing and analytical skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines
- Fluency in English.

**Mission Duration**

The mid-term evaluation mission is expected to last for 4 weeks. Three weeks will be allowed for research, interviews, etc, with a final week for drafting and finalization of reports.

**Annexes**

The following documents will be provided to the Evaluation Team

- ✓ UNDP Quality Criteria for Evaluation Report
- ✓ Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
- ✓ UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
- ✓ Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS)
- ✓ Project Documents
- ✓ End of Year Reports
- ✓ Minutes of Meetings

**ANNEX 2****PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>INSTITUTION</b>
Dr. William Alen	Director General	Civil Service Agency
Mr. Toga McKintosh	Minister of Planning	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
Mr. Togba Ngangana	Deputy Minister for Technical Services	Ministry of Public Works
Mr. Richard V. Tolbert	Economic Advisor to the President and Chairman	National Investment Commission
Mr. Peter E. Norman	Executive Director	National Investment Commission
Mr. William Towah	Consultant, Strategic Management	Ministry of Public Works
Dr. Robert Dennis	Chief Medical Officer	JFK Memorial Hospital
Dr. K.K. Kamaludeen	Economic Advisor and Chief of Strategy and Policy Unit	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Mr. Monroe Outland	Research Assistant Strategy and Policy Unit	UNDP
Mr. Cleophas Torori	Policy Specialist Strategy and Policy Unit	UNDP
Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh	President	University of Liberia
Mrs. Elfrieda Steward Tama	Deputy Minister for Revenue	Ministry of Finance

Mr. Roderick G. Smith	Deputy Minister for Expenditure and Debt Management	Ministry of Finance
Mr. Sean P. Hall	Democracy Officer	USAID
Mr. Emmanuel Fradzo	Senior Economist	World Bank
Mr. Michael Slewon	Director General	Department of Education
Dr. Emmanuel Wollor Topor	Assistant Professor	University of Liberia
Ms. Sodey C. Lake	Nurse	
Dr. Stephen Kaifa	Vice President for Academic Affairs and Professor	Cuttington University College
Mr. Dominic Sam	Country Director	UNDP
Ms. Monique Cooper	National Economist	UNDP
Mr. Joe Pemagbi	Country Director	OSIWA

Mrs. Augustine Nguafua	Director	Office of the Budget
Mr. T. Negbabree Warner	Focal Point	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
Dr. Edward Liberty	Director General	Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services

Dr. Shelton Bedol	Vice President for Academic Affairs	University of Liberia
Mr. Aoron Weah-Weah	Program Associate	Partners for Democratic Development
Mr. Joseh Sankartuah	President	Federation of Liberian Youth

## ANNEX 3

## LIST OF TOKTEN BENEFICIARIES

## 1. Locally hired TOKTEN beneficiaries

No	Name	Sex	Position	Institution
1.	Dr. Daniel Toweh*	M	Sr. Curative Medical Specialist	Ministry of Health
2.	Sodey Lake*	F	Training Coordinator	Ministry of Health
3	Bigboi Yanquoi*	M	Technical Advisor on Regional	Ministry of Planning
4.	James Mayson*	M	Legal Advisor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5.	Henry Fahnbulleh*	M	Consultant, African-Asian Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
6.	Cyril Allen*	M	Coordinator, Policy/Training	National Investment Commission
7.	Alvin Atta*	M	Deputy National Authorizing Officer	Ministry of Planning
8.	Amos Kofa*	M	Director of Strategy and Policy	Ministry of Planning
9.	J. Marwolo Sonnie*	M	Program Manager-UPU	Ministry of Posts
10.	Mohammed Nyei*	M	Technical Support Officer	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11.	Dr. Charles K. Mulbah*	M	Consultant, Agri & Environmental	Cuttington University
12.	Kehleboe Gongloe*	M	Consultant, Research & Statistics	Ministry of Labor
13.	William Towah	M	Strategic Management Consultant	Ministry of Public Works
14.	Annie Wesley-Swen	F	Assistant Minister for Admin & Public Safety	Ministry of Justice
15.	Cyrus Badio	M	Press Secretary to the President	Executive Mansion

