



**Country Programme Action Plan
Outcome 5 (Policy Dialogue)
Evaluation
(July – August 2008)**

**Evaluation Report
(November 2008)**

Mosharraf Zaidi, Team leader

Contents

1	Introduction	3
1.1	Background: Where the CPAP comes from?	3
1.2	Where Outcome 5 comes from?	3
1.3	Why an Outcome 5 evaluation?	6
1.4	What the Outcome 5 evaluation focuses on?	6
1.5	How the Evaluation is structured?	8
1.6	How the evaluation was pursued (methodology & approach)	8
2	The Development Context	10
2.1	Overall Afghanistan context	10
2.2	The Outcome-specific context	10
2.3	Insecurity and other contextual factors	12
2.4	Aid and Donors context	13
2.5	UN and UNDP context	13
2.6	Net impact of contextual issues	14
3	Findings and Conclusions	15
3.1	Preamble to Evaluation Findings	15
3.2	Status of the outcome	15
3.3	Performance against Output Indicators	16
3.4	Performance against Outcome Indicator	17
3.5	Gap between indicators and Output/Outcome	18
3.6	The Evidence for Changes in Conditions	19
3.7	CPAP Outcome 5 projects	19
3.8	Output Analysis	21
3.9	Outcome Analysis	23
3.10	Attribution analysis: UNDP contributions to the Outcome through Outputs	27
3.11	Next generation planning	28
3.12	Strengths & weaknesses	29
3.13	UNDP Partnership Strategy & Relationship Issues	31
4.	Recommendations	32
4.1.	Recommendations for projects	32
4.2.	Recommendations for UNDP CO	33
5.	Annexes	36

Acknowledgements

The independent evaluation team of Mosharraf Zaidi, Team Leader, and Najibullah Amin, Director of Monitoring and Evaluation, Office of Administrative Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Government Counterpart) would like to thank Fahim Tahiree, (Evaluation Assistant) and Abdullah Nedaee (Programme Assistant) for the tremendous logistical support they provided to the evaluation mission throughout the duration of their work. Yama Halem, Programme Officer was instrumental in orienting the evaluation team to Afghanistan, and to UNDP Country Office. Micheline Baussard, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, was supportive throughout the process. Mohammad Ali Ashraf, the Chief of the PPSU was patient, understanding and accommodating, and his support was central to the evaluation. Other UNDP Country Office staff members who were particularly helpful included Mohammed Sediq Orya, Dilawar Khan, Khalid Khushbeen Mohammed, Indai Sajor, and Rosanita Annie Serrano. The Project Staff for all projects were extremely helpful and accommodating, taking out valuable time to explain their work to the team, and answer sometimes provocative questions patiently and happily.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background: Where the CPAP comes from?

The Country Programme Assistance Plan (CPAP) is a legal agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP with a three-year framework defining mutual cooperation between the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP. Originally, it was slated to cover the period 2006 to 2008, which has since been extended to 2009. It was prepared based on development objectives for Afghanistan as outlined in the UN Common Country Assessment 2004 (CCA) and the planned UN response as defined by the UN Development Assistance Framework 2006-2008 (UNDAF). These overarching documents are inspired by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), lessons learned from UNDP previous engagement in Afghanistan, and the Government of Afghanistan own agenda for stable, sustainable and secure development — as articulated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy process, and the Afghanistan Compact. The CPAP preparation process involved close consultations with key stakeholders, and therefore represents the development priorities of Afghanistan that the UN system, and in particular UNDP view as achievable objectives within the specific context of Afghanistan. It is vital to recognize at the outset that the formulation of the current CPAP occurred not only within the specific Afghanistan context at the time, but also the existing body of work of UNDP.

While UNDP has been in operation in Afghanistan since 1956 (when it signed a Standard Technical Assistance Agreement, or STAA, since 1984, UNDP Afghanistan had been operating without a comprehensive country programme. The Administrator was authorised by the Governing Council and later the Executive Board to provide support to Afghanistan on a project-by-project basis until 2005. It re-initiated work through a country-based operation in 2002 after an absence of significant duration. The 2003 Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan (TAPA) was a pioneering event in Afghanistan development story as it sought to coalesce support across a wide, diverse and disparate set of development actors and bilateral incentives into a singular emphasis on support for the very young Afghan state which was entirely transitional in nature. The current CPAP therefore represents the first-ever normal CPAP framework for the country. The implication therefore is that while Afghanistan itself represents a first-case scenario as a country context, UNDP Country Office is also constrained by the freshness of the challenges it faces.

1.2. Where Outcome 5 comes from?

UNDP Afghanistan CPAP 2006 to 2009 is a bold and ambitious document. It draws on the Afghanistan Compact, the ANDS process, the MDGs and the experience of UNDP in Afghanistan, both during the conflict period in which it operated from outside the country, as well as from 2002 onward, when it played a central role among the international donor community in assisting Afghanistan transition from a conflict zone to a newly formed state. Given the special context of Afghanistan (discussed in greater detail in Section 3), UNDP Afghanistan CPAP committed UNDP to pursue work in the following three broad areas:

1. Strengthening democratic state and government institutions
2. Deepening Democracy
3. Promotion of sustainable livelihoods for the poor

These work areas translated into the following thematic groups within UNDP Afghanistan:

4. State-Building & Government Support
5. Democratization & Civil Society Empowerment
6. Promotion of Sustainable Livelihoods

Within the broad domain of state-building, democracy, and livelihoods, UNDP CPAP specified the importance it placed on inclusive policy dialogue in Section 4.19, titled “Policy Dialogue”:

“UNDP will support the strengthening of national capacities in policy advocacy and reporting on the Millennium Development Goals in support of the implementation and monitoring of the ANDS. In this endeavour, UNDP will contribute to the improvement of the understanding of poverty in Afghanistan through the refinement of qualitative and quantitative human development and poverty monitoring indicators and partnerships building for research. The National Human Development Report will be an important tool for strategic analysis and policy dialogue. Joint work with the UN country team for MDG and HDI, GDI/GEM monitoring will also help the government to enhance its accountability. UNDP will assist in the

development of pro-poor and pro-women policies and poverty reduction strategies and initiatives in both rural and urban areas.”¹

In short, this passage within the CPAP captures UNDP commitment to improving Afghanistan capacity to produce good policy. The CPAP defines good policy, as one that is broadly favourable to the poor, (pro-poor), and one that enables women to achieve their potential as active economic, political and social agents, (gender sensitive). In addition, the CPAP identifies the hallmarks of a good policy dialogue as one that is participatory and evidence-based. The logical continuum leading from Afghan and international community priorities to outcome 5 and output 5 (as well as Outcome 6 and Outputs 6) is illustrated below.

Without even delving into the specifics of the CPAP Results Framework (where we find the language that specifies what Outcome 5 is, and how it shall be measured – via Output 5), it is obvious that the success of the CPAP is contingent on UNDP ability to contribute to improvements in the quality and breadth of inclusive policy dialogue in Afghanistan. This then leads to the specification of this identified need, as Outcome 5:

“Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns.”

The concurrent output for this outcome, Output 5 is:

“Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development.”

¹ Section 4.19 of the UNDP Afghanistan CPAP, Page 15.

Table 1: Logical Genesis of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP Outcomes and Outputs (5 and 6)

National Goal	UNDAF Outcome	Former MYFF Service line	Strategic Plan			CPAP outcome	Output
			Focus Area	Key result area	Outcome		
To create the conditions necessary for the people of Afghanistan to secure sustainable livelihoods in the legal economy, and to lay the foundations for the formation of long-term human development.	Area of Co-operation: Sustainable Livelihoods Outcome 1: By 2008, the national policy and planning framework more extensive provides for an enabling environment for the promotion of secure and sustainable livelihoods	Goal: 1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty SL 1.1 MDG country reporting and poverty monitoring	Poverty Reduction & Achievements of the MDG	Promoting inclusive growth, gender equality and achievement of the MDGs	Enhanced national and local capacities to plan, monitor, report and evaluate the MDGs and related national development priorities, including within resource frameworks	Outcome V: Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns	Output 5: Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development
To strengthen the rule of law and implement measures that enhance the confidence of Afghans in their government; to create a modern and effective civil service with gender equity in government offices	Area of Co-operation: Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; Outcome 2: By 2008, an effective more accountable and more representative public administration is established at the national and sub-national levels, with improved delivery of services in an equitable, efficient and effective manner (area of cooperation Governance, rule of law and human rights).	Goal: 1. Achieving the MDGs and reducing human poverty SL 1.6 Gender mainstreaming			Policies, institutions and mechanisms that facilitate the empowerment of women and girls strengthened and implemented	Outcome VI: Structures, mechanisms and processes in place to impact practices and projects and to ensure that a gender perspective is brought to bear on policy making and development planning.	Output 6: Institutional capacity for gender mainstreaming enhanced to promote women empowerment

1.3. Why an Outcome 5 evaluation?

As UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan begins the process of formulating its next Country Action Programme, a set of outcome evaluations is merited by three specific needs. First, UNDP Country Office needs to begin the process of preparation for a new CPAP that draws on lessons from the current CPAP. Second, outcome level analyses are required to inform the Assessment of Development Results (ADR) exercise for Afghanistan that has been commissioned and is underway. Third, the new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Afghanistan also requires inputs drawing on outcome level analyses of UNDP performance in the CPAP period 2006 to 2009.

To meet these needs, UNDP Afghanistan Country Office Programme and Policy Support Unit (PPSU) commissioned an evaluation of Outcome 5 (among others) of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP.

Outcome evaluations in UNDP are meant to assess the overall quantum of contribution of UNDP to the changes in conditions in the partner country. Specifically, the "outcome evaluation in UNDP assesses progress towards the attainment of outcome(s) which are changes in development conditions in programme countries. It focuses on UNDP contribution towards the nationally owned outcome(s). It explicitly recognizes the role of partners in the attainment of the outcome(s). Outcome evaluations provide critical information to enhance development effectiveness and assist decision and policy making beyond a particular project or intervention. Outcome evaluations provide a substantive basis for UNDAF evaluations, and independent evaluations such as the ADR and the evaluations of the Regional and Global programmes."²

The ToR for the Outcome Evaluation identify the following specific purpose for this evaluation:

1. Evaluate the results achieved to date, and likely to be achieved by end 2009;
2. Provide inputs to the Assessment of Development Results exercise to be carried out by UNDP Evaluation Office later in the year;
3. Provide information, recommendations and lessons learnt for the next Country Programme, which drafting will start in January 2009.

This report presents the evaluation of Outcome 5 of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP conducted by the independent consultant team lead by Mr. Mosharraf Zaidi, supported by Mr. Fahim Tahiree, and with the participation of the government counterpart, Mr. Najib Amin.

1.4. What the Outcome 5 evaluation focuses on?

The evaluation focuses on Outcome 5 and its constituent projects, namely the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD). However, the evaluation also looks closely at the gender-related projects that are located within Outcome 6 of the CPAP, these being the Institutional Capacity Building for Gender Equality project (ICB GE) and the Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP project (GM UNDP). This examination of the Outcome 6 projects was hinted at within the Terms of Reference (Annex 1), and explicitly requested in subsequent interaction between UNDP Country Office and the independent evaluation team. Nevertheless, all assessment of the projects is specific to the contribution they could have, did, or did not make to Outcome 5. In short, the criterion for assessing projects was whether or not they made a contribution to the delivery of Output 5, and the achievement of Outcome 5. The logical genesis of the Outcome 5 and Output 5 (as well as Outcome 6 and Output 6) is illustrated in Table 2.

² UNDP Website, *Programme & Operations: Policies & Procedures*
<http://content.undp.org/go/userguide/results/programme/evaluating/>

Table 2: Logical Genesis of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP Outcomes and Outputs (5 and 6) Projects

CPAP Outcome	CPAP Output	Project	Project Outputs
Outcome V: Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns	Output 5: Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development	ANDS	Output 1: ANDS/PRSP Development team established and maintained (2008: Finalization of ANDS) Output 2: Achievement of a participatory policy making/development planning approach in relation to the ANDS Output 3: National and sub-national consultations conducted and broad ownership of the ANDS across government (2008: Linking Programs and Projects to Sector Strategy Priorities) Output 4: Costed and prioritized ANDS/PRSP finalized and disseminated (2008: Dissemination, Communication, Strategic Communication around the ANDS) Output 5: JCMB Secretariat established to effectively monitor and coordinate progress on the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact Output 6: Effective Consultative Groups and Working Groups and Support to Strategic Policy Analysis and Assessment
		CPHD	Output 1: Improve and inform policy making; advocacy and information shared. Output 2: Data updating and assessment of possibility to calculate the HDI, GDI, GEM and HPI at the national and district levels. Output 3: Capacity building of research and analytical skills through training on human development concept and thematic frameworks. Output 4: Identification and debating issues Output 5: Summarizing findings/assessments and planning for the next phase. Output 6: Preparation of a proposal for a NHDR; design of institutional and advisory mechanisms.
Outcome VI: Structures, mechanisms and processes in place to impact practices and projects and to ensure that a gender perspective is brought to bear on policy making and development planning.	Output 6: Institutional capacity for gender mainstreaming enhanced to promote women empowerment	GM UNDP	Output 1: UNDP Afghanistan Policy framework on gender equality covering both operations and programme is in place Output 2: UNDP CO and project staff committed and able to apply gender equality principles in their respective work Output 3: Guidelines and tools for gender mainstreaming in programme/projects and in operations developed and applied Output 4: Information materials on gender mainstreaming in UNDP Afghanistan published and disseminated to target users/audiences
		ICB GE	Output 1.1: Roles, responsibilities and co-operation for gender mainstreaming among ministries clarified Output 1.2: Capacity of MoWA and selected ministries enhanced Output 1.3: Gender responsive planning and practice in place and use Output 1.4: A gender mainstreaming strategy of Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in place Output 1.5: Gender responsive budgeting framework and methodology established and accepted Output 1.6: Gender mainstreaming Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system in place/use Output 2.1: A Gender Studies Institute is operational Output 2.2: A model framework for data collection and analysis on the status of women established Output 3.1: Communities sensitised/capacitated for the promotion of women's rights Output 3.2: Communities and local institutions capacitated to promote women friendly local level justice system and facilitate women's access to justice in selected provinces Output 3.3: Gender sensitive media established

1.5. How the Evaluation is structured?

The structure and framework for this report have been derived from three sources. The first is the guidance from the UN Evaluation Group and the Evaluation Office of UNDP. The second is the set of key questions that are outlined in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation.

Finally, the third source of the structure for the report is the methodology and approach outlined in the work plan for the evaluation that was agreed with UNDP Afghanistan Country Office team at the inception of the evaluation mission. Guidance documents for evaluations in the UN and UNDP that were consulted for the framework of this report include:

1. Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, United Nations Evaluation Group, April 2005
2. Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, United Nations Evaluation Group, April 2005
3. Evaluation Report Deliverable Description, UNDP, 2006
4. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators: Monitoring and Evaluation Companion Series, #1, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002

The ToR specified twenty one specific questions to shape the scope and depth of the evaluation. These questions were organized in five groups, these being:

1. To what extent have UNDP development interventions attained the intended results?
2. How UNDP development interventions have generated changes, and at which level, in the CPAP outcome areas?
3. Do these outcomes address the national priorities?
4. How efficient was the programme approach in the expected achievement of results?
5. What are the chances that the accomplishments and results will be sustained in the future?

