

Terminal Evaluation of the Project:

**“Strengthening Evidence Based Decision Making for
Citizen Security in the Caribbean (CariSECURE)”**

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

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*This final report lays out the results of the evaluation conducted for UNDP Barbados, between September 1st, the day the contract was signed, and November 14, 2022. It covered the 8 countries - **Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname**-, that participated to the conclusion of CariSECURE 1.0. CariSECURE is a Key Activity under the USAID’s Youth Empowerment Services (YES) Project.*

*It was guided by the methodology described in the Inception Report, and according to the TORs. The evaluation process also followed the **UNDP Evaluation Guidelines** and the **Code of Conduct** of the evaluator.*

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I would like to highlight the capable and motivated staff of the CariSECURE 1.0 Project Management Unit, many of whom served as key informants in this review. Their commitment to project, despite the difficulties encountered, is recognized, and highly appreciated. Hopefully, this report does justice to their commendable efforts and somewhat motivates them to keep facing the challenges currently experienced with the strengthening of Youth and Gender Crime knowledge in the Caribbean.

All comments on the evaluation report by the evaluation reference group are considered by the evaluators and duly addressed, where appropriate, in the final text of this report. Furthermore, I declare no conflict of interest in this assignment. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDP Barbados. For any lapse or error in this report, the responsibility rests solely with me.

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ACRONYMS

AMEP	Activity Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
AOR	Agreement Officer Representative
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CCSIF	Caribbean Composite Citizen Security Indicator Framework
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contract Officer Representative
DO	Development Objective
DQA	Data Quality Assessment
ESC	Eastern and Southern Caribbean
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GIS	Geographic Information System
IBTCI	International Business & Technical Consultants Inc.
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IR	Intermediate Result
MSI	Management Systems International
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
NQAF	National Quality Assurance Framework
PIF	Police Incident Form
PIRS	Performance Indicator Reference Sheet
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PRMIS	Police Records Management Information System
RBM	Results-based Management
RF	Results Framework
RSS	Regional Security System
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

A. Background and Context

A.1 Regional Context and CariSECURE¹

1. Throughout the Caribbean, the economic and social well-being of the region has suffered high levels of violent crimes. According to the 2012 UNDP Caribbean Human Development Report (CHDR), this situation was worsened by the implementation of ineffective policies which failed to sufficiently address the root causes of violence and crime, especially among the region's youth. There was a need to improve youth crime and violence policymaking and programming in Caribbean countries using quality, comparable and reliable national citizen security information.

2. The failure of public policies to address youth crime and violence has been largely due to a lack of standardized, disaggregated data to understand the dimension of the problem and monitor the level of success of interventions. Assessments indicated that in most states of the Caribbean, data was not being systematically collected by individual entities nor shared among stakeholders involved in youth crime and violence (police, prisons, courts) and substantive joint analysis did not take place. It was evident that no comprehensive analysis was regularly provided to policymakers.

3. As a result, policies were being actioned and implemented without the required data to address the issues they were designed to solve. Moreover, not only was data not shared but there were marked silos and a hesitancy among agencies to collaborate and exchange information. This culture of not sharing crime data, resistance to change and the resulting environment it caused was not conducive to the successful implementation of citizens security policies.

4. Therefore, a series of national citizen security dialogues on “Defining Priority Actions for Sustainable Human Development and the Citizen Security Agenda” were held in the eight countries. Stakeholders included government ministries, youth and women's organizations, faith-based organizations, academia, and other stakeholders resulting in a set of recommendations and solutions for citizen security policy and programming – including prevention – at the national level. The recommendations also included core sets of citizen security indicators to be monitored at the national level.

5. Knowledge Management was applied when preliminary citizen security information management needs assessments were conducted in beneficiary countries. These assessments were based on meetings with Police; Central Statistical Offices; Ministries of National Security/Home Affairs, Social Transformation/Social Cohesion and Youth; and various civil society organizations.

6. Additionally, a legal assessment on existing legal frameworks revealed that there were variations in legal definitions between Criminal Codes in each country, which needed to be addressed to allow the project to make a coherent regional impact. The assessment also found that there were no protocols or arrangements that provided an institutional underpinning for information sharing, yet existing legislative frameworks did not prevent information sharing between government agencies. This was a significant finding in that it allowed to consider an

¹ Adapted from: 2021 CLA Case Competition: “Citizen Security: CLA to Strengthen Evidence Based Decision Making in the Caribbean”.

adaptive approach and focus energies on formalizing information sharing and focus on the change management/cultural adaptation aspect of working with beneficiary countries rather than on legislative reform.

7. To facilitate knowledge sharing, a Citizen Security Toolkit was developed to capture administrative and survey data at different levels. The Toolkit included the Caribbean Citizen Security Indicator Framework (CCSIF); the Citizen Security Data Collection Form; the Caribbean Citizen Security Coding Structure; the Guidance Notes on Citizen Security Data Collection and Dissemination; and a Draft Data Sharing Agreement.

8. Lastly, continuous learning and improvement was demonstrated in the use of a phased approach to the introduction of the Police Incident Form (PIF) to test, learn and adapt the software for the final implementation of the PRMIS platform and in so doing, allow partners in each beneficiary country to prepare and to be better equipped in terms of ICT infrastructure, computer literacy, human capacity and change management support.

A.2 Project Information²

9. CariSECURE is a Key Activity under the USAID's larger Youth Empowerment Services (YES) Project. The purpose of the YES Project is to increase the institutional and technical capacity of regional bodies, selected national government systems and community stakeholders to reduce risk factors that drive youth crime, violence, and victimization. It has a specific goal of reducing youth involvement in crime and violence in target communities. Accordingly, the YES Project has three expected results under its relevant Activities:

- **CariSECURE Project - Strengthened Evidence-based Decision-making in Youth Crime and Violence Prevention Policy and Programming.**
- Community, Family and Youth Resilience (CFYR) Project - Communities, families, and youth strengthened to withstand, mitigate, and recover from crime and violence.
- Juvenile Justice Reform Project (JJRP) – The rehabilitation and reintegration of youth in conflict with the law in society.

10. CariSECURE 1.0 was also a regional project part of the Regional Programme Strategy. As such, the project is aligned with the regional objectives laid out in the 2018-2021 programme, and was executed across 8 countries: **Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.** The project was implemented by the UNDP Barbados Multi-country Office in cooperation with the UNDP Offices in Guyana and Suriname and with specific oversight from the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) due to the regional scope of the project (Eastern and Southern Caribbean).

11. CariSECURE's three (3) Approaches were:

- National Approach- Led by stakeholders (National Task Force mandate) and facilitated by interagency protocols for sharing data.

² Extracted from Project Documents and Terminal Evaluation ToRs.

- Regional Approach- Standardized regional indicators, data platforms and crime analysis methodology and citizen security framework
- International Approach- ICCS, UN-Crime trends survey and the SDG 16

12. At the national level, the project engaged partners and stakeholders to include: National Security Ministries, police forces, statistical offices, probation and parole services, public prosecution offices, courts, prisons, Ministries of Youth. CARISECURE worked with regional institutions such as the Regional Security System (RSS) and supported the establishment of a regional crime observatory at the organization to collect and aggregate national data on the citizen security indicators from their member states on a monthly basis and generate regional analysis to feed into their semi-annual meeting of the Council of Ministers of National Security.

13. The primary objective was to improve national capacities in the beneficiary countries to collect citizen security data based on an agreed set of core citizen security and juvenile justice indicators. The result of this is the availability of quality and comparable citizen security data that can be analyzed to inform the design and implementation of policies and programs that aim to reduce crime and violence.

Project ToC, goals/objectives and expected results

14. As mentioned, the CariSECURE project was a regional initiative implemented by UNDP and is one of three components of the broader USAID Youth Empowerment Services (YES) Project. CariSECURE worked to strengthen the integrity and accessibility of citizen security data in 8 Eastern and Southern Caribbean countries.

15. The project supported building systems and capacities of public officers to analyze and use data to develop targeted policies to effectively reduce and prevent youth involvement in violence and crime. The overall goal of the CARISECURE project was to improve youth crime and violence policymaking and programming in the Southern and Eastern Caribbean, using disaggregated, comparable, and reliable national citizen security information.

16. The Project's Theory of Change illustrated that a disaggregated and standardized way of reporting and sharing crime administrative and survey data by and across national authorities will incentivize an ongoing reliance on this data. It was envisioned that this would foster the culture of evidence-informed approaches to citizen security policymaking generally, and youth crime and violence prevention more specifically. The pathway to this is through increased institutional and technical capacities of national governments for crime and violence prevention and protection of vulnerable groups.

17. The Project intervention logic was based on a public health approach to violence prevention, comprised of four essential steps: 1. Identifying the problem; 2. Identifying Risk and Protective factors; 3. Developing and Pilot Testing Prevention Strategies; and 4; Ensuring widespread adoption and scale up of successful strategies. The three Project outputs are:

- **Output 1:** Standardized and disaggregated crime data reporting within and among national authorities to foster the reliance on valid, reliable, and comparable data on citizen security.
- **Output 2:** Utilization of evidence-based analysis of crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programs, and policies

- **Output 3:** Improved decision-making on youth crime and violence based on available evidence at national level.

Modifications

18. Through this Theory of Change, the Project was originally designed to deliver on three core USAID Outputs:

- **Output 1:** *Standardized and Disaggregated Crime Data Sources Established to Facilitate Identification and Measurement of Youth Risk and Resilience Factors.*
- **Output 2:** *Reliance on Evidence-Based Analysis of Crime and Violence Data to Inform National Citizen Security Policymaking.*
- **Output 3:** *Targeted Policymaking to Reduce Likelihood of Youth Involvement in Crime and Violence, based on Valid, Reliable, and Comparable Evidence at all Levels.*

19. CariSECURE was originally designed with a US\$14 million budget, but due to donor funding limitations, a substantive revision was carried out and approved by the Project Board in November 2018 reducing project activities and funding to US\$9.55 million. Significant modifications included a reduction in the number of target countries from 10 to eight (8), reduction in the number of national beneficiaries from five (5) to three (3) in each country, and the elimination of some key activities which resulted in revised project outputs and indicators. The proposed realignment did not alter the strategic focus on youth but allowed a more targeted focus with unique in-country stakeholders for ensuring the realization of the project's outputs. The present outputs (see previous section) are the result of the realignment that included the refocusing of the project's outputs.

20. A strategic realignment was further approved in July 2020 to extend the period of performance and completion date of the award to 30 September 2021, reducing the fund award for the total obligated number of USD 9,165,000.00, and an update to the programme description, and reduction in the number of national beneficiaries from 3 to 1 in each country. A further extension was approved in August 2020 to extend the period of performance and completion date of the award to September 30, 2021, to incrementally fund the award in the amount of US\$1,450,000.00 for the total obligated amount of US\$9,965,000.00, and an update to the program description. It was granted by USAID due to the impacts of the COVID-19 Global Pandemic on the Information Communication Technology (ICT) supply chain, and to deliver the key element of Police Records Management Information System (PRMIS) as it was delayed due to the impacts of COVID19. The changes are summarized in the following table:

	Original Budget in USD	Budget (Revision 2018)	Budget (Revision June 2020)	Budget (Revision July 2021)	Budget (Revision January 2022)	Extension Cost May 2022 to October 2022
TOTAL BUDGET	14,000,000	9,500,000	9,165,000	9,365,000	9,965,000	600,000
Number of countries targeted	10	8	8	8	8	7 (*)
Number of national beneficiaries	5	3	1	1	1	1

21. The impact assessed necessitated a 7-month extension and a request for US\$200,000 additional funds to deliver PRMIS in January and February 2022 and allow for post-deployment Monitoring & Evaluation whilst continuing to work with national counterparts to expand data use in advocacy and decision-making to period ending April 29, 2022. A more recent assessment of the impact suggested that a further 6-month extension beyond April 2022, coupled with a request of US\$600,000 would provide adequate time to mitigate the risk associated with delays to the PRMIS centralized solution at CARICOM IMPACS while also presenting an opportunity to bolster national crime analysis capacity and standardize crime analysis reporting in beneficiary countries where crime analysis units were established.

22. It would also permit a more realistic timeframe for post-deployment monitoring and evaluation around data collection through PRMIS and data use in the development of strategies and policies for crime and violence prevention. Additionally, sustainability measures focused on extending the PRMIS Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the software vendor and addressing some of the national level gaps identified in the sustainability framework and ICT Roadmaps that would support the deployment and uptake of the PRMIS system.

23. The extension was granted to April 29, 2022, and a further USAID contribution was received of US\$200,000 additional funds to support this extension, resulting in a total obligated amount of USD 9,365,000.00. A final extension was granted in March 2022, which increased the USAID contribution to USD 9,965,000 and extended the project's lifecycle to October 31, 2022, to allow sufficient time for capacity-building initiatives with national and regional partners, the operationalization of data warehousing solutions, supporting countries in crime analysis, and addressing ICT gaps.

B. Methodology

B.1 Description of the Intervention

24. The final evaluation report will provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The Evaluator will review all relevant sources of information and any other materials that the team considers useful for this evidence-based evaluation. A participatory and consultative approach will be followed ensuring close engagement with the Project Team, government counterparts, Implementing Partners, the UNDP Country Office(s), USAID, direct beneficiaries, and other stakeholders.

25. Engagement of stakeholders is vital to a successful evaluation. Stakeholder involvement included interviews with stakeholders who had project responsibilities, including but not limited to organizations and persons listed in Annex I; executing agencies, senior officials and task team/component leaders, key experts and consultants in the subject area, Project Board, project beneficiaries, academia, local government and CSOs, etc. The Evaluator conducted field missions to consult with local project teams and the key stakeholders in the following countries from each Tier:

Tier 1 countries – Barbados and Grenada

Tier 2 countries - Saint Kitts and Nevis

B.2 Evaluation scope, objectives, criteria, and questions

26. The evaluation will assess the project's implementation and its results as compared to its planned activities and outputs (taking account of necessary changes made in response to COVID-19); the extent to which the project's objectives were effectively and efficiently achieved or are expected to be achieved; and the relevance of the project's contributions. It will provide an independent assessment of the achievements of the project, through an analysis of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and orientation to impact the project. The TE will also assess the viability of the interventions vis-à-vis the project outcomes and expected results, assess the implementation approaches, progress made, and challenges encountered, identify, and document the lessons learnt and good practices while addressing questions on how the intervention sought to mainstream gender in development efforts, considered disability issues and applied the human rights-based approach.

27. The TE will also lay the foundation for a sustainability and scaling up of the project. The terminal evaluation will be conducted between September and November 2022 to ensure all the results to date are captured. Furthermore, the evaluation will support accountability, learning, planning, and building knowledge and will extract lessons learned for future UNDP capacity development activities in Public Security and Crime Prevention, and to provide specific recommendations to UNDP to support the implementation of the next phase of the project. The evaluation will be shared with all project stakeholders, including the beneficiary country

28. As a result of the considerations set above, two overall *generative* questions for this evaluation can be formulated³:

Has the project succeeded in laying the foundations for a robust and sustainable information system on crime and citizen security data to inform policy?

Has the project fostered evidence-based decisions on youth crime and violence, with a special focus on gender-based violence?

29. Derived from this generative question, seven key general supplementary questions are added:

- i. Have youth crime and citizen security information systems upgraded to become reliable and useful data sources to inform policy design and implementation? Is there evidence-based decision making on a national level, and through the regional crime observatory?
- ii. Have police forces in each country showed active acceptance and ownership of the information systems implemented, especially the digitalized and mobile data collection systems? Do they shifted from paper

³ As mentioned, the CariSECURE 1.0 project was object of adjustments in its scope (countries, beneficiaries, activities) that resulted in revised outputs and indicators. All these changes altered the original logic and pathways set as ToC. Consequently, this core question will be assessed against a revised or reconstructed ToC, closer to what at the end the project was expected to deliver.

to a digital culture in an irreversible way, and have in place processes to update installed systems and hardware that will help preserve the investments/upgrades made?

- iii. Have they created Crime Analysis Units to use *intelligence* for crime prevention and criminal investigations? Are police forces and relevant stakeholders better aware and prepared for combatting TIP?
- iv. Can concrete signs of improvement in citizen security systems performance of each country be identified, with the use of the CST, ICCS, and strategic and tactical responses to crime and violence due to information sharing between the Police and relevant agencies, and the coordinated support of CariSECURE, with gender and youth considerations?
- v. Is there a perception of better results, citizen satisfaction, impartiality, and higher professionalization of its police officers? Is there a feeling of greater predominance of ethics, legality, and internal and external trust in police forces?
- vi. Is there an improvement in the situation of women's rights, in the sense of a decrease in cases of unpunished violence, abuse and discrimination for gender reasons?
- vii. What are the main successes of the strategy implemented by the project, and its main weaknesses?

30. Key questions for the TE framed by the Evaluation Criteria are as follows (adapted from the Evaluation Matrix in the Terms of Reference -see Annex-):

Relevance: Is the intervention doing the right thing?

- Is the problem of the lack of consistent data on crime, youth crime, and gender violence well addressed?
- Are assumptions correct, and changes to the context to achieving the project results considered?
- Was the project concept in line with the national development priorities and plans of each country, and full ownership can be perceived?
- Were perspectives of those who would be affected by project decisions, those who could affect the outcomes, and those who could contribute information or other resources to the process, considered during project design processes?
- Were relevant gender issues (e.g., gender-based violence and discrimination, involvement of women's groups, engaging women in project activities) raised in the Project Document and implementation strategy?
- Were the project's results framework, indicators, targets, objectives, outcomes and components clear, practical, and feasible within its time frame?

Effectiveness: Is the intervention achieving its objectives?

- Are there any remaining barriers to achieving the project's objective for the remainder of the project?
- Has progress so far led to or could in the future catalyze beneficial development effects (i.e., income generation, gender equality and women's empowerment, improved governance etc...) that weren't included in the project results framework and monitored on an annual basis?
- Are there ways in which the project can further expand these benefits?
- Have changes been made and are they effective?

- Are responsibilities and reporting lines clear?
- Is decision-making transparent and undertaken in a timely manner?
- Did the Executing Agency/Implementing Partner and/or UNDP and other partners have the capacity to deliver benefits to or involve women? If yes, how?
- Adaptive management changes have been reported by the project management and shared with the Project Board?
- Lessons derived from the adaptive management process have been documented, shared with key partners, and internalized by partners?

Efficiency: how well are resources being used?

- Does the project strategy provide the most sound or relevant route towards expected/intended results?
- Does the project take full advantage of ICTs to foster its solutions?
- Are work-planning processes results-based?
- Does the project have the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allow management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allow for timely flow of funds?
- In case co-financing is used, is co-financing being used strategically to help the objectives of the project? Is the Project Team meeting with all co-financing partners regularly to align financing priorities and annual work plans?

Coherence: how well does the intervention fit?

- Did local and national government stakeholders support the objectives of the project? Did they continue to have an active role in project decision-making that supports efficient and effective project implementation?
- Have there been synergies and interlinkages between the project and other interventions carried out by the government?
- Is the project in alignment with other interventions in the same context (I.e. complementarity, harmonization and coordination with others, and the extent to which the intervention is adding value while avoiding duplication of effort)

Sustainability: will the benefits last?

- The risks identified in the Project Document, Annual Project Review/Annual Project Progress Reports are the most important and the risk ratings applied are appropriate and up to date?
- What is the likelihood of financial and economic resources not being available once USAID assistance ends (consider potential resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and other funding that will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project's outcomes)?
- Were there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project outcomes?
- What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership (including ownership by governments and other key stakeholders) will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained?
- Did the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow?
- Was there sufficient public / stakeholder awareness in support of the long-term objectives of the project?
- Are lessons learned being documented by the Project Team on a continual basis and shared/ transferred

to appropriate parties who could learn from the project and potentially replicate and/or scale it in the future?

- Do the legal frameworks, policies, governance structures and processes, or changes in these, pose risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project benefits?
- Installing the crime observatory in IMPACTS was part of the sustainability strategy. Is the functionality of the observatory adequate to play this potential role once the project is over?

In addition to the key evaluation questions, the TE also seeks the answers to the following questions related to the M&E and communication and knowledge management of the project:

Project-level Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

- Did the monitoring system provide the necessary information?
- Did they involve key partners?
- Have they been aligned or mainstreamed with national systems?
- Did they use existing information?
- Were they efficient? Were they cost-effective?
- Were additional tools required?
- Were sufficient resources allocated to monitoring and evaluation? Were these resources being allocated effectively?
- Were relevant gender issues incorporated in monitoring systems?

Communications & Knowledge Management

- Has the project developed and leveraged the necessary and appropriate partnerships with direct and tangential stakeholders?
- To what extent has stakeholder involvement and public awareness contributed to the progress towards achievement of project objectives?
- Was communication regular and effective?
- Were key stakeholders left out of communication?
- Were there feedback mechanisms when communication is received?
- Did this communication with stakeholders contribute to their awareness of project outcomes and activities and investment in the sustainability of project results?
- Were proper means of communication established or being established to express the project progress and intended impact to the public (is there a web presence, for example? Did the project implement appropriate outreach and public awareness campaigns?)

