

## Summary of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN

***Qatra Qatra darya meshad –***

***One drop at a time makes a river -***

***Collecting one gun***

***at a time makes peace -***



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# PART 1: SUMMARY REPORT

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## EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW:

Between 2003 and 2006 the UNDP and UNAMA assisted the Government of Afghanistan to organise the down-sizing and disarmament of Afghan Military Forces. Generous support from a number of donors, led by Japan, funded the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) created for this purpose, leading to more than 63,000 ex-combatants being disarmed and demobilized and more than 106,000 weapons collected. An external evaluation of the DDR and CIP components of ANBP was desired by all stakeholders, to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan experience, to identify its impacts, and to draw lessons from the Afghan experience that can be useful to other disarmament programmes. Specifically the Evaluation Team was requested to evaluate the DDR and CIP components of the Afghan New Beginnings Project, to analyze the direct and indirect impacts of the programme, and draw Lessons Learned, and to make recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and the donor working group concerning future policies and strategies in support of ANBP's objectives. This is the evaluation report prepared by a team of four independent specialists.

We identify eight different components inside the ANBP. The 'Ammo Project' and 'DIAG' were accorded separate project status, but they could have been integral parts of a six-year DDR programme. Likewise the Heavy Weapons Cantonment could have been a separate project, but wasn't. Reintegration is so complex that could have been broken down functionally into a number of different units. This raises structural DDR management issues we address in the Lessons Learned.

**We find that the Disarmament & Reintegration Commission Chaired by Vice-President Khalili (with Minister Stanekzai as Vice-Chairman) is the appropriate**

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<sup>1</sup> UN evaluation guidelines specifically encourage evaluators to provide space for Dissident Opinions.

**high-level mechanism for coordinating inter-ministerial actions and the Afghan government's partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in the delicate security sector.**

We recommend that the mandate of the D&R Commission should be extended to cover destruction of surplus weapons and ammunitions and explosives, and that this activity should receive continued UNAMA and UNDP support for three more years.

We find that the original three-year mandate of ANBP was too short, and its work is incomplete due to this programme design error. Donors were generous and far-sighted in their support of ANBP: funding was adequate and flexible, and funds arrived early enough for project activities to work smoothly. Yet all donors recognize that the work is not complete. We recommend that the Ammo and DIAG projects should not be handed over to the GoA in 2008. On the contrary, **we recommend that UNAMA and UNDP should continue to support the government in managing these projects, assuring international standards and recognition for a further three years.**

We recognize the extreme sensitivity of weapon policy and weapon ownership issues in Afghanistan. Afghans have an historical relationship with firearms that borders on the romantic, and Afghans are sensitive to the fact that the millions of small arms and munitions in the country have cost it dear in money and in blood. Nevertheless some dramatic symbol is needed from the nation's political leaders, to show Afghans and the world that the legacy of war is broken and the flow of weapons must be stopped.

**We recommend that the emotional dependency of the Afghan nation on firearms should be challenged in a dramatic way with a major, public and symbolic destruction of soviet era surplus weapons that tells Afghans, 'We must put the rule of firearms behind us.' This weapon destruction ceremony should take place on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2008 (UN International Weapon Destruction Day).** A documentary film should be made of the ceremony and widely broadcast. President Karzai should describe and highlight this dramatic event – and Afghanistan's destruction of its mine stockpiles - in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2008. We believe this will radically change international and domestic perceptions of Afghanistan's progress towards peace.

**Disarmament is first and foremost a political activity, and its success should be judged by political factors. We find that the ANBP disarmament project – and specifically through its DDR and CIP components – has made a significant contribution towards promoting peace and bringing stability in Afghanistan.**

Overall we are favourably impressed with the management, results and impacts of ANBP. The collection of light and heavy weapons changed the level and nature of potential violence in Afghanistan and brought commanders into the political and electoral processes. Downsizing the armed forces, and the defence budget, paved the way for creating a new national army. DDR has been the most successful aspect of Afghanistan's security sector reform. The CIP created significant peace building and reconciliation initiatives, while helping to buy time for a democratic political process to develop. The destruction of weapons, ammunition and stockpiles of anti-personnel

landmines has brought very significant benefits to Afghanistan, although these achievements are not sufficiently recognized at home or overseas.

ANBP created an excellent, committed Afghan staff whose competence is a national asset. ANBP missed opportunities with demobilization and reintegration, and we recommend that UNDP should pursue post-integration activities for three more years through the NSP, the RSPE, and the NABDP. We recommend that eight ANBP regional offices should be maintained to support the ongoing Ammo, DIAG and post-reintegration projects, and that other UN projects should use these offices for greater



decentralization, for national capacity building, and to obtain development impact in the provinces.

### **Thanks:**

Evaluations seldom offer thanks, but they always mean a lot of extra work for the staff. Evaluators take up space and time, and above all demand extra work from people whose office hours are already filled with their normal workload. It is bad luck on the staff who have to handle evaluators. The staff of ANBP and UNDP were very tolerant and extremely helpful, led by cheerful and efficient managers who put in a lot of time with and for us: David Wilson, Kavil Mohsan, Dominic Grant and Anton Ivanov at ANBP and the five regional offices we visited; Anita Nirody, Ian Holland, Basir Samiri and Lisa Singh at UNDP. We also greatly

appreciated the support of Chris Alexander and his team at UNAMA. The two main supporters of our work, however, were Shapari Enshayan of ANBP and Besmillah Ekhlas in UNDP. They put in long hours preparing the mission and organizing dozens of meetings for us. They were unfailingly friendly, helpful and efficient.

The other key people were those who ran the logistics: Ehsanullah and his team of drivers, Achim Bruedgam, Haroon Atmar and Musa Jaji who arranged our secure transport in and out of the country and a whole team of accountants who were efficient and quick and friendly. We thank you all and we remember you all as fine exponents of the legendary Afghan hospitality.

### **Acronyms used in this report**

AITM	- Afghan Institute for Training in Management
AMF	- Afghan Military Forces
ANA	- Afghan National Army
ANAP	- Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANBP	- Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
ANP	- Afghan National Police
ATA	- Afghanistan Transitional Administration
BCPR	- Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)
CDC	- Community Development Councils (of NSP)
CIP	- Commanders' Incentive Programme
CRIB	- Commanders' Incentive Review Board
CSO	- Civil society organizations
CSTC	- It means 'ISAF military people supporting ANA'
DDR	- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
D&RC	- Demobilization & Reintegration Commission
3D4R	- see section 9.1.
DIAG	- Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme
FAO	- Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN
FRP	- Financial Redundancy Package offered to CIP commanders
GAP	- Government Appointments Panel
GoA	- Government of Afghanistan
GOLIAG	- my favorite acronym! Government Officials with Links to Armed Groups. (Have you met any Goliags recently? I had tea with a Goliag.)
HWC	- Heavy Weapons Cantonment
ICRC	- International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS	- International DDR Standards (published by UN)
ILO	- International Labour Organisation of the United Nations
IMS	- information management systems.
INGO	- International NGO
IOG	- International Observer Group
IP	- Implementing Partner
M&E	- monitoring and evaluation
MDG	- Millennium Development Goals
MDU	- Mobile Disarmament Unit
MoD	- Ministry of Defence
MoE	- Ministry of Education
MoL	- Ministry of Labour
MoPH	- Ministry of Public Health
MoWA	- Ministry of Women's Affairs
MRRD	- Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development
MoSAMD	- Ministry of Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled
NABDP	- National Area-Based Development Project

NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
NSDP	- National Skills Development Program
NSP	- National Solidarity Programme (of MRRD)
PWD	- people with disabilities
RSPE	- Reintegration Support Project for Employment
RVC	- Regional Verification Committees
SALW	- Small Arms and Light Weapons
SMSG	- Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN
SSR	- Security Sector Reform
TSA	- Transitional Safety Allowance (given to XCs)
UNDPA	- United Nations Department for Political Affairs
UNDPKO	- UN Department for Peace Keeping Operations
UNFPA	- UN Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	- United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNMACA	- United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan
UNODC	- United Nations Office for Drug Control
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development
WFP	- World Food Programme of the United Nations
WHO	- World Health Organisation of the UN
XC/Xcom	- ex-combatants

## 1.1. Introduction: an overview of eight ANBP components

- **DDR – Disarmament for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**
- **DDR - Disarmament for Heavy Weapons**
- **Destruction of weapons and ammunition**
- **Demobilization of Afghan Military Forces**
- **Reintegration of XComs and the other 'Rs'**
- **CIP – Commanders' Incentive Programme**
- **Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile - 'Ammo' project,**
- **DIAG - the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme.**

### • **DDR – Disarmament of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

The classic micro-disarmament activity of the DDR+DIAG programme had brought in 94,262 light weapons by 30 August 2007, of which 56,163 were destroyed. From our point of view, DIAG is a second phase of the Afghan DDR project which was aimed specifically at reducing the size of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and removing their SALW from circulation. This it achieved successfully.

The mechanism used was the Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU). These units moved and subdivided as needed (officially they were eight in number). In times DDR has a cantonment process with semi-permanent camps where XCs come, and the DDR process takes place. The innovative MDU system suited the needs of Afghanistan much better since many the AMF units were really local militias, newly registered as units of the MoD after the fall of Kabul. ANBP's disarmament programme was innovative, efficient, dynamic and well-organised.

Some of the DDR units were originally from the full-time Afghan army, and officered by professional career soldiers. These men did not wish to end their careers, and it is true to say that they were demobilized against their will. This has left 'high and dry' some very bitter men in their 40s and 50s, many of whom told us they have only one career – that of a professional military officer – and they wish for no other. In this country built on Honour, these men feel they deserve Respect and Recognition – even more than they feel they deserve a decent pension.

Most of the ordinary soldiers, on the other hand, were happy to leave military service. Only a few of the demobilized men had ever been full-time soldiers. Many were part-time *jihadi* fighters who returned to their farms after the war ended, and for them this DDR process was an unexpected bonus. Some of the long-serving *jihadis* were left out, however: and these too are bitter men who feel they fought against communism to win the liberation of their homeland and they have been forgotten. The table below (supplied by ANBP on 27 August 2007) indicates the number of XCs put through various processes as well as the number of weapons collected:

<b>Disarmament</b>	<b>Demobilization</b>	<b>Reintegration</b>
63,380	62,376	53,145
<b>Light Weapons handed to MoD</b>	<b>Heavy Weapons collected for MoD</b>	
38,099	12,248	
<b>Total weapons destroyed</b>	<b>Total weapons collected</b>	

56,163	106,510
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The disarmament and demobilization phases came to an end in November 2005, with the last AMF members officially handing their weapons over to President Karzai in a ceremony held in Kabul. The reintegration phase of DDR officially ended on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2006, when the DDR mandate came to an end.

### • **DDR - Disarmament of Heavy Weapons**

It became clear in late 2003 as fighting broke out in Mazar (and then in Herat in early 2004) that Heavy Weapons Cantonment was a necessary condition for bringing peace. The HWC took place between Jan 2004 and October 2005, and the activity was officially completed Feb 2006.

This was a remarkable triumph for UNAMA and ANBP, for the GoA and for international cooperation which – for once – was quick, focused and effective. We have noted that ANBP was exceptionally good as a quick reaction force, with managers thinking on their feet and finding innovative solutions to each new problem as it arose. The heavy weapon response provides an eloquent example of this.

HWC began with a peace brokered between Dostum and Atta in the north. Very quickly the political pressures ensured that all other commanders followed suit. Using the upcoming elections and the registration of political parties as a carrot, UNAMA and the GoA showed commanders they either had to join HWC or be excluded from the new political process.

The HWC worked as follows: ISAF handled the four sites around Kabul; ANBP handled the rest with funds from USA and Canada. Halo Trust was engaged to remove ammo, breech blocks and fuel pumps which immobilized heavy weapons until they could be collected with heavy cranes and moved to MoD depots. All ammunition was removed, but useless metal was left to lie.

The claim that 98% of heavy weapons have been collected and turned over to the ANA must be treated with caution. Precise figures of the total weapon stocks are impossible to know. It is clear however that most of the heavy weapons have been taken out of circulation and this changes the political and military context in which peace building is taking place. Levels of potential violence in Afghanistan have been greatly reduced, disarmament efforts can now be focused on SALW.

### • **Destruction of weapons and ammunition**

Although this was not managed as a separate component, the destruction activity is sufficiently precise and important that it deserves to be treated separately. The destruction of light weapons was (and is still being) carried out by Halo Trust as a sub-contracted Implementing Partner inside the MoD facility at Pul-i-Charki, near Kabul. The quantities destroyed by 'chopping' or 'shearing' have reached 56,163 SALW. The Deputy Minister of Defence insists that more are being destroyed - as much as 50% of all the DDR and DIAG weaponry delivered to the MoD, although the exact basis of his calculation could not be



established.<sup>2</sup>

We find that the original ANBP design did not include the collection and destruction of ammunition, which we consider a serious design fault. All DDR programmes should demand ammunition together with the SALW as a condition for demobilization. On the other hand, ANBP moved with commendable swiftness to develop a major ammunition collection project, once the dimensions of the ammo problem in Afghanistan had been understood.

As of 30 August 2007, 15,833 tons of ammo have been destroyed out of an estimated 32,300 that have been surveyed in 1648 caches. Around 100 tons that have been identified: the distinction is important, for caches may be booby-trapped and many are in remote mountain caves which cannot easily be visited. Meanwhile 9,443 tons of ammo that was judged of usable quality has been consolidated and delivered to the MoD. This is useful information, but we are not directly concerned since the Ammo Project is outside the terms of reference of the evaluation.

ANBP and Halo Trust together have a mandate to destroy stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. By 30 August 2007, 496,717 anti-personnel mines and 16,125 anti-tank mines had been destroyed. Thanks to this activity – and provided that the Governor of Panshir province cooperates – Afghanistan is on target to meet international obligations before the end of 2007 under the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines.

Ammunition in a poor state has been (and continues to be) destroyed by the same IP at various locations, both in MoD areas and in mountainous areas close to where unstable ammunition stocks are found. In most cases there is ANBP and MoD supervision, and safety measures are mostly very good. On one occasion an ammo dump was only partially destroyed: villagers seeking to recuperate steel for recycling picked up unexploded ordnance and were injured. BCPR reported finding an IED being manufactured in one MoD workshop. These are serious issues.

With the proposed ending of ANBP in March 2008, all destruction activities are planned to be handed over to the MoD. The evaluation team has strong reservations about this decision, because guarantees of international supervision and neutrality are likely to help with the maintenance of high safety standards, and improve the chances that more weapons and ammunition will be handed in for destruction. We recommend another three years of UN support.

### • **Demobilization of Afghan Military Forces**

The final number of XCs passing through demobilization came to 62,376 – just four of whom were women (two officers and two nurses). Logistically the operation ran smoothly, as did all the ANBP arrangements where military planning and precision were imposed and admired. Soldiers who had been disarmed one or two days earlier by the MDU, presented themselves with their receipt at the gates of the MDU temporary compound where they were demobilized and received transport money and a printed photographic ID card as justification.

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<sup>2</sup> ANBP data shows that by 26 August 2007, weapons collected by DIAG numbered 32,805 of which 20,507 were judged ‘operational’. This word is sufficiently vague to allow multiple interpretations concerning the quality of weapons.

A word may be added here to compliment the ANBP staff on their logistical and technological prowess. MDU planning was meticulous, thanks to careful Recce visits and the field work of the Regional Verification Committees – a local group of retired Afghan army officers hired to negotiate with Commanders, check every ID, and approve every name against the MoD lists of XCs. The RVC is an innovation that may be copied elsewhere. Each province had one respected and respectable representative chosen for the regional team (and paid \$450 per month). The RVC group moved together from province to province discussing with commanders and preparing the terrain for DDR. Each RVC had one young man recruited by ANBP as Secretary, keeping records in all the local languages.

It is no mean feat to create a national computer system and carry it into the middle of the Hindu Kush mountains on the back of a truck, producing an apparently accurate database covering more than 60,000 XCs. It seems to the evaluators equally remarkable that more than 106,000 light and heavy weapons were trucked out of places as remote as the Hazarajat without any reported casualty or accident.

Commanders are said to have used differing strategies to take advantage of the DDR process for themselves. Some placed their family and closest clients on the demobilization list, at the expense of other deserving (even more deserving) XCs. Others are said to have held back some of their men in case of need, or in order to strengthen their hold on them. Others again filled in the spaces of their ghost units with whomsoever they could find: we know one school teacher in Paghman who was the surprised and happy recipient of a cow, after being put on the DDR list by a local commander who had more names in his unit than faces to match the names.

If a wider public relations campaign had been possible in this rugged country and after thirty years of fighting, it might have been possible to make the demobilization process more democratic. Individual XCs might have been able to present themselves and a mechanism might have been invented by the creative management of ANBP to overcome the rigidity of the rule that all XCs had to figure on the MoD registers. In the event, MoD officials and field Commanders had full and complete control over the choice of who should benefit from DDR and who should not. This may have strengthened the patronage power of some commanders.

The MoD registers had doubtful validity as proof of the size of individual units. The reason DDR was initiated in the first place is because the AMF salary bill had become inflated way beyond the capacity of the national budget to pay. In a country coming out of civil war, controlled by heavily armed factions, and surviving the syndrome of 'Seven Pakistans inside Afghanistan' (the seven warring factions all funded through sources in Pakistan), we find that the DDR process was a reasonable and realistic way to pay off the commanders and their men in the interest of promoting peace and stability.

Although the DD was very efficient, we find the demobilization process was rather summary – being mainly a series of bureaucratic gestures like filling in forms and receiving ID cards. There were virtually no 'reinsertion' activities and this got the Reintegration process off to a poor start. In fact ANBP would have been more successful if it had named its programme DDRR: this would have focused management's attention on the human rather than the administrative side of demobilization: according to the United Nations international standards for DDR, with Demobilization there should also be Reinsertion.

In other countries, demobilization-reinsertion has focused more on the man and the family, and less on the soldier. For example, a medical check-up and treatment for health problems can be a part of the demobilization process: and probably they should be since we do not

want to send sick men home to infect the community and their families with (say) Tuberculosis. Later the same medical facilities could be offered to the XC's family as part of the reintegration package.

Reinsertion typically includes civic education, literacy and numeracy, using participative teaching methodologies to encourage returning fighters to respect the village hierarchy, eschew domestic violence, protect women and children, understand concepts about human rights and the rule of law. Films and football matches have their place in demobilization and the participatory civic education process. These are important parts of the interface between military and civilian life, between disarmament and reintegration. They were missing from the ANBP strategy, and that is a pity (as many ANBP staff recognise). In future we recommend that these aspects should be an important part of any and every DDR.

It is important to emphasize that DDR is first-and-foremost a political process. Overall we find there is no reason to criticize either the method chosen to reduce the number of armed men, nor the administrative mechanisms by which ANBP put the demobilization into practice.

### • **Reintegration of XComs and the other 'Rs'**

Every DDR process tends to be easier at the start and become more complex as it proceeds. The reason for this is that initially soldiers and weapons are the focus, and thereafter people and families are involved in every step. The first D takes a few days or weeks; the second D may take a few weeks or months; whereas the R process will take years. In the case of Afghanistan the 'R' component should necessarily include Recognition of service, Respect for sacrifice to the nation, Reintegration into civilian life, Rehabilitation of homes and lives, Reconciliation between former enemies.<sup>3</sup> Even if DDR managers do not recognize these components, they are there fixed in the hearts and minds of the people.

In general the Reintegration phase of ANBP was not as well prepared or thought-out as the DD phases. Too little time was allowed, and the design was not carried out in a participative manner involving experienced reintegration people. Implementing Partners (many of whom were international non-governmental organizations with excellent track-records and a long experience of running reintegration in DDR programmes) were not properly consulted. They were treated as contractors hired to execute a task, rather than as partners of ANBP. Collectively the IPs had far more knowledge and experience of reintegration than the ANBP managers, and we feel their experience was not adequately used. It is true that NGOs were few and many regions were poorly serviced – ANBP was successful in persuading some IPs to open new programmes simply to help. Some of them opened a project office in a new province, used it for a few months as a base for vocational training, and then left the area – removing the possibilities for further support.

This is why we heard the witty comment that that ANBP was not providing DDR, but DDT<sup>4</sup>: disarmament, demobilization and training. There is some truth in this, especially where IPs did

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<sup>3</sup> In other countries, Repatriation of refugees and Resettlement of displaced populations may be vital components of the peace and demobilization process, and they may need to be an integral part of DDR or – as we prefer to call it – 3D4R. This will be true for Sudan and Somalia, and for Congo where they already call the programme DRRRR. ANBP would have been wise to take account in its planning of the 2 million refugees who are still returning from Pakistan and are often competitors for resources with the XCs.

<sup>4</sup> DDT is of course also the name of a toxic pesticide: the person making this joke is critical of ANBP.

not provide any follow-up support for reintegration after the training. There is no really hard data about employment, since ANBP did not fund or foresee follow-up. ANBP might have found the NGOs and IGOs to be better partners – and vice versa - if the IPs had been involved in DDR planning from the very start. If INGOs had been involved in the programme design, they might have persuaded the donors of the necessity to plan for six years instead of three.

In most regions the XCs were poorly informed. There was usually a single information session about the future reintegration, and a promise of assistance that was often understood by XCs as a guarantee of a future job. The DD was very efficient in administrative terms, but it was not very effective in human terms: the interface between military and civilian life begins with the demobilization-reinsertion process, and this was too mechanical. For a lot of Afghan XCs, the best part of DRR was the WFP offering 130 Kg of food to every XC involved in the process. This WFP operation was an efficient and effective contribution to DDR, in excess of the ANBP expectations, and was a major factor in producing short-term contentment among the XCs.

The evolution of the reintegration process was – like every ANBP response to a problem – swift and efficient. Case workers were assigned to ANBP regional offices – as many as twelve or sixteen in some regions, but what they had to offer did not really excite the XCs. The ‘package’ solution meant that XCs had to choose very quickly an orientation and a form of training that would determine their future lives. We met some very happy XCs, but we met more who felt that the ‘packages’ did not in the end help them to make a decent living. To take just one example: by all accounts, \$700 is not sufficient to purchase stock for a shop that will support a family. Many XC shopkeepers are therefore living at a miserable level, and on the verge of losing their fragile livelihood. No doubt the caseworkers did their best, but many of the XCs were left confused, facing a world for which the years of war had not prepared them. Many of them believe the government promised them a job, and they are still waiting.

We find the most successful reintegration activity was demining. XCs get prestige as well as an income, as *minepok* are seen as folk heroes by the Afghan population. Around 1000 XCs are believed to have become *minepok*. Far more could have been recruited as deminers but an structured recruitment was made impossible by disagreements over wages, over ANBP’s financial contribution, and by an insistence that DDR demining should be ‘community based.’ It seems most unfortunate that ANBP could not harmonize its policies with other institutions.

Response from a Commander asked if he was satisfied with CIP:

*“When I was a Commander, I was making \$10,000 a month, now I’m getting only \$200, how can I be happy?”*

His answer illustrates the privileges some Commanders received before DDR, and gives an insight into the “needs” of commanders. Most Commanders feel they sacrificed years of their lives to liberate the country from the Russians and the Taliban, therefore they deserve recognition and rewards.

### • CIP – Commanders’ Incentive Programme

One main problem that the DDR process faced was convincing commanders to enter civilian life. The majority of Afghan commanders were *jihadi* officers nominally integrated into the MoD. Having fought against national enemies, they felt that they were entitled to compensation from the government in return for their years of service. The social structures of

many regions have changed during the war, as ‘qomanders’ replaced traditional *beys* or *begs* or *arbabs* and usurped their influence, especially in the South.

One of the foremost problems that has been identified by GoA and UN officials is the close bond between the commanders and their soldiers, and the dependency of the later on the commanders. The strong social network of dependency is seen within ANBP as a potential threat to security. Unless this link is broken, the UN officials feel that DDR will not be successful. DDR seeks the smooth and effective transition of these commanders from their military into civilian life. To address these issues, CIP was launched by ANBP and much attention was paid in demobilization and reintegration of commanders through special business training, which facilitated their transition from military into civilian life.

CIP special business training programme had several goals, including elements of reconciliation, recognition, changing ideas and introducing commanders to aspects of the modern business world, as well as helping ex-commanders to find sustainable social and economic integration into civilian society<sup>5</sup>. ANBP supported a selected number of 335 ex-commanders with intensive, living-in-a group, business training for a period not exceeding one month at the AITM -Afghan Institute for Training in Management. This was much appreciated by all the commanders we met. Although some gained more from the training than others (at least one we met decided to open a business thanks to the training), they all agreed that the month changed their ideas. Eleven commanders were even taken on a trip to Japan, to see democratic governance in action – and three of that number are now elected members of parliament. This is all training, but overseas visits do not create sustainable livelihoods. Ultimately, ex-commanders must reintegrate themselves into civilian life. The role of ANBP can only be to facilitate this process.

The insurgents are running short of good quality explosives, and this shows we are having an impact. Three Pakistani trucks were stopped recently by Afghan security officials: they were carrying 70T of TNT high quality explosive. Security is improving because rebels are short of explosive material – otherwise they would not have to bring it from Pakistan.  
Colonel Dimiter Jeleu, UNHCR security officer

### • **Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile - ‘Ammo’ project**

When ANBP realized the size and distribution of ammunition stockpiles throughout Afghanistan, it moved swiftly to establish the ‘Ammo Project’. This is not a part of the present evaluation, but it should not pass without notice. There are 8 Ammunition Survey Teams throughout the country, co-located with the DDR and DIAG regional teams, and they are undertaking a valuable and risky enterprise.

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<sup>5</sup> Sustainable social and economic reintegration refers to the strengthening of social cohesion in an environment that encourages economic revitalization and the attainment of sustainable livelihoods, i.e. long-term employment. The Edburgh Associates evaluation criticized the ANBP definition of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ as narrow, equating to mere ‘survival’. They propose ‘income and food security above minimum levels’ as the definition.

The Ammo Project is achieving positive results in a difficult political, security, environmental and developmental context. Safety concerns are caused in part by the difficulty in the recruitment of properly qualified ammunition technical personnel. The BCPR team in 2006 recorded cases of accidents, dangerously overloaded trucks, IED devices found in workshops ... This raises real and serious questions about the conditions under which – if at all - the project should be handed over to GoA officials as it is currently planned, in March 2008. The evaluators believe this would be premature, and recommend that UN support should continue for another three years.

The ammunition survey teams along with the implementing partners are deployed across eight regions within the country and have been able to achieve the following:

**Ammo Project figures for DDR + DIAG at 30 August 2007**

Ammunition Surveyed DDR	29,623.53	Tons
Ammunition Surveyed DIAG	2,676.80	Tons
Ammunition Surveyed DDR + DIAG total	30,300.33	Tons
Ammunition consolidated total	9,443	Tons
Ammunition destroyed total	15,833	Tons
Total number of ammo caches surveyed countrywide	1,648	Units
Anti-Personnel Mines destroyed	496,717	Pieces
Anti-Tank Mines destroyed	16,125	Pieces

Achievements of ANBP are important. Of the 1,648 caches surveyed, the project has so far recovered 1,032 caches of ammunition and mines. Working in beneficial synergy with its Implementing Partner Halo Trust, the Ammo Project is hoping to ensure that all known stockpiles of anti-personnel mines are destroyed during 2007 to enable the Government of Afghanistan to meet its State obligation to the Ottawa treaty on ban of all anti-personnel mines. Only the province of Panshir stands as an obstacle to Afghanistan announcing to the international community during November or December 2007 that it has reached the prestigious achievement of meeting the mine destruction targets.

Private Security Companies behave like private armies that live outside the law. Unless we control them, they will undermine the DIAG project and continue to thrive in a culture of impunity protected by the international community.  
Minister Massum Stanekzai, Deputy Chairman of D&R Commission

- **DIAG - the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme.**

The DIAG programme is also not a part of the present evaluation, but we perceive it as the continuation of the DDR and CIP processes under a new name and with different parameters. DIAG began in July 2005, two years ago, and negotiated disarmament

may bring in as many weapons as the DDR process: 20,507 'operational' weapons have been handed over so far to the MoD under the DIAG project from a total of 32,805 collected weapons. In addition, DIAG has collected 296,346 pieces of ammunition.

DIAG's strength is that it is a government-led programme, overseen by the D & R Commission, which is chaired by Vice-President Karim Khalili. The Vice-Chairman is Minister Mohammad Massum Stanekzai. Although the AMF had been officially demobilized, the presence of other informal armed groups in Afghanistan was seen as a continuing threat to security, and therefore to development.

The original concept for a DDR programme envisaged a caseload of around 100,000 former combatants; many of these individuals could not prove their allegiance to the AMF because they were not on MoD official lists of units. They were therefore not eligible for DDR under the terms that had been defined. They are among those targeted for DIAG. At the same time, DIAG provides a way to support disarmament within communities in a way that acknowledges that weapons possession and use is controlled by leaders of local armed groups.

DIAG's stated aims are two-fold:

- a. To support the government through disarmament and disbandment of illegal armed groups and reduce the level of armed violence in the community;
- b. To empower existing government programmes for socio-economic development to enhance stability and the promotion of good governance, an essential part of security sector reform in Afghanistan.

The 2006 BCPR mission described DIAG as a political and a law-enforcement programme, and wondered whether its structure as a development programme would allow its essential nature to be expressed. It praised as 'innovative and worth pursuing' the idea of working through commanders of armed groups, rather than attempting voluntary civilian disarmament - a 'rich source of lessons to be learned in Afghanistan and elsewhere'.

In para 82 the BCPR team remarked that, 'If the programme is successful in disbanding illegal armed groups, Afghan security structures are unlikely to be able fill the security vacuum that may be created. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to provide security for the population.'

Since the Security Sector Reform process appears stalled in several key areas, including police, DIAG faces big challenges. The Director of ANBP is aware of the challenges and is coming up with new and interesting, innovative directions for DIAG and for ways to address the legalization of *de facto* armed groups disguised as private security companies. The UN needs to remain committed to the solution of this problem. Working towards 'weapons management' rather than 'disarmament' certainly seems a constructive approach.

The police chief of Badakhshan province – who had been recently appointed through the Ministry of Interior reform process – narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. The likely reason? He had shut down heroin laboratories and supported the implementation at the district level of police reforms that would have limited the capacity of illegal armed groups to benefit from the heroin trade.

DIAG, as originally conceived, was ill equipped to face this new challenge, necessitating as it did intelligence sharing, strengthened law enforcement capacity, and high-level political engagement. It was also essential that ISAF – including all 37 of its contributing nations – be prepared to back up enforcement operations. Such backing was agreed to by the ISAF commander and provided for in the DIAG Concept of Operations, but ISAF troop contributors have been inconsistent in their support.

SRSg speech, Tokyo DIAG Conference, 21 June 2007

## 1.2. Background to ANBP and DDR-CIP

Insecurity remains a major challenge confronting Afghans in their daily lives. The Afghan government has no monopoly on coercive force, and independent commanders wield considerable influence across the country. The underlying cause of this insecurity is not so much ideology as competition between individuals and tribal groups for local scarce resources and power. Afghans despair at the impunity with which many groups operate. In the meantime opium production remains the mainstream of southern Afghanistan's economy; security and disarmament issues cannot be separated from the drug economy. The UNODC's report published 27 August 2007 shows an 18% increase in production this year, particularly in the Helmand areas nominally under British occupation. In July 2001 the US government paid \$43 millions in cash to the Taliban to encourage poppy reduction, but even under the Taliban it is questionable whether opium production was really being reduced. With no alternative cash crop available to them, farmers are bound to plant more poppies.

