THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Evaluation of the
Second Country Cooperation Framework [2002-2006] and the Bridging
Programme for [2007-2008]

EVALUATION REPORT
June, 2009
MISSION MEMBERS

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<td>ADR</td>
<td>Area Development Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>ADS</td>
<td>Area Development Scheme</td>
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<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>BSWG</td>
<td>Budget Sector Working Group</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Country Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Country Programme Action Plan</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [Canada]</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development [UK]</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>Economic Security Council</td>
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<td>GGEPPP</td>
<td>Good Governance for Equity and Political Participation Programme</td>
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<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid Commission</td>
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<td>ICSS</td>
<td>Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technology</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>IMDGR</td>
<td>Interim Millennium Development Goals Report</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INCS</td>
<td>Interim National Constitution of Sudan</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>JDT</td>
<td>Joint Donor Team</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<td>LDF</td>
<td>Local Development Fund</td>
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<td>LG</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Act</td>
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<td>Local Government Board</td>
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<td>Lakes State</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>Ministry of International Cooperation</td>
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<td>MOFEP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
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<td>MoHPU</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities</td>
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<td>MOLACD</td>
<td>Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development</td>
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<td>MoLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government - State</td>
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<td>MOPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs</td>
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<td>MOPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Presidential Affairs</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Ministry of Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>NEX</td>
<td>National Execution</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<td>PLWA</td>
<td>Persons Living with AIDS</td>
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<td>Prodoc</td>
<td>Project Document</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Policy Steering Committee</td>
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<td>PTC</td>
<td>Programme Technical Committee Meeting</td>
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<td>RIEP</td>
<td>Rapid Impact Emergency Programme</td>
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<td>RoL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>RRP</td>
<td>Recovery &amp; Re-integration Programme</td>
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<td>SAID</td>
<td>Sudan Aid Information Database</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Speakers Forum</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>TPC</td>
<td>Technical Planning Committee</td>
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<td>TRMA</td>
<td>Threat &amp; Risk Mapping Analysis</td>
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<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UPS</td>
<td>Upper Nile State</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose, scope and method
Sudan has one of the most complex and challenging post-conflict recovery contexts. This Evaluation examines UNDP’s contributions to national development results and offers a strategic analysis that can be used to enhance the performance and positioning of UNDP’s support to national development priorities, together with UNDP corporate policy. The Evaluation covers the period starting from the CCF-2 Programme [2002-2006], which was superseded by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Eastern Sudan and Darfur Peace Agreements, up to the Bridging Programme 2007-2008, which was prepared as a strategic framework until the UNDAF 2009-2012 and UNDP new country programme [2009-2012] came into force.

This Evaluation comprises both a retrospective and a prospective assessment. The retrospective assessment focuses on the evaluation of the CCF2 and Bridging programmes (the Programme) and offers lessons learned on the Programme’s performance. The Programme is composed of ten outcomes, of which only the Rule of Law (RoL) component has undergone outcome evaluation. The Team’s overall task for the remaining 9 outcomes has been to assess project outputs for their higher level effects. It was not, however, possible to consider all of the projects and programmes that comprised the Programme and so a purposive sample of projects contributing to outcomes executed during the period under consideration was drawn from the inventory of projects and programmes, with full agreement between the Team and the programme managers. It became evident; however, that baseline data was unavailable, making an assessment of outcomes inferential, at best. An extensive compendium of documents was assembled with the valuable cooperation of the M&E units in both Khartoum and Juba—and not to mention with the superb management of the Mission’s logistics. Evaluation of the outputs associated with the nine outcomes was complex and time consuming.

The prospective analysis intends to anticipate how UNDP might best cooperate with Sudan’s economic reconstruction within the framework of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for the period 2009-2012. This analysis is based on the issues identified during the evaluation planning phase together with the overall retrospective analysis, both of which have been vital in understanding the pervasive and acute development challenges facing Sudan, which are at the outer edge of UNDP’s mandate. In short, on the basis of the lessons learned from this Evaluation, the Report addresses: 1- recommendations that have been drawn from the retrospective analysis that pertain to specific CPAP programme areas, and 2- strategic alliances, drawn from the prospective analysis, which are proposed to advance UNDP’s corporate strategy.

Programme Relevance
Against difficult odds UNDP, in collaboration with government and civil society actors, proved to be relevant to the varying national and regional realities and to stated national objectives. Following the signing of the CPA, UNDP built development approaches suitable to start up Sudan’s post-conflict recovery. Sudan now exists as “one country/two-systems”, the cardinal principle of which is to implement the two programmes in one country, while at the same time making sure that there is close cooperation and communication between the offices of Khartoum and Juba. Overall, the Programme commanded a degree of flexibility which enabled UNDP to

1 This was also the case for the country programme evaluation of the CCF 1997-2001, [page 14]
respond promptly to various evolving and unplanned needs. Discerning UNDP relevance should nonetheless be approached from a nuanced perspective.

It is not as important to look at what UNDP has accomplished overall, as many of its accomplishments have not been recorded, as it is to observe what difference UNDP has made under trying circumstances. For example, UNDP’s RoL staff and paralegals have empowered many thousands of Sudanese citizens, IDPs, and stakeholders and have given them the confidence they need in order to exercise their human rights; human rights now prevail in Sudanese legislation across both North and South Sudan. Along these same lines, numerous interviews with donors and government officials testified to the trust and confidence that the UNDP enjoys throughout Sudan.

Following the cessation of hostilities and the signing of the CPA, UNDP worked closely with government and civil society actors to conduct a recovery-oriented framework. The Bridging Programme responded directly to at least six of the eight strategic objectives outlined in Sudan’s five-year development plan for 2007 – 2011. The aim was to reconstitute the apparatus of government and institute RoL actions, start up a livelihood programme to reconstruct and re-build peoples’ quality of life, and implement actions to advance MDGs and cross cutting issues. Within these programme areas a set of ten outcomes was implemented in the North as well as nationally, whereas a set of six outcomes was implemented in the South.

**Programme Effectiveness**

The trust placed in UNDP by donors operating in Sudan is reflected in current delivery figures. Over the period 2006-2008, UNDP delivered a total amount of USD 457 million—of which USD 318 million [70%] went to the North and USD 138 million [30%] to the South. From the total amount delivered, core funds [USD 21 million] represented 5% and non-core funds 95% of the total delivery [USD 436 million]. Overall, for both the North and South, the absolute figures are impressive, with the exception of programme themes temporarily paralyzed by political challenges. The growth in delivery rates by programme themes is more than satisfactory.

Under uniquely limiting circumstances which were further characterized by a hostile social context, difficult terrain and unreliable logistics, UNDP contributed to delivering a recovery-oriented programme:

- The RoL outcome has made crucial strides by empowering citizens of all walks of life about their human rights. It has also advocated for IDPs and vulnerable groups by setting up legal information centers, Justice and Confidence Centre (JCC) paralegal-led mediations, and referrals of cases to UNDP’s Legal Aid Network lawyers.
- In an innovative move, UNDP went to the most remote of locations to conduct training and legal seminars in the midst of ongoing hostilities, such that UNDP JCC paralegals and Legal Aid Network lawyers rendered mediation and representation to many hundreds of individuals throughout Sudan.

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2 The relevance of UNDP’s programmes was assessed in relation to a number of key reference frameworks including the INC and South Sudan ICSS, the CPA, the JAM framework, the national development objectives as reflected in the Five-Year Development Plan and the realities that the country was experiencing during that period of time.

3 UNDP programme was informed by Country Analysis. The identification of unmet needs were in line with national priorities.
UNDP supported legal victories in the courts of Darfur and elsewhere that served to advance the rule of law, particularly in regards to sexual gender based violence (SGBV).4

In the context of AIDS control, an approach in incubation has begun producing results. The endorsement of the first training curriculum by the Ministry of Guidance and Endowment, which was the result of two years of programme activities carried out by UNDP and its partners and supported by the release of the Khartoum Declaration, has accelerated the fight against AIDS.5

UNDP’s counterpart, the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), has enhanced its level of effectiveness in aid management and coordination, and has also established a multi-ministry M&E unit composed of key government entities relevant to aid management and coordination stemming from the awareness raised as to the importance of the M&E.6

UNDP supported the development of the Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID), which has reporting capabilities and accessibility through the MIC intranet. In collaboration with the MIC, the Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration Survey collected data.7

In the North, leadership training for women exceeded expectations and contributed to the personal and professional empowerment of a great number of women.8 This result was strengthened through policy reform by the enactment of the Political Parties’ Act, which allocates a 25% quota for women from the 40% of constituencies assigned to what can best be termed as “relative representation” in legislative bodies at the federal and state levels.9

The three northern states of Kassala, the Red Sea and South Kordofan acquired skills in the preparation of a five-year development plan incorporating the MDGs and using Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) as a planning tool. These states demonstrated competence in conducting effective state planning and budgeting. There has also been vital progress towards the outcome in participatory bottom-up planning and capacity building for pro-poor planning at the local government level.

In the South, UNDP worked closely with government actors to build capacity for Judiciary/MOLACD in critical areas. The 2008-2010 MOLACD Strategic Plan was developed and is awaiting approval, but there is still a long road ahead with respect to JOSS and MOLA before outcomes become apparent. UNDP contributed significantly to the strengthening of the MOLA HQ level, MOLA strategy development, support for the construction and development of a functioning legal resource centre, and support for the Budget Sector Working Group budget processes.

GoSS institutions are blossoming, even though requirements for continuous training, legislative actions, and access to quality services, knowledge and practice are substantial. State and county planning units are now able to plan and budget, thereby showing a clear potential for achieving outcomes where there was little potential before. Specifically:

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4 UNDP Outcome Evaluation for the Sudan Rule of Law. December 2008, pp 2-6
5 The Khartoum declaration states: “We do appreciate the goals of the call made by medical doctors and specialists for the use of various protection instruments to alleviate danger against self and others, while watching out for those who, intentionally or otherwise, transmit infection by not using every possible means of protection that do not infringe upon religious teachings”.
6 MIC, ministry of finance, HAC and the economic Security Council.
7 With the collaboration of MIC, the Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration collected survey data which has received good responses from major donors. The national counterpart raised their awareness of the importance of M&E in aid coordination and as a consequence, MIC established a multi-ministry M&E unit composed of MIC, MoF, HAC and the Economic Security Council.
8 Evaluation Report of the Good Governance & Equity in Political Participation project, November 2008
9 The elections law stipulates a division of the total constituencies into a 60% geographic representation and a 40% relative representation for key social groups such as women.
economic planning at the GoSS level provides the framework for an integrated planning and budgeting system involving GoSS, the states and the donors,
states have put in place state planning and development committees (SPDC) with BSWG, as a means of annual planning and budgeting,
all 10 states have developed their strategic plan for 3-5 years,
all counties have a county plan and budget,
Inter-governmental coordination and policy dialogue takes place through the Governors and the Speakers Forum.
The GoSS has declared 2009 as the year for decentralization, which is a distinct impact of UNDP promoting decentralized governance in Southern Sudan.

Sustainability

UNDP programmes show substantial potential to improve the peoples’ quality of life, however evidence indicates that the bulk of the expected outcomes have not yet reached fruition. Although there is no objective timeline for post-conflict recovery, extant fragile institutions and weak human capital across Sudan militate against the recovery progress. The situation is further exacerbated by the historical legacy of violent conflict reflected in the widespread destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure in the North and marginalization in the South.

As the reintegration component (DDR) is not yet operational the Governance & RoL, together with the livelihood programmes, are fundamental for post-conflict recovery. Within the time frame of the CCF2, the Governance and RoL programmes in the North and South have been progressing as much as possible; however, more time is needed before outcomes reach complete fruition. As a proxy baseline value, the history of now developed countries shows that in their earlier days of development it took several decades, and sometimes even generations, to develop the essential components of governance structures and institutions, such as the judiciary.\textsuperscript{10} Given the complexity and protracted nature of institutional transformation, it is essential to identify which institutions must absolutely be modified.

The livelihood programme\textsuperscript{11} correctly identified the demographic and social dynamics of the targeted population, but does not appear to be responsive to the mode of livelihoods and their manifested priorities. The design of the programme shows an absence of planning towards sustainability. Although the information is fragmented, the extant mode of livelihoods requires technical recalibration to take into account the demographic pressure on land and water resources, which has led to intense competition over land for crop production and overgrazing due to overstocking. Without this recalibration, land productivity for crop and livestock grazing will dwindle with the associated resource degradation, leading to desertification.

Strategic Positioning

UNDP has managed to position itself strategically for the formation of partnerships in the post-CPA phase. Consequently, UNDP has been entrusted with a leadership role in a number of areas related to governance, re-integration of ex-combatants and recovery, as well as the massive task of establishing the machinery of government in Southern Sudan. The Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF) and the Recovery & Re-integration Programme (RRP) are examples of pivotal


\textsuperscript{11} Recovery and Reintegration Programme, financed by the EU
partnerships. In other cases, UNDP assumed the responsibility of the management of large specific funds needed to meet post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation needs, i.e. Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). This indicates productive and successful partnerships with national counterparts, donors and international organizations.

Set against a backdrop of an untenable external debt of USD 27 billion, driving forces in the development process are emerging at the outer edge of UNDP’s role as coordinator of the UN system. These driving forces have to do with concerns regarding long term sustainable development and inclusive economic growth. The dual nature of the national economy is characterized by a buoyant oil-based sub sector, which is disarticulated from the agrarian-based economy with dwindling natural resources. While one sector grows at double digits, the other has negative rates of per capita food production (cf. section 2.1).

As an oil extracting economy trapped in the “resource curse”, Sudan faces the critical challenge of economic diversification that must be carried out within a short time span, before oil resource depletion occurs. Sudan’s vital task is to allocate public investments and expenditures outside of the oil industry that will lower the costs of producing manufactured or agro processed export goods for the benefit of the population at large, especially the poor. If there is no economic diversification before oil depletion, a critical opportunity to reduce poverty will have been missed.

Subsistence farmers fall outside of the oil-based economy and as much as 83 % of the Sudanese population depends on farming for its livelihood. Extensive livestock-rearing, a central component of subsistence agriculture, is typically nomadic and co-exists with semi-nomadic/agro-pastoralists and a sedentary system. An estimated 40 % of the Sudanese population practices livestock rearing, and this percentage is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60 % of the population depends on extensive livestock-rearing.

Subsistence agriculture is based on traditional technology; competition for land is therefore at the heart of many local conflicts. Regrettably, however, there is no evidence of a systematic and comprehensive policy with which to tackle the developmental challenges of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock practices from which the bulk of the rural population makes a living.

During the Mission’s visits to the North and the South there were incessant requests for a borehole wells programme, or water storage investments, so that water stored during the rainy season can be used during the dry season for livestock as well as for agricultural purposes. One inescapable conclusion can be drawn from this: food security is a paramount issue across Sudan, and is exacerbated by competition over grazing land; in turn, this problem has been further aggravated by the dynamics of oil exploration, extraction and the apportionment of oil revenues. These pervasive and acute issues are the current driving forces behind the development process.

**Strategic Partnerships**

It follows from the above; that the demand is rising to comprehensively harness Sudan’s sustainable human development and ensure an inclusive economic growth. These long term issues are situated at the outer edge of UNDP’s mandate and UNDP may therefore require strategic alliances in order to harness Sudan’s sustainable human development.  

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12 This was one lesson learned from CCF 2002-2006 [page 3]: how can the UNDP programme be more comprehensive.
Furthermore, UNDP has not yet forged the partnerships needed to accelerate the achievement of short- and medium-term programme results. For example, in the political context, UNDP needs to position itself strategically for partnerships in:

- the forthcoming parliamentary democracy and multi-party revival; and
- the implementation of a decentralization process from central structures down to the community level. These partnerships are included in the CPAP’s partnership strategy [Part v] and
- a more focused approach to the livelihood programme based on the recalibration of the agricultural production system, based on an ecologically friendly use of resources, socially acceptable and financially viable.

Recommendations to the attention of UNDP

These are divided in two sets:

1- Recommendations complementary to CPAP operations, which are based on lessons learned from the retrospective analysis (cf: sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.6). 13

2- Proposed strategic alliances, derived from the prospective analysis in order to meet emerging issues associated with CPAP and long term concerns related to inclusive growth and sustainable development situated at the outer edge of UNDP’s role as coordinator of the UN system.

CPAP Oriented Recommendations

Given the marked differences between the South and North, which encapsulate substantive variations in approach and method for programming purposes, the recommendations hereunder must be considered as actionable guidelines.

- These guidelines should be validated by relevant stakeholders for each region in order to reflect the appropriate context within the programme framework.

Pro poor livelihoods and private sector development [CPAP: Output 1.3]

1. Ensure sustainability in the design of all projects for enhancing livelihoods and customize delivery of the outputs to ensure benefits reach those who need them most.
2. Recalibrate the production system based on sustainable land use practices, to prevent land degradation and erosion stemming from unsuitable land management techniques and overgrazing.
3. Consider making available technical assistance on-farm for possible forthcoming microfinance operations in agriculture [crops, livestock, and fisheries], thereby ensuring a viable and sustainable production system.
4. Consider making a portion of these agricultural value chain operations organic and ecologically friendly. This will not only realize higher benefits, but will contribute to the maintenance of sound ecosystems. To this end, the potential beneficiaries will require [1] access to pertinent organizations to register their “organic products” status; [2] and information on foreign market niches where these organic products can be placed.

Citizen participation and democracy [CPAP: Output 3.1]

5. Undertake urgent preparations in order to strengthen the electoral process and related institutions prior to elections.

Strengthening women’s security in crisis [CPAP: Output 3.3]

6. Consider combining forces with UNIFEM to mainstream gender in recovery and development.

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13 The recommendations refer to: CPAP, Sudan, Draft 2, 8 December 2008
7. With due consideration of the different legal systems and procedures in the North and South, consider a sector wide approach for the delivery of criminal justice and a system analysis perspective such that there should be a continuum from “entry to exit”. This includes management of “in flows” into the system through court case management, decriminalizing petty offences and ensuring that only the most serious criminals are incarcerated. The approach should also address minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners, including prison renovations.

8. Consider organizing a UNDP joint strategic plan for environmental governance for sustaining livelihoods and the environment. The plan must address the linkages between environmental degradation, conflict and poverty.

9. Consider launching youth “on the job training” programmes in carpentry, brick-laying, blacksmithery, construction and electrical and mechanical repairs to stimulate private sector growth.

10. Consider expanding the national United Nations Volunteer programme under UNDP to partner youth with retirees who have specific skills and experiences.

11. Conduct a cross-sectoral survey about key human development indicators pertinent to the forthcoming cycle, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, in order to establish baseline information.

12. Conduct evaluations of the key outcomes of the forthcoming cycle.

13. Carefully record the results from institutional modifications to learn how to improve them.

14. Encourage the M&E unit in Juba to work jointly with the public work’s executing agency to agree on a monitoring format for reporting outputs leading to potential outcomes. Once the format has been achieved and tested successfully, consider mainstreaming in the M&E system where applicable.

15. UNDP should consider the potential of mediating access to finances for infrastructure development with the World Bank Group, IMF, regional banks and the private sector, and in particular, with Global Compact. All stakeholders interviewed suggested that UNDP in Sudan would be the best organization to mediate badly needed finances for economic infrastructure, especially in the South.

16. Implement stopgap measures as the most practical option, particularly in the South, for the enhancement of management operations in disbursement and procurement. Specifically,
determine real-time parameters for financial disbursement and procurement so that they can be used in the planning process and the budgeting of the forthcoming cycle. This measure should be supported by all stakeholders and partners until such a time when financial services and banking operations have been substantially improved.

17. Consider developing a vision based on the concept of human security, in partnership with other UN agencies, to address the structural conditions leading to conflict. This vision should integrate development concerns with those of security.
18. UNDP should consider building relations with civil society groups as partners in strategy formulation and to monitor security. These organizations could include NGOs and CBOs.
19. Involve civil society organizations, such as academic institutions and women’s organizations, in a long-term analysis of the structure of conflict and of the monitoring of human security. These organizations are often concerned with advocacy issues for the public good and promote think-tank organizations.

Inclusive growth and sustainable economic development

UNDP, in response to the severe challenges associated with long term sustainable development and inclusive economic growth, should consider the coordination of a comprehensive strategy with the participation of experienced stakeholders. Among the UN system these stakeholders should include: UNEP, IFAD, FAO, ILO as well as the World Bank Group, USAID, CIDA, the Governments of China, India, Brazil, and others. Each of these stakeholders has dealt with the subject matter extensively.

20. UNDP, as the coordinator of the UN system, should consider monitoring the issue of food security tailored to the context of different ecosystems across Sudan with the support of key partners, i.e. UNEP, FAO, IFAD and others, using the TRMA tool. In this context, it will be productive to review opportunities and potential for the transformation of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock rearing into a sustainable system of food production. This is a comprehensive task that should take into account all services needed from the farm level to the consumer including price policies.
21. UNDP with support of stakeholders with competence in private sector development, i.e. the WB Group, must tackle the critical challenge of economic diversification to get out of the resource curse trap. It requires allocating public investments outside of the oil industry for the production of trade goods that lowers their costs to Sudanese and makes them attractive for international trade. The two essential instruments of public policy are institutional reform and a public investment programme customized to specific Sudanese conditions in order to:
   1. Improve the investment climate, i.e. reducing the costs associated with bureaucracy, customs delays, corruption, risk, streamlined export procedures, and essential business services; all these are central to building international competitiveness
   2. Education must serve a larger percentage of the population and enrolments should continue into the secondary grades. In order to enhance the skills of the poor, the quality and relevance of educational services need to be improved and should provide technical and vocational training to create new skills in areas of value added agriculture, agro processing, transport and communications.
1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose
The completion of the Country Cooperation Framework (CCF 2) [2002-2006] and Bridging Programme [2007 -2008] is an opportunity to assess the achievements of the previous programme cycle (henceforth referred to as CCF2 Evaluation). The mandate is to evaluate evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country level and to provide strategic analysis for enhancing performance and positioning of UNDP support within national development priorities and UNDP corporate policy directions. It will also record lessons and experiences that could provide input–or feedback for the implementation of the next Country Programme Document (CPD 2009- 2012). Specifically, the Terms of Reference (TOR) in Annex 1 stipulate [page 2]:

1. Provide an independent assessment of development results of the UNDP’s Country Programme by assessing the relevance and effectiveness achieved through UNDP support and partnership with other development actors during the last five to seven years;
2. Assess the performance of the country programme and specify the development results achieved in the areas of policy advice, capacity development and knowledge management within the areas of the programme focus, and assess the scope and range of strategic partnerships formed;
3. Ascertain how the country programme, based on actual results, has strategically positioned UNDP to establish its comparative advantage or niche as a major national policy advisor for poverty reduction and sustainable human development and as a knowledge-based organization; and
4. Present key findings and lessons learned, and identify innovative approaches in incubation and provide forward-looking options for management to make adjustments in the current strategy and the next Country Programme.

1.2 Scope and Method
The present Evaluation’s scope comprises both a retrospective and a prospective assessment.

- The retrospective assessment focuses on the evaluation of the CCF2 and Bridging programmes and offers lessons learned on the programmes’s performance.
- The prospective assessment looks ahead to anticipate how UNDP might best serve Sudan during their period of economic reconstruction within the framework of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) for the period 2009-2012.14

Thus, on the basis of the lessons learned from this Evaluation, the Report addresses two strategic issues: 1- recommendations to specific CPAP programme areas, and 2- strategic alliances to advance UNDP’s corporate strategy.

The retrospective offered in this Report has been approached through the lens of the TOR [page 2] which is why the evaluation has been conducted as a “meta-evaluation, drawing on the conclusions of outcome evaluations undertaken during the 2002-2008 (CCF) and [has been] largely based on secondary data.”

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14 The GoNU, GoSS and the UNDP-Sudan Country Office have indicated their mutual agreement to the content of CPAP and their responsibilities in the implementation of the country programme. The duration of the country programme adapts to the timeframe of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and is based on the common strategy for the United Nations in Sudan – the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The document draws on the Country Analysis (CA) prepared by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in 2007 as well as on information gained through the UNDP Threats and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) Project and the background documentation prepared for and endorsed at the 2008 Sudan Consortium. Cf: CPAP, 2008, p 3
The CCF 2 and Bridging Programmes are composed of ten outcomes, and of these ten outcomes, only the Rule of Law (RoL) programme has undergone outcome evaluation. Most of the other nine outcomes have conducted project evaluations without outcome assessments which is why in this exercise outcome evaluation turned into a central approach. As a result, the Team’s overall task for the remaining 9 outcomes has been to assess project outputs for their higher level effects which could be characterized as intermediate outcomes. To this end, within the framework of outcome assessments, the following tasks have been considered:

- To examine changes that have taken place within programme outcomes or projects associated with these outcomes, whether they are human security and recovery, governance or poverty reduction;
- To explain these changes with reference to specific contributing or impeding factors that are of particular relevance to the Sudan context;
- To determine UNDP’s contribution to these changes, as UNDP may or may not have made a difference to the specific changes, as well as in determining these changes; reference is made to changes that can be attributed to UNDP outputs, to the relevance of these changes and to their sustainability and effectiveness;
- To inquire as to whether or not UNDP’s approach towards partnership and coordination has been a factor that has advanced or improved progress.

The Evaluation took place between 16 November and 21 December, 2008. The research was conducted in three phases. Each phase took different approaches towards information collection and analysis.