Evaluability analysis

- Did CARISECURE strategy logically match the problem analysis?
- Was the theory of change and its later adjustments clearly expressed and explicitly laid out in a way that appears plausible to the non-specialist, in the narrative, and/or as a graph?
- Were its outcomes relevant, precise, and verifiable in a robust results framework?
- Were performance indicators appropriate proxies for outcomes in terms of capturing relevant changes?
- Were there adequate resources reserved to implement the monitoring plan, including establishment of initial baseline measures?
- Was CARISECURE's approach within the context of the UN development frameworks, which require a

preliminary judicious analysis of institutional and implementation capacity?

- Is there evidence in project design and implementation of a thorough understanding of wider complementarities, i.e., the results chain linking individual projects to the broader objectives of a specific sector, and their contribution to national development goals, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?

Cross-cutting themes:

- How did the project engage women?
- Will the project likely have the same positive and/or negative effects on women and men?
- Identify, if possible, constraints on women's participation in the project. What can the project do to enhance its gender benefits?
- What was the gender balance of project staff?
- What steps have been taken to ensure gender balance in project staff?
- What was the gender balance of the Project Board? What steps have been taken to ensure gender balance in the Project Board?
- Did the M&E framework support performance reporting on gender equality?
- Were indicators framed in a manner that would inform the gender equality and disability inclusion related results?
- Were broader development and "crosscutting areas" such as the integration of gender, human rights, and persons with disabilities, monitored effectively?
- Did data collection methods support gender- disaggregated monitoring and reporting?
- Were critical reflection processes and events involving constituents and stakeholders adequately planned?

B.3 Evaluation approach and methods

31. The methodology utilised was a mixed method evaluation. The qualitative aspect is important as a critical component of the process is the collection of the information of the incident or crime on the spot or during the complaint made by the victim. Given the specific information gathering process the project is focused on, a lot is at stake at the outset of incident or crime reporting. If information is poorly surveyed or lost when making the report, it is then difficult to recover or reconstruct. The obvious solution adopted by most countries is a form with standardized items. However, this improvement runs into numerous difficulties:

First, it does not always adapt to the needs and customs of Justice. Prosecutors or other judiciary officials can be accustomed to the criminal narrative, although there is room for a narrative afterwards.

Second, the police themselves are trained and accustomed to creating narratives, presenting a challenge in shifting strategies

Third, a defining aspect is the interpretation and meaning given to the items of the typified form. Two agents from the same base and similar trajectories can interpret the wording of the form items very differently.

Fourth, all the classic resistance to change also adds up: distrust in a digital system; rejection for being imposed from outside the country, by donors; doubts about continuity once the external aid has ended; local capacity to properly maintain the system, etc.

32. Thus, a critical aspect of data collection will be semi-structured interviews with police officers. A representative and well-designed sample of officers who are effectively on the street should be assembled, and ideally, with recently promoted police officers with hierarchical functions, who have previously been using the system at the street level as well. These will be the main KIs of the process, since they experienced the system at the base, and then analyzed it from an upstream perspective.

33. Another critical aspect to be evaluated would be the capacity and, above all, continuity of the technicians and analysts at the higher levels of the system. Collecting, processing and validly analyzing criminal information is a highly complex task. No less is the professional capacity needed to interpret this data, and to design and implement quality, efficient and effective citizen security policies.

34. The main reason for underdevelopment is the state's weakness as an autonomous structure with a permanent bureaucracy. This undermines the construction of trained and experienced teams, including here the hierarchies. It will be important to evaluate the degree of stability and validity of a merit system to elicit the sustainability of Cari SECURE reforms.

35. The last emphasis of the proposed methodological approach- which will be corrected and complemented once it is confronted with more information and dialogue with the actors of the process – is the gender issue. Women who are abused or sexually assaulted, despite the seriousness of the crime, are still intimidated from making a complaint, and when they dare to do so, they face situations that can further aggravate the nightmare they have lived through until then.

36. Modifying this situation and consolidating a system that is not only sensitive but also proactive when it comes to combating gender-based crimes, is one of the main public policy challenges. Here it is important to carefully evaluate the narrative of police officers, both hierarchical and at the street level, to understand what the prevailing culture is.

37. In summary, and for everything said so far, I propose a methodology based on in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants, keeping the ***social desirability bias*** at check. A danger to avoid in an evaluation like this, is to carry out quick and superficial interviews with the officials and members of the project, so that they tell what they think we want to hear.

B.4 Data Analysis

38. The key aspect of this evaluation was a qualitative survey of beneficiaries, with special attention to capturing the real sentiment of beneficiaries and stakeholder's vis a vis the service improvements to understand their concerns and address their proposals. The purpose of this approach is to strengthen the reliability of data, the validity of the findings and recommendations, and to broaden and deepen our understanding of the processes through which program outcomes are achieved, and how these are affected by the context within which the program is implemented.

39. Specifically, adopting a qualitative analysis through interviews seeks to understand the program through studying the relationships among many different elements of the stakeholder community or other setting in which the program operates. The aim of the interviews is to identify mechanisms through which the program helps to achieve its objectives. For this purpose, statements will be analyzed according to whether they attribute the outcomes to project activities.

40. The objective is to analyze, implementing a survey based on in-depth interviews, the beneficiaries' present status in relation to the key dimensions previously defined, adding strategic supplementary aspects to those normally included in the qualitative analysis. In terms of obtaining a sample that covers the main voices relevant to the reform process in the 8 participating countries, an initial size of 40+ interviews -5 KIs per country on average- is proposed (see ANNEX 1). Determining the optimal sample size in qualitative research can be difficult, because it is often adaptive and emergent: a sample size that is too small can risk adequate depth and breadth, but too large a sample size can produce shallow or unwieldy volumes of data, known as saturation.

41. Following the overall evaluation objective, the interview gathered statements will be categorized as to whether respondents described the effects as positive or negative. The methodology of this project consists of two aspects: on the one hand, the generation of data from interviews and FGDs, that will serve as input for the second phase: the evaluation of impact through econometric estimations.

B.5 Description of the evaluation methodology: activities, timeframe

42. Desk research, project document review and stakeholder interviews were the main method of evaluation, based on documentation related to the project, online communication and interviews and e-mails with key individuals from the UNDP as implementing agency; national and international consultants; and project stakeholders.

43. During the interviews, field observations, Focus Group Discussions, meetings with project staff, Implementing Partners, project stakeholders and other key informants identified during the field sessions, plus internal travel, will complete each of the working days. In FGDs, a richer approach and a better understanding of the key questions will be obtained, since in-depth interviews seek a candidate perspective from the beneficiary -mainly police officers-, while focus groups encourage discussion and exchange of ideas. A "LESSONS LEARNED" workshop with project implementers can also be considered.

44. A tool for assessing project effectiveness was the Results Framework indicators against progress made towards the end-of- project targets using the Progress Towards Results Matrix; color code progress in a "traffic light system" based on the level of progress achieved; a rating was assigned based on the progress of each outcome; make recommendations from the areas marked as "Not on target to be achieved" (red).

45. The total duration of the Final Evaluation will be approximately 90 calendar days over a time of 12 weeks starting from the date of contract signature and shall not exceed 5 months from when the consultant is hired. The tentative Final Evaluation timeframe is as follows; however, completion dates are tentative and may be adjusted based on unforeseen events.

Date (2022)	Activity / Milestone	Responsible
September 7	Contract Signed Final Evaluation Start Date	UNDP Evaluation Manager
September 8	Introductory meeting- project progress to date, timeline shared	UNDP Evaluation Manager
September 8	Complete Project Information Package Shared with Final Evaluator (individual files clearly labeled making their content self-evident)	UNDP Evaluation Manager with support from project team

Date (2022)	Activity / Milestone	Responsible
September 8 to 12	Evaluator reviews project information package documents	Evaluator
September 12	Briefing with PMU: PMU briefs Evaluator on project and what has transpired to date, also describing any issues that may have been encountered	Requires the presence of PC and the Admin/Finance Officer
September 18	Draft the inception report and submits to UNDP	Evaluator
September 18	Introductory emails sent and contacts shared with Evaluator (beneficiary reps. Police commissioners, taskforce focal point, readiness managers. To be identified)	UNDP CO and/or PMU (if CO requests PMU to do this on their behalf)
September 23	Meeting with Readiness Managers	PMU
	Introductory meeting with Evaluation Reference Group	ERG roles discussed with Evaluator
September 28	Comments returned on Inception report	ERG, UNDP Evaluation Manager, PC and Cluster Lead
September 30	Inception report finalised	
October 4 to October 24	Interviews with stakeholders Site visits to 3 countries: Barbados, Grenada and St Kitts and Nevis.	Evaluator
November 2	Prepare and Present preliminary findings	
November 24	Evaluator submits draft Evaluation report	
December 1	Deadline for receipt of UNDP comments on the draft report in Audit Trail format	ERG, UNDP Evaluation Manager, PC and Cluster Lead
December 12	Deadline for receipt of stakeholder comments on the draft report in Audit Trail format	Key stakeholders
December 16	Submit Final Evaluation Report and Audit Trail (Evaluator addresses and incorporates all comments and includes his/her response to all comments in the audit trail, shares Audit trail)	

C. Findings

C.1 General: supporting information for the performance assessment

134. CariSECURE 1.0 suffered significant delays and modifications related to inception, formulation, and monitoring framework issues. Other factors that affected the project in a substantial way were factors out of its control: budget cuts, pandemics, political momentum, and hurricanes.

135. At present, however, and through PRMIS deployment, the project has achieved a substantial result: to set the foundations of **full digitalization of police operations**, and **full statistical standardization of crime data**, that can be available at the regional level. Considering that actual implementation only started, this year with Grenada, and had to confront several challenges, advances are remarkable, and prospects are positive. PRMIS is showing it will deliver. The leading countries, also including Barbados and St Kitts, besides Grenada, had higher previous digitalization capabilities. They are doing the harder trial and error inevitable in any ICT system, but taking advantage of the process, and paving the way for the followers. One can expect faster learning curves for the countries that come behind. Country coordination challenges lay ahead, however nothing that the installed capabilities of actors cannot successfully address, under the umbrella of an adequate and vigorous sustainability strategy.

136. However, the project did not only consist of the installation of the PRMIS system, but also developed other activities that promoted the digitalization of information on crime in the participating countries. Also, the project worked on different initiatives to improve the availability of information, the analysis of knowledge about crime, and also the possibility that public policies on citizen security are formulated more based on evidence.

C.2 Performance assessment: assessment against the evaluation criteria/questions

137. In the analysis of CariSECURE performance, it is useful to single out in the duration of the project two periods: the first, up to the first major revision, and the second, from the second major revision onwards. Before the revision, most evaluation criteria are not satisfied, nor is there a projection they will be. At the end of the project, and after its main revision, the project gains in relevance and effectiveness. However, reaching a satisfactory mark in these key criteria is done at the expense of fully addressing the rest of the criteria, and especially its efficiency, coherence and M&E capabilities.

138. The different adjustments needed for the project to become effective and relevant at the outcome, changed the focus given to different countries and beneficiary sectors. So, in the end, initial resources were invested in beneficiaries, activities and products that were later discontinued or sided because of these changes. Sharpening the focus of the project also is done sacrificing potential stakeholder participation: the initial CariSECURE 1.0 ambitious design aimed at involving almost all actors of the citizen security system in each country. So, this did affect coherence at some point.

Criteria	CariSECURE 1.0 up to revisions	CariSECURE 1.0 after revisions	Rating	
Relevance	MU: donor, regional and analyst biases.	Police operations digitalization high in the police force modernization agenda	HS 6	Highly Satisfactory
Effectiveness	MU: since PIF is geared towards the regional data needs more than to police needs.	PRMIS still to replace old system but has passed the threshold of acceptance. Deployment is a matter of time -and sustained efforts. Other results pending.	S 5	Satisfactory
Efficiency	MU: dispersion of efforts in unrealistic outputs; wrong country priorities with too many turnarounds.	Still addressing medium- and long-term deviations, direction changes, isolated efforts and recent staffing issues.	MS 4	Moderately satisfactory
Coherence	MS: efforts to engage stakeholders with mixed success, ending in focusing on too few.	With respect to external coherence (harmonization and coordination with others): Focusing solely on police forces has better supported their operational and criminal data needs. However, the concentrated focus on the police forces may have limited the impact of other key actors who are especially interlinked to police information management, such as the judiciaries.	MS 4	Moderately satisfactory
Sustainability	HU: budget and orientation changes and low yields left countries reluctant to follow.	Leaders are buying, entering phase of palpable/substantial advantages of PRMIS. Missing full RSS/CI engagement.	MS 4	Moderately satisfactory
Project-level M&E Systems	MS: Reasonable AMEPs in place, however, outputs too unrealistic, design flaws	Inherited M&E framework from CariSECURE inception not adapted to streamlined operations under PRMIS deployment and for tight follow-up of residual activities. PB meetings needed.	MU 3	Moderately unsatisfactory
Comm & KM	HU: dispersion/low technical KM.	PRMIS deployment technical efforts neglected broad Comm & KM strategy. Project Board meetings are missing.	MU 3	Moderately unsatisfactory
Cross-cutting issues	MU: Progress limited to youth/gender statistics disaggregation.	Some progress is reported (St Lucia/Guyana) still bolder initiatives missing in most countries	MS 4	Moderately Satisfactory

139. After the revisions, the AMEP, which was already defective, is hardly adapted to the refocusing on PRMIS and the police forces. Nor there is occasion or effort left to put in place a more robust mechanism for knowledge sharing and diffusion, that would help leader countries boost the chances of those following. Communications and knowledge management suffered in the process, not to mention staff rotation both at the PMU level and at some participating countries.

Relevance

140. From its inception and until the first revision, CariSECURE has a focus on **crime analysis**, which guides the rationale of the project's background and justifications. Logically, priority was put into its importance to improve Caribbean citizen security policies. Citizen's security is a key priority in the Caribbean region, since most countries

relay of international tourism as a main source of economic activity, and crime is a deterrent for external tourism flows in any country. This might explain why at the inception of CariSECURE, all participant countries rapidly endorse the project fully and the first version of the “CariSECURE Citizen Security Toolkit” (more below). The project document states that:

“...Given the lack of an evidence-based culture circumscribing policy-making throughout the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, and the aim to improve the institutional capacity for evidence-based decision-making on youth crime and violence policy and programming in these eight beneficiary countries...”

141. However, the aim of setting a regional analysis structure is confronting different national realities, and several of them do not fit the general diagnosis. It is noted that some countries already had non-administrative crime information, and robust reporting and statistical systems, that were sustained and improved eventually.

Pre-existing data management capabilities at the national and regional level

142. According to the PM Del Misto, Trinidad and Tobago had already adopted the ICCS and had a powerful CIMS system by 2017. Not only Trinidad & Tobago, later excluded from CariSECURE, but also St Kitts and Nevis, Barbados, and Grenada had developed their own digital police reporting systems.⁴ Guyana also boasted an online crime reporting system, defined as “80% of PRMIS” by a local user. Also, at the regional level there were institutions working with consolidated digitalized statistics - originated both from paper sources in police stations, and from regional digital systems, for crime analysis and research: RSS and CARICOM IMPACS (CI).

143. CARICOM IMPACS (CI) and the Regional Security System (RSS) have not only regional coverage and influence, but also relevant operational background and technical capabilities to manage the systems – PRMIS hosting and Data Base- CariSECURE 1.0 has entrusted them. The RSS was chosen by CariSECURE to establish the Regional Crime Observatory (RCO) officially launched the RCO in August 2021. In addition, both agencies boast a regional exposure that could be built into post CariSECURE leadership for permanently upgrading and expanding these systems to other countries. The CI⁵ manages the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC), which includes the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC), the Maritime Single Window (MSW), the Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS) an automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) in CARICOM Member States, named Electronic Manifest Management (EMMA). CI also works in TIP training, and is developing the CBSI-Connect, a law enforcement training mechanism. The RSS partnered with Arizona State University (ASU) in 2020 to assess the scope and nature of the TYG problem in RSS member states, as well as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, and their capacity for responding to TYG problems and to offer recommendations for national and regional responses.

⁴ In St Kitts and Nevis the Crime Management System, in Barbados Security Information Management System, and in Guyana, the Crime Information System.

⁵ CARICOM IMPACS manages the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC), formed in 2007, and responsible for the operations and management of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), which gathers, analyses, and disseminates data of approximately forty (40) Million passengers annually travelling within the CARICOM Region by air and seaports. CI also hosts the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC), created in 2007, a sub agency that provides support to Member States in intelligence gathering, sharing and analysis. It is staffed mainly by attachments from individual Member States. Since 2020, CI manages the Maritime Single Window (MSW), part of the Integrated Border Systems, a digital platform where relevant information regarding ships, passengers and cargo is stored. It is a single electronic portal for completion of multiple documentation in relation to vessels, cargo and passengers which are required by the relevant border agencies. CI manages the Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS) an automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) in CARICOM Member States. ACIS which was named Electronic Manifest Management (EMMA), went into production on May 13th, 2019 with the Grenada Customs administration. CI works in TIP, training law enforcement officers in victim care, interagency cooperation, and Harmonized TIP Legislations, Counter Trafficking in Human Beings, Counter Smuggling of Migrants and Forced Returned Migrant. CI is developing the CBSI-Connect, a law enforcement training mechanism that includes a learning management system, content hosting, classroom video conferencing and a network of police academies and other institutions that host and participate in trainings.

Pre-existing statistical data

144. In the case of St Lucia, just to take the example of one of the two priority countries during the period before the revision, the use of evidence base policy formulation can already be found in the country’s 2020-2023 Medium Term Development Strategy. Of course, still a lot was to be done, especially in terms of improving the quantity, quality, timelines of data, disaggregating by age/gender and other demographics, and improving compilation and frequency of data sharing:


“...Although the crime rate has decreased in 2018/2019, over the past few years, Saint Lucia has been beset by an unprecedented rise in the rate of crime and violence... In 2017 a Royal Saint Lucia Police Force (RSLPF) Weekly Crime Report indicated that 81 percent of serious crime in Saint Lucia Islet, Micoud, Vieux Fort and Soufriere. During the period 2013 to 2017, criminal activity was concentrated in crimes against property, aggravated assaults, robberies, drug offences and sexual assaults, of which crime against property accounted for 63 percent. ...

...For the similar period, robbery and burglary increased by 10 percent and 4 percent respectively. At the same time, there was an uptick in grievous harm incidents which rose by 3.7 percent, while homicides increased by 79 percent for the period 2016 to 2017...

***...Cognizant of the potential impact of crime, successive governments have invested heavily to ensure national security.** It is understood that the use of a proactive approach is needed to curb the crime situation. The success of investments in educational, social and rehabilitation programmes with the hike in youth crime and the overall sustaining of Citizen Security in Saint Lucia...”*

p.7, 2020-2023 Medium Term Development Strategy: “Economic Growth on the A.R.I.S.E. – Nou Tout Ansanm”, 2018.

145. According to the list of contributors, this strategy was not drafted by external actors, but has been prepared entirely by the Department of Economic Development, Transport and Civil Aviation officials, with collaboration of the Caribbean Development Bank, and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. In fact, the CariSECURE, “Saint Lucia Citizen Security Taskforce Meeting, November 25, 2021” report source quoted is the “Police and Court administrative statistics (2016-2020) on major crimes sourced from “Central Statistical Office of Saint Lucia Annual Statistical Digest 2020” confirming that crime statistics were previously available.



146. The data from the Statistical Office does not have the sex or age disaggregation, but is quite detailed, and shows no serious concerns regarding crime evolution in the country. This contradicts the regional diagnosis previously mentioned that was justifying the intervention due to the worsening citizen security panorama in the Caribbean.

Besides the availability of crime statistics, the region also had a significant background in crime victims' surveys, namely the *IDB Caribbean Crime Victimization Survey module* attached to the 2014/15 Latin American Public Opinion Project Survey, administered in five capital cities: New Providence, The Bahamas; GBA: Greater Bridgetown Area, Barbados; KMA: Kingston Metropolitan Area, Jamaica; Paramaribo, Suriname; and PSMA: Port of Spain Metropolitan Area, Trinidad and Tobago.

Underestimation of the police force issue

147. At page 6 of the PRODOC, a brief diagnosis of the rising crime scene in the Caribbean can be found. It is immediately followed by a prescription:

*“...With crime rates coinciding with negative economic and social indicators in the Caribbean, (...) there is an **increased need for an evidenced based multi-sectoral response which focuses on prevention and empowerment**. Such responses go beyond a traditional security sector response which places an emphasis on judicial and legislative reform as well as strengthening the capacity of the security forces as punitive measures to punish perpetrators. A citizen security approach to crime prevention requires a paradigm shift from traditional approaches to one that allows for participatory processes with the inclusion of vulnerable groups such as youth and women...”*

148. These prescriptions are not based on any substantial evidence, at least referred to in the document. The fact that criminality is rising does not imply that (more) evidence-based policies are needed, or that “a paradigm shift” towards “participatory processes” is the solution. This is a bit paradoxical, given the declared project goal of bringing “evidence-based decisions” to the Caribbean citizen security systems.