The US-led occupation of Afghanistan brought the return of the drug lords under American protection, and opium production has soared. Unless the drug economy can be brought under control, Afghanistan will become a 'narco-state' and criminal mafias will take over. The economic laws of supply and demand have proved far stronger than any form of legislation or suppression, so the solution to Afghanistan's drug problem must lie in some form of opium market modification, rather than in policies of repression that have been unsuccessful since the 1970s. Security Sector Reform will fail unless new approaches are introduced to replace failed counter-narcotics policies. Changing a failed policy cannot be achieved with more money, only with new ideas.<sup>6</sup>

Demobilization and disarmament were identified as priorities for the rebuilding of the

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<sup>6</sup> Two radically different recipes for change were offered on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2007 in articles by Vice-President Massoud in the British *Sunday Telegraph* and by Peter Bergen and Sameer Lalwani in the *Los Angeles Times*. (see bibliography for detailed references). The conclusion must be that we are failing.



country after twenty-five years of war, and on 2 December 2002 His Excellency President Hamid Karzai signed a Decree outlining principles and conditions on security and the Afghan National Army (ANA). The decree states that the ANA will be an ethnically balanced organization not to exceed 70,000 – meaning a reduction in the numbers of soldiers and militias who had joined the army since the fall of the Taliban. In 2007 we are informed that the number of men in the ANA has reached 35,000.

In order to direct the implementation of the military reorganisation, President Karzai issued several decrees on 11 January 2003 to establish four Defence Commissions:

1. The Disarmament Commission, to approve the disarmament plan developed through discussions with the MoD and ANBP (responsibilities met on October 8, 2003 and thereafter the Commission was dissolved);
2. The Demobilization & Reintegration (D&R) Commission, chaired by Vice President Khalili, to produce the strategy, standards and methods to guide the ministries that would contribute to this phase of the DDR process;
3. The Officer Recruiting & Training Commission, chaired by General Zadran, to oversee the commissioning and decommissioning of officers;
4. The Soldier Recruiting & Training Commission chaired by General Wardak, to will oversee the recruitment of soldiers, Mujahiddin and those with no formal raining or experience who wish to join the ANA.

The last two commissions and the first have been subsumed into the reformed MoD, while the D&R Commission remains the principle partner of UNAMA and UNDP in the running of the ANBP and a forum for inter-ministerial cooperation in SSR.

Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was announced in February 2003 at the Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan as part of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) package for Security Sector Reform (SSR). ANBP was created for three years under the auspices of UNDP to help the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, now the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, implement a country-wide Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme to disarm the Afghan Military Forces (AMF).

ANBP's central office is located in Kabul, and regional offices were established in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, Nangahar (Jalalabad), Kunduz, Bamiyan, Paktia (Gardez) and Herat. Parwan is covered from the Kabul head office making eight regional offices altogether. These offices are still functioning, and they are extremely well managed. This decentralized structure offers exciting opportunities for UNDP to develop regional strategies using the facilities and contacts developed by ANBP.

The programme was implemented by UNDP on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Contributions were channelled to ANBP through the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery/DDR Trust Fund. UNAMA provided overall policy guidance as part of its larger coordination function on behalf of the UN system; UNDP provided technical backstopping and operational support to ANBP. The principal government partners for this programme have been the DDR Forum and the Demobilization and

Reintegration (D&R) Commission.

ANBP was organized as three programme components:

- DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile - the 'Ammo' project,
- DIAG - the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme.

From the point of view of the evaluators in July 2007, DRR can be broken down into six different components: this makes eight components in all for ANBP, which may also make good sense from an organizational and functional point of view.

ANBP documents say that it has 'assisted the Government of Afghanistan in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF): 62,376 members of the AMF were demobilized and 53,145 ex-combatants joined the reintegration process through one of many 'reintegration packages' including vocational training, agriculture, de-mining, small business, contracting teams, teacher training or joining the Afghan National Police (ANP) or the Afghan National Army (ANA).'

While the Ammunition project and the DIAG programme continue, ANBP's DDR mandate ended in June 2006. UNDP has continued to support the ex-combatants' reintegration process through a Transition Phase run by ILO,<sup>7</sup> with monitoring and evaluation of beneficiaries beyond June'06 to maintain programme sustainability and facilitate initiatives which lead beneficiaries to sustainable livelihoods. The ANBP mandate equated 'reintegration' with 'vocational training'.

The training component was completed by ANBP, but a three-year programme is not long enough for a real reintegration process to take place. The Afghan war-and-drug economy is booming, but the Afghan peace economy is very weak and post-war investments have been slow to arrive. Employment opportunities for XCs are therefore few and poorly paid. UNDP and its partners are rethinking strategic policy to ensure reintegration becomes a sustainable endeavour achieving long-term development goals.

The macro- and microeconomic dynamics of post-conflict communities also influence the outcome of DDR programmes... The ending of hostilities alone is not enough to improve economic conditions, although a rapid increase in economic benefits, often seen as a 'peace dividend', is often expected by populations recovering from conflict. Economic recovery is also a long and complex process. DDR programmes should therefore be designed to reinforce economic recovery efforts and not to compete with them.

*Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks*, UN 2006,  
2.3. *The economic environment*

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<sup>7</sup> RSPE = Reintegration Support Project for Employment

### 1.3. Relevance

In the context of Afghanistan's post-conflict recovery, and the urgent need for Security Sector Reform (SSR), ANBP was a highly relevant programme. Indeed DDR and the reorganization of the Afghan army that it initiated, were two of the five pillars of SSR<sup>8</sup> identified by the President, and the ones that have worked best so far.

It is important to remember, as we look back over five years, that ANBP was conceived and implemented in a war zone. It involved bringing into an embryonic political process large numbers of armed men whose commitment to peace had not been declared. Most DDR programmes are part of a peace process. This one was not, and much of its action took place in a context of rumbling war against Taliban rebels who remain excluded from the Bonn Agreement. Many observers think it was a mistake to have excluded the Taliban.

The initiation of ANBP was important for Afghanistan. Its swift implementation was impressive, especially when it is viewed against the insecurity, dangers, broken infrastructure and post-war chaos of the time. In terms of helping to create an enabling environment for weapon management through the control of armed groups (and the disbandment of some of them), the programme has had an extremely positive impact. The CIP has engaged Commanders and officers from different areas and many political persuasions and factions and brought them together, thereby creating the first elements of reconciliation between people and regions. Many recent aspects of Afghan political evolution in the area of SSR would have been impossible without the DDR and CIP programmes. The relevance of ANBP is not in doubt.

Asia Times □ 14 August 2007

By Haroun Mir □ Kabul, former advisor to Masoud

Afghanistan and Pakistan face a far greater dilemma than their historic territorial disputes. Because of almost three decades of intensive radicalization of Pashtuns in Pakistani madrassas (seminaries), they are losing their traditional tribal structures.

Traditional leaders have been replaced by the likes of Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah; the latter hardline commander was killed in fighting in Afghanistan this year. Many traditional Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan were killed during the war against the Soviets or were assassinated by the communist regime in the early 1990s.

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<sup>8</sup> The Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform are: Military Reform, Police Reform, DDR, Judicial Reform, and Counter-Narcotics.

## **1.4. Efficiency in terms of cash (value for money) and delivery (value for people)**

We believe that ANBP has given good value for money, and its donors should be well satisfied with their investment. We feel that some aspects of its design were poorly thought through, and this reduced the sustainable impact of DDR in some areas: but this does not change the fact that the political impacts of the programme have been positive and important for Afghanistan.

In terms of implementation and delivery, we are impressed by the efficiency of ANBP management, its clarity of purpose and its control systems. The mechanisms ANBP created for regional structures and mobile teams succeeded in reaching commanders and XCs throughout the complex geographical layout of Afghanistan, and they provide a model for similar programmes everywhere.

Not all XCs were reached, and this will remain a source of grievance in some regions. We believe that this was largely due to the self-interest of certain commanders. Whether this should be seen as a 'failure' of the ANBP is questionable in the circumstances of the DDR process, controlled as it was by MoD officials whose lists were the only source of identification of DDR beneficiaries. It is possible that more flexibility in time and selection criteria, and a wider public information programme, might have allowed more XCs to lobby for inclusion, but this is not at all certain – and numbers might have got out of control. How can any DDR programme identify 'a man with an AK47' as a genuine ex-combatant, unless there is a framework for his identification? It is not realistic to believe that flexibility alone can provide adequate controls. Nonetheless, some XCs who were missed out of DDR are now causing headaches for the DIAG programme.

The CIP component reached out to a selected list of commanders, chosen after considerable effort had been put into an innovative identification survey.<sup>9</sup> The CIP certainly had a favorable impact on those commanders whom we met. Their eyes were opened to new ideas, and they were brought into contact with – and even into friendship with – other commanders against whom they had recently been fighting. Was the CIP simply 'buying time' by involving some commanders in non-violent activities? Possibly so, and this seems perfectly acceptable in the circumstances. We find it was a very efficient and cost-effective strategy for the moment at which it was designed.

While some people criticize the ANBP as an 'expensive' programme, this is a view we do not share. Although there are undoubtedly areas in which some economies could have been made (fewer vehicles?), this may be more obvious with hindsight than it

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<sup>9</sup> We have heard about the identification forms A and B but the M&E section of ANBP was unaware of them and has no data on commanders who were left out of the database (no one can explain why this was done). ANBP has underestimated the value of the database. Neglect of such a tool soon renders it useless. DIAG does not use CIP data – indeed DIAG doesn't seem to have any data at all about commanders. The DDR-CIP bank of information has not been used or updated since June 2006.

could have been in 2002 when donors agreed to fund the demobilization of 100,000 XCs. In the event fewer came forward for demobilization, but managers could not predict that.

The reintegration part of ANBP was less obviously efficient than the DD and CIP parts of the project. To a large extent that is because ANBP was funded for only three years, and this was the fault of the donors: no one believes that a DDR project can enable XCs to achieve 'sustainable civilian livelihoods' in just three years. When the time is subtracted that it takes to set up an organization the size of ANBP to handle a case-load of 63,000 or more XCs (at its peak, ANBP had 693 employees), and the time needed to plan operations and order vehicles, it becomes clear that the period actually available for field operations barely exceeded 18 months. This is obviously inadequate for any DDR programme.

No one can judge the success of reintegration until DDR beneficiaries have been established in civilian life for at least five years – the length of time that we normally judge the viability of a new small business in Europe or America. In the ANBP project document, the 'R' was described mainly in terms of vocational training, and in that regard the project largely fulfilled its mandate.<sup>10</sup>

ANBP is so admired in Afghanistan, its reputation for efficiency is so great, that our reservations about the 'R' process are resented by military personnel. "The first principle of war is, 'Selection and maintenance of the aim'," comments the Halo Trust, ANBP's closest implementing partner. "What was the aim in this process and was it achieved? If the aim was to take weapons off people, get the heavy weapons out of circulation and let the ex-combatants return to their villages, then the aim was largely fulfilled." That is true, but it is not the whole story. We agree the disarmament process was brilliantly and efficiently executed, and we are only sorry that the other parts of the DDR process were not as brilliant as the first 'D'. Was disarmament the most important part? Undoubtedly. Will collecting weapons by and of itself produce sustainable peace? We think not.

To improve efficiency we believe that DDR projects should benefit from the lessons of previous experience, and plan for seven years in order to allow the 'R' time to happen. The fact that UNDP, ILO, USAID and others are busy designing follow-up projects to assist beneficiaries succeed in their reintegration, confirms that it would have been better to start in 2002 with a proper, seven-year DDR programme. Efficiency would have improved by taking advantage of lessons learned in other programmes – not Sierra Leone (where the DDR programme was greatly criticized and not too successful), but the large number of DDR experiences that have been recorded and analysed since the seminal Rhodesian-Zimbabwe DDR experiment 30 years ago. This would have involved bringing in a broader range of expertise at the 'inspiration' and design phase, and ANBP would have benefited greatly.

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<sup>10</sup> Whether 6 months are long enough to count as 'vocational training' is another matter. We recognize that the ILO's design of and support to the National Skills Programme had not yet started when ANBP was designing its programme, but specialist expertise is not evident in the ANBP training design.

Not all lessons can be transferred, of course. The ANBP attempt to provide temporary incomes with road building labour failed because Afghan XCs did not want building work. This was a perfectly laudable idea, a creative way to generate short-term incomes that may have been inspired by the World Bank experiment in 2004 linking road building and DDR in Burundi (that loan cost more than the economic return to DDR of the road).

In response to those who claim that ANBP was too expensive, against what measurement shall we decide that \$120 millions are 'too much' – or indeed 'too little'? By what standards can we judge? It made much more sense for Afghanistan than the World Bank's \$84.71 million loan agreement with Burundi. One contributing donor embassy official remarked, "We have wasted so much money in Afghanistan that the ANBP project seems quite modest."

We do not believe that number-crunching is very useful at this level of evaluation. An audit looks at facts, while an evaluation considers impacts. The overall impact of DDR and CIP must be measured in political terms, not by counting numbers of weapons or packages of 130Kg of foodstuffs. We will consider the details, of course, in the two thematic reports: but once we have decided that ANBP had a major and positive influence on Afghan's political processes, enabled security sector reform to begin and facilitated the creation of a new Afghan National Army, we must conclude that the Japanese, British, Canadian, US and other supporting governments – and above all the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) - received good value from their investment.

"Commanders who have joined DDR are very bitter because they are not recognized, jobless and humiliated. They feel the Gov is stigmatizing them because they are suspected of remaining loyal to old commanders. A council of commanders should be formed to advise the government on political and military issues. That way the government would be able to keep an eye on the commanders. Commanders would appreciate recognition and their influence at the community level could be used."

Comment from ANBP regional office manager.

## **1.5. Effectiveness, Objectives, Dissenting Voices and Stakeholder Satisfaction:**

- did DDR improve lives and promote peace?**
- What were the objectives (stated or not)**
- And did ANBP meet them?**

While ANBP managers were very efficient in getting things done, the broader question of ANBP's effectiveness in promoting Afghan peace and stability, and improving lives by promoting sustainable reintegration of XCs, requires a more subtle appreciation. Appreciation of effectiveness should take account of the views of a range of

stakeholders who base their appreciation of ANBP's effectiveness on very different points of view. Each group had different objectives, some of which were never stated. We have tried to discover whether ANBP gave them satisfaction. The evaluators have met with representatives of all these stakeholders:

- Government of Afghanistan, and its institutions involved particularly in security sector reforms (MoD, MoI, MoJ) and other ministries such as Ministry of Social affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Education which should be concerned with reintegration.
- Provincial governments and officials
- Afghanistan civil society and general public.
- Ex-combatants (XCs).
- Ex-combatants' wives and families
- Communities receiving XCs, including martyrs' widows and disabled veterans
- International governmental stakeholders, including UNAMA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and other UN agencies, international humanitarian organizations, and ANBP implementing partners (IPs) including GTZ, AGEF, IOM, CFA, Care, World Vision, Halo Trust, CSTC-A.
- International observers of the DDR process, including EU, EC, NATO, ISAF
- DDR Donors.
- International civil society organizations (some of whom were IPs)
- Local and international business community
- Members and former members of ANBP staff

### • **1.5.1. Government of Afghanistan**

#### **Objectives:**

Governments are not homogenous institutions. Different departments have different objectives. Soldiers have a different perspective from policemen or teachers or ministers – and ministers do not always agree. To make the situation more complicated still, GoA is centrally weak. Governments have always been weak in Afghanistan, which has always been run by a Royal Court with 'courtiers' being appointed as governors. In terms of European models, the Afghan system most closely resembles Switzerland which has strong, independent cantons and a weak coordinating central executive. The court system persists at national and provincial level. That is how Afghan central government needs to be seen to be understood.

ANBP was most closely involved with the Ministry of Defence which had the main task of downsizing the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and creating a new Afghan National Army (ANA) with regional and ethnic balance. The secondary aim of MoD was to collect as much hardware and ammunition as possible, irrespective of real or calculated equipment needs, and remove it from illegal hands so that- for the first time in many years – dissuasive force could become the sole preserve of a legal Afghan

government. The MoD was very clear that they have 'ownership' of all collected weapons and ammunition. The MoD is also very clear that they wish to keep a monopoly of decision-making over the destination and disposal of all weapons and ammunition. In a democratic system, however, judgements of elected political leaders take precedence over the views of technical ministries. The ultimate decision-making power therefore resides with the elected President

Through the D&R Commission many other ministries were involved – at least theoretically. Our impression is that the D&R Commission worked quite well, but that technical ministerial involvement was minimal. Most ministries are interested in survival, which means the accumulation of funding and power – that, after all, is what ministries and courtiers do. When ANBP was seen to offer funding or other advantages, collaboration was forthcoming; when ANBP asked for support to make a success of reintegration through finding jobs, most sectoral ministries were quite unhelpful.

"We knew that MRRD was launching a big project with a need for lots of labourers," one ANBP programme officer told us, "So I went there to talk with them in the field. I told them we have all these XCs with some training and they need jobs. But the ministry people were not really interested." The Ministry of Education is said to have been more helpful than other ministries, and some educated XCs and their wives have been taken on as teachers.<sup>11</sup> Generally speaking, however, Ministers have done little to impress on their staffs that President Karzai labeled DDR and SSR as national priorities.

### **Satisfaction:**

The Government of Afghanistan at the central level is well satisfied with the positive impacts of ANBP: diminishing the crippling MoD budget through DDR, promoting peace, weapon management, reduction of levels and threat of conflict thanks to the heavy weapons cantonment, ammunition collection, and through ANBP's ongoing contribution to security sector reform through the DDR process and the disbandment of disparate units listed as belonging to the Afghan Military Forces, through the DIAG and Ammo projects. The CIP programme – and its successor DIAG – have high level political support and are appreciated as important projects for engaging and neutralizing dangerous, and potentially destabilizing commanders.

Inside the MoD - and in other ministries like the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled - there is concern that 'reintegration' has not guaranteed jobs to the thousands of XCs, although everybody (including the two Deputy Defence Ministers we met) recognizes that job security and business success for XCs depend more on economic growth than on ANBP's actions.

The economy is said to be growing at 12% per year which is less than half what one would expect from a war-torn economy recovering its energies. This is because of poor agricultural conditions and because too much of the international effort has been invested in the war economy. Donors after 2002 were very slow indeed to invest

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<sup>11</sup> For a certain number of literate wives of XCs, ANBP signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education and provided a six-month upgrading course leading to a teaching certificate issued by the MoE. Yet in Kunduz and Nangahar provinces we found ladies whose certificates had later been refused by the MoE – even though they hold MoE certificates! And we are desperately short of teachers!



in the peace economy, and GoA officials at every level are bitterly critical of the international coalition and its failure to invest. Finally that is happening: roads and bridges are being built, and the long-awaited, American-funded Shir Khan Bandar bridge across the Amu Darya was actually inaugurated by President Karzai during the evaluation mission. The hope is that the ANBP vocational training provided to XCs has equipped them to hold down solid jobs as the economy grows.

Many (perhaps most) of the XCs are in fact working, many of them doing at home what they were always doing except when they were away being occasional, short-term, part-time *jihadis*. In the current economic climate, however, many XCs find their revenues are small and they are not able to support their families at the level they desire. Their disappointment is palpable and understandable.

The fact is that ministries in Kabul are weak, and the international community is overloading them with projects. Donors have a centralized mentality, and they like projects to be implemented from Kabul. The donors and the ministries would get better results if – like ANBP – they decentralized their actions to the provincial level. If more projects were decentralized, Governors would get things done. This would leave government ministries the time to focus on coordinating national strategies. Local implementing capacity would grow in the provinces, and Afghanistan's peace economy would benefit.

Decentralization would benefit ANBP as well. One governor complained that the DIAG weapon collection process is paralyzed by Kabul: it takes 6 months to get permission, by which time the targeted weapons have already been sold. One minister retorted that it suits governors to blame Kabul for their inaction: that way they can blame someone else and avoid taking any risks themselves. As he might have said, citing a proverb, "They don't want to get their feet wet."

*Ab-ra na didi mozara az poi makesk* - Proverb

'If you don't see water, don't remove your shoes'

Meaning: Plan before you act

Or : Look before you leap

Or : Kabul should take the risk, and I'll keep my shoes dry

### • 1.5.2. Provincial governments and officials

#### **Objectives:**

Provincial officials wanted both DDR and CIP to improve security. Jobs are an important part of this equation, because Provincial Governors are constantly aware that that unemployed men who once used guns to make a living, are easily enticed back into illegal activity or open rebellion. Some officials can be classed as Goliags<sup>12</sup>,

<sup>12</sup> Government officials linked to illegal armed groups

and some of these have used the DDR process to legalize themselves and their militias by integrating government structures (some are good, some are not so good). As insecurity increases in the south, so officials in other regions watch warily for signs of growing criminal activity in their zones, or for a resurgence of the Taliban with local, regional support.

### **Satisfaction:**

All officials have a positive view of the disarmament programme, of its political value and its neutralization of many troublesome commanders. They recognise DDR's positive impact on peace through the removal of weapons; but they have to live with the results of 'reintegration' and with the complaints of disappointed people who thought the GoA was going to give them a job. Broken DDR promises have cost the government a lot of prestige – and it is local officials who bear the brunt of that disappointment. Local governors see more of the local job problems than do members of the presidency in Kabul, and may have less appreciation for the strategic gains of ANBP.

The first, early ANBP mistake was giving out cash in the form of a short-lived Transitional Safety Allowance (it was perceived across Afghanistan as cash-for-weapons, even if this was not the intention). A private commercial operator commented spontaneously, 'ANBP, they are the ones who bought weapons for cash.' For XCs who had heard about the offer, its withdrawal was a disappointment and a broken promise. Those who received cash payments found it a bitter experience, as they were forced to surrender the payment to their commanders ... and those who resisted were beaten up!

The GoA has had even more negative political fall-out from its dismissal of elderly members of the professional officer corps who have been demonstrating and protesting in Kabul on a regular basis. This has nothing to do with the DDR programme since many dismissals took place before ANBP started work: but that is not how the colonels and their friends see it. The GoA missed an opportunity here: these colonels could have been put through the DDR process. GoA is considered to have failed to care for professional army officers. Both GoA and ANBP get criticized about the lack of jobs for XC colonels, as well as by soldiers and *jihadis* who believed – often with good reason – that jobs had been promised to them. "Why do we allow road construction to take place with foreign labor?" asked one provincial Governor in frustration, adding that unemployment is an invitation to Commanders to take up arms and for soldiers to be recruited.

Another Governor is worried about six or seven powerful, restless commanders in his province: "They need to be occupied, or they might join Taliban." The Governor would like to see them sent overseas for 3 years. Some of these commanders dare not travel outside their own zone, for fear of vengeance. On the other hand, 'real *jihadis*' cannot put food on the table... and this is often blamed on DDR, although it is really a function of the weak peace economy. A general at MoD laughed bitterly, "What economy? There is no economy!"

'I know some former officers are protesting. They feel they deserve a better deal. They want respect. We give them respect, but respect has to be earned. Some of them have lost it.'

Deputy Minister of Defence

- **1.5.3. Afghan civil society and the general public.**

**Objectives:**

The Afghan general public wants peace and prosperity. Before DDR liberated them from the rule of the gun, a lot of them wanted to be free from the commanders and their abusive demands for free food and tithes. This is expressed in private conversation rather than in public debate, which is not widespread. There is no tradition of civil society in Afghanistan outside the urban elites who create teachers' unions and lawyers' associations, and more recently NGOs and human rights organizations with small, elite memberships. Through the NSP, elected Community Development Committees (CDC) have been created in many of Afghanistan's 40,000 villages. However these are new, imported structures that have no deep community roots<sup>13</sup>, and they are often dominated by the local strong man (*khan* or commander). In Afghan society as a whole, the only indigenous civil society structures we see are the mosques *masjid* and *takiyakhana* (respectively for Sunni and Shia worship) and the *sufi* brotherhoods.

**Satisfaction:**

What most Afghan civilians know about DDR, if they know anything at all, is the failure of XCs to get jobs is. At the same time citizens accept the benefits and peace dividends of DDR, without realizing how they came about. The 2005 Charney Afghan Omnibus Survey found that 77% of Afghans believed their country was heading in the right direction – up from 64% the previous year. This suggests that DDR had an impact on people's appreciations of peace and security, even if they didn't realise it was because of ANBP and the D&R Commission. Maybe ANBP and the D&R Commission need to ratchet up their public information campaign and target more accurately certain specific segments of society so that people hear the truth about DDR and its achievements. 77% is an approval rating many governments would be glad of. An informed observer might suspect that the approval rating has slipped since then, as security has decreased in the South.

The average urban citizen is glad there are fewer weapons on the streets, relieved that Commanders are no longer racing through the cities in huge, darkened limousines accompanied by a bunch of trigger-happy armed bodyguards spilling out of two pickup trucks. At the same time, ordinary Afghans do not see any improvement in the peace economy, where job opportunities should come. They are worried by rising levels of insecurity, and the failure of the international community to invest in wealth-creating, job-creating enterprises. The successes of DDR and CIP are becoming lost in the general malaise. Some Afghans who moved back from exile and invested in business ventures are talking of leaving if security becomes worse.

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<sup>13</sup> In Africa the CDC movement is strong, and rooted in African traditions of civil society and democratic governance. This is simply not the case in patriarchal Afghan society.

The few urban, educated, English-speaking Afghans who are active in what we call Civil Society, recognize that DDR and CIP have been good for Afghanistan: DDR helped bring peace, reduced the presence of weapons on city streets, and reduced the problem of commanders in large areas of the country. Some big commanders became very rich from having their ghost militias registered with the Ministry of Defence, and they made more money still out of DDR which benefited their families and cronies, but at least many of their militias have now been disbanded.

A lot of people have heard that Commanders were sent to Japan, which they see as rewarding thieves with an overseas holiday – suggesting an unfortunate lack of public communication skills in the CIP and DIAG offices. (In fact just eleven commanders visited Japan, and the purpose of the trip was both to give the visitors insights into democratic governance and the rule of law, and to show the Japanese public that their money had been well spent in Afghanistan).

Many small commanders have lost their power to tyrannize local people, and so did lots of middle-level commanders, which people across the country see as a benefit. In places like Badakhshan, Badghis, Uruzghan, Ghor and the southern Pashtun provinces, certain commanders have strengthened their position through lack of a strong police force and through their control of drug trade. There is no rule of law, and no strong, reliable, honest police presence. This worries thoughtful Afghans, and some people see this as a failure of the DDR and CIP processes – although it is actually a failure of the Security Sector Reform process of which DDR has been the most successful pillar.

In the provinces, commanders often lived by brute force, seizing 10% of the local harvest and livestock and using the proceeds of their illegal taxation to reward their men. In most places where DDR took place, the commanders have lost their weapons and the pillaging has stopped. Rural people are happier: most areas a calmer than before, the men are back and rural communities have a larger, more reliable workforce which they need to feed the widows, orphans and disabled left from war. In the southern provinces where violence is on the rise, life is more stressful. Some people make a lot of money from opium poppies, but rural communities are subject to unannounced attacks from American helicopters, from British counter-narcotics agents, from Taliban insurgents, and from criminal armed gangs.

For the Pashtun regions of South and East Afghanistan, there is no peace dividend from DDR and there won't be any until the failing Western counter-narcotics policies have been changed. Right now every Afghan citizen and most Western journalists believe that British counter-narcotics policy is the Taliban's principal source of strength.

Indigenous civil society structures – *shura* councils in the Pashtun lands, religious charity schools *madersas* and *madrassas*, mosques *masjid* and *takiyakhana* (respectively for Sunni and Shia worship) and the *sufi* brotherhoods across the country – are composed mostly of ordinary Afghan men whose religion Islam contains the word *salaam* = peace. What they mainly want is a peaceful life. Afghans are tired of war. A few are affiliated with radical Islamic movements, and quite a few mosques

have been taken over by radicalized *mullahs* brought from Pakistan. Some of these preachers live in a fractious partnership with the villagers, whom they dominate with Islamic learning thanks to Saudi money but with whom they have no very warm relationship because they are 'foreigners'. Most of these people want the foreign occupying forces to withdraw, and they wonder why DDR brought no wealth to them.

Communities received nothing out specific out of DDR, except that they got peace. That is what they wanted most of all, after 30 years of war. If they had more help with their widows and orphans, they would be happier. If their disabled veterans had received more help and greater recognition, they would feel better about the DDR process. We conclude that most Afghans, if pushed into a longer discussion of the benefits and disbenefits of DDR, would agree that DDR had its disappointments but that overall the results were positive for them and for their children.

"DDR was fine for the country, because it reduced weapons and it helped to bring a reduction of violence. But for DDR people it was useless because there are no jobs. Where are the factories to employ the DDRs? Life is better now than before, but people are uneasy about what is happening with the Americans in the south. We are scaring, and wonder if we will lose our business and have to flee."

Stationery trader Delawar, a Hazara from Mazar with a shop in the Habibullah Market in Kabul

### Objectives:

XC's wanted plenty of benefits, wealth, or at least a steady government job. Some were happy just to get home and live with their wife and kids, but most were hoping for economic security in exchange for giving up the firearms with which they and their commanders had been making a living. Many of them believe they fought for a income, earned a job, deserve to be rewarded. We cite elsewhere the XC who said, "I am happy. I have a wife and a house. DDR should give me a second wife and a second house."

### Satisfaction:

Many ordinary XC's have returned to their farms where they eke out a living, and which many of them only left on an occasional basis for a swift campaign. They sometimes feel they have lost out because DDR removed the tool with which they made a living: the gun. They may not like DDR's results, but that doesn't mean that DDR was bad for the country – only bad for them!

We met XC's who were delighted to get out of the military, relieved to break away from their commanders, and happy to see the demise of the AMF. On the whole, **the most satisfied DDR customers are soldiers, officers and commanders who own and cultivate land; educated men who have found a job**, or who managed to start a business that feeds their family; and older men who have become tired of fighting and 'running up mountains' as one put it.

We have met others – a larger number - who feel let down by the failure of DDR and GoA to provide them with a job. It seems pretty certain that many of these XC's did hear officials promise during the demobilization process that DDR would bring them a

job (rather than vocational training for prepare them to find a job). Certainly most of them think that is what they heard.<sup>14</sup> These are men who believe they have fought for the nation and deserve recognition (and a job) in exchange for their effort and sacrifice.

There is some evidence that educated XCs have done better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Some have found government positions. Shopkeepers and businessmen who can keep accounts tend to do better than those who have to remember everything in their head. Those XCs who return to their communities with literacy have greater prestige than the uneducated and there is even some spiritual benefit: education is highly prized in Islam, for *the pen is mightier than the sword*.

It is inevitable that Afghan public opinion will be divided concerning the benefits of DDR. Ordinary XCs did well enough if they were literate. XCs have found jobs as teachers, in the ANA and ANP, or in government administrative positions. Some have found jobs in the problematic but lucrative security sector, working for unlicensed Private Security Companies. PSCs pay well, and the XC feels comfortable with his weapon, although it still an illegal weapon. Maybe a job with a PSC brings good value for the XC, but maybe it represents a failure for the hopes of DDR. A licensing system for the problematic PSCs will be one of the outcomes of the DIAG project, hopefully reaching the statute book during 2008.

Commanders who combine accumulated wealth with commercial acumen have made a good living out of business. Plenty have chosen drugs as their most profitable option. They are probably the happiest XCs of all, but they don't necessarily make the rest of Afghanistan happy, for their financial influence may be as pernicious as their military influence was before. The 2005 Charney Omnibus Survey showed 34% of Afghans worried about corruption, and 41% saying that getting rid of the warlords was a top priority (and some of the respondents are presumably XCs who want to be rid of their Commanders). That is a mandate for DIAG, and shows the importance of the work that ANBP has been doing. There is more still to be done.

A pair of appropriate proverbs

Pashtu: *Chaqu ka de sroo she sog-e pa gaeda na mandee*

Even if a knife is made of gold, a person won't stab his own heart with it.

Meaning: Don't side with your best friend if he is in the wrong

Or: Even if DDR is good for the country, what did it do for ME?