**Phase 1: Planning the Evaluation**

The activities carried out during this phase were the following.

1- In Khartoum, initial briefings were launched with senior management, a programme unit head or a programme manager with special reference to the issues proposed by the M&E unit. Initial contacts were carried out with donor representatives, relevant national government agencies, key informants, and initial queries reviewed. A division of labour was set up within the team that was in line with TOR’s directives.

It became clear, however, that baseline data was unavailable. Consequently, a comprehensive assessment of outcomes and impacts was not feasible. Whenever possible, research findings that

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15 It is important to keep in mind that a **Project Evaluation** attempts to gauge how much of an impact or effect a project has made on the sector as a whole. In contrast, an **Outcome Evaluation** shows a relationship between the changes observable in a particular programme or sector, e.g. promotion of human security and recovery, and the extent to which UNDP contributions are responsible for them. Outcome Evaluations look first at the broad direction of an outcome, then determine what might have been responsible for the direction and finally after examining the UNDP contributions, consider whether UNDP interventions might have been responsible in some way. Cf.: UNDP. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators: Monitoring and Evaluation Companion Series, #1. NY 2002 pp 6-8.

16 One can extrapolate from UNDP guidelines that outputs can make progress without reaching the level of outcomes as articulated in a Programme document. This situation is similar to the circumstances when there may be valid results that significantly improve development at the local level but may not change the national development situation. These outcomes are referred to as **intermediate outcomes**. Ref. UNDP. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators: Evaluation Office New York, 2002, p 16

17 Cf: UNDP. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators: Monitoring and Evaluation Companion Series, #1. NY 2002

18 This was also the case of the country programme evaluation of the CCF 1997-2001, [page 14]
pertained to the Sudanese context were used as proxy baseline values. For example, without baseline information it is difficult to gauge the progress of the institutional transformations associated with legal institutions. Research on lessons from now developed-countries in earlier times can shed light on institutional transformation, however, and this approach helps to navigate a sea of imperfect and asymmetrical information.20

Monitoring systems are second-tier systems that operate by extracting information from existing sectoral or central statistical suppliers.21 Evaluation missions do not produce monitoring information, but are users of monitoring information.

2- The inventory of projects and programmes was reviewed so as to be able to proceed with the preparation of a purposive sample of projects contributing to outcomes executed during the period under consideration. It was not possible to consider all of the projects and programmes that comprised the CCF2 and Bridging Programmes. It was established that the list was appropriate and that there was full agreement between the Team and the programme managers on the projects to be reviewed.

On the basis of a purposive sample of projects contributing towards outcomes, the bottom-up method examined and confirmed or invalidated findings. Expected outcomes were examined individually and the findings aggregated (bottom-up). This was supplemented by a review of the overall achievements within a sector or thematic area (top-down). The top-down method examined overall achievements within a thematic area and then attempted to explain which parts of the successes and failures linked back to the efforts of particular expected outcomes. Top-down and bottom-up methods were thus used simultaneously.22

3- With the valuable cooperation of the M&E units in both Khartoum and Juba, an extensive compendium of documents was assembled including national policy documents encompassing records of round table meetings, sector policies and action plans; programming frameworks including UNDAF, Country Assessment, CCF , Strategic Result Framework, Results-Oriented Annual Report, and other progress reports on projects contributing to outcomes; desk reviews of support documents, evaluations and assessments, programme/project reports, annual reports and technical assessment reports of UNDP; and policy documents on UNDP’s involvement in conflict situations as well as on Sudan’s recent history. All members of the team reviewed and commented on the literature in order to ensure all were similarly familiar with the historical context and were familiar with the range of viewpoints regarding the activities of the UNDP Country Office for Sudan North and South.

Previous extended missions, e.g. the Joint Assessment Mission, have assembled and generated fundamental information for example, the prevailing issues and problems concerning poverty alleviation in Sudan within the framework of sustainable peace.23 This has been of considerable value in the present Evaluation.

19 If monitoring systems suffer from sparse information and incomplete baseline data the monitoring information is compromised. For example, sparse or non-existing information about targeted populations makes it difficult to design performance indicators, as in the case of the current CCF2 programme targets which are open-ended.
22 UNDP. Assessment of development results. First draft, July 2002, pp 10-11
23 JAM. Framework for sustained peace, development and poverty eradication. 3 vols March 2005
4- External factors were identified that influence the UNDP country programme and which would, in addition to the retrospective research, require investigation through the use of prospective analysis. An original list of key issues across Sudan included: 1) a request regarding financing the infrastructure of economic development, 2) sub optimal disbursement and procurement operations of goods and services, 3) stakeholders concerns regarding security and sustainable human development, 4) greater attention to partnerships, and 5) improved communication among political/military actors in order to enhance the role of development concerns in their agenda. Over the course of the evaluation the five key issues were reduced to three:

- mediating access to the financing of the infrastructure of economic development,
- sub optimal disbursement and procurement operations of goods and services,
- Stakeholders concerns regarding security and sustainable human development.

5- A field work schedule was designed as part of an Inception Report,24 to be carried out in both Northern and Southern Sudan. It was considered essential by the Team and UNDP evaluation managers that the outcome evaluation be evidence-based.

**Phase 2: Field Work: Focused Interviews**

6- Field visits were conducted in North and South Sudan from 26 November to 11 December 2008. The Evaluation Team and counterparts jointly identified the field sites for visit, which were chosen primarily to verify the achievement of outputs leading to outcomes. The M&E teams in Khartoum and Juba undertook superbly the challenging task of the Mission’s logistics. Because of security reasons, there were complex arrangements involving military transportation necessary to travel within Sudan and on the ground the terrain was difficult.

7- The Team visited Kadugli in South Kordofan, Port Sudan and Sawakin near the Red Sea, as well as the town of Kassala in the Kassala state. In South Sudan the Mission was stationed in Juba and visited Rumbek in the Lakes State and Malakal in the Upper Nile State. The volatile security situation in some parts of northern Sudan (Darfur) limited visits to project sites, interviews, and meetings with grass-roots level beneficiaries in that area. Otherwise, the Team interacted in the North and the South with government officials at all levels, as well as with programme managers, donor representatives, executing agents and direct beneficiaries. However, as the month of December included a number of extended public holidays in the North (Eid) as well as the commencement of the year-end holidays, some interviews and meetings with stakeholders and beneficiaries on the ground were missed. Annex 2 contains the list of persons met and Annex 3 contains the Mission’s itinerary across North and South Sudan.

8- While conducting focused interviews, the following five key questions were posed to stakeholders. These questions summarize the core of the evaluation issues:

- Did UNDP do what it stated it would do?
- What can the UNDP learn about what worked, and what did not work?
- What difference did it make that UNDP participated in any particular project or programme?
- What could UNDP do differently?
- How does UNDP plan to use the evaluation findings for continuous learning?

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24 This was finalized as: Inception Report Results-Based Monitoring & Evaluation Within The Framework Of Participatory And Livelihood Approaches, Khartoum, 22 November 2008
9- Where there was a dearth of information, interviews with project officers supplemented the project files. In some cases, the project officers had moved on or had been replaced. An understanding of the project files was placed in the context of a larger knowledge of the outcome involved. This involved researching the relevant literature, reading commentaries on the UNDP programs and reports emanating from a diversity of donors, NGOs and interested parties. In point of fact, as stipulated in TOR [page 4], “triangulation of information and data sources [constituted] a primary methodology for the assessment.”

10- Linking the status of the outcome and the UNDP contributions suggested factors that influenced the outcome. More specifically, it identified those factors that helped and/or hindered the UNDP’s contribution to meeting expectations. Interviews with ranking persons in UNDP helped identify these factors and answer basic questions, particularly those that had to do with factors internal to UNDP. The information was supplemented by interviews with heads of other agencies and international organizations, members of the government [North and South] and development counsellors from a selection of bilateral donors, as listed in Annex 2.

Phase 3: Preliminary Synthesis/Incorporating Data into Findings

11- The Team outlined the CCF 2’s intended and unintended outcomes and came to appreciate the linkages among partners, coordinated efforts and shared activities. On 18 December 2008, the Mission reported it’s debriefing to the UNDP-Juba and UNDP-Khartoum offices. Comments from both meetings allowed the Mission to obtain an early validation of findings, conclusions, lessons learned, recommendations and future strategic directions.

12- After the debriefing, the Team began to review the material, so that they could prepare a preliminary report. This provided an occasion to verify (triangulate) information. The Team could not examine every key output encompassed in the 9 outcomes, but instead cited major themes attempting to outline the outcomes. In the report, there are extensive citations of the extant documentation. If, however, there is an absence of citation for a particular statement or conclusion, it should not be taken to mean that the Team had no basis for reaching that conclusion.

13- Inherent in the evaluation questions used during the focus interviews was an evaluation criteria which was used to gauge the CCF 2 level of progress towards outcomes. These criteria were defined in the Inception Report [page 6], and data was collected and interviews conducted with these criteria in mind. With the cooperation of M&E units from the North and South, two tables presenting outcome results for the North [Table 1] and for the South [Table 2] were prepared, and can be found in Annex 4.25 For each outcome the level of progress towards the outcome has been gauged according to the following criteria.26

- Relevance. Is the outcome relevant to Sudan requirements and UNDP’s corporate and country office mission?
- Effectiveness. Has the outcome met expectations and does it contribute to outcome?

25 As mentioned, the Team confirmed the impossibility of carrying out definitive assessments of the progress towards outcomes, because CCF2 interventions were carried out without the benefit of quantitative measures of change following CCF 2 interventions, i.e. baseline data. Estimates are therefore at best inferential.

26 It is to be noted that these criteria have been customized from the original concepts defined by UNDP in: Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for Results. Glossary, 2002, page 97
- Efficiency. Has the outcome been implemented within the timeline and proposed procedures?
- Sustainability. Is the outcome likely to continue after funding is discontinued?

14- Each of the outcomes was scored by noting whether perceived estimations met the evaluation criteria perfectly (score = high progress), satisfactorily (score = medium progress), less than satisfactorily (score = low progress) or not at all (score = no progress). This operation has provided an approximate measure of performance. It has been concluded that UNDP contributions were relevant and effective to the moment of execution, as indicated in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex 4.

15- Several strategic issues were identified during the Evaluation Planning phase [activity 4] and the overall retrospective analysis, which have been vital in understanding development challenges to UNDP in its role as the coordinator of the UN system. This analysis also brought to the fore the notion that in order for the UNDP to tackle the pervasive and acute development challenges facing Sudan it needs to consider taking a comprehensive approach, and therefore needs to begin forging strategic alliances. Thus, discerning UNDP’s success in reaching its programme goals should be approached from a nuanced perspective. Overall the procedure used met the evaluation objectives by drawing on experience and on lessons of what worked and what did not work. The assessment of the outputs associated with the nine outcomes was complex and time consuming. Annex 5 contains a list of references used in this evaluation.

Organization of the Report

The present Evaluation Report is fundamentally based on a retrospective and prospective assessment.
- To obtain a longterm view on the pervasive development issues, the section on national development context extended itself moderately by examining key drivers in the development process.
- Subsequently, the Report reviews, retrospectively, the development outcomes in CCF 2 and offers lessons learned.
- Lastly, and prospectively, on the basis of the lessons learned from this Evaluation, the Report addresses two strategic issues: 1- recommendations to specific CPAP programme areas, and 2- strategic alliances needed to advance UNDP’s corporate strategy.

2. National Development Context

Preamble

The TOR [page 3] stipulates “to analyze the underlying factors beyond UNDP control.” Webs of complex interrelated factors are embedded within the social structure and influence expected outcomes together with the country programme performance. For example, as is discussed in section 3.3.4, these factors can be reflected in programme design; if programme design is flawed, there will be shortfalls in programme achievements. In reality, programme shortfalls are symptomatic of larger systemic issues beyond UNDP control. The case of food security across Sudan is illustrative. Ongoing programmes associated with livelihood initiatives currently overlook community needs which place high priority on food security. The root cause, however, is associated with extant modes of livelihood which require technical recalibration because of the demographic pressure on land and water resources. This problem has led to intense competition over land for crop production as well as to overgrazing due to overstocking, among other things.
The above mentioned pervasive and acute driving forces behind the development process, are situated at the outer edge of UNDP’s mandate. UNDP, besides being the leading UN organization in sustainable human development, has corporate strategies and the UNDP Country Offices in the North and the South have their own priorities as well. UNDP therefore may require strategic alliances in order to harness Sudan’s sustainable human development. The way to move forward may be by forging strategic alliances, as is discussed in section 4.6.

2.1 Physical Landscape and Demography
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, dominated by the Nile and its tributaries, with a total area of 2.37 million km². The climate is tropical in the south, arid desert in the north with a rainy season that varies by region (April to November). The terrain is generally a flat, featureless plain with mountains in the far south, northeast and west; the north is dominated by desert. The north has the largest irrigated area in sub-Saharan Africa and ranks second only to Egypt on the continent. The south is a resource rich area and has vast unused potential. There is significant opportunity for agriculture expansion. There is also petroleum, small reserves of iron, copper, chromium, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, and hydropower. The south is underdeveloped due to neglect, deprivation and marginalization. Recent conflicts and the resulting destruction of human lives, property and physical infrastructure has further exacerbated the situation.

The transportation challenge may be currently underestimated because of the availability of air transportation, which is provided by the military arm of the UN. In reality, in terms of economic development, the transportation infrastructure is woefully inadequate. There are 5,978 km of railways and the density of railways is 2.3 km/1000km². There are 101 airports, only 17 of which have paved runways, and four heliports. There are 11,900 km of roadways, 36% of which are paved. Sudan has the lowest density of roadways among LDCs at 5.0 km/1000km². It is difficult to imagine sustainable economic development without an improved transportation network.

2.1 Physical Landscape and Demography
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, dominated by the Nile and its tributaries, with a total area of 2.37 million km². The climate is tropical in the south, arid desert in the north, with a rainy season that varies by region (April to November). The terrain is generally a flat, featureless plain with mountains in the far south, northeast and west; the north is dominated by desert. The north has the largest irrigated area in sub-Saharan Africa and ranks second only to Egypt on the continent. The south is a resource rich area and has vast unused potential. There is significant opportunity for agriculture expansion. There is also petroleum, small reserves of iron, copper, chromium, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, and hydropower. The south is underdeveloped due to neglect, deprivation and marginalization. Recent conflicts and the resulting destruction of human lives, property and physical infrastructure has further exacerbated the situation.

Table 1 show that the estimated population of all Sudan is 37.7 million and growing at 2.0% annually. Southern Sudan is a vast land of about 640,000 km² with an estimated population of

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27 This was one lesson learned from CCF 2002-2006 [page 3]: how can the UNDP programme be more comprehensive.
31 UNCTAD op cit Statistical Annex p 151
33 These preliminary estimates and others in the present and forthcoming sections are working estimates to advance analysis. They do not intend to settle any contentious issue directly or indirectly nor should they be used for any other purpose than technical analysis at the pre feasibility level.
7.51 million and an annual growth rate of 2.85%.  

In the North, approximately 30% of the population is urban. Whereas, in the South it is estimated the population is predominantly rural—only 2% reside in towns such as Juba, Malakal, Wau, Aweil, and Rumbek. Thus, the population density is one of the lowest in Africa at 16 persons/km² for all Sudan, an estimated 12 persons/km² for the South and 17 persons/km² for the North.

Table 1: Preliminary Estimates of Rural and Urban Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>North</th>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Million</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>21.24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>9.11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.35**</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.73*</td>
<td>7.51**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Mission estimates. Area and population estimates come, respectively, from:

2.2 Socio-Economic and Political Context

Sudan has two economies, one is oil-based and the other is agrarian-based. The latter is typified by subsistence farming in co-existence with a relatively small commercial agriculture. This dual economy has no linkages to induce economic synergy to benefit the national population at large. As discussed throughout this Report, these facts are paramount for the planning process and implementation of programmes. Often they are not taken into account, to the considerable detriment of the poor population, particularly in the rural areas.

The Oil Based Economy

The oil boom and associated direct foreign investment has made Sudan's economy buoyant since it began exporting crude oil in 1999 (Table 2). From 1997 to date, Sudan has been working with the IMF to implement macroeconomic reforms, including a managed floating of the exchange rate. The growth in GDP of 6.1% in 2001 has almost doubled to 11.2% in 2007.
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators 2001-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Real Sector</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth [% change]</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP [million USD]</td>
<td>13,369</td>
<td>15,109</td>
<td>17,680</td>
<td>21,610</td>
<td>27,699</td>
<td>37,442</td>
<td>46,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita [USD]</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>1,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation [%]</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, billions of USD</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net international reserves [million USD]</td>
<td>-109</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,144</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With most of the producing oil fields located in the South, oil in Sudan accounts for 92.6% of export revenues. The construction sector has thrived due to the work associated with the building of oil pipelines, refineries, road infrastructure, power stations and dams. It has grown by a solid annual rate of 8% over the 2001-2005 periods. The manufacturing sector is linked to the oil economy with an 8.3% share of the GDP. It includes petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, cement, automobile/light truck assembly, cotton ginning, textiles, edible oils, sugar, soap, distilling, and shoes.

As shown in Table 2, outstanding external debt is about USD 27 billion. This is untenable in the end. Government fiscal pressures in a volatile environment have been acute, especially in the South. In the context of a dual economy, it is not surprising that expansion has been unbalanced. Exports of key products have fallen in large part because of reduced competitiveness, leading to “jobless growth.” For example, the share of agriculture in GDP has increased from 33.8% [1990] to 45.8% [2006]. However, the share of the labour force in agriculture decreased from 69.5% [1990] to 57.4% [2004]. There is no evidence to indicate that labour was absorbed by the oil sector. The oil sector uses high technology with low cost. Although no statistics are available for Sudan, currently, in Iraq the oil sector employs about 1% of the work force and generates 60% of Iraq’s GDP. Oil revenue for the Iraqi government increased from USD 15 billion in 2003 to over USD 50 billion in 2006 as the value of oil increased but it had little or no discernible impact on employment and poverty. Typically, an increase in oil revenues has no discernible effect on employment levels and poverty reduction. In fact, in the case of Sudan the per capita agricultural production stagnated during 2000-2006 [+0.5%] and in 2006 was negative [-0.6%]. This is the period when Sudan achieved the highest GDP growth. In essence, though the information is sparse, the data available are proxy indicators of wide spread poverty despite the economic boom from oil exports.

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41 European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. Sudan’s oil industry. Facts and analysis. 2008, p 7
42 UNCTAD op cit Statistical Annex p 143
44 UNCTAD op cit Statistic Annex p 141
46 UNCTAD op cit Statistical Annex p 141
Jobless growth is associated with the “resource curse.” In an oil-rich economy, typically, the income from oil extraction increases the demand for all goods. This increased demand is met by imports at fixed international prices. The national production of non-tradable goods is usually characterized by rising marginal costs, and rising prices relative to internationally traded goods. Exchange rate appreciation puts the economy at risk of having too few industrial activities outside of the oil sector. It reduces the diversity of internationally competitive manufacturing activities and exports, and discourages entry into new production and export lines. Since manufactured goods are the quintessential exportable, the resource curse works against the drivers of long-run growth that are needed to sustain the economy once the oil has been depleted.

Poverty reduction relies on an expanding labour market which, in turn, depends on the expansion of labour-intensive enterprises. This requires enterprises outside of the oil sector with the capacity to absorb labour supported by policies that encourage the expansion of the labour-absorbing sectors, i.e. value added agriculture and manufacturing. This requires allocating public investments outside of the oil industry for the production of trade goods that lowers their costs to Sudanese and makes them attractive for international trade. Malaysia, Indonesia and Chile have shown the way. The two essential instruments of public policy are institutional reform and a public investment program. These must be customized to specific Sudanese conditions in order to:

· Improve the investment climate. This includes reducing the costs associated with bureaucracy, corruption, risk, and providing essential business services that are central to building international competitiveness. Also included are reducing customs delays and streamlining export procedures.
· Ensure that education serves a larger percentage of the population, and enrolments continue into the secondary grades. In order to help the poor, educational services need to provide technical and vocational training to create new skills in areas of value-added agriculture, transportation, and communications.

To sum up, Sudan faces a critical challenge of economic diversification that must be carried out within a short time span. Sudan’s vital task, as an oil extracting economy, is to allocate public investments and expenditures outside of the oil industry that lower the costs of producing manufactured or agro processed export goods. The successful experience of Chile [copper], Indonesia, and spectacularly Malaysia demonstrate that it is possible to use public policy to expand and diversify from an oil exporting economy into industrial or agro processing production for the benefit of the population at large.

The Agrarian Based Economy
Although the largest share of national revenue comes from oil exports, agriculture is the biggest economic sector in Sudan. The estimates of its magnitude vary from 80% employment of the

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48 Large oil revenues create a “dependency culture”, both, among the public at large and many policy makers. According to this syndrome, the public sector financed by oil revenue, should provide jobs for everybody. The state should also provide free or subsidized social services, i.e. education, health, transport and communications. This pattern skews a country’s policies and investment priorities to revolve around those who control oil reserves and their revenues. Unsurprisingly, political and bureaucratic vested interests emerge to maintain this status-quo.
49 Page, J. op cit, 2008
work force, with a growth rate of 4% and contributing an average of 40% to the GDP in the period between 2001 and 2005 and 57.4% of the work force, contributing 45.8% to the GDP.

Estimates of Sudan’s cultivable area are from 84 to 105 million hectares, or 34 to 42% of the country’s total area. Between 12.6 and 16.65 million hectares, or 15-16% (1980-2002 data) are actually farmed in a given year, depending largely on rainfall levels. The FAO country report for 2004 indicates that the agricultural sector is the main source of sustained growth and the backbone of Sudan’s economy in terms of contribution to the GDP. The value of the crop and livestock sub-sectors, which together contribute 80 to 90% of non-oil export earnings, is almost equal at 47% and 46% respectively.

Agriculture employs the largest share of the workforce. Field estimates indicate that as much as 83% of the population depends on farming for its livelihood. Recent information indicates that more than 50% of the agricultural work is carried out by women.

Five main types of farming are practiced in Sudan: mechanized rain-fed agricultural schemes; traditional rain-fed agriculture; mechanized irrigation schemes; traditional irrigation; and livestock husbandry/pastoralism. Best estimates of the structure of the sub-sectors indicate that 70% of the workforce depends on traditional rain-fed farming, 12% on irrigated agriculture and only 0.7% on mechanized agriculture. Sorghum, millet and maize are the main food crops. Other important produce for the domestic market includes sugarcane, dates, wheat, sunflower, pulses and forage. The principle export crops are cotton, gum arabic, sesame, groundnuts, fruits and vegetables.

Commercial agricultural activities are roughly concentrated in a belt at the centre of the country. Irrigated agriculture is mainly in the North. The importance of the irrigated sub-sector is reflected in the fact that while it makes up only 7% of the cultivated area, it accounts for more than half of the crop yields. Small-scale subsistence agriculture exists throughout

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51 UNCTAD op cit Statistical Annex p 141
52 UNEP op cit, 2007, p 163. It must be noted that due to the dearth of information, disaggregated figures between North and South are seldom available. Whenever possible disaggregated estimates will be provided.
53 BBC announced that Sudan had received US$ 9 billion so far, in the form of investments in agriculture oriented to export crops [broadcast of 31-12-08] If so, this could open up a window of opportunity to build up rural livelihood systems by taking advantage of markets opened up by these investments, but only if the policy is inclusive.
54 The most recent appraisal of the agriculture sector has been conducted by UNEP. The analysis incorporates environmental considerations. UNEP. Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, Nairobi, 2007
56 There are no disaggregated figures for these types of agriculture, however, the next paragraph provides a glimpse.
57 It falls into two broad categories: traditional irrigation and modern schemes. Approximately 90 percent of the irrigated area is managed under the latter. Sorghum is the main cultivated crop, followed by cotton, fodder, wheat, vegetables, groundnuts and sugarcane.
58 Large-scale irrigation schemes have been North Sudan’s leading economic investment in the past century. Evidence indicates that their performance has been below potential. Of the 1.9 million ha prepared for irrigation, only half was actually cultivated in 2005, owing largely to dilapidated irrigation and drainage infrastructure. UNEP op cit, sec 8.1
Sudan, and is dominant in Southern Sudan and Darfur. This is generally a low input/low yield production system characterized by small farms ranging from 2 to 30 ha in size and relying on labour intensive cultivation with hand tools. On average, traditional and mechanized agriculture accounts for 55 and 45 % respectively of the rain-fed cultivated area. It is estimated that due to the vagaries of rainfall, land degradation, and conflict, significant swathes of mechanized agriculture have been abandoned.

The main problem facing the traditional rain-fed sector is population pressure driving unsustainable rates of land use. This has also led to deforestation. To meet the subsistence needs of the family unit, traditional farmers are burning and clearing forests that would have a much higher return as agro forestry plantations than as short-term crops. It is reported that in Southern Sudan, high-value timber trees are being burnt simply to clear land for a few years of low-intensity maize production. Food security looms as a paramount issue across Sudan. [UNEP, 2007, p 161]

**Livestock and grazing** land estimates vary between 97 and 117 million hectares, or 39 and 47 % of the country. Rangeland is part of almost all of Sudan’s ecological zones, except for mountain and real desert areas. An overwhelming proportion (80%) is in semi-desert and low rainfall savannah zones characterized by unpredictable rainfall and frequent droughts. Thus, the rangeland’s vulnerability to overgrazing is high, and its overlap with cultivation is a major source of potential conflict [UNEP, 2007, pp 179-189].