149. More riskily, the text almost seems to equate “strengthening the capacity of the security forces” with “punitive measures to punish”. In these prescriptions formulated without empirical backing, the project is launched subtly biased against the role of the police forces in this issue, which is a big problem, for several reasons.

150. First, police officers are what Public Policy theory call “*street level bureaucrats*”, which are “on their own” at the crime scene, far from peers, the station, or other parts of the system. The quality and opportunity of their initial reporting is the key to the entire edifice. And the quality of reporting of a police officer is proportional to the quality of the officer itself, regardless collecting methods.

151. Second, what institutional strengthening for development practice shows around the world is that policies should become more human-centered, focusing on the quality -or capacity- of people, namely, public servants such as the police, more than in the “superstructure”, both normative and technological. The best norms, processes and systems fail if they are managed by the “wrong” people. If officials lack integrity, motivation, and capacity, all the rest is insufficient. As in any other sector, the citizen security sector shows how important it is to have good police officers. Without them, there is no security nor rule of law.

152. There are few better examples than this that a frequent “vicious circle” found (and statistically verified)

in juvenile crime prevention: when juvenile crime and gender-based violence gets on top of the agenda, stronger protective measures are enacted, including stricter police procedures, that increase their liability dealing with these types of cases. And as was verified by several police officers interviewed during this evaluation, the logical reaction of police forces is to avoid at all means interacting, arresting, or physically approaching young people, and specially women.

153. The next step, of course, is refraining from reporting on the incidents where they fail to intervene, except if a very serious crime is in the making. This further makes juvenile and sexual crime invisible, which directly and hardly hurts CariSECURE's primary objective. Not to say that when criminal gang leaders understand this situation, they tend to hire increasingly young, and especially women, for conducting criminal activities.

154. The weak link had already been detected, previous to CariSECURE. For instance, a paper published in 2015, begins in the introduction of its first chapter "Crime Trends in the Caribbean" authored by T.L. Gaona, with the following statement:

"...Conducting crime studies in the Caribbean has proven to be a difficult task since there are varying definitions of crime across the Caribbean countries. Fear and hatred for the police has led to underreporting of crime partly due to the lack of trust between citizens and law enforcement, which has led to poor records of incidents..."

155. Thus, the nucleus of CariSECURE's mission should have been -with a proper human centered diagnosis- **the strengthening of Caribbean police forces**, because only well motivated, committed, trained, human-right and especially gender sensitized police officers can overcome negative attitudes, such as refusing to deal with youth because of the legal risks involved for them. Key remedy is to foster institutional practices that create better human and organizational environments inside police forces, yield more satisfied and willing police officers.

156. In fact, that young people and especially women victims are well taken care of, in an incident or crime, depends very much on the preparation and good predisposition of police officers, who are happy with their jobs because they are happy with their position and tasks, happy with their boss, and with the police institution. Police officers will take better care of citizens -including young and women victims- when they are taken care of by the institution. This is what in this evaluation is meant by a "human-centered" focus on policing and citizens security policy in general. This relationship was regularly implicit in the way police officers interviewed described first what they understood was expected from them, and what the institution provided so they could fulfill their duty.

Getting fully relevant with PRMIS consequences for police work

157. The transition to a fully digitalized reporting system is not only as a more accurate, complete, faster, and safer way to manage information, but a tool that frees police officers from extremely tedious, obnoxious, and most times useless task of writing and copying by hand again and again the same information. This is, a tool that empowers police officers and help make them better perform their true mission: police service to the community, taking care of victims, listening to witnesses, persecuting criminals, etc., instead of being anchored to bureaucratic and Kafkaian narrative writing chores.

158. The project acknowledges that full digitalization is a priority seems to surface in November 2018, at the 4th CariSECURE Project Board Meeting, when confessing that there is a *"Decision to digitalize crime data as most countries still use books"*. Nevertheless, it took almost 4 years – with COVID Pandemic and a global supply shortages crisis-, to start seeing indistinguishable trends in some countries towards full digitalization of police forces.

159. PRMIS was -finally- conceived as the principal tool, the project backbone, aimed at providing a **fully effective and digital police operations management system**. It seemed primarily designed to free police officers from absurd hand-written reporting, provide intelligence -something police officers truly appreciate- and tactical knowledge for their day-to-day routine, and build a versatile knowledge management tool that helps disseminate senior officers' savoir-faire to the entire police force.

160. Regional statistics will be generated in the same process, but probably better conceived -because police officers are from the start, really accompanying the system. Moreover, a fully digitized police operation would help attract the young and bright into the police force, when today the archaic scribe methods used chase the best from being recruited. Young police officers interviewed were particularly shocked by the extent of the writing requirements.

Effectiveness

161. None withstanding the previous remarks, the project has achieved its main goal. The deployment of PRMIS supplemented with other training and awareness actions have succeeded in the sense of initiating ***“an automated, disaggregated, and standardized way of reporting and sharing administrative and survey crime data by and across these national authorities will incentivize an ongoing reliance on this data, towards fostering the culture of evidence-informed approach to citizen security policy-making generally, and youth crime and violence prevention more specifically.”*** All indicates the participating countries, in different stages of advancement, are transitioning towards these accomplishments. This was the consequence of achieving some remarkable and important results:

For Output I: Standardized and Disaggregated Crime Data Reporting Within and among National Authorities to foster the reliance on valid, reliable, and comparable data on Citizen Security

162. The institutionalization and operationalization of Correspondence Tables (CT) for the Adoption of the International Classifications of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) in all participating countries. The Project also developed, tested, deployed, and trained in relation to the Police Records Management Information System (PRMIS) with the ICCS Correspondence Tables (CT) and CariSECURE Citizen Security Indicators integrated, and provided ongoing training and technical assistance to regional and national authorities, in addition to hosting meetings on data governance protocols. To achieve this the Project focused on the institutionalization and operationalization of the Caribbean Citizen Security Toolkit -see table below- as to embody mechanisms for national authorities to capture administrative and survey data at different levels.

Caribbean Citizen Security Toolkit operationalization 2017-2018

Country	Date of First endorsement/ signature	Caribbean Composite Citizen Security Indicator Framework (CCSIF)	Citizen Security Data Collection Form	Citizen Security Data Coding Structure	Citizen Security Data Sharing Agreement	National Task Force Terms of Reference
The Caribbean Citizen Guidance Notes						
Antigua & Barbuda	31 October 2017	26 June 2018	26 June 2018	26 June 2018	26 June 2018	26 June 2018
Barbados	21 February 2018	21 Feb. 2018	21 Feb. 2018	21 Feb. 2018	21 Feb. 2018	21 Feb. 2018
Dominica		22 August 2018	22 August 2018	22 August 2018		
Grenada	19 June 2018	19 June 2018	19 June 2018	19 June 2018	19 June 2018	19 June 2018
Guyana	29 November 2017	13 March 2018	13 March 2018	13 Mar 2018	26 April 2018	11 January 2018
St. Kitts and Nevis		19 July 2018	19 July 2018	19 July 2018	19 July 2018	19 July 2018

St. Lucia	3 October 2017	30 May 2018	30 May 2018	30 May 2018	30 May 2018	3 October 2017
SVG	26 March 2018	26 March 2018	26 March 2018	26 Mar 2018	26 Mar 2018	26 Mar 2018
Suriname	12 February 2018	24 April 2018	24 April 2018	24 April 2018	13 July 2018	24 April 2018

Source: AMEP 2018, USAID.

163. The Project also engaged with CARICOM IMPACS to expand such analysis to CARICOM Member States, through the establishment of a crime and violence data warehouse which hosts the Police Records Management Information System (PRMIS) application and will support the RSS with the collection, monitoring and analysis of these regional indicators to support evidence-based decision-making on crime and violence within Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.

Output 1

EXPECTED OUTPUT	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)								DATA CLCT METHODS
			Value	Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	FINAL	
Output 1: Standardized and disaggregated crime data reporting within and among national authorities to foster the reliance on valid, reliable, and comparable data on citizen security	1.1 Number of countries with Government approved Caribbean Citizen Security Toolkit	Guidance Note, TOR, Info Sharing Agreement	0	2017	-	1	8	0	0	0	0	8	Document review
	1.2 Number of countries with draft Correspondence Tables for the International Classification of Crime f/ Statistical Purposes	Draft Correspondence Tables from CariSECURE countries	0	2017	-	-	0	0	0	8	0	8	Document review
	1.3 Number of countries with Digitized Application for the Police	Observation Mission Report	0	2017	-	-	-	2	5	1	0	8/a.	Observation Report
	1.4 Number of Tier I countries with 75% of Police stations with digitized Police application capable of collecting and producing crime statistics report	CariSECURE Country Readiness Assessment	0	2020					0	3	0	3/b.	Observation Report; Country Agreement
	1.5 Number of Tier I countries with 75% of Police stations utilizing mobile technology	CariSECURE Country Readiness Assessment	0	2020					0	0	3	3/c.	Observation Report; CA
	1.6 Number of partnerships implemented exposing Tiers 2 & 3 countries to funding for sustainable interventions to scale up the technological rollout for police applications	CariSECURE Country Readiness Assessment	0	2020					0	1	0	1	Donors/ Partnership Meeting Rt; Roadmaps
	1.7 Number of Tiers 2 and 3 countries with Government endorsed Roadmap for the independent roll-out of the Police application post CariSECURE	CariSECURE Country Readiness Assessment	0	2020					0	5	0	5/d.	Roadmaps

Source: CariSECURE PMU.

164. As of the attainment of Sub Output 1.4, only Grenada covers the definition on October 30, 2022. For Sub Output 1.5, mobile technology is still in an experimental phase, with Grenada using the provided PDAs for training purposes, and Barbados starting a deployment of digital reporting that includes the use of smartphones on incident or crime scenes. Partnerships are needed yet to become a reality (1.6) and all countries have their ICT Roadmaps, albeit only Antigua and Barbuda and Suriname have it officially endorsed.

PRMIS implementation

165. The implementation began in Grenada, which was the most advanced country in terms of technological availability. It had previous infrastructure derived from its participation in the CARCIP of the World Bank, with a data center and a fiber optic network. It was able to quickly fold into the PIF and then house both the PRMIS application and the crime data center to be generated.

166. Behind Grenada, were Barbados and Saint Kitts and Nevis, which also had previous experience in digitizing

police reports, with their respective online systems. The advantage of these two countries over Grenada was the availability of a greater amount of computer equipment, although without enjoying the same technological capabilities to host the application or to support data warehousing.

167. They were (and are at present) followed by Antigua and Barbuda -which is currently in the process of deploying PRMIS-, and Guyana, which has already advanced in the training of its police officers and in the beginning of the deployment of equipment. Because of the size of the country, Guyana faces an implementation challenge five to 10 times greater than island nations. Nevertheless, there seems to be a high level of engagement because government's LTE network is being built and the police forces will follow with PRMIS other digital transformation initiatives.

PRMIS deployment	Grenada		Barbados		St Vincent & the Grenadines		St Kitts & Nevis		Antigua & Barbuda		Guyana	
As end of October 2022	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
Nb of operationally trained personnel	500	301	280	375	600	161	120	120	150	140	2500	300
Nb of stations in country	14		12		21		11		13		124	
Nb of stations ready for PRMIS	11	14	9	12	16	5	8	11	10	12	93	70
Nb of stations live	11		7		2		3		11		0	
% of stations live (operationalized)	75%	79%	75%	58%	75%	10%	45%	27%	54%	54%	10	0
Nb of Trained Trainers	14		5		5		5		5		6	
Source: UNDP Barbados - CariSECURE PMU												

168. This dispersion in the deployment of PRMIS on October 31 is logical, because it depends on the prior preparation of each country and its degree of internal initiative, both at the police and ministerial levels. The propensity of the country to digitize, is recursively based on the previous preparation. Due to the programming problems already mentioned, it has not been possible for a process of equalization of initial conditions to be applied intensively in the less advanced countries.

169. It is now important to focus on those countries, at least for the following reasons:

- i. The least advanced countries are the ones that will find the most added benefit from the implementation of awards.
- ii. PRMIS may be a catalyst for the necessary digitization of each country at a broader level.
- iii. The precedents show that without a close accompaniment, it is difficult for national priorities and scarce technological resources to turn to the police forces. In general, when computers or broadband become available, they are referred to the cabinet areas closest to political power. This is a constant in many countries.

Proper reading of the results

170. It is necessary to read these results within the framework of the project chronology. First, the still low level of implementation of PRMIS by country does not mean that the project failed or did not have the expected effectiveness. On the contrary, and as stated earlier, the project is satisfactorily achieving its main objective, although with a great level of delay.

171. The problem is the different delays resulting from events beyond the control of the PMU, the reconfigurations of the project from the changes in its financing, and the complexity of simultaneously implementing a digital solution in countries with very different realities. All of this was delaying the process beyond the original schedule and generating new deadline postponements and rescheduling of objectives and goals.

172. The final result was the October 30 deadline, as a consequence of the circumstances experienced. The longer time granted to CariSECURE 1.0 in its final phase is not necessarily due to technical considerations, such as the natural maturation periods of the activities, or considering the time necessary for the deployment of a solution such as PRMIS. As in all development projects, external factors may have played a part as well, such as the need to fit in restrictive scheduling due to the expiration of deadlines for fund uses.

173. The successive rescheduling, due to the same logic of urgency, could not manage to incorporate planning in sufficient detail of all the activities involved in the deployment of PRMIS. As mentioned later in “Lessons Learned”, this is a very sensitive, critical process that must be executed with great precision, so that the solution is a replacement for traditional methods as soon as possible, and not an overlapping solution, and an additional burden to the existing work.

Project’s (adaptive) management

174. For everything mentioned in the previous section, the final phase of CariSECURE is a typical example of a chain of suboptimal strategic decisions, and without necessarily speaking of technical inexperience or negligence by someone or any particular area. To the contrary, the PMU often appeared to make the best decision possible given the changing circumstances, available information, resource constraints and deadline pressures.

175. For example, the decision was made not to look for a new executive director of the project, who resigned as of January 2022. At that time, it was considered that the project is ending and that therefore the timeline for recruitment was limited. However, the project was finally postponed until October 2022. In addition, it was only from the beginning of this year that the solution brought by the project began to take shape, and to be effectively implemented by the countries.

176. Then, the project management lacked a high visibility leadership and management profile, in what ultimately ended up being the most important period of all, throughout the life of the project: the complex year 2022 of PRMIS deployment. The technical team at UNDP Barbados that was left in charge of the project had to deal with a programming which reflected the wide project goals formulated years ago at the time of its inception. After subsequent budget cuts and the final refocusing in PRMIS, many of these goals were now much harder to achieve, and most were dependent on the attainment of the first output, which ended being a PRMIS fully running, as to provide data needed for analysis and for making informed decisions. Thus, the logical framework did not reflect this challenge either, nor served as a strategic guide to understand well which chain of results was to be achieved, and what were the delicate intermediate stages of the implementation of PRMIS. As mentioned earlier, PRMIS ended being one single sub output, and thus no proper disaggregation could be made.

177. The disappearance of a hierarchical and visible figure also affected the project's relations with the high authorities in each of the countries and added to the negative political effects of countermarches and budget cuts. In the same process, the relationship with the two key regional instances for the future sustainability of the

project, which are RSS and CARICOM IMPACS, suffered strongly. Interviewees from both institutions regret deeply their lack of full involvement in the crucial period of PRMIS deployment. Both had full coincidence on this issue, bringing different examples, although they were interviewed separately.

178. The PRMIS implementation challenges this year show that there was a great need for discussion and consensus, both on technical matters and on strategic decisions to be made, even with political ramifications. However, project board meetings, previously held at a minimum of twice per year, have reduced in frequency with the last meeting executed in July 2021.

179. Some respondents from the Stakeholders' side also mention the frequent turnover in project staff that affected the maintenance of institutional knowledge, and the possibility of maintaining more stable long-term relationships. The stability of the personnel affected by the project is a critical factor, since in the case of projects that last several years, they face the realities of political instability in most of the countries where they operate. It is also customary in the AMLAT and Caribbean region for a great rotation and renewal of personnel to take place at each change of management or government. This amplifies the positive effect that the continuity of multilateral cooperation projects can have, sometimes the only ones capable of sustaining a longer-term policy.

180. Despite all the issues referred to previously, the significant technical solvency and motivation of the UNDP Barbados team allowed for the deployment of PRMIS to continue with increasing success. It was possible for them to manage and solve in the process of software adjustment, of most of the programming and functionality problems that are characteristic of any computer solution, such as PRMIS, that is generated from scratch. The solutions attained have made PRMIS viable at the regional level and have convinced the leading countries that it's worth the effort. As mentioned earlier, only Suriname is still reluctant to embrace PRMIS -although totally convinced that a digital solution is the way-. This said, it is also true that some other countries from the "followers" group need a boost to secure their enthusiasm.

181. Therefore, at the time of the closing of this project and of the present evaluation the deployment of PRMIS is just beginning and is still far from its maturation phase. But there are enough indications to assume that the implementation, the result of which will be the full digitization of police operations in the participating countries, will be achieved within a reasonable period of time. In summary, we can say that the deadlines were not met at the end of the last extension on October 30, but in reality, they are in the process of being met, except in the particular case of Suriname, which perhaps deserves a separate mention.

The case of SURINAME

182. The success of PRMIS as a regional solution for the digitalization of the police operation was helped because in the six countries where the implementation is underway, the same language and the same legal and police management tradition were shared. Suriname, on the other hand, inherits the Dutch legal tradition and that language, which makes the implementation of an English-based regional system in that country more complex. In addition, the police tradition is quite different, even in basic matters of authorization and validation by superiors, functionalities that make up the essence of the PRMIS management mechanics⁶.

⁶ Comment from a reviewer: "PRMIS comes in both English and Dutch. The application can therefore be switched to mirror their primary language. Additionally, there are a number of permission changes that can be done in the backend to mirror their current validation by supervisor's processes. Additionally, in cases where the system does not fully meet our needs, SOPs were created around the normal functioning of the system to obtain the desired results. This too may be possible for their country. As a suggestion, it may be possible for a review to be done with their country and another country already utilizing the system to verify whether or not these challenges can be curbed before they completely forgo the use of the application."

183. Even in countries that start from legal and police traditions and a common language, the reconciliation of national realities, political organization, policing culture and the terminology used in legal or police matters was a challenge, although reasonably well resolved by the project. With Suriname, all these efforts are multiplied. At the time of this evaluation, the country's authorities are seeking to reinstall the original PIF, as a way of moving their police management towards a digital reporting system. They see the first try with PRMIS as a failure, that has not captivated the police ranks.

Saint Lucia and countries with PRMIS still in its infancy

184. Different from Suriname is the case of Saint Lucia. Although the project was unable to work with the country's police forces, it had demonstrated success in supporting the conduct of the victimization survey and the after-effects that this survey generated. It is not impossible to think that in the near future the attractiveness of PRMIS will be enough for the government, and especially the Saint Lucia Police, to have the initiative, and at the same time generate the resources to install the system mainly using their own means.

185. In the case of Saint Lucia and also of the other smaller countries that still have PRMIS in its early stages, the support role of RSS and CARICOM IMPACS will be of great importance, to accompany Saint Lucia in this process. It will also be of fundamental importance that these regional institutions know how to coordinate and manage to obtain financing, to bring technicians and police officers from the countries that successfully led PRMIS.

186. It will have a lot of strength and forcefulness, the living example and the testimony of the countries that are already enjoying PRMIS. They will have eliminated the multiple instances of handwriting on pads or books, and the need for reports to retrieve the same information about people or assets over and over again. In turn they will speak to their police colleagues, in the language they know will motivate them. In this, the key terms are police intelligence, location of people and assets anywhere in the system and from any unit, etc.

187. The arguments are more than enough for the adoption of PRMIS. Not to mention that with the passage of time it will be more and more perfected and with a greater number of functionalities that are very useful for police operations. Undoubtedly, another compelling argument is the incorporation of PRMIS within the network of digitized systems of the public sector. Once PRMIS benefits from interoperability with other systems that are key to the police, such as immigration, judicial, penitentiary, traffic without fines, the national registry of people, etc., will become a central node of egov base of citizen security.

For Output 2. Utilization of evidence-based analysis of crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programs, and policies.

188. During the project's first year, three (3) comprehensive assessments in the form of comparative cross-sectional case studies were executed. The first focused on the legal and regulatory environment that circumscribes administrative data sharing among the core entities of the criminal justice system. The second assessment focused on the institutional capacities of these core entities as well as others such as National Statistical Offices; these institutions constituting the mechanisms by which administrative and survey data are managed. The third assessment made the shift towards crime prevention and sought to audit crime prevention policies, programmes,

and strategies in the countries, to determine how the Project could strategically give assistance in this regard, and specifically to youth crime and violence prevention.

189. Regarding the results of Output 2, and Sub-output 2.1, it is true that the Regional Crime Observatory has been launched in the RSS, which was also already active training and carrying out analysis activities and publishing reports. The Annual Situational Report by RSS, corresponding to the year 2020, processes the information from each of the member countries according to the legal classifications in each nation, to then apply the ICCS. For 2.2, there are the examples mentioned of St Lucia -CVS and NYPAP -see below-, Guyana, Grenada, and Barbados. However, the participating countries are not yielding collectively a sustained analysis of citizen security indicators. Things will improve sharply with the full deployment of PRMIS.

