

ne	Donors	Time Period	Type of Programme and Main Activities	Amount committed (US\$)	TA (Advisors) planned	Amount Unfunded	Pre-Status
for pipet et			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~ Identification of local products with market potential</li> <li>~ Develop market maintenance/management mechanisms</li> <li>~ Develop mechanisms for providing child care/early childhood development services in market</li> <li>~ Establish linkages with organizations engaged in counter trafficking efforts</li> </ul>				by N
ey	IOM /New Zealand Gov.	4 months (Jun-Oct 2000)		22,000			Cor (200
on	New Zealand Government	3 years	Direct Re-integration Assistance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~ Micro credit</li> <li>~ Credit management training</li> <li>~ Vocational training</li> </ul> Community Assistance MWVA Capacity Building	225,000		1,080,894	See add func
ject A	ADB	6 months (Jan-Jun 2002)	MWVA role: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~ Participation/capacity building in gender analysis and project design</li> </ul>	n/a			MO ADE MA May
	JICA	2 years (1999-2001)	Mainly in the area of Economic Empowerment and Education	--	Poverty Alleviation Advisor		Unti Sep 200
ner	JICA	6 months (Sep 00 - Feb 01)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research on the silk industry in Takeo</li> <li>~ Training in textile design, dying and coloring</li> </ul>	--	Textile Designer		Cor
and	German Development		Agronomists (2): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~ Training on marketing and micro-</li> </ul>	--	2 Agronomists 1 Credit Specialist		Ass mis

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*(This is an Informal Working Document, requiring continuous updating and not to be used for quotation!!)*

**ASSISTANCE TO DEMINING PROGRAMMES - PHASE III CMB/98-006 CMB/93-A0715A+5Y; CMB/98-A0315A; CMB/98-A06/IP**

**TERMINAL EVALUATION MISSION  
February - May, 2001**

***FINAL REPORT***

**Phnom Penh May 2001**

Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001 CMB/98-006

**PREFACE**

This is the final version of the Terminal Evaluation Mission Report, which has been prepared in accordance with the requirements set down in the Terms of Reference. A presentation of the key issues, findings and recommendations was made to a meeting of CMAC, CMAC Governing Council, CMAA, UNDP and the project team on 20 April 2001 after which a draft version of the report was issued on 27 April. Following that, a similar presentation of key findings, recommendations, lessons learnt and the next steps, was made to the Donors on 7 May.

Comments and suggestions received at and after those presentation meetings, up to close of business on 8 May 2001, have been incorporated into this Final Report.

Feedback has suggested that the following points be highlighted early in the Report:

- The structure of this Report follows the UNDP guidelines for evaluation reports, and of necessity, stays close to the Terms of Reference and to the Project Document. Other donors have different guidelines, and application of these may result in a somewhat different style, focus and length of report.
- The core project period covered by the evaluation mission was July 1998 - April 2001. On certain issues the Report covers earlier events insofar as they are necessary to understand the development of the project. The focus of the mission has not been solely on the period of the mission namely, February - April 2001. Findings and lessons are to be seen in the context of the core project period, unless specifically stated otherwise.
- In certain matters to which the mission has drawn attention or made one or more recommendations, activities may be going on or are about to be started by CMAC and one or more technical advisors or experts. Where such activities are occurring or are planned, the mission has attempted to give due recognition in all cases, and as such would like the related recommendation(s) to be seen as an endorsement of the action being taken or being planned, unless specifically stated otherwise or circumscribed.
- Given the difficulties encountered by CMAC and the project over the last two years or so, it is not surprising that there are considerable sensitivities. In the time allotted, the mission has made every effort to prepare a proper, balanced and fair report that attempts to put things into perspective, and give key issues, findings and recommendations an appropriate weighting in its deliberations. If the report is mute or does not comment on all activities and achievements in a particular area, this is not to be seen as "silent" criticism of those activities or achievements that have not been mentioned. The mission is satisfied that it has identified the key events, issues, findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons. Any omissions, real or perceived, are to be considered in context as "neutral".

The Terminal Evaluation Mission would like to acknowledge the many organisations visited during the course of this technical review, and to thank them for their openness, their genuine willingness to discuss achievements, issues, challenges and constraints, and for their courtesy and hospitality. To H.E Khem Sophoan, Director-General, Mr. Heng Rattana Deputy DirectorGeneral, and all the management, staff and technical advisors and experts at Cambodian Mine Action Centre in Phnom Penh and in other parts of the country, to H.E. Ieng Mouly, Chairman of the Governing Council, to H.E. Sam Sotha, CMAA Secretary-General, to Mme. Dominique Ait Ouyahia-McAdams, Resident Representative UNDP (Phnom Penh) and Mr. Jean-Claude Rogivue, Deputy Resident Representative, a special debt of thanks for the excellent logistics, advice and support throughout. To the various donor embassies, development organisations, non-governmental organisations, international funding institutions, and all individuals, many thanks for hosting meetings, for sharing insights, experiences and perspectives, and for your hospitality. Finally, a special note of gratitude to Mr. Massoud Hedeshi, UNDP Programme Manager (Phnom Penh), Mr Korm Chanmony and Ms. So Lida and to Mr. Ian Bullpitt, Programme Co-ordinator CMB/98-006, for giving their time and support in so many ways, in making this mission a success.

To one and all, a sincere Thank You.

Phnom Penh, 10 May 2001

Mission members:

Mr. Bou Puthy

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Mr. Michael Dalton (Team Leader)

Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001 CMB/98-006

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AAM

ADB AOS AP AT AEX AUSAID CBMAP CDRI CIDA CMAA CMAC (C)MMT CTA CIDEV COFRAS DDG

DDU DEC DEX DFID DG

DU EOD GC GIS GPC

HALO Trust HI

HQ

I MSMA IWP LUPU/LUMU MAG

MAU MCTU MDD NEX NPA PDRD PRDC PwC QA/QC RCAF RGC SIDA SOP SRSG SSA (S)TA TC

TEM TOR TPR

UNDID (CO) UNAMIC UNHCR UNICEF UNMAS UNOPS UNTAC UNV  
UXO WP AO TWG W/M WRF

Adopt -A- Minefield  
Asian Development Bank Administrative and Operational Services Anti-personnel mine  
Anti-tank mine  
Agency Executed  
Australian Agency for International Development Community Base Mine Awareness Programme  
Cambodian Development Research Institute Canadian International Development Agency Cambodian  
Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority Cambodian Mine Action Center (Community) Mine Marking  
Team Chief Technical Advisor  
Conseil International et De::veloppement Compagnie Frangaise d'Assistance Specialisee Deputy  
Director-General, CMAC (Development) Demining Unit Directors' Executive Committee Direct  
Executed  
Department For International Development (UK) Director-General, CMAC Demining Unit  
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Governing Council (of CMAC) Geographical  
Information System German Project Coordination  
Hazardous Areas Life Support Organization Trust Handicap International  
Headquarters  
Information Management System for Mine Action Integrated Work Plan  
Land Use Planning Unit/Land Use Management Unit Mine Advisory Group  
Mine Action Unit  
Mine Clearance Training Unit Mine Detection Dog National Execution  
Norwegian People's Aid  
Provincial Department of Rural Development Provincial Rural Development Committee  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Quality Assurance/Quality Control Royal Cambodian Armed Forces  
Royal Government of Cambodia Swedish International Development Agency Standard  
Operating Procedures Special Representative of Secretary General Special Services  
Agreement (Senior) Technical Advisor Training Centre  
Terminal Evaluation Mission Terms of Reference Tripartite Project Review  
United Nations Development Programme (Country Office) United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Mine  
Action System United Nations Office for Project Services United Nations Transitional Authority in  
Cambodia United Nations Volunteer  
Unexploded Ordnance White Phosphorous Area of Operation Technical  
Working Group Work/Month  
World Rehabilitation Fund

#### Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001 CMB/98-006

- (i) Preface
- (ii) Acknowledgements
- (iii) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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## OVERVIEW

The purpose of the Overview is to set out the background and context of the project: Assistance to Demining Programmes, phase III, and to present the key findings, recommendations and overall conclusions 1 lessons learnt in a number of key areas - (a) mine action in Cambodia, (b) the Government/UNDP project, (c) CMAC organisation, management and operations, and (d) capacity building at CMAC. The text is derived from the body of the main report, and cross-references are given to guide interested readers to the details. The background to and details of the evaluation mission itself are given in the Report (refer to Section 1).

## 1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT (- Report: Section 2)

The Royal Cambodian Government established the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in 1993 to clear landmines and Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs) in Cambodia. CMAC's humanitarian mandate is to clear land for resettlement of Internally Displaced People (IDP), agriculture, community development, and reconstruction of infrastructure. Under the UNDP project of Assistance to Demining Programmes, CMAC grew rapidly from a small group of local deminers and a few international experts at the start in 1993 (when the group was known as MCTU), to a large national organization that employed close to 3,000 deminers and HQ personnel by June 1998. CMAC had enjoyed international partners' confidence and funding from many donor countries for its operations and had become one of the world's most successful Mine Action Programmes. From 1993 to 2000 CMAC was mandated as the national co-ordinating and regulatory body as well as an implementing agency.

In 1998, managing the rapid expansion of the organisation was the biggest challenge for the CMAC management team. However, by late 1998, several disturbing issues had surfaced around CMAC. As a result of rumours and concerns, KPMG was given a contract to audit funds provided by the Government to CMAC over 1993 to 1998. This audit exercise was subsequently extended to cover all sources of funding, including the UNDP Trust Fund over the period 1997 - 98. The first exercise uncovered certain irregularities in financial management of the Government contributions. The extended exercise highlighted managerial deficiencies as well as weaknesses in key processes and mismanagement of cleared land including land seizure, but no

embezzlement of donor funds. These led to the departure of a number of senior CMAC managers including the Director-General.

A number of important audits and evaluations were instigated by Government and UNDP, and by mid-2000 considerable progress was made towards restoring donor confidence. However, a perceived lack of substantive consultation by Government regarding the establishment of and appointments to the new CMAA on 4 September, led to a further crisis of confidence. The holding of a National Symposium: *Mine Action in Cambodia*, on 16 November, chaired by the Prime Minister, restored some confidence. Unfortunately, the flow of funds to CMAC was so low by early-October that 1,937 deminers and staff had to be retrenched. The Prime Minister approved the revised structure for CMAC on 30 January 2001. On 19 February, a CMAC Deputy Director-General was appointed in accordance with key reform recommendations, and since then other key positions have been advertised. CMAC has now downsized its HQ to three departments, with Operation and Planning merged into one Department. In addition, CMAC integrated and converted its DDU and PMU to CMAC DUs, resulting in CMAC now having six DU's and one Training Centre.

The RGC/UNDP Project: Assistance to Demining Programmes - Phase III, was signed on 9 July 1998. There were two important needs assessment missions in the period leading up to the framing and formulation of the current Phase (III) project. These were (a) the mandatory Capacity Assessment Mission in September/October 1997, and (b) the In-depth Evaluation of phase (II) project, in February 1998. The original concept of the phase (III) project was clear - build on the achievements of CMAC in the first two phases (November 1993 - June 1998) and support CMAC in fulfilling the final two years (approximately) of the then current Five-Year Strategy (1996-2000). It was intended to run for two years, but due to the crisis mentioned above, it was extended twice - to end-December 2000, and then to end-June 2001. In line with the earlier phases, the phase III project had three components: (1) providing financial resources contributed by donors to cover CMAC's operations in line with its humanitarian mandate and 1996-2000 Strategy, (2) channelling in-kind contributions of specialised military personnel contributed by donors to provide technical advice to CMAC, and (3) institution building in the areas of leadership, planning, administration and financial management, through technical advisors funded from UNDP core resources. In the period 1993 - 2000, no less than USD 63 million has been given to CMAC through the UNDP Trust Funds, not including the Government's contribution of USD 1.76 million over the same period to CMAC, and its Governing Council. The seven Immediate Objectives of the project were: Interventions for Casualty Reduction; Verification/Area Reduction Activities; Land mine and UXO Clearance Operations; Land mine / UXO Information and Planning; Ownership through

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Institutional/Corporate Development; Ownership through Human Regulatory Functions.

#### The Mine Action Sector in **Cambodia** (refer to sections 3.1.4.1 and 5.1) Resources and Capacity Building; and

As one of the first countries to receive Cambodia has developed considerable action is still relatively new in Cambodia and case studies. The elements of mine

Management: The Cambodian Governor the Ottawa Convention on banning antirequirements of the Convention, well ah implementation of this legislation has ha needs to be done. In parallel, it was i government, would be responsible for th co-ordinating body CMAC exercised little MAG and HALO Trust. National Standar crisis that struck CMAC in 1999-2000, als

assistance from the UN system in mine action, starting in 1993, xperience and had some notable achievements. As a sector, mine as elsewhere, with an emerging body of knowledge, best practices ction in Cambodia are outlined below.



nt is one of the world's foremost advocates and active participants in personnel landmines. It has already enacted legislation to fulfil the ad of other countries similarly affected by landmines. The actual results, which are both encouraging and useful in identifying what tended that CMAC, as the national organisation mandated by the planning and management of mine action at the national level. As a influence over the other de-mining service providers such as RCAF,

- s and a Long Term Strategy were not developed in this period. The
- had a detrimental effect on progress in this regard.

Nevertheless, a number of important steps have been taken with initiatives such as the establishment of CMAA and the holding of the National Symposium. Moreover, regular meetings of the Cambodian Demining Co-ordination Committee (CDCC), coupled with the productive work of the Disability Action Committee (DAC) are steps in the right direction. The separation of regulatory functions from service provision, is the generally preferred route for mine action to take globally, and Cambodia is no exception. Under certain circumstances different arrangements are working in other countries. The CMAA/CMAC arrangement is valid and should be supported as being technically correct for Cambodia, notwithstanding the original disquiet of the donor community at the lack of substantive consultation prior to the establishment of CMAA in September 2000. The potential for these initiatives to be quickly developed with a greater degree of credibility is considerable. CMAA may not be able to effectively develop without support and assistance from the international and national mine action communities. Priority must be given to seeing that quality and standards are established and maintained for all mine action activities, to ensure the confidence of beneficiaries, service providers and donors. The following areas require development at the national level:

- Legal Framework for the Authority,
- Long Term National Vision and Strategy for Mine Action,
- National Standards for Mine Action,
- National Data Base for Mine Action (IMSMA),
- National Work-Plan,
- National Reporting System,
- National Policies on Mine Action,
- External Quality Assurance,
- National Accreditation and Licensing Procedures, and
- Formation and implementation of the Mine Action Joint Working Group and subordinate Technical Working Groups. (Some of these are in place under different names)

Mine Awareness: At this point Mi (TWG) led by UNICEF. This component degrees to parent agencies such as MA following four basic approaches with a n Media Approach, (3) Institutional Approach with the CMAC Community Based Mine

CMAC has been active in the TWG, has developed and appears to be having an UNICEF External Evaluation of UNICEF 2000. There has been a marked decline success of all partners in this component linking more effectively to the national structure

Mine Awareness is co-ordinated through a Technical Working Group that is linked to the HI/CRC Mine Victims database and to varying and HALO Trust, with CMAC as an active partner. It covers the national perspective: (1) Direct Mine Awareness Approach, (2) Mass media, and (4) Community Based Approach, this last one very recently awareness Project (CBMAP).

Working to develop suitable approaches. The field capacity is well impact on casualty reduction, as suggested by the findings in the Supported Activities to Prevent Mine Incidents, dated June/July in mine-related incidents over the period (see table in section 3.1). The effort is to be highly commended. However, this component requires strategy and national plan rather than standing alone.

Survey: The National Socio-Economic Impact Survey (Level One Survey) commenced in 2000. Prior to this there were a number of attempts at capturing the data both by UNTAC and CMAC. At this point there

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is no standard approach to Level One Survey (LOS) and data collection in the various implementing agencies, although some attempts have been made in this area. The final LOS report - currently expected in May 2002 - will be vital tool for proper national planning in the sector. Until the Level One Survey is completed and entered into the national data-base, it is difficult (but not impossible) to develop national work-plans through CMAA. Some attempt could be made once the National Strategy is prepared, to develop a national work plan using existing data from both the CMAC and HI/CRC databases. This will allow the earliest allocation of scarce resources in accordance with national development priorities and work-plans, whilst accommodating the final Level One Survey results.

Clearance: The national priorities for clearance are not adequately co-ordinated, and to a certain degree implementers have chosen their own areas of operation. Allocation of resources to the provinces/regions is not nationally managed, as it ought to be in order to ensure the fulfillment of national priorities. Quality and standards of clearance are not nationally identified and enforced, but vary from implementing agency to agency. There are currently at least six organisations undertaking various approaches: MAG, HALO Trust, RCAF, UXB, PMU (DU6 under COFRAC/CIDEV contract) and CMAC. There appears to be no external Quality Assurance on the products of these organisations. The outputs of these agencies are considerable, currently estimated to have cleared close to 146 km' of contaminated land since 1992 (refer to Section 3.1 for details).

Data and information: These, for all aspects of Mine Action, are not centralised nor standardised. CMAC has established a sound database and attempted to capture national data. However, the data are incomplete, and CMAC has had difficulty ensuring the support of other agencies. There is no single capacity available to identify (a) total areas cleared, (b) areas to be cleared, or (c) areas marked. Additionally there is no central mapping capacity at this time. Without these capacities it will be difficult to make an initial national strategy. CMAA is likely to be assisted by German Project Co-operation (GPC) who is developing the IMSMA system with database and GIS. This centralised capacity will incorporate the Level One Survey currently being conducted. The database for mine victims is currently held with CRC and HI. It has been confirmed that their data can be retro-fitted into the IMSMA.

Mine Victim Support: This component is handled under the disabled sector and led by DAC, which in international terms, is a unique organisation for a developing country. This sector is well co-ordinated, effective and has a high profile with many agencies involved. The only concern from the Mine Action point of view is a lack of strong linkage to Mine Action. There are some interventions that are driven by specific individuals and agencies, such as the linkage with the CMAC CMAP and Mine Victim Awareness programme by WRF. These linkages are the exception rather than the rule, and more effort should be placed on integrated and related activities with Mine Action. The disabled working group is in place and functioning. Representation at this TWG by CMAA would be a good step toward establishing linkages. The main areas for CMAA to become involved are mine victim advocacy, data collection and information provision. From a national Mine Action perspective, involvement in this component is currently minimal and should remain this way.

Human Resource Development: An exceptionally high-quality human resource capacity has been developed at the site team level, including supervisors, in CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG. This is to be highly commended.

#### Longer term issues:

Mine Action in Cambodia as a national programme has not developed in pace with the individual implementation capacities. One of the problems with developing a five-year strategy is the short horizon and the focus on short-term goals and objectives. This has led to a combined capacity of over 4,000 national staff between the three implementing agencies (i.e. CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG) that will only be sustainable while donor support is present. As this is already flagging, the future for this capacity is already of some concern. However, it does aim at a longer-term perspective, which is to be commended. A longer-term strategy must be developed so that the short-term solutions do not become unworkable or unsustainable in the future. With the situation as it is now, CMAA becomes the focus for national mine action development initiatives. To do this it must take the lead and produce national policies and regulations for the management of mine action. The need to develop national human resources to achieve effective national ownership cannot be understated. With the weakening of the current capacity during the last two years there is a need to focus on management development over the next few years. Real ownership of the programme comes from national leadership and management capacity, and it must be capable and credible to undertake the task at hand.

The following recommendations are made in relation to the mine action sector in Cambodia. Full details of each recommendation can be found at the respective Section in the Report.

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- Future cooperation programme development in mine action needs to have the regulatory authority included as one or more components within the programme. (5.1.1)
- The regulatory authority needs to set up and lead a Joint Working Group, which in turn will generate a series of technical sub-working groups. (5.1.2)
- The lead and coordination in the Mine Awareness in future needs to be handled by the regulatory authority, once it has developed itself. (5.1.3)
- Closer coordination between the regulatory authority, the Level One Survey contractor and the technical advisor on IMSMA needs to occur so that survey can be interlocked with data management. (5.1.4)
- A national long-term strategy needs to be developed which will include the production of national standards, a national work plan, a national licensing system, a national accreditation system, a national survey and marking system. (5.1.5)
- Further thought needs to be developed on more substantial and long-term fencing of low priority areas. (5.1.6)
- A national work-plan needs to be prepared to ensure resources in quantity and location match the national development priorities. (5.1.7)
- A substantial national QA system and standards needs to be enforced to provide confidence in the system. (5.1.8)
- A national data-base needs to be completely installed as soon as possible after the national standards for mine action information have been established, so that it will complement the Level One Survey being conducted by the specialist contractor (5.1.9)
- The regulatory authority needs to call a TWG on information and data so as to commence coordination of this component (5.1.10)
- The regulatory authority needs to investigate the capacity to retro-fit all available databases into the IMSMA system and whether the IMSMA system is a suitable tool for Cambodia. (5.1.11)
- CMAC needs to incorporate the UNDP-sponsored (Cranfield University) Middle Managers/Supervisors package with their own supervisor training. The content of this training package needs to be shared with other implementing agencies and efforts made to have centralised mine action training for supervisors. (5.1.12)
- The UNDP-sponsored Middle Management/Supervisors course, once developed by

Cranfield University and CMAC, needs to be localised through a university in Phnom Penh, with the real prospect that this course will become the South-East Asia Regional Training for Mine Action. This course could be open to all Mine Action Agencies operating in Cambodia so that the valuable NGO Human Resources can be developed as well. (5.1.13)

- CMAC and the regulatory authority need to identify one or two candidates for the next UNDPsponsored Senior Management in Mine Action course in July 2001, at Cranfield University. (5.1.14)
- The regulatory authority could become more aware of and support the disabled sector. (5.1.15)

#### General Conclusions and Lessons Learnt regarding Mine Action:

- A long-term (20-25 year horizon) National Mine Action Vision, with mine action goals, needs to be put in place, followed by a National Mine Action Strategy (5-10 year horizon), as early as possible. If properly prepared, this Strategy is not negated as more detailed survey information becomes available.
- The earliest completion of a National Level One (General) Survey is essential for proper and effective planning.
- The use of the military in support should be limited to emergency situations, and not used unless necessary in the developmental phase. Without proper experience and qualifications, the ability to transfer knowledge and build capacity is going to be limited.
- Government needs to be wary of adopting mine action templates or models, with or without modification, from other countries, without first critically examining their constraints, prerequisites and suitability. In addition it has been advisable to separate the regulatory authority from an implementing organisation. Cambodia has not learnt as much from other countries as it could have over the years.
- Government needs to have a strategy and a plan for Research and Development (R&D) in mine action. It needs to proceed with caution and not expand too rapidly, taking care to avoid donor-driven assistance and systems that may not be useful, applicable or sustainable in the local context.

#### **The Royal Government of Cambodia /UNDP Project** (refer to sections 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2)

The current project is the third in a series of projects arising out of the Government's appeal for international assistance in mine action, starting back in 1993. It is in support of CMAC's Five Year Strategy (1996 - 2000):

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*Clearing the Path Ahead.* The project (a) provides financial resources from donors through a dedicated trust fund for CMAC's operating expenses, (b) channels in-kind contributions of specialised military personnel to CMAC as experts, and (c) promotes institution building through UNDP/UNOPS technical advisors in the areas of leadership, planning, administration and financial management.

#### Project Concept and Design:

The design was correct in so far as it promoted CMAC as the *de-facto* project executing agency, including coordination responsibility, for delivering the listed outputs, assisted by UNDP, UNOPS and donors. The level of technical assistance was identified in some detail in the text, referring to both project staff and experts on mission. Potential risks were also well identified, demonstrating a good understanding of the context by the original formulation team. The project document calls for seven technical advisors plus one UNV Programme Officer, for Year 1, with the expectation that this number would be reduced in Year 2 (refer to Section 3.2.5 for details). Other positions listed in the project document totalled 61, in addition to the seven UNDP-funded advisors. These positions

were to be funded/provided by no less than ten donors and two UN agencies. Key issues identifiable here are (a) whether parties not explicitly and contractually bound to the project document could in practice have been expected to co-ordinate and co-operate, and (b) whether CMAC could co-ordinate the different elements of technical assistance from all sources.

The support for CMAC was to be funded through a number of modalities, which acknowledged a range of options for the Government and donors alike. The UNDP-administered Trust Fund has been the primary choice for many donors, for reasons of proven track record, simplicity, transparency and accountability. It was expected that this trend would continue, but due recognition was given to those donors who wished to enter bilateral agreements directly with CMAC, including in-kind support. So as to facilitate CMAC adopting a longer and more stable planning horizon, donors were requested to make multi-year contributions. This did not transpire, and is a weakness inherent in mine action projects, irrespective of country or conflict.

The contractual agreements between UNDP and the Donors, and the direct relationship of these agreements with the project document are less than ideally structured (refer to Sections 3.2.8 and 3.2.9 for details) This has had implications specially in the reporting requirements placed on UNDP and CMAC, and a mismatching of expectations between the partners, as well as unnecessarily complex and diverse obligations on UNDP given the large number of partners involved. It is strongly recommended that the reporting requirements of UNDP Donor agreements be streamlined, and that a standard quarterly report be put in place for all donor partners with a clear statement of goals, objectives, targets and success indicators.

#### Project Implementation:

In 1998, UNDP initiated a move toward the Direct Execution of the Trust Fund in a bid to reduce overhead costs and to ensure greater responsiveness to Donors and timeliness in the management of the UNDP Trust Fund for CMAC. A contractual Agreement was signed with CMAC in December 1998, and the UNDP Direct Execution (DEX) Trust Fund (CMB/98/A03/5A) became operational in June 1999. In early 1999 CMAC created a new Planning Department to focus on the preparation of the CMAC annual Work Plan and to conduct studies on the socio-economic (SE) impact of the clearance activities of minefields prior to and after clearance.

The progress of the project was affected by the crisis of 1999-2000, in many ways, but not exclusively so. First there was the loss of self-confidence throughout CMAC due to the allegations of wrongdoing and the widespread negative media coverage. Secondly, there was the departure of senior managers. Thirdly, there was the re-organisation and reform process brought about as a result of the management audit and evaluations. Fourthly, there was the slow-down in donor commitments, starting in mid-1999 and to a degree, still continuing. Fifthly, there was the changes to the leadership of the technical assistance team over a nine-month period starting with the departure of the first Programme Co-ordinator, followed by the short-term assignment of a mine action specialist, then an interim period with a Focal Point, finally ending with the arrival of the present Programme Co-ordinator. Other factors have been identified as the short-term assignments for certain experts on mission, the turnover of technical advisors for a variety of reasons, less than optimal use of resources from all sources in the field etc. An assessment of progress towards the Outputs listed in the project document is given in the annexes (refer to Annex B.3).

#### Co-ordination:

There are several levels of co-ordination required on a project as large and complex as this, and these were adequately structured to fit the needs.

- At the highest level co-ordination between donors and the Government through the bi-annual Steering Committee mechanism which has served the intended purpose well with CMAC's IWP, Financial Statements and Progress Reports providing the necessary documentation inputs.

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- The next level is Donor Co-ordination, which is facilitated by UNDP, at both the country level and at headquarters. Donor Meetings have been held on an as-required basis. Over the period of crisis within CMAC, there were many such meetings supplemented by smaller gatherings as well, all chaired by UNDP. Key documentation is the UNDP-issued Donor Update, the CMAC progress report, major assessment/evaluation reports, various presentations, and additional information as required.
- The third level of co-ordination is the Tripartite Project Review (CMAC/UNDP/UNOPS), which is held annually. The meetings are attended by one or more Government agencies such as Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as the three parties directly involved in the project namely, CMAC, UNDP, and UNOPS. The annual TPR's have been held regularly in accordance with UNDP procedures.
- The fourth level of co-ordination is at CMAC: executive co-ordination is provided through the Directors' Executive Committee meetings, which have been held on a weekly basis since late 1998 whenever possible, also involving technical advisors. CMAC Corporate Management co-ordination is provided through the Governing Council Meetings.
- The fifth level is at the project level where the Programme Co-ordinator convenes a weekly meeting of Senior Technical Advisors, supplemented by a general TA meeting once a month. This forum allows advisors and experts on mission, irrespective of donor agency or affiliation, to discuss issues regarding co-ordination of assistance. Supporting documentation now includes the monthly reports submitted by all technical advisors to the Programme Co-ordinator, following closely the UN reporting format.
- All of the above have been supplemented by ad-hoc meetings at various levels, which were particularly important during the period of crisis 1999 - 2000.

#### Project Management, Backstopping and Support:

The UNDP Country Office (CO) has been pro-active in the management of the Trust Funds and in the backstopping of the project throughout with key technical inputs and support from UNDP HQ upon request from the CO. The sensitive and high-profile nature of the CMAC portfolio as of mid-1999, when taken together with the concurrent change to the direct UNDP execution (DEX) modality of the Trust Funds required an unusually high level of attention be given by staff (both in operations and programme) and by senior management. Furthermore, with the channelling of Government funds for CMAC and GC through the DEX Trust Fund as of December 1999, financial management of the Trust Fund was taking up an inordinate amount of time compared to other duties in support of the mine action programme. A key area for UNDP's attention is in the reporting of pledges, commitments, budgets and expenditures against the various donor funds that that contribute to the General Trust Fund and the Swedish Sub Trust Fund. Considerable effort has been made by UNDP to alert donors to the status of the Trust Fund at all times. Donors have acknowledged the need for them to take action more quickly, and to ensure the commitments are transferred in a timely manner. As far as can be ascertained, without pre-empting or prejudicing the KPMG audit report for the period 1999 - 2000, it appears that UNDP is managing the Trust Fund correctly. In addition the records shows that UNDP, in consultation with CMAC, has kept donors - current and potential, informed of the funding requirements of CMAC, in a timely manner. Specific issues raised by donors with the Mission, have been addressed in the Report (refer to section 3.2 for details).

It is noted that the regular Mine Action Donor Updates issued by UNDP are proving very useful to the donors, particularly the section on the status of funds. This is clearly an area where UNDP can continue to refine the content and detail, so as to continue to give donors important information in a timely manner. One issue that has been raised by CMAC, is whether donors could be more pro-active and indicate likely pledges and commitments well in advance. It is understandable that

CMAC would want to plan for the medium- to longterm, but this is difficult in the absence of indicative budget figures. This is not a case of budget-driven development, but a realistic request, which if answered, will allow CMAC to set the correct level of field and headquarters staff. It is unreasonable to expect good quality of work and sustained morale, when CMAC is obliged to adopt a hire-and-fire approach to human resources because of the uncertainty surrounding the flow of funds to it.

#### Project Outputs:

In terms of achievement against project objectives, it is estimated that CMAC has achieved somewhere slightly in excess of 50% of what it was hoping to do. The main reasons for this modest achievement has been discussed above namely, the crisis in 1999 -2000, the disruption to funds, and the need to reform, restructure and down-size. However, it is too narrow to look at CMAC alone, and draw conclusions about progress in other areas. In this period there was a lot going on in the wider field of mine action in Cambodia: the national endorsement of the Ottawa Convention, the early enactment of national legislation flowing from

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that Treaty, the destruction of landmine and UXO stockpiles, the starting of the national Level One Survey, the victim support initiatives co-ordinated by the Disability Action Council, the formation of an independent regulatory authority (albeit not without some adverse reaction for certain reasons), and the holding of the national symposium on 16 November 2000.

The following recommendations are made in relation to the project:

- The current technical assistance project Phase III should be closed 30 June 2001, as planned. (5.2.1)
- The new approach must consider:
  - clearer coordination modalities/ agreements.
  - Simpler and standard contracts with donors.
  - Clearer and simpler reporting lines and requirements.
  - Include the regulatory authority as a new partner. (5.2.2)
- Donors must provide more timely support. (5.2.3)
- The Trust Fund must be seen as a long-term funding capacity rather than encouraging CMAC to use all financial resources in the year they are allocated. (5.2.4)
- Contractual arrangements must be clearer in future between UNDP and CMAC, UNDP and CMAA, UNDP and other contractors as necessary. (5.2.5)
- Whereas the Government's decision of putting its contribution through a UNDP RGC Trust Fund was widely welcomed by donors in the past, the time has now come to review the efficacy and purpose of having this continue say, after the end of the current project (30 June 2001). (5.2.6)

#### General Conclusions and Lessons Learnt in regard to the Project:

- Formulation and progressive development of a good mine action programme/project must be balanced, flexible and with a medium- to long-term perspective, under national ownership and leadership from the outset
- Where there are multiple donors operating within a general programme, with a number of contractual arrangements between donors and host organisation, it is vital to have an explicit clause written into all agreements that technical assistance must answer to the Director-General of the counterpart national organisation, co-ordinated through a Programme Co-ordinator if one has been appointed. The role of the Programme Co-ordinator must be clearly understood by all parties - CMAC, UN agencies and donors.
- There needs to be co-ordination in the drawing up of the terms of reference of all technical advisors and experts, and whenever possible, the application of uniform terms, conditions and

administration.

