



UN Millennium Campaign

EXTERNAL EVALUATION 2009

Africa subreport



**UN Millennium Campaign
External evaluation 2009
Asia subreport**

**Prepared for the
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By


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This is the report of independent evaluators commissioned by the UN Millennium Campaign. The views expressed in this report should not be taken as being those of the UN Millennium Campaign. They reflect evidence collected and expressed by the evaluation team. Any comments regarding this report can be sent to the evaluation team by email at info@leitmotivsocial.com



DEDICATION TO TAJUDEEN ABDUL-RAHEEM

Every now and again, Africa is blessed with a person of light who gives us a vision of a continent we wish to see but have long forgotten. Africa becomes particularly blessed if that person not only gives us a vision, but inspires us to action to achieve that vision. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem was such a person. Tajudeen's truth was pan-africanism and what a united Africa could mean to its people. He spoke this truth frankly and unabashedly whether he was speaking to African Presidents or the youth. His warmth and passion with people reminded us that his truth was not just a concept but a way of believing how Africans can be with each other. For many of us, his truth is now our truth. In his life and his death, may Tajudeen continue to inspire us to action for the African unity we wish to see.

Taaka Awori
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ACRONYMS

| | |
|------------|---|
| CDD | The Center for Democracy and Development |
| CISLAC | The Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center |
| CBOs | Community Based Organizations |
| CSOs | Civil Society Organizations |
| FBOs | Faith Based Organizations |
| G-CAP | Global Call to Action Against Poverty |
| KASWESHA | Kariobangi South Welfare and Slums Housing Association |
| KYCEP | Kenya Youth Education and Community Development Programme |
| INGO | International Non Governmental Organization |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MDG-PIU | Millennium Development Goals Project Implementation Unit |
| MWENGO | Mwelekeo wa NGO |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OSSAP-MDGs | Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Millennium Development Goals |
| PADEAP | Pan African Development and Education and Advocacy Programme |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Fund |
| UNIC | United Nations Information Center |

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

In the last three years, the achievements of the Campaign in Africa have been immense. The regional team, particularly the Regional Director, has effectively taken the discourse on MDGs from New York to Africa; from the UN General Assembly to the schools and mosques. Notwithstanding these achievements, there is still much the Campaign has to do in the region. The tragic death of the Africa Regional Director, Dr. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem will leave a gap that will be hard to fill.

The report provides an overview of the impact of the campaign in the region with specific examples from Kenya and Nigeria which were selected as the two case studies. As will be seen, many of achievements and challenges found in Kenya and Nigeria are reflective of the findings for the other countries in the region. The Campaign is currently designing its strategy for the next phase of its work. It is hoped that the findings and lessons in this regional report will prove useful to this process.

2. Public Awareness

The Campaign and its partners have undertaken a number of activities to increase awareness of the MDGs among ordinary citizens. For many of the partners and stakeholders, Stand Up was the main tool they used to create awareness on the MDGs.

The major achievement of Stand Up in Africa was its ability to give voice to citizens who do not normally have a say on issues central to their lives such as education, health and water. The power of this cannot be underestimated where many people in the region feel unable to influence the policies and programmes of their Governments.

A number of lessons can be drawn from the experience with Stand Up and the other awareness raising events. First, is the importance of linking awareness raising activities to an ongoing process of citizen engagement with government on specific MDG-related issues. Second, is the importance of supporting citizens how to hold their governments to account, not on “start and stop” basis but on a sustained basis. Finally, the need to plan early for mass mobilization events such as Stand Up was raised by a number of partners.

3. Communication/Media

By far, the media has been the most widely used communication tool. At the regional level, the impact of the Campaign’s communication work is evident; engagement with the media led to increased visibility. At a national level, the impact is less evident. One problem cited was the lack of capacity within the national partners to effectively engage the media. The other problem cited is that engagement with the media was very event driven and was usually centered on Stand Up. Some best practice has emerged around strategic partnerships with the media. In the next phase,

the Campaign may explore how to develop more media partnerships that are result-oriented, aimed at deepening capacity and ensuring in-depth coverage of MDGs issues.

4. Political/ Policy

Different approaches were taken in the region to achieve policy change. Some were more effective than others. For example, The *People's Budget* in Kenya and the poverty hearings held in Jigawa State, northern Nigeria clearly had an impact on government policy and practice. On the other hand, the Stand Up policy demands and the Shadow reports were excellent strategies but could have had more of an impact if they had been systematically followed up by partners. All of these activities provide lessons on what works and what doesn't work in effecting policy change. As the Campaign strengthens the impact of its policy work, it may consider prioritizing the policy issues to work on; increasing the policy capacity within campaign partners and leveraging its UN status to access policy spaces.