Dari: *kas namega ke dogh-e ma tursh ast*

No one says his own buttermilk is sour.

Meaning: No one advertises his own faults.

Or: Commanders will never admit they have done wrong.

<sup>14</sup> The 3-minute *Demobilization* film, funded by USAID and made by Richard Scarf for D&R Commission and Afghan television broadcasts to promote DDR, shows a DDR briefer telling XCs sitting in a class room: "As you know, weapons oppose construction. Think about which option will suit you best. When you leave this room, you will go to see the caseworker who is in charge of finding you jobs (or reintegration options). You can tell him which job suits you best."

- **1.5.5. Ex-combatants' wives and families**

**Objectives:**

Wives and families wanted to get their menfolk home alive and with two legs and two arms. Like their husbands who are happy just to get home to their wife and kids, most women were hoping that economic security would arrive along with their men. This has not happened, as the economy stays sluggish, peace investments have been slow, and harvests have not been good. However, by and large Afghan women do not suffer like their men from hang-ups about wealth and status. A quiet life is what they want, without hunger. If there is prestige so much the better, but physical security is the key thing for a woman's survival in this tough land, and the presence of men as farmers and herders, merchants and negotiators definitely makes the lives of women easier.

**Satisfaction:**

In general, the wives and families of XCs have been primarily glad that their husbands and sons and brothers are back from the war, and that fighting has ceased. The joy and celebration has its economic drawbacks: one woman told us she has had four children in five years since her husband stopped fighting! But children who cost money and demand food in the short term, will provide a future source of wealth, comfort and social security for their parents' old age.

Incomes and jobs are the main problem. ANBP showed imagination in bringing teacher training to a small number of (mostly urban upper class) women, some of whom have found jobs – although the Ministry of Education has not been as supportive as expected in getting placements for these qualified and certified teachers. Maybe some of the MoD's disappointed, early-retired colonels could be retrained as teachers. This would bring them incomes and employment, along with the prestigious title of *moalem sahib*.

The vast majority of families, however, were left out of the DDR and CIP equations. All attention was focused on the demobilized soldier as an individual<sup>15</sup>, and nothing was attempted in terms of supporting extended families and communities in which numbers of XCs – including unknown numbers of disabled veterans and martyrs' widows – have to be integrated.

The 2005 Charney survey showed that only 22% of respondents feel that the UN has done enough to empower women – which concurs with the evaluation team's regrets about ANBP's neglect of gender issues. At the same time, 86% of Afghans felt in 2005 that the situation of women has improved since 2001. This would seem to be a vote of approval for the Government's continued stubborn resistance to Taliban rebels in the South of Afghanistan.

We have no satisfaction data from child soldiers, who were not included in the DDR equation by ANBP. This is a field in which UNICEF takes the lead, but ANBP was bound

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<sup>15</sup> For the small number of disabled XCs that came within the purview of DDR, however, the handicapped veteran was allowed to nominate a member of his family to receive vocational training in his place, so that the training might lead to income creation to support the XC and his family - a sensitive ANBP innovation.

to find some under-age soldiers turning up in the DDR process, and they did. ANBP insisted - against all previous DDR experience - that 'only soldiers with weapons' would be accepted. Military labourers, carriers, intendants, cooks and sex-slaves were excluded from DDR by ANBP's rigid and idiosyncratic criteria. Were there any? We shall never know!

None of the ANBP staff who admitted they had come across under-age soldiers, really knew what happened to them. Every XC has mental trauma and adjustment problems. Young men will be parents one day, then they will be fathers. What sort of fathers will they be? Every DDR project has a responsibility to the future generation to make every effort to help XCs adjust properly and productively to civilian life.

There was not even any health check-up to ensure that veterans returning from *jihad* were not carrying tuberculosis with which they might infect their children, or sexually transmitted diseases with which to make their wives' lives a misery – far less was there an offer of medical facilities for the families themselves. Health treatment is a reinsertion option which would have been extremely valued by XCs and their families, which they would have seen as showing respect and recognition for their service. This is an area in which XC families are not satisfied.

We find the original design of DDR flawed not only in terms of its neglect of fashionable themes like 'gender equity' and 'child soldiers' and 'equality for the handicapped', but also in terms of its approach to reintegration: there was no room for women or families in the DDR implementation. This was partly because staff were not recruited who could handle these issues, and partly because there was not enough time to develop sustainable livelihoods, community development or family wellbeing in a project conceived to last only three years.

**Mr Ghaus Rashid, Deputy Minister of Labour**, says there are 2 million child-headed households and widows in Afghanistan.

**UNICEF** says there are 8,000 child soldiers in Afghanistan.

IRIN news release, United Nations, 29 September 2004

- **1.5.6. Communities receiving XCs, including martyrs' widows and orphans and disabled veterans**

**Objectives:**

Communities want peace, and an improvement of their livelihoods. Civil society in most Afghan villages today has a new expression: in addition to the mosque, which is the centre of worship and community decision making for the men, there is a rival institution called the CDC, the Community Development Committee. Part of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) the CDC is an elected body charged with promoting economic and social development. If asked their wishes for DDR, CDC leaders will express hope that DDR will bring peace and prosperity, incomes for their war veterans, and pensions for widowed and disabled community members who are a



burden on their families and communities. Widows and the disabled cannot survive on subsistence agriculture because they cannot plow the fields. The mosque will want the same things as the CDC, and also request a new wife for their *mullah*.

In theory the CDC should be a great bonus for any community, and for DDR, by providing an institution that can help reintegrate XCs. If they had been asked, the CDCs would have been enthusiastic reintegration partners. They would have developed objectives and strategies with and for XCs.

In practice ANBP did not seek to use the CDCs. We see great potential for UNDP to develop relations with CDCs for ongoing reintegration support, and in this there is a natural partnership available with UN Habitat, which is one of the leading partners of NSP. A big question-mark hangs over the CDC: when the initial \$10,000 block grant from the World Bank has been spent, what will keep the CDC alive? We do not believe that elections, or a desire for free speech, will be enough to keep the CDC in existence. The natural community forum for debate and decision-making is the mosque. A new XC reintegration partnership with UNDP or other donors could provide a new purpose for CDCs, an opportunity to reach out to the forgotten people of DDR, and a new chance for XCs to gain respect and earn a position in the community that recognizes their contribution.

### **Satisfaction:**

The answer you receive depends on the question you ask ... and to whom. Ask an XC who has lost his weapon, his power and his source of illegal incomes (from checkpoints and hold-ups and illegal tithes on neighbouring villages, and the question will be negative: "we got nothing out of DDR." Ask his uncle or his mother or his neighbour, about changing security patterns in their region, or the *mullah*, or one of the CDC leaders, and the answer may be positive because nothing is more important to communities than peace, after thirty long years of war. Or they may give a negative answer because their brother is an XC who believes the government owes him - and promised - him a job.

Do rural communities understand the role of DDR in peace building? The link is clearly there, but it does not always seem obvious to people living in remote villages, especially if they think that owning weapons is their chief source of security. What they often see most clearly, however, is the result of CIP and **reduced power of local commanders**. If the commander is their 'boy', they may have enjoyed the fruits of his pillaging. But most communities are tired of war and tired of the commanders with their illegal taxes and their constant threats and demands. DDR brought a peace dividend to many Afghan villages even if they do not realize it came from DDR. CIP and DIAG are the ANBP programmes they probably most recognize as having an impact on their lives.

Communities were not entirely taken aback by the DDR process, for many of the XCs had never really abandoned the village. "There was no reintegration," a senior official at the MRRD told us, "because no reintegration was necessary: most of these part-time fighters never left home."

While some *jihadis* spent fifteen years in the mountains of Nuristan or Badakhshan, many of the DDR veterans were really no more than part-time militiamen following a local commander in occasional skirmishes against a national enemy (Russians, Communism, Taliban) or internecine struggles against neighbours who happened to be of a different party, a different faith, or tribe, or whose land their commander coveted. If the local commander is a rogue, his militia may be described by local communities not only as an 'illegal armed group', but as an 'armed criminal gang'. This is why there are commanders in almost every province who never leave their home village, for fear of assassination.

When war ends and DDR arrives, communities hope for a better life. Maybe they have excessive expectations, but the financial burden can be heavy when a village finds itself with numerous widows and orphans, and disabled men who cannot plough the fields or tend the herds. These communities may consider DDR a failure, if they can see no additional incomes brought to the community. The pittance paid to urban disabled in Kabul (500 afs per month = \$10) doesn't reach the villages. Even if a disabled veteran could travel, the fare to Kabul would consume the pension and the round-trip might take three days or a week. Contented men who opted for the agricultural package and went home perfectly happy with their milk cow, have found themselves under pressure from the community because they have no income generation: the milk cow feeds their children, but it brings them no money.

Thirty years ago, rural Afghans had little use for money in their daily lives: they produced what they ate, selling the surplus to purchase Eid gifts for their wives, kerosene for their lamps, candles, salt and sugar for their households, tobacco for stimulation. War and refugee camps have changed all that: this generation of XCs are used to having, and using, money. A cow is nice for the kiddies' health, but it does not bring the prestige associated with cash and guns. The lack of cash incomes has therefore coloured the views of communities in urban and rural Afghanistan alike. For most, peace is a success, but DDR was seen as a source of revenues. If the jobs and wages didn't materialize, then they consider DDR was a failure.

Most international officials, aid workers and consultants in Afghanistan live a hermetically sealed life - advised not to step outside by armed security guards, and often working at very high salaries on very short-term contracts. So too much of the money earmarked for aid to Afghanistan actually goes straight back to donor countries.

The Chief of Staff at the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Ministry, Abbie Aryan, condemned the culture of "champagne and caviar consultants" who come to Afghanistan and "deliver nothing". There is still no internationally agreed strategy on how to tackle the drugs problem. Mr Aryan says that large amounts of ... money have been wasted on things that the Afghans do not need. The international community is only paying lip service to the idea that Afghanistan should determine aid priorities for itself. BBC report David Loyn 26 June 2007

- **1.5.7. International governmental and UN stakeholders**

**Objectives:**

Peace, stability and Security Sector Reform was the general objective for this category, through down-sizing of the AMF ... followed by 'sustainable livelihoods' for XCs through the reintegration process. For many of the UN agencies and INGOs, DDR was also offered potential partnership and funding. ANBP was a huge project needing implementing partners. UN specialized agencies and others hoped or expected to find a role, especially for those whose mandate or expertise fitted them particularly well to work in DDR.

### **Satisfaction:**

UN political and strategic thinkers in embassies, in UNAMA, NATO, UNDP and the UN family are generally satisfied with the positive impact of DDR and CIP. They see both programmes as integral parts of a peace process and security sector reform (SSR) process that has changed the patterns of violence and political debate in Afghanistan. The heavy weapons cantonment (HWC) is generally recognized as a turning point both in international cooperation and in reducing levels of violence. HWC also proves that political incentives are stronger than economic incentives in promoting a peace process.<sup>16</sup> By decree the GoA changed the status of heavy weapons from 'booty' *ghanimat* to 'Government Property', and challenged Commanders politically to defy the decree. The elections and the registration of political parties were used as carrots for Commanders to support the HWC. ISAF and US government were brought in as partners of UNAMA, ANBP and MoD, while US and Canadian funding oiled the collection machinery – and the excellent result is a compliment to all of them. HWC provides an example as to how cooperation can happen. It brings dividends for everyone involved.

At the Tokyo DIAG conference on 21 June 2007, the SRSG in his speech described DDR as "one of the landmark achievements of the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, led by Japan. DDR catalysed the reform of the Ministry of Defence, yielded massive cost savings in the defence budget, and most importantly, removed the possibility of heavy weaponry again being employed in internal armed conflicts."

Afghanistan's DDR programme is already seen in UN circles as a rich source of lessons learned. During 2007, ANBP staff have helped design UN DDR strategies in Nepal and Sudan. At the same time as they are proud of the DD success story, UNDP officials are very conscious that the Demobilization phase was reduced to an administrative function by ANBP, that 'Reinsertion' was missed out, and that the 'Reintegration is still a work in progress'. They are taking steps to remedy certain lacunae and to make integration happen so that DDR will be seen as an increasingly successful story as the Afghan peace economy develops.

Other high spots of ANBP identified by the UN leadership as major sources of satisfaction include the weapon destruction (although 56,000 is a small number of

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<sup>16</sup> One UNAMA political advisor commented, "No matter how many carrots you offer a man, no one will give up his weapon if he thinks he will die."

weapons to be destroyed by international standards,<sup>17</sup> and compared to the vast number of weapons in Afghanistan); the ammunition destruction; the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines; the formal dissolution of whole AMF units and the demobilization of all their listed members; the collection of SALW and their delivery to MoD; the management of the mobile units and the regional verification committees; the creation of a mobile XC database system for more than 60,000 XCs; the engagement of commanders through CIP and later DIAG; the vocational training of more than 50,000 XCs for reintegrations; and the reorganization of ANA and MoD - both of which would have been impossible without DDR.

ANBP not only helped change the local political canvas: it also gave great coherence and credibility to UNAMA as the political mentor of ANBP, and to UNDP as the implementing agency, linking in a most positive way DPKO + UN development agencies and – through the D&R Commission – their partnership with the Government of Afghanistan

Not all UN senior staff are convinced that the CIP-DIAG strategy is beneficial. There are worries that it may simply support certain political factions and strengthen commanders' influence over their former fighters (just as DDR may have done when commanders were able to exploit it as form of patronage). These are complex issues involving questions of political judgement, and with the benefit of hindsight (which they did not have) we can see that ANBP leaders did not always get it right. But they did pretty well! On balance, the evaluation team shares the opinion of the majority of UN staff, that the CIP-DIAG strategy is a good way to engage with and neutralize troublesome commanders.

Whereas ANBP provides a good example of coordination between UNAMA and UNDP (between the Peacekeeping and development arms of the UN secretariat), other international partners saw cooperation with ANBP as something of a disappointment. Getting UN agencies to work together is often tricky, for it depends more on the egos and petty jealousies of the local staffs than on the political commitments of their bosses in New York or elsewhere. No one doubts the technical competencies of the UN agencies. We understand that the failure of ANBP to work well with UNICEF illustrates weaknesses on both sides, but there is a presumption of competence for UNICEF on the issue of child soldiers that ANBP should have been prepared to recognize<sup>18</sup>. In other cases the UN agencies were ignored more-or-less because ANBP was so focused on its military and disarmament mission.

If ANBP had managed a better balance in its senior staff, it would have been better

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<sup>17</sup> For comparison, the EU-ASAC Cambodian project Assistance to Small Arms control in Cambodia ended on 30 June 2006 with a total of more than 198,000 small arms destroyed by the government since 1999. Of these, 144,000 were destroyed in public ceremonies supported by EU-ASAC that were specifically promoted to build confidence in the peace process.

<sup>18</sup> We understand that part of the problem was ANBP's refusal to accept that XCs under 18 years as 'child soldiers'. In Afghan society, childhood has a very different meaning from Europe, and in a sense the age of 18 is absurd. Yet UNICEF was using international guidelines which we consider ANBP – as a UN programme – should have been willing to accept. In the end, Afghans were the losers.

equipped to plan and manage its reinsertion and reintegration mandate and could have achieved synergy with many of the UN Agencies (such the military wing of ANBP did achieve with Halo Trust). Perhaps UNDP should be faulted for allowing the R&R side to be neglected, and for not recruiting stronger development people into the ANBP team. In this context, thanks and recognition are due to WFP for its food contribution to XCs and for a successful partnership that significantly helped DDR to succeed. This success was due mainly to the initiative and professional competence of WFP, and the experience of their staff from other DDR programmes across the world.

**Other international organizations were treated rather as contractors than as partners**, and instructed to deliver the predetermined ANBP 'menu' to XCs. We feel that the Reintegration part of DDR suffered for it. It is difficult to talk about 'cordial relations' when experienced international relief and reintegration organizations say they were treated like subalterns by army commanders from the UN! There are many ways of doing business, and military hierarchies do not always fit well with UN or NGO culture. The former Director of ANBP disagrees with this analysis and believes that he consulted adequately with IPs: but not one of his IP reintegration partners agrees with that. We feel that ANBP missed some precious opportunities here.<sup>19</sup>

DDR activities were not part of a proper DDR process as there was no legal frame or agreement between parties and armed groups, apart from the Bonn Agreement from which the Taliban were left out. The rebuilding of the country did not take place; it brought stabilization to a certain category of people but did not stabilize the country.

Director of IOM, ANBP Implementing Partner

#### • 1.5.8. International observers of the DDR process

##### **Objectives:**

The International Observer Group was a small body staffed largely by Japanese and German ex-servicemen, which followed the MDUs around the countryside to supervise and observe the DDR process. Their objectives were equity and transparency in the DDR process: indeed the IOG and ANBP each held one of the two padlock keys sealing the containers filled with SALW, and jointly proceeded on each occasion to the handover of weapons to the MoD at the Pul-i-Charki weapon depot outside Kabul. Like the EU and other observers, the IOG gave credibility and support to the general

<sup>19</sup> An exception must be made for partners working in the de-mining field: UNMACA and Halo Trust report good working relations with ANBP and there seem to have been very good synergies here. "They needed us and we needed them," comments the manager of Halo Trust. We suspect that ANBP managers were more comfortable dealing with people in the familiar military area of de-mining and weapon destruction, than in the reintegration/ development field where command structures are less formal.

political objectives of the DDR process and its execution, in terms of its promotion of peace, stability and Security Sector Reform. We did not interview members of the IOG, since their job finished long ago. The comments below are drawn from interviews with outside observers of the ANBP project DDR process working for a variety of international organizations.

### **Satisfaction:**

International representatives who were not responsible for the design and implementation of ANBP are well satisfied with the political contribution made by DDR, CIP and DIAG, and the achievements of ANBP in collecting heavy weapons and ammunition, launching SSR and down-sizing the Afghan armed forces so as to make way for the new ANA. Heavy Weapons Cantonment is frequently highlighted as the ANBP's major innovation. Removing the heavy weapons - and placing them under GoA control - changed the nature of conflict, reduced levels of potential violence, and stimulated international cooperation in ways that (sadly) are seldom repeated.

The admiration is not uncritical. While ANBP was working in extreme conditions of conflict, culture and climate, and was successful in seizing a window of opportunity that may have closed since the DDR process was completed, there is a feeling that ANBP was slow to recognize the importance of key elements in the process. Ammo was not a part of the original disarmament design, and this was a mistake. Giving out cash was another early mistake – and both of these errors could have been avoided if lessons had been learned from West African DDR experience. The feeling is that senior managers came in with pre-conceived ideas about DDR, and applied them without sufficient thought and without drawing on the experience of a wider range of experienced professionals.

M&E started late, and the databases have not been used as well as they could have been – suggesting that there were no senior managers with a good grasp of sustainability issues and the intricacies of reinsertion, reintegration and reconciliation. Reintegration planning was late to start, and the process stopped before it could complete its task - a programme design fault for which UNDP is currently trying to compensate.

Decentralization is one theme that comes up approvingly: ANBP was successful in decentralizing its efforts through 8 regional offices, and this is thought by some observers to be a better model than centralized donor efforts that seek to build bureaucratic capacity in centralizing, Kabul-focused ministries. Donors ask too much of ministries with their limited staffs, and too many donors are asking the same small number of Afghan ministry people (especially the ones with good English) to do too many disparate things, and all at the same time. ANBP emerges as a decentralized model for efficient and appropriate development implementation.

The CIP programme is recognized as a reasonable and constructive way to engage commanders. There is general support for its successor DIAG programme. Most outside observers feel that weakening the power of commanders is important for Afghanistan's peace and stability – though not everyone is convinced the DIAG

programme approach is the only way to do this. DIAG is seen as important for creating genuine, nonviolent political spaces for civilian governance, and for installing the rule of law across the country. Its success is considered more and more problematic as violence increases in the south of the country.

The 'ammo project' is respected and seen as important, but observers wonder why ammo became a 'sudden discovery' when even laypersons know that SALW require ammunition to be lethal. DDR research shows that uncollected ammo provides an incentive to purchase new weapons: "I've got all these bullets; it'll be wasted if I don't get myself another firearm". While the lack of ammo collection with weapons was a weakness in ANBP's planning and design, the successful scaling up and collecting thousands of tons of ammunition and explosives is recognized as a strength.

The destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles is also recognized as an important ANBP contribution to peace in Afghanistan. Nearly all international observers are keen to see Afghanistan meet the conditions during 2008 for adherence to the Ottawa Convention on Landmines. Since the known remaining stockpiles are in the Panshir valley, only the Governor of Panshir stands between Afghanistan and Ottawa!

The very size and importance of the ammo and landmine problem means that most external observers want ANBP to continue well beyond March 2008. Handing the project over to the government removes much of the 'clout': without the neutrality and political positioning of UNAMA, and without the technical and supervisory skills of UNDP and the ANBP international staff to support Afghan technical staff, there is a fear both that safety standards will suffer, and that the ammo project will run out of steam. In that case the huge Afghan reservoir of ammo will be opened to illegal smugglers and Afghanistan's stores of ammunition and weapons will feed insurgent and terrorist organizations all around the region.

"We are satisfied with the result, which was the best we could have achieved in the difficult circumstances. DDR took place at the 'perfect moment' – UNDP seized the window of opportunity, which would probably not be open any longer in the conditions of 2007. Was ANBP expensive? Maybe, but it was certainly not a waste of money!"

Comment from the First Secretary of one donor embassy

#### • 1.5.9. DDR-CIP Donors

##### **Objectives:**

Donors – the governments of Japan, Britain, Canada, USA, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Norway (and the European Union - EC – for the destruction of mine stockpiles but not for DDR and CIP) were extremely supportive of the objectives in the original project document. The objectives of ANBP were set out in a short enabling document

rather than a detailed programme. We have no criticism of this approach, which allowed UNDP to get the ANBP off the ground quickly and efficiently. The objectives were stated as follows:

**Disarmament:** Assistance in weapons collection and storage.

**Demobilization:** Assistance for former AMF members, including commanders, officers and soldiers, in identifying alternate sources of income in return for leaving behind military life.

**Reintegration:** Assistance to former combatants to return to civilian life; to assist communities to increase their employment and economic absorption capacity; and to provide former combatants with sustainable and appropriate means of making a living through offering packages, including but not limited to community based de-mining, vocational training/job placement, agriculture, contracting teams, small business, teacher training and placement in the Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police.

Ref: UNDP/ANBP factsheets (<http://www.undp.org.af>)

### **Satisfaction:**

Recognizing the positive political impact that DDR and CIP have had on Afghanistan's recent political evolution, the donors are generally very pleased with their investment.

Substantial amounts of ANBP money remained unspent (around \$40 millions, depending on how you count the earmarked funds). This is not surprising since the project lasted only three years and had been budgeted for demobilizing 100,000 XCs. A tangible sign of donor satisfaction is that most of the unspent money has been passed on into DDR successor-projects including DIAG and RSPE.

US Ambassador Khalilzad remarked on leaving Afghanistan for Iraq, that the two greatest achievements of the donors had been the Afghan elections and DDR. That can be read as a sign of considerable donor satisfaction.

DDR in Afghanistan has been promoted as a high-profile success story, and not only by the Japanese government whose support was critical to its conception and its success. The Japanese are aware that the three-year time-scale placed limits on ANBP planning and hindered success for the reintegration phase. The same is true for other donors, several of whom gave additional funds to DIAG and Ammo projects to ensure that ANBP could continue after June 2006. Meanwhile the UNDP is looking for new strategies to keep the reintegration process alive. UNDP and ILO have created the Reintegration Support Programme for Employment (RSPE) through 2008 to keep helping XCs across the country find jobs appropriate to their skills in the public, private and social sectors.

Although USAID contributed \$9 millions, the Americans have been reluctant to engage fully in the ANBP partnership and have most often been critical from the outside. This can be helpful. In large part the M&E process was started inside ANBP because of constant complaints and badgering by Americans – including a mission



that made critical and helpful suggestions that were acted upon inside ANBP.<sup>20</sup> In return, ANBP senior management found American attitudes to DDR - and their half-promises about funding - unhelpful. American support and cooperation was erratic. We believe this is partly due to frequent personnel changes at every level. Some US ambassadors, diplomats and military officers understood the importance of the ANBP mission; others did not, or were less inclined to be cooperative.

This is really unfortunate. The evaluators found USAID staff very friendly and interested during this evaluation process, but we have US diplomatic and army personnel were unapproachable and unhelpful. Most have simply said they know nothing about DDR – a serious admission in and of itself. Other email contacts have been polite, but forced, and after six weeks of trying they have provided no useful information to this evaluation.

“My data regarding strength would only be for the present as no records were provided to me regarding strength prior to my arrival. Perhaps the data does exist but to be frank, I don't much care about past strength figures only present and future,” wrote one US colonel in the CSTC about Afghan army recruitment, when we were trying to confirm numbers we had received verbally from elsewhere.

That contemptuous ‘brush off’ is not the sort of support an evaluator hopes for when he asks open and transparent questions of someone who is supposed to be a partner in the Afghan peace building process. If that is typical of US army cooperation with its allies, it goes a long way towards explaining the confused and unsuccessful policies of the international coalition in Afghanistan and the disappointments of ANBP.

Rapid staff turnover may explain the apparent US lack of knowledge and expressed lack of interest. The public information activities that USAID funded for the D&R Commission in 2004-5 would have brought more benefit to everyone if they had been incorporated inside the ANBP and developed sustainability. The activities lasted a year, and then – just as the new micro-credit process was beginning to attract interest from the XCs it was designed to assist – funding was cancelled by a new ambassador who had no interest in disarmament and reintegration.

Belatedly recognizing the danger (‘middle commanders can be spoilers’ said former US Ambassador Newman who was one ambassador who grasped the importance of DDR), USAID has launched a pair of business planning projects aimed at 300 ‘dangerous’ commanders whom they have identified with ANBP’s help: ASMED (training) and ARIES (business loans). These are helpful and constructive efforts, designed specifically to take ANBP’s reintegration process forward. All USAID contractors are also instructed to hire DDR people; we were not able to find out what impact this has had on XC employment.

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<sup>20</sup> Brief Review of Afghanistan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDRP) and Recommendations for Possible USAID Assistance, by Ted Morse and Sharon Isralow, November 2004

The main problem I have had in dealing with the US government is that they have no single policy. Every US government agency has a different policy, and very often some policies are in direct contradiction to the others.

Senior official in the British MoD in London  
who formerly served in Iraq with Ambassador Bremer

- **1.5.10. International civil society organizations (some were IPs)**

**Objectives:**

International non-governmental organizations (NGO) were supportive of the same strategic objectives as the donors, except that they all put greater emphasis on the social aspects of demobilization and reintegration, on gender and child protection issues, and the sustainability of employment or income generating 'packages'. On the whole, the NGOs had greater hopes and ambitions for development processes and reintegration projects, while the embassies were focused more on political and military aspects of DDR.

**Satisfaction:**

International NGOs share the opinion of the international community that the programme was broadly a success for Afghanistan. Disarmament was well-organised and had a positive impact, but several experienced INGO managers saw ANBP burdened with deep flaws from the design stage. They feel that the 'R' was designed in too much of a hurry inside ANBP by too small a number of people, and that not enough prior consultation took place. In some ways ANBP was 'more of an inspiration than an organization' and it suffered from that. Management innovations and structures had to catch up with the inspiration, as one unplanned, unexpected activity led to another.

INGOs recognize that ANBP was very successful in implementation, efficient in management, and innovative in its flexible response to the unexpected challenges of commanders, heavy weapons, large ammunition stockpiles. Some of them feel, on the other hand, that the long-term strategic planning was deficient. "Why," they ask, were problems with commanders and ammunition so unexpected?" Other DDR programmes have already made the mistake of not collecting up bullets with small arms, so the lesson should have been learned.

The NGOs are mainly grassroots organizations with field agents who are focused on different areas than the international and political achievements of ANBP. Without denying the political and strategic contributions to peace and stability perceived by UNAMA and ambassadors, the NGOs are watching the lives of XCs

who received short-term training that was not always market-oriented, and did not provide families with sustainable incomes.

If the ANBP design process had been participative, NGOs would have organised reintegration market studies, rehabilitation, reconciliation, micro-credit operations, and provided the family/gender sensitivity that was lacking inside ANBP. They would have worked with UN Habitat and other NSP partners to help CDCs design coherent community development plans with full participation of men and women (separately) that would have taken account of reintegration and XCs as well as returning refugees, child soldiers and people with special needs.

Child soldiers as a category were neglected<sup>21</sup>, and sexual violence was all but ignored. Health issues were left out of the reinsertion process, despite the clear UN guidelines for DDR, and this is an area many NGOs consider very important. Literacy and numeracy could have been provided to all XCs, but this was done in only certain places. Training in civil and human rights was not mentioned by ANBP, although they have been important components of other DDR experiences during the demobilization phase and widely disseminated using the skills of civil society organizations (CSO).

Likewise CSOs consider that the length of the project – three years – could and should have been recognized as inadequate for the task of reintegration. The project document almost equates ‘reintegration’ with ‘vocational training’ and this is unacceptable to an NGO community composed of highly qualified professionals committed to long-term sustainable development. The ‘interface’ between DDR and Development was not worked out, which is why UNDP is struggling in 2007 to work out the post-DDR phase which should have been prepared back in 2002.

A lot of NGOs believe ANBP has no real handle on impacts and results because each IP has a different idea of impacts, and a different way of measuring results. No IP data was fed into the DDR database – thus neither ANBP nor its partners had access to meaningful monitoring statistics. This is why the wonderful database of 63,000 XCs couldn’t provide the evaluators with any useful information.

ANBP was driven by numbers, not by impacts. The Programme Office of ANBP could see how many XCs were sitting in classrooms, but had no way to find out what individual XCs were learning or whether the vocational training would ever prove useful to the supposed beneficiaries. The claim of 65% success for reintegration is widely challenged, but we have no way of appreciating the real

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<sup>21</sup> Several INGOs have been working with UNICEF on this issue and are frustrated that ANBP ignored it. This is not because child soldiers are a secret! The website <http://www.alertnet.org/childsoldiers4.htm> states for Afghanistan: There are 8,000 actual and former child soldiers. Boys reportedly joined or were forcibly recruited into factional armed groups and militias. There are reports that girls were forced into early marriages with armed group commanders. Under-18s arrested in Afghanistan were held at the U.S. military detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. □□

*U.N. protocol prohibiting use of child soldiers:* Afghanistan acceded September 2003.

figures. Better follow-up is needed. It didn't happen since DDR was planned for just three years.

Some NGOs question the fixed 'menu' of training options, and wonder whether – in the absence of any sort of market-based survey – the choice on offer was always appropriate. As stated in the ToR for the DDR portion of the current evaluation:

" .. choice was considered an important element of ANBP's reintegration philosophy. ANBP developed a broad-based menu of careers, training and job options, and provided a system of directed counselling that would assist XCs to make a sensible and informed choice. A focused public information campaign aimed at potential participants and their families preceded the initiation of the DDR process while in the course of a 'demobilization day' XCs were briefed ... about the various 'opportunity packages' on the reintegration 'menu'.

NGOs were not consulted on the composition of the menu. As Implementing Partners (IPs) they consider they were treated as contractors, not partners, and their institutional expertise was largely ignored even though some of the INGOs have long experience of DDR in other countries. Rural development specialists in certain regions who proposed changes to the menu, were turned down (ie COOPI wanted to provide small credits to XCs, to assist the sustainability of their chosen career paths which was especially relevant as a coping mechanism in view of the coming winter season – this was refused by ANBP).

As it turns out, the biggest reintegration success stories are those where non-ANBP funding provided the largest part of the NGO's budget and the institutional support for XCs is therefore constant even fifteen months after the end of DDR. In Jalalabad, in Kunduz and in Herat we found IPs with ongoing programmes (craft training, micro-credit, micro-enterprise, child soldiers, women's education, drug rehabilitation, etc) that are still assisting XCs with their reintegration. If ANBP had started from the basis of genuine partnerships with other organizations, synergies might have developed in a much broader and more durable manner. In that case, the degree of satisfaction expressed by INGOs would certainly have been much greater.