\* Currently out of contracts but still serving in posts

## 2. Expatriate Nationals

No	Name	Sex	Position	Institution
1.	Winston Beysolow	M	Human Resources Manager	Roberts International Airport
2.	David Logan	M	Snr. Technical Advisor to NACP	Ministry of Health
3.	Jackson Wonde	M	Consultant, Labor Relations	Ministry of Labor
4.	Sam Russ	M	Debt Management Consultant	Ministry of Finance
5.	Dr. Michael Slawon	M	Director-National Commission for Higher Education	Ministry of Education
6.	Dr. Louise Kpoto	F	Epidemiologist	Ministry of Health
7.	Edsel Smith	M	Architectural Engineering Consultant	Ministry of Public Works
8.	Richard Klah	M	Senior Legal Counsel	Ministry Of State
9.	Benjamin Wolo	M	Managing Director	Liberia Telecomm
10.	Stephen Kaifa	M	Consultant, External Curriculum	Cuttington University
11.	Arabella Greaves	F	Technical Advisor	Ministry Of Health
12.	Aloysius T. Jappah	M	Lead Consultant	Ministry of State
13.	Benjamin Johnson	M	Coordinator, Reform Programs	Civil Service Agency
14.	Cll. Patrick Sendolo	M	Coordinator, Port Sector Reform	LRDC
15.	Klahn-Gboloh Jarbah	M	Consultant, Operational Management	Ministry of Public Works
16.	Dr. Emmanuel Torpor	M	Asst. Professor III	University of Liberia
17.	Dr. Robert Dennis	M	Surgical Specialist	JFK Medical Centre
18.	Djuteh Amy Clark	F	Consultant, Finance Dept.	Central Bank of Liberia
19.	Dr. Ayele Ajavon-Cox	F	Dental Director	JFK Medical Centre
20.	D. Abugarshall Kai	M	Advisor, Research & Extension Service	Ministry of Agriculture
21.	Vera Cooper	F	Chief Administrator for Fiscal Affairs	JFK Medical Centre
22.	Angelique Weeks	F	Chief Legal Counsel	Ministry of Finance

#s 1-16 are currently on post.



## ANNEX 4

## LIST OF LECBS BENEFICIARIES

No•	Name of Beneficiary	Sex	Position	Institution	Terms
1.	Antoinette Sayeh	F	Minister	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
2.	Togba Ngangana	M	Deputy Minister	Ministry of Public Works	31-Dec-08
3.	Amara Konneh	M	Deputy Chief of Staff	Executive Mansion	31-Dec-08
4.	Elva Mitchell Richardson	M	Special Assistant	Executive Mansion	31-Dec-08
5.	Beatrice Sieh	F	Inspector General	Liberia National Police	31-Dec-08
6.	Roderick Smith	M	Deputy for Expenditure & Debt Management	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
7.	Elfrieda Stewart- Tamba	F	Deputy Minister for Revenue	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
8.	Richard Tolbert	M	Chairman	National Investment Comm.	31-Dec-08
9.	Etmonia Tarpeh	F	Minister	Ministry of Youth & Sports	31-Dec-08
10.	Philip Banks	M	Minister	Ministry of Justice	31-Dec-08
11.	Augustine Ngafuan	M	Director General	Bureau of the Budget	31-Dec-08
12.	Tarnue Marwolo	M	Deputy Minister for Administration	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
13.	Eugene Shannon	M	Minister	Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy	31-Dec-08
14.	Frederick Norkeh	M	Deputy Minister	Ministry of Commerce	31-Dec-08
15.	Laurence Bropleh	M	Minister	Ministry of Information	31-Dec-08
16.	Raja Kaul	M	Senior Counsel	Office of the President	30-Jun-08
17.	Emmett Dennis	M	Member, Board of Trustee	University of Liberia	31-Dec-08
18.	Elizabeth M. Tubman	F	Deputy Commissioner	General Audit Commission	30-Jun-08
19.	Andrew Paygar- Flanglah	M	Assistant Minister Revenue	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
20.	Aletha Browne	F	Asst. Minister Expen & Debt Management	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
21.	Dabah Varpilah	F	Special Assistant	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
22.	Richard S. Klah	M	Energy Advisor	Ministry of State	31-Dec-08