In addition to the organization of the questions specific in the ToR, the Outcome Evaluation work plan outlined a methodology and approach that committed to examining the questions from a two-pronged perspective of a retrospective look at what has happened, and a forward-looking perspective focusing on the future. In each of these two categories, a further two perspectives were highlighted, namely, output and outcome analysis for retrospective, and attribution and future planning analysis for forward-looking.

1. Outputs Analysis (Project Output to CPAP Output Analysis), or an informed assessment about the degree of success that UNDP has had (and is likely to have) in delivering *“enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development”* through its programme in Afghanistan.
2. Outcome Analysis (CPAP Output to CPAP Outcome Analysis), which will largely lead from the Activity to Output assessment, or analysis, i.e. from that assessment, an attempt to identify the extent to which specific programmatic outputs then contributed to the achievement of increased *“government capacity for formulating gender sensitive, pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account, human development concerns.”*
3. Attribution Analysis, or an unpicking of any improved (or worsened) conditions related to the outcome, in Afghanistan, and the attribution of such conditions to the actions and activities of UNDP-managed, or financed programmes or projects. This attribution will be analysed in a manner that will enable tentative conclusions drawn here to be used, or analysed in greater depth in the ADR for UNDP Afghanistan.
4. Next-Generation Planning, or inputs for the forthcoming next CPAP in 2009. This analysis will focus on what UNDP has done well thus far, and how it can approach the issue of policy dialogue and inclusive growth to meet Afghanistan development challenges. To the extent possible, this will attempt to identify out of the box solutions for the development of realistic, achievable, and yet ambitious CPAP Outcomes.

This structural edifice was complemented by the standard evaluation criteria of assessing relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, degree of change and sustainability.

1.6. How the evaluation was pursued (methodology & approach)

The agreed methodology for the process was centred on three nodes. A review of the documents related to UNDP actions in the Outcome 5 and Output 5 areas, meetings with people related to UNDP actions,

including but not limited to projects, and finally, visits to and with project locations, both within Kabul and around the country.

The document review was anticipated to be a quick process that would be completed before the commencement of the in-country mission. Instead, the document review continued to the end of the evaluation, demonstrating the difficulty in collecting and collating the most up to date information on UNDP projects in the Afghanistan country office. For at least two projects that have already been closed, electronic documents did not exist, whereas the most recent versions of updated, or extended projects almost always had to be procured separately from the standard documents provided to the evaluation team.

Upon the inception of the in-country mission, a series of meetings were arranged for the evaluation team, a full list of these meetings is presented in Annex 2. These meetings helped to inform the specific contours of the history and nature of projects, and the partnerships and relationships that fuel them.

Each project was judged in light of the 21 questions framed in the Terms of Reference. The two perspectives from which the analysis was conducted was retrospective and forward looking. The output and outcome analysis served to inform retrospection, while the attribution analysis and future planning analysis informed the forward looking dimension.

To the extent possible, it was hoped that the evaluation would draw on a significant degree of data about projects to inform its judgments. In practice, there were two major challenges in this regard. The first was that on first attempts in many cases, the mere availability of data was questionable. Often, project staff had to double check on whether an original version of a project document (particularly in the case of closed projects) was available, even in hard copy, or paper form. The second was that even where a given document was available, it had to be procured directly from a given project Programme Officer/Project Officer. In several cases, Programme or Project Officers had budget information which often conflicted with budget information available on the website, or with the budget information available from the donor-relations unit within the PPSU. This is a general observation that reflects a less than efficient information sharing and dissemination regime with the CO. It also underscores the overarching problem the evaluation faced in collecting data began with the challenge of collating of all versions of the project document, and extended to the challenging of synthesizing a variety of budget numbers in terms of total budgets, total commitments, and total unfunded budgets.

2 The Development Context

2.1. Overall Afghanistan context

Afghanistan represents one of the world most pressing political and development challenges. Since 2002 there has been a united global commitment to Afghanistan stability and development, but this commitment is often tested by the limits to which donors are able to provide funds, the competing strategic interests of Afghanistan key partners, neighbours, and regional allies, and the Afghan government own capacity limitations and political exigencies. The transformation of Afghanistan from a post-conflict state with limited capacities facing enormous political difficulties, to the Afghanistan envisioned in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy is an enormous challenge. The Vision presented in the ANDS states that by the year 2020, Afghanistan will be:

"A stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbours, standing with full dignity in the international family.

A tolerant, united, and pluralist nation that honours its Islamic heritage and deep aspirations toward participation, justice, and equal rights for all.

A society of hope and prosperity based on a strong, private sector-led market economy, social equity, and environmental sustainability."³

The depth of the challenge to get Afghanistan to such steady-state equilibrium is also perhaps best surmised by the ANDS itself,

"No other nation has faced, simultaneously, the range and scale of far-reaching challenges with which Afghanistan must now contend. Today, the country remains devastated with a large part of the human, physical and institutional infrastructure destroyed or severely damaged. Afghanistan faces widespread poverty; limited fiscal resources which impedes service delivery; insecurity arising from the activities of extremists, terrorists and criminals; weak governance and corruption; a poor environment for private sector investment; the corrosive effects of a large and growing narcotics industry; and major human capacity limitations throughout both the public and private sectors. Meeting the challenges of recovery and rebuilding a country that can provide the basis for sustained economic development will take many years and require consistent international support."⁴ The range of state-related challenges faced by Afghanistan has been the subject of a significant body of both practitioner-focused scholarship as well as academic research. Without expanding on the range of these, it is important nevertheless to identify those that are relevant to Outcome 5, and thereby related to inclusive and participatory policy dialogue.

2.2. The Outcome-specific context

Policy dialogue, by definition, cannot be a one-way monologue, therefore the changes that any set of interventions should affect, have to be both at the level of the government's capability, and at the level of capacity among Afghanistan people to engage with government. In particular, given the specificities of how Outcome 5 has been defined in UNDP CPAP Results Framework (See Table 3 below), this requires a particular emphasis on three areas. The first is the quality of policy dialogue, which from the framework itself we can define as the ambient level of participation and inclusivity, as well as the level of acceptability of the quality of that dialogue to Afghanistan's development partners. The second is the degree of participation of women, and the extent to which women's issues are addressed by the dialogue itself. Finally, the third area is the degree to which the policy dialogue is targeted specifically toward the reduction of poverty and by extension the improvement in Afghan per capita incomes. Overall, Output 5 must contribute, above anything else, to an overarching improvement in the human condition, or in UNDP terms, improved human development.

³ Page ii of the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Executive Strategy*, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008

⁴ Section 3, Page 2 of the *Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Executive Strategy*, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2008

Table 3: CPAP Results Framework (Outcome 5)

<i>National Priority or Goal</i>	To create the conditions necessary for the people of Afghanistan to secure sustainable livelihoods in the legal economy, and to lay the foundations for the formation of long-term human development.
<i>ANDS Benchmarks</i>	None
<i>UNDAF Outcome</i>	Area of Co-operation: Sustainable Livelihoods Outcome 1: By 2008, the national policy and planning framework more extensive provides for an enabling environment for the promotion of secure and sustainable livelihoods
<i>Programme Component</i>	MYFF goal: 1. Achieving the MDG and reducing human poverty Service Line 1.1 MDG country reporting and poverty monitoring
Outcome 5 Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns	
<i>Partners</i>	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Hadj and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Information and Culture Office of the Deputy Ministry of Youth Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Kabul University; Civil society Organizations.
<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Baseline and Benchmarks</i>
National policies/strategies incorporate human development concerns with special emphasis on gender.	Baseline: One identified (Securing Afghanistan Future) Benchmarks 2009: - Human Development principles incorporated into the 8+5 ANDS plus Youth sectoral strategies; - ANDS benchmarks, in line with MDG, mainstreamed in provincial development plans and national policies; - Incorporation of Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure in monitoring and evaluation mechanism of ANDS.

Output 5 Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development						
Indicators	Baseline and Benchmarks	Indicative resources (Thousand USD)				
		2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Indicator 5.1. Quality and quantity of human development and poverty monitoring indicators enhanced.	Baseline: NHDR 2004 Benchmark 2009: NHDRs 2007 and 2009, produced with data disaggregated by male/female, ethno-linguistic, geographic areas.	Core: 600	Core: 1 026	Core: 538	Core: 538	Core: 2 702
		Non-Core: 704	Non-Core: 2 500	Non-Core: 2 000	Non-Core: 2 000	Non-Core: 7 204
Indicator 5.2. Human development concepts promoted nationwide through academia, civil society and the media	Baseline: Kabul University involved in HD Benchmarks 2009: - Centre for Policy and Human Development established; - One capacity building programme established; - One exchange programme established; - 30 lectures on HD delivered.					
Indicator 5.3 Number of nationwide participative consultations on Human Development and pro-poor policy planning	Baseline: - Human Development (HD) consultations conducted in 6 regions (NHDR 2004). Benchmarks 2009: - Two rounds of consultations on HD in all 6 regions to reach the 34 provinces; - One Sub-National Consultation in each of the 34 provinces to formulate Provincial Development Plans.					

It is important to contextualise exactly where Afghanistan began the journey toward fulfilment of the Afghanistan Compact, in general, and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy in particular. By extension, such contextualization lends itself to setting the appropriate expectations with regards to the achievement of UNDP aspirations for Afghanistan, including those articulated in Outcome 5.

At the state capability level it is vital to recognise at the outset the dramatically diminished basic functional capabilities of the Afghan state at the time the Bonn Agreement was signed, and throughout the process of the fulfilling major conditions en route to the formulation of the Afghanistan Compact. Perhaps one way of fully synthesizing the limits of Afghan state capability is to examine the production of the ANDS itself, which was delayed, not due to fundamental policy differences between Afghanistan's government and its development partners. Nor was it delayed due to any fundamental clashes of ideas within, or amongst ministries, departments, or even individuals within government. Instead, some suggested that the factor most responsible for the delayed production of the ANDS was conflict between different nodes of authority and power within government. It is crucial to appreciate this for what it is: a post-conflict country in the process of reconstruction where leverage with donors and power are both deeply contested.

These kinds of conflicts are absorbed and assimilated within most state structures because such structures develop, over the course of time, the kind of flexible and absorptive operational traditions that adjust for the "human factor". The Afghan state capacity to absorb such, otherwise mini-shocks, was completely extinguished by the intergenerational conflict the country suffered prior to the Bonn Agreement. Rejuvenating this key capacity within the state structure is itself an intergenerational challenge. Neither Outcome 5 nor the overarching objectives of the related UNDAF or even national goals from which Outcome 5 was drawn, assume such a capacity exists, nor do they assume, in the process of pursuing Outcome 5, the regeneration of this capacity.

On one hand therefore, we have a state with very limited capacity to deal with procedural and operational challenges through the dint of its plethora of procedural or operational traditions (which individually are in some countries referred to as standard operating procedures, or SOPs). On the other hand, the state's clientele or its citizens have experienced a much more dramatic and obvious degeneration of capacities. The unspeakable suffering of the Afghan people during the conflict preceding 2001 has several different dimensions. Perhaps among the less obvious, but more important ones is the ability of common citizens to engage with governmental and decision-making structures. The fact that the Bonn Agreement and its timeline required the establishment of many new and fresh institutional mechanisms and processes to be in place made the challenge even more imposing. This was particularly true because of the interesting and unique relationship between formal governmental structures and informal but deeply institutionalized decision-making structures, outside the systems of formal governance. Overall, the combination of what constituted the interface between state and citizen in pre-conflict Afghanistan, with the vacuum for such an interface created by the intergenerational conflict the country experienced prior to 2001, and the quick adaptation the Afghan people had to make to new structures after 2001 represents a truly unique set of complexities. The ability of citizens to engage with the state, in particular with decision-making nodes within the government, to participate in what Western analysts would qualify as policy dialogue therefore was not only marginalized and limited to begin with. Instead, one might argue that the challenge itself was exacerbated and deepened because of the vast complications involved in launching a new Afghan state in a short period of time. Perhaps most importantly, the re-launch of the post-war, post-conflict Afghan state was itself not a process free of conflict. Several internal and external factors have ensured that the process of state-building itself has face enormous challenges well outside the domain of traditional in-country policy dialogue.

2.3. Insecurity and other contextual factors

While serving as an absorptive sink for millions of Afghan nationals during the conflict, Afghanistan's neighbouring countries have pursued and continue to pursue their regional interests in the country. This has often conflicted with Afghanistan own needs and priorities raising strong and deep disagreements with its neighbours. Regional powers also have strong economic and security stakes in Afghanistan, and, after the incidents of 9/11, global powers have long term stakes, in terms of how these powers view the long term security and insecurity dimensions of working with the Afghan people to rehabilitate the country. While the Afghan people have benefitted in many ways from the attention of its neighbours, regional and global powers, the confluence of so many varying strands of security and economic interests in Afghanistan has also been somewhat of a curse for its people, extenuating already difficult circumstances, and disabling a rapid regeneration of state capacities.

Internally, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of a badly damaged state and society in Afghanistan required an inclusive approach to state-formation, necessitating what would have otherwise been inconvenient and in some cases, unnatural political alliances between different power centres in the country. These alliances cut across different dimensions, including ethnic, provincial, religious and sectarian and ideological. Six years after the initial Loya Jirga that sought inclusivity and participation of all strands of society however, the strains on the relationships between many of those varying and often conflicting political groups and power centres are showing.

The rate of attacks by Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces on the very nascent new Afghan state increased substantially over the period constituting the outcome evaluation (concurrent with UNDP CPAP period beginning 2006 to the present). This escalation in insecurity has multidimensional impacts on the ability of the Afghan state and people to engage in policy dialogue that involved women and delivers reduced poverty. Among the most serious is the diversion of high-level attention and scarce resource from the non-security related discourse on Afghanistan development, to one that is centred by security. Others include the reduced ability of international organizations to engage in areas that are viewed as presenting significant or serious threats to the personal security of their staff and officials.

Finally, perhaps the most persistent and challenging contextual reality is the specific culture of Afghanistan, which is rooted in a tribal democratic tradition, and informed most significantly by Islam, or the dominant mode of Islam that is practiced in the country. While the Afghan tribal-democratic tradition and Islam's inherent egalitarian traditions provide useful leverage points with which development interventions can relate and juxtapose, the Afghan culture also provides for a significant slew of challenges. The status of women in particular is a vexing and almost insurmountable challenge for Western organizations attempting to engage in areas related to the free and full participation of women. Where intelligent programme and project formulation and design has sought to use Islam-centred discourses on the appropriate roles for women in Afghan society, programme and project managers have found it nearly impossible to find the appropriate human resources. The fact that the challenges are being approached from a confluence, rather than a conflict perspective is a positive development, but this shift does not in any way assuage or mitigate the existing challenge of working in Afghanistan unique and difficult cultural context.