5. Partnerships

In Africa, partners are at the forefront of the campaign and thus represent the power of the Campaign but also its vulnerability. Within the various countries, partnerships were developed with the media, private sector, Parliament, Local Government, the UN Country Team (UNCT) and CSOs (both local and international NGOs). The partnerships with Parliament are only being developed thus the impact is yet to be felt. However, the potential they offer to influence government policies and budgets is immense. Another partner that has been critical to the work of the Campaign at the national level has been the UN. On the whole, there has been a high level of collaboration with UNDP, primarily on Stand Up. Discussions are underway to strengthen this partnership and extend it to other agencies within the UN family.

The value of the partnerships with G-CAP was varied depending on the capacity of the coalition. In future, partnerships with G-CAP should not be assumed in each country, but should be examined on a case by case basis. As the Campaign thinks through its partnerships in the next phase, it may consider reviewing the choice of CSO partners in each country in light of what it is seeking to achieve; increasing the amount of financial support provided to partners and further strengthening the capacity of national partners.

6. Conclusion

2015 the year in which the goals are to be reached is fast approaching. To date, the Campaign has been extremely successful giving voice to the millions of voiceless through *Stand Up*. The opinions are unanimous, however, that it is time to move beyond *Stand Up*. This is something that the Campaign team globally is aware of and efforts made in this respect will go a long way to strengthening the ability of citizens to hold their governments accountable on the MDGs.

Africa Report

1. Introduction

The task of an evaluator is never an easy one. One can never pretend to know an organization after a few weeks of interaction in the same manner as those who work in the organization day in and day out. An evaluation seeks to capture what was done and the impact of those activities. Again, the organization will always know better than the evaluator what was done and, even before the evaluation, will have a good sense of the impact. So all the evaluator can offer is a set of fresh eyes. By talking to other stakeholders, the evaluator may also offer feedback that others haven't been able to provide directly. In that respect, much of what will be said in this report will not be new to the organization, particularly the Africa team. As the organization already knows, in its work in Africa, there is much to celebrate but there also significant room to grow. What we as evaluators hope, however, is that by naming and putting in writing what you as the organization already know, there will be impetus for change.

The report provides an overview of the impact of the campaign in the region with specific findings from the two case studies, Kenya and Nigeria. Some consideration was given whether to structure the report with separate chapters for each of the case studies or whether to integrate the findings from Kenya and Nigeria into an overall report. The latter option was chosen to avoid repetition and unnecessary fragmentation of the report. This is primarily because many of achievements and challenges found in Kenya and Nigeria are reflective of the findings for the other countries in the region. Sufficient details are provided on each country so that the case studies are not lost in the overall report. The findings are discussed under four of the key areas set forth in the terms of reference namely: (i) Public awareness (ii) Communications/ media (iii) Policy engagement; and (v) Partnerships.

The limitations of this evaluation should be stated upfront. First, documentation has been a major challenge for the organization. Thus, in many instances the description of the Campaign's activities and the resulting impact has been gleaned from a handful of reports and the perceptions of people interviewed. The subjectivity inherent in this goes without saying. We hope that this will encourage the organization to strengthen its documentation and monitoring and results framework as it campaigns. Second, the sudden death and subsequent burial of Dr. Abdul-Raheem in Funtua, Nigeria occurred the same week as the evaluator's visit to the country. Many interviews, particularly those occurring in Funtua, had to be cancelled. Where interviews were held many of the partners and stakeholders were still in shock. Their agreement and often insistence on meeting the evaluator, despite the difficult circumstances, is much appreciated and is a reflection of how much they are committed to continuing the work of the late Africa Director.

2. Background

6.1. Context

More than halfway towards the target date of 2015, Africa as a whole is not on track to achieve any of the Goals. Hidden in the aggregate figures are some examples of success. These include a significant reduction in child mortality rates in Malawi, an increase in primary school completion rates in Tanzania and significant progress towards the water target in Senegal.¹ Despite this, numerous challenges persist. Higher food prices may push more people into poverty in the region; a significant number of countries have made no progress in reducing child deaths and the levels of maternal mortality are still the highest in the world.²

As noted previously, Kenya and Nigeria are the two countries selected as case studies for this evaluation. Kenya is the regional hub for trade and finance in East Africa. Even though the country has enjoyed relative stability in comparison to many African countries, governance has been characterized by high levels of corruption and political cronyism. The most recent elections in December 2007 were marred by serious violence with election observers reporting that the process had not been free and fair. The Government of Kenya has taken some steps to mainstream the MDGs into national planning. In March 2005, the Government issued a cabinet memo requiring all Government ministries to mainstream MDGs in their specific policies, plans and budgets. In addition, the Government established an MDG's Project Implementation Unit (MDG PIU) within the Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 which prepares regular reports on the status of achievement of the MDGs in Kenya. Earlier this year, the Minister for Planning announced that Kenya would only meet two of the MDGs by 2015: Goals 2 and 6.

