



United Nations Development Programme UNDP

# A TERMINAL EVALUATION OF THE GOK/UNDP TRANSCENDING FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA PROJECT

*January, 2020 - December, 2023*

Final Evaluation Report

December, 2023

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**United Nations Development Programme UNDP**

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# Acronyms

ABC	Africa Borderlands Centre	NIM	National Implementation Modality
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution	NPS	National Police Service
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands	NSC	National Steering Committee
CBOs	Community Based Organizations	ORPP	Office of the Registrar of Political Parties
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan	PBCM	Peace Building and Conflict Management
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission	PBCS	Peace Building and Community Security
CPD	County Programme Document	PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
CPC	County Peace Committee	PeaceNet	Peace and Development Network Trust
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations	PfPS	Partnership for Peace and Security
DaOs	Delivering as One	PMB	Programme Management Board
DIM	Direct Implementation Modality	PMCU	Programme Management and Coordination Unit
DPCs	District Peace Committees	PSC	Project Steering Committee
DPs	Development Partners	PWD	People with Disabilities
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
GOK	Government of Kenya	SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
IPs	Implementing Partners	SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
IRCK	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya	SRIC	Security Research and Information Centre
KII	Key Informant Interview	TOC	Theory of Change
KNAP	Kenya National Action Plan	TPP	Transcending Peace Project
KNFP-SALW	Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons	TWG	Technical Working Group
LNOB	Leave No One Behind	UCSPAK	Universities and Colleges Students Peace Association of Kenya
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
MCK	Media Council of Kenya	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MOICNG	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government	UN	United Nations
MTPP	Medium Term Plan		
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission		
NCI	National Cohesion and Integration		
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre		

## Project/outcome Information

Project/outcome title	Transcending Foundations of Peace and Security for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Kenya (To be shortened to “Transcending Peace Project” (TPP))	
Atlas ID	00122662	
Corporate outcome and output	<p>United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UN-SDCF) 2022-2026 under Outcome 1.1 :By 2026, people in Kenya at risk of being left behind -, particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) counties, informal urban settlements, all women and girls, all children and youth - inhabit an inclusive, enabling, socially cohesive, and peaceful society where human rights are upheld, benefit from accountable institutions, participate in transformative governance systems that are gender-responsive, and uphold the rule of law.</p> <p><b>Output 2.1:</b> Government has normative standards, capacities to operationalize policies and legal frameworks on conflict management, cohesion, and human security;</p> <p><b>Output 2.2:</b> Strengthened capacities of peace architecture at the national, county and community levels on peace, inclusion, reconciliation, social cohesion, and integration</p>	
Country	Kenya	
Region	Eastern Africa	
Date project document signed	28 <sup>th</sup> January, 2020	
Project dates	Start	Plan ended
	January, 2020	December, 2023
Total committed budget	\$ 19, 657,344	
Project expenditure at the time of evaluation	\$ 5,000,000	
Funding source	Sweden, UNDP, GOK	
Implementing party <sup>44</sup>	Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government	

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We also appreciate the respondents drawn from the national level implementing partners and in the different counties visited, as well as those that were

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# Executive Summary

The ‘Transcending Foundations of Peace and Security for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Kenya (2020 - 2023)’ project is a four-year development project designed to build on the achievements of the previous project, “Deepening Foundations for Peace Building and Community Security in Kenya, 2014-2018”. The envisioned development outcome of the project is a Country (Kenya) where people live in a secure, peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive society. The project was supported by the Government of Kenya, the Government of Sweden and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

UNDP commissioned a terminal evaluation for the Transcending Peace Project (TPP) to provide an overall assessment of progress and achievements made against planned results, as well as assess and document challenges and lessons learnt since the commencement of the project.

Additionally, the terminal evaluation (TE) sought to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the TPP project, including mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as human rights, youth gender, Persons Living with Disability (PWDs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs) etc. Further, the TE sought to assess the institutional structures supported to enhance coordination and harmonization between UNDP, implementing partners and state and non-state actors.

The TE adopted a qualitative approach where both primary and secondary data were collected to assess the effects of the project’s interventions against the set objectives. Qualitative primary data was collected through targeted key informant interviews (KII) at national, county and community levels in the targeted counties. Additionally, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with key informants.

Additionally, a detailed desktop review of secondary data was undertaken. This was based on the UNDP site visits and field reports, implementing partners’ quarterly reports, intervention implementation reports, National Government and County Governments surveys. This was to assess the project’s interventions and attendant deliverables. Further, reports from the project, the UNDP, including from other affiliate UN agencies’ reports, were examined to determine the complementarity of results.

This evaluation covered the project period from January 2020 to July 2023 and targeted all the counties covered by the project. A purposive sample of thirteen counties was selected for field visits and data collection. The selection of the counties for data collection was based on a strict criterion that ensured diversity of counties (coverage) and a fair

representation based on the project’s interventions by different implementing partners.

The analyzed qualitative data was organized into common themes that were used to draw conclusions about the performance of the project. The reporting of the evaluation findings is organized around the four (4) output areas of this project and the evaluation quality criteria. The analyzed data and results and the attendant conclusions on the overall effect of the project are presented using the traffic light color-coding format (green, amber, red), where green signifies achievement of results, amber partial (moderate) achievement of results, and red indicates minimal achievement of results.

The project’s Theory of Change (ToC), was well thought out at design phase. However, its implementation was influenced and made more complex by three (3) key factors. First, the project faced a severe funding gap with 26% of the total budgeted amount was raised. Second, soon after the commencement of the project in January 2020, COVID-19 struck, and by March 2020, the government’s pandemic containment -that limited movement and public gatherings- measures curtailed the project’s programming and activities. Lastly, the looming August 2022 elections and the attendant transitions at both the national level and in twenty-one (21) counties diverted development interventions to a peaceful general election. The TPP was not an exception.

Given the above, the extent to which the TPP project achieved its objectives against planned results is a mixed bag of success and missed hits. Overall, the level of achievement was rated amber. This rating is an accumulated assessment of the level of achievement in the four output areas of the TPP project, as discussed subsequently and the specific achievements under each criterion of the evaluation criteria.

A significant contribution to this rating is the emergent and divergent project implementation and funding frameworks. While the project design envisaged a central coordination role of the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government through the National Steering Committee (NSC), the actual (field) implementation and funding models favoured non-state actors. This discrepancy largely explains the mild-green (moderately low) achievement for output one and the amber (partial) achievement for outputs two and four in the ToC.

The level of achievement on output 1 was rated amber. Although the project was instrumental in the establishment of directorates/ departments of peace and conflict management in some counties, most of the legislative and regulatory interventions are yet to be finalized and adopted.

The level of achievement of output 2 was rated amber. Whereas the project strengthened the capacities for the NSC, the National Cohesion and Integration Committee (NCIC) and other peace structures such as community policing committees (CPC) in Baringo, Nairobi, Nakuru and Isiolo counties, the project did not build or strengthen peace and conflict management structures of the county governments. The existing peace structures are a continuation from 2010 that do not account for the 2010 constitutional changes that created two levels of government that are distinct but interdependent.

The level of achievement on output 3 was rated green. The evaluation revealed that the project adhered to the principle of Leave No One Behind (LNOB) and demonstrated inclusivity by actively involving women, youth, PWDs, and populations residing in ASAL areas and informal settlements. Based on UNDP's gender equality marker, the project scores a two. Further, evidence shows that collaborations with gender

technical groups in various interventions increased awareness of gender-based violence in the different counties.

The level of achievement on output 4 was rated amber. The evidence shows that the project was instrumental in supporting revitalization of the Uwiano Platform and supported a robust communication strategy for civic education and messaging on peace through collaboration with other stakeholders. There is, however, little evidence to show that the project built new institutional capacities meant to address conflicts related to electoral processes or attempted to strengthen the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. If anything, the project rode on the goodwill of the already existing County Peace (and Security) Committees.

In respect to the project's quality criteria, the level of achievement on each criterion is mixed as summarized below:

Evaluation Criteria	Level of Achievement	Evidence
Strategic	Green	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project's ToC adapted to the development context changes.</li> <li>Project was aligned to UNDAF/UNSDCF 2022-2026 &amp; UNDP - CPD 2022-2026.</li> <li>Despite being aware, TPP did not prepare for the two-layered transitions at the national &amp; in the counties after the 2022 elections.</li> <li>Whereas UN agencies practice the 'deliver as one' principle, at project implementation level, its merits are seldom practiced.</li> </ul>
Relevance	Green	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TPP was aligned with key development planning documents.</li> <li>TPP was responsive to the changing needs and priorities of the beneficiaries.</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	Yellow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TPP had a mixed bag of achievements.</li> <li>TPP was instrumental in the localization of KNAP on Women Peace and Security &amp; enactment of Isiolo &amp; Mombasa County Action Plans on PCVE</li> <li>TPP's late interventions in some counties e.g., West Pokot raise questions on the effectiveness of the project. In other counties, the project was not felt e.g., Kilifi.</li> <li>Difficult to attribute success to TPP's interventions given other projects' Interventions, e.g., IRRL, ABC &amp; PBF.</li> </ul>
Efficiency	Red	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Difficult to ascertain value for money out of TPP interventions.</li> <li>Due to funding shortfall, TPP did not prioritize interventions to maximize impact.</li> </ul>
Sustainability & National Ownership	Yellow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Some TPP interventions such as FGM &amp; disarmament can be replicated &amp; scaled-up.</li> <li>The project had limited effect on building county government's peace architecture.</li> <li>There were no clear findings on the projects impact on climate and environmental sustainability.</li> </ul>

Evaluation Criteria	Level of Achievement	Evidence
Management & Monitoring		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project adequately dealt with political, financial, security and technological risks.</li> <li>The project's M&amp;E plan was never executed nor were annual progress review meetings' recommendations followed through.</li> <li>The project experienced delays in clearance of workplans and disbursement of funds.</li> <li>No mid-term evaluation conducted and</li> <li>The project was not adequately staffed with critical skills e.g., M&amp;E Specialist.</li> </ul>
Gender & Social Inclusion		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project promoted the inclusion of marginalized groups</li> <li>The project advanced gender equality and promoted the principles of "Leaving No One Behind".</li> </ul>
Climate & Environmental Sustainability		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project's climate and environmental sustainability was not clearly advanced, despite concerns raised during the annual progress review meetings in 2021 &amp; 2022 respectively.</li> </ul>
Impact		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>TPP had notable changes at the county level attributable to its interventions e.g., Peace agenda in CIDPs, TPP did little to strengthen devolved institutions.</li> </ul>

## Conclusion

The TPP project's overall achievement was rated amber or moderate in respect to its four (4) output areas and the different components of the evaluation criteria. Programmatically, the project's achievement was rated moderately low in view of the over-ambitious development objectives that it set to achieve. The main reason for this achievement is the alteration of the project design's implementation and funding frameworks from NIM as envisaged in the project design to what was adopted in the field- DIM. Inadvertently, the two models (implementation and funding) favoured non-state actors over state actors and this caused mistrust between the two. The result of this mistrust was the non-engagement of previously created peace committees and to some extent weakening them.

Whereas the project had some positive effects, it is difficult to lay attribution of change to the project's interventions given that a number of other actors had equivalent interventions especially on matters related to peaceful elections. Also, in view of the two impending transitions at the national and in 21 county governments, there is no evidence that the project strengthened the capacities of county governments on peacebuilding and conflict management.

Given that a number of interventions under outputs 1, 2 & 4 are 'work in progress' and given the stretched nature of the available funds- spread across over forty (40) counties, it is difficult to make a case for

value for money. Saliently, within the UNDP, the silo project implementation approach denied the project the opportunity to ride on other projects to scale up impact.

## Recommendations

1. Future peace projects should consider integrating alternative livelihood interventions and sustainable climate and environmental adaptations.
2. There is a need for peace and conflict management interventions to be cognizant of the devolved system of governance and the need to conceptualize an intergovernmental peace architecture. This will require complementary working modalities between/ among UNDP-supported programmes to create synergy and avoid silo implementation approaches.
3. For sustainable outcomes and ownership, it is crucial to implement project interventions that are tailored to the specific needs of local communities. One effective approach is to empower local Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) to implement solutions that are closely aligned with the context and requirements of the community.
4. In future programming, it is recommended to adopt a competitive process when selecting implementing partners. This ensures that the

<sup>1</sup>See, Article 6 (2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

most qualified organizations are engaged, contributing to the overall success of the project. Furthermore, it is essential to strictly adhere to project monitoring and management protocols to maintain accountability and effectiveness.

