Community Security and Arms Control Project

A joint review by DFID and UNDP-BCPR

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**Joint DFID-UNDP (BCPR) Review of Community Security and Arms Control Project**

**- UNDP Southern Sudan -**

**Executive Summary**

**Security in Jonglei state in Southern Sudan has been blighted by a number of fatal clashes between communities over the last two years, leaving over 2000 people dead[[1]](#footnote-1). Inter-tribal violence and “cattle-raiding” combined with the high prevalence of small arms mean that Jonglei is a source of insecurity to its people and to Southern Sudan. A challenging physical environment and limited transport infrastructure make it one of the least accessible states where state authority is largely absent. The ongoing violence and instability combined with a short time frame until the elections and referendum could have negative repercussions for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In this context, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) needs to increase its ability to plan for and respond to these complex security and arms control issues through an aligned community, state and central governance system and by strengthening the rule of law. CSAC provides an important component of support to strengthen this response in Jonglei, particularly at community level. If the approach is refined there is potential for it to be scaled up and applied in other states.**

**CSAC has supported the State Governor and county commissioners to engage with their communities and to identify, prioritize and plan for their security needs. It has also strengthened the county commissioner’s abilities to articulate these needs at the state and central levels and has begun to develop a range of policy options for the Government of Southern Sudan to inform its approach to disarmament. CSAC also supports the CSAC Bureau in developing the GoSS’ policy and approach to community security and arms control. However, CSAC’s biggest hurdle has been its institutional relationships. This review suggests that CSAC could contribute to community security improvements more effectively if appropriately connected to GoSS institutions. It also finds that the project’s outcome threshold created inflated expectations as to what could be achieved within the limited time frame and resource envelope. The challenges and opportunities for progress are outlined in the findings and recommendations that follow.**

**The opportunities for CSAC’s progress fall in to two key areas:**

***CSAC relationships within GoSS* - For CSAC to seriously contribute to security improvements in South Sudan it needs to influence as well as inform the provincial/state and GoSS security, arms control and disarmament planning.**

***CSAC interconnectedness within UNDP* - Connecting CSAC more closely to other UNDP programmes, would create a comprehensive package of support that would be stronger conceptually and administratively and would have greater impact through an area-based approach. By linking CSAC with the Rule of Law & Governance Programmes, the Conflict Risk Mapping and Analysis Programme, as well as the rollout of the Sudan Recovery Fund it would inform and strengthen GoSS response to security and arms control issues through a balanced approach to strengthening the rule of law. It would also improve value for money, align administrative processes, improve the impact of CSAC interventions, maximize technical expertise and provide a strategic focus for donor support.**

1. **Introduction**

The CSAC project was launched in November 2008 through an initial one year pilot focused on the state of Jonglei. The project aimed to enhance the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to improve security at community level through an integrated approach that brought together interventions involving security, the rule of law and development. The purpose was to peacefully control the use of small arms while enhancing the stability and prosperity of communities.

*The stated outcomes for DfID funding were:*

1. Enhanced community security reflects community needs and demands and is supported by the delivery of material benefits.
2. Effective governmental institutions that can meet community security demands and deliver improved security and stability in a sustainable manner.

The project aimed to be catalytic in the sense that it would also influence a broader range of UNDP, UNMIS and other agency programmes and engagements around a coordinated and complementary agenda. It was piloted in Jonglei in order to address immediate challenges and concerns relating to violence and insecurity as well as seeking to identify lessons and good practice to inform a future roll out of the approach in other key states of Southern Sudan. The project sought to address the threat and use forceful disarmament methods by GOSS in Jonglei which, as well as being unsustainable, had led to high levels of violence, injuries and deaths and had exacerbated conflict dynamics. The CSAC project aimed to promote peaceful approaches to improving security and encouraging voluntary disarmament and arms control linked also to the delivery of a peace dividend.

In parallel, the CSAC pilot project also focused on building the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) [[2]](#footnote-2) to take a leadership role in the development of community security and arms control policies and programmes. . The need to link work on CSAC with broader peace building and reconciliation efforts was also clearly identified and the project sought to enhance the capacity of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission to support peacebuilding efforts, in coordination with influential NGOs working on these issues – primarily PACT and Saferworld.

This Review of CSAC was carried out in October 2009 by a joint DFID-UNDP team with combined institutional interest and complementary areas of expertise. The Review considered the activities, achievements and outcomes of the Project and has arrived at a series of findings and recommendations addressing the CSAC project and related issues e.g. the rollout of disarmament campaigns and the implementation for the Sudan Recovery Fund.

* 1. *Objectives of the joint review*

The objectives of the joint review, as outlined in the Terms of Reference (see annex 1) were to:

* Determine the degree to which the CSAC project has delivered on its goal, purpose and outputs.
* Assess lessons learned in terms of good practice.
* Determine the degree to which the outputs have delivered outcomes / sustainable improvements.
* Comment on any issues around relationships with government, state and local authorities.
* Assess the extent to which the project played a catalytic role in encouraging coordinated and complementary interventions by a range of UN and NGO partners in promoting community security.
* Make recommendations for future approaches to community security and arms control in South Sudan.
* Provide recommendations to inform the completion of the pilot project and its possible expansion to other States in South Sudan.
  1. *Methodology and review team*

The review team comprised of Paul Eavis (Senior Adviser, BCPR/UNDP), Katy Thompson (Rule of Law Programme Specialist, BCPR/UNDP) and Charlotte Morris (Community Development Specialist, Stabilisation Unit, DFID).

The team spent five days in Southern Sudan between 19 – 23 October, 2009, and visited Juba and two counties in Jonglei State (Bor and Akobo).

The review team conducted a literature review of project and other relevant reports and briefing materials (see annex 2). Meetings were held with UNDP (Senior Management, Team Leaders of CPR, Rule of Law and Poverty Reduction), Donors including DfID, CIDA and the Joint Donor Office, the CSAC team and Rule of Law team), as well as a range of key stakeholders, including representatives from the GoSS (Ministry of Interior), Jonglei State government, local government in Bor and Akobo, the South Sudanese Police Service, the CSAC Bureau, UNMIS and NGOs. In Akobo the team participated in a consultation with representatives from local government, traditional leaders and community members (including youth and women).