2.4. Aid and Donors context

One of the driving motivations for the global engagement with Afghanistan since 2001 has been the argument that without sustained and meaningful changes in the conditions of the Afghan people and their lives, it is unrealistic to expect Afghan society to be able to resist the violent extremist ideology that was able to conquer the majority of the country's territory by 2001. This has meant, without exception, that international engagement in Afghanistan, even when it has been centrally defined by a military engagement (as it has in many areas), is rooted in the pursuit of a "development agenda". Given the United Nation's central role in defining this agenda, and the natural credibility that is lent to such an agenda by them, the Millennium Development Goals have featured strongly.

2.5. UN and UNDP context

In ordinary circumstances, UNDP represents the primary United Nations agency with a clear lead mandate for development interventions. Immediately after the elimination of the Taliban regime in 2002, Afghanistan unique circumstances necessitated an UN-mandated mission that represented political neutrality and the collective expertise that only a cross-UN agency could fulfil. Thus was born United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA has a unique mandate, with an overarching lead on development issues, ensured by its specific role as the primary partner of the Government of the Afghanistan in its pursuit of the objectives of the Afghanistan Compact. This in turn has significant implications for UNDP, which traditionally enjoys, as mentioned above, a lead role in the UN development agenda. Therefore, while there are clear and important overall, macro-level benefits to the presence of the UN SRSG and UNAMA in Afghanistan, the presence of UNAMA has three major implications for UNDP and its role as the prime agency for development activities.

First, UNAMA presence affords UNDP a degree of programmatic flexibility than it would otherwise enjoy (where it was tasked with fulfilling the Resident Coordinator role). At least in theory, the presence of an overarching UNAMA umbrella enables UNDP to operate with greater flexibility in terms of the management and attenuation of political risk. In other situations, UNDP directly manages the political risk of operating in a given context itself. With UNAMA leading the UN political work in Afghanistan, and enjoying the status not

only of the lead UN agency, but also of the joint stewardship of the Afghanistan Compact agenda with the government, UNDP is much better positioned to take programmatic risks that would otherwise seem politically loaded, charged, and programmatically hazardous.

Second, UNAMA presence creates a de facto gap between the aid policy and harmonization agenda, which is UNAMA domain, and the delivery of development results agenda, which is UNDP domain. Therefore, even though UNAMA has a clear overarching leadership role, its specific role as lead coordination agency for development issues, such as gender, human rights and governance—limits the scope of UNDP involvement in the broader policy picture. UNDP involvement in policy issues is at the invitation of UNAMA, rather than as a driver of the agenda. Without the implementing role that usually goes hand in hand with UNDP role as a coordinating agency, UNAMA has the mandate, but not the programmatic wherewithal to execute its vision. Conversely, UNDP has the programmatic robustness to execute development projects, and indeed the confidence of donors (as expressed through contributions to projects). It does not however enjoy a mandate to cohere or coordinate the international community's aid efforts.

Third, with the high levels of insecurity and high degree of risk that UN employees assume, upon taking office in Afghanistan, there is a limited pool of top-shelf applicants and candidates for positions within the UN. In a sense, UNAMA and UNDP cannibalize each other available pool of human resources (as do all development actors in any post-conflict development context). This is because they split coordination and execution responsibilities, without sharing any of the costs of maintaining an operation in Afghanistan. This is clear and measurable in the case of buildings, vehicles and other material goods and services, but less discernable in the case of human resources. Nevertheless, there is a strong likelihood that in a joint agency for coordination and implementation, there would be a lower overall need for specific kinds of skill sets.

2.6. Net impact of contextual issues

Together, the internal Afghanistan context, the overarching global and regional political context, the specific security context, the aid and aid harmonization context and the UNAMA/UNDP context all combine to both significantly enable (in some cases, such as resource mobilization) and severely constrain (in other cases, such as insecurity) the ability to UNDP to deliver an outcome-level agenda in Afghanistan. Throughout the evaluation, a strong and concerted attempt was made to continue to retain sight of these contextual issues and ensure that the treatment of the analysis of projects, outputs and outcomes was fair, balanced and within the scope of the limitations and de-limitations imposed by Afghanistan special and very specific human development context.

3 Findings and Conclusions

3.1. Preamble to Evaluation Findings

Outcome 5 of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP states, “Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns”. The evaluation of this outcome finds that since 2006 there has not been a significant and meaningful improvement in the Afghanistan government’s *“capacity to formulate pro-poor and gender-sensitive policy”*, nor has there been a significant or meaningful improvement in the ability of the Afghanistan government to ensure *“programmatic targeting of human development concerns”*.

The criteria to make this judgment have been described in Section 1 and represent a holistic, contextually sound and rigorous process. The primary question a good outcome evaluation should answer is: What progress was made towards measurable changes in development conditions in Afghanistan? The outcome we evaluated defines the kind of development conditions that were being assessed, namely the following:

1. government capacity;
2. gender sensitive policies;
3. pro-poor policies, and;
4. targeted human development programming.

The measurable change the evaluation sought to measure in this case was encapsulated by the word “greater”.

Output 5, through which Outcome 5 would be achieved, states, “Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development.” Again, to parse this into small parts capable of being assessed in light of the critical question of what progress was made toward measurable changes in development conditions, this requires an analysis of the following components:

1. policy dialogue
2. focus of such dialogue on poverty reduction
3. focus of such dialogue on human development

The measurable change the evaluation sought to measure in this case was encapsulated by the word “enhanced”.

3.2. Status of the outcome

The outcome evaluated was:

“Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns.”

The concurrent output for this outcome, Output 5 that was being evaluated, was:

“Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development.”

The time period being evaluated was from 2006, the beginning of the current CPAP period, to the present (the CPAP expires in 2009).

The generic findings of the evaluation are that:

- At the output level, there has not been an “enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development”.
- And at the outcome level, since 2006 there has not been a significant and meaningful improvement in the Afghanistan government “capacity to formulate pro-poor and gender-sensitive policy”, nor has there been a significant or meaningful improvement in the ability of the Afghanistan government to ensure “programmatic targeting of human development concerns”.

This evaluation also finds that while gender-related issues are a much more visible part of the development discourse than they would have been in the absence of donor programmes of support, the discourse itself has limited participation from the Afghan people, is centred largely on Afghan government capacity, and is burdened by questions about sustainability and government ownership.

3.3. Performance against Output Indicators

The generic findings described above have been reached through the analysis described in the following sections. Before detailing the analytical process that was pursued to reach these findings however, it is important to assess the degree of achievement of the output and outcome as measurable against the output and outcome indicators described in the CPAP results framework.

Output 5 has three indicators, with defined baselines and benchmarks, as illustrated below.

It is important to note some important features of the CPAP output and outcome indicators. The indicators used for this evaluation were established toward mid 2007. This means that they were not only established after projects had been designed, initiated and assigned to different outputs and outcomes, but that they also had been established well almost half way into the CPAP time frame (2006 to 2009). It is also important to note that all three indicators were clearly designed with the CPHD project in mind.

Indicator	Baseline	Benchmark for 2009
Indicator 5.1. Quality and quantity of human development and poverty monitoring indicators enhanced.	NHDR 2004	NHDR 2007 and 2009, produced with data disaggregated by male/female, ethno-linguistic, geographic areas.
Indicator 5.2. Human development concepts promoted nationwide through academia, civil society and the media	Kabul University involved in HD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Centre for Policy and Human Development established; - One capacity building programme established; - One exchange programme established; - 30 lectures on HD delivered.
Indicator 5.3 Number of nationwide participative consultations on Human Development and pro-poor policy planning	Human Development (HD) consultations conducted in 6 regions (NHDR 2004).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Two rounds of consultations on HD in all 6 regions to reach the 34 provinces; - One Sub-National Consultation in each of the 34 provinces to formulate Provincial Development Plans.

3.3.1. Indicator 5.1.

"Quality and quantity of human development and poverty monitoring indicators enhanced."

There was no significant evidence, based on the baseline and benchmarks, of this either being achieved, or not being achieved. In short, there was no movement in either direction.

The design of this indicator was faulty to begin with. No CPHD or ANDS activity supported the collection, or development of data or indicators that would help contribute to better HD and poverty monitoring indicators. (Instead they both drew on existing government and international agency data). Both the baseline NHDR 2004 and the benchmark NHDR 2007 state explicitly the lack of credible and consistent data that is disaggregated across gender, ethnic, linguistic or geographical areas. Both studies identify the very estimation of Afghanistan population as a key challenge to conducting HDR analysis. The recommendations made in the baseline document, hold in the case of the benchmark document.

The important issue to consider is that the Afghanistan Central Statistical Office (CSO), and the broad universe of international donors — the two key sources of data — were not under the jurisdiction of UNDP, either at the project or programme levels. Moreover, none of UNDP project activities focused as a primary target of their efforts, the CSO. Therefore, improved indicators for human development and poverty monitoring established for other agencies (such as the JCMB or Kabul University for example) would be of little institutional value, given that the baseline document (the NHDR 2004) and its successor (NHDR 2007) both focus their recommendations on the CSO.

Despite these odds, the CPHD team helped to deliver an NHDR 2007 in which statistics were at the heart of the analysis (relatively more than in NHDR 2004), and in which recommendations on statistics were focussed narrowly on two areas (population and prices).

It would be difficult to judge that the *"Quality and quantity of human development and poverty monitoring indicators"* were not *"enhanced"*. This is simply because the richer and wider discussion of statistics in NHDR

2007 included provincially disaggregated data, and data that was gender disaggregated. The sources of the data however, were disparate and often conflicting. Therefore it would also be difficult to judge that they were "enhanced".

3.3.2. Indicator 5.2.

"Human development concepts promoted nationwide through academia, civil society and the media".

There was enough evidence to suggest that as defined by the baseline and benchmark, that this was achieved.

All four conditions defined in the benchmarks have either already been met (CPHD established and capacity building programme launched), or are likely to be met before the end of the CPAP time frame of 2009. Work to put together an exchange programme is underway, and several high profile lectures on HD have been delivered, with several more scheduled for the future.

A key issue here again is design. In this case, while the benchmarks have been achieved, the sum of the benchmarks did not equal the whole of the indicator, as it is defined. For example, none of the benchmarks really have any bearing on the extent to which civil society or the media are promoting human development concepts. Indeed, very little of the CPHD work has focussed on media or civil society. Some of the ANDS work engaged with civil society, but the extent to which this took place is hard to capture, and even more difficult to reflect in the analysis of this indicator because of the narrowly defined baseline and benchmarks.

3.3.3. Indicator 5.3.

"Number of nationwide participative consultations on Human Development and pro-poor policy planning".

There was enough evidence to indicate that, as defined by the baseline and benchmarks, that the desired number of consultations was achieved.

Several assumptions would have to be made to validate this judgement. First the ANDS process is assumed to have been responsible for the production of specific Provincial Development Plans⁵. Second, all provincial plans have been produced and they all adequately reflect the needs and aspirations of the people of those provinces.

Arguments can be made about the absence of any measure of quality of consultations (for example how many women or poor citizens attended the consultations). However, the purpose of multiple indicators is to give that richness to the assessment of the given output. In that sense, this is a fine indicator.

3.4. Performance against Outcome Indicator

The Outcome 5 indicator in the CPAP results framework is:

"National policies/strategies incorporate human development concerns with special emphasis on gender".

The baseline was defined as "One identified (Securing Afghanistan Future)".

With the following benchmarks for 2009:

- Human Development principles incorporated into the 8+5 ANDS plus Youth sectoral strategies;
- ANDS benchmarks, in line with MDG, mainstreamed in provincial development plans and national policies;
- Incorporation of Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure in monitoring and evaluation mechanism of ANDS.

Based on the baseline and benchmarks, there exists sufficient evidence to suggest that this will be achieved. Significant evidence exists that the benchmarks have already been, or are likely to be achieved.

Human development principles have been incorporated in ANDS and associated sectoral strategies, efforts are under way, despite some challenges to ensure that ANDS benchmarks are properly monitored and included in provincial plans, and gender equality and the monitoring of progress on that front is an explicit provision of the ANDS—whereas the Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure are likely to take longer to incorporate into ANDS M&E systems.

⁵ This is a problematic assumption as the evaluation team was not able to clear the confusion about whether Provincial Development Plans were a direct product of the ANDS process, or whether those plans evolved as a separate mechanism.


Even in the absence of the nuance of detail provided by the benchmarks, the key consideration in assessing the achievement of the outcome, as measured by progress or performance against the indicator, has to be whether national policies and strategies have benefitted from human development principles (and gender). Both generically and technically, this seems to be the case.

3.5. Gap between indicators and Output/Outcome

In the absence of any other generic analytical tools, the judgment of whether progress has been made or not, at either the output level or the outcome level is left entirely to the indicators. From that perspective, two of three output indicators were achieved, the third saw no positive or negative movement, and the overall outcome indicator was also achieved. From this evidence-base it would seem that the work of UNDP had produced a resoundingly successful set of interventions. Indeed, it has.

With the following caveat: the indicators capture only part of the essence of what UNDP had aspired to as articulated in the CPAP. In short, the indicators do not describe in enough detail, a set of circumstances that would fulfil the relationship between the achievement of indicators, their manifestation in a clear achievement of the state output, the subsequent contribution of the output to the outcome indicator, which would demonstrate achievement or progress towards the achievement of the outcome.

The arrows in the chart above should flow without the need for explanation. As they stand, the indicators do not do enough to merit those arrows.



The fact is that the results framework for the CPAP Outcome 5 (indicators against the output and the outcome) does not provide any substantially important insights into the words “greater” (at the outcome level), or “enhanced” (at the output level).

In other words, the design and formulation of the CPAP results framework compelled the evaluation team to conduct an exercise in judgment through the approximation of collected wisdom, rather than judgment through the precision of evidence.

One of the key findings of the evaluation is in fact related to this issue of the formulation and quality of results frameworks. As will be described in greater detail below, there is an abundance of rhetoric-stocked, but measurability-deficient results frameworks within the Outcome 5 project roster. Given the already inherent challenges of measuring changes in conditions in Afghanistan, such results frameworks make the task of measuring changes produced by UNDP, or by its projects, much more taxing. More than any other performance factor, measuring what UNDP does is the single most important part of evaluating the outcomes to which it contributes. If it is not possible to fairly and impartially measure what UNDP does, evaluating an outcome is akin to a philosophical exercise. It is very challenging to argue convincingly either in favour of the findings, or against them. This is a death knell for impartiality, objectivity and the empirical basis with which UNDP should be conducting and measuring its own performance, and with which evaluators should be assessing progress against the stated intended changes in conditions in Afghanistan.

3.6. The Evidence for Changes in Conditions

Given the gap (described above) in defined parameters for assessing the kind of change that outcome 5 and output 5 were in pursuit of, the evaluation team still felt that it was important to identify objective parameters against which the evidence for change, or lack thereof could be argued. In addition to the actual project outputs, which are analyzed separately, it was important to identify neutral and objective measures to assess changes in the conditions of,

1. At the outcome level, "government capacity to formulate pro poor and gender sensitive policy...", and
2. At the output level, "policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development".