5. As part of continuous improvement, UNDP should undertake a comprehensive review of its programs within the governance docket to identify and articulate collaboration areas where various programs can complement each other than assuming an automatic application

of “delivery as one” principle. This proactive approach will enhance synergy among different initiatives, fostering a more cohesive and impactful contribution to governance-related objectives.

6. To enhance accountability for results, UNDP will need to review the project governance structures that advance the maker-checker principle. The composition of the apex decision making organ of UNDP projects should be independent and impartial to promote objectivity in project implementation.

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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

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## 1.1 Background and Context

Kenya's political, social, and economic growth and stability within the East African region continue to attract attention from various actors, both internally and externally. Internally, Kenya's development challenge is corroded with a myriad of conflict drivers, such as socio-economic marginalization, social discrimination and exclusion, inequitable and scarce environmental resources, and environmental degradation. Additionally, the increased proportion of poverty, especially among the youth, has created a fertile breeding ground for violent extremism, political violence and terrorism<sup>2</sup>.

From a governance perspective, negative ethnicity is often politically exploited during the electioneering period to cause conflict and instability, mainly due to a trust deficit in the electoral body. Due to poverty, the poor, youth, and marginalized groups often get lured to join criminal gangs and terrorist groups, further exacerbating conflict and instability.

Externally, though Kenya is peaceful, its neighbours such as; Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and recently Ethiopia, present significant conflict and security challenges. This regional instability has created a conducive environment for terrorist networks to recruit and indoctrinate the youth and has created trade networks for small arms, drugs, and human trafficking. It is against this background that the Transcending Foundations of Peace and Security for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Kenya (Transcending Peace project [TPP]) was developed to further entrench the peace and security architecture and the attendant gains.

The 'Transcending Foundations of Peace and Security for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Kenya (2020 - 2023)' project is an intervention that builds on the achievements of the previous project, "Deepening Foundations for Peace Building and Community Security in Kenya, 2014-2018".

The envisioned long-term development outcome of the project is a Country (Kenya) where people live in a secure, peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive society.

The main objective of the project was to address immediate and underlying drivers of conflict, including poverty and inequality, youth unemployment and vulnerability, exploitation of ethnic differences,

inequitable distribution of scarce environmental goods, environmental degradation and adverse effects of climate change, socio-economic exclusion and marginalization, limited engagement of women in conflict transformation and proliferation of small arms.

The secondary objective of the project was to strengthen partnerships with state and non-state actors, learning institutions and innovators, the private sector, United Nations agencies, development partners and regional organizations to promote peace and security for inclusive and sustainable development<sup>3</sup>.

To achieve the above outcome, the project sought to deliver four key outputs. These were:

- i. Policies, legal and regulatory frameworks for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, cohesion, community security and prevention of violent extremism (PVE) formulated, reviewed and implemented;
- ii. Capacities for peace architecture at national and county levels for sustainable peace, inclusion, cohesion, integration, community security, and PVE strengthened and coordinated;
- iii. Inclusion and participation of the youth, persons with disabilities (PWDs), women and other marginalized groups in peace and security interventions strengthened; and
- iv. Collaborative partnerships to prevent incidences of violence at community, county and national levels strengthened.

With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Government of Sweden, and the Government of Kenya (GoK), the project embraced a tripartite implementation approach that was led by the Ministry of Interior and National Administration (through its deconcentrated offices at subnational level<sup>4</sup>), the county governments through the Council of Governors (CoG) and the community through various non-state actors such as; the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC); Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK); PeaceNet Kenya, and Partnerships for Peace and Security (PfPS). The project supported peace and security dialogue through the UWIANO Platform for Peace composed of twelve partners<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>2</sup>National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, "National Conflict Mapping and Analysis: Peace and Conflict Trends in Kenya".

<sup>3</sup>UNDP County Programme Document (2020-2023). "Transcending Foundations of Peace and Security for Inclusive and Sustainable Development in Kenya".

<sup>4</sup>Ministry of Interior and national Administration agencies: National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), and the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP-SALW). Together they form the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC-PBCM) that also includes other non-State actors.

<sup>5</sup>UWIANO Platform for Peace partners include NSC-PBCM, NCIC, UNDP, UN Women; IRCK, PeaceNet, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); Office of Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP); National Police Service (NPS); Council of Governors (CoG); Media Council of Kenya (MCK); Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)/MkenyaDaima

The project was aligned with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support to the Government of Kenya (GoK) in line with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2018-2022/UNSDCF 2022-2026 Strategic Result Area on Transformative Governance and UNDP'S CPD 2022-2026 Outcome 1.3. The project contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 5 (gender equality), SDG 10 (reduced inequalities), SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships). See Annex J on details of documents reviewed.

Under the project, the UNDP deployed its expertise, skills, and knowledge towards ensuring that policies and legal frameworks for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, addressing violent extremism and community security were strengthened; peace architecture at all levels was strengthened and effectively coordinated for purposes of promoting social cohesion, enhancing community security and sustained peace.

UNDP also made it deliberate that the youth, persons living with disabilities (PWDs), women, and other marginalized groups of the country were engaged in implementing the project as both participants and beneficiaries to ensure ownership and sustainability.

At the project design phase, the project was to be complemented with other related UNDP peacebuilding and governance Programmes, including the Government of Japan, which supported "Stabilization and Recovery of Communities Affected by Violent Extremism, Conflict and Disasters in Kenya" and "Capacity Building for Maritime Disaster Management and Response to Peace and Security Threats within Kenya", and the basket fund of the "Deepening Democracy Programme." The project also was to pursue partnerships with other actors and initiatives working on peace and security in the country to enhance the achievement of its development objective. These aspirations were, however, not realized during the implementation phase.

## 1.2 Evaluation Objective, Purpose and Scope

This terminal evaluation of the TPP project sought to provide an overall assessment of progress and achievements made against planned results, as well as assess and document challenges and lessons learnt since the commencement of the project.

The information generated from this evaluation will contribute to organizational learning and generate knowledge for development effectiveness and importantly will inform a potential next phase of peacebuilding support under the new Country Programme Document (CPD) 2022-2026.

The main objective of the terminal evaluation was to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the TPP project including mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues. The specific objectives of the TE include:

- a. To examine alignment and adaptability of the project's Theory of Change (ToC) with the goals, outcomes or problems addressed in implementing the project and learn from evidence and experiences on emerging innovations and improvements required for future projects of similar nature;
- a. To review the relevance of the project to the country development context that reflects both the national government and county governments development priorities;
- a. To review the effectiveness of the project including attributability of results to the project;
- a. To assess the efficiency in the utilization of project funds including cost-effectiveness and value for money while balancing with social dimensions including gender equity and environment;
- a. To examine the sustainability of project outcomes and impacts beyond the project duration, and
- a. To document lessons learnt, challenges and future opportunities and provide recommendations for improvements or adjustments in strategy, design and/or implementation arrangements.

## Scope of the Terminal Evaluation

The evaluation covered the project period from January 2020 to July 2023. The TE was conducted at the national level and in all the counties covered by the project. At the national level, the TE covered engagements with the lead implementing partner (IP), which is the Ministry of Interior and National Administration - through the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC-PBCM). It also included interviews with focal persons working closely with the Ministry, including the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP-SALW).

Two categories of non-state actors were engaged during the evaluation. Internally, the UNDP staff implementing the TPP provided valuable technical and contextual data about the project. These staff included those who provided actual supervisory/managerial support to the project and those who run and manage other complimentary UNDP Programmes under the governance docket.

Externally, the evaluation team engaged the following implementing partners at national and county levels. These included the Security Research and

Information Centre (SRIC), Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK), PeaceNet Kenya, Partners for Peace and Security (PfPs) and partners in the UWIANO Platform for Peace. Further, the evaluation reached out to project beneficiaries in all the 13 counties visited during the field visits. A summary of the scope, objective and purpose of this evaluation under ToRs is provided in Annex A of this report.

For the results to be generalized at the county level, a targeted regional representation of thirteen (13) counties was selected out of the total population of forty (40) counties in the sampling frame for field visits. The rationale for the selection of sample counties beyond regional representation, was based on the seasonality of conflict triggers such as the

electioneering period (Kisumu), homogeneity of the population with strong cultural norms with potential to exclude marginalized groups (Wajir), inter-county border conflicts (Baringo), conflict triggered by the scarcity of environmental resources (Kitui and Baringo), cosmopolitan and ethnic driven conflicts (Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Narok), counties bordering neighbouring countries prone to terrorism (Wajir) arid counties (Isiolo), counties with substantial prevalence for organized crimes (Murang'a) and counties prone to religious radicalization (Mombasa and Kilifi) and diverse conflict triggers and complementarity of partners (Nairobi). Table 1.1 outlines the counties selected for field visits.

*Table 1.1: Selected Counties for Field Visits*

Zone	Counties	County visited
Nyanza /Western	Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Siaya, Kakamega, Bungoma	Kisumu and Migori
North Rift	Turkana, West Pokot, Trans Nzoia Elgeyo Marakwet, Uasin Gishu, Nandi	Uasin Gishu
Central Rift	Nakuru, Baringo, Samburu, Laikipia, Nyandarua	Nakuru and Baringo
South Rift	Kajiado, Narok, Kericho, Bomet	Narok
Coast	Kilifi, Mombasa, Tana River, Kwale, Lamu, Taita Taveta	Mombasa and Kilifi
Lower Eastern	Machakos, Kitui, Makueni	Kitui
Upper Eastern	Isiolo, Marsabit	Isiolo
North Eastern	Wajir, Mandera, Garissa	Wajir
Nairobi	Nairobi	Nairobi
Central	Kiambu, Nyeri, Murang'a, Tharaka Nithi, Kirinyaga	Muranga

### 1.3 Evaluation Criteria and Questions

The key evaluation questions were aligned with the UNDP project quality criteria which include strategy, relevance, social and environmental standards, management and monitoring, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and national ownership as well as cross-cutting criteria of gender equality and leaving no one behind (LNOB).

The specific evaluation questions that address the above evaluation criteria include:

- To what extent has the TPP been relevant, strategic, and coherent for UN agencies, its main partners, and stakeholders?
- To what extent has the TPP been implemented effectively?
- To what extent has the TPP been implemented efficiently?

- What have been the main impacts of the TPP been to date?
- To what extent are the results of the TPP to date sustainable?
- How and by how much has the TPP supported gender equality and inclusion of marginalized populations?
- What are the main lessons learned from the TPP?
- What is recommended for future UN programming to support devolution? For detailed evaluation questions, *see Annex F*.

The TPP evaluation followed up on these questions to gather details relevant to analyze and to elaborate on the project's design, implementation, results, and sustainability, including for women, youth, PWDs and marginalized populations (LNOB). The evaluation report is organized into the said UNDP evaluation categories.

## 1.4 Cross-cutting Issues

The evaluation examined cross-cutting issues and applied a qualitative approach to review gender sensitive indicators and assessed whether implementing partners ensured inclusion of all constituents (women, girls, boys, men, PWDs) in the spirit of Leaving No One Behind (LNOB).

Further, the evaluation sought to establish whether the project applied gender-lenses and whether it was gender responsive right from the project design

including within the conflict analysis, outcome statements and results frameworks through to project implementation.

This assessment was guided by the UNDP gender equality marker, which employs a four-point coding scale that ranges from 0 (no contribution to gender equality and the empowerment of women), 1 (limited contribution to gender equality), 2 (significant contribution to gender equality) and 3 (gender equality as the principal objective). This sought to ensure that the project did adhere to gender equality as required by the UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2022-2025.

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## 2.0 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

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## 2.0 EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 The Approach

To undertake this evaluation, a Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach was adopted which entails community members involvement in the evaluation process to gain deeper insights into the communities' perspectives, experiences, and the effectiveness of interventions from their point of view.

The following steps were applied in the data collection and data validation processes:

- A review of relevant literature including project reports produced during the life cycle of the project was undertaken. This was done for to serve two key purposes; first, for a deeper understanding of the project and second, as a source of secondary data;
- Briefing and debriefing with the project staff and UNDP evaluation team;
- Round table discussions with IPs, UNDP, and donor representatives; and
- Data collection using different methods such as in-depth key informant interviews, questionnaires, interviews, focus group
- discussions with IPs including counties, UNDP, representatives of Sida involved in the project, citizens, and other relevant respondents to enrich the project review with qualitative data.

The evaluation used triangulation as a central data collection and analysis method that drew information from multiple sources.

Prior to commencement of the data collection exercise, the evaluation team had a de-brief session with UNDP project staff and partners to ensure that the evaluation team adequately understood the assignment and both were aligned on the areas of focus (topics and respondents).

