



EVALUATION OF THE

# DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE Thematic Trust Fund

COUNTRY  
STUDY:  
PHILIPPINES

United Nations Development Programme





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Country case studies were a key part of the evaluation of UNDP's Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). The evaluation team reviewed and analysed DGTTF projects in eight countries: Bhutan, Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Mozambique, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Yemen. This country case study is meant to complement the main text of the evaluation report.

The DGTTF has left a remarkable MDG footprint in the Philippines. The two completed projects, **Local Gains for MDGs** and **Meet MDG Targets**, together with the just approved DGTTF project **CALL 2015** are making a ground-breaking impact by achieving the MDGs at the city level. The methodology used in these DGTTF projects is already being shared regionally, and in the view of the evaluators should become a UNDP global model for how localities can realize the MDGs. UNDP signed an agreement in 2004 with UN-Habitat to develop a localization framework and

enjoin the local government units to support the national campaign on the MDGs. Advocacy campaigns on the MDGs both at local and national levels brought government, civil society and other stakeholders together to focus their efforts on realization of the MDGs. The Campaign has contributed tremendously to focusing attention on the importance of the MDGs in achieving sustainable human development and human rights.

Two other completed DGTTF projects, **Justice for the Disadvantaged** and **Voter Education**, are qualified successes only because they both were deficient in terms of being sustainable and catalytic.

While it is too soon to draw conclusions about the fifth project, **CALL2015**, which has only just started, it holds great promise and is expected to make its own contribution.

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# ABBREVIATIONS

<b>APJR</b>	Action Programme for Judicial Reform of the Supreme Court	<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>CER</b>	Consortium for Electoral Reform	<b>MYFF</b>	multi-year funding framework
<b>COMELEC</b>	Commission on Election	<b>NDI</b>	National Democratic Institute
<b>HRVA</b>	hazards and risk vulnerability assessment	<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>IDRC</b>	International Development Research Centre	<b>OECD/DAC</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
<b>IPER</b>	Institute for Political & Electoral Reform	<b>OGC</b>	Oslo Governance Centre
<b>LGU</b>	local government unit	<b>ProDoc</b>	Project Document
<b>PAO</b>	Public Attorney's Office	<b>RB(x)</b>	Regional Bureau(x)
<b>APR()</b>	Annual Project Report	<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Agency
<b>BCPR</b>	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery	<b>SL</b>	Service Line
<b>BDP</b>	Bureau for Development Policy CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women	<b>SURF</b>	Sub-Regional Resource Facility
<b>CO</b>	Country Office	<b>SWAp</b>	sector-wide approach
<b>CPAP</b>	Country Programme Action Plan	<b>TOR</b>	terms of reference
<b>CSO</b>	civil society organization	<b>TRAC</b>	target for resource assignment from the core
<b>Danida</b>	Danish Development Assistance	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development	<b>UNAIDS</b>	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
<b>DGG</b>	Democratic Governance Group	<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>DGP</b>	Democratic Governance Practice	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>DGTTF</b>	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund	<b>UNDP NY</b>	United Nations Development Programme Office New York
<b>ECIS</b>	Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	<b>UNESCAP</b>	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
<b>EOI</b>	expression of interest	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>GTZ</b>	German Agency for Technical Cooperation	<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
<b>HQ</b>	headquarters	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>HURLITALK</b>	Human Rights Policy Network		
<b>ICT</b>	information and communications technology		
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency		
<b>LPAC</b>	Local Project Appraisal Committee		

# 1. BACKGROUND

DGTTF has left a remarkable footprint in the Philippines with its four completed projects and one new project under way. The methodology used in the successful DGTTF projects and CALL 2015 is already being shared regionally. In the view of the evaluators, this methodology should become a UNDP global model for how localities can realize the MDGs.

All five projects are in sync with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), the Key Results UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–11 and the seven UNDP Democratic Governance Service Lines. But the UNDP Country Office (CO) has recently made human rights the focus of its efforts, so it is not clear where this leaves the office's governance efforts (including those supported by DGTTF) in the future.

Although successful in terms of completing outputs, two DGTTF projects (Justice for the Disadvantaged and Voter Education) did not meet DGTTF expectations in the opinion of the evaluators. These two projects were marred by administrative problems both in the UNDP and in the recipient organizations. One DGTTF proposal, which was to be a follow-on to the 2003 Voter Education project, was rejected. This was unfortunate. The most intense period of voter education with the greatest potential impact was early 2004, in the lead up to the general election that year, and thus this was a missed opportunity to make a huge impact.

The Philippines is suited to the small scale of DGTTF because the UNDP governance programme is small and even \$100,000 makes a difference. In short, the Philippines UNDP CO welcomes DGTTF, wants it to continue and, ideally, to grow.