ANBP was supposed: "to provide former combatants with sustainable and appropriate means of making a living." To achieve that, vocational training by itself is not enough. Good planning could have achieved so much more, and this is the main criticism of the INGO community.

"If we ask soldiers, they will all say DDR 'failed' because it did not transform their lives. But the 'R' was generally a success."

Former ANBP programme officer

- **1.5.11. Local and international business community**

- **Objectives**

The business community is fairly interested in DDR's impacts on peace, but mainly in DR reintegration packages providing training to satisfy the private sector's need for skilled employees. In Kabul their focus tends to be on English language competence and computer skills. In the provinces the main area of work is road building, and agricultural transformation for the regional market.

Although many private sector operators are sophisticated international operators (many with two passports and a family in USA or Sweden or Germany or elsewhere) and they appreciate the peace and the commercial opportunities brought by ANBP and other programmes, they are getting increasingly worried about the security situation. Some are openly wondering whether they should sell-up and move away.

**Satisfaction:**

There is recognition among business investors (there are too few of them) that ANBP has made significant contributions to reducing armed tensions and promoting security sector reform – although there is disappointment that more progress has not been made by GoA and the international community with police reform, justice reform, drug regulation and installation of the rule of law.

The one area where employment opportunities beckon XCs is the security sector, where **Private Security Companies have been happy to hire former combatants**. Some local PSCs were founded by former commanders, who employ their former fighters dressed in new uniforms. They argue that they are needed because the ANP is not providing adequate security: they are not only filling a market niche in the private sector, but also supplying a need. These men generally recognize that DDR was necessary for the country, and say that it provided opportunities for them to recruit trained security personnel.

Those who are not running PSCs recognize that they pose a major security problem for Afghanistan. Even companies that hire private security guards recognize that these PSCs – and this is equally true for American and Afghan companies – are *de facto* private militias and potential criminal gangs, moving around the country with unregistered weaponry and subject to no form of law. ANBP-DIAG is working to assist the GoA in regulating PSCs. A draft law is expected to be approved by GoA before the end of 2007, after which it will be presented to Parliament.

In terms of providing employment opportunities, other business leaders are fairly indifferent to DDR and the needs of XCs. They will take a trained DDR building supervisor if he turns up, but there doesn't seem to be any feeling among business leaders of a personal responsibility to make DDR a success – rather like the lack of interest we found among government ministries.

Most of the opportunities coming up in private sector employment in Kabul require English language and computer skills: **the global economy require skills that most XCs do not have. The fighting skills they do have are feared by business**, but the responsibility for dealing with XCs is left to 'government' or

'international community' in a classic private sector 'cop-out'.

"People in Panshir think, 'They are taking our weapons from us, and then how do we know what will happen tomorrow? Will we need our weapons?' That is their view of DDR. Taliban are distributing money to people- and GoA is not. Taliban pays \$200, and ANA pays \$70. The Taliban have force and they have money. How is that? How does the International Coalition allow that? Where does this Kuwait and Saudi and other money come from? Thank God, they are not in Panshir yet. Not yet."  
Afghan member of the PRT in Panshir

#### • 1.5.12. Current and former members of ANBP staff

##### **Objectives:**

Whatever indifference they may have felt about the job when they joined ANBP, we have found all the staff well-trained and highly committed to the cause of micro-disarmament and reintegration. Both international staff and Afghan staff are excellent. These men and women have been well-led and well-motivated, and they all believe that DDR and CIP will improve the security of Afghanistan and the lives of the XCs - although recent rises in violence in Kabul and the South make even the most dedicated ANBP peace worker wonder if the achievements will prove vain.

##### **Satisfaction:**

Without exception, ANBP staff and former staff are proud of what has been achieved. As the former ANBP Director wrote to us, "The collection of 12,000 heavy weapons and 55,000 light weapons, and the destruction of ammunition should be regarded as a 'miracle' ... in this society." It is worth remembering that this is the society of which a Pashtun gun merchant once told the famous American newspaper *Christian Science Monitor*, 'In Afghanistan women wear jewelry, and men wear guns.'<sup>22</sup>

We find that the level of expertise and motivation in the ANBP organization was and remains exceptional, its management systems and implementation skills were and are unrivalled in Afghanistan. People are beginning to leave ANBP only because of its planned closure. Since the evaluators recommend a further three years of support to security sector reform, weapon and explosive destruction, DDR and CIP-related activities by UNDP and UNAMA, **a rapid decision will encourage good staff to stay on and continue to believe in their future role with UNDP.**

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<sup>22</sup> Baldauf, Scott, 'Report from Landi Kotal, in the Khyber Pass', *C S Monitor*, 27 March 2002.

We found the staff and former staff ready to talk, and we found them extremely open to discussing the strengths and weaknesses of ANBP. The decentralized nature of the organization is praised; all staffers are proud of the way the MDU-RVC-IOG structure worked and the remarkably smooth DDR process it administered.

Running the DDR, CIP, DIAG and Ammo projects has required great moral and physical courage from both national and international staff. The ANBP staff play down the risks of their chosen profession, but they have been frequently threatened with weapons, and have sometimes come under fire from armed militias who did not want to surrender their weapons or their stocks of ammunition. Commanders make dangerous playmates: even during our evaluation mission, one regional director of ANBP-DIAG received death threats to himself and his family. ANBP may provide staff with a well-paid position, but theirs is not an easy mission.

Training and promotion were available to national staff. We found young men and women of exceptional talent throughout the organization, often exercising with great skill and knowledge some high responsibilities that few organizations would leave to such young people. This is entirely to the credit of ANBP and its senior management.

ANBP in 2007 is smaller and less well-staffed than it used to be. The evaluators sometimes found it difficult to extract the information needed, because 'X is no longer working for ANBP' or 'Y is on leave'. This was tiresome, especially in terms of finding tables of data and specific data from the M&E section. Our work would have been much easier, if ANBP had planned our visit with their usual efficiency and arranged to produce in advance the data we were bound to request and need.

Despite the quality of the original database, M&E was always the runt of ANBP's litter and that is very much the case today. DIAG does not seem to be maintaining coherent institutional records. If the database is to be useful, M&E section needs today to benefit from the management attention it was denied in the past.

## 1.6. Impacts - strategic and negative)

### 1.6.1. Impact on Security in Afghanistan

Andkhoy wants water  
Maimana wants roads  
Kandahar wants security  
Helmand wants to be free to grow opium

Former ANBP staff worker explaining that different people want different results from DDR

## Positive and

DDR is not the only reason that there are fewer armed men on the streets, and CIP is not the sole influence that has brought many commanders into the political process (and some to elected positions). Nevertheless it is fair to claim for ANBP that it has

made a major contribution to improving Afghan security. There are no longer commanders driving around with Kalashnikov-toting bodyguards. Fewer rural commanders are terrorizing their neighbours and demanding *osher* illegal taxes of 10% on all crops, with which to pay their illegal armed groups. Rebels find it harder to obtain high quality explosive supplies inside Afghanistan: Taliban supplies are coming across the frontier from Pakistan. DDR and CIP have contributed to these positive changes.

Private Security Companies remain a major security problem. Although some in the international community think they provide security, the GoA, the UN and the evaluators see PSCs as a significant threat to stability. An unknown number of XCs have found employment with PSCs. The international donors are part of the insecurity problem, for it is through their protection that PSCs act above and outside the law, enjoying impunity even for the most outrageous behaviour. Many are really no more than illegal private militias acting outside the law but with the protection of Western embassies. ANBP is helping the GoA to regulate PSCs as part of the DIAG process, and this will have a further beneficial impact on security and on security sector reform.

### **1.6.2. Impact on peace in Afghanistan**

DDR has had a positive impact on the Afghan peace process, creating the conditions necessary for security sector reform and the creation of a new Afghan National Army. Levels of violence, and overt intimidation by military commanders using threatening behaviour, have been reduced thanks to the ANBP. Whether this will still be the case in a few years time depends on how political and military processes evolve between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international coalition. If all goes well, history will record ANBP as the starting point for long-term peace and security in Afghanistan. If violence grows and the sub-region sinks back into generalized warfare, ANBP and the DDR process will become a forgotten irrelevance. Let us hope this is not the case.

One of the major contributions of ANBP has been its technical and political support for the destruction of surplus weapons, ammunition and anti-personnel mines. Thanks to this, Afghanistan is expected to be able to ratify the Ottawa Convention on Landmines before the end of 2007, although some hidden reserves in Panshir province still need to be found and destroyed. This will have a positive impact on public confidence in the peace process, and on the international image of Afghanistan.

All stakeholders acknowledge the positive impact of Heavy Weapons Cantonment, which changed the political climate of the country by bringing certain major commanders into the electoral process and reduced substantially the risk for further violence. We believe this to be unique among UN supported DDR programmes. As the 2006 BCPR mission remarked, "This achievement has a potentially important impact on the medium-term security of Afghanistan and the resumption of war."

Peace has not yet returned to the country, despite the success of DDR. One problem is failure of the international coalition to develop a coherent strategy for building a



peace economy: most investments have been in the war economy. This has encouraged many commanders to remain outside the system, and CIP was neither long enough nor strong enough to bring all the commanders in. Unless a coherent job-creation programme is developed and unless the drug trade can be addressed with new, innovative policies (with practical support from ISAF), permanent peace is going to be difficult to find.

Security sector reform is the critical mechanism for assuring sustainable peace in Afghanistan. DDR is the pillar that has worked best. DIAG and other ANBP successor components need to work closely with the army and police reform, counter narcotics and reform of the justice sector, if peace is to become permanent.

### **Recommendation to the GoA and UN**

***We recommend that the United Nations should continue to work with the GoA providing three more years of technical assistance and political support for the collection and destruction of mines, surplus ammunition and SALW, and provide three more years of support to the D&R Commission to expand and strengthen its mandate.***

### **1.6.3. Impact on Regional peace**

For centuries, Afghanistan has been the nodal point of the Central Asian region, and the focus of a Great Game played between global powers to gain control of the trade routes and resources of this fascinating part of the world. Whenever war has disturbed Central Asia, Afghanistan has been in the center of it. Afghanistan is always the key to victory, and the key for peace. On the Afghan peace process rests the future of all the 'Stans' – from Pakistan in the south to Turkmenistan in the north-west and to Kazakhstan in the north-east.

There is a lot of concern about the destination of the collected weapons, and the large stocks of ammo that have been collected by ANBP and delivered to the MoD. These weapons are GoA property but it is not clear if they are all needed by MoD. So far as we can judge, supplies of SALW from Central Europe received in 2003-2004 were more than adequate for the needs of ANA which has 35,000 soldiers in August 2007. Therefore the DDR and DIAG weapons about which the MoD complains may very well be surplus to current needs.

With the ANA and ANP about to be equipped with a completely new set of NATO equipment, all existing stocks of Soviet era Kalashnikovs, mortars, RPGs and other SALW will presumably become obsolete and surplus to government needs. The Deputy Minister of Defence told us that surplus weapons and ammo will be destroyed. ISAF is aware of this and the US army colonel who is currently Director of International Donations CSTC-A told us by email dated 14 August 2007: "From my knowledge, we are working on a plan to both distribute the NATO standard weapons and to deal with the old Eastern bloc weapons - some will be going to the ANP (good weapons) and the rest will most likely be destroyed."

If the destruction does not take place, there is a real danger that huge stocks of weapons and ammunition will be shipped out of Afghanistan (both legally and illegally) and could destabilize surrounding states. Judging from international lessons learned, as they become surplus to need the MoD weapons collected by DDR and DIAG will find their way into armed conflicts elsewhere - unless they are destroyed.<sup>23</sup> We see an opportunity for GoA to solve the problem of surplus stocks with a dramatic act of weapon destruction that will change the way Afghans see their relationship with weapons, and transform Afghanistan's international image. This is one of our main recommendations.

We accept that changing GoA or NATO policy is not something for which UNDP or ANBP are responsible in any way. Senior management sent the following written statement to us:

"The weapons that ANBP collected and handed over to the GoA were done so on the basis that they were actually MoD property - and the MoD therefore sought their return to be able to properly equip their own Forces. This was the mandate to which ANBP was instructed to operate and therefore did so. It would be unfair to lay ... the responsibility for possible world supplies of weapons at the door of the UN!"

Creating peace in Afghanistan will definitely have a beneficial effect on peace in the whole region. If peace arrives, ANBP will have had a beneficial impact on peace in Afghanistan and in Central Asia. Alas! we are unable to predict what the future will bring, or what historians may judge the impact of DDR and CIP to have been.

### **Recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan**

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<sup>23</sup> To this end there are some important lessons to be learned from the Mozambique DDR, where the UN Security Council ended the mandate in 1994 before huge stocks of collected weapons had been destroyed. These weapons undermined security across Southern Africa for years to come. This is a comment by Ana Leao from an ISS paper published in 2004. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No94/Chap1.html>

"Another point of consensus was the military component of ONUMOZ, which Mozambicans did not hesitate in labelling a failure. They are not the only ones who have made this assessment. The fact that most UN documents on ONUMOZ include but a few paragraphs on the disarmament process, as opposed to extensive debates on other aspects of the mission, seems to indicate the dissatisfaction of the UN itself with this area of work.

"In all fairness, one has to say that given the political circumstances at the time, the UN mission was confronted with tough choices, which required rapid decisions in an environment still pervaded by mutual suspicions between the two warring parties. For the sake of the ultimate goal – to bring peace to a country that had experienced conflict for over 30 years – compromises had to be made. Furthermore, some of the prevailing problems seem to have been more the doing of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) at the time than with a lack of will or capacity of the UN to solve them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when the UN withdrew in the end of 1994, the GoM inherited disgruntled armed forces, overstaffed paramilitary institutions, and the volatile combination of jobless demobilized soldiers and arms caches around the country in an economic environment offering few opportunities. Adding to this, weapons collected during the ONUMOZ period were handed over to the GoM, to arm an already over-armed army that had little capacity to manage the stockpiles under its supervision."

**1- We recommend that the mandate of the D&R Commission chaired by Vice-President Khalili - which is the appropriate high-level mechanism for coordinating Afghan government partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in this delicate sector - should be extended to cover destruction of surplus weapons and ammunitions and explosives.**

**2- We recommend that the 9<sup>th</sup> July 2008 – United Nations International Day for the Destruction of Weapons – should be celebrated with a large-scale, public weapon destruction ceremony and that the President of Afghanistan should report on this in September 2008 to the General Assembly of the United Nations.**

**The event should be filmed and widely broadcast abroad and at home to convince Afghan public opinion that destroying surplus arms is a good thing for their country.**

**We find that the commercial and military value of old weapons and outdated stocks of ammunition is far outweighed by the political value of their public destruction, which will build public confidence in peace and will bring international renown to the government and to the Afghan nation.**

#### **Recommendation to UNAMA and UNDP**

**We recommend that the Ammo and DIAG projects should not be handed to the GoA in 2008. On the contrary, we recommend that UNAMA and UNDP should continue to support the government in managing these projects for a further three years, to assure international standards and recognition, and that three years further support should be given to the D&R Commission.**

#### **Recommendation to the international community**

**His Excellency the Deputy Minister of Defence assured the evaluation mission that surplus stocks will be 'melted or burned'. While this is reassuring, the international community should put in place safeguards to ensure that Soviet model surplus weapons and munitions are destroyed, and not exported from Afghanistan.**

#### **Recommendation to UNDP, UNAMA and GoA**

**In a country awash with weapons, and with new weapons and munitions coming in for the ANA on a regular basis, we consider that the logical position for the UN (and for the DIAG and Ammo programmes) is to destroy all collected weapons. At the very least, one old weapon/box of ammunition should be destroyed for every new weapon/box of ammunition delivered to the ANA or ANP. The 'disarmament' phase of all DDR programmes should include destruction equal to the number of weapons and munitions collected.**

Reintegration is a mid to long term process. The most difficult and important phase of the DDR process is Reintegration. Its success will be the benchmark in the mid to long term upon which the DDR program in Afghanistan will ultimately be judged.

Richard Scarf, USAID's former public information advisor to the D&R Commission

#### **1.6.4. Impact on healing Afghan society**

While DDR had a very positive political impact on promoting peace and stability at the macro level, its impact at the micro level is less clear-cut. Demobilization and Reinsertion provide a platform for Reintegration, and this phase normally includes health checks and treatments, trauma counseling, and participatory teaching about civil rights, domestic violence, reconciliation, human rights and the rule of law. These issues are important for the healing of war-torn societies.

Gender issues did not register in ANBP's planning. Domestic violence and gender-based violence were ignored, despite the fact that they are areas of very major concern throughout Afghan society – even in peacetime. What will be the medium-term implications for community healing of thousands of XCs living in their families with their war memories?

The gender imbalance risks exacerbation if ex-combatants find reintegration difficult, fail to generate the new incomes they hoped for, blame the government or ANBP for not giving them jobs, and take it out on their wives and families. The ANBP could have made more effort to link the DDR reintegration process into other programmes, including notably the NSP and their creation of CDCs<sup>24</sup>. These institutions could promote healing and reconciliation, and assist XCs with their intergration. This opportunity was missed, although the NSP was – like DDR - a priority Presidential programme that started around the same time as ANBP. It is not too late: UNDP could still mobilise the NSP to help the reintegration process, and thereby help NSP contribute more significantly to the healing of society.

The Commanders' Incentives Programme, on the other hand, provides an creative example of how healing can be promoted through training and discussion, and bringing together former enemies to discover ways in which they can begin to rebuild society. Although it is still early to judge, we believe that the CIP has had a positive effect on healing Afghan society.

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<sup>24</sup> There are around 40,000 villages according to MRRD. In August 2007 there are already 18,000 CDCs with more to be created. Afghanistan has 34 provinces and 364 districts. A Census is planned for 2008 with UNFPA technical assistance.

Case Study July 2007

**Mohammed Sideq works for an NGO helping extremely vulnerable victims of war**

I was a soldier for more than one year in the time of Najibullah. At first I was a guard in the Shomali Plain at Bagram, and later were sent into the mountains to a guard post. The Mujahiddin used to use the area at night for transporting weapons and food and other stuff and I told my men, "We will not attack them because they are Afghans and we are Afghans."

The Najibullah communist government was nearly ending and soon the Mujahiddin attacked right across the region and they destroyed all the other guard posts. But our guard post was left unharmed and my eleven soldiers were very happy. The Mujahiddin used to send us food, their women brought us food to eat in our guard post. War is ended, but war leaves scars – external wounds and also damages inside your head.

What are the mental scars left behind in my head? I do not know. One time I was at the bus stop when Kabul had seven Presidents all of whom were destroying the city. Many people were waiting for the bus. I turned into the market beside the bus stop to buy some small food items for my family. I was inside the market for only two minutes, when a rocket exploded at the bus stop. More than 100 people were killed, exactly where I had been standing two minutes before. In those days Hekmatyar was sending so many rockets to destroy Kabul. In one week he sent more than 100 rockets against the city.

Everything was black with smoke. For maybe five minutes I sat on the floor curled up with my hands over my head and my arms covering my ears. I was in shock from the blast. After five minutes the air cleared and maybe I felt calmer. I opened my eyes and in front of me on the floor I saw the head of a woman. Only her head. That was another shock for me, and I do not know if these experiences will have an impact later on my life and my behaviour. How can I tell?

I was wounded in the leg in two places from that rocket. There were people who lost their arm in the explosion, and they saw their arm on the pavement beside them with their fingers still moving. Such a thing is a great shock, and it can have impact later inside your head. Who knows what will happen to me?

I am happy now, with a complete family: my mother, my wife and my two children including the 4-year old daughter who is my BOSS! But I have already lost three sons who died – one died just four months ago, and my wife is not in good health. She has been operated three times, twice because of the babies who died after five days, and now the doctor tells me she must not bear any more children for five or six years. That is no problem. I am happy.

**Recommendation to the UN system**

***UN funded DDR programmes should prepare and design the demobilization-reinsertion phase as a launch-pad for reintegration. Activities should include health checks and treatments and health education for XCs and for their families, trauma healing, participative training on gender issues, child rights, human rights, the respect of women, national reconciliation and the rule of law, literacy and numeracy, as well as studies of training and employment opportunities that may ensure sustainable livelihoods for XCs and their families.***

**Recommendation to UNDP**

***UNDP should review its ongoing support to reintegration, and envisage a decentralized***

*programme using the REABP or NSP and the experience of UN Habitat and other IPs, to incorporate some post-ANBP reintegration and rehabilitation efforts into the programme of CDCs.<sup>25</sup>*

### **1.6.5. Impact on political leadership, illegal militias and the rule of law**

The DDR process had a clearly beneficial impact on the stability of Afghanistan's political leadership, as tensions diminished and commanders bought into the political process. Both the heavy weapons cantonment and the demobilization diminished the threat of serious violence as senior commanders joined the political process, and the disbandment of military units brought significant lessening of tensions across the country.

The impact of the micro-disarmament (SALW) is less obvious, since it is generally assumed that commanders held back plenty of light weapons while handing in only part of their store. In terms of progressing towards permanent peace, **the process of micro-disarmament is more important than actual numbers of weapons collected**. 'Not using weapons' is more important than 'not having weapons'.

Despite the efforts of CIP and DIAG, some commanders remain outside the political process. Some have joined politics, some are bandits, while others avoid the rule of law by creating unregistered and unregulated private security companies (ANBP is helping the GoA to produce regulations through DIAG). Legal reform is one of the SSR pillars that has made the least progress.

Fighting continues and even intensifies in the South, and illegal militias remain a problem in certain provinces. Some commanders have taken their private militias into the Afghan National Auxiliary Police or into the highway police, and this may also be a problem in the medium term. UNAMA and UNDP seized a window of opportunity for DDR, which did not remain open for long, and they were successful in getting DDR and CIP to work. As the slow progress of DIAG shows, the window may now be closing.

**Recommendation to the GoA, the International Community and UN**  
***The present security climate is not propitious for disarming Afghanistan and destroying all illegal weapons and explosives. Instead of disarmament, Afghanistan needs to think in terms of 'weapons management'.***

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<sup>25</sup> We apologize for the acronyms, but we are proud that we have managed to cram seven acronyms, none of them military, into a single sentence of three lines. Is this a record?

"It's very important that these Afghan National Auxiliary Police (A.N.A.P.) get trained to an adequate level as soon as possible, so that we can put them out with the (regular) A.N.P. in a support position, doing the jobs that A.N.P. would normally be doing, so they [the police regulars] can be free to do other tasks.

"After just two weeks training, the question is, will the new policemen be more loyal to their former bosses or to the Afghan government, based hundreds of kilometers away in Kabul?"

Sergeant Mark Davidson, a senior police trainer. <http://www.ddrafg.com/ANP.htm>

### 1.6.6. Impact on Afghan democratic governance

The CIP and DDR projects worked in a complementary fashion to bring commanders into the democratic process. Some have been elected to Parliament and others to Provincial Development Councils. CIP had a positive impact on elections and on the whole of the government and governance process.

For many middle-level and senior commanders – and for many former professional army officers who were forcibly retired – not enough has been done to occupy them, to find them jobs and to give them honour: Respect and Recognition are two 'R's that are especially important for Afghan DDR. The CIP by itself is insufficient to bring satisfaction to these disgruntled men.

Several governors are worried that local commanders will become untenable unless the government finds them jobs and occupations. One told us that he has half a dozen commanders who need to be sent to jobs in embassies overseas: not only to break their hold on their followers, but also to remove them from possible links to the Taliban. To make it worse, most of these men either believe the government promised them jobs (which is probably true in most cases – we have seen plenty of official letters from Kabul requesting ministries to hire them), or believe that they have fought for - and deserve - a government position. This is not a negative impact of ANBP so much as a limitation on the economic and political possibilities of CIP.

At a more subtle level, we find that the recruitment and training of an exceptional team of national staff inside ANBP, and their deployment across the country through the regional office system, has provided exceptional support to decentralized democratic governance. Provinces are strengthened by the presence of ANBP offices, and the by the competence and intelligence and positive commitment of their staff.

#### **Recommendation to UNDP**

***UNDP should take over the ANBP regional offices to support programmes that promote equality of national development based on decentralized governance. The ANBP regional structures and the widespread influence of the DDR and CIP programmes offer an opportunity for UNDP and other UN agencies to regionalize and decentralize their management.***

### 1.6.7. Impact on the Afghan economy

The impact of DDR and CIP on the Afghan macro-economy is considerable, thanks to the transformation of the MoD budget which threatened to bankrupt the government. On the micro-economy, however, there is less impact. Yet this is where jobs must be found. Employment can come only from investment in job-creating enterprises. Some Commanders have invested money in businesses thanks to the training they received. Some money from ANBP went into the economy: up to \$1500 was invested per XC on the reintegration process, much of which went into vocational training budgets. This strengthened some IPs and provided vocational training that may generate incomes for XCs in the medium term.

ANBP definitely tried to stimulate employment. Although road-building jobs were offered, XCs were almost unanimous in their refusal to work in MRRD road building unless they were supervisors. Some ministries have been uninterested in employing XCs, and even international agencies have been mixed in their support.<sup>26</sup>

We have no means of measuring the real economic impact of ANBP, and in any case it is too soon to make a judgement. Theoretically the time that XCs used to spend in soldiering is now being invested in economic activities. The opportunity cost is probably so small however, that most of these part-timers sacrificed very little of their normal incomes to soldiering – although the time they may have spent pillaging other villages for the profit of their commanders is certainly an economic disbenefit that has been removed by DDR and CIP. The ANBP database for 63,000 XCs and their families could be updated as we suggest to UNDP (see the Sustainability section below). If this database can be transformed into a development tool, the measurement of DDR's economic impact could be attempted in two years' time. In the meantime, the evaluators believe - given the small size of incomes being generated by XCs whom we have interviewed - that DDR did no harm to the micro-economy, but its economic impact in the provinces is too small to register.

## 1.7. Sustainability

### 1.7.1. Giving new lives to ex-combatants

ANBP's reintegration component was aimed at assisting the XCs to develop a new civilian livelihood. Giving XCs a choice of training and career was also considered an important element of ANBP's reintegration philosophy. According to ANBP project documents, efforts were made in order for all reintegration opportunities to be:

- *Sustainable:* Long term solutions as opposed to short term interventions
- *Multi-sectoral:* ANBP offered a range of opportunities based on the needs and aspirations of the former combatants

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<sup>26</sup> While USAID insists that its contractors hire XCs as a preference, the World Bank refused a request from MRRD to include this in their contracts.



- *Integrated:* Where possible, ANBP placed former combatants in national priority programmes, Ministry initiatives or coordinated programs with other UN agencies

How long should we wait to determine sustainability? Some of the XCs only completed their vocational training in 2006, and one year is certainly too soon to decide. Western bankers usually allow five years for a small business to determine whether it will be profitable and sustainable (although it may easily fail earlier, its success cannot be judged until the company has had time to develop products and a customer base).

Many of the complaints directed at the ANBP reintegration programme concern the lack of job opportunities: and while it is true that many XCs have no work, or have jobs that pay very little, this can be blamed more on the small size and slack growth of the Afghan peace economy than on ANBP. The slow pace of Afghanistan's peace economy should be blamed on the war focus of the international coalition, and not on UNAMA, UNDP or ANBP.

Of all the re-training efforts of DDR, the greatest sustainability comes from the deminers. Halo Trust believes that at least 1000 of the 2500 deminers are XCs, and this is a job that brings prestige as well as a salary. *Minepok* has become not just a profession, but a term of respect and admiration. Every *jerib* of land they clear will provide an annual crop that did not grow when the land was mined. Every yard of road they clear improves trade and information flows. Demining is a truly sustainable investment in peace.

Vocational training has sustainability built into it. If the DDR reintegration training leads to XCs making a living – and if that can be monitored - then sustainability can be proved. Education is an investment in the future. It is a pity that DDR didn't teach reinsertion literacy and numeracy to thousands of XCs who had no previous chance of schooling. Literate XCs seem to have found it easier to get better paid jobs than those who cannot read – and the same is true for commanders who can expect government employment if they have education, but not otherwise.

With the completion of bridges<sup>27</sup> and roads – and if the 2007 and 2008 harvests are good, and provided war doesn't break out again – the economy may turn up and jobs may become plentiful. After five years of reintegration (by 2011) it may well be that the tailors trained by ANBP and its IPs will be making a decent living with their sewing machines, carpenters will be making a good living making windows and doors and furniture, and the building supervisors will be busy rebuilding the country.

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<sup>27</sup> On 26 August 2007, as we were presenting this report to Vice-President Karim Khalili, President Karzai and the President of Tajikistan were presiding over a ceremony at Shir Khan Bandar to open the first Afghan bridge across the Amu Darya (the mythical and distant Oxus River of the Ancient Greeks). This US investment in peace should give a huge boost to the northern economy and create thousands of jobs.

### 1.7.2. ANBP Staffing.

One of the lasting, sustainable legacies of ANBP will be the training of the national staff. We have been unfailingly impressed by the quality and motivation of ANBP staffers, including those who have since joined other organizations: in fact they are sought after, since the reputation of ANBP for efficiency and good management systems is widely known and respected in Afghanistan. We have found ANBP managers constantly curious and questioning, proud of their achievements for their country, conscious and open-minded in discussing both the strengths and weakness of DDR and CIP. In large part, the conclusions of this evaluation report are their conclusions. In the future, ANBP staff will be found in positions of responsibility throughout the political economy of Afghanistan.

Much of the international war economy is based in Kabul, and its occasional spinoffs into the peace economy are most visible in the capital. Capacity building and investment in the regions are sadly lacking. In this respect ANBP has made a significant contribution to the sustainable growth of the provinces. National staff members are remarkably well qualified, well-trained and well-motivated. Recruitment has been excellent, and so has on-the-job training. ANBP has been a learning project, and its impact will be sustainable through the work of its regional staffs and their future management of their country.

### 1.7.3. ANBP data and information systems

The evaluators expected to find sustainability in the database for all 63,380 disarmed XCs, created by the Mobile Disarmament Units. To our dismay, instead of IPs updating the national monitoring database, each organization collected information separately on Excel sheets for reporting to ANBP. Data from the IPs has not been integrated into the ANBP database (despite the recommendations of BCPR in 2006), nor has the original data been 'cleaned up'. The database was never used for monitoring.

The DDR database should have been the principle ANBP monitoring tool, allowing managers to see on a quarterly basis how programme activities were reaching the supposed beneficiaries, how the training course were progressing, and how the XCs were reacting. Instead, the M&E section created new monitoring tools, using separate (and doubtful) sampling to produce their four annual Client Satisfaction Surveys. There were crossover questions, however, that fed into the DDR database, and these concerned between 5,000 and 6,000 XCs each time – the last one being in July 2006 as DDR was closing down. For the past year the database has been dormant, its managers have mostly moved on to graze new pastures. At present unused, the database has obvious potential as a development resource if it is maintained and updated.

**The CIP database is in a similar position.** Commanders were not included in the DDR database (which seems a pity – they could simply be pulled out as a subset). The rump of the M&E section took five weeks to find the CIP on a 'P' drive in one of their

computers. DIAG could and should be using this, updating the information on a weekly basis so that all managers are able to access the same information about the commanders, their needs and demands. Instead, it seems that DIAG managers keep their relations with commanders personal, so contacts, discussions and negotiations are unrecorded by the agency. The evaluators recommend that DIAG should manage its information in a more sustainable manner, using the CIP database as the basis for monitoring its own work.

**Sustainability was raised in the Edburgh evaluation of July 2005.** Many of these issues were addressed. Edburgh Consultants made proposals for improving and prolonging M&E, and expressed concern that the sustainability factor was receiving scant attention from management whose 3-year project was due to end in June 2006.

