




# Summative Evaluation Report Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS)

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Project Information		
<b>Project/outcome title</b>	Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS)	
<b>Project number</b>	00089459 (Output ID 00095684)	
<b>Overall objective and specific objectives</b>	<p>Impact: Improve the short and middle term living conditions in Iraq's newly liberated areas, in collaboration with the Government of Iraq, to promote the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and to inspire greater confidence in Iraqis in their prospects to return to their area of origin.</p> <p><b>Outcome 1:</b> A standard of living which was there before the conflict is achieved through infrastructure rehabilitation in and between ISIL affected Iraqi cities, to an extent that it is safe for Iraqi families to return home.</p> <p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Iraqis, particularly women-headed households, feel more secure with their income-earning potential in their area of origin.</p> <p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Government officials at the local level are better equipped to contribute to and manage stabilization activities and to take over management of infrastructure once projects are completed.</p>	
<b>Country covered</b>	Iraq – Liberated governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah Al-Din.	
<b>Project Dates</b>	Start	Planned End Date
	May 2015	December 2023
<b>Total Budget</b>	Approximately US\$ 1,200,000,000	
<b>Funding Source</b>	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America.	
<b>Implementing Party</b>	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Country Office in Iraq	
Evaluation Information		
<b>Evaluation type</b>	Project Evaluation	
<b>Final/midterm review/ other</b>	Summative Evaluation	
<b>Period under evaluation</b>	Start	End
	May 2015	June 2023 (and forecasted results by December 2023)
<b>Evaluators</b>	Ms. Rania Fazah, Team Leader- Senior Evaluation Expert	
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<b>Evaluation Dates</b>	Start	Completion
	August 2023	April 2024

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations	Acronym
<b>BoQ</b>	Bill of Quantity
<b>BREP</b>	Building Resilience through Employment Promotion
<b>CA</b>	Contribution Analysis
<b>CBO</b>	Community-Based Organizations
<b>CfW</b>	Cash for Work
<b>CPD</b>	Country Program Document
<b>CSCs</b>	Community Service Committees
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
<b>DFAT</b>	Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade
<b>DoA</b>	Description of Action
<b>DS</b>	Durable Solutions
<b>DSTWG</b>	Durable Solution Technical Working Group
<b>EH</b>	Explosive Hazards
<b>EQ</b>	Evaluation Question
<b>ER</b>	Evaluation Report
<b>ET</b>	Evaluation Team
<b>FE</b>	Final Evaluation
<b>FFES</b>	Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization
<b>FFIS</b>	Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization
<b>FFS</b>	Funding Facility for Stabilization
<b>FGDs</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>Gol</b>	Government of Iraq
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator
<b>HDP</b>	Humanitarian Development Peace
<b>HRBA</b>	Human Rights-Based Approach
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IEDs</b>	Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>ICPE</b>	Independent Country Program Evaluation
<b>ICRRP</b>	Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme
<b>IEO</b>	Independent Evaluation Office
<b>IME</b>	Integrity ME
<b>INGOs</b>	International Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IR</b>	Inception Report
<b>ISIL</b>	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
<b>KIIs</b>	Key Informants Interviews
<b>KRG</b>	Kurdistan Regional Government
<b>LTA</b>	Long-Term Agreements
<b>MSAs</b>	Municipal Stabilization Advisors

Abbreviations	Acronym
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OVI</b>	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
<b>PCA</b>	Project Cooperation Agreement
<b>PM</b>	Programme Manager
<b>PMC</b>	Programme Management Costs
<b>PMF</b>	Popular Mobilisation Forces
<b>PRODOC</b>	Project Document
<b>PCCs</b>	Provincial Control Cells
<b>PSC</b>	Programme Steering Committee
<b>PT</b>	Programme Team
<b>PVE</b>	Preventing Violent Extremism
<b>PWDs</b>	Persons With Disabilities
<b>RBAS</b>	Regional Bureau for Arab States
<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator
<b>REFAATO</b>	Reconstruction Funds for Affected Areas of Terrorist Operations
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>SMART</b>	Specific Measurable Accepted Realistic Timely
<b>SMEs</b>	Small And Medium- Size Enterprises
<b>SoV</b>	Sources of Verification
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UNDSRSG</b>	United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
<b>UNDS</b>	United Nations Development System
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNEG</b>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<b>USIP</b>	United States Institute for Peace
<b>UXOs</b>	Unexploded ordnances
<b>WHHs</b>	Women Head of Households

# 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## 1.1 RELEVANCE

**The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) is aligned with the national priorities of the Government of Iraq (GoI) and responded to the needs of 6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which were identified with the participation of governmental stakeholders at the national and local levels.** The GoI developed a number of planning tools, such as the National Development Plans for 2018-2022 and 2023-2027 highlighting strategic sectors included under the early FFS design. For instance, the 2018-2022 Iraqi National Development Plan is based on a philosophy aimed at enhancing “asset management policies for infrastructure activities (water and sewage, electricity, building and construction, transportation and communications and storage, health and education”.<sup>1</sup> The planning document also encompasses the institutional challenges, which also represent an important pillar integrated within FFS. In February 2018, the GoI enacted the Reconstruction and Investment framework, which is structured around five key pillars: 1) Governance; 2) Reconciliation and Peacebuilding; 3) Social and Human Development; 4) Infrastructure and 5) Economic Development<sup>2</sup>, many of which were already set in motion under the early stages of the FFS.

As such, the FFS was implemented as a government-driven action, whereby stakeholders at the provincial and local levels played a pivotal role in identifying needs and priorities in four key priority sectors: water, electricity, health, and education; in addition to main roads, bridges, governmental buildings, and livelihoods through an area-based approach. Nonetheless, the evaluation could not establish sufficient evidence to confirm that FFS ensured participation of potential beneficiaries in planning, design, and selection of FFS projects.

**The FFS maintained its relevance over time, expanding its scope rapidly to meet the needs of newly liberated areas while concurrently adapting its organizational capacity through area-based, multi-sectorial approaches.** The FFS aims to provide rapid stabilization assistance across four areas of work or “windows”, namely (1) public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation; (2) livelihoods or cash for work; (3) capacity support to local governments; and (4) social cohesion. The phased rollout of these windows reflected a sequential progression of stabilization efforts, which was coupled with adjustments in organizational capacity to meet changing needs and priorities on the ground. Despite security issues and limited access, UNDP's flexible approach and reliance on governmental authorities facilitated the adaptation of FFS projects to the evolving political and security context.

**The FFS design incorporated a human rights-based approach, gender responsive approaches and conflict sensitive analyses including socio-cultural and political analyses however with limited application.** The FFS underscores its commitment to integrate cross-cutting issues as of 2018, including non-discrimination, disability inclusion, community participation, conflict sensitivity, do no harm, and environmental considerations. While these considerations have been taken into account as part of the FFS design, the operationalization of these principles was not clearly articulated, with limited evidence proving systematic implementation. On the other hand, efforts to implement the Gender Strategy advanced FFS's integration of Gender in the implementation period post-2018, especially in large infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihood projects.

<sup>1</sup> The Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning. National Development Plan 2018 – 2022, p. 4, available at [https://www.iraq-jccme.jp/pdf/archives/nationaldevelopmentplan2018\\_2022.pdf](https://www.iraq-jccme.jp/pdf/archives/nationaldevelopmentplan2018_2022.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> The Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning. Iraq Reconstruction and Investment, February 2018, p. 4, available at <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/846201597292562703/pdf/Iraq-Reconstruction-and-Investment.pdf>



## 1.2 COHERENCE

**The FFS multi donor trust fund architecture was fit for purpose to ensure alignment and coordination between 29 different donors, governorates, and Gol Council of Ministers Secretariat,** whom Secretary General co-chairs the programme's Steering Committee, aside the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as per FFS Project Document. Governmental stakeholders assumed a central role across phases starting from needs identification, prioritization, project selection, and execution oversight. The Provincial Control Cells (PCCs) architecture facilitated clear communication and decision-making among UNDP and government stakeholders – allowing for little duplication. UNDP also played a key role in coordinating between governorates and the Gol, through engagement in high-level meetings with donors. Sub-governorate coordination mechanisms were gradually established after 2018; however, there is insufficient evidence around the approaches employed for consulting and engagement with local community actors and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Engagement with CSOs appeared to be approached case by case and based on the contextual challenges and needs.

**FFS mostly appeared as a stand-alone project, with very little coordination with other international organizations and UN agencies, albeit improvements after 2018.** With a notable exception, since its inception, FFS has collaborated with and relied on the United Nations Mine Action Service, which led efforts to clear mines, explosive remnants of war, and improvised explosive devices. This demining work paved the way for UNDP's stabilization interventions, including the construction of public infrastructure and the support of livelihood activities such as agriculture. This can notably be explained by the presence of only few initiatives on the ground in the early stages of liberation; the central coordination role was carried out by the PCC. FFS model of speed and scale required a trade-off between consultative processes and efficient response time to ensure speedy rehabilitation and return. After 2018, the FFS nonetheless increased coordination through selective information sharing with international organizations and UN agencies to avoid duplication and ensure consistency and alignment with broader objectives. FFS collaborated with the Stabilization Working Group, both before 2018 and thereafter, to avoid duplication of stabilization efforts.

**The FFS followed a sequential progression, starting with window 1 through window 2, 3, and 4. While the first three windows were integral to the FFS initial design, the social cohesion component (window 4) was introduced later to streamline the overall approach to stabilization.** The FFS followed a sequential progression rather than a simultaneous package of interventions. While such progression was not strictly linear, the implementation of certain components established pre-requisites for others. The social cohesion component, was initially a UNDP program pre-FFS, later incorporated into FFS. While the rationale behind the integration of social cohesion remains unclear, a consensus eventually emerged over the need to incorporate social cohesion from the outset. As the FFS was being implemented in the early stages, UNDP realized the need for the social cohesion aspect and recognized how it would play a complementary role in facilitating the return of IDPs under the FFS framework.

## 1.3 EFFICIENCY

**FFS was mainly driven by scale and speed with sufficient human and financial resources to meet organization needs.** The total budget allocation for FFS from 2015 to 2023 amounted to approximately US\$2.12 billion, with US\$1.32 billion expended. Notably, window 1 constituted the majority of both allocated and disbursed funds (accounting for 86% and 78%, respectively), with the remaining three windows and cost categories each representing 7% or less of the overall budget allocations and the expenditures. The evaluation identified discrepancies between planned versus actual expenditure for all windows throughout the implementation, including the programme management component. This is largely due to the nature of stabilization work, which requires agility, phased rollout, changing political and security context, adaptability of

FFS etc. The low project management cost ratio demonstrates cost efficiency when compared to the average and benchmark rates observed in similar projects.

**The FFS retained high level of overall output efficiency throughout its implementation and similar efficiency under windows 2 and 4.** Efficiency per output has indeed been increasing from approximately 75% in the first analysed period (2016-2018) to 190% in the second cycle (2019-2020) and remaining high at 151% in the 2021-2023 period.

**FFS resources were mostly allocated to public work and infrastructure rehabilitation (window 1), aligning with its core objective to address the extensive level of damage and destruction in the liberated areas** and informed by the FFS sectoral needs assessment- which determines the stabilization needs in respective FFS operational governorates. Nonetheless, there is a general perception from officials at Governorates' level around uneven allocation across regions and cities with Nineveh receiving the most, followed by Anbar, then, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, and lastly Diyala. Disparity in the satisfaction levels between different governorates is also clearly correlated to areas that had received less resources from FFS. Such disparity can be due to several factors, including access to liberated areas, security, level of damage, population density, as well as donor and government priorities.

## 1.4 EFFECTIVENESS

**The FFS achieved considerable stabilization objectives, meeting needs and priorities in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of basic services.** The FFS has delivered 3,697 projects across liberated areas of Iraq in five governorates, across 10 sectors and 31 areas. UNDP FFS was considered as one of the top three stakeholders doing rehabilitation work, alongside the GoI, Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terroristic Operations (REFAATO), and NGOs. FFS was effective in addressing needs and priorities for critical services, rehabilitating infrastructure, promoting economic growth, and encouraging stability.

**The FFS provided economic starter seed money aimed at immediately supporting the return of local economic activities in the target areas but missed economic opportunities for ensuring continuity.** UNDP offered initial funding through Cash for Work (CfW) initiatives, engaging NGOs, and local firms, and offering seed grants to revitalize small enterprises and assist women-led households. This facilitated immediate earnings for returnees and allowed for the return of economic activity. However, the FFS was seen as favouring short-term projects over longer-term economic development, lacking efforts towards serious economic revival, including in the agriculture sector.

**Following infrastructure, housing rehabilitation represents the second most needed and most appreciated result of FFS despite shortcomings.** FFS rehabilitated 37,241 housing units in the action period 2015-2023, a higher achievement than the planned output of 32,000. Over two-thirds of surveyed housing rehabilitation beneficiaries showed high levels of satisfaction from the quality of the housing, with rehabilitation efforts taking place shortly after the beneficiaries returned. However, housing rehabilitation remains highly needed as it is one of the main reasons for delaying some IDPs return. Identified challenges to rehabilitation efforts include restricted funds, the restricted scope of rehabilitation, IDPs' lack of registration documentation, disputes over land ownership, and power dynamics involving negotiations with local political actors.

**FFS struggled with defining the scope of stabilization within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus.** The evaluation identified persistent challenges in defining stabilization within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus and durable solutions, which has notably resulted in unclear boundaries between development and stabilization goals and objectives.

**FFS encountered shortcomings in ensuring response to some emerging needs in terms of housing (see Finding above capacity building, incorporating accessibility and environmental specifications into building plans.** Although capacity-building opportunities for public servants surpassed the initial target output,

respondents expressed the need for more specialized and advanced training. Moreover, limited incorporation of accessibility requirements, coupled with low environmental requirements in rehabilitation projects, Identified reasons for such limitation include (i) the absence of environmental considerations at the inception/planning stage, (ii) poor incentives to use cost-efficient and readily implementable materials, (iii) reduced funding in the later implementation stages despite growing interest in environmental sustainability, (iv) and a lack of adequate numbers of skilled technicians and maintenance.

## 1.5 SUSTAINABILITY

**FFS efforts to ensure sustainability of the stabilization effort were late and do not clearly lay down steps and processes to ensure transition.** Put forward late in 2022, the transition plan sets out a timeline between 2024 and 2026, as the FFS received another extension. The evaluation underscored challenges to the sustainability of stabilisation gains, signalling a sense of scepticism regarding long-term viability. Anticipated risks and challenges identified in the transition strategy include (i) Insufficient allocation of technical and financial resources at the sub-national levels, coupled with limited long-term planning; (ii) Lack of government willingness and commitment, (iii) High turnover and lack of institutional handover processes; and (iv) Fluctuation of government revenues due to its reliance on crude oil. Besides, the evaluation found that there are a few challenges within UNDP's control that have not been sufficiently addressed, including late planning for the Transition Strategy and insufficient formal agreements with national stakeholders.

**UNDP handover to GoI stakeholders enhanced their ownership of rehabilitated infrastructure despite indication that GoI stakeholders have yet to demonstrate their capacity in adequately ensuring sustainability.** The FFS close engagement with the GoI ensured ownership over the stabilization agenda since design in 2015 to ensure that resources and staffing were allocated. However, efforts to ensure preconditions to the sustainability of stabilization gains are limited and mostly focused on (i) The transfer of skills and competencies to government staff, (ii) Building the capacity of public servants in operation, maintenance and newly provided equipment and technologies, and (iii) handover of projects, including warranties for potential technical defects.

## 1.6 IMPACT

**FFS achieved considerable stabilization impact with the safe and voluntary return of 4.86m IDPs out of 6m.** FFS contributed to the ultimate return of 4.8 million IDPs to their places of origin and functioning of essential facilities and public infrastructure such as water, electricity, bridges, roads, school, and hospitals – all of which were identified as contributing to restoring a sense of normalcy. By the end of 2019, 4.5 million IDPs had returned, the number of IDPs has shown a gradual but slower increase, reaching 4.863,072 on December 2023, with little probability of secondary displacement at this stage. Overall, the FFS has largely contributed to return.

**FFS had limited contribution to enhancing the trust between national and local authorities on one hand and with local communities on the other.** While UNDP and FFS are praised for supporting the return of displaced populations, little trust was expressed in local authorities' ability to take over stabilization efforts. This lack of trust stemmed from issues like resource scarcity and bureaucratic complexities within provincial and national governments. FFS's has limited contribution to building institutional-level capacities – a systematic issue that falls beyond the scope of stabilization.

**FFS contributed to some aspects of the durable solutions mainly basic services and livelihoods but fell short of influencing social cohesion and communal peace. FFS also fell short in incorporating conflict-sensitivity approaches while working at speed and scale when started in 2016; while was incorporated in 2018.** The FFS operated in a deeply entrenched conflict context, with social cohesion efforts seen as limited in their impact on IDP return". Stakeholders and UNDP interlocutors highlighted challenges in achieving long-term social cohesion within FFS's stabilization mandate. Trade-offs were made to navigate political tensions,

particularly in areas controlled by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), with underserved regions like the Nineveh Plains and Salah Al-Din receiving less attention due to complex political dynamics.

## 1.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP established itself as a major stabilization actor, contributing to the safe and voluntary return of millions of Iraqi IDPs. The next phase will most likely to further the discussions to clarify the HDP nexus and finetune the mandate, scope and tools. It seems essential to pursue these efforts while tilting the mandate towards recovery frameworks and tools, as livelihoods and socio-economic issues have been identified as main factors preventing for the remaining IDPs and to alleviate any risk of secondary displacement in the short run.

*Transition the Action from Stabilization to Recovery:* The transition phase would need to maintain the efforts under the standards and guidelines of durable solutions for forced displacement, which allow an open and direct cooperation channel with relevant national and local authorities. This framework would warrant further reflection as to potential trade-offs to be conceded to the given authorities in exchange for speed and scale dynamics. The action should consider extending such efforts to areas that have not yet been targeted, while increasing housing rehabilitation efforts and further reaching out to local communities under this window. Hence, UNDP should give stronger attention to long-term community rehabilitation efforts through specific actionable projects targeting youth and vulnerable populations.

*Further develop sustainability dynamics with GoI:* the action should consider expanding the social cohesion component in the coming transition phase, which is deemed crucial to encourage the return of the remaining IDPs and consolidate civil peace and coexistence at the local levels within the target areas. There is a need to take in consideration past and ongoing achievements on that level in the target areas without necessarily embedding them in the coming action design but rather developing workable partnerships. UNDP should also consider associating other specialized agencies dealing with issues outside of its original scope, namely on the legal protection aspects or housing-land-property (HLP) issues under durable solutions, in addition to other difficult post-war matters such as the fate of the disappeared. UNDP is hence strongly encouraged to strengthen its human rights-based approach and include it across its ongoing and future windows of operations.

Furthermore, UNDP will need to address the public administration's expressed needs as to specialized and expert-level capacity-building in order to ensure a formal and smooth hand-over process of the action's outputs at the local and provincial levels. Namely, UNDP could consider training relevant governmental stakeholders on integrating conflict-sensitive approaches into all stages of project planning, implementation, and monitoring, in addition to peace-building dynamics and rule of law-based processes and guarantees.

*Phase out from the 'business-as-usual' dynamics towards more agile approach* to its intervention model, UNDP had acknowledged the need to shift from a "business-as-usual" model in the framework of implementing the FFS. Yet, many aspects pertaining to the design, implementation and monitoring of the action were not sufficiently adapted to the scale and complexity of the action. UNDP is strongly encouraged to improve its operational systems to incorporate the need of processing the massive size of the output data and facilitate evaluation processes during and after the implementation of the action. This would facilitate the design efforts in addition to the budgeting process of the projects, enabling for easier periodic reviews in the course of the programme. UNDP needs to consider resorting in a more systematic fashion to formal agreements with national stakeholders to facilitate the M&E track, while fostering long-term sustainability, and continue developing public administration's capacities to ensure local and provincial planning and management of all aspects of the post recovery phase, as to smooth hand-over and ensure greater sustainability of the action's outputs.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

This external evaluation of the Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) for the period 2015–2023 was commissioned by UNDP Country Office in Iraq as FFS was entering its last year of implementation. The purpose, objectives, scope, methodology and methods of the evaluation were discussed and fine-tuned with UNDP’s Evaluation Management Team (EMT) during a series of kick-off and inception meetings held in the period August–October 2023.

Key points affecting the direction of the evaluation compared to the initial Terms of Reference (ToR, Annex 10.1) include the following:

- The evaluation period that was supposed to stretch from August to November 2023 was extended to April 2024 for the EMT to conduct field data collection.
- Internal discussions within UNDP in relation to the direction of this evaluation and linkage with the Independent Country Programme Evaluation (IECP), the inception phase was extended until November 2023, and the scope extended.
- As per the ToR, the findings from this evaluation are expected to serve two objectives: to reflect on the FFS’ implementation strategies and to determine the extent to which FFS successfully delivered its set objectives and draw on lessons learnt which will be used to inform UNDP’s future Stabilization interventions, as well as contribute to the Iraq ICPE, which will inform the Iraq Country Office during the design and implementation of new projects. It will also serve at providing insight into the nexus between stabilization and development.
- The intended users of this final evaluation include UNDP country office in Iraq, specifically the FFS Project team and senior management, the Government of Iraq counterparts, development partners including donors, the general Iraqi public and beneficiaries and UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) for communication, messaging, and advocacy purposes.
- The geographic scope of the evaluation covers all five governorates targeted by FFS comprising Anbar, Salah Al-Din, Nineveh, Diyala and Kirkuk. The intention is to ensure that none of the targeted governorates are excluded from the evaluation and that they can contribute to findings.
- The evaluation addresses all OECD/DAC evaluation criteria noted in the ToR (relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, impact).
- The evaluation also addresses cross-cutting issues prioritising gender equality and human rights considerations. Other aspects the evaluation touches upon in terms of the design of FFS include conflict sensitivity, disability, non-discrimination, do no harm and environmental sustainability.
- Data collection approach and tools prioritised the safety of facilitators, enumerators, participants and respondents. Therefore, questions on government capacity and legitimacy were only covered to the extent feasible in interviews with government stakeholders.

This evaluation was conducted by AARC Ltd (based in Ireland), in partnership with a local research team, Integrity ME (IME), based in Iraq; and two senior evaluators from Elephas Consultants Inc. – Canada with extensive international expertise. (Team background in Annex 10.3).

This evaluation report starts by introducing the description of the intervention, its core components and setup (Chapter 4). It then summarises key elements of the evaluation purpose, scope, framework, approach and methods (Chapter 5), which are further elaborated in annexes. The report then moves on to present key findings by evaluation criteria, highlighting key findings for each evaluation question (Chapter 6). Finally, it offers key conclusions (Chapter 7); lessons learned (Chapter 8), and recommendations (Chapter 9)

### 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION

#### 3.1 Context and Background

In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) captured territories in northern Iraq and started advancing further south. The situation led to one of the country's main political, social and security crises including a massive displacement wave of nearly 6 million internally displaced people (IDPs)<sup>3</sup>. A government-led campaign, with support from the Global Coalition against ISIL, for the liberation of ISIL-occupied territories was launched the same year.<sup>4</sup> Concurrently, plans for the immediate stabilization of newly liberated areas were being drawn as the international community committed to providing rapid assistance to respond to immediate stabilization needs of GoI in these areas and allow IDPs to return home.<sup>5</sup>

The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) started in 2015 as the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), at the request of the Government of Iraq (GoI), supported by international donors, and managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Initially set for two years (2015-2017) with the aim of handing over the stabilization mechanisms to the GoI FFIS focused on rehabilitating and equipping local government buildings and essential public services in the education, health, electricity, and water sectors to support the resumption of the most crucial social services and signal the Government's return to liberated areas. The assumption was that GoI would concentrate on infrastructure. The FFIS was extended to 2018 to become, the Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization (FFES), in April 2016 to meet expanded stabilization needs, such as medium scale rehabilitation projects that would generate local jobs and incentivise IDPs to return.

FFIS and FFES components were merged into FFS following the same management, implementation processes and oversight mechanisms. This new channel allowed contributing countries to support different phases of the stabilization process and help sequence interventions and expanded its geographic scope from a few liberated districts in 2015 to all-liberated areas in 2016. Table 1 hereunder shows how the action connects to other relevant planification and programming tools, as per UNDP's reporting.

**Table 1: Evolution of Project's relation to other planification priorities and programmes**

2015-2018	
UNDAF OUTCOMES(S)	Outcome 1: Government and Communities' resilience to disasters (man-made and natural) strengthened
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 1: "Adopting an efficient administrative and financial system responsive to recovery needs, community stability requirements and sustainable peace building"
UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOME	Outcome 3: Conditions improved for the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons in Newly Liberated Areas
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 2: "Rehabilitating the infrastructure with a comprehensive and spatial coverage"

<sup>3</sup> International Organization for Migration (IOM). Iraq Displacement Crisis 2014–2017, October 2018.

<sup>4</sup> European Union Agency for Asylum. Country Guidance: Iraq Common analysis and guidance note, June 2022, pp. 65-68, available at [https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022\\_06\\_Country\\_Guidance\\_Iraq.pdf](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022_06_Country_Guidance_Iraq.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> UNDP. Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS), Project Document, June 2015.



OUTPUTS	Output 1: Iraqi Government is supported to address the immediate stabilization needs in newly accessible areas which allows for the return of IDPs
<b>2020-2023</b>	
UNSDCF (2020-24) OUTCOME(S)	Outcome 3.2: People in Iraq, civil society and communities, particularly women, have improved capacity to lead, participate in and contribute to the design and delivery of equitable and responsive services, especially for the most vulnerable populations.
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Population and Workforce   Section 3: Good Governance Objective 6: Ensuring public participation in the decision-making process. Human and Social Development   Section 3: Women Objective 2: Empowering women economically Objective 4: Empowering women in areas affected by terrorist acts
UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2020-24) OUTCOME	Outcome 1.1: Number of governorates with direct participation mechanisms for civil society engagement in all facets of development plans for the delivery of equitable and responsive services that operate regularly and transparently.
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Population and Workforce   Section 3: Good Governance Objective 3: Improving the application of administrative decentralization Objective 5: Improving the performance of the administrative system efficiently and effectively
UNDP STRATEGIC PLAN (2018-22) OUTPUT	Output 1.1.2: Marginalized groups, particularly the poor, women, and people with disabilities and displaced are empowered to gain universal access to basic services and financial and non-financial assets to build productive capacities and benefit from sustainable livelihoods and jobs.
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 4: Strengthening human immunity and protecting it against the risks of relapse Population and Workforce   Section 6: Poverty Alleviation Objective 6: Enabling and promoting the social, economic and political integration of displaced persons and returnees in liberated areas

Post 2017, the scope of FFS expanded to meet the growing needs including sewerage. Livelihood activities kicked off as returns started following the liberation of key cities (see annex 10.5 for timeline of liberated areas). The action's aimed to meet urgent needs while facilitating rehabilitation works through, rubble removal, accompanied by awareness raising on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnances (UXOs). Its portfolio further expanded significantly with the liberation of Mosul in 2017. This prompted a revision of the project document in 2018 in view of this significant increase in scale and scope of activities with an extension to 2020. The action was now covering areas within five governorates: Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah Al-Din, including up to 31 locations, with activities being carried out across four windows (see Figure 1) and 10 different sectors (electricity, health, water, education, housing, sewerage, livelihoods, municipalities, roads and bridges, and social cohesion<sup>6</sup> - see table 1b in annex 10.3).

<sup>6</sup> Social cohesion activities under window 4 were put on hold but resumed at a modest rate in 2018, as stated in UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2018, p.11.

Figure 1: FFS Approach- Source: UNDP. FFS First Quarterly report for 2022, p. 11.



As the country was struck by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, Iraqis underwent excruciating health and economic crises, which created complications and challenges to the deployment of the FFS action. Additionally, the context had led to the emergence of massive protests and demonstrations in October 2019, which denounced socioeconomic conditions and the ambient corruption. As reported by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), “these developments have exacerbated long-standing tensions, feeding public distrust in the state and tribal violence in the south. They have also detrimentally affected minority communities, especially in ISIL-affected areas; as the country has been struggling with “building stable institutions, the ongoing presence and activities of various armed groups and militias have hindered the central government’s authority and ability to fully exert control”.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the focus was put on immediate response to rehabilitation needs, given the scale of destruction.

In November 2020, the FFS was further extended to 2023; its mandate included:

- A focus on areas that have experienced difficulties in returns,
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure that supports productive sectors such as agriculture and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
- Sustainable livelihood activities that promote employment opportunities.
- Strengthened mainstreaming of human rights principles, environmental sustainability, conflict sensitivity and gender in all sectors of work<sup>8</sup>.

Towards the final phase of the action in 2023, the country was undergoing a period of tumult, as the political formations could not agree over a government after the 2021 parliamentary elections for almost a year. The action revision included the formation of a transition strategy in 2023, to hand over ownership to the GoI. The transition is expected to take place from 2024 until 2026.

<sup>7</sup> United States Institute for Peace (2020). The Current Situation in Iraq, A USIP Fact Sheet, 4 August 2020, available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/current-situation-iraq>.


<sup>8</sup>FFS Annual Report 2021, p.12



### 3.1.1 Action portfolio

As per the reporting documents, UNDP’s thirty international partners have allocated a total budget of 2.12 billion USD for the 2015-2023 period, with a total expenditure of 1.32 billion USD, thus enabling the implementation of **3,697 projects** across all sectors of intervention and in the five liberated governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah Al-Din (see figure 2 for geographic distribution)<sup>9</sup>.

**Figure 2: Geographic breakdown of implemented projects, as of 30 September 2023. Source: UNDP. FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 45.**



As such, **close to 4.9 million people returned to their places of origin in the five liberated governorates**, as part of the rehabilitation efforts undertaken by the FFS action (see figure 3). The rehabilitation of 353 electricity substations and networks along 119 water treatment plants and 305 water projects improved access to water and electricity and sewage to create basic conditions for a safe and voluntary return of IDPs. The project also rehabilitated 37,241 houses, allowing families to return home safely, in addition to rebuilding 83 roads and bridges, linking workers to jobs, goods to markets, and people to essential services.

**Figure 3: Number of Returnees and remaining IDPs in target areas, 2014-2023 / Source: UNDP. FFS Third Quarterly report for 2023, p. 10.**



<sup>9</sup> UNDP Annual Report 2020- P14

The FFS rehabilitated and equipped 712 schools and six major national universities, improving access to education; rebuild 19 hospitals and 159 public health centres, ensuring access to primary health care services. 75 police stations and courthouses were rebuilt, strengthening the security and justice sector. It restored 179 municipality-owned buildings, allowing officials to resume functions. Close to 12,000 governmental staffers received a form of training during the implementation period.


In the livelihood window, the FFS created 49,830 cash-for-work opportunities, distributed 4,153 small business grants including Agri business, and provided cash grants to 6618 women-headed households, allowing people to restart their lives. It provided 1,437 people with vocational skills, equipping them to enter the job market and rebuilt 1,365 shops, markets, and agriculture infrastructure boosting local businesses.

### 3.1.2 UNDP’s Stabilization Framework and Theory of Change

The FFS was built around a stabilization concept post a conflict relying on three major pillars: **speed, scale, and social cohesion**, refuting the “business as usual” approach (see figure 4 below). As expressed in the action’s 2017 Annual report, the “FFS can be differentiated from any other reconstruction programmes due to its pragmatic and swift delivery design”<sup>10</sup>.

As the FFS intervention was initiated as soon as ISIL-controlled areas were being liberated, it set in motion the conditions to finance and implement the rehabilitation of key infrastructures, habitat, and basic services to prevent protracted displacement. UNDP’s perspective over FFS consider “speed of the essence and should not be compromised”.<sup>11</sup> Yet, the social cohesion component came later into the project’s design and implementation back in 2017, as UNDP considered that “stabilization programmes should simultaneously recruit staff who work on gaining a deeper understanding of the conflict dynamics to initiate simultaneous social cohesion, peace and development activities”.<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 4: UNDP Stabilization Essentials. The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS), A Stabilization Instrument for the Government of Iraq and International Community, Good Practice and Lessons Learned, Draft for discussion with partners, Baghdad, 11 December**



<sup>10</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2017, p. 23.

<sup>11</sup> UNDP Stabilization FFS, A Stabilization Instrument for the Government of Iraq and International Community, Good Practice and Lessons Learned, Draft for discussion with partners, Baghdad, 11 December 2023, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> UNDP Stabilization FFS, A Stabilization Instrument for the Government of Iraq and International Community, Good Practice and Lessons Learned, Draft for discussion with partners, Baghdad, 11 December 2023, p. 9.

UNDP Iraq is still reviewing internally the relevance of introducing social cohesion programmes early in the stabilization process, as some would argue that “persons who have lost everything require support to return home and regain some sense of normalcy before even considering engaging in emotionally demanding social cohesion and reconciliation processes. An increased focus on social cohesion in the early phases of the stabilization process will negatively impact the speed with which FFS can deliver, delaying the needed return to a sense of normalcy”.<sup>13</sup> Whether social cohesion processes are a pre-condition for return, or a condition to stay in affected areas is still a debate.

The FFS is often characterized as “fast-track instrument”<sup>14</sup> that delivers large-scale infrastructure projects, while creating considerable income opportunities for the local population.


The action was based on a theory of change (ToC) for UNDP’s work on Stabilization, which was adapted for FFS (see figure 5). The highlighted desired change was to “improve the short and middle term living conditions in Iraq’s newly liberated areas, in collaboration with the GoI, to promote the return of IDPs and to inspire greater confidence of Iraqis in their prospects to return to their area of origin.