Nigeria is the world's eighth largest exporter of oil and revenues from oil fund 80% of the budget. The country is also Africa's most populous country and undoubtedly one of the most complex. For many of the years between independence and 1999, Nigeria was governed by military rulers. While the assumption of civilian rule since 1999 has improved the human rights record of the country, many challenges persist. Both the elections in 2003 and most recently in 2007 were marred by significant irregularities.

To some extent in Nigeria, the MDG agenda has moved from the UN to the Government. In 2006, the Government of Nigeria began to use gains from debt relief, amounting to 1 billion annually, to finance identified MDG activities.³ The federal government also established the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Millennium Development Goals (OSSAP-MDGs) to oversee expenditure of the MDG funds.⁴

¹ United Nations (2008): *Achieving the MDGs in Africa – Recommendations of the MDG Africa Steering Group*.

² United Nations (2008): *The Millennium Development Goals Report*.

³ Government of Nigeria, *MDGs Needs Assessment and Financing Strategy for Nigeria – Policy Brief* (Nov 2008) at 3.

⁴ Id.

Despite these institutional efforts, the country is unlikely to meet all the MDGs by 2015.⁵ OSSAP-MDGs with support of UNDP has recently produced a mid point assessment of the MDGs in Nigeria. The report shows some progress with respect to girl's enrollment in primary education and the prevalence rate of HIV and AIDs. However, women continue to be grossly under-represented at the highest decision making levels, infant mortality has risen, immunization rates have been low which has accounted for the increase in polio cases and maternal mortality continues to be of concern.

6.2. UN Millennium Support to the Region

The Africa regional office, based in Nairobi, Kenya, was reconstituted and officially re-launched in mid 2006. By the beginning of 2009, the office had 6 professional staff and 3 volunteers based in Nairobi. The Campaign has been working in 13 priority countries in Africa namely: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. The Nairobi office has engaged with stakeholders at the regional level on the MDGs but majority of the campaigning has been done at the national level within the priority countries. In these countries, the work has been led primarily by Global Call to Action (G-CAP) Coalitions. Thus while the regional team has directly campaigned at the regional level, their role at the national level has largely been facilitative of the work of the G-CAP coalitions and other partners.

3. Public Awareness

In the region, majority of the work at the national level has centered on raising awareness of the MDGs. In Nigeria and Kenya, partners held events on key days such as Africa Day, Day of the African Child, Women's Day, World Water Day, and World Aids Day. However, the primary means by which partners and stakeholders sought to create awareness on the MDGs was through *Stand Up*. It is important to note however, that this was not the original purpose of *Stand Up*; rather it was intended to generate media attention and public debate on the MDGs for eventual policy change. In that sense, public awareness was not expected to be an end in of itself. In addition, over the past one and half years, efforts have been made to move beyond awareness raising, to policy engagement through the "Take action" component of *Stand Up*. More is said about the impact of this later in the report, in the section on policy impact. This section of the report only focuses on the impact of *Stand Up* on awareness raising; this is not imply that this is all *Stand Up* sought to achieve.

Stand Up was able to mobilize masses of people in a significant way. In 2006, the region was able to mobilize 3.6 million people in 24 countries. In 2007, the number increased significantly to 7.3 million people and in 2008 it soared even further to 24 million people excluding North Africa (Egypt mobilized 15 million people alone). In Kenya, a little over 100,000 people participated in

⁵ Id.

2006; the number increased to a little under a million people in 2007 and it further grew to 3 million people in 2008. In Nigeria, the number of people participating in 2006 was 104,244 people. This number grew to close to 2 million in 2007 and soared to 9 million people in 2008.