1. **Findings**

*Summary of findings*

Despite considerable delays in the early stages of the project, CSAC is on track to achieve many of its project outputs. Indeed, after 11 months, the project has moved relatively quickly on delivering the conflict sensitive development projects. The consultative methodology has mobilized and empowered communities across Jonglei State. The CSAC Project has also supported the identification of priority stabilization projects by the Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) at State level. County Commissioners were able to capitalize on the delivery of the CSAC projects (peace dividends) to their constituents allowing them to focus on stabilization challenges affecting the whole State - alleviating the pressure on them to lobby for the SPF funds to be divided equally across the Counties. The project demonstrated progress by bringing together County commissioners with state level officials and in strengthening the relationship between state and national institutions. The CSAC Bureau has also made some headway in developing a concept document on community security and arms control which has been endorsed by the Council of Ministers. The CSAC project has helped consolidate a network of structures at the community, state and national levels, it now needs to build on these structures to improve security and inform the arms control agenda.

*Positioning of the CSAC Bureau* - The CSAC project experienced extensive delays in its inception phase due to challenges in reaching full agreement with GoSS on the contents of the project document and in the recruitment processes within UNDP. The slow creation of the Bureau for CSAC – as the key GoSS counterpart - contributed to these delays. In hindsight, it may not therefore have been optimal or strategic to establish the Bureau when an alternative existing GOSS counterpart could have been identified e.g. the Ministry of Interior.

*Operational Delays* - The Review also concludes that the pace and depth of implementation of the CSAC project were constrained by internal UNDP operational challenges such as lengthy recruitment procedures, including the appointment of a Project Manager. Given these initial challenges the CSAC has effectively been functioning for only 11 months at the time of review which means the conclusions drawn in this report are necessarily tentative.

*Progress on Consultations* - Once initiated, the project has moved remarkably quickly on delivering the conflict sensitive development projects: developing the methodology for the community security assessments; holding community consultations across all 11 counties of Jonglei State in extremely challenging operational circumstances; and commencing, in some cases, the delivery of material projects which had been identified by communities as “priority” projects for the promotion of security in each County. The consultative methodology brought a creative and innovative approach to delivering local solutions in Jonglei. It mobilized and empowered communities across Jonglei State. In Akobo, the Review teams were informed by community members that such consultations were unprecedented and highly appreciated. The approach helped inform County Commissioners of their constituents perspectives on security, and enabled them to articulate these perspectives to state level processes, when CSAC brought together all the county commissioners with state officials for the very first time.

*Assessment and Documentation*: Questions were also raised about the need for better baseline assessments and documentation to assess impact and the need to ensure the output of consultations were better connected with the planning and prioritization processes of donors, other UN agencies and INGOs. The community security assessments provide material for the UN and other international actors to focus programming in Jonglei State in a manner which is coordinated, complementary and community responsive. The CSAC has also supported the identification of priority stabilization projects by the SRF at State level. County Commissioners were able to capitalize on the delivery of a peace dividend to their constituents allowing them to focus on stabilization challenges affecting the whole State and alleviating the pressure from them for the SRF funds to be divided equally across the Counties.

*Strengthening the rule of law and impact on security*: It is premature to judge whether the delivery of the prioritized projects will have a positive impact on the overall security environment in Jonglei. However, the team concludes that in order for the CSAC project to increase its impact on the overall security environment a larger resource envelope is needed and a complementary focus on the long term structural challenges in Jonglei State such as weak security and justice actors across Southern Sudan, high levels of poverty, poor accessibility to the Counties and, crucially, the continued high rate of small arms possessions among civilians. This highlights the need to scale-up the response to the CSAC assessments in Jonglei (and other priority States), and to embed them in planning an area-based approach which builds in Rule of Law, Governance and Poverty Reduction interventions. With this in mind, the Review Team recommended the development of a comprehensive area-based programme strategy for Jonglei.

*Disarmament Policy* - In response to attempts by the GOSS and SPLA to undertake disarmament by coercive means in 2006 and 2007, the UN advocated for an alternative voluntary disarmament policy and strategy which respected international standards. At the same time the Bureau for CSAC was established. Thereafter there appears to have been an unexplained vacuum in policy and strategy development in relation to arms control and disarmament except for some uncontroversial exercises undertaken by the SPLA in specific areas (such as Lakes between August and September 2009). In 2009 the high death toll in Jonglei State resulting from inter-tribal clashes and “cattle raiding” incidents has led the GOSS and State governments to openly question the decision to cease forceful disarmament and to insist that such campaigns will shortly be re-started in the absence of any other solution to this crisis. The Review team concludes that either directly or indirectly the UN should collectively have taken steps to ensure this policy vacuum was filled given the delays in operationalising CSAC and the political and strategic weakness of the CSAC Bureau. The UN remains without a strategy for engagement in this crisis and should quickly conclude whether and how to support arms control and disarmament exercises and mobilize the relevant expertise and capacity support as appropriate.

Findings by Output:

* 1. ***Bureau formally established and operational, ensuring effective coordination and facilitation of all processes relating to CSAC. (Also including DfID Outputs 2.2 development of regulatory framework and legislation on small arms and light weapons and 2.5 regional north-south and cross-border initiatives to strengthen security)***
* The CSSAC project has successfully achieved the output targets in relation to the formal establishment and initial capacity development of the Bureau. Through a combination of material and technical support, the Bureau has a functioning office in Juba with over thirty staff in total and two officers in each state.
* The Bureau’s effectiveness, however, as a key actor in the power structures of the GoSS, and hence in the development of GoSS’ policy and operational plans for CSAC, has been weak due to protracted decision-making over the Bureau’s location within GOSS structures, the reluctance of the Director of the Bureau to be based in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the poor working relationship between the Director and Deputy Director (which is replicated amongst other staff in the Bureau) and other problematic leadership issues. As such, the CSAC Bureau has, to date, only marginally influenced the views of the Minister of Interior, and is having minimal input to the GOSS’ Security Committee.

