

OUTCOME EVALUATION
United Nations Development Programme-Philippines
CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY
2008

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List of Acronyms

ACT for Peace/A4P	Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme
ADSDPP	Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan
ARG	ARMM Regional Government
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
AWFP	Annual Work and Financial Plan
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BDA	Bangsamoro Development Agency
BDC	Barangay Development Council
BDP	Barangay Development Plan
CADT	Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
CAR	Cordillera Autonomous Region
CBFM	Community-based Forest Management
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCAGG	Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework
CDP-ELA	Community Development Plan-Executive Legislative Agenda
CG	Consultative Group
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CoP	Culture of Peace
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CPLA	Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army
CPPB	Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Programme (GOP-UNDP)
CPP-NDF-NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines - National Democratic Front - New Peoples Army
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSPP	Conflict- Sensitive and Peace- Promoting
DepEd	Department of Education
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DGM	Donors' Group on Mindanao
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
EO	Executive Order
EC	European Commission
FACE	Fund Authorization and Certificate of Expenditure
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GZO-PI	Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute
GoP	Government of the Philippines
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
GRP-MNLF FPA	Government of the Republic of the Philippines – Moro National Liberation Front Final Peace Agreement
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
HR/IHL	Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law
HSI	Human Security Index

IA	Implementing Agency
IP	Implementing Partner
IPs	Indigenous Peoples
ISDS	Institute for Strategic and Development Studies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IP	Indigenous Peoples
IRR	Implementing Rules and Regulations
IRA	Internal Revenue Allocation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KALAHI	Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (government anti-poverty strategy)
KM	Knowledge Management
LCE	Local Chief Executive
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
LGU	Local Government Unit
MA	Managing Agent
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDP3	Multi-Donor Programme Phase 3
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEDCo	Mindanao Economic Development Council
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MPAD	Mindanao Peace and Development Plan
MTC	Maharlika Trade Center
MTF	Mindanao Trust Fund
MTPDP	Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MWG	Mindanao Working Group
NAPC	National Anti-Poverty Commission
NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	Non-Government Organizations
NPP	National Peace Plan
NUC	National Unification Commission
NZAid	New Zealand Agency for International Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development- Development Assistance Committee
OIA	Overall Implementing Agency
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
P&D	Peace and Development
PDA	Peace and Development Advocate
PDAL	PDA League
PDC	Peace and Development Community
PDF	Philippines Development Forum
PDTWG	Peace and Development Technical Working Group
PHDR	Philippine Human Development Report
PI	Poverty Index

PMO	Programme Management Office
PNP	Philippine National Police
PRINCE2	Projects in Controlled Environments 2
QCIC	Quezon City Islamic Cemetery
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
RKCG	Regional Kalahi Convergence Group
RP	Responsible Partner
RPMM	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao
RPM-RPA-ABB	Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SPCPD	Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development
SPDA	Southern Philippines Development Authority
SPR	Standard Progress Report
SRF/ROAR	Strategic Results Framework/Results-Oriented Annual Report
SRA	Social Reform Agenda
SSRI	Security Sector Reform Index
SZOPAD	Special Zone of Peace and Development
TWSC	Third World Studies Center (University of the Philippines)
UARO	Urban Assets Reform Office
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UP-CIDS	University of the Philippines Center for Integrative Studies
US-AID	United States of Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Outcome Evaluation aims to establish progress towards attainment of the Outcome for the Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) component of the UNDP-Philippines Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for 2005-2009 and the Country Cooperation Framework II (CCF II) for 2002-2004. The Report examines the status of the Outcome: “Key actors are better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace and human security”, identifying contributing factors as well as constraints to its achievement. In this light, it looks at UNDP’s contributions, including its partnership strategy, in the attainment of the Outcome. The Evaluation is intended to inform the formulation of the next CPAP (2010 to 2014) and to determine any modifications in focus and approach towards attainment of the CPR Outcome.

Key Evaluation Findings

Overall, progress towards Outcome attainment is positive. Capacities are being built relative to targets set by UNDP for the CPR component. Substantial contributions have been made towards improving socioeconomic conditions, basic social services, micro enterprise and access to livelihoods in areas covered by programmes under UNDP’s CPR component. Capacities have been built towards enabling communities and individuals to determine, plan and lead in the processes and mechanisms for bringing about improved social and economic conditions in their areas. From a peacebuilding perspective, it appears that substantial progress has been made in bringing about transformations towards peace at personal, relational and institutional levels—indicating among others, changes in mindsets, improved relations among former antagonists, and establishment of mechanisms for institutionalizing peacebuilding among Local Government Units (LGUs). The foundations for transformation towards shared perspectives, meanings and aspirations for peace are being laid down through peace education including the establishment of Schools of Peace, and through continuing capacity-building on the Culture of Peace for CPR partners and stakeholders.

Significant achievements both in peacebuilding processes and in the benefits of peace are clearly demonstrated on the ground, in the community-based mechanisms and alliances for peace and development that have been built over four phases of the GoP-UN Multidonor Programme in Mindanao. Peacebuilding and the pursuit of peace benefits at the local level have been institutionalized through various local Executive Orders, Peace Units created in local executives’ offices, legislative action and financial allocations which attest to LGUs commitment to continue the initiatives even after CPR programmes phase out. There is also evidence of replication by LGUs in areas not currently covered by the programme. Multisectoral peace and development Technical Working Groups have been established at municipal, provincial and regional levels. In all cases, buy-in from significant actors, i.e. the LGUs and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), have been key in sustaining the momentum for peace.

Central to CPR capability-building interventions is the Peace and Development Community (PDC) concept and approach, where the community becomes actively engaged in the transformation process that includes socioeconomic development as well as building linkages towards mainstreaming into local governance structures and mechanisms. Around 60% of the PDCs are in higher stages of development and transformation, i.e., are able to negotiate their own peaceful environments, mobilize resources to support their peace and development plans, and are able to share their

peace-building skills/capacities with neighboring communities, among others. Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs), majority of whom are former combatants of the MNLF, have become local resources for peace who lead in peace advocacy and constituency-building, as well as in resource mobilization and liaison and coordination with LGUs. There is ample evidence to suggest that the PDA Leagues (PDALs) established to consolidate and promote local peace and development agenda are viable entities able to sustain and continue to promote peaceful and self-reliant communities. Counterpart resources from local government units/agencies and non-government organizations for the development of PDCs had an estimated value of US\$ 558,403 or 9 percent of the actual programme expenditures for 2005-2007.

At the national level, the sustainability strategy involves the institutionalization of peacebuilding through the strategic integration of peace and human security perspectives in policies, frameworks, and plans. Efforts are just taking root through the integration of human security perspectives in the draft revised National Peace Plan for the Medium Term Philippines Development Plan (MTPDP) now awaiting approval by the President. Efforts are also underway to institutionalize or mainstream peace and human security in local governance through training on conflict-sensitive perspectives in development planning. Capacity-building for peace-sensitive planning has also been initiated for regional line agencies and LGUs through the Regional *Kalahi* Convergence Groups (RKCG) capacity-building initiative on conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting planning.

Strengthening the policy environment for peacebuilding will require efforts to address key conflict issues, such as natural resource extraction, equitable distribution of resources, injustice, and marginalization of disadvantaged sectors. At the national level, efforts at sustainability will have to be accompanied by governance reform measures and positive responses to resource-based issues; and at the local level, service delivery, capacity-building for peace, and confidence-building among groups and sectors will need to take place on a continuing basis in order to sustain the peace and development that has taken root in the communities. While the community and LGU-led strategy appears to be a good formula for sustainable peacebuilding on the ground, this will need complementation, upscaling and replication to be sustainable over the long term. Innovative approaches, such as the “Schools of Peace” project in Mindanao are contributing to enhanced perspectives on tolerance and diversity and provide foundations for a durable peace. By engaging key institutions that most influence the thinking of children and the general public – such as schools, religious institutions, the media – the transformation of mindsets towards a culture of dialogue, tolerance and peace can be sustained over the longer term.

Several factors facilitate attainment of the Outcome. First, there is a strong peace infrastructure - comprising networks, communities, and highly trained human resources for peacebuilding - that has been established over four phases of the MDP/ACT for Peace. Other factors are: the strategic engagement by UNDP of the MNLF, government agencies and LGUs; the existence of a peace agreement between the GRP and the MNLF; and civil society participation.

On the other hand, hindering factors to Outcome attainment include: a weak policy environment for peacebuilding at the national level; the inconclusive status of peace negotiations with rebel groups; episodes of armed conflict that set back the gains of peace on the ground; leadership shifts among partners resulting from elections, political

appointments and institutional changes that cause delays or adjustments in programme implementation. Other factors seen to affect attainment of the Outcome are the temporary nature of the offices/mandates of programme IPs; the need for a stronger engagement of CSOs at the national level, and the need to strengthen vertical integration of local and national peacebuilding efforts. UNDP's bureaucratic processes contribute to delays in programme implementation.

To mitigate adverse effects of the hindering factors mentioned above on the CPR Outcome, multisectoral peace and conflict analysis with strong risk assessment components should be undertaken on a regular basis by CPR programmes. These assessment processes should also guide UNDP in considering the adequacy of its response to national peacebuilding vis-à-vis its limited resources, and in the context of planning for the next CPAP cycle.

The absence of baseline data has provided challenges in the measurement of progress towards Outcome. On the other hand, the CPR component, through the ACT for Peace programme, has developed a comprehensive peace-based M&E system, currently in its pilot phase, which should be adopted by all CPR component programmes for performance measurement and tracking the effectiveness of interventions.

The CPR Outcome is highly relevant to identified national priorities for peace, as well as to UNDP's niche in capacity building. Given various other development programmes engaged in the same activities in Mindanao, and an observed diminution of UNDP's leadership role in the region over the past few years, UNDP can build on its niche as a pioneer in peace and development by taking the lead in knowledge management, drawing on lessons learned from its long engagement in the field as well as on the expertise of other UN agencies and its global network to move knowledge management forward. It can also re-establish its coordinating and convening role by reinvigorating the Donors' Group on Mindanao which it has co-chaired over the last four years. It can also assert its leadership role in peace and development by building on its national conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme, an area where it has again assumed a pioneering role.

Recommendations

To enhance effectiveness of development results, the Outcome Evaluation makes the following recommendations:

A. General Recommendations

1. Support the lobby for a legislated national peace policy to provide consistency and accountability to the peace process within and between government administrations.
2. Support the lobby for the permanent status of Implementing Agencies (OPAPP, MEDCo) to facilitate their work and provide consistency in the pursuit of long-term peace and development agenda.
3. Increase the Level of Engagement in Luzon and Visayas to respond to national peacebuilding issues, and to strategically position UNDP as the only development partner with a full peace building programme outside Mindanao.

4. Engage the private sector or major businesses to harness their vast potential in contributing to peace advocacy as well as to community and enterprise development, and to draw them into consensus-building processes relative to key conflict issues such as mining and other resource-based issues.
5. Develop social marketing campaigns to promote the public's appreciation of the peace situation and help transform prejudices and intolerance into peacebuilding action.
6. Re-strategize economic development approaches to move from small-scale micro-enterprise to an industry-based approach that is sustainable, will benefit larger numbers of people in the community, and incorporates tested developmental approaches to community-based enterprise.
7. Engage the youth for peacebuilding. The youth are a critical factor in the achievement of a lasting peace for this and future generations. It is imperative to engage them in leading peace advocacy amongst their peers, and themselves practice the values of tolerance and the culture of peace towards long-term sustainable peace in and outside their communities.

B. Programme-level Recommendations

1. Sustain community-based interventions by linking with relevant government agencies. Mainstreaming of programme gains and interventions into existing similar initiatives of national government agencies will allow sustainability and follow-through.
2. Continue to build M&E for peace programmes. Strengthen baseline data gathering, conduct peace/conflict analyses, generate necessary inputs towards more measurable indicators. Adopt the peace-based M&E framework developed by ACT for Peace programme to relevant areas of national peacebuilding and continue efforts to share the framework with other development programmes in Mindanao.
3. Institutionalize risk management. CPR programmes and interventions operate in environments that are highly volatile and unpredictable. Change is being pursued in an environment that is itself constantly changing. Risk assessments and risk management plans are extremely important in moving towards attainment of CPR results/outcomes.
4. Establish mechanism/s to develop shared standards in project management among Programme implementers. Institutionalize a regular mechanism for assessments, lessons-learning and experience-sharing among Implementing Agencies, aimed at consolidating and developing standards in project management.
5. Systematize learning and prioritize Knowledge Management (KM). Mechanisms to institutionalize learning in UNDP CPR programming should be established: regular knowledge sessions should be held among programmes; continuing documentation of lessons learned; roundtables among key partners such as LGUs in conflict areas . UNDP policy assessments on Mindanao (as well as the entire country) should be resumed. KM can be the platform for UNDP to regain its leadership status in peace and development in the country and should be prioritized in the less than two years before the end of the current CPAP cycle.

6. Strengthen government-CSO partnerships for peace. In the context of CPR programmes, institutional partnerships between government agencies and peace-centered civil society organizations should be strengthened and reinforced. Interface should be tightened so that interrelated objectives (for example, Human Security and Culture of Peace) are pursued with synergy and complementation.
7. Initiate collaboration and complementation for peace among UNDP CPAP components. Peace is the result of positive action and progress made on key governance, environmental and poverty issues. UNDP should establish specific collaborative and complementary actions that its portfolios can collectively take to contribute to peacebuilding. The UNDP Governance portfolio particularly should make contributions in the context of governance reforms towards sustainable peace.

C. Areas for Future Peace and Development Work

1. A continued focus on capacity-building for peace, with special attention to key actors in national level policy-making, such as peace negotiators, the security sector and national line agencies. Sustain the focus on capacity-building for LGUs, who are key to sustainable peace.
2. Contribute to an enhanced policy environment for peacebuilding to include support for a rights and reform agenda that would form the backbone of government peace policy. Develop a deliberate approach to Gender and Peace with a platform that responds to women's rights, welfare and protection in the conflict setting. Also, have an added and special focus on the management and resolution of resource-based conflicts.
3. Actively pursue peace education and advocacy as a key strategy for sustainability of peacebuilding and to target the youth as active participants in conflict transformation, including Schools of Peace replicated in Luzon and Visayas where teachers should also be involved in the development of context-sensitive peace education modules.
4. Continue to strengthen CSO constituency for peace, given their important role in catalysing peaceful change, and in consideration of the diverse peace and development agenda that they bring with them.
5. Scale-up the work with the PDCs in Mindanao. CPR programme resources, expertise and experience from 10 years of peacebuilding should be systematically shared and applied outside of the CPR programme locus in Mindanao.
6. Establish collaboration and partnerships with key governance institutions, including the legislature and the security sector, towards strengthening dialogue processes with the peace constituency, and establishing their support and participation in peace advocacy and participation.
7. Support and strengthen platforms for political dialogue among various actors in the conflicts, and thus assume a peacemaking dimension in future peace and development work.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In May 2002, the United Nations began a comprehensive participatory consultation process to develop the Common Country Assessment (CCA) for the Philippines, an in-depth analysis of the country's development context and the challenges it faced. Multi-sectoral workshops with government and civil society groups were held to analyze national priorities vis-a-vis the Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Six themes that were further processed by Thematic Working Groups, the results of which were validated with key partners¹. These development challenges were then translated into the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) which established national priorities and needs to be addressed by the UN system in cooperation with the Philippine government. Five (5) priority areas were identified, one of which was Conflict Prevention and Peace Building, the first time that this area was identified as a development challenge. Conflict prevention and peace-building thus emerged as a new critical area of cooperation alongside macroeconomic stability, broad-based and equitable development; basic social services; good governance; and environmental sustainability.

Following the formulation of the UNDAF, individual United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes formulated their programmes and actions in their Country Programme Documents (CPD) and Country Programme Action Plans (CPAP) covering the period 2005-2009. UNDP's CPAP was finalized with (4) identified priorities: (1) Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and Reducing Human Poverty (2) Fostering Democratic Governance (3) Energy and Environment for Sustainable Development, and (4) Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR). CPR was a new addition to the other three components, which had been established areas of cooperation under the previous UNDP Country Cooperation Frameworks (CCF I and II). (1) Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and Reducing Human Poverty; (2) Fostering Democratic Governance, and (3) Energy and Environment for Sustainable Development. A Peace and Development (P&D) Portfolio was established to manage the programmes and projects under the CPR component.

As indicated in the CPAP, the CPR component is intended to contribute to the creation and maintenance of a secure and peaceful environment, especially for the poor and the marginalized. As such, it is envisioned to address conflict prevention and peace building, recovery and small arms reduction, and disarmament and demobilization².

Strategies towards achieving objectives of the CPR component include *one*, fostering an enabling policy environment for sustainable peace; *two*, building capacities of key actors for peace building and conflict prevention; *three*, strengthening access of conflict-affected communities to basic services and increased incomes and fostering their participation in local governance; *four*, supporting government-civil society partnerships to build a nationwide constituency for peace with heavy involvement of women given they are proven to be effective peace educators; and *five*, establishing strategic partnerships towards mobilizing resources for sustained nationwide peace-building³.

¹ UNDAF 2005-2009 Document, page 13

² CPAP 2005-2009 Document, page 11

³ Ibid

This component supports the achievement of UNDAF Outcome #5 which envisages that by 2009, *the level of violent conflict has been reduced, and human security and the culture of peace have been promoted nationwide*. (NOTE: This is identified as Outcome 5 in the UNDAF document, but as UNDAF Outcome 4 in the UNDP CPAP. For purposes of consistency with the overarching UN document for the cycle 2004-2009, it is referred to in this Evaluation as UNDAF Outcome 5).

1.2 Purpose of the Outcome Evaluation

In accordance with the UNDP-Philippines Country Office Evaluation Plan, an outcome evaluation of the CPR Component of the CPAP was planned to take place within the first half of 2008. This outcome evaluation took place from 5 May to 15 July 2008.

The overall objective of this evaluation is to establish progress towards the envisaged outcome of the CPR Component: *“Key actors are better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace and human security”*. The outcome analysis will identify contributing factors as well as constraints to its achievement. The evaluation will also examine the UNDP’s contributions, including its partnership strategy, in the attainment of the outcome.

Specifically, the Outcome Evaluation should be able to:

- a. Ascertain the status of the outcome
- b. Examine the factors affecting the outcome
- c. Assess the key contributions of UNDP to the outcome
- d. Assess UNDP partnership strategy for changing the outcome.

The expected output of this exercise is a document establishing progress towards outcome of the CPR component of the 2005-2009 CPAP, to include recommendations for future planning and programming and lessons learnt, among others.

An improved understanding of the Outcome itself - its progress, contributory factors, interrelationships of significant elements, and emerging needs – will help to establish any modifications in focus and approach, if needed, for the rest of the CPAP cycle, and will inform the formulation of the next CPAP 2010 to 2014. This will also contribute to efforts within UNDP to enhance programme implementation through results-based evaluation.

1.3 Methodology

This study follows the guideposts provided by UNDP Evaluation Office in its *Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*⁴.

Recognizing inherent challenges in attempting to measure peace outcomes given qualitative and contextual considerations as well as attribution issues⁵, progress towards

⁴ Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002

⁵ As pointed out by OECD-DAC, “questions of measurement, time scale, data, complexity and attribution have been repeatedly highlighted as particular weakness of established methods when these are applied to conflict prevention and peace-building evaluation”. See *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (OECD 2008), page 19

Outcome is also assessed from the lens of peace-results monitoring and evaluation.⁶ The evaluation also draws perspective from relevant criteria set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development –Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) on evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building activities⁷.

This evaluation used a combination of data collection methodologies: desktop research/documents analysis; field-based data-gathering, and interviews/consultations with officials and staff of implementing agencies/partners (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process or OPAPP; Mindanao Economic Development Council or MEDCo; Urban Assets Reform Office or UARPO); local governments, representatives of civil society groups and community representatives, including former combatants involved in programme implementation. Interviews and discussions were also held with UNDP officials and staff. Field work was conducted from 16-21 May 2008, with site visits ranging from 1-2 days in duration. The sites selected included Leon in Iloilo; Tanhay in Negros Occidental; Naujan in Oriental Mindoro; Tulunan in Cotabato; Matalam in Cotabato; and Rosario in Batangas. In the field, the evaluator interviewed local authorities, programme staff and partners, and beneficiaries of various community interventions to solicit feedback and cross validated information through focus-group discussions (FGDs) and on-site observation visits (Refer to **Annex A** for list of documents reviewed, names of FGD participants and key informants, and areas visited). A Validation Workshop was conducted among programme stakeholders on 26 May 2008 to clarify information and data generated from documents analysis, FGDs, site visits and in depth interviews, and to level off the understanding and appreciation of various points among the stakeholders. Eric Barro conducted the evaluation, supported by Marie Labajo and Emily Fajardo. (See **Annex B** for the evaluation TOR)

1.4 Scope and Limitations

This Outcome Evaluation covers the programs and projects implemented under the CPR component/Peace and Development Portfolio during the CPAP Cycle 2005-2009, as well as projects implemented under the Country Cooperation Framework for 2002-2004 (CCF II). Contributions and relevance of respective programme outputs to the outcome are examined. The role and strategy of UNDP in the attainment of the outcome is likewise assessed.

The programmes and projects included in the CPR assessment are in Table 1.

Because some CPR projects were either operationally or financially closed at the time of the Evaluation, information collection was limited to interviews with some key players and reviews of annual and end-of-project and evaluation reports.

Given time constraints vis-à-vis the scope and wide geographic spread of the CPR Component's operations, FGDs and interviews were conducted only with specific people and participants as agreed upon with UNDP and Implementing Agencies, though representing the islands of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

⁶ From John Paul Lederach et al. *Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit*. The Joan B Croc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana. 2007.

⁷ The OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building activities include: relevance/appropriateness; effectiveness; efficiency; impact; sustainability; linkages/connectedness; coverage; coherence; consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values. See *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (OECD 2008), pp 39-46.

Baseline information, including conflict analyses which are essential to the evaluation of peace outcomes, was generally lacking and uneven across Portfolio programmes. However the comprehensive peace-based M&E framework developed by the ACT for Peace Programme in 2007, including baselines on communities assisted by the Programme, was helpful in the analysis of progress towards the Outcome. Also, since this Outcome Evaluation immediately followed the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the ACT for Peace Programme, this assessment has been able to use the findings from the MTR as they contribute to the achievement of the Outcome under review.⁸ However under CCF II, no baselines were established from which this Outcome Evaluation could anchor its assessment of the Programme's contribution to the Outcome. In the absence of baseline information, annual reports and the MDP3 end-of-programme evaluation have provided basis for the assessment.

⁸ The Outcome Evaluator for the CPR component of the CPAP was a member of the three-person team that conducted the ACT for Peace MTR.

