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**Final Evaluation of Timor Leste Rural
Development Programme (TL RDP)
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Members of SCANAGRI DENMARK CONSORTIUM



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Abbreviations and Glossary

ACS	Assistance to Community Stabilisation in Timor-Leste Project
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AMCAP	Ainaro and Manatuto Community Activation Project
AIM	Programme for Access Improvements to Markets in the Eastern Region
Aldeia	Sub-village (hamlet)
AMFITIL	Association of Micro Finance Institutions in Timor-Leste
ARP III	Third Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme
ARP II	Second Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme
ARP I	First Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme
ASC	Agricultural Services Centre
CAF	Community Activation Facilitator
CAPWIP	Centre for Asia-Pacific Women in Politics
CBO	Community-based organisation
CDF	Community Development Fund
CEDAW	Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEP	Community Empowerment Project
CFET	Consolidated Fund for East Timor
CNIC	Centro Nacional Investigaco Cientifica
CSO	Civil society organisation
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DAC	District Agriculture Coordinator
DAO	District Agriculture Officer
DEC	District Employment Centre
DESD	Division of Employment and Skills Development (succeeded by SEFOPE)
DIO	District Irrigation Officer
DIT	Dili Institute of Technology
DNAT	National Directorate for Territorial Administration
DoRB&FC	Directorate of Roads, Bridges and Flood Control
EC	European Commission
ERR	Economic rate of return
ETIF	East Timor Implementation Fund (UNOPS)
EVTF	Employment and Vocational Training Fund
FEFOP	Fundo de Emprego e Formaçaõ Profissional
GDP	Gross domestic product
GoTL	Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
Ha	Hectares
HR	Human Resources
ICT	Information and communication technology
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INAP	National Institute of Public Administration
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IT	Information technology
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDP	Local Development Programme
LMI	Labour market information
M&E	Monitoring & evaluation
MoTC	Ministry of Transport and Communications
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MFI	Micro-finance institution
MoDE	Ministry of Development and Environment
MAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ¹
MAP	Ministerio de Agricultura y Pescalas
MLCR	Ministry Labour and Community Reinsertion
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MSA	Ministry of State Administration
ND-ACD	National Directorate for Agricultural Community Development
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRM	Natural resource management
O&M	Operations & maintenance
OCAP	Oecussie Ambeno Community Activation Project
OPE	Office for Promotion of Equality of the Prime Minister's Office
PERWL	Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building in East Timor
PIU	Programme Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PVS	Participatory varietal screening
PWC	Project Working Committee
RCDRA	Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas
REDE Feto	Timor-Leste Women's Network
SALT	Sloping agriculture land technologies
SDO	Sub-district Development Officers
SEFOPE	Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment (successor to DESD)
SEP	Small Enterprises Development Project
SEPI	Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality
SHG	Self-Help Group
SIP	Sector Investment Plan
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
STAGE	Skills Training for Gainful Employment Programme
Suco	Village
TFET	Trust Fund for East Timor
TIDS	Timor Institute of Development Studies
TLPC	Transformative leadership, politics and communities (methodological training approach based on experiential learning)
TNA	Training needs assessment
TOR	Terms of reference
TOT	Training of trainers
Trusses	Support or strengthening for a bridge with a network of beam and bars
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
VLW	Village Livestock Worker
Watsan	Water and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WUA	Water Users' Association

¹ At the start of the project, Forestry was included, but it separated in a reorganisation during implementation. To avoid confusion, this evaluation refers to MAF throughout, but many earlier documents refer to MAFF.

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1 Executive Summary

2 Introduction

2.1 The Timor Leste Rural Development Programme (2003)

2.1.1 The National Development Plan

Upon gaining independence in May 2002, East Timor adopted the National Development Plan (NDP) espousing its poverty reduction strategy, the main elements of which comprise (Section 4.7):

- a) Create an enabling environment to generate opportunities for the economic participation of the poor, improving their productivity and enhancing their incomes;
- b) Provide and/or encourage and help others to provide basic social services to the poor on affordable terms;
- c) Provide or help to provide security of person and property, and protection from unforeseen shocks and disasters (vulnerability), including food security at both the household and national levels; and
- d) Empower the poor and other vulnerable groups through popular participation in deciding upon and managing development in their aldeias, sucos, postos, districts and the country.

In its chapter on agriculture, the NDP discussed a number of constraints, including (section 12.16):

Capacity

MAF currently faces a lack of institutional and personnel capacity to undertake the wide range of tasks with which they are confronted, including the implementation, management and monitoring of donor-funded activities. The planned increase in staff numbers in 2002/03, along with capacity building for staff will address these issues to a partial extent.

Management and Entrepreneurial Skills

Farmers and fishers in East Timor are typified by low levels of management skills and entrepreneurial ability. This is a capacity constraint in the private sector component of the sector.

Poor Transport, Communication, Marketing and Processing Infrastructure

Many sucos and aldeias cannot be reached by vehicles, and the majority have little or no communication facilities other than transistor radio. This imposes constraints both on development programs and extension activities, while also hindering the marketing of produce by isolated communities. Furthermore, value-adding is constrained by a lack of processing facilities.

State of Irrigation Schemes

Irrigation schemes were extensively damaged in 1999, although many were already in a poor state, due to lack of maintenance and weak structure. Water shortages and poor management are typical and, amongst other things, result in irrigated rice normally grown only as one crop per year.

2.1.2 Development of the Programme

The first EC Country Strategy Paper (2002 - 2006) identified rural development as one of two focal sectors and the EC allocated €25.5 million in 2003 to support the Government of Timor

Leste (GoTL) in attaining its objectives of poverty reduction and promotion of economic growth. At that time the EC was represented by a small office in Dili and a major concern was to minimise the management requirement (both Finance & Contracts and Task Management) which would need to be provided remotely from the responsible Delegation in Jakarta. Multilateral co-financing agreements were therefore explored with agencies that already had a presence in Timor Leste and proven capacity in the rural development sector. An appraisal mission considered a number of proposals and selected the projects and management agencies shown in Table 1.

Table 1: RDP Components and Funding as Committed in 2003/4

Management Agency	Component (Implementing Agency)	EC Budget €	Other funds ² € [%of total budget]
UNDP (RCDRA) [58.35%]	1) AIM (UNOPS) Access Improvements to Markets in the Eastern Region	6,592,110	Nil [25.88%]
	2) OCAP (UNOPS) Oecussi Ambeno Community Activation Project	3,062,089	297,168 [12.01%]
	3) PERWL (UNIFEM) Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building in Timor-Leste	575,000	50,000 [2.25%]
	4) STAGE (ILO) Skills Training for Gainful Employment	4,650,994	436,000 [18.24%]
IOM	5) ACS (IOM) Assistance to Community Stabilisation in Timor-Leste	2,715,502	389,732 [10.65%]
World Bank	6) ARP III (MAF³) Third Agriculture Rehabilitation Project	6,854,530	(TFET) \$3,000,119 (CFET) \$1,537,200 [26.88%]
Monitoring, evaluation and audit ⁴		700,000	Nil [2.75%]
Contingency		349,775	Nil [1.37%]
Total Budget		25,500,000	N/A

These components covered the identified PRSP elements and constraints quite comprehensively:

² During the course of implementation some additional funds were contributed from other sources, for example the GoTL agreed to contribute \$700,000 as a contingency towards the AIM bridge construction.

³ At the time, MAF (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) was designated MAFF (including Forestry). This changed during the implementation period and to avoid confusion the Ministry is referred to as MAF throughout this report.

⁴ The € 700,000 monitoring and evaluation budget was to be committed within the first year, but due to miscommunication the EC Delegation omitted to do so with the consequent permanent loss of this funding.

AIM's objectives were to facilitate access to markets for farmers in Viqueque and Lautem districts by constructing bridges, and to increase capacity in the Department of Roads, Bridges and Flood Control.

OCAP was designed to empower communities to lead the development process, and thereby improve their livelihoods opportunities through community infrastructural investments as well as identification and participation in agriculture and other economic and entrepreneurial activities.

PERWL was directly concerned with empowering women to participate in local government and thereby increase their role in managing local development.

STAGE was designed to enhance national capacity to develop and implement a sustainable and effective system of skill and enterprise training.

ACS objective was to improve rural community empowerment and livelihoods through community-based infrastructure rehabilitation and development (irrigation schemes, water supply, markets etc) in three districts. (ACS was a short duration programme which was evaluated earlier and is not included in the current evaluation)

ARP III represented a transition from earlier TFET (WB managed multi-donor trust fund) support which emphasised rehabilitation towards a development approach, with an emphasis on capacity building. It had a number of sub-components dealing with irrigation and community roads rehabilitation, provision of services to farmers, policy and management support and (without EC funding, and hence not included in this evaluation) upland farming.

It is important to realise that each component was designed and presented as a freestanding project and that even though AIM, OCAP, PERWL and STAGE were consolidated for administrative purposes into RCDRA (Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas) there was no intention that either RCDRA or the overall programme would be an *integrated* rural development programme. It is more accurately to be regarded as a package of projects addressing the poverty reduction strategy in rural areas.

The Financing Decision was approved in December 2003, with special conditions that *'AIM will require an initial economic and financial assessment, in addition to engineering surveys, before the infrastructure works can begin. Land ownership needs to be verified in advance. Caraulun Irrigation Scheme (ARP III, Component II, Subcomponent 2) will only begin when a detailed topographic survey of the area is completed and the Water Users Associations (WUA) formed and developed'*. The necessary agreements with managing agencies (Contribution Agreement 2004/082-039 with UNDP and Administration Agreement 2004/082-219 with the World Bank) were signed in May and June 2004 respectively.

The implementation period, as well as the years immediately preceding it, suffered periodic turbulence and upheaval as Timor Leste addressed the challenges of independence. Inevitably there were disruptions and these affected most of the components to some extent.

2.2 The Final Evaluation

The Final Evaluation took place between 15th July and 14th August 2009, with all activities including submission of the draft report taking place in that period. The Terms of Reference, team details, itinerary, list of persons met and list of documents consulted are presented in Annexes 1 – 5. Logframe matrices are collated in Annex 6, maps of the project area in annex 7 and the DAC Evaluation Report Summary is included as Annex 8.

Following a briefing in the Dili Delegation on 15th July, several days were allocated for document review and preparation of Evaluation Questions. Introductory meetings with MAF and UNDP were held on 17th July. An Inception Note was delivered on 20 July. This note took cognisance of the aforementioned fact that the RDP was a package of individual projects and suggested that the evaluation, and reporting, should be approached as such. It was thus agreed that Chapter 3 of this report would deviate from the TOR, in that instead of discussing each criterion⁵ in turn (implicitly dealing with each project and then moving on to the next criterion), the

⁵ The DAC evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability, plus the EC criteria of Coherence, MS Added Value. In fact, to avoid excessive repetition, the last two criteria have been reported holistically.

Chapter should discuss each project in turn, by criterion. Then Chapter 5 would be used to provide an overview, also in terms of the criteria.

Thereafter fieldwork commenced, but literature review carried on, as a large amount of basic and essential documentation continued to arrive throughout the visit, including during the debriefings. Individual evaluation team members were assigned the lead for different components according to their backgrounds, but in most cases (STAGE and PERWL excepted) several members participated in evaluating each component.

The fieldwork was arranged in collaboration with former stakeholders of the various components, and with assistance from UNDP for Oecusse logistics. The objective was to obtain answers to the Evaluation Questions and hence develop an informed opinion as to each component's status in relation to the evaluation criteria. Methods used to obtain the information varied according to component, but included discussions with former management and review of project files, visits to sites of activities and discussions with local stakeholders, including members of local organisations (self help groups, water user associations etc) and other beneficiaries, plus with local and district government officials, and with other stakeholders such as NGOs, CSOs and people involved in other projects in the locality. The field visits were then followed up by further meetings with representatives of the former management to clarify any misunderstandings and probe more deeply about any pertinent issues.

Finally, a series of debriefing meetings was held for each component. In the case of the RCDRA projects, these were attended by the former PSC chairman, former national project managers (if available) and representatives of UNDP and implementing agencies; there was also an overall RCDRA debriefing for UNDP. For ARP III there was a debriefing with MAF senior officials and also for WB. Debriefings were given in the Dili Delegation for the EC and other donors, and the Team Leader visited the EC Delegation in Jakarta to debrief on 18th August.

2.2.1 Limitations of the evaluation

The TOR call for information about limitations or weaknesses of the evaluation. The Final Evaluation Team feels that it has been able to perform a competent and professional service, but feels that there are some lessons that could be learnt to facilitate future missions contracted for similar purposes.

The first is that it might have been more efficient to provide a period of document study before mobilisation, rather than in-country - at least for the team leader and preferably for the entire team. This would have allowed a better opportunity to consider team deployment, and also to communicate with the stakeholders in advance, facilitating briefing and logistical arrangements. As it was, the first three days of the mission were spent in basic pre-preparation activities.

A second lesson could be that the team composition specified in the Terms of Reference for such assignments needs either to allow more flexibility or, if constrained by the framework mechanism, to be more accurately specified in terms of expertise requested and time allocated. There was little call for a rural business development expert, and it could be argued, given the desire to concentrate on benefits (effectiveness and impact) rather than on achievement of targets, that the full-time presence of a rural infrastructure specialist was excessive. On the other hand, the team lacked expertise in community development, and found it difficult to deploy the environmental specialist effectively given his brief input.

Finally the requirement to deliver the draft report before the team departs country raises a number of issues. The draft report is the document that gets read and remembered. It is circulated to stakeholders for comment and they scrutinise it carefully. This was apparent on this assignment: people talked about the MTE, but were actually referring to the draft report, not to the final which was a very different document. Clearly there is a need for proper editing and integration, not merely compiling, of the various team members' contributions, but that is not possible when the contributions arrive on the delivery date! In fact because it is a significant deliverable, Framework Consortia are entitled to require time to undertake quality control, and then to deliver the report themselves, which is not possible in the timeframe.

3. Answers to Evaluation Questions

During the desk study phase, a number of Evaluation Questions were developed to guide the subsequent fieldwork for each component. These are complex questions aimed at constructively probing for information sufficient to form a judgement about the five DAC Evaluation Criteria. The draft questions were submitted to the Delegations as they were produced, and in some cases were modified to ensure that they remained relevant as the team's understanding of the issues developed. The questions, with their answers, are presented below for each project in turn. Findings concerning the two additional EC criteria are provided at the end of this section to avoid repetition between components.

3.1 ARP III (Third Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme)

Duration: June 2004 – December 2008
Total Budget: € 9,854,530
Contributors: EC (€6,854,530), WB -TFET (\$3,000,000 @ €1=\$1)

The Overall Objective of ARP III was directed at MAFF, to attain food security and improve self-sufficiency; and to generate rural employment and increase income, through farming systems diversification and agro-industrial development.

To do this, the Project Purpose was to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries [now MAF] and its development partners to assist rural communities in increasing their production and income in a sustainable way.

The ARP III comprised 4 sub-components. Sub-component 1 (Upland Agriculture) was not financed by the EC and was excluded from this evaluation. Sub-component 2 is concerned with infrastructure rehabilitation (irrigation schemes and farm-to-market roads), while Sub-component 3 covers Services to Farmers – incorporating information, animal health and agribusiness. Sub-component 4, Programme Management covered policy development and capacity building. The latter is considered of fundamental importance to achieving the Purpose and therefore has been prioritised hereunder in Section 3.1.1.

3.1.1 Capacity Strengthening

Problems and Needs (Relevance)

1. Is the intervention logic sound for MAF at this point in its development (2004 and 2009) with particular reference to moving its approach from rehabilitation towards development?

The needs of rural farmers in particular and the broader TL population to address food insecurity and poverty are well documented. MAF is clearly legally mandated to directly action GoTL policies, priorities and strategies to improve these conditions. The challenges to MAF in trying to meet its mandate are significant and are recognised needs by both GoTL and international donors.

The project built directly upon ARPI and ARP II, whose prime focus was rebuilding basic assets (largely infrastructure). It was recognised that MAF would soon need to move from running rehabilitation works to actioning long-term development strategies. As such it was judged to be weak in its ability to do this. ARP III aimed to build MAF's capacity in readiness to take up agricultural development subsequent to rehabilitation. Integral to this aim was to build MAF capacity to manage agricultural development projects. This is judged a valid and relevant project intervention.

2. Do activities and measurements of progress reflect capacity building as the prime focus with realistic indicators and targets for the timeframe and the external environment - post conflict situation and political changes?

The ARP III project design deliberately focused on selected MAF priority areas. It aimed to bring proven procedures from previous project work into the core functioning of the ministry, including budget support – i.e. institutionalise the function; increase internal project management capabilities (therefore no PMU) including financial control; upgrade or establish equipment support and increase technical skills. Additionally it aimed to strengthen functions such as planning and M&E in support of long-term benefits and impact.

The project design was weak in its intervention logic because it did not provide a direct causal link between activities and the PP of MAF capacity building.

1) There is no overall context within which to place the delivery of capacity building activities. No reference is made to any strategy or plan inside or outside of MAF. There is no needs assessment (although an HR assessment was done at GoTL level) or baseline study from which to measure changes.

2) Capacity building in the design was made a sub-set, not the guiding principle, of defined planned activities for the three sub-components⁶ – irrigation, service to farmers, programme management. Capacity building activities were therefore indicated in general terms and for the most part comprised only training (formal and on-the-job training of staff and some local partner groups using workshops, seminars, study tours) and provision of equipment. This does not adequately support the PP, however, which places prime emphasis upon capacity building. MAF also placed its emphasis on the learning experience of ARPIII.

3) The un-stated assumption is that capacity building is for technical skills only and not how to make them effective in MAF. The training activities emphasise information, education and technical skills. They do not address the process issues such as cross directorate collaboration or how to engage farming communities. There is no provision for introducing changes in behaviour and thinking, and no provision for ensuring that skills or new thinking can be used, particularly pertaining to M&E. This is fundamental in shifting from activity focused hard outputs (as with the rehabilitation work) to services seeking effectiveness and impact with indicators defining quality/value.

4) The various delivery methods for skills upgrading were not integrated – advisors, training (long, short, in/out of country), study tours, on-the-job experience – in order to gain collective added value. No action was defined for sharing of knowledge and learning with colleagues or events to enhance the collective investment in capacity building activities.

5) The targets and timeframe were not set realistically for what MAF could achieve while it was learning. Supporting MAF to work better and more independently does not initially equate to efficient and timely performance. This was a project with standard contract limitations – i.e. specific targeted outputs against a schedule and budget. Project output targets shifted emphasis from learning to activities, outputs and performance.

Indicators were defined as performance targets for individual services. They are based on effectively running the specific institutionalised services during the project implementation period. These are insufficient for indicating increments of improvement and there was no baseline using any measure by which to mark change. Consequently, when the targets were not met there were no measures to claim any capacity building was achieved.

6) Technical design for components and sub-components emphasised delivery of services, not planning and refining actions for effectiveness of those services. They were also narrowly assigned to single directorates rather than fostering cross-directorate collaboration or joint implementation.

⁶ A fourth ARP III sub-component of Upland Agriculture was not funded by the EC contribution and does not appear in the logframe included in the Administration Agreement.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness)

1. Are the priority services institutionally secure and functioning? Can managers see any change pre- and post-ARP III? Is there an appropriate mechanism to move individual learning into the organisation?

ARP III has assisted MAF in building capacity through increased technical skills, established systems and procedures, equipment support to those systems and organisational changes and budgetary support. This has been achieved in these priority service areas to varying degrees. ARP III has not succeeded in supporting the achievement of *effective functioning* of those services. Achievements range from adequate to poor. Capacity has been improved for individual skills. Systems and procedures are defined and organisational changes made. Because these elements have not been integrated (as in inter-related to each other) nor process skills added to ensure they function as intended, ARP III was unable to reach the majority of defined project targets (OVIs at PP level) and / or document them with hard data.

The broader environment of ARP III was not stable enough to nurture change actions. There were 2 changes of office premises and 3 restructurings and expansions of MAF in a 4 year period, as well as disruptions over a 12 month period due to civil unrest and political change.

ARP III achieved improved skills in planning, finance and procurement with some improvement of general project management skills at senior MAF level but less management improvement in the directorates. M&E remains weak with no improvement due to absence of the section head and the lack of ARP III activities to support directorates to take up their own M&E. It is regarded as an exercise in reporting and data gathering to be done by the planning department. There were no targeted activities to understand the use of M&E for improving effectiveness.

Without reference to an integrated strategy guiding the training / education / on-the-job learning, the benefits remain isolated. An HR needs analysis was done some years ago (not found in archives) for the GoTL ministry at the time responsible for overall government capacity building. No reference was found to this or to a specific MAF HR strategy in ARP III documentation. Consequently ARP III training has no referential context. There were few mechanisms for moving individuals' learning into MAF for institutional learning and development. The improvements in capacity building, therefore, lie largely with the individual's professional skill with no collective enhancement.

2. Have the types of capacity building actions addressed enabling the use of new ideas, increasing effectiveness, working cross-directorate, etc.

Long-term, out of country education for diploma MAs was provided to 6 staff (all permanent senior civil servants). Each signed an agreement whereby they would return to MAF and work for 5 years. There is however, little incentive provided in return. Individuals might return to the same job or to a completely new post not related to either their previous job or the topic of study. One person has been promoted to a higher civil service level. There is no requirement, beyond a report (concerning working status rather than subject of study) and no seminar or workshop to share new knowledge.

In this group, two individuals are demonstrating an effective alternative. Their joint research is being done through MAF, involving other staff, in the field and learning new knowledge and skills (working with experienced farmers growing cashew and using weaver ants to control their associated pests). This work is expected to inform cashew farming as a cash crop plus environmentally sustainable pest control plus extension skills - learning from farmers and doing pilot projects with them.

Short-term staff training included some out-of-country study in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and some local study. Topics ranged through agriculture, environment, administration, accounting, extension and language studies. Some trainees (number is unrecorded) have made presentations to colleagues upon their return. Local (Dili based) study had little incentive as it

was in addition to the regular workload. For example English language training within MAF premises started with 97 students but only 33 took the final test.

Advisors, both long- and short-term, demonstrated a mixed effectiveness. Positive attributes of the advisor approach were that they were integral to MAF; they filled gaps when key senior personal were absent for training; they were judged overall good for on-the-job technical skills transfer. ToR of most senior advisors specifies motivate, train, transfer new skills. Negative attributes are the examples of apparent dependency of some MAF staff, even post project, for instructions to do what should be regular work (ALGIS). Some advisors were also found to respond to ARP III contractual pressures for performance outputs rather than on-the-job training, so they did the work themselves rather than coaching their MAF colleagues. The advisors were not linked as a group to provide any added value across directorates or with MAF trainees. This is another missed opportunity.

Without the benefit of a MAF strategic approach and in the context of the environmental disruptions, changes in thinking / behaviour changes / relationship building were not viable. A change in thinking that seeks to build relationships with district and community level groups such as VLWs, WUAs and other farmer /producer groups, is key to effective work and project outcomes. The project timeframe was too short to achieve this in the context.

ARP III had no pre-planning or strategy for how to institutionalise a procedure / system / service to ensure effectiveness. Opportunities for capacity building were missed. The irrigation project of Caraulun offers one example. Ideally this sub-project would have started with joint planning and strategy making among the relevant directorates to commit to providing the most effective sequence of support to farmers regarding crops, market potential, water management practices, O&M, etc. in conjunction with the larger irrigation system building works. Without this, the building was done out of sequence to farmer support and the subsequent benefit of the system was not maximised in line with the feasibility estimates. There is reported technical learning but an opportunity was missed to learn how to execute an integrated project of this nature, across directorates, to achieve an *effective* outcome and good level of impact and sustainability. Part of the reason for this situation is the pressure to meet ARP III (i.e. contractual) deadlines.

Summary of ARP III Funded Training 2004 - 2008 (May)									
Project Component	Source of Funds	Numbers of Days	No. of Participants			Total Person Days	Category of Participants		
			Men	Women	Total		Government Staff	Partners (Facilitators, VLWs, WUAs)	Beneficiaries
ARP III - TFET									
Upland Farming	ARP III - TFET	24	65	6	71	101	21	50	0
Irrigation & WUA	ARP III - TFET	183	109	0	109	715	109	0	0
Extension & Information	ARP III - TFET	20	2	0	2	20	1	0	0
Livestock Health	ARP III - TFET	66	22	0	511	1,219	0	511	0
Agribusiness	ARP III - TFET	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Project Management	ARP III - TFET	40	0	5	5	200	5	0	0
SUB-TOTAL		353	200	11	700	2,275	137	561	0
Percentage of women- current status (target: 30%)			2%						
ARP III - EC									
Irrigation & WUA	ARP III - EC	122	77	0	77	352	76	35	2,429
Extension & Information	ARP III - EC	580	4	1	34	581	5	0	0
Livestock Health	ARP III - EC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agribusiness	ARP III - EC	54	648	159	807	5,036	54	34	775
Project Management	ARP III - EC	1,748	62	9	71	244	23	18	0
SUB-TOTAL		2,504	791	169	989	6,213	158	87	3,204
Percentage of women- current status (target: 30%)			17%						
TOTAL for ARP III (EC + TFET)		2,857	991	180	1,689	8,488	295	648	3,204
Percentage of women- current status (target: 30%)			11%						
Note: Unfortunately, for many activities, the numbers of males and females are not recorded, so unfortunately, the percentage of participating women is underreported.									

Source: J.C. Steele (ARP III Senior Adviser) ICR May 2008.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency)

Efficiency of the programme will be more appropriately covered in the separate discussions of the sub-components. However it is noted positively that the increased funds due to development of the euro against the dollar (approximately \$1.6m gain) was used largely to support capacity building activities such as the long-term training and technical assistance under sub-component 4 (Programme Management).

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact)

1. Any evidence of how the established systems are to be taken forward – issues of budget, vision, understanding of goals, enabling, cross directorate work.

Project impact is modest. ARP III functioned well as a backstop during this period of civil disturbances, in the absence of key staff on training, during 2 changes of MAF offices and through 3 sets of MAF restructuring and expansion. It did not significantly enhance capacity building for MAF *effectiveness*.

ARP III aimed to firmly root MAF services institutionally in preparation for moving from rehabilitation work to development work. It did not address the need to change the mindset and the working processes necessary for development, particularly integrated development. This capacity deficit remains unaddressed.

The services and systems targeted by this project are fully institutionalised in MAF. Currently they are all supported by CFET budget to varying degrees. The project has increased physical capacity with equipment and / or replaced equipment lost in the civil disturbances. A limited number of MAF staff, largely in Dili, have increased technical skills as demonstrated in certain functions running without the aid of advisors – e.g. principally in administration and animal health. The general opinion of national directorate managers is that staff capacity for technical know-how has improved in relative terms but there remains a significant need for upgrading.

MAF can now demonstrate a critical capacity in its reporting and planning that recognises limitations in achieving effective outcomes through its services and support to the rural population. Some parts of the services involved in ARP III are recognised as non-viable, i.e. VLW for fee based vaccinations delivery, or weak i.e. WUA for O&M in Caraulun. MAF managers express frustration at ineffective interaction with farmers.

2. Has there been any shift away from activities / outputs emphasis towards effectiveness – learning – long-term implications?

MAF staff demonstrate an intellectual appreciation for the need to effectively engage the farmer (communication, information, support, etc.), however there is limited understanding of what this means to MAF's daily work and the evolution of its services. As elaborated earlier, there was a missed opportunity for improving MAF cross-directorate capacity for effectiveness.

The gap between the farmer and the largely top-down approach of MAF and GoTL is emphasised by the lack of active engagement of farmers – for example, to make use of irrigation rehabilitation, of opportunities to set up and run agri-business and of accessing MAF information. One step taken to address this is the significant increase of extension staff and the creation (late in ARP III) of a specific directorate for agricultural community development (ND-ACD), which includes extension outreach. It does not as yet have a policy strategy to guide it. The ND-ACD is clearly highly important and deserves priority status and enabling to work cross-directorate.

Overall the level of current HR capacity remains weak. This was observed by the necessity of advisors to cover in the absence of senior staff on training. It is not valid to expect that change can be achieved in this context. This is evident in the prolonged absence due to ill health of the M&E head. Even with advisor input, M&E could not make significant improvements. The MAF

ICR analysis of lessons learned remains focused primarily on technical skills of the directorates – mathematical, analytical, reporting writing, with only a passing reference to ‘social sciences’ skills by which is meant the skills for interfacing with farmers (participatory work, facilitation, etc.). These are the process skills that enable cross directorate work, that support genuine two-way communication with farmers and which support identification of development opportunities specific to TL rural population.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability)

1. What is the current political reality for the institutional development of MAF – risks / opportunities?

There is full ownership by MAF of all project benefits and full policy and structural support to all the services involved in ARP III.

Staffing practices are not supporting sustainability. Capacity improvement achieved has largely been individuals’ capacity improvement. As long as they remain in MAF, and in appropriate positions, this will contribute, but there is a tendency for people to move to positions that they do not have experience for – agriculture training to finance, as one example. Additionally, the majority of staff are classified as temporary and, with opportunities for employment on projects, there is significant turnover and minimal incentive to remain to build up MAF capacity.

MAF’s financial situation is cautiously optimistic. Over the last four years the CFET budget has been incrementally and significantly increased and now it fully supports the existing MAF structure. Donor funded projects at present are not coordinated. The 2010 budget is currently under discussion and may represent a significant reduction over current levels. Staffing and basic functions are secure but funding under minor capital expenditures, which supports the actioning of programmes, could shrink to the point of severely restricting MAF’s ability to work.

This could prove to be an opportunity to focus on *effective* service provision – cross directorate joint work to maximise budget and achieve greater involvement and buy-in (i.e. ownership) of community partners (i.e. less top-down approach).

There has been frequent MAF reorganisation over the project period, which generates insecurity. In four years there have been 3 restructurings. At ARP III start there were five directorates specific to agriculture. Now there are ten. MAF Director General is now responsible for the work of 12 national directorates in total plus 13 districts. In such an unstable context it is not possible to do genuine and substantial capacity building. If the coming budget shrinks too tightly this might generate yet another reorganisation and then MAF is at risk of losing capacity.

3.1.2 Sub-components

Problems and Needs (Relevance):

1. Was the process of irrigation scheme selection transparent and did it take into account GoTL/MAF development priorities and potential synergies with other components of ARP III or RCDRA? What has happened subsequently to other potential schemes that were not selected? In what way has MAF capacity been strengthened as a result of implementing the irrigation and access roads rehabilitation schemes?

Discussions with MAF staff and advisors indicate that the selection of Caraulun as the major scheme for rehabilitation investment was urged by the World Bank in 2003, following feasibility studies on a number of schemes, and based on projected economic returns. The economic analysis of Caraulun was based on an unrealistic command area of 1050 ha, of which there were land ownership, tenure and scheme development issues for about 400ha; hence a conditionalities about survey and WUA development were specified in the Financing Decision before Caraulun could be funded; although the conditions were to some extent met, they did not

guarantee any development of the additional 400ha and therefore the economic return of the scheme remained in doubt. The project most favoured by MAF at the time was Uatolari, with a potential command area of more than 1000 ha, and an active farming population. Uatolari is situated adjacent to the site of AIM Bridge 1 (Bebui) and its successful rehabilitation may have stimulated market development in the area with clear synergies for the AIM project. It is understood that such benefits were not included in the feasibility study economic analysis (and this is not necessarily surprising as AIM and ARP III were not at that time linked into RDP, and AIM funding was not guaranteed). The MAF is currently undertaking rehabilitation of the Uatolari scheme using its own budget, but it is understood that work is progressing very slowly. It would have been very positive if, once the RDP package components were known, some initiative had been taken to change the selection through a contract amendment.

Informants in Manufahi could not point to any specific benefits to them in terms of capacity for irrigation management and rehabilitation. However the position of "Local Consultant for WUAs" is now incorporated into the Irrigation Section of the local MAF office in Same. In late 2008 Sr Vicente, Chief of the Department for WUAs and other senior staff attended training on WUAs in Bali.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness):

1. What evidence is there that ARP III's strategy of disseminating information (radio programmes, paper materials, videos) has been effective in enabling farmers to increase their production?

There was no clear information dissemination strategy. The information section was strengthened with multimedia production equipment, but it acted as a service department, reactive to requests from the technical directorates for the production of materials. These requests were many and varied, but were not coordinated into a systematic information programme. Around 50 paper-based items were produced between late 2004 and mid-2008. These ranged from stickers and calendars to posters, flip-charts, magazine articles and a series of around 15 booklets, mainly intended for extension workers⁷, students and literate farmers. Topics covered have included forest protection, crop production, pest and weed management, irrigation, disease control, aquaculture among others. The style of information presentation ranged from rather traditional text-based booklets, based on Indonesian information and style, some with poor quality photographs, to more colourful cartoon-based materials suitable for farmer training. The print runs for many of these products have been small, ranging from 60 copies of a pig vaccination flipchart, to 750 or 1,000 copies of some booklets. Posters tended to have higher print runs. The actual diffusion of these materials was the responsibility of the commissioning directorates. We were able to confirm that an irrigated rice production flipchart had reached the District MAF office in Same, whence the District Irrigation Officer had passed them to the WUA at Caraulun. This has very simple text in Tetum and informative coloured cartoons which make it suitable for working in small groups of semi-literate farmers.

Videos were made, but again dissemination remains an issue, since there is no regular way of showing them – the department has two mobile cinema vans which would go from place to place, again at the request of directorates (including district directorates), but the vans were also - and mainly - used for other purposes. Some of the radio programmes appear to have addressed issues of great importance for farmers, such as how to manage maize pests, and have also attempted to influence attitudes to nature conservation (e.g. marine turtles). However there is limited ownership of transistor radios, and indeed limited radio coverage in the mountainous interior of the country, so it is not clear how many people would hear these messages. No impact survey of MAF broadcasts, or any other information dissemination methods, has been conducted.

⁷ Despite the fact that MAF did not have any extension workers until late 2008. These booklets remain as a resource and will be useful for the newly recruited body of extension workers.

2. How has the established network of weather stations under ARP III enabled MAF to generate data which has contributed to raising yields of farmers?

The meteorological network is run by the GIS unit, ALGIS, within the Planning Directorate of MAF. There are 21 installed stations (14 automatic, 7 manual) of which two are non-functional. The Oecusse station has not been installed yet. Several stations were visited and found to be in good condition, with the grass being kept cut as required. Data from the automatic stations is stored on a logger and the stations are visited every 5-6 weeks to download it onto a laptop. At present the downloaded data is passed to the National Meteorological Office and is not used by MAF as there is nobody in ALGIS with the skills to use it (two senior ALGIS staff are currently away on training in Indonesia and New Zealand), or to explain why MAF has a requirement for agromet data. Nevertheless, as long as the data is kept safely, it will be useful once the trained staff return. The risk is that the data will be lost. The ALGIS equipment is old and contaminated with viruses. There is no data archiving protocol to ensure that back-ups are kept. Given the history of ransacking MAF offices, some kind of off-site data storage is essential and should have been a basic part of the training given to technicians when the agro-met stations were provided.

3. How has the rehabilitation of Caraulun delivered benefits for rice farmers in the scheme?

A variety of different figures have been presented to describe the impact of the breakdown of Caraulun after the loss of the weir in December 2001 and the benefits of the rehabilitation carried out in 2005. These are generally expressed in terms of the area available for rice cropping, and the cropping intensity. The initial capacity of the Caraulun scheme (without development of the right bank of the river) was said to be 1,030 ha⁸. The potential cropping system was said to be a complete three-crop sequence: two crops of rice (sown in December and April respectively) and a following crop of maize and legumes in August. As to the actual area under command, MAF reports in recent years to speak of a rice area of around 600 ha with about 160% cropping intensity. Discussions with farmers did reveal that they considered yields to have increased since the rehabilitation, although it was not possible to get a clear indication of the extent of increment. The farmers, however, did not seem interested or motivated to produce large surpluses by intensification. The WUA is not effective in ensuring maintenance of the system. From direct observation, the state of secondary canals in Caraulun becomes increasingly dilapidated further from the inlet. On the most northerly secondary canal (Rai Fusa canal) there is considerable siltation even of lined canals. Much of the secondary and tertiary network of canals is unlined. These are particularly vulnerable to erosion, siltation and collapse. Visible livestock damage to unlined canal banks has caused leakage from the canal and flooding of an area of low-lying bush near the north east edge of the scheme (at Lewai). It is evident that livestock are pastured within the woodland on the range of hills north of the scheme and regularly cross the Rai Fusa canal, causing damage. A lined crossing point would obviate this problem, if it is not possible to reroute livestock trails. The Rai Fusa canal receives at least part, probably most, of its silt load from surface water runoff from the foot slopes of these hills which rise directly from the canal bank, with no intervening bunding.

Many of the minor canals are hidden beneath a jungle of weedy shrubs, principally composed of the invasive exotic Siam weed (*Chromolaena odorata*). MAF has received extensive assistance from Australia in managing this weed and indeed produced a leaflet on the subject under ARP III. This accumulated expertise needs to be addressed to the problem in Caraulun. However the simple act of regularly slashing down, collecting and burning the weeds would make a great difference and could be carried out at minimal cost.

⁸ The Agricultural Rehabilitation Project, East Timor – Heavily Damaged Schemes – ARP III. Rehabilitation of Caraulun Irrigation Scheme. Design Report. Main Report. February 2003. SMEC International Pty Ltd.

4. How has ARP III's irrigation component complied with World Bank safeguard policies and "built environmental expertise within MAF"?

MAF middle level staff were well aware of the potential impacts resulting from the excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides, and of waterlogging and salination. However they had no perception that the World Bank had specifically sought to mainstream environmental safeguards or impose specific conditions in irrigation practice as specified in the project documents.

5. To what extent has crop pest management been made more environmentally benign by the policy work on pesticide management conducted under ARP III and what plans have been formulated to implement the pesticide law?

The Pesticides law is due to be presented to the Council of Ministers in August. The draft Decree Law was formulated in 2006 in English under ARP III and has since been translated into Indonesian in 2007 and into Portuguese in June 2009. Schedule 1 to the draft Law is a list of banned pesticides which includes all those in WHO classes 1a and 1b (Extremely or Highly Hazardous) plus some others with particular toxicity to people. Exclusion of these pesticides also complies with the policy of the World Bank.

It appears that no significant changes have occurred in MAF pesticide management. Discussions with MAF staff and beneficiaries in Oecusse and in Manufahi consistently mentioned the provision by MAF of pesticides for rice production. In Caraulun farmers are encouraged to use cheap older pesticides which have been in use in Timor Leste since Indonesian times. A single herbicide, DMA 6 (2,4-D, dimethylamine salt) is used for weed control in rice fields at Caraulun. The insecticides mentioned were Sevin (Carbaryl), Bassa (BPMC or Fenobucarb) and Dursban (chlorpyrifos). Sevin and Fenobucarb are carbamate insecticides. Fenobucarb is commonly used against leafhoppers, planthoppers, thrips and weevils. These three pesticides are all classified by WHO as moderately hazardous and all are cholinesterase inhibitors. The organophosphate pesticide Dursban is now a controversial choice since restrictions were introduced by the US Environmental Protection Agency on its use as a domestic pesticide, based on incidence of neurological problems in applicators and alleged foetal abnormalities in exposed female subjects.

None of the pesticides discussed above are on the proposed Schedule 1 banned list. Nevertheless, they all represent a hazard for handling and use by farmers in hot climates where protective clothing is scarce and uncomfortable. A further concern in relation to free or subsidised government supply of pesticides for rice production is that farmers are likely to use them on vegetables in their home gardens, with the high risk of dietary exposure to residues, and to sell them on to others at local markets, in which case conditions of usage cannot be easily monitored. There is also a significant risk of poisoning where pesticides are stored within the reach of children.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency):

1. What efforts were made to ensure proper management and maintenance of irrigation systems rehabilitated under ARP III through WUAs and what capacity building and resourcing was given to District Irrigation Officers to support the WUAs in this?

For the management of the rehabilitated Caraulun Irrigation Scheme, a Ministerial Order was signed by the then Minister of Agriculture, Estanislau Aleixo da Silva on 1st August 2005⁹, setting out the legal rights and responsibilities of MAF and the WUA. The Order clearly assigned responsibility for O&M of the headworks and the main canal for 2.3 kilometres from the intake to MAF for a period of 5 years before handing over to the WUA. The WUA was assigned immediate responsibility for the O&M of the entire irrigation network beyond this initial section of main canal.

⁹ Ministerial Order No. 001/2005, 1st August 2005. Water rights, roles and responsibilities for the maintenance, repair and use of the Caraulun Irrigation Scheme.

The Order went on to describe the duties of the farmers, which include excavation of sediment in the canals, grass cutting along canals and drains, repairs to infrastructure, greasing and painting, erosion control, drainage provision and removal of any debris or vegetation in waterways. The WUA was to organise these activities and government formally reserved the right to withdraw its assistance from the scheme in the event that these conditions were not met.

The Permanent Secretary of MAF who was also the Project Manager for ARP III, wrote to the World Bank on 26 July 2005¹⁰, to state compliance with the previously mentioned pre-conditions for the Caraulun scheme. The letter confirmed that the WUA had been set up and a Board of Directors selected. Ten Water User Groups had been identified and committees and gate operators selected. Statutes for the WUA were written and translated from English into Portuguese (and were then in process of translation into Tetum). By-laws were drafted, the WUA was registered with MAF, an O&M manual was written and adopted by MAF. Most importantly a topographic and GPS survey was completed in May 2005 and the land holdings of all farmers were said to have been marked on this map (845 farmers on 667 hectares).

The PS's letter further reported that the Caraulun Irrigation Farmers had signed an agreement to undertake the O&M of the scheme on completion of rehabilitation works, that the Ministerial order had been made, and that two staff of MAF had been assigned to work full time with the consultants and the contractors "for the duration of the rehabilitation of the scheme". What has been difficult to clarify is to what extent the O&M manual was made available and explained to the WUA and the WUGs, and what subsequent capacity building and mentoring they received.

The evaluation team's visit to Caraulun included a discussion with the DIO. He has no office computer, no internet access and no office phone. He has no control over any budget. He is supplied with a motorbike and he fuels this from his own pocket. There are 4 large and 4 medium tractors owned by MAF in Same, which can be made available to carry out cultivation at Caraulun. Of these, one of each class is currently broken. The only other staff member is the WUA Organizer, previously known as the Local Consultant for WUAs. His task is to motivate and train farmers in water user group management and also to advise on maintenance of equipment.

The Caraulun WUA has received 18 hand tractors from MAF which have been distributed to groups, and several were seen working in the fields preparing land for a second rice crop. These were said to be available to all, but one farmer, questioned at random in the fields, said his group does not have access and he uses water buffalo to prepare the field¹¹. Groups have to pay for maintenance of hand tractors and send someone to fetch spare parts from Dili or Atambua (in Indonesia). The WUGs are able to organise payment for this among themselves. Some farmers appear to have planted their second rice crop as much as three weeks ago and others more recently. There is no suggestion that capacity to cultivate, per se, is a serious limitation on rice area for farmers who are active within the scheme, given the availability of both water buffalo and hand tractors.

The evident neglect of secondary and tertiary canals suggest that the WUA and WUGs have never been committed to a self-reliant strategy for maintenance of Caraulun, despite their legal obligations. Discussions indicated that WUA officers need to be mentored more intensively to understand their role and the nature of irrigation scheme management. Local informants agree that the WUA does not currently levy a regular fee from farmers for maintenance. However, when asked about their hopes for the future, the management group responded that they want to reach a point where maintenance is covered by members' fees.

It is clear that there is a critical need for long-term group development work in Caraulun, alongside a competent technical assessment of the current water delivery pattern through the season, the cropping potential within the scheme and the options for maximising functionality at affordable cost. This needs to be accompanied by a social assessment of the scheme including

¹⁰ Letter from Cesar Jose da Cruz to Oliver Braedt, World Bank. No 157/SP/VII/05 of 26 July 2005. Re: Compliance with the Preconditions for the Rehabilitation of Caraulun Scheme. 2 pp.

¹¹ He has 20 water buffalo, 50 cows, 10 pigs and 15 goats.

a census to determine who is actually living and farming within the scheme, their livelihood strategies, and enterprises and the social structures which sustain them.

2. To what extent has development of the vaccine cold chain and the vaccination system using Village Livestock Workers delivered benefits for farmers?

Under ARP III, 56 solar-powered refrigerators were installed in district offices and sub-districts selected sucos in all districts in 2006. By the end of the project, 15 of them had had technical problems which had been repaired locally, and currently all are reported to be working properly. The evaluation team saw several installations in different districts and found them to be working (although in some cases only the solar panel could be seen as the refrigerators were in locked rooms). There are also normal electric refrigerators at MAF HQ. Vaccines are imported and delivered to MAF HQ, then distributed to districts and sub-districts and finally to the VLS by road, in cold boxes. There is a general assumption that the cold chain works – ie that the vaccines are live when imported, and that they are kept cold, and hence live, throughout the distribution and storage process until they are used. There are no quality control checks to ensure this, however. Under ARP III, vaccinations were imported from Malaysia for Newcastle disease in chickens, swine fever of pigs and septicaemia for cattle. After ARP III finished, the government has been able to continue with a septicaemia inoculation campaign, which was in progress during the evaluation, and vaccines for Newcastle disease and swine fever are currently being tendered through an FAO grant. The evaluation team spoke to some of the VLS. During campaigns inoculations are free for farmers, and the VLS are paid between \$0.03 and \$0.15 per injection. No follow-up information is collected after inoculation, so it is not possible to determine whether the success-rate has improved following provision of the cold chain, or whether there have been examples of ineffective inoculations because of break downs in the cold chain.

3. Has the agribusiness sub-component resulted in the establishment of successful small businesses?

The agri-business sub-component had several activities. A number of crop profiles have been prepared and in particular those on mung bean and soybean as second-season crops in irrigated areas have attracted a lot of interest, including from donors such as USAID.

A market survey system established in Dili, Baucau and Maliana collects information on fruits, vegetables and cereals, but analysis and reporting is not yet developed, so at the moment no use is made of the information.

The Agri-business Service Centres (ASC) were set up on a pilot basis in 4 districts, but did not really succeed in promoting trade and only one is still functioning (in Maliana), basically as an input supply centre.

As outputs in the main design of ARP III, four agricultural processing facilities were to be set up, for extraction of coconut and candlenut oil. The evaluation team visited 3 of these units and found that none was working properly. One of them had begun production, but had ceased several months ago because of poor maintenance of the equipment. The other two were located in unsuitable areas – one far from a road, the other up a flight of steps in the centre of Baucau – and had never had their equipment installed, or begun processing. A major cost of all of these was the construction of the buildings, and insufficient attention had been paid to supply and installation of equipment. As such, the buildings could easily be 're-purposed' by local people, resulting in a complete loss in terms of agro-processing.

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact):

Findings for effectiveness have been disappointing and at present there is no expectation of wider impact, other than the potential use of data collected by the agromet stations by the National Meteorological Office.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability):

1. Is the meteorological equipment purchased by ARP III actually in place and working at the chosen sites and is there any plan and budget in MAF for its maintenance? What changes to MAFF or GoTL strategies regarding crop production, climate change, or other issues have resulted from the availability of the agromet data?

Except in Oecusse, the agromet stations are in place and several were seen by the evaluation team. They are protected by high fences with a locked gate, and local caretakers are employed to keep the grass cut low and to report any vandalism or other damage. Similar equipment (manufactured in France) is used throughout Indonesia, and the manufacturer has a maintenance team in Indonesia available to assist in repairing it. The instruction manual is in Bahasa Indonesia and training was provided to the ALGIS staff.

So far the data has not been used at all by MAF, but this is because the data run is short and the responsible officer is away on training. In due course the network should provide useful data which can be compared with historic data from Portuguese and Indonesian times. Discussion with irrigation personnel in Caraulun on their perception of climate stability over the last ten years elicited the view that the "Mountain" Rains used to start in December or January, but now begin in March or April. In April there used to be supplementary rains from the sea which do not come now. The rains still end around July, so the overall rainy season is shorter. Flood episodes in the river are now shorter than formerly, lasting 1-2 days rather than a week, and the flood period starts later (March-April) rather than in January. If the agromet data supports these findings, then clearly some significant revisions in agricultural production strategies, irrigation scheduling etc will be needed.

2. Is there sufficient demand from farmers who are prepared to pay for livestock services to enable the VLWs to remain in business? Is there any indication that the cold-chain is not functioning?

The VLWs are still active and carrying out inoculation campaigns supported by the government. In Caraulun a farmer with a large number of livestock indicated satisfaction with VLW services and no objection to paying for animal treatment when necessary. The VLWs themselves often seem to be farmers who have received training from MAF, and who are willing to undertake the vaccination campaigns for a small additional income, rather than people who were trying to draw a full-time living from provision of para-veterinary services. This is a pragmatic and sustainable strategy.

The cold chain is known to have broken down in December 2008 due to the failure of the MAF HQ generator. Ideally the refrigerators should be provided with a separate emergency back-up facility.

The World Bank ICR for ARP III judged the project to be moderately unsatisfactory. The final evaluation team concurs with this on the grounds that whereas most of the activities have been carried out, they have not resulted in significantly strengthened capacity of MAF, or significantly improved provision of services required by farmers.

3.2 Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas (RCDRA)

As mentioned in the Introduction, the RDP was packaged in order to facilitate the contracting process, with four projects being included in a Contribution Agreement with UNDP under an action named Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas (RCDRA). This had a consolidated objective to pursue overall poverty reduction and empowerment of rural communities in line with the GoTL NDP. Although the CA was signed with UNDP, the four individual projects were managed by different UN agencies as already shown in Table 1. Issues relating to the overall performance and management of the RCDRA are covered in Section 5 (Overall Assessment). Each of the four projects is considered independently in the following sub-sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.4.

3.2.1 AIM (Programme for Access Improvements to Markets in the Eastern Region)

Duration:	May 2004 – Nov 2009 (for impact study)
Budget:	€ 6,590,000
Contributors:	EC (€6,590,000)
Additional Funding:	GoTL \$700,000

AIM was a project designed to replace a sequence of five bridges between Viqueque and Los Palos that had been damaged by floods in order to facilitate market access for the rural communities living in adjacent villages. The project was intended to build the capacity of the Department of Roads, Bridges and Flood Control (DoRB&FC) by implementation through the Department's existing Project Management Unit. The intention was to maximise the use of local labour in the construction process. The implementing organisation was UNOPS.

The project has built the bridges, but did not implement through DoRB&FC, so a major part of its purpose and impact was neither addressed nor achieved. So far, not much evidence of improved market access is visible, but the bridges are expected to last for a long time and there is potential for benefit in the future.

Problems and Needs (Relevance)

1. What are the principle agricultural products whose trade was curtailed by the damage to the bridges on the Viqueque – Los Palos road, or whose potential for production is constrained by the poor communications?

The Impact Study Stage 1 (really a baseline) conducted focus groups and individual stakeholder meetings, but found no indication that production had been more intensive than now before the bridges were damaged, and/or had reverted to subsistence because of inability to access markets. Currently there is subsistence production of maize, rice and cassava, and limited production of copra. Between Viqueque and the first bridge (ie, before reaching the project area) there are some irrigation schemes, and a new large one is under construction at Uatolari. The landscape indicates scope to develop similar schemes inside the project area. If developed, they would produce a surplus for sale and would require inputs like agro-chemicals (but probably not much seed, since open-pollinated varieties are favoured). Viqueque would be the most likely market. Copra production could also be significantly increased, but there are apparently no plans to do so. A Malaysian company did visit the area at the time the project was being developed, but has not returned.

2. Were there any other accessible markets that could have been upgraded (eg Suai?), or alternative transport to the main markets (eg by sea), and were these considered as options at the design stage?

Other markets are not really the issue. The bridges link villages between Viqueque and Los Palos to those two towns, and do not make any difference to access from those towns to Baucau, Manatuto or Dili.

The objective of AIM is framed differently in different sources, including three different statements in the Contribution Agreement (CA) and its Annexes. The logframe gives the purpose of AIM as “Improve access to markets in the eastern region as a means of stimulating socio-economic development in the districts of Viqueque and Lautem” with an indicator that “Households along the Viqueque – Lautem road have better access to market centres in Viqueque, Los Palos, Baucau, Manatuto and Dili.” This is quite an accurate statement, but it has not been used in subsequent reporting. Annex 1 says “It is designed to facilitate the country’s economic and social development through the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the five bridges which hold the key to fulfil the rich agricultural potential of the eastern region of Timor Leste comprising the districts of Lautem and Viqueque.” Whereas these two districts do have significant agricultural potential, it is questionable whether the bridges hold the key to it. Only about 20% of the area of Viqueque district and no more than 5% of Lautem district benefits from the bridges. In terms of population (adapting data from the Impact Study Stage 1, taking account of location of centres of population within sub-districts) the number of households inside the project area is about 5,200, being about 18% of the 28,500 households in the two districts. More than half of these beneficiaries live between Bridges 1 and 2, suggesting that an analysis of the requirement for each bridge at design stage might have been positive for Bebui but might have struggled to justify the others.

The March 2004 ‘Relevance and Synergy’ document appended to CA Annex 1 says that AIM aims at improving access of Viqueque and Lautem districts to markets in Baucau, Manatuto and Dili *by rehabilitating 5 key national and district roads including the construction of 5 major bridges*. In fact AIM had no road rehabilitation component and the bridges do not link either district to Baucau, Manatuto or Dili. The unitalicised part of this statement has been used in project annual reports.

The reality is that the bridge construction facilitates travel between the beneficiary villages and their respective district capitals (Viqueque or Los Palos), from each of which there was already satisfactory communication to Dili via Baucau and Manatuto. Strictly speaking, this obviates the need for the longest and most expensive bridge, Irabere. As such, the parameters of the project are much more local, with Viqueque and Los Palos offering adequate markets. Demand for travel along the whole length of the road – between Viqueque and Los Palos – will probably arise in future but was not a primary objective of the project.

Road travel is the most suitable method, but for most of the year it is possible to ford the rivers, and it would have been interesting to have considered provision of storage facilities, with its implications for community planning, food security and price optimisation, as well as avoiding the need to cross the river when it is in flood, as an alternative to bridge construction.

3. Would rehabilitation / construction of the bridges, without attention to other required upgrading of the roads, be sufficient to stimulate the anticipated increases in agricultural output and trade? What provision was made in the design to stimulate opportunities to undertake the necessary additional upgrades?

The bridges make transport possible throughout the year, unless the road itself becomes impassable. The road is in poor condition and in need of significant upgrading. The design assumed that the road would be upgraded, because that was apparently indicated at the time by the government. Since then priorities have changed and the road has not been included in the forthcoming 10 year Road Network Development Project.

The relevance of the AIM component, according to its own objectives, and to the overall objective of RCDRA and RDP is considered to have been reasonable at the time the decision was taken, but to have reduced subsequently.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness)

1. Has there been an increase in transportation of the products identified above?

There is no baseline information, however the visit to the project area, during which a rudimentary traffic census was conducted, confirmed comments that have been made by most other visitors, that the volume of traffic along the road is negligible. The traffic survey took place on Friday 24 July 2009 on the road between Viqueque and Los Palos commencing at 07.30 and ending at 16.30. On average, the road carried 16 vehicles per hour, most of them motorbikes, though morning traffic volumes towards and near Viqueque were significantly higher, up to 48 vehicles in the hour between 8.30-9.30 am. Our Traffic count results are broadly consistent with those of the Consultant (Cardno Australia) engaged by AusAID to prepare a National Roads Development Plan.

Most of the traffic was seen moving intra-village, and therefore not affected by the bridges. There was noticeably more traffic between Bridges 1 and 2 than at any other point, and all of it was moving towards Viqueque (in the morning). This is not surprising since most of the target population is located between these bridges and Viqueque is their local centre for commerce, administration and other services, and also for employment. It indicates that Bridge 1 (Bebui) is serving a useful purpose. A small number of motorbikes and bicycles were seen moving along the open road between Bridges 2 and 3. Virtually no traffic moved on the Lautem side (between Bridges 3 – 5 and onwards to the village of Iliomar). Bridges 1, 2, 4 and 5 have been open to traffic for 17 months (since March 1, 2008) and it is disappointing that more traffic has not been stimulated. The delay in completion of Bridge 3 (Sept 27, 2008) does not affect the desired stimulus which refers to traffic servicing agricultural production in the project area moving to/from Viqueque in the west and Los Palos in the east, and not traversing the entire length. The field visit did not take place at a critical time for agricultural transportation (planting or harvest), and it is noted that UNOPS intends to undertake Stage 2 of the Impact Assessment later. It would be interesting to do this during a harvest period, so that peak traffic counts can be estimated. Nevertheless, the overriding impression is that there will be no significant agricultural intensification in the project area without additional external intervention.

There is hearsay evidence of a fish trader who has started to use the road to collect fish from coastal settlements, but no information about the frequency of collection or volume / value of trade. It is, however a start. Therefore effectiveness is found to be low with potential to improve in future.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency)

1. To what extent did the fact that UNOPS was managing AIM from Bangkok, as a subcontractor to UNDP in Dili, constrain implementation and the ability to respond to changing local needs and conditions?

The main issue is that UNDP, which is not experienced in implementation of engineering projects, had to undertake a lot of the local managerial responsibilities, such as participation in PSC decision making, on behalf of UNOPS. This probably had the effect of drawing UNDP in too closely to engineering issues, and particularly contractor performance issues, at the expense of maintaining a wider oversight of the entire project. If UNDP had been able to concentrate on the wider project, and had monitored accordingly, it would have immediately noticed the implementation deficiencies regarding capacity building in DoRB&FC.

2. Was technical assistance provided as per the Budget for the Action? If so where are the outputs, especially regarding M&E? Was the TA adequate to i) develop local capacities to define objectives and produce results, and ii) to provide / facilitate technical solutions? Were MTR and ROM recommendations about TA, studies etc acted upon?

The project document refers to provision of staff to be seconded to the Project Management Unit of the DoRB&FC. This was a unit for management of projects in general, not specific to the AIM project. In fact UNOPS recruited all the staff and managed the programme independently. This means that the intended result of the project pertaining to increasing capacity in the

Department was totally neglected and has not succeeded. No monitoring took place apart from regular reporting by the contractor to the consulting engineer and between the consulting engineer and UNOPS, and a large number of PSC meetings, including site visits. Such kind of reporting was related only to progress of the construction contract, and even the PSC (as recorded in the minutes inspected of more than a dozen meetings) only considered the road upgrading issue twice (one time being after the construction was completed) and never considered the capacity building in DoRB&FC, despite being chaired by the Minister, nor any issues relating to preparing the population for the new road – either in terms of gearing up for increased production, or in terms of safety awareness programmes given the anticipated increase in traffic. The only MTR and ROM recommendation taken up was an Impact Assessment study, which involved a belated baseline survey conducted in March 2008 (after 4 of the bridges were completed). A second phase of this study is expected to be done later this year. Ideally it should be done at a harvest time, which would be in 2010, but the funding will expire before that.

3. Were the bridge designs appropriate? Were alternatives considered and did the selected design offer the best value for money? Was the design / selection linked or separated from tendering, and was the opportunity taken to develop local capacity in the design, selection and tendering processes?

The adopted bridge design (steel box trusses) is a very common design in this region of the world. It was initially introduced to Indonesia in the 1970s, where it has been widely used over the last 30 years. In pure cost terms, it may be marginally higher than the only practical alternative (reinforced concrete). However, it is much simpler to build. Even more importantly is its longevity, being especially strong against possible flood and other damage, compared to the bulkier reinforced concrete design. As noted below, maintenance costs are minimal; for these reasons, the final evaluation team believes the design is highly appropriate.

4. What is the strategy for ensuring that problems arising within the guarantee period are identified and reported, and that remedial measures are undertaken?

The 12 month guarantee period expires on 26 September 2009. The resident engineer undertook a site inspection on 18th November 2008 and identified several defects which were shown and communicated to the contractor. Unfortunately these issues were only identified after the evaluation had been completed, so it was not possible to check whether they had been carried out. However, one of the issues was the placement of plaques at each bridge, which has definitely been done, so it seems reasonable to assume that the other tasks have also been completed. A site visit by MoPW, UNOPS and UNDP was conducted in April 2009. They were concerned about deformation of elastomeric bearings on several bridges, but did not follow-up by communicating with the engineers. The evaluation team checked the deformations and contacted the engineers about them. The response was “These mastic materials are designed to take up to 50% deformation without affecting their purpose so if the deformation is minor there should not be any concern.” The deformation is indeed minor.

The contract of the consulting engineering company ended with a letter of handover to UNOPS which was accepted on 27 November 2008, and the company is therefore not planning any further visits to identify more recent defects, nor to prepare the Final Certificate of Fitness at the end of the guarantee period. Such a certificate will be required by the MoPW before it is likely to accept the bridges from UNOPS.

Efficiency is judged to have been poor, based on lack of monitoring to ensure that all intended results were likely to be achieved (e.g. it was never reported that capacity building was not taking place – reports contained platitudes about DoBR&FC being ‘fully involved’, which is ambiguous and misses the point), and because of the uncertainty within UNOPS and UNDP concerning the identification and rectification of defects during the guarantee period and the process of handing over of the bridges to the government.

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact)

1. Has the improved communication led to significant benefits to other sectors in addition to agriculture?

Improved infrastructure is usually associated with multiple benefits beyond the immediate objectives for which it was implemented. In this case there are reports that the bridges have made it easier for children to attend school, and for the sick to get to hospital. The former reports appear true according to the site visit, as there was frequent pedestrian traffic at several of the bridges. It would undoubtedly be impossible for pedestrians to cross the rivers when they are in flood, and this should disrupt the schooling of children who need to cross rivers. It was not possible to get detailed numbers of how many children would be affected, but it is a significant number. In some cases, children had to stay with families close to the school during the rainy season, or, undoubtedly in many cases, simply not attend school for long periods. The claim that the bridges will facilitate access to the hospital in Los Palos is less credible. Whereas no doubt the presence of the bridges makes the journey contemplable, the quality of the road to Los Palos is very poor in stretches and no public transport was seen on any section between Bridge 2 and Bridge 5 or onwards to Iliomar village. No ambulances, and in general very few vehicles other than motorbikes or bicycles were seen. Public transport between Bridges 1 and 2 was plying to Viqueque, not to Los Palos. Indeed most of the traffic seen was between Viqueque and Bridge 2. The Bebuy Bridge has certainly made it much easier for people in Uatolari to reach Viqueque, including to commute to work, as well as to access basic services.

2. Have there been changes in agricultural production (areas, intensity etc)? What effects have these had / are they likely to have on livelihoods of the poorer sections of the community, and on the environment?

There is no baseline data for the specific project area. During the field visit there was no indication that farmers had newly expanded their areas, or introduced intensified production practices. Experience elsewhere in Timor Leste (including in more accessible parts of Lautem district, through the EC NGO Food Security grant project) is that farmers are not pro-active in intensifying production, but require significant nurturing and incentivisation (through provision of inputs and technical / advisory services).

3. Has increased heavy transportation caused any negative effects such as deterioration of the roads?

There is no evidence of increase in heavy transport. The roads are already in poor condition, and very poor in some Lautem sections. Even if there was a significant increase in production, pick-up trucks would probably be the most appropriate type of vehicle to use between production areas and collection centres. If copra production takes off, then heavy vehicles will certainly be used.

4. Did the project successfully build capacity in the Department of Roads, Bridges and Flood Control?

No – see response to Efficiency question 2 above.

5. Are there any negative environmental issues resulting from the increased accessibility of the areas, or from any aspect of the construction? (e.g. charcoal, sandalwood, construction / demolition debris, borrow pits...)

Improved road access has its disadvantages as well as benefits. One of these which is almost endemic in this part of the world is the facilitation of illegal logging. No evidence of any such activity was seen. However, the forested landscape in the project area, especially between bridges 3 and 5 (ie on the Lautem side), contrasted greatly with the landscape closer to Los Palos, where in some areas there were no trees at all. The road leads directly to the National Park. The risk of logging and resulting environmental degradation is a risk that was not included in the logframe and has not been addressed.

There is a considerable amount of construction debris at Iribere which should be removed during the guarantee period.

Although benefits for schoolchildren and for the population of Uatolari are good, overall impact is moderate due firstly to low effectiveness, meaning limited additional income and opportunity for livelihood improvements, and secondly to risk of use of the road for unsustainable logging activities.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability)

1. What are the technical and financial maintenance requirements likely to be? Are there human and financial resources to cover them?

Bridge maintenance may be categorised into three separate activities, as follows:

(i) Emergency maintenance becomes necessary should there be serious damage to the bridges, such as from massive flooding, possibly deck failure, and possibly from structural damage to the bridges from a major vehicle crash on the bridge. Emergency maintenance is extremely rare, and may indeed never happen. Many similar steel truss bridges in Timor Leste built over the last 20-30 years appear to have never had to have emergency maintenance. For this reason, it is effectively impossible to plan for the costs of emergency maintenance.

(ii) Routine maintenance needs to be conducted at least on an annual basis, and it is best done at the end of the rainy season each year. Routine maintenance required for these bridges varies from bridge to bridge. Examples include checking of hand rails for any damage, or possible removal by miscreants; repair of plaques; checking of bridge abutments, and repair of any damage from flooding, which typically will be very minor (if any); and checking of reinforced concrete piers for possible damage, which again is quite unlikely.

(iii) Periodic maintenance refers to maintenance of components which are expected to deteriorate over an extended period of time. In the case of these bridges, there are effectively no components, except possibly the mastic bedding on which the deck beams are founded on the embankments and piers. In the case of the five bridges, these mastic beddings are of a black material, approximately 7 cm thick. These appear to be perfectly adequate as installed. In the case of many similar bridges built in Timor Leste over the last 25 years, the mastic bedding have remained intact, so those in the five new bridges are similarly expected to remain in condition over time.

The cost of maintaining the five new bridges is expected therefore to be very low, and might easily be done most effectively when road maintenance is carried out in the same location. The bridges are found to be sustainable; however the capacity building in the DoRB&FC did not take place and therefore has not produced lasting benefits.

3.2.2 PERWL (Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building in Timor Leste)

Duration: May 2004 – July 2007
Total Budget: € 625,000
Contributors: EC (€575,000), UNDP (€18,750), UNIFEM (€31,250 in kind)
Additional Funding: UNDP (US\$100,000) and UNIFEM (US\$30,000)

PERWL was designed by stakeholders to meet a strategic opportunity – the first suco level elections of 2004/05. Although women's rights are established in TL law they are not yet reflected in socio-cultural norms. The elections formed an opportunity to generate certain catalytic discussions and learning for both women and men in the community.

The project was effective in achieving its targets but with much learning along the way. The impact is modest in degree but is observable in the start of new trends in thinking concerning the role of women in the community. The single most significant output is a well documented, tested, and shared model for supporting rural women's participation in the political process and as effective leaders of community development.

Problems and Needs (Relevance)

1. Can the definition of needs and delivery mechanism of the design be justified?

PERWL was and remains highly relevant to identified needs and is highly appropriate in its methodology. The weakness in project design was the insufficient resource allocation for such an ambitious scope (time, funding, staffing).

PERWL focused on two needs. The first was a very specific need and strategic opportunity – the first local level elections of Timor Leste (2004-2005) and the legally prescribed role of women in those elections. GoTL had already begun to incorporate gender concerns into the constitution with associated laws and regulations. This had developed into the electoral laws specifying that the first local government (rural) suco elections were to select Councils consisting of 1 chief of council, 2 women, 2 youth (1 male and 1 female), 1 elder/local leader (currently expanded into 2 seats) plus 1 representative for each aldeia (subsection of suco) within the area. The need therefore was to engage these communities and promote their involvement including women in this new experience. For candidates and potential leaders, that meant capacity building of individuals and groups at national and local levels to enable informed participation.

In addressing the election issues, TL women's socio-cultural context warranted particular attention. The patriarchal society does not traditionally support women's leadership or even discussion in decision-making inside and outside of the home. The project methodology therefore needed to be sensitive to encouraging women's political participation as a way of exercising their rights while sufficiently addressing the anticipated objections from family and community. The GoTL had a basic awareness campaign to stimulate interest in the elections but for the women themselves a more substantive and sensitive approach was needed to ensure their participation and gain the community's acceptance and, hopefully, their support.

The second need related to GoTL's general need for gender aggregated data and specifically to the signing of the CEDAW. The prime targeted users would be GoTL agencies of all types in support of the required gender mainstreaming cross ministries. The need for baseline data for CEDAW was essential, particularly for relating gender, poverty and rural areas, as this would mark the starting point of the UN assessment of TL's progress in future.

The stated overall objective therefore was: Facilitate women's participation in building a social, political and legal framework for an independent Timor-Leste that is rights-based, socially inclusive and gender responsive. The OVI target (set by project partners) was 30% of suco elected councillors will be female. This target does not adequately indicate the ability of the

elected women to influence a socially inclusive rights-based and gender responsive political process beyond laying claim to their right to participate politically

The project's design and intervention logic was strongly focused and pragmatic. It was informed by UNIFEM's global and, since 2000, Timor Leste specific experience which was very aware of rural women's conditions including illiteracy levels. The initial concept was formed through a consultative process including OPE (now SEPI), INAP, DNAT, TL women's organisations at national level such as REDE Feto (women's network) and the partners that eventually implemented PERWL. This collective experience provided the needs analysis and agreed on the approach to be taken, ensuring relevance, validity and ownership. This collaborative process satisfactorily explains the concerns regarding needs analysis and method selection raised by the EC MTE.

The project initially emphasised getting women to participate - i.e. to exercise their rights - in the very first suco elections. How to get them interested, involved information about TL political systems and laws and rights put into the context of rural women. The training, therefore, was highly gender sensitive and initially excluded men, however, the design was modified in response to demand later in project to include male elected councillors.

2. Was the scope of the project appropriate to the needs-timeframe-budget?

The planned action was very ambitious. Component 1 included identification of potential women candidates during DNAT general election promotion, district based training for those potential candidates, post election training for those elected and women's constituent strengthening. Component 2, the development of training materials specific to TL and the rural target group (with limited literacy) and training of trainers / facilitators was integral to the project. Component 3, a study by TIDS of rural women and poverty comprised of desk study, field survey and 3 case studies aimed to support GoTL and policy decision-makers.

The training was based on TLPC - Transformative Leadership, Politics and Communities, developed (tested and used extensively) by CAPWIP in the Philippines. It aimed at engaging women in politics and developing necessary skills for leadership in the context of local development and sensitivity of the gender implications locally. In addition to the project formulation exercise described above, it should be noted that TLPC is an experiential learning methodology, which uses the trainees' life experience as the reference point for new learning. It is not reliant on literacy levels as the group interaction and discussion is the learning. The concepts are defined in terms of what is relevant to the individual - not right and wrong definitions (e.g. "Transformative leadership for me means change, being able to send my children to school...", suco council youth representative Bobonaro). Based on reviews of the current adaptation of those materials and the participants' and partners' opinions, this evaluation finds that the approach was and is highly appropriate.

The project design's weaknesses were that it did not anticipate either the high demand for its services (both pre and post election by both women and men) or the degree of capacity building required by its implementing partners. This required more coordination, communication, M&E and increased input from UNIFEM itself, which it supplied through additional staffing. This need was confirmed by the UNIFEM MTR mission.

The significant level of demand for this training is clear even today, two years post project. Both women and men recognised the need for pre- and post-election training for increasingly specific and varied skills and knowledge. This resulted in an expansion of project activities to include post-election training for elected women and men of all suco's plus a representative group of non-elected aldeia women for constituent awareness raising. This broadened the project aim and clearly put a strain on resources. A flexible response to provide additional activities was funded by UNDP/UNIFEM within the project context.

The log-frame was revised at start of project with an expanded Project Document (description of action) including justification of methodology and expanded work plan. In this evaluation's judgement it is an elaboration, clarification and updating of the original concept note included in the agreement between EC-UNDP. This revision, reflecting the EC input, and reviewed through

the PSC was accepted (July 2005) and signed by the Prime Minister in December 2005. Log-frame and targets were well formed and used as a management tool. The indicators at OO and PP level are limited and do not fully address how to demonstrate ensuring women's rights.

Relevance was high. The wide ranging consultative process with stakeholders ensured the methodology was refined and the project responded to needs as they were identified.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness):

1. Was project able to meet the OVIs as defined and did the assumption of sufficient interest prove valid?

The project was very effective in reaching and engaging the intended beneficiaries / stakeholders; strengthening an extensive network of local partners; and generating interest in women's electoral participation. The limitation to effectiveness was the timeframe - too brief to allow for further follow-up to consolidate change and learning.

The project has achieved its defined targets and OVIs at project purpose level (a. the first elected suco councils 2004/05 composed of 20% women representatives; and b. in 8 districts 20% of candidates for suco/aldeia chief were women and elected in at least 3 districts.) although these are more targets than indicators of improved rights protection and it must be recognised that this is one step on a very long road. The assumptions of GoTL continuing legal and policy support and rural women being interested have proved correct.

Of 1326 seats reserved for women, 1311 or 99% were filled. This is an excellent achievement for a first ever suco election considering the drive for women's participation is coming initially from the national level and not as yet from rural women campaigning to be included. In Ermera one party actively campaigned against women in politics.

Timorese Women in Numbers				
	Women	Men	Total	% of Women
GoTL Council of Ministers	7	30	37	18.9
Civil Service (all levels)	2,746	8,557	11,298	24.3
National Parliament	24	64	87	26.4
Local Elections 2004/05				
Suco Councils	1,342	3,523	4,865	27.6
Chefe Suco	7(8)	435	442	1.6
Chefe Aldeia	22	2,206	2,228	0.9
Elder	2	440	442	0.4
Youth- M		442	442	
Youth – F	438		438	100
2x women rep	873		873	100
Total Candidates	2,639	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total Voters	225,928	231,716	457,644	49.37

The figures appear to indicate that the PERWL trained candidates had an increased rate of success. Of those trained and who ran for election 55% were elected compared with the

national average for women candidates of 37%. The figures must be used with care as the intention of PERWL was to encourage participation, not to guarantee election success.

The project was very effective in engaging the two categories of direct stakeholders – implementing partners and women candidates - and indirectly their communities. PERWL reached 1265 directly for training in TLPC alone and some 5000+ through other trainings with partners INAP and DNAT to reach a total of 6840 women and 493 men.

2. Did the methodology (specifically the transformative leadership, politics and communities process) prove appropriate and respond to local needs in Timor Leste?

The political candidates themselves reported that the training was *one* significant factor in their standing for election, succeeding in the political process and staying the full term. This has been recorded in 2004/05 (in reported review discussions), in a UNIFEM assessment exercise May 2009 done in conjunction with a new project and again during this evaluation. Many highlighted the ability and confidence to speak to the community, to gain support for their ideas (e.g. promotion of all children attending school), and to lead community initiatives such as establishing drinking water supply for aldeias and forming groups for IGAs such as sewing.

The methodology has proven very appropriate to local needs as demonstrated by the degree of interest and demand for more. This remains in evidence two years after project completion. The TLPC has been continuously refined (during and post project) to ensure up-to-date relevance to TL and the 2009 elections. The issue of literacy affects the general promotion and awareness work particularly at aldeia level where literacy is very low. For the potential suco-level candidates identified for the leadership training, there is a basic requirement of primary school because of the responsibilities of passing on information (usually provided in written form) from official bodies, reporting and financial tracking. The universal comment however is more of this facilitated training and learning is needed, for more of the community and more often. Sufficient flexibility was incorporated into the project design to refine and adjust the content of training in response to stakeholder needs and interests.

Constraints for PERWL participants were and continue to be costs in conjunction with attending training at the sub/district (travel, food, accommodation, child care) and challenges from family and communities, including some aggressive threats. The first requires (at present) external funding to support mobilisation of local trainers to go out to at least more at the suco level. The second constraint was addressed through some direct mediation (talking to community / spouse) but also through teaching skills for dispute resolution.

3. What is the organisational strength and viability of women's CSO/NGOs and government partners to use the materials to support long-term behavioural change for increased women's participation in elections and nation-building?

The implementing partners of PERWL were national level government (OPE/SEPI, DNAT, INAP), non-government organisations (REDE Feto, Caucus, etc), and local organisations (CSO/NGO) in each district. The local implementing organisations were required to learn a great deal quickly and to commit to effective delivery, which required significant coordination and capacity building efforts. For training of trainers / facilitators, they first learnt the concepts for leadership and for gender concerns / dynamics, then moved these into evolving the training materials for the different groups with different levels of literacy and experience. Training of trainers was done first, then piloting of teaching materials in 3 areas and revisions to the materials and teaching methods were made. After this the race to reach as many sucos as possible began. Ten districts were trained pre-election and 3 post-election. Post-election, follow-up reviews were conducted; DNAT provided training to non-elected aldeia women (2 each) to strengthen constituent support for elected councillors; and civic education material (topic: constitution) was developed and used by all partners in their areas.

Significant support / tracking was done by UNIFEM of the implementing partners (national level) to ensure that the coordination of the training materials development was done with full input from facilitators' experiences and participants' critical appraisals. This was integral to the work of developing the approach while meeting the deadlines of the elections themselves. UNIFEM

partners needed more capacity building than expected therefore UNIFEM staff were stretched and non-PERWL staff drafted in. This, however, is distinct from UNDP M&E, which was minimal.

These national and local partners are still able to demonstrate their capabilities in both facilitating and understanding the issues / topics relating to women in TL politics. It was evident in observations of training events in process, the ability to gather focus groups of 30+ to meet this evaluation mission, and to facilitate genuine discussion among those groups. There is also, in some cases, the current work being done with new donors (mostly non-EU with the exception of Ireland) using the same materials / methodologies refined to the current purpose (not all current projects are focused on political involvement but they are using gender awareness in developmental processes). This group remains in regular communication and feeds directly into SEPI level discussions.

The loose networking of the partners was and is surprisingly effective. There was and continues to be genuine engagement of national level partners (including government bodies) with women's CSO/NGOs on a regular basis. National level, Dili based organisations including SEPI continue to send their representatives to the districts to engage in exchanges (evident in documented assessment focal groups) and to participate in training / information events. The NGO bodies were more active while project supported the cost and are less active now due to funding constraints but they remain in contact and participate in events (Women's Day), workshops, focal groups, etc.

The synergies and collaborative action with other projects of RDP and as part of the UNDP subsection RCDRA was with OCAP's work for building and empowering community level groups. This was an effective link in providing further tools / skills / capacity to local groups that could be activated by good leadership to achieve tangible economic development, i.e. savings groups or self-help groups doing vegetable gardening or sewing for income generation. The limits to this interaction are based in budget and minimal planning at the design stage of RDP overall. There were opportunities for more, but they were not viable in the project context (time and resources).

Coordination with other donors has been integral particularly when nurturing the local implementing partnerships. Overlap was avoided but ongoing financial support was not immediately found. Sharing of information was done through the national bodies that have direct links to other donors, e.g. SEPI and REDE Feto.

Effectiveness is concluded to be good judging from the increased demand from the expanded group of stakeholders and the ability of project to stretch resources to meet those demands.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency)

1. Was there any dis/advantage to project management by UNIFEM / UNDP?

2. Was M&E of the programme sufficient, constructive and timely?

Overall PERWL was implemented in a responsive flexible and largely efficient manner with some shifts in the planned scheduling, but with insufficient M&E support from UNDP.

Delays were due to 2 factors. The 6 months between the financial agreement signature and the first EC disbursement reaching UNIFEM (January 2005) was bridged by an advance from UNIFEM regional office (Bangkok) as activities needed to keep pace with the electoral schedule. The second was the civil demonstrations (2006-07) and subsequent security situation that hampered the baseline study work, resulting in the official launch being abandoned and 3 planned dissemination workshops having to be conducted post-project. UNDP provided funds for these and EC support was fully acknowledged.

The budget, as noted above, proved insufficient to meet the significant support required from UNIFEM to local implementing partners. The degree of this support and the number of partners

was not fully anticipated at the design stage. As per UNIFEM MTR (and supported by EC ROM mission) an additional staff member was added to the team as National Project Officer.

Outputs and targets were achieved to plan for each of the 3 components and done to a good quality standard. Outputs include a range of training materials – manuals, flipcharts – in Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese and /or English; 35 trainers trained +11 for INAP; range of needs assessment reviews; civic education material on RDTL constitution. All were refined, produced and distributed widely - at least to the consultative and implementing partner organisations and some beyond to suco and aldeia levels. The Baseline Study preliminary findings were used for the CEDAW, the National Action Plan and for REDE Feto's shadow action plan (women's focus). The final output has been distributed to other GoTL ministries, academic institutions and donors. Less tangible outputs include a widespread network of TL women's organisations able to be facilitators at suco and aldeia level for gender, leadership training and civic education.

The baseline research study, after initially consolidating existing data, designed the fieldwork to produce valid sample data. This entailed seven sample districts reflecting rural, poor, up/lowland, east-central-west. In addition, three case studies were produced to explore specific factors impacting on women's poverty.

UNDP performance as the direct EC contractual partner was mixed. Advantages include significant enhancement of effectiveness when resources or project contractual parameters did not allow for full responsiveness. UNDP/UNIFEM additional funding allowed for:

- a) training on 'Food Production / Preparation and Women's Political Participation' in Ermera, (note: this is the location of active anti-women campaigning)
- b) 5 day training on making governance gender responsive (TLPC at national level),
- c) 3 day expanded post-election training for elected women and men of 13 districts,
- d) 2 day orientation workshop by DNAT to strengthen women's constituency support with non-elected women of all aldeias (2 reps per aldeia - 2925 participants), and
- e) for the baseline survey's dissemination workshops held post project.

Additional support provided by UNIFEM included staff to effectively support local partners' capacity building (and monitoring); additional studies and information developed to inform stakeholders (e.g. Participation of Women in Politics and Decision Making in Timor-Leste: A Recent History, April 2006).

The limitations include UNDP's consolidated reporting that did not always meet EC requirements and the absorption of PERWL's M&E budget line but with minimal M&E support in return. The project would have gained benefit from UNDP regular reviewing. In its absence the project developed its own M&E mechanisms, did its own field visits and reviews with the consultative partners and reported back to the PSC. As resources for the project were very modest, the costs in staff time could have been well used elsewhere.

The project therefore was largely efficient. It required significant flexibility to address unforeseen obstacles such as the civil unrest and unplanned additional activities.

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact)

1. Is there proof of impact in terms of a. women standing in local elections – getting elected – staying in elected position; and b. input into the review of proposed policy and legislation?

PERWL can claim and document a good level and quality of direct impact but care must be taken not to overstate its influence. It has taken a number of firm steps (not leaps) forward in designing, testing and refining a replicable approach to furthering women's active participation in TL political – socio – economic development. That said, it has contributed to increased women's election participation in 2004/05 elections; to increased awareness of gender in local development at district level and indirectly at suco level; to increased skills of local leadership on an individual level and to local partners' capacity and their networking. Its limitations stem

from the short timeframe and resources for follow-up actions to weave these changes more firmly into local communities. UNIFEM and partners' current involvement with follow-up projects is building on PERWL's experience directly and is strengthening and increasing this impact and sustainability.

Key areas of impact value are found with the women councillors themselves, their socio-cultural context, their community context and at national level.

Individual women councillors are functioning in the political sphere with a 27.6% representation on suco councils and 365 of those influenced by PERWL. Additionally there are 5000+ aware in the rural communities that are increasingly participating in local decision-making. Through group meetings for this evaluation and the various assessment exercises done by stakeholders in the past two years, women have reported changes and increasing support to elected women councillors. In the evaluator's sample, elected women are definitely going to stand for re-election because of the encouragement from their community. This provides some indication of their performance and recognition of their capabilities. This cannot be credited entirely to the project but women are clear that PERWL has contributed. The next step of documenting and doing lessons learned from the experiences of this first group of elected women suco leaders has begun. One recent study is *Women of Timor-Leste in Political Life: Results of Project in Monitoring and Documentation of the 2007 Election Campaign – a gender perspective* (2009, UNIFEM, FOKUPERS)

In the socio-cultural context changes are being observed in household relationships and in suco council dynamics. Those interviewed and engaging in focus groups with CSOs are reporting changes in the home where some of the politically active women are increasing their input into decision-making that affects their family. Some are reporting that their husbands have supported their candidacy and role on the council once elected – so much so that the individual women feel they can stand for re-election. Council dynamics vary. Some are reported to be marginalising the women members but others have been so accepting that at the death of a Suco Head the council elected one woman councillor to be Head. Others are being encouraged to run again in the 2009 elections.

In the community context, projects are being undertaken and not always with external support. One women Chefe Suco talks of her work in bringing drinking water to two aldeias of her suco and of actively promoting all children to attend school. Other elected councillors talk of organising groups for savings, for vegetable gardening enterprises and for sewing. The TLPC is feeding directly into facilitating community development initiatives and as such it should be recognised as a valid approach to building more self-reliant community development by activating women's initiatives. This is a beginning but again this must be balanced against a widespread lack of local resources and limited access to external support from GoTL.

At the national level, PERWL has achieved impact through the GoTL partners who have institutionalised some of the training developed. INAP helped develop materials and deliver TLPC training. New modules include women's rights and gender issues and a part of standard training for civil servants, who now include the elected suco councils. It also conducted, as part of its regular work, a needs assessment for elected councillors, and subsequently produced a manual "Strengthening the Role of Women Leaders in the Suco Council" (2005) in Tetum, Portuguese, Indonesian and English. DNAT has used, trained and distributed the civic training material for RDTL constitution aimed at aldeia level constituencies. This supports strengthening their capacity to participate and support their representatives (women and men). It incorporates gender awareness and is designed for the trained aldeia representatives (non-elected) to use with their communities. Indirectly supported is the MSA commitment to gender sensitisation training as part of the decentralisation plans for the GoTL.

The Baseline Study on Feminization of Poverty in Timor-Leste Deprivation of Women Across Sectors (August 2007) has been provided to a wide group of stakeholders including GoTL and donors. This provides the first stage in what is a complex data set that requires developing over time. As planned, the study informed both the National Development Plan and CEDAW.

There is further impact potential in the training approach TLPC (Transformative leadership, politics and communities). It is significant to impact because it is valid on several levels – political, socio-cultural, and economic. It is directly in support of good governance (politics, transparency, accountability, and leadership, sensitive to the post conflict period). It allows for the issues of women to be acknowledged and potentially addressed. It specifically seeks to develop leadership skills geared for change and development through community participation. This means it supports political-social-economic development and although this project targeted women as political leaders, the method is not exclusive but inclusive as it engages men in households and communities. This approach is relevant to overall development in rural areas (including poverty reduction) and deserves broader consideration (by other than women specific organisations) as an integral approach to community development - not only as a 'gender add-on'.

UNIFEM added value is the data gathering, which is informing the national bodies. The baseline study has been used as intended in CEDAW and also in the National Development Plan. The national women's umbrella group REDE Feto, also used it to form a shadow national development plan reflecting women's agenda. The database of gender disaggregated data for the PERWL related activities is also being used more widely as the baseline for women in suco elections.

2. Have there been any further developments amongst the network such as new initiatives; integration of the delivery method into other initiatives, etc.?

Increasing PERWL impact has begun. Project is judged by GoTL to have achieved a good level of impact and is recognised as replicable. Consequently, MSA has requested further collaboration designed to build upon PERWL experience. Currently there are two programmes in progress, conducted by UNIFEM with SEPI. Integrated Programme for Women in Politics and Decision Making, (IPWPDM), is funded by AusAid, Irish Aid, Norway, UNIFEMAus and the TL National Council. The seven-year programme directly incorporates a 'PERWL II' plus direct support to national level agencies. Enhancing Women's Role in Timor Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation Building is funded by UNDEF (UN Democracy Fund), which also seeks to use the strategic opportunity of the suco elections in 2009.

The significance of these new projects is that they are a direct follow through of PERWL and are using it as a model, informed by experience and collaborative critical review. Both are benefiting from and building upon PERWL. As such they seek to extend the impact for both quantity (extended geographic coverage and an additional election) and quality of women's participation, while further refining the delivery methods of the support.

Impact is surprisingly good considering the modest funding. It can now be observed and demonstrated that PERWL functioned as a catalyst and as a well tested pilot with quality outcomes.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability)

1. How well is the network functioning. Are the CSO / NGOs / GoTL making use of the materials for ongoing training? Is there any leader in taking this forward?

Sustainability of the project's benefits varies with each category of stakeholder. Individuals demonstrate the ongoing use of these skills but overall the ability to sustain the provision of ongoing support to women's political participation is very limited. The single most restrictive factor is financing. The GoTL however is firmly committed to developing what has been learned in PERWL and is already taking it forward into the 2009 election support activities.

Individuals who have been trained and the first women suco councillors are to varying degrees active in sharing their knowledge and promoting women's involvement in local governance and local development. Many of those interviewed are working in conjunction with UNIFEM supported current projects for 2009 elections. Most of those elected are planning to run for a second term as councillor now that they have proven themselves to the community and to

themselves. On this level the benefits are continuing and are being shared. This reflects improved capacity and an evolving socio-cultural acceptance. The women are very clear that momentum is building for change in the role of women in decision-making – home and community – and in community leadership. Current constraints for suco women councillors include transportation, communication, finances, socio-cultural discrimination and limited ongoing support (May 2009 assessment report UNIFEM).

Women's CSO/NGOs who delivered the training each have some degree of increased capacity and are confident in delivering the training / facilitation. Some have been able to use their skills in new projects as seen in Oecussi. Caucus (NGO) has provided the TLPC training to political parties. The over-riding issue is funding. Institutional capacity weakness stems from a lack of a domestic funding base, and generating reliance upon donor project specific funding. This is not a sufficient basis to retain staff and develop programming. Many of those trained often leave the organisation when there is work elsewhere. Conversely, many return when there is work again – such as the follow-up project related to the 2009 elections. Some former NGO staff is involved with other local NGOs or even form groups of their own as seen in Oecussi. Those interviewed emphasised the need for funding to get their people out to suco and aldeia – transportation / accommodation costs. They felt confident in their knowledge and experience and in the training materials already developed.

The networked group of partners (GoTL-CSO-NGO) is stronger than it initially appears and collectively carries more potential than it does individually. Separately they lack capacity but as a group they have collaborated at all stages of development and review from planning to training-materials development. This started before PERWL and is continuing now. The pool of expertise and loose network affiliations continue despite funding limitations and are firmly linked to national women's groups and GoTL. This clearly shows potential sustainability for networking for the longer term. Most significantly however, it represents full ownership by TL stakeholders at all levels and is fundamental to genuine impact and sustainability potential.

GoTL partners included OPE, INAP and DNAT. Each agency demonstrates a good level of sustainability for its part of the project. OPE has now changed from an advisory function attached to the Prime Minister's office to an increased budget Secretary of State (SEPI). Its mandate is to co-ordinate and facilitate for matters concerning gender with the Council of Ministers and other stakeholders through to district level. It now has the ability to solicit studies, hire advisors, provide training to Ministries, etc. Further legislation has been developed that firmly integrates gender sensitive issues into government (e.g. current electoral revisions, gender advisors in each ministry and district offices) and into development (e.g. MAF gender advisor). The challenge will be to action what is already legislated. SEPI has maintained and built up more interaction and networking with women's CSO/NGOs particularly at district level. Monthly visits by SEPI staff are now done regularly and consultative forums with these groups are the norm. It also actively seeks to better link national elected women to women leaders at district/suco levels. INAP, which is responsible for public administration education including for suco councillors, now has 11 trainers trained and experienced in TLPC and has incorporated gender awareness into its core programme. DNAT, which promotes electoral participation, has begun to use and promote civil education material from PERWL at the aldeia level.

2. Is this programme currently integrated into or being developed by new initiatives?

In terms of developing a long term institutionalised support to promotion of women in politics / leadership, the two current projects already mentioned are key. These were requested by MSA and, as with PERWL, all of the relevant government agencies and women's CSO/NGO partners have been part of the new design process. Sustainability of PERWL's achievements thus appears to be on a firm footing.

Timorese Women in Numbers				
	Women	Men	Total	% of Women
Population	456,885	467,757	924,642	49.4
Head of Households	36,899	158,063	194,962	18.9
Adult Literacy Estimates	52%	65%	n.a.	52
GoTL Council of Ministers	7	30	37	18.9
Civil Service (all levels)	2,746	8,557	11,298	24.3
National Parliament	24	64	88	26.4
<i>Local Elections 2004/05</i>				
Suco Councils	1,342	3,253	4,865	27.6
Chefe Suco	7(8)	435	442	1.6
Chefe Aldeia	22	2,206	2,228	0.9
Elder	2	440	442	0.4
Youth- M		442	442	
Youth – F	438		438	100
2x women rep	873		873	100
Total Candidates	2,639	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total Voters	225,928	231,716	457,644	49.37

I. Council of Minister figures as of Feb 2006. District and Sub-District figures as of July 2004.

II. Civil Service figures as of Feb 2006 provided by Direcçao Nacional da Funcao Publica (DNFP). Totals updated every 3 months.

III. NP figures as of Feb 2006. NP's current capacity is 88 but was reduced due to death of one deputy in 2005.

IV. Suco Council figures provided by STAE as of 13 Feb 2006. Totals may change pending re-elections for limited positions.

2004/2005 Local Elections						PERWL Project Specific Statistics				
District	Total Number of Candidates					Women Trained in TLPC	Those Who Ran		Those Elected	
	Male	%	Female	%	Total		Total	%	Total	%
Oecussi	289	77	86	23	375	51	26	51	26	100
Bobonaro	293	71	122	29	415	90	10	10	11	100
Baucau	183	40	275	60	458	210	164	78	98	60
Lautem	439	75	146	25	585	165	139	84	59	42
Manatuto	445	73	162	27	607	65	44	68	13	29
Covalima	219	55	179	45	398	76	30	39	20	67
Ermera	709	66	361	34	1070	96	23	24	22	96
Viqueque	257	53	230	47	487	36	22	61	22	100
Aileu	195	59	137	41	332	63	16	25	4	2
Same	686	77	204	23	890	53	17	32	3	18
Ainaro	196	42	266	58	462	79	57	72	57	100
Dili	296	49	307	51	603	181	87	48	19	22
Liquica	207	63	121	37	328	67	22	33	12	54
Total	4,414	63	2,596	37	7010	1,265	657	52	365	55

Adapted from: Database on women/Men Candidates and Women Candidates Trained on Transformative Leadership and Elected during the Village Elections 2004-2005, Timor-Leste. Compiled under PERWL.

3.2.3 OCAP (Oecussi Ambeno Community Activation Programme)

Duration:	May 2004 – May 2009
Total Budget:	€ 3,359,257
Contributors:	EC (€3,062,089), UNDP (€297,168)

Introduction

OCAP sought to establish sustainable livelihood opportunities for the people of Oecusse, an enclave some 70 kms distant from the rest of the country. Strict imposition of border controls by Indonesia following independence had hampered traditional trading links, both with neighbouring areas of Indonesia and with the mainland of Timor Leste. The project approach was based on the aggregation of beneficiaries into Self Help Groups (SHGs), jointly addressing development issues and promoting cohesion-building and development initiatives.

Problems and Needs (Relevance)

1. Did OCAP really address the core need for sustainable livelihoods opportunities in this remote area?

The project's design was built on previous experience of the implementing agency (UNOPS) with a predecessor programme in Ainaro and Manatuto districts (AMCAP). A series of stakeholder workshops at district/sub district level contributed to the enclave needs assessment and project formulation, identifying a certain number of priority needs such as cattle fattening, improving rice yields, small scale agro-processing and development of small scale industries & services, including the promotion of border security issues & trading linkages. Several other community prioritised needs including sandalwood plantation development, aquaculture and communications were not taken up. Nevertheless the four program components (1. community mobilization & strengthening of decision-making capacity; 2. improved agricultural technologies including improvement of cattle production and introduction of upland farming; 3. economic & social development opportunities; 4. capacity building of key stakeholders for the district's development process) did address the priorities of food security & income generation activities that are fundamental for the local population.

2. What was the rationale for addressing so many issues simultaneously?

The need assessment workshops indicated a wide range of priority needs for Oecusse in the Social area (health, education, gender, youth, culture); in Infrastructure (clean drinking water, transportation/communications, public infrastructure, electricity); in Economic development (trade, training, job opportunities, marketing, financial support services); and in Security & border issues (as border marketing & trade). OCAP addressed most of these needs and also introduced successful models from the AMCAP project such as community development techniques, improved agricultural technologies for upland farming, irrigation rehabilitation, small scale livestock improvement, rice seed multiplication, reforestation and watershed management.

OCAP attempted to satisfy many of the identified priority needs, with a large number of agricultural activities. However, given the unrealistically high number of targeted small groups, the limited resources the project could deploy were clearly insufficient to provide the necessary sustained support for these activities.

3. Did the project respond appropriately to recommendations to rationalise?

There were several opportunities for the project to improve its design, and its prospects for success, in response to external recommendations. These include ROM recommendations in 2005 and 2006 to improve the logframe, which were never carried out. Indeed the logframe was ignored in favour of the Results Framework, which is a lengthy and indigestible document that creates a tendency towards an activity driven approach – quite the opposite of a logframe. The MTE recommended a rationalisation of the activities and indeed a more timely rationalisation

would have improved the programme. By project end, eleven activities had been simplified and eleven cancelled out of 81. Some of the cancelled activities were those suggested in the MTE (e.g. poultry, nurseries) while others, such as the distribution of breeding bulls, were not in line with the spirit of self reliance of the programme. The market study for the identification of marketable products and potential market niches was taken on by Oxfam by mutual agreement, allowing the budget to be reallocated to the ETAZONE border regime study. The proposed aquaculture and artificial insemination programmes were dropped for technical reasons and other activities, such as forestry, were cancelled due to budget or time constraints. On a more fundamental note, the scope of outreach of the project was cut back from 800 SHGs to 200 SHGs (with a proportionate drop in beneficiary numbers) in 2007, when it was accepted that it would be better to aim for quality and sustainability rather than quantity.

4. To what extent was it appropriate for a substantial part of the project design to be based on the assumption of free cross-border trade, and should this have been treated as a killer assumption?

The stakeholder workshops indicated very clearly that promotion of trading linkages with East Timor and Indonesia, and the border security issues, were fundamental needs. One of the main income sources, and a significant sub-component of the project, is cattle fattening. Traditionally the cattle are sold to Indonesia or transported to market in Dili. When the border was closed, the principal legitimate market was Dili, but the transportation was more complicated and costly, and prices were lower. Illegal border trafficking with Indonesia has been valued at as much as \$600,000/year, (Oecusse Market Survey Report -Oxfam Australia/EU 2008) with 2,000-3,000 head of cattle crossing annually. During the field visit, respondents talked about the risks of this trade, including the possibility of seizure by Indonesian border police. It was also said that armed gangs from Indonesia cross over and kidnap cows in border villages. This security/economic situation was a strong priority and should have been treated with much more urgency by OCAP. Activities were included in component 3 but with minor influence and the situation has not been improved. If there had been a specific component addressing these issues from the outset, there could have been a totally different final impact. Although not exactly a killer assumption, it should have been dealt with much more seriously.

5. What mitigation steps did the project take during the implementation period, and how relevant and successful were they?

The ETAZONE project (led by the Secretary of State in Oecusse), intends to draft a law on these border issues to be presented to the Council of Ministers to accord a special status to Oecusse. The related studies and visits to similar situations in Malaysia & Indonesia were financed by OCAP. A workshop with Oecusse stakeholders planned for August - September 2009 will give the opportunity to Oecusse stakeholders to provide inputs to the existing draft law before it is presented to the Council of Ministers. UNDP and the Secretary of State for Oecusse have offered their support to ensure that the process will be completed in light of the fact that OCAP has already terminated.

Overall, there is no doubt that Oecusse needed a project like OCAP, and that OCAP responded to many of the needs. However the design was weak, with too many activities, over-ambitious beneficiary targets and insufficient emphasis on the border situation, which limited the potential for success.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness)

1. Was the Self-Help Group (SHG) model appropriate?

The community-based Self Help Groups (SHGs) were a core part of OCAP's design, based on earlier experience with AMCAP. The MYRADA approach was chosen (in comparison with Grameen Bank and Agha Khan Models) to organise the community into solidarity groups and provide training and start-up support. The model is a proven one, suitable to encourage income generating activities and to build capacity, particularly in saving & credit schemes, but it requires significant support and the project found that it took a lot more time than had been anticipated.

Between December 2007 and January 2008 a self-assessment impact study facilitated by a MYRADA consultant indicated that a great number of the Self Help Groups were still very weak in terms of their capacity and would require continuous support up to the end of the project. This reinforced the decision that OCAP should not focus any longer on setting up new SHGs, but rather on the strengthening of existing ones to ensure sustainability. The decision reduced the potential beneficiaries to 25% of the original target which, even though the decision was accepted by the EC, is a disappointment in terms of aid delivery. It is also particularly unfortunate for the members of the approximately 240 groups that did not survive the first three years, whose hopes had been raised in vain. Such a high drop-out rate indicates a mismatch between the mode of intervention and the ability of the target group to participate. It is possible that a different model might have enabled the project to work effectively with a higher number of beneficiaries. A study of the relative effectiveness of different models of social activation in Timor Leste would be useful to inform further interventions in rural development.

2. To what extent have improved agricultural technologies introduced by OCAP (especially drip irrigation, ponds, SALT) provided tangible benefits to local people? Have there been benefits resulting from other opportunities identified by the project?

The role of OCAP in introducing agricultural technologies in Oecusse has been substantial and extensive. However benefits extend far beyond agriculture *per se*. The Community Development Fund (CDF) considered 84 proposals for infrastructural enhancement from the local communities and funded 58 of them. Projects financed included four schools, five sanitation projects and 13 drinking water systems (wells, reservoirs or piping). In terms of technical infrastructure for agriculture, nine flood control works (using gabions) and construction of 12 irrigation canals, at a cost of around \$280,000, provided benefits at least in theory, for up to 3,250 households by conserving and irrigating their farmland. Two further irrigation canals were constructed in support of MAF's irrigation development master plan.

The specific technologies for annual cropping and horticulture introduced or promoted by OCAP included Sloping Agricultural Land Technologies (SALT), pond liners for water conservation to supply vegetable production using improved seeds, drip irrigation, participatory variety selection and block demonstrations, slash and mulch and composting. Livestock activities included cattle fattening using stall feeding with Napier grass (*Pennisetum purpureum*) and production of local chickens.

At project end 29 SHGs were involved in vegetable production, covering all the 18 sucos, which had received training in small-scale irrigation technology and vegetable growing techniques. These technologies enabled the groups to overcome the key production constraint of chronic dry season water shortage. The introduction of 18 improved vegetable varieties and production input supply were effective in increasing yield in the production plots. Most of the members of the vegetable groups are female. Altogether 36¹² plastic ponds were constructed and 24¹³ sets of low cost irrigation systems were procured and set up¹⁴. By 2007 there were already signs of quality improvement in the supply of vegetables on the local market and in family consumption of vegetables in beneficiary households.

Overall SALT was extended to a total of 54¹⁵ SHG to protect hillside land from erosion during cultivation. However this number had fallen to just 32 groups which were deemed to be still functional at February 2009¹⁶, representing at least 463 households. The single SALT site visited by the mission¹⁷, covering 2 hectares and involving 30 households, was unusual in

¹² Of which 28 are shown in the database as being operated by functioning SHGs as at Feb 2009.

¹³ Of these 19 were shown in the database as belonging to functioning SHGs as at Feb 2009.

¹⁴ Substantial disparities in numbers of completed inputs/output exist between different OCAP data sources. For example the OCAP Final Report, July 2009 (p. 20) speaks of "19 plastic ponds" and "30 sets of low-cost irrigation systems" being installed. The MTE has used the OCAP SHG database, which attributes specific inputs to specific SHGs, as a primary data source. However these inconsistencies, which could not be checked by the MTE team, are a cause for concern.

¹⁵ As listed in the OCAP database, Feb 2009.

¹⁶ Out of a surviving total of 177 SHG. This number apparently rose slightly to 184 by EOP (May 2009), but the figure for active SALT groups at EOP is not clear.

¹⁷ Noaninef Cabana SHG, Suniufe Village, Nitibe Sub-district.

having the contour bund composed of stones cleared from the field, backed by a line of trees (rather than a dense pruned hedgerow), but looked effective. The farmers appreciated the mixed cropping with agroforestry trees, which enabled them to get several intercrops (maize, cassava, peanuts) off a small area of what had been waste ground. Slash and mulch techniques were demonstrated by 19 groups, reducing soil erosion and nutrient losses compared to traditional slash and burn practices.

The Participatory Variety Selection trials (PVS) and block demonstrations (PBD) involved comparisons of local and improved varieties of rice, maize and beans. Seeds of improved varieties were supplied with by MAF (from the Seeds of Life project). The trials were intended to demonstrate potential yield increase but also to improve soil fertility and nutrition. The results of these trials (yield, quality & taste), were reported to be very satisfactory, with rice yield increases of 44.3 to 55.3% compared to the local varieties¹⁸. The most promising varieties were multiplied and distributed as a seed "minikit" to 42 beneficiary households.

Particular attention has been given to the 3 agricultural/livestock sub components which the MTE suggested should be phased out. *Cattle fattening* is one of the most important livestock enterprises available to farmers in Oecusse, providing one of the main sources of local income. The Oxfam Australia Market Research Report for Oecusse (May 2008) estimates a population of 25,000 cattle in the enclave, and suggests that 2,000 – 3,000 head cross the border with West Timor illegally each year, with a value of US\$600,000¹⁹. OCAP supported the formation of a total of 43 cattle owners' associations²⁰. By February 2009, the OCAP database listed 19 of these COA as comprising the majority of the 25 listed cattle fattening SHG²¹. OCAP promoted and partly financed the building of cattle sheds and the cultivation of Napier grass and *Sesbania* for stall feeding. OCAP has also played a role in facilitating improved access to livestock vaccination services through MAF. The infrastructure for the cold chain was supported by ARP III, including a vaccine refrigerator powered by a roof-mounted solar panel at the quarantine building in Pante Macasar.

Due to the importance of such livestock production in the enclave, the suggestion by the MTE, that the livestock component of OCAP be phased out, because there was no legal cross-border market and no local market for fattened cattle, was not accepted by the PSC, chaired by MAF. Support for cattle fattening continued under OCAP, reaching an estimated total of 315 households²². All other MTE recommendations were however accepted and adjustments were made accordingly. Subsequently MAF has expressed interest in supporting cattle fattening. Only one out of six demonstration units of a technology using rice straw treated with urea for cattle feed were set up, and demonstrations of a silage-making technique using Napier grass were curtailed because there was insufficient Napier grass production to provide a surplus for silage.

The *small livestock (poultry, pig, goat) support to MAF* subcomponent was initiated with the aim of improving farm household incomes, but also to try to increase the intake of protein through the household consumption of eggs. Communities were already keeping poultry but it was living out in the open. OCAP established 55 chicken houses²³ in 18 villages and a poultry training manual was developed. However it was later decided that the houses were unsuitable for keeping chickens under local conditions. Failure of vaccine supply to Oecusse through MAF led to mass poultry deaths in 2005-2006, presumed to have been caused by Newcastle disease (ND)²⁴. The very low numbers of poultry held by SHG at the time of the MTE, led to the

¹⁸ Findings of Participatory Variety Selection Programme on Food Crops in Oecussi Enclave. Powerpoint Presentation to MAFF Workshop 18-19 Sept 2007. Jitendra Prasad Jaiswal and Sirilo dos Remedios Baba

¹⁹ This is likely to be an underestimate in terms of value, as prices paid for fattened bulls are said to be as high as \$600.

²⁰ According to the OCAP Final Report, p.16.

²¹ At February 2009, the OCAP database showed 20 extant fattening groups, of which 12 were also COA.

²² At February 2009, the OCAP database suggests around 247 households still actively involved. OCAP has been unable to collect comprehensive figures for the numbers of fattened cattle sold into Indonesia, due to the understandable unwillingness of some farmers to admit to illegal and untaxed sales.

²³ OCAP SHG Database, Feb 2009.

²⁴ The extent to which poultry deaths might be attributable to Avian Influenza is currently being investigated by the Bird Flu Survey of the FAO Biosecurity Strengthening Project, at the National University of TL.

consultants' suggestion that this component should be phased out. However as at February 2009, 28 out of an original figure of 40 SHG were still involved in poultry rearing²⁵. The former PIU strongly feel that chicken rearing provides an important and rapidly realised source of income for resource-poor rural women's self help groups, easily conducted using traditional methods and with little outlay, alongside their other duties. However owing to the susceptibility of poultry to ND, a functioning vaccination system is essential. There is a continuing need for training of women in village communities to administer the ND vaccine²⁶ and for MAF to ensure adequate supply. OCAP facilitated the vaccination of at least 4738 chickens, belonging to SHG households.

The tree *nursery subcomponent* of OCAP was initiated as a result of a request from MAF, based on the perceived needs of the District, since the Ministry wanted to implement a reforestation programme. Six pilot tree nurseries were established by SHG, and an agreement was made between MAFF and OCAP that MAF would be one of the main purchasers of these seedlings. However this arrangement was never formalised and MAF opted to set up their own nurseries, rather than buying from the OCAP nurseries. OCAP acted in good faith in this initiative, which failed due to changes in the procurement policies of MAF. Following the MTE the Community Nursery component was handed over to the government. Since this time, MAF has organised a high-profile three day workshop in Pante Makasar Oecusse on sensitisation on tree nurseries and replanting of trees with a focus on discouraging slash and burn, attended by various dignitaries and local community representatives. However it is not clear what level of resources MAF will be able to allocate to nurseries in the future.

Constraints in both budget and personnel meant that the planned support to the Government's fisheries and forestry programme did not take place. The demonstration programs on Onion and Garlic (involving 19 SHG) and on compost pits (involving 50 SHG) were not directly observed by the mission. It was not possible to determine the effectiveness of the training to establish Integrated Pest Management (IPM) demonstrations. Apart from an introductory presentation on the theory of IPM, no detailed practical IPM training materials specifically addressing the pest and disease problems of the main crops which OCAP worked with in Oecusse have been seen by the mission.

3. Did OCAP work sufficiently closely with local government and NGO partners to enhance their capacity to manage and coordinate development initiatives?

The capacity building to local administration and other partners component aimed to enhance the capacity for development coordination within Oecusse. Local Government Institutions and NGOs were represented in all trainings alongside OCAP CAFs. These included training on community mobilisation through the MYRADA approach, training on the various techniques employed under the agricultural component such as SALT, water harvesting technology, seed replication, participatory variety selection etc.

In particular, the capacity of local government institutions and NGOs was enhanced through their participation in the Project Working Committee (PWC) which had 27 members chaired by the District Administrator, and met on a monthly basis. PWC members assumed responsibilities and took initiatives in community organization and livelihood development activities. Together with suco authorities and the OCAP PIU, they developed annual project action plans. Their coordination skills were strengthened through their involvement in the CDF component.

Partnership with the office of the Secretary of State (SoS) Administration and local Government Administration was developed. At district level, support to the District Administrator (DA) of Oecusse and his team, while at sub-district level coordination centres allowed effective interaction with sub-district administrators, suco chiefs and suco councils. Collaboration was established with different line ministries, particularly MAF in Dili and in Oecusse and the Ministry of Development & Environment. Such interaction and collaboration has strengthened the local government capacity to manage future development initiatives; for example the ETAZONE project will continue to be supported by the local administration until its completion.

²⁵ OCAP SHG Database, Feb 2009.

²⁶ Administered by drops into the eye, rather than by injection.

Overall, the effectiveness of the project is considered moderate. Many of the production-related activities have been successful, and participation by local government and non-government organisations was good. The disappointment is in the high number of SHGs which did not survive and hence the reduced number of direct beneficiaries.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency)

1. To what extent did the fact that UNOPS was managing OCAP from Bangkok, as a subcontractor to UNDP in Dili, constrain implementation and the ability to respond to changing local needs and conditions?

The fact that ROM recommendations for improved project management, such as logframe revisions, increase in PIU management responsibilities, and development of a proper M&E programme were not satisfactorily responded to indicates the weakness of the management system. The MTE found that the management structure hindered the project because of the perceived requirement for all expenditure to be approved in advance by UNOPS in Bangkok, and the difficulty of communicating with UNOPS from Oecusse. In fact it appears that there was a delegated authority for expenditure, but this was not properly understood by OCAP or UNDP and was itself a manifestation of the poor communications. The MTE recommended cancellation of the UNOPS contract and direct management of have the project by UNDP in Dili, but this was viewed as a radical and impractical suggestion. From 2007, UNOPS had a representative based in Dili, who among other tasks was responsible for UNOPS business acquisition, liaison and coordination with donors, UN agencies and the Government, maintaining close contact with clients, being a contact point for International or national staff employed by UNOPS and also coordinating UNOPS strategies in Timor Leste in close coordination with the UNOPS Regional Office in Bangkok. This improved the bureaucracy (the project reports that processing of procurement requests, staff payments and the like improved), but is not reported to have had an impact on management decisions.

2. Was the provision of technical assistance adequate i) to develop local capacities to define objectives and produce results, and ii) to provide / facilitate technical solutions?

The intermediate level staff (CAFs) provided support to the SHGs. They were trained in and promoted the MYRADA model, which does develop local capacities to define needs and work towards achieving them. However the monitoring programme, which would have established the extent to which this level of empowerment had been reached was not put in place and the high failure rate of the groups suggests that it was problematic.

The senior staff positions suffered significant turnover. Between July - October 2006 OCAP was without a CTA, the national project manager (NPM) resigned for personal reasons and three recruitment processes had to be completed before his replacement was in place, while the gender officer resigned in order to take up a position in Dili. By October 2007, the situation had significantly improved and a new international programme coordinator (IPC) and NPM were in place and were moving things forward at a faster pace. However, the expatriate UNV who took the lead in promoting technologies for upland agriculture (SALT, varietal trials, IPM etc) was only employed for two years (2006-2007) out of five. This weakened support for these activities, especially SALT (which is intended to deliver its benefits over 4-5 years) and the reporting of results and lessons learned. In the final project year, the departure of the IPC and upgrading of NPM to overall leader with introduction of a Deputy NPM, resulted in increased efficiency and timely results, and resulted in sufficient staff cost savings to enable the project to extend from the anticipated early completion date of December 2008 to the full 5 year programme period (to May 2009).

The project suffered from the absence of an infrastructure expert to follow the Community Development Fund (CDF) activities. About 60 infrastructure projects were carried out under the CDF, the design of the works being done by local offices of MAF and MoPW. It would have been useful to have had somebody who could have evaluated the proposals, checked the designs on behalf of the community and also ensured the quality of the work. An example of a

27 ha irrigation scheme was seen in which only 400m of the necessary 600m canal length had been lined, leaving the tail end excavated in porous rock and soil.

Additional specialised short term expertise would have been useful, particularly in strengthening the capacities of the government departments involved in the border trade issue.

3. Were MTE and ROM recommendations about M&E acted upon?

Recommendations were provided by the June 2005 and June 2006 ROM reports and the 2007 MTE. The ROMs were concerned that the responsibility for M&E had been taken from the project and given to UNDP and that there were no apparent plans to put a system in place. They were concerned that UNDP did not have the capacity to undertake an M&E programme and that an attempt to undertake a "one size fits all" programme for the four diverse projects in RCDRA would be unproductive. They pointed out the inadequacies of the OCAP logframe and the difficulty of succeeding with a project having so many activities. The MTE suggested to include participatory monitoring by the SHGs and to improve several OVLs. In fact these recommendations were not acted upon. UNDP did not establish an M&E system. In October 2007 it fielded an M&E consultant who provided excellent advice and, in February 2008, produced a good M&E manual. But by then it was too late to consider setting up a system and the input was therefore not followed up. The absence of an M&E programme means that there is no systematic data that can identify whether the project activities have indeed been able to fully address the four components, and the extent to which the objective of restoring sustainable livelihoods opportunities has been achieved.

4. What measures were taken to safeguard the management and operation of the Community Development Fund?

The Community Development Fund was a component which undertook 60 high profile infrastructure schemes, providing quick and visible results, and relatively easy to be managed. Proposals up to the value of \$10,000 were eligible for evaluation/approval by the PWC, while those exceeding \$10,000 were evaluated and approved by the PSC (in total 49 of the financed schemes were under \$10,000 while 11 were above this sum). A screening checklist was developed to ensure the eligibility and feasibility of proposals in terms of the approved (by PSC) CDF guidelines.

The M&E consultant, in his report (February 2008), recommended that a number of issues be considered including that proposals be more thoroughly screened in order to ensure that the poorest members of the population were being reached in the most cost efficient manner. The criteria for assessment of CDF applications were amended accordingly. In addition, the PWC ensured that for every proposal that came to them, both a technical expert from the PWC along with the CAF in question, would carry out an on-site assessment of the technical aspects of the proposal, as well as issues relating to beneficiaries, value for money etc. Following their visit, this team then made a presentation to the PWC based on these elements to allow them to make their final decision.

The CDF was closed when OCAP ended, having spent \$650,000 out of the allocated \$686,285 (95%). However the experience of the PWC and PSC members represents useful capacity building that will facilitate their management of any similar small grants schemes in future.

On balance, OCAP has been found to be low to moderately efficient. The failings in management by UNOPS and UNDP, in particular their disregard of repeated suggestions to develop a good M&E system and to simplify the project design, have prevented a better finding for efficiency. The management of the CDF, and the completion of a large number of activities in the agricultural component are positive, as was the decision to favour quality over quantity of the SHGs. Stronger emphasis should have been put on the border trade issue and this might have been identified and dealt with if an M&E system had been in place.

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact)

1. Can it be demonstrated or otherwise concluded that target families have benefitted from meaningful ongoing improvements in livelihoods (income or food security) as a result of participation in OCAP?

It cannot be demonstrated because the baseline carried out was too general and did not address suitable indicators. Some evidence is available as a result of information gathered by CAFs, largely based on households recounting differences between their situation before and their current situation and what they feel OCAP contributed to this change, but it is anecdotal and requires to be properly documented. On the field visit, modest improvements were described and witnessed, but it must be remembered that the target group was reduced to 25% of the original planned number of beneficiaries because of the decision to work with fewer SHGs, and only 93% of that reduced target was achieved. In that respect, modest benefits are disappointing.

2. Have any introduced technologies or production models (e.g. cattle fattening, ponds, drip irrigation, SALT) been taken up by local people other than direct beneficiaries?

There are no specific figures available on the uptake of such technologies by non- direct beneficiaries.

Cattle fattening has been hugely popular and the OCAP approach (stall feeding instead of the usual practice of free-range) has been taken up by MAF and extended considerably throughout Oecusse. It has been observed by many farmers and it is something they can take up fairly easily and at modest cost. The production of Napier grass as fodder has certainly spread beyond the project.

Regarding SALT, the technology is simple and interest is being shown by other farmers who are requesting other donors for help. WFP is involved in supporting 12 former OCAP SALT groups with cash for work to maintain and extend the technology. The MAF itself is supporting SALT with local and international NGOs Caritas and Oxfam.

The interest of non-OCAP farmers to take up some activities is certainly present but it is constrained by the investment required. The drip irrigation is an example - the system is quite expensive, all the material comes from abroad and it requires skill and experience to set it up. Communities have been very eager to adopt pond technology and on one occasion OCAP worked with a local NGO to facilitate access. On the other hand, an individual farmer was met who was keen to install his own pond but didn't have the cash or the skills to do so. Other farmers were seen observing irrigation activities and considering how to apply them on their own small vegetable fields.

The OCAP SHG making bricks (using a machine which cost \$3,800) accumulated more than \$6000 in its first year of operation. The machine came from Indonesia and the group would like to buy another. Some competitors have started operating in the vicinity using similar equipment.

3. Can any examples be shown of improved local government/NGO development management/coordination today as a result of the OCAP intervention?

The capacity building to local administration and other partners component established participatory linkages with governmental institutions at all levels, particularly involving these institutions in the project capacity development coordination, increasing local ownership. The PWC was created at district level as a decision making body and more importantly to ensure the sustainability of the project after closure of the programme. The PWC body was chaired by the DA and co-chaired by relevant line ministries. It met regularly to ensure timely implementation of project activities and to oversee the activities of the CDF. Since the closure of OCAP, this body has continued under government resources and procedures to ensure the sustainability and maintenance of the programme and the DA has become an advisor to the new NGO FEEO. Since September 2008, the DA has been holding regular meetings with representatives of government, NGOs and other agencies to coordinate development efforts. His stated aims

(mirroring those of OCAP) are local food production and the development and support of small groups. The benefits of the CDF approach have been recognized and a similar approach has been adopted by MAF, focussing on livestock.

Although there is insufficient information to demonstrate the significance of benefits, in improved livelihoods terms, being achieved by direct beneficiaries, wider impact of OCAP is regarded as promising because of the spread of several technologies and the continuation of the PWC mechanism by the district administration.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability)

1. What exit strategies were used to promote sustainability of SHGs and users of agricultural technologies?

A task force was established with representatives from MAF, MDE, DA, OCAP and UNDP and two joint visits were undertaken in the last six months of project activities to ensure the continuation of assistance to SHG after OCAP closure. PWC members agreed to hand over the responsibility for SHG mentoring to the new national NGO (FEEO) set up by the former OCAP Deputy Manager, which includes 12 former OCAP staff. MAF also agreed to provide some resource support to the FEEO following a decision in the final PSC that all OCAP assets should be handed over to MAF Oecusse office (which took place on 12 May 2009).

Training of the newly recruited MAF extension staff will include the formation of community-based groups. Six former CAFs joined the local MAF extension staff, and will be able to share their skills to benefit MAF as it adopts approaches such as participatory block demonstrations, seed multiplication, slash and mulch, cattle fattening and others.

2. What has been the survival rate of OCAP SHGs since the project closed? Might a different strategic approach (other than SHG) have been more sustainable?

During the project lifetime, a total of 424 SHGs were formed, although there were never more than about 300 operational at the same time. Some group failures are said to have been due to market factors (the closed border) affecting sales of their products. Another reason is likely to have been the limited amount of support provided during the early stages of group formation. By project end, 184 groups remained and FEEO reports that they all remain operational under its support. Several of the groups have formed formally registered credit unions and therefore have high prospects for sustainability. Since its formation as an NGO, FEEO has been providing support to 43 vegetable production groups and has facilitated the creation of 13 new SHG, indicating a continuing demand for this type of structure. Other positive aspects of the system, once a certain level of group formation has been achieved, include the generation of volunteerism and an affinity binding members together; the setting by SHGs of their own agenda and the design of their own rules and systems of functioning rather than having them imposed from the outside; and the building of homogeneous groups of members ensuring the voices of the most vulnerable are heard. These are characteristics that are likely to result in strong sustainability.

3. Which technologies, skills or services introduced under OCAP are being maintained or expanded by the target communities, local administration and NGOs?

The SHG approach has been recognised by MAF as having potential and Oxfam is continuing with a similar approach. The Cattle Owners' Associations (COA) established under OCAP are particularly strong and are being used as a coordination mechanism not only by those farmers that benefitted under OCAP but also other farmers engaging in cattle production for a variety of assistance, from accessing markets to negotiations with third parties such as Café Cooperativa Timor which is currently scaling up its activities in Oecusse. MAF sees cattle fattening as a promising initiative and has used the CDF mechanism to increase cattle ownership in the enclave. OCAP provided concept training in self-help group formation to trainees from groups supported by other institutions. Seven SHG not affiliated to OCAP have now been formed as a result.

Simple technology introduced to increase vegetable production has also been adopted more widely, and is now being promoted by Caritas and Oxfam in Oecusse. Women that have become active in community life through their membership of SHGs are becoming, in coordination with Centro Feto in Oecusse, actively involved in public life. ETAZONE, founded by the SoS in Oecusse with OCAP's active support and encouragement continues to work towards a satisfactory economic regime for the enclave. In terms of the services introduced through the CDF, all such projects are now handed over to, and the responsibility of, the beneficiary community groups and are being backstopped by local government – these include water and sanitation services, market buildings, schools, gabion infrastructure and irrigation canals.

4. What inputs are the beneficiaries supplying in order to maintain these technologies, skills and services, and how do they obtain them?

In most cases, the technologies and skills listed above are self maintaining and do not require inputs other than the commitment of time from beneficiaries in order to maintain them – a commitment which has been demonstrated over the past five years. In relation to the CDF components which involved the construction of various pieces of infrastructure, some inputs are required for maintenance purposes. In such instances, evidence of an ongoing commitment and ability on the part of the community to provide the necessary inputs to maintain such structures was an essential part of the CDF assessment process. In many cases, as was seen during the field visit, user fees have been introduced and are being used as a maintenance fund. Linkages have been formed with local government in order that more major repairs may be carried out when required.

5. Which technologies, skills or services introduced under OCAP are not being continued, and why not?

Some of the aspects of OCAP that were dropped during implementation such as the forestry element, the fisheries support for MAF and the development of small livestock are obviously not continuing. The Community Development Fund as it existed under OCAP is not continuing in that exact form at present (although a variant of it has been adopted under MAF) due to budget constraints at the local level. However, there is a strong possibility that it will be revived in line with the governments decentralisation process which is now progressing at a fast pace. MAF has not yet rejected any of the agricultural technologies introduced under OCAP although it is prioritising the livestock sector at present alongside the introduction of hand tractors in line with the nationwide push to distribute such technology as broadly as possible. Under support provided to MAF at the early stages of OCAP, the abattoir that was funded has ceased to function as an abattoir since the keys were handed over to MAF. The circumstances surrounding this decision relate to internal discussion within MAF to which the OCAP team were not privy.

6. How have project technologies (e.g. drip irrigation, ponds, SALT) contributed to enhancing the sustainability of crop production in Oecusse?

These technologies first and foremost have contributed to increasing crop production often from a situation of near zero production to a much higher level. This was particularly the case in the terms of land on slopes where water was rarely absorbed into the soil prior to the implementation of the SALT technology. The farmers are fully familiar with how to maintain the technologies and with the income they are now earning from the crops they are producing are now able to invest the time in maintaining these structures instead of being forced to work elsewhere to earn an income. Ponds and drip irrigation have both contributed to ensuring that scarce water is used as efficiently as possible so that crops can be produced for longer into the dry season. Once again, farmers have been trained in relevant maintenance and minor repairs have already been successfully carried out. PVS and PBD with improved varieties have been of particular importance in allowing farmers to select the varieties that best suit their situations. This has ensured that improved varieties have been absorbed seamlessly into the local farming system.

7. What are the main perceived environmental benefits for local people?

Environmental benefits have come not only from the agricultural component of OCAP but also from the CDF. From the agricultural components, farmers note how they have greater access to water due to the technologies that have been introduced. SALT, in combination with slash-and-mulch is valued by those who are continuing with it because unproductive hillsides with secondary scrub can be made productive, producing maize and cassava, while providing fodder and firewood from trees; the use of the loose stones from the alleys to make the contour bund leaves a good quality soil for cultivation. In terms of individual households, those that have applied for and received funding for a water supply or sanitation facilities pointed to the new clean environment in which they lived which in turn had knock-on effects on their overall health status. In addition, the SHGs set up under OCAP allowed for synergies to be created with the UNDP Environment Unit's Rural Energy pilot project which introduced bio-energy and solar energy into the enclave. Although not planned at the outset of OCAP, the SHG mechanism was flexible enough to allow such synergies, thereby enabling groups to use less fuel wood for their household energy needs.

8. To what extent will the resource-pool of former project staff result in continuing benefits in Oecusse post-project?

All of the CAFs and the deputy national project manager have remained in Oecusse. Some have been integrated into the MAF system of extension workers and the others have secured employment with a local NGO (FEEEO) which continues to work to build the capacity of communities in Oecusse. In this way, the skills that they have built over the five years of OCAP will continue to be applied within Oecusse rather than being transferred elsewhere. In addition, the employment of one former OCAP member as the coordinator of MAFs extension service in Oecusse has ensured that the lessons learned from OCAP can be fed into MAFs future planning, helping to avoid the pitfalls whilst also applying the positive lessons that had been learned along the way.

Sustainability of OCAP is rated good, for several reasons including the strong continuing interest of the district administration and MAF; the commitment of the former project staff; and the low maintenance requirement for many of the interventions. Overall the project is regarded as modestly successful, providing important and sustainable benefits to a needy target population, but hampered by design complexity, high support requirements for SHGs, insufficient attention to border trade issues and poor management oversight, including lack of M&E.

3.2.4 STAGE (Skills Training for gainful Employment Programme)

Problems and Needs (Relevance)

1. Was the project design sufficiently coherent and comprehensive to achieve its purpose and contribute to the OO? Were all the components really necessary (rural yes – urban no)? Was any important aspect omitted?

The STAGE Programme started being discussed in a context in which unemployment was a major concern for Timor Leste and a threat to political stability, as the country was just earning independence from Indonesian rule. Estimated unemployment was about 20 percent reaching around 43 percent among youth aged between 15 and 24 years. In order to promote a stable socio-economic condition, there was an obvious and urgent need to develop a national capacity to generate jobs through employment in the civil services, public enterprises, private sector, and employment through small scale/micro enterprises. The initial design maintained its relevance throughout the entire implementation of the Programme, emphasizing institutional building, and including all the components for self-employment promotion such as career guidance and referral, skills training, enterprise training and micro-finance services. The design of the STAGE Programme was comprehensive including the different aspects of unemployment in rural and urban areas, and particularly adjusted to the prevailing situation in Timor-Leste. All the aspect concerning the OO were considered and taken in tight consideration. Indicators were inserted at the results level having minor modifications in 2006 (see Efficiency question 2) All the indicators inserted in the revised logframe were actually extracted from the original prodoc of the STAGE. These indicators were sensible & realistic to be achieved in the project live time, as the result conclusion of the project activities largely indicates.

The integrated implementation strategy adopted by the STAGE implies a total transparency of results and compelled the Programme to be totally and permanently accountable not only to the execution agency, implementing partners and to the donor, but also and first of all, to the national counterpart. From the very beginning that STAGE was considered a programme/instrument of the Government, and it was crucial for the Government to be always aware of the progress of the activities.

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) methodology established by STAGE, as further described below, was a response to this need, involving teams assigned to the different relevant departments of the National Directorate of Employment and National Directorate of Vocational Training. A Labour Market Information (LMI) Department was also created by STAGE within the structure of the national counterpart, including the development of a LMI computerized database, which represented a platform to systematize data collection and processing. This LMI database system was a crucial M&E instrument, providing permanently updated information on, for example, all unemployed job and training seekers registered in the District Employment Centres, and information on all the participants in the skills training, enterprise training and micro-credit schemes. The M&E function was considered a fundamental pillar of the implementation of the STAGE. The M&E was the basis of the entire community empowerment component of the STAGE. Community proposals submitted to EVTF were evaluated and approved or rejected on the basis of preliminary M&E missions conducted by the relevant departments of the SEFOPE. The same applied to the progress payments approved by the EVTF during the implementation, always supported by the results of the respective monitoring missions.

The M&E system, including the LMI database, was used by STAGE for the preparation of all progress reports. Currently, and after the end of the STAGE, the LMI Department represents the backbone that allows SEFOPE to report its activities to the Council of Ministers and to the social partners, and the continuous evaluation and adjustment of the programmes.

2. Was there adequate GO capacity, in the context of the post-conflict project design period, to identify requirements and undertake the planned programme? To what extent were the Secretariat of State for Labour and Solidarity (predecessor of Secretariat of for

Vocational Training and Employment - SEFOPE) and other stakeholders involved in developing the project and revising the logframe? Were they appropriate stakeholders or would it have been better to work through other organisations?

Against this Country's overall backcloth, STAGE was designed in close consultation with the initial main counterpart agency, the Secretariat of State for Labour and Solidarity (SSLS) (later on converted into Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion and finally into the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment under the present Government). The choice of the Secretariat of State for Labour and Solidarity (SSLS) as the STAGE main national counterpart was particularly appropriated, considering that SSLS was the sole Government agency responsible for employment and skills development. On the other hand, SSLS, similarly to most of the other Timor-Leste Government departments at the time, was a relatively new and inexperienced institution, extremely under-resourced in terms of equipment, and marked by a severe lack of human resources both at the level of quantity and quality. Very few of the SSLS staff in-charge for the running of the initial Division of Employment and Skills Development (DESD) possessed formal qualifications for their job, and most of them were actually working in fields not at all related with their education.

Furthermore, there was not enough staff within the SLSS to handle the demand for employment-related services. In-depth and substantive consultations were jointly held by SSLS and ILO with training and micro-credit providers to collect additional feedback and inputs on the Programme design, approach, strategy, and implementation arrangements. Based on the above joint work and consultations, STAGE proposed a three-fold strategy designed to assist the Secretariat of State for Labour and Solidarity to develop the competences, methodologies, and instruments to deliver effective employment services, strengthen the capacity of SSLS departments and staff, existing rural and urban training providers, and empower communities through the provision of skills and micro-enterprise development and business start-up support. The services would be delivered by SSLS staff and thus contribute to community trust in public services and organizations. Immediately upon the STAGE inception, and while relationships with the counterpart institution, stakeholders and implementing partner organizations were intensified and strengthened. The original logical framework was slightly revised to improve clarity and indicators but the Programme immediate objectives and results remained unchanged.

3. What difficulties were faced by the original design and were these satisfactorily addressed in the logframe revision?

A very important difficult feature of the original design of the STAGE was to foresee the establishment of an Employment and Vocational Training Fund (EVTF), to promote and support the training and income generating activities start-up under the community empowerment objective. The fund was carefully designed so that it could be administered by SSLS with a high degree of transparency and deliver concrete results at the community level. STAGE developed EVTF administration guidelines and governance structure. Linked to the EVTF was also the regular coaching of SSLS/SEFOPE staff appointed to the EVTF committees, SSLS district employment centres, training providers, and introduction of community-based rapid market appraisals, so that communities were able to match the areas of training needs with market opportunities. Such programme design & implementation contributed to a satisfactory LF proved that the EVTF, implemented by STAGE, was a strategic and enabling element for the overall achievements and, most of all, for the sustainability of the STAGE programme.

Achievement of Purpose (Effectiveness)

1. Is SEFOPE fully capable of developing, coordinating, monitoring and delivering urban/rural vocational enterprise skills development?

The five-year implementation timeframe of the STAGE provided a good opportunity for strong and structural capacity building initiatives to be introduced and consolidated within the Secretariat of State for Vocational Training and Employment (SEFOPE), and represented a major factor contributing to the overall success of the Programme. It allowed for significant upgrading of the capacities of the partner vocational training centres, business development centres and, to a lesser extent, micro-finance institutions. On the other hand, the integrated implementation strategy promoted important results in terms of institutional capacity building of the national counterparts and sustainability of activities. STAGE worked fully embedded in the organizational structure of its national counterparts, sharing premises with the National Directorate of Employment (DNE) and the National Directorate of Vocational Training (DNAFOP), thereby representing a continuous institution building resource, properly placed to assess and respond to identified capacity and organizational gaps. ILO and SEFOPE departmental leaders worked side by side in planning, executing, monitoring, and evaluation of programme initiatives.

Thirty four national staff were recruited by SEFOPE with financial support from the STAGE and placed in various positions within the District Employment Centres, and under the Directorate of Employment and Directorate of Vocational Training. They were assigned to the tasks that are now the main features of SEFOPE, including field monitoring. When STAGE closed they were absorbed as permanent staff of SEFOPE, thus maintaining operational and administrative capacity to further implement STAGE-initiated employment creation mechanisms. Finally, the STAGE integrated implementation strategy was also translated into impressive results in the lives of programme's final beneficiaries – the Timorese men and women jobseekers. Following an initial period inevitably centred on the strengthening of the national counterpart teams at central and district levels, the same Programme that was initially planned to cover a maximum of four districts and to create around 6,000 jobs, actually achieved a national coverage organising activities in all thirteen districts, providing counselling and referral services to more than 27,000 registered unemployed (48.5%% women) and generating more than 11,000 sustainable jobs (of which 77% occupied by women).

2. Has the EVTF contributed significantly to beneficiaries' livelihoods?

During this process, SEFOPE was able to increase its capacity to respond to the national employment challenge. On the one hand, the FEFOP "Fundo de Emprego e Formação Profissional" (also set-up with STAGE assistance, and approved by the Council of Ministers as a development of the programme's original EVTF) represents a structural instrument to enlarge the range of training and employment promotion programmes supported, including specific initiatives (on-the-job training, internships, and work experience) to facilitate school-to-work transition. On the other hand, the increased capacity of SEFOPE's Division of Employment and Division of Vocational Training to provide labour market services, and the expanded network of partner organizations, created an enlarged basis for the implementation of community empowerment initiatives throughout Timor-Leste. Putting its District Employment Centres at the core of a network of Vocational Training Centres, Business Development Services Providers and Micro Finance Institutions contributed to improving SEFOPE's visibility and the quality of its employment and career guidance services as well as creating, at district level, a solid coordination mechanism for any intervention in the area of self-employment promotion.

Considering the extremely limited opportunities for wage employment created by the fragile economy of Timor-Leste, and especially in the rural areas, STAGE defined the promotion of

self-employment as a priority target for the programmes supported by the EVTF. All the training manuals and Training of Trainers developed and implemented to establish the networks of Skills Training and Enterprise Training Providers went on this direction from the very beginning. The same applied with the capacity building for the District Employment Centres and with the definition of the micro-credit schemes in partnership with micro-finance institutions.

This network of District Employment Centres, Vocational Training Centres, Business Development Centres, and Micro-Finance Institutions, supported by the STAGE continuous capacity building programmes and the EVTF resources, allowed the implementation of an “integrated micro-enterprise development strategy” where unemployed registered in the District Employment Centres (DECs) were provided with access to vocational training, business management training, and micro-finance services²⁷.

MFIs directly benefited from such linkages since they could refer, through the services of the DECs, loan applicants to vocational and/or management training first, lowering the risk of defaulting on loan repayments. On the other hand, Training Providers also profited from this services because they were able to offer their clients much more than mere training. Potential and existing entrepreneurs also took advantage from the combined efforts of training providers and financing institutions working together since they were able to directly approach the latter for funding after training or counselling.

The Monitoring and Follow-up missions conducted by the SEFOPE show that, in overall terms, 86% of the participants in the business training programmes initiated their businesses. Moreover, each created micro-enterprise employed, in average, 1.5 workers. Despite the fact that the large majority (90%) of the businesses employ only family members, 97% of the total of entrepreneurs/workers are paid a salary.

The above results clearly demonstrate the level of effectiveness achieved by the STAGE Programme, which was built based on the improved capacity of the national implementing partners, and on the articulation and synergies created among vocational training centres, business training centres and micro-finance institutions, lead by the District Employment Centres. Results also display the importance of the Programme for the rural households livelihood, for whom the only alternative was subsistence agriculture.

Sound Management and Value for Money (Efficiency)

1. What synergies resulted from the links with other programme components? (and demonstrate the synergies)

Effective synergies were accomplished in Oecusse where beneficiaries of the OCAP agriculture skills courses were assisted by SEFOPE's Oecusse District Employment Centre. They were subsequently provided access to business management training and micro-credit schemes organised with the support of STAGE and financed through the EVTF.

PERWL was a short project which terminated before STAGE got into full swing and hence there was no opportunity to collaborate. The AIM component was located in Viqueque, a district not included in the initial priorities defined by the Government of Timor-Leste for the STAGE.

²⁷ A field visit to two of these DECs in Baucau and Dili, indicates the strong support to the local community empowerment strategy providing registration, counselling, advice and referral to local courses run by VT providers as well as handling recruitment exercises for labour-based projects to jobseekers, especially to young people entering the work force. It was provided during the visits, a list of registered people by district, sub district, age, education level, training received, work status, another list of the codified and visited companies to obtain information on their actual work force and their immediate/future needs and noted the list of vocational training centres in the districts were to send the job seeker in need of training. They have also actively promoted opportunities for local communities to obtain training and employment support through proposals under FEFOP to develop local income generating opportunities. They also serve as a monitoring agency and coordination point between training providers, MFI and local communities involved in implementing EVTF proposals

2. What changes in management techniques or in project approach resulted from the 2006 logframe revision? Did these have a positive or negative effect on project performance?

The 2006 logframe review was undertaken to upgrade the Results level OVIs. This did not involve any modification to programme objectives or activities, but it facilitated improved articulation of the project's results and better reporting. However the Purpose level indicators were removed from the revised logframe and the very weak Overall Objective indicator (income and employment generating opportunities are increased) was unchanged. It therefore became more difficult for the project to measure and report on impact. This situation is well explained in the note having differences between the EU and ILO logframe structure and indicators.²⁸

The Project Document, work plan of 2006 and workplan/results for period Nov 2007-April 2008 showed on-going efforts by the ILO to improve the indicators to facilitate reporting. The Evaluator seemed to be of an opinion that UNDP actively engaged project M&E. The M&E report carried out by UNDP consultant was submitted to STAGE In April 2008 whether this is the final version of the report is questionable and to what extent ILO inputs were incorporated is not known.

Regarding the STAGE impact assessment, various evaluative undertaking – project final evaluation, TVET impact assessment, self-employment assessment, SIMU assessment, avail information about the qualitative contribution of STAGE that would be difficult to capture accurately with quantitative targets.

3. What advantages accrued to the project as a result of management by UNDP/ ILO?

As part of the STAGE integrated implementation strategy, the ILO programme's international staff worked directly with the national counterpart (DESD/SEFOPE) staff. STAGE assigned

²⁸ Logframe structure:

There were some initial difficulties with differences of terminology, because the "Programme Purpose" is a term not usual for the ILO. However, STAGE adopted the traditional "chain" including the following steps:

- 1-Overall Objective;
- 2-Immediate Objectives;
- 3-Results;
- 4-Activities.

Basically nothing changed except for the fact that the term of "Programme Purpose" was replaced by "Immediate Objectives"

Logframe Indicators:

Initially the EU indicators were at three levels:

- Overall Objective;
- Programme Purpose;
- Results.

These initial indicators were gradually developed during the implementation of the Programme. Indicators for the Overall Objective didn't change, and the Immediate Objectives (The three components of STAGE: (i) SEFOPE Capacity Building; (ii) Training Providers Strengthening; and (iii) Community Empowerment), were always understood by STAGE as the target/indicators themselves. In 2006, the Programme introduced the "Results Framework" as the main monitoring and evaluation tool. It includes indicators at the Results level, and introduced for the first time, indicators at the Activity level. This set of indicators at the Results and at the Activity levels were felt as a much more useful tool to guide the implementation of the Programme, and to allow appropriate monitoring and evaluation. The set of indicators defined were gradually revised and updated during the lifespan of the Programme. STAGE think that this is the most important aspect to be highlighted, considering that this development of indicators at the Results and Activity levels really represented a very helpful and transparent tool for the STAGE.

each ILO international expert to a specific head of department. Then, instead of recruiting national staff through ILO, all the additional national staff was recruited under the national counterpart. This allowed the building of an enlarged, cheaper and more unified team. During the lifespan of the Programme, SEFOPE completed the process of integration of all the national staff initially selected and recruited with the support of the STAGE to reinforce the teams of the National Directorate of Employment and National Directorate of Vocational Training. A total of 34 staff were recruited and transferred in this way. This was a fundamental step in the development of the SEFOPE labour market services, and demonstrated SEFOPE's commitment to ensuring the sustainability of its institutional strengthening process and to achieving a continuous improvement of its outreach capacity. This indicates the appropriateness of the STAGE implementation strategy.

4. Were staff and finances appropriate and available in time?

The UNDP and ILO partnership in the implementation of the STAGE programme rested upon the global agreement between UNDP and ILO. Clear procedures were already set up with regards to reporting and financial transfers. ILO Budget Department and UNDP HQ in New York managed the inter-agency financial reporting and transfer of funds. The STAGE programme was opened in ILO account at the full amount. Should expenditures in a given year exceed the planned allocation, the ILO advanced the fund. It seems that there was no problem with transfer of fund between UNDP and ILO.

Difficulties in the project financial management lay in the need to combine three financial/accounting systems (those of UNDP, ILO, and the EC). This was a complicated matter, which had implications in project implementation, as the staff in UNDP and ILO needed to learn about each agency's accounting system and try to map the information into EC format as they were performing their work. Financial reporting and budget revision were two key areas of difficulties.

Financial reporting required mapping financial expenditures from ILO accounting system to EC format and converting from USD to Euro. The reports then needed to be reviewed by UNDP staff who were learning about ILO's accounting system. The situation improved towards the end of the project. This arrangement generated significant workload for both ILO and UNDP staff who provided direct programming support (i.e., resources planning, budget management, and implementation). As staff spent their personal/weekend time on this, the reporting did not impact project implementation.

Budget revision: by UNDP and ILO global agreement, any revised allocation is subject to UNDP approval. Although the EC financial rules allows for a 15% tolerance level for budget revision, any changes in budget line allocation are subject to UNDP approval. Reviews of request for budget approval took time when the operational environments were quite fluid and demanded constant adjustments. Substantive time investments were needed from UNDP and ILO in preparation and review of budget revision and hence coping strategies to minimize adverse impact to on-the-ground activities. As activities could only be initiated after budget approval, STAGE's activities planning had to be adjusted. A series of small activities, rather than one comprehensive set, were implemented. When feasible, the project also mobilized resources from ILO regular budget to ensure sufficient funds for some of the activities. Truthfully, the time required for budget revision and due process in approval in both ILO and UNDP meant that there was little time left at the end of the project to fully disburse all project's budget. A balance of some USD 100,000 was unspent.

5. What was the final utilisation of funds and staff inputs, and why did this differ from the original plan?

The project budget was originally designed with a big-ILO team of international and national staff to implement activities. The international staff plan (CTA, business development expert, and community empowerment expert for the full timeframe, gender, vocational skills training, and MIS for the first 2 yrs, and some short inputs) was quite appropriate. However, on gender expertise, it would have been more beneficial to have had a gender advisor in Timor-Leste in the second half of the project as the system was solidified and better absorptive capacity. Regular and instant inputs were much needed.

As already mentioned, national staff were recruited through SEFOPE. However, because of difficulties within SEFOPE to plan and disburse its budget, STAGE provided substantive support in operations and staff costs to enable progress. The project's original design foresaw ILO hiring of 10 national professional staff and 10 national support staff (admin and finance, logistics, and drivers). The ILO granted a special approval for a contracting arrangement with SEFOPE to match realities in Timor-Leste. Budget allocations for national staff remained within the original amount, as SEFOPE salary scale is much lower than that of the ILO. Allocations for operations, maintenance, equipment, and sundries at the project were high but within the 15% tolerance. High operational costs are typical in post-conflict situations.

6. What advantages did the integrated implementation approach confer, and could better performance have been achieved if a different approach had been followed?

Besides the obvious advantages in terms of capacity building and national ownership, the STAGE integrated implementation strategy proved an excellent instrument to inspire, promote and support the sustainability of the Programme. By recruiting national staff into government positions instead of on consultancy terms, the normal end-of-project disruption and loss of capacity was avoided.

7. How did the M&E programme and the PSC system improve project strategy and management?

The initially planned UNDP M&E programme for the four components of the package was never visible at least at the level of field monitoring. Nevertheless, STAGE assisted its national counterparts in the establishment of a methodology for the continuous monitoring of the implementation of activities. This monitoring methodology is part of the Operational Guidelines developed to rule the implementation of the EVTF, and involves staff of the Departments of Vocational Training, On-the-Job Training, Self-Employment Promotion, Labour Market Information and Gender Cabinet at the central level, as well as staff of the District Employment Centres. The SEFOPE monitoring was a central part of the Programme, allowing the initial assessment of the community empowerment proposals to be approved, reformulated or rejected, and the continuous follow-up. It was a key function also enabling national counterpart capacity building and promoting national ownership.

Regular PSC meetings were organised to assess the progress of the activities of the Programme and discuss the plans for immediate implementation. The PSC comprised the Secretary of State SEFOPE, representatives from UNDP, EU and ILO, representatives from Employer and Trade Union organizations and relevant Department Heads from SEFOPE and other Ministries when appropriate. As a rule, the SCM met biannually during the project with the final meeting taking place in May 2009. In general, all the institutions, including the national counterparts, were represented at high level representing an important mechanism to provide appropriate guidance to the Programme. The STAGE/SEFOPE Monitoring programme was central to the entire programme. Each community empowerment activity

Achievement of Wider Effects (Impact)

1. What changes in levels of paid or self-employment have arisen as a result of STAGE activities, especially in rural areas? Can changes in urban areas be attributed to people relocating from rural areas?

Basically, the only “urban” areas of Timor-Leste are the cities of Dili and Baucau. The designation of “city” here is used to make the distinction versus “district”. Most of the district of Dili is in fact peri-urban/rural and this is even more visible in Baucau. All the other districts are clearly rural zones. In this context, STAGE, like all the other components of the EC Package, was a rural development Programme.

The results of the community empowerment component of the STAGE, as presented below, show that, starting from 2006, more than 3,000 sustainable jobs/year were created through the activities financed by the EVTF. This represents about 20% of the new entrants in the labour market, and a very important and impressive number for a country in which the formal economy comprises no more than 40,000 people²⁹.

In addition, STAGE created a national capacity to continue, expand and monitor the impact of the activities. Currently, SEFOPE is launching a “Labour Force Survey” that will collect and process updated labour market data in all the 13 districts of Timor-Leste. The survey is implemented by the LMI (Labour Market Information) Department of the SEFOPE that was created and trained by STAGE.

2. Is there likely to be an appropriate contribution to poverty reduction and economic growth as a result of STAGE?

Despite all the contextual challenges including the very low institutional ground at the start, the social unrest and economic chaos associated with the crisis in 2006 and 2007, and the Governmental changes that forced the STAGE to work with three different national counterparts, the Programme was able to overcome such constraints. The STAGE achievements surpassed all the defined targets, but the success of the Programme reached far beyond this exceeding of the original targets.

Three key impacts of STAGE contributing to poverty reduction and increasing economic growth are:

²⁹ CDC Business Plan Exercise: Early in the project, the “Centro de Desenvolvimento Comunitário” (CDC) in Baucau which was selected as local partner of the STAGE Programme as part of the community empowerment process for the district of Baucau. STAGE assisted the strengthening of the CDC for the delivery of community based training in different skills areas and for the provision of post-training monitoring and support to the trained community groups. STAGE and CDC cooperated in the design and implementation of the “Blacksmith” and “Agro Food” training in resulted in the trained Blacksmith and Agro Food groups now producing and selling goods for a number of clients in different districts of Timor-Leste. STAGE subsequently supported CDC to develop a business plan to help promote its sustainability, assuring these CDC to better assist the involved groups to become enterprises. During field visit to Bacau CDC, the manager shown the income generating activities coming from products produced by an Agro Food groups as different fruits and vegetable cans resulted by group processing and packaging (Jam, marmalade, compost of different kind). These products are actually bought by the Ministry of Commerce & Industry to be distributed to TL schools.

Visiting the Blacksmith groups and production site was noted the numerous agricultural tool produced and sold to a number of clients in different district of TL, while the group head proudly indicate us the recent received certification from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry providing them the enterprise status as “Blacksmith Community Production Centre of Bacau”.

- Improved SEFOPE administration and operational capacity for implementation of employment creation mechanisms,
- Solid trust building between community and SEFOPE units,
- Increased incomes and employability of Timorese men and women jobseekers.

a) SEFOPE administration and operational capacity

The STAGE Programme was designed to support interventions in the three districts of Dili, Baucau and Bobonaro. Rapidly after the start, the Programme assisted the launching of activities in the District of Oecusse. The establishment of the SEFOPE in 2007 brought in a new vision and urgency to expand the labour market services provided to the communities, and the STAGE Programme was requested to support that goal, within the boundaries of the Programme budget. This situation was further emphasized by the recommendations of the Programme MTE that also pointed out the importance of ensuring the provision of training and employment opportunities at the national level. STAGE worked with SEFOPE in the design and implementation of an expansion plan based on the strengthening of the existing District Employment Centres and also on the increase of the capacity established within the National Directorates of Vocational Training (DNAFOP) and Employment (DNE) at the central level. Gradually, the District Employment Centres (DECs) reached a real regional coverage. Each DEC was able to positively respond to the request to support activities in a number of districts. At the same time, the central teams of the DNAFOP and DNE have been able to fulfil their roles as national bodies and promote, support and follow-up on training and employment activities in all the 13 districts of Timor-Leste.

b) Community Trust

On the other hand, the STAGE results in the economic empowerment of rural communities would have not been possible without the improved institutional capacity among training providers. The technical and management staff of the training providers in the STAGE network were supported to attend a series of technical and management training, became exposed to new concepts and training methodologies, and were provided with new training programmes and training materials. These opportunities improved the quality of training delivered to the communities and consequently the livelihoods and earning abilities of community members both in the short run and the long run.³⁰

The cumulative number of registered unemployed reached 27,017: a figure that is higher than the one reported by the Census 2004. It unmistakably shows the visibility of the District Employment Centres and, in turn, reflects the improved quality of their labour market services provided to the communities.

c) Increased incomes and employability of Timorese men and women jobseekers

In quantitative terms, the Programme exceeded the initially defined targets for the Vocational Training and for the Enterprise Training and Credit components. The table below profiles STAGE beneficiaries:

³⁰LAHO) Business Development Plan - Sericulture: Another intervention has been given by STAGE support to the local organization LAHO (Loron Aban Hahu Ohin – The Future Starts Today). The aim of the plan is to develop LAHO from an operating NGO project into a community co-operative, whose main impacts will have been to realize the transition from subsistence farming to income generating farming for the local farmers and to provide sustainable employment for staff in the manufacture of silk product. A Field visit to LAHO site meeting the management shows the strong commitment and enthusiasm as well as the practical approach. Farmers involved will receive silk warm from the LAHO which has special chambers to grow the warm from the eggs, and subsequently feeding them with planted mulberry tree leaves till the degree of cocoons, and later giving back the cocoon to LAHO for spinning and waving. The farmer's competencies will improve till the point where the farmers will spin the cocoon silk. About 180/200 people will be involved in such production much requested for export.

Description of services	Total beneficiaries	% of women participation
Registration and Employment Counseling (EC) of unemployed at the District Employment Centres	27,017	48.5%
EC & Vocational Training	1,923	46.0%
EC & Enterprise development	4,643	81.5%
EC & Micro credits	2,880	99.5%
EC & Job Placement	596	30.5%

The number of vocational training, enterprise development training, micro credits, and job placements services provided totals 10,042 (77% benefited by women). Due to the overlaps in the vocational training and enterprise development population, the actual number of beneficiaries is 9,028 (6,951 women).

From the services provided by STAGE, and taking in consideration the results of the Impact Assessments conducted by the SEFOPE for the Vocational Training and Self-Employment components, it is possible to calculate the number of jobs created:

Description	Jobs created	Women (%)
Vocational training	961 (1,923 x 50%)	442 (46%)
Self-employment	9,704 (7,523 x 86% x 1.5)	8,733 (90%)
Direct job placements	596	182 (30.5%)
Total	11,262	5,358 (55%)

In addition, the STAGE Programme centred particular attention in the promotion of women's equal access to employment and training opportunities. After experimenting a very difficult start (the initial three months of operation of the District Employment Centres saw 900 men registered as unemployed and no women registered at all), by the end of the programme in May 2009, women participants outnumbered men in nearly all components. Total programme average shows that women constituted 48.5% of the registered unemployed population and 80% of the EVTF beneficiaries. Women are the dominant beneficiaries of enterprise development and microfinance services.

Vocational training has been an area where women's participation has been relatively low. In September 2008, women represented only 29.6% of skills trainees. In May 2009, a significant increase is recorded :46%.

STAGE success to ensure that women, burdened by family responsibilities, have been able to participate in and benefit from SEFOPE employment programmes does not happened un-engineered. Close monitoring of the SIMU data, regular gender analyses of programme performance, and TVET impact assessment have been instrumental for the SEFOPE team to understand critical issues that hampered women's participation. These issues are for example selection of courses, course duration, relevance of economic opportunities in the communities, and gender awareness of training providers.

Likely Continuation of Achieved Results (Sustainability)

1. Which were the actions put in place to support local community empowerment and encourage the continuation of the component activities?

DESD minute workforce was the baseline for the design of the STAGE embedded implementation strategy, which in hindsight proved to be the right response to the identified challenge. From the very beginning, the STAGE Programme and its national counterpart formed a single harmonized team that functioned as a whole towards overall common objectives to support the local communities. A key element of this integrated strategy was the establishment of a “service agreement” between STAGE and DESD according to which all the additional national staff required to achieve the proposed objectives was selected, trained and recruited. Over the years, STAGE has put in place a system of integrated employment and skills training services that are sensitive to labour market conditions and strongly support the local community empowerment.

2. Which were the actions put in place to support SEFOPE project’s ownership?

Guidelines for the administration and implementation of the system were developed, introduced, reviewed and legislated. Staffs of SEFOPE and counterpart organizations were trained in a range of skills areas so that they could operationalize the system effectively. The STAGE intensive on-the-job training and coaching support, together with the commitment of SEFOPE, bear fruit. In the final year of STAGE programme, a cadre of capable managers and technical trainers has emerged. They are now in charge of implementing various aspects of the integrated employment and skills training services system and expanding the programmes.

The adopted integrated implementation strategy promoted a powerful national ownership. It ensured that all the outputs of the Programme were achieved through the national counterpart, based on the development of an internal capacity that was projected to other national and international implementing partners and finally to empower the communities. The approach allowed that the external recognised face of the Programme was primarily associated with the staff of the District Employment Centres, and the national counterpart Directors and Heads of Department. As the results of STAGE were visible to the community as well as government institutions in the national administration system, SEFOPE was able to secure national budget allocation for STAGE-initiated existing programmes and new ones.

A fundamental component to ensure the sustainability of the activities launched by the STAGE was the creation of the FEFOP-“Fundo de Emprego e Formação Profissional” supported by national legislation approved by the Council of Ministers. The approved FEFOP Law represented a clear recognition of the importance of the EVTF (Employment and Vocational Training Fund) initially established by the STAGE, and shows the commitment of the Government to ensure the sustainability of this key instrument to promote the creation of training and employment opportunities in the communities. The approval of the FEFOP Law, developed with the technical and legal assistance of STAGE, enabled the use of the State Budget to finance the continuation of the different types of activities launched and supported by the EVTF, sustaining the implementation of employment policies and the establishment of consistent and effective linkages between employment and training services on one side, and income generation and economic development programmes on the other.

The delivery of services to the districts is a process under the leadership of SEFOPE and implemented by a network of training providers and Micro-Finance Institutions. STAGE worked with SEFOPE in the implementation of an intensive plan to expand the coverage of the community empowerment component. This expansion was enabled by a broad range of preparatory works including the assessment of vocational training providers, an increased

capacity of the Business Development Centres to implement quality enterprise training, the development of new partnerships with Micro-Finance Institutions, and the improved monitoring and backstopping capacity of the SEFOPE teams at the central level. The combination of these measures has engendered a lasting capacity for self-employment promotion at the district level, with SEFOPE staff ensuring the quality of the services by conducting regular field monitoring.

3.3 Mutual Reinforcement and Member State Value-Added

In addition to the five DAC Evaluation Criteria, the TOR also calls for an assessment of the additional two EC criteria, which are Coherence and Value Added. To avoid repetition in each of the preceding sections, these two criteria are dealt with separately in this section.

3.3.1 Mutual Reinforcement (Coherence)

At the time of its design, this programme had a very good fit with the GoTL NDP and with the EC CSP (2002-2006) and this has already been described in Section 2.1. The NDP, which represents the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy remained in force throughout the duration of the project, although the change of government in 2007 may have resulted in a certain change of emphasis in its implementation, most notably in the tendency to prioritise actions in the western part of the country. The only implication of this to the impact of RDP has been the de-prioritisation of the rehabilitation of road A-08, being the road along which the 5 AIM bridges lie (and it is not proven that policy towards the west is the full explanation – the road was included as two out of 64 links in a feasibility study, which included traffic counts, and achieved a low rating). From being a high priority in 2003, this road now does not feature among the 32 road sections to be rehabilitated in the draft 10-yr plan to 2020.

The EC presence in Timor Leste developed dramatically over the course of the RDP, from a representational office to a full Delegation in 2009, following Timor Leste's ratification of the Cotonou Agreement and hence membership of the ACP countries in December 2005. As such, Timor Leste left the ALA grouping and to cover the transition and to maintain synchronicity with the EDF mechanism, a bridging CSP/NIP 2006-2007 was prepared, covering the 9th EDF, followed by a full 2008-2013 CSP and NIP for EDF 10. The bridging CSP had a budget of €18m and covered two focal areas – sustainable rural development and institutional capacity building. The present 2008-13 CSP, with a budget of €63m, covers three focal sectors and two non-focal sectors. The focal sectors are Sustainable rural development (€35m, 55% of NIP), Health (€8m, 13%), and Institutional capacity building (€13m, 21%). The remaining 11% of the budget are allocated for the non-focal sectors of support to non-state actors and the technical assistance facility. Indicative actions proposed in the current CSP include, under the sustainable rural development sector:

- Agricultural production and extension activities, including training and sensitization in sustainable techniques for conserving natural resources, and possibly deforestation and integrated water resources management
- Development of links between producers and traders and appropriate financial institutions
- Development of rural roads and rural infrastructure notably in the fields of sustainable energy and water supply
- Strengthening the extension and support services of MAF to improve service delivery.
- Capacity development in MAF and possibly other Ministries involved in the programme
- Skills enhancement on central and local level (provision of on-the-job trainings)

These are additional to other EC-financed or co-financed actions that have commenced since RDP began, such as RDP II and RDP III which, inter-alia, support activities in MAF and MoPW related to agricultural extension, capacity building and rural infrastructure.

Under the institutional capacity building focal sector, two of the five indicative actions are:

- Actions to improve the capacities and performance of the civil service; and
- Support to communication with the aim of fostering understanding and information within institutions and with the population. This will be done through national and community radio as well as other available media.

These priorities are well-placed to build upon the experiences of ARP III and OCAP and to take advantage of the outputs of AIM.

The non-focal sector support to NSAs allows for capacity building and support to organisations involved in promoting improved conditions for society or sections of society. This offers potential to continue support to the 18 CSOs active under PERWL, and to the NGO and SHGs in Oecusse.

The only examples of potential duplication of activities during the RDP lifetime were in the very small seeds activity included in the agri-business sub-component of ARP III, which was successfully solved by cancelling ARP III's continued involvement, and in vaccination campaigns in Oecusse, where both MAF and OCAP had programmes, but this was also solved promptly by OCAP cancelling the activity.

Mutual reinforcement and coherence are therefore rated high.

3.3.2 EC Value Added

Numerous EC member states contribute to the development process in Timor Leste. Several paid into the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET), to the tune of \$109m (Portugal \$50m, EC \$47.4m and smaller contributions from UK, Finland and Ireland), with Japan (\$28m) and Australia (\$12.4m) being the other major donors. The TFET is managed by the World Bank, and contributed \$3m to ARP III.

Annual donor meetings enable issues of coordination, complementarity and conflict to be addressed, and there are more frequent meetings with the EC MS. The fact that the debriefing for this evaluation was attended by representatives from Spain, France and Germany (as well as Australia; Ireland and Portugal being absent on leave) who contributed to the discussion, indicates their interest in keeping mutually updated.

EC MS donors with bilateral technical cooperation programmes include Portugal, Spain, Sweden, France, Ireland and Germany. Justice and governance are favoured sectors receiving support from Portugal, Sweden, France and Ireland. Education is supported by Portugal; Germany supports the maritime sector and food security; and France has involvement in tourism and journalism. Institutional capacity building is a sector which receives significant donor support and requires coordination. The Irish contribute to a trust fund for the Planning and Financial Management Capacity Building Programme (PFMCBP).

The EC is the major donor in rural development, which is a sector also supported by Germany and Spain. The Spanish have a rural development programme in Liquica district, whereas Germany is a 50% contributor to RDP II (to which the EC contributes the other 50%) which is implemented by GTZ. The EC also has recently commenced the RDP III project in Manufahi district. RDP II is particularly important as follow-up to ARP III. It is involved in many of the MAF directorates, as well as in the MoPW, and has an important role in policy and planning, as well as in specific technical and geographic areas. The other two programmes are district-based development programmes and RDP III operates in the district in which the Caralaun scheme is located. RDP III and the Liquica RDP are both connected to the new National Directorate for Agricultural Community Development, which is responsible for the new extension agents. There is no sign of any conflict between the newer programmes and any of the components of the first RDP. On the contrary, there are good prospects that the programmes, especially RDP II, can strengthen various capacity building aspects of the ARP III intervention. However RDP II does not have the mandate or resources to fully undertake the remaining work that needs to be done in MAF to develop a more integrated organisation of mutually supporting directorates. EC Value added is therefore regarded as positive, but not highly significant.

4. Visibility

Visibility is a compulsory requirement for all development interventions funded or partially funded by the EC. Guidelines for compliance are issued from time to time and published on the EC website, and indeed new guidance was issued during this evaluation, replacing the 2005 version which would have been applicable to the RDP projects.

4.1 RCDRA

The Contribution Agreement for RCDRA, Article 7(1)(5) specifies “it is mandatory for the Organisation to implement the rules laid down in the General Conditions (annex 2) on donor visibility (art.6)”. Article 6 is quite detailed and can be summarised that all infrastructure, equipment, vehicles, information materials and publicity materials provided to, or produced by, the project should acknowledge the EC contribution and display the EC logo.

The Evaluation Team was satisfied that the RCDRA components had complied with requirements:

- All 5 AIM bridges had marble plaques at each end showing the EC logo and informing that the bridge had been financed by the European Union. People in the vicinity of the bridges were able to quote this.
- Plaques and logos were clearly displayed on OCAP buildings, equipment and CDF community infrastructure. Newspaper articles have acknowledged EC funding.
- PERWL, whose activities were mainly transformational learning procedures, had clear visibility on training materials and on banners used at events.
- Visibility was evident at all the STAGE project sites visited. Signboards and logos were prominently displayed on programme vehicles, manuals, documents, media tools, etc. But most importantly in discussion with all the relevant partners, the Mission found that the EC contribution to the success of the STAGE programme was clearly acknowledged by them all.
- Logos and acknowledgement of EC contributions are also clearly visible on the web pages and downloadable information sheets of all these projects.

4.2 ARP III

The Administration Agreement with the World Bank states in Article 4 of the Special Conditions states that all press releases and other information materials should indicate EC funding, that visible infrastructure should display a plaque or similarly visible sign, and that Article 7 of the Standard Provisions should be fully applied. The latter principally refers to recognition in articles, seminars, training programmes, symposia. In contrast to the findings of the Mid-term Evaluation, which stated that signboards were erected except at Caralaun, the Final Evaluation Team did not find any evidence of visibility at any of the many sites visited, including the Caralaun scheme, several of the community rehabilitated irrigation and farm-to-market roads, several agromet stations, several cold-chain (solar operated fridges) installations, agribusiness service centres, nor at any of the three processing plants visited. Logos are not present on equipment, or on any of the materials produced under the Information to Farmers sub-component. Apparently a plaque was produced for the opening ceremony of the Caralaun scheme, but was removed to have the Minister's signature engraved, and has never been returned. The Director General promised to rectify this promptly.

5 Overall Assessment

5.1 Achievement of RDP Purpose and contribution to the Overall Objective as set out in the Financing Decision and TAPs.

The TAP Annex 2 presents a logical framework of the overall project, which is reproduced hereunder in Annex 6. The Project Purpose is: *To support six initiatives that contribute to rural development by restoring community infrastructure, empowering communities, increasing job opportunities, improving livelihood capacities and self-sufficiency (food security) in rural areas.*

Community infrastructure was restored through three of the interventions – ARP III, OCAP CDF and ACS. OCAP and ACS operated in specific geographic areas, whereas the projects implemented under ARP III were widespread (see map, Annex 7). OCAP undertook nearly 60 community infrastructure projects. ARP III rehabilitated about 850ha of irrigated riceland from a target of 3,000ha, and at least 87km from a target of 150km of farm to market roads. The OVI of ‘infrastructure works in rural areas completed and market access improved’, albeit a weak one for lack of targets, has therefore been achieved although the ARP III targets were not. One of the MOV for this indicator concerns AIM, but the AIM bridges cannot be regarded as community infrastructure since there was no community input in needs identification or planning, only minor input in construction and the communities do not have O&M responsibilities.

The indicators for empowering communities are ‘communities and local government empowered’ and ‘gender equity attained and role of women in key positions strengthened’, both of which have indicators of ‘project/M&E reports: all projects’, with ‘particularly PERWL’ added to the latter. Again these are weak indicators and especially weak MOV. There is no likelihood, nor record, of community empowerment being achieved through AIM and very little under ARP III – since the setting up of organisations such as WUAs does not necessarily reflect community empowerment. Undoubtedly the SHGs formed by OCAP can be considered to be empowering, and more than 180 have endured. However, about 240 SHGs did not survive to the end of the project, and another 380 were not established from the initial target of 800. Therefore, from an empowerment point of view, the achievement of OCAP against the expectation was very modest. Community empowerment was also achieved under PERWL, in a nationwide context, but unfortunately in a manner that cannot be quantified. Nevertheless, as the report on PERWL has indicated, the evaluation team feels that direct community empowerment was achieved and also that the potential for continuing empowerment, not restricted to gender issues, through use of the TLPC experiential learning process is good. As for the MOV of ‘gender equity attained’, it is inappropriate. None of the projects had achievement of gender equity as a target. There is probably no country in the world that has attained gender equity and certainly it cannot be expected in Timor Leste in the foreseeable future. As for ‘the role of women in key positions strengthened’, again this was not a target of any project, including PERWL (whose purpose was ‘to guarantee and protect the rights of rural women in Timor Leste’). Over the course of the RDP project, the role of women in key positions has been strengthened, because the suco councils have been created and elected, and these have included positions for women and female youth. This happened independently of the project and PERWL’s role in the process was to promote the participation of women, both as candidates and as voters. However, since the seats were reserved for women and nearly all of them were filled, the conclusion that PERWL was responsible for getting women elected would not be accurate. Nevertheless, the evaluation team feels that the TLPC process used by PERWL had the potential to change community attitudes and thereby enable elected women to participate more effectively.

In terms of increasing job opportunities, the indicator is ‘level of employment and income increased’. Unfortunately this is also a weak indicator. The MOV again point to project reports, indicating that the indicator is not expected to be affected at the national statistics level, but only within projects’ spheres of influence. The specified projects are STAGE, OCAP, ACS and ARP III. ACS was not part of this evaluation. Some of the OCAP activities have definitely been profitable for their practitioners – especially cattle fattening, brick making and vegetable production. ARP III has not collected information on beneficiary livelihoods. The evaluation findings were that the agribusiness component has not resulted in the setting up of sustainable

businesses, and that the irrigation component has not achieved the anticipated increases in cropping intensity that would indicate the transformation from subsistence farming to market-oriented farming. Regarding increase in level of employment, STAGE is the relevant project. It was expected to assist 8,000 unemployed people by ensuring their access to career guidance services and training and employment opportunities. Of these, 6,000 were expected to be successful in finding employment or in initiating their own income generating activities. In fact STAGE reports generating more than 11,000 jobs, of which nearly 10,000 are in self-employment, and most of the beneficiaries were female.

Regarding the purpose level indicator of improving livelihood capacities and self-sufficiency (food security) in rural areas, the indicator is 'food security improved (inter-alia, alternative commodities expanded, vulnerability to drought reduced, rice production increased, role of MAF strengthened)'. OCAP has contributed through expanding vegetable production in Oecusse, but this indicator mainly refers to ARP III. The agri-business component has encouraged production of non-traditional marketable crops such as mungbean and soybean, but there are no details of uptake and it is thought to be minor. Vulnerability to drought was covered by a sub-component excluded from the evaluation because it was not directly funded by the EC. There is no systematic data on improvements in rice crop yields and production, and it would be too soon to expect it as the vagaries of each season necessitate comparison of data averaged over several years, both pre- and post- rehabilitation of the irrigation schemes. It is known that the take-up of rice production in the irrigated areas has been below expectation, and where it is successful it is through the efforts of other interventions such as RDP II. With the recent employment of extension agents, the potential role of MAF in improving food security has been strengthened, but it was not done through ARP III.

Overall, because of the weakness of the indicators it is possible to say that the Project Purpose has been partially achieved, but if the indicators had been less ambiguous and had set suitably ambitious targets, it is likely that they would not have been met. Certainly in terms of contributing to the Overall Objective of pursuing overall poverty reduction, economic growth (and stability), the achievement has been below reasonable expectations.

5.2 Synergies within the programme

It is understood and accepted that at the time the programme was prepared, the EC wished to undertake a significant programme of assistance in Timor Leste, but did not have sufficient capacity in its Finance and Contracts Section in the Jakarta Delegation to support a large number of interventions. This resulted in the decision to package the programme into 3 contracts – RCDRA, ARP III, and ACS (the latter being a short programme that has been evaluated earlier and is not included in the remit of this evaluation). This packaging is clear in the Financing Decision. It is also clear, especially for the four RCDRA projects (AIM, OCAP, PERWL and STAGE) that this was simply a marriage of convenience that was not designed to achieve significant synergies. The RDP was a rural development project with an emphasis on moving away from the rehabilitation focus of the contemporary interventions towards a development orientation. It was neither planned nor named as an *integrated* rural development project. As such, the expectation for synergies or complementarity should be only at the level of expectations between unconnected projects. Nevertheless, it is pleasing to report that efforts were made at the outset to identify and foster scope for synergies. These were all reported in the MTE and so are mentioned only briefly here. The main focus for synergies was Oecusse and this is understandable since OCAP served a clear geographic area with a fairly holistic rural development remit; this meant that it was likely to have complementarity with several of the other projects. PERWL assisted OCAP by giving gender training to CAFs and studying female participation in SHGs, while benefitting from both CAFs and SHGs to leverage some of its message delivery. STAGE and OCAP collaborated on a cash-for-work flood protection scheme implemented under the CDF. OCAP worked closely with MAF, and the Secretary of State for Livestock chaired the PSC. The project was therefore able to avoid duplication with ARP III in activities such as vaccination campaigns; unfortunately however, because MAF was very top-down at the time, there were some misunderstandings when agreements made with the District Director of Agriculture were ignored or over-ruled by the headquarters. The only known example of attempted synergy outside Oecusse was a suggestion that STAGE could assist with the

supply of labourers for the AIM contractor and sub-contractors. However this was resisted by local labour sources, who pointed out that the benefits should go to local people and STAGE did not at that time operate in Viqueque.

It is worth mentioning some missed opportunities for synergy. Both of these concern AIM, which is a project that the evaluation team feels will struggle to meet its potential for stimulating the local economy in the foreseeable future. Its prospects might be brighter if things had been handled differently at the RDP design stage. Firstly, despite the argument based on economic returns (the assumptions and data for which are always likely to be questionable in a country emerging from crisis, with unreliable or missing statistics), the prospect for rehabilitating the large Uatolari irrigation scheme adjacent to the AIM project area should have been prioritised over Caralaun, on the grounds that it would stimulate agricultural trade in the area and hence motivate farmers with irrigable land between the bridges. Secondly, both AIM (30 months) and ACS (36 months) were planned as short projects within the 60-month RDP timeframe, so it would have been possible to phase them, with ACS starting in the second year, rather than for both to start at the same time. ACS was involved in community infrastructure rehabilitation in three districts including the two districts served by AIM. Several ACS schemes are visible when driving between Bridge 5 and Los Palos, but none were seen between Bridges 1 and 5. It is possible that poor communication led to exclusion of schemes in this area, and that the potential for stimulating agricultural production in the area through minor irrigation, flood protection or other schemes of agricultural merit was not exploited.

5.3 Management issues relating to the RCDRA

RCDRA was a package of four projects managed by UNDP under a Contribution Agreement regulated by the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) between the EC and UN. The intention was that the EC administrative workload would be simplified through this arrangement. The projects were to be implemented through other UN agencies – UNOPS (AIM and OCAP); ILO (STAGE); and UNIFEM (PERWL). Although each project had a budget line for M&E it was decided that the implementing agency should receive from and then pay back this amount to UNDP, which would undertake the M&E as part of its general management responsibilities.

There were benefits and disadvantages to this arrangement. The prime benefit was that it enabled the four projects to be implemented. The EC was not in a position to award four separate contracts. Secondly, it gave the opportunity for UNDP to contribute to the projects, beyond its committed contribution. In the case of PERWL, UNDP contributed an additional \$100,000 to support several activities (UNIFEM also provided an additional \$30,000 and although it doesn't sound like much, these contributions represent a 20% increase over PERWL's original budget of €625,000 (at €1=\$1)).

The main disadvantage was that the arrangement did not really simplify the administrative workload for the EC. The use of three different implementing agencies, two of them with representation in Bangkok, not in Dili, and each having its own system of financial reporting, turned out to be too complicated, and resulted in delays of up to 9 months in submission of Annual Reports. One particular problem was the perceived need to report to a financial year governed by the date of the CA, which conflicted with the standard UN reporting period based on the calendar year. In fact the EC accepted a switch to that basis, but only towards the end of the programme – it would have done so earlier, but nobody realised it could be requested. This is a point that could be made in future guidelines for the FAFA.

Particularly in the early years, reports contained mathematical errors, leading to a concern that UNDP might not be exercising its responsibility to ensure that expenditure was being properly made and accounted for. Since the EC contract was with UNDP and not with the implementing agencies, the Commission found itself unable to follow-up on such concerns.

Another serious disadvantage was the lack of effective M&E. The value of M&E budget lines repaid to UNDP by the projects was \$835,000, and there is very little to show for it. Given that this was a package of non-related projects, and not an integrated programme, there was no real

justification for attempting an integrated M&E system. The RCDRA logframe (Annex 6) does not have an integrated Purpose, but simply collects together the Purpose statements (and indicators, MOV and assumptions) of each of the four projects. Progress monitoring was done and reported by the individual projects as would be expected, and the progress reports supplied by UNDP are simply compilations of reports provided by each project. They indicate progress against activities and nothing more. In discussions with staff from UNDP and UNOPS, and technical staff of the ILO project, it appears that there is confusion about what is regarded as M&E by the UN organisations and the EC. The UN organisations frequently referred to their results framework synonymously to the logical framework, and pointed out that the UN system uses the results framework for monitoring. The results framework is similar to a workplan, and as such follows the logframe format but is focussed at activity level. Progress monitoring is indeed done at that level. However M&E requires monitoring at higher levels – Results and Purpose – and this seems to have been misunderstood. Whatever the reason, there was no monitoring at Results and Purpose levels, and hence no opportunity for UNDP to provide strategic guidance to the projects it was managing or for the projects themselves to undertake informed reflection. This situation continued to the end of the programme despite being highlighted in several ROM reports and the MTE. In the worst case – AIM – an entire result was ignored by the implementing agency and UNDP took no action.

This lack of M&E also led to some missed opportunities for UNDP to perform more effectively. UNDP was a member of the PSC for all four projects and attended all the meetings. In the case of AIM alone, there were at least 18 PSC meetings, so the involvement was quite high. However, the minutes of those meetings do not reflect the intention of UNDP, as manager, to use the PSCs as fora to consider project strategies and make necessary programme modifications. The AIM PSC meetings were all concerned with micro-management of the construction contract – a process that should have been undertaken by the MoPW's Project Management Unit that AIM was intended to strengthen. In fact the PSC did not (unless at the outset – some of the initial minutes have been lost) discuss the issue of support to the PMU. It also had no substantive discussion about the upgrading of road A-08, which was eventually de-prioritised, or about any strategy to promote agricultural trade or other economic or social benefits that could result from the bridge construction.

UNDP set up a coordination group for the RCDRA projects. The minutes that were provided show that meetings were brief and purely administrative, involving UNDP informing the projects of the content and deadlines required for financial and progress reporting. These meetings presented an opportunity to discuss M&E needs or any other central support that UNDP could have provided to the projects, but this was not taken.

The overall conclusions are firstly that RCDRA did not, and could not, function as a programme because it comprised a package of disparate projects and secondly that UNDP found itself in a situation where it felt it had no clear role other than to coordinate and compile progress reports. Even that was a challenge because of the reporting procedures used by the different organisations involved. UNDP appears not to have understood the potential influence it could have had in terms of strategic guidance to projects if it had implemented a strong M&E system, but it must be remembered that the case for a centralised M&E system with such diverse projects was weak and it might have been wiser to have given back full M&E responsibility (and budget) to the individual projects at an early stage. Like the EC, UNDP itself has found the arrangement unsatisfactory and would not wish to repeat it. It believes it has a lot to offer in terms of partnership with the EC, but that further collaboration should be in terms of projects or programmes to be implemented directly by UNDP.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

The political context at the time of the RDP preparation and continuing through implementation was of considerable significance. During the preparation process in 2003 Timor Leste was a new country with little physical presence of donor agencies and very high visibility of the UN. The EC had a small office reporting to the Delegation in Jakarta. The decision to package the programme into three contracts was pragmatic in such circumstances, but possibly created a higher expectation of coordination and synergy than was reasonable. The packaging led to several layers of logframes (layer 1: RDP; layer 2: RCDRA, ACS, ARP III; layer 3: AIM, PERWL, OCAP, STAGE) and more attention could have been paid to what outcomes were expected at the higher levels (especially RDP, RCDRA and ARP III), and what mechanisms would be available to adjust the programme to improve prospects of achieving them. These three logframes had common characteristics in that they suffered from poor internal logic (especially Results to Purpose) and weak indicators.

The implementation period included times of civil unrest during which disruption occurred to most of the projects, often resulting in the withdrawal of staff from project areas, and of international staff from the country. ARP III and AIM suffered particularly badly from looting and vandalism of equipment and MAF was forced to relocate offices twice and to replace several advisers who did not return following evacuation. Naturally performance was affected and ARP III would likely have been more successful if it had enjoyed more stable times.

The management of RCDRA by UNDP was not successful and resulted in dissatisfaction for all parties. UNDP did not succeed in finding a role for itself other than as a middleman between EC on one side and UNOPS, ILO and UNIFEM on the other. It did not undertake its M&E function and, probably related to that, did not provide strategic oversight to the projects, either directly or through the PSCs.

Regarding specific projects, the principle conclusions and lessons learned are summarised as follows:

ARP III

The capacity building objective was not achievable through the components undertaken, and to some extent the components, through being implemented by specific directorates, undermined the objective. MAF still needs to develop procedures for integrated planning, programming and implementation cross-directorates in order to deliver services that will enable farmers to successfully increase production and income. This is not easily done in a project context which tends to favour activity-based targets over change management processes, but until it is done projects might undertake their activities yet struggle to reach their objectives – under-utilised irrigation schemes being an example. Linkages between the new National Directorate for Agricultural Community Development, which operates the new extension service and therefore is the primary link to the grassroots, and the other directorates will be key.

AIM

The five bridges have been built, but rehabilitation of the road has been cancelled and there is as yet no sign of increased traffic. Proper involvement of the DoRB&FC, as per the project design, might have improved the prospects for the road rehabilitation. A lesson to learn is the need for strong oversight of implementing agencies, especially on engineering projects where intangible outputs such as capacity building can tend to get overlooked. There was no community preparation aspect to this project, and hence no quick response by communities to increase their production now that access to markets is easier. The assumption that market forces alone will stimulate action might hold true in time, but, as long as potential can be proven, encouragement through direct intervention will be quicker.

OCAP

OCAP 's experience mirrored that of many other community-based rural development / food security projects around the world, in that it struggled with policy and sustainable group development issues, but did well with introduction of agricultural and other IGAs. The fact that all the CAFs are still in Oecusse, either working for MAF or in NGOs continuing OCAP support and methods is very positive. The main lessons to learn concern setting of realistic targets (formation of 800 SHGs was later reduced to 200) and taking heed of identified community needs (cross-border trade) even if they are complex and require inputs of unforeseen skills.

PERWL

PERWL successfully introduced an innovative tool for community development (TLPC) and contributed to the success of the first suco committee elections. It under-estimated the demand that it would create for its services, but was able to source additional funding to increase its outreach. The 3-year duration was rather short to enable sufficient follow-up and reinforcement, since it was dealing with attitudinal change, which is a long term process. Nevertheless significant behavioural changes have been reported and many women beneficiaries have championed local development projects. The PERWL process has been fully documented and represents a fully-tested support system ready for replication.

STAGE

STAGE succeeded in becoming and remaining fully embedded in the government structure, despite two reorganisations, and is highly valued by the present administration. The Employment and Vocational Training Fund was adapted as Fundo de Emprego e Formacao Profissional (FEFOP) represents a structural instrument to enlarge the range of training and employment promotion programmes supported. The manuals and handbooks produced by STAGE are widely acknowledged as major resources for vocational training providers.

6.2 Recommendations

The most pertinent recommendations, given that the programme has finished, are related to the design and management of similar programmes in future and are addressed to the EC.

The first recommendation is to **avoid packaging of disparate projects** into programmes unless absolutely essential. The reason is that in the packaging process will come the temptation to look for efficiencies and synergies. Seeking efficiencies in packaged programmes poses a risk. Efficiencies are likely to concern horizontal or cross-cutting issues – M&E, gender, environment, rights etc. The experience of RCDRA with M&E was unsuccessful. Although the normal care must be taken to ensure coordination and complementarity of each project with the others in the package, as with all other projects including those of other donors, expectations of synergy should not be raised unless they have been specifically built in to the programme.

Secondly, **the opportunity to promote synergy within a package is greatest in the design stage**. Special care should be taken during the design to seek out synergies, without sacrificing value of individual projects. Examples already mentioned include the possibility of phasing interventions so that one can take advantage of the other (eg if ACS had been delayed until the AIM bridges were built³¹) or of including synergistic benefits in the selection process of schemes (eg favouring Uatolari to Caralaun irrigation rehabilitation because of its proximity to AIM). From the time the Financing Decision was signed in December 2003 these options would have required amendments.

Thirdly, if packaging projects (disparate or not) **use a single management and implementation agency**. The other significant issue with RCDRA was the administrative challenge of timely preparation and submission of reports based on data from multiple implementation agencies. Reporting on a packaged programme is a contractual necessity which

³¹ It turned out that the bridge construction was delayed, but the point remains valid

can inadvertently hold back some projects if others are under-performing (in terms of requesting disbursements), but when it involves several partners, each with its own reporting procedures, the risks of delay, compilation errors, non-acceptance of reports etc is increased. RCDRA submitted its 6-monthly report for April -September 2008 in August 2009. If the package had been of four projects managed and implemented by the same agency (for example, by UNDP), delays and errors would be expected to be much lower. Nevertheless the argument about under-achieving projects holding back the rest remains valid and it would be preferable to avoid packaging whenever possible.

Recommendations pertaining to specific projects are:

ARP III

MAF requires a period of stability in which to develop its institutional culture, following the numerous reorganisations of recent years and **would benefit from further support in change management and capacity building**. It needs to develop the ability for cross-directorate programming and collaboration, and this will become increasingly apparent with the creation of the National Directorate for Agricultural Community Development which will become the main interface with farmers. Most training in the past has focussed on technical skills, and while there is still a need for strengthening in this area, it is equally important that senior staff have the opportunity to develop management skills in strategic planning, including setting of realistic objectives in terms of benefits to farmers (rather than services provided) and developing effective monitoring programmes to track their progress.

AIM

As and when the opportunity arises in donor and NGO coordination meetings, and with government organisations, **the EC should raise awareness about the improved access** to Uotolari, Uato-carbau and Iliomar sub-districts and **encourage prudent rural development initiatives** in the area. If the communities respond and traffic flows increase, the EC should lobby for re-prioritisation of the rehabilitation of the A-08 road.

OCAP

The most important issue relates to the border trade, and this is now being taken up by the Oecusse administration. **UNDP and the EC are encouraged to follow developments and participate in the process** (dialogue, review etc) as appropriate. A feature of OCAP was use of the MYRADA model to form SHGs. The EC, in its NGO grants for Food Security has supported several NGOs to undertake programmes which have used similar rural IGA approaches (lined ponds, SALT, etc) but with different models for group formation. Some of the programmes will end within the next year and it would be interesting for **the EC to fund a comparative study of the various models** employed, with particular regard to ease of group formation, performance in selected IGAs and sustainability of the groups.

PERWL

TLPC is a potentially powerful tool for rural development in general, not simply as a tool related to gender issues. It works on political, socio-cultural and economic levels. **UNIFEM should consider how to develop the tool for wider application in Timor Leste and raise awareness about it** at donor and NGO forums. Many of the local women's organisations that implemented PERWL may represent a capable pool of training providers in community development.

STAGE

STAGE appears to have embedded a sustainable and workable system within SEFOPE. It also produced a number of highly regarded training manuals and handbooks. **SEFOPE should take care to ensure that these are updated periodically, new topics added as required, and that they continue to be distributed and used** in vocational training.

Annexes

- 1. Terms of Reference of the Final Evaluation**
- 2. Names of the evaluators and their company**
- 3. Mission Itinerary**
- 4. List of persons consulted**
- 5. List of documents consulted**
- 6. Logframe matrices**
- 7. Maps**
- 8. DAC summary**

Annex 1

Terms of Reference of the Final Evaluation



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Final Evaluation of Timor Leste Rural Development Programme (TL RDP)	
Beneficiary Country	Timor Leste
Sector (as defined in CSP/NIP)	Rural Development
Project number	ASIE/2003/005-795

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 Context

- The poverty incidence in Timor-Leste continues to be one of the highest in Asia and in the world with a Human Development Index rank of 140¹. Despite progress in many areas since the restoration of independence in 2002, 50% of Timor-Leste's population (estimated at 925,000) still live below the poverty line. Poverty indicators and trends have shown a worsening of the standard of living between 2001 and 2007. There are ongoing problems with environmental degradation, food insecurity, inefficient service delivery, damaged or poorly maintained infrastructures and poor health and nutrition.
- Most poor people live in rural areas. Indicators show a trend of increasing poverty from East to West part of Timor Leste and mostly concentrated in the western districts. Upland families are more likely to be poor than lowland families, although this division is increasingly less distinct. Annually, 90% of the population suffers food shortages for at least one month, with the majority suffering shortages for 3 to 5 months between November and March each year. Moreover the crisis of 2006 resulted in the displacement of 100,000 people and unsettlement in rural areas due to rebel army roaming the country. These problems have now been mostly solved: the rebel soldiers were reintegrated in civilian life, while 53 of the 64 IDP camps have been closed and the people returned to their homes or to transit shelters.
- Ninety percent of the rural population relies on farming as the sole source of income while another 10% relying on wages and other income, including self-employment. The vast majority of East Timorese are engaged in subsistence agriculture with low productivity. Raising cattle and small livestock and growing maize, sweet potato and cassava are the main subsistence activities, especially in the uplands, and relatively few products are traded. Environmentally unsustainable farming practices such as the application of traditional shifting cultivation systems, have contributed to the uncontrolled degradation forest and watershed in the country. Local populations experience annual cycles of drought, flash flooding, soil erosion, pests and diseases which contribute to further impoverishment.

¹ Human Development Report 2006, UNDP

- With a view to contribute to making the transition from humanitarian emergency aid and the ensuing rehabilitation/reconstruction phase to a longer term development approach with tangible benefits for the rural poor, the EC adopted a Decision on 17 December 2003, ASIE 2003 / 005-795, in support of Timor Leste Rural Development Programme (TL RDP) with a total EC contribution of € 25.5 million. The programme was in conformity with the development priorities as expressed in the Country Strategy Paper for Timor-Leste (2002-2006) and the National Indicative programme (2002-04), which adopted health, rural development and public institutional capacity building as the key priority areas of focus for EC development cooperation with Timor-Leste.
- In order to assess and maximize relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and lessons learnt for future similar initiatives, the EC wishes to launch a final evaluation of TL RDP to assess the final achievements of the programme. The final evaluation will cover 5 of the 6 components, 1 component (implemented through IOM) having already be evaluated after completion (31/03/2007).

1.2 Description of TIMOR LESTE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (TL RDP)

1.2.1 Overall objective

- The overall objective of TL RDP is to pursue overall poverty reduction, economic growth (and stability) in line with the Timor Leste Government poverty reduction strategy and the National Development Plan.

1.2.1 Programme Purpose

- The programme purpose is to support six (6) initiatives that contribute to rural development by restoring community infrastructure, empowering communities, increasing job opportunities, improving livelihood capacities and self-sufficiency (food supply) in rural areas.

TL RDP consists of 6 components (3 contracts). For the implementation of the 6 components, the EC signed three contribution / administration agreements with UNDP, IOM and WB and IOM.

Total component cost: € 31,210,219			
EC contribution:	€ 25,500,000	100.00 %	Other funding sources: € 5,710,219
Rehabilitation and Community Development in rural areas (RCDRA) - UNDP	€ 14,880,193	58.35 %	(UN AGENCIES) € 783,168
- Access Improvements to Markets in the Eastern Region (AIM)	€ 6,592,110	25.88 %	(UNDP / UNOPS) € 0
- Oecussi Ambeno Community Activation Project (OCAP)	€ 3,062,089	12.01 %	(UNDP / UNOPS) € 297,168
- Skills Training for Gainful Employment (STAGE).	€ 4,650,994	18.24 %	(UNDP / ILO) € 436,000
- Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building in Timor Leste (PERWL).	€ 575,000	2.25 %	(UNDP / UNIFEM) € 50,000
Assistance to Community Stabilisation in Timor Leste (ACS) - IOM	€ 2,715,502	10.65 %	(IOM) € 389,732
Agriculture Rehabilitation Project (ARP III) - World Bank	€ 6,854,530	26.88 %	(TFET) € 3,000,119 (CFET) € 1,537,200
<i>Monitoring, evaluation & audit</i>	€ 700,000	2.75 %	€ 0
<i>Contingencies</i>	€ 349,775	1.37 %	€ 0

1.2.3 Expected results

The expected results of TL RDP are:

- AIM: Improved access to markets - key bridges repaired thereby opening up district roads in Viqueque and Lautem for vehicular use (main target group: farmers and traders);
- OCAP: Livelihood opportunities restored through the adoption of improved agricultural technologies, food security and basic service delivery in Oecussi (main target group: rural population);
- STAGE: Increased employment through vocational skills training nation-wide (main target group: government staff, trainers and rural poor);
- PERWL: Enhanced rural women's leadership and participation through the empowerment of the women's civil rights nation-wide (main target group: rural women);
- ACS: *120 community based infrastructure components in the Eastern region rehabilitated, e.g. markets, village water systems and community irrigation schemes (main target group: farmers and traders)*²;
- ARP III: Capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and its development partners strengthened to support farmers in increasing sustainable production and income (main target group: government staff, farmers, development partners).

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

2.1 Global objective

The final evaluation, which has been foreseen in the Technical and Administrative Provisions of the Commission Decision, will provide the decision-makers in the Government of Timor Leste, the relevant services in the European Commission, the implementing partners (UNDP and the WB) and the wider public with sufficient information to:

- make an overall independent assessment about the past performance of the programme / components, paying particularly attention to the impact of the actions against its overall objective and project purpose;
- identify key lessons learnt and practical recommendations for future rural development programme / projects in Timor Leste;

These Terms of Reference are for a comprehensive and independent final evaluation of the TL RDP and its components:

- UNDP – RCDRA which consists of four components: AIM, OCAP, STAGE and PERLW.
- WB – ARP III
- IOM – ACS. **This component will not be covered by this final evaluation as it was already completed when the Mid Term Review (MTR) mission took place in March 2007.**

A brief summary of the six components is presented in Annex IV of this ToR.

2.2 Issues to be Studied

- The evaluation study responds to the requirements of the last phase of the project cycle. The experts shall verify, analyse and assess in detail the issues outlined in Annex II "Indicative Layout and Structure of the Final Evaluation Report". The list of issues is not intended to be exhaustive, and they refer to the five evaluation criteria endorsed by the OECD-DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact), and to the EC-specific evaluation criteria (EC added value and coherence).
- The experts are requested to verify, analyse and assess the integration and impact of cross cutting issue in the project. The experts are required to use their professional judgement and experience to review all relevant factors and to bring these to the attention of the Government of Timor Leste and European Commission.

² This component will not be covered by this evaluation.

- The evaluation criteria should all be assessed taking into consideration the conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt provided in the previous Mid Term Evaluation.

2.3 Requested services and Methodology³

- The selected consultant shall provide a team of experts to undertake an evaluation of TL RDP.
- At the start of the evaluation mission, the experts will have a briefing with the EC Delegation in Dili, Timor Leste.
- The experts will undertake a desk review of all available documents relevant to the programme / components.
- Within 5 working days the commencement of the mission, the experts will develop an inception report, in consultation with the implementing partners (UNDP, WB and relevant GoTL agencies). The inception report will outline the scope, methodology and process of the final evaluation, as well as identify key stakeholders to be consulted and activities to be undertaken. It will include a schedule for meetings with relevant parties and for field visit.
- The team will carry out field visits of the 5 components and hold discussions with relevant ministries of the GoTL, implementing agencies, project management units, main beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders to assess relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and potential sustainability of the components. It will ensure adequate contact and consultation with, and involvement of, the different stakeholders, working closely with the relevant government authorities and agencies during the entire assignment.
- At the end of the mission, the experts will conduct a debriefing in Timor Leste, with the EC Delegation in Dili, Timor Leste, relevant government agencies and component representatives. Another debriefing by the Team Leader of the evaluation mission. is foreseen with the EC Delegation in Jakarta, Indonesia.

2.4 Requested Outputs

- An inception note outlining the evaluation mission work plan and methodology.
- A draft outline of the de-briefing for stakeholders in Timor Leste, presenting the main conclusions. The outline will be approved by the EC Delegation in Indonesia prior to the de-briefing meeting.
- A draft final report using the indicative structure set out in Annex II.
- A final report with the same specifications as the draft final report, taking into accounts comments from the EC Delegation in Indonesia.

3. EXPERTS PROFILE

The evaluation team will be composed of 5 experts with the following profiles and qualifications:

Common features:

- a solid and diversified experience in the specific field of expertise needed, including experience in evaluation of programmes / projects;
- experience in the region and Timor Leste highly desirable (years of experience may vary per expert irrespective of their position on the team);
- excellent report writing skills, full working knowledge of English, and if possible of Tetum Language, Portuguese Language or Bahasa Indonesia would be an asset but not compulsory;
- fully conversant with the concept and principles of EC project cycle management;
- experience in working with programme / projects funded by other international institutions, notably World Bank and UNDP.

³ For methodological guidance refer to the EuropeAid's Evaluation methodology website http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/evaluation/intro_pages/methods.htm where guidance is available for both evaluation managers (Commission staff) and evaluation teams (consultants) as well as to 'Aid Delivery Methods', Volume 1 'Project Cycle Management Guidelines (EuropeAid, March 2004) http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/reports/pcm_guidelines_2004_en.pdf

3.1 Expertise required

Profile	Max number of Working Days ⁴	Nr.	CAT
Team leader – Specialist in project evaluation	35	1	Cat I
Rural Business Development Specialist	30	1	Cat II
Rural Infrastructure Specialist	30	1	Cat II
Institutional development expert	30	1	Cat II
Environmental Specialist	19	1	Cat II

▪ **Team-leader (Category I) - Specialist in project evaluation**

Assignment	32 working days maximum with 3 days travel. The expert will act as team leader and will be responsible for the overall planning and implementation of the mission, as well as for the preparation, presentation, finalisation and in-time delivery of the evaluation report.
Qualifications	At least up to Masters' Degree in rural development, tropical agronomy or other relevant discipline; <u>Minimum requirements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimum 15 years of experience in rural development projects with significant experience in the monitoring and/or evaluation of development cooperation activities, with specific experience in the evaluation of rural development projects; ▪ Proven experience in the field of post-crisis assistance and community development; ▪ Familiarity with EC-supported projects and procedures; ▪ Familiarity with the evaluation guidelines of the EC; ▪ Fluency in English both spoken and written; ▪ Excellent writing and reporting skills.

▪ **Rural Business Development Specialist (Category II)**

Assignment	28 working days maximum with 2 days travel. The expert will work under the supervision of the Team Leader.
Qualifications	At least up to Masters' Degree in relevant discipline. <u>Minimum requirements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimum 10 years experience in the area of private sector development, microfinance, agribusiness in developing countries, preferably in post-crisis situations; ▪ Familiarity with the evaluation guidelines of the EC; ▪ Fluency in English both spoken and written; ▪ Excellent writing and reporting skills.

⁴ Including travel time and report writing

- **Rural Infrastructure Specialist (Category II)**

Assignment	28 working days maximum with 2 days travel. The expert will work under the supervision of the Team Leader.
Qualifications	This expert should have at least up to Masters' degree in civil engineering or other relevant disciplines). <u>Minimum requirements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimum 10 years experience in the area of infrastructure construction in rural areas of developing countries, and especially with bridges, irrigation schemes and rural water supply. ▪ Familiarity with the evaluation guidelines of the EC; ▪ Fluency in English both spoken and written; ▪ Excellent writing and reporting skills.

- **Institution Development Specialist (Category II)**

Assignment	28 working days maximum with 2 days travel. The expert will work under the supervision of the Team Leader.
Qualifications	At least up to Masters' Degree in rural development, development studies or other relevant disciplines. <u>Minimum requirements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 years experience working in institutional development/capacity building related projects, training need assessment, training implementation including vocational training, preferably related to rural development projects; ▪ Familiarity with the guidelines of Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development of the EC; ▪ Familiarity with the evaluation guidelines of the EC; ▪ Fluency in English; ▪ Excellent writing and reporting skills.

- **Environmental Specialist(Category II)**

Assignment	28 working days maximum with 2 days travel. The expert will work under the supervision of the Team Leader.
Qualifications	At least up to Masters' Degree in environment, rural development or other relevant disciplines. <u>Minimum requirements:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 years experience working in the field of environment, conducting environmental impact assessment, undertaking environmental issues in rural development / agriculture programmes / infrastructure projects; ▪ Familiarity with the evaluation guidelines of the EC; ▪ Fluency in English; ▪ Excellent writing and reporting skills.

Please note that the proposed experts must not have been directly involved in the preparation or implementation of RDP I or any of its components.

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

- **Indicative starting date: 29 June 2009** (Dili, Timor Leste)
- **Foreseen finishing period or duration:** The maximum duration of the mission is 35 working days with the detail breakdown number of days to be presented hereafter.

- The maximum number of working days allowed for each consultant during the assignment is:

Activities	Team Leader	Rural Business Development Specialist	Rural Infrastructure Specialist	Institution Development Specialist	Environmental Specialist
Timor Leste					
Mission	26	26	26	26	15
International travel	2	2	2	2	2
Indonesia					
Travel	1	-	-	-	-
Debriefing with ECD Jakarta	1	-	-	-	-
Home					
Preparation and final report writing	5	2	2	2	2
TOTAL	35	30	30	30	19

- **The location/s of assignment:** Timor Leste. A debriefing is foreseen in Jakarta, Indonesia, by the Team Leader of the evaluation mission.
- The main language used for the mission will be English. However some meetings may take place in Tetum or Portuguese language.

5. REPORTING

Quality: The quality of the final report will be assessed by the evaluation manager (in the delegation or in head quarters) using a quality assessment grid (see Annex V). The explanation on how to fill this grid is available on the following link:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/egeval/guidelines/gba_en.htm

The report must match quality standards. The text of the reports should be illustrated, as appropriate, with maps, graphs and tables; a map of the components' areas of intervention is required (to be attached as Annex).

Content: (See also Annex II)

The team is required to submit the following reports in English:

- **An inception report** of maximum 5 pages to be produced within 5 working days from the start of the mission to be given to the EC Delegation in Timor Leste and Indonesia (by email). The main objective of the inception report is to provide a work plan and a methodology. It should also describe the foreseen degree of difficulties in collecting data, other encountered and/or foreseen difficulties and other relevant information considered appropriate by the experts.
- **A draft outline of the de-briefing** for stakeholders in Timor Leste, presenting the main conclusions, to be submitted to the EC Delegation in Timor Leste and Indonesia (by email) 3 days before the de-briefing meeting taking place. The outline will be approved by the EC Delegation in Indonesia prior to the de-briefing meeting.
- **A draft final report** (of maximum 40 pages, main text, excluding annexes) using the indicative structure set out in Annex II to be submitted to the EC Delegation in Dili Timor Leste and Indonesia (by email) prior to the end of the field mission and reflecting comments of the de-briefing meeting. The EC Delegation in Indonesia will provide comments on the draft report within **20 working days** after submission.

- **A final report** with the same specifications as the draft final report, taking into accounts comments from the EC Delegation in Indonesia, to be presented within **10 working days** of the receipt of EC comments on the draft final report.

The report will be in English, maximum 50 pages long (excluding the necessary annexes) and include a comprehensive executive summary. Upon approval of the evaluation report, a full good quality translation in Portuguese will be provided, as well as a good quality translation of the executive summary in Tetum, as part of the required deliverables (Both Portuguese and Tetum are official languages of Timor-Leste).

- Distribution of all the reports should include an electronic version and 3 paper copies. For the final report, 10 paper copies should be submitted including the electronic version.

6. IMPORTANT REMARKS

- Reimbursable costs: a budget shall be allocated for international travel, local travel, per diems, and services provided by interpreter/ translator, if required. The budget should also comprise the cost of organising a debriefing workshop in Dili.
- The selected consultant will supply the personnel for the team as specified in point 3 of these Terms of Reference for the full duration of the assignment. The consultant is expected to organise the team's travel arrangements within Timor Leste, transport and support/secretarial services to the team.
- Selected experts must possess a passport with a validity of at least six months and obtain an appropriate visa to undertake the mission in Timor Leste.
- Component staff will facilitate the task of the mission, providing explanations and documentation and assisting in setting up meetings.
- The consultant must ensure that all the members of the team have laptop computers and other necessary equipment for the collection and drafting of the requested reports. The cost of such equipment cannot be charged to this contract.
- During all contacts with the Timor Leste Authorities, or any component or Organisation, the experts will clearly identify themselves as independent experts and not as official representatives of the European Commission. All documents and papers produced by the consultant will clearly mention on their first page a disclaimer stating that these are the views of the consultant and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission.
- All outputs shall be in English and contain the following reference: *“This report was prepared with the financial support of the European Commission. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the European Commission.”*

ANNEXES:

ANNEX I: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION

ANNEX II: INDICATIVE LAYOUT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

ANNEX III: METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

ANNEX IV: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EACH PROGRAMME COMPONENT

ANNEX V: QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

ANNEX VI: THE STANDARD DAC FORMAT FOR EVALUATION REPORT SUMMARIES

ANNEX I: KEY DOCUMENTS FOR THE EVALUATION

The following documents will be provided by the EC Delegation and/or component staff. This list only contains key documents which consultation will be essential for the consultation. Additional documents considered relevant by the experts should be provided as well.

- EC relevant Country Strategy Paper
- Financing Decision and Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAPs) of ASIE/2003/005-795
- Contribution Agreement with UNDP
- Administration Agreement with World Bank
- Progress Reports + EC Delegation Comments
- ROM Monitoring Reports + EC Delegation Comments
- Minutes of relevant meetings and mission reports
- Component Work Plans
- Mid-Term Evaluation report
- Other relevant reports

ANNEX II: INDICATIVE LAYOUT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

The final report should not be longer than approximately 50 pages. Additional information on context, programme or aspects of methodology and analysis should be confined to annexes.

The cover page of the report shall carry the following text:

"This evaluation is supported and guided by the European Commission and presented by [name of consulting firm]. The report does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the European Commission".

The main sections of the evaluation report are as follows:

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A tightly-drafted, to-the-point and free-standing Executive Summary is an essential document. It should be no more than five pages. It should focus mainly on the key purpose or issues of the evaluation, outline the main analytical points, and clearly indicate the main conclusions, lessons learnt and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text that follows.

2. INTRODUCTION

A description of the programme / components and the evaluation, providing the reader with sufficient methodological explanations to gauge the credibility of the conclusions and to acknowledge limitations or weaknesses, where relevant.

3. ANSWERED QUESTIONS / FINDINGS

A chapter presenting the evaluation questions and conclusive answers, together with evidence and reasoning.

The organization of the report should be made around the responses to the Evaluation questions which are systematically covering the DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, plus coherence and added value specific to the Commission. In such an approach, the criteria will be translated into specific questions. These questions are intended to give a more precise and accessible form to the evaluation criteria and to articulate the key issues of concern to stakeholders, thus optimising the focus and utility of the evaluation.

3.1. PROBLEMS AND NEEDS (RELEVANCE)

The extent to which the objectives of the development intervention (programme/components) are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and EC's policies.

The analysis of relevance will focus on the following questions in relation to the design of the component:

- the extent to which the programme / components have been consistent with, and supportive of the priorities of Timor Leste, the alignment and responsiveness of the programme and its components to the National Development Plan, Sector Investment Plans and Government Policy;
- the extent to which the programme / components have been consistent with the EC strategy in Timor Leste; EC's Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme;
- review the flexibility/adaptability of the five components under TL RDP in responding to changed priorities and circumstances in the rural development sector and within GoTL policy;

- the quality of the analyses of lessons learnt from past experience, and of sustainability issues;
- the component's coherence with current/on going initiatives;
- the quality of the problem analysis and the components' intervention logic and logical framework matrix, appropriateness of the objectively verifiable indicators of achievement;
- the extent to which stated objectives correctly address the identified problems and social needs, clarity and internal consistency of the stated objectives;
- the extent to which the nature of the problems originally identified have changed;
- the extent to which objectives have been updated in order to adapt to changes in the context;
- the degree of flexibility and adaptability to facilitate rapid responses to changes in circumstances;
- the quality of the identification of key stakeholders and target groups (including gender analysis and analysis of vulnerable groups) and of institutional capacity issues;
- the stakeholder participation in the design and in the management/implementation of the component, the level of local ownership, absorption and implementation capacity;
- the quality of the analysis of strategic options, of the justification of the recommended implementation strategy, and of management and coordination arrangements;
- the realism in the choice and quantity of inputs (financial, human and administrative resources)
- the analysis of assumptions and risks;
- the appropriateness of the recommended monitoring and evaluation arrangements.

3.2. ACHIEVEMENT OF PURPOSE (EFFECTIVENESS)

The effectiveness criterion, concerns how far the component's results were attained, and the component's specific objective(s) achieved, or are expected to be achieved.

The analysis of Effectiveness will therefore focus on such issues as:

- whether the planned benefits have been delivered and received, as perceived by all key stakeholders (including women and men and specific vulnerable groups);
- whether intended beneficiaries participated in the intervention;
- whether the components' impact on a wider number of potential beneficiaries beyond those targeted directly;
- in institutional reform components, whether behavioural patterns have changed in the beneficiary organisations or groups at various levels; and how far the changed institutional arrangements and characteristics have produced the planned improvements (e.g. in communications, productivity, ability to generate actions which lead to economic and social development);
- if the assumptions and risk assessments at results level turned out to be inadequate or invalid, or unforeseen external factors intervened, how flexible management has adapted to ensure that the results would still achieve the purpose; and how well has it been supported in this by key stakeholders including Government, Commission (HQ and locally), etc.;
- whether the balance of responsibilities between the various stakeholders was appropriate, which accompanying measures have been taken by the partner authorities;
- how unintended results have affected the benefits received positively or negatively and could have been foreseen and managed;
- whether any shortcomings were due to a failure to take account of cross-cutting or over-arching issues such as gender, environment and poverty during implementation;
- extent to which mechanisms are in place to ensure coherence, coordination, complementarity and synergies between the components; with the other EC-funded interventions and with other

stakeholders (GoTL, other donor agencies, international NGOs, other implementing partners) in Timor-Leste; and to avoid occurrence of duplication of activities;

- In which areas (geographical, sector, issue) have the components made the greatest achievements? Why is this? What have been the supporting factors? How can the component build on or expand these achievements? In which areas have the components produced the least results? What have been the constraining factors and why? How could they have been overcome?

3.3. SOUND MANAGEMENT AND VALUE FOR MONEY (EFFICIENCY)

The efficiency criterion concerns how well the various activities transformed the available resources into the intended results (sometimes referred to as outputs), in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. Comparison should be made against what was planned.

The assessment of Efficiency will therefore focus on such issues as:

- the quality of day-to-day management, for example in:
 - a. operational work planning and implementation (input delivery, activity management and delivery of outputs), and management of the budget (including cost control and whether an inadequate budget was a factor);
 - b. management of personnel, information, property, etc.;
 - c. whether management of risk has been adequate, i.e. whether flexibility has been demonstrated in response to changes in circumstances;
 - d. relations/coordination with local authorities, institutions, beneficiaries, other donors;
 - e. the quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders have been kept adequately informed of component activities (including beneficiaries/target groups);
 - f. respect for deadlines.
- extent to which the costs of the component have been justified by the benefits whether or not expressed in monetary terms in comparison with similar projects or known alternative approaches, taking account of contextual differences and eliminating market distortions;
- partner country contributions from local institutions and government (e.g. offices, experts, reports, tax exemption, as set out in the LogFrame resource schedule), target beneficiaries and other local parties: have they been provided as planned?;
- Commission HQ/Delegation inputs (e.g. procurement, training, contracting, either direct or via consultants/bureaux): have they been provided as planned?;
- technical assistance: how well did it help to provide appropriate solutions and develop local capacities to define and produce results?;
- quality of monitoring: its existence (or not), accuracy and flexibility, and the use made of it; adequacy of baseline information;
- Did any unplanned outputs arise from the activities so far?

3.4. ACHIEVEMENT OF WIDER EFFECTS (IMPACT)

The term impact denotes the relationship between the component's specific and overall objectives.

At Impact level the final evaluation will make an analysis of the following aspects:

- extent to which the objectives of the programme / components have been achieved as intended in particular the planned overall objective;

- whether the effects of the components:
 - a) have been facilitated/constrained by external factors
 - b) have produced any unintended or unexpected impacts, and if so how have these affected the overall impact.
 - c) have been facilitated/constrained by components management, by co-ordination arrangements, by the participation of relevant stakeholders
 - d) have contributed to economic and social development
 - e) have contributed to poverty reduction
 - f) have made a difference in terms of cross-cutting issues like gender equality, environment, good governance, conflict prevention etc.
 - g) were spread between economic growth, salaries and wages, foreign exchange, and budget.
- whether environmental risk from linked to the implementation of infrastructure projects have been identified and mitigated. The assessment will be based notably on:
 - the views and concerns of stakeholders,
 - the socio-economic consequences (especially on vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities),
 - compliance with environmental regulations and standards,
 - consistency with environmental objectives and policies, and
 - their implications for sustainable development.
- Review to what extent the programme / components influenced the policies and programmes of the GoTL and other relevant agencies;
- Assess to which extent TL RDP contributed to the overall poverty reduction, social and economic development and empowerment of rural communities as well as environmental benefits in the targeted regions of Timor-Leste.

3.5. LIKELY CONTINUATION OF ACHIEVED RESULTS (SUSTAINABILITY)

The sustainability criterion relates to whether the positive outcomes of the component and the flow of benefits are likely to continue after external funding ends or non funding support interventions (such as: policy dialogue, coordination).

The final evaluation will make an assessment of the prospects for the sustainability of benefits on basis of the following issues:

- the ownership of objectives and achievements, e.g. how far all stakeholders were consulted on the objectives from the outset, and whether they agreed with them and continue to remain in agreement;
- policy support and the responsibility of the beneficiary institutions, e.g. how far donor policy and national policy are corresponding, the potential effects of any policy changes; how far the relevant national, sectoral and budgetary policies and priorities are affecting the component positively or adversely; and the level of support from governmental, public, business and civil society organizations;
- institutional capacity, e.g. of the Government (e.g. through policy and budgetary support) and counterpart institutions; the extent to which the component is embedded in local institutional structures; if it involved creating a new institution, how far good relations with existing institutions have been established; whether the institution appears likely to be capable of continuing the flow of benefits after the component ends (is it well-led, with adequate and trained staff, sufficient budget and equipment?); whether counterparts have been properly prepared for taking over, technically, financially and managerially;
- the adequacy of the component budget for its purpose particularly phasing out prospects;

- socio-cultural factors, e.g. whether the component is in tune with local perceptions of needs and of ways of producing and sharing benefits; whether it respects local power- structures, status systems and beliefs, and if it sought to change any of those, how well-accepted are the changes both by the target group and by others; how well it is based on an analysis of such factors, including target group/beneficiary participation in design and implementation; and the quality of relations between the external component staff and local communities;
- financial sustainability, e.g. whether the products or services being provided are affordable for the intended beneficiaries and are likely to remained so after funding will end; whether enough funds are available to cover all costs (including recurrent costs), and continued to do so after funding will end; and economic sustainability, i.e. how well do the benefits (returns) compare to those on similar undertakings once market distortions are eliminated;
- **technical (technology) issues (i.e. methods used to increase agricultural productivity, etc.), e.g. whether (i) the technology, knowledge, process or service introduced or provided fits in with existing needs, culture, traditions, skills or knowledge; (ii) alternative technologies are being considered, where possible; and (iii) the degree in which the beneficiaries have been able to adapt to and maintain the technology acquired without further assistance;**
- wherever relevant, cross-cutting issues such as gender equity, environmental impact and good governance; were appropriately accounted for and managed from the outset of the component;
- assess the degree in which the programme/components are embedded in Government institutions, as well as the degree of preparation of these institutions to take over after the end of EC funded implementation. Are national partners committed and likely to continue the activities at the end of implementation of the programme components?

3.6. MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (COHERENCE)

The extent to which activities undertaken allow the European Commission to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other Community policies. Extent to which they complement partner country's policies and other donors' interventions.

Considering other related activities undertaken by Government or other donors, at the same level or at a higher level:

- likeliness that results and impacts will mutually reinforce one another
- likeliness that results and impacts will duplicate or conflict with one another

Connection to higher level policies (coherence)

Extent to which the component/programme (its objectives, targeted beneficiaries, timing, etc.):

- is likely to contribute to / contradict other EC policies
- is in line with evolving strategies of the EC and its partners

3.7 EC value added

Connection to the interventions of Member States. Extent to which the programme / components (its objectives, targeted beneficiaries, timing, etc.)

- is complementary to the intervention of EU Member States in the region/country/area
- is co-ordinated with the intervention of EU Member States in the region/country/area
- is creating actual synergy (or duplication) with the intervention of EU Member States
- involves concerted efforts by EU Member States and the EC to optimise synergies and avoid duplication.

4. VISIBILITY

The experts will make an assessment of the component's strategy and activities in the field of visibility, information and communication, the results obtained and the impact achieved with these actions in both the beneficiary country and the European Union countries.

5. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

A chapter synthesising all answers to evaluation questions into an overall assessment of the programme / components. The detailed structure of the overall assessment should be refined during the evaluation process. The relevant chapter has to articulate all the findings, conclusions and lessons in a way that reflects their importance and facilitates the reading. The structure should not follow the evaluation questions, the logical framework or the seven evaluation criteria

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusions

This chapter introduces the conclusions relative to each question. The conclusions should be organised in clusters in the chapter in order to provide an overview of the assessed subject.

Note:

The chapter should not follow the order of the questions or that of the evaluation criteria (effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, etc.)

It should feature references to the findings (responses to the evaluation questions) or to annexes showing how the conclusions derive from data, interpretations, and analysis and judgement criteria.

The report should include a self-assessment of the methodological limits that may restrain the range or use of certain conclusions.

The conclusion chapter features not only the successes observed but also the issues requiring further thought on modifications or a different course of action.

The evaluation team presents its conclusions in a balanced way, without systematically favouring the negative or the positive conclusions.

A paragraph or sub-chapter should pick up the 3 or 4 major conclusions organised by order of importance, while avoiding being repetitive. This practice allows better communicating the evaluation messages that are addressed to the Commission.

If possible, the evaluation report identifies one or more transferable lessons, which are highlighted in the executive summary and presented in appropriate seminars or meetings so that they can be capitalised on and transferred.

6.2 Recommendations

They are intended to improve or reform the programme / components in the framework of the cycle under way, or to prepare the design of a new intervention for the next cycle.

Note:

The recommendations must be related to the conclusions without replicating them. A recommendation derives directly from one or more conclusions.

The ultimate value of an evaluation depends on the quality and credibility of the recommendations offered. **Recommendations** should therefore be as realistic, operational and pragmatic as possible; that is, they should take careful account of the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the programme / components, and of the resources available to implement them both locally and in the Commission.

They could concern policy, organisational and operational aspects for both the national implementing partners and for the Commission; the pre-conditions that might be attached to decisions on the financing of similar projects; and general issues arising from the evaluation in relation to, for example, policies, technologies, instruments, institutional development, and regional, country or sectoral strategies.

This section should specify which recommendations are address to the EC, to the Executing Authority and other GoTL institutions, to the component management, and to the technical assistance team.

The team will review the lessons learnt from the programme and its components as inputs for GoTL, the EC and other stakeholders for the design of future actions and related activities in the field of rural development.

7. ANNEXES TO THE REPORT

Annexes should include at least the mission's itinerary, name of persons and institutions met, summaries of meetings held. Other relevant information may be added as appropriate.

- Terms of Reference of the final evaluation;
- Names of the evaluators and their company (CVs should be shown, but summarised and limited to one page per person)
- Methodology applied (phases, methods of data collecting, sampling, etc.)
- Logical Framework matrices (original and improved/updated)
- Maps of component areas, where relevant
- List of persons / organisations consulted
- Literature and documentation consulted
- Other technical annexes (e.g. statistical analysis)
- 1-page DAC summary, following the format in Annex VI

ANNEX III: METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

The evaluation team should refer to the programme / components logical framework.

It is suggested that the evaluation team carry out a rapid appraisal through a field visit and a series of interviews and a series of focus groups involving beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, along with the use of other appropriate evaluation tools.

The proposal in response to these terms of reference should identify any language and/or cultural gap and explain how it will be bridged.

The programme / components are to be judged more from the angle of the beneficiaries' perceptions of benefits received than from the managers' perspective of outputs delivered or results achieved. Consequently, interviews and surveys should focus on outsiders (beneficiaries and other affected groups beyond beneficiaries) as much as insiders (managers, partners, field level operators). The proposal in response to these terms of reference, as well as further documents delivered by the evaluation team, should clearly state the proportion of insiders and outsiders among interviews and surveys.

A key methodological issue is whether observed or reported change can be partially or entirely attributed to the programme / components, or how far the programme / components has contributed to such change. The evaluation team should identify attribution / contribution problems where relevant and carry out its analyses accordingly.

It must be clear for all evaluation team members that the evaluation is neither an opinion poll nor an opportunity to express one's preconceptions. This means that all conclusions are to be based on facts and evidence through clear chains of reasoning and transparent value judgements. Each value judgement is to be made explicit as regards:

- the aspect of the programme / components being judged (its design, an implementation procedure, a given management practice, etc.)
- the evaluation criterion is used (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, coherence, EC value added)

The evaluation report should not systematically be biased towards positive or negative conclusions. Criticisms are welcome if they are expressed in a constructive way. The evaluation team clearly acknowledges where changes in the desired direction are already taking place, in order to avoid misleading readers and causing unnecessary offence.

ANNEX IV: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EACH PROGRAMME COMPONENT

1. RCDRA – UNDP – Contract No. ASIE/2004/082-039, duration 60 months: 14/05/04 – 14/05/09

The overall objective of RCDRA is to pursue overall poverty reduction, economic growth (and stability) in line with the Timor-Leste Government's poverty reduction strategy and the National Development Plan. RCDRA consists of four components:

Programme for Access Improvements to Markets in the Eastern Region (AIM - UNOPS)

AIM is a two-year-and-a-half programme with an estimated cost of € 6.59 million in support of the National Development Plan. It is designed to facilitate the country's economic and social development through the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the five bridges which hold the key to fulfil the rich agricultural potential of the eastern region of Timor-Leste comprising the districts of Lautem and Viqueque.

The programme will target five major bridges along the Viqueque - Los Palos national road:

- Bebui (90 m span. Viqueque district)
- Wekain (30 m span. Viqueque district)
- Irabere (220 m span. Viqueque/Lautem districts)
- Mauma'a or Rorolai (120 m span. Lautem district)
- Lihulu (45 m span. Lautem district)

Oecussi Ambeno Community Activation Programme (OCAP - UNOPS)

OCAP is a five-year programme, at a proposed cost of €3.36 million, in support of the National Development Plan designed to respond to the special needs of the 48,000 population of the enclave of Oecussi Ambeno, one of the country's poorest Districts.

The overall objective of OCAP is the restoration of sustainable livelihood opportunities for the residents of Oecussi Ambeno District. The strategy will be the empowerment of communities whereby the people lead the development process. Strategic entry points will be the promotion of cohesive communities, development of new skills and knowledge, enhanced food security and generation of supplementary income, and identification of livelihood opportunities.

The programme will introduce a mechanism (Community Development Fund) to finance community investments which are planned and implemented by community groups. The knowledge and viability of women will be renewed and they will be empowered to play a wider role in their communities. Community owned savings and credit schemes will be introduced for enhanced access to basic financial services. Simple improved agricultural technologies in cattle raising, upland farming, etc. will be introduced in order to improve productivity.

Skills Training for Gainful Employment Programme (STAGE - ILO)

STAGE is a 5-year programme at a proposed cost of €5.09 million. In response to prevailing poverty and high unemployment levels, the programme proposes a flexible decentralised approach to skill training, and small and micro business development that will lead to income generation and gainful employment.

Accordingly, the programme's purpose is to build national capacity to develop and implement a sustainable and effective system of skill and enterprise training. The overall strategy is three-fold:

- Institutional and capacity strengthening of the Secretariat of State for Labour and Solidarity (SSLS) and its District Employment Centres, (DECs) which provide enterprise development and skills training services to the districts, in particular. DEC staff will be trained in 4 regional offices (Dili, Maliana, Oecussi and Baucau) on collection and analysis of employment data to ensure that training programmes are designed based on local economic opportunities. Effective management of the Employment and Vocational Training Fund (EVTF) will also be ensured;

- In order to develop effective training capacities and a micro/small enterprise development mechanism in Timor-Leste, STAGE will strengthen the capacity of existing training providers by providing them with management training, training of trainers, resource material and financial resources through increased access to the EVTF. Training providers will work closely with the DECAs for the delivery of training to the communities through mobile units; and
- Given the fragile economy, employment in the sense of full-time wage employment may not be an option for many years to come. The STAGE will put emphasis on informal sector employment opportunities for the grassroots. Access of community members to small business development and skills training will be facilitated through a decentralized and flexible system of training, including outreach programme and mobile training, and the EVTF mechanism.

Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building in Timor-Leste (PERWL)

The proposal is for a three-year programme, at a proposed cost of €0.63 million, to enhance rural women's participation in nation building in Timor-Leste. It is part of an integrated strategy focused on facilitating capacity building of women leaders and groups at the national and local levels so that women can participate on an informed basis in the processes of nation building including elections, establishment of local government and how to use nation building institutions at a local level.

The component aims:

- To support women to run for the aldeia and suco elections country wide ; vote with greater knowledge and increase the effectiveness of women local government officials and build capacity of rural women's transformative leadership and citizenship in the context of decentralised government;
- To pilot in 4 districts per region and in the districts of Lautem and Bobonaro methods and materials to build the capacity of grassroots women to understand, contribute to and benefit from the process of nation building through training in leadership and civic education, gender sensitisation of grassroots men, and linking grassroots women with national women's organizations and women leaders; and
- To generate essential data required for the formulation of informed programmes to address the socio economic needs of rural women and address urgent need by the government to produce the first national report and civil society to produce a shadow report to the CEDAW committee.

2. ACS – IOM – Contract No. ASIE/2004/081-103, duration 36 months: 24/03/04 – 31/03/07

The IOM component will not be covered by the EC final evaluation as it was already completed when the MTR took place in January-March 2007.

The overall objective of the Component is to improve rural community assets in the districts of Baucau, Lautem and Viqueque in order to contribute to long-term population stability and minimise rural-urban migration. The purpose of the Component is to improve rural community infrastructure, empower communities and improve livelihoods of rural Timorese.

Component results:

- 120 community-based infrastructure projects undertaken, e.g. markets, village water systems and community irrigation schemes.
- Component partners trained to manage the implementation of at least 40 projects.
- Women directly involved in the identification and implementation of at least 40 projects.
- Skills transfer in programme management for nine IOM national staff and capacity building for 8 staff of two Project partner institutions (in general project and financial management and implementation).
- 20 training sessions/seminars held for local partners and community/government participants.

3. ARP III – WB – Contract No. ASIE/2004/082-219, duration 60 months: 29/06/04 – 28/06/09

The overall objective of the Third Agriculture Rehabilitation Project (ARP III) is to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and its key development partners to assist rural communities in increasing their production and income in a sustainable way.

Irrigation Rehabilitation and Management Component

This component will support MAF's program of strengthening rural communities' food security and sustainable economic development in lowland, irrigated areas. The component will rehabilitate community based irrigation schemes serving 3,000 hectares of irrigable land, and 150 kilometres of rural access roads; rehabilitate the major-damaged irrigation scheme in Manufahi (Caraulun) covering 1,030 hectares of irrigable land; and strengthen or establish about 24 Water User Associations (WUAs).

Results:

- 3,000 ha. of irrigated area rehabilitated by communities
- 150 km. of existing farm-to-market roads rehabilitated by communities
- 1,030 ha. of major-damaged irrigation scheme rehabilitated
- 14 new Water Users Associations (WUAs) established (including a network of WUAs in major-damaged scheme), and 10 existing WUAs provided with advisory services and further training (including women)

Services to Farmers Component

This component aims to strengthen and institutionalize MAF's Service Delivery to Farmers in three key areas (a) Information Services (b) Animal Health Services (c) Agri-business

Programme Management Component

This component aims to assist MAF in developing key organizational and sector policies, build further core skills amongst MAF staff and their partners, and integrate ARP management fully within MAF's organizational structure.

- Four agriculture policy studies/advisory services completed, discussed with key stakeholders, and accepted by MAF
- Advisory support to component management, finance, and procurement provided
- 100 person-days of training provided to MAF staff and partners (including women)

ANNEX V - QUALITY ASSESSMENT GRID

**This grid is annexed to the ToRs for information to the experts*

The quality of the final report will be assessed by the evaluation manager using the following quality assessment grid where the rates have the following meaning:

1 = unacceptable = criteria mostly not fulfilled or totally absent

2 = weak = criteria partially fulfilled

3 = good = criteria mostly fulfilled

4 = very good = criteria entirely fulfilled

5 = excellent = criteria entirely fulfilled in a clear and original way

Concerning the criteria and sub-criteria below, the evaluation report is rated:	1	2	3	4	5
1. Meeting needs:					
a) Does the report precisely describe what is evaluated, including the intervention logic in the form of a logical framework?					
b) Does the report clearly cover the requested period of time, as well as the target groups and socio-geographical areas linked to the programme / components?					
c) Has the evolution of the programme / components been taken into account in the evaluation process?					
d) Does the evaluation deal with and respond to all ToR requests. If not, are justifications given?					
2. Appropriate design					
a) Does the report explain how the evaluation design takes stock of the rationale of the programme / components, cause-effect relationships, impacts, policy context, stakeholders' interests, etc.?					
b) Is the evaluation method clearly and adequately described in enough detail?					
c) Are there well-defined indicators selected in order to provide evidence about the programme / components and its context?					
d) Does the report point out the limitations, risks and potential biases associated with the evaluation method?					
3. Reliable data					
a) Is the data collection approach explained and is it coherent with the overall evaluation design?					
b) Are the sources of information clearly identified in the report?					
c) Are the data collection tools (samples, focus groups, etc.) applied in accordance with standards?					
d) Have the collected data been cross-checked?					
e) Have data collection limitations and biases been explained and discussed?					
4. Sound analysis					
a) Is the analysis based on the collected data?					
b) Is the analysis clearly focused on the most relevant cause/effect assumptions underlying the intervention logic?					
c) Is the context adequately taken into account in the analysis?					
d) Are inputs from the most important stakeholders used in a balanced way?					
e) Are the limitations of the analysis identified, discussed and presented in the report, as well as the contradictions with available knowledge, if there are any?					
5. Credible findings					

Concerning the criteria and sub-criteria below, the evaluation report is rated:	1	2	3	4	5
a) Are the findings derived from the data and analyses?					
b) Is the generalisability of findings discussed?					
c) Are interpretations and extrapolations justified and supported by sound arguments?					
6. Valid conclusions					
a) Are the conclusions coherent and logically linked to the findings?					
b) Does the report reach overall conclusions on each of the five DAC criteria?					
c) Are conclusions free of personal or partisan considerations?					
7. Useful recommendations					
a) Are recommendations coherent with conclusions?					
b) Are recommendations operational, realistic and sufficiently explicit to provide guidance for taking action?					
c) Do the recommendations cater for the different target stakeholders of the evaluation?					
d) Where necessary, have the recommendations been clustered and prioritised?					
8. Clear report					
a) Does the report include a relevant and concise executive summary?					
b) Is the report well structured and adapted to its various audiences?					
c) Are specialised concepts clearly defined and not used more than necessary? Is there a list of acronyms?					
d) Is the length of the various chapters and annexes well balanced?					
Considering the 8 previous criteria, what is the overall quality of the report?					

ANNEXE VI - THE STANDARD DAC FORMAT FOR EVALUATION REPORT SUMMARIES

Evaluation Title (and Reference)

Abstract
(central, 4 lines maximum)

Subject of the Evaluation

(5 lines max. on the programme / component, organisation, or issue/theme being evaluated)

Evaluation Description

Purpose (3 lines max)

Methodology (3 lines max)

Main Findings

Clearly distinguishing possible successes/obstacles and the like where possible (25 lines/lignes max)

Recommendations

25 lines/lignes max

Feedback

(5 lines/lignes max)

Donor: European Commission	Region:	DAC sector :
Evaluation type: Efficiency, effectiveness and impact.	Date of report:	Subject of evaluation :
Language :	N° vol./pages :	Author :
Programme and budget line concerned :		
Type of evaluation :	() ex ante (x) intermediate / () ex post ongoing	
Timing :	Start date :	Completion date :
Contact person :	Authors :	
Cost : Euro	Steering group : Yes/No	

Annex 2

Names of the evaluation team and their company

CURRICULUM VITAE

Proposed role in the project: Team Leader (Niras)

Category: I

1. **Family name:** BENE
2. **First names:** Timothy Charles
3. **Education:**

Institution [Date from - Date to]	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:
University of Reading [10/1980 – 09/1981]	MSc Tropical Agricultural Development
IRRI, Philippines [10/1979 – 09/1980]	ODA (now DFID) Scholarship – 1 st year of MSc above
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, [10/1975 - 07/1978]	BSc Agricultural Botany

4. Key qualifications:

Mr Bene is an international consultant specialised in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of international development programmes worldwide. He is fully experienced in the **EC Results Based Management Approach**, having either led or participated in **25 Results-Oriented Monitoring missions** and monitored about 50 EC projects. He is familiar with the Logical Framework Approach and was involved in developing and refining logframes for ASSP, ASIRP, PETTRA (in Bangladesh) and in PNG RWSSP, PNG Education and Swaziland LUSIP (the latter 3 with EC funding).

Involvement in evaluations of development projects includes Team Manager experience on the **Final Evaluation of the Agricultural Support Services Project in Bangladesh** where Mr Bene was responsible for the set up of the office and logistics for a multi-disciplinary team of 9 international experts, planning and managing a survey conducted by 20 enumerators, stakeholder consultations with the donor and implementing agency (Department of Agricultural Extension), and collation, editing, drafting and revision of the final report; planning and undertaking the **Ex-post Evaluation of the LOTUS project in Bangladesh**, which concerned a project that had closed more than a decade earlier; and agronomist on the **Ex-post Evaluation of the Buner Development Project**, an EC funded rural development initiative in Pakistan. Mr Bene was also the de-facto Team Leader (after departure of the appointed TL in the planning stage) of a 5-member multi-disciplinary international team conducting the **Mid-Term Review of Proshika Poverty Alleviation Project, Phase V**, in which the EC was one of a number of donors. All of these assignments (with the exception of Buner) involved briefings, planning / progress meetings and debriefings with high-level stakeholders (donors, executing agencies and implementing agencies / teams), and the use of structured and semi-structured data collection (a mixture of questionnaire surveys, KAP studies, Focus Group Discussions and simple observations) which are the key features of the EC Participatory Evaluation approach. In all cases issues such as the differential implications of the programme for women and men and the possible effects on the environment were included as topics and covered in the reports. These cross-cutting issues were also important elements of the Impact Assessment Programme of the ASSP in Bangladesh, of which Mr Bene was Team Leader. This programme involved external monitoring of the ASSP programme on approximately 6-monthly basis by a team which regularly included gender and environment experts and occasionally small-business and marketing experts.

Mr Bene is an effective communicator with the capacity and experience to work effectively at all levels including with government officials. He has excellent report writing and presentation skills and the managerial and leadership qualities to ensure an efficient and effective implementation of the assignment.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Proposed role in the project: Rural Business Development Specialist (ADE)

Category: II

1. **Family name:** BIGI
2. **First names:** Giorgio
3. **Date of birth:** 30/09/1945
4. **Education:**

Institution [Date from - Date to]	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:
- CESMA/IFOA, Reggio Emilia, Italy - March - June 1997	E.U. ADAPT Project "Marketing Course on International Buying and Selling for SMEs in the Agro Mechanical Industry".
- University of Bologna, Italy Nov. 1967 - July 1973	Doctorate in Agricultural Science (Sc.D) with Specialisation in Agro Industrial Development.
- High School for Civil Engineering, Reggio Emilia, Italy Oct. 1960 - July 1965	Graduate Diploma in Civil Engineering

5. Key qualifications: (Relevant to the project)

- **Project Management:** Project Cycle Management (PCM) with Use of the Logical Framework Matrix, Project Identification, Monitoring (Result Oriented Monitoring - ROM) & Evaluation; PCM Project & Proposals Assessment, Relevance Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact & Sustainability – Pilot Studies for Selected Areas & Sector's Technical Studies, Agricultural Statistics Surveys & Reports including Marketing Information System (MIS)- Design & Writing ToRs & Project Fiches – Annual Work Plans, Budgets, Business Plans & Feasibility Studies Preparation – Experiences in different Aid Modalities & Developing Partners' Procedures as Sector Budget Support, Sector Wide Programme (SWAp), Pool Funding & Program Based Approach (PBA).
- **Policy Advice & Institutional Building:** Agriculture, Rural Development, Food Security Policy & Poverty Alleviation Advice Planning and Support - Drafting & Enforcing Agricultural Legislation and Policies Harmonization; Analysis of Policies/Strategies with preparation of Briefing Papers; Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), EU Acquis Communautaire - EU Pre – Accession Approximation/Integration IPA/IPARD/SAPARD and LEADER Principles, in the Former Socialist Countries and in Post Conflict Environments.
- **Capacity Building & Governance** actions to Ministries, Public Administrations, Development Agencies and Organizations & Private Entrepreneurs, in Countries with Transition economies, Former Socialist Countries, the Balkans and in Post Conflict Environments.
- **Agriculture, Rural Development & Agro Food Industry:** Agricultural & Rural Enterprise Development, Agriculture & Horticulture Production Analysis & Technical Advice; Farm and Agri Enterprise Business Management, Marketing & Value Chain Analysis including Cost Benefit Analysis, Profit Margin Analysis – Rehabilitation, Development & Improvement of Competitiveness & Diversification in Rural and Agriculture SME - Advice, Support & Development to Farmers job creation & Women growth including Microfinance Services.
- **Agriculture & Agribusiness SME Policies Development, Trade Promotion & Support Structures,** International Co-operation in the Agricultural – Agro Food sector, Investment; Export & Partnership Promotion for SME .
- **Food Safety & Control:** Several experiences in the HACCP Rules, ISO Procedures, Standards Technical Regulations, MSTQ system four areas of intervention, (Metrology, Standards, Total Quality Conformity Assessment), Trainer in Food Safety & Quality Control
- **Co-operative/Farm Development & Assistance:** Promotion & Development of Rural Co-operatives, Farmer's Associations, Producer's Groups & Unions & Agricultural Inter professional Organizations - **Agricultural & Services Development** particularly in Input Supply of different Agricultural Commodities to Farmers, Promotion of Mechanization Service to Associations, Co-operatives, Organizations.
- **Agriculture, Agro Industry Analysis, Evaluation& Privatization:** Company Analysis & Evaluation (Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact Sustainability), as Due Diligence of Enterprise (Technology - Processing - Marketing – Management - Environmental Sustainability), Agricultural Processing/Storage Resources Evaluation, Restructuring, Rehabilitation, Privatization and Formulation of Related Initiatives, particularly in the Privatization process of State Owned Enterprises
- **Extension, Training & Advisory Services, Educational Programs** to Governmental Agencies, Ministerial Staff, & Farmers Local Action Groups (LAGs) with Knowledge of LEADER Principles & Approach; Design & Implementation of Training Materials, Manuals & Booklets; Training of Trainers; Agricultural Extension & Training, Support to Advisory Services to Farmers; E&T Institutional Strengthening, Capacity Building, Human Resource Planning;
- **Agricultural Research Analysis & Innovation:** Research Analysis Evaluation; Strategies Design & Proposals.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Proposed role in the project: Rural Infrastructure Specialist (Niras)
Category: II

1. **Family name:** MELLOR
2. **First names:** Colin
3. **Education:**

Institution [Date from - Date to]	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:
University of Sydney, Australia (1984)	Environmental Planning Certificate Course
London School of Economics, UK (1976)	Master of Science (Economic Planning)
University of Queensland, Australia (1972)	Bachelor of Economics (International Development)
University of Queensland, Australia (1969)	Bachelor of Engineering (Civil) (Hons)

1. **Key qualifications:**

- More than **15 years experience in South Asia region**
- **Extensive experience in EC project cycle management in engineering, and evaluation of EC funded projects**
- **Experience in working with projects funded by EC, World Bank and UNDP** and governmental institutions,
- **More than 10 years experience in infrastructure construction in rural areas of South Asian countries, including irrigation schemes and rural water supply,**
- Excellent report writing skills, **full working knowledge of English, and Bahasa Indonesia**

Curriculum Vitae: Anne SLAMEN-MCCANN

Proposed role in the project: Institutional Development Specialist (Niras)
Category: II

Family name: Slamen-McCann

First names: Anne

Education:

<i>Institution: Date from – Date to</i>	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained
University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management, UK, 1993 - 1994	MSc Human Resource Development: change management, organisational development
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1987 - 1988	Post Graduate Diploma in Rural Policy and Project Planning - Project evaluation
University of Toronto, Canada, 1979 - 1981	MLS Library and Information Science -IT
University of Toronto, Canada, 1972 - 1979	BA (Hons) - East Asian Studies

Key qualifications:

- **Monitoring & evaluation:** 10 years EC M&E of EU funded projects in 3 regions, Russia, Africa and Asia. Proven report writing skills and fast in-depth analysis.
- Wide range of sectors were covered including: **private sector development** / finance (SME, finance, banking, trade), **rural development** (civil society, agriculture, transport, infrastructure, health, education), **environment** (waste management, business environmental sustainability), **rehabilitation** – post-conflict / post-disaster (disaster preparedness, tsunami), unexploded ordinance, communications, public administration, health, education ++.
- 20 years **Asia experience**
- 15 years knowledge of EC programmes, procedures, contracts, management, country programmes.

Proposed role in the project: Environment Specialist
Category: II

1. **Family name:** Ritchie
2. **First names:** Jeremy Mark
3. **Education:**

Institution [Date from - Date to]	Degree(s) or Diploma(s) obtained:
University of Bradford, UK 25/4 – 27/5 1994	Certificate, Environmental Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal in Developing Countries
The Open University Business School, UK 04/1990 – 10/1993	Professional Certificate in Management.
Imperial College, London 10/1973 – 04/1980	PhD and Diploma of Imperial College in Agricultural Entomology
Imperial College, London 10/1970 – 07/1973	BSc (Hons), ARCS in Zoology (Class 2)

6. Key qualifications:

- PhD-qualified agriculturalist with **postgraduate training in environmental impact assessment.**
- **Experience in working with the evaluation guidelines of the EC** (based on leading two reviews of EC-funded projects)
- Fifteen years solid and diversified postgraduate experience in **environmental impact assessment of large rural development programs in developing and transitional economies** (six separate environmental assessments carried out in the last four years, 2006-2009). **Projects assessed have included agricultural production and processing, forestry, pest management, irrigation and infrastructure development.**
- **Resident working experience in Timor Leste (2004-2005) in the UNDP Institutional Capacity Development Project**, as an advisor in the Ministry of Agriculture, involving frequent field involvement with farmers in Baucau and Maliana, and linking with projects financed by GTZ and ACIAR.
- The expert has **not** been directly involved in the preparation or implementation of RDP I or any of its components.
- **Fully conversant with the principles of EC project cycle management, through missions for EC involving developing and reviewing project and programme logical frameworks**
- **Native English speaker with proven track record of excellence in drafting of lucid and accurate reports** and oral presentations to **donors EC, DFID, ADB, World Bank** and host country stakeholders.
- **Introductory level familiarity with Portuguese, Tetum and Bahasa Indonesia.**
- Familiarity with international environmental conventions (including biodiversity, climate change, pollution control, protected areas).

Annex 3

Mission Itinerary

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
		15 July (Day 1) Team arrives, Internal meeting; Delegation briefing	16 July (Day 2) Document download & dist'n; Desk study	17 July (Day 3) Initial meetings w MAFF & UNDP; Desk Study	18 July (Day 4) Desk study; Initial planning	Uncounted day Desk study; Evaluation Questions (EQs)
20 July (Day 5) EQs; Follow-up mtgs w MAFF, UNDP, others; Inception Report	21 July (Day 6) Finalise RCDRA EQs; Finalise logistics; Further meetings with Dili stakeholders	22 July OCAP: GB, MR Field visit Oecusse PERWL / OCAP: , AS-M Field visit Oecusse AIM: CM, TB Field visit Viqueque	23 July	24 July	25 July (Day 10) Team meeting: debriefing, preparation for next week	Uncounted day Finalise ARP3 EQs
27 July (Day 11) ARP3 Irrig: CM, MR Manufahi STAGE: GB Field Visit PERWL: AS-M Field Visit	28 July	29 July	30 July MR report prep & debriefing ARP3 Institutions: AS-M Dili ARP 3 Info / Livestock: TB Dili	31 July	1 August (Day 16) Team meeting: debriefing, prep for next week MR departs	
3 August (Day 17) RCDRA overall issues: TB, AS-M ARP3 Agribusiness: GB ARP3 Irrig: CM	4 August	5 August (Day 19) 6 August (Day 20) Follow-up activities in Dili ARP3 Irrig: CM	6 August (Day 20)	7 August (Day 21) Report and debriefing note preparation	8 August (Day 22) Debriefing note submission Report preparation, Debriefing OCAP	Uncounted Day Report & debriefings preparation
10 August (Day 23) Debriefing PERWL, STAGE	11 August (Day 24) Debriefing MAF, UNDP, WB	12 August (Day 25) Debriefing Delegation and other donors, Debriefing AIM	13 August (Day 26) Report preparation	14 August Draft report submission Team departs Dili		
17 August Public holiday in Jakarta	18 August Debriefing in Jakarta (TB only)	19 August TB dep Jakarta (00.30)				

NB: TB – Tim Bene, Team Leader; GB – Giorgio Bigi, Agribusiness Development; CM – Colin Mellor, Rural Infrastructure; MR – Mark Ritchie, Environment; AS-M – Anne Slamen-McCann, Institution Development **Yellow highlighting indicates field visits outside Dili** Where no specific activity is shown for an individual on a particular day, it indicates the day was spent in preparatory and follow-up meetings in Dili, or in document review and report preparation.

Timor Leste RDP Final Evaluation: Primary (dark shading) and Secondary (light shading) Responsibilities per (sub-) component.

	RCDRA				ARP III		
	AIM	OCAP	STAGE	PERWL	Irrig Rehab & Mgmt	Services	Management
TL / Agriculture Tim Bene							
Business Development Giorgio Bigi							
Inst Dev Anne S-McC							
Infrastructure Colin Mellor							
Environment Mark Ritchie							

Annex 4

List of Persons consulted

Final Evaluation of Timor Leste Rural Development Programme

List of persons consulted

Date Name Position Organisation Re: Component	Summary of meeting
15/07/2009 Mr Guglielmo Colombo, Attache- Programme Officer Policy / Operations, European Commission (EC). Re RDP (all components)	Dili, general briefing regarding all components of RDP I. Role of EC office; Government policy regarding rural development; features of RDP components and their implementing agencies.
16/07/2009 Ms Brigitte Podborny- Sugiono, Principal Advisor, Peace Fund Timor Leste, GTZ, and Sr Arcanjo da Silva, National Coordinator, GTZ (Formerly Director of Planning and Finance, MAF and later Minister of Economy and Development of Timor Leste). Re ARP III and AIM	Dili, AAgricultural Service Centres, problems of subsistence and clan-based culture vis-à-vis entrepreneurship. Significance of the 5 new bridges for reduced transit times for development activities and governance between Viqueque and Los Palos. Development of MAF.
16/07/09, 19/07/09 Elaine Tan, Country Prog. Mgr, Dianne Arboldea, Prog. Mgr UNIFEM PERWL	16 th Introductory session of evaluation mission to PERWL, basic reports and documents provided and initial discussion of logistics and itinerary and some decisions made including contacts. 19 th Extended interview. Review of in-house documentation and project outputs, contacts made for field trips to Oecussi and Ermina.
17/07/2009 Eng. Lourenco Borges Fontes Director General Ministry of Agric & Forestry (MAF) ARPIII (all sub-components)	Dili, introductory briefing with many senior staff: heads of policy & planning, NRM, forestry, agribusiness, livestock, information, finance, etc. Individual team members were then able to arrange follow-up meetings with relevant contacts.
17/07/2009 Eng. Adelino Pimentel do Rego Ministry of Agric. Fisheries & Forestry MAF Director Agribusiness /ARP III - Deputy Program Manager	Follow up meeting aiming to discuss one of the ARP III Sub-component C (agribusiness) Received information on the component activities, location area, and main final results. Forecasted another meeting to receive updated material, maps, and discuss further the matter and plan visits

<p>16/07/09, 04/08/09 Arbilio Ornay, Chief, Quintaliano Alfonso Belo, Jose Gouveia Leite Amaral, Fatima Bucar Information Division, MAF</p>	<p>Initial briefing w Information Section. They provided their 'Final Report' for ARP III, which is quite critical of their performance, and the discussion also was rather downbeat. Follow-up discussion with Fatima and Jose to confirm some apparent design weaknesses regarding internet connectivity to districts etc, and to discuss the role of the division in current MAF context</p>
<p>17/07/2009 Octavio da Costa Monteiro de Almeida, National Director of Policy and Planning, MAF Re ARPIII (Policy sub- component)</p>	<p>Dili, policy documents developed under ARP III and extent of progress. Status of meteorological stations supplied under ARP III. Outline map supplied purporting to show sites of 21 stations. Also discussed mapping capacity (professional staff absent on training). Irrigation plan drawings are responsibility of Irrigation Directorate.</p>
<p>17/07/2009 Mr Akbar Usmani, Country Director and Mr Pradeep K. Sharma, Senior Assistant Country Director, Poverty Reduction and Environment Unit, UNDP</p>	<p>Dili, general introduction to the RCDRA projects: AIM, STAGE, PERWL, OCAP; role of UNDP not substantive; main successes of OCAP: women's group; savings and credit; community development fund activities; SALT benefits; issue of cross-border trade;</p>
<p>20/07/2009 Pradeep K. Sharma, Senior Assistan Country Director, Poverty Reduction and Environment Unit and Joana de Mesquita Lima, Programme Officer Environment, UNDP. Re Policy sub-component, ARP III</p>	<p>Dili, reviewed the environmental policy and governance context in TL and obtained relevant UNDP documents.</p>
<p>20/07/2009 Mr. Josè Assalino Chief Technical Advisor & Leader Officer - ILO -Dili STAGE</p>	<p>Introductory meeting to receive information on the STAGE component activities, results & location areas. Forecasted another meeting to receive updated material, maps, and discuss further the matter and plan visits to beneficiaries</p>
<p>20/07/2009 Mr. Roberto Pes Youth Employment Enterprise Development Expert – ILO -Dili STAGE</p>	<p>Introductory meeting to receive information on the STAGE component activities, results & location areas. Forecasted another meeting to receive updated material, maps, and discuss further the matter and plan visits to beneficiaries</p>
<p>21/07/2009 Jose Reinaldo da Silva Soares, formerly National Project Manager OCAP Re OCAP and AIM</p>	<p>Dili, described communication difficulties in Oecusse project management structure, self-help group actions, market problems, Community Development Funds and issues, livestock fattening, linkages with other projects. Explained presentation regarding handed over bridges and their problems due to flood water.</p>

21/07/2009 Mr. Sammy Mwiti Communication Officer UNDP - Dili OCAP	Informal meeting as accompanying officer in the OCAP mission to Oecusse
21/07/2009 Mr. José Soares Director of Vocational Training. Division of Employment & Skills Development (DESD)-Dili STAGE	As direct beneficiary of STAGE the meeting was mainly directed to gather impression and information on projects activities results.
20/07/2009 Dianne Arboldea, Prog. Mgr UNIFEM PERWL	Further questions, documentation reviewed and additional statistical data, steering committee minutes. Phone call to DNAT re current status of elected women (all on seat -1 who died)
20/07/09 Paula Corta-Real, Institution Building Mgr, CAUCUS PERWL	NGO who helped design and deliver training. Update on materials and their use.
20/07/09 Belarmino Neves, Director INAP PERWL	He personally helped adapt training materials and deliver training. Now he manages the use of that material by INAP for the longer term.
21/07/09 Merita Marques, FEEO- Fundasaan Esperansa Enclave Oecussi PERWL	Initial meeting with new NGO formed to continue OCAP work plus some aspects of PERWL. She was active partner and trainer for PERWL. Visit to village SHG of women to discuss dynamics of group – history, achievements, plans. Indication of possibilities and limitations of women and group work.
21/07/2009 Dr John Steel, formerly Project Management Consultant, ARP III Re: ARP III	Skype conversation to UK, regarding documentation on irrigation schemes, management issues with World Bank
22/07/09 Centro Fedo hosted a meeting of 31 persons Oecussi PERWL	Those participating included local NGO / CSO, women elected officials, candidates for current election, trainers, electoral officers, media. All had interacted with PERWL training and discussed changes, challenges, plans, experience of elected women officers and future needs.
22/07/09 Jose Tanesib Anuno, DA, + local MAF (vet, pesticide) school, veg growing group, market, brick maker, abattoir. OCAP (and ARP III – MAF)	a. links to PERWL experience and synergy with OCAP b. MAF district level situation institutionally and capabilities.

22-23/07/2009 Sra Merita de Jesus Marques, Director FEEO (former Deputy Manager, OCAP) Re OCAP	Oecusse, general briefing on OCAP sub-components and results and sustainability issues. Ms Marques accompanied the team to all OCAP sites visited in Oecusse between 22 and 24 July.
22/07/2009 Sr Acacio Cardoso Amoral, National University of Timor Leste, FAO Biosecurity Project, Re OCAP	Oecusse, bird Flu Survey in chickens being conducted in Oecusse
22/07/2009 Men's SALT group, Suni Ufe Village Re OCAP	Oecusse, benefits of SALT as a cropping system on hillside land.
22/07/2009 Kiuana A Women's Savings and credit Group, Taiboco Village, Re OCAP	Oecusse, benefits of savings and small loans for households; replication, sustainability
23/07/2009 Sr Emmanuel Afulit, Mausuta Cattle fattening Group, Sakato Nipani Village, Re OCAP	Oecusse, benefits of membership of cattle-fattening group and King grass and Sesbania for fodder; also benefits of OCAP Oecusse, training in savings and credit group formation and management.
23/07/2007 Mahata Aldeia Farmers' Group, Costa Village, Re OCAP	Oecusse, benefits and quality of 600m irrigation canal financed by OCAP, designed by MAF and MPW, built by contractor for a theoretical command area of 27 hectares.
23/07/2007 Sr Jose Tanesib Anuno, District Administrator, Oecusse, GoTL, Re OCAP.	Oecusse, government perception of OCAP activities, effectiveness and benefits. Tasks unfinished, budgetary problems. Government priorities: food security from local production, formation and organization of small groups; border issues
23/07/2009 Sr Savino Freitas, Ag Chair of Technical Department of Agriculture & Sr Alberto Taek, Livestock Officer, MAF, Re OCAP	Oecusse, Vaccination campaigns and cold chain; pesticides provision; OCAP activities carried out with the support of ARP III and now handed over to MAF
23/07/2009 Na'at Taletetite Self-help Group, Re OCAP	Oecusse, Advantages of pond liner for storing water for dry season vegetable production.
23/07/2009 Rob Williams, Team Leader, Seeds of Life Project, MAF, Re OCAP	Oecusse, Discussed provision of SoL seeds to OCAP and the known performance of these seeds in Timor generally and Oecusse in particular.

23/07/09 Brigitte Podborny, Principle Advisor Peace Fund Timor Leste, GTZ ARPIII + member states	Survey and general introduction to history of experience of GTZ in Timor Leste development action and specifically the dynamics and background concerning MAF evolution. Reference for further contacts.
23/07/09 Lucio Nuno, District Director of Agriculture, Viqueque AIM, Agromet, Information	Discussion about agriculture in the province, and info about agromet station, agricultural service centre and Pilot Information Centre (he couldn't say anything about the latter, even after speaking to Arbilio for clarification).
23/07/09 Gilberto Amaral District Rep, Viqueque Peace Dividend Trust AIM	Discussed the role of Peace Dividend Trust in 'matchmaking' between organisations requiring assistance for business development, and organisations able to offer such assistance. Unfortunately the office opened 6 months ago, so no info about stimulated demand from project area after opening of the bridges.
24/07/2009 Mr. Da Costa Soares Hernani Director of Operation IADE – NED (Business Training Centres) -STAGE	Receiving information on the BDC activities related to the support from STAGE/EVTF
24/07/2009 Mr. Angelo B.C. Soares Executive Director TUBA RAI MRTIN (Micro Finance NGO) -Dili STAGE	Introductory meeting to receive information on the Micro Finance activities of the NGO particularly related to the support received from STAGE/EVTF.
24/07/2009 Sr Deolindo da Silva, Former Director, National Directorate for Agriculture and Horticulture (NDAH), MAF, Re ARP III	Dili, discussed the lack of coherent role for NDAH's predecessor unit (Division of Crops and Horticulture) in ARP III.
24/07/2009 Telephone conversations with Abilio Ornai (Chief of Information Unit) and Salvador Ribeira of National Directorate for Agricultural Community Development, MAF and with Sr Martinho Laurentino Soares, Ag Director of Irrigation.	Dili, Setting up preparations for visit to Caraulun Irrigation scheme, Manufahi.
27/07/2009 Sr Napoleao da Cunha, Irrigation Officer, MAF	Dili, Preparations for visit to Caraulun Irrigation Scheme for 28-29/07/2009
27/07/2009 LAHO Baucau Mr. Alfredo Gutierrez Manager LAHO (Silk production) - STAGE	Field visit to STAGE and EVTF related activities (complete silk production circle, spinning & waving) in collaboration with farmers. Gather Impression & Information according after STAGE sustainability.

27/07/2009 Mr. Simao Luis daCosta Program Coordinator CDC (Centro de Desenvolvimento –Comunitario Baucau) - STAGE	Field visit to this CDC centre now transformed in NGO. Impression & Information according their sustainability.
27/07/2009 Mr. Joao Luis do Carmo Pinto Administrative Coordinator CDC (Centro de Desenvolvimento Comunitario Baucau) - STAGE	Field visit to this CDC centre now transformed in NGO. Impression & Information according their sustainability.
27/07/2090 Mr. (Romualdo Antonio de Sousa. Director District Employment Centre Baucau - STAGE	Field visit to gather Impression & Information according their centre sustainability at the end of STAGE.
27/07/09 Maria Evelin Iman, Proj Coordinator of RF-UNDEF Proj, Rede Feto, with Micoela Ximenes, Head of Dept. Liaison and Coordination, SEPI, Ermina Field Trip PERWL	Observed and discussed training of potential women candidates using PERWL developed materials. (20+ persons), trainer/facilitators (3 were with PERWL), 2 elected women councilors, 1 Chefe Suco – Leonilda Mayo of Eraulu. Reported on current circumstances, why getting involved in politics, experience of elected reps, challenges / constraints. Plus current situation and activities of SEPI.
28/07/09 Dianne Arboldea, Prog. Mgr. UNIFEM PERWL	Followup for copies of documentation
28/07/09 Cesar Hose Cruz, National Programme Mgr., RDPII ARPIII	Former Perm Secretary of MAFF for ARPI, II and start of III. History of MAF development and dynamics.
28/07/2009 Mr. Rainaldo da Silva Soares Program Manager OCAP UNDP/UNOPS – Dili OCAP	Second meeting to clarify pending questions and receive documentation not received yet.
28/07/2009 Sr Eurico de Andrade, District Irrig Officer, Same ARP III	Same, Breakdown and rehabilitation of Caraulun Irrigation Scheme, cropped area; maintenance of canals and intake, rice cultivation, extension support, resources for DIO

<p>29/07/2009 Sr Hermegildo Pereira, WUA Support Officer, MAF, Alegria da Costa Geronimo, WUA President, Antonio Jose Florindo Marcal, Gatekeeper, MAF and WUA Deputy President, Caraulun Irrigation Scheme. Re ARP III irrigation rehabilitation</p>	<p>Caraulun, discussed Caraulun Irrigation Scheme function before and after rehabilitation, maintenance; changes in river flow and rainfall; rice cultivation pattern; water management; use of pesticides; problems and future hopes</p>
<p>29/07/2009 Sr Adelino da Costa, farmer, Caraulun Irrigation Scheme. Re ARP III irrigation rehabilitation</p>	<p>Caraulun, cropping activities, area and yields; livestock activities, cultivation methods</p>
<p>29/07/2009 Sra Armandina Pereira, Met. station cartaker, MAF, Caraulun Irrigation Scheme. Re ARP III Meteorological stations</p>	<p>Caraulun, care of Meteorological Station enclosure</p>
<p>29/07/2009 Mrs. Cipriana Soares Chief Department for Agribusiness Development (Industrial crops, forestry, fisheries & Livestock) MAF Calcoli Dili ARP III</p>	<p>Meeting to organise a field visit for ARP III (agribusiness component)</p>
<p>29/07/09 Laurenco Borges Fontes, Dir Gen, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, needs, future priorities, capacity and institutional development + specific to ARPIII.</p>
<p>29/07/09 Rob Williams, Prog Mgr, H. Nexbitt, Prog Coord. Seeds of Life Project ARPIII</p>	<p>Seeds programme and relationship to ARPIII. History of MAF and observed dynamics internally – what possible to do and not to do.</p>
<p>29/07/09 Adelino Pimento I de Rego, Head of Dept Agri Development, ND-Ind Crops, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>

<p>31/07/09 Joao Gomez, Operations Officer, EACDF, World Bank + Program Officer Olivio dos Santos ARPIII</p>	<p>Briefing about the WB system as it handled ARPIII contract and monitoring of MAF. Request for financial information and documentation (including authorised version of ICR)</p>
<p>31/07/09 Lin Cao, ACD, M&E UNDP</p>	<p>She was on leave at the initial RCDRA briefing. This was a briefing meeting and request for documentation, plus discussed the general situation of M&E for RCDRA. She said that OCAP would not have a final evaluation because our team would cover it, but this was after our team had finished and had not prioritised sufficient additional resources.</p>
<p>03/08/09 Adelino P do Rego, Dept Head Agri Development ND- Industrial Crops, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>03/08/09 Mario Francisco Amarul, Dept Chief Animal Health, Calisto de Costa Varela Dir, ND- Livestock & Veterinary Services, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>3/08/2009 Eng. Adelino Pimentel do Rego Ministry of Agric. Fisheries & Forestry MAF Director Agribusiness /ARP III - Deputy Program Manager-MAF Calcoli – Dili ARP III</p>	<p>Second meeting to organise field visit for ARP III (agribusiness component) and discussion with the presence of Mrs. Ann concerning Institutional Building of the Agribusiness Directorate within MAF</p>
<p>3/08/2009 Mr. Rainardo da Silva Soares UNDP/UNOPS - OCAP Program Manager Ms. Claire Martin UNDP Officer –Dili OCAP</p>	<p>Meeting to receive documentation and answer to question related to OCAP</p>
<p>4/08/2009 Mrs. Cipriana Soares Chief Depart.ment for Agribusiness Development (Industrial crops, forestry, fisheries & Livestock) MAF Calcoli <i>Accompanied by:</i></p>	<p>Field visit to Los Palos and Bacau districts accompanied by Mrs. Cipriana Soares and Mr. Joao Pui Pinto. Visited 3 Coconut processing centre (2 in Los palos and 1 in Bacau). Gather Impression & Information according after ARP III sustainability.</p>

<p><u>Accompanied by:</u> Mr. Joao Pui Pinto Agribusiness Department Responsible for Coconut Processing Centres- MAF <u>Having meeting in Los Palos</u> <u>with:</u> Mr. Hipolito de Jesus Cropping system Assistant & Chief of the Agricultural Technical Department MAF- Lautea District- Los Palos - <u>Accompanied in field visit by:</u> Mr. Raimundo da Cruz Director of Industrial Crops & Agro Commerce. Agricultural Technical Department MAF -Lautea District – Los Palos – ARP III</p>	
<p>6/08/2009 Mr. Fernando Encarnacao Youth Employment Community Empowerment Expert –ILO- Dili Mr. Federico Pereira de Matos Chief Department CEOP FEFOPE –Dili Mr. Josè Assalino Chief Technical Advisor & Leader Officer - ILO -Dili STAGE</p>	<p>Different meeting held on gathering information from STAGE</p>
<p>04/08/09 Mantinho Soares, Dir, ND- Irrigation, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>04/08/09 Ervina Soares Pinto Chief of Finance, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of finance and how to take it forward. + experience of training experience and how move to MAF instit.</p>

<p>04/08/09 Fernando Egidio MAF trainee (was Nat. Dir. of Ind. Crops) ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of finance and how to take it forward. + experience of training experience and how move to MAF instit.</p>
<p>04/08/09 Maria Odete do Cru MAF trainee (was Dir Gen) ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of finance and how to take it forward. + experience of training experience and how move to MAF instit.</p>
<p>04/08/09 Helger Alberto Neves, Hd Dept. National and International Cooperation & Food Security, ND-Policy & Planning ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>04/08/09 Octavio de Costa Monteiro de Almelda, Dir NP Policy & Planning ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>05/08/09 Januario Marcal de Araujo, Dir. ND-Community Devt., MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Interview for MAF: - history, political dynamics, inter-directorate dynamics, - needs, future priorities, opportunities - capacity and institutional development, changes / benefits specific to ARPIII - working of service and how to take it forward.</p>
<p>05/08/09 Lourenco Borges Fontes Director General, MAF ARP III</p>	<p>Discussion about quality of advisers, consequences of periods of disruption, current situation and way forward for MAF</p>
<p>05/08/09 Ervino Soares Pinto Chief of Finance, MAF ARPIII</p>	<p>Financial procedures and circumstances of ARP III General senior administration intelligence discussion</p>
<p>05/08/09 Domingos Mook, Land Use Milton Ribera, Remote Sensing Jose Quintana, Agromet, ALGIS section MAF ARP III</p>	<p>Discussion about agromet data – how it is collected, stored, handled etc. What is the purpose of it? Also discussion about the GIS capability in MAF</p>

05/08/09 Dianne Arboleda, Prog Mgr UNIFEM PERWL	Additional questions and information
07/08/09 Edmundo Viegas, Exec. Director, Timor Institute Development Studies PERWL	Baseline Study for Women and Poverty: - explanation of study methodology, parameters, challenges, value of end result - results themselves and indications for future - challenges of data collection in TL
7/08/2009 Mr. Valentino Varela Secretary of State Pecuararia – MAF- Dili Mr. Pradeep Sharma UNDP Ass't Country Director Ms. Claire Martin, UNDP	Debriefing meeting of OCAP
10/07/2009 Mr. Bendito Dos Santos Freitas Segretary of State SEFOPE - Dili With the presence of : Mr. Josè Assalino Chief Technical Advisor & Leader Officer - ILO – Ms. Lin Cao UNDP Head of Strategic Planning M&E PSU Mr. Josè Soares Director of Vocational Training. Division of Employment & Skills Development (DESD)-Dili STAGE	Debriefing meeting of STAGE
10/08/09 Dianne Arboleda PERWL	Debriefing
11/08/09 Dir Gen + 6 heads MAF ARPIII	Debriefing
11/08/09 Akbar Usmani, Country Dir., Pradeep Sharma, Senior Assistant Country Dir, Poverty Reduction and Environment Unit UNDP RCDRA	Debriefing

<p>11/08/09 Joao Gomes, Operations Officer, EACDF, Habib Rab, Country Economist, World Bank ARPIII</p>	<p>Debriefing</p>
<p>12/08/09 G. Columbo, Attache, Roy Potocki Economic Attache, HE Juan Carlos Rey Salgado, Ambassador ARPIII & RCDRA</p>	<p>Delegation Debriefing</p>
<p>12/08/09 Donor Group ARPIII, RCDRA</p>	<p>Debriefing with donor group – AusAid, GTZ, Spanish Aid, French, World Bank, Seeds of Life Project</p>
<p>18/08/09 Ms Nona Deprez, Head Finance and Contracts Section Destriani Nugroho Programme Officer EC Delegation Jakarta RDP 1</p>	<p>Final Debriefing</p>

Annex 5

List of Documents Reviewed

Final Evaluation of Timor Leste Rural Development Programme

List of documents consulted

Re: Component	Document title (with date of publication if known)
RDP - (all components)	DAC criteria to evaluate Development Assistance - OECD DAC web site note.
RDP- (all components)	DAC Evaluation quality Standards – OECD DAC web site note.
RDP- (all components)	Evaluating Development Cooperation – Summary of key norm & standards - OECD DAC web site publication.
RDP (all components)	UNDP Comments on EC Mid-term Evaluation of the Rural Development Programme for Timor Leste (RDP 2003). 15 pp. (2007)
RDP - all components)	Mid term Evaluation – Draft final Report - Cardno Agrisystem Ltd. (march 2007)
RDP - all components)	Mid term Evaluation – Final Report - Cardno Agrisystem Ltd. (June 2007)
RDP - all components)	Financing Decision and Technical & Administrative Provisions (TAP), November 2003
RCDRA	EU Contribution Agreement with UNDP (April 2004), with 4 amendments
AIM	Project Document, 18/03/04, UNDP / GoTL
AIM	Joint Inspection to Five AIM bridges by Ministry of Public Works, UNDP and UNOPS. 20-22 April 2009. Jose Reinaldo da Silva Soares. Powerpoint Presentation
AIM	Access Improvements to Markets (AIM) in the Eastern Region. Five Bridges, Conceptual Design Report. (Section 1 only, including Executive Summary). Nicholas O'Dwyer & Co. ?2003.
AIM	Access Improvements to Markets (AIM) in the Eastern Region. Impact Assessment Study – Stage I. Draft Final Report. Sarath Mananwatte, UNOPS Consultant. 16 March 2008.
AIM	Minutes of 12 PSC meetings held between 11May 2006 and 5 Aug 2008
AIM	ROM Monitoring Report 10/06/06 and responses thereto
AIM	Final Defects List ; Letter of Handover; and Final Services Invoice letters, Nicholas O'Dwyer, November 2008
AIM	RCDRA Addendum no 4
OCAP	Oecusse market Survey - Oxfam Australia May 2008
OCAP	PSC minute of the meeting 29 July 2008
OCAP	Mekong Economics OCAP Baseline Survey 2006
OCAP	Mekong Economics Poverty mapping Research Papers 2006
OCAP	OCAP Inception Report July 2007
OCAP	Integrated Pest Management. Jitendra Prasad Jaiswa, Upland Agricultural Specialist, OCAP, Oecussi. April 2006. Powerpoint Presentation.
OCAP	Contour Hedgerow Intercropping. Sloping Agricultural Land

	Technology (SALT) Jitendra Prasad Jaiswa, Upland Agricultural Specialist, OCAP, Oecussi. Undated. Powerpoint Presentation.
OCAP	Excel spreadsheet. OCAP Community Development Fund Completed Project. OCAP CDF. Years Nov 2006- April 2009.
OCAP	OCAP (during 5 years: May 2004-May 2009). Powerpoint presentation to Final Review Mission 22 July 2009. Merita
OCAP	Self-Help Groups Database, February 2009. Excel spreadsheet.
OCAP	Minutes Of The 10th OCAP PSC Meeting Held On 29th July, 2008.
OCAP	Oecusse Market Research Report. John Spilsbury, Oxfam Australia, May 2008.
OCAP	Seeds of Life. Fini ba Moris. Annual Research Report 2007.
OCAP	UNDP Field Monitoring Reports: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24-26 Oct 2007 (Laura Lalor) • 16-21 Nov 2007 (Lin Ciao, Laura Lalor, Ayako Higuchi) • 30 Nov 2007 (P. Sharma) • 11-16 Jan 2008 (P. Sharma, UNOPS team, report by Laura Lalor) • 27 June – 2 July 2008 (A. Sarmento + OCAP team). • 1-3 October 2008 (H. Takagi, P. Sharma etc) • 16-19 Jan 2009 (A. Sarmento, J. Lima, E. Belo, S. Mwitty, UNDP). • 27 Feb – 2 Mar 2009 (A. Sarmento, C. Martin, M. De J. Marques) • 22 April – 29 April 2009 (C. Martin (UNDP), M.de J. Marques (for UNOPS))
OCAP	OCAP Work plan (April 2008 – May 2009)
OCAP	Results Framework (1 May 2007 – 31 March 2008)
OCAP	Results Framework (1 April 2008 to 13 May 2009)
OCAP	Project Steering Committee Meetings: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6th, 11 July 2007, MAF, Dili • 7th, 4 Oct 2007, MAF, Dili • 8th, 13 Jan 2008, Oecussi • 9th, 20 March 2008, MAF, Dili
OCAP	Impact Chain and Indicator Framework. UNDP. undated
OCAP	Options for the sustainability of the SHGs. Summary of Recommendations. A. McMahon, November 2007. UNDP.
OCAP	OCAP M & E Handbook. A. McMahon, Feb 2008. UNDP
OCAP	OCAP Consultant Report TIM/SSA/07149 M & E Report. A.J. McMahon. Feb 2008, UNDP.
OCAP	Annual Progress Report on Upland Agricultural Activities Maid May 2005 to Mid May 2006.

OCAP	Letter from International Programme Coordinator, OCAP, to Mr Lourenco Borges Fontes. Subject Demand for seeds of food crops fro Oecussi. 24 Sept 2007.
OCAP	Letter from International Programme Coordinator, OCAP, to Mr Lourenco Borges Fontes. Subject Demand fro additional seed of food crops fro Oecussi. 8 Nov 2007.
OCAP	Findings of Participatroy Vatiety Selection Programme on Food Crops in Oecussi Enclave. Powerpoint Presentation to MAFF Workshop 18-19 Sept 2007. Jitendra Prasad Jaiswal and Sirilo dos Remedios Baba.
OCAP	Final Report on OCAP Programme, prepared for the EC. July 2009. UNDP, Dili.
OCAP	UNOPS Project fact sheet
OCAP	UNDP Report on Delegation mission to Malaysia ETAZONE
OCAP	EU monitoring reports June 2005 – June 2006 and budget for the action – Addendum N. 3
OCAP	Power Point Presentation: Findings on Participatory Varieties Selection Programma on Food Crops In Oecusse MAF Workshop September 2007
OCAP	Upland Agriculture – UNV End of Assignment & Handling over Report Mr. Jitendra Prasad December 2007
OCAP	Module 3 Capacity Building for Participatory Community Mobilization & Development for OCAP December 2007 Janauary 2008 MIRADA Consultants Report
OCAP	OCAP CDF Guidelines & Rules with formats 2006
OCAP	PRODUCTION CUM VERIFICATION (PCV) PROGRAMME ON VEGETABLE CROPS - Handing Over of the Items to Vegetable Groups
OCAP	OCAP Report Result LF Zerol Draft May 2009
OCAP	OCAP Handover strategy
PERWL	EC Contribution Agreement with and International Organisation. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Special Conditions for “Rehabilitation and Community Development in Rural Areas, 5 May 2004
PERWL	UNDP PERWL Programme Document <July 2005, PSC approved final version>
PERWL	PERWL Steering Committee Minutes of Meetings. 01/09/04 – 15/02/07
PERWL	EC ROM Monitoring Report 10/06/06 (PERWL specific) +RS
PERWL	PERWL Medium Term Review Report, 3-12 April 2006
PERWL	PERWL Terminal Report. UNIFEM, July 2007
PERWL	PERWL Final Evaluation, August 2007
PERWL Project Outputs:	
PERWL	Konstituisaun RDTL Xave Hodi Hakbiit Feto Iha Vida Politika. Two manuals: Manual ba Partisipantes and Manual ba Fasilitador.
PERWL	Strengthening the Role of Women Leaders in the Suco Council: Facilitator’s Manual <2007> (3 versions: English, Tetum, Portuguese) (INAP developed manual for PERWL)
PERWL	Pelatihan Transformasi: Kepemimpinan Politik dan Masyarakat yang

	Transformatif: Facilitator Manual. October 2006 (version also in Tetum)
PERWL	Transformasaan: Transformasaun ba Lideransa, Politicka ho Komunitade; Adaptasaun ba treino loron 2. Manual Treino.
PERWL	Baseline Study on Feminization of Poverty in Timor-Leste: Deprivation of Women Across Sectors. Institute of Development Studies for PERWL. Aug 2007. + 4 Policy Briefs
PERWL	PERWL Summary Results of Debriefing in 13 Districts Mar 05 – Mar 06
PERWL	PERWL Debriefing with Women Candidates and Elected Officials, Workshop Guide Questions
PERWL	PERWL Assessment of Structures Existing in the Communities as Described by Women Leaders (Results of focus Group Discussions Conducted during the Debriefing . Aug 05 – Mar 06
PERWL	PERWL Publications and Advocacy Campaign Materials Produced – reviewed list and materials themselves
PERWL	PERWL Exit Strategy.<2007> (this is sustainability indicators + plans for follow through action)
PERWL	PERWL Assessment of NGO Implementing Partners of UNIFEM <form with questions>
PERWL	PERWL; Impact of the Training on Transformative Leadership, Politics and Communities to Women Participants. OPE evaluation 04/11/2006 (based upon discussion in 11 districts)
PERWL	PERWL Activity Report: Training Needs Assessment Results Presentation 27 October 2005
Other:	
PERWL	Center for Asia-Pacific Women in Politics (CAPWIP). Training Manual Transformative Citizenship and Leadership. (basis of PERWL manuals' adaptation)
PERWL	Participation of Women in Politics and Decision Making in Timor-Leste: A Recent History. Feb-Apr 2006 (UNIFEM commissioned study)
Post PERWL Documents:	
PERWL	Dissemination of the Findings of the Baseline Study on the Situation of Rural Women in Timor Leste: Deprivation of Women Across Sectors: Narrative Report: Launch and Dissemination Workshop. October 2008 (done post project with UNDP funds)
PERWL	Adaptation Workshop for the Training Manual on Transformative Leadership, Politics and Communities. Mission completion Report. 8-9 June 2009
PERWL	The District Conference 9-27 June 2008 of Redo Feto Timor Leste. Priority Issues and Recommendations: Cultural Sector, Education, health, economy, media, politics, justice (shadow document to the National Development Strategy Document.
PERWL	Kongresu Nasional Feto Timor Leste 10-12 Sep 2008. Plan of Actions – East Timor Women 2008 – 2012 (English and Tetum)
PERWL	UNDEF (United Nations Democracy Fund). Enhancing Women's Role in Timor Leste Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Nation Building. Project Document <description> and Progress Report Feb-Mar 09
PERWL	Integrated Programme for Women in Politics and Decision Making

	(IPWPDM). Project Document <description> December 2006. (direct follow-up of PERWL starting April 2008) and Progress Report Apr-Dec 08 and Mission Completion Report of Jun 09.
PERWL	Variety of statistical data for general population and election data, women specific data, separate stats for PERWL participants.
STAGE	Evaluation: Rural Development Programme for Timor Leste (RDP) – Skills Training for Gainful Employment (STAGE). Evaluation Summaries. International Labour Office. 3 pp. (2007)
STAGE	Skill & Training for Gainfull Employment (STAGE) – Evaluation fact Sheet ILO
STAGE	EU monitoring reports June 2005 – June 2006
STAGE	ILO – UNDP STAGE Final Report 13 May 2004 – 12 May 2009
STAGE	UNDP –ILO Final evaluation Report – May 2009
STAGE	Vocational Training in TL &-Gender dimension in vocational training (STAGE publications ILO -UNDP)
STAGE	Start your own business -Manual & Plan (in Tatum Language) STAGE -Ministry Of economics & Development -UNDP
STAGE	Financial Report July 2009 - Tuba Rai Metin (Micro Credit NGO)
STAGE	Start your own business Training manual (in Tatum Language (STAGE Ministry Of economics & Development UNDP)
STAGE	Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant Report March 2008
STAGE	DESD Initial Structure 2- 004
STAGE	SEFOPE current structure 2008
STAGE	Annual Report May 2007 – March 2008
ARP III	Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Trust Fund for East Timor Grant in the Amount of US\$ 3.0 Million to the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste for a Third Agriculture Rehabilitation Project. October 6, 2004. World Bank Report No 26799-TP.
ARP III	Administrative agreement with WB (June 2004)
ARP III	Addendum No. 1 December 2007
ARP III	ROM Report 05/07/05 and RS.
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	APRIII Quarterly Project Status Report January-March 2005
	APRIII Quarterly Project Status Report April-June 2005
	APRIII Quarterly Report July-September 2005
	APRIII Quarterly Report Oct-Dec 2005
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Annex 6

Logical Framework Matrices

Due to the number of projects, components and subcomponents involved, all pertinent conditions are stated in the relevant appraisal reports.

The implementing agencies will invite the EC to take part in meetings with the Government and other international donors, which focus on the co-ordination of the programme being implemented in Timor Leste.

Annex 2 – Logical framework

Overall objectives	OVI	MOV	
To pursue overall poverty reduction, economic growth (and stability) in line with the Timor Leste Government poverty reduction strategy and the National Development Plan	Macro-economic indicators Human Development and poverty indices	National Statistics National census (being planned by GoTL and UNFPA) National Policy Review Reports MDG Report Human Development Reports	Law
Project purpose			
To support (6) initiatives that contribute to rural development by restoring community infrastructure, empowering communities, increasing job opportunities, improving livelihood capacities and self-sufficiency (food supply) in rural areas	Infrastructure works in rural areas completed and market access improved Food security improved (inter alia, alternative commodities expanded, vulnerability to drought reduced, rice production increased, role of MAFF strengthened) Communities and local government empowered Level of employment and income increased Gender equity attained and role of women in key positions strengthened	Project/M&E reports: AIM, ARP III, ACS (IOM) Project/M&E reports: OCAP, ARP III, STAGE Project/M&E reports: all projects Project/M&E reports: STAGE, OCAP, ACS, ARP III Project/M&E reports: all projects, particularly PERWL	No Far soc foll
Results			
1. Access to markets in the eastern region improved as a means of stimulating agricultural production in Viqueque and Lautem (AIM)	5 bridges completed along the district road Viqueque – Lautem Agricultural production and marketing in Districts Viqueque and Lautem increased	Baseline survey + assessment after completion of the infrastructure works Contractor Contracts Construction Completion Reports District Statistics Project Report	The and rela
2. sustainable livelihood opportunities restored for the residents of Oecussi districts (to contribute to poverty reduction) (OCAP)	Decrease in the number of families exposed to food shortage during the year (currently 3 out of the 4 sub-districts, approximately 90% of the families). At least 2 community investments are successfully implemented in each village.	District Statistics PRAs on Project Effect and impact with the beneficiaries Food Situation Surveys	Cor
3. Level of unemployment and under-employment reduced through building national capacity to deliver a demand driven vocational and enterprise skills training system (to contribute to poverty reduction and facilitate economic growth in Timor Leste) (STAGE)	Gainful employment increased nation-wide by end of Project Capacity of the Department of Vocational Training and Employment (DVTE) and Training providers strengthened 8000 people receiving skills and enterprise training and support, with 75% gainfully employed or self-employed	Training Reports Reporting of the Employment Centres Project Progress Monitoring Reports Project studies and surveys Project Evaluation & Completion Reports	Mac incr Der be r

<p>4. Enhanced rural women's leadership and participation in decision-making, through the nation-wide empowerment of women's civil rights (PERWL)</p>	<p>30% of women elected to (and trained for) the suco councils and as Chefes de Suco</p> <p>Number of gender sensitive policies and programs implemented</p> <p>Increased knowledge and understanding by grassroots women and men of the constitution and other national institutions.</p> <p>First national report by the government and shadow report by civil society organisations produced</p>	<p>Central and District level statistics</p> <p>Number of active women at Sub-district and Suko level</p> <p>Records of Parliament Sessions</p>	<p>Pol A p rese</p>
<p>5. Rural communities empowered to improve their community assets in order to promote involvement in rural development and minimise rural migration to population centres (ACS)</p>	<p>120 community based infrastructure projects rehabilitated and operational in the Eastern Region by end of project</p>	<p>District Statistics</p> <p>Project progress monitoring reports</p> <p>Project studies and surveys</p> <p>Project Completion & Evaluation Reports</p>	<p>Con cou</p>
<p>6. The capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and its development partners strengthened to assist rural communities in increasing agricultural production and income in a sustainable way; Irrigation schemes rehabilitated (ARP III)</p>	<p>All major project activities integrated into MAFF programs and funded by the Government by the end of the project</p> <p>70 percent of farmer beneficiaries satisfied with the services received.</p> <p>Average rice yields in rehabilitated irrigated areas increasing from 1.5 to 2.0 metric tons per hectare per crop by the end of the project</p>	<p>MAFF HR statistics</p> <p>Project progress monitoring reports</p> <p>Project Studies and Surveys</p> <p>Project Evaluation & Completion Reports</p>	<p>Suff rem MA serv Law lan Pro</p>

Activities	Specification of inputs	Specification of costs (all contributions)
1. AIM (Viqueque & Lautem)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Supplies Works Operating expenditure Total	92,800 52,000 5,992,050 455,260 6,592,110
2. OCAP (Oecussi)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Supplies Grants Operating expenditure Total	1,770,253 218,200 982,000 388,804 3,359,257
3. STAGE (4 Outreach Centres)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Supplies Grants Operating expenditure Total	3,341,500 405,700 100,000 1,239,794 5,086,994
4. PERWL (Nation-wide)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Operating expenditure Total	561,112 63,888 625,000
5. ACS (Eastern region)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Supplies Grants Operating expenditure Total	1,153,304 247,500 1,200,000 504,430 3,105,234
6. ARP III (Nation-wide)	Services (staff, M&E, Activities, backstopping) Supplies Works Grants Contingencies (incremental costs) Total	5,455,060 1,899,499 2,694,000 242,230 1,101,060 11,391,849

Preconditions:
Funding and imple
Funding agreemen

The following impact and output indicators will be monitored during implementation:²

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Critical Assumptions
<p>Overall Goal (MAFF): To attain food security and improve self-sufficiency</p> <p>To generate rural employment and increase income, through farming systems diversification and agro-industrial development.</p>	<p>Sector Indicators³:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 50% increase in average kilo-calories intake by rural households during scarcity months (Nov-Feb) by 2008 <input type="checkbox"/> An increase of at least 5% a year in the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries GDP <input type="checkbox"/> At least 2.5% increase per year in indirect employment in agriculture and related agro-industries <input type="checkbox"/> At least 3% improvement a year in the agriculture trade balance 	<p>2001 and 2005 Timor-Leste Household Poverty Surveys</p> <p>Central Statistics</p> <p>Central Statistics</p> <p>Central Statistics</p>	

Project Development Objective (Purpose):	Impact/Outcome Indicators ⁴ :	Sources of Verification	(from Objective to Goal)
<p>To strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and its development partners to assist rural communities in increasing their production and income in a sustainable way.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> All major project activities fully integrated into MAFF programs and funded by CFET at EOP. <input type="checkbox"/> Average rice yields in rehabilitated irrigated areas increasing from 1.5 to 2.0 tons/ha/year at EOP. <input type="checkbox"/> Cropping intensity in Caraulun increasing to 160% by 2008 and in community irrigation schemes increasing to 100% by 2008. <input type="checkbox"/> 70% of farmer respondents claiming their knowledge of agriculture has increased as a result of the information provided (exit surveys) <input type="checkbox"/> Disease related mortality at less than 25% for chickens, and 10% for buffaloes, cattle and pigs. <input type="checkbox"/> Amount charged by Village Livestock Workers for private services. <input type="checkbox"/> Amount produced and sold by Rural Producer Organizations assisted by MAFF's Agro-business unit. <input type="checkbox"/> At least 70% of farmer-beneficiaries satisfied with the services received from MAFF and its partners by EOP. 	<p>Government FY07/08 budget</p> <p>MAFF crop yield monitoring reports</p> <p>MAFF crop yield monitoring reports</p> <p>Information Team monitoring reports</p> <p>Livestock Team monitoring reports</p> <p>Agri-business team monitoring reports</p> <p>Farmers' satisfaction survey at EOP.</p>	<p>No major natural disasters occur (e.g. major droughts, floods or pest infestations) of unusual scale or severity</p> <p>Farmers have the right macro-economic and social incentives to increase their production following project assistance (e.g. favorable markets)</p>

² Note: only indicators pertaining to activities funded by the Commission are included.

³ Sector-wide indicators are not under the direct responsibility of the project and would not be reported in normal supervision reports. They would likely be measured only 1-2 times during the project life.

⁴ Impact indicators will be tested and (if necessary) adjusted during the first 6-8 months of project implementation.
EOP- End of project

Results for each Component:	Result Indicators per Component: By End-of-Project	Sources of Verification	(from Outputs to Objective)
Irrigation Rehabilitation and Management Component	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 3,000 ha. of irrigated area rehabilitated by communities <input type="checkbox"/> 150 km. of existing farm-to-market roads rehabilitated by communities <input type="checkbox"/> 1,030 ha. of major-damaged irrigation scheme rehabilitated <input type="checkbox"/> 14 new Water Users Associations (WUAs) established (including a network of WUAs in major-damaged scheme), and 10 existing WUAs provided with advisory services and further training (including women) 	<p>Quarterly project monitoring reports and technical audit report</p> <p>Quarterly project monitoring reports and site visits</p> <p>Quarterly project monitoring reports and WUA reports</p>	<p>Water legislation is adopted to clarify government and community roles in O&M.</p> <p>Sufficient farming labor is available to farm the whole scheme.</p> <p>Rice prices do not decline further</p> <p>Farmers are willing to change their current practices (to increase yield and/or plant second crops) following irrigation rehabilitation</p> <p>Farmers are willing to maintain the rehabilitated canals and manage water resources in times of scarcity.</p>
Services to Farmers Component 1. Information to Farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> About 40 pre-tested information materials provided to communities through different media <input type="checkbox"/> At least 10 cross-visits between CGIAR scientists and MAFF to provide advisory services and information support <input type="checkbox"/> At least 3 regional centres connected electronically and functional up to EOP <input type="checkbox"/> At least 10 meteorological stations, 20 rain gauges and 4 hydro stations established and functional by EOP 	<p>Quarterly project monitoring reports</p> <p>CGIAR scientists reports and MAFF staff reports</p> <p>Quarterly project monitoring reports</p> <p>Quarterly project monitoring reports and field visits</p>	<p>Farmers use information provided effectively.</p> <p>MAFF staff apply training received and convey agricultural information in a timely, accurate, effective manner</p> <p>Telecommunication system sufficiently developed to permit district connections.</p>
2. Sustainable Animal Health Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> At least 80% of adult cattle, buffaloes and pigs vaccinated on a timely manner <input type="checkbox"/> 265 Village Livestock Workers trained (including women), and 70% actively providing services to villages <input type="checkbox"/> National VLW Association established and organizationally functional up to EOP 	<p>Quarterly project monitoring reports</p> <p>VLW Association reports</p>	<p>Farmers continue to recognize the benefits of vaccination and bring their livestock to vaccination corrals.</p> <p>Farmers are satisfied and willing to start paying for treatments provided by VLWs.</p>
3. Agri-Business Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> 12 village processing facilities established and functional by EOP <input type="checkbox"/> MAFF agri-business unit established and operational by EOP 	<p>Quarterly project monitoring reports and field visits</p> <p>MAFF organization set-up</p>	<p>Oil mills become profitable under current market conditions</p>

Results for each Component:	Result Indicators per Component: By End-of-Project	Sources of Verification	(from Outputs to Objective)
Program Management Component: 1. Policy and Strategy Development	<input type="checkbox"/> Four agriculture policy studies/advisory services completed, discussed with key stakeholders, and accepted by MAFF	Advisors' reports and policy study reports	Government adopts the policies, promptly issues implementation guidelines, and monitors compliance.
2. Project Management and Capacity Building	<input type="checkbox"/> Advisory support to project management, finance, and procurement provided <input type="checkbox"/> 100 person-days of training provided to MAFF staff and partners (including women)	Advisors' contracts Training reports	Trained counterparts remain in their positions and are able to apply their skills effectively. Counterpart budget sufficient to ensure project sustainability

General – Social and Environmental Indicators			
Partnership Arrangements	<input type="checkbox"/> At least 2 consultative meetings/year held by each partnership group where more than 60% of key stakeholders attend: - Policy Advisory Group - Irrigation Network - Information Forum - Livestock Network - Consultative Group on Agri-Business	Consultative meeting minutes and quarterly project monitoring reports	
Environmental Mitigation	<input type="checkbox"/> Level of compliance with environmental mitigation measures: at least 90% of all community-based activities: - Do not require mitigation plan - Fully comply with mitigation plan; or - Partially comply with mitigation plan (and are receiving training to improve mitigation)	Quarterly project monitoring reports and field verification	
Land Policy Guidelines	<input type="checkbox"/> No. of community projects requiring land <input type="checkbox"/> No. of grievances recorded and resolved	Quarterly project monitoring reports and field verification	

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RCDRA Logical Framework Matrix (taken from Description of the Action)

Overall objectives:	Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement	Sources and Means of Verification	Assumptions & Conditions
<p>To pursue overall poverty reduction, economic growth (and stability) in line with the Timor-Leste Government's poverty reduction strategy and the National Development Plan.</p>	<p>Continuing annual increases in GDP. Households living below the poverty line reduced in accordance with NDP.</p>	<p>National census Millennium Development Goals Reports (MDGRs) National Human Development Reports (NHDRs) National Policy Review Reports Inter-Parliamentary Unit, CEDAW reports, etc.</p>	
<p>Project purpose:</p> <p>To improve access to markets in the eastern region as a means of stimulating socio-economic development in the districts of Viqueque and Lautem. (UNDP/UNOPS-AIM)</p> <p>To restore sustainable livelihood opportunities for the residents of Oecussi district. (UNDP/UNOPS-OCAP)</p> <p>To build national capacity to development and implement a sustainable and effective system of skill and enterprise training. (UNDP/ILO-STAGE)</p> <p>To guarantee and protect rights of rural women in Timor-Leste. (UNDP/UNIFEM-PERWL)</p>	<p>Households along the Viqueque-Lautem Road have better access to market centres in Viqueque, Los Palos, Baucau, Manatuto and Dili and vice versa.</p> <p>Decrease in the number of families exposed to food shortage during the year (currently 3 out of the 4 sub-districts, approximately 90% of the families). At least 1 community investment is successfully implemented in each village.</p> <p>Key players (government counterparts, training service providers and communities) trained. Income and employment generating opportunities are increased in communities that have received training services.</p> <p>At least 30% of women elected to Village Councils. Women run for suco (village) and aldeia (hamlet) heads in at least 4 districts and are elected in at least 1 district.</p>	<p>Impact survey through an analysis of report cards.</p> <p>National census. Quarterly progress reports. Analysis of Report Cards submitted by the beneficiaries. Evaluation reports.</p> <p>Quarterly progress reports. Programme's Management Information System and tracer studies. Training Providers' records.</p> <p>Electoral Secretariat reports Political party lists Programme reports</p>	<p>The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF) provides the necessary support in terms of improved agricultural technology and availability of agricultural inputs to the farmers in Viqueque and Lautem Districts.</p> <p>The central and district governments and residents of Oecussi Ambeno remain committed to the overall development of the district.</p> <p>Counterpart staff appointed on a full-time basis. Low turnover of staff. DEC staff is in place and providing information to the Programme's MIS. Good cooperation between communities, training providers and the government.</p> <p>Adoption of reservation for women in electoral law. Ongoing commitment by political parties. Strength and cohesiveness of women's organization continues.</p>

<p>1. Major bridges rehabilitated and constructed in Viqueque and Lautem Districts. (UNDP/UNOPS-AIM)</p>	<p>Five major bridges in Viqueque and Lautem Districts are rehabilitated. Technical skills and knowledge of concerned government officials and local workers improved.</p>	<p>Completion reports. Impact assessment through an analysis of report cards conducted at the end of the Programme.</p>	<p>The DoRB&FC provides the necessary support in resolving social issues related to labour disputes, land acquisitions, access to local construction materials, subcontracting with local companies, etc.</p>
<p>2. Oecussi residents' capacity to lead community development strengthened, improved agricultural technologies available, economic and social development opportunities identified and feasibility confirmed, local capacity for development co-ordination built. (UNDP/UNOPS-OCAP)</p>	<p>(Note: Annualized quantitative indicators will be formulated during the inception phase of the Programme.) Increase in the number of households actively participating in local development process. Increase in the number of female-headed households actively participating in group activities. Increase in the number of community group members participating in savings and credit schemes. Increased in the number of the households own cattle. Increase in the number of farming families adopted improved farming techniques. The number of studies and assessment reports produced. The number of studies, discussions, workshops or meetings to which the OCAP participated and contributed to. Evidence of effective participation and monitoring of local development initiatives by local government officials. Timely and effective delivery of OCAP activities by the PIU.</p>	<p>Analysis of Report Cards submitted by the beneficiaries. Quarterly progress and financial reports. Evaluation reports. Feasibility studies, assessment reports. Market delineation studies. Studies, minutes of discussions or meetings, reports on workshops, etc. PSC, PWC minutes.</p>	<p>Communities remain committed to self-led local development. Recognition by the communities on the expanded role that women can play in the society. Community members maintain transparency and accountability of savings and credit schemes. Cooperating families are successfully identified as demonstration agents. Availability of local expertise in conducting studies. Relevant government agencies take lead in border and economic regime discussions. Relevant government officials provided with proper mandate and resources to carry out their duties. Recruitment of qualified national PIU staff.</p>

<p>3. Division of Employment and Skill Development (DESD), District Employment Centres (DECs), existing training providers strengthened and fully functional, communities' capacity and resources to access training increased and community members gained skills and resources for better employment opportunities. (UNDP/ILO-STAGE)</p>	<p>Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) developed and operational by the end of programme implementation.</p> <p>DESD staff trained in all aspects of enterprise skills development and effectively co-ordinating, delivering and monitoring demand-driven enterprise skill development at the urban and rural levels.</p> <p>DECs have a fully operational work plan and performance management systems. Services effectively provided to communities and training providers by DECs increased.</p> <p>Management skills of training providers will have improved for effective delivery of skills and enterprise training.</p> <p>Capacity of trainers to deliver appropriate skills and enterprise training will have been built. Guidelines and training manuals prepared and used by training providers.</p> <p>ILO CBT and SIYB material available and in use by training providers.</p> <p>Increased number of communities and training providers successfully accessing DESD services and EVTF resources.</p> <p>Income and employment generating opportunities are increased in communities that have received training services.</p>	<p>Quarterly progress reports.</p> <p>SOP and independent evaluation mission.</p> <p>MIS.</p> <p>LS records.</p> <p>DEC records.</p> <p>Evaluation reports.</p> <p>Training Providers' records.</p> <p>PSC, PWC minutes.</p>	<p>Government continued policy support for the NLB.</p> <p>No delays in appointment of DESD and DEC staff.</p> <p>DEC established with sufficient budget allocations.</p> <p>SLS policies are gender sensitive.</p> <p>Positive support from community leaders.</p> <p>All of the above.</p>
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<p>4. Rural women empowered to be able to participate effectively in national building process. (UNIFEM)</p>	<p>By 2004 At least 800 potential women candidates trained.</p> <p>By 2004 At least 200 women advocates trained.</p> <p>By 2004 Women's agenda agreed on and defended by at least 50% of women candidates.</p> <p>By 2004 At least one support groups established in each of six districts.</p> <p>By 2005 Quarterly meetings established between national members of Parliament and women members of local power structures.</p> <p>By 2004 methods and materials to build capacity of grassroots women produced and piloted in district of Oecussi and another yet to be defined.</p> <p>By 2005 materials used in at least 2 other districts (to be defined).</p> <p>By 2005 reporting of cases of violence against women increased by 20 %.</p> <p>By 2005 participation by grassroots women in public consultations by National Parliament increased by 20%.</p> <p>By 2004 preliminary findings of baseline study available and imputed into the first CEDAW state report.</p> <p>By 2005 baseline study on rural women completed and launched.</p>	<p>Quarterly progress reports.</p> <p>Report by women's NGOs.</p> <p>Media reports.</p> <p>National Parliament reports.</p> <p>Materials produced and activities reports.</p> <p>Police reports.</p> <p>CEDAW report.</p> <p>Baseline studies.</p> <p>PSC, PWC minutes.</p>	<p>Political will for gender equity continues.</p> <p>Phased time frame proposed by government maintained.</p> <p>Infrastructure conditions maintained.</p> <p>Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue.</p> <p>Political stability.</p> <p>Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue.</p> <p>Continued political good will.</p> <p>Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue.</p> <p>Continued political good will.</p> <p>Domestic violence legislation adopted.</p> <p>Confidence in judiciary strengthened.</p> <p>National Parliament maintains legislative process open.</p> <p>Continued political good will.</p> <p>Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continued.</p>
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AIM Logframe (from ProDoc)

	<p>Logical Framework</p>	<p>Project title: Access Improvements to Markets (AIM) in the Eastern Region</p> <p>Country: East Timor</p> <p>Project no.:</p>	<p>Estimated project period:</p> <p>Prepared on: 26 May 2003</p>	<p>Sheet no.</p>
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Intervention logic	Objectively verifiable indicators	Sources of verification	Assumptions
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<p>Overall objectives:</p> <p><i>To promote socio-economic development in Viqueque and Lautem Disricts as a means of reducing poverty in the two districts.</i></p>	<p><i>Better access to market centers resulted in more economic activities, information and service flows among the population along the Viqueque-Lautem Road.</i></p>	<p><i>Impact assessment through an analysis of report cards conducted at the end of the Programme.</i></p>	
<p>Project purpose:</p> <p><i>To improve access of Viqueque and Lautem Districts to market centres in Baucau, Manatuto and Dili for agricultural inputs and products.</i></p>	<p><i>Households along the Viqueque-Lautem Road have better access to market centers in Viqueque, Lospalos, Baucau, Manatotu and Dili and vice versa.</i></p>	<p><i>Impact assessment through an analysis of report cards at the end of the Programme.</i></p>	<p><i>The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF) provides the necessary support in terms of improved agricultural technology and availability of agricultural inputs to the farmers in Viqueque and Lautem Districts.</i></p>
<p>Results:</p> <p>1. <i>Major bridges rehabilitated and constructed in Viqueque and Lautem Districts.</i></p>	<p><i>Five major bridges in Viqueque and Lautem Districts are rehabilitated.</i></p> <p><i>Technical skills and knowledge of concerned government officials and local workers improved.</i></p>	<p><i>Completion reports.</i></p> <p><i>Impact assessment through an analysis of report cards conducted at the end of the Programme.</i></p>	<p><i>The DoRB&FC provides the necessary support in resolving social issues related to labour disputes, land acquisitions, access to local construction materials, subcontracting with local companies, etc.</i></p>

Activities:	Specification of inputs	Specification of costs	
1.1. Strengthen an existing PMU at DoRB&FC.	Key PMU staff (Project Manager, Field Inspectors and office support staff) recruited and office equipment procured for the duration of the project during the first quarter of project implementation. Project Working Committee (PWC) and the Project Coordination Committee (PCC) established by the PMU in the first quarter of project implementation.	Systems and procedures for implementing the project. Budget is Euro 168,800.	The DoRB&FC approves the PMU's quarterly work plans and takes immediate actions on urgent recommendations.
1.2. Contract feasibility study, detailed designs and technical specifications through a competitive bidding process.	Contracts awarded following internationally accepted competitive bidding process and procedures in the first quarter of project implementation.	Signed contract. Budget is estimated at 15% of the cost of the bridges and river protection.	The DoRB&FC approves the award of contract.
1.3. Contract rehabilitation and construction Works through a competitive bidding process.	Contracts awarded following internationally accepted competitive bidding process and procedures in the third quarter of project implementation.	Signed contract. Budget is estimated at 85% of the cost of the bridges and river protection.	The DoRB&FC approves the award of the Contract.

Preconditions:

Oecussi Ambeno Community Activation Programme (OCAP) Logframe

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of verification	Assumptions
<p>Overall Objective To contribute to the national Developments Plan's goal of poverty reduction</p>	<p><i>Decrease the current proportion of the population who live below the poverty line (\$0.55 per day as at Sept 2001)</i></p>	<p><i>National Census Millennium Development Goals Report National Human Development reports</i></p>	<p>The law and order situation remain stable</p>
<p>Immediate Objective To restore sustainable livelihood opportunities for the residents of Oecussi Ambeno district</p>	<p><i>Decrease the number of families exposed to food shortages during the year (currently 3 out of the 4 sub-districts, approximately 90% of the families). At least 1 community investments are successfully implemented in each village</i></p>	<p><i>National census (being planned by GoTL and UNFPA) Quarterly progress reports Analysis of report cards submitted by beneficiaries Evaluation reports</i></p>	<p>The central and district governments and residents of Oecussi Ambeno remain committed to the overall development of the district.</p>
<p>Results 1. Oecussi residents' capacity to participate and lead the local development process strengthened</p>	<p><i>(Note: Annualized quantitative indicators will be formulated during the inception phase of the programme)</i></p> <p><i>Increase in the number of HH actively participating in the local development process</i></p> <p><i>Increase in the number of female-headed households actively participating in group activities</i></p> <p><i>Increase in the number of community group members participating in savings and credit schemes</i></p>	<p><i>Analysis of report cards submitted by the beneficiaries</i></p> <p><i>Quarterly progress reports</i></p> <p><i>Evaluation reports</i></p>	<p>Communities remain committed to self-led local development</p> <p>Recognition by the communities on the expanded role that women can play in development</p> <p>Community members maintain transparency and accountability of savings and credit schemes</p>
<p>2. Agricultural technologies available to the farmers improved</p>	<p><i>Increase in the number of households who own cattle</i></p> <p><i>Increase in the number of farming families who have adopted improved farming techniques</i></p>	<p><i>Analysis of Report Cards submitted by the beneficiaries</i></p> <p><i>Quarterly progress reports</i></p> <p><i>Evaluation reports</i></p>	<p>Cooperating families are successfully identified as demonstration agents</p>
<p>3. Economic and social development opportunities identified and feasibility confirmed</p>	<p><i>The number of studies and assessment reports produced</i></p> <p><i>The number of studies, discussions, workshops or meetings to which the OCAP participated and contributed to.</i></p>	<p><i>Feasibility studies, assessment report. Market delineation studies. Studies, minutes of discussions or meetings, reports on workshops etc.</i></p>	<p>Availability of local expertise in conducting studies</p> <p>Relevant government agencies take lead in border and economic regime discussions</p>

<p>4. Local capacity (of the local administration, project staff and other partners) for Oecussi development coordination enhanced</p>	<p><i>Evidence of effective participation and monitoring of local development initiatives by local government officials.</i></p> <p><i>Timely and effective delivery of OCAP activities by the PIU</i></p>	<p><i>PWC minutes</i> <i>Analysis of report cards submitted by the community beneficiaries</i> <i>Quarterly progress and financial reports</i> <i>Evaluation reports</i></p>	<p>Relevant government officials provided with proper mandate and resources to carry out duties</p> <p>Recruitment of qualified national PIU staff</p>
<p>Activities</p>	<p>Specification of inputs</p>	<p>Specification of costs</p>	
<p>1.1 Empower community groups to be able to successfully access community development Fund (CDF) for community investments</p> <p>1.2 Empower women through training and sensitization campaigns so that they can effectively take part in social and economic activities</p> <p>1.3 Train community groups in sustainable management of savings and credit schemes to increase access to basic banking facilities</p>	<p>1.1 <i>CDF coordinator, village based community activation facilitators (CAFs) consultants, Community Development Fund, training, study visits.</i></p> <p>1.2 <i>Gender advisor, CAFs training, sensitization campaigns, study visits</i></p> <p>1.3 <i>CDF coordinator, village based Community Activation Facilitators (CAFs), training, study visits.</i></p>	<p>€ 625,313</p>	
<p>2.1 Train select families in cattle quality improvement and practice of <i>paronisasi</i>.</p> <p>2.2 Train select families in improved upland farming techniques</p> <p>2.3 Support to MAFF in implementation of pig and livestock development services</p> <p>2.4 Support MAFF in implementation of its small irrigation development plan</p> <p>2.5 Support MAFF in demonstration of improved fishery techniques</p>	<p>2.1 <i>Agriculture Coordinator, UNV cattle production specialist, CAFs, training, materials</i></p> <p>2.2 <i>Agriculture Coordinator, UNV upland agricultural specialist, CAFs, training, materials</i></p> <p>2.3 <i>Agriculture Coordinator, UNV cattle production specialist, CAFs, training, materials</i></p> <p>2.4 <i>Agriculture coordinator, CAFs, training, materials,</i></p> <p>2.5 <i>Agriculture coordinator, CAFs, training, materials</i></p>	<p>€ 533,750</p>	
<p>3.1 Conduct various targeted technical and feasibility studies</p> <p>3.2 Conduct market delineation studies</p> <p>3.3 Support relevant ministries in conduct of studies, discussions, workshops, or meetings in relation to the possible border and economic regime for Oecussi Ambeno</p>	<p>3.1 <i>PIU, consultants</i></p> <p>3.2 <i>PIU, consultants</i></p> <p>3.3 <i>PIU, consultants</i></p>	<p>€ 183,750</p>	

<p>4.1 Establish a comprehensive set of operational guidelines, procedures, rules, forms and work plans for OCAP implementation</p> <p>4.2 Conduct workshops and trainings to build local development partners (District Administration staff, etc.) understanding on the OCAP design and implementation studies</p> <p>4.3 Develop District Administration's capacity to chair Programme Working Committee</p> <p>4.4 Organise study visits to other local development projects</p>	<p><i>4.1 Programme start up and management expert (PSME), PIU, consultants.</i></p> <p><i>4.2 Programme start up and management expert (PSME), PIU, training.</i></p> <p><i>4.3 PIU</i></p> <p><i>4.4 PIU</i></p>	<p>€ 61,250</p>	
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Annex 2: Logical Framework

Intervention Logic	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions
<p>Overall objective:</p> <p>Facilitate women's participation in building a social, political and legal framework for an independent Timor-Leste that is rights-based, socially inclusive and gender responsive.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By 2007, women constitute at least 30% of local government bodies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Parliament/Government/Local Government Inter-Parliamentary Union, UNIFEM, CEDAW reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ongoing commitment by government Strength and cohesiveness of women's organisations continue
<p>Project purpose:</p> <p>Rights of rural women in Timor-Leste guaranteed and protected.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By end of 2005, at least 20% of women elected to suco councils. By end of 2005, 20% women run for <i>suco</i> (village) and <i>aldeia</i> (hamlet) heads in at least 8 districts and are elected in at least 3 districts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Electoral Secretariat reports Political party lists Programme report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adoption of reservation for women in electoral law Ongoing commitment by political parties Interest and enthusiasm of women heightened and sustained Strength and cohesiveness of women's organisations continue
<p>Results:</p> <p>1. Transformative leadership, politics and communities promoted through the active and reciprocal participation of women as members of constituencies and potential leaders in the political processes and governance at the local and community levels.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> By end of 2005, at least 1,200 potential women candidates increased their awareness and knowledge on the importance of transformative leadership, politics and communities and demonstrated skills through their proactive participation in the political processes and governance at the local and community levels. By end of 2006, national members of Parliament and women elected officials and members of local structures including NGOs and networks established and strengthened linkages and support to each other through bi-annual meetings, trainings, study tours and visits (where appropriate). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme reports Report by women's NGOs Media reports INAP reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Phased time frame proposed by government maintained Infrastructure conditions maintained Interest and enthusiasm of women heightened and sustained Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue Political stability Training modules and materials improved/refined based on experiences in the conduct of trainings

<p>2. Understanding, contribution of and benefits for rural communities, in particular women, on gender mainstreaming in the nation building process as a method to further promote transformative leadership, politics and communities enhanced.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By early 2006, gender responsive and rights-based materials produced and piloted in the districts of Oecussi and Bobonaro or Lautem** to increase understanding of grassroots women on the role, importance and relevance of the key elements to nation building. • By end of 2006, revised or refined materials used and promoted in at least 1 district (yet to be determined) in each of the 4 regions and distributed to relevant institutions, groups including men's groups, NGOs/CSOs and other organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme reports • Report by women's NGOs • National Parliament reports • Media reports • INAP Report • Minutes of bi-yearly meetings • Designed, tested and refined copies of the training modules and materials with activity reports • Programme reports • Training reports (including monitoring and evaluation reports) • Police reports • National Parliament reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue • Interest and enthusiasm of women sustained • Enhancement of training skills of trainers continued • Continued political goodwill • Domestic violence legislation adopted • Confidence in judiciary strengthened • National Parliament maintains legislative process open
<p>3. Contributed to government planning, programming, policy development and budget allocation that is based on and responds to the socio-economic situation, needs and rights of rural women.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By last quarter of 2005, preliminary findings of baseline study on the situation of rural women made available and inputted into the first CEDAW state report (due to be completed by October 2005) and shadow report. • By mid-2006, baseline study on rural women completed, launched, disseminated and contributed to government's planning, programming, policy development and budget allocation that reflects and responds to women's situation, needs and rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CEDAW report • Baseline study produced • Activities report • Programme reports • Media reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continued political goodwill • Strength and cohesion of women's organisations continue • Qualified local organization to conduct baseline study available
<p>Activities:</p>		<p><i>Specification of costs</i></p>	

<p>1.1 In collaboration with CAPWIP and Women's Caucus, conduct TOT for project's pool of trainers;</p> <p>1.2 Conduct follow-up enhancement training sessions with the pool of trainers;</p> <p>1.3 Conduct training for potential women candidates and candidates in 13 districts;</p> <p>1.4 Develop relevant training manuals and materials on transformative leadership, politics and communities and revise/adapt based on recommendations from previous trainings conducted;</p> <p>1.5 Complete the training manuals in Tetun and Bahasa Indonesia;</p> <p>1.6 Produce and disseminate information, education and communication materials in the campaign for increased women's participation in the suco elections and in local power;</p> <p>1.7 Conduct debriefing for women leaders who contested the elections – both who won and did not make it to office;</p> <p>1.8 In collaboration with INAP, UNCDF and OCAP, conduct training needs assessment with elected women officials to prepare them for office;</p> <p>1.9 Develop, use, revise or refine and adapt training manuals and materials for elected women officials;</p> <p>1.10 Assess strengths of local NGOs and network's capacity to provide support to elected women officials and establish other support structures at the national, local and community levels including OCAP's SHGs; and</p> <p>1.11 Organise bi-annual meetings, trainings, study tours and exchange visits (where appropriate).</p>	<p>Human resources (project coordinator and trainers, and consultants)</p> <p>Training materials on Transformative Leadership</p> <p>Campaign materials</p> <p>Training</p> <p>Debriefing, TNA and development of training manuals for elected women officials</p> <p>Reporting/documentation</p> <p>Post-election activities</p>	<p>€ 209,881</p> <p>€ 18,350</p> <p>€ 20,000</p> <p>€ 48,586</p> <p>€ 17,000</p> <p>€ 3,500</p> <p>€ 55,140</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road conditions maintained at current level • No changes to duration of rainy season and rainfall • Coordination and good will between women's organisations continue • Consultants and experts identified available • Coordination and good will between women's organisations continue • Consultants and experts identified available
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<p>2.1 Develop gender responsive and rights-based materials on key elements towards nation building;</p> <p>2.2 Conduct 2 training workshops in the 2 pilot districts using the materials developed and conduct pre-training workshop assessment and summative evaluation in the 2 pilot districts;</p> <p>2.3 Revise and finalise materials developed based on feedback received from workshops conducted and recommendations from the PERWL Working Group; and</p> <p>2.4 Launch and use the materials through the conduct of 4 training workshops in 1 district (yet to be determined) in each of the 4 regions and explore opportunities for its distribution to other institutions, groups (including men’s groups), NGOs/CSOs, etc. for further dissemination and promotion.</p>	<p>Human resources (project coordinator, trainers and consultants) Development of campaign materials Pilot, and refinement of materials Workshops for dissemination and promotion</p>	<p>As above € 20,000 € 22,780 € 22,020</p>	
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<p>3.1 Draw up a concept paper on the proposed focus of the study (feminised poverty and to include the impact of internal migration);</p> <p>3.2 Commission the conduct of the baseline study;</p> <p>3.3 Prepare inputs to the first CEDAW state report utilising the preliminary findings from the baseline study;</p> <p>3.4 Finalise, launch and disseminate the baseline study results;</p> <p>3.5 Based on the results of the baseline study, develop advocacy campaign strategies and tools to contribute to government's planning, programming, policy development and budget allocation that reflects and responds to women's situation, needs and rights; and</p> <p>3.6 Collaborate with UNDP projects on strengthening parliamentary democracy and the capacity of CSOs in local and national development processes for advocacy campaign.</p>	<p>Human resources Organisation to implement and launch and dissemination of baseline study Advocacy campaign</p>	<p>As above € 62,800 € 10,200</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and good will between women's organisations continue • Consultants and experts identified available • Weather conditions do not change • Government's goodwill continues and Plan for CEDAW reporting implemented • Consultant and experts identified available
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<p>Additional Pre-conditions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local power elections held 2. Government maintains current level of commitment and reports to CEDAW Committee 3. Women's organisations maintain their current level of interest and cohesiveness

* Transformative leadership, politics and communities training materials refers to an all inclusive training package which aims to train and raise awareness on the importance of women's participation, not in terms of quantity but in terms of quality of participation. This is done through a two-way relationship whereby the women elected maintains the agency engaged and vice versa, so that the elected women officials continue to defend women's rights and is in turn supported to make a difference.

** The original proposal has only indicated Oecussi as 1 of the 2 pilot districts for PERWL. Proposed as the 2nd district is either Bobonaro or Lautem looking at the existing situation of these districts with the limited opportunities of the people to meet their needs and the foreseen potential linkages of support from funding agencies including EC, DESA, etc. with projects that will soon be started. For Lautem, it has been identified by Government as one of its targeted districts for development interventions while Bobonaro is the pilot district for the LDP of UNCDF and the only district where the councils are already functioning and sub-district and district assemblies established.



Logical Framework

Project title: **STAGE**
 Country:
 Project no.:

Estimated project period:
 Prepared on:

Sheet no.

Intervention logic	Objectively verifiable indicators ⁶	Sources of verification	Assumptions
<p>Overall objectives: To reduce poverty in Timor-Leste and facilitate economic growth by reducing the level of unemployment and underemployment at the national level through appropriate employment skills training.</p>	<p>Income and employment generating opportunities are increased.</p>	<p>Independent evaluation mission and tracer studies. National Human Development Report.</p>	<p>The law and order situation continues to improve. No major natural or economic calamities.</p>
<p>Programme purpose: (Immediate Objectives)</p>			

⁶All indicators will be sex disaggregated.

<p>To build national capacity to develop and implement a sustainable and effective system of skill and enterprise training through:</p> <p>1: Strengthening the capacity of the DESD to enable it to provide secretarial support and services to a Vocational Education Advisory Board (VEAB); develop, coordinate, monitor and deliver vocational enterprise skills development at the national and rural level through the employment centres and through other providers; establish and maintain an MIS and restructure and expand the Employment Vocational Training Fund.</p> <p>2: Strengthening the capacity of existing rural and urban training providers to deliver flexible and integrated vocational and small business training strengthened.</p> <p>3: Empowering communities through the provision of skills and enterprise training that leads to paid and/or self-employment.</p>	<p>DESD staff trained and capable of undertaking their duties.</p> <p>Increased number of communities and training providers successfully accessing DESD services and EVTF resources.</p> <p>The capacity of training providers to effectively deliver demand driven training courses is enhanced.</p> <p>Income and employment generating opportunities are increased in communities that have received training services.</p>	<p>Programme monitoring and evaluation reports.</p> <p>Programme's Management Information System</p> <p>Programme's MIS and tracer studies</p> <p>Training Providers' records</p> <p>Programme's MIS and tracer studies</p> <p>Training Providers' records</p>	<p>Counterpart staff appoint on a full-time basis.</p> <p>Low turnover of staff.</p> <p>DEC staff are in place and providing information to the Programme's MIS.</p> <p>Good cooperation between communities, training provider and government.</p>
<p>Results: (Outputs)</p> <p>Output 1.1 – The DESD fully functioning as a secretariat with capacity to support a VEAB in developing policies and programmes to advise the Government on vocational enterprise skills development at national district and community level.</p> <p>Output 1.2 – A skill development and employment management training capacity established within the DESD with systems and expertise in place to design, develop, implement and monitor enterprise skill programmes, and to provide advisory services for enterprise skills development for the urban and rural district.</p>	<p>Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) developed and operational by the end of programme implementation.</p> <p>DESD staff trained in all aspects of enterprise skills development and effectively coordinating, delivering and monitoring demand-driven enterprise skill development at the urban and rural levels.</p>	<p>SOP and independent evaluation mission</p> <p>Programme reports and MIS</p> <p>SLS records</p> <p>DEC records</p> <p>Independent evaluation mission</p>	<p>Government continued policy support for the NBL.</p> <p>No delays in appointment of DESD and DEC staff.</p>

<p>Output 1.3 – District Employment Centres (DEC) strengthened, with fully trained staff to support coordinate and monitor centre-based and rural mobile enterprise skills training provided by training providers or for the DECs to directly deliver enterprise skills programmes.</p>	<p>DECs has a fully operational work plan and performance management systems.</p> <p>Services effectively provided to communities and training providers by DECs increased.</p>	<p>Programme reports and MIS DEC records SLS records</p>	<p>DEC established with sufficient budget allocations.</p>
<p>Output 2.1 – Capacity of existing training providers to manage delivery of skills and enterprise training for paid and self-employment is enhanced.</p>	<p>Management skills of training providers will have improved for effective delivery of skills and enterprise training.</p>	<p>Programme reports and MIS Training Providers' records</p>	
<p>Output 2.2 – Technical capacity of trainers to deliver gender sensitive skills and enterprise training that leads to paid and self-employment is enhanced.</p>	<p>Capacity of trainers to deliver appropriate skills and enterprise training will have been built.</p>	<p>Programme reports and MIS Training Providers' records</p>	
<p>Output 2.3 – Appropriate gender sensitive resource materials are available for and being used by training providers and DECs trainers to deliver enterprise training for paid and self-employment is available.</p>	<p>Guidelines and training manuals prepared and used by training providers.</p> <p>ILO CBT and SIYB material available and in use by training providers.</p>	<p>Programme reports and MIS Training Providers' records</p>	<p>SLS policies are gender sensitive</p>
<p>Output 3.1 – Community's capacity and resources to secure appropriate skills and enterprise training is increased.</p>	<p>Increased number of communities and training providers successfully accessing DESD services and EVTF resources.</p>	<p>Programme's MIS and tracer studies Training Providers' records</p>	<p>Positive support from community leaders</p>
<p>Output 3.2 – Community members gained skills and resources that leads to paid and/or self-employment.</p>	<p>Income and employment generating opportunities are increased in communities that have received training services.</p>	<p>Programme's MIS and tracer studies Training Providers' records</p>	<p>All of the above</p>
<p>Activities: Activity 1.1.1 – Identify core DESD management staff, assess their training needs and develop a training plan (month 1). Activity 1.1.2 – Train core DESD management staff in all aspects of enterprise skills development system management and policy and programming of enterprise skills training (month 1-36). Activity 1.2.1 – Identify core DESD Technical Support Team staff, assess their training needs and prepare a training plan (month 1)</p>	<p>Specification of inputs</p> <p><i>As this Programme is essentially a capacity building initiative (SLS, training providers and communities) individual inputs cannot be attributed to specific activities.</i></p> <p><i>Programme input used in this Programme include:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. Project staff B. Duty travel and mission costs C. Sub-Contracts for specialised services to communities D. Fellowships /In-Service Training/National workshops and seminars f E. Equipment for Project Team and DEC outreach 	<p>Specification of costs</p>	



Activity 1.2.2 – Provide ongoing training through courses, workshops and seminars and on-the-job training to core DESD staff in all aspects of their relevant skill areas, including management of the EVTF, TENA, curriculum development, training of trainers, MIS, instructional design, technical support with mainstreaming of gender and equal opportunities (month 2-36)

Activity 1.2.3 – Assist counterpart staff to implement surveys and analyse information, including data collected by the DECAs in rural and urban surveys. In collaboration with training of trainers, curriculum developers, gender in development and outreach coordinators and other training providers, prioritise identified skill areas and business opportunities (month 5 – ongoing)

Activity 1.2.4 – Assist counterparts to develop a flexible and sustainable model for identifying and delivering skills and business training through centre-based and mobile means through skill providers and/or through direct delivery (month 8-22)

Activity 1.3.1 – Assess the training needs of DEC counterpart staff and develop a training plan for management and implementation of community based enterprise skill development programmes (month 3)

Activity 1.3.2 – Train DEC counterparts in managing and implementing community-based enterprise skill training, including surveys, specific curriculum identification, evaluation of training programmes implemented by other training providers and assessment of direct training (month 5-24)

F. *Employment and Vocational/Enterprise Training Fund*

G. *Miscellaneous*

These inputs and cost specifications are described in Section Programme Inputs of this document. A detailed budget is provided in Annex 1.

Activity 2.1.1 – Assist training providers through the DEC counterparts to plan, design and implement TENA surveys and business opportunity surveys in collaboration with other government departments, training providers and other organizations in order to identify appropriate skill training related to paid and self-employment opportunities (month 7-20)

Activity 2.1.2 – Assist training providers through the DEC to analyse data collected and determine courses to be implemented, level of skills required in relation to employment opportunities availability suitable instructor and the possibility of cooperating with a suitable training provider (or direct training facilities), availability

Activity 2.1.3 – Assist training providers to identify their training, equipment and resource needs based on data collected as a result of Activities 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 and assist them to prepare a training plan (month 8-36).

Activity 2.1.4 – Based on Activities 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 assist training providers to complete formalities and submissions for assistance from the EVTF (month 9-30)

Activity 2.2.1 – Provide training to training provider's staff in identified areas, for example, training of trainers, curriculum development, gender training and evaluation of training programmes (month 9-40)

Activity 2.2.2 – Assist DEC's and training providers to identify and pilot strategies for delivering enterprise skills training to specific target groups (women, youth, people with disabilities and older people) as well as accounting for ethnic and language differences (month 9- 60)

Activity 2.2.3 – Assist the DECAs to work with training providers and or to direct deliver training courses in enterprise skills in at least 25 identified skill areas and in small business training where required (month 10-60)

Activity 2.2.4 – Assist DECAs and training providers to plan, coordinate and implement follow-up studies and prepare data for inclusion in the MIS

Activity 2.3.1 – Assist the DESD to develop appropriate resource material in at least 25 discrete skill areas and appropriate small business training material as well as adapting and further developing existing ILO material such as CBT and SIYB (month 6-36)

Activity 2.3.2 – Assist the DESD and DECAs to trial and redraft material developed in Activity 2.3.1 prior to printing, publishing and distribution (month 16-50)

Activity 3.1.1 – Assist the community leaders to implement meetings and appropriate workshops at the community level to encourage dialogue with the community to continually improve relationships and quality of training delivery and to encourage community ownership of the processes involved.

Activity 3.1.2 – Assist target communities and training provider to identify real employment local opportunities and make proposals to get access to resources to develop these opportunities from both this Programme and other appropriate sources.

Activity 3.2.1 – Assist target communities to work in partnership with training providers to organise for the delivery of formal and informal skills and enterprise training and to access post training support, including linkages to credit and marketing support.

Activity 3.2.2 – Assist target communities and training providers to monitor the impact and relevance of skills and enterprise training received.

STAGE EC PROGRAMME LOGFRAME (revised)

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT	INDICATORS	SOURCES OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS
Overall Objective			
<p>To reduce poverty in Timor-Leste and facilitate economic growth by reducing the level of unemployment and underemployment at the national level through appropriate employment skills training.</p>	<p>Income and employment generating opportunities are increased.</p>	<p>Independent evaluation mission and tracer studies.</p> <p>National Human Development Report.</p> <p>Programme Database and Programme Reports.</p>	<p>The law and order situation continues to improve.</p> <p>No major natural or economic calamities.</p>
Purpose:			
<p>1. Strengthening the DESD capacity to: Provide secretarial support and services to a National Authority for the Vocational Education and Training (NAVET); Develop, coordinate, monitor and deliver vocational enterprise skills development at the urban and rural level; Establish and maintain a Management Information System, and restructure and expand the Employment Vocational Training Fund.</p>			

Results	Indicators
<p>1.1 – Under the DESD leadership, a National Authority for the Vocational Education and Training (NAVET) established to ensure the management of: (i) The Certification Framework; (ii) The System for Registering Training Organizations; and (iii) The System for Recognition of Prior Learning;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Draft law prepared in consultation with MLCR and MEC; -Draft law endorsed by MLCR and MEC and submitted to the Council of Ministers; -Law on NAVET promulgated; -NAVET functional;
<p>1.2 – A Skill development and employment management training capacity established within DESD, with systems and expertise in place to design, develop, implement and monitor enterprise skill programmes, and to provide advisory services for enterprise skills development for the urban and rural districts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Employment Fund Law prepared and endorsed by MLCR; -EVTF established and operational; -DESD staff trained in all aspects of enterprise skills development, and effectively coordinating, delivering and monitoring demand-driven enterprise skill development at the urban and rural levels; -A National Labour Market Information Centre established, ensuring regular and systematic assessment of employment, self-employment, unemployment, and training needs, and communicating the available information to a range of different stakeholders; -A Performance Management System established, based on Labour Market Indicators;
<p>1.3 – District Employment Centres (DECs) strengthened, with fully trained staff for labour administration and provision of labour market services, including support, coordinate and monitor centre-based and community-based enterprise skills training and income-generating activities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Systems to register jobseekers and job vacancies are implemented, and job mediation services are organized; -Labour market information is collected, processed and disseminated. Local Training Providers and Enterprises are identified and characterised; -Vocational counselling and guidance methods are introduced and operational; -Work Plans for the implementation of community-based training and income-generating activities are prepared and implemented;

Activities		
Activity 1.1.1 – Establish a Working Group within DESD, aiming to support the preparation of legislation for the establishment of the NAVET;		
Activity 1.1.2 – Prepare legislation for the establishment and operation of the National Authority for the Vocational Education and Training, in close coordination with the Ministry of Labour and Community Reinsertion (MLCR) and the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC);		
Activity 1.2.1 – Through a participatory process within MLCR and DESD, promote the EVTF sustainability developing legislation on the establishment of a National Employment Fund;		
Activity 1.2.2 – Establish quality standards for EVTF management and administration;		
Activity 1.2.3 – Adjust the DESD structure to its mandate in the scope of employment and unemployment, enterprise promotion, vocational training, and labour market information services;		
Activity 1.2.4 – Provide training to core DESD technical staff, in the areas of Employment, Vocational Training, Enterprise Promotion, and Gender and Equality;		
Activity 1.2.5 – Assist DESD to establish a National Labour Market Information Centre, with capacity to collect and analyse information, including data produced by the District Employment Centres;		
Activity 1.3.1 – Expand the computerised Labour Market Information (LMI) System in order to cover Employment Centres in all targeted districts;		
Activity 1.3.2 – Enhance the Information and Referral services of the District Employment Centres for Skills Training and Micro-Enterprise Promotion;		
Activity 1.3.3 – Implement specific training for DEC staff to promote “gender-equal communities”;		

Purpose:			
2. Strengthening the capacity of existing rural and urban training providers to deliver flexible and integrated vocational and small business training.			

Results	Indicators
2.1 – Capacity of existing Training Providers to manage the delivery of skills and enterprise training for paid and self-employment is enhanced.	-A Methodology for the continuous assessment of Training Providers is designed and used by DESD; -Training System bottlenecks are identified and used to design remedial responses; -Courses implemented are market-oriented, based on the LMI System;
2.2 – Technical capacity of training providers to deliver gender sensitive vocational and enterprise training that leads to wage and self-employment is enhanced.	-4 Methodologists Working Groups created and trained to develop new curricula relevant for the labour market; -System for evaluation of training and training providers established and operational; -Training Of Trainers modules developed, covering at least 4 different priority technical areas;
2.3 – Appropriate Gender sensitive resource materials are available for and being used by training providers and trainers to deliver enterprise training for wage and self-employment.	-Guidelines and training manuals are prepared, for at least 25 different skills areas, and used by training providers;

Activities			
Activity 2.1.1 – Assess Training Providers and identify capacity gaps and bottlenecks affecting the operation and performance of the vocational training system;			
Activity 2.1.2 – Using the LMI System as a basis, define indicators and evaluate periodically the performance of the training providers, and provide feedback information to promote corresponding adjustments;			
Activity 2.2.1 – Establish Methodologists Working Groups in key technical areas;			

<p>Activity 2.2.2 – In the scope of the established Methodologists Working Groups, develop and implement gender sensitive concrete proposals for the improvement of the training providers capacity and of the performance of the training system;</p>		
<p>Activity 2.3.1 – Assist DESD to develop appropriate resource material in different skills areas and small business training, as well as adapting and further developing existing ILO material such as Start and Improve Your Business (SIYB);</p>		
<p>Activity 2.3.2 – Assist DESD and DEC's to trial and redraft training materials developed under activity 2.3.1, prior to printing, publishing, and distribution to training providers;</p>		

Purpose:			
3. Empowering communities through the provision of skills and enterprise training that leads to paid and/or self-employment.			


Results	Indicators
3.1 – Community’s opportunities to access to appropriate skills and enterprise training and credit schemes are increased.	-Communities access successfully the DESD and DEC’s services; -Communities project proposals are formulated according to EVTF defined requirements;
3.2 – Community members gained skills and resources that leads to paid and/or self-employment.	-500 graduates from Vocational Training Courses; -2,500 graduates from Enterprise Training courses; -75% of the members of the communities enrolled in skills training and/or enterprise training are engaged in income-generating activities;

Activities		
Activity 3.1.1 – Assist communities in the identification of sustainable local employment and self-employment opportunities and in the preparation of proposals to access resources made available by the EVTF;		
Activity 3.2.1 – Assist communities to access to the activities promoted by the EVTF, including vocational and enterprise training, and micro-finance services;		
Activity 3.2.2 – Assist target communities and training providers to monitor the impact and relevance of skills and enterprise training received		

Annex 7


Maps of the project Area

The map on this page shows the entire country of Timor Leste, including the location of the enclave of Oecusse. The OCAP project took place in all 18 sucos of Oecusse. PERWL, STAGE and ARP III had nationwide outreach, but a map showing locations of the ARP III farm to market roads is provided on the following page. After that, a map showing the locations of the 5 AIM bridges is presented.



Map of AIM Bridges, extracted from the Project Document

(The bridges are the 5 easternmost, marked 1 to 5 on the map)



Annex 8

DAC Evaluation Summary

Final Evaluation of Timor Leste Rural Development Programme (TL RDP)
ASIE/2003/005-795

Abstract

The packaging of the programme was justified by circumstances at the design stage, but eventually led to inefficient management of part of the programme and a lack of attention to results. The overall achievement of components covered by this evaluation was below expectations, partly, but not entirely due to disruptions during the implementation period.

Subject of the Evaluation

The TL RDP comprised a package of 6 projects grouped into 3 contracts. This evaluation covered 5 of them, the ACS having finished and been evaluated earlier. The remaining projects were the ARP III implemented through an Administration Agreement with the World Bank, and four projects packaged together as RCDRA under a Contribution Agreement with UNDP, but implemented by UNOPS (2 projects), ILO and UNIFEM.

Evaluation Description

The Purpose of this Final Evaluation was to provide an independent assessment as to the performance of the programme against the standard 5 DAC and additional 2 EC criteria, to identify lessons learned and make practical recommendations for future programmes

The team travelled extensively to project areas, visiting sites and holding discussions with all levels of stakeholders. There was considerable literature review, and much discussion in Dili-based head offices, especially of MAF, and communication with former project staff.

Main Findings

The decision to package the programme into three contracts was pragmatic given the prevailing circumstances of a country emerging from an independence struggle, but possibly created a higher expectation of coordination and synergy than was reasonable. The packaging led to several layers of logframes (layer 1: RDP; layer 2: RCDRA, ACS, ARP III; layer 3: AIM, PERWL, OCAP, STAGE) and more attention could have been paid to what outcomes were expected at the higher levels (especially RDP, RCDRA and ARP III), and what mechanisms would be available to adjust the programme to improve prospects of achieving them. These three logframes had common characteristics in that they suffered from poor internal logic (especially Results to Purpose) and weak indicators.

The management of RCDRA by UNDP was not successful and resulted in dissatisfaction for all parties. UNDP did not succeed in finding a role for itself other than as a middleman between EC on one side and UNOPS, ILO and UNIFEM on the other. It did not undertake its M&E function and, probably related to that, did not provide strategic oversight to the projects, either directly or through the PSCs.

The implementation period included times of civil unrest during which disruption occurred to most of the projects, often resulting in the withdrawal of staff from project areas, and of international staff from the country. ARP III and AIM suffered particularly badly from looting and vandalism of equipment and MAF was forced to relocate offices twice and to replace several advisers who did not return following evacuation. Naturally performance was affected and ARP III would likely have been more successful if it had enjoyed more stable times.