With the second largest herd on the continent (after Ethiopia), there are three types of livestock rearing: pure nomadic, semi-nomadic pastoralist, and a sedentary system. It is practiced by an estimated 40% of the population. This figure is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60 percent of the population depends on livestock. The livestock population consists mainly of camels, sheep and goats in the desert and semi-desert areas, and of cattle in the low to high rainfall savannah and Upper Nile floodplains. The estimated head count is impressive: approximately 135 million in 2004. The stocking rate has increased six fold in less than fifty years, from a population size of 22 million in 1959. There is no recent livestock census available for Southern Sudan, where estimates of the population range from 12 to 22 million. With these figures, overgrazing was inevitable.

However, a second cause of overgrazing is a major reduction in rangelands over the past several decades in central and northern Sudan. This is due to uncontrolled expansion of mechanized and traditional rain-fed agriculture; desertification; and to a less extent, expansion of irrigation schemes.

Rangeland reduction is most prevalent in northern and central Sudan and has caused problems for the pastoralist’s mobility. Pastoralists in Sudan have historically been very mobile, but have kept their annual herd migrations to relatively well-defined routes. In order to reach new pastures,

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59 Deforestation is occurring at a fast rate. Between 1990 and 2005 Sudan lost 11.6% of forest cover. This is likely to get worse in the near future with the return of refugees and IDPs. See: UNDP/BCPR, op cit, p 23

60 Specifically, the characteristics are: (i) pure nomadism, based largely on the herding of camels, sheep and goats by the Abbala in the semi-arid and arid north; (ii) semi-nomadic agropastoralism, combining the herding of cattle and some sheep with a form of cultivation by the Baggarra and Dinka/Nuer in central and south Sudan as well as in the seasonal *wadis* of the north; and (iii) a sedentary system, where cattle and small livestock are reared in close proximity to villages, mainly in the central belt from Gedaref to Kordofan/Darfur. [UNEP, 2007: 179-189]

61 Their general pattern is to move north and south to optimize grazing conditions and minimize pest problems. In the dry season, the movement is southwards towards the better pastures and later rainfall; in
pastoralists pass through agricultural regions. In a land without fences, agricultural and grazing zones are not clearly delimitated. Competition for land is at the heart of many local conflicts. This major reduction in the amount, quality and accessibility of grazing land is considered a root cause of conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies throughout the drier parts of Sudan.

The response to food security from the government side has been inadequate to the needs of small-scale rain-fed farmers and extensive livestock producers. The Ministry of Agriculture proposes a mega “agricultural revitalization” plan of USD 5 billion from 2008 - 2011. The plan will incorporate private entrepreneurs and will target export crops, e.g. wheat, maize, fruits and vegetables. There is no evidence of a systematic and comprehensive programme to tackle the developmental challenges of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock practices.

Summary
Approximately 83% of the workforce depends on farming for its livelihood. The bulk of farmers (70%) rely on rain-fed farming to meet the subsistence needs of the family. Available estimates (virtually all from northern and central Sudan) indicate that the traditional rain-fed sector contributes the entire Sudan production of millet, 11 % of sorghum, 48 % of groundnuts and 28 % of sesame.

Although traditional rain-fed agriculture has been practiced in Sudan for millennia, the patterns of crop and livestock production systems are experiencing a breakdown because of demographic, political, and technical constraints. The key issue is population pressure driving unsustainable rates of, both, land use and deforestation.

Livestock-rearing, a central component of the agricultural sector is typically nomadic in co-existence with semi-nomadic/agro pastoralist and a sedentary system. An estimated 40 percent of the Sudanese population practices livestock rearing. It is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60 percent of the population depends on livestock.

Due to the characteristics of the predominant ecosystems, the rangeland’s vulnerability to overgrazing is high and can result in desertification. In addition, a substantial reduction in rangeland areas has occurred over the past several decades due to uncontrolled expansion of mechanized and traditional rain-fed agriculture, and to a lesser extent, expansion of irrigation schemes. Competition for land is at the heart of many local conflicts. Therefore, this major reduction in the amount, quality and accessibility of grazing land is considered a root cause of conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies throughout the drier parts of Sudan.

It is not surprising that food security is a paramount issue across Sudan—which is exacerbated by competition over grazing land; in turn, this conundrum has been aggravated by the dynamics of oil exploration, extraction and apportionment of oil revenue.

the wet season, it is generally northwards to follow new growth and avoid the flooding, mud, and insect-borne diseases prevalent in the more humid regions. A similar pattern of migration, though over shorter distances, occurs in the hilly regions, where valleys are grazed mainly in the dry season and high rangeland mainly in the wet season. [UNEP 2007: 179-189]


63 To the contrary, recent evidence appears to suggest that Sudan supplies the land while its neighbors supply the money, management, science, and equipment. Sudan is exporting wheat for Saudi Arabia; sorghum for camels in the United Arab Emirates; and wheat, beans, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, oranges, and bananas for Jordan. Cf.: Gettleman, J. (2008). Darfur Withers as Sudan Sells Food. New York Times August 10, 2008. Cited in UNEP Yearbook 2009, Nairobi, pp 14-15
**Political Evolution**

Military regimes and internal conflict have dominated national politics since Sudan’s independence in 1956. Since then, there were two prolonged civil wars. The first ended in 1973 with the Addis Ababa Agreement, but a second broke out again in 1983. The second war and the related famine resulted in more than four million people displaced and two million deaths over a period of two decades.64

Peace talks gained momentum in 2002-04 with the signing of several accords. The final North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in January 2005, granted South Sudan autonomy for six years based on “one country/two systems” to be followed by a self-determination referendum. There are three protocols concerning the status of the three border areas - Abyei, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan State. They were located along the frontlines during the North-South civil war and were particularly hard hit by the country’s decades of warfare. Each area faces an influx of refugees and internally displaced persons, widespread poverty, insecurity, and a lack of basic infrastructure. Consequently, the three areas have special status under “protocols” attached to the CPA. These states will decide in 2011 whether they will join the North or the South.

A separate conflict, which broke out in the western region of Darfur in 2003, has displaced nearly two million people and caused an estimated 200,000 deaths. The UN took command of the Darfur peacekeeping operation from the African Union on 31 December 2007. As early as 2008, peacekeeping troops were struggling to stabilize the situation, which became increasingly widespread, and brought instability to eastern Chad. Delay of humanitarian assistance to affected populations often occurred because of armed conflict, poor transport infrastructure and the weak level of government cooperation.

The "wealth sharing" item on the negotiation agendas evokes concerns on inequitable development and impoverishment among the population. The CPA entitles the GoS to 50% of all oil revenues produced in the South (after the producing state receives 2% and a deduction for the Oil Stabilization Fund).65 However, the official Government production figures cannot be verified. The GOSS considers this a major point of contention, understandably, as oil is its only independent source of income.66

The formulation and adoption of the Interim National Constitution (INC), within the framework of the CPA, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS, Dec 2005) and, later, of states’ constitutions, represents a first essential step towards the implementation of the agreement. It is the first practical step towards providing a national constitutional framework for democratizing Sudan. The democratic principles of human rights emphasized in the CPA agreement incorporated in the new INC as well as the ICSS grant freedom of speech and association, including political participation, to every Sudanese. From a strategic and long-term perspective, the promotion of a democratic culture, with adherence to the rule of law, is a fundamental goal.

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64 UNDP/BCPR op cit, Table 2.1, p 24
65 European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. Sudan’s oil industry. Facts and analysis. 2008, pp 34-35
66 Wealth sharing appears stalled by boundary disputes. “A North-South Border Commission has been established, which is yet to come to a decision on where the border between North and South Sudan lies. The ruling NCP and GoSS dispute whether the Heglig field, which produces 37% of Sudan’s oil, is in the North or South; and in the current stand-off, the GoSS is not receiving 50% of Heglig revenues. Disputes persist over other fields in the Melut Basin. The district of Abyei is another potential flashpoint, and the results of an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report were rejected by the NCP.” See: European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. op cit, p 35
for sustaining Sudanese democracy. The forthcoming programme should therefore consider preparing capacity building efforts in order to strengthen the electoral process and associated institutions prior to forthcoming elections.

“The Sudan has the greatest opportunity in a generation to build peace and to improve the lives of its entire people, especially the poor and conflict-affected communities. The most critical challenges of the recovery and development phases are to re-establish sustained security for people to return; create opportunities for them to re-integrate and rebuild their livelihoods; build trust between the people and Government, as well as between different communities; and equitably distribute resources.”

2.3 The Human Development Context

UNDAF [2008, page 5] summarizes starkly the estimated poverty rates: up to 90 % in Southern Sudan, the three protocols of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, and over 50 % nationally. Barely 1 in 5 children complete primary school; clean water is available to only 1 in 4 in some regions.

The longest-running civil war left 2 million dead, displaced 4 million, reinforced ancient tribal and ethnic rivalries and severely limited infrastructure development, all exacerbated by a perceived centralization of power in Khartoum. Moreover, pockets of insecurity have remained in both the North and South since the CPA came into force in 2005.

As highlighted in the JAM, performance against the MDG indicators demonstrates inequalities with respect to gender, rural-urban residence, and at the regional and sub-regional levels. These disparities are associated with socio-economic differences; population movements related to conflict; lack of basic infrastructure in Southern Sudan; and other humanitarian effects of the conflict. Table 3 illustrates disparities between Northern and Southern Sudan. As reviewed earlier, these disparities are cause and effect of conflicts historically originated because of ethnic, religious, and socio-economic differences. Competition for scarce natural resources; for land, for cattle grazing and migration rights among and between tribes and ethnic groups exacerbates these differences. Since the mid-1970s, the dynamics of oil exploration, extraction and apportionment of revenue aggravated the whole process.

In spite of the above mentioned predicament, Sudan has the technical potential necessary to reduce poverty through economic diversification, which must be carried out within a short time span. As is discussed in 2.2, the successful experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Chile [copper] demonstrate that it is possible to use public policy to expand and diversify an oil exporting economy into an industrial or agro processing production one, for the benefit of the population at large. This policy approach enables poverty reduction efforts through the expansion

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67 To this end, three important exercises stipulated in the CPA include: 1- conducting a population census as a key tool for planning; 2- resource allocation for equitable development as a pre-requisite for the planning processes, and 3- referendum for self-determination to strengthen the democratization process.

69 GoNU/GoSS/UN. Sudan Country Analysis. 2007, p 27
70 Best estimates of Sudan’s proven oil reserves using existing technology indicate that oil production will peak in 2008. Revenues can then be maintained for another 10 years [2018], depending on prices. Cf.: European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. Sudan’s oil industry. Facts and analysis. 2008, pp 21-23
of the labour-absorbing sectors, for example, value added agriculture and manufacturing. The potential of using strategic alliances for this purpose is discussed in section 4.6.

Table 3 Sudan: Status of MDG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>2015 Target [North Sudan]</th>
<th>2015 Target [Southern Sudan]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG1 Poverty and Hunger</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated poverty incidence [% of total Population] [a]</td>
<td>50-90 %</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of child malnutrition [underweight moderate and severe % Under 5] [b]</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG2 Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net attendance rate of primary School age children [b]</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completion rate [b]</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG3 Gender equality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio girls t boys in primary education Gender Parity Index [b]</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s literacy rate [a]</td>
<td>N: 62%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: 12%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of women in National Assembly/Council States [a]</td>
<td>N: 9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S: 4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MDG4 Child Mortality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000) [112] [b]</td>
<td>50-90%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) [b]</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG5 Maternal mortality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) [a]</td>
<td>1.107 (N:638) (S:2,037)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth attended by skilled health staff (%) [b]</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG6 HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge about HIV prevention (correctly identifying two ways of avoiding infection) [a]</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV prevalence [%adults ages 15-49] [a]</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 5 with fever treated with anti-malaria [%] [b]</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDG7 Environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of improved drinking water sources [b]</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of sanitary means of excreta disposal [b]</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. UNDP Contribution to Development Results

3.1 Analysis of UNDP CCF-2 [2002-2006] and Bridging Programme for [2007-2008]

3.1.1 Strategy of Programming Assistance

Concept

Development planning is challenging even in an economy without the legacy of civil war and destruction. Although a few countries with one or the other of these problems have been successful in development planning, different principles are required for a country that needs to both build and rebuild foundations, and to establish the conditions of self-sustaining and inclusive
growth in the aftermath of violent conflict. These principles to design post-conflict economic recovery are neither obvious nor simple.

UNDP/BCPR has proposed a road map for guidance in the uncharted area of post-conflict economic recovery composed of the following drivers: reconstructing basic economic infrastructure; reconstituting human capital; integrating ex combatants; rebuilding social capital, local institutions and governance; providing employment and livelihoods, and mediating access to finance. 71

Three overarching principles support these drivers: gender equity, context appropriateness and conflict sensitivity. Gender consideration, a moral and practical imperative, is central to the notion of human and society development. It allows individuals to contribute their full potential to society regardless of gender, thereby strengthening societies. Context must consider the demography and social dynamics of the conflict-affected society together with the dominant modes of livelihood. Moreover, the design of every intervention must be conflict-sensitive. Firstly, it must help prevent or transform violence as a solution to conflicts and promote mechanisms and capacities for peaceful, non-violent conflict management and resolution. Secondly, it must contribute to reduction of the structural causes and escalating factors of violent conflicts. 72

This approach requires finding the right balance between immediate and long-term goals with historical considerations, where applicable. It means reconciling the need for quick and visible gains while supporting the longer-term activities necessary for sustainable human development. In specific social contexts characterized by pervasive social and economic inequities, there is an opportunity to address these inequities by building back differently, rather than merely re-establishing them.73

As schematically shown in Figure 1, there is a systematic linkage with the other drivers in a pattern reflecting the reality under consideration so it can be operational. The aim is to manage the relationships among drivers such that the whole system provides employment and livelihoods for sustainable human development.74 It is possible that livelihoods and employment may not be one of the competitive advantages of UNDP Sudan. As discussed in section 3.3, the ground realities across Sudan indicate that enhancing livelihoods is a paramount factor in post conflict economic recovery.

72 The problem is not societal conflict per se, but the way in which it is managed and resolved. See: GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fürTechnische Zusammenarbeit) Private Sector Development in (Post-) Conflict Situations. Guidebook. 2008, p 10
73 For example, two cases testify that what previously existed in two countries were societies with pervasive social and economic inequities that had to build back differently. This is evinced in two studies that examined the pre-conflict conditions in El Salvador (i.e. the civil war of the 1980s), and Nicaragua (i.e. when dictator Somoza was toppled in 1978). For Nicaragua, see: IFAD. Informe de la misión especial de programación a Nicaragua. IFAD. Roma, Octubre 1980. For El Salvador, see: E. R. Quiroga. Le rôle des institutions dans le processus du changement technologique: étude de cas du Salvador. Département d’Économie et Gestion. Thèse du doctorat Nouveau Régime. Université de Paris VIII à Saint-Denis, France. 1996.
74 In this light, a ‘good’ program is optimally adapted to the local context by taking full account of local and national capacities and seeking to build on existing practices in a creative manner. It is one where local communities are actively engaged in strategic decision making, even as they consciously seek to build bridges across old sources of tension. See: UNDP/BCPR, op cit, pp 48-96
3.1.2 The CCF2: Programme Characteristics Strategy

The CCF-2 Programme [2002-2006] contained two underlying areas geared towards poverty reduction: 1- Improving governance and environmental management and 2- Promoting peace and social inclusion. The three cross cutting themes were gender, HIV/AIDS, and ICT.

In 2005 the CCF-2’s objectives and priorities were superseded with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Eastern Sudan and Darfur Peace Agreements. In consultation with the Government of National Unity (GoNU), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and other partners, “the UNDP Sudan Strategic Framework for the Bridging Programme 2007-2008” was prepared (henceforth Bridging Programme). It’s goal is “to promote sustainable peace and development by providing strategic support for the implementation of the peace agreements, guided by the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), in partnership with the parties to the peace agreements, civil society, and the national and international development partners.”

To this end, four programme areas will be assessed, in the following order:

· 1. Fostering Democratic Governance and the RoL,
· 2. Promoting Human Security and Recovery,
· 3. Reducing Human Poverty and Advancing Progress Towards the MDGs, and
· 4. Cross-cutting issues: developing the capacity of institutions and processes at all levels, gender inequality, addressing environmental degradation, mainstreaming HIV/AIDS, and integrating conflict transformation and prevention.

Within these programme areas a set of ten outcomes was implemented in the North as well as nationally, whereas a set of six outcomes was implemented in the South. The strategy of programming assistance was characterized by its remarkable flexibility and responsiveness to the country’s priorities and needs. It worked around sensitive issues associated with legitimacy and domination by local and national social structures.

· In the context of post-conflict peace setting together with continuous escalating conflict and humanitarian assistance, urgent needs emerged. The Programme became flexible to meet these vital challenges.
· The transitional framework arrangements for the presence and work of the UN system in Sudan proved to be a challenge to UNDP because the UNCT team had more humanitarian than development workers.
· Massive new funding for UNDP from non-core and extra-budgetary resources brought an additional work load for applying these funds to UNDP programmes. It is not surprising that some of the UNDP operations among projects and programmes slowed down in order to absorb the additional funds.
· Some stakeholders claimed that UNDP's engagement in raising and managing funds hinders its capacity to operate strategically. Although there was an increase in workload, there is no evidence indicating that the capacity to operate strategically slowed down.
· However, in the South, where banking infrastructure and financial services are in the making, financial operations can be time consuming. The Mission was surprised that some stakeholders did not understand that a financial transaction without banking services is time consuming.

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75 The Bridging Programme’s areas and cross-cutting issues responded directly to at least six of the eight strategic objectives outlined in Sudan’s five-year development plan for 2007 – 2011.
77 The UNDP Resident Representative was named DSRSG for humanitarian assistance.
consuming as every step in the process needs to be done manually—as opposed to current electronic processing of banking transactions that are much faster.

The Bridging Programme provided an exploratory framework for programming. Sudan was dominated by contrasting national and regional circumstances and dynamics in Darfur, the east, the south and the transitional areas. UNDP's programme in the North and South concentrated on immediate post-conflict needs and the implementation of the CPA. The evolving Darfur conflict brought about the displacement of an estimated 2 million people. In addition, the three conflict-affected Protocol Areas (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile) required accelerated recovery assistance to provide basic social services, to restore livelihoods, to accommodate returnees and to re-integrate ex-combatants. Therefore, UNDP’s programme featured a recovery-oriented framework to reconstitute the apparatus of government and institute RoL actions.

The restoration of RoL, stemming from the massive population displacement in Darfur into IDP camps and the vacuum in legal protection in IDP camps, dominated UNDP’s programming in the North. In the South, there was equally strong emphasis on RoL and governance with consideration of the cultural history of the region.

Under the circumstances, the recovery-oriented work took precedence over all priorities. As consequence, there was little or no advance in upstream policy. For example, opportunities for urgent assistance at the policy level arose during the Darfur conflict, especially in the governance sector. If these had been seized in time, UNDP could have played a strategic role in the key deliberations on the interim constitution, the formation of political parties, and the election laws
by providing the different negotiating parties with exposure to similar experiences and laws elsewhere.\(^7^8\)

Circumstances can change rapidly in Sudan. For this reason, a recovery framework to reconstitute the apparatus of government and the RoL was necessary. In the North, the RoL and Access to Justice emerged as key areas. While in the South, besides the field-based access to justice programming, the strategy also combined institution and capacity-building efforts for the new RoL institutions and legal framework outlined in the CPA, INC, and ICSS. Foundational support projects for the Judiciary, Police, Prisons, and Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development were essential to establishing the transitional governance system. However, the economic factors needed for the country’s reconstruction and long-term development were temporarily subordinated to the recovery strategy.

In sum, UNDP’s recovery-oriented Bridging Programme responded with priorities, programme areas and cross-cutting issues focussed directly on Sudan’s long-term strategic objectives. These are outlined in the national five-year development plan for 2007 – 2011. Annex 4 contains an assessment of the level of progress towards outcomes [2002-2008] for the North and the South.

3.1.3 Resource Mobilization

According to Table 4, over the period 2006-2008, UNDP delivered a total of USD 457 million—USD 318 million [70%] of which went to the North and USD 138 million [30%] of which to the South.

From the total amount delivered, core funds [USD 21 million] represent only 5% and non core funds 95% of the total delivery [USD 436 million]. Over the period under analysis, the yearly increase in delivery was 67%. Although there are no public sources of information on the delivery of other post conflict countries, the absolute figures are impressive, in particular when looking at the growth over the period under consideration. This growth testifies to the trust placed in UNDP by donors operating in Sudan. The list of donors and the associated funds channelled through the UNDP are available at the UNDP Finance Unit.

**Table 4. UNDP/Sudan: Delivery by Source [2006-2008]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>4,995,037.31</td>
<td>4,593,769.66</td>
<td>3,325,522.41</td>
<td>12,914,329.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-Sharing/Global Funds/Co-financing</td>
<td>51,645,087.87</td>
<td>53,838,442.91</td>
<td>80,473,420.08</td>
<td>231,956,950.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>23,303,956.60</td>
<td>19,665,842.74</td>
<td>30,399,541.46</td>
<td>73,369,340.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub total</td>
<td>79,944,081.78</td>
<td>118,098,055.31</td>
<td>120,198,483.93</td>
<td>318,240,621.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>4,233,064.97</td>
<td>2,400,594.48</td>
<td>1,202,045.18</td>
<td>7,835,704.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust fund</td>
<td>1,135,567.27</td>
<td>8,577,111.71</td>
<td>13,019,567.63</td>
<td>22,732,246.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub total</td>
<td>25,631,108.49</td>
<td>42,334,785.40</td>
<td>70,954,236.70</td>
<td>138,920,130.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>105,575,190.27</td>
<td>160,432,840.71</td>
<td>191,152,720.63</td>
<td>457,160,751.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP/Sudan. Finance Unit, 2009

Table 5 shows each expenditure, by programme area, for the period 2006-2008. Note that the categories are those of the UNDP Finance Unit. The dominant programme area in the North, as a percentage of the total regional expenditure, is Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR), followed

\(^7^8\) In the near future, two opportunities for UNDP assistance at the policy and reform level may emerge: [1] decentralization as a major national commitment, and [2] capacity building of local governance for pro-poor planning at states level.
by HIV/AIDS/Gender/Global Fund and Governance & RoL. Half of the total expenditure is accounted for by the Management Support Unit (MSU), the Fund Management Unit (FMU) and the Resident Coordinator (RC) projects.79

In the North, during the period under consideration, the programme areas CPR and HIV/AIDS/Gender/Global Fund more than doubled their yearly change in delivery rate. In contrast, delivery stagnated in the programme area of Governance & RoL. This reflects the ongoing political challenges in Darfur and particularly in Abye, where the programme had to stop temporarily.

In the South, the delivery rates of the Programme themes exhibit a different pattern. The dominant programme, as a percentage of the total regional expenditure, is Governance & RoL. This is followed by HIV-AIDS/Gender/Global Fund and CPR. Expenditures on FMU, SMU and RC projects account for 5% of the total expenditure. The yearly change in delivery rate in CPR was more than twofold and higher than that of the other programme themes.

Overall, for both the North and the South, for the period under consideration, the figures indicate an impressive growth in delivery rates in terms of absolute numbers. The growth in delivery rates by programme area is more than satisfactory, with the exception of programme areas temporarily paralyzed by political challenges.

In terms of addressing national needs, the overall expenditure pattern reflects UNDP and its partners full support to Sudan’s post-conflict recovery. Sudan now exists as “one country/two-systems” and consequently there are two separate budgets. The vital expenditures needed to reconstitute the apparatus of government, and which are supported by RoL institution, reflect regional differences, as conditions differ from region to region. The livelihood and health/gender programmes are beginning to reconstitute and enhance peoples’ quality of life. On the whole, the delivery figures signal ample flexibility exercised by UNDP and partners, which is needed in order to match the unique circumstances experienced by Sudan.

### Table 5: UNDP/Sudan: Delivery by Programme Area [2006-2008] [in USD]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Theme</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Rule of Law</td>
<td>12,927,433.34</td>
<td>12,916,584.29</td>
<td>12,071,373.56</td>
<td>37,915,391.19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
<td>13,604,951.77</td>
<td>23,053,338.87</td>
<td>30,591,071.92</td>
<td>67,249,362.56</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS &amp; Gender including Global Fund</td>
<td>9,723,452.97</td>
<td>19,419,926.43</td>
<td>24,511,014.05</td>
<td>53,654,393.45</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (FMU, MSU, RC Projects, Others)</td>
<td>43,688,243.70</td>
<td>62,708,205.72</td>
<td>53,025,024.40</td>
<td>159,421,473.82</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td>79,944,081.78</td>
<td>118,098,055.31</td>
<td>120,198,483.93</td>
<td>318,240,621.02</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Rule of Law</td>
<td>14,030,164.29</td>
<td>19,584,346.33</td>
<td>27,818,916.05</td>
<td>61,433,426.67</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
<td>1,522,479.84</td>
<td>7,362,136.74</td>
<td>22,221,822.45</td>
<td>31,096,439.03</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS &amp; Gender including Global Fund</td>
<td>7,867,993.14</td>
<td>9,306,140.17</td>
<td>16,974,818.12</td>
<td>34,148,951.43</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (FMU, MSU, RC Projects, Others)</td>
<td>2,210,471.22</td>
<td>6,002,162.16</td>
<td>3,938,680.08</td>
<td>12,143,313.46</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub total</strong></td>
<td>25,631,108.49</td>
<td>42,334,785.40</td>
<td>70,954,236.70</td>
<td>138,920,130.59</td>
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</tr>
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<td>457,160,751.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP/Sudan. Finance Unit, 2009

79 With time available, the Evaluation Mission focused on the development results from the outcome evaluation.
Four kinds of execution modalities normally carry out the necessary work, i.e. direct execution (DEX) by UNDP; UN Agencies; NGOs; and National Execution (NEX). During this cycle, however, only three were used: UNDP/DEX, UN Agencies execution and NEX.