In 2007 and 2008, the regional Campaign team developed partnerships outside of G-CAP with a diverse group of organizations such as youth groups, community based organizations (CBOs) and faith based organizations (FBOs) to mobilize around *Stand Up*. These partners were able to mobilize a wide variety of ordinary citizens such as members of churches and mosques, school children, politicians, people in the entertainment sector (musicians, DJs, actors), people with disabilities, youth and women. In Nigeria they even able to get people quarantined in a leper colony and the Sultan of Sokoto one of the most respected traditional rulers in West Africa. The events around which people were mobilized on the *Stand Up* days were equally diverse and quite innovative. For example in 2008, in northern Nigeria, a poverty hearing or “*Talakawa Summit*” was organized with Jigawa State Government while in Lagos people stood up at a concert held during *Felabration* an annual festival held to commemorate the life of the late Afro Beat musician, Fela Kuti. In Kenya, the events did not take place in Nairobi alone but expanded to towns such Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa, Kakamega, Kisumu, Eldoret and Kiambu where large parts of the population are living in poverty.

One of the major achievements of *Stand Up* in Africa was its ability to give voice to people at the margins who are not normally heard. For example, in Kenya events took place in informal settlements such as Korogocho in Nairobi. Furthermore, in Kenya where inequality is high and the recent elections were marred by serious ethnic violence, platforms in which people can symbolically stand for something are critical.

Domesticating *Stand Up* to link with existing local priorities was also useful in making the campaign relevant to people’s lives. In Kenya, *Stand Up* in schools was about “35/40” a term used in the country to discuss the quality of education and utilization of time in school. In another province, the term was “Women’s Participation” and in another area where *Stand Up* was done in a prison, the focus was on water. In Nigeria, the campaign was renamed “Make our money work for us.”

Furthermore extending partnerships beyond G-CAP to FBOs and youth groups was clearly successful in bringing in large and important constituencies who are not usually found among “the converted”. By giving people the freedom to organize their own events, the mobilizers were able to engage citizens in the institutions and spaces that comprise their daily lives such as schools, mosques, churches and football stadiums.

Despite this, the impact of *Stand Up* and other awareness raising activities on the levels of awareness among citizens of the MDGs is unclear.

In Kenya, the perception of many is that the level of awareness of the MDGs is still quite low. In contrast, in Nigeria, the perception is that given the large amounts of money flowing through the Government debt relief MDG fund, many Nigerians would at least have heard of the word MDGs. Undoubtedly at events where there was a specific discussion on the MDGs, the awareness of those participating increased. These, however, did not constitute the majority of events in which the millions of people participated. In these latter events, it is not clear whether the MDGs were mentioned or whether there was sufficient media attention to generate public debate on the MDGs.

A number of lessons can be drawn from the experience with Stand Up and the other awareness raising events. First, is the importance of linking awareness raising activities to an ongoing process of citizen engagement with government on specific MDG-related issues. While the regional campaign team argues that this occurred in some instances, there is no documentation of this and thus it is not clear how often this occurred or how effective it was. Ultimately, holding awareness raising activities as stand-alone, one-off events is clearly not effective. The second lesson is the importance of supporting citizens to hold their governments to account, not on “start and stop” basis but on a sustained basis. It is not one off action that gets African Governments to shift but consistent and sustained engagement by citizens on the issues. Finally, the importance of planning early for mass mobilization events such as Stand Up was raised by a number of partners. As stated by one partner: “fail to prepare, prepare to fail.”

“So we stood up, so what?”
Kenya Campaign Partner

4. Communication/Media

The Africa Communications Strategy 2006-8 sets forth the aims of the regional Campaign in its communication work. This includes enhancing a public understanding of the Millennium Campaign, developing and implementing an effective Africa-wide media engagement strategy and documenting best practices and lessons learned by national campaigns.

By far, the media has been the most widely used communication tool. Institutional relationships were developed with both national media houses and the Africa bureau of international media houses such as Associated Press, BBC and Voice of America. The Campaign reported that this led to an increase demand for interviews from all regional Campaign staff, not just from Dr. Abdul-Raheem who was already well-known to the media. Dr. Abdul-Raheem’s influential weekly column, Pan African Postcard, which was carried in numerous newspapers across the continent, further carried the message of the MDGs to many countries.

In a number of instances, strategic partnerships were developed with specific media houses. For example, a partnership with Panos was developed in which it was agreed that journalists within the Panos Media Network would focus their attention on the MDGs. In 2007, a partnership was

also developed with CNN Africa which led to the Campaign publishing and launching a book written by the CNN African Journalist of the Year Richard Kavuma of Uganda. The following year, the Campaign partnered with the *Mail and Guardian* newspaper in South Africa to do a series in which Kenyans, Ugandans, Tanzanians and Rwandans asked their Presidents questions and the Presidents responded in writing. A very successful partnership was also developed with MNET in which *Big Brother Africa*, which is watched by millions around the continent, featured the MDGs for one week.