- Multi-year funding is vital for realistic planning, and a trust fund mechanism should not be seen as (a) a never-ending source of cash, and (b) a petty cash box. A Trust Fund should be used as a long-term financial planning and management tool. Any effort to deplete it to zero annually should be resisted.
- UNDP and donors must strive for a medium- to long-term programme/project budget horizon (three to five years minimum, depending on the level of threat) in mine action so as to facilitate planning and allow sufficient time for capacity building.

### **Cambodian Mine Action Centre - Organisation, Management and Operations**

Since the early stages the national capacity for mine action has developed to where CMAC has:

- Evolved as a mine action asset capable of self sufficiency in training;
  - advanced mine awareness approaches;
  - included UXO destruction into clearance;
  - mechanical capacity being developed;
  - dog capacity being developed;
  - limited data and information management; and
- i been developing national management capacity to handle multi-faceted and multi- project operations.

This complex capacity has been developed during an era where Mine Action, as a sector has itself been rapidly evolving and developing. Credit can be given for the very real achievements of CMAC so far, regardless of the issues raised. As the first UNDP mine action intervention world-wide, this project was a step into the unknown for all parties. Since its inception, CMAC has expanded and developed its field capacity to a large and capable status. CMAC's outputs for and contributions to the country's development are significant. The agency has cleared the most land during this period, at an average cost of USD 1 per square metre (sq.

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m.) that is both acceptable and competitive. This figure is far below that of many other countries and is close to that of Afghanistan. However, it should be remembered that the figure does not include in-kind donations of personnel, expense items or explosives. (see section 3.3.1 for details) Furthermore, CMAC has the potential to increase its operational productivity by in excess of 50% at little or no extra cost (see Sections 3.3.1, 3.3.3 - 3.3.6 for details).

To date CMAC's reform and restructure have brought about a more appropriate and efficient organisational structure for CMAC as an implementing agency. The CMAC structure must remain flexible so as to fulfil the needs of the long-term national strategy, once formulated. CMAC will probably require further review as an ongoing internal process ("right-sizing"), to gauge its responsiveness to this long-term national strategy.

CMAC Governing Council: The GC and in particular the Chairman have been very active in advocacy, international involvement and with the ICBL. The role of the GC is to oversee the activities of CMAC and to give directives to ensure conformance with government mandate. It is also responsible for the approval of CMAC budgets, work plans, programmes, accounts and reports. This has grown to a Governing Council that is now a full time organisation of 22 staff and members and 13 temporary staff in a separate facility with a separate budget. It is recognised that



any public agency requires external oversight and the original concept for the GC was to act in a similar fashion as an NGO Steering Committee. The effort and cost should reflect the amount of impact and added value that the office brings to the project. Therefore, with the restructuring and redirection of CMAC to being a service provider, coupled with the creation of a higher authority in CMAA, it follows logically that a re-assessment of the role, responsibility and requirements of the GC should occur. A smaller Council with five or seven members, with an appropriate mix business and finance experience and some knowledge or awareness of public administration policy and procedures, should act as a proper board of directors, to oversee and guide CMAC towards becoming a cost-efficient service provider. As the tasking, external quality assurance, advocacy and other national-level responsibilities will now fall with CMAA, the GC oversight is focused on CMAC budget, structure and internal policies approval that will have to conform to any national policies and standards set by the CMAA. With this reduced responsibility set by Government, the need for a full-time GC is unclear.

CMAC Operations Management: Although operational tasking has now been delegated down to each DU, the Operations Department still has an important and detailed role to perform. The need for Task Management at this level was highlighted in both the KPMG management audit report (27 September 1999) and the then acting Programme Co-ordinator's report on 'Accounting for Land Cleared by the CMAC' (7 December 1999). This report clearly identifies the task management gaps. It would appear that little has changed since then. This process becomes all the more critical as CMAC goes further down the path of individual projects that are separately funded through bilateral or earmarked funding. The main concern is that, as a result of the crisis and other factors, at this point the weaknesses are such that if accreditation were to take place, it is not certain that CMAC would meet international mine action standards. Areas of concern are lack of authorised and current written procedures and policies, in explosive handling; storage and transport; and the level of the medical support capacity. Having said that, as the national standards have yet to be developed, this allows CMAC a period in which to resolve these issues and ensure that the gaps are filled. These issues can be readily resolved.

The focus to date for CMAC has been on safety, effectiveness and to some degree, efficiency. Although the cost figures are good, there is room for further improvement, simply by giving greater attention to certain aspects of operations. From observation, efficiency does not appear to have been given sufficient attention, but this is now changing and is to be commended. There has been an inability to analyse basic data or interrogate information systems, but this is in the process of being improved. This highlights an earlier lack of attention to productivity. With its new re-focussed role as an implementing agency CMAC will need to become more efficient, as it will have to compete for dwindling scarce resources with the other implementing agencies. Therefore, CMAC can improve productivity, to become cost-effective and efficient, and remain the lowest cost operator. CMAC will need to develop sound management capacity for its field operations to further enhance the issue of productivity. This will allow timely internal evaluation of outputs. A simply resolvable issue has been the dearth of key policies and procedures documents available in the vernacular. This has rather hindered the full use of important documents as such as the Standard Operating Procedures manual - even in draft form (refer to Section 3.3.3 for details).

Project Management: A project matrix has been developed by CMAC Operations and Planning Department. CMAC currently has 19 projects underway and is negotiating a further six projects. In addition the TA Management Training has developed a Project Management Handbook, which can be used here. CMAC

are taking place.

Swedish Dog Support Operations: Overall, the technical capacity (i.e. the dog and its handler) of this project is developing well. From observation, selection and flexibility of deployment, along with field deployment techniques, may need review. As indicated in the title the dogs should be treated as a supporting capacity to manual demining rather than as a stand-alone capacity. An integrated approach is desirable, giving flexibility to move dog teams into suitable parts of the task or to where CMAC may be able to select more suitable tasks, leaving those difficult components to the platoons. In general, the dogs need to be put to work for longer periods in the right tasks so as to improve productivity (refer to Section 3.3.4 for details).

Finnish Flail Operations: The technical capacity is advancing well ahead of the implementation and application of this technology, which is still developing. The Flail project is a mechanical trial project with limited capacity building. From observations, changes in the approach to the project need to occur to improve productivity. The most productive component of the project is the flail itself so this should be driving the project support, not the other way around. Therefore, consideration should be given to increasing the number of national operators and the introduction of shift-work to improve the currently rather low productivity. Combination testing with the dogs is advisable (refer to Section 3.3.5 for details).

Brush Cutter Project: This project to date has not fully developed nor has it been integrated into the manual or dog teams. This is being looked at currently with the dog teams and as funding becomes available, should be further tested and analysed. Again detailed and accurate project management of the financial costs for the project must be maintained to produce an accurate analysis of the impact of the brush cutters. As an observation the mobility of these brush cutters is of concern, and consideration should be given to a lighter vehicle such as the locally-produced Tempest, a wheeled or plastic tracked light tractor that is capable of moving itself around. Clear drills and SOP must be developed for the use of this equipment (refer to Section 3.3.6 for details).

Mine Awareness: During the evaluation mission it was not possible to view CMAC mine awareness activities as all teams had been disbanded due to the cut-backs in 2000. A number of implementing agency key personnel were interviewed and various reports and files were reviewed. CMAC has undertaken a direct and mass media approach to mine awareness. Prior to the cut-backs CMAC employed mine awareness teams (MAT) and community mine marking teams (CMMT), which had an integral mine awareness capacity to deliver the messages. This has been a commendable effort which, although not measurable, has contributed to the large reduction to landmine and UXO casualties over the project life. From 1998 to the present the annual casualty rate has been reduced by 56% which exceeds the project objective, and is highly commended (refer to Section 3.3.7 for details).

Support Functions: There are many components under this. Some observed shortcomings in medical support are covered (refer to Annex B.5). Similarly, logistic support requirements are outlined (refer to Annex B.5). A number of observations have been made when reviewing the Assets Register. There appears to be a large amount of equipment awaiting write-off for the last few years. Apart from taking up valuable storage space some of this material will have a resale value, the proceeds of which could be recycled back into the programme. There appears to be an amount of equipment that cannot be accounted for, but it is expected that these items will be verified when the Fixed Assets Register is validated (refer to Section 3.3.8 for details).

Finance: The Finance Department is under-staffed at this point, but the recruitment of four additional HQ finance staff is in progress. Systems are still being developed and the Department is at a critical stage where the field programme is recommencing at a rapid rate. If not handled with some urgency there may be difficulties later. Since the start of this project, there has been a concerted effort to strengthen financial management processes and systems. There are now annual audits undertaken by an internationally recognised firm, a significant computer-based

package (Sunsystems), which when finally operationalised and fine-tuned in the coming months, will give real-time financial control across all areas of CMAC - operations, logistics, supplies, procurement, personnel, equipment and so on, subject always in such situations, to the quality of data input and verification. In addition to the annual audits, CMAC and UNDP have put in place a monthly checking exercise with PriceWaterhouseCoopers, since June 1999. Key procedures for financial management have been finished, and are being reviewed. At time of writing this report the Audit exercises for the Trust Fund for the period 1999 - 2000 were under way. Following on from the September 1999 KPMG Report, there is now an increase in confidence in CMAC financial management - processes, systems and procedures, but at the same time all the work is not yet finished. It is expected that the latest KPMG audits will give a clearer picture on how close CMAC is to taking on full financial responsibility, and in the event of weaknesses or gaps, will be making suggestions on how these can be addressed.

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This will also have a bearing on whether CMAC and donors should be looking at continuing and deepening the Trust Fund modality or moving to stand-alone project or contract funds. To run discrete accounts for 19 + projects, alongside conventional operations, first requires that all basic accounting systems and skills, including bank accounts, charts of accounts, management accounting with appropriate cost centres, asset register and sub-registers, are in place. Only when these are truly embedded, is the stand-alone approach likely to be appropriate and successful. Until then it would seem prudent to reduce financial management risks to a minimum, by avoiding wherever possible, complex arrangements whether standing alone or when aggregated that increase the potential for difficulties. Hence, for the foreseeable future, the simpler the overall funding arrangements are, the better. The Trust Fund modality appears to meet this criterion and give interested parties confidence.

Human Resource Development: HRD capacity of CMAC is under-strength and without adequate systems. Conditions of service for employees are not clear, nor are the systems for career advancement in place. After finance, this is a critical area that must be corrected before going too far forward, as some the concerns of the past will re-emerge if the system is not developed. The general area of human resource management is one of concern for the welfare of the employees, good personnel management and for transparency.

Training Centre: The training facility is well developed and provides a very good service. For this CMAC is to be commended. Complex-wise it may be one of the best available. The facility is well developed with the exception of the explosive storage, which has been recognised and is being planned for relocation. This is under consideration by the TC management. Training system-wise, the TC requires upgrading in a number of areas. Currently training packages do not exist in adequate detail. The courses have not been objectivised nor have the jobs been assessed and analysed on their needs for training. A training needs assessment has just recently commenced but the process could not be reviewed by the TEM. It was encouraging to note the positive inputs on training development being undertaken by the TA Training Management and the TA Training. End-of-course validation is in place. The movement toward field monitoring will ensure that the cycle of training is developed and that the external validation process is introduced. Instructor development is an ongoing process and the current staff appear to have all the necessary skills. Adequate training aids need to be further developed and maintained. The EOD facility is unused. CMAC may be better served using this facility for other HQ functions such as communications, operations, research and development, audit and QA team, medical, logistics and transport. This would reduce the HQ personnel in Phnom Penh.

The following recommendations are made in relation to CMAC - Organisation, Management and Operations:

- Emphasis needs to be placed on building and consolidating procedures and policy documentation. (5.3.1)

- The recommendations (see Annex B.5) need to be undertaken with an emphasis on areas that will affect accreditation. (5.3.2)
- Fast tracking of the development of the Level Two Survey capacity is essential to efficiency, and need to be undertaken soonest. (5.3.3)
- The implementation of a national study on socio-economic impact of cleared land needs to be undertaken within the year to ensure that the national strategy developed is supported by the real outputs. (5.3.4)
- The restructure processes needs to continue to enhance CMAC as an implementing agency. (5.3.5)
- Improve the task and project management by operations. (5.3.6)
- Adjust the TOR of Planning Officer and the Deputy Director: Operations to monitor progress of projects and to provide the Director with weekly or fortnightly updates. (5.3.7)
- The current procedures need to be reviewed and a more productive approach developed. (5.3.8)
- Further training of DU Managers and Operations staff on task selection to be expanded and reinforced. (5.3.9)
- Improve the productivity of the dog support capacity. (5.3.10)
- Improve the productivity of the flail mechanical team. (5.3.11)
- Improve areas that are critical to future accreditation of CMAC. (5.3.12)
- A rationalisation and validation of the USD 20,000,000 Fixed Assets Register is required. This needs to be done before the next programme approach commences. (5.3.13)
- Review the allocation of vehicles against usage and need (5.3.14)
- Review the role and requirement for the Governing Council in relation to CMAC's new role as an implementing agency, with a view to rightsizing the organisation into a part time role. (5.3.15)
- Review the personal insurance arrangements for staff and the third party liability insurance for CMAC. (5.3.16)
- Review the field operations training needs and develop a training package that is driven by work place requirements. This is currently ongoing (5.3\_17)
- There is a need for follow-up on actions taken arising out of this evaluation mission. ( 5.3.18)

#### General Conclusions and Lessons Learnt regarding CMAC - Organisation, Management and Operations:

- As the CMAC experience has shown, it is possible for a mine action organisation to go through a long period of crisis, and still deliver effective mine clearance, provided management, staff and UN commitment is present to work through the difficulties together, and donor support is forthcoming.
- Potential for cost-effectiveness can be enhanced or achieved if early nationalisation of the mine action process and programme are implemented, after the initial high cost start-up phase of TA's and equipment purchase have been absorbed.
- Policies and procedures must be prepared and put in place, as early as possible, prior to commencing field operations.
- Considerable attention must be given to ensuring proper and appropriate translation services are available from the outset. Documentation must be developed in or translated into the host country national language at all times. The official version of documents must be those that are in the host country language. Deminers, supervisors and managers may not necessarily have the same level of reading comprehension of a foreign language as their spoken ability might otherwise suggest.

## **CMAC - Capacity Building** (refer to Sections 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5)

The UNDP Capacity assessment mission in October 1997 and the CMAC's Five-Year Strategy: *Clearing the Path Ahead*, confirmed the need to strengthen a sustainable national mine action capacity, through a comprehensive and well-structured system that could meet the needs of the organisation. The accountability and the transparency of the reformed organisation were to have been reflected through a new structure, refined directives and the creation of committees. Four key directives for the Personnel and Administration Branch have been revised and translated into Khmer language in March 1997, and they have been fully utilised in 1998 by the organisation. In 1998, a variety of substantial documents have been developed and refined to provide guidance to the overall capacity building planning of CMAC. At this stage, good progress has been accomplished to strengthen internal CMAC capacity based on the readjustment and the standardisation of directives and procedures. In addition, an important re-organisation of CMAC has been carried out as part of a better management structure, such as the establishment of socio-economic planning capacity in 1999, and the re-establishment of the Training Centre, at Kampong Chhnang. The CMAC Training Centre moved to this better location, in August 1997. Since 1998, the Human Resources Section has been too weak to handle all the HR activities, functioning more as a "paper-processing unit" and archives storage. In addition, there was an absence of collaboration between the Training Centre activities and the HR Section. AusAID has been supportive of assistance to the HR elements of the project. The official recognition of a strong and pro-active Human Resources Department only started in 2000, but that was soon affected by the need to downsize the organisation (see section 3.5 for details).

As might be expected in a crisis situation of the magnitude that faced CMAC, donors sought to ensure that their funds were not involved. This was confirmed by the KPMG audit, in 1999. However, there appears to have been differing perceptions and expectations regarding the nature and extend of UNDP's, and by extension UNOPS's, oversight of CMAC particularly in the area of financial management. The primary responsibility and liability for financial management has always rested with the national organisation. As the project is now in its third phase, it would be disappointing if CMAC did not have the capability to manage funds, from all sources, but judgement on this awaits the outcome of the latest KPMG audits. With specific reference to accountability in financial management, capacity building has been focussing on strengthening processes and systems, as well as enhancing beneficiaries' skills. It is through proper processes and systems, including auditing and verification that a sustainable national capacity is built that fosters transparency and accountability, and it is on these areas that the technical assistance concentrated.

Functional Analysis: The initial concept of "one-to-one" counterpart has been determined by CMAC management as inefficient in creating a sustainable capacity building environment. It was decided that a functional approach would be more in tune with CMAC's requirement. Analysis of the gap between needs and current capabilities would help focus attention on the correct priorities, and clarify what should be done in which order. One issue, for instance, is the potential for and efficacy of utilising a roving or a horizontal approach to support instead of having an advisor dedicated to only one national counterpart. The team approach for TA is likely to be a more suitable approach to national capacity building. The transfer of knowledge to the widest audience from each technical input remains a key priority of CMAC. A concern in early 2000 appears to have been whether initial proposals were too radical in terms of withdrawing technical assistance too quickly. This is an issue that goes to the heart of any exit strategy for technical assistance.

A preliminary functional needs analysis of all departments was prepared by the TEM as an initial input to stimulate further analysis and debate. The exercise was intended to identify the need for technical assistance, if any, for the next programme, in collaboration with CMAC. There have been a series of

discussions, and broad consensus has been reached. In addition the detailed draft study undertaken by the TA's themselves has been reviewed and ties in closely with the CMAC / TEM conclusions. The analysis in this Report should be considered as a consensus document, for consideration in discussions on formulation with CMAC management (refer to Section 3.5.5 and Annex B.12)

Exit Strategies: The phased reduction of international staff is the key to allowing and encouraging full control by Cambodian management. The TEM assessment indicates that for the continuation of the programme, a combination of approaches to support to CMAC management should be employed to fit better to the new requirement of the organisation. In addition to the use of Technical Advisors, alternatives such as short-term consultants, national expertise, external audit, volunteers, outsourcing of certain tasks, internal and external training packages, sub-regional and regional co-operation etc. should be equally considered (see section 3.5.6 for a detailed discussion on the concept and previous evaluation recommendations).

The key issue for national staff and technical advisors and experts alike, is assessing the effectiveness of knowledge and skills transfer. There have been good examples of the TA approach working well, and meeting counterparts' expectations. Similarly, there has been a lack of continuity and coherence between TAs working in the same unit, whether as a result of one TA not following the lead set by his or her predecessor or perhaps concurrent TA's not liaising enough with one another on issues, priorities and actions needed. A common point of agreement is the major role of the technical assistance in the capacity building. Based on CDRI survey, Experts working in national authorities are generally asked to "do the job" as well as or instead of developing capacity. This may not always be reported to donors, but there has to be some recognition of the reality within host or target organisations.

The ownership of mine action assistance is the key to developing a realistic and effective exit strategy. Previously, technical assistance initiatives appears to have been donor-driven. Experts rotated to their government's schedule, often for only six months at a time, with minimum consultation with CMAC on proposed replacements or whether targets or work-plan objectives are being achieved or indeed if the terms of reference were correct in the first place, and usually without an end-of-assignment report to CMAC and/or the Programme Co-ordinator. It has been reported to the TEM that previously some experts/advisors were like "technical tourists", spending not insignificant time outside of the CMAC office/ field of operation without informing CMAC management, and showing insufficient regard for attendance, time-keeping and discipline. This is no longer understood to be the case. Having said that, CMAC personnel can readily identify those experts/ advisors, past and present, who have made a genuine effort to build a sustainable capacity with counterparts, for which their efforts are appreciated. Overall, this situation is cause for reflection, with regard to a general mismatch between terms of reference and local expectations, amongst other issues.

There is now a very real sense that national staff at all levels in CMAC, want to feel that they own the process of designing, selecting, managing and monitoring all technical assistance in the future. The phased reduction of technical experts/advisors, including the adjustment of their roles, will certainly contribute to building up self-confidence among national staff. CMAC management has realised that the "culture" of the organisation is the vector to set up a number of fundamental values such as: professionalism, integrity, discipline, ethical behaviour and the feeling of being part of a world-class organisation in mine action.

The following recommendations are made in relation to Capacity Building in CMAC, noting that the focus is on HRM and HRD - general recommendations on operations, etc, are made under Section 5.3:

- Conduct a series of workshops and information sessions on Human Resources concepts, mechanisms, models and purposes, to CMAC management and supervisory staff. (5.5.1)

- Create a Deputy Director post in Support Department with a TOR that is focused on HR. (5.5.2)
- Rationalise the TOR for the HR section to avoid overlapping in functions and roles. (5.5.3)
- Review revised job descriptions for all departments, by HR section. (5.5.4)
- A Personnel Committee needs to be established as soon as possible to make decisions on administrative and personnel management practices and procedures. (5.5.5)
- Performance appraisal form and system need to be refined to include objective and professional criteria for career plan development for all CMAC staff including. (5.5.6)
- Create two sub-sections of the HR Section, to handle the two distinct functions of HR development and recruitment. (5.5.7)
- Review the insurance coverage for CMAC and the current medical funding policy. (5.5.8)
- Review the HR policy and procedures and update these in relation to serials 5.5.2-7 above. (5.5.9)
- Each department is to conduct a training needs assessment for HRD requirements and entry into the HRD database. (5.5.10)
- Conduct proper Human Resource development, for long-term benefits of staff and organisation alike. (5.5.11)

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- Improve TA coordination and cooperation when advising in different departments so that the impact of department decisions and its implications to other departments is fully understood. (5.5.12)
- Develop departments, sections and staff so that they can function as autonomous, self-directed units able to compete with other mine action service providers within Cambodia and abroad. (5.5.13)
- TA support and provision should be made more conducive to capacity building across functional areas with greater emphasis on training and systems development against identified needs (5.5.14)

#### General Conclusions and Lessons Learned regarding CMAC - Capacity Building:

Capacity building needs a very clearly articulated plan - entry / implementation and monitoring / exit, with clearly defined goals, objectives, milestones and success indicators for each element of the proposed technical assistance. The use of successive short-term technical advisors and experts (i.e. less than twelve months) for key long-term needs, is to be avoided, as the indications are that this approach is unlikely to be productive. This should not exclude the use of short-term, non-resident advisors or consultants coming on a regular basis to follow-up on an agreed work-plan for any given year.

#### **Government and Donor Support** (refer to Sections 3.4, 4.4 and 5.4)

Government: The RGC has clearly stated that it is committed to a policy of ensuring Cambodia will be free from the threat of mines and UXOs. As part of this commitment, Cambodia is one of the signatory state parties among other members who signed the Ottawa Convention in December 1997. Since then the RGC has banned the use, sale, manufacture and trade of anti-personnel landmines in Cambodia. Substantial stockpile destruction has been noted since 1994 and continuing to-date (see section 3.4 for details). The Government original pledge of USD 10 million over the period 1996-2000 is behind schedule. However, so far, the RGC cash contribution share of the cost of CMAC administration and operation has been a total of USD1,814,327, and a noticeable improvement has been noted since November 1999, making the Government the fifth largest donor to CMAC in 2000. In addition, RGC has so far granted CMAC taxexemption status, which greatly reduces the project import costs. In an effort to make the financial management of

the RGC more transparent and accountable, the RGC has changed its practice from direct cash contributions of CMAC account to direct contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund. Nevertheless, the RGC does not have sufficient financial resources to fully cover the administration and operational cost of CMAC, neither at the present nor in the short term. Overall, its contribution is approximately 5-10% of CMAC's operational needs.

Donors: For Cambodia specifically, donors have been supporting the development of CMAC as a national management capacity with technically sound national staff, and are keen to see RGC take full ownership of the programme and taking a national execution (NEX) approach within a long-term national vision. In addition, donors also want to see the positive impact linking mine action to socio-economic development plan such as poverty alleviation, rural development, decentralisation, and so on. In the period January 1998 - December 2000, the combined donor contribution through the UNDP Trust fund has been approximately USD 22.8 million to CMAC. Since 1993, donors have contributed approximately USD 63.4 Million to CMAC operations, through the UNDP Trust Fund. Donors support to mine action has not just contributed to CMAC alone, but also to other mine clearance operators in Cambodia like HALO Trust, MAG and to other national and international agencies which are actively involved in mine action such as HI, NPA, CRC, DAC, CARE. The fund to HALO Trust and MAG is for medium- and small-scale demining operations. However, some other funds covered the hiring of external technical advisors to support CMAC, CRC database, DAC programme, CARE project.

The following recommendations are made in relation to Government and Donor Support to the project:

- Senior representatives from key and concerned ministries must become involved in the discussion, brainstorming and formulation of the Mine Action National Strategy and long term national vision ( 5.4.1)
- To reflect true ownership of Mine Action in Cambodia, a budget line needs to be identified and used in the National Budget, for mine action activities. (5.4.2)
- Based on the national strategy, CMAC should develop a strategy to developing national capacity. (5.4.3)
- All Mine Action in Cambodia documentation needs to be translated into the Khmer language. ( 5.4.4)
- As priority, develop a national approach to land management at provincial level through PRDC including LUPU/LUMU organisations, in those provinces that have significant landmine/UXO contamination (5.4.5)

## **SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION MISSION** (refer to Sections 3.2.11- 12)

The conclusion of the Terminal Evaluation Mission is that the project has been relevant to national development in Cambodia. It is now time for the list of target groups to be updated to include the regulatory authority and RCAF. It falls within UNDP's mission and comparative advantage to engage in dialogue regarding both CMAC aR4 CMAA, and to continue to offer sound advice and appropriate assistance. In terms of performance, there were good sustainable achievements, supported by assistance from the project. The most important achievement has been the survival of CMAC itself as an organisation, after going through a period of unprecedented turmoil, reform and down-sizing. Again, on large complex projects such as this, there is always room for improvement. However, it must be remembered that mine action was a relatively small and new sector, and experienced human resources have been scarce and often difficult to replace. In terms of success, the project has assisted CMAC to contribute significantly to the reduction in landmines/



UXO casualty figures nationally. Although there were concerns raised about the TA/Expert approach adopted including the level of international personnel, the project has contributed to capacity development at CMAC.

## **THE WAY FORWARD**

Regarding the "Next Steps", the Terminal Evaluation Mission recommends that the current technical assistance project not be extended after 30 June 2001, but that a new programme or holistic approach be adopted for mine action as soon as possible, and that it be led and owned by the Government. Within such a programmed approach it will be possible to identify suitable initiatives for the appropriate national partners - at the macro level, CMAA as the national regulatory, licensing and planning authority, at the meso level, CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG, RCAF, DAC, HI, CRC and other NGOs as service providers - regionally or nationally, and at the micro level, individual LUMUs or LUPUs within Provincial Rural Development Committees, specific communities and disadvantaged groups. The priorities are for Government to proceed with the preparation of a National Mine Action Strategy incorporating a 20-25 year time horizon Vision. This should lead to Government and donors coming together to formulate a parallel long-term Financial Strategy for Mine Action that looks at presenting a realistic sliding scale complementarity between national and donor funds over time, and at streamlining the amount and timing of funding commitments from all sources in any given year. CMAA will have a key role to play in strengthening national information and data collection, publication and exchange including the Level One Survey, IMSMA, HI/CRC database, and all other pertinent databases from CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG and others. The invaluable work to date in raising or reinforcing mine awareness must continue nationally, as must efforts to destroy stockpiles in accordance with national legislation (refer to Section 5.6).

## **THE REPORT**

## 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION: THE EVALUATION MISSION

The Project: Assistance to Demining Programmes, Phase III (CMB/98-006) commenced in July 1998, and is currently scheduled to finish on 30 June 2001. The project document calls for a full external evaluation for the first quarter of the final year of the project. The terms of reference for the evaluation were drawn up by UNDP and CMAC in consultation with UNOPS, Donors and other organisations active in mine action. The Terminal Evaluation Mission (TEM) commenced in Phnom Penh on Monday, 26 February 2001. The team consisted of four independent consultants, two national and two international. The national consultants were an Independent Engineer and former CMAC staff member, and a Human Resources Development specialist now resident in Cambodia after many years overseas. The international consultants were a former mine action Manager in Afghanistan, Iraq and Azerbaijan, and a Programme/Project Management specialist with experience in national development planning and management, who was also the team leader.

The TEM was given detailed terms of reference (refer to Annex A.1), covering six objectives for evaluation, which categorised a number of key concerns and issues deemed important by CMAC and UNDP. A further objective was to propose, as appropriate, a five-year capacity development plan in support of mine action in Cambodia. In addition the TEM was invited to look at all pertinent issues relating to the proper design, planning, management, funding, co-ordination,

implementation, monitoring and reporting of: this complex project, over and above those concerns and issues raised by CMAC and UNDP. The six objectives were:

1. Delivery in Core De-mining Operations
2. Institutional Capacity Development and National Ownership
3. Enhanced Capacity in National Co-ordination and Regulatory Functions
4. UNDP's Project Design and Project Management Performance
5. Choice of Execution modality; Technical and Management Inputs from UNOPS
6. Earmarked Activities funded under the UNDP-administered Trust Fund.

### 1.3 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND PROGRESS

The methodology adopted by the mission follows a logical progression starting with an understanding of the background to and context of the project, establishing the relevant facts from interviews, meetings, inspections and documents, then analysing these facts and determining the issues and findings with regard to the objectives, drawing conclusions from the analysis, and making recommendations on what type of action is appropriate for the project to take at this stage and on whether new initiatives should be considered. Where lessons relevant to Cambodia and/or relevant to mine action world-wide, can be identified, they are to be presented for consideration. The TEM has not attempted to re-do previous evaluations, but where opportunities arose, the TEM inspected previously-identified minefields and villages, and carried its own validation exercise. Communication with UNOPS (New York), the executing agency for the technical assistance component, was by e-mail and facsimile.

A detail schedule of the TEM's itinerary, meetings, field-work and report drafting has been prepared (refer to Annex A.2). In summary the TEM schedule was as follows:

#### 26 Feb - 11 March

Meetings with CMAA, CMAC, UNDP, Donors and NGOs in Phnom Penh.

#### 12 - 24 March

Inspection of CMAC De-mining Units in Battambang, Pailin, Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap; Meetings with Donors in Bangkok.

#### 25 - 31 March

Inspection of CMAC De-mining Unit in Kompong Thom and the Training Centre at Kampong Chhnang; Meetings with CMAA, UNDP, Donors and HALO in Phnom Penh and elsewhere. 01 - 19 April

Final data collection and verification, checking cross-references, follow-up meetings with CMAC, UNDP and donors, report drafting.

### 1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE EVALUATION

#### EVALUATION

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1. The mission was to

By the end of the mission period up to and including report submission, numerous meetings had been held with a range of organisations and individuals (refer to Annex A.3). In total the TEM:

- held 35 meetings with CMAC (HQ), CMAC Governing Council and CMAA
- held 16 meetings with CMAC De-mining Units, Training Centre, LUPU/LUMU
- inspected 17 minefields and related operations in five provinces
- held 21 meetings with Technical Advisors and other consultants/experts
- held 15 meetings with UNDP and other UN agencies

- held 21 meetings with Donors and International Funding Institutions
- held 18 meetings with NGOs and other organisations in mine action.

As this is a multi-faceted evaluation mission, there were many information sources (i.e. reports, audits, publications, policy papers, conventions, strategy papers, handbooks, terms of reference, budgets, financial statements, working drafts, newspapers, CD's, web-sites) inspected, as well as files examined at CMAC and UNDP (refer to Annex A.4 for a list of source documents). In addition there were many individual items of correspondence reviewed. Every reasonable effort has been made to identify and obtain relevant information. The composition of the mission is given (refer to Annex A.5).

#### 1.4 THE REPORT

The report format follows the guidelines set down in the UNDP Programming Manual, (version April 1999) Chapter 7: Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation, section 7.4.6.1 (b) - Contents of the Evaluation Report. It also takes into account the guidelines of the UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook, Chapter 14.