190. For 2.3, all Police Forces have their Crime Analysis Units set up and its members trained. However, in most cases these are preexisting capabilities -except for some specific training-, and still not linked to data obtained from the digital source (PRMIS). Not even in Grenada the CAU is working with PRMIS, and it seems a considerable amount of time will elapse before the rest of the countries do.

191. This statistical compilation is an important first step, given that in time it may evolve by incorporating the information that will be generated from PRMIS and significantly expanding the standardization criteria in the reporting of information on crime. In addition, as the collection of information progresses and the work of RSS is consolidated, it will be possible to generate statistical analyzes in greater depth, which support various diagnoses and recommendations both at a general level and for each country.

Output 2

EXPECTED OUTPUT	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)								DATA CLCT METHODS
			Value	Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	FINAL	
Output 2: Utilization of evidence-based analysis of crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programs, and policies	2.1 Sub-regional crime observatory with capacity to analyse security data received from countries	Hardware/Software Installation Report, Operational Policy, Job Descriptions and Training Report	0	2017	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	1/ e.	Document review of Reports and Job Descriptions
	2.2 Number of countries capable of producing analysis using Citizen Security Indicators	Analytical products produced by Institutions such as: graphs, reports, statistics, etc	0	2017	-	-	-	0	0	8	0	8/ f.	Document review Interviews, Observation
	2.3 Number of Countries with the Police force having Crime Analysis Units with the capability of generating intelligence reports	Technical Mission Reports; Analytical products being produced by Police such as: graphs, reports, statistics, etc	0	2020					0	3	0	3/ g.	SOPs of Crime Analysis Units; Qualitative Document Review. Interviews. Observation

Source: PMU, UNDP Barbados

192. Another significant advance of the project has been the development of training on crime analysis, which has produced Criminal analysis documents by the participants from each of the countries. In these reports can verify the link between the analysis of information and the tactical and strategic measures designed by the respective police forces. As of 2021, the Surinamese police issued a bulletin on crime. Members of the St. Vincent police force have also carried out analytical work. As a result of this entire process, the criminal analysis units were approved and implemented in the participating countries that have been supported by CariSECURE, with the provision of technology for information processing.

For Output 3: Improved decision-making on youth crime and violence based on available evidence at national level.

193. CariSECURE collaborated with UNWOMEN and the IDB Citizen Security Programme in Guyana to cost share and pilot the CARICOM Gender-based Violence (GBV) Prevalence Survey Model to test the validity of data received on incidences of sexual and domestic violence. Additionally, CariSECURE through an agreement with UNODC and the Saint Lucia Central Statistics Office supported the implementation of the 2020 National Crime Victimization Survey in Saint Lucia.

194. For Sub output 3.1, no elaborated examples are found in the participating countries. In Grenada, there is a basic use of statistical information from PRMIS at the station level (South St Georges Police Station), where a customized crime map is used to set up the monthly Action Plan of the station. Still, in the case of Grenada and in the rest of countries, PRMIS needs more time, to be used more extensively, so it can yield statistical information useful for analysis. The cases to be mentioned for Sub output 3.2 are: St. Lucia CVS with effects on media/stakeholders, although no formal strategies; and Guyana: Women Survey, that was instrumental in designing the Spotlight Initiative for VAWG.

Output 3

EXPECTED OUTPUT	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)								DATA CLCT METHODS
			Value	Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	FINAL	
Output 3: Improved decision-making on youth crime and violence based on available evidence at national levels	3.1 Number of Countries with developed strategies and tactical responses to crime and violence due to information sharing between the Police and relevant agencies and the coordinated support of CariSECURE	Baseline survey of response strategies Crime Analysis Training Reports and Evaluations	0	2020	-	-	-	-	0	1	6	7/h.	Post training and technical support survey Response strategies; Info sharing agreements
	3.2 Number of countries utilizing non-administrative or survey data with the help of CariSECURE to inform national crime and violence strategies with youth and gender considerations.	CVS Survey Data	0	2020	-	-	-	0	1	0	0	1/i.	Qualitative Document Review
Target: 60	3.3 Number of Police Officers with basic Trafficking in Persons (TIP) skills and training to respond to TIP	Trafficking in Persons Report	0	2021					0	51	0	51/j.	Training Report
Target: 20	3.4 Number of Police Officers with enhanced specialized TIP skills and training to respond to TIP	Trafficking in Persons Report	0	2021					0	15	0	15/j.	Training Report
Target: 1	3.5: National Survey completed on public knowledge/perception of TIP	Trafficking in Persons Report	0	2021					0	1	0	1/j.	Baseline Survey Report

Source, UNDP Barbados, CariSECURE PMU

195. The National Youth Policy Action Plan 2021-2026 "Co-creating Saint Lucia's Youth Development Agenda", Government of Saint Lucia, Ministry of Youth Development and Sports refers to CariSECURE intervention, and as a partner, and some of the activities presented are taken from the report prepared by the consultant hired by CariSECURE, "Saint Lucia Citizen Security Taskforce Meeting, November 25, 2021". However, little evidence or data is supporting the NYPAP, and no statistical references when referring to "Goal Four: Safety Security and peaceful Coexistence". However, the document seems to have been issued in late 2021, this is after the Saint Lucia National Crime Victimization Survey (SLNCVS) 2020. The references for this document (listed in the last page) are only academic papers.

TIP readiness in Barbados

196. Another important result was the provision of TIP capacity building support to the Barbados Police Service, which started in March 2021, when UNDP invited UNODC to collaborate within the framework of the CariSECURE Project to provide technical and capacity building support to the Government of Barbados to strengthen the fight against Trafficking in Persons in line with the Barbados Action Plan on Trafficking in Persons. Several activities were executed:

- a. Basic Training on Introduction to Human Trafficking. While originally planned for in-person implementation, COVID-19 restrictions forced the virtual realization of this activity which catered to front-line officers of the Barbados Police Service.
- b. Advanced Training on the Identification, Investigation and Prosecution of Trafficking in Persons in Barbados. This training catered to specialized officers of the Barbados Police Service, including from the Sex Crimes and Trafficking Unit, and involved the participation of Police Prosecutors.
- c. Provision technical assistance for the strengthening or development of minimum standards and guidelines for the identification, protection, and assistance to Victims of Human Trafficking.
- d. Support the institutional review and strengthening of the Sex Crimes and Trafficking unit of the Barbados Police Service. UNODC carried out an assessment through desk reviews of reports, research, and available literature, combined with round tables and discussions with relevant stakeholders. This assessment sought to provide deeper understanding of national capacities and procedures, as well as existing gaps and needs.

197. Several recommendations were produced because of this assessment, including one for the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs). In cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General, the Barbados Immigration Department and the Barbados Police Service, UNODC led the development of SoPs for the identification, investigation, and referral of victims in trafficking in persons.

Efficiency:

198. Although difficult to gauge with the information provided, it is quite reasonable to presume that the efficiency in the use of resources was compromised by the different adjustments during its lifecycle, such as changes in budget, scope, and targeted countries. In early 2018, for instance, training of National Officers in Guyana and Saint Lucia is executed, “to support in-country implementation in the priority countries.” (3rd meeting PB). However, a deployment of a digitized system for Saint Lucia was not part of the scope of CariSECURE 1.0 given the Leahy Law issue that prevented from working directly with them. Guyana, together with Suriname are, 4 years later, still behind the leading countries in the deployment in police stations of a digitalized solution.

BUDGET LINE ITEMS	Original Budget in USD	Budget (Revision 2018)	Budget (Revision June 2020)	Budget (Revision July 2021)	Budget (Revision January 2022)	Extension Cost May 2022 to October 2022
1. Salaries and Wages	\$ 3,825,589.75	\$ 2,331,271	\$ 2,059,637.98	\$ 2,159,637.98	\$ 2,239,637.98	\$ 80,000

2. IT Equipment Procurement		\$ 487,985.99	\$ 586,697.67	\$ 571,697.67	\$ 651,697.67	\$ 80,000
3. Consultancies	\$ 1,042,000.00	\$ 1,283,319	\$ 2,801,163.74	\$ 2,861,163.74	\$ 3,127,718.74	\$ 266,555
4. Travel, Transportation and Per Diem	\$ 3,466,353.92	\$ 1,615,177.63	\$ 1,107,598.38	\$ 1,107,598.38	\$ 1,152,598.38	\$ 45,000
5. General Operating and Other Direct Costs	\$ 3,204,212.18	\$ 1,020,860.00	\$ 1,089,268.32	\$ 1,115,268.32	\$ 1,175,268.32	\$ 60,000
6. Other Equipment and Commodities	\$ 494,885.11	\$ 69,954.00	\$ 302,017.19	\$ 302,017.19	\$ 302,017.19	
7. Communication and Miscellaneous Costs		\$	\$ 50,197.57	\$ 72,197.57	\$ 96,197.57	\$ 24,000
Training, Workshops, Conferences		\$ 1,260,191.64	\$ 151,000.00	\$ 151,000.00	\$ 151,000.00	
9. Sub-contracts and or Sub-grants	930,000.00	\$ 723,333.00	\$ 200,000.00	\$ 185,000.00	\$ 185,000.00	
10. Programme Support Costs (GMS)	\$ 1,036,959.04	\$ 707,907.00	\$ 817,419.15	\$ 839,419.15	\$ 883,863.55	\$ 44,445
TOTAL USAID CONTRIBUTION	\$ 14,000,000	\$ 9,500,000	\$ 9,165,000	\$ 9,365,000	\$ 9,965,000	\$ 600,000

199. The project schedule and efforts were also affected by hurricanes and by the COVID pandemic. The project budget has seen different modifications that might have hindered its optimization. In the 3rdPB meeting minutes 07MAY2018, it was also noted that the Project is operating without 5 of its core staff roles. Staffing issues have been recurrent during the lifecycle of the project. The project's periodical changes also influenced some shifts in the approach to the main policies that were adapted. Already mentioned were the different priorities given to different countries, or stakeholders along the way.

200. The project initially proposed the adaptation and use of a core set of indicators derived from a regional consultative process led by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) through a regional public goods initiative, which was done in collaboration with UNDP, the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank. Then it moved away from these initially proposed indicators and promoted the use of the Caribbean Composite Citizen Security Indicator Framework (CCSIF). Despite the relevance of this indicator framework, it was finally discontinued and replaced by the ICCS.

Coherence

201. Partnerships and stakeholder involvement has been an issue in CariSECURE 1.0. The project was originally designed with a US\$14 million budget, but the substantive revision in November 2018 reduced project activities and funding to US\$9.55 million. Significant modifications included a reduction in the number of national beneficiaries **from five (5) to three (3) in each country**. Originally the project's main stakeholder was to be the ministries of Youth in each country. A later review of the country level information systems and analytic capacity highlighted that these resided primarily within the police, prosecution services, courts, rehabilitation services, and youth diversion institutions and not necessarily the Ministry of Youth Affairs the targets of the project's policy outcomes.

202. The strategic realignment of Cari SECURE 1.0 further approved in July 2020 to extend the period of performance and completion date of the award to 30 September 2021, reduced the fund award for the total obligated number of USD 9,165,000.00, and an update to the programme description, and **reduction in the number of national beneficiaries from three (3) to one (1) in each country**. To contribute to the anticipated

outcome of a reduction in youth involvement in crime and violence the project intended to target the police forces improving the overall crime information management systems whilst, simultaneously prioritizing disaggregated data such as age and gender for better monitoring of trends in gender and youth related issues.

203. This process of leaving all initial beneficiaries behind and concentrating one institution can raise concerns about the coherence of the design and execution of CariSECURE 1.0 with implications for external coherence specific to harmonization and coordination with others. A beneficiary excluded from a project is unlikely to be a good partner or active stakeholder in the near future. It is true that the first budget cut was substantial. However, partnerships can be fruitful without an associated cost. Lacking a tight involvement of the judiciary and the prisons system in the deployment of PRMIS meant sacrificing opportunities of efficient linkages, a more coherent overall data management system, and easier future interoperability.

204. Generating standardized crime data with sex and age disaggregation through PRMIS grounded at the police forces of each country is a powerful result of CariSECURE. However, if any of this data, its custody and the transmitting format is not considered “valid” or “legal” by the court system -which is an independent power from the executive-, the coherence of the solution can suffer.

Overall, CariSECURE has done a satisfactory job in this sense, since conflicts between the police forces and the judiciary regarding the digitalization of crime data, although detected in almost all countries, have been under control and solved, or likely to be solved. Nevertheless, some mayor low-cost gains would have arisen if considering installing simple interfaces of PRMIS at the courts and the prisons management units in each country.

205. On the other hand, it is true that during the project’s first year, three (3) comprehensive assessments in the form of comparative cross-sectional case studies were executed (see “Effectiveness”). However, during this evaluation at the outset of the project, the statistical offices of the participating countries do not seem to be present as much as they could be. Some interaction was thus detected:

- In St Lucia, the statistical office had a leading role in the deployment of the Crime Victimization Survey, and in providing valuable crime statistical information for the elaboration of the *Saint Lucia CariSECURE National Task Force*, November 25, 2021, by Grace-Ann Cornwall, Citizen Security Consultant.
- Another reference to CariSECURE’s contributions can be found in the presentation by Halim Brizan, of the Central Statistical Office, Grenada, of “Grenada’s experience with the production of gender statistics”, during the *Caribbean Gender Statistics Webinar Series* on August 26, 2020⁷.

206. Notwithstanding, a key objective of CariSECURE 1.0 was “Coordinating National Statistical Systems”, as to constitute the focal points for data on youth crime and violence, so they could set the methodological guidelines and administer the *Citizen Security Protocols* for the production and sharing of official statistics on youth crime and violence; foster the harmonization of statistical information and the avoidance of duplication at the national level, based on its regulatory oversight and/or budgetary allocations; and also, the institutional structure and related work processes of this body could take focus on youth inside and/or outside the formal criminal justice system. At present, the final result of CariSECURE is the RSS regional crime analysis center mentioned earlier. Thus, some thinking should be done in the future as to how to recover and honor these important objectives that can boost the national use of crime statistics, which is in fact a central goal of CariSECURE 1.0.

⁷ https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/presentations/gender_mainstreaming_in_national_plans_in_grenada.pdf

Gender mainstreaming:

207. The Caribbean Composite Citizen Security Framework (CCSIF) offered countries the opportunity to develop key thematic indicators specific to gender. According to USAID, the CCSIF allows countries to go much further than data disaggregation towards mainstreaming and norming gender into their policymaking processes. The present application of the ICCS in PRMIS have generated some limitations that will have to be addressed, but that are possible to solve. The option given is “Gender Involved”: MALE /FEMALE options, without specification if it is the victim or the offender. Also, the category of “SEX OFFENCES”, would need further breakdown to better capture the nature of different Gender-based Violence (GBV).

208. The two major CariSECURE products that address gender issues are the **Piloting of the Gender-Based Violence Prevalence Survey** in Guyana, and the **Crime Victimization Survey** (CVS) in St Lucia, that has a focus towards sex offences and GBV, including sexual harassment, and considering intersex persons as a demographic variable. The inclusion of sexual harassment is a regional improvement that will at some point follow suit.

209. Another significant contribution is CariSECURE’s trainings on **Crime Analysis** that were implemented to support national agencies (Police, Ministry of National Security) to produce basic crime analysis reports, of course with gender sensibilization for GBV. Secondary analysis workshops were also conducted with policy makers, programme managers and other gender stakeholders to identify key information to inform policy and enhance programmatic activities on information sharing between national agencies.

Gender parity:

210. Even though the project ended focusing on working with the police forces of each participating countries, staffed in a majority by women, the project engaged women in a significant way, and other mayor constraints on women’s participation were detected. Introducing gender considerations into national and regional crime statistics is a mayor contribution to gender mainstreaming, as mentioned earlier.

Composition by sex, CariSECURE 1.0 Project Board Meetings, from 2018 to 2021

PB meeting	Attendees FEMALE	Attendees MALE	Meeting Chair
3 rd	9	7	M
4 th	7	5	F
5 th	9	10	M
6 th	5	8	M
7 th	7	8	F
	37	38	3M/2F

Source: PMU

211. In CariSECURE project board meetings, which performed the oversight of the initiatives during the project’s lifecycle, and for those meetings where information is available for this evaluation, gender parity was respected, at roughly a 50 to 50% proportion. An underlying issue for the future of CariSECURE initiatives, is the lack of gender parity in the region’s police forces, who will be the central actor in PRMIS full implementation. To take the example of Grenada, there is 1 female superintendent out of 15, and only 2 female assistant superintendents out of 20. This does not necessarily represent the existence of a glass ceiling – all interviewees in

all countries visited denied gender discrimination in promotion- but reflects the overall gender mix in the police forces 65-35 against females. The good news according to the police sources is that new recruits are increasingly more balanced in this aspect.


C.3 Other assessment: assessment against other relevant criteria

Project-level Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

212. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, the project was handled with a complete schedule contained in a first AMEP for the period from October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2021, approved in July 2020 and another AMEP engaged until April 2022 extension that includes the period June 1, 2020, to April 30, 2022. However, the general structure shows a high level of complexity, lack of clear verification means, and the definition of outputs and sub outputs that do not unmistakably delimitate the scope of each of the three mayor outputs.

213. A significant issue observed was that the project ended focusing mainly on output 1.3 and accessorily on 1.4, referring to the digitization of the process of collecting and producing statistics and reports on crime. This concentration of efforts, as mentioned, was correct. However, since the logical framework included several other sub outputs and two other outputs, the reporting system did not allow for a detailed disaggregation of these two sub outputs. This was needed due to the numerous components of the PRMIS implementation strategy. That is why the monitoring and evaluation system did not become a useful tool to inform and adjust the PRMIS implementation strategy in each country. It is even possible to think that the disaggregation of each of the three main outputs, into five, three, and five sub items, may have induced the project management to comply with most one of them, and thus disperse the effort that should have been concentrated on the significant challenge that the implementation of PRMIS represented.

214. Due to the design of the Logical Framework and due to the changes and delays that the project suffered, it could not be expected to make much progress in outputs 2 and 3. This, because these outputs derive from the previous fulfillment of output one. In effect, in the absence of an established and generalized system of digitized police reporting, it is still not possible to generate national or regional statistics -output 2-, and or generate actions and policies informed by reliable evidence -output 3-. This is acknowledged when presenting the “Logical Sequence of Anticipated Project Results”:



In this model, the availability of sufficient standardized and disaggregated data is the foundation of the entire edifice. However, at the project’s closure, countries are far from producing it. Only the full utilization of PRMIS will get them to this stage, and no single country, even the leader Grenada, is still there. This makes the Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix difficult to manage, and to yield a fair picture of the project’s efforts and accomplishments.

215. Another problem that made the monitoring and evaluation system less effective was the design of

indicators based on reporting the number of countries that met the stated goal. The sub-indicators, formulated in a general way, reported whether first three, then five, or eight countries met a certain criterion. However, and in practically each criterion, the situation of each country included or not in compliance could be and in fact is very different.

216. To take an illustrative example, we chose indicator 14, mentioned above as one of the most important. This indicator measures the number of countries that have 75% of their police stations with a digitized application capable of collecting and producing crime statistics. The reality is that in each country, this meant different things. In some, it meant that some stations or dependencies completely abandoned the use of paper and physical books to pass their operations on PRMIS. In others, it meant that the system was installed and used in parallel and in addition to the rest of the existing digital or physical systems. Also, there were instances where the system is installed, but only particular elements of the platform were utilized while other areas were omitted. And in other countries, it means that the system is installed, but not always used. And in some others, it means that police officers have been trained and are ready to use the system, even though they may not necessarily do so.

217. In most project monitoring and evaluation reports, this analysis is based on the number of countries that do or do not meet certain targets. Next, and out of necessity, a breakdown is made by group of countries (tiers) and in some cases the individual country is mentioned, especially if it stands out extraordinarily, as in the case of Grenada. And such a methodology, in some cases, generates difficulty in monitoring and being able to make integrated comparisons of the progress of each country in the region.

218. In the 3rd Board Meeting of CariSECURE, May 7, 2018, it was noted that M&E approaches from USAID and UNDP differ between levels (institutional and national), scope of indicators as well as temporally. It is possible that this could become an issue with time explaining the level of complexity that can be observed.

219. *Intervention Logic:* as indicated in the prodoc, the Project intervention logic was based on: “...a public health approach to violence prevention, comprised of four essential steps:

- a. *Identifying the problem.*
- b. *Identifying Risk and Protective factors.*
- c. *Developing and Pilot Testing Prevention Strategies; and*
- d. *Ensuring widespread adoption and scale up of successful strategies...”*

It is not clear how both the initial ToC of the project, and the ensuing adjustments made, fit this intervention logic. As it is well stated, the “public health” approach might not be the best fit for a citizen security public policy issue that was finally addressed through the deployment of PRMIS and the training of police officers to use it.