The impact of the regional team's communication work is evident; engagement with the media led to increased visibility. The strategic partnerships with *Mail and Guardian* and with CNN, for example, were particularly effective in getting attention across the region. The partnership with Panos was also strategic in that it enabled the Campaign to provide sustained capacity development for journalists to do in-depth coverage on the MDGs rather than one-off trainings. These strategic partnerships are an example of best practice that should continue.

According to the regional team, their engagement with French speaking media has not been as effective. They argue that the fact that none of the senior staff in Nairobi can speak French fluently has contributed to the problem. Even though this was not examined in any detail in the evaluation, the effect of the language barrier probably goes beyond the work on the media. It likely has an impact on the depth of engagement that the Campaign has with citizens of Senegal, Burkina and Mozambique. Thus in the next phase, efforts should continue to strength the francophone capacity in particular within the regional team.

At a national level, the impact of the work with the media is less evident. On one hand, the Campaign reported that media coverage in Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Malawi, Ghana and Nigeria improved remarkably in 2007 compared to 2006. In Campaign global retreats, it was also reported that at the national level there was significant media interest in *Stand Up*. On the other hand, a number of staff and partners stated in interviews that the overall engagement with the media at the national level was not as effective as it should have been. One problem cited was the quality of media coverage given, which often included a broad coverage of the MDGs without any in-depth analysis. Another problem cited was weak media monitoring to effectively capture reportage on MDGs and related issues. And yet another problem cited was engagement with the media only as reporters of events rather than partners in on ongoing campaign on the MDGs.

In contrast, because of the presence of the regional office in Nairobi, the work with the media in Kenya was quite effective. The Regional Communications Coordinator already had extensive contacts in the media and this enabled the Campaign to develop direct relationships with specific journalists and national media houses. Eventually, an informal network of journalists emerged who the Campaign met regularly. This in turn enabled more in-depth reporting on MDG issues such as the programme on Nation TV on free schooling.

A number of approaches by the Campaign were cited as being particularly effective in engaging with the media in Kenya. In 2007 and 2008, the regional team partnered with a radio station to spend a few weeks discussing the MDGs around the *Stand Up* period. Information was shared on the MDGs and then a competition was held in which the listeners were asked to name the Goal and share what they were going to do on the *Stand Up* days. This approach was thought to work particularly well because it was interactive and got listeners engaged. But equally important it educated listeners about the content of the MDGs and encouraged them to do something, however small, to symbolically support achievement of the Goals. Another approach that was reported as being effective in engaging audiences was using the priorities of Kenyans namely education, food prices, health and water as an entry point to talk about the MDGs.

The success of the engagement with the media in Kenya came about from direct partnerships and links between the Regional Campaign team and media houses or journalists. The result would have been different had the Campaign left it to the partners alone to develop these partnerships. Thus, in the next phase of the campaign, the regional team may consider how to sustain this aspect of their communication work by increasing the capacity of partners to: a) produce high quality stories and b) move beyond event driven engagement to strategic partnerships.

Ultimately, within all the priority countries, the Campaign needs to take forward the best practice of developing strategic partnerships with the media at the national level. The media partners may include a network of journalists from both broadcast and print media who have already shown an interest in covering issues around the MDGs or it may include select media houses. Ultimately, the partnerships should be result-oriented, aimed at deepening capacity and ensuring in-depth coverage of MDGs issues.

In addition to the media, the other communication tools the Campaign used included posters, calendars, brochures and promotional items such as t-shirts and bags. Majority of these materials were produced by the Nairobi office and sent to national partners usually for *Stand Up* events.

Feedback on the usefulness of these communication materials was mixed. On one hand, the Campaign team argued that centralized procurement was effective in ensuring quality control and cost effectiveness. On the other hand, partners noted that while many of the materials were useful and of high quality, at times they arrived too late or did not respond to the local context. The most cited example is the *Stand Up* poster of a male and female figure which was considered inappropriate when taken to largely Islamic northern Nigeria. The poster had to be redone in Nigeria with the female figure clothed and her hair covered. In the same vein, the use of “Piga Debe” for the campaign on maternal mortality was also questioned as something that people would not understand in Nigeria. The regional campaign team has already recognized the need for increased procurement locally and has thus in some countries this happens regularly. In addition, the regional team stated that in future production of IEC materials will be done locally and materials produced centrally would be used primarily for major marquee and media events.