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<sup>13</sup> UNDP Stabilization FFS, A Stabilization Instrument for the Government of Iraq and International Community, Good Practice and Lessons Learned, Draft for discussion with partners, Baghdad, 11 December 2023, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> UNDP. The Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS), A Stabilization Instrument for the Government of Iraq and International Community, Good Practice and Lessons Learned, Draft for discussion with partners, Baghdad, 11 December 2023, p. 4.

Figure 5: UNDP Stabilization Theory of Change



Such ambitions contrast with the deep trends concerning forced displacement in the region and the world, generally of protracted nature. Between 2016 and 2022, the number of forced displaced persons in the world passed from 66 million to 108 million<sup>15</sup>, with little to no progress in the implementation of durable solutions for most of the contexts struck by such ordeal.

<sup>15</sup> UNHCR. [Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2022](#), June 2023, p. 2.

FFS ToC was designed in a difficult context under which durable solutions pertaining to forced displacement are usually overlooked. It aspired to set for the proper conditions to ensure safe and voluntary return of Iraqi IDPs to the liberated areas, as per durable solutions' international standards, i.e. "when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement".<sup>16</sup>

The ToC was hence designed as a multifaceted framework aiming to improve short and medium-term living conditions in Iraq's newly liberated areas, including cross-cutting aspects such as gender (namely focusing on WHHs) despite lacking deeper conflict-sensitivity and human-rights approaches. As such, the given ToC highlights the works of the first three windows but leaves out social cohesion, reconciliation and other social factors pertaining to the return and reintegration paradigms under the Iraqi context. FFS has not revised the ToC when window 4 was introduced, so the ToC has not indicated any social cohesion components or objectives.

Moreover, the ToC states in its second "If" statement that peace is a pre-condition to return, whereas it clearly is an integral part of the rehabilitation process and should be considered a byproduct and not a pre-condition. Nonetheless, the overall objective, focusing on the return of IDPs and building confidence in Iraqis, is to be achieved through three inter-linked outcomes as shown in Annex 10.4 (List of outcomes under FFS ToC- Analysis).

### 3.1.3 Key Partnerships

#### Primary Duty Bearers National Authorities

The Government of Iraq (GoI) holds decision-making authority over the strategic areas in which the FFS assisted, plays a role in setting the overall policy framework, providing guidance, and works in coordination and cooperation with development partners to formulate and implement national development plans and priorities. Kurdistan regional government also has decision-making authority over the FFS intervention within its jurisdiction.

#### Governorates and local authorities

The governorates within Iraq, such as Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Salah Al-Din, and municipalities have decision-making authority at the sub-national and local level. They contribute to the planning, implementation, and monitoring of FFS projects within their respective areas, ensuring alignment with local development needs.

#### Secondary duty bearers

Mainly community leaders who advocate for the project's beneficiaries, private sector partners contributing resources or technology, and donor organizations. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) specializing in the FFS areas fulfil a secondary role by aiding in implementing the FFS project, leveraging their technical expertise, resources, or funding. Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were also involved to develop and implement community-based initiatives.

<sup>16</sup> Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, April 2010, p. 5.

## 4. EVALUATION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

### 4.1 Evaluation purpose and scope

This evaluation is aligned with the UNDP's programme management directives, with the **purpose** to "assess the extent to which the FFS project has met its objectives and to provide evidence of UNDP's contribution towards outcome achievements, impacts and the role played in the Stabilization interventions in Iraq".<sup>17</sup>

The aim of this independent summative evaluation of the FFS project is to undertake an "evidence-based and highly consultative reflection on the FFS project to promote learning and accountability. The evaluation findings and recommendations are expected to contribute to the ongoing UNDP Iraq Independent Country Programme Evaluation (ICPE) led by UNDP's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), inform and improve future related projects, and contribute an evidence-based for what is next after the FFS, i.e., FFS 2.0."<sup>18</sup> for the years 2024-2026.

The scope of the evaluation includes geography, results, timeframe, and organization.

- **Geographical Scope:** The evaluation covered the liberated provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah Al-Din, looking at the outcomes and achievements, to craft a well-rounded view of the project's workings in these locations.
- **Results:** The summative evaluation examined outputs and contributions from each window and offered a comprehensive analysis to present a holistic view of the project's achievements and challenges.
- **Timeframe:** The evaluation covered the project's implementation timeline that spans from 2015 to December 2023. That said, more focus was placed on the period post midterm evaluation – that is 2021-2023.
- **Efficiency analysis:** with the revision of the scope in October 2023, and in response to the request from the UNDP Country Office to include a cost-efficiency analysis.
- **Organizational arrangement:** this evaluation also investigated the coordination, management and steering mechanisms adopted by FFS project, aiming at assessing their efficacy and how they facilitated achievement of the project's objectives and deliverables.

### 4.2 Evaluation Objectives

In essence, this evaluation serves as a reflective tool to understand the past performance and a strategic guide to inform and enhance future endeavours, contributing to the broader development and stabilization agenda in the region. As specified in the ToR, "the first objective is to reflect on the FFS' implementation strategies and to determine the extent to which FFS successfully delivered its set objectives. Drawing from that, the evaluation is expected to draw on lessons learnt which will be used to inform UNDP's future Stabilization interventions, as well as inform the Iraq Country Office during the design and implementation of new projects".<sup>19</sup>

This evaluation followed the **specific objectives that reflect OECD/DAC methodology** to:

- Assess the relevance of the project.
- Assess the efficiency of project implementation, including the operations support.
- Assess the effectiveness of the project and its windows in reaching the stated objectives.
- Assess the appropriateness of the project design and management arrangements for achieving the stated objectives.

<sup>17</sup> FFS Summative Evaluation ToR, p. 4

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*

<sup>19</sup> FFS Summative Evaluation ToR, p. 5

- Assess the coherence of the project's components.
- Assess the sustainability of the project results.  
Assess the project's contribution to gender equality, women's empowerment, and human rights.
- Take stock of the overall project progress and its windows as of November 2023 and forecasted results by December 2023, achieved against the project's expected results, and contribution towards Outcome 1 of UNDP's Country Program Document (CPD, 2020-2024).
- Outline lessons learned and good practices that can be used in future identification, design, regular review, implementation, and monitoring of FFS interventions.
- Provide constructive and practical recommendations, including programme and policy recommendations, on factors that can contribute to project sustainability, develop the FFS transition strategy, and inform any course corrections (if required/where relevant), including for the new CPD (2025-2029).

#### 4.2.1 Criteria

The evaluation focuses on the criteria that the ToR defined – relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Also, the evaluation has taken into consideration additional cross-cutting criteria, gender mainstreaming and leave no one behind.

- The evaluation comprises a **Relevance** analysis, seeking to align the action with broader developmental priorities, policies, and societal needs, providing an insight into how the Project fits within the overall context.
- The evaluation incorporated a **Coherence** assessment of how the Project aligned and interacted with existing national and international initiatives.
- **Efficiency** focused on cost-efficiency and timeliness while reflecting on the appropriateness of its monitoring and evaluation system.
- The Project's **Effectiveness**, including its different "Windows," was assessed through the Project's achievements, acknowledging the challenge of sampling across an extensive Project portfolio.
- **Sustainability**, both in terms of national ownership and financial terms, formed another layer of the evaluation and how the Project integrated sustainability considerations at various stages, including design, implementation, and result realization.
- The Project's **Impact** on the extent to which it made a significant change in the lives of the IDPs and returnees to the liberated target areas, and how the FFS contributed to the improvements of local social, economic, environmental and development factors?
- Cross-cutting themes, Human Rights, Gender Equality, Conflict Sensitivity, and Disability.

The ET has followed the main evaluation questions developed in the Inception Report, which consolidated list of evaluation questions where questions that were too similar have been combined and others re-framed. Furthermore, the questions addressing specifically the criterion of impact have been reformulated to better reflect the relatively short implementation period for the FFS, and therefore focus more on evidence of results and outcomes on target populations. Nevertheless, the evaluation team thinks that the scope of questions created several overlaps.

#### 4.2.2 Evaluation Questions

Based on the above-mentioned evaluation criteria, in addition to the cross-cutting sections, the ToR addresses a total of 52 guiding questions for this evaluation. These questions were grouped, reframed, and reformulated into 17 key evaluation questions (EQs), which are highlighted in the table below. They are distributed across the



OECD/DAC evaluation categories, while integrating the cross-cutting sections relevant to this Project's assessment (see Evaluation Matrix under Annex 10.2).

<b>Relevance</b>	<p><b>EQ1.</b> To what extent was the design of the intervention, including the formulation of its planned results, relevant to the needs and priorities of the country, intended beneficiaries and key stakeholders?</p> <p><b>EQ2.</b> Has the FFS remained relevant during its implementation and appropriately responsive to the country's security, political, economic, institutional, and other changes? Is it still relevant now?</p> <p><b>EQ3.</b> To what extent have gender and human rights principles and strategies been integrated into the FFS design and implementation?</p> <p><b>EQ4.</b> What is UNDP comparative advantages in Iraq and liberated regions to implement this project?</p>
<b>Coherence</b>	<p><b>EQ5.</b> How did the FFS project windows contribute to the coordination, cooperation, non-duplication, and consultation with different levels of Iraqi authorities, and development partners?</p> <p><b>EQ6.</b> How did the 4 windows work in synergy with each other. What were the main intersectionality amongst them?</p> <p><b>EQ7.</b> What feedback mechanisms were incorporated to ensure consistency during implementation?</p>
<b>Efficiency</b>	<p><b>EQ8.</b> Have FFS results been implemented as planned?</p> <p><b>EQ9.</b> Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve FFS outcomes?</p> <p><b>EQ10.</b> To what extent did the monitoring and evaluation system put in place allow for continuous collection and analysis of quality and segregated data on expected outputs and outcomes?</p>
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<p><b>EQ11.</b> To what extent has the project contributed to the outputs and outcomes as stipulated in project document?</p> <p><b>EQ12.</b> To what extent has the project integrated the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus in its design and implementation?</p> <p><b>EQ13.</b> Was the Project flexible responding to the changes in the environment and the needs of beneficiaries during the implementation?</p>
<b>Sustainability</b>	<p><b>EQ14.</b> What is the likelihood that the Project results will be sustained long-term after a) completion of activities and handover to end-user, and b) after the closure of FFS?</p> <p><b>EQ15.</b> How effectively has the FFS generated country ownership and transferring to local authorities of the results achieved, the establishment of partnerships with relevant stakeholders and the development of in-country capacities to ensure sustainability of efforts and benefits?</p>
<b>Impact</b>	<p><b>EQ16.</b> How did the FFS contribute to a lasting stabilization process in the target areas? Did it promote a rights-based approach for all groups?</p> <p><b>EQ17.</b> To what extent has the FFS contributed to the improvements of local social, economic, environmental, and other development indicators?</p>



## 5. EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS<sup>20</sup>

### 5.1 Evaluation approach

Following the ToR, the evaluation developed a tailor-made methodology in line with UNDP Evaluation Guidelines<sup>21</sup> and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Criteria<sup>22</sup>. The ET adhered to UN Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards<sup>23</sup>, and UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation<sup>24</sup>. Furthermore, the evaluation was designed to be gender-responsive, following a human-rights based approach.

Following the ToR, the ET applied a theory-based evaluation approach<sup>25</sup> using the FFS Theory of Change (ToC) to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, and sustainability, in addition to rights-based, gender equality<sup>26</sup> lenses. It further ensures that the methodology encompasses the cross-sectorial aspects when collecting, analysing, and triangulating the data for this assessment.

#### 5.1.1 Performance standards

This evaluation used the ToC and the intervention logic as a main reference. The evaluation matrix which included clear indicators (Annex 10.2) has provided the performance standards based on which the FFS has been reviewed. The ET ran the empirical data, gathered during the evaluation, through the ToC matrix, in addition to the program's monitoring and evaluation system. This allowed the ET to present an adjusted ToC in the final report. The data collected helped analyse if the logical sequence of results occurred, the major assumptions held, the expected outcome level changes occurred, and the indicators were relevant.

This evaluation resorted to diverse methodologies to provide a comprehensive assessment:

- A **mixed-method approach**, a blend of qualitative and quantitative data enabled the ET to capture a well-rounded view of the project's impact, particularly on living conditions and vulnerable populations.
- **Desk and Literature Review:** A systematic examination of project documents and materials was deemed foundational to this evaluation. The evaluation matrix provided a key tool in this process, detailing the types of literature to be reviewed to respond to specific evaluation questions.
- **Quantitative analysis** of the beneficiaries' survey results published statistics and studies, efficiency analysis data, and monitoring data from the FFS. This statistical perspective complements the rich narrative drawn from qualitative methods.
- **Qualitative Methods:** key informant interviews, group discussions and focus groups techniques were thoroughly employed to include a broad range of stakeholders, such as UNDP staff, local officials, women,

<sup>20</sup> Some of the more detailed technical information are contained Annexes 10.6;10.7;10.8;10.9 &10.11. to the report..

<sup>21</sup> UNDP Evaluation Guidelines. Available at <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/>

<sup>22</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), Network on Development Evaluation, Better Criteria for Better Evaluation Revised Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use, 2019, available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/revised-evaluation-criteria-dec-2019.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Evaluation Group- Norms and Standards for Evaluation. Available at <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/download/2787>

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Evaluation Group-Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation Towards UNEG Guidance. Available at <http://www.uneval.org/document/download/1294>

<sup>25</sup> Centre of Excellence for Evaluation (2012). Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practices. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

<sup>26</sup> The Feminist Evaluation approach emphasizes the systemic nature of gender inequalities and urges evaluators to adopt an activist stance, fostering inclusivity and collaboration in the evaluation process with an ultimate goal to amplify gender equality and social justice. More at Better Evaluation (2019): Feminist Evaluation: [https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/themes/feminist\\_evaluation](https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/themes/feminist_evaluation)

IDPs, and community leaders. This inclusive approach ensured that the evaluation is sensitive to diverse experiences and needs.

- **Efficiency analysis** that used 4 main approaches: (1) Actual vs Target Outcomes: To determine and compare the achievement of actual outcomes versus those anticipated at the inception of FFS, subsequently assessing FFS efficiency. (2) Calculating Costs per Unit – in relation to achieving outcomes under each window; (3) Cost-efficiency analysis: by comparing costs per unit to those of similar interventions and (4) Analysis of Financial and Human Resources Allocation across Various Regions.
- **Data Triangulation:** By employing various sources and methodologies, the ET could validate findings and uncover multifaceted insights. This rigorous approach ensured the reliability and depth of the data.

### 5.1.2 Data Sources

Following the kick-off meetings, the ET conducted an initial review of the FFS project documents, and other relevant publications accessed via open sources. These included but are not exhaustive of the following (See Annex 10.10- for a list of documents reviewed). After the initial analysis of the documents during the inception phase, the ET carried out further reviews of documents included mid-term evaluation, FFS documentation, narrative annual reports, financial reports, evaluation reports, conceptual documents, lessons learnt documents, transition plans, and strategic frameworks.

Document review findings were recorded as per the evaluation matrix, questions, and criteria; and triangulated against other data sources to generate robust findings. Data collected from all sources was captured and systematized according to the specific evaluation questions. Literature review

The ET conducted a literature review, providing a light-touch overview of the grey literature relevant to stabilization, durable solutions, area-based development, and other themes, such as forced displacement and Global Compacts, on the following evaluation themes:

- Context within which the four windows have been implemented (legal, political, security, economic and societal perspectives) including post-conflict situation reports, and community, patriarchal and gender dynamics.
- A review of existing secondary data – relevant to provincial and national statistics on political and economic related data, gender relations, etc., for rights holders.
- Third-party data on conditions for women and girls in Iraq/KRI at an economic and political level, using two main types of sources:
  - *Official statistics:* When available, the ET relied on UN agencies, Donors and government statistics on economic and political participation figures relating to women and trace how they have changed over the period of the projects. Data sets included, among others, the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, the Iraq Central Organisation for Statistics, International Organization for Migration (IOM) Iraq Displacement Data, UNHCR relevant reports about returnees and IDPs, and the World Bank Data Portal.
  - *Country-specific studies:* The ET also gathered data from country-specific studies that provided insight into the situation facing the FFS target groups including women and girls in Iraq/KRG. Studies by UN agencies around the impact of ISIL and the reconstruction phase.

### 5.1.2.1 Efficiency Analysis

The ET reviewed the detailed financial reports provided by UNDP, that showcased allocations for each of the four windows: Basic Services and Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Livelihood - Cash for Work and Employment, Capacity Support, and Social Cohesion. Concurrently, UNDP provided data on human resource deployment specific to each window. The ET develop the breakdown of resources by objectives and outcomes, and juxtaposed them against the outcomes reached, while looking into the geographical areas to test the assumption that areas with more pressing needs and were mostly impacted by the conflict received appropriate attention. Hence, the ET has taken in consideration the liberation dates of the different target locations (see Annex 10.5 for a liberation timeline), as it investigated the expansion of the FFS scope, namely starting 2017-2018.

Further, the team collected feedback from stakeholders around the transparency, inclusivity, and fairness embedded within procurement bidding mechanisms, and examining the timeliness, conditions, and efficiency governing financial disbursements. The ET used such insights from on-the-ground personnel across the four windows to fathom any operational disparities or constraints in the distribution of resources. This approach ensures that the team conducts a meticulous appraisal, verifying the balanced financial and human resources distribution under the FFS across its diverse objectives, outcomes, and target sectors.

### 5.1.3 Data collection procedures and instruments

The evaluation relied on a blended approach of remote and in-country data collection using a concurrent design of mixed methods composed of four streams of data collection (see table 2 hereunder for sampling information):

- Remote and in-country qualitative data collection in the form of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), undertaken by the international team (two Arabic-speaking senior evaluation specialists)
- In-country qualitative data collection in the form of Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) undertaken by a local research team.
- In-country survey undertaken by the local research team targeting beneficiaries from different FFS windows, including civil servants from the public sector.
- In-country assessments undertaken by engineers from the local research team to inspect a sample of 27 sites.

#### 5.1.3.1 Subjects' selection

The ET resorted to purposive sampling techniques to identify, in coordination with UNDP, at the governorate level, and across the various sectors, several key informants in addition to determining and selecting around 150 participants across key areas to arrange for the FGDs.

The purpose of both KIIs and FGDs was to provide depth in responses, reflecting on their roles as duty bearers and/or rights holders. Moreover, the respondents were selected while making sure to include the following characteristics:

- Gender
- IDP, refugee/ non-IDP refugee status
- Disability (where relevant)
- Window (Type of intervention)
- Geographic location

The ET mainstreamed gender sensitive approaches to ensure stakeholders' participation, including men and women. Thus, the ET worked to involve stakeholders directly affected or concerned by the FFS and the beneficiaries' who were given a chance to explain how processes and interventions affected their lives.

**Table 2: Overview of field data collection instruments and sampling approach**

Data collection Scope	
71 Key Informant Interviews	11 donors' country (13 KIIs) 19 UNDP team present and former 4 national government stakeholders 27 Local government stakeholders 8 Community Stakeholders
16 Focus Group Discussions	Total respondents 151. 83 Public servants & 68 Beneficiaries
Survey of Beneficiaries from Public Services & Infrastructure rehabilitation projects	2,987 respondents, out of 3,820 enlisted (78.2% response rate) – 41% of respondents were women.
Survey of Beneficiaries from Housing, Livelihood & Capacity-Building projects	<b>Housing:</b> 1,157 respondents, <b>Livelihood:</b> 596 respondents <b>Capacity-Building:</b> 1,169

#### 5.1.3.2 Remote and in-country qualitative data collection

As highlighted in table 2, a total of 71 Key Informant Interviews (KII) provided with in-depth insights of the implementation dynamics, its perceptions, results, challenges, and limitations (full list of KIIs is available under Annex 10.6).

#### 5.1.3.3 In-country qualitative data collection

A total of 16 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) allowed to discuss with beneficiaries from returnees, IDPs, (including women) to reflect on their experiences, perceptions, and the project's impact, fostering a shared understanding, namely in localities where projects have been implemented (see Annex 10.6 & 10.8). The FGDs gathered mainly two types of participants, those from civil servants from local government services and beneficiaries from the main FFS activities under windows 1 & 2 regarding housing rehabilitation and livelihood opportunities.

A total of 151 participants joined these sessions that were conducted during January 2024 by the local research partner Integrity ME, showing for a small proportion of women (19). This under-representation of women will be corrected in the surveying tools where the ratio would reach approximately 50% across the surveying board.

#### 5.1.3.4 In-country surveys

The evaluation team designed one survey which questionnaire was divided in two large sections. The first part of questions addressed the returnees' and beneficiaries' experience and perception after the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the restoration of public services, as per FFS projects. As such, 76% of the sample were former IDPs who returned to the liberated areas, whereas the rest were citizens who continue to live in the areas, which allowed to cross-reference any discrepancy in the results. The other part was specific to each of the three types of direct beneficiaries: housing rehabilitation, livelihood opportunities and capacity-building programmes. Further cross-tabulations were explored to further any specificity in terms of geography and gender. The phone

survey was administrated in Arabic by the local research partner. The survey captured a segment of the project's beneficiaries in relation to activities under window 1 (housing projects, infrastructure rehabilitation), window 2 (livelihood opportunities) and window 3 (capacity-building efforts). Annex 10.6 details the different survey activities, breaking down the sample sizes by governorate and gender categories.

#### 5.1.3.5 Facilities observation visits

The evaluation included observation visits to some of the facilities, in order to assess the overall condition, environmental and accessibility specs, in a context where close to 4,000 projects were implemented. 27 sites were identified, in coordination with UNDP, and were visited in January 2024 by a team of four engineers, supervised by the local research partner IME. Four governorates out of five were included in the process as the UNDP did not provide any contact information for Kirkuk (see Annex 10.9 below for the distribution of the inspected facilities). The engineers could proceed with their assessment based on a checklist prepared by the ET (available in Annex 10.7).

#### 5.1.4 Ethical considerations

The ET complied with the OECD DAC ethical considerations for development evaluations and United Nations Ethical Guidelines, following ethical considerations in selecting interviewees, interacting with them, and respecting their personal and institutional rights.

As such, informed consent was secured from all stakeholders before asking any questions related to the Project evaluation, in a fashion adequate to the relevant data collection method. Stakeholders were systematically given the right to refuse or to withdraw at any time. The ET also ensured respondent privacy and confidentiality and exercised discretion in all matters of the evaluation, to prevent any divulging of confidential information. The ET also made sure for sensitive information not to be traced to its source so that the key informants are fully protected. Original data, including interview records and notes from interviews, continue to be retained in confidential files, and will be destroyed post approval of final report.

#### 5.1.5 Main Limitations and Challenges

Challenges pertaining to this evaluation developed rather quickly as of the initiation phase. First being revision of the timeline of the evaluation, post kick-off meeting of August 17, 2023, and during the preparation of the inception report, the team identified a main mismatch between scope and depth of the evaluation and the timeframe given to the evaluation (supposed to end by October 2023), especially in terms of responding to the extensive data collection requested by UNDP ICPE including 60-70 KIIs, and surveys. Based on discussion with UNDP and the inception report submitted in October 2023, the timeline has been revised and the contract amended towards extending the timeline till April 2024.

Despite the revision of the evaluation scope and timeline, the time constraints remained an issue, given the large scope of FFS and multiple data collection streams. This meant the data collection phase was extended beyond the planned period to ensure that all the methods could be processed, without compromising the quality and integrity of the methods. As a result, most of the meetings and gatherings could be achieved with a very low cancellation rate.

Additionally, the team structure was also affected by specific circumstances. One of the team members had to withdraw due to health reasons, leaving only two evaluation specialists to take the load of this mission.

Nonetheless, the ET was able to manage the process and achieve it within the agreed upon calendar without compromising with the quality and integrity of the assessment. Moreover, the implementing party, AARC, had to change the local research partner, switching to Integrity ME in the middle of the inception phase, due to the identification of a conflict of interest with the previous partner who had closely worked with UNDP Country Office in Iraq before.

A third challenge was related to the interaction with UNDP staff, due to the turnover of the FFS teams, which came with a great deal of institutional memory loss. This led to multiple time delays in finding and sharing the necessary data to the ET.

A fourth challenge faced the evaluation is the quick access of M&E data within UNDP which posed limitation, for example UNDP was unable to provide the team any beneficiaries contacts from housing rehabilitation projects in the Anbar governorate, until the end of the evaluation. It took UNDP more than 4 weeks to provide lists of beneficiaries for the surveys. As a result of these limitations, the ET had to ensure a tight triangulation of data to validate the survey results and mitigate the under-representation of some segments.

A fifth challenge was faced during the in-country visits and conducting of KIIs, the ET noticed some managers of facilities were new to their positions, hence not quite relevant to the evaluation discussion. This was mitigated by conducting some interviews with previous UNDP staff and other relevant stakeholders. Moreover, there was also some difficulty accessing female participants, namely for FGDs, which was compensated with sampling of female respondents in the in-country surveys towards the programme's beneficiaries.

An additional challenge that was identified is the disproportion size of window 1 to the other 3 windows, and the limited number of people who have accurate knowledge around impact and effectiveness especially amongst donors who had restricted presence in the country. Despite these limitations, the evaluation has been able to generate an adequate informational basis to draw findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

## 5.2 Data Analysis

The Evaluation used several approaches to analyse the data and ensure validity and reliability of the analysis:

- **Comparing, contrasting, and synthesizing the data:** Interviews, reports, and conversations were classified into categories as per Evaluation questions, and analysed for trends, patterns, relationships, similarities, and differences. They were then grouped by themes that emerged from the analysis. This helped identify convergences and divergences and detect outliers.
- **Variation induction:** In this approach, valuative findings are constructed based on the variety of collected data that support the conclusion.
  1. The Evaluation carried out triangulation between various data gathered through interviews, FGDs, surveys, and data obtained from the desk review to ensure the integrity of findings. Data gathered was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively (separately first, then combined), to directly answer Evaluation questions and explain the results. The Evaluation deployed three different forms of triangulation: (1) methodological triangulation; (2) source triangulation, involving at least three lines of evidence including primary and secondary data and at least 6 different sources (beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, UNDP, national authorities, international actors, and local partners) and (3) Investigator triangulation *where this Evaluation* involved 2 main evaluators and a team of 10 data collectors.

2. Gender dimensions were explicitly incorporated into the scope of the Evaluation and the approach, with associated indicators for most Evaluation sub-questions. The Evaluation reviewed gender and age-disaggregated data to ascertain the numbers of women receiving food assistance, the proportion of HHs where women, or both women and men make decisions and female representation amongst partners and local staff. Female data collectors were also recruited to ensure access (3). The survey results were tabulated based on gender to identify any divergence in responses or trends, where differences occur, the evaluation team has clearly indicated that in the findings section.
3. For the efficiency analysis, the ET reviewed the detailed financial reports provided by UNDP, that showcase allocations for each of the four windows to determine and compare the achievement of actual outcomes versus those anticipated at the inception of FFS, subsequently assessing FFS efficiency. Moreover, to better understand the breakdown of resources by objectives and outcomes, the ET dissect the financial allocation within each window and juxtapose it against the outcomes reached. For example, funds designated for education within the Public Works window will be gauged against the number of schools refurbished and the subsequent student enrolment in these institutions, and the number of returnee students because of reconstruction, thus calculating Costs per Unit – in relation to achieving outcomes under each window. The cost efficiency analysis was also done from a geographical perspective, comparing the financial and human resources assigned to various target groups and regions and across diverse objectives, outcomes, and target sectors, aggregate level under each window.

By weaving together these multifaceted themes, the ET has presented a tapestry of the FFS project's strengths, achievements, and areas for improvement to ensure a proper understanding of the Project's results on the community; and informing future planning, implementation, and crafting of interventions.



## 6. EVALUATION FINDINGS

This chapter presents key findings on the overall evaluation questions. It is structured around six evaluation criteria relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, and impact. Each section starts by presenting the evaluation question followed by key findings, outlining the key areas of inquiry in line with the evaluation framework. Findings for each level of inquiry are then elaborated/unpacked in the subsequent sub-sections.

### 6.1 RELEVANCE

Relevance is assessed in relation to three levels of inquiry namely i) national priorities, ii) priorities of UNDP and donors including cross cutting issues and iii) the context.

#### Evaluation Question 1

*To what extent was the design of the intervention, including the formulation of its planned results, relevant to the needs and priorities of the country, intended beneficiaries and key stakeholders?*

**FINDING 1.** FFS is aligned with national priorities of GoI and responds to the basic needs of 6 million Iraqi IDPs affected by ISIL hostilities, which were identified with full participation of Governmental stakeholders at the national and local levels.

FFS has responded to the national priorities of the Government of Iraq (GoI) and IDPs to return to liberated areas, through the restoration of basic services in four key priority sectors: water, electricity, health, and education; in addition to main roads, bridges, governmental buildings, and livelihoods. Government stakeholders at the provincial and local levels were pivotal in identification of needs and priorities as listed in the National planning documents such as the National Development Plan, Sector strategic plans, National Recovery/ stabilization strategic plans, and National vision (see table 2b Annex 10.1). UNDP FFIS provided technical assistance in assessing “the most urgent stabilization needs”<sup>27</sup>, including the removal of rubble, landmines, and improvised explosive hazards (EH) and prioritization of reconstruction sites. Project selection was based on criteria, for example access, security, the level of damage, and the number of affected populations.

The evaluation confirms that the FFS is a government-driven action, whilst all decisions were made “within the framework of the Provincial Control Cells (PCCs), which are headed by the respective Governors”<sup>28</sup>. The evaluation found that FFS is consistent with agreed upon priorities amongst various national actors (GoI/KRG/communities in affected areas), UNDP receives the final lists of prioritized projects under the 4 basic services sectors from the PCCs to start the process of project implementation. Certain gaps exist as a result of security and politically sensitive areas (elaborated under finding 4).

The FFS followed an area-based approach, which allowed UNDP to work in the targeted areas while addressing a range of development issues using a multi-sectoral approach that involved basic services, immediate economic opportunities, livelihoods, and social cohesion.

The evaluation found a **pivotal role by the Government stakeholders**, and a strong **political support**, whether at the international, national, and local levels, to ensure conditions for the **safe return and reintegration** of IDPs and the restoration a sense normalcy for future stability and development. Such buy-in minimised the need for

<sup>27</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 9.

<sup>28</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 9.



extensive consultations with other UN agencies, INGOs and local communities in the initial design phase, as it revolved around addressing basic needs and restoring vital infrastructure (Education, Health, Water, and Electricity) through rapid and large-scale delivery. Overall, the need identification, project prioritization and selection process were guided by a well-structured and coordinated process, which ensured clear lines of communication, consultation and decision-making among UNDP and governmental stakeholders (see finding 7 or coordination architecture).

The evaluation could not establish enough evidence to confirm that FFS ensured participation of rights' holders in planning, design, and selection of FFS projects; non-governmental involvement and participation in the design and implementation was relatively restricted to some consultation under the social cohesion component.

### Evaluation Question 2

*Has the FFS remained relevant during its implementation and appropriately responsive to the country's security, political, economic, institutional, and other changes? Is it still relevant now?*

**FINDING 2.** FFS was fit for purpose, it maintained its relevance to the context overtime expanding its scope rapidly to meet the needs of newly liberated areas while concurrently adapting its organizational capacity through area-based, multi-sectorial approaches.

UNDP ensured that the proposed FFS projects fell within the stabilization mandate to “provide rapid stabilization assistance across four areas of work, or ‘windows’. The four windows identified as critical to facilitate the return of IDPs and to restore trust between the government and the people, are (1) public works and light infrastructure rehabilitation; (2) livelihoods – to be better referred to as cash for work; (3) capacity support to local governments; and (4) social cohesion”.<sup>29</sup> Under Window 1, UNDP ensured rehabilitating existing infrastructure which had been damaged or destroyed because of the conflict, not constructing new infrastructure under the moto of “build back better”.

This final evaluation confirms what the MTE had already determined, the FFS had been able to maintain its relevance to the context over time, expanding its scope rapidly to meet the needs of newly liberated areas while concurrently adapting its organizational capacity.<sup>30</sup>As such, FFS evolution suggests that the different windows reflect a **sequential progression** rather than a simultaneous package of interventions post initial efforts to remove rubbles and secure areas, livelihood, shelter, and other needs took priority. As the country moved from stabilization to recovery mode, social cohesion became a priority as people were returning to their liberated regions.

Once security and political considerations are cleared, projects to restore basic services were then decided and put into the execution phase. Based on the notion of “pull and push factors”, each of the four FFS windows were geared to address specific conditions to secure durable solutions for a sustainable return of IDPs in the liberated areas. Although the implementation wasn't strictly linear, certain components established prerequisites for others. As an example, rehabilitating government buildings was key pre-condition for delivering basic services to

<sup>29</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2021, p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> FFS Mid-Term Evaluation, 2021, finding 3.

communities. Similarly, cash-for-work activities, such as rubble removal and repair work, complemented larger-scale infrastructure rehabilitation initiatives.

The **social cohesion** component (window 4, which focuses on community reconciliation, assisting local leaders and community groups to work towards enhanced social cohesion) has been delayed for a number of months pending completion of key infrastructure projects and the large-scale return of IDPs<sup>31</sup> before it could restart initially in western Anbar and western Nineveh in early 2018. The adoption of a multi sector area-based approach through the four windows to ensure safe and voluntary return and reintegration on such a massive scale implemented under the umbrella of a single UN agency has been a precedent.

The implementation of FFS projects faced various contextual challenges, which include security clearances and limited access, while assessing recently liberated areas particularly in the early phase of FFS. FGDs also pointed to security challenges which prevented workers from entering locations engaging in house rehabilitation works. UNDP FFS reports refer to “adverse security conditions in some areas continued to create difficulties in accessing and implementing activities. Delays in obtaining access to project sites by checkpoints, the presence of armed groups and militias also continue to be a challenge”.<sup>32</sup> The presence of landmines, UXOs, EH presented additional threats to personnel, requiring clearance prior to commencement of work on site. Where FFS closely worked with UNMAS and UNDSS to ensure cleared sires. Additionally, tensions and instances of violence among ethno-religious groups, political manoeuvring during elections, and restricted movement due to the COVID-19 pandemic further impacted project implementation.

