



EVALUATION OF THE

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Thematic Trust Fund

**COUNTRY
STUDY:
KYRGYZSTAN**

United Nations Development Programme

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Country case studies were a key part of the evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). The evaluation team reviewed and analysed DGTTF projects in eight countries: Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen. This country case study is meant to complement the main text of the evaluation report.

DGTTF funding has allowed Kyrgyzstan to further the democratic agenda with a series of important interventions in the following areas: **access to justice and human rights; electoral assistance and processes; parliamentary development; and local governance**. Given the unique position of UNDP, along with its funding in a country where funding is not easily available (some donor

agencies that work on democratic governance had moved out), DGTTF projects have made a considerable difference. All projects have been conceptualized according to the specific needs and priorities of the country. At the same time, considering numerous other factors in play, it is more realistic to discuss the overall contribution of DGTTF to specific development outcomes than attributing them to DGTTF projects.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	3
1. BACKGROUND	4
1.1 Strategies for Kyrgyzstan's development	4
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	6
3. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DGTTF PROJECTS IN KYRGYZSTAN.....	9
3.1 Relevance of the projects.....	9
3.2 One-year time-frame	9
4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROJECTS	10
4.1 Innovation of the projects.....	10
4.2 Catalytic nature of the projects.....	10
5. EFFICIENCY OF THE PROJECTS	12
5.1 Application process	12
5.2 The DGTTF funding process	12
5.3 Reporting requirements.....	12
5.4 Transaction costs	12
5.5 Monitoring and evaluation.....	12
6. SUSTAINABILITY	13
6.1 Knowledge management	13
7. PROJECTS OVERVIEW	14
7.1 Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament	14
7.2 Support to the Institution of Ombudsman	15
7.3 Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration.....	16
7.4 Promotion of Democratic Election	17
7.5 Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster: Risk Reduction	19
8. PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE KYRGYZSTAN COUNTRY STUDY.....	20

ABBREVIATIONS

APR	Annual Project Report	ProDoc	Project Document
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery	RB(x)	Regional Bureau(x)
BDP	Bureau for Development Policy	SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women	SL	Service Line
CO	Country Office	SURF	Sub-Regional Resource Facility
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan	SWAp	sector-wide approach
CSO	civil society organization	TOR	terms of reference
Danida	Danish Development Assistance	TRAC	target for resource assignment from the core
DFID	UK Department for International Development	UN	United Nations
DGG	Democratic Governance Group	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
DGP	Democratic Governance Practice	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
DGTTF	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
ECIS	Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	UNDP NY	United Nations Development Programme Office New York
EOI	expression of interest	UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
HQ	headquarters	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
HURLITALK	Human Rights Policy Network	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
ICT	information and communications technology		
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency		
LPAC	Local Project Appraisal Committee		
MDG	Millennium Development Goal		
MYFF	multi-year funding framework		
NDI	National Democratic Institute		
NGO	non-governmental organization		
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee		
OGC	Oslo Governance Centre		

1. BACKGROUND

After becoming independent in 1991, Kyrgyzstan began taking steps towards establishing democracy and a market economy. In spite of significant difficulties during the initial years following independence, the country was a leader of political, social and economic reforms in the region. During the 1990s, several key sectors of Kyrgyz economy, such as services, construction and agriculture, were privatized. In addition, social protection and pension systems were introduced and the first stage of reforms was introduced in the health sector. Another measure to ensure macroeconomic stability was land reform, which included the recognition of property rights.

The first Constitution, adopted in 1993, was fairly modern; however, amendments to the Constitution were made in 1996 and 1998 that strengthened the president's power and weakened the role of the parliament. In 2003, a new Constitution transferred some power to the parliament but still retained a strong presidency.

All Constitutions adopted in Kyrgyzstan after the country became independent have recognized and guaranteed human rights according to universally accepted norms and principles. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, human rights increasingly deteriorated in comparison to the previous years. After the dramatic events in spring 2002, when police killed several demonstrators, demands for the creation of a human rights protection system in the country increased. In 2002, after several years of extensive national debates, the Law on Ombudsman was adopted by Parliament and the first ombudsperson was selected. Unfortunately, the ombudsperson failed to radically improve the state of human rights in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, in 2005, the Commission on Human Rights under the president of Kyrgyzstan was established—thereby creating competition between the two institutions and weakening the role of the ombudsperson.

The reforms introduced at the beginning of 1990s did not bring the expected results. The political system has remained weak, corruption has grown and the capacity of public administration remains low. In addition, the rule of law worsened. Weak and ineffective governance slowed economic growth, laying the groundwork for several changes in government including the so-called March Revolution in 2005, and ongoing back-and-forth regarding the power of the president vis-à-vis the parliament. Generally speaking, instability continues today to obstruct and limit effective governance.

By the end of the 1990s, the country had accumulated experience and built capacity in the management of foreign aid and in setting strategic development goals. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), to last through 2010, was adopted in 2001. The CDF's mission was the identification of a long-term strategy for sustainable socio-economic development and the efficient use of donor assistance. In 2003, the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR) for the period 2003–2005 was adopted as an action program of the first stage of the CDF. The CDF and the NSPR had three strategic priorities: (1) economic growth and employment; (2) a fair society ensuring social protection; and (3) good governance and an effective public sector. During the implementation of the NSPR, reforms in various sectors were undertaken and a basis was built for further development. All these efforts ensured macroeconomic stability: average annual economic growth rose to 5 percent, and the poverty rate decreased from 52 percent in 2003 to 44 percent in 2005.

Decentralization of state administration and the development of local self-governance is a key objective of the recent administrative reforms in Kyrgyzstan that aim to improve governance. By the end of 2001, urban and rural municipalities had been formed and heads of local governments had been elected. In order to define long-term strategic priorities and speed up the reforms, the National Strategy on Decentralization and Development of Local Self-Governance (NSD) was adopted in 2002. The strategy, which was designed to last until 2010, covers six priorities: improving the legal system, increasing state support for local governance; economic and financial decentralization; establishing municipal services; social mobilization; and consolidation of civil society.