5. Political/Policy

As stated previously, the ultimate aim of the Campaign is for citizens to influence their Governments to take necessary action to achieve the MDGs. Different approaches were taken at the national level in this respect. On one hand, *Stand Up* contained specific policy demands that were made relevant to each country. Each year, much work was done to improve on these policy demands. MDG Shadow reports or Citizen Score Cards were also published in eight countries which sought to give people's perspectives on implementation of the MDGs. G-CAP Nigeria and G-CAP Kenya both produced Shadow reports. In addition to this, G-CAP Kenya presented a number of policy papers to Government and supported the work of the MDG Unit. Also in Kenya, the Socio-Economic Rights Foundation prepared the *People's Budget 2008/9* which included suggestions on how the national budget could become more responsive to the needs of the poor. In Nigeria, in addition to the Shadow Report, the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center (CISLAC) trained members of the Federal House Committee on the MDGs and the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) held a poverty hearing in Jigawa State.

Some activities were more effective in achieving policy impact than others. In Kenya and Nigeria for example, neither the *Stand Up* policy demands nor the Shadow reports can show any impact on Government practice and policy. As noted by one partner: "You get 2.9 million people to *Stand Up* and still you are not on the front page of the newspaper." Implicit in this statement is that in Kenya, whether you get on the front page or not, gives you an indication of how influential you are. It does not appear that in Kenya or Nigeria, the *Stand Up* policy demands or the MDG Shadow reports were systematically followed up by local partners. They become ends in of themselves and not a means to achieve specific policy changes. This underscores, once again, the importance of consistent activism and engagement with government on policy issues.

One of the activities that seems to have been more effective in influencing policy discourse is the *People's Budget* by the Social Economic Foundation in Kenya. The organization engaged with Parliament on the report and as a result, on at least one occasion, it was referred to by a Parliamentarian in their debate of the national budget. The poverty hearing held in Jigawa State, northern Nigeria is another example of an activity that had an impact on Government policy. The hearing was held in conjunction with state government and at the end, the state government committed to doing specific things in response to the issues raised. The Jigawa experience highlights the importance of creating spaces in which citizens can engage with national and local government. In the next phase, the Campaign should support partners to develop such fora with government on a regular not just "one-off" basis.

The Campaign has already identified policy influencing as an area that needs to be strengthened and different strategies are being considered to address this. As the Campaign undergoes this process, they may also consider the following suggestions for achieving more of a policy change.

- **Prioritize the issues and work on them on a consistent basis.** These may be cross-cutting issues that are critical impediments to achievement of the goals such as corruption or decentralization. In Kenya for example, budget transparency was often mentioned as an important issue to engage with to ensure that the MDGs are achieved. At the local level, there are many funds around which there is little transparency such as the MP's constituency fund, the Youth Fund and the HIV/AIDs fund. The other option is to prioritize specific Goals while still arguing for the interdependence of the MDGs. Ultimately, focusing enables the Campaign and its partners to engage with the issues in an in-depth and substantive manner over a period of time. It also enables the Campaign and its partners to set specific policy change targets and track progress over a period of time.
- **Increase policy capacity within countries:** While many of these coalitions are strong in mobilizing citizens they are not strong in policy engagement. In most countries this capacity sits within a few research and advocacy organizations that are usually not members of the national coalitions. The Campaign should explore how to tap into this capacity, either by commissioning these organizations to do specific pieces of work or by supporting them to work more closely with national partners.
- **Leverage UN status to access policy spaces:** Part of what makes policy engagement effective is its responsiveness to existing challenges faced by Government in fulfilling its mandate. Governments have often critiqued civil society for simply "making noise" and failing to providing concrete solutions for the development challenges faced. The reality, however, is that influencing government policy is easiest when one is part of regular policy dialogue with government. In many countries, this type of policy dialogue happens regularly with donors and rarely with civil society. As part of the UN family, there is a need for the Campaign to leverage its UN identity to have access to these policy spaces at the national level. The Campaign has made a lot of effort to imbed a full time MDG Coordinator within the Resident Coordinator's office in the priority countries. Once these coordinators are in place, they will have access to policy dialogue spaces with government and gain knowledge about where CSOs could add value. This knowledge could then be used to support CSOs in their policy engagement.

6. Partnerships

In Africa, partnerships are vital for the Campaign. At a national level, they are the vehicle that gets the Campaign from where it is to where it wants to be. Because partners are at the forefront of the campaign, they represent the power of the Campaign but also its vulnerability. Within the various countries, partnerships were developed with the media, private sector, Parliament, Local Government, the UN Country Team (UNCT) and CSOs (both local and international NGOs). From an evaluation perspective one of the essential issues is whether, given its objectives, the Campaign selected the right partners.