Table 1. Programmes and Projects under CCF II and CPAP

Name of Programme and Duration	Key Thrust	Coverage Areas	Institutional Arrangements	Other Partners	Financial Resources/ Donor	Status
Country Cooperation Framework II (2002-2004)						
Government of the Philippines-UN Multidonor Programme Phase 3 (MDP3) 2001-2005	Provision of basic services and livelihood opportunities, Empowerment of Peace and Development Communities (PDCs), Capacity building for MNLF, LGUs, other peacebuilding actors, Promoting a Culture of Peace	Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Cotabato City, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga City	Joint programme participated by UN agencies (FAO, ILO, UNFPA and UNDP) and Government (through the Mindanao Economic and Development Council (MEDCo) as Overall Executing Agency; and Regional Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as the Lead Implementing Agency for the ARMM areas); UNDP as the Administering Agent	Conflict-affected MNLF communities; local governments; Civil Society Organizations; Government Agencies	US\$10 million; Government of Australia, New Zealand and Spain	Financially closed
Environmental Protection in Lake Lanao Area in Support to Sustainable Livelihood of MDP3 2003-2005	Capacity building and development of Lake Lanao Environmental Management Plan, Support to environmental conservation and protection measures, livelihood support to MNLF communities	Lanao del Sur/Norte, Marawi City	ARMM Regional Government as Executing Agency	Conflict-affected MNLF communities and communities in environmentally critical areas surrounding lake Lanao; ARMM agencies	US\$ 770,176; Netherlands	Financially closed
Country Programme Action Plan (2005-2009)						
Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB) 2005-2009	Policy Development, Capacity Building and Provision of Basic Services	Antique, Mindoro, Occidental, Pampanga, Camarines Norte, Abra, Apayao, Ifugao, Quirino, Zambales, Tarlac, Bondoc Peninsula, Mountain Province, Batangas	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) as Implementing Partner	Post-conflict, conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable communities; local governments; Civil Society Organizations; Government Agencies	US\$2 million; UNDP	On-going

Name of Programme and Duration	Key Thrust	Coverage Areas	Institutional Arrangements	Other Partners	Financial Resources/ Donor	Status
Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace 2005-2010	Transformation of conflict-affected/vulnerable areas to peaceful, self-sufficient communities; Capacity Building for peace; Enhancement of Partnerships for peace and development; promotion of a Culture of Peace	Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Shariff Kabunsuan, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Cotabato City, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga City, Palawan, Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Surigao del Norte	Joint undertaking of UN and the Philippine Government; Mindanao Economic and Development Council (MEDCo) as its Overall Implementing Agency; Regional Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as the Lead Implementing Agency for the ARMM areas; UNDP as the Managing Agent	Post-conflict, conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable communities (PDCs); local governments; MNLF; Other peacebuilding actors outside PDCs and LGUs; UN agencies (FAO; ILO; UNFPA)	US\$ 16.2 million; Governments of Australian, New Zealand, and Spain	On-going
Support to the Development of Pilot Muslim Communities in the Philippines 2005-2007	Infrastructure support	Taguig City, Quezon City, Bukidnon, Tawi-Tawi	Urban Assets Reform Office (UARO) as Implementing Agency	Muslim Communities in Metro Manila and Mindanao; Local government units; local hospitals; educational systems including Madrasah schools; Government agencies including DFA and DBM	US\$ 1 million; Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain	Operationally closed
Rehabilitating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Communities in Southern Philippines 2004-2006	Relief, Resettlement and Rehabilitation	Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Bukidnon	MEDCo as Overall Implementing Agency; Regional Government of ARMM as the Lead Implementing Agency for ARMM areas	IDP communities, humanitarian organizations/Civil society organizations, Local Government Units, OCD and disaster coordinating units	3 million Euro (US\$3.6 million); European Commission	Financially closed

Name of Programme and Duration	Key Thrust	Coverage Areas	Institutional Arrangements	Other Partners	Financial Resources/ Donor	Status
Joint Needs Assessment for the Mindanao Trust Fund 2005	Preparatory assistance (DDR and Governance Review) for the development of the Mindanao Trust Fund	North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and other areas in Central and Southwestern Mindanao	Directly executed by UNDP	World Bank, UN and other participating donor agencies; Local government units; civil society organizations	US\$ 200,000; UNDP	Financially closed


It should be noted that in late 2007, in line with corporate strategic directions, crisis arising from natural disasters was added to the scope of the Peace and Development component/portfolio. This addition to the programme coverage prompted a change in the name of the Portfolio from “Peace and Development” to “Crisis Prevention and Recovery”. Thus, the component/Portfolio may be interchangeably referred to as Peace and Development (P&D) or Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) throughout this document. Programme and projects on crisis arising from natural disasters are not covered in this Evaluation.

1.5 Structure of the Outcome Evaluation Report

This study generally follows the Sample Outline suggested by the UNDP Evaluation Office (See **Annex C**), with certain modifications as deemed appropriate, to present findings that are clear, simple and easily understood, while capturing information fully.

Diagram 1 presents the general process flow of the Outcome Evaluation Study. More details are presented in a diagram attached as **Annex D**.

Diagram 1. Flow of Outcome Analysis



2.0 THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

This section looks into the peace/conflict context within which UNDP has been involved in the pursuit of peace and development outcomes in the Philippines. As such, it examines key peace and conflict issues that the CPR Outcome is expected to address, the policy environment for peace-building, as well as the key partners, main stakeholders and expected beneficiaries of the Outcome.

2.1 The Peace and Development Situation

The situation of long-drawn, protracted armed conflict – now lasting four decades - is acknowledged in the CPAP as a major challenge to sustainable peace, development and human security in the Philippines today⁹. The conflicts have mainly involved a communist insurgency affecting the whole country, and a secessionist rebellion largely confined to Southern Philippines (Mindanao). Both rebellions find their roots in issues of social inequity, exclusion, injustice, and a skewed distribution of resources in favor of an elite minority.¹⁰ In addition to these shared root causes, the secessionist movement is fueled by an assertion of Muslim self-determination and an Islamic way of life.

The armed conflicts are contemporaneous with each other, having had triggering events around 1968. The secessionist rebellion was initially led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which signed a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in 1996. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which split from the MNLF in 1984, is now at the forefront of the revolutionary movement in Mindanao, and has been engaged in peace negotiations with the GRP since 1997 (currently suspended). On the other hand, the communist rebellion is led by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF) as well as its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), collectively referred to as the CPP-NPA-NDF. The communist rebellion has affected 68 of the country's 81 provinces.¹¹ In addition to the main rebellions, in the period covered by CCF II and CPAP implementation there have also been episodes of attempted coup d'etat and mutinies staged by restive and politicized elements from among the government's security forces.

The armed conflicts have remained unresolved due largely to inadequate responses to their root causes. As indicated in the UNDP policy paper series on peace and development in Mindanao (authored by Dr Paul Oquist, former Senior Regional

⁹ Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2005-2009, p.2.

¹⁰ The (now defunct) National Unification Commission (NUC) created by President Fidel Ramos in 1993 held nationwide public consultations and identified the root causes of conflict as: 1) widespread poverty and inequitable distribution of wealth and control of the resource base 2) poor governance, as manifested in poor delivery of basic services 3) injustice and abuse by those in authority, including HR violations, corruption, poor administration of justice 4) structural inequities in the political system, including control by an elite minority 5) exploitation and marginalization of indigenous cultural communities, including lack of respect for ancestral domains and indigenous political and legal systems. NOTE: No other nationwide consultations of this nature have been held since 1993, and various policy studies maintain that these root causes are still valid to this date. See National Unification Commission Report on the Comprehensive Peace Process, 1993.

¹¹ Several splinter groups have emerged from the Communist movement, including the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA), Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPM-RPA-ABB), which have concluded agreements with the GRP and the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao /RPMM, negotiations with GRP ongoing.

Governance Advisor for Asia), and reiterated in the Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) of 2005, inconsistencies and incongruence of policies within and between government administrations over the past decades have not allowed for sustainable peace to take place, and have in fact contributed to the protraction of the armed conflicts as well as the peace processes intended to help address them.¹²

Oquist points out that the protraction of the peace process is not entirely attributable to either or both parties, but can be traced to the lack of good governance, which is the “the social capacity to set and achieve objectives”. There remains a need for policy reforms to enable the poor to have more equitable access to and control of productive resources; more inclusive mechanisms for the participation of disadvantaged sectors in governance, and effective basic services delivery for marginalized communities in order to address conditions that breed armed conflict and allow it to persist.¹³

The pursuit of solutions to the conflicts has remained in every President's agenda for over forty years. At present, the government's peace agenda is embodied in Executive Order No. 3, *Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government's comprehensive Peace Efforts*, signed in February 2001, embodying its *Six Paths to Peace*¹⁴ that includes among others political and socio-economic reform measures and peace negotiations with rebel groups. Item 9 of the Arroyo administration's 10-point agenda also aims to bring a just end to the peace process. Further, the National Peace Plan is laid out in Chapter 14 of the MTPDP, setting the government's objectives and thrusts towards addressing the various armed conflicts in the country up to 2010.

Despite this policy framework, the Philippine peace process continues to face major challenges. The peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF has been suspended since 2004; the 1996 GRP-MNLF FPA is widely regarded as having failed to respond to the key issues of peace and self-determination and is currently under review by the parties, and the GRP-MILF peace negotiations have recently collapsed on the issues of territory and ancestral domains, resulting in the resumption of armed hostilities in several provinces in Mindanao. There are continuing accusations against the Philippine Government as being insincere and lacking in integrity -- given the slow pace of socio-political reforms; the slow and partial implementation of agreements, and an aggressive military approach against insurgents that has triggered in allegations of violations of human rights and provisions of international agreements. The situation of conflict in

¹² The UNDP policy paper-series (2002-2006) on Mindanao authored by Dr Paul Oquist advances the view that the “extreme protraction of the armed conflict” can be traced primarily to three competing policy positions: the “**military victory position**”, which supports the military defeat of rebel groups; the “**pacification and demobilization position**” aimed at a cessation of hostilities and demobilization of combatants with as little concessions as possible, usually resulting in a peace agreement; and the “**institutional peace-building position**”, the goal of which is the “adoption and implementation of the policies necessary to achieve sustainable, long-term peace, and the articulation of institutions to implement and consolidate these policies as central tasks”. At various points in the history of conflict in the Philippines, any of these policy positions have been dominant or have combined, especially the first two, where it has been politically expedient. But in general there has not been much policy consistency in the government's responses to the armed conflict, within and across administrations. The dynamics among these positions have led to a situation of continuing peace processes with various rebel groups for over a quarter of a century, with none resulting in successful conclusion. See Paul Oquist “Mindanao and Beyond: Competing Policies, Protracted Conflict, and Human Security”, Fifth Assessment Mission Report. UNDP, September 2002

¹³ UNDP background paper for the Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Programme, June 2004.

¹⁴ The “Six Paths to Peace” was originally embodied in Executive Order 125 series 1993 issued during the term of President Fidel Ramos. This has remained as the overall government framework for peacebuilding.

Mindanao is heightened by the perceived failure of not only the 1996 GRP-MNLF FPA, but the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as vehicles for Moro self-governance, coupled with a general sense of government neglect in the face of continuing conditions of abject poverty and the lack or absence of basic services, particularly in marginalized communities affected by armed conflict.

The armed conflicts and the peace processes are taking place in a development context where the Philippines faces challenges in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Statistics from the 2005 and 2007 Philippine Progress Reports on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) point to a positive nationwide outlook for the Philippines in meeting most of the MDG targets for 2015. For example, there have been steady improvements (33% for 2000 and 30% for 2003) relative to the country's target poverty incidence (PI) indicator of 22.65% by 2015. The yearly average rate of decline pegged at 1.28% is higher than the required annual rate of decline of 0.61%, which makes the 2015 target of 22.65% poverty incidence highly attainable for the Philippines. However, attainment of PI targets are threatened by, among other factors (such as the global economic crisis), the effects of protracted conflict in the country's poorest regions, where continued inability to meet the MDGs will only deepen disparities and fuel more conflict.

A comparative review of regional statistics shows uneven progress and wide disparities in relation to the MDGs. Most of the regions and provinces lagging behind in achievement of MDG targets are in Mindanao¹⁵. Three of the 6 Mindanao Regions (Region IX, Caraga and ARMM) indicate low probability of meeting their regional targets for 2015. Region IX, Caraga and ARMM PI rates are the 3 highest across the 17 regions in the Philippines. Further, the 2005 Philippine Human Development Index (HDI) shows that seven out of the ten lowest HDI-ranked provinces are in Mindanao. Most of the 10 lowest-ranked provinces are also conflict-affected.

The correlation of the protracted armed conflict to the high poverty incidence in Mindanao is evident in statistics from the National Statistical Coordinating Board (using 2006 data from the Family Income Expenditure Survey) which shows that 11 out of the 20 poorest provinces and 6 out of the ten poorest provinces are found in Mindanao. ARMM provinces, which have experienced armed conflict over the past four decades, have consistently been in the list of poorest provinces. In terms of regional data, Caraga and the ARMM are the two poorest regions respectively. Both regions are part of the geographic coverage of the ACT for Peace Programme of the CPAP's CPR component.

Internal displacement has been the most visible effect of the continued armed conflicts in the country. The 2005 PHDR notes a cyclical pattern for displaced populations, who leave their communities, seek refuge in evacuations centers until it is safe to return to their homes—only to flee again when armed hostilities take place in their communities once more. The PHDR notes that during the worst phase of the communist insurgency-related conflict in the period 1986-1991 as the Aquino government pursued its “total war” against the NPA, some 1.2 million people throughout the country were displaced; on the

¹⁵ These are Regions IX, X, XI, XII, ARMM and Caraga. More information on progress towards achievement of MDG targets in the Philippines may be accessed from the *First (2003) and Second (2005) and the Midterm (2007) Philippines Progress Reports on the Millennium Development Goals* produced by the National Economic Development Agency and the United Nations Development Programme, Manila, Philippines.

other hand, as many as 2 million people are estimated to have experienced displacement over the entire period of the Mindanao conflict since the 1970s, with around 800,000 displaced in mid-2000 (during the Estrada administration's "all-out war" against the MILF) and around 60,000 at the end of 2004.¹⁶ These numbers are likely to increase yet again, with the new wave of displacements taking place as of this writing from the outbreak of violence following the suspension of peace talks due to the MOA-AD issue.

In the face of difficulties and challenges in the Philippine peace process, there is a continuing civil society-led constituency for peace that had grown since the restoration of democracy in 1986. Civil society peace initiatives have generally included efforts to build a national constituency for peace, formulation of a peace agenda and peace advocacy and networking as well as area-based peace initiatives--evident in interfaith dialogues, building of demilitarized peace zones, participation in healing and reconciliation processes and assistance for the relief and rehabilitation of communities affected by the armed conflict. The CSO peace constituency has considerably weakened at the national level in recent years, perhaps owing to the rather dispersed geographical spread nationwide that has to be covered by the peace advocacy and constituency-building, but also because the constituency needs to grow beyond the peace "veterans" and expand to include new "second-liners".

Nevertheless, during the period covered by CCFII and the CPAP, some important CSO engagements in peacebuilding have included among others, participation in consultation processes and lobbying for legislation of a national peace policy, participation in working groups for the peace negotiations between government and rebel groups, and the conduct of fora and assessments on the peace and conflict situation in the country. On the other hand, while national-level CSO peacebuilding needs strengthening, the citizens' peace movement in Mindanao is strong, dynamic and growing, driven by a common agenda for the protection and welfare of conflict-affected communities, the protection of human rights and the peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in their midst.

Overall, there is a need to nurture and strengthen civil society's role and participation in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, given its role in catalyzing peaceful change – an important function in the face of the weak and constantly shifting policy environment for peacebuilding. There is also a need to support CSO engagement with government towards achieving common goals for peace and development. Experiences from the past show that sustained CSO engagement with government had led to the development of policy instruments critical to sustainable peace, such as the *Six Paths to Peace* which has remained central to the government's peace framework, and the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) that eventually led to the creation of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).¹⁷

Finally, it should be mentioned that development assistance plays a key role in the peace and development context within which the CPR Outcome has been pursued, particularly in Mindanao. Development assistance associated with peace and

¹⁶ Philippine Human Development Report 2005, HDN and UNDP, Manila, 2005. p. 9-10.

¹⁷ A comprehensive perspective on civil society peacebuilding in the Philippines is contained in Coronel-Ferrer et al., *Learning Experience Study on Civil Society Peacebuilding in the Philippines*, Manila: UNDP and University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, (5 vol) 2005.

development streamed into Mindanao following a call by then-President Fidel Ramos for international assistance, particularly in the post-conflict rebuilding of areas covered by the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) stipulated under the GRP-MNLF FPA.¹⁸ Aside from the GoP-UNMDP, development assistance in support of the FPA implementation includes programmes of the USAID, World Bank and various programmes of bilateral agencies.

As has often been pointed out by the MNLF, and as acknowledged by the GRP, to a significant degree the stability, peace and economic development that have been established in MNLF communities may be attributed to the development assistance that came in to support post-conflict rebuilding, particularly the socio-economic aspects of the FPA in the face of government's limited resources.

A Donors' Group on Mindanao (DGM) which had been co-chaired by UNDP¹⁹ was established in light of the numerous peace and development projects coming in to the region. It was envisaged to become a forum to discuss coordination and collaboration among donors implementing development interventions in Mindanao, but it has been inactive for the past two years inasmuch as its concerns are also addressed through donor interaction at the Mindanao Working Group (MWG)²⁰, which serves as venue for government-donor coordination. Co-chaired by MEDCo and the World Bank, the MWG was established under the Consultative Group (CG), now known as the Philippines Development Forum or PDF, a forum for deliberation on priority development concerns of the Philippines in general, co-chaired by the Department of Finance and the World Bank. The MWG continues to be the venue for discussions on common frameworks for development assistance in Mindanao, towards optimizing impacts through collaboration and complementation of development assistance programmes. Given the need for donor programmes to respond to quickly evolving operating environments however, it may be necessary to revive the DGM as a venue for regular discussion and consensus on collective or collaborative action among key donors in Mindanao.

2.2 UNDP's Role in Peace and Development

The role of UNDP in peace and development is widely associated with the GoP-UN Multi-donor Programme (GoP-UNMDP) in Mindanao which began in March 1997 following the signing of the GRP-MNLF FPA in September 1996. UNDP was the first international organization to respond to the Philippine government's call for international assistance in the post-agreement rebuilding of conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. As such, it is a pioneer in the Philippine peace and development arena and has been closely involved in the peacebuilding effort in the region for over ten years now. **Peacebuilding** here refers to initiatives that "foster and support sustainable structures

¹⁸ As prescribed by the 1996 FPA, the SZOPAD would be the focus of intensive socioeconomic development interventions during a 3-year transition period towards the establishment of an expanded ARMM. The SZOPAD covered the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sarangani, and Palawan; and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa.

¹⁹ DG was co-chaired by UNDP and Canada in 1999 to 2002, and then with Japan from 2004 to 2006.

²⁰ Interview with Alma Evangelista, CPRU Portfolio Manager, UNDP, 26 May 2008.

and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict”.²¹

From a brief emergency relief assistance period in 1997 with UNDP funding, the UN/UNDP response expanded to become a Multidonor programme in its next three phases, with interventions ranging from emergency needs assessment to capacity development and confidence-building for peace and development. Primarily focused on the former combatants of the MNLF and their communities, the Programme has evolved to include other conflict-affected areas, including Indigenous Peoples’ communities and areas affected by the communist insurgency in the Caraga region.

The Peace and Development Community (PDC) has been central to the community-based approach of the GoP-UNMDP from its second phase²² to the current (fourth) phase, the *ACT for Peace* programme. A PDC is a marginalized, conflict-affected community where social and economic transformation takes place and opportunities for development, access to basic services, participation in governance and capacity-building for managing and resolving conflicts are pursued. A PDC may consist of a *barangay* (village) or a *barangay* and adjacent households marked by a convergence of peace-building and development goals and activities. The community becomes actively engaged in the transformation process that includes socioeconomic development as well as building linking and mainstreaming of PDCs into local governance structures and mechanisms. Community-based Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs), many of whom are former combatants of the MNLF, are key actors in the community transformation process.

From the start of its engagement for peace and development in Mindanao, **capacity-building** has been at the heart of UNDP’s role, particularly at community level. An examination of the desired outcomes from Phase 1 to Phase 4 (ACT for Peace) of the GoP-UNMDP shows a consistent objective to develop and enhance capacities of individuals, institutions and communities to build peaceful, secure, cohesive and self-reliant environments. Thus the range of capacity-building activities for both duty bearers (e.g. government line agencies, LGUs) and claimholders (e.g. MNLF, IDPs) has included conflict-sensitive governance, conflict analysis and management, peace education, livelihoods, management of peace-building programmes among others. This role should be fully maximized: one, by sharing experiences with other peace and development programmes in Mindanao and identifying areas of collaboration, and second by bringing the experience from Mindanao more systematically into the national peacebuilding effort.

UNDP has played a convening and coordinating role in development assistance for peace and development on two levels: as Administering/Managing Agent for the GoP-UNMDP/ACT for Peace, and as previously mentioned, as co-chair of the Donors’ Group on Mindanao. The opportunity to continue UNDP’s convening role seems to have been missed as the DGM was allowed to become inactive. While the MWG serves as venue for government-donor coordination in Mindanao, there remains a continuing need for coordination, complementation and information-sharing amongst donors, and UNDP should take steps to re-convene the group.

²¹ Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Tools for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. APFO, CECORE, CHA, FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld; London, UK: January 2004

²² Strategic Results Framework/Results-Oriented Annual Report for on Goal 5: Special Development Situations. 2002. UNDP Philippines

In the context of its coordinating and convening niche, UNDP can also draw on the experiences and expertise from among other UN agencies and donors towards convergence, complementation and shared initiatives for capacity-building. This was demonstrated in the coordinating role that UNDP assumed in the Joint Needs Assessment for the GoP-World Bank Trust Fund for Mindanao in 2004, which was participated in by various UN agencies.

As Managing Agent the past three phases of the MDP, UNDP has played the primary role of manager for donor funds, while supporting capacity-building for the Programme's Implementing Partners on results-based management and the effective management of peace-building programmes. This is a role it appears to have played satisfactorily, as evidenced by continuing donor contributions over three MDP phases and the current ACT for Peace programme. In relation to this, resource mobilization for peace and development is another role for UNDP, particularly for Mindanao. Over the past 10 years since its initial engagement in the region, UNDP has mobilized more than 30 million US dollars (approximately US\$10 million under CCF II and US\$20 million under CPAP)²³ from external sources for the programmes it has managed. This role is not evident in relation to the national peacebuilding effort and must be pursued by UNDP if the current CPPB programme is to expand and build on its initial gains. Resource mobilization has traditionally been one of UNDP's strengths and it should be able to establish strategic entry points in the national peacebuilding programme to leverage donor interest and participation in the programme.