Communications & Knowledge Management

220. There is no evidence of formal communication channels during the lifetime of the project that could qualify as regular and effective. The downsizing of the project beneficiaries after both revisions also affected the relationship with those who were then key stakeholders in each country. The lack of leadership and project wide meetings after July 2021 also affected communication and understanding between the project and its key regional stakeholders, such as RSS and CARICOM IMPACS. According to both agencies, there was no clear communication of the sustainability plan, and the role of each actor and stakeholder at the end of the project. There were no proper means of communication established to express the project progress and no web presence. No sensibilization or public awareness campaigns related to youth crime or GBV was planned.

Evaluability analysis

221. As described in the “Relevance” section, CariSECURE had some design and methodological issues for strategy logically match the problem analysis. Its theory of change and its later adjustments affected the strength in which outcomes could be relevant, precise, and verifiable in a robust results framework. As mentioned in the previous sections, the performance indicators accounting for the number of countries meeting certain definition was not the most appropriate proxies for outcomes in terms of capturing relevant changes. The logical framework appears to be more an issue, than a component with positive contributions to the attainment of the project initial goals. -see point 214. above-

222. The establishment of initial baseline measures was affected by the design based more on previous experiences in other countries, than on the concrete and real citizen security situation of the participating Caribbean countries. In fact, the analysis of institutional and implementation capacity is done once the project has started, such as the *Assessment of National Policies / Strategies* in 2018, and other country studies implemented during CariSECURE early stages.

Cross-cutting themes

223. The earlier mentioned limitations of the M&E framework did not help to properly support performance reporting on gender equality, nor to produce indicators framed in a manner that would inform the gender equality and disability inclusion related results. Gender equality and considerations towards youth issues are implicit in the disaggregation by sex and age introduced through the standardization process of crime reporting and statistics. Once PRMIS yields consistent and comparable statistics by sex and age, a new phase will open reflecting on what should be done with this gender and youth related knowledge previously absent.

C.4 Sustainability of the project

224. Based on what was evaluated by country, and especially based on the experience carried out in the countries visited, indications that the sustainability of the system is assured are mixed. Nevertheless, sustainability is linked in a significant degree to the path taken by the country where the most progress has been made, Grenada. In effect, and despite the enthusiasm for PRMIS that the Grenada police commissioner has, and the main promoters of the project within the police forces, they still recognize difficulties for locating the data and the use of a regional system versus securing their own hardware, as is currently the case. They also recognize that both at the ministerial level and at the level of the police forces themselves, there is a multiplicity of needs and urgencies.

Sustainability factors		Sustainability issues	
	Initial enabling conditions	As perceived by country	Identified during evaluation
Grenada	Had preexisting ICT infrastructure thanks to CARCIP-WBG. Staging and Production capabilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Need to secure data at national level and to preserve progress made by local PRMIS hosting capabilities that could be lost once merged at regional level. - The application is smartphone compatible, but not over the internet, so cannot be used off station. -The system needs more hardware, and signpads. - PRMIS should speak with the immigration management system that has been on for a while. - Special Victim Units: high prevalence of gender-related crime, but Grenada was not included in the training component (2) of sexual crimes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There is mention of legal issues to transfer database to CI. App, since it sits open on internet, not a VLAN. (*) - The 24 PDAs are used for training, because no VLAN for field mobile use. -Still there is a tendency to narratives, and not fill in the basic form spaces: duty report, and instead, info is added in the summary. -Hardware needed, at least 2 computers per station: 30 computers -An official formal switch to PRMIS and cancellation of book used should be scheduled and enacted
Barbados	Good level of computer literacy. Computers not an issue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Cultural issue of need for computers (central adm) whereas in the stations they have other priorities. -Tablets donated, but data plans are expensive. -Need regional meetings: more technical details. -SIMS has abundant data about people and goods. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Barbados CMS "SIMS", poses challenges in how to be replaced. Today used in parallel. -Formal Launch not yet defined but understood the need for a "dump the books" moment.
Antigua & Barbuda	No previous digital experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The use of a 24 hours' time format perceived as an improvement. - Connection to Courts and prisons is desired 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Need between 40 and 50 computers to equip all stations.
St Kitts & Nevis	Previous CMS, is still used and station diary. Has had crime analysis before using CMS, so PRMIS does not trigger this process but brings agility: mapping was done manually with excel files and locators input in My Map, and now	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRMIS has the pad feature, but they do not have the pads. Problem is how to print the interaction with the prisoners, important to take to court.⁸ -There is no formal policy for how and when to start a report and how to use the data. -Sometimes the specific training police officers get does not match the requirements of their position. -Summons, tickets and financial information is still registered in physical book: they are audited by Government Auditing Department statewide. - Power issues: each station has its own generator. The real problem is internet access and bandwidth. -Disconnection to the servers is a problem sometimes, and issue is then in Barbados. -There should be protocols defining which documents to scan or take a picture of and then 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -There should be a strategy of getting all station chiefs together for a political top-down empowerment. The useful features for them should be disclosed and discussed. -Link different government information from different ministries (fees tables, specific regulations or categories, scales of tickets, etc., all with hyperlinks to PRMIS. -Need to create interministerial taskforce, a level above the Police Commissioner level, as to put all government institutions into joint digitalization and interoperability. This a leading political force. -SUPERVISION type of training: Stg. Thompson and his colleague in St Kitts are looking for getting help from Grenada,

⁸ Comment from a PRMIS user reviewing the text: "The system does have this feature and it can be shown to them. What the system does not do in this regard is attach the name of the person in custody with whom the interactions were recorded for. 2. A formal policy on how to start a report and how to use the data was documented in our training manual and SOPs which can be shared to offer assistance and guidance in this regard. 3. As it related to the procedure for scanning documents, this is an SOP that must be designed by the country themselves as required documents per section in the platform differs along with the country's legal requirements. A sample of our SOPs can be shared to provide a general idea on how to achieve this if deemed necessary."

	PRMIS can automatically.	have this as a standard procedure that not only speeds up the process and secures documents that sometimes are later lost in the transfer to courts.	-Each station has individual chats. -Opportunity to create a dedicated chat for PRIMIS, including the focal points in each station, and the same solution for the supervisory level.
Guyana	Had a preexisting CMS, at "80% of PRMIS", so digital culture in the police.	-Not legal to upload criminal information from a station to a regional repository according to the National Information Management Authority... -PRMIS does not accommodate political organization of towns and regions. - Judicial adaption, not possible to get rid of paper. Courts are having their system being build.	- Development could be given to Guyana. -Having a functioning CMS is a problem as well. The value added of PRMIS is less evident. Had also 2 data centers: criminal data need permanent custody
St Vincent & the G	Had no previous system.	- Ticketing functionality would be desirable. - Too early for statistical use, only two stations are online.	- Country with limited resources 70 + computers. Each station needs at least 2 computers.
St Lucia		- Victimization survey with media and academia repercussions.	- Need to connect St Lucia PF with regional peers.
Suriname	March 2019 the PIF was installed with many technical issues. Then PRMIS meetings got delayed + the language barrier.	- Dutch translation is not working ⁹ . - Common Law regional format not adapted to Dutch Legal system. ¹⁰ - Reports being sent to superiors' validation, not a practice in SURINAME. ¹¹ <u>Glitches faced with PRMIS:</u> - Information saved like crime location was lost. - Who made the report then was lost. - Nationality of offender missing. - Supervisor cannot see the name of the officer.	- Somewhat strict and rigid view of their own security regulations, seem unlikely to make efforts to make theirs compatible with. - Strongly reluctant to go back to PIF, and to the PRMIS regional solution. - Equipment needed is not significant - Worked on customization of different modules, they were designed but some were not possible, because it would break the (regional) application.

(*) Memorandum of Understanding for sharing, RSS but legislation changes are going through. Through the Electronic Data Act of the Ministry of Mobilization - PS has digital signature, digital office, immigration kiosk / Home Affairs/ Judiciary.

225. Since from the start the project was raised with the objective of achieving evidence-based regional statistics and policies, these reasons do not necessarily have priority at the national level or at the police forces themselves. This only begins to change, when the local police discover that PRMIS can be a system that completely transforms the operation, generating immense savings in terms of transcription and providing key information and intelligence for their operations. For example:

- The system's standardized approach, makes shifting police officers from station to station need not to adapt to the station's culture.
- It is signifying a substantial time savings, when crime information (Monthly Crime Report), where information is produced.
- In Grenada, the system replaced 16 books that had to be filled in. Only 10 books left, but for minor tasks, such as key register.
- Also in Grenada, PRMIS is the main tool for initiating and deriving reports from their centralized call center (911), which significantly helps the organization of the call for service system.

⁹ Comment from PRIMIS user to this report: "...The translation feature works for us. We have seen that with the update of certain versions, some areas are not updated also. This needs to be checked by admin any time an update is made by the developers, and they must be informed so that they can make the necessary changes..."

¹⁰ Comment from PRIMIS user to this report: "...The law format can be altered to reflect various legal modules. This may need to be checked on the administrative end to see if it can accommodate their structure..."

¹¹ Comment from PRIMIS user to this report: "... Supervisor validation request feature can be removed by the administrators. The glitches identified can be resolved through procedural changes. During the process, if certain steps are not followed in the correct order or omitted, it will resolve in these issues. There are also some settings that would turn on or off some of these requests. As a suggestion, we should meet and share best practices to see if they application really cannot address their law enforcement needs before forgoing it altogether..."

226. Now, except for the cases of the three leading countries, Grenada, St Kitts and Barbados, where the significant benefits of having PRMIS can be experienced, the rest still lack the full motivation needed to want to overcome the challenges of digitalization. That is why this project must be continued with a much more focused approach on police operations and with a logic of self-benefit for each national security system. Only in this way can the sustainability of the project be guaranteed once the USAID financing ends. At the same time, there are improvements in PRMIS that need to be quickly addressed so the buy in and subsequent sustainability is assured. Examples mentioned in the participating countries:

Grenada:

- Serious Crime officers ask for restricted view in PRMIS. There is no secure access by department or by type of crime.
- PRMIS should facilitate the printing of police certificates.
- PRMIS prepares the docket for the Judiciary, but with eight forms missing¹²
- Interview and declaration forms of detained persons should be digital.

Barbados¹³

- PRMIS date format considered an issue, because it diverges from the previously used by the Police.
- Wording issues: various categories and meanings
- System underlines in red but not the right word.
- “Sudden death”/ fire register missing option.

Antigua & Barbuda¹⁴

- Ask to print pages directly without going through Microsoft Word software where they can be modified
- Cannot reject/ cancel the incident/ Call for Service, has to be elevated.

St Kitts and Nevis

- Linked to the License Authority ticket system.
- Alert telling the user that the report is still open and typed, and it has not been dispatched. Thus, no log out should be possible before fully taking care of the report. Also, the hour of dispatching is the hour registered as the report was done, which is not always true and creates a gap between the time an incident happened, and when it was registered (time of dispatch).
- National ID is a mandatory requirement to utilize the system

227. It is evident that coordination issues at the regional level exist. The strengthening of PRMIS as a regional solution needs a lot of negotiations and consensus on which common wording, features and upgrading should prevail. This implies all countries making concessions, in an equitable way. The presence and leadership of the regional institutions such as RSS and CARICOM IMPACS should evolve into a different stage from what exists presently. Essentially, the Caribbean countries must rely on their visible, respected, and trusted regional security institutions, and not be dependent on donors or multilateral agencies. Countries will should in the medium run be more confident to share their sensitive and confidential data with them. They also must trust entirely their police operating system to properly function in real time and during critical moments such as natural catastrophes.

¹² 1.the Bail forms. 2.The record of conviction 3.The charge sheets/ 4.Complaint without Oath/ 5.Notice of intended prosecution 6.Statement form 7. Record of Interview 8.Medical form.

¹³ Comment from PRIMIS user to this report: “...most of the wording categories and meanings can be altered by the administrator with a few areas left standard. Specific examples may better aid in obtaining their desired results. The PRMIS application does not have a built-in word correction software, as such, the underlying of the words is what is produced by the computer’s memory itself. To resolve this issue, we have downloaded Grammarly on each computer using the application to get the proper corrections. Sudden death and fire registries can be created, using the Call for Service application. It is not a separate module, but it can be filtered to achieve the desired results as is the case with our country...”

¹⁴ Comment from PRIMIS user to this report: “...The system does have the option to provide an HTML format that does not afford the user the ability to alter any document that you may desire to print. That option must be selected as opposed to the word format. The system also does allow us to reject a call for service and to cancel an incident report. The stage at which these activities take place is what is important... As a point of clarity – the National ID is a mandatory required field to add a person to the system not to utilize the entire system. Additionally, the ID required by the system can be changed to suit the countries preferred identification format (passport, NIS card etc) or a default code as established here can be used to mitigate this concern...”

The institutions are there and should be empowered, so they can take full responsibility for the future sustainability of the regional police operations system.

228. Another key sustainability issue is that PRMIS needs to take its right place among the *egov* systems of a totally digitized state, with compatible and interlinked systems. Then PRMIS will become a truly powerful police force enhancing tool. These are some of the obvious interoperability challenges:

- Customs/ Penitentiary/ Judiciary (to accept digital cases and evidence in full)
- Government Audit Agency (need to accept full digital money receipts)
- Motor Vehicle and License Registry (to link systems so info pops-up in PRMIS fields)
- National Persons Database-Civil Registry (to have a quick way to identify people)
- Digital Legal Registry (all laws online) with hyperlinks to most important ones¹⁵.

The regional security institutions and future participating multilateral agencies will have the task of pushing this issue high into the political agenda of each country. The police forces themselves do not have the power and influence to engage different ministries and central agencies that are above in the state hierarchy.

¹⁵ Comment from reviewer that is PRMIS user: "...we are not certain if the Help Section of the PRMIS application was considered fully as an option to curb this issue. We have already begun to upload all of our local laws under the heading Laws and Procedures. This way, officers are able to locate, read and review all local laws while using the application..."

D. Lessons learned and conclusions

D.1 Lessons learned

229. If the project is analyzed from a broad perspective, CariSECURE was an excellent idea that led to a very important solution for the citizen security system of the Caribbean countries where it was implemented. The idea of generating synergies at the regional level, and solutions that were difficult to achieve for each country separately, was undoubtedly a success. The main result of CariSECURE, which is the implementation of a digital workflow for the operations of the police forces of each country, is also a great advance that is only just maturing today, and that little by little will bear fruit.

230. However, and throughout the project's life cycle, there were actions that could have been done better, which of course are easy to identify in an ex-post perspective. But this is the constructive meaning of an evaluation, insofar as it can systematize lessons learned and provide guidelines for the future. Thus, it will be possible to launch the continuation of operations with increasing levels of efficiency and effectiveness.


i. Stronger attention to beneficiaries' initial conditions and the disparities between countries

231. A first fundamental lesson is that the project should have been more sensitive to local needs, the real situation of each country, and to the cultural, socio-economical, technological, and political differences among them. This would have helped to detect more accurately from the beginning what were the root causes of the lack of good reliable crime statistics. For an initial project of more than 14 million dollars, some questions must be stressed beforehand:

- It is said that crime statistics are not there, or not trustable, and decision making is seldom based on evidence: is all this **really** so? Is it similar in all countries?
- Of course, there are deficiencies in planning, decision-making and policing, but which are the actual causes? If hard analysis is not used for acting in crime prevention, can't this be a practice that happens in all government ministries and agencies, and thus a question of political culture?

232. If the route that the project finally took after the last revision had been made from its inception, the existing shortcomings in police operations would have been detected, and the great potential for improvement of the archaic system based on pencil and paper, and on books, and diaries. More in-depth work could have been done from the beginning on this problem, which is an obvious cause, clearly described by all the concerned actors, of the inaccuracies and errors generated by the reporting system.

A repetitive reporting system needs to be replaced



233. For example, verifying that the culture of the "blank sheet" leads police officers to insist on the narrative, to the detriment of reporting typified and precise data. Also, there are strong incentives to limit the amount of data reported, since each police officer knows that he or she must copy it numerous times later.

234. Regarding the specific reporting of issues such as minority protection or gender issues, flaws could also have been detected that could be very serious when trying to build statistics and valid knowledge for decision-making. For example, several police officers interviewed expressed concern about the increasingly sensitive laws and regulations regarding the handling of cases involving young people and especially young women.

235. That is why they recognize that there is a certain reluctance on the part of police officers acting on the ground, to report and therefore to intervene in cases in which young people, and especially young women, are involved. Except in extremely serious cases, the intervention of the officer will be the minimum necessary. And if circumstances allow, the incident will not be reported, thus avoiding possible investigations and eventual sanctions.

Youth crime: how the issue may feed itself



236. This is the beginning of a vicious circle that begins with a certain sense of impunity generated by this attitude of non-intervention by the police in situations involving young people or women. They thus avoid committing themselves. That impunity may not only facilitate an attitude towards more criminal conduct on the


part of the young people themselves. Also, it can cause experienced criminals who lead gangs or criminal networks to seek to capture young people and women to induce them to commit crimes. So, the lesson learned is that all public policy problems must be centered on the human being, who is both the origin of the problem and its solution. In this case, the police officers, and their correct motivation, vocation, ethical conduct, commitment, training, and education, are the central axis of the problem, and of its solution.

237. And when talking about police officers, it refers to all levels of the hierarchy, up to political leadership. At the apex is the question whether the higher ranks want to have a legalistic police force with officers with a great sense of integrity, or on the contrary, to command a body of officers with a weakened motivation and lower ethical standards. In certain countries of the region, such as the Dominican Republic or in the Caribbean countries of Central America, such as Honduras, there are high crime levels. However, in areas where there are strong interests related to tourism -Punta Cana in RD, and Roatan Island in Honduras-, the level of crime is practically zero. “Protected areas” for international tourism are also common in many other Latin American and Caribbean countries. This might be the evidence that political will, which translates into the support and adequate financing of the police, and the defense of its integrity, is often the determining factor.

238. In short, when speaking of strengthening Caribbean police institutions from a human perspective, one must think of empowering capable police officers. And this is **NOT** limited to “training”. Better police officers are built nurturing the vocation for public service in the police forces. This implies, among other elements, social recognition in the form of symbolic recognition -prestige-, or the pride of being a police officer; economic recognition -good pay, benefits, uniforms, and available equipment and vehicles-; and political recognition: senior police officers respected and trusted by political bosses and the citizenry. This is the core citizen security agenda because policing, in the same way that crime reporting, is essentially based on the human beings that are there, in place, protecting the community.

Stronger focus on the transitional phase in PRMIS deployment

239. Another important lesson learned is that the implementation of a system that digitizes police operations, and the installation strategy during the transition from a paper format to an electronic one, is very delicate. This ended up being evident in each of the countries where PRMIS was installed in police stations.




240. At first, installing PRMIS in parallel to the existing operation, out of necessity, meant an additional workload, to the already markedly repetitive and cumbersome system of reporting and data collection. A very unfavorable and discouraging situation was generated that had to be very well coordinated to minimize the

transition periods, and at the same time link the achievements of one country with the other, dynamically transmitting the lessons learned from the leading countries in this aspect.

241. As a lesson learned, it was also verifying how the dispersion in terms of project objectives was perhaps the cause of not being able to put more energy and coordination into this PRMIS implementation process. Even an explicit or formal strategy was not detected regarding the implementation of the first crucial link in the system, which are the mobile devices that digitize the information gathering on the ground, that is, from the beginning of the process. The country with the highest degree of progress, Grenada, received a certain number of tablets, although not in sufficient number, but for now they are used solely for educational purposes in the training center of the police technology area.

242. As was already mentioned in the section referring to relevance, a central element for a successful strategy that is enthusiastically "bought" by the beneficiaries, and in this case by the police of each country, depends on correctly emphasizing the advantages that the solution has for the work of each of the members of the force.

Final arrangement crucial to upgrade police ops



243. In the case of PRMIS, a system that will be of great use to the police once fully installed in each country, this was not very difficult to achieve. PRMIS has the possibility -already demonstrated in some leading cases- of eliminating the system of multiple reports that involve writing the same data three times by hand and typing it a fourth time, as is the case in countries that already had a computerized database.

244. In addition, it allows to eliminate the heavy workload that keeps police officers busy in their daily work. PRMIS will gradually become a powerful communication tool for the police; a source of police intelligence and knowledge for the development of their tactics and strategies; a powerful knowledge management tool for supervisors to monitor, mentor, and instruct younger officers; a self-administered on-the-job training tool, with the autonomy and flexibility that provide easy and automatic access to information sources, tutorials, and instruction manuals.

245. In short, the great lesson learned is that PRMIS focuses directly and forcefully on the problem that CariSECURE sought to solve from the beginning. Although not in the way that was proposed in the logical framework of the project. Indeed, the impact of PRMIS in the medium and long term will not be so much because it is the instrument for digital collection of information, or as a source of generation of statistics, but because of its effect on improving the work and operational effectiveness of the police, that allows its members to focus on tasks with much greater added value, and less on tedious bureaucratic routines. Furthermore, these

improvements to the policing routine will make the profession much more attractive and improve the chances of being able to recruit and retain capable and motivated young people. Thus, the training provided on data reporting and the use of PRMIS will be more effective, and the Caribbean police forces will have much greater precision and quality in collecting the key information necessary to build good statistics on crime.