The report is presented in such a way that the reader starts with an understanding of the purpose of the evaluation mission (Section 1), then the context and the history of mine action in Cambodia to date (Section 2), leading to the specific findings of the mission under five key headings, progressing from the general to the particular - mine action, the project, CMAC, government and donor support, and capacity building (Section 3). This is followed by discussion and conclusions arising out of the findings (Section 4), followed by a structured set of time-framed recommendations (Section 5) that flow logically from the findings and the discussions/conclusions. The final aspect of the report deals with lessons learnt, and how they apply not only to the situation in Cambodia, but also to mine action globally (Section 6).

#### 1.5 FEEDBACK

The TEM received no less than eighteen sets of comments, written and oral, in response to the advance draft and the draft reports. All efforts have been made to meet or communicate with those who have taken the time to make submissions, so as to ensure full understanding of the points being raised. Where appropriate the TEM has incorporated constructive criticisms on matters of factual accuracy and sufficiency of detail. Where the TEM differs from opinions offered by others on particularly important issues, the difference will be flagged.

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## 2. CONTEXT

### 2.1 ORIGIN

As a result of various conflicts over the last thirty years or so, both within and outside its borders, Cambodia is one of the most heavily land-mine contaminated countries in the world, in addition it has a very high level of unexploded ordnance. The generally accepted and quoted figures in most documents are 4 - 6 million landmines spread over approximately 1,500 - 2,000 sq. Km. However, the accuracy of these figures is open to question, particularly with the Level One Survey that is now taking place. With the country experiencing an average of over 600 land-mine and UXO victims per month in 1992, the Royal Cambodian Government and UNTAC established the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in 1993 to clear land-mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) in Cambodia. CMAC's humanitarian mandate is to clear land for resettlement of Internally Displaced People (IDP), agriculture, community development, and for reconstruction of infrastructure. According to a UNDHA multi-country study in 1996-97, Cambodia was one of the few countries that attempted to adopt a single structure or institution whereby planning and regulatory functions are combined with operational modalities.

Under the first UNDP project of Assistance to Demining Programmes (1994 -1996), CMAC grew rapidly from a small group of local deminers and a few international experts at the start 1993 (when the group was known as MCTU), to a large national organization that employed close to 3000 deminers and HQ personnel. This included about 60 Technical Advisors. CMAC's deminers were organized into four regional Demining Units (DU), the Project Management Unit (PMU) in Siem Riep also known as COFRAS-CIDEV, the Training Center and the Development Demining Unit (DDU). In the year 2001 this was re-organised into six DU's and a Training Centre, for

reasons that will be discussed in more detail in this report. The initial phase of the UNDP project (Phase I) consisted of two major components, both executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The first component assured the administration of an Open Trust Fund to provide financial resources for the organisation and operations of CMAC, and also provided a framework through which donors could contribute military technical advisors to assist CMAC to meet its operational objectives as a technically effective and professional demining organisation. The second component, financed from UNDP core funds, provided technical assistance to CMAC to build its capacity to run as an efficient and autonomous national organisation. The initial two-year project (Phase I: 1994 - 1996) was followed by a second two-year phase of support (1996 - 1998) with the same overall project objectives.

From 1993 until 2000 CMAC was mandated as the national co-ordinating and regulatory body as well as an implementing agency. Despite its role as a co-ordinating body it exercised little influence over the other demining service providers such as RCAF, and also MAG and HALO Trust both of whom have been in Cambodia since 1993. National Standards and a long-term National Strategy were not developed in this period, although CMAC had prepared a Five-Year Plan (1996 -2000). The issue of having a regulatory body that not only was to regulate and co-ordinate other service providers but also be self-regulatory was seen as contentious one, from the point of view of other service providers such as NGO's and the private sector. Nevertheless, according to the UNDHA report previously mentioned, factors that contributed to CMAC as an institutional model included its credibility and support for mine action activities, the extensive nature of the mine problem and its implications for socio-economic development, and strong donor interest in Cambodia's rehabilitation.

The international movement to ban the stockpiling and use of land mines, culminating in the International Land Mines Treaty signed in Ottawa in December 1997, gave new impetus to demining efforts world-wide, and particularly in Cambodia. Although enhanced international attention to land mine issues resulted in greater international political will to deal with the problem of land mines and unexploded ordnance, including through increased financial and technical resources, it also has resulted in an exponential increase in the expectations of mine action programmes such as CMAC.

Globally, in the bigger picture so to speak, the complexity of mine action programmes was quickly changing to include not only humanitarian demining (i.e. verification and clearance), but also developmental demining, as a contribution to post-conflict reconstruction and development. The limitations of focussing on demining were recognised and were being addressed by a more holistic approach. The UNDHA report drew attention to the increased awareness of the socio-economic dimension of landmines highlighting the importance of striving for a better understanding of the impact of mines (and by extension, UXO) on the lives and livelihoods of affected communities. It recognised that as of early 1997, impact assessment techniques were still weak, but that it was becoming more and more apparent in all settings that the costs, actual or opportunity, to affected communities far exceeded actual resources required to launch and operate mine-removal programmes. Since then, core concepts and principles of mine action have been developing all the time. The building up of the

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body of knowledge of proven modalities, processes, procedures, training and case studies, has been both evolutionary and rapid amongst the small community of mine action organisations, institutions and practitioners.

CMAC enjoyed international confidence and funding from many donor countries for its operation and had become one of the world's most successful mine action programmes by 1997. The primary tool for the deminers during the initial phase and up to and including the present phase is a metal mine detector. Sound drills, high levels of training and supervision, the capability of the demining equipment and appropriate logistical support, determine the consistency and standard of

de-mining. CMAC also evaluated new demining technologies by conducting field trials for mechanical area-reduction equipment, mine detectors, etc. At the end of 1996 the (Swedish-funded) Mine Detection Dog Project commenced. In 1997, CMAC re-addressed the mine survey issue by developing innovative community-based mine marking projects. Mine detection dogs were introduced into the CMAC programme to facilitate area-reduction exercises. CMAC also began to develop an enhanced capacity to address the problem of widespread contamination by Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). By late 1997, there was an introduction of mechanical de-mining through the (Finnish-funded) Flail and the (German-funded) "Rhino", and in mid 1999 (Japanese-funded) Brush Cutters were introduced. By early 1998, the full staff complement of CMAC - field and headquarters, was close to 3,000.

Hence, by mid-1998 CMAC enjoyed a reputation for safe work, flexibility and innovation. Nevertheless, on the global scene, the Cambodian model was not being replicated, as other countries adopted the principles and the recommendations of the UNDHA report. In 1998, UNDP initiated a move toward the Direct Execution of the Trust Fund in a bid to reduce overhead costs and to ensure greater responsiveness to Donors and timeliness in the management of the UNDP Trust Fund for CMAC. A contractual Agreement was signed with CMAC in December 1998, and the UNDP Direct Execution (DEX) Trust Fund (CMB/98/A0/5A) became operational in June 1999. In early 1999 CMAC created a new Planning Department to focus on the preparation of the CMAC annual Work Plan and to conduct studies on the socio-economic (SE) impact of the clearance activities of minefields prior to and after clearance.

## **2.2 THE CRISIS: EVENTS SINCE 1998**

By the end of 1998, managing the rapid expansion of the organisation was the biggest challenge for the CMAC management team. There was a UNDP capacity development review mission in March 1999, which identified a number of key areas for CMAC to address, as well as raising concerns about (a) the potential conflict of interest between its regulatory function and its operations, and (b) the danger of "mission creep" into areas that distract from core functions of service provision. There have been concerns raised that in addition to offers of genuine assistance that would benefit CMAC, perhaps inappropriate or redundant assistance may also have been extended, which CMAC found difficult to refuse. However, by the end of 1998, CMAC had a completely different set of challenges to face.

Several disturbing issues had surfaced around it, and were then widely reported in the media. A decision was made to get to the facts and openly address valid concerns, and not rely on media-related rumours and what was subsequently found to be exaggeration, which may or may not have been deliberate and self-serving; KPMG was appointed in May 1999 to audit the Royal Government's contributions to CMAC over 1993 to 1998, and then extended to cover all sources of funding including the UNDP Trust Fund (1997-98). In summary, the audit uncovered certain irregularities in the financial management of the RGC direct funds to CMAC, weaknesses in key processes, and mismanagement of cleared land in the case of land seizure by a former Khmer Rouge military leader in Kampot Province. It concluded that: "... the performance of the financial, management and operational activities was **seriously deficient** (*sic*) for the period from January 1997 to 31 December 1998. There was no irregularity uncovered regarding donor funds in the UNDP Trust Fund. Leading up to and throughout this time of crisis for CMAC there was also an element of internal friction within the UN project, between certain technical advisors and the then UN Programme Co-ordinator. This eventually resulted in the resignation of three technical advisors, when their chosen course of action received no support from CMAC, UNDP or UNOPS.

Part of the immediate response, some time before the issuance of the KPMG management audit report on 27 September, was the departure of the then CMAC Director-General in August 1999, followed by the reassigning of the Assistant Director-General to a position in the Governing Council, the withdrawal of the then UN Programme Co-ordinator and later on, the resignation of the Director of Operations and the demotion of the Director of Finance. In addition, the Manager, Deputy Manager and Operations Officer of DU 3, were all dismissed. The replacement of the

CMAC Director-General occurred immediately in August 1999. In midSeptember a short-term consultant with considerable experience in mine action programmes took on the responsibilities of UN Programme Co-ordinator, while a reform process was progressing intensively. At the

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end of his three-month contract in December, the consultant chose not to extend his assignment, and once again CMAC and the project team were without a Programme Co-ordinator. However, an acting Focal Point from within the project team was appointed until such time as a suitable candidate was identified, interviewed and mobilised. This person took up his post in early May 2000. Hence, there was a period (August 1999 - May 2000) when there were four project team leaders - the first Programme Co-ordinator, a short-term senior consultant as (acting) Programme Co-ordinator, an interim Focal Point and finally the current Programme Coordinator.

Not surprisingly, donor confidence in CMAC was seriously affected, and CMAC, assisted by UNDP took steps to address genuine concerns. At the same time as the management of the organisation and the project team were changed, the organisation was required to produce extensive reform programmes and institute new management procedures. In the key area of financial management, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was awarded a contract to verify CMAC expenditures under the Trust Fund as of June 1999, and continued to end -2000 with further extensions foreseen. Under the contract, CMAC is required to submit copies of all vouchers to PwC originally through UNDP, on a monthly basis, and PwC prepares a monthly report on their findings. In addition the government's direct contributions to CMAC were ceased in mid-1999, and subsequently channelled through the UNDP Trust Fund as of December 1999 when a contractual agreement was signed between UNDP and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, establishing the "Royal Government Fund" for CMAC.

To assist them in regaining confidence, donors requested two particular evaluations of CMAC: an Independent Assessment of the Reform Programme in CMAC, and a Socio-Economic Evaluation of CMAC's demined land. These were completed by May and July 2000 respectively. As a result of this series of external audits and evaluations regarding the organisation, processes and systems, there emerged a number of recommendations for specific reforms. In response to the recommendations, which had been endorsed by the donors, CMAC took steps to restructure its management and carry out reform throughout the whole organisation, at headquarters and in the field. This also involved the CMAC Governing Council.

Due to the situation that existed during and after the country-wide political events of 1997, CMAC Governing Council was not able to meet for most of 1998, and as such could only offer limited oversight of CMAC. It had offices at CMAC headquarters, and its primary role was to oversee the general operation of CMAC, to coordinate with donor countries, and to represent CMAC at international conferences. In December 1999 CMAC Governing Council moved to a separate office building, as part of the move towards establishing a separate regulatory authority. It maintained the same responsibilities as before, as well as trying to restore government and donor confidence in its oversight of CMAC operations and finances. Parliament and donors alike, subjected the Chairman of the Governing Council to considerable scrutiny regarding accountability, at this time. What was, and probably still is unusual about the Governing Council is that it has a number of full-time members and staff, including the Chairman and Treasurer. Although the background to this arrangement is believed to be of a historical and political nature, and any oversight arrangement is within the government's prerogative to decide, the efficacy and added value here have not been clear to donors.

## **2.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

By late 1999 CMAC began to experience a critical situation in relation to availability of funds.

Donors had been freezing their support gradually, and this put pressure on CMAC to continue the reform process based on the recommendations in the KPMG report. The Government began to redress this loss of donor confidence in a number of ways. One of the first was the preparation of the CMAC White Paper 2000 in late 1999, which set out a clear picture of the depth and breadth of reforms in five key areas - changes in (a) strategic structure and emphasis, (b) in overall management, (c) in organisational structure and deployments, (d) in field operational concepts, and (e) in work practices. Government was also assisted by UNDP's mobilisation of the two key review missions in early 2000 - independent assessment of the reform process, and the socio-economic study of land cleared. In addition, the Governing Council commissioned the preparation of a short "non-paper" on the proposed regulatory authority under the chairmanship of the GC chairman, as a basis for discussion with interested parties. One of the main recommendations of these reports was to remove the "regulatory", "national co-ordination" and "national socio-economic monitoring" (i.e. land use monitoring) functions of CMAC to another independent authority in order to ensure fair play in the regulation, co-ordination and assessment of the impact of all mine action operators (i.e. MAG, HALO Trust, etc.) in Cambodia. The reports also recommended greater collaboration amongst all stakeholders to determine national policy and workable objectives.

However, all this hard-earned goodwill suffered a setback in early September 2000. A perceived lack of substantive consultation by Government with donors, regarding the establishment of and appointments to the

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new Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), led to a withdrawal of critical funding on the part of certain donors. As the funding became scarce in 2000 CMAC first reduced office staff salary by 20% and cut other expenses in an attempt to maintain its operation at maximum capacity. This salary cut and the rumours about staff lay-offs badly affected CMAC staff morale and performance. With great reluctance the Prime Minister agreed to the suspension of CMAC's activities, except those funded directly under bilateral arrangements. on 13 October 2000, following the recommendations of the Governing Council in September 2000. As a result some staff resigned before CMAC had to lay off around 1937 de-miners including office personnel, on 13 November 2000. Many of the departures were at the upper level, which further weakened corporate knowledge, institutional memory and specialist skills levels.

By early September 2000, the responsibility of national co-ordination and regulation passed from the embryonic national regulatory authority answering to the Chairman of the Governing Council of CMAC, to CMAA. This action took away from CMAC a number of elements in its mandate, which were also covered in the project document. The Royal Government, in consultation with and support from UNDP, held a National Symposium on 16 November 2000 with participants from Donor Countries, International NGOs and agencies involved with mine action. This was presided over by the Prime Minister who has always taken a personal interest in demining matters. It was held with the view to enhancing national and international partnerships, under the principle of greater national ownership and leadership. Specifically it was to discuss the need for a national demining plan, clarifying role of the newly established CMAA, and the future of CMAC. As an initiative it led to a consensus that there were four key issues to be addressed. These were (a) to prepare a national demining plan in line with the national socio-economic development plan, (b) to focus the role and functions of CMAA through a genuinely consultative process in preparing a new sub-Decree, so that it was truly responsive to the needs of Cambodia and did not become another bureaucracy in search of an ever-enlarging and self-funding mission, (c) to re-shape CMAC as a service provider and to amend the relevant Decree, and (d) to clarify the status, functions and siting of the Governing Council in the light of the changes regarding CMAA and CMAC. As a result of this National Symposium and the on-going consultative process on the four key issues, donor confidence is once again increasing, and funds were pledged and committed towards CMAC's operations in and for the first half of 2001.



In light of the national symposium and the downsizing of CMAC, the Prime Minister approved the revised structure for CMAC on 30 January 2001. On 19 February, the Chief of Cabinet was appointed CMAC Deputy Director- General. Other key positions have been advertised and several new staff appointed in early May 2001. CMAC has now downsized its HQ to three departments with Operations and Planning merged into one Department. Also CMAC has started a new approach to de-mining by creating new Mobile Platoons, to allow more flexibility in its operation. CMAC has developed a strategy to move de-miners site camps closer to the fields to save time and cost of travelling. In addition, CMAC has now integrated and converted its DDU and PMU to CMAC DUs, resulting in there now being six DU's (including Siem Reap) and one Training Centre. On the 6 March 2001, a pre-steering committee donors' meeting was held at UNDP to discuss pertinent issues, which had not been resolved to date. At this meeting the donors pledged funds for the continuation of operations by CMAC. On 7 March 2001 the Steering Committee was successfully convened after several delays, leading to the Integrated Workplan & Budget 2001 being endorsed. The question of long-term pledges to CMAC, and to the mine action sector in general in Cambodia, has still to be resolved.

A chronology of key events is given (refer to Annex B.1).

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### **3. FINDINGS**

#### **3.1 MINE ACTION: THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE**

Management: The Cambodian Government is one of the world's foremost advocates and active participants in the Ottawa Convention. It has already enacted legislation to fulfil the requirements of the Convention, well ahead of many other countries similarly affected by landmines. The actual implementation of this legislation has had results, which are both encouraging and useful in identifying what needs to be done. In parallel, planning and management of mine action at the national level are vital for effectiveness and for maximising the return on scarce resources. It was intended that CMAC, as the national organisation mandated by government, would move into this role, particularly during this third phase. However, due for the most part to the crisis that struck CMAC in 1999-2000, national management of mine action has not progressed as far as had been hoped, under the CMAC project.

A number of important steps have been taken with initiatives such as the establishment of CMAA and the holding of the National Symposium. For understandable reasons, there has not been developed to date an effective long-term national strategy or national standards. For the same reasons it appears that effective national co-ordination is proving elusive, but the holding of regular meetings of the Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee (CDCC), coupled with the productive work of the Disability Action Committee (DAC) are steps in the right direction. Therefore, with the creation of the CMAA and in taking the opportunity to build on what has been done to date, the potential for these aspects to be quickly developed with a greater degree of credibility is considerable. It is anticipated that the CMAA may not be able to effectively develop without support and assistance from the international and national mine action communities. Priority must be given to seeing that quality and standards are established and maintained for all mine action activities, to ensure the confidence of beneficiaries, service providers and donors. The following areas require development at the national level:

- Legal Framework for the Authority and its Policies,
- Long Term National Strategy for Mine Action,
- National Standards for Mine Action,
- National Data Base for Mine Action (IMSMA),
- National Reporting System,

- National Work Plan,
  - National Policies on Mine Action,
  - External Quality Assurance,
  - National Accreditation and Licensing Procedures, and
  - Formation and implementation of the Mine Action Joint Working Group and subordinate Technical Working Groups. (Some of these are in place under different names)

In the early stages of the current project this responsibility was with CMAC. Some development did occur in this area in the second year namely, the Government Decrees including draft revisions and the Discussion Paper: *Mine Action within Cambodia beyond 2000*, for the National Symposium but little else was produced by way of a national document with national implications. International and national exposure of the project was maintained to a degree. The executive management of the programme, the Chairman of the Governing Council and the CMAC Director-General both raised the profile of CMAC and the project during this phase but unfortunately some of CMAC's hard-earned prestige was tarnished by the crisis of 1999/2000. Although the Treaty-related legislation is now operating, as indicated in the Landmine Monitor Report 2000, there is some concern over the effectiveness and the need for external confirmation of the destruction of stockpiles, but this can be addressed by the relevant authorities.

A major issue that arose in 1997 - 1998 was the question of land ownership before/after mine clearance. Rightly or wrongly, CMAC was criticised for not doing sufficient checking. This matter was studied in some detail in the socio-economic evaluation mission mobilised by UNDP in mid-2000. The conclusion was that land ownership and registry were issues beyond CMAC's control and responsibility, and were for central government to regulate. The TEM observes that a lot more structure and transparency have been brought to bear on these matters in the provinces, and this is to be commended and supported. At the central level, CMAA is expected to work closely with the Ministry of Land Management, Town Planning and Construction, which has been mandated to handle land ownership issues. Given the conflict and turmoil the country has experienced for so long, not surprisingly land issues are very sensitive and require careful handling .

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Mine Awareness: At this point Mine Awareness is co-ordinated through a Technical Working Group led by UNICEF. This component is dealt within a national perspective and through various implementing agencies, covering the four basic approaches:

- Direct Mine Awareness Approach,
- Mass Media Approach,
- Institutional Approach, and
- Community Based Approach. (just recently with the CMAC Community Based Mine Awareness Project {CBMAP}).

This component is linked to the HI/CRC Mine Victims database and to varying degrees to the parent agencies such as CMAC, MAG and HALO Trust work-plans. This component requires linking more effectively to the national strategy and national plan rather than standing alone as a national intervention. CMAC has taken an active role in being a member of the TWG and working closely to develop suitable approaches to address the issues. The field capacity is well developed and appears to be having an impact on casualty reduction. This cannot be confirmed in absolute terms, as there is no methodology for measuring this impact. This statement is supported by the findings in the UNICEF External Evaluation of UNICEF Supported Activities to Prevent Mine Incidents, dated June/July 2000. As indicated below there has been a marked decline in Mine Victims over the period:

Type Casualty	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Mine	2,369*	1,299	1,247	638	<b>432</b>
UXO	673	348	401	367	<b>367</b>
Unknown	4	4	37	0	0
Total	3,046	1810/1,651	1910/1,685	1032/1,005	<b>799**</b>

\*Figures in normal print were obtained from HI from the Mine and UXO Casualties in Cambodia, Bi-Annual Report 1998-1999 \*\*Figures in bold were extracted from the Monthly Mine Incident Reports

As can be seen in the table the reporting and data collection process by HI/CRC has and is further improving and a more accurate database is being developed. In a space of one year all figures have been updated for the last four years. This aside, there is a definite downward trend in casualties and this is also supported by the figures in the first two months of 2001 indicating a further 5% decrease. All of this is indicative of the hard work that all partners in mine action have been doing at all levels, and is to be commended.

Survey: The Canadian Government, through CIDA, is funding the National Socio-Economic Impact Survey (Level One Survey) which commenced in the year 2000. Prior to this there have been a number of attempts at capturing the data both by UNTAC and CMAC. At this point there is no standard approach to Level One Survey and data collection in the various implementing agencies although some attempts have been made in this area. CMAA can achieve standardisation through the National Standards and licensing procedures. Standardisation will ensure comprehensive, accurate and useable data is collected that will be easily placed into the database. Mine Victim (Disabled) survey is currently a separate project by HI/CRC and hopefully this data will be able to be retrofitted into the CMAA national database. The CMAC has not developed a comprehensive approach to survey but has identified this as a requirement for the future. This is one of the areas in need of greatest attention, and in this respect CMAC was not able to achieve its objective in the 1996-2000 Five-Year Strategy.

Clearance: The national priorities for clearance are not currently co-ordinated, and to a certain degree implementers have chosen their own areas of operation. Allocation of resources to the provinces/regions is not managed, which it ought to be, to ensure national priorities are fulfilled. Quality and standards of clearance are not nationally identified and enforced, but vary from implementing agency to agency. There are currently at least six organisations undertaking various approaches: MAG, HALO Trust, RCAF, UXB, PMU (DU6 under COFRAC/CIDEV contract) and CMAC. There is no External Quality Assurance on the products of these organisations. The outputs of these agencies are considerable:

RCAF -	36,329,039 square metres, 1994-2000 (3,940,000 sq.m. 1994-1999)
UNTAC -	5,479,850 square metres, 1992
CMAC -	75,624,212 square metres, 1992-2000
COFRAC/CIDEV -	13,080,000 square metres- 1993-1998
UXB -	Figure not provided.

MAG -	4,505,895 square metres, 1992-2000.
HALO Trust -	10,570,000 square metres, 1992-2000

**TOTAL: 145,588,996 square metres (14,558.9 hectares or 145.6 sq. Km)**

The figures shown in brackets indicate the figures shown in the Landmine Monitor Report, whereas the figure 1994-2000 against RCAF is the one stated by the RCAF commander recently in a meeting. This cannot be verified by the TEM. The figures against COFRAC/CIDEV and HALO Trust are figures provided through CMAC Database. These issues aside, the figures indicate a substantial amount of area cleared (145 square kilometres) since 1992. As there is no QA and no trend analysis of mine accidents in cleared areas, the assumption is that the clearance is being conducted at a reasonable standard. A substantial internal and external QA system would provide a greater degree of comfort in the quality of the product and service.

Until the Level One Survey is completed and entered into the IMSMA, it is difficult (but not impossible) to develop national work-plans through CMAA. Some attempt could be made once the National Strategy is prepared, to develop a national work-plan using existing data from both the CMAC and HI/CRC databases. This will allow the earliest allocation of scarce resources in accordance with national priorities and work-plans, whilst retaining flexibility to accommodate the final Level One survey results.

Information and Data: Data and information for all aspects of Mine Action are not centralised nor standardised. CMAC has established a sound database and attempted to capture national data. However, the data are incomplete, and CMAC has had difficulty ensuring the support of other agencies. As indicated in the report on Accounting for Land Cleared by CMAC, dated 7 December 1999, CMAC internal processes have not supported the accuracy of this database as well. To get the clearance data indicated above, each agency had to be individually approached to provide the data. The accuracy of this data is of concern, specifically the COFRAC/CIDEV figures. At this point each programme/agency has its own database and methodology for gathering information for the database. There is no single capacity available to identify (a) total areas cleared, (b) areas to be cleared, or (c) areas marked. Additionally there is no central mapping capacity at this time. Without these capacities it will be difficult to make an initial national strategy. The German Project Cooperation (GPC) is developing the IMSMA system with database and GIS for CMAA. This centralised capacity will complement the Level One Survey currently being conducted. It will also require implementing agencies to use standardised formats. It is anticipated that field modules will be available for implementing agencies, ministries and provincial land usage committees such as PRDC and LUMU/LUPU. The database for mine victims is currently held with CRC and HI. It has been identified that the data can be retro-fitted into the IMSMA. There have been a number of TWG in this component managed by CMAA, however, it appears that GPC and GeoSpatial Inc. were not aware of such a TWG. These are two key players that must be included in future TWG.

Mine Victim Support: This component is handled under the disabled sector and led by DAC, which in international terms, is a unique organisation for a developing country. This sector is well co-ordinated, effective and has a high profile with many agencies involved. The only concern from the Mine Action point of view is its lack of strong linkage to Mine Action. There are some interventions that are driven by specific individuals and agencies, such as the linkage with the CMAC CMAP and Mine Victim Awareness programme by W RF. These linkages are the exception rather than the rule, and more effort should be placed on integrated and related activities with Mine Action. The disabled working group is in place and functioning. Representation at this TWG by CMAA would be a good step toward linkage. The main areas for CMAA to become involved are advocacy, co-ordination of activities, data collection and information provision. At this point very little is happening from the national Mine Action perspective regarding co-ordination of this component.

Human Resource Development: An exceptionally high-quality human resource capacity has been developed at the site team level, including supervisors, in CMAC, HALO and MAG. This is to be commended. The management and support capacities are still being developed to varying degrees in the different agencies. Regardless, of agency, Cambodia now has human resource assets that at the field to middle management level for Mine Action are of international standard. (

This topic will be developed in details in section 3.5). It is in the development of senior to executive management that CMAC has lagged behind due to the turmoil, loss of key staff and the subsequent loss of corporate knowledge. All department heads in CMAC have changed since 1998, thereby losing 5 years of experience, training and corporate knowledge. This has in turn been further exacerbated through promotions has drawn on the middle management, thereby weakening this solid base of managers. This coupled with the fact that these positions are generally controlled by expatriate staff in MAG and HALO Trust, the national capacity is weak in this area and requires further development and exposure to international Mine Action. The TA Training Management has developed a Team Leader and a

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Supervisors course. In addition Cranfield University is preparing a Middle Managers and a Supervisors training courses. The Senior Managers course will be again conducted this year.

## 3.2 THE PROJECT

### 3.2.1 CMAC Strategy: 1996 -2000

To understand the project it is important to first understand what CMAC had achieved by the end of phase (II) and what it was hoping to do in the new phase. CMAC Strategy at the time of designing the project (February

- June 1998) was titled: *Clearing the Path Ahead; Five Year Strategy: May 1996 - December 2000.*

This plan

recognised that the scope of work to be done was still being estimated, and had set a number of high priorities. These were (a) conducting of intensive verification and surveying exercises to determine, with confidence, the location and dimensions of all reported minefields, (b) conducting a thorough appraisal of the UXO problem, and to make recommendations for addressing it, and (c) formulate a National Demining Plan to serve as a co-ordinating tool for all organisations working in demining in Cambodia, which would serve as a direct input to the national reconstruction and development plan. The Strategy was to be subject to annual review regarding achievements, with revisions being made as necessary and submitted for Governing Council and Steering Committee approvals.

The second phase project - the Assistance to De-mining Programmes; CMB/96-003 (TA) CMB/93-A07(Trust Fund), attempted to assist CMAC to address these and other issues in the period July 1996 - June 1998 . It was always recognised that this project would only be able to assist CMAC in part, as the time-frame did not extend to the end of the five-year period covered by the CMAC Strategy. In February 1998, the In-depth Evaluation Mission assessed CMAC's performance against the two objectives and associated milestones of the Strategy including Plan components and their respective goals. At the same time it reaffirmed the relevance of the Strategy, at that time.

### 3.2.2 Long-term National Strategy

One of the key issues brought out in the report of the In-depth Evaluation of Phase (II) project ( February 1998) was that CMAC needed to understand that it had a broader role beyond that of purely being a demining operator, as the mine action centre for the country. For a number of reasons, some within and some outside the control of CMAC, the formulation of a National Demining Plan had not proceeded as had been hoped, by the end of phase (II). Hence, one of the recommendations from that evaluation was for CMAC to develop a comprehensive National Demining Plan itself that incorporates NGO and commercial requirements for resources. By doing so it was expected that CMAC would broaden its view of its goals by incorporating other agencies

financial requirements into its long-range planning. This would allow CMAC to have a greater impact by funding other mine action agencies whenever resources allowed. One of the expectations were that if this higher role was fulfilled, that there would be greater co-operation and co-ordination in the field, with all players collectively being more effective and complementary.

### 3.2.3 Needs Assessment 1997-98

As well as the needs of CMAC being reported in the progress reports, there were two important needs assessment missions in the period leading up to the framing and formulation of the current phase (III) project. These were (a) the mandatory Capacity Assessment Mission in September-October 1997, and (b) the In-depth Evaluation of phase (II) project, in February 1998.

Both missions recognised that CMAC had grown considerably since the start of phase (II) - July 1996, and that there were many challenges, internal and external, ahead for CMAC. In particular, the rapid growth of the organisation placed heavy demands on CMAC for greater management, planning, decision-making, delegation and communications skills at the various levels of management and supervision. In addition, given that there was no separate authority for prioritising minefields and no National Development Plan, it fell to CMAC to introduce a planning capacity that would apply socio-economic analytical tools and techniques, so as to determine priority sites in a transparent manner. This was to involve rigorous data collection, local consultation and participation, ownership of the process at provincial level, transparent land title certification, and post-clearance assessment of benefits accruing to target beneficiaries. Other needs identified included greater information sharing and quality assurance.

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### 3.2.4 Project Concept and Design

The concept of the phase (III) project was clear - build on the achievements of CMAC in the first two phases (November 1993 - June 1998) and support CMAC in fulfilling the final two years (approximately) of the then current Five-Year Strategy. It was founded in the main on the recommendations of the two previously mentioned assessment or evaluation missions. The project was to have the same three parallel strands as phases (1) and (II), and these strands had to be closely inter-linked if the project was to be successfully delivered:

- Provide financial resources, contributed by donors, to cover CMAC's operations in line with its mandate and the Five-Year Strategy (- phase II only),
- Channel in-kind contributions for specialised military personnel contributed by donors, to provide technical and operational advice,
- Ensure institution building assistance through the provision, from UNDP core resources, of technical advisors in the areas of leadership, planning, as well as administrative and financial management.

The initial formulation was prepared by the In-depth Evaluation Mission (February 1998), in consultation with CMAC and the donor community, finalised and signed on 9 July 1998. Given the wider scope of the project as reflected in the increased number of objectives and outputs, it was to be expected that the budget (net of AOS) for TA would also be increased.

	Phase (I)	Phase (II)	Phase (III)
Immediate Objectives	5	5	7
Outputs	5	5	9

Time-frame - planned	2 years	2 years	<b>2 years</b>
Time-frame - actual	2.5 years	2 years	<b>3 years*</b>
Period - actual	Nov/93 - June/96	July/96 - June /98	July/98 - June /01
Budget - (TA only)	USD 801,500	USD 1,504,000	<b>USD 1,800,000</b>

. = agreement currently in force.