23.	James Aaron Boker	M	Comptroller General	Ministry of Finance	31-Dec-08
24.	Angelique Weeks	F	Legal Counsel	Ministry of Finance	30-Jun-08
25.	Winsley Nanka	M	Deputy Commissioner	General Audit Commission	30-Jun-08
26.	Luseni Donzo	M	Minister	Ministry of Public Works	31-Dec-08
27.	Michael Slawon	M	Director for Higher Education	Ministry of Education	30-June-08
28.	Joseph Z. Korto	M	Minister	Ministry of Education	31-Dec-08
29.	Edward McClain	M	Presidential Advisor	Ministry of State	One time payment
30.	Ambulai Johnson	M	Minister	Ministry of Internal Affairs	One time payment
31.	Jackson E. Doe	M	Minister	Ministry of Transport	One time payment
32.	J. Chris Toe	M	Minister	Ministry of Agriculture	One time payment
33.	Walter Gwenigale	M	Minister	Ministry of Health & Social Welfare	One time payment
34.	Jeremiah Sulunteh	M	Minister	Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications	One time payment
35.	Frances Johnson-Morris	F	Minister	Ministry of Commerce	One time payment
36.	Anthony Kromah	M	Minister	Ministry of National Security	One time payment
37.	Varba Gayflor	F	Minister	Ministry of Gender and Development	One time payment
38.	Morris Saytumah	M	Minister	Ministry of State	One time payment
39.	C. William Allen	M	Director-General	Civil Service Agency	One time payment
40.	Willard Russell	M	Director	General Service Agency(GSA)	One time payment

## ANNEX 5

**SAMPLE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

PROJECT TITLE : \_\_\_\_\_

NAME OF INSTITUTION \_\_\_\_\_

DATE : \_\_\_\_\_

**Direction : Please check where indicated or describe briefly in the space provided to the right.**

<b>Q 1</b>	[ Respondent's Sex]	1. Male [ ] 2. Female [ ]
<b>Q 2</b>	What is your level of education?	1. BA/BSC [ ] 2. MA/MSC [ ] 3. PHD [ ] 4. Others _____
<b>Q 3</b>	How long have you been working within your area of Specialization?	
<b>Q 4</b>	Do you currently work within your area of specialization?	1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ]
<b>Q 5</b>	If no, why?	
<b>Q 6</b>	If yes, briefly describe your current assignment	
<b>Q 7</b>	How did you come to this assignment/program?	1. I applied [ ] 2. I was invited [ ] 3. I was already working in this assignment [ ] 4. Others [ ]
<b>Q 8</b>	How long have you been in your current assignment?	

<b>Q 9</b>	What area/s have you made the most impact in your current duty?	1. Policy formulation [ ] 2. Policy implementation [ ] 3. Capacity building [ ] 4. Monitoring & Evaluation [ ] 5. Others (Please state)
<b>Q 10</b>	Were you involved in the formulation of the iPRS?	1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ]
<b>Q 11</b>	Were you involved in the formulation of the PRS?	1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ]
<b>Q 12</b>	Were you/are you involved in any other reform process? If yes, briefly describe	1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ]
<b>Q 13</b>	How many staff did you/do you manage?	
<b>Q 15</b>	What is your assessment of the TOKTEN/LECBS programs?	1. Needs to be continued [ ] 2. Needs to be modified [ ] 3. Needs to be terminated [ ] 4. Okay for now
<b>Q 16</b>	Which aspect/s of the TOKTEN/LECBS needs to be modified?	1. Remuneration [ ] 2. Tenure of service [ ] 3. Condition of service [ ] 4. Recruitment Process [ ]
<b>Q 17</b>	In reference to question 15, can you give reason/s why?	
<b>Q 18</b>	In reference to question 16, can you give reason/s why?	