D.2 General conclusions

246. Despite its initial design issues, the project ended being a success. Police forces are slowly engaging, and the leader countries are beyond the point of no return, where reform becomes irreversible. They are also consolidating themselves as the examples to follow by the other countries that are still behind. CariSECURE leadership and the donors should back a second round very firmly, this time adjusting the focus from a regional “analyst agenda”, towards a police officer empowerment agenda through the full digitization of police forces operations, bringing PRMIS to become an all-encompassing and powerful tool with extensive report and intelligence elaboration features, and digitally linked to the relevant systems -motor vehicle registry, national persons databases, traffic ticketing, etc.

247. In short, intelligence-driven, and digital policing improve the image of the police job, which helps to attract talented youth, and even include endangered segments, as it has been done in some countries. Also, addressing the barriers of bureaucracy increases the possibility to focus on the victim and the stakeholders of the case instead of writing or typing or keeping books. Then there is scope for better retraining of police forces as a community service based on working with people’s needs and urgencies, with police officers freed to focus on the most delicate human issues, and then well utilizing and optimizing the intervention or treatment protocols that protect young people, women, and other targeted groups.

248. In short, that young people and women victims are well taken care of, in an incident or crime, depends very much on the preparation and good predisposition of police officers. These are happy with their jobs because they are happy with their position and tasks, happy with their boss, and with the police institution. Police officers will take better care of citizens -including young and women victims- ***when they are taken care of by the institution***. This is what in this evaluation is meant by a “human-centered” focus on policing and citizens security policy.


249. The entire police force enhancing strategy, is based on PRMIS. And PRMIS sustainability is based on the strengthening and empowerment of the regional citizen security institutions RSS and CARICOM IMPACS, that have the capabilities and potential leadership to resolve pending technological matters, and to move forward into beefing PRMIS up, and properly maintaining the system. Also, the sustainability is based on the backing of donors and multilateral agencies, and their power to influence the highest levels of government. As was mentioned in the section discussing sustainability, PRMIS and the regional crime prevention system goes way beyond and above the matters of police forces.

250. In the medium and long run, when Caribbean countries acquire increasingly higher digital and technical capabilities, and ICT government systems are run more independently in each country, at lower costs and better degrees of control, the question of how to deal with a key system security system that is shared regionally will arise more strongly. The discussion between centralized or decentralized hosting and data warehousing may run under the following lines:

PRMIS hosting

Common hosting

- All countries benefit from all innovations
- Homogenous statistical categories under control
- Economies of scale in operation and maintenance
- Better system integrity
- Easier upgrade capabilities




Country hosting

- Faster and more precise customization
- Avoids regional coordination and connectivity issues
- Allows full adaptation for countries – i.e. Surinam – with different policing and legal systems

Crime Data Database

Regional

- All countries benefit from all innovations
- Homogenous statistical categories under control
- Economies of scale in operation and maintenance
- Better system integrity
- Easier upgrade capabilities



Country specific

- Faster and more precise customization
- Avoids regional coordination and connectivity issues
- Allows full adaptation for countries – i.e. Surinam – with different policing and legal systems

As can be inferred, the technical challenges and need for building consensus and common knowledge is significant. Again, a reason for building the most credible regional institutions with strong political influence and excellent technological capabilities.

E. Recommendations

E.1 Focus on PRMIS and its strengthening of police forces

251. Conceived, and marketed as a system to upgrade the police function and to free officers from the most tedious tasks, which related to rewriting by hand their reports. Then, full support, if not to say great enthusiasm, will help consolidate the acceptance of PRMIS, probably in all countries. Once the client (the Police) really appreciates and thus demands the solution, national buy-in is assured, and most logistical and managerial issues are naturally and swiftly solved by the interested -and supporters-.

252. Unfortunately, PRMIS ended becoming an additional task for police officers, grounded on the idea that international organizations and donors, under the “analyst agenda”, are intending to secure regional data for crime analysis. Of course, this is presented as a useful process also for each country, such in the case of a trainer that would awaken police officers’ enthusiasm with the idea that *“YOU, through PRMIS, are helping our Prime Minister make better decisions”*. Happily, some police forces, and Grenada comes to mind, have quickly understood that the digital revolution is in their direct benefit, regardless of the donor’s agenda.

253. When PRMIS is finally understood this way, there will be full support -and funding- to include features that were not originally given such an importance, since it was mainly conceived as a reporting and data gathering tool, instead of being seen as:

- A police strategy and intelligence tool. The very limited and rigid dashboard of PRMIS, where daily hour by hour incidents can be seen only, yielding very little useful information, and in general almost none if the day is quiet or its morning time and yet very few incidents have been reported. The obvious dashboard for PRMIS would have been crime/incident maps which could be adjusted to different time periods, like “last 2, 3, 4, ...weeks, last months, etc...” and other more useful info which police officers in each country could certainly suggest. The dashboard should have the obvious option to be customized by the user.
- A powerful communication tool. PRMIS links all stations together into share their information and work. However, when reports are dispatched and transferred from one user to another, there is no popup notice for the recipient to be alerted that a case has entered in his/her domain. This communications capability can be also used for Human Resource management.
- A potent knowledge management and training on the job tool. Supervisors still demand more flexibility to PRMIS in the sense to permit -traceable- corrections and remarks, as to be able to continually optimize reports and work practices.
- Tactical and informational tool. PRMIS allows to find targeted persons and goods, and their relevant backgrounds, in real time, across all police stations. Before, it would have been necessary to call them all, and to check each station diary. Also, when connected to other agencies systems, PRMIS will be able to quickly identify and check identities and the status of vehicles and other possessions.

D. 2. Focus AMEP and project Management on PRMIS deployment.

254. The strategy requires revision and decisions made regarding the need to make a version of PRMIS for Dutch-speaking countries, and in the process, perhaps incorporate some more countries from the Dutch

Caribbean. Another option, on the contrary, would be to gradually lead Suriname to make legal and operational modifications that allow it to be integrated into a regional reporting system, an option that also has its advantages.

255. In any case, the strategy must be adjusted. It is key to identify and achieve early victories, and to advance firmly step by step. From the very beginning, it is crucial to constantly demonstrate to the country's police forces that the system constitutes a great advantage both real and potential for them. On the contrary, if it is presented as a certain imposition of the majority countries, which share another language and other legal systems, it will be very difficult for both the Suriname police and its authorities to embrace the project with the necessary energy to ensure your success.

256. The main argument, which, as has been said, has gained much more strength since the COVID epidemic, is the imperative and urgent need to digitize the entire citizen security system. This will work better if the proposal is integrated into national digital transformation policies. Also if emphasis is placed, and the solution is prepared, so that it can gradually bring the police forces closer to what will be the main environment of crime in the future, which is cybercrime.

D. 3. Going forward, PRMIS needs a framework with a higher degree of formalization and support. One should at least think about:

257. A permanent Technical Committee, made up of the ICT specialist within each police force, which advances in the compatibility, through a formalized consensus mechanism arbitrated by the regional authorities of CARICOM IMPACS/ RSS, of each one of the functionalities of PRMIS, and of the terminology to be used. Terms and categories differ in each country, and therefore a system must be considered where each one agrees to give up some uses and accept a new term or category, in exchange for retaining or imposing one of its own, as long as it does not imply generating confusion or insurmountable impediments. These are topics that a technical board of participating countries could address, clarifying concerns and building a consensus. Consensus is also needed for setting a common crime language, in line with international standards but beyond it, referring to police and judiciary practices, and different working models.

258. In the same way, the Technical Committee must decide on the possible reforms or substantial improvements to PRMIS, and its necessary updates. An attempt should also be made to move forward with consensus arbitrated by some regional authority. In this sense, the development of PRMIS should be agreed as follows. If the contracted company delivers the source code, there will be countries with a higher and lower level of capacity to make changes to it.

259. This leads to the need to analyze, the dilemma between a PRMIS common to all countries, and a regional database, or the appropriation and independence of the system and databases so that they reside in each Caribbean nation. Grenada has the IT capacity to carry out autonomous development in each area and is interested in taking advantage of it. However, I would not want to stop benefiting from the advances that could be incorporated into the regional PRMIS, nor the opposite, that it be the countries furthest behind that miss out on the improvements that Grenada could bring.

260. In this sense, technical cooperation between the Caribbean countries themselves should be intensified. The diversity of cultures and practices, combined with the multiplicity of PRMIS functions and its future possibilities, calls for taking full advantage of the many innovations that could arise from daily and critical use of

the system. There should be a technical body under the coordination of CARICOM IMPACS/RSS to discuss:

- Which adjustments, modifications and upgrades should be made to PRMIS;
- After getting the code from the software developer, deciding who will be responsible thereafter, for maintaining the application's integrity, while allowing for adding improvements through coding.
- The exchange of implementation experiences, shortcuts, and good practices
- Sharing training strategies and manuals, online tutorials.
- Sharing models of data representation and utilization.

261. A main and forceful lesson of this evaluation is that just as it is said that "each person is a world", original and unique, it happened that in each police station visited, in each country, without exception, its members referred to some aspect to consider, modify or improve that was different from everything previously surveyed. Whether it was a minor detail or a substantial contribution, it was a demonstration of the richness to which this regional exercise can lead, if directed to this end.

262. At the national level, a focal point per country that could represent each nation and coordinate Q&A Whatsapp groups in each country, where users share doubts and solutions to different issues. Also, the national board, technical, for interoperability of data and to foster strategies for full digitalization to build consensus of the post CariSECURE objectives. These regional advisory bodies under CARICOM IMPACS/RSS might have been intended by CariSECURE in its inception phase, but ended up weakened and almost disconnected, for all the reason already discussed. However, the future could be different.

D. 4. Provide required equipment and software to countries with digitalization gaps.

263. If hardware is insufficient, police officers, once the digital solution in place, can find themselves queuing up to use a computer at the station or dealing with machines that are too outdated or malfunctioning. This can be very negative for the police forces that worked hard together with CariSECURE, to push motivation and commitment of police officers through advocating for the benefits of digitization. Here it will also be necessary to include connectivity equipment in some countries. Another item associated with this problem would be the servers and databases necessary to complement or backup the system or information in the case of larger countries that do not want to depend exclusively on the regional node. Here, the contributions in equipment of the project would have a great impact, if they are achieved gradually, and adapted to the needs and to the already existing IT park. Compatibility is key in this regard. It is true that in any project the recipient should contribute with its own equipment and not wait for everything to be given by the donor. However, in the case of CariSECURE 1.0, this issue is complicated.

264. To understand why the project had, and would have, an impact in this area, it must be noted that in general, equipping police forces is not always a political priority in Caribbean countries. In cases where it is decided to equip the forces, or there is a budget left in the respective ministries, it will not always end up acquiring computers and servers, since there are other needs such as vehicles, non-ballistic weapons, uniform accessories, personal or vehicular webcams, etc. Within the police themselves there may be resistance to spending the funds allocated for desktop computers, tablets, or signature pads, which are seen as a type of unpoliced equipment. These ideas emerged and were corroborated during in-depth interviews with members of the forces. Now, it is essential to make a precise calculation of the needs, and cover it, especially in countries where the equipment is very scarce, such as Grenada or St Vincent, or even in Guyana.

D. 5. Additional strategic support in ICT equipment provision.

265. One cannot sell digitization and get police officers excited, only to find themselves queuing up to use a computer at the station or dealing with machines that are too outdated or malfunctioning. Here it will also be necessary to include connectivity equipment in some countries. Another item associated with this problem would be the servers and databases necessary to complement or backup the system or information in the case of larger countries that do not want to depend exclusively on the regional node. Here, the contributions in equipment of the project would have a great impact, if they are achieved gradually, and adapted to the needs and to the already existing IT park. Compatibility is key in this regard. It is true that in any project the recipient should contribute with its own equipment and not wait for everything to be given by the donor. However, in the case of CariSECURE 1.0, this issue is complicated.

266. To understand why the project had, and would have, an impact in this area, it must be noted that in general, equipping police forces is not always a political priority in Caribbean countries. In cases where it is decided to equip the forces, or there is a budget left in the respective ministries, it will not always end up acquiring computers and servers, since there are other needs such as vehicles, non-ballistic weapons, uniform accessories, personal or vehicular webcams, etc. Within the police themselves there may be resistance to spending the funds allocated for desktop computers, tablets, or signature pads, which are seen as a type of unpoliced equipment. These ideas emerged and were corroborated during in-depth interviews with members of the forces. Now, it is essential to make a precise calculation of the needs, and cover it, especially in countries where the equipment is very scarce, such as Grenada or St Vincent, or even in Guyana.

No	Recommendation	Key points	Entity Responsible	Timeframe
1	Focus on PRMIS and the strengthening of police forces	<p>Conceived, and marketed as a system to upgrade police functions and to free officers from the tasks they dislike the most, full support, will help consolidate the acceptance of PRMIS</p> <p>National buy-in is assured, and most logistical and managerial issues are naturally and swiftly solved by the interested</p>	CARICOM, IMPACS, RSS	ASAP
2	Address the special country cases	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adjust strategy to allow for a version of PRMIS for Dutch-speaking countries; or 2. Lead Suriname to make legal and operational modifications that allow it to be integrated into a regional reporting system. 3. Key to achieve <u>early victories, and to advance firmly step by step.</u> 4. From the beginning, crucial to demonstrate that PRMIS constitutes a great advantage both real and potential 	CARICOM, IMPACS, RSS	ASAP

3	PRMIS needs a framework with a higher degree of formalization and support, and “conflict resolution” capacities	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A permanent Technical Committee which decides on the possible reforms or substantial improvements to PRMIS, and its necessary updates 2. Need to address the dilemma between a PRMIS common to all countries, and a regional database, or the appropriation and independence of the system and databases so that they reside in each Caribbean nation. 3. Technical cooperation, and KM resources between the Caribbean countries intensified 	CARICOM, IMPACS, RSS	ASAP
4.	Redesign of an AMEP and project management around PRMIS deployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New indicator framework to incorporate critical tasks, milestones and strategic objectives to reflect the complexity and need for coordination and synchronization, in the rollout of PRMIS, and design and implementation of its supporting activities. • Deployment strategy in each country is different, but KM system must be there to help the followers take advantage of the lessons learned by the leading countries. • Key to minimize period during which PRMIS must be used in parallel to all the existing reporting systems. • Monitoring and management skills needed during the phase where all alternative reporting systems are abandoned, to give full centrality to PRMIS. 	CARICOM, IMPACS, RSS	ASAP
5.	Strategic support through provision of ICT equipment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment is insufficient in quantity and in specifications (including servers and databases) at some stations, preventing wide scale utilization. • Equipping police forces is not always a political priority • Resources can be available, but end up acquiring other needs such as vehicles, personal or vehicular webcams, etc. 	CARICOM, IMPACS, RSS	See country ICT roadmaps

Annexes

I. Management response, in the AUDIT TRAIL TEMPLATE format.

This is the audit trail for the comments received on the CARISECURE 1.0 Evaluation DRAFT REPORT. The following comments provided on the DRAFT REPORT are referenced by institution/organization (without including the commentator's name) and by the page and paragraph number as numbered in the draft report.

	Institution/ Organization	Page # in Draft Report	Paragraph No. in draft report	Comment/Input	Evaluator's response response and actions taken
1.	UNDP	11	28	These are two questions	In fact, if taken as one question, one could evaluate more rightly the project, since the first part -laying an info system- should be the <i>prerequisite</i> of the second part – fostering evidence-based decisions with focus on gender and youth-. Taken separately, -the logframe's three outputs- affects the evaluation of the project's performance. ACTION: <u>This said, I did separate them to better reflect this M&E issue.</u>
2.	UNDP	12	30	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Internal coherence addresses the synergies and interlinkages between the intervention and other interventions carried out by the same institution/government, as well as the consistency of the intervention with the relevant international norms and standards to which that institution/government adheres. 2. External coherence considers the consistency of the intervention with other actors' interventions in the same context. This includes complementarity, harmonization and co-ordination with others, and the extent to which the intervention is adding value while avoiding duplication of effort. 3. Bullets 1 and 3 relate more to 'Communication and Knowledge 	These were the questions reviewed and approved in the Inception Report. Nevertheless, I do agree they fit better under the criteria mentioned. ACTION: I did the changes, and added others more strictly related to internal and external coherence.

				Management'; comments 4,5 and 6 relate more to 'crosscutting issues'; 7 and 8 aligned to 'effective'	
3.	UNDP	17	45	<p>In the table:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> September 23: persons responsible should be PMU OCT 4-24: Please revise to only highlight countries visited Please revise November to December timeline to show the revisions/updates which have taken place or are planned 	OK. ACTION: Corrected all remarks.
4.	UNDP	19	138	<p>Table (specific to coherence):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Given the definitions of internal and external coherence, adaptive management was not the intended focus here, but rather synergies and interlinkages, complementarity, and harmonization. As outlined in the TOR, relevance and coherence are best assessed together. It may be best to either remove coherence as a criterion or adjust the rating based on what it should measure and have it alongside relevance. 	Ok. ACTION: adjusted the rating.
5.	UNDP	19	140	"was inspired by the work of crime analysts" This comment is unnecessary - the sentence could be reworded to indicate that emphasis was placed on crime analysis, no need to make assumptions on why	Ok. It's true it does not add to the understanding of the evaluation, nor it is a "proven" fact. ACTION: Modified the paragraph to reflect this.
6.	UNDP	19	140	<p>Would be good to start the section by answering these questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was the project concept in line with the national development priorities and plans of each country, and full ownership can be perceived? Were perspectives of those who would be affected by project decisions, those who could affect the outcomes, and those who could contribute information or other resources to the process, considered during project design processes? 	Yes, these questions were included in the Inception Report criteria questions. ACTION: Added more specific topics answering these questions
7.	UNDP	20	143	It is important to illustrate how these points contribute to the project being	Yes ok, added text at the beginning of p. 143.

				relevant; please make that connection throughout the paragraph	
8.	UNDP	20	144	While there was pre-existing data available and some use of that data for policy formulation, maybe improving the quantity, quality, timelines of that data and/or for e.g. disaggregating by age/gender and other demographics can provide information for more nuanced programming around crime prevention. Questions can also be asked about the quality of existing formats, ease of compilation and frequency of data sharing etc.	Ok, added text to 144 to incorporate this idea.
9.	UNDP	21	147	“getting back to the project document” Please rephrase	Ok, rephrased it.
10.	UNDP	20/21	164	Suriname has also endorsed the ICT Roadmap	Ok added, thank you.
11.	UNDP	26	172	Last sentence is a sensitive statement, please re-word	Yes, ok, reworded.
12.	UNDP	28	186	The word seduce is not appropriate, perhaps, persuade?	Ok, changed to “motivate”
13.	UNDP	30	195	CariSECURE did not finance the drafting of the NYPAP. This was Government of Saint Lucia initiative	OK, corrected, same paragraph
14.	UNDP	31	198	A deployment of a digitised system for Saint Lucia was not part of the scope of the Project given the Leahy Law issue that prevented CariSECURE from working directly with them. While they did receive a digitised system through resource mobilization by UNDP, Saint Lucia did not participate in the collective training and testing activities around the deployment of PRMIS. With this challenge I think it's unfair to say this. Was training of National Officers specific to the deployment of a digitised application? He also mentions Guyana's size somewhere in the report as a major challenge prior to this.	OK, changed the paragraph to reflect these comments.
15.	UNDP	25	214	The statement is not clear; in paragraph 213 it is mentioned that the project focused primarily on one output; in paragraph 214 it is mentioned that there is a need to tighten the focus on one area. Which is it?	Yes ok, both paragraphs 213 and 214 modified.

16.	UNDP	37	224	<p>1. Under Barbados: please rephrase “plenty of data”</p> <p>2. Antigua: what does “OK with 24 time” mean</p> <p>3. St. Kitts and Nevis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • please rephrase, the points are disjointed. “Sometimes people are trained in different things but then they do not work on that”; the language here is too casual; please rephrase. • “the problem is the internet”: please complete sentences throughout the table. • Under what was identified in the evaluation, please identify the challenge instead of listing questions at the end 	<p>Ok, done. Ok, edited.</p> <p>Ok, changed.</p> <p>Ok, done.</p> <p>Ok done.</p>
17.	UNDP	38	226	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is happening in a few countries? • In Barbados: Why is date format considered an issue? • In St. Kitts, this phrase is unclear: “the report open and typed had not being dispatched, and thus he should no log out before that” 	<p>Ok, explained now in detail, same paragraph.</p> <p>Ok, explained.</p> <p>Ok, done.</p>
18.	UNDP	39	227	In the first line, did you mean that there are coordination issues? I am not following the statement that the coordination issues are necessary.	OK, explained in the paragraph, expanded.
19.	UNDP	41	237	"which allows them to be subdued and used for political or spurious purposes". Please rephrase.	Ok, rephrased it.
20.	UNDP	43	246	"and the leaders are <u>far enough beyond the point of no return</u> , and of becoming the examples to follow". Please rephrase.	OK.
21.	UNDP	45	251	Please rephrase: "the tasks they hate the most"	OK, corrected.
22.	UNDP	46	260	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • which bug repair, features add (please confirm this is the correct terminology to be used) and changes should be made to PRMIS; • After getting the code from the software developer, who works on the (sentence incomplete) 	<p>OK, rephrased.</p> <p>Ok, done.</p>
23.	UNDP	47	D.4	Could rephrase the recommendation to: Provide required equipment and software to countries with digitalization gaps	Ok, done, thank you for the title.