As earlier noted, the partnerships with Panos, M-Net (for Big Brother) and the *Mail and Guardian* (for the Presidential series) offered either increased visibility or a strategic way of increasing capacity for in-depth coverage of the MDGs. These represent the kinds of media partnerships the Campaign should continue to develop in its next phase.

Partnerships with the private sector were often with banks primarily for *Stand Up*. For example, in Nigeria it was the First Monument Bank, while in Kenya it was Equity Bank. In the next phase, as the Campaign supports its partners to move beyond *Stand Up*, further thought will have to go into how to continue to engage the private sector at this level.

Partnerships with local government offer a lot of potential for the Campaign to support citizens to hold their government's accountable. This will be most evident, however, in partnerships with specific local governments, rather than local government associations. In Kenya and Nigeria, the selected countries in which the evaluator was able to interview stakeholders, other than the Jigawa state example, no mention was made of the work with local government. It is thus difficult for the evaluator to determine the impact of the Campaign's work in these countries in this respect. In the same vein, while some mention has been made in the annual reports of the work with the local government in Gulu, Uganda, not enough is known to determine the impact. Both the experience with Jigawa State in Nigeria and Gulu Local Council in Uganda, however, reveal the rich potential these partnerships offer as mechanisms for sustained engagement of citizens at the local level.

In the same vein, the partnerships with Parliament are only being developed thus the impact is yet to be felt. However, the potential they offer to influence government policies and budgets is immense. In Kenya, discussions are underway to support the MDG Caucus within Parliament. The Caucus would provide a platform for Parliamentarians to play a watchdog role to ensure that government's programmes, legislation and budgets enable achievement of the MDGs. The Caucus would also ensure that appropriate actions are taken by the local governments within their constituencies to achieve the MDGs. In Nigeria, the Campaign has recently developed a partnership with the Federal House Committee on MDGs. Given the oversight this committee has large sums of Government resources dedicated to MDG projects, the partnership is highly strategic.

Another partner that has been critical to the work of the Campaign at the national level has been the UN. The perception from the regional Campaign team is that at times the Campaign have said things that many agencies wouldn't normally say and have partnered with CSOs that government perceives as the opposition. Despite this, there has been a high level of collaboration with UNDP, primarily on *Stand Up*. In Nigeria for example, UNDP participated in *Stand Up* activities and funded the G-CAP national coordinator position for 6 months. They have committed to further supporting the network if a strong campaign strategy is developed. In Nigeria, the Campaign also partnered with the United Nations Information Center (UNIC) to do *Stand Up* in a number of schools. In Kenya, while UNDP and the Campaign have worked closely, the latter has made a conscious decision not to have offices within the sprawling UN compound where security is

stringent. Instead, the Campaign chose offices closer to town in a building with other CSOs. While physically distancing itself from the UN, the Campaign physically and symbolically brought itself closer to Kenyan civil society.

Even though collaboration with UNDP has been good to date, the Campaign has recognized the need to strengthen its relationship with the whole UN family in country. In Kenya, discussions have begun with the UNDP Country Director to broaden the collaboration to other parts of the campaign such as engagement with the media and support to Parliament. In Nigeria, plans are underway to recruit an MDG Coordinator to sit within the Resident Coordinator's office. One of the roles for this person will be to develop a joint action plan for the UNCT on the MDGs. This will go a long way to ensuring that the Campaign works more effectively with all UN agencies not just UNDP. However, for the MDG Coordinator to develop and ensure effective implementation of the joint action plan, the person would have to be of sufficient seniority, than is currently envisioned. Outside of these two countries, the Campaign is in the advanced stage of recruitment of a full-time Millennium Campaign staff in the UNDP Regional Center in Dakar to support the work in West Africa. In addition, in about ten countries, starting with Ethiopia, Senegal and Kenya, national MDG Campaign Coordinators will be jointly recruited by the UN Country Teams and the Millennium Campaign who will be based in the UN Resident Coordinator's office.

Other close partnerships developed were with international NGOs (INGOs) both at the national and regional level, namely Action Aid and Oxfam. At the national level, the Campaign collaborated with the INGOs to support G-CAP. At the regional level, the Campaign and these organizations held joint events or put out joint communiqués. This collaboration was very effective in minimizing competition, sharing information particularly when they were funding the same local organizations and providing a common powerful front in their advocacy. However, the success in this collaboration appears to stem from close personal relationships among the relevant representatives of the Campaign, Oxfam and Action Aid. The challenge will be to sustain this as the personalities change within these institutions.