"The point that we are underlining is that the social outcome of DDR should not be left to chance; social goals must be set and agreed upon, in order to design strategies to ensure the project optimizes desired impacts and minimizes undesired social impacts." (p18) If this challenge to UNDP was not adequately met, the reintegration process can still be turned into a success and the database may be a key factor." Edburgh Consultants Evaluation July 2005

Edburgh provides a good analysis of the weaknesses in ANBP's data analysis systems, concluding: "The fact that information on approximately 50,000 Ex-combatants is retrievable is a valuable asset. It is recommended to cherish the database and upgrade the quality of information it contains." (p13)

On the next page they give a very accurate description of data-gathering difficulties in Afghanistan, which should be used to guide every researcher.

What should be done with the ANBP data legacy to ensure sustainability of the reintegration process? Other UN agencies such as UNFPA (which is helping GoA to organize a National Census in 2008), UNICEF, UN Habitat, FAO and RSPE project (ILO) should be interested in the value of such a database, which potentially provides information on 63,380 families scattered through many of Afghanistan's 40,000 villages and more than half the 364 districts.

Worries inside ANBP concerning confidentiality seem easy enough to handle. The main problem is that no one has asked ANBP to focus on the database since the end of DDR.

The evaluators recommend that UNDP should look at the DDR database to see what needs to be done to prepare it for use as a development monitoring tool, so that the flow of data inform Afghan development policies.

### **Recommendation to UNDP**

**UNDP should contract the company Digistan [Tamim.samee@digistan.com](mailto:Tamim.samee@digistan.com) (Samee, Tamim created the original database as a UNDP staff member) to study technical questions associated with the database to see what it would take to prepare it as a development monitoring tool. Discussions with UNFPA and other agencies will**

***determine its potential value of the DDR database. This approach for long-term support to the reintegration process is one that every future DDR programme should study, and apply to their own circumstances.***

***If the technical review is favorable, UNDP should use the decentralized structures of ANBP to maintain the database as a UN development resource.***

**Recommendation to the international community**

***There is evidence that educated XCs have done better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Self-esteem is notably enhanced among XCs who learn to read and write and handle written arithmetic. In terms of sustainability, education has some obvious long-term benefits. Every demobilization programme should therefore have a period of reinsertion training that includes numeracy and literacy training.***

**Cartoon by Samedi in the Afghanistan Times**

QuickTime™ and a  
TIFF (LZW) decompressor  
are needed to see this picture.

# PART 2: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## **Lessons to be learned from the ANBP experience**

- 2.1. Strategic lessons
- 2.2. DDR – Disarmament for SALW
- 2.3. DDR - Disarmament for Heavy Weapons
- 2.4. Destruction of weapons and ammunition
- 2.5. Demobilization of Afghan Military Forces
- 2.6. Reintegration of XComs and the other 'Rs'
- 2.7. CIP – Commanders' Incentive Programme
- 2.8. Lessons from ANBP staff

## **Lessons to be Learned for DDR in other countries**

- 2.9. Defining DDR – or 3D4R
- 2.10. DDR & SSR in peace building
- 2.11. Structuring a DDR programme
- 2.12. Components of DDR differ in each country

**Robin-Edward Poulton**  
**Chimène Mandakovic**  
**Jayaseeli Bonnet**  
**Javid Ahmadi**

**Kabul, 6 September 2007**

## **Introduction to Lessons Learned & Recommendations**

We circulated a draft report on 16 August, three weeks before the end of the mission to invite comments. We presented the main recommendations on 25 and 26 August to the H.E. Vice-President Karim Khalili, Chairman of the D&R Commission, to H.E. Mohd Massum Stanekzai, Deputy Chair of the D&R Commission and to H.E. Habibullah, Deputy Minister of Defence. UN officials, donors and partners attended a briefing at UNAMA on 26 August.

Adverse comments have come from some people with a military background. Despite the fact that we consider DDR a huge success on the basis of its political achievements and the excellence of its disarmament implementation, our characterization of demobilization as too administrative, and our criticism of the reintegration design rankles. This is the clash of cultures: in the military people take orders, while development people are always questioning. It is as if we are saying that ANBP is a BUS. It is running fine, has a great engine and sound body, but it better seats and safety features. Even without seats, the bus can take us to our destination, but it is safer if we install seats and belts, and repaint the interior. The BIG picture is the bus = DD, but discussing interior design involves a lot of detail = RRRR. Reintegration is less spectacular and more complex than disarmament. That takes nothing away from the DD achievements of ANBP.

## **2.1. Strategic Lessons Learned**

### **2.1.1. - The UNAMA-UNDP partnership worked very well**

ANBP benefited from a well-coordinated partnership between the development and peacekeeping departments of the UN. UNAMA provided political guidance at critical junctures (such as heavy weapons cantonment) and UNDP provided efficient field support for implementation. This combination between UNDPKO and UNDP has worked before; it worked well in Afghanistan and DDR was a political success.

### **2.1.2.- The D&R Commission Chaired by Vice-Pres Khalili, is an appropriate GoA high-level mechanism for coordinating DDR.**

The D&R Commission is well-composed and well-coordinated. It provides a coherent mechanism for the Afghan government partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in this delicate sector. Such a commission, seated above any individual ministry, has the necessary influence to bring ministries together and to ensure that decisions are implemented. The commission has an important role in bringing the MoD and Mol and other government entities to devise and coordinate government policies on weapons, ammunition and other security issues.

If the Commission has not always worked as comprehensively as everyone hoped, this is because many of the member ministries are overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks thrown upon them. Partly this is due to the capacity limitations of individual ministries, but also to the fact that a multiple donors are thrusting too many tasks at ministers. More decentralization to the provinces by donors, and by the functional ministries themselves, would improve central coordination of policy initiatives including the D&R Commission.

### **2.1.3.- Continued support to D&R Commission**

As the DDR process was winding down, the BCPR mission recommended in 2006 that UNDP should “engage with the GoA in order to revisit the ToRs of the National Commission. The ToRs should include new responsibilities in line with its role in

implementation and policy making on the DIAG project. Its membership should also be reviewed to reflect this new role.”

The present evaluators find that four years is not enough. The D&R Commission will need – and should receive - continued support from the GoA and the UN for its supervision of the DIAG and other security issues. The UN should continue to ensure international standards and recognition, and to support consolidation of the disarmament and reintegration process over at least the next three years. We find that pulling out UN support too early carries the risk of losing the positive results and diminishing the positive impacts already achieved.

### **Recommendation to GoA**

***The evaluators recommend that the role of the D&R Commission should be strengthened and its mandate extended to provide technical and political supervision of the Ammo Project and Mine destruction in the MoD in addition to the DIAG project. We further recommend that the D&R Commission should receive a mandate from the President to ensure that all surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives will be destroyed as they become surplus to need.***

### **Recommendation to UNAMA and UNDP**

***The evaluators recommend that the DIAG and Ammo projects should not be handed over to GoA at present and that further, appropriate support should be extended to the D&R Commission to supervise these projects for at least three years.***

### **2.1.4.- Threat of exports of arms and ammunition from Afghanistan**

Experience in countries across the world shows that surplus stocks in official military or police armouries that are not destroyed, inevitably leak into the criminal market or are sold - legally or illegally – on the world market. Afghanistan has become the region’s largest reservoir of small arms and ammunition. The numbers of weapons and munitions surplus-to-usage will increase significantly, as the ANA and ANP receive NATO standard weapons and equipment beginning in 2007. The Deputy Minister of Defence has stated to the evaluators that he wishes all surplus arms and ammunition to be destroyed.

### **Recommendation to GoA**

***The evaluators recommend that a major destruction ceremony of soviet era surplus weapons should be organized on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2008 (UN International Weapon Destruction Day) – in view of impending change over of ANA and ANP to NATO standard weapons. We recognize that destroying weapons is a sensitive – even emotional – issue in Afghanistan, but the political value of such a ceremony far outweighs the monetary value of ageing surplus weapons.***<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> “A recent poll carried out by the Afghan Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium reveals that two-thirds of Afghans think that disarmament is the single most important path to security. In fact, Afghanistan's famous gun culture is motivated as much by fear as by cultural norms. From Kabul to Kandahar, people are not willing to surrender their weapons if they feel vulnerable to criminals, warlords, or Taliban insurgents.” Quoted from the article “Afghan 'gun culture' is fuelled by fear” by Mark Sedra



***A documentary film should be made of the event for television broadcasting worldwide. President Karzai should present the world-premiere of the film and announce the destruction during a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2008.***<sup>29</sup>

**Recommendation to NATO and the international community**

***The evaluators recommend to NATO and to donors that they should continue to support destruction of weapons and explosives by GoA. Unless the international community engages with the GoA on this issue, and implements a complete inventory and destruction programme, Afghan SALW and explosive stocks will remain a source of regional instability for years to come.***

**2.1.5 Donors established a partnership for success with GoA**

The commitment of GoA and donors was largely responsible for this disarmament success. As BCPR noted, “Unlike other DDR programmes that have suffered because of partial funding for different components of the process, the upfront dedication of donors allowed the GoA and its partners to plan and implement from the outset a coherent and comprehensive DDR programme. The success of DDR programmes is often dependent on this critical element. In Afghanistan, thanks to the commitment of the stakeholders, and principally of the donors, funding shortfalls were avoided.”

**2.1.6.- Disarmament was innovative, efficient and successful**

ANBP excelled at implementation, under UNAMA political guidance and UNDP management. Micro-disarmament arrangements benefited from military planning and precision that were widely admired, bringing back safely 94,262 SALW with ingenuity and good implementation.

Cantonment of 12,248 heavy weapons took place between January 2004 and October 2005, and was officially completed February 2006. Observers agree that the HWC changed the balance and level of potential violence in Afghanistan and created the conditions for political dialogue. This was a remarkable triumph for UNAMA and ANBP, for the GoA and for international cooperation which – for once – was quick, focused and effective.

**2.1.7.- Demobilization was very efficient but less effective**

Demobilization efficiently entered 62,376 XCs into a database, provided them with instant photo IDs and passed them through to the reintegration training stage. Normally demobilization leads into reinsertion activities that include health checks and treatments (which ANBP neglected), training in civic education and human rights,

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and Robert Muggah, *Ottawa Citizen*, Thursday, 6 September 2007

<sup>29</sup> A similar ceremony and UN speech were organized by Cambodia in 2001, and a film ‘Fighting Weapons for Development’ was funded by the Dutch government and shown at the UN. The impact was enormous.

literacy and numeracy. Participative teaching methodologies encourage returning fighters to respect the village hierarchy, eschew domestic violence, protect women and children, understand the rule of law. These are important parts of the interface between military and civilian life, between demobilization and reintegration. They were missing from the ANBP strategy, and that is a pity.

### **Recommendation to UN**

***Demobilization and reinsertion activities – including health, literacy and human rights training - should always be carried out before the reintegration phase is introduced.***

#### **2.1.8.- Reintegration needs more time to get sustainable livelihoods**

We find that three years is not long enough for DDR. Although the vocational training delivery exercise was efficient and most XCs liked their training, it is not clear how many XCs have been able to establish themselves with 'sustainable livelihoods'. It is too early to evaluate this. Most XCs believe they were promised jobs by the government. Some government ministries have not been helpful in finding employment for XCs, despite the best efforts of the ANBP and the D&R Commission.

The reintegration mandate for ANBP was mainly limited to providing training, and this was done (even if some training subjects were questionable and the duration not always adequate). To provide training to 55,000 people in 18 months provides further proof of ANBP's excellence in implementation. The mistake lies in designing a DDR project for only three years.

### **Recommendation to donors and to UNDP and UNDPKO**

***A DDR programme should never be designed for only three years. If the DD take a year or two, the RRRR will last at least a further four years: making a minimum of five or six years. If donors should be persuaded that they may provoke further conflict unless they commit to the full peace process. Disarmament without successful reintegration and reconciliation does not bring peace.***

#### **2.1.9.- Government cooperation with ANBP**

The BCPR mission of 2006 heard complaints from officials that they were 'not engaged in the process from the outset, in terms of consultation in programme design and were subsequently 'out of the loop' during the implementation and uninformed. The evaluation team finds that the D&R Commission provided an adequate and effective government coordination mechanism at the formal level. If government officials wanted information, it was there and available and DDR processes were transparent.

We find that the reintegration design process was insufficiently participative, but in general we cannot fault the ANBP staff for forging ahead and getting the programme done - with or without ministry participation. In 2003 most ministries were new and weak, and even today they are overloaded. The fact that Afghanistan had a successful DDR programme was thanks to the fact that the D&R Commission, UNAMA and UNDP pushed ahead to implement the President's policies in the most expeditious manner

possible, and using a decentralized implementation strategy.

**Recommendation to donors and UN agencies**

***More decentralized planning and project implementation at the provincial level would reduce the overload on central government ministries, giving them the chance to be more efficient and to focus on national planning, while improving project implementation and developing national capacity in the regions.***

**Recommendation to UNDP**

***We recommend that UNDP should take over and maintain the ANBP regional office structures as an asset for decentralized support to further reintegration, to UNDP projects, to decentralized management and capacity building in the provinces.***

**2.1.10. Who should design a DDR programme and how?**

We find a major weakness of ANBP in the original conception, which was carried out by a handful of people (initially just three men) rather than a structured group of experts bringing different skills and experiences to share at the table. Specialized UN agencies, DDR analysts and experienced international NGOs<sup>30</sup> were not involved, so the Lessons Learned from other DDR programmes were lost. This, we believe, explains the failure of demobilization to go beyond the purely administrative, the absence of reinsertion activities, the delays in reintegration planning, the failure to create an M&E system, the lack of gender awareness in DDR, the forgetting of ammunition, the lack of market surveys for the vocational training programmes, etc.

**Recommendation to donors and to UNDP**

***Future DDR programmes should begin with inter-agency collaboration, and a group of men and women with multiple skills and experiences. At the same time, strong and dynamic leadership is essential, and DDR leaders should not hesitate to tread on a few toes in order to get disarmament and demobilization done in a timely manner.***

**Recommendation to donors and GoA**

***Greater coordination is needed between the pillars of SSR and especially with counter-narcotics strategies, which are a counter-productive failure and need to be radically changed. The alienation of southern provinces by repressive counter-narcotic actions undermines the achievements of DDR and CIP, reinforces elements of a narco-state, and threatens to bring instability to the rest of Afghanistan.***

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<sup>30</sup> No DDR programme should be designed without including technical experts from relevant ministries, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO, WFP, ILO, IOM and NGOs working in the field. A disarmament researcher from UNIDIR or another security research group should be included, to ensure that lessons are drawn from the analysis of other programmes.

*Du tarbuz da yak dest gerefte namesha* Dari proverb

Two watermelons cannot be carried in one hand

Meaning:

You cannot do everything by yourself

Or

If you are do too many things at once, you will succeed with none

Or

DDR needs to combine several different skills to make it succeed

## **2.2. Lessons Learned - Micro-Disarmament of SALW**

### **2.2.1.- ANBP achieved its main objectives supporting the peace process**

Afghan DDR project was aimed specifically at reducing the size of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and removing their SALW from circulation. This it achieved, paving the way for the creation of a new Afghan National Army (ANA) and wider security sector reform. While DDR contributed significantly to the transition to peace in Afghanistan by reducing the numbers of armed units under the MoD and collecting their weapons, its special contribution was helping to create the political dynamic that led to further negotiations over heavy weapons and bringing Commanders into the political process.

### **2.2.2.- Successful Micro-Disarmament in the context of DDR**

Although the number of weapons collected did not significantly dent the supply of illegal weapons in Afghanistan (running in the millions), SALW disarmament was a big success. Few DDR programmes have achieved such a high ratio of weapons per ex-combatant: 63,380 XCs were disarmed, and 94,262 SALW weapons were collected (which, added to the 12,248 heavy weapons, makes a total of 106,510). This was achieved by taking in old .303 rifles and poor quality Pakistani-made weapons, and then refusing them as a passport to DDR - insisting that XCs must first come back and surrender a proper assault rifle.

### **2.2.3- Questionable weapon supply policies**

The number of weapons destroyed is 56,163 - slightly more than half of the number collected. Other weapons and ammo were returned to the MoD because they are 'national property' - but whether they should be re-used for aggression is a matter of policy, not law. We can find no evidence that MoD actually needed these arms - indeed we know they received large numbers Kalashnikovs in 2003 from Eastern Europe. The MoD repeatedly complains about the poor quality of DDR weapons, and replenishing stocks of weapons during wartime runs contradictory to our understanding of a 'disarmament' mandate.

### **Recommendation to UNDP and UNDPKO**

***The evaluators believe that no UN project should supply additional light weapons, especially in a country that is awash with SALW and still at war. Even though we recognize the symbolism of firearms in Afghanistan, we believe that disarmament in a post-conflict zone should include destruction.<sup>31</sup>***

### **Recommendation for future DDR programmes**

***NEVER issue cash. The early decision to award a \$200 Transitional Safety Allowance was a mistake, and this is known from previous DDR experiences. TSA was designed to be paid in two tranches of \$100 several weeks apart to help the XC to feed his family while awaiting the start of his reintegration package, but it was appropriated by Commanders. The TSA was seen across Afghanistan as 'cash-for-weapons'.***

#### **2.2.4.- ANBP's innovative and impressive mobile disarmament system and transparency suited the needs of Afghanistan**

We find innovative and impressive the record of Mobile Disarmament Units collecting weapons and Regional Verification Committees checking the ID of every candidate for DDR. It seems remarkable that more than 106,000 weapons and 32 tons of ammo have been moved out of places as remote as Badakhshan and the southern Hazarajat without any reported serious casualty or accident. This is a tribute to meticulous planning and execution.

### **2.3. Heavy Weapons Disarmament Lessons**

#### **2.3.1.- Successful heavy weapons disarmament**

All stakeholders and observers agree that results attained by the Heavy Weapons Cantonment were exceptional, and the impact was very positive. We concur with the BCPR team that, to the best of our knowledge, no other UN supported DDR programme has succeeded in securing such an important number of heavy weapons. This achievement has a potentially important impact on the medium-term security of Afghanistan and the resumption of war. It may inspire other, future DDR programmes.

#### **2.3.2.- Excellent international cooperation**

The HWC came about as the result of exemplary cooperation between the GoA, UNAMA and certain donors – notably the US and Canada. The ISAF force covered the Kabul region, while ANBP collected weapons across the rest of the country, with US and Canadian support. The political initiative emerged from UNAMA, and it changed the nature and level of potential violence in the country, while becoming a carrot that succeeded in bringing seriously dangerous, recalcitrant commanders into the political process.

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<sup>31</sup> Cambodia is another poor country with 30 years of war and a warrior tradition that venerates firearms. Nevertheless the government destroyed 200,000 SALW as a confidence building measure to promote sustainable peace.

### **2.3.3.- Flexible response brought dividends**

Once again, the ANBP pragmatic genius for implementation found solutions where others might have found problems. The partnership with Halo Trust produced both synergy and safety. Heavy weapons that could not be moved immediately were demobilized (loading breeches and mechanical motor parts removed) until means could be found to bring them into MoD depots. Junk was disarmed and left where it lay, but recuperable weapons were brought in for repair.

## **2.4. Destruction of Weapons and Ammunition - Lessons**

### **2.4.1.- Ammunition collection and destruction sends positive messages**

Political commitment from GoA and its partners has improved the image of Afghanistan as a peace-seeking nation. We are not required to evaluate the Ammo Project, but it would be unfair to pass over without mentioning the positive impact of the Ammo Project and the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. Thanks in part to ANBP and Halo Trust – and the vision of UN and EU donors - only one Province remains uncleared for Afghanistan to meet the conditions for accession to the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines. Only the province of Panshir has not yet destroyed its stockpiles. The collection of Ammo has brought 9,443 tons of good quality munitions into MoD depots and assured the destruction of 15,883 tons so far, as well as 496,717 anti-personnel mines.

### **2.4.2.- Increasing the GoA stocks increases risks of leakage**

We have reservations about the increase by ANBP of government stocks of ammo, especially in view of the imminent changeover to NATO standards which will render obsolete all these Soviet stocks from the point of view of the ANA... but not from the point of view of rebels and terrorists. This explains our insistence on the importance of destroying surplus stocks.

### **2.4.3.- Collected weapons should be destroyed, and their destruction used as a confidence-building measure in support of peace.**

We are unconvinced by the argument that weapon refurbishment 'saved the Afghan government millions of dollars.' We believe that all collected weapons should be destroyed. Afghanistan's problem is having too many weapons, not too few, and they keep coming. In 2007 NATO will begin supplying new weapons to ANA and ANP, rendering all these collected Soviet era weapons obsolete. What will happen to them?

We recognize the attachment of Afghans and soldiers to firearms, but the objective of DDR is to promote peace. The argument that these weapons were needed is weak, and the political impact of their destruction could be strong. We find that the failure to destroy all collected weapons diminished ANBP's positive impact on peace building.

### **2.4.4.- Destruction mechanism was efficient but as had little impact**

Other DDR operations have destroyed more weapons and in a more spectacular manner. 'Chopping' is an effective destruction mechanism and it was handled well by Halo Trust – but 'secret' destruction has little impact because it does nothing to build public confidence in peace.

### **Recommendation to GoA and NATO**

***As NATO weapons arrive and are phased in, so all weapons and ammunition from other sources should be destroyed so that they cannot be sold to rebels or terrorists.***

*bae la bada pane na khwazegae*

Pashtu proverb

A tree does not move unless there is wind.

Meaning: Every effect has a cause.

Or: You cannot make progress without exerting some effort

Or: People will not believe in peace  
until they feel the breath of peace

## **2.5. Lessons Learned from Demobilization**

### **2.5.1.- Successful demobilization of 62,376 XCs**

The ANBP programme planned meticulously the efficient administrative demobilization of 62,376 ex-combatants. Each XC received a photo ID card on the spot, and their identification was exemplary. DDR was negotiated politically for a maximum number of 100 000 XC participants. Once the MoD lists were established, the GoA and its partners set up rigorous and verification mechanisms and – to quote the BCPR mission - applied 'sufficient political pressure to prevent an over-inflation of the caseload.' This was a clear success.

### **2.5.2.- Partial success in reducing commanders' military networks**

No DDR process is totally successful in screening XCs to ensure that only legitimate participants enter the programme. The Afghan DDR process was controlled by MoD officials and commanders who had the power of decision concerning who would be registered and who would not. This allowed some commanders to use the DDR process as additional patronage and self-enrichment, while others gave up their weapons and, with them, their influence. Some commanders have stopped commanding, while others continue to control or influence their former fighters, especially where they are local *qawm*. Some commanders have even taken their militias and weapons into the highway police, or turned them into PSCs.

### **2.5.3.- Demobilization was very efficient but not totally effective**

The efficiency of DDR was not entirely matched by its effectiveness. Demobilization emphasised military and bureaucratic elements at the expense of reinsertion activities that focus on the XC and his family: health, family, community, education and reintegration. Future DDR programs should include reinsertion activities that move the XC emotionally towards reintegration: health checks for the XC and for his family; treatments of physical and mental ailments ('all XCs have mental trauma'); numeracy and literacy; training in civil and human rights. All of these would have enhanced the self-esteem of Afghan XCs and equipped them for reintegration.

### **Recommendation to UN and international community**

***Demobilization should lead into reinsertion activities that are the crucial interface between disarmament and reintegration. It needs to be short, constructive and effective in moving ex-combatants from a military to a civilian mentality and equipping them with minimum skills for civilian life including good mental and physical health, basic literacy and numeracy, an understanding of human rights and the rule of law, and of the responsibilities of men in family and community life. Demobilization should be planned with military precision and development objectives, executed and funded as the first step of a civilian, reintegration process.***

### **2.5.4.- DDR staffing must combine development and military skills**

We admire the military precision of ANBP's management and its implementation of the first 'D' – and we recognize that DDR is a military operation first. However, staffing was not adequate for the 'DR'. The UNDP should have realized that ANBP's development people were too few and too weak. Meanwhile some expatriate military officers operated with a happy-go-lucky disregard for UN rules, ideals, and purposes. The officers got things done very fast, but discipline was lax and some serious incidents were reported. Senior management certainly reacted swiftly against bad behaviour and hiring procedures improved later.

### **Recommendation to UN on staffing**

***Orientation on Human Rights, DDR, gender and UN ethics should be provided to all staff, just as all receive UN security training. Good leaders are precious, military initiatives are vital, and ANBP was well-led. But good managers are equally important: finance and HR managers, and also managers to plan and execute successful reintegration components. UNDP and UNDPKO must ensure that all jobs are described precisely, and that the right balance is achieved between DDD and RRRR.***

## **2.6. Lessons Learned from Reintegration Component**

### **2.6.1.- Success in Reintegration**

The BCPR team in 2006 remarked that reintegration is "a long term process, especially in the context of Afghanistan where soldiers have been engaged in different conflicts for many years, during which they have abandoned their civilian lives and means of earning their living." Many XCs were only part-time fighters. We find that ANBP did a



remarkable job in making the vocational training package available to 55 000 XCs before 30th June 2006. This required strong commitment from donors, ANBP and its implementing partners (IPs), whose flexibility and responsiveness allowed it to happen ... but it was not really 'reintegration'.

We find that the ANBP project should have been designed to last for a minimum of six years - and probably seven years would be more realistic, as new, successor projects are being cobbled together. Future DDR programme designs should recognize that reintegration will take four or five years. The failure of the design phase to recognize that reintegration needed more time and adequate follow-up, may yet lead to the failure of this component of ANBP. It is too soon to judge.

### **2.6.2.- DDR needs three Ds and several Rs**

There is more to peace building with ex-combatants than just the one word 'reintegration', which conceals a number of inter-related steps better described separately: Recognition and Respect (especially for Afghan *jihadis*), Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people (including youths, widows and orphans, disabled veterans, trauma counseling), Reconciliation, and probably Resettlement (remembering there are still 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who are potential reintegration rivals for XCs).

We find that '3D4R' is less misleading than the shorthand version DDR which makes the process sound easier than it is (Congo has a DDRRR programme). Does our 3D4R concept include too many different aspects under the same roof? Reintegration will fail if we miss key issues. Not enough analysis was by made ANBP of how many widows each XC must care for, and how many angry young men still seek vengeance, and too many *jihadi* commanders feel they have not received the respect they deserve.

### **Recommendation to UNDP and international donors**

***Future DDR programme designs should recognize that reintegration takes at least five years. Every DDR or RDD or 3D4R programme will be complex, and should therefore be designed and funded for a minimum of six or seven years.***

### **2.6.3.- Don't spoil the DDR ship for a ha'penny worth of tar**

We believe ANBP was designed for only three years, partly from fear that donors would not be willing to fund a longer programme. We believe this underestimates the wisdom and serious intentions of the Japanese government, although we recognize that European and American donors tend have short attention-spans due to a rapid staff turnover. Yet we find it a pity to invest \$120 millions in a three-year programme design that actually needed \$150 millions over six years. The additional money, spent on further training, caring and follow-up of XCs and their families, will make the initial investment succeed.

Our proverb comes from wooden sailing ships: having built a whole ship, it is foolish to economise on the tar that caulks the hull to ensure it remains waterproof. Saving money by using too little tar may cause the whole ship sink - and you will lose everything.

### **Recommendation to UNDP**

***We recommend that UNDP should pursue the present ANBP transition strategy, through RSPE and by seeking integration of XCs into ongoing development programmes such as NSP, and NABP which can offer recognition to the XC while bringing benefits to the communities into which each has reintegrated. In the meantime the DIAG and Ammo projects should continue under UNDP management, since their transfer to Afghan national control at the present time would undermine their effectiveness.***

#### **2.6.4.- The D is a military operation, but the R is a development project**

We find that leadership of the D portions of DDR should be led by a military officer with the rank of Colonel or General. The R portions, however, need a very different type of implementation that requires a long-term understanding of village, community and regional development mechanisms. The same style of leadership does not suit every type of programme, and different skills must be brought to bear on different problems.

#### **2.6.6.- Experience & skills of Implementing Partners should be used fully**

ANBP treated the international organizations and NGOs as contractors, rather than as partners – although some of the IPs had more reintegration experience than ANBP. We find that the reintegration process would have been better designed and better implemented if a participative design process had been initiated with IPs. INGOs might even have persuaded donors to invest in a six-year project. The lesson is that future DDR and development programmes will benefit from a more participative design process.

At the same time we recognize that the ANBP leadership was creative in persuading INGOs to support DDR by opening training projects in areas of the country where development and security were both absent.

#### **2.6.7.- Making continued use of the best IPs**

The standards of quality and professionalism offered by Implementing Partners were variable, and performance was not linked necessarily to the reputation of the IP. In Jalalabad we found the remnants of a rather poor international performance (the agency has closed its regional programme) being picked up and saved by a local training NGO doing excellent work with few resources.

Since the reintegration process of ANBP was mainly training, an extension should be offered by UNDP to some of the original IP contracts so that they can provide further reintegration assistance to XCs: additional training, job placement, health and trauma counseling, etc, and providing data for monitoring. Here is a lesson to be learned by other DDR programmes, that long-term commitment and on-going support to XCs brings better results than short-term training.

### **Recommendation to UNDP**

***We recommend that new contracts should be offered to some of the IPs so that they can provide further reintegration assistance and support to XCs.***

#### **2.6.8.- Study how to update and maintain a monitoring database**

The BCPR review emphasized that “efficient management of information on XC is key to a high impact reintegration phase and its monitoring.” ANBP recognizes that it was slow to create a Monitoring and Evaluation system. ANBP’s central database was not shared adequately with its partners, and as a result, most IPs created separate databases of some sort which – by themselves - add nothing to the overall understanding of success or failure of the ‘R’. So far as we know, the problem of multiple, partial databases has not been resolved.

#### **Recommendation to UNDP**

***UNDP should contract the company Digistan [Tamim.samee@digistan.com](mailto:Tamim.samee@digistan.com) (Samee, Tamim created the original database as a UNDP staff member) to study technical questions associated with the database and to see what it would take to prepare it as a development monitoring tool to be exploited by RSPE and other project – and whether this is feasible and cost-effective. Discussions with UNFPA and other agencies will determine the potential value of the DDR database. This approach for long-term support to the reintegration process is one that every future DDR programme should study, and apply to their own circumstances.***

#### **Recommendation to UNDP and the international community**

***In future we recommend that the M&E system should be set up on Day 1, that some form of baseline data should be collected at once (even if it cannot provide complete data because of security limitations), and that planning for the ‘R’ should start at the same time as planning for the ‘D’. The database should become the main tool for monitoring and evaluation of the DDR process.***

#### **2.6.9.- Literacy training should be a standard part of DDR**

There is evidence that educated XCs do better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Self-esteem is notably enhanced among XCs who learn to read and write and handle written arithmetic – and self-esteem is generally an important part of Afghan XCs’ reintegration into civilian society. This is especially true among commanders who attended the business management course.

#### **Recommendation to UNDP and the international community**

***Literacy and numeracy training should be included in every demobilization and reintegration programme.***

... obscured the government's continued accommodation with mid- and lower-level commanders, often with the acquiescence of external donors. One major haven for these commanders has been the highway police, with responsibility for securing the ring road linking the country's four major cities as well as the main roads connecting Afghanistan with its neighbours. This arrangement is fraught with risks, not least because it facilitates narcotics trafficking by commanders. A private American security company, U.S. Protection and Investigations (USPI), has been paying high wages to highway police commanders for guarding the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supported Kabul-Kandahar road project without imposing any apparent accountability on them. The result of these relationships has been to strengthen the commanders politically, militarily, and economically, thus undermining DDR.

International Crisis Group report on DDR  
Asia Briefing No. 25, 22 February 2005

## **2.7. Lessons from the Commanders' Incentive Programme**

### **2.7.1.- The CIP was a reasonable and creative mechanism**

The CIP brought commanders into the political process of joining civilian life. It provided some salary for two years, and some training to change their ideas. It was a good investment which bought time and space for new political and democratic processes to emerge and offers a possible model for future DDR programmes.