To navigate these contextual challenges, UNDP relied on governmental authorities, including governors and PCCs, which acted as key arbiters. As such, the extent to which a conflict analysis lens was directly and systematically used seems limited, with FFS relying on the political authority of the government at the sub-national level and its ability to mediate between local stakeholders (including, but not limited to, mayors, tribal leaders, ethnic and religious minorities) and decide on priorities on the ground. (See finding 4 conflict sensitivity)

In response to evolving political and security contexts, UNDP adopted a flexible approach, redirecting its activities accordingly. Although these contextual challenges generated some delays in project implementation and sometimes project cancellations, these were not perceived to have a substantial impact on FFS. The ability to swiftly adapt was indeed notably facilitated by the multitude of needs and the imperative to rapidly respond providing numerous projects for prioritization.

**FINDING 3.** FFS response developed its approach to integrate the Government of Iraq’s quest of durable solutions to forced displacement fostering conditions for the return of IDPs and the restoration of living conditions, thus adopting a wider multi-disciplinary approach as the context evolved with new needs.

In 2021 and in an attempt to support GoI efforts to resolve internal displacement in Iraq, through the durable solutions coordination architecture (figure 6- Annex 10.1), under the leadership of the United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG / RC / HC). The architecture comes in lieu of the humanitarian coordination structure. The new durable solutions coordination architecture aims to bridge the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, bring together United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations and other actors specialising in humanitarian, development, stabilization, and peace-building programming, and support the Government of Iraq to implement its national

<sup>31</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2018, p. 11.

<sup>32</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 40.

durable solutions plan; with UNDP being one of the chairs of the Durable Solutions Technical Working Group (DSTWG).

Under the framework of durable solutions, 8 key criteria were agreed upon: 1. Safety, security, and freedom of movement 2. Adequate standard of living 3. Employment and livelihoods 4. Housing, land, and property 5. Personal and other documentation 6. Family reunification 7. Participation in public affairs 8. Effective remedies. UNDP adopted this new approach of durable solutions and is active under criteria 1,2,4, and 7. (check finding 26)

### Evaluation Question 3

*To what extent have gender and human rights principles and strategies been integrated into the FFS design and implementation?*

**FINDING 4.** FFS design integrated some aspects of human rights, gender, and conflict sensitive approach however with limited application.

FFS has passed through various cycles of design and adaptation – (as indicated in the description section several issues were introduced as the FFS evolved.

**Integration of cross-cutting issues.** during planning phase more focus on implementation happened starting 2018 project document where FFS underscores its commitment to cross-cutting issues to be guided by a set of minimum principles including: i) Inclusiveness (gender, age, ethnicity, religion, geography, disability), ii) Rights-based approach, conflict-sensitivity and do no harm, iii) Gender equality and women’s empowerment, and iv) Environment sustainability considerations. Aside from gender equality tackled in finding 5, the operationalization of these principles is not clearly articulated:

**Non-discrimination:** The project design does not clearly refer to non-discrimination; however, post 2018, FFS’ knowledge of the context ensured that such considerations were integrated in the selection of target groups and prioritisation of activities. FFS started incorporating different modalities (NGOs, Community-Based Organisation (CBOs), local authorities) considered responsiveness to the needs of vulnerable groups including women, youth, and minorities. Particular attention was given to minority groups (e.g. ethnicity, religion, tribal affiliation), partly because of earmarked funding to the special programme that prioritized supporting equitable and balanced access for minority communities.

Similarly, there is a general perception that **disability issues** were not systematically addressed, instances of considerations for people with disability were sporadically integrated in the Bill of Quantities (BoQ) development for public infrastructure. Starting 2018 vulnerability was identified as a selection criterion for housing projects. Ensuring access to people with disabilities was not systemically addressed in housing rehabilitation, and other infrastructure rehabilitation as finding 23 below illustrates. UNDP used the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ list of registered women classified according to their vulnerability<sup>33</sup>.

**Community Participation** was mainly focussed on governorate and local authorities (Finding 1) in defining stabilization needs and prioritizing projects in targeted locations. Notwithstanding their importance, FFS’ mandate does not include aspects of how Gol identifies its population needs. There are examples however were affected populations were consulted especially in sensitive areas, and this was primarily due to UNDP clear

<sup>33</sup> The government’s vulnerability criteria include income level, poverty, disability and marital status (UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2018, p. 57). While FFS prioritized vulnerability, cases of community pushback for supporting ISIL affiliated families were encountered in practice.

directives to consult with vulnerable and under-represented groups (see below under conflict sensitivity). This evaluation corroborates the assessment of the German contribution to the FFS action carried out in 2020 that “the programmes correctly identified key challenges faced by their target groups and developed an appropriate approach to respond to them”.<sup>34</sup> For instance, women were consulted on the types of CfW programmes that may be appropriate and women head of households, were consulted for housing rehabilitation.

**Conflict sensitivity and do no harm:** Conflict assessments and conflict sensitivity training are primarily linked to social cohesion window, however, FFS has taken a positive approach to conflict sensitivity since its inception.<sup>35</sup> Early decisions to hire staff with conflict advisory functions and Municipal Stabilization Advisors (MSAs) are consistent with the operationalization of this commitment. However, the extent to which conflict assessments were systematically used to guide the design of all windows, and mainstream conflict sensitivity in all FFS windows<sup>36</sup> is unclear. While “do no harm” is referred to across project documentation, the evaluation could not gather evidence on how it is integrated in the projects. Working with local authorities to ensure that outreach to different groups is consistent with a do no harm approach despite being aware that this bears some risks, as the government in some case does not seem to represent all groups in society, and in other cases can be seen as hostile to certain communities and a party to the ongoing conflict.

**Environmental considerations:** There are several references in UNDP documents emphasising that UNDP’s Social and Environmental Standards are met and on conducting environment impact assessments for large scale infrastructure works to identify potential risks. The evaluation team could not find enough evidence as to how mitigating adverse environmental impacts was integrated. Some projects were selected based on environmental considerations. Nonetheless, the integration of cross-sectional issues remained a subject of debate among UNDP respondents, acknowledging a growing discussion on whether stabilization efforts should extend beyond rehabilitation to enhance existing infrastructure and address concerns of inclusion, participation, and environmental sustainability. Under the growingly alarming context of global warming today, this debate will likely reach a consensus under which any future stabilization action will necessarily have to integrate a solid sustainable environment component.

**FINDING 5.** FFS showed some progress on gender inclusion in both larger infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihoods following relative absence during its first two years.

**Framework for integrating gender:** the evaluation found no gender plan incorporated at the inception of FFS; project approaches, outcomes, outputs, and indicators were mainly gender neutral, except for quantitative indicators of women beneficiaries under the livelihood component the program largely focused on speed and scale. However, progress was made to integrate gender equality considerations into large infrastructure rehabilitation and livelihood. In 2017, UNDP identified women-headed households among the most vulnerable returnees and assigned a gender advisor to develop a Gender Strategy through consultations with staff, partners, government counterparts, women, women’s groups, and community leaders, including field missions to Diyala, Anbar, and Salah Al -Din governorates.

The advisor identified gaps such as absence of gender dimension in plans, poor staff understanding (staff were gender blind), limited attention and inclusion of “women and girls in the restoration of community life and

<sup>34</sup> Joyn-Coop. Mid-term evaluation of the German Contribution to the FFS and ICRRP in Iraq, German Financial Cooperation with UNDP in Iraq, 30 October 2020, p. i.

<sup>35</sup> UK Stabilization Unit, Lessons Learned Review of FFS, 2018.

<sup>36</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2019, p. 63.

infrastructure rehabilitation<sup>37</sup>. The gender strategy proposed remedial pathways through (i) improving the participation of women in the design and delivery of the FFS activities, (ii) undertaking gender-focused projects to directly meet the needs of the most vulnerable women, and (iii) capacity building<sup>38</sup> (iv) including setting-up a gender team, (one advisor<sup>39</sup> and two gender officers based in Baghdad and Erbil<sup>40</sup>), and engagement with local authorities and prioritising gender sensitive projects.

The evaluation found that efforts to implement the Gender Strategy advanced FFS's integration of Gender in the implementation period post 2018. Prior to 2018, flagrant gender gaps occurred such as the rehabilitation of universities and leaving female dormitories which prevented women's access to education; or the absence of lockers and changing rooms for female police officers, as well as separate rooms for women complainant in police stations to file their complaints.

Among the remedial efforts was gender-specific projects such as CfW for women and the development of livelihood opportunities to women head of households, in addition to supporting women and girls' access to vocational training and small grants opportunities. Towards the end of the action, the number of women beneficiaries were much higher under window 2. In 2017, UNDP reported 114 livelihoods schemes supporting 24,455 people among whom 6,655 women to earn an income to support their family.<sup>41</sup> By the end of 2023, the number reaches 77,485 beneficiaries, including 24,702 women, hence increasing from 27% to 32%. In the area of small grants, the FFS provided 4,153 projects, among which 2,865 went to women totalling 69% of the beneficiaries. Additionally, by the third quarter of 2023, 6,618 small grants were devoted to WHHs.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, girls' educational facilities (e.g. schools, universities, and dormitories) were prioritized, particularly due to the disproportionate harm done to women's education under ISIL.

Capacity building for UNDP **staff** (including engineers, field monitors, liaison officer) was crucial to address gender blindness. Similarly capacity building to **contractors**, to incorporate women-inclusive conditions into contracts, equal pay, work duration, working conditions, and protection from sexual harassment; moreover, accompanying project staff in the field to coach them on gender integration in large infrastructure projects (e.g. building female dorms when rehabilitating university buildings, or engaging women in rubble cleaning of girls' school).

**On the level of GoI and the PCCs, integrating gender equality** in Iraq context faced restrictions reinforced by conservative and patriarchal norms. Acknowledging cultural and social barriers the **FFS adopted a pragmatic approach** focused on willingness and awareness of the importance of women's participation among UNDP staff, contractors, and governmental stakeholders. The latter showed stronger resistance to the inclusion of women. For example, efforts were made to encourage mayors to recruit women as part of stabilization activities such as rubble removal and school rehabilitation. Similarly, respondents highlighted FFS's efforts toward ensuring the rehabilitation of girls' schools, diverging from the government's inclination to prioritize boys' schools. Efforts with contractors and partners have resulted in gender-sensitive measures, including the recruitment of female engineers, the rehabilitation of infrastructure providing services to women (such as fertility clinics, maternity wards, and female dormitories for university students, window 1), as well as specific attention to the livelihoods of women-headed household, cash grants to women headed households women's access to small business grants and CfW activities including in traditionally male-dominated roles such as rubble removal and repair work

<sup>37</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2021, p. 45.

<sup>38</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2021, p. 45.

<sup>39</sup> Gender Advisor position covers the whole Stabilization Pillar (FFS, ICRRP, and BREP).

<sup>40</sup> The position in Erbil became vacant recently.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2017, p.92.

<sup>42</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 13.

which represented a significant milestone in challenging patriarchal norms (window 2). This is exemplified in women inclusion in capacity-building sessions (window 3) and social cohesion activities (window 4).

Despite the above, this evaluation could not determine a detailed gender strategy specific to each Window, and no separate FFS budget allocation for gender components. Some donors earmarked funding for women and girls. The gender team is financed as part of the project management costs (PMC). Planned activity targets guide project prioritisation (e.g. 30% minimum women for livelihood activities) rather than specifically allocated budgets. UNDP reported an exponential increase of women beneficiaries (Figure 7- Annex 10.1), numbers of cumulative beneficiaries double between 2017 and 2020, passing from 4.3 million women to 7.8 million. The evaluation could not find more recent data on this component.

#### Evaluation Question 4

*What is UNDP comparative advantages in Iraq and liberated regions to implement this project?*

#### **FINDING 6. UNDP is a reliable implementing partner with proven record to coordinate across governmental, sectors and donors.**

The FFS represents the conjunction of multiple stakeholders' willingness to address the devastating consequences of ISIL occupation in Iraq, as the political and security conditions improved. Thus, it offered UNDP the opportunity to spearhead "civilian stabilization efforts using the FFS as the primary mechanism to establish the necessary conditions for IDPs to return and rebuild their lives in dignity and peace".<sup>43</sup> FFS has adopted an integrated approach combining substantial infrastructure rehabilitation across vital sectors<sup>44</sup> with immediate and medium-term socioeconomic interventions aimed at supporting livelihoods, enhancing local government capacity, and fostering social cohesion and peacebuilding initiatives (this also links for finding 7). UNDP's efficiency in project delivery at "speed and scale" (see efficiency below) has also gained UNDP the reputation of a reliable and effective partner. In terms of comparative advantage FFS model was a unique introduction in the stabilization realm that was piloted for the Iraq reconstruction.

## 6.2 COHERENCE

This section assesses the FFS contribution to coordination between different stakeholders, including government stakeholders and communities, INGOs and UN agencies, as well as international donors. It also evaluates coherence within FFS, assessing intersectionality and synergies between windows, as well as feedback loops and mechanisms.

#### Evaluation Question 5

*How did the FFS project windows contribute to the coordination, cooperation, non-duplication, and consultation with different levels of Iraqi authorities, and development partners?*

<sup>43</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 12.

<sup>44</sup> Education, electricity, health, housing, municipal services, roads and bridges networks, sewage, and water,



**FINDING 7.** FFS Multi donor trust fund architecture was fit for purpose and presented a unique structure to ensure alignment and coordination between 30 different donors, including the GoI to implement large scale complex infrastructure involving multi stakeholders with little duplication and increased efficiency.

Since its inception the FFS has been headed by a Steering Committee co-chaired by the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Council of Ministers and UNDP Resident Representative. Under the Steering Committee's supervision, Governorate level Provincial Control Cells (PCCs) were established and chaired by governors, sub-directorate of key ministries, local authorities (municipalities) and technical experts to identify local needs and priorities through consultations with local communities. Regular meetings and exchange took place between the Steering committee, and the PCCs in presence of main donors, where main projects and issues were discussed regularly (twice a year).<sup>45</sup>

The evaluation noted a **pivotal role by the Government stakeholders**, and a strong **political support**, whether at the international, national, and local levels, to ensure conditions for the **safe return and reintegration** of IDPs. The PCCs architecture presented a structured and coordinated process, which ensured clear lines of communication, consultation and decision-making between UNDP and governmental stakeholders.

Throughout the implementation of FFS, UNDP maintained close coordination with **government stakeholders**, who assumed a central coordination and decision-making role across phases of needs assessment, prioritization, project selection, and execution. As such, every project had to undergo approval from the governorate's PCC, which is responsible for assigning projects to ensure there is no duplication. Corrective measures were implemented upon discovering duplication during the early stages of project implementation. The evaluation has identified insufficient coordination with Reconstruction Funds for Affected Areas of Terrorist Operations (REFAATO), a national entity attached to the Council of Ministers in charge of reconstruction. Despite the signature of an agreement in May 2021<sup>46</sup>, coordination mechanisms were largely centered within PCCs as the local authorities.

On sub-governorate levels, coordination mechanisms were developed gradually post 2018 in response to a growing request by local stakeholders. Direct consultation with **local communities** at the subnational level, was also mandated to the PCCs. Interviewees nonetheless gathered insufficient information on the specific methods employed in consulting local communities and CSOs as well as the exact level of engagement, which reflects similar challenge as detailed in the MTE. The architecture proved its ability to navigate the transition and ensured government ownership. UNDP has played a pivotal role in facilitating coordination between governorates and GoI through ensuring involvement of governorates into high level coordination meetings that also took place with donors.

**Finding 8. FFS appeared as a stand-alone project with little coordination with other INGOs and UN agencies, albeit improvement after 2018.**

FFS mostly stood as a stand-alone project, with very little coordination with other **international organizations and UN agencies**. This was particularly the case at the early stages when very few other initiatives were active. FFS was designed to operate as a stand-alone facility to provide a unique type of intervention outside the realm of humanitarian, development, and peace nexus, which is usually characterised by slow and long process that does not qualify as a fit for purpose of speedy rehabilitation and return at "speed and scale". With a notable exception, since its inception, FFS has collaborated with and relied on the United Nations Mine Action Service,

<sup>45</sup> FFS Annual Report, 2020, p. 12

<sup>46</sup> The agreement aimed at providing residents in Ishaqi, Salah al-Din with access to safe reliable drinking water.

which led efforts to clear mines, explosive remnants of war, and improvised explosive devices. This demining work paved the way for UNDP's stabilization interventions, including the construction of public infrastructure and the support of livelihood activities such as agriculture. Additionally, UNDP /FFS collaborated with the United Nations Department for Safety and Security for security updates in the FFS governorates to support its interventions. Lastly, UNDP/FFS collaborated with the Stabilization Working Group. Decision making around reconstruction projects under window 1 were coordinated formally through the governorate level PCCs, in collaboration with other stakeholders active in the rehabilitation efforts including UNDP engineers. PCCs facilitated coordination among various international organizations and agencies to prevent duplication of actions and ensure verification and handover when projects are completed. Post 2018, under windows 1 (housing rehabilitation), 2 and 4 and, FFS increased coordination with other international actors through information sharing to avoid duplication and ensure consistency and alignment with broader objectives. For example, UNDP shared information with other international organizations about projects locations, and beneficiaries. Also, UNDP agreed with UNICEF on amounts paid to beneficiaries of livelihood initiatives or CfW. Restrictions around confidentiality posed certain limitations to sharing data around beneficiaries (check finding 9).

As indicated in Finding 3, UNDP headed the Durable Solution Technical Working Group and the Durable Solutions Task Force with the RCO and IOM and played a leading role in Area Based Coordination bodies, and clusters such as the livelihood cluster, however, frustration was voiced out via other INGOs around the solo mode of operation of UNDP; while such a concern can be legitimate, it can be overstated when considering window 1 (construction projects) and close coordination via the governorate based command centre, which made UNDP coordination with other stakeholders less relevant as it is already undertaken by the PCC.

Coordination between UNDP and donors varied based on level of contribution and political clout. Smaller donors indicated that UNDP maintained limited coordination. While other donors indicate that coordination and funding were geographic and thematic priorities. Overall donor engagement remained mostly confined to periodic reporting and coordination meetings convening donors, UNDP representatives, and government stakeholders to discuss ongoing progress; several donors were largely disconnected, due to the turnover of staff.

### Evaluation Question 6

*How did the 4 windows work in synergy with each other. What were the main intersectionality amongst them?*

### **FINDING 9. While the first three windows were integral to the FSS initial design, the social cohesion component (window 4) was integrated later to streamline the overall approach to stabilization.**

UNDP had a social cohesion program pre-FFS, which was then incorporated under FFS. The portfolio within window 4 was geared towards: (i) funding and training community-based organizations and grassroots actors (among whom a significant proportion of women) on preventing violent extremism (PVE) and Sexual and Gender Based Violence. (ii) Convening religious leaders and government officials to tackle PVE and (iii) actions to build confidence amongst severely impacted populations to return during post liberation and construction phases "assuring stabilization in the conflict-affected regions of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salah Al-Din".<sup>47</sup>

Nonetheless, the rationale behind incorporating social cohesion activities within the FSS is debatable. While some respondents described how social cohesion had been recognized as a crucial aspect to increase the number of

<sup>47</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report, USAID Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xiv.



returns, others dubbed it as donor driven. FFS team indicated that social cohesion activities were stand-alone initiatives pre-existing the FFS, with little clear connection to other components. Moreover, this window is substantially smaller than the rest of the components with a total of 39 projects achieved by the third quarter of 2023 for 5.7 million USD, thus representing a minute fraction of FFS.<sup>48</sup>

Additionally, the way social cohesion was reported by UNDP also contribute to this confusion. In 2016, UNDP attaches its social cohesion agenda to “community reconciliation” to “help local leaders and community groups promote dialogue, with special attention to local women’s groups, and start a restorative justice process”.<sup>49</sup> By 2023, the FFS had shifted its priorities to “an integrated approach that necessitates the scaling up of critical soft stabilization programming initiatives such as capacity support and social cohesion, while maintaining a focus on addressing the most critical stabilization (access to basic services for the most vulnerable) needs in return areas”.<sup>50</sup> Ultimately, social cohesion took the form of “engagement and close collaboration with the various peace mechanisms” to “promote and strengthen reintegration and community resilience”<sup>51</sup>, while focusing on “PVE, social cohesion, women empowerment, and gender-based violence”.<sup>52</sup> At the same time, UNDP has stated being in “the process of determining the needs of government counterparts in relation to social cohesion, PVE, and community reintegration”, as the “engagement with the government is expected to take place in the coming quarter (2023).<sup>53</sup>

There is a consensus that social cohesion should have been incorporated from the outset, and linked to other FFS components, recognizing its complementarity in facilitating the return of IDPs, and leverage the rehabilitation of strategic infrastructures such as schools, universities, community, or sports facilities, using them as entry points for targeted social cohesion initiatives (Recommendation 3 of MTE).

### Evaluation Question 7

*What feedback mechanisms were incorporated to ensure consistency during implementation?*

**FINDING 10. FFS feedback mechanism, is characterised by being intuitive, and informal feedback loop, in addition to a hotline that guarantees housing beneficiaries can communicate their issues directly.**

At the early implementation stages of FFS, UNDP lacked a formal and systematic feedback mechanism, be it with local authorities or communities. In 2017, as FFS started to implement larger number of projects, UNDP staff was “informed by relatively sporadic feedback”<sup>54</sup> despite “overwhelmingly” positive responses. By 2019, donors’ third-party monitoring recommended beneficiary feedback mechanisms to be incorporated into FFS, yet it was restricted to beneficiaries of housing rehabilitation to raise complaints and inquiries. Accordingly, FFS has since established two independent phone lines to receive inquiries from beneficiaries and to ensure that the FFS team follows up with an appropriate response to address the issue.<sup>55</sup>

The evaluation found that apart from the above housing hotlines, no evidence or documentation detailing a systematic feedback mechanism to ensure that views and experiences of beneficiaries and stakeholders are

<sup>48</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 11.

<sup>49</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2016, p. 9.

<sup>50</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 7.

<sup>51</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 30.

<sup>52</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 31.

<sup>54</sup> UNDP FFS Annual Report, 2017, p. 121.

<sup>55</sup> The verification of this information does not fall under the scope of the evaluation.

accounted for. Collection of feedback from beneficiaries of window 1 has rarely been done, however direct beneficiaries of windows 2 and 3 could share feedback through interactions with FFS team, though little formal feedback was deliberately collected. Interactions with beneficiaries were carried post interventions, and rarely were they consulted before.

Instead, the FFS has been intuitively and organically collecting feedback during its consultation and interaction with communities and authorities. FFS's consistent coordination with governmental stakeholders during the project implementation facilitated an informal feedback loop. This allowed it to continually adjust and address government concerns – thereby ensuring ongoing government satisfaction and securing ownership post-handover. Besides, evaluations have been used as feedback to inform UNDP's stabilization programming.

### 6.3 EFFICIENCY

This section assesses the FFS ability to deliver results as planned, focusing on manpower and resources used to meet organizational needs, efficiency per output, as well as cost efficiency. It also examines whether resources have been strategically allocated to meet intended outcomes, including resource allocation per window, the use of adequate procurement mechanisms, and budget utilization. Lastly, this section analyses the extent to which the M&E system facilitated the collection and analysis of output and outcome-oriented results.

#### Evaluation Question 8

*Have FFS results been implemented as planned?*

**FINDING 11. FFS was mainly driven by scale and speed with sufficient human and financial resources to meet its intended stabilization objectives as agreed between the government and its development partners.**

Due to limitation of data availability,<sup>56</sup> the evaluation focused mainly on assessing the proportionality of overall annual project management costs in relation to the total expenditure. For this analysis, project management costs are defined as expenditures associated with planning, monitoring, coordination, and execution of project activities. This includes personnel salaries, administrative overhead, technology infrastructure, and other operational expenses directly tied to managing and overseeing the project.

UNDP's ability to allocate resources based on identified needs is notably facilitated by most donors providing unearmarked funding; while few donors might indicate specific funds for geographic or thematic areas, or priorities. UNDP matched locally identified needs and priorities with donors' earmarked funds. This criteria will assess efficiency of **FFS financial management process**. More precisely, the key aim is to assess the accuracy of initial budget estimates and identify trends in either budget overestimation or underestimation. Additionally, the intention is to evaluate whether budget accuracy has improved based on lessons learned from the initial years of implementation, thereby contributing to more efficient budget planning.

<sup>56</sup> According to the UNDP, "the project setup in the Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) (Atlas and now Quantum) was not designed to reflect a geographic breakdown either in budgeting or in expenses. We have attempted to go through the historical details, but this must be done manually and will take extensive time to complete."

## Budget Overview

The total budget allocation for FFS from 2015 to 2023 amounted to approximately US\$2.12 billion, with US\$1.32 billion expended. Notably, Window 1 under FFS constituted the majority of both allocated and disbursed funds, accounting for 86% and 78%, respectively. The remaining three windows and other cost categories each represented approximately 5% or less of the overall budget allocations and 7% or less of the expenditures (Table 3).

**Table 3: FFS Budget, Expenditure, and Expenditure Ratios (Source UNDP)**

Category	Total - 2015-2023			
	Budget	% of Total Budget	Expenditure	% of Total Expenditure
Assessments	\$ 13,017,082	1%	\$ 450,723	0.03%
Window 1 - Public Works & Infrastructure Rehabilitation	\$ 1,828,698,270	86%	\$ 1,035,135,724	78.21%
Window 2 - Livelihood Assistance and Employment	\$ 91,496,517	4%	\$ 101,354,756	7.66%
Window 3 - Capacity Support to Municipalities	\$ 60,815,039	3%	\$ 102,469,360	7.74%
Window 4 - Peaceful Communities & Social Cohesion	\$ 16,510,809	1%	\$ 14,292,274	1.08%
Program Management	\$ 108,346,843	5%	\$ 69,609,564	5.26%
FFS Transition	\$ 719,413	0%	\$ 185,178	0.01%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 2,119,603,975</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>\$ 1,323,497,580</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 8 below, annual budget allocation and expenditure varied considerably by year, remaining low in the initial years of FFS implementation. For instance, annual budget allocation increased from approximately \$7 million in 2015 to \$487 million in 2018, then decreased to \$192 million in 2022, and rose again to \$297 million in 2023. Similarly, annual expenditure increased from approximately \$3 million in 2015 to \$283 million in 2019, declining each subsequent year to \$80 million in 2023. This is largely due to the nature of stabilization work, which requires agility, phased rollout, pace of liberation, changing political and security context, adaptability of donors' funding cycles, and Covid during 2020 which led to some delays. etc.


Table 4 (Annex 10.1) shows budget utilization rates for all cost categories by year and total for the entire FFS period. The rates were determined by dividing annual expenditures by corresponding budget allocations for each cost category. As shown in table 4, the assessment of planned versus actual expenditure reveals notable discrepancies. For instance, annual budget utilization under Window 1 varied from 42% in 2015 to 92% in 2019 and 28% in 2023. For Window 2, annual execution rates varied significantly from 33% in 2015 to 227% in 2017, 408% in 2019, and 17% in 2023. They varied even more drastically under Window 3, from 34% in 2015, to 384% in 2016, 2,768% in 2020 and 28% in 2023. They also varied significantly for Window 4, from 79% in 2015, to 458% in 2019, and 38% 38% in 2023.

Annual budget utilization rates of the project management component also varied, remaining low in the initial three years, improving in years 4 and 5, staying slightly low in subsequent years, and then falling considerably to 28% in 2023. Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 9 (Annex 10.1), total budget utilization rates by year increased from 44% in 2015 to 105% in 2019, declined to 58% in 2020, increased again to 80% in 2022, and fell significantly to 27% in 2023. The FFS budget achieved an overall utilization of 62%, with rates ranging between 27% and 62% over seven of the nine years of its implementation.

Figure 10 illustrates a comparison of the total annual FFS budget execution rates with that of Window 1 and the project management component — both combined accounted for 91% of the total budget allocation and 83%

of the total expenditure. As shown in Figure 10 (Annex 10.1) trends in total budget execution rates were primarily attributed to Window 1, with the project management execution rates following a similar pattern.

Figure 6: FFS Annual Budget and Expenditure- Source UNDP



## Project Management Cost

Annual project management costs as percentage of the total budget, shown in Table 4, remained relatively high in the initial two years, then decreased in subsequent years before rising again in 2023. Overall, project management costs accounted for approximately 5% of total expenditure. The low project management cost ratio demonstrates cost efficiency when compared to the average and benchmark<sup>57</sup> rates observed in similar project. For instance, the “Independent Evaluation of the Infrastructure Partnerships Program and the Water and Sanitation Initiative Global Program” by the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 2012 assessed the average administrative costs of funds (across several international organizations) to be between 10%-15%.<sup>58</sup> Please refer to Table 4 and 6 for a detailed demonstration of planned budget, actual expenditure, and budget utilization rates by each cost category and year, as well as for the entire FFS evaluation period.

**FINDING 12: The FFS retained high level of overall output efficiency throughout its implementation, Efficiency per output has been increasing from approximately 75% in the first analysed period to 190% in the second cycle and remaining high at 151% in the 2021-2023 period.**

This section evaluates the achievement of FFS output indicators to determine overall efficiency. Output indicators act as measurable benchmarks reflecting an entity's success in achieving its set targets. Efficiency in this context is determined by comparing actual values with that of target for each indicator. Full achievement corresponds to 100% efficiency, while partial achievement is assessed by calculating the efficiency as the ratio of the actual value to the target value. The analysis covers the three FFS implementation periods: 2016-2018, 2019-2020, and 2021-2023. The first year of FFS implementation, 2015, was omitted from this analysis due to lack of adequate data. A detailed output efficiency analysis is found under Annex 10.2.

Over the analysed periods (2016-2018, 2019-2020, and 2021-2023), there was a significant improvement in the average achievement of output indicators, increasing from approximately 75% in the first analysed period to 190% in the second, and remaining high at 151% in the last period. This suggests an overall positive trajectory in performance from the initial years of FFS implementation, with specific indicators playing a key role in driving the observed improvements. However, several factors likely influenced these outcomes, which are detailed in the section of utilization (finding 15).

## Efficiency Ratios

Although a precise quantitative correlation between annual total budget expenditure and output indicators could not be established due to the wide variation in scope and resource allocation for each indicator, the evaluation team gained insights through an exploratory analysis. This analysis involved comparing the average achievement of output indicators with that of expenditures for analysed periods, resulting in efficiency ratios.

Figure 9 in the annex shows efficiency ratios for the three FFS periods.

**2016-2018 Period:** During this period, an average of 75% of output indicators was successfully attained, utilizing an average of 58% of the allocated budget for this period. This resulted in an efficiency ratio of 1.29, signifying a high level of efficiency with a balance between achieving outputs and budget utilization.

<sup>57</sup> Such benchmarks for UN organizations are not publicly available.

<sup>58</sup> Rajasingham, Sanjivi et al. Independent Evaluation of the Infrastructure Partnerships Program and the Water and Sanitation Initiative Global Program (212). <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/wash-ipp-wsi-ind-eval.pdf>

**2019-2020 Period:** In this specific time frame, an average of 190% of output indicators was accomplished, making use of 79% of the allocated budget. The resulting efficiency ratio of 2.4 highlights a much higher level of efficiency, showcasing improved fund optimization leading to a relatively high increase in output.

**2021-2023 Period:** Throughout this period, an average of 151% of indicators was met, utilizing 53% of the allocated budget. This resulted in an efficiency ratio of 2.85, demonstrating even higher efficiency. The noteworthy overachievement in outputs with a lower percentage of the allocated budget underscores the effectiveness of resource utilisation.

**FINDING 13: The scope and average cost of overall service delivery under the windows 2 and 4 were similar, in terms of percentage of total expenditure, the percentage of total beneficiaries, and the cost per beneficiary indicating effective management of resource allocation across various projects under the two windows, although there may have been missed opportunities for optimising costs to achieve greater cost efficiency.**

### Cost Efficiency by Window and Region

Due to wide variations in the size and scope of projects implemented under each window in each location, it was not feasible to calculate and compare the average cost per beneficiary for projects of similar scopes and sizes. Therefore, the evaluation analysed the cost per beneficiary of total assistance delivery under Windows 2, and 4, across the five regions. The evaluation found that the scope and average cost of overall service delivery under these two windows were similar, from a comparative cost efficiency analysis angle. This involved analysing critical metrics, including the percentage of total expenditure, the percentage of total beneficiaries, and the cost per beneficiary under each window in each of the five regions.

#### Window 2:

As shown in Table 6, the overall average cost for delivering assistance per beneficiary under Window 2 varied among the five governorates, with a combined average cost of \$1,286 per beneficiary across all five regions.

Nineveh had the highest total expenditure and the largest percentage of beneficiaries (62% and 71%, respectively), indicating substantial project volume and impact. The region achieved the lowest cost per beneficiary at \$1,116. This showcases an efficient use of resources, particularly noteworthy for a region with a higher volume of beneficiaries. The economy of scale appears to be a contributing factor to the lower cost per beneficiary, reflecting effective management and distribution of project costs across a larger population.

Anbar follows with the second-highest total expenditure and a significant percentage of total beneficiaries (29% and 23%, respectively). This suggests a relatively low-cost efficiency, with a cost per beneficiary of \$1,590, compared to overall average of \$1,286. While not as low as Nineveh, Anbar still demonstrated an effective balance between expenditure and the number of beneficiaries.