The evaluation team identified three such measures. The first is quantitative, namely the Human Development Index (HDI) value for Afghanistan and the second is qualitative, namely the year's first International Crisis Group summary report on Afghanistan. The third is based on Afghan citizen perceptions. Both the HDI value for Afghanistan and the year on year Crisis Group summary judgments about the conditions in Afghanistan represent neutral, globally credible, widely recognized and academically rigorous instruments to measure a change in conditions in Afghanistan. The Asia Foundation perception surveys are a globally accepted measure of the attitudes and opinions of Afghan citizens.

What do these three measures suggest about the degree of change in Afghanistan since 2006 in the areas of "greater government capacity" and "enhanced policy dialogue"?

The National Human Development Report (NHDR) 2004 HDI value for Afghanistan is 0.346. Three years later, across the time frame for the outcome evaluation the NHDR 2007 HDI value is 0.345. This represents virtually no change, and at least statistically represents a regressive tendency.

Here is what the International Crisis Group identified as Afghanistan's core challenge on January 29, 2007, in its report on the Afghanistan Compact entitled, "Afghanistan Endangered Compact":

"A year on, even those most closely associated with the process admit that the Compact has yet to have much impact. Afghans and internationals alike still need to demonstrate the political will to undertake deep-rooted institutional changes if the goals of this shared vision are to be met."

Over a year later, on February 6, 2008, the International Crisis Group, in its report, "Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve", had this to say:

"The international community (must) build Afghan capacity and accountability at central and, even more importantly, local levels which would be the ultimate guarantor of a stable, sustainable state. Unfortunately international players have too often created parallel foreign structures ... while tolerating subversion by self-interested local elite ... In addition, the UN has failed to seize the initiative and perform the function of coordinator and driver of international efforts set out in its mandate."

Finally, according to the Asia Foundation survey for 2008, the percentage of the population that feels the country is moving in the right direction dropped from 44 percent in 2006 to 38 percent in 2008, while the number saying the country is going in the wrong direction increased from 21 percent in 2006 to 32 percent in 2008.

From a quantitative, a qualitative and a perceptions perspective then, it may be tentatively argued that the aspired to increase in government capacity to produce gender and poverty-centred public policy (Outcome 5) is not occurring, at least not to the extent of making a discernable change occur in the conditions of Afghanistan. More importantly, even at the output level, which by definition should be more tangible, measureable and achievable than an outcome, it is difficult to conclude that there is enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development.

3.7. CPAP Outcome 5 projects

The four active projects under Outcome 5 that were analysed were:

1. Afghanistan National Development Strategy project or ANDS;
2. Centre for Policy and Human Development project or CPHD;
3. Institutional Capacity Building for Gender Equality project or ICB GE, and;
4. Gender Mainstreaming in UNDP project or GM UNDP.

In addition, there are four projects that are closed that also fall under Outcome 5. Given that all four were precursors to active projects they were examined but not analysed to the same extent as the active projects. For details on all eight of these projects, see Table 4.

Table 4: Projects Information for Projects under Outcome 5

Project Name	ANDS	ICB GE	GM UNDP	CPHD	NHDR	ICB MOWA	GM UNDP	Prep ANDS
Team	PSLP	DCSE	DCSE	PSLP	PSLP	DCSE	DCSE	PSLP
Project ID	(51821)	(54320)	(58415)	(50008)	(11032)	(11033)	(45279)	(51821-I)
Duration	24 months	24 months	26 months	24 months	6 months	24 months	6 months	3 months
Timeline	February 2007 to January 2009	March 2007 to February 2009	October 2007 to December 2009	January 2006 to December 2007	February 2003 to August 2003	February 2003 to January 2005	June 2005 to December 2005	June 2006 to August 2006
Extended?	No	yes (in May 2008, to February 2010)	No	Yes (to December 2009)	Yes	Yes (to March 2007)	No	Yes
Duration of Extensions	na	12 months	na	24 months	na	26 months	na	na
Status	active	active	active	active	closed	closed	closed	closed
Modality	direct	direct	direct	direct	direct	direct	direct	direct
Total Budget	8,773,141.00	10,628,500.00	1,328,240.00	700,000.00	204,550.00	1,399,588.00	100,200.00	1,631,885.00
Revised Total Budget	11,738,893.00	10,628,500.00	1,328,240.00	1,153,096.00	NA	1,243,782.00	NA	NA

3.8. Output Analysis

Of the twenty-one questions (21) highlighted in the ToR, and attached as Annex 3, four (4) were identified as questions that pertained specifically to the link between the collective project outputs, and the specific CPAP output. These questions were:

1. To what extent have results been achieved to date?
2. To what extent are results likely to be achieved by end 2009?
3. What were the major factors influencing the achievement/non-achievement of the results?
4. To what extent have gender issues been addressed in UNDP programme/projects?

These questions are answered in Table 5, which summarizes the analysis for the four Outcome 5 projects in terms of project outputs to CPAP outputs.

What we find from the data on the projects is that UNDP is able to deliver a significant share of the project outputs it is committed to (through the results frameworks of its project).

Unfortunately, the delivery of project outputs has limited significance because the definition of those outputs themselves is amorphous in many cases. A sympathetic view would lead to the kind of assessment made here, where a significant portion of project outputs have been deemed as having achieved the desired result. In fact, a more rigorous lens on the issue would raise a number of questions about what “delivery” and “results” really mean. This is primarily because the results frameworks lack the kind of definitive and measureable indicators that would help evaluators (and UNDP decision-makers) determine performance. This is a problem that affects all four active projects results frameworks, and in terms of the starkness of the problem is demonstrated in Tables 6 through Table 9 (available in Annex 4).

Ultimately the absence of measureable indicators for the project outputs means that any assessment is both difficult to challenge, and to defend. A positive assessment would suggest that projects have achieved their intended outputs, while a negative assessment may suggest that despite perfunctory achievement of project outputs, the CPAP output has not been achieved. This is a major programmatic problem and one that lends itself to mismanagement.

The only project that has a visibly functional and measurable results framework is the Gender Mainstreaming for UNDP project. This is a little ironic, given that the project is the only one within UNDP project portfolio whose audience and beneficiary is UNDP itself, rather than the Afghan people, or government.

The key question we sought a response to in the output analysis exercise is whether or not the sum total of the pursuit, and where application, achievement of project outputs has contributed to the CPAP Output, which is “Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development”?

The CPAP Results framework indicators for this output are:

Indicator 5.1. Quality and quantity of human development and poverty monitoring indicators enhanced.

Indicator 5.2. Human development concepts promoted nationwide through academia, civil society and the media

Indicator 5.3 Number of nationwide participative consultations on Human Development and pro-poor policy planning

If the physical or mechanical production of documents and the signing of agreements is the accepted benchmark for indicators of success in this regard, then there has indeed been a contribution of these projects to the achievement of the CPAP Output. In fact, while the CPAP Results Framework, nominally suggests, but does not confirm, this to be the case, any serious and honest assessment of Afghanistan’s condition, in terms of policy dialogue, cannot conclude anything but that the CPAP Outcome has not been met.

The Output Analysis therefore suggests that the sum of the project activities geared toward the achievement of project outputs have successfully produced those outputs, but have not made a substantive contribution to the CPAP output. The CPAP output itself has not been achieved.

Table 5: Output Analysis for Outcome 5 Project Outputs v. Output 5

Project	Results Now	Results by 2009	Influential Factors	Gender coverage
ANDS	4 of 6 outputs can be judged to have been achieved Outputs 1 through 4 can nominally be judged to have been met, Outputs 5 and 6 cannot	Most or all outputs will be achieved This means very little given the flexible and generous estimates for what achievement may mean.	US AID Govt. of Afghanistan Poor project ownership/oversight/power distribution	Yes, at least nominally
CPHD	Not measureable	The project outputs are not likely to be achieved because they are exceptionally poorly defined, however the project can be judged, from research and exploration, to have been a resounding success. Given the lack of measurable indicators however, it is not possible to "prove" the project's success.	Kabul University (KU) Human resources retention Turnover in KU leadership Unwillingness of UNDP to stand by NHDR 2007 Exceptionally immeasurable results framework Exceptional national staff	Yes
ICB GE	5 out of 11 outputs can be judged to have been achieved Not achieved: Outputs 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 The remaining outputs can nominally be judged to have been met	Most or all outputs will be achieved This means very little given the flexible and generous estimates for what achievement may mean.	Ministries/Govt. of Afghanistan Exceptional national staff	Yes
GM UNDP	2 out of 4 outputs can be judged to have been achieved Outputs 1 and 3 seem almost certain to be achieved Outputs 2 and 4 may take a longer duration to achieve, but seem like reasonable bets to also be achieved within the time frames given	Most or all outputs will be achieved because of the sharpness with which the indicators have been defined.	CO ownership relationships w/ other projects Clear, crisp and sharp indicators that enable measurement	yes

3.9. Outcome Analysis

The outcome analysis picks up where the output analysis leaves off. Instead of asking questions about project to country programme (CPAP) level, the outcome analysis asks the most pertinent questions in an outcome evaluation. Of the twenty one (21) questions in the ToR, the Outcome Analysis deals with seven (7) of them (as well as the all important question about the extent to which results have been achieved to date). These questions are:

1. Do the respective projects outputs significantly contribute to the achievement of the Country Programme outputs and outcomes?
2. Does the progress made by the projects and the achievement of the CPAP outcomes significantly contribute to the related UNDAF outcomes?
3. Were the selection of projects and their outputs consistent with the intended CPAP outcomes and outputs?
4. Were the projects and soft assistance dedicated to the production of the outcomes sufficient in terms of quality and quantity?
5. Was there any duplication or lack of co-ordination between the productions of the outputs?
6. Do the outcomes/outputs cross-fertilize one the other, and in case, to what extent?
7. What happened as a result of UNDP programme, projects and soft assistance?

When analysing the outcome level, we are no longer looking at projects in their individual capacity, whether active or closed, but instead trying to acquire a clear and evidence-based idea about the overall performance of UNDP in attempting to achieve the CPAP Outcome. Nevertheless, for the purposes of collecting the evidence, a project-by-project breakdown of these questions enables the formulation of a clear and confident response to the overarching question of whether or not the outcome has been achieved. Table 10 summarizes the responses to each of the seven questions, by project.

Table 10: Outcome Analysis for Outcome 5 Project Outputs v. Output 5

Project	Significant contribution to CPAP Output/ Outcome	Contribution to UNDAF Outcome	Selection Consistency	Assistance sufficient?	Duplication/ Coordination Issues	Cross Fertilization	What did UNDP Assistance Do?
ANDS	No. The ANDS typified failed PRSP processes despite having been produced through a highly participatory process. Ambient policy dialogue quality in Afghanistan has not improved as a result of UNDP investment in ANDS	None. While it may be possible that an exceptional ANDS implementation process yields an improved environment for securing livelihoods, this is not currently the case.	Yes. The selection of the ANDS project was indeed consistent with the Outcome/ Output.	No. The assistance was not sufficient. It should have included full leadership of the ANDS process.	Yes, several. Most pertinently a lack of coherence across even the multilateral donors, not to mention large bilaterals.	Possible, but not availed.	Operational, nothing substantive. The ANDS would have been prepared anyway. UNDP facilitated operational procedures, but added nothing of substance.
CPHD	Yes. THE NHDR challenge conventional wisdom, are rigorously researched, and are outside the scope of political manipulation. They are located inside an Afghan institution and produce far reaching outcomes.	None. Again. Very difficult to assume that trickle down from the CPHD will contribute to a policy framework for improved livelihoods.	Yes. The selection of the CPHD project was indeed consistent with the Outcome/ Output.	No. Both the duration and the availability of funds constrained the project. Most importantly, soft assistance viz. UNDP CO was not available when required (justice).	Yes. Donors not willing to share 7-15% management costs with UNDP were unable to contribute to the project.	Possible, but not availed. Project is in KU, but ICB GE is setting up a Gender Institute without coordination.	Substantive. THE NHDR 2007 is a long term reform document. The interaction between top shelf national staff (Wardak, Kakar) is of constant benefit to KU students and faculty.
ICB GE	Partially. But too early to tell in Afghanistan, any work on gender may have significant long term impacts.	No. Especially so given the issue here is gender, already a highly contentious and controversial development issue in Afghanistan	No. Not for Outcome 5. ICB GE supports capacity in government to deal with gender. It's a step removed from enhancing capacity	Difficult to say. Almost \$11 million seems like a large figure for capacity building—but the nature of the challenge is perhaps	Yes. NGMS, UNIFEM, UNICEF, GTZ all have gender units within MOWA. Add to this the National Gender Strategy, and it is hard to identify the	Possible, but not availed. See above as one example. Proliferation of gender projects at MOWA is another.	Superficial, but perhaps substantive in the long run. Introduces gender issues at six ministries.

			to deal with gender-centric policy-making.	globally unique. If so, the project design and HR allocation is deeply inadequate, even if funds are not. .	common coordinating thread.		
GM UNDP	Partially. Partially. But too early to tell in Afghanistan, any work on gender may have significant long term impacts. The GM UNDP project is not directly feeding into Afghan entities but rather within UNDP, despite this its impact might be dramatic, if all UNDP projects end up adopting the work streams it has sought to	No. The project is wholly focused on UNDP as the beneficiary. There may be ancillary knock on benefits, but their measurement is impossible.	Partially. However, only as a lead in project for other projects.	Yes	No. In house project, and highly coordinated with others.	Yes	Operational and substantive. But limited to UNDP staff and projects. Highly successful in leveraging projects to take another look at gender, and mainstream key issues.

In addition to the project-wise summary presented in the table, it is important to develop a collective response for the outcome as a whole.

Q. Do the respective projects outputs significantly contribute to the achievement of the Country Programme outputs and outcomes?

A. The fair response to this is that while UNDP project outputs could make a significant contribution to CPAP output 5.1 and outcome 5, they currently do not. This is largely because of the abstract nature of policy dialogue, the poor connections and linkages between CPAP indicators and CPAP outputs and outcomes, and the poor linkages between project outputs, and CPAP outputs.

Q. Does the progress made by the projects and the achievement of the CPAP outcomes significantly contribute to the related UNDAF outcomes?

A. This is not a relevant question because project progress is not clearly linked to the CPAP output and outcome, and they in turn have not been judged to have been achieved. Their achievement may or may not contribute to the UNDAF outcomes, but that is a very high level assessment, in a context where even project results frameworks are lacking basic logical clarity, and sharpness of indicators.

Q. Were the selection of projects and their outputs consistent with the intended CPAP outcomes and outputs?

A. The selection of the ANDS and CPHD were indeed consistent with the intended CPAP output and outcome, however they were not sufficient, nor were they sufficiently designed. In addition, the gender projects were also relevant to the CPAP output and outcome — but they too lacked the necessary clarity in terms of linkages with the CPAP.

Q. Were the projects and soft assistance dedicated to the production of the outcomes sufficient in terms of quality and quantity?