### **2.7.2.- Commanders had differing strategies to exploit DDR for themselves**

As one would expect, some commanders took advantage of the DDR process for themselves. MoD officials and field commanders had full and complete control over the choice of who should benefit from DDR and who should not. In the event certain commanders were able to use DDR as patronage to strengthen their influence over the men under their command. This is a lesson learned, but not necessarily a problem that can be avoided.

### **2.7.3.- Some of the long-serving *jihadis* were left out**

Some former *jihadis* are bitter men who feel they fought against communism to win the liberation of their homeland, and have been forgotten. In the case of Afghanistan the 'R' component should necessarily include Recognition of service, and Respect for sacrifice to the benefit of the nation. While these remarks are true for many XCs, they are accentuated in the case of commanders and officers whose sense of self-worth is greatly heightened. DDR contains many cultural aspects, and each country or culture is specific in this regard. This dangerous issue is being addressed by DIAG.

### **2.7.4.- A wider public relations campaign was required.**

If a wider public relations campaign had been possible in this rugged country, and after thirty years of fighting, the demobilization process might have become more democratic. The GoA has been remarkably successful and broad-minded in opening the airwaves to radio, television and telephone connections, and this is one of its big achievements.

## **2.8. Lessons Learned from ANBP STAFF**

**Among the many interesting and positive suggestions made by ANBP staff for any future ANBP ('if we were going to do this all over again, what are the important lessons we would learn?'), the most significant were:**

- international staff should be better selected, trained and orientated (some foreign military officers were seen to be too impatient, too focused on getting quick results, unwilling to adapt to the humanitarian and national development objectives of ANBP or its cultural, Afghan environment);
- too many foreign military personnel were hired in the early years of ANBP, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the ANBP staff;
- the project design was poorly conceived because reintegration and 'sustainable livelihoods' cannot possibly be achieved in only three years;
- better job profiling is needed for international positions, to ensure that only the correct people, with the most appropriate experience, apply and are appointed;
- better orientation is needed for international staff working in Afghanistan and working for the UN;
- NEVER issue cash: the early decision to award the Transitional Safety Allowance was a mistake, and this could have been known from previous DDR experiences (TSA – it was designed to be paid in two tranches of \$100 several months apart to allow the XC to keep his family while awaiting the start of his reintegration package, but it caused trouble and was appropriated by Commanders. The TSA was seen across Afghanistan as 'cash-for-weapons');
- Design the 'R' before you design the 'DD';
- Start M&E with baseline data collection at the beginning of the programme. Earlier M&E would have allowed ANBP to redirect reintegration efforts in different regions and to focus earlier on family and community issues;
- better market research was needed to prepare the reintegration 'packages', for remobilized people in different regions want and need different things.
- too many people received training that they couldn't use to generate incomes;
- better coordination between IPs would reduce duplication, and training too many people in the same craft;
- vocational training in rich countries lasts 5 or 7 years, but ANBP provided just a few months;
- better and longer demobilization process (with literacy and numeracy training, health visits, civil rights and rule of law teaching, etc) would have resulted in better choices by XCs in some cases;
- the management of expectations was not successful, and it could have been done better during the demobilization phase: XCs believe they are owed jobs, and many believe they were promised jobs, therefore many of them consider DDR a failure;<sup>32</sup>
- too much focus on administering the individual soldier and the military unit, meant that the human side of the man and his wife (wives) and family and community were neglected;

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<sup>32</sup> We were quoted the example of one XC who said, 'I am happy and I am fortunate. I have a wife and a house, but DDR should get me a second wife and a second house.'

- most Afghan XCs need psychological or medical treatment, which was not offered to them;
- ANBP had some health and drug-related treatments in a Gardez clinic (in Paktia province), but this could have been more developed;
- more could have been done to link DRR to national programmes like the skills training programme;
- more 'gender sensitivity' would have improved ANBP: more could and should have been done to integrate widows and wives and to make sure the families and communities were benefiting from what they need;
- more pressure should have been brought onto ministries to support DDR by hiring XCs for projects;
- ANBP should have done more to create jobs, or to encourage IPs to stick to the task and help create jobs;
- better follow-up would be needed to support XCs, but this cannot take place in just three years;
- 'group packaging' (ie encouraging XCs to work in groups to create wealth) might have been tried;
- when IPs did a poor job, the instincts of senior management were often to cover up the problem rather than solve it and bring better services to the XCs – so numbers took over from impact in the driving seat;
- since we are not following up on XCs, we have lost the opportunity to influence their behaviour and to keep them away from joining up with the Taliban;

## **\* Lessons Learned for DDR in other countries**

### **2.9. Defining DDR , or perhaps we should call it: 3D4R**

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration – is a short-hand that can be very misleading. We feel that the expression 'DDR' distorts program design – this has been the case in Afghanistan and is the major cause of the ANBP's weaknesses. 'RDD' would be better<sup>33</sup>, because it brings to the front the Reintegration part which is longer, more complex and more complicated than the DD. Disarmament (and even demobilization) are more dangerous, and they require rigorous planning and execution. ANBP excelled in this. Yet a good 'DD' is not enough to bring sustainable peace. The lessons learned on five continents show that success in resolving conflicts and building peace demands a complex, integrated package for ex-combatants and local communities that includes all the following components. We call the programme 3D4R.

#### **Micro-Disarmament and DDDRRRR**

- Disarmament of all armed groups

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<sup>33</sup> This was suggested by the BICC e-conference of 2002 for ANBP, but it was not adopted although some of the ANBP senior staff participated in the exchanges.

- Destruction of illegal and surplus weapons and ammunition
- Demobilization of units and individual ex-combatants, and
- Reintegration of the members of armed groups into civilian life
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people, including youths
- Resettlement of displaced populations, and
- Reconciliation between communities.

Miss one of these steps, and you may miss them all.

We often present the 3D4R programme as DDDRRRR, or DDD+RRR+R (or: 3D3R+R?) in order to make planners think hard about the content that is most appropriate to the circumstances in which they find themselves. This 'R-business' is a culturally-sensitive construct. DDD are standards. Their performance can be largely reproduced from previous models (although the Afghan HWC was a dramatic innovation). But 'R' is complex, depending on multiple social and cultural factors ... therefore we think it useful to ask in each different country, "which 'R' is missing in the 4R model?" Resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) is often crucial for reintegration (that was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone). Resettlement of refugees is sometimes vital (look at Rwanda, or DR Congo where the UN actually calls the programme 'DDRRR'). Both refugees and IDPs were important in Afghanistan, without having any direct influence on the ANBP programme.

In Afghanistan, however, many ex-combatants (XCs) were upset because they felt that they did not receive sufficient Respect and Recognition. 3D4R is culturally-specific. The Afghan case is unusual in that we were not dealing with a peace treaty between 'rebel' and 'government' soldiers. In Afghanistan, many *mujaheddin* felt that they deserved recognition after fighting for decades to save their country from enemies (Soviets, communists, atheists, Taliban or whomever, even if they had spent almost as much time fighting each other). This is a country where the primary religion is HONOUR, and it is clear that the reintegration process did not sufficiently offer the respect and recognition that many XCs craved.

The 3D4R programme design therefore needs thought and sensitivity. The first two Ds are military terms that require military organization. From Demobilization onwards, however, we need to move into long-term development mode which requires a different, non-military form of planning and implementation lasting several years.

## 2.10. Security Sector Reform and Peace Building with DDR

The DDR process was announced by President Karzai at the Berlin Conference, and described as one of the pillars of Security Sector Reform (SSR). This should always be the

case. Separating DDR from SSR always leads to disappointment: police forces fail to provide security that disarmed families require; borders remain porous if border police cannot perform their functions; armouries prove to be 'leaky' and criminal violence increases, etc. DDR should always be considered an integral part of a larger SSR programme. Experience from successful peace building programmes across the globe leads us to recommend a holistic approach involving a range of actions that are often neglected under the label of DDR:

- Confidence building (with written codes of conduct) between armed forces and civilians
- Redefining respect and the roles of police and military forces
- Creating a coherent legal framework for peace and disarmament
- Building cross-border cooperation between neighbouring countries
- Mobilizing civil society for peace building and reducing violence
- Using the media, developing legends and rewriting textbooks to build a culture of peace
- Reducing the number of illegal weapons, caches and official armouries
- Destroying surplus arms and ammunition to build confidence and reduce leakage
- Ensuring that official armouries are well managed and controlled

In the case of Afghanistan, linking SSR to counter-narcotics strategies is important – except that these have completely failed and are now actually counter-productive in that they are helping the Taliban insurgency. The ultimate objective of DDR and SSR is to return the country to a state of peace. Counting weapons is a sterile exercise, unless it is part of a cumulative set of measurements for peace and stability. Peace building is the process, peace is the goal, DDR and SSR are steps along to path to reaching the goal.

## **2.11. Structuring a DDR programme**

### **Managing the interface between disarmament and reintegration**

Integrating the Ds and the Rs requires an appropriate management structure. No one doubts that disarmament should be led and carried out by military officers using military planning and implementation. The ANBP management provided a brilliant demonstration of an efficient disarmament programme organized across the country under difficult, often dangerous, circumstances.



Demobilization is the 'interface' between military and civilian life. The Afghan demobilization process was efficient in a bureaucratic sense, but it missed out reinsertion which introduces the human aspects of the interface process: and it therefore failed to show enough 'respect' and 'recognition' of the XCs as people. Lectures, films and participatory teaching about civil rights, human rights and the rule of law can greatly improve the self-respect and social status of XCs when they return to civilian and community life. The same is even more true of literacy and numeracy classes, which greatly enhance the image of XCs and their capacity to succeed in civilian life.

One of the lessons from Afghanistan is that demobilization-reinsertion should always include health examinations and treatments that ensure the beneficiaries start their new civilian life healthy. Probably some form of counseling should have been included. Group therapy can help XCs adjust to the effects of their violent past, and through controlled discussions and exchanges of experiences with others who have lived through war. This may reduce domestic violence and gender-based violence during the reintegration process.

Reintegration is not a military operation: on the contrary, it is precisely a non-military operation since XCs are ending their military life and entering a new, civilian life in which they are encouraged to abandon their fighting habits and to end their allegiance to former commanders. Just as refugees leave their camps and 'humanitarian emergency' situations in order to move into 'sustainable development mode', so XCs are leaving military camps to rejoin civilian life. The four RRRRs are steps into civilian life, new livelihoods, and sustainable development. Logically they should be run by development people, who will almost certainly be civilians.

In the Mali DDR of 1995, for example, government military officers ran the disarmament and demobilization camps with very light UN political and military support, but the UNDP sub-contracted the reintegration process entirely to IOM.

## **Designing the right management structure**

It seems therefore that our DDR (or 3D4R) programme needs both military and civilian skills and the same is true of the management. There appear to be three possible, alternative management structures that will facilitate the military-civilian interface. Of the three, it is the first one that we prefer.

### **1. A single Director oversees the whole programme and handles fundraising, with a Deputy Director for DDD and a Deputy Director for RRRR.**

This combines the advantage of 'keeping the whole programme under one roof' (attractive for programme unity, host government organisation, donor coordination, and fundraising) with the separation of powers which we believe is necessary to avoid the downgrading and neglect of the reintegration process - which has so often happened in DDR programmes.

The Director in this management model will have the profile of a manager-diplomat responsible for monitoring and evaluation, as well as finance and personnel.

The DD for DDD will be a Colonel or Brigadier with expertise in SALW and ammunition, and he would be in charge of organizing the Disarmament as well as Destruction of weapons, munitions and explosives.

The DD for RRRR – the other Deputy Director - will be a senior development manager with experience of reintegration and resettlement issues, and knowledge of reconciliation and rehabilitation in conflict areas. (S)he will organize baseline data collection and help set up the monitoring and evaluation systems that are essential to provide information that allow the Director to make programme adjustments when XCs actually reach the communities. (S)he will begin a participative process of programme design, including government departments, local businesses and associations, and international NGOs. (S)he will launch early market surveys of job opportunities to plan the vocational training and employment creation which leads XCs from demobilization to reintegration.

Demobilization-reinsertion will be organized jointly by the two Deputy Directors: DD for DDD will take the lead and will handle the administrative mechanisms that take men out of the service and provide them with a new, civilian ID card. Health checks should be provided as part of this process, as well as training in laws and human rights, civilian lifestyles, domestic violence and correct behaviours – and these should be run jointly by the two Deputy Directors in such a way that their departments come to realize that they are interdependent.

The process of reconciliation for ex-combatants (with themselves and between each other) needs to begin during demobilization. XCs need help and encouragement to come to terms with their violent past, and to confront their peaceful future. Some form of socialization training and group therapy needs to take place during this period, before former fighters choose their future lifestyles and move into vocational training. The success of the DDR programme will not be judged ultimately by the numbers of ID cards issued or the quantities of weapons and ammo destroyed, but by the successful social integration of the XCs into their families and communities after several years of peaceful, civilian employment.

## **2. Appoint a strong Director of DDD and a strong Deputy Director of RRRR who takes over in two years.**

In the case of Afghanistan, the weakness we perceive was not in the DDR leadership itself, but in the failure of the leadership to plan early on for the complex processes of reintegration. DD turned out to be a brilliant exercise in administration and logistics, dominated for good and sufficient reasons by concerns for safety, weapon management, and (very soon) ammo management and heavy weapon cantonment. Meanwhile the military organizers did not have sufficient time to focus on RRRR. It was the absence of forward planning for the next, post-demobilization phase that caused M&E to begin late, that missed out the need for a market study of

employments opportunities, that neglected the health and family and community aspects of demobilization and reintegration. Military organization was also one reason that the ANBP programme was designed to last for only three years – leaving UNDP and the donors scrambling around to create successor projects that can ensure some perennity to employment and social stability of XCs and commanders during the ongoing reintegration process.

In this second management scenario, the whole operation will be kept under one roof, but the Deputy Director (Reintegration) will be a strong and experienced manager whose appointment starts on the same day as the Director's and with a clearly defined, separate mandate. The Deputy will begin the planning of reintegration from Day 1. His boss the Brigadier (or Colonel) will have overall control of the DDR programme for two years, after which we assume that disarmament would be ended and he will move on to graze in different pastures – allowing the Deputy to move up into the top spot.

The attraction of this formulation is that the programme keeps its unity and donors keep their commitment, while changing personnel movements at the top of the organisation match the changes in programme emphasis. The programme will be designed to last for 6 years. By year 3 the DD will be ended and reintegration process will be dominating project activities. We can assume that the military aspects of the programme will have dwindled to mopping up operations for remaining explosive materials and destroying surplus weapons and munitions – activities that can be handled by the new Deputy Director who may well have a military background but whose profile and functions will be different from those of the former Director.

### **3. Separate the DDR programme into two different projects**

The third possibility is to design DDD as one project lasting three years, and have the RRRR as a separate programme designed to last five or six or seven years. This allows short-term donors to fund disarmament and work with security sector reform, while donors who are interested in building sustainable peace can invest in both the military and the reintegration processes.

It can be argued that 'keeping it all under one roof is best', but in the end this has not happened in Afghanistan because of the poor programme design. After three years (stretched to four-and-a-half as a result of the BCPR assessment in early 2006) we face the imminent disappearance of ANBP in March 2008 while a plethora of successor projects under myriad different roofs try to pick up the pieces. In April 2008 we will have the DIAG project under the D&R Commission, the Ammo project continuing under the MoD, RSPE run by the ILO, the ASMED and ARIES projects for commanders created by USAID, a scattering of projects underfunded with various NGOs, and still no one will believe that the reintegration process was completed or was a real success. Our third management solution might have allowed the military-political DD success story to unfold under a UNAMA-UNDP disarmament umbrella, while an entirely separate, professional, well-planned reintegration programme was created by UNDP and IOM or a consortium of NGOs. The first project would have been designed for

three years (or four-and-a-half years) and the second could have been designed for six or seven years since we know that is how long the reintegration process really lasts.

**The decision comes down to the donors.** Are the donors willing to fund two different projects? Are they prepared to fund reintegration separately from disarmament, or is it the 'sexy' aspect of the latter that persuades them to fund the former?

Ambassadors are surprisingly amateurish when it comes to discussing and measuring results. We have met ambassadors (and this did not happen in the case of ANBP in Afghanistan) who were happy to count the number of weapons collected after one year and then stop funding the project. This may pander to financial expediency back home, but it does little to ensure lasting peace in a conflict-zone where weapons are plentiful and civilian jobs are few. Unless the reintegration and reconciliation succeed, even the best-organised disarmament and demobilization ultimately fail.

In the end the greatest strength of ANBP was the combination of UNAMA-UNDP, and the commitment of a small number of donors. ANBP was a success, thanks to the Japanese government's decision to provide funding, together with the UK and Canada and USAID, as well as Netherlands and Norway and others. ANBP was their success.

## **2.12. Components of DDR – or 3D4R**

One of the striking successes of ANBP has been its capacity to handle a wide number of components, some of them quite unexpected. Not every programme Director will have the opportunistic flair and exceptional organizational ability that was found in ANBP. We conclude from this experience that the planning of DDR programmes should always seek out the unexpected. DDR should not be narrowly focused simply on demobilizing soldiers. In their project design, DDR planners should analyze with the host government, and with the most experienced donors, international agencies and NGOs, what elements are key for peace building in each target country. DDR is culture-specific: what works in Afghanistan may not work in Nepal or in Sudan, but certain lessons can be taken from every new DDR experience.

As each DDR programme is being developed, the UN staff should ask the question, "What are the local ingredients that will make peace here?"

Let us list again here *pour mémoire* **the eight components we identified inside ANBP:**

- **Micro-disarmament for SALW**
- **Disarmament of heavy weapons**
- **Destruction of weapons and ammunition**
- **Demobilization of XCs**

- **Reintegration and the other 'Rs'**
- **CIP - Commanders' Incentive Programme**
- **Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile - 'Ammo' project,**
- **DIAG - the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme.**

To make the list more complete, we should break out the 'R' component into a more detailed menu of things that planners need to bear in mind when they design DDR. When we talk about 3D4R, we are deliberately seeking to emphasise that the 'R' component is more complex and takes longer than the Ds. There may be more than four Rs in any one programme. If we were redesigning the ANBP with the benefit of hindsight, six years after the original design, we would make it more complete.

**Here are the 'R' factors we see as important for building lasting peace in Afghanistan.**

- **Reintegration of the members of armed groups into civilian and community life**
- **Recognition (of the role of the *mujaheddin* in nation building)**
- **Respect (in a country where Honour is more important than employment)**
- **Reduction of the influence of corrupt Commanders and drug-lords**
- **Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people (after thirty years of destructive warfare)**
- **Reinforcement of respect for women and youths (in a culture with gives them low value)**
- **Resettlement of displaced populations (of the 5-8 million refugees, 2 million remain in Pakistan) who are competing for resources with XCs<sup>34</sup>**
- **Reconciliation between communities and between Commanders**

Planners designing a more complete peace and disarmament programme in a new post-conflict country may decide (as the UN did in DRC) that the short-hand appellation 'DDR' is not enough. We wish them good luck, and PEACE.

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<sup>34</sup> In Takhar province the two XCs who chose to learn tailoring from CFA were sure they could make a good living. When they came to open their shops, however, they found two refugee professional tailors had just returned from Peshawar and had opened shops. There was room for two tailors in town, but not for four.

## ANNEX 1: THE EVALUATION TEAM:

A team of three international consultants and one national consultant was requested to evaluate the DDR and CIP aspects of the ANBP programme, to analyze the direct and indirect impacts of the programme, and to make recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and the donor working group concerning future policies and strategies in support of ANBP's objectives, drawing out from the ANBP experience the key Lessons Learned about good practices, and presenting them in ways that will encourage other DDR programmes (starting with Nepal, Sudan, Congo) to rethink or refine their DDR strategies..

### **The team members were:**

1. Dr Robin-Edward Poulton, Team Leader
2. Ms Jayseeli Bonnet, DDR Evaluator
3. Ms Chimène Mandakovic, CIP Evaluator
4. Dr Jawid Ahmadi, Coordinator and medical specialist

**Dr Robin-Edward Poulton, Team Leader**, has collected weapons in West Africa and Cambodia, and written extensively on DDR, SSR and development issues relating to small arms. Senior Research Fellow at UNIDIR he has designed and managed SALW projects for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. In 1979 he defended his PhD on rural development in Afghanistan, based on his work with UNICEF in mountain villages of the Hazarajat, province of Balkh. [repoulton@epesmandala.com](mailto:repoulton@epesmandala.com)

**Ms Chimène Mandakovic, CIP Evaluator** worked for five years with Médecins Sans Frontières, taking on increasing responsibilities in Serbia, Angola, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, becoming Chef de Mission in Uganda and then Haiti. She moved to UN positions in human rights in Angola, Haiti, then to work on DDR Rwanda and DRC with United Nations Peacekeeping missions. After this evaluation she will take up a child protection position with UNDPKO in Nepal. [mandakovic@hotmail.com](mailto:mandakovic@hotmail.com)

**Ms Jayaseeli Bonnet, DDR Evaluator** has experience of conflict management and cross-cultural conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Europe, India, SE Asia and SW Africa. Specialized in gender and health aspects of conflict management (HIV aids and family mediation, mine-victim assistance in post-conflict zones), she has also been closely involved with disarmament and reintegration conflict issues. [jayaseeli.bonnet@gmail.com](mailto:jayaseeli.bonnet@gmail.com)

**Dr Javid Ahmadi** is a medical practitioner with a diploma in business administration and a great love of the English language. He speaks Pashtu and Dari, studies and writes in three languages. He worked with Japanese medical professors before being hired by US army for translating and interpreting duties. He has also worked in the field of counter-narcotics with Adam Smith Institute in Kabul. [ahmadijavid@hotmail.com](mailto:ahmadijavid@hotmail.com)

## ANNEX 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Originally a part of the evaluation, the 'Ammo Project' was dropped at the last minute from the Terms of Reference (ToR). This should be born in mind when reading the objectives of the Evaluation below.

The Strategic Objective of the evaluation is described in the detailed ToR for DDR and Ammo as follows:

*To measure the impact of the DDR and Ammo projects on the stabilization of Afghanistan and to draw lessons learned from Afghanistan's experience with disarmament., demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants for application in the national poverty and conflict mitigation strategies, as well as for UNDP's corporate knowledge ... and draw best practices for UN global corporate knowledge and the benefits of other partners.*

The specific objectives are:

- Assess the overall relevance, impact and sustainability of the DDR (and Ammo) in relation to the ultimate goal of supporting security sector reforms towards sustainable peace
- Assess and document the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Afghanistan DDR (and Ammo) projects in relation to the programme's immediate objective;
- Identify "lessons learnt" with a view to contribute to improving the future policies, strategies and operational aspects of DDR, including design, organization, financial management, and implementation with particular reference to assessing the effectiveness of DDR-Afghanistan's unique initiatives.
- The application of the evaluation's findings and lessons learnt to support the improvement of security sector reforms in Afghanistan.
- Identify and outline best practices in the planning and implementation of the Ammo and Heavy Weapons Cantonment projects - HWC (the latter completed in October 2005) and further evaluate whether HWC objectives were accomplished. Also, determine short to long-term contributions of these two projects to security sector reforms in Afghanistan.

## ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGY

The ToR offered the following guidance:

The evaluation should be based on a participatory approach, utilizing the knowledge and experiences of all relevant stakeholders, who played important roles during the process. This includes:

- Government of Afghanistan, and its institutions involved particularly in security sector reforms (MoD, Mol, MoJ) and other ministries such as Ministry of Social affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Education.
- Afghanistan civil society and general public.
- Various other stakeholders, i.e UNDP, UNICEF and other UN-system agencies, international humanitarian organizations (governmental and non-governmental, including commercial), and DDR & Ammo implementing partners (IPs) i.e. AGEF, IOM, Halo Trust, CSTC-A.
- DDR Donors.
- Ex-combatants.
- Ex-combatants' wives (these two points have been added by the evaluators)
- Communities including martyrs' widows and disabled veterans

Furthermore the development community at large, academics and the general public interested in the area of transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development are an important target audience in relation to the findings of the evaluation.

Finally, the evaluation should be put into perspective by comparing the findings with relevant research and experiences from other conflict areas.

**The team started with desk research**, involving an analysis of the considerable literature and statistical information produced by the ANBP and provided by UNDP. A lot of very impressive work has been carried out and documented by the programme.

**We also focused on comparative research**, searching out results and analyses of DDR programmes in other countries, using literature from UNDP, UNIDIR, BICC, GTZ, NGOs and donors as well as our own combined experience in the field.

**Team meetings with UNDP, ANBP and UNAMA staff** were immensely important for our early understanding the background and for analyzing implementation difficulties experienced by ANBP.

As well as meetings group discussions, we made use of **qualitative interviews** with ANBP staff, former staff, UNDP staff and other observers of the ANBP process. Most of the people interviewed were no longer occupying the positions they had in ANBP – remembering that the DDR process ended in June 2006. This gave the advantage of hindsight and *distanciation* and removed the need for most staff members to feel



defensive about their project; but of course the memory recall factor meant that some pertinent points may have been forgotten. Instead of a smooth process of understanding by observation and discussion, we found ourselves piecing the jigsaw together to recreate an image of what ANBP was like one, three and five years ago.

**An informal SWOT analysis** was carried out as a team-building exercise, highlighting the considerable strengths of ANBP as well as the weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The absence of key ANBP players who largely created the first three years, was compensated only partly by the excellent documentary record they left behind them. Among donors, it was noted that nearly all the leading players in DDR had been transferred, especially from the Japanese, Canadian and British Embassies.

It was therefore decided to **send out a short questionnaire by email to departed officials** and 'absent friends' whose opinions were considered important) both in UNDP – ANBP and among the partners and donors) inviting their opinions and participation in the external evaluation. We received some interesting and helpful replies, but overall participation was disappointing.

**Then we moved to an action-research methodology.** We were instructed to assess the direct and indirect impacts of ANBP's work, and these necessarily include unexpected impacts as well as planned direct impacts and hoped-for indirect impacts. Using the field experience of UNIDIR's participatory evaluation studies of voluntary weapon-for-development programs in several countries (cited in the bibliography), we opted to use **1-on-1 interviews and small focus groups using informal questionnaires**. We also included **before-and-after analysis**, asking people to recall their lives before DDR and to compare them with their lives today.

We conducted a wide range of **qualitative interviews in the field**, in addition to detailed **discussions with government and donor officials** (individually and in groups), and other regional officials directly involved in ANBP's implementation. We also focused strongly on **UN specialized agencies and NGO Implementing Partners** which had worked with ANBP, and other NGOs that had not. This included **site visits to meet NGOs** and also **to meet ex-combatants in their place of work** for more intimate and detailed discussions. These included Kabul, Kunduz, Shir Khan Bandar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh, Jalalabad, Herat. Some of this movement was hampered by security restrictions. Notably we were discouraged from traveling to the south.

For Kandahar we experimented with **telephone focus groups**, but it was not entirely satisfactory because of the lack of visual context and body language, and because of a tendency for interviewees to repeat the previous answers.

**'The most significant change' strategy** was used in some focus groups' This question allows for comparison and contrast of opinions between groups of men and women and youths, and is also good for stimulating debate within a focus group. When each person explains what has changed the most for them, patterns emerge that allow the evaluator to appreciate different priorities and perceptions. As change

occurs, so the various actors react differently and this provokes more change: a classic action-research scenario.

**Participative action-research provides a valuable and scientific method for impact evaluations,** bringing into the quality equation a wider range of opinions than can be achieved by other forms of survey. UNIDIR's work on participative evaluation of weapon collections programmes has been invaluable. Fortunately the ANBP project completed several significant statistical opinion surveys of demobilized soldiers, and we have exploited their results with gratitude. The ANBP database was something of a disappointment, but with the Client Satisfaction Surveys we have attempted to base our conclusions on **both qualitative and quantitative analyses.**

**The participative action-research model necessitated design and translation of simple questionnaires.** Focus groups and interviews cannot be carried out effectively unless the questions have been prepared in advance. Questionnaires can be used formally (in surveys) or informally (preferable for interview formats) but in both cases the quality of translation is critical to ensure that the right question is asked in the right way, using culturally appropriate images and language. Questionnaires were prepared for CIP and DDR groups, for wives of DDR beneficiaries, and for implementing partners, as well as for provincial government officials. Due to the large number of donors whose staff had changed leaving no institutional memory, we prepared a separate questionnaire for 'absent friends' with just thirteen questions (as described above).

**Finally we studied the numbers.** Of course, we were looking at (and for) the numbers from the very beginning, but with a healthy dose of scepticism. It was very difficult to obtain statistics from ANBP, because management was not focused on our work. Eventually friendly faces in the organization produced the numbers we needed. Evaluation by numbers is an unreliable way of measuring impacts, especially the unexpected impacts that result from any outside intervention. Evaluation-by-Results encourages a focus on pre-determined statistical indicators that tend to guide evaluators onto paths traced by the original project planners, and therefore lead them away from examining the unexpected.

Numbers can be especially misleading in DDR where baseline data is notoriously lacking. DDR should be evaluated in terms of its contribution to peace, stability and security sector reform, and not simply in terms of the number of weapons collected or destroyed. How many small arms and light weapons (SALW) are there in Afghanistan? We have no idea. According to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 million Kalashnikovs were brought in by the Soviet time. According to disarmament research about the *jihad* period, another 3 million AKs were brought in by the CIA and the ISI. This was before the Taliban came in with their own ISI supplies.

Does this add up to eight or ten million light weapons, many of them now ageing? We do not know. Judging the significance of weapons/combatants/ stockpiles in terms of numbers and percentages assumes that we have some idea of the total picture. Researchers in this tricky field know all too well that the statement: 'There are

estimated to be x million weapons/landmines/rounds of ammunition,' all too often means that a single Military Attache, or one well-intentioned academic, has made a guesstimate that will be repeated gratefully by journalists and report writers until it becomes a conventional wisdom without any real basis in fact.

**We do not refuse numbers:** we have made guesstimates ourselves in war zones where nothing resembling real data could be found, but we try always to steer clear of believing in 'numerical truth'. Numbers are beloved of donor committees and make for beautiful – and misleading - reports. This report deliberately tries to balance the quality of opinions and statistics with the possibility that they may not show the whole truth. We do not shy away from statistics, but we have tried to take account of real, evidence-based findings as well as dissident views, in line with recommendations in the excellent guideline document from the United Nations Evaluation Group: *Norms for Evaluation in the UN System*, April 2005.

## ANNEX 4: ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

### Organization of the team's work

The Team Leader began work on July 9<sup>th</sup> and the full team was in Kabul from July 21<sup>st</sup>. The final report was delivered as planned on 6<sup>th</sup> September 2007.

- Week 1:** Desk research, statistical research. Team Leader meetings in Kabul
- Week 2:** CIP member reaches Kabul. Comparative and Statistical research action-research phase, preparing ?aires, focus groups
- Week 3:** DDR member arrives. 28th travel to Kunduz and Mazar, focus groups
- Week 4:** Travel to Jalalabad 02 Aug, action-research, interviews, focus groups  
Progress briefing for deputy Minster of Defence Nuristani August 6<sup>th</sup>
- Week 5:** TL absent Aug 9-21, rest of team travel to Herat 12-15 August.  
CIP-DRR focus groups, interviews, analyze results,  
CIP & DDR experts collect and analyze statistics
- Week 6:** Preparation of CIP & DRR reports Draft Report due August 19  
UNDP sends to stakeholders
- Week 7:** Preparation of Annexes and oral presentations
- Week 8:** Presentation of draft report at a Stakeholders' Workshop Aug 26<sup>th</sup>  
Team leaves Kabul Aug 28  
Stakeholders' analysis and comments
- Week 9:** Revisions, corrections and presentation of final report September 6th

## ANNEX 5: PASHTUNWALI, HONOUR AND ISLAM

### Pashtunwali and Honour in Afghanistan

The official Code of Honour of the Pashtuns, called *pashtunwali*, has greatly contributed to defining the Taliban brand of Islam and its repression of women. The Pashtun code is based on four fundamental rules.<sup>i</sup>

**Hospitality:** The first law of *Pashtunwali* requires the showing of hospitality *melmastia* to all visitors without hope of remuneration or reward. Some Pashtun claim descent from Abraham and Isaac, both nomads, and this is the Law of the Desert which (for example) forbids anyone to charge for water (for water is Life). This law includes *badragga*, meaning a tribal escort for visitors. If a *badragga* is violated, a tribal feud will follow.