TABLE 1. PROJECT SUMMARIES

PROJECT	OUTCOMES	ACTIVITIES	IMPLEMEN- TATION	REQUESTED IN EOI	FUNDING RECEIVED	SPENT BY MID-TERM	FINAL EXPEND- ITURE	OTHER RESOURCES (TRAC, COST-SHARING)	STATUS/ COMMENTS
Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002)	Enhanced capacity of parliament to communicate with the public and to become a more transparent and accessible institution	Various capacity-building interventions (training, equipment, study tours)	6 months	\$105,000	\$165,000	\$40,048	\$162,859	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Support to the Institution of Ombudsman (2003)	A functioning ombudsman institution in accordance with international standards	Capacity-building through policy advice and study tours, provision of office equipment	9 months	\$240,000	\$140,000	\$26,422	\$140,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed; UNDP discontinued support to the ombudsman institution
Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration (2004)	Increased professional capacity of local civil servants	Establishment of two training centres, development of training materials and provision of equipment	6 months	\$140,000	\$60,000	\$18,964	\$60,000	Yes, additional funds provided by Hans Seidel Foundation; project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Promotion of Democratic Elections (2005)	More fair and transparent elections. Fewer irregularities observed during the electoral process	Capacity-building provided to the Central Electoral Commission; voter education campaigns; establishment of a monitoring mechanism in the pre-election period	8 months	\$250,000	\$200,000	\$87,200	\$200,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Building Capacity of Local Self Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006)	Increased ability of the local authorities and populations to mitigate disasters	Capacity-building through training and facilitation of community-based responses	8 months	\$200,000	\$125,000	28,737	\$125,000	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Completed
Transparent municipal finance through improved local statistics (2007)	Enhanced ability of national and local government to allocate resources, especially toward most vulnerable groups and the least developed regions	Most activities for this project had not been implemented at the time of research	N/A	\$200,000	\$130,000	Ongoing	Ongoing	No, but project part of TRAC programme	Ongoing

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This section summarizes the main findings of the DGTTF evaluation team in Kyrgyzstan. Specific information about individual DGTTF projects may be found in the annexes to this country study.

- DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan are highly relevant for furthering the country's democratic development and for the democratic governance portfolio of this country office (CO). The DGTTF projects are conceptualized according to specific needs and priorities of the country and are in line with current CO programming.
- The assessment of political opportunities and risks is especially important for doing business in this UNDP CO. The real obstacles to long-term programming are frequent changes at the top of the government, new counterparts with whom UNDP has to work and renegotiate programming, and the overall feeling of political instability and unpredictability.
- Despite an overall scepticism toward the international community working in the country, UNDP has managed to retain good communications and relationships with the government. National officials have high expectations of cooperation with UNDP. UNDP is also highly regarded among civil society and other donors in the country and plays an active coordination role in donor assistance.
- UNDP is in a position to make a unique impact through initiatives such as DGTTF. In order to do this, it is critical to seize arising opportunities and to have a flexible funding mechanism. In the view of the senior management of the UNDP CO, DGTTF should be made more flexible and adaptable to new opportunities.
- On average, DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan are implemented within eight months. All project managers would like to see DGTTF funds available in the CO at the beginning of January. Many local respondents believe, however, that the short project duration fosters clear objectives that are sometimes difficult to achieve in longer projects and programmes. In their view, the one-year time-frame is an advantage, given the volatility of the domestic political situation.

TABLE 2: PROJECT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS*	PARTNERSHIPS* WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002)	Yes. Innovative in addressing a politically sensitive area of transparency and public monitoring over branches of government in a neutral and non-threatening way of capacity-building.	The Netherlands and the EC	Yes. The project led to a larger project; set standards for the press service in the parliament; and facilitated public debate regarding human rights.	Yes. While several donors work with the parliament, UNDP's neutrality allowed for addressing the issue of transparency and public oversight.	Strengthened to a minimal degree	Very much so. With the parliament.	No	Yes	Indirectly. Through public awareness campaigns on the ombudsman institution.
Support to the Institution of Ombudsman (2003)	Very much so. Established an institution that has never existed in the country and that was extremely needed.	Not at all. UNDP withdrew support due to differences between UNDP and the ombudsman's views on its assistance.	To a limited degree. By inciting a public debate on roles and responsibilities of the Ombudsman's Institution.	Yes. Because of high sensitivities around the issues of human rights, other donors were reluctant to get involved.	Partially. OSCE.	Partially. With the government and the parliament.	No	Yes	Yes

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNERSHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	GENDER	CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration (2004)	Partially. First step toward institutionalization of training for civil servants and elected officials on the local level.	To a limited degree. Renewed government's interest in revitalizing the training.	Partially. Project contributed to the enactment of a law on municipal service; encouraged volunteerism.	Partially. Other donors could have done this project. However, UNDP's local governance/ decentralization portfolio is highly regarded in the country (donors).	Yes. World Bank, DFID, Hans Seidel Foundation.	Very much so. Local government.	No	No	No
Promotion of Democratic Elections (2005)	To a limited degree. A component of this project was innovative (early warning for conflict prevention network). During this project, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) moved out of the presidential palace to a separate location.	Partially	To a limited degree	Very much so. UNDP's expertise in provision of electoral assistance. Other donors preferred to work with civil society.	To a limited degree	Very much so	Yes	Yes	Yes
Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006)	Very much so. By mainstreaming disaster management with local governance which was innovative for Kyrgyzstan and the entire region.	Yes. World Bank, other donors, Government.	Very much so. Government adapted the project's methodology to other parts of the country with support from other donors attracted by the success of DGTTF-funded activities	Yes. UNDP experience in local governance; a highly regarded expert in the disaster management in the CO.	Very much so. Swiss, World Bank.	Very much so. Local and national government.	No	Yes	No
Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics (2007)	Partially	N/A	N/A	Partially	Very much so. World Bank, ADB, TACIS Programme, DFID.	Very much so. Government (Ministry of Finance).	Yes	Yes	No