To ensure a coherent design of the evaluation, an evaluation matrix was developed. The matrix laid out the entire evaluation plan. For each evaluation question, the matrix identified key assumptions to be examined, indicators, sources of information and data collection methods. The evaluation matrix was crucial for developing a detailed plan for data collection and development of data collection tools.

### 2.2 Methodology

This evaluation used a qualitative approach where both primary and secondary data were collected and analyzed. Primary data was collected through

targeted in-depth key informant interviews at national, county and community levels in the targeted counties. Additionally, FGDs were conducted with key informants. For both KIIs and FGDs, semi-structured interviews were conducted guided by a set of evaluation questions.

Additionally, a detailed desktop review of secondary data based on UNDP site-visits and field reports, implementing partners' quarterly reports, intervention implementation reports, National Government and County Governments surveys and documents was undertaken to assess the project's interventions and attendant deliverables. Additionally, the evaluation methodology involved a comprehensive examination of multiple sources, including reports generated by the project itself, UNDP reports, reports from affiliated UN agencies and complementary projects. This comprehensive approach aimed to assess the extent of complementarity in results across these diverse sources. By analyzing a variety of reports, the methodology sought to provide a well-rounded analysis, offering a nuanced understanding of how the project's outcomes complemented those of UNDP and its affiliated agencies.

#### 1. Sampling of Respondents

A purposive sampling technique was employed to collect data from respondents. The rationale for employing this technique was to target data collection from the respondents who were most knowledgeable about the project. These included officials of the National Government, County Governments and community leaders at county level. Also, efforts were made to interview project beneficiaries, private sector actors, and non-state actors. Additionally, interviews were conducted with a select number of UNDP staff and staff of UN affiliate agencies.

#### 2. Sampling of Counties

The evaluation sampled thirteen (13) out of a population of forty (40) counties. The counties were sampled on the basis of diverse conflict triggers and a set of other criteria as explained above.

### 2.3 Data Collection Methods

Data collection methods were chosen on the basis of their appropriateness, suitability to different settings and importantly on the ability to elicit information from respondents at policy making level, intervention/ implementation and beneficiary levels. In view of this, the following methods were used:

- i. Desk/Documents review: which involved an extensive review of various types of documents

relevant to the evaluation questions to derive secondary data. The criteria for documents selection included relevance to the “Transcending Foundations of Peace” (TPP) project deliverables, relevance to evaluation questions guided by the UNDP evaluation criteria, periodicity of the document to ensure the documents fall within the evaluation period and contribution to the understanding of TPP project. The list of documents reviewed is annexed to this report.

- ii. Semi-structured face-to-face in-depth key informant interviews: These were undertaken to collect primary data from key informants. Key informants were purposively selected from a broader stakeholder mapping list based on their role in implementation of TPP project. Further, KIs were chosen because they were knowledgeable about the project or aspect(s) of it, either through direct involvement or witnessing implementation of its activities.
- iii. Focus Group Discussions were conducted with direct project beneficiaries in select counties to obtain their perspectives on the impact, relevance and effectiveness of the project’s interventions. Selection of FGD participants factored in spatial distribution of the counties, project activities and support.
- iv. Semi-structured virtual interviews were also conducted with the project funders (Swedish Embassy) UNDP staff, implementing partners at national and regional offices to ensure that all key informants were reached.

A table summarizing how the different data sources contributed to the evaluation objectives is provided in Annex B of this report.

## 2.4 Data Quality Assurance and Analysis

### Data quality assurance

Data quality assurance was in-built from the very beginning in the data collection process. Data quality was assured through;

- i. the use of standardized and disaggregated mixed-interview guide for different categories of respondents,
- ii. beyond the KIs and FGDs informants identified by the project implementing partners, the evaluation team sourced for other KIs knowledgeable about the project and sought their perspectives on the different aspects of the project related to this evaluation (see Annex E on the Schedule and people interviewed),

- iii. cross-checking interview data with key UNDP staff after the conclusion of the field interviews to seek further clarity, elaboration on the context of various occurrences and,
- iv. presentation of preliminary findings to the UNDP technical team from the governance division where the evaluation findings were presented and feedback provided which informed the final report.

### Data Analysis and Reporting

The qualitative data was organized and analyzed in terms of common themes that were used to draw conclusions about the effect of the project based on the UNDP evaluation criteria. Data analysis techniques employed in this evaluation were;

- **Review of the ToC:** A critical review of the TPP’s theory of change (TOC) to assess how the UNDP-supported interventions achieved the planned outputs and how those outputs contributed to the achievement of the CPD outcome. An assessment of the underlying assumptions especially on the project’s implementation was scrutinized to examine its viability to deliver the expected outcomes. This analysis is presented diagrammatically with the attendant findings in this report.
- **Quantitative data analysis:** Data from UNDP quarterly financial reports of all the implementing partners was analyzed to examine and triangulate the project’s implementation and funding models as conceptualized from field interviews,
- **Qualitative data analysis:** This data collected from documents, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and observations were organized around the evaluation criteria to discern emerging common themes, and
- **Triangulation of data:** The results presented in this report and the conclusions drawn in this evaluation were based on a combination of the above data sources and analysis techniques out of which the findings of this evaluation were matched with prevailing evidence.

Reporting of the evaluation results was organized around the four (4) output areas of this project and around the evaluation quality criteria. It is against these parameters that the conclusions on the overall effects of the project were drawn using the traffic light color-coding approach (green, amber, red) where green signifies achievement of results, amber partial (moderate) achievement of results and red signifies minimal- achievement of results.

## 2.5 Limitations Encountered During the Evaluation

The limitations encountered during the evaluation and mitigation measures taken are outlined in the

table below. These limitations were not sufficient to invalidate the evaluation findings.

*Table 2.1: Field Limitations*

Limitations Mitigation measures	
Scope of the TPP project: The scope of this project was broad in terms of outreach i.e., in 40 counties with diverse conflict triggers.	A careful sampling of counties based on diverse conflict triggers to ensure a fairly representative sample was undertaken.
Whereas on paper the project design identified the NSC-PBCM as the anchor agency, in practice, its role in the field, was limited and in some cases, it was non-existent, if not ignored, by the IPs. This presented a challenge with respect to data collection given that data had to be collected from multiple implementing partners.	Where data collection could not be achieved physically, the evaluation team deployed virtual technology to collect data from informants. Every effort was made to accommodate conflicts related to the scheduling.
In some counties, some of the KIs identified for interviews were either unaware of the project or had been selected to present a premeditated viewpoint.	Where the informants were identified as less useful to the evaluation, the evaluation team cancelled the interviews with such informants and sought replacements with others more acquainted with the project.
Lack of at least two (2) annual reports and mid-term evaluation reports of the project.	<p>The evaluation team made use of activity summary reports and quarterly activity implementation reports and a draft bi-annual report to gather insights on various interventions undertaken by the implementing partners.</p> <p>Additionally, the evaluation complimented this report's findings with the UNDAF (2018-2022) evaluation findings, PBF, ABC and IRRL evaluation reports to draw inferences and conclusions on the TPP findings.</p>

The background consists of three solid color blocks: a teal block in the top-left corner, a dark blue block in the bottom-left corner, and a light blue block on the right side.

## 3.0 EVALUATION FINDINGS

## 3.0 EVALUATION FINDINGS

This section delves into the key findings derived from the evaluation process. The exploration commences with an in-depth analysis of the contextual development environment within which the project's theory of change was implemented. Following this, an examination and deconstruction of the foundational assumptions embedded in the theory of change take center stage, with a specific emphasis on scrutinizing the project's design and its implementation framework. The concluding segment of this section provides a comprehensive presentation of the evaluation results, aligning them with the predefined evaluation criteria.

### The Development Context of the TPP

Although a number of exogenous factors adversely affected the development and roll-out of the TPP project, three (3) key contextual factors affected and shaped its eventual rollout. First, the COVID-19 pandemic: The PDC document of the TPP project was signed in late January, 2020 and by mid- March, 2020 Kenya confirmed its first COVID-19 case<sup>6</sup>. The attendant mitigation measures announced by the government's multi-sectoral agency greatly affected the initial roll-out of the project. While the project adapted to the changing circumstances including the use of local/community non-state actors to roll-out peace activities, the COVID-19 measures had adverse effects on the project's ultimate performance.

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**Second, Kenya's 2022 general elections:** Elections in Kenya are generally a major trigger for violence and ethnic conflicts. The 2022 general election was particularly significant given that the outgoing regime had finished its constitutionally prescribed two-terms limit<sup>7</sup>. Additionally, in view of the same constitutional provision<sup>8</sup>, twenty-one (21) county governments were also ripe for transition. Given these two-layered transitions and given the volatility and emotions invested in the elections, most government's and donor support programmes were aligned to mitigate against any potential election-related conflicts. The TPP project was no exemption to this alignment and the available field evidence show that

most interventions were geared towards promoting a peaceful election<sup>9</sup>.

**Lastly, funding constraints:** The initial budget estimate for the project was \$19,657,344 which was to be raised from donors and the Government of Kenya<sup>10</sup>. Out of the proposed budget, only \$5M was raised through a contribution from the Embassy of Sweden and an additional \$1 from UNDP. With COVID-19 contributing to revenue shortfalls in government compounded by a long spell of drought in 2021/2022, government was unable to make its contribution albeit most of it was to be in-kind contributions. To adapt to the funding challenges, the project reverted to cost cutting measures including deployment of a lean workforce to implement the project adopting digital and virtual execution strategies and using complementary UNDP administrative mechanisms. Despite this, it created adverse effects in terms of inadequate engagements and follow-ups with implementing partners and project beneficiaries<sup>11</sup>. The net effect of this was an over-reliance on implementing partners (non- state actors) who in some areas were perceived as outsiders and out of touch with local peace and conflict matters.

### Project Implementation Framework

At the project design phase, the project embraced a tripartite implementation approach where UNDP, Government of Kenya (GoK) and the Government of Sweden were to provide financial support for the project. The three (3) key actors in this approach were the Ministry of Interior and National Administration (through its affiliate agencies) at the national level, the county governments through the Council of Governors (COG) and at the community level through various non-state actors i.e., PeaceNet Kenya, Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) and Partnership for Peace and Security (PfPS). The project also supported peace and security dialogue through the UWIANO platform.

Whereas this tripartite implementation approach was well conceived at the design phase, its actual implementation was plagued by a lack of funding as initially planned. With the funding shortfall, the implementation approach mutated into a community level-led approach where more focus and activities were undertaken by the non-state actors such as IRCK, SRIC, PfPS and PeaceNet Kenya. Figure 3.1 shows the field project implementation framework.

<sup>6</sup>Nanyingi, M. (May, 2020): "The evolution of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Kenya". The Royal Society of Tropical Medicine & Hygiene (RSTMH).

<sup>7</sup>See, Article 142 (2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

<sup>8</sup>See, Article 180 (7) (a) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

<sup>9</sup>This is affirmed by Key Informant Interviews separately conducted in the 12th September and 19th September, 2023.

<sup>10</sup>See, Country Programme Document, "Transcending foundations of peace and security for inclusive and sustainable development in Kenya 2020-2023". Project Number:00122662.

<sup>11</sup>Key informant interview (KII) conducted virtually on 19th September, 2023 at 4:00pm.




Figure 3.1: The Field Project Implementation Framework

Despite its departure from the initial project design's implementation framework, the above model achieved some milestones that the original model would not have achieved. For instance, in Baringo where there exists a huge trust deficit between the community and the police, the interfaith women and youth forums of IRCK managed to host peace dialogues and inter-community activities that were anathema previously. A key initiative out of these dialogues was the creation of a forum (including a WhatsApp group) among religious leaders from the Pokot, Turkana and Tugen in Baringo whose outcome has strengthened local community peace structures.

An obvious shortfall of this field implementation framework was the inadvertent side-lining (scaled-down role) of both the national peace actors and county governments in undertaking peace interventions. Evidence from the field visits suggest that the previously created peace committees from the county-level to the locational levels were either ignored or underutilized under the Transcending Peace project.

The result of this has been a brewing distrust between the county level peace committee members (who see themselves as formally recognized by the NSC) and the coordinators of non-state peace actors (NGOs) who are perceived as young, rich, arrogant and ignorant of peace matters given their unfamiliarity with intricacies of local issues. This sentiment is aptly captured in an interview with a KII in Kisumu;<sup>12</sup>

*"Non-State actors with support from UNDP have created parallel structures not recognized by government. They have engaged their friends whom they call peace ambassadors. Ordinary people do not recognize them. UNDP is funding bodies not recognized by government at the grassroots levels".*

Related to the above and a fundamental flaw in the implementation framework from the project design phase, is the muted role of the national government anchor agency (NSC-PBCM) of the TPP project and a lack of the same anchor agency/department at the county government level to coordinate peacebuilding and conflict management. Granted, the project

did anchor the implementation in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and its "affiliate agencies" and specifically the NSC-PBCM secretariat. In practical terms this is broad, amorphous and ambiguous especially at the county-level in respect to which agency the project was rightfully domiciled in. Field evidence reveal that at the county-level, some County Commissioners who would naturally take the lead, were hardly involved through the TPP.