Salah Al-Din, despite having a lower percentage of total expenditure and total beneficiaries (5% and 4%, respectively), maintained a cost per beneficiary of \$1,780. This reflects a reasonable equilibrium between expenditure and the number of beneficiaries, indicating slightly low efficient resource allocation for optimal impact.

Kirkuk, serving the second lowest percentage of total beneficiaries at 2%, exhibited a significantly higher cost per beneficiary at \$2,723, compared to overall average of \$1,286. The lower volume of beneficiaries in Kirkuk may have contributed to a less favourable economy of scale, resulting in higher project management costs per beneficiary.

Diyala served the lowest percentage of total beneficiaries, at less than 1%. This led to a cost per beneficiary of \$2,743, considerably higher than the overall average of \$1,286, suggesting that the economy of scale related to project management costs may have been a contributing factor to the relatively higher cost. Additionally, high costs of providing security for service delivery contributed to the comparatively high cost per beneficiary.

In summary, the analysis emphasizes the significance of the economy of scale, particularly evident in Nineveh, where a higher volume of beneficiaries correlated with a lower cost per beneficiary. This underscores the importance of spreading project management costs effectively across a larger population to achieve greater cost efficiency.

#### **Window 4:**

As shown in Table 6, the average cost for the delivery of assistance per beneficiary under window 4 also varied significantly among the five governorates, with an overall average cost per beneficiary for all five regions of \$62.

Salah Al-Din stands out as a cost-efficient region with the lowest cost per beneficiary at \$36. Despite a relatively smaller share in both total expenditure (2%) and total beneficiaries (3%), its efficient utilization of resources makes it a noteworthy performer.

Nineveh emerges as a region with a balanced approach, with a cost per beneficiary at \$46, well below the overall average. Despite representing a substantial share in both total expenditure (25%) and total beneficiaries (34%), Nineveh's cost efficiency reflects a reasonable alignment between scale and resource utilization.

Anbar exhibits a moderate level of cost efficiency with a cost per beneficiary at \$61, almost at par with the overall average, ranking third in this metric among the regions. The percentage of total expenditure and beneficiaries stands at 2%, aligning closely with its proportional share.

Kirkuk, while boasting the highest total expenditure (70%) and beneficiary coverage (61%), seems to have faced challenges in cost efficiency, evident in its comparatively higher cost per beneficiary at \$72.

Diyala presents unique challenges in cost efficiency, as reflected in its significantly higher cost per beneficiary of \$616, the highest among the regions. The region's minimal share in both total expenditure (1%) and total beneficiaries (0.11%) reflects the significantly higher costs of delivering assistance—primarily attributed to the high costs of providing security and high project management expenses spread over only 0.11% of the total beneficiaries.

In summary, Salah Al-Din emerges as a standout performer, demonstrating exceptional cost efficiency with the lowest cost per beneficiary at \$36. Despite its relatively smaller share in both total expenditure and total beneficiaries, the region's efficient resource utilization positions it as a noteworthy case study for effective cost management.



In contrast, Kirkuk, despite having the highest total expenditure and beneficiary coverage, demonstrates challenges in cost efficiency, indicated by a comparatively higher cost per beneficiary at \$72. The region's significant scale of projects suggests that despite serving a substantial number of beneficiaries, there might have been missed opportunities for optimizing costs to achieve greater cost efficiency.

The quantitative findings are corroborated by stakeholders' feedback, including responses to survey questions. That is, given the change of scale that occurred onto the FFS starting 2017<sup>59</sup>, the UNDP adapted its organizational capacity on an **operational level**, using a set of measures taken at its inception to ensure speed and delivery. As such, there is a widespread perception that **human resources** remained sufficient to meet organizational needs, which was largely attributed to third-party contracting through long-term agreements (LTA). This arrangement has allowed FFS to quickly hire field staff for implementing and monitoring activities without going through UNDP recruitment procedures. Moreover, the phased rollout of the four FFS windows was coupled with adjustments in organizational capacity to meet the changing needs and priorities on the ground.

### Evaluation Question 9

*Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve the Programme outcomes?*


#### **Finding 14. FFS Resources were mostly allocated to public work and infrastructure rehabilitation (window 1), aligning with its core objectives, of rapid stabilization albeit with uneven allocation between areas.**

Resources were primarily allocated to infrastructure rehabilitation in an approach to ensure the return of IDPS; respondents agreed that the FFS has proven successful in rehabilitating existing infrastructure through rapid and large-scale delivery (Speed and Scale). FFS was provided extensive resources to carry out its action. The total budget allocation (2015-2023) amounted to \$2.12 billion, with total expenditure of \$1.32 billion. Window 1 accounted for 86% of total allocations and 78% of total expenditures. Other 3 windows and cost categories each accounted for 5% or less of total allocations and 7% or less of total expenditures. This aligns with the core objective of FFS' immediate and large-scale stabilization work, which requires addressing the extensive level of damage and destruction experienced in the liberated areas. (see Table 6 Annex 10.1) The social cohesion pillar (window 4) accounted for a minimal percentage of the total FFS budget (1%) with a budget, which passed from 1.8 million USD during the MTE period to 16.5 million USD for the overall implementing timeline.

**Geographical disparity.** Figures confirm stakeholders' perception around uneven allocation across regions and cities with Nineveh receiving the most, followed by Anbar, then, Salah Al-Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala. This disparity in resource allocation across regions and cities is due to several factors, including access to liberated areas, security, level of damage, population density, as well as donor and government priorities. A recurring example highlighted by both UNDP and national stakeholders was the case of Baiji and Tikrit, Nineveh plains and Mosul where the former was perceived to receive fewer funds despite experiencing more or comparable damage. (see finding 29)

<sup>59</sup> The number of projects passed from 32 in 2015 to 225 in 2016 to ultimately jump to 1,287 in 2017.

Figure 7: Number of projects distributed per governorate, by 30 September 2023<sup>60</sup>.



The perception of uneven allocation of resources appeared as a major conclusion from the FGDs conducted across the field work across the target governorates. Table 7 (Annex 10.1) shows the disparity in the satisfaction levels between different governorates with a clear correlation to the fact these areas had received less resources from FFS, mainly Diyala and Salah Al-Din and somehow Anbar in the areas of social cohesion and transition towards development.

Interviewees spoke of the following under-served regions / areas mainly Nineveh plains – in comparison to Mosul; Areas in Salah al-din such as Makhoul, Tilal, Tooz, Baiji, Al-Shirqat, Yathrib, Balad, Al-Awja Hamrin Mountains, Main border area in Anbar: AlQaim, and areas in Diyala: Jalawla, Al-Saadiya, Alozaim- North of Mokdadiya, Almansouriya.

**FINDING 15. FFS set up a rapid and efficient procurement system and procedures, aligned with the scale of the project's goals, but could not avoid significant delays in implementation.**

**Adherence to Project Budget and Timeline**

Due to data constraints, particularly the absence of project procurement data, comprehensive information on project budget and timeline was not available.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, the limited analysis presented here is derived from the evaluation team discussions with UNDP team members, providing insights into procurement efficiency, based on the premises that acquiring resources strategically within budget limits and deploying them precisely not only enhances operational effectiveness but also maximizes value, leading to optimal project outputs and outcomes.

Many FFS projects faced extensions beyond their initially planned completion dates, a trend particularly prevalent in large infrastructure projects. These extensions can be attributed to various factors, such as expansions in project scopes to address emerging technical challenges, additional requests from end-users, the significant impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, prolonged delays in internationally sourced procurements, security challenges, and disruptions caused by political and religious events. Despite encountering challenges, such as delays in project implementation leading to project extensions and an estimated 10% budget overrun rate, the FFS procurement

<sup>60</sup>Source: UNDP Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 45.

<sup>61</sup> Procurement documents/data for FFS projects were not stored in a database, thus data needed to be collected manually from project documents. For instance, lists of beneficiaries for housing rehabilitation projects in the Anbar governorate were not made available to the ET. Not a single person seems to have been recorded during the implementation period in this region.

system demonstrated resilience and reasonable efficiency and agility in responding to the complexity of Iraq and ensuring successful project outcomes.

Furthermore, FFS implementation benefited from efficient procurement, allowing for rapid and large-scale initiation of projects. This was essential given the FFS had contracted over 95% of the work to local private sector, “thus reducing costs, supporting local economies, and creating income-generating opportunities”<sup>62</sup>, with the support of “Municipal Stabilization Advisors and Area Coordinators maintained close monitoring of the situation on the ground”.<sup>63</sup> UNDP also set up a “multi-layer control during project implementation to mitigate risks of corruption or other types of misconduct”<sup>64</sup>; with several cases being investigated resulting in corrective measures to some procurement rules.

UNDP managed to maintain flexibility and adaptability in the way projects would be implemented, “given the fluidity of the situation in Iraq”<sup>65</sup>. A dedicated service centre was established to ensure rapid and large-scale delivery. Several UNDP respondents noted how such arrangement allowed for ownership and sense of urgency, resulting in processing time of approximately 2 months. Leadership and staff competencies were also identified as key factors facilitating rapid procurement process. However, UNDP respondents have noted how in recent years, the average processing time has doubled to 4 months, leading to delays in project implementation and sometimes cancellation. This finding was corroborated in the MTE, which found that 92% of cases processed within 4-5 months, with the majority (75%) taking 4 months for the year 2019. Delays are mostly attributed to reduced staffing at the service centre, in addition to lengthy administrative and bureaucratic approvals and exemptions notably when importing medical equipment with the need to navigate approvals from both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Federal Government added significant time to the processing.

### **Estimated vs Awarded Project Costs**

Table 7 (Annex 10.1) presents a sample of 40 FFS projects randomly selected across the four windows and five locations. It is important to note that project procurement data is not stored in a central database, thus necessitating manual collection from each of the sample project documents. The table shows details for both estimated and awarded costs for each sample project. Notably, in 28 out of the 40 projects (highlighted in Red), the awarded costs were lower than the estimated costs by over \$2.2 million, reflecting savings of approximately 11% based on statistical analysis of a randomly selected subset, it can be extrapolated that there’s an 11% reduction in costs.

### **FINDING 16: Several factors influenced low budget utilization & high output achievements primarily stemming from budget overallocation.**

In the context of FFS low budget utilization, several factors contributed to the challenges faced, primarily stemming from budget overallocation. Below are some reasons behind low budget utilization, highlighting the impact of overallocation on financial management.

- **Higher-than-expected donor funding and unrealistic budgeting:** A key factor contributing to low budget utilization rates appear to be the reception of more funding from development partners than initially planned during the budget allocation process—in consultation with development partners and the government. That

<sup>62</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2021, p. 13.

<sup>63</sup> UNDP FFS First Quarterly Report for 2022, p. 12.

<sup>64</sup> UNDP FFS First Quarterly Report for 2022, p. 15.

<sup>65</sup> UNDP FFS First Quarterly Report for 2020, p. 30.

is, the budgets were originally developed based on conservative projections of external funding. The unexpected increase in donor contributions resulted in overallocation. The disparity between expected and actual funding levels left FFS overfunded, impacting its budget utilization.

- **COVID-19 Pandemic:** the significant impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on project implementation across the regions.
- **Security and logistical challenges:** While ongoing movement restrictions, logistical challenges, and security-related issues presented significant barriers to the prompt implementation of planned activities throughout the FFS implementation period,<sup>66</sup> they were more acute during the initial years. Thus, delays in access and project implementation in designated areas impeded the utilization of the allocated funds, thereby affecting the overall budget utilization.
- **Extensions of FFS implementation:** The practice of extending FFS implementation without making proportional adjustments to annual budgets resulted in overallocation. In instances where all outstanding funds were allocated at the end of a period—such as the allocation in 2018, the final year of the 2016-2018 period, which increased from \$178 million in the preceding year to \$487 million. Moreover, it rose again in 2020, the concluding year of the 2019-2020 period, from \$270 million to \$329 million. These abrupt increases in the budget without corresponding planning strained implementation capacity and impeded the effective utilization of resources.
- **Carryover of unspent funds:** The carryover of unspent funds from one year to another, particularly when large sums were allocated at the end of each period, compounded the challenge. While the intention might have been to ensure continuity, the practical outcome was budgetary imbalances and underutilization of resources in subsequent years.
- **Delays in international procurements:** Delays in the procurement process, particularly for equipment sourced internationally, significantly impeded project timelines. Lengthy procurement procedures resulted in unspent budget allocations, affecting the overall execution rates, and delaying project milestones.
- **Lack of periodic budget reviews:** Another contributing factor to low budget utilization was the absence of periodic budget reviews during the annual budgeting process. Failure to assess and adjust budgets based on changing circumstances and needs led to overallocations that did not align with the actual requirements for successful FFS implementation.

Variation in efficiency ratios and achievement of output indicators for the analysed periods were likely influenced by several factors. Lower expenditure and budget utilization were attributable to the overallocation of the budget, additionally, the conservative estimation and costing of targets for output indicators at the onset of each of the three FFS implementation periods<sup>67</sup>, based on anticipated donor funding rather than realistic funding.

The shifting of priorities also played a role in expenditure variation across the outputs. For instance, under Output 1 during the 2016-2018 period, Indicators 1.4 and 1.5 were significantly underachieved, with efficiencies of 2% and 10%, respectively. This was primarily due to a higher priority for infrastructure-related projects. Both indicators were related to social cohesion and capacity building. In contrast, Indicator 1.5 under Output 1 during the 2019-2020 period, associated with social cohesion, was overachieved by 671%. Indicator 1.9 under Output 1 during the 2021-2023 period, related to capacity building, was also overachieved at 671%. These shifts in priorities and their corresponding achievements significantly impacted the overall efficiency and achievement of output indicators for the specified periods.

<sup>66</sup> UNDP FFS Quarter One Report for 2023.

<sup>67</sup> Costing/estimates of planned output indicators were detailed in Project Document for each of the 3 analysed period, following substantive discussions with both donors and the government.

**Evaluation Question 10**

*To what extent did the monitoring and evaluation system put in place allow for continuous collection and analysis of quality and segregated data on expected outputs and outcomes?*

**FINDING 17. FFS deployed a fragmented and inadequate M&E system, as it increased attention to the consolidation of the M&E process later in the implementation phase.**

The evaluation found that the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system deployed for the FFS to be focused on outputs. Indicators were quantitative and data gathering tools were not elaborate nor periodic. Social cohesion and cross thematic issues were difficult to assess due to focus output level indicators, and limited focus on outcomes and processes around gender mainstreaming, disability, and environmental accountability. Social cohesion's sole output indicator relies on the "number of participants in social cohesion activities (gender disaggregated, cumulative)", arranged over a set of four "indicative activities", as per the revised PRODOC in 2018. Post the MTE, UNDP introduced an online system called PRISM to consolidate M&E process and results, improve projects tracking work- flow and delivery however the current evaluation could not examine the system nor validate its use.

FFS relied on a **muti-layered** Excel sheets **aimed at tracking output level results achieved on speed and scale**, where various stakeholders were involved and tasked with M&E responsibilities, including supervision engineers and their teams, international engineers, as well as Quality Insurance and Quality Control engineers. These efforts were complemented by an additional layer of donor-led third-party monitoring. As explained by several UNDP respondents, the M&E system remained output-oriented and focused on monitoring the achievement of specific targets, while learning events were seen to be highly pertinent in reflecting on the outcome level and informing the direction of FFS. Nonetheless, increased attention to outcome-oriented results resulted in a series of beneficiary surveys being carried out since 2018. Despite this positive development, FFS has not yet sufficiently matured to provide and consolidate data on key outcomes achieved. Similar tracking challenges were identified during the efficiency analysis, where project procurement data is not stored in a central database, thus necessitating manual collection from each of the sample project documents.

The M&E strategy lack qualitative indicators and monitoring tools, the social cohesion component indicator is restricted to number of participants in activities but does not to reflect results or changes in processes, agreements, dynamics or relationships. Moreover, context indicators are not identified, neither outcome indicators. Context monitoring appears to be practiced as an intuitive practice by staff which includes discussions, exchange with authorities and partner CSOs, and tracking through social media. FFS team also showed consideration to housing rehabilitation beneficiary feedback (See finding 10).

## 6.4 EFFECTIVENESS

This section focuses on the FFS achievements of stabilization objectives in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation, restoration of basic services, livelihood opportunities, and housing rehabilitation. It also examines differing conceptual interpretations around the scope of stabilization within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus, along with implications on the project's perceived effectiveness.

**Evaluation Question 11**

*To what extent has the project contributed to the outputs and outcomes as stipulated in prodoc?*

**Evaluation Question 17**


*To what extent has the FFS contributed to the improvements of local social, economic, environmental, and other development indicators?*

**Finding 18. FFS achieved considerable stabilization objectives, meeting needs and priorities in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of basic services.**

FFS activities have resulted in a measurable and demonstrable result in **the rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of basic services**, delivering 3,697 projects across liberated areas of Iraq in five governorates, across 10 sectors and 31 areas. UNDP FFS was considered as one of the top three stakeholders doing rehabilitation work, alongside the GoI, REFFATTO, and NGOs.<sup>68</sup> Feedback from FGDs shows a high proportion of respondents who see FFS as addressing needs and priorities for critical services, rehabilitating infrastructure, promoting economic growth, and encouraging stability. FFS has ensured that priorities are recognized and addressed in the 5 governorates; KIIS also highlighted the effectiveness in implementing projects, while staying agile in reacting to changing demands at various phases of the rehabilitation process. FGDs and KIIS from Diyala were less satisfied with FFS, this is also corroborated by KIIs and efficiency analysis (see findings 13 and 15. the figure below illustrates the percentages of beneficiaries per governorates.

<sup>68</sup> 2021, AARC – FFS Mid-Term Evaluation Report

Percentage of Beneficiaries per Governorate






**FINDING 19. FFS provided economic starter seed money aimed at immediately supporting the return of local economic activities in the target areas but missed essential economic opportunities and ensuring continuity.**

UNDP primarily provided seed money through Cash for Work (CfW) programmes, contracting local companies, the provision of seed grants to regenerate small businesses and support women-headed households. Respondents indicated that this provided returnees with immediate income and allowed for the initial return of economic cycle. Overall, UNDP reported creating 49,830 livelihood opportunities in target areas<sup>69</sup> (indicator 1.4), in supplement of its other programs under The Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP) and Building Resilience through Employment Promotion (BREP). It provided 4,153 grants including 2,865 for women beneficiaries (indicator 1.5), in addition to 6,618 small grants to women-headed households across the five governorates (indicator 1.6).

USAID evaluation considered the CfW activities “successful, unsurprisingly, in improving the income of participants [...] with nearly 50% of respondents noted that their lives, and income, have improved since the [CfW] activities”.<sup>70</sup> A UNDP CfW assessment carried out at the same period shows roughly the same ratio at 52% as to the meaningfulness of the CfW projects in the rehabilitation efforts in the liberated areas. The most recent survey conducted in the framework of this evaluation showed that 44.8% indicated some improvement in their ability to earn a living through the livelihood programs, and 21.3% indicated significant improvement. Broken down by gender, there was no significant ratio differences.

**Figure 8: Enhancement in livelihoods (2,987 respondents)**



Yet, the evaluation found that discrepancies in the beneficiaries’ livelihoods income amongst regions and rural vs urban areas. For instance, close to 26% of respondents in Nineveh and 30.7% in Diyala saw


<sup>69</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 52.

<sup>70</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility For Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report, USAID /Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xviii.

no improvement at this level, compared to 4.6% in Anbar. Discrepancies were also noted amongst ethno-religious groups, similarly, identified by USAID 2020 evaluation “[...] Shia, Sunnis, and Yazidis earned less than Christians and those who identified as “Other” in their payments, while Shabaks fared better than other ethnic groups in the cash received” 71. Whether this is due to discrimination, or other factors is unclear in the data”72 This evaluation found that earmarked funding to certain communities might be behind such discrepancies, as an approach of positive discrimination, or towards enhancing equity and to provide better incentives for some ethno-religious groups to return as indicated by key informants.

FFS seemed to provide a one view of livelihood projects in the form of short-term quick livelihood that provide only immediate gains with little consideration to longer term livelihood that fall short from ensuring continuity, or seed-funding of small businesses. FFS provided rehabilitation of basic agricultural infrastructure, training farmers, and providing small grants and assets to small farmers, including female farmers, however, according to FGDs and NGOs KIIs respondents, more emphasis is needed to support livelihoods of agriculture sector, which is a top concern for many of the rural areas impacted by conflict. Return to rural areas is bound by the revival of agriculture which constitutes the primary source of income for families. As a result, most KIIs stressed on the need for future stabilization programming to tackle longer term economic development challenges and issues.


**Percentage of females benefiting from the livelihoods program**



<sup>71</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report, USAID /Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xix.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*

Figure 9: Satisfaction with livelihood Programmes (596 respondents)




**FINDING 20: Housing rehabilitation was the second most needed and most appreciated result of FFS, and enhanced IDPs return.**

**Returnees benefited from the rehabilitation of their houses, as per re set conditions,** FFS reported rehabilitating 37,241 housing units in the action period 2015-2023, a higher achievement than the planned output of 32,000.<sup>73</sup> The evaluation captured gratitude and satisfaction of returnees for the works accomplished allowing them to return. Survey results with housing rehabilitation beneficiaries, reflected satisfaction from the quality of the housing with 67% rating it as either “excellent” or “good” (close to 71% among women) and 31% considering the works of being “average”. Only 2% rated the results as “poor”. In terms of geographic locations, the satisfaction ratios came back higher in Salah Al-Din and Diayala (79.9% rating the works as “excellent” or “good”), with the lowest perception measured in Kirkuk (falling to 50%).

The same survey results showed how most of the rehabilitation efforts had taken place shortly after the beneficiaries returned (88%), with 11% starting before they returned. In most of the cases (96%), the rehabilitation activities lasted between one to three months. Only a couple of cases endured significant delays, one construction lasting nine months and another one up to 15 months.

<sup>73</sup> UNDP FFS Third Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 52.


Figure 10: Beneficiaries' Satisfaction from Housing Rehabilitation (1157 respondents)



Many key informants mentioned insufficient **housing efforts** as one of the FFS’s main shortcomings; this is corroborated by FGDs which highlighted “limited funds” preventing a comprehensive refurbishment of houses, as home renovations are expensive and the budget cap 4,000USD per housing unit, restricted the scope of rehabilitation to limited spots on the ground floor only. As per the survey, the satisfaction ratio is higher in Salah al Din and Diayala, and worst in Kirkuk.

According to respondents, housing rehabilitation remains highly needed, as it is identified as one of the main reasons for preventing the remaining IDPs to return, as more than a million remain displaced from the previously occupied territories. Several challenges hindered housing rehabilitation efforts, including IDPs’ lack of registration documentation, disputes over land ownership, and power dynamics involving negotiations with local political actors. Survey responses also indicated that 52% of the housing has been completed before return in Kirkuk and 31.8% in Diyala, whereas only 8.28% in Nineveh and 1.39% in Salaheddin. No data was collected from Anbar, as the sample did not include beneficiaries from Anbar (see limitations above) which indicates that better planning was conducted in Kirkuk and Diyala in comparison with Nineveh and Salaheddin. (Figure 16 Housing timeline).

Figure 11: Housing Rehabilitation Timeline (1157 respondents)



**Evaluation Question 12**

*To what extent has the project integrated the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus in its design and implementation?*

**FINDING 21. FFS faced a dilemma of defining the stabilization scope within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus as stabilization can present a new dimension to the HDP nexus.**

FFS falls under a new yet to be fully defined stabilization paradigm that can intersect with some elements of HDP, and the newly introduced durable solutions (in 2021). FFS seems to be carrying out a mandate in direct relation with post-war reconstruction. Out of the four legs of UN-led stabilization efforts identified by Wittkowski<sup>74</sup> (1) Supporting political processes that strengthen state institutions and provide legitimacy, while at the same time enabling social reconciliation; (2) Contributing to a safe environment that ensures the protection of civilians; (3) Demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (or families) as well as mine clearance; (4) Strengthening an effective and accountable security sector as well as the rule of law and human rights)<sup>75</sup>, only point 2 was directly relevant to the FFS action. Setting the scope of what stabilization should entail, was a main challenge that the FFS faced with refining what are the boundaries and components of stabilization. While UNDP interlocutors themselves “in most instances use the term stabilization interchangeably with a range of other terms and concepts that pertain to programmes in conflict affected countries such as peacebuilding, recovery and conflict prevention

<sup>74</sup> Andreas Wittkowski. Stabilization: A Cross-cutting Task to Overcome Imminent Violent Conflict. Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF): Berlin, 2017; quoted in UNDP 2017 Annual Report, p. 25

<sup>75</sup> Andreas Wittkowski. Stabilization: A Cross-cutting Task to Overcome Imminent Violent Conflict. Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF): Berlin, 2017; quoted in UNDP 2017 Annual Report, p. 25.

and their programmes included elements of reintegration, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, prevention of violent extremism, durable solutions, resilience, etc.”<sup>76</sup>.

FFS UNDP Iraq has reflected on definitions and boundaries in its reporting<sup>77</sup>, while quoting the works of Robert Muggah who explained how Stabilization projects operate in a condition in which there is “armed conflict, emerging from war, or suffering from extreme forms of organized (and frequently criminal) violence...[and where] governments...seem unable and/or unwilling to fulfil the social contract which in turn contributes to declining service delivery, tax take, and regime legitimacy”.<sup>78</sup>

In Iraq, the stabilization scope of the FFS was determined based on the most immediate needs in consultation with the GoI and the PCCs, eventually determining “that the most effective and efficient way to do so was to expedite the return of Iraqis to their homes immediately following liberation and to support them in moving towards having different facets of their lives return to normal”.<sup>79</sup>

Consequently, the evaluation team has identified persistent **lack of consensus in defining stabilization within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus**, and durable solutions which has notably resulted in unclear boundaries between development and stabilization goals and objectives. Similarly, USAID evaluation had pointed in 2020 how “stabilization is a relatively new phenomenon to the development space, and measuring its efficacy is still mired in debate. Furthermore, there is no consensus on whether outputs from development programmes can be used to measure stabilization or if there is a correlation”.<sup>80</sup> This evaluation emphasizes that clarifying such conceptual frameworks is crucial to optimize the effectiveness and impact of UNDP stabilization programming and navigate the transition from immediate stabilization to long-term development in pursuit of overarching peace objectives.

### Evaluation Question 13

*Was the Project flexible responding to the changes in the environment and the needs of beneficiaries during the implementation?*

## **FINDING 22. FFS encountered some shortcomings in ensuring response to some emerging needs in terms of housing and capacity building.**

From the onset of the design, FFS was a government lead effort, FFS often strived to guarantee working with the government (and PCCs) and ensuring government buy-in. The four windows identified (finding 2) as critical to facilitate the return of IDPs were agreed upon with the government.

**Housing** as part of FFS response was later included under the Durable Solutions framework on GoI upon the establishment of the DSTWG, which was set up at the end of November 2020 under the overall leadership of the

<sup>76</sup> Rajeev Pillay, Jan-Jilles van der Hoeven. Stabilization: An Independent Stock-Taking and Possible Elements for a Corporate Approach for UNDP, 2017, p. 8.

<sup>77</sup> UNDP. Annual Report, 2017, p. 25.

<sup>78</sup> Robert Muggah. The United Nations Turns to Stabilization, December 5, 2014, available at <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/>; quoted in UNDP 2017 Annual Report, p. 25.

<sup>79</sup> UNDP. Annual Report, 2017, p. 26.


<sup>80</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report USAID /Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. 20.

Durable Solutions Task Force (DSTF).<sup>81</sup> GoI sought UNDP's assistance due to the identification of housing rehabilitation as a crucial factor influencing the return of IDPs, coupled with the government's limited financial resources to address this need. The FFS's housing rehabilitation efforts were guided by an initial assessment and selection process, which developed selection criteria such as the level of damage and the feasibility of rehabilitation; based on which FFS have assigned a cap of (\$4,000 USD) for rehabilitation by a contractor. While more most surveyed housing rehabilitation beneficiaries report high levels of satisfaction with the quality of rehabilitation works, many national stakeholders perceive it as insufficient and emphasize its continuous need (see Finding 20).

Nonetheless, few respondents spoke of a better alternative to UNDP model provided by UN Habitat approach to housing where the homeowners used local resources to rebuild their homes instead of corporate contractors; and where design and conditions were more suitable to the needs of the population, including but not limited to accessibility and environmental conserving practices. In that, as specified earlier in the report, there was little to no coordination between FFS and other international stakeholders, as the trade-off clearly went for speed and scale in order not to risk slowing down the rehabilitation efforts.

**Capacity building to public servants;** FFS consolidated capacity-building opportunities for government officials and employees, reaching 12,261 persons, among which 2,613 women, far surpassing the initial target of the output set at 3,000 beneficiaries. However, feedback from key informants and survey respondents showed an urge for a more calibrated focus regarding capacity-building. While most respondents appreciate the content (96%), quality (95%) and usage (78%) of the provided training material, 99% expressed the need for more specialized trainings, and more advanced level.

Figure 12: Training Satisfaction Timeline (1169 respondents)



On the one hand, the unmet expectations expressed by some national stakeholders could be partly attributed to the perceived substantial financial opportunities associated with FFS, potentially leading to heightened expectations. KIIs also indicated conflicting perceptions of the FFS' shortcomings – showing a prevalent lack of

<sup>81</sup> Source: Global Shelter Cluster. Iraq Housing-HLP (Durable Solution) page, available at [https://sheltercluster.org/iraq/pages/iraq-housing-hlp-durable-solution#:~:text=The%20Durable%20Solutions%20Technical%20Working,Solutions%20Task%20Force%20\(DSTF\).](https://sheltercluster.org/iraq/pages/iraq-housing-hlp-durable-solution#:~:text=The%20Durable%20Solutions%20Technical%20Working,Solutions%20Task%20Force%20(DSTF).)





common understanding of stabilization objectives. This might, in part, stem from the initial lack of a well-defined transition strategy, and the introduction of durable solutions concept that shifted the paradigm towards a longer intervention which would have allowed for delineating clear expectations regarding the conclusion of stabilization, recovery, and development.

**FINDING 23. FFS did not initially incorporate accessibility and environmental specs into building plans, thus falling short of ensuring environment sustainability.**


Since 2015 FFS committed to re-construct buildings following the initial specs that were initially adopted when the buildings / infrastructures were built in the last century without any changes; this in turn poses a challenge with respect to the extent to which these essential infrastructures will respect accessibility, and environmental specifications. Some governorates’ engineers highlighted the odds to reconstruction based on “outdated governmental specs that have not been reviewed since the 70s of last century”; also pointed out in USAID previous evaluation to the limited integration of accessibility considerations in buildings.<sup>82</sup> Despite the introduction of “build back better” in 2018 the evaluation inspection of 27 facilities clearly corroborates the above finding especially with respect to accessibility specifications, where only 52% of the inspected buildings have a ramp levelled area; and 33% has handrails; while only 19% has lifts and 52% has accessible toilets to PWDs:

**Figure 13: Specs of Building Accessibility (27 Inspection Visits)**




<sup>82</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report, USAID/Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xvii.

Figure 14: Specs of Toilets for Persons with Disability (Inspection Visits to public buildings)



The beneficiaries survey confirmed the finding related to PWD accessibility, where 65.25% indicated that the infrastructure is accessible to some extent, whereas 13.96% thought that it is inaccessible to PWD, and fairly the same percentage thinks it is accessible (14.6%) Figure 20 below.

Figure 15: Beneficiaries feedback on infrastructure accessibility to PWD (2987 respondents)




Despite recommendations issued by the MTE in 2021<sup>83</sup>, there is a general perception that FFS did not systematically address environmental sustainability. For instance, amidst Iraq facing a growing drought challenge, national stakeholders stressed the importance of supporting farmers through innovative practices and sustainable infrastructure such as water conservation and irrigation systems. Likewise, UNDP representative and national stakeholders identified few efforts to incorporate **environmental** considerations into infrastructure rehabilitation. Some examples provided by national stakeholders and UNDP representatives include solar power energy on some facilities, sustainable irrigation systems in some agriculture projects, and sustainable water waste management, such as the rehabilitation of the wastewater treatment plant in Tameem, Ramadi (Anbar) or the expansion of wastewater Treatment Plant in Fallujah Teaching Hospital, also in Anbar. However, Infrastructure

<sup>83</sup> Mainly recommendations 1, 2, & 3.

inspection reports of 27 sites clearly indicates very limited environmental practices, and accessibility measures into buildings. As a result, more than two thirds of the selected sites had a negative assessment outlook as per Figure 21 below.

**Figure 16; Average rating for Inspection per building (27 inspection visits)**



These efforts nonetheless remained limited, with no systematic integration of environmental sustainability considerations into FFS rehabilitation projects. According to UNDP respondents, reasons for such limitation include the absence of environmental considerations at the inception stage, poor incentives to use cost-efficient and readily implementable materials, and reduced funding in the later implementation stages despite growing interest in environmental sustainability (as shown in the development of green building rehabilitation plans). Other KIIs mentioned the local stakeholders’ “reflexes” of choosing thermic energy solutions over renewable ones, also to prevent any worry of finding skilled technicians close-by to ensure the maintenance of the energy installation. As such, energy needs by local authorities often involved the acquiring of an electric generator as a main preference, while not being encouraged by the UNDP to potentially switch to the installation of solar panels. On one hand, the preference towards the generator stems from common representations as to the energy sources local authorities and stakeholders are used to. On the other, the UNDP had little incentive to boost an energy transition as this growing technology still lacks adequate numbers of skilled technicians and maintenance warrantees. On that note, respondents from vocational training centres highlighted the importance of engaging in this transition, namely in “quickly attaining more hybrid systems”. Those who have initiated this turn have been resorting to donors’ sources independent from the FFS action. As such, the FFS did not capitalise enough on the opportunity to gradually integrate a more environmental-friendly vision during its implementation.