The seven Immediate Objectives of the project were:

In the Project Document the activities necessary to deliver individual outputs, were given in some detail, along with numerous success indicators. The executing agency for the project is identified as UNOPS. The institutional arrangements described the situation as existed in mid-1998 namely, the central role of CMAC for responding to the problem of land mines and UXO's in Cambodia. This role is recognised where the text (p.11) refers to the Director-General of CMAC serving as the Project Manager of the UNDP project, with clearly defined duties and responsibilities. The UNDP/CMAC agreement covers the use of the Trust Fund, and has terms of reference attached that identify four (sub-) programmes of Mine Awareness, Mine Area Reduction, Land Mine and UXO Clearance, and Training, all of which are cross-referenced in the Project Document. Again, in the section on Implementing Arrangements (p.18) there is clear indication that over the course of the phase (III) project steps would be taken towards full National Execution. The expectation was by the end of the project, if not sooner, it would be possible for the CMAC Director-General to assume full financial national execution responsibility for all CMAC operations. Hence, the listed activities correctly fall within CMAC's responsibility. Given the general achievements that had been made by CMAC over phase (II), the anticipated progression towards full financial national execution was not unreasonable. Hence, the finding is that the project as designed was relevant to the national needs in 1998.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Interventions for Casualty Reduction (- 2 Outputs)

Verification/Area Reduction Activities (- 1 Output)

Land mine and UXO Clearance Operations (- 2

Outputs) Land mine / UXO Information and

Planning (- 1 Output)

Ownership through Institutional/Corporate Development (- 1 Output)

Ownership through Human Resources and Capacity Building (- 1

Output) Regulatory Functions (- 1 Output).

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### 3.2.5 Project Strategy, Institutional Arrangements and Funding

The aim of this third phase was to build the capacity within CMAC to take full control of aspects of demining within its mandate - planning, operations, awareness, regulatory, and to emerge at the end of the two-year period with sufficient skills to manage with minimum technical assistance in the future. The work by CMAC was to be undertaken in four core programmes - mine awareness, mine information, mined area clearance, and training programme, funded by donors through the Trust Fund or bilaterally. There is a correspondence between these four programmes and six out of the seven objectives in the project document. The forecast budgets (net of admin. or AOS charges) for these CMAC core programmes were, as of May-June 1998:

Year "1"

Year "2"

Sub-totals

Mine Awareness	Mine Information	Mine Clearance	Training	Management + CMAC o/head
520,000	1,460,000	9,060,000	530,000	772,000
520,000	1,460,000	9,060,000	530,000	772,000
1,040,000	2,920,000	18,120,000	1,060,000	1,544,000
		Grand Total	24,684,000	
		TA only (b)	1,800,000	

Notes: (a) Values USD, (b) TA budget is not included in the Grand Total.

The Project Document states that the intention is to start with UNOPS executing the project followed by a phased introduction of National Execution modality, by the end of Phase III. In effect CMAC was to carry out all activities as *de-facto* executing agency, assisted by various technical advisors and experts on mission. One issue here is that given the comprehensive scope of the project objectives, outputs and the supplementary agreement, the budget (forecast or estimated) for CMAC's operations could have been included in the project document. The funding for technical assistance was to come from UNDP (TRAC 1.1.3) funding and from a cost-sharing arrangement with Australia.

The main focus of technical assistance was to continue with experts and advisors assisting CMAC staff in institutional and human resources development. The forecast was that the number of advisors/experts would be a minimum of 58, covering replacements, for Year "1". The expectation was that this number would reduce in Year "2", but the exact figures would have to await the achieving of milestones, set during the first year. What has not been spelt out in the project document, and understandably so, was the environment in which the project was to operate and to act as a catalyst for change. Through numerous interviews the Mission has learnt that the presence of so many technical advisors and experts at the time of project initiation (July 1998) was such that CMAC national staff - operatives and supervisors, felt insecure. Furthermore, national staff were not inclined to take decisions without reference to an expert or technical advisor. Hence, there is a subtext underlying the project design namely, how to encourage national staff to take more initiative at all levels, independently of experts and advisors. This perspective must be balanced against concerns that there was little or no delegation of authority in the earlier stage of this phase, whether for cultural or political reasons is not known. If decision-making was indeed centralised within CMAC at that time, then this would throw a different light on how national staff may have been inclined to use advisors and experts to make decisions for them.

CMAC senior management believed at the time of project formulation that a gradual approach to reducing military-related experts/advisors to more manageable terms, and to increasing the number of developmentfocusing advisors over time, on an as-required basis, was the best way forward. This strategy was not without risk and potential confrontation, as there were those present in the organisation whose interests would not be served by a more open approach that focused on strengthening national ownership, leadership and decisionmaking. Hence, the strategy as set down in the project document was for support to be extended to CMAC to implement the then remaining 2.5 years of the Five-Year Strategy. CMAC was to undertake major operational, organisational and managerial tasks, utilising resources not only from UNDP but also from other donors. In this regard UNDP was to assist CMAC to mobilise and co-ordinate additional financial and advisory support. The flexibility of this approach was such that support for activities not foreseen in the Strategy could be prepared through CMAC, for Steering Committee and Governing Council review and approval. The Steering Committee is a review and advisory body for CMAC, chaired by Government and with representatives from other national bodies and the donor community. The Governing Council is the body charged by Government to oversee CMAC's activities, and to give guidance and direction to CMAC through regular monitoring of its operational and financial performance.



Hence, the design was correct in so far as it promoted CMAC as the *de-facto* project executing agency, including co-ordination responsibility, for delivering the listed outputs, assisted by UNDP, UNOPS and other donors. (This will be developed in greater detail in section 3.5). An analysis of the reporting and coordination is given (refer to Annex B.2).

The support for CMAC was to be funded through a number of modalities, which acknowledged a range of options for the Government and donors alike. The UNDP-administered Trust Fund had been the primary choice for many donors, for reasons of proven track record, simplicity, transparency and accountability. It was expected that this trend would continue, but also due recognition was given to those donors who wished to enter bilateral agreements directly with CMAC, including in-kind support. So as to facilitate CMAC adopting a longer and more stable planning horizon, donors were requested to make multi-year contributions. This did not transpire, and is a weakness inherent in mine action projects, irrespective of country or conflict status.

### 3.2.6 Risk Analysis

The project document identifies some of the risks that UNDP and CMAC believed could adversely affect the achievement of the seven project objectives. These included - military instability/insecurity, clearance prioritisation and disputes over the disposition or use of cleared land, composition of the Governing Council, lack of government resources, lack of trust fund resources, sustainability (of the project design/concept). The text acknowledges that these risks are not particular to demining as such, but rather characterises the environment for development in Cambodia, as of mid-1998. These risks are a reasonable listing. Even at time of formulation it had been flagged that Government was significantly behind in its disbursement of its contribution to CMAC (p.21). In addition, it recognised that CMAC did not control the process of land ownership and distribution, before or after demining, and the move towards closer co-operation and liaison with Provincial Rural Development Committees. However, it did not prevent CMAC from being criticised, rightly or wrongly, for its association with the land dispute in Kampot Province that was to surface later.

Not surprisingly, there is no reference to the down-side risks that could arise out of the problems that were to overwhelm CMAC in 1999. Nevertheless, there is an implied risk under *lack of trust fund* resources namely, any event or action that shake donors' confidence in the integrity of CMAC would have an adverse effect on the flow of pledges and commitments. As it turned out this is what happened, and to a degree, is still happening today.

### 3.2.7 Project Implementation

The progress of the project was affected by the crisis of 1999-2000, in many ways, but not exclusively so. First there was the loss of self-confidence throughout CMAC due to the allegations of wrongdoing and the widespread negative media coverage. Secondly, there was the departure of senior managers. Thirdly, there was the re-organisation and reform process brought about as a result of the management audit and evaluations. Fourthly, there was the slow-down in donor commitments, starting in late 1999 and to a degree, still continuing. Fifthly, there was the changes to the leadership of the technical assistance team over a ninemonth period starting with the departure of the first Programme Co-ordinator, followed by the short-term assignment of a mine action specialist, then an interim period with a Focal Point, finally ending with the arrival of the present Programme Co-ordinator. Other factors have been identified as the worst floods in many decades in 2000, which proved highly disruptive for the whole of government, the proposed reforms of the national mine action sector culminating in the establishment of CMAA, the short-term assignments for certain experts on mission, the turnover of technical advisors for a variety of reasons, less than optimal use of resources from all sources in the field, and other factors.

An assessment of progress towards the Outputs listed in the project document, is given (refer to

### Annex B.3). **3.2.8 Co-ordination**

There are several levels of co-ordination required on a project as large and complex as this. At the highest level, there is the formal co-ordination necessary for donors and the Government, to share information and exchange views, review progress, constraints and funding, and to take decisions regarding the direction of and support to mine action in Cambodia. The Steering Committee is the mechanism on this project, chaired by the Prime Minister's Representative and is attended by CMAC, all donors and participating UN agencies, and other government bodies in mine action. The Steering Committee meets approximately every six months, and is the highest level decision-making body regarding approval of CMAC's workplan, budget and funds. Key documentation is the Integrated Work-Plan for the year, the Budget required to implement the IWP, and the Financial Statement. The next level is Donor Co-ordination. This has been facilitated by UNDP over the duration of all three phases, and is the forum for information exchange and operationalising funding pledges

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against forecast funding requirements. Meetings are held on an as-required basis, and over the period of crisis within CMAC, there were many such meetings supplemented by smaller gatherings as well, all chaired by UNDP. Key documentation is the UNDP-issued Donor Update, the CMAC progress report, major assessment/evaluation reports completed since the previous meeting, and additional information as required.

The third level of co-ordination is the Tripartite Project Review (CMAC/UNDP/UNOPS), which is held annually. The meetings are attended by one or more Government agencies such as Ministry of Economy and Finance, as well as the three parties directly involved in the project namely, CMAC, UNDP and UNOPS. Key documentation includes the Annual Project Report, the Programme Co-ordinator's presentation, and the Notes or Minutes of the meeting itself. The TPR's to date have been held on 17 June 1999 and 27 June 2000. The fourth level of co-ordination is at CMAC where there are Directors' Executive Committee meetings, held on a weekly basis since late 1998 whenever possible, also involving technical advisors. The fifth level is at the project level where the Programme Co-ordinator convenes a weekly meeting of Senior Technical Advisors, supplemented by a general TA meeting once a month. This forum allows advisors and experts on mission, irrespective of donor agency or affiliation, to discuss issues regarding co-ordination of assistance. Supporting documentation now includes the monthly reports submitted by all technical advisors to the Programme Coordinator, following closely the UNOPS Mine Action Unit reporting format. In addition to these levels, there is also co-ordination at the international level, globally, through the efforts of various UN agencies. This is manifested in the development of international standards, level one surveys, IMSMA, and similar activities.

All of the above have been supplemented by ad-hoc meetings at various levels, which were particularly important during the period of crisis 1999 - 2000. A schedule of co-ordination meetings regarding CMAC and/or the project is attached, (refer to Annex B.4). This is not complete, but is a good indication of the high level of co-ordination that has been achieved by UNDP and CMAC. But meetings alone are not the whole answer. The question of responsiveness to partners needs must also be examined.

The first responsibility of UNDP, and by extension, UNOPS, must be to Government. On this project Government is represented by organisations at different levels - CMAC, CMAC Governing Council, the new CMAA, the Steering Committee (with donors) and perhaps higher. Regarding CMAC it can be found that UNDP had a proper and supportive relationship throughout the course of phase III, building on the dialogue and trust of the earlier two phases. This manifested itself in many different ways, and to date the relationship appears to positive, dynamic and beneficial.

UNDP is considered as a trusted partner, with the interests of the people at heart, bringing considerable information and experience in mine action to CMAC and others. UNDP is considered as including the project team based at CMAC, where the various Programme Co-ordinators, amongst others, have been important contributors. The relationship with the Governing Council is slightly more removed, due to the GC's responsibility for oversight of CMAC, which must take into account the input and support from UNDP. Nevertheless, there has been considerable exchange of information and support, particularly during the crisis period. As of October 2000, UNDP has administering RGC trust funds for supporting the Governing Council as well as CMAC, in accordance with the rules and regulations set down by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

The emergence of the CMAA, which was not envisaged at the formulation stage of phase (III), has given rise to further opportunities for policy dialogue and enhancing regulatory transparency in mine action. In this regard, UNDP has been responsive to Government's needs, ranging from briefing and advising the Prime Minister concerning the national symposium (November 2000), to advising and assisting the CMAA SecretaryGeneral on actions and inputs needed for the formulation of a national demining strategy. UNDP's efforts, including the work of the various Programme Co-ordinators over the years, in promoting and facilitating policy dialogue in the area of mine action has been appreciated by Government and donors alike. For example, the process leading up to as well as the preparation of the discussion papers (where the Programme Co-ordinator made a significant contribution) for the National Symposium in November 2000, coupled with the giving of an important paper by the ERD Team Leader at the same event, and the more recent CMAA discussion at UNDP on outlining the steps for preparing a National Demining Strategy, have all reflected well on the impact of UNDP in this key area of policy development.

The second responsibility of UNDP is towards the donors, (a) who contribute funds for CMAC's operations, through the Trust Fund, and (b) who are contributing bilaterally and directly to CMAC's operations, and who wish to ensure that their assistance is co-ordinated within a framework for CMAC. As discussed above, UNDP has endeavoured to facilitate and give leadership to a co-ordinated programme of technical assistance to CMAC. This requires information exchange, regular meetings, briefings and updates, specialist advice, circulating assessment and evaluation mission reports, commenting on proposed legislation and decrees, collaboration with visiting donor missions, and other services, all of which UNDP appears to have provided. The work of UNDP and the project team in assisting CMAC to prepare for the Steering Committee meetings is widely acknowledged and appreciated. The fielding of assessment and evaluation missions and also

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specialist missions, including pre- and post-consultations with CMAC and the donors, has been a regular feature of UNDP's active involvement. The same applies to the fielding of independent auditors, as well as the verification exercise also undertaken by a reputable, independent firm.

As might be expected in a crisis situation of the magnitude that faced CMAC, donors sought to ensure that their funds were not involved. This was confirmed by the KPMG audit, in 1999. However, there appears to have been differing perceptions and expectations regarding the nature and extend of UNDP's, and by extension UNOPS's, oversight of CMAC particularly in the area of financial management. In order to clarify this, it is useful to re-visit the project fundamentals.

The UNDP technical assistance project, executed by UNOPS, is about building up national capacity to lead, manage and deliver mine action initiatives and services appropriate to Cambodia, in a transparent and accountable manner. Advisors are there to support and assist counterparts at different levels just like in previous phases, and this was explicitly stated in the project document (p.19). The foundation for effective capacity building is the formation of trust between advisor and counterparts, leading to mutual respect and to open dialogue about the true needs of the intended beneficiaries and their organisation. A critical part of skills or knowledge transfer in any situation world-wide, is encouraging beneficiaries to test the validity of what has been learned. The key here is that the process, as represented by the advisor/trainer, permits the

beneficiaries to test and experiment so as to ensure a sound understanding. In doing so it is accepted that mistakes will sometimes be made, for a variety of reasons. What is not acceptable is for poor or insufficient understanding on the part of the beneficiaries, to go uncorrected. This is when the advisor and beneficiaries jointly examine the extent, trend and nature of misunderstandings and errors. From time to time this can lead to changes in procedures, documentation, equipment and training. Hence, testing by beneficiaries should be considered a two-way process. Where difficulties creep in is when external parties expect advisors to adopt, formally or informally, the position of "policeman" or "auditor". This is contrary to the fundamental ethos of capacity building and is also highly disruptive to trust-forming efforts, so vital for establishing a nurturing, nonthreatening learning environment.

The primary responsibility and liability for financial management has always rested with the national organisation. As the project is now in its third phase, it would be a disappointing indictment of national capabilities on all fronts, if CMAC could not manage funds from all sources. With specific reference to accountability in financial management, capacity building has been focussing on strengthening processes and systems, as well as enhancing beneficiaries' skills. It is through proper processes and systems, including auditing and verification that a sustainable national capacity is built that fosters transparency and accountability, and it is on these areas that the technical assistance concentrated. Capacity is not built by having advisors and trainers acting as internal auditors on a project. So that the beneficiaries can test the improved processes, systems and training, CMAC has to be primary actor in managing the donors' fund. Errors can be expected and gaps will be revealed, but as before, these should be picked up through the audits, verification and GC oversight exercises. This in no way condones or accepts deliberately fraudulent behaviour.

As has been shown by the actions of the Government, Parliament and CMAC in response to the findings of the KPMG management audit in 1999, people are being held accountable. If this is not sufficient, and donors want direct supervision and verification by advisors regarding the use of their own fund, then completely different arrangements need to be negotiated with the Government and with CMAC in particular. It is to be noted that moves in this direction cannot be considered capacity building - which is founded on trust, but rather as policing/auditing, which is founded on mistrust. Perhaps what is missing on the part of some donors is an acknowledgement that capacity building, and development in general, is not a risk-free enterprise. Successful donors, including the UN system, who have built real partnerships with developing countries, have long recognised this.

Since the start of this project, there has been a concerted effort to strengthen financial management processes and systems. There are now annual audits undertaken by an internationally-recognised firm, a significant computer-based package (Sunsystems), which when finally operationalised and fine-tuned in the coming months, will give considerable real-time financial control across all areas of CMAC's work - operations, logistics, supplies, procurement, personnel, equipment and so on, subject always in such situations, to the quality of data input and verification. In addition to the annual audits, CMAC and UNDP have put in place a monthly checking exercise with PriceWaterhouse Coopers, since late 1999. As might be expected in such a major decentralised organisation as CMAC - HQ, five/six DUs and a Training Centre, there are queries from PwC every month, and these are being resolved. Final reports from PwC for FY 2000 are expected by end-April. One issue is that whereas the original feedback from PwC was to have been on a monthly basis, this does not seem to be the case to date, for a number of reasons. These have been addressed and should lead to a faster turn-around in future. This will embed good accounting practice in

CMAC further, as part of the strengthening of the integrity of the financial management system. There is the issue of raising the awareness of the management team regarding its core responsibility for ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of financial management as applied

throughout CMAC. Key procedures for financial management have recently been finished, and are being reviewed. At time of writing this report the Audit exercises for the Trust Fund for the period 1999 - 2000 were under way. Overall there is a noticeable increase in confidence in financial management - processes, systems and procedures.

### 3.2.9 Reporting and Monitoring

The essence of the project reporting and monitoring system is that those who have oversight responsibilities check whether CMAC is monitoring its own progress against agreed plans and budgets, through interrogation of quarterly and six-monthly progress reports and six-monthly financial statements.

The requirements for reporting are covered under three headings - (1) those that are given in Section H of the project document regarding (a) the progress of the work-plan and budget, and which are to be prepared and submitted by CMAC and the project team on a quarterly basis, and (b) the six-monthly progress report and financial statement that must be prepared and submitted by the CMAC Director-General to the CMAC Steering Committee, (2) those that are specified in the Contractual Agreement, including the Terms of Reference, between UNDP and CMAC regarding the use of the Trust Funds, and for all intents and purposes, reflect the requirement in (1.b) above, and (3) those that are required of UNDP in accordance with Trust Fund agreements it has signed with various donors. The Programme Co-ordinator, under items (1.q) and (1.r) of his Terms of Reference as attached as annex 4(1) to the project document, is to assist the CMAC Director-General in preparing the necessary reports for submission to the Steering Committee and to UNDP/UNOPS. In addition he is to monitor budgets for both the Trust Fund and the TRAC1.1.3 (TA) projects, track expenditures against both projects and propose amendments to the respective budgets. It is not clear how the Programme Co-ordinator was expected to do this, other than relying on CMAC's accounting system which itself was to be improved during the course of this phase of the project.

No specific report format is requested of CMAC or the Programme Co-ordinator in the project document, other than the Terms of Reference attached to the Contractual Agreement saying: "... the report (i.e. the sixmonthly progress report) will describe clearly in sufficient detail for each of the four sub-programmes the targets of work/activities which had been planned for the period and those actually achieved, any problem encountered which impeded or delayed achievement of targets. The report will include a full Financial Statement including detail per the attached sample Format for the period under consideration...". This raises a question for the CMAC Director-General and the Programme Co-ordinator - how much detail is actually required in the report? The best way to gauge this is to ask the recipients of the report if it is helping them. After all, the recipients and users of a report are the true "owners" of a report. As far as can be ascertained, some feedback is being given regarding the reports coming from CMAC, that is if the discussion at the Steering Committee No. 13 held on 7 March 2001 is indicative of donor requirements. The annual report for the year 2000, is expected to be issued by CMAC by the end of April 2001.

The fall-out from the period of crisis 1999-2000, has led all parties to be much more cautious, sceptical and risk-averse, to the extent that gaining progress has not been easy in both de-mining and in capacity building. CMAC and UNDP have worked closely to maximise the benefits of co-ordinating technical assistance, and CMAC recognises that UNDP is the correct focal point for co-ordinating the efforts to date and for re-building confidence. One very encouraging aspect of this has been that the current Programme Co-ordinator has been able to obtain consensus amongst all Technical Assistance personnel on a *modus operandi* regarding coordination of work-plans, priorities, reporting, information exchange and problem solving.

There has been a major shift in attitude amongst advisors and experts since the beginning of phase (III) to what is a shared commitment today for promoting the good of mine action and of CMAC. Although the project document (p.19) states that: "... irrespective of the source of international advisor (*sic*) it is agreed that all international advisors will function under the overall co-ordination of the Programme Co-ordinator...". It is not clear on how such a commitment can be

binding on parties who are not signatories to the project document, unless the project document or the co-ordinating role of the Programme Co-ordinator is specifically mentioned in the individual agreements between CMAC and the donors. Examination of those agreements accessible by the TEM, suggests that this is not always the case (refer to Annex B.2). Again the project document (p.20) identifies the scale and range of experts on mission, but it does not convey what the DHA Report has termed "the conceptual gulf" between (military) experts focussing on improving operations, and (civilian) advisors focussing on management and development. It would not be correct to say that such a gulf exists here, but there are differences, however slight. The priority must be in getting the best-qualified and suitably experienced person for any particular advisory or expert post, irrespective of which type of organisation they are representing or their individual background. There is now agreement that all advisors and experts,

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irrespective of funding source, will prepare a monthly progress report, which follows the UNOPS format (see below). This in turn allows the Programme Co-ordinator to build upon the various submissions, and to prepare his summary report for CMAC, UNDP and UNOPS. So as to complete the information/feedback loop, he also shares his findings and analysis with the full complement of technical advisors and experts.

The reporting format in UNOPS mine action is:

- CTA's report
- Objectives and Outputs of the month just finished
- Review of other TA's reports (- attached as annexes)
- Challenges and Bottlenecks
- UN and Head Office Support Requirements
- Next month's Objectives and Outputs
- Conclusions

The project document (p.19) is clear on the planning and reporting requirements for technical assistance, from all sources, to the CMAC Director-General. However, as mentioned above, it is not clear on how such a commitment can be binding on parties who are not signatories to the project document, unless the project is specifically mentioned in the individual agreements between CMAC and the donors. Again, examination of those agreements accessible by the TEM, suggests that this is not always the case (refer to Annex B.2). Whereas some reports from UNDP/UNOPS technical advisors have been sighted by the TEM, it is understood that CMAC Director-General has had very little by way of assignment plans, targets and reports from advisors and experts funded by other donors. This situation is now improving with the co-ordinated report system now in place through the Programme Co-ordinator. Perhaps one area for greater co-operation and added value is in the sharing of progress information between CMAC/Programme Co-ordinator and the UNDP (CO) Programme Management Unit, once requirements are known.

### **3.2.10 Project Management, Backstopping and Support**

The phase (III) project has three components - CMAC operations, the operation of the Trust Fund, and the provision of technical assistance. As stated in the project document, although UNOPS is the Executing Agency, CMAC is in fact the actual project management and implementing agency. In the project document (p.21) it was suggested that whereas CMAC was strongest in the area of operations, it had capacity in planning, administration and finance, and by implication the capacity to manage the project. This view is supplemented by the statement (p.11) regarding the CMAC Director-General serving as the Project Manager, and by the General Considerations of the Terms of Reference (p.1) attached to the Contractual Agreement between CMAC and UNDP regarding the Trust Fund.

In previous phases UNOPS was not only the Trust Fund Manager, but also the co-ordinated

backstopping of the project by UNDP (Country Office) and UNOPS as the Executing Agency. For earlier phases and up until 30 June 1999, UNOPS Asia Office (based in Kuala Lumpur) was responsible for both the Trust Fund management and the technical assistance. After this date, responsibility was transferred to the Mine Action Unit, based at UNOPS headquarters in New York, which has responsibility for mine action programmes in a number of countries world-wide. After much deliberation UNDP decided to manage the Trust Fund itself during this third phase for two reasons - to give greater impetus to the move towards NEX, by having an interim DEX period, and to increase the net funds available to CMAC by eliminating the AIDS for the Agency responsible for managing the Trust Fund. This meant that there was a period in 1998/99 of closing out the original general trust fund (CMB/93-A07/5A) under UNOPS, and the building up in 1999 the new general trust fund under UNDP (CMB/98-A03/5A) which became operational in June 1999. The same applies to the Swedish trust fund namely, CMB/93-A03/5Y became CMB/98-A06/IP, effective September 2000.

The UNDP Country Office (CO) has been pro-active in the management of the Trust Funds and in the backstopping of the project throughout. Originally the team at UNDP (CO) consisted of an Assistant Resident Representative (ARR) and a Programme Officer (PO), who operated in close consultation with both the Resident Representative and Deputy Resident Representative. Whereas the ARR and the PO had responsibilities for other projects, there was continuity from phase (II) to the current phase (III). The then Resident Representative retired in early June 1999, and was replaced in late August 1999. The then Programme Officer departed for another assignment in October 1999. A new Programme Officer was recruited in January 2000, and took over the responsibilities fully as the Mine Action Programme Manager in August 2000 when the ARR was re-assigned to another office. The sensitive and high-profile nature of the CMAC portfolio as of mid-1999, when taken together with the concurrent change to the direct UNDP execution (DEX) modality of the Trust Funds required an unusually high level of attention be given by staff

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(both in operations and programme) and by senior management. Furthermore, with the channelling of Government funds for CMAC and GC through the DEX Trust Fund as of December 1999, financial management of the Trust Fund was taking up an inordinate amount of time compared to other duties in support of the mine action programme.

As part of an internal UNDP(CO) restructuring exercise in August 2000, UNDP management decided to expand the mine action unit of the office with two support staff (recruited in October and December 2000 respectively) to assist the Mine Action Programme Manager, so as to fulfil the management and oversight functions expected of the CO. In view of the significant additional responsibilities and workload as of mid-2000, UNDP reviewed its cost structure. Having consulted several donors informally, UNDP instituted a new programme management cost budget line in the Trust Fund budget as of October 2000. This was to recover the extra cost of staff, and also to pay for other project management costs including audits, evaluations, meetings, missions, specific consultancies, contracts and sundries. UNDP estimated this cost to be around 3% of total contributions, hence bringing total administration charges from 3% up to 6%. This is a reasonable charge for managing a fund as complex as this. The change in charges was noted in the UNDP letter to Donors (2 February 2000) and in the Donors Update No. 9 (2 February 2001). This was also discussed at the donors meeting (6 March 2001) where some donors, accepting the general need for a cost increase for UNDP, requested UNDP to write to them formally and earlier in future regarding such matters. In December 2000, UNDP HQ carried out an evaluation of the DEX modality in a number of field offices including UNDP Cambodia, in order "to review the experience of UNDP in Direct Execution and recommend improvements". There is additional pressure on UNDP as it now has to handle the general trust fund, the Swedish trust fund and the RGC Fund. It is noted that there are issues raised from time to time regarding the accounting and entitlements of the Governing Council, but UNDP follows the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

A key area for UNDP's attention is in the reporting of pledges, commitments, budgets and expenditures against the various donor funds that contribute to the general Trust Fund and the Swedish Trust Fund. Considerable effort has been made by UNDP to alert donors to the status of the Trust Fund at all times. Donors have acknowledged the need for them to take action more quickly, and to ensure the commitments are transferred in a timely manner. In 2001, there was a delay in getting funds for February salaries to CMAC, as the Integrated Work Plan 2001 and Budget were not approved until the holding of the Steering Committee meeting on 7 March. This was resolved during the last week of March. In summary, for fund disbursement CMAC is obliged to submit an annual work-plan, supported by a budget, to the Governing Council for approval, which is then endorsed by the RGC/Donors joint Steering Committee. The working procedure is for CMAC to submit quarterly budget breakdowns to UNDP, in advance, and to submit monthly applications by the 12<sup>th</sup> of each month. UNDP releases the monthly income within a few working days, and CMAC then pays all salaries, expenses and certified invoices.

At time of writing this report (mid-April 2001) there was only enough money in the Trust Fund to cover CMAC general operating expenses to the end of May 2001. This is very tight, and causes difficulties and distress at CMAC, which has only recently gone through a re-hiring process on the strength of pledges of support from donors. UNDP (CO) has received the draft budget from CMAC for Q2/2001 requesting approximately USD 1.225 million. As this is outside the annual amount of USD 2.2 million budgeted under for IWP/2001 approved at Steering Committee meeting No. 13 on 7 March, UNDP has referred a number of urgent queries to CMAC for clarification on how it intends to stay within the approved amount. As far as can be ascertained, without pre-empting or prejudicing the KPMG audit report for the period 1999 - 2000, it appears that UNDP is managing the general Trust Fund and the Swedish Trust Fund correctly. In addition the records show that UNDP, in consultation with CMAC, has kept donors - current and potential, informed of the funding requirements of CMAC, in a timely manner. How donors respond, is another issue.

Some donors have expressed concern at delays in getting timely, detailed financial reports from UNDP/ UNOPS. Hard-copy details of these concerns are not available to the TEM, but the matter could be resolved if donors discussed their specific concerns directly with UNDP, in advance of their reporting deadlines and cut-off dates. It is noted that there are a number of disparate requirements on UNDP regarding financial reporting for different donors at different times of the year, thus increasing the workload on the programme unit at UNDP (CO). In summary, senior and programme management in UNDP (CO) are very active in mine action matters at different levels. UNDP has expended considerable resources beyond normal expectations in support of the project, and in assisting CMAC to regain the confidence of the donors. The relationship with Government - CMAC, CMAC GC and CMAA, as well as with donors and other organisations active in this field, is considered positive and facilitating.

UNOPS is the executing agency for the technical assistance component, usually described by its code: CMB/98-006. In addition it has also been responsible for the original general trust fund and the Swedish trust

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fund, which was phased out with the introduction of the DEX modality for both the general trust fund and the Swedish trust fund. The earlier phases of the project were backstopped/managed by UNOPS Asia, from its regional headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. From 1 July 1999, management of all mine action projects, including this project, moved to a new unit - the Mine Action Unit (MAU), based at UNOPS headquarters in New York. Given the proximity of the Kuala Lumpur office, UNOPS made arrangements for visits from a senior portfolio manager from there, as part of his regular trips (approximately monthly) to Cambodia. This also included regular de-briefings at UNDP (CO) during such visits, as well as communicating as required by telephone, facsimile and e-mail with the ARR and PO. This is in addition to the backstopping provided by the portfolio manager at MAU in New York who has visited the project both in August and in December 1999, and again in June 2000. Regular telephone and e-mail communications are maintained throughout the year. This is a reasonable level of support and backstopping, and has been appreciated by the programme team.



It is not possible to comment on UNOPS's performance as trust fund manager, particularly in advance of the KPMG audit for the period January to June 1999, which was expected to be available, in draft form, at the end of April, but is now expected in mid-May. It is noted that one of the reasons UNDP moved the to DEX modality for the management of the trust fund was concern at UNOPS's apparent inability to respond to requests for expenditure reports and budget revisions to be issued in a timely manner, in the period 1997-1998. This concern has been confirmed from examination of communications between UNDP and UNOPS. Other concerns have been raised by UNDP regarding the difficulties UNOPS appeared to have in recruiting suitable personnel for certain positions. Again, from examination of correspondence it is noted that UNOPS indicated that the database of experienced mine action personnel is relatively small but growing and that with respect to one particular position, no less than two selected candidates withdrew, one after the other. Other issues have been raised by both agencies, which indicate to the TEM that there have been communication difficulties periodically. These things are normally sorted out during management-level visits to Phnom Penh or New York, and prior to or at the Tripartite Project Reviews. There have been two TPR's so far during this phase of the project (- June 1999 and June 2000).