Because the project and the programmes were designed because of the necessity imposed by the circumstances of emergency response, no technical judgement can be made about the merits of the execution modalities of these programmes as compared to ones that were not used but were technically possible. In situations of emergency response, there is little or no time to carry out even pre-feasibility analysis for implementing arrangements and management procedures. It must also be noted that most donors, under any conditions, are not interested in financing either feasibility studies or cost-benefit assessments.

There are several observations based on ground experiences that merit consideration. For example, one programme evaluation considers DEX to be suitable to the constantly changing development context of Sudan, in particular to the requirements of the RoL programme, which demands a flexible approach for implementing projects, whereby UNDP maintains direct control over project inputs, enhancing the delivery of outputs and cost-effective expected outcomes.

In another programme evaluation, under EC funding, UNDP organized an Action Management Unit (AMU) to conduct the RRP programme across all of Sudan. Although the programme will contribute significantly to future peace, the evaluation found that AMU suffered from senior staff shortages, inexperienced management and a lack of funds and facilities that should have been provided by UNDP under the Co-financing Agreement.

In the South, where financial services and banking infrastructure are in the making, together with the necessary commercial legal instruments, it is extremely complex to run programmes in “business as usual” mode. The CO/Juba has been proactively searching for ways to increase the ownership of programmes that will support sustainability; however this is not always possible to attain. For example, national NGOs are impeded in their ability to execute operations because of the absence of banking and commercial legal instruments. This is compounded by the fact that implementing post conflict recovery is extremely intricate.

Lesson Learned
UNDP is ultimately responsible for all funds and must therefore exercise prudence. Under a post-conflict context, the evidence available, though fragmented, indicates that there are no panaceas for executing modalities. This is because of the necessity imposed by the circumstances of emergency response and the fact that most donors, under any conditions, are not prone to finance either feasibility studies or cost-benefit assessments for management purposes. Because the development context in Sudan is exceedingly complex and in continual evolution, arrangements should be calibrated case by case and in the context of the prevailing characteristics of the North and the South.

UNDP should consider assembling an arsenal of blueprints that can be used for project preparation, implementation, monitoring and executing corresponding modalities for emergency response in post-conflict and economic reconstruction contexts. These blueprints can be modified and adapted to the specific context and will allow for the accumulation of lessons learned each time a blueprint is used. Technical evaluations of the most promising executing modalities could

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be used as a litmus test. The publication of UNDP/BCPR Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report 2008 is a step in this direction. 81

3.2 Programme Area: Fostering Democratic Governance and Rule of Law

The programme area focused on supporting increased accountability and transparency of government at all levels to ensure fulfilment of the commitments of the peace agreements. Priority areas were:

- Access to justice, judicial reform, and capacity building for RoL institutions.
- Decentralized governance including policy, strategy and capacity development.
- Parliamentary development, the issue of gender and political participation; capacity development of political parties, electoral assistance, and support to civil society.
- Public Administration reform, including civil service reform, accountability and transparency, and aid management/co-ordination.

UNDP’s historical presence and commitment to Sudan, places UNDP to lead Sudan’s complex socio-economic and political evolution. The RoL programme evolved hand-in-hand with democratic governance in the three Protocol areas, the North and the South. 82 The approach has been to develop programmes for poverty alleviation using a governance lens which enables the RoL to influence development. 83 Its implementation is at various levels of progress for each of the different geographic regions and each of the different components. In nearly all cases, outputs are being produced that will become outcomes. It is too early to discern completed outcomes. 84 It will take a few more years to produce tangible results, as is discussed in section 3.2.

The RoL Outcome Evaluation [2008, pp 1-6] noted that the “outcome has advanced incrementally in Northern and Southern Sudan via its support to the Judiciaries; support to the Ministry of Justice (North) and the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Constitutional Development (South); support to Police and Prisons; and support to Access to Justice. This includes raising human rights awareness, legal information for all stakeholders in Sudan, and legal representation and advocacy for IDPs and most vulnerable groups.

…Customary law and traditional authorities have been supported, but only to a relatively limited degree…

…UNDP, in close cooperation with UNMIS, advanced the outcome via its support of improvements in prison infrastructure (i.e. water and sanitation; dormitories for inmates) at several locations in Northern and Southern Sudan…

…In Northern Sudan, UNDP trained police and prison officers in human rights, Sudanese law and concepts of community policing; and facilitated community policing in Khartoum’s IDP camps.

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82 The relevant overall goal is outlined in the Sudan’s five-year development plan: “…good governance and democratic process secured by basic freedoms, rule of law, respect of human rights and justice.” The specific national target as outlined in the national plan is to increase the rate of participation in the coming general election to 80%. Ref. The Five Year Plan 2007-2011, Objectives, Challenges and Opportunities, Vol I.
83 This approach may be considered UNDP comparative advantage in governance and RoL. Cf.: UNDP. Supply and demand: bringing law and development together. Khartoum, 2008
84 In some cases, progress is made towards outcomes but outcomes have not reached the level of development as articulated in the Programme document outcomes. For example, there maybe valid results that significantly improve development at the local level but may not change the national development situation. These outcomes are referred to as intermediate outcomes. Ref. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators: Evaluation Office New York, 2002, p 16
In Southern Sudan, UNDP provided technical advice to the Prison Service; trained police and prison officials; and cooperated with UNMIS to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate former SLPA soldiers and other armed groups into the police and prison services. UNDP has also funded the construction of model police stations in several locations…”

In sum, the Mission concurs that the Outcome has made crucial strides with respect to raising human rights awareness as well as advocacy for IDPs and most vulnerable groups together with legal information centers; Justice and Confidence Centre (JCC) paralegal-led mediations and referrals of cases to UNDP’s Legal Aid Network lawyers. UNDP has taken an innovative approach by going to the most remote locations to conduct training and legal seminars despite the ongoing hostilities. In this manner, UNDP JCC paralegals and Legal Aid Network lawyers have rendered mediation and representation to many hundreds of individuals throughout Sudan. UNDP has managed to support legal victories in the courts of Darfur and elsewhere that has advanced the rule of law, particularly in regard to sexual gender based violence (SGBV).

The financial delivery in Governance & RoL in the North and South during the time under consideration is approximately USD 100 million. This corresponds to more than 35% of total delivery [without taking into account FMU, MSU, RC funds]. The main funding partners are: the UK’s DFID, the Governments of Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT-Canada), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the European Union (EU) and the World Bank. In the case of Southern Sudan, the GoSS is a donor with respect to the MDTF Police and Prisons Project and in some of UNDP’s cost-sharing arrangements (e.g., Judiciary Support Project). The UNDP Sudan Fund Management Unit administers a number of Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF).

UNDP conducts the RoL programme in coordination with a number of UN sister agencies and missions as well the Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF). The SPF is comprised of UNDP, Netherlands, UK (DFID), and Denmark (DANIDA). It is a funding framework to facilitate flexible fund flow to the most needed development priorities of the government of Sudan, with particular reference to Governance/RoL, and recovery related activities.

UNMIS is UNDP’s key UN-partner for RoL programming. UNDP also collaborated actively with UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, UNIFEM, FAO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WB, MDTF Technical Secretariat in areas of rule of law and good governance. The UNMIS/UNDP Steering Committee on Rule of Law report of April 2006 outlined a division of labour for each entity in the RoL sector in Sudan.

3.2.1 Key Results in the North

In the North, the access to justice programme is expanding in six different states and is identifying cases of vulnerable and marginalized groups for assistance. Training of paralegals for Justice and Confidence Centres (JCCs’) has been systematic. In Darfur, the RoL and Access to Justice Programmes seek to build capacity and access to justice within a post conflict region where a virtual RoL vacuum exists. UNDP and partners support raising awareness of large segments of the population, both IDPs and formal and informal legal practitioners, on basic

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85 A network of 60 lawyers and 150 paralegals filled the legal vacuum that existed because of conflict and displacement. The vital contribution of paralegals has been confirmed by the Mission during working sessions scheduled for this purpose.
human rights principles, including combating sexual gender based violence. Consequently, people become empowered, participate in decisions that affect their lives, and their quality of life begins to change.

In Kassala and Darfur, the RoL fundamentals were advanced through legal information centres; human rights and legal awareness raising activities; JCC, paralegal-led mediations and referrals of cases to the Legal Aid Network of lawyers. In the IDP camps around Khartoum, UNDP’s contribution resulted in better awareness by displaced persons of their basic legal rights, improved community policing and security in the IDP camps.

Providing legal aid to sexual and gender-based violence survivors gained acceptance by the local authorities in Darfur because of UNDP-supported legal interventions and advocacy. A vital result was the abolition of police Form 8. The support of El Fasher radio station on a series of gender-related topics, but especially SGBV, was considered as highly relevant, of good quality and having wide outreach at the village level. It empowered the most vulnerable segment of society who suffered the lion’s share of the conflict’s atrocities. Generally, the RoL programme adopted a recovery framework to fill the legal protection vacuum that existed.

There are signs of progress in criminal law towards global standards. Recent judicial decisions reflecting global standards, have improved the decisions of the courts in cases of criminal law. The National Constitutional Court, which is a separate body from the National Judiciary, ruled in May 2007 on the constitutionality of Article 130 of the Sudanese Criminal Procedure Act (1991). The Court declared that the use of Art. 130 to suspend a newspaper limited the freedom of the press as guaranteed in the INC.

In the governance area, there has been progress towards intermediate outcomes in gender equity and political participation. Leadership training for women exceeded expectations and contributed to the personal and professional empowerment of a great number of women. This result was strengthened through policy reform by the Political Parties Act. It allocates a 25% quota for women in 40% of the constituencies. This can best be termed as “relative representation” in legislative bodies at the federal and states level.

There has been vital progress towards the outcome in participatory bottom-up planning and capacity building for pro-poor planning at the local government. Three states (Kassala, the Red Sea and South Kordofan) have acquired skills in the preparation of a five-year development plan incorporating the MDGs and using Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) as a planning tool. A description of this tool is in the next section. These states have demonstrated competence in conducting effective state planning and budgeting.

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86 JCCs are estimated to have processed 3500 cases in Darfur to 153 cases processed in Kassala.
87 Form 8 which mandated that unless the form is completed and filed with police, the victim cannot access medical treatment and, consequently, evidence of rape as the processing of the form is very slow and may take days to process
88 UNDP Outcome Evaluation for the Sudan Rule of Law. December 2008
89 See, Art. 121 of the INC
91 UNDP. Evaluation Report of the Good Governance & Equity in Political Participation project, November 2008
92 The elections law stipulates for a division of total constituencies into a 60% geographic representation and a 40% relative representation for key social groups such as women.
The Kassala state made additional progress through the applications of TRMA by using it at the local level. Analysis and maps for three pilot localities were completed. Relevant capacity for planning within the localities and the requisite training capacity among the core working groups was built. Teams were trained and demonstrated their effectiveness in capacity building activities related to state planning and budgeting. A discussion of the potential contribution of TRMA to development results is in the next section.

UNDP’s counterpart, the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), was the object of capacity-building efforts in Aid management and coordination. MIC’s partnership with UNDP increased the level of effectiveness in aid management and coordination. UNDP supported the development of the Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID) with reporting capabilities and accessibility through the MIC intranet. The Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration Survey collected data in collaboration with MIC. There was a good response from these donors. Additionally, aid coordination raised awareness of the importance of M&E when the MIC established a multi-ministry M&E unit composed of key government entities relevant to aid management and coordination.

There was little progress, however, in the support of public administration reform, including civil service reform. This is despite the fact that UNDP provided strategic inputs to help jumpstart implementation activities through the establishment of a programme implementation unit (PIU), the provision of ICT facilities and commissioning some key studies on civil service reform. Given the pivotal role of public administration reform to achieve democratic governance, additional partners should be considered to participate in this vital component of democratic governance.

3.2.2 Key Results in the South

Juba is the base for the institutions of Southern Sudan. Overall, the institutions are blossoming following the peace process and signing of the CPA. Outside Juba, nearly all locations in Southern Sudan are lacking in governance and RoL infrastructure. The difficult terrain with little or no transportation infrastructure and other amenities make work in the South most challenging. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that institutions are only at the embryonic level. However, the Mission was moved by the commitment shown by government officials in improving the ongoing situation.

The evidence available suggests relatively little progress in Southern Sudan, considering the historical absence of precedence for RoL as defined by the RoL Programme. As in the North, RoL is being established through Justice and Confidence Centers (JCC) and promoting dialogue and awareness of in all states. Historically, customary and traditional authorities developed and played a fundamental role in Southern Sudan society. However, the jurisdiction between customary law and traditional law is not yet clear. It has been suggested that ascertainment is not the solution but is a first step in understanding the present status of customary law and its current application. This provides a baseline for examining how to proceed to the next step of harmonizing and developing a system for jurisdiction and authorities at the levels of statutory and

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93 MIC, ministry of finance, HAC and the economic Security Council.
94 Early British social anthropologists [i.e. Evans Pritchard] attempted to understand the social structure of the Azande, the Nuer societies in terms of rules and canons. It has not been ascertained to what extent these early works could be considered as proxy baseline in the RoL endeavors.
95 The vital contribution of JCC members has been recorded in a set of case studies. See Appendix of Annex 4.
customary adjudication. Mainstreaming customary law is not only a path breaking effort, but also holds crucial implications for the region.

UNDP worked closely with government actors to build capacity for Judiciary/MOLACD in critical areas. The 2008-2010 MOLACD Strategic Plan is developed and awaiting approval. Preliminary efforts have initiated for the establishment of regulatory frameworks and policy environment. No doubt, there is a long road ahead with respect to JOSS and MOLA before outcomes become apparent. UNDP has contributed significantly to the strengthening of the MOLA at the HQ level, specifically the participation in weekly MOLA strategy development; support to the construction and development of a functioning legal resource centre, and support to the Budget Sector Working Group budget processes. Also, much remains to be done in terms of decentralizing services.

Elements of rehabilitation and construction of police and prison facilities with the establishment of policy and legal frameworks has begun. It was not evident to the Mission, however, that there was the required cooperation, coordination and communication between the relevant actors. This is necessary to deliver proper criminal justice, both, in the south and the north, i.e. police, prisons, courts, lawyers, prosecutors, and the like. As discussed below, the issue appears as one of design rather than partnership.

In both the North and South, it appears prisons are overcrowded and lack human rights considerations for prisoners. Young petty offenders were in prison, which seems to indicate a failure somewhere in the justice system. The most frequent first line response heard by the Mission is to build/renovate more prisons. Nevertheless, it seemed that building prisons was becoming a contentious issue between the national partners as perceived by the members of the Mission.

The evidence suggests that now is the time to launch a Sudan wide approach to deliver fair justice, as indicated by one UNDP/Sudan proposal. In this context, it is vital to deliver justice throughout Sudan in such a manner that there is a continuum from “entry to exit”. This includes the management of “in flows” into the system through court case management, decriminalizing petty offences and ensuring that only the most deserving are incarcerated; while also addressing human rights based minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners through prison renovation.

Nonetheless, as it was cautioned to the Mission, several issues need ironing out. As useful as the Sudan-wide approach maybe, the sensitivities involved in the one country-two systems approach must be acknowledged. It is essential to recognize the autonomy of GoSS as outlined both in the


97. For example, in another country in the region, 2 million USD was spent to re-build an over-crowded and dilapidated prison over the course of 2 years. The old prison held more than 200% in excess of maximum capacity – and it had become a petri dish of respiratory and other diseases; and prisoners came out hardened rather than rehabilitated. The new prison increased prison size by at least 200%, and provided workshops for prisoner training. Less than 3 years after opening, however, the new prison was even more over-crowded, and disease ridden. With a “nice” brand new prison – judges became even more willing to sentence offender’s to serve time! In the absence of an overarching reform of sentencing guidelines – as long as new prisons were built they could be filled twice over. Source: UNDP. A road map to developing a justice sector wide development program: opportunities in Sudan. Governance and Rule of Law Unit. Khartoum, 2008
CPA, INC, and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, which are based on common law principles. The legal system in Khartoum is based on Sharia principles. There are ongoing discussions with the GoSS, however, to develop policies and frameworks that promote alternatives to incarceration and decriminalization. It must be noted that besides the complexity stemming from different legal regimes between North and South, this is compounded by local culture norms associated with notion of incarceration and decriminalization. These cultural-legal complexities indicate that policies must move cautiously. It will be a prolonged process.

Institutions in the South are beginning to display potential. Requirements for continuous training, legislative actions, and access to quality services, knowledge and practice are substantial. Because of the dire needs, all outcomes are strategic. There is considerable potential for outcome realization. State and county planning units are now able to plan and budget, thereby showing clear potential for achieving outcomes, where there was little before. Specifically:
(i) economic planning at the GoSS level provides the framework for an integrated planning and budgeting system, i.e. GoSS, states and the donors,
(ii) states have put in place state planning and development committees (SPDC) with BSWG as a means of annual planning and budgeting,
(iii) All 10 states have developed their strategic plan for 3-5 years,
(iv) All counties have a county plan and budget,
(v) Inter-governmental coordination and policy dialogue takes place through the Governors and the Speakers Forum. The GoSS has declared 2009 as the year for decentralization. This is a distinct impact of UNDP in promoting decentralized governance in Southern Sudan.

Moreover, capacity for local and community level structures has been considerably strengthened in planning, monitoring and the provision of basic services like public drainage, sanitation and waste disposal, and community water supply, which are the result of UNDP interventions in public work programmes. In the 10 southern states, funds for interventions in these sectors are from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank with government contribution as cost sharing. State officials that have participated in the preparation of county plans and budgets indicated to the Mission, during interviews, that they were eagerly waiting for development funds to launch their plans.

A robust monitoring and reporting system is required as clearly stipulated in the Local Government Act, which has yet to be enacted. Conflict between the local Executive Directors and the Governors stemming from the absence of the Local Government Act holds back performance. A legal and policy framework would be useful to reach an understanding of inter-governmental responsibilities on the roles and responsibilities between the Executive Directors and the Governors.

Despite the capacities built at the Legislative Assembly, it was revealed there is a requirement for specific training for legislative members in regulatory frameworks, laws, policies and management, especially to help first time parliamentarians do their job well. Current training has started to address this issue, and should continue in the next cycle. In fact, a documentation centre at the Legislative Assembly would be a useful resource of all elected officials.

It became evident that efforts to empower women to enable their full participation in state affairs are in short supply. For example, low literacy rates among women prevent their effective participation in development. In areas where women speak only Arabic, they are unwittingly becoming marginalized due to the lack of command of the English language. While English remains the official language of the South, certain counties may need to become bilingual until
such a time that English is commonly used and understood. This is a widespread practice in multilingual countries

In the Malakal community, the Rapid Impact Emergency Program (RIEP) has empowered women and youth by providing opportunities to expand or rehabilitate the infrastructure of their communities. However, increased coordination in the selection of the rapid works is necessary to avoid duplication and, more importantly, to realize synergies with the local government.

Further, interviews with the executing agency indicate that it is possible to report the sum total of outputs delivered in such a manner that potential for outcomes would become discernible. For example, rather than reporting simply the maintenance of length of irrigation canals rehabilitated and the cash distributed for the labour used, an improved reporting format would make an estimate of the canal’s command area (in ha), potential of crop production, and number of families within the command area that would benefit from the rehabilitation work. In fact, the Mission has verified field records which show information/comments from executing agencies about benefits and beneficiaries’ characteristics where outputs leading to potential outcomes could be delineated. The M&E unit in Juba, jointly with the executing agency, plan to agree on a future monitoring format for the purposes discussed. This minor modification in reporting procedures responds to donors concern that UNDP reports often contain a distribution of inputs and a list of outputs. It should be possible, in time, to report a configuration of outputs leading to outcomes.

An important challenge is emerging very clearly in the South. Ministries are becoming safety net programmes. Government could consider using this labour in a creative manner, such as the construction and maintenance of public infrastructure. Feeder roads for multiple agriculture purposes are the most immediate need. The expansion and rehabilitation of public infrastructure for poverty alleviation yields substantial dividends as shown by the case of China’s growth in the 70s and 80s through pro-poor public investments.

Lessons learned: Historical perspective about change in legal institutions
The absence of baseline information makes exceedingly complex to gauge progress in the process of institutional modifications associated with legal institutions. Historical analysis offers a proxy. Research on institutional development in developing countries taking into consideration lessons from now developed-countries in earlier times can shed light on this quandary. Institutional analysis was conducted about changes during the 19th and 20th century in the essential components of governance structures: democracy, bureaucracy and judiciary, property rights institutions, corporate governance institutions, financial institutions and social welfare/labour institutions. The research indicates, among other things, that the developed countries took a long time, i.e. several decades and even generations, to develop institutions in their earlier days of development. In the case of the judiciary, for example:

“Like their counterparts in modern-day developing countries, the judiciary in many [now-developed-countries] suffered from excessive political influences and corruption in appointments (or elections where applicable) until at least the late 19th centuries and often beyond. It was also frequently filled with men from a narrow privileged social background with little, if any, background in law, with the result that justice was dispensed often in biased and unprofessional ways.

- In the UK, even the anti-corruption laws of 1853-4 and 1883 did not affect the election of Coroners, which was subject to widespread corruption and party political manoeuvring (Glasgow, 1999).
- Germany made an impressive progress towards “rule of law” during the late 19th century and gained a largely independent judiciary by the end of the century. However, there was still lack of equality before law, with military and middle-class crimes getting less diligently brought to the court and less severely punished. This problem of “class justice” equally dogged other [now-developed-countries] at the time – the UK, the USA, and France (Blackbourn, 1997, p. 384).
- In Italy, at least until the late 19th century, judges did not usually have background in law, and “could not protect themselves, let alone anyone else, against political abuses” (Clark, 1996, p. 54).” Chang, op. cit, 2001, p 8

Several conclusions arise. First, stakeholders at large should be realistic about the possible speed of institutional development in the RoL and Governance programme areas. Second, in close association with the previous conclusion, key stakeholders should reconsider which institutions are absolutely necessary to modify given the complexity and protracted nature of these changes. Lastly, the Evaluation Mission, without legal scholars or competent lawyers as team members, took a precautionary stand by deferring to experts for substantive judgments on legal subjects. 101

3.3 Programme Area: Promote Human Security and Recovery

This programme area focuses on supporting national and local capacities for consolidation of peace, recovery and human security. Priority areas are:

- Promotion of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), Community Security (CS) and Mine Action.
- Livelihood restoration, sustainable natural resource management and capacity building for conflict resolution.

Subsequent to the signature of the CPA, communities and other groups had to jump-start their livelihoods to meet the subsistence needs of the family unit. To start with, there was need of a safe environment conducive to recovery and development. The threat to everyday life from explosive remnants of war had to be diminished systematically.

On the whole, the present programme intended to provide support to these communities. This support is vital because experience indicates that the consolidation of peace in the immediate and the long-term is linked to the successful restoration of sustainable livelihood opportunities, such that there is an improvement in the quality of life for people of all walks of life.

101 In retrospect, a programme evaluation where RoL is predominant, there should have been at least one team member with substantive legal experience.
It is sobering to consider that, statistically, countries emerging from conflict show 44% tendency to relapse into conflict within the first five years.\textsuperscript{102} This relapse is mostly due to the stagnation of the quality of life of communities impacted by conflict.\textsuperscript{103} This statistic should be kept in mind as proxy baseline value in the implementation of recovery programme.

Although the present programme theme has potential to improve the peoples’ quality of life, the available evidence shows that the bulk of the expected outcomes, as discussed in 3.3.1 and 3.3.4, have not reached fruition. Several possible reasons emerge.

\begin{itemize}
  \item The historical cause is the legacy of violent conflict reflected in widespread destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure in the North and marginalization in the South. Above all fragile institutions and weak human capital across Sudan. Sudan is one of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that has suffered the largest total deaths (2 million) during 1983-2002.\textsuperscript{104} There is no objective timeline for the recovery progress. It takes the time it takes.
\end{itemize}

However, there is evidence, discussed in 3.3.4, indicating design flaws in the programming process, in particular an absence of planning towards sustainability.

\subsection*{3.3.1 Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration}

In any post-conflict situation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are vital for the consolidation of peace. The two parties to the CPA (GoS and GoSS) assumed leadership in the implementation and management of DDR. UNDP assumed leadership on the side of international organizations in supporting national counterparts.

The following key outputs were achieved and are a critical contribution to outcome generation:\textsuperscript{105}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1,700 ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilized in Eastern Sudan.
  \item 1,800 child soldiers across Sudan have been demobilized and reunited with their families
  \item 3,906 weapons were collected from demobilized groups across Sudan [300 in the East and 1500 in the rest of Sudan].
\end{itemize}

Intermediate outcomes in process reflecting UNDP’s contribution to DDR at the policy and institutional levels are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The formulation of the national policy framework, the National Strategy for DDR, which was endorsed by the GoNU and GoSS in November 2007.
  \item The establishment of the National DDR Coordination Council.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{itemize}

The reintegration component is not yet complete and shows, in some cases, operational delays.

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{103} In this context the setbacks in Afghanistan are discouraging. Available information suggest that locals assert that neither the “foreigners” nor the Afghan government had made any efforts to counteract the detrimental effects of drought and poverty. It is claimed that the international community’s failed counter-narcotic schemes have destroyed many Afghans’ livelihoods, and further exacerbated their dire poverty crisis. Source: SENLIS. Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban Spring/Summer 2006

\textsuperscript{104} UNDP/BCPR op cit Table 2.1, p 24

\textsuperscript{105} These are the latest figures made available to the Mission.

\textsuperscript{106} The government is cost sharing the DDR programme in both north and south by 50% of a total budget of $400 million.
3.3.2 Mine Action

One intermediate outcome in process at the policy level in support of Mine Action is the development, endorsement and passing of a National Mine Action Policy Framework and National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006-2011. Subsequently, the setting up of the national mine action structure, fully equipped and functional with 6 field offices of NMAC in Kassala, Damazine, Kadugli (in the north) and SSDC Yei, Malakal, and Wau (in the south) constitutes a major achievement.

Mine clearance is estimated to have defused 50% of identified mines 107 with the target date of 2014 set for completion of all de-mining work. In Kassala state, the delivery of humanitarian aid to communities in conflict-affected areas was largely facilitated by the clearing of 234 kilometers of roads cutting down the trip between Kassala and Hamashkouraib from 9 hours to 3 hours.

In the short term, this enabled the return of IDP and refugees to their homes. In the long run, it facilitates the country’s economic recovery and development. UNDP’s support of Sudan’s national capacity to coordinate, plan and manage mine action, in accordance with humanitarian, recovery and development needs, helped define capacity-building. An UNMIS-commissioned evaluation in 2007 concluded that capacity-building needs were consolidated and strengthened?.

After four years of swift progress in de-mining, the socio-economic impact of de-mining is evident on the ground. However, there is need for an in-depth study to quantify the results.

3.3.3 Resource-based Conflicts

Key outputs have been achieved which will contribute to the attainment of the expected outcome. Work focussed on identifying conflict issues on natural resource and mitigation measures, with particular reference to land tenure. Six studies on land tenure were conducted with the purpose of imparting policy advice for legislation. These studies were shared and reviewed with rural dwellers and decision makers.

Training in mediation skills were simultaneously provided to a wide range of stakeholders utilizing standard procedures for conflict-resolution and leadership strengthening. Participating stakeholders (i.e. sedentary communities, CBOs, nomads, local government, traditional leaders and law enforcement officials) attended debates and meetings on resource-based conflict to explore linkages between land degradation and levels of conflict.108

Several key outputs at the national policy level are now in the process of becoming outcomes:
· Under the umbrella of Sudan Conflict Management Advisory Group, there are social mechanisms set up to mitigate resource-based conflicts and
· As stipulated in the CPA of 2005, the National Land Commission was set up in 2008. The land commission is an entry point for support and policy development in peace-consolidation.
· To reduce conflict, civic, pastoral and farming organizations cooperated through Community Resource Management Bodies (RMBs). These were organized, trained and empowered to lead resource management and environmental rehabilitation.

Local authorities in the high-conflict-risk areas of Kassala, Red Sea and South Kordofan, took ownership of the Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) tool.

107 The estimated number of mines is 4100 of which 2100 were cleared constituting reasonable progress (50%) since the start up of the programme in 2004.
108 More than 14,000 persons were engaged in such discussions in the states of Khartoum, Al Obied, Malakal, Deleng, Gedarif, South Kordofan and Darfur.
The TRMA is a geo-information tool.\(^{109}\) Its potential contribution encompasses:

- providing the specific information required to mainstream conflict and disaster risk sensitive programming across a UNDP Country Programme. It can do so by developing regional strategies to facilitate coherent programming of the identified outcome areas. This is based on the provisions of the peace agreements of the different Sudans, regional and cultural diversity, and prevailing security conditions;

- closing the gap of physical information for planning purposes. Because the tool has the capability of retrieving archival information on natural resource information contained in satellite images for at least the past 10 years, the planning process no longer needs to be based on assumption, but can be based on the actual situations derived from recent information – or from a series of information sources to depict intended changes.

A functioning TRMA requires a national geo-information infrastructure. The added value of a geo-information infrastructure does not come from its possession and retention within an administrative region or a municipality. It comes from the information’s broad distribution and use by the relevant stakeholders. Accordingly, the critical factor to build a geo-information infrastructure is national ownership. It is essential that the process of installing a geo-information system is conducted by a national task force. One way to install a geo information system successfully is to ensure national ownership from the start.\(^{110}\)

It is often assumed that only developed countries can have good maps derived from geo-information infrastructure. In fact, countries became developed because they invested in a geo-information infrastructure to produce good maps.\(^{111}\) This principle is not well understood in developing countries and, often, by donors as well.

In sum, in light of the recent Abyei and S. Kordofan clashes, it is premature to signify achievements in outcome generation in resource-based conflict efforts. An interim evaluation conducted in April 2007 indicates that a modest reduction of resource-based conflicts in some of the programme areas has been accomplished.\(^{112}\)

A moderate advance has been achieved in mainstreaming TRMA in the North. TRMA’s progress in the South is slow. This is primarily due to ownership issues. GoSS authorities conveyed to the Mission that there was no institutional understanding reached about the use, management and the information derived from the proposed technology. As discussed above, ensuring national ownership from the start facilitates a successful installation of a geo information system.

### 3.3.4 Recovery and Reintegration Programme

The RRP programme incorporates the recovery of livelihoods in conflict-affected communities, rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and delivery of social services, capacity building of local partners and peace building through the promotion of inter-tribal dialogue. Ten community-based integrated recovery and rehabilitation projects in the conflict-affected areas of the Red Sea and

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\(^{109}\) Geo-spatial information is an integrated approach to collect information which use both point and spatial information to make decisions based on many inputs. These are known as decision support tools. These tools can facilitate the process where multiple factors need to be considered, i.e. soils, water, climate, demography, budget. As each of these factors has a geographical location component, they are referred as geo-information factors. Cf: FAO. Geo-information for agricultural development. Rome, 2003, pp 1-11


\(^{111}\) Paraphrase of a remark by Prof. Dr. Arthur J. Brandenberger, Consultant to the United Nations and Professor, Laval University. See ISPRS Lausanne, 1968; Photogrammetric Engineering. April 1969.

\(^{112}\) UNDP. Reduction of resource-Based Conflict – Interim Evaluation report, April 2007, p.29
the three Protocol areas are ongoing with the cooperation of international and local NGOs. The Abyei RRP has stopped because of recent clashes, destruction of all basic services infrastructure and displacement of the Abyei population.

The following critical outputs achieved are essential for outcome generation:

- 300 recovery projects, implemented in 10 states in North and South Sudan, have benefited 800,000 people by improving livelihoods, improving basic services and strengthening the capacity of the local population.
- 22 primary health care centres were rehabilitated or built and provided with medicines; 
- 207 water works (water pumps, boreholes, wells and networks) were refurbished or built across Sudan.

Although these outputs provided some relief, they fell short of fully supporting the recovery of livelihood systems. The evidence indicates that essential activities, i.e. agriculture, small livestock, inland fisheries, wherefrom the bulk of the rural population derived their livelihoods were not adequately addressed. To begin with, there are serious monitoring difficulties. For example, the refurbishing or building of 207 water works [presumably within the past 2 years] should have had some effect on agriculture or livestock. No information is available because there is no means to collect this kind of monitoring data. Here is where TRMA can make a difference. If each of these water points can be geo-referenced, then it will possible to track these points in time with the aid of satellite images. If water is being used for agriculture, it should be possible to determine in each of the geo-referenced points as an increase/decrease in area under cultivation, types of crops, and the like.

Secondly, from RRP programme evaluation findings, it can be conjectured that there is a possible flaw in the design. The programme correctly identified the demographic and social dynamics of the target population. Nevertheless, it is not responsive to the mode of livelihoods and their manifested priorities.

The Mid Term review [RRP Programme] was somewhat surprised to see that little effort was made in most projects to directly improve incomes through basic agriculture and food security, which is a major issue in many project areas. Villagers often reported problems of water supply, good seed availability and lack of other inputs as major constraints to them achieving significant yield improvements. Yet the projects largely ignored these observations, often preferring to focus on goat restocking as the main income generating activity for the poor. This is an appropriate activity but it is limited by low availability of good quality goats and shortage of feed stuff in the poorest households [EU, op, cit, p 23]

The claims for this restocking should be evaluated, except where the goats are permanently penned and fed, because all too often the benefit to individuals is offset by the added cost of seedling and garden protection for the wider public. Furthermore, goat’s milk lacks folic acid, essential for preventing spina bifida in human foetuses. Thus, programmes recommending goats milk as a nutritional source needs [reconsideration]...[EU, op, cit, p 10].

113 It is not clear – particularly in the three transitional areas - to what extent the original substantive regional integrated approach that emphasized different elements of sustainable livelihood such as natural resource management and environment, governance and RoL, livelihoods, and awareness-raising programmes on such issues as HIV/AIDS, gender etc. have been adhered to.
Lastly, the contribution of small livestock to overgrazing appears underestimated.\textsuperscript{115}

To sum up, all combined evidence indicates that the design shows an absence of planning towards sustainability. Community needs manifesting a high priority about food security were not taken into account. Although the information is fragmented, the extant mode of livelihoods require technical recalibration to take into account the demographic pressure on land and water resources, which has led to intense competition over land for crop production and overgrazing due to overstocking. Without this recalibration, land productivity for crop and livestock grazing will dwindle with the associated resource degradation leading to desertification.

Finally, the RRP programme evaluation, further, indicated that management suffered from either inexperienced or insufficient personnel, exacerbated by national counterparts who could not deploy personnel and meet agreed recurrent costs.\textsuperscript{116} These are serious shortcomings in performance. To conclude, overall evidence indicates that the programme has limited sustainability—even though it may be marginally beneficial in certain aspects to peoples’ quality of life.

\textit{Lessons Learned}

\textit{a] Subsistence agriculture and natural resource depletion}

Despite the sparse and fragmented information, it is evident that the rain-fed agriculture practiced in Sudan for millennia, i.e. traditional food crops and extensive livestock production systems are experiencing a breakdown because of demographic, environmental, political, and technical constraints. The key issue is population pressure driving unsustainable rates of both land use and deforestation. As much as 83\% of the population across Sudan depends on farming for its livelihood. Five main types of farming are practiced in Sudan: mechanized rain-fed agricultural schemes; traditional rain-fed agriculture; mechanized irrigation schemes; traditional irrigation; and livestock husbandry/pastoralist. Best estimates of the structure of the sub-sectors indicate that 70\% of the workforce depends on traditional rain-fed farming, 12\% on irrigated agriculture and only 0.7\% on mechanized agriculture

Livestock-rearing, a central component of the agricultural system is typically nomadic in co-existence with semi-nomadic/agro-pastoralist and a sedentary system. An estimated 40\% of the Sudanese population practices livestock rearing. It is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60\% of the population depends on livestock. Competition for land is at the heart of many local conflicts.

Due to the characteristics of the predominant ecosystems, the rangeland’s vulnerability to overgrazing is high and can result in desertification. In addition, a substantial reduction in rangeland areas has occurred over the past several decades due to uncontrolled expansion of mechanized and traditional rain-fed agriculture, and to a lesser extent, expansion of irrigation schemes. Therefore, this major reduction in the amount, quality and accessibility of grazing land is a root cause of conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies throughout the drier parts of Sudan. All these factors can be geo-referenced to take into account the effects in the North and the South.

\textsuperscript{115} Mission’s remarks in italics.
\textsuperscript{116} EC op cit p 15
It is not surprising that food security is a paramount issue across Sudan—which is exacerbated by competition for land and over-grazing; in turn, this conundrum has been aggravated by the dynamics of oil exploration, extraction and apportionment of oil revenue.

*b] A blueprint for local sustainable development*
One key guiding principle to consider is to address sound resource management and poverty eradication simultaneously and holistically within a sustainable development framework. This is schematically shown in Figure 2. The blueprint identifies key factors to consider in the design of local development efforts under post conflict economic recovery.

Besides the key factors, one must identify an adequate system of incentives and penalties to encourage a sustainable use of resources. This might be significant for establishing sound institutions, policies and processes for sustainable livelihoods. Some of the challenges that will require a situation-specific analysis are the following:

- Making sure institutions and policies are attuned to local realities around decision-making amid uncertainty and minimizing risks for the poorest individuals.
- Ensuring approaches to facilitating project design are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate different livelihood realities.
- Assessing to what extent people have confidence and trust in the institutional process – stakeholders need to feel that their needs are being addressed.
- Making sure that project intervention supports and responds rather than undermines ongoing sustainable livelihood strategies; that is, what is the best way to deliver services effectively and to strengthen assets.
- Proposing patterns of employment to increase social and economic equality activities that combine economic efficiency with social equity and environmental protection.
- Ensuring institutions allow individuals and groups at the micro level to do things on their own and achieve aggregate results that improve the sustainability of livelihoods.
- Linking a broader set of levels, such as household, community and district.
- Making micro finance available to help stakeholders who can use it. If so, there may be a need to train stakeholders in elementary finance management skills (numeracy and literacy) and market and marketing considerations.
Outcome Monitoring Features

- The M&E process is designed and managed with partners and beneficiaries.
- Partners and beneficiaries are involved in the collection and analysis of information.
- Indicators are identified and negotiated with partners and beneficiaries.
- Partners and beneficiaries play a key role in judging performance.
- People’s attitudes to change are as important as physical measures of change.
- Ensure that the project is linked up with the TRMA system for monitoring.

Figure 2  BLUEPRINT FOR LOCAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT UNDER POST CONFLICT ECONOMIC RECOVERY
3.4 Reducing Human Poverty and Progress towards the MDGs

The programme area focuses on the development area, raises awareness, undertakes advocacy, and provides policy advisory services to all stakeholders for longer-term sustainable development. Priority areas are:
- Monitoring and reporting MDG progress, Human Development, and poverty.
- Pro-poor policy reform, advocacy and networking required to achieve MDG targets.

The national five-year development plan gives priority to the achievement of the MDGs\textsuperscript{117}. Some useful outputs were accomplished towards promoting and monitoring the progress of the MDGs.

In 2008, preparatory and preliminary work was accomplished related to an assessment exercise and the establishment of a MDG Task force in collaboration with MIC. Specifically:
- Completion of four poverty-related studies that covered economic governance, public expenditure management, mapping of policy making government institutions and the participation of civil society organizations in the PRSP and national development policies.
- Establishment of consultative mechanisms and a participatory process from GoSS to Local Government levels that have supported the development of MDG based Budget Sector Plans for 2008/2009.
- Enhancement of the statistical base and of the capacity for monitoring MDGs, and socio-economic data for development of the Statistical Master Plan for the Southern Sudan DEVINFO.
- The three northern states of Kassala, the Red Sea and South Kordofan acquired skills in the preparation of a five-year development plan incorporating the MDGs and using Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) as a planning tool.

It is not simple to make progress towards achieving MDGs targets and goals when the awareness level is low, particularly in the Southern Sudan’s states and counties. Research suggests that though focusing on goals and targets is essential; there is a need to focus on the fundamentals in order to make these MDG goals and targets achievable\textsuperscript{118}. One of the fundamentals applicable across Sudan, for example, is gender equality.

Progress towards key MDG targets –i.e. those linked to nutrition, health, education and the environment – is being determined, to some extent, by gender issues.\textsuperscript{119} In Sudan recent research indicates that there is a growing feminization of agricultural labour. Nearly 60% of agricultural work is carried out by women, whereas only 20% of agricultural extension agents are women.\textsuperscript{120} In this light, if one could reach a broad consensus on the potential of gender equity to achieve several of the existing MDG goals, then it should be possible to develop a set of good practices in

\textsuperscript{117} It has targets for each goal. Reducing the poverty rate by 30%. Making basic education available to 90% of both boys and girls, raising secondary education to 80% for both sexes, and for and higher education to 70%. Reducing child mortality rate to less than 5%. Reducing mother mortality rate to less than 5%. Reducing malaria and tuberculosis cases by 80%. Increasing access to potable water by 80%. Increasing access to information sources to 50% among the population.

\textsuperscript{118} Cf.: ODI. Achieving the MDGs: The fundamentals. Success or failure will be determined by underlying issues. ODI Briefing Paper 43, London, September 2008


monitoring progress, leading to a set of potential interventions. Stakeholders could then decide for themselves how they would monitor this issue in relation to the MDGs. Some would use a gendered poverty index, i.e. the sex-differentiation in agricultural labour associated with income and consumption. The notion here is that this is a key issue that should continue to be monitored at the national level, but remain linked to the national MDG discourse. There are other fundamental issues, such as economic growth, peace and political stability.

3.5 Cross-Cutting Issues

A cross-cutting issue is one that affects all of the other issues. Because the programme theme centres on the capacity development of institutions and processes at all levels, it is difficult to gauge specific progress within this context. The areas of gender inequality, environmental degradation and conflict transformation and prevention have progressed to different degrees within the programme areas.121

**HIV/AIDS and Other Endemic Diseases**

The efforts of UNDP and other partners directed at mainstreaming HIV/AIDS towards the centre of national development and poverty reduction strategies have been vital. These efforts mobilize and coordinate all levels of government and civil society for an effective response to the epidemic, while protecting the rights of people living with AIDS, women, and vulnerable populations.

With funding made available from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and UNDP as Principle Recipient, the national response against AIDS and other endemic diseases has progressed, with a strategy that focuses on prevention through raising awareness.122 To this end, a partnership was forged with religious leaders in anti-AIDS efforts. Religious leaders are now moving beyond commitment to action by advocating with the government for the enactment of a law for the protection of persons living with AIDS (PLWHIV).

The fight against AIDS was accelerated by the endorsement of the Ministry of Guidance and Endowment of the first training curriculum, which was the result of two years of programme activities by UNDP and partners and supported by the release of the Khartoum Declaration.123 The following essential outputs that are expected to generate outcomes were achieved:

- With UNDP’s support, the first national NGO for Sudanese People Living with AIDS was founded. It was given the Red Ribbon Award at the Toronto World AIDS Conference.

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121 Even if cross cutting outputs were reviewed to assess progress towards outcomes, when the progress is stagnant it is not always possible to inquire into circumstances surrounding this situation for obvious reasons

122 - The most recent limited sentinel surveillance testing conducted during 2004 by the Sudanese National AIDS Control Programme revealed the rise in prevalence in high risk groups and that the country may now be in a state of generalized HIV/AIDS with adult prevalence rate of 1.6% and with specific groups prevalence rates ranging between 0.5% to 2.5%.

123 The Khartoum declaration states: “We do appreciate the goals of the call made by medical doctors and specialists for the use of various protection instruments to alleviate danger against self and others, while watching out for those who, intentionally or otherwise, transmit infection by not using every possible means of protection that do not infringe upon religious teachings”. 

53
In five years, a partnership between UNDP, WHO, the Sudan National Malaria Programme and the GFATM succeeded in reducing the incidence of tuberculosis and malaria by 30% in 11 Northern states. This resulted in a 55% decrease in morbidity rates and a 52% decrease in mortality rates.

Major emphasis was placed on providing training for malaria case management and placing 1405 medical doctors and medical assistants in health facilities across 11 Northern States.

The training module for religious leaders focuses on helping religious figures promote the spiritual values of care and compassion for People Living with HIV/AIDS. Involving religious leaders in a culturally sensitive setting proved to be very effective given the standing of religious leaders in communities. This partnership should be encouraged at all levels.

Capacity development is ubiquitous to UNDP programmes. The capacity development reported hereunder is particular to a few key issues. Specifically:

- there was progress in institutional capacity development and processes with the commissions set up under the CPA, and other peace agreements;
- There was little progress in gender inequality. It has disproportionately affected women’s access to and participation in the social, economic, and political life in Sudan, at both the private and public levels. Possible ways to mainstream gender equality into the national economy using the MDGs is discussed in 3.4.;
- Environmental degradation requires a substantive and focussed approach. The crux of the issue is that natural resource based conflicts must be treated as integral components in economic recovery and disaster management. Overall economic development, including the oil sector of the economy, should be linked to environmental management oriented towards the conservation of the vegetation cover, in order to avoid environmental degradation together with desertification. 124


Sudan has one of the most complex and challenging post-conflict recovery contexts. The political situation on the ground is constantly changing, and the absence of development statistics and reliable baseline indicators at the national and sub-national levels makes progress assessment exceedingly difficult. Under these circumstances the achievement of results depends, more than ever, on the political will and commitment of decision-makers at the national or sub national levels. UNDP’s effectiveness therefore depends on forming productive strategic partnerships.

Against difficult odds UNDP, in collaboration with government and civil society actors achieved some commendable results. Numerous interviews with donors and government officials testified to the trust and the confidence the UNDP enjoys throughout Sudan.

Political intentions, reflected in the signing of the CPA, are the outlined principles of the INC and development plans. Evidence suggests that there is an urgent need for “soft intervention” by UNDP in order to transform decision-makers’ intentions into commitments and ownership. Its long-standing credibility as an impartial partner qualifies the UNDP to deliver “soft interventions”.

4.1 Relevance of the UNDP programme

Throughout this cycle the UNDP showed exceptional responsiveness to evolving national and sub-national needs. Following the cessation of hostilities and the signing of the CPA, Sudan’s evolving needs required a recovery-oriented framework to reconstitute the apparatus of government and institute RoL actions. The livelihood programme began to reconstitute and enhance peoples’ quality of life.

UNDP showed considerable flexibility by building working approaches for development that were suitable for the start-up of the post-conflict recovery of Sudan. Following the signing of the CPA, Sudan exists as “one country/two-systems,” the principle of which is to implement, in one country, the two programmes, with close cooperation and communication between the offices of Khartoum and Juba.

The predominance of the recovery-oriented context took priority over actions directed to the upstream policy level. Nonetheless, the Bridging Programme responded directly to at least six of the eight strategic objectives outlined in Sudan’s five-year development plan for 2007 – 2011.\(^{125}\)

It is important to observe, not what UNDP has accomplished overall, since many of its accomplishments are without the benefit of a full record, but rather to observe what difference UNDP has made under difficult circumstances. The case of the UNDP RoL in Darfur is a good example. UNDP RoL staff and paralegals have empowered many thousands of Sudanese citizens, IDPs, and stakeholders and have given them the confidence to exercise their human rights; human rights now prevail in Sudanese legislation across both North and South Sudan.

The impact of these outputs has been felt in Darfur in particular… UNDP has managed to achieve legal victories in the courts of Darfur and elsewhere that has advanced the rule of law, particularly in regards to sexual gender based violence (SGBV) and the removal of barriers in the legal system that prevents victims from reporting SGBV and holding perpetrators accountable.\(^{126}\)

4.2 Effectiveness of UNDP Interventions

At the end of this CCF cycle the UNDP has left a proactive footprint in institutional change that is rooted in successful programme experience.\(^{127}\) Under uniquely limiting circumstances characterized by a hostile social context, difficult terrain and unreliable logistics, UNDP’s contribution was to deliver a recovery-oriented programme.

- RoL outcomes have made crucial strides with respect to raising human rights awareness and advocacy for IDPs and most vulnerable groups, setting up legal information centres, Justice and Confidence Centre (JCC) paralegal-led mediations, and the referral of cases to UNDP’s Legal Aid Network lawyers.
- In an innovative move, UNDP went to the most remote of locations to conduct training and legal seminars in the midst of ongoing hostilities. UNDP JCC paralegals and Legal Aid Network lawyers rendered mediation and representation to many hundreds of individuals throughout Sudan.
- UNDP supported legal victories in the courts of Darfur and elsewhere that advanced the rule of law, particularly in regards to sexual gender based violence (SGBV).

\(^{125}\) The five-year development plan’s strategic goals are: sustainable development, poverty and the realization of the millennium goals, good governance and the rule of law, institution-building, capacity-building monitoring and evaluation, the sustainability of peace, informatics and national sovereignty and reconciliation.

\(^{126}\) UNDP/Sudan. Rule of Law Outcome Evaluation. 2008, p 8

\(^{127}\) As the Evaluation focused on the 10 expected outcomes, the role of UNDP as fund manager of MDTFs such as CHF and its role in the Resident Coordinator, was not reviewed.
A new approach, currently under development, has produced results. The fight against AIDS was accelerated by the endorsement of the first training curriculum by the Ministry of Guidance and Endowment, which was the result of two years of programme activities by UNDP and partners and supported by the release of the Khartoum Declaration.\textsuperscript{128}

UNDP’s counterpart, the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), built up capacity by enhancing overall level of effectiveness in aid management and coordination. UNDP supported the development of the Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID), which has reporting capabilities and accessibility through the MIC intranet.

The Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration Survey collected data in collaboration with MIC.\textsuperscript{129} Additionally, aid coordination raised awareness of the importance of M&E when the MIC established a multi-ministry M&E unit composed of key government entities relevant to aid management and coordination.\textsuperscript{130}

In the North, leadership training for women exceeded expectations and contributed to the personal and professional empowerment of a great number of women.\textsuperscript{131} This result was strengthened through policy reform by the enactment of the Political Parties’ Act. This act allocates a 25% quota for women from the 40% of constituencies assigned to what can best be termed “relative representation” in legislative bodies at both the federal and state levels.\textsuperscript{132}

The three northern states of Kassala, the Red Sea and South Kordofan acquired skills in the preparation of a five-year development plan incorporating the MDGs and using Threat and Risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) as a planning tool. These states demonstrated competence when conducting effective state planning and budgeting. There has been vital progress made towards the outcome in participatory bottom-up planning and capacity building for pro-poor planning at the local government level.

In the South, capacity building for Judiciary/MOLACD has begun in critical areas, and the 2008-2010 MOLACD Strategic Plan was developed and is awaiting approval. There is, however, still a long road ahead with respect to JOSS and MOLA before outcomes become apparent. UNDP contributed significantly to the strengthening of the MOLA HQ level and MOLA strategy development and supported the construction and development of a functioning legal resource centre, as well as the Budget Sector Working Group budget processes.

GoSS institutions are blossoming even though requirements for continuous training, legislative actions, and access to quality services, knowledge and practice are substantial. State and county planning units are now able to plan and budget, thereby showing clear potential for achieving outcomes, where there was little potential before. Specifically:

- Economic planning at the GoSS level provides the framework for an integrated planning and budgeting system involving GoSS, the states and the donors,

\textsuperscript{128} The Khartoum declaration states: “We do appreciate the goals of the call made by medical doctors and specialists for the use of various protection instruments to alleviate danger against self and others, while watching out for those who, intentionally or otherwise, transmit infection by not using every possible means of protection that do not infringe upon religious teachings”.

\textsuperscript{129} With the collaboration of MIC, the Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration collected survey data which has received a good response from major donors. National counterparts raised their awareness on the importance of M&E in aid coordination. Consequently, MIC established a multi-ministry M&E unit composed of MIC, MoF, HAC and the Economic Security Council.

\textsuperscript{130} MIC, ministry of finance, HAC and the economic Security Council.

\textsuperscript{131} Evaluation Report of the Good Governance & Equity in Political Participation project, November 2008

\textsuperscript{132} The elections law stipulates a division of the total constituencies into a 60% geographic representation and a 40% relative representation for key social groups such as women.
- states have put in place state planning and development committees (SPDC) with BSWG as a means of annual planning and budgeting,
- all 10 states have developed their strategic plan for 3-5 years,
- all counties have a county plan and budget,
- Inter-governmental coordination and policy dialogue takes place through the Governors and the Speakers Forum.
- The GoSS has declared 2009 as the year for decentralization, a clear result of UNDP promoting decentralized governance in Southern Sudan.

4.3 Sustainability

As the reintegration component (DDR) is not yet operational, the Governance & RoL, together with the livelihood programmes, are fundamental for post-conflict recovery. UNDP programmes have the potential to improve the peoples’ quality of life, and evidence indicates that the bulk of the expected outcomes have not yet reached fruition. The historical cause is the legacy of violent conflict reflected in the widespread destruction and degradation of physical capital and infrastructure in the North and marginalization in the South. Another factor is the extant fragile institutions and weak human capital across Sudan. There is no objective timeline for the recovery progress. It takes the time it takes.

The livelihood programme correctly identified the demographic and social dynamics of the targeted population, but does not appear to be responsive to the mode of livelihoods, and the priorities they manifest. The programme design shows an absence of planning towards sustainability. Although the information is fragmented, the extant mode of livelihoods requires technical recalibration to take into account the demographic pressure on land and water resources, which has led to intense competition over land for crop production as well as to overgrazing due to overstocking. Without this recalibration, land productivity for crop and livestock grazing will dwindle with the associated resource degradation, leading to desertification.

The Governance and RoL programmes in the North and South have been progressing as much as possible within the time frame of the CCF2, but it will take more time before outcomes reach complete fruition. As a proxy baseline value, the history of now developed countries shows that in their earlier days of development it took several decades, and sometimes even generations, to develop the essential components of governance structures and institutions, such as the judiciary. Realistic expectations should be reflected when identifying which institutions must absolutely be modified, given the complexity and protracted nature of these changes.

When all is said and done the vulnerability of communities in terms of ecological fragility, natural disasters, heightened insecurity and violence, as well as political volatility, remains the overarching challenge. UNDP has the comparative advantage to play a leading role in addressing this pervasive vulnerability.

4.4 Strategic Positioning

Against a backdrop of an untenable external debt of USD 27 billion, there are driving forces in the development process that are at the outer edge of UNDP’s role as coordinator of the UN

system. The dual nature of the national economy calls attention to the fact that the buoyant oil-based sub sector is disarticulated from the agrarian-based economy, which has dwindling natural resources. While one sector grows at double digits, the other languishes negative rates of per capita food production (cf. section 2.1).

As an oil extracting economy trapped in the “resource curse”, Sudan faces a critical challenge that consists of economic diversification which must be carried out within a short time span, before oil resource depletion occurs. Sudan’s vital task is to allocate public investments and expenditures to projects that are outside of the oil industry and that will lower the costs of producing manufactured or agro processed export goods for the benefit of the population at large. This is quintessential for the economic growth that is needed to sustain the economy; either independently from oil revenues or once the oil has been depleted. If there is no economic diversification before oil depletion, a critical opportunity to reduce poverty will have been missed

Subsistence farmers fall outside of the oil-based economy and as much as 83 % of the Sudanese population depends on farming for its livelihood. Five main types of farming are practiced in Sudan: mechanized rain-fed agricultural schemes; traditional rain-fed agriculture; mechanized irrigation schemes; traditional irrigation; and livestock husbandry/pastoralist. Best estimates of the structure of the sub-sectors indicate that 70 % of the workforce depends on traditional rain-fed farming, 12 % on irrigated agriculture and only 0.7 % on mechanized agriculture

Livestock-rearing, a central component of the agricultural system is typically nomadic and co-exists with semi-nomadic/agro-pastoralists and a sedentary system. An estimated 40 percent of the Sudanese population practices livestock rearing, and this percentage is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60 % of the population depends on livestock. Competition for land is therefore at the heart of many local conflicts. In addition, a substantial reduction in rangeland areas has occurred over the past several decades due to the uncontrolled expansion of mechanized and traditional rain-fed agriculture, and to a lesser extent, to the expansion of irrigation schemes. This major reduction in the amount, quality and accessibility of grazing land is therefore a root cause of conflict between pastoralist and agriculturalist societies throughout the drier parts of Sudan. There is no evidence of a systematic and comprehensive programme with which to tackle the developmental challenges of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock practices from which the bulk of the rural population ekes out a living.

During the Mission’s visits to the North and the South, there were incessant requests for a borehole wells programme, or water storage investments, so that water stored during the rainy season can be used during the dry season for livestock as well as for agricultural purposes. Ensuring the availability of water for the dry season could be a catalyst for development and a strong mechanism for tribal crisis reduction and prevention, and in addition it may ensure peace and stability in the state. The focus should be to capture and store water through community-based water development works.

There is one inescapable conclusion that can be drawn from all this: food security is a paramount issue across Sudan, and is exacerbated by competition over grazing land; in turn, this problem has been further aggravated by the dynamics of oil exploration, extraction and the apportionment of oil revenue. These issues are the current driving forces behind the development process.

**Recommendation**

- UNDP, as the coordinator of the UN system, may consider monitoring the issues: 1. of food security and diversification from an oil exporting economy into an industrial or agro
processing production economy for the benefit of the population at large;\textsuperscript{134} and 2, of the transformation of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock rearing into a sustainable system of food production.

\textit{Strategic Partnerships}

UNDP has managed to position itself strategically for the formation of partnerships in the post-CPA phase. Strategic partnerships with national counterparts, donors and international organizations resulted in UNDP being entrusted with a leadership role in a number of areas related to governance, re-integration of ex-combatants and recovery, as well as the massive task of establishing the machinery of government in Southern Sudan. The Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF) and the Recovery & Re-integration Programme (RRP) are examples of such a partnership. In other cases, UNDP assumed the responsibility of the management of large specific funds needed to meet post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation needs, i.e. Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).

On the other hand, UNDP has not yet forged the partnerships needed to accelerate the achievement of long-term programme results. For example, in the political context, UNDP needs to position itself strategically for partnerships in:
- the forthcoming parliamentary democracy and multi-party revival; and
- the implementation of a decentralization process from central structures down to the community level. These partnerships are included in the CPAP’s partnership strategy [Part v].

Within the context of comprehensively harnessing Sudan’s sustainable human development, as discussed in section 2.2, there are pervasive and acute driving forces behind the development process. These issues may be at the outer edge of UNDP’s mandate. UNDP therefore may require strategic alliances to harness Sudan’s sustainable human development.\textsuperscript{135} The way to move forward may be by forging strategic alliances.

\textbf{4.5 Lessons Learned}

\textit{Learning in the Context of Post-Conflict Recovery}

Given the special context of post-conflict recovery, the institutional setting is in continuous evolution. Because this fluid environment is further compounded by a lack of information, it is not always possible to identify benchmarks with which to measure progress. As a proxy baseline value, historical analysis, when available, can provide broad guidelines. For example, among developing countries Vietnam has recovered relatively fast and after World War II and France appeared to have recovered faster than Italy.\textsuperscript{136} There are, however, no objective criteria with

\textsuperscript{134} Recent research shows that countries with better private sector institutions (rule of law) are less likely to be affected by the resource curse. Policy makers in oil-rich countries must consider prioritizing the development of institutions governing the private sector in order to facilitate growth. More research is required on the specific ways in which private sector institutions could lead to optimal natural resource outcomes, and which of these institutions are necessary in the process. Cf: Kolstad, I. The resource curse: which institutions matter? Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway (2008)

\textsuperscript{135} This was one lesson learned from CCF 2002-2006 [page 3]: how can the UNDP programme be more comprehensive.

\textsuperscript{136} Cf. Cassella, A & B Eichengreen. 1994 Halting inflation in Italy and France after 1945. Quoted in UNDP/BCPR op cit, p 175
which to measure the performance of post-conflict countries in the recovery process, as each case appears to have a context-specific explanation.

In this Evaluation, observations were made based on the application of the UNDP/BCPR road map. These observations were made without the benefit of quantitative values measured against base line information and so the lessons learned from the observations are therefore, at best, inferential.

**Recommendations:**
- Record carefully the results from institutional modifications, such as they are. These results fall within the framework of either impact studies or ex-post evaluations and can be gathered at least one or two years after the cycle has been closed.\(^{137}\)
- Continue making observations based on the UNDP/BCPR road map regarding the best path to follow. Infer, from the best information available -which is without the benefit of quantitative values measured against baseline information, the best path under the circumstances.

Hereunder is a list of lessons learned. The analysis is found in the corresponding section of the text.
- Executing modalities and blueprints for programme preparation and implementation [section 3.1]
- Historical perspective of change in legal institutions [section 3.2]
- Subsistence agriculture and natural resource depletion [section 3.3]
- Blueprint for local sustainable development [section 3.3]
- Factors interfacing M&E functions [section 4.6]
- Outcome-oriented reporting in public works [section 4.6]

### 4.6 Recommendations about Strategic Directions

GoNU, GoSS and UNDP have agreed to implement the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) as the Country Programme for Sudan for the period 2009-2012. The CPAP is a comprehensive and articulated plan. Although CPAP is coherent with CFF2, not every CPAP output can be reviewed in the context of lessons learned from CCF2. Accordingly, on the basis of the lessons learned from this Evaluation, the Report addresses two strategic issues: 1- recommendations to specific CPAP programme areas, and 2- strategic alliances needed to advance UNDP’s corporate strategy.

The Mission concurs with the overall purpose of CPAP:
- It reflects the most immediate opportunities to support the achievement of the MDGs through private sector development, as well as through conflict prevention and peace building, and
- It evokes the Sudan National Strategic Plan for timely achievement of the MDGs. Specifically, it focuses on three key programme areas: (I) poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs; (II) democratic governance; and (III) crisis prevention and recovery.
- The CPAP is correctly shifting priorities by giving more attention to political, social and economic inclusion – the lack of which serves as the root cause of all conflict – through the advancement of the MDGs and by supporting capacity-building for pro-poor planning.

\(^{137}\) See: Ruttan. V. Social science knowledge and institutional change. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 1984, pp 549-559.
equitable delivery of basic services, democratic governance and a focus on RoL. The CPAP proposes to meet the requirements of the reconstruction of sustainable livelihoods through the MDGs.

4.6.1. Programme Oriented Recommendations

Given the marked differences between the South and the North, which encapsulate substantive variations in approach and method for programming purposes, the recommendations hereunder must be considered as guidelines. These guidelines should be validated for each region to best reflect the appropriate context within the programme framework.

Within the framework of CPAP, the Mission proposes recommendations for specific programme areas based on lessons learned (cf: sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.6).

Poverty reduction and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
Pro poor livelihoods and private sector development [CPAP: Output 1.3]

Modes of livelihood and sustainability

UNDP livelihood programmes correctly identified the demographic context and social dynamics of conflict. However, the mode of livelihoods, which are peculiar to each ecosystem in which the poor live, have not yet been understood or operationalized. This is probably why livelihood outputs introduced through projects have been done so without considering sustainability.

Recommendation:
- Ensure sustainability in the design of all projects for enhancing livelihoods. To this end, one approach used to determine the mode of livelihoods is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3. It contains two steps: 1- identify among the target populations the prevailing modes of livelihood & community preferences and 2- customize the delivery of outputs in accordance with the findings of item 1 above. Its overall purpose is to ensure that benefits reach those who need those most, thereby enhancing their quality of life.

Recalibrating the production system to meet food security requirements

Communities placed high priority on food security, which was not taken into account in either the preparation or the implementation of projects.

Recommendation
- To meet the food security requirements identified by communities, project designs need to conduct a technical recalibration of the production system. This should compensate for the land degradation and erosion that stem from overgrazing and unsuitable land management techniques. Without this recalibration, which is situation-specific, yields from crops and livestock would probably not be sufficient to meet food security requirements.

One approach towards recalibration is shown diagrammatically in Fig 2. Which shows a blueprint for local sustainable development? The fundamental factors which need to be taken into account are: 1. ecosystem governance and sound natural resource management, 2. sustainable livelihood analysis, and 3. analysis of the root causes of socioeconomic inequality. Besides the key factors, a sound system of incentives and penalties to encourage a sustainable use of resources is also outlined.

CPAP’s anti-poverty strategy proposes, among other things, support for the GoNU and GoSS in creating a regulatory framework to establish a sustainable and competitive microfinance industry
and to integrate pro-poor value chains in markets such as gum Arabic\textsuperscript{138}, hibiscus\textsuperscript{139} and livestock products.

Microfinance, intended to add value to agricultural production [i.e. crops and livestock], can help farmers and herdsmen get out of the poverty trap. This is provided that the production system is technically viable, so that financial returns are feasible. This is where the previous lessons learned regarding the sustainability and recalibration of the production system is relevant. Without taking these lessons into consideration, financial losses will follow technically unviable production systems.

\textbf{Recommendations}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Consider making available on-farm technical assistance for microfinance operations in agriculture [crops, livestock, and fisheries], thereby ensuring a viable and sustainable production system.
  \item Consider making a portion of these agriculture value chain operations organic and ecologically friendly. This will realize not only higher benefits but will also contribute to the maintenance of sound ecosystems. To this end, the potential beneficiaries will require [1] access to pertinent organizations in order to register their “organic products” status; [2] and information on foreign market niches where these organic products can be placed.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Fostering and consolidation of democratic governance}

\textit{Citizen participation and democracy [CPAP: Output 3.1]}

So far, support for parliamentary democracy is not linked to the peace process or to oversight over the executive.

\textbf{Recommendation}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Consider launching an oversight capacity-building effort after the forthcoming elections. Urgent preparations for capacity-building should be undertaken now, in order to strengthen the electoral process and related institutions prior to elections. This should be complemented by a comprehensive democratic governance approach to consolidate results, expand outreach to the state-level and to communities around the issue of gender equity in political participation.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Strengthening women’s security in crisis [CPAP: Output 3.3]}

\textbf{Recommendation}

\begin{itemize}
  \item In cooperation with UNIFEM, consider combining forces to mainstream gender in recovery and development. A practical tool at both the national and sub-national level is the gender-based budgetary audit, which is low-cost and has a high impact in terms of policy. This tool analyzes public expenditure as a tool for strengthening gender mainstreaming in development.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Strengthening access to justice & promoting rule of law [CPAP: Output 5.1]}

Provided the sensitivities and legal frameworks involved in the one country-two systems approach are acknowledged, all evidence suggests that now is the time to focus on the “sum total” of the processes and operations of several related public institutions to deliver criminal justice.

\textsuperscript{138} Gum Arabic \textit{[Acacia senegal]} leguminous tree common in the sudano-sahelian climate used as glue and incense.

\textsuperscript{139} Hibiscus \textit{[Hibiscus malvaceae]} a plant common in the tropics grown for fiber or timber
is important to examine the ability of these institutions to deliver to the overall mission and
development objectives of a government based on human rights principles.\textsuperscript{140}

**Recommendation**

- Consider a sector wide approach for the delivery of criminal justice as well as a system
  analysis perspective, such that there should be a continuum from “entry to exit”. This
  includes the management of “in flows” into the system through court case management,
  decriminalizing petty offences and ensuring that only the most serious criminals are
  incarcerated. It also addresses human rights based minimum standards for the treatment of
  prisoners, including prison renovation.

**Support to crisis prevention, conflict management and recovery**

*Disaster risk reduction and natural resource management [CPAP: Output 6.3]*

The environmental governance portfolio must address the linkages between environmental
degradation, conflict and poverty. It can do so by establishing a pro-poor political change to
promote sustainable management practices of resources; by creating greater awareness amongst
public and private sectors about environmental obligations, rights, duties and practices; by
facilitating access to and ensuring involvement of the marginalized in regards to
resources/management; by gaining support for reflection on environmental rights and justice in
the legal regime; and by fostering attitudinal and administrative changes that will institutionalize
sustainable development based on environmental considerations.

**Recommendation**

Consider organizing a UNDP joint strategic plan for environmental governance that is composed
of the relevant programmes. It should: [1] establish the unit of analysis and intervention, i.e.
ecosystem, watershed, etc., [2] gather and compile basic information within the TRMA
framework, and [3] as a pilot exercise, establish and monitor, with one unit of analysis and
intervention, a politically viable and sustainable livelihood system supported by a rights-
approach. The lesson learned about technical sustainability of the production system is applicable
here.

\textsuperscript{140} The conceptual sources are: UNDP/Sudan. Supply and demand: bringing law and development
together. Governance and Rule of Law Unit, March 2008; a road map to developing a justice sector wide
development program with GNU. A proposal. February 2008.
POVERTY REDUCTION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MDGs
Expected Outcome 1: Enhanced national and sub-national capacities to plan, monitor, evaluate and implement the MDGs and related national development policies and priorities
Expected Outcome 2: Improve impact of resources to fight HIV/AIDS

FOSTERING AND CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Expected Outcome 3: Institutions, systems and processes of democratic governance strengthened
Expected Outcome 4: National/sub-national/state/local levels of governance expand their capacities to manage equitable delivery of public services
Expected Outcome 5: Rights upheld and protected through accountable, accessible and equitable Rule of Law institutions

CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY
Expected Outcome 6: Strengthened capacity of national, sub-national, state and local institutions and communities to manage the environment and natural disasters and to reduce conflict over natural resources
Expected Outcome 7: Post-conflict socio-economic infrastructure restored, economy revived and employment generated

SOCIAL STRUCTURES AT THE LOCAL & SUB-NATIONAL LEVELS SPECIFIC TO ECOSYSTEMS IN AREA PROGRAMMES

IDENTIFY IN TARGET POPULATIONS THE PREVAILING MODES OF LIVELIHOODS & COMMUNITY PREFERENCES

CUSTOMIZE THE DELIVERY OF OUTPUTS

Fig. 3 IDENTIFYING LIVELIHOOD MODES
The Mission’s visits to the North and South indicate the need for public works combined with “on the job training” that is targeted at youth. Workshops and training centres for youth in carpentry, brick-laying, blacksmith, construction, and electrical and mechanical repairs could stimulate private sector growth in southern Sudan as well as in south Kordofan. This approach could also reduce the burden of idleness and dependency, and even reduce violence among youth and the informal sector. Although accurate information is scarce, estimates indicate that 80% of the population earns their subsistence from the informal sector.

**Recommendations**

- Consider launching youth programmes in the context of reintegration and reconciliation among communities.
- Consider expanding the national United Nations Volunteer programme under UNDP, to partner youth with the services of retirees that possess specific skills and experience. In this manner, youth can earn credibility and legitimacy within communities. They could also be deployed to their area of origin, where they are knowledgeable about the community culture and are accepted. They could work, especially, on advocacy and community mobilization.

**Monitoring & Evaluation**

**Lessons Learned: Factors interfacing the M&E function.**

- Insufficient baseline information. What evokes concern are the findings of a programme evaluation, which indicates that even when resources are available, there is insufficient motivation or knowledge among project officers about the value of setting up monitoring systems in general, and gathering baseline information in particular. Without the benefit of quantitative or qualitative measurements of change following UNDP interventions, definitive assessments of project performance can, at best, be inferential.
- Linked to the above matter is the limited availability of statistical information and socio-economic data. This situation is the result of extended internal conflict as typified in all post-conflict countries. Sudan’s statistical weakness is severe. The 2008 Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report exemplify this. The statistical annex contains 13 themes, and statistics for Sudan are available for only one [GDP growth rates]. Insufficient baseline information compounded by the limited availability of statistical services indicates the substandard capacity of the national statistical offices.
- Strengthening national statistical units is vital for effective M&E. Monitoring systems are second-tier systems that operate by extracting information from existing sectoral or central statistical suppliers. Those monitoring systems that generate relevant, timely and compatible information do so by coordinating existing systems, and so if the existing systems are inadequate because of sparse data, the monitoring information will be compromised. For example, sparse or non-existent information about targeted populations makes it difficult to design performance indicators, as in the case of the current CCF 2 programme targets, which are open-ended.

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**Recommendations**

- Conduct a cross-sectoral survey about key human development indicators pertinent to the forthcoming cycle, with the participation of all pertinent stakeholders, to establish baseline information.
- Conduct evaluations of the key outcomes of the forthcoming cycle.

**Outcome-oriented reporting in public works**

Interviews with the executing agency indicate that it is possible to report the sum total of outputs delivered, in such a manner that potential for outcomes would become discernible. The Mission has verified field records that show information/comments from executing agencies regarding benefits and beneficiaries’ characteristics, where outputs that could lead to potential outcomes could be delineated.\(^{144}\) Recording and reporting this information to donors will address the issue that UNDP’s reports to donors contain a distribution of inputs and a list of outputs from time to time. It should henceforth be possible to report a configuration of outputs that lead to outcomes.

**Recommendation**

The M&E unit in Juba, in collaboration with the public work’s executing agency, should agree on a monitoring format for reporting outputs leading to potential outcomes. Once the format has been achieved and has been tested successfully, consider mainstreaming in the M&E system where applicable.

### 4.6.2 Strategic Alliances: Prospective Issues and Actionable Guidelines

The **prospective** assessment seeks to anticipate how UNDP might best serve Sudan during their period of economic reconstruction within the framework of the CPAP. To this end, the Evaluation has reviewed a complex web of interrelated factors embedded within the national social structure, which influence expected outcomes together with country programme performance. As discussed in section 2.2, these factors are at the outer edge of UNDP’s role as coordinator of UN system, which raises the following question: how can the UNDP programme be more comprehensive so as to be in a position to best harness Sudan’s sustainable human development.\(^{145}\) The way to move forward may be by forging strategic alliances. These alliances may, however, require a context-specific approach.

The Evaluation has catalogued a web of complex interrelated factors.

- Broadly associated with the framework of UNDP’s role as coordinator of the UN system, there are factors associated with inclusive growth and sustainable development that are relevant to long term concerns of the national economy.
- Broadly associated with the framework of the CPAP, there are issues related to mediating financing for the infrastructure of economic development.

**Inclusive growth and sustainable economic development**

The national economy has a dual nature. There is the buoyant oil-based sub sector which is disarticulated from the agrarian-based economy characterized by dwindling natural resources. While one sector grows at double digits the other languishes in negative rates of per capita food production (cf. section 2.1). In this context, Sudan faces the critical challenge of economic

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\(^{144}\) UNDP/Sudan. RIEP. Completed sub-projects matrix. Public works programme component of the rapid impact emergency project (PWPC of RIEP). Completed and hand-over public works sub-project matrix. Rumbek. 02 Dec 2008.

\(^{145}\) This was one lesson learned from CCF 2002-2006 [page 3]
diversification, compounded by the fact that it must be carried out within a short time span before oil resource depletion.

The task is to allocate public investments and expenditures to projects outside of the oil industry that will lower the costs of producing manufactured or agro processed export goods for the benefit of the population at large. This is quintessential for the economic growth that is needed to sustain the economy; either independently from oil revenues or once the oil has been depleted. If there is no economic diversification before oil depletion, a critical opportunity to reduce poverty will have been missed.

Subsistence farmers are outside the oil-based economy. As much as 83% of the population across Sudan depends on subsistence farming for its livelihood. An estimated 40% of the Sudanese population practices livestock rearing and this percentage is even higher in Southern Sudan, where over 60% of the population depends on extensive livestock-rearing.

With the exception of the less than 1% of the rural population that are involved in commercial and export-oriented commercial agriculture, the bulk of rural families eke out a living from subsistence agriculture. One inescapable conclusion can be drawn from all of this: food security is a paramount issue across Sudan, and is exacerbated by competition over grazing land; in turn, this problem is aggravated by two additional factors.

Although the information is fragmented, the extant mode of livelihoods requires technical recalibration in order to take into account the demographic pressure on land and water resources that has led to intense competition over land for crop production as well as to overgrazing due to overstocking. Without this recalibration land productivity for crop and livestock grazing will dwindle with the associated resource degradation, leading to desertification.

Regrettably there is no evidence of a systematic and comprehensive programme which will tackle the developmental challenges of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock practices, from which the bulk of the rural population depend for their daily livelihood.

Recommendation

UNDP, in response to the severe challenges associated with long term sustainable development and inclusive economic growth, should consider the coordination of a comprehensive strategy with the participation of experienced stakeholders. Among the UN system these stakeholders should include: UNEP, IFAD, FAO, ILO as well as the World Bank Group, USAID, CIDA, the Governments of China, India, Brazil, and others. Each of these stakeholders has dealt with the subject matter extensively.

20. UNDP, as the coordinator of the UN system, should consider monitoring the issue of food security tailored to the context of different ecosystems across Sudan with the support of partners, i.e. UNEP, FAO, IFAD and others, using the TRMA tool. In this context review opportunities and potential for the transformation of rain-fed agriculture and extensive livestock rearing into a sustainable system of food production. This is a comprehensive task that should take into account all services needed from the farm level to the consumer including price policies. The farming system approach, for example, has yielded productive results in India in improving agricultural technology among resource-poor farmers working in less favourable natural environments.\textsuperscript{146}

21. UNDP with support of stakeholders with competence in private sector development, i.e. the WB Group, must tackle the critical challenge of economic diversification to get out of the resource curse trap. It requires allocating public investments outside of the oil industry for the production of trade goods that lowers their costs to Sudanese and makes them attractive for international trade. The two essential instruments of public policy are institutional reform and a public investment programme customized to specific Sudanese conditions in order to:

1. Improve the investment climate, i.e. reducing the costs associated with bureaucracy, customs delays, corruption, risk, streamlined export procedures, and essential business services; all these are central to building international competitiveness

2. Education must serve a larger percentage of the population and that enrolments continue into the secondary grades. In order to enhance the skills of the poor, the quality and relevance of educational services need to be improved and should provide technical and vocational training to create new skills in areas of value added agriculture, agro processing, transport and communications.

Mediating financing for the infrastructure of economic development.

These issues are closely associated with previous ones, and fall within the framework of the CPAP. During the Team’s interactions with government officials, at local and central levels, in both the South and the North, requests about the financing of economic development infrastructure were evoked almost regularly. Additional concerns were evoked, both by donors and government officers, about results from sub-optimal disbursement and procurement of goods and services operations. Lastly, stakeholders raised concerns about sustainable development and human security. These concerns are crucial for overall development, as the infrastructure for economic development can influence not only the rate and pace of overall economic development, but also poverty alleviation efforts.

By mediating access to finances, UNDP stands to gain potential benefits from strategic partnerships with the WB, IFC, IMF, regional development banks and civil society. Joint programmatic work could cover rules and regulations that affect the growth of private sector bank and financial operations, policies that encourage the growth of small enterprises, the creation and enhancement of market institutions, the improvement of the investment climate and other country issues not necessarily covered by CCF. For example, the judicious use of the WB’s International Development Association (IDA) credits and grants, combined with the people-oriented perspective of UNDP, would provide a strong basis for a partnership that could yield results in terms of human security and human development.

147 The broad task of civil society development has been the task of UNDP with its expertise in institution building. The narrower task of private sector development, i.e. fostering the development of commercial organizations, prudential institutions to manage and protect against risk, aid in enforcing contracts and property rights, among others, has been the task of the WB Group. This distinction avoids conflict of mandates.

148 Research has drawn attention to the fact that the lack of ready access to basic infrastructure services can directly hamper the poor from their chances of rising out of poverty. For example, the hours women and girls spend fetching water severely restricts the time they have for education, training opportunities or income earning activities. See: WB. Infrastructure for poor people. Washington, DC, 2003, pp 2-17

149 All these functions are included under Private Sector Development (PSD). This is a narrow concept within the broader task of the Civil Society Development (CSD). In practice, civil society is separate from markets, comprising the institutions that allow markets to function in the general interest. CSD is a broad task and is appropriate for UNDP with its expertise in institution building, while PSD is a narrow task and would be the expertise of the World Bank.
Regional development banks could participate in post conflict reconstruction, which requires extensive investments in roads, power plants, housing, and irrigation, in accordance with the country’s need. Training is required for the community to participate in effective management of loans and grants from regional development banks. Regional banks often perceive community management as incapable of guaranteeing the proper use of funds provided by loans or grants. This is where UNDP’s comparative advantage in community-based and area-based development work would be expedient.

As administering entity of the MDTF, The WB is currently funding UNDP projects. Although the Mission did not interact with WB on this subject, in principle the ongoing work arrangements should not preclude additional joint activities that might lead to the jump-starting of the economic recovery of Sudan. In fact, through the internet, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the WB Group, announced that through a new programme it intends to deepen its impact on some of the most challenging economic environments in Africa and to help countries devastated by conflict rebuild their private sectors in order to create new jobs and opportunities. All in all, a partnership is considered to be a tool that facilitates the contribution of an organization, such as UNDP, to a given outcome.

Recommendation:

- UNDP should consider the potential of mediating access to finances for infrastructure development with the World Bank Group, IMF, regional banks and the private sector, and in particular, with Global Compact. All stakeholders interviewed suggested that UNDP in Sudan would be the best organization to mediate badly needed finances for economic infrastructure, especially in the South.

Procurement of Goods and Services

With respect to the sub-optimal operations related to the disbursement and procurement of goods and services, UNDP management in Khartoum indicated to the Mission that in-house capacity for financial disbursement and procurement grew almost exponentially from 2005 onwards. In addition, UNDP anticipates opening sub-offices at the state level in order to resolve operational and logistical problems.

In the South, early evidence suggests that there are structural constraints beyond UNDP’s scope. In Southern Sudan the economy has a nascent banking system and supporting financial services, which are further exacerbated by the geographical position of Southern Sudan. All world supply centres, such as Bangkok and Singapore, are in Asia or northern Europe. The transportation infrastructure is such that while airline shipping is technically viable, it is not necessarily financially competitive. Under these circumstances, economic logic suggests that regardless of how much UNDP invests in enhancing its own management operations in Southern Sudan, it will not make up for the absence of a national banking system and financial services, as procurement will remain costly and time consuming. Government authorities have assured the Mission, however, that they are proactively looking for solutions to improve the banking and financial services.

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www.developmentgateway.org
Recommendation

- Implement stopgap measures as the most practical option, particularly in the South, for the enhancement of management operations in disbursement and procurement. Specifically, determine real-time parameters for financial disbursement and procurement so that they can be used in the planning process and the budgeting of the forthcoming cycle. This measure is likely to be supported by all stakeholders and partners until such a time when financial services and banking operations have been substantially improved.

Sustainable Development and Human Security

A set of issues linked to overall economic development and human security became manifest in several working sessions with stakeholders. Although these issues are long-term concerns, they are relevant in the current conjunction. Conflicts frequently reflect the failure of development to resolve structural problems; solutions to conflict cannot last long unless underlying development issues are dealt with effectively and in a sustainable manner. Progress in one area bolsters progress in the other, and failure in either area increases the risk of failure in the other.151 There is a close link between human development and human security. While human development enables people to expand their choices, human security allows them to exercise those choices safely and freely, and be reasonably confident that the opportunities available to them today will not be lost tomorrow. Concrete progress in human development leads to the achievement of human security, which in turn protects the gains of human development from sudden, severe or extended downturns. The two concepts are also closely linked to human rights, which guarantee the freedoms and rights of development. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said,152 “Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other… Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”

UNDP has a unique position to address the structural conditions that lead to conflict. UNDP developed new strategic responses to conflict and has introduced many innovative projects, especially community-based ones. UNDP Sudan should develop the expertise to properly understand specific conflicts and to monitor human security.153

Recommendations:

- Consider developing a vision based on the concept of human security, developed with other UN agencies, to address the structural conditions leading to conflict. This vision should integrate development concerns with those of security.
- UNDP should consider building relations with civil society groups as partners in strategy formulation and to monitor security. These could be organizations including NGOs and CBOs.
- Involve civil society organizations, such as academic institutions and women’s organizations, in a long-term analysis of the structure of conflict and of the monitoring of human security. These organizations are often concerned with advocacy issues for the public good and promote think-tank organizations.

151 This subject is analyzed in: Baytalhikma. Iraqi Review of Human Development 2008, Bagdhad, pp 18-20
153 These concepts are based on the present evaluation findings which were corroborated in: United Nations. Management response to the evaluation of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries. Executive board of the UNDP and UNPF, 9 January 2007, DP/2007/4
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1. Background

UNDP Sudan programme has been operating within the framework of the Country Cooperation Framework for 2002-2006, approved by the Government of Sudan and by UNDP Executive Board on September 22, 2002. In light of the signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army on January 9, 2005, and the subsequent Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006 and the East Peace Agreement, the country is experiencing new political, economic and social needs.

In May 15, 2006 the UN Country Team in Sudan decided to extend the UNDAF for two more years until the end of 2008. The agreed timeframe for the next CCA/UNDAF is 2009-2012 where the year 2012 will be used for consolidation of the results of that period. Consequently, UNDP requested its governing body, the UNDP Executive Board, for an extension of the CCF-2 of two years. The two-year extension is also known as the UNDP Bridging Programme 2007-2008 which not only reflects the extended time period but also the changed priorities following the signing of the CPA.

A mid term review of the CCF-2 was conducted in October – November 2006. The review provided an intensive analysis on the pre- and post- CPA programmes in UNDP Sudan, identifying the significant roles the programme played in the post conflict/transitional phase. The key recommendations have been reflected in the Bridging Programme 2007-2008, and in the drafting of the new Country Programme Document 2009-2012.

Accordingly UNDP Sudan in coordination with its Government counterpart Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) agreed to review the priorities defined in the CCF for 2002-2006 and re-align its agenda with that of the country having a bridging programme for 2007-2008. Thus, UNDP Sudan has decided to conduct a CCF evaluation in 2008, covering the period of the CCF2 and the bridging programme.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Sudan is therefore planning to conduct a country evaluation for the Country Corporation Framework (CCF-2) 2002 – 2006 and the Bridging Programme 2007 – 2008. The CCF-2 evaluation has been designed for a number of reasons: The completion of the 2002-2008 Country Cooperation Framework presents an opportunity to evaluate the achievements over the past programme cycle and before, to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP’s contributions to development results at the country level and provide strategic analysis for enhancing performance and strategically positioning UNDP support within national development priorities and UNDP corporate policy directions. The evaluation should also generate lessons and experiences that could provide inputs or feed into the implementation of the next country programme document (CPD 2009-2012).

2. Purpose

The purpose of the proposed CCF-2 evaluation is to measure UNDP’s contribution to the development results and approaches employed with a view to fine-tune the current UNDP country programme, and inform the new programming CP/CPAP cycle 2009 - 20012 under the UNDAF 2009-2012. The evaluation will support the country management team’s substantive accountability function to national stakeholders and partners, and serve as a vehicle for quality assurance of UNDP interventions at the country level; generate lessons learned from experience to inform current and future programming at the country and corporate levels; and provide country programme stakeholders an objective assessment of results at programme/outcomes level that have been achieved through UNDP support in partnerships with other key actors for the period 2002 - 2008.

Objectives of the Evaluation

The evaluation will assess UNDP’s contributions to development results and strategic positioning in Sudan, drawing lessons learned and outlining options for improvements.

The evaluation will specifically:
1. Provide an independent assessment of development results at the country level, with particular emphasis on UNDP’s Country Programme, assessing the relevance and effectiveness achieved through UNDP support and in partnership with other development actors during the last five to seven years;

2. Assess performance of country programme and specify the development results achieved in the areas of policy advice, capacity development and knowledge management within the core results areas that the programme has focused on, and assess the scope and range of strategic partnerships formed;

3. Based on the actual results, ascertain how the country programme has strategically positioned UNDP to establish its comparative advantage or niche as a major upstream national policy advisor for poverty reduction and sustainable human development and as a knowledge-based organization in the country; and

4. Present key findings, draw key lessons learned, and identify innovative approaches in incubation and provide forward-looking options for management to make adjustments in the current strategy and next Country Programme.

3. Scope of the Evaluation
The evaluation will review UNDP Sudan country programme during the CCF-2 period (2002 – 2008). It will refer to the UNDP activities under the Second Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) 2002-2008 and, when necessary, to the first CCF 1997-2001. It will be conducted as a meta-evaluation, drawing on the conclusion of outcome evaluations undertaken during the 2002 - 2008, (CCF) and will be largely based on secondary data. In assessing the strategic importance, partnership strategy, underlying factors, strategic positioning of UNDP, relevance, and development effectiveness of the CCF, the evaluation will cover the following key areas in relation to the four study objectives above, inter alia:

a) Providing an examination of the effectiveness and sustainability of the UNDP programmes by i) highlighting main achievements at programme, at the national level in the last seven years and UNDP’s contribution in terms of key outputs, ii) ascertaining current progress made in achieving different outcomes in the given thematic areas and UNDP’s support to this. Qualify UNDP’s contribution to the programme with a fair degree of plausibility.

b) Assessing contribution to cross cutting issues, including contribution to capacity development at the national and sub-national level to the extent that it is implicit in the intended results, as well as contribution to gender equality. Consider anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative outcomes.

c) Providing an in-depth analysis of the main programme areas, assessing the anticipated progress in achieving intended outcomes under each of the objectives and programme areas.

d) Identifying and analyzing the main factors influencing results, including the range and quality of development partnerships forged and their contribution to outcomes, and how the positioning of UNDP influences its results and partnership strategy.

e) Identifying lessons learnt and best practices and related innovative ideas and approaches in incubation, and in relation to management and implementation of activities to achieve related outcomes in the thematic areas of focus and on positioning that can provide a useful basis for strengthening UNDP and its support to the country and for improving programme performance, results and effectiveness in the future. Draw lessons from unintended results.

Underlying factors: Analyze the underlying factors beyond UNDP’s control that influenced the country programme performance. Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management capacities and issues including the timeliness of outputs, the degree of stakeholders and partners’ involvement in the completion of outputs, and how processes were managed/ carried out.

Strategic Positioning of UNDP: Examine the distinctive characteristics and features of UNDP support to national needs, development goals and priorities, including linkages with the goal of reducing poverty and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and how it has shaped UNDP’s relevance as a current and potential partner. The Country Office (CO) position will be analyzed in terms of communication that goes into articulating UNDP’s relevance, or how the CO is
positioned to meet partner needs by offering specific, tailored services to these partners, creating value by responding to partners' needs, mobilizing resources for the benefit of the country, not for UNDP, demonstrating a clear breakdown of tailored UNDP services and having comparative advantages relative to other development organizations in major national challenges to development.

Assess how UNDP has anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context affecting specific thematic areas. The evaluation should consider key events at the national and political level that influenced the development context, notably the risk management of UNDP, any missed opportunities for UNDP involvement and contribution, efforts at advocacy, and UNDP’s responsiveness versus concentration of efforts.

The evaluation should consider the influence of systemic issues, i.e. policy and administrative constraints affecting the programme, on both the donor and programme country sides, as well as how the development results achieved and the partnerships established have contributed to ensure a relevant and strategic position of UNDP.

**Partnership strategy:** Ascertain whether UNDP's partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective. What were the partnerships formed? What was the role of UNDP? How did the partnership contribute to the achievement of development results? What was the level of stakeholders’ participation? Examine the partnership among UN Agencies and other donor organizations in the relevant field. This will also aim at validating the appropriateness and relevance of thematic areas to the country’s needs and the partnership strategy and hence enhancing development effectiveness and/or decision making on UNDP future assistance.

4. Methodology

Based on the objectives mentioned above, the lead consultant will propose a methodology and plan for this assignment, which will be approved by UNDP senior management. A design matrix approach relating objectives and/or expected results to indicators, study questions, data required to measure indicators and data sources.

However, it’s recommended that the methodology should take into account the following, namely:

Triangulation of information and data sources will constitute the primary methodology for the assessment. The evaluation will utilize both primary and secondary data from both routine and non-routine sources; coupling quantitative and qualitative designs, hence facilitating both quantification of variables of interest and explication of why these variables are at the observed levels. It will utilize the methodology for meta-evaluation of UNDP’s country programme focus areas. The meta-evaluation will review and validate findings and data from existing evaluations; conduct selective spot checks, i.e. in-country project visits and consultations with CCF stakeholders on the ground.

Data gathering techniques will include: desk reviews, stakeholder meetings, client surveys, and focus group interviews and selected site visits. The evaluation consultants will use triangulation of perceptions, documents and validations and will review national policy documents, such as the record of the roundtable meetings and sector policies and action plans, as well as programming frameworks (UNDAF, Country Assessment, CCF, Strategic Result Framework/ Results-oriented Annual Report, etc.), which gives an overall picture of the country context.

Desk review of existing documents and materials such as support documents, evaluations, assessments, and a variety of temporal and focused reports will be conducted. In particular it will review mission, programme/project reports, the annual reports and the consultant’s technical assessment reports.

A stakeholder involvement and consultation process is envisaged. The evaluation consultants will meet with government ministries/agencies, other institutions, civil society organizations, NGOs, private sector representatives, UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors, and beneficiaries.

Field visits to selected sites; and briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP and the Government, as well as with donors and partners.
5. Key deliverables
The consultant(s) will produce a report structured demonstrating disaggregations were possible for South and North Sudan, totaling 30 pages plus annexes, with an executive summary of not more than 5 pages describing key findings and recommendations. The assessment will entail, *inter alia*:

1) A report containing (Hard copy, a soft copy in MS Word and Acrobat reader, Times New Roman, Size 12, Single Spacing):
   a) Executive summary of conclusions and recommendations
   b) Introduction, description of the evaluation methodology
   c) An analysis of key interactions (the development results, substantive influences, UNDP’s contribution and how UNDP works with other relevant actors) and associations between variables measuring programme performance
   d) Key lessons learnt, highlighting key factors that might have hampered the impact of country programme and suggesting possible recommendations for future
   e) Conceptual Framework to guide country programme in terms of future programming and policy
   f) Assumptions made during the evaluation and study limitations, and
   g) Conclusions and recommendations
   h) Annexes: ToRs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc

2) Provide a draft report before leaving Sudan, and submit a final report within two weeks

3) Debrief UNDP, Government of Sudan, GoSS, other UN agencies and development partners in Sudan

6. UNDP’s obligations
UNDP will:
   a) Provide the consultant with all the necessary support (not under the consultant’s control) to ensure that the consultant(s) undertake the study with reasonable efficiency.
   b) Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the consultant(s) during the evaluation process.
   c) Collect background documentation and inform partners and selected project counterparts.
   d) Meet all travel related costs to project sites as part of the programme evaluation cost.
   e) Support to identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the evaluation.
   f) The programme staff members will be responsible for liaising with partners, logistical backstopping and providing relevant documentation and feedback to the evaluation team
   g) Cover any costs related to stakeholder workshops during dissemination of results
   h) Organize inception meeting between the consultants, partners and stakeholders, including Government prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment

7. Time Frame
The evaluation consultancy is tentatively scheduled to take place from September/October 2008 onwards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tentative timetable (Sudan)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation Team</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of documents and production of inception report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations with UNDP Senior management team, key programme stakeholders in Khartoum and Juba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits - project and institutional visits (Northern and Southern Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report writing and de-briefing/presentation to stakeholders (Khartoum &amp; Juba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of comments and submission of final report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Work Days</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. **Reporting**
The consultant(s) will be reporting directly to UNDP senior management.

9. **Qualifications/experience of the consultants**
The evaluation team shall consist of three consultants: an International consultant (team leader) and two national consultants with extensive knowledge of the country situation. The Team Leader (International) will have the responsibility for the overall co-ordination of the evaluation and for the overall quality and timely submission of the evaluation report to the UNDP Country Office.

**International Consultant**

**Education:**
Possesses advanced university degree in economics and/or social development field, Anthropology, demonstrate strong understanding of development results concepts and prior experience of programming in a post-conflict setting

**Experience:**
- Proven experience of a minimum of 15 years at the international level, preferably with UN experience. Knowledge and familiarity of the United Nations system, its reform process and UNDP programme policies, procedures.
- Solid academic/research records/publications on development work.
- Familiarity with the UNDAF/CCF/CPD, UNDP Multi-Year Funding Framework and other results based M&E frameworks.
- Previous experience in conducting country programme evaluations is an asset.
- Knowledge of the political, cultural and economic situation in Sudan or ability to quickly acquire such knowledge is desirable
- Excellent writing and analytical skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines

**Language Requirements:**
Fluency in English

**National Consultants for Juba and Khartoum**

**Education:**
Possesses advanced university degree in economics and/or social development field, demonstrate strong understanding of development results concepts and prior experience of programming in a post-conflict setting

**Experience:**
- Proven experience of a minimum of 7 years at the national level, preferably with UN experience. Knowledge and familiarity of the United Nations system, its reform process and UNDP programme policies, procedures.
- Solid academic/research records/publications on development work.
- Previous experience in conducting country programme evaluations is an asset.
- Knowledge of the political, cultural and economic situation in Sudan or ability to quickly acquire such knowledge is desirable
- Excellent writing and analytical skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines

**Language Requirements:**
Fluency in English and Arabic
10. Remuneration and Terms of Payment
National consultants will be paid in accordance with UNDP standard contract rates as applicable for national consultants. The international consultants will be recruited and paid in accordance with UN conditions and procedures.

11. Conditions of Work
Consultants will be expected to use their own laptop computers. UNDP will support and facilitate the consultants travel, provide administrative, logistics and facilitate security related issues of the consultancy.