This ambiguity was even more pronounced at the county governments' level. Evidence from the field interviews show that some county governments were

<sup>12</sup>Key informant interview (KII) conducted at Ahero in Kisumu County on 22st August, 2023 at 6:00pm.

neither engaged nor aware of the peace interventions by the non-state actors. Where the county governments were aware of peace interventions, they resented the current modus operandi where national government peace committees ignore the devolved structures of governance as enshrined in the constitution. This was well articulated by a KII from Migori;<sup>13</sup>

*“...we have serious issues where the national government actors want to by-pass the county government in resolving local issues. PeaceNet has said they have peace committees all over the county. As a county, we want to strengthen them so that we are felt on the ground. Moreover, as a county we want to strengthen the council of elders to roll out alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to deal with FGM menace”.*

The above sentiments are an affirmation of the lack of an intergovernmental implementation structure to manage conflict and peace matters from the initial project design stage. Broadly, it is fair to conclude that right from the start, the project’s implementation framework was riddled with funding and structural defects. Saliently, the muted role of an anchor national government agency to domicile the conflict management and peace agenda, coordinate and support county governments, adversely hampered the effective implementation of the project.

Beyond the ‘re-adjusted’ implementation framework, the TPP project’s funding model appears to have given equal prominence to the non-state actors similar to key state actors. As shown in Figure 3.2, most

funding was channeled through the non-state actors either directly or indirectly who in return funded/ supported activities run by either their regional offices or activities of state actors. On some other occasions, even some state actors received funds/ support indirectly through the non-state actors.

As evidenced in figure 3.2, the local (regional) non- state actors through funding from their parent organizations at the national level, were more engaged on the peace agenda more than the local state actors (peace committees) that the previous UNDP programmes had created and supported.

Like the implementation framework, the funding model caused friction with the existing county peace committees. Because of the seemingly side-lining of the NSC-PBCM structures and their actors, a number of peace interventions were done in “big hotels instead of being down within the communities where security and conflicts arise”. Given their access to funding, the local non-state actors were accused of recruiting and recycling the same people for training/ capacity building and workshops<sup>14</sup>.

Mistrust over the funding model was not only between the state and non-state actors but also within the non-state actors themselves. For instance, even within the state peace actors there are proposals for UNDP to consider introducing a programme-based budgeting where funds are appropriated to the county peace structures directly based on a pre- approved workplan with clear deliverables. This will enable ease of reporting and erase the existing disconnect between UNDP and the local peace actors.




Figure 3.2: Project Transcending Funding Model

<sup>13</sup>Key informant interview (KII) conducted in Migori County on 21st August, 2023 at 9:00am.

In view of the above analysis, it is clear that the resultant implementation framework and funding model of the TPP project did not enhance coordination and harmonization between UNDP, implementing partners and state and non-state actors. In this respect, the contextual development environment, the implementation framework and funding model, exposed the theory of change to confounding challenges. In view of this, the extent to which the TPP project achieved its objective against planned results is a mixed bag of success and missed hits. The sections that follow present segmented findings in accordance to the evaluation criteria.

### 3.1-Evaluation Findings Based on the Evaluation Criteria

This section presents the findings based on the

evaluation criteria that examine eight (8) aspects i.e., strategic, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency sustainability and ownership management and monitoring, social and environmental standards and impact. The overall level of achievement of each of the eight (8) aspects of the evaluation criteria was rated using the traffic light colour coding. Based on the data and evidence collected for this evaluation, table 4.1 summarizes the level of achievement of each aspect of the evaluation criteria.

#### Strategic

This criterion sought to examine the extent to which the project pro-actively took advantage of new opportunities, to adapt its theory of change to respond to changes in the development context including national and county priorities. Additionally, it sought to examine whether the project was aligned with the thematic focus of the UNDP's strategic plan.

*Table 3.2: TP Project Level of achievement Based the Evaluation Criteria*

Criterion	Rating	Criterion	Rating
Strategic		Management & Monitoring	
Relevance		Gender & Social Inclusion	
Effectiveness		Climate & Environmental Sustainability	
Efficiency		Impact	
Sustainability & National Ownership			

The latter aspect of this evaluation relating to alignment with UNDP strategic plan, the evaluation criterion on relevance above provides the findings of the evaluation. With respect to the former relating to the adaptation of the theory of change to the development context, the introductory part of this section on findings elucidates three contextual factors i.e., COVID-19; 2022 general elections and funding constraints and the attendant findings have been discussed exhaustively above on their effect on the theory of change.

Notwithstanding the above, the evaluation findings show that despite the changing development context, the overall scope of the project did not change. Additionally, a majority of the interventions were dedicated to the 2022 general elections at the expense of other development objectives of the project. Further, aware of the two-layered transitions at both the national and in twenty one (21) counties, there is little evidence to show that the project positioned itself to adapt to the impending transitions. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid, the overall rating for the strategic criterion was rated as amber.

In view of the development context of the project, the evaluation findings on the level of achievement of the four output areas as set out in the theory of change

are summarized below and presented using the traffic light color coding.

#### General Observations on Level of Achievement of Each Output

*Output 1:* The level of achievement of this output was rated as amber. Beyond alignment to major planning documents, during the period under review, the project supported the development of various bills that are yet to be enacted into law by parliament or the County Assemblies. For instance, the project supported the development of a policy on small arms and light weapons which hitherto had not existed. Currently the policy is in draft form awaiting finalization and adoption.

The project also made substantial contributions in the development of county peace policies and supported the creation/establishment of directorates/ department of peace and conflict management in some counties. Lastly, the project was instrumental in ensuring the inclusion of peace and conflict agenda in some counties' County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs). In light of the fact that most of the legislative and regulatory interventions are still in draft form and yet to be finalized and adopted, the level of achievement of this output was rated as amber.




Figure 3.3: The Transcending Foundations of Peace Project's Theory of Change's Level of Achievement

*Output 2:* Capacities of the peace architecture at both the national and county levels was assessed in terms of existing institutions and human resources for the peace and conflict management agenda.

Whereas there is strong evidence to support strengthened capacities for NSC plus the various peace committees and NCIC, the prevailing turf wars<sup>15</sup> between the two institutions and a lack of understanding by IPs and beneficiaries on the roles and responsibilities of the two institutions adversely affected the proper coordination of the peace interventions in some counties<sup>16</sup>.

The above misunderstanding in some instances, created an implementation and coordination void that the non-state actors readily filled.

Given the hierarchical nature of the non-state actors' organizational structure, it is fair to conclude that the project rode on these structures to strengthen community-based organizations as evidenced in Baringo and West Pokot where there exists a huge trust deficit between the community and formal organizations of government.

Additionally, in places like Kuria in Migori County, Isiolo and Wajir counties where strong cultural affinities to female genital mutilation (FGM) still exist and is a big conflict trigger under gender-based violence

[GBV], there is evidence that through the support of the TPP, the project strengthened local leaders' and community-based organizations' capacity to tackle this vice through inter-county benchmarking tours involving elders from Kuria and Marsabit.

There is sufficient evidence to support strengthened capacities of peace architectures such as community policing committees (CPC) in Baringo, Nairobi, Nakuru and Isiolo. Beyond just the creation of these committees in the mentioned counties, they actually work albeit with challenges not of the committees' making but rather caused by impromptu transfers of police officers working with the CPC<sup>17</sup>.

The main shortfall under this output was the limited deliberate effort to build and strengthen peace and conflict management of the county governments. As documented elsewhere in this report, the existing peace committees though based in counties, are entities of the national government. While some partners engaged counties especially in ensuring peace and conflict management agendas were incorporated into their CIDPs, such engagements were often one-off and therefore not structured and sustainable. The current peace structures are a continuation from 2010 when they were created and are oblivious of the implications of the 2010 constitutional changes that created two levels of government that are distinct but interdependent<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>15</sup>NSC sees security matter including peace as part of their mandate and therefore should naturally coordinate that agenda. Its officials see NCIC as an entity within the Ministry of Interior that should be coordinated albeit its constitutional independence. The NCIC on the other hand, see peace and conflict management as solidly their mandate as enshrined in its founding legislation.

<sup>16</sup>Key informant interview (KII) conducted Virtually on 19th September, 2023 at 4:00pm

<sup>17</sup> This variously corroborated by KIIs in Nakuru, Baringo and Isiolo.

Given that the original implementation framework envisaged a tripartite arrangement in the delivery of this project, the limited engagement and capacity building to strengthen peace structures of the county governments, the level of achievement of this output was rated as amber.

**Output 3:** The level of achievement of this project output was rated green. The evaluation revealed that the project had diligently adhered to the principle of LNOB and demonstrated inclusivity by actively involving women, youth, PWDs, and populations residing in ASAL areas and informal settlements. There is strong evidence to support a score 2 based on the UNDP gender equality marker, given its significant contributions to gender equality.

Through the various initiatives employed in implementation of the project, the evaluation findings show that the gender equality promotion aspect of the project was advanced through capacity building, localization of Resolution 1325 in specific counties, enactment of gender-responsive policies which resulted in increased women leadership roles at the county level. Inclusive peace structures actively engaged women, youth, and PWDs, leading to their inclusion in leadership roles of various committees.

Additionally, field evidence demonstrates that inclusion and participation of marginalized groups were promoted including innovative interventions that targeted PWDs albeit with challenges.

Further, evidence shows that collaborations with gender technical groups in various interventions increased awareness of gender-based violence in the various counties and contributed to enhancing the referral pathway among other key prevention and response strategies to gender based violence.

Despite these achievements, further efforts are required to enhance the inclusion of youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs). Consideration should be made and prioritized for these groups during the programme design phase to ensure their comprehensive participation in programme implementation for increased innovation and broader reach.

**Output 4:** The level of achievement of this output was rated as amber. This rating was on the basis that the output sought to support strengthening collaborative partnerships to prevent incidences of violence at the community, county and national levels. Evaluation evidence points affirms a focus on continuous early warning, early response, to promote peaceful elections during the entire electoral process, and post-election electoral dispute resolution.

Through the TPP, the project achieved a revitalized Uwiano Platform and contributed to the development of a robust communication strategy for civic education and messaging on peacebuilding. This result was, however, achieved through collaboration with other stakeholders in the elections process including but not limited to the Peace Building Fund (PBF), Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties, the Media Council of Kenya among others.

There is little evidence however, to demonstrate that the project enhanced or built new institutional capacities meant to address community conflicts. At national level, the TPP project rode on and further strengthened the already existing Uwiano Platform for Peace, in bringing both state and non-state agencies into discourses on national cohesion and integration.

A key example noted was the missing link in involving key players such as the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) which had previously played a key role on the peace-building space, especially in reconciliation and integration.

While the state played a key role in empowering the IEBC, ORPP, NPS and whereas the project partners NSC and NCIC as well as other international and local non-state actors had implemented peace projects in collaboration with other partners besides UNDP, it is evident that there has been fragmented implementation of peace projects, with available data showing that collaboration and coordination was largely seen during elections period. There is, however, scanty evidence that such coordination and collaborations were exploited in other interventions outside the 2022 general elections.

## Relevance

Relevance in the context of this project pertained to how well the project was aligned with the specific needs, priorities, and development goals of the country. It involved assessing whether the project effectively addressed pressing challenges and whether it contributed to the achievement of the stated development objectives. In addition to evaluating policy and legal alignment, this assessment sought to determine whether the project adequately addressed community needs and their development priorities. Furthermore, it aimed to gauge the extent to which the project's interventions had a significant impact within the country.

With respect to whether the project was aligned with national and sub-national (county governments) 'priorities as identified in a spectrum of essential frameworks, including Vision 2030, UNDAF/UNSDCF 2022-2026, MTPP III, and CIDPs, the

<sup>18</sup> See, Article 6 (2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

project's evidence affirms strong resonance with the transformative governance pillar of UNDAF, which emphasizes the creation of a secure, peaceful, inclusive, and cohesive society within Kenya.

Moreover, the project's objectives resonate with the core principles of the United Nations, notably the commitment to "Leaving no one behind." This principle is at the heart of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, and underscores the importance of inclusive development that benefits all segments of society.