In terms of environmental specs. Results of 27 buildings’ inspection clearly indicated that energy efficiency (Figure 22) was relatively limited, with only 52% have energy star rated appliances, 30% has onsite solar panels and 22% has rain barrels. Whereas it was clear that some specs were implemented such as light timers, and exterior walls insulation.

Figure 17: Level of Respect to Energy Efficiency Specs (27 Inspection Visits)





Figure 18: Inclusion of Water Conservation Specs (27 Inspection Visits)



**FINDING 24.** There were multiple expectations regarding the scope of stabilization efforts of FFS, as the project was evolving, learning and adjusting to boundaries and mandate.

Despite respondents’ consensus on the FFS’s main achievements under windows 1 and 2, implementation revealed multiple understanding and expectations around the mandate and results of stabilization. The evaluation makes a distinction between:

- **perceived expectations when seeing stabilization as foundational** providing immediate remedial to ensure return such as restoration of basic service, cash for work, and housing.

AND

- **perceived expectations when approaching stabilization from a development approach:** Expectations of long-term economic growth, systemic approach in social cohesion, government capacity building at institutional level.

This evaluation contextualizes such ambiguity within the broader need and ongoing effort to refine stabilization's conceptual framework and to draw clear demarcation lines between 3 different frameworks: (i) HDP Nexus, (ii) stabilization and recovery, (iii) durable solutions. This necessity arises, in part, due to the recent emergence of the concept of stabilization, dating back to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and being only recently refined following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Stabilization differs from UNDP's primary engagement in development and governance programming, requiring speed and scale to restore the social contract between the State and communities. While this evaluation does not engage in analysis of the conceptual framework for stabilization, as it falls beyond its defined objectives, it acknowledges the impact of UNDP's stabilization project in Iraq, particularly in addressing immediate and medium-term needs in areas liberated from ISIL. (please also refer to finding 21)

## 6.5 SUSTAINABILITY

This section assesses the likelihood that the FFS achievements will last beyond the project's duration. It focuses on FFS efforts to ensure sustainability of stabilization efforts as well as remaining gaps and challenges, falling both within and outside UNDP's control.

### Evaluation Question 14

*What is the likelihood that the Project results will be sustained long-term after a) completion of activities and handover to end-user, and b) after the closure of FFS?*

### Finding 25. FFS efforts to ensure sustainability of the stabilization effort, were late and does not clearly lay down steps and processes to ensure transition.

In 2020, the FFS Steering Committee agreed to extend the mandate of the programme until December 2023, with the agreement that year 2023 will be a transition year for FFS, and mandated UNDP to prepare a transition plan to ensure the smooth wind-down for programme activities by December 2023. **The absence of Transition was one of the loopholes identified**, by both the 2021 MTE and the 2020 German assessment, which noted how the "conceptual approach to achieving long-term sustainability is insufficient".<sup>84</sup> The awaited transition plan was put forward late in 2022, to sustain stabilization gains achieved through the programme during its period of implementation.<sup>85</sup> The transition plan sets out a timeline from 2023 until 2026, as the FFS received another extension.

Evaluation respondents consistently underscored challenges to the sustainability of stabilization gains, signalling a prevailing sense of scepticism regarding long-term viability. The transition strategy itself detailed several contextual and external challenges which dubbed as out of UNDP sphere of influence, mostly related to the political buy in, macro-economics, fiscal policies, poor guarantees to ethnic and religious communities, inflation, COVID, and donors' commitment. The transition strategy also deliberated over risks and challenges specific to the GoI mainly (i) **Insufficient allocation of technical and financial resources** at the sub-national levels, coupled

<sup>84</sup> Joyn-Coop. Mid-term evaluation of the German Contribution to the FFS and ICRRP in Iraq, German Financial Cooperation with UNDP in Iraq, 30 October 2020, p. ii.

<sup>85</sup> UNDP Draft FFS Transition Strategy.

with a limited long-term planning hindering the government's ability to ensure long-term maintenance, investments, and capacity building; (ii) **limited governmental will**, due to personality-based politics and on individuals champions reliance (iii) **High turnover and lack of institutional handover processes**, resulting in a loss of technical knowledge and expertise (iv) **Fluctuation of government revenue** due to its reliance on the oil sector, affecting governorates' budgets.

The Transition Strategy draft also identified one additional challenge, namely **increased tensions between communities, and possible ISIL resurgence**, thereby threatening the sustainability of the return process and resulting in new displacements. To address the challenges, "the draft Transition Strategy dated June 2022 seeks to monitor the following structural risks: i) overall country fragility; ii) weak governance at the national and local level; iii) limited economic diversification; iv) weak business and economic environment; and v) climate change".<sup>86</sup>

The evaluation found that there are a few challenges within UNDP's control that have not been sufficiently addressed, which included:

- **Late planning for the Transition Strategy.** There is a consensus among respondents that the transition strategy should have been developed from the outset of FFS. As explained by a few UNDP interlocutors: "stabilization can only be foundational in nature and should not take on a development role." "From the stabilization programme's design phase, national and sub-national governments, supported by UNDP and partners, should plan on transitioning stabilization-generated opportunities into recovery, peace and development programmes for long-term impact on people's lives in the targeted area"<sup>87</sup>. This also highlights the undefined boundaries between stabilization and development (finding 21 and 24), The transition plan also falls short of explaining how the transition will contribute to the durable solutions that UNDP has committed to in 2021 with Gol.
- **Insufficient formal agreements between UNDP and national stakeholders.** These were identified as crucial steps to enhance government commitment in allocating the necessary resources for the operation and maintenance of rehabilitated facilities after handover (e.g. MoU, letter of commitment). The Transition Strategy outlines how written commitments from local government officials were sometimes secured. However, the evaluation found little evidence for the systematic implementation of this approach. Moreover, even with the presence of such written commitment, UNDP has little to no oversight mechanism to ensure commitment.

Nonetheless, the evaluation found that the transition strategy speaks of the need for "(i) sustained resources, (ii) sustained technical and managerial capacity, (iii) a conducive policy and regulatory environment, and (iv) sustained political commitment to pursue the identified objectives". These necessary preconditions cannot be achieved within the timeline of one year transition notwithstanding the complexity of governance, fiscal, economic, and social reform in Iraq. Moreover, the roadmap components per each window of the transition plan rather represent high level objectives and not concrete actions to be implemented. The same roadmap "actions" then appear as recommendations set forward to the Gol, blurring the lines in terms of roles and responsibilities between UNDP or Gol.

<sup>86</sup> UNDP FFS Draft Transition Strategy.

<sup>87</sup>The Stabilization Guidance note (December 23).

**Evaluation Question 15**

*How effectively has the FFS generated country ownership and transferring to local authorities of the results achieved, the establishment of partnerships with relevant stakeholders and the development of in-country capacities to ensure sustainability of efforts and benefits?*

**Finding 26. UNDP handovers to Gol stakeholders enhanced their ownership of rehabilitated infrastructure despite indication that Gol stakeholders have no capacity to adequately ensure sustainability.**

FFS close engagement with the Gol ensured ownership over the stabilization agenda since design in 2015, and through the selection of infrastructure projects that were operational prior 2015 to ensure that resources and staffing were already allocated. Gol ownership also manifested through Gol durable solution plan in 2021; and the financial contribution of the Gol to stabilization efforts in the liberated governorates which reached US\$ 793 million channelled through the Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terrorist Operations (REFAATO) and the US\$ 116 million through financial and in-kind support to the FFS as a share in the efforts.<sup>88</sup> However, efforts to ensure preconditions to the sustainability of stabilization gains are limited (finding 25); and focussed on:

- **Transfer of skills and competencies to government staff** through continuous involvement in projects' planning and implementation, as well as **training** on technical and management aspects.
- **Building the capacity of Public Servants** in operation and maintenance of rehabilitated infrastructure, on new technologies used by rehabilitated infrastructure and on newly provided equipment and technologies (reaching 12,261 persons, among which 2,613 women, far surpassing the initial target of the output set at 3,000 beneficiaries.) to strengthen government capacities to sustain gains achieved by the FFS and for authorities to take over the stabilization agenda".<sup>89</sup>
- **Handover of projects, including necessary warranties for** technical defects that may arise to ensure the reliability and durability of the completed project. UNDP ensured liaison with Gol, to secure a written commitment from local government that they will accept responsibility and commit the necessary resources for the operation and maintenance of rehabilitated facilities after handover.

This evaluation found that for handover to succeed, strengthening mandate and capacity of local authorities to manage infrastructure should be considered in the design FFS and the transition. Similarly, the USAID evaluation noted how "although outside the scope of FFS, improving provincial authorities' capacity for revenue collection and budgeting may need special attention from the donor community and the GOI".<sup>90</sup> Moreover, it is unclear where does FFS mandate ends and where does UNDP role in the durable solutions coordination architecture, which was introduced with Gol in 2021, begins<sup>91</sup>; and how would that role facilitate or otherwise, the transition to Gol. In addition to lack of local authorities' fiscal mandate and capacities (which is out of the evaluation scope), Gol has not yet demonstrated engagement in reform efforts on macro-economic, public service, fiscal policies, economic development, neither did it manifested any commitment to political inclusion, human rights, and equity especially in hard to return locations to ensure sustainability of gains.

<sup>88</sup> US\$ 88.2 billion is the value of assessed damages and other negative consequences of the conflict in Iraq. Since 2016 the international coalition to fight ISIL has shown commitment to support Gol in rebuilding.

<sup>89</sup> UNDP FFS Second Quarterly Report for 2023, p. 13.

<sup>90</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report, Usaid/Iraq Performance Management and Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xx.

<sup>91</sup> Durable Solutions aims to bring together UN agencies, non-governmental organisations and other actors specialising in humanitarian, development, stabilization, and peace-building programming, and support the Government of Iraq to implement its national durable solutions plan.



## 6.6 IMPACT

This section assesses the overall changes that FFS brought to the lives and conditions of the target groups.


### Evaluation Question 16

*How did the FFS program contribute to a lasting stabilization process in the target areas? Did it promote a rights-based approach for all groups?*

### Finding 27. FFS achieved considerable stabilization impact with the safe and voluntary return of 4.86m IDPs out of 6mn.

FFS largely contributing to the **ultimate return of 4.8 million IDPs to their places of origin**. An estimate of approximately 6 million IDPs had been forcibly displaced during ISIS claim of Iraq territories. By the end of 2019, 4.5 million IDPs had returned.<sup>92</sup> Subsequently, the number of IDPs has shown a gradual but slower increase, reaching 4.863,072 by December 2023<sup>93</sup>. FFS activities have resulted in a measurable demonstrable positive change in the delivery of essential services in key geographic al areas since 2015 which impacted the lives of thousands of returnees and residents (non-returnees).<sup>94</sup>

**Figure 19: Beneficiaries' Satisfaction with Infrastructure Rehabilitation (2987 respondents)**




<sup>92</sup> IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), December 2020. Available at <https://dtm.iom.int/node/21421>

<sup>93</sup> <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/>

<sup>94</sup> USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility for Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report-USAID/Iraq Performance Management and Support Program, 6 April 2020, p. xiv.

Through 3,697 **infrastructure and of basic services** projects across liberated areas; UNDP FFS was considered as “one of the crucial elements that can support returnees”<sup>95</sup>. These achievements have been identified as contributing to **restoring a sense of normalcy**. Most respondents explained how the success of these initiatives was most evident in the visible return to life in several rehabilitated areas. National stakeholders for instance mentioned that “life has come back to the city” (referring to the city of Fallujah) as well as how “cities are buzzing”. Overall, the consensus around these achievements suggests that the FFS has largely contributed to return and functioning of essential facilities and public infrastructure such as water, electricity, bridges, roads, school, and hospitals. In the survey administered through this evaluation, which included both former IDPs and non-IDPs, 62.6 % of returnees across all surveyed areas stated they are very likely to stay in their areas, compared to only 49.7% of the non- returnees<sup>96</sup>. Moreover, 11% of non-returnees were “not sure” to remain in their homes, further indicating the risks of reverse displacement soon.

**Figure 20: Likeliness to stay in the current location (2987 respondents).**




Despite the positive impact, economic challenges are deemed to be the major challenge facing returnees, with 73.7% of males and 47.8% of females.

<sup>95</sup> UNDP Second Quarterly Report for 2017, p. 65.


<sup>96</sup> Survey Sample=2,987

**Figure 21: Challenges faced by Beneficiaries (594 respondents).**



Challenges mainly security, economic, and social still face a number of respondents. As per governorates: 57% of respondents from Anbar, 67% from Nineveh, and 70% from Salaheddin indicated economic challenges as the primary challenge they face post return.

**Figure 22: Challenges faced by Beneficiaries post return – aggregated by governorate (594 respondents).**



**Finding 28. FFS had limited contribution to enhancing the trust between national and local authorities on one hand and with local communities on the other.**

As many interlocutors, and national stakeholders were praising UNDP and the FFS for their extensive support in returning forcibly displaced populations in the targeted areas, many were hopeful for a continued financial effort by the donors, putting little trust in their own local authorities and their abilities to meaningfully take over the stabilization efforts. Lack of resources, complex bureaucracies and other obstacles were noted by many respondents, showing limited consolidation of trust towards local provincial, and national governments. Most respondents spoke of efficient, quick, and serious work of UNDP FFS in delivering project, comparing the scale and speed to similar national lead efforts (via REFAATO or others). This finding re-iterates the German assessment

that FFS “programmes likely contributed to the increased return of IDPs but did not succeed in improving trust in the government”.<sup>97</sup>

That said, most respondents emphasized FFS's limited contribution to building government capacities to deliver to the citizens. The evaluation notes that FFS mandate does not include institutional-level capacities such as financial and budget planning, strategic organizational development, and management but instead focused on enhancing capacities on individuals' level. While acknowledging the importance of adopting long-term institutional approaches, this evaluation emphasizes the need for a pragmatic and realistic approach to stabilization. Unlike addressing broader challenges of reform, bureaucratic processes or governance, weak political commitment, the primary focus of stabilization efforts should be on implementing practical remedial measures to restore essential government functions. Structural and systemic issues stem from deeply rooted institutional gaps existing prior to the ISIL war, placing them beyond the scope of stabilization efforts. (refer to finding 22 on boundaries).


**FINDING 29. FFS contributed to some aspects of the durable solutions mainly basic services and livelihoods but fell short of influencing social cohesion and communal peace. FFS also fell short in incorporating conflict-sensitivity approaches while working at speed and scale in many sectors.**

FFS operated in complex deep-rooted conflict between communities. The results of social cohesion initiatives were often perceived as limited or strictly granular and local by national stakeholders, interviewees and FGDs respondents, who could not identify specific examples showing how social cohesion initiatives of FFS effectively led to IDPs return in comparison with concrete initiatives, like for example the action of local peace committees which facilitated achieving tribal reconciliation through the enactment of the Anbar Pact. Several UNDP interlocutors also emphasized the long-term aspect of social cohesion, with some arguing that social cohesion fell beyond the boundaries of FFS's stabilization mandate. This was also mentioned in the MTE, which identified that community initiatives remained limited as to sufficiently achieve the overall intention of improving the conditions in communities of origin to expediate returns. Most respondents pointed that UNDP social cohesion worked through locally based partners who had access to communities, and tribal leaders to facilitate return of some IDPs. Poor social cohesion was identified as one of the challenges in the DSTWG report detailing the main barriers to return in June 2021<sup>98</sup>, in addition to availability of adequate housing (Check finding 18), and barriers related to security and safety.

<sup>97</sup> Joyn-Coop. Mid-term evaluation of the German Contribution to the FFS and ICRRP in Iraq, German Financial Cooperation with UNDP in Iraq, 30 October 2020, p. ii.

<sup>98</sup> UNAMI, 2021, Resolving Internal Displacement in Iraq: Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework June 2021

Figure 23<sup>99</sup>: Inter-Agency Durable Solutions report on main barriers to return in June 2021



Respondents also spoke of avoidance approach where FFS dropped some projects, or selected projects that have less tension points in areas where tensions between ethno-religious groups exist. Some UNDP personnel emphasized the avoidance approach indicating “we do not interfere in political struggles especially in Iraq where geopolitics is high”. This was also corroborated by the assessment of the German contribution to the FFS action considered that “speed and scale have been too heavily prioritized over conflict-sensitive and community participation”.<sup>100</sup> The evaluation has found that UNDP FFS had to make several trade-offs during its long engagement to ensure work in politically hot areas, balancing between cooperation with governors on one hand, and respecting power dynamics (and regional geopolitics) especially in sensitive areas controlled by the PMF. Several under-served regions / areas (finding 14) which benefited less from FFS efforts were highlighted; partial reasons behind that can be attributed to the complex political and regional dimension of the conflict and ethno-religious makeup of these areas: Nineveh plains – in comparison to Mosul; areas in Salah al-din such as, Tilal, Salman Bek in Tooz, Baiji, Bou Ajil, , Yathrib<sup>101</sup>, Balad, Al-Awja<sup>102</sup>, Main border area in Anbar: Al Qaim<sup>103</sup>, and areas in Diyala<sup>104</sup>: Jalawla, Al-Saadiya, Aloxaim- North of Mokdadiya, Al Mansouriya. The evaluation also reflects the MTE’s findings emphasizing the need to consolidate and refocus social cohesion activities on initiatives that contribute to facilitate the return of IDPs, focussing on threats to safety, human rights, and countering cultural shame in sensitive communities. Closely related to this concern, while most cities have restored most critical services, rural areas seem to be on the disadvantaged side, especially when these rural areas are also border areas. The scope of intervention in ethno-religious struggles and ability to manoeuvre complex geopolitical relations was challenging for FFS. It has been already stated multiple times with respect to the debate around boundaries and whether social cohesion is part of stabilization, or recovery, or HDP nexus, or durable solutions.

<sup>99</sup> UNAMI, Resolving Internal Displacement in Iraq: Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework, June 2021

<sup>100</sup> Joyn-Coop. Mid-term evaluation of the German Contribution to the FFS and ICRRP in Iraq, German Financial Cooperation with UNDP in Iraq, 30 October 2020, p. ii.

<sup>101</sup> Conflict between PMF and local tribes in Yathreb, and Balad was very harsh, religious tensions between Sunnis and Shiaa is slowing return to these areas.

<sup>102</sup> Sleeping ISIL cells

<sup>103</sup> Control of border with Syria by PMF

<sup>104</sup> Diyala is politically sensitive in the conflict over control of areas bordering Iran between PMF and Suniis.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

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The findings validate the Theory of Change assumptions and hypothesis, while improving short and medium-term living conditions in Iraq's newly liberated areas and equipping governmental officials at the local level to contribute to take over management of infrastructure. Social cohesion remained a challenge.

### Relevance:

The FFS in Iraq, aligned with national priorities, addressed the needs of 6 million IDPs, engaging governmental stakeholders at national and local levels. Implemented as a government-driven initiative, it focused on restoration of key basic services alongside infrastructure and livelihoods. While participation of rights holders in decision-making was not fully evidenced, the FFF remained relevant, expanding rapidly to newly liberated areas with adaptable organizational capacity. Its phased rollout across four "windows" facilitated stabilization efforts amidst security challenges. The FFF project documentation emphasized human rights, gender responsiveness, and conflict sensitivity, though operationalization of these principles lacked clarity, despite some improvement in gender integration since 2018. The design of FFS constituted a crucial stabilization tool to foster the conditions for the return of 4.8 million Iraqi IDPs to their places of origin that were affected by ISIL operations. FFS worked closely with governmental stakeholders to identify needs and priorities; however, the evaluation found little evidence as to how IDPs, and later returnees' inputs were factored into the action's design and implementation.

### Coherence:

The FFS multi-donor trust fund architecture effectively coordinated 30 donors, including , with governmental stakeholders central to needs assessment, prioritization, and project execution. Structured communication and decision-making through the PCCs minimized duplication. While sub-governorate coordination was well developed, while structured engagement on community levels and with the civil society is weaker. FFF primarily operated independently, with limited coordination with other international organizations and UN agencies, despite some interlinkages, to avoid duplication. FFF's sequential approach, progressing through four windows, prioritized reconstruction and CfW, with social cohesion added later. Despite its later integration, there's consensus on the importance of including social cohesion early, recognizing its role in facilitating IDP return.

### Efficiency:

FFS prioritized scale and speed, with ample resources totalling approximately US\$2.12 billion allocated from 2015 to 2023, of which US\$1.32 billion was spent. Window 1 received most funds (86% allocated, 78% spent), with other windows and costs representing smaller proportions. Discrepancies between planned and actual expenditure were noted due to the dynamic nature of stabilization work. Despite this, FFS demonstrated cost efficiency, with low project management costs compared to similar programs. Output efficiency remained high throughout implementation, particularly in windows 2 and 4. Resources primarily focused on public works and infrastructure rehabilitation in liberated areas, with uneven allocation across regions, correlating with satisfaction disparities among governorates, influenced by factors such as access, security, damage level, population density, and donors' priorities. FFS fell short of deploying an adequate MEL system, and a systematic feedback mechanism, which was compensated through intuitive informal feedback loop.

## **Effectiveness:**

UNDP managed to establish a workable and efficient framework aimed at rehabilitating liberated areas and enabled the safe and voluntary return of IDPs to their places of origin, as per durable solutions' international standards. The FFS successfully achieved stabilization objectives by delivering 3,697 projects across liberated areas of Iraq, meeting infrastructure and basic service needs. Recognized as a key stakeholder alongside the Government of Iraq, FFS was praised for addressing critical services, infrastructure rehabilitation, and promoting stability. Economic revitalization efforts, primarily through cash-for-work initiatives and seed grants, facilitated immediate earnings for returnees but lacked long-term economic development focus, particularly in agriculture. While housing rehabilitation efforts were appreciated, challenges such as limited scope, high renovation costs, and land ownership disputes persisted. FFS faced difficulties in defining stabilization within the broader humanitarian-development-peace nexus, resulting in unclear boundaries between development and stabilization goals. Shortcomings included insufficient response to emerging needs, limited disability inclusion and environmental sustainability in infrastructure projects, and a need for more specialized capacity-building opportunities.

## **Sustainability:**

The FFS faced challenges in ensuring the sustainability of stabilization efforts, with a late transition plan introduced in 2022 outlining steps from 2024 to 2026. Respondents expressed scepticism about long-term viability, citing risks such as insufficient resources at sub-national levels, government commitment issues, turnover, and oil revenue fluctuations. Challenges within UNDP's control, like late planning and lack of formal agreements, remained unresolved. While UNDP's handover to Iraqi stakeholders increased ownership of rehabilitated infrastructure, concerns arose about the government's capacity to sustain it. Efforts focused on skill transfer, capacity building, and project handover, but preconditions for sustainability remained limited. Challenges persist in consolidating the housing rehabilitation process, promoting social cohesion, incorporating conflict-sensitive approaches, mitigate adverse environmental impacts and incorporate environment friendly conditions in the project's action.

## **Impact:**

FFS significantly contributed to the safe return of 4.86 million out of 6 million IDPs, aiding in the restoration of essential infrastructure and public services. However, it had limited impact on trust-building between national and local authorities and communities due to resource scarcity and bureaucratic issues. While FFS improved basic services and livelihoods, it lagged in fostering conflict-sensitive approaches in its operations and dealing with communal grievances. Social cohesion efforts were overshadowed by local peace initiatives, with challenges in achieving long-term cohesion, particularly in conflict-affected areas controlled by groups like the Popular Mobilization Forces. Underserved regions faced neglect due to complex political dynamics, hindering FFS's effectiveness in promoting lasting stability.

## 8. LESSONS LEARNT

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### **The FFS has crafted a Functional Post-conflict Stabilization Model, that needs iterative model refinement.**

The evaluation of the (FFS) underscores the importance of iterative refinement before scaling up interventions. While the FFS Model demonstrates promise for application in diverse post-conflict settings, several key adjustments are imperative for its broader effectiveness. First, successful implementation hinges on securing commitment from pertinent political entities and fostering alignment with international donors' objectives. Without such alignment, replicating the FFS Model's achievements become significantly challenging. Second, a critical aspect for enhancing the FFS Model's applicability lies in reevaluating its sequential approach and emphasizing early integration of housing initiatives. This strategic adjustment is pivotal for realizing the model's overarching goals.

Furthermore, while the FFS Model shows potential applicability in forced displacement contexts, it necessitates the integration of a robust social cohesion component to bolster return dynamics and ensure the sustainability of the process. Achieving this entails heightened involvement of local communities, direct engagement with returnees, and leveraging FFS resources to negotiate social cohesion measures alongside addressing critical return conditions. In essence, the evaluation highlights the need for ongoing refinement and adaptation of the FFS Model to address contextual nuances and maximize its impact on post-conflict stabilization efforts.

### **Enhancing Gender and Human Rights Integration in Stabilization Efforts**

The evaluation underscores the commendable performance of the (FFS) in fulfilling its stabilization mandates. However, it emphasizes the imperative need to strengthen its gender and human rights-based approach to fully address the complexities of its operational context. While the FFS has demonstrated its relevance and efficacy within challenging socio-economic environments, there exists a critical gap in its design regarding the incorporation of human-centred approaches. This necessitates a thorough review of the stabilization framework to ensure alignment with principles of gender equality and human rights.

The current operational landscape, characterized by the involvement of both the GoI and subnational entities, presents an opportunity for the FFS to recalibrate its approach towards a more inclusive and rights-focused model. UNDP faces trade-offs in prioritizing a human-centred approach, which underscores the need for nuanced decision-making, and building on political capital with GoI. Furthermore, the intricate nature of the FFS's multi-sectoral interventions demands greater flexibility in addressing conflict sensitivity angles. Although gender considerations were somehow integrated into the project, the depth of its Human Rights-Based Approach remained relatively superficial.

The evaluation prompts a broader discourse on the expectations of stabilization efforts within the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, emphasizing the importance of elucidating trade-offs, boundaries, and limitations. Addressing the gap in integrating social cohesion within this framework is paramount, as is leveraging and bolstering grassroots-level initiatives to augment the FFS's impact.

In essence, the evaluation underscores the critical need for the FFS to enhance its gender and human rights integration to achieve more inclusive and sustainable stabilization outcomes within complex political context.

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## **Document what worked and what did not in terms of Planification, Budgeting, and M&E Tools for FFS Post-conflict Stabilization**

The evaluation highlights critical learning during the implementation of (FFS) Model's planning, budgeting, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) mechanisms, necessitating drafting of "what worked and what did not" in terms of actions and strategies. Leveraging accrued experience, UNDP could develop streamlined planning process, integrating geographic nuances and cross-sectorial issues. Additionally, procurement controls could be established to ensure expeditious yet transparent processes.

## 9. RECOMMENDATIONS

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### Transition the Action from Stabilization to Recovery

- **Clarify UNDP and FFS mandate, scope, and boundaries** to manage the upcoming transition phase from stabilization to recovery, while defining the mandate in terms of recovery frameworks and tools, especially in livelihoods, socio-economic issues, and clarifying the pathways of stabilization programming and transition from immediate stabilization to mid and long-term development and peace objectives. UNDP established itself as a major stabilization actor, contributing to the safe and voluntary return of millions of Iraqi IDPs. The next phase should focus on clarifying the interlinkages with the HDP nexus and fine-tune the mandate, scope, and tools bridging FFS with durable solutions. It seems essential to pursue these efforts while defining the mandate in terms of recovery frameworks and tools, especially in livelihoods, socio-economic issues have been identified as main factors preventing for the remaining IDPs and to alleviate any risk of secondary displacement in the short run. This also while clarifying the pathways of stabilization programming and transition from immediate stabilization to mid and long-term development and peace objectives. FFS need to maintain efforts under durable solutions, as to pursue coordination with national and local authorities with emphasis on including communities to address the return of the remaining 1.2 million IDPs to the liberated areas.
- UNDP to **engage more with Gol during the transition phase** to maintain the efforts under the standards and guidelines of durable solutions for forced displacement, which allow an open and direct cooperation channel with relevant national and local authorities. This framework would warrant further reflection as to potential trade-offs to be conceded to the given authorities in exchange for speed and scale dynamics. The action should consider extending such efforts to areas that have not yet been targeted, while increasing housing rehabilitation efforts and further reaching out to local communities.

### Further support Gol capacities to ensure sustainability

- **Continue developing governmental capacities to ensure local and provincial planning and management** of all aspects of the next recovery phase, as to achieve greater sustainability of the action's outputs. UNDP will need to address the public administrations expressed needs as to specialized and expert-level capacity-building to ensure a formal and smooth hand-over process of the action's outputs at the local and provincial levels. Namely, UNDP could consider training relevant governmental stakeholders on integrating conflict-sensitive approaches into all stages of project planning, implementation, and monitoring, in addition to peace-building dynamics and rule of law-based processes and guarantees. This in turn will allow stronger attention to long-term community rehabilitation efforts through projects targeting youth and vulnerable populations.
- **Consolidate the action's social cohesion window with a stronger human rights-based approach.** The action should consider expanding the social cohesion component and climate security in the coming transition phase, which is deemed crucial to encourage the return of the remaining IDPs and consolidate civil peace and coexistence at the local levels within the target areas. There is a need to take into consideration past and ongoing achievements on that level in the target regions and further develop workable partnerships. UNDP should also consider associating other specialized agencies dealing with issues

outside of its original scope, namely on the legal protection aspect or housing-land-property (HLP) issues under durable solutions, in addition to other difficult post-war matters such as the fate of the disappeared. UNDP is hence strongly encouraged to strengthen its human rights-based approach and include it across its ongoing and future windows of operations. FFS would need to rethink the trade-offs to be conceded through the close cooperation with the given authorities, which in such circumstances are very likely to be one of the parties to the conflict and factor them much earlier into the planification phase and devise a deconflicting mechanism.

## PHASE OUT FROM 'BUSINESS-AS-USUAL' DYNAMICS TOWARDS MORE AGILE APPROACH

- **Develop the planning, budgeting and M&E tools adapted to the scale and complexity of the action.** UNDP had acknowledged the need to shift from a "business-as-usual" model in the framework of implementing the FFS. Yet, many aspects pertaining to the design, implementation and monitoring of the action were not sufficiently adapted to the scale and complexity of the action. UNDP is strongly encouraged to improve its M&E systems to incorporate the need of processing the massive size of the output data and facilitate evaluation processes during and after the implementation of the action. This would facilitate the design efforts in addition to the budgeting process of the projects, enabling for easier periodic reviews during implementation. UNDP needs to consider resorting in a more systematic fashion to formal agreements with national stakeholders to facilitate the M&E track, while fostering long-term sustainability. A revision of the ToC would further ensure higher impact of this stabilization model, which will need to rely much more on local communities to preserve coexistence, achieve reconciliation and secure the necessary conditions for the return of the 1.1 million IDPs that are yet to be allowed to return to their places of origin. Moreover, Given the scale and intricacy of the FFS portfolio, Strengthening M&E processes is pivotal for accurately gauging FFS effectiveness and sustainability, ensuring smooth handover procedures, and enabling beneficiary tracking necessitating a shift in the FFS's operational mindset towards continuous learning and adaptation.
- Continue to conduct periodic budget reviews (annual and mid-year) to assess and adjust budgets based on changing circumstances to assess and adjust budgets based on changing circumstances, thereby ensuring efficient utilization of financial resources and minimising low budget execution rates in terms of cost efficiency by window and region.
- UNDP to engage in strategic planning and operational adjustments necessary to maximize resource efficiency across various regions and programs. The efficient utilization of resources in future projects, could benefit from a study and emulate the cost management strategies employed in Salah Al-Din under Window 4, where exceptional cost efficiency was achieved with the lowest cost per beneficiary, to develop a model for economies of scale building on Nineveh under Window 2 based on spreading costs over a larger population can significantly enhance cost efficiency.
- Prioritize activities linked to environmental sustainability. UNDP should consider expanding the environmental considerations in the next phase and encourage resorting to renewable energy sources, sustainable agricultural techniques, water waste management, and creation of green jobs. Focus could be shed on developing vocational education and training specific to environmental considerations to provide the market with skilled labor and expertise on that level. UNDP should give stronger attention to long-term

community rehabilitation efforts through specific actionable projects targeting youth and vulnerable populations.

## 10. ANNEXES:

### 10.1 Tables and Figures:

**Table 2b: GoI Planification Priorities**

IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 1: "Adopting an efficient administrative and financial system responsive to recovery needs, community stability requirements and sustainable peace building"
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 2: "Rehabilitating the infrastructure with a comprehensive and spatial coverage"
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Population and Workforce   Section 3: Good Governance Objective 6: Ensuring public participation in the decision-making process Human & Social Development   Section 3: Women Objective 2: Empowering women economically Objective 4: Empowering women in areas affected by terrorist acts
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Population and Workforce   Section 3: Good Governance Objective 3: Improving the application of administrative decentralization Objective 5: Improving the performance of the administrative system efficiently and effectively
IRAQ NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2018-2022)	Post-crisis reconstruction and development   Objective 4: Strengthening human immunity and protecting it against the risks of relapse Population and Workforce   Section 6: Poverty Alleviation Objective 6: Enabling and promoting the social, economic and political integration of displaced persons and returnees in liberated areas

Figure 24: Durable Solutions Architecture<sup>105</sup>






Figure 25: Women Beneficiaries from FFS (cumulative)<sup>106</sup>



<sup>105</sup>Durable solution architecture, cf. <https://iraqdurablesolutions.net/>

<sup>106</sup>source: UNDP FFS Annual Report for 2020, p. 36.