Regarding resource mobilisation, there is an item - 1(e) - in the terms of reference of the Programme Coordinator, which calls for him to assist the CMAC Director-General to: "... establish a comprehensive international donor support arrangement for CMAC and conduct active and innovative resource mobilisation initiatives to maintain a high level of donor commitment". The first Programme Co-ordinator was very actively involved with the then Director-General's efforts, and the record shows that they visited many donor capitals on more than one occasion. With the arrival of the new Director-General in August 1999 at the height of the crisis, and in the absence of a Programme Co-ordinator until May 2000, CMAC was obliged to do the best it could under trying circumstances. CMAC and the Programme Co-ordinator have been widely acknowledged as restoring donor confidence in the strategic direction of mine action for Cambodia. Independently, CMAC senior management has been making significant contact with donors, and new proposals are receiving favourable hearings from donors.

As mentioned previously, CMAC is already implementing the main project, funded under the DEX-modality Trust Fund. This is almost the same as NEX. If its procurement procedures and standards, as well as financial management procedures, meet government and UN requirements, then it would appear that there is little stopping it from implementing any future technical assistance/ capacity building project as well. In this regard, the work of the UN technical advisors, in finance, procurement and management, has contributed to CMAC being at this stage of readiness to determine and to manage technical assistance by itself.

It is noted that there are some outstanding issues regarding communications, division of responsibilities and personnel, amongst Government/CMAC, UNDP (CO), UNOPS (HQ) and the programme team at CMAC. These issues need to be resolved, and can be cleared by all parties prior to or at the next TPR.

### **3.2.11 Progress towards Immediate and Development Objectives**

#### **(A) Progress towards Objective (1): Interventions for Casualty Reduction**

For most of the project period, CMAC was beset by the crisis. This also had an effect on the technical assistance team, with four different project leaders in a period of just nine months. Hence, when evaluating, one must take into account that for one reason or another, CMAC and the project team were constrained or distracted for close on 18 - 24 months.

Good progress has been achieved and the trend in casualties is definitely coming down at a faster rate than was predicted. How much of this is attributable to CMAC is hard to gauge but clearly its efforts in raising mine awareness through different media and other initiatives are paying dividends. It is making a big investment as a "partner" to GeoSpatial Inc., the Level One Survey contractor. The database work done to date is very useful, and complements the work done by HI/

CRC. With the forthcoming exercise of preparing a national

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demining strategy, under the auspices of CMAA, but certainly involving CMAC, under way, there could be a cementing if not a further quantum decrease in casualty rates. This is a most positive outcome overall, for which CMAC can rightfully claim some praise.

(B) Progress towards Objective (2): Verification/Area Reduction Activities

This is the area where the crisis seriously affected CMAC the most. The targets and success indicators set in the project document have in the main, not been achieved. This remains a critical area for mine action in Cambodia as a whole, and certainly will have to be re-visited through the forthcoming national demining strategy.

(C) Progress towards Objective (3): Landmine and UXO Clearance Operations

This has been one of the key areas of achievement for CMAC, notwithstanding the long period of crisis. It is to be commended. There is still work to be done, but the outcome of the achievement has definitely contributed to a safer Cambodia.

(D) Progress towards Objective (4): Landmine / UXO Information and Planning

There is now better planning - socio-economic and operational, within CMAC, and with it, improving data collection. The next step is to interrogate the data, and to formulate appropriate responses or changes of plan. Some responsibilities have now passed to CMAA, but this is for the better. The outcome has been that CMAC is not involved in land disputes, has a better understanding of developmental demining, and is working closely with other service providers.

(E) Progress towards Objective (5): Ownership through Institutional and Corporate Development

As mentioned above, CMAC has achieved as much as any organisation could during such a prolonged period of crisis. Through all the reform and restructuring there was always a sense of having worth, and in having something of value to offer the people of Cambodia. Although a Planning Department did exist for a while, the restructuring has seen it amalgamate with the Operations Department. This, as it turns out, is no bad thing, now that CMAC is becoming more of a service provider, and a decentralised one at that. A Quality Assurance ethos has been introduced, and although there are still key staffing problems to be resolved, CMAC staff think, plan and act more for quality. Various systems in financial management, logistics, personnel, MIS, database, QA, training and so on are in place and being operationalised through appropriate procedures which are themselves being finalised. It is in the area of management that CMAC faces the remaining challenges. What is needed is for CMAC management, having demonstrated national ownership of mine action, to contribute leadership to mine action alongside CMAA and to lead by example within CMAC itself. Overall the outcome has been positive, with a renewed sense of confidence within CMAC, and a keen desire to own and lead any future demining projects, including technical assistance, by running CMAC as a proper functioning cost-efficient service provider along corporate lines.

(F) Progress towards Objective (6): Ownership through Human Resources and Capacity Development

There have been good achievements in this area, some of which have been undone to a degree by the restructuring. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to recapture these gains, particularly if there is sufficient attention given to human resource development and training. The outcome is somewhat unclear at this time, but could improve particularly as the level of technical advisors and experts on mission decreases, and more CMAC staff take key decisions by themselves with confidence.

(G) Progress towards Objective (7): Regulatory Functions

Responsibility for this objective has effectively passed to CMAA since September 2000.

The Development Objective is: "... To reduce land mines / UXO contamination in Cambodia so that people can go about their lives free from the threat of land mines/UXO, so that reconstruction and development activities can take place in a safe environment, and to achieve the target of Zero Victims...".

People in Cambodia in 2001 are, in the main, able to go about their lives free from the threat of land mines/UXO. Mined areas are being cleared and IDP's and former residents are returning to their localities. Priorities for demining are being set in each province, within a transparent forum. Beneficiaries are receiving interim land use certificates, until such time as final land registry affairs are resolved in Phnom Penh. The fall in casualties has been greater than expected, and the trend is expected to continue. How realistic a target of zero victims is, remains to be seen, but it is unlikely to be achieved for some time to come. CMAC's Five-Year Strategy (1996 - 2000) identified two main objectives, again without reference to zero victims. Furthermore, CMAC has adjusted its mission to now read: *Mine Action: saving lives and supporting development for Cambodia*. Hence, there is a realistic objective. Unfortunately at present, without a national demining plan that supports a national development plan, it is not possible to measure the progress of CMAC towards the

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new mission/objective. This is expected to change with the preparation of the first national demining strategy, to be followed soon after by a national demining plan with targets and time-frames clearly indicated.

### **3.2.12 Relevance, Performance and Success**

Relevance: The project is certainly relevant the development of Cambodia, and this has been confirmed by various missions. As mentioned in the section above, priorities are currently being set locally (i.e. provincially), using nationally agreed selection criteria. In this way the priority target groups and beneficiaries living in mine-contaminated areas in key provinces are recognised. What probably needs to happen is for Government and UNDP to keep an eye on the objectives of a project such as this, to re-examine the project strategy, the institutional arrangements and the risks from time to time, to re-confirm the relevance. For instance, CMAC has had its regulatory functions given to CMAA, a new organisation. Hence, it is pertinent that the list of target groups is updated for such instances, and the needs of such an important policy-making body are not forgotten. Again, it falls within UNDP's mission and comparative advantage to engage in dialogue regarding both CMAC and CMAA, and to continue to offer sound advice and appropriate assistance.

Performance: Progress of the project, in terms of progress towards its objectives, has been discussed in detail above. When conditions permitted, it is fair to say that the project, as executed by CMAC, support by technical assistance from UNDP/UNOPS and others, was effective and efficient. However, the crisis period has overshadowed much of the effort, with predictable results. Timeliness of inputs has also been discussed, and under different circumstances might have been better. However, it is important to note that mine action as a sector was still very new in 1998, and the skilled, experienced practitioners were not that many. This has now changed for the better. The problems with getting a regular flow of predictable funds to CMAC through the Trust Fund, or bilaterally, are known and have been discussed elsewhere.

Success: The impact of the various outcomes mentioned above is that CMAC has a better focus on what it is doing, on how it should be working, and where it should be working. The impact on people in Cambodia is that there is a noticeable decline in casualties, more land is being cleared for agriculture and community assets, and the cost-effectiveness of the CMAC operation continues to increase. There is greater transparency and accountability in the way CMAC is working. The challenge is building on these hard-earned achievements so as to make its core functions

sustainable. As a service provider, CMAC has to recognise that its survival depends on the marketplace for its services. It will have to compete for scarce national resources in the years to come, against equally deserving development priorities. Hence, it will have to demonstrate that it is a cost-effective service provider, that a cost/benefit analysis of cleared agriculture land or community assets will confirm its added value to national development priorities, and that its structure, processes and systems will allow it to right-size to accommodate any given funding situation in which the government may find itself. In the years to come. Although there have been concerns raised regarding the TA approach, it is safe to say that the project has indeed contributed to capacity development at CMAC.

### **3.3 CAMBODIAN MINE**

#### **ACTION CENTRE 3.3.1**

##### **General**

The initial UNDP project in 1993 subsumed an indigenous mine clearance and training capacity called CMAC, from UNTAC. The focus was on mine awareness, mine marking, mine clearance and training in mine clearance. These core issues have not changed greatly since that time. The manning level at that time was approximately 200 personnel in the MCTU and approximately 1, 400 in the CMAC. Since this early stage of development the national capacity for mine action has developed to where CMAC has evolved as follows:

- a mine action asset capable of self sufficiency in training;
- advanced mine awareness approaches;
- inclusion of UXO destruction into clearance;
- mechanical capacity being developed, -
- dog capacity being developed;
- limited data and information management; and
- developing national management capacity to handle multi-faceted and multi- project operations.

This complex capacity has been developed during an era where Mine Action, as a sector has itself been rapidly evolving and developing. As a further step toward national capacity building, the national regulatory and co-ordinating authority, CMAA was established in September 2000. This body has been given responsibility for the less-developed functions of the CMAC mandate such as its role as a co-ordinating and

regulatory authority. After a major reform and restructure, CMAC will now focus on implementation. After the current recruitment, CMAC will have an impressive national resource of 2,363 mine action staff with a HQ, six Demining Units and a Training Centre. The restructure has reduced the support and HO elements to a more realistic ratio of 1:24 (HQ : Field Operations) in comparison to the ratio in 1997 of 1:12. The current training capacity is such that it could be further developed into a regional (SE Asia) Mine Action Asset, able to support other countries in the region. The field manual demining capacity is well advanced and totally nationalised, and is to be commended. Some observations for further improvement are indicated (refer to Annex B.5). The mechanical and dog support capacities need more attention as part of the national capacity and observations on possible improvements are as indicated below. The management and systems of the CMAC are in need of further development prior to accreditation by the national authority.

It is impossible not to give credit for the very real achievements of CMAC so far, regardless of

constraints faced (refer to Annex B.5). As the first UNDP mine action intervention world-wide, this project was a step into the unknown for all parties. As a sector it is developing very rapidly now with a recognised body of knowledge in its own right, but only a few years ago it offered little historical guidance on how to implement mine action interventions. As an early model, CMAC was developed to fulfil the requirements of the RGC in 1993. Since its inception, CMAC has expanded and developed its field capacity to a large and capable capacity. The outputs and contributions to the country's development are significant. The agency has cleared the most land during this period, at an average cost of less than USD1 per square metre (sq. m.) that is both acceptable and competitive. This figure is far below that of many other countries and is close to that of Afghanistan. However, it should be remembered that the figure does not include in-kind donations of personnel, expense items or explosives.

The Table below demonstrates the current analysis:

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
CMAC Costs (USD)	5,837,404		5,296,067	7,253,032	12,263,815	10,619,107	9,946,581	7,136,744
UNOPS TA Costs (USD)	101,748		158,672	314,280	632,039	474,415	839,431	706,544
Swedish Trust Fund	0		0	0	0	0	0	97,850
Total In Kind Equipment (USD)*	1,093,499*		30,550	196,600	1,339,581	316,930	1,407,981	38,014
Total Costs	7,032,651		5,485,289	7,763,912	14,235,435	11,410,452	12,193,993	7,979,988
Average Number of national staff	1,526		1,613	1,668	2,506	2,668	2,830	2,246
Area Cleared Sqm	7,865,242		10,150,014	10,493,654	15,565,241	12,382,541	10,797,705	8,369,635
Cost per Sqm	USD 0.89		USD 0.54	USD 0.74	USD 0.92	USD 0.92	USD 1.13	USD 0.95
Mines Destroyed	12,247		22,208	7,316	17,301	13,781	14,971	16,361
Cost per Mine	USD 574		USD 247	USD 1061	USD 823	USD 828	USD 815	USD 488
Sqm per Mine	642		457	1,434	900	899	721	512
UXO Destroyed	208,854		47,123	31,574	32,767	47,313	67,610	45,379
Total Number of Devices	221,101		69,331	39,083	50,068	61,094	82,581	61,740
Cost per Device	USD 32		USD 79	USD 199	USD 284	USD 187	USD 148	USD 129
Economic Impact Value	Not Available (N/A)		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

The figures illustrated above indicate a number of issues that will require addressing:

- The average cost per square metre could be further reduced with increased productivity.
- The number of square metres cleared per mine is high (an average of 795 square metres cleared per mine) and a lot of time is spent clearing low probability ground. As this is currently undertaken by manual teams, the inefficiency here is obvious but maybe not the reasons for it. Although when

Note:

In Kind personnel, explosives or expense items have not been costed and therefore are not part of

the calculations. 'Figures extracted from the Fixed Assets Register.  
"Includes transfer of UNTAC assets.

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compared internationally this figure is not high, it can be further reduced through more accurate survey and efficient reduction capacity are natural conclusions to draw from such data.

- The cost per device is not an issue unless one chooses to place a financial value on human life. The TEM chose not to do so. The figures reinforce the previous point. The lower costs per device in the early years can be attributed to the destruction of caches and stockpiles.
- The lack of socio-economic value data does not provide adequate feedback as to whether clearance rather than avoidance, is an appropriate approach. Detailed research needs to be undertaken to ensure that the investment made in mine clearance is effective and results in an socio-economic gain or profit, taking into account the opportunity costs of other realistic development options foregone. If the result of such research indicates that there is an socio-economic loss, then serious consideration should be given to increasing the relocation of villages, permanent marking/fencing and greater mine awareness as another possible approach.

The CMAC structure must be flexible so as to fulfil the needs of the long-term national strategy, once formulated. After the formulation of the national strategy the structure and role of CMAC will probably require further review, to gauge its responsiveness to this long-term national strategy. A long-term strategy for CMAC needs to address the mission of mine action in Cambodia, while taking into account, national ownership, national management, sustainability, appropriateness and the shortest time-line to achieve the National Mission. CMAC reform and restructure have brought about a more appropriate and efficient organisational structure for CMAC as an implementing agency. The organisational structure as with any entity will grow and adjust according to the needs and requirements of its mission. There is clearly a move towards real decentralisation within CMAC, but this can only come about when the full package of operations/management/QA/financial systems are in place and the management has been trained. Overall, this is a move in the right direction and is to be encouraged, even though it will take some time to become fully operationalised.

Some observations on the current structure are given (refer to

#### Annex B.6). **3.3.2 CMAC Governing Council**

The original decree forming the Governing Council required a council of nine to ten members with three key positions, chairman, vice chairman and a secretary, which was to meet quarterly. The GC and in particular the Chairman, has been very active in advocacy, international involvement and with the ICBL. The role of the GC is to oversee the activities of CMAC and to give directives to ensure conformity of its operations. It is also responsible for the approval of CMAC budgets, work plans, programmes, accounts and reports. This has grown to become a Governing Council that is now a full time organisation of 22 staff and members and 13 temporary staff in a separate facility with a separate budget. The crisis of 1999-2000 has demonstrated that this organisation has had limited impact while providing this full-time oversight. The ability of the GC to identify and prevent incorrect practices through the oversight mechanism and then to intervene is unclear during the period, although the primary responsibility lies with CMAC HQ.

It is recognised that any public agency requires external oversight and the original concept for the GC was to act in a similar fashion as an NGO Steering Committee. The effort and cost should reflect the amount of impact and added value that the office brings to the project. Therefore, with

the restructure and redirection of CMAC to a service provider, coupled with the creation of a higher authority in CMAA, it follows that a reassessment of the role, responsibility and requirements of the GC must occur. A smaller Council with five or seven members, with an appropriate mix business and finance experience and some knowledge or awareness of public administration policy and procedures, should act as a proper board of directors, to oversee and guide CMAC towards becoming a cost-efficient service provider. As the operational, tasking, external quality assurance, advocacy and other national responsibilities will now fall with CMAA, the GC oversight is on CMAC budget, structure and internal policies approval that will have to conform to any national policies and standards set by the CMAA. With this further reduced responsibility set by Government, the need for a full-time GC remains unclear.

### 3.3.3 CMAC Operations Management

Although the operational tasking has now been delegated down to each DU, the Operations Department still has an important and detailed role to perform.

Task Management: The need for Task Management at this level was highlighted in both the KPMG management audit report (27 September 1999) and the then acting Programme Co-ordinator's report on 'Accounting for Land Cleared by the CMAC' (7 December 1999). This report clearly identifies the task

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management gaps. It would appear that little has changed since then. A total system approach must be adopted ensuring there are systems and procedures from start to finish covering each of the following steps or stages:

Registration of a dangerous area and issue of unique minefield (MF) number.

2. Level 1 Survey report.
3. Task folder created.
4. Level 2 Survey report.
5. Clearance conducted.
6. Task Halted Report, if required.
7. Monthly Reports.
8. Completion Report.
9. Level 3 Survey Conducted.
10. Hand-over of Land to owner.
11. Socio-Economic Survey after 12 months (Level "4")

This process becomes all the more critical as CMAC goes further down the path of individual projects that are separately funded through bilateral or earmarked funding.

Project Management: A project matrix has been developed by CMAC Operations and Planning Department. CMAC currently has 19 projects running with another six under negotiation. In addition the TA Management Training has developed a Project Management Handbook, which can also be used to manage this process. As it now appears that CMAC is undertaking many different projects through bilateral funding, it is noted that there is no clear policy for project management at this point although it is being developed. Each project will require separate management in finances, outputs and reporting. Other programmes tend to have a project/contracts officer in their planning cell. His or her duties are to assist in formulating the contract, monitoring the outputs, monitoring the inputs and preparing the reports. CMAC requires a project management process and policy as a matter of some urgency, as projects are already taking place.

### 3.3.4 Swedish Dog Support Operations

Overall, the technical capacity (i.e. the dog and its handler) of this project is developing well. There are plans to expand the project to cover clearance of MDDT minefields, integration with the Finnish Flail, integration with the Brush Cutter, integration with manual teams, development of road clearing capacity and developing project specific capacity. From observation, the task selection is an area that may need attention. As indicated in the title, the dogs should be treated as a supporting capacity to manual demining rather than as a stand-alone capacity. The current task for MDDT 1 at MF-1768 is not suited to dog operations currently, whereas at task MF-3510A the dogs could be used very effectively on selected components of the minefield. An integrated approach must be adopted, with flexibility to move dog teams into suitable parts of the task or to where it may be possible to select more suitable tasks, leaving those difficult components to the platoons. This will require a suitable marking and recording system so that areas cleared by dogs are easily defined. The other alternative is to provide the dog support with its own demining capacity. The dogs should have the capacity to work in grass up to 30cm tall, and the need to have the vegetation cut down to within 2.5cm of the ground, should be reviewed. This issue is under investigation by the project. The current drill is inefficient and a waste of the most productive asset (the dog) in terms of actual productive work. This is recognised by the project and options are being developed to address this challenge. The micro approach of using two dogs in conjunction with two grass-cutters is unproductive and needs to be developed in the context of far more deminer assets. During a ten-minute work period each dog may do as little as 30 seconds of productive work, in other words 5% productivity. (This was not measured with precision but estimated, and clearly requires further evaluation) If these figures are proven to be even approximately correct, the conclusion must be that this is inefficient, and the dog needs to be put to work for longer periods.

The medical support with MDDT 1 is under development, possibly weak and requires review. This points to the need for quality control (QC) of medical support. The issue of training the national veterinarians still requires resolving as the Thailand option has been set aside for now. The possible outsourcing of training within the SE Asia region is strongly supported and should be considered.

This project's staff have focussed on the technical development and procedures, with the main emphasis on technical quality rather than to productivity. Although it is noted that a number of integration initiatives are being considered and the integration of dogs with the flail is to commence in June 2001. As a result the dog teams are currently inefficient but this can be overcome. The team currently does six hours a day for four days a week in the minefield, yielding a total of 24 productive hours of which the dogs work a total of about 2.4 to 3 hours in the week. Weekly training should be transferred from Friday to Saturday, and continuation training

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conducted daily, with the dogs being used during the day to a far greater effect. Although the monthly output is increasing the productivity is still too low by international comparison (i.e. 10, 000 square metres per month per six dogs as against six dogs in other programmes being able to clear 40-50,000+ square metres using a four-dog cover over each square metre of ground approach). As the approach here is a two-dog cover over every square meter of ground, then the outputs should be as a minimum, four times the current outputs even allowing for vegetation constraints. Integration with flail or the brush cutter will also add to the efficiency of the dogs. This should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.


As there has been no external assessment/accreditation of the dogs to date, CMAC programme confidence in the dogs requires building. This is of concern as the internal accreditation conducted by the project did not cover a number of the mines and in one case, dogs were not tested on anti-tank (AT) mines. These issues have been discussed with project team leaders and plans are being developed to overcome some of these issues.



	1999	2000	Jan - Mar 2001	TOTALS
Square Metres	0	37,245	(46,133) Does not include March	(83,378)
Project Costs	-USD800,000	USD802,550	USD163,500	USD1,766,050
29 Dog Costs	0	USD64,116	USD13,964	USD78,080
Equipment*	0	USD1,680	0	USD1,680
CMAC Costs"		USD97,850	USD62,801	USD160,651
Total Cost	-USD800,000	USD966,196	USD240,265	USD2,006,461
Cost/Square Metre	N/A	N/A	USD5.21	USD24.06
Mines destroyed	0	12	4	16
Devices destroyed	0	12	19	31

\*Equipment costs are from the Assets Register. Most equipment provided to this project either come from SIDA project costs or from existing equipment holdings within CMAC.

\*\*CMAC costs have only been recorded as a separate component since 2000.



This is a typical cost per square metre (series 1) versus area cleared (series 2) trend graph. In most programmes that enjoy a progressive development the cost per square metre will rapidly come down with in the first year (i.e. "the learning curve") and the productivity should increase upwards as new technologies and procedures are introduced to increase outputs, thereby eventually decreasing the cost per square metre.

The figures indicated in the table above indicate that the current costs per square metre are in excess of USD 5.21 per square metre. This is to be expected in the initial start-up of a project and, therefore, will not reflect the true value/contribution of the dog project over the long-term. If one ignores the in-kind and start-up costing, and focus on the costs to CMAC for future operations, then the use of dogs will definitely be costeffective. Six new dogs cost approximately USD 19,800, plus three new vehicles cost approximately USD 72,572, plus operating costs for one team is currently approximately USD 10,000 per month (calculated on the 2001 figures for two teams for three months). Given that most other equipment is in-kind, therefore, over a

24-month period each team will need to clear 13,850 square metres per month to cover the operating costs and initial expenditures, so as to operate at USD 1.00 per square metre. This

target monthly output figure must be doubled (27,700) if the team is to operate at USD 0.50 per square metre. These figures do not include external TA support nor the training costs. However, if each team was to operate at a minimum of 30,000 square metres per month over a period of 3-4 years these costs would be absorbed. In most programmes this is an acceptable rate for four dogs. Therefore, the output of the six dogs should easily achieve this figure in the future if some simple steps toward improving productivity are taken. At this point accurate cost analysis cannot be undertaken as it would be premature.

### 3.3.5 Finnish Flail Operations

The technical capacity is advancing well ahead of the implementation and application of this technology, which is still developing. The flail project is a simple implementation with limited capacity building. The current project finishes in February 2002 and has been operating since 1998. Total area cleared during this period is 356,068 square metres. Productivity of the two machines has grown gradually over the last year and is currently up to a rate of 56,250 square metres per month. There are still a number of inefficiencies with the project that do affect outputs. There is a large amount of machine down time due to minefield set-up, maintenance, travel and logistic support. All of these issues can be addressed with a change in approach towards productivity, ensuring that the productive component (the flail) puts in more working hours in the minefield. The total number of operating hours in the minefield for the two machines was 64 hours for February 2001 and 54 hours for January 2001 (giving a total of 118 hours), out of a possible 400 hours (based on two machines working 5 hours per day for a total of 40 days over the two months). This equates to 30% of the available working hours. Hence, some changes in the approach to the project need to occur to improve productivity. The planned number of operational hours worked by the machines (5 hours per day) is considered low for capital equipment.

The most productive component of the project is the flail itself so this should be driving the project support, not the other way around. Therefore, consideration should be given to increasing the number of national operators from 4 to 8 so that shift work can be achieved on a daily basis. Shift One works sunrise to lunchtime, and Shift Two works lunch-time to sundown. This initiative if adopted, may require an additional TA in the short term. This would have a further impact on the cost effectiveness however. Maintenance should be programmed to take place either in the evening or on weekends. This may require the two international mechanics to do shift-work on a five-day per week basis: Saturday to Wednesday, and Wednesday to Sunday. The project design of having the operators qualified as maintenance staff as well is sound however, to expect an operator driver to operate for five hours and then conduct maintenance or repair for a further period maybe asking too much. Therefore, this may also require the hiring of two national mechanics specifically for support to also work on shifts with their international counterparts. The spare parts should be bought forward and mounted on to the back of a GMC. An additional GMC vehicle should be provided and converted into a mobile workshop with at least a generator, arc welder, oxy welder, lathe, heavy duty drill, electrical tools and a full set of mechanic and metal smith tools. (This has already taken place after the TEM field visit as an initiative by the flail team. This is commendable.) This will allow on-site responsive support ensuring down-time is kept to a minimum.

Productivity at present is as follows:

	1998	1999	2000	Jan 2001	Mar
Square Metres	21,596	84,102	130,770	119,600	
Working Days	23	74	72	26	
Project Costs*	-USD 360,000	-USD 456,000	-USD 476,000	-USD 108,000	
CMAC Costs**	Not available	Not available	USD17,400	USD19,274	
Cost/Square Metre	USD 16.67	USD 5.42	USD 3.77	USD 1.06	

Mines destroyed	0	1	7	10
UXO destroyed	0	3	4	0

\*Costs are based on figures provided by STA Flail and only include lease of equipment and salaries.

\*\* Figure does not include capital equipment costs donated or procured for operations. These costs are covered by the Finish Project costs and are funded by Finland.

Approximate current costs per month are as follow:

CMAC Operational Costs	USD 6,000
TA Salaries	USD 16,000
Lease of Equipment	USD 20,000

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The cost of clearance by dogs and manual deminers behind the flail has yet to be assessed. The increase in productivity will have to be weighed against the operating costs of the flail. If the current cost is USD0.95 per square metre for manual clearance, then it is estimated that the flail will have to have the impact of having this cost. Therefore the two flails will have to operate at about USD0.50 per square metre and would have to at least produce 84,000 square metres per month with TA or 52,000 square metres per month without TA, at the minimum. To achieve the 84,000 square metres the two flails would only need to increase their output by at least 50%. This can be easily achieved if the productivity recommendations are accepted.

With the suggested changes, productivity could conceivably be trebled. In this case the flail should prove to be an efficient and productive approach. However, at the current output it cannot be said to be efficient and cost effective. As the project is completed in 2002, CMAC should investigate the possibility of CMAC leasing the equipment directly from the equipment provider. Together with one TA the project would cost approximately USD 30,000 per month not including external transport costs. This would require a minimum output of 60,000 square metres per month. This should be easily achieved with careful project management. There will also be a knock-on cost per square metre reduction in the manual demining as the more difficult tasks are made easier by the flail.

Task selection is one of the keys to successful employment of the flail. The flail should be used where possible on firm and heavily vegetated ground, so as to make full use of the capacity and the benefits of this equipment. The DU managers and operations staff need to be trained in the task selection process. The actual provincial deployment should also be based on this criterion, as the equipment will be used to speed up operations where hard ground and dense vegetation exist. In summary the Flail Project concept is sound and a useful component of clearance for CMAC, if it can be made to be cost-effective, which is certainly feasible.

### 3.3.6 Brush Cutter Project

This project to date has not developed at this point nor has it been integrated into the manual or dog teams. This is being developed currently with the dog teams and as funding comes available, should be further tested and analysed. Again detailed and accurate project management of the financial costs for the project must be maintained to produce an accurate analysis of the impact of the brush cutters. The rapid introduction of these devices without an appropriate assessment, highlights the need for a carefully planned and thought out approach using a trial and evaluation process. This will ensure the correct, timely and appropriate application of the technology that is introduced. As an observation the mobility of these brush cutters is of concern, and consideration should be given to a lighter vehicle such as the locally produced Tempest, or a wheeled or plastic tracked light tractor that is capable of moving itself around. Clear drills and SOP must be developed for the use of this equipment. HALO Trust is well advanced in this area and CMAC would find it beneficial to learn from HALO Trust rather than re-inventing the approach. Unfortunately, due to the recent funding problems encountered by CMAC the TEM was not able to investigate this particular capacity further, but CMAC is encouraged to do so.

### 3.3.7 Mine Awareness

During the evaluation mission it was not possible to view CMAC mine awareness activities as all teams had been disbanded due to the cut backs in 2000. A number of implementing agency key personnel were interviewed and various reports and files were reviewed. CMAC has undertaken a direct and mass media approach to mine awareness. Prior to the cut backs CMAC employed mine awareness teams (MAT) and community mine marking teams which had an integral mine awareness capacity to deliver the messages. The use of sign boards, posters, radio, TV and video were also used to complement the direct mine awareness. Since 1993 CMAC conducted 7,916 courses to train 1,592,338 villagers (967,957 during the period 1998-2000). In addition the CMAC has conducted 60 courses to train 2,266 national and international UN and NGO staff from 1998 to 2001. This has been a commendable effort which, although not measurable, has contributed to the large reduction to mine and UXO casualties over the project life. From 1998 to the present the annual casualty rate has been reduced by 56%, which is greater than the project objective.

The plan for the future is to continue with the mass media and direct approaches with a new focus on a Community Based Mine Awareness Project, which has been successfully applied in other countries such as Afghanistan. This will focus on empowering the villagers and the village leadership with the capacity to educate, inform and report on hazardous areas in their area of interest. With the remobilisation of the MAT and CMM teams CMAC should continue to provide valuable inputs into the Mine Awareness Sector and contribute to the reduction of casualties.

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### 3.3.8 Support Functions

The medical support is already covered (refer to Annex B.5). Logistic support requirements are also covered in this Annex. A number of observations have been made during research particularly when reviewing the Assets Register. There appears to be a large amount of equipment (USD 680,396) awaiting write-off for the last few years. Apart from taking up valuable storage space some of this material will have a resale value that could be recycled back into the programme. There is also a large amount of equipment that cannot be accounted for, valued at USD 95,262. All items on this list can be tracked to individuals (nationals and internationals) some of whom has since left the programme. In addition, there are a number of items of equipment issued to individuals such; as seven mine detectors to the previous senior management; and numerous items such as motor bikes, mobile phones, computers and furniture that are out on signature to national staff both past and present. The purpose of these issues appears unclear at this time, but it is expected that these items will be verified when the Fixed Assets Register is validated. If equipment is surplus or unnecessary to the project then it should be stored or sold off. In addition there is USD 647,350 worth of items identified as lost or stolen on the Fixed Assets Register. A check needs to be made as to whether the loss of these items has been investigated and whether action was taken. There may be an excess of vehicles at the HQ and in the DU HQ, but limited vehicles actually available in the field. Currently according to the Fixed Assets Register, there are a large number of vehicles in the HQ, (not including trailers or EOD vehicles stored at the HQ), three vehicles and motorbikes with former senior management and eight vehicles and motorbikes with the Governing Council. This would appear to require review, probably when the Fixed Assets Register is validated.

CMAC is required to have adequate insurance for its staff and for the project liability, in accordance with Section V: General Provisions, of the Contractual Agreement between CMAC and UNDP. It appears that this has not been provided, and may be a breach of the contract, which must be resolved as soon as possible.