**TABLE 1. PROJECT SUMMARIES**

PROJECT	OUTCOME	ACTIVITIES	REQUESTED	RECEIVED	SPENT	OTHER RESOURCES	COMMENTS
<b>Justice for the Disadvantaged (2002)</b>	Justice baseline studies and performance indicators	Surveys and studies	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$94,257	\$30,000 (TRAC) \$70,000 (third party)	Only four months for implementation
<b>Voter Education (2003)</b>	Voter education leading up to election	Voter education modules and study of voter behaviour	\$150,000	\$75,000	\$75,000	\$70,000 (TRAC)	DGTTF follow-on proposal turned down
<b>Local Gains for the MDGs (2005)</b>	MDG achievement at city level	Mainstream MDGs in city plans	\$300,000	\$162,000	\$162,000	UN-HABITAT	Innovative conceptual approach for cities to reach MDGs
<b>Meet the MDGs (2006)</b>	Local governments equipped to overcome obstacles to achieve MDGs	Hazards, vulnerability and risk assessments in cities	\$90,000	\$90,000	\$89,387	UN-HABITAT, UNESCAP, UNICEF, UNAIDS and UNIFEM	Very important concept in hazard-prone country
<b>CALL 2015 (2007)</b>	Citizen involvement and local leadership for MDGs			\$80,000			

## 2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

- The Philippines 'won' five of its six DGTTF proposals, which indicates it was both active and successful in its DGTTF applications.
- Unique perhaps to the Philippines, three of its DGTTF projects in succession were focused on reaching the MDGs at city level. This is both positive and negative. The positive side is that it shows that the DGTTF has the flexibility to approve a series of initiatives toward a much larger result. The negative side is that it necessitated three separate applications for essentially the same project, which is time consuming and inefficient both for the applicant and for UNDP NY. This may also suggest that the one-year time-frame for launch to completion is not viable for many initiatives and may be one explanation for breaking up the project into three submissions.
- The two MDG-related DGTTF projects were highly successful while Justice for the Disadvantaged and Voter Education were judged qualified successes only because, while considered innovative, both were deficient in terms of being sustainable and catalytic.
- Two DGTTF projects are situated in a UNDP TRAC project. This is the quickest way to situate, negotiate and design a DGTTF undertaking because UNDP already has a relationship and has built up trust and momentum through its TRAC project.
- The Philippines projects escaped the chronic funding shortfall crunch for DGTTF projects apparent in most other countries, because where the DGTTF award was less than requested, UNDP Philippines met the budget with TRAC funds.
- The DGTTF TRAC relationship should be clarified. It is a close and complex relationship that can differ from project to project. It requires an analysis and recommendations as to what kinds of relationships are constructive and acceptable under the DGTTF guidelines and what are not, e.g., using DGTTF simply to bump up the TRAC budget by \$100,000.
- DGTTF projects are consistent with the Philippines UNDAF and with CPAP. This demonstrates that DGTTF has been advancing the overall UN/UNDP agreed plan for the Philippines. However, this could change because the CO has now decided to prioritize human rights in its overall programme while scaling back its governance effort.
- Sharing of experience is already under way for the MDG-related projects within the Philippines, among UN organizations and with other COs. This is a remarkable achievement in a short period of time for UN-HABITAT, the project implementer. However, a more systematic sharing of DGTTF projects in and among regions is lacking.
- DGTTF's one-year implementation restriction is counter-productive in that it compromises DGTTF projects that do not get underway until well into the calendar year by forcing a focus on disbursement rather than impact. Besides, the scope and scale of some DGTTF initiatives makes them multi-year undertakings and such DGTTF projects are bound to fail if shoehorned into a single year.
- The fixed timing of the annual DGTTF call for proposals compromises their utility. COs miss opportunities unless they can draw funding from an existing TRAC project and if they can then there is no need for DGTTF as a programme. An open call programme with a more stringent review of projects based on a more comprehensive evaluation of the factors most pertinent to project success is a possible solution.
- The current 10-step DGTTF application process and accompanying negotiations with the recipient government is heavy in transaction costs for the relatively small amount of money in question. The consensus among programme officers is that a DGTTF project takes as much front-end effort as a TRAC project. It would be helpful if this process could be streamlined and simplified.
- The compelling importance of a champion to lead the project should not be underestimated. This person must not only be sufficiently senior to have the necessary authority to implement the project, he or she also must have the vision and drive to make it all happen. DGTTF had such persons in the case of the two successful projects described earlier. This distinctive feature of successful projects should become a criterion when mounting future DGTTF projects.