Q 1 9	What need/s has the program served in the institution that you are currently assigned? Please briefly describe	
Q 2 0	Do you intend to continue in your current assignment after the program has ended? If yes, why? If no, why Not?	1. Yes [ ] 2. No [ ]
Q 2 1	If the program were to be continued, what do you think should be the focus? Briefly describe	

**ANNEX 6****SAMPLE OF THE ORAL INTERVIEW GUIDE**

1. One of the objectives of the TOKTEN AND LECBS projects was to help revitalize beneficiary institutions and make them more productive. To what extent this objective has been achieved within your organization?
2. To what extent these projects have contributed to any economic or social service revitalization?
3. Identify specific contributions or achievements made by TOKTEN or/and LECBS project beneficiaries in your organization or at the national level.
4. What are the major weaknesses of the projects and how can they be corrected?
5. Do you have any concerns with respect to project management, coordination and monitoring?
6. Do you have any comments regarding your relationship with UNDP, OSIWA, USAID or any other donors associated with these projects?
7. What would you recommend to the evaluation team to be incorporated in the report?

## ANNEX 7

### Focus Group Discussion Guide

#### About the facilitation

The facilitator (Mission leader) will introduce himself describing his role in guiding the discussion and ensuring that every one has a chance to speak. The facilitator will state the purpose of the study. He will insist that every opinion/view is valued and will be respected. He will also indicate that the proceedings of the meetings are meant to be confidential and that notes/recordings are meant to ensure accurate reflections of views expressed. He will ask participants to introduce themselves, call their names and say some thing about themselves.

#### Situation of the Country [15 minutes maximum]

- Ask: How are things going in the country these days? Are things generally going in the right direction?
- What is the best thing about the current situation?
- What is the worst thing about the current situation?

#### Project Design [25 minutes]

- What are the most important issues of reform a project such as TOKTEN should be focused on?  
(Facilitator/ rank key issues raised)
- What claim can you lay on the current state and performance of public institutions, such as the ones you've served or are serving ?
- What do you like about TOKTEN ?
- What do you think should have been done differently?
- Is TOKTEN gender sensitive? Should it be? What difference would it make?
- What experience had you had with reforming institutions, prior to TOKTEN?
- Do you intend to return after you service? Should the project enable people desirous of staying to continue in their current capacities, or in others as may be deemed fitting? Are there adequate performance monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure that beneficiaries deliver?
- How do you view the role of the PIC? Should it be modified? What modification would you suggest?

**Project Effectiveness (30 minutes)**

- Given that TOKTEN is a response to the huge capacity constraints confronting Liberia's post-conflict recovery and reforms, do you think that the project is accomplishing its objectives? Why/How, or why not?
- Since the project is intended to attract expatriate nationals who would engineer and manage change that boost the capacity of targeted institutions so that they function effectively and efficiently, do you think the current project design is adequate, or is it been implemented as planned? Why, where, how, why not?
- In your opinion, should this project be continued, expanded, or terminated?
- If you think it should, how should it then be carry out? Is there any change you would like to suggest to the scope, duration or design?
- As a beneficiary, do you get the impression that your colleagues in the institutions you've served speculate that you are paid better and hence feel dissatisfied or are resentful?

**Project Impact Assessment (30 minutes)**

- Do you think TOKTEN is having an impact on the public sector reform program ? Why, how, why not?
- What specific contributions have you made to the improvement of the institution you serve ? In your own assessment, how much impact has it had on the overall emergency capacity development agenda?
- How does TOKTEN contribute to the fight against corruption, poverty reduction, national security, governance and sustainable peace?
- Which other areas needs to be strengthened?
- To what extent has TOKTEN contributed to technical knowledge development?
- Do you believe that expatriate nationals recruited under this project had the requisite training, education, exposure, experiences and ability to engender institutional reforms as envisioned under the project?
- Is there anything else you want the independent evaluation team to know about the impact of this project?

**Project Management and Coordination (25 minutes)**

- What do you think about the way the project has been managed?
- Are you satisfied with the PIC? why, why not ?



- Are you satisfied with UNDP? Why, why not ?
- Is there something else you want us to know about project management and coordination?