The Finance Department is understaffed at this point. The recruitment of the four additional HQ finance staff is in progress, but perhaps should have been a priority for CMAC given the crisis and

the issues raised in 1999-2000. The systems are still being developed and the department is at a critical stage where the programme is recommencing at a rapid rate, yet all the necessary staff and systems are not in place. If not handled with a degree of urgency CMAC may find itself in difficulty later.

Human Resource capacity of CMAC is under-strength and without adequate systems. Conditions of service for employees are not clear nor are the systems for career advancement in place. After finance, this is a critical area that must be corrected before going too far forward, as some the concerns of the past will reemerge if the system is not developed. The general area of human resource management is one of concern for the welfare of the employees, good personnel management and for transparency.

### **3.3.9 Training Centre**

The CMAC Training Centre moved to a better location, in Kampong Chhnang, in August 1997. The new centre has provided appropriate and adequate rooms, administrative facilities, and practical field training areas. It was supported by the German Government and was fully operational in 1998. However, there is some concern over the design and limited potential utilisation of the EOD Building. The training facility is well developed and provides a very good service. For this CMAC is to be commended. Complex-wise it is one of the best available. The facility is well developed with the exception of the explosive storage, which has been recognised and raised with the HQ. Training system-wise, the TC requires upgrading in a number of areas. Currently training packages do not exist in adequate detail. The courses have not been objectivised nor have the jobs been assessed and analysed on their needs for training. This has just recently commenced with a training needs assessment (TNA).

It was encouraging to note the positive inputs on training development being undertaken by the TA Training Management and the TA Training. End-of-course validation is already in place. The movement toward field monitoring will ensure that the cycle of training is developed and that the external validation process is introduced. The Training Centre is also taking on the responsibility for accident investigations and the development of internal QC. Instructor development is an on-going process, and the current staff appear to have all the necessary skills. Adequate training aids need to be further developed and maintained.

The EOD facility is at present unused and is a wasted resource. CMAC could be better served using this facility for other HQ functions such as trials and evaluation, audit and QA team, medical, logistics and/or transport. This would reduce the personnel and equipment holdings at HQ in Phnom Penh and possibly allow one of the two Phnom Penh facilities to be closed thereby reducing maintenance and running costs.

## **3.4 GOVERNMENT AND**

### **DONOR SUPPORT 3.4.1 Government**

#### **3.4.1.1 Political Commitment**

The RGC has clearly stated that it has committed to a policy of ensuring Cambodia will be free from the threat of mines and UXOs. As part of the commitment, Cambodia is one of the signatory state parties among other members who signed the Ottawa convention in December 1997. Since then the RGC has banned the use, sale, manufacture and trade of anti-personnel landmines in Cambodia.

In addition, on 17 Feb 1999, The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) Deputy Commander-in-Chief formally stated that RCAF completely destroyed stockpiles of AP mines. RCAF reported that between 1994 and 1998 it destroyed 71,991 anti-personnel (AP) mines as well as 3,585 anti-tank (AT) mines and 2,302 improvised explosive devices. Yet throughout 1999-2000 significant numbers of mines at provincial military and police facilities have continued to be turned in and destroyed. In another move to

clear stockpile of mines, the RGC has also enforced a domestic mine ban law which states that whoever possesses mines must report them to CMAC for destruction. As a result, a total of 5,118 AP mines were handed over and destroyed in 1999, and another 250 in January 2000. It is understood that more recent data are not available. Overall, it is expected that RCAF will have a long-term, complementary role to play to the demining service providers, particularly with regard to EOD, complex munitions and stockpile destruction.

The Chairman of the GC, with the encouragement of the Prime Minister, has been very pro-active in the development and implementation of the Ottawa Convention. The Chairman and CMAC Director-General have been actively representing the RGC at International Conferences. Moreover, CMAC has also shared its experience with the other mine-affected countries in the meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on Demining Technology, which is held at least twice a year. The Chairman has been co-Chair in the past of one of the Standing Committees of Experts: Technologies for Mine Clearance. In addition, CMAC holds annual mine awareness days on the 24 February, with participants from all agencies involved in mine action in Cambodia.

The Prime Minister has highlighted the RGC concern in the Symposium held on 16 November 2000 that demining is the government's highest priority and more government funds need to be contributed to CMAC. However, there has not been much involvement from high level key representative from key ministries, although at the provincial level there have been activities regarding LUMU/LUPU going on. There is room for more substantive support for LUMU/LUPU activities. In the case of Pailin, for instance, the LUPU office was created but without staff and resources, hence no activity of note has taken place, and subsequently it must be considered not functional as an entity for now.

#### 3.4.1.2 Leadership and Ownership

Before the inception of CMAC in 1993, the organization was known as MCTU and operated under UNTAC management. After the inception in 1993, CMAC officially became a National Mine Action agency with a mandate to clear landmines and UXOs from the country. At that time CMAC leadership had started building up gradually, with UNDP initial Assistance to Demining Programme support project, which focused on the administration of the Trust Fund (TF) and Technical Assistance (TA) to CMAC. UNDP had played an important role in co-ordinating donors to provide assistance to CMAC and ensuring that CMAC funding is made available in a timely manner. After the first project finished UNDP had carried on to Phase II and Phase III. During the initial phases I and II implementation, CMAC management was still on a learning curve, as mine action was still a new sector. The first CMAC Director-General was appointed in July 1995 and since then CMAC structure started to expand. During this time the Director-General was seen as not just managing a rapidly-growing organisation but also acting as a public figure who was very pro-active in fund raising and building up a network with donor countries. During the crisis the then Director-General departed CMAC in early August 1999, and the new Director-General appointed by the Prime Minister took office immediately and carried on with the existing management structure, while commencing to work on restructuring CMAC as a whole.

After having gone through many restructuring processes following the audit and donors' recommendations matrix, CMAC leadership has now changed significantly. The CMAC new structure was approved by the Prime Minister on 30 January 2001. A Deputy Director-General was appointed 19 February 2001 in accordance with the reform strategy and took office immediately. On the 7 March 2001

CMAC management

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team presented to the 13th Steering Committee Meeting, their goals, objectives and annual work plan with the intention to take full national ownership. These were endorsed.

On 26 March 2001 a technical need assessment meeting was held involving all CMAC top management and chaired by CMAA Secretary-General, to identify the need for technical assistance and how that should be carried out in the future. Most of technical documents such as procedures, policies and directives are in English and mostly developed jointly by experts and senior CMAC management. Thus, CMAC middle management and other national staff find it hard to read and understand key documents, as a result most of them have not learnt enough. This may also be an issue in communication and advocacy at higher levels, with the donor community, as well as a possible lack of understanding of donor requirements.

It is clearly and widely understood that Government is responsible for advocacy, diplomacy and maintaining the overall credibility of the mine action programme. There has been and must continue to be leadership, through the CMAC Governing Council and now CMAA, in the constant dialogue needed with partners - parliament, donors, service providers, communities and pressure groups. Whereas the UN system has particularly responsible role to play as the lead partner in mine action, it cannot be considered as the advocate for a sovereign government. Policy and advocacy are the prerogative and responsibility of government. One way that these can be enhanced, would be, for instance, if more nationally-driven evaluations of the mine action programme were undertaken, and the results fed back into national policy and planning.

#### **3.4.1.3 Financial Commitment**

Besides an effort to ban the use of anti-personnel landmines, the RGC also pledged cash contribution to cover CMAC administrative and operational costs. According to the Project Document CMB/98/006/A/07/31, RGC pledged to contribute USD 10 million over the period 1996-2000. With that pledge so far, the RGC cash contribution share of the cost of CMAC administration and operation is attached (refer to Annex B.7).

Until now RGC has contributed a total of USD 1,814,327, which is less than what the RGC had pledged for the period. However, from November 1999 to today, the trend has changed with the RGC significantly increased their contribution, which makes them the fifth largest donor to CMAC in 2000. In addition, RGC has so far granted CMAC tax-exemption status, which greatly reduces the project import costs.

In an effort to make the financial management of the RGC more transparent and accountable, the RGC has changed their practice from direct cash contributions of CMAC account to direct contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund. Nevertheless, the RGC does not have sufficient financial resources to fully cover the administration and operational cost of CMAC, neither at the present nor in the short term. Overall, its contribution is approximately 5-10% of CMAC's operational needs.

#### **3.4.1.4 National Structure**

Before December 1999, CMAC's Governing Council was physically part of CMAC, responsible for overseeing CMAC's activities, providing guidelines, policy, direction and to ensure conformity of CMAC mandates. In late 1999, in an effort to sort out the crisis, and follow the donor framework, the Governing Council moved to a new office in December. This was an attempt to separate responsibilities from being both regulator and a service provider. At this point CMAC became executing agency through amendment of the royal Decree and Sub Decree on the regulatory authority.

On 4 September 2000, CMAA was established as the national co-ordinating body with the Prime Minister as the President, the Minister of Council of Ministers as Deputy President and the former Director-General of CMAC as the Secretary General. CMAA functionally has considerable responsibility for co-ordination, regulation, accreditation, licensing, providing victim assistance and quality assurance, which should be similar to the structure of most other mine action authorities in the world. This re-focuses CMAC as a national demining service provider and with it the need for CMAC to become more business-like in how it plans and carries out its day-to-day operations and logistics.

#### **3.4.2 Donors**

##### **3.4.2.1 Long Term Perspective on Mine Action**

Donor perspective on mine action has been to place great effort into fully implementing the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) to stop production/transfer and destroy the stockpile of mines. Donors still commit to funding

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mine action regionally and globally. Some donors have invested significant funds into the research and development area. For Cambodia specifically, donors have been supporting the development of CMAC as a national management capacity with technically sound national staff. Donors are keen to see RGC take full ownership of the programme and taking a national execution (NEX) approach within a long-term national vision. In addition, donors also want to see the positive impact linking mine action to socio-economic development plan such as poverty alleviation, rural development, decentralisation etc.

So far, the major donors to CMAC under the UNDP Trust Fund are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, UK, USA. The donor community is encouraging mine-affected states and interested parties to implement the Ottawa Convention through the work of the five committees, Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on Mine Clearance, SCE on Victim Assistance, SCE on Stockpile Destruction, SCE on Mine Action Technology and finally the SCE on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

#### **3.4.2.2 Regional Interests**

Australia has a clear geographic priority in funding Australia's immediate neighbours, particularly Cambodia, which has received more than half of Australia's mine action funding. Australia has always been the largest donor to mine action in Cambodia. From 1995-2000, Australia contributed approximately USD 30 millions to mine action programme globally and has continued to commit further USD 60 millions through 2000-2005 for mine action.

In addition, for the last few years the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have provided loans to the RGC to rebuild its infrastructure, and part of the package has been the demining component. Japan so far has contributed many millions of dollars to the RGC for the country development programme through the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA). In particular, Japan has provided equipment direct to CMAC through bilateral arrangement.

#### **3.4.2.3 UN Involvement**

The first UN involvement with mine action in Cambodia was the creation of the MCTU during the UNTAC time in 1993 to clear land for refugees and internally displaced peoples (IDP's). In 1993 UNTAC then transferred responsibility to UNDP Country Office (CO) to further continue assisting the newly-elected government.

The UN involvement globally is to assist governments to develop long-term capacity to manage, prioritize and coordinate their Mine Action Programme. The United Nations Policy on Mine Action has incorporated mine awareness and risk reduction education, minefield survey, mapping, marking and clearance, victim assistance including rehabilitation and reintegration and advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on antipersonnel landmines. The policy outlines roles and responsibilities of each of the relevant UN agencies, coordinate by UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The UN has also developed a standard format for database, GIS, and data collection system called IMSMA. At the present, UN has completed reviewing the international standard for mine action and distributed its draft to mine action organisations for comment and feedback.

UNMAS has also developed a management-training course for Senior Managers Level through



Cranfield University (UK). Middle managers' training will be done in country. There has been established a Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining where mine action activities for humanitarian demining are coordinated. One CMAC staff member attended the first two-month course last year, but resigned immediately upon his return to Cambodia. It is understood that this situation is not unique to mine action in Cambodia, but happens elsewhere. Logically to stop this abuse, there should be a return-of-service obligation as a formal binding commitment between selected candidates for training courses and the parent organisation, provided the conditions are commensurate with the length, cost and frequency of the course in question.

#### **3.4.2.4 Support to other Mine Action Organisations**

Donors support to mine action has not just contributed to CMAC alone, but also to other mine clearance operators in Cambodia like HALO Trust, MAG and to other national and international agencies which are actively involved in mine action such as HI, NPA, CRC, DAC, CARE. The fund to HALO Trust and MAG is for medium- and small-scale demining operations. However, some other funds covered the hiring of external technical advisors to support CMAC, CRC database, DAC programme, CARE project, etc.

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#### **3.4.2.5 UN System Roles**

As agreed by RGC and donors, UNDP's role is to administer the Trust Fund and to continue providing associated backstopping support through the Country Office in Phnom Penh and from its headquarter in New York. UNDP regularly provides Mine Action Donor Updates reports to all donors, on approximately a monthly basis. The report contains CMAC status, financial situation of the TF, and outcome of the donors meeting, achievement and points for further improvement. The donors have reported that they have found these concise updates to be very useful. UNOPS, through its Mine Action Unit, has been responsible for supporting the project team based at CMAC, and for liaising with UNDP (CO).

There is continuous dialogue amongst UNDP, donors and government including CMAC and GC. UNDP initiated TPR meetings, Steering Committee meetings and donor co-ordination and resource mobilisation meetings. UNDP had also initiated a numbers of *ad-hoc* donors meeting on the UNDP Trust Fund, to update donors on the situation of Trust Fund and issues of importance at CMAC and in mine action. In addition, UNDP has also been involved in co-ordinating pre-symposium donors meetings, consultation in the build up the symposium, and the preparation of the National Symposium itself on 16 November 2000. In addition, UNDP had also circulated its comments on the draft CMAA Sub-Decree, and assisted in disseminating the Activity Plan of the RGC to donors. The latest Budget Revision of UNDP CMB/98/006: Support to Demining Programmes is "I" (refer to Annex B.7).

#### **3.4.2.6 Donors Financial Commitment**

Prior to the year 2000, CMAC did not experience any financial shortfalls. Donors had always contributed their funds in a timely manner to the Trust Fund. Records of CMAC financial statement show positive balances for the Trust Fund. Donors' financial commitment from 1993 to 2001 to the Trust Fund are noted (refer to Annex B.7).

From late 1999, some donors decided to freeze or slow down funding to CMAC, which resulted in the organisation having to lay off 1,937 deminers including office personnel on 13 November 2000. CMAC financial situation has improved somewhat since then, with donors gaining confidence in the credibility of CMAC, but still remains very low in absolute terms. As a result, in the Steering Committee meeting held on 7 March 2001, donors pledged to resume normal funding to CMAC again. Current balances indicate that at present (i.e. mid-April 2001) there are only

sufficient funds to cover CMAC's expenses for the months of April and May.

#### 3.4.2.7 Flow of Funds

There are different ways that funds can flow to mine action. Fund comes through the Trust Fund, or bilateral agreement, or earmarked project, or private contributions such as Adopt-A-Minefield (UNA-USA)

The more obvious one for donors is to fund CMAC through the Trust Fund. Originally UNOPS was an executing agency who responsible for administering the Trust Fund. UNOPS charged 4% for AOS. However, after June 1999, as UNOPS fund went down, its responsibility was transferred to UNDP as it started building up the new Trust Fund. For the administration including project audit and evaluation cost, UNDP has charged overhead of 3%, and subsequently, a programme management fee of 3% effective October 2000.

The second choice is through bilateral arrangements. Specific donors agree to directly fund a particular project through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as in the case of PMU in Siem Riep. This has received funds directly from the German government to the DU itself.

The other type of funding is through the so-called earmarked project, whereby donors fund, through UNDP Trust Fund, for specific projects.

Funding for Adopt-A-Minefield is where CMAC selects one or more minefields, produces all support documentation including estimated cost and rationale why those specific minefields need clearance. The donor - UNA/USA - then funds the clearance of those minefields that interest them.

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### 3.5 CAPACITY BUILDING

#### 3.5.1 CMAC 1998: The Starting Point

The UNDP Capacity Assessment mission in October 1997 and the CMAC's Five-Year Strategy: *Clearing the Path Ahead*, confirmed the need to strengthen a sustainable national mine action capacity, through a comprehensive and well-structured system that could meet the needs of the organisation. The accountability and the transparency of the reformed organisation were to have been reflected through a new structure, refined directives and the creation of committees. Four key directives for the Personnel and Administration Branch have been revised and translated into Khmer language in March 1997, and they have been fully utilised in 1998 by the organisation.

To support each directive, a committee has been created to allow CMAC personnel to be involved in all key decisions made by the organisation. The Director-General has been designated the Chairman of all committees. Within the new structure, the task has been delegated to the Deputy Director-General. A number of directives have been drafted for use in managing CMAC's human resources.

Directive 01 has been established to provide financial assistance to CMAC staff members (or their family) in case of death or injury of CMAC employees. The monthly contribution per CMAC employee is USD 1.50. A compensation board has been established for the allocation of the Compensation fund in appropriate cases.

Directive 02 has been formulated for the disciplines codes to promote a high standard of

discipline throughout the organisation, four levels of discipline authorities on their subordinates employees has been established to status on the cases and to take the decisions.

Directive 04 has been used as the Employment Policy to define the process for better hiring practices and for monitoring CMAC staff. At CMAC headquarters, the Director- General has been nominated as the hiring authority, all recruitment requiring his personal approval. At the DU level and at the Training Centre, the Manager is the chairman of the committee, and the Administration and Personnel Officer is the secretary. In 1998, the Office of the Director was responsible for the recruitment process, the Assistant Director was the Chairman of the Recruitment Committee and the Senior Administration & Personnel Officer has played the role of secretary.

Directive 05 is concerned with the Personnel Evaluation Report. It has started to be fully utilised as the only basis for promotion, and is considered a simple method for work performance measurement.

In 1998, a variety of substantial documents have been developed and refined to provide a guidance to the overall Capacity Building planning of CMAC. At this stage, significant progress has been accomplished to strengthen internal CMAC capacity based on the readjustment and the standardisation of directives and procedures.

In addition, an important re-organisation of CMAC has been carried out as part of a better management structure, such as the re-establishment of the Training Centre, at Kampong Chhnang. In terms of training programmes, various training courses have been designed and run in the past. The number of training courses carried out in 1998 increased to 44, compared to 39 in 1997. At the same time, the number of participants increased from 1342 (1997) to 3331 (1998), therefore, a substantial increase of 1989 participants (148%).

In 1998, one of the priorities of the Training Centre was to re-assess the course contents, objectives, targets and to develop a new needs assessment more focused on the management skills. The training package has been re-adjusted and harmonised to reflect actual job requirements and performance target indicators. Thus, the Training Centre capacity has been expended. It was agreed with CMAC management that specific courses should be developed such as:

- Junior/Senior Leadership for section /platoon commanders
- Site Commander Courses
- Mine marking/survey/EOD courses
- Medic courses
- Basic Supervisor training

One of the priorities of the Training Centre is to be able to provide basic deminer training graduates, capable of clearing land of all metal content, to international standards of quality and safety in any type of terrain. The

other priority of the Training Centre was to ensure that a better utilisation of resources is made. Therefore, the involvement of several NGOs to assist in delivering some training courses has been programmed. The validation of training should be part of the process to provide a high standard qualification to CMAC personnel. The Training Centre covers the important mission to implement an ongoing training validation programme in collaboration with the Human Resources Branch.

In 1998, the Human Resources branch structure was too weak to handle all the HR activities. It has been functioning as "paper-processing unit" and archives storage with an important lack of expertise, there was a total absence of collaboration between the Training Centre activities and the HR Branch. The official recognition of a strong and pro-active Human Resources Department only started in 2000, but that was soon affected by the need to downsize the organisation in November 2000.

### **3.5.2 Needs Assessment Analysis**

The need to establish an effective Human Resources Section has been highlighted by previous evaluation missions since 1996. More recently Human Resources implementation has started with the endorsement of CMAC new structure in November 2000 by the Governing Council, and with the latest re-structuring, approved by the Prime Minister on 30 January 2001 (refer to Annex B.8). The final approval of CMAC new structure showed due recognition of the Section. Substantial progress has been made to develop and to integrate an appropriate Human Resources Development (HRD) strategy and to bring forward a comprehensive needs assessment analysis.

By June 1997, the Human Resources Branch should have completed all job descriptions but for a number of reasons, partially due to the recent restructuring process and on-going recruitment this year, additional job descriptions have been developed, and reviewed by different departments at the same time. For instance, the recruitment of a HR Director failed twice. The applicants were rejected because of their low level in Khmer writing skills.

Under the project AusAID has provided four Technical advisors in 1999 to support the HR Section:

- A Senior Technical Advisor: Management Training
- A Technical Advisor: Management Training
- A Senior Technical Advisor: Human Resources
- A Technical Advisor: Education and Training

It is part of Australian assistance objective, also shared by the project to shift from military support to developmental support. The project decided that both the Senior Technical Advisor Human Resources and the Technical Advisor: Education & Training would develop, advise and assist the Human Resources Section as a whole. The designated counterpart for the STA: Human Resources was the Chief of HR, whereas the counterpart of TA: Education & Training was the Training & Education Officer. Under this strategy, the advisors were responsible for advising and training their respective counterparts so as to be able to take over all duties and activities when the advisors had finished their respective assignments.

As part of the strategy some of the following activities were proposed: HR policies and directives development and implementation, HR workshops for field and headquarters staff, regular meetings and fields visits, salary scale reviewing, transfer of the recruitment to HR, and implementation of a comprehensive HR Information system. Progress has been slow to take off, mainly, because of the restructuring period CMAC has been through. In addition, the chief of the Section, possibly through a lack of understanding or action, appeared to have some difficulties in supporting any recommendations or advice from the technical advisors. Furthermore, the lack of funds did not contribute to facilitating development of the HR Section.

For this year, it is planned that HRD models would be implemented, to target the training needed by CMAC staff that could be provided by the Training Centre or conducted externally. A sample training needs analysis was completed for the deminer through to the Site Manager resulting in a HRD model (refer to Annex B.9). This is certainly a move in the right direction, but a more thorough assessment needs to be done to ensure that all training needs are being met.

Direction for the determination of training priorities will be addressed through both policy and

procedures for training in CMAC, and also through the HRD models. Due to the significant budgetary constraints on CMAC, the focus on training has been on ensuring that the staff could operate in the fields; this is the primary responsibility of the Training Centre, and it has performed well in this respect. The external training requirements have been discussed with the different sections and units within CMAC, but once again

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budgetary constraints have led to a limited action. Nevertheless, it was suggested that Sections and Units could conduct some in-house training courses with their respective TA's.

Despite many efforts, the personal database is not being systematically updated. For instance, training received by the personnel is not mentioned in the personal history sheet. This is an important issue for early resolution, as personnel files do not reveal reliable benchmarks or performance indicators, as part of the buildup to a comprehensive needs analysis for the individual. In terms of career development, the current CMAC evaluation form appears subjective. According to the Personnel Administration Directive 05, all staff are required to be evaluated annually by the first day of December. This does not appear to be happening.

AusAID has requested CMAC to nominate personnel for three AusAID-funded sponsorships. The organisation has nominated certain CMAC staff for these scholarships through an internally transparent and open competition. One CMAC candidate passed the AusAID test and was invited to attend six-month extensive English training course, in Phnom Penh. However, senior management did not give this candidate permission to attend the course.

The HR technical advisors have already created the planning and programming of training courses. Previously, a plan and budget have been submitted to CMAC Management for external training for the year 2000. However, through the budgetary process and the lack of committed funds from donors money was not allocated for any external training for the first half of the year 2000. Furthermore, for the last quarter of the year 1999, money initially allocated to the Training and Education section for external Training was reallocated into the Operations budget of CMAC.

By the end of April 2000, the assessment of staff training needs for the area of general management was completed, and the generic management training modules developed. These modules will be integrated into the HRD models. The objectives of the management training technical advisors were to determine the different level for training required to develop the national capacity of CMAC. The initial approach to the needs assessments was by conducting a pilot analysis covering managers in the Support Department at the headquarters, the Training Centre and Demining Unit 4. This preliminary survey was the initial step before moving to assess the broader management group. The technical advisors experienced many constraints; there was a lack of appreciation by the senior management about the necessity of the needs assessment process. Therefore, an awareness presentation was made to the management cadre by the TA's, soon after the commencement of the project, explaining the process and its significance. It appeared that the request from the management level has focused on supervisory training, management refreshers, general management, administration, and leadership. A popular requirement was for English language training, especially at the lowest level.

In addition, a draft set of procedures for Development, Delivery, Evaluation and Management of training and a comprehensive Project Management Handbook (February 2001) have been developed by the Technical Advisor: Management Training. The procedures were designed based on the CMAC training system and also include practical checklists and lessons plans. The document has been submitted to the Policies and Procedures Committee for approval, and to the Training Centre Manager and the Chief of Human Resources for comments since January 2001, no feedback has been received so far.

### 3.5.3 Project Design for Capacity Building

CMAC the Phase III Project, three modalities were developed for providing technical Assistance to

- UNDP core project resources and bilateral agreements for developmental TA,
- UNDP/Donor Country agreements within the framework of the Trust Fund for military personnel as Expert on Mission;
- Other sources as NGO's and the European Commission.

It was understood that all international advisors would operate under the co-ordination of the Programme

Coordinator. Technical advisors have to be responsible for advising and training their Cambodian counterparts on a day-to-day basis towards achieving the objectives set out in the Five-Year Strategy. The UNDP Phase III project document stipulates clearly the terms of reference and the mission's modality of technical assistance. The TA is responsible to pre- and post-assessment of the progress of his/her Cambodian counterpart, and must submit these assessments to the Director-General. All TA also have the responsibility to submit their updated work plans every six months to the CMAC Director-General, through the Programme Co-ordinator, for approval.

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Seven technical advisors and one UNV Programme Officer were recruited for the Phase III programme with specific terms of reference. Three main objectives mentioned were:

- To ensure that the co-ordination between all the counterparts involved in Mine Action is successfully done in the CMAC strategy framework;
- To ensure all resources are properly accounted in line with CMAC budgeting and financial management procedures
- To ensure the use of Trust Fund is properly accounted for.

The Executing Agency claims that there have been some difficulties encountered in recruiting suitable people for the project, on the basis of the funding situation and on the short duration of assignments, particularly after the crisis of 1999. This phase of the project was due to finish in June 2000, but it was extended at the second TPR (June 2000) to December 2000, and extended once again in December to June 2001. It is possible to see that differences of opinion would arise on how best to staff the project. In the opinion of the Executing Agency, the project may have foregone suitably experienced candidates who were available to join the project, but this is debatable under the circumstances.

In preparation for phase III of the Assistance to Demining Programme in 1998, there was evidence of there having been an objective assessment to determine the level of capability of the organisation at that time. This should have demonstrated that the level of ability of the CMAC Departments to effectively run the organisation was less than what was widely believed to be the case.

The policies and procedures under which all departments operate, have been devised and written by former advisors. However, the processes and procedures proposed by these advisors are frequently not the ones that are followed by CMAC personnel. The reasons for this divergence are not clear.

### **3.5.4 Project Implementation for Capacity Building**

No less than 2,492 employees were registered at CMAC in January 1998, increased to 2,836 in December 1998. This shows a 12% increase for the year alone. At that time (end of phase II and beginning of Phase III), 78 technical advisors were working in the organisation. At the beginning of the phase III in July 1998, 51 technical advisors were registered at CMAC, then 78 from January to June 1999. During this period an average of 2,842 personnel was registered within CMAC. A complete listing of CMAC staff numbers is given (refer to Annex B.10).

The Phase III project document proposed a number of Technical Advisors to support CMAC. Fifty-one Technical Advisors should have been advising and training Cambodian counterparts in all CMAC departments, all Demining Units and the Training Centre as follows:

- The Corporate and Executive Department
- The Planning Department
- The Operation Department
- The Support Department
- The Finance Department
- The four Demining Units (DU6 is not included, and DU 5 had not been formed)

- The Training Centre

Seventeen CMAC project Advisors were proposed to support:

- The Mine Detection Dog project
- The Mechanical area Reduction Project,
- The Manual Demining Capacity Expansion projects,
- The Community Minefield Marking Project

The level of technical assistance was addressed in some detail in the text, referring to both project staff and experts on mission. The project document calls for seven UNDP-funded, UNOPS provided technical advisors plus one UNV Programme Officer, for Year 1, with the expectation that this number would be reduced in Year 2. The seven advisory positions were - Programme Co-ordinator, Chief Advisor: Support, Chief Advisor: Planning, Senior Advisor: Human Resource Development, Advisor: Procurement/Supply, Senior Advisor: Finance, Senior Advisor: Roving Support. Other positions listed in Annex 3 of the project document totalled 61, in addition to the seven UNDP-funded advisors and the UNV Programme Officer. These 61 positions were to be funded/provided by no less than ten donors and two UN agencies. Key issues here are (a) to what level

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parties not explicitly contractually bound to the project document, should have been expected to co-ordinate and co-operate, and (b) whether CMAC could co-ordinate the different elements of technical assistance from all sources.

The duration of assignments of the Technical Advisors was not respected, as mentioned previously all the assignments mandated by UNDP that were programmed for a maximum of two years. It is part of the Exit Strategy to withdraw the external support. In November 1999, a total of 62 international advisors were in place in CMAC, by the first half of 2000, the number had decreased to around 45 expatriates. At 31 March 2001, the number of technical advisors and experts had decreased to (20). A summary chart of TA during Phase III, prepared by the project team, is given (refer to Annex B.11). General issues include a possible lack of understanding of Cambodian culture and sensitivities, and the possibility that some advisors and experts did not have the necessary qualifications and/or expertise to carry out their intended role.

### 3.5.5 Functional Analysis

The initial concept of "one-to-one" counterpart has been determined by CMAC management as not efficient in creating a sustainable capacity building environment. The feeling, widely held, is that a team approach across a department would probably have been more beneficial all round. In seeing how to study the situation, it was decided that a functional approach would be more in tune with and responsive to CMAC's requirement. Analysis of the gap between needs and current capabilities would help focus attention on the correct priorities, and clarify what should be done in which order. One issue, for instance, is the potential for and efficacy of utilising a roving or a horizontal support instead of having an advisor dedicated to one Cambodian counterpart. The transfer of knowledge remains a key priority of CMAC and how to reach the widest audience with each unit of TA input. It is noted that recommendations regarding the design of technical assistance were developed previously by the Capacity Assessment Mission in October 1997, by the In-depth Evaluation of February 1998, and by the Capacity Development Review Mission undertaken in March 1999. These recommendations were reviewed and discussed by CMAC, UNDP and donors. In addition there was a Review of TA Requirements of CMAC, prepared by the (interim) Programme Co-ordinator, in December 1999. The concern in early 2000 appears to have been whether these last proposals were too radical in terms of withdrawing technical assistance too quickly. This is an issue that goes to the heart of any exit strategy for technical assistance.

However, there are other issues such as gauging local commitment correctly, and seeing how this fits in with the answers being offered.

An independent, functional needs analysis of all departments has been prepared by the TEM. The exercise was intended to identify the need for technical assistance, if any, for the next programme, in collaboration with CMAC. The TEM preliminary analysis was submitted to CMAC management for comments. Feedback was received on this matter, and matters of difference were discussed in detail and effectively resolved. This will be discussed further during the formulation stage. Hence, the analysis (refer to Annex B.12) should be considered as a consensus document at this time. By way of cross-checking, the TEM also received a detailed functional analysis conducted by the TA team. This was reviewed against both the TEM analysis and CMAC management's analysis. It was found that there was very close similarity between all three assessments. This is particularly encouraging; three independent exercises, representing three different perspectives, arriving at approximately the same conclusions.

In looking at possible technical assistance solutions to help CMAC bridge the gap, the TEM has been careful to leave all realistic options open to consideration, so as to allow CMAC to choose the most appropriate type for each situation. Options here include: long-term advisors and experts (for twelve months or more, on continuous assignment), advisors on intermittent assignments over a period of several months or years, shortterm consultancies focussing on delivering specific time-framed products and service, institutions, volunteers, secondment of individuals from external organisations or CMAC personnel going on secondment or internship, and so on. In all of this, the TEM has been conscious of the need to avoid building up dependencies within CMAC that can occur so easily, with long-term advisors and experts.

Management: The management and the technical capacities of CMAC personnel are still weak, and need to be strengthened. On the other hand, a substantial number of formal training courses increased the technical capabilities of CMAC staff in the field:

- From February 1992 to May 1993, 92 basic Demining courses were conducted for 2,302 persons
- Deminers, trained by the UNAMIC and UNTAC as well as,
- 2 Instructor courses, 6 supervisors courses, one EOD course and one Dog handler for the period.