A. Not to the degree they could have been. ANDS suffered from the lack of sufficient level of control over the project by UNDP, which complicated internal project dynamics. CPHD suffered from a limited level of funding and a lack of UNDP flexibility to allow the project to take on funds from other donors. The gender project both enjoy strong funding, and a sufficient level of UNDP-backing.

Q. Was there any duplication or lack of co-ordination between the productions of the outputs?

A. Yes. The most telling example is the presence of a UNDP-backed centre (CPHD) at Kabul University, as another UNDP project, prepares to establish another centre at the same university (ICB GE setting up Institute of Gender Studies). Other examples at a more macro level include the ANDS, which suffered delays because of internal lack of coherence among donors, and conflicts between key agencies within the Afghan government.

Q. Do the outcomes/outputs cross-fertilize one the other, and in case, to what extent?

A. They do, but not to the extent they could. Largely this is due to the limited degree of internal conversation between UNDP projects. On the positive side, the GM UNDP project does a stellar job of engaging other UNDP projects, however this is also part of the very core of the project purpose. On the other hand, the NHDR 2007 for example refers liberally to the consultative work of the ANDS, and there is a clear feedback mechanism at play in the preparation of the NHDR. A similar reflection is not found in the ANDS documents, in terms of it being informed by the NHDR (in fact UNAMA urges UNDP to drop references to NHDR 2007!⁶).

Q. What happened as a result of UNDP programme, projects and soft assistance?

A. UNDP is an important player in the “policy dialogue” arena in Afghanistan. However, the entire arena of policy dialogue suffers from serious shortcomings. Donors cannot be held responsible for the level of engagement between the Afghan people and their government. However donors do bear a significant level of responsibility for the lack of responsiveness of the government to key concerns that are part of the informal policy dialogue in Afghanistan (such as corruption). UNDP strong project management and concerted efforts to engage in aid harmonization and policy coordination activities are to be lauded. ANDS helped provide logistics for the preparation of the document, CPHD produced a substantive and high quality report with a limited audience, ICB GE further advocates the gender issue within ministries and GM UNDP forces UNDP projects to be attentive to gender issues. However the efforts need to have demonstrable results. Those results are simply not evident at the macro-level at which an outcome evaluation attempts to understand UNDP interventions.

⁶ Page 223, “Outcomes from the Donor Dialogue on the first draft of the Afghan National Development Strategy and Consolidated Donor Comments,” UNDP Afghanistan, Monday 10 March 2008

There are two elements to our ultimate assessment of the success or failure of the outcome. First, whether or not the outcome was achieved, and second, the degree to which it fell short (or overachieved). We concluded based on the range of interviews, meetings, document reviews and judgment of the evaluation team (as well as the evidence offered by the NHDR HDI values and the ICG reports) that the outcome has indeed not been achieved.

The outcome analysis helps illuminate how much of a distance is left to bridge before one may be able to conclude that Afghanistan government has greater capacity to formulate pro-poor and gender sensitive public policy that feeds into targeted programming that produces net positive human development outcomes. There is no doubt the journey is a long one. The talent of Afghan national staff and the quality of some of the project level work of UNDP projects is impressive. However there is a dramatic difference between the stated ambitions of international agencies, and the realities of Afghanistan. More realistic expectations by agencies such as UNDP need to govern future programming. Given what we knew in 2005-6 as well as what we know today, Afghanistan was simply not going to be able to achieve the CPAP Outcome 5 (even if UNDP had unlimited top-shelf talent, unlimited funds, and perfect results frameworks). This reflects poorly on the CPAP design, and on the processes of programme and project conception within UNDP Afghanistan.

3.10. Attribution analysis: UNDP contributions to the Outcome through Outputs

The following six questions relate to the attribution of results to UNDP. While these questions cover a range of issues, they thematically link to the issue of UNDP contribution to the overall quantum of development in Afghanistan.

1. How far these results are attributable to UNDP?
2. To what extent do the outcomes/outputs address national priorities⁷?
3. Was the most efficient process adopted?
4. Was the partnership strategy efficient or not?
5. How Government and public institutions have been affected?
6. To what extent is the Afghan population, including marginalised groups, benefiting from these results?

The first question is of a more complex nature and its response can only be collective, rather than at a project level.

To the extent that UNDP interventions in the area of policy dialogue have produced results, the results are mainly at the project output level. Those results can be attributed to UNDP strongly. As has been argued thus far in this report, the evaluation found little evidence of a transformative shift in national policy conversation in Afghanistan. Outcome 5 may not explicitly have sought this kind of transformative shift, but it clearly aspires to enable the government to undertake programmes and policies that would represent a radical departure from tradition (from the gender, poverty and targeting perspectives). At that level, there is nothing to attribute to UNDP, because very little indeed has changed. Again, this is not to undermine the great achievements of some of the activities of UNDP projects, especially the pioneering consultative work of the ANDS, the cutting edge research at CPHD, the strong partnerships being developed by ICB GE, or the excellent coordination and harmonization work of the GM UNDP. Those achievements however have no measurable or immediate impact on government capacity to develop pro-poor and gender sensitive programmes and policies.

For the remaining questions, the attribution analysis can benefit from a parsing the responses at the project level lends a degree of objectivity to the process, an important factor in the absence of rigorous results frameworks. Table 11 represents a summary of the responses.

Table 11: Attribution Analysis for Outcome 5

Project	Addresses National Priorities?	Efficient Processes?	Efficient partnership strategy?	Impact on Govt./Public institutions	Benefit to Afghans
ANDS	Yes	No	No	Negative	None
CPHD	No	No	Yes	Positive	None
ICB GE	No	Yes	Yes	Positive	None
GM UNDP	No	Partially	Yes	Difficult to judge	None

⁷ National priorities are the explicit and implicit priorities of the government.

Whether national priorities are gauged from documents like the ANDS, and Afghanistan Compact or from the behaviour and degrees of demonstrated “ownership” by government entities, there is very limited evidence to suggest that the projects under Outcome 5 represent the addressal of national priorities. Projects do not generally follow efficient processes, largely owing to the inefficient and unworkable design flaws introduced by immeasurable indicators. This is why of all four projects only the project with a relatively well formulated results framework, GM UNDP, actually demonstrates partially efficient processes. Although there are several major issues to be addressed, for the most part, projects followed reasonable, sensible and efficient strategies for partnership, which at least allowed for the potential of exploring and exploiting synergies. ANDS was the exception in this case, again, because even internally, it did not utilise resources for their most obvious functions (e.g. UNDP Project Manager, an economics PhD, played coordination, rather than a substantive policy role). The core problem with ANDS was not UNDP quality or quantity of engagement, but in fact the structural anomaly of placing the project under the administrative authority of quasi-government structures. This detracted from the potential of ANDS to play a cohering role within government, and instead disabled UNDP (at both project and CO levels) to prevent the emergence of tensions between Finance, the Head of State’s office, Economy and the Secretariat that was formulated to deliver the ANDS. Despite a widely recognized and robust process of consultations, a high quality project team at its disposal, and a high degree of CO ownership and involvement then, the ANDS parts did not add up to its sum. From the perspective of Output 5.1 and Outcome 5, in particular, the ANDS project did not add to the net ability of the Afghan state to engage citizens, even though it included a highly visible consultation process. Despite drawing on several layers of organizations—such as the NABDP supported community level, and the ASGP supported provincial and district levels—the consultations have not been, and likely cannot be institutionalised, and therefore represent one-off, top-down initiatives, rather than systemic, predictable, replicable and bottom-up processes. Ultimately, while the rest of government will be saddled with implementation, the Secretariat will likely not exist in the form that it did during conception. No lead donor could claim a clear lead role in coordination, with constant competition between donors.

In fact, in terms of attribution, this is an important issue. As an agency responsible for coordinating the delivery of development results, UNDP has an obvious role in affecting the Paris Declaration for Aid Harmonization. More importantly, UNDP has developed a global reputation for having at its disposal substantive area experts or advisors. In many countries, the development discourse is enriched by the substantive and issues-based discourse that development actors including UNDP feature in. There seems to be less of that kind of in-house capacity in Afghanistan. The only case in which a substantive debate was sparked by a UNDP project was the CPHD NHDR 2007 controversial but academically rigorous overview of justice in Afghanistan. UNDP however, instead of seizing the opportunity to initiate public policy competition and debate, readily accepted the objections of the government and failed to disseminate the report in the manner that it was originally planned. In the case of ANDS, perhaps even more important in terms of its potential impact and scope, some observers felt that donors failed to engage the Government of Afghanistan in substantive, issues-driven debates. Records of consultations and several different versions of the ANDS reflect that in fact substantive debate did take place. Regardless of the differing claims about the depth of UNDP technical involvement in shaping the document, the structure of the ANDS project within the larger ANDS context certainly limited the autonomy that UNDP may have otherwise exercised.

In summation, there is no attribution of the outcome to UNDP largely because there has been no substantive achievement of the outcome. As far as individual project deliverables go, project staff, and programme managers consistently deliver the “goods”, but those goods are small project deliverables, not for the most part, game-changing, substantive outcomes. To attribute those to changing conditions in Afghanistan would be a stretch. At best UNDP Afghanistan office makes a marginal contribution to a capacity and political will constrained environment for open and robust policy dialogue.

3.11. Next generation planning

The final lens of analysis is the forward looking set of questions that would inform the conduct of the Assessment of Development Result exercise, and the preparation of the new Country Programme Action Plan, as well as UNDAF exercise. Four (4) of the twenty-one (21) questions are specific to this lens of analysis:

1. How strong is the level of ownership of the results by the Government and public institutions?
2. What is the level of commitment from the Government to ensure sustainability of the results achieved?
3. Does the Government have the capacity to mobilize resources (human, financial) to pursue/secure the results in the future?

4. How secure/volatile are the changes observed in the improvement of the situation/rights of the population, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups, and to what extent do they have the capacity to be perpetuated?

In fairness, the limited attribution of the conditions to UNDP, and the low level of impact ratings already assigned mean that there is very little likelihood that we would find a dramatically significant or large level of commitment from government to the project outputs or to the CPAP outcome and output. Indeed, as is evident from Table 12, this is exactly the case.

Table 12: Future Planning Analysis for CPAP Outcome 5

Project	Govt. Ownership	Commitment by Govt. Sustainability	Govt. Resource Mobilization Capacity	Are Changes for Afghan People Sustainable
ANDS	Medium	Medium	None	N.A.
CPHD	Low	Low	None	N.A.
ICB GE	Medium	Medium	None	N.A.
GM UNDP	N.A.	N.A.	None	N.A.

The key question of what can UNDP do to improve Afghanistan capability to conduct a national discourse on development, and especially on poverty and gender is not answered convincingly by the analysis. What can be deduced with a certain degree of confidence is that there are some very clear disparities and disjoints between UNDP project outputs—which, tend to be achievable, especially if they were to be defined by proper measurable indicators, and UNDP CPAP outcome which is not only immeasurable, but due to the contextual inappropriateness and over-ambition, likely also unachievable. The most important thing a future CPAP will do in UNDP Afghanistan context is to ground-truth its assertions and ambitions with the limitations of the country and agency context, and to make each element of the CPAP results framework, robustly measurable. More recommendations follow in the Recommendations section.

3.12. Strengths & weaknesses

The evaluation has identified a range of strengths and weaknesses demonstrated by UNDP in its pursuit of the CPAP Outcome 5. The strengths have contributed to the significant project output achievements, and the weaknesses have detracted from the CO ability to deliver macro-outcomes, instead of a range of micro-outputs.

3.12.1. Primary areas of strength

Reputation for responsiveness to Government needs: UNDP Afghanistan country office has a reputation for being a responsive donor that is sensitive to the Government of Afghanistan needs. Those needs, as articulated by the government spokespersons and functionaries that interact with the donor community and the UN system tend to be responded to with project support. Projects tend to be directed toward the identified and agreed needs of the government.

Ability to negotiate working relationship with UNAMA: UNDP tends to be the lead UN agency on issues of democracy and governance, which are crucially linked to the ambient quality of public policy formulation and dialogue. In Afghanistan, the UNAMA mandate quite clearly covers issues of governance. In this sense, the potential for serious overlap and conflict is high. It is clear however that this risk has been well managed by both UNDP CO and UNAMA itself. The space allowed to UNDP to lead projects and the dialogue with government that those projects entail, enables UNDP to continue to behave toward government in a responsive manner. At the same time, UNAMA lead role as a partner of the Government of Afghanistan has not been undermined by UNDP.

Resource mobilization: One way in which UNDP can be an effective responder to Government of Afghanistan needs is to be able to devise and design projects that can attract significant donor interest quickly and efficiently. UNDP has a consistent record in Afghanistan of identifying project opportunities, and producing documentation and partnerships that can deliver those projects. This has enabled UNDP to put together one of its largest and most ambitious country programmes. The proliferation of projects generates valuable resource flows and sustains UNDP ability to reflect its value as a donor and implementer at the cutting edge of development issues in Afghanistan.

Operational outreach through projects: The strong body of project work that UNDP possesses is not only a source of credibility with government, and funds, it also enables UNDP to have a presence in all regions of

Afghanistan. Field visits by the evaluation team to Mazar i Sharif and Bamiyan both demonstrated the reputational and developmental benefits of having field offices. The field offices can serve the valuable function of providing realistic and robust analysis to Kabul and New York about the micro and macro impact of projects on the Afghan people, the ambient mood of the Afghan people, and the distance between Government of Afghanistan policy and the needs of the Afghan people. This represents one of the greatest strengths of UNDP Afghanistan country programme.

Piloting approach and project flexibility: Multiple examples within even the small galaxy of projects in Outcome 5 reflect the ability of UNDP Country Office to respond to the non UN environment quickly and to adapt project design to changing micro and macro realities quickly. One significant measure of this is the consistent extension of projects well beyond their original end dates. While this is generally seen as a weakness, it reflects the very real tensions and compulsions of the dual donor-implementer role that UNDP plays in a difficult environment. By adapting project budgets and durations regularly, UNDP is able to ensure the longevity of its projects—projects that serve both government needs (such as ANDS) and the long-term developmental needs of Afghanistan.

National staff: UNDP Afghanistan national staff has a surprising level of administrative and technical abilities — far greater than what would normally be assumed for a country that is still experiencing inter-generational violent conflict. These abilities are best reflected in projects with little or no international staff (such as CPHD) and in the fact that most projects continue to operate despite often long gaps between the vacating of international posts and their filling.

3.12.2. Primary areas of concern / weakness

Treading a Fine Line: While support for the host government is invaluable, and UNDP perception as a responsive and government-friendly donor is very useful in sustaining engagement with the government on important issues, there is a fine line between being responsive to Government (enabling policy dialogue), and following its dictat — which could in some cases require endorsing limitations on participation and debate. One of the key roles donors must play in a post-conflict country with limited recent memory of inclusive and participatory policy dialogue is to encourage the government to allow dissenting opinions on serious issues of governance, such as the quality and quantum of the delivery of justice. Such dissent, especially if it is technically robust and with merit, must not only be allowed but must be responded to with changes in macro-level policy. UNDP track record on supporting technically robust research that challenges the Government of Afghanistan is not particularly strong.

Lack of clarity about policy areas, and roles viz. UNAMA: While there is a good degree of clarity about UNDP role as a project implementer, and even as the lead agency for dialogue on issues surrounding its projects, UNDP has ceded its coordinating, and convening function to UNAMA. This may enable a smooth and functioning relationship with UNAMA, but it betrays one of UNDP globally recognized skills—technical input. The impact of a separation of policy dialogue at the macro “issues” level from policy dialogue around micro “project issues” is a significant reduction in the overall potential for UNDP to deliver internally consistent and coherent CPAP outcome wins. So whereas a project-based dialogue is able to ensure a smooth project, the larger dialogue about what ails the Afghan policy spectrum is not a dialogue that UNDP is particularly engaged in. One clear manifestation is the complete absence of technical policy advisors from the staff complement at UNDP Afghanistan Country Office.

Resource mobilization distract from development objectives, and from unique UNDP / UN mandate: While the ability to generate projects and mobilise resource is a valuable and important function within a country office, there are cases when the impulse to create a project must be moderated by larger concerns for the coherence of what the UN is doing in a country, what donors are supporting, and what impact their actions will have. The ability to discern between an opportunity to proliferate projects to achieve or sustain development objectives, and an opportunity to simply mobilise resources is an important ability for a country office to demonstrate. While it is difficult to judge whether there is a clear failure to demonstrate this ability, it is equally difficult to suggest that the balance has not been breached.

Multiple uncoordinated field project offices; at sea without centralised UNDP field presence: Having regional field presence is a clear advantage for UNDP in its ability to understand Afghanistan needs and respond to them. However, all of the field offices are project offices. This means that there is no consistency across regions on how many projects are in a given region, and what the standard procedures or protocol is for coordinating not only the macro project operations in Kabul, but more important the intricate operations at the field level. Where personal relationships have been forged, there is a strong level of engagement between projects, but this is entirely dependent on circumstance. More importantly, while the UNAMA has an official staff complement in each region, it is left to deal with a multiplicity of projects with varying levels of willingness and mandate to coordinate and cohere with UNAMA. UNAMA field operations are uniform in

their appetite for UNDP staff presence in the regions to coalesce, cohere, and coordinate the valuable and important work done by its projects in the regions.

Piloting and flexibility may be abused as shortcut approval mechanisms: The average duration of approved in Outcome 5 and associated projects is 27 months. The advantages to having a flexible approach to project design, including the use of pilots are manifold. However there are substantial risks also. The most important is that for managers with limited time, and a high incentive to mobilise resources (and proliferate and sustain projects), approving a high number of short projects that are implicitly designed to be extended. The consistency with which projects have been extended at UNDP (in outcome 5 and beyond) suggests that this risk has a high potential to be realised. A more nuanced and tentative approach to project design would not only mitigate this risk, but also allow project managers to focus on development outcomes, rather than project outputs, necessary to demonstrate value, and therefore justifications for extension.

3.13. UNDP Partnership Strategy & Relationship Issues

UNDP in Afghanistan represents a fascinating and complex confluence of several “personalities” or “identities”. It is of course, a UN agency, with a unique mandate in the most generic sense. It is a UN agency in Afghanistan, without the Resident Coordinator role. It is a development donor that has its own funds to provide to Afghanistan. Yet it is a net recipient of other donors’ money as well. It is in many ways, a contractor, or implementer, without some of the advantages (independence from political considerations) and disadvantages (it does not need to compete for contracts with other “implementers”). The confluence of these different “identities” makes for a very important set of conditions to which UNDP is subject to in the internal and external relationships that it has, and that it must have, to pursue its CPAP outcomes. The management of relationships and partnerships then makes for a very important set of challenges that have a deep impact on UNDP ability to deliver⁸.

⁸ *The evaluation made a number of observations about generic management issues that relate to UNDP Afghanistan overall (not only to Outcome5), and these have been shared separately with the CO.*

4. Recommendations

This evaluation sought to identify whether or not UNDP work in Afghanistan helped achieve (or cover any ground toward achieving) Outcome 5 of the CPAP:

“Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns.”

The projects of UNDP represent the work done by UNDP in pursuit of this outcome. The recommendations below are focused therefore on the outcome and how the projects related to it, rather than the projects as stand alone entities with connections to other, even desirable outputs and outcomes. In short, the lens through which projects were seen was firstly, collective, and secondly in the context of Outcome 5 of UNDP Afghanistan CPAP.

4.1. Recommendations for projects

4.1.1. ANDS

Despite the significant success that the ANDS process had in conducting inclusive consultations and developing broad consensus about Afghanistan’s development needs, the ANDS project itself was not successful in enhancing government capacity, simply because the structures put in place by the project were not in “government” but in parallel to government. Across a range of ministries and government departments, the ANDS has ownership to the extent that senior government officials signed up to the basics enshrined in the document. It does not however have “programmatic” ownership, and it does not have an institutional “home” or locus from which it can pursue “programmatic targeting, taking into account human development concerns”.

This represents a more generic and broader critique in many ways of the entire PRSP paradigm. In that sense it is a position that can be argued against and for.

What is less controversial in the case of the ANDS project is the limited value addition of UNDP involvement in the process. The ANDS Project Manager was not a critical member of the key meetings and consultations that shaped the document. The degree to which UNDP was a critical member of the group of donors that shaped the high-level decisions that determined major elements of the document is unclear. While UNDP was a facilitator of the logistics and operations that helped produce the ANDS, it was not a bulwark against the core problems that plagued the ANDS process, including but not limited to long delays, issues of institutional competition within government, the absence of alternative views of development in Afghanistan and a lack of harmonization among donors.

In short, while the ANDS project did not do any harm, it did not do the things that UNDP is good at, that UNDP is mandated to do and where UNDP could have added value.

The evaluation recommends:

- The closure of the ANDS project.
- A review and comparative analysis of the role played by UNDP in Afghanistan PRPS process with the role played by UNDP in PRSP processes in other countries.
- The transfer of the ANDS monitoring and oversight process, which would be the natural domain of a sustained ANDS project, to UNAMA. There is no added value of offering UNDP funds and expertise for a function that entails across the board monitoring capacity in government, and the coordination of all donors to it. In fact the best contribution UNDP can make to that process is through the holistic nature of support that it provides to ministries and sub national levels through other projects. In that way, in fact, the ANDS offers a great test case for the different roles mandated to UNDP and to UNAMA.

4.1.2. CPHD

CPHD and its predecessor projects have produced two well received and highly regarded national human development reports. It has also contributed to greater appreciation of development issues in Afghanistan through improved capacity among teachers and students at Kabul University (through innovative activities like the resuscitation of a Kabul University academic journal that had been dormant for almost 30 years). CPHD however has not made substantive and sustainable contributions to government capacity. There are two reasons for this.

The first is the scope of the CPHD project. The project is too short in duration, too limited in its access to funds, too constrained by UNDP logistical/operational requirements and too dependent on stability within the Afghan government, especially at Kabul University.

The second is the limited support or backing being provided to the content, or substance that the CPHD has generated. The NHDR 2007 was one example of this. The lack of support provided to the project by UNDP is largely a product of the need to stay “onside” with government, in an increasingly difficult environment.

The solution to the first problem is to expand the scope of the project, lengthen its duration, and initiate new branches of the CPHD to diversify the risk of being planted in one organizational context (U of Kabul). There is no clear solution to the second problem. While UNDP must maintain a good working relationship with government, it must also use its relationship to influence change. Finding the balance is not an easy task.

The evaluation recommends:

- The formulation of a new results framework and project document that builds on the CPHD successes (the currently formulated project, on paper, must not be extended).
- The new CPHD must have a duration of ten years, must be present in at least three, if not more universities other than University of Kabul, and must make investing in Afghan nationals’ capacity a core element of its work.

4.1.3. ICB GE & GM UNDP

The Gender Equality project is an ambitious project in a difficult environment. It is a source of potentially important value addition to the capacity of ministries in Kabul, and where it has regional offices, to appreciate and understand issues of gender. It is not, and likely cannot be, a source of transformative change in terms of the rights and protection of women in Afghanistan. Ideally, the project would be working not only with the ministries identified in the project document, but with all ministries. However, the challenge of finding the right Afghan talent to sustain that kind of an expansion is unlikely to be met successfully in the medium term.

The Gender Mainstreaming project is a highly successful intervention. Its success is rooted in the ability of the project to successfully develop and cultivate relationships with other projects, and negotiate the appropriate space for gender issues in those projects.

However, two significant challenges face these projects. First, it is not clear why UNDP has a separate project (GM UNDP) to fulfil a function that should be the task of an in-house Gender Adviser. Second, it is not clear what developmental value addition there is of “yet another” gender equality project with a range of existing projects being run by other donors (including NGMS, MOWA w/ UNIFEM, w/ GTZ), the presence of a UNAMA engagement in gender issues, and the proliferation of gender units or components in UNDP own projects. The distinction between these and the ICB GE project’s capacity building focus is clear, but the coherence of having a multiplicity of interventions for the same thematic area is not.

The evaluation recommends:

- The merging of the GM UNDP and ICB GE projects into one coherent gender focused project, with two key thrusts. The first being capacity building of all government departments and ministries on gender equality issues, and the second being the harmonization of existing donor initiatives.
- The acquisition of UNAMA endorsement to lead donor harmonization, or the inclusion of the top UNAMA gender position in the active governance of the newly formed gender project.
- The absorption of the GM UNDP project manager and project team into the Country Office as Country Office staff, with a mandate to mainstream and standardise gender across UNDP project portfolio (a role already being fulfilled, but without the “authority” of being an element of the Country Office).

4.2. Recommendations for UNDP CO

On the basis of the range of issues identified, and the clear successes and failures of the projects, as well as the contribution to progress on, but not achievement of CPAP Outcome 5, the evaluation makes the following recommendations.

4.2.1. Portfolio rationalization

There are far too many projects in the portfolio—given the number of staff members available to UNDP Afghanistan Country Office. Too often there are projects in the same generic thematic area that should not exist as separate entities, but as coherent components of a holistic single intervention. Both gender projects are one example of this, but the ANDS and CPHD are another. In a single, powerful and coherent project focused on Afghanistan ability to research, identify, define, formulate and monitor its national development

agenda, UNDP could have done all the work it has done (or attempted to do in CPHD and ANDS), possibly with less fragmentation of efforts, and higher level of both UNDP and GoA ownership.

4.2.2. Log frame rationalization

UNDP Afghanistan Country Office project results frameworks are a study in the very real link between incomplete and inadequate project formulation, design and approvals processes, and the incomplete nature of development work that such processes lead to. If an output cannot be measured, it should not be attempted. If the metrics for measurement are not obvious, development actors have a responsibility to develop them, collect the relevant data and then use it. However ill defined activities and outputs, with no defined performance criteria and vague definitions of what constitutes accomplishment is a recipe for incomplete development. At best it explains why project outputs, defined in the most liberal manner, were regularly achieved by Outcome 5 projects, but the Afghanistan-centric CPAP Outcome 5 was not. All existing results frameworks must therefore be revised to reflect coherent, realistic, achievable and measurable indicators that have three characteristics of good indicators: quality, quantity and time. One feature of all good log frames is wide ownership—one specific requirement for any refurbished log frames is that they must be produced through a participatory process, with project partners. In Afghanistan, this will necessarily mean that the participatory process must be conducted in Dari and/or Pashto.

4.2.3. Staff function rationalization

The twin functions of a regular donor or UNDP office are being fulfilled by only one set of staff members—the two functions being operational and programme management, and technical development expertise. UNDP Afghanistan Country Office has one in-house technical specialist (or adviser), who is almost entirely dedicated to servicing corporate needs (M&E). Of the most pressing issues in Afghanistan, none are addressed by UNDP at an agency level. This is surprising not only because so much of UNDP portfolio is policy and public sector oriented, but also because democracy and governance are two of the widely recognised areas of technical expertise within UNDP. There is no paucity of staff expertise across the wide galaxy of UNDP staffers available for deployment.

If there were no technical experts in Afghanistan working for UNDP, then the explanation of the difficulty of attracting top-shelf advisory talent to Afghanistan would be a reasonable one. However projects are staffed with both high and mid level technical experts and advisers, in some cases, even located outside Kabul.

For the cross-cutting issues of gender, local and sub-national governance, and public administrative reform, senior advisers must be brought into the country office team. Their functions must include:

- cross-office technical oversight and technical coherence of UNDP projects,
- cross-donor technical coordination, and aid effectiveness, and
- policy support for the Government of Afghanistan, rooted in the challenge function.

4.2.4 Investment in capacity to produce credible log frames

UNDP Afghanistan Country Office needs to invest in the skills of its programme staff to develop and monitor credible log frames. In making this investment, it is vital that a concurrent investment be made in project partners' staff, whether that is with government agencies or civil society.

4.2.5. Follow the Guidelines on Capacity

A full throttled UNDP capacity assessment of UNDP Afghanistan Country Office is an urgent necessity. Both the Capacity Building Guideline and the Capacity Assessment Guidelines issued by UNDP HQ in NY offer clear and comprehensive solutions to the issues of both UNDP Country Office capacity constraints and the capacity challenges posed by a post-conflict rebuilding government, as is the case in Afghanistan.

4.2.6. Figure out what UNDP does well

One of the key problems of the CPAP Outcomes themselves and their indicators is that they reflect the same weaknesses of formulation and design that are present in the project log frames. While learning how to construct a proper log frame offers part of the solution, a clear product of UNDP excellent recent record of project proliferation and resource mobilization, is that there is no clear strategic ownership of any specific areas. UNDP cannot be the most capable agency in all sectors all the time. There are some in which it has clear competitive and comparative advantages, and some in which it does not. Conducting a competitive and comparative advantages assessment will enable UNDP to make better decisions about project work that it takes on, and project work that it passes onto other multilateral mandates agencies (such as the ARTF for example). The notion that this would have an adverse affect on revenues is not necessarily true — given that if UNDP consistently delivers high quality results, a lot less effort would need to be invested in resource mobilization and a lot more frequent incidence of “repeat” engagements would occur with donors satisfied with project outputs and outcomes.

4.2.7. Making sure it happens

The only realistic way that the currently configured UNDP Country Office will be able to undertake a rationalization of portfolio, and log frames, and an investment in the analysis necessary to improve internal efficiencies and effectiveness is through the dedication of a senior staff resource for the purpose. UNDP Afghanistan Country Office will need to hire full-time programme strategy advisor, reporting to the Country Director. This position would undertake internal programming changes, and would fulfil the programme management oversight function.

4.2.8. Limit short term fixes

The average project duration of 27 months is a reflection of skewed incentives—where the development objectives of UNDP are competing with other objectives, including operations and management. In a post-conflict environment, there is a very narrow and limited set of arguments that would justify such short interventions. UNDP Afghanistan Country Office should issue an immediate moratorium on the approval of any project proposal of less than 48 months, without a written certification from the Country Director, and ideally a senior government official that a short intervention is a legitimate development response to whatever problem the proposal identifies and seeks to address.

4.2.9. Limit unrealistic budget formulations

The significant gap between Outcome 5 projects projected budgets and the money that was eventually available to the projects reflects either poor design skills, or poor persuasion of donors to finance interventions in the appropriate manner. One way to resolve this issue is to enforce a more rigorous internal process. For example, UNDP Afghanistan Country Office could issue a moratorium on project approvals unless 75% of total budget identified in the project proposal is committed to in principle, by donors.

4.2.10. Project Documentation

There is no clearinghouse mechanism for UNDP existing or closed project portfolio. Acquiring project documents that are up to date and readable is a highly challenging task. A fail-safe mechanism needs to be developed to ensure that Senior Management, and others that require the information, are able to access project information quickly and reliably.

UNDP Afghanistan Country Office should therefore immediately establish a PDF and Word-based database for UNDP Afghanistan's project portfolio, that enables a browser to track changes to a project document, changes in the financing and the original and current project documents and results frameworks.

5. Annexes

Annex 1: ToR for Outcome 5 Evaluation

Annex 2: List of Meetings

Annex 3: Consolidated List of Questions for the Evaluation

Annex 4: Results Framework Measurability

UNDP Afghanistan

Evaluation of Outcomes 2 (State building), 5 (Policy dialogue) and 7 (Livelihoods) (July – October 2008)

Terms of Reference

1. Context

The first Country Programme Action Plan for Afghanistan (2006-2008, extended 2009) was signed in December 2005 between the Government of Afghanistan and UNDP. It includes eight outcomes covering the areas of Democratization, State building, Justice and Human Rights, Civil society, Policy dialogue, Gender, Livelihoods and Environment.

Three of them will be subject to Evaluation:

- *Outcome 2: The democratic state and government institutions strengthened at national and sub-national levels to govern and ensure the delivery of quality public services, including security, with special attention to marginalised groups.*
 - Output 2.1.* Public sector capacity strengthened through the development of civil service at the central and sub-national levels, the establishment of accountability mechanisms and the enhancement of information management for better service delivery.
 - Output 2.2.* Law and order institutions at national and sub-national levels strengthened and security of the population improved.
- *Outcome 5: Greater government capacity for formulating gender sensitive pro-poor policies and programmatic targeting taking into account human development concerns.*
 - Output 5:* Enhanced policy dialogue on poverty reduction and human development.
- *Outcome 7: Strengthened domestic economic opportunities through area-based/community led initiative, private sector partnership, trans-boundary interaction and accession to relevant trade platforms.*

Output 7: Access to social and economic opportunities (local poverty initiatives, private sector development, alternative livelihoods) improved for the poor and vulnerable groups.

A full description of the context and the outcomes is given in Annex A.

2. Purpose of the evaluation

As the Country Programme nears its completion the opportunity exists to evaluate UNDP contribution and generate recommendations that will inform UNDP future programmes in Afghanistan.

The evaluation of these three CPAP outcomes/outputs has the following objectives:

- Evaluate the results achieved to date, and likely to be achieved by end 2009;
- Provide inputs to the Assessment of Development Results exercise to be carried out by UNDP Evaluation Office later in the year;
- Provide information, recommendations and lessons learnt for the next Country Programme, which drafting will start in January 2009.

The outcomes will be evaluated by independent and external evaluators (1 for each Outcome) from July to September 2008, with mission in Afghanistan in July-August.

3. Scope and focus

The evaluation will address the following questions for all the selected outcomes and their related outputs:

A. To what extent have UNDP development interventions attained the intended results:

- To what extent have results been achieved to date?
- To what extent are results likely to be achieved by end 2009?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement/non-achievement of the results?
- To what extent have gender issues been addressed in UNDP programme/projects?
- Do the respective projects outputs significantly contribute to the achievement of the Country Programme outputs and outcomes?

B. How UNDP development interventions have generated changes, and at which level, in the CPAP outcome areas:

- What happened as a result of UNDP programme, projects and soft assistance⁹?
- How far these results are attributable to UNDP?
- How Government and public institutions have been affected?
- To what extent is the Afghan population, including marginalised groups, benefiting from these results?

C. Do these outcomes address the national priorities:

- To what extent do the outcomes/outputs address national priorities?
- Do the progresses made by the projects and the achievement of the CPAP outcomes significantly contribute to the related UNDAF outcomes?
- Were the selection of projects and their outputs consistent with the intended CPAP outcomes and outputs?

D. How efficient was the programme approach in the expected achievement of results:

- Was the most efficient process adopted?
- Was the partnership strategy efficient or not?
- Were the projects and soft assistance dedicated to the production of the outcomes sufficient in terms of quality and quantity?
- Was there any duplication or lack of co-ordination between the productions of the outputs?
- Do the outcomes/outputs cross-fertilize one the other, and in case, to what extend?

⁹ Soft Assistance = Advocacy and Policy dialogue

E. What are the chances that the accomplishments and results will be sustained in the future:

- How strong is the level of ownership of the results by the Government and public institutions?
- What is the level of commitment from the Government to ensure sustainability of the results achieved?
- Does the Government have the capacity to mobilise resources (human, financial) to pursue/secure the results in the future?
- How secure/volatile are the changes observed in the improvement of the situation/rights of the population, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups, and to what extent do they have the capacity to be perpetuated?

For each question, the “*How?*” and the “*Why/Why not?*” should be analysed and reported.

A special attention should be given to the positive/negative changes affecting women and marginalised people.

4. Existing information sources

Detailed Information can be found in the country office Annual Results reports, the projects Annual Progress and/or Final reports, projects Evaluation reports, etc...

Relevant information may also be found in reports of other UN agencies, public or private institutions such as the National Human Development Reports, AREU reports, etc...

5. Evaluation process and methods

The evaluation should be based on a stakeholder approach, where all groups and individuals, who affect and/or are affected by the achievement of the outcomes, are involved in the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation will take into consideration the social, political and economic context, which affects the overall performance of the outcomes achievement; for example, the dramatically deteriorating security environment which occurred from mid 2005 onwards.

The evaluation will be carried out in an objective, sensitive and independent manner with varied and balanced considerations of both positive/negative aspects and areas in which significant improvement are required.

Data Collection

In terms of data collection, the evaluators should use multiple methods that could include desk reviews, workshops, group and individual interviews, project/field visits and surveys. The appropriate set of methods would be determined in the Work Plan that the selected evaluators should submit upon their arrival in the country.

Validation

The evaluators should use a variety of methods to ensure that the data is valid, including triangulation. Precise methods of validation will be detailed in the Work Plan.

Stakeholder Participation

The involvement of a broad range of stakeholders should be applied. The identification of the stakeholders, including Government representatives of ministries/agencies, civil society organizations, private sector representatives, UN Agencies, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries, will take place with support of UNDP programme managers and respective country office units. Also, a Government member from key ministries/institutions will participate as evaluation team member for each Outcome.

Furthermore the development community at large, academics and the general public interested in or benefiting of UNDP interventions, in particular from specific areas of transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development, are specially required to participate.

Evaluation progress

The evaluation consists of the following stages/phases:

For each Outcome,

A. Preliminary phase: Evaluation Approach and Work Plan

Evaluators should provide a detailed Evaluation Approach and Work Plan in response to the Terms of Reference.

This document should detail the conceptual framework and the proposed methodology (data collection, validation, stakeholders' participation, presentations/workshops...).

B. Evaluation Phase: Evaluators assignment

- *Desk Review:* The evaluator will conduct desk reviews of available reports, project reviews and earlier evaluations prior to visiting Afghanistan.
- *Work Plan:* The evaluator will prepare a detailed work plan based on the desk review. The plan will be approved by UNDP. If applicable, the Evaluation TOR shall be adapted on the basis of the desk review findings.
- *Bilateral meetings/consultations:* The preliminary findings from the desk review shall serve as point of departure for in-depth interviews/meetings/consultations with representatives of key stakeholders and selected implementing organizations.
- *Field Visits:* Field visits will be planned and organised in close collaboration with the agencies concerned so as to get the optimal inputs from the stakeholders and also not duplicate existing or ongoing surveys and studies. The evaluation will have to cover 3 regions.
- *An Interim Evaluation Report* shall be submitted mid-way through the evaluation period. It should outline the findings based on desk review and interviews/field visits by date. If applicable, the Work Plan would be revised for the second part of the mission. This report will be presented to UNDP programme team in a meeting (PowerPoint presentation).
- *Draft Evaluation Report:* The first draft report shall be ready for scrutiny at the end of the evaluation period in Afghanistan. This report shall be presented in stakeholders' meetings/workshops in Kabul prior to the evaluator's departure.
- *Final Evaluation Report:* Comments from the stakeholders' workshop as well as from individual stakeholders will be consolidated and electronically sent to the evaluator. The Final Evaluation Report shall integrate the comments and observations, and shall be submitted to UNDP for approval.
The Evaluation Report should be presented in a solid, concise and readable form and be structured around the outcomes and issues listed under Part 3 in the present TOR. It should clearly distinguish the important findings and conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt.
The approval of the Final Report by UNDP is the condition for full payment of the contract.

6. Deliverables

Each evaluator is expected to provide the following deliverables for the indicated dates:

1. A detailed **Evaluation approach and Work plan** (27 July 2008) presenting the approach and methodology that will be used for the evaluation;
2. An **Interim report** (4 August 2008): This report will outline the preliminary findings. It will be submitted and presented to UNDP CO mid-way through the evaluation period;
3. A full **Draft report** (28 August 2008) that will be submitted to UNDP at the end of the mission. This report will be discussed within UNDP and with its partners involved in the outcomes. UNDP will transmit to the evaluator the comments made on this draft within two weeks;
4. The **Evaluation Report** (29 September 2008) integrating the comments will have to be submitted to UNDP, (MS Word and PDF format) within two weeks after reception of the comments on the draft report. This report is subject to UNDP approval;

5. An **Executive Summary** (29 September 2008) of the Evaluation Report, presented as a stand-alone document (5 to 10 pages, MSWord and PDF format).

Other hand, all documents, material, questionnaires, surveys or intermediate reports that might be established for the purpose of the mission should be delivered to UNDP.

All the deliverables are reputed to be public documents, owned by UNDP. Therefore the quality is a paramount.

Documents should be in English language (British) and be submitted in MS Office format (MS Word, MS Excel and PDF).

The Executive Summary should also be translated in Dari and Pashto.

7. Team composition

It is likely that for each outcome, a team will be constituted of one sectoral expert, drawing on the following competencies, and one government counter-part member. In addition they will be support staff.

- **Government Counterpart Members:** three government counterpart officials, on per outcome, would join the evaluation as full-time members.
- **State building and Democratic Governance Expert (Outcome 2)**, with strong expertise in institutional development and capacity building, who will provide the expertise in the core subject areas of the evaluation as Public administration reform, Local governance, Civil service capacity and Service delivery. *(P5 level)*
- **Policy Dialogue and Inclusive growth Expert (Outcome 5)**, will be responsible for looking into the issues of inclusive/participatory policy, support development for poverty alleviation and human development policies, and for analysing the changes in the life of women and marginalised population. *(P5 level)*
- **Livelihoods / Rural-Urban development Expert (Outcome 7)**, will be responsible for analysing the post-crisis economic infrastructure development, livelihoods strategies, and employment through area-based development, trade and public-private partnerships. *(P5 level)*
- **UNDP Programme Officers**, (3), one for each outcome – part time – will support the team with all relevant materials for desk review, indentify the potential stakeholders/persons to meet and support the experts in analysis during their mission in Afghanistan.
- **Team support** (national), one for each outcome who will undertake data collection at the country-level, as well as administrative and logistical support for the work of the missions. The team support should also serve as translator as needed (meeting, interview, documents).
- **Logistic/administrative clerk;** UNDP country office will second a suitable person for the period of the mission – part time. The staff member will provide day to day support in meeting booking and arrangement, travel arrangement (field visits), and documents duplication.

8. Duration, Procedures and Logistics

Duration

The total duration of the mission would be nine calendar weeks (international travels time not included) starting from July 2008.

The evaluation work will be conducted in two phases.

The first phase of Desk Review will start as soon as the Evaluator is assigned (July). During this two week phase the evaluator will review the relevant documents and reports, and prepare the Work plan.

The second phase will start from the day following the evaluator's arrival in Kabul (27 July 2008).

- *Government counterparts:* 5 weeks, during the Evaluation phase in Afghanistan.

- *Area Experts*: 9 weeks; Two weeks for preparation, five weeks for evaluation work in Afghanistan plus two weeks for consolidation and finalization of the Report.
- *Programme Officers*: 10 weeks part time; three weeks prior the visit, five weeks of mission in Afghanistan and two weeks for consolidation of stakeholders' comments.
- *Team support, Logistic/administrative clerk*: 5 weeks each (full time for Team support, other part-time) to support the evaluators during the five weeks in country.

The evaluators will work 6 days per week; Fridays are day-off.

Logistic and administrative arrangements

While the evaluators would be responsible for the delivery of quality outputs, UNDP will be responsible for organizing and facilitating the evaluation. Programme units staff will also assist the evaluators in performing their tasks.

UNDP will arrange the logistic support upon requisition from the evaluators. Secretariat should be ensured by the evaluators themselves.

Transportation will be provided by UNDP.

Printing facilities and presentation facilities for workshops/meetings will be provided by UNDP during the period in country. Internet access will be provided in UNDP country or projects offices (in locations where UNDP is present).

Visa / Security requirements

Evaluators are responsible to obtain visa for entry and work permission for the duration of their mission. UNDP will provide letters for facilitating visa issuance.

Evaluators will be subject to UN security rules and procedures in Afghanistan, namely field visits will be subject to Security Clearance.

Annex 2: List of Meetings

List of Persons Met During the Evaluation Mission

Name	Designation	Organization	Date
Fakhruddin Azizi	Country Head	UNIDO	August 06, 2008
Mohammed Sediq Orya	Program Officer	UNDP	August 06, 2008
Moqamuddin Siraj	Program Officer	UNDP	August 06, 2008
Khwaga Kakar	Project Coordinator	CPHD, UNDP	August 06, 2008
Indai Lourdes Sajor	Program Manager	GEP, UNDP	August 07, 2008
Sebastian Silva	Project Manager	ANDS, UNDP	August 07, 2008
Dr. Ali Wardak	Adviser	CPHD, UNDP	August 07, 2008
Rosanita Annie Serrano	Project Manager	GM UNDP, UNDP	August 10, 2008
Abdel-Ellah Sediqi	Project Manager	SCOG, UNDP	August 10, 2008
Walid Rahimi	Deputy Project Manager	AIMS, UNDP	August 10, 2008
George Varughese	Country Representative	The Asia Foundation	August 10, 2008
Nazeer Shahidi	Deputy Minister for Economy	Ministry of Economy, GoA	August 11, 2008
Paul Lundberg	Project Manager	ASGP, UNDP	August 12, 2008
Adiba Karimi	Gender Coordinator	ASGP, UNDP	August 12, 2008
Margie Cook	Chief Electoral Advisor	ELECT, UNDP	August 12, 2008
Charlemagne Gomes	Program Officer	UNDP	August 12, 2008
Jamie Graves	Program Manager	NABDP, UNDP & MRRD, GoA	August 12, 2008
Abdul Karim Mateen	Head of Monitoring and Result Reporting	NABDP, UNDP & MRRD, GoA	August 12, 2008
Dr. Paula Kantor	Director	AREU	August 14, 2008
Fiona Ritchie	Programme and Strategy Coordinator	DFID Afghanistan	August 14, 2008
Lu Ecclestone	Governance Adviser	DFID Afghanistan	August 14, 2008
Rebecca	Livelihoods Adviser	DFID Afghanistan	August 14, 2008
Wahid Waissi	Process Manager	ANDS, GoA	August 14, 2008
Mustafa Aria	Project Manager	MBAW, UNDP & MOF, GoA	August 14, 2008
Fitsum Abraha	Consultant	MBAW, UNDP, Kabul	August 14, 2008
Shakti Sinha	Senior Governance Officer	UNAMA	August 14, 2008
Naysan Adlparvar	Consultant	UNDP	August 15, 2008
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui	Policy Research & Advocacy Coordinator	Action Aid, Afghanistan	August 15, 2008
Rowshan Bakoev	Civil Affairs Officer	UNAMA, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 17, 2008
Ahmaduddin Sahibi	Provincial Coordinator	GE ICB, UNDP, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 17, 2008
Friba Majeed	Provincial Director	MOWA, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 18, 2008
Raphael S. Saplan	International Infrastructure Engineer	ASGP, UNDP, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 18, 2008
Mohammed Naseer Hamidi	Municipal Management Specialist	ASGP, UNDP, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 18, 2008
Isha Sharma	Public Participation Specialist	ASGP, UNDP, Mazar-i-Sharif	August 18, 2008
Younis Ahmed	Regional Manager	ANBP, UNDP, Bamiyan	August 24, 2008
Gopi Pradhan	Governance Officer	UNAMA, Bamiyan	August 24, 2008
Franceska Massanello	Relief and Development Officer	UNAMA,	August 24, 2008

		Bamiyan	
Vikram Bhatia	Deputy Field Security Coordination Officer	UNAMA, Bamiyan	August 24, 2008
Anila Aftab	Gender Training & Curriculum Consultant	FAO, Bamiyan	August 24, 2008
S. Ikram Afzali	Project Specialist	ACT, UNDP	August 26, 2008
Dilawar Khan	Program Officer	UNDP	August 26, 2008
Humayun Hamidzada	Spokesperson & Dir. of Communication	Office of the President, GoA	August 26, 2008
Abdul Hasib Latifi	Project Manager	SSBSGC, UNDP	August 26, 2008
Soraya Sofiezada	Program Associate	UNDP	August 26, 2008
Kumlachew Aberra	Project Manager	CSLD, UNDP	August 26, 2008
Mithulina Chatterjee	Assistant Country Director	UNDP	August 27, 2008
Raj Kamal	Project Manager	CAP, UNDP	August 27, 2008
Mashoud Tokhi	Head of the Programme Unit	CDS, IARCSC, GoA	August 27, 2008
Rouhullah Osmani	Director	CDS, IARCSC, GoA	August 27, 2008
Ahmad Masood Amir	Assistant Country Director	UNDP	August 27, 2008
Yama Helaman	Programme Officer, DCSE	UNDP, Kabul	August 27, 2008
Akmal Dawi	Humanitarian Reporter	IRIN, OCHA	August 27, 2008

Annex 3: Consolidated List of Questions for the Evaluation

ToR Question Set	Associate Component of the Analytical Framework
1. To what extent have UNDP development interventions attained the intended results? (Outputs level)	Activity to Output
2. How UNDP development interventions have generated changes, and at which level, in the CPAP outcome areas? (Outcomes level)	Output to Outcome
3. Do these outcomes address the national priorities? (Consistency with national and international commitments)	Output to Outcome & Attribution
4. How efficient was the programme approach in the expected achievement of results? (Value for Money & Cost-Effectiveness)	Attribution
5. What are the chances that the accomplishments and results will be sustained in the future? (Sustainability)	Next Generation Planning

Outputs Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have results been achieved to date? To what extent are results likely to be achieved by end 2009? What were the major factors influencing the achievement/non-achievement of the results? To what extent have gender issues been addressed in UNDP programme/projects? 	Outcome Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do the respective projects outputs significantly contribute to the achievement of the Country Programme outputs and outcomes? Do the progresses made by the projects and the achievement of the CPAP outcomes significantly contribute to the related UNDAF outcomes? Were the selection of projects and their outputs consistent with the intended CPAP outcomes and outputs? Were the projects and soft assistance dedicated to the production of the outcomes sufficient in terms of quality and quantity? Was there any duplication or lack of co-ordination between the productions of the outputs? Do the outcomes/outputs cross-fertilize one the other, and in case, to what extend? What happened as a result of UNDP programme, projects and soft assistance?
Attribution Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How far these results are attributable to UNDP? To what extent do the outcomes/outputs address national priorities? Was the most efficient process adopted? Was the partnership strategy efficient or not? How Government and public institutions have been affected? To what extent is the Afghan population, including marginalised groups, benefiting from these results? 	Next Generation Planning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How strong is the level of ownership of the results by the Government and public institutions? What is the level of commitment from the Government to ensure sustainability of the results achieved? Does the Government have the capacity to mobilise resources (human, financial) to pursue/secure the results in the future? How secure/volatile are the changes observed in the improvement of the situation/rights of the population, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups, and to what extent do they have the capacity to be perpetuated?

Annex 4: Results Framework Measurability

Table 6: ANDS Results Framework Measurability

	Project Outputs	Output Indicators	Measurability		
			Quantity	Quality	Time
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)	Output 1: ANDS/PRSP Development team established and maintained (2008: Finalization of ANDS)	- Effective and capable team in place	no	no	no
	Output 2: Achievement of a participatory policy making/development planning approach in relation to the ANDS	- Mechanisms to ensure participation of civil society - Communication strategy - Public awareness campaigns on national and sub national levels - Trainings, conferences, workshops, round tables, on national and sub national levels - ANDS translated and disseminated nationally and sub-nationally - Scale of mass media involvement	no	no	No
	Output 3: National and sub-national consultations conducted and broad ownership of the ANDS across government (2008: Linking Programs and Projects to Sector Strategy Priorities)	- National consultations - Sub-national consultations - Ministries actively involved in ANDS process - Non-governmental agencies engaged in consultations on ANDS	no	no	No
	Output 4: Costed and prioritized ANDS/PRSP finalized and disseminated (2008: Dissemination, Communication, Strategic Communication around the ANDS)	- Costing methodology and estimations in place - MDG baselines established in the context of ANDS - National policies incorporating the cross-cutting themes of gender, counter-narcotics, human rights, regional cooperation, and anti-corruption	no	no	No
	Output 5: JCMB Secretariat established to effectively monitor and coordinate progress on the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact	- Effectively managed and coordinated secretariat - Good quality periodic reports	no	no	No
	Output 6: Effective Consultative Groups and Working Groups and Support to Strategic Policy Analysis and Assessment	Well organized and coordinated CGs and WGs	no	no	No

Table 7: CPHD Results Framework Measurability

	Project Outputs	Output Indicators	Measurability		
			Quantity	Quality	Time
CENTRE POLICY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (CPHD) FOR AND	Output 1: Improve and inform policy making; advocacy and information shared.	- Data and information collected, translated and disseminated - Human Development Resource Centre established - Network of Friends of NHDR established	no	no	no
			no	no	no
			no	no	no
	Output 2: Data updating and assessment of possibility to calculate the HDI, GDI, GEM and HPI at the national and district levels.	- Available data is gathered and verified - Data producers trained on HD indicators - Agreed framework produced for HD data collection - Dissemination of updated information on availability of data	no	Yes	no
			no	no	no
			no	no	no
			no	no	no
	Output 3: Capacity building of research and analytical skills through training on human development concept and thematic frameworks.	- Training organized for potential members of NHDR	no	no	no
	Output 4: Identification and debating issues	- Series of HD research papers commissioned for 3 purposes, a) to analyse current trends on thematic areas, b) identification through the process of researchers and specialists on HD and theme areas, and c) identification of potential themes for the NHDR	no	yes	no
	Output 5: Summarizing findings/assessments and planning for the next phase.	- Conference organized	no	no	no
	Output 6: Preparation of a proposal for a NHDR; design of institutional and advisory mechanisms.	- Design of a full project document and proposed mechanisms. - Fundraising carried out with donors for next phase	no	no	no
			no	no	no

Table 8: ICB GE Results Framework Measurability

	Project Outputs	Output Indicators	Measurability		
			Quantity	Quality	Time
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING-GENDER EQUALITY (ICB GE)	1.1. Roles, responsibilities and co-operation for gender mainstreaming among ministries clarified	Number of assistance requests from selected ministries to MoWA Confidence of other institutions in MoWA capacity Number of support activities provided by MoWA Number of gender integration initiatives taken by ministries	Yes/no	No	no
	1.2. Capacity of MoWA and selected ministries enhanced	Level of satisfaction of other ministers/institutions with the support received from MoWA Number / % of staff trained in each ministry Oversight/line ministries seeking MoWA advice in planning and Project formulation exercises Degree of gender responsiveness in ministerial planning exercises, strategies, business practices MoWA offers technical expertise, tools, guidelines Ministries consideration of gender disparity in their planning and budgeting exercises Quarterly progress reports of ministries are informed of gender differential/desegregated data/analysis	Yes/no	Yes/no	No
	1.3. Gender responsive planning and practice in place and use	Number/% of staff trained on gender consideration in planning exercise Guidelines and checklists (tools) are available Pool of gender resource people available (Nr of trained people) Ministry of Economy (MoEc) staff guide other ministries/departments planning exercises in a gender sensitive manner	Yes/ No	No	No
	1.4. A gender mainstreaming strategy of Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in place	Number of trained personnel available Process is being led by key national staff of MoA Number/% of staff trained on gender consideration in strategy development exercise Applied gender mainstreaming framework available	Yes/ No	No	No
	1.5. Gender responsive budgeting framework and methodology established and	Number of tools and guidelines developed Number/ % of trained personnel MoF technical staff lead discussions on gender matters, use gender tools in their planning and monitoring exercises and give gender responsive budgeting instructions to line ministries Number/% of staff trained on gender consideration in budgetary exercise	Yes/ No	No	No

	accepted	Sectoral resource allocations showing gender needs' responsiveness			
	1.6. Gender mainstreaming and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system in place/use	Number of M&E meetings/workshops at national, sub-national levels conducted Periodic Gender status report available Quarterly progress reports available at any given time Gender sensitive M&E system and methodology; templates for annual status report; tools and guidelines; trained personnel	Yes/ No	No	No
	2.1. A Gender Studies Institute is operational	Number / % of students trained Number of on-going research activities Number of diploma/certificate courses delivered % of successful students Number of enrolment/graduates Gender related policy advice given to GoA	Yes/ No	No	No
	2.2. A model framework for data collection and analysis on the status of women established	Model survey tested in two provinces and gender desegregated data available A pilot baseline on status of women is available	No	No	No
	3.1. Communities sensitised/capacitated for the promotion of women's rights	Number of Mullahs / community leaders trained Change in perception of community (men and women) in respect of women's human rights Shurahs understand/accept women's rights under existing laws Women informed and aware about their (rights) position under existing constitution and laws Difference of community perception of women's rights before and after the completion of the project.	Yes/ No	No	No
	3.2 Communities and local institutions capacitated to promote women friendly local level justice system and facilitate women's access to justice in selected provinces	Religious and local leaders publicly acknowledge role of paralegals Women and community seek support, information, services from trained women paralegals in the community Policy directives and guidelines to institutions to deal with women's issues/cases in dignified manner Number of women's complaints registered Number of paralegals trained Number of cases handled and referred by paralegals Number of women seek information from public institutions Number of requests to DoWAs by women and other institutions for support DoJs proactive to support women and DoWAs	Yes/ No	No	No
	3.3 Gender sensitive media established	Media report proactively on violence against women (VAW) and gender issues from women's rights perspective	No	No	No

Table 9: GM UNDP Results Framework Measurability

	Project Outputs	Output Indicators	Measurability		
			Quantity	Quality	Time
GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN UNDP AFGHANISTAN (GM UNDP)	1. UNDP Afghanistan Policy framework on gender equality covering both operations and programme is in place	1.1: Policy framework and implementation guidelines approved and implemented Baseline: General policy for gender mainstreaming drawn from corporate standards Benchmark: - Policy framework tailor fitted to Afghanistan security, development and cultural context prepared and tested (end of 2008) - Full implementation guidelines (end of 2009)	yes	yes	Yes
	2. UNDP CO and project staff committed and able to apply gender equality principles in their respective work	2.1: # of staff members who complete training programme on "men, women and development" Baseline: none Benchmark: - 100 by end of 2008 - 200 by end of 2009	yes	No	Yes
		2.2: # of projects with gender strategy and action plan designed and implemented Baseline: LOTFA, ANBDP, Access to Justice at District Level and ICB Gender Equality Project Benchmark: - 6 additional projects by end of 2008 - 30% of all UNDP projects by end of 2009	yes	yes	Yes
		2.3: # of units with gender strategy and action plan implemented Baseline: none Benchmark: - 1 unit in Programme by end of 2008 - all units in Programme by end of 2009	yes	no	Yes

	3. Guidelines and tools for gender mainstreaming in programme/projects and in operations developed and applied	3.1: Gender mainstreaming tool kit tailor fitted to UNDP Afghanistan (programme and operations) Baseline: only UNDP corporate kit which is not systematically used in Afghanistan CO Benchmark: By mid 2009, complete Gender Mainstreaming tool kits in: - Staff recruitment, training and promotion - RCA/Accountability - Project management - Editorial guidelines - Gender mainstreaming in the project cycle, including gender sensitive indicators and guidelines	yes	Yes	Yes
		3.2 Work environment and other facilities friendly to or supportive of gender equality Baseline: crèche in CO used only by 11 national staff members (4 are males); two project offices are without toilets for female staff use; all staff with access to transport services to and from work except for the 11 staff with children enrolled in the crèche who are not allowed to use the official vehicle. Benchmark: increase crèche patronage to 16 staff members and increase proportion of rank and file staff users; 100% of project offices with clean and safe toilets for male and female staffs; staff with children are allowed to travel on official vehicle	yes	yes	Yes
	4. Information materials on gender mainstreaming in UNDP Afghanistan published and disseminated to target users / audiences	Number of information materials produced Baseline: event-based (such as IWD, quarterly fact sheets, etc.) Benchmark: Brochure and poster by end of 2007 Video documentation by end of 2008	no	yes	Yes
		Number of times that UNDP gender related initiatives are reported in UNDP newsletter in Afghanistan and HQ; quarterly gender status report Baseline: average of once per quarter in CO Benchmark: one article per month	yes	no	Yes