*Percentage of females to males in Social Cohesion Projects:*



## 10.2 Efficiency Related Graphs

**Table 4: FFS Budget, Expenditure, and Expenditure Ratios**

Category	Total - 2015-2023			
	Budget	% of Total Budget	Expenditure	% of Total Expenditure
Assessments	\$ 13,017,082	1%	\$ 450,723	0.03%
Window 1 - Public Works & Infrastructure Rehabilitation	\$ 1,828,698,270	86%	\$ 1,035,135,724	78.21%
Window 2 - Livelihood Assistance and Employment	\$ 91,496,517	4%	\$ 101,354,756	7.66%
Window 3 - Capacity Support to Municipalities	\$ 60,815,039	3%	\$ 102,469,360	7.74%
Window 4 - Peaceful Communities & Social Cohesion	\$ 16,510,809	1%	\$ 14,292,274	1.08%
Program Management	\$ 108,346,843	5%	\$ 69,609,564	5.26%
FFS Transtion	\$ 719,413	0%	\$ 185,178	0.01%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 2,119,603,975</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>\$ 1,323,497,580</b>	<b>100.00%</b>



Table 5: FFS Budget Execution Rates by Cost Category – (Data Source: UNDP)

Category	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate	Budget Execution Rate
<b>Assessments</b>			44%	26%					1%	3%
<b>Window 1 - Public Works &amp; Infrastructure Rehabilitation</b>	42%	47%	76%	44%	92%	50%	58%	74%	28%	57%
<b>Window 2 - Livelihood Assistanances and Employment</b>	33%	40%	227%	110%	408%	149%	53%	87%	17%	111%
<b>Window 3 - Capacity Support to Municipalities</b>	35%	384%	162%	138%	283%	2768%	311%	497%	28%	168%
<b>Window 4 - Peaceful Communities &amp; Social Cohesion</b>	79%	132%	128%	NO DATA	416%	458%	80%	128%	38%	87%
<b>Project Management</b>	69%	50%	41%	106%	95%	76%	82%	75%	28%	64%
<b>FFS Transition</b>									26%	26%
<b>Gender</b>									9%	9%
<b>REFATOO</b>									34%	34%
<b>Total</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>84%</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>105%</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>62%</b>

Figure 26: FFS Budget Performance, Output Indicators Achievement, and Efficiency Ratios (Data Source: UNDP)





Figure 27a: FFS Budget Execution Rates Total – Data Source: UNDP



**Table 6: Satisfaction levels between different governorates -Results of FGDs with public sector**

Table: FGDs with public sector stakeholders as to their perception of FFS action	Ricard scale from 1 to 5 as to agreeing with statement				
	Kirkuk	Diyala	Salah Al Din	Nineveh	Anbar
FFS met needs & priorities	4.4	3.5	4.1	4.6	4.8
FFS ensured coordination & partnerships	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.7	4.7
FFS contributed to returning displaced individuals to liberated territory	4.1	3.7	3.4	4.5	3.9
FFS addresses the problems of disadvantaged groups, including handicapped people and women-headed households	3.3	2.5	2.9	3.8	3.8
FFS promotes social cohesiveness in the freed zones	4.3	3.6	3.1	4.1	3.2
FFS strengthens institutional capacity-building at the municipal level	4.1	3.7	3.9	4.8	4.7
FFS helps to transition to development and improves peace possibilities in affected regions (HDP nexus)	4.3	3.9	3.8	4.2	3.9


Table 7: Estimated vs Awarded Project Cost (Data Source: UNDP)

#	Project	Sector	Governorate	Estimated Cost \$	Awarded Cost \$	Cost Difference \$
1	Full Rehabilitation of Al-Nahreen Primary School for Boys (12 Classes) in Al-Busooda - Karma	Education	Anbar	539,999	429,363	110,636
2	Rehabilitation of Haditha Vocational Secondary School - Anbar-Iraq	Education	Anbar	499,663	516,263	(16,600)
3	Rehabilitation of School supplies warehouse in Baiji	Education	Salah Al-Din	53,310	41,208	12,102
4	Full Rehabilitation of annex (4) classrooms for Al adnania Secondary School in Suleiman bek-Salahuddin Governorate-Iraq	Education	Salah Al-Din	81,228	71,358	9,870
5	Rehabilitation of Six schools in Al Muqdadiya District	Education	Diyala	485,149	444,526	40,623
6	Full Rehabilitation of Al-Jafaa Sub PHCC in Falluja	Health	Anbar	292,781	239,367	53,414
7	Rehabilitation of Al-Obaidi General Hospital in Al-Qaim	Health	Anbar	1,369,672	1,273,205	96,467
8	Rehabilitation of Al-Zejalba Water Complex in Al-Jazeera District – Karma	Water	Anbar	88,710	115,045	(26,335)
9	Rehabilitation of Haditha Unified Water Plant	Water	Anbar	1,161,359	1,041,895	119,464
10	Rehabilitation Works of Baiji WTP Stage 2	Water	Salah Al-Din	1,956,412	1,579,560	376,852
11	Rehabilitation of Suleiman bek water Station Project (350m3hr)- Suleiman bek	Water	Salah Al-Din	483,920	341,170	142,750
12	Supply and Installation of Water Complex 50m3hr in Seeh Khan Bani Saad	Water	Diyala	240,933	284,325	(43,392)
13	Rehabilitation of Thaileb Bridge on the Way Between Ramadi and Al-Rahaliya	Roads & Bridges	Anbar	611,710	478,900	132,810

#	Project	Sector	Governorate	Estimated Cost \$	Awarded Cost \$	Cost Difference \$
14	Maintenance internal roads in different sectors in Jalwla-Diyala	Roads & Bridges	Diyala	713,952	559,834	154,118
15	Full Rehabilitation of The Electrical Feeder from Zankora SS to Al-Wafaa District in Ramadi	Electricity	Anbar	1,054,241	1,162,901	(108,660)
16	Rehabilitation of Electrical Network in Rutba City	Electricity	Anbar	512,030	449,705	62,325
17	Full Rehabilitation of National Power Grid in AL Qadisiya (Al Kafaat)	Electricity	Salah Al-Din	292,884	\$ 279,385	\$ 13,499
18	Rehabilitation of internal electric networks for Makhol district in Baiji	Electricity	Salah Al-Din	136,850	\$ 148,180	\$ (11,330)
19	Supply and Installation of Power transformer for Buhrz station	Electricity	Diyala	\$ 545,000	\$ 493,400	\$ 51,600
20	Rehabilitation of Haditha public Library	Municipality	Anbar	\$ 125,655	\$ 128,627	\$ (2,972)
21	Full Rehabilitation of Rutba Municipal Asphalt Plant	Municipality	Anbar	\$ 1,090,587	\$ 947,923	\$ 142,664
22	Rehabilitation of Baiji dump site	Municipality	Salah Al-Din	\$ 151,241	\$ 122,780	\$ 28,461
23	Rehabilitation works at Al-Muqdadia Youth Forum in Diyala	Municipality	Diyala	\$ 398,691	\$ 376,513	\$ 22,178
24	Rehabilitation of Two Workshops for Engineering College of Sherqat	Education	Salah Al-Din	\$ 283,325	\$ 170,298	\$ 113,027
25	Rehabilitation of Athrban primary mixed	Education	Kirkuk	\$ 47,217	\$ 47,217	0
26	Renovation of Al - Masanaa school 6 classes rooms in Hawija District	Education	Kirkuk	\$ 174,890	\$ 153,978	20,912
27	Rehabilitation of Electrical Transformer's Maintenance Workshop in Kirkuk	Electricity	Kirkuk	\$ 15,625	\$ 11,040	4,585
28	Ashmeet Bridge in Zab- Abaasi	Roads & Bridges	Kirkuk	\$ 299,890	\$ 239,910	59,980

#	Project	Sector	Governorate	Estimated Cost \$	Awarded Cost \$	Cost Difference \$
29	Rehabilitation of Pediatric Ward in Hawija Hospital	Health	Kirkuk	\$ 87,415	\$ 94,138	(6,723)
30	Rehabilitation of Brej WTP (100 m3 per hr.) in Riyadh Sub-District-Hawija District	Water	Kirkuk	\$ 300,000	\$ 324,444	(24,444)
31	Rehabilitation of Seed Receiving Yards-Hawija-Kirkuk Governorate	Municipality	Kirkuk	\$ 895,181	\$ 854,562	40,619
32	Rehabilitation of Nursing and Pharmacy Building -Ninawa University	Education	Ninawa	\$ 3,115,867	\$ 2,704,066	411,801
33	Rehabilitation of Mosul University Kindergarten and Nursery	Education	Ninawa	\$ 253,155	\$ 197,105	56,050
34	Rehabilitation of Qayrawan PHC in Qayrawan sub district-Sinjar-Ninawa Governorate	Health	Ninawa	\$ 149,439	\$ 144,400	\$ 5,039
35	Rehabilitation of the Hattin Water Distribution Network-Ninawa Governorate	Water	Ninawa	\$ 110,000	\$ 104,724	\$ 5,276
36	Roads between Buildings in Agricultural Complex in Tel Abtah	Roads & Bridges	Ninawa	\$ 39,960	47,080	(7,120)
37	Rehabilitation of Sinjar Court House in Sinjar District-Ninawa Governorate	Municipality	Ninawa	\$ 175,889	223,695	(47,806)
38	Rehabilitation Housing Works of 167 units (Phase 3) in Al-Ta'ameem Neighbourhood / Baiji	Housing	Salah Al-Din	\$ 429,323	366,244	63,079
39	Rehabilitation Housing Works of 116 units in Al Sa'adiyah Neighbourhoods: Lot 2 (Al-Zuhoor,Al-Zaytoon,Al-Salam &Al-Noor)	Housing	Diyala	\$ 299,072	302,823	(3,751)
40	Rehabilitation Housing Works of 248 units in Al-Rayhana District / Anah	Housing	Anbar	\$ 670,400	499,334	171,066
<b>Sub Total</b>				<b>\$ 20,232,625</b>	<b>18,010,490</b>	<b>2,222,135</b>

Figure 28: Budget Execution Rates: FFS total, Window 1 and Project Management





### 10.3 Efficiency Analysis Per Output

The evaluation covers the following three outputs:

- Output 1: Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization (FFIS)
- Output 2: Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilization (FFES, as of 2018)
- Output 3: FFS Exit Strategy (renamed Transition Strategy in 2022).

According to UNDP, the outputs for each of the three FFS implementation periods were developed in close consultation with the government and development partners. Targets were set and costs were determined based on anticipated funding in the UNDP Project Document for each period. Furthermore, to assess average efficiency across the three periods, the evaluation calculated the average completion percentage for all indicators under all outputs in each period, assigning equal weight to each indicator within each period. While this approach may not yield precise quantitative results due to variations in scope and resource allocation of each indicator, it offers a relative and qualitative basis for efficiency evaluation.

**2016-2018 Period:** The overall average achievement of all output indicators under the two outputs stood at approximately 75%. The partial efficiency resulted from the significant underachievement of Indicators 1.4 (2% efficiency) and 1.5 (10% efficiency).

Only 2 outputs were developed for FFS during this period, with Output 1 consisting of 6 indicators and Output 2 including 5 indicators.

Under Output 1, Indicator 1.1 achieved 100% efficiency, while Indicators 1.2 and 1.3 were partially achieved, indicating 63% and 73% efficiency, respectively. Indicators 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 were significantly underachieved, with efficiencies of 2%, 10% and 0.0%, respectively.

Three of the 5 indicators under Output 2 during this period were fully achieved, indicating 100% efficiency. Indicator 2.1 was significantly overachieved, with an efficiency of 200%. No data was provided for Indicator 2.5.

**2019-2020 Period:** Average achievement improved significantly to 190%, attributed to significant overachievement of Indicators 1.2 (464% efficiency) and 1.4 (671% efficiency).

Two outputs were developed for FFS during this period, with Output 1 consisting of 6 indicators and Output 2 of only 1 indicator.

Under Output 1, Indicator 1.1 achieved 100% efficiency, Indicator 1.2 significantly overachieved at 464%, Indicator 1.3 was partially achieved at nearly 81%, and Indicator 1.5 substantially overachieved at 671%. Indicators 1.4 and 1.6 were not achieved, indicating efficiency of 0.00% for both.

Output 2, with one indicator, was significantly underachieved at 16.3% efficiency.

**2021-2023 Period:** Average efficiency remained considerably high at 151%, primarily due to approximately 100% achievement of most indicators and significant overachievement of Indicators 1.3 (118% efficiency) and 1.9 (671% efficiency).

During this period, FFS comprised three Outputs, with Output 1 encompassing 10 indicators, while both Output 2 and Output 3 consisted of only one indicator.

Under Output 1, Indicator 1.1 had no target as it was fully completed in the previous period. Eight of the 9 remaining Indicators achieved 100% efficiency or close, while Indicator 1.9 notably overachieved at 671%.

Outputs 2 and 3 in this period, with one indicator each, were fully achieved, indicating 100% efficiency.

Table 9: Efficiency of FFS Output Indicators

Efficiency of FFS Output Indicators				
2016 - 2017 - 2018				
Expected Outputs	Output Indicators	Target	Actual	Achievement
<b>Output 1</b> Iraqi Government in newly liberated areas is supported to address immediate challenges for return of internally displaced persons	1.1 Carry out the local assessments with verification missions and prioritization workshops and finalize report	31	31	100.0%
	1.2 Rehabilitation of priority infrastructure in newly liberated areas	2,500	1,577	63.1%
	1.3 Jumpstarting of the local women benefit from job economy and income generation such as Cash for Work opportunities	10,000	7,268	72.7%
	1.4 Technical support to Government women benefit from job authorities opportunities	30,000	600	2.0%
	1.5 Design and implementation of social cohesion and dialogue initiatives	7,000	700	10.0%
	1.6 Project management team set up	3,000	-	0.0%
<b>Output 2</b> High impact medium-size projects are reconstructed and local businesses supported in order to sustain gains in stabilization Number of implemented projects and number of beneficiaries	2.1: implementation structure set up	45	90	200%
	2.2: rehabilitate priority infrastructure as identified in assessments	100	99	99%
	2.3: jumpstarting of local economy and cash for work	28,422	28,422	100%
	2.4: housing depots for house repairs and house complexes	15,825	15,825	100%
	2.5: micro insurance schemes explored and piloted	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>Average Achievement</b>				<b>75%</b>
2019-2020				
Expected Outputs	Output Indicators	Target	Actual	Achievement
<b>Output 1</b> Iraqi Government in newly liberated areas is supported to address immediate challenges for return of internally displaced persons	1.1 (Assessments) Carry out local assessments to identify immediate stabilization needs			100.0%
	1.2 Rehabilitate priority light infrastructure in newly liberated areas # of infrastructure projects for basic services (water, health, education, electricity, housing, roads and bridges, sewage and municipal services) which have been restored in target areas	2,500	11,612	464.5%
	1.3 Support immediate income generation opportunities Indicative activities # of immediate livelihood opportunities created for individuals, including women and youth <sup>13</sup> in the target areas # of small business grants provided in the target areas (gender disaggregated)	25,990	21,045	81.0%
	1.4: Capacity development of Government authorities to facilitate stabilization Indicative activities	40,000		0.0%
	1.5 Design and implement initiatives to promote social cohesion	5,200	34,894	671.0%
	1.6 Set-up Project Management and Operations support teams	6,500		0.0%
<b>Output 2</b> High impact medium-sized infrastructure projects are rehabilitated to sustain stabilization gains (FFES)	2.1 Rehabilitation of priority, medium-size infrastructure projects	123	20	16.3%
<b>Average Achievement</b>				<b>190%</b>
*New output indicator included in the revised FFS Project Document, which was endorsed by the Steering Committee on 9 November 2020. Therefore, not reported in 2019 & 2020				
2021-2023 cumulative				
Expected Outputs	Output Indicators	Target	Actual	Achievement
<b>Output 1</b> Iraqi Government in newly liberated areas is supported to address immediate challenges for return of internally displaced persons	1.1) % of early needs assessments carried out in FFS targeted liberated areas	n/a	n/a	n/a
	1.2) # of infrastructure projects for basic services (water, health, education, electricity, housing, roads and bridges, sewage and municipal services) which have been restored	3,300	3,302	100.1%
	1.3) # of houses rehabilitated in liberated areas	32,000	37,615	117.5%
	1.4) # of immediate livelihood opportunities created for individuals, including women and youth in the target areas. - Overall number of women: 8,444 -Overall number of youth: 17,771	53,000	49,830	94.0%
	1.5) # of business grants provided in the target areas (gender disaggregated)	4,500	4,389	97.5%
	1.6) # of small grants provided to women- headed households	6,500	6,618	101.8%
	1.7) # of training opportunities and/or job placement created for individuals, including women and youth in the target areas. Women 468	1,500	1,437	95.8%
	1.8) # and type of technical advisory support capacities in place to support authorities in the target areas to plan and execute stabilization activities <sup>43</sup>	16	16	100.0%
	1.9) # of capacity building opportunities created for government officials and employees (gender disaggregated). Women 4,535	3,000	20,118	670.6%
	1.10) # of participants of social cohesion activities (gender disaggregated). Women 37,105	110,000	90,831	82.6%
<b>Output 2</b> High impact medium-sized infrastructure projects are rehabilitated to sustain stabilization gains (FFES)	2.1) # of medium-size infrastructure projects implemented in the newly liberated areas	125	129	103%
<b>Output 3</b> Exit Strategy is drafted in consultation with the Government of Iraq, for the liberated governorates	3.1) Exit Strategy for post-FFS stabilization and development work in the liberated governorates drafted	1	1 (draft)	100.0%
<b>Average Achievement</b>				<b>151%</b>

**Table 1b: Reported number of beneficiaries by sector**<sup>107</sup>

Sector	Number of beneficiaries in all 5 governorates	
	Total	Women
Education	1,327,434	572,981
Electricity	6,516,976	3,377,780
Health	4,693,864	2,430,986
Housing	285,747	124,369
Livelihoods	77,095	24,560
Municipality	5,015,506	2,728,600
Roads and Bridges	3,129,000	1,588,500
Sewage	2,208,055	1,095,105
Social Cohesion	35,405	12,837
Water	5,734,879	2,899,602

<sup>107</sup> UNDP. 2023 Quarter Three Report. Funding Facility for Stabilization.

## 10.4 Evaluation ToR

Will be inserted in the final version of the report.

## 10.5 Evaluation Matrix

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
Relevant evaluation criteria: <b>RELEVANCE</b>				
<i>SQ 1.1. To what extent was the design of the intervention, including the formulation of its planned results, relevant to the needs and priorities of the country, intended beneficiaries and key stakeholders?</i>	<p>JC 1.1.1. The extent to which the needs of beneficiaries were identified with the participation of stakeholders (beneficiaries and partners) have been involved in the design and priority setting.</p> <p>JC1.1.2. The extent to which the FSS is consistent with agreed upon priorities amongst national actors and strategies concerning security, political, economic, institutional, and other areas.</p> <p>JC 1.1.3. The extent to which the findings of the identification of needs and priorities, and the consultation</p>	<p>Evidence (examples and opinions) that the needs and priorities of beneficiaries have been identified during the design and examples that have been reflected in the FSS design.</p> <p>Evidence that the Project ensured participation of rights' holders and duty bearers during the entire Project cycle (planning, design, implementation, and decision)</p> <p>Examples of partners involvement and participation in the Project's design and implementation</p> <p>Evidence that the FSS is consistent with agreed upon priorities amongst various national actors (Gol/KRG/communities of</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk/literature review of relevant documents (including problem analysis conducted by the UNDP and national/regional stakeholders)</li> <li>Key informants' interviews (semi-structured interviews/focus groups)</li> <li>Group interviews and focus groups</li> </ol>	<p>In depth analysis of the national strategic and policy frameworks and development/security and socio-economic/ context in Iraq with the reference to sustainable return and inclusion of IDPs and returnees in the targeted governorates</p> <p>Analysis of the country's</p>

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
	with the stakeholders have been incorporated into the FFS.	<p>affected areas) priorities and strategies concerning security, political, economic, institutional, and other areas.</p> <p>Examples and opinions of consultation with key stakeholders on FSS design and their involvement in the design</p> <p>Comparison between the needs and priorities identified and the selection of implementation strategies</p>		<p>development path-crisis prevention and recovery efforts- with the reference to security, political, social, economic, and other areas</p> <p>Problem/risk analysis related to FFS areas of intervention.</p>
<p><i>SQ1.2. Has the FSS remained relevant during its implementation and appropriately responsive to the country's security, political, economic, institutional, and other changes? Is it still relevant now?</i></p>	<p>JC 1.2.1. The extent to which the FSS remained relevant during its implementation, responding to the emerging/changing needs and priorities.</p> <p>JC 1.2.2. The extent to which a conflict analysis (dividers and connectors) has been incorporated.</p>	<p>- Evidence (examples and opinions) that the FSS ToC remained relevant to the country's security, political, economic, institutional changes and demanded by the beneficiaries</p> <p>- Evidence and examples that the Project supported transition from emergency to development paradigm</p>		<p>Triangulate data collected from various sources and means (e.g., cross check interview data with desk review to validate or refute ToC and the FF intervention logic).</p>
<p><i>SQ1.3. To what extent have gender and human rights principles and strategies been integrated into the FFS design and implementation?</i></p>	<p>JC1.3.1. The extent to which the FFS design incorporated human rights-based approach, gender analyses and conflict analyses including socio-cultural and political analyses.</p> <p>JC1.3.2. The extent to which implementation strategies are gender responsive.</p>	<p>Evidence (examples and opinions) that gender and human rights standards and principles related to non-discrimination are contained in the design.</p> <p>Evidence that the human rights of target beneficiary groups, including the return IDPs, youth, women, disabled persons, have been considered and addressed.</p>		

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
		Examples and opinions that gender responsive principles and HRBA were integrated in implementation strategies.		
<i>SQ1.4. What is UNDP comparative advantages in Iraq and liberated regions to implement this project?</i>	JC1.4. The extent to which partners and beneficiaries perceive UNDP as trustable, reliable independent, neutral, impartial actor placed to support implementation of the FFS.	Opinions of beneficiaries and partners about UNDP as best placed to support FFS implementation, including examples of UNDP unique capacities. Examples of approaches the other stakeholders recommend or identify as more effective for the project in which UNDP has the most added value		
Relevant evaluation criteria: <b>COHERENCE</b>				
<i>SQ 2.1. To what extent are the project windows creating synergies to deliver systemic results?</i>	JC2.1.1. The extent to which the objectives, activities, and expected outcomes of the Project are logically connected and consistent with each other across 4 windows. JC2.1.2. The extent to which project windows work in synergy with each other to deliver systemic results.	Evidence and opinions that the Project intervention logic is well-established, based on adequate problem needs analysis. Evidence that the FFS objectives were relevant and achievable. Evidence that project windows contribute to the achievement of the expected outcomes and the overall objectives (systemic results) through synergies	1. Desk/literature review of relevant documents (including third-party reports and national documents) 2. Map a theory of change to identify the logic, indicators problem analysis and assumptions behind the FFS 3. Key informants' interviews	Analyse FFS sectors, results and progress. Analysis of the reports and analysis of other development partners and FFS reports and deliverables. Interviews with the key informants Results of implemented research.
<i>SQ2.2. To what extent were the project design and delivery coherent with international obligations and SDGs?</i>	JC2.2.1. The extent to which the Project contributes to SDGs and national SDG targets.	Examples and opinions that the Project aligns with the national development priorities. Evidence that the Project addresses SDGs and their targets		

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
<i>SQ2.3. Has the Project aligned and complemented work among different entities, including development partners with similar interventions?</i>	<p>JC2.3.1. The extent to which the Project complemented and coordinated with other interventions and initiatives (partnerships with other agencies and INGOS) addressing the issues that the FFS is addressing.</p> <p>JC2.3.2. The extent to which the project windows ensured synergies and coordination with Government's and key partners relevant efforts to deliver systemic results.</p> <p>JC2.3.3. The extent to which trade-offs and drivers were considered in the project's implementation</p>	<p>Examples of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the FFS and other initiatives that authorities and development partners implemented in this area</p> <p>Examples that other or similar interventions (within and outside UNDP) or policies support or undermine the project.</p> <p>Examples of synergies that the FFS and other initiatives in the critical area ensured during the implementation.</p> <p>Evidence (including opinions) that the trade-offs and drivers were considered during the implementation</p>		Triangulate data collected
<i>SQ2.4. To what extent has the FFS contributed to improved cooperation and coordination between the FFS &amp; national/provincial /municipal relevant sectors' authorities?</i>	<p>2.4.1. The extent to which the project's activities led to improved coordination, cooperation, and capacity as relevant at the National and/or Governorate and/or Municipality levels.</p> <p>2.4.2. The extent to which the project's activities led to improved coordination, cooperation, and consultation among development partners (including UN agencies and donors to this project)</p>	<p>Evidence- including opinions- that the Project's activities led to improved coordination, cooperation, and capacity as relevant at the National and/or Governorate and/or Municipality levels.</p> <p>Evidence that the project's activities led to improved coordination, cooperation, and consultation among development partners</p>		
<i>SQ2.5. To what extent has the FFS developed and implemented mechanisms</i>	2.5.1 the development of mechanisms for feedback/communication between the beneficiaries and the project	Evidence- that the Project's designed and implemented feedback mechanism.		

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
<i>for feedback and community participation</i>	2.5.2 the extent to which FFS incorporated feedback into plans or implementation			
Relevant evaluation criteria: <b>EFFICIENCY</b>				
<i>SQ3.1. Have the FFS's results been delivered in a timely manner?</i>	JC.3.1.1. The degree of timely implementation of the Project, in a logical sequence, and availability of inputs in a timely fashion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence of timely implementation of activities (without delays)- analysis of planned vs implemented activities and delivery of outputs.</li> <li>- Evidence and records on effective communication that the Project established</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Desk review of the FFS documents and project management practices</li> <li>2. Interviews with UNDP/ FFS Team</li> <li>3. Interviews with national and other development partners</li> <li>4. Analysis of UNDP management practices</li> </ol>	<p>Analysis of the FFS management practices</p> <p>Meeting minutes with FFS Team / UNDP CO and other stakeholders</p> <p>Desk review of the critical indicators</p> <p>Triangulation of the collected primary and secondary data</p>
<i>SQ3.2. Have resources (financial, human, technical support, etc.) been allocated strategically to achieve FFS outcomes?</i>	<p>JC 3.2.1. The extent to which the FFS established sound and effective operational, management practices technical support, administrative, procurement and financial procedures?</p> <p>- JC3.2.2. The extent to which are financial and human resources were equitably distributed among target groups and areas</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The analysis of management practices and approaches under the FSS                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The analysis of financial and human resources by objectives and outcomes, administrative, procurement and financial procedures</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		
<i>SQ3.3 To what extent did the monitoring and evaluation system put in place allow for continuous collection and analysis of quality and segregated</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC 3.3.1. the extent to which the project tracked progress on expected outputs and outcomes and communicated results.</li> <li>- JC 3.3.2. the extent to which the data is segregated by age / gender / location.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The analysis of M&amp;E practices under the FSS</li> </ul>		



Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
data on expected outputs and outcomes?	- JC 3.3.3. The frequency of program revisions / evaluations and adjustments made based on monitoring and evaluation findings – adoption of MTE’s recommendation.			
<b>Relevant evaluation criteria: <u>EFFECTIVENESS</u></b>				
<i>SQ4.1. To what extent has the project contributed to the outputs and outcomes as stipulated in prodoc?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC 4.1.1. The extent to which the Project contributed to improved living conditions in Iraq’s newly liberated areas, in collaboration with the Government of Iraq</li> <li>- JC4.1.2. The extent to which the Project promoted the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), inspiring greater confidence in Iraqis in their prospects to return to their area of origin.</li> <li>- JC4.1.3. The extent to which the project mitigated and addressed protection concerns of vulnerable populations (returnees, communities that did not leave IISIL-controlled areas, minority communities, etc.) in the targeted areas.</li> <li>- JC 4.1.4. The extent to which a standard of living is achieved through infrastructure rehabilitation in ISIL conflict affected Iraqi cities, to an</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence (including perceptions and statistics) that the Project contributed to improved living conditions in Iraq’s newly liberated areas, in collaboration with the Government of Iraq</li> <li>- Evidence, including statistical data and perceptions, that the Project promoted the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), inspiring greater confidence in Iraqis in their prospects to return to their area of origin.</li> <li>- Evidence that the project’s mitigate, and address protection concerns of vulnerable populations in the targeted areas.</li> <li>- Evidence that the standard of living is improved in the targeted areas.</li> <li>- Evidence (examples and opinions) that infrastructure in and between ISIL affected cities is improved to ensure safe return of Iraqi families.</li> <li>- Evidence that Iraqis, particularly women-headed households feel more secure with</li> </ul>	<p>1.FFS relevant data extraction- detailed analysis of 1) planned activities and outputs and 2) achievement of results).</p> <p>2. Interviews with key informants - focus on validating or refuting lines of inquiry - collecting perceptions about legal documents, strategies, partnerships established, and skills developed, and actions implemented related to the FFS. Observations on the “why” and factors that influence or impede effectiveness.</p>	<p>Analysis of the FFS results versus established targets.</p> <p>Contribution analysis against the outcomes and outcome indicators</p> <p>Completion of a template of ‘factors’ with analysis of ‘strength of influence (the factors affect the FSS ability to achieve its outputs and progress towards outcomes)</p>

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
	<p>extent that it is safe for Iraqi families to return home.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC 4.1.5. The extent to which Iraqis, particularly women-headed households, feel more secure with their income earning potential in their area of origin.</li> <li>- JC4.1.6. The extent to which Government officials at the local level gained capacity and are better equipped to contribute to and manage stabilization activities and to take over management of infrastructure once projects are completed.</li> <li>- JC4.1.7. The extent to which the project facilitated the creation of resilient community systems and structures and fostered inclusive and sustainable community environment.</li> </ul> <p>JC4.1.8 The extent to which FFS contribute to economic growth and job creation? (e.g., increased income, reduced poverty)</p>	<p>their income earning potential in their area of origin.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence- including examples and opinions that the Government officials at the local level are better equipped to contribute to and manage stabilization activities and to take over management of infrastructure.</li> <li>- Evidence that the Project strengthened the community's ability to recover from setbacks and adapt positively to changes, ensuring a sustained growth and stability and promoted inclusivity, and in establishing systems and structures that are ecologically sustainable and provide long-term benefits to the community.</li> </ul>	<p>3. Other findings to cover gaps or validate preliminary findings</p>	

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
<i>SQ4.2. To what extent has the project integrated the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus in its design and implementation?</i>	- JC4.2. The extent to which the FFS ensured the humanitarian development, and peace nexus in its design and implementation.	Evidence including opinions, examples, and that the FFS ensured the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus in its design and implementation		
<i>SQ4.3. What are the results of partnerships with relevant actors, given strengthening project implementation and/or ensuring project sustainability?</i>	- JC4.3.1. The extent to which the Project extended partnerships given strengthening project implementation and/or ensuring project sustainability. - JC4.3.2. The extent to which the project partnership with development partners and CSOs contributed to results. - JC4.3.2. The extent to which the funding facility has been able to mobilize the financial resources to provide rapid stabilization assistance	- Evidence (opinions and examples) that the selected strategies and approaches ensured results and expanded partnerships. - Evidence that the funding facility has been able to mobilize the financial resources to provide rapid stabilization assistance. - Satisfaction among beneficiaries of Project's partnership strategies		
<i>SQ4.4. Was the Project flexible responding to the changes in the environment and the needs of beneficiaries during the implementation?</i>	- JC4.4.1 The extent to which the FFS flexible in responding to the changes in the environment and the needs of beneficiaries during the implementation	- Evidence that the FFS was flexible and responsive during the implementation to the changes in the environment. - Opinions that the FFS responded to the changing needs of target groups and beneficiaries.		

Relevant evaluation criteria: **SUSTAINABILITY**

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
<p><i>SQ5.1. What is the likelihood that the Project results will be sustained long-term after a) completion of activities and handover to end-user, and b) after the closure of FFS?</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC5.1.1. The extent to which the FFS results will be maintained after the completion of the FFS</li> <li>- JV5.1.2. Existence of national and sub-national regional mechanisms or structures to maintain the results achieved (and the extent that financial and human resource capacities are ensured)</li> <li>- JV 5.1.3. The extent to which the project address financial, social, political, or other risks that may jeopardize the sustainability of project achievements.</li> <li>-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence and opinions that the FFS activities national and sub-national mechanisms to maintain these results (national /sub national ownership – spin off) participation of CSO?</li> <li>- Type of national/regional mechanisms/ structures to maintain the results achieved.</li> <li>- Evidence that financial resources are assigned to national and regional mechanisms and structures.</li> <li>- Evidence and examples that the FFS and UNDP Project team considered and applied UNDP Social and Environmental Standards</li> </ul>	<p>1.FFS relevant data extraction- detailed analysis of 1) planned activities and outputs and 2) achievement of results).</p> <p>2. Interviews with key informants - focus on validating or refuting lines of inquiry - collecting perceptions about legal documents, strategies, partnerships established, and skills developed, and actions implemented related to the FFS. Observations on the “why” and factors that influence or impede effectiveness.</p> <p>3. Other findings to cover gaps or validate preliminary findings</p>	<p>Analysis of the FFS results versus established targets. Contribution analysis against the outcomes and outcome indicators</p> <p>Completion of a template of ‘factors’ with analysis of ‘strength of influence (the factors affect the FFS ability to achieve its outputs and progress towards outcomes)</p>
<p><i>SQ5.2. How effectively has the FFS generated country ownership and transferring to local authorities of the results achieved, the establishment of partnerships with relevant stakeholders and the development of in-country capacities to ensure sustainability of efforts and benefits?</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC5.2.1. Existence of the country and national ownership of the results and partnerships with relevant stakeholders</li> <li>- JC5.2.2. The extent to which stakeholders’ capacities at the local and country level have been developed to ensure sustainability of efforts and benefits.</li> <li>- JC5.2.3. The extent to which the FFS fostered the participation of civil society actors including women’s organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence that national and sun-national capacities and mechanisms (legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes) are in place for sustaining project benefits.</li> <li>- Evidence that stakeholders’ capacities at the country and sub-national level have been developed to ensure sustainability of efforts and benefits.</li> <li>- Evidence (opinions and examples) that the FFS fostered the participation</li> </ul>		

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
<p><i>SQ 5.3. To what extent has the project helped transition Iraq from humanitarian and stabilization to the development phase?</i></p>	<p>- JC5.3.1 The extent to which the Project helped transition Iraq from humanitarian and stabilization to the development phase.</p>	<p>- Evidence that the transition from humanitarian to development phase was initiated. - Evidence that the Project contributed to this transition</p>		
<p><i>SQ5.4. To what extent has the project planned for exit strategy and what was achieved?</i></p>	<p>- JC 5.4.1. The extent to which lessons learned are being documented by the project team and shared with appropriate parties who could learn from the project. - JC5.4.2. The extent to which exit plans, phase out / spin off – handover plan / procedures have been produced and handed to national and sub national stakeholders. - JC 5.4.3. The extent to which SFF link to transition strategies such as livelihoods, building institutional capacities of national and subnational bodies?</p>	<p>- Codification and availability of lessons learned generated during the FFS implementation. - Evidence about the opportunities for continuation and expansion of the results and activities in the FFS areas (Examples of successful practices that were documented; successful practices that were disseminated; successful practices replicated) - Evidence on building institutional capacities and provision of exit plans, handover procedures...</p>		
<p><i>SQ5.5 How does the program align with environmental sustainability goals</i></p>	<p>JC 5.4- whether construction and rehabilitation activities observed environmental impacts, such as waste management, resource conservation, and ecosystem preservation.</p>	<p>- Observations of waste management, resource conservation, and ecosystem preservation installations in buildings</p>	<p>Desk/literature review of relevant documents (including third-party reports and national documents) 2. Key informants' interviews (semi-</p>	

Relevant sub-question	Judgement criteria	Indicators	Data Sources and collection tools	Data analysis
			structured interviews/ focus groups) 3. Observation visits to some facilities	
Relevant evaluation criteria: <b>IMPACT</b>				
<i>SQ6.1. Is there evidence of progress towards potential impact and differences made to life of the target group (across all dimensions of empowerment)?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC6.1.1. The extent to which living conditions in Iraq’s newly liberated areas have been improved.</li> <li>- JC6.1.2. The extent to which IDPs enhanced confidence in their prospects to return to their area of origin.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence/ examples and opinions that the FFS contributed to empowerment of the target groups across all its areas and dimensions.</li> <li>- Evidence that living conditions in Iraq’s newly liberated areas have been improved.</li> <li>- Evidence (including opinions) that IDPs enhanced confidence in their prospects to return</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Desk/literature review of relevant documents (including third-party reports and national documents)</li> <li>2. Key informants’ interviews (semi-structured interviews/ focus groups)</li> <li>3. Other sources and consultations as appropriate</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with the key stakeholders (including UN, development organizations, etc)</li> <li>Analysis of the results of various available research and surveys.</li> <li>Review of national statistics and other available data</li> <li>Triangulation of the collected primary and secondary data</li> </ul>
<i>SQ6.2. To what extent has the FFS contributed to the improvements of local social, economic, environmental, and other development indicators?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- JC6.2. Changes of the local social, economic, environmental, and other development indicators</li> <li>JC 5.3.2. Level of noticeable improvements in stability security, social cohesion, or economic conditions?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Evidence that changes occurred on economic, environmental, and other development indicators.</li> <li>- Evidence and examples that improvement in stability, social cohesion, and economic conditions</li> </ul>		

## 10.6 Evaluation Team Composition

Team Members	Primary Role	Specific tasks within the Evaluation	Background information
Rania Fazah	Evaluation Team Leader	Led the overall evaluation, liaising and communicating with UNDP. Leading on the design of the evaluation process, methodology, design of the tools, and the training the data collectors. She conducted executive oversight and managed quality assurance on all deliverables, in addition to primary data collection in the field	Seasoned evaluator practicing for over 20 years, Rania has a Masters in Evaluation Rania has led several evaluations in the past years in conflict and fragile contexts in Afghanistan, DR Congo, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Karim El-Mufti	Evaluation Expert	Developed the evaluation's methodology, in addition to conducting primary review of literature and existing data, contribute to the design of tools and support analysis and recommendations development. Also proceeded with data collection in the field, data analysis and co-drafting of the Final Evaluation Report.	International expert in Governance, Justice & Security Affairs with a focus on the Middle East and the Balkans. His work revolves around Stabilization and Development in post-conflict contexts and Fragile States, with frequent visits to the Middle East, with a strong record of projects' evaluations in the Arab world. A Scholar in political science and international law based in Paris,
Hamid Rohilai		Conduct cost efficiency assessment, and resource utilization assessment including budget expenditure ratios,	Academic background in finance and economics, coupled with extensive international experience in Public Finance Management (PFM) and Public Investment Management (PIM) leading teams in capacity-building, devising strategies for evidence-based decision-making, or managing multimillion-dollar donor-funded programs, his contributions have consistently aimed at fostering sustainable economic growth and fiscal stability.
Integrity M&E	Field Research	Leading the field data collectors, providing support, and mentoring for data collection, data classification and reporting. Also monitored the filed inspections inside Iraq.  The data collectors are independent and have not been involved in any FFS related activities previously.	Iraq based corporation

## 10.7 Annex: List of outcomes under FFS ToC

<p>1.1.1 Outcome 1: Achieving a pre-conflict standard of living in ISIL-affected Iraqi cities to ensure a secure environment conducive for families' return</p>	<p>The foundation of this outcome lies in the holistic rehabilitation of vital infrastructures. Restoring these structures is pivotal, not just for physical reconstruction but also for the emotional and psychological rebuilding of communities.</p> <p><b>Core Activities:</b> This outcome revolves around an encompassing rehabilitation strategy that doesn't just focus on physical reconstruction. It taps into the psyche of the community, aiming to rebuild trust, hope, and a sense of belonging. The systematic rejuvenation of utilities, health facilities, education centres, transportation networks, and housing, sets the stage for a comprehensive, sustainable, and deeply impactful recovery of the ISIL-affected Iraqi cities.</p>
	<p>1.1.1.1 Basic Utility Restoration (Output 1.1): Enhanced Access to Water, Electricity, and Sewage Systems for Iraqis</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>A city's heartbeat is its utilities. Restoring water ensures hygiene and health; electricity powers home and reignites economic activities; and an effective sewage system is pivotal for sanitation and preventing disease outbreaks. Together, these basic services restore a sense of familiarity and predictability to daily life, signalling a move towards urban normalcy.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.1.2 Health Infrastructure Revitalization (Output 1.2): Augmented Health Services Accessibility, Focusing on Maternal and Paediatric Care for Iraqis:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>Access to health care is a fundamental human right and a cornerstone of societal well-being. Re-establishing health facilities, especially focusing on vulnerable populations like mothers and children, doesn't just heal physical ailments but mends the psychological scars of conflict. It also reiterates a community's commitment to its members' well-being, further emphasizing its readiness for resettlement.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.1.3 Re-establishment of Education Facilities (Output 1.3): Broadened Access to Education, Particularly for Women and Children:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>Schools are symbols of a community's hope and aspiration for a better future. Rebuilding them, particularly for women and children, reinstates this hope. It also plays a role in restoring routine, providing children a sense of normalcy, stability, and an environment to heal and grow.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.1.4 Transportation Infrastructure Rehabilitation (Output 1.4): Augmented Safety and Functionality of Roads and Bridges:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>Efficient transportation links are the arteries of a city. Roads and bridges facilitate movement, commerce, and communication. Their restoration not only boosts the economy but also stitches the fabric of the community back together, promoting interconnectivity and mutual support.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.1.5 Housing Rehabilitation (Output 1.5): Increased Habitable Housing Units in Key Iraqi Cities via Rehabilitation:</p>



	<p><b>Premise:</b> <i>A home isn't just a shelter—it's an emblem of security, family, and belonging. When families see houses being rebuilt, it's a tangible sign of recovery and a call to return, rebuild, and re-root themselves in their community.</i></p>
<p>1.1.2 Outcome 2 Strengthening the economic resilience and income potential of Iraqis, with an emphasis on aiding women-headed households to regain financial stability and confidence in their areas of origin.</p>	<p>At the heart of this outcome is the recognition that financial security is a key pillar of stability, especially in post-conflict settings. The economic empowerment of households, particularly those headed by women who often face compounded vulnerabilities, is essential for creating a self-sustaining community that feels secure and confident in its potential to thrive.</p> <p><b>Core Activities:</b> At the operational level, the strategy is clear: extend immediate financial assistance to vulnerable families and individuals, providing them with a lifeline. This approach ensures short-term relief in the meantime the GoI should take charge.</p> <p>Collectively, these strategic outputs, grounded in their respective premises, weave together a comprehensive approach to economic rehabilitation. The overarching goal is clear: to reignite confidence in the economic potential of ISIL-affected regions, ensuring that residents, especially women, can play a role in their community's resurgence.</p> <p>1.1.2.1 Immediate Financial Support (Output 2.1): Increased Access to Temporary Cash-for-Work Employment:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>In the immediate aftermath of conflict, while the broader infrastructural and societal systems are in recovery, individuals need quick, reliable sources of income to cater to their daily needs and stabilize their households. By providing temporary cash-for-work opportunities, the project delivers an immediate solution, helping families bridge the interim period until more sustainable income avenues are accessible.</i></p> <p>1.1.2.2 Long-Term Financial Security (Output 2.2): Enhanced Access to Small Business Grants:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>Ensuring sustainable economic growth requires a focus on long-term solutions. By providing small business grants, particularly targeting vulnerable women-headed households, the initiative empowers individuals to carve out independent income avenues. This not only boosts household income but also rejuvenates the local economy, fostering community-level growth. The prioritization of women acknowledges the pivotal role they play in societal advancement and aims to rectify the imbalances they face, positioning them as key stakeholders in the region's economic landscape.</i></p>
<p>1.1.3 Outcome 3: Ensuring sustainable growth and long-term stabilization in post-conflict regions by enhancing the capabilities and resources of local governmental bodies and authorities.</p>	<p>A fundamental principle of this outcome is the belief that locally anchored, efficient governance structures are vital for a region's holistic recovery, especially after conflict. Local authorities, when equipped with the right resources and expertise, can spearhead initiatives that resonate deeply with community needs, ensuring the resulting benefits are widespread and lasting.</p> <p><b>Core Activities:</b> At its heart, the strategy revolves around nurturing and empowering local authorities. Through focused capacity development initiatives, municipal bodies are equipped not just with tangible assets, but with the knowledge and expertise required to use them effectively. This positions local authorities as both guardians and catalysts of their region's growth, ensuring that the path to stabilization is locally led, responsive, and sustainable.</p>

	<p>1.1.3.1 Infrastructure Rehabilitation (Output 3.1): Improved Rate of Rehabilitation of Key Municipal Infrastructure:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>Infrastructure is the backbone of any thriving community. By prioritizing and accelerating the rehabilitation of key municipal structures, the project ensures that basic services are restored promptly. This fosters a sense of normalcy, encourages community members to engage in socio-economic activities, and lays the groundwork for further developmental initiatives.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.3.2 Resource Availability (Output 3.2): Enhanced Access of Municipal Authorities to Required Assets (e.g., computers):</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>To function efficiently and effectively, municipal authorities need modern tools and assets. Computers, enable accurate data collection, effective communication, and streamlined administrative tasks. By equipping local authorities with essential assets, the project ensures they are well-prepared to tackle the multifaceted challenges of post-conflict governance and to implement impactful projects that cater to the diverse needs of their communities.</i></p>
	<p>1.1.3.3 Capacity Building (Output 3.3): Improved Capacity of Municipal Staff to Lead Program Design and Implementation for Stabilization and Broader City Management:</p> <p><b>Premise:</b> <i>While resources are critical, they are only as effective as the people operating them. By focusing on enhancing the capacity of municipal staff, the project ensures that local governance structures can design, implement, and manage programs that address the specific needs of their communities. Empowered with the right knowledge and skills, these staff can drive initiatives that are both responsive and sustainable, ensuring long-term stabilization and growth.</i></p>

## 10.8 Dates of Liberation of Target Areas

### 10.8.1 Anbar Date of liberation per district

Ramadi	Fallujah	Karma	Haditha	Heet	Ruthba	Rawa*	Qaim*	Anah*
2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2016	2018	2018	2018

### 10.8.2 Nineveh Date of liberation per district

Sinuni*	Sinjar*	Rabia*	Qayarah	Ninevehh Plain	Mosul (East)	Mosul (West)	Tel Afar	Ba'aj
2015	2015	2015	2016	2016	2017	2017	2018	2018

### 10.8.3 Diyala Date of liberation per district

Saadaiyah	2015
Hamrin	2015

#### 10.8.4 Kirkuk Date of liberation per district

Bashir	2017
Hawija*	2018

#### 10.9 Data collection scope and sampling approach

Data collection methods	No.	Information on Sampling
Key Informant Interviews	<p><b>Total:</b> 71 Interviews</p> <p>11 donors' country (13 KIIs)</p> <p>19 UNDP team present and former</p> <p>4 national government stakeholders</p> <p>27 Local government stakeholders</p> <p>8 Community Stakeholders</p>	<p>Interviews were conducted with various stakeholders, including UNDP staff current and former, provincial, and local government stakeholders, government units' officials, implementing partners and community actors (CSOs) under window 4.</p> <p>Interviews were conducted in both English and Arabic and all information treated confidentially to encourage open and honest assessment. The process helped understand dynamics, contexts, challenges and demonstrate the project's contribution to restoring living standards and inspiring confidence in Iraqis' prospects to return to their areas of origin.</p> <p>Selection of interviewees was made based on <b>purposive sampling</b> to ensure maximum relevance in the data collection process. KIIs were distributed per governorate and activities/area of intervention: For each governorate and area of intervention, the ET coordinated with the FFS/ UNDP Team to identify KIIs with adequate information on the design, implementation, MEAL, and finance and procurement related aspects of the projects, as well as key stakeholders (external to direct implementing partners) who were involved in the project.</p>
Focus Group Discussions	<p>Total: 16 FGDs</p> <p>Total respondents 151.</p> <p>83 Public servants &amp; 68 Beneficiaries</p>	<p>Focus group discussions constitute a pivotal component in the FFS project evaluation, allowing for the collection of diverse perspectives on the impact and effectiveness of the project's initiatives in improving living conditions and facilitating the return of IDPs in Iraq's liberated areas.</p> <p>These discussions were carefully designed to include a representative sample of stakeholders, such as community members, local government officials, IDPs, and women-headed households, capturing their experiences and insights.</p> <p>Moderated by skilled facilitators, the focus groups explored specific themes, such as infrastructure rehabilitation, income security, and community stabilization, fostering an environment where participants feel comfortable sharing their candid opinions and stories.</p>

Data collection methods	No.	Information on Sampling	
		<p>The insights from these interactive sessions were instrumental in triangulating findings with other data collection methods and providing a nuanced understanding of the FFS project's successes and challenges. They also played a role in identifying opportunities for enhancing ongoing efforts and shaping future interventions tailored to the complex needs of the targeted communities.</p> <p>Selection of FGD participants was made based on <b>stratified random sampling techniques</b>. The chosen stratification criteria also included geographic location (focusing on liberated provinces), gender, age brackets, and distinct beneficiary categories. The ET tried to incorporate gender considerations, but due to the lack of adequate beneficiaries' information, it was difficult to increase the gender ratio, which was only 13% during the FGDs.</p>	
Survey of Beneficiaries from Public Services & Infrastructure rehabilitation projects	2,987 respondents, out of 3,820 enlisted (78.2% response rate) – 41% of respondents were women.	This survey allowed to assess the satisfaction of returnees and beneficiaries from construction projects. The sample was randomly constituted from lists provided by UNDP of FFS beneficiaries, taking into considerations geographic distribution and a minimum of 30% gender representation. The survey also targeted the civil servants to measure the changes in knowledge, attitudes, and skills (practices) as a result of capacity building from UNDP. For the housing sample, UNDP could not provide beneficiaries list from Anbar governorate within the agreed upon timeline, before January 2024.	
Survey of Beneficiaries from Housing, Livelihood & Capacity-Building projects	<p><b>Housing:</b> 1,157 respondents,</p> <p><b>Livelihood:</b> 596 respondents</p> <p><b>Capacity-Building:</b> 1,169.</p>	<p><b>Housing:</b> 1,157 respondents, out of 1,487 enlisted (77.8% response rate) – 32% of respondents were women.</p> <p><b>Livelihood:</b> 596 respondents, out of 601 enlisted (99.2% response rate) – 50% of respondents were women.</p> <p><b>Capacity-Building:</b> 1,169 surveyed respondents, out of 1,732 enlisted (67.2% response rate) – 46% of respondents were women.</p>	
	Number	Data source	Contribution to evaluation criteria
Key informant interviews (KIIs)	19	FFS management, technical advisors, area coordinators, operations, and field staff.	Relevance, Coherence Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, Impact
	31	Gol (national, governorate, district, and local levels)	Relevance, Coherence, Efficiency, Sustainability
	6	Implementing partners / other INGOs	Relevance, Effectiveness, coherence.
	13	Donors	Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, impact
	2	Community leaders	Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact
TOTAL	<b>71</b>		

Number of FGDs, broken down by type, location, gender, and date

FGD Type	Governorate	District	No. of Participants			Date
			Females	Males	Total	
Public Services (Local Government officials)	Anbar	Fallujah	0	5	5	7/1/2024
		Ramadi	0	9	9	8/1/2024
		Al-Qaim	0	4	4	9/1/2024
		Anaa	0	7	7	10/1/2024
	Nineveh	Nineveh	1	13	14	14/1/2024
		Mosul	2	13	15	15/1/2024
	Salah Al-Din	Tikrit	1	9	10	17/1/2024
		Tikrit	0	6	6	17/1/2024
	Diyala	Baquba	0	10	10	18/1/2024
	Kirkuk	Kirkuk	1	12	13	22/1/2024
Beneficiaries /Training	Nineveh	Mosul	5	12	17	23/1/2024
	Anbar	Fallujah	2	13	15	25/1/2024
Beneficiaries /Housing	Nineveh	Mosul	1	5	6	23/1/2024
	Anbar	Fallujah	2	4	6	25/1/2024
Beneficiaries /Livelihood (CFW)	Nineveh	Mosul	2	5	7	23/1/2024
	Anbar	Fallujah	2	5	7	25/1/2024
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>19</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>151</b>	

### 10.9.1 Surveys Respondents, broken down by type, location, gender, and date

<i>Overview of Survey over public services (2,987 respondents)</i>				
Governorate	Total	Gender		N/S
		F	M	
<b>Anbar</b>	609	297	306	6
<b>Nineveh</b>	1,494	471	1013	10
<b>Salah Al-Din</b>	523	258	263	2
<b>Diyala</b>	130	79	51	0
<b>Kirkuk</b>	229	105	123	1
<b>N/S</b>	2	1	1	0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2,987</b>	<b>1,211</b>	<b>1,757</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>From</b>	<b>3,820</b>			
<b>% Responses</b>	<b>78.2%</b>			

Overview of Survey towards Direct Beneficiaries (2,920 Respondents)													
Governorate	Training			Livelihood (CFW)			Housing			Total			
	Total	Gender		Total	Gender		Total	Gender		Total	Gender		
		F	M		F	M		F	M		F	M	N/S
Anbar	317	82	235	259	129	128	0	0	0	576	211	363	2
Nineveh	321	148	172	239	103	133	894	278	614	1,454	529	919	6
Salah Al-Din	286	121	163	80	52	28	144	76	68	510	249	259	2
Diyala	44	43	1	14	11	3	69	22	47	127	76	51	0
Kirkuk	180	101	78	0	0	0	48	3	45	228	104	123	1
N/S	21	0	1	2	0	1	2	1	1	25	1	3	21
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1,169</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>631</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>1,157</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>775</b>	<b>2,920</b>	<b>1,170</b>	<b>1,718</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>From:</b>	<b>1,732</b>			<b>601</b>			<b>1,487</b>			<b>3,820</b>			
<b>% Responses</b>	<b>67.5%</b>			<b>98.8%</b>			<b>77.8%</b>			<b>78.2%</b>			

### 10.9.2 Inspected Facilities

Governorate	Number of facilities inspected	Type of facilities inspected.			
		Health	Electricity/Water/ Agriculture	Education	Police Justice /
Nineveh	14	3	8	1	2
Anbar	6	4	2	0	0
Salah Al-Din	5	2	1	1	1
Diyala	2	0	0	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>

### 10.10 Data Collection Tools

#### 10.10.1 Semi Structured Key Informant Interviews

Target: FFS UNDP Project Team -

#### RELEVANCE

Q1: How did the FFS identify needs and priorities of beneficiaries? (participation of communities and stakeholders)

Q2: How did the FFS ensure and maintain consistency of agreed priorities with security, political, economic context?

*Probe:* Did the process rely on a conflict-analysis lens?

Q3: Who were the stakeholders consulted when designing and revising (evaluating) FFS and through which mechanisms?

Q4: How did the FFS adapted to contextual changes and needs over time (including recommendations from MTE)

Q5: How did the FFS incorporate human rights and gender into design and implementation?
<b>COHERENCE</b>
Q6: How did the FFS project windows contribute to the coordination, cooperation, non-duplication, and consultation with different levels of Iraqi authorities, and development partners? <i>Probe:</i> Coordination / consultation / non duplication / partnership amongst UN agencies With Donors / other INGOs With National government With Local government With local communities With active CSOs
Q7: how did the 4 windows work in synergy with each other- what were the main intersectionality amongst them?
Q8: what feedback mechanisms were incorporated to ensure consistency in implementation
<b>EFFICIENCY</b>
Q9: How did FFS results were implemented as planned <i>Probe:</i> Timelines / cost / manpower / management and procurement systems / quality control...
Q10: Were the resources well planned and applied across all four windows? And equitably between regions
Q11: can you describe the M&E system used in the project? What type of data was gathered and segregated? How did M&E findings incorporate in implementations (amendments /changes)
<b>EFFECTIVENESS</b>
Q12: What would you consider the main achievements for FFS? <i>Probe:</i> <i>Probe</i> How did it improve women conditions, Livelihoods, economic growth, job creation, return, services, protection and safety for vulnerable population?
Q13: How did FFS contribute to building the capacities of government officials (provincial and national) to manage infrastructure and contribute to stabilization? <i>Probe</i> What were the main obstacles and challenges?
Q14: What would you consider the main shortcomings for FFS? <i>Probe</i> What were the main obstacles and challenges?
<b>SUSTAINABILITY</b>
Q15: How will the FFS activities and results be maintained upon completion of the programme?
Q16: What were the efforts and measures undertaken to ensure the ownership of the programme by institutional stakeholders? <i>Probe:</i> national or subnational mechanisms or structures to maintain the results achieved: exit plans, phase out / spin off – handover plan / procedures / capacity building for authorities <i>Probe:</i> financial and human resource <i>Probe:</i> institutional capacities <i>Probe:</i> community engagement <i>Probe:</i> contingency planning and risk preparedness <i>Probe:</i> measures of resource and water conservation
<b>IMPACT</b>
Q13: How did the FFS program contribute to a lasting stabilization process in the target areas? Did it promote a rights-based approach for all groups?

*Probe: how the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus was integrated and planned*

## 10.10.2 Semi Structured Key Informant Interviews

Target: Gov stakeholders / local government / CSOs

### Q 1

#### **Were your needs and priorities met by the FFS programme & how?**

*Probe: any indication that priorities might have been missed in FFS design and implementation?*

*Probe: were the areas of security, economy, reconstruction, and capacity-building covered?*

*Probe: any indication the quality of the services is met?*

*Probe: any indication that UNDP adapted to such needs over time?*

*Probe: a conflict-analysis lens? Did it include gender and human rights-based approaches?*

### Q 2

#### **Who did you coordinate directly with throughout the intervention? How did these different partnership's function?**

*Probe: any indication of impartiality, reliability of UNDP and Gol stakeholders in the process?*

*Probe: any indication local stakeholders / CSOs were consulted throughout the implementation? (feedback mechanisms)*

*Probe: any indication of efficiency and fluidity of coordination process and mechanism?*

*Probe: How did you experience the work of the different components together*

### Q 3

#### **How has FFS contributed to the return of displaced persons to the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication whether FFS created enabling conditions for IDPs to return?*

*Probe: any indication of likeliness of returnees to stay thanks to program?*

*Probe enhancing government officials capacities, economic growth,*

### Q 4

#### **How did FFS address the concerns of vulnerable populations, disabled persons and women-headed households, minorities?**

*Probe: any indication the program focused on this groups / protection to these groups?*

*Probe: examples from the program managing to support these populations?*

### Q 5

#### **Did the FFS strengthen social cohesion among the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication of community level engagement?*

*Probe: any indication of potential violence on local level?*

*Probe: examples of successful social cohesion activities?*

### Q 6

#### **Did the FFS strengthen institutional capacity-building at the municipal level to maintain the achievements of FFS?**

*Probe: any indication of enhancement of financial and human resources capacities to maintain rehabilitated facilities?*

*Probe: any indication of handover plan or procedures, contingency plan, to ensure access and quality of services from FFS?*

*Probe: examples of successful ownership transitions?*



**Q7:**

**Did the FFS contribute to transition to development and enhancement of opportunities of peace in impacted areas (HDP nexus)?**

**10.10.3 Focus Group Discussion Protocol for: Local government officials / municipal officials / project managers**

**Q 1**

**Were your needs and priorities met by the FFS programme?**

*Probe: any indication that priorities might have been missed in FFS design and implementation?*

*Probe: were the areas of security, economy, reconstruction, and capacity-building covered?*

*Probe: any indication the quality of the services is met?*

*Probe: any indication that UNDP adapted to such needs over different stages?*

**Q 2**

**Who did you coordinate directly with throughout the intervention? How did these different partnership’s function?**

*Probe: any indication of impartiality, reliability of UNDP and Gol stakeholders in the process?*

*Probe: any indication local stakeholders were consulted throughout the implementation?*

*Probe: any indication of efficiency and fluidity of coordination process and mechanism?*

**Q 3**

**How has FFS contributed to the return of displaced persons to the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication whether FFS created enabling conditions for IDPs to return?*

*Probe: any indication of likeliness of returnees to stay thanks to program?*

**Q 4**

**How did FFS address the concerns of vulnerable populations, disabled persons and women-headed households?**

*Probe: any indication the program focused on these groups?*

*Probe: examples from the program managing to support these populations?*

**Q 5**

**Did the FFS strengthen social cohesion among the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication of community level engagement?*

*Probe: any indication of potential violence on local level?*

*Probe: examples of successful social cohesion activities?*

**Q 6**

**Did the FFS strengthen institutional capacity-building at the municipal level to maintain the achievements of FFS?**

*Probe: any indication of enhancement of financial and human resources capacities to maintain rehabilitated facilities?*

*Probe: any indication of handover plan or procedures to ensure access and quality of services from FFS?*

*Probe: examples of successful ownership transitions?*

**Q7**

**Did the FFS contribute to transition to development and enhancement of opportunities of peace in impacted areas (HDP nexus)?**

## 10.10.4 Focus Group Discussion Protocol for: Beneficiaries

**Q 1**

**Were your needs and priorities met by the FFS programme?**

*Probe: any indication that services were made available?*

*Probe: any indication the quality of the services was met?*

*Probe: any indication that UNDP adapted to such needs over different stages?*

**Q 2**

**Who was FFS target population?**

*Probe: any indication whether it reached women-headed households, disabled persons, youth, rural groups?*

*Probe: any indication of priorities and groups missed in the process?*

*Probe: any indication vulnerability dimension present in the implementation?*

**Q 3**

**How has FFS contributed to your return to the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication whether FFS created enabling conditions for them to return?*

*Probe: any indication of their likeliness to stay thanks to FFS?*

**Q 4**

**Did the FFS strengthen social cohesion among the liberated areas?**

*Probe: any indication of community level engagement?*

*Probe: any indication of potential violence on local level?*

*Probe: examples of successful social cohesion activities they might have participated in?*

**Q 5**

**Can you report any shortcomings from the program stakeholders?**

*Probe: any indication of favouritism or sectarian discrimination?*

*Probe: any indication they could trust the implementation parties?*

*Probe: any indication safeguard measures were known, understood and available?*

**Q 6**

**What needs to be done to maintain FFS results?**

*Probe: any indication of institutional involvement, at local or national levels?*

*Probe: any indication of resources build-up at the local level?*

*Probe: any indication their voice is being sought and heard?*

**Q7**

**Did the FFS contribute to transition to development and enhancement of opportunities of peace in impacted areas (HDP nexus)?**

### 10.10.5 Sustainability and Accessibility Checklist

Target: facilities (schools /buildings / hospitals)				
	Criteria	yes	no	comments
<b>ACCESIBILITY</b>				
1	1. Are the pavements leading to the venue in good condition?			
2	a) Good accessible road crossings with warning texture and crossing systems?			
3	2. Is there accessible parking near the entrance?			
4	a) How many spaces are there?			
5	b) Is it within 50 metres uncovered or 100 metres covered to an accessible entrance?			
6	c) Is there lighting from the accessible parking to accessible entrance?			
	3. Is the entrance accessible?			
7	a) If there is a ramp, does it have a levelled area at the top?			
8	b) If the doors are closed, can they be opened unaided by a person in a wheelchair i.e. light weight door (try opening it with one finger), low door handle...?			
9	c) Are steps and floor level changes clearly marked with a bright contrast edging?			
10	d) Are their handrails on access ramps / stairs for people with mobility difficulty			
11	4. Is there an entrance Lobby where a wheelchair user can move clear of one door before using the next one?			
12	a) Does the lobby door have space to be fully opened?			
13	b) Is there a trip hazard?			
14	5. Is there a reception area?			
15	a) Is there a low area for someone who may not be able to see over the counter?			
16	b) Is there a higher area for tall people who might find it difficult to bend for signing things?			
17	6. Are the floor surfaces nonslip?			
18	a) Does the floor surface create a glare?			
19	b) are anti-slip strips applied on the floors			
20	7. If there is seating, do some have armrests?			
21	a) Is the seating fixed to the floor?			
22	b) Is the seating set out in rows and if so can you get a walking frame down the rows?			
23	c) Is there a clear space for wheelchair users to sit where they are away from traffic flow?			

24	8. Is there clear access to the rooms?			
25	a) Wide doors?			
26	b) Wide corridor?			
27	c) No obstacles in the way i.e. rubbish bin, etc...			
28	d) If the doors are closed, can they be opened unaided by a person in a wheelchair i.e. light weight door (try opening it with one finger), low door handle...?			
29	9. Is there colour contrasting in the building so that the doors and fixtures are easy to distinguish?			
30	10. Is there an accessible toilet at least 1.5m x 2.2m?			
31	a) how many toilets are there per floor?			
32	b) Wide door?			
33	c) Is there a low door handle?			
34	d) Does the handle have a lock that can be flipped or slid to lock?			
35	g) Is the sink near the toilet, so it can be reached while on the toilet, but not located in the transfer space?			
36	11. Do the average toilets have door handles no higher than 1.1m?			
37	a) Are the cubical door handles near 80cm from the floor & have a lock that can be flipped or slid? I.e. no twisting locks			
38	b) Do the toilets and sinks contrast with surroundings so they can be easily identified?			
40	12. Is there a lift?			
41	a) Is it wide enough to encompass a wheelchair in addition to 1 or 2 people			
42	b) Are the buttons in the lift at the height that a wheelchair user could reach?			
43	13. Is there clear signage? a) Is only the first letter of each word capitalised?			
44	a) Is the font simple or plain, such as Arial or Helvetica?			
45	b) Is there colour contrasting, such as black & white or yellow & dark blue?			
46	14. What is the evacuation procedure for assisting wheelchair users out of the building?			
<b>Environmental sustainability</b>				
	LIGHTING			
47	Light Timers			
48	LED Lights			
49	sun control and shading installation			
50	motion sensors in rooms and corridors			
	CONSTRUCTION			

51	Insulation Systems (air-conditioning or heating leaks)			
52	on-site solar panel system			
53	non-Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) paint			
54	rain barrels			
	HEATING AND COOLING			
55	exterior walls are Insulated.			
56	large windows and natural light –			
57	programmable thermostats installed–			
58	window film Installed			
	WATER			
59	low-flow sensor faucet aerators in bathroom sinks			
60	Install water dispensers –			
	ENERGY			
61	Energy Star-rated appliances			
	WASTE			
62	a recycling program			
	INDOOR ENVIRONMENT			
63	filtration and ventilation systems –			
	LANDSCAPING			
64	plants and trees throughout your property –			
	MAINTENANCE			
65	Regular maintenance of building structure including piping			
66	Degradable soap -napkins and refillable cleaning detergents			

**10.10.6 Capacity Building Beneficiaries Questionnaire**

**Gender:**

Male

Female

Prefer not to say

**Age:**

18-25

26-35

36-50

50+

**Professional Role:**

TO BE INDICATED

Other (please specify)

**Provinces**

Nineveh	
Anbar	
Salah al Din	
Kirkuk	
Diyala	
Other (please specify)	

**Knowledge uptake and utilization of Training**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
How would you rank the usefulness of the training workshop					
Do you think there is a need for specialized training for public servants					
Training content was comprehensive and touched upon the various aspects of work					
Training content was relevant to my work					
Training provided knowledge / skill I need for my work	very good	good	Somehow	poor	No opinion
<b>MATERIALS</b>					
Rate the training materials that were handed to you	very good	good	Somehow	poor	No opinion
Rate the training presentations?	very good	good	Somehow	poor	No opinion
Rate the training exercises?	very good	good	Somehow	poor	No opinion

Rate the trainers' facilitation & training skills?	very good	good	Somehow	poor	No opinion
<b>UTILIZATION</b>					
I have applied/used the learning/knowledge I received during the training in my work	To a big extent	Somewhat	To a lesser extent	Limited	No opinion
There was noticeable change in my performance (skill / application) when back in my role after receiving the training	To a big extent	Somewhat	To a lesser extent	Limited	No opinion
There is a chance that I transfer the learning to another person	To a big extent	Somewhat	To a lesser extent	Limited	No opinion
Overall, the training program was effective in improving my job performance	To a big extent	Somewhat	To a lesser extent	Limited	No opinion
Which were the most significant changes in the way you perform your job as result of attending the training program?					
What helped you to apply what you learned? (Choose as many answers as apply)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Opportunities to apply</li> <li>• Relevance of knowledge/ skills to my role</li> <li>• Support from other stakeholders (who)</li> <li>• Had the time.</li> <li>• Encouraged by previous accomplishment</li> </ul> <p>Other:</p>				
What are the reasons behind non utilization:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No opportunity to apply.</li> <li>• No support from supervisor</li> <li>• No legal framework</li> <li>• Absence of SoPs/tools</li> <li>• No official designation</li> <li>• Do not remember the course content.</li> <li>• Information not enough</li> <li>• Had no time.</li> <li>• Tried but it did not work</li> </ul>				
Please list what additional topics or skills would you recommend be included in the training curriculum:					





## 10.10.7 SURVEY FOR RETURNEES & PROJECTS BENEFICIARIES

### WINDOWS 1 & 2

#### INTRO & CONSENT

Hello, my name is (---) and I am a surveyor/researcher for \_\_\_\_\_.

We are focusing on evaluating the UNDP projects implemented in the framework of the Funding Facility for Stabilization in liberated areas from ISIS. This is why we are conducting a large survey with returnees in these regions to better understand your perspective on the different projects that were developed in the recent years.

We are independent from the UNDP and all responses will remain strictly confidential and the data safely stored without being shared with anyone without further consent.

The interview usually takes about 30 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary, and you can choose not to answer any question you do not want to answer or stop the survey anytime.

Do you agree to continue with the survey?

**I/ Return Experience**

Are you a returnee to the present location?

- Yes
- No (thank the respondent and end the survey)

**Gender:**

Male

Female

Prefer not to say.

**Age:**

18-25

26-35

36-50

50+

**Provinces**

Nineveh	
Anbar	
Salah al Din	
Kirkuk	
Diyala	
Other (please specify)	

When did you return to the rehabilitated area?

[month and date]

Did you return to the same location you used to live in before you were displaced?

- Yes
- No

What were the primary reasons for your return?

- To go back home
- Family factors
- Work factors
- Health factors
- Other: \_\_\_\_\_
- I don't know

Civil status:

- Single
- Married\*
- Divorced\*
- Separated\*
- Widowed\*

a. \*Year of marriage: [year] - *calendar*

b. \*Do you have any children?

- Yes, how many? [number dropdown]
- No

Are you head of your household?

- Yes
- No

Are there any persons with disabilities in your household?

- Yes\*
- No

a. \*How many? [number dropdown]

b. \*On a scale 1 to 5, how suitable would you consider infrastructure development to PWDs needs?

- Not suitable at all
- Not suitable
- Somehow suitable

- Suitable
- Very suitable

On a scale from 1 to 5, how likely it is for you to stay in this locality?

- 1) Very unlikely
- 2) Unlikely
- 3) Still thinking about it
- 4) Not likely
- 5) Not likely at all

What is your educational background?

- Elementary school
- Middle school
- High school
- University/institute studies (higher education)
- I didn't go to school

## II/ Satisfaction with Rehabilitation Efforts

On a scale from 1 to 5, did you notice any improvement on your locality's infrastructure since your return?

- 1) No improvement at all
- 2) A little bit of improvement
- 3) Everything is the same
- 4) Some improvement
- 5) Much improvement

On a scale 1 to 5, how would you rate the infrastructure improvements in regards to your immediate needs?

- 1) Very poorly
- 2) Poorly
- 3) Average
- 4) Good
- 5) Excellent

Which infrastructure development sectors has directly impacted your daily life? *[up to 3 answers possible]*

- Education
- Electricity
- Health
- Housing
- Sewerage
- Water

On a scale 1 to 5, how would you rate the infrastructure improvements in regard to:					
	1)Very poorly	2) Poorly	3) Average	4) Good	5) Excellent
Roads and bridges?					
Water?					
Sewerage?					
Health?					
Electricity?					
Education?					
Housing?					

What additional infrastructure improvements would you like to see in your area?

*[open Q]*

Was your house rebuilt through a UN rehabilitation project?

- Yes\*
- No

a. \* When was it rebuilt?

- Before I returned
- Once I had returned
- The rehabilitation is still ongoing

b. \*How long did it take to rebuild (in months)?

*[transcribe number of months]*

c. \*On a scale 1 to 5, how would you rate the rehabilitation works to your house?

- 1) Very poorly
- 2) Poorly
- 3) Average
- 4) Good
- 5) Excellent

d. \*On a scale 1 to 5, how satisfied are you with the rehabilitation of your house?

- 1) Not satisfied at all
- 2) Poorly satisfied
- 3) Somewhat satisfied
- 4) Satisfied
- 5) Very satisfied

### III/ Livelihood Improvement

On a scale from 1 to 5, did you see any improvement in your livelihood since you returned?

- 1) No improvement at all
- 2) A little bit of improvement
- 3) Everything is the same
- 4) Some improvement
- 5) Much improvement

On a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent did the rehabilitation of infrastructure improve your ability to earn a living since you returned?

- 1) No improvement at all
- 2) A little bit of improvement
- 3) Nothing changed
- 4) Some improvement
- 5) Much improvement

What was your occupation before you left the area?

*[open Q]*

Were you able to resume the same occupation when you returned?

- Yes
- No

Since you returned, have you benefited from a UNDP livelihood program?

- Yes\*
- No\*\*

a. \*Which type of program did you benefit from? *[enumerate list to respondent]*

- Cash for Work
- Small Business Grants
- Cash Grants for Women
- Vocational Training
- Job Placement & Apprenticeships
- Job Creation through Agriculture

b. \*On a scale 1 to 5, how would you rate this livelihood program?

- 1) Very poorly
- 2) Poorly
- 3) Average
- 4) Good
- 5) Excellent

c. \* On a scale from 1 to 5, to what extent did this program improve your ability to earn a living?

- 1) No improvement at all
- 2) A little bit of improvement
- 3) Nothing changed
- 4) Some improvement
- 5) Much improvement

a. \*\* Did you know about these livelihood programs supported by the UNDP?

- Yes#
- No

#### IV/ Challenges and Obstacles

What are the main challenges you have faced since returning to the area?

- Security challenges\* [elaborate]
- Economic challenges\* [elaborate]
- Social challenges\* [elaborate]
- All of the above
- Other: \_\_\_\_\_
- No challenges

Have you encountered any obstacles that hindered the utilization of the rehabilitated infrastructure?

- Yes\*
- No

a. \*What kind of obstacles?

[open Q]

What support or resources do you think your locality needs today?

[open Q]

#### V/ Sustainability

On a scale 1 to 5, how would you consider the work done by:						
	1)Very poorly	2) Poorly	3) Average	4) Good	5) Excellent	I don't know
Your municipality?						
Civil society organizations in your area?						
Religious organizations in your area?						
UNDP?						



## 10.11 List of FGDs Respondents

### 10.11.1 FGDs carried out with public sector in Anbar Governorate.

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the FFS, implemented by UNDP - Fallujah (1)		
Sector	Health, Education, Municipal Services and Sanitation Sector		
Key target group(s)	No.	Entity	Post
	1	Karma Municipality Directorate	Deputy Technical Director of Karma Municipality
	2	Anbar Health Directorate	Director of Primary Health Care Sector at Al Karma
	3	Anbar Education Directorate	Head of the Educational Buildings Unit in the Department of Education in Karma
	4	Anbar Sewerage Directorate	Director of the Fallujah Sanitation Center
	5	Anbar Health Directorate - Fallujah Teaching Hospital	Maintenance Engineer at Fallujah Teaching Hospital
Location – city - governorate	Anbar / Fallujah District		

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the FFS, implemented by UNDP- Ramadi (2)		
Sector	Health, water, education, higher education, municipal services and electricity sector		
Key target group(s)	No.	Entity	Post
	1	Anbar Water Directorate	Assistant Director of Anbar Water Directorate
	2	Anbar Water Directorate	Director of the Water Center in Ramadi
	3	Anbar Health Directorate	Director of the Engineering Department at Anbar Health Directorate
	4	Anbar Education Directorate	Director of the Planning Department in the Anbar Education Directorate
	5	Vocational Training Center	Director of the Vocational Training Center
	6	Anbar University	Director of Construction & Projects Department
	7	Khalidiya Electricity Distribution Branch	Khalidiya Electricity Distribution Branch Manager
8	Anbar Central Electricity Distribution Branch	Director of Electrical Substations Maintenance Unit	

	9	Heat Electricity Distribution Branch	Heat Electricity Distribution Branch Manager
Location – city - governorate	Anbar / Ramadi District		

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the FFS, implemented by UNDP- Al-Qaim (3)		
Sector	Health, Water, Education and Electricity Sector		
Key target group(s)	No.	Entity	Post
	1	Anbar Water Directorate	Director of the Water Center in Al-Qaim
	2	Anbar Health Directorate - Al-Obaidi General Hospital	Engineering and Maintenance Unit Officer at Al Obaidi General Hospital
	3	Anbar Education Directorate	Restoration Officer in Al-Qaim Education Department
	4	Upper Furat Branch for Electrical Distribution	Director of the electricity sector in Al-Qaim
Location – city - governorate	Anbar / Al-Qaim District		

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the FFS, implemented by UNDP- Al-Haditha (3)		
Sector	Health, Water, Education and Electricity Sector		
Key target group(s)	No.	Entity	Post
	1	Anbar Water Directorate	Director of the Water Center in Anah
	2	Directorate of Municipality in Anah	Head of the Machinery Unit in the Municipality of Anah
	3	Anbar Water Directorate	Director of the Water Center in Haditha
	4	Haditha Municipal Office	Head of the engineering unit in the municipality office of Haditha
	5	Upper Furat Branch for Electrical Distribution	Branch Manager of Upper Al-Furat Electricity Distribution
	6	Municipality Directorate in Rawa Area	Planning and follow-up officer in Rawa district
7	Upper Furat Branch for Electrical Distribution	Director of Electricity Sector at Rawa Company	
Location – city -governorate	Anbar / Anah District		

**10.11.2 FGDs carried out with public sector in Nineveh Governorate.**

Focus Group Discussion Title	Mosul 1			
Sector	The electricity, health, and water sectors			
The main targeted group (groups)	No.	Position	Gender	Location
	1	Control Manager	Male	Northern Power Transmission Company
	2	Finance Manager	Female	Northern Power Transmission Company
	3	Maintenance Engineer	Male	Nineveh Electricity Network
	4	Head of Lines Dept	Male	Nineveh Electricity Network
	5	Deputy Nineveh Network	Male	Nineveh Electricity Network
	6	Training Department Manager	Male	Northern Power Transmission Company
	7	Planning Department	Male	Northern Power Transmission Company
	8	Energy Sales Department	Male	Northern Power Transmission Company
	9	Head of Engineering Department / Sinjar Sector	Male	Health Sector / Sinjar
	10	UNDP Coordinator	Male	UNDP
	11	Legal Advisor	Male	Northern Power Transmission Company
	12	Chief Engineer	Male	Nineveh Water
	13	Senior Engineers	Male	Nineveh Water
14		Male	Municipality	
Location - City - Governorate	Nineveh / Mosul			

Focus Group Discussion Title	Mosul 2			
Sector	The electricity, health, and water sectors			
The main targeted group (groups)	No.	Position	Gender	Location
	1	Senior Engineer	Male	Ministry of Education / Nineveh
	2	Senior Engineer	Male	Ministry of Education / Planning Department / Nineveh
	3	Engineer	Male	Ministry of Electricity / Branch of Parties / Sinjar Sector
	4	Senior Accounts Manager	Male	General Company for Electricity Distribution in Nineveh
	5	Senior Engineer	Male	Northern Company Branch of Parties / Baaj Sector
	6	Senior Engineer	Male	Ministry of Health / Health Nineveh / Projects Department
	7	Engineer	Female	Ministry of Health / Health Nineveh / Projects Department
	8	Senior Engineer	Male	Directorate of Water Nineveh
	9	Senior Engineer	Female	Headquarters of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company
	10	Senior Engineer	Male	Headquarters of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company
	11	Senior Engineer	Male	Nineveh Electricity Distribution Branch
	12	Senior Engineer	Male	Nineveh Electricity Distribution Branch
	13	Senior Engineer	Male	Headquarters of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company
	14	Senior Engineer	Male	Nineveh Electricity Distribution Branch
15	Senior Engineer	Male	Headquarters of the Northern Electricity Distribution Company	
Location - City - Governorate	Nineveh/Mosul District			

**10.11.3 FGD carried out with public sector in Diyala Governorate.**

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the FFS implemented by UNDP / Diyala / Baqubah		
Sector	The agriculture sector, youth forum, municipal services, and healthcare.		
Key target group(s)	<b>No.</b>	<b>Department</b>	<b>Position</b>
	1	Ministry of Agriculture	Agricultural Engineer
	2	Ministry of Agriculture	Agricultural Engineer
	3	Youth and Sports Forum	Youth Forum Director
	4	Electricity Directorate	Employee
	5		Engineer
	6		Engineer
	7	Diyala Health	Engineer
	8	Immigration Department	Migration Director
	9	Saadia Municipality	Director
	10		Civil Engineer
Location – city – governora te	Diyala / Baqubah		

## 10.11.4 FGD carried out with public sector in Salah al-Din Governorate (1).

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the Funding Facility for Stabilization, FFS, implemented by UNDP SalahDin Tikrit 1																																	
Sector	Health, water, education, higher education, municipal services and electricity sectors																																	
Key target group(s)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>No</th> <th>Department</th> <th>Position</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Salah al-Din Electricity (Tikrit)</td> <td>Distribution Engineer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Salah al-Din (Dhuluiya)</td> <td>Electrical Engineer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>Qadaa Balad</td> <td>Engineer and Water Center Manager</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>Tikrit Electricity Directorate</td> <td>Deputy Director</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>Tikrit</td> <td>Engineer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>Planning and Distribution for Tikrit Electricity</td> <td>Chief Planning Engineer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>Bayji</td> <td>Engineer and Electricity Director</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> <td>Education of Sharqat</td> <td>Follow-up Officer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>Tikrit</td> <td>Media Director</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>Education Directorate</td> <td>Deputy Head of Programmers</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	No	Department	Position	1	Salah al-Din Electricity (Tikrit)	Distribution Engineer	2	Salah al-Din (Dhuluiya)	Electrical Engineer	3	Qadaa Balad	Engineer and Water Center Manager	4	Tikrit Electricity Directorate	Deputy Director	5	Tikrit	Engineer	6	Planning and Distribution for Tikrit Electricity	Chief Planning Engineer	7	Bayji	Engineer and Electricity Director	8	Education of Sharqat	Follow-up Officer	9	Tikrit	Media Director	10	Education Directorate	Deputy Head of Programmers
No	Department	Position																																
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9	Tikrit	Media Director																																
10	Education Directorate	Deputy Head of Programmers																																
Location – city – governorate	Salah al-Din Tikrit																																	

## 10.11.5 FGD carried out with public sector in Salah al-Din GOVERNORATE (2).

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the Funding Facility for Stabilization, FFS, implemented by UNDP Salah al-Din Tikrit 1																							
Sector	The sectors of environment, water, and electricity awareness and training.																							
Key target group(s)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>No.</th> <th>Department</th> <th>Position</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Water Directorate</td> <td>Deputy Director of Surveillance Project</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Bayji Municipality</td> <td>Waste Management Department Director</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>Vocational Development in Tikrit</td> <td>Awareness and Training Division Manager</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>Water Directorate in Sharqat</td> <td>Water Center Officer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>Water Directorate in Sharqat</td> <td>Sharqat Water Officer</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>Department Head in Electricity</td> <td>Department Director</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			No.	Department	Position	1	Water Directorate	Deputy Director of Surveillance Project	2	Bayji Municipality	Waste Management Department Director	3	Vocational Development in Tikrit	Awareness and Training Division Manager	4	Water Directorate in Sharqat	Water Center Officer	5	Water Directorate in Sharqat	Sharqat Water Officer	6	Department Head in Electricity	Department Director
No.	Department	Position																						
1	Water Directorate	Deputy Director of Surveillance Project																						
2	Bayji Municipality	Waste Management Department Director																						
3	Vocational Development in Tikrit	Awareness and Training Division Manager																						
4	Water Directorate in Sharqat	Water Center Officer																						
5	Water Directorate in Sharqat	Sharqat Water Officer																						
6	Department Head in Electricity	Department Director																						
Location – city – governorate	Salah al-Din Tikrit																							

**10.11.6 FGD carried out with public sector in Kirkuk Governorate.**

Title of FGD	Focus Group Discussion to external evaluation of the Funding Facility for Stabilization, FFS, implemented by UNDP Kirkuk																																										
Sector	Health, agriculture, and electricity sectors																																										
Key target group(s)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>No.</th> <th>Position</th> <th>Department</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Senior Chief Engineer</td> <td>Kirkuk Electricity Distribution</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>Pharmacist</td> <td>Kirkuk Health Directorate</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>Senior Chief Engineer</td> <td>Kirkuk Electricity Distribution</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>Engineer Manager</td> <td>Electricity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5</td> <td>Senior Chief Engineer</td> <td>Electricity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6</td> <td>Engineer</td> <td>Electricity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7</td> <td>Project Engineer</td> <td>Project Department</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8</td> <td>Engineer</td> <td>Electricity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9</td> <td>Civil Engineer</td> <td>Project Department</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10</td> <td>Senior Engineer</td> <td>Technical Department in Electricity</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11</td> <td>Electricity Distribution Employee</td> <td>Inspection Department</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>Engineer</td> <td>Molasses Sector Maintenance</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13</td> <td>Agricultural Engineer</td> <td>Horticulture Department</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	No.	Position	Department	1	Senior Chief Engineer	Kirkuk Electricity Distribution	2	Pharmacist	Kirkuk Health Directorate	3	Senior Chief Engineer	Kirkuk Electricity Distribution	4	Engineer Manager	Electricity	5	Senior Chief Engineer	Electricity	6	Engineer	Electricity	7	Project Engineer	Project Department	8	Engineer	Electricity	9	Civil Engineer	Project Department	10	Senior Engineer	Technical Department in Electricity	11	Electricity Distribution Employee	Inspection Department	12	Engineer	Molasses Sector Maintenance	13	Agricultural Engineer	Horticulture Department
No.	Position	Department																																									
1	Senior Chief Engineer	Kirkuk Electricity Distribution																																									
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5	Senior Chief Engineer	Electricity																																									
6	Engineer	Electricity																																									
7	Project Engineer	Project Department																																									
8	Engineer	Electricity																																									
9	Civil Engineer	Project Department																																									
10	Senior Engineer	Technical Department in Electricity																																									
11	Electricity Distribution Employee	Inspection Department																																									
12	Engineer	Molasses Sector Maintenance																																									
13	Agricultural Engineer	Horticulture Department																																									
Location – city -governorate	Kirkuk																																										



**10.11.7 FGD carried out with beneficiaries in Anbar Governorate - Fallujah**

No.	Gender	Function – Beneficiaries of Capacity Building
1	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
2	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
3	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
4	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
5	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
6	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
7	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
8	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities
9	Female	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
10	Female	Ministry of Construction, Housing and Public Municipalities
11	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
12	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
13	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
14	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities
15	Male	Ministry of Construction, Housing and General Municipalities

No.	Gender	Function – Beneficiaries of livelihoods / housing
1	Male	Bread winner
2	Male	Bread winner
3	Male	Bread winner
4	Female	Housewife
5	male	Bread winner
6	Female	Housewife
7	Female	Housewife
8	Female	Housewife
9	Female	housewife
10	Female	housewife
11	Female	housewife
12	Female	housewife
13	Female	housewife

**10.11.8 Report of FGD carried out with beneficiaries in Nineveh Governorate - Mosul**

No.	Gender	Function – Beneficiaries of Capacity Building -Mosul
1	Female	Nineveh Water Directorate
2	Female	Nineveh Water Directorate
3	Male	General Company for Electric Power Transmission
4	Male	General Company for Electric Power Transmission
5	Male	General Company for Electric Power Transmission
6	Male	General Company for Electric Power Transmission
7	Male	General Company for Electric Power Transmission
8	Male	General Company for Northern Electricity Distribution
9	Male	General Company for Northern Electricity Distribution
10	Female	General Company for Northern Electricity Distribution
11	Male	Nineveh Water Directorate
12	Male	Nineveh Water Directorate

No.	Gender	Function – Beneficiaries of Capacity Building -Mosul
13	Female	Directorate of Nineveh Municipalities
14	Female	Directorate of Nineveh Municipalities
15	Male	Directorate of Nineveh Municipalities
16	Male	Directorate of Nineveh Municipalities
17	Male	Directorate of Nineveh Municipalities

No.	Site	Gender	Function – Beneficiaries of livelihoods / housing
1	Nablus District	Male	Earner
2	Saddam District	Male	Earner
3	Ray Avenue	Male	Earner
4	Al-Dawasa District	Male	Earner
5	Alzahraa District	Male	Earner
6	Nablus District	Male	Earner
7	Al Rifai District	Female	Housewife
8	Cairo District	Female	Housewife
9	Al Nahda District	Female	Housewife
10	Al Rifai District	Male	Earner
11	Sheep Market	Male	Earner
12	Sheep Market	Male	Earner
13	Al Rifai District	Male	Earner

## 10.12 Inspection Visits Sites

Inspection Visits Sites
1. Rehabilitation of Al-Batool Hospital - Nineveh
2. Rehabilitation of Blood Bank Building, Al-Shifaa Medical Compound - Nineveh
3. Rehabilitation of Radiology Building, Al-Shifaa Medical Compound – Nineveh
4. Rehabilitation of Al-Qubba Water Treatment Plant, Al-Qubba Village – Nineveh
5. Rehabilitation of the 1st (of seven) Power Substation, Al-Zuhoor – Nineveh
6. Rehabilitation of the 2nd (of seven) Power Substation, Bab Al-Shames – Nineveh
7. Rehabilitation of the 3rd (of seven) Power Substation, Domez – Nineveh
8. Rehabilitation of the 4th (of seven) Power Substation, Al-Qubba – Nineveh
9. Rehabilitation of the 5th (of seven) Power Substation, Shuqaq Al-Habaa – Nineveh
10. Rehabilitation of the 6th (of seven) Power Substation, Sukar – Nineveh
11. Rehabilitation of the 7th (of seven) Power Substation, University of Mosul - Nineveh
12. Rehabilitation of Theatre Hall, University of Mosul – Nineveh
13. Rehabilitation of Investigation Court House – Nineveh
14. Rehabilitation of Criminal Court House - Nineveh
15. Rehabilitation of Falluja Teaching Hospital – Falluja - Anbar
16. Full Rehabilitation of External Consultancy Clinic in Karma Maternity and Emergency Hospital – Karma – Falluja - Anbar
17. Construction of Falluja Stormwater Lift Station Falluja - Anbar
18. Renovation of Ramadi Maternity and Children's Hospital – Ramadi – Anbar
19. Installing Solar Power System for Water Station – Heet - Anbar
20. Renovation of Al-Obaidi Hospital – Qaim - Anbar
21. Rehabilitation of PHC – Biji - Salahuddin
22. Rehabilitation of Police Station – Biji - Salahuddin
23. Rehabilitation of Agricultural Warehouse – Biji - Salahuddin
24. Rehabilitation of Adnaniya School – Tooz -Salahuddin
25. Rehabilitation of Tikrit Teaching Hospital – Tikrit - Salahuddin
26. Rehabilitation of Youth Center – Muqdadia - Diyala

27. Rehabilitation of Youth Center – Bani Saad - Diyala

**10.13 List of Reviewed Documents**

Source	Type of document	Documents
UNDP IRAQ	Project Documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Original version</li> <li>. Revision 1 of April 2016</li> <li>. Revision 2 of February 2018</li> <li>. Revision 3 – 2020.</li> <li>. FFS Theory of Change</li> <li>. Evaluation ToR</li> <li>. Draft transition strategy</li> <li>. Transition Strategy for Donors Consultation</li> <li>. FFS Validation Mapping Priorities</li> <li>. Methodology for Project Selection</li> <li>. UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021</li> <li>. UNDP Gender Strategy, Annual Report 2020.</li> </ul>
	Progress Reports	UNDP FFS Annual Reports 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021.
	Quarterly Reports	UNDP FFS Quarterly Reports for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.
	FFS Sectorial Assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Anbar Sectorial Assessment for 2017-2021: Agriculture; Education; Electricity; Health; Housing; Livelihood; Municipal Sector; Roads &amp; Bridges; Security Sector; Water &amp; Sewage.</li> <li>. Diyala Sectorial Assessment for 2017-2021: Agriculture; Education; Electricity; Health; Housing; Livelihood; Municipal Sector; Roads &amp; Bridges; Security Sector; Water &amp; Sewage.</li> <li>. Salah Al-Din Sectorial Assessment for 2017-2021: Agriculture; Education; Electricity; Health; Housing; Livelihood; Municipal Sector; Roads &amp; Bridges; Security Sector; Water &amp; Sewage.</li> </ul>
	Internal Evaluations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Cash Grants Internal Evaluation, 2019</li> <li>. Cash for Work, Post-Evaluation for Livelihood Sector, data sets for Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk.</li> <li>. Housing internal evaluation, data sets for Ramadi, Fallujah, Nineveh Plain, West Mosul, West Anbar.</li> <li>. Post-evaluation for Livelihood, 2021.</li> </ul>
	Quality Assurance	FFS Implementation Stage Quality Assurance Report for 2019, 2020, 2022.
	Donors Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Aid Works, UNDP Partner Performance Assessment, 2018-2020, 12 May 2021</li> <li>. AA BMZ Evaluation Letter, 18 August 2020</li> <li>. UNDP FFS. Japan Emergency Grant, Final Report, Window 2: Livelihoods, Location of Projects: Fallujah, August-December 2016. UNDP, Government of Japan. Immediate Stabilization and Resilience Building in Iraq, March 2016-March 2017, FY2015 Japan Supplementary Budget</li> <li>. UNDP Quarterly Reports to the Government of Japan, Quarter 2 &amp; 3 &amp; 4 2016.</li> <li>. UNDP Quarterly Reports to the Government of Japan, Quarters 1 &amp; 2 2018.</li> <li>. Joyn-Coop. Mid-term evaluation of the German Contribution to the FFS and ICRRP in Iraq, German Financial Cooperation with UNDP in Iraq, 30 October 2020</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. UNDP Report for Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Program, Quarter 3 for 2018.</li> <li>.USAID. Evaluation Funding Facility For Stabilization, Midterm Performance Evaluation Report,Usaid/Iraq Performance Management And Support Program, 6 April 2020</li> </ul>
	Third Party Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. DFID FFS Lessons Learned and Recommendations,</li> <li>. UAE Aid, Oct. 2018 &amp; January 2020 reports.</li> </ul>
	Stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. FFS List of Stakeholders</li> <li>. Stakeholders Matrix, August 2023.</li> <li>. ICPE List of Stakeholders</li> </ul>
	Risks Log	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. FFS Risk Framework 2017-2018</li> <li>. FFS Risk Analysis, 2018, 2019, 2020.</li> </ul>
	M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. M&amp;E strategy for stabilization programme 2022-2023</li> <li>. FFS Result Matrix for 2022, 2023.</li> <li>. FFS Projects Database Track, June 2023.</li> </ul>
	Stabilization Field	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Stabilization Guidance note</li> <li>. Stabilization Snapshot Analysis</li> <li>. UK Stabilization Unit, Lessons Learned Review of FFS, 2018.</li> <li>. SREO Consulting. Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul, January 2019.</li> </ul>
	Sampling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. List of data for sampling</li> <li>. Beneficiaries list for sampling per window and project sector.</li> </ul>
AARC	Evaluation	AARC. Mid-Term Evaluation Report for FFS, 2021.
	Guidelines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. UNDP IEO Evaluation Guidelines, 2019.</li> <li>. UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System</li> <li>. UNEG, March 2008</li> </ul>
	Steering Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Steering Committee ToR.</li> <li>. Steering Committee, Minutes of Meetings for 19/11/2015; 31/3/2016; 27/9/2016; 13/12/2016; 9/3/2017; 30/5/2017; 16/7/2018.</li> </ul>
	FFS documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Financial Agreement between UNDP and Government of Iraq, 2016.</li> <li>. UNDP. Lessons Learned for FFS, November 2015</li> <li>. UNDP FFS, Social Cohesion Year in Review, 2020.</li> </ul>
	M&E	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. FFIS Monitoring Plan, March 2017</li> <li>. FFS M&amp;E Framework</li> </ul>
Literature Review	Guidelines	Durable solutions architecture, <a href="https://iraqdurablesolutions.net/">https://iraqdurablesolutions.net/</a>
	Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. IOM Return Index. Returns In Iraq: 2021 Overview</li> <li>. IOM Housing, Land and Property (HLP) Issues facing Returnees in Retaken Areas of Iraq: a preliminary assessment, 2016.</li> <li>. IOM DTM, December 2020. <a href="https://dtm.iom.int/node/21421">https://dtm.iom.int/node/21421</a></li> <li>. Rajasingham, Sanjivi et al. Independent Evaluation of the Infrastructure Partnerships Program and the Water and Sanitation Initiative Global Program, AidWorks, March 2012, <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/wash-ipp-wsi-ind-eval.pdf">https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/wash-ipp-wsi-ind-eval.pdf</a></li> <li>. UNAMI, 2021, Resolving Internal Displacement in Iraq: Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework June 2021</li> </ul>

	Other	<p>. Rajeev Pillay, Jan-Jilles van der Hoeven. Stabilization: An Independent Stock-Taking and Possible Elements for a Corporate Approach for UNDP, 2017</p> <p>. Robert Muggah. The United Nations Turns to Stabilization, December 5, 2014, available at <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/">https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/12/united-nations-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-stabilization/</a></p>
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### 10.14 List of KII respondents.

KII-Respondent	Institution	M/F
<b>DONORS = 13</b>		
1	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	F
2	KFW	M
3	Japan	F
4	Australia	F
5	Belgium	M
6		F
7	Denmark	M
8	Italy	F
9		F
10	Sweden	F
11	Netherlands	M
12	Norway	F
13	United Arab Emirates	F
<b>UNDP = 19</b>		
14	UNDP	M
15	UNDP	M
16	UNDP	M
17	UNDP	F
18	UNDP	M
19	UNDP	M
20	UNDP	M
21	UNDP	M
22	UNDP	M
23	UNDP	M
24	UNDP	M
25	UNDP	M
26	UNDP	M
27	UNDP	M
28	UNDP	M
29	UNDP	F
30	UNDP	F
31	UNDP	F
32	UNDP	M
<b>Community stakeholders = 8</b>		
33	Civil Development Organization Iraq	F
34	Public Aid Organization	F
35	Al Tahreer Association for Development	M
36	Caritas Czech Republic (CCR)	F
37	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	M
38	USIP	M

KII-Respondent	Institution	
39	Priest	M
40	Tribal leaders	M
<b>National Government =4</b>		
41	Council of Ministers General Secretariat (ComSec) Transition Strategy Secretariat in ComSec	F
42	Ministry of social affairs and labour- Iraq Social Protection Unit	F
43	Ministry of social affairs and labour- Iraq Social Research Unit	F
44	Ministry of Displaced- Women Unit	F
<b>ANBAR – RAMADI Local authorities =6</b>		
45	Deputy Governor for Technical Affairs	M
46	Manager of Planning and Follow-up Department	M
47	Manager of Engineering Department in Anbar Health Directorate	M
48	Administrative Associate of Anbar Water Director	M
49	Deputy Manager of School Buildings in Anbar Education Directorate	M
50	Manager of Vocational Training Centre	M
<b>Tikrit – Salah Al-Din Local authorities =5</b>		
51	Mayor of Tikrit	M
52	Head of engineering dept. - Salahadine police command	M
53	Technical Deputy of the Governor	M
54	Salahadine DOW director	M
55	Manager of NGOs Dept.	M
<b>Baquba – Diyala Local authorities=5</b>		
56	Manager of Jalwlaa municipality	M
57	First Deputy Governor of Diyala	M
58	Head of the Engineering Department in Diyala Governorate	M
59	Manager of Planning and Follow-up Department	M
60	Director of Education buildings	M
<b>Mosul local authorities =6</b>		
61	Deputy Governor for organization issues Nineveh	M
62	Deputy Governor for building and construction issues Nineveh	M
63	Director Project Mosul University	M
64	DG of Agriculture	M
65	Vocational Center, vice-director	M
66	Qaemmaqam Sinjar	M
<b>Kirkuk Local authorities =5</b>		
67	General Planning Director	M
68	Municipality of Hawija Director	M
69	Chair of Kirkuk DoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA)-Kirkuk	M
70	Head of DoA Kirkuk Directorate of Agriculture	M
71	Projects Dep. Head, Ministry Agriculture	M





# Thank You



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