This initial training programme revealed the weaknesses of the courses schedules. In 2001, there is still a need to strengthen the EOD team. The reduction of the basic training shows that CMAC personnel

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capabilities may have increased. Management training courses conducted from 1993 to 1999 are given (refer to Annex B. 13).

A concern is that CMAC managers may be so busy with their general tasks that they cannot find the time to devote themselves to policy development and procedures checking. It is understood that much documentation has been produced by technical advisors and experts, but is unclear whether some or indeed, all of this has been accepted or rejected by CMAC. A further issue is that once a policy or a set of procedures are adopted, that some form of appropriate training needs to be given as the case may be. Whether this has happened previously is unclear.

While lower level management is generally adequate, the mid- to higher level general management within CMAC is in need of further development. There is a particular need to develop executive and corporate management, and from observation and discussions with CMAC management, a senior management TA could be a very useful asset for a twelve-month period or more, to advise and assist the executive management, as well as to assist in coordinating the TA



assets. Although CMAC indicated its Public Relations section was weak, from the perspective of an implementing agency it is viewed as probably overstaffed and adequately prepared with sufficient national resources to draw on to further develop the capacity if needed. The argument that the CMAC's web-site is not up to date is no longer valid as the Information Section is developing this element.

Quality Assurance and Audit Section: Since the lay-off period (November 2000) the Internal Auditor Officer has not been replaced. A technical advisor, in place since November 2000, has been working without a counterpart. Hence, the first priority is to fill this vacant position. The detailed process and policy for the section have been drafted and are awaiting approval. Therefore, it is envisaged that the TA here, currently an in-kind donation from NPA, would be required for a further twelve months.

Operations and Planning Department: There is a lot that can be done to improve productivity here, and without significant cost. One observation is that this Department does not have an advisor with a strong technical background based on extensive personal demining/UXO experience, in a senior position. The current senior capacity has a focus on management, whereas there is some technical capacity at the next level down with the EOD, Flail, and Mine Dog TA, (all of whom are currently military and lack depth in Humanitarian Demining). This cannot be the answer for effective operations management. The inclusion of the TA QA/Audit into the operations team as a technical advisor to off-set this shortcoming defeats the purpose of having a separate QA/Audit capacity, and as such must be considered an understandable but short-term solution. The efforts of the current incumbents is commendable, however, the need for a sound demining/UXO technical advisor to the Operations Director cannot be understated. In summary, it is unclear whether the current arrangement is the most responsive to CMAC Operations' developmental needs or not, and as such, is a matter for CMAC to review. An assessment of the Operations Department needs, including staffing requirements and defining appropriate experience, should be undertaken. The two senior technical advisory positions in the Department need to be maintained but there is also a need to clarify the respective terms of reference, to avoid any duplication in functions and objectives. The duty statement for Planning TA needs to be broadened to include development of the project management capacity. It is anticipated that an Operations TA will need to spend six months in CMAC HQ, setting up the SOP and operations systems, followed by a roving role to implement these processes in the DU for a further six months. A Planning TA will need to continue for a further twelve months to consolidate the agency planning process, and to further develop the project management process and system. Key technical assistance duties will probably have to be modified when all the Department's positions have been filled.

It is noted that a Deputy Director will be recruited externally very soon for the Department, and should have a background in project management. It will probably take time for the recruited person to demonstrate his or her ability to assimilate the department activities and to function as an efficient manager. In that case, the role of the Planning Technical Advisor will be very important. The job descriptions for the Department should be refined and completed, and the draft procedures form should be finalised and standardised. Furthermore, all procedures should be accessible via computer. The Department needs to create a project management function, it is highly desirable to convert one of the existing posts to a Contracts or Project Management Officer to co-ordinate and monitor the 19 different projects. Again, the new position should be assisted by Planning TA. The new mechanical project should be supported by a Technical Advisor with a strong background in technical and plant management skills for a duration of twelve months. The alternative would be to place it within the Flail TA's responsibilities, subject to necessary technical skills being present.

A Technical Advisor should also assist the Survey project for a duration of twelve months for the Level One, Two and Three surveys. There is a need to continue to develop the whole project, using the existing Level One, and developing the Level Two and Three elements. CMAC capacity for the Dog project is well

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developed, and a three-month consultancy should be sufficient to develop national capacity in quality control (QC) and monitoring of that project.

The EOD component is in need of a significant technical upgrade. To achieve this it is recommended that six national staff be identified and sent overseas to a donor country, to undertake a specific EOD technicians course in say, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Canada or Australia. Simultaneously the STA EOD should develop and implement an upgrade training course to bring the EOD staff up to full EOD Technician for Land Service Ammunition (LSA). As this course is implemented additional TA should be put in place (- one TA per four EOD teams) in each Demining Unit to carry out on-the-job training (OJT) with the newly trained staff. The duration of these field TA's should be a minimum of six months OJT with the teams. Approximately eight field TA's for a minimum of six months, or better still, four TA's over twelve months, will be required for this exercise. The STA and one other EOD TA will be required for twelve months to design, implement and then validate the training. The next phase of developing specialist capacity is in aerial- and sea-delivered munitions. This can be developed using the six overseas-trained national staff with the EOD STA and TA for the six months, following their return from overseas training.

Training Centre: By end-June 2001, the Management Training Technical Advisor's contract will be completed. It is recommended to extend this position for an additional twelve months, so as to deliver a project management handbook and the procedures for training development, delivery, evaluation and management (of training). These have been designed and submitted for approval, and after this has been given, they should be implemented as soon as possible with his assistance. In addition, over the last three years, there has been a substantial increase in the level of training activity. New courses need to be initiated all the time. The Training Centre is expected to organise some outside management training under Cranfield University (UK) tutorial system. To achieve this it would be an asset if the courses could 'be conducted regionally or nationally through a Governmental Institution or University. There is a need to do a training needs analysis or assessment (TNA) of the field operations and do a task analysis to ensure that the training packages are appropriate. This has just recently commenced and the TEM commends this initiative. The training packages will then require to be objectivised. CMAC's participation in the UNDP-sponsored, DFIDfunded mine action management courses (recently developed by Cranfield University) is on-going and as such, Cambodian participation in these courses, as well as in further in-country tertiary-level management and administration training, must be a high priority.

Regarding the overall project, adopting an attachment programme approach would be very useful to upgrade and extend Cambodian staff competencies. Experiences from other mine action programmes supported by the UN elsewhere in the world, would serve as a benchmark to establish CMAC standards. The EOD team provided by the Belgium Co-operation have been operating for a too short a period (six months for the team). As a general principle, so as to avoid any disappointment on both the national and donor sides, it is concluded that the frequency of rotation should be much less, so that experts have the time to train Cambodian staff and to achieve tangible results.

Trials and Evaluation (T&E) is an area that has not been addressed by the restructure and will have to have some capacity within the new organisation. CMAC needs to identify a TA to strengthen the T & E capacity and that this capacity should be built around the instructional team. At least two years will be probably be required to develop this capacity with a technically sound TA as mentor.

Support Department: Logistics Section is sound and is developing well. The Support Department as a whole, still has a need for enhancement. The new Director Support will probably need advice and assistance in this area, specifically in logistics and procurement. This advisory role could be fulfilled by the new Logistics TA. It is also identified that the Logistics TA could cover the advisory role on procurement matters.

Careful examination of the procurement system office needs to take place in order to strengthen the unit as a whole. In the new organisation chart, this unit is under the supervision of the Director of Support. It is noted that additional staff with a solid background in procurement and finance, will need to be hired to support the unit. The presence of a short-term consultant could be very useful so as to readjust and update the policies and procedures. The MIS section is developing well but still requires some further development of systems and capacity. This can be achieved with the current TA over the next twelve months or so.

For the medical section, it is necessary to look closely at the mismatch between the needs and the terms of reference plus experience of the current Medical Coordinator. Given the specialist nature of this very important post, it will be necessary to recruit externally, an alternative person with a strong background in surgery, traumatic amputation, or medical field operation experiences. There is a need for a short-term consultancy to assess the system and equipment, and to refine the procedures.

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Since May 2000, the Human Resources Branch in the Support Department, has been running without any external support. There is still need for a Senior Technical Advisor for a period of twelve months, with a strong background in management to assist the HR Deputy Director and to work closely with the Deputy DirectorGeneral and the Director-General. The Deputy Director will be responsible for coordinating and facilitating the liaison between the Training Centre and the HR Branch.

The Communication and MIS Officer should be assisted by a three-month communications consultancy to assess the system, formulate local procedures and policies, and also train counterparts in management area. Indications are that there are some unresolved issues in the area of transport and maintenance. These issues could be addressed by CMAC and JICA together. A TA Maintenance and Transport working closely with national counterparts, should only require 12 months to resolve transport/maintenance management systems.

Finance Department: Given the reasons for the period of crisis (1999-2000), CMAC recognizes the need to have a full-strength Finance Department, with fully trained personnel working with proper and complete procedures. There are steps being taken to recruit and appoint additional accountants and staff, as soon as possible. This step and the subsequent training, are vital. In addition there is the need to coordinate and operationalise all the accounting / logistics / procurement procedures as soon as possible. The monthly validation exercise with PriceWaterhouseCoopers needs to be made more timely, and to deal with new areas as CMAC moves towards full financial management under national execution modality. The annual audits are continuing, and the importance of transparency and accountability is being embedded throughout CMAC. Overall, the observation is that technical assistance is needed until such time as all processes and systems, including validation of the Fixed Assets Register, are embedded, oversight is working as planned, and transparency and integrity are clear. There has been a Financial Advisor more or less working with the Department since the start of phase III. The most recent position-holder did not have his contract renewed at the end of March 2001. It is noted that there was a difference of opinion on the necessity for continuing the incumbent at that time, between the project team and UNOPS on the one hand and CMAC senior management and UNDID (CO) on the other hand. Whereas there is still a need to assist CMAC in this critical area and a key input in determining the need or otherwise of on-going TA will be the latest KPMG audit, the TEM assumes that the decision for not extending the incumbent STA Finance's contract was taken with the (anticipated) KPMG audit findings and recommendations in mind.

A FMIS Officer should be recruited and appointed by end-May 2001. The person will need to be supported and trained on the financial automated system by the existing technical advisor for a

period of three months or so. A Budget Officer and an Accounting Officer, an Assistant Finance Director, are expected to be recruited and appointed very soon. They will need to be supported by the Department for some time, where there is a lot to do in the implementation of the financial policies and procedures, and for ensuring the integrity of the CMAC financial system as a whole. The role of senior management is very important here, and there may well be a need for some financial management awareness training at management level. Overall, CMAC and UNDP will probably need to review progress regularly in this very important Department, and as appropriate, introduce advice and assistance on an as-required basis.

A summary matrix of the TEM's assessment of CMAC functional needs compared to CMAC senior management's own estimate, department by department, is given (refer to Annex B. 12).

### **3.5.6 Exit Strategies**

The 1999 Capacity Assessment. Mission of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre developed an Exit Strategy on UNDP criteria. The analysis is based on five core assumptions that set the parameters for the Exit Strategy:

- The transition of managerial responsibilities fully into the hands of Cambodian management
- The reduction of international staff
- Continuing short and mid-term need for international funding assistance
- Long-term transition to financial self support
- Eventual adoption of a National Execution (NEX) modality.

Various definitions of the term: Exit Strategy has been developed by other donors and agencies, slightly different from this one. The World Bank perspective is more concentrated on the institutional framework development. For example:

- The first phase recognised by the World Bank is to reorganise the whole National Mine Action sector through appropriate civil services incentives, local training facilities, and the establishment of policies decrees and laws,

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- The second phase is the role of capacity-building that should be developed in collaboration with the target institutions, and
- The consolidation phase where the authority is in the position to identify its needs and to manage its own development at all levels.

Hence, one can see that there is a difference of approach to achieving the exit strategy phase among donors agencies. For this very reason the concept of exit strategy should be used cautiously and always in context.

The views of donor agencies and government officials on their interpretation on Capacity Development and the purpose of technical assistance have been reported through a Cambodia Development Resources Institutes survey, in August 2000. Both donors and government emphasised capacity development as the most important aim of technical assistance, therefore, the capacity building level is functioned to the quality and the quantity of its technical assistance. According to the survey, the direct impacts of the technical assistance are focused on:

- Capacity development (100% for all donors)
- Incomes (50% for bilateral donors)
- Facilitation and monitoring of resources flow (total of 9%)

There was a slight difference of opinion between donors and government officials about the

purpose of TA. All mentioned capacity development as an aim and most interpreted this to mean that TA should be expected to develop the capacity to replace itself. At the beginning of the Mine Action programme in Cambodia, capacity development took the second place to more urgent objective of demining the Cambodian territory for population resettlement. The dimensions of capacity development emphasised by agencies and government officials focus on the development of individual and on institutional capacity, although the respondents recognised the importance of ensuring financial sustainability, which is also part of a TA mission.

CMAC management is still in the process of being strengthened. Considerable improvement has been made, and the management of the CMAC is on the right track to becoming a completely autonomous and independent enterprise. Because of the crisis of 1999-2000, there is a need to rebuild the self-confidence of CMAC personnel and to train or recruit appropriate managers with a strong managerial background and potential. Based on the assessment done previously by the Training Centre, various training courses has been developed for all level of management but some re-adjustments have been recommended to achieve the appropriate standard. In 2001, the organisation has the potential to manage all aspect of its operations. The need assessment discussions with CMAC Management during this evaluation mission indicates that the reduction of international experts reflects the standard of CMAC personnel's skills levels to date. It is recognised that it is difficult to prepare a plan for technical assistance with confidence, while the organisation is being re-structured.

The transition of managerial responsibilities is about to be fully in the hands of Cambodian management, although there is still need external assistance to consolidate some aspects of the management activities, but only for a limited duration. The reduction of international staff is the key to allow an entire control of Cambodian management in the organisation, at the end of the phase III project, CMAC registered 20 technical advisors and experts. The analysis assessment indicates that for the continuation of the programme, other form of support could be more appropriate and could fit to the new requirement of the organisation such as: short-term consultancy, national expertise, external audit, volunteers.

In terms of self-support, the Royal government of Cambodia has pledged a total amount of USD 1, 814, 327 from the beginning of the programme, for the first quarter of the year 2001 USD 50.000 has been injected through the UNDP Trust Fund. The RGC does not have enough funds to support the administration activities and their operations, with the creation of the new authority CMAA. It is a challenging mission for the Government to gather additional funds at this time.

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## **4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **4.1 MINE ACTION**

Mine Action in Cambodia as a national programme has not developed in pace with the individual implementation capacities. CMAC has not developed into a credible national authority and co-ordinating body, for a number of reasons. For the Cambodian government to take ownership of the mine and UXO problem and its solution, an effective management authority and co-ordinating body must be found. During the greater period of this phase of the project this was not achieved. It was after the crisis of 1999 that a concept of a separate national authority evolved. The CMAA concept crystallised during the period of July - August 2000, with the Royal Decree creating CMAA issued on 4 September. The creation of this body is only the first step toward developing a national programme and will require a high level of support from both the national and international community.

There is still no national programme for mine action. Proper mine action planning needs a national programme so that all players are aware of the bigger picture and to allow them to co-ordinate

their individual work-plans. CMAC, although mandated to do so, did not address this issue. CMAA has now been mandated to take the lead in this area, particularly in preparing a national strategy. One of the problems in developing a five-year strategy is the short horizon and the focus on short-term goals and objectives. This has led to a combined capacity of over 4,000 national staff between the three implementing agencies (i.e. CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG) that will only be sustainable while donor support is present. As this is already flagging, the future for this capacity is already of some concern. The mission of CMAC has varied from phase to phase. The current CMAC mission: *"Saving Lives and Supporting Development"* is difficult to measure or quantify. However, it does aim at a longer-term perspective, which is to be commended. A longer-term strategy must be developed as soon as possible, so as to avoid the adoption of short-term solutions that give rise to longterm difficulties. Currently the short-term perspective has led to the creation of a very large national capacity concentrating on clearance that may not be sustainable, and appears not to be focussing on the achievement of the overall mission. The creation of a long-term national strategy is essential to the future of the national programme.

With the situation as it is now, CMAA should become the focus for all national mine action development initiatives in all aspects in the future. To do this it must take the lead and produce national policies and regulations for the implementation of mine action activities. The need to develop national human resources to achieve effective national ownership cannot be understated. With the weakening of the current capacity during the last two years there is a need to focus on the management development over the next few years. The real ownership of this programme comes from national leadership and management capacity, and it must be capable and credible to undertake the task at hand.

## 4.2 THE PROJECT

Without doubt the context of the project has changed very significantly, from the time of formulation (Q1 - Q2 1998) to where it is now. The crisis has been discussed in some detail elsewhere in this report. Nevertheless, its impact on CMAC and on the project cannot be overstated. However, there have been other developments that have taken place and these need to be considered.

First and foremost there is the emergence of mine action as an important development sub-sector in its own right, and with it the building up of sound practices, case studies, standards, norms and a body of knowledge. The number of seasoned and respected practitioners back in 1998 was few indeed. Most individual advisors in mine action were possibly on their first or second assignment, and may not have had the reference framework for gauging how they were doing, vis-a-vis other programmes or practitioners. In the context of Cambodia, one of the most important events since the start of the project has been the decision of the Government to establish CMAA as the independent regulatory body. Whatever about the concerns of the donor community at that time, CMAA is now very much in the mine action equation. Thirdly, CMAC has been working in severely mine-affected areas, and has made a difference. There may be an issue here of rightsizing the level of mine action in Cambodia, and not spending all available funds within a given year. It may be a question of doing fewer things, in order of priority to the national development plan, thus getting greater added value overall and greater returns on investment. This needs better socio-economic analysis and impact assessment, and should begin to be resolved with the new National Mine Action Strategy.

Regarding CMAC and the project, a number of issues have emerged from the findings. First there is the feeling that perhaps expectations might have got ahead of reality with respect to the readiness of CMAC's financial management capability in mid-1998, to move towards full national execution before the end of the project period. As it turned out, the crisis served as a wake-up call, so to speak. At this time, April 2001,

CMAC has learned from that very bitter experience, and seems better positioned now to work with UNDP, in the spirit of the DEX/NEX progression, not only for demining operations but also for planning and managing technical assistance. Whereas the Government's gesture of putting its contribution through a UNDP RGC Trust Fund was widely welcomed by donors in the past, the time has now come to review the efficacy and purpose of having this continue say, after the end of the current project. This position should of course, take into account the findings of the latest KPMG audits, which are expected shortly. The expansion of the whole trust fund portfolio has meant a considerable increase in work-load for the UNDP Mine Action programme unit, and if sustainability is to mean something, national ownership and accountability of financial management must figure prominently.

It is noted that the regular Mine Action Donor Updates issued by UNDP are proving very useful to the donors, particularly the section on the status of funds. This is clearly an area where UNDP can continue to refine the content and detail, so as to continue to give donors important information in a timely manner. One issue that has been raised by CMAC, is whether donors could be more proactive and indicate likely pledges and commitments well in advance. It is understandable that CMAC would want to try and plan for the medium- to long-term, but this is difficult in the absence of indicative budget figures. This is not a case of budget-driven development, but a realistic request, which if answered, will allow CMAC to set the correct level of field and headquarters staff. It is unreasonable to expect good quality of work and sustained morale, when CMAC is obliged to adopt a hire-and-fire approach to human resources because of the uncertainty surrounding the flow of funds to it.

Referring to the project document, it would have been easier to understand the relationships better if an estimate of the trust fund budget was also included. This could have been done either as a single line under Sub-contracts in the budget for CMB/98-006, or a separate budget completely, CMB/98A\*\*, attached as an annex 1(b), and cross-referenced on the title page under the project number. It is noted that the separation of UNOPS as a separate UN Agency from UNDP (January 1995) has not been recognised in the contractual agreement for CMAC to carry out the operations under Phase III. It made little or no difference in phase (II), where there was a simple roll-over of the trust fund agreement plus terms of reference, signed between CMAC and UNOPS (14 April / 31 May 1995), as UNOPS was continuing as executing agency for both the trust fund and the technical assistance and was in a position to accept the trust fund agreement as a subcontract. What was different in phase (III) was that UNDP was moving to direct execution (DEX) of the trust fund, leaving UNOPS with the technical assistance component only. The final move to DEX for the trust fund was not confirmed until November 1998, and the new agreement signed between CMAC and UNDP on 17 December during the visit of the UNDP Associate Administrator to Cambodia. Hence, from 17 December 1998 onwards there is a situation whereby CMAC is carrying out its four-programme work-plan funded by the UNDP trust fund under the new Agreement with UNDP, when the project document as a contract in its own right refers to UNOPS as the executing agency, and there is no (new) agreement between UNOPS and CMAC for the sub-contract. This anomaly was raised in correspondence between UNOPS headquarters and the UNDP Associate Administrator in early January 1999. It is not clear how this matter has been tidied up contractually between CMAC and UNOPS. The only document on record now is the project document, and this has not been amended to include a new sub-contract agreement. This may appear to be a little late at this stage, but it does help to understand some of the difficulties in the working relationship between UNDP and UNOPS on the project.

Perhaps, a case could be made that, once the management of the Trust Fund moved from UNOPS to UNDP, there should have been a redrafting of the project document into two components, or even two separate project documents, to reflect the different nature of the responsibilities. On the one hand there could have been a project document to cover the CMAC operations under a (national execution) contract with the UNDP Trust Fund for the four-programme work-plan as per the annex to the original project document. This would be complemented by a second project document that focused purely on technical assistance to CMAC, provided by UNOPS and by donors. In this way the national project manager (i.e. the

CMAC Director -General) has responsibility for delivering the operational programme, and the Programme Co-ordinator looks after the agency-executed technical assistance project, insofar as he has control over all technical assistance for capacity building. If both operations and technical assistance are under national execution, then the national project manager has single point responsibility for both components.

Donors have queried whether the move from agency (i.e. UNOPS) execution of the Trust Fund to DEX (i.e. UNDP) execution could not have been more clearly explained to the donors in advance. There has been a concern raised that, even though the change was undertaken for the best of intentions, UNDP (CO) did not foresee how demanding the actual management of the Trust Fund was going to be. This is reflected, to some degree, in the way that there was originally no administration and management charge for the (DEX) Trust Fund. This was later changed to 3% in October 2000, when it became clear that, in addition to the extra or unanticipated support and services that were needed to help deal with the CMAC crisis of 1999-2000, there

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were on-going and not insignificant costs involved in managing the fund. The question has been raised whether the splitting of Trust Fund management from technical assistance management had any detrimental effects on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the two components. On consideration, given that for the most part of the phase (III) period, there were constant change and flux at CMAC which overshadowed and dominated everything, it is difficult for the TEM in the time available to draw anything more than the conclusion that this cannot be clearly determined one way or the other. Organisations closer to the running of CMAC and the project throughout this period, based on their detailed knowledge of all pertinent facts, may find it easier to dis-aggregate the two groups of factors and effects, and draw conclusions that differ from that of the TEM.

If something is to be learnt from all this it is that in the new contractual arrangements for the use of the trust funds, contracts must be tightly designed and must include a clear statement of goals, objectives, targets and success indicators. In addition, the loose arrangement whereby donors, as parties not mentioned in the project document or the trust fund, have not written specific terms regarding co-ordination under a CMAC recognised Programme Co-ordinator into their agreements with CMAC, must be amended to show explicit lines of reporting to the CMAC Director-General. This is the situation that must prevail under the national execution modality.

#### **4.3 CAMBODIAN MINE ACTION CENTRE**

CMAC has inherited a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed in the short term. The main concern is that, as a result of the crisis and other factors, at this point the weaknesses are such that if accreditation were to take place, it is not certain that CMAC would meet international standards. The serious areas of concern are its lack of authorised and current written procedures and policies, in explosive handling; storage and transport; and the level of the medical support capacity. Having said that, as the national standards have yet to be developed, this allows CMAC a period in which to resolve these issues and ensure that the gaps are filled. A concerted effort to strengthen these main areas needs to be undertaken and can be successful if tackled with a strong sense of commitment and targeting.

The focus to date for CMAC has been on Safety, Efficiency and Effectiveness. Although the figures given in section (3.3) are good, there is room for improvement, simply by giving greater attention to certain aspects of operations. From observation it appears that area of efficiency does not appear to have been given sufficient attention, but this is now changing and is to be commended. The inability to analyse basic data or interrogate CMAC's information systems which is now being addressed, highlights this earlier lack of attention to productivity. There is some improvement at this time, and is likely to continue to improve. With its new refocussed role as an implementing agency CMAC will need to become more efficient and effective, as it will have to compete for dwindling scarce resources with the other implementing agencies. Therefore, it will be vital to improve productivity, to become cost effective and efficient, and remain the lowest cost



operator. CMAC will need to develop sound management capacity for its field operations to further enhance the issue of productivity. This will allow timely internal evaluation of outputs.

#### **4.4 GOVERNMENT AND DONOR SUPPORT**

From the RGC side, there has been a sign of commitment to mine action at the highest level, as well as the management staff in CMAC. The actual involvement from the key ministries in term of co-ordination, information sharing and actual participation in key meeting so far is less than expected. In terms of national capacity, after having been in this business for over eight years, CMAC is quite well developed. The issue is how to prioritise, plan and fund the work that remains to be done, nationally and locally. The current steps being taken by Government to prepare a National Mine Action Strategy are certainly in the right direction, particularly the consultative and collaborative approach being adopted, and is to be commended. This dialogue will eventually lead to the key question of what needs to be funded, when and by whom. Areas that are deemed low priority against national development criteria at the initial stage, may have to be permanently fenced until such time as the re-calculation of the socio-economic cost/benefit ratio suggests that areas should be tackled because the parameters have changed.

#### **4.5 CAPACITY BUILDING**

The TEM has found that there is no consensus on what constitutes "capacity building". So as to address this shortcoming, the TEM has concluded that it should be possible to propose and utilise a definition within the context of mine action, which should be acceptable to Government and donors alike. In this regard, after considerable deliberation, the following is offered and is used in the remainder of this report:

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*CAPACITY BUILDING is strengthening the ability of national organisations and their human resources to carry out their functions independently in an effective, efficient, safe and sustainable manner by enhancing knowledge, skills, competencies, processes, systems and procedures through a range of interventions within a coherent, co-ordinated and time-bound framework.*

It appears that core concepts of capacity building and human resource development are not being grasped in certain areas. For instance, the Recruitment Committee for the Director of Human Resources focused on the Khmer writing skills of the applicants, rather than their knowledge and understanding of HR issues, strategies and procedures. It appears that the cabinet of the Director-General, the Operations and Planning Department and the Training Centre have all been sharing functions and responsibilities normally located in a unified Human Resources department or section. This applies particularly to the areas of training, management development and job description formulations; there may be duplication, gaps, conflicts and inefficient use of resources later.

National leadership in human resources management should be enhanced. To date initiatives have been led by the past and present technical advisors because of the lack of appreciation of HR role in the organisation.

##### **4.5.1 Project Design and Implementation for Capacity Building**

In the new thinking all organisations must adapt themselves to "continuous learning", and this applies to CMAC as well as to CMAA. Hence, there will need to be consideration given to strengthening this concept in national organisations involved in mine action, through technical assistance for capacity building. For the achievement of capacity building as defined above, the following mechanisms can be utilised:

- Long-term advisors, experts and specialists
  - Consultants, for short-term missions
  - Formal training
  - On-the-job training
  - Provision of (proven) policies, processes, systems and procedures
  - Study tours and visits
  - Internships, exchanges and secondments
  - Conferences, seminars and workshops
  - Distance learning

Since the beginning of the project - Phases (I) and (II), the design of the technical assistance packages have been developed by donor agencies with little or no consultation with CMAC. It appears that due to this lack of co-operation, the role of the technical assistance has been understood differently from both sides. The absence of collaboration on the objectives of the external assistance has created misunderstandings, frustrations and confusion. There is an issue regarding the concept of externally-specified expertise levels and competencies, without reference to the counterpart/recipient organisation. An additional issue is how strong training/teaching skills should a technical advisor/expert have, in order to achieve the minimum of common expectations. It appears that some advisors may have considered their mission only from an operational perspective, without sufficiently addressing human resources development whether explicitly stated in their Terms of reference or not. This also raises a question of whether CMAC management paid enough attention to transfer of knowledge in previous years. The issue is how the goals of the technical advisors/assistants could have been enhanced - does it need different TOR or does it need a different mindset? The TEM has been informed that as a Cambodian organisation, CMAC places great value on having technical advisors who are sensitive to the Khmer culture and who are able to adjust their inputs so that they fit within Asian context. For many outsiders, such an adjustment may be difficult to make. While acknowledging that there may be highly experienced mine action professionals outside of Cambodia, CMAC believes that a greater contribution can be made to resolving its problems by drawing on those personnel who have already made this transition, provided that their competence and suitability for the position is not in doubt.

CMAC believes that serving effectively in the role of technical advisor requires some knowledge of the national language. This expectation, it must be said, has to be commensurate with (a) the length of time any one advisor/expert has in the country, (b) the likelihood that someone with the specific skills/expertise will have had the opportunity to work for a realistic period in a Khmer-language situation. Many of the advanced technical skills in mine action are not readily found in Cambodia, hence the need for external assistance. While it is acknowledged that advisors on short-term contracts may be unable to make the necessary investment in learning a new language, CMAC is asking that advisors and experts from all sources be required, as part of their contract, to develop a language competency proportionate to their tenure. This

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measure, perhaps as part of an induction course, followed up by regular Khmer language tuition, could be an in-kind input from the Government. It would go some way to promoting cultural understanding, but it must be remembered that linguistic ability and cultural sensitivity are not one and the same thing. The primary criterion for suitability for consideration for a position as technical advisor or expert should be technical ability and proven experience. On a related issue, a case can be made for CMAC, CMAA and RCAF, jointly or separately, training a cadre of specialist mine action / demining / EOD translators in Khmer/English/French.

At the higher level are the issues of national ownership of the development agenda and national leadership of the development process. The Royal Government of Cambodia elaborated a new

approach to this when it published its draft Paper: *A New Development Co-operation Paradigm for Cambodia*, for the Consultative Group meeting in Paris on 24-26 May 2000. This new thinking is permeating down and is being reflected in the input of CMAC, and now CMAA as well, in the terms of reference, the duration of the technical support, the modality of the contract, the recruitment process, and the design of work plan of each technical advisor or consultant are crucial to producing valid and tangible results, all under national ownership and leadership. An issue for CMAC is to ensure that the Director-General becomes the real focal point for managing all current and future technical assistance.

The key issue for national staff and technical advisors and experts alike, is assessing the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. There have been good examples of the TA approach working well, and meeting counterparts' expectations. Similarly, there has been a lack of continuity and coherence between TAs working in the same unit, whether as a result of one TA not following the lead set by his or her predecessor or perhaps concurrent TA's not liaising enough with one another on issues, priorities and actions needed. It appears that the short duration of many assignments (i.e. less than one year) has had a major influence here. On reflection, and with the benefit of hindsight but not exclusively so, assignments should be at least one year to achieve proper expectations. This does not apply to short-term consultancies needed to address specific issues. The rotation of advisors /experts has been designed and programmed in the Phase III Project Document, the purpose of the rotation system is to progressively reach a reduction of the military TAs in favour of developmental specialists, so as to allow a reduction of the number of TA's to a minimum in the organisation. In the mine action sector globally, there is a recognition that the militaries are no longer the single source of experts for manual demining or the management of mine action programmes. The humanitarian mine action sector is now producing a lot of the required expertise. Nevertheless, the militaries remain the leading source of expertise in EOD, technical training, logistics, and explosives storage and handling. They can and are expected to play an important role, complementing humanitarian demining efforts. This becomes important when looking ahead at the situation in five years or so from now. RCAF will have to be correctly strengthened and positioned to deal with those aspects of EOD that are always going to be beyond the (civilian) demining sector, such as the more complex munitions. One of the things that may have been missing was a real understanding on the part of donors of what the technical advisors and experts were doing, and how they were working together. Given that there were many individuals involved, in the region of 70 in mid-1998, to about 20 in early 2001. One suggestion to the TEM has been to have periodic meetings with a representative from UNDP and from other donors. This would give everyone greater insight into how things are actually progressing against expectations. As a result stakeholders (Donors/TA's) would be able to detect if the project was beginning to show signs of stress, and to discuss remedial options in a timely manner. Quarterly or even monthly progress reports are also important in this respect.