- The issue of attributing concrete development outcomes and impact on governance to the DGTTF projects is complicated. DGTTF interventions are only one small part in a mosaic of other variables. These include the political situation, the political will and commitment of beneficiaries and partners, the work of other donors in the areas covered by DGTTF projects, and the limited scope of the projects, in terms of both finances and duration.
- The evaluation team considers three of the six DGTTF projects implemented to date in Kyrgyzstan to be highly innovative: Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002), Support to the Institution of Ombudsman (2003), and Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006). Their common characteristic is that they introduce a new approach to a critical democratic governance issue. In two cases, Support to the Institution of Ombudsman, 2003, and Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics, 2007, the projects were politically sensitive as well.
- The projects are conceptualized long before the expressions of interest (EOIs) are announced by DGTTF management at HQ. A few proposals are taken to the CO's senior management, which makes a final decision. Beneficiaries and potential partners of the projects are involved in the conceptualization and elaboration of the applications.
- The DGTTF cycle is not well-aligned with the CO cycle. The negotiations with the government for new projects are finalized in October while work plans are signed and approved in January. At the same time, the DGTTF schedule only invites expressions of interest (EOIs) in October. This requires the CO to return to the government with new projects and renegotiations.
- The DGTTF projects are high in transaction costs; they require much preparation and reporting time and high levels of project staff involvement and management. The limited funding that DGTTF provides, coupled with no cost recovery, makes it impossible to carry out stand-alone DGTTF projects.
- The accomplishments of four DGTTF-funded projects in Kyrgyzstan (out of five examined) have been sustained to various degrees by capacity-building and the scaling-up achieved through either 'national ownership' or other UNDP programming. The highest sustainability was found to correlate to the highest buy-in on the part of the government and the relevance of the project to addressing the country's critical needs.
- Knowledge management on DGTTF-related past experiences and consultations with other COs occurs on an ad-hoc basis and is done only within the region. There is little awareness and information on DGTTF projects in other parts of the world.

3. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DGTTF PROJECTS IN KYRGYZSTAN

DGTTF funding has allowed Kyrgyzstan to further the democratic agenda with a series of important interventions in the following areas: access to justice and human rights; electoral assistance and processes; parliamentary development; and local governance. Given the unique position of UNDP and the availability of its funding, in a country where funding is not as easily available as in other parts of the world with some donor agencies that typically work on democratic governance moving out of the country (e.g., CIDA and SIDA), DGTTF projects can make a considerable difference. At the same time, considering numerous other factors in play, it is more realistic to discuss the contribution of DGTTF to specific development outcomes than attributing them to DGTTF projects.

3.1 Relevance

DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan are highly relevant for furthering the country's democratic development and for the democratic governance portfolio of this CO. The DGTTF projects are conceptualized according to specific needs and priorities of the country and are in line with current CO programming. In some cases, the relevance of DGTTF-funded interventions lay in the fact that no other donors were willing to work on certain issues for various reasons. An example of this was the 2005 DGTTF project that provided support to the Central Election Commission (CEC) prior to the presidential and municipal elections in 2005. At that time, no other donors were willing to work with the CEC in the wake of widespread disappointment with highly flawed parliamentary elections. These donors worked only with civil society and UNDP was criticized for supporting the CEC instead of working with civil society.

Yet, putting aside the disputed outcome of presidential elections and their fairness, building the technical capacity of CEC has been, in the view of the evaluation team, an important contribution to the improvement of the electoral processes in the country. In other instances, the importance of DGTTF interventions could be observed in related projects spurred by these interventions. For example, in the 2006 project, UNDP was a pioneer in merging governance and disaster management issues. This prompted two other organizations, the World Bank and ADB, to move forward on their programming in this field.

3.2 One-year time-frame

Out of five DGTTF projects analyzed, not a single one enjoyed a full year for implementation. DGTTF funds arrive in April or later. On average, DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan were implemented within eight months. Projects that require special expertise—for example the 2007 project (Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics)—were further delayed by difficulties in securing experts within a short time-frame. Given that the mid-delivery rate for DGTTF projects is well beyond the 50 percent mark and the final delivery rate is nearly 100 percent, projects have to be rushed in the last months of the year. This situation burdens the project staff with an extra workload.

While all project managers suggested that the funds should be available in the CO at the beginning of January, neither the DGTTF project manager nor beneficiaries interviewed stated that the one-year time project duration was problematic. In fact, several beneficiaries and representatives of other donor organizations appreciated the short duration of DGTTF projects and their consequent sharp focus and concrete objectives that are sometimes difficult to achieve in longer projects and programmes. In addition, the one-year time-frame had, in their view, the advantage of being easier to discontinue, given the volatility of the political situation, and thus curtail wasteful spending. An example of this is a DGTTF project that supported the ombudsperson institution (2003). Although planned as a pilot for a long-term support, UNDP withdrew its assistance to this institution after it became clear that the ombudsperson did not share UNDP's vision and international standards guiding such offices.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROJECTS

It is difficult to determine the specific impact (if any) of DGTTF projects on the governance situation. DGTTF interventions are only one small part in a mosaic of other variables. These include the (often volatile) political situation; the political will and commitment of beneficiaries and partners; work of other donors in the areas covered by DGTTF projects; and the projects' limited scope, both in financial terms and in their duration. The fact that all DGTTF projects are separate but still components within larger, often multi-million dollar and multi-year UNDP programmes makes assessment of impact even more difficult.

4.1 Innovation of the projects

Even given these limitations, however, the evaluation team considers three out of six DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan to have been highly innovative (those implemented in 2002, 2003 and 2006). Their common characteristic is that they introduced a new approach to a critical democratic governance issue. Two of them, Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament (2002) and Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction (2006), were found sustainable and have been scaled up.

In two cases (Support to the Institution of Ombudsperson, from 2003, and Transparent Municipal Finance through Improved Local Statistics, from 2007), the projects were politically sensitive as well. The third project aimed to improve communication of the national parliament (from 2002). This project was notable for its innovative character, which lay in the fact that its tacit goal was to increase transparency and public oversight over the Parliament and its activities. These very sensitive issues were addressed on the neutral and non-threatening ground of building capacity of the parliamentary press service and on providing equipment. Today, the Kyrgyzstan Parliament is considered the most open public institution in the country. At the time research for evaluation was conducted, in 2007, the evaluation team believed that such openness would continue regardless of the results of the upcoming elections (held in December 2007).