The answer to whether the Campaign selected the right CSO partners is more complicated. As noted before, in all priority countries, the Campaign's primary CSO partner was G-CAP. From 2007 to 2008 partnerships were extended to other organizations including youth groups and faith based organizations. For example, in Kenya, the Campaign partnered with 9 more organizations which included youth groups and FBOs and in Nigeria they partnered with five more organizations. The impact of the partnerships with the youth groups and FBOs is clearly demonstrated by the millions who stood up. They were critical in bringing in a diverse and wide constituency. In future, however, the Campaign needs to think how to continue to involve these constituencies beyond *Stand Up* in a sustained long term campaign.

The value of the partnerships with G-CAP has varied depending on the capacity of the coalition. In some instances, G-CAP has been a vital partner bringing in a wide range of CSOs from within its network. At other times, the partnership with G-CAP hasn't worked in the same way. As the

Campaign has itself recognized, in future, partnerships with G-CAP should not be assumed in each country, but should be examined on a case by case basis.

What is largely absent from the portfolio of CSO partners is organizations which have the capacity to do citizen led campaigning (usually difficult to find) and organizations who have the experience to do effective policy engagement (increasingly easier to find). In the few instances in which the Campaign partnered with organizations with some policy expertise such as the Social Economic Foundation in Kenya, CDD and (CISLAC) in Nigeria, the impact on policy change was readily felt.

The second issue with respect to partnerships, which applies more to the CSOs, is whether the level and quality of support provided to partners enabled them to achieve the Campaign objectives. By 2008, funding to these organizations ranged from \$1,000 to \$30,000. For many organizations, this made it difficult for them to do anything but *Stand Up* and other “one-off” events. In Kenya, for example, Christian Partners Development Agency and G-CAP received the largest amount of funding with \$10,000 and \$9,500 respectively. The other partners received \$1,000 to \$6,000. In Nigeria, the grants to partners ranged from \$3,000 to \$30,000, with the largest amount going to G-CAP. The plans for 2009 are to increase the amounts going to G-CAP and PADEAP to roughly \$50,000 each. In Kenya, support to G-CAP will also increase to roughly \$50,000. This presents a more realistic budget allocation if the partners are to do much broader campaigning.

In addition to the grants, the Campaign has provided support in kind by paying for hotel halls and media coverage. Even more critical, the Campaign has invested a significant amount of time in supporting G-CAP’s internal processes. In some instances, G-CAP coalitions suffered from internal conflicts that affected implementation of planned activities. When this would happen, the regional team would travel to the affected country and personally mediate between the conflicting parties. The ability of the regional Campaign team to play this role is a reflection of the trust which partners gave them. Going forward, as the campaign grows there will be a need to provide more formal support to assist the different stakeholders to work together effectively.

As the Campaign thinks through its partnerships in the next phase, it may consider the following:

- ***Review the choice of partners in each country in light of what the Campaign is seeking to achieve.*** Ensure that the portfolio of partners in each country includes CSOs that are able to mobilize citizens to engage with government over a period of time (either at national or local government level), organizations which have an understanding of policy issues, the media and the private sector. Depending on the capacity in each country, careful consideration should be given whether to partner with G-CAP in the priority countries.
- ***Increase the amount of financial support provided to partners.*** This can be achieved by partnering with fewer organizations in each country and prioritizing a number of countries in each sub-region in which increased resources can be provided.
- ***Strengthen the capacity of national partners to both “be” and “do”.*** In particular, the Campaign should ensure that support is provided to the partners to:

- Develop an effective campaign strategy that brings in different constituencies (the media, private sector, youth groups) and engages government on specific policy issues.
- Rethink how partners in the campaign have been working together. This will include whether to retain G-CAP as the coordinator of the campaign or whether it continues to participate but not lead. Tensions and conflict may naturally emerge from this process thus the Campaign should be prepared to pay for the engagement of an organizational development facilitator to work with the partners over a period of time.

7. CONCLUSION

Across the region, the Campaign has successfully mobilized a lot of energy and interest in the MDGs. Probably the greatest achievement has been giving voice to the millions of voiceless through *Stand Up*. The opinions are unanimous, however, that it is time to move beyond *Stand Up*. This is something that the Campaign team globally is aware of and efforts made in this respect will go a long way to strengthening the ability of citizens to hold their governments accountable on the MDGs.

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