### **Linkages to Other Capacity Development Initiatives [10 min.]**

- Do you know of any concrete link between TOKTEN and other projects or programs such as the Governance Economic Management Assistance Programme, the Liberian Emergency Capacity Building Support, Senior Executive Service ?
- Do you believe that a link or harmonization would significantly impact on institutional capacity strengthening and human resource development or the larger post conflict reform agenda? How, why, why not?

### **ORGANIZATION OF FOCUS GROUPS : 2 GROUPS**

**Group 1 Profile** : 10 Expatriate nationals and locals serving in the TOKTEN project

Location: Monrovia

Venue: CSA Conference Room

Time: 10:00 am

Tentative Date: June 17, 2008

Sector/Post: Energy Specialist Executive Mansion; Chief Administrator-Fiscal Affairs, JFK; Ast. Professor, University of Liberia; Ast. Min. Adm. Ministry of Justice; Managing Director, LTC; Press Secretary to the president; HRD RIA; Technical Advisor MOE; Coordinator Policy/Training NIC and Senior Legal Advisor, MOS.

**Group 2. Profile:** 10 Expatriate nationals and locals serving in the TOKTEN project

Location: Monrovia

Venue: CSA Conference Room

Time: 10:00 am

Tentative Date: June 20, 2008

Sector/Post: Chief Legal Counsel, MOF; Chief Adm. JFK; Architecture Engineer, MOPW; Consultant Labor Relation, MOL; Economic Advisor to Minister, MOC; Coordinator Port Sector Reform, LRDC; Coordinator Reform Programs, CSA; Consultant African Asian Affairs, MOFA; Consultant External Curriculum & Process Management, CUC and Strategic Management Consultant MOPW; Coordinator, MOHSW.

## ANNEX 8

### DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

- Annual Report 2007, National Investment Commission, December 31, 2007.
- Civil Service Annual Report, January 1-December 31, 2007
- Common Country Assessment- Liberia, Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development, United Nations, Monrovia, June 2006
- Current State Assessment for Civil Service Agency, 3 May 2003, Republic of Liberia, 2006
- Civil Service Reform Strategy (2008-2011)- Draft
- First Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Liberia 2000-2002, UNDP, September 1999
- Internal Mid-Term Evaluation Report and Funding Proposal of the LECBS, Government of Liberia, February 2008
- Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, Republic of Liberia
- (The )Investors Guide to Liberia, NIC, Monrovia, Liberia, 2007
- Lands, Mines, & Energy Annual Report (January 1-December 31, 2007)
- LECBS Project Document
- LECBS Project Internal Mid-Term Evaluation Report and Funding Proposal
- Ministry of Finance Revenue Department: Customs Modernization Strategy
- Ministry of Health & Social Welfare Annual Report (January 1-December 31,2007)
- National Budget, FY July 1, 2008-June 30, 2009, Government of Liberia, Bureau of the Budget, Monrovia (Draft)
- National Human Development Report, 2006, MPEA and UNDP, 2006
- National Policy on Higher Education in Liberia, October 4, 2002
- National Stakeholders Consultative Conference on Tertiary Education in Liberia (Report, April 2007), Government of Liberia and UNESCO, 2007
- Poverty Reduction Strategy, Republic of Liberia, 2008.
- Project Documents-LECBS and TOKTEN
- (The) SeniorExecutive Service, Government of Liberia, Civil Service Agency and UNDP.
- TOKTEN Project Document
- UNDP-Liberia –End of Year Donor Report for LECBS and TOKTEN, 2006 and 2007
- UNDP-Liberia Annual Report, 2007
- UNDP Country Programme Action Plan, March 2008

- UNDP-World Bank, Results Focused Transitional Framework, National Transitional Government of Liberia, April 2005 (Revised).
- UNDP-Liberia, First Country Cooperation Framework 200-2002, September 1999
- UNDP-Liberia, Mid-Term Review of Liberia's First Country Cooperation Framework (1997-2001), Issue Paper, December 2000
- United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2021

The mission also consulted available minutes of PSC/PIC meetings and performance