* With the support of UNDP and the NGO, Saferworld, some significant improvements have been noted in recent months, including the development of a concept paper for arms control and disarmament which has received the support of the Council of Ministers. The Minister for Internal Affairs has also been using CSAC documentation – including research on community security in six States (funded by the Canadian government) and data collected on fatalities in Jonglei State - in his own speeches and policy statements. In addition, the constructive working relationship between the Deputy Director of the CSAC Bureau and the Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs is noteworthy. Also, the CSAC Bureau is beginning to enhance its relevance by organizing the delivery (from the Regional Centre for Small Arms - RECSA) of a SALW marking machine, and beginning work on guidelines for stockpile management. There would appear to be increased demand for this type of work from the Ministry of Interior – a positive indication of the potential impact and influence of the Bureau.
* The Bureau has been working with community security and arms control experts from RECSA, as well as with the National Focal Points (NFPs) on small arms in North Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. The Bureau has represented GoSS in the International Great Lakes Conference, and the follow-up discussions relating to strengthening cross-border controls of small arms flows.
* CSAC Bureau has established representation in all States in Southern Sudan which provides an opportunity for the Bureau’s “concept” to be scaled up and taken to states beyond Jonglei. The Bureau’s representative in Jonglei is well positioned to play an influential role at State Security/Governor level and shows a good understanding of how community security consultations can link positively to peace building processes across the State.
  1. ***Improved security environment allows for development at the community level in Jonglei through community consultations and delivery of conflict-sensitive development projects.***

In CSAC’s early phases, GoSS conducted some peaceful voluntary disarmament in Akobo and Pibor in 2006 and 2007 respectively. However the changing political environment at state and national level, and the increasing focus on forceful disarmament, meant that the arms control and disarmament initiatives at local levels were downgraded in favour of working with local communities to improve understanding of security threats and deliver confidence-building ‘peace dividends’.

2.2.1 *Connecting County and State Security Planning and Response*

* At the outset of the consultations the CSAC project brought together, for the first time, all 11 Jonglei County Commissioners together with the State Governor. As well as obtaining political support for and ownership of the CSAC assessment process this event appears to have had significant spin-off confidence building effects appreciated by national and international actors enabling joint planning and improving mutual accountability. Similarly, within the consultation processes at County level, representatives from each Payam were brought together with a similar effect. The operational terrain in Jonglei prevents Commissioners visiting their own constituents and community members from conferring with each other so the consultation process clearly enabled the County Commissioner to be more engaged with and influenced by their own community members and therefore in a better position to represent their needs at State and GOSS level.
  + 1. *Methodology*
* Community Based Approach - A methodology has been developed for conducting security planning workshops at the county level. The workshop methodology is based on well recognized conflict sensitive approaches developed by Saferworld, UNDP Indonesia and Do No Harm. The workshops, conducted over a two day period, follow four phases: enable communities to map their security risks, explore links between conflict causes and effects, identify initiatives that could address these patterns and prioritise initiatives as a collective group. Four groups were identified in each county. The groups were facilitated through the first three phases of the workshop alone and were brought together as a collective for the final prioritization exercise.

CSAC Bureau staff discussed participation with the county commissioner and participants were subsequently invited to represent the four groups: traditional leadership, state authorities, women and girls and male youth. Efforts were made to invite representatives from each payam or sub district though attendance from more remote areas was constrained by limited transportation. It was not possible within the short time frame of the review to identify which groups were not represented. However, CSAC Bureau staff recognized that representation had been predominantly from county centres and people already known to the county commissioners. They also recognized that a second phase of consultations could benefit from engaging more “hard to reach” communities especially youth in rural areas, particularly those from “cattle camps”.

Participants in the Akobo workshop said that this was the first planning workshop of this type they had been involved with. They spoke positively of their experience and were able to connect the project they had selected with their immediate security concerns.

The project staff consisted of male international and national staff and a female international. In order to strengthen women’s participation in future and to contribute to enhancing national capacity of women it would be helpful to engage and, if necessary, train a national female consultant or staff member as a community facilitator for CSAC work and/or to use the UNDP Gender team.