The support to the Institution of the Ombudsman project (2003), was particularly sensitive politically. Mounting pressures from within and outside the country, following gross human rights violations, made human rights protection one of the most contentious issues in the country. Because of high sensitivities around these issues, other donors, except for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were reluctant to get involved in this area in a more substantial way. UNDP's perceived credibility and neutrality were crucial factors and gave it a clear comparative advantage.

However, this DGTTF project did not bring expected results. There was constant misunderstanding between the ombudsperson's office and UNDP staff regarding the nature of UNDP assistance, which the ombudsperson envisaged largely as the provision of funds for equipment and less as advice or capacity-building and training activities. Also, the ombudsperson's abuse of his office for political campaigning as well as his increasingly fundamental religious views made the cooperation between that office and UNDP impossible. Since innovation should occasionally fail, based on a view of DGTTF as a democratic governance venture capital fund, the team does not consider this project a failure: instead, it is a risky investment that tested new ground in democratic governance. Thanks to this project, UNDP at least learned that one of the success factors behind an institution such as an ombudsperson's office is the personality and integrity of the person heading the office.

Another factor that affects propensity for innovation is UNDP's status as a trusted partner of the government. This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides UNDP with easy access to governmental officials, makes the programming more effective and allows for a good coordination mechanism; on the other hand, it does not encourage politically sensitive initiatives. In the view of civil society in the country and some other donors, UNDP could afford to push harder on politically risky initiatives.

4.2 Catalytic nature of the projects

The evaluation team considers the 2002 (Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament) and 2006 (Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction) projects as most catalytic insofar as they received support from the government and other donors, and their achievements are being scaled up. For example, in the case of the 2006 project, UNDP was the first organization that started working on mainstreaming governance issues with risk and disaster management. Following UNDP's example, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have now moved into this area as well. The small parliamentary TV studio that was started with DGTTF funding developed into a well-functioning TV station with further support from the European Commission and UNDP. In that sense, the DGTTF projects constituted pilot projects that have been picked up by other donors and by the government.

Finally, the way that DGTTF project managers utilized the most successful projects can be seen as catalytic and innovative. For example, the 2002 parliamentary project led to the 2003 project aimed at supporting the ombudsperson's office; moreover, UNDP staff seized the opportunity of additional funds available from DGTTF at the global level and received an additional \$40,000 for an educational campaign on human rights. The training centre for local civil centres established in the regions within the 2004 DGTTF project provided facilities for conducting trainings and meetings for local civil servants; computer equipment purchased for the training centre in Bishkek was also made available for students of the Academy of Management, which houses the centre. In the same vein, the press room in the Parliament (which was established through the 2002 DGTTF project) was made open to students, outside journalists and the general public.

5. EFFICIENCY OF THE PROJECTS

5.1 Application process

The projects are conceptualized long before the EOI is announced by DGTTF management at HQ. Programme and project staff meet at a brainstorming session to discuss country priorities, needs and strategic entry points for engagement and to anticipate current thematic topics that are the 'value added' in the DGTTF Guidelines published each year. An example of the latter is a project (from 2006) on building local capacity in disaster risk reduction that responded to the guidelines encouraging cross-cutting projects from the area of democratic governance to crisis prevention and recovery. This initiative became the first DGTTF project in this area. A few proposals are taken to the CO's senior management, which makes a final decision. After that, the EOI for the agreed-upon proposal is prepared. Project documents are sent to the Bratislava office, government and other stakeholders in the country. Beneficiaries and potential partners of the projects are involved in the conceptualization and elaboration of the application.

This methodology has proven effective in successful applications for DGTTF funding in each edition of the fund. Another factor that made Kyrgyzstan an attractive recipient of DGTTF funds was its preferential status as a Group 2 country with 10 percent of funding earmarked for that group and with limited competition from within group (from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Geographically, Kyrgyzstan is in the group of countries (Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, or ECIS) whose DGTTF proposals are most frequently rejected.

With the exception of the first edition of the DGTTF programme, the CO received less funding than requested in all other years. The evaluation team was told that, based on the trend of cutting the requested amounts, the CO's strategy has been to apply for more than really required to implement the project.

5.2 The DGTTF funding process

The DGTTF cycle is not well aligned with the CO cycle. The negotiations with the government for new projects are finalized in October while work plans are signed and approved in January. At the same time, the DGTTF schedule only invites EOIs in October. This requires the CO to return to the government with new projects and renegotiations. Another problem with the execution of DGTTF funds is connected to the fact that while the CO closes its financial books in November, DGTTF projects run till the

end of December. This, coupled with the frequent late arrival of funds from New York, means that projects have significantly less than a year for implementation.

Despite these constraints, UNDP Kyrgyzstan management welcomes and appreciates DGTTF and believes that these funds make a difference in the country where few donors work on the specific democratic governance issues addressed by DGTTF and are flexible enough to react to new opportunities. It should be noted that DGTTF is part of other fundraising efforts of this CO. Project managers apply to other trust funds, donors, and so on.

5.3 Reporting requirements

Project staff have generally been satisfied with the reporting requirements, whereas senior management would like to see them reduced and streamlined with other necessary reporting—e.g., with the MYFF reporting—by adding an additional page on DGTTF. Senior management interviewed added that reporting should be country driven. During the implementation of the 2002 project, its manager was required to send reports to Bratislava Regional Centre and to New York every month.

5.4 Transaction costs

DGTTF projects are high in transaction costs; they require much preparation time and high levels of project staff involvement and management. As a senior UNDP manager observed, they require the same set up as a multi-million dollar project. The limited funding that DGTTF provides, coupled with no cost recovery, makes it impossible to carry out stand-alone DGTTF projects. It is interesting to note that the CO charged a 3 percent cost recovery fee for the first two DGTTF projects, 2002 and 2003.

5.5 Monitoring and evaluation

DGTTF guidelines allow for the application of leftover DGTTF funds for a project's evaluation. In the case of DGTTF projects in Kyrgyzstan, no evaluation was carried out after completion of a project. With nearly 100 percent of money allocated to delivery, there were no funds to do so. However, projects have monitoring and oversight built in during their implementation. In addition, two projects were evaluated externally as part of larger UNDP programmes and have received very positive assessments. These are the electoral support (2005) and disaster management (2006) projects.

6. SUSTAINABILITY

The accomplishments of four DGTTF-funded projects in Kyrgyzstan (out of five examined) have been sustained to various degrees by capacity-building and the replication or scaling-up achieved through either 'national ownership' or other UNDP programming. The highest sustainability was found to correlate to the highest buy-in on the part of the government and the relevance of the project in addressing the country's critical needs.

All projects implemented in Kyrgyzstan under the auspices of DGTTF have had a high national ownership. National partners, be they government or NGOs, were involved in all phases of the projects, from their inception and design to their implementation and follow up or scaling up. For example, the Ministry of Emergency is keen to adopt strategies from the 2006 DGTTF project piloted in several disaster-prone villages of southern Kyrgyzstan; this project helped local governments and communities develop responses to recurring disasters. UNDP continues to work on this topic as well.

In case of the 2002 project, DGTTF funds provided seed funding for the establishment of a now well-functioning parliamentary press service and TV studio and increased the capacity of the press service staff by providing training and study tours. In addition, it invited journalists from local media to use the Internet and the library, which allows them to report to their readership in a timely manner. Finally, the project raised funds for other related projects. However, while this has been a success story overall in the view of the evaluation team, one component of this project—public access points (PAP) that were set up as a bridge between the Parliament and local authorities and populations—has not lived up to these expectations. Two PAPs were transferred to small local private businesses at the end of 2005. However, neither the UNDP project staff nor the head of the press service at the Parliament could tell the team how or whether the PAPs were used for the envisaged purpose.

The 2004 project addressed a crucial need for increasing the professional capacity of local civil servants by providing educational materials and establishing two training centres. Although these objectives were met and the infrastructure for training was developed along with the necessary materials, there has not been enough government resolve to move the project to the next level—namely, to carry out training systematically and

according to need. There has been no consistency in training schedules and curriculum and, most of all, there has been no system of motivation that would encourage local civil servants to participate in these programmes. Furthermore, the identification of persons for training has not been done based on actual needs, but rather on meeting the quota for the district or municipality. During the time of this evaluation, the president passed a decree elevating the training centres to the rank of institute; this provides some reason for optimism, as it shows a renewed interest in institutionalizing training for local civil servants. Nevertheless, the question remains whether this project was a timely intervention, given the lack of sufficient governmental commitment.

Finally, although UNDP discontinued its support to the ombudsperson's institution, it continues to work on human rights with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6.1 Knowledge management

Knowledge management on DGTTF-related past experiences and consultations with other COs occurs on an ad hoc basis and is done only within the region. One exception is the 2006 project on disaster management, which has been chosen as a case study that will be distributed by UNDP/BCPR globally and whose manager has become a resource person for similar projects.

Moreover, there is little awareness and information on DGTTF projects in other parts of the world. Nobody interviewed was aware that there is an online database of DGTTF projects that can be consulted for past DGTTF projects.

The staff interviewed would like to see more DGTTF printed materials and cited DGTTF leaflets as being very helpful. In addition, they would like DGTTF management in NY to send all participating countries hard copies of Annual Reports.

The general view has been that DGTTF experience should be shared through UNDP practice areas by channels that already exist (e.g., via knowledge networks) and that no special mechanism for DGTTF specific projects should be necessary.

7. PROJECTS OVERVIEW

7.1 Improving Access to Information and Communication with Parliament

Project amount: \$165,000

Objectives:

Promotion of democratic and participatory dialogue between the parliament and citizens through capacity-building interventions directed at the parliamentary press service, journalists and civil society. While the main activities to reach the objectives were carried out in Bishkek, the capital, the project's intention was also to reach the regional level through the establishment of PAPs.

Key activities:

Capacity-building through:

- training and policy guidance for the parliamentary press service staff and accredited journalists;
- development (or translation) of manuals for parliamentarians, NGOs, and the mass media;
- study tours to parliaments with well-developed press services (including those in the Netherlands and Russia);
- provision of technical infrastructure to facilitate the communication between parliamentarians and their constituencies. Such materials included video equipment for the parliamentary studio, computers with Internet access for the media room, and development of a web-based news system;
- establishment of PAPs in pilot rural areas so that citizens outside of the capital could also be informed about the work of the Parliament; and
- seminars on the role of a parliamentary institution of ombudsperson. (This activity was initially not part of this project. It was carried out only after securing additional funds from DGTTF.)

Relevance of the project:

The project was designed after a situational analysis revealed the very weak communication capacity of the Parliament. This was largely a legacy of the Soviet era, during which public relations were not considered important. Simultaneously, UNDP Kyrgyzstan capitalized on a willingness of key change agents in the Parliament.

They expressed an interest in streamlining parliamentary operations by using ICTs and encouraging change in the management style. Additional impetus was provided by the ICT strategy for the country in the same year.

The project was also in line with UNDP priorities for Kyrgyzstan and was executed as part of a large TRAC-funded project on supporting the legislative function of Parliament. Through this project, the CO enhanced its partnership with Parliament.

Effectiveness of the project:

Based on interviews with the project's beneficiaries (the parliamentary press service, NGOs, civil society) and the UNDP project manager, the evaluation team considers this project highly effective. Most observers agreed that Parliament is now the most open and accessible public institution in the country. The level of professionalism of the press service staff has significantly increased. Facilities such as a press room and media room that have been equipped thanks to this project are also used by outside journalists. This access has improved the ability of accredited journalists to give first-hand accounts from Parliament to their newspapers. The facilities are also being frequently used by graduate students.

- **Innovation:** The project was innovative not only by virtue of its objectives but also and especially due to its addressing the politically very sensitive area of transparency and public monitoring of branches of government in a neutral and non-threatening way. The evaluation team believes that the project has been a crucial contributor to the perception of the parliament as the most open public institution.
- **Catalytic characteristics:** The project won additional support from the European Commission and UNDP for enhancing the parliamentary TV studio. Even in a situation of political instability, the standards for the press service in Parliament have been set (thanks to the project). It is the team's belief that these standards will remain high regardless of the parliament's political composition. Meanwhile, the Parliament of the Netherlands, a destination of a study tour organized within this project, provided an additional 200,000 euros (\$320,000) for a project to increase parliamentary oversight function.

The project was also catalytic in seizing the opportunity of ongoing public debate on human rights issues in parliament, thereby paving the way for the 2003 ombudsperson project and raising awareness of human rights issues in the country. For its work on human rights, the project was awarded additional DGTTF funds (\$40,000) from the global pool. The project galvanized additional donor and government's support; its achievements are sustained and expanded.

Efficiency of the project:

The project was implemented from May to December 2002. The two-month parliamentary summer recess reduced the project's implementation time to six months. Even so, the six months proved to be sufficient time to carry out all project's activities. Its clear objectives and the lack of the need for international experts, the recruitment of whom often causes delays in DGTTF projects, helped to make this possible.

The concept and project documents were shared with the advisor of the Bratislava Regional Centre, for comments. This project required much reporting. In addition to the regular mid-term and final reporting, the project manager sent monthly progress reports to UNDP NY, as well as periodic reports to the Regional Centre.

Sustainability of the project:

The effects of this project, completed in 2002, have been sustained and expanded with additional funding from UNDP, the European Commission (EC) and the Parliament of the Netherlands, and with support from the government. The evaluation team visited facilities funded by this project and found them all operational. Moreover, a parliamentary TV studio was created, supported by UNDP TRAC and EC money. There are now plans to have real time connection to the TV studio established with DGTTF funds. There are two programmes a week from the parliamentary studio on national TV. The library and the press rooms are used not only by the press service and parliamentary staff but also by students and the general public.

In addition, UNDP was chosen by the EC as an executing agency for a \$500,000 parliamentary support project. Since UNDP has worked with Parliament in the framework of the larger programme supporting this institution, it is not clear whether the 2002 DGTTF project was the sole reason for mobilizing additional funding. A significant part of the EC money was spent on providing parliamentarians with laptops. Another component of the project was directed at support for drafting the electoral code, the law

on political parties, and other normative acts. In this regard, it should be added, however, that despite a large UNDP and donor assistance, the proposed draft was rejected by the president.

Two PAPs established by the project in the regions were transferred to small local private businesses at the end of 2005. This was to ensure self-financing and sustainability of the PAPs by providing the paid information service to the public. Nevertheless, persons interviewed were not certain whether the PAPs were being used for the intended purpose.

Sharing of experiences with regard to this project occurred within the region only with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Project staff noted that there was a lack of knowledge exchange via DGTTF about other similar projects or best practices for the support to the parliamentary press service. The project managers chose the parliaments of the Netherlands and Russia as examples for site visits.

7.2 Support to the Institution of Ombudsman

Project amount: \$140,000

Objectives:

The main objective of the project was to assist the newly created Kyrgyzstan ombudsperson institution become a fully functional, accessible and independent institution. Secondary objectives were to enhance public awareness on human rights issues and to encourage the cooperation of civil society and mass media with the ombudsperson institution. The project was envisaged as a seed project for long-term UNDP support.

Key activities:

- provision of policy advice on the structure, management and roles of an ombudsperson's office by employing three international experts;
- study tours to visit ombudsperson institutions in the post-Soviet region;
- provision of equipment for the ombudsperson's office; and
- trainings and seminars for the ombudsperson's staff and civil society on human rights conventions and institutions.

Relevance of the project:

The evaluation team found this 2003 DGTTF project very relevant for Kyrgyzstan insofar as it sought to address the critical and timely issue of human rights. After extensive national debates and international pressure—e.g., from the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, who visited Kyrgyzstan in 2001 and encouraged the government to undertake human rights trainings for government officials and employees in the judicial system—the Law on Ombudsman was adopted by the Parliament and signed by the president in August 2002.

Against this background, UNDP and OSCE became involved in the process of drafting the Law on Ombudsman, providing recommendations and consultancy on improving the draft law in line with international standards. This assistance was carried out during the 2002 DGTTF project. After the Law on Ombudsman was adopted and Parliament was preparing for the process of selecting an ombudsperson, UNDP conducted a public awareness campaign on the ombudsperson's role and functions.

- **Innovation:** In the specific country context, the evaluation team considers this project highly innovative for the following reasons. First, it helped establish an institution that had never existed in Kyrgyzstan, yet was extremely needed because of the country's mixed human rights record. Second, UNDP had a clear comparative advantage in embarking on its support. Because of high sensitivities around the issues of human rights, other donors (except for OSCE) were reluctant to get involved in a more substantial way.
- **Catalytic characteristics:** The team cannot describe this project as catalytic. UNDP stopped working with the ombudsperson's office due to reasons stated below (in the section on effectiveness). Similarly, other donor organizations do not work with the current ombudsperson. The institution is underfunded by the state budget. The general view in the country at the time this evaluation took place was to await the election of a new ombudsperson before engaging further with this office.

Effectiveness of the project:

This project was not as effective as originally planned. The ombudsperson envisaged the assistance of UNDP as largely provision of office equipment and less of policy advice or capacity-building/training activities. Furthermore, his abuse of the office for his political campaign as well as his increasingly fundamental religious views made

cooperation between the ombudsperson's office and UNDP impossible. NGOs including the Freedom House as well as other donors in the country all share this assessment. In their view, a new ombudsperson is the only way out of this impasse.

Efficiency of the project:

The project was implemented within nine months. The manager of this project noted that in addition to the regular reporting (mid-term, final report), there was extra reporting to Bratislava every month, which seemed rather extensive. Constant differences of opinions about the nature of this project between the ombudsperson and UNDP hampered its implementation.

Sustainability of the project:

Although this project was planned as a first phase of UNDP's long-term strategic support to the ombudsperson's institution, it became clear that continued support would be ineffective and wasteful. Therefore, UNDP stopped its assistance to the institution. As already mentioned, currently no other donor organizations or NGOs work with it. UNDP has continued working in the area of human rights in the country, but has shifted its support to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among other things, it is focusing on implementation of and reporting on international human rights treaties to which Kyrgyzstan is a signatory.

Because of its short duration, DGTTF proved to be a flexible mechanism that allowed UNDP to discontinue its engagement with the ombudsperson's institution relatively easily. This might not have been the case with a multi-year programme.

7.3 Building Capacity of Civil Servants in Local Administration

Project amount: \$60,000

Objectives:

The key objective of this project was to support the National Decentralization Strategy (NSD) through increasing the professional capacity of local civil servants.

Key activities:

- establishment of two municipal training centres for local civil servants, one each in the north and south of the country;

- provision of equipment for the two centres, including computers, printers, and Internet access;
- training of trainers (a total of eight individuals) to conduct seminars and trainings for local municipal workers; and
- development of training materials and curricula.

Relevance of the project:

This project was well-aligned with the country's priorities, in particular in its support to NSD as well as with UNDP work on local governance in the country. It responded to a demand for professional staff of municipalities by providing educational materials and establishing two training centres that could serve municipal servants (9,000) and elected councils (7,000), all of whom need to be trained.

While working on this project, the CO enhanced its partnerships with local governments and with other donors working in this area (including the Hans Seidel Foundation, World Bank and DFID).

Effectiveness of the project:

The objectives of the project were met: the two training centres were established and training materials were developed. Yet the impact of this project has been limited due to the lack of government's resolve to move this project to the next level, namely, to carry out training on a systematic and needs-based manner. There has been no consistency in training schedules and curriculum; most of all, there has been no system of motivation in place that would encourage local civil servants to participate in these programmes. Furthermore, the identification of persons for training was not done based on the actual needs of the participants, but rather on meeting the quota for the district or municipality. Large staff turnover due to very low wages and no career development structure further impeded the training efforts.

UNDP is one of many donors working on local governance in the country, which makes it particularly difficult to assess the impact of this project and other interventions in supporting local governance. However, several donors interviewed stated that in terms of governance work, UNDP is best known for its local governance and decentralization portfolio.

The innovative nature of this project lay in it being the first step toward institutionalization of training for civil servants and elected officials on the local. In addition, it encouraged volunteer work by engaging volunteers in the activities of the training centres. This project contributed to the enactment of a law on municipal service (2004).

Efficiency of the project:

This project was implemented over the course of six months, from June to December 2002. The delay was caused by UNDP's complex procurement requirements. This small project was housed in a larger UNDP programme supporting local governance. The manager of this project coordinated its activities with other donors working with local civil servants, including the World Bank and DFID. No implementation problems were reportedly encountered. Most of the funds (\$42,000) were spent on equipment for the training centres. The centres established by this project were used to carry out activities of the 2006 DGTTF projects on disaster management.

Sustainability of the project:

Although the training centres currently exist and are staffed, the training activities have been organized on an ad hoc basis. Problems with the training centres have been exacerbated by changes in their management. Most recently, a new director of the centres was appointed. In addition, during the time of this evaluation mission, the president elevated the training centres to the rank of institute, which shows a renewed interest in institutionalizing training for local civil servants. Nevertheless, the question remains whether this project was a timely intervention, given the lack of sufficient governmental commitment. It is also unclear whether the new management will be able to proactively seek funds to sustain the operation of the centres and to introduce systematic training for local civil servants.

With regard to knowledge management, the project managers provided consultations on establishment of training centres for civil servants to several COs in Central Asia.

7.4 Promotion of Democratic Elections

Project amount: \$200,000

Objectives:

The goal of this project was to improve the democratic quality of elections in general—and specifically, to significantly reduce electoral law violations and irregularities in the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Key activities:

- Key activities of this project were a series of capacity-building initiatives including:
- provision of training to staff of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and regional election administration, and to ICT system administrators;

- provision of training on election complaints to judges, prosecutors, members of the police and the ombudsperson institution;
- organizing a series of countrywide conferences for representatives of electoral bodies, state and local authorities, political parties, candidates, NGOs and mass media—at the local and national levels—on lessons learned from previous parliamentary and presidential elections;
- organizing focus groups meetings and workshops on strengths and weaknesses of the past presidential and parliamentary elections and on amendments to the electoral code;
- assisting the CEC in designing a countrywide voter awareness campaign, including a campaign directed at female voters and candidates;
- purchase of equipment and printing of voter education materials; and
- in cooperation with OSCE, the Swiss Development Agency, and IFES, establishment of an early warning scheme that provided national and international institutions and organizations with a weekly update on areas of possible electoral tensions so as to be able to address them in a timely fashion.

Relevance of the project:

Provision of electoral assistance to ensure the democratic quality of the presidential election was (and still is) of utmost importance for further political, social and economic development in Kyrgyzstan. Fair and transparent elections increase acceptance among the public of the elections' results and confidence in newly elected authorities. This project addressed these objectives by increasing the capacity of the CEC to conduct elections in a more efficient and fair manner and by training voters and law enforcement bodies on their role in the election process. At that time, no other donors were willing to work with the CEC because they had been disappointed with the highly flawed parliamentary elections. These donors worked only with civil society, and UNDP was criticized for supporting the CEC and working solely with that sector.

This project was a component of a larger UNDP programme on electoral support during the period of July 2004 to June 2006. Given this fact, the project was not innovative in terms of its objectives and areas of intervention. However, some components of the project can be considered innovative, including the introduction of the 'Early Warning for Conflict Prevention' network and training of the press

service on the election administration to provide a high-level service and information to all stakeholders.

During the implementation of this project, the CEC moved out of the presidential complex to a separate building. This highly symbolic step was considered important for its legitimacy.

Effectiveness of the project:

Given that this project was just a small intervention among other UNDP projects in support of elections, as well as involvement of other stakeholders, it is difficult to assess its impact. Nevertheless, undoubtedly this project was very successful in terms of voter education. Observer organizations noted in their report that voters had access to an unprecedented level of knowledge about the election process and the candidates. The services provided by the CEC during the presidential election were widely commended by international journalists. The 'Early warning for conflict prevention' network was an important source of information on incidents of electoral irregularities. The introduction of self-copying paper for results tabulation reduced possibilities for manipulation.

On the other hand, the evaluation team was told by some NGOs that UNDP's efforts strengthened the capacity of the election administration to better manipulate election results. As stated by the OCSE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on presidential election: "The 10 July 2005 early presidential election marked tangible progress by the Kyrgyz Republic towards meeting OCSE commitments, as well as other international standards for democratic elections. This was the case in particular during the pre-election period and the conduct of voting, although... the quality of the process deteriorated during the vote counting and tabulation of results."

Efficiency of the project:

The project was implemented within eight months. The manager of the project consulted the UN Department of Political Affairs as well as the Electoral Advisor of the Bureau for Development Policy in New York. Flawed parliamentary elections of February–March 2005 hampered cooperation with the CEC. In addition, staff had to work on this project in an unstable environment following the March Revolution of 2005.

Sustainability of the project:

Although the project significantly assisted in building the capacity of the CEC, frequent changes of CEC members and staff of election administration mean that it is impossible to

ensure that the project will be sustained at an appropriately high level. Furthermore, the project stakeholders who met with the evaluation team could not say whether the new electoral code proposed by the president reflected amendments suggested by a series of workshops and conference organized within the framework of this project.

7.5 Building Capacity of Local Self-Governments in Disaster Risk Reduction

Project amount: \$125,000

Objectives:

The main objective of this project was to strengthen the capacity of local governance in responding to natural and man-made disasters.

Key activities:

- Key activities of this project included the following:
- facilitation of the development of risk maps in 10 pilot villages by local communities
- facilitation of the establishment of village rescue teams and their training
- workshops on local risk management for local authorities and populations
- development of public campaign materials on disaster risk management (including a short video and printed materials)

Relevance of the project:

In Kyrgyzstan, natural and man-made disasters take many lives and cause substantial damage each year. Although disasters happen at a community level, the government's response, limited by scarce resources and low capacity, is managed at the national level. What little donor attention there is is also focused mainly at the national level. However, local leadership and the ability to identify threats, seek local solutions and engage in prevention are crucial factors in effective risk management. Identifying this critical gap, a 2006 DGTTF project sought to increase local capacity for disaster risk reduction by incorporating disaster management issues into local governance in 10 selected villages.

This project allowed the CO to strengthen its partnership with the government, NGOs working on risk management as well as with other COs through sharing of experiences.

Effectiveness and sustainability of the project:

The evaluation team considers this project highly effective and innovative. Mainstreaming disaster management with local governance has been innovative not only for Kyrgyzstan, but for the entire region, where decentralization processes are still in their early stages. The activities supported by this project included risk mapping, conducted in a participatory manner at the community level, which later fed into the development of disaster risk maps on the district and national levels; the establishment of voluntary village rescue teams; and the training of local authorities and populations in community-based response to disasters.

Although UNDP and other organizations had previously worked on disaster management, UNDP was a pioneer in treating disaster management as primarily a governance issue. Furthermore, UNDP paved the way for other donors to work in this area. For example, the World Bank has committed \$12 million for a massive programme in disaster management.

Although initially uncertain about the merits of the bottom-up approach to disaster management, the national government adapted the project's methodology and achievements to other parts of the country with support from other donors attracted by the success of DGTTF-funded activities. The government would like to see 30–40 percent of the disaster-prone areas covered by this programme by 2010. Furthermore, the methodology applied for this project has been considered as best practice by BCPR and presented at numerous international conferences. The CO continues to work in the area of disaster risk reduction within a larger programme.

Efficiency of the project:

The project was implemented within eight months (from May to December 2006). The project staff would have liked more policy guidance from the Regional Centre or from Headquarters. The project built on prior UNDP experience in local governance and on its existing infrastructure in the regions. For example, training centres established with the 2004 DGTTF project were used for training and workshops. Additionally, project managers applied lessons learned from Tajikistan regarding training and workshop methodology. This project was implemented as part of a larger UNDP programme. According to the project staff interviewed, it was the first DGTTF project awarded globally that combined two UNDP practices, crisis prevention and democratic governance. The 2006 DGTTF guidelines saw the nexus of the two disciplines as a value added in the allocation of the funds.

8. PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE KYRGYZSTAN COUNTRY STUDY

Civil society

Ulan Kasymov, Director, Public Foundation “CAMP Ala-Too”

Galina Kulikova, Coordinator / Head of the Consulting Council of the Project, Political Party “Moya Strana”

Asiya Sasykbaeva, Director, NGO “Inter-Bilim”

Medet Tiulegenov, Executive Director, Soros Foundation–Kyrgyzstan

Government

Orozmat Abdykalykov, Chairman, National Statistics Committee

Tursunbai Bakir uulu, Ombudsman, Ombudsman Institution

Bahtiyar Fattahov, Deputy Director, National Agency on Local Self-Governance Affairs

Arzybek Kojoshev, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Finance

Aina Mamytova, Director, Training Centre for Civil and Municipal Servants

Nina Muhina, Director, Data-Analytical Department, Central Election Commission

Salih Murzaev, Director, MPA Department / Head of the Working Group for Development of Training Materials of the DGTTF Project

Emil Niyazov, Deputy Head of Press Service, Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic

Adylbek Sultanbekov, President-Rector, Academy of Management under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic

Taalaibek Temiraliyev, Head of External Relations Department, Ministry of Emergency Situation

Adam Zakirov, Deputy-Rector, Academy of Management under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic

International donors

Myrza Karimov, Project Management Specialist, Democracy/Education, USAID

Scott Kearin, Country Director, NDI, Kyrgyzstan

Jorg Ketelsen, Acting Head, EC Delegation

Markus Muller, Head of the Centre, OCSE Centre in Bishkek

Anna Oberg, Political and Economic Officer, EC Delegation

Natalia Pisareva, Economist, World Bank Office in Kyrgyzstan

Andrew Segars, Democracy Specialist, USAID

Oleg Semeneko, Human Dimension Officer, OCSE Centre in Bishkek

Aida Tashirova, Deputy Head, DFID Office in Kyrgyzstan

UN System

Neal Walker, Resident Coordinator

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Ainura Alymbekova, Programme Officer

Ilima Bokosheva, Programme Associate

Sanjar Ibraimov, Disaster Management Component Assistant

Mukash Kaldarov, TTF Project Coordinator

Alexander Kashkarev, Programme Officer

Muratbek Koshoev, Disaster Management Programme Advisor

Gulmira Mamatkerimova, Programme Advisor on Parliamentary Reform/Head of Cluster

Sezin Sinanoglu, Deputy Resident Representative

Damira Sulpieva, LSG Component Coordinator

Asiya Taranchieva, Budget and Finance Expert of the TTF Project



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