As a general principle, Technical Advisors should be able to carry out training and to:

- Promote the implementation of a customer-oriented approach to all activities and operations
- Discuss issues and strategies with Cambodian counterparts
- Provide appropriate technical and management advice and suggestions to resolve problems in collaboration with their counterparts.
- Develop a technical and/or management development programme adapted to the staff's needs
- Provide the internal audit or quality control function for the departments(s) to which the TA is attached, it would need the support and expertise of a specific TA in charge of the development of internal audit /quality control.
- Monitor the implementation of the policies and procedures of the respective CMAC departments.

From observation there is little sense of ownership by the HR Section's staff of any concepts and issues that are addressed in the policies and procedures written by former TA's. Why this is so is a moot point. Employees are expected to understand and adopt a new set of processes and procedures while at the

same time, operating under old ones. There may have been some resistance to the changes that were introduced by different Technical Advisors in the same post. This would also explain the reason why there are still some difficulties in promoting appropriate HR practices, and addressing violations of HR Directives. Even though the HR Directives have been amended several times, they are still in draft form (version 1997), and not

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surprisingly, having multiple versions of the manual has created some confusion as to which are the ones that apply. This can and should be rectified.

An experienced Human Resources consultant could be employed to develop a fully integrated HR system in order to provide the transparency and the accountability in HR issues for CMAC. A national consultant would understand the Cambodian environment and would work closely with the Deputy Director in charge of the section fully supported by the Director and Director-General.

CMAC should deploy a pertinent strategy to fully use the manpower resources of the organisation, therefore, it could be interested to recruit people based on the area of competence but also on their capacity to develop additional skills in other areas. Within departments, employees should be able to cover for their colleagues, even to accomplish their duties. They should view themselves as employees of the departments as a whole and be able to handle many aspects of the business in the particular department. This is an issue for the Recruitment Committee, it should be based on multi-skills criteria's for the reinstatement process, and i.e. the deminers should be able to work in the fields but should also be able to be a good driver. Refining all the job descriptions should help to limit the disappointments in recruitment by moral obligation; even if they do not fit to the position.

A previous survey showed that employees undertaking roles in CMAC are generally loyal in terms of length of employment with the organisation. Those at the headquarters have an average employment record of 4.8 years. The second group, primarily field-based average 5.5 years' employment, with many personnel having had prior experience with UNTAC. The majority have served in a range of positions, with an average of three to four different positions.

#### **4.5.2 Exit Strategies**

The use of the term: "Exit Strategy" should be standardised for all partners involved in Mine Action in order to achieve and promote common expectations. A common point of agreement is the major role of the technical assistance in capacity building. Based on CDRI survey, Experts working in national authorities are generally asked to "do the job" as well as or instead of developing capacity. This may not always be reported to donors, but there has to be some recognition of the reality within host or target organisations. From this perspective, the full substitution of TA by local manpower is some distance away from being fully accomplished.

The ownership of mine action assistance is the key to developing a realistic and effective exit strategy. There is a perception that in the past, technical assistance initiatives may have been donor-driven. Things have improved since then. Experts rotated to their government's schedule, often for only six months at a time, with minimum consultation with, or perhaps requested by, CMAC on proposed replacements or whether targets or work-plan objectives are being achieved or indeed if the terms of reference were correct in the first place, and usually without an end-of-assignment report to CMAC and/or the Programme Co-ordinator. It has been reported to the TEM that a number of earlier experts/advisors were like "technical tourists", spending not insignificant time outside of the CMAC office/ field of operation without informing CMAC management, and showing insufficient regard for attendance, time-keeping and discipline. This is no longer considered a major issue, but nevertheless is indicative of the type of problems that can arise when multi-faceted and multinational technical assistance streams and rotations are un-coordinated. Terms of reference have been missing key co-ordination, monitoring and reporting clauses, so vital for effective delivery of capacity building in such a situation as in CMAC. Although no one can be absolutely sure in such matters, the general feeling is that the source of much

misinformation fed to the media in the period of crisis, came from disgruntled experts/advisors, but not exclusively so. Having said that, it is not fair to categorise all experts/advisors in the same way. CMAC personnel can readily identify many experts/ advisors, both past and present, who have made or who are continuing to make a genuine effort to build a sustainable capacity with counterparts, for which their efforts are appreciated. Overall, this co-ordination situation is cause for reflection, and the lessons to be learnt from this should be taken into account when designing multi-stream or complex capacity building interventions in future. One immediate answer would be to remove as much complexity and risk as possible at the design stage, by simplifying arrangements and streamlining inputs.

The difficult period the country has been through during the last three decades, has taken a toll far beyond what can be imagined. But, there have been positive developments and ever-widening and deepening stability in many aspects of Cambodian life. CMAC and CMAA now constitute the main driving force for change in mine action in Cambodia. The concept of national ownership and leadership in this area is new, having been overshadowed for so long by the presence of so many donors, experts and advisors. This has taken on considerable importance particularly as mine action as a sector moves away from recent difficulties, and not just at CMAC. There is now a very real sense that Cambodian staff at all levels in CMAC, want to feel that they own the process of designing, selecting, managing and monitoring all technical assistance in the future.

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They need to take responsibility for decision-making. This is of vital importance. The phased reduction of technical experts/advisors, including the adjustment of their roles, will certainly contribute to building up selfconfidence among national staff. CMAC management has realised that the "culture" of the organisation is the vector to set up a number of fundamental values such as: professionalism, integrity, discipline, ethical behaviour and the feeling of being part of a world-class organisation in mine action.

The key question is determining why technical assistance is needed in each area. CMAC and CMAA have already begun their own internal discussions on this issue, and as a first step have reached consensus on what they do not want. No one is saying that CMAC and CMAA can be fully functional without assistance on 30 June 2001; the day after the current phase of the project finishes. The whole re-organisation of CMAC, indeed the changes to the sector as a whole, mean that there may be new needs emerging and likely to do so, for some time to come. Thus, what is needed is for a thorough assessment of CMAC's and CMAA's respective abilities to deliver against their new roles and functions as confirmed in the final decrees to be issued by Government, and in the time-frame set by Government.

By undertaking a proper needs or gap analysis, both organisations can determine with confidence their short to medium-term needs. It will then be up to Government to invite donors to support CMAC and CMAA to address these gaps, under national leadership. Gaps are likely to be in such areas as policy, strategy, data collection and management, regulation, accreditation, financial management and auditing, quality assurance, and so on. Unlike before there is a need to address capacity building horizontally across divisions of the host organisation, and not have one-to-one arrangements, which has proved disappointing. The real issue from the lessons learnt is that counterpart organisations must clearly define what it is they are expecting from each element of a technical assistance programme. In this way will the expertise and experience necessary to carry out individual assignments become clear. This will guide the drafting of terms of reference, and will permit the partnering organisations - counterpart and donor, to decide on the length and timing of the assignment, in consultation with other assignments that may be on-going or planned. Numerous options on how to avoid the selection of inappropriate experts/advisors/consultants are being discussed. Amongst the suggestions are (a) specific schedules regarding co-ordination and reporting under a single focal point be inserted in the agreements between all donors and the host organisation, (b) closer hand-on management of individual TA by the host organisation, from start to finish, (c) using a questionnaire on Khmer culture, religion and history as part of the recruitment of potential candidates who are willing to apply in TA position, (d) the use of loans could be a

strategic way to withdraw the external aid and to allow the national authorities to be entirely responsible of mine action in Cambodia, and such like.

As a general principle so as to avoid undue disruption to the current system, reduction of technical assistance should be done gradually, over a realistic period of say, one or more years. In this way, national management can accelerate or decelerate the rate of reduction, depending on the achievements in the key areas where capacity is to be built. To move towards the entire independence of CMAC and CMAA, the presence of international experts/advisors can be reduced and, as required, replaced by local consultants or experts. On the other hand, the financial independence and sustainability of CMAC is still an issue, and Cambodia still needs the support of the donor community for some time to come. The integrity of the financial management system at all host organisations, will determine the potential for full financial national execution.

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## **5.**

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 - 5.5**

For Recommendations relating to: Mine Action, The Project; Cambodian Mine Action Centre; Government and Donor Support, and Capacity Building, please refer to the accompanying tables on pages 66 - 76. The designations H/M/L beneath each serial number stand for priority ranking - High, Medium or Low priority. The priorities have not been re-grouped within these three categories, as it was felt the recommendations should flow logically from the earlier sections of the Report.

#### **5.6 The Next Steps**

From a detailed analysis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations in this report, the next steps for mine action in Cambodia are clear:

- The needs of the mine action sector should be identified and addressed with a comprehensive and holistic approach which takes into account the overall development needs and objectives of the country ( - a "programme approach" ) , under the principle of national ownership.
- CMAC new focus and mandate as a service provider must be reinforced, with appropriate amendments to Decrees, processes, systems, procedures, organisational structure, staffing levels, training, equipment and resources. Technical assistance must be very carefully planned and managed by CMAC itself in close consultation with UNDP and the donor community.
- CMAA, as a central component of and actor in the national mine action policy, needs to be assisted in focussing on and setting realistic terms of reference, and in operationalising itself in a speedy manner as the national regulatory, licensing and planning authority in mine action.
- The Government must proceed with the preparation of a National Mine Action Strategy, with a long-term time horizon or vision of 20-25 years as a minimum.
- The Government and donors must come together to formulate a long-term Financial Strategy for Mine Action. This, of necessity must involve looking at ways of streamlining the timing and amount of funds available, preferably through a transparent and timely mechanism that permits Government, UNDP and donors alike to see clearly at what level the funds are at any stage.

- CMAA, as the lead organisation, will be seeking to strengthen national information and data collection, publication and exchange, including the completed Level One Survey, national data-base, HI/CRC database, and all pertinent databases from operators such as CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG. This needs to be supported.
- Efforts to strengthen co-ordination and collaboration in mine action throughout the country must be supported, including mine awareness and advocacy programmes, victim assistance initiatives, provincial and local level planning and prioritisation.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Mine Action In Cambodia

The following recommendations are made in relation to mine action in Cambodia:

Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Time frame	Outcome Expected
programme development needs to include CMAA as a partner within the mine action programme.	Mobilisation of Resources. Agreement to include CMAA in future Project Document.	Govt.	30 June 2001	a. Donor Support. b. CMAA as a programme partner
to set up and lead a Joint Working Group which in turn will generate a series of technical sub-working groups.	Formation of JWG	CMAA	31 August 2001	Assistance in national document formulation such as standards, procedures, policy, work plan, etc.
and coordination in the Mine Awareness sector in future needs to be supported by CMAA, once developed.	CMAA in the Mine Awareness TWG	CMAA	31 Dec 2001	Closer linkage of demining to mine awareness and sharing of data.
Co-ordination between CMAA, Geospatial Inc. and GPC is needed so that data can be interlocked with data management.	A survey TWG is re-established.	CMAA	31 August 2001	Co-ordination of the national data-base and Level One Survey.
A national long-term strategy is needed, which include the production of national standards, a national work plan, a national marking system, a national accreditation system, a national survey and marking system.	Develop the national strategy.	CMAA	30 July 2001	A National Strategy, a national work plan, a National Standards which include a national survey and marking system and a national licensing and accreditation system.
Further thought is needed on more substantial long-term fencing of low priority areas.	The survey TWG to analyse the data and the national strategy.	CMAA	31 Dec 2001	Develop a long-term plan to mark and surveying of low priority areas.
National work-plan needs to be undertaken to ensure resources in quantity and location meet the national needs.	Develop a national work plan.	CMAA	30 Nov 2001	Demining resources are allocated per the national needs.
A substantial national QA system and standards needs to be enforced to provide confidence in the system.	Develop a policy and process for external QA system.	CMAA	31 Mar 2002	A national QA capacity is developed and contracted.
National data-base needs to be completely updated so that it will complement the Level One Survey being conducted by Geospatial.	Commence installation of national data-base, at CMAA, or alternatively sub-contracted to CMAC.	CMAA/ GPC	31 Dec 2001	A national data-base operational.
Information on information and data needs to be coordinated to co-ordinate this component.	Continuation of the TWG to coordinate the national database.	CMAA	30 Nov 2001	All implementers provide standards for the national database.

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<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Action Required</b>	<b>Focal Point</b>	<b>Time frame</b>	<b>Expected Outcome</b>
to retro-fit all available databases into SMA system needs to be investigated.	An agency requested to investigate the possible retrofit of all available databases	CMAA/ GPC	30 Nov <b>2001</b>	Data inputs to the national d
operation of the Cranfield University Middle Management/Supervisors package with CMAC's course. The content of this training package to be shared with other implementing agencies and an effort needs to be made to have revised training for supervisors.	Co-ordinate with UNDP (NY) and Cranfield University regarding the content of the training package.	CMAC	31 Dec <b>2001</b>	A substantial superviso package that has i recognition,
Middle Management/Supervisors course, developed, needs to be sponsored through a university in Phnom Penh and that this could become the South-East Asia Regional Training for Mine Action. That this be open to all Mine Action Agencies operating in Cambodia so that the valuable NGO Resources can be developed as well.	CMAC to appoint a project officer to initiate this activity. Continue to liaise with UNDP (NY), Cranfield University and local institutions to ascertain capacity and language. Develop with the chosen institution the curriculum.	Project Officer	31 Dec <b>2001</b>	A substantial middle manage training package t international recognition and undertaken by other agency country participants as well a regional participants.
Candidates, from CMAC and CMAA, to the next Senior Management course in the	Liaise with UNDP (NY) and Cranfield University to ascertain the possibility of placing two students on the course.	Project Officer	31 June <b>2001</b>	At least one student and one on the Senior Management c
is a need for CMAA to be become involved in the mine victims component of the disabled	CMAA to liaise with DAC to become a member of the disabled TWG. CMAA liaise with HI/CRC to centralise the database within the national data base.	CMAA/ GPC	31 Dec <b>2001</b>	Data and inputs made availa improve the capacity t nationally.

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**5.2 The Project**

The following recommendations are made in relation to the project:

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Action' Required</b>	<b>Focal Point</b>	<b>Time - frame</b>	<b>Expected Outcome</b>
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current project Phase III should be closed at end of June 2001.	Evaluate further involvement with Mine Action in Cambodia and decide on the next approach.	UNDP	21 May 2001	A final project completion Decisions on equipment of Reference to paragraph 5. Recommendations Serial project document.
new approach must consider: - clearer coordination modalities/ agreements. - simpler and standard contracts with donors. - simpler and simpler reporting lines and agreements. CMAA as one partner. CMAC as another. The trust fund as a UNDP supporting organization.	Prepare a new Programme/Project Document.	UNDP	04 June 2001	A Programme or Project document. Simpler and standard contracts. Simpler, standard and coordinated TA/expert support. Standard quarterly report to donor partners, with statement of goals, targets and success indicators.
Donors need to immediately support the current approach to Mine Action.	Actively seek resource mobilisation for the period May 2001 onward.	UNDP/ UNOPS/ CMAC	21 May 2001	Donor contributions allow project to be completed and approach initially funded.
Trust Fund must be seen as a long term funding capacity rather than using all finance resources in the year they are allocated.	Seek Donor concurrence and change to contract content. Develop a long term financial plan for the Trust Fund in accordance with the Long-Term National Strategy.	UNDP/ RGC	31 Dec 2001	A long term financial plan for Mine Action in Cambodia sustainable.
Contractual arrangements must be clearer between UNDP and CMAC, UNDP and CMAA, UNDP and contractors as necessary.	Draft clearer contracts to include: Goals, Objectives, Outputs, Milestones and a reference to National and International standards. (UNOPS has a good model for this purpose)	UNDP	30 June 2001	Have contracts between UNDP and CMAC. Have contracts between UNDP and contractors. Outputs.
Funding inputs through the Trust Fund must be reviewed.	Review the funding arrangements with a view to RGC funds not being processed through the Trust Fund.	RGC/ UNDP	30 June 2001	Dependent on the review.

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#### 5.3 CAMBODIAN MINE ACTION CENTRE

The following recommendations are made in relation to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre:

Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Time-frame	Expected Outcome
Emphasis needs to be placed on building and consolidating the procedures and policy documentation.	All departments need to produce a current policy or procedure and these documents should then form two manuals.	Directors	31 Dec 2001	A Manual of CMAC Policies A Manual of CMAC SOP. A Mine and UXO recognition A team leaders book extra SOP.
The recommendations at Annex B5 need to be undertaken with an emphasis on are that will affect accreditation.	CMAC to respond to or implement the recommendations in B5.	Director-General	30 June 2002	Improvements in safety, efficiency and effectiveness.
Close tracking of the development of the Level 1 Survey capacity is essential for efficiency, and must be undertaken as soon as possible.	CMAC to develop an SOP on the survey approach and implement the process.	Director Operations	31 Dec 2001	Survey SOP produced including levels of survey. MMT and LOS survey team trained to full survey capacity.
The introduction of appropriate socio-economic	Develop an internal procedure for	UNDP/	30	An internal reporting procedure.

Measurement procedures be adopted by agencies for cleared land, needs to be undertaken within the year to ensure that the national strategy developed is supported by the outputs.	capturing the socio-economic impact. Reference can be made to UNDP Global socio-economic study that is to be released shortly.	CMAC	June 2002	clearly indicates whether d is providing a socio-econom or loss when compared to
structure processes need to continue, so as enhance CMAC as an implementing agency.	Undertake recommendations in Annex B6.	Director-General	31 Dec 2002	An improvement to the efficiency and effectiveness of the H
There is a need to improve the task and project management by Operations Department	Create an Operations Department SOP and CMAC Policy to include a procedure on Task Management and Project Management	Director Operations	31 July 2001	Creation of SOP covering t issues of task orders, issue folders and maintaining a t board or record so that per and outputs can be checked monthly reports. Create a p indicating how project man is to occur in CMAC.
Must to TOR of Planning Officer and the Deputy Director: Operations to monitor progress projects and to provide the Director with weekly or fortnightly updates.	Adjust TOR in accordance with Policy on Project Management	Director Operations /HR Section	31 July 2001	Job Description of Planning and Deputy Director: Opera changed.
The current monitoring procedures need to be reviewed and a more projective approach developed.	Develop and ethos that is not only safety-driven but also productivity-driven.	Director Operations	30 June 2002	Increase of productivity of 100% over the next with ex resources.

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Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Timeframe	Expected Outcome
Training of DU Managers and Operations task selection be expanded and	Conduct formal training with practical exercises of staff in task selection for dog and mechanical support.	Project + Training TA	31 Dec 2001	Better task selection for dog and teams and a resultant improved productivity.
Need to improve the productivity of the port capacity.	Serious consideration be given to the introduction of the following: Improve the drill for the dog and close markers by adding more close markers and having the dogs work more. Conduct training on weekends and each day. Integrate the dogs with survey, manual teams, flail and brush cutter.	TA/CMAC	31 Dec 2001	Increase of productivity of at least 50,000 square metres per team (dogs) Dog set trained to support survey

need to improve the productivity of the mechanical team.	Consideration of the introduction of: Conduct operations and support in shift work. Conduct maintenance on weekends. Move accommodation for all staff closer to the minefields. Provide a mobile workshop and containerise spare parts onto the back of a GMC. Minefield set up and preparation conducted in advance by CMAC platoons. Provide dedicated platoons and EOD teams to full capacity. Research incorporation of fragmentation reduction/removal with the fail.	TAI CMAC	31 Dec 2001	Increase of productivity by at least 50,000 square metres per month.
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Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Time-frame	Expected Outcome
Need to improve areas that are critical to the accreditation of CMAC.	Review, using consultants where appropriate, internal QC system, the medical, explosive handling, procedures and policies to ensure they fulfil contract and international standards.	Director-General	31 August 2001	Improvement to medical support, right level of staffing, right level of internal QC process and sound controlled training. Improve explosive handling to include issues in detail in SOP, production of a plan for provision of storage capacity, retraining and internal QC. Publication to all levels the SOP in Khmer. Extracts of SOP in Team Leader level.
Validation and validation exercise of the 10,000 Fixed Assets Register is this needs to be done before the next approach commences.	Contract an external agency to conduct a validation and rationalisation audit on the Fixed Assets Register.	UNDP	31 August 2001	Decision on write off. Decision on recovery. Decision on disposal of surplus. Decision on further action
Need to review the allocation of assets against usage and need.	Conduct a review of the vehicle holdings, locations, allocations and usage to ensure appropriateness.	UNDP/ CMAC	31 Dec 2001	Decision on allocation. Decision on disposal / reallocation
Need to review the role and mandate for the Governing Council in relation to its new role as an implementing agency, and to rightsizing the organisation into a leaner structure.	Review, develop and write a new TOR for the GC in its new role, given the new role of CMAC and the creation of the CMAA.	Steering Committee / RGC	30 June 2001	Amendment to the Royal Decree on the new role of the GC and its structure. The new structure and role should be approved by a part time small organisation policy approval and guidance on
Need to review the personal insurance cover for staff and the third party liability for CMAC.	Conduct a review refer to Paragraph 5.5 Capacity Building Serial 8 below.	Director-General / UNDP	30 June 2001	For the new project establish a Third Party liability for operation and Third party liability for vehicles.

				Death and disability insurance. Health insurance or an adequate system with in CMAC.
need to review the field operations and develop a training package by work place requirements. ( -This mission has recently commenced)	Conduct an objectivised study of the employment categories: Deminer, Section Leader, Deputy Platoon Leader, Platoon Leader, Site Medic, Surveyor, EOD user and EOD technician.	Training Centre	31 Dec 2001	Objective based training packages after training needs assessment. Course packages for initial and training rewritten.
need to follow-up on actions taken after mission.	A joint review be held six months after endorsement of this Evaluation Report	CMAC/ UNDP	30 Nov 2001	Confirmation that final recommendations endorsed have been initiated, if completed

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#### 5.4 Government and Donor Support

The following recommendations are made in relation to Government and donor Support to the project:

Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Timeframe	Expected Outcome
Representatives from key and concerned must become involved in the brainstorming and formulation of the National Strategy and long term mission.	Encourage the involvement of key policy makers from various ministries.	CMAC/ UNDP	30 June 2001	The following ministries have representation on the JWG: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Ministry of Land Management, Planning and Construction and Industry,
Ensure ownership of Mine Action in Cambodia, a budget line identified and used in the National Budget for Mine Action activities.	Initiate a budget line in the National Budget for Mine Action in Cambodia.	RGC/ UNDP	30 June 2001	Timely and regular financial input to Mine Action in Cambodia from the RGC level of a sense of ownership at the programme.
Under the national strategy, CMAC should develop a strategy for developing its own	Develop a strategy and a plan toward CMAC capacity building in line with the national strategy.	CMAA/ CMAC	30 Nov 2001	A capacity building strategy developed by CMAC. This is then to be adopted in the first TPR of the new programme.
Mine Action in Cambodia documentation must be translated into the Khmer language.	Create two posts of translator/ interpreter and have the posts placed on their respective organisations. All documentation to be produced in Khmer and then translated where possible.	CMAA/ CMAC	31 Jul 2001 31 Jul 2002	Translator posts filled. All documents produced in Khmer.
Develop a national approach to landmine clearance at provincial level through PRDC (LUMU) organisations, in those provinces with significant landmine/UXO	Encourage the Ministry of Rural Development to implement a national programme of provincial LUMU/LUPU inside the PDRD offices.	CMAA	31 Dec 2001	Each province to have formed a LUPU (suggest also standardisation at each provincial capital inside the office).

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## 5.5 Capacity Building

The following recommendations are made in relation to Capacity Building in CMAC:

Recommendation	Action Required	Focal Point	Time-frame	Expected Outcome
need to conduct a series of workshops and information sessions on Human Resources mechanisms, models and purposes, to management and supervisory staff.	Contract a HR consultant to design and conduct a series of HR workshops.	UNDP/CMAC	31 Dec 2001	All managers and supervisors (and deputy platoon leaders) to attain a better understanding of HR by management and supervisors. Full implementation of HR systems in CMAC.
need to create a Deputy Director post in the Department with a TOR that is focused on HR.	Create a new post and TOR for the position of Deputy Director, Support Department. Advertise and Recruit new post.	DDG/HR section	30 Jun 2001 Jul 2001	A greater focus on HR. Clarify management responsibility for HR. TOR for Deputy should include: a. Be a proactive member of the Reform Committee. b. Develop, recommend and implement strategies for reform, c. Lead the recruitment committee. d. Advise the DDG on the implementation of change strategies for CMAC. e. Advise the DG on Human Resources reform issues. f. Advise on recruitment process for executive positions. g. Be a member of the committee for the interviewing process for senior positions. h. Present HR issues to the DEB. Train the CMAC staff to be able to use the use of logic framework for the development of work plans and departments.
Review the TOR for the HR section to avoid overlap in functions and roles.	CMAC to rationalise the TOR for HR section.	DDG/HR section	31 August 2001	Clear HR policy developed.
Plan to review revised job descriptions for all positions.	HR section to review all job descriptions.	HR section	31 Dec 2001	All job descriptions are relevant and consistent with the restructure.

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Recommendation	Action Required: -	Focal Point	Time frame	Expected Outcome
Personnel Committee needs to be established as possible to make decisions on administrative and personnel management and procedures.	TOR written and submitted for approval for the Personnel Committee by Consultant. Personnel Committee formed and activated by CMAC.	DDG/ HR section/ Consultant	31 August 2001	Personnel Committee formed on Implementation of HR reforms.
Performance appraisal system and form needs to be developed to include objective and measurable criteria for career plan development for CMAC staff including.	Review the appraisal system and upgrade the report format, including CMAC employees achievement expectations (to be in tune with the CMAC 5 year plan).	TA / HR section	31 Dec 2001	A performance appraisal system developed, objective, professional, fair and measurable performance evaluation form that meets system requirements.
Functions of the HR section need to be clearly defined to handle the discrete functions of HR management and recruitment.	Create a role, structure and TOR for two sub sections as follow: a. HR Development Unit to include HRMIS. b. Recruitment Unit to include selection, compensation, contracts/legal issues and conditions of service.	DDG/ TAI HR section	30 Sept 2001	Policy, TOR, structure and recruitment of suitable staff for the creation of the HR structure,
Health insurance coverage for CMAC and medical funding policy.	Create a sustainable and appropriate death and disability insurance capability through an external company. Research and review the possibility of outsourcing health insurance with the death and disability company. Contract a company to cover CMAC operations and vehicles for third party liability insurance.	Director-General I UNDP	30 Jun 2001	For the new project establish a contract for: a. Third Party liability for operations b. Third party liability for vehicles c. Death and disability insurance d. Health insurance or an appropriate medical system with in CMAC
HR policy and procedures need to be reviewed and updated in relation to serial items listed above.	Rewrite HR policy and procedures.	Deputy Director: Support	31 Jan 2002	HR policy and procedures updated to include: terminology, occupational safety, equal employment (disabled), maternity leave, study leave, employee benefits (conditions of service), health insurance, death insurance, income protection and pension.
HRD section needs to conduct a training needs assessment for HRD requirements and update the HRD database.	Conduct a staff training needs assessment for all department staff.	Directors of Department	31 Dec 2001	HR section to design format of data for training needs assessment. HR section to train Directors of Department to conduct <a href="#">assessment. HR</a> Section to complete the needs assessment. Training needs Assessment completed for all staff in CMAC

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Recommendation	Action	F Point	Time- frame	Expected Outcome
ent of human resources needs to be	Conduct internal training and outsource training to develop the skills of CMAC staff in accordance with the Training Needs Assessment.	HR Section/ Training Centre	End of new project.	Identify the aim and objectives of requirements. Courses conducted the skills of staff in accordance with assessment.
ation and cooperation needs to when advising different departments, so impact of department decisions and relations to other departments are fully d.	Conduct a number of workshops for TA and department counterparts to discuss this topic. Use working groups where cross-functional and cross department projects and activities are involved.	Director General/ Senior Advisor	31 Dec 2001	Creation of appropriate task force oriented groupings to address cross projects and activities.
nts, sections and staff need to develop e that they can function as us, self-directed units in a business- r, able to compete with other mine ice providers within Cambodia and	Development and setting of department, section and individual goals and objectives. Monitoring and updating these goals and objectives on a monthly basis.	DG, DDG, and Directors	31 Dec 2001	Comprehensive TOM goals and at each level.
t and provision should be made more to capacity building across functional	TA to be centrally controlled and coordinated through CMAC DG. Clear objectives and work plans set for each TA. TA assignments increased to a minimum of 12 months, optimum 24 months where appropriate. TA recruitment and CV approved by the DG.	UNDP  CMAC UNDP  UNDP/ CMAC	30 June 2001	TA Contracts with donors and agencies changed to reflect new arrangements. TA needs assessment completed. TA objectives and work plans set.

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## 6. LESSONS LEARNT

There are a number of lessons that have been learned as a result of this project, and have been explored in the earlier sections of this report. These have applicability here in Cambodia, as well as giving some food for thought to other mine action programmes and practitioners world-wide:

Lesson (1):

It is possible for a mine action organisation to go through a long period of crisis, and still deliver effective mine clearance, provided management, staff and UN commitment is present to work through the difficulties together, and donor support is forthcoming.

Lesson (2):

Potential for cost-effectiveness can be achieved if early nationalisation of the mine action process and programme has been implemented as happened in Cambodia, after the initial high cost start-up phase of TA's and equipment purchase is over

Lesson (3):

A long-term (20-25 years horizon) National Mine Action Vision, with mine action goals, needs to be put in place, as early as possible, followed by a National Mine Action Strategy (5-10 year horizon). If properly prepared, this strategy is not negated as more detailed survey information becomes available.

Lesson (4):

The earliest completion of a National Level One (General) Survey is essential for proper and effective planning.

Lesson (5):

Policies and procedures must be prepared and put in place, as early as possible, prior to commencing field operations. Training must follow any significant changes to policies or procedures.

Lesson (6):

As part of their on-going development CMAC, and also CMAA, should try to keep up with the changes occurring within the mine action sector and lessons being learned elsewhere, but Governments must be wary of adopting mine action templates or models, with or without modification, from other countries, without first critically examining their constraints, prerequisites and suitability. In addition it is advisable to separate the regulatory authority from an implementing organisation. Cambodia has not utilised lessons learnt in other countries as much as it could.

Lesson (7):

Government must have a strategy and plan for Research and Development (R&D) in mine action. It must proceed with caution and not expand too rapidly, taking care to avoid donor-driven assistance and systems that may not be useful, applicable or sustainable in the local context.

Lesson (8):

Multi-year funding is vital for realistic planning, and a trust fund mechanism should not be seen as (a) a neverending source of cash, and (b) a petty cash box only. A Trust Fund should be used as a long-term financial planning and management tool. Any effort to deplete it to zero annually should be resisted.

Lesson (9):

UNDP and donors must strive for a medium- to long-term programme/project budget horizon (three to five years minimum, depending on the level of contamination) in mine action, so as to allow sufficient time for capacity building.

Lesson (10):

Formulation and progressive development of a good mine action programme/project must be balanced, flexible and with a medium- to long-term perspective, under national ownership and leadership from the outset.

Lesson (11):



Considerable attention must be given to ensuring proper and appropriate translation services are available from the outset. Documentation must be developed in or translated into the host country national language at all times. The official version of documents must be those that are in the host country language. Deminers, supervisors and managers may not necessarily have the same level of reading comprehension of a foreign language as their spoken ability might otherwise suggest.

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Lesson (12):

Capacity building needs a very clearly articulated plan - entry / implementation and monitoring / exit, with clearly defined goals, objectives, milestones and success indicators for each element of the proposed technical assistance. The principle is proper planning of assignments, alone and overall, and the avoiding of changes in personnel before completion of tasks. However, short-term consultancies can be used for time-bound outputspecific assignments, or where non-resident options are more attractive for scheduling visiting advisors or experts.

Lesson (13):

Difficulties in reaching technical assistance objectives, for civilian and military advisors and experts alike, can be traced back to (a) poorly designed and co-ordinated terms of reference, .(b) poorly co-ordinated timing of different advisors and experts, and (c) too early rotation before key tasks completed. Without proper qualifications, experience and ability to teach counterparts, the ability to transfer knowledge and build capacity is going to be limited.

Lesson (14):

Where there are multiple donors operating within a general programme, with a number of contractual arrangements between donors and host organisation, it is vital to have an explicit clause written into all agreements that technical assistance must answer to the Director-General of the counterpart national organisation, co-ordinated through a Programme Co-ordinator if one has been appointed.

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