* Conflict sensitive assessment processes – Overall the processes have been impressive in their ability to mobilize and inspire local communities to participate in planning. The diversity of project priorities identified by communities demonstrates the need for differentiated responses and shows how communities have been enabled to identify solutions to varying sources, types and levels of security threats. The empowering effect of the participative processes on the community’s ability to engage in decision making on aid interventions which affect their lives was tangible in Akobo. The Review team also heard from consultation participants who demonstrated a clear understanding of the anticipated causal connection between the consultation process, the identified priority project and expected improvements of the local security environment.
* Baselines - The reviewers would have appreciated baselines assessments of the security environment and threats across Jonglei at the outset of the consultation phase. Whilst secondary sources were used by the team (PACT local assessments and the Small Arms Survey report, 2008) tools such as the Conflict Risk Mapping and Analysis (CRMA) could feed into these in future. Documented baselines would enable impact to be measured more effectively as well as strengthening monitoring and evaluation of the project and contributing to learning on community security issues in Southern Sudan and globally. The NGO Saferworld is in the process of developing monitoring and evaluation indicators with the CSAC Bureau which may also support this process in future.
* Documentation. The CSAC project has not adequately documented baseline assessments of security threats in the Counties, the planning and development of the consultation methodologies and the reports and outcomes of the consultation processes. Information captured from the process must be documented so that it can inform State, GOSS and international community planning and prioritization processes, as well as to produce donor reports and assist future resource mobilization. Documenting local knowledge on conflict drivers within key conflict prone areas is also critical to identifying patterns of conflict and in mobilizing an early response. There is potential for the Project to regain this ground by following up the previous work with a validation process to identify and take forward the broader recommendations and the raw data gathered in the original process.
* Projects - The decision to identify and deliver one priority conflict-sensitive project of the value $91,000 in each County prevented this fairly small allocation from being subdivided and also meant these first phase consultations had a fairly straightforward and easily understandable objective. Additionally, the quick delivery of one project can be essential to the continuing legitimacy of the CSAC and building confidence of community members in this initial phase. However, the need to gain consensus around one project meant that that the issues identified by women did not gain priority status. Only female community members identified threats to their security from within the community/County in addition to external threats. Men focused exclusively on the latter. Where perceived and actual security threats are so gendered then responses need to be flexible enough to cater for this differentiation. The single project focus meant that the potential for identifying a range of project initiatives to which a range of actors could respond was not built in to the project from the outset. Efforts are being made by the CSAC team currently to capture all that information and to direct that to various partners operating in Jonglei.
* Steering committees – CSAC has established of county level “Steering” Committees, comprised of participants in the planning workshops, to oversee, feedback and promote continued ownership of the projects. This has promoted continued engagement of community members in the oversight of the project process and quality assurance. It also creat a platform for future management and use of the resources for wider community benefit.
* Cross-border initiatives - In this phase the consultation process focused on heightening communities’ awareness of the causes of insecurity and enabling them to identify projects with a security benefit for their own Counties. Having now established a sound foundation and network of relationships within Counties, CSAC could further develop its approach by supporting conflicting communities to tackle inter-community violence and support reconciliation and mutual understanding across-borders.. The CSAC team gave an example where CSAC and PACT had facilitated a ceasefire between two communities at the local level. This approach should be supported and expanded as confidence improves. The Review team acknowledge the need for communities themselves to see tangible benefits before moving onto inter-community processes.
* The team was limited by the short time frame available and the ambitious scope of the CSAC Programme to be reviewed. The team would have liked to explore the applied methodology in more detail, visited more than one county and spent additional time interviewing beneficiaries and exploring opportunities for addressing security concerns at the locality level. The team advises that these issues are explored in depth during subsequent reviews.
  1. ***The capacity of the Southern Sudan Peace Commission (SSPC) is enhanced in supporting peace-building, conflict transformation and mitigation***
* The SSPC was established to promote peaceful coexistence of all communities in Southern Sudan and to monitor the implementation of the CPA. It consists of a small Secretariat in Juba, and has a network of part-time advisers attached to Government offices at the State level. The SSPC works with a range of national and international organizations, including traditional authorities, local Peace Committees, NGOs such as PACT and the UN (eg UNMIS (Civil Affairs) and UNDP).
* The CSAC project support is focused on: (i) the provision of training on peace-building and conflict transformation to the Commission, representatives of government, civil society and traditional authorities; (ii) the establishment of Platforms for Peace at State level to support dialogue and peace-building; and (iii) the establishment of peace-building fund to support peace-building initiatives and projects.
* To date, the CSAC project has provided technical and material (tents, chairs, etc) support to the SSPC, and has placed a Technical Adviser in the Commission. The Review Team noted, however, that only limited progress had been made with regard to rolling out a training programme on peace-building and conflict transformation, and that support for Platforms for Peace was in its early stages. Indeed, the SSCP appeared to lack the financial resources to initiate and support many peace dialogues, and instead tended to participate in dialogue meetings hosted by other organizations.
* The Review Team considered that the work of the SSPC, with its focus on peace dialogues and support for peace-building, could usefully complement the work of the CSAC Bureau and CSAC project at State and County level. Specifically, the outputs from peace dialogues could inform the development of community safety plans, and the CSAC project could support (financially) some of the peace-building priorities identified through such dialogue processes. Such cooperation would do much to strengthen the peace-building dimension of the CSAC project.
  1. ***Connections with GOSS & UN Programming and planning processes and potential for an Area-Based approach.***
* The CSAC community based assessments have identified a range of priority issues and responses required to strengthen actual and perceived security at County level. The sectors highlighted are diverse: rule of law (justice and security institutions), governance, infrastructure, environment and economic development/livelihoods for youth were particularly emphasized. Thus one relatively small scale project such as CSAC is insufficient to meet this diversity of needs and should be complemented by other State level interventions as well as macro-level capacity-building of institutions such as the police, corrections, courts administration, lawyers and judiciary. This leads the Review team to conclude that there is a palpable need for the UN and other international actors to plan and implement in a more coordinated and targeted manner in Jonglei State. An enhanced international presence in the Counties could itself contribute to peace, confidence and stabilization however the development of an Area-based Jonglei Strategy could ensure existing and future resources are targeted in a coordinated fashion both to support SRF interventions and to build confidence at County level through follow-up to the CSAC assessments. This could, at minimum, be spearheaded by UNDP through an Area-based approach.
* *Improved capacity within GoSS Institutions including the Police* (DfID output 2.1) By focusing on security issues and actors with less emphasis on strengthening justice institutions the CSAC project has promoted an uneven approach to the establishment of the rule of law in Jonglei. However, this weakness was identified by UNDP prior to the Review process and a Joint Justice Programme is currently under development which will strengthen the justice component as well as building on the findings of the CSAC assessments. Additionally more effort could have been made by CSAC to connect with colleagues working at GOSS level to support the judiciary, police and prisons and to ensure better alignment with UNDP’s own programmes in these areas as well as GOSS level planning. Related to this is the problem of ensuring the infrastructure supported by the CSAC project is incorporated into GoSS local budgets and planning to ensure sustainability which requires a connection to GoSS level planning as well as influencing programming priorities in parallel UNDP projects. It is anticipated that the collective engagement of all international rule of law, justice and security actors, including CSAC, in the Justice and Security Sector (JSSAC) will ensure better integration and complementarity of internationally led interventions along with continued engagement in the Rule of Law Budget Group.
* In contrast, the Review team received very positive feedback from a UNPOL and UNMIS regarding effective communication and coordination both at State and GoSS level and participation in the various coordination fora which exist. The CSAC concept was complimented for building in the flexibility and responsiveness needed for programming in such a volatile setting. In order to build on these positive relationships the Review team would hope to see that, together with the expanded UNDP Rule of Law focus in Jonglei, the UN can deliver targeted support to strengthen Rule of Law (including both justice and security actors) at community level to stabilize the communities most at risk whilst staying aligned to UNDAF planning priorities.
  1. ***Operational challenges***
* The CSAC project experienced extensive delays (up to 8 months) in its inception phase due to challenges in reaching full agreement with GoSS on the contents of the project document. The slow creation of the Bureau for CSAC – as the key GOSS counterpart - contributed to these delays. Given these initial challenges the CSAC Project has effectively been functioning for only 11 months at the time of review.
* The pace and scope of implementation of the CSAC project was also constrained by internal UNDP operational challenges such as lengthy recruitment processes. In particular, UNDP found it difficult to identify and recruit a Project Manager during the lifetime of the project, and so had to recruit temporary managers on short-term contracts, and more recently, to appoint the Field Co-ordinator as the Acting Project Manager. This has had a detrimental impact on project activities. The Review team was informed that a new Project Manager would be in place by January 2010, and that interviews had taken place for the Field Co-ordinator (the post-holder’s ALD – temporary - contract had come to an end) resulting in the selection of an alternative candidate to the previous post-holder. The Review team is concerned that the delays resulting from the change in staffing as the new Project Manager and Field Co-ordinator take up their positions and become familiar with the project will compromise its impact. Failure to deliver the identified projects on the ground would have negative impact on UNDP’s credibility at State, county and payam level and on communities’ confidence in the project. The positive relations which have been painstakingly built by the project team could also be undermined.

* A major challenge for the Project is the difficult operating environment. Most Counties in Jonglei State are inaccessible by road for at least eight months of the year. Many airstrips are not useable during the rainy season, some Counties are only accessible by boat (with armed escorts), and some requiring two days travel. This presents operational and logistical challenges not only for the organization of County consultation processes but for the delivery of vehicles and materials for priority projects. To work well in this environment the Project has developed a deep familiarity with the territory and a good knowledge of the operations and logistics environment. It has retained a strong focus on Operations and has built a solid partnership with UNMIS enabling them to adapt and deliver in spite of these challenges. For the project’s continued success it is crucial this focus and institutional memory is not lost during staffing changes.
* To reduce the time spent by Project staff on procurement and delivery of goods and services for the priority projects, UNDP has contracted UNOPS to deliver this component of the Project. UNDP has also requested that, where possible, UNOPS procure from locally run businesses, in order to generate additional employment opportunities with the Project.
  1. ***Public information campaigns use all available media in partnership with the grassroots NGOs, peace committees, women’s associations and other local actors. (DfID output 1.1)***
* The CSAC project has better enabled county commissioners to understand how the communities they represent perceive and understand security issues. The CSAC team has worked closely with state authorities while reaching out to groups that are often underrepresented in security planning, particularly women and youth.
* The lack of standard print and telecommunications media in Jonglei State has meant that public information has been primarily transferred through “town hall” style meetings and through “word of mouth” via county networks. CSAC team members identified that traditional fora, including poetry and music, could be used more effectively to re-enforce key messages for conflict resolution and arms control.
* The distribution of VHF hand held radios to county commissioners has increased connectivity and sharing of security messages between counties and between county and state authorities.
* The proposed SRF project to establish a radio network in the province could be an opportunity to strengthen the cascade of security messages across the state if messages are coordinated, accurate and contribute to peace across the region.
  1. ***Engagement of UNMIS in dynamic Patrolling (DfID output 1.4) and establishment of security buffer zones (output 2.3)***
* The changing and complex political environment in Sudan has hindered progress on these two outputs which depend on decisions made within UNMIS and GoSS, on whom CSAC has limited influence. CSAC has engaged with UNMIS in Jonglei, however opportunities to influence the patrolling patterns have been limited.
* CSAC has also had limited influence on the establishment of buffer zones which have been slow to materialize. CSAC has supported the construction of police posts along key county boundaries, however the limited number of police to patrol these areas, has meant that they provide little deterrent for conflicting communities. Location of buffer zones and the deployment of SPLA in key conflicting communities has been controversial and politically sensitive. It may be necessary to re-consider these project outputs as within the current political climate it is unlikely CSAC will be able to implement them.

* 1. ***Continuation and scaling-up of CSAC***
* The CSAC project has received funding from the Norwegian government to enable it to conduct a second round of consultations in Jonglei. The Review Team recommends that the CSAC project focus these funds on those Counties facing the highest risk of violence, to seek to identify priority projects to support collaboration between neighboring Counties, and to use a proportion of these funds to support projects prioritized by women.
* Upper Nile and Eastern Equitoria - Both the Canadian and Dutch governments have indicated their interest in supporting the expansion of the CSAC project to Eastern Equitoria and Upper Nile. These counties were highlighted by the GoSS as the next priorities during the project endorsement phase. CSAC is beginning to undertake preparatory work for the assessment and county-level consultation process but will need to have its full complement of staff in place to enable the effective delivery of the project to other states. Expansion to other states should be planned to complement the role out of other programmes in those areas such as SRF, CRMA and DDR.
* SRF – There is significant potential for the SRF and CSAC project to complement each other, with CSAC providing the County/community level platform and SRF focusing support at the state level. Both have benefited in Jonglei from the additional resources provided by the other. The CSAC County-level assessments informed the SRF process in identifying and prioritizing projects to promote stabilization at State level. County Commissioners were more able to engage with the SRF state-level process and agree to state wide initiatives having already capitalized on the delivery of a peace dividend to their constituents through CSAC. Had CSAC been absent, county and state officials would have been under pressure from their communities to lobby for the SRF resources to be distributed at the locality level. CSAC enabled officials to maintain SRF resources for initiatives that contribute to stabilization challenges affecting the state as a whole.
* The next phase of the SRF intends to target the states of Lakes and Eastern Equatoria. While it would be desirable for the CSAC methodology to again complement the delivery of SRF, funding is not currently available to roll out CSAC in Lakes. This means that CSAC will either require additional funding or a decision will need to be taken on whether to maintain the existing focus on Upper Nile or change track to focus on Lakes. SRF and CSAC need to urgently establish a collective planning and funding framework if they are to establish themselves as a complementary package in Lakes. CSAC would need to start preparation immediately if it was to deliver its consultation process in time to feed into the SRF processes. At a minimum, CSAC project team could undertake County-level assessments and consultation, if SRF were able to provide funds for county level as well as State level initiatives. Alternatively, the SRF could be encouraged to focus next on Eastern Equatoria. CSAC could also contribute more directly to SRF funded projects. For example in Jonglei the SRF plans to build a road from Bor to Pibor using labour intensive construction tecniques. CSAC could support this approach by mobilizing labour from across the state and therefore demonstrating the benefit of the road to all counties, not only those immediately bisected by the road, and by strengthening local communities along the route to maintain security of the road once open.
* The Review team strongly recommends that the findings and recommendations of this report are incorporated into any future iteration of this project in particular the need for a balanced focus on justice, rule of law and community security and the need to deliver the project as part of a comprehensive area-based approach incorporating all UNDP pillars and other development actors.

1. **Recommendations**

**Strengthen the CSAC assessment and consultation/planning process**

1. Undertake baseline assessments (ideally including surveys) of perceptions of safety and security to inform consultation processes and to establish baseline indicators. Draw upon and adapt existing assessment tools (e.g. from Ituri, DRC) and integrate into the Crisis Risk Management Assessment (ie. for the future assessments in Eastern Equatoria).
2. Strengthen the documentation of the process and outputs from the consultations process, including: the methodology; the identified conflict and security risks; issues raised by the group discussions; and the range of projects identified to address the range of risk factors. All analysis should be broken down by group (women, youth, and traditional leaders).
3. Disseminate the findings of the assessments to all stakeholders, including State and Country Security and Development Committees and other international agencies and NGOs to ensure the plans are integrated into State Security and Development Plans and inform priorities and interventions by other development actors.
4. Build on the community networks and assessment processes e.g. through continued iterations of the project ensuring a focus on projects identified by women and to develop inter-County activities, and a validation process of current findings.
5. Strengthen the connection between the community security assessments and rule of law programming to ensure that a balance is retained between emphasis and strengthening of justice and security services to reinforce the rule of law.
6. Strengthen the connection between the community security assessments and peace processes to link community level dialogue on security threats with processes for promoting peace.
7. Build capacity of local partners participating in the processes e.g. Can local community based organizations be trained to conduct CSAC consultations? Can Southern Sudanese women be supported as facilitators in future processes?
8. Evaluate the priority projects for conflict-sensitivity and sustainability (including linking with national programmes which may support CSAC interventions) and provide feedback to the communities concerned.

**Strengthen the networks and consultation platforms to inform County and State-level planning processes**

1. Undertake second round of County-level consultations, if possible including representatives from other communities, to strengthen the County-level platforms. This could be linked to monitoring of implementation of funded projects, to update analysis and further development of the Community Security plans, and to identify additional projects that support women’s security concerns, as well as projects that address community concerns across neighboring Counties.
2. Encourage the use of the County-level platforms for other planning processes (e.g. Local Government Plans). Encourage partners, from other UN security and justice programmes to visit the county level with representatives from police and judiciary in Juba.

**Strengthen capacity of the CSAC Bureau and encourage its effective integration into the Ministry of Interior (and GoSS State Security Committee)**

* 1. Enhance the profile and relevance of the CSAC Bureau within the Ministry of Interior, and with the Minister of Interior, through technical support for the development of arms control policies and guidelines (e.g. firearms policy, guidelines for marking and registering weapons; guidelines for stockpile security) and by organizing opportunities for the Minister to interact with and meet counter-parts in other African countries pursuing arms reduction processes.
  2. Encourage the integration of the office of the CSAC Bureau within the Ministry of Interior, along with Juba-based UNDP CSAC project staff. Use the opportunity provided by the end of the current rental support by UNDP (in December 2009) to encourage the Bureau (or at least key staff) to be co-located with the Ministry of Interior. DFID and other donors to raise this issue with the Vice President and Minister of Interior.
  3. In parallel, explore the possibility of placing an Internal Security Adviser in the office of the Minister of Interior, to work alongside the existing Rule of Law and Access to Justice Adviser (UNDP), to provide advice on community security, arms control and related issues, and to encourage the integration of the CSAC Bureau into the Ministry of Interior.
  4. Support the development of CSAC Bureau information/publicity materials to increase the profile of the Bureau with the GOSS and State and County authorities, and to roll-out the CSAC concept at State and County-levels.
  5. Support communication and outreach to CSAC Bureau officers at State level in order to encourage their active engagement in State and County-level processes to enhance community security, including the roll-out of the CSAC concept.

**Strengthen collaboration between the CSAC Bureau and South Sudan Peace-building Commission**

1. Ensure that the CSAC consultation processes at State and County level are informed by the outcomes of previous peace dialogues, and seek to incorporate the priority peace-building projects that have emerged from such dialogues into the CSAC planning process.
2. Ensure that the CSAC consultation processes engage representatives from SSPC and local peace-building committees, and draw upon the individuals that have been trained in peace-building and conflict transformation, so as to develop a pool of trained peace-builders and community dialogue facilitators.

**Develop a clear strategy to enhance arms control and voluntary disarmament**

1. Encourage support for the CSAC Bureau’s concept on arms control and disarmament within the GoSS and UNMIS by supporting the Bureau’s integration into the Ministry of Interior and advisory role to the Minister of Interior (as outlined above).
2. Provide technical support to the CSAC Bureau and Ministry of Interior (if requested) to develop an operational plan for voluntary disarmament, including an awareness raising strategy (at State and County-levels). Such a policy and operational plan could help persuade the GoSS to forgo forceful disarmament and to make more informed choices.
3. Work with UNMIS and the UNCT to prepare a risk-mitigation strategy for forceful disarmament, along with a position paper on civilian disarmament (outlining the conditions under which the UN could support a GOSS voluntary disarmament effort). Such a position paper would highlight the need for: voluntary disarmament; an awareness raising strategy (through Governors, County Commissioners, elders, NGOs, etc); deployment of SPLA Units and UNMIS monitors; rapid training of auxiliary police/civil defence units; support for registration processes and public destruction of obsolete weapons.
4. Encourage the CSAC Bureau to initiate work on guidelines for registering arms and stockpile management, and the development of a SALW policy and updated Firearms Act.

**Develop an area-based approach to community security and access to justice in Jonglei State through linkages with all UNDP thematic programme pillars**

1. Develop an area-based programme strategy in Jonglei which brings together the existing pillars of UNDP interventions operationally and programmatically and is aligned with the programmes and priorities of UN partners.
2. Co-locate UNDP CSAC and Governance programme staff in Jonglei with the CSAC Bureau and South Sudan Peace Commission in the same government ministry (Ministry of Local Government), and hold regular (weekly) meetings with other UNDP ROL and Poverty Reduction staff based in other ministies.
3. Appoint a Coordinator or OIC of the Jonglei area-based programme and ensure that the TORs for programme staff include clear reporting arrangements to the OIC (as well as their supervisor in thematic programmes in Juba).
4. Ensure that the community security planning process is effectively integrated into the State and County-level Security and Development Plans.
5. Use the JSSAC, Rule of Law Budget Group and State level fora to ensure proactive coordination and complementarity on programming strategy and priorities on justice and security ensuring appropriate balance.
6. Use the findings of the CSAC assessments to inform the Joint Justice Programme currently under development.
7. Hold an internal workshop for UNDP CPR, Poverty Reduction, and RoL and Governance staff to develop the area-based programme for Jonglei and to develop synergies between the different programmatic pillars.

**Scale-up the scope and impact of the CSAC approach in South Sudan**

1. Deep engagement in Jonglei: The Review Team recommends that the CSAC project engages in a second-round of consultations in Jonglei, using the Norwegian funds (as outlined above). These consultations should focus on those Counties facing the highest risk of violence and to seek to identify priority projects to support collaboration between neighboring Counties. A second round should also support projects prioritized by women.
2. Extend CSAC to other States: Once the full team has been appointed, and funds made available, the CSAC project should extend to one additional State (Eastern Equatoria or Lakes). During this next phase of the project, UNDP should seek to focus on the project’s “added value” (eg capacity development of CSAC Bureau and SSPC, (quality control of the) assessment and consultation process, GoSS policy development, monitoring and oversight) and look to identify other implementation partners for the consultation process (eg PACT) and infrastructure projects (eg UNOPS or IOM).
3. Sudan Recovery Fund: Work with the Sudan Recovery Fund (SRF) to ensure that the CSAC project can complement and inform the SRF funding priorities in other States. Where necessary, use a proportion of SRF funds to support CSAC planning and programming at County level in target States. The SRF and donors should plan and resource a CSAC intervention in Lakes alongside the forthcoming SRF planning processes, or encourage the GoSS to focus next on Eastern Equitoria.
4. Produce practical/accessible tools for the assessment and consultation process and encourage other actors to apply the community security approach in other States.
5. Plan regular subsequent reviews to ensure that the programme stays on track and adjusts with the political environment in Southern Sudan where appropriate.

**Annex 1: Terms of reference**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

**REVIEW OF COMMUNITY SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL (CSAC) PROGRAMME IN SOUTHERN SUDAN**

**Background**

1.1 The CSAC programme was launched in April 2008 through an initial one year pilot focused on the state of Jonglei. The programme aimed to improve security at a community level through an integrated approach that brought together inter dependent interventions involving recovery, development, security and the rule of law support with the aim, over time, of also promoting progress on arms control issues. This was designed to be a catalytic programme in that it would also influence a broader range of UNDP, UNMIS and other agency programmes and engagements around a coordinated and complimentary agenda. The pilot in Jonglei was developed in order to address immediate challenges and concerns relating to conflict and insecurity in the state whilst also seeking to demonstrate impact, identify lessons and good practice to inform a future roll out of the programme and approach into other key states in southern Sudan. The threat of GOSS resorting to a forcible disarmament campaign in Jonglei to address the increasing levels of tribal violence underlined the urgency and importance of the programme in seeking to identify alternative peaceful approaches towards improving security through progress through arms control towards a conducive environment for voluntary disarmament. Previous GOSS attempts at forcible disarmament in Jonglei, implemented by the SPLA, led to high levels of violence, injuries and deaths and proved unsustainable and only exacerbated conflict dynamics.

In parallel, the CSAC pilot programme also focused on building the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) to take an effective leadership role in developing effective policies in relation to community security and arms control and in taking a greater leadership role in coordinating the implementation of programmes towards this objective. The newly created CSAC Bureau provided a partner within GOSS[[3]](#footnote-3) in taking forward this agenda and the programme focused on working with the Bureau in support of capacity development. The engagement of the Vice President of Southern Sudan also provided the programme and CSAC agenda with an influential supporter and advocate within the GOSS. The need to link work on CSAC with broader peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts was also clearly identified and work was undertaken to build a coordinate approach with influential NGOS’s working on these issues – primarily PACT and Saferworld – and with relevant GOSS institutions e.g. Southern Sudan Peace Commission.

1.2 The **goal** of the CSAC pilot programme is to protect the rights and lives of southern Sudanese citizens in Jonglei state during what is a fragile state-building process. The **purpose** is to reduce the vulnerability of communities in Jonglei to localised conflict and instability through the delivery of improved community security, a voluntary approach to arms control and foundational recovery efforts. Two key **outcomes** within the programme were each supported by four **outputs** as follows:

1. Enhanced community security reflects community needs and is supported by the delivery of material benefits that combined reduce conflict and support poverty reduction. Specific outputs include:

* Public Information campaigns
* Community security, recovery and development plans which reflect local needs and demands
* Delivery of development support linked to arms control activities
* More effective presence of UNMIS

1. Effective governmental institutions that meet community security needs and deliver improved security, stability and access to justice, particularly to the poor, in a sustainable manner. Specific outputs include:

* Improved police service capacity
* Development of regulatory framework and legislation on small arms and light weapons (SALW)
* Establishment of security buffer zones
* Enhanced access to justice

**Progress to date**

1.3 The CSAC programme pilot has suffered delays in terms of delivery of the programme for a number of reasons including insecurity in Jonglei, staffing issues, and GOSS programme approval delays. However, the programme has almost completed local level consultations in the eleven counties of Jonglei; identified quick impact projects that respond to community priorities; provided material support to state level police service and rule of law institutions; and provided capacity building support to the CSAC Bureau and, more recently, to the Southern Sudan Peace Commission.

1.4 The pilot programme was initially due to complete in mid 2009 and received funding from DFID, Norway and UNDP BCPR. Funding from the Netherlands, through the Strategic Partnership mechanism, has enabled the CSAC programme to broaden its engagement and provide capacity building support to the Southern Sudan Peace Commission. The CSAC programme is now planning to broaden its activities into two additional states and is seeking additional funding from a broader donor base for this purpose.

**Objective**

3.1 A review of the CSAC pilot programme is required to:

1. Determine the degree to which the project has delivered on its goal, purpose and outputs as set out in the log frame – with a specific focus on the key indicators identified for the assessment and evaluation of the pilot. This assessment should include an appraisal of the projects approach to risk identification and management. The DFID annual review template should also be completed.
2. Assess lessons learned in terms of good practice, including an assessment of the programme management, methodology, approach and processes for supporting and delivering against community security and arms control objectives.
3. Determine the degree to which the outputs have delivered outcomes in terms of sustainable improvements.
4. Comment on any issues around relationships with government (particularly with key programme partners), state and local authorities.
5. Assess the extent to which the programme played a catalytic role in encouraging coordinated and complimentary interventions by a range of UN and NGO partners (particularly Saferworld and PACT) in promoting community security in Jonglei and capacity development and advocacy at the Juba level.
6. The review should be forward leaning and make recommendations for future approaches to supporting community security and arms control in southern Sudan as a key pillar of a peace-building and recovery effort. The specific issues and questions related to future approaches can be found at annex A.
7. Provide any recommendations as identified to inform the completion of the pilot programme and to improve the approach and promote sustainability moving forward.

**Methodology**

4.1 This assessment will be carried out jointly by DFID and UNDP BCPR by:

* Conducting a literature review of reports (see Annex B for details).
* Conducting interviews with range of stakeholders (including beneficiaries)
* Time should be split between Juba and Bor and include at least one visit to location where local level consultation have taken place and where material support has been provided through the programme (ideally where the process is well advanced). A DFID staff member will participate in the visit.

**Skills Required**

* 1. The consultant(s) should have the following skills and experience:
  + experience in project evaluation
  + experience in conflict programming – particularly in relation to social cohesion, community security and arms control
  + understanding of aid environment in a post-conflict country and the range of actors / capacities.
  + Understanding of recovery and development coordination issues

**Outputs**

* 1. The following outputs are required:

1. Debrief meeting of preliminary findings with DFID and UNDP in Juba and make presentation to project board.

2. Completed Annual Review template according to DFID procedures.

3. A report of no longer than 20 pages, including an executive summary, which

responds to the issues set out above and the questions and issues in Annex A (attached).

**Duration and Timing**

7.1 The consultancy is expected to take up no more than 20 working days (including 10 full working days in country). The draft report is expected to be submitted to DFID and UNDP BCPR within two weeks of the completion of the interviews and site visits. It will be reviewed and comments provided by DFID and UNDP BCPR within two weeks of its receipt. Report should be finalised within two weeks of receipt of comments. It is expected that the final report will be submitted no later than end of November 2009.

**Reporting**

8.1 The consultant will report to Graham Thompson (Peace and Security Adviser) and Julie Hunter (Deputy Programme Manager) in DFID Sudan and to in UNDP BCPR and in UNDP Southern Sudan.

**Travel and Logistics**

9.1 The consultant will be responsible for making his or her own travel arrangements and covering other logistical matters, but some assistance and advice in Juba will be provided by DFID Sudan. UNDP will assist with any visits beyond Juba. DFID will provide support regarding a visa for Sudan.

**ANNEX OF KEY DOCUMENTS**

CSAC Project Document

CSAC Logframe

CSAC Progress Reports

CSAC Project Board Minutes

CSAC community consultations methodology and reports

IMAC Minutes

**CSAC Review**

**Annex 2: List of interviewees**

**UNDP**

Claudio Caldarone UNDP Country Director

George Conway Deputy Head of Office UNDP Southern Sudan

David Saunders CPR Team Leader

David Lochhead Acting Project Manager (Field Coordinator), CSAC

Richard Philbin Rule of Law Coordinator CSAC Project

Philip Okin Technical Adviser, Peace Commission Officer

Neda Mansouri Technical Adviser, CSAC Bureau

Becca Pankhurst DDR Programme Officer

Ganiyu Ipaye Rule of Law Team

Martin Sagal Planning Specialist, UNDP – Jonglei State

Mohamud Adan Rule of Law Officer, UNDP - Jonglei State

Emmanuel Oliver Field Programming Officer CSAC

**UNCT**

Lise Grande Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (Southern Sudan)

**UNMIS**

Patrick Carey Deputy DDOA

Fatima Persson Chief of Judicial Affairs

Waldemar Vrey Head of DDR

Ralph Mamiya UNPOL

Ilker Ayhan UNPOL

Malick Ceesay UN Civil Affairs, Bor

Drian Tomko UN Civil Affairs, Bor

Nelson Ramsden UN Civil Affairs, Bor

Jane Otuko UN Civil Affairs, Bor

Jean Kamano UNMO, Bor

**Donors**

Emily Alexander Policy Officer Governance and Rule of Law Joint Donor Office Juba

Graham Thompson Conflict Adviser DFiD

Jo Raisin Recovery Adviser DFiD

**South Sudan Peace Commission**

Peter Gwang Akich Deputy Chairperson Peace Commission

**Ministry of Interior**

Lt. General Peter Wal Under Secretary Minister for the Interior

**CSAC Bureau**

Chuol Gew, Deputy Director

Aguti Adut Aguti Jonglei CSAC Representative

**Bor**

H.E Eng. Kuol Kuol Manyang Juuk Governor

H. E Hussein Mar Nyuot Deputy Governor

Police Commissioner

Peace Commission

Infrastructure Ministry Director

UNOPs

**Akobo**

Akobo County Commissioner

Participants of the Akobo CSAC Workshop

**NGOs**

William Paterson Team Leader Sudan Saferworld

1. Human Rights Watch, (2009) “No one to intervene, Gaps in Civilian Protection in Southern Sudan.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The CSAC Bureau was initially established within the Office of the Presidency but during the period of the CSAC programme was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)