There is evidence to support the objective of engagement of women, men, youth, persons with disabilities, and marginalized communities in select counties. Field interviews show that implementing partners were intentional about including various target groups in the implementation stages.

The project significantly contributed to the objectives outlined in MTPP III. These contributions encompass enhancing conflict resolution capacity, promoting national peace, early warning and conflict prevention, and fostering capacity development in conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation, and the prevention and response to gender-based violence.

Additionally, through various interventions of some IPs, the project bolstered early warning mechanisms. For example, SRIC enhanced and capacitated community policing structures at the county level, while IRCK conducted mediation trainings in various counties and implemented the women situation room, which had had a positive effect and furthered peace initiatives during elections. PfPS's role in enhancing beneficiaries' capacities has led to their 19KII with implementing partners on 25th August 2023 at 10am.

20FGD with implementing partner on 15th August 2023 at 9am. contributions being included in the CIDPs of various counties namely in Nairobi, Kitui, Taita Taveta, Nyeri and Murang'a Counties among others.

Stakeholder ownership and participation play pivotal roles in project success. There is evidence in most counties that IPs and beneficiaries proactively contributed to the project through the established peace committees and community policing structures. These committees were fairly successful in building bridges between the community and the security sector and facilitated the sharing of valuable information on community security. This in turn, fostered trust between the community and the security sector thus contributing to enhanced peace. This response is illustrated below, in an interview conducted with IRCK members in Narok County<sup>19</sup>, when asked about the community response to the peace committees.

*"Yes, the community trusts us because they know what we do."*

The localization of the Kenya National Action Plan 1325 on women, peace, and security has fostered ownership at the County level, resulting in the domestication and development of County Action Plans. This was evident in Isiolo, Mombasa, Kitui, and Nyeri, Taita Taveta counties. However, changes in County leadership in August 2022 impacted the finalization and launch of some developed County action plans on women, peace and security. This was expressed in an interview with one of the implementer's<sup>20</sup> of the project;

*"We supported the localization of national peace building architecture in Muranga county, where the document is with the county gender officer awaiting the forward from the Governor in order to be published. We have developed one for Taita Taveta which is in draft awaiting revision on the request by the Governor and county commissioner in order to reflect the county needs considering it was developed before the 2022 general elections."*

The project played a key role in enhancing the peace architecture in the country, both individually by the IPs and collectively through the umbrella of the Uwiano platform for peace that brought together various actors and stakeholders. Evaluation evidence points to the fact that Uwiano was very instrumental in ensuring a peaceful 2022 general elections.

At the national level, the national peace architecture is currently under review through the leadership of the NSC and NCIC with support from UNDP. At the same time the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was passed in 2014, however its implementation has been pending awaiting the appointment of the National Peace Council to operationalize it. This policy is meant to ensure that peacebuilding and the peace structures are prioritized by the government in resource allocation.

In addition to alignment to various planning documents, the project's evidence shows adaptability and responsiveness. Through TPP, attempts have been made to create and institutionalize different structures such as county directorates that handle issues of peace at the county level in select counties such as Nakuru, Migori, Wajir, Isiolo, Marsabit, Garissa, Kitui among others. on the influence of TPP on devolved governance. This is further captured in an interview<sup>21</sup> below. For detailed information on county-level interventions, *see Annex I*.

<sup>19</sup>KII with implementing partners on 25th August 2023 at 10am.

<sup>20</sup>FGD with implementing partner on 15th August 2023 at 9am.

*“Yes, it is through PeaceNet currently we have a county department of peace under the Deputy Governors’ office.”*

The implementing partners have played pivotal roles in building local capacities for peace advocacy across various regions, resulting in enhanced security in several counties. This is evidenced by an interviewee<sup>22</sup>;

*“The early response mechanism has really worked, because those who had been trained on early response were really vibrant and engaged in the last elections on the ground and were able to give first-hand information as it is on the ground. There was an incident where there was a funeral in the area and politicians intended to use it as an opportunity to flex their political muscles through their supporters, but we got the information the previous night from where the meeting was being held at the time and informed the OCS and the police were there very early in the morning at 5am and that alone scared everybody away and there was nothing they could do.”*

Importantly, the project is highly relevant at the devolved levels of government. Through the capacity-building efforts of implementing partners, beneficiaries at the county level have been able to

advocate for policies specific to their conflict triggers, which has positively impacted the community and enhanced peace. A prime instance is in one county, where the peace committee was actively engaged in developing a sustainable sand harvesting policy, addressing a critical resource conflict issue. As ably articulated by a KII<sup>23</sup>;

*“On issues pertaining sand harvesting, we have in one way or the other influenced the county government and actually right now there is a committee that is looking into the matter on sand harvesting and areas where sand harvesting should be done and how and the benefits to the local community”.*

This approach extends to other counties through the domestication of policies and the development of County Action Plans on women, peace, and security. These efforts have led to the passage of peace policies in Nakuru and Migori counties. Based on

the aforesaid, the project’s achievement in respect to relevance was rated as green.

## Effectiveness

The project’s effectiveness was gauged by the extent to which the project’s results were achieved and was rated amber. Notably, the peaceful 2022 elections in the previously designated hotspot regions showcased the project’s ability to foster peace and security. The project’s interventions played a crucial role in maintaining this calm, fostered communal unity which replaced past tensions and conflicts during election times. This is exemplified in a comment by a KII<sup>24</sup>;

*“This region was a serious hotspot during elections, the road you used today would have been impassable, but our collective efforts have contributed to peace.”*

Furthermore, the project significantly contributed to augmenting peace and security in specific counties by leveraging on the existing peace structures, such as peace committees and community policing frameworks. These community-based peace structures established strategic liaisons with the security sector, facilitating information flow from local communities to law enforcement agencies. This substantially improved trust between communities and the security apparatus, resulting in enhanced county-level security. This is illustrated in a comment below from a FGD<sup>25</sup>;

*“We now interact with the police without fear, we are recognized as CPC members and we are trusted.”*

The project also played a pivotal role in enhancing governance. It achieved this by building the capacities of various implementing partners to empower local communities to participate in county peace initiatives, integrate peace policies into County Integrated Development Plans, and localized the Women, Peace, and Security Resolution 1325 in select counties.

Though not primarily through the project, other projects’ interventions also contributed to socio-economic investments in promoting peace in Kenya. This is demonstrated by a comment<sup>26</sup> below;

*“They worked very well with the Uganda country office to invest in boreholes in an area in West Pokot called Nassau, which they then linked up with an irrigation scheme to support a school and medical facilities. At the same time, in Urum, they invested in a cross-border school”.*

<sup>21</sup>KII held on the 21st August 2023 at 10am.

<sup>22</sup>FGD held on the 22nd August 2023 at 11am.

<sup>23</sup>FGD held on 25th August 2023, at 3pm.

<sup>24</sup>FGD, 22nd August, 11am-12:30pm

<sup>25</sup>FGD, 23rd August, 10am- 11:30am

Field evidence suggests that the project contributed to improving the quality of life in select regions through various initiatives that sought to reform the youth at risk. A key initiative was through the Maskani talks which is an initiative by the peace committees that involves sensitization of the youth on the need to reform from a life of crime as well as the dangers of drug and substance abuse. This initiative had great success in reducing crime levels in the county. The peace committees also created job opportunities for the reformed criminals, as alternative sources of livelihoods. These sentiments<sup>27</sup> are aptly captured below;

*“The maskani talks are a safe space for the youth to reform as they feel safer to talk and reform. Through maskani talks a lot of youths have reformed from drug addiction and a life of crime”.*

Beyond the TPP project, there exists other stakeholders in the field whose collaborative contributions may have played a role in the success of peacebuilding activities in the specific counties and these stakeholders were not exclusively UN- affiliated entities<sup>28</sup>.

Within UNDP initiatives there exists potential for valuable strategic collaborations to enhance the project’s objectives. Field evidence shows little collaborative efforts between/among UNDP projects which tended to operate independently and in silos, despite their shared goal of advancing the peace and conflict agenda in the counties. This is also true between the TPP and the Africa Borderlands Centre (ABC) where both of them work in West Pokot but with little project intervention complementarities within the county. This was also the case between TPP and IRRL project which was implemented in at least eight (8) similar counties.

The project promoted disarmament initiatives as an intervention, encouraging communities to surrender their firearms. However, a notable challenge arose in border communities that had not yet engaged in disarmament. The statement below clearly illustrates this<sup>29</sup>;

*“They were supported with income-generating activities such as chicken rearing, carwash businesses, farming amongst others in order for them to fetch for themselves and their families”.*

The project promoted disarmament initiatives as an intervention, encouraging communities to surrender

their firearms. However, a notable challenge arose in border communities that had not yet engaged in disarmament. The statement below clearly illustrates this<sup>30</sup>;

*“UNDP works with small arms to encourage the community to surrender arms so that the community can have peace and tranquillity, i.e., Karamoja who are on the Kenya side surrender their weapons but are attacked by Sudan. We they get attacked and wonder why we were disarmed.”*

Another unintended result that arose out of the project’s intervention is the perception of an alignment of the peace architecture with the national government. During elections, peace actors at the county level were perceived as aligned with the national government, creating challenges in regions where politicians believed that the national administration was supporting the opposition. These sentiments were ably represented below;

*“During one meeting our county commissioner was embarrassed by the local politician and asked to leave the meeting, they thought he was campaigning for the opposition, we came with him, what could we do?”*

Whereas the project adopted a ‘problem-iteration approach’ to on-board counties, the emergent unintended consequence was that in some counties there was an over-representation of partners. This resulted in the provision of multiple and overlapping trainings to raise awareness by various partners and in some cases the capacity building programmes were infiltrated by the perpetrators of conflicts thus defeating the objectives of the training programmes. This may have been due to the centralization of training locations rather than the project’s focus. These views were aptly expressed<sup>32</sup> below;

*“We have trained till we have trained the perpetrators; they now know how to destroy the evidence”.*

Given the sensitivity of the gender-based violence cases, the project’s interventions sought to empower victims of (GBV) by linking them with social and the criminal justice (legal) support systems. In enforcing their rights through law enforcement, victims/survivors of GBV often rescinded their own evidence and demanded the release of their family members (assailants), who often were the families’

<sup>26</sup>KII, 1st September 2023, 9-10am.

<sup>27</sup>FGD, 24th August 2023, 10:30-11:30am.

<sup>28</sup>Jamii Thabiti, GIZ, World Vision, ACK, Tegla Lerope Foundation etc. All work in the peacebuilding and security arena and their contributions are noticeable.

<sup>29</sup>KII, 24th August 2023, 1:30-2pm

<sup>30</sup>KII, 16th August 2023, 9-10am.

breadwinners. This double-edged consequence where, on the one hand, the projects positively intervened to address GBV but on the other hand, GBV victims are forced to weigh the costs to benefits of having their loved arrested and prosecuted resulting to a loss of livelihood for a family continues to hamper progress in GBV mitigation.

In some counties the peace actors on the ground became the gatekeepers of the community. In Isiolo County for instance, some members of the Community Policing Committee (CPC) assumed the role of the police themselves and acquired ‘pseudo-police’ powers. Other members of the CPC assumed the role of the community. They became the ‘community’ themselves to the extent that they confused personal priorities with those of the community”<sup>33</sup>. The IPs were forced to retrain the CPCs on their roles as peace actors. In addition, some of the peace actors were taunted as spies of the police in the community.

Lastly, due to unemployment, some people exploited loopholes in the sector and masqueraded in some counties as peace actors when indeed they were not. The peace actors’ solution to this is a proposal to design a mechanism of identifying peace actors through formal registration by either the NGAO or the county government before being allowed access into the community as peace actors.

### Efficiency

Efficiency measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) are converted into results, (UNDP 2009). Based on the above, efficiency of the TPP project implementation was rated as red.

The efficiency criterion examined whether adequate strategies were explored to mobilize resources for the project. It also examined whether any cost-cutting measures were encouraged and whether the project efficiently converted available resources into results. Further, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the project utilized UN’s comparative advantage in the Kenyan context to advance its objectives.

If efficiency in the context of this project is measured in terms of an attempt to ‘do more (scope) with less (funds)’, then the project would be rated high (green). This is the case because the scope of interventions targeted forty (40) counties with meagre resources of only \$5million. Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the project’s outreach, the project’s interventions were spread out to most of the counties albeit thinly.

If on the other hand, efficiency is measured in terms of ‘value for money’, then the project fell short of meeting the expectations on this criterion. This is

because there is little evidence to show that the project mobilized additional resources to support its activities apart from the additional \$1M from the UNDP.