UNDP's pioneering role in the Mindanao peace and development arena initially defined a leadership role and niche for it. There has been an observed diminution in this leadership role, however, with the establishment of other (larger) funds and projects to support peace-building and development in the region, increased involvement of other major development partners and the shift in focus of the Southern Philippines peace process from the MNLF to the MILF. For example, the USAID-assisted Mindanao Peace and Development Programme (MPAD) has a budget of US\$190 million over five years; the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Reconstruction and Development (MTF-RPD) has an estimated minimum financial requirement of US\$ 405 million over 5-8 years, contingent on the signing of a GRP-MILF Peace Agreement.²⁴

Another key role for UNDP has been in the area of policy advocacy for peace and human security in the form of policy papers and publications. This "soft input" to peacebuilding has mainly been done through the Mindanao policy paper series earlier mentioned in this document which began in 1999. The policy paper series has advanced the concept of human security as response to the conflict situation in Mindanao – and the entire country – and has analyzed the protracted armed conflicts as well as peace processes in the context of key governance issues, popularizing the view that policy coherence is of central importance to addressing the country's long-standing conflicts.

It has been noted that while the concept of human security in relation to development first came out in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, it was the UNDP policy paper series on peace and development in Mindanao that "brought the perspective of

²³ Culled from UNDP financial reports, CPR Unit records.

²⁴ MEDCo website <http://www.medco.gov.ph/> and ACT for Peace MTR, 2008.

human security into the consciousness of local peace and human rights advocates in both government and civil society”²⁵ Indeed, based on interviews with duty bearers as well as claimholders, UNDP is very much associated with the role of advancing human security as part of peacebuilding, and of supporting an enabling policy environment towards long-term peace. This view has been further reinforced with the publication of the 2005 PHDR on *Peace, Human Security and Human Development*, which examined the various insurgencies and conflicts besetting the nation and reiterated the premises of the UNDP policy papers on Mindanao on the causes of the protracted conflicts and peace processes, including its recommendations on the need for policy coherence and the strengthening of a national peace constituency. Other “soft” assistance that have contributed to progress towards attainment of the CPR Outcome include among others, policy fora, policy briefs and a consolidated framework on human security in partnership with CSOs led by the UP Third World Studies Center; the crafting of the National Peace Act (House Bill 5767), intended to legislate a national peace policy; the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order 570 integrating peace education and the culture of peace in the school curricula, in partnership with the Department of Education, and support for consultations and a study towards the issuance of Proclamation No. 1377, granting amnesty to members of the CPP-NPA-NDF and other communist rebel groups in the Philippines (currently awaiting Congressional concurrence). As mentioned earlier, a five-volume study on CSO peacebuilding in the Philippines has also been published by UNDP and the University of the Philippines (UP) Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS).

While it has made some important contributions to the national policy debate particularly in the area of human security, UNDP, with its long years of experience in Mindanao and global expertise can contribute much more to the Philippine peace policy discourse. The policy assessment series on Mindanao can be expanded to look into the national peace, conflict and development landscape and can be planned more systematically so that the policy papers are produced on an annual basis. The last UNDP assessment paper on Mindanao was produced in 2006; given rapidly changing political developments, another assessment would be most opportune at this time.

Through its programmes, UNDP also plays the role of providing platforms for government-CSO engagements for peacebuilding, in effect linking two sectors which have traditionally had a mistrust of each other, and brokering continuing discussions on key conflict issues – at the same time bridging CSOs to government for action on specific peace and development issues. Needless to say, this should be a continuing role for UNDP towards increased trust and confidence between government and CSOs in peacebuilding.

Under the current CPAP, UNDP has taken on an expanded role for peacebuilding and development. It has moved from the traditional donors’ niche, Mindanao, and has been supporting efforts to build peace at the national level through the GoP-UNDP CPPB Programme. As such UNDP is the only development assistance programme that has embarked on support to peace and development outside Mindanao through a range of interventions that covers (a) mainstreaming peace at the policy level, (b) building capacities for peace-building and (c) assisting communities in Luzon and Visayas affected by armed conflict. In this national level peace-building role, UNDP is supporting

²⁵ Ma. Lorenza Palm-Dalupan, *Some Imperatives for a National Peace Policy*. Paper presented at the “Waging Peace in the Philippines” Conference, Ateneo de Manila University, 4 December 2003.

government efforts, through the OPAPP, NEDA and DILG to mainstream peace-building and human security in development planning processes. UNDP's CPPB programme places UNDP in a strategic niche where it can make meaningful contributions towards advancing the national peace and development agenda for both government and civil society. The programme has started small with just over US\$2million in UNDP core funds over four years of implementation, but there is a vast range of peace interventions – from peace education to support for peace negotiations to assistance to area-based peace initiatives in Luzon and Visayas – that can be explored as distinct areas of UNDP assistance which can be leveraged to generate donor interest and assistance to peacebuilding beyond Mindanao.

In performing its various roles in support of the national peacebuilding process, UNDP has directly partnered with government agencies (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process/OPAPP; Mindanao Economic Development Council/MEDCO; ARMM and UARO) and Programme donors (AusAid, European Commission, New Zealand Aid and Spain). A key partner for the implementation of the GoP-UNMDP/ACT for Peace from its inception has been the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). UNDP has also established relationships, through the programmes, with various CSOs, LGUs, other Government Line Agencies and Communities (See [Table 1](#)). A discussion of UNDP's partnership strategy is presented in Section 3.6.

3.0 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This section probes the core question in this evaluation, i.e., whether the Outcome has been achieved, or whether progress has been made towards its achievement.

Various considerations in the measurement of the CPR Outcome progress are discussed before actual progress towards the achievement of the Outcome is assessed. This is followed by a discussion on the relevance of the CPR Outcome to the national context and needs as well as to the UNDP niche, exploring how UNDP may maximize its role within the peace and development context, and looking into the appropriateness of the programmes under the CPR component in relation to the peace and development environment and vis-à-vis other institutions' programmes.

A key consideration in assessing the contribution of UNDP is the link and logical flow among four factors: UNDAF Outcome, the Country Programme Outcome, the Outputs and the actual accomplishments of CPR. Both quantitative and qualitative outputs are presented to determine how the interventions relate to the Outcome. Programme management of the CPR component is also examined, including a brief presentation on resource utilization. The challenges that the programme has experienced and the mechanisms that help to address these are likewise discussed.

The Outcome Under Review

The CPAP identifies three outcomes under the CPR component:

Outcome 1. Peace-building, conflict prevention and human security mainstreamed in development processes

Outcome 2. Key actors are better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace and human security

Outcome 3. Conflict-affected communities have improved access to basic services, increased incomes and participate in governance.

As mentioned earlier in this document, In line with corporate efforts to streamline results for better focus around mid-2007, Outcome 2 “Key actors are better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace and human security” was established as the overarching Outcome for the CPR component and is the focus of this Evaluation.

Following the 2007 Annual Review, a joint NEDA-UNDP memorandum had stated that “from an original long menu of outcomes, outputs, activities and partners in the CPAP, it is primordial to separate the core from the peripheral...to be able to focus the programme... to narrow the expected outcomes and targets, after which the CPAP will be revised accordingly with focused outcomes...”²⁶

It is important to note that the original country programme outcomes, although distinct from each other, are inherently linked. Improved capacities of key actors (the focus of outcome 2), contribute to the mainstreaming of peace building, conflict prevention and human security in development processes (focus of outcome 1), and contribute as well to improving access of communities to basic services, increased incomes and increasing their participation in governance (focus of outcome 3).

²⁶ ANNEX 6, Guidelines for the Revision of the 2007 Annual Work Plans (AWPs)

It is noted that the objectives of the GoP-UN Multi-donor Programme-Phase 3 (MDP 3) under CCF II also refer to capacity-building, to wit: a) improved capacities of target communities in partnership with their local governments for self-sustaining development and improved access to basic services; strengthened institutional support mechanisms to promote collaboration and enhance coordination for continuing support to peace-building and development, and c) a positive environment of mutual trust and confidence among the peoples and institutions in SZOPAD leading to lasting peace.²⁷

Thus the CPR Outcome is relevant and appropriate as the overall integrating outcome for both CCF II and the current CPAP cycle.

It should be noted that even prior to the consolidation of the three CPR outcomes into one, the CPR outputs were already being reviewed for streamlining purposes, the original results framework having identified too many, closely interrelated and similar outputs.²⁸ The first refinement was done during the CPPB Strategic Planning Workshop in June 2006, and then refined further in October 2006 at the Results and Resources Framework (RRF) Enhancement workshop, resulting in the identification and streamlining of expected outputs.

The relevance of the outputs to the outcome is best determined by analysing the link and fit of the two, and by establishing the plausibility of the association. To do this, it is helpful to break down the outcome definitions and statements and analyse the relationships of these terms.

UNDAF Outcome 5 states that by 2009, the level of **violent conflict has been reduced** and **human security** and the **culture of peace** have been **promoted** nationwide. The main consideration in relation to the country programme outcome is the **how** and the **degree** to which these are achieved.

The country programme CPR outcome statement reads: **Key actors** are **better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts** and to **build peace and human security**. This answers both the **how** and the **degree** of UNDAF Outcome 5, and adds the “**who**” dimension.

The next step is to see and analyse how the country programme outcome is linked with the outputs. **Key actors (who)** are represented by partners, namely: the Security sector (Outputs 1 and 2), Legislators and Policy Makers (Outputs 3 and 4), CSOs (Output 5), Government Agencies and LGUs (Output 5), Indigenous Peoples (Output 6), Former combatants (Output 8), Women (Output 10) and Communities (Output 10). **Capacities (how)** are specified in Outputs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10. **To build (how)** is articulated in Outputs 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. **Degree** involves quantitative dimensions, better captured in the output indicators.

The discussion above presents the chain of causality of the outputs and outcome, i.e. as the outputs are achieved, key actors will better prevent, manage and resolve conflicts

²⁷ GoP-UNDP Second Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for the Philippines 2002-2004. May 2002, pages 7-8.

²⁸ Interview with ASec Evelyn Daplas, National Programme Director of the CPPB Programme, OPAPP office, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, 14 May 2008

and will better build peace and human security, thus contributing to the reduction of violent conflict and the promotion of human security and the culture of peace nationwide. The succeeding discussion focuses on the actual output accomplishments and their contribution to progress towards attainment of the CPR Outcome.

Measuring Progress Towards the CPR Outcome

The measurement of progress towards achievement of the CPR Outcome faces several challenges: one, the inadequacy of baseline data; two, the loose connection between outcome indicators and outputs resulting from the consolidation of the three original CPR outcomes, and three, the inherent challenge in measuring peace outcomes, which are often intangible and difficult to precisely determine. Overall there is also the need to capture progress towards the Outcome both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Based on the CPAP document, the following eight (8) outcome indicators have been set:

- Percentage increase in human security index
- Number of government-civil society joint peace initiatives
- Number of conflicts peacefully settled
- Percentage increase in participation in peace building
- Number of conflicts averted/resolved
- Percentage increase to access to basic services
- Percentage increase in participation in local governance institutions and processes
- Percentage increase in the average income of families in conflict affected communities

The two key elements critical to measuring progress towards attainment of outcome are outcome indicators and baseline data against set targets.

The indicators require a set of baseline data as starting points to see expected changes. As formulated, there are five (5) indicators requiring degree of change (percentage increase), while the remaining indicators entail statement of occurrences (number of). Both need baseline data, though of differing nature. Baselines for the degree of change indicators would need to show data of “what is” in order to capture progress to “what will be” -- comparative before intervention and after intervention analysis. Baselines for the statement of occurrences indicators does not, technically, need to have a starting point for comparison, as it requires only actual achievement tallies.

Available baseline information in relation to the outcome indicators is either lacking or needs further validation. The scarcity of systematically collected baseline data makes it difficult to measure change and progress. An alternative is to reconstruct baseline conditions using the programmes’ monitoring reports, key informant interviews and participatory approaches. Although these have their individual weaknesses (e.g. difference in focus, potential biases, etc.), they can provide useful reference data that will help in measuring change and progress. It is also noted that although the Outcome refers to capacity building, capacity assessments have only been undertaken recently (late 2007) for PDCs, LGUs and CSO partners of the ACT for Peace, in the context of developing the M&E system for the Programme.

3.1 Status of the Outcome

When the outcome statement was revised, all the outcome indicators were subsumed under Outcome 2, and the subsequent revised outputs aligned to it as well. However, what is lacking is a tight link between the outcome indicators and the outputs, i.e. which output corresponds to which outcome indicator²⁹. Based on contextual definitions, **Annex E** shows the relationship between the outcome indicators and outputs.

As can be gleaned, there are outcome indicators that have more than one output. At the same time, there are particular outputs that correspond to more than one outcome indicator. This reinforces the earlier observation about the loose alignments between outcome indicators and outputs, resulting in open interpretations as to the logic of the relationship/connection. For one, outcome indicators (numbers 1 and 3) that have more than one output appear to be given more emphasis/importance or are more difficult to measure hence the need for various outputs. One might also view this as the lack of identified and articulated outputs that could directly respond to the outcome indicator (e.g. Output 8 as addressing both numbers 5 and 7). To avoid these interpretations, it is therefore important to review this link and establish a clear logic between outcome indicators and outputs.

Albeit the issue of baseline data, reconstructed baseline information drawn from project documents, monitoring reports and other related documents provide information about what has been achieved thus far. While these do not capture incremental changes that would help to determine progress, the data provides contextual information that indicates progress towards outcome achievement. As stated in the *Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*, “Even in the absence of good baselines, indicators or results monitoring, outcome evaluators can make use of contextual information, project documents and the information provided by the partners. This information can help approximate baselines and chart progress towards outcomes”.³⁰

The basic challenge to the measurement of progress towards attainment of the CPR Outcome, however, is the inherent difficulty in measuring peace results, which are often intangible and amorphous. Indicators are more qualitative than quantitative because they essentially try to capture behavioural changes, e.g., the transformation of mindsets and relationships, or the responsiveness of institutions as they contribute to peace outcomes. Further, there are causality and attribution considerations: a peace outcome could very well be the result of several interventions and cannot be attributed to one action alone. Also, all the capacity building is taking place in volatile and uncertain environments, where the gains of peacebuilding may be set back anytime.

But it is possible to capture qualitative change in a peace/conflict situation by looking at transformative processes that take place through capacity-building interventions in specific programme contexts. The CPR Outcome essentially focuses on conflict transformation, a change process where the conflicts are also opportunities to transform the relationship and the systems in which the relationships are embedded. Thus, the underlying process (as well as objective) of all the capacity-building taking place is the

²⁹ Not one document reviewed established the relationship between outcome indicators and outputs as a result of the revisions

³⁰ *Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*, UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002. p. 11.

transformation of the conflict along four dimensions of change: personal, relational, structural and cultural.³¹ This provides an analytical framework that allows the assessment of progress towards the CPR Outcome from a peacebuilding perspective.

Based on the premises above, there is reasonable basis to indicate **substantial progress towards outcome attainment** as seen in the summary table below (Table 2). The full matrix is attached as **Annex F**.

Table 2. Progress Towards Outcome: A Peacebuilding Perspective

Dimensions of Change	Strategies/ Tools and Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
<p><u>Personal</u></p> <p>Changes in knowledge, skills, attitude and behavior of each person</p> <p><i>Violent conflict changes individuals psychologically, emotionally and spiritually</i></p>	<p>Training; workshops; promotion of interfaith, inter-ethnic dialogue; manuals & toolkits</p> <p>Former combatants; communities; academe; government, LGUs; CSOs, general public</p>	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. The shifts in mindsets among MNLF combatants from a combat/defense orientation to peace and development advocacy is evident among the PDAs in the PDCs where CPR programme interventions have included empowerment and confidence building approaches as well as hands on planning and implementation of development activities . (from A4P M&E, MDP3 evaluation)</p> <p>PDAs, CSOs and have formed Peace Core Groups and are championing peace advocacy in their respective and neighboring communities, and in their respective line of work (A4P mid-term progress report).</p> <p>LCEs, MNLF members, government agencies are championing peacebuilding and conflict prevention and have acquired knowledge and skills in conflict prevention, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, and, conflict-sensitive planning among others (annual progress reports)</p>
<p><u>Relational</u></p> <p>Changes in communication patterns between and among individuals and groups</p> <p><i>Violent conflict changes communication patterns, creates stereotypes, increases polarization and decreases trust</i></p>	<p>Training; workshops; promotion of interfaith, inter-ethnic dialogue; manuals & toolkits</p> <p>Former combatants; communities; IDPs; youth; women; academe; government,</p>	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. CPR programme interventions have transformed relationships among former antagonists, and support the rebuilding of social cohesion in communities affected or highly vulnerable to conflict (A4P M&E document). Confidence and capacity building interventions of duty bearers (government, civil society) and claimholders (MNLF members, internally displaced persons) has spurred collective action and positive engagement among diverse groups.</p> <p>Some 246 Peace and Development Communities in Mindanao (A4P Mid-term progress report) and 8 conflict affected areas in Luzon and Visayas (2007 SPR) serve as fulcrum for CPR assistance in partnership with duty bearers.</p>

³¹ Lederach et al. pp 18-19.

Dimensions of Change	Strategies/ Tools and Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
	LGUs; CSOs, peace networks; general public	Concrete changes in the relationships between former antagonists, which also feed into structural or institutional change, are manifested in the election of 12 MNLF/PDAs into municipal or barangay positions; 16 Provincial and 62 Municipal Technical Working Groups co-chaired by the local chief executives and MNLF state chairmen; 34 Barangay Peace-based Development Plans are integrated in municipal and provincial plans; replication of the PDC framework and processes in 39 other communities in Mindanao (A4P mid-term progress report, MTR), and 77 disaster management and contingency plans formulated (IDP Eval)
<p><u>Structural/ Institutional</u></p> <p>Refer to changes in social conditions, procedural and institutional patterns</p> <p><i>Violent conflict impacts systems and structures at various levels (family, organizations, communities) – i.e., how relationships are organized, who has access to power.</i></p>	<p>Conflict analysis; Peace and development plan formulation; Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting Community Development Plan-Executive Legislative Agenda (CDP-ELA) that promote transparency, equality, participation and access</p> <p>Local Government Units (provincial, city, municipal, barangay); LGU Planning offices;</p>	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. Peace benefits institutionalized through various Executive Orders, Peace Units, Legislative Agreements and Financial Allocations attest to LGUs commitment to continue the initiatives even if UNDP assistance such as ACT for Peace phases out (MTR).</p> <p>These platforms and mechanisms have enabled participation in and access of marginalized groups to local governance processes. Capabilities for the management of development projects in post-conflict settings has been enhanced. New skill sets (e.g. peace organizing, Islamic leadership and governance, conflict-sensitive development planning) (A4P mid-term progress report) significantly contributed to reducing vulnerabilities of marginalized groups (MNLF members and their families, displaced families) through the access to basic services and livelihood opportunities including relief assistance, accompanied by culture of peace and conflict mediation interventions. (A4P mid-term progress report)</p> <p>These inputs are instrumental in developing a sense of permanence (IDP Eval) and their improved well being as well as contributed to the decreased likelihood of a reoccurrence of armed conflict. (2006 CPR review)</p>


Dimensions of Change	Strategies/ Tools and Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
<p><u>Cultural</u></p> <p>Refer to changes in how meaning is constructed and shared by a group</p> <p><i>Violent conflict causes deep-seated cultural changes i.e., norms that guide patterns of behavior between men and women, how Muslims, IPs and Christians relate to each other.</i></p>	<p>CoP training; promotion of interfaith, interethnic dialogue; peace education</p> <p>Teachers; parents; DepEd officials; communities; former combatants; government officials; all other Programme stakeholders</p>	<p>Partial progress towards Outcome. Through ACT for Peace, 6 schools in Mindanao supported the development/integration of COP in the curriculum, conduct of series of teachers training as well as a putting up Schools of Peace and peace knowledge centers. (2007 SPR, A4P mid-term progress report)</p> <p>Continuing capacity-building activities in PDCs; among government officials/agencies/security sector; advocacy to promote the Culture of Peace (2006 and 2007 SPR, A4P midterm progress report)</p> <p>UNDP supported consultations processes and participated in efforts to finalize Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) on <i>institutionalizing Peace Education in the Schools</i> (Executive order 570) led by OPAPP with ACT for Peace and CPPB Programmes. (A4P mid-term progress report)</p>

While the table above provides a peacebuilding framework in looking at progress towards achievement of the CPR Outcome, it is worthy of note that the CPR component, particularly the ACT for Peace Programme, has developed a comprehensive peace-sensitive M&E framework and system that allows for both quantitative and qualitative measurement. Anchored on Theories of Change³², the M&E system essentially measures attainment of the CPR Outcome through a framework that keeps track of behavioural changes and transformation processes amongst PDCs, LGUs and CSOs resulting from various Programme interventions and technical assistance. Baseline data on the PDCs, LGUs and CSOs have been established in this regard, and serve to inform the tracking of progress towards outcome.

Transformative processes are captured in the *PDC Stages of Development and Transformation*) and the *LGU and CSO Transformation Framework*, as shown in **Diagram 2** and **Table 3** respectively below.

³² A theory of change is a set of beliefs, an explanation of how and why a set of activities will bring about the changes that an intervention or programme seeks to address; behind each programme initiative is a theory of change, explaining the logic behind programme approaches that can be easily monitored and evaluated. From Lederach, et al, pp 25-36.

Diagram 2. THE SIX STAGES OF PDC DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION



1. **Early Stage.** PDC is aware of its conflict and human security issues and concerns, and are developing a perspective for peace.
2. **Emerging Stage.** PDC is able to organize and practice participatory processes to collectively address its peace and human security needs and concerns.
3. **Developing Stage.** PDC has built its capacities to act upon its peace and human security requirements.
4. **Implementing Stage.** PDC is able to optimize internal and external resources, and is implementing its priority peace and human security projects and activities.
5. **Adapting Stage.** PDC is adopting practices and systems applied in Stage 4 which have effectively established peace and addressed human security needs of the communities.
6. **Expanding Stage.** PDCs is able to comply with service delivery standards, share its good practices and reach out to other communities, and is involved in larger peace building activities.

On the other hand, a similar 4-stage framework is also intended to capture transformation and development processes for LGUs and CSOs, as shown in Table 3 below:

Table 3. The Four Stages of LGU/CSO Transformation and Development

Stage 1 Early Stage	Stage 2 Developing Stage	Stage 3 Adapting Stage	Stage 4 Expanding Stage
Earliest stage in capacity development; conflict transformation and peacebuilding capacities are at a basic level.	Structures and mechanisms for conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes and approaches are in place and functional.	Has a track record of success /achievement in peacebuilding work and conflict management which is recognized by its constituency and other agencies.	Conflict transformation and peacebuilding structures and processes are being replicated; and inform national and/or international initiatives.

As of the time of this evaluation, the M&E system is still being pilot-tested. However, it is a good anchor for developing a peace-responsive M&E framework for all programmes under the CPR portfolio, particularly as it integrates a rights-based approach to the peace monitoring processes, with specific and measurable indicators. Please see the Peace Significance Matrix, attached as **Annex G**.

3.2 Relevance of the Outcome

The CPR Outcome essentially refers to capacity development for long-term peace and human security, and is therefore highly relevant to the achievement of national priorities and goals for peace.

The MTPDP articulates the government's priorities for peace as follows: *The Government's initiatives aim at securing peace while accelerating development in conflict and non-conflict areas. Programmes toward these ends are guided by constitutional processes and are intended to preserve the state's territorial sovereignty. Peace building efforts are to be strengthened by programmes that enhance multi-ethnic coexistence*³³.

Capacity development is critical to achievement of various elements of the national peacebuilding agenda as articulated in the National Peace Plan (NPP), which constitutes Chapter 14 of the MTPDP, as well as the government's Six Paths to Peace as embodied in Executive Order #3. UNDP's CPR component supports the achievement of national peace and development goals mainly through capacity-building of local actors towards the achievement of NPP objectives, particularly under the conflict prevention and peace-building component of the Plan that includes, among others, the rehabilitation and development of conflict areas, the catch-up development programme for the ARMM, and healing and reconciliation programmes for conflict-affected communities.

The CPR component responds to the national peace and development agenda through a rights-based approach holding the state and its constituencies accountable for safeguarding human lives, and provides a conceptual link between the domains of conflict and poverty³⁴. The approach integrates prevention and management of conflicts with peace consolidation. Issues on governance, justice, poverty and environment are therefore addressed with a long-term peace perspective.

The relevance of the Outcome may also be seen from the perspective of UNDP's niche in capacity-building, which is recognized globally. As a "brand" it has built its credibility and good image over the years. It maintains and is rightfully perceived to have a neutral stance that makes it credible in bringing together government, civil society organizations, private sector and other development partners to achieve coordinated and effective responses to the poverty and peace challenge. The brand and niche can be maximized within the context of capacity-building for peace and development.

As a pioneer in the field, UNDP has much to offer in terms of capacity development beyond the programmes it is supporting or managing. Good practices and lessons learned, not only from its long years of involvement in the Mindanao peace process but from its worldwide presence and network, can feed into the national peace policy discourse as well as in community-level peacebuilding. In this sense, the choice by UNDP of the Outcome on capacity-building as the key result for the CPR component is highly strategic.

However, UNDP is yet to maximize this niche and contribute more significantly to capacity-building in the peace and development arena through continuing

³³ UNDAF Document, page 31

³⁴ UNDAF Document, page 18

documentation and sharing of its experiences in this area, and providing venues for knowledge sharing among other actors in the field, including government, civil society and area-based peace practitioners and advocates - an opportunity it did not fully seize during the past three phases of the GoP-UNMDP. With a little less than two years towards the end of ACT for Peace in June 2010, UNDP should make the full range of knowledge management—from policy dialogues to documentation to experience sharing and publication - a key priority in its CPR component. This should include the documentation of early lessons learned in the implementation of the CPPB programme.

The relevance of the Outcome to UNDP's niche may also be seen in the context of its strategic position vis-à-vis other programmes/institutions in the field. While its resources are comparatively much less than other peace and development interventions, UNDP's niche is distinguished by its long years of experience and extensive network in the field (pioneering) and its move to support peacebuilding beyond Mindanao (trailblazing).

At present some of the key peace and development programmes in Mindanao aside from ACT for Peace are the World Bank-supported MTF, the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development Project (J-BIRD); the USAID MPAD and the Canada-supported Local Government Support Programme in ARMM (LGSP-A) to name a few. In general these programme have common thrusts and initiatives implemented at varying degrees, ranging from capacity-building for communities, institutions, and former combatants; basic service delivery; relief and rehabilitation; reconstruction and development work; infrastructure development, enterprise development, governance, institutional capacity development and support to livelihoods.

In Mindanao, not one institution can categorically claim to have an exclusive differentiation of its programme. Unintended intersections, at times direct duplication, of projects take place in as much as the area of coverage, the needs assessment (with corresponding service delivery), and the programme focus possess a certain stratum of commonality and cohesion. Ultimately, UNDP may not be able to unreservedly claim an exclusive niche. But the significance of its role lies in its having implemented a comprehensive peace and development programme that has remained a vital and stable intervention on the ground even in the face of significant changes in the political milieu such as the collapse or suspension of peace processes, shifts in leadership of local institutions or the outbreak of violent conflict. It is also evident that succeeding programmes for peace and development have benefited from the MDP model and programme design. The continued relevance of the UNDP CPR intervention in Mindanao will very much be determined by the sustainability of the PDC approach, and its capacity to scale-up beyond its current parameters, i.e., through sharing its peacebuilding and development technologies beyond existing programme coverage areas, and through complementation with other peace and development programmes in Mindanao. Specifically, the MTR for the ACT for Peace Programme recommended complementation with the capacity-building efforts for the MILF and selected communities under the MTF.

As mentioned earlier the UNDP-assisted CPPB Programme appears to be the only ODA-supported comprehensive peace building and conflict prevention programme that has a nationwide scope, supporting policy development, peace advocacy, partnership-building, capacity-building, as well as enterprise development.³⁵ UNDP's presence in

³⁵ Final CPAP-CPR 2006 Annual Review Document, page 14

Luzon and Visayas is a good differentiation, firmly establishing its strategic position as an entity that is concerned with responding to conflicts outside the MNLF and MILF setting. Within this context, the intervention is relevant. But its continued relevance is very much linked to its sustainability in the face of inherent uncertainties in the peacebuilding environment, including shifts in national peace policy, the ascendancy of the militarized approach to the insurgencies and the constant possibility of renewed armed conflict, which may undermine the gains of the programme so far.

On Sustainability

Sustainability is defined as the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major assistance has been completed.³⁶ It refers to the probability of continued long-term benefits and resilience to risk over time and includes financial, institutional, human resources, management and other elements. In practical peacebuilding terms, it requires ownership, strengthened governance institutions, and capacities among key actors to sustain peace initiatives.

Based on these premises, the CPR Outcome has a high probability of sustainability, particularly in Mindanao. While not as firmly evident as in Mindanao, there is a fair degree of probability of sustainability of the Outcome at the national level. Although CPR interventions had only started barely three years ago amidst uncertainties in the national policy environment for peace, overall, mechanisms to pursue sustainability are evident at the policy level. This is demonstrated by the incorporation of human security perspectives in the updated National Peace Plan for incorporation in the revised MTPDP, the institutionalization of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in local legislation and planning processes. Policy-level sustainability initiatives, however, will need to connect to larger governance reform measures, including positive policy responses to resource-based issues, so as to effectively contribute to efforts to address the root causes of conflict.

At the local level, service delivery, capacity-building for peace, and confidence-building among groups and sectors will need to take place on a continuing basis in order to sustain the peace and development that has taken root in the communities.

As to ownership as a function of sustainability, this is clearly demonstrated in both peacebuilding processes and the benefits of peace on the ground, and in the community-based mechanisms and alliances for peace and development that have been built over four phases of the MDP. The annual reviews of 2006 and 2007, as well as the MTR for the ACT for Peace programme confirm the successful institutional strengthening of key partners and the institutionalization of peace benefits through various local Executive Orders, Peace Units, legislative action and financial allocations which attest to LGUs commitment to continue the initiatives even after ACT for Peace phases out. There is also evidence of replication by LGUs in areas not currently covered by the programme. Multisectoral peace and development TWGs have been established at municipal, provincial and regional levels. In all cases, peacebuilding has been sustained because there was buy-in from key actors, i.e. the LGUs and the MNLF from the start.

³⁶ Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (working draft).OECD-DAC 2008, page 42.

In terms of capacities built towards sustainability of CPR interventions, the MTR noted that around 60% of the PDCs were in higher stages of development and transformation, i.e., are able to negotiate their own peaceful environments, mobilize resources to support their Peace and Development Plans, and are able to share their peace-building skills/capacities with neighboring communities, among others. The PDAs have become local resources for peace who lead in peace advocacy and constituency-building, as well as in resource mobilization and liaison and coordination with LGUs. Per MTR finding, there is ample evidence to suggest that the PDAs are viable entities able to sustain and continue to promote peaceful and self-reliant communities. For example, as of the time of the MTR report, counterpart resources from local government units/agencies and non-government organizations had an estimated value of US\$ 558,403³⁷ or 9 percent of the actual programme expenditures for 2005-2007.

The establishment of “Schools of Peace” in Mindanao that adopt a peace-based curriculum promoting tolerance and respect of diverse cultures, is an innovative approach which draws on “culture-bearers” into the effort to build and sustain peace. Because the approach respects local conditions and people’s actual circumstances, and has drawn buy-in from key partners – particularly the Department of Education and the LGUs – this initiative is likely to be self-sustaining over the long term. By engaging key institutions that most influence the thinking of children, youth and the general public – such as schools, religious institutions, the media – the transformation of mindsets towards a culture of peace, dialogue and tolerance can be sustained over the longer term.

The sustainability strategy at the national level appears to be the institutionalization of peacebuilding through the integration of peace and human security perspectives in policies, frameworks, and plans. Efforts are just taking root through the integration of human security perspectives in the draft revised National Peace Plan now awaiting approval by the President. Efforts are also underway to institutionalize/mainstream peace and human security in local governance in partnership with the Department of Interior and Local Government, through a possible issuance of an administrative order to encourage all conflict-affected and vulnerable LGUs to use a conflict-sensitive perspective in development planning. This initiative could be further strengthened by including conflict/peace analysis, as well as peace-sensitive development planning in the mandatory orientation-training for newly elected LGU officials, including their planning officers.

Capacity-building for peace-sensitive planning has also been initiated for regional line agencies and LGUs through the RKCG initiative on conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting planning. CSO partners, as well as security sector representatives, have been part of the capacity-building. Since this intervention just started two years ago, it is too early to tell if sustainability has taken root in terms of applying and sharing newly-acquired skills.

Sustainability of peacebuilding at the local level, particularly through peace-sensitive development planning, appears strong, but will need more than the efforts initiated through the CPR component to achieve long-term results. Peace is very much a governance issue: people resort to armed violence when governance processes and mechanisms are unable to respond to their interests, needs and grievances. On the

³⁷ ACT for Peace Mid-term Progress Report, May 2008

other hand, the responsiveness of governance institutions, particularly in the conflict setting, will determine if peace will be achieved or will be sustainable.

Overall, sustainability would be facilitated by a policy environment that enables achievement of long-term peace objectives and supports reform measures to address the root causes of armed conflict even as immediate actions are taken to prevent the occurrence or escalation of violent conflict. Strengthening the policy environment for peacebuilding will require efforts to address key conflict issues, such as natural resource extraction, equitable distribution of resources, injustice, and marginalization of disadvantaged sectors. In this regard, there will need to be tighter coordination and joint initiatives among key government agencies led by the OPAPP towards supporting reform measures around these key peace and conflict issues.

Strengthened local governance capabilities and the pursuit of reform are key to a sustainability strategy in an uncertain environment where violent conflict may erupt at any time, threatening peace benefits and initiatives. The ACT for Peace approach has proven that where local governance mechanisms are strong, violent conflict is less likely to occur, unless this is externally induced. The strategy could be shared with other conflict-affected communities outside Mindanao through a lessons learning initiative in the context of the UNDP CPR component. Documentation of lessons learned from the application of the PDC concept outside of the SZOPAD area – specifically in Caraga region - will be helpful in informing approaches to community-based peacebuilding of CPR programmes in communist insurgency-affected areas outside Mindanao.

3.3 Factors Affecting the Outcome

This section examines the factors that have affected the CPR Outcome (either positively or negatively), and attempts to establish how these have limited or facilitated progress towards outcome attainment. As defined, these factors are those that drive change, proactive opportunities to be seized or negative constraints to be removed.³⁸

A key facilitating factor towards the attainment of the Outcome, particularly at the community level in Mindanao, is a strong peace infrastructure on the ground that has developed over four phases of the GoP-UNMDP since 1997. As pointed out by the MTR for the ACT for Peace Programme, this infrastructure of peace mechanisms and processes - including the existence of leagues and alliances composed of peace advocates trained in consensus-building and the management/settlement of conflict – has helped to strengthen peacebuilding capacities and expand the peace constituency at the local level. An independent evaluation of the MDP3 concluded its positive effect on changing mindsets, building mutual trust and confidence between former warring groups, particularly of the MNLF members; and preventing the resurgence of conflict³⁹.

Prior to this, a strong policy environment during the Ramos presidency contributed to the setting up of a strong foundation for peace and development and allowed pursuit of the CPR Outcome to continue with minimal disruptions in the Programme coverage area, even as large-scale armed offensives took place during the Estrada term (2000) and the Arroyo administration (2003, 2008).

³⁸ Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, page 14

³⁹ Third Phase of the GoP-UN Multidonor Programme: End-of-Programme Evaluation Report, 2005

Related to this, the UNDP strategy of engaging the MNLF in programme implementation from the start of the GoP-UNMDP has been a vital facilitating factor in making progress towards attainment of the Outcome. MNLF members and their communities have acquired skills in community organizing, conflict management, consensus-building and project management, among others, and now serve as peace resources, helping to build peacebuilding capacities in and outside their communities. In the same manner, the deliberate engagement of LGUs in capacity building and programme implementation as the CPR interventions progressed has also been a facilitating factor in the attainment of the Outcome. This has laid the foundations for sustainable peace and development, where local actors are prepared to take on leadership roles in conflict-sensitive governance. The choice of Mindanao-based institutions – MEDCo and the ARMM regional government – as Implementing Partners has on the overall had the effect of strengthening the peace infrastructure on the ground, albeit both have needed continuing capacity-building for the management of peace-oriented development programmes. MEDCo's direct linkage with the Office of the President facilitates bridging of local concerns to key national decision-making bodies and processes.

Peace negotiations and agreements⁴⁰ affect progress towards the Outcome in various ways. Signed peace agreements, such as the 1996 GRP-MNLF FPA, provide the impetus to formalize peace-building interventions. They legitimize efforts and present the opening for collaboration among the key players in peace and development (government, civil society groups, local government units, donor agencies, former combatants and communities) towards strengthening capacities for peace and human security. Collaborative efforts between former combatants and LGUs in the formulation of local peace and development plans are the result of sustained capacity-building efforts under the CPR component of the CPAP. In contrast, the gains of peacebuilding are threatened by the collapse or suspension of peace negotiations, such as in the case of the GRP-CPP-NDF and the GRP-MILF talks.

Development assistance for peace and development has significantly contributed to progress towards achievement of the Outcome. Particularly in Mindanao, various capacity- building interventions ranging from governance and leadership training to micro-enterprise development are supported through donor-assisted programmes.

While there is the tendency to be driven by their own agenda, the mere presence of donor agencies often indicates financial resources for peace and development that the government could not have otherwise given. In fact, particularly in Mindanao, there is a general perception that peace-related projects seem to have been dispensed to funding institutions. While donor agencies implement varied programmes depending on their respective niches, the cumulative net effect addresses widespread and diverse needs (basic services, livelihood, housing, infrastructure, relief assistance, among others).

On the other hand, there is lack of and weak synergy among the donor-assisted programmes. This may negatively impact progress towards Outcome, as capacity-building interventions from donor agencies may duplicate each other, or may not be

⁴⁰ The NPP mentions six (6) peace processes. Of these, the GRP-MNLF, Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and Rebolusyonaryong Partido Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPM-RPA-ABB) have concluded in signed peace agreements. The peace negotiations with the GRP-MILF, CPP-NPA-NDF and Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao (RPMM) are still on-going, although the former two remain suspended.

necessary, or may cause new animosities among beneficiaries and partners who may feel that there is an imbalance in resource allocation (some receive more, others less).

A civil society-led peace constituency reinforces progress towards the Outcome. CSOs are often seen in terms of their engagement for capacity development in two ways—as recipients of capacity-building interventions, or as implementers and trainers themselves. Given the breadth and significance of CSO involvement in Philippine peacebuilding, however, it is important to see them as partners with strategic value in the pursuit of long-term peacebuilding objectives, beyond their engagement as partners in the implementation of programme activities.

CSOs have long been in the forefront of peace advocacy, community organizing and development, and in the areas of policy (assessment, formulation, evaluation), project implementation and partnership building. This has enjoined other sectors, like the youth, to be active participants as well. In this capacity, CSOs have provided platforms for capacity-building that support progress towards attainment of the CPR Outcome. Direct CSO peacebuilding is evident in Mindanao, while network-building and contributions to the policy arena through consultations and policy papers are taking place at the national level.

Individuals and communities that have experienced the benefits of peace are natural advocates and instruments for upscaling capacity development. The benefits of peace are in themselves strong driving factors for positive change, and present opportunities for advancing peace-building goals. People are able to identify the innate merits of peace: a peaceful situation in the community where basic needs are met, as against armed hostilities in the pursuit of development or redress of grievance. Children are getting healthier, medical needs are given attention, safe drinking water is available, and for some, a homecoming after being displaced by war. Former combatants have become active participants in community efforts to build peace and sustain it so that more productive activities can flourish—livelihood, community development, and participation in governance.

As shown in this discussion so far, the facilitating factors for progress towards the Outcome have been very pronounced at the local level. Several factors however limit progress towards the achievement of the Outcome, particularly at the national level.

Capacity-building for key national actors is constrained by a weak policy environment for peace-building that is characterized by policy incongruence in the approach to the armed conflicts within and between administrations. The national comprehensive peace policy exists alongside a national security paradigm in the government response to conflict. (At the same time, it is this environment that makes capacity development imperative).

While the CPR Outcome seeks to strengthen capacities for building peace and human security, national security considerations determine the responses to the armed conflicts, as demonstrated by the military offensives in Mindanao in the years 2000, 2003 and 2008, as well as the “all-out war” aimed at dismantling the CPP-NPA-NDF by 2010. Within this context, another constraining factor to attainment of the Outcome are the episodes of armed conflict on the ground that often set back peace and development initiatives. For example, the ACT for Peace 2006 annual report cites that hostilities between the Government and CPP-NPA-NDF in the CARAGA region resulted in sporadic violence that affected peace and development initiatives.

The CPR Outcome is also negatively affected by local political processes, where newly-elected officials have either been resistant or have needed extensive orientation on the CPR interventions before endorsing or fully participating in Programme implementation, thus causing delays or adjustments in Programme implementation. Two elections (local and *barangay*) have taken place since the start of CPR programme implementation.

Overall the vertical link between local and national peacebuilding is observed to be weak, contributing to dissociated directions where national policy pronouncements on the response to the conflicts are not congruent with or do not always support local peace initiatives. Conversely, local peacebuilding initiatives need to be factored in and inform the national policy environment more effectively

The pursuit of the CPR Outcome both in the current and previous programming cycles has been affected by changes introduced in institutional/management arrangements midway into the implementation of CPR programmes in view of evolving structures and processes in the government. Particularly, the dissolution in 2002 of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), main implementing agency for the Third Phase of the GoP-UNMDP, caused disruptions in programme implementation and constrained UNDP to assume direct execution of the programme for almost a year. The Urban Assets Reform Office (UARO), implementing agency for the Bahrain-funded project, was dissolved in 2007 towards the end of the project due to rationalization efforts under the Office of the President, disrupting project implementation and lowering delivery rates.

Some of the hindering factors above are related to the absence of a legislated national peace policy, which would provide consistency and accountability in the government's approach to the peace process. As pointed out by the 2005 PHDR, specific legislation may take the form of a permanent advisory and coordination mechanism for the peace process, which can regularly report to Congress on the status of the peace negotiations, and any changes in the approach or position regarding the peace process would have to be justified before Congress. This would also reinforce the supremacy of civilian authority over the military and address weaknesses and uncertainties inherent in the change of administrations.⁴¹

Other hindering factors that came out of interviews and FGDs for this Evaluation relate to the nature and processes of UNDP's assistance, and consequent effects on Outcome results:

- UNDP's limited resources are perceived to be spread too thinly and were seen as insufficient to adequately respond to key peacebuilding concerns nationwide
- UNDP required excessive paperwork and reporting procedures, consuming time of project staff and government implementing agencies alike.
- UNDP concentrated its efforts on the management of inputs, outputs and processes before evolving into results-orientation, outcomes, and the monitoring and evaluation of performance. This included the introduction of new management systems and tools (HACT, PRINCE 2) midstream in programme implementation that required new sets of skills and adjustments in management processes and structure

⁴¹ PHDR 2005, p. 36.

- Delayed Programme Implementation due to late approval of AWP's for 2006 and 2007, which were approved only in the second quarter of the year, thus diminishing time needed for project implementation.

In regard to the observation above on adequacy of UNDP response to national peacebuilding vis-à-vis its limited resources, and in the context of planning for the next CPAP cycle, UNDP should consider reviewing its strategies and approaches against current realities in the national CPR arena, anchored on an updated peace/conflict analysis to be conducted with multisectoral participation. Given fluid conditions - including the conduct of national elections, the inconclusive state of the peace processes, and global economic difficulties - that characterize the planning environment of the next programming cycle, effective risk assessment should form part of the peace/conflict analysis. UNDP should also factor in its risk analysis the effects of corporate changes or adjustments on programme implementation and take necessary steps to lessen the bureaucratic processes that stakeholders are subjected to in the implementation of CPR programmes and projects – by definition crisis requires immediate responses that should not be impeded by bureaucratic processes.

It is noted that although progress towards the Outcome through achievement of outputs faced a number of challenges, both externally and institutionally, the CPR component was able to tap on some supporting or “helping” mechanisms that addressed difficulties and concerns. Effective risk management, for example, helped in providing alternative approaches in light of armed skirmishes that affected service delivery to PDCs, as well as in cushioning the effects of adjustments in the downloading of donor funds and currency exchange rate fluctuations, such as bridge financing mechanisms to cover resource shortfalls resulting from these circumstances.

3.4 UNDP contributions to the outcome through outputs

Annex E shows the Results Framework for the CPR Outcome, reflecting the changes and modifications resulting from the workshops of June and October 2007. The outputs are formulated to translate into quantitative output indicators, albeit more as statements of occurrences, rather than statements of the degree of change – presenting challenges in conducting comparative measurement, since the starting and end points are not cogently presented.

This requires capturing the output accomplishments in both quantitative and qualitative terms. On one hand, the output indicators are statistical in nature, looking at numbers and percentage increases. Necessarily, evaluation of progress suggests looking at numerical accord to come up with quantitative results. On the other hand, peace is viewed as going beyond numbers and its effects are often personal and experiential, needing qualitative deposition and wider range of explanations.

Aside from the most obvious distinction between numbers and words, the conventional wisdom is that qualitative and quantitative methods have different strengths, weaknesses, and requirements. And it is in integrating the two approaches and building on their complementary strengths that makes the findings more useful and significant.

Output Accomplishments

Following the Refined Results and Resources Framework of CPAP and based on year-end accomplishment reports, the following are the specific and detailed output accomplishments, from 2004-2007 under CPAP, and from 2002-2004, under CCF 2. Per *Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*, progress on accomplishment of the outputs are rated according to the degree to which the output targets have been met, as follows: **No** (not achieved); **Partial** (if two thirds or more of the quantitative target is achieved) and **Yes** (fully achieved). Given the highly qualitative nature of peace outcome measurement, *partial* ratings will not strictly adhere to the criteria above, but will consider contextual reports on output accomplishments.

Output 1. Human Security-based National Comprehensive Peace Plan Promoted

Output Indicators:

- Human Security is mainstreamed in Chapter 14 of the MTPDP;
- Number of government officials who champion human security;
- Number of agencies that have conflict-sensitive and peace promoting plans

Accomplishments:

- Completed revision/updating of National Peace Plan (NPP), currently constituting Chapter 14 of the MTPDP, incorporating human security concepts and addressing emerging peace concerns. The revised NPP will be incorporated in the updated MTPDP upon approval by the President.
- Human Security Index (HSI) developed by UP Third World Studies Center in partnership with OPAPP, CPPB and ACT for Peace Programme
- Efforts towards incorporating conflict-sensitive and peace promoting plans to the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) have been started.

*Rating: **Partial**, due to a) updated NPP not yet incorporated in updated MTPDP b) HSI yet to be finalized and c) conflict-sensitive and peace promoting plans among target government agencies have not yet materialized, although initiatives already begun*

Output 2. Improved Professionalism, Efficiency and Respect for Humans Rights, Gender and Cultural Sensitivity supported among Security Sector institutions

Output Indicators:

- Evidence of improved security sector performance based on the Security Sector Reform Index

Accomplishment:

- SSRI baseline report completed by Institute of Strategic Development Studies (ISDS). Report has been presented in various fora involving security sector institutions and civil society organizations to increase awareness on the need to pursue security sector reform.

*Rating: **Partial**, as only baseline report has been completed and no evidence yet of improved security sector performance*

Output 3. Peace and Human Rights and Human Security Promoted through Participatory Policy Making

Output Indicators:

- Number. of policies developed/enhanced and issued that promote peace, human rights and human security;
- Number of CSOs involved in policy making for peace, human rights and human security;
- Number of CSOs declaring support for peace, human rights and human security policies

Accomplishments:

- Crafted the National Peace Act of 2006 (HB No. 5767) introduced in Congress with inputs from 41 peace organizations in 13 regions. GZO-PI led other other CSOs in a technical working group that crafted initial drafts of the Bill introduced in Congress by the 3 AKBAYAN Partylist Representatives
- Drafted Implementing Rules and Regulations of EO 570 to promote the culture of peace in schools in partnership of CPPB, ACT for Peace, OPAPP and Department of Education through consultations
- Issuance of Proclamation No. 1377 on 6 September 2007, granting Amnesty to CPP-NPA-NDF and other communist rebel groups in the Philippines
- 4 Policy briefs and a consolidated framework on human security developed by UP Third World Studies Center through a series of policy dialogues with representatives from government and civil society
- Initial recommendations to address human security concerns of IPs relative to IPRA and Mining Act implementation already drawn by PSSC including inputs on the revision of DENR's CBFM provided by PsPN and 24 community leaders in Region VI.

Rating: Yes, as a number of policies have developed and enhanced, and there is active participation of CSOs

Output 4. Conflict Sensitive and Peace Promoting Planning and Legislation Mainstreamed in Local Governance

Indicator:

- Number of local governments with conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting plans and policies

Accomplishments:

- 92 PDCs have formulated community development plans that are included in Barangay, Municipal and Provincial development plans; and successfully accessed external resources to support their priority needs
- 11 provincial-level MNLF State Revolutionary Commands (SRCs) and PDALs have developed basic peace promoting capacities, systems, processes and approaches
- LGUs have formed 16 Provincial and 62 Municipal Peace and Development Technical Working Groups to provide support to the PDCs co-chaired by Local Chief Executive (LCE) and MNLF State Chair
- Conflict transformation and peace-building structures and processes have been replicated in 6 Provincial, 18 Municipal and 3 City LGUs

- 66 LGUs have mainstreamed peace and development in their LSBs and 373 LSFs now demonstrate enhanced capacities to apply peacebuilding principles and processes
- 77 Community Rehabilitation Plans were completed and adopted at the barangay level
- Capacities of 4 provinces, 5 cities and 45 municipalities in Region XII and 25 municipalities in Luzon being enhanced through formulation of Conflict Sensitive and Peace-Promoting (CSPP) Community Development Plans and Executive-Legislative Agenda (CDP-ELA). These plans have been developed using the Peace Promoting and Conflict Sensitive Local Development Planning Manual developed under the CPPB Programme.
- Four Department of Education (DepEd) regional offices in Mindanao partnered in peace education initiatives and are providing technical assistance to Schools of Peace: 22 Schools of Peace are now applying peace education, and culture of peace modules, peace-based lesson plans, monitoring and evaluation system, and a speakers' bureau for peace education were developed and enhanced.
- In partnership with NCIP, facilitated processing of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and preparation of Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP) for pilot IP communities including the processing of ancestral domain title and preparation of social development plan for pilot Mangyan community in Mindoro
- Training manual on integrating conflict sensitive and peace promoting planning for national government being prepared by OPAPP and to be tested with NEDA, DILG and NAPC.
- 77 Community Rehabilitation Plans completed and adopted at the barangay level

Rating: Yes, as evidenced by various conflict-sensitive and peace promoting plans by local government units (municipal and barangay levels, and various other outputs that contribute to conflict-sensitive governance

Output 5. Government, CSOs and Other Parties to Conflict have Stronger Capacities in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and for Peace Building

Output Indicators:

- Number of government personnel, CSOs and other parties to conflicts knowledgeable and skilled in conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- Evidence of conflict prevention, management and resolution processes and practices in government and civil society organizations

Accomplishments:

- LGUs in 27 provinces and 14 municipalities in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao capacitated on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
- 250 members of the Regional Kalahi Convergence Group have been made aware about the principles of peace, human security and conflict transformation in 6 regions (CAR, I, III, IV-A, V, VIII)
- 300 local government personnel in 20 conflict-affected barangays in Bohol gained knowledge and skills in conflict prevention and problem solving through roll-out trainings.

- 62 TWGs at the provincial and municipal levels in Mindanao were created to promote/support PDC initiatives
- 82 members of the Federation of United Mindanaon Bangsamoro Women Multi-Purpose Cooperative completed the training on strategic planning for peace and development
- 36 peace trainers with advanced skills in conflict mediation and resolution from local government offices, PNP/military, and CSOs participated in the trainer's training program sponsored by the Bohol Provincial Peace and Order Council.
- 114 peace workers from various CSOs were capacitated on peace, mediation and conflict transformation
- Imams and traditional leaders including PDCs and MNLF state leadership trained on Islamic Leadership and Governance
- Parents and teachers in 6 schools and 36 grassroots leader in Mindanao oriented about the culture of peace and conflict transformation, and trained to become facilitators for COP workshops. COP modules are also being developed for community schools in 3 IP communities in Luzon
- Research, consultations and training workshops to enhance awareness and capacities of 13 IP communities in the provinces of Aurora, Mindoro, Northern Quezon, Pampanga and Camarines Norte undertaken.
- 20 multisectoral peace advocates and 10 Lupon ng Tagapamayapa capacitated in pilot conflict barangays in Antique
- Strengthened organizational capacities of SANAMA (Samahan ng mga Alangan Mangyan) to respond to peace and development concerns of 52 Mangyan barangays in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
- 97 representatives from the Ulama, Academe, Indigenous Peoples and Bangsamoro Women participated in forum on understanding conflict, building peace and drafted policy recommendations on peace and development
- Peace Core Groups formed in the ARMM PDCs are in the forefront of conflict management, while volunteer groups were trained to become local advocates for the human security framework of the UN and the protection of human rights in the Caraga region

Rating: Yes, as illustrated by the accomplishments, and due to the programme focus on capacity building

Output 6. Effective Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and for Peace Building especially Indigenous and Innovative Peace Building Installed or Harnessed

Output Indicators:

- Number of mechanisms installed or harnessed for conflict transformation, healing and peace building for human security;
- Number of government – CSO engagement for conflict transformation and peace building for human security;
- Evidence of conflicts prevented, managed or resolved

Accomplishments:

- Federation of MNLF States in Western Mindanao established and strengthened, playing prominent role in resolving *rido* (family/clan feuds) and conducting interfaith dialogues

- 22 PDALs/Alliances are taking on primary roles in resource mobilization, activity implementation and monitoring and conflict mediation in the PDCs, and strengthening community peace structures and networking with LGUs and other agencies
- 3 Barangay Peace and Order Councils in Leon, Iloilo composed of multisectoral representatives were created by the program in collaboration with UP Visayas Foundation, Inc. and Grupo Paghidaet
- Dap-ay System for conflict resolution of the Maeng Tribe in Tubo, Abra being strengthened and assisted in the formulation of its organization and interfacing with LGU governance systems
- Development of a 3-Year IP Women Peace and Development Program including the strengthening of conflict management mechanisms in IP communities
- Local Peace Mechanisms involving multisectoral dialogue processes formulated and initially implemented in Tarlac, Mt. Province, Sorsogon, Bondoc Peninsula and Negros
- “Peace Parliament” composed of peace and development advocates and with multisectoral participation established in ARMM; multi-stakeholder peace network formed in South Central Mindanao
- In partnership with DILG, supported the strengthening of governance bodies at the municipal and barangay levels to enable various LGUs in Mindanao to effectively undertake and sustain peacebuilding initiatives in the PDCs
- Partnership with the Bangsamoro Lawyers Network for the conduct of para-legal training on the Code of Muslim Personal Law in the PDCs
- Two pilot PDCs in North Cotabato are recipients of the ongoing initiative on IPRA localization and popularization including conversion of ancestral domain claims to titles and the formulation of ADS DPP
- Formation and organization of 36 peace *Usrah* (Committee) in 36 PDCs, whose membership includes Muslim religious leaders, PDAs, sectoral leaders including Christian religious leaders
- 30 representatives from various Council of Elders have formulated strategic peace plans
- Produced several knowledge products which are currently used as training and information materials to promote successful local practices on peace and human security
 - Best practices on conflict resolution and HR/IHL promotion documented in 13 IP communities in Aurora, Mindoro, Northern Quezon, Pampanga and Camarines Norte
 - Enhancement of Barangay Governance Modules to integrate Islamic peacebuilding elements
 - Used locally developed module on Islamic Leadership and Governance on a series of PDC-based trainings in 10 PDCs
 - Translation of Barangay Governance manual into Tagalog version
 - Documentation of Indigenous Peace and Conflict Management Systems to produce modules on IP Conflict management System training
 - Developed a Manual on Clan Authority and Conflict Mapping in the PDCs
 - Completion of Module Guide on Operationalizing the Culture of Peace, Gender and Development and Results-Based Approach in Barangay Governance

Rating: Yes, as shown by the numerous peace mechanisms set and developed in the communities, barangays and LGUs.

Output 7. More Citizens or Groups Support Conflict Transformation and Peace Building for Human Security

Output Indicators:

- Number of groups mobilized for conflict transformation and peace building for human security;
- Number of young people mobilized for conflict transformation and peace building for human security;
- Number of initiatives to reduce proliferation of loose firearms;

Accomplishments:

- 42 displaced communities (IDPs) declared their areas as peace sanctuaries, where some are hosting displaced families from neighboring communities
- Collaboration with national and regional media networks like Mindanao Communicators Network (MindaComNet) was pursued to build expertise on peace journalism and make media an effective tool for peace advocacy
- 22 media practitioners of the Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas-SOCKSKARGEN gained understanding on CoP concepts
- National and local peace advocates led by GZO-PI have gathered annually since 2005 to assess their peace efforts in the light of the emerging challenges to human security and peace, and come up with recommendations to enhance the peace process including the resumption of peace talks with rebel groups and the strengthening of local peace initiatives
- Youth peace network composed of 13 youth organizations organized and engaged in peace advocacy activities.
- A youth peace agenda for 2007 was formulated during the Youth Waging Peace in the Philippines Conference based on recommendations of 66 participants from 31 organizations
- Formation of student core groups in 8 selected areas (NCR, CAR, Cebu, Bacolod, Naga, Bohol, Quezon, Tarlac) which mobilized about 5,000 students for various peace-building activities
- Generation Peace Network (GenPeace), which is composed of 10 national youth organizations has developed a strategic plan. It has actively mobilized around 1,771 individuals to actively participate in youth peace advocacy activities
- Children in 6 schools in ARMM, South Central and Western Mindanao participated in peace building consultations and trainings toward building a comprehensive childrens' peace agenda

Rating: Yes, as exhibited by the participation of a variety of sectors and individuals that have been mobilized to support conflict transformation and peace building for human security, although it is noted that progress is yet to be made on initiatives to reduce proliferation of loose firearms

Output 8. Basic Services and Livelihood Support Provided to Conflict Affected Areas

Output Indicators:

- Number of residents of conflict-affected communities, especially vulnerable groups such as women and children, that availed of socio-economic projects in pursuance of conflict prevention and peace building

Accomplishments:

- 26,466 displaced families served with food and non-food packages including medicines and supplemental feeding for malnourished children
- 16,364 displaced families returned to their places of origin or resettled in rehabilitation areas
- Integrated early recovery package for 42 priority rehabilitation sites of 12 provinces, benefiting a total of 15,039 IDP families, provided with 780 units of core shelter, 257 individual or communal latrines, water supply systems (69 Level I; 13 Level II) and 25 community health centers
- 2,243 IDPs provided with psycho-social trauma healing sessions and 5,997 malnourished children of displaced families provided with supplemental feeding
- 24 conflict-affected communities with a peace declaration signed by officials of local government units and offices, representatives of the Peace and Development Councils including community leaders, military and armed rebel groups
- 16,518 households in PDCs benefiting from 59 community water system projects
- 38,846 households benefiting from 99 Botika ng Barangays (village pharmacies) and 79 basic health center including the provision of medical equipment and facilities
- Scholarship grants on Midwifery Curriculum were given to qualified students from 30 PDCs in Mindanao
- 16 new classrooms including Madrasah Arabic School benefiting more than 800 indigent school children including IP communities
- 15,156 households, of which 40% are women, benefiting from 106 community economic development activities
- Provided start-up capital for 47 community level enterprises in 66 barangays
- Supported 220 community level enterprises with various farm inputs, livestock and farm machineries to 46 barangays
- 12,000 individuals in Barangay Maharlika in Taguig City to benefit from the construction of the Maharlika Trade Center
- 20 Muslim communities in Quezon City will be served by the constructed 1.5 hectare Quezon City Islamic Cemetery (QCIC) in Montalban, Rizal
- 10 barangays in the provinces of Bohol and Mindoro were provided with small-scale and quick impact community-level enterprises or agricultural and water system projects (installation/rehabilitation of level II water systems in 6 barangays in Bohol; construction of virgin coconut oil processing plant in Naujan, Mindoro)
- Implementation of farm and non-farm livelihood activities in communities of former combatants in 4 provinces (Iloilo, Ifugao, Abra and Apayao)
- Training on organic farming and provision of farm inputs were conducted for upland farmers, IPs and former combatants' communities in Iloilo, Negros Oriental and Quirino
- 4 water systems, 1 school building and 2 health stations constructed in 8 conflict-affect communities in Luzon and Visayas benefitting former combatants and indigenous people
- Provision of core shelter units to 200 households residing in Eleven Islands, Zamboanga City
- Distribution of food and non-food assistance packages to about 2,700 families displaced by the recent armed conflict in the provinces of Cotabato, Sulu and Surigao del Sur in collaboration with the Sulu Area Coordinating Council, Municipal and Barangay LGUs and the PDA leagues.

Rating: Yes, as evidenced by the list of basic services provided in the areas of health, housing, education and livelihood.

Output 9. Women and Men Members of Conflict Affected Communities, including Former Combatants, Participate in Governance Processes and Mechanisms

Output Indicators:

- Number of conflict-affected communities whose members are involved in consultations, local development planning and local special bodies

Accomplishments:

- Members of the Barangay Peace and Development Council composed of youth, women, farmers and former combatants in Leon, Iloilo participated in the formulation of a Barangay Peace and Development Plan that contains their peace and reform agenda
- Facilitated the activation and reorganization of 135 Barangay Development Committees (BDCs)
- Reinvigorated Peoples Organizations in PDCs and formalized their membership in the 135 Barangay Development Councils in Mindanao
- Assisted 20 PDA Leagues/Alliances in organizational capacity enhancement
- 181 MNLF members mainstreamed and productively participating in various government structures, civil society groups and local social formations
- Multisectoral peace advocates led the enhancement of their Barangay Development Plan incorporating their peace and human security concerns. These plans have been adopted and recognized by both the barangay and municipal LGUs through the issuance of local resolutions

Rating: Yes, as demonstrated by the various consultative processes conducted and the development/enhancement of barangay development plans

Based on the identified output indicators, there have been numerous accomplishments. Ratings-wise, targets appear to have been met fully, except for output 1 (Human Security-based National Comprehensive Peace Plan Promoted) and output 2 (Improved Professionalism, Efficiency and Respect for Humans Rights, Gender and Cultural Sensitivity supported among Security Sector institutions) where achievements were just partially met. This Evaluation notes several interventions addressed to specific women's concerns (e.g programme for IP women, training of Muslim women on planning processes) but recommends the development of a comprehensive gender strategy for CPR programmes that responds to the special needs of women and children in the conflict setting and promotes their rights and welfare.

At this point it is reiterated that the output indicators are statements of occurrence and not degrees of change, due to the absence of baselines. Hence, the ratings are assessments of what have been done thus far in relation to the output indicators and not ratings on the progress towards outcome achievement. It is however acknowledged that the sheer volume of outputs and activities thus far indicate positive movement in the status of the Outcome.

Qualitative Results

The listing of accomplishments above can translate into qualitative evidence of movement towards Outcome attainment. For example, participation in a “peace” program by conflict-affected and, in a number of cases, traumatised communities, instils a culture of peace and provides recognition of their conflict-generated hardships and hope for the future; its “real value” is not easily quantifiable.⁴² This section presents some examples of changes that while not quantifiable have nevertheless made a difference in the lives of and relationships among various stakeholders: communities, MNLF, local government units, civil society organizations and the implementing partners.

Communities. Most of the peace-building efforts and activities have been geared towards holistic empowerment of the communities, affecting social, economic, political and cultural dimensions. This means stronger social relationships, increasing financial independence, maturing political involvement and acceptance and respect of cultural differences. This is particularly evident in the PDCs, as articulated in the 6-Stage Transformation and Development process. Relatedly, a stronger peace constituency has been built among the various communities, and peace advocates have become more skilled in conflict analysis, prevention, management and resolution. In the case of IP communities, existing mechanisms for conflict resolution, management and prevention, indigenous and innovative mechanism have been revived, strengthened and mainstreamed in their political and administrative systems such as those of the Mangyans in Mindoro and the Tinggians in Abra. In all of the FGDs conducted for this evaluation, the restoration of dignity, confidence and hope was among the key changes identified by participants as having incrementally taken place as CPR interventions for participation, voice and economic opportunities came in, along with other development interventions from LGUs and various donors. The number of joint declarations for peace, and resolutions for peace is an indication of cohesion amidst diversity and increasing levels of acceptance and respect of the differences in beliefs, ideologies and practices. The concept of selflessness is becoming more evident as people start to give in and accept compromises, for the greater good of the majority/community. A sense of human security is strengthened through the provision of basic services. Concrete and tangible benefits of peace in communities motivate people to maintain a peaceful environment

“ Twenty five years ago, I and my family had to leave this community because of conflict. Finally, at the age of 75, I am back...I now can say that I can finally die.”
– Council of Elders member in Sibugan Island, Mindanao

MNLF. The findings of the programme-end evaluation for MDP3 implemented under CCF II, as well as the MTR for the ACT for Peace Programme under the CPAP, bear repetition here: that a most significant result of the CPR interventions has been the shift in mindsets of MNLF members who have transformed from being combatants to community leaders and PDAs. As such they are skilled in conflict management, community organizing, peace advocacy, and for some, resource mobilization. Many of those that constituted the MNLF ground forces have become peacebuilding leaders in and outside their communities, sharing skills and helping build the capacities of others – including LGUs and government line agencies – in building peace and human security. The shift in mindsets is apparent in the absence of armed conflicts in the areas covered by the MDP/ACT for Peace, and by the lack of response to a call for *jihad* by MNLF

⁴² Act for Peace Mid-term Review draft report, p.23.

Chair Nur Misuari in Jolo in 2004. Change in perception as to their roles in relation to implementation of the CPR programme is also evident in the PDAs' constant reference to themselves as "partners" rather than as "beneficiaries".

Local Government Units

LGU participation in the sustainability of the peace building efforts is crucial. The LGUs' openness to conflict transformation processes provided by the programme should be maximized as this presents opportunities for long-term peace and development. The Peace Lens:

An important aspect in the capacity building initiatives for the LGUs is the introduction of a new paradigm – a peace lens - which guides area development planning, integrating

"I have seen that the ACT for Peace programme, through the creation of PDCs, can bring peace and development. When I went to one conflict-prone community I told them if you want me to help, give up your arms and I will help. There was also this instance when it was the community that came to me, offered to provide 100 hectares, and in return, requested the provincial government to assist them in developing the land. I immediately contacted DOLE Philippines. Now, the community people are banana growers for DOLE."

Hon. Governor Miguel Dominguez leads the replication of the PDC approach in other 32 communities of Sarangani Province

participatory and inclusive approaches that promote human security, good governance, peace-generating, sustainable development, gender-mainstreaming, culture-responsiveness and respect for cultural and religious differences. In some cases, LGUs acknowledged that the GPR-MNLF FPA provided them the "legal" mandate and opportunity/opening to pursue peace initiatives in conflict affected areas. It likewise gave the communities the opportunity to deal and negotiate with the LGUs above ground. This provided avenues for collaboration for genuine development of the area. It is observed that a contributing factor to the growth of locales is the establishment of peace: local officials regard peace as a leverage for development. Where peace has taken root, resources are easier to access to assist in post-conflict areas. This has prompted a number LGU leaders to showcase peace initiatives to invite investments and assure investors. Capacity-building for peace has also served to enhance LGU-community relationships, particularly those that had not seen government services over a long period of time. This relationship has been renewed and enhanced, as evidenced by the inclusion and integration of local plans to provincial and municipal development plans, providing opportunity for once-isolated communities to feel they are part of local governance.

Civil Society Organizations Most of the partner civil society organizations of the CPR component at the national level have long been at the forefront of peace activism, with roles ranging from public advocacy to participation in peace negotiations to influencing government policies on peace and development issues. There are also efforts which, although not exclusively aimed at promoting and sustaining peace and development in conflict areas, sectors have contributed to favourable conditions that promote peace and development through community empowerment. The CPR component appears to have contributed to or provided the venues for the mainstreaming of CSO advocacies and promotion of participatory engagement. From among the CSO groups interviewed, there appears to be a perception of heightened public spaces for citizens' participation, particularly in forging consensus on policies and concerns addressing peace and development. Veteran civil society organizations involved in peace work have participated in consultation processes for the crafting of national legislation and policies such as the National Peace Plan, National Peace Bill, Amnesty Bill, and have participated in exercises to support possible policy formulation, such as efforts to

develop a Human Security Index and the continuing discussions on the issues of mining/resource extraction and finding policy-level solutions to its adverse effects particularly on marginalized sectors. The implementation of CPR projects in conflict-affected areas provided opportunity for convergence of efforts for peace between government and peacebuilding organizations, bound by a common framework of analysis of the current conflict situation, and a common understanding of the means and approaches to achieving peace (“Six Paths to Peace”).

Implementing Partners. FGDs with IPs indicate that qualitative changes have also taken place amongst the IPs of the CPR component. The appreciation of the concept of peace has deepened. For the MEDCo and ARMM regional government, involvement in the MDP3 and ACT for Peace allowed for the development of a peace perspective in their economic development work and in their planning responsibilities respectively. The rights-based approach of UNDP to development has also contributed to enhancements in the approach to project development and management by the IPs of programmes under the CPR component. Skills in programme management have also been enhanced. As mandated by the Executive Orders that created them, both OPAPP and MEDCO⁴³ are essentially tasked to review, formulate, and evaluate policies on peace and economic development, respectively. The implementation of programmes and projects are not within the core competencies of these offices, notwithstanding individual capabilities. Yet, as implementing partners, they are expected to possess skills that would enable them to manage the CPR programmes. Several skills enhancement programs were conducted for the IPs in results-based planning and management, conflict mediation, and communication skills, among others, thus enhancing their competence as programme implementers. This was also acknowledged as a benefit for UARO staff who were involved in the implementation of the Bahrain-funded project. Finally, by being associated with UNDP, stakeholders and IPs alike feel that their credibility and image has been enhanced as institutions engaged in conflict management and peace-building,

Some general conclusions on the Status of the Outcome

Overall, progress towards Outcome is positive. Capacities are being built relative to targets set by UNDP for the CPR component. From a peacebuilding perspective, it appears that substantial progress has been achieved in bringing about transformations towards peace at personal, relational and institutional dimensions—indicating changes in mindsets, improved relations among former antagonists, and establishment of mechanisms for institutionalizing peacebuilding among LGUs. Efforts are being undertaken to lay the foundations of change at the cultural level through peace education and Culture of Peace training, among others.

The probability for sustainability of the Outcome—in terms of ownership, capacities acquired, institutionalized processes for peacebuilding - is stronger at the local level, given a peace infrastructure that has been built over the past ten years. Central to capacity-building has been the PDC concept although this may need complementation, upscaling and replication to be sustainable over the long term. While the community and LGU-led strategy appears to be a good formula for sustainable peacebuilding on the

⁴³ The Urban Assets Reform Office (UARO), the implementing agency of the Bahrain programme, had ceased to operate in 2007.

ground, the uncertain policy environment and the possibility of renewed fighting is a continuing threat to the gains of peace. To bolster sustainability of peace efforts at the national/policy level, concerted efforts must be pursued to improve governance capacities and support reforms at the national level to address the root causes of conflict. This would require integrated government – as well as UN/UNDP – approaches.

The CPR Outcome is highly relevant to identified national priorities for peace, as well as to UNDP's niche in capacity building. Given various other development programmes engaged in the same activities in Mindanao, and an observed diminution of UNDP's leadership role in the region over the past few years, UNDP can build on its niche as a pioneer in peace and development by taking the lead in knowledge management, drawing on lessons learned from its long engagement in the field as well as on the expertise of other UN agencies and its global network to move knowledge management forward. This should be a key priority in the less than two years left for the CPAP implementation. UNDP can also re-establish its convening/coordination role in Mindanao by reviving the DGM.

Several factors facilitate attainment of the Outcome: peace networks and resources that have been established over four phases of the MDP/ACT for Peace; strategic engagement by UNDP of the MNLF, government agencies and LGUs; the presence of a peace agreement between the GRP and the MNLF; civil society participation, and the peacebuilding opportunities that derive from the benefits of peace on the ground. On the other hand, there are hindering factors to Outcome attainment. These include: a weak policy environment for peacebuilding at the national level; the absence of a peace agreement with the CPP-NPA-NDF, and the suspended GRP-MILF peace process; episodes of armed conflict that set back the gains of peace on the ground; leadership shifts among partners resulting from elections, political appointments and institutional changes that cause delays or adjustments in programme implementation. Other factors seen to affect attainment of the Outcome are the temporary nature of the offices/mandates of programme IPs; the need for a stronger engagement of CSOs at the national level, and the need to strengthen vertical integration of local and national peacebuilding efforts. To mitigate adverse effects of the hindering factors mentioned above on the CPR Outcome, multisectoral peace and conflict analysis with strong risk assessment components should be undertaken on a regular basis by CPR programmes.

Relative to the CPR goals and strategies (as reflected in its three original outcomes, (i.e. policy development, capacity-building for key actors, and empowerment of communities) the component appears to be well on track on the second and third outcomes. There is, however, a need for the fast track progress towards the outcome in relation to the policy environment for peace, as outputs are only partially accomplished, particularly on security sector reform and the integration of the enhanced NPP in the MTPDP.

The absence of baseline data has provided challenges in the measurement of progress towards Outcome. Pursuit of the CPR Outcome in the next CPAP cycle would benefit from the conduct of capacity assessments for programme implementors, partners and stakeholders. On the other hand, the CPR component, through the ACT for Peace programme, has developed a comprehensive peace-based M&E system, currently in its pilot phase, which should be adopted by all CPR component programmes for performance measurement and tracking of programme effectiveness.

Relative to observations regarding the adequacy of UNDP response to national peacebuilding vis-à-vis its limited resources, and in the context of planning for the next CPAP cycle, UNDP should consider reviewing its strategies and approaches against current realities in the national CPR arena, anchored on an updated peace/conflict analysis to be conducted with multisectoral participation. UNDP's strategic niche in its support for peacebuilding at the national level can be maximized through complementation and collaboration among its various CPAP components/portfolios and by drawing in donor assistance to national conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

3.5 Financial Performance

CPR financial resources under the 2005-2009 CPAP amount to \$22.5 million dollars. Almost 91% of this comes from donor contributions (ACT for Peace, IDP and Bahrain) while the remaining 9% is sourced from UNDP core funds (CPPB) (Table 4).

Fund utilization for ongoing programmes (ACT for Peace and CPPB) appears to be on track, with an average of 92% expenditure of its approved budget for 2005-2007. Utilization for completed programmes (IDP and Bahrain) stand at 95% of total budget. Overall Programme Management cost (M&E, trainings and meetings, equipment, administrative costs, foreign exchange gain/loss) is at 17%, excluding the UNDP management cost at 3% for portfolio programmes (except CPPB, which is funded from core funds). It should be noted, however, that US\$ 253,294 or 2% of the total expenditure is attributed to forex gain/loss, e.g. exchange rate from US dollars fluctuated from Php 55 in August 2006 to Php 42 in December 2007.

Table 4. CPR Portfolio Budget and Expenditures for 2005-2007

Programme	Budget	Funds Utilized	Delivery Rate*	Type of Disbursement		
				Direct Services	Technical Assistance	Programme Management
ACT for Peace	15,906,607	7,784,216	49%	2,604,921 (33%)	3,725,460 (48%)	1,453,835 (19%)
CPPB	2,000,000	1,382,795	69%	261,418 (19%)	941,313 (68%)	180,064 (13%)
IDP	3,673,942	3,474,470	94%	1,682,330 (48%)	873,592 (25%)	918,548 (26%)
Bahrain	1,000,000	982,901	98%	851,307 (87%)	18,007.0 (2%)	109,953 (11%)
Total	22,580,549	13,620,052	60%	5,399,978 (40%)	5,558,373 (41%)	2,662,400 (20%)

Note: Computation as of end 2007.

The funds have been utilized within the boundaries of goals and targets set by the individual programmes, though common to all is support the capacity of key actors for peacebuilding, as reflected in the 41% of resources disbursed to technical assistance. Disbursements for direct services include provision of for basic services and livelihood assistance intended not just to address basic needs of the communities supported by the CPR component, but also to catalyze peace-building and promote social cohesion, thus significantly contributing to the attainment of the CPR outcome.

3.6 UNDP Partnership Strategy

The strategy for pursuing the CPR Outcome is anchored on UNDP's Country Programme partnership strategy which acknowledges that the attainment of intended outcomes is possible only by building consensus, creating a deeper sense of ownership and a higher level of accountability of the development process and the intended outcomes among partners, and with the support and concerted action of all stakeholders.⁴⁴ In the CPR context, UNDP engages various partners before, during and after crisis – national/regional government agencies local government units/offices, civil society, and selected communities to commonly achieve development results.

From the start of the CPAP formulation, partnership anchored on consensus, ownership and accountability was already evident in the various consultation and consensus-building processes conducted in the preparation of the UNDAF and the CPAP, from the analysis of development challenges to the finalization of the documents. These partnership principles and processes are also evident in the pursuit of the CPR Outcome, where UNDP has involved a wide range of partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries from design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects.

The principal partner in pursuing the CPR Outcome is the Philippine government. NEDA co-chairs with UNDP the Executive Committee of the CPAP Outcome Board, which essentially oversees, sets directions and makes decisions in regard to the implementation of the CPAP. CSOs from the peacebuilding and conflict prevention sector are represented in the Outcome Board, as they are in the various oversight and decision-making arrangements and governing bodies for the programmes and projects under the CPR portfolio, including the Programme Coordinating Committee (PCC) and Executive Committee of the ACT for Peace Programme and the Project Executive Group (PEG) of the CPPB Programme, among others. Institutional Arrangements for Portfolio programmes and projects consistently involve NEDA, Implementing Partners, representatives of CSOs and relevant government agencies, and in the case of the GoP-UN MDP (from Phase 1 to the current ACT for Peace Programme), the MNLF. The mix of government agencies, CSOs, and primary beneficiaries/stakeholders (MNLF) underscores national ownership and accountability, while ensuring CSO participation and voice and overall check and balance in direction-setting and decision-making for the CPR programmes.

While this overall partnership strategy underpins the institutional arrangements for UNDP programmes, it is also articulated in various areas critical to the attainment of the CPR Outcome:

The main Implementing Partners (IP) of UNDP in pursuing the Outcome and objectives of its CPR Component are the OPAPP for the CPPB Programme, and the MEDCo with the ARMM Regional Government (ARG) for the ACT for Peace Programme. The reasons for selecting these agencies as IPs are obviously connected to their respective mandates, OPAPP as the main national agency responsible for the implementation of the government's comprehensive peace process, and ARMM and MEDCo as institutions covering socioeconomic development in the autonomous and non-autonomous regions

⁴⁴ CPAP 2004-2009, p.14

of Mindanao respectively. Prior to this arrangement, the main partner for the implementation of the MDP was the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which was established pursuant to the provisions of the 1996 GRP- MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA) as transition body before establishment of the expanded ARMM. Upon phase out of the SPCPD in 2002, Executive Order 80 prescribed the ARG and the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) as implementing agencies for development projects in the ARMM and non-ARMM areas respectively, although with the deactivation of SPDA by the President shortly after, MEDCo emerged as the regional body to partner with in the non-ARMM areas.

The partnership between UNDP and the Programme IPs includes oversight and provision of guidance and technical assistance ⁴⁵ to the programmes by UNDP, including training on results-based management, technical assistance on programme planning and AWFP preparation, financial management, knowledge management and the development of the Programme's peace-sensitive M&E System. Guidance on the integration of peace concepts such as peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA), the Culture of Peace and the measurement of peace outcomes is also part of UNDP's capacity-building functions with the IPs. This has allowed for close and constant interaction between UNDP and the IPs, which is acknowledged by all as being beneficial to the smooth implementation of the programmes.

In the formulation of CPR programmes and projects, IPs, other related government agencies, CSO partners, and pertinent UN agencies participate in consultation processes to generate input and establish consensus on the overall programme design, which is embodied in a Project Document (ProDoc). A Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC), an *ad hoc* multisectoral body, is organized to review each new programme/ProDoc and provide inputs towards ensuring consistency with national goals and the MDGs, ownership, accountability and responsiveness of proposed programmes to national conditions. Towards attainment of the CPR Outcome, UNDP through the Programme IPs, partners with CSOs, the academe, LGUs and other local actors, who are Responsible Partners (RPs) in project implementation. This ensures direct participation of concerned sectors in finding solutions to issues and concerns that directly affect them, while increasing ownership and accountability.

Programmes under the CPR component collaborate with selected national and local government agencies (NEDA, DILG, NCIP, DSWD, DENR, and DepEd) in the areas of policy tool development, advocacy and peace constituency building, and enhancement local capacities for peace. For example, the CPPB Programme has supported and partnered with regional peace and development mechanisms, such as the KALAHI Regional Convergence Groups, in consolidating and pushing forward regional peace agenda. The partnership extends as well as to delivery of basic services to conflict affected communities.

UNDP's multisectoral partnership strategy is evident in the entire project management cycle. Annual assessments on project implementation involving programme partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries are held both at CPR and CPAP levels inform the annual work and financial planning process. Proposed annual workplans are subjected to review processes by Management Committees/MANCOM (for ARMM and non-ARMM areas respectively) in the case of GoP-UNMDP/ACT for Peace and submitted to the

⁴⁵ Adopted from Mid-Term Review for ACT for Peace, pages 29-30

Programme Coordinating Committee (PCC) in the case of the ACT for Peace programme and by the PEG (in the case of the CPPB), before these are submitted by the IPs for final approval by the Outcome Board. While the process may be driven by the consultation and consensus-building aspects of the UNDP partnership strategy, programme implementation partners point out that it is also tedious, time-consuming, and has hindered the timely implementation of annual workplans.

Various partners and stakeholders are also involved in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of CPR programmes, including programme donors as in the case of GoP-UNMDP/ACT for Peace, the IDP Programme and the Lake Lanao Project. The partnership strategy of stakeholder-beneficiary-donor involvement in M&E is most pronounced in the ACT for Peace programme. Because all have been involved in the formulation and validation processes in crafting the M&E system, and because there is a high degree of beneficiary-partner participation in the monitoring processes, M&E has become both a management tool and a capacity-building exercise, and is thus a major contributing factor to progress towards the CPR Outcome focus on better equipping key actors in managing conflict and building peace and human security.

Partnership-building for peace advocacy and expansion of the peace constituency is apparent in all CPR programmes. At the national level, UNDP through the CPPB programme has partnered with the Waging Peace Network, an umbrella organization of CSOs and NGOs and local peace advocates for network and constituency building. An annual “*Waging Peace in the Philippines*” conference involving both the CSO/peace advocates network and government representatives serves as venue for the assessment of key peace and conflict issues and for exploring responses and possible collaboration towards addressing these issues. A “*Youth Waging Peace*” network has spun off from this initiative, as presented among the outputs in Section 3.

The UNDP partnership strategy for community empowerment, constituency-building and peace advocacy is most apparent at the local level in Mindanao, where a primary objective is to link marginalized communities to local governance processes and mechanisms. The core of the partnership on the ground is the PDC, around which alliances as well as external partnerships have been built in pursuit of local peace and development agenda. The ACT for Peace programme is designed to pursue this “bridging” initiative, where local peace and development plans are formulated through joint efforts of the PDCs and the LGUs in the Programme areas covered. Capacity-building is at the heart of this process, with PDAs often sharing both project management skills and perspectives/concepts on the development of conflict-sensitive local development plans. As such, PDAs, PDALs and alliances are central to peace constituency-building. Because they have gone through personal transformation processes (to which CPR Outcome interventions have contributed), they are well-equipped with capacities to organize and expand the Programme’s peace constituency, and in some cases, to mobilize additional resources to support community priorities.

In pursuing the CPR Outcome, partnership mechanisms for CSO-government collaboration, have been put in place at the barangay, municipal, provincial as well as regional levels. These are known as Peace and Development Technical Working Groups (PDTWGs) which serve as venue for multisectoral dialogue and participation in the crafting of local peace and development agenda in the areas covered by the CPR portfolio in Mindanao (referred to in Section 3). The PDTWGs are usually chaired by the local chief executives and in some cases co-chaired by the MNLF. The mechanism thus

serves as both peace mainstreaming and capacity-building tool, towards the sustainability of peace-building efforts even after the UNDP-supported programmes would have closed down. At the national level, CSOs have partnered with OPAPP in the implementation of various policy-related as well as community-based activities.

Crucial to the CPR component's partnership strategy is its relationship with the LGUs, as the sustaining mechanisms for peace and development interventions on the ground, who face the brunt of localized violent conflicts and are directly responsible for leading constituents towards their own peaceful, secure and prosperous environments. The partnership with the LGUs has included capacity building, coordination and resource sharing in the pursuit of peace and development agenda. The objective is for the LGUs to adopt conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting governance agenda, such as participatory and inclusive decision-making processes, preferential action for the disadvantaged and marginalized, attention to gender concerns, and regular venues for dialogue on key peace issues. LGUs generally integrate or mainstream conflict-sensitive governance either through Executive Orders or through local legislation to ascertain continuity even after their terms of office end. At the national level, OPAPP has partnered with LGUs in several regions towards capacity-building on the development of conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting plans and legislation.

Other aspects of the partnership strategy involve resource mobilization, accountability measures, and donor partnerships. UNDP partners with programme IPs in the identification and design of proposals for new or additional resources for CPR programmes, for which consultations with partners, stakeholders and beneficiaries are undertaken jointly (particularly for CPR programmes in Mindanao). While UNDP is the primary actor for resource mobilization, Programme IPs have participated in consultation processes on possible new resources for CPR programmes.

The twin strategies of engaging the MNLF and establishment of TWGs at the barangay, municipal and provincial levels strengthened ownership, accountability, collaboration and collective planning. It also helped strengthen linkages between LGUs and barangays as evidenced by the support given in the areas of policies (ordinances, executive orders), financial resources (budget, special funds), and human resources (appointed peace and development staff). The engagement of credible and acceptable responsible partners who at times also provide venues for dialogue and serve as mediators between communities and local governments and agencies, has likewise facilitated programme implementation. Finally, the consultative and participatory management mechanisms helped in programme responses to adjustments in programme management systems and processes introduced midstream in programme implementation.

Attainment of the CPR Outcome is likewise supported by UNDP's partnership with programme donors, not only in regard to obvious assistance in terms of programme funds and as members of the decision-making bodies of the Programme, but in the expertise and technical know-how that has been shared in enhancing capacities of IPs for conflict-sensitive programme management. This is particularly true of Australia, the biggest donor for the ACT for Peace programme, which fielded fielded M&E programming experts in the development of the Programme's M&E framework and system. UNDP has also partnered with other UN agencies, particularly ILO, FAO and UNFPA in the implementation of various components of the GoP-UNMDP. This was more pronounced in Phase 3 of the UNMDP, with each agency taking a lead role in the implementation of respective programme components. Under ACT for Peace, these UN

agencies are members of the Programme's governing bodies (Management Committee, Programme Coordination Committee), and in this context provide technical advice in their respective fields of expertise as needed.

What is lacking in the CPR partnership configuration is a strategy to engage the private sector, where there is a vast potential for support to peacebuilding, particularly in the areas of peace advocacy and education, as well as support to livelihoods and enterprise development in conflict-affected communities. Other partnership areas that need to be fully tapped are the regional and global network of UNDP for capacity-building, particularly in knowledge and experience-sharing with similarly-situated countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and a more pronounced partnership with the media for peace advocacy.

On the overall, the UNDP partnership strategy in pursuing the CPR Outcome has been effective in providing mechanisms and platforms for capacity-building, confidence-building between CSOs and government, participatory decision-making and ownership of programmes. The strategy has been tested in the areas covered by the GoP-UNMDP/ACT for Peace programme, where a good peace infrastructure has been established, comprising peace-building communities, advocates for peace and development, LGUs, and mechanisms/tools for peace advocacy and constituency-building, among others⁴⁶. Although this infrastructure would have resulted from the sum of all efforts in the areas covered, including LGU interventions, it is also the cumulative effect of good practices, lessons learned and partnerships built over 10 years of programme implementation. Over this implementation period, conflict management and peace-building capacities have been developed, enhanced and strengthened.

The challenge is how to concretely make contributions from this experience on the ground to the pursuit of the CPR Outcome at the national level. There have been obvious hurdles in this regard. First, the CPPB programme is but three years from the time of implementation at the time of this review. Second, there are considerably less financial resources, intended to support conflict prevention and peace-building on a national scale, covering policy development, capacity-building and assistance to conflict-affected communities. Partnerships do not have the benefit of 10 years gestation period, as in the case of the ACT for Peace programme. All of these are taking place in a national policy environment that, as pointed out in policy assessment papers mentioned earlier, presents many challenges to peace-building at this time. However, the practices and lessons learned from Mindanao can help inform partnership-building at the national level. Where the MNLF is the main non-government partner of the MDP/ACT for Peace Programme, CSOs and academe represent OPAPP's partners in the implementation of the CPPB programme. This is a relationship that entails continuing confidence and trust-building, given traditional antagonisms between CSOs and government. UNDP through the CPPB programme has provided a venue for government-CSO collaboration in peacebuilding, and will need to continue its "brokering" role as the partnership between the two sectors is strengthened. It should be noted that the dynamics of CSO-Government engagement was mentioned in the CPR Annual Review of 2006, which recommended that OPAPP strengthen its role as integrator of the peace process, to include agenda of CSOs and other partners in its peacebuilding efforts.

⁴⁶ Philippine Human Development Report, HDN and UNDP, 2005, page 49

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

This section shall present two sets of recommendations for the CPR. The first covers recommendations that are more programme-based (CPPB and ACT for Peace), while the second focuses on recommendations that address the larger milieu in which the CPR component operates.

4.1 Programmatic

a) Sustain community-based interventions by linking with relevant government agencies. Efforts in service/development delivery at community-level, particularly in PDCs and IP communities, should be geared towards greater coordination and convergence with the concerned national agencies and institutions. Mainstreaming of programme gains and interventions into existing similar initiatives of national government agencies will allow sustainability and follow-through. A mainstreaming plan covering all relevant programme interventions should be formulated.

b. Continue to build M&E for peace programmes. Strengthen baseline data gathering. For CPPB, conduct a peace/conflict analysis in areas where there is programme presence. This will generate necessary inputs towards more measurable indicators. Adopt the peace-based M&E framework developed by ACT for Peace, as necessary. For ACT for Peace, continue updates of the baseline information gathered in 2006, and make necessary adjustments/enhancements to the programme M&E framework as necessary. Continue efforts to share the framework with other development programmes in Mindanao.

c. Institutionalize risk management. CPR programmes and interventions operate in environments that are highly volatile and unpredictable. Change is being pursued in an environment that is itself constantly changing. For this reason, risk assessments and risk management plans are extremely important in moving towards attainment of CPR results/outcomes.

d. Establish mechanism/s to develop shared standards in project management among Programme implementers. Institutionalize a regular mechanism, possibly anchored by UNDP, for regular assessments, lessons-learning and experience-sharing among Implementing Agencies, aimed at consolidating and developing standards in project management.

e. Systematize learning and prioritize Knowledge Management (KM). UNDP has a lot to offer in terms of capacity-building and expertise in policy analysis. Its long years in Mindanao and its access to a vast global knowledge network can contribute immensely to capacity-building for peace in the Philippines. Mechanisms to institutionalize learning in UNDP CPR programming should be established: regular knowledge sessions should be held among programmes; documentation of lessons learned should be done on a continuing basis; roundtables can be held regularly amongst LCEs in conflict-affected areas; knowledge and experience sharing amongst other peace and development partners in Mindanao should be initiated by UNDP, and the UNDP policy assessments on Mindanao (as well as the entire country) should be resumed. KM can be the platform for UNDP to regain its leadership status in peace and development in the country. In the

less than two years before the end of the current CPAP cycle, KM should be prioritized and a KM plan for the CPR component should be formulated and implemented.

f. Strengthen government-CSO partnerships for peace. The attainment of peace requires multidimensional and complementary efforts. Peacebuilding requires both immediate action and long-term approaches that help address the roots of armed conflict. In the context of CPR programmes, institutional partnerships between government agencies and peace-centered civil society organizations should be strengthened and reinforced. Interface should be tightened so that interrelated objectives (for example, Human Security and Culture of Peace) are pursued with synergy and complementation.

g. Initiate collaboration and complementation for peace among UNDP CPAP components. Peace results from positive action and progress made on key governance, environmental and poverty issues. For this reason, and in order to maximize UNDP resources, UNDP should establish specific collaborative and complementary actions that all of its practice areas can take to contribute to peacebuilding. The UNDP Governance portfolio particularly should make contributions in the context of governance reforms towards sustainable peace. A strategic peacebuilding and conflict prevention support plan establishing points of collaboration, complementation and coordination among UNDP CPAP components/portfolios can be collectively formulated.

4.2 General Recommendations

a. Support the lobby for a legislated Peace Policy. The lobby for a legislated peace policy has been taking place for sometime now, starting with the Peace Bill filed by Senator Gregorio Honasan in the late '90s. Bills have been filed in both Houses of Congress to this effect, although often overtaken by legislative processes and needing to be re-filed. The PHDR of 2005 reiterates the need for a legislated national peace policy to address differences and inconsistencies in approaches to the peace process within and between government administrations. The CPR Component may consider going beyond its support of consultation processes in the crafting of the peace bill, and join in the public lobby for a legislated national peace policy.

b. Support the lobby for the permanent status of Implementing Agencies. By way of their creation through Executive Orders, OPAPP and MEDCo are institutionally vulnerable, always facing the threat of dissolution, an eventuality experienced by other agencies under the Office of the President. The fragile arrangement imperils long-term plans and the sustainability of the gains achieved thus far. Their present stature also limits operations. Structurally, OPAPP does not have regional presence. MEDCo, on the other hand, though recognized throughout Mindanao likewise faces uncertainties as to its continued existence. The MEDCo budget is miniscule, and it depends on funding sourced from donors to implement projects. OPAPP has continuously worked on peace policy, particularly in relation to peace negotiations, as it is mandated to do. Still, even in this respect, it is viewed as a small player with constricted influence. This is further magnified by its image among LGUs and communities, many of whom have a poor awareness of OPAPP's mandate or existence. This naturally reflects on the government's intent with regard to its peace and development agenda. A permanent status for the two agencies will facilitate the work that they do and provide consistency in the pursuit of long-term peace and development agenda.

Lobbying is a tedious process that requires financial resources, political savvy combined with factual information, and credible, non-threatening, and charismatic champions within the legislature but action in this regard is very important in the sustainability of the peace process, and will need the support of various influential sectors such as UNDP, as well as the general public.

Specific Recommendation: Support the preparation of a 2-3 year Strategic Lobby Plan for a legislated peace policy as well as the permanent status of OPAPP and MEDCo.

c. Increase the level of engagement in Luzon and Visayas. It is strategic that UNDP is the only development partner with a full peace building programme outside Mindanao. Its national presence is the main differentiation that makes it a more relevant and significant player. It sees peace beyond the borders of Mindanao. It will be difficult to up the ante in its current involvement and achievements in Mindanao, considering that other groups are already addressing all peace-related components.

In Luzon and Visayas, however, UNDP has room for bigger strides and potential for more impact. Though akin to the Mindanao context to a certain extent, issues are more straightforward and are cushioned from the compounding problems brought about by cultural/historical/tribal context and terrorism labeling. The issues require direct responses. Resource-based conflicts like mining, for example, demands policy development intervention. The dissimilarity from Mindanao context opens the door for creative and non-traditional approaches.

UNDP is enjoined to pursue a truly national presence in terms of wider area coverage and increased programmes and projects, thus enhancing its institutional and programme relevance as well as leadership in peace building.

Specific Recommendation: Come up with Expansion Plan in Luzon and Visayas, focused on responses to resource-based conflicts.

d. Engage the Private Sector. While UNDP CPR has an effective partnership strategy that has engaged relevant sectors, one important group that it has neglected to tap is the private sector or major businesses. As peace and development cuts across all sectors, private businesses are also affected, especially those that have interests in conflict-affected areas. Their perspective on the peace situation normally comes from the security sector, appreciation of which does not include human security. They may also be engaged in activities that have the potential to trigger conflict. Mining, for example, has become a double-edged industry. As companies embark on “responsible mining” (allowed and encouraged by the government), civil society and communities maintain continued opposition to large-scale mining. In the telecommunication industry, reports say that pay-offs to NPAs are common occurrences and being done regularly just to spare cell sites from bombing. At the end of the spectrum are companies, like Dole Philippines, that provide sub-contracting opportunities to communities for as long as peace is maintained.

The private sector’s competence in creating, managing and sustaining enterprises and the huge amounts allotted for corporate social responsibility are yet to be tapped by UNDP, particularly in the area of peace and development. It is important that they be drawn in, informed about the situation, the gains and the challenges being faced by

peace efforts to help determine the entry points and the role that they have the potential to play.

Specific Recommendation: Conduct a series of peace and development orientation sessions for business groups and associations (e.g. Makati Business Club, Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and Plan a Donors Forum.

e. Develop social marketing campaigns. The public's appreciation of the peace situation has always been conflict-driven. Media highlights the violence committed and the negative effects of war, creating false impressions on communities caught in conflict and reinforcing prejudice and intolerance.

Success stories are rare, more so the peace efforts being undertaken on the ground, such as the Peace and Development Communities of the CPR programme. There is a need to communicate these positive stories to the national level to influence public perceptions towards peace. UNDP must explore strategic channels to systematically share these gains and learning for wider consumption. A creative and well-planned social marketing campaign can assist to bring prominence the gains and challenges of peacebuilding, but beyond this, the social marketing campaign aims to change behaviours and build a critical mass for the general public to see both sides of the story: the continuing challenge posed by violence and the continuing contributions of peace and development work.

Specific Recommendation: Partner with progressive firms (e.g. EON, Campaigns and Grey) to craft the social marketing plan, part of which is to hold a National Peace Conference that highlights good practice from past and ongoing efforts, gains thus far, and challenges being faced.

f. Re-strategize economic development approaches. The general approach of UNDP's programmes to economic development is to support small, oftentimes start-up, livelihood projects. This is an initial step to provide the opportunities to earn for added income. There is no data available to determine the changes in income levels, but interviews with the communities reveal only nominal change, and only for individuals who succeed.

Micro-enterprises that are dependent on "community-markets" are less inclined to prosper, given meager disposable incomes and competing identical small enterprises. Communal ventures, such as cooperatives, tend to have higher rates of success, but scaling up continues to be a challenge and income remains static. These are two approaches with varying degree of success. On one hand, micro-enterprises (operated individually or communally) serve their purpose – contributory to subsistence and in jumpstarting economic activities, but restricting growth and prone to failure (consequently frustration). On the other hand, an industry-based approach is highly complex, requiring new sets of competence and considerable resources, though results are long lasting. But enterprise development as key strategy to sustained financial independence should move from addressing subsistence requirements to having higher disposable incomes.

Specific lessons can be learned from the seaweed project of the municipality of Payao supported by the ACT for Peace Programme, the first attempt to undertake an industry-based economic development approach. Payao is seaweed-abundant and the industry cannot cope with the needs of the market -- the law of supply and demand working well. To ascertain that the communities will earn, the project considers the whole chain of doing business: from raw material sourcing, storage, distribution, transport and marketing. In the process, middlemen are eliminated. Also, since this is resource-based, the communities are trained to become more responsible in maintaining the possible source of sustained livelihood.

Specific Recommendation: Formulate an overall economic development framework to guide programme-based economic initiatives that are sustainable, benefit larger numbers of people in the community, and while context-driven, incorporates tested developmental approaches to community-based enterprise.

g. Engage the youth for peacebuilding. Sustainability of peace efforts may be pursued through legislation, or well-crafted community development programmes, but a most critical factor in achieving a durable, lasting peace are the children of this and future generations. The CPR has done well by embarking on a peace education initiative that has included the establishment of Schools of Peace, the development of peace education modules, and the development of Implementing Rules and Regulations for the mainstreaming of the Culture of Peace in Philippine schools. All of these efforts have the participation and support of the Department of Education. In addition to this, however, it is necessary to engage the young people themselves in leading peace advocacy amongst their peers, and themselves practice the values of tolerance and the culture of peace towards long-term sustainable peace in and outside their communities.

Specific recommendation: Develop a youth-oriented peace advocacy plan, which includes the identification and engagement of role models and champions among them.

5.0 LESSONS LEARNED

a. The Importance of Data. In developing the CPR/peace and development outcomes, considerable amount of time was spent in consultations with different sectors to get their inputs. It seemed, however, that discussions were based on stock knowledge and experience of the peace situation, with insufficient attention to specific and validated information. The lack and absence of baselines impedes a full grasp of what has been accomplished and what still needs to be done. The difficulties of measuring peace results notwithstanding, it is still critical to anchor peace interventions on accurate and well-validated data.

b. Engagement and Buy-In of Key Actors from the Start of A Peace Intervention Helps to Achieve Peacebuilding Goals. Engaging the MNLF early on in the MDP/ACT for Peace Programme, and the LGUs as the Programme progressed promoted ownership and accountability and contributed to building trust and confidence among former antagonists, thus facilitating programme implementation.

c. Capacity-building for Peace Needs to be a Sustained and Continuing Process Involving Key Institutions. The job does not end with a set of people or communities that have acquired skills in conflict management and negotiations through training provided by peace-building programmes. Key institutions, referred to by the ACT for Peace Programme as “culture bearers”, such as the schools, religious institutions and the media need to be drawn into the continuing effort to build people’s capacities for peacebuilding. Public support is necessary when mindsets need to be transformed.

d. Collaboration and Convergence are Key to the Process of Peacebuilding. The success of peace initiatives cannot be attributed to a single peace effort. Not one can claim to have the better programme. The attainment of peace requires simultaneous action along parallel but interrelated paths. Not one sector is responsible for the improved peace conditions in a particular area. More often, an outcome is the result of the cumulative efforts of many players. Hence, despite the weak synergy of the different groups, peace appears to have an ingrained connective quality that bonds these initiatives. Peace triumphs are interconnected. An infrastructure project of one group supports the livelihood development of the other, which in turn is reinforced by marketing venture of another group. Successes invariably build on each other even in the absence of conscious harmonization. This gives more reason to promote convergence.

e. Good governance, including the pursuit of reforms, the fight against corruption, transparency and accountability forms the core of actions that prevent conflict in the first place by building citizens’ trust in government. Creating an enabling policy environment, building capacities for peace and helping to develop conflict-affected communities are but a few of the actions that need to be pursued to build peace.

AREAS FOR FUTURE PEACE and DEVELOPMENT WORK

In general, any future new directions for pursuing peace and development outcomes would benefit from a strong anchor on the thrusts that have been pursued in the ongoing CPAP cycle: policy development, capacity-building for peace and support to communities affected by armed conflict. These are processes that need long-term,

sustained action in order to impact effectively together towards sustainable peace and development. They should therefore continue to be pursued in the next CPAP cycle. The nexus of these three original CPR outcomes would be a strong peace constituency and infrastructure comprising an enabling policy environment for sustainable peace; a strong nationwide peace constituency; platforms and mechanisms for peaceful dialogue; skills and capacities across various sectors for peacebuilding, conflict management and resolution, and self-sufficient, peaceful communities that are actively participating in mainstream local governance.

At present, progress towards attainment of the CPR outcome is strongest at the community level, particularly in Mindanao. Future directions in the CPR component should learn from the Mindanao experience, but should continue to focus on **capacity-building for peace** especially for critical sectors in nationwide peacebuilding such as national policymakers and negotiators, the security sector and national line agencies. This thrust should help lay stronger ground for an enhanced policy environment for peacebuilding, but future CPR work in the policy arena should include support for a **rights and reform agenda** that would form the backbone of government peace policy. Capacity-building for peace should have an added and special focus on responses to **resource-based conflicts**, the management and resolution of conflicts arising from resource extraction and/or allocation. CPR should engage DENR, LGUs and the UNDP environment portfolio in this initiative. **LGUs will continue to be key to sustainable peace.** The CPR component should maintain, if not increase the level of capacity-building being undertaken for this sector.

In relation to strengthening a rights-based approach to implementation of CPR programmes, an essential area to be pursued should be **gender and peace**. CPR programmes have just started developing frameworks for programme responses to gender rights and welfare in the conflict setting, and will need to bring these to concrete action. In like manner, **peace education and advocacy** should be actively pursued as a key strategy for sustainability of peacebuilding and to target the youth as active participants in conflict transformation. The initial work being done in Schools of Peace in Mindanao should see replication in Luzon and Visayas, where teachers should also be involved in the development of context-sensitive peace education modules. **Strengthening the CSO constituency for peace** should be a continuing thrust of the CPR portfolio, given that CSOs are the constant element in peacebuilding and are critical to catalyzing peaceful change. Related to this, in the immediate term it is important for the CSO peace constituency to take advantage of platforms and opportunities for peacebuilding at the right time. Particularly The 2010 national elections provide opportunity for CSOs and peace advocates to advance the inclusion of key peace/conflict issues in the political platforms of potential candidates, and advocate for the consolidation of these issues into a coherent national government agenda for peace and development.

At the community level, there should now be a stronger focus on **scaling-up the work that is being done with the PDCs in Mindanao**, with a more pronounced link to local efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs by 2015. The CPR component has helped to build a highly-skilled group of peacebuilders and peacemakers at the ground level; capacities and strategies for community-based peacebuilding should now be systematically shared and applied outside of the CPR programme locus in Mindanao.

Finally it is reiterated that long-term, sustainable peace is very much interrelated with and dependent on good governance. The CPR component should establish **collaboration and partnerships with key governance institutions, including the legislature and the security sector**, towards strengthening dialogue processes with the peace constituency, and establishing support and participation in peace advocacy and promotion. Beyond its current focus on peacebuilding, the CPR component may consider supporting **platforms for political dialogue** among various actors in the conflicts, and thus assume a peacemaking dimension in its future peace and development work.

ANNEX A

List of People Interviewed and Schedule of Main Mission

People Interviewed

Karen Tanada, Gaston Z Ortigas –Peace Institute (GZO-PI) Executive Director
Jhecy Rebete, GZO-PI Program Officer
Joeven Reyes, Sulong CARHRIHL Head of Secretariat
Paz Bumogas, Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance
Leah Abines, DILG Region VII
Ligaya Lintawagan, Tugdaan Mangyan Center for Learning and Development- Manager
Muhammed Pepito Tiamson, MNLF
Dir. Eileen Jose, OPAPP- General Secretariat
Dir Romy Halabaso, OPAPP-Policy and Programs Development Office
Dir Rollie Asuncion, OPAPP- Peace Institutions Development Office
Evelyn Florina Daplas, OPAPP Assistant Secretary and CPPB Programme National Programme Director
Mylene Rivera, Bahrain-Funded Project Manager
Ben Abadiano, Assisi Foundation & Ilawan Inc.
Dr. Ruth Rico, University of the Philippines-Philippine Social Science Council
Ruben Gamala, UP Visayas Foundation Inc. (UPVFI)
Fr. Rolex Nueva, Social Action Director, Diocese of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental
Col. Cesar Yano, Commander of 302nd Infantry Brigade
Lulu Tison, Paghiliusa sa Paghidaet Negros (PsPN) Project Coordinator
Livino Duran, DENR Provincial Director for Negros Occidental
Josephine Altura, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator in Rosario, Batangas
Janet Lopez, MEDCO Executive Director
Diosita Andot, ACT for Peace Programme Manager
Pio Fuentes, CPPB Programme Manager
Rodolfo Alonday, UNDP Programme Assistant
Sergio Villena, UNDP Programme Associate
Alma Evangelista, UNDP Portfolio Manager

Focus Group Discussions Conducted/Participants

1. Barangay Leon, Tacuyong (UPVFI Project)

Jose Cabangbang
Pablo Camiros
Nestor Candelada
Flordeliz Candelada
Estela Camandono
Nicomedes Caletina
Expedito Cahilso
Richard Caldito
Antonio Capirayan

Nenita Capirayan
Mildred
Camano

2. Bacolod City (PsPN Project)

Gil Portillo
Noel Famillaran
Merlinda Garbosa
Dante Caparida
Tomas Tingson
Geofrey Caminade
Glenda Grande
Fred Carma
Pedrito Disol
Malut Samson

3. Barangay Popoyon, Tulumun, North Cotabato (ACT for Peace)

Led by Barangay Captain Wilfredo Billones

4. Barangay Natutungan, Matalam, North Cotabato (ACT for Peace)

Led by Barangay Captain Israel Balah

Schedule of Main Mission

No.	Date	Activity	Destination/ Venue
1	05 – 09 May	Review of project documents and reports and drafting of the outcome evaluation design incorporating key activities and evaluation strategies/ methodologies, among others	
2	07 May	Consultation/Discussion with: ▪ CPPB PMO Consultation/Discussion on the Outcome Evaluation Itinerary ▪ CPPB PMO ▪ UNDP	CPPB PMO, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
3	09 May	Consultation/Discussion with CPPB Programme partner ▪ Gaston Z. Ortigas – Peace Institute (GZO-PI)	GZO Office

No.	Date	Activity	Destination/ Venue
4	12 May 10:00 am 10:00 am	GenSec/ Dir. Eileen Jose Sulong CARHIHL	OPAPP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City Sulong Office, 24-E Malingap St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City
5	13 May 10:15 am 11:00 2:00 pm	Consultation/ Discussion with: OPAPP Implementing Units (PIMO/PIDO/PPDO) ▪ PPDO/ Dir Romy Halabaso ▪ PIDO/ Dir Rollie Asuncion Bahrain Project/ Ms Mylene Rivera	OPAPP, Pasig City Makati City
6	14 May 10:00 am 2:30 pm 3:00 pm	Consultations/Discussions with: OPAPP/ ASec Evelyn Florina Daplas ADFI & Ilawan/ Mr Ben Abadiano PSSC – Dr. Ruth Rico	OPAPP Office 5F Prestige Towers, Emerald Ave., Ortigas Center, Pasig City UP Political Science Dept., Faculty Room 3139
7	15 May 12:00 nn 6:00 pm	Consultations/ Discussions with: CCAGG/ Ms Paz Bumogas DILG Region VII/ Ms Leah Abines	Legend Villas
8	16 May 5:10 am 8:00 9:30 12:00 pm 2:00 3:00 7:00	Consultations/Discussions Manila to Iloilo (PAL) Iloilo to Tacuyong, Leon FGD with Project Participants Lunch KII with Municipal Mayor and PNP FGD with UPVFI and Local Church KII with Ruben Gamala, Project Manager	Leon, Iloilo
9	17 May 6:00 am 7:30 10:00 2:00 pm 5:00	Consultations/Discussions Iloilo to Bacolod (Super CAT) Bacolod to Tanhay, 302 nd Brigade AFP Attend the meeting between the military and community leaders in Negros KII with 302rd Brigade CO, Col. Cesar Yano KII with Fr. Rolex Nueva, Social Action Director, Diocese of Kabankalan	In Negros Occidental
10	18 May 8:30 am 1:00 pm 3:00 6:40	FGD with CPPB-PsPN Claimholders (community leaders) KII with Lulu Tison, Project Coordinator KII with Mr. Duran, DENR Provincial Director Bacolod to Manila	In Negros Occidental

No.	Date	Activity	Destination/ Venue
11	17 May 4:00 am 6:30 7:30 9:00 10:30 1:30 pm 3:00	Manila to Batangas, Pier Batangas to Mindoro Pier Mindoro to Naujan KII with CO of Military Detachment FGD with Barangay LGUs, Samahan ng Mangyan sa Naujan (SANAMA), Mangyan Mission FGD with Ilawan/ Mangyan Project Claimholders KII with Tugdaan Manager & Principal/ Ms Ligaya Lintawagan	In Paitan, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
12	19 May 4:30 am 9:00 3:00pm 4:30 9:35	Manila to Davao Consultations/Discussions with Claimholders: Site Visit to 2 A4P Programme PDCs Consultations/Discussions with: ▪ MEDCo/ Ms Janet Lopez ▪ A4P PMO/ Ms Jojo Andot Davao to Manila	In Davao
13	21 May 10:00	Consultations/discussions with: Rosario, Batangas LGU Officials	Rosario, Batangas
14	26 May	Validation Workshop ▪ OPAPP/ CPPB PMO-PMT ○ ASec Evelyn Florina Daplas ○ Mr Pablo Rey Pio Fuentes ▪ MEDCo/ A4P PMO ○ Ms Janet Lopez ○ Ms Jojo Andot ▪ UNDP ○ Ms Alma Evangelista ▪ Outcome Evaluation Team ○ Mr Eric Barro ○ Ms Marie Labajo	OPAPP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City
15	29 May	Presentation/submission of findings/ evaluation results	
16	30 May – 02 June	Integration of comments and clarifications	
17	03 June	Submission of final report	

ANNEX B

Terms of Reference of the CRP Outcome Evaluation

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the UNDP-Philippines Country Office Outcome Evaluation Plan, an outcome evaluation of the Peace and Development (P&D)/ Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) Component outcome of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) will take place within the first half of 2008.

This evaluation will coincide with/ build on the ongoing mid-term review (MTR) of the ACT for Peace Programme under the P&D Portfolio. The findings/ results and recommendations of the ACT for Peace Programme MTR will contribute to this larger Outcome Evaluation of the P&D Component.

The P&D Component Outcome Evaluation will be guided by the “Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators” of the UNDP Evaluation Office, and will serve to inform the development of the next UNDP Philippines - Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for 2010-2014.

An independent evaluator will be engaged to conduct this Outcome Evaluation.

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The objective of this evaluation is to clearly establish progress towards the envisaged outcome of the P&D Component: “By 2009, the level of violent conflict has been reduced, and human security and the culture of peace have been promoted nationwide”. In line with the “Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators”, the Outcome Evaluation should be able to:

- a) Ascertain the status of the P&D outcome
- b) Examine the factors affecting the P&D outcome
- c) Assess the contribution of UNDP P&D Component to the outcome
- d) Assess partnerships for changing the outcome

This Outcome Evaluation will cover the programs/projects implemented by the Portfolio during the CPAP Cycle 2005-2009. These are:

- a) Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Programme (ongoing);
- b) ACT for Peace Programme (ongoing);
- c) Rehabilitating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Communities in Southern Philippines (operationally and financially closed); and
- d) Support to the Development of Pilot Muslim Communities in the Philippines (operationally closed).

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REVIEWER

The assessment and recommendation of the outcome evaluator must be anchored on the following:

On ascertaining the status of the outcome

- Review of the information from the P&D Component gathered through monitoring and reporting on the outcome

- Review of contextual information including data/information and baselines contained in project documents, the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), the UN Development Assistance Framework, among others
- Validation of information about the status of the outcome that is culled from contextual sources such as the Results and Resources Framework (RRF) and monitoring reports and from interviews of key informants, focused group discussions and site validation visit reports
- Probe of pre-selected outcome indicators
- Conduct of a constructive critique of the outcome formulation

On examining the factors affecting the outcome

- Use of data collection and analysis undertaken by the P&D Component prior to this outcome evaluation
- Identification of major contributing factors that drive change to the outcome
- Examination of local sources of knowledge about factors influencing the outcome
- Determination of the issue of P&D Component interventions having an unintended effect or not having the intended effect

On Assessing the contribution of the P&D Component to the outcome

- Determination of whether or not the P&D strategy and management of the P&D operations appears to be coherently focused on change at the outcome level
- Examination of whether the P&D's in-house planning and management of different interventions has been aligned to exploit synergies in contributing to outcome
- Determination of whether or not individual outputs are effective in contributing to outcomes (drawing the link between UNDP outputs and outcome)

On Assessing the partnerships for changing the outcome

- Determination of whether or not there is consensus among P&D actors, stakeholders and partners that the partnership strategy designed was the best one to achieve the outcome
- Assessment of how the partnerships were formed and how they performed
- Examination of how the partnership strategy affected the achievement of or progress towards the outcome

COMPETENCIES AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE REVIEWER

The outcome evaluator must have the following qualifications:

1. Reputable background in programming, monitoring and evaluation for the specific programme or practice area to be reviewed.
2. Knowledge of Philippine peace and development process and experience.
3. Knowledge of the P&D interventions' accomplishments, issues, and achieved results.
4. Experience in results-based Monitoring and Evaluation.
5. Previous experience in monitoring and evaluating programmes falling within the UNDP practice areas an advantage.

EXPECTED OUTPUT

The output expected for this exercise is a document establishing progress towards outcome of the P&D component of the 2005-2009 CPAP, including recommendations for future programming among others, and lessons learnt. The report follows the prescribed UNDP Evaluation Office's format (please see Annex 1).

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The day-to-day work of the outcome evaluator will be managed by the P&D/CPR Unit of the UNDP Philippines including coordination with P&D Implementing Partners (IPs) in terms of data requirements, schedule of meetings and deadlines. The P&D/CPR Unit will make available relevant project documents, reports, proceedings/documentations, etc.

TIMEFRAME OF ENGAGEMENT

The evaluator shall be engaged for a period of twenty two (22) working days from 08 May 2008 to 06 June 2008.

Timeframe	Major Tasks/ Activities
08 May – 15 May	Review of project documents and reports and drafting of outcome evaluation design
16 May	Conduct of Inception Workshop
19 May – 26 May	Conduct of site visits
27 May – 02 June	Review/analysis of data/info including preparation of draft report
03 June	Presentation of draft report findings and recommendations
04 June – 05 June	Integration of comments and clarifications
06 June	Submission of Final Report

ANNEX C

Suggested Outline of the Outcome Evaluation Report from UNDP Evaluation Office

This is a sample outline for an outcome evaluation report. It does not follow a prescribed format but simply presents one way to organize the information. Project evaluations should employ a similar structure and emphasize results, although they may differ somewhat in terms of scope and substance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- What is the context and purpose of the outcome evaluation?
- What are the main findings and conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned?

INTRODUCTION

- Why was the outcome selected for evaluation? (refer back to the rationale for including this outcome in the evaluation plan at the beginning of the P&D Component of the Country Programme Action Plan)
- What is the purpose of the outcome evaluation? Is there any special reason why the evaluation is being done at this point in time? (is this an early, mid-term or late evaluation of the P&D Component of the CPAP)
- What products are expected from the evaluation? (should be stated in TOR)
- How will the evaluation results be used? (should be stated in TOR)
- What are the key issues addressed by the evaluation? (should be stated in the TOR)
- What was the methodology used for the evaluation? (should be stated in the TOR)
- What is the structure of the evaluation report? (how the content will be organized in the report)

THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

- When and why did the P&D Component begin working towards this outcome and for how long has it been doing so? What are the problems that the outcome is expected to address?
- Who are the key partners for the outcome? The main stakeholders? The expected beneficiaries?

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings and conclusions of the evaluation report should reflect the scope presented in the TOR. There should be some flexibility for the reviewer to include new issues that arise during the course of the evaluation. The findings and conclusions in the report will take their lead from the nature of the exercise. If the purpose of the outcome evaluation was to learn about the partnership strategy, the findings and recommendations may address issues of partnership more than the other elements listed below. If the purpose was for mid-course adjustments to outputs produced by the P&D Component, the report findings and conclusions might give some more emphasis to issues related to the P&D's contribution to the outcomes via outputs. The section on findings and conclusions should include the **ratings** assigned by the reviewer to the outcome, outputs and, if relevant, to the sustainability and relevance of the outcome.

The following questions are typical of those that must be answered by the findings and conclusions section of an outcome evaluation. They reflect the four categories of analysis.

1. Status of the outcome

- Has the outcome been achieved or have progress been made towards its achievement?
- Was the outcome selected relevant given the country context and needs, and UNDP P&D's niche? (Presumably, if the outcome is within the RRF it is relevant; however, the outcome evaluation should verify this assumption.)

2. Factors affecting the outcome

- What factors (political, sociological, economic, etc.) have affected the outcome, either positively or negatively?
- How have these factors limited or facilitated progress towards the outcome?

3. P&D contributions to the outcome through outputs

- What were the key outputs produced by UNDP that contributed to the outcome (including outputs produced by "soft" and hard assistance)?
- Were the outputs produced by the P&D Component relevant to the outcome?
- What were the quantity, quality and timeliness of outputs? What factors impeded or facilitated the production of such outputs?
- How well did the P&D Component use its resources to produce target outputs?
- Were the monitoring and evaluation indicators appropriate to link outputs to outcomes or is there a need to establish or improve these indicators?
- Did the P&D Component have an effect on the outcome directly through "soft" assistance (e.g., policy advice, dialogue, advocacy and brokerage) that may not have translated into clearly identifiable outputs or may have predated P&D's full-fledged involvement in the outcome? (For example, was policy advice delivered by P&D advisors over the course of several years on the advisability of reforming the public service delivery system and on the various options available? Could this have laid the groundwork for reform that subsequently occurred?)

4. P&D partnership strategy

- What was the partnership strategy used by P&D in pursuing the outcome and was it effective?
- Were partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries of P&D assistance involved in the design of P&D interventions in the outcome area? If yes, what were the nature and extent of their participation? If no, why not?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Flowing from the discussion above, the section on recommendations should answer the following question:

- What corrective actions are recommended for the new, ongoing or future P&D work in the outcome?

LESSONS LEARNED


- What are the main lessons that can be drawn from the outcome experience that may have generic application?
- What are the best and worst practices in designing, undertaking, monitoring and evaluating outputs, activities and partnerships around the outcome?

ANNEXES

Annexes are to include the following: TOR, itinerary and list of persons interviewed and FGDs conducted, summary of field visits, questionnaire used and summary of results, list of documents reviewed and any other relevant material.

ANNEX D

Evolution of CPR Portfolio and UNDP Peace Interventions



ANNEX E. CPR Revised Results Framework

Outcome Indicators	Outputs	Output Indicators
CPR Outcome: Key actors are better able to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to build peace and human security		
1: Percentage increase in human security index	Output 1: Human security based national comprehensive peace plan promoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Human Security is mainstreamed in Chapter 14 of the MTPDP; No. of government officials who champion human security; No. of agencies that have conflict-sensitive and peace promoting plans
	Output 2: Improved professionalism, efficiency and respect for humans rights, gender and cultural sensitivity supported among security sector institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of improved security sector performance based on the Security Sector Reform Index
	Output 3: Peace and human rights and human security promoted through participatory policy making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of policies developed/enhanced and issued that promote peace, human rights and <i>human</i> security; No. of CSOs involved in policy making for peace, human rights and human security; No. of CSOs declaring support for peace, human rights and human security policies
2: Number of government-civil society joint peace initiatives	Output 7: More citizens or groups support conflict transformation and peace building for human security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of groups mobilized for conflict transformation and peace building for human security; No. of young people mobilized for conflict transformation and peace building for human security; No. of initiatives to reduce proliferation of loose firearms;
3: Number of conflicts peacefully settled / Number of conflicts averted/resolved ¹	Output 3: Peace and human rights and human security promoted through participatory policy making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of policies developed/enhanced and issued that promote peace, human rights and <i>human</i> security; No. of CSOs involved in policy making for peace, human rights and human security; No. of CSOs declaring support for peace, human rights and human security policies
	Output 4: Conflict sensitive and peace promoting planning and legislation mainstreamed in local governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of local governments with conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting plans and policies

¹ For the purpose of this matrix, these two outcome indicators have been collapsed as they appear to be connected

Outcome Indicators	Outputs	Output Indicators
	Output 6: Effective mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and for peace building especially indigenous and innovative peace building installed or harnessed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of mechanisms installed or harnessed for conflict transformation, healing and peace building for human security; No. of government – CSO engagement for conflict transformation and peace building for human security; Evidence of conflicts prevented, managed or resolved;
4: Percentage increase in participation in peace building	Output 5: Government, CSOs and other parties to conflict have stronger capacities in conflict prevention, management and resolution and for peace building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of government personnel, CSOs and other parties to conflicts knowledgeable and skilled in conflict prevention, management and resolution; Evidence of conflict prevention, management and resolution processes and practices in government and civil society organizations
5: Percentage increase to access to basic services	Output 8: Basic services and livelihood support provided to conflict affected areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of residents of conflict-affected communities, especially vulnerable groups such as women and children, that availed of socio-economic projects in pursuance of conflict prevention and peace building
6: Percentage increase in participation in local governance institutions and processes	Output 9: Women and men members of conflict affected communities, including former combatants, participate in governance processes and mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of conflict-affected communities whose members are involved in consultations, local development planning, local special bodies, etc.; No. of barangay/municipal council resolutions or manifestos recognizing/ endorsing community-based peace initiatives;
7: Percentage increase in the average income of families in conflict affected communities	Output 8: Basic services and livelihood support provided to conflict affected areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No. of residents of conflict-affected communities, especially vulnerable groups such as women and children, that availed of socio-economic projects in pursuance of conflict prevention and peace building

ANNEX F. Progress Towards Outcome: A Peacebuilding Perspective

Dimensions of Change	Capacities/Peace Values Developed	Strategies/ Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
<p><u>Personal</u></p> <p>Changes in knowledge, skills, attitude and behavior of each person</p> <p><i>Violent conflict changes individuals psychologically, emotionally and spiritually</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deeper appreciation of basic human rights and welfare, culture of peace ▪ Skills in conflict management, mediation and resolution ▪ From fear of others to trust in others, particularly increased trust and confidence in the government ▪ Greater tolerance for different perspectives 	<p>Training; workshops; promotion of interfaith, inter-ethnic dialogue; manuals</p> <p>Former combatants; communities; academe; government, LGUs; CSOs, general public</p>	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. The shifts in mindsets among MNLF combatants from a combat/defense orientation to peace and development advocacy is evident among the PDAs in the PDCs where CPR programme interventions have included empowerment and confidence building approaches as well as hands on planning and implementation of development activities . (from A4P M&E, MDP3 evaluation)</p> <p>PDAs, CSOs and have formed Peace Core Groups and are championing peace advocacy in their respective and neighboring communities, and in their respective line of work (A4P mid-term progress report).</p> <p>LCEs, MNLF members, government agencies are championing peacebuilding and conflict prevention and have acquired knowledge and skills in conflict prevention, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, and, conflict-sensitive planning among others (annual progress reports)</p> <p>Results of cross-cutting interventions contributed to personal transformation with 700 PDAs/Peace Core Groups advocating and supporting the implementation of their local peace agenda (MTR); and</p> <p>1164 peace advocates within local government working for a more peace promoting policies, planning and allocating funds for local peacebuilding initiatives (MTR).</p>
<p><u>Relational</u></p> <p>Changes in communication patterns between and among individuals and groups</p> <p><i>Violent conflict changes communication patterns, creates stereotypes,</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ From adversaries to partners in managing conflict ▪ From fragmented to socially cohesive community of diverse ethnicities ▪ From “exclusivity” to “inclusiveness” of different groups in 	<p>Training; workshops; promotion of interfaith, inter-ethnic dialogue; manuals & toolkits</p> <p>Former combatants; communities; IDPs;</p>	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. CPR programme interventions have transformed relationships among former antagonists, and support the rebuilding of social cohesion in communities affected or highly vulnerable to conflict (A4P M&E document). Confidence and capacity building interventions of duty bearers (government, civil society) and claimholders (MNLF members, internally displaced persons) has spurred collective action and positive engagement among diverse groups.</p> <p>Some 246 Peace and Development Communities in Mindanao (A4P Mid-term progress report) and 8 conflict affected areas in Luzon and Visayas</p>

Dimensions of Change	Capacities/Peace Values Developed	Strategies/ Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
<i>increases polarization and decreases trust</i>	community activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> From discouraging to encouraging women participation 	youth; women; academe; government, LGUs; CSOs, peace networks; general public	(2007 SPR) serve as fulcrum for CPR assistance in partnership with duty bearers. Concrete changes in the relationships between former antagonists, which also feed into structural or institutional change, are manifested in the election of 12 MNLF/PDAs into municipal or barangay positions; 16 Provincial and 62 Municipal Technical Working Groups co-chaired by the local chief executives and MNLF state chairmen; 34 Barangay Peace-based Development Plans are integrated in municipal and provincial plans; replication of the PDC framework and processes in 39 other communities in Mindanao (A4P mid-term progress report, MTR), and 77 disaster management and contingency plans formulated (IDP Eval)
<p><u>Structural/ Institutional</u></p> <p>Refer to changes in social conditions, procedural and institutional patterns</p> <p><i>Violent conflict impacts systems and structures at various levels (family, organizations, communities) – i.e., how relationships are organized, who has access to power.</i></p>	Conflict analysis; Peace and development plan formulation; Conflict-Sensitive and Peace-Promoting Community Development Plan- Executive Legislative Agenda (CDP-ELA) that promote transparency, equality, participation and access	PCIA; training workshops Local Government Units (provincial, city, municipal, barangay); LGU Planning offices;	<p>Substantial progress towards Outcome. Peace benefits institutionalized through various Executive Orders, Peace Units, Legislative Agreements and Financial Allocations attest to LGUs commitment to continue the initiatives even if UNDP assistance such as ACT for Peace phases out (MTR). According to the MTR, these attest to LGUs commitment to continue the initiatives even if UNDP assistance such as ACT for Peace phases out. These platforms and mechanisms have enabled participation in and access of marginalized groups to local governance processes. Capabilities for the management of development projects in post-conflict settings has been enhanced. New skill sets (e.g. peace organizing, Islamic leadership and governance, conflict-sensitive development planning) (A4P mid-term progress report) significantly contributed to reducing vulnerabilities of marginalized groups (MNLF members and their families, displaced families) through the access to basic services and livelihood opportunities including relief assistance, accompanied by culture of peace and conflict mediation interventions. (A4P mid-term progress report). It has significantly contributed to reducing their vulnerabilities (MNLF members and their families, displaced families). With continuing dialogues and capacity building interventions, communities facilitated for (A4P M&E):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wider access to potable water and health services resulting to reduction in incidence of water-borne diseases Increasing participation/transparency in local governance processes Establishment of conflict management mechanisms that recognize both indigenous and legal systems of handling conflicts

Dimensions of Change	Capacities/Peace Values Developed	Strategies/ Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
			<p>Placing premium on capacity and partnerships built among and between people and institutions, some of the instruments development through UNDP assistance are: 80 Executive and Legislative issuances to institutionalize peacebuilding mechanisms; 66 Local Special Bodies, and 373 Local Social Formations that support development activities in PDCs (MTR, A4P mid-term progress report). Sectoral peace networks among youth (NCR, CAR, Cebu, Bacolod, Naga, Bohol, Quezon, Tarlac), indigenous peoples (10 IP organizations in Luzon and Visayas), and media practitioners (MindaComNet, SOCSARGEN) have been consolidated to advocate their peace agenda (2007 SPR). In the integration of Culture of Peace (COP) in curriculums of 20 formal and non-formal School of Peace including the Mindanao State University's (MSU) (A4P mid-term progress report) and 3 IP communities in Luzon (2007 SPR).</p> <p>The Waging Peace Network consolidates and links peacebuilding initiatives on the ground and policy levels towards advancing a nationwide citizens' peace agenda (2007 SPR). CSO participated in crafting of National Peace Bill (House Bill 5767); development of indices on Security Sector Reform and Human Security in the Philippine context; and updated National Peace Plan being incorporated in the revised MTPDP. (2007 SPR)</p> <p>Partnerships forged by UNDP programmes facilitated pooling of resources of almost 10% from LGUs, complementation of efforts with ongoing interventions of government (OPAPP, MEDCo, NCIP, DILG, DepEd), LGUs, civil society (Assisi Foundation, UP-Third World Studies) and other development assistance (World Food Programme, LGSPA) as well as replication of good practices in other 38 areas, which broadened program reach and impact (2007 SPR, A4P mid-term progress report).</p> <p>UNDP assistance has significantly contributed to reducing vulnerabilities of marginalized groups (MNLF members and their families, displaced families) through the access to basic services and livelihood opportunities including relief assistance, accompanied by culture of peace and conflict mediation interventions. (A4P mid-term progress report) These inputs are instrumental in developing a sense of permanence (IDP Eval) and their improved well being as well as contributed to the decreased likelihood of a reoccurrence of armed conflict. (2006 CPR review).</p>

Dimensions of Change	Capacities/Peace Values Developed	Strategies/ Sectors or Groups Capacitated	Status of Outcome Attainment and Summary of Results
<p><u>Cultural</u></p> <p>Refer to changes in how meaning is constructed and shared by a group</p> <p><i>Violent conflict causes deep-seated cultural changes i.e., norms that guide patterns of behavior between men and women, how Muslims, IPs and Christians relate to each other.</i></p>	<p>CoP training; promotion of interfaith, interethnic dialogue; peace education</p>	<p>CoP training; module making</p> <p>Teachers; parents; DepEd officials; communities; former combatants; government officials; all other Programme stakeholders</p>	<p>Partial progress towards Outcome. Through ACT for Peace, 6 schools in Mindanao supported the development/integration of COP in the curriculum, conduct of series of teachers training as well as a putting up Schools of Peace and peace knowledge centers. (2007 SPR, A4P mid-term progress report)</p> <p>Continuing capacity-building activities in PDCs; among government officials/agencies/security sector; advocacy to promote the Culture of Peace (2006 and 2007 SPR, A4P midterm progress report)</p> <p>UNDP supported consultations processes and participated in efforts to finalize Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) on <i>institutionalizing Peace Education in the Schools</i> (Executive order 570) led by OPAPP with ACT for Peace and CPPB Programmes. (A4P mid-term progress report)</p>

ANNEX G. Peace Significance Matrix

Result	Theory of Change	Indicators	Peace Significance
Outcome 1 Transformation of PDCs, and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained; and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed;	Conflict-prone areas require complementing support to sustain their transformation into peaceful, resilient and developing communities; they are the peace constituents at the grassroots level and can influence other conflict-affected areas; their experience can be the foundation of peace-oriented policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No. of PDCs that have enhanced abilities to plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and address threats to human security ▪ No. of communities undergoing conflict transformation processes 	Rights-Based Approach at the Grassroots. Collective abilities of grassroots communities to plan, implement and sustain/adapt signal the exercise of rights and taking on of responsibilities, which are at the core of “transforming communities” Communities that have a stake in the transformation of their areas will seek and adapt to more effective ways of dealing with differences and conflicts, and of sustaining peaceful change
Outcome 2 Peacebuilding and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalized; and	Working with a larger base of local actors will strengthen responsiveness of duty bearers and civil society to the aspirations of conflict-affected communities; and strengthen local capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No. of LGUs and organizations that model practices, systems and structures in conflict transformation and peacebuilding ▪ No. of LGUs and organizations that have peace-promoting capacities, systems, processes and approaches 	LGUs and Rights-Based Approach. LGUs are the prime duty bearers at the local level. They are mandated to respond to the aspirations of constituents particularly vulnerable communities. LGUs can take the lead in the creation of an environment that is more favorable for sustained peace and development. Peace and Horizontal Relationships. Collaborative efforts of LGUs and other local stakeholders can strengthen relationships that are essential to peace and conflict transformation; and can provide the linkage between grassroots and top level peace actors
Outcome 3 Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are strengthened	Working with key institutions, particularly “culture bearers,” broaden peace constituency and nurture the environment for peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of improved interaction among peace networks, LGUs, government agencies, the security sector, MNLF, media, academe, private, and religious sectors in promoting peace and development 	Peace and Vertical Relationships. Key “top level” institutions (duty bearers, private sector, civil society and non-state actors) can provide policy and institutional support to local initiatives that build an overall positive environment for peace. Culture bearers (religious groups, schools and the media) play key roles in evolving and promoting a culture of peace to a larger audience which will broaden peace constituency and lead to generational change.

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