- The transaction cost of designing, negotiating and planning DGTTF projects is too great for the amount of money involved. One officer said the amount of time spent on DGTTF project development was as much as for a TRAC project. Ways and means should be explored of shortening and streamlining the application process in order to keep investment of time and energy to a minimum for all stakeholders including the recipient government, the UNDP CO and UNDP NY.
- There is a close relationship between TRAC projects and two of the DGTTF projects in the Philippines. Most often, the DGTTF project fits into a planned or existing TRAC project. This is logical since UNDP has invested time and effort in building a relationship with a given government agency and it is therefore easier to gain a DGTTF agreement than by starting from scratch with a new government agency. Sometimes the DGTTF project is followed by a TRAC project either because funds are required to finish it or because the DGTTF project has identified a new follow-on opportunity.
- DGTTF proposals must be carefully reviewed for their scope to ensure that they are feasible in the one-year time-frame. All four completed projects were unable to complete their work in the allotted DGTTF single-year time-frame. This time-frame forces project managers to focus on disbursement at the expense of results.
- The Philippines CO has grown in its capacity to identify, design and make its DGTTF projects succeed. Its first and second projects did not entirely meet DGTTF expectations, but its third and fourth projects were clear successes and its current project shows every sign of being a success. This learning needs to be documented and shared.
- The Justice for the Disadvantaged project experienced a series of UNDP administrative problems including staff turnover, contracting problems, and disbursement problems—all of which seriously delayed the project, with the result that some of the unspent DGTTF budget had to be returned to UNDP NY. This unfortunate result points to at least one key observation: If UNDP has a rapid disbursement designed programme like DGTTF, then it must provide the administrative machinery to make sure it operates effectively and usefully.
- COs and recipient governments would benefit from more clearly defined criteria as to what DGTTF is looking for in its projects, perhaps with a focus on 'innovative' as the defining characteristic. This would likely reduce the number of rejected projects and would reduce risk of failure of approved projects. At the heart of this review would be an exercise to develop the definition of success, i.e., being 'innovative, catalytic and strategic.'
- A clear policy and process should be articulated for sharing DGTTF experience among UNDP COs. Experience-sharing is one of the important objectives of the programme and cannot be done by COs alone. Regional Bureaux (RBx) or UNDP NY must take charge of this.
- The Annual Project Report (APR) is not a valid project evaluation instrument. There needs to be a more professional, objective approach to evaluating DGTTF projects so that lessons are learned and shared among countries and regions. Currently, COs are reluctant to admit failure and to use the experience to learn—this leads to a tendency to describe all projects as successes in the APR.



**TABLE 2. PROJECTS PERFORMANCE SUMMARY**

PROJECT	INNOVATIVE	MOBILIZED FUNDS	CATALYTIC	UNDP COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE	PARTNER-SHIPS WITH DONORS	PARTNERSHIPS WITH GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS	INCORPORATED GENDER CONCERNS	INVOLVED CIVIL SOCIETY	HUMAN RIGHTS
<b>Justice for the Disadvantaged (2002)</b>	Yes	No	No	UN is architect of MDG concept	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Voter Education (2003)</b>	Created political dialogue among opposing parties at sensitive time		Yes	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Local Gains for the MDGs (2005)</b>	Yes	No	No	UNDP seen as neutral convener in a sensitive political situation	No	Ministry of Economy and Finance	No	No	No
<b>Meet the MDGs (2006)</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner to work on elections	BCPR, UNFPA and UNICEF	Secretariat for Women	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>CALL 2015 (2007)</b>	No	Yes	Yes	UNDP seen as neutral partner by Parliament	No	Parliament	Yes	Yes	Yes

- The two completed MDG projects, Local Gains for the MDGs (2005) and Meet the MDGs (2006), have built an unprecedented consensus around accountable and deliverable action plans for MDG achievement. They, along with the third MDG project from 2007, CALL 2015, provide an excellent template that should be applicable broadly across other countries and regions and, indeed, globally. The first step in the process is developing a clearly measurable MDG baseline. The second step is completing a gap analysis between current practices and MDG goals at the local city level.

Finally, the third step is developing an action plan for meeting the MDGs at the city level, with citizens playing an active role in holding local government accountable. This three-stage process for planning the attainment of MDG goals at the local level is a remarkable success and every effort should be made to communicate the effectiveness of this process and to encourage its adoption and replication in other UNDP/UN-HABITAT countries (either as part of the DGTTF or, if not possible, then through another mechanism).