Additionally, the project’s implementation framework’s preference for non-state actors to drive interventions over state actors which created mistrust was perhaps not a very efficient way of deploying the scarce resources. Further, value for money was lost through the project’s interventions that sought to strengthen county-based institutions that were not aligned with the devolved system of governance and were not institutions of the county governments. Because of this, future peace interventions will have to build and strengthen a county peace architecture anew.

The TPP project was implemented alongside other peace programs such as African Borderlands Center’s project, PBF project, the devolution project etc, but there is little evidence that these projects implemented interventions as one. A lot of synergy would have been built between the TPP, PBF or IRRL and devolution projects given that they were UNDP projects rolled out in the same counties in most cases. There is little evidence that this was the case.

On the aspect of efficiently converting resources/ inputs into results including value for money, evidence points to the contrary in most cases. Field evidence shows that the project experienced delays on disbursement of funds and delays in approval of work plans and activities for IPs. Perhaps a great indictment on the project related to efficiency was the contradiction between its stated objectives of poverty alleviation, inequality and socio-economic exclusion. This contradiction is aptly captured by a Nairobi-based KII.

*“The UNDP partners preach socio-economic empowerment but they do the opposite. For example, they call us for meetings and order food for us from Serena Hotel. I’m sure it costs a lot instead of giving us the money to sort ourselves. Alternatively, if they don’t want to give us cash, they can engage our youth or women to cook for us here so that they earn a living as well. Our people see this and are not happy. Some IPs do support us but others don’t want to hear any of it. To us, this is wasteful...”*

In respect to efficiency from a management capacity perspective and based on the above caption from field interviews, the project scored lowly given that it did not utilize local expertise/capacity. This is also

<sup>31</sup>FGD, 24th August 2023, 3-4pm

<sup>32</sup>FGD, 23rd August 2023, 2:30-3:30pm

<sup>33</sup>KII conducted on 19th August, 2023 at 10:00am.

<sup>34</sup>FGD, 22nd August 2023, 11am-1pm.

the case where local CBOs were not adequately onboarded to support IPs rollout some interventions. Efficiency, therefore as a criterion, was minimally achieved/ advanced by the project thus it was rated as red.

### Sustainability and National Ownership

This criterion examined the prospects of the project interventions continuing beyond the current life of the TPP project. To assess this, special consideration was given to institutional structures put in place or supported by the project and their ability to survive on their own without the current project. The evaluation also paid attention to the expected behaviour change out of the created/ supported institutional structures. This evaluation borrows from social science conceptualization of institutions to mean the humanly devised structures of rules and norms that shape or constrain human behaviour<sup>35</sup>.

The five (5) key questions addressed under this criterion include; whether the project incorporated adequate exit strategies and capacity development measures to ensure sustainability of results over time; whether the project put in place mechanisms to ensure benefits of the project interventions were sustained and owned by IPs at the national and sub-national levels; whether the project had adequate exit strategies and capacity development measures to ensure the sustainability of results over time; whether national institutional capacity development and strengthening of national systems were built to enhance sustainability and whether there were good strategies that could be replicated and scaled up.

On the aspect of incorporation of adequate exit strategies, there is scanty evidence to demonstrate that the project put in place exit strategies. Additionally, whereas there were a number of capacity development interventions, these interventions were episodic, ad hoc and often conducted in distant places away from the conflict theatre. In some cases, respondents lamented the manner in which beneficiaries were selected which they felt was unfair. Such feelings are summed up by a FGD and KII from some state actors of the NSC<sup>36</sup>.

*"...some implementors' messaging and interventions remain in big hotels..... the same same leaders are chosen for all manner of interventions instead of being sector-based depending on the issue at hand"*

*"By the way, Wakaranga\* has overstayed here and he organizes Programmes without involving the local administrators - national and county government".*

In view of the above sentiments, therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether the capacity development interventions of the project under review are sustainable.

Overall, there was a weaker sense of ownership of the project by many partners especially those in the field. In almost all the counties visited, the peace committees had tepid reception of the interventions spearheaded by the non-state actors. This clearly demonstrates a lack of local ownership. Ownership of interventions by implementing partners within the community policing space is also questionable especially among the police. Evidence suggests that the police themselves had not either appreciated community policing or have not been capacitated on it.

Field evidence reveals instances where chiefs ignored CPC members whenever benchmarking and training opportunities arose and instead sent their supporters who often were not members of CPC. Equally, field evidence reveals that often police officers used information provided by CPC members to protect conflict perpetrators. The two instances demonstrate the disconnect of the capacity building interventions among various stakeholders within the community policing space.

With respect to building strong partnerships with key stakeholders, the project interventions in the community policing space had noticeable results in terms of narrowing the trust deficit between the police and the citizens in terms of receptibility and acceptance of the role of community policing committees (CPC). Their viability and sustainability are however, questionable.

This sustainability is threatened not by the project design but rather by the National Police Service (NPS) tendency to transfer station commanding officers (OCS) on a regular basis thus undoing the rapport created through the CPC. Often, those who replace the departing OCS's lack training on CPC and take a long time to accommodate the CPC agenda in their priority list. A more confounding issue on sustainability relates to the process of constituting the CPC. In some cases, evidence shows that the process is opaque and often the local chiefs populate the CPC with their cronies.

Worse still, some members of the CPC doubled up as members of the "Nyumba Kumi". In some instances, some members of either committee were unaware which of the two committees they belong to as members<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>35</sup>See, Paul. Pierson., (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton University Press.

<sup>36</sup>Varied FGDs with County NSC members conducted on 28/8/2023 at 3:00pm and 30/8/2023 at 5:00pm

Many partners expected more than was provided and some appeared not to understand the full scope of the project or its interventions. There were, however, a number of beneficiary stories that pointed to the appreciation of the project interventions. Some of these beneficiaries included the youths from reformed gangs and youth in conflict hotspots such as Nyalenda in Kisumu County, among others.

The project did not demonstrate the existence of an exit strategy that was disseminated and understood by all partners. Several partners appeared not to have prepared for the end of the project and in some instances, partners like those in Kilifi indicated that they were still waiting for the project to kick off. This is aptly captured by a KII below<sup>39</sup>;

*“...yes we attended the launch of the project in Nairobi where I participated, after the launch we were told the project was to be rolled out to the counties, but up till now we have never received any support. I have asked severally, and I was told it's because of COVID-19 the project will not begin in Kilifi”.*

While there was recognition at both the national and county levels of the importance of peace-building and the project design was coherent on this, financial support for related structures, such as District Peace Committees (DPCs) [presently known as Sub County Peace Committees (SCPC)], remained inadequate or non-existence. This financial gap weakened their operations, posing a threat to their continued existence. Financial strains therefore hindered the scaling up and implementation of the project as envisaged in the project document.

There were mixed findings on the institutional capacities of partners to continue the project activities beyond the project cycle. For instance, partners in Nakuru county felt they had received adequate capacity-building sessions and skills to conduct peacebuilding interventions, while partners in other counties, especially in the coastal region felt they did not benefit from the project.

Governmental institutions were expected to lead peace-building programmes by enacting enabling laws, guidelines, and policies. However, there have been delays in advancing these frameworks thus hindering progress in peace-building efforts. The missing link with the county governments is likely to affect the sustainability of the project. There are a good number of peace partners and initiatives at county-level that are/were supported by other donors and partners and therefore, TPP's exit strategy

would benefit and leverage on such efforts and partnership with such actors to ensure continuity of its interventions.

Evaluation findings revealed that stakeholder coordination and collaboration faced challenges, including misunderstandings between state and non-state actors and conflicts between national and county-level peace actors. Strengthening collaboration is essential for the project's sustainability. In some counties visited, where there was more than one partner, there was limited evidence of coordination and collaboration despite working on the same project.

While Community-Based Organizations and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were envisioned to play a crucial role in sustaining peace at the local level, their involvement was limited. Community members in rural areas expressed concerns about the reach and effectiveness of peace-building initiatives, with disparities between urban and rural areas. Addressing these involvement and equity issues is therefore vital for the sustainability of the results realized by the project.

Lastly, in respect to whether there are good strategies that could be replicated and scaled-up at county and community levels, there is evidence from Baringo and Migori counties of community-level interventions worthy replication and scale-up. In Baringo, the trust deficit between the police and the community is rather obvious and any attempt to build peace by peace actors affiliated with government is bound to fail.

Through the TPP interventions such as community dialogues by the IRCK's interfaith groupings (youth and women), religious leaders from warring communities held engagements with each other and got to understand each other on why cattle rustling is a menace. Such engagements seldom take place between the police and the Pokot community. The lesson here is that the perceived use of force by the state to take away the Pokot's guns may be far less effective than sheer dialogue advanced by non-state actors who share a common understanding and can build trust with each other.

In Migori on the other hand, FGM is a huge conflict trigger and often a key issue for political mobilization among the Kuria. Political leaders who attempt to dissuade the community from the practice often face the wrath of voters and are condemned to political oblivion. Whereas there have been baby steps progress in mitigating against FGM especially among the Kuria clan bordering the Luo community, three(3) of the four Kuria clans still practice FGM.

<sup>37</sup>Interview with KIIs & FGD Conducted in Baringo on the 30/8/2023 at 1:00pm.

<sup>38</sup>Interview with KII conducted in Kisumu on 23/8/2023 at 11:30am.

<sup>39</sup>KII Interview Conducted in Kilifi on ....8/2023 at .....pm

One of the strategies that has been employed to tackle this tradition is the use of “peer-to-peer” benchmarking tours where elders from a community that has practiced this tradition for a while but are at the verge of eradicating it meet with elders from the Kuria to share ideas and persuade each other. In this instance, elders from Marsabit were taken to meet elders from Kuria to discuss the merits and demerits of FGM. Why elders? Because they are the gatekeepers and zealots of FGM. Ideally, the antithesis of killing the messenger. At the time of conducting this evaluation only one such effort had been made. Preliminary evidence from such effort suggests that a change of attitude among those that participated and that this effort needs to be scaled up.

### Management and Monitoring

The Project monitoring and evaluation criteria examined the quality of formulation of results at different levels of the results chain. Specifically, the key questions sought to determine the extent to which the indicators and targets were relevant, realistic, and measurable and also progress baselines against which to access progress and if

they addressed cross cutting issues. It further sought to examine the alignment of project indicators with SDGs and if not, what changes needed to be made.

Further, the evaluation sought to examine the extent and in what ways were risks and assumptions addressed in the project design. Additionally,

the evaluation sought to determine whether the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the different partners was well defined, facilitated in the achievement of results and if arrangements had been respected during implementation. Lastly the evaluation examined how the project was managed.

UNDP made a deliberate effort to ensure key stakeholders, including governments, CSOs, youth, women, religious actors were engaged in the development of the project document for the TPP. However, an analysis of the project documents points to a lack of deliberate effort to involve the sub national level (County Governments), the private sector and community representatives in the design. The project monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning as an evaluation criterion was for the most part not achieved and thus was rated as red.

Whereas the M&E plan at project design phase developed and was fairly sufficient to monitor results and track progress toward achieving objectives, its implementation was wanting. The project was not adequately staffed with critical skills to roll out, monitor and manage the project in all the targeted counties despite this omission being flagged out in a number of progress review meetings.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the planning, monitoring and evaluation require a focus on nationally owned development priorities and results, and should reflect the guiding principles of national ownership, capacity development and human development. A key detailed SMART indicator analysis (whether indicators are sufficiently Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound) is summarized and presented in **Annex C**.

The letter of agreement (LOA) signed between the United Nations Development Programme and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of the National Government for the provision of services in August, 2020 provided that the following support services for the activities at Programme/ project were to be provided:

- Identification and recruitment of project and Programme personnel.
- Identification and facilitation of training activities
- Procurement of goods and services

Based on the LOA, the supported **Annex 1**, provided for five output, one of them being: Output 5: Programme Management Monitoring and Evaluation which provided for the achieved status as indicated Annex D of the report.

In an interview with partners, they recognized that the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the different partners was well defined, and facilitated in the achievement of results and the arrangements had been respected during implementation though not fully given the non- engagement of the county government. Additionally, in some cases state actors such as NSC at the county levels felt ignored and were not engaged to fully undertake their roles.

The Project Board/Project Steering Committee (PSC) functions were well undertaken including: identifying and proposing programme activities and budgets, approving work plans presented by executing partners, coordinating programme implementation, monitoring and reporting and proposing and approving changes in activities and implementation. As the apex decision-making organ of TPP, the composition of the PSC lacked a ‘maker- checker” mechanism to enhance accountability over resources and deliverables. A key shortfall of the PSC was a lack of independence, impartiality and objectivity in decision making given that key project implementing partners were engaged at the project design and development phase, implemented the project, approved work plans and budgets, oversaw the project and provided policy directions.