24.	UNDP	47	263	Language here is casual and requires rephrasing: "One cannot sell digitization and get police officers excited, only to find themselves queuing up to use a computer at the station or dealing with machines"	Ok,done.
25.	Evaluation Reference Group	7	10	The project is aligned with the regional objectives laid out in the 2017-2021 programme. Shouldn't this read 2018-2021?	Yes thank you, corrected.
26.	Evaluation Reference Group	9	20	The information presented in the paragraph in terms of numerous financial amounts and dates, becomes a bit confusing. I recommend presenting this information as a timeline, or in bullet form, for understandability.	Table added between paragraphs 20 and 21.
27.	Evaluation Reference Group	14	Cross cutting themes	Bullet point 3 should starts with were and not where	Thank you, corrected.
28.	Evaluation Reference Group	18	134	Challenges in terms of delays AND achievement in terms of PRMIS deployment are contained in this paragraph. It is therefore unclear what the main message of this paragraph is. I recommend separating the paragraphs and have one focus on the main achievement and the other focus on the main challenge.	Ok, included achievements in the following paragraph 135.
29.	Evaluation Reference Group	18	135	This paragraph is hard to follow. It talks about "leading countries" but it is not clear which countries these refer to. I recommend identifying countries so the context is clear. I also recommend re-examining wording for flow and understandability.	OK, included, and paragraph rephrased.
30.	Evaluation Reference Group	18	137	However, reaching a satisfactory mark in those criteria is done affecting the rest... no clear what is meant to say.	Ok, edited.
31.	Evaluation Reference Group	18	138	The different adjustments needed to become effective and relevant at the outcome, show that resources were invested in beneficiaries, activities and products that are later discontinued or sided. First part of the sentence and second part not coherent. Sentence is not clear on what it intends to convey.	Ok, edited.
32.	Evaluation Reference Group	18	138	"Sharpening the focus of the project also is done sacrificing potential stakeholder participation, affecting coherence". This is potentially	Ok, elaborated in the same paragraph.

				important point and needs some elaboration.	
33.	Evaluation Reference Group	20	144	...Cognizant of the potential impact of crime, successive governments have invested heavily to ensure national security. Invested heavily of what?	It is a quote. The next sentence mentions as investments: <i>educational, social and rehabilitation programmes</i> .
34.	Evaluation Reference Group	21	146	"and shows no serious concerns regarding crime evolution, despite the phrasing of the regional diagnosis". Meaning of this is unclear. Suggest rewording.	Ok, edited and separated in two different paragraphs.
35.	Evaluation Reference Group	22	156	This should read In fact, that young people especially women victims are well taken care of	Yes, thank you. Edited.
36.	Evaluation Reference Group	22	156	Is there a citation for this? Was this a finding from the evaluation? Need to distinguish and cite.	No, this derives from interviews. Added the source to the paragraph.
37.	Evaluation Reference Group	23	160	"Moreover, a fully digitized police operation would help attract the young and bright into the police force, when today the archaic scribe methods used chase the best from being recruited". Is there a citation for this? Was this a finding from the evaluation? Need to distinguish and cite.	It's a finding deriving from interviews. Added the explanation.
38.	Evaluation Reference Group	26	172	This paragraph is not definitive. It speculates about the reasons for delays. One might expect such a paragraph to be more definitive or to give evidence of what is being suggested.	Yes, you are right. Previous comment in the same sense: paragraph rewritten and expanded.
39.	Evaluation Reference Group	26	176	"As if that were not enough, the technical team at UNDP Barbados that was left in charge of the project had to deal with inadequate programming and, furthermore, most of its goals were unattainable". This is a loaded statement and requires context and explanation.	Yes, you are right: paragraph rewritten and significantly expanded.
40.	Evaluation Reference Group	27	177	"Interviewees from both institutions regret their lack of full involvement in the crucial period of PRMIS deployment". Excellent reference. This is the type of example that is missing in other areas.	Ok, thank you. Did added now references to inputs from interviewees were evidence was lacking.
41.	Evaluation Reference Group	27	180	"It was possible to solve on the fly...". For the purposes of this technical report, it is important to explain exactly what this means.	OK, rephrased and expanded.

42.	RGPF	27	182	PRMIS comes in both English and Dutch. The application can therefore be switched to mirror their primary language. Additionally, there are a number of permission changes that can be done in the backend to mirror their current validation by supervisor's processes. Additionally, in cases where the system does not fully meet our needs, SOPs were created around the normal functioning of the system to obtain the desired results. This too may be possible for their country. As a suggestion, it may be possible for a review to be done with their country and another country already utilizing the system to verify whether or not these challenges can be curbed before they completely forgo the use of the application.	Thank you very much. I added your comment, full of valuable and pertinent information, as a footnote.
43.	Evaluation Reference Group	31	199	The project schedule and efforts were also affected by hurricanes (Dominica). Not sure why Dominica was mention since it was no part of the project.	Thank you for the clarification. Added to the text.
44.	RGPF	34	221	Line 5 – the (h) after the number 15 may need to be removed.	Thank you. Removed.
45.	RGPF	35	216	It should be added that there are instances where the system is installed, but only particular elements of the platform is utilized while other areas are omitted.	Thank you, your suggested option was added to the text.
46.	RGPF	37	224	In the table provided, Guyana indicated that “PRMIS does not accommodate political organization of towns and regions.” If they are referring to group areas based on a politically outlined geographical area as opposed to the parish, then this can be accommodated within the system.	You are probably right, but all those interviewed mentioned this issue. If either they cannot accommodate the system nor they do not know how to do it, it is an issue in both cases.
47.	RGPF	37	224	In the table provided, St. Kitts and Nevis indicated that 1. they are not able to print the interactions to take to court. The system does have this feature and it can be shown to them. What the system does not do in this regard is attach the name of the person in custody with whom the interactions were recorded for. 2. A formal policy on how to start a report and how to use the data was documented in our training manual and SOPs which can be shared to offer	Thank you. Added as a footnote to do justice to PRMIS.

				assistance and guidance in this regard. 3. As it related to the procedure for scanning documents, this is an SOP that has to be designed by the country themselves as required documents per section in the platform differs along with the country's legal requirements. A sample of our SOPs can be shared to provide a general idea on how to achieve this if deemed necessary.	
48.	RGPF	37	224	In the table provided, Suriname indicated that 1. Dutch translation is not working on their end, the translation feature works for us. We have seen that with the update of certain versions, some areas are not updated also. This needs to be checked by admin any time an update is made by the developers, and they must be informed so that they can make the necessary changes. 2. The law format can be altered to reflect various legal modules. This may need to be checked on the administrative end to see if it can accommodate their structure. 3. Supervisor validation request feature can be removed by the administrators. 4. The glitches identified can be resolved through procedural changes. During the process, if certain steps are not followed in the correct order or omitted, it will resolve in these issues. There are also some settings that would turn on or off some of these requests. As a suggestion, we should meet and share best practices to see if they application really cannot address their law enforcement needs before forgoing it altogether.	Thank you. Added as a footnote too.
49.	RGPF	37	224	Table – St. Kitts and Nevis – (identification during evaluation) – supervision type of training should read- Sgt. Thompson and his colleagues in St. Kitts and not Grenada.	Thank you, Corrected.
50.	RGPF	38	226	Barbados – most of the wording categories and meanings can be altered by the administrator with a few areas left standard. Specific examples may better aid in obtaining their desired results. The PRMIS application does not have a built-in	Thank you. Added as a footnote too.

				<p>word correction software, as such, the underlying of the words is what is produced by the computer's memory itself. To resolve this issue, we have downloaded Grammarly on each computer using the application to get the proper corrections. Sudden death and fire registries can be created, using the Call for Service application. It is not a separate module, but it can be filtered to achieve the desired results as is the case with our country.</p> <p>Antigua an Barbuda – The system does have the option to provide an HTML format that does not afford the user the ability to alter any document that you may desire to print. That option must be selected as opposed to the word format. The system also does allow us to reject a call for service and to cancel an incident report. The stage at which these activities take place is what is important.</p>	
51.		38	228	<p>"Now this still happens in very few countries". What does this refer to? What still happens?</p>	Edited.
52.	RGPF	39	228	<p>With regards to the Digital Legal Registry – we are not certain if the Help Section of the PRMIS application was considered fully as an option to curb this issue. We have already begun to upload all of our local laws under the heading Laws and Procedures. This way, officers are able to locate, read and review all local laws while using the application.</p>	Thank you, info added as a footnote.
53.	RGPF	45	251	<p>Line 1 – fromtedious should reflect from tedious</p>	Thank you, edited.
54.	Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda Police	13	29	<p>Do the legal frameworks, policies, governance structures and processes pose risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project benefits? The legal frame work and policies are in place as it related to PRMIS.</p>	Yes, it is more the changes that can affect sustainability. Added to the text.
55.	Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda Police	25	167	<p>Number of stations live 4 from 13. Number of stations live presently 11 from 13. Other departments such as Traffic and Narcotics will also be live shortly.</p>	Ok, corrected.

56.	Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda Police	37	224	Issues with bandwidth availability. High Speed connectivity is now available. Stations can now be connected to fibre	Ok, omitted.
57.	Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda Police	42	239	Implementing PRMIS. Maintaining both digital and writing poses some discomfort at the start. Once the comparison synchronizes, it was felt that the transition from writing to digital is necessary.	Yes, I understand this is duly reflected in the text.
58.	Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda Police	45	253	PRMIS links all stations together into share their information and work. This capability in PRMIS can be used to share information and at the same time use for human resource management.	Yes, agree, added the idea to the text.
59.	Evaluation Reference Group	41	237	“This can be suspected in the empirical experience in various countries of the region”. Caution that this can be seen as subjective. What is the empirical evidence? This needs to be supported. UNDP	No formal or academic evidence, only causal empirical evidence. Edited the text to make this as clear as possible.

II. Terms of Reference

INTRODUCTION

This is the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the UNDP project titled “Strengthening Evidence Based Decision Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean (CariSECURE)”, which is to be undertaken between July 2022 and August 2022. The project started on 25 July 2016 and is in its final year of implementation). This ToR sets out the expectations for this Final Evaluation. The evaluation process must follow the guidance outlined in the document UNDP Evaluation Guidelines (revised in June 2021) ([UNDP Evaluation Guidelines.pdf](#))

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

CariSECURE 1.0 is a Key Activity under the USAID’s larger Youth Empowerment Services (YES) Project executed across 8 countries, namely: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. The project is being implemented by the UNDP Barbados Multi-country Office in cooperation with the UNDP Offices in Guyana and Suriname and with specific oversight from the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean (RBLAC) due to the regional scope of the project (Eastern and Southern Caribbean).

At the national level, the project engaged partners and stakeholders to include: National Security Ministries, police forces, statistical offices, probation and parole services, public prosecution offices, courts, prisons, Ministries of Youth. CARISECURE worked with regional institutions such as the Regional Security System (RSS) and supported the establishment of a regional crime observatory at the organisation to collect and aggregate national data on the citizen security indicators from their member states on a monthly basis and generate regional analysis to feed into their semi-annual meeting of the Council of Ministers of National Security. The Project also engaged with CARICOM IMPACS to expand such analysis to CARICOM Member States, through the establishment of a crime and violence data warehouse which hosts the Police Records Management Information System (PRMIS) application and will support the RSS with the collection, monitoring and analysis of these regional indicators to support evidence-based decision-making on crime and violence within Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.

CariSECURE also collaborated with UNWOMEN and the IDB Citizen Security Programme in Guyana to cost share and pilot the recently approved CARICOM GBV Prevalence Survey Model in order to test the validity of data received on incidences of sexual and domestic violence. Additionally, CariSECURE through an agreement with UNODC and the Saint Lucia Central Statistics Office supported the implementation of the 2020 National Crime Victimization Survey in Saint Lucia. The Project has also collaborated with the Office of the Attorney General in Barbados to support activities in Barbados to combat trafficking in persons including: training for officers of the Barbados Police Service on the detection, investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons; a TIP knowledge and perception survey of the Barbadian public and public awareness products – jingle, PSAs and video targeted at the Barbadian Public.

The purpose of the YES Project is to increase the institutional and technical capacity

of regional bodies selected national government systems and community stakeholders to reduce risk factors that drive youth crime, violence, and victimization. It has a specific goal of reducing youth involvement in crime and violence in target communities. Accordingly, the YES Project has three expected results under its relevant Activities:

- CariSECURE Project - Strengthened Evidence-based Decision-making in Youth Crime and Violence Prevention Policy and Programming
- Community, Family and Youth Resilience (CFYR) Project - Communities, families, and youth strengthened to withstand, mitigate and recover from crime and violence and the
- Juvenile Justice Reform Project (JJRP) – The rehabilitation and reintegration of youth in conflict with the law in society

The Strategic Objective of CariSECURE was to ensure Regional, national and local organizations use evidence-based decision making for youth crime and violence prevention and policymaking with associated outputs as follows:

- ☐ Output I: Standardized and Disaggregated Crime Data Reporting Within and among National Authorities to foster the reliance on valid, reliable, and comparable data on Citizen Security
- ☐ Output II: Utilization of evidence-based analysis on crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programs and policies
- ☐ Output III: Improved decision-making on youth crime and violence based on available evidence at the national level

Further project details are provided in the Table below:

Table 1: Project Information

Project title:	Strengthening Evidence Based Decision Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean (CariSECURE)		
ATLAS ID:	00097340		
Corporate outcome and output	UNDP strategic Plan Outcome 3: Responsive, inclusive and accountable institutions improve the quality of democracy and the rule of law		
Country	Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname		
Region	Eastern and Southern Caribbean		
Date project document signed	25 July 2016		
Project dates	Project start: 25 July 2016	Start	Planned end
	Project Revisions: (please see table below) New end date: 31 October 2022	25 July 2016	31 October 2022
Project budget	10,683,143.72		

Project expenditure at the time of evaluation		
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Detailed Project Revisions undertaken:

Revision	Scope	Beneficiary Countries	Results Framework	Closure of Project
November 2018	National beneficiaries adjusted from 5 to 3 in each country (Police, Prisons, Prosecutions)	Reduced from 10 to 8 (Trinidad and Tobago and Dominica removed)	Outputs and Indicators revised 30 September 2020	30 September 2020
August 2020	National beneficiaries adjusted from 3 to 1 in each country (Police)	Number remains at 8	Indicators revised, some removed and more added	30 September 2021
September 2021	Local installation of PRMIS pilot in Grenada; monitoring and provision of technical support with PRMIS implementation; Inclusion of activities related to Trafficking in Persons (TIP)	Number remains at 8	Indicators for TIP revised	30 April 2022
March 2022	Support the full operationalization of the Crime Data Warehouse Solution by building the capacity of CARICOM IMPACS; ongoing technical and capacity-building support to countries to build crime analysis capacity; and addressing national level ICT and other gaps identified in roadmap and sustainability documents to support full	Number remains at 8	Indicators have not been revised as the work foreseen will involve reinforcement of capacities in identified indicators	31 October 2022

	deployment of PRMIS			
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2. FINAL EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The Final evaluation report will assess the achievement of project results against what was expected to be achieved and draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, future projects with similar objectives, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming. The Final evaluation report promotes accountability and transparency and assesses the extent of project accomplishments and is one of the evaluations to be implemented under the UNDP 2022 to 2026 evaluation plan within outcome 4 of the Country Programme document and Outcome 1 of the UNDP 2022- 2025 Strategic Plan.

The final evaluation will also be important in determining the completeness of the project, and if the activities and indicators identified during project development justly reflected the project objectives. It could also provide some guidance on how request for project extensions could be fairly correlated to time granted.

The evaluation will be focused on the 8 beneficiary countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. Particular attention will be placed on the Tier 1 countries (Barbados, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), that have been prioritized and have benefited from a greater level of support through the project. It will assess the project's impact on the availability of crime and violence data, the analysis of this data, frameworks for sharing data with key stakeholders and agencies and the use of available data in the development of strategies and policies. The evaluation will target key national agencies that have benefitted from the project, namely national police forces/services (including crime analysis units where applicable), Ministries of National Security, statistical bureaux, Ministries of Youth/Youth affairs and other agencies engaged in the CariSECURE National Task Forces. Additionally, the Office of the Attorney General and the National Task Force for the prevention of Trafficking in Persons in Barbados should be targeted for activities related in Trafficking in Persons (TIP) in that country.

The evaluation will also concentrate on the following outcomes and outputs:

Output I: Standardized and Disaggregated Crime Data Reporting Within and among National Authorities to foster the reliance on valid, reliable, and comparable data on Citizen Security

1.1 Number of countries with government approved Caribbean Security Toolkit

1.2 Number of countries with draft Correspondence Tables for International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)

1.3 Number of Countries with Digitized Applications for Police as a result of CariSECURE's assistance

1.4 Number of Tier I countries with 75% of Police stations with digitized Police application capable of collecting and producing crime statistics report

1.5 Number of Tier I countries with 75% of Police stations utilizing mobile technology.

Output II: Utilization of evidence-based analysis on crime data to inform citizen security strategies, programs and policies

2.1 A regional crime observatory with the capacity to analyze security data received from countries

2.2 Number of countries capable of producing analysis using the Citizen Security Indicators

2.3 Number of Countries with the Police force having Crime Analysis Units with the capability of generating intelligence reports

Output III: Improved decision-making on youth crime and violence based on available evidence at the national level

3.1 : Number of Countries with developed response strategies and tactical responses to crime and violence due to information sharing between the Police and relevant agencies and the coordinated support of CariSECURE

3.2 Number of countries utilizing non-administrative or survey data with the help of CariSECURE to inform national crime and violence strategies with Youth and Gender considerations

3.3 Number of Police Officers with basic TIP skills and training to respond to Trafficking in Persons

3.4 Number of Police Officers with enhanced specialized TIP skills and training to respond to Trafficking in Persons

3.5 National Survey completed on public knowledge and perception of TIP

3. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND GUIDING QUESTIONS

The project will be evaluated within key criteria to determine if the project meets required standards and will be assessed through the use of key evaluation questions. Evaluation questions outline the information that the evaluation will generate. It is proposed that these questions, once answered, will provide users of the evaluation with the information they require to make decisions, take action or add to knowledge. Questions should be grouped according to the four Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)

evaluation criteria: (a) relevance; (b) coherence c) effectiveness; (d) efficiency; and (e) sustainability. Cross-cutting issues e) Human rights and f) Gender equality should also be assessed. While sample questions have been provided in Annex B, it is expected that the final questions used in the evaluation will be submitted by the consultant in the Inception report.

4. FINAL EVALUATION APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

The final evaluation report must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The Evaluator will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase (i.e., Project Document, UNDP Social and Environmental Screening Procedure/SESP) project reports including annual APRs, project budget revisions, lesson learned reports, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the team considers useful for this evidence-based evaluation.

The Evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with the Project Team, government counterparts, Implementing Partners, the UNDP Country Office(s), direct beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

Engagement of stakeholders is vital to a successful evaluation. Stakeholder involvement should include interviews with stakeholders who have project responsibilities, including but not limited to organizations and persons listed in Annex I; executing agencies, senior officials and task team/component leaders, key experts and consultants in the subject area, Project Board, project beneficiaries, academia, local government and CSOs, etc. Additionally, the Evaluator is expected to conduct field missions to consult with local project teams and the key stakeholders in one country from each Tier as follows (final country selections to be confirmed):

- ☐ Tier 1 countries – Barbados, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines;
- ☐ Tier 2 counties - Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis or Saint Lucia
- ☐ Tier 3 country - Suriname.

The UNDP suggests that the following methodological approaches be utilized:

- a) Document review of all relevant documentation
- b) Semi-structured interviews (this will also inform the development and finalization of key evaluation questions)
- c) Data review and analysis
- d) Field visits to aforementioned countries

However, it is noted that the specific design and methodology for the evaluation should emerge from consultations between the evaluator, programme unit and key stakeholders regarding what is appropriate and feasible for meeting the final evaluation purpose and objectives and answering the evaluation questions, given limitations of budget, time and data. The evaluator must use gender-responsive methodologies and tools and ensure that gender equality and women's empowerment, support to persons

with disabilities, as well as other cross-cutting issues and SDGs are incorporated into the report.

The final methodological approach including interview schedule, field visits and data to be used in the evaluation must be clearly outlined in the Final Evaluation Inception Report and be fully discussed and agreed between UNDP, stakeholders and the TE Team.

5. EVALUATION REFERENCE GROUP (ERG)

Based on the perceived scope of the evaluation, an evaluation reference group will be utilized to support the evaluation process, help to ensure transparency, provide comments and directions as well as to strengthen the credibility of the evaluation. The evaluation reference group will consist of key government partners, project management boards and individuals with expertise in evaluation design, conduct and quality. The ERG will also review key deliverables produced throughout the evaluation, including the Inception Report, Draft and Final Evaluation reports.