12. Reference materials
The consultants should study the following documents among others:
   a) UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results
   b) Ethical Code of Conduct for UNDP Evaluations;
   c) Guideline for Reviewing the Evaluation Report;
   d) UNDP Results-Based Management: Technical Note
   e) CCF-2, Bridging Programme documents
   f) CCF-2 mid term review report
   g) Project Documents and relevant reports
   h) Other documents and materials related to the country programme to be evaluated (from the government, donors, etc.)
   i) Sudan 5 year strategic Plan
   j) SP and Rule of Law Outcome evaluations
ANNEX 2
LIST OF PERSONS MET
NORTH SUDAN

GOVERNMENT

Moses Machar  Chairman, High Commission for Civil Service
Yaseen Issa    Ministry of International Cooperation – Khartoum
El Awad El Bashir Ali  Director, NMAC – Khartoum
Abdalla Al-Imam  Secretary General, S. Kordofan
Awatef Eltom Idriss Almy  State Minister, M. Social Welfare – S. Kordofan
Mohammed Ahmed Alkinani  Judiciary – S. Kordofan
Abdel Sattar A. Awad-Alkarim  Appeals Court – S. Kordofan
Mohammed El-Taheer Fadul  Director, Police Force – S. Kordofan
Alkhidir Mahmud  Training Dept. – Local government – S. Kordofan
Abdel-Samad Ibrahim Mohammed  Brigadier /Police force – S. Kordofan
Hassan Abdel Qader Kambal  Director General, Prison Dept. – S. Kordofan
Hassan………….  Director General, Local Government & Civil Service
Mohammed Bakr Mahmud  Director General – Planning & Development Dept. – Kassala
Musa Oshiekh  Senior Inspector – Planning Dept. – Kassala
Khaled Mohammed Ali  Director – Dept. of Local Government – Kassala
Alsadig Bannaga  Deputy Director/HAC – Kassala
Yaseen Ja’afar Abdalla  Children Sector/HAC – Kassala
Alshiekh Gamaraddin Alshiekh  Reintegration Officer/ HAC – Kassala,
Adel Mahmoud Ramadan  Reintegration Coordinator/ HAC – Kassala,
Abdel Qader Ahmed  Director – Local government Dept. – Kassala
Alsadig Bannaga  Local government officer – Kassala
Asia Abdel Rahman  Director, Kassala prison
Yehia Ibrahim  Officer, Kassala prison
Ahmed Ibrahim Alfaki  Director/Economic Planning & International
Alsadeg Abdel Marouf Cooperation – Red Sea
Amin Hassan  Planning Dept – Red Sea
Taha Bamkarr  Development Dept. – Red Sea
Nadia Naser  Planning Dept. – Red Sea
Sawakin Locality  Red Sea

Traditional Leaders
Ahmed Hamid  Nazir, Rashaida Tribes
Ali Ibrahim Mohammed Osman Nazir, Hadandawa Tribes
Mohamed Ali Gandal  Nazir, Beni Amer Tribes

Embassies/Partners
Hege T. Magnus  First Secretary – Royal Norwegian Embassy
Wandia Gichuru  Governance Advisor – DFID
Rob Ower  Deputy Programme Manager – DFID
Alicia Herbert  Senior Social Development Advisor/Team Leader– DFID

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### NGOs & INGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Office</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Ahmed Abu Ammar</td>
<td>Chairman, Lawyers Union – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alnumeiri Widatollah Mohammed</td>
<td>Sec. General/Al Manar JCC - RoL – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas Said Saad</td>
<td>President, Al Sharq JCC - RoL – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeinab Idriss Mohammed Ali</td>
<td>Legal Resource Centre, Community Development College – University of Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Mohammed</td>
<td>SCF/Senior Programme Manager - RRP – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brima Fatorma Ngombi</td>
<td>SKILLS/RRP Project Manager – S. Kordofan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SKILLS project team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arbaat Development Association</td>
<td>Community Development NGO – Red Sea State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thoraya Mohammed Elhassan</td>
<td>IRC - Leader NGO Consortium/RRP – Red Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issa Yaqoub</td>
<td>ACORD – RRP/Red Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osman Ali</td>
<td>SOS – RRP/Red Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saleh Issa Kuku</td>
<td>Paralegal/Justice &amp; Confidence Centre – S. Kordofan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anwar Hussein Alradi</td>
<td>Paralegal/Justice &amp; Confidence Centre – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Khaleq Alshiekh Tutu</td>
<td>Paralegal/Justice &amp; Confidence Centre – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Naseem Issa</td>
<td>Paralegal/Justice &amp; confidence Centre – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UN Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surendra Sharma</td>
<td>Reform &amp; Restructuring coordinator - UNMIS/UNPOL – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel Forrestal</td>
<td>Deputy Programme Manager - Mine Action – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’a Aldeen M. A. Taha</td>
<td>RCSO – Red Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haidar Hamadnalla Abdul Qader</td>
<td>RCSO – Kassala &amp; Gadaref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atef Alamoush</td>
<td>NMIS/UNPOL – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammed Almuhajir</td>
<td>NMIS/UNPOL – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Alajouz</td>
<td>NMIS/UNPOL – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Hayward</td>
<td>UNMIS/UNPOL – S. Kordofan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerzy Skuratowicz</td>
<td>UNDP Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auke Lootsma</td>
<td>UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Olupot</td>
<td>UNDP – M&amp;E Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuha Abdelgader</td>
<td>UNDP M&amp;E officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Ishaq</td>
<td>UNDP/Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Ibrahim</td>
<td>UNDP/Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanna Ahlmark</td>
<td>Planning Officer – RC Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Elsheikh</td>
<td>UNDP/HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanan Mutwakkil</td>
<td>UNDP/Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Al-Haj</td>
<td>UNDP - RRP National Officer – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamya Badri</td>
<td>UNDP - GGEPP Manager – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadeem Khan Tariq</td>
<td>Senior Technical Advisor, Mine Action – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basil Massey</td>
<td>Programme Manager - DDR – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Cheema</td>
<td>Programme Manager/RRP – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alinazar Alinazarov</td>
<td>RRP Financial Administrator – Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maarten Barends</td>
<td>Programme Manager – RoL – Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Makunga</td>
<td>UNDP – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutasim Abdelmoula Mohammed</td>
<td>National Officer – RoL – Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Yehya Omer</td>
<td>HIV/AIDS Officer – UNDP/Kassala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Mutasim</td>
<td>Governance Programme – UNDP/Kassala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abdel Mutalib Ibrahim  UNDP Project Manager – Red Sea
Ahmed Abu Zainab  Finance Officer – UNDP/Red Sea
Zahir Yacoub Abdel Sayed  Local Development Advisor – Red Sea
Taj Elsirr Hashim  Finance & Admin Officer – Red Sea
Lealem Berhanu Dinku  Senior Technical Advisor - Governance – S. Kordofan
Catherine………………… Project Manager/RoL Advisor – S. Kordofan & Abyei
St. John Costelloe  UNV – RoL Officer – S. Kordofan & Abyei
Edith Kabui-Rotich  Governance Trainer – S. Kordofan & Abyei

SOUTH SUDAN

UNDP Office, Juba

George Conway  Deputy Head of Office (Programme)
Momodou Dibbo
Anselme Sadiki
Tedla Mezemr
Tsedeke Otuloro
Ker Bower
Sue Tatten  Rule of Law
Vivian Luka  HIV/AIDS
Margaret Ng’ong’a Gulavici Monitoring and Evaluation/Reporting Officer
Andrew Markos Shuruma  Programme M&E Analyst/PMS Unit
Kaori Kawarabayashi  PMSU Head
Shyam Bh.  Governance
Syaed Hussein M.  Programme Manager
Daniel N. Kabira, PhD  Head of HIV/AIDS & Global Fund Coordinator

Government

H. Majok Mading  Undersecretary, Ministry of Legal Affairs – Juba

Rule of Law/Promoting Access to Justice: (ROL Promoters)/Center in Juba:

Taban
Cariline-UNDP

**Local Government Board (Juba):**

Gordon Soro  Undersecretary, LGB
Nikadimo Arou  Manager, LGB
David Koak Guok  Deputy Chairman, LGB
Caesar Arkangelo Suliman  Chairman, LGB
Chamangu Awow Adogjok
Boniface Ndyabahuca R.  UNDP

**Parliamentary Affairs**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Julia Aker Dual</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Justin Achor</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Presidential Affairs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngor Akec</td>
<td>D/Executive Director/C/County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan J. Kulang</td>
<td>D/G Public Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Majok Anhiem</td>
<td>Assistant Inspector LG. Yirol West County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abraham Majak Makur</td>
<td>Senior Inspector LG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrey Akec Nar</td>
<td>Director for Planning and Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macuor Anyieth Reec</td>
<td>Executive Director/Wulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Mayom Malek</td>
<td>D/Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabor Champ Mabor</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelo Makuac Caurop</td>
<td>D/G Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakaria Namba Marik</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. E. Matur</td>
<td>Economic Advisor – Lakes State, Rumbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.E.Mawan Gak</td>
<td>Deputy Governor – Lakes State, Rumbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Michael Batuku</td>
<td>Director of Prisons, Central Prisons – Lakes State, Rumbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses K.</td>
<td>UNIMIS, Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Nile, Malakal</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Biar M. Biar</td>
<td>Commissioner of Police – Upper Nile State, Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Obuonyo Deng</td>
<td>SSAC – Upper Nile State, Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. David Reth Malual</td>
<td>Act./Director of Prisons – Upper Nile State, Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice/Stephen Awanta</td>
<td>Act./President Court of Appeal – Upper Nile State, Malakal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pauline Puto</td>
<td>UNOPS Construction Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrey Tisa Sabuni</td>
<td>Undersecretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses Mabior</td>
<td>Director Budget and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bona Thiang Thiep</td>
<td>Director of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiona D.</td>
<td>Economic Advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 3

MISSION ITINERARY

16 November 2008
- UNDP office – Programme Support Unit (PSU) – M&E
- UNDP office – Deputy Resident Representative (Programme)

17 November 2008
- Human Security and Recovery Unit – Khartoum
- HIV/AIDS, MDGs & Gender Unit – Khartoum

18 November 2008
- Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) - Khartoum
- Project Management Team – Rehabilitation & Recovery Programme (RRP) - Khartoum
- Project Management Team – Threat and risk Mapping Analysis (TRMA) - Khartoum
- Royal Norwegian Embassy - Khartoum

20 November 2008
- Project Management Team – Mine Action programme - Khartoum
- National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) – Khartoum
- British Embassy – DFID – Khartoum

21 November
- Chief Technical Advisor – Rule of Law/Darfur project – Khartoum

23 November 2008
- Project Management Team – Disarmament, Demobilization & Re-integration (DDR) - Khartoum
- Civil Service Commission - Khartoum

24 November 2008
- Project Manager – GGEPP – Khartoum

26 November 2008
- UNDP field office/Kadugli
- Ministry of Local government and civil Service (MOLGCS) – S. Kordofan/Kadugli
- Justice & Confidence Centre (JCC) – S. Kordofan/Kadugli

27 November 2008
- Secretary General of the Government – S. Kordofan/Kadugli
- State Judiciary – S. Kordofan/Kadugli
• State Police – S. Kordofan/Kadugli
• Prison Department – S. Kordofan/Kadugli
• Ministry of Economy & Investment
• UNMIS/UNPOL

28 November 2008
• SCF/USA – RRP Team – S. Kordofan/Kadugli

30 November 2008
• UNDP office – Kassala
• Al Manar & Al-Sharq NGOs – Kassala
• Resident Coordinator’s Support Office

01 December 2008
• Ministry of Local Government - Kassala
• Economic Development & Planning Department – Kassala
• Police Commissioner - Kassala
• UNMIS/UNPOL – Kassala
• State Prison – Kassala
• Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC) – Kassala

02 December 2008
• Resident Coordinator’s Support Office - Kassala
• University of Kassala/Legal resources Centre – Kassala (RCSO)
• Lawyers’ Union -Kassala
• Traditional Leaders (Beja, Rashayda & Hadandawa Nazirs/Tribal Chiefs) – Kassala
• HIV/AIDS focal point

03 December 2008
• Meeting with NGO – Arbaat Community Development Committee
• Meeting with NGOs (SOS, IRC, ACORD) – Red Sea

04 December 2008
• Economic Planning & International Cooperation – Red Sea State
• Resident Coordinator’s Support Office (RCSO)
• Meeting with NGO - Sudanese Living With AIDS (SLWA)

08 December 2008
• UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) – Khartoum
• UNDP Country Director
ANNEX 4

Level of Progress Towards Outcomes [2002-2008]

The Evaluation Team realizes the impossibility of carrying out definitive assessments of the performance of outcomes. This is because UNDP interventions were carried out without the benefit of quantitative measures of change following UNDP interventions. Thus estimates at best are inferential.

Nevertheless to assess level of progress the following criteria was used. It is to be noted that these criteria have been customized from the original concepts defined by UNDP in: Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for Results. Glossary, 2002, page 97

Relevance. Is the outcome relevant to Sudan requirements and UNDP’s corporate and CO mission?

Effectiveness. Has the outcome met expectations and contributes to outcome?

Efficiency. Has the outcome being implemented within the timeline and procedures anticipated?

Sustainability. Is the outcome likely to continue after funding is discontinued?

For each of the outcomes, it was scored by noting whether perceived estimations met the evaluation criteria perfectly (score = High Progress), satisfactory (score = Medium Progress), less than satisfactorily (score = Low Progress) and deficient (score = No Progress). This operation has provided an approximate measure of performance. It is concluded that UNDP contributions were relevant and effective to the moment of execution as indicated in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: UNDP Sudan Programme: North & National Outcome Results
Source: UNDP M&E Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Outcome</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Results Achieved as of 07/08</th>
<th>Level of Progress Towards Outcome [2002-2008]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rights upheld and protected in accordance with international and national laws through accountable and equitable justice and rule of law institutions</strong></td>
<td>Justice and Rule of Law institutions are not able to uphold and protect the rights citizens due to lack of capacity.</td>
<td>- Form 8 Advocacy Strategy developed and approved, currently Form 8 is not required by law to pursue justice in Darfur. - In 2007, 2,250 vulnerable individuals received legal assistance through legal aid centers and using strengthened lawyers/paralegal networks (2000 cases in Darfur, 50 cases in Eastern Sudan and Khartoum, 134 cases in Darfurn, and 66 cases in South Kordofan). - In 2008, 4,000 cases have been taken by UNDP Legal Aid Centres and paralegal groups. - 19 legal aid centers in Darfur, Khartoum.</td>
<td>Medium Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2: Parliament, political parties, media and civil society are empowered to support the implementation of the CPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Capacity of the legislative and democratic institutions such as political parties, civil society and media is weak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Four (4) parliamentary committees assisted in development of strategies, which have been approved. The strategies developed were (or the Economic Affairs Committee: the Peace and National Reconciliation Committee; the Legislation and Justice Committee: and the Information, Data and Communication Committee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 20 Political parties oriented on their roles in democratic systems with main focus on gender and good governance principles.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- 254 members from 22 different political parties trained on &quot;the electoral systems and women&quot; and &quot;census</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Progress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kassala, Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Abyei area established and working in collaboration with partners (Legal Aid Department of the Ministry of Justice and International Rescue Committee (IRC)). -- Sudan Legal Aid Network established in collaboration with Legal Aid Department of the Ministry of Justice, UNDP, IRC, and the People's Legal Aid Center (common platform for the Sudanese paralegals and lawyers who provide legal assistance to the communities across the country). - 8 judges trained in legal analysis skills as Trainers of Trainers (TOTs) in legal analysis skills, including Internet Assisted Legal Research and English Legal Terminology. Additional 50 Judges trained.
and its relation to elections.  
- 100 Parliamentarians trained on their roles and responsibilities in the National parliament including Parliamentarian bicameral models  
- 30 (20 female and 10 male) members of National Assembly received "Leadership Training" and on electoral processes.  
- A booklet in parliamentary processes & roles of parliament prepared and distributed (English / Arabic) for orientation of parliamentarians.  
- 25 Parliament journalists representing daily Sudanese newspapers trained in English modules for Media and Communication Purposes, Computer Skills and Journalism Editing with a focus on Parliamentarian coverage

### Outcome 3:
Institutional capacity of Local Government improved to adequately plan, set priorities, manage revenue and expenditure, and deliver basic services in an equitable manner

| 1. # of priority States/counties with completed 5 year plans disaggregated by north and south Sudan  
2. # of civil servants trained in office management, budgeting, and ICT disaggregated by state | - Three states (Red Sea, Kassala and South Kordofan) supported to complete 5 year strategic plans.  
- Planning and information units established in all 10 localities in Red Sea and the the relevant capacity for planning created within the 10 localities. - Three localities finalized a three year participatory planning (Agieg, Toker and Sinkat) this represents the first experiments in participatory planning | Medium Progress |

### Outcome 4:
Strengthened civil service and robust financial accountability systems established.

| 1. # of government officials trained in managerial, administrative and various technical areas to enhance their capacities  
2. # of Federal states and ministries submitting timely, accurate and | 1. Civil service pay and grading system is weak  
- PIU established, equipped and functioning.  
- Focal points from different implementing ministries, agencies and department identified. The focal points reviewed and discussed their role in the implementation | 1. Civil service pay and grading system is weak  
- PIU established, equipped and functioning.  
- Focal points from different implementing ministries, agencies and department identified. The focal points reviewed and discussed their role in the implementation | Low Progress |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 5:</th>
<th>Warring parties disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated in accordance with the provisions of the CPA and ESPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. # of ex-combatants disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated disaggregated by children and adults</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of weapons collected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No adult ex-combatants have gone through a DDR process.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No voluntary civilian disarmament carried out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| - 1,700 of ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized in Eastern Sudan. |
| - 1,800 children across Sudan (300 in East, 1,500 rest of Sudan) were demobilized and reunited with their families. |
| - 3,906 (1,500 in East, 2,406 in rest of Sudan) weapons collected from demobilized groups across Sudan. |

**Reintegration:**
- The Hakamas project concluded in Lagawa with the distribution of 5 goats to each Hakama who participated in the peace building activities.
- Community-based reintegration activities for CAAFG continued, with the special focus on the recently released CAAFG in Blue Nile State.
- 71 x-combatant (EF) provided with IG projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 6:</th>
<th>National capacity strengthened to manage mine action to provide an enabling environment for recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National legislative framework for mine action adopted and implemented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of de-miners trained and equipped disaggregated by North and south Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. # of de-mines that have been</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. National Mine Action Centers in North and South operate at low capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Draft national mine action law available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pilot group of 120 national de-miners trained and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| - North and South Sudan Mine Action government agencies equipped and functional. |
| - Infrastructure provided for the establishment of Head Offices of the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) – Khartoum, and the |
successfully conducted disaggregated by North and South Sudan equipped in partnership with DFID and the International Mine Action Center in Nairobi

Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC)
- 6 field offices of NMAC and SSDC in Kassala, Damazine, Kadugli (North) and Yei, Malakal and Wau (South) established.
- National domestic mine action law drafted and translated to Arabic and submitted to the Ministry of Justice GONU for review and comments.
- 5 local staff members were trained in Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
- As part of UNDP support to the GoNU to fulfill Sudan’s Mine Ban Treaty obligation, Article 7 report prepared and submitted to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation support unit.
- 140 de-miners trained and equipped with UNDP support.
- The de-mines, de-mined 446 km of the Babanusa-Wau railway line by clearing mines and UXOs.
- With support from UNDP and GoNU the jointed integrated de-mining Units cleared Kadugli-Kauda Road (119 km) as well as Kadugli-Talodi road (62 km) in the Nuba Mountains area.
- With Support form UNDP and GoNU, the Joint Integrated De-mining Units (Mine/ERW clearance teams) deployed on operations to clear 176 km suspected road linking Tokar to Garora in the east of Sudan.
- 234 kilometers of roads in Kassala state verified;
- 13 anti-tank mines and 3 anti-personnel mines as well as 20,000 explosive
| **Outcome 7:** Livelihoods and community security improved in conflict affected areas, in environmentally sustainable way | 1. # of recovery interventions implemented disaggregated by region | 1. Inadequate basic services with regional disparitiesSouthern Sudan: Overall limited quality of services, provided mainly through NGOs.
2- Gross school enrolment is 62% but large geographical disparities. Southern Sudan; GER 20%; school inadequate; 38% of children are schooled under trees.
4. No GOSS policy on civilian arms control and reduction yet exists;
5. No community security pilots yet initiated;
6. No local economic recovery pilots yet initiated;
7. No prior beneficiaries as Programme initiating in 2007 | - 300 recovery projects benefiting 800,000 people implemented in 10 states in North and South Sudan, improving livelihoods, basic services and strengthening capacity of local population.
Enhancing basic services delivery:
- Rehabilitated/built 22 primary health care centers, and provided with medicines;
- 207 water systems (water pumps, boreholes, wells and networks) refurbished or built across Sudan.
- Improving livelihood:
- 959 Households provided with agricultural inputs and tools;
- 986 farmers and veterinary associations trained in farm management and provided with agricultural inputs and tools to start food production;
- 71,000 animals vaccinated;
- 10 Grain banks/mills were established;
- 297 women trained in handicrafts and business skills
- 4,520 women received micro-credit support for their small businesses;
- Vocational training activities provided to 130 youth
- 433 health workers (nurses and midwives) trained in health care delivery and management
433 health workers (nurses and midwives) trained in health care delivery and management | Medium Progress |

<p>| <strong>Outcome 8:</strong> Capacities in govt. and civil society to | 1. Land degradation support report available | Land commissions not established No natural | -Natural resource conflict issues and mitigation measures were identified, documented and | Low Progress |
| 2. xx amount of | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manage natural resources for sustainable livelihoods; and to meet global environmental commitments strengthened.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial resources mobilized to implement the 2nd communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources conflict reduction pilots yet initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared with key stakeholders in Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 450 km migratory routes demarcation made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Six research studies and reports related to land tenure and pastoralist issues completed during 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Threat and Risk Mapping in South Kordofan, Red Sea, Kassala, Blue Nile and Gedaref completed and verified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Multi-stakeholder analysis of collected data is available for South Kordofan, Kassala and Red Sea State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TRMA information ready to fed into conflict-sensitive programming.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 9: Conflict sensitive Pro-poor and MDG based policies and strategies implemented by GNU and GOSS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MDG and NHDR 2008 reports disseminated, disaggregated by stakeholders attending the disseminations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of MDG and NHDR recommendations endorsed and implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. # of MDG task forces established and meetings held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of states and counties reached by awareness-raising campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No HDR or MDG report produced in the last two years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. MDG task forces not yet established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Low awareness of MDGs amongst states and counties in Southern Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TOR(MDG Task force) developed and shared with MIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MDG capacity assessment developed awaiting MIC signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- MOU on Devinfo between UNICEF/UNDP prepared and awaiting for signature MIC and RC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sudan Aid Information Database (SAID) developed with good reporting capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SAID is accessible through MIC intranet). Official Development Aid (ODA) and Paris Declaration Survey data were collected successfully with good response from major donors and.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Four study reports on the following topics has been produced:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Economic Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public Expenditure Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mapping of Policy making government Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participation of civil society organizations in PRSP and national</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low Progress
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Results Achieved as of 07/08</th>
<th>Level of Progress Towards the Outcome [2002-2008]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1: Rights upheld and Protected in accordance with international law and national laws through accountable and equitable justice and rule of law institutions</td>
<td>1. # of Judiciary Judges trained in legal and analytical skills disaggregated by national and state Judges</td>
<td>Justice and Rule of Law institutions are not able to uphold and protect the rights of citizens due to lack of capacity</td>
<td>1. Establishment of Rule of Law For a and Justice &amp; Confidence Centres for the promotion of dialogue /awareness of Rule of Law at States level 2. Foundation for establishment of regulatory frameworks and policy environment developed 3. Foundation for establishment of Customary and traditional authorities mechanisms developed 4. 2008-2010 MOLACD Strategic Plan developed awaiting approval 5. Capacity building for Judiciary/MOLACD in critical areas 6. Rehabilitation and construction of Police and Prison facilities 7. Establishment of framework for policy</td>
<td>Medium Progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: UNDP Southern Sudan Programme: OUTCOME RESULTS
Source: UNDP Southern Sudan: M&E Unit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2</th>
<th>Empowerment of Parliamentary members in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Outcome</td>
<td>1. Capacity of the legislative and democratic institutions such as political parties, civil society and media is weak. 2. On average 7 women participate in each state parliament of GoSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Outcome</td>
<td>Capacities of the State legislative assemblies and the Southern Sudan Legislative Assemblies were strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3</td>
<td>Institutional capacity of Local Government improved to adequately plan, set priorities, manage revenue and expenditure, and deliver basic services in an equitable manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. # of priority States/counties with completed 5 year plans disaggregated by state and south sudan</td>
<td>1. Strategic planning process initiated in 9 southern states in 2006. 2. Two prior Governor's Forums convened in 2006; 3. Local Government Framework drafted as basis for Bill; 4. No county level Government officials formally trained in planning and budgeting; 5. N/A (rollout of county budgets for first time in 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of civil servants trained in office management, budgeting, and ICT disaggregated by state</td>
<td>1. Development and establishment of decentralisation agenda via Governors Forum via improved service delivery; increased fiscal state &amp; county allocations and implementation of service reforms. 2. Strategic Planning, annual consultative planning and budgeting mechanisms established at State and County levels. 3. Infrastructural development and equipment provided to key planning institutions at State and County Levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 7</td>
<td>Livelihoods and community security restored in conflict affected areas in gender sensitive and environmentally friendly manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. # of recovery interventions implemented disaggregated by region</td>
<td>1. Inadequate basic services with regional disparities. Southern Sudan: Overall limited quality of services, provided mainly through NGOs. 2. Gross school enrolment is 62% but large geographical disparities. Southern Sudan: GER 20%; school inadequate; 38% of children are schooled under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. # of people benefiting from recovery interventions disaggregated by North and South Sudan</td>
<td>1. Improved community livelihoods through provision of agricultural implements. 2. Mine Risk Education training provided. 3. Rehabilitation of schools, improved water sources. 4. Establishment of Village Development Committees for community planning and prioritisation. 5. Improved local government capacity its collaborative efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. % increase in school enrollment disaggregated by gender, north and south Sudan</td>
<td>4. GoSS policy on civilian arms control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
finalized and approved;
5. # of community security pilots initiated;
6. # of local economic recovery pilots initiated;
7. Number of public works initiatives, and number of labourers benefiting

trees.
4. No GOSS policy on civilian arms control and reduction yet exists;
5. No community security pilots yet initiated;
6. No local economic recovery pilots yet initiated;

and in improvement of livelihoods for those in conflict sensitive areas, the capacity for local and community level structures were strengthened in planning, monitoring and the provision of basic services (public drainage, sanitation and waste disposal, and community water supply) funded by the Mutli - Donor Trust Fund in 10 South States.

Outcome 9
Conflict sensitive pro-poor, human development, and MDG based policies and strategies implemented by The Government of National Unity (GNU) and The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)

1. No HDR or MDG report produced in the last two years
2. MDG task forces not yet established
3. Low awareness of MDGs amongst states and counties in Southern Sudan

1. MDG and NHDR 2008 reports disseminated, disaggregated by stakeholders attending the disseminations
2. # of MDG and NHDR recommendations endorsed and implemented.
3. # MDG task forces established and meetings held
4. Number of states and counties reached by awareness-raising campaign

1. Establishment of consultative mechanisms and participatory process from GoSS to Local Government levels that have supported the development of MDG based Budget Sector Plans for 2008/9.
2. Enhancement of the statistical base and capacity for monitoring MDGs & Socio-economic data leading to development of the Statistical Master Plan for the Southern Sudan DEVINFO

Outcome 10
Effective National response to HIV/AIDS (and tuberculosis and malaria) scaled-up.

1. # of clients receiving ARV treatment
2. # of people who received VCT services disaggregated by gender
3. # of condoms procured and distributed for HIV prevention
4. # of economic impact study recommendations endorsed and implemented
5. # of gender audit recommendations endorsed and implemented
6. % of health facilities with no stock out of anti-malaria drugs in the last three months

1. Number of clients on ARV treatment = 1,011
2. Number of people received VCT = 9,658
3. 6,000,000 condoms procured and distributed in 2006
4. Zero sub-offices established at state level in Southern Sudan; 5 County Aids Committees established

1. Improved performance in TB prevention and treatment, an effective national response to Malaria and HIV/AIDS through its role as Principle Recipient for the Global Fund.
2. Development of Ministry of Health’s five year national TB strategic plan: Southern Sudan HIV/AIDS Behavioural Change Communication strategy