The project met minimum requirements for a project’s governance arrangements including

stakeholder representation (i.e., UNDP, national partners, beneficiary representatives, donors, etc.) with authority to make decisions regarding the project albeit the aforesaid shortfall. The organogram provided for how the target groups were to be engaged in decision making for the project, to ensure their voice and participation.

In the project document, there was a clear results framework trickling from national level to the County level. Annual Work Plans were developed identifying activities agreed upon with the national implementing partners.

At reporting level, there were some notable gaps. For instance, only one bi-annual (2021-2022) report was done although at the time of this evaluation it was in draft format. There is evidence that supports the conduct of regular status reviews and joint field missions during the implementation period and a number of project meetings were held to revise implementation strategies to accommodate context realities.

Despite the annual programme review meetings being held and regular PSC meetings, a number of actions arising out of those meetings were never implemented. For instance, on two occasions both the Embassy of Sweden and PSC raised concerns over the M&E component of the project including recruitment of a M&E Specialist but this was never acted upon. Similarly, the Embassy of Sweden pointed out the need for TPP to create linkages with the devolution project and integrate climate and environmental sustainability interventions. There is little evidence that these were considered.

In view of the fact that only one annual report was done and no mid-term evaluation conducted for the project, the project therefore did not benefit from “correcting-course” through those review reports.

The project document recognized that the new system of devolved government brought more complexity to conflict dynamics in Kenya particularly with devolution expanding spheres of public participation and self-governance. However, either by design or default, there seems to have been no deliberate effort made to align the project to the devolved context of governance.

The project’s risks and assumptions were clearly articulated, with mitigation strategies that were associated with implementation put in place. Five key risk areas were considered and the attendant mitigations measures as summarized below.

**Financial risks:** As indicated inadequate resources to meet the Programme’s expectations occurred arising out of a non-contribution from government. Aware of this, little evidence exists to demonstrate any efforts made by UNDP to fill the funding gap in terms of fundraising.

**Political risks:** Risk of violence during the 2022 general elections was perceived to be real. As articulated, elections presented a threat to peace and stability due to polarization and intolerance resulting from the likelihood elite fragmentation, and Kenya’s history of political party zoning and incitement to violence. Working with NCIC, the project implemented an Early Warning, Early Response (EWER) mechanism that was rolled out by the IPs. The project effectively developed capacities for collaborative and problem-solving leadership at the national and county level. There was also close collaboration with UWIANO platform, Media Council of Kenya, ORPPP, IEBC and other institutions related to electoral processes. At the national and county levels there was also signing off of peace declaration charters by political leaders committing to uphold peace.

**Institutional risks:** In line with the Constitution of Kenya 2010, there were two-layered transitions at the national level and in twenty-one (21) county governments. Although through project progress review meetings the project flagged out these transitions it failed to factor in arrangements for either continuity or exit of the project interventions post-transitions. Due to this omission, a number of initiatives previously undertaken remain dormant/inactive since the new regimes came to power.

**Security risks:** In view of this, the project partnered with relevant state and non-state actors in continuous research. Keenly, the hotspot mapping exercise undertaken by NCIC between January and April 2022 enabled the security agencies to deal with the high-risk areas early enough during the campaign period. By July 2022, the high and medium risk areas had been reduced to low risk, which significantly contributed to peaceful electoral process.

**Technological risks:** Examples of these include cybercrime, and hate speech perpetuated through social media platforms during the period under review. As envisioned, the project collaborated with relevant government institutions in the security sector, the media and mobile service providers to mitigate against this risk. Further, this risk was also mitigated through the “Peace Building Fund” (PBF) project’s initiatives including a well-structured and responsive social media strategy.

Further, as key partner of NCIC, PBF invested in forensic capacity to capture hate speech in rallies and other political fora as well as on social media, from which evidence could be pick up from conversations in Swahili and English but also in other vernacular languages such as Luhya, Luo, Kikuyu and Kamba. This capacity led to development of Hatelex, a lexicon of words and phrases that were used to spread hate and division. This capacity also allowed intervention in time when there were contraventions of the law.

Available evidence from IPs indicate that delayed clearance of work plans and subsequent disbursement of funds adversely affected the projects. In such delays the evaluation found gaps in communication with beneficiaries and coordinators of peace committees. This should have been rectified noting that peace committees were the key implementers at county and sub-county levels, hence such a gap ended up affecting results. In view the aforesaid, the level of achievement of this criterion was rated red.

In conclusion, it is worthwhile to note that both the baseline study as well as mid-term evaluation were not carried out. The final evaluation in absence of the baseline study relied on the results of IPs' quarterly reports and the terminal evaluation reports of the previous projects. The mid-term evaluation would have also informed how the lessons learned were adapted to the implementation process but this was never undertaken.

## Impact

This criterion sought to assess the impact of the project on devolution especially on the role of the citizenry and their participation in the devolution process. Three key evaluation questions to be answered were; whether there were any major changes in the context of devolved governance that could reasonably be attributed or associated with the project, whether there were high-level results (impacts) that the project contributed to and the extent to which the project led to the strengthening of devolved institutions with regard to management, empowerment, effectiveness, accountability, transparency and efficiency in service delivery.

In respect to attributability of the project to the changes in the context of devolution, field evidence demonstrates that project's role in initiating changes in devolved structures was not sufficiently evident. For instance, through the project, some counties created or are in the process of creating directorates of peace within the structures of the county government. Additionally, through the project, the peace and conflict management agenda made its way into several counties' five-year development plans (CIDPs) albeit this was episodic and not structured. Further, although not conclusive, through the project a number of counties have developed "peace and conflict management policies" and the attendant draft legislations that have either been approved by the County Executive awaiting County Assembly approval or are in the process of being approved. A summary of evidence of TPP's interventions linked to governance changes at the county level is presented in **Annex H**.

On the question of whether the project can be attributed to lasting high-level results, there exist a body of evidence from field interviews in four areas where the project's high-level results are attributable to the TPP project. In Kisumu for instance, the county has for long been associated with violent protests during electioneering period. Through the project under review, implementing partners through peace walks engaged the youth, women and county government leaders led by the governor himself to promote peaceful elections and its aftermath. At stake was the tag of "a city of violence". Their peace messaging was tailored around shading-off "the city of violence" tag. Using the Governor and his office as the peace champion, they deployed 'sloganeering' and named Kisumu - 'Europe' and coined messages to the effect;

*"Kisumu is the cleanest city and most organized rivalling Europe and therefore you cannot destroy or burn our Europe"*

Empirical field evidence in support of the impact of the sloganeering shows that indeed, it worked during and after the elections. Saliently, even during the recent country-wide protests, the sloganeering messaging was still effective. Figure 3.4 below presents different photos taken during the data collection exercise for this evaluation and soon after the national wide protests were called off.

What is clear from the above photos is that the slogan "Kisumu is Europe" and therefore you "cannot destroy/burn it", resonated with the citizens long past the elections and continues to shape the conduct of Kisumu residents during and whenever protests are called for. This change of behaviour is well encapsulated by a Kisumu resident who is engaged in the Boba Boda business<sup>43</sup>;

*"....we have been taught by our leaders and even in church about burning roads and its impact. You know, Kisumu is the headquarters of opposition politics and therefore getting a road to be done is not easy. We now know when you burn this road it melts and gets destroyed. Getting it repaired will take a long time. We have been taught if we have to burn tires during protests in solidarity with 'Baba', we do it on the side, or at the roundabout or at the middle of a dual road".*

A similar high-level impact attributable to the project is evident in Uasin Gishu (Eldoret). Like Kisumu, Eldoret town has held the tag "hot-spot" during the



**Photo 1:** Objects burnt in the middle of a dual-carriage road in Kisumu.



**Photo 2:** Objects burnt at the roundabout in Kisumu.



**Photo 3:** Objects burnt at an intersection of two roads joining a roundabout in the CBD - Kisumu.

Photos taken during field visits for data collection in August, 2023.

### Figure 3.4: Evidence of 'Responsive' Protests in Kisumu through TPP's Sloganeering & Messaging

electioneering period. Overtime, leaders and residents have noticed that most local and international visitors and investors escape from the county in fear of potential post-election violence largely attributed to the tag "hot-spot". Through support of the TPP project leaders engaged in community dialogues and peace-walks not only to promote peaceful co-existence but also launched a campaign to shade-off the "hotspot" tag. The peace messaging (interventions) "hot-spot"

was weaponized and linked to loss of job opportunities from fleeing investors. There is evidence that this peace messages and linkage to loss of economic opportunities resonated well with the community and has been associated with a peaceful 2022 general election in Eldoret for the first time since 1992.

Lastly, another high-level impact of the project is the increased levels of political tolerance in Migori among the Kuria and in Uasin Gishu. In the former, the ability of women political candidates to stand and contest for elective seats was anathema. Through the project's

<sup>42</sup>FGD, Conducted in Kisumu on the 22/8/2023 at 10:00am.

<sup>43</sup>KII Conducted in Kisumu on the 22/8/2023 at 12:00 Noon.

<sup>44</sup>KII Conducted in Kisumu on the 23/8/2023 at 10:00 am.

<sup>45</sup>KII Conducted in Migori in the 21/8/2023 at 11:00am.

interventions of empowering women and diluting the messages of traditional practices to subjugate women, in the August 2022 general elections there were slightly more women contestants than they have been before among the Kuria.

Additionally, in Kuria there has been a change of attitude among young men about FGM. Whereas before traditional pro-FGM die-hards propagated the notion that uncircumcised women were not 'wife-material' and that could not bear children and even condemned men who dared marry such women, through the project's interventions these narratives have changed. Increasingly, receptibility of the anti-FGM is taking root with more uncircumcised women among the Kuria getting married and bearing children<sup>45</sup>. Where this change has occurred, it is unlikely that the community will go back to the traditional mode.

On the question of whether the project led to strengthening devolved institutions regarding management, efficiency, accountability, effectiveness etc, there is scanty evidence to support any claim that there was a deliberate attempt to support institutions of the county governments. As outlined under the strategic criterion, the field project implementation model varied from that of the project design and therefore the county government structures did not benefit from the project's interventions in this regard. Overall, the empirical evaluation evidence on the impact of the project

as measured by the three evaluation questions, is assessed as moderately met given the developmental context and accordingly rated amber.

### 3.2 Cross Cutting issues: Gender and Inclusion

In this section, we examined the extent to which the principles of "Leaving No One Behind" (LNOB) were incorporated into the project's implementation. To address the LNOB principle effectively, it was crucial that the project specifically target vulnerable and marginalized groups, such as women, youth, people with disabilities (PWDs), ASAL communities, and those living in informal settlements.

In our evaluation of inclusion parameters, we sought to answer specific questions regarding the participation of women, youth, and PWDs, resulting in the following findings. In respect to the subject of inclusivity, the project's interventions across all counties intentionally ensured the inclusion and participation of women, youth, and PWDs in their programmes. Meetings in select counties consistently featured the presence of women, youth, and, in some areas, PWDs. These

sentiments were echoed by an implementing partner<sup>46</sup> below;

*"In matters of peace building, we ensure that at least 80% of the participants are women".*

On the subject of gender equality advancement, the project's interventions played a pivotal role in advancing gender equality through capacity building on gender inclusion, gender-based violence prevention and response, and localization of Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security.

This resulted in the inclusion of contributions of beneficiaries into the CIDPs in select counties and development of County National Action Plans on women, peace, and security in select counties. These views were reiterated in an FGD<sup>47</sup> below,

*"Through public participation, the network wrote a memorandum during the CIDP making process because they had issues which needed attention and needed to be planned in the next 5 years".*


**Peace Architecture Inclusivity:** The peace architecture in the country as represented by peace committees and community policing structures, actively adhered to the inclusion of women, youth, and PWDs. These structures were intentional in their composition, ensuring the participation of women and youth, leading to inclusion of women and youth in leadership in various committees. It was notable that in Murang'a, Nakuru, Wajir, Isiolo and Kitui Counties, there was evidence of women in leadership as reflected in the enlisted examples below.

1. **Gender-Responsive Policies:** Policies formulated as part of the initiatives of implementing partners were gender-responsive. An example of this is the formulation of County Action Plans on women, peace, and security in counties like Murang'a and Kitui. These initiatives resulted in women's leadership at the county level on peace and security. Women in Isiolo and Wajir challenged patriarchal structures and advocated for women's leadership, even securing political positions in the counties. As exemplified by the outcome of the August 2022 general elections, for the first time Isiolo County elected a woman senator and a high number of women MCAs.
2. **Specific Initiatives:**

<sup>45</sup>KII Conducted in Migori in the 21/8/2023 at 11:00am.