**Revenge:** The second law of *Pashtunwali* demands the taking of revenge *badal* over time or over space to avenge a wrong. Never allow yourself to be slighted. If two Pashtuns accidentally brush feet under the table, they will immediately shake hands to show that neither intended to offend, nor has taken offense. Here we can recognize the ancient Biblical law “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”. Such practice leads eventually to a land of blind and toothless people.

**Sanctuary:** *Nanawatay* derives from the verb to go in and is used when the vanquished party seeks refuge, or goes to the victors to beg forgiveness. There is no *nanawatay* when the dispute involves injury to women. *Tor* (black) cases concern the honor of women. *Tor* can only be changed to *spin* (white) by death. I remember a UN colleague in 1972 requesting three days leave to pay blood money, for his cousin had just killed a man as part of a 100-year-old blood feud. My friend would be the next target for revenge; he preferred to offer *nanawatay*. Evidently women were not involved.

**Rules:** A Pashtun must obey - to protect his honour - decisions and rules *nang* of Elders and tribal Councils *jirga*. The rules include service in the *lashkar* the tribal army, which implements decisions of the *jirga*. *Nagha* is a tribal fine imposed upon the wrongdoer by the *jirga*, which can be collected if necessary by the mobilization of a *lashkar*. A wrongdoer may have his house burned. *Nang* includes correct behavior towards your *tarboor* (cousin), who may be a rival for a female cousin's hand in marriage. Hence the Pashtun proverb ‘there is no hatred, like that between cousins.’

Although *Pashtunwali* is very much the code of the Pashtuns who live on either side of the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, myriad ethnic groups in Afghanistan have intermingled over the millennia so that they share some of the same values. While the Taliban's protestant *Salafa Deobandi* interpretation of Islam derives from (and is bankrolled by) Saudi *Wahhibism*, it is the mixture of Pashtun tribal values and Pakistani politics which has made the Taliban's creed appear so repressive, so violent and alien to western observers, and so anti-Islamic according to many Moslem commentators.<sup>ii</sup>

## Islam, village politics and refugees

Every tradition and superstition is said by Afghan villagers to derive from the Holy Koran, which few of them actually read or understand. Islam is central to every aspect of life, yet intimately mixed with pre-Islamic ritual. In the village mosque young boys learn by rote a few passages of the Koran - receiving what passes for a religious education. 'Childhood' as invented by Victorian Europeans does not exist in Afghanistan. An Afghan boy remains with his mother, secluded behind the walls of their house, until the age of 6 or 7 years. Then he passes through circumcision into the harsh world of men, of economic survival and protection of honour. A Pashtun boy traditionally receives his first knife at age seven, his first rifle at age 12 or 14. From then on, he can hunt game and kill enemies to protect the honour of his family.

The role of Islam in Afghanistan cannot be overemphasized. Islam is the umbrella under which all Afghan mujahedin can fight the *jihad* (struggle, *not* holy war). However, the terms "moderate" and "fundamentalist" are used to describe the various political parties in Peshawar. Only a few "conservative" (a better term) Afghans want to go back to an idealized golden age of Islam, which never existed except in the minds of a few romantics. Virtually all leaders want to use Islam as a weapon to move Afghanistan into the 21st century - Islam's 16th century.<sup>iii</sup>

Meanwhile the women are excluded from the mosque. Women have a second-rate status in Afghan society, influenced by the Indian caste system and linked to pre-Islamic notions of 'impurity'.<sup>iv</sup> This removes women from the central decision-making space of the community. A girl remains with her mother behind the walls, until she reaches puberty. By this time she has been trained as a wife, and is ready for marriage and motherhood.

Life in the Afghan refugee camps of Pakistan and Iran has been miserable for twenty-eight years. Infant mortality and malnutrition have often been as high in the camps as they have been inside Afghanistan. While displacement has brought women new ideas, and experiences beyond the walls of their husband's house, the radicalization of political parties by the ISI and Saudis has meant greater restrictions, and the imposition of *purdah* on groups which previously did not wear the veil. Repression of women has become almost a token of religious purity; Islam has moved steadily away from the soft, mystical *sufi*<sup>v</sup> influences of Central Asia towards a hard, linear, Saudi desert *Wahabbism*.

Notes extracted from an academic lecture on Central Asian Studies

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## ANNEX 6: BIBLIOGRAPHY

# Bibliography

### ANBP/UNDP DDR EVALUATION

JULY – SEPTEMBER 2007

#### INTERNET LINKS

- Children and Child and Young Adults Soldiers- Recruitment Prevention
- Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
- GINIE - Global Information Networks in Education
- HRW Demobilization of Children - DRC- Reluctant Recruits
- War Child War-Affected Children - Links treaties to activist
- BICC - Bonn International Center for Conversion
- HRW - Human Rights Watch, Arms Division
- IANSA - International Action Network on Small Arms
- International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution
- IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies
- INDG - Peace Wire, International Network on Disarmament & Globalization
- ISN - International Relations and Security Network
- Practical Helpdesk for Disarmament
- UN DDR Resource Center
- UNIDIR - UN Institute for Disarmament Research
- Global Security – Afghanistan
- DDR public information website <http://www.ddrafg.com/contacts.htm>

#### Afghan Government Documents

- 2006 **The Afghanistan Compact**, 31 January 2006, Annex 1 (Security).
- 2005 **Millennium Development Goals Report** Islamic Republic of Afghanistan;  
Chapter 12: Enhance Security (Goal 9) retrieved from:  
<http://www.ands.gov.af/mdgsgroups.asp>

#### ANBP Documents

- 2006 4th DDR Client Satisfaction Survey June 2006 – and three previous surveys
- 2006 **Mission Report UNDP/BCPR** support to :  
Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme 16 to 30 April 2006
- 2005 **Evaluation of the Reintegration Aspects of DRR in Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme**, by Edburgh Consultants, Utrecht, Netherlands July
- 2004 Brief Review of Afghanistan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDRP) and Recommendations for Possible USAID Assistance, by

- Ted Morse and Sharon Isralow, November 2004
- 2005 **ANBP Post-Reintegration Support Survey Report** – First Version, May 2005, 22 pages
- 2004 **ANBP-DDR South-West Region Activities Progress Report** March-October by Aziz Ahmadzai, Regional Office Kandahar

Numerous other reports and data sources not all listed separately

## Reports on Afghanistan security and disarmament issues

- 2007 **The Missing Ingredient: Non- Ideological Insurgency And State Collapse In Western Afghanistan, 1979-1992** by Antonio Giustozzi Crisis States Research Centre, LSE London, Working Paper no. 11, February 2007
- 2006 **Genesis Of A 'Prince': The Rise Of Ismail Khan In Western Afghanistan, 1979 – 1992** by Antonio Giustozzi Crisis States Research Centre, LSE London, Working Paper no. 4, Sept 2006
- 2006 **Disarmament, Demobilisation And Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants (Ddr) In Afghanistan: Constraints And Limited Capabilities** by Simonetta Rossi University of York and Antonio Giustozzi, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE London, Working Paper no. 2 Series 2, June 2006
- 2004 **"Afghanistan: New approaches for weapons management,"** by RE Poulton in *Bulletin on small arms and human security, focus on Central Asia*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, October-November 2004 <http://www.hdcentre.org/?aid=61>.
- 2004 **Recommendations from "Civil Society Participation in Afghan Peacebuilding and Reconstruction" Conference**, Friederich Ebert Stiftung & Afghan Civil Society Forum, Berlin, Germany, 30 March 2004
- 2003 Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform, One Year After the Geneva Conference, *Results of the BICC E-Conference, 4-11 June*
- 2003 **Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan** by Vikram Parekh, *ICG Asia Report N°65*, 30 September 2003
- 2003 **Honour, Guns and Jihad – improving childhood and communications in Afghanistan would promote peace"** by Robin-Edward Poulton, King's College London, *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*", Volume 3, No 3 December 2003

## UNIDIR micro-disarmament, DDR and small arms research

- 2006 **Bound to cooperate – Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone** Written by leaders of civil society in Sierra Leone, second edition co-editors Robin-Edward Poulton & Anatole Ayissi, UNIDIR, Geneva, 206 pages
- 2005 **Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania**, by Robert Muggah, Small Arms Survey, University of Geneva and UNIDIR, April 2005



- 2005 **Exchanging Weapons for Development in Cambodia – an assessment of weapon collection strategies by local people**, by Geoffrey Mugumya and Shukoko Koyama, UNIDIR Geneva,
- 2004 **Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali - Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People**, by Geoffrey Mugumya, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland, Sales No. GV.E.04.0. ISBN 92-9045-
- 2005 **“The role of civil society in weapon collection and peace building,”** European Union and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, RE Poulton, UNIDIR Senior Research Fellow, November 2005
- 2004 **“New ideas for DDR in Afghanistan– Trying to reduce disappointments for Afghans and donors”** Paper by Dr RE Poulton presented to a UNIDIR Conference in Geneva on *Increasing the Cost-Effectiveness of Weapons Collection by Involving Local Communities in Decision-Making*, 14-15 September 2004
- 2004 **“Micro-disarmament and peace building: The European Union ASAC programme in Cambodia after three years of activity”** UNIDIR, *Disarmament Forum* 2004/2 co-authors RE Poulton, Seng Son, Neil Wilford
- 2003 **Peace Consolidation through Community Weapon Responsibility: this is what happens after VWCP Success. Discussion Paper on the evolution of Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes, UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), Geneva, June 2003.**
- 2002 **“Ethnic and Inter-State Complexity in the Central Asian 'Stans”** by RE Poulton, in *Asian Affairs*, Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, London, February 2002
- 2001 **“The role of the Kalashnikov in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the other ‘Stans”** by RE Poulton, *Asian Affairs*, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, London, October 2001 p295-99. Review of *The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: features and implications* by Bobi Pirseydi, UNIDIR 2000.
- 2000 *The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: features and implications* by Bobi Pirseydi, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs, Palais des Nations, Geneva, May 2000. ISBN 92-9045-134-3.
- 1998 **A Peace of Timbuktu: democratic governance, development and African peacemaking**, with a preface by Kofi Annan, UNIDIR, Geneva, 388pages: launched by the Secretary-General 17 March 1998 in Geneva by RE Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf

### **Other research documents: Afghan disarmament and development**

- 2007 **“Afghan 'gun culture' is fuelled by fear”** by Mark Sedra and Robert Muggah, *Ottawa Citizen*, Thursday, 6 September 2007
- 2007 **“Leave it to us to end the poppy curse”** by Ahmad Zia Massoud, First Vice-

Pres of Afghanistan *Sunday Telegraph*, 2 Sept 2007

- 2007 **"U.S. efforts to eradicate Afghanistan's crop are empowering the Taliban by sowing seeds of resentment"** by Peter Bergen and Sameer Lalwani *Los Angeles Times*, CA, September 2, 2007
- 2007 **The Critical Link in DDR: An Operational Manual for Donors, Managers, and Practitioners** Small Arms Survey Working Paper 5: Avoiding Disarmament Failure: Peter Swarbrick
- 2006 **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities**, by Simonetta Rossi, University of York & Dr Antonio Giustozzi, LSE Crisis States Research Centre, London
- 2006 **Les défis de la gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest** also published as **The challenges of Security Sector Reform in West Africa** Co-editors Boubacar N'Diaye, 'Funmi Olosakin, Alan Bryden, with Robin-Edward Poulton, DCAF Geneva
- 2006 **The Punishment of Virtue** by Sarah Chayes about Kandahar and USA
- 2006 **The role of women for peace building in Somalia: lessons learned and strategies proposed** Essay written by Ms Kawther Elmi & Dr RE Poulton: EPES Mandala Lessons Learned Series No 1
- 2005 **An Analysis of Transitional Economic Reintegration**, by Baaré, A., Swedish Initiative for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SIDDR), [www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/68/e2f4e518.pdf](http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/04/39/68/e2f4e518.pdf)
- 2005 **No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Weapons Reduction during Post-Conflict**, by Muggah, Robert. *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* Vol 94, No. 379.
- 2005 **Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track**, by Vikram Parekh International Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005
- 2004 **The Places In Between**, by Rory Stewart, Picador, UK.
- 2004 **Weapons in Mozambique - Reducing Availability and Demand** by Ana Leão, ISS Monograph N0 94, Johannesburg.  
<http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No94/Chap1.html>
- 2004 **Experience in Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR)** USAID
- 2003 **Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan** International Crisis Group, ICG Asia Report N°65
- 2003 **Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration: A Field Classroom Guide** GTZ, NODEFIC, PPC, SNDC:
- 2002 **The hard road home.** Pearson Peace Keeping Center: Peace process: DDR issues and consideration.
- 2001 **A Search for Peace** Colombia International Affairs online, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: Shalini Chawla
- 2000 **Security Sector Reform** Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis
- 1999 **Post war Demobilization Reintegration and peace building.** BICC Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Kees Kingma

- 1999 **Doing Well out of War**, Paul Collier World Bank.
- 1997 **When Combatants Become Civilians** GTZ: Eschborn,
- 1981 **Afghanistan Que sais-je ?** Robin et Michelle Poulton, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 128p
- 1979 **Village afghan dans le Hindou Kush: traditions sociales et économiques face au développement** Robin Edward Poulton and Michelle Elcoat Poulton, thèses de Doctorat, 3 tomes, EHESS et UCI, Paris, 1378p

## UN Reports

- 2006 **IDDRS – International DDR Standards**
- 2006 Post-conflict Stabilization, Peace-building and Recovery Frameworks
- 2005 **Conference Report Freetown** United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone DDR and Stability in Africa
- 2000 **Sharing new ground in post-conflict situations: the role of UNDP in support of reintegration programs**
- 2000 **The role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.** Report of the Secretary-General
- 2000 **UN resolution 1325**
- 1973 **Services for Children in Regional Development zones in Afghanistan** by B & T Amat, RE & MJ Poulton, A. Paktiani, L.Lung CINAM and UNICEF, Kabul 1973, 3 volumes

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<sup>i</sup> There are numerous sources for the *pashtunwali*, including Caroe, Sir Olaf, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan, 1958); Dupree, Louis, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N: Princeton University Press, 1973); Ali, Mohammed, *The Afghans* (Kabul: Kabul University, 1969). In compiling these paragraphs I have also used helpful observations from Pashtun scholars Mohamed Nader Ayubi and Ghazi Amirul Momineen.

<sup>ii</sup> Rashid, Ahmed, *Taliban* (New Haven, CN: Yale Univ Press, 2000), pp.88-90. Ahmed Rashid traces the spread of Deobandism from its origins in the aftermath of the 1857 Indian Mutiny, to its 12 *madrassas* in 1879 with numerous Afghan *talebs* (Arabic plural – *taleban*), to the 9000 *madrassas* with which it celebrated its centenary.

<sup>iii</sup> Dupree, Louis, “Afghanistan: Return, Repatriation, Reconstruction” in the *Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs*, 1989. The late Professor Louis Dupree, my friend and mentor, was the greatest American expert on Afghanistan. This title now rests with his widow Nancy Hatch Dupree, who continues from her base in Peshawar, to work for Afghan peace and development, culture and historical research.

<sup>iv</sup> The Brahmanist caste system includes the *sati* tradition of the submissive woman. To understand the position of women in a nomadic society such as the Pashtun, I recommend *The Red Tent*, a best-selling novel about the Old Testament personalities of Rebecca and Dinah, members of Isaac’s household. The red tent is a place where women stay during menstruation, isolated from society until they are ‘pure’ again. Diamant, Anita, *The Red Tent* (New York: Picador, 1997).

<sup>v</sup> Sufism was always an important component of Central Asian Islam. Jalaluddin Rumi, for example, one of the most popular *sufi* poets and founder of the whirling dervishes, was born in Balkh, near Mazar-i-

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Sharif in 1207. He moved to Anatolia with his father around 1220 to avoid Genghis Khan (who destroyed Balkh in 1226). Rumi died in Konya (Turkey) in 1273.

## ANNEX 7: LIST OF PEOPLE MET

### **PEOPLE MET DURING THE MISSION July-August 2007**

#### **UNDP – ANBP Evaluation Team**

UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul

Tel: +93 (0)70 222-386

Team Leader Robin-Edward Poulton [repoulton@epesmandala.com](mailto:repoulton@epesmandala.com)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meeting subject</b>	<b>Address</b>
Abdalla, Elmigdad <a href="mailto:elmigdad.abdalla@wfp.org">elmigdad.abdalla@wfp.org</a>	Head of WFP area office, Jalalabad	Discussed WFP and DDR 2 Aug	070 282 817 – 26 070 602 195
Dr Ahmad <b>Javid</b> Ahmadi	Team Member	Starts work July 20	+93 (0)700 680 412 <a href="mailto:javid.ahmadi@asi.ord.af">javid.ahmadi@asi.ord.af</a>
Ahmady, Hamidullah <a href="mailto:hahamady@unicef.org">hahamady@unicef.org</a>	Child Protection Officer	Joined UNICEF in June 2004	0798507557
Alexander, Chris <a href="mailto:alexanderc@un.org">alexanderc@un.org</a>	UNAMA 2 <sup>nd</sup> i/c Deputy SSR of SG for Political Affairs	Former Canada Amb in Kabul, he has a broad view of DDR.	+1 212 963 2668 ext 6366 + 39 083 124 6366 070 282 166 0799 305 464
Alexander, Michael <a href="mailto:michael.alexander@cec.eu.int">michael.alexander@cec.eu.int</a>	Security Sector reform specialist, European Commission	Everyone knew that DDR was being done too quickly, but it fitted the political needs	0799 32 25 54 Michael is moving from Kabul after 7 years and taking up a post in New Delhi
Amiri, Najib	Programme Manager, UN Habitat	View from the field – Najib has 3000 village CDCs and literacy projects in 16 provinces. DDR did not bring peace, but it reduced weapons. Reintegration had little effect.	0799-330 476 classify commanders: drug lords Goliags Excluded by govt Hate US occupation Business sub-contractors Private Security Cos
Anwar Gul	Kunduz Project Officer of UNOPS	29 July meeting of IPs in Kunduz	
Akbari, Noor <a href="mailto:Noor_akbari@yahoo.com">Noor_akbari@yahoo.com</a>	PRT member Panshir	Afghans are losing confidence about DDR & peace	070 222 120
Fernando AROCENA <a href="mailto:farocena@iom.int">farocena@iom.int</a>	IOM Chief of Mission	Joined IOM Afghanistan in July 2006	070251255 0798249211
Atikullah	Former Manager of SAB centre for child soldiers	Aug 2 <sup>nd</sup> we heard about UNICEF and NGO Solidarité Afghan-Belge	0700 634 821

<b>ATMAR, Haroon</b> <a href="mailto:hatmar@anbpafg.org">hatmar@anbpafg.org</a>	UNDP/ANBP-DIAG National Security Officer & Deputy CPO		UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul. +93(0)70-298-666
<b>Aziz Ahmadzai</b>  <a href="mailto:aahmadzai@anbpafg.org">aahmadzai@anbpafg.org</a> <a href="mailto:azizahmadzai@yahoo.com">azizahmadzai@yahoo.com</a>	<b>Acting Director, Joint Secretariat for DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</b>		+93 (0)799 376 522 +93 (0)700 229 166  <a href="http://www.diag.gov.af">www.diag.gov.af</a>
Azizi UNOPS	UNOPS Admin and finance officer	Road construction training for Ex Cbts	
<b>Nasseeam Ahmadzai</b>	President of the family court of Jalalabad	He will arrange for us to meet with lawyers and Qommandans in Jalalabad.	070 648 398
<b>Anwarzada, Abdullah</b> <a href="mailto:aanwarzada@anbpafg.org">aanwarzada@anbpafg.org</a>	Project Associate (Ammo) in ANBP	We discussed lessons learned	0799 353 965
Hamidullah Azamy, Dir of Studies <a href="mailto:Hamidullah-azamy@yahoo.com">Hamidullah-azamy@yahoo.com</a>	AITM - Afghan Institute of Training & Management	CIP trainers	0700 078 937
Azimi, Ubaidullah <a href="mailto:uazimi@anbpafg.org">uazimi@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP data base officer	Finding data and seeing if the database works	0799 401 705
Bahrami, Fazel Ahmad <a href="mailto:Fazel_08@yahoo.com">Fazel_08@yahoo.com</a>	National coordinator, International Labor Migration Project	He assisted Minister Bashiri's meeting and translated into very good English	0799 343 503
Bajrami, Bexhat <a href="mailto:bexhat@yahoo.com">bexhat@yahoo.com</a> <a href="mailto:bbajrami@anbpafg.org">bbajrami@anbpafg.org</a>	DDR Officer, Central Region and Ammo Project	5 Aug meeting on Mobile Units & lessons learned	070 261 292 0799 861 001
HE Wazir BASHIRI	Deputy Minister of Labour & Employment	23 July courtesy : disappointment on reintegration and employment creation	c/o Fazel Ahmad Bahrami 0799 343 503
Bekdash	Mazar Office UNDP Regional Governance Ex-DDR officer	Traveled with the team July 31 and supplied valuable insights on DDR	
Berry, Greg  <a href="mailto:Gregory.L.Berry@afghan.swa.army.mil">Gregory.L.Berry@afghan.swa.army.mil</a>	Colonel, US Army CSTC-A DSN: 318-237- 1031	Email contact facilitated by UNAMA Senior Military Advisor, brought some information on weapon policy	Cell: +93-700-688-507 Director, International Donations NATO-ISAF
<b>Besmillah Ekhlās</b> <a href="mailto:besmillah.ekhlās@undp.org">besmillah.ekhlās@undp.org</a>	UNDP program officer for ANBP	Formerly worked for ANBP	Tel: +93 (0)20 2101682-89, Ext. 4040 Mob: +93 (0)799 306 318 Fax: +47 241 369 02
Ms Bobani	Woman ex com Former Major	She was interviewed	

<b>Bonnet, Ms Jayaseeli</b>	DDR Specialist for the UNDP-ANBP Evaluation	Arr July 24	Experienced in DDR in several countries with reintegration and health speciality.
<b>Boserup, Hedvig</b> <a href="mailto:hedvig@turquoisemountain.org">hedvig@turquoisemountain.org</a>	Turquoise Mtn Foundation, <i>Firozkoh</i> Dir of Business Outreach Formerly UNDP Prog Officer for reintegration	We discussed job creation, economy (McKinsey's venture capital failed to create business) and reintegration successes	0799 341 725  2 <sup>nd</sup> Phase, Kat-e-Parwan behind old British Embassy
<b>Bourse, Clément</b> <a href="mailto:clement.bourse@ec.europa.eu">clement.bourse@ec.europa.eu</a>	EC delegation Mines, Rural Dev, Displaced People	ANBP has 6mil Euros from EC for mine stockpile destruction	0799 095 004  0799 155 970 mob
<b>BRUEDGAM, Achim</b> <a href="mailto:abruedgam@anbpafg.org">abruedgam@anbpafg.org</a>	UNDP/ANBP-DDR Chief Protection Officer	Gave me a detailed security briefing July 12 <sup>th</sup> E. German Colonel rtd	+93 (0)70 274-344
Charmes, Olivier <a href="mailto:ocharmes@anbpafg.org">ocharmes@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Public Information Officer	We met August 27 when Olivier just arrived in his new position	
Christensen, Ingrid <a href="mailto:christensen.ilokabul@undp.org">christensen.ilokabul@undp.org</a>	ILO Country Representative	RSPE will look at how to make use of ANBP database	
Crane, Brig Sean <a href="mailto:cranes@un.org">cranes@un.org</a>	Senior Military Advisor	We discussed DDR July 19 <sup>th</sup> he will contact ISAF for us.	+1 212 963 2668 Ext 6004 +39 083 124 6004 Mob +93(0)700 282 153
Ahmad Dawar <a href="mailto:daryapour@anbpafg.org">daryapour@anbpafg.org</a>	HR Assistant	Met me at airport	0700 215 992
Daud Mohammad <a href="mailto:mdaud@anbpafg.org">mdaud@anbpafg.org</a>	Operations Manager	Brought me my mobile phone July 12 <sup>th</sup> at 20.30h	0700230 452 UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
Lt Col Davis, US Army	'Mentor to Deputy Minister Nuristani'	They never even called me	I left my card with Col Davis and asked that his colleagues knowing about the DDR project should get in touch with me.
Delawar Mandawi	Stationery Merchant in Habibullah Mkt Hazara trader with Qizilbash wife –	very intelligent, feels DDR is good for the country, no benefit for individuals	0778 816 070
Dibb, Tom <a href="mailto:halo@haloafg.org">halo@haloafg.org</a>	Halo Trust Senior Operations Officer	Major partners to ANBP for mine, ammo & weapon destruction. They see our report as anti-military	Carronfoot, Thornhill Dumfries DG3 5AY - UKT: +44 (0)1848 331100F: +44 (0)1848 331122 mail@halotrust.org www.halotrust.org
Dighe, Tushar <a href="mailto:tushard@unops.org.af">tushard@unops.org.af</a>	UNOPS Advisor to the Country Director		0799686597

Ebrahimkhail, Nasir <a href="mailto:Nasir.Ebrahimkhail@international.gc.ca">Nasir.Ebrahimkhail@international.gc.ca</a>	Canadian Embassy CIDA Development Program Officer	Canada is a major ANBP donor. We agreed to send a ten-point ?aire to him and former staff members	House 256, Street 15, Wazir Akbar Khan  +93-799 742 866 0799-315 336
<b>ENSHAYAN Shapari</b> <a href="mailto:senshayan@anbpafg.org">senshayan@anbpafg.org</a>	<b>ANBP Donor Relations &amp; Reporting Officer</b> + Corporate Memory	15 July Ppt very good presentation of ANBP good practices, innovations & lessons learned	+ 93 (0)700 077 472 ANBP offices UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
Jean-Francois Fitou, <a href="mailto:jean-francois.fitou@diplomatie.gouv.fr">jean-francois.fitou@diplomatie.gouv.fr</a>	1er Conseiller, Ambassade de France	REP & CM Security situation slowly degrading, destabilizing by Kuchis (recent Dai Kundi clashes and <i>jirga</i> ). Decentralization is one solution	+93 (0) 797 165 065
Dr Feda Mohd, <a href="mailto:feda@cfafghanistan.org">feda@cfafghanistan.org</a>	Head of Taloqan office, for CFA Takhar province	Child Fund Afghanistan is IP for ANBP	0799 697 687
Gebremedhin, Yohannes <a href="mailto:yohannesg@gmail.com">yohannesg@gmail.com</a>	Consultant with USAID and ADB	An astute Eritrean observer of international scene, he looks at DDR and American/ ISAF policies	Assa 2 Guest House, Kabul
Gezer, Ufuk <a href="mailto:gezeru@isaf-hq.nato.int">gezeru@isaf-hq.nato.int</a>	Political Advisor to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan	7 <sup>th</sup> August we exchanged information about Afghanistan	Office (0093) (0) 799 511 481 Cell (0093) (0) 799 572 729
Geert Gompelman <a href="mailto:geertgompelman@icqmail.com">geertgompelman@icqmail.com</a>	DDR Researcher at Univ Utrecht Funded by CORDAID	He has found poor reintegration impact in Mazar and Herat	0700 304 481  ANBP was not good at 'Managing Expectations'
Ghafoori, Aysha <a href="mailto:aghafoori@unicef.org">aghafoori@unicef.org</a>	UNICEF Child Protection Officer	Child soldiers + war affected children	0798507666
GRANT, Dominic <a href="mailto:dgrant@anbpafg.org">dgrant@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP ASSET MANAGER	Kindly supplies transport to the team	070 217 297 UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
H.E. Habibullah	Deputy Minister of Defence	Attended the presentation at UNAMA Aug 26	0700 217 549
Maj Gen M. Habib Hessary	MoD Chief of Planning & Strategy – General Staff i/c DIAG & DDR policies	Briefed him July 17 <sup>th</sup> , debriefing due Aug 7 Then Aug 22	+93 2021 04175 / 03397 c/o <a href="mailto:Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af">Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af</a> mob 0700 217 602
Halim, Atiqullah <a href="mailto:ahalim@anbpafg.org">ahalim@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	Finding data and seeing if the database works as a monitoring tool	0700 278 163



Hamilton, John <a href="mailto:jhamilton@anbpafg.org">jhamilton@anbpafg.org</a>	UNDP-ANBP Admin & Finan Officer, Kunduz	We discussed IP and UN Agency cooperation and comparative DDR experiences in West Africa 02 Aug in Jalalabad	070 025 190 0799 083 356
Harmsma, Ronald <a href="mailto:ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int">ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int</a>	PolAd – Political Advisor to NATO Senior Civilian Representative	Aug 7 we discussed Afghan strategy and DDR	0799 511 759 070 920 929
Andrew Harvey <a href="mailto:Afghanlocust@yahoo.com">Afghanlocust@yahoo.com</a>	FAO pest managements expert based in Mazar	He told us about Melon Fly in Faryab, and Colorado Beetle in Baghlan	0799 820 546
Saeed Iqbal Hashimi, <a href="mailto:iqbalhashimi@hotmail.com">iqbalhashimi@hotmail.com</a>	Field Coordinator and Monitoring Specialist, RSPE Kabul Employment Services Center	We had a focus group of 12 colonels and majors all of whom feel abandoned by GoA and DDR	799 300 541 he spent 10 years in Australia and speaks good English
Ronald Harmsma <a href="mailto:ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int">ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int</a>	Senior Political Advisor to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan	7 <sup>th</sup> August the hoped-for exchange of information did not take place. 'Nato does not want to sit on the first row' – observers not participants?	Office (0093) (0) 799 511759 Cell (0093) (0) 709 20929  anyhow we offered information from our side and sent them some more.
Helaman, Yama <a href="mailto:yama.helaman@undp.org">yama.helaman@undp.org</a>	UNDP-DCSE Prog Officer, formerly ANBP case worker	Focus group discussion July 16	+93(0)700 287 925
HICKS, Colin <a href="mailto:Colin.hicks@fco.gov.uk">Colin.hicks@fco.gov.uk</a>	<b>UK Embassy</b> 2nd Secretary Political/Military	23 July meeting on UK satisfaction with ANBP, \$18 mil funding and ongoing funding of RSPE.	+93 (0) 798 018 709 FTN 8404 2306  POBox 334, Kabul, Afghanistan
HOLLAND, Ian <a href="mailto:ian.holland@undp.org">ian.holland@undp.org</a>	<b>UNDP Deputy Country Director for Programmes</b>	July 18 <sup>th</sup> meeting overview of ANBP impacts and help to meet key donors	Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul, Afghanistan +93(0)20 212 4136 Fax +47 241 369 02  Mobile 0798-237 543
Ibrahimi, Ms Somah <a href="mailto:sibrahimi@anbpafg.org">sibrahimi@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Public Information & Media Monitoring	We have an office space in her office	070 072 577