# 3. PROJECTS OVERVIEW

## 3.1 Local Gains for the MDGs

**Results:** Overwhelming success

**UNDP Core Democratic Service Line:** Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development

**UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011 Theme:**

Fostering Inclusive Participation

**Start/end date:** January–December 2005

**Amount requested:** \$300,000

**Amount approved:** \$162,000

**Amount spent:** \$162,000

### UNDP project context:

To jump-start the process of MDG localization in Philippine cities, the UNDP signed an agreement in 2004 with UN-HABITAT to develop a localization framework and enjoin the local government units (LGUs) to support the national campaign on the MDGs. Advocacy campaigns on the MDGs at both local and national levels brought government, civil society and other stakeholders together to focus their efforts on realizing the MDGs. The campaign has contributed significantly to focusing attention on the importance of the MDGs in achieving sustainable human development and human rights.

### Project purpose:

The project established local operational mechanisms for governance reforms and practices in LGUs, CSOs and the private sector toward poverty reduction, protection of rights and sustainable human development. The project aimed to

- increase accessibility to information, public goods, and services by the poor and disadvantaged groups and communities;
- enhance capacities of LGUs to rationalize government service, curb corrupt practices and promote ethical behaviour in public service along MDG targets;
- develop synergy in the delivery of basic services among LGUs;
- demonstrate and replicate a participatory, gender-responsive and rights-based cooperation among local governments in selected areas.

### Planned project outputs and degree achieved:

The project met the following outputs:

- cooperation institutionalized at the national and local levels as a strategy for the localization of the MDGs;
- MDGs mainstreamed in city plans and budgets to ensure that city programs and projects support meeting selected MDG targets;
- consultation, dialogue and linkages established among LGUs;
- access to information by the poor assured through the city consultation process;
- tools to assess the city's MDG targets, planning and budgeting, baselining and constituency feedback developed and used
- tools developed to assess the mainstreaming of human rights and gender responsiveness in MDG planning
- various means to advocate for the MDGs used, including live theatre in the villages

The project was funded recognizing that, while the above effort was a good start to mobilizing local and national stakeholders on the MDGs, there was still a huge need to support further capacity-building and accountability; build interventions on the ground; demonstrate actual MDG projects at the local level; and sustain efforts to strengthen local governance reforms and partnerships in the future.

### Innovative nature of the project:

Inter-LGU cooperation was implemented to work toward the MDGs. This led to (1) synergy in the delivery of basic services; (2) operationalization of local solutions to development challenges in contiguous LGUs; (3) effective institutional reforms; (4) implementation of long-term and big ticket projects; and (5) resource mobilization and maximization of human resources through cross-postings. The use of creative advocacy through live theatre in the villages was emphasized. Localizing the MDGs harnessed innovative leadership, creative advocacy and community journalism, energized a much wider base for participation, and ensured the formation of advocacy mechanisms in communities.

### Catalytic nature of the project:

The development and establishment of citizens' monitoring systems strengthened and expanded advocacy and citizens' feedback of government performance in the delivery of goods and services.

The project promoted, synchronized and institutionalized MDG-oriented and rights-based approaches to be utilized in executive and legislative policy measures, plans, budgets and monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, it improved local government service delivery in three ways: (1) codification of city legislation, ordinances and policies with regard to the MDGs and related human rights and gender concerns; (2) capacity assessment; and (3) the development of an impact measurement system to determine the responsiveness of the capacity-building calendar towards MDG localization and delivery of targets.

### Sustainability of the project:

The project prompted the development of a term-based (three years) MDG target setting, planning and budgeting supported by annual work plans and targets. The project was directly responsible for the documentation and promotion of models to market and popularize inter-localization of MDGs.

### Success drivers of the project:

- Poverty profiles and development baselines provided a direction and basis for setting local MDG targets.
- Cities with local resource institutions were twinned.
- A systematic and knowledge-based constituency feedback system was set in place, which made LGUs more accountable and more motivated to improve delivery of services.
- Innovative knowledge products and learning tools were developed.
- Peer-to-peer learning and exchanges, which is a solutions-based approach to localizing the MDGs, was implemented.
- Local governments were open to collaboration.
- The projects and activities were locally initiated and demand-driven.

- Community buy-in and active participation were major priorities from the beginning
- Clear and doable project outputs were developed.

In sum, this small initiative of \$162,000 made the MDGs come alive at the city level to impact the individual citizen. In the case of Pasay City, families pledged in a government form to meet the MDGs. The methodology from this project and the following two DGTTF projects dealing with the MDGs is of global significance. It should be taken on by UNDP/UN-HABITAT in a corporate manner and implemented globally.

### Adequacy of one-year time-frame:

The implementation time-frame of one year proved to be short. Some activities and outcomes could not be fully realized in this period.

### The value of the project:

Without this project, the impressive gains and insights from bringing the MDGs down to the city level would not have been achieved. UN-HABITAT and UNDP would not have cooperated on this initiative, and the synergy and learning among the 13 participating cities would not have taken place.

## 3.2 Meet the MDGs

**Results:** Overwhelming success

**UNDP Core Democratic Service Line:** Decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/Rural Development

**UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011 Theme:**

Fostering Inclusive Participation

**Start/end date:** January–December 2006

**Amount requested:** \$90,000

**Amount approved:** \$90,000

**Amount spent:** \$89,387

### UNDP project context:

This project reinforced and supplemented UN-HABITAT's Local Gains for the MDGs initiative, which was also funded by DGTTF (as described in Annex 1). In 2005, several initiatives (including the Local Gains project) were undertaken to increase awareness of the MDGs and action on the part of the national government, LGUs, the private sector, academia and civil society. The project helped LGUs to reform themselves to prepare and protect against natural/man-made disasters that may prevent them from reaching the MDGs.

**Project purpose:**

The project equipped local governments to overcome obstacles to MDG implementation at the community level. More specifically they helped to:

- pursue local governance reforms among LGUs that were implementing the MDGs, particularly those that were financially and organizationally weak, and in places highly vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters;
- use the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs as rallying points for reform in local bureaucracies to make them more relevant and responsive to the communities they serve;
- transform local policies, structures, systems and practices of LGUs, especially those related to fiscal and financial matters;
- provide policy advocacy and capacity-building interventions to LGUs and other stakeholders in the areas of disaster vulnerability management, gender-based budget planning, revenue generation and public expenditure management
- engage selected LGUs, local academic institutions and grass-roots organizations and communities to work together to define common areas for cooperation against external threats.

**Planned project outputs and degree achieved:**

- Key milestones specified in the project were achieved. Nine cities and one municipality were selected for hazards and risk vulnerability assessment (HRVA). Each LGU had one MDG focus. People's participation was key to generating data for the identification, analysis and assessment of hazards and vulnerabilities. Based on this data and analysis, a governance reform agenda was generated. Each city identified policy, administrative, structural/organizational as well as operating agenda for the LGU.
- The project generated 10 HRVA guidebooks focused on a particular MDG as well as the cities' HRVA.
- Following the passage of the resolution on the integration of the HRVA in the development planning processes of the LGU, the use of the HRVA can be replicated for the other MDGs and other interventions/programs.

**Innovative nature of the project:**

The Philippines is prone both to natural and man-made disasters. This project used the HRVA (hazards and risk vulnerability assessment) methodology to examine threats to MDG achievement. It is innovative because this was the first time cities looked at the MDGs in terms of mitigating external threats of both natural and man-made disasters and put in place governance resolutions to ensure achievement of the MDGs. The project underlined the point that any development would suffer a setback when a disaster occurred. Therefore, it is best to identify and mitigate disasters beforehand rather than simply reacting to them afterwards.

**Catalytic nature of the project:**

The project led to other partnerships within the UN system and other donors. With project support, UNESCAP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNIFEM and UNDP combined resources in some cities.

The project brought about local legislative and executive resolutions to ensure local funding for HRVA to be conducted for other projects. One city, Pasay, generated funds from UNESCAP for a new project using the HRVA concept. The project provided a tool for planning interventions. The HRVA-based tool gives local governments a better look at the situation in their area and sector, and helps them identify where development investment can make a strategic difference in avoiding or reducing the risk of disaster. Most cities in this project are now using or adapting this process for all their development projects and for other MDG targets. Other cities outside of the 10 pilot cities have shown interest in the HRVA tool.

**Sustainability of the project:**

In some of the 10 pilot cities, development funds have been allocated annually along with resource mobilization (e.g., ODA [official development assistance] grants and loans). Local skills transfer was a major strategy of the project. A team of local city personnel conducted and implemented each project—thus each city now has a core team. Finally, community participation reinforces sustainability.

In sum, this small project of \$90,000 has made a remarkable contribution toward a methodology for localities to meet the MDGs. UNDP/UN-HABITAT should make this methodology standard practice throughout their operations.



**Adequacy of one-year time-frame:**

The one-year time-frame for project implementation was too short, especially for capacitating local governments in the conduct of HRVA activities and its replication.

**The value of the project**

In the absence of this project, UN-HABITAT would not have been able to complete the 'good urban governance' development cycle. DGTTF allowed UN-HABITAT to build on its previous DGTTF projects to complete the loop.

**Success drivers of the project:**

The following factors were key to the success of this project:

- a strong and committed local UN-HABITAT team that implemented the project combined with committed LGUs;
- readiness and openness of LGU partners to pursue and use the project's HRVA methodology;
- participatory, bottom-up approach in the identification and prioritization of the local governance reform agenda;
- community-generated data that provided deeper perspective for development planners;
- consultation among the project's 10 local government units and their citizens;
- development of innovative knowledge products and learning tools;
- locally initiated and demand-driven aspects of the projects and activities;
- clear and doable project outputs.

### 3.3 Justice for the Disadvantaged

**Results:** Did not meet DGTTF expectations in terms of being catalytic and sustainable

**UNDP Core Democratic Service Line:**

Justice and Human Rights

**UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011 Theme:**

Fostering Inclusive Participation

**Start/end date:** January–December 2002

**Amount requested:** \$150,000

This is a cost-sharing project:

Total cost:	\$250,000
DGTTF:	\$150,000
UNDP TRAC:	\$30,000
Third party cost-sharing:	\$70,000
<b>Amount approved:</b>	\$150,000
<b>Amount spent:</b>	\$94,257

**UNDP project context:**

This project supported the Supreme Court of the Philippines in establishing baseline data for monitoring efforts along its Action Programme for Judicial Reform (APJR) 2001–2006, which was developed and formulated through an earlier UNDP Technical Assistance TRAC project. The study was also part of the UNDP-Supreme Court's Programme on Strengthening Access to Justice by the Disadvantaged in the Philippines 2002–2006.

The project helped monitor the APJR and the UNDP-Supreme Court's programme. It also served as an input to the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) in the Philippines, in preparation for the next UNDAF 2004.

This project, however, was buried in a large donor programme in the Supreme Court's permanent Programme Management Office. This made it more difficult to single out the contribution of the DGTTF project. The prior TRAC-funded project that drew up a blueprint for reform was much more innovative, catalytic, strategic and sustainable because it rallied the institution and the donors around the reform plan.

**Project purpose:**

The Supreme Court embarked on a five-year Judicial Reform Program and wanted to establish baseline information on the justice sector to aid programme implementation and monitoring. Several studies were undertaken to

- define performance indicators;
- establish quantitative baselines on access to justice by the disadvantaged;
- identify what other sectors under the judicial system needed to be reformed or improved in order to increase access to justice by the disadvantaged.

#### Planned project outputs and degree achieved:

- A National Survey on Private Legal Practitioners to Monitor Access to Justice by the Disadvantaged generated data on the perception, assessment and experience of legal practitioners belonging to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Alternative Law Groups, on judicial legal remedies available to the poor.
- A National Survey of Inmates and Institutional Assessment generated baseline information on access to justice of inmates prior to and during their detention in jail and assessed the institutional capacity of key agencies involved in the correction pillar of the criminal justice system.
- A Study of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) looked at the office's capacity to provide legal assistance to the poor.
- An Expanded Caseload Survey collected data, identified and analyzed the factors affecting access to justice, and enabled the formulation of appropriate interventions to address the situation.

#### Innovative nature of the project:

The various surveys and studies were the first time an attempt was made to develop baseline information under the more comprehensive justice reform perspective rather than only from a judicial reform point of view. The project provided the venue and opportunity for the various institutions to work together and address justice concerns. Justice administration involved three separate institutions—Congress (from the legislative branch), the Department of Justice (from the executive branch), and the Supreme Court (from the judiciary branch). Hitherto, there was no oversight body that coordinated the resolution of justice issues among these three implementing institutions.

#### Catalytic nature of the project:

The project broadened understanding of the fact that to achieve holistic reforms in the criminal justice system, the government must coordinate its five pillars, namely, the courts, prosecution, enforcement, corrections and rehabilitation, and the community. The initial collaboration evolved in the establishment of an ad hoc Technical Working Group on the Criminal Justice System to coordinate various efforts on justice reform. A major output of this working group was the formulation of a medium-term

development plan for justice reform linking the five pillars. The same plan was incorporated into the Mid-Term Philippine Development Plan. As an offshoot, the justice sector is now part of the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council that sets the country's legislative agenda. The results of the study influenced formulation of the CPAP 2005–2009.

#### Sustainability of the project:

The surveys in this project provide a permanent baseline in the subsequent monitoring tracking system conducted annually by the Supreme Court.

#### Adequacy of one-year time-frame:

The project experienced serious delays. The first disbursement did not occur until September 2002, which left only four months to complete the project; it therefore had to continue into 2003. There is confusion about what happened in this project. The APR states that some project funds had to be returned to UNDP NY, but the CO maintains this did not happen and that all funds were disbursed. What is clear is that the project was not completed by the end of the calendar year and that it ran several months into the subsequent year.

#### Value of the project

In the absence of this project, there may have been fewer subsequent donors in the reform process and they may have had fewer resources—although it is possible they would have come to the table in any case. Currently, there is an impressive donor presence in the judicial reform arena involving millions of dollars.

### 3.4 Voter Education

**Results:** Did not meet DGTTF expectations in catalytic and sustainability terms, but was innovative and strategic

#### UNDP Core Democratic Service Line:

Electoral Systems and Processes

#### UNDP Corporate Plan 2008–2011 Theme:

Fostering Inclusive Participation

**Start/end date:** May–December 2003

**Amount requested:** \$150,000

**Amount approved:** \$75,000

**Amount spent:** \$75,000

**UNDP project context:**

UNDP had a larger and longer-term electoral reform project with the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), from 2003–2006. The original IPER proposal was for a three-year \$500,000 project, but it was scaled back to a \$150,000 one-year DGTTF proposal. The final DGTTF project in fact received only \$75,000, but the UNDP TRAC project added \$70,000 for the 2003 Voter Education Summit.

The DGTTF project was intended to jump-start mobilization of both government and civil society for a massive citizen-voter education in 2003 leading up to the 2004 general elections. These elections were crucial to Philippine political stability. The Philippines requires ongoing political and electoral reforms in the aftermath of the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship to ensure that democracy is consolidated. The second People Power revolt (in 2001) underscored the need for more political reform.

The citizen-voter education campaign was part of the resolutions of IPER/Consortium for Electoral Reform-initiated (CER) 2002 National Electoral Reform Summit, which was core or TRAC-funded by UNDP. This was a follow-on initiative which fell within the major thrust of the UNDP Governance Portfolio.

Since IPER acted within the framework of the CER coalition, the funding gap was addressed by mobilizing the CER nationwide network to fund other activities outside DGTTF. IPER gained support from other local and international partners such as the Commission on Election and Congress, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Asia Foundation. IPER submitted a follow-up DGTTF project in 2004, but it was rejected. The UNDP CO ultimately funded it with TRAC funds. The fact that this project was intertwined with a prior UNDP TRAC project that continued during the DGTTF project made it difficult to separate and define clearly the value-added of the DGTTF project.

**Project purpose:**

- This project was aimed at the development and enhancement of responsible citizenship and the right of suffrage toward a firmer commitment to democratic political processes. It targeted the 2004 electorate while laying the groundwork for long-term education for democracy and citizens' role in democratic governance.

- The project comprised a nationwide citizen education campaign to train voters from marginalized and underrepresented sectors in electoral participation; hold conferences on the conduct of elections involving the participation of CSOs, media and the private sector; and produce publications on voter education campaigns and electoral reforms. The objectives were to enhance people's awareness of and participation in the electoral and governance process, and the quality of their choices for elective positions.

**Planned project outputs:**

The project outputs were (1) a voter education summit and regional echo conferences; (2) basic and sectoral voter education modules; (3) an initial media, grass-roots and sectoral voter education campaign; and (4) an update of a study of Filipino voter behaviour. The project accomplished the following:

- a permanent coordinating mechanism for continuing voter education and a nationwide network for voter education, as a result of the 2003 Voter Education Summit, laying the foundation for long-term voter education;
- a voter education campaign established prior to the 2004 elections to raise the level of awareness of the electorate, especially disadvantaged sectors;
- the decision of the Department of Education to agree to include voter education in its curriculum using the IPER modules through its National Service Training Program for college students;
- media linkages to continue voter education through mass media;
- the updating of the 1998 baseline data on Filipino voter behaviour as a reference point to determine appropriate interventions for voter education.

**Innovative nature of the project:**

The first National Voter Education Summit was convened to establish the Consortium on Electoral Reforms (CER) with the Commission on Election, respective congressional committees on electoral reforms, the Department of Education and the Commission on Higher Education. This summit, attended by more than 80 representatives of concerned government agencies and national CSOs, was the first ever to be held in the Philippines. It resolved to

conduct a massive voter education campaign in time for the 2004 general elections and beyond. The citizen-voter education campaign harnessed both formal and informal media of instruction. Voter education included formal sessions, mass community education meetings, community-based media initiatives, and use of commercial television, radio, printed, mobile phone (SMS), and the Internet.

**Catalytic nature of the project:**

The campaign mobilized various government and civil society sectors that had both the capability and interest in electoral reforms. Target campaign movers include COM-ELEC (the Commission on Election), national government agencies, LGUs, political parties, media organizations, church-based organizations, business groups (including public relations outfits), NGOs, people's organizations, and individuals. The campaign helped establish IPER/CER as a credible and non-partisan organization for electoral reform.

**Sustainability of the project:**

IPER felt that continued and increased funding through the 2004 election should have been provided for a follow-on project because the activities in 2003 were mostly foundational, and there was a strong need for continuing voter education. The full potential of the project could only have been realized in the 2004 election and after. Moreover, DGTTF funds only became available in May 2003, which meant the project had to be compressed into eight months. Unfortunately, the DGTTF follow-on proposal was turned down.

**Adequacy of one-year time-frame:**

A one-year time-frame was not sufficient. The initiative is part of a multi-year TRAC project and UNDP continued to fund it up to 2006. DGTTF was tapped to complement and supplement the TRAC funds. However, the basic flaw of the project design was that the DGTTF project was not followed by a multi-year TRAC project.

**Value of the project**

If there had been no DGTTF project, IPER would have had to get funding support from other donors.

**Success drivers of the project:**

The following were the primary success drivers of the project:

- the 2004 general election, which focused attention on this project and made it a practical reality;
- committed partner organizations;
- multi-stakeholder participation;
- a dedicated and visionary project implementer;
- the fact that the government and civil society sectors were unified in the goal of reforming governance in the Philippines;
- the conscious effort to build consensus among partners to support electoral reform.

### 3.5 CALL 2015

The Citizens Actions and Local Leadership to Achieve MDGs in 2015 (CALL 2015) has only recently been approved and cannot be evaluated at this time. However, it is seen as making a far-reaching impact by achieving the MDGs at the city level. CALL 2015 aims to promote transparent and accountable governance by meeting the MDGs on time by 2015 through the engagement of citizens, especially women, in instituting anti-corruption initiatives, and localizing salient United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) provisions in selected local government units in the Philippines. CALL 2015 is expected to organize and capacitate MDG Integrity Circles composed of local citizens' groups, especially local women leaders; establish citizen-government face-to-face dialogue; and demonstrate and replicate sound MDG practices that promote anti-corruption measures.

The MDG Integrity Circles are expected to enable more local women to participate in policy-making, which will drive transparent and accountable governance needed to reach MDG targets. Localizing the MDGs with a particular focus on mitigating corruption will bring about the greater empowerment of citizens and communities in decision-making, and ensure that resources and budgets of local governments are not diverted but properly utilized to meet MDG local targets. Strategic use of existing and time-proven participatory tools and approaches such as those developed by UN-HABITAT and UNDP—in particular, Tools to Support Participatory Urban Decision-Making—will hasten the replication of sound practices and the localization of UNCAC.



# 4. PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE PHILIPPINES COUNTRY STUDY

## **Government**

Elizer Abundo, Officer, Muñoz City Cooperative

Nestor Alvarez, City Mayor, Science City of Muñoz

Ruth Asmundson, Mayor, Davis, California (USA)

Alex Brillantes Jr., Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines

Ramon Casiple, Executive Director, Institute for Political and Electoral Reform

Ronnie Domingo, Secretary, BBP-PMG

Evelyn Dumdum, Judicial Reform Program Administrator, Supreme Court of the Philippines

Arceli Espena, Secretary, Muñoz City PMG

Nemesio Macabale, Agriculturist, Muñoz City

June Mico, Officer, Muñoz Acting City Environmental and Natural Resources

Armando Miranda, Engineer, Muñoz City

Austere Panadero, Undersecretary, Local Government Department of Interior and Local Government

Ben Sibulboro, Auditor, Muñoz City PMG

Erik Tubalinal, Officer, Muñoz City Planning and Development Office

Felix Santoa, Chairperson, BBP-PMG

Ma. Theresa Sayco, Officer, Muñoz Rural Health

Ruben C. Sevilleja, President, Central Luzon State University

Rowena Tabuso, Development Officer, Pasay City Cooperative

Nestor Venturillo, Director, Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Group, Supreme Court of the Philippines

## **International donors**

Matek Dornik, Third Secretary, Operations Section, Delegation of the European Commission to the Philippines

Prasanna Kumar Jena, Governance Specialist, Asian Development Bank

R. Mukami Kariuki, Local Program Coordinator, World Bank Office Manila

Eva Pastrana, Delegation of the European Commission to the Philippines

Steven Rood, Country Representative and Regional Advisor for Local Governance

## **UN system**

### **United Nations Agency for Human Settlement (UN-HABITAT)**

Jaime Antonio Jr., MDG Localization Programme Coordinator

Eden Garde, Programme Manager ad interim

Juan Blenn Huelgas, Disaster Management Specialist

Cris Rollo, Knowledge Management Specialist

### **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)**

Emmanuel Buendia, Assistant Resident Representative Programme

Kyo Naka, Deputy Resident Representative

Jennifer Navarro, Programme Assistant







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