6. ACTIVITIES AND TIMEFRAME

The total duration of the Final Evaluation will be approximately 45 days over a time period of 10 weeks starting from the date of contract signature and shall not exceed 5 months from when the consultants are hired. The tentative Final Evaluation timeframe is as follows; however completion dates are tentative and may be adjusted based on when the contract is signed:

ACTIVITY	NUMBER OF WORKING DAYS	COMPLETION DATE
Document review and preparing Final Evaluation Inception Report (Inception Report due no later than 2 weeks before the Final Evaluation mission)	5 days	August 16, 2022
Final Evaluation mission: stakeholder meetings, interviews, field visits NB: The mission is tentative and will depend on the sanitary restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. If it cannot be completed on-site, interviews will be carried out virtually. The stakeholder interviews, if done virtually, may require a longer than usual time period. Please adjust the number of days and completion date to accommodate this.	17 days	September 14, 2022
Presentation of initial findings	2 days	September 16, 2022

ACTIVITY	NUMBER OF WORKING DAYS	COMPLETION DATE
Preparing draft report	5 days	September 23, 2022
Finalization of evaluation report/ Incorporating audit trail from feedback on draft report (due within 1 week of receiving UNDP, ERG and stakeholder comments on the draft and 2 weeks after stakeholder feedback received) (note: accommodate time delay in dates for circulation and review of the draft report)	3 days	October 19, 2022

N.B: Options for site visits should be provided in the Inception Report.

7. FINAL EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

#	Deliverable	Description	Timing	Responsibilities
1	Inception Report (no less than 15 pages)	Evaluator clarifies objectives and methods of Final evaluation exercise	No later than 1 week before the Final Evaluation mission:	Evaluator submits to the Commissioning Unit and project management
2	Presentation	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission:	Evaluator presents to project management, the Implementing Partners and the Commissioning Unit
3	Draft Final Report (40-60 pages including the Executive summary)	Full report (using guidelines on content outlined in Annex B) with annexes	Within 2 weeks of the evaluation mission:	Sent to the Commissioning Unit, reviewed by, Project Coordinating Unit, ERG
4	Final Report*	Revised report with audit trail detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report	Within 2 weeks of receiving UNDP comments on draft:	Sent to the Commissioning Unit

*The final evaluation report must be in English. If applicable, the Commissioning Unit may choose to arrange for a translation of the report into a language more widely shared by national stakeholders.

8. FINAL EVALUATION ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this Final Evaluation resides with the Commissioning Unit. The Commissioning Unit for this project's MTR is the UNDP Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean Sub-Regional Office.

The Commissioning Unit will contract the consultants and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the countries selected (to be confirmed) for the MTR team and will provide an updated stakeholder list with contact details (phone and email). The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the evaluation team to provide all relevant documents, set up stakeholder interviews, and arrange field visits.

9. INDEPENDENT EVALUATOR

The independent evaluator (with experience and exposure to similar projects and evaluations in other regions) will conduct the Final Evaluation. The evaluator will conduct interviews with local counterparts, conduct site visits, liaise with local counterparts to schedule meetings and visits (with some support from UNDP), be responsible for the overall design and writing of key reports and supporting documents (Inception and Final Evaluation report), analyze and interpret data collected, present findings, deduce key lessons, insights and recommendations and ensure these are reflected in the relevant reports.

The consultant cannot have participated in the project preparation, formulation, and/or implementation (including the writing of the Project Document) and should not have a conflict of interest with project related activities.

The selection of consultants will be aimed at maximizing the overall "team" qualities in the following areas:

Technical Criteria	Rating
Recent experience with result-based management evaluation methodologies and applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios Less than 1 year – 5pts 1 -3 Years - 15pts 3 years and over 20 pts	20
Experience working with citizen security projects, demonstrated understanding of issues in citizen security and competence in adaptive management, as applied to citizen security Less than 1 year – 5pts 1 -3 Years - 15pts 3 years and over 20 pts	20
Experience with national, multi-sectoral stakeholder engagement in the OECS	10
Project evaluation/review experience within UN system	10

A Master's degree in criminology, criminal justice, public policy, monitoring and evaluation or other closely related field	10
TOTAL	70

Education

- ☐ A Master's degree in criminology, criminal justice, public policy, monitoring and evaluation or other closely related field
- ☐ Certification in project management is an asset.

Experience

- ☐ Relevant experience with result-based management evaluation methodologies;
- ☐ Experience applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios;
- ☐ Competence in adaptive management, as applied to citizen security
- ☐ Experience in evaluating projects;
- ☐ Experience working in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean, in particular Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname.
- ☐ Experience in relevant technical areas;
- ☐ Demonstrated understanding of issues related to gender, youth crime and violence and citizen security. Experience in gender sensitive evaluation and analysis.
- ☐ Excellent communication skills;
- ☐ Demonstrable analytical skills;
- ☐ Project evaluation/review experiences within United Nations system will be considered an asset.

Language

- ☐ Fluency in written and spoken English.

10. ETHICS

The Final Evaluation team will be held to the highest ethical standards and is required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation'. The Final Evaluator must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees, and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The evaluator must also ensure security of collected information before and after the Final Evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information, knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the final evaluation and not for other uses without the express authorization of UNDP and partners.

11. PAYMENT SCHEDULE

- ☐ 20% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the Evaluation Inception Report and approval by the Commissioning Unit
- ☐ 40% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the Draft Evaluation report to the Commissioning Unit

- ☐ 40% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the Final Evaluation report and approval by the Commissioning Unit (via Report Clearance Form) and delivery of completed Audit Trail
- Criteria for issuing the final payment of 40%¹:
- The Final Evaluation report includes all requirements outlined in the evaluation TOR and is in accordance with the evaluation guidance.
 - The Final Evaluation report is clearly written, logically organized, and is specific for this project (i.e., text has not been cut & pasted from other evaluation reports).
 - The Audit Trail includes responses to and justification for each comment listed.

12. APPLICATION PROCESS²

Recommended Presentation of Proposal:

- a) Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability using the [template](#)³ provided by UNDP;
- b) CV or a Personal History Form ([P11 form](#)⁴);
- c) Brief description of approach to work/technical proposal of why the individual considers him/herself as the most suitable for the assignment, and a proposed methodology on how they will approach and complete the assignment; (max 1 page)
- d) Financial Proposal that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price and all other travel related costs (such as flight ticket, per diem, etc.), supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template attached to the Letter of Confirmation of Interest template. If an applicant is employed by an organization/company/institution, and he/she expects his/her employer to charge a management fee in the process of releasing him/her to UNDP under Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA), the applicant must indicate at this point, and ensure that all such costs are duly incorporated in the financial proposal submitted to UNDP.

All application materials should be submitted by email indicating the following reference “Consultant for Final Evaluation for “Strengthening Evidence Based Decision Making for Citizen Security in the Caribbean (CariSECURE)” at the following address ONLY: procurement.bb@undp.org by the indicated deadline.

¹ The Commissioning Unit is obligated to issue payments to the MTR team as soon as the terms under the ToR are fulfilled. If there is an ongoing discussion regarding the quality and completeness of the final deliverables that cannot be resolved between the Commissioning Unit and the MTR team, the Regional M&E Advisor and Vertical Fund Directorate will be consulted. If needed, the Commissioning Unit’s senior management, Procurement Services Unit and Legal Support Office will be notified as well so that a decision can be made about whether or not to withhold payment of any amounts that may be due to the evaluator(s), suspend or terminate the contract and/or remove the individual contractor from any applicable rosters. See the UNDP Individual Contract Policy for further details:

https://popp.undp.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/UNDP_POPP_DOCUMENT_LIBRARY/Public/PSU_Individual%20Contract_Individual%20Contract%20Policy.docx&action=default

² Engagement of the consultants should be done in line with guidelines for hiring consultants in the POPP:

<https://info.undp.org/global/popp/Pages/default.aspx>

³

<https://intranet.undp.org/unit/bom/psa/Support%20documents%20on%20IC%20Guidelines/Tem plate%20for%20Confirm ation%20of%20Interest%20and%20Submission%20of%20Financial%20Proposal.docx>

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/Careers/P11_Personal_history_form.doc

Criteria for Evaluation of Proposal: Only those applications which are responsive and compliant will be evaluated. Offers will be evaluated according to the Combined Scoring method – where the educational background and experience on similar assignments will be weighted at 70% and the price proposal will weigh as 30% of the total scoring. The applicant receiving the Highest Combined Score that has also accepted UNDP's General Terms and Conditions will be awarded the contract.

ToR ANNEX A: List of Documents to be reviewed by the Evaluation Team

1. UNDP Project Document
2. UNDP Environmental and Social Screening results
3. Project Inception Report
4. Quarterly progress reports and work plans of the various implementation task teams
5. Audit reports
6. Updates results framework showing target achievement to date by indicator
7. Oversight mission reports
8. All monitoring reports prepared by the project
9. Financial and Administration guidelines used by Project Team
10. Workplans and Procurement Plans
11. Project Risk log

The following documents will also be available:

12. Project operational guidelines, manuals, and systems
13. UNDP country/countries programme document(s)
14. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee Meetings and the Project Appraisal Committee Meeting
15. Project site location maps
16. Key Stakeholders and Partners

III. List of documents reviewed

60. 2016-07-28 CariSECURE Signed project document
61. 2022 Proposed Timetable for CARISECURE 1.0 Final Evaluation, September 7, 2022
62. 2019 CariSECURE Annual Report Y3 Oct2018-Sept2019 USAID approved
63. 2018 CARISECURE Annual Report YR2 Oct2017-Sept2018 USAID approved
64. 2020 Request of extension of the Direct Implementation authorization for the Project "Strengthening Evidenced-Based Decision Making for Citizen Security", Project ID 00097430"
65. 2022-01-01 CariSECURE Extension Rationale January 2022 (Final)
66. 2022-03-25 AID-538-Modification of Assistance MOA.
67. 2022-04-20 CariSECURE Annual Work Plan OCTOBER 2022
68. 2019-01-01 RULE OF LAW 2019-2 Project Pipeline
69. 2020-07-05 CariSECURE Substantive Revision July 2020
70. 2020-08-05 AID-538- Modification of Assistance MOA. IO-16-00001-07 2020
71. 2021-09-23 AID-538- Modification of Assistance MOA.IO-16-00001-09 2021.
72. 2022-05-19 CariSECURE Direct Implementation (DIM) authorization Memo Extension to October 2022
73. 2022-05-19 NTF CARISECURE Direct Implementation (DIM) authorization DIM MAY 2022
74. 2022-05-22 00097340 Annual Work Plan (19 May 2022 v2)
75. 2022-05-25 AID-538- Modification of Assistance MOA.IO-16-00001-10
76. 2022-05-30 Certificate of Completion - Summary
77. 2022-05-31 Caratula Atlas May 2022 Direct Implementation (DIM) authorization
78. 2018- CariSECURE Revision Multi Year Work Plan 2016-2020
79. 2018-12-05 CariSECURE substantive revision 2018 (002)
80. 2019-02-11 CariSECURE Substantive Revision 2019
81. 2020-05-01 CariSECURE Year 4 and 5 Work Plan Matrix USAID approved 07.02.2020
82. 2020-06-01 CariSECURE Strategic Realignment Document USAID approved 07.02.2020
83. 2020-06-26 CARISECURE Work Plan 2020 202USAID approved 07.02.2020
84. 2020-07-02 CariSECURE Monitoring and Evaluation Plan June 2020 to September 2022 USAID approved
85. 2020-08-31 CariSECURE Sustainability Framework Revised August 2020
86. 2020-05-01 CariSECURE Substantive Revision (2) (May 2020)
87. 2020-06-01 CariSECURE Strategic Realignment Document (draft for review)
88. 2020-06-30 CariSECURE Strategic Realignment Document final
89. 2021.07-15 CariSECURE Revised Monitoring and Evaluation Plan through Oct 2022
90. 2022-01-01 CariSECURE Year 5 and 6 Work Plan January 2022
91. 2022-01-01CariSECURE Extension Rationale December 2021 draft
92. 2022-01-05 CariSECURE Extension Rationale January 2022 (Final)

93. 2021-07-15 CariSECURE Revised Monitoring and Evaluation Plan through October 2022
94. 2018-05-07 CariSECURE 3rd Project Board Meeting Minutes
95. 2018-11-19 CariSECURE 4th Project Board Meeting Minutes
96. 2019-10-04 CariSECURE 5th Project Board Meeting Minutes
97. 2020-08-27 CariSECURE 6th Project Board Meeting Minutes
98. 2021-07-15 CariSECURE 7th Project Board Meeting Minutes
99. 2021-07-15 CariSECURE 7th Project Board Meeting presentation
100. 2019 Saint Lucia Medium Term Development Strategy MTDS 2020-2023
101. 2020 Saint Lucia- The New Normal for Central Statistical Offices (CSOs) Session 1
102. 2020 Saint Lucia National Crime Victimization Survey (SLNCVS) 2020 MAIN RESULTS
103. 2021 Saint Lucia Citizen Security Taskforce Meeting November 25, 2021
104. 2020 UNDP BARBADOS -CariSECURE-Newsletter-November-2020
105. 2021 Proof of Entitlement - Royal Grenada Police Force - Order #63539141
106. 2021 Proof of Entitlement - Royal Police Force of Antigua - Order #63548931
107. 2021 Proof of Entitlement - Royal St. Vincent Police Force - Order #63539097
108. 2020 -8- 01 Establishment Letter of a Crime Analysis Unit Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda
109. 2022-11-01 Establishment Letter of a Crime Analysis Unit in Saint Kitts and Nevis
110. 2020 -8- 14 Establishment Letter of a Crime Analysis Unit at the Royal Grenada Police Force
111. 2020 -8- 20 Establishment Letter of a Crime Analysis Unit at the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force
112. 2020 -8- 11 Establishment Letter of a Crime Analysis Unit, St Vincent and the Grenadines
113. 2021 -01- 05 Regional Security System 2020 Annual Situation Report Final, Regional Crime Observatory.
114. 2020 Antigua and Barbuda Citizen Security Indicator Framework
115. 2020 Antigua and Barbuda CCCSIF Indicator Framework Copy of Projected Population data 2011 - 2019
116. 2016 Barbados - CCCSIF Indicator Framework Crime Statistics and Indicators
117. 2016 Barbados ICCS Crime Statistics
118. 2017 Barbados - Crime Statistics and Indicators
119. 2017 Barbados - CCCSIF Indicator Framework
120. 2018 Barbados - Crime Statistics and Indicators
121. 2018 Barbados - ICCS Crime Statistics
122. 2019 Barbados Crime Statistics and Indicators
123. 2019 Barbados - ICCS Crime Statistics
124. 2016 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 10000 population
125. 2016 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 100000 population

126. 2017 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 10000 population
127. 2017 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 100000 population
128. 2018 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 10000 population
129. 2018 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 100000 population
130. 2019 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 10000 population
131. 2019 Barbados CariSECURE Indicators per 100000 population
132. 2020 Grenada Annual Population estimates for 2019
133. 2020 Grenada Crime Statistics 2008 – 2019 14 May 20
134. 2020 Grenada CARISECURE Indicator 2008 - 2019 Nov 9, 2020
135. 2020 Grenada Crime Statistics 2008 – 2019 14 May 20
136. 2020 Guyana CariSECURE Indicators per 10000
137. 2020 Guyana CariSECURE Indicators per 100000
138. 2020 Guyana CariSECURE Indicators 7 April 2020
139. 2022 Guyana Police Indicator Version 1
140. 2020 Saint Kitts and Nevis CariSECURE Indicator Worksheet April 2020
141. 2020 Saint Kitts and Nevis CariSECURE Indicators per 10000
142. 2020 Saint Kitts and Nevis CariSECURE Indicators per 100000
143. 2020 Saint Kitts-Nevis 2010 - 2019 Indicators Worksheet (April 2020)
144. 2020 Saint Lucia CariSECURE Indicators
145. 2020 Saint Lucia CariSECURE Indicators 12 May 20
146. 2020 Saint Lucia CariSECURE Indicators 17 Mar 20
147. 2020 Saint Vincent and Grenadines Revised Crime Citizen Indicators SVG
148. 2020 Saint Vincent and Grenadines Citizen Security Indicator 2010 - 2019 Final
149. 2021 Saint Vincent and Grenadines Citizen Security Indicator 2010 - 2020
150. 2021 Suriname CSIF 2010-2020 indicators worksheet - final
151. 2021 SAINT VINCENT CRIME ANALYSIS REPORT: GANGS IN SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
152. 2021 -01-01 Suriname - Crime Series Bulletin
153. 2022 CRIME ANALYSIS COUNTRY REPORTS - MERGED
154. 2022 CariSECURE Support for Trafficking in Persons -TIP in Barbados 2022.02.26
155. 2021-09 Trafficking in Persons Perception Survey - Final Report Inclusive of Recommendations updated
156. 2022 UNODC Final Narrative Report - Trafficking in Persons - CariSECURE-01112022
157. 2021 CLA Case Competition, Citizen Security: CLA to Strengthen Evidence Based Decision Making in the Caribbean, USAID's *CLA Team in the Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL) and by the Program Cycle Mechanism (PCM), a PPL mechanism implemented UNDP Barbados and the EC*
158. 2021 UNDP - REGIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2021. TRAPPED: HIGH INEQUALITY AND LOW GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

159. 2021 Charles M. Katz, John Walcott, Kayla Freemon, Paolo del Mistro, Policy Note: Enhancing the Capacity for Data-Driven Decision-Making on Citizen Security across the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Case Study of CariSECURE, Caribbean Journal of Criminology 3, 1 (2021): 93–123.
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IV. List of interviewees

Antigua and Barbuda		
1	Rohan Cordice	Readiness Manager, Inspector (IT Unit)
Barbados		
2	Station Sargent TROTMAN	Station manager District E Speightstown St Peter Parish
3	Constable SANDIFORD	Police Station District E
4	Constable Hinkson	Police Station District E
5	Constable Roberts	Police Station District E
6	Yvette Goddard	Permanent Secretary
7	Richard Boyce	Commissioner of Police,
8	Louis EVERSLEY	Superintendent, RBPF
9	C.S. BISHOP	Assistant Superintendent, RBPF
10	M.A. Jordan	Inspector, RBPF
11	ASP Mark White	ASP
Grenada		
12	Mr. Wayne Wilson ASP	ASP - RGPF
13	Inspector Allan James	ASP - RGPF
14	Edvin Martin	Commissioner of Police – RGPF
15	Carvel Lett	Permanent Secretary
16	Petal Rush (Chair)	Senior Planning Officer
17	Wendy Chitterman	Chief Info Officer – Cabinet Office
18	Alfred Pierre	RGPF – Crime Analysis Unit
19	Commander Glenn T. Charles	Assistant Superintendent of Police
20	Superintendent Vannie CURWEN	RGPF
21	Caporal ALBERT	RGPF
22	Tafawa Pierre	Deputy Commissioner of Police
23	PC Cuffie	St Davis Police Station
24	WPC John	St Davis Police Station
25	WPC Thomas	St Davis Police Station
26	Sargent Horsford	St Davis Police Station
Guyana		
27	Jermain Johnson	Superintendent
St Lucia		
28	Sean Mathurin	Director of Statistics, Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Saint Lucia
St Kitts and Nevis		
29	Osmond Petty	Permanent Secretary
30	Julian Morrishaw	Technical Support RSCNPF
31	Supt. Cromwell Henry (Primary)	Readiness Manager RSCNPF
32	Javier Greene	PRMIS Trainer

33	Hilroy Brandy	Commissioner of Police
34	Travis Henry,	PRMIS Trainer
35	Delroy Harris	PRMIS Trainer
36	Winston Thompson	Data Manager RSCNPF
37	Constable Matthews	Cayon Police Station
38	Constable BROWN	Cayon Police Station
39	Sargent FRANCIS	Cayon Police Station
40	Sargent LIBURD	Tabernacle Police Station
41	Constable WALTERS	Tabernacle Police Station
42	Constable JONES	Tabernacle Police Station
43	Chief Coporal ISAAC	Cottonground Station
44	Constable ISAIAS	Cottonground Station
45	Constable JAMES	Cottonground Station
St Vincent & the Grenadines		
46	Angello Duncan	Readiness Manager RSVGPF
Suriname		
47	Lilian Wiebers	Readiness Manager
48	Sieglie Aviankoi	National Task Force
49	R. Babolall	Readiness Manager
50	Roel Vonsee	Readiness Manager
51	Meriam Hubard	
52	Ana Soeltan-Beck	Readiness Manager
Other Key Informants		
53	Sharon Ramsaran	USAID Eastern and Southern Caribbean Mission
54	Julia Salomon	Regional Programme
55	Tonya Ayow	CARICOM IMPACS
56	Sadio Harris	Operations Manager – Regional Security System
UNDP BARBADOS		
57	Rhea Reid-Bowen	Progr. Coordinator (Regional Security System)
58	Sacha Brown	UNDP Barbados
59	Miguel Trim	UNDP Barbados
60	Jason La Corbinieri	Cluster Manager, UNDP Barbados
61	Andre Waterman	ICT Analyst UNDP Barbados
62	Andrea Cummings	Project Coordinator (Joint Programmes and CariSECURE) UNDP Barbados

V. Project results model or results framework.

📌 Project Results Framework 2020 - 2022