Ivanov, Anton <a href="mailto:aivanov@anbpafg.org">aivanov@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Operations Manager AMP&ASDP	Former Heavy Weapons Team Leader We worked very helpfully on Lessons Learned	070 227 281  Formerly artillery officer in Bulgarian army
Col (rtd) Dimitar Jeleu,	UNHCR Field Security Officer	He offered a AFG security overview from 10 years with UN in 6 different hotspots, after 27 years as a Bulgarian artillery officer.	070 279 072
Thomas Johnson, USAID <a href="mailto:tjohnson@usaid.gov">tjohnson@usaid.gov</a>	Supervisory Program Officer	ASMED & ARIES projects for reintegration of Commanders	1-202-216-6288 x 4341 0799 822 352
Rikki Maliklali <a href="mailto:Rikki.Maliklali@wfp.org">Rikki.Maliklali@wfp.org</a>	WFP Deputy Country Director	Reacted to our draft report with support for 3D4R concept	
Kabir, Muhammad <a href="mailto:mkabir@anbpafg.org">mkabir@anbpafg.org</a> <a href="mailto:mohkabir2003@yahoo.com">mohkabir2003@yahoo.com</a>	Personal Assistant to ANBP Regional Director, Jalalabad	He assisted us with Commanders' meetings	0799 211 117
H.E. Vice-President Karim KHALILI	Vice-President of Afghanistan, Chairman of D&R Commission	Briefing 26 <sup>th</sup> August on findings of the Evaluation	
KHAN Abdullah <a href="mailto:khana@un.org">khana@un.org</a>	Governance & Dev't Officer UNAMA former CIP in ANBP	22 July we discussed Commanders and their motivations for DDR & DIAG	+1 212 963 2668 ext 5060 mob 0700 246 041 POBox 5858 Grand Central Station New York NY10163-5858
Ambassador Junichi KOSUGE, <a href="mailto:junichi.kosuge@mofa.go.jp">junichi.kosuge@mofa.go.jp</a>	Embassy of Japan	August 1 <sup>st</sup> courtesy call w David Wilson	
Larin, Andry <a href="mailto:alarin@anbpafg.org">alarin@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP DIAG programme officer, ex-DDR	Former Soviet army officer, Andry is a weapons expert	0700 274 345
Lorena Lando <a href="mailto:llando@iom.int">llando@iom.int</a>	IOM Deputy Chief of Mission	Joined IOM Afgh. In 2006	0700144956
Lundberg, Paul <a href="mailto:Paul.Lundberg@undp.org">Paul.Lundberg@undp.org</a>	UNDP Regional Governance Project Manager	He will introduce me to Mohd Ata in Mazar and to complexity theory	0799 649 287 introduced me to Complexity Theory
Leo, David S. <a href="mailto:David.S.Leo@afghan.swa.army.mil">David.S.Leo@afghan.swa.army.mil</a>	Colonel, US Army, Deputy CJ1, CSTC-A DSN 318-237-3551	Email contact facilitated by UNAMA Senior Military Advisor.  It brought no useful information.	Cell 0798010867  responsible for ANP personnel recruiting, personnel mgt programs, and strength accounting. NATO-ISAF
Mahdi, Waleed <a href="mailto:Walid.MAHDl@fao.org">Walid.MAHDl@fao.org</a>	FAO Team Leader, Irrigation	WM is Iraqi so he has a natural interest in DDR	0700 405 086

Mahtub	Kunduz Project Officer, AGEF German NGO		
Malangyar, Haji Sahib Maj Gen Mohd Halim	Former Deputy Gov of Nangahar & ex-Commandr of Division 11	He led DDR in E. Region for 3000 soldiers after years as Mujahid against Russians and later against Taliban.	0777 531 415 0799 531 415
Mandakovic, Ms Chimène <a href="mailto:mandakovic@hotmail.com">mandakovic@hotmail.com</a>	CIP specialist in UNDP-ANBP Evaluation	Arr July 19	Experienced in Central Asia and in Africa with field problems associated with demobilization and conflict resolution 0700 829 454
<b>MANSOURI, Neda</b> <a href="mailto:nmansouri@anbpafg.org">nmansouri@anbpafg.org</a>	Special Assistant/Political Affairs Officer, office of Director ANBP		
Massey, Basil <a href="mailto:basil.massey@undp.org">basil.massey@undp.org</a>	Former ANBP Chief of Staff and Gerdez ROM. Now Deputy Chief UNMIS DDR (Sudan)	He gave good & intelligent info & we were lucky to meet him as he passed through Kabul, but he feels everything was perfect	+249(0) 187089410
<b>Masi</b>	Clothing trader, Habibullah Mkt	Was In UK. He likes DDR but is scared about the security	0772 018 489
<b>MOFAKER</b> , Ehsanullah	ANBP Dispatcher	KU91 sends us cars	079-316-999, 070-229-169 UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
<b>MOHAN</b> , Kavil <a href="mailto:kmohan@anbpafg.org">kmohan@anbpafg.org</a>	<b>Senior Operations Manager (Ammo)</b>	Called me 20.45 to check my new phone on July 12. Indian Colonel rtd No 2 in ANBP	0700 241 478 UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
Mohmand, Nazir Ahmad	Country Director, BEST Jalalabad Basic Education & Employable Skills Training NGO has 18 years experience in Peshawar	BEST seems to be the best DDR Implementing Partner in E. Region with 65% job placement and commitment to creating jobs	<a href="mailto:namohmand@hotmail.com">namohmand@hotmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:nammohmand@gmail.com">nammohmand@gmail.com</a> 070 606 463 070 600 730
Mojadidi, Aman <a href="mailto:nativerefugee@gmail.com">nativerefugee@gmail.com</a>			0798-982522
Morand, Henri <a href="mailto:henri.morand@undp.org">henri.morand@undp.org</a>	UNDP Country Director a.i. and Deputy Director for Operations	Discussed pros and cons of decentralized project management	Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul, Afghanistan +93(0)20 212 4136 Fax +47 241 369 02
Nasrullah,	Head of Kunduz office, for CFA	Child Fund Afghanistan is IP for ANBP	<a href="mailto:feda@cfafghanistan.org">feda@cfafghanistan.org</a> 0799 697 687

<b>NIRODY, Anita</b> <a href="mailto:anita.nirody@undp.org">anita.nirody@undp.org</a>	<b>UNDP Country Director</b>	July 18 <sup>th</sup> meeting discussed overview of ANBP impacts and help to meet key donors	Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt, Kabul, Afghanistan +93(0)20 212 4136 Fax +47 241 369 02
H.E. Dr Yusuf Nuristani	First Deputy Minister of Defence	Briefed him July 17 <sup>th</sup> , debriefing Aug 7	+93 2021 04175 / 03397 s/c <a href="mailto:Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af">Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af</a>
Mr Ogawa	Embassy of Japan, First Secretary	August 1 <sup>st</sup> we discussed weapon imports/ exports	
Omar, El Haj Engineer Mahammad <a href="mailto:eng_mdomar@hotmail.com">eng_mdomar@hotmail.com</a>	Governor of Kunduz Province	Met July 29 <sup>th</sup>	079 448 909 070 700 003
Omar, Dr Abdul Hameed <a href="mailto:abdulhameed.omar@gmail.com">abdulhameed.omar@gmail.com</a>	UNDP - ANBP – DIAG Regional Office Manager, Jalalabad	Medical doctor, former election officer, former ANBP Senior Programme Officer	070 227 355
Ota, Yukari	UNMACA project officer, formerly ANBP Reintegration officer	CM & JB & JA Lucid in her analysis and criticisms of re-Integration and ANBP management strengths	
Payenda, Maj Gen M. Nazem	Deputy Assistant Minister, MoD for Policy & Strategy	Briefed him July 17 <sup>th</sup> , debriefing due Aug 7 Then Aug 22	+93 2021 04175 / 03397 c/o <a href="mailto:Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af">Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af</a>
Parekh, Vikram UN <a href="mailto:parekh@un.org">parekh@un.org</a>	Political Affairs Officer, Office of DSRG Pillar I UNAMA	Discussion on political events and UNAMA-UNDP-DDR	Work: 1 212 963 2668 x 6331 Mobile: 0799 010 276
Pinsley, Lisa	Private citizen, formerly with ANBP re-integration	18 July we discussed how reintegration worked	Contact c/o Samee, Tamim <a href="mailto:Tamim.samee@digistan.com">Tamim.samee@digistan.com</a>
Pitterle, Kenneth J. <a href="mailto:Ken.pitterle@hq.isaf.nato.int">Ken.pitterle@hq.isaf.nato.int</a>	Political Advisor to the NATO SCR formerly PRT in Ghor	7 <sup>th</sup> August we exchanged information about Afghanistan	Office (0093) (0) 799 511 262 Cell (0093) (0) 797 140 024
Poulton, Dr Robin-Edward Managing Partner, EPES Mandala Cons <a href="mailto:repoulton@epesmandala.com">repoulton@epesmandala.com</a>	UNDP-ANBP Evaluation Team Leader	Arr July 12	Senior Research Fellow, UNIDIR Geneva, development practitioner experienced with DDR in Asia and Africa
Qazizada, Abdul Roof <a href="mailto:rquazizada@anbpafg.org">rquazizada@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Kunduz		070 712 058
Hameed Qureishi, <a href="mailto:hquraishi@anbpafg.org">hquraishi@anbpafg.org</a>	UNDP & ANBP Regional Manager, Balkh Province	30 July briefing in Mazar on DDR	0700 522 477

Rahimi, Mohammad Shafi <a href="mailto:mshafi@anbpafg.org">mshafi@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Regional Manager for Kunduz & NE	Met him in Kunduz July 29 <sup>th</sup>	070 502 716
Rao, Dr P. Madhava <a href="mailto:madhava.rao@undp.org">madhava.rao@undp.org</a>	Senior Public Administration Reform Advisor, ASPG – UNDP	Afghanistan sub-National Governance Programme talk July 30 <sup>th</sup> at Assa2	<a href="mailto:Pmrao_42@hotmail.com">Pmrao_42@hotmail.com</a> 0797 517 915
Rawlings, Lt Col Pat <a href="mailto:rawlins@un.org">rawlins@un.org</a>	Military Advisor, UNAMA	He attended our final briefing Aug 26	0700 257 658
Razaqyar, Alhaj M. Anwar	Acting Govern Balkh Province		0799 200 054 070 501 958
Reza, Dr Mohammad Haider <a href="mailto:HaiderR@unmaca.org">HaiderR@unmaca.org</a>	UNMACA Programme Director	UN Mine stats show almost 500,000 destroyed to date	0797 323 223 7070 392 184 United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan
Rishtia Habibullah <a href="mailto:aitm786@yahoo.com">aitm786@yahoo.com</a> <a href="mailto:habibullah-rish@yahoo.com">habibullah-rish@yahoo.com</a>	Dep Dir AITM - Afghan Institute of Training & Management		0700 078 937
<b>Name</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Meeting subject</b>	<b>Address</b>
Michael Sachsse <a href="mailto:michael.ilokabul@undp.org">michael.ilokabul@undp.org</a>	ILO Expert, Ministry of Labour, Social Aff, Martyrs and the Disabled	National Skills Development Strategy	Assa Two Guest House
Samee, Tamim <a href="mailto:Tamim.samee@digistan.com">Tamim.samee@digistan.com</a>	Private Sector DIGISTAN Former IT chief of ANBP	We discussed the creation of ANBP	0799-671 001 +93-752 001 708
Sarwari Dr Basir Ahmad <a href="mailto:basir.sarwari@undp.org">basir.sarwari@undp.org</a>	UNDP Assistant Country Director	15 July discussion on planning the team's mission with Lisa Singh & Ekhlal	+93 (0)799 761 99 +93 (0)799 306 329
Scarf, Richard <a href="mailto:Richard@pc-af.com">Richard@pc-af.com</a> Sayed Sharif, DIAG Provincial Coordinator in Kunduz 0799 264 390	Formerly with IOM & USAID doing DDR re-integration	RS is critical of ANBP. While some insights are helpful, he offers little in the way of alternatives	+93 (0)798 500 500
Schiewek, Eckart <a href="mailto:schiewek@un.org">schiewek@un.org</a>	Political Advisor, UNAMA	We discussed DDR and CIP and DIAG	0700 299 001 +39 083 124 6089
Sayed Sharif, DIAG 0799 264 390	Provincial Coordinator in Kunduz	Met him at the Governor's on July 29 <sup>th</sup>	Office of El Haj Engineer Mahammad Omar Governor of Kunduz Province 070 700 003 <a href="mailto:eng_mdomar@hotmail.com">eng_mdomar@hotmail.com</a>
Sediqli, Ahmad Shah <a href="mailto:ahmadshah.sediqli@undp.org">ahmadshah.sediqli@undp.org</a>	UNDP Admin Services Mgr,	Interesting and helpful analysis of Strengths and Weaknesses of ANBP. Wide & good experience	0700 251 292 former demobilization Mgt Officer, then i/c DDR in Mazar-i-Sharif, and finally ANBP Senior Prog Officer Kandahar, Mazar, Herat

Seraj, Mahboub-Ullah Ozob-Seraj	Retired Afghan civil servant	Cousin to the King, we discussed history and politics and he offered some original insights	0700 283 906 Ger: 02263 1651 Steeger Str 13 D-51766 Engelskirchen
Serajuddin Safi	DIAG program officer, formerly CIP	Explained the CIP identification system, forms A and B + classification Harmless, Fairly Harmless, Dangerous.	0795- 342 857
Shahriari, Ramin <a href="mailto:rsahriari@anbpafg.org">rsahriari@anbpafg.org</a>	ANBP Regional Office Manager Herat		AWCC/ 0700274349 ROSHAN/ 0799343627
Sidiqi, Mohd Naim <a href="mailto:Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af">Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af</a>	Secretary to First Deputy Minister of Defence, smart with vg English	Visited July 17 <sup>th</sup> , debriefing due Aug 7 Then Aug 22	+93 2021 04175 / 03397 0799 326 070 0700 326 070 0777 326 070
Sidique, Ahmad Qais <a href="mailto:qsidique@anbpafg.org">qsidique@anbpafg.org</a>	Operations Assistant with good English	He is busy looking for a new job	+93 (0)70 234 444 UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul
<b>Lisa SIMRIQUE SINGH</b> <a href="mailto:lisa.singh@undp.org">lisa.singh@undp.org</a>	Senior Programme Officer, UNDP Sustainable Livelihood Unit	15 July we discussed planning the mission including meetings with donors, ministries, ex-soldiers parliament, etc	Work: +93 (0)20 212 4020 Mobile: 070 479 735 fax +47 241 369 02 Shah Mahmood Ghazi Watt Kabul, Afghanistan
H.E. Minister Mohammad Massum Stanekzai, ,	Deputy Chair, D&R Commission and founder of Afghan DDR	formerly Minister of Communication, an irrigation engineer with an MSc Jesus Coll, Cambridge	Office of the Prime Minister In the Office of the Second Vice-President
Taiwo, Bolaji <a href="mailto:taiwo@unfpa.org">taiwo@unfpa.org</a>	Chief technical Advisor, UNFPA Census Project	Nigerian census expert who ran the East Timor census is planning the 2008 Afghan census	UNOCA Compound Assa 2 Guest House 0799
Tane, Migena <a href="mailto:tane@unmaca.org">tane@unmaca.org</a> <a href="mailto:migena@gmail.com">migena@gmail.com</a>	UNMACA program Officer		0797165048
Tembo, Saleh <a href="mailto:tembo1@un.org">tembo1@un.org</a>	Area field Security Coordination Officer	Security briefing	070400239 079035557
Vanchev, Maj (rtd) Nikolai Mobile Teams,	Security officer and Ammo former member of ANBP	leaving Saturday to join UNHCR Africa	
Von Hacht, Lt Col Andreas <a href="mailto:vonhacht@un.org">vonhacht@un.org</a>	Military Advisor	We discussed DDR July 19 <sup>th</sup>	+39 083 124 6005 0799 825 956

Walden, Nicole <a href="mailto:nicole.walden@theirc.org">nicole.walden@theirc.org</a>	Protection Officer, International Rescue Committee, Kabul	We discussed refugees and returnees July 17 <sup>th</sup>	
Wardak, Ghulam Rabbani <a href="mailto:rwardak@unicef.org">rwardak@unicef.org</a>	UNICEF Project Officer Health Nutrition	OIC UNICEF	0798507664
<b>WILSON David</b> <a href="mailto:dwilson@anbpafg.org">dwilson@anbpafg.org</a>	Director ANBP	First meeting July 23 <sup>rd</sup> on David's return to Kabul	0797 368 606 0700 280 943 Efax 1(925) 884 8364
Mark Zellenrath, <a href="mailto:mark.zellenrath@minbusa.nl">mark.zellenrath@minbusa.nl</a>	Netherlands Embassy First Secretary	Leaving to take up a position in Den Haag. DDR was a success.	+93 (0)20 220 15 99 Off: 0700 286 641 Mob: 0700 279 661
Yahya Omid <a href="mailto:Yahya_omid@wvi.org">Yahya_omid@wvi.org</a>	Human resources Officer	In charge of the reintegration program from 2004 to 2005	0799232937
Hafiza Yazdani <a href="mailto:hyazdani@anbpafg.org">hyazdani@anbpafg.org</a>	Personal Assistant to ANBP Director		0797 368 606 0700 280 943 Efax 1(925) 884 8364

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## ANNEX 8: LIST OF MEETINGS HELD

### **EVALUATION CONSULTANTS PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES**

**Dr R-E Poulton, Ms J. Bonnet, Ms Ch Mandakovic, Dr J.Ahmadi**

#### **UNDP – ANBP Evaluation Team**

UNOCA Compound, Jalalabad Rd, Kabul

Tel: +93 (0)70 222-386

Team Leader Robin-Edward Poulton [repoulton@epesmandala.com](mailto:repoulton@epesmandala.com)

<b>Date &amp; time</b>	<b>Organization/ persons</b>	<b>Discussion</b>
Week 1		
<b>09 July Monday</b>	REPoulton departs Richmond Monday 5pm, plane to UK	
<b>10</b>	REP arrives LHR 12.30 pm	Overnight in London
<b>11</b>	REP dep 9.00 am for Frankfurt & Dubai arr 11pm	Overnight in Dubai
12	REP dep 12 noon for Kabul arr 5pm Security Meeting with Mr Achim Bruedgam, Chief Protection Officer <a href="mailto:abruegdgam@anbpafg.org">abruegdgam@anbpafg.org</a>  8pm Daud Mohammad, Operations Officer delivered a telephone	Met by Ahmad Dawar of ANBP  Curfew 23.00h-05.30h; strict rules about safe and less-safe areas and districts, vehicle use, no walking around the bazaars, etc. We will all take an Advanced Security Test on DVD. I took delivery of a radio, call sign KU 1-4, and made my first daily call to Kilo Uniform Base.  My number is: +93 (0)799-538-119
13 Friday rest day	Working on documents  Meeting Amanullah Mojadidi Abdul Hadi Mojaddedi	Internet connexion problems  American scion of a great Sufi Afghan family. His Danish cousin – both have interesting identity questions from two cultures.
<b>14 Sat UNDP Closed</b>	Working on documents  Meeting InterSOS refugee NGO: Monica, Marcello, Mohammad Suliman	Began first draft of Final Report to provide a framework for team's work  social discussions on Afghan stability and peace



<b>15 Sunday</b>  <b>8.30 – 1pm</b>	8.00 to ANBP – Jalalabad Rd  <b>Col Kavil Mohan</b> , No2 i/c Senior Operations Manager (Ammo) <a href="mailto:kmohan@anbpafg.org">kmohan@anbpafg.org</a> <b>Shapari ENSHAYAN</b> ANBP Donor Relations & Reporting Officer <a href="mailto:senshayan@anbpafg.org">senshayan@anbpafg.org</a> <b>Aziz Ahmadzai</b> , Acting Director, Joint Secretariat for DIAG Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups <a href="mailto:aahmadzai@anbpafg.org">aahmadzai@anbpafg.org</a>	Go there early or not at all, because of traffic & road building. Our driver is Sher Khan.   15 July Ppt very good presentation of ANBP innovations, good practices & lessons learned  strong discussion on successes and weaknesses of ANBP seen by Shapari  Met all ANBP staff, saw our team office
<b>3.30-4.30 pm</b>	To UNDP after lunch  Sarwari Dr Basir Ahmad UNDP Assist Country Director <a href="mailto:basir.sarwari@undp.org">basir.sarwari@undp.org</a> Lisa SIMRIQUE SINGH Senior Programme Officer <a href="mailto:lisa.singh@undp.org">lisa.singh@undp.org</a> <b>Besmillah Ekhlas</b> UNDP program officer for ANBP and former ANBP staffer <a href="mailto:besmillah.ekhlas@undp.org">besmillah.ekhlas@undp.org</a>	Team has been given an office with two computers in UNDP and another in ANBP.   15 July we discussed planning the mission including meetings with donors, ministries, ex-soldiers parliament, etc  4.30-5.30 pm: prepared documents and also Advanced Security Training CD for tomorrow
<b>16 Monday</b> <b>9 am</b>	Dr Ahmad Javid Ahmadi Came to the office	Javid will be the fourth member of the evaluation team, starting Saturday. He accompanied REP to meet Minister Stanikzai.

10 am	<p>Minister Mohd Massum Stanikzai, Deputy Chair, D&amp;R Commission and founder of Afghan DDR, formerly Minister of Communication, an irrigation engineer from Logar with an MSc Jesus Coll, Cambridge</p> <p>HE Minister Stanikzai suggests we should meet the following people to highlight the importance of DIAG and to find out their opinion concerning the success of DDR:</p> <p>Key Ambassadors Key ISAF Commanders HE Minister of Interior HE Minister RRDev't HE Zalmay Rasul, Head of National Security Council Speaker of Parliament Speaker of Upper House who is also Head of the Peace and C.... Commission</p> <p>He also requested we run a focus group with the Media and Another with women members of Parliament and women leaders of civil society</p>	<p>Afghan society was totally militarized. Every one of the 49,000 villages in all 364 districts and 34 provinces had one or more commanders, each having 10 or 15 armed men at his disposal. In addition, the N.Alliance turned their militias into official army and the size of payroll – increased by phantom salaries – made down-sizing essential.</p> <p>Successful Reintegration is key to avoid increased criminality. Their skill is fighting; now their new skills must be matched to the markets. DIAG is critical for further DDR success, and a more sophisticated operation because of the drug mafias. DIAG has already collected as many weapons as DDR, but it needs both carrot and stick. The MoI has to implement ASAP the new Arms Law, while DIAG incentives provide a carrot.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Licences must be issued for legal defence weapons</li> <li>• Private Security Companies must be licensed and regulated, to break the Culture of Impunity that the international community has brought to Afghanistan</li> <li>• Our team can help increase ISAF &amp; NATO support for security sector reform and links to counter-narcotic efforts. Donors are making arrangements for short-term protection of their troops that are undermining the long-term objectives</li> <li>• The success of DIAG may be tricky, but it will bring immense kudos and credibility to donors who help make it work</li> <li>• In the long term, only economic success will bring stability: water and irrigation investments are needed for food and cash crops; marketing and transport are needed to export Afghan fruit and other produce</li> </ul>
11 am	<p>Aziz Ahmadzai, Head of JS Debriefed on Minister's meeting <a href="mailto:Aziz.ahmadzai@undp.org">Aziz.ahmadzai@undp.org</a> 0700 229 166 and then telcon I briefed Shapari and asked her advice on the suggested meeting list.</p>	<p>We will see how many of these people we can reasonably meet, taking into account their interest in DDR and UNDP's political position.</p> <p>A question to ponder: Did shortcomings in the DDR programme lead to more IAGs, and what was its overall impact on the security aspects of Afghan evolution?</p>

<p><b>1 pm</b></p>	<p>Focus group on Re-integration and DDR Yama Helaman (DCSE) Masood Amer (DCSE) Besmillah Ekhlās (ANBP)</p>	<p>Now with UNDP's Democracy &amp; Civil Society Empowerment unit, these guys were formerly with ANBP re-integration part of DDR. We discussed why people had <b>guns, why they gave them up</b>, and what they felt they got in exchange.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- guns were less attractive as new economic opportunities seemed to be opening</li> <li>- anyhow it is easy to get a new gun</li> <li>- weapons were army property, not personal property, so they were surrendered to gain monetary/in kind advantage</li> <li>- they gave up a government weapons and kept their own</li> <li>- they calculated: a rifle = \$20, integration package \$200;</li> <li>- the reasons they were fighting have been resolved at least in part.</li> <li>- self-defence remains a factor, but people are feeling optimistic.</li> <li>- the risk of domestic violence is recognized: in one case an argument between neighbours ended in 5 gun deaths.</li> </ul> <p>The more important question concerns links to <b>commanders: have they been lessened</b>, or broken?</p> <p>For a start, men are not alone. 5 brothers will have 5 weapons, and they will not give up all of them in case they are needed for self-defence in a policeless state. So the weapons that link to commanders are still there. M&amp;E interviews say the links are broken. The Cdrs have reshaped themselves as parliamentarians or ANA or APA officers and they keep feudal affiliations. Most of the DDR was not for full-time fighters, but for people with homes and villages and families and farms. DDR targeted AMF and not mountain guerrillas. This was necessary to rid GoA of the fictitious salary burden.</p> <p><b>How were DDR 'beneficiaries' chosen?</b></p> <p>Plenty of soldiers didn't want to leave the army, especially career officers. The DDR mobile team was ambushed near Chaghcharan by the unit they had come to disarm.</p> <p>Some claim Mujaheddin officers in the MoD pushed out Pashtuns and kept Panshiris. Some say USA wanted to get rid of Soviet-trained professionals and bring in untrained, 'non-communist' replacements: so professionals were sent home with a cow, and young men with 3 months training are ANA officers. 7500 officers were promised recruitment, then USA changed its mind and these men had missed the DDR process and were left high and dry and angry and protesting. They were retired, but not backdated, with 2 months' salary and a plot of land in their home village (and not in Kabul!).</p> <p><b>How accurate is the M&amp;E story?</b></p> <p>67,000 people spread all over Afg, with 60 NGOs doing the job-placement and trng: difficult to monitor. Much easier and cheaper for monitoring to have one central camp, but this would surely have been disastrous for DDR reintegration and for peace. Regional flexibility was one secret of success.</p> <p>Focus on the family became a strong factor</p>
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<b>2 pm</b>	Went to HR for ID badge	
4 pm	Richard Scarf ex-USAID with Sharapi +93 (0)798 500 500 <a href="mailto:richard@pc-af.com">richard@pc-af.com</a> Formerly with IOM & USAID doing DDR re-integration, former ISAF public information officer	RS is critical of ANBP. While some insights are helpful, he is negative without offering much in the way of alternatives. He ran \$500,000 pilot projects for USAID to help resettle ex-soldiers and then the money was cut leaving ... nothing at all. While Richard's criticisms of M&E are interesting, and his attack on UN for hiring militias as security agents is provoking, his one penetrating insight concerns the lack of real jobs after DDR. He calls the programme DDT: Disarmament, Demobilization + Training
<b>6 pm</b>	Lee Forsythe, DAI / USAID Kandahar with Shapari	Lee is the friend of a former PRT member, and we met him on the way to take leave. He doesn't know much about DDR, but was informative about US security policies failing in Kandahar.
<b>17 July Tuesday</b>		8-9.30 Advanced Security Training CD
	Bashur Khan	Is our driver; he has 7 children.
	Jamila	Is the cleaner of our office. She is a widow struggling with 6 children
<b>10 am</b>	Ministry of Defence Minister Nuristani General Payenda Maj General Habib Brig Gen Jiri	<p>The Minister – who lives in St Diego – opined that the D&amp;D had been adequate (notably collecting the heavy weapons and the hundreds of tons of ammunition that are being destroyed) but the 'missing R' caused anxieties: no permanent jobs or livelihoods will not keep people away from guns. Is DIAG fed by DDR due to the lack of real incomes and employment? We need more emphasis on creating legitimate jobs.</p> <p>Private Security companies are undermining the DDR results, says the Minister: they are paid by whom and answerable to whom? They carry unlicensed heavy weapons. The May 28<sup>th</sup> riots were caused partly by a PSC causing deaths in a traffic accident. Mol says still most are not registered with Mol.</p> <p>CIP was 'not without benefit, the few \$ they got and the trip to Japan where they learned some new ideas - but after two years of salaries, we are left with the burden until we can retire them gracefully under a new law.'</p> <p>Why do 37 countries in Afg waste millions while refusing to pay salaries to 448 retiring generals (ie the CIP project) and failing to train thousands of police? "The cost of one bullet-proof vest would feed 30 police for a month. If they are trained and equipped, they can take on the job of imposing security instead of international troops losing their lives." We saw pictures of military outposts in the spectacular mountains of Kunar and Nuristan.</p> <p>DIAG is DDR under a different name- see General Aziz and Aziz Ahmadzai. Generals complain that 90% of DIAG collected weapons are useless. REP thinks they are wrong : a rifle useless for the army can very much be used by criminals, should be collected and destroyed. REP offered every support to the Minister.</p>

	<p>Mohd Naim Sidiqi Secretary to First Deputy Minister of Defence <a href="mailto:Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af">Naim.Sidiqi@mod.gov.af</a></p>	<p>+93 2021 04175 / 03397 0799 326 070 ; 0700 326 070 ; 0777 326 070</p> <p>I wrote to Sidiqi asking for meeting with Generals July 21 or 22 and for a briefing to the Minister Aug 6 or 7</p>
11 am	<p>Lt Col Davis, US Army 'Mentor to Deputy Minister Nuristani'</p>	<p>I left my card with Col Davis and asked that his colleagues knowing about the DDR project should get in touch with me. They never did.</p>
7 pm	<p>Nicole Walden, IRC</p>	<p>Specialized in child protection EVI with UNHCR, she has heard almost nothing about child soldiers.</p>
18 July Wednesday		
9 am	<p>Canadian Embassy CIDA Development Program Officer Ebrahimkhail, Nasir <a href="mailto:Nasir.Ebrahimkhail@international.gc.ca">Nasir.Ebrahimkhail@international.gc.ca</a></p>	<p>Canada is a major ANBP donor. We agreed to send a ten-point ?aire to him and former staff members such as Neepa, former head of CIDA here who retired to teach at Univ Ottawa and also Richard, Political Section who was formerly in Kandahar.</p> <p>.Canada regards the ANBP project as a huge success, tho the officer demo was unpleasant. Some people see ANBP as expensive. Commanders made a lot of money from Jihad, so CIP and the trips to Japan were widely seen as a bad idea, a reward for crimes. Few Afghans realise that only a handful of commanders went to Japan. It was probably a bad PR action.</p> <p>Nasir – from Paghman – sees communities as indirect beneficiaries. He knows a teach at the local school who got a cow, because the local commander needed him to make up the numbers. He is delighted with his cow!</p>

10 am	<p>Hedvig Boserup Firuzkoh – Turquoise Mountain Foundation former UNDP DDR Programme Officer, reintegration <a href="mailto:hedvig@turquoisemountain.org">hedvig@turquoisemountain.org</a></p> <p>Contact Basil, former Chief of Staff</p> <p>Check out AREA and Steve McQueen RIP</p>	<p>We discussed job creation, and the weak peace economy. McKinsey's \$20 million venture capital fund – brought by Ashraf Ghani and Sultan Aziz – failed to create business and reintegration successes in 2006 because Pierre the CEO was too slow and too risk-averse.</p> <p>Firuzkoh (founded by Rory Stewart) is itself a magnificent private enterprise creating and upgrading craft skills and markets for the skills. Hedwig was on UNDP side preparing contracts for IPs and had less to do with ANBP field work. DDR is a success because it is amazing that disarmament happened at all.</p> <p>The 'R' was less successful not because of ANBP but because the economy has no jobs to offer. The sector choices and skill choices were good, but where is the market for them? Govt restructuring is making more unemployment, so fewer customers. A lack of market is not the fault of ANBP and no reason not to pursue the reintegration strategy. We know the economy is slow, but we need disarmament so we go for DDR anyway!</p> <p>Where are the XