

Evaluation of the Climate Security Mechanism

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List of Abbreviations

CPAS	Comprehensive Performance Assessment System
CSM	Climate Security Mechanism
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
MPTFO	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UN DPO	United Nations Department of Peace Operations
UN DPPA	United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme



1. Executive Summary

Introduction

The effects of climate change are increasingly influencing risk behaviour as well as development pathways. Desertification and flooding, the increasing frequency of hurricanes, are some of the factors that can affect security and increase vulnerability. These climate related risks can have a disproportionate impact on women as well as on poor, vulnerable or marginalized populations. Climate change will exacerbate state fragility, fuel conflicts, and lead to displacement, migration and urban crises.

In 2018, a number of actors working with the United Nations (UN) in New York decided to create a unified workstream to harness analysis of the linkages between climate change and security, and to integrate these linkages into the UN's prevention, peacebuilding, and climate action work. This led to the creation of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM).

The evaluation covers the CSM's second phase, 2020-2022. It examines mainly the work of three UN entities: the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The UN Department of Peace Operations (UN DPO) is less directly covered, as it only formally joined the Mechanism in December 2021.

The method chosen for the evaluation was to apply the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's evaluation criteria¹ (forming the structure of the findings) through a focus on six case studies² and the use of broader evidence. Some 43 interviews were conducted with stakeholders that have been involved in the CSM across the world.

Profile and Positioning of the CSM

The CSM is supported through voluntary contributions and Junior Professional Officers from Member States, as well as through existing resources from the four participating entities. It is designed to support the integration of a climate security lens in the work of UN entities, in addition to partners outside the UN system. It operates as a threshold actor, in the sense that it bridges many professional communities and areas of UN work. It is the first of its kind at a global level.

The May 2022 Progress Report states that as of May 2022, a total of US\$ 12.5 million has been mobilised by the CSM since the first phase in 2018. The CSM Joint Steering Committee is composed of the four UN entities represented at principals and working levels, and the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (for administrative purposes). Donors are represented by five Member States: Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Germany, and Ireland. In-kind contributions were made by Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France and the Netherlands in the form of Junior Professional Officers.

There is an increasing realization of the importance of anticipatory and adaptation measures worldwide in response to climate change, including in security. The first explicit Security Council

¹ Relevance, sustainability, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact.

² 1. Knowledge Management and Generation, 2. Community of Practice and convening work, 3. Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, 4. UN Regional Office for Central Africa, 5. Sudan risk assessment and awareness raising, and 6. League of Arab States.

reference to climate security was an open debate in the Security Council in 2007 under the UK Presidency. The first time a formal Council outcome referenced the issue was the 2011 Presidential Statement under German Presidency. A Resolution was passed in 2017 concerning Lake Chad. Since then some 21 Security Council Resolutions have mentioned climate related security risks.

The work of the CSM fits well within a global current of engagement on climate change, peace and security. The active support of the Member States has provided the CSM with a unique role amongst UN entities, linking field-level projects and data, supporting deliberations linked to the Security Council.

Apart from knowledge products, newsletters and events, the CSM is engaged in field initiatives, which it reports on to Joint Steering Committee members. These are determined by the conduit by which the CSM is contacted, defined by four types of partners:

1. **Special Political Missions:** this includes the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS); the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA); the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for the Horn of Africa;
2. **Non-UN Regional Bodies and Multilateral Commissions:** the Liptako Gourma Authority, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the League of Arab States.
3. **Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams:** In Sudan, in Northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras), in Andean States (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru), in Somalia, in the Philippines.
4. **Peacekeeping Operations:** the first initiative has been the UN Mission in South Sudan. Conversations have been initiated with other UN peacekeeping operations, including in Mali.

Findings

Relevance and sustainability

The CSM has developed in a continuous manner since its creation in October 2018, growing to some twenty (dedicated combined staff at UNHQ and in the field, in addition to part time personnel as well as consultants). After what can be described as the codification of foundational knowledge, which took place during Phase I, during Phase II, it has developed a significant outreach capacity. Thanks to its position within the three or more recently four entities that compose it, it has responded in an articulate, measured and informed manner with a range of actors.

There are however warning signs that this responsiveness could become a liability as the Mechanism is touched by a critical mass of demand and needs. The intensified level of support from the core team in New York comes with a need for briefs required within a short timeframe of 1-2 weeks, while also defining possible prevention strategies. The deployment of analysts and consultants has in particular been difficult to do due to a limited pool of expertise. Personnel are extremely stretched, operating in many cases on own entity tasks as well as those required across many regions.

Coherence and Efficiency

While a significant level of engagement has been deployed, the conduits of information are primarily externally facing, while most of the management related content is exchanged in the course of meetings and via email. This creates a significant information management challenge to do justice to the depth and complexity of the domain and of the individual initiatives. The issue is further complicated by the natural challenge of differentiating between entity-specific information (which tends to remain internal) and CSM-specific information.

A particular concern relates to the decision making around the support given to one or the other initiative. Since single entities are able to draw on their own as well as CSM-wide resources, it is relatively difficult to differentiate internal funding decisions from CSM decisions. Similarly, the decisions by Member States to allocate funding to the MPTFO or to earmark them to specific

initiatives has made overall coherence more challenging. It is striking to see that there is only a loose sense of the criteria the CSM applies to selecting where to work with partners.

Effectiveness

The Theory of Change is articulated in clear, practical and feasible outputs and outcomes. However these are not always clearly linked in a cascade system with those of the field initiatives. This has allowed the Theory of Change to be valid in terms of the range of applications, and effective in creating a perimeter of intervention, but has weakened performance monitoring and reporting.

The quality of the work is of a good level across the board, underpinned by the conceptual tools and knowledge sharing of the CSM. The ability of the CSM to work remotely and tap into the resources that exist within each entity (for example UNEP deployment of hydrological modeling for UNSOM) have allowed the continued delivery of the outputs. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and procurement difficulties have often led to delays.

The CSM is finding it difficult to respond to the more recent requests formulated by its partners. They require more directly operational inputs – in other words more localized knowledge, directly applicable for positive measures to be implemented. The increasingly short reporting timeframes are compounded by a lack of templates and standardized methodologies.

Impact

The practice of conducting climate security risk assessments in areas relating to peace and human security are increasing. These assessments have maintained a cautious distance from statal security matters (which interlocutors tend to refer to as ‘hard security’) but the uptake, for example around humanitarian and development programmes in Sudan, is direct.

A significant constraint on the impact of the CSM relates to the risk aversion of many of the stakeholders. At a general level this related to the linkages between the main domains. While a climate finance study concentrated on the difficulty of engaging in investments in fragile and conflict affected countries, there is also a difficulty for many in bringing together the notion of security and climate. This has been expressed in interviews as caused in conversations and writing by dropping of the conjunction ‘and’ within ‘climate and security’, to the benefit of the easier to pronounce ‘climate security’. The analytical implication is that climate change should be considered for security purposes, rather than as a related risk to be taken into account.

The narrow donor base, and the limits to the degree to which members of the Security Council are reluctant to translate risk mitigation measures into concrete policy frameworks, are a considerable conundrum for the CSM. However, while broader engagement at the Security Council or Mission level remains an issue, the evaluation concludes that the principal challenge is turning broad concepts linking climate change and security into agile context-specific measures, and tracking outcomes.

Conclusion

From 2020 until now, the significant achievements of the CSM have been triggered by a high degree of dedication and responsiveness in the core team, and of senior entity personnel. It can also be traced to the drive of partners in the regional engagements, as well as the support of particular donors. There is an unmistakable global momentum to better address the security implications of climate related risk.

The current CSM infrastructure is solid but will soon be insufficient for this expansion, posing the risk of confusion and paralysis. There must be a renewed emphasis given to identifying climate and security linkages before intervention; and enhancing information management to ensure that the CSM intervenes effectively where those linkages are evident.

The principal tipping point now will be the CSM’s ability to turn broad concepts and policies around climate change and security into agile context-specific measures. The CSM must build a permanent staff at its core, with personnel dedicated to tracking outcomes in a revised and structured information

system. While there can be no assurance of an expansion of funding in Phase III, there are distinct opportunities for new sources of financing and new forms of cooperation.

Recommendations

1. *Preserve the nature of a Mechanism.*

- The Mechanism is a relevant design to be preserved so as to remain embedded in the New York peace and security environment.
- The Mechanism should not expand further the number of component entities beyond the current ones, and the current policies and objectives should be maintained.
- To prepare for Phase III the CSM team and stakeholders should engage in a planning process.

2. *Focus the brand and tighten the concept.*

- The Mechanism should adhere as closely as possible to its original inception name of 'Climate and Security'.
- To create important synergies the Mechanism should formalise the geographic and institutional scope of its initiatives.
- Climate and Security analysis should explore the concept of resilience, and also create linkages to the definition of the key risks and those to whom these risks apply.

3. *Strengthen the team.*

- The four entities should structure the Core Team into a clearly defined two-tier function, one focusing on information management, the other on the collegial resolution of problems.
- Personnel in New York (operations, working level) should be strengthened to align with the growing demand for time-sensitive knowledge.
- The judicious positioning of personnel outside New York is key to their ability to perform, while the expansion of the network of Climate Security Advisors is central to the development of the CSM.

4. *Become data driven.*

- By defining priority environmental and security components, the CSM should encourage the creation of a real time system of data collection, retrieval, storage and analysis.
- Monitoring and Evaluation should be simplified and assess performance by tracking outcomes in these defined areas of work.
- The CSM should develop a data management system and the creation of dashboards to enable decision making in a wide variety of countries and regions.

5. *Bring in new partners.*

- The CSM should create a standby consultancy capacity contract of a more interactive nature than the Climate Security Roster to cultivate expertise that bridges the climate and the security sphere.
- The CSM should work with intermediary bodies that can act as open data exchanges with other institutions dealing with risk and climate finance.
- The CSM should engage more actively with Member States which have previously not been amenable to the concept of climate and security through these intermediary bodies.

These findings and recommendations are further developed in the body of the text.

2. Introduction

2.1 Mandate of the Evaluation

The evaluation of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) Joint Programme is a performance review covering the period 2020-2022. This is the second phase of the Mechanism. It is titled “Strengthening Field Capacity to Address Climate-Related Security Risks” and ends in December 2022.

The evaluation examines the work of three United Nations (UN) entities: the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The UN Department of Peace Operations (UN DPO) is also covered, although it only joined the Mechanism in December 2021. The mechanism is ensured by a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) composed of Member State representatives from capitals and Missions to the UN, as well as the four CSM entities and the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO).

The study was commissioned to take place in July and August 2022, with the aim of preparing Phase III of the Mechanism, as well as informing the final stage of Phase II. Under the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) binding the different stakeholders, the planned end for Phase III is December 2025³. This evaluation is mandated by general UN fiduciary guidelines, and specifically by the bilateral donor agreements, but its aim is to provide a 360° analysis with a forward-looking focus.

Reflecting the nature of the planning and reporting for the CSM, the structure of the evaluation is intended to be a two-level one, and described in the Terms of Reference (ToR) as the following:

Level of analysis	Priority areas of work	CSM Outputs to which priority areas contribute
Tier 1	1. Supporting analysis and action in the field by providing technical advice to risk analysis and response strategies in frontline regions	Outputs 3 and 4
Tier 2	2. Strengthening partnerships and advocacy and convening relevant actors to promote appropriate action	Output 5
	3. Enhancing knowledge co-generation and management for policy support	Output 2
	4. Capacity building	Output 1

For each level the TOR propose that six evaluation criteria be applied, following the models of the UN Evaluation Group and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. This spells out, by responding to a number of evaluation questions, what has worked, what has not, enquiring as to the reasons for this performance, so as to facilitate the drawing of lessons and recommendations.

These criteria and evaluation questions are included in the Terms of Reference, but can be summarised in the following manner:

³ Amendment no. 1 (27 September 2021) between MPTFO and Participating UN Organisations (Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme).

1. **Relevance:** to what extent does the CSM align with the SDGs, defined needs, UN partner policies and demands?
2. **Coherence:** to what degree is the CSM learning from and compatible with other initiatives in this field of climate action and sustaining peace?
3. **Effectiveness:** to what extent have the intended outputs and outcomes been well defined and been achieved, with particular reference to gender equality and empowerment of marginalised groups?
4. **Efficiency:** to what extent has the funding and human resources allocated to the CSM achieved the maximum outputs and outcomes given the context?
5. **Sustainability:** to what extent have capacities been created, replicated, and what is the prospect of these assets in terms of funding and risk management?
6. **Impact:** to what extent has the CSM generated broader changes in UN inter-agency work and been catalytic? A specific request is made for indicators of impact for the future phase.

The evaluation process is intended to be consultative and learning oriented. It is intended to be providing feedback to the Joint Steering Committee in the final days of August, to inform strategic discussions in early September.

2.2 Methodology

The approach proposed for the evaluation has been to rely on the Monitoring and Evaluation system, both in terms of the status of current reporting and in terms of the potential for further elaboration (what would be viable and useful for an expanded Monitoring and Evaluation system). Special attention was given to the opportunities that exist to refine the CSM impact assessment framework, as emphasised by the CSM Core Team.

The evaluation sought the evidence behind individual indicators or narrative statements, but has not analysed expenditure. The efficiency analysis was done by examining whether alternative approaches exist to those currently employed, or whether waste could be avoided.

The evaluation applied a two-tier approach as proposed in the TOR: one focusing on advocacy, knowledge and capacity at the global level (the global line of analysis), and one focusing on the field applications (the local line of analysis).

This translates for each line into a particular methodology:

- ✓ **Global line of analysis:** is a qualitative assessment of the coordination and collaboration between key actors situated within the sphere of influence of the CSM, as called for by the Theory of Change of the CSM. This is analysed (1) in terms of progress achieved in coordination and collaboration – defined through respondents in interviews and new binding documents and processes; (2) in terms of the accessibility and utilisation of the products generated by the CSM in relation to the actors where such progress is registered. The logic is that the evidence of progress in creating a climate security regime should be linked to the performance of the products, or to events and discussions. This performance was tested by exploring the working hypotheses outlined further below in 3.3.

- ✓ **Local line of analysis:** in a first phase the evaluation sought to define for a sample of four case studies what the evidence of results specific to a particular initiative could be. This evidence was analysed (and clearly stated in the evaluation reporting) on the basis of (1) relevance, extent and duration of the exposure of a particular actor (or sub-set of actors) to the outputs of the CSM; (2) degree to which gender equality human rights and conflict sensitivity are applied to the outputs; (3) evidence of alignment of the outputs to the working hypotheses outlined below, which are themselves linked to evaluation criteria.

The evidence was collected by applying four specific working hypotheses to six case studies. The hypotheses were formulated so as to refer back to the evaluation questions formulated in the TOR. The case studies provided insights for what is implementation in time-bound and high data density environments.

The findings reflect the evidence from the case studies in a transversal manner – in other words while the text draws on the data generated by the cases, it does not single them out, and instead uses them to inform broader conclusions. The first line of analysis is given to intra-case analysis (criteria applied on the merits of each case), while a second line for the conclusions serves for inter-case analysis (recurrence and divergence across the cases and with other initiatives).

The interviews and the analysis of the documents proceeded on the basis of the following broad set of verifiable hypotheses, which are further reflected in the Findings section:

1. The outputs of the CSM encounter a specific need and demand amongst key actors in the fields relevant to the interaction between climate change and security. These needs and demands may not be explicitly stated, but correspond to foresight and mitigation measures or the capture of specific opportunities (this will respond to the relevance and sustainability criteria of the evaluation TOR in particular). Risks and capacities have been generated in a satisfactory manner to respond to these needs and demands.
2. If the CSM continues to expand in terms of funding, personnel and specific applications, this relies on the formulation of specific decision making and monitoring processes, and the formulation of benchmarks of capacity. These decision-making, monitoring and capacity markers are made explicit to all stakeholders while acknowledging the need for adaptiveness in the midst of a highly complex environment (this will respond to the efficiency criteria in particular).
3. The outputs are planned and delivered in a way that gives proper emphasis to complementarity, as well as quality and good project cycle management. While there is considerable diversity of outputs, these revolve around the CSM Toolbox (this will respond to the effectiveness criteria in particular) and implementation matches the original intent.
4. The outputs are 'gap bridging' and replicable at scale, and fit well into the longer term strategies of the stakeholders which will be hosting them. Risks to implementation and longevity have been well understood and transparently flagged, such as for example the centrifugal effect of labour intensive initiatives that risk losing a strategic impact (this will respond to the impact criteria).

The consultant conducted 43 semi-structured interviews remotely, and analysed all the relevant literature within the universe of case studies at the Global and the Local Levels.

The case studies, number six in total: two for the global line of analysis, and four for the local line of analysis. These were drawn from the previous typology, with an element of temporality, geographical and CSM entity balance:

1. Global line: Knowledge Management and Generation, including the climate finance events and publications.
2. Global line: The Community of Practice and convening work of CSM.
3. The support to the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa.
4. Support to the UN Regional Office for Central Africa.
5. Sudan: climate-related security risk assessment and awareness raising.
6. League of Arab States, addressing climate-related security risks in the region.

It must be pointed out that this case study evidence is non-exclusive. The evaluation also includes some contextualisation of the deployment of the Climate Security Adviser to the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan and to the UN Mission in Somalia and provides considerations of the Resident Coordinator's initiative in relation to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines.

2.3 Information Used

The evaluation finds that the CSM reporting is complete and material, but highly narrative, and concentrated mainly on outputs. While broader outcome and impact level evidence is proposed, this remains either specific to particular field initiatives (contained in project documents), or highly aspirational, and so difficult to measure. There are frequent references to growing interest which will need to be verified and weighed against other concerns in a fast-changing world.

The logical framework presented in the January 2020 to December 2025 Joint Programme is written in narrative form: the impact statement is that “negative impacts of climate change on peace and security are recognized, understood and addressed effectively by relevant stakeholders at all levels to ensure that states and societies possess the necessary capacities to manage, absorb and – where possible – benefit from the transformative processes brought on by climate change in a peaceful manner.” This would indicate a focus on policy and initiatives.

The outcome speaks primarily to UN actors and risk management: “Climate-related security risk dimensions are integrated into the work of UN development, climate change, and peace and security actors, including political analyses and prevention strategies as well as policy, planning and programming decisions.” This is hence only indirectly related to the work of non-UN actors, such as the League of Arab States. This points to the need to understand the outputs within the broader frame of climate-related security risks, helping to apply the climate security lens, and building on existing joint analysis.

Different types of reporting are reflected in the documents prepared for the different donors represented in the JSC. These are linked to overall CSM outputs, but these are themselves in many cases described as indicators of outcomes and impact. Even these outcome indicators remain focused on a single quantitative measurement which would require further qualification to serve adequately for an understanding of effects (for example: “Number of regional, sub-regional and national partners with increased understanding of climate security risks”).

Hence the evaluation must both rely on the CSM reporting but also needs to develop evidence from interviews and additional documents with which to form an evaluative judgement. This required some triangulation of secondary sources. A list of interviewees is presented in the Annex.

2.4 Analysis

The timeframe required for the evaluation implied a high degree of collaboration between CSM stakeholders and the evaluator, and an open access for documentation review and interviews. This has been forthcoming, and the evaluator found the evaluability not to contain significant limitations.

The evaluation proceeded over July and August with an intensive process of interviews and document reviews, punctuated by short informal briefings with the CSM team. Two additional Evaluation Briefs have been prepared for discussion at the end of the evaluation, offering greater depth on two areas adjacent to the CSM: (a) impact monitoring and evaluation options, and (b) partnerships with climate finance actors.

Considering the importance of consultation, the evaluation consultant followed the following reporting milestones:

- Two core team Briefings were held with the evaluator **on 28 July and 4 August**.
- On **Friday 12 August** key findings and recommendations were presented in a report.
- The final report was sent on **Friday 16 September to the CSM**.
- A **final Strategic Workshop** will be held in late September to review the way forward for the CSM.

The evaluation's recommendations are written with a view to serving as the basis for the consideration of strategic choices to be made by the CSM in the final months of 2022.

3. Analysis of the CSM

3.1 Profile of the Mechanism

The effects of climate change shape our geopolitical environment and will increasingly influence risk behaviour as well as development pathways and human security. For example, thawing permafrost and icecaps, desertification and flooding, the increasing frequency of hurricanes, are factors that can contribute to increased human insecurity and geostrategic competition.

These can lead to famine, floods, loss of land and livelihood, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls as well as on poor, vulnerable or marginalized populations, as well as potentially exacerbate state fragility, fuel conflicts, and lead to displacement, migration and urban crisis, creating conditions that can be exploited by state and non-state actors that threaten or challenge well-being and development pathways.


In 2018, UN DPPA, UNDP and UNEP, with support from Sweden, decided to create a unified workstream to harness information and analysis about the linkages between climate change and security, and to integrate this as a lens into the UN's prevention, peacebuilding, and adaptation work. UN DPO joined in December 2021. The CSM is supported through voluntary contributions and Junior Professional Officers from Member States as well as through existing resources from the four participating entities. It is designed to support the integration of a climate security lens in the work of UN entities, in addition to partners outside the UN system.

After initially relying on bilateral agreements, the main funding modality was moved to the UNDP-operated Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) to act as administrative agent. While maintaining the possibility for bilateral agreements, the governance of the funds was allocated to the Joint Steering Committee of donors, underpinned by a small UNDP hosted secretariat. The governance of the mechanism is enshrined within a core team with personnel both at Director and working levels.

The CSM has received funds⁴ through the MPTFO (total donor contributions received to date): Republic of Ireland: USD 920,680, Norway: USD 331,159, Sweden: USD 1,568,874, United Kingdom: USD 3,941,956. Targeted parallel funding: Germany: USD 994,400 (estimate), Sweden: USD 2,346,274, Norway: USD 997,447. Not all parallel funds were allocated to specific focus field initiatives, or allocated to specific regional initiatives. Additional grants are under consideration for the second half of 2022 and not included here.

The May 2022 Progress Report states that as of May 2022, a total of US\$ 12.5 million has been mobilised by the Climate Security Mechanism since the inception of the first phase of its work in 2018 (calculated using United Nations operational rates of exchange on the dates the respective transfers were made). The graph below shows estimated budget commitments by programmatic year up to 2022, highlighting both funding and in-kind contributions from Member State partners.

⁴ These are the UN recorded amounts as of July 2022.



Graph 1: CSM estimated budget commitments by programmatic year up to 2022 (US\$)

The composition of the CSM core team at the time of the evaluation includes a 2-person secretariat (a Programme Officer and Operations Associate), and three dedicated staff members, in addition to up to three Junior Professional Officers for DPPA, one for UNDP and one for UNEP - representing a total of 11 staff⁵. UN DPO are dedicating one part-time staff member and a part-time intern to the CSM core team. The Joint Steering Committee is composed of the four UN entities represented at principals and working levels, the MPTFO and five Member States: Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Germany, and Ireland. In kind contributions were made by Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France and Netherlands in the form of Junior Professional Officers.

3.2 Positioning of the Mechanism

The debate has moved quite far from what was conceived originally in a technocratic frame, starting from environmental and Disaster Risk Reduction analysis, and coming to address peace and the security sector with a climate lens, with the aim of ‘climate-proofing’ previously less connected sectors of initiative (peacekeeping, peacemaking, prevention, stabilization) that had been largely climate-blind. While mitigation measures, such as reducing the environmental footprint of peacekeeping operations, are still the first reflex of policy and decision makers, there is an increasing realization of the importance of anticipatory and adaptation measures. This is in great part triggered by the growing empirical evidence of climate change, including its effects on conflict behaviour. Earlier studies⁶ that showed that relatively little was known about how, when and why climate-related security risks were being addressed, or with what effects, are increasingly outdated.

⁵ It should be pointed out that UN DPO does not have dedicated staff nor dedicated Junior Professional Officers at headquarters as of August 2022 and UNDP only has had a Junior Professional Officer since January 2022. The CSM tasks are performed by relevant personnel on pre-established positions.

The link between climate change and security is now as well established as that between commercial investment and climate change. Globally, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors are now shifting the competitive landscape for business. When coupled with the increasing quantification of sustainability data and the number of companies setting net-zero targets, it has become materially crucial to align investments with a positive supply chain, production and product footprint.

The model of the Mechanism has coincided well with these shifts, combining analytical and experimental methods to foster more effective responses. The current CSM reporting framework is based on the following narrative two-level Theory of Change, where the pre-conditions would point to the need for specific outputs:

- If the traditional divides between the peace and security, human rights, and development pillars of the UN are bridged and relevant entities work in a more coordinated manner on the intersection of these different fields to collectively address climate-related security risks at multiple levels, and
- If UN entities, in particular at the field level, are provided with the necessary resources and capacity to expand existing efforts to analyze, understand and respond to climate-related security risks in an integrated fashion, and
- If strategic partnerships are formed with different actors beyond the UN system, with Member States, regional organizations, civil society, the growing external research community, and the private sector to foster awareness, collaboration and coordination, and
- If the evidence base of climate-related security impacts is strengthened and we have better gender-sensitive information on the pathways through which climate-related transformations interact with social, economic, demographic and political factors, and a better sense of which response strategies work and which do not work, and
- If diplomatic, advocacy and communications efforts help raise awareness among global, regional and national leaders and decision makers and succeed at sustaining the attention of political, policy and research communities, and if stakeholders are convened under UN auspices at regional, national and local levels to consider appropriate responses,
- Then, entities working on climate change, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development, and entities working on peace and security and conflict prevention will be better able to develop effective response strategies and policy and programming solutions to address climate-related security risks.

The work of the CSM fits within a broader current of consultation and engagement on the linkages between climate change, peace and security, supported informally by some of the diplomatic missions to the United Nations. These are increasingly structured as consultations and projects. This reflects the active role of some Member States in formulating the positioning and role of the CSM, in particular the early initiatives taken by Sweden, Norway and Germany. This provided the CSM with a unique role among UN entities, linking field-level projects and data to a wider circle of deliberations around the Security Council.

It is worth mentioning in particular the Germany and Nauru co-founded Group of Friends on Climate and Security, on which the CSM and the International Committee of the Red Cross are permanent observers. There is also an Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security.

⁶ For example Dellmuth, L. et al., 'Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the research agenda', WIREs Climate Change, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018).

In 2019, the Climate Security Expert Network was launched as a hub for research on the linkages between climate and security. The Berlin-based think-tank, adelphi, serves as the Secretariat for the Network. It launched, in particular, the Weathering Risk Peace Pillar to pilot and evaluate peace programmes which integrate climate-security risk analysis across a range of different geographic contexts and conflict types. Its Peace Pillar contributes scientific evidence from operational programming experience and rigorous impact assessments.

In 2020, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)⁷ and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (known by the acronym NUPI) initiated the Climate-related Peace and Security Risk project, a three-year initiative funded by the Norwegian government that assesses climate-related security and development risks in certain cases on the Security Council's agenda. This was begun during Sweden's Security Council tenure, in close proximity to the CSM. This is translated into CSM attendance at meetings, exchanges and collaboration on fact sheets, as well as the broadening of the research community to the global east and the south.

A considerable effort has been delivered within UN entities across the Humanitarian – Development – Peace continuum, reflecting the role of the CSM as a convening platform and a common reference point for stakeholders across and beyond the UN. An informal interagency Community of Practice on Climate Security now counts more than three hundred members drawn from more than thirty United Nations entities. The CSM also provides analytical considerations to United Nations System-wide analytical and planning processes, including Common Country Analyses, Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and Integrated Strategic Frameworks.

The Security Council has also historically debated the thematic security threat posed by climate change, even before the Conference of the Parties/Paris Agreement. The first explicit Security Council reference to climate security was an open debate in the Security Council in 2007 under the UK Presidency. The first time a formal Council outcome referenced the issue was the 2011 Presidential Statement⁸ under German Presidency. A Resolution was passed in 2017 concerning Lake Chad. Regional and sub-regional organisations are strengthening their engagement in this area (the African Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development would deserve particular mention). The League of Arab States is developing a White Paper on Climate Change and Security to be launched in 2022. In June 2018, a high-level international meeting was convened where the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini declared that: "Sustainable peace needs climate action."

However, it is difficult to define the future course of UN Security Council engagement on climate and security, which some Member States see as belonging firmly in the sustainable development organs of the UN. A thematic resolution was tabled in December 2021 at the Security Council by Niger and Ireland, garnering 113 co-sponsors, but was vetoed. This has since been mentioned informally by many Member States as one reason to keep climate and security at lower levels of policy, and let it appear in individual resolutions.

The Council is in fact increasingly including the issue in its deliberations, reflecting the rise of the impact of climate change across the globe. More and more, meetings on climate change and security (and related topics) have been convened, climate-security related text is being incorporated into resolutions, and various informal mechanisms (Group of Friends, etc.) are being established to help support the Council's work on this issue. More broadly, a number of institutions are being created to formalize this topic, such as the Stockholm Hub on Environment, Climate and Security.

⁷ <https://www.sipri.org/research/peace-and-development/climate-change-and-risk/expert-working-group-climate-related-security-risks> published in 2018.

⁸ S/PRST/2011/15

The work of the CSM bridges what could be broadly described as at a minimum three very different professional communities: those dealing with security and peace, those dealing with climate change, and the broader field of development and humanitarian assistance (each one of course with its own cleavages). The Council has emphasised the need for risk assessments and risk management strategies in particular contexts, and called for better reporting on climate-security risks. However, there remain many hurdles in bridging such a range of assessment, planning and reporting systems, even when using a cross-cutting method such as risk management.

3.3 Tools and Policy Framework

To provide guidance and strengthen capacity through common language and approaches among a community of practitioners and researchers and following an EC/DC decision from 2019, the CSM has created a “Toolbox” in Phase I that provides guidance to help the UN system develop a shared language and approach to the challenges brought on by climate-related security risks. These documents include:

- a “briefing note” that provides an overview of linkages between climate change and peace and security;
- a “conceptual approach” that delineates a common perspective for assessing climate change-related security risks across the UN system;
- a gradually broadening set of “open data” on security risks related to climate change; and
- a “conflict analysis checklist” with climate change-related questions for consideration during conflict analyses.

The Toolbox emphasises that climate-related security risks are context specific; that they interact with various political, social, economic, and demographic challenges contributing to instability; and that climate change has wide-ranging and interlinking development, peace and security, humanitarian, and gender implications. It also stresses that climate security risk prevention and management mechanisms need to consider and build upon existing coping capacities in states and communities to be effective.

The CSM has created during Phase II the Climate Security Board, a new online space on the knowledge management Trello platform that allows practitioners and researchers to access, contribute and share climate security-related events, news, publications, and key knowledge products. A Climate, Peace and Security Newsletter is also disseminated to share information and updates regarding the linkages between climate change, peace and security from around the world. It is intended as a monthly feature curated by the CSM, and shared primarily with the growing community of practice.

In December 2021, UNDP and the CSM published a study on “Climate Finance for Sustaining Peace: Making Climate Finance Work for Conflict-Affected and Fragile Contexts”. The report examines the contributions of climate finance to sustaining peace and focuses on: trends in access to climate finance in conflict-affected and fragile contexts; gaps and opportunities to leverage the co-benefits of climate action for peace and security; strategies for mainstreaming climate-related security risks into climate finance; and recommendations to make climate finance work more effectively in contexts affected by conflict and fragility. UNEP has also delivered work on extractive industries, security and the energy transition. Papers on the link between climate, peace and security and mediation, as well as climate, peace and security and gender are under preparation.

3.4 Regional and Country Applications

At a more applied level, the CSM works with UN regional offices, as well as multilateral regional bodies, through studies and the deployment of personnel, collaborations with NGOs and research institutes, and commissions to expert consultants. This takes various forms, depending on the context which determines the conduit by which the CSM is contacted, and can most simply be described as a four-pronged typology of partners (applying slightly arbitrary criteria based around the nature of the leading entity):

1. **Special Political Missions:** the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) for the Horn of Africa partner with the CSM to address climate-related security risks. In 2020, in collaboration with UNOCA, the Economic Community of Central African States and UN Country Teams in the sub-region, the CSM developed a project to strengthen the knowledge base regarding the interlinkages between climate change and security in Central Africa, and the capacity of subregional actors to develop effective risk prevention and mitigation strategies. The CSM supports UNOWAS to expand its work on climate security and conduct analytical deep dives, which will inform the mission's political and prevention work in West Africa and the Sahel. In the Horn of Africa, the CSM supports the OSE in managing the impact of climate change on regional prevention efforts and good offices. A Climate Security Advisor was recruited at the OSE in February 2022 and in UNOCA in September 2022, and another advisor is currently being onboarded at UNOWAS.
2. **Non-UN Regional Bodies and Multilateral Commissions:** in 2020, the CSM deployed a Climate Security Adviser to the Liptako Gourma Authority, to mainstream climate-related security risks in the post-conflict stabilization efforts (in relation to G5 Sahel initiatives) and the planned Stabilization Facility, as well as an analysis of the institutional frameworks addressing climate-related security risks in the sub-region and building on the experience of the Lake Chad Basin Stabilization Facility. In December 2021 a Policy Specialist, Climate and Security Risk was then embedded in the Secretariat of the League of Arab States, and conducted studies on the stakeholders and role of the League in analyzing and addressing climate-related security risks in the region. Similar support is being designed for the Lake Chad Basin Commission's capacities to analyze and respond to climate-related security risks (reflecting the follow up to the original CSM field initiative in 2018), and to inform the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin.
3. **Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams:** In Sudan the CSM is piloting community-based risk management. In Northern Central America, based on regular exchange with RC offices on how to conceptualise climate-related security risks, work has focused on: 1) quantitative data analysis and management, 2) planning a dialogue on future climate, peace and security scenarios, 3) applying a climate security lens on human mobility, in particular on the urban dimension. In Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, climate-related security risks and priority assessments have been conducted to strengthen awareness and early warning, and defining policy options and an action plan for the Andean States. In Somalia work started in November 2020 to analyze and determine climate security challenges and pilot community-based approaches to mitigate and manage climate-related security risks. In the Philippines support is being planned in consultation with the Resident Coordinator for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, with the intent of building capacities for assessment and planning. These partnerships with the CSM are the only ones where there is no full-time staff being recruited centrally to support the work, which is managed by the CSM and relevant regional and country offices of individual UN entities.
4. **Peacekeeping Operations:** The CSM has helped finance and recruit in mid-2022 a Climate Security Adviser in the UN Mission in South Sudan who is positioned within the Office of the Deputy Special Representative Political of the Secretary General, with a dual reporting line to the Director of Civil Affairs and the UNDP Resident Representative, and who will strengthen the mission's ability to address climate-related security risks, and enhance coordination with the UN Country Team. Conversations have been initiated with other Missions (in Mali in

particular, where the recruitment of a Climate Security Adviser has started at the time of writing).

These initiatives seek to develop tailored approaches to understand and address climate-related security risks in specific contexts, with support from the CSM core team and the guidance materials it produced. At the same time, the experience from these initiatives shapes CSM tools and analyses to inform global engagement into particular environments and institutional configurations. Respondents in interviews pointed out that this allows the creation of some degree of universality for the concepts and tools, as well as concrete local implications. These are needed to go beyond generalities and also to offer new insights for the global body of knowledge.

Each of the four UN entities implementing the CSM (UNDP, UN DPPA, UNEP and UN DPO) have been involved to varying degrees in particular roll-outs, building on their respective resources, expertise, contacts and presence - while a continuous effort of convergence of thinking and approach have allowed them to operate as a single workstream - with no institutional affiliation beyond the CSM which could be clearly visible during the Inception Phase. It is however clear that the centrifugal forces of so many initiatives taking root in such different conditions will need to be taken into account.

4. Findings

4.1 Relevance and sustainability

Initial Working hypothesis: The outputs of the CSM encounter a specific need and demand amongst key actors in the fields relevant to the interaction between climate change and security. These needs and demands may not be explicitly stated, but correspond to foresight and mitigation measures or the capture of specific opportunities (this corresponds to the relevance and sustainability criteria of the evaluation ToR in particular). Risk assessments and capacities have been generated in a satisfactory manner to respond to these needs and demands.

The CSM has developed in a relatively organic and continuous manner since its creation in October 2018, growing from three full time staff at UNHQ in New York to a broader aggregate team of some twenty (combined staff at UNHQ and in the field as well as consultants, not all full time) at this point in time. After what can be described as the codification of knowledge which took place during Phase I (such as the creation of a Toolbox described in 2.3) it has during Phase II developed a significant outreach capacity. Thanks to its position within the three or lately four entities that compose it, it has responded in an articulate, measured and informed manner with a range of actors. This includes an interactive website based on Trello, a Community of Practice, the deployment of experts within the four different types of actors in countries and regions described in 2.4 above.

This has occurred thanks to donor financing (for example Ireland's support to the Climate Security Adviser in the UN Mission in South Sudan), to the wording of Mission mandates formulated by the Security Council, to the ability to tap into subject matter expertise, and a responsive and pragmatic approach to the gradually increasing level of demand. Some of the entities have personnel and units dealing with related issues (UNEP, UNDP), and there is increasing interest in the topic. This is demonstrated for example by the Office for Internal Oversight Services' evaluation of the opportunities, efforts and challenges of peacekeeping operations and special political missions to consider and integrate climate-related security risks into their strategies, and the Peacebuilding Fund's thematic evaluation of its climate security portfolio.

Climate change and peace and fragility *problématiques* are clearly moving up the priority agenda internationally, notwithstanding the fact that the CSM contributes to a wide range of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Security Council and General Assembly concerns (the CSM arguably serves multiple targets under multiple SDGs, but its role as an enabler would not allow it to claim a direct link between its outcomes and the SDG targets). There is an unmistakable momentum in this novel domain, which links previously separate fields of expertise and institutional specialization.

There are however warning signs that this responsiveness and outreach from the CSM could become a liability as the mechanism is touched by a critical mass of demands and needs. While the personnel deployed across the globe describe having to meet a high level of expectations, they also describe a corresponding unmet need for intensified levels of support from the core team in New York (still barely more than ten). With the expectations come a need for increasingly clear capacity to deliver, in terms of briefs required within a typical timeframe of 1-2 weeks, while also looking ahead at how climate change and variability might affect local dynamics in the medium term, and what are the possible prevention strategies. There is also demand for programming tools (for example, from the UN Peace-Building Support Office and UN Country Teams), analytical and political expertise (OSE Horn of Africa, UNSOM) and policy support by Member States.

This capacity can be created and fielded by the CSM, but it requires time and a pool of expertise that has until now been extremely limited. The deployment of analysts and consultants has in particular been a constraint for the Mechanism, even when it tried to combine different profiles within one team. There is consistent evidence across the interviews of both CSM members and external stakeholders which engage with the CSM that personnel are extremely stretched, operating in many cases on own entity tasks as well as those required across many regions, on a wide variety of topics and processes.

The most critical element described as a constraint is the difficulties increasingly encountered, as Phase II progresses, in sharing information within the CSM. Staff have become engaged in some labour-intensive field initiatives and knowledge functions at headquarters, while there has not been a corresponding structuring of information and decision levels. The CSM Core Team meetings, which would normally be based on distinctions between strategic and operational aspects, with corresponding delegations of action points, are often described as occurring in an iterative manner in a time-poor environment.

4.2 Coherence and Efficiency

Initial Working hypothesis: If the CSM continues to expand in terms of funding, personnel and specific applications, this relies on the formulation of specific decision making and monitoring processes, and the formulation of benchmarks of capacity. These decision making, monitoring and capacity markers are made explicit to all stakeholders while acknowledging the need for adaptiveness in the midst of a highly complex environment (this corresponds to the efficiency criteria in particular).

The focus field initiatives are increasingly encountering the climate action and sustaining peace work of other entities (including regional organisations, governments, UN Country Team agencies and programmes, and civil society organizations) in focus field locations. One interlocutor spoke of a ‘thousand networks’ emerging, of variable quality, and while the CSM is clearly coherent with these initiatives, it in effect mechanically places the UN at the apex. This is the result of the cristallisation of the issues taking place both in terms of realized risks (shocks and stresses that are increasingly interconnected), as well as a policy convergence which is reflected in an increasingly wide circle of actors.

There is a growing compatibility of other UN system-wide work with CSM Phase II across environmental protection, climate action, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as with climate security-related initiatives of other UN entities. This leads to the growth of thematic initiatives within the entities and across other UN bodies. The evaluation was for example given to understand the emerging role of the SDG-Climate Facility Project, launching six pilot projects, managed by UNDP out of its Regional Hub for Arab States. This is the result of the policy shift within the League of Arab States, which is witnessing a heightened interest in the implications of climate change.

At the same time this creates a significant information management challenge. While a significant level of engagement has been deployed for example by the UN Regional Office for Central Africa, it remains primarily a UN DPPA initiative, focused on the interaction between the Libreville-based Adviser and New York, with limited integration of UNEP’s data on the Congo Basin (although UNEP data is being integrated into the regional dashboard that the UN DPPA Innovation Cell is developing). This has been evocatively described by one UNEP respondent as a ‘lack of connecting tissue’.

Personal contacts are actively used by personnel to compensate for the difficulty in the sharing of information. In the case of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa these are used to facilitate the launch of a dialogue between this Mission and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, for example. Similarly, the most pressing need of the CS Adviser to the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa is for targeted real-time briefings on political, climate related and security issues that emerge as increasingly important in regional negotiations.

This difficulty in the definition, transmission and presentation of information has also been described as a challenge within the CSM core team. The conduits of information are primarily externally facing, while most of the management related content is exchanged in the course of meetings and via email. While these are frequent, they cannot do justice to the depth and complexity of the domain and of the individual initiatives. The issue is further complicated by the natural challenge of differentiating between entity-specific information (which tends to remain internal) and CSM specific information.

The decision-making processes are differentiated between three levels. First are those concerning Member States and the CSM which are dealt with through the Joint Steering Committee. Second are decisions that are CSM-wide and which are dealt with by a circle of senior personnel operating astride their functions as Directors within the four entities, and their responsibility for the CSM. A considerable number of content-related decisions are then made within the core team of professional level personnel, producing administrative material, knowledge tools, and supporting the field initiatives. This is governed by unwritten rules and a strong *esprit de corps*, but does not lend itself to an expansion of the work, not to mention the number of entities. It is dependent on the willingness of the four entities to work together in a collaborative Mechanism.

A particular concern relates to the decision making around the support given to one or other initiative. Since the MPTFO operates at one step removed from the CSM and since single entities are able to draw on their own as well as CSM-wide resources, it is relatively difficult to differentiate internal funding decisions from CSM decisions. Similarly, the decisions by Member States to allocate funding to the MPTFO or to earmark them to specific initiatives has made overall coherence more challenging. It is striking to see that there is only a loose sense of the criteria the CSM applies to selecting where to work with partners. These are enumerated as: the need for a climate and security angle; whether the CSM resources can make a difference; are there local/national/regional partnerships in place to ensure buy-in; are long-term perspectives sustainable. The resulting decisions about field work remain unorganised.

An emphasis on foresight can be detected as a common theme in interviews and in documentation. This remains highly geared to programming and policy making, with a strong normative content, which remains relatively generic. There has not been an effort to link this work to specific adjacent bodies of academic research - such as, for example, indicators of food systems and the measurement of resilience. The link to operational decision making has also not yet been fully made.

The combination of limited information systems and collegial decision making create difficulties in defining the overall direction of the CSM in Phase III, as well as defining which initiatives to undertake, or more importantly not to undertake. There are no clear markings on the footprint that the CSM could have, and in some cases there is limited information shared within the CSM on the launch and implementation status of individual initiatives.

4.3 Effectiveness

Initial Working hypothesis: The outputs are planned and delivered in a way that gives proper emphasis to complementarity, as well as quality and good project cycle management. While there is considerable diversity of outputs, these revolve around the CSM Toolbox (this corresponds to the effectiveness criteria in particular) and implementation matches the original intent.

The CSM Phase II Theory of Change is articulated in clear, practical and feasible outputs and outcomes. These are not always clearly linked in a cascade system with those of the field initiatives, which are often framed within separate entity reporting and donor reporting requirements (the UK's Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office support to a number of field initiatives has its own logical framework and indicators for example). This has allowed to a great extent the CSM Theory of Change to be valid in terms of the range of applications, and effective in creating a perimeter of intervention.

The CSM has consistently achieved its expected outputs and its outcomes against the Theory of Change and results framework, although the COVID-19 pandemic and procurement difficulties have often led to delays. The quality of the work, and the level of effectiveness is, as far as can be observed, of a similarly good level across the board. The ability of the CSM to work remotely and

tap into the resources that exist within each entity (for example UNEP deployment of hydrological modeling for UNSOM) have allowed the continued delivery of the outputs in spite of these constraints. The other factor of success is the undeniably high level of determination of the personnel in New York and within the various types of partners in countries around the world.

The principal weakness of evaluability pointed out in the preceding section 2.3 is found in the highly narrative, generic and hence difficult to verify statements of outcome and impact. This is not so much an issue of clarity of purpose as of measurability. This includes for example outputs such as “the number of UN Country Teams and/or field missions that include climate related security risks in Common Country Analyses and UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks and/or other analysis and strategic planning processes”. While on the surface this would indicate change, it is not possible to verify how individually significant these are, and what risks should be included.

While the overall Theory of Change outlined in 3.2 indicates a range of converging lines of intervention, these rely on a diffuse notion of increased understanding by stakeholders, as well as a high density of description of activity. The interviews conducted for the evaluation consistently indicate that while there was a continuous effort to facilitate the adoption of the climate and security agenda, there hasn't been a concerted and deliberate effort to measure success. Instead of an analytical framework which would facilitate Monitoring and Evaluation (there are elements such as vulnerability and exposure to risk, but these are not developed), there is an emphasis on activities. These for example create markers that relate to the degree of involvement of gender and vulnerable and marginalized groups within the activities, rather than in terms of their own empowerment.

While the products generated by the CSM are generally appreciated (such as the tools in the Toolbox), there is a recurrent view that the stage of maturity of the climate and security domain of intervention requires more directly operational inputs – in other words more localized knowledge, directly applicable for positive measures to be implemented. The CSM is finding it difficult to respond to the more recent requests formulated by its partners. They require more directly operational inputs – in other words applicable for positive measures to be implemented. The increasingly short reporting timeframes are compounded by a lack of templates and standardized methodologies.

4.4 Impact

Initial working hypothesis: The outputs are 'gap bridging' and replicable at scale and fit well into the longer-term strategies of the stakeholders which will be hosting them. Risks to implementation and longevity have been well understood and transparently flagged, such as for example the centrifugal effect of labour intensive initiatives that risk losing a strategic impact (this corresponds to the impact criteria).

The usefulness of CSM outputs is a fast evolving value. The range of issues and the types of partners that apply the knowledge and information is striking, and fast expanding. For the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, probing questions emerge concerning the factors, including drought, which determine shifts in the security situation in Somalia, and the importance of a group representing disenfranchised, drought-affected Somalis. In the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, this is couched in the formulation of cogent messages that capture the concerns of the population for the attention of the authorities. Such lines of enquiry imply a growing maturity within the field, and heightened awareness amongst all actors.

The practice of conducting climate related risk assessments in areas relating to peace and human security are increasing. These assessments have maintained a cautious distance from statal security matters (which interlocutors tend to refer to as ‘hard security’) but the uptake, for example around humanitarian and development programmes in Sudan, is direct. This includes for example the use of solar stoves by refugees from Ethiopia to reduce the need to collect firewood, simultaneously reducing tensions with communities and the exposure of women to gender-based violence. In a country overwhelmingly affected by droughts and flooding, climate and security have a high degree of connectedness and constitute a catalytic input for UN Country Team coherence. UNDP is preparing larger programmes in the country, based on these seminal inputs by the CSM, and these are now being extended via the network of Regional Climate Security Advisers.

A pioneering study on funding for climate adaptation and mitigation⁹ was produced by UNDP and a group of consultants in connection with the CSM, and pointed out the disparity in funding for climate finance towards fragile and conflict affected countries. It argued that climate finance is still risk averse, and that it relies heavily on the quality of domestic and national priorities. Linked to this, however, it points to the need to re-engineer climate finance mechanisms, including results management systems and metrics.

This study points to a broader obstacle to the development of the climate and security nexus. This relates to the risk aversion of many of the stakeholders to the linkages between the two. While the previously mentioned study concentrated on the difficulty of engaging in investments in fragile and conflict affected countries, there is also a difficulty in bringing together the notion of security and climate. This has been expressed in interviews as the dropping of the conjunction and within ‘climate and security’, to the benefit of the easier to pronounce ‘climate security’.

The abbreviated term implies a focused relationship to climate change, such as exists towards food in ‘food security’ or water in ‘water security’ – the emphasis is on influencing climate change. This however is seen to imply what has been called a securitization of climate change. It triggers concerns of sovereignty, or even of burden shifting which would make developing countries responsible for mitigating climate change, to the detriment of other forms of development.

The focus on climate change and security closes tantalising perspectives but creates a specialism - useful in the shifting policy landscape. Climate security tends towards concepts which are designed to be all-inclusive and non-operational. It is akin to food security, which implies a sphere of control. It touches on peacebuilding by better use of natural resources. However, by its focus on risk prevention and climate change adaptation and mitigation with a security lens, the domain of intervention is scaled up and encourages cooperation. The conjunction Climate and Security leads to the question ‘why?’ rather than ‘what is?’, which is integrative.

While peace (as in ‘climate, peace and security’) would be a more broadly accepted term (and the evaluator recognizes that there is a considerable push to bring the word ‘peace’ into the name), many respondents highlighted that this is already a programme area, expanding the semantic field without necessarily adding much value.

Another partly related constraint to a greater impact relates to the constituencies behind the CSM. The donor base in particular has been until now relatively narrow, drawn from northern Europe. While climate change is rapidly becoming a global priority, there are still limits in the degree to which the CSM has engaged with many permanent members of the Security Council, or the regional organisations and non-Europe based academic institutions.

Another constraint on the long-term impact of the CSM is the difficulty of translating risk mitigation measures into concrete policy frameworks. While there is a clear gap between individual projects dealing with specific sites and broader engagement at the Security Council or Mission level, the principal challenge is turning broad correlations between climate change and security into the appropriate mitigation measures and prescriptive messages for the key actors in the region. This is already being done, for example the Foresight work done in Somalia.

This is due primarily to the absence of personnel that combine within their skills set the multiple types of expertise that are required, i.e. bridging political analysis, environmental sciences, and humanitarian, human rights and development programming (as has been done increasingly by the CSM, for example in Somalia). This is compounded by the absence of a measurable impact frame. This relates in part to the comments made in the previous section to the lack of a strong Monitoring and Evaluation system, but also to the contextualization of the measures. There are wide differences in levels between the Sudan projects and the League of Arab States initiatives (the former being heavily focused on sub-regional outcomes within Sudan, the latter on identifying key actors and

⁹ “Climate finance for sustaining peace: Making climate finance work for conflict-affected and fragile contexts”

priorities for the Arab States), but there is no line of convergence between the two, where one could inform the other.

The possibility of scaling up the field initiatives and further applying the knowledge generated through the global lines of engagement of the CSM are tied to this absence of a defined impact frame. There is also a fundamental choice to be made within the identity of the CSM in relation to the UN Country Team, Missions and regional bodies. This relates in particular to the degree to which the CSM is involved in implementation. It has been described in the course of the interviews conducted as a standard setter, a clearing house, a knowledge hub, and these are clearly functions in high demand. There is however a call for more direct translation into contextualized measures and initiatives.

5. Conclusions

The Climate and Security domain of policy and practice is based on increasingly solid empirical evidence, and increasingly clear programming and operational implications. Couched within a risk framework (where probability and severity of impact are key variables, as well as mitigation capacities) it is merging with broader areas of concern – areas where security risks extend beyond statal security to people-centered notions of safety and identity ('societal security'), illicit activities, and social and environmental sustainability reporting. Conversations on these topics are rapidly expanding, as are the number of initiatives around the globe that seek to deal with climate related risks to security. The CSM finds itself at an increasingly busy cross-road of research, policy and planning.

From 2020 until now, the various achievements of the CSM have been triggered by a high degree of dedication and responsiveness in the core team and senior entity personnel, the drive exercised by partners in the regional engagements, as well as by the support of particular donors. This has allowed for bodies of knowledge and funding to be applied locally to create new incentives and practices, and to reframe certain issues confronting UN partners, using agile deployment modalities. Each field initiative could be considered to offer an experiment in outreach, with their own knowledge management, coordination and decision-making workloads, with varying degrees of financial execution.

The CSM has been prevented by its small size from engaging in broader risk management domains, such as for example human security, or food security, or environmental peacebuilding. Climate and Security is becoming relevant to previously remote concerns, such as private investment in fragile and conflict affected countries, and the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus. However this relevance means that it is apt that it continue to expand, but should do so in a carefully calibrated manner.

At the same time, the CSM is continuing to encounter a certain degree of distrust. This revolves around the security angle. This is due to the sovereignty concerns that govern the Security Council. Along with a heretofore limited funding base, this reluctance is a constraint to its ability to engage with this expanding field which must be taken into account.

This issue of acceptability highlights the importance of further advancing conceptual clarity and the empirical evidence at this point in time. Multiple policy associations are matched by the increasingly wide range of CSM applications. There are widespread practice areas that require to be connected (such as intelligence assessments in peacekeeping, or adaptation measures to deal with the so-called 'twin crises' of biodiversity, to name just two). There are also trends towards fragmentation in international relations in which climate change and insecurity can become contested or on the contrary bridging concerns. This makes the CSM into what could be called a threshold actor, where it can play an organising role, and where it can usefully serve as an information and normative platform.

The CSM can be described as a threshold actor in the sense that it operates at the junction of different disciplines, essentially between climate change and security. The interface between the highly contextualized realities in the field and global policy making is well captured by different forms of UN and multilateral involvement as represented by its four component entities. To fulfill that, however, it must consolidate its own management and sharpen its conceptual and measurement work. While in previous phases a certain ambiguity and generic content was useful, it is becoming more of a liability.

This would recommend a change of position of the CSM in relation to new sets of actors, bolstering its constituency while continuing to focus primarily on thematic work within the Security Council. One particular example that could be cited, and which would expand the resource base of the CSM, is climate finance. At present, many tools do exist to align corporate strategies with social and environmental outcomes, but demand is growing for more precision. Businesses and their finance

teams are increasingly called upon to put the processes in place to monitor and report on social and environmental risks and improve business models to redefine how they create value. Wider sets of open source Environmental Social and Governance data from fragile and conflict affected situations can create the bedrock for climate finance.

The following overall conclusions emerge as recurrence across the evaluation criteria:

1. **Momentum** is a significant and recurrent theme, implying a fast-developing initiative. There is a fast-rising level of interest in the issue among a number of Member States, as well as a realisation that climate change will be influencing most areas of international relations. This of course begs for a strengthening of the analytical frameworks and information systems to avoid confusion.
2. **The teams involved are highly motivated** and encounter increasing demands for contributions. There are multiple pathways that could be chosen, and multiple regions selected, based on criteria still to be defined. Receipt of requests or network effects will not provide the red thread to guide efficient implementation of the work of the CSM.
3. There is at the same time some confusion around the word ‘**security**’ which is perceived to touch on securitising climate change, and which is seen as sensitive as a result of the linkages to peace interventions and stabilisation. There is a possibility to move towards a more risk-focused approach, where climate security increases the severity and frequency of risks, which in turn threaten specific ‘valued components’ (to be defined in various ways, and which will be further elaborated in the recommendations section).
4. The private sector and multilateral development banks seem to offer interesting synergies, in terms of ‘**de-risking**’. There is also a clear demand for empirical evidence on causal links, which may come from field projects. The Security Council mandates for Special Political Missions and Peacekeeping Missions, as well as Mission transitions, increasingly require due diligence and concrete guidance from the CSM.
5. **Modality**: there is a possibility for the CSM to focus increasingly on its current poles of work: deploying advisers and guiding projects at the field level to test clearly defined concepts with a view to replication and scaling up, or to trigger catalytic change. In another direction, it could focus to a greater extent on evidence, measurement, learning and the formulation of policy priorities, helping local organisations define their approaches. Should it choose to pursue both, additional capacities will be required.

The CSM has created the opportunity for a common language to emerge between climate/ environmental and conflict related spheres, between financial risk and non-financial information. It has tapped into differing skillsets situated between security, political resolution, sustainability and potentially innovative financial instruments. It could recast the dialogue between peace and security, development and private finance.

There is a need for the CSM, as a threshold actor, to focus on the linkage between different bodies of data –becoming a clearing house. This is compatible with the growth of a Climate Security Adviser network, situated within peacekeeping or political missions, or larger development financing projects. This could contain important contextualized knowledge and advisory services which these organisations are calling for.

The current infrastructure is solid but will soon be insufficient for this expansion, posing the risk of confusion or paralysis. While there can be no assurance of an expansion of funding in Phase III, there are distinct opportunities for new sources of financing and new forms of cooperation. This provides the basis for the following recommendations that emphasise clarity of purpose, deeper involvement in open data management, and an active external relations function.

6. Recommendations

The following recommendations are formulated for the attention of the CSM and the Joint Steering Committee. They do not require acceptance by the CSM. The final agreement and adoption of these recommendations are the prerogative of the Joint Steering Committee.

The recommendations are not prioritized as they are conceived as a package of measures that reinforce one another and as such are more effective if implemented together.

6.1 Preserve the nature of a Mechanism.

The low-key nature of a Mechanism is useful to capture and share political and security analyses. The institutional room for manoeuvre has allowed the CSM to create a strategic niche. The following recommendations are aimed at the JSC.

- **The Mechanism is a relevant design to be preserved so as to remain embedded in the New York peace and security environment.** As a Mechanism, the CSM is able to operate with its host institutions, other entities and partners around the globe. There is limited value in formalising further the mechanism by turning it into a fund, a programme, or creating a senior level position to head it. The current four-entity model with consensual decision making allows for the continuation of an ‘hourglass’ model, which brings together senior levels of the UN in New York, the Secretariat, and the ‘field’, into a narrow funnel within the four entities.
- **The Mechanism should not expand further the number of component entities beyond the current ones.** This recommendation aims to reduce the risk of paralysis. The current composition creates a useful complementarity of mandates and constituencies and avoids the creation of governance bodies that would slow down decision making or lead to the capture of the Mechanism within existing work streams and institutional interests. This complementarity of roles should however be formalised on the basis of the unique capabilities that define each entity.
- **The current policies and objectives should be maintained.** The existing Theory of Change (described in 2.1) should be kept for Phase III of the CSM as it describes a focus of work. Collaboration should continue with the Climate Security Expert Network, the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, and the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security. The Community of Practice on Climate Security, and the engagement with research institutes and the UN Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus, are to be valued as long-term assets, with the aim of becoming increasingly context specific in the knowledge generated.
- **To prepare for Phase III the CSM team and stakeholders should engage in a planning process.** The closure of Phase II represents an opportunity for stock taking and learning which takes place at a turning point in the life of this initiative. The following recommendations are accompanied by specific Briefing Notes that represent options that relate to Monitoring and Evaluation and to partnerships in climate finance.

6.2 Focus the brand and tighten the concept.

The CSM is located in a fast-expanding practice and policy area, which makes clarity of thinking particularly important at this point in time. The following recommendations are intended for the JSC (first

and second) and the core team of the CSM (third).

- **The Mechanism should adhere as closely as possible to its original inception name of ‘Climate and Security’.** This should not imply a change in the abbreviation (CSM) but would be used in full when referring to the domain. This should be used to emphasise the nature of the work of the CSM as a threshold organisation, and so highlight the more acceptable aspects to parties that would consider ‘Climate Security’ as an unwelcome extension of international interventions in domestic affairs. It also points to the increasingly salient importance of climate change within the compounding risks of a fast-changing world.

- **To create important synergies the Mechanism should formalise the geographic and institutional scope of its initiatives.** While some degree of geographic and empirical pragmatism is required in the applications of its work, the CSM should formulate priority domains that help enshrine the field initiatives in a logic and prioritization frame¹¹. These will be ever deeper forms of country or regional engagement where the CSM can generate a proof of concept. These would be pilot initiatives that reflect causal influence (but avoid seeking to define attribution of insecurity and conflict to climate change, which is not possible in complex systems) within specific valued environmental and social components (priority ecosystems or livelihood zones, for example). These should be based on analytical models that delineate a list of climate and security interactions in given geographic areas, such as for example the relationship between disenfranchised communities and the state in Mindanao, or refugee impacted areas of Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The objectives and outcomes would be more clearly mapped to patterns of climate change, reflecting demand from key stakeholders.

- **Climate and Security analysis should explore anticipatory tools, and also create linkages to the definition of the key risks and those to whom these risks apply** as well as broader analysis of anticipated impact. Scenario planning could be extended (currently used in Somalia) to serve as a method of engagement with non-security actors. The relations to the domains of peace and human security, or biodiversity, should be clarified so as to be strengthened, and an acknowledgement made that each have their own established applications and normative space which are separate (if occasionally overlapping) with those of climate-change related risk implications.

6.3 Strengthen the team.

The centrifugal effects of multiple applications and the global momentum of interest require a deeper roles-based team by entity. The following recommendations are aimed at the four member entities of the CSM.


- **The four entities should structure the Core Team into a clearly defined two-tier function.** This includes firstly an information focused function (‘operations’, at UN grades this would be P2-P4 level which would be full time on the CSM) which should be data driven and constraining. This should be delivered thanks to structured reporting. The operations team should be capacitated to work on monitoring and the periodic production of structured analysis (rather than allocating the monitoring function to a single person). Within the Core Team a second level would be formally defined in terms of its membership (P5-D1 level, who may possibly be working on other functions within their entities). This level works as something akin to a ‘quality circle’ (non-hierarchical, recommendations focused). In this model the operations team will prioritise problem types identified in the course of monitoring functions.

The more senior ‘working level’ will be tasked to find concrete solutions, and if disagreements persist prepare recommendations briefs, to be reviewed by the Joint Steering Committee (and

¹¹ Security Council resolutions that highlight climate in mandate resolution can be a useful guide, as well as identifying opportunities whereby mission specific climate security advisers can be linked up to regional initiatives

decided upon where appropriate). This policy level is composed of UN entities and member states that can adjudicate high level decisions that affect the system beyond the four entities. It will track the implementation of recommendations made within the working level team or endorse outreach to other partner networks and institution to share knowledge and practices and adopt ensuing priorities.

This can be represented in the following manner:



- **The number of staff in New York (operations, working level) as well as in the field should be strengthened.** This can be achieved by requiring that each member entity should issue full time contracts for the positions of two staff members, one at each level (see previous recommendation), possibly strengthened by seconded personnel. The Climate Security Advisers could be organized to operate as a network of agents of change. While funding modalities may still require innovative solutions (for example a closer collaboration with Multilateral Development Banks), it is important for the integrity of the system that CSM financial markers be applied for projects which are clearly under the responsibility of the CSM (as a whole) and those that belong to adjacent sectors, policies or institutions. The entities are collectively accountable for fiduciary management and the delivery of results.
- **The judicious positioning of personnel outside New York is key to their ability to perform.** The Climate and Security Advisers should be placed as close as possible to Heads of Missions, be they special political missions or peacekeeping missions. The alternative positioning of these advisors within development bodies and UN Country Teams would reduce their ability to focus on the security and political aspects, and the strategic scope of their normative work in security. It may be desirable to always deploy both environment and security experts in tandem, although this will naturally increase the cost.

6.4 Become data driven.

The CSM has the potential to become a monitoring and learning system. This requires the definition of measurable aspects that are central to the work, validated by sources as close to the affected populations

and operative stakeholders. The recommendations here are intended for the CSM core team.

- **By defining priority environmental and security components, the CSM should encourage the creation of a real time system of data collection, retrieval, storage and analysis.** Valued Components are the environmental, social and security elements of an ecosystem that are identified as having a significant exposure to climate change. The definition of the components enables the definition of risks within a priority framework, and of mitigation and adaptive measures. This in turn defines a scope for data that will be made available to assist the Climate Security Advisers to provide timely and authoritative briefings to their stakeholders, and to encourage collaborative networks with research, investment and political actors that need confirmation of climate change related risks. This should be bolstered by the provision of standby ad hoc consultancy services where additional effort is required.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation should be simplified and designed to assess performance by tracking outcomes in these defined areas of work.** This must rely on two sources: project monitoring (the work of Advisors in field initiatives); and the structuring of key situational data into priority environmental and security components (or valued systems). The project level (or 'Field Initiative') monitoring will focus on outcomes, which are defined by the degree to which there is a utilisation of CSM knowledge, practices, and applications of policies. The impact will in turn be measured by tracking the effect of these outcomes against a context in which key drivers of security, or key networks of actors, or key capacities, can act as frames of reference. Outcomes should be defined in the same way, whether they are field initiatives or New York level engagement, as both levels should feed into each other into a virtuous cycle of change, where practice informs policy and vice-versa.
- **The CSM should develop a data management system leading to the creation of dashboards to enable decision making in a wide variety of countries and regions.** This will enable the Monitoring and Evaluation system to track its activities using no-go/go criteria, funding decisions, and annual work plans, to track outcomes as measures of uptake (for example using quotations, short surveys, focus group discussions), and to monitor the key points of reference: drivers, networks or capacities. It should also store analyses done by others (political briefs, impact assessments, investment due diligence, etc.) and in particular strengthen systematic information exchanges between entities. It should enable joint analysis to help structure this emerging field of work. It will require a collaborative indicator management system designed in collaboration with the entities (such as Strata in UNEP, or Sage or CPAS in UN DPO, Crisis Risk Dashboards in UNDP), which will require user interfaces, and real-time networks around issue categories (investment de-risking, social cohesion, for example).

6.5 Bring in new partners.

The CSM is developing a capability to access data concerning climate change, and to generate timely analyses which explore the risk implications, while outlining resilience measures. This is a valuable competence that requires both strengthening and benefiting further from partnerships. The following recommendations are meant for the CSM core team, and for the last, to some degree the component entities:

- **The CSM should create a standby consultancy capacity of a more interactive nature than the Climate Security Roster to cultivate expertise that bridges the climate and the security sphere.** Today when considering publications and difficulties in finding consultants, it is unanimously observed that this is insufficiently widespread, and little codified. The creation of a Long-Term Agreement or framework contract would link the operations team of the CSM with consultancies that provide access to expertise and can carry out quality control tasks for text and tools. It would foster a pool of analysts with the required skills that can come in support of the long-term Climate and Security Advisers, from a wider resource base than is currently accessible to the UN. The work should include a training and documentation facility and so enable the CSM

Secretariat to outsource those activities. This should be framed as a call-down and highly reactive service managed jointly by the UN entities, rather than achieved through a structured partnership with established research institutions which is more rigid.

- **The CSM should work with intermediary bodies that can act as open data exchanges with other institutions dealing with risk and climate finance.** The increasing requirement of a range of actors from investors to peacebuilding need better access to climate change and security data, presented within a risk and resilience framework. The Multilateral Development Banks' interest in particular lies in de-risking investments and creating more detailed investment information environments. The ad hoc working group on climate finance, which looks at all finance streams including humanitarian and peacebuilding as they relate to climate finance, indicates the need for information sharing partnerships. This will require the creation of additional capacity within the operations team which could be funded by new partners, and a regional focus with other willing actors. It will create a broader diversity of origins and profiles for those involved, and could, if successful, lead to an expansion of the Joint Steering Committee. For the CSM this ensures an extension of its normative influence.
- **The CSM should engage more actively with Member States which have previously not been amenable to the concept of climate and security through the above intermediary bodies.** This could be done in three ways:

(1) through climate finance by emphasising the links between investment opportunities and better climate risk resilience. Relations with finance would emphasise that climate and security is not the sole province of state security, but a common risk-based concern, with a wide range of applications that can operate far beyond Official Development Assistance flows (working for example with the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank).

(2) increase the opportunities for dialogue and joint analysis in the margins of the Security Council, and with regional organisations as currently done with UNOCA and the Liptako Gourma Authority, the League of Arab States, expanding in a deliberate manner the work already being done. While the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union as well as Africa or Pacific-focused institutions come to mind, there are also opportunities in more localised areas with other Asia-focused or Latin American institutions.

(3) Select a number of regional centres of excellence that produce valuable research on subjects that relate to climate and security and provide short remote seminars and courses which use the precedents of work with the UN Staff College and Columbia University in New York.

Annex I: List of Persons Met

The following persons have been met for individual interviews. The evaluator is much indebted for their openness and the investment of their time.

1	Broman, Mattias	Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden	Deputy Director, Global Agenda Department
2	Carabine, Elizabeth	Office of Special Envoy, Horn of Africa	Climate Security Advisor (UNEP)
3	De Coning, Cedric	NUPI	Senior Researcher
4	de Jong, Helena	UN DPPA	Associate Political Affairs Officer
5	Fong, Alexandra	UN DPPA	Chief, Policy & Guidance, Policy & Mediation Division
6	Goldschmidt, Catarina	UN DPPA	Political Affairs Officer
7	Grand, Anab	UNDP	Climate and Policy Analyst – Climate & Security Risk
8	Haeri, David	UN DPO	Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training
9	Hannemann, Christian	Perm. Mission of Germany to the UN	First Secretary, Climate, Environment, Migration
10	Herman, Marie	UNEP	Associate Expert
11	Hervouet, Valentin	UNDP	Programme Management Specialist, CSM Secretariat
12	Hiensch, Annick	UN DPO	Partnerships Team Leader/Climate Security
13	Ibrekk, Hans Olav	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway	Special Envoy on Climate and Security
14	Ikegaya, Eiko	UN DPO	Deputy Chief, Policy and Best Practices Service
15	Eichel, Japhet	UN DPPA	Associate Expert
16	Kafle, Bhasker	UNDP Philippines	Peace Programming Officer
17	Khaitova, Nigina	UN DPPA PBO	Knowledge Management Officer
18	Klinpoon, Ootsanee	UNDP	Operations Associate, CSM Secretariat
19	Kumar, Srinivas	UNDP Philippines (previously in Sudan)	Head of Peace and Stabilisation Unit
20	Kyurkchieva, Desislava	UNDP Sudan	Programme Specialist, Peace & Stabilization Portfolio
21	Laderach, Peter	CGIAR	Climate Security Lead
22	Lehtonen, Matti	UNEP	Senior Programme Manager
23	Lotze, Walter	UN DPPA	Team Leader – Somalia
24	Nakasi, Daisy	UN Office of Internal Oversight Services	Evaluation Officer
25	Pant, Sujala	UNDP - Amman Regional Hub	Regional Project Manager - SDG Climate Facility
26	Pattison, Corey	UNEP	Regional Adviser, Climate Security Unit
27	Richards, Rebecca	UN World Food Programme	Head of Global Network Against Food Crises
28	Ritzer, Thomas	UN DPPA	Political Affairs Officer
29	Rizk, Samuel	UNDP	Head, Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Responsive Institutions
30	Salem, Ossama	League of Arab States / UNDP	Policy Specialist – Climate and Security Risk
31	Schroll, Michael	UN Office of Internal Oversight Services	Evaluation Officer
32	Sellwood, Elizabeth	UNEP	Head of Environmental Security Unit
33	Serizawa, Tomokazu	UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub	Policy Specialist Climate & Security Risk Asia & Pacific
34	Sheinberg, Diane	UN DPPA PBO	Programme Officer
35	Skah, Maha	UN DPPA	Associate Expert
36	Soer, Albert	European Investment Bank	Senior Conflict Prevention and Recovery Expert
37	Stoefs, Ewout	Delegation of the European Union	First Secretary
38	Tabbara, Hadi	UNDP	Consultant, Climate and Security Risk
39	Tranøy, Mona	Perm. Mission of Norway to the UN	First Secretary, Climate & Security, WPS
40	Wegelein, Christina	Federal Foreign Office, Germany	Head of Division, Climate and Security
41	Wang, Sarena	UN DPO	Intern
42	Wong, Catherine	UNDP	Team Leader – Climate and Security Risk
43	Yoshii, Megumi	UN Regional Office for Central Africa	Political Affairs Officer

Annex II: Terms of Reference (summary)

Evaluation of the Climate Security Mechanism Joint Programme – Phase II “Strengthening Field Capacity to Address Climate-Related Security Risks”

TERMS OF REFERENCE

SUMMARY

Purpose: The impending conclusion of Phase II of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) in 2022 provides an opportune moment to reflect on the progress of the CSM to date, assess results, identify early achievements and challenges, and learn from good practices, as well as less successful activities. Findings and recommendations from this evaluation will inform the next phase of the CSM (Phase III 2023-2025) allowing for adjustments in working methods, processes and division of labour to reflect existing priorities as well as new realities and enhance efficiency, and ensuring that the CSM is able to capitalize on its experience and lessons learned.

Scope: This independent evaluation will cover Phase II of the CSM Joint Programme (2020-2022) and take a two-tiered approach across CSM priority areas of work. Tier 1 will focus on assessing the effectiveness and early impact of focus field initiatives. Tier 2 will cover CSM Phase II global workstreams.

Objectives:

- Provide an objective assessment of CSM Phase II to determine its relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability (and when feasible, its impact)
- Generate actionable recommendations to improve and scale up the CSM
- Promote dialogue on the role of the CSM in supporting integrated UN approaches in analyzing and addressing climate-related security risks
- Provide recommendations on how the CSM could reformulate and measure its expected impact
- Communicate achievements to the CSM’s direct stakeholders, particularly Member State partners, to inform future investment and programming
- Articulate ways in which the CSM has added value to UN’s climate security work at HQ and in the focus field contexts; identify good practices and less successful activities, documenting lessons learned to contribute to the global knowledge base on climate security research and practice

Methodology: The evaluation is expected to follow a participatory and consultative bottom-up approach that is informed by, and ensures close engagement with, CSM partners and stakeholders from focus field initiatives. It will endeavor to present diverse and gender-balanced perspectives, with particular attention paid to bringing perspectives from Global South representatives and experts. The evaluation will rely on both secondary research (desk review) and primary data collection (interviews) to be conducted remotely.

Key deliverables (content and format to be refined and agreed with evaluator(s)):

- **Evaluation inception report** (10 pages max.) based on preliminary discussions and desk review.
- **Evaluation report** (40 pages max.) including an executive summary (3-5 pages) to promote dissemination of findings and recommendations. The report will include “boxes” that will zoom in on select best practices and related lessons learned.
- **Strategic workshop with key partners and stakeholders** to present and discuss key findings and recommendations and conduct a short strategic planning exercise to ensure that lessons learned are adequately reflected in the next phase of the CSM Joint Programme until 2025.
- **Evaluation briefs (TBC):** Evaluator(s) will produce three to four briefs (2-pagers) to be designed as knowledge products for wider dissemination of findings: two to three briefs on select focus field initiatives to document successes focusing on early impacts of the CSM, and one brief unpacking key recommendations for Phase III, including on future CSM and partnership configuration.

Proposed selection modality: fast track selection via UN roster(s) of technically vetted consultants

Indicative list of partners and stakeholders who should be consulted as part of the evaluation:

- CSM partners in focus field locations: Andean States (RCOs and UNCTs, including PDAs), League of Arab States, UNOCA, OSE Horn of Africa, Liptako Gourma Authority, Northern Central America, Somalia, Sudan, UNMISS, UNOWAS
- UN Community of Practice on Climate Security
- Member State partners (CSM donors and in-kind contributors)
- Members of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security
- Members of the informal expert group of members of the Security Council on climate and security
- Experts from the research community and civil society organizations working on climate security
- UN Resident Coordinators, Peace and Development Advisors, and other UN officials including in select peacekeeping operations who have not received CSM support

Evaluator(s) will also conduct a desk review and to the extent possible consult resource persons to identify M&E lessons learned from other global UN (joint) initiatives related to climate action and/or sustaining peace (including but not limited to PBSO/PBF, the UNDP-DPPA Joint Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention, UN-REDD) with a view to informing CSM upscaling and sustainability.

Guiding questions (to be refined by the evaluator(s) in the inception report and agreed with the CSM):

Relevance

- To what extent do the CSM's objectives and design respond to regional and national needs, policies and priorities as well as those of partners in focus field locations? Are the objectives and design responding to relevant analysis by the research community?
- Has the CSM's coverage and support been appropriately distributed, based on partners' demand and assessed needs?
- To what extent is the CSM Joint Programme in line with SDGs 13 and 16 and their interconnections with SDGs 1, 2, 5, 6, 14 and 15, priorities of the UN Secretary-General and wider UN system, and corporate strategies of CSM entities?

Coherence

- To what extent were lessons learned from other initiatives considered in the design of Phase II?
- What is the compatibility of CSM Phase II with other UN system-wide work across environmental protection, climate action, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and with climate security-related initiatives of other UN entities?
- To what extent are focus field initiatives coherent with the climate action and sustaining peace work of other entities (including regional organizations, governments, UNCTs, civil society organizations and other HDP partners) in focus field locations?

Effectiveness

- **Theory of change (ToC) and results framework:** Has the CSM Phase II ToC articulated clear, practical and feasible expected outputs and outcome, and to what extent has the ToC proven valid and effective? To what extent has CSM Phase II achieved its expected outputs and outcome against the ToC and results framework? How could the ToC be improved?
- **Achievements:** In which areas (results, processes, thematic areas and focus field locations) does CSM Phase II have the greatest achievements? Why and what have been the supporting factors? What can be scaled up and how can the CSM build on or expand these achievements? In which areas does CSM Phase II have the fewest achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can or could they be overcome in the future?
- **Comparison between initiatives:** What are differential results as well as similarities and differences in approaches across CSM focus field initiatives? Which approaches/models have worked best and what synergies can be identified?
- **Gender and vulnerable and marginalized groups:** To what extent has the CSM mainstreamed gender considerations, including opportunities to promote gender equality, and contributed to the empowerment of women, youth, minorities, and marginalized groups, as well as the realization of human rights? Did any (possible) unintended effects emerge for specific groups?
- **Coordination:** To what extent are current collaboration and coordination modalities between CSM entities effective (including in terms of geographic and thematic division of labour), and how can they be further optimized? How has the CSM fostered coordination between CSM entities and within the broader UN system?

Efficiency

- To what extent has programme management been efficient in generating the expected results?
- To what extent have resources been used efficiently, including in focus field locations, and to what extent have activities been cost-effective and delivered in a timely manner?
- To what extent has there been an economical use of financial and human resources? Have resources (funds, staff, time, expertise, etc.) been allocated strategically?

- How has the CSM monitored progress and documented lessons learned from focus field initiatives, and how could it be improved in the future?

Sustainability

- **Overall sustainability:** In the medium to long term, to what extent will CSM partners benefit from the CSM Phase II efforts and results in addressing climate-related security risks? To what extent is the CSM expected to be sustainable as a mechanism and joint programme?
- **Dedicated capacity:** To what extent has the CSM contributed to the development of global, regional, national, and local dedicated capacity to bridge gaps in analyzing and addressing climate-related security risks? To what extent will resources remain available to sustain such capacity, including the deployment of embedded experts in focus field initiatives?
- **Replicability, upscaling, and exit:** In CSM Phase II focus field initiatives, how replicable are results, processes and approaches to other locations? To what extent do focus field initiatives have development, upscaling or exit strategies?
- **Risks:** Are there any social, political, and financial risks, or risks associated with the legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes within which the CSM Joint Programme operates, that may jeopardize the sustainability of CSM Phase II results?

Impact

Expected CSM (medium-term) outcome and (long-term) impact:

- To what extent has the CSM Phase II contributed to achieve its expected outcome and impact?
- Moving forward, how could the CSM's expected impact be reformulated and better measured through relevant indicators and metrics in the framework of the next phase of the CSM?

Impact of the CSM as a joint programme:

- How have CSM outputs across priority areas (including knowledge products and tools) been useful to CSM stakeholders and strengthened the capacity of the UN system to systematically analyze and address climate-related security risks?
- To what extent have climate-related security risk assessments undertaken as part of focus field initiatives (as appropriate) informed related response strategies and follow-up activities?
- How has dedicated capacity in focus field initiatives contributed to more concerted analysis and action, new or strengthened partnerships with key stakeholders, and mainstreaming of climate security into the work of UN missions and (sub-)regional organizations?
- To what extent has the UN CoP on Climate Security enabled awareness raising, exchange of experiences and lessons learned and become a UN "hub" for climate security practice, and generated joint work beyond traditional policy silos? How could the CoP be strengthened?

Impact of the CSM as a catalyst:

- To what extent has the CSM helped grow attention to and foster a common understanding of climate security, shape and inform the climate security policy agenda? Has this contributed to the mobilization of increasing and more sustainable resources for climate security as an integrated policy area (particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts)?
- Has the CSM helped bring coherence in the way the UN system addresses this agenda, from building awareness to developing integrated approaches to climate action and sustaining peace?
- To what extent has the CSM contributed to catalyze partnerships within the UN, including through the UN CoP on Climate Security, and beyond the UN system?
- To what extent has the CSM helped catalyze integrated policy and programming work on climate security by UN entities, Member States, and non-UN actors, including in regional or country contexts not directly supported by the CSM?