



EVALUATION OF THE

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Thematic Trust Fund

**COUNTRY
STUDY:
MOZAMBIQUE**

United Nations Development Programme

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By Fidelx Kulipossa and Harry Garnett

Country case studies were a key part of the evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). The evaluation team reviewed and analysed DGTTF projects in eight countries: Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen. This country case study is meant to complement the main text of the evaluation report.

The Mozambique case illustrates both successful and unsuccessful applications of the DGTTF funds. The anti-corruption and judicial set of DGTTF projects led to key players in the judicial sector being able to identify key problems in the sector and taking ownership of their solution. Some other uses of the DGTTF funds were neither innovative nor did they lead to any follow-on activities; at least one DGTTF project was probably an inappropriate use of the funds, stretching the definition of democratic governance beyond its limits.

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ABBREVIATIONS

APR	Annual Project Report	RB(x)	Regional Bureau(x)
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery	SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy	SL	Service Line
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women	SURF	Sub-Regional Resource Facility
CO	Country Office	SWAp	sector-wide approach
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan	TOR	terms of reference
CSO	civil society organization	TRAC	target for resource assignment from the core
Danida	Danish Development Assistance	UN	United Nations
DFID	UK Department for International Development	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
DGG	Democratic Governance Group	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
DGP	Democratic Governance Practice	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
DGTTF	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund	UNDP NY	United Nations Development Programme Office New York
ECIS	Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EOI	expression. of interest	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
HQ	headquarters	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
HURLITALK	Human Rights Policy Network		
ICT	information and communications technology		
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency		
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee		
MDG	Millennium Development Goal		
MYFF	multi-year funding framework		
NDI	National Democratic Institute		
NGO	non-governmental organization		
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee		
OGC	Oslo Governance Centre		
ProDoc	Project Document		

1. BACKGROUND

Mozambique has made progress in governance since 1992. The country has completed three general and presidential elections, held in 1994, 1999 and 2004, and two local elections (1998 and 2003), all of which the international community considered free and fair. Provincial assembly elections were scheduled for December 2007, in line with the 2004 Constitution.

As a result of its relative success in implementing political and economic reforms, Mozambique has been projected as a model for democracy and peace-building, supported by substantial foreign aid. A new Constitution was approved, by consensus, by the multiparty parliament and there has been some progress in democratization and in the creation of a reconciliatory the creation of a viable multiparty system comprising Frelimo, the dominant political force in power since independence, and Renamo, the former rebel movement.

Despite this relative success in implementing political and economic reforms, governance in Mozambique still remains weak and corruption is a growing concern. Large and small businesses frequently pay bribes to state officials to avoid fines related to outdated regulations. While Mozambique compares well with other low-income and African countries in terms of political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law, it compares poorly in curbing corruption. In fact, Transparency International's corruption ratings for Mozambique have been worsening, even though the government is publicly committed to fighting corruption. The government's actions to date in this respect have included promoting policy and administrative reforms in known corruption prone areas such as the judiciary, the police, public financial management, public procurement, privatisation, customs, and tax administration.

Despite these weaknesses, the Ministry of Justice, the Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office have finalized reform plans, to be implemented over the next few years. An anti-corruption unit has been set up in the Attorney General's Office and an anti-corruption law was passed by the Mozambican parliament in 2003.

Civil service capacity is constrained by small numbers, low education and low morale resulting from poor remuneration. The state is thinly spread and has difficulty in delivering services and enforcing legislation in every district. Ancillary functions such as legal, accounting and audit services remain weak. Bureaucratic processes remain cumbersome despite some progress in registering new businesses.

In 2001, the Government of Mozambique approved its global strategy for Public Sector Reform (PSR) aimed at enabling the public sector to promote socio-economic development and reduce absolute poverty. The PSR also aims to improve public servant pay and base promotions on performance, which will help to reduce incentives for corruption. Reforms taking place in municipalities and districts aim to increase public oversight, increase transparency and accountability to ensure efficient and effective service delivery, and enhance the capacity and competence of local institutions.

The rationalization and decentralization of service delivery is one of the key components of the reform process, and it entails the restructuring of the public sector based on functional analyses and restructuring plans for ministries. This restructuring is changing the functions, structures and human resources of the central government in connection with policy formulation and monitoring.

The PSR focuses on six key areas: (1) improving service delivery through decentralization and institutional restructuring; (2) strengthening the policy formulation and monitoring process; (3) enhancing professionalism in the public sector; (4) improving financial management and accountability; (5) promoting good governance and combating corruption; and (6) management of the reform process. However, the implementation of public sector reforms is well behind the schedule approved by the Council of Ministers and announced by the previous president in 2001.

In 2003, the Mozambican parliament passed Law 8/2003 that allowed the Centre to devolve certain functions to local state bodies (provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities) in the areas of service delivery, investments, planning and budgeting through upward accountability. Although the law reaffirms the continuation of a central-

ized principle of public administration, the government has thus far done little to change the very top-down nature of the system, leaving few discretionary resources with local administrative units. Following Law 8/2003, the government has allocated, since 2006, 7 million MTn (\$300,000) in capital investment to each of the 128 districts of Mozambique to enable them to provide the most needed services and promote local development projects at the district level.

This section evaluates six national governance projects implemented through the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). The assessment concentrates on the four main variables of the evaluation of DGTTF: effectiveness; relevance; sustainability; and efficiency.

The six national governance projects implemented through the DGTTF global window are:

1. and 2. Support to Initiatives Towards Accountability in the Public Sector, 2002–2003
3. Court Integrity, 2004
4. Facilitation of Local Enterprise Through ICTs, 2004
5. Strengthening the Integrity and Capacity of the Judiciary System, 2005
6. Service Delivery Network to Support Decentralization of Mozambique, 2006

The projects are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1. PROJECT SUMMARIES

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
Accountability in Public Sector	Improved accountability and transparency in the civil service	Forum and training of journalists and magistrates	\$300,000	\$299,000	\$299,000	No	Second phase, provincial forums, not carried out
Court Integrity	Improved capacity of judicial sector to administer justice	National Assessment; National Integrity Meeting; Action Plan	\$100,000	\$100,000	\$100,000	No	Action plan still being prepared
Facilitation of Local Enterprise	Facilitating the development of enterprises	Equipment for 'one-stop shops' to improve services; microcredit for incubator firms		\$143,000			
Judicial Integrity	Strengthening transparency accountability in public sector	National assessment; Anti-corruption plan for judiciary	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$124,000	No	Follow-up to court project
Service Delivery	Connecting government and citizens	Linking province to district to people on pilot basis		\$125,000	\$117,000	\$42,000 (TRAC)	

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This country study is based on Annual Project Reports (APRs), Project Documents (ProDocs), Mid-Term Reports as well as from interviews with the UNDP staff, donors and beneficiary institutions.

2.1 Innovation

The challenge to this CO, and to DGTTF, was laid down in the 2004 Mozambique Assessment of Development Results, to quote:

UNDP is absent from most political discussion between the government and development partners

UNDP has no clear strategic position

UNDP is good at post conflict...but has had difficulty to carve out a role once the agenda has shifted to long term development perspectives

and the opportunity for DGTTF:

UNDP is handicapped by] inflexible programming procedures...[and a] lack of resources not tied to the five-year planning cycle

One of the main objectives of the founders of DGTTF was to give Resident Representatives “money to play with”, as one of them told the evaluation team. The new (at that time) administrator was concerned about the very inflexibility problem mentioned in the APR.

The question is: Did the CO use that money to achieve the objectives intended for DGTTF? Another quotation may be instructive here, taken from the March 2007 draft on Democratic Governance, a UNDP’s contribution to the development outcomes:

DGTTF strengthened UNDP Country Offices’ ability to seize emerging opportunities and to foster innovation by exploring new approaches in democratic governance. In a number of cases, DGTTF has enabled Country Offices to address issues in politically sensitive areas where the use of core funds was more problematic and slow, and to fill critical gaps not addressed by governments, civil society and other donors.

The key phrases here are ‘foster innovation’ and ‘issues in politically sensitive areas.’

The series of three projects with a corruption theme (Accountability and Transparency, and the two judiciary projects) did move into politically sensitive areas. In fact,

these areas were so sensitive that the government actually cancelled the planned second project, which would have supported provincial forums on transparency and corruption—and the government took that step shortly before parliamentary elections. These projects were innovative too. The forum brought to Mozambique insights from other countries and forced the government to realize that it, not others, had to take some critical and difficult decisions to tackle rising levels of corruption. The two judiciary projects encouraged the judiciary to take responsibility for its own problems and suggested solutions. All these results went a step beyond the taking of surveys of perceptions and experiences of corruption that had just been undertaken, and the generic anti-corruption strategies that had been prepared.

2.2 Duration

The success to date does highlight an important problem with DGTTF, however. It took a four-year programme, not a one-year project, to foster innovation and move significantly into politically sensitive areas. Yet, the programme is not over: for example, the action plan has not been prepared. Only when the action plan is implemented will it be possible to observe outcomes in terms of improved governance.

It is hard to see the other two projects as fostering innovation or moving into politically sensitive areas, or even positioning UNDP strategically. UNDP had already established its position in decentralization with the Nampula pilot project, a model copied by other donors, including the World Bank. There is no evidence that the service delivery project will be replicated beyond the three districts in one province. And in any case, the community multimedia centres selected as partners in this project are not new, even to Mozambique. It is difficult to judge the facilitation of local enterprise through ICTs as a democratic governance project, or at least a particularly strategic or politically sensitive one, and the organization supported by the project, the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Investment (MICTI), is far from being catalytic since it is struggling to survive.

2.3 Defining outcomes

The Mozambique case demonstrates the need to define outcomes carefully; rarely was a correct definition of an outcome used. The OECD/DAC definition of an outcome is “The likely or achieved short-term or medium-term effect of an intervention’s outputs.” However, the outcomes used

in these projects tended to be too vague or too distant from the intervention's outputs—and, generally speaking, there should be some causal connection between the intervention and what is stated as the outcome. In most cases, the outcomes depended almost entirely on interventions other than the very small DGTTF-funded projects. For example, in the 'update on outcome' section of the Corruption APR, 'public sector reform plan approved' was written. This particular project had no demonstrable effect at all on the approval of that plan. The outcome could have been a more modest one such as: 'provincial governors more active in reducing corrupt practices in their administrations'. It would be easier for the DGTTF projects to support demonstrably true innovation if outcomes have been more closely connected to the interventions.

2.4 UNDP role

This case also illustrates UNDP's struggle to claim a role in the era of direct budget support and sector-wide approaches (SWAs). Mozambique has long been a country characterized by SWAs: in agriculture, health and education, and more recently, public sector reform and public finance management. Mozambique was also one of the first countries to move towards a high incidence of direct budget support, and have a series of Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits through which the World Bank and other donors fund the implementation of the PRSP (called PARPA in Mozambique). To a certain extent, UNDP has lost its traditional coordination role to the lead donors in these harmonized approaches. The evaluation team was told by donors that UNDP does send staff to donor meetings—for example, the many PRSP working groups—but that they tend to be very quiet. (The Resident Representative admitted that he often had to send very junior people to these meetings.) The two exceptions would seem to be the legal and judicial reform donor groups, where UNDP has a highly respected role, and donor/government meetings on the elections, where UNDP has had a strong role in the past. In the former case, DGTTF-funded projects were crucial.

2.5 Administrative costs

The management of the CO, although very supportive of DGTTF, complained about the high administrative costs associated with the fund, in particular in applying for the fund. Each DGTTF project required, according to staff, a lengthy project document, even though a simplified format

of the standard UNDP document is required. For example, the Service Delivery project's document is 27 pages long; the others are shorter but still quite lengthy. It should be pointed out that the choice of length of document is largely that of the CO, not DGTTF management. Procurement associated with projects is time consuming in terms of staff time and overall duration. The two contracts for the 2007 DGTTF Civil Society project were still not in place when the evaluation team visited Mozambique at the end of July 2007. Since fewer than three firms sent in proposals, a New York waiver was required, which is usually discouraged, but permitted when well justified. Again, it should be pointed out that these are UNDP procurement rules, not those of DGTTF.

2.6 Donors' view of UNDP role

Donors also complained that UNDP had failed to use its good relations with government to (at least occasionally) push critical but unpopular policy issues. UNDP seemed more interested, they say, in maintaining those good relations than risking them in order to encourage difficult but necessary courses of action, especially in the governance arena. For example, many donors were upset that the local elections had been called at very short notice, and all but EC have said they will not provide any funding. The donors believe that UNDP, whose Resident Representative told the team that the minister of foreign affairs asked him to sit next to him at a recent meeting to discuss the elections, could have had influence the government's understanding of the time needed to prepare properly for the elections. The team was told that the CO was well aware of this issue but that it could not take a position until an assessment mission had completed its work. The government's Electoral Administration Division is mandated to deal with and approve all UN actions regarding elections.

2.7 Alignment

This case shows that at least in this CO one of DGTTF's objectives—democratic governance—now seems redundant. The current but also the past country strategy are very democratic governance oriented. Almost all of the components of Mozambique's 2007–2009 programme are related to democratic governance: development planning, coordination and monitoring; decentralization and local development; democratic processes; justice, security and the rule of law; trade and private sector partnerships; HIV/AIDS and gender; and support for capacity development.

2.8 Quick responsiveness

Evidence from this country study shows that the most appealing feature of DGTTF is that it is a fund that can be accessed quite quickly to make breakthroughs in advancing democratic governance and, by doing so, overcome the complaints about administrative burdens. The TRAC funding and three-year programmes do not seem to have had this flexibility. Whatever the administrative costs of applying for and managing DGTTF funds—and they may be as high as for a long-term project—staff have applied for the funds each year. In 2007, there were actually competing applications. It is often very difficult to predict how best to address an issue, or even what the critical issues will be, three years ahead—and yet it almost always takes a long time to make

progress in any endeavour involving institutional reform. In the Mozambique case, at least for the series of corruption projects, the ability to make annual responses to emerging opportunities, with each response building on the previous one, proved to be very useful.

The performance of each of the projects in meeting key DGTTF objectives is summarized in Table 2. Some projects were to some extent innovative, but none really mobilized additional funding from the government or donors—except somewhat indirectly in the cases of legal and judicial reform, which was, however, always on the agenda for donors and government. Only the series of anti-corruption projects moved into politically sensitive territory. Most were quite important in development partnerships, especially with governance institutions. Almost all involved civil society, and most involved human rights.

TABLE 2: PROJECT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Judicial Integrity	Workshop based on survey leading to action plan	Not yet	Potentially, could lead to action in judicial sector	Others could have funded this, but UNDP neutrality helped	Not directly; donors appreciated survey and workshop	Yes, very important: judges, prosecutors and court staff	No	No	Very much so
Service Delivery	Only in linking CMC and provinces	Not yet	Could be, but no interest shown yet	Not at all; others key players	Yes, with SDC and decentralization donors	Yes, with CMCs and provinces	No	Yes	No
Court Integrity	Yes. Two surveys carried out; and one national integrity meeting held; leading to national anti-corruption action plan	Yes; Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Portuguese	Potential; it could lead to action in the court system	Yes, UNDP neutrality helped, but others could have funded this	Yes, very important; Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Portuguese	Yes, very important; government, courts and police	Yes	Yes	Very much so
Accountability in Public Sector	Yes. Public awareness on the importance of accountability and transparency	Not yet	It has that potential, but not yet	Others could have funded this, but UNDP neutrality helped	Yes, important; BDP and UNICRI assistance	Yes, Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), government, civil society organizations, and CFJJ	No	Yes	Yes
Facilitation	Yes, very important; public awareness about ICTs and their potential	Yes; but not sufficient to implement fully the project	It could, but no interest shown yet	Yes, others could have funded the project, but UNDP helped	Yes, very important; UNDP, UNIDO, and the Italian government	No, this project is not directly related to governance	No	Yes	No
CSOs Capacity	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes, others could have funded this project, but UNDP helped	N/A	N/A	No	Yes, very much so	No

3. PROJECTS OVERVIEW

3.1 Support to Initiatives Towards Accountability and Transparency in the Public Sector

This project included a number of activities that were all aimed at improving efficiency, accountability and transparency in the civil service: a forum on transparency and corruption, a needs assessment in the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), a workshop with PIC provincial directors, and training courses for journalists and magistrates/judicial inspectors.

Relevance of the project:

This project addressed one of the most central governance issues in Mozambique, corruption, a matter of much concern on the part of the government and a subject of substantial donor criticism of the government. Corruption is also a central issue for UNDP, and one where UNDP's multi-donor status and close relationship with government makes it particularly suitable as a sponsor of activities that might lead to breakthroughs in anti-corruption.

Efficiency of the project:

The institutional and organizational architecture of DGTTF facilitated the achievement of this DGTTF project's objectives. The approval and disbursement of funds worked well. The project's effectiveness was enhanced by expert assistance from the BDP Institutional Development Group (now DGG) and from the United National Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

Effectiveness of the project:

The project had quite a widespread impact. Under the project, a forum was held on Transparency and Corruption, as a joint initiative of the National Assembly and UNDP. About 240 participants attended from a wide range of governance institutions as well as donors; some 29 papers were presented; and there was broad media coverage.

This was not the first forum on corruption in Mozambique; there had been an earlier one sponsored by USAID based on a survey by a local NGO. Involvement in transparency and accountability issues was also not new for the CO since the governance unit already had justice, media, police and parliamentary projects. However, this forum brought together a wider range of participants in a more public set-

ting; in that sense, the forum was innovative and strategic. The project also carried out a needs assessment for the Criminal Investigation Police and organized a national workshop to discuss the findings. The third activity was a training course for journalists, magistrates and judicial inspectors. This was a good example of applying one of UNDP's cross-cutting themes, South-South cooperation, since the two journalists' courses were organized by the South Africa Media Training Trust.

This project helped lead to a number of positive intermediate outcomes in terms of improved democratic governance, although it should be pointed out that a number of other initiatives may have contributed as much to these outcomes. One of the project's outcomes was the approval of a public sector reform implementation plan. In fact, this plan had been under preparation for some time, starting before the DGTTF project. The preparation of the World Bank's Public Sector Reform project was completed at about the same time as this DGTTF project ended; the World Bank's project included an implementation plan. The survey of corruption, which is also identified as an outcome of the DGTTF project and did take place in 2003 after the DGTTF project had been completed, was planned by UTRESP during the preparation of the Bank's project in collaboration with the World Bank Institute. An anti-corruption strategy, which formed a basis for the Anti-corruption Bill, had been drafted by UTRESP with support from an international advisor even before the DGTTF project began. It is, however, possible to conclude that this DGTTF project did make a significant contribution to the achievement of the intended outcomes, although perhaps the APR could have made more reference to the contribution of other initiatives. Individuals contacted by the evaluation team reported that insights into anti-corruption programs in other countries provided particularly useful insights to participants from the government and parliament—for example, as to how policy should deal with past crimes as well set standards for future action.

Some would argue that the stated intended outcomes are not really outcomes, but outputs on the road to the achievement of a true outcome: less corruption in the public sector. As of 2007, that outcome had not been achieved. Some of those contacted during this evaluation, including an NGO led by a prominent journalist, think the situation may have only become worse.

Nevertheless, the project was unique since for the first time

instead of just asking various members of society about their experiences and perceptions of corruption, as earlier studies had, including the USAID and World Bank Institute (WBI) surveys, the project brought key Mozambican stakeholders together with experts from other countries, including Hong Kong, to discuss solutions to corruption problems. These interactions made it clear to the government that it had to make some important and difficult decisions if corruption were to be attacked. For example, the government had to decide what to do about crimes in the past; was there to be a reconciliation process or should these crimes be prosecuted?

Sustainability of the project:

The partnerships with governance institutions reinforced during the project certainly help to sustain the drive towards improved accountability and transparency, in particular the partnerships with the National Assembly and the Criminal Investigation Police. The forum also gave UNDP greater credibility with the donor community.

Probably the most significant partnership of all was with the provincial governors, many of whom were so impressed by the forum that they asked that forums be held in their provinces. This became the basis for the second DGTTF project in 2003.

Unfortunately, this second DGTTF-funded project was not implemented. Although the government asked for the project, it subsequently decided that the municipal elections were too imminent for there to be a series of provincial forums on such a politically sensitive issue. This illustrates how far Mozambique has to go to achieve significant outcomes in term of reduced corruption.

However, the very rejection of the second phase by the government served to demonstrate that in this case DGTTF was funding activities in a very politically sensitive area. One of the key objectives of the fund is to test out new approaches to resolving particularly difficult issues. The very nature of a test is that occasionally it will not succeed. Regardless of the results, UNDP and its partners then learn from that test and can, if necessary, try something else. By the political sensitivity standard, these two projects were particularly appropriate DGTTF activities, even though they were not as successful as they might have been.

The 2002 project did however lay the foundation for the 2004–2005 DGTTF-funded projects in the judicial sector. Thus, the process of reducing corruption and improving governance was sustained by subsequent DGTTF-funded projects.

3.2 Court Integrity

This project aimed to increase the capacity of the judicial sector to administer law and order, incorporating international norms on human rights. Intended outputs included an independent national assessment of judges, an anti-corruption plan for the court system, and a national meeting of court system stakeholders leading to the preparation of an action plan.

Relevance of the project:

This DGTTF project had a clear, coherent and consistent set of objectives. The CO was able to promote strategic initiatives in the area of democratic governance by airing concerns related to corruption in the court system and engage in dialogue with Parliament with the aim of encouraging it to address corruption issues and pass additional anti-corruption regulations. The enthusiasm with which the project was accepted by the target beneficiaries at least supports the case for other donor agencies to make additional funds available for the implementation of anti-corruption reforms; some years later, anti-corruption is part of the public sector reform project. The Court Integrity project is representative of UNDP's comparative advantage since it addresses sensitive issues and was able to do so because of its good relationship with the government and the judiciary. This good relationship stems from its status as a multilateral and neutral institution, although it should be added that one donor thought that the Danish Development Assistance (Danida), which has had a major role in judicial reform, could just as easily have funded this project. The project helped to win UNDP a seat at the judicial reform donor coordination table along with Danida, the EC, USAID and the World Bank.

The project does raise one important DGTTF issue: the complications caused by earmarking. The use of earmarked funds from Portugal delayed the start of the project by about two months. Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD), with which the CO had no contact, rejected proposals for DGTTF funding in 2005,

2006 and 2007 (the three projects for those years discussed here) without explanation. The project officer felt that she should have been able to address these issues through the embassy. In mid 2007, the CO received a letter from the Portuguese Embassy to say that Portugal was prepared to fund another project for \$75,000. As one project officer wrote to the team in an email: “We still need to understand this request before responding to it.” Clearly this is extreme earmarking, when the CO does not even know the nature of the earmarked project in its own country.

Efficiency of the project:

The actual selection process worked quickly: the decision had been taken early in December, following the November one-page EOI. The idea originated in the CO through its contacts with the judiciary and other donors. The CO reported that the human, technical and physical resources had been adequate to manage the processes efficiently. Staff felt they had been well-supported technically from New York. The CO worked together with another UN agency, UNODC, in the implementation of this project.

The typical process of cutting down the size of the applications so that limited DGTTF funding could be applied in more countries did have an impact on this project. Since only half the requested funding was approved, the planned survey of prosecutors and court clerks had to be postponed to the next DGTTF project.

Effectiveness of the project:

This DGTTF project has achieved its main objectives. It has contributed to the thematic focus and alignment of UNDP’s democratic agenda, especially in regards to the agenda of Service Line 2.4 (Justice and Human Rights). Other donors as well as the beneficiaries accepted that the project was innovative in that it helped to bring attention to sensitive issues affecting governance in Mozambique: the role of the courts in corruption. The project has helped to identify the kinds of reforms and capacity-building needed in the court system, and to stimulate partnerships between courts, the government and donors.

The surveys carried out under this project and the following year’s DGTTF-funded project were unique. For the first time, participants were asked to identify ways in which their practices led to or supported corruption. In contrast, the WBI-sponsored survey, which was carried out at about

the same time, asked questions of perception and experiences of corruption, and did not focus particularly on the judiciary. Two surveys were carried out in the two projects (2004 and 2005): for judges and for prosecutors and court staff. This culminated in the National Integrity Meeting for court system stakeholders and, eventually, the drafting of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan for the Court System. One donor referred to the meeting as “a very significant event” and “innovative”. The project has enabled the reform process to be driven and owned by the judiciary itself. The evaluation team concluded that the survey was very well-designed and well-conducted; some 92 per cent of judges completed the survey instrument. The report, which has been widely distributed, is an invaluable source of information on process and capacity weaknesses in the judiciary. This project raised the respect of the donor community for UNDP in the judicial sector.

The downside is that the action plan has still not been finalized. A firm was hired, against the advice of UNDP, to draft the action plan. This firm, which the evaluation team visited, had no experience in preparing strategies of action plans; it was an advocacy organization. The judiciary’s own steering committee has rejected the plan and a new procurement plan is under way for a firm to assist in the preparation of the plan.

It should also be pointed out that this project in effect took two years, since a second DGTTF project was required to cover prosecutors and court clerks. In addition, activities spilled over into a second year: the National Integrity Meeting scheduled for the end of 2004 was postponed because of the presidential and National Assembly elections. It ultimately did not take place until early in 2005; the CO was given special permission to carry over the funding.

This pair of projects (including the one described in the next section) raises questions regarding the role of UNDP at a time when many donors are moving towards SWAPs and direct budget support. UNDP does not provide direct budget support and is not a participant in the Agriculture, Education, Health and Public Sector Reform SWAPs (the latter now including legal and judicial reform, a topic that has been important for UNDP). UNDP relies either on implementing projects or on establishing intellectual leadership in some other way to promote its—and its counterpart governance institutions’—democratic governance agenda. These judicial sector projects, plus the

earlier anti-corruption project, have positioned UNDP so that it is a key member of the PRSP (called PARPA in Portuguese) judicial working group and is now part of the PARPA joint review mechanism.

Some of the donors contributing to DGTTF would like the fund to be used to move into politically sensitive areas where, perhaps, bilaterals would fear to enter. UNDP did not use this pair of projects to try to make breakthroughs in the governance sector in Mozambique where corruption is thought to be greatest, the police. UNDP's counterparts in the judiciary told the team that they would have liked to extend the work on the judiciary and the Attorney General's Office to the police. UNDP did, however, include the police in the earlier accountability and transparency DGTTF project. Many of the recommendations in the reports on the survey of the judiciary, and the later survey of prosecutors and court clerks, centre on easier-to-raise issues of pay, training and equipment. Such issues can be resolved with funding rather than tough policy decisions. However, the funding decisions themselves can be hard to make, such as to make the required budgetary allocations to train more judges or build more courthouses. The judiciary complained to the evaluation team that it had only about 10 percent of the judges it needs and also that 95 percent of the lawyers live in Maputo (the capital) because the government has not allocated enough funding to build courthouses in all 130 districts.

Sustainability of the project:

This project—taken together with the two 2002 and 2003 accountability and transparency projects and the 2005 follow-up project—will have long lasting consequences. Any future judicial sector reform and capacity-building project will take account of the findings of the two surveys and, eventually, the action plan. In addition, UNDP has an important seat at the donor coordination table as far as judicial reform is concerned. There is now a judicial reform component of the multi-donor supported Public Sector Reform project. The fact that it has taken four years of related DGTTF projects to reach this breakthrough point strengthens the case for longer projects (and it should be noted, the all-important action plan has not yet been prepared by the participants). Each project prepared the ground for the next project, thus gradually building understanding of the issues and ownership of the solutions, which have a good chance of turning around the upward corruption trend shown by many studies.

3.3 Facilitation of Local Enterprise through ICTs

This project set out to facilitate local enterprise through simplifying the licensing and registration process and by supporting a business incubator initiative.

Relevance of the project:

This DGTTF project is well-aligned with UNDP objectives in Mozambique, such as access to and utilization of ICTs, defined in the Strategic Results Framework (SRF). However, it is hard to justify the project in terms of being an innovative approach to the solutions of fundamental democratic governance problems. The simplification of business licensing and registration is closer to the scope of DGTTF than the business incubator initiative. Mozambique was once rated as the country requiring more time than almost any other to register a business.

While the project was able to promote strategic partnerships with other institutions, such as the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC), the ICT Policy Commission, ICT Policy Implementation Technical Unit and Mozambique's ICT Institute, the one-year frame was not adequate for ensuring the use of DGTTF as a flexible funding tool due to the delays in the disbursement of funds. This in turn had an effect in terms of sustainability, quality and results.

Efficiency of the project:

The selection process worked well in this case but the selection decision may not have been correct. The two components are only marginally within the scope of the 'democratic governance' in the title of DGTTF and they are not particularly innovative or strategic. In addition, even if the case could be made for these projects in term of promoting economic governance, neither component ever set out to do enough to fully test the innovations being piloted by the project. The APR admits that more funds would be required to finalize the one-stop licensing system and that even the Web-based system, is not complete since it does not allow clients to track progress with their applications. The microcredit scheme that is an integral part of the second component made loans to beneficiaries that would not be repaid until more than two years after the project had ended. The APR admits that a project coordinator would have been desirable, but there was not enough funding for this. At the very least, these projects required much more than one year even to be fully piloted, let alone reach a point at which they could be sustained.

Effectiveness and sustainability of the project:

The first component, business registration simplification, was more effective than the second, microcredit promotion. The first component successfully reduced the time to register a business to one week from many months. The team was told by the counterpart organization that business registration is such an important development issue that the government may well provide the funding to sustain the project by training 'one-stop shop' staff and provide connectivity and local area networks (LANs), perhaps initially through the PSR project, and extending improvements made in the three pilots to other provinces. The project enhanced the probability of sustainability by helping to build the capacity of the counterpart agency, UTICT. In contrast, although the second component has been helpful to a small number of individuals, it is hard to imagine that the business incubator supported by the project will eventually generate large numbers of small businesses. Two of the individuals have abandoned their enterprises already and marketed their relatively scarce IT skills elsewhere.

3.4 Strengthening the Integrity and Capacity of the Judiciary

This was a follow-up to the previous project (Facilitation of Local Enterprise through ICTs), but in this case involving a survey of prosecutors and court clerks. As above, the issues raised in the report were to be discussed at the planned National Integrity Meeting.

Relevance of the project:

The project was as relevant as the previous one. The publication of the results of two surveys, their discussion at the National Integrity Meeting held in the second half of 2006 and the drafting of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan are all important steps in the direction of improving efficiency and fighting corruption within the justice sector.

Efficiency of the project:

The late start made it difficult for the project to achieve all its outputs. As with the previous project, the CO benefited from support from UNDOC Pretoria.

Effectiveness of the project:

As with the previous project, beneficiary institutions (the judiciary and the Office of the Attorney General) and

UNDP Mozambique CO staff believe that the project has achieved its main objectives. The project has contributed to the thematic focus and alignment of UNDP's democratic governance agenda, in particular to the agenda of Service Line 2.7 (Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption). The project has indeed strengthened partnerships among the beneficiary institutions, donors involved in the funding of the project and the government, with potentially positive spillover effects in the entire judiciary system. The outstanding problem is that the action plan that might lead to the realization of improved governance has not yet been prepared.

However, this project, like the previous one, did not achieve all the outputs planned for the year of the project, 2005. The start of this project was delayed several months (until June) due to the late allocation of funds and the implementing team had to request the DGTTF manager to extend the implementation of the project's activities up to mid-2006. The National Integrity Meeting also had to be delayed until April 2006. Another source of delay was that the team had to adjust the survey approach to take account of the difficulties the court clerks had in completing the questionnaire.

Sustainability of the project:

The process of improving governance in the judicial sector supported by this project is likely to be sustained by the counterpart organizations' strong ownership of the project's activities, as confirmed by the evaluation team in meetings with staff from the Office of the Attorney General and the Supreme Court. Key counterparts include the Centre for Legal and Judiciary Training, the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, the Attorney General's Office and the government. The focus on actions to overcome corruption rather than on perceptions and experience will also increase the chances of success. For example, the National Integrity Meeting brought together a wide range of stakeholders to discuss practical solutions to important governance problems. Even the Judiciary's Steering Committee's rejection of the first draft action plan is a sign of ownership and serious intent that might lead to sustainability. The objectives of these projects may also be eventually achieved and then sustained through the relationship that developed, for the first time, between the UNDP Resident Representative and the chief justice.

3.5 Service Delivery Network to Support Decentralization of Mozambique

This project set out to pilot new approaches for connecting local government to provincial and central government and to the surrounding population. The project aimed to establish one provincial data resource centre and two community multimedia centres (CMCs). About one third of the project's funding came from TRAC. The pilot took place in Nampula province, where UNDP had piloted approaches to decentralized planning that were subsequently adopted in other provinces with donor support.

Relevance of the project:

This was not the first project that set out to connect the people to their local government; local radio had been used for some time and an earlier project had established participatory planning processes. The CMCs already existed, and are part of a wider Africa regional project. The Mozambican government and its ICT Policy Implementation Technical Unit have been engaged in the implementation of the various components of the national ICT Policy, such as the Government Electronic Network (GovNet), Provincial Digital Resource Centres (CPRDs), telecentres, electronic State Financial Management System (eSISTAFE), Civil Identity System, and SchoolNet.

Efficiency of the project:

Of seven intended outputs, only three have been achieved, some with difficulty. The main constraints faced by the project during its implementation, according to the APR, include:

- high communication costs for access to the Internet in the two selected districts (Angoche and Monapo);
- connectivity problems—the two district governments are not connected to the CMCs;
- high costs related to the hiring of ICT technicians;
- higher rate charges practiced by local Internet service providers;
- high costs for making linkages and synergies among the Provincial Digital Resources Centres (CPRGs), CMCs, and GovNet;

- insufficient resources to cover all costs of the project, despite additional funds mobilized through partnership and collaboration between the UNPD CO, UNESCO, the Italian government and the ICT Policy Implementation Technical Unit;
- high costs for installing the ICT equipment to the two districts;
- other technical problems related to ICTs.

It is possible to conclude that this project attempted too much with too little technical support.

Effectiveness of the project:

The partners at various levels of government in Nampula did display considerable enthusiasm for the project. However, the project faced problems of inadequate infrastructure (electricity, housing, roads, PCs, radio sets and batteries, especially at the community level), limited entrepreneurial capacity, inadequate human resources, high illiteracy rate, limited professional training at provincial, district and community levels, lack of local expertise in ICTs, and poor institutional memory of routine processes. The government was slow to select a site for the pilot. High charges by the Internet service provider inhibited the implementation of the Internet aspects of the project. Initially, it had been expected that integration with the government's GovNet project would have minimized these charges. There were also technical problems associated with utilizing GovNet. The budget was not sufficient to cope with these problems, resulting in other partners being brought in. To cope with these internal problems, the project managers and partners are studying alternative ICT solutions by contacting other ICT service providers such as VSAT (very small aperture terminal) and mobile operators in order to select appropriate ICTs and provide best solutions both from technological and financial perspectives.

Sustainability of the project:

There is no evidence that the pilot has been replicated elsewhere in Nampula, let alone throughout Mozambique. It would of course be difficult to do so until the technical problems are resolved. To extend and sustain such a project would require substantial funding from the government and a sufficient supply of high quality technical hired staff to be responsible for running management opera-

tions, developing local content (web pages, etc.), developing basic database, and installing, configuring and maintaining basic computer networks and networks administration. Some observers have said that this project is technically inappropriate since sustainability has to be based on high quality hired staff and is contradictory to the objective of empowerment of local communities envisaged in the project. Empowering local communities in the use of ICTs entails training them in basic computer skills and applications (MS Windows, Microsoft Office, Outlook and Internet Explorer) and other ICT skills to allow them to be in charge of running these ICT services on their own.

4. PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE MOZAMBIQUE COUNTRY STUDY

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