<sup>46</sup>FGD held on 15th August 2023 at 9am.

<sup>47</sup>FGD held on 16th August 2023 at 12pm.



Implementing partners initiated specific programmes for women and youth. For instance, IRCK ran the Women Situation Room during the 2022 general elections and established the Women of Faith Network and Kenya Youth Interfaith Network, that addressed the unique interests of women and youth in target counties. USCPAK's involvement ensured the mainstreaming of youth issues in peace and security through university student trainings as voter educators and peace ambassadors, enhancing early warning mechanisms, particularly during elections.

3. *Intergenerational Dialogues:* Implementing partners conducted successful intergenerational dialogues. This initiative brought together youth and the elderly in Nakuru County, facilitating discussions on peace and security issues and preventing violence in the county.
4. *PWD Initiatives:* A targeted initiative for PWDs was implemented by UNDP Accelerator Lab and with support from the Government of Sweden, they launched an innovation challenge inviting solutions and approaches responding to the socio-economic challenges experienced by persons with disability as a result of COVID-19.

The innovation challenge aimed to expedite the inclusion of persons with disabilities and promote social cohesion, creating a stable and secure environment conducive to enable the flourishing of individuals with disabilities.

5. *Gender Technical Working Groups:* National government's peace structures based at the county level collaborated with gender technical working groups to advance gender-based violence reporting, capacity building, and other

related issues. This is demonstrable by the fact that there was a nexus created between peace and gender initiatives in the select counties where the project was implemented.

6. *Awareness on Gender-Based Violence:* The project contributed to increased awareness/ reporting of gender-based violence and advocating for cases to be adjudicated in court rather than through alternative dispute resolution. This awareness was widespread across the visited counties, thanks to training and capacity-building efforts by implementing partners.
7. *Involvement of Informal Settlements:* Persons living in informal settlements actively participated in the project's activities. PfPS, for example, worked in Mukuru Kwa Reuben, Pipeline, Kware, Mukuru Kwa Njenga with the Embakasi South Women Network, fostering peace through caravans during elections, raising awareness on gender-based violence prevention and response, enhancing GBV referral pathways, building relationships with local security agencies, and collaborating on various initiatives including International Peace Day celebrations.

### 3.3 Successful Innovations

1. *Intergenerational Dialogues:* Facilitated intergenerational dialogues between youth and elders, as seen in Nakuru County through PfPs interventions. These dialogues fostered understanding and trust between generations, contributing to peacebuilding efforts.
2. *Sports Tournaments for Peace:* Implementing partners organized sports tournaments that brought different groups together. In Isiolo, SRIC successfully united youth and the police, building trust and addressing issues related to small arms. A similar initiative by PfPS in Nakuru County strengthened trust and promoted peacebuilding with the youth from Molo, Kuresoi- North, Kuresoi South and Njoro. IRCK also organised Inter-religious youth games that brought together the Pokot and Tugen youths to deliberate and know that they were not different in their beliefs and that fostered peace in the community unlike previously when they would not interact. This also offered an opportunity for mentorship of the youth.
3. *Women's Situation Room During Elections:* The establishment of a women's situation room during elections proved highly effective in reporting incidents of violence. This mechanism significantly contributed to maintaining peace in the community, including for women aspirants during the 2022 election thus resulting in peaceful campaigns and promoting peace efforts during the campaigns. These opinions were

appropriately expressed during a KII interview<sup>48</sup> below;

*“The women’s situation really helped in addressing violence against women during the campaigns. And so, we had women who were doing their campaigns peacefully, unlike before. We had women now through such a mechanism and women could campaign freely during elections.”*

4. **Peaceful Advocacy Through Music:** PeaceNet engaged young girls in Samburu to sing peaceful songs and persuade morans not to engage in raids, effectively using music as a tool for peace advocacy.

### 3.4 Challenges

1. **PWDs Accessibility:** Despite including PWDs, practical challenges remain, as some beneficiaries reported a lack of sign language interpreters, Braille documents, and inaccessible buildings or terrain for individuals with mobility challenges.
2. **Women Inclusion in Patriarchal Areas:** In areas with strong patriarchal norms, there remains a challenge of including women in peacebuilding activities, as reported by PeaceNet in pastoralist areas like Baragoi.
3. **Limited Youth Engagement:** Youth engagement in peace activities is limited, primarily because such activities are not perceived as income-generating. Politicians target universities and informal settlements to influence youth toward disrupting peace.
4. **ASAL Regions Engagement:** Engagement in arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) regions requires further attention and advocacy to ensure the inclusion of women, youth, and PWDs in peacebuilding activities. Some regions reported that due to the vastness of their counties, some areas were not reached, as most partners were concentrated in the towns. This was reported in Kilifi County with specific reference made on Magharini and Ganze, as was the case in some areas of Kitui County e.g., Tseikuru.

### 3.5 Lessons Learnt

There are two key lessons to learn from TPP. These are;

1. Although peacebuilding is everyone’s business, its absence and lack of it and the expected mitigation measures are mandates assigned to the national government in the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Within the boundaries of Kenya however, matters of cohesiveness, security and inclusion are domiciled in the counties. A key challenge faced by a number of implementing partners was on how to navigate interventions in the two levels of government. Under the current peace architecture, there lacks an intergovernmental peace architecture through which complex peace and conflict can be addressed. In view of the existing provisions of Section 8 (c) of the Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2012 and the existing regional economic blocs, there is need to draw from these institutional structures to advance an intergovernmental peacebuilding agenda.
2. Project management and governance play a crucial role in the successful rollout and implementation of projects. As highlighted elsewhere in this report, the TPP’s Board - the PSC, lacked operational, managerial and policy oversight objectivity, impartiality and independence because of its membership. Ordinarily, contracted/implementing parties ought not to have been members of the PSC for purposes of holding them to account for results. Members of the apex decision making out to be independent except for representatives of; donors (UNDP), the anchor agency head (NSC), Embassy of Sweden representative, 4 other independent actors (jointly recruited by UNDP & NSC but not staff of UNDP or NSC) and joint secretaries (TPP project manager and the NSC focal point). Responsibilities for approving budgets, workplans and monitoring implementation of project strategies rest with such a Board.

<sup>48</sup>Virtual KII held on 5th September at 10:30am.

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## 4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### 4.1 Conclusion

TPP was rolled out during the most challenging moment in recent history defined by COVID-19. Notwithstanding this, the project's contributions in Kenya's development landscape though modest, was fairly impactful. Three key achievements stand out. First, for the first time since 2002, Kenya held a relatively peaceful election in August, 2022 and TPP's contribution in this electoral outcome was noticeable. This outcome was achieved through the peace structures strengthened through TPP.

Second, TPP has been instrumental in changing and structuring the development conversations and narratives. The push for inclusion, gender mainstreaming and intergenerational dialogues in Kenya's political discourse will for a longtime influence decision making not just in politics but at the community levels as well.

And third, TPP was critical in infusing community dialogues and interests into key government policy documents albeit some still remain in draft form.

Increasingly and inadvertently, through TPP's interventions public officials are embracing the constitutional and legislative prescription for public engagement and participation.

In view of the UNDSCF's 2022-2026 and UNDP's CPD 2022-2026 pillar on governance, TPP therefore, made its contribution.

Despite TPP's aforesaid milestones, its roll-out provides a glimpse of UNDP's often ignored reality. TPP's scope in forty (40) counties with varied interventions on myriad conflicts in the face of limited resources and capacities exposed the project to failure.

Further, as initially conceptualized, the project was ambitious with a limited timeframe of just four (4) years for implementation. For instance, the identified projects' objectives were "to address immediate and underlying drivers of conflict including poverty, inequality, youth unemployment, inequitable distribution of scarce environmental goods, exploitation of ethnic differences" among others. Within a span of four (4) years, achievement of this objective was unrealistic.

Within UNDP, different projects on the peace agenda were implemented in silos indicating a lack of a coordinated and structured approach in project implementation. Under the peace agenda of the UNDP, TPP, PBF and ABC projects were separately implemented with little complementarity thus

denying the three projects the existing synergies and opportunities to deliver as one.

While the TPP project design conceptualized a NIM in its roll-out/ implementation and funding, it fell short of NIM given that a number of field interventions were implemented by non-state actors that were not competitively on-boarded by the NSC as the anchor agency. This change of approach to the NIM modality as often practiced not only created mistrust and friction between the state and non-state actors but back-peddled previous gains in terms of weakening existing peace committees.

Additionally, the use of resources to support national governance structures based at the local level ostensibly in the name of building the capacity of counties in utter disregard of the devolved system of governance was the least efficient way of supporting and working with the county governments on the peace and conflict management agenda.

The project also had another fundamental design flaw in terms of how the "community level" was defined under the tripartite arrangements. While the project document identified Council of Governors, select civil society organization (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) at the sub-national level as the main implementors, a huge component of this project was delivered by CSOs. Fundamentally, the role of the community was defined and was synonymous with that of SRIC, IRCK, PeaceNet- Kenya and PfPS at the detriment of CBOs. These CSOs therefore assumed the role/place of the "community" when in effect their diverse interests may not have been necessarily the same as those of the different communities. In effect, the CSOs defined themselves as the 'community' and assumed diverse localities in different parts of the country.

Saliently, the national level CSOs were part and parcel of the project design team that developed the project. They were also members of the PSC. The same CSO's had been instrumental in the implementation of the previous two (2) projects. In respect to the TPP project, there is no evidence that their on-boarding to implement the project was competitively done. From the onset of the project, therefore, the CSO's role was assumed and given their level of capacity compared to CBOs, the latter were side-lined. An ideal process would have been a competitive process of on-boarding project implementors.

A fundamental flaw in the project's design was on the project's governance and specifically related to the constitution and composition of the apex decision making organ - the PSC. A majority of the members of the PSC were also the project's implementers,

the same members approved strategies, workplans and budgets over and above providing oversight on the project. Such an organ, it lacked objectivity, impartiality and importantly independence in decision making.

Additionally, there was little evidence to show what structured role, if any, the COG played for the period the project was implemented as initially designed.

In the absence of such ‘structured role’, TPP failed to effectively incorporate county governments in strengthening county governments’ peace architecture. This omission emanated from the project’s design flaw that failed to acknowledge and recognize the devolved system of governance under the Constitution of Kenya 2010.

Further, there was little evidence to demonstrate that an empirical conflict assessment (study) was undertaken to identify and segment conflict drivers into different counties and tailor-make interventions to address those conflicts effective for wanting to do more with less.

Lastly, the TPP project did not fully implement the recommendations of the end-term evaluation report of the “Deepening Foundations for Peace and Community Security in Kenya 2014-2018”. For instance, promotion and integration of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and traditional community conflict resolutions systems and mechanisms as recommended were not pursued.

Further, actionable decisions arising out of a number of progress and PSC review meetings were not implemented.

## 4.2 Recommendations

1. The next project should consider “peacebuilding for economic empowerment and sustainable development” to address conflict triggers such as poverty, marginalization, and inequalities as encapsulated in UNDP’s development objectives.
2. There is a need for joint programming and integrated field execution for UNDP supported projects/programs that deal with conflict management and peacebuilding to scale-up impact.

3. There is a need to undertake a customized and updated empirical study segregated by region to unearth real conflict issues in order of priority and develop clear and tailor-made interventions in each region instead of “a one-size fits all” approaches.
4. The peace structures and peacebuilding efforts should be aligned to Kenya’s devolved system of governance through support for an intergovernmental peace structure.
5. UNDP should actively engage in building sustainable partnerships with the private sector to enhance opportunities for entrepreneurial start-up grants for peace-related projects.
6. There is need to innovatively think about alternative ways of resourcing/remunerating community-level peace structures and actors.
7. There is a need to push for the finalization of pieces of legislation and policies for key national institutions (NCIC & KNFP-SALP) and in various county governments to give teeth to peace actors.
8. Recognizing the shift of conflicts and challenges to the digital space, UNDP should enhance its investment in and contribution to digital peacebuilding initiatives, particularly in social media.
9. Peacebuilding should cease to be episodic, ad hoc (after conflict flare-ups), and periodic (during election time) but rather should be continuous, structured, and inculcated/nurtured in the education system through initiation and scaling up of peace clubs in schools or a curriculum on peace.
10. UNDP should review modalities of constituting project governance mechanisms/structures to ensure they promote independence, objectivity and impartiality in decision making to foster accountability for results.



