



EVALUATION OF THE

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Thematic Trust Fund

Consolidated Report
May 2008

United Nations Development Programme



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Evaluation of Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund

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FOREWORD

Significant strides have been made in recent years towards a more democratic world. Yet, far too many democratic deficits remain. The deficits arise when certain groups are denied access to the political process because they cannot vote or join political parties, or when basic public services fail to function or reach people in remote areas, or when the rule of law is not consistently applied, impunity prevails, and access to justice is denied

Recent country experiences and much academic research has documented that it is perfectly possible to achieve economic growth without democratic governance, but many experiences and much research also document that it is not possible—neither conceptually nor in practice—to seek and sustain comprehensive gains in human development as defined by UNDP without democratic governance.

The Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) is one of the important tools UNDP has at its disposal to foster progress in democratic governance. It was created in 2001 to better align UNDP's global, regional, and country programmes around the democratic governance practice area, and to mobilize donor resources for thematic priorities as a new, quick funding alternative to traditional project-by-project co-financing. In the last six years, DGTTF has supported 550 innovative and catalytic projects strengthening democratic governance at global, regional, national and local levels. Given the strategic significance of this work, UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) commissioned an independent forward-looking evaluation of the DGTTF in 2007. The overall objective of the evaluation was to provide lessons and recommendations to UNDP and BDP in particular for positioning and improving the DGTTF mechanism in promoting democratic governance for human development.

This report indicates that overall the DGTTF has been successful as a 'venture capital fund', promoting innovation in an area of development where it is both notoriously hard to make progress and extremely important to do so. The successes have often been characterized by the involvement of the counterpart governance institutions in the design of the innovation and by an implementation period longer than DGTTF's normal one year. The successful innovations have almost always led to major programmes of reform and capacity development, supported not only with UNDP core funding but even more often by other donors and the governments concerned. The greatest weakness of DGTTF identified has been that UNDP in general and the Democratic Governance practice in particular, the Regional Service Centres and Country Offices, as well as DGTTF's donors, could have learned much more from successful and unsuccessful projects, if appropriate procedures and mechanisms had been put in place.

The evaluation recommends that the DGTTF play an even more important role as a sponsor of innovation in democratic governance, as well as assuring alignment of UNDP results across democratic governance interventions. This would entail a redesign of DGTTF to reflect the findings of the evaluation as well as opportunities presented by the UNDP Strategic Plan (2008–2011) to further integrate and innovate in democratic governance areas of focus.

The evaluation team's primary data collection included interviewing more than 100 persons from UNDP's New York office as well as Regional and Country Offices, donors, counterparts from governance institutions and beneficiaries of the projects. The team also conducted a survey (May–June 2007) of members of UNDP's democratic governance network; analysed all Annual and Mid-Term Project Reports; and carried out eight detailed country cases studies in Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen.

This report is the result of the dedication and contributions of many people. BDP is deeply grateful to the evaluation team that produced it, led by Harry Garnett, and supported by Robert G. Boase and Renata Nowak-Garmer. The international team was joined by a national expert in each of the case study countries: Khalid Al-Akwaa (Yemen), Runzin Dem (Bhutan), Omar Fall (Mauritania), Pamela Grafilo (Philippines), Fidelx Kulipossa (Mozambique), Gregorio Lanza Meneses (Bolivia), Patrick Robin (Sierra Leone) and Karabek Uzakbaev (Kyrgyzstan).

The evaluation team benefited from the advice of an advisory panel of international experts drawn from development agencies and academia: Beate Bull (NORAD), Ludgera Klemp (BMZ), Dr. Micheal Mc Faul (Stanford University, USA) and Dr. Siddiquir Osmani (University of Ulster, UK and BRAC University, Bangladesh).

We owe a great deal of gratitude to the numerous government officials, partner organizations, donors and members of civil society representatives, whose insights were invaluable to the evaluation team. I would like to single out for special thanks all the Resident Representatives and UNDP staff of the countries visited by the team and other colleagues in Headquarters' units who provided feedback. This includes in particular the members of the Steering Committee: Rosemary Kalapurakal (RBAP), Janey Lawry-White (BCPR), Cecile Molinier (Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative, Mauritania), Dr. Rolf Ring (Raul Wallenberg Institute), Mohamed Said Ould Hamody (Independent National Commission for Human Rights, Mauritania) and Dr. Massimo Tommasoli (International IDEA). Without their interest and involvement, the evaluation would not have been possible.

In BDP, the evaluation was task managed by Pauline Tamesis and Giske C. Lillehammer with administrative support provided by Tenagne Getahun. We would also like to express our appreciation to Jeff Hoover, editor of this report.

I hope that this evaluation will be useful to a broad audience and that the implementation of the recommendations will contribute to more effective support from UNDP in building societies where people, including the poor and marginalized, have political power and a voice in the political decisions that affect their lives.



Olav Kjoerven
Assistant Secretary General and Director, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR	assessment of development results
APR(s)	Annual Project Report(s)
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy
CO(s)	Country Office(s)
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSO(s)	civil society organization(s)
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DGG	Democratic Governance Group
DGP	Democratic Governance Practice
DGP-Net	Democratic Governance Practice Network
DGTTF	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund
ECIS	Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
EOI(s)	expression(s) of interest
HQ	headquarters
HURLITALK	Human Rights Policy Network
ICT(s)	information and communications technology(ies)
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC(s)	least developed country(ies)
LIC(s)	low income country (ies)
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee
MDG(s)	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MYFF	multi-year funding framework
NGO(s)	non-governmental organization(s)
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OGC	Oslo Governance Centre
ProDoc(s)	Project Document(s)
PSU	Policy Support Unit
PTL	Practice Team Leader
RB(x)	Regional Bureau(x)
SL	Service Line
SURF	Sub-Regional Resource Facility
SWAp	sector-wide approach
TOR	terms of reference
TRAC	target for resource assignment from the core
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP NY	United Nations Development Programme Office New York

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

About this report

This report is based on the findings of an independent evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). Conducted in 2007, the evaluation was based on OECD/DAC criteria of effectiveness, sustainability, relevance and efficiency. The main objectives of the evaluation were to i) assess the results achieved by DGTTF against its objectives, the relevance of the fund and its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other similar funds within UNDP, and the efficiency of the fund's management processes; and ii) to distil important lessons learned and identify areas for improving the results, approach and processes.

The evaluation team's primary data collection included interviewing more than 100 persons from UNDP's New York office as well as Regional and Country Offices, donors, counterparts from governance institutions and beneficiaries of the projects. The team also conducted a survey (May–June 2007) of members of UNDP's Democratic Governance Practice Network (DGP-Net); analysed all Annual Progress Reports (APRs) and other reports on the projects; and carried out eight country cases studies.



UNDP Kyrgyzstan

*Training for women,
Support to Democratic
Elections project.
Kyrgyzstan, 2005.*

About DGTTF

DGTTF was created in 2001 to promote a thematic focus around UNDP's Democratic Governance Practice (DGP). Its main function is to provide Country Offices (COs) with discretionary funds to explore innovative approaches and address issues in politically sensitive areas where the use of core funds may prove more problematic and slow. DGTTF was designed to allow rapid disbursement and to attract funding from donors interested in democratic governance. From 2002 to 2007, DGTTF disbursed \$70 million for a total 572 one-year projects. Additional funding was provided for global projects and for the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC).

Key overall results from the evaluation: Summary of findings and lessons learned

Generally speaking, the results of the evaluation indicate that DGTTF has been successful as a venture capital fund promoting innovation in an area of development where it is both extremely important to make progress and notoriously hard to do so.

The successes have often been characterized by the involvement of the counterpart governance institutions in the design of the innovation and by an implementation period of longer than DGTTF's one year. The successful innovations have almost always led to major programmes of reform and capacity-building, supported not only with UNDP core funding but even more often by other donors and the governments concerned.

The greatest weakness of DGTTF has been that UNDP HQ (in New York), the Regional and Country Offices, and DGTTF's donors have not learned as much as they might have from both the successful and unsuccessful projects (In a venture capital fund such as DGTTF, investors and the market learn as much from failure as from success).

DGTTF can play an even more important role as a sponsor of innovation in democratic governance. That objective would best be achieved by taking advantage of UNDP's multi-donor status, reputation for objectivity and good relations with governments and governance institutions, as well as an increased level of support from its donors and some redesign.

“UNDP is uniquely positioned because of its particularly close relationship with government and its widely recognized neutrality [...]. The team found that almost every single project studied in the country studies took advantage of UNDP's comparative advantage defined in this way: even though many of the projects could have been implemented by another donor, UNDP's perceived neutrality gave it an edge.”

Findings and lessons learned

A total of 18 distinct findings and lessons learned are summarized below. Each is numbered individually and grouped by relevant sub-heading.

Effectiveness

1. **DGTTF has been successful in fostering innovative projects that have led to larger programmes and projects aimed at making major improvements in democratic governance.** Two thirds of the projects reviewed by the evaluation team in the country studies were rated as innovative by the team in consultation with counterpart governance institutions, donors and Country Office (CO) staff. Half the projects mobilized additional funds to scale up the innovation piloted by

DGTTF. Almost every project fostered partnerships with governance institutions. DGTTF has also been successful in promoting UNDP themes: three quarters of the country study projects involved civil society, more than one half emphasized human rights, and half addressed gender issues.

2. **UNDP staff value DGTTF.** Over 60 percent of staff surveyed gave DGTTF the highest rating in terms of aligning country projects with DGTTF agenda, supporting innovation, pushing the governance agenda and developing partnerships. Most COs apply for DGTTF funding each year. One measure of the popularity of DGTTF is that applications for funding outstrip the availability of funding by about two times. CO staff, including managers, particularly appreciate having access to a fund that can be mobilized outside the existing programmes agreed with government and one that addresses a key need, democratic governance. Staff appreciate DGTTF's role in implementing the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011, in which democratic governance is identified as one of four areas of UNDP comparative advantage.

Alignment

3. **DGTTF has been notably successful in aligning COs around the theme of democratic governance.** The team's comparison of the CO strategies prepared in the early 2000s with those prepared more recently shows a strong trend towards mainstreaming democratic governance. Not only do most COs have democratic governance as one of their programme's specific themes, but issues of democratic governance have been included in other themes as well, such as environment, health, education, and HIV/AIDS. Many DGTTF projects are linked to TRAC-funded governance projects. It has to be pointed out, however, that DGTTF's promotion of alignment around democratic governance reinforced a general UNDP corporate focus on democratic governance, including the UN assigning the governance mantle to UNDP.

Innovative and catalytic projects

4. **DGTTF supports innovative projects that are catalytic, as intended by the designers of the fund.** The evaluation team found that about half the projects reviewed in the country studies were innovative, and that many of them were scaled up into larger operations by governments (often with donor support), leading to improvements in democratic governance. Linking together innovation with catalytic impact through DGTTF is very much in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan's assertion that "UNDP will not support small-scale projects with no country-wide impact." It is worth noting, however, the corollary of the opening sentence: half the projects were **not**, as they are supposed to be, innovative. Steps are being taken by the Allocation Commission to ensure that only truly innovative projects will be selected from 2008 onward.
5. **Successful innovative and catalytic projects play an important role in positioning UNDP in the donor community and in defining its relationship with governance institutions.** In about one quarter of the projects reviewed in the country studies, the CO has been able to take on a leadership role in some major democratic governance projects as a result of successful innovative DGTTF projects. In some cases these projects have addressed politically sensitive issues.

“Many of the projects reviewed in the country studies were innovative and catalytic [...]. Many also mobilized additional funds for follow-up projects and almost all helped to develop partnerships with government, civil society and donors.”

6. **Many of the successful innovative and catalytic projects have involved early consultations with the government.** Such projects have resulted from discussions between government and UNDP, and also the donor community in some cases, well before the expressions of interest (EOIs) have been called for. However, staff at some COs avoid such consultations until after their project proposals have been approved by the Allocation Commission because they fear disappointing their government or governance institution counterpart.
7. **However, there is a general perception on the part of some CO staff, regional Policy Advisors and New York-based Policy Advisors that too many projects are not truly innovative.** The evaluation team was told by some staff in the COs, but more often by regional Policy Advisors and staff at UNDP NY, that too many COs too often use DGTTF to carry out projects that could be labelled 'governance' but are not particularly strategic or innovative. The team's review of the project files confirmed this to be the case. Many staff in the COs visited during the country studies were also of this view, even though the team found many of the projects studied during the country studies to be innovative. Some UNDP staff surveyed felt that DGTTF had in many cases been less than fully successful in i) helping governance institutions carry out projects they would not otherwise have supported and ii) in mobilizing additional funds.

“The team’s review of a number of Country Offices’ Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs) confirms that democratic governance is indeed not only an important theme but in many cases the dominant one, not only in the sense that there are more democratic governance programmes and projects than in the past but also because democratic governance themes are integral parts of projects in other sectors.”

Projects' one-year time limit

8. **Almost everyone contacted agreed that the one-year time limit and fixed schedule often result in projects not being as effective as they might be in terms of testing an innovation and laying the basis for scaling up.** This was by far the most common complaint of the staff responding to the 2007 survey and the CO staff visited during the country studies. Half of the Annual Project Reports (APRs) indicated 'progress below target'; seventy five percent of those attributed limited success to the time constraints. Forty percent of those responding to the survey said that they were unable to complete their projects in one year. Because of delays, in particular in obtaining government approval (about one third of APRs reporting 'performance below target' give this as the main reason), the activities of the average project must be implemented in the last five months of the year.

Funding for individual projects

9. **Many respondents also think that the funding actually allocated to the individual projects is too small to test innovations that might be catalytic.** Few projects receive the funding the applicants believe is necessary for the project to succeed in meeting its objectives. As stated above, most do not achieve their targets. The average size of approved projects in 2007 was \$112,000—less than half the average application size (\$236,000)—and the average size of approved projects has been falling over time. Instead of fully funding fewer, perhaps larger projects that might be more truly innovative and catalytic, the selection process has favoured giving three quarters of CO applicants some support, often in the form of a smaller budget (and therefore a smaller project) than they applied for.

10. **Many COs have responded to the partial funding issue by topping up with TRAC funds or by obtaining funding from other sources, usually from other UN agencies.** One third of all projects have had supplemental funding. Some add the funding in a second year, thus expanding the project in terms of time of implementation. DGTTF can therefore be regarded as a means through which additional funds are mobilized for the innovation the fund supports as well as, potentially, to scale up the innovation.

New standards for 2008

11. **DGTTF management has already responded to the funding and innovation/catalytic issues by announcing clearer and more stringent standards for innovation and specifying its intention to fully fund projects that score highly in terms of innovation and catalytic potential.** All 2008 projects that received excellent or very good scores (49 percent of the total number of applications) from the Policy Advisors have been approved by the Allocation Commission for full funding; projects with these scores make up \$13.4 million out of the \$16 million available for CO projects.

Sharing experiences

12. **A more effective sharing of experiences would raise the quality of projects.** Only 15 percent of those responding to the staff survey said there was significant sharing of their experiences with other COs, while only 12 percent said they benefited from such experiences. Few CO staff contacted in the country studies reported that they had learned of experiences from other COs that might have helped them to identify opportunities in their own countries. Hardly any CO staff interviewed during the country studies mentioned the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) as a source of information, ideas or analysis of governance issues, even though OGC runs training courses for CO staff and OGC's reports are available online. Many staff told the team that OGC could play a stronger role in assembling, analysing and disseminating DGTTF-funded project experience. In response to this need, the Democratic Governance Group (DGG) work plan for 2008 has allocated global resources to ensure a more systematic codification and sharing of lessons and knowledge.
13. **The knowledge management problems are exacerbated by a failure to systematically evaluate individual DGTTF projects.** The APRs were not designed as evaluation documents, even though they do request evaluative data from project managers; instead, they are mainly reports on progress to date. Moreover, the APRs lack objectivity since they are prepared by the project officers. In some cases the data are misleading. For example, despite the data noted above (point #8) on 'performance below target', APRs report that 83 percent of project outcomes were achieved. Somewhat illogically, APRs also report that 54 percent of outputs were achieved. The APRs show that although over 90 percent of the APRs report that the projects were catalytic, only one quarter actually attracted more funds for additional activities. Even this information on lessons learned, which the team found to be useful, is not very accessible to other CO staff. Furthermore, such evaluations as are undertaken by Policy Advisors do not seem to have been widely shared. CO staff could use part of the DGTTF budget for the project to carry out evaluations of their projects, but they almost never do.

Support from regional Policy Advisors

- 14. Staff in COs said they would like more support from regional Policy Advisors to identify, prepare and implement DGTTF projects.** Staff in COs tend to be well informed about their countries' governance problems, but many lack the experience needed to identify potentially innovative interventions that might make a difference. Many would also appreciate help in preparing projects, monitoring their implementation and addressing issues arising during implementation. There is a general perception on the part of CO staff that the regional Policy Advisors do not have enough time to provide the many COs they are asked to serve with all the help needed.

Flexible timing for applications

- 15. Some staff in COs and some of those who responded to the survey feel that DGTTF should have greater flexibility to respond to opportunities when they arise and not only in accordance with the current fixed schedule.** The evaluation team was given a number of examples of opportunities that the COs were unable to respond to because of the fixed schedule for applications for DGTTF funding. Such instances often followed the election of more reform-minded governments.

DGTTF as a source of 'market' information

- 16. DGTTF can be a very useful device for measuring changing demand for various aspects of democratic governance globally and regionally.** From 2004 to 2008 applications for national, regional and local governance projects have been more numerous than for any other type; the number of applications in this area also has risen most sharply over the past year, and this growth is common to all regions. The second largest governance area is justice. The demand for projects in civil engagement has been on a rising trend. In 2007 there were very few applications for women's empowerment and elections projects.

Efficiency

- 17. Staff in COs, Regional Bureaux and at UNDP NY in general support the current selection process.** Few in the COs complained about the Allocation Commission in New York selecting the projects to be funded by DGTTF. Some did complain about the timing of the requests for expressions of interest (EOIs), coming as they do at the end of the year, which is a busy time administratively for all concerned.
- 18. There were, however, many CO complaints about the administrative burden of DGTTF projects.** Most of those contacted in the country studies complained about having to prepare a full Project Document (ProDoc), a Mid-Term Report, and an APR at the end of the year for such small projects. At the same time, however, the evaluation team found misconceptions about the true extent of the current administrative requirements. For example, many were not aware of the fact that they need not prepare a full ProDoc if the DGTTF project is linked to an existing project—although it should be added that linking to another project could dilute the innovative nature of the DGTTF project. Moreover, the various documents can be prepared online and the documentary requirements are much less extensive than used to be the case. It should be added that some staff in Country Offices agreed that all this documentation is important and necessary and understand that many of the documentary requirements are those of UNDP, not unique to DGTTF.

Recommendations

A total of 17 distinct recommendations based on the evaluation are summarized below. Each is numbered individually and grouped by relevant sub-heading.

Improving the DGTTF mechanism

1. **Two-year projects should be permitted.** Permitting two-year projects would result in more projects being completed and give more time to carry out the consultations needed to get the projects under way. One-year projects may be most appropriate in many cases and should be permitted as well, although some are likely to spill over into a second year. Since the team found no evidence that COs thought the upper limit of \$300,000 too low, this limit should not be changed. However, consideration should be given to raising the maximum at a later stage once the experience of the first wave of two-year projects has been evaluated.
2. **Approved projects should in general be fully funded, unless consultations between regional and New York Policy Advisors and CO staff result in the reduction in the size of the project on technical grounds.** Agreeing to fund half of what is requested by the CO makes little sense. The principle of full funding has already been agreed to by the Allocation Commission and implemented for 2008. Greater competition for DGTTF funds should raise the quality of proposals. Steps should be taken by regional and New York Policy Advisors and the Regional Bureaux to counter the current practice of inflating the size of requests, a practice that derives from a selection process that has tended to cut projects in half so that more COs can receive at least some funding.
3. **It follows from the introduction of two-year, fully funded projects that multi-year funding should be discussed with DGTTF donors.** Multi-year funding would give DGTTF management and the Allocation Commission more confidence to approve two-year projects. The team has discussed multi-year funding with some of the donors, who do not object to this in principle.
4. **Donors should be encouraged to provide their funds to DGTTF without earmarking.** Earmarking reduces the demand/need-driven characteristic of the fund. For example, earmarking by service line and country forces funding into a specific service line. That may be inappropriately restrictive when the real need for an innovative project with catalytic potential in that country is for a project more properly categorized and administered under a different service line. Moreover, earmarking by service line tends to distort choices in favour of that service line, thereby weakening the fund as a source of 'market' information.

The majority of funding to date, 84 percent over the life of DGTTF, has been provided unearmarked. Removing restrictions on the remaining share would further increase its flexibility.

5. **The quality of projects would be improved if more expert advice were available to the COs, in particular from regional policy staff.** The principal job of the regional policy staff, led by the proposed Practice Team Leaders, should be to work with CO staff to identify key issues, prepare proposals to address the issues, and be available to assist in addressing any implementation problems. It has been proposed that some DGTTF funding be allocated to the Regional Service Centres

in 2008 to provide a flexible mechanism for regional Policy Advisors to respond to emerging needs in democratic governance from COs.

6. **The selection process should in general remain as it is now.** Neither the staff survey nor the country studies found much evidence that the selection process itself should be changed. There were objections to the **application** of the process: the tendency to reduce the size of projects so that almost all applicants receive some funding and the lack of rigor in selecting truly innovative projects. But these problems are being addressed under the 2008 guidelines. All participants in the selection process appreciate the need for full funding and the emphasis on innovation. The selection should continue to be made by the New York-based Allocation Commission consisting of the Policy Advisors, Regional Bureaux and Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) management. The regional Policy Advisors should have no role in the selection process; for them to do so would represent a conflict of interest since they should have already been involved in helping the CO staff to identify key issues and potentially innovative projects.

7. **However, consideration should be given to one of the following timing changes: two calls for EOIs each year, a single call in the middle of the year, or one of those options plus having some funding unallocated so that emerging opportunities can be responded quickly to at any time during the year.** Currently, the call for EOIs comes at a particularly busy time of the year. Two calls is probably not the best option because the Allocation Commission would have to be assembled twice, thereby increasing its administrative burden. The simplest option would be to have a single call in the middle of the year: this would reduce the end-of-year pressure on staff and likely improve the quality of proposals. Continuing to have a single call would probably be most convenient especially if the proposal to allocate some flexible funding to the Regional Service Centres is implemented.

“Earlier involvement of clients in the project process may not only increase ownership but also speed up the process between the preparation of an EOI and the implementation of the project.”

8. **Encouragement should be given to CO staff, and the regional Policy Advisors who support them, to involve the governance institutions that might be responsible for the implementation of the project in the identification and early preparation of the project.** Many of the more successful projects reviewed by the team in the country studies were characterized by discussion between the CO and the governance institution concerned, usually some part of the government itself, months before the EOI was prepared. This practice enhances ownership, reduces the risk of implementation problems and facilitates a more rapid start of the project. The Allocation Commission might consider encouraging such steps by giving higher ratings to projects with early counterpart involvement. However, COs should not be penalized if they can make the case that early involvement with government might discourage innovation.

9. **Every project should be independently evaluated one to two years after it has been completed.** If a local consultant were hired, an evaluation would cost \$5,000 to \$10,000 (plus the administrative cost) and take one to two weeks. The focus of the evaluation would be on whether the project was successfully innovative enough that it could (or should) be scaled up with government and/or donor funding. Although the CO and Practice Team Leaders (PTLs) should have direct

responsibility for commissioning the evaluation, the New York Policy Advisors and Regional Bureau staff would take responsibility for these evaluations and together with OGC be responsible for analyzing them and disseminating the results.

10. **The APRs should be redesigned to provide more useful information and to have more of that information pre-coded to facilitate analysis.** An APR should be regarded as a 'project completion report'. It should contain largely factual and easy to code data. The team's coding of information from the APRs for this evaluation could provide a guide.
11. **Practice Management, Policy Advisors and Regional Bureaux should continue to stress the importance of DGTTF only funding innovative projects that might be catalytic in terms of being scaled up by governance institutions with or without donor support.** The best way to do this is to include examples of successful projects in the DGTTF guidelines, as was the case with the 2008 guidelines. Every encouragement should be given to COs to use DGTTF to push the frontier of democratic governance in the country concerned, using UNDP's good relations with government and civil society to move into politically sensitive territory where the chances of success may be low but the returns in terms of improved democratic governance could be very high.
12. **Practice Management and Policy Advisors should clarify for CO staff the meaning of 'outcomes' for the innovative projects intended for DGTTF funding and replace 'outcome' with 'result'.** The team's analysis of the APRs found confusion between 'outputs' and 'outcomes'. More projects were reported to have successfully achieved their outcomes than their outputs. Although this is logically possible, it is more likely that outputs are achieved but outcomes not, since the former are largely within the control of the project while the latter are not.



UNDP The Philippines

Groundbreaking of the City Health Expansion Building and launch of the "Text Mo, Kalusugan Mo" ("SMS your state of health") project which provides the telecommunications framework for citizen feedback on health concerns, with Science City of Munoz Mayor Nestor Alvarez (8th from left). Citizens Actions and Local Leadership to Achieve MDGs in 2015 (Call 2015) project. The Philippines, 2007.

The evaluation team recommends that the term ‘result’ be used instead of ‘outcome’ to define what happens after the project has been completed. A good result in terms of DGTTF’s objectives would be a new policy adopted by the government or a new programme based on the DGTTF project that has a good chance of bringing about a breakthrough in democratic governance.

Improving strategic positioning

- 13. It will continue to be important to balance the demand-driven aspects of DGTTF, characterized by Country Offices responding to unique local democratic governance needs and opportunities, with BDP’s need to promote, and be held accountable for, the democratic governance policy themes agreed as part of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011.** DGTTF has an obligation to reflect

the multi-year funding framework (MYFF) and the Strategic Plan priorities agreed with the Executive Board in the selection and allocation process, since the management will be held accountable by the donors for using their funds to promote the agreed policy objectives. However, under the new guidelines—where the over-riding objective for DGTTF is to test innovative approaches, with a high proportion of the scoring in the selection process for innovation and catalytic potential—COs are unlikely to be significantly constrained by having to fit the proposed project into service lines or results areas, or even a cross-cutting theme. The most important requirement is, instead, that the proposed project be truly innovative.

“There should be a feedback mechanism among lessons learned through DGTTF innovations, ‘full’ UNDP projects with democratic governance objectives, and the themes promoted by BDP globally and regionally.”

- 14. As part of the dialogue within UNDP and with donors, BDP should use lessons learned from DGTTF projects to identify kinds of activities that work best in addressing difficult democratic governance issues.** The shifting pattern of demand for DGTTF funding and the evaluations of the activities that have been most successfully innovative should be used to inform discussions about the kinds of activities UNDP can best support and promote. It is worth noting that the evaluation team’s analysis of the project files and country studies found extensive variations by region in both of these areas.

- 15. DGTTF should be used to position UNDP as a supporter of innovation in its member countries.** DGTTF should be used to demonstrate to governments, civil society and donors that UNDP is an innovator in democratic governance, willing and able to test innovations that might result in breakthrough in seemingly intractable democratic governance problems. Using DGTTF, COs should take advantage of UNDP’s good relations with government and perceived neutrality to test innovative approaches to particularly politically sensitive issues that other donors are less well positioned to address because of their perceived lack of impartiality. COs should be prepared to take what might be perceived to be short-term risks in their relationships with governments in order to reduce the longer term risks associated with a failure to improve democratic governance. Improving the quality of advice and support given to CO staff through Practice Team Leaders and their staff and a more systematic mining of DGTTF experience will enhance UNDP’s role as a successful innovator. Through the analysis of the impact of DGTTF projects, UNDP can position itself as the prime agency in the

post-Paris Declaration era¹ that continues to use small projects to test new approaches to difficult democratic governance issues. These approaches could then become incorporated into national programmes, with the approaches providing the basis for budget support benchmarks.

Improving communications strategy and outputs

- 16. Much more proactive assembly, analysis and dissemination of DGTTF project experience are very important.** This recommendation follows from complaints from some donors (about weak reporting of results) and some staff (that experiences have not been shared). The proposed evaluations of each project would provide the basis for the reporting and sharing of experiences. OGC should have principal responsibility for this knowledge management activity, working closely with New York policy and RB staff. Funds in the 2008 budget have been set aside for the Regional Service Centres to work on knowledge codification of DGTTF projects. The OGC Fellowship could be positioned to focus on DGTTF experience. More user-friendly Web sites should be set up to disseminate experiences of successful innovation as well as those with which there have been problems. Better use should be made of existing knowledge management networks for dissemination and exchange. It is recommended that hard copies of the DGTTF Annual Report be distributed to and within the COs, with enough copies to be distributed to locally based donors and local governance institutions. The Democratic Governance Network could be used to invite stories from the field; perhaps prizes could be offered for the top three stories each year.
- 17. Donors would give even greater support to DGTTF if more of the projects were truly innovative, creating opportunities for scaling up and making breakthroughs in democratic governance, and if there was more reporting to the donors of the success of such projects.** This recommendation links strategic positioning with the communications strategy. The donors contacted by the team said that although the Annual Reports have improved over time, there is still not enough information available about the effectiveness of the projects that their funding is supporting. In some cases parliamentary oversight committees in donor nations have complained about the lack of such information. These donors continue to believe, however, that DGTTF has an important role to play in testing innovative approaches to democratic governance issues, thus taking advantage of UNDP's good relations with government and its perceived neutrality. Consideration should be given to making the evaluation reports available online. DGTTF Annual Reports could include more case material on successfully innovative projects in addition to providing summaries of all projects, as it does now.

¹ Endorsed in March 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness aims to increase harmonization, alignment and managing of aid with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. It was signed by 100 government ministers, heads of agencies and other officials from around the world.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose, objectives and scope of this evaluation

This evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) is primarily a strategic, forward-looking assessment that is expected to provide valuable lessons and recommendations to the Allocation Commission and Democratic Governance Group (DGG), in particular, for positioning and improving the DGTTF mechanism in promoting democratic governance for human development. Secondly, the evaluation aims to inform the strategic positioning of the fund in the context of UN reform. Finally, it is designed to inform the development of a communications strategy for the fund, particularly in regards to donors.

As per the initial TOR, the evaluation focuses on the approach and processes governing the global window of DGTTF as well as projects funded through this window, both at the global level and in the field².

The main objectives of the evaluation are to:

- i) assess the results of the fund over the initial five years of its existence, in particular to what extent it has achieved its objectives;
- ii) assess the relevance of the DGTTF approach and its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other similar funds within and outside of the UN system;
- iii) assess the efficiency of the DGTTF management processes (selection and allocation of resources and review, oversight and reporting on projects) for achieving the objectives of the fund; and
- iv) distil important lessons learned and identify areas for improving the results, approach and processes of DGTTF in relation to strategic positioning; regulations and guidelines; project implementation; knowledge management; workload/division of labour for involved parties; and review, oversight and reporting. The aim in all of these areas is, as per the fund's focus, the greater fostering of democratic governance.

1.2 Methodology

The methodology and approach can be summarized as follows.

The evaluation team assessed the achievement of DGTTF's four main objectives:

1. promoting thematic focus and alignment;
2. mobilizing funds;
3. allowing rapid disbursement; and
4. promoting strategic initiatives.

The assessment was done in terms of the following OECD/DAC criteria:

1. effectiveness;
2. sustainability;
3. relevance; and
4. efficiency.

The evaluation comprised UNDP staff surveys; analysis of project files and financial records; country case studies; and interviews with a wide range of stakeholders at their HQs, regional offices, and country offices. Non-UNDP stakeholders included staff and representatives of donors, governance institutions and civil society organizations, as well as independent in-country observers.

The evaluation team also traced the contribution and impact of 40 projects that were studied in greater detail in eight countries selected for country case studies. In this undertaking, the team sought to determine the effectiveness of the management processes through the analysis of locally available documentation and open, informal discussions with UNDP staff, donors, governance institutions, civil society and independent observers. The primary objective was to discover the extent to which DGTTF-funded projects have been catalytic in generating broader-based activities leading to improved democratic governance on a larger scale.

² This statement of purpose, objectives and scope is taken from the TOR for the evaluation. See Annex 1.

As identified by the evaluation team, the greatest challenges facing this evaluation were as follows:

- How to isolate the results³ of funded projects from other activities also aiming to promote a positive development impact through improved democratic governance. Each DGTTF project is very small and aims at leverage rather than direct impact. Thus it is conceptually difficult precisely to measure the unique impact of DGTTF intervention.
- Related to the above, how to be sure that what DGTTF supports or supported would not have happened anyway, using funds from elsewhere in the UN system, another donor, or even the government concerned.
- Once the results of individual projects supported by DGTTF were identified, how to aggregate those findings so that the effectiveness of the fund as a whole could be evaluated.

- Looking to the future, how to assess the unique contribution that might be made by DGTTF alongside so many other democratic governance funds, both inside the UN system, and from donors, some of whom contribute to DGTTF.

In summary, it was very difficult to posit the counterfactual in this evaluation in a reasonably scientific or objective manner: controlled experiments or econometric studies filtering out other effects, exogenous factors or 'noise' are out of the question. The evaluation, and its methodology, necessarily had to rely heavily on in-depth semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders to trace the unique results of DGTTF-funded activities.

The attribution problem is not so severe in studying the effectiveness of the overall process. Once funds have been received, the individual processes under review are internal to UNDP (except for final government approval). The overall process' effectiveness could therefore be



UNDP Bhutan

Woman studying the Voter Guide elaborated by the Institutional and Human Capacity Building of the Election Commission of Bhutan project while waiting to cast her vote in the National Council Elections on 31 December 2007. Bhutan, 2007.

³ The term 'result' is used by the evaluation team to denote what might or should happen beyond the outputs achieved under the DGTTF project. Often in the evaluation literature 'outcome' and 'impact' are bracketed together; in other literature, 'impact' is beyond 'outcome' in the results chain. The point here is that it proved possible to evaluate if a DGTTF project results in a scaling up of the project or of a policy tested, but it was not possible to evaluate the result of that scaling up since too many other factors might also be responsible. Furthermore, almost none of even the earliest DGTTF projects has resulted in a scaling up that in turn has had time to generate final results such as lower poverty in rural areas or even better rural access to water brought about at least partly by empowered locally elected councils.

studied through interviews with participants in the process, mapping the process, and an analysis of the time taken to go through its various steps.

Similarly, there was no serious attribution problem in assessing the achievement of the 'alignment' objective. Again, staff can be interviewed to find out if their offices have been influenced to take more seriously various aspects of democratic governance and, and in a more focused manner, DGTTF.

This was an unusual evaluation since it aimed to assess the results of a fund that operates through a large number of small activities throughout the world that, on their own, would not be expected to have a big development outcome or impact. (And, it should be noted, DGTTF funding is only a small fraction of UNDP's total funding for democratic governance.) Instead, the fund's main potential impact is likely to be achieved through leveraging follow-up activities based on successful innovation. Although it was possible to at least find out if leverage has occurred, and even if that leverage had resulted in a beneficial development impact on a reasonably large scale, it was more difficult to devise indicators that measured successful leverage for the fund as a whole, or for particular service lines.

1.3 Sources of information

The findings are based on interviews with UN staff in New York and Washington, including managers of other trust funds; phone and email contact with UNDP staff in Regional and Country Offices; a survey of UNDP staff experiences of DGTTF (Annex 3 contains survey results); an analysis of DGTTF project files; reviews of DGTTF Annual Reports and other UN and UNDP reports; visits to the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), including a meeting with the member of the Advisory Panel for this evaluation; visits to donor counterparts in Germany and the Netherlands; email contacts with donors in other countries; participation in the Annual Global Democratic Governance Practice Meeting, Bratislava (Slovakia), July 2007; and country case studies focusing on Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen. It should be noted that more people outside than inside UNDP were consulted in the course of this study, especially through the country studies (Annex 5 contains a full list of all persons interviewed). The methodology, which is based on OECD/DAC standards, is outlined in Annex 2.

1.4 About the consolidated report

In accordance with the TOR, the report i) assesses the results of DGTTF, the strategic relevance of the DGTTF approach and the efficiency of DGTTF management processes as outlined above; ii) draws lessons learned; and iii) suggests improvements for the future. As such, the first part of this report outlines the findings and lessons learned under each of the OECD/DAC criteria that guided this evaluation by answering a number of questions posed in the TOR. The criteria can be summarized as follows:

1. **Effectiveness:** Has DGTTF helped to align country projects with the democratic governance agenda; has it supported innovation that has in turn helped to mobilize more funds?
2. **Sustainability:** Have the achievements of the projects been sustained?
3. **Relevance** and strategic positioning: Are the objectives of DGTTF relevant and clear?
4. **Efficiency** of DGTTF processes: Are the selection, oversight and reporting processes efficient?

Recommendations for the future are outlined in the second part of the report. Some of the findings in the Interim Report have already been included by DGG and Practice Management into revised guidelines for DGTTF. These include i) a stronger emphasis on innovative projects that might provide the basis for larger operations and ii) the full funding of approved projects, as much as makes sense and is possible given overall funding limits.

This report was prepared by an independent team comprising Harry Garnett, Bob Boase and Renata Nowak-Garmer as well as national consultants for individual country cases studies. Annex 6 contains executive summaries of those case studies.

2. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

2.1 Effectiveness

It is important to be clear about what is meant by ‘effectiveness’ in an evaluation of a trust fund. This is not an evaluation of a bridge or improving the supply of anti-retroviral drugs or supplying schoolbooks or training nurses or supplying potable water to slums. In each of those cases, outcomes and impacts can be defined in reasonably measurable ways and in terms of indicators related to reducing poverty and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and related more or less directly to the inputs of training, equipment and consultancies. The results of improving democratic governance are much more remote from the actions supported by the inputs. For example, funding that results—through training and workshops, perhaps—in more women voting will only have an impact on the MDGs once the women have been able to influence policy set by the government and approved by legislatures. The empowered women’s ability to exercise that specific influence may not be possible until the next election and after they have been able to influence the new set of policy makers and legislators.

DGTTF projects are even further away than that from having MDG-like outcomes and impacts. A DGTTF project would aim to innovate in women’s empowerment, and then, if the innovation were successful, the kinds of activities carried out under the DGTTF project would be expanded into a larger project or programme, which would eventually lead to the election of a parliament more favourably inclined towards women’s issues and so on. So in the DGTTF case an ‘effective’ impact would be very ‘intermediate’ in results-based planning jargon.

It should also be clearly stressed that the evaluation did not focus on individual DGTTF projects but on the implementation of the overall programme as a whole. The projects were only reviewed to provide evidence one way or another about the programme as a whole. It would be quite possible for a DGTTF project to fail—in the sense that something was attempted, say a series of workshops on women’s empowerment, and failed, in that nothing further happened as a result of this project—and yet that activity nonetheless supports the objectives of the DGTTF programme as a whole. If the DGTTF programme is viewed as a venture capital fund that tests innovative approaches to difficult democratic governance issues, then the failure of one initiative does not matter, especially if something is

learned from that test. Members of the evaluation team stressed that point to each of the COs that participated in the country studies; team members did not seek to evaluate their projects but to collect evidence about the effectiveness of DGTTF as a whole.

Since almost every single project that the team looked at in the country studies had not **yet** been converted through a scaling-up programme into outcomes and impacts in terms of improved MDGs (or some indicator approaching the MDG indicators through a logical sequence), there was little point in visiting final beneficiaries such as poor people in rural areas who had limited access to water partly because of governance problems. Instead, team members met with what might be referred to as ‘intermediate’ beneficiaries: those who might or had converted the DGTTF innovation into a bigger programme. It should be pointed out that, as shown in Table 1, many DGTTF projects examined have been scaled up into major governance programmes that are themselves important intermediate links to the eventual achievement of MDGs.

The TOR included five sets of questions under the heading of **effectiveness**. Each of the five is discussed below: overall objectives (Section 2.1.1); alignment (Section 2.1.2); innovation (Section 2.1.3); cross-cutting issues (Section 2.1.4); and results (Section 2.1.5).

2.1.1 Overall objectives

Questions addressed: To what extent has DGTTF overall achieved its main objectives? And how (if successful) has this been achieved?

As will be discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report, DGTTF has made progress in meeting all four of the main broad objectives noted previously: promoting thematic focus and alignment; mobilizing funds; allowing rapid disbursement; and promoting strategic initiatives. DGTTF has definitely helped to align country projects around a democratic governance agenda; democratic governance is a key theme, perhaps the most important theme, in all the countries visited as part of the country studies. DGTTF is clearly appreciated as a flexible source of funds; everyone contacted has supported this view, and most COs apply for the funds year after year. While researching the country studies, the evaluation team found many truly innovative and catalytic DGTTF-funded projects—but, it has to be

said as well, many that were not. Almost everyone contacted believes DGTTF remains relevant even after the principal alignment objective (alignment with democratic governance in general) has been achieved; therefore, a thematic focus for development support will continue to be important. (The relevance of DGTTF in the context of the UN and UNDP reforms, and in a CO environment in which the 2005 Paris Declaration is being implemented, is discussed elsewhere in this report, in Section 2.3.6.)

There is no doubt that DGTTF is a central element of UNDP's comparative advantage as defined not only by UNDP staff but also by donors and clients, who regard UNDP's multi-donor status, objectivity and good relations with government as critical for promoting democratic governance. As noted in a March 2007 internal UNDP paper on democratic governance⁴:

Fostering democratic governance is at the heart of UNDP, as underscored by the September 2000 Millennium Declaration. In signing this document, the heads of state pledged to spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Further, the 2006 High Level Panel recommended that UNDP's role should be "leading the UN's support to governance"⁵.

DGTTF projects are in line with the key result areas established by the UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008–2011. These areas are:

- fostering inclusive participation;
- strengthening responsive governing institutions; and
- supporting national partners to implement democratic governance practices grounded in human rights, gender equality and anti-corruption.

DGTTF is clearly achieving important development objectives since it appeals to a wide range of stakeholders. There is strong support for DGTTF. Most UNDP staff and beneficiaries contacted believe that DGTTF has been very helpful. In the UNDP Survey of HQ Products and Services, for 2005 and 2006, DGTTF received the highest ratings of

all BDP trust funds, although the rating for 2006 was lower than that for 2005. UNDP staff gave generally positive ratings to DGTTF in the survey carried out by the evaluation team (as discussed below and summarized in Annex 3). Almost all the CO staff contacted in the country studies, including Resident Representatives, spoke positively about DGTTF. All donors contacted were also supportive of DGTTF, even those that also said they did not have enough information on the results achieved.

The high level of demand for DGTTF, more than for any other BDP fund and at twice the level that can be satisfied by the funding from donors, is itself an important piece of information for UNDP, the UN system and for the donors.

As a thematic trust fund, DGTTF is performing a key role in the implementation of UNDP's focus on an important theme, democratic governance. Recent assessments have supported the 2002 reforms that introduced the current practice areas and the associated thematic trust funds. In a survey undertaken within the framework of Phase II of the Management Review, 94 percent of the Resident Coordinators/Resident Representatives and Deputy Resident Representatives indicated that the practices and service lines introduced in 2002, which included democratic governance, have benefited their work by providing greater focus, improving knowledge management, stressing results, and through facilitating positioning and advocacy at the national level. The 2006 Review Study of Trust Funds Management found thematic trust funds to be the most effective, largely because they align with UNDP's strategic priorities, and reported that thematic trust funds account for only 21 percent of the total value of UNDP's 470 trust funds, or less than four percent if the BCPR (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) trust fund is excluded. The study points out that trust funds such as DGTTF balance a global perspective with responding to the needs of Country Offices and their clients⁶. The Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) of course operates through a small number of thematic trust funds, of which DGTTF is the largest.

⁴ UNDP, March 2007. This internal document was shared with the evaluation team.

⁵ UN, Delivering as One, Report by the Secretary General's High Level Panel, November 2006

⁶ UNDP, Review Study of Trust Funds Management, 2006

2.1.2 Alignment

Question addressed: Is there evidence that the country projects have contributed to the thematic focus and alignment of UNDP's democratic governance agenda, in particular to the agenda of the service lines?

The designers of DGTTF interviewed by the team regarded the alignment objective as very important, since they sought to encourage staff in the Country Offices to make the promotion of democratic governance a more important UNDP theme than it had been. UNDP staff responding to the evaluation team's 2007 survey⁷ certainly gave a positive response:

- 64 percent said DGTTF helped to align country projects with UNDP democratic governance agenda 'very much so'; and
- 62 percent said DGTTF was valuable in helping COs, RBx, HQ to push the democratic governance agenda 'very much so'.

Almost all of those who did not give the 'very much so' response responded with 'somewhat'. Less than 5 percent answered 'not at all'.

“Even though the general alignment objective will be less important in the future—because democratic governance has been mainstreamed into almost all country programmes—the fund will continue to be important in terms of aligning UNDP around changing priorities within democratic governance.”

The team's review of a number of Country Offices' Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs) confirms that democratic governance is indeed not only an important theme but in many cases the dominant one, not only in the sense that there are more democratic governance programmes and projects than in the past but also because democratic governance themes are integral parts of projects in other sectors. For example, almost all of the components of Mozambique's 2007–2009 programme are related to

democratic governance: development planning, coordination and monitoring; decentralization and local development; democratic processes; justice, security and the rule of law; trade and private-sector partnerships; HIV/AIDS and gender; and support for capacity development.

Even though the general alignment objective will be less important in the future—because democratic governance has been mainstreamed into almost all country programmes—the fund will continue to be important in terms of aligning UNDP around changing priorities within democratic governance. During this evaluation three new key results areas have replaced the six service lines: inclusive participation, responsive institutions and the application of UNDP principles. These results areas have been mapped against nine outcome areas that have replaced the old service lines. (Moreover, individuals consulted by the evaluation team on the COs and many at UNDP NY said that UNDP's client governance institutions would tend to recognize the original six service lines more easily than the new key results areas.)

It has to be pointed out that democratic governance is now at the heart of the UNDP agenda for many reasons other than successful promotion through DGTTF. Many staff have attended training courses on various aspect of democratic governance. Numerous papers (practice notes, policy papers, toolkits, etc.) on the topic have been disseminated. And probably most important of all, UNDP staff have simply worked out from their field experiences that it is difficult to make progress with programmes in just about any sector without making progress with democratic governance.

It will be important to balance the alignment objective with the demand-driven characteristic of the projects funded by DGTTF. From now on this will be a matter of aligning country programmes not so much with democratic governance in general—that has been achieved—but with particular dimensions or aspects of democratic governance. Many in the COs said they wanted to be unconstrained in terms of policy content because they sought the kinds of democratic governance projects that through innovations might provide critical breakthroughs. Yet at the same time, UNDP NY needs to be able to promote the priorities in the strategic plan agreed with the Executive Board. There should be no conflicts of interest if the plan's priorities are based on information flowing from the field on the kinds of

⁷ The results of the survey are summarized in Annex 3. Quotes used in the text are answers from UNDP staff to open-ended questions; they are included as written by respondents as closely as possible, with changes made only to ensure clarity and comprehension (not, therefore, to content). In the interests of confidentiality, neither names nor positions of respondents are given.

activities that best promote democratic governance. This is one reason why it is so important to capture the lessons learned from DGTTF projects as well as core funded projects (and other donors' experiences).

To that broad end—feeding lessons learned into plans prepared by UNDP NY—the role of DGTTF as a source of information on changes in 'market' for democratic governance, as it were, is important, on the assumption that staff in the COs will seek out those projects that are most likely to have the greatest impact at that time in their countries. The types of projects requested in the expressions of interest (EOIs) are a source of this information.

Monitoring what has succeeded would of course provide an even better source of information than the EOIs themselves.

2.1.3 Innovation

Questions addressed: In what ways are the projects innovative? Which innovative approaches have proved to be most effective?

These may well be the key questions in the whole of this evaluation. Although 64 percent of DGTTF staff responding to the survey said DGTTF projects strongly supported innovation and almost all project managers rate their projects as innovative in the APRs, many of those interviewed by the team, especially the New York, regional and Oslo-based Policy Advisors and the donors, questioned the 'innovative' content of many of the projects. All of the approved DGTTF projects are certainly new, but are they innovative? The evaluation team interpreted 'innovative' to go beyond simply 'new', as discussed below.

The March 2007 draft on Democratic Governance, a UNDP contribution to the Development Outcomes 2004–2006 given to the evaluation team early in the project, includes the following statement on the value of DGTTF⁸:

[DGTTF] strengthened UNDP Country Offices' ability to seize emerging opportunities and to foster innovation by exploring new approaches in democratic governance. In a number of cases, DGTTF has enabled Country Offices to address issues in politically sensitive areas where the use of core funds was more problematic and slow, and to fill critical gaps not addressed by governments, civil society and other donors.

It is against these standards that DGTTF should be evaluated: 'fostering innovation' and 'issues in politically sensitive areas' and 'filling critical gaps.' The projects outlined in Boxes 2 and 3 did so.

Some UNDP staff familiar with DGTTF define innovation along those lines. One respondent to the survey defined 'innovative' as follows⁹:

*DGTTF should fund projects that are **not** the 'business as usual' types. CO TRAC funds can handle these types of projects. DGTTF's niche should encourage creative and innovative designs that give premium to initiatives that i) allow governance themes to interface with other themes (like peace, environment and poverty, gender, human rights, MDGs); ii) serve as a staging point for bigger programmes; and iii) probe into un/underexplored territories/topics of governance such as interface of formal systems with indigenous/traditional governance practices.*

Although some respondents were sceptical about the innovative nature of many of the projects, some answers to open-ended questions in the survey also provided evidence of true innovation. Five examples are noted below¹⁰:

When democratic governance was instituted as a practice in UNDP, India called it 'grandiose' and added that when the British said 'you could either have good governance or self-government, but not both', India made its choice! India did not want external support for justice institutions. DGTTF support for Access to Justice was allowed since it was additional to committed TRAC support. That project then paved the way to a TRAC-funded project to strengthen the Access to Justice at the district level, and DFID came forward with an offer of \$15 million. But for DGTTF India would have continued with the notion that external support to key governance institutions could infringe upon the sovereign domain of the state.

The CO essentially built its democratic governance portfolio with the DGTTF, starting with fiscal decentralization 2004; then security sector 2005 and finally women's political empowerment 2007. We now have three strands of programmatic intervention under our democratic governance portfolio, each of which began with DGTTF seed funding. Before 2004 we had no spe-

⁸ UNDP, Democratic Governance, 2007

⁹ UNDP staff survey, 2007

¹⁰ All comments are from the 2007 survey of UNDP staff conducted by the evaluation team.

cific/ identifiable democratic governance portfolio, except some local governance work. Thanks to DGTTF our CO pioneered work in security sector governance in Turkey in 2005–2006, resulting in a large government policy on EU human rights political criteria with a budget of \$3 million. This is the first time in the country that security matters have been taken up outside the framework of NATO!

UNDP Afghanistan uses DGTTF resources as seed money for initiating new and innovative projects. Support to the Civil Service Commission, capacity-building for the Afghanistan public service, and women empowerment (gender) projects are good examples. These projects received full funding support from donors after they were initiated through DGTTF.

DGTTF has contributed to introduce and strengthen new models of alternative justice in Brazil such as community justice and restorative justice. These new models are now being expanded by the Court of Justice of Federal District, Porto Alegre and São Paulo.

Because of the funded DGTTF project on support for the electoral management board in Guinea-Bissau, the country is now organizing the next electoral process with a new approach that will reduce election costs. For the first time in the country, all electoral stakeholders gathered together to discuss and recommend changes to the system to reduce costs and improve procedures. For these reasons, other donors are already in contact with UNDP to coordinate support for the next elections. By providing space to focus on our host country's priority governance areas, DGTTF projects have made it possible for our Country Office to maintain consistent support and be known as a key partner in the field of governance and democracy.

It is important to point out that the 2008 DGTTF guidelines stress innovation more than in the past, partly in response the findings on innovation in the Interim Report. The section on changes in the guidelines begins with:

*The most important change for 2008 concerns the **innovative and catalytic nature of proposals** to which much greater attention will be paid by the Allocation Commission than in the past editions.*

An annex to the guidelines defines innovative and catalytic in the following way.

Innovative projects are characterized as:

- Addressing a critical democratic governance issue, an issue the resolution of which may lead to substantial improvements in some aspect of democratic governance.
- Recognized as a critical issue by the government and other donors or partners.
- An initiative never before attempted in the country concerned, either in the problems addressed or the approach taken.
- Potentially risky. DGTTF projects are not necessarily a guaranteed success. Although it is expected that a proper risk analysis will be undertaken, the DGTTF project is expected to be riskier or less certain of success than a 'traditional' project. It would not be surprising if there was some reluctance on the part of the government or other governance institutions to fund such an initiative without pilot testing or proven results.
- Carrying out the innovation helps to position UNDP as a key player in democratic governance in terms of 'pushing the frontier'.

Catalytic projects are characterized as:

- Having a high likelihood of receiving support from government or other governance institutions (including other donors) for scaling up or following up, if the project is successful¹¹.

Annex 6 provides details of innovative and catalytic projects taken from this evaluation's country studies.

Some regional and New York-based advisors consider many of the projects proposed for approval simply new rather than truly innovative. They see little evidence that, when the call for applications is received towards the end of the year, staff in the Country Offices meet to discuss which is the most important democratic governance issue and how an approach to resolving this issue might be tested, potentially resulting in a major breakthrough. Evaluation team members were sometimes told that such deliberations do take place; more often, however, someone in an office sees the request for applications as an opportunity to carry out a project that he or she, or the client, has in mind but cannot as easily fund from TRAC or other sources.

¹¹ UNDP Guidelines, 2008

What then do the country studies show in this regard? The results achieved in one project in four of the eight countries surveyed are summarized below. Other results may be found in Boxes 2–5 and at various places within the text.

DGTTF Bhutan: 2 of 4 DGTTF projects had positive results, for example

Project (2005): Performance Auditing with the Royal Audit Authority (RAA)

The project's major impact is that performance auditing rather than traditional transaction auditing is now the practice of the Royal Audit Authority. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- A performance auditing manual in both Dzongkha and English was prepared and is used across the government.
- RAA officials were trained under DGTTF in India, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States. Upon their return, they have trained over 100 RAA auditors and 15–20 internal auditors in various government agencies.
- This project strengthened international networking. Training, experience and lessons learned in other countries (India, Bangladesh, Canada, Pakistan and the United States) were used when the Performance Audit Manual was designed.
- Existing partnerships were strengthened with regional and international auditing centres including ASOSAI (Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions) and INTOSAI (International Organization for Supreme Audit Institutions). New partnerships were developed with UNDP audit offices in Malaysia through that country's CO.
- The RAA established two new sections: an environmental audit and an information technology (IT) audit section. The IT section is directly related to the growth and development of performance auditing.
- The project led to the division of the performance audit division into two separate focus areas, performance audit and thematic audit. This outcome is intended to enable authorities to pay more explicit attention to each of these two categories of audit.

DGTTF Bolivia: 3 of 5 DGTTF projects had positive results, for example

Project (2006): Local Governments' Progress toward MDGs

Eight of nine MDG prefecture baseline reports were completed. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- All reports have been put on CDs and distributed.
- The project linked up the Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPE) and the National Statistical Institute (INE) in common statistical bases for MDG achievement.
- This project promoted access to information, thereby contributing to transparency and accountability and also advancing the MDG agenda.
- The project educated counsellors, mayors and social leaders about the current situation in health, education and basic infrastructure. It helped empower rural communities in service delivery and improving livelihoods.
- The project strengthened links and coordination among municipalities, prefectures and the central government.
- DGTTF funding has been leveraged: the Spanish government will contribute \$50,000 in 2008.

DGTTF Mauritania: 2 of 4 DGTTF projects had positive results, for example

Project (2004): Political Dialogue

This project's major overall impact was to successfully demonstrate that different political parties and stakeholders could sit down and discuss their differing points of view without the event deteriorating into chaos. In this sense, it had a catalytic effect in starting a national dialogue toward building consensus and a national vision for the country. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- This project inspired the Forum on Democratic Values, which was organized by the political parties, civil society and the media in April 2005. This forum clarified the responsibilities and duties of the parties in power and those in opposition. Its final statement was subsequently implemented.
- It is probable that the national consultation days organized by the military for justice and democracy

in October 2005 were inspired by the approach taken in this project.

- The Mauritania vision 2030 initiative was inspired by this project.
- This project possibly warded off an impasse between the party in power and the opposition parties by providing an impartial arena for dialogue; without this, there was a risk of a deteriorating situation and no opening for dialogue after the second coup.
- UNDP project staff assisted neighbouring countries in facilitating political dialogue—such as in Togo, on the eve of that country's October 2007 parliamentary elections.
- Several participants in the workshops took up political careers or have taken on more senior posts in the government administration.

DGTTF Sierra Leone: 3 of 4 DGTTF projects had positive results, for example

Project (2002): Practice Team on Analysis on Governance (TANGO)

The governance advisor to the project was also in charge of building the UNDP governance unit, which meant that the project played a vital role in launching a governance unit in the UNDP Sierra Leone Country Office. The project

also put UNDP in the donor leadership position with regard to governance in Sierra Leone. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- The project called for a number of thematic papers on different aspects of governance to be written by eminent Sierra Leoneans. This ensured the issues were accurately described, accompanied by practical solutions, and laid the groundwork for building ownership and momentum for Sierra Leone to find its own governance solutions.
- The interim-governance plan developed in this project became the source for many government/donor initiatives in subsequent years, especially the large and continuing government decentralization effort.
- This project has proven its sustainability by the fact that much of the governance agenda even to this day, five years after the project, can be traced back to this interim-governance project. Examples include decentralization and local governance, and public services and public sector reform.

The characteristics of the 40 completed projects studied by the evaluation team in eight countries are summarized in Table 1¹². The numbers in the table denote the number of projects with the characteristics identified in the column heading.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF PROJECTS IN COUNTRY STUDIES

	TOTAL NUMBER	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZE FUNDS	CATALYTIC	PARTNER- SHIP DONORS	PARTNER- SHIP GOVERNANCE INSTITUTION	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
PARLIAMENT	6	3	4	4	2	6	4	4	3
ELECTIONS	4	2	3	3	2	4	4	4	3
JUSTICE AND HR	8	7	3	4	2	6	5	6	7
E-GOVERNANCE	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	0
DECENTRALIZATION	8	6	5	4	6	8	2	7	3
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	11	6	4	5	3	11	6	8	8
TOTAL	40	27	20	22	17	37	22	31	24

Source: Country studies

¹² Projects are noted here as 'innovative' if the evaluation team members (the international and national consultant) were fully convinced that they were so, using the definition of innovative outlined in this report. Team members' judgments were based on discussions with CO counterparts, key informants outside UNDP, including donors and people in governance institutions, and a review of reports on the projects, thus achieving the triangulation required in evaluation. The other headings in this table have a more objective, factual basis: the projects did or did not mobilize additional funds, or included gender components, etc.

Two thirds were judged to be innovative by the evaluation team, in consultation with staff from the governance institutions, donors and Country Office staff. However, only about half either mobilized additional funds for a follow-on programme or project or were catalytic (which could mean they mobilized funds or were otherwise scaled up; it is possible to mobilize funds and not be catalytic, but that is unlikely). The public administration and anti-corruption projects, the largest service line, fared least well, with less than half mobilizing additional funds or being catalytic. Almost all judicial and human rights projects were innovative, but less than half mobilized funds or were catalytic. Decentralization projects tended to be innovative and mobilize funds; they were also most successful in generating partnerships with donors and almost all involved civil society. Almost every project fostered partnerships with governance institutions, but less than half did so with donors. Three quarters involved civil society and over half gender and human rights.

Box 1 contains a handful of opinions and observations, both positive and negative, of some of the individuals interviewed by the evaluation team in preparing the country studies.

In an attempt to ensure the ‘representativeness’ of the projects in the country studies, the evaluation team selected the countries to be studied with the goal of covering the whole range of service lines in their proportions in the population of projects as a whole. The 40 projects are roughly representative in that regard. Putting projects in one category rather than another is somewhat arbitrary; there were, for example, parliamentary e-governance projects and anti-corruption projects that could have been classified as justice and human rights. The evaluation team’s judgments on the characteristics were subjective, but they were made in consultation with CO office staff.

Even if it is inappropriate to draw too many firm conclusions from this small number of projects examined—just 1 percent of the total number of DGTTF projects—the country studies show the following in regards to innovation:

1. COs have been most successful in innovating in justice and human rights and decentralization;
2. COs have been most successful in mobilizing additional funds and in promoting their

Box 1. What DGTTF partners had to say

“The DGTTF decentralization pilot was a good experience for us. It gave us an opportunity to implement the systems as the law says and we were able to identify capacity as a serious problem.”

—Ministry of Local Administration official, Yemen

“The capacity-building of one of the committees of the Shura Council funded by DGTTF has been so successful that we are going to extend it to the other committees with our own funding.”

—Chief of staff for the speaker of Yemen’s Shura Council, which had just been given legislative powers as an upper chamber

“The Parliamentary Committee had no budget, so DGTTF paid for discussion and promotion of the proposed bill on new gender legislation. The bill passed two days before the close of parliament; this legislation would not have happened without DGTTF.”

—Dr. Alusine Fofanah, chairman of Sierra Leone’s Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and project manager of the DGTTF project, ‘Post-Conflict Gender Legislation’

“This [project] is the first time that the average citizen has heard about UNDP....The baseline statistics encourage a competitive spirit among municipalities because they can compare....The public investment budget is now formulated with assistance from the MDG statistics. But how will they [municipalities] undertake an update of the MDG baseline now that the DGTTF project is finished?”

—Francisco Quina, director of planning for La Paz (Bolivia) Prefecture, who was involved in the DGTTF project, ‘Local Government Toward the MDGs’

Source for all quotes: Interviews conducted for country studies

relationships with donors and civil society in decentralization projects;

3. COs have been least successful with public-sector reform and anti-corruption projects. Many of these projects have not been innovative, few have been scaled up and partnerships have not in general been fostered with donors; and
4. DGTTF projects are very successful in promoting partnerships with governance institutions and only slightly less successful in partnerships with civil society, even if the projects do not lead anywhere.

This summary does not necessarily imply that DGTTF should focus on decentralization and justice and human rights projects. Even though some types of projects seem

to be more successful than others, there were examples of successful projects in each of the service lines.

The country studies do provide some good models for the kinds of projects that are truly innovative and catalytic, and the ways in which COs identify such projects. Each of Yemen's projects (summarized in Box 2) has been innovative and so successful that, in two cases, major donor-supported programmes based on DGTTF pilots are now under way. In the third case, a project building the capacity of a committee of the Shura Council, the council is now using its own funds to expand the project to other committees. In each case the governance institution concerned was involved in identifying an opportunity for innovation long before the EOI had to be prepared. For all three projects, the CO took advantage of an opening for innovation in a change in the governance environment: in

Box 2. Innovation leading to major governance programmes in Yemen

Each of Yemen's DGTTF-funded projects has been both innovative and catalytic. The Decentralization project began a process that has resulted in capacity-building piloted in 6 districts now being implemented in 48, the preparation of a national decentralization strategy based on the lessons learned, and support for decentralization from a number of donors. The two Modernization of Justice projects improved the transparency, fairness and effectiveness of an ineffective, largely Islamic and tribal-based, and corrupt judicial system by introducing human rights training for judges and the introduction of an IT-based records and court management systems. In a country where law libraries had been destroyed, printing the laws on CDs was so successful that the number of copies was increased from 500 to 5,000. Other donors only began to provide support for reforms and capacity-building in the judicial sector after UNDP had achieved some success with these two projects. DFID, with support from UNDP, is now leading an eight-year Integrated Modernization of Justice project. The Shura Council project has supported the transformation of the council from an advisory to a legislative body through capacity-building. Through DGTTF, UNDP was the first donor to work with the Shura Council. The council itself will be funding the scaling-up of this project to all of its committees.

The 2007–2011 Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) refers to the Evaluation Office's 2005 assessment of the development results (ADR) for Yemen and confirms the value of DGTTF initiatives:

One of the most important lessons drawn from this assessment is the good relationships that have been developed with the government and other development partners in the field. The trust and respect that exist between UNDP and its counterparts have been paramount for the success of UNDP's programme, and will form the basis for our continued work in the country. Finding the balance between upstream and downstream support, such as in the Decentralisation Programme, where support to the development of a national strategy has been coupled with pilot initiatives at the local level, has placed UNDP in a favourable position both within the government and among local communities. In its previous programme cycle, UNDP also clearly demonstrated its ability to build capacity and pilot innovative initiatives [the DGTTF project], exemplified by the handover of community-based rural development projects to the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation's (MoPIC) internalization of the PRSP process.

(More information about the Yemen projects is available in Annex 6, which contains executive summaries of the country studies.)

one case, more open-minded leadership in the judicial sector; in another, the government's intention to convert an advisory body into a legislative one; and in the third case, the introduction of legislation decentralizing service delivery, but without effective means to implement the legislation partly in terms of local capacity.

The evaluation team examined the APRs from countries that are not donor dependent and so large that DGTTF funding would truly be a 'drop in the ocean' to see if DGTTF projects could be in any sense innovative and catalytic in such circumstances. One of the regional advisors suggested that DGTTF could be particularly useful in such countries by testing ideas that the governments concerned would not initially want to be associated with. The three countries examined were China, India and Indonesia.

The common characteristics were:

- COs all apply for the maximum in DGTTF funding, or nearly so, and receive a small fraction;
- the EOIs, ProDocs and APRs are well formulated, which means that the staff are well trained and/or they are well advised by the regional advisors; and
- most projects were on Human Rights and Justice. This is not surprising because the governments in all three countries may have a certain nervousness about testing new approach to such sensitive issues; moreover, they may also be reluctant for donors to become significantly involved in such issues.

There have been four projects in China:

- Promoting Local Governance in Urban Community in China (2003): \$300,000 requested, \$150,000 allocated
- Creating an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development in China (2005): \$250,000 requested, \$125,000 allocated
- Promoting Equality, Participation and Human Rights by and for Persons with Disabilities (2006): \$300,000 requested, \$90,000 allocated
- Promoting Women's Equal Rights and Participation in Local Governance (2007): \$300,000 requested, \$80,000 allocated

The 2006 project in China is a good example of a successful one. According to the APR there was a positive outcome, the outputs were achieved and there were no

implementation problems. Progress was on target. The project was considered catalytic and innovative, although it did not mobilize additional funds. The APR noted that more resources are needed and the lesson to be learned is that UNDP should be a pioneer on human rights and support national capacity-building.

A characteristic of 'innovation' is that the attempt should be expected to fail occasionally. The APRs are not a good source of information on failure, however. Although Table 1, which is based on the country studies, does show that some innovative projects did not result in any follow-up, hardly a single APR admits failure.

The evaluation team is aware, however, of one such case that may help to demonstrate why an innovative project that seems to fail may actually be a legitimate DGTTF project. The second DGTTF project in Mozambique did seem to fail. The proposed follow-up to the first anti-corruption project, which would have involved provincial forums to discuss corruption, based on the successful corruption forum held at the national level under the first DGTTF project, did not take place. It ultimately was

“A characteristic of ‘innovation’ is that the attempt should be expected to fail occasionally.”

blocked in 2004 by a government fearful of such public discussion of corruption immediately prior to local elections. The rejection of the follow-up project may look like a failure but it can better be regarded as a success because this pair of politically sensitive projects tested the government's resolve to address, and its vulnerability to, corruption issues. Thus the projects taken together were truly innovative, as defined by the founders of DGTTF: UNDP took risks with this pair of projects, as some inside and outside UNDP believe the organization should through the mechanism of DGTTF.

The support to the establishment of an ombudsman office in Kyrgyzstan is another highly politically sensitive, venture capital kind of project. Mounting pressures from within and outside the country following gross human rights violations made human rights protection one of the most contentious issues in the country. Because of high sensitivities around these issues, other donors (except for OSCE), were reluctant to get involved in a more substantial way. UNDP's credibility and neutrality were a crucial factor and a clear comparative advantage for its involvement. Yet

this DGTTF project has not brought expected results. There has been constant misunderstanding between the ombudsman office and UNDP staff regarding the nature of UNDP's assistance, which the ombudsman envisaged largely as the provision of funds for equipment and less as advice or capacity-building/training activities. Also, the ombudsman's abuse of his office for political campaigning as well as his increasingly fundamental religious views made the cooperation between the Ombudsman's office and UNDP impossible. Since innovation should occasionally fail, based on a view of DGTTF as a democratic governance venture capital fund, the team does not consider this project a failure: instead, it is a risky investment that tested new ground in democratic governance. Thanks to this project, UNDP at least learned that one of the success factors behind an institution such as an ombudsman office's is the personality and integrity of the person heading the office.

Also, as is discussed elsewhere in this report, true innovation may require a longer than one-year project term. As one former manager of a DGTTF project wrote in the 2007 UNDP staff survey¹³:

The biggest issue with DGTTF is that although it encourages us to pursue innovative democratic governance ideas, the timeframe given to spend money is very short: when you want to initiate something new, two years are needed, especially because DGTTF funds are not approved right away to make a quick start. By the time we did some research and analysis in the field (this was important because the area was new), only a few months were left for implementation and identifying lessons learned.

Are some approaches to the identification, design and implementation of innovative projects more successful? Again, there is no firm evidence of this from the 40 projects reviewed in the country studies, but some of the more successful projects that innovated and were scaled up into major operations involved early consultation with the governance institutions, in particular the government itself.

For example, each of the Yemen projects described in Box 1 involved consultation with the government—and, in one case, the speaker of the Shura Council, the main counterpart—well before the request for EOIs was issued. When the CO learned that the advisory Shura Council was going to become a legislative body (and, eventually, an

elected body), the Resident Representative met with the council speaker to see if UNDP could provide capacity-building support. The CO thought this represented a good opportunity to improve democratic governance since the legislative process was generally thought to be slow and cumbersome, thereby holding up many key reforms across all sectors. The speaker agreed to discuss some ideas with his staff and members of the council. After some weeks the Resident Representative and the speaker agreed on a capacity-building project that might be (and was) supported by DGTTF. That project was successfully implemented in a number of committees of the council and is being extended to all others with the council's own funds.

In another example, both the Yemen and Kyrgyzstan Country Offices consider a number of options each year before sending in their EOIs. Ideas are narrowed down to three, for which short concept notes are prepared. Management then selects the best option and an EOI is prepared.

2.1.4 Cross-cutting issues

Questions addressed: Is there any evidence that DGTTF has contributed to enhancing issues prioritized in 2005 and 2006? Do they follow guidelines, such as gender mainstreaming and South-South cooperation? Have they applied a human rights-based approach principle? What type of internal and external problems have the projects faced and how have they coped with them?

The evaluation team's analysis of the APRs and the country studies shows that most DGTTF-funded projects include one or more of the cross-cutting issues referenced in those questions. For example, the 2006 DGTTF Annual Report states that 60 percent of all projects included gender components. That focus has been greatly appreciated in many parts of the world, including Bhutan (as noted in Box 3).

A recent DGTTF project (from 2006) in Mauritania arguably was even more successful in achieving significant cross-cutting impact regarding gender. Through the project, titled Women in Elections, DGTTF supported an initiative establishing a quota of 10 percent of the seats in the National Assembly to be reserved for women. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- The results of the initiative exceeded expectations: Women now comprise 17 deputies out of 95 (18 percent), far above the 10 percent targeted in

¹³ UNDP staff survey, 2007

the law; 9 out of 38 Senate seats (also 18 percent); and 1,120 city councillors out of 3,688 (more than 30 percent). (The third outcome was largely the result of a provision in the law requiring that all deputy mayors be women.)

- The project brought together four UN organizations (UNDP, UNIFEM, UNFPA and UNICEF) along with the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in a coordinated effort for greater overall impact.

Box 3. Gender-focused project in Bhutan

The evaluation team concluded that two of four DGTTF projects completed to date in **Bhutan** had positive results. One of them, Moving on Gender (2006) with the National Commission for Women and Children (NCWC), reportedly transformed the way the Bhutanese government looks at issues regarding women and children.

Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- The National Plan of Action on Gender (NPAG) spells out the gender gaps between the current and the desired situation across all sectors so that the government and donor community can focus their effort. There is a 15-year work programme implied in the NPAG.
- NCWC has worked with the police, the judiciary and the people's representatives on human rights and rule of law as they apply to women and children. Such efforts have impacted these important institutions to the point that they now bring issues to NCWC for discussion and resolution.
- The project established and trained gender focal points in 21 government agencies.
- NCWC initiated work with the Election Commission of Bhutan (ECB) on the participation of women in politics. Among the results have been a number of training initiatives involving the commission and the two political parties and a new DGTTF project in support of the ECB.
- The NCWC director, a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Gender Committee, used the NPAG template to discuss the setting up of a SAARC gender database, which subsequently has been introduced in SAARC.
- A follow-on project has been introduced, to be funded by UNDP's Gender Thematic Trust Fund and TRAC funding, to address the gender MDG gaps laid out in the NPAG described as a 15-year work plan to bring Bhutan up to international standards. This new project focuses on three main areas:
 - political representation of women;
 - domestic violence against women; and
 - institutional strengthening of NCWC.

In sum, this small initiative of \$175,000 has already brought about an impressive list of results, including a follow-on project to be jointly funded by UNDP's Gender Thematic Trust Fund and TRAC. In an interview with the evaluation team, NCWC's executive director, Dr. Rinchen Chopel, praised DGTTF for its role: "Without the DGTTF project we would not have completed our CEDAW [Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women] report and we would not have our National Plan of Action for Women and Children, which lays out a course of action for the next 15 years."

(More information about this and other Bhutan projects is available in Annex 6, which contains executive summaries of the country studies.)

- The project can take some credit for the upgrading of the Secretariat of Women to a full ministry post after the election. The new entity's name is the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and Youth. It also has greater resources than its predecessor body, thereby ensuring continued attention to the issue of women in politics.
- The current DGTTF project for 2007 is a follow-on of this project in the sense that it provides women deputies with training as part of an effort to strengthen their engagement and impact.
- GTZ and the Spanish government are now heavily involved in the training of elected women and men at the municipal level.

And finally, the evaluation team judged a third gender-focused project, in Sierra Leone, to have been successful as well. The 2006 project, titled Post-conflict Gender Legislation, had as its primary goal the development and passage of a law strengthening the human rights of women. The project brought together three UN organizations (UNDP, UNIFEM and UNICEF) for greater overall impact. It strengthened the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights with its 'on-the-job' training of members as the legislation was developed. It also raised the profile and credibility of this parliamentary committee in the process.

The law eventually was passed in July 2007, just two days before parliament was dissolved in preparation for an upcoming election. The member of parliament who established the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights told the evaluation team: "This legislation would not have been approved without the strong contribution of DGTTF."


Many projects also include activities aimed at improving human rights and involve civil society¹⁴. However, few projects were reported in the APRs to have advanced South-South cooperation: this may be problem given that the UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008–2011 makes numerous references to the need to promote more South-South collaboration.

The country studies confirm these data. As shown in Table 1, over half the projects reviewed included gender, human rights and civil society components. As with the APRs, very few featured South-South collaboration.

As to the question regarding internal and external problems, the most significant internal problems the projects have faced (as per the country studies) are administrative and operational. These issues are discussed in more detail in the section on efficiency (Section 2.4). Suffice it to say at this point that most projects actually begin implementation close to or after mid-year largely because of government approval delays and the time needed to procure goods and services. In some instances, changing circumstances make the government less eager to collaborate.

'Performance below target' was reported in APRs for half the projects, as shown in Chart 1. The three top performance problems were related to i) too little time/delays in receiving funding, ii) political situation, and iii) delays caused by government.


CHART 1. REASONS FOR NON-PERFORMANCE, ACCORDING TO APRs



¹⁴ This will be discussed elsewhere, but since the DGTTF projects are demand driven, responding to opportunities to make innovative improvements in democratic governance at the country level, it is difficult for them also to have as their **primary** focus using the human rights approach or mainstreaming gender. But as the data show, most projects included components that did advance the human rights and gender objectives. The primary focus had to be fostering innovation leading to potential breakthroughs in democratic governance in the country concerned.

These problems are confirmed by the answers to another question on implementation challenge, shown in Chart 2. According to APRs, the main reasons for weak implementation are too little time, delays caused by government, and national capacity limitations.

CHART 2. REASONS FOR WEAK IMPLEMENTATION, FROM APRs



However, despite these problems, the project's outcomes were achieved in 323 out of 389 cases, according to APRs. Not a single project officer reported a negative outcome, a result that says much about the need for independent evaluation (which is discussed in Section 2.4.3).

2.1.5 Results

Questions addressed: Is there evidence that the results extend beyond the individual projects? To what extent have they had a catalytic effect—substantially, financially and in terms of development and/or strengthening of partnerships? To what extent has DGTTF functioned as a vehicle for Country Offices to jumpstart projects in new areas and to mobilize additional non-core resources, i.e., to manage more strategic initiatives? To what extent has DGTTF supported in-country delivery, in particular of TRAC resources?

To achieve the objectives of DGTTF, projects must be not only innovative but must also lead to some significant breakthrough in democratic governance. Everyone contacted by the evaluation team—at UNDP NY, in the regions, at COs, at donors' offices at headquarters and in the field, and governance institutions in the countries visited—agreed with this interpretation. Further, this joining together of innovative and catalytic is made very clear in the 2008 DGTTF guidelines. In almost all cases the use of DGTTF funds can only be regarded as successful if, as asked in the first question, results are extended beyond the individual project. There may be some instances when the project alone achieved a significant result or breakthrough, but that occurrence appeared to be rare. One example of such an important direct breakthrough, at least in the opinion of a key stakeholder, was noted as follows¹⁵:

The DGTTF Judicial Integrity project was crucial to the preparation of an action plan to overcome the problems in the judicial sector identified in the survey and [anti-corruption] forum.

Perhaps an even greater indication of a project's impact can be provided by individuals who benefit directly. As noted in the following quote, the 'results' of a DGTTF project in Yemen appear to offer significant relief to those in need¹⁶:

I am now able to obtain up to date information about the progress of my case. In the past I would have had to bribe an official to obtain this information and to move my case forward in the queue.

However, as is the case with confirming the innovative nature of DGTTF projects, the APRs are not a good

¹⁵ Deputy attorney general of Mozambique, as quoted in the Mozambique country study conducted for this evaluation. See Annex 6 for more information.

¹⁶ Litigant in court office, Sanaa, Yemen, referring to an information system installed with DGTTF funding that brought transparency to the judicial system for the first time. As quoted in the Yemen country study; see Annex 6 for more information.

objective source of information in terms of impact of outputs and outcomes achieved¹⁷. Almost none of the APRs' authors, the managers of DGTTF-funded projects, admit a failure to achieve the intended results, with over 80 per cent reporting positive changes in terms of outcomes, as Chart 3 shows.

This source of information is further compromised by a possible misunderstanding by some of the project managers as to the distinction between outputs and outcomes. The OECD/DAC definitions are as follows:

Output: The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from an intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.


Outcomes: The likely or achieved short- and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.

The evaluation team has used the term 'result' in this report, defined as a scaling up of the project or a policy change that might lead to what would normally be referred to as an outcome and impact.

As noted in Chart 3, APRs reported a higher percentage of projects with a positive change for the outcomes than achieved for the outputs. Although it is possible for the outcomes (results) to be positive without all the outputs achieved, it normally should be the other way around because outcomes result from the outputs. An alternative interpretation of this finding is that the outcomes are indeed achieved at a better rate than the outputs and that this is because activities other than the project have contributed to the achievement of the outcomes. That possibility raises questions as to the unique contribution of a DGTTF project to the achievement of the outcome, as well as attributing the outcome to a contribution from a DGTTF project.

The survey of UNDP staff provided information on the value of DGTTF in fostering innovation leading to improved democratic governance, the key objective of the fund. Those surveyed gave mixed responses to the questions regarding DGTTF's impact on developing partnerships, whether DGTTF supports projects that would otherwise not have been supported and whether it mobilizes funds effectively¹⁸:

CHART 3. OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS OF DGTTF PROJECTS, 2002–2006, AS PER APRs



¹⁷ The APR requires information on what it refers to as outputs and outcomes. The 'outcomes' are what are referred to as 'results' in this report: whether or not the projects resulted in a larger programme or a sustainable policy change, which in turn might achieve what are normally referred to as outcomes and then impacts. The evaluation team suggests that henceforth the APR refer to 'result' rather than 'outcome', since the outcome will only occur well beyond the completion of the DGTTF project.

¹⁸ UNDP staff survey, 2007

Training of Trainers carried out with representatives from civil society organizations, Maputo, Strengthening CSO capacities project. Mozambique, 2007.



UNDP Mozambique

- Over 60 percent thought DGTTF ‘very much’ had a role in developing partnerships;
- 43 percent thought DGTTF projects ‘very much’ helped governance institutions carry out projects they would not otherwise have supported; and
- 32 percent thought DGTTF had been ‘very’ catalytic in mobilizing additional funds.

In each case, almost all of the other responses were ‘somewhat’. Only 50 percent of APR reported that the projects ‘strengthened partnerships’.

The open-ended questions in the survey provided some examples of DGTTF projects that were catalytic. For example¹⁹:

DFTTF has supported an initiative to establish and strengthen the Transparency Citizen Commission in western Honduras. The process initiated by UNDP and the National Commissioner for Human Rights has increased the participation of the people in the social audit of the municipal budget and the delivery of the public services provided at the local level. At the same time, the initiative supported by DGTTF has increased

accountability among municipal authorities. This process has been continued by the National Commissioner of Human Rights in more than 50 municipalities in the country with the support of Denmark [Danish Development Assistance, or Danida].

Some also reported the development of strategic partnerships, for example²⁰:

The DGTTF fund allowed UNDP Timor-Leste to launch a new project building the capacity of the Office of the President. The DGTTF funds constituted seed money to start some activities. The Office of the President was very active and key in mobilizing additional resources for the project. It could be said that DGTTF allowed the CO to build a new partnership with the Office of the President.

In the self-reported APRs, the overwhelming majority of DGTTF managers regard their projects as ‘catalytic’; the response for ‘innovative’ was about the same.

Many of the projects reviewed in the country studies were innovative and catalytic, as shown in Table 1. Many also mobilized additional funds for follow-up projects and almost all helped to develop partnerships with govern-

¹⁹ UNDP staff survey, 2007

²⁰ UNDP staff survey, 2007

ment, civil society and donors. For example, according to information obtained from Yemen, donors in 2006 spent over \$3 million on the Democratic Decentralization and Local Governance Programme, which followed from the DGTTF project. These donors include UNDP itself, the Social Fund for Development, and development funds from Denmark, Italy and the United States (Boxes 1 and 2 provide more examples of these partnerships).

The analysis of the project and DGTTF files does shed light on one results issue: the importance of size. Many of those surveyed, as well as regional and New York Policy Advisors, complained that too many projects are too small to have a significant impact and thus to provide innovations that might result in democratic governance breakthroughs. The data on size are shown in Charts 4 to 7.

Many projects may be too small to achieve the intended result since the amounts granted are less than the amounts applied for. And, as the charts also show, not only is the average allocated amount declining (it was just \$112,000 in 2007), but the gap between what is requested and what is approved is rising. Country Offices reporting results for 2007 said they had on average received one third of the requested amount. Meanwhile, the number of approved

projects has risen steadily each year, from 76 in 2002 to 107 in 2007. Staff interviewed in the country studies said they applied for a particular level of funding because they believed that amount of funding was needed to ensure the project achieved its objectives. If it is thought to take \$236,000 for the average project to achieve the intended impacts, how could effective can projects be with only half the funding?

Over time some CO staff have tended to apply for more funding than they need because of the expectation that they will receive only half. Now that the principle of full funding is being applied, it is to be expected that this year's batch of projects (the 2008 applications) will not need all the requested funding. Presumably, COs will adjust to more realistic and necessary levels of funding for the 2009 applications.

The frequency distribution in Chart 5 shows just how many projects are rather small.

Size varies by region as well. As noted in Chart 6, for example, the average project funding amount approved in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is almost half that of the Africa region.

CHART 4. WIDENING GAP BETWEEN AVERAGE DGTTF APPLICATION AND ALLOCATION




CHART 5. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DGTTF PROJECTS




CHART 6. AVERAGE SIZE OF DGTTF AWARD BY REGION





CHART 7. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DGTTF PROJECTS IN LAC



As noted in Chart 7, two thirds of projects in LAC are between \$50,000 and \$100,000. The only major exceptions are one \$300,000 project in Jamaica and two regional projects that are relatively large.

The (small) size issue was raised by some respondents to the survey, including the following²¹:

All donors are supporting innovative programmes in governance...and it is difficult to see the value added from this trust fund, especially when the grants are around \$100,000 to \$150,000. In large countries with big governance programmes, applying for and managing funds like this—for such small amounts of money—is not cost effective and the governments do not take UNDP seriously. NGOs come up with much larger amounts of resources and it is embarrassing for UNDP to present proposals for \$100,000 or \$150,000.

Many COs resort to topping up with TRAC funds when DGTTF funding is insufficient. Some also do so to take advantage of the provision that allows a CO to avoid preparing a ProDoc if the DGTTF project can be shown to be linked to a TRAC-funded project. However, relatively few of those contacted in the country studies knew about this option. Those involved in the early days of DGTTF told the team that topping up with TRAC funds was not originally

envisaged: the DGTTF projects were supposed to be stand alone, doing things that the TRAC-funded projects could not do within their terms of reference. Over time, the evaluation team was told, TRAC funds not only became acceptable but were used as a sign that the CO was serious enough about the project to co-fund it from its own resources. At the same time, as the amounts applied for tended not to be granted, COs were forced to add TRAC funds to complete the project, in some instances in a second year. The APRs show that over a quarter of DGTTF projects have been partially funded from TRAC sources. It may be that over the coming years, with the introduction of the practice of fully funding of projects, the incidence of TRAC funding will fall.

The high incidence of TRAC co-financing does raise questions as to whether COs value one of DGTTF's objectives: to be a flexible source of funding in a situation where the uses of TRAC funds is assumed to be inflexible. One of the designers of the fund told the team that one of their main objectives was "to give Resident Representatives some money to play with". If it is possible to pull funding out of a TRAC-funded project to do something not planned for in the project, then DGTTF might not be needed for the purpose of providing flexible funds. However, the cases of TRAC funding the evaluation team looked at in the coun-

²¹ UNDP staff survey, 2007

try studies were characterized by a reluctant topping up of less than applied for DGTTF funding; moreover, they were in almost all instances used to test extensions to the scope of the TRAC-funded project beyond its strict terms of reference. In effect, the DGTTF project had the catalytic effect of attracting TRAC funds. Also the very existence of DGTTF encourages staff to try something new even within the context of a TRAC-funded project, giving that project greater flexibility.

The following comments from a former DGTTF CO project manager make a distinction between the use of TRAC and DGTTF funds²²:

First, DGTTF funds are more open-ended in nature, in terms of the nature of activities they can fund. TRAC funds are usually used for 'business as usual'; i.e., to extend/expand ongoing projects. Usually TRAC funds are subject to the 'sharing the cake' mentality (and political horse-trading) and the usage of TRAC funds is mainly determined by the national counterpart (in consultation, of course, with the UNDP Country Office). For DGTTF funds, it's different: the national counterpart is not in the driver's seat and the CO has more flexibility.

Whereas for TRAC funding the national counterpart is steering (which is good for national ownership), for DGTTF funds the CO can decide more freely what to do with the funds through a set of internal meetings—and in consultation with the national counterpart of course. Outside the turmoil of the political bargaining for TRAC funds, DGTTF funds can be used to start up new/innovative projects.

Secondly, DGTTF funds need to be justified. Whereas TRAC funds are seen as entitlements by the national counterpart, for DGTTF funds you need to show real interest of the project. With TRAC funding there is no incentive to fund innovative projects. You can fund anything. If you don't fund innovative projects, you still receive the money. This isn't (any longer) true for DGTTF funds. You need to demonstrate innovation; otherwise funds will not be allocated. In this sense, there is a strong incentive to be innovative in the types of project funded.

Turning to the question about the mobilization of funds to scale up or follow up on a DGTTF project, judging by the APRs analyzed for the period 2002–2006, only a few DGTTF projects managed to raise additional funds for the

Box 4. Importance of follow-up: DGTTF projects in the Philippines

Three DGTTF MDG-related projects in the **Philippines** were not only innovative but also demonstrate the frequent need for more than a single one-year project to achieve a significant impact. These three projects are a continuum of first, documenting the existing situation vis-à-vis the MDGs at city level; second, examining threats to the MDGs and how to eliminate or minimize the impact of these threats; and third, putting in place a citizens' watch for monitoring progress toward the MDGs at city level. Key effects of these three MDG-focused projects include raising awareness among city bureaucrats and the citizens at large and marshalling resources and energy toward MDG achievement. These projects are a harbinger of how the UN will work in future in common effort. The key partner for these projects is UN-HABITAT; the effort has also involved other UN agencies such as UNESCAP, UNICEF, UNAIDS and UNIFEM.

The 2005 DGTTF project in the Philippines promoted collaboration among departments in planning and delivering basic services to meet MDG targets in 13 cities. Those cities' laws, ordinances and policies were improved to make them more responsive to the MDGs, human rights and gender. The project improved accessibility to public goods and services by the poor and disadvantaged groups. The success drivers included poverty profiles and development baselines, which formed the basis for setting local MDG targets, twinning cities with local resource institutions, and knowledge-based constituency feedback mechanisms, which made the local government units more accountable. This model has been documented and is being disseminated through the Philippines.

(More information about the Philippines projects is available in Annex 6, which contains executive summaries of the country studies.)

²² This quoted material is taken from an email sent to the team by a former manager of a DGTTF project.

continuation of a project. While many APRs allude to donor interest in the project, DGTTF currently has no follow-up mechanism to check whether these pledges have materialized. As shown in Table 1, some 50 percent of the projects reviewed in the country studies resulted in additional funds being mobilized to follow up on the project.

2.2 Sustainability

At the outset, it should be said that it is difficult to measure sustainability of a project until well after the project has been completed; and it is now less than five years after the first year's projects were completed. The fact that no one is required to report systematically—say, a year or two after a project has been completed—to DGTTF managers on the sustainability of the project is perhaps a weakness in the reporting system. Country Offices can use leftover funds to carry out evaluations, but very few do.

There is some concern about the sustainability of the projects. Only 38 percent of UNDP staff who responded to the survey gave the 'very much' response to the question of whether projects were sustainable.

Some projects are sustained by follow-on DGTTF projects. According to the APRs, 39 projects (8 percent) of all DGTTF projects between 2002 and 2006 built on projects ongoing in the previous year. This included two cases, in Cambodia and Malawi, where electoral assistance projects supported by DGTTF spanned three years. There were other projects partially sustained under a different service line or title because they were catalytic enough, for example one of Kyrgyzstan's.

These kinds of projects may support the case for longer-term DGTTF projects.

The various aspects of sustainability covered by the TOR are discussed throughout this section.

A total of four sets of questions are included under the heading of **sustainability**. Each of the four is discussed below: ownership (Section 2.2.1); strategic links (Section 2.2.2); capacity-building (Section 2.2.3); and knowledge management (Section 2.2.4).

2.2.1 Ownership

Questions addressed: What measures have been taken to ensure the sustainability of the achievements of the projects? How have issues of ownership and participation of target groups/clients been addressed both in the formulation and implementation of projects? What should be done differently? Did the projects continue without additional DGTTF funding?

The project files indicate that the ownership aspect of sustainability is generally well taken care of. Reviews of the project files, including the minutes of Local Project Appraisal Committee (LPAC) meetings and ProDocs, indicate that target groups and clients are involved in the formulation of the projects and certainly in the implementation. The project files and country studies show that potential clients are involved in the preparation of some expressions of interest (EOIs); this is not the norm, however, since the practice might lead to disappointment and loss of face on the part of the project officer if the application fails (even though applications rarely do). As discussed in Section 2.1.5, the usual result is that less is awarded than requested so that most requests can be accommodated.

Earlier involvement of clients in the project process may not only increase ownership but also speed up the process between the preparation of an EOI and the implementation of the project. (For more on this, see the discussion of the one-year timeframe issues in Section 2.3.3).

As noted in Table 2, no region is favoured over another in terms of applications versus approved: the regional percentage breakdown of applications is about the same as the breakdown of approvals. As Table 3 shows, on average applications succeed 77 percent of the time, with the highest success rate in Africa (86 percent) and the lowest (63 percent) in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (ECIS).

Answers to the open-ended questions in the survey also provided evidence of the development of effective partnerships, another aspect of sustainability. For example²³:

Our partnership with UNDP on DGTTF trust fund helped in establishing partnership with the national police of Rwanda. A gender desk was set up with the national police for rapid response to SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence] crimes. A toll free phone line was supported. This has helped to increase the number of reported cases.

²³ UNDP staff survey, 2007

TABLE 2. EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST (EOIs) VERSUS APPROVED PROJECTS, 2002–2007

REGION	NUMBER OF EOIS	% OF TOTAL EOIS	APPROVED	% OF TOTAL APPROVED
AFRICA	234	31%	202	35%
ARAB STATES	88	12%	66	12%
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	123	16%	99	17%
ECIS	149	20%	94	16%
LAC	152	21%	111	20%
TOTAL	746	100%	572	100%

TABLE 3. EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST (EOIs) VERSUS APPROVED PROJECTS BY REGION, 2002–2007

REGION	EOIS	APPROVED	APPROVAL RATE
AFRICA	234	202	86%
ARAB STATES	88	66	75%
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	123	99	80%
ECIS	149	94	63%
LAC	152	111	73%
TOTAL	746	572	77%

In their annual reports, CO DGTTF project managers stated that DGTTF projects strengthened UNDP's partnerships most frequently with the government, then with the donors and finally with civil society. This is borne out by the country studies. Almost every project reviewed by the evaluation team showed strengthened partnerships with governance institutions (as noted in Table 1).

A project in Kyrgyzstan provides an example of an innovative DGTTF project that subsequently became 'owned' by government officials to some extent. In that country, natural and man-made disasters take many lives and cause substantial damage each year. Although disasters happen at a community level, the government's response, limited by scarce resources and low capacity, is managed from the national level. The relatively little donor attention to the problem is also focused mainly at the national level. However, local leadership and the ability to identify threats, seek local solutions and engage in prevention are crucial factors in effective risk management.

Identifying this critical gap, a 2006 DGTTF project sought to increase local capacity for disaster risk reduction by incorporating disaster management issues into local governance in 10 selected villages. This approach has been innovative not only for Kyrgyzstan but for the entire region, where decentralization processes are still in their early stages. The activities supported by this project included risk-mapping conducted in a participatory manner at the community level, which later fed into the development of disaster risk maps at the district and national levels; the establishment of voluntary village rescue teams; and the training of local authorities and populations in community-based response to disasters.

Although initially uncertain about the merits of the bottom-up approach to disaster management, the national government has now adapted the project's methodology and achievements to other parts of the country with support from other donors attracted by the success of DGTTF-funded activities. The methodology applied for this project has been considered as best practice by BCPR and presented at numerous international conferences. The CO continues to work in the area of disaster risk reduction within a larger programme.

2.2.2 Strategic links

Question addressed: To what extent are the projects embedded in a larger coherent strategy directed at enhancing democratic governance?

The project files show that the projects are always consistent with, and embedded in, larger government or UNDP democratic governance strategies. This finding was confirmed in the country studies. Every CO visited by the evaluation team had democratic governance as a cornerstone of the country strategy.

governance programme. DGTTF is a very useful source of seed money to support initiatives that are of particular interest for the Country Office (CO). The DGTTF also facilitates the possibility of working directly with non-governmental actors and institutions.

2.2.3 Capacity-building

Question addressed: Is there any evidence that the capacities at the individual, organizational and/or systems level have been strengthened through the projects?

The UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011 refers to capacity development as being “the overarching contribution of UNDP”. Moreover, most APRs stress the importance of developing national capacity to support and sustain democratic governance initiatives. Lack of success in building this capacity is among the reasons for ‘performance below target’ in the annual reports, but it is cited only for 3 percent of the projects, as shown in Chart 1.

However, despite these weaknesses in building counterpart capacity, DGTTF has helped to build CO governance capacity. The high incidence of democratic governance objectives in recent country strategies is evidence that the CO capacity to address democratic governance issues has been developed through the preparation and implementation of DGTTF-funded projects. Further, many sectoral strategies include addressing governance issues. Most COs now have the experience of four or five DGTTF-funded projects. Of the staff in COs interviewed for this report, many with responsibility for DGTTF-funded projects were not originally specialists in any aspect of democratic governance. All told the team that they had learned a lot from their experience of implementing DGTTF projects, although it should be said that most still expressed the need for more support from regional specialists.

DGTTF has been instrumental in helping COs launch their governance units in two of the countries visited. In the case of Sierra Leone, DGTTF used part of its funding for its first project to contract an advisor to help build the CO’s governance unit. Five years later, the governance unit is headed by a national staff with a number of democratic governance initiatives under way. In the case of Bolivia, DGTTF has been instrumental in re-thinking the CO structure to form a governance unit. More generally, DGTTF has helped develop and strengthen existing CO governance units in other countries.

“The project files show that the projects are always consistent with, and embedded in, larger government or UNDP democratic governance strategies. This finding was confirmed in the country studies. Every CO visited by the evaluation team had democratic governance as a cornerstone of the country strategy.”

Many APRs highlight such strategic links. In Yemen, for example, the APR for the Decentralization and Local Governance project stated that in regards to that project, “UNDP is acting as a bridge-builder between central and local authorities, and between local authorities and the local population. It has successfully drawn more development partners into the programme and secured increased financial allocations for local government from the Ministry of Finance.”²⁴

The same APR noted the following, which points to another important underlying strategic element that characterized many of the projects: “The trust, respect and neutrality commanded by UNDP and the access it enjoys among government officials as well as civil society groups enables it to take on an advocacy role on the one hand and pioneer new initiatives on the other.”

In Bolivia, meanwhile, a respondent said the following to the evaluation team:

DGTTF has been instrumental for the launching of initiatives that have contributed to the development of strategic components of our present democratic

²⁴ Yemen country study. See Annex 6 for more information.

In Yemen, meanwhile, the ADR for the Decentralization and Local Governance project concluded that “UNDP’s involvement has helped to spawn partnership among various government agencies, including the MOLA [the Ministry of Local Administration], SFD [the Social Fund for Development], and the ministries of health, education and finance.”²⁵ The ADR added that through DGTTF, UNDP has helped the government to develop an overarching strategy for decentralization and building the necessary capacity to implement the programme.

2.2.4 Knowledge management

Questions addressed: How do the experiences and lessons learned from projects at the country level feed into UNDP’s analytical framework, policy making and programme design? How can DGTTF be used to strengthen knowledge management in UNDP? Which tools should be put in place to ensure codification and dissemination of knowledge from DGTTF?

Under the new UNDP Strategic Plan (2008–2011), the knowledge management objective of the fund will be even more important in the future. This is reflected in the Annual Global Democratic Governance Practice Meeting Briefing Notes, which open with the following focus on knowledge management²⁶:

UNDP provides knowledge management and capacity development to strengthen policies, institutions and values which give people better lives... The role of the [Democratic Governance] practice is to provide relevant knowledge, advisory services, and development solutions to strengthen democratic governance.

Many do benefit substantially from the services provided by the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC), which is partially funded by DGTTF²⁷. For example, many UN staff have participated in OGC’s Human Rights Policy Network, HuriTALK, which is open to all UN staff (and not funded by DGTTF but nevertheless an OGC service). Membership in this network among staff from various UN agencies had risen to 900 by the end of 2006, and the network posted 23 queries during that year. HuriTALK hosted an e-discussion on linking the MDGs and human rights; it lasted six weeks and attracted more than 65 contributions. It should be noted that there are also other sources of Internet-based exchanges of democratic governance experience. These

include the Democratic Governance Practice Network (DGP-Net), which has a membership of about 1,800 UNDP staff. In 2006, the network posted 55 queries from the COs. The largest demand for sharing of country experience has been in the area of human rights and access to justice (30 percent of all queries received by DGP-Net in 2006). This corresponds to the demand for DGTTF funding in the same year, where proposals for projects in this area and number of approved projects constituted 28 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Another key service being pioneered by OGC, this time funded by DGTTF, is the Democratic Governance indicators and assessment.

OGC has also contributed to knowledge management through the Bergen Seminars on emerging themes around the nexus of governance and poverty. Further, the governance indicators project is supporting Country Offices in concepts and approaches to governance measurement. OGC publications have included a guidance note on governance and conflict prevention and a programming guide on elections and conflict.

That said, many respondents to the 2007 survey felt that there had not been a sufficient sharing of experiences among Country Offices. Only 10 percent said they had benefited ‘very much so’ from the experiences of other Country Offices and over a third said they had not benefited at all. Looking at the question from the other side, about half said that they had ‘somewhat’ shared their experiences with other offices. Better mechanisms for sharing DGTTF experiences are clearly needed. Some staff interviewed at COs suggested that more hard copies of the DGTTF Annual Report be sent to the COs.

One aspect of knowledge management tends to be overlooked: the knowledge passed on to UNDP concerning the varying level of demand for service lines. Tables 4 and 5 provide a breakdown of DGTTF EOIs and approved projects by region and service line. Data on number of applications and approved projects show that the justice and human rights service line has consistently been the highest in demand since the beginning of DGTTF, followed by decentralization. The lowest demand has been for e-governance initiatives. It has to be noted, however, that several large, multi-year e-governance projects that are formally a part of DGTTF but are managed independent of DGTTF process are not included in these statistics. The selection process generally

²⁵ Yemen country study. See Annex 6 for more information.

²⁶ UNDP, Annual Global Democratic Governance Briefing Materials, June 2007

²⁷ OGC plays an important role in many of the issues covered in this report. It is not discussed in extensive detail, however, because a separate DGTTF-funded independent evaluation of OGC was not launched until May 2008 (after this report was prepared).

responds to the pattern of demand, although 87 percent of EOIs on electoral assistance are successful compared with most other service lines (percents in the mid-70s), with e-governance the lowest at 67 percent.

The high level of demand for DGTTF, more than for any other BDP fund and at twice the level that can be satisfied by the funding from donors, is itself an important piece of information for UNDP, the UN system and for the donors. The changing pattern of demand for the various service lines is important knowledge as well. This knowledge informs the programming of funding, research and staffing decisions. The information helps UNDP to define its position in the development 'market'.

Issues related to knowledge management and dissemination should also take into account potential beneficiaries outside UNDP, in particular organizations, agencies and individuals on the ground. The country case studies prepared for this evaluation offered numerous examples in-country of clear instances when vital knowledge and learning stem from individual DGTTF projects. For example, a donor in Mozambique said, "The [anti-corruption] forum was a very significant event because it brought together for the first time all the participants in the judicial sector on the basis of their own identification of the problems [in the sector]."

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST (EOIs) BY REGION AND BY SERVICE LINE, 2002–2007

REGION	SERVICE LINE					
	PARL DEV	ELEC	JUS & HR	E-GOV	DECENTRAL	PAR
AFRICA	37	30	55	17	56	39
ARAB STATES	20	3	22	6	28	9
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	16	14	33	12	29	19
ECIS	12	6	33	15	43	40
LAC	17	10	62	14	35	14
TOTAL	102	63	205	64	191	121

Note on service line abbreviations: 'Parl Dev' = Parliamentary Development; 'Elec' = Electoral Systems and Processes; 'Jus & HR' = Justice and Human Rights; 'E-gov' = E-governance and Access to Information for Citizens' Participation; 'Decentral' = Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development; and 'PAR' = Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption.

TABLE 5. NUMBER OF APPROVED PROJECTS BY REGION AND BY SERVICE LINE, 2002–2007

REGION	SERVICE LINE					
	PARL DEV	ELEC	JUS & HR	E-GOV	DECENTRAL	PAR
AFRICA	29	29	48	12	49	35
ARAB STATES	16	2	16	6	20	6
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	12	11	30	10	23	13
ECIS	9	5	23	8	25	24
LAC	12	8	46	7	26	12
TOTAL	78	55	163	43	143	90

Note on service line abbreviations: 'Parl Dev' = Parliamentary Development; 'Elec' = Electoral Systems and Processes; 'Jus & HR' = Justice and Human Rights; 'E-gov' = E-governance and Access to Information for Citizens' Participation; 'Decentral' = Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development; and 'PAR' = Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption.

2.3 Relevance

A total of seven sets of questions are included under the heading of relevance. Each of the seven is discussed below: clear objectives for DGTTF (Section 2.3.1), guidelines in support of objectives (Section 2.3.2), one-year timeframe (Section 2.3.3), regional allocation (Section 2.3.4), unique role of DGTTF (Section 2.3.5), UN reform (Section 2.3.6) and earmarking (Section 2.3.7).

2.3.1 Clear objectives for DGTTF

Question addressed: Does DGTTF have a clear, coherent and consistent set of objectives?

No one interviewed either at UNDP NY or through the country studies questioned the clarity, coherence or consistency of DGTTF's objectives. The evaluation team also found no evidence of lack of consistency in the four main DGTTF objectives:

1. promoting thematic focus and alignment;
2. mobilizing funds;
3. allowing rapid disbursement; and
4. promoting strategic initiatives.

The first and the fourth are the key objectives, with the second and third lower level objectives—in reality, they are the means to achieve the key objectives. Taken together, all four comprise a coherent set.

Of even greater importance for this forward-looking evaluation is the need to review the objectives for the future in the context of the High Level Panel and the new (2008–2011) Strategic Plan. Some have suggested, for example, that the alignment objective will be less important in the future since all UNDP staff and their development partners appreciate the importance of democratic governance. However, although it is clear that the general alignment objective (with democratic governance) has been achieved, there will continue to be a need to align the COs with particular objectives within democratic governance. There should be a feedback mechanism among lessons learned through DGTTF innovations, 'full' UNDP projects with democratic governance objectives, and the themes promoted by BDP globally and regionally. What works should be promoted.

²⁸ Mozambique case study. See Annex 6 for more information.

²⁹ UNDP staff survey, 2007

2.3.2 Guidelines in support of objectives

Questions addressed: Do the regulations and established guidelines adequately reflect the rationale behind DGTTF, in particular, the broad goals of providing a supporting mechanism for corporate policy alignment and a flexible and quick funding alternative aimed at promoting strategic initiatives in the area of democratic governance? If yes, how has this been accomplished? If no, why?

The guidelines have already been amended to emphasize the importance of applications be innovative and potentially catalytic. Every CO visited by the team, including all Resident Representative and Resident Coordinators, expressed appreciation for this flexible source of funding.

In Mozambique, for example, several respondents said that one particularly appealing feature of DGTTF is that it is a fund that can be accessed quite quickly to take advantage of opportunities to make breakthroughs in advancing democratic governance. In their mind, such a benefit outweighs concerns regarding certain administrative burdens. Stakeholders in Mozambique noted that, at least for the series of corruption projects, the ability to make annual responses to emerging opportunities—with each response building on the previous one—proved to be very useful²⁸.

2.3.3 One-year timeframe

Questions addressed: To what extent have the DGTTF framework and, in particular, the one-year timeframe been adequate for ensuring the use of the fund as a flexible funding tool promoting innovation and strategic partnerships? What effect has this timeframe had on projects in terms of sustainability, quality and results?

Some Regional Bureau and Country Office staff, Policy Advisors in the regions and New York, and respondents to the 2007 staff survey expressed strong reservations about the one-year time limit for each project. Some said they would prefer longer projects, others procedures that allowed the projects to be completed in one year rather than finished by the December deadline. Findings on this topic include²⁹:

- The one-year timeframe was by far the most common complaint in the open-ended part of the survey; in addition, 75 percent of Annual Project Reports that indicate 'progress below target' attribute the limited success to the time constraints.

- Half of those surveyed said they were unable to complete all the planned activities within the one-year period.
- Some respondents proposed two-year timeframes, others a moving process not tied to a particular year.

The evaluation team's review of the project files has shown that, on average, eight months elapse from the time of allocation of DGTTF funds until 31 December. However, the actual implementation period, in terms of activities undertaken, is much shorter. Project activities are being implemented not between January or February and December, but in the last five to six months of the year. Quite a few projects only begin implementation in October. This is confirmed by the low expenditure rates by mid-term reporting (see Table 6 and Charts 8 and 9).

The origin of the problem is as follows. Because donor commitments are made only in late fall, DGTTF is unaware of how large its funding window will be for the next year until very late in the current year. This results in the application process deadlines being set for the fourth quarter of the current year and with approvals not coming until well into the first quarter of the implementation year. The need for government approval is a further cause of delay. The overall result is that many projects do not start until the middle of

the year. Table 6 shows that, over the years, only between 22 and 34 percent of funding is spent by mid-year. These proportions vary by service line and region as shown in Charts 8 and 9 (It is worth noting that the data presented in the charts may exaggerate the mid-term percentage because projects without Mid-Term Reports were excluded from the average; in fact, there may be no Mid-Term Report because there has been little or no spending).

In general, the delays obviously limit the implementation window, with many complaining that projects suffer from a weakness of efficiency, effectiveness and impact as they rush to complete within the one calendar year. Furthermore, as observed by the evaluation team, such complaints are often folded into observations that are in general quite complimentary of DGTTF. The following quote is from the Philippines³⁰ :

DGTTF piloted the MDG baseline information system, which is now being used by the Ministry of Finance to decide on funding of the localities. DGTTF permitted knowledge management for the entire Philippines by UN-HABITAT for all of its effort....But DGTTF is too short. Project approval drags on into March before funding approval is given. It is July before real implementation is under way.


TABLE 6. DGTTF EXPENDITURES: MID-TERM VERSUS FINAL (58% OF PROJECTS, 2002–2006)³¹

YEAR	REQUESTED	APPROVED	MID-TERM EXPENDITURES	FINAL EXPENDITURES	% OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES SPENT BY MID-TERM	% OF APPROVED EXPENDITURES SPENT BY FINAL
2002	\$8,147,896	\$6,730,301	\$1,705,159	\$5,503,753	25%	82%
2003	\$13,300,400	\$7,415,000	\$2,179,450	\$7,107,530	29%	96%
2004	\$2,922,000	\$1,490,000	\$502,980	\$1,322,454	34%	89%
2005	\$15,235,700	\$10,049,000	\$3,327,117	\$8,945,589	33%	89%
2006	\$18,405,000	\$10,091,000	\$2,253,649	\$8,842,025	22%	88%

³⁰ UN-HABITAT programme manager in the Philippines and project manager of three DGTTF projects in successive years. As interviewed by the evaluation team.


³¹ In Table 6 and Charts 8 and 9, only projects with available data for both mid-term and final expenditure have been analyzed.

**CHART 8. DGTTF EXPENDITURES: MID-TERM VERSUS FINAL AS % OF TOTAL AWARD BY SERVICE LINE
(58% OF PROJECTS, 2002–2006)**



Note on service line abbreviations: 'Par Dev' = Parliamentary Development; 'Elec' = Electoral Systems and Processes; 'HR & Jus' = Justice and Human Rights; 'A2info & egov' = E-governance and Access to Information for Citizens' Participation; 'Loc Gov' = Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development; and 'PAR/AC' = Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption.

**CHART 9. DGTTF EXPENDITURES: MID-TERM VERSUS FINAL AS % OF TOTAL AWARD BY REGION
(58% OF PROJECTS, 2002–2006)**



Note on region abbreviations: 'AS' = Arab States; 'A&P' = Asia and the Pacific; 'ECIS' = Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and 'LAC' = Latin America and the Caribbean.

One way to remedy this process problem is to move towards a multi-year funding framework so that commitments are known well before the next implementation cycle. There are two ways this could be achieved. The simplest way would be for donors to move towards making multi-year funding commitments. This could be seen as being in their best interest because it would allow for greater impact from more successfully delivered projects. The other option is for DGTTF to move to its own multi-year funding arrangement wherein annual donor contributions would be spread over a two-year implementation period. This would create a slight blip during the first year of implementation as the overall available amount would be considerably less, but this could be offset by using a 60:40 (or 70:30) funding ratio of commitments for the current year and the following year, with subsequent funding ratios to be adjusted until a 50:50 balance has been achieved.

Once a multi-year funding framework is achieved by either of the above methods, then the application process could be moved significantly forward in the current calendar year with the only remaining process step being the funding release at the beginning of the implementation year. There is one potential obstacle to this step, however. As part of the trust fund rules, COs cannot receive new DGTTF funding until they have completed submission of the APRs from projects from the previous year. This rule further limits the implementation window in regards to the receipt of the project funding. One possible fix would be to revise the rule to allow COs to receive a 70 percent initial funding tranche at the start of the calendar year, with the remaining 30 percent balance to be transferred upon the submission of the previous projects' APRs.

2.3.4 Regional allocation

Question addressed: Is there a more appropriate criterion for allocating regional envelopes than the 60-30-10 rule?

This rule applies to Country Office funding and means that 60 percent of the total funding goes to Africa and LDCs, 10 percent to low-income countries and 30 percent to other countries. Overall, 70 percent of DGTTF funding should be allocated to field projects (Country Office and regional projects), with a maximum of 30 percent to global projects, including OGC. Tables 7 and 8 and Chart 10 illustrate the current division of DGTTF resources by regions.

Some staff in Regional Bureaux outside Africa believe that Africa receives too much funding. They argue that DGTTF-funded innovations with the potential for replication throughout the world have a better chance of initial success in their regions.

The evaluation team found no evidence that the regional allocation is inappropriate. One reasonable UNDP objective is to devote more of its resources to locations where democratic governance problems are more severe (which contributes to lower Human Development Index scores) rather than where investment in an innovative project might have the highest pay-off. Moreover, allocating a high proportion of funding to Africa is in line with the policies of all development agencies.

Results from a 2003 DGTTF project from Sierra Leone, titled Support to Decentralization, highlight some of the important potential impacts of the fund's involvement in Africa. The main outcome was the passage, in January 2004, of a landmark local government law. Notable specific results (as obtained by evaluation team):

- A simplified version of the law, titled 'You and Your Local Government', was eventually developed. That step succeeded in more quickly raising public awareness about the new law, thereby helping ensure a large turnout in local government elections that took place in May 2004, four months after the law was enacted.
- The project included the anti-corruption agency in discussions, which resulted in an important transparency and accountability section in the new law. It also introduced for the first time the notion of affirmative action with a view to encouraging more women to take their place in local government affairs.
- For the first time in Sierra Leone, the public was invited to discuss a proposed law and give feedback. Some 280,000 Sierra Leoneans reportedly participated.
- As a result of this project the World Bank contributed a \$25 million grant and DFID came on board with considerable funding.
- The 2004 Local Government Law has been touted as the best local government law in the sub-region. Government officials are keen to improve it if necessary: the Ministry of Local Government plans to review the law and make adjustments prior to the 2008 local government elections.


TABLE 7. NUMBER OF APPROVED DGTTF PROJECTS BY REGION AND BY YEAR, 2002–2007

REGION	PROJECTS APPROVED PER YEAR					
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
AFRICA	25	36	31	31	39	40
ARAB STATES	10	10	10	12	12	12
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	13	19	13	18	17	19
ECIS	18	16	13	16	15	16
LAC	10	18	17	23	23	20
TOTAL	76	99	84	100	106	107

TABLE 8. APPROVED DGTTF PROJECTS BY REGION AND YEAR IN \$, 2002–2007

REGION	AMOUNT APPROVED PER YEAR						TOTAL
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
AFRICA	\$5,460,000	\$5,319,000	\$3,200,000	\$5,260,000	\$5,370,000	\$5,707,562	\$30,316,562
ARAB STATES	\$1,420,000	\$1,280,000	\$685,000	\$1,396,000	\$1,480,000	\$1,150,000	\$7,411,000
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	\$1,570,000	\$2,560,000	\$1,418,000	\$2,408,000	\$1,863,000	\$1,985,000	\$11,804,000
ECIS	\$2,372,382	\$2,102,000	\$1,015,000	\$1,740,000	\$1,820,000	\$1,630,000	\$10,679,382
LAC	\$1,925,301	\$1,965,000	\$1,105,000	\$1,780,000	\$1,748,000	\$1,576,000	\$10,099,301
TOTAL	\$12,747,683	\$13,226,000	\$7,423,000	\$12,584,000	\$12,281,000	\$12,048,562	\$70,310,245

CHART 10. APPROVED PROJECTS BY REGION AND BY YEAR AS % OF TOTAL FUNDING, 2002–2007



2.3.5 Unique role of DGTTF

Question addressed: Would the implementation of the selected projects have been possible without DGTTF?

It is difficult to test this hypothesis. The evaluation team did ask other donors if they thought that another donor might have funded the projects concerned: the answer was invariably 'maybe', but the fact remains that other donors did not do so. Since the weakest aspect of DGTTF projects is their ability to foster partnerships with donors (see Table 1), it might be concluded that UNDP was supporting activities that others could not support; on the other hand, it is also possible to conclude that these were activities that others would not support. The fact that more of the projects examined in the country studies were considered to be truly innovative, and even catalytic, than fostered donor partnerships supports the case that these were projects at least within UNDP's comparative advantage.

Some respondents to the country studies referred specifically to the unique ability of UNDP, through DGTTF, to engage directly in important democratic governance issues. That perception was a factor behind their inclination to become involved themselves. The following quote from Mauritania is a good example³²:

I volunteered to co-chair this project because it was UNDP. The organization was able to bring together the different political parties and civil society representatives to discuss the MDGs at a time when there was almost no political dialogue. The project was particularly innovative and was probably only possible because the events were sponsored by the UNDP, which is viewed as a neutral and impartial institution. The workshops created a

badly needed atmosphere of negotiation, discussion and consensus-building. UNDP gave people around the table the confidence to make their points of view known. Prior to the UNDP project, there was no dialogue and the country was headed toward a dangerous impasse.

2.3.6 UN reform

Question addressed: In the context of UN reform, how can UNDP best position DGTTF as an effective mechanism to support emerging needs in democratic governance vis-à-vis other similar funds within and outside the UN system?

The importance to the UN and UNDP of the words 'democratic governance' in the name of the fund is clear. Under the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011, democratic governance is one of the four areas where UNDP is focusing on strengthening national capacities and providing quality advice. Democratic governance is referred to as one of UNDP's comparative advantages. The plan identified two key roles for UNDP:

1. promote the coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system as a whole; and
2. enhance the operational role by providing policy and technical support to programme countries by working on and advocating for multi-sectoral challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and sustainable development.

The plan refers to the three key results areas that will take the place of the current DGTTF service lines: fostering

Box 5. Relevance of key DGTTF project in Kyrgyzstan

In some cases, according to respondents interviewed by the evaluation team in Kyrgyzstan, the relevance of DGTTF-funded interventions lay in the fact that no other donors were willing to work on a specific issue for various reasons. An example of this is the 2005 DGTTF project that provided support to the Central Election Commission (CEC) prior to the presidential and municipal elections in 2005. At that time, no other donors were willing to work with the CEC because they were disappointed with highly flawed parliamentary elections that had taken place recently. These donors worked only with civil society, and UNDP was criticized for supporting the CEC instead of working with civil society. Yet, putting aside the disputed outcome of presidential elections and their fairness, building the technical capacity of CEC has been, in the view of the evaluation team, an important contribution to the improvement of the electoral processes in the country.

(More information about this and other Kyrgyzstan projects is available in Annex 6, which contains executive summaries of the country studies.)

³² Co-chair of Reinforcing Dialogue with the Civil Society to Achieve MDGs, a DGTTF project in Mauritania.

inclusive participation; strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; and grounding democratic governance in international principles. The six service lines have been transformed into nine outcome areas mapped to the three results areas.

The evaluation team did assess each of the projects in the country studies in terms of what it called ‘UNDP’s comparative advantage’. The team even asked DGTTF project counterparts, Resident Representatives, CO staff, and donors what they believed UNDP’s comparative advantage to be. The general consensus was that UNDP is uniquely positioned because of its particularly close relationship with government and its widely recognized neutrality—unlike the bilateral donors, which are often regarded as vehicles for their countries’ foreign policy, especially in issues of governance. The team found that almost every single project studied in the country studies took advantage of UNDP’s comparative advantage defined in this way: even though many of the projects could have been implemented by another donor, UNDP’s perceived neutrality gave it an edge.

However, a number of donors, both in the field and in their head offices, thought that UNDP did not always take advantage of its close relationship with government to ‘push the envelope’ on key governance issues, thereby promoting progress where it would have been difficult for a bilateral donor to do so. For example, in one the countries, donors were upset that the government had called elections at a date that would not (in their opinion) give sufficient time for proper preparations to be made. UNDP was said to be reluctant to join the donors and civil society groups lobbying for a longer preparatory period. Since UNDP had been so instrumental in the first and subsequent multi-party elections, the donors felt that the agency could have used its good relationship with government to persuade the government to have a longer preparatory period. In this and other countries, some donors and representatives of civil society told the team that UNDP did not cash in its good will often enough. To them, it seemed that Resident Representatives would do nothing to jeopardize their good relations with governments.

These observations are important. Although speaking out against an action planned by the government may risk good relations with the government—a UNDP priority—not to speak out may be even riskier if the government subsequently gets into greater governance difficulties as a result of its policies. In this case, rushed elections may favour the ruling party but also reduce its legitimacy. DGTTF projects are a way to ‘push the envelope’ a bit in UNDP’s relationships with government.

Many donors reminded the team that some major donors are moving towards budget support and away from projects. This process began even before the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Budget support gives donors less direct control over specific objectives and activities; policy targets are agreed, then it is up to the government to organize itself to meet those targets. If they do, the budget support continues; if not, it might be adjusted. DGTTF funds very precise, narrowly targeted project activities. Although these activities may appear to be against the spirit of the Paris Declaration, none of the signatories has said that projects should be abolished. DGTTF may have an even enhanced role in testing ideas that might then be taken up by government, to be funded from the donor-supported national budget. Thus the focus would be on the mobilization of government funds from the national budget rather than UNDP TRAC and donor project funds to scale up successful DGTTF-funded pilots.

What is more open to debate is DGTTF’s unique role within the UN system, given that there are other funds with seemingly overlapping responsibilities. The team discussed that issue during meetings with managers of some of these funds, including the Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF).

UNDEF, which is a UN fund, has about the same amount of funding available as DGTTF. Donors include Australia, Germany, India, Japan, Qatar and the United States. An executive board, which includes members of the Security Council and four academics, makes all allocation decisions, although they have to be confirmed by the Secretary-General. Any organization can apply for the funds, not just government but also civil society (which has become the primary focus of UNDEF grants). Seventy percent of the funds are supposed to be allocated for countries, and 30 percent for global projects (the ratio used to be 80:20). Unlike DGTTF, government approval is not required—this was also originally proposed, but not accepted, for DGTTF—although UNDEF staff told the team that this has proved difficult to implement. Much of the work for UNDEF is carried out by its Programme Consultative Group, of which UNDP is a member.

There are fundamental differences between DGTTF and UNDEF, including the following:

- The UNDEF Advisory Board has recognized the usefulness of catering UNDEF to non-UN agencies and focusing specifically on civil society organizations. This effectively disqualifies UNDP and other

UN agencies from receiving grants under UNDEF. It is thus clear that DGTTF is primarily for UNDP and UNDEF for others outside the UN system.

- Political involvement is completely absent from DGTTF's selection process (unless earmarking is regarded as a way for donors to exert a kind of political influence over the countries chosen or the types of projects), whereas the Security Council connection in the case of UNDEF may tend to give its selection process a more political element.
- A recent review of UNDEF's performance indicates that the fund lacks administrative and monitoring capacity³³.
- One of the distinct advantages of DGTTF is quality control through the vetting of proposals, review of draft Project Documents (ProDocs), and approval of ProDocs. The Policy Advisors invest quite some time to support COs. In the case of UNDEF, policy advice is very limited.

CPR-TFF, meanwhile, is a BCPR trust fund that was set up at about the same time as DGTTF. There is some potential for overlap because many DGTTF projects seek to help to stabilize post-conflict countries through improving democratic governance. CPR-TFF, which attracted over \$200 million from donors in 2006 (and even more in 2005), now focuses on three areas (instead of seven service lines as previously): early recovery and cross-cutting issues, conflict prevention, and disaster risk reduction. Eighty eight percent of the funding is earmarked, and a slightly lower percentage is allocated to Country Offices. The current policy is to direct 40 percent of the funding to conflict prevention and 60 percent to recovery. Applications can be received at any time. To prevent overlaps between DGTTF and BCPR Trust Fund, BCPR sits on the allocation commission of DGTTF.

There are also potential overlaps for DGTTF with other UNDP thematic trust funds—for example, with the Gender Thematic Trust Fund (GTTTF) and the ICT Thematic Trust Fund (although the latter has now been mainstreamed within DGTTF). DGTTF, which is bigger than the other five BDP funds combined, tends to operate in a different way. For example, GTTTF sets out to achieve alignment by training CO staff in gender issues and mainstreaming, whereas DGTTF attempts to achieve alignment through

encouraging staff to become involved in innovative democratic governance projects. Apart from the gender fund, DGTTF is the only BDP fund that has an open call for proposals, and thus is responsive to country-based demand.

Based on discussions with staff in the COs and at UNDP NY, and with donors in their head offices and overseas, the evaluation team believes that UNDP can best position itself by using the fund to carry out truly innovative projects that have a real chance of leading through follow-up projects that represent major breakthroughs in democratic governance. Donors currently provide around \$20 million to DGTTF even though, as many told the team, they have little evidence that it has been effective in supporting major progress in democratic governance. That is not to say that there has been no progress—only that the progress to date has not been evaluated and reported to them. Importantly, they continue to support the fund despite this perceived lack of comprehensive evidence. However, the donors' DGTTF counterparts in their capital cities told the team that it would be easier for them to persuade their ministers of foreign affairs and development, and their parliaments, to fund DGTTF if they were given more evidence that DGTTF projects were innovative and led to major operations that advanced democratic governance.

2.3.7 Earmarking

Questions addressed: What is the effect of additional earmarking of resources by donors? If this trend continues, how can DGTTF accommodate these donor demands and still be able to effectively deliver on its goals of providing an open, flexible and highly demand-driven mechanism to support innovations on the ground?

The High Level Panel complained about this trend towards earmarking in the UN as a whole³⁴:

There is too much earmarked funding and too little funding of the core budget of the UN organizations... with donor priorities rather than multilateral mandates determining some of their actions.

Originally there was no 'hard' earmarking, which refers to earmarking by service line or country or both, or even by sub-service line—the 'additional' earmarking referred to the evaluation question. In 2005, 19 percent of the total amount available for programming was earmarked;

³³ UNDP, Review of UNDEF Projects, 2008

³⁴ UN, Delivering as One, Report by the Secretary General's High Level Panel, November 2006

in 2006 and 2007, the amounts were 28 percent and 26 percent, respectively. The larger percentage numbers for 2006 and 2007 are associated with the increase in donations of donors who already earmarked their contributions in previous years. In 2006, DGTTF received an earmarked contribution from a new donor, France. On the other hand, Spain, which became a new contributor to DGTTF in 2007, has placed no restrictions on spending.

All but three of the donors to DGTTF earmarked their contributions over the period 2001–2005. However, about 84 percent of the total funding up to the end of 2005 was not earmarked. Norway, the largest contributor to DGTTF (62 percent of the funding 2001–2007) is among the donors that do not place restrictions on spending. Of the donors that earmark, some have earmarked not only by country, but also by service line (see Table 9).

TABLE 9. EARMARKING OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO DGTTF, 2005–2007

	DONOR	AMOUNT (\$)	EARMARKING
2005	TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR PROGRAMMING ³⁵	14,706,356	
	AUSTRIA	120,337	Loc Gov, J&HR and Elec Sys
	GERMANY	722,589	J&HR
	NEW ZEALAND	764,331	Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, Nicaragua, the Philippines
	PORTUGAL	1,015,076	Lusophone countries
	STATOIL	225,750	J&HR, Loc Gov and PAR/Anti-corruption. Statoil Business Places
	TOTAL EARMARKED 2005	2,848,083	19% of total available for programming
2006	TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR PROGRAMMING	15,133,096	
	AUSTRIA	604,595	Loc Gov, J&HR and Elec Sys. Palestine and Uganda
	FRANCE	1,276,800	Loc Gov, PAR and J&HR. Central African Republic and Sudan
	GERMANY	1,825,377	J&HR and Loc Gov
	PORTUGAL	546,000	Lusophone countries; Translation of the HDR into Portuguese
	STATOIL	94,500	J&HR, Loc Gov and PAR/Anti-corruption. Statoil Business Places
	TOTAL EARMARKED 2006	4,272,497	28% earmarking of total available programming
2007	TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR PROGRAMMING	18,476,914	
	AUSTRIA	660,000	Loc Gov, J&HR and Elec Sys
	FRANCE	1,168,554	Loc Gov, PAR and J&HR. Central African Republic and Sudan
	GERMANY	1,440,922	J&HR and Loc Gov
	PORTUGAL	934,000	Lusophone countries; Translation of the HDR into Portuguese
	STATOIL	679,750	J&HR, Loc Gov and PAR/Anti-corruption. Statoil Business Places
	TOTAL EARMARKED 2007	4,762,304	26% earmarking of total available programming

Note on key abbreviations (all for DGTTF service lines): 'Elec Sys' = Electoral Systems and Processes; 'J&HR' = Justice and Human Rights; 'Loc Gov' = Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development; and 'PAR' = Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption.

³⁵ After a 5 percent deduction for GMS (general management support) fees.

All things being equal, it is much more difficult to manage the fund when a higher proportion of the funding is earmarked. Projects have to be selected to meet the priorities of the donors and then added together to make up the total funding earmarked by a particular donor for that type of country or service line. There is often a double approval process involving national governments and even embassies providing money to DGTTF (as in one of the country case studies, Mozambique).

2.4 Efficiency

Efficiency is usually defined in terms of the ratio of outputs to inputs. At first glance it appears that DGTTF projects require considerable administrative effort for a small dollar value. But that is an inappropriate way to measure efficiency in this case because the result to be achieved is not a small project generating certain outputs at the end of one year, but a successful test of an innovation that might result in much larger operations that could in turn have a significant impact on the MDGs, poverty and development.

Given this larger objective, the major issues to be considered are whether the selection, allocation and review processes are as efficient as they might be; whether oversight is effective in measuring the effectiveness of DGTTF investment; and whether BDP makes the most of the information generated by these innovative projects. To that end, a total of three sets of questions are included under the heading of efficiency. Each of the three is discussed below: selection, allocation and review processes (Section 2.4.1), roles in the processes (Section 2.4.2), and oversight and reporting (Section 2.4.3).

2.4.1 Selection, allocation and review processes

Questions addressed: To what extent does the institutional and organizational architecture of the DGTTF mechanism facilitate the achievement of the objectives of DGTTF? How can the selection and allocation processes be enhanced to increase efficiency and results? To what extent have there been adequate human, technical and physical resources to manage the processes efficiently? Have the processes been effective in developing quality projects and facilitating strategic choices? If so, how?

The team interviewed New York and regional Policy Advisors, staff from the Regional Bureaux and CO staff about the selection, allocation and review processes. The processes are viewed favourably for the most part. Many respondents to the 2007 staff survey actually complemented the management of the process by the DGTTF Practice Trust Fund and Services; UNDP staff rated DGTTF as follows:

- review process: 70 percent 'favourable', 30 percent 'average'
- disbursement process: 70 percent 'favourable', 28 percent 'average', 2 percent 'low'
- reporting: 67 percent 'favourable', 32 percent 'average', 1 percent 'low'

Overall, DGTTF is rated higher than any other trust fund³⁶.

Many involved with other trust funds at UNDP NY, directly or as reviewers of those funds, thought that DGTTF procedures, although complex, had the merit of being "rigorous", to quote one reviewer, unlike those of many other trust funds. That reviewer defined the benefit of rigor as being "able to be held accountable for results". He thought that since there was no possibility of accountability for most trust funds, it was impossible to demonstrate to donors that their "investments" had produced the desired return. In contrast, it would be possible to do so with DGTTF (as this evaluation is attempting).

Some staff in some COs tend to view UNDP trust funds as a means of funding an activity they would like to do which they cannot easily fund from existing projects. COs have built up an expectation over time that their applications will be successful and that they will receive some, if not all, of the funding they have requested. This results in pressure from the COs to the RBx to ensure that their interests are being taken care of.

However, the new DGTTF guidelines make it clearer than before that EOIs should be made only for projects that are truly innovative and might lead to a larger operation (The 2008 guidelines' criteria for such projects were outlined in Section 2.1, which focused on effectiveness).

This sense of entitlement among some COs is exacerbated by the perception that the administrative burden relative to the size of funding is very high. During the country studies senior staff in COs in particular, as well as some

³⁶ UNDP, BDP, 2006

project officers, complained about the administrative burden that applying for DGTTF funds involves; they see this burden as being out of proportion to the value of the funds received when compared to projects using TRAC funding. One of the respondents to the 2007 staff survey complained about the administrative costs as follows³⁷ :

Grants need to be larger; otherwise they are simply not worth the administrative costs. There shouldn't be a calendar year restriction because government approvals take a long time for projects. Finally, I'm not sure that small amounts of money can really help innovation unless it were somehow much easier to access and programme the funds: the difficulties are both on the UNDP side and the government (how innovative are they willing to let UNDP be?).

Despite the many complaints by CO staff about the administrative burden of the process, they all added (without prompting) that they would likely apply for DGTTF funding year after year. In fact, a high proportion of offices do apply each year. In some offices staff even draft competing proposals for DGTTF funding—this is the standard practice in one CO (in Yemen) reviewed as part of the evaluation team's eight country studies.

It is inappropriate to conclude that the process is inefficient because administrative burden is high relative to the value of the DGTTF project. Instead, the administrative costs should be considered in relation to the hoped-for, follow-on project and its probability. Thus a \$200,000 investment might turn into a \$100 million programme supported by UNDP, other donors and various governance institutions, as was the case with many of the projects we looked at in the country studies. DGTTF projects should be viewed as carrying a high risk (perhaps), but also being very strategic because of the possibility of very high returns and the small investment in administrative costs.

In any case, the only unique DGTTF requirements are the one-page EOI plus two short evaluation reports (mid-term and annual), although some chose to write longer reports than absolutely necessary. In nations with Country Programme Action Plans (CPAPs), ProDocs are now very short.

Furthermore, it is hard to see how any of the steps in the process (as delineated in Table 10, which is from the 2008 guidelines) could be avoided. Many are UNDP (not DGTTF) requirements, such as the need for a ProDoc. DGTTF's

Web-based application is easy to use. Preparing a new ProDoc can be avoided if the DGTTF application can be linked to an existing project—although, as noted in the country studies, many CO staff do not realize this (yet this is stated in the guidelines).

TABLE 10. TEN STEPS FOR PREPARING A DGTTF PROJECT

1. Schedule your TTF process: establish the TTF calendar with your outposted Policy Advisors, in three phases: drafting the ProDoc, holding the LPAC and obtaining final approval
2. Draft the ProDoc according to the simplified ProDoc format
3. Submit the draft to HQ and review it with your SURF/RSC/PSPD Policy Advisor
4. Convene and hold the LPAC, invite Policy Advisors virtually or physically, finalise the minutes and amend the ProDoc as appropriate
5. Obtain clearance of ProDoc by SURF/RSC/PSPD Policy Advisor
6. Obtain in-house approval to send the ProDoc to HQ
7. Submit the ProDoc, work plan, budget and the LPAC minutes via the DGTTF Web application
8. Create your Atlas budget
9. Submit Atlas information to HQ
10. Begin implementation

Source: DGTTF 2008 guidelines

The more competitive selection process from 2008 onwards should result in a more efficient allocation of funds. The decision to fully fund the projects that are selected by the Allocation Commission, unless there are good technical reasons for reducing the allocation, should mean that the most innovative projects with the greatest potential will be selected. Many staff at UNDP NY told the evaluation team that they welcomed this more competitive environment because they believe it will result in higher quality DGTTF projects. The downside is that many COs will be denied funding each year unless donor funding is increased substantially; this may in turn result in those COs losing interest in submitting applications in subsequent years.

The DGTTF selection process also includes regional projects, although from 2002–2006 the total number of such projects totalled only 17, which represented 3.5 percent of the total

³⁷ UNDP staff survey, 2007

TABLE 11. DGTTF REGIONAL PROJECTS BY REGION AND BY YEAR

REGION	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTAL
ARAB STATES	1	2	—	—	—	3
AFRICA	—	—	—	—	—	0
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	1	3	—	3	3	10
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	2	2	—	—	—	4
ECIS	—	—	—	—	—	0
TOTAL	4	7	0	3	3	17

(see Table 11). More than half (10) of all regional projects took place in Latin America and the Caribbean, while Africa and ECIS have never mounted a regional project.

Regional DGTTF projects are a decision of the individual Regional Bureau in consultation with COs. For example, the Africa Bureau never mounts regional projects because it already has a large regional programme that includes many governance projects; the bureau therefore prefers using DGTTF funds exclusively for individual African countries. At the other extreme, the Latin America Bureau has mounted 60 percent of all regional projects. All 10 of its projects are essentially learning events, e.g., Knowledge Fair on Local Governance for Latin America (which is an example of the South-South sharing of experiences generally absent from DGTTF projects). Two of the projects were extensions to a second year. Latin America Bureau regional projects from 2002–2006 include the following:

- Virtual Fair to Strengthen Local Governance in Latin America
- Democratic Development in Latin America: Status, Citizens' Perceptions, Indicators and Agenda
- Democratic Dialogue: Promoting Multi-stakeholder Consensus Building as a Tool for Strengthening Democratic Governance
- Strengthening Civil Society Participation in CARICOM Regional Governance and Decision-making Organs
- Short Term Analysis and Prospective Scenarios for Democratic Governance

- Knowledge Fair on Local Governance for Latin America

A number of people interviewed at UNDP NY and at COs complained that the requests for proposals are issued at a very busy time of the year (November) for UNDP offices and staff. Some suggested that mid-year would be better. Others would have preferred there to be no fixed application times or perhaps two application dates so that COs could be more responsive to opportunities as they arose—such as, for example, the coming to power of a more human rights-oriented government.

A single application date is probably advisable for reasons of administrative economy, but it might be worth considering holding back some funds each year to respond to emerging opportunities. The Bolivia CO suggested creating an 'emergency DGTTF fund' that would set aside a small amount, say 5–10 percent of the DGTTF budget, for responding to proposals outside the annual call. Yemen's CO told the team about a lost opportunity in establishing UNDP's leadership in a project that linked judicial reform to the security sector because it was impossible to apply when the opportunity arose early in the year.

2.4.2 Roles in the processes

Question addressed: To what extent has the support of the different parties (advisors in New York, Oslo and the regions, Regional Bureaux, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) in strengthening the proposals and their potential results been particularly beneficial for meeting the objectives of DGTTF?

There are two sets of players in the allocation and selection process:

- Allocation Commission: Chaired by the DG Group Leader. It is also composed of BDP HQ Advisors, the Trust Fund Coordinator and DG Practice Manager as well as representatives from BCPR, HDRO and each of the Regional Bureaux, where:
 - Regional Bureaux: Assess the EOIs from the regional perspective and assure geographical balance.
 - HQ-based Policy Advisors: Assess the EOIs from a technical point of view.
- Outposted Policy Advisors: Help COs draft EOIs; substantively assess them; and offer help with implementation (if requested).

The timetable for the 2008 allocation, with respective roles, is detailed in Table 12.

Through 2007 the procedure worked as follows. Once the ProDoc and LPAC minutes were reviewed and approved, the final approval letter was sent out and instructions were provided on how to set up the project on Atlas. The lead advisors then reviewed the documents in the Web application and the Policy Support Unit (PSU) authorized the spending limits in Atlas. The procedure was altered slightly for 2008, however. Now, once the ProDoc and LPAC minutes have been reviewed and approved, the COs upload the Atlas information in the DGTTF Web application. Next, following review by DGTTF management, PSU issues Authorization Spending Limits (ASL).

TABLE 12. DGTTF TIMETABLE 2008 EDITION

2007	
8 OCTOBER	FIRST ALLOCATION COMMISSION (AC) MEETING: INITIAL APPROVAL OF THE GUIDELINES
15 OCTOBER	INVITATION TO SUBMIT EOI
16–31 OCTOBER	CONSULTATIONS WITH RBX
5 NOVEMBER	DEADLINE FOR EOI SUBMISSION
6 NOVEMBER	INFORMATION ON EOI AND REVIEW PROCESS TO AC AND REGIONAL ADVISORS
18 NOVEMBER	DEADLINE FOR EOI REVIEW BY ADVISERS (HQ AND REGIONS) AND BCPR
21 NOVEMBER	SECOND AC MEETING: ANALYSIS OF EOI
22 NOV–2 DEC	CONSULTATIONS WITH RBX
3 DECEMBER	THIRD AC MEETING: FINALIZED ALLOCATIONS PROPOSAL
5 DECEMBER	ANNOUNCEMENT OF ALLOCATIONS AND INVITATIONS TO SUBMIT PRODOCS
2008	
1 JANUARY	OPENING OF DISBURSEMENT
18 JANUARY	DEADLINE FOR POSTING DRAFT PRODOC FOR REGIONAL ADVISOR REVIEW
18 FEBRUARY	DEADLINE FOR FINALIZED PRO DOC AND LPAC MINUTES SUBMISSION TO HQ
18 FEBRUARY	DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING APR FOR 2007 APPROVED PROJECTS
29 JUNE	DEADLINE FOR MID-TERM REPORT
2009	
13 FEBRUARY	DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING APR FOR 2008 PROJECTS

Some who responded in the 2007 staff survey thought that some roles are not clear to staff in Country Offices³⁸:

The role of HQ and the Regional Service Centres (RSCs) in the approval process does not seem to be understood or appreciated by some COs. Very often the RSCs are bypassed until HQ refers back to the COs for RSCs' comments. Further clarity of the approval process is required.

Both respondents to the survey and staff in COs thought that the short amount of time available to prepare the EOLs placed a difficult burden on the regionally based Policy Advisors. One solution to this problem might be to encourage the practice followed in some COs, whereby staff begin thinking about next year's DGTTF application long before the request for proposals is posted. In the 2008 edition more time was given to COs to elaborate the EOL: almost three weeks, instead of two weeks previously.

The Policy Advisors could have a more significant role in the process. Under current arrangements, the role of the BDP Policy Advisors, who are the experts on democratic governance, is limited to the pre-implementation phase of DGTTF projects. After the two initial screenings of the EOLs and the simplified ProDoc, the role of the Policy Advisors is basically phased out except for some ad hoc backstopping with advice provided if requested. Although it would not be feasible for the Policy Advisors to assume project oversight responsibilities for all DGTTF projects they are assigned to at the selection stage, it would likely greatly improve project quality if they retained ownership of a percentage of these projects, particularly the ones they felt to be particularly catalytic or innovative in their policy realms. This would also improve the post-project documentation of lessons learned.

Even as this evaluation was being conducted, changes in the institutional arrangements and relationships in the BDP were being considered. The most significant change is to appoint Regional Practice Team Leaders (PTLs) for each of the BDP practices. These individuals, who would be based in the regions, would then hire specialists as needed for their region.

This proposal came too late for the team to test in the country studies. However, it is very much in line with the request by many in the COs for more help from the regionally based Policy Advisors. In particular, staff at many COs would benefit greatly from regionally based advisors who are not only specialists in various aspects of governance

policy, but who also share with COs their experiences regarding democratic governance issues and opportunities from the region and elsewhere.

It has been suggested that the PTLs have a key role in selecting the projects to be funded by DGTTF. It would be inappropriate for the person responsible for working closely with COs in identifying and then perhaps advising on the implementation of the project also to select that project. Instead, the PTL and his or her team should focus attention on supporting the Country Office, including helping the CO to identify a key issue and prepare a good proposal for a truly innovative project that might be scaled up into a major operation that would significantly improve democratic governance.

The evaluation team found no strong case for any major change in the roles of the various participants in the selection and allocation process. The selection of too many projects that are not innovative and the practice of reducing the funding on a high proportion of projects is not caused by the institutional arrangements but by the perhaps improper application of those arrangements. After all, the Allocation Commission—which includes the very Policy Advisors and Regional Bureaux that have approved non-innovative projects in the past and cut the funding to most projects so that almost all COs would be at least partially satisfied—was able to change the rules of the game for 2008 and promote innovation and full-funding.

It is, however, worth thinking carefully about the role of HQ in setting the democratic agenda. DGTTF has to balance a demand-driven process with guidance from the centre on the policy priorities. During the country studies, many in the COs complained about being guided a bit too strongly by UNDP NY (the Regional Bureaux and the Policy Advisors) and the regional Policy Advisors, who they felt did not have the COs' understanding of the governance environment in the country. Such concerns might grow as a higher proportion of projects are rejected from 2008 onwards than has been the case in the past.

During the country studies, some staff suggested that COs that have proved they can successfully innovate should be pre-qualified to receive an annual allocation to spend as they see fit, as long as the project is innovative, without having to go through the New York allocation process. Such a practice would complicate the accountability process, however. UNDP NY strikes deals with donors for a certain amount of DGTTF funding to be used to achieve

³⁸ UNDP staff survey, 2007

agreed results in terms of democratic governance innovation. Those results were defined in terms of supporting the six service lines and more recently the three clusters with innovation, also taking account of cross-cutting priorities such as gender, human rights and the involvement of civil society. In a way, the service lines and clusters (now mapped to each other) are a way of defining what needs to be done to improve democratic governance. If the centre (UNDP NY) had no control over what the funding were spent on it could not be held accountable for the results to be achieved under each of the service line/cluster headings, or for that matter for innovation.

Although a major overhaul is not necessary, there are some ways in which the participants in the selection process can play more productive roles:

1. There should be final review of the proposals by the New York Policy Advisors and the Regional Bureaux meeting together. At the moment, the Policy Advisors score the proposals from a policy point of view (how innovative the proposals are on the basis of their worldwide knowledge of the topic concerned) and then the Regional Bureaux review the proposals. What then happens in practice is that DGTTF management discusses with the Regional Bureaux any differences in judgement between the Policy Advisors who, like the DGTTF management, are part of BDP, and the Regional Bureaux staff in New York, who are not. Such discussions usually are not very effective because although the Policy Advisors will have read all the proposals in their specific fields, the small DGTTF management team cannot reasonably be expected to have done so. It would be better if, as a last step in the process, the New York Policy Advisors met with the New York Regional Bureaux staff for say, one day, to iron out any differences and make a truly joint selection.
2. Any comments made by the New York Policy Advisors on the proposals should be shared with the COs. This would help the COs to prepare better ProDocs. Of course under the proposed new arrangements, the regional Policy Advisors (reporting to the PTL) would have already given their input in the preparation of the proposal. The New York Policy Advisors' scoring of the proposals should not be made available to COs because that could cause tedious disputes over the worthiness of the proposals.

Although no one has suggested that the locally based donors should be involved in the selection process (they have in effect outsourced these innovative DGTTF projects to UNDP partly to reduce their own administrative costs), consideration should be given by COs to their involvement in at least defining the key democratic governance issues. This is very much in the spirit of the Paris Declaration's harmonization objective. COs should make a point of informing their donor partners about DGTTF and their role in funding innovative approaches to technically difficult and often politically sensitive democratic governance issues—and they should invite suggestions for issues to be addressed innovatively. Although the donors visited by the evaluation team during the country studies knew about DGTTF projects, very few had ever heard of DGTTF (although the governance institutions involved in the projects did know about fund).

2.4.3 Oversight and reporting

Questions addressed: Are the established mechanisms sufficient to ensure oversight by BDP, both at the global and regional levels, on the implementation and monitoring of DGTTF projects? Should a light feedback mechanism from beneficiaries of the projects (governance institutions, civil society, etc.) be elaborated? If yes, from which beneficiaries? What are the purposes of the tools established for oversight and reporting (Mid-Term and Annual Project Reports) and to what extent have these tools served their purposes? What other mechanisms for oversight and reporting should be put in place?

The main source of information to BDP, the donors and anyone else interested in DGTTF is the Annual Report. One donor told the team that the 2006 report was far better than previous years' since it reported better on the results achieved from each project. Another donor complimented the 2006 report because the lessons learned section responded well to her own judgment about the problems with DGTTF.

However, one of the most strongly expressed complaints about DGTTF is that donors and other observers of the fund do not know enough about the results achieved from donors' direct investment in DGTTF. It is perhaps a measure of the value of DGTTF that donors continue to provide funds when they have so little evidence of DGTTF's effectiveness to report back to their parliaments.

The projects' Annual Project Reports (APRs) are the main source of information for the DGTTF Annual Report, although input is sought directly from COs and Policy

Advisors, especially on lessons learned and examples of successful projects. Using this source of information to determine the effectiveness of DGTTF has limitations for a number of reasons.

First of all, the reports are not always prepared, although performance in this regard has improved since the early years of DGTTF, as shown in Chart 11.

Of 465 projects registered in the DGTTF database from 2002-2006, 61 (13 percent) do not have APRs. The DGTTF team reports that compliance has improved over time, however.

Second, the reports are rather subjective since they are prepared by staff at the CO that applied for the funding. For example, very few APRs include negative ratings for outputs and outcomes, and most projects are reported to have been innovative and catalytic. The APRs do, however, frequently mention process problems, such as problems in obtaining government approval; such problems make it difficult to complete projects in one year.

Third, the APR is not an evaluation report, even if, perhaps prematurely, it requests information on outcomes, resource mobilization and lessons learned.


Policy advisors, CO staff, Regional Bureaux and donors agree that there should be a more systematic and objective evaluation of DGTTF projects. This would involve

contracting a national consultant to evaluate DGTTF projects a year or two after their completion, depending on how long it takes a given project to show results. A line item for evaluation from \$3,000 to \$5,000 should be included in each DGTTF proposal. That amount would probably be sufficient to hire a national consultant for about one week, which in turn should be sufficient time to evaluate a project given that this report's evaluation team managed to obtain a decent picture of each of the country study's four to five projects in about one week. COs can use DGTTF funding to carry out evaluations under the current guidelines, but few take advantage of this provision.

Ideally, evaluations of individual projects would focus on what has happened since project completion in terms of its leading to larger or replicable initiatives either in-country, regionally or globally. Project failures would permit the evaluation consultant to draw lessons on what to avoid in future. The proposed Practice Team Leader (PTL) and the CO would be the first-line clients for these evaluations, which, once reviewed, would be shared corporately across UNDP.

Even though APRs are more project completion reports than evaluation instruments, they could become more informative reports on the projects. They are monitoring tools as part of UNDP's framework 'results-based management' and by design they are self-reporting. (see www.undp.org/eo/documents/HandBook/ME-HandBook.pdf). As such, they should be connected to other reporting

CHART 11. DGTTF REPORTING (ALL DOCUMENTS)³⁹



³⁹ 2004 has been omitted due to database gaps resulting in 71 percent of Mid-Term Reports.

(i.e., to the old MYFF databases). DGTTF generates a valuable source of data on democratic governance projects globally and over time that should be systematically analyzed. Ideally, this should be done in an automated way when APRs are filed via an online system. The DGTTF team has in fact suggested that the Web application system be changed so that information is organized in several pre-determined categories and boxes. Such a structure would make it easier to compile, analyse and compare the information. A system such as this would mean that there would be no uploading of APRs as one document in Word format, but instead that COs type their narrative and financial information into built-in frames in the Web application.

Other suggested changes (from the evaluation team) to the APRs include the following:

- Include definitions on what is understood by the following terms: output, outcome, impact, catalytic characteristics of the project, innovative nature of the project.
- To measure the actual duration of DGTTF projects, one of two potential changes would be useful: i) the current APR field 'period covered' should be changed to 'implementation period', or ii) fields 'official start date' (date of official launch of project/ first disbursement) and 'official completion date' (date of official closing of project) should be added elsewhere. Currently, the APR form reads, 'the period since last APR. In the case of DGTTF, this will be from whenever you were allocated the funds until December 31'.
- Add two fields for \$ figures in the section: 'Resources used in the reporting period'. One field should be for DGTTF resources used and the second for other resources (specified by source).
- Include a field for listing a country (some APRs have only codes, not the actual names of countries, or nothing at all).
- Reporting on outcomes and outputs is currently voluntary in the APRs—thus many COs leave the fields 'outputs and outcomes achieved' blank. This makes quantitative analysis difficult.
- Encourage written comments that are clear and succinct (e.g., in section 'Lessons Learned' or 'Implementation Issues').

If the planned online reporting system does not support easy analysis of data contained in APRs, there could be some pre-coding of the answers to open-ended questions along the lines of the charts prepared for this report. The evaluation team has established a database that includes all these pre-coded answers for all such questions in all APRs to date.

An online system of submitting, tracking and monitoring of DGTTF documents introduced in 2007 allows COs to upload all project documentation online. This will significantly reduce the burden of the fund's management and will allow for comprehensive analysis of project files.

The evaluation that the team is proposing for one or two years after a project has been completed would assess the outcome of the project. In particular, it would seek specific responses to the following questions: Did the project result in a scaling-up into a much larger operation? How was that funded? Did the success of the project enhance UNDP's leadership and coordination role in the donor community? Did the project strengthen the ties between UNDP and governance institutions? Was a further DGTTF-funded project, or one funded from another source, needed to make the intended breakthrough (given that follow-on projects have been quite common)? Did the project help the government and donors to define policy benchmarks for budget support operations?

Although such an evaluation process will undoubtedly prove useful and informative in many respects, several caveats must be mentioned. The most notable is that even two years after a project ends it is unlikely that it will be possible to measure outcomes in terms of indicators such as improved access to justice, more women elected to parliament, or improved delivery of public services. That is because, as argued in Section 2.1 (on **effectiveness**), even the follow-on project in legal and judicial, electoral capacity-building or decentralization will take years to have a significant impact on those kinds of indicators.

3. KEY OVERALL RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

Generally speaking, the results of the evaluation indicate that DGTTF has been successful as a venture capital fund promoting innovation in an area of development where it is both extremely important to make progress and notoriously hard to do so. The successes have often been characterized by the involvement of the counterpart governance institutions in the design of the innovation and by an implementation period of longer than DGTTF's one year. The successful innovations have almost always led to major programmes of reform and capacity-building, supported not only with UNDP core funding but even more often by other donors and the governments concerned.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the fund is related not to its intent, but to its application. Many selected projects have not been truly innovative, a problem exacerbated by the practice of agreeing to fund on average only half the funding applied for, with the objective of giving just about every applicant some funding. The second most significant weakness has been a general failure to identify lessons learned from both successes and failures and to disseminate those lessons to COs.

Some of the fund's weaknesses identified in this evaluation—including some that have made it more difficult for COs to implement innovative projects that might lead to

larger reform and capacity-building programmes—are already being addressed by BDP and the managers of DGTTF. Applications are now fully funded, unless there is a good reason to reduce the level of funding. The application and reporting processes are now more user-friendly. Organisational changes are being put in place that will make the support given by Policy Advisors, especially the regional advisors, to COs more effective. At the time research for this report was conducted, it had been proposed that for 2008 about \$1.75 million of DGTTF funds be allocated to the six regional centres to allow the regional practice leaders to respond to emerging demands. In addition, steps were being taken to improve the sharing of experiences of DGTTF projects. Most of all, the new guidelines for 2008 make it clearer than before that the over-riding criterion for COs' access to the funds is that their projects test innovative approaches to the resolution of difficult democratic governance problems.

Taking advantage of UNDP's multi-donor status, reputation for objectivity and good relations with governments and governance institutions, and with an increased level of support from its donors, and some redesign, DGTTF can play an even more important role as a sponsor of innovation in democratic governance.



UNDP Bhutan

Elderly voter in the National Council Elections of Bhutan on 31 December 2007. Institutional and Human Capacity Building of the Election Commission of Bhutan project. Bhutan, 2007.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

A total of 17 distinct recommendations based on the evaluation are listed below. Each is numbered individually and grouped by relevant sub-heading.

4.1. Improving the DGTTF mechanism

1. **Two-year projects should be permitted.** The requirement that DGTTF projects be completed within the year is a major impediment to their completion as intended. That limitation is exacerbated by the fact that the average project is only actually implemented in the last five months of the year, even if the steps needed to access the funding have been completed earlier. Permitting two year projects would result in more projects being completed and give more time to carry out the consultations needed to get the projects under way. The evaluation team found, in fact, that some of the more successful DGTTF projects were actually a series of two or even three projects. One-year projects may be appropriate in some cases and therefore should be permitted (although some are likely to spill over into a second year).

Since the team found no evidence that COs thought the upper limit of \$300,000 too low, this limit should not be changed. However, consideration should be given to raising the maximum at a later stage once the experience of the first wave of two-year projects has been evaluated. It is appreciated that there is a case for raising this limit since some projects have been in place for many years and the proposed two-year time may encourage the preparation of larger innovative projects. Further, many of the applications for funding in 2008 are for the maximum of \$300,000, implying that the applications might have been larger if that were permitted. However, against this, there has been a clear practice of inflating requests because of the expectation that they would be halved by the Allocation Commission and, in any case, some projects fail to spend even the reduced allocation they have been given.

2. **Approved projects should in general be fully funded, unless consultations between regional and New York Policy Advisors and CO staff result in the reduction in the size of the project on technical grounds.** Agreeing to fund half of what is requested by the CO

makes little sense; however, that is what happens in the interests of spreading the funding over as many COs as possible. It is therefore not surprising that such a high proportion of projects are not successfully innovative. The principle of full funding has already been agreed to by the Allocation Commission and implemented for 2008. Many COs are bound to be disappointed with this change, especially the first time around, because it will mean that more proposals are turned down than in the past (given that the amount of funding from the donors is less than the amount requested in EOIs). However, the New York Policy Advisors and Regional Bureaux believe that more competition for DGTTF funding will improve the quality of proposals. Steps should be taken by the New York Policy Advisors and the RBx to counter the current practice of inflating the size of requests, a practice that derives from a selection process that has tended to cut projects in half so that more COs can receive at least some funding.

Initial results from the new emphasis on fully funding are striking. For example, almost all the requests granted for projects in Africa and Asia in 2008 were for the maximum of \$300,000.

3. **It follows from the introduction of two-year, fully funded projects that multi-year funding should be discussed with DGTTF donors.** It would be possible to have two-year projects with single-year funding by the donors, but it would be better if multi-year funding were possible. Multi-year funding would give DGTTF management and the Allocation Commission more confidence to approve two-year projects. The team has discussed multi-year funding with some of the donors, who do not object to this in principle—although they would have to convince their ministries and parliaments of the need. Longer projects could still be supported with year-by-year funding since donor funding has tended to rise over time and not fluctuate too much.
4. **Donors should be encouraged to provide their funds to DGTTF without earmarking.** Earmarking reduces the demand/need-driven characteristic of the fund. For example, earmarking by service line and country forces funding into a specific service line. That may be inappropriately restrictive when the real need for an innovative project with catalytic potential in that

country is for a project more properly categorized and administered under a different service line. Moreover, earmarking by service line tends to distort choices in favour of that service line, thereby weakening the fund as a source of 'market' information.

The majority of funding to date, 84 percent over the life of DGTTF, has been provided unearmarked. Removing restrictions on the remaining share would further increase its flexibility.

5. **The quality of projects would be improved if more expert advice were available to the COs, in particular from regional policy staff.** Although CO staff tend to be very sensitive to local governance conditions, many are not specialists in democratic governance. Few contacted by the evaluation team in the country studies had attended courses in governance. They generally recognize their limitations in this regard: staff in many COs have asked for more technical support. The principal job of the regional policy staff, led by the proposed Practice Team Leaders (PTLs), should be to work with CO to identify issues, prepare proposals to address the issues, and be available to help with any implementation problems. PTLs should not be funded from DGTTF since that would leave too little funding available for the projects themselves.
6. **The selection process should in general remain as it is now.** Neither the 2007 staff survey nor the country studies found much evidence that the selection process itself should be changed. There were objections to the **application** of the process: the tendency to reduce the size of projects so that almost all applicants receive some funding and the lack of rigor in selecting truly innovative projects. But these problems are being addressed under the 2008 guidelines. All participants in the selection process appreciate the need for full funding and the emphasis on innovation. The selection should continue to be made by the New York-based Allocation Commission consisting of the Policy Advisors, Regional Bureaux and BDP management. The regional Policy Advisors should have no role in the selection process; for them to do so would represent a conflict of interest since they should have already been involved in helping CO staff to identify key issues and potentially innovative projects.
7. **However, consideration should be given to one of the following timing changes: two calls for EOIs each year, a single call in the middle of the year, one of those options plus having some funding unallocated so that emerging opportunities can be responded**

quickly to at any time during the year. Currently the call for EOIs comes at a particularly busy time of the year. Two calls is probably not the best option because the Allocation Commission would have to be assembled twice, thereby increasing its administrative burden. The simplest option would be to have a single call in the middle of the year: this would reduce the end-of-year pressure on staff and likely improve the quality of proposals.

Consideration should also be given to having a small emergency fund to which applications could be made at any time. This would be most useful for COs in particularly difficult governance environments that seek to respond quickly to emerging opportunities, such as a new government.

8. **Encouragement should be given to CO staff, and the regional Policy Advisors who support them, to involve the governance institutions that might be responsible for the implementation of the project in the identification and early preparation of the project.** Many of the more successful projects reviewed by the evaluation team in the country studies were characterized by discussion between the CO and the governance institution concerned, usually some part of the government itself, months before the EOI was prepared. This practice enhances ownership, reduces the risk of implementation problems and facilitates a more rapid start of the project. The Allocation Commission and Policy Advisors might consider encouraging such steps by giving higher ratings to projects with early counterpart involvement.
9. **Every project should be independently evaluated one to two years after it has been completed.** The lack of information on the results achieved from DGTTF projects was the most common complaint made by the donors. In addition, many UNDP staff who responded to the 2007 survey said that there was little sharing of lessons learned. If a local consultant were hired, an evaluation would cost \$5,000 to \$10,000 (plus the administrative cost) and take one to two weeks. The focus of the evaluation would be on whether the project was successfully innovative enough that it could (or should) be scaled up with government and/or donor funding. Although the CO and PTLs should have direct responsibility for commissioning the evaluation, the New York Policy Advisors and Regional Bureau staff would take responsibility for these evaluations and together with OGC be responsible for analyzing them and disseminating the results.

10. The APRs should be redesigned to provide more useful information and to have more of that information pre-coded to facilitate analysis. An APR should be regarded as a 'project completion report'. It should contain largely factual and easy to code data. The team's coding of information from the APRs for this evaluation could provide a guide; in particular, consideration should be given to carrying out the kind of analysis of the APRs shown in this evaluation report's tables and charts.

11. Practice Management, Policy Advisors and Regional Bureaux should continue to stress the importance of DGTTF only funding innovative projects that might be catalytic in terms of being scaled up by governance institutions with or without donor support.

The best way to do this is to include examples of successful projects in DGTTF guidelines, as was the case with the 2008 guidelines. Additional useful cases are included in this report. Every encouragement should be given to COs to use DGTTF to push the frontier of democratic governance in the country concerned, using UNDP's good relations with government and civil society to move into politically sensitive territory where the chances of success may be low but the returns in terms of improved democratic governance could be very high.

12. Practice Management and Policy Advisors should clarify for CO staff the meaning of 'outcomes' for the innovative projects intended for DGTTF funding and replace 'outcome' with 'result'. The team's analysis of the APRs found confusion between 'outputs' and 'outcomes'. More projects were reported to have successfully achieved their outcomes than their outputs. Although this is logically possible, it is more likely that outputs are achieved but outcomes not, since the former are largely within the control of the project while the latter are not.

The evaluation team recommends that the term 'result' be used instead of 'outcome' to define what happens after the project has been completed. A good result in terms of DGTTF's objectives would be a new policy adopted by the government or a new programme based on the DGTTF project that has a good chance of bringing about a breakthrough in democratic governance.

4.2. Improving strategic positioning

13. It will continue to be important to balance the demand-driven aspects of DGTTF, characterized by Country Offices responding to unique local democratic governance needs and opportunities, with BDP's need to promote, and be held accountable for, the democratic governance policy themes agreed as part of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008–2011. DGTTF has an obligation to reflect the MYFF and Strategic Plan policy priorities agreed with the Executive Board in the selection and allocation process, since the management will be held accountable by the donors for using their funds to promote the agreed policy objectives. However, the evaluation team was repeatedly told that CO staff want to respond to local issues and opportunities without being constrained by having to fit their proposals into the service lines and results areas—or follow various UNDP priorities, such as gender, South-South and civil society—that may vary from one year to the next or otherwise seem inappropriate in their contexts.

At the same time, though, other CO staff said that it is not in practice difficult to fit a project opportunity into one of the service lines or results areas. Their perception has been strengthened by the new guidelines, under which the over-riding objective for DGTTF is to test innovative approaches, with a high proportion of the scoring in the selection process for innovation and catalytic potential. This means that COs are unlikely to be significantly constrained by having to fit the proposed project into service lines or results areas, or even a cross-cutting theme, but rather will be guided by the requirement that the proposed project be truly innovative. It also seems clear that COs would have greater ownership of the policy priorities if it is made more obvious through the communications strategy, and as a result of the more systematic evaluation of DGTTF projects, that the priorities themselves are at least partly based on the information from the field on lessons learned.

14. As part of the dialogue within UNDP and with donors, BDP should use lessons learned from DGTTF projects to identify kinds of activities that work best in addressing difficult democratic governance issues. The shifting pattern of demand for DGTTF funding and the evaluations of the activities that have been most successfully innovative should be used to inform discussions about the kinds of activities UNDP

can best support and promote. It is worth noting that the evaluation team's analysis of the project files and country studies found extensive variations by region in both of these areas. For example, the evaluation found very little demand for projects with South-South elements and, although the highest demand of all was for public administration projects in the country studies, these proved the least successful, albeit based on a very small sample of projects. These results should not necessarily be interpreted as a call for DGTTF and UNDP to focus on other activities; instead, more thought should be given as to how to make South-South support and public administration projects more effective.

These recommendations are in line with a UNDP/BDP business model presentation shown to the team (in a private communication) that includes the following reference to research and content development:

- Conduct analysis of data, case evidence and research findings to distil relevant lessons: DGTTF project evaluations would be an important source of lessons learned, especially from innovative approaches to democratic governance issues.
- Generate, based on research and analysis, innovative operational concepts aimed at widening UN/DP policy/programming options: the analysis of data from DGTTF lessons learned by the Policy Advisors and OGC would inform UNDP policy options.
- Develop, test and roll out tools and methodologies in focus areas to provide 'how to' guidance and ensure standards: OGC would have a key role in providing 'how to' guidance through Web sites, training programmes and reports.

- 15. DGTTF should be used to position UNDP as a supporter of innovation in its member countries.** DGTTF should be used to demonstrate to governments, civil society and donors that UNDP is an innovator in democratic governance, willing and able to test innovations that might result in breakthrough in seemingly intractable democratic governance problems. Using DGTTF, COs should take advantage of UNDP's good relations with government and perceived neutrality to test innovative approaches to particularly politically sensitive issues that other donors are less well positioned to address because of their perceived lack of impartiality. COs should be prepared to take what might be perceived to be short-term risks

in their relationships with governments in order to reduce the longer term risks associated with a failure to improve democratic governance.

Improving the quality of advice and support given to CO staff through PTLs and their staff and a more systematic mining of DGTTF experience will enhance UNDP's role as a successful innovator. Through the analysis of the impact of DGTTF projects, UNDP can position itself as the prime agency in the post-Paris Declaration era that continues to use small projects to test new approaches to difficult democratic governance issues. These approaches could then become incorporated into national programmes and the elements of the national programme drawn from DGTTF-sponsored innovation provide the basis for budget support benchmarks.

Although investing in innovative approaches that could succeed but might fail may make some COs feel that they have to take more risks than they are comfortable with, in reality not to take risks to advance democratic governance is the greatest risk of all. And it is well worth taking risks to improve governance. Paul Collier, in his recent book *The Bottom Billion*, has identified 'bad governance' as one of the traps into which countries with large numbers of the poorest people fall. It has proved extremely difficult for governments in these countries to take the steps needed to escape this trap. Many international studies of governance have shown governance to be improving at best marginally in some countries and deteriorating in others, many of them LDCs. UNDP has the opportunity to lead the way in the donor community to test new approaches to improving democratic governance through the adventurous use of DGTTF in partnership with good governance-minded counterparts in otherwise change-resistant governments, civil society representatives demanding a greater voice and better accountability, highly principled leaders in the legal and judicial sectors, and local communities seeking more influence in determining how the funds raised from them are to be spent.

The risk of not testing new approaches is that the 'bottom billion' will remain as such. Some COs that the team visited demonstrated a willingness to act entrepreneurially by testing innovations in democratic governance. In most cases the risk paid off and major programmes are now under way that will lead to improvements in democratic governance that should eventually result in reduced poverty; in the other cases, at least the CO and its partners learned more about the frontier of democratic governance in that country.

4.3. Improving communications strategy and outputs

16. Much more proactive assembly, analysis and dissemination of DGTTF project experience are very important. This recommendation follows from the complaints from some donors (about weak reporting of results) and some staff (that experiences have not been shared). The proposed evaluations of each project would provide the basis for the reporting and sharing of experiences. OGC should have principal responsibility for this knowledge management activity, working closely with New York policy and RB staff. Funds in the 2008 budget have been set aside for the Regional Service Centres to work on knowledge codification of DGTTF projects. The OGC Fellowship could be positioned to focus on DGTTF experience. More user-friendly Web sites should be set up to disseminate experiences of successful innovation as well those with which there have been problems.

Moreover, better use should be made of existing knowledge management networks for dissemination and exchange. The communication strategy proposed here is in line with the practice advocacy outlined in a BDP business model shared with the team (by email):

- Provide substantive and content leadership in UNDP corporate discussions and Inter-Agency coordination on practice issues: in this case the content leadership would be based on the experiences of innovation in democratic governance.
- Represent UNDP (and UN partner organizations) to advocate practice messages in the international development fora and discussions: again, DGTTF would be a unique source of information on tests of innovative approaches to democratic governance.
- Mobilize external partnerships behind UNDP initiatives: the far better reporting of results would help to mobilize more funds from the current donors and might encourage other donors to contribute.
- Design and implement, together with the Communications Office, communication strategies to promote internal practice coherence and advance UNDP key policy messages externally: stronger links would be established between BDP and DGTTF management and the Communications Office; communications on successful innovations will be very appealing.

Also, it is recommended that hard copies of the DGTTF Annual Report be distributed to and within the COs, with enough copies to be distributed to locally based donors and local governance institutions. The Democratic Governance Network could be used to invite stories from the field; perhaps prizes could be offered for the top three stories each year.

17. Donors would give even greater support to DGTTF if more of the projects were truly innovative, creating opportunities for scaling up and making breakthroughs in democratic governance, and if there was more reporting to the donors of the success of such projects. This recommendation links strategic positioning with the communications strategy. The donors contacted by the team said that although the Annual

“Issues related to knowledge management and dissemination should also take into account potential beneficiaries outside UNDP, in particular organizations, agencies and individuals on the ground.”

Reports have improved over time, there is still not enough information available about the effectiveness of the projects that their funding is supporting. In some cases parliamentary oversight committees in donor nations have complained about the lack of such information. These donors continue to believe, however, that DGTTF has an important role to play in testing innovative approaches to democratic governance issues, thus taking advantage of UNDP's good relations with government and its perceived neutrality. The reporting could consist of making the evaluation reports available to the donors, perhaps at the country level so as not to overwhelm their headquarters. Consideration should also be given to making the evaluation reports available online. DGTTF Annual Reports could include more case material on successfully innovate projects in addition to providing summaries of all projects, as it does now.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Evaluation of the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF)

1. Background

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advocates democratic governance for poverty reduction and human development. The Democratic Governance Practice Area is one of UNDP's priority areas of intervention⁴⁰ and its work, as expressed in the multi-year funding framework (MYFF)⁴¹, is organized along seven specific service lines:

1. SL 2.1: Policy Support for Democratic Governance
2. SL 2.2: Parliamentary Development
3. SL 2.3: Electoral Systems and Processes
4. SL 2.4: Justice and Human Rights
5. SL 2.5: E-governance and Access to Information
6. SL 2.6: Decentralization, Local Governance, and Urban/Rural Development
7. SL 2.7: Public Administration Reform and Anti-corruption

The Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) was created in 2001 as part of UNDP reform. It has four main objectives:

- i) **promoting thematic focus and enhancing substantive alignment** of UNDP's global, regional and country programmes around the Democratic Governance Practice Area;
- ii) **mobilizing funds** not available for regular (core) resources nor easily accessible at the country level, by making it simple for interested donors to contribute to thematic priorities in the area of democratic governance, either globally, regionally or in a specific country;

iii) **allowing rapid disbursement** of funds by responding to the immediate needs of Country Offices. DGTTF supports the process of simplification and harmonization, as specified in the UN reform, by using procedures such as the simplified Project Document Format without the need for additional documentation, separate approval processes, or special reporting;

iv) **promoting strategic initiatives** by providing Country Offices with a source of discretionary funds to explore innovative approaches, address issues in politically sensitive areas where the use of core funds may prove more problematic and slow, and which would otherwise not be the object of a programme intervention by UNDP with governments, civil society, and other donors and develop partnerships, by encouraging Country Offices, through the specific nature of the selected interventions, to pursue often unconventional alliances with the national counterparts, the donors, and civil society, and, hence, strengthen the coordination among these. Since 2005, and as a way of pushing forward the global governance agenda, the Allocation Commission has considered with particular attention projects that integrate the MYFF "Drivers for Development Effectiveness"⁴². This contributes to establishing UNDP as a voice on key issues and a coordinator of democratic governance initiatives. The DGTTF also functions as seed money opening up new avenues for resource mobilization.

Donors' contributions to DGTTF are made through the country, the regional, and the global windows. In the two first cases, contributions are made to a specific country or regional programme, and the recipient Country or Regional Office is responsible for managing the funds and reporting to the donor. In the case of the global window, 30 percent of the contributions are applied to global projects with the aim of strengthening the Democratic Governance Practice and the role of the Democratic Governance Group (DGG) as a provider of policy support

⁴⁰ The four other Practice Areas are Poverty Reduction, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Energy and Environment, and HIV/AIDS.

⁴¹ See: United Nations, *Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund: Second Multi-year Funding Framework, 2004-2007*, New York, 13 August 2003, DP/2003/32.

⁴² The six drivers are: i) building national capacities; ii) promoting national ownership; iii) advocating and fostering an enabling policy environment; iv) promoting gender equity; v) forging strategic partnerships; and vi) South-South cooperation.

to Country Offices. The remaining 70 percent is earmarked for projects at the country and regional levels. Originally, global contributions were untied but increasingly donor contributions have been earmarked.

DGTTF supports six service lines (2.2-2.7). In addition, the Thematic Trust Fund regulations establish the need to balance allocations in favor of least developed countries (LDCs), the African region, and low-income countries (LICs). Therefore, out of the 70 percent from the global window allocated to Country Offices, 60 percent is reserved for projects in the LDCs and Africa. An additional 10 percent is established in favor of LICs, while the remaining 30 percent is made available to all the other Country Offices.

The allocations to local projects from the global window are made annually and the management structure is aligned with the annual programming exercise. The Allocation Commission makes all major decisions including the guidelines, the assessment of project proposals, and the allocation of resources. The commission is chaired by the Democratic Governance Group Leader⁴³ and it is composed of the BDP Policy Support Coordinator, Governance Policy Advisors from headquarters and the Oslo Governance Centre, representatives from each of the Regional Bureaux and the Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships, in addition to the Trust Fund Coordinator and the Trust Fund Manager. The latter is responsible for the overall management of the fund. The Commission reviews both the former performance of the requesting offices and the quality of the proposals. In addition, policy advisors in the Sub-Regional Resource Facilities (SURF)/Regional Centres provide support to the assessment, formulation and the implementation of DGTTF-funded projects.

DGTTF relies on two mechanisms for oversight: i) the *Mid-term Reports* provided by those awarded project funds aimed at helping the project teams and the DGTTF manager make the necessary substantive and financial readjustments mid-course, and ii) the *Annual Project Reports*. The DGG produces annual reports to its donors and to the Executive Board on the progress of the fund and its potential results. In addition, Country Offices report on DGTTF through their annual MYFF report.

The DGTTF Manager is responsible for the overall management of the fund with the assistance of the DGTTF Coordinator and the Knowledge Services Assistant. The current management system is characterized by a high level of

manual procedures performed at the central level, such as individualized communications with advisors and Country Offices (receipt of documents, distribution of documents for review, financial approval letters, review of budgets, etc.) and uploading of project related documents to the online DGTTF database. This Web application is currently in the process of being reviewed and upgraded with the aim of reducing the paperwork and heavy administrative burden of managing the fund, mainly at the central level.

Since its inception, the global window has financed several global and regional initiatives and almost 500 projects at the country level. Yet to this date, there has been no systematic evaluation of the results and strategic relevance of the funding mechanism or the efficiency of its management processes—corporately or at the country level. In a time when DGTTF is growing, both in terms of supply and demand, the donor base is diversifying and UNDP has gained a certain experience in the management of the fund, the time has come to take stock and assess these issues. Consequently, in consultations with the Regional Bureaux, the Country Offices and the donors, the Democratic Governance Group has included this evaluation in its work plan for 2006-2007.

2. Purpose, objectives and scope

This evaluation is primarily a strategic, forward-looking assessment that is expected to provide valuable lessons and recommendations to the Allocation Commission and DGG in particular for positioning and improving the DGTTF mechanism in promoting democratic governance for human development. Secondly, the evaluation will inform the strategic positioning of the fund in the context of UN Reform. Finally, it will inform the development of a communication strategy on the fund, for instance to donors. The main objectives of the evaluation are to:

- i) assess the results of the fund over its initial five years of its existence, in particular to what extent it has achieved its objectives;
- ii) assess the relevance of the DGTTF approach and its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other similar funds within and outside of the UN system;
- iii) assess the efficiency of the DGTTF management processes (selection and allocation of resources and

⁴³ The Democratic Governance Group (DGG) is the unit in charge of the Democratic Governance Practice Area in the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP). The DGG Leader is its director and UNDP's highest official in the Democratic Governance Practice Area.

review, oversight and reporting on projects) for achieving the objectives of the fund; and

- iv) distil important lessons learned and identify areas for improving the results, the approach and processes of DGTTF in relation to strategic positioning; regulations and guidelines; project implementation; knowledge management; workload/division of labor for involved parties and review, oversight and reporting with the aim of fostering democratic governance.

The evaluation will focus on the approach and processes governing the global window of DGTTF as well as projects funded through this window, both at the global level and in the field.

Key evaluation questions:

- **Effectiveness**

To what extent has DGTTF overall achieved its main objectives? How? Is there evidence that the country projects have contributed to the thematic focus and alignment of UNDP's democratic governance agenda, in particular to agenda of the service lines? In what ways are the projects innovative? Which innovative approaches have proved to be most effective? Is there any evidence that DGTTF has contributed to enhancing issues prioritized in the 2005 and 2006 guidelines, such as gender mainstreaming and South-South cooperation? What type of internal and external problems have the projects faced and how have they coped with them? Is there evidence that the results extends beyond the individual projects? To what extent have they had a catalytic effect, substantially, financially and in terms of development and/or strengthening of partnerships? To what extent has DGTTF functioned as a vehicle for Country Offices to jumpstart projects in new areas and to mobilize additional non-core resources, i.e., to manage more strategic initiatives? To what extent has DGTTF supported in-country delivery, in particular of TRAC resources? How? At what expense?

- **Sustainability**

What measures have been taken to ensure the sustainability of the achievements of the projects? How have issues of ownership and participation of target groups/clients been addressed both in the formulation and implementation of projects? To what extent are the projects embedded in a

larger coherent strategy directed at enhancing democratic governance? Is there any evidence that the capacities at the individual, organizational and/or systems level have been strengthened through the projects? What should be done differently? Did the projects continue without further DGTTF funding? How do the experiences and lessons learned from projects at the country level feed into UNDP's analytical framework, policy making and programme design? How can DGTTF be used to strengthen knowledge management in UNDP? Which tools should be put in place to ensure codification and dissemination of knowledge from DGTTF?

- **Relevance and strategic positioning**

Does DGTTF have a clear, coherent and consistent set of objectives? Does the regulations and established guidelines adequately reflect the rationale behind DGTTF, in particular the broad goals of providing a supporting mechanism for corporate policy alignment and a flexible and quick funding alternative aimed at promoting strategic initiatives in the area of democratic governance? If yes, how has this been accomplished? If no, why?

To what extent have this framework and in particular the one-year timeframe been adequate for ensuring the use of the fund as a flexible funding tool promoting innovation and strategic partnerships? Would the implementation of the selected projects have been possible without DGTTF? What effect has this timeframe had on projects in terms of sustainability, quality and results? Is there a more appropriate criterion for allocating regional envelopes than the 60-30-10 rule?

In the context of UN Reform, how can UNDP best position DGTTF as an effective mechanism to support emerging needs in democratic governance vis-à-vis other similar funds within and outside the UN system?

What is the effect of additional earmarking of resources by donors? If this trend continues, how can DGTTF accommodate these donor demands and still be able to effectively deliver on its goals of providing an open, flexible and highly demand-driven mechanism to support innovations on the ground?

- **Efficiency of the DGTTF processes**

- a) **Selection , Allocation and Review Processes**

To what extent does the institutional and organizational architecture of the DGTTF mechanism facilitate the achievement of the objectives of DGTTF? How can the selection and allocation processes be enhanced to increase efficiency and results?

To what extent have there been adequate human, technical and physical resources to manage the processes efficiently? Have the processes been effective in developing quality projects and facilitating strategic choices? How? To what extent has the support of the different parties (Advisors in New York, Oslo and the Regions, Regional Bureaux, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery) in strengthening the proposals and their potential results been particularly beneficial for meeting the objectives of DGTTF?

- b) **Oversight and Reporting**

Are the established mechanisms sufficient to ensure oversight by BDP, both at the Global and Regional level, on the implementation and monitoring of DGTTF projects? Should a light feedback mechanism from beneficiaries of the projects (governance institutions, civil society, etc.) be elaborated? If yes, which?

What are the purposes of the tools established for oversight and reporting (Mid-term and Annual Project reports) and to what extent have these tools served their purposes? What other mechanisms for oversight and reporting should be put in place?

- Interviews, either in person or by telephone, of a broad spectrum of key informants, including primary beneficiaries, civil society representatives, government officials, UNDP Country Office staff, UNDP headquarter staff (the Trust Fund Management team and the UNDP advisors at the Bureau for Development Policies (BDP) and representatives from the Regional Bureaux and the Bureau for Resource Mobilization and Strategic Partnerships (BRSP) and donors;
- **Surveys** carried out on the relevant UNDP networks;
- **Country visits (5-7)** to evaluate projects funded by DGTTF. Given the scope of the exercise, and to facilitate the evaluation process, these countries will be selected based on the following criteria:
 - existence of a recent Country Evaluation Report and/or existence of outcome evaluation reports in a relevant area of democratic governance;
 - fair representation of regions, service lines, country groups (LDC, LIC and other, fragile states) and multi-year/one-year projects; and
 - sufficient experience in implementing DGTTF projects (good and bad practices).

Debriefing and briefing sessions will be organized at the start and end of each country visit. In each country, the evaluation team will be supported by a focal point from UNDP CO and an independent national consultant.

Analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative. Examples of good/best practice will be noted and comparative analysis made. Gender analysis and protection of vulnerable groups will be fully integrated at every stage and in all aspects of the evaluation, which will follow the “Standards for Evaluation in the UN System” developed by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) presented in Annex.

3. Evaluation Approach

The evaluation team will be asked to prepare an inception report detailing the methodology of the evaluation three (3) weeks into the consultancy. It is envisaged that the methodology will encompass a number of instruments including:

- **Desk study:** Collection and review of documentation such DGTTF regulations and guidelines, DGTTF Annual Reports, project documents, LPAC minutes, individual Annual Project reports, financial reports, country and outcome evaluations and materials produced as outputs of DGTTF-funded projects;

4. Products expected from the evaluation

The outputs of the evaluation will be:

- i) an inception report of no more than 2,500 words outlining the methodology of the evaluation and proposing a list of countries that should be visited by evaluation team, due three (3) weeks after the start of the evaluation;

- ii) an interim evaluation report on the relevance of the DGTTF approach and the efficiency of its management processes of no more than 20,000 words, excluding a two-page executive summary and annexes. The report should be submitted both in hard copy and electronic formats. The Report will
 - a) assess the relevance of the DGTTF approach and its strategic positioning vis-à-vis other similar funds within and outside of the UN system as well as the efficiency of its processes; b) draw lessons learned and c) suggest improvements for the future;
- iii) 5-7 country reports. These country reports will highlight the country context as well as the issues and challenges faced by the Country Office in the DGTTF project cycle. They will assess the performance of DGTTF projects in the countries and must present findings supported by evidence and clear recommendations; and
- iv) a consolidated, comprehensive evaluation report of no more than 40,000 words, excluding a three-page executive summary and annexes. The report should be submitted both in hard copy and electronic formats. The report will a) assess the results of DGTTF, the strategic relevance of the DGTTF approach and the efficiency of the DGTTF management processes as outlined above; b) draw lessons learned and c) suggest improvements for the future. The reports from the country evaluations will be attached as Annexes.

The evaluation report will guide the Allocation Commission and DGG in particular in the formulation of DGTTF guidelines outlining the approach and management arrangements for future editions of the fund. A management response matrix will be prepared, involving all members of the Allocation Commission. The country project evaluations will feed into the consolidated, comprehensive evaluation as well as the general knowledge management system of UNDP. A communication and dissemination strategy will be developed to ensure proper use of and advocacy around the information provided in the reports for communication with relevant parties, such as Head-quarter units, SURF/regional centres, Country Offices and donors.

⁴⁴ Includes representatives from the donors

5. Implementation arrangements

Evaluation team

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent evaluation team which will be identified by UNDP and composed of an Evaluation Team Leader and other consultants as specified in the inception report (both international consultants as well as national consultants contracted for country evaluations). Each member will perform in-depth country analysis for countries assigned to her/him by the Team Leader and prepare Country reports. The final reports will be prepared by the Team Leader in close collaboration with the other team members and in consultation with the Evaluation Office and the Task Manager. The reports will be subject to peer review by internal and external readers as outlined below. Differing views between the evaluation team, UNDP, partner-countries and other affected parties must be reflected in the reports. The reports must be approved by the Steering Committee to be deemed completed.

Management arrangements

The following management bodies will be put in place for the evaluation:

- An external **Advisory Board** composed of evaluators and experts in the area of democratic governance⁴⁴ that will assure and control the quality of the evaluation by:
 - reviewing and commenting on the Terms of Reference (TOR);
 - reviewing and commenting on the inception report; and
 - reviewing and commenting on the evaluation reports.
- A **Steering Committee** composed of representatives from each of the Regional Bureaux, BRSP, BCPR, the corps of Resident Representatives and BDP, which will overview the initial and final stages of the evaluation process. The Committee will:
 - approve the Terms of Reference (TOR) based on discussions with the evaluation team;
 - approve the inception report and list of countries to be visited by the evaluation team;

- discuss the findings of the final draft of the evaluation reports to ensure the TOR have been fulfilled;
 - approve the final evaluation reports; and
 - prepare and monitor a Management Response and an Action Plan based upon findings and recommendations of the evaluation
- A **Task Manager (DGG)**, who will overview all stages of the evaluation process, in particular:
 - review and comment on the Terms of Reference (TOR);
 - review and comment on the inception report received from the evaluation team and identify key informants;
 - discuss the findings of the first draft of the evaluation reports to ensure the TOR have been fulfilled;
 - prepare a communications strategy based on the content of the final consolidated evaluation report; and
 - facilitate the preparation and monitoring of the Management Response and the Action Plan.

The Task Manager can draw upon the members of the Steering Committee on an ad hoc basis to assist him/her with the oversight of the evaluation process.

Tentative time schedule

The exercise will be conducted in two phases, each focusing on different aspects of the evaluation as follows:

- i) **Phase 1 (Process):** Evaluation of the relevance of the DGTTF approach and the efficiency of its management processes: January to March 2007.

A draft interim evaluation report should be presented to the Steering Committee for comments three weeks prior to the submission of the final version of the interim report, which should be completed by the end of March 2007.

- ii) **Phase 2 (Results):** Evaluation of the results of DGTTF: April–December 2007.

This evaluation will be used to refine the content of the interim report mentioned above. A draft of the consolidated report should be presented to the Steering Committee for comments three weeks prior to the submission of the final integrated report, which should be completed by the end of December 2007.

Cost

The exercise of evaluation will be funded by DGTTF. The costs, including travel, DSA and fees for the evaluation team will be determined based upon UNDP's rules and regulations and in negotiation with the selected consultants.

ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY

The methodology was outlined in the Inception Report. It was adjusted following comments by the Steering Committee and the Advisory Panel.

The methodology and approach can be summarized as follows.

The evaluation team assessed the achievement of DGTTF's four main objectives:

1. promoting thematic focus and alignment;
2. mobilizing funds;
3. allowing rapid disbursement; and
4. promoting strategic initiatives.

in terms of the OECD/DAC criteria:

1. effectiveness;
2. sustainability;
3. relevance; and
4. efficiency.

by carrying out staff surveys, analysis of project files and financial records, country case studies, interviews with a wide range of stakeholders at their HQs, Regional Offices, Country Offices, including donors, governance institutions, civil society, independent in-country observers.

The evaluation team also traced the contribution and impact of 44 projects that were studied in greater detail in eight countries selected for country case studies. In this undertaking, the team sought to determine the effectiveness of the management processes through the analysis of locally available documentation and open, informal discussions with UNDP staff, donors, governance institutions, civil society and independent observers. The primary objective was to discover the extent to which DGTTF-funded projects have been catalytic in generating broader-based activities leading to improved democratic governance on a larger scale.

On the basis of experience of other evaluations of this kind (covering a major multi-lateral agency's support for improvements in governance around the world), the team believed that the most significant information on alignment, the value of DGTTF in mobilizing funds, the

effectiveness of DGTTF processes, and the success of the fund in promoting strategic initiatives would come from discussions with a wide range of stakeholders at the country level.

In line with the Terms of Reference (TOR), the methodology was based on the examination of a results chain where inputs (experts, workshops, equipment) result in outputs (studies completed, people trained) that in turn create outcomes (improved democratic governance, in this instance) leading to impact (progress towards the MDGs, poverty reduction). The methodology followed the OECD/DAC guidelines and was informed by the May 2006 document 'The Evaluation of Policy of UNDP, the United Nations Evaluations Group's Norms for Evaluation in the UN System', and, most of all, UNDP Evaluation Office's guidelines for Outcome Evaluators.

The team was also guided by the January 2007 Assessment of Development Results (ADR) by the UNDP Evaluation Office, which aims to answer two key questions particularly pertinent to this study:

- Is UNDP doing the right things?
- Is UNDP doing things right?

The methodology summarized in this report was discussed with staff from the UNDP Evaluation Office.

The TOR refers to assessing the results of DGTTF. However, the words 'outcome' and 'impact' are not used in the TOR. The results the TOR refers to are the achievement of the objectives of DGTTF. The team felt that to do this it had to examine country level DGTTF-funded projects to determine if anything happened beyond the completion of the project's intended outputs. This was because the critical objective of DGTTF was to foster innovation that might ('catalytically' in the language of DGTTF) lead to a major policy breakthrough or a scaled-up operation. So to the team, the intended outcome or impact of the hopefully innovative DGTTF at the CO level was in most cases a larger project or program supported by the government concerned, or another governance institution, that might lead to a major improvement in human rights, public administration efficiency, access to services by women and the poor, and so on. This is what is referred to as the 'impact' of the DGTTF project in the report; the most final result of the DGTTF project that it is reasonable for the team to assess.

In line with methodology, the team took the following steps (in particular in regards to the country studies, as discussed in greater detail below):

1. ascertain the status of the impact/outcome;
2. examine the factors affecting the impact/outcome;
3. assess the contribution of DGTTF; and
4. assess partnerships for changing the impact/outcome.

The data collection approach was more qualitative than quantitative since although the team sought to assess causality (more on that below) and reach conclusions that could be generalized, it was also interested in understanding processes, behaviours and conditions as perceived by UNDP staff, governance institutions, civil society, donors, final beneficiaries and independent observers. Further, DGTTF inputs are so small that it was difficult to isolate and quantify outcomes and impacts then generalize. The generalization comes instead from studies of all DGTTF projects in eight countries from many perspectives and through the analysis of DGTTF files, including the project files. Gender analysis and the protection of vulnerable groups were fully integrated into all aspects of this outcome evaluation.

The main questions asked under each of the key evaluation questions are listed in the TOR (effectiveness, sustainability, relevance and strategic positioning, and efficiency; see Annex 1). These questions helped to define the team's understanding of the key evaluation questions. Team members also developed some issues to be examined in the country studies on the basis of discussions with UNDP staff, donors, the survey of members of the DGP Network, and the analysis of the project files.

The methodology included semi-structured interviews personally and by phone, surveys, analysis of project files, focus group meetings and workshops. A wide range of stakeholders was covered, from UNDP staff at headquarters and in the field, staff from governance institutions and civil society in the field, some of them the intended beneficiaries of DGTTF-funded projects, and donors in the field as well as their headquarters.

The investigations covered the effectiveness of both the application, implementation and reporting processes associated with DGTTF and the success of DGTTF in achieving its objectives, ultimately positive development impact on the ground through improved democratic governance.

As identified by the evaluation team, the greatest challenges facing this evaluation were as follows:

- How to isolate the result⁴⁵ of funded projects from other activities also aiming to promote a positive development impact through improved democratic governance. Each DGTTF project is very small and aims at leverage rather than direct impact. Thus it is conceptually difficult precisely to measure the unique impact of DGTTF intervention.
- Related to the above, how to be sure that what DGTTF supports or supported would not have happened anyway, using funds from elsewhere in the UN system, another donor, or even the government concerned.
- Once the results of individual projects supported by DGTTF were identified, how to aggregate those findings so that the effectiveness of the fund as a whole could be evaluated.
- Looking to the future, how to assess the unique contribution that might be made by DGTTF alongside so many other democratic governance funds, both inside the UN system, and from donors, some of whom contribute to DGTTF.

In summary, it was very difficult to posit the counterfactual in this evaluation in a reasonably scientific or objective manner: controlled experiments or econometric studies filtering out other effects, exogenous factors or 'noise' are out of the question. The evaluation, and its methodology, necessarily had to rely heavily on in-depth semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders to trace the unique results of DGTTF-funded activities.

The attribution problem is not so severe in studying the effectiveness of the process. Once funds have been received, the processes under review are internal to UNDP (except for final government approval). The process's

⁴⁵ The term 'result' is used by the evaluation team to denote what might or should happen beyond the outputs achieved under the DGTTF project. Often in the evaluation literature 'outcome' and 'impact' are bracketed together; in other literature, 'impact' is beyond 'outcome' in the results chain. The point here is that it proved possible to evaluate if a DGTTF project results in a scaling up of the project or of a policy tested, but it was not possible to evaluate the result of that scaling up since too many other factors might also be responsible. Furthermore, almost none of even the earliest DGTTF projects has resulted in a scaling up that in turn has had time to generate final results such as lower poverty in rural areas or even better rural access to water brought about at least partly by empowered locally elected councils.

effectiveness could therefore be studied through interviews with participants in the process, mapping the process, and an analysis of the time taken to go through its various steps.

Similarly, there was no serious attribution problem in assessing the achievement of the 'alignment' objective. Again, staff can be interviewed to find out if their offices have been influenced to take various aspects of democratic governance more seriously, and in a more focused manner, DGTTF.

This was an unusual evaluation since it aimed to assess the results of a fund that operates through a large number of small activities throughout the world that, on their own, would not be expected to have a big development outcome or impact. (And, it should be noted, DGTTF funding is only a small fraction of UNDP's total funding for democratic governance.) Instead, the fund's main potential impact is likely to be achieved through leveraging follow-up activities based upon successful innovation. Although it was possible to at least find out if leverage has occurred, and even if that leverage had resulted in a beneficial development impact on a reasonably large scale, it was more difficult to devise indicators that measured successful leverage for the fund as a whole, or for particular service lines.

The country studies, surveys, and the analysis of DGTTF databases helped the team to assess the contribution of DGTTF in meeting the objectives set for DGTTF. The greater challenge was to measure the impact on a single DGTTF project in terms of development or even governance outcomes. Individual DGTTF projects range from \$40,000 to \$300,000. All have to be completed in one year. It was very difficult to isolate the impact of, for example (a real one), a single gender workshop on elections on improved governance in the country concerned, let alone a high level indicator such as MDGs, or the Transparency International's corruption perceptions index, or the Afro barometer.

What the evaluation team could do was trace the contribution of the project by studying the impact of the project in the country concerned from many points of view: UNDP staff, governance institutions, donors, civil society, and intended beneficiaries. Team members' discussions with all key stakeholders in each project at the country level provided important evidence of impact and contribution (and leverage—leading to other larger scale impacts). Thus it proved possible to say if the project initiated a process by which democratic governance has been or likely will be improved in the country concerned. This could be thought of as a logframe process with

DGTTF inputs, leading to certain outputs that in turn contributed to the achievement of certain outcomes which might be expected to lead to certain impacts. The evaluation team was also able to determine the extent to which these improvements may not have taken place without the innovation supported by DGTTF. Thus it was possible to conclude, for example, that the DGTTF-supported studies into the establishment of a senior executive service in Sierra Leone was important in improving governance by laying the groundwork for mainstreaming within the public service the reform activities now being carried out by donor-supported project implementation units. Additional DGTTF-supported work persuaded that country's Government at the highest level that the senior executive service should be set up and assuaged some of the doubts some donors had about the service. And finally, the service became an integral part of the Government's public-sector reform strategy.

In some instances the country studies showed that nothing resulted from the DGTTF project (which is not to say the project should not have been supported, an objective being to test new ideas); that the project would have taken place anyway; or that the activities following from the project would probably have taken place even without DGTTF intervention.

In almost all cases it was possible to carry out an assessment of the final and ultimate impact of the DGTTF project because democratic governance outcomes take such a long time to work their way through. First the one-year DGTTF project has to be completed, then something has to be implemented that builds upon the DGTTF initiative, then that project or policy has to be in place for long enough for it to show up as democratic governance outcome affecting people, institutions and processes. The team found it difficult to assess the extent to which events were moving in the right direction (or not).

The evaluation team examined outcomes from many perspectives. Its triangulation sought the views of HQ staff (and their views vary, with the policy specialists and the regions staff, for example, having different views on the selection criteria); Country Office staff (through the survey and the country case studies); donors (in country and at their HQs); and in-country governance institutions, civil society beneficiaries and independent observers. Thus the triangulation included documentary evidence, hard data and structured interviews.

To support the independent nature of this evaluation, the team used data from a variety of sources, not only UNDP,

and especially at the country level. Its members maintained a certain level of independence from Country Offices as well. No one from the Country Offices attended any of the non-UNDP meetings at the country level. In each country, the local consultant worked for the team, not UNDP—although, like the team, local consultants were hired by UNDP. The evaluation team met some independent observers not at all connected with any of the projects to provide some independent validation.

The evaluation looked into how DGTTF is aligned with corporate priorities. In this regard, one of the most important outcomes assessed was gender awareness and the promotion of gender equality in democratic governance institutions and processes. The team also examined the importance this cross-cutting UNDP theme in the selection of, and reporting on, projects. Many of the projects assessed in the country studies have a gender theme or gender awareness and promotion components. The evaluation also examined whether DGTTF projects follow another key corporate priority, the human rights–based approach.

The evaluation compared situations where DGTTF is a particularly important source of funding, because relatively fewer funds from UNDP and donors are available, with situations where DGTTF funding was very small compared with funds for other sources for democratic governance projects. The team also compared the incidence (and contribution) of projects in DGTTF service lines in countries with and without DGTTF funding. It compared the DGTTF database against the MYFF to establish if the DGTTF projects have been truly strategic, innovative, and explored sensitive but important areas, in particular in the eight case study countries.

A key part of this forward-looking evaluation was to relate the findings on effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and relevance to the UN and UNDP reforms, including the new strategic plan. Findings on the DGTTF processes were related to the processes being put in place under the common country programming process and the related processes for government approval of specific projects. The impact of redefinition of the service lines was also examined. The team explored issues such as these in discussions with UNDP staff at HQ and in the field, the donors supporting DGTTF, and UNDP's partners inside and outside government. But underlying all of this was the objective of obtaining a good assessment of the unique contribution of DGTTF to improving democratic governance outcomes. Are democratic governance outcomes better because of DGTTF? And if so, are there ways in

which DGTTF can be improved to have an even greater impact within the context of the reforms?

The tools used by the evaluation team were as follows:

Interviews with headquarters staff. The objective of these meetings was to seek the views of staff based in New York of the past effectiveness of DGTTF and ways in which the fund might change to become more effective in the future, especially in the context of the recommendations of the High Level Panel and the Management Review, as well as to gain an understanding of the role of these staff in DGTTF processes.

Staff at UNDP NY were asked a number of basic questions:

- What has been your experience of DGTTF?
- Has it achieved its objectives?
- What are the key issues with the fund?
- Do the original objectives still apply?
- How would you change DGTTF and the way in which it operates in the future, especially in the context of the High Level Panel and the Management Review?

The evaluation team's leader had meetings with the BDP director, the DGG director, the policy support coordinator for BDP, policy advisors in DGG and evaluations specialists. Meetings were also held with staff of the Democratic Governance Practice, the Regional Bureaux, the Bureau of Management, the Bureau for Resource Mobilization and Strategic Partnerships, and from some other trust funds, including UNDEF and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. And finally, meetings were held with present and past DGTTF practice managers.

Regional advisors and other key staff not based in New York or Washington were interviewed by phone. Some communicated their views by email.

Team-building workshop. The evaluation team assembled in New York in mid-April 2007 to review progress to date, clarify roles and responsibilities, prepare detailed plans, and to discuss the issues that had emerged on the basis of the headquarters interviews.

Reviews of major reports. The reviews were undertaken with three objectives in mind:

- to gain a better understanding of DGTTF, its procedures, and experience;

- to understand the larger context in which DGTTF now operates, and even more so, will operate in the future; and
- to gain an understanding of the population of DGTTF projects. (This will be supplemented by the later analysis of the project files.)

Reports reviewed included DGTTF regulations and guidelines (to assist in mapping the management processes); DGTTF Annual Reports (for basic background information on the fund, and to assist in assessing performance and identifying lesson learned); and the Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel, the UNDP Management Review, the Democratic Governance Strategic Plan, and the Review Study of Trust Funds Management (to gain an understanding of the context in which the Fund will operate in the future). Additional information was provided by the MYFF Cumulative Report 2004–2006, expenditure data for the Democratic Governance Practice Area 2004–2006, the results database (which aggregates Country Office reporting), Global Cooperation Framework III (BDP's core funding for the current period), BDP's Strategic Plan 2000, OGC evaluation of 1st phase, trust fund agreements, and annual reports and guidelines for other trust funds.

Review of DGTTF project files. The objective of this review was to generate information on the effectiveness of the projects; how effectiveness might vary by region and service line; and how performance and the kinds of activities, and their impact, have changed over time.

The Annual Project Reports (APRs) provide information on outputs relative to the intended outcomes of individual projects, reasons for progress below target (if this is the case), and updates on partnerships. APRs also discuss project performance and implementation issues, rate progress towards results, identify soft assistance not provided through projects or programmes, outline ways in which projects were innovative or catalytic, and summarize lessons learned. These data are assembled into a series of tables that summarize performance and lessons learned by region, service line and other key variables.

DGTTF files also yielded data on a number of applications relative to approved projects and on some process performance variables such as how quickly a project started once funding was secured and if all the funding was utilized.

Mapping the management processes. The objective of mapping DGTTF management processes was to provide the basis for exploring ways to address some of the

process-related problems raised by participants HQ, the Regional Offices and the Country Offices.

Online survey. The objective of this survey was to obtain the views and experiences of DGTTF among UNDP staff interested in democratic governance. The findings helped assist assessment of the fund's achievement of its objectives and the identification of typical problems either with the DGTTF processes or with the impact of the funded activities. The analysis of these data helped to identify the issues that became the focus of the country case studies.

In addition to being distributed through the DGP-Net, the questionnaire was sent to UNDP Resident Representatives and Deputy Resident Representatives, the staff members of the Democratic Governance Group of UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy and DGTTF focal points. The questionnaire included a small number of multiple choice questions related to the key evaluation questions, space under each question to elaborate on the answers, open space for the respondent to summarize their experiences of DGTTF and another one where they could 'tell stories' about their experience of DGTTF, negative or positive.

Interviews with staff from the Oslo Governance Centre (OGC). The objective of these interviews was to gain an understanding of OGC's role in promoting UNDP's thematic focus on democratic governance and its relationship with UNDP in New York, the regions and the Country Offices.

The team leader visited OGC to discuss with key staff the centre's role in support to UNDP in knowledge management and knowledge products; policy advice and technical support to the Country Offices; partnerships with other similar institutes; promoting capacity development; and advocacy and outreach. A visit with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was included during this trip.

Interviews with donors. The objective of the interviews with donors was to ascertain their views on the importance of DGTTF in the context of their own governance support operations and funding.

Two types of interviews took place. Interviews with headquarters staff of the donors contributing to DGTTF focused on why they support the fund to the level they do and how they view the effectiveness of the fund. How does DGTTF funding fit into their overall funding priorities, and why is this funding for democratic governance channelled through DGTTF? Under what circumstances would they increase their funding (especially given that the demand for funds from countries greatly exceeds the supply of funds)?

The second set of interviews took place during the country visits. Some of the same ground was covered, but in this case team members were also interested in the donors' views of the impact of the projects funded by DGTTF.

Interviews with key informants in eight countries.

The objective of the country visits was to prepare case studies providing information on the impact of DGTTF projects in terms of innovation, being a catalyst and mobilizing funds—and to discuss problems with the management processes from the point of view of the Country and Regional Offices. A local consultant was hired in each of the eight country case study countries to assist the international consultant.

In-country interviews were needed for the simple reason that they were the best way to obtain the views and experience of key informants, inside and outside UNDP, and in greater depth than possible through the survey. They were also needed because the data on impact in the APRs are both limited in scope and provided by one person, usually the person responsible for managing the implementation of the project. Semi-structured in-depth interviews with a wider range of stakeholders were required fully to trace the impacts and to assess if the project was truly innovative and catalytic, did mobilize additional funds, and indeed did have a positive longer term development impact.

ANNEX 3: DGTTF SURVEY

Purpose: The evaluation team conducted an online survey seeking to solicit UNDP staff views about the key questions of the evaluation in regard to DGTTF: effectiveness, sustainability, relevance, and efficiency. In addition, respondents were encouraged to share any observations or stories that might appropriately inform this evaluation.

Survey target group: The survey was sent to the following groups of UNDP staff:


- 582 UNDP staff that currently are or were DGTTF managers
- Approximately 1,500 UNDP staff via DGP-Net
- 258 Resident Representatives/Coordinators and Deputy Resident Representatives

Duration: 22 May to 15 June, 2007

Responses:

- Total started survey: 116
- Total completed survey: 114
 - 63 provided responses to the open-ended question 1: Feel free to say anything about DGTTF what would help make UNDP’s support for democratic governance more effective
 - 54 provided responses to the open-ended question 2: Share any ‘stories’ about DGTTF, good or bad, that point to lessons learned
- 75 percent of respondents work on democratic governance
- Senior UNDP management who completed the survey included 1 Resident Coordinator; 3 Resident Representatives; 2 Assistant Resident Coordinators; 8 Deputy Resident Coordinators; and 11 Assistant Resident Coordinators.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY RESPONSES



Note on abbreviations in chart: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; A&P = Asia and the Pacific; HQ = headquarters (UNDP NY); and AS = Arab States


DGTF SURVEY: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS

Number of respondents: 116


QUESTION	VERY MUCH SO	SOMEWHAT	NOT AT ALL	I DON'T KNOW	NOT APPLICABLE	OTHER	'OTHER' TEXT (note: the comments are presented verbatim, i.e., with no editing or changes at all)
Has DGTF helped to align country projects with UNDP's corporate democratic governance agenda?	62.9%	34.5%	2.6%	0%	0%	0%	—
Have DGTF projects supported innovation in your country/region or globally	64.7%	31.9%	3.5%	0%	0%	0%	—
Have DGTF projects helped the Country Office to persuade governance institutions to carry out projects they would not otherwise have supported?	42.2%	38.8%	8.6%	10.3%	0%	0%	—
Have DGTF projects been catalytic in mobilizing more funds from government, donors or the private sector for a scaled up project?	32.8%	48.3%	12.1%	0.9%	0%	6%	too early to comment; it is difficult to attribute this to a source of funds; projects have been catalytic at national and regional levels; resource mobilization depends on the success of individual projects; the amounts are too small to judge;
Have the achievements of DGTF projects been sustained by governance institutions, civil society, and other beneficiaries?	32%	55.2%	0.9%	0.9%	0%	11%	this was a UNDP internal project — CO allocated 200K to follow up on DGTF project recommendation; the CO integrates lessons learned/ achievements of DGTF into other projects; amount of resources is too small; too early to tell; project is expected to be sustained with government funds; National Police sustained the activities promoted by DGTF at community level;
Has DGTF been a valuable instrument for Country Offices/Regional Bureaux/HQ to push forward their democratic governance agenda?	63.8%	32.8%	3.5%	0%	0%	0%	—
Has DGTF been a valuable instrument for Country Offices/Regional Bureaux/HQ to initiate partnerships?	60.3%	28.5%	2.6%	8.6%	0%	0%	—
Are the objectives of DGTF clearly understood by UNDP staff?	47.4%	49.1%	3.50%	0%	0%	0%	—
Is the DGTF selection process efficient?	41.4%	40.5%	6.9%	11.2%	0%	0%	—
Is the disbursement of funds process efficient?	50%	34.5%	6.9%	8.6%	0%	0%	—
Has your office implemented all planned activities supported by DGTF with the timeframe given?	48.3%	33.6%	6%	0%	12.1%	0%	—
Have you profited from DGTF experiences of other Country Offices?	12.1%	37.9%	31.9%	0%	18.1%	0%	—
Have you shared your experiences with other Country Offices?	15.5%	47.4%	23.3%	0%	13.8%	0%	—

SURVEY RESULTS: QUESTIONS 1 - 4


1. Has the DGTTF helped to align country projects with UNDP's corporate democratic governance agenda?




2. Have the DGTTF projects supported innovation in your country/region or globally?



3. Have the DGTTF projects helped the Country Office to persuade governance institutions to carry out projects they would not otherwise have supported?




4. Have the DGTTF projects been catalytic in mobilizing more funds from government, donors or the private sector for a scaled up project?




SURVEY RESULTS: QUESTIONS 5 - 8


5. Have the achievements of the DGTTF projects been sustained by governance institutions, civil society, and other beneficiaries?




6. Has the DGTTF been a valuable instrument for Country Offices/Regional Bureaux/HQ to push forward their democratic governance agenda?



7. Has the DGTTF been a valuable instrument for Country Offices/Regional Bureaux/HQ to initiative partnerships?




8. Are the objectives of the DGTTF clearly understood by UNDP staff?




SURVEY RESULTS: QUESTIONS 9 - 12


9. Is the DGTTF selection process efficient?




10. Is the disbursement of funds process efficient?



11. Has your office implemented all planned activities supported by the DGTTF with the timeframe given?




12. Have you profited from the DGTTF experiences of other Country Offices?



SURVEY RESULTS: QUESTION 13

13. Have you shared your experiences with other Country Offices?



Open-ended question 1: Would you please share with us any “stories” about DGTTF, good and/or bad experience that point to lessons to be learned. [unedited responses]

1. The key challenge for us in Afghanistan was to ensure the delivery of this very strategic yet small in terms of funds project within the timeframe given. We had to go for several extension requests and colleagues in the HQ have been extremely understanding and supportive. As the result of the evaluation; assessment and awareness workshops the issues of gender have higher profile and greater attention. The CO now has established a crèche to facilitate the work life balance for staff and to encourage more females to apply with UNDP. The actual implementation of the recommendations is still to be undertaken and only then it would be possible to say more about the impact of the small fund on a large programme like the one in Afghanistan.
2. The Ministry of Finance asked us for support in the development of statistical indicators in the framework of fiscal decentralization. We drafted an EOI, sent it to DGTTF, but were able to confirm our support for the task already a couple of months later. We started to build partnership around the ideas and discovered that many other UN agencies would be interested in cooperating on the project. The project has started with DGTTF funding, four UN agencies are currently working on it, and a “joint programming initiative” is foreseen for the next stage.
3. One lesson learned is that partnership with local partners helps the utilization of the DGTTF resources within the given timeframe. In 2005, our DGTFF fund was for the establishment of fully-fledged civil society resource center in Mogadishu, the Somali capital. Some 8 months elapsed before we actually started the implementation of the project. However through use of local partner which have been selected through competitive resources, not only did we manage to achieve the establishment of the Centre, but also we did disburse 98 percent of the allocated funding. Another good lesson is the catalytic benefit of the DGTTF fund. For 2006, we received \$150,000 from DGTFF for constitutional dialogue, which we used to mobilize \$1,152,000 from donors, 10 times more funding.
4. The DGTTF has supported an initiative to establish and strengthen Transparency Citizen Commission in the western of Honduras. The process initiated by UNDP and the National Commissioner for Human Rights has increased the participation of the people in the social audit of the municipal budget and the delivery of the public services provided at local. At the same time the initiative supported by DGTTF has increased the accountability in the municipal authorities. This process has been continued by the National Commissioner of Human Rights in more than fifty municipalities in the country with the support of Denmark cooperation.

5. During an inter-political party dialogue on increasing women representation and participation in the leadership and governance structures of the parties, one party indicated that the chairmanship of the party was reserved for men because it is challenging. At the end of the session he felt the party needs to review that stance. At least, if follow up activities including intra-party dialogue leads to the changing of that stance to pave way for women to compete for the chairmanship of that party, DGTTF will surely share in this achievement.
6. I think that for a country that is considered a Net Contributing Country like Libya where 100 percent of UNDP programming is funded by government, at times, it is hard to find resources to advocate for and implement small-scale interventions that are at the core of UNDP priorities. DGTTF offers UNDP COs in NCCs the opportunity to take the initiative and approach counterparts to develop certain critical projects. For example, the Libya CO used the 2006 DGTTF to localize MDGs and strengthen decentralization systems. Through implementation of the project, a need was identified for greater a degree of comprehensiveness and coherence of data collected at local level. This initiative to localize MDGs drew attention to an issue that is related to monitoring development efforts in general and their impact at local level.
7. Our project, which focused on strengthening the capacities of the Justice administration, has resulted in the rehabilitation of the services of this Ministry. It has also served as an advocacy tool for and initiator of the activities of the National Programme for the Modernisation of the Justice Sector. Nevertheless, one of the key activities (strengthening the capacities of inspection of the administration) was not undertaken due to delays in the implementation of the project⁴⁶.
8. The interaction between the DGTTF manager and the Country Offices is excellent with information regularly exchanged. One would wish that at some point the various country experiences (good and bad) were compiled into a short readable booklet.
9. I participated in the dealing of a survey on the communication between national assembly and the civil society in Burkina Faso, 2003 financed by UNDP (I suppose DGTTF) the finding is lesson learned is the lack of communication between these entities. People don't really understand the leading role of a deputy.
10. Delays in the approval of ASLs. The auto responses are not efficiently followed up.
11. DGTTF's purpose, as we understand, is to promote innovations in democratic governance practice. In my opinion, it serves this purpose extremely well. It also helps building partnership and communication between CO, Regional Bureaus and Centres. Because during the proposal preparation and implementation of projects we exchange ideas a lot. Also information available on the Web helps us to see other countries' projects and progresses. Thanks to DGTTF team for maintaining very constructive Web site. However, more lively discussions on the lessons learned and experiences would be appreciated. Because of the nature of our work, we are bad in digging into passive information available online and also making efforts to contribute/enrich this network, i.e. we produce good lessons, but spend a little time to document them.
12. Sometimes I think the eligibility criteria for DGTTF can be too restrictive and hence block new innovative solutions, as in my experience it has been the case that if the CO has tried to apply some new thinking while still sticking to the main aim of DGTTF the proposal has not been approved with the explanation that it does not fit completely the criteria.
13. Many countries in Eastern and Southern Africa tend to look at DGTTF as a main funding project source instead of a catalyst for policy innovations or service delivery modalities. As a result DGTTF projects tend to be broad in scope and outputs relative to the one-year implementation period.
14. I think that it is a good thing to share the experience of local governance in Asia and Africa.
15. The project benefited a population of 600,000 (6) Administrative units with estimated 100,000 in each) in terms of providing the communities the

⁴⁶ Translated from French.

- rare opportunity to express their views and be able to influence local development activities, getting their interests incorporated in the planning of development in general, attaining improved good governance in their localities.
16. I don't have specific experience regarding DGTTF; however, the Democratic Governance Network has proved to be a good mean of bridging all Country Offices and an effective pool of sharing experiences and thoughts.
 17. I managed DGTTF in 2005, so not sure if the same rules & procedures would be applied. The biggest issue with DGTTF is while it encourage us to pursue innovative DG ideas, the timeframe given to spend money is very short - when you want to initiate something new, it needs 2 years to do so esp. DGTTF takes time until it is approved and to make a full start. By the time we did some research & analysis in the field (it was important as the area was new), only a few months left for implementation & get lessons learned.
 18. The Caribbean SIDS Democratic Dialogue Programme which was initially funded by DGTTF is now being considered by BCPR, RBLAC and BDP programme funding support. DGTTF provided the Barbados Office with the catalytic resources which that made this possible.
 19. The main issue is the time constraints. One year for project implementation is very difficult. The project duration should be a minimum of 1.5 years as project set up (recruitments in particular) take a minimum of 2 months.
 20. The seed money provided by DGTTF for our office in 2004-2005 to hold a Local Governance Forum has helped substantively in creating a bigger project with the national partner.
 21. Our partnership with UNDP on DGTTF trust fund helped in establishing partnership with the national police of Rwanda. A gender desk was set up with the national police to for rapid response to SGBv crimes. A toll free phone line was supported. this has helped to increase the number of reported cases to at least 6 per.
 22. There is a need to improve control over use of resources. The fact that resources are to be disbursed quickly might have negative consequences because offices will tend to spend the money quickly without taking into consideration the efficiency of the result achieved.
 23. Good experience; it helps pointed out specific problem related to governance issues. Bad experience: the time is very short.
 24. Good: With relatively small strategic investments through DGTTF, pilot initiatives are quick to be set up and implemented and, when properly identified and designed have a good potential to attract the attention and support from other development assistance entities, increasing the prospects for durable and sustainable impact. Condition is that initiatives need to be identified and selected in good and close collaboration with the relevant stakeholders.
 25. I received messages requesting information but they do not need the reason or the project that is needed.
 26. When Democratic Governance was instituted as a Practice in UNDP, India called it 'grandiose' and, added that when the British said 'you could either have good governance or self-government, but not both', India made its choice! India did not want external support for justice institutions. DGTTF support for Access to Justice was allowed since it was additional to committed TRAC support. That project then paved the way to a TRAC-funded project to strengthen the Access to Justice at the district level, and DFID came forward with an offer of USD 15 million. But for DGTTF India would have continued with the notion that external support to key governance institutions could infringe upon the sovereign domain of the state.
 27. The CO essentially built its Dem. Gov. portfolio with the DGTTF, starting w/ fiscal decentralization 2004; then security sector 2005 and finally women's political empowerment 2007. We now have three strands of programmatic intervention under our DG, each of which began with the seed funding of DGTTF. Before 2004 we had no specific/identifiable DG portfolio, except some local governance work. Thanks to DGTTF our CO pioneered work in security sector governance in Turkey in 2005-2006, resulting in a large government policy on EU human rights political criteria with a budget of \$3 million. This is the first time in the country security matters are taken up outside the framework of NATO!

28. UNDP Afghanistan uses DGTTF resources as seed money for initiating new and innovative projects. Support to Civil Service Commission, Capacity Building for Afghanistan Public Service, and Women empowerment (gender) projects are a good example. These projects have received full funding support from donors after they were initiated through DGTTF fund.
29. DGTTF has contributed to introduce and strengthen new model of alternative justice in Brazil such as community justice and restorative justice. These new models are now being expanded by the Court of Justice of Federal District, Porto Alegre and São Paulo.
30. DGTTF is a very dynamic and flexible instrument that promote key projects in the area of democratic governance. From a regional perspective, it has allowed to support strategic initiatives in governance supporting strengthening of democracy and conflict management, like in the cases of the regional projects in Latin America on Democratic Dialogue and Political Analysis and Prospective Scenarios. DGTTF has been essential in widening efforts to knowledge creation and sharing (Political Analysis Regional Network) and helping to get the support of bilateral donors.
31. In our case, the Governance Unit has benefited twice from DGTTF and the story can be qualified as “successful” since the national institution, the National Police has been the counterpart that has understood the objectives of the initiative (preventive approach of the sexual and domestic violence) and has institutionalized its activities and outcomes.
32. Some DGTTF donors (witness of the success in two projects), claimed UNDP doesn’t mention his contribution and commitments. UNDP mention the contribution of other donors under the direct project co-financing.
33. The period of one year is usually too short for implementation; implementing agencies take time to understand how UNDP operates.
34. Good: dinámica de trabajo, rápido impacto, continuidad y articulación de proyectos gestionados en las convocatorias del DGTTF
35. Because of the funded DGTTF project on EMBs support in Guinea Bissau, the country is now looking at the next elections processes with new approach based on the electoral cycle and it’s trying to reduce electoral costs. For the first time in the country, all electoral stakeholders gathered together to discuss and recommend changes on the system to reduce costs and improve procedures. For these reason, other donors are already in contact with UNDP to coordinate support for next elections. By providing space to focus on our host country’s priority governance areas, DGTTF projects have made it possible for our Country Office to maintain consistent support and be known as a key partner in the field of governance and democracy.
36. By providing space to focus on our host country’s priority governance areas, DGTTF projects have made it possible for our Country Office to maintain consistent support and be known as a key partner in the field of governance and democracy.
37. The early support given, through DGTTF funds, to our country electoral process allowed the government to adopt and realize the new “bulletin unique” for the country, and give necessary trainings to electoral actors on the field.
38. DGTTF has allowed us to work in the areas that are formerly considered as “politically sensitive” (e.g. local election, NGO involvement) by making our own funding available, which helped us a lot in convincing/ negotiating with the Government. Since these areas are typically opened up for UNDP intervention due to our political neutrality, other donors were not necessarily immediately accepted by the Government to participate, which is largely a reason why DGTTF did not at least in short-term leveraged other donors. However, donors showed lots of interest in following up on plans and results with UNDP, which very much helped to make donors realize strong niche of UNDP in this field.
39. DGTTF manager has always helpful answers to questions and over the months the speed of reaction to emails improved remarkably.
40. Our current DGTTF proposal is very innovative in the country in which we are implementing it. The formulation and LPAC process went very fast and effective, partly because the government knew it would receive funds. However, getting the project document approved and signed takes a long time because the highest-level government officials have to endorse it. This takes a long time. The advantage of this process is that once it is approved we are allowed

to go ahead with all our activities, and even continue the project with new funds in the next year. The disadvantage however is that there is not much time to implement the activities. So DGTTF was very useful to get buy-in into the process. On the other hand, however, our Country Office might be 'punished' next year for not spending all the funds.

41. DGTTF has funded projects in human rights based approach to programming which would otherwise have not been easily funded or even conceptualized. UNDP has also funded projects to enhance service delivery with impact on the vulnerable, the poor and women.
42. The Project Manager is quite efficient in responding the queries!! Congratulations!!
43. Well, as I said before, I hope to be able to share a story by end of December.
44. The one-year limit for funds can be an obstacle in countries where implementing partners can be slow as well as democratic change - ex human rights. For another project, DGTTF funds allowed UNDP to be a more prominent partner and mobilized funds from 11 partners for a joint project fighting corruption.
45. Given the short duration of projects it is essential to make that aspect clear to beneficiary institutions which more than often are not happy when our support comes to an end. It is important to target strategic results and not support routine activities.
46. Thanks to DGTTF we started a project on parliamentary development with our parliament and the fact that we could provide the money gave us credibility and power. The parliament was then very happy and added more money to the project to continue it.
47. The online system used for 2007 is excellent and efficient.
48. DGTTF has played a catalytic role, to induce local institutions to follow up with good practices. In Sri Lanka, the assistance to the Bribery Commission has helped to invite resource persons from the region to upgrade its activities.
49. The Samoa Multi-Country office covers 4 Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and had introduced a sub-regional approach to its DGTTF projects in Niue & Tokelau, which were based on ICT4D. This approach fostered a cohesive approach to using ICT as a

means of encouraging continued and enhanced communication between indigenous populations and their people living abroad (Taoga Niue Web site) and to the creation of a more politically savvy population in Tokelau through the Law Web site. Both are part of key priorities of the respective governments in supporting the principles of good governance of transparency, accountability & participation.

50. The DGTTF fund allowed UNDP Timor-Leste to launch a new project building the capacity of the Office of the president. DGTTF funds constituted seed money to start some activities. The Office of the President was very active and key in mobilizing additional resources for the project. It could be said that DGTTF allowed the CO to build a new partnership with the office of the president.
51. The direct discussion in Country with the donor contributing to the Fund has been instrumental to ensure approval of the proposal.
52. (five remarks:)
 - a) One advantage, sometimes disadvantage (see further) of DGTTF funds is that there is a deadline, both for approving the project document as well as spending the funds. This helps in speeding up decision-taking processes and has helped in my case, twice with getting a sensitive project approved faster (not that it was not a priority and would otherwise not have been approved, but it happened faster). However, sometimes this time pressure can have an adverse effect where there may arise an impression of 'donor-drivenness' because of the pressure to approve or spend before counterparts are fully 'ready'.
 - b) The fact that the funds must be spent within the calendar year, and must be for newly approved projects, is quite a serious restriction to the type of projects you can fund with DGTTF funding. The very nature of Governance projects is very often long-term, process oriented rather than fast action-oriented projects of less than one year; good governance projects will almost always be in areas that require behavioral changes and changes of the way decisions in society are taken, and a simple one-year project may not be able to achieve just that. My experience and also my approach to DGTTF projects has therefore been that the project is still a long-

term project but the TTF funding is used in the initial stage, after which TRAC or (Government) cost-sharing kicks in. However, a Country Office may not always be in the position of having sufficient TRAC or cost-sharing resources, resulting in a quick project focusing on 'quick wins' (which are very hard to find in true Governance processes). Furthermore, new governance projects often have a slow start and disbursements from the TTF funds do not go fast initially, leading to peak spending by the end of the year.

- c) Related to the previous point, DGTTF funds are often relatively small (although the ceiling is high, the actual allocation is often much lower, probably to give more offices a piece of the pie) which is another restriction on the type of projects that can be funded with DGTTF money (again, Governance projects often require a longer-term and more extensive (and therefore more expensive) approach than a one-year small project). The TTF funds are also not available for continuation activities of the approved project. I do appreciate the need for full disbursement and the risk of non-disbursement if higher amounts would be allowed; and a solution to that may be that left-over funds, rather than being carried over for the next year's allocation, be granted to grantees of that same year that have performed well in terms of spending. For example, 'my' project of 2006 utilized almost all DGTTF funding but this year we have to add (limited) TRAC resources that could have been used differently, whereas I might have applied for additional funding for the approved project in 2007 from TTF, if that restriction was not there.
- d) The fact that you can only submit 'small' projects will eventually lead to saturation; an office can simply not sustain the build up of many small projects over the years and will stop submitting proposals to the TTF. This may eventually become a problem for the TTF modus operandi
- e) The restriction of having a project approved by 28 February is also a limitation to the TTF functionality. For example, at this very moment I have a very good proposal/request from the Government on anti-corruption (designing a strategy and assisting in the setting up of a National Anti-Corruption Commission) but I have no fast funding. DGTTF would be the ideal funding modality

for this but I would have to wait until next year; I cannot start with TRAC funding (because TTF requires a specifically designed project document). A solution to this may be that TTF funding is approved a priori (in my example this year, possibly around October) but disbursed only after February next year; in the meantime the project can start with TRAC funding.

- 53. DGTTF, in spite of that fact that allocates small amount of money, has been very useful for starting projects in very sensitive fields of work and has allowed UNDP CO to position as leaders in some fields. DGTTF has been very important for Latin American COs for start working on violence prevention issues, in part thanks to DGTTF UNDP is one of the leader agencies (if not the leader) in that field.

Open-ended question 2: Feel free to say anything about DGTTF that would help us to suggest ways to make UNDP's support for democratic governance more effective in the future. [unedited responses]

- 1. The timing of allocations has to be made more flexible and perhaps happen a number of times a year. DGTTF should collaborate with other TTF funds, notably the CPR. There should be a bonus for joint approaches.
- 2. Flexibility in disbursement schedules; less demanding reporting requirements; and more help in helping find the technical assistance in the field of gender would be great help.
- 3. I would like to recommend in line with the other TTF that DGTTF be flexible in terms of yearly deadline. Sometimes because of various reasons (political agenda, weaknesses in absorptive capacities) some countries may not be able to meet the deadline in a DGTTF which is bound to finish by the fiscal year. In the same vein because of that, some key objectives may not be achieved or additional resources may not be mobilized.
- 4. Just more funds to be allocated.
- 5. It is a very efficient because flexible instrument to follow innovative ideas in a limited timeframe and financial frame. It is an excellent instrument to test ideas, build partnerships around them and either complete limited tasks quickly or lay the fundament for a broader scale project.

6. I think DGTTF should be made more flexible to give the CO more leverage on the use of these resources. A short concept paper outlining the broad areas of democratic governance the CO wants to engage in the given year should suffice, hence the need for detailed proposal, SURF comments etc should be abolished.
7. Approval process can be streamlined. Communications between the DGTTF staff and the UNDP staff at headquarters needs improvement.
8. DGTTF is an excellent instrument for innovative ideas and I would highly recommend continuing with this initiative. Great work!
9. Since my point of view DGTTF need to continue supporting strategic programmatic initiatives in governance, in the Country Offices.
10. Extension of the period for the usage of the funds that remain at the end of the year will be most desirable. This is more so as sometimes unforeseen circumstances make it difficult for planned activities to be carried i.e. use all the funds within the agreed timeframe.
11. Since DGTTF resources are expected to be spent during the calendar year, I wish funds could be transferred sometime in the 1st or 2nd week of January so as to allow more time for activities.
12. Nécessité d'allonger la durée des projets DGTTF (au moins deux ans) * Accroître les ressources DGTTF dont l'utilisation sur le terrain semble plus efficace * Le passage des projets DGTTF par les SURF ne semble pas très indiqué: cela ne simplifie pas les choses (il est souvent difficile de s'accorder avec le SURF pour sa participation à la réunion du Comité local d'examen des projets).
13. The amount of funding for each allocation could be re-examined and based on available funds increased given the importance accorded to good governance in most countries.
14. DGTTF has to define core indicators for democratic governance for monitoring. I realized National Assembly and the government took in account many recommendations of our study 3 to 6 months later.
15. The one-year timeframe can be rather short in certain instances.
16. We are obliged to deliver/spend all the money as of 31 December of the financial year. This puts a great pressure on project staff, especially in the case of 2006, the funds were disbursed in April, and we literally had 8 months to deliver the results.
17. DGTTF should become an instrument of true competition where the best proposals would get the funding and preferably funding of no less than \$100,000. Duration may also be extended up to 18 months.
18. The role of HQ and the Regional Service Centres in the approval process does not seem to be understood or appreciated by some COs. Very often the RSCs are bypassed until HQ refers back to the COs for RSCs comments. Further clarity of the approval process is required.
19. It is very important to share the experience of local governance in Africa.
20. I suggest that the relevant outcome that is designed in the UNDP strategic framework is "financial and human resources mobilized and allocated in support of decentralization and local governance in the rural and urban areas through improved efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. This initiative should continue to reach other areas so that its outreach the marginalized people.
21. Effective use of & good lessons from DGTTF would be useful for CO. Some CO managed DGTTF well to use it as a seed fund or experiment in the new area. And it should be used as a part of implement CPAP. Also, it may be good to encourage competition to access to funds (rather than limiting the number of proposal per CO - could be 2 or 3).
22. There should be more support for inter-agency initiatives which reflects the direction of UN System reforms. I would recommend the use of the 'PAF modality' used to support RC joint UN system programming as a funding mechanism for DGTTF projects.
23. Larger amounts allocated More innovative projects.
24. More exchange of best practices across UNDP COs would be very helpful.
25. The disbursement of funds after selection of projects should be done very quickly since this helps to move activities at the field very quickly and accessing results before the end of year.

26. Rather than a one-year period why don't you try a two-year period.
27. Extend period of execution for at least three additional months.
28. The main concept and operational modalities of DGTTF are good; the effectiveness depends highly on COs homework and level of results-based management.
29. to improve the communication in the network DGTTF, to develop tools, to think about regions and to facilitate others languages of communication in this network.
30. The time period permitted under DGTTF should be more flexible because it's impossible to complete any project in the months that remain in the year after funding is finalized. The involvement of BDP Advisors at the outset in conceiving an initiative with the COs is preferable to their involvement in quality control aspects during the review stage of Expressions of Interest. Quality can be judged by a small team in New York, but innovating in the field is where DGG advisors can be most catalytic.
31. Very frankly some response on the mid term reviews would be nice.
32. Processes that require changes institutional changes needs time to mature and consolidated. DGTTF should consider extending beyond one-year project execution period, and also consider a second round of financing of a project that has shown to produce good results.
33. Let the Country Offices participate in suggesting priorities on democratic governance, based on our experience.
34. I believe that part of the resources in DGTTF project funding should be dedicated to experience exchanges on different democratic governance initiatives among different RBx and COs.
35. Clarify (again) to Country Offices that these funds are intended to be for relatively small and catalytic initiatives, not to "top up" pre-existing projects with extra resources. Consider using a two-year option for some countries who want/need it.
36. Probably we would need to disseminate much more our good practices with other Country Offices and to exchange more with our Regional Office, SURF Panama, in order to profit more from the expertise and other good practices in Latin America.
37. Most projects in my region development during last 3 years, reveal a degree of sophistication that demonstrates the grasp of the mayor democratic governance challenges. The UNDP-BDP should make a bigger effort to socialize (know the results, good practices and projects contributions).
38. Debe mantener la calidad actual de eficiencia y eficacia.
39. All donors are supporting innovative programmes in governance [all innovative/pilot initiatives!!] and it is difficult to see the value added from this trust fund, especially when the grants are around US\$100 to US\$150,000. In large countries with big governance programmes applying for and managing funds like this—for such a small amounts of money—are not cost effective and the governments do not take UNDP seriously. NGOs come up with much larger amounts of resources and it is embarrassing for UNDP to present proposals for \$100 or \$150,000. You need to change the way you operate.
40. Grants need to be larger, otherwise simply not worth the administrative costs. Don't have the calendar year restriction as government approvals take a long time for projects. Finally, not sure that small amounts of money can really help innovation unless it were somehow much much easier to access and programme: the difficulties are both on the UNDP side and the government (how innovative are they willing to let UNDP be?).
41. It would be helpful to have a more sustainable approach of DGTTF: resources allocation based on 2-3 years planning.
42. I also would like to point out that the degree of such political sensitivity may vary from country to country. For example, one of the proposals that we submitted in the past related to court automation was identified as an entry point for us to go into justice reform. It was considered innovative in the specific country context and supported by the SURF expert, while it was apparently not well-understood at HQ and hence rejected. Ironically, after we pursued with core funding, two European donors (untraditional bilateral donors in Syria) committed good level of their co-funding as they understood the significant implication of the expected impact

- to a possible future broader intervention in the pro-poor reform process. This proposal could not have been so attractive if it came from another country. But the above incident indicates the significance in this particular country setting. I would like to stress the importance for BDP/SURF to identify such COs' efforts in seeking entry points for potential DGTTF funding.
43. The period covered shouldn't be only one year (in fact, it is always less than one year; the first quarter is usually the period of the fulfillment of the disbursement conditions) Because we work with Public institution and because of their weakness, it is, very often, difficult to respect the deadlines.
 44. Allow the DGTTF fund to run three months extra in the following year, since this will make up for the time lost in the first year for getting the document approved in countries where the government is still taking a lot of control over project approval.
 45. DGTTF has played an important role as a catalyser. COs should use it as funds for quick wins to demonstrate impact and take the responsibility to mobilize additional funding for roll out. Otherwise it will remain a nice pilot which would not lead to real development impact.
 46. A year duration for implementation is short and puts pressure on the limited government and other partners' capacities.
 47. Under DGTTF fast track projects are given priority but UNDP processes require involvement of other units and offices (example — issue of procurement) as well so the relevant units and offices should also be given adequate orientation to deal with DGTTF projects accordingly.
 48. DGTTF's one-year timeframe / '31 December' "expiration date" remains a challenge which, in certain situations, may tempt recipient Country Offices to let delivery/disbursement concerns preside over medium-/long-term impact considerations. A minimum two-year cycle would definitely be more realistic for projects addressing complex political/institutional issues whose roots plunge deeply into the socio-cultural fabric of societies, and such, are bound to elicit resistance, if not hostility. DGTTF projects do have the potential to act as catalysts for change, but more time/flexibility would definitely reinforce our chances of success in strengthening national ownership and mustering consensus among all state and non-state stakeholders concerned. A 'second-best' alternative would be to start the one-year period 'stop-watch' as from the actual receipt date of the ASL.
 49. The duration seems to be a problem in most cases.
 50. I would propose larger amounts to fewer countries each year. Yes the funding is meant to be catalytic seed funding, but in many cases it just falls short of what is really needed to make a noticeable impact in a short time (perhaps also the funding may be granted for 2 years — predictability in available funding over time is a huge and underestimated factor of success in sensitive programming areas).
 51. There is a problem with the timing allowed for preparation of TTF proposals. We usually have very little advance information and, even if we are only asked to convey 'expressions of interest', this does not leave the time to have a meaningful discussion with partners. Often, they accept a project just because it is extra money coming their way, but in this way we are acting contrary to the principles of national ownership. When there is ownership, then it is because we use the TTF to complement ongoing or planned activities where we are short of funds.
 52. Provide an explanation when you do not receive any funding, though the procedures are clear, the decision and allocation process is not transparent at all, when not funded you do not receive any justification but continue to receive messages non-stop with instructions that do not apply to the CO, very irritating. Late arrival of funds and rigid spending deadlines have given us problems with the government.
 53. The delivery of the funds is not at all efficient and seriously affects the implementation of the projects activities. The money arrive late and the request is to spend all of them before December without considering that in some countries summer means that all governmental institutions are closed/not working for two months. Moreover, in 2007, Ramadan will be in September and then Eid, which means more holidays and less time to implement the projects. I suggest an extension of the time until March at least.
 54. It may help to make some pilot work with some projects in order to "tune" or improve impact measurement.

55. The twelve-month implementation period is very short and sometimes seems impossible to meet. However, in the long run, it helps projects to focus and achieve their objectives. We support the mandatory inputs of the regional governance advisors on our EOLs & prodocs however, there is no subsequent involvement. I think it would be good for them to monitor progress, be involved and perhaps document best practices, if there, that they could disseminate and promote. What about follow-up? Can they follow-up?
56. I would suggest to maintain the one-year implementation for DGTTF. From a CO perspective, it could be sometimes difficult to comply with this requirement, but it gives the necessary push to get things done and formulate realistic projects and work plans.
57. 1) Since DGTTF projects are limited to operate within a year, planned outputs are normally scaled down which tend to affect the overall design and purpose of the project. if we encourage innovation and results, we should allow time for projects to mature (note: start-up time for new projects takes at least 3 months!) 2) fund allocation should be based on track record of co, and quality, relevance and innovativeness of proposal and NOT based on regional income classification. 3) DGTTF should fund projects that are NOT the 'business as usual' types. CO TRAC funds can handle these types of projects. DGTTF's niche should encourage creative and innovative designs that give premium to initiatives that (a) allow governance themes to interface with other themes (like peace, environment and poverty, gender, human rights, MDGs); (b) serve as a staging point for bigger programmes; (c) probe into un/underexplored territories/topics of governance such as interface of formal systems with indigenous/traditional governance practices.
58. Flexibility in the timeline, for example, submission timeline. Democratic Governance themes can sometimes be sensitive and would require additional time for discussions with Government and/or implementing agencies.
59. The rule to spend all funds within a financial year is total non-sense and does undermine sustainability. Taking the slow assignment of funds into account (mid year) it effectively leaves the COs with 6 months to rush the project through for the sake of spending all funds. The approach is counter productive and has nothing to do with contemporary development thinking and policy.
60. Implementation of projects supported by DGTTF are limited to one calendar year. In most cases by the time project documents are formulated, approved and then signed, start-up activities take place in second quarter and actual implementation may start in second and third quarters. The constraint of one calendar thus disrupts project activities and the achievement of results. In several cases notification to extend project duration were received very late in December or in January of the following year. It should be noted that new initiatives with new partners require enough lead time to establish and operationalize management arrangements, mobilization of stakeholders, etc.
61. Actually, I don't understand how, I mean, according to what criteria, the projects are selected. What an office considers a good project, innovative and necessary, is not considered by the Fund, or the Fund assigns only some scarce resources to the project... Funds should be assigned to cover whole budgets, in order to warranty complete financing.
62. Included in my remarks under Q14. In spite of the restrictions mentioned above I feel the TTF funds have very much benefited the programming in [my country] and indeed played a catalytic role in the sense that TRAC funding alone would not have been sufficient to initiate the type of projects that we now had, or would have required a longer time for resource mobilization from other donors (in a donor-scarce environment in the low/middle-income country where I operate).
63. The selection process of EOLs is very political - regional projects should not be selected for allocations — fund raising should continue in order to increase investment — HQ should monitor projects and SURF/RCs policy advisors should be accountable on DGTTF-funded projects.

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ANNEX 5: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

This section lists the names of individuals who provided information and observations to the evaluation team as it was preparing the report. They are grouped in sub-sections under the following broad categories: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) staff; UN staff; international donors; and country (for the eight country case studies).

Individuals are listed in alphabetical order per sub-section, which generally refers to their place of employment.

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4. Case studies

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ANNEX 6: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

Country case studies were a key part of the evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). The evaluation team reviewed and analysed DGTTF projects in eight countries: Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen.

This section contains summaries of the eight case studies, arranged alphabetically by country. The full text of the country case studies is available in a separate UNDP report.

1. Bhutan country study: Executive summary

Two of the four completed DGTTF projects are judged successful by the evaluators according to the fund's criteria of 'innovative, strategic and catalytic'. These two projects have made and are making a difference in Bhutan. While it was too soon to draw conclusions about the fifth project, Building the Election Commission (which had only just started when the evaluation was conducted), it seemed to hold great promise in contributing substantially in the critical period leading up to Bhutan's first election.

While DGTTF is not widely known in Bhutan outside the institutions where it has operated directly, the programme has made a difference where it has operated—and this is particularly the case for the Moving on Gender and the Performance Audit projects. As is the case in most countries under review, the track record of success in Bhutan is mixed. Two DGTTF projects, Public Access to Information and Strengthening Legislative Process, failed to measure up to expectations. Success is measured here in terms of outcomes and not outputs, and the outcomes relate exclusively to DGTTF criteria for project success, i.e., innovative, catalytic, strategic and sustainable.

Bhutan has 'won' all five DGTTF proposals so it has been both active and successful in its DGTTF applications. The 50 percent success rate in its projects is at odds with previously reported DGTTF global feedback suggesting reluctance on the part of local project and programme managers to admit failure, an acknowledgement that is a necessary precursor for programme improvement. The modest financial range of DGTTF projects is appropriate in Bhutan, where the overall UNDP programme is relatively small and where bilateral donors are not in a position to fund UNDP initiatives. UNDP Bhutan successfully applied for the Gender Thematic Trust Fund rather than DGTTF because the timing

The table below summarizes the activities and outcomes of the projects:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Strengthening Legislative Process (2003)	Legal framework for decentralized authority	Training and equipment	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$149,972	No	Only three months for implementation
Public Access to Information (2004)	Demonstrate benefits of ICT for rural people	Test rural ICT centre for use by locals	\$100,000	\$125,000	\$125,000	No	Project too ambitious for one-year DGTTF
Performance Auditing (2005)	Performance auditing implemented in government	Strengthening of Royal Audit Authority (RAA); draft performance audit manual	\$200,000	\$125,000	\$125,000	Follow-on TRAC to complete work	Performance auditing has taken hold
Moving on Gender (2006)	New National Commission for Women and Children (NCWC) well launched	NCWC strengthened; Gender plan for government; Political representation of women	\$200,000	\$175,000	\$175,000	No	Transformed the way Bhutan looks at women and children
Capacity Development of Election Commission (2007)	Enhanced capacity of the new election commission	Enhanced understanding of elections by women and youth		\$150,000		\$250,000 (TRAC) \$1 million (JICA)	Under way so could not be evaluated

Note on abbreviations in table: JICA = Japan International Cooperation Agency

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNER-SHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNER-SHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Strengthening Legislative Process (2003)	No	No	No	UN seen as neutral	No	National Assembly	No	No	No
Public Access to Information (2004)	Yes	No	Yes	None	No	Department of Information Technology	Yes	Yes	No
Performance Auditing (2005)	No	No	Yes	UNDP seen as source of global knowledge	No	Royal Audit Authority of Bhutan	No	No	No
Moving on Gender (2006)	Yes	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as source of global knowledge on gender	No	National Commission on Women and Children	Yes	Yes	Yes
Capacity Development of Election Commission (2007)	No	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner by election commission	Yes JICA	Election commission	Yes	Yes	Yes

was more convenient for this fund than for DGTTF. This demonstrates the critical nature of timing for all trust funds. With over 470 UN/UNDP trust funds, DGTTF is only one among several available options, and Country Offices will apply for the most timely trust fund.

In general, DGTTF has worked well for Bhutan. The five projects are in sync with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), the seven UNDP Democratic Governance Service Lines and the UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011. In sum, the DGTTF profile in Bhutan is on target, robust and has made a difference.

Other observations from respondents to the Bhutan country study:

- The one-year time limit for implementing DGTTF projects is unrealistic. It forces project managers to focus on disbursement at the expense of results. Options need to be explored for addressing this issue. Moreover, development of a DGTTF project typically takes as much time and effort as a much larger and longer-term TRAC project. The current process is neither efficient nor effective. Ways and

means should be explored of shortening and streamlining the application process.

- It would be preferable if DGTTF could become an open-call programme from the user's point of view because this would allow Country Offices to take advantage of critical windows of opportunity that do not fit into annual calls for DGTTF proposals. Governments would benefit from more clearly defined criteria as to what DGTTF is looking for in its projects. This would likely reduce the number of rejected projects and would reduce risk of failure of approved projects.
- There is no clear or effective policy or process for sharing DGTTF experience among UNDP Country Offices. This issue needs to be addressed since this is one of the important objectives of the programme. There needs to be a more professional, objective approach to evaluating DGTTF projects so that lessons are learned and shared among countries and regions. Currently there is reluctance in COs to admit failure and to use the experience to learn; thus the tendency to describe all projects as successes in the APR.

2. Bolivia country study: Executive summary

Bolivia is a country in almost permanent political ferment. The deep-seated source of political conflict is between residents of the relatively well-off eastern lowlands, which has substantial natural gas reserves, and the Altiplano, whose inhabitants are largely poor and indigenous. Recent political history has been particularly turbulent with six presidents between 2000 and 2006, two of whom were ousted. The current president is the first indigenous leader and he is seeking to amend the Constitution because he believes it is a necessary step to address the factors that make Bolivia one of the most inequitable countries in Latin America. Recent Human Development Reports show progress in health and education but not in income and jobs.

Bolivia is perhaps ideally suited to the small-scale nature of DGTTF because it has a relatively small population and is served by a small UNDP budget. Equally important, Bolivia has been and is going through a fundamental transition toward democratic governance. The Bolivia UNDP CO therefore welcomes DGTTF, wants it to continue and ideally to grow, and has suggestions for its development and strengthening.

Projects implemented in a political crisis are almost certain to experience delay and therefore may extend beyond the one-year DGTTF timeframe. In retrospect, the Coordination Unit for the Constituent Assembly was seen as an instrument of the party in power by other political parties and this seriously restricted its effectiveness. The major challenge in this period has been the high level of political instability in the country. This required UNDP to demonstrate creative flexibility in project implementation.

In such a context a second challenge has been to maintain close relationships with governmental authorities in charge of political affairs while building open relationships with key political and social actors. To rebuild confidence among the political actors was a key objective, and one that takes time and requires patience and creativity in project implementation.

Of the six DGTTF projects launched in Bolivia, all but one (Public Administration Observatory) had been completed at the time this evaluation took place. Three of the five completed projects are judged successful by the evaluators according to DGTTF criteria of 'innovative, strategic and catalytic'. These include the Constituent Assembly Preparation project (2004), the Consensus-building for the Constituent Assembly Process project (2005), and the

The table below summarizes the activities and outcomes of the six DGTTF projects to date in Bolivia:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Strengthening Political Participation of Women (2002)	Women councillors capacitated to play their role	Training of women councillors	\$125,000	\$125,000	No TRAC	Project failed due to problems in executing agency
Citizens against Corruption (2003)	Enhanced citizen networks to fight corruption	Equip participants to identify and lodge complaints about corruption	\$200,000	\$138,000	Part of larger government initiative. TRAC came in Year 2 to ensure continuity.	Project failed when anti-corruption agency was abolished
Constituent Assembly Preparation UCAC (2004)	Law drafted for operation of Constituent Assembly	Support activities to Constituent Assembly	\$200,000	\$100,000	Part of a larger government initiative. TRAC came in Year 2 to ensure continuity.	Law drafted two years after DGTTF project
Consensus-building for the Constituent Assembly Process (2005)	Political dialogue begun on constitutional amendment	Academics and citizen groups brought into the dialogue	\$200,000	\$100,000	No TRAC	Project established important dialogue with civil society
Local Governments toward MDGs (2006)	To improve MDG impact in the decentralization framework	MDG baseline established at local level for first time	\$250,000	\$90,000	TRAC came in Year 2 to ensure continuity	Project brought MDGs down to provincial level
Public Administration Observatory (2007)	Strengthen national policy evaluation	Citizen surveys on public services			Part of a larger government initiative. No TRAC.	Currently under way

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Strengthening Political Participation of Women (2002)	Somewhat, working with elected women	No	No	No	No	Partnered with Association of Women Councillors of Bolivia	Yes, focused on women politicians	Yes	No
Citizens against Corruption (2003)	Yes, first donor assistance to fight corruption	No	No	UNDP was first donor to assist in fighting corruption	No	Partnered with new anti-corruption secretary in the Ministry of the President	No	Yes, focused on civil society	Yes
Constituent Assembly Preparation UCAC (2004)	Yes, helped pave way for the Constituent Assembly law	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral body to assist with the new law	Led to other donors assistance	Partnered with Coordination Unit for the Constituent Assembly in the Ministry of the Presidency	Yes	Yes	Yes
Consensus-building for the Constituent Assembly Process (2005)	Yes, brought in academics and civil society to the constitutional dialogue	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as reliable body to introduce new participants to constitutional dialogue	Led to other donors assistance	Partnered with Coordination Unit for the Constituent Assembly in the Ministry of the Presidency	Yes	Yes	Yes
Local Governments toward MDGs (2006)	Yes localized MDGs for first time	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as MDG authority	Yes	Partnered with the nine departments in developing MDG baseline	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public Administration Observatory (2007)	Yes, involving civil society in policy evaluation	Yes	Yes	No	Other donors already involved	Partnered with the Ministry of the Presidency	Yes	Yes	Yes

Local Governments toward the MDGs project (2006). The two DGTTF projects that did not meet DGTTF expectations are the Strengthening Political Participation of Women (2002) and the Citizens against Corruption project (2003). Three successes out of five is a solid performance given Bolivia's turbulent political setting, where the environment can change suddenly for a donor initiative and potentially imperil it. While it is too soon to draw conclusions about the sixth project, it appears to hold promise.

The evaluation confirmed many CO staff's assertions that DGTTF's one-year implementation restriction is counter-productive. It compromises DGTTF projects that do not get under way until well into the calendar year by forcing a focus on disbursement rather than impact. As well, some DGTTF initiatives realistically are multi-year undertakings

and are bound to fail if shoehorned into a single year. In the case of Bolivia, four out of five projects went beyond one year.

Additionally, there needs to be a DGTTF strategy for sharing experiences or replicating successful initiatives among UNDP Country Offices. The Annual Project Reports (APRs) are not a valid evaluation instrument: there must be something more objective for a proper evaluation.

3. Kyrgyzstan country study: Executive summary

After becoming independent in 1991, Kyrgyzstan began taking steps toward establishing democracy and a market economy. In spite of significant difficulties during the initial years following independence, the country was a leader of political, social and economic reforms in the region. During the 1990s, several key sectors of Kyrgyz economy, such as services, construction, and agriculture, were privatized. In addition, social protection and pension systems were introduced and the first stage of reforms was introduced in the health sector. Another measure to ensure macroeconomic stability was land reform, which included the recognition of property rights.

The first Constitution, adopted in 1993, was fairly modern; however amendments to the Constitution were made in 1996 and 1998 that strengthened the president's power and weakened the role of the parliament. In 2003, a new Constitution transferred some power to the parliament but still retained a strong presidency.

Decentralization of state administration and development of local self-governance is a key objective of the administrative reforms in Kyrgyzstan that aim to improve governance. By the end of 2001 urban and rural municipalities had been formed and heads of local self-governments had been elected. In order to define long-term strategic priorities and speed up the reforms, the National Strategy on Decentralization and Development of Local Self-Governance (NSD) was adopted in 2002. The strategy, which was designed to last until 2010, covers six priorities: improving the legal system; increasing state support for local governance; economic and financial decentralization; establishing municipal services; social mobilization; and consolidation of civil society.

A total of five DGTFF projects were implemented in Kyrgyzstan in the 2002–2006 period:

1. Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament
2. Strengthening National Human Rights Defence System through the Establishment of the Ombudsman Institution in Kyrgyzstan
3. Building Capacity of Civil Servants and Local Administration
4. Promotion of Democratic Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic

5. Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction

These five DGTFF projects were assessed against four evaluation criteria: their effectiveness, sustainability, relevance and efficiency (A sixth DGTFF project in Kyrgyzstan, Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics, could not be fully reviewed as it has not been completed at the time research was conducted).

DGTFF funding has allowed Kyrgyzstan to further the democratic agenda with a series of important interventions in the following areas: access to justice and human rights; electoral assistance and processes; parliamentary development; and local governance. Given the unique position of UNDP and the fact that the funding is not as easily available as in other parts of the world with some donor agencies that typically work on democratic governance moving out of the country (e.g., CIDA and SIDA), DGTFF projects can make a considerable difference. At the same time, considering numerous other factors in play, it is more realistic to discuss the contribution of DGTFF to specific development outcomes than attributing them to DGTFF projects.

DGTFF projects in Kyrgyzstan are highly relevant for furthering the country's democratic development and for the democratic governance portfolio of this CO. The DGTFF projects are conceptualized according to specific needs and priorities of the country and are in line with current Country Office programming. In some cases, the relevance of DGTFF-funded interventions lay in the fact that no other donors were willing to work on a specific issue for various reasons. An example of this was the 2005 DGTFF project that provided support to the Central Election Commission (CEC) prior to the presidential and municipal elections in 2005. At that time, no other donors were willing to work with the CEC in the wake of widespread disappointment with highly flawed parliamentary elections. These donors worked only with civil society and UNDP was criticized for supporting the CEC instead of working with civil society.

In terms of timing and process, DGTFF projects in Kyrgyzstan are implemented within eight months on average. All project managers would, however, prefer to see DGTFF funds available in the CO at the beginning of January. The short project duration sometimes makes it difficult to achieve established objectives. Yet at the same time, the one-year timeframe has an advantage in the context of the volatility of the political situation because donors and implementers are not tied to a longer-term project that is no longer workable.

The table below summarizes the projects' activities and outcomes:

PROJECT	OUTCOMES	ACTIVITIES	IMPLEMEN- TATION	REQUESTED IN EOI FUNDING	RECEIVED	SPENT BY MID-TERM	FINAL EXPEND- ITURE	OTHER RESOURCES (TRAC, COST-SHARING)	STATUS/ COMMENTS
Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002)	Enhanced capacity of parliament to communicate with the public and to become a more transparent and accessible institution	Various capacity-building interventions (training, equipment, study tours)	6 months	\$105,000	\$165,000	\$40,048	\$162,859	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Support to the Institution of Ombudsman (2003)	A functioning ombudsman institution in accordance with international standards	Capacity-building through policy advice and study tours, provision of office equipment	9 months	\$240,000	\$140,000	\$26,422	\$140,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed; UNDP discontinued support to the ombudsman institution
Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration (2004)	Increased professional capacity of local civil servants	Establishment of two training centres, development of training materials and provision of equipment	6 months	\$140,000	\$60,000	\$18,964	\$60,000	Yes, additional funds provided by Hans Seidel Foundation; project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Promotion of Democratic Elections (2005)	More fair and transparent elections. Fewer irregularities observed during the electoral process.	Capacity-building provided to the Central Electoral Commission; voter education campaigns; establishment of a monitoring mechanism in the pre-election period	8 months	\$250,000	\$200,000	\$87,200	\$200,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Building Capacity of Local Self Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006)	Increased ability of the local authorities and populations to mitigate disasters	Capacity-building through training and facilitation of community-based responses	8 months	\$200,000	\$125,000	28,737	\$125,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Transparent municipal finance through improved local statistics (2007)	Enhanced ability of national and local government to allocate resources, especially toward most vulnerable groups and the least developed regions	Most activities for this project had not been implemented at the time of research	N/A	\$200,000	\$130,000	Ongoing	Ongoing	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Ongoing

It is difficult to determine the specific impact (if any) of DGTTF projects on the governance situation. DGTTF interventions are only one small part in a mosaic of a number of other variables. These include the (often volatile) political situation; the political will and commitment of beneficiaries and partners; work of other donors in the areas covered by DGTTF projects; and the projects' limited scope, both in financial terms and in their short duration. Even given these limitations, however, the evaluation team considers three out of six DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan to have been highly innovative (those implemented in 2002, 2003, and 2006). Their common characteristic is that they introduced a new approach to a critical democratic governance issue. Two of them, Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002) and Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006), have been sustainable and scaled up; in two cases (Support to the Institution of Ombudsman, from 2003, and Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics, from 2007), the projects were politically sensitive as well.

One problem is that the DGTTF cycle is not well-aligned with the CO cycle. The negotiations with the government for new projects are finalized in October while work plans are signed and approved in January. At the same time, the DGTTF schedule only invites expressions of interest (EOIs) in October. This requires the CO to return to the government with new projects and renegotiations. In addition, DGTTF projects are high in transaction costs; they require much preparation and reporting time and high levels of project staff involvement and management. The limited funding that DGTTF provides, coupled with no cost recovery, makes it impossible to carry out stand-alone DGTTF projects.

The accomplishments of four DGTTF-funded projects in Kyrgyzstan (out of five examined) have been sustained to various degrees by capacity-building and the scaling-up achieved through either 'national ownership' or other UNDP programming. The highest sustainability has been correlated to the highest buy-in on the part of the government and the relevance of the project in addressing the country's critical needs.

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002)	Yes. Innovative in addressing a politically sensitive area of transparency and public monitoring over branches of government in a neutral and non-threatening way of capacity-building.	Yes. Dutch, EC.	Yes. The project led to a larger project; set standards for the press service in the parliament; and facilitated public debate regarding human rights.	Yes. While several donors work with the parliament, UNDP's neutrality allowed for addressing the issue of transparency and public oversight.	Strengthened to a minimal degree	Very much so. With the parliament.	No	Yes	Indirectly. Through public awareness campaigns on the ombudsman institution.
Support to the Institution of Ombudsman (2003)	Very much so. Established an institution that has never existed in the country and that was extremely needed.	Not at all. UNDP withdrew support due to differences between UNDP and the ombudsman's views on its assistance.	To a limited degree. By inciting a public debate on roles and responsibilities of the Ombudsman's Institution.	Yes. Because of high sensitivities around the issues of human rights, other donors were reluctant to get involved.	Partially. OSCE.	Partially. With the government and the parliament.	No	Yes	Yes

Table continues on next page

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration (2004)	Partially. First step toward institutionalization of training for civil servants and elected officials on the local level.	To a limited degree. Renewed government's interest in revitalizing the training.	Partially. Project contributed to the enactment of a law on municipal service; encouraged volunteerism.	Partially. Other donors could have done this project. However, UNDP's local governance/ decentralization portfolio is highly regarded in the country (donors).	Yes. World Bank, DFID, Hans Seidel Foundation.	Very much so. Local government.	No	No	No
Promotion of Democratic Elections (2005)	To a limited degree. A component of this project was innovative (early warning for conflict prevention network). During this project, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) moved out of the presidential palace to a separate location.	Partially	To a limited degree	Very much so. UNDP's expertise in provision of electoral assistance. Other donors preferred to work with civil society.	To a limited degree	Very much so	Yes	Yes	Yes
Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006)	Very much so. By mainstreaming disaster management with local governance which was innovative not only for Kyrgyzstan, but for the entire region.	Yes. World Bank, other donors, Government.	Very much so. The government has now adapted the project's methodology to other parts of the country with support from other donors attracted by the success of the DGTTF-funded activities.	Yes. UNDP experience in local governance; a highly regarded expert in the disaster management in the CO.	Very much so. Swiss, World Bank.	Very much so. Local and national government.	No	Yes	No
Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics (2007)	Partially	N/A	N/A	Partially	Very much so. World Bank, ADB, TACIS Programme, DFID.	Very much so. Government (Ministry of Finance).	Yes	Yes	No

4. Mauritania country study: Executive summary

Mauritania is going through a critical transition to democratic governance. An attempted coup in June 2003 was followed by a successful one (by the army) in August 2005 and then by a democratic election in March 2007. UNDP's DGTTF played an important role in this transition by fostering a political dialogue at a time when there was none and by helping increase the participation of women in the political process. Mauritania is suited to the small-scale nature of DGTTF because the local UNDP programme is small (with a budget of just \$6.8 million from 2006–2008), and thus even \$100,000 has made a difference.

There have been four completed DGTTF projects in Mauritania. While DGTTF as such is not widely known in Mauritania outside the institutions where it has operated directly, the programme has an important place in the country's transition toward democratic governance. This is particularly the case for two of the projects: Strengthening Dialogue toward Reaching the MDGs and Women in Elections. The other two projects, Nationalization of MDGs and Strengthening Governance of Littoral Resources for

Reaching MDGs, also helped with the country's transition to democratic governance but did not meet DGTTF expectations. While it is too soon to draw conclusions about the fifth project, Strengthening Parliament (which has only just started), it holds great promise and should therefore make its own contribution in the larger DGTTF effort of helping Mauritania make the fundamental transition to democratic governance.

The Mauritanian experience proves that DGTTF can make a meaningful contribution toward the most sensitive and critical aspects of a country's transition toward democracy. This is particularly true in terms of creating space for political dialogue and advocating for more women politicians in an Islamic country.

None of the four projects was completed within the DGTTF-required year. The one-year time limit has the negative side effect of focusing valuable time and effort on disbursement at the expense of project results, impact and sustainability. The two projects that did not meet DGTTF expectations were completed in just four months. If they had a reasonable amount of implementation time they might have met DGTTF expectations.

The table below summarizes the projects' activities and outcomes:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Nationalization of MDGs (2003)	Nationalization of MDGs	Plan for nationalizing the MDGs	\$210,000	\$105,000	\$78,442	No	Project was sidelined by presidential election and an attempted coup
Strengthening Dialogue toward Reaching the MDGs (2004)	Creation of political dialogue among parties and civil society around achieving the MDGs	Series of workshops around country	\$223,200	\$143,385	\$123,916	Local bank and French government assistance	Created political dialogue in a tense period
Strengthening Governance of Littoral Resources for reaching MDGs (2005)	Raised awareness on issues of exploiting fisheries and oil	Series of workshops	\$210,000	\$210,000	\$161,387	No	Project implemented in the last four months of the year only
Women in Elections (2006)	Election law with women's quota and strengthening capacity of women candidates	Training of women candidates	\$250,000	\$175,000	\$161,670	UNICEF and UNFPA	More women elected than the official quota
Strengthening Parliament (2007)	Higher performing parliament	Capacity strengthening				French government assistance	Under way so cannot be evaluated

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Nationalization of MDGs (2003)	No	No	No	UN is architect of MDG concept	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strengthening Dialogue toward Reaching the MDGs (2004)	Created political dialogue among opposing parties at sensitive time	Yes from local bank & French assistance	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strengthening Governance of Littoral Resources for Reaching MDGs (2005)	Yes	No	No	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	No	No	No
Women in Elections (2006)	Yes	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner to work on elections	Yes, BCPR, UNFPA and UNICEF	Secretariat for Women	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strengthening Parliament (2007)	No	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner by parliament	No	Parliament	Yes	Yes	Yes

In sum, these projects overcame serious obstacles including a presidential election, an attempted coup and only four months for implementation. It was too ambitious for a DGTTF intervention. But it did succeed in integrating MDG perspective into the World Bank-led PRSP and in adjusting to some extent national statistics to reflect the MDGs. These are notable accomplishments for such a small and brief intervention.

Other observations from respondents to the Mauritania country study:

- The transaction cost of designing, negotiating and planning DGTTF projects is too great for the amount of money involved. The consensus among those interviewed in Mauritania is that the amount of time spent on DGTTF project development was as much as for a TRAC project. And, as noted previously, all four completed projects were unable to complete their work in the allotted DGTTF single year timeframe. They all required a rushed implementation strategy.
- The development of a DGTTF project takes as much time and effort as a much larger and longer-term TRAC project. The current process is neither efficient nor effective. It would also be preferable if COs were allowed to make their proposal at any point in the year to take advantage of critical windows of opportunity that do not fit into annual calls for DGTTF proposals. Options for shifting from a once a year to an upon-demand from the CO proposal process should be explored.
- In terms of evaluating DGTTF projects, it is worth noting that the Women in Elections project had an official independent evaluation carried out by a national gender consultant paid out of the DGTTF project budget. This is one way of approaching a proper assessment of DGTTF projects rather than relying on the Annual Project Reports (The report's recommendations ultimately were acted upon).

5. Mozambique country study: Executive summary

Mozambique has made progress in governance since 1992. The country has completed three general and presidential elections, held in 1994, 1999 and 2004, and two local elections (1998 and 2003), all of which the international community considered free and fair. Provincial assembly elections were scheduled for December 2007, in line with the 2004 Constitution.

Civil service capacity is constrained by small numbers, low education, and low morale resulting from poor remuneration. The state is thinly spread and has difficulty in delivering services and enforcing legislation in every district. Ancillary functions such as legal, accounting and audit services remain weak. Bureaucratic processes remain cumbersome despite some progress in registering new businesses.

In 2001, the Government of Mozambique approved its Global Strategy for the Public Sector Reform (PSR) aimed at enabling the public sector to promote socio-economic development and reduce absolute poverty. The PSR also aims to improve public servant pay and base promotions on performance, which will help to reduce incentives for corruption. Reforms taking place in municipalities and districts aim to increase public oversight, increase transparency and accountability to ensure efficient and effective service delivery, and enhance the capacity and competence of local institutions.

The series of three projects with a corruption theme (Accountability and Transparency, and the two judiciary projects) did move into politically sensitive areas. In fact, these areas were so sensitive that the government actually cancelled the planned second project, which would have supported provincial forums on transparency and corruption—and the government took that step shortly before parliamentary elections. These projects were innovative too. The forum brought to Mozambique insights from other countries and forced the government to realize that it, not others, had to take some critical and difficult decisions to tackle rising levels of corruption. The two judiciary projects encouraged the judiciary itself to take responsibility for its own problems and gave guidance on what the solutions might be. All of this was a step beyond the surveys of perceptions and experiences of corruption that had taken place and the generic anti-corruption strategies that had been prepared.

Developments in Mozambique also illustrate UNDP's struggle for a role in the era of direct budget support and sector-wide approaches (SWAp). Mozambique has long been a country characterized by SWAps: in agriculture, health and education, and more recently, public sector reform and public finance management. Mozambique was also one of the first countries to move towards a high incidence of direct budget support and to have a series of Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits through which the World Bank and other donors fund the implementation of the PRSP (called PARPA in Mozambique).

The table below summarizes the activities and outcomes of the national governance projects implemented through DGTTF:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Accountability in Public Sector (2 projects) (2002 and 2003)	Improved accountability and transparency in the civil service Forum and training of	journalists and magistrates	\$300,000	\$299,000	All	No	Second phase, provincial forums, not carried out
Court Integrity (2004)	Improved capacity of judicial sector to administer justice	National Assessment; National Integrity Meeting; Action Plan	\$100,000	\$100,000	All	No	Action plan still being prepared
Facilitation of Local Enterprise (2004)	Facilitating the development of enterprises	Equipment for 'one-stop shops' to improve services; microcredit for incubator firms		\$143,000			
Judicial Integrity (2005)	Strengthening transparency accountability in public sector	National assessment Anti-corruption plan for judiciary	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$124,000	No	Follow-up to court project
Service Delivery (2005)	Connecting government and citizens	Linking province to district to people on pilot basis		\$125,000	\$117,000	\$42,000 (TRAC)	

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNER-SHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Judicial Integrity (2005)	Workshop based on survey leading to action plan	Not yet	Potentially, could lead to action in judicial sector	Others could have funded this, but UNDP neutrality helped	Not directly; donors appreciated survey and workshop	Yes, very important: judges, prosecutors and court staff	No	No	Very much so
Service Delivery (2006)	Only in linking CMC and provinces	Not yet	Could be, but no interest shown yet	Not at all; others key players	Yes, with SDC and decentralization donors	Yes, with CMCs and provinces	No	Yes	No
Court Integrity (2004)	Yes. Two surveys carried out; and one national integrity meeting held; leading to national anti-corruption action plan	Yes; Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Portuguese	Potential; it could lead to action in the court system	Yes, UNDP neutrality helped, but others could have funded this	Yes, very important; Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Portuguese	Yes, very important; government, courts and police	Yes	Yes	Very much so
Accountability in Public Sector (2002 and 2003)	Yes. Public awareness on the importance of accountability and transparency	Not yet	It has that potential, but not yet	Others could have funded this	Yes, important; BDP and UNICRI assistance	Yes, Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), government, civil society organizations, and CFJJ	No	Yes	Yes
Facilitation (2004)	Yes, very important; public awareness about ICTs and their potential	Yes; but not sufficient to implement fully the project	It could, but no interest shown yet	Yes, others could have funded the project, but UNDP helped	Yes, very important; UNDP, UNIDO, and the Italian government	No, this project is not directly related to governance	No	Yes	No
CSOs Capacity (2007)	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes, others could have funded this project, but UNDP helped	N/A	N/A	No	Very much so	No

The management of the Country Office, although very supportive of DGTTF, complained about the high administrative costs associated with the fund, in particular in applying for the fund. Each DGTTF project required, in the views of the staff, a lengthy project document, even though only a simplified format of the standard UNDP document is required. Procurement associated with projects is time-consuming in two ways: taking a lot of staff time and taking a long time.

Donors also complained that UNDP has failed to use its good relations with government to (at least occasionally) push critical but unpopular policy issues. UNDP seems more interested, they say, in maintaining those good relations than risking them in order to encourage difficult but necessary courses of action, especially in the governance arena.

This case also shows that at least in this CO one of DGTTF's objectives now seems redundant. The DGTTF was not needed to align staff around UNDP's democratic governance theme. Not only the current but also the past country strategy are very democratic governance-oriented.

Evidence from this country study, on the other hand, indicates that the most appealing feature of DGTTF is that it is a fund that can be accessed quite quickly to take advantage of opportunities to make breakthroughs in advancing democratic governance, and by doing so overcome the complaints about administrative burdens. The TRAC funding and three-year programmes do not seem to have had this flexibility. Whatever the administrative costs of applying for and managing DGTTF funds—and they may be as high as for a long-term project—staff have applied for the funds each year.

6. The Philippines country study: Executive summary

In the Philippines, two completed DGTTF projects are judged successful and two partially successful by the evaluators according to the criteria of 'innovative, strategic and catalytic'. While it is too soon to draw conclusions about the fifth project, CALL2015 (which had only just started when the evaluation took place), it appeared to hold great promise in contributing to the larger DGTTF effort of improving local efforts to help reach the MDGs.

The two projects judged as having been successful are Local Gains for the MDGs and Meet the MDGs. The methodology used in these DGTTF projects is already being shared regionally, and in the view of the evaluators the projects should become a UNDP global model for how localities can realize the MDGs.

All five projects are in sync with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), the Key Results UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011 and the seven UNDP Democratic Governance Service Lines. But the UNDP CO has recently made human rights the focus of its efforts, so it is not clear where this leaves the office's governance efforts (including those supported by DGTTF) for the future.

The projects experienced a series of UNDP administrative problems including staff turnover, contracting problems and disbursement problems—all of which led to serious delays, with the result that some of the unspent DGTTF

budget had to be returned to UNDP NY. The lesson learned from such developments is that UNDP should provide the appropriate administrative machinery to help ensure the success of rapid disbursement-programmes such as DGTTF.

The benefits were sadly abbreviated because UNDP did not approve follow-on projects to continue voter education into the critical period leading up to the 2004 election and beyond. The Voter Education project was complicated further by the fact that it was intertwined with a prior UNDP TRAC project that continued during the DGTTF project. Therefore, it is difficult to separate out and define clearly the value-added of the DGTTF project.

This experience is example of the close relationship between TRAC projects and two DGTTF projects in the Philippines. Most often the DGTTF project fits into a planned or existing TRAC project. This is logical since UNDP has invested time and effort in building a relationship with a given government agency and it is therefore easier to gain DGTTF agreement than by starting from scratch with a new government agency. Sometimes the DGTTF project is followed by a TRAC project either because funds are required to finish it off or because the DGTTF project has identified a new follow-on opportunity.

Generally speaking, the DGTTF projects have been useful in the Philippines. In making the MDGs understandable and measurable, they have built an unprecedented consensus around accountable and deliverable action plans for MDG achievement. The two completed MGD

The table below summarizes the DGTTF projects' activities and outcomes:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Justice for the Disadvantaged (2002)	Justice baseline studies and performance indicators	Surveys and studies	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$94,257	\$30,000 (TRAC) \$70,000 (third party)	Only four months to implement
Voter Education (2003)	Voter education leading up to election	Voter education modules and study of voter behaviour	\$150,000	\$75,000	\$75,000	\$70,000 (TRAC)	DGTTF follow-on proposal turned down
Local Gains for the MDGs (2005)	Localizing MDG achievement to city level	Mainstream MDGs in city plans	\$300,000	\$162,000	\$162,000	UN-HABITAT	Innovative conceptual approach for cities to reach MDGs
Meet the MDGs (2006)	Local governments equipped to overcome obstacles to achieve MDGs	Hazards, vulnerability and risk assessments in cities	\$90,000	\$90,000	\$89,387	UN-HABITAT, UNESCAP, UNICEF, UNAIDS and UNIFEM	Very important concept in hazard-prone country
CALL 2015 (2007)	Citizen involvement and local leadership for MDGs			\$80,000			

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNER-SHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Justice for the Disadvantaged (2002)	Yes	No	No	UN is architect of MDG concept	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Voter Education (2003)	Created political dialogue among opposing parties at sensitive time		Yes	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
Local Gains for the MDGs (2005)	Yes	No	No	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	No	No	No
Meet the MDGs (2006)	Yes	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner to work on elections	Yes, BCPR, UNFPA and UNICEF	Secretariat for Women	Yes	Yes	Yes
CALL 2015 (2007)	No	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner by parliament	No	Parliament	Yes	Yes	Yes

projects and the third under way now provide an excellent template that should be applicable broadly across other countries and regions and indeed, globally. The first step in the process is developing a clearly measurable MDG baseline. Second, a gaps analysis between current practices and MDG goals is completed at the local city level. Third, an action plan is developed for meeting the MDGs again at the city level with citizens playing an active role in holding local government accountable.

This three-stage process for planning the attainment of MDG goals at the local level is a remarkable success and every effort should be made to communicate the effectiveness of this process and to encourage its adoption and replication in other UNDP/UN-HABITAT countries (either as part of the DGTTF or, if not possible, then through another mechanism).

Other observations from respondents to the Philippines country study:

- DGTTF's one-year implementation restriction is counter-productive in that it compromises DGTTF projects that do not get under way until well into the calendar year by forcing a focus on disbursement rather than impact. As well, the scope and scale of some DGTTF initiatives makes them multi-year undertakings and such DGTTF projects are bound to fail if shoehorned into a single year.

- Timing is critical where UNDP wants to be innovative, strategic and catalytic, as in DGTTF. The fixed timing of the annual DGTTF call for proposals compromises its utility. Country Offices miss opportunities unless they can draw funding from an existing TRAC project and if they can then there is no need for DGTTF as a programme. An open call programme with more stringent review of projects based on a more comprehensive evaluation of the factors most pertinent to project success is a possible solution.
- The current 10-step DGTTF application process and accompanying negotiations with the recipient government is heavy in transaction costs for the relatively small amount of money in question. The consensus among programme officers is that a DGTTF project takes as much front-end effort as a TRAC project. It would be helpful if this process could be streamlined and simplified. The transaction cost of designing, negotiating and planning DGTTF projects is too great for the amount of money involved.

7. Sierra Leone country study: Executive summary

Sierra Leone's 10-year conflict devastated much of the country and brought great suffering to its people. It resulted in the displacement of more than half the population, disrupted economic activity and destroyed much of the infrastructure. The conflict is largely responsible for Sierra Leone's standing as 176th out of 177 countries in the 2006 Human Development Report.

The causes of the conflict were many and complex, with origins well before the actual conflict itself. They lie in a mix of bad governance, denial of fundamental human rights, economic mismanagement and social exclusion, including the marginalization of youth. The diversion and misuse of diamonds, rutile and other resources exacerbated these problems. All these factors, together with instability in neighbouring states, contributed to the collapse of national institutions and services, the breakdown of state security and the misappropriation of government resources—thereby causing the impoverishment of rural populations and urban dwellers alike.

Since the end of the conflict in 2002, there has been significant progress towards consolidation of peace and recovery in the country. Civil authority has been restored

throughout the country, two successive presidential and parliamentary elections have been peacefully held and over 543,000 displaced persons have returned to their home areas and begun the process of rebuilding their lives.

DGTTF is alive and well in the UNDP Sierra Leone Country Office. All five DGTTF proposals were approved; four of the projects are completed and one was under way as this evaluation was being conducted.

The DGTTF has made a difference in Sierra Leone's transition to democratic governance with its four completed projects and one new project under way. Three completed projects are judged successful by the evaluators according to DGTTF criteria of 'innovative, strategic and catalytic'. These projects have made and are making a difference in Sierra Leone. A fourth project is judged not to have met DGTTF expectations. While it is too soon to draw conclusions about the fifth project, Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission (which has only just started), it holds great promise and should therefore make its own contribution in the larger DGTTF effort of helping Sierra Leone make the transition to democratic governance.

While DGTTF is not widely known in Sierra Leone outside the institutions where it has operated directly, the programme has an important place in the country's transition toward democratic governance. This is particularly the

The table below summarizes the projects' activities and outcomes:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Practice Team on Analysis on Governance (2002)	Governance plan for Sierra Leone and establishment of governance unit at UNDP CO	Regular meetings with stakeholders to discuss governance plan	\$348,200	\$348,200	\$255,547	No TRAC	Success despite a politically tense and potentially dangerous national political situation
Support to Decentralization (2003)	Law on government decentralization	National consultations	\$90,000	\$90,000	\$89,387	No TRAC	Judged the best local government law in the sub-region
Creation of Senior Executive Service (2005)	Project failed; no executive service created	Training of senior officials	\$225,000	\$225,000	\$224,605	No TRAC	Project failed due to differences among participating donors: World Bank, DFID and EU
Post-conflict Gender Legislation (2006)	Four laws pursuant to CEDAW on women's rights	Build capacity of judiciary and strengthening of Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$112,889	No TRAC	UNIFEM and UNICEF participated in project
Strengthening the Human Rights Commission (2007)	Strengthening of this new institution	Training and equipment				No TRAC	This new institution is critical to addressing violations of human rights dating from the civil war

Note on abbreviation in table: CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

The table below summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Practice Team on Analysis on Governance (2002)	Created governance plan and established UNDP governance unit	Donors contributed to governance reform in subsequent years	Established plan for government and donor action for the years ahead	UNDP seen as neutral convenor of stakeholders	Donors participated in discussions	Involved key government institutions	Yes	Yes	Yes
Support to Decentralization (2003)	Yes, first donor assistance for decentralization	Yes	Yes	UNDP was first donor to assist when other donors were not interested	No	Close partnership with Ministry of Local Government and Community Development	No	Yes, focused on civil society	Yes
Creation of Senior Executive Service (2005)	No	No	No	No	No	Partnered with Presidential Commission on Reform of the Civil Service	Yes	No	No
Post-conflict Gender Legislation (2006)	Yes, raised awareness on discrimination against women	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as body to implement CEDAW	UNIFEM and UNICEF partnered in the project	Partnered with Human Rights Parliamentary Committee	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strengthening the Human Rights Commission (2007)	No	Not yet	Not yet	UNDP previously involved with same client	Not yet	Partnered with the new Human Rights Commission	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note on abbreviation in table: CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

case for three DGTTF projects: Practice Team on Analysis on Governance, Post-conflict Gender Legislation and Support to Decentralization. Together with the 2007 DGTTF project (Strengthening the National Human Rights Commission), these three projects are all helping the country in its transition to democratic governance.

Other observations from respondents to the Sierra Leone country study:

- Timing is critical where UNDP wants to be innovative, strategic and catalytic, as in DGTTF. The fixed timing of the annual DGTTF call for proposals compromises its utility, however. DGTTF projects should be careful about the nature and scope of donor collaboration. In addition, DGTTF proposals must also be carefully reviewed for their scope to ensure that they are feasible in the one-year time-frame. DGTTF is slotted into an annual call for

proposals by UNDP NY. It would be preferable if COs were allowed to make their proposal at any point in the year.

- Often there is a close and complex relationship between DGTTF and TRAC projects that can differ from project to project. This issue can benefit from analysis and recommendations to clarify what kinds of relationships are constructive and acceptable under DGTTF guidelines and which are not.

8. Yemen country study: Executive summary

The Republic of Yemen was formed in 1990 from two territories (the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) with distinct political orientations. A new constitution was approved in a national referendum; most restrictions on freedom of association, expression, and movement were lifted; and a general amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles was granted. In short, democratization and good governance were seen as prerequisites for the unification process, domestic politics, as well as international recognition and support from the international community.

These important developments notwithstanding, the issue of democratic governance in Yemen is crucial given the current poverty and corruption indicators. A greater degree of awareness and policy planning is required to help prevent the economic, social and political challenges from leading to further instability and crisis. Donors and other stakeholders continue to be as engaged as possible even though the government considers some of the important governance domains as internal politics that do not need to be publicized or embedded in the system.

This section examines four national governance projects implemented through DGTTF:

1. Decentralization and Local Governance
2. Modernization of Justice Sector (two projects)
3. Modernization and Strengthening Capacities of Legislative Bodies

Each of Yemen's DGTTF-funded projects has been both innovative and catalytic. The Decentralization and Local Governance project began a process that has resulted in capacity-building, the preparation of a national decentralization strategy based on the lessons learned, and support for decentralization from a number of donors. The two Modernization of Justice Sector projects improved the transparency, fairness, and effectiveness of a very ineffective, largely Islamic and tribal-based, and corrupt judicial system by introducing human rights training for judges and the introduction of an IT-based records and court management system.

Each of the projects demonstrates the problems caused by the size and time limitations. The allocated funding was less than what the CO requested; that limitation, coupled with the time needed to gain full government buy-in to the project and complete the initial procurement, resulted in the Shura project requiring, and receiving, additional funding (from UNDP) after the end of the year to achieve its objectives.

The DGTTF-funded projects helped to develop new key governance partnerships for UNDP. These included the Ministry of Local Administration, the Shura Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Social Fund for Development, and a number of NGOs. Today UNDP leads donor coordination for decentralization and the Shura Council and has a lead role together with DFID in judicial reform.

In the Yemen CO, the DGTTF project selection process centres on office-wide discussion and consideration of a number of options. CO teams suggest a number of ideas; a short list of two or three is drawn up; concept notes are

The table below summarizes the projects' activities and outcomes:

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Decentralization and Local Governance (2003)	Effective legal and policy framework for decentralized authority and management	Pilot capacity-building in six districts	\$175,000	\$125,000	All	TRAC	Collaboration with the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
Modernization of Justice Sector (two projects) (2004 and 2005)	Fair and efficient administration of justice with human rights approach	Training judges, prosecutors and lawyers; pilot IT at two courts	\$200,000 \$200,000	\$90,000 \$200,000	All All	TRAC HR project	
Modernization of Legislative Bodies (2006)	Shura Council with capacity to undertake new legislative role	IT and capacity building in Shura Council	\$200,000	\$135,000	All	TRAC, Shura Council	Outcome in ProDoc was human rights treaties embedded in local legislation

Note on abbreviations in table: IT = information technology

The following table summarizes the projects' performance:

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Decentralization and Local Governance (2003)	Very much so, piloted a new approach	Yes, many donors now fund	Yes, pilot spreading from 6 to 48 districts	Yes, UNDP leads donor coordination	Many other donors now involved, plus Social Fund and NGOs	Strong relationship with Ministry of Local Administration and Districts	Yes	Yes	Yes
Modernization of Justice Sector (two projects) (2004 and 2005)	Yes, introduced IT and HR training to sector	Yes, major donor project	Spreading from two pilot courthouses to others	UNDP entered very conservative sector in support of reformers	UNDP implementing multi-donor project	Strong relationship with judiciary, Ministry of Justice and observatory NGOs	Yes, women's access to justice important	Yes, strong relationships with NGOs	First training in HR
Modernization of Legislative Bodies (2006)	Yes, first support to newly empowered Shura Council	From council itself	Capacity-building spreading from pilot committees to others	UNDP took advantage of opportunity offered by new legislative powers	Could be in future	Strong link with speaker of Shura Council	No	International Parliamentary Union, National Democratic Institute, and Yemen CSOs	Objective to improve HR legislation

Note on abbreviations in table: IT = information technology; HR = human rights; NGO = non-governmental organization; CSO = civil society organization.

prepared for each of them; and then the management selects one it thinks is the most important, innovative and likely to be catalytic.

There were mixed views on the administrative burden of DGTTF. Many complained about the Atlas system; for example, it was blamed for the delays in starting the Shura project. Use of Atlas system is a corporate requirement, not unique to DGTTF. However, although some complained about the administrative burden of having to prepare a full project document as well as hold the LPAC meeting for a project as small as one funded by DGTTF, others thought the burdens both minimal and necessary, pointing out that project documents are much easier to complete now than in the past. Again, completing project documents is a corporate requirement, not DGTTF's.

Each of the projects included funding from non-DGTTF UNDP sources. This was partly to make up for shortfalls in DGTTF funding (three of the four projects received less than they applied for) but also to benefit from progress made in other projects and from already established institutional relations, even though each project took an existing operation in new directions. One project officer thought that DGTTF could be legitimately used to carry out an activity already covered in a general sense by a project but not anticipated in detail in the original design and implementation plans. He felt this would reduce the administrative burden by eliminating the need for a new project document and minimize the time required to consult with partners, yet fulfil the innovation requirement. In fact, it is possible to link DGTTF projects to ongoing TRAC-funded projects.



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