



Centre for
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and Security

Assessing and reviewing the impact of small arms projects on arms availability and poverty

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1.1 Introduction

Armed violence causes death and injury to millions but also ruins livelihoods and economic security in countless communities around the world. In such circumstances, insecurity associated with endemic violence and the wide availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) often ranks high amongst the concerns of the poor. Inevitably many projects that seek to address the spread of arms and the accompanying insecurity, take place in some of the world's poorest countries. It thus makes sense to ask whether such projects have an impact on poverty reduction and development, as well as any success they may have in arms reduction or curbing violence. Few assessments have in fact been made of these broader dimensions. This report seeks to fill that gap.

1.2 Aims and objectives

The objectives of this study are to review and assess the impact of recent SALW projects on reducing arms availability and use, and on poverty. The work is based on assessments of nine SALW reduction and control projects¹ supported in recent years by a range of donors and non-governmental organisations including the UK, the EU, UN agencies, NGOs and other bilateral donor agencies. Most of these projects have been 'stand alone' activities and are not fully integrated with donors' poverty reduction programmes. However, some of them have set themselves broader targets than merely collecting weapons and have explicitly incorporated objectives of improving well-being. Indeed one type of project has been labelled 'weapons for development', as will be seen below. A particular aim is to scrutinise such projects, whether development goals or explicitly incorporated or not, to see how successfully they bridge the realms of disarmament and development.

This synthesis report thus specifically aims to:

- Analyse the implications that projects for reduction of SALW and armed violence have for poverty reduction.
- Compare the different types of such projects and their relative 'success' in realising both kinds of objectives and in integrating disarmament and development goals.
- Discuss lessons learned and recommendations for the design, implementation and evaluation of arms reduction projects, programmes and policies in the future.
- Develop indicators for assessing the SALW reduction projects and their impact on poverty reduction and other Millenium Development Goals (MDG).

1.4 Structure of the report

This synthesis report is split into six sections:

- **2. The Projects** describes the types of SALW projects selected for analysis.
- **3. Findings I: SALW programmes' direct impact on development and poverty.** This section looks at the direct impacts on development through the direct support of health, education etc. This section will seek to assess the projects' impact on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

¹ Projects were selected according to the following criteria: geographical spread; prior project evaluations; suitable original purpose of project; high profile or high cost interventions which are judged to be having an impacts, such as the work of UNDP.

- ❑ **4. Findings II: SALW programmes and indirect impacts on poverty and development.** This section is split into five main potential impact areas: safety and security, governance, security sector, participation/empowerment and confidence building.
- ❑ **5. Findings related to programme design and process.** This section presents key findings and makes recommendations for the future design and implementation of SALW projects and programmes.
- ❑ **6. Indicators and analysis** This section discusses the appropriate use of indicators, makes suggestions on what they should be and how to embed them.
- ❑ **7. Conclusions and recommendations** This section discusses the positive and negative lessons learned.

2.1 The projects

The projects were carefully selected on the basis of geographical spread, prior project evaluations, suitable purpose of the project, and those which were judged high profile or high-cost interventions. Although it had been hoped to review up to 25 projects, it was not possible to secure relevant documentation from a sufficiently wide range of donors to explore more than nine. The study is indebted to a number of donors, particularly UNDP, for sharing not only project documents but also their own assessments. The nine projects reviewed were in Mozambique, Mali, Albania, Colombia, Brazil, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Congo and El Salvador. They are listed below.

2.1.1 Sierra Leone “Arms for Development Programme”. This project was assessed from 2002 to the present day. It was a “development in exchange for weapons” project pursued through voluntary SALW collection and the construction of weapons-free zones for which a development project was awarded.

2.1.2 Republic of Congo “Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Small Arms Collection”. This project was assessed from July 2000-December 2002. It was a disarmament and reintegration programme pursued through providing sustainable livelihoods to ex-combatants.

2.1.3 El Salvador “Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control”. This project was assessed from February 2001-December 2003. Its principal goal was consciousness raising and changing attitudes towards violence and weapons possession through public debate and political advocacy.

2.1.4 Brazil “Reducing SALW impact: civil society participation in security sector reform within MERCOSUR”. This project, which is part of the broader Viva Rio project, was assessed from 2001-2004. Its aim was to aid in the reduction of SALW-related urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and the MERCOSUR region through research, advocacy and training of civil society organisations and security sector agencies. It also sought to improve communication through media and publicity campaigns.

2.1.5 Cambodia “Weapons for Development”. This project was assessed from 2001-2004. Its focus was small-scale development in exchange for weapons, as well as public awareness and police reform.

2.1.6 Colombia “Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia”. This project was assessed from June 2003-June 2004. Its objective was the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as assistance to vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.

2.1.7 Albania “Small Arms and Light Weapons Control”. This project was assessed from 2002-2003. Its objective was to organise weapons-collection competitions with small development projects as prizes, with additional support for weapons control and awareness campaigns.

2.1.8 Mali “Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon collection programmes assessed by local people”. This project was assessed for the period 1992-2003. Its main aim was to create a sense of local ownership of the principal stakeholders.

2.1.9 Mozambique “Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares”. This project was assessed from 1995-2003. Its aim was weapons collection and their exchange for tools.

2.2 Methodology

The first phase of the research reviewed six projects – in Mozambique, Mali, Albania, Colombia, Brazil and Cambodia – based on available completed evaluation and assessment materials, and interviews where appropriate.

The second phase conducted three field assessments in Sierra Leone, Congo and El Salvador in which two consultants (one poverty specialist and one SALW specialist) reviewed the documentation, both programme specific documentation and more general information relating to the country context, interviewed key stakeholders and visited the projects over eight days.² These assessments focused on:

- ❑ The character and extent to which these projects contributed to a reduction of armed violence and poverty in the countries and communities in which they had been implemented.
- ❑ The obstacles and opportunities experienced in implementing such projects in relation to armed violence and poverty reduction.

The added value from these field studies was so significant that it was decided at a later stage to add another set in East Africa that would illustrate examples of a different kind of initiative, one aiming at a national action plan rather than a finite ‘project’. At the time of writing this work is about to begin. The final version of this Report will incorporate the broader comparison that these cases will make possible.

It should be stressed that these reviews were not meant to be formal assessments of these projects; many of them had already been subjected to that process. Rather there was an intention to look beyond any such assessment in two ways:

- ❑ To explore the extra dimension of outcomes in relation to any impact on poverty, well-being or development, as well as those to do with arms reduction and enhancing security, and thereby provide some insights into how such development impact assessments might be made.

² Full copies of the three field reports will be available at the Advisory Board meeting in July, and can be requested from m.turner4@bradford.ac.uk

- To analyse these types of initiatives in a comparative way, rather than the individual projects in their own terms, and thereby offer some lessons learned in future design, but also pose basic questions: do such projects or programmes offer 'models' which should be replicated? What circumstances affect the 'success' of such projects?

It should also be made clear at the outset how we understand **poverty**, which can be defined in many ways – e.g. in absolute or relative terms. However, absolute measures of poverty (such as \$1 or \$2 a day) measure income only and offer a superficial representation of how poverty is experienced by poor people. In this study poverty will be understood in a much wider, relative sense, consistent with DfID's usual definition, particularly that used in livelihoods analysis where the assets or capital – human, social/political, financial, physical and natural – and vulnerabilities of poor people are identified across a range of groups such as youth, women, urban and rural poor. This study also seeks to assess the impact of armed violence on social protection, such as the provision of and access to education and health services, and governance is also considered as this has an impact on people's livelihoods.

2.3 Types of Project

The projects cover a very wide range of initiatives, even though all aim to reduce the availability of weapons and armed violence. So as to help make it clear in the analysis that follows that one is comparing like with like, they can be categorised in terms of:

- *Circumstances of Armed Violence*: some were initiated in an **immediate post-conflict** situation, and may even have been provided for in a peace agreement and/or as part of a planned DDR; some were planned as a later, second stage of disarmament; while others sought to address armed violence not associated with a recent civil conflict.
- *Provisions of the Project*: in particular the lever or **incentives** offered to get people to disarm or turn in weapons – whether through a 'buy back' or 'weapons for development' or public awareness campaigns or formal measures for improved small arms control (see Table 1 below for summary) – and the groups targeted.

Table 1 lists the projects and distinguishes them along these two dimensions, i.e. providing an initial indication of the particular **context** of armed violence in which they were introduced and of the basic **approach** to disarmament they involved.

Table 1 – Circumstances and provisions of projects

Country	Project Name	Circumstances	Provisions
Sierra Leone	Arms for Development (UNDP)	Immediate post-conflict	Weapons collection for development activities in chiefdoms
Republic of Congo	Ex-combatants Reintegration and Small Arms Collection (UNDP)	Later post-conflict	Small arms collection through alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants

El Salvador	Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control (UNDP)	Criminal violence	Discouraging crime, promoting arms legislation through public sensitisation
Brazil	Reducing SALW Impact: civil society participation in SSR within MERCOSUR (DFID)	Criminal violence	Improving regional SALW controls and in-country SSR
Cambodia	Weapons for Development (EU)	Later post-conflict	Weapons collection for small-scale development
Colombia	Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia (UNDP)	Ongoing conflict	Increasing public legitimacy for demobilisation and reintegration
Albania	Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (UNDP)	Later post-conflict	Weapons collection for small-scale development
Mali	Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali (UNIDIR)	Later post-conflict	Assessment of weapons in exchange for development projects
Mozambique	Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares (CCM)	Later post-conflict	Weapons collection for farming implements

The first three in the table are those on which field work was conducted.

In terms of their **circumstances**, it can be seen that most of them were implemented after prolonged and major violent civil conflict. In some cases (Mozambique, Cambodia, Albania and Mali) such violent conflict was some time ago and the projects are thus later stage efforts to mop up remaining weapons and/or limit their spread and use in new forms of violence. In others like Sierra Leone the formal end of violent conflict is more recent, and full assessment of the impact of the project is thus premature, and has to be seen as related to DDR. Two of the cases, Viva Rio in Brazil and El Salvador, are addressing endemic armed criminal violence – although the latter did come out of a civil war in the early 1990s, the proponents are not the former adversaries. Our three case studies thus offer examples of these differing contexts of AV:

- Recent civil conflict – Sierra Leone
- Later stage of disarmament after earlier violent conflict – Republic of Congo
- Violent organised criminality – El Salvador.

It should also be noted that Columbia is a case where the several conflicts involving AV remain on-going.

In terms of their **approach** and the **provision**, or '**incentives**', they offer to reduce AV, they can all be seen as follow-ups after or alternatives to more conventional arms reduction initiatives either by enforcement or through simple buy-back. They differ from such arms collection in one or more of the following ways:

- ❑ Offering inducements to individuals that are alternatives to cash – by farm tools (Mozambique), livelihood support (Republic of Congo). Elsewhere such incentives as lottery tickets (South Africa) have been used.
 - ❑ '**Weapons for Development**' a UNIDIR and UNDP term given to projects where the inducement is offered to the **community** not individuals, usually in the form of some provision of social or physical infrastructure for development. Cambodia, Albania, Mali and Sierra Leone all offer variants of this approach
 - ❑ **Awareness** promotion to counter what is seen as a 'culture of violence', through a range of public education and campaigns, often through local institutions.
 - ❑ **Strengthening arms control**, through local or national measures such as 'gun-free' areas etc., often through a mix of government and community institutions.
- Our Brazil and El Salvador projects combine both of the last two elements. Thus our field work covered cases in each of these categories.

These differences in **circumstances** and in **approach** in terms of what they provide in exchange for SALW need to be borne in mind in considering the findings from the evidence collected from documents and field work, which are presented below. An effort will also be made in the Conclusions to compare them, particularly in terms of approach, as the types identified above can be considered as offering a range of possible **models** for future arms reduction programmes.

3.1 Findings I: SALW programmes' direct impact on development and poverty

The projects were first assessed in terms of their direct impacts on development and poverty. Some projects, for example, gave direct support to health and education measures or other community development projects. The assessment of direct impacts is obviously easier where such broader development aims were explicitly stated as part of the objectives. Some of the projects were not stand-alone but part of wider programmes which addressed, for example, issues of reintegration, and those impacts on the broader programme's aims are also worth retrieving. However, many of the projects had no specific aims beyond their arms and violence reduction and beyond target groups associated with AV. Even when there were such aims some had little broader development impact, hence the use of poverty indicators or those of MDG are not currently being monitored as they have little direct relevance. Nevertheless the MDG offer a convenient way of cataloguing some of the direct effects, whether these were explicitly in the aims or not.

3.2 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

For many of the projects, no direct link was observed. However, some had an indirect impact through the generation of employment opportunities (Congo, Albania), improving the infrastructure (Albania), the provision of "tools" which can help develop and sustain livelihoods (Mozambique), or providing development projects (Sierra Leone, Mali). In some cases, the projects were part of a wider programme which could be having an impact that cannot be accessed here (Brazil, Colombia).

3.3 Achieve universal primary education

For some of the projects no direct link could be observed (Brazil, Colombia, Mozambique). However, a fair number did have an impact by helping to construct schools (Sierra Leone, Albania, Mali, Cambodia), occasional assistance to poor students (Mozambique), and specifically targeting previously marginalised groups (the Tuareg in Mali). Others had an indirect impact through their participation as part of a wider programme (Congo, El Salvador, Brazil)

3.4 Promote gender equality and empower women

For a couple of the projects this was a central goal and they pursued it by ensuring that women equally participate in the decision-making (Sierra Leone, although it was often felt that they were being pushed out of the process), are engaged in conflict resolution and income-generating activities (Mali), and through empowering girls (El Salvador). Other projects initiating discussion about gender-related violence in the home, school and society (El Salvador), and provided financial support to women's organisations in the cities (Albania). However, other projects did not actively engage with women (Congo, rural Albania, Mozambique). In these circumstances it was felt that this was largely a missed opportunity.

3.5 Reduce child mortality

In the majority of the projects no direct link could be observed. In only one project (Mali) was a direct link observed – immunisation and child feeding programmes were promoted. Nevertheless, many of the projects may have had an impact through funding or helping to reconstruct health centres and clinics (Sierra Leone, Albania).

3.6 Improve maternal health

There was no direct link observed in any of the projects. However, again an indirect link was observed in the development of healthcare provision (Sierra Leone, Albania, Mali) and the development of organisations that promote women's health (Mali).

3.7 Combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases

No link was observed in any of the nine projects. One project (El Salvador) opened up opportunities for another project to raise awareness about HIV/Aids, and another attempted to address it in its second phase but failed to carry out the plans (Congo). It was felt that in specific cases this was a missed opportunity to tackle an issue which is a time bomb waiting to explode (Sierra Leone).

3.8 Ensure environmental sustainability

This was one of the more difficult MDGs to assess impact by the projects. No direct link was observed in most cases, although one project claimed an impact although in what way was unclear (Albania). Possible contributions mooted are the promotion of hunting with traps rather than guns (Sierra Leone, although this has been questioned by conservationists), and the reduction of poaching (Congo). In one case, it was observed

that the project did not address the environment even though environmental vulnerability and degradation were intimately related to poverty (El Salvador).

3.9 Develop a global partnership for development

In some cases global partnerships were not apparent (Sierra Leone). However, some of the projects enhanced cooperation between development agencies within the country (Congo); developed regional cooperation to counteract arms trafficking (Brazil, Mali); and developed a partnership between civil society, the government and the international donor community (El Salvador, Colombia, Mozambique).

4. Findings II: SALW programmes and indirect impacts on poverty and development

As noted above, of the three main case studies, Congo and Sierra Leone are both instances where the SALW programmes involved disarmament schemes to either sustain a ceasefire or prevent a return to armed violence between different factions. In the case of Congo, this was a project that gave immediate support to ex-combatants for disarmament and reintegration, while the Sierra Leone case was conceived within a Weapons for Development (WfD) framework. Other desk studies that also included direct disarmament activities were Mali, Albania and Cambodia within a WfD programme framework. Mozambique remunerated disarmament at the level of the individual or groups of individuals not of the community. On the other hand the El Salvador SALW programme did not implement direct disarmament activities and instead focused on issues of baseline data collection, legislative reform and public awareness raising. These activities are similar to those discovered through desk research on the Viva Rio experience in Brazil though this intervention did involve some weapons collection and public destruction. The other Latin American case covered via desk research, Colombia, is a different type of intervention altogether in that the conflict is active and it focuses on the action and impacts of armed violence rather than the weapons themselves.

4.1 Security environment

Even more important than these programmes' real and potential impacts on poverty and development – as measured in the MDGs and other indicators – are the impact these programmes have on the security environment as well as participants and other beneficiaries' perceptions of security in general. In the Congo the disarmament efforts targeted the most dangerous young male militia members and their weapons believing that this would, as an emergency stop-gap measure, allow for the broader DDR process to take root. The field study in Sierra Leone looked at a programme that targeted the weapons that had now been distributed more diffusely during the period of conflict to communities by engaging in a WfD intervention that engaged with tribal leaders. In the case of El Salvador, initiated almost a decade after the civil war had concluded, and weapons had become widely distributed through both legal and illegal markets, the group had to target the general population with a double-strategy of targeting elementary school-age children to influence their attitudes before they were at ages of greater risk as well as communicate with adults through the messages transmitted to their children.

Of course each of these projects implemented by UNDP could have been done slightly differently including the target groups, but it does seem that each intervention chose target groups appropriately based on the distance in time from armed conflict and the degree and nature of SALW proliferation within society. In the Congo only 3,106 SALW (an estimated 4-5% of SALW in circulation) were recovered in addition to UXO and ammunition. At the time of the field study weapons had not been collected by the UNDP project in Sierra Leone and actual disarmament activities were not even contemplated by the UNDP and its partners in El Salvador during the stage of the project evaluated by the field research team. The three field reports, in combination with the desk research, have concluded that judging SALW interventions in terms of the numbers of weapons collected, number and nature of beneficiaries and cost benefit analysis is important in terms of accountability to donors and partners, but misses the important point where timing and relevance to the peace and security needs a given society or community is the crucial matter. If other measures are not implemented to maintain peace, improve security and prevent further circulation of weapons are not put into place even interventions where significant percentages of weapons are removed from society will not likely have a sustaining impact. Based on desk research, specifically the cases of Viva Rio in Brazil and Albania, progress on SALW reduction and security is a process that usually comes out of sustained implementation of a series of projects and activities carried out by a coalition of diverse, but like-minded actors.

One challenge of SALW interventions in general -especially in developing countries where statistics on crime, public health and violence where there is a lack of historical and reliable data- is isolating their quantitative impact on crime and violence. This report and the reports that feed into it have discovered that SALW projects not only have direct impacts of a qualitative nature on post-conflict peace-building and security, but they also have quite important indirect effects that in some cases may be of equal importance in the long run. The next two sub-sections discuss in greater detail these direct and indirect impacts.

4.2. Post-conflict peace building: direct impact

As mentioned above measuring the direct impact of SALW interventions effects on quantitative indicators such as armed crime incidents or homicides is difficult in developing countries where if this data exists it is not very reliable. The field research carried out in the Congo and Sierra Leone provided little hard data to make such determinations. In El Salvador considerable data on armed violence was available from several sources: police, attorney general and the national forensics office, however, while this data did show a downward trend in many incidents related to SALW violence over the last five to ten years it represented historical data up to the point of the intervention and did not yet include information after activities had been implemented. Even if reliable, historical data did exist for the three SALW interventions studied in depth it would be difficult to isolate their impact on armed violence among a myriad of other important factors ranging from continued weapons proliferation to generalised economic crises.

Regardless, the research team did identify other contributions to post-conflict peace building and security that came directly out of the SALW interventions in the areas of building capacity to control weapons, increasing transparency and accountability in the security sector, raising public awareness and fostering security sector/community relations.

The desk study of Viva Rio, Brazil demonstrated how a combination of research, civil society activism and the willingness of an NGO to collaborate with the police, despite major differences of opinion on public security policy, could build the capacity of the police to improve weapons registration, stockpile management and weapons destruction practices. Despite the technical nature of these exercises after mutual trust was built both the NGO and police were able to make their co-operation culminate in public awareness and civic action activities related to the need for disarmament in Brazil.

Box 1: El Salvador

The Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control project is situated within the larger UNDP Society Without Violence programme in El Salvador. With a budget of US\$300,000 and running from February 2001 to December 2003, the project's goals were to produce information for public policy on SALW and their impact, reform arms legislation, and enforce and cultivate a public mood in favour of disarmament. The particular target areas were 12 municipalities with high levels of violence and crime and specific target groups included schoolchildren, young men and boys (aged 15-35), but the public awareness campaigns had a national focus.

El Salvador, much like the rest of Latin America, is a country of deep inequalities of wealth. These stresses led to a civil war, which began in 1980 with a major influx of SALW from Cold War adversaries. The parties to the conflict signed UN-sponsored peace accords in 1992. Currently the explosion of violent crime, which is the major area of concern in relation to SALW, is associated with the proliferation of youth gangs or maras, which draw more on returned refugees than the combatants of earlier civil war.

The project supported the work of existing organisations and local leaders and built up their capacity to combat the existing culture of armed violence – this enhanced the sustainability of the project. In addition it worked with a range of actors, including schoolchildren and government officials, and promoted its work widely and professionally. There are many possible indicators of the impact of this project on armed violence and poverty such as public opinion polls on small arms possession attitudes, change in number and size of gang-controlled “no-go” areas and changing trends in annual victimisation surveys.

A lesson from this project is that there needs to be more work done to develop a clear monitoring and evaluation strategy at UNDP especially in relation to the impact on different socio-economic groups. Furthermore, poverty reduction aims could be more built in to project design by including (or planned alongside) measures that could benefit the target group with suitable measurement of the combination of factors that affect the development of that group over time.

In El Salvador, UNDP's project partners assisted in the computerisation of more than 50,000 police crime reports involving firearms. This had two direct impacts. First, the process allowed the police to develop a crime reporting system that provided more detail on armed violence including the weapon specifications, role in crime and whether or not it was legal or illegal. Second, the analysis of the data helped dispel several myths regarding armed violence and crime and obliged the police to approach the issue of weapons possession in a different and more restrictive manner despite a difference of opinion with the many within the same government.

The SALW interventions in the Congo and Sierra Leone appeared to have contributed to a perception of improved security even if concrete proof has not yet materialised. In

Sierra Leone many individuals interviewed mentioned that no longer hearing constant gunshots in the communities has helped create an increased sense of safety. In the Congo many interviewed had expressed an increased perception of the security situation as a result of the disarmament process and related DDR activities, though anecdotal evidence may indicate that there has been no improvement in public security. Similar observations were also noted in desk research of Albania and Cambodia. In a sense one of the most commonly observed direct impacts of SALW interventions is a psychological, and perhaps symbolic, increase in an individual or their community's sense of security. What is less clear is how long this psychological effect can be sustained all else being equal.

All the three in-depth field case studies demonstrated how by their nature SALW interventions, at least the ones implemented by UNDP, require a mix of technical and social capacities. In this context the police and/or military are obliged to work with communities and their peoples in a collaborative manner for disarmament, peace and security and vice-versa. Because of war or historical distrust this might not have been possible before. Because of the focus on the weapons it is the weapons that are considered to be 'bad' rather than one specific group or another. In this sense SALW interventions may be seen as an entry-point for armed violence reduction directly, but also for other activities as described in the next section on indirect impacts.

In Sierra Leone the police had to work with traditional tribal chiefs as well as other newer voices in order to select which communities would become 'weapons-free'. In El Salvador, in addition to working with NGOs on data collection and analysis the police also implemented public awareness raising activities in schools as part of the Angels of Peace programme and its campaign 'Weapons...Not Even as Toys.' Advocacy by the police with students was a way to influence youth at an early age while indirectly influence their parents at home. Activities of this nature had not been contemplated by the police until the SALW intervention project was underway.

Desk research carried out on Mozambique and Cambodia also demonstrated the development of similar community/security sector relationships that would not have taken place otherwise. In Mozambique the military and police seconded technical experts for indefinite time periods to support the disarmament project there. Their roles were purely technical and they were subordinate to civilian project leaders something unthinkable years ago.

4.3 Indirect impacts: as a result of greater security

Another key discovery of the field and desk research has been that one of the most significant impacts, and potential impacts, that SALW interventions have on the MDGs comes as a result of some the indirect outcomes that may lead to improved security, good governance practice, progress on security sector reform, increased civic participation and empowerment and confidence building.

Box 2: Sierra Leone

The UNDP Arms for Development Programme was designed to remove SALW from circulation in Sierra Leone by providing an incentive for communities and individuals within them to disarm. Each chiefdom participating in the programme was given US\$ 40,000 (40,000,000 Leones) once they were declared weapons-free to implement a development project of their choosing. These projects were selected and meant to be run by chiefdom recovery committees (CRCs), project management committees (PMCs), police and local communities. Other goals of the programme included strengthening borders and advising on arms legislation. The ultimate goal was to increase public security to enable development.

Sierra Leone's deep structural inequalities and economic malaise exploded into a brutal ten-year civil war that finally came to an end in 2002. As a result SALW have flooded the country. Despite the continued presence of these weapons, they are not used extensively but mostly for hunting though some are in the hands of criminals in Freetown and less policed areas. Sierra Leoneans view guns as legitimate hunting tools but have a generally weapons averse culture and their possession has been further stigmatised by the war.

The community development projects undertaken – a football field in one town, a school in another – have often been contested and are mostly only of token direct benefit, and not significantly to the poorest of the poor.

Since being declared weapons-free, there have been no reports of gunshots in selected chiefdoms and this has had a positive impact on people's perception of security. The knock-on effect is that people feel freer to move around the countryside to work, farm or attend school for example. However, not all the impacts have been positive. Without guns, hunters are unable to hunt and farmers are unable to scare off animals that can destroy their crops. Also Sierra Leoneans remain deeply suspicious of police and government officials and this does not appear to be changing.

The programme has been administered through the chiefs and is likely to reinforce a chiefdom system that some sees as part of the obstacles in the way of opportunities for disaffected young men. Any potential for beneficial effects on community involvement and building local capacity depend on ensuring the democratic functioning of CRCs and PMCs. To encourage this, a robust participative monitoring and evaluation regime is lacking and should be implemented with proper staff in place. Similarly, communities feel detached from the gun legislation being debated and they should be brought on board. Finally, there is some disagreement between the stated goal of a weapons-free Sierra Leone and the gun legislation that would set out terms for gun ownership.

4.3.1 Improved security

One must be clear that there is a substantial difference between feeling safe and being safe, the former being associated with the fear of armed violence and the latter with the actual risks. Behaviour is generally shaped by perceptions and while no one would deny that being safe is important, in terms of developmental impact the perception of security is equally vital. Not one of the cases from the field or desk research can claim a statistically significant impact on security though many observed changes in individual and community perceptions of security as identified through individual interviews and public opinion polls. In Sierra Leone women and men were able to return to farming land that was lost during the war as a result of the reduction of armed violence as measured by members of the community in terms of less frequent incidents of gun shots

sounds in public. The ability to go back to cultivating land based on an improved perception of security is clearly an important aspect of poverty reduction in rural Sierra Leone.

4.3.2 Good governance practice

Few things demonstrate the ineffectiveness and impotence of government actors and structures as does the widespread availability of military-style SALW and their irresponsible use. The extent to which SALW interventions highlight armed violence and other public issues in need of government action is a step to improving governance and public policy practice. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil the research Viva Rio carried out both on SALW proliferation and its effects on crime and public health mobilised state (provincial) government to pass strict laws which in turn led the national congress to eventually pass one of the most restrictive firearms laws in the world. Similarly in El Salvador, the data produced by UNDP project partners dispelled several myths about public weapons carrying and their use in self-defence which has led the police to support stricter restrictions now being considered by the national congress. In Cambodia the European Union supported SALW intervention provided the space and public support to draft the country's first weapons law. The ability of governance structures to react to a combination of public pressure and evidence is essential to formulating development and poverty reduction policies.

4.3.3 Progress on security sector reform

In many instances individuals and citizens groups claim that they would not resort to weapons if the police and other security forces could truly guarantee their security. The action and public debate surrounding specific SALW interventions often times arrives to the conclusion that it is not the weapons themselves that are the problem rather the lack of capacity of the security sector or even acts of weapons abuse committed by police officials. While specific SALW interventions may not have a sustained, measurable impact on armed violence they may be a very useful entry point to security sector reform and capacity building as mentioned in the prior section. In Cambodia the SALW project not only helped improve weapons handling, transfer, storage and destruction techniques it also served as an opportunity to improve the infrastructure of government arsenals. In Sierra Leone the project includes a component on capacity building for border control within a framework that allowed customs officials to share authority and responsibility with military commanders, something that was unthinkable of in the recent past. The concept of 'security first' for development may no longer be the latest buzzword in conflict and development circles, but the concept is as relevant as ever.

4.3.5 Increased civic participation and empowerment

Most SALW interventions, especially those implemented at the community level, bring people together to discuss relevant problems not only those related to armed violence. In Sierra Leone the WfD scheme many men and women were participating together for the first time putting citizens in contact with local government to discuss their development needs. While the WfD process was meant to reward disarmament for development it did not originally intend to empower people and provide them greater access to local government structures. Similarly, in Albania where one of the first WfD project was implemented prior to the intervention there was no tradition of the general population getting involved in community or municipal affairs, this left to the local elites to do on behalf of the people. In Brazil, Viva Rio empowered women's advocacy capacity through the 'It's Your Gun or Me (you make the choice)' campaign where wives, girlfriends and daughters pleaded with the men in their lives to choose love and life over

weapons and violence. The ability of community agents to participate in public policy, especially women, has been identified as a key to poverty reduction. The ability to participate openly in a public debate on an issue as controversial as weapons control is a good indicator of participation potential in society.

4.3.6 Confidence building

The field and desk research that feed into this report have discovered that SALW interventions are unique opportunities to establish open and public dialogues between citizens and authorities on problems of security and development. Because most SALW control activities outside the context of an immediate ceasefire or peacekeeping operation require a mix of both technical and social capabilities the military and police need the co-operation of civilian government authorities and civil society and vice-versa. In this context based on mutual need for a common goal, reduction in weapons circulation and armed violence, an opportunity for trust and confidence-building arises. In El Salvador and Brazil the police opened up their crime reports and confiscated weapons facilities to civil society groups for scrutiny and analysis on the one hand and help in computerisation on the other. The responsible and constructive manner which both parties have collaborated has led to greater trust and willingness to work together in the future. In Albania collaboration between emerging community groups and police has led to relationships and forms of communication that did not exist in the past.

Box 3: Republic of Congo

The “Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Small Arms Collection” was a stand-alone project implemented by UNDP-IOM, though it was connected to a parallel UNDP project on community development “Action Communautaire”. With a budget of US\$4.5m and running from July 2000-December 2002, the project’s goals were specific: to assist ex-militia members to re-integrate into civilian life by offering them the opportunity to set up their own businesses or other livelihoods and as an inducement for them to turn in their weapons. The target group was the most dangerous elements of the militia, considered to be young male leaders, primarily in Brazzaville.

From the demise of the authoritarian regime in 1991 to the outbreak of civil war in 1997, Congo’s experience of democracy was extremely fragile, fraught with disputed elections and sporadic violence. Armed gangs financed and manipulated by political factions engaged in partisan violence, which broke into outright conflict in 1997. An amnesty and ceasefire in 1999 led to a stabilisation of the situation and a new constitution. However, the country continues to suffer from a political system based on patronage and corruption, severe economic problems and an enormous external debt.

Despite heavy criticism from donors that it was “rewarding” perpetrators of violence, the project has been highly successful as an immediate security measure critical in holding a fragile peace. It did provide sustainable livelihoods to 15,000 ex-combatants (and unusually as many as 66% of them were still functional two years later), and it collected 3,106 SALW (although this constitutes only 4-5% of total SALW in country).

There are two main lessons to be learned from this project. First, that World Bank involvement in the country had a negative impact on the project. This was because WB offered money, albeit on a larger scale, but only for reintegration not for disarmament – this brought SALW collection to a halt. Second, although it was a highly innovative project, its key obstacle was that it was trying to address two very different and highly complex issues – both long-term development issues and short-term disarmament and reintegration issues.

Paradoxically, governments, international agencies and NGOs do not usually initiate SALW interventions stating as their primary objectives being the indirect improvement of governance structures and practice, security sector reform, increased civic participation and confidence building between the security sector and society. Rather they may say they want to improve security by reducing the numbers of armed incidents such as homicides and robberies by reducing the number of weapons in circulation. The field research and desk research summarised in this report indicates that there is more evidence that SALW interventions may indirectly benefit long-term development than they can improve security in the short-term in a sustained way. Their ability to achieve varying degrees of success in difficult places with violent reputations that hold little interest for the international community and investors is also testimony to their potential benefits.

5.1 Findings related to programme design and process

It is undesirable, and perhaps impossible, to construct a one-size-fits-all project design as many are operating under different circumstances and with different objectives. However, it is necessary for each project to have a **clear aim, goal, purpose, objectives, activities and indicators of success** (possible indicators are suggested in Chapter 6).

One step that was thought to be valuable in achieving such clarity would be to conduct a analysis of potential stakeholders in order to define the target group of the project. Governance experts should also be used to analyse power relations, which should be taken into account in the design of the project. This will aid a fuller understanding of the root causes of violence and will inform who the project is targeting and why? In the case of Congo, the project was an immediate emergency measure critical designed to hold the fragile peace by diverting the most dangerous elements of the militias into other activities. It was heavily criticised by other donors for “rewarding” perpetrators of violence. Because it was so controversial, the official documents do not adequately reflect the project – there was much PR about “community involvement” but the project itself was very focused and achieved its aims. An interesting question to ask is: would this project have been accepted if the documents had been adequately reflected the actual project?

5.2 Engagement with stakeholders

It was also potentially important to engage with stakeholders in each phase of the programme process (design through to implementation and follow-up). Stakeholder involvement, particularly if it is the whole community, is more likely to make the project sustainable by encouraging community mobilisation and a sense of ownership. For example, in the case of Albania, where stakeholders were actively involved throughout the project, the sense of community empowerment and common purpose was very high. Community involvement is also likely to help develop trust between the police and the community. For example, in the case of Brazil, low-public confidence in the police is being tackled through the use of community policing in the *favelas*.

The extent to which the projects assessed in this report engaged with the stakeholders is assessed below in Table 2 below.

Table 2 – Stakeholder involvement in projects

Country Project	Stakeholder Participation
Sierra Leone	The chiefdoms and local communities, not involved in design of project but been involved ever since, especially in selecting the development project for their chiefdom
Republic of Congo	The primary group, ex-militia members, not involved in design of project; some resistance to their centrality in project at expense of other youth
El Salvador	Project carried out stakeholder interviews, created focus groups and conducted national survey that tried to take account of men, women and children
Brazil	Essential networking between primary target groups, the police and urban <i>favela</i> dwellers
Cambodia	Focused on working with local stakeholders (police, civilians and civil society groups) by funding NGO-led trainings, workshops and public awareness campaigns
Colombia	Community participation main criterion for project design but unclear about consultations
Albania	Communities actively involved throughout most of project
Mali	Communities involved in almost all stages of the project
Mozambique	Project conducted needs assessment studies for guidance but overall the target groups were not consulted

5.3 Sustainability

5.3.1 Developing linkages with development agencies

Formal and informal linkages between development actors and programmes and SALW programmes were not well developed in many of the projects assessed. Even some of the SALW projects that had clear development goals, such as Mozambique, were not directly linked to national or international development agencies. In the case of Albania, while the UNDP is actively pursuing the MDGs, the connections to the SALW project were weak and inserted after the project began.

In the case of Congo and Sierra Leone, the projects were linked with a wider UNDP programme. It was felt that overall this linkage was well conceived as it helped to address some of the wider needs not taken into account in the SALW projects. It was felt, however, that it is wiser to keep SALW interventions highly focused, with the explicit aim of linking them to other initiatives which deal with the longer-term development issues. A key obstacle in the case of Congo was the nature of a “hybrid” SALW project, which touches on long-term development issues in insufficient depth under the immediate and clear pressure to achieve specific disarmament and limited reintegration objectives. This was dealt to in some degree by the structural linkages with the wider UNDP programme, but it left many processes unfinished. For example, the surprising success of the micro-enterprises (66% were still functional two years later) could not be properly supported and followed through due to a lack of micro-credit. This is unfortunate in the context of poverty reduction.

It was concluded that SALW projects should be embedded properly within a wider UNDP development framework for a sustainable outcome. It was also suggested that development actors be involved in the design and evaluation of SALW projects as they will offer a different perspective.

5.3.2 Timing and funding issues

Timing of funding disbursement is crucial as community enthusiasm wanes as it waits for follow-up. One of the key obstacles in the Sierra Leone project arose over delays within the project – ex-combatants returning to the community often had to wait up to 18 months for the education and training programme to start (a stop-gap programme which brought ex-combatants and civilians together to rebuild civil buildings was highly successful, however). Delays in the release of monies for development projects, and delays over a promised reformed gun licensing law (which had been promised to those giving up weapons that had a license) also caused frustration and disempowerment and seriously jeopardises community relations. It is important to ensure that delivery of all aspects of a programme can take place when planned, if not then a review of the roll-out needs to be made.

6.1 Indicators and analysis

Obviously it is important to establish indicators that monitor these weapons collection programmes and their progress in their own terms but also to evaluate their impact on society. In fact many of the projects had no monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in place; others had used only a limited range of assessments. This section, therefore, suggests indicators that could be used, some of which are already being utilised by projects. It is important to emphasise that these should be used flexibly, depending on the type of project and the nature of the problem being addressed.

Indicators can be split into two main types: quantitative and qualitative. But they need to cover a range of different aspects of the projects and of impacts:

- ❑ Monitoring progress made in the actual process of arms reduction and the effectiveness of the measures for doing this.
- ❑ Measuring the direct impact on armed violence itself and on the realities and perceptions of insecurity.
- ❑ Assessing the effectiveness of the approach and provisions: do buy-backs, other individual inducements or weapons for development benefits offer appropriate, sufficient and cost-effective **incentives** that actually work?
- ❑ Evaluating the other stated and other development and poverty reducing impacts of projects.
- ❑ Evaluating the indirect development effects of (in)security.
- ❑ Evaluating the impact of development programmes, especially in a post-conflict situation, on security.

6.2 Quantitative indicators

Technical indicators provide useful benchmarks to measure the impact of an intervention. These indicators provide an assessment of the short-term and intermediate impacts of the programme and the extent to which project goals were realised. Such statistics will often allow some aspect of longitudinal comparison – which is important in assessing impact. Amongst other things, these might cover:

6.2.1 SALW collection statistics

Reducing the availability of weapons remains a vital component of efforts to generate security so it is obviously important to assess the success of the project in achieving this. There should be independent monitoring or verification of weapons collection. This is often the key indicator of success being used in current projects and should continue to play an important role in assessing a project's success – although not as the sole indicator.

Recovery statistics should assess the number of guns recovered. But such indicators are only significant when set against the estimated number of guns at large in the community. For this comparison some kind of base-line survey is an essential requirement; the Small Arms Survey has done a number, which offer a methodology, but such surveys have not always been conducted in advance of arms reduction programmes. Ideally it is also worthwhile to estimate the efficiency of these efforts by assessing in some way the resources or cost that has gone into them. UNIDIR (2003) has explored the use of financial costs per SALW unit collected. By such measures, some projects are hard to justify as they bring so little at huge cost.

6.2.2 Figures on re-integration of ex-combatants

Statistics on how many ex-combatants were reintegrated should be collected, if appropriate. This was important in, for example, the Republic of Congo. On-site visits and interviews with ex-combatants and members of the community could help assess the qualitative nature of this “reintegration”.

6.2.3 Crime statistics

A review of crime statistics, including murders using weapons, wounding using weapons and armed robbery might help to assess the level of reduction in armed violence. In the case of El Salvador, assessing changes in the number and size of “no-go” areas controlled by gangs also helped to gauge the impact of the project.

6.2.4 Health statistics

A review of health statistics, including in-patient profiles and firearm injury statistics, can help to assess the impact that the programme is having on public health – and security.

6.2.5 Weapons sales and street prices

Figures on domestic sales of weapons would help to gauge the amount of ownership and whether a project, such as the one assessed in El Salvador, is being successful in developing an anti-gun culture. Another indicator might be provided by the street price of weapons. An increase might indicate an increasing scarcity of available weapons and thereby success in gun recovery.

6.2.6 National economic statistics

More generally, the wider development and poverty impact of a project could be assessed through correlating statistics on levels of economic activity and extent of investment, for example, and the incidence of armed violence.

6.3 Qualitative indicators

Qualitative gains from the impact of SALW programmes, such as *perceived* security and safety (rather than actual), are incredibly difficult to measure. As one report on the RoC suggests, it might be easier to look at the extent to which weapons collection is improving the overall climate on *insecurity* by measuring temporal changes in health, crime and participation assessments.³ Community-developed indicators should be applied as much as possible in order to avoid over-reliance on statistics that do not capture the qualitative indicators.

6.3.1 Measuring perceived safety and security

This can be achieved through attitudinal surveys, household victimisation surveys and public opinion polls. These can help to assess the perceived security and safety of a community. For example, in the Republic of Congo two surveys (one of structured interviews, one household survey) were carried out to evaluate impressions of ex-combatants and community impressions of the project. The household survey gauged the communities' feelings on insecurity and security. (This can often be achieved through merely listing what makes people feel insecure.) Statements such as "there are no more gunshots", made for example in Sierra Leone, are important indicators as they suggest reduced violence and fewer people carrying guns. In conducting surveys such as these it is particularly important to capture gender differences in elements of feeling safe. Potential indicators are women's willingness to go out at night.

Household victimisation surveys can begin to assess the impact of armed violence on the communities concerned beyond official crime statistics, which can sometimes be inaccurate or inappropriate. However, these are not without pitfalls. For example, in the context of ongoing hostilities in Pool, Republic of Congo, the interview refusal rates were high.

Public opinion polls can help measure attitudes towards violence. In the RoC, for example, a questionnaire administered to schools explored the scale and magnitude of youth violence in secondary schools and colleges and the role of ex-combatants in contributing to violence. In El Salvador, surveys were conducted to assess the motivation of children and teenagers to join anti-violence campaigns; in this circumstance it was also possible to assess the number of people participating in campaigns for peace. Trust in state and security sector institutions can also be gauged in this way.

6.3.2 Ensuring community-wide participation

Participatory appraisal techniques are important in order to develop good practice indicators on measuring processes of empowerment. Making sure that all sections of the community participate is not an easy process, particularly in situations where there is patronage and lineage systems such as in Sierra Leone. Semi-structured interview and attitude surveys in the community might help gauge to what extent a project has sought to include different groups within the community and how transparent has been its decision-making mechanism. Such an analysis will help to ensure that all voices in the community – specifically vulnerable groups such as women, children and elderly – are taken into account. Careful note also needs to be taken of who is "representing" their community. For example, women in powerful lineage positions often act to preserve their patterns of advantage rather than serving all the women in the community. This was

³ Demetriou, et al, 2002, p36.

a particular problem in the Sierra Leone case where on occasion, a chief's wife or son, for example, were brought along to represent the community.

6.3.4 Longitudinal monitoring

Short-term qualitative impacts can be measured through visits, inspections and interviews, while long-term qualitative impacts should be measured through annual assessments. Opinion polls, surveys and appraisal techniques can be replicated annually. Such longitudinal monitoring and evaluation is important to determine the long-term impact of any SALW programme.

7. Conclusions

7.1 Overall assessment

At the outset the intention was spelled out that this review would offer some assessment as to what the range of different arms reduction projects had achieved: what had 'worked' about them? In what sense had they indirectly or directly, intended or not, made a contribution to limiting AV? And to what extent do any of them offer models for future arms reduction programmes or for integrating SALW and development work?

These are among the general conclusions emerging from the study:

- ❑ The most significant impacts on development from projects like these, even if not intended, are through the nature and extent of their indirect impact on enhancing the climate of security. These included particularly the change to a less fearful climate, the ability to resume social and livelihood activities, and some empowerment of local communities to deal with their own security.
- ❑ In the last respect, WfD programmes that provide **collective** inducement have an advantage but often the tiny scale and contested nature of the community development initiatives associated with them hardly offer any adequate incentive to disarm.
- ❑ Projects have so far mainly offered a token and insignificant 'add-on' 'development' element. In fact these seldom address the underlying issues of poverty and competition for inadequate livelihood assets, which have been identified as the roots of both poverty and armed violence. Thus the absolute dearth of opportunities for young people in Sierra Leone is in no way included in any arms reduction programmes.
- ❑ SALW projects should continue to be designed with some development component but these ideally should meet two needs: for appropriate incentives that will generate disarmament and for priority to be given to the basic needs of the community and to those that promote violence out of conflict. It may be that no 'project' even with more careful planning of appropriate development elements can ever be on a scale necessary or a sufficiently long time-scale to meet the fundamental issues of poverty in particular societies.
- ❑ It may be more appropriate to try to bring together the development and disarmament imperatives which exist in societies plagued by AV, not within combined projects but more at the programme and policy level, by greater

coordination and synchronisation between agencies concerned with the two dimensions.

7.2 Lessons learned, recommendations and risks

There are a number of recommendations that emerge from these assessments.

7.2.1 Developing linkages

In section 5.3 there was a discussion of the risks associated with embedding/not embedding SALW programmes into development. Linkages between the projects and development agencies were, on the whole, not well developed. This was disappointing particularly in the case of those projects with clear development goals, such as Mozambique. It was felt that more effort should be made to develop linkages between SALW projects and development agencies, both domestic and international. It was felt that the UNDP was a particularly logical home for such interaction between projects particularly as it is the leading UN body for the implementation of small arms reduction and control projects. In Congo, for example, when the Reintegration and Disarmament project was thwarted by politics and insufficient funds, at least there was an ongoing project (Action Communautaire) dealing with recovery and reconstruction, which was offering some opportunities to ex-combatants, which could in some way continue the work of the project that was cut short. UNDP can also often 'broker' disarmament activity in a way that probably few agencies could given its valuable neutral role. Another recommendation, which clearly emerged from the Congo assessment, is that linkages are necessary so that different agencies do not undermine the work of others, such as happening when the World Bank provided funds for reintegration which thwarted the UNDP-IOM project and brought disarmament to a halt.

7.2.2 Training and capacity building

Another key finding from many of the projects was the importance of training and capacity building. In the case of Sierra Leone, it was felt that the training for field staff and for community-based organisations was a very underdeveloped aspect of the programme and that adequate resources had not been put into it. It was also felt that key players of important institutions should be involved in the design stage in order to ensure buy-in, as should the project manager/s. Albania, for example, was an example of where the project manager had to redesign the project on the hoof because the original design was too over-ambitious.

7.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation

This was a very much overlooked in all the projects assessed, often only constituting 5% of the project budget. However, it is necessary to build in baseline surveys, particularly into pilot projects, in order to help develop recommendations and possible extension of project. Such surveys could also help to extend the evaluation of the projects beyond the purely technical issues regarding numbers of weapons collected (although these are, of course, important too) to assess the qualitative, indirect impacts of the project on the community. For example, the numbers of weapons collected in Sierra Leone was small but the impact was huge in terms of community security and confidence.

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Appendix 2: Matrix of case studies

Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Mali, Albania, Colombia, Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Brazil, Cambodia

Basics: project name, location, project stage	Sierra Leone <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arms for Development Programme Northern, Southern and Eastern provinces Ongoing project 	Mozambique <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares Primarily in the south but expanding to less developed north Ongoing project 	Mali <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali Lere, Gao City and Menaka M&E research study 	Albania <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Small Arms and Light Weapons Control 15 of 36 districts Toward the end of the project 	Colombia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia Meta, Oriente Antioqueño and Montes de Maria Preparatory phase of new project
Context I: causes of violence, who's armed, type of armed violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weapons needed for hunting, primarily in the hands of hunters but some criminals as well Post civil war, some armed robbery etc in Freetown 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mainly Frelimo and Renamo fighters who have kept weapons Weapons kept as protection or as a nest egg by most and some use for crimes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Post-war social banditry and a high culture of arms Regional development disparity between north and south 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic violence, petty crime, organised crime Weapons kept for protection or crime but mainly kept to be traded for money 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflicting ideological and economic objectives Weapons held by armed groups and criminal gangs Ongoing conflict
Context II: which groups are targeted, goals and broader project intentions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeted: Chiefdom Recovery Committees, Project Management Committees, Police and local communities Building a weapons-free environment in selected chiefdoms Engaging communities to take ownership of process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No specific target Central project goals to remove as many weapons as possible to build peace and security Make alternatives to guns and violence available to people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local communities M&E project with the goal of assessing weapons for development projects in Mali 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Less weapons, more security. More security, more investment. More investment, more, development. More development, more prosperity" Challenging the gun culture of Albania Targeting the general population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civil organisations in conflict areas, national level actors, youth and high social risk groups Increasing social support for DDR, alternatives for youth, challenging culture of conflict Enabling local organisations to participate

Findings and Indicators: SALW, security and governance, socio-economic, process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant SALW reductions and stigma attached to arms • Police increasingly seen positively in communities • Government and elites not trusted • Not hearing gun shots is building sense of safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 270,351 assorted SALW, UXO, and ammunition rounds claimed but some doubts • Overall not much disarmament • Police and government not trusted • Not much consultation and relied on needs assessment studies • Very focused on ex-combatants and men 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive security and governance and socio-economic findings and indicators * • Communities felt a part of the projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 9,600 weapons collected 1.2 million bullets and 49,000 pieces of UXO also recovered incidentally • Increasing trust in state security structures • Growth of community confidence as they were part of the project and increased feelings of security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No SALW collection • Target groups very involved in design or project • Attempt to deal with human rights abuses central
DAC Criteria: sustainability, impact Conclusions: lessons learned, recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weapons-free unsustainable, guns to return with legislation • Regulation may have positive impact for poverty reduction • Need to send a clear message • Needs better M&E • Good governance vital to ensuring the conflict does not break out again 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term vision building a culture of peace • Main impact challenging normalcy of weapons possession • Important to link weapons collection with building a culture of peace • More focus on public education and poverty reduction at the expense of weapons collection might be required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Projects have continued beyond timelines • Less guns has led to increased development * • Results not equal to resources put in • Non-quantitative indicators important • Pre and post-intervention analysis vital • Must take account of beneficiaries' perceptions of security/insecurity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Within severe constraints, the project did strive for durable development projects" • Limited poverty reduction impacts • Important benefits to making it a community activity with shared incentives * • Should have included ammunition and explosives • Independent monitoring • More national media and govt support would have helped 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focused on participation and partnership for sustainability and working with existing practices and institutions • Political will must support technical planning • Project too new for lessons learned • Several indicators that could reduce armed violence *

	Republic of Congo	El Salvador	Brazil	Cambodia
Basics: project name, location, project stage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-combatants Reintegration and Small Arms Collection Brazzaville primarily some other regions Post-project phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control National and locally in 12 municipalities End of project but design of new project phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reducing SALW Impact: civil society participation in SSR within MERCOSUR Rio de Janeiro but also regionally and nationally New phase of ongoing project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weapons for Development Cambodian provinces with high levels of insecurity New phase of ongoing project
Context I: causes of violence, who's armed, type of armed violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Battle between political factions mobilising young men frustrated by govt corruption Govt forces, militias and few civilians armed – mostly men 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Myriad causes including drug trafficking, dislocation, insecurity and marginalisation * Primarily men armed with commercially sold handguns. Also 450,000 registered weapons Organised criminal violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak gun legislation and enforcement Common citizens and young drug traffickers for protection against police, as status symbol and use against rivals On-going street violence, related to drug-trafficking in Rio 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leftover weapons from Cambodian civil war in the hands of criminals and civilians for self-defence Civilians, militias and criminal gangs armed Petty and organised criminal violence
Context II: which groups are targeted, goals and broader project intentions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex-militia members especially young, male leaders Provide sustainable livelihoods to 15,000 ex-combatants and collect 20,000 SALW 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeted civilians in possession of small arms (long-term 15-35 year old men and medium-term children) Focused on measuring crime and public attitudes, arms legislation, and micro-disarmament to promote less violent environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police officers, urban <i>favela</i> dwellers in Brazil and regionally Improving SALW controls and SSR to reduce armed violence Specifically reducing firearms deaths in Rio de Janeiro's <i>favelas</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police officers, police officers wives, and civilians in possession of SALW Goal of removing SALW from circulation through destruction or registration and increasing professionalism in police
Findings and Indicators: SALW, security and governance, socio-economic, process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3,106 SALW, 8,034 UXO, 67,544 rounds of ammunition collected Estimated only 4-5% of total SALW in country collected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No weapons collected Growth in public trust of police however wary of "Iron Fist" policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hundreds of thousands since 1999 – key indicator Community policing increasing trust in <i>favelas</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 86,461 collected and destroyed out of all EU-ASAC programmes Feeling of security increasing, more movement

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People's sense of safety has increased but not safety itself • Focused on individual livelihoods • Micro-enterprises were not allowed to expand for fear of bringing together ex-combatants • Has not addressed poor governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some private sector groups benefit from armed violence some not • Angels of Peace group empowered young and built support against gun culture * 		possible, less gunshots being heard, increased trust in police, new arms law being drafted
DAC Criteria: sustainability, impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite it being an emergency intervention, sustainability (66%) of micro-enterprises was very good • Redirected dangerous ex-combatants away from violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very well integrated with government and civil society structures • Human rights ombudsman and police have worked with findings and given support and public debate has increased 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not being reviewed in project as poverty is not the main objective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project works to encourage civil society in its mandate • Good links with local and international NGOs and public awareness work has been successful
Conclusions: lessons learned, recommendations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could be made more poverty-centred and focused on long-term development • Importance of UNDP neutrality in a highly political environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could be linked with other hemispheric and regional SALW projects • Missing a link with poverty • Good inclusion of diverse actors made it more a social not just technical exercise • Built on pre-existing structures, support and dynamism • UNDP needs to measure progress in relation to poverty and violence possibly through a one-year research project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Importance of engaging civil society with state institutions – Viva Rio a good example • Poverty reduction not addressed or measured in detail – this could be enhanced • More M&E needed to measure role of project in reducing armed violence and poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections and delays in passing legislation have impacted on the project but there is good awareness of the political process • Some competition with Japanese JSAC could lead to wasted resources and more could be done to build up a mutually supportive relationship

* See assessment table for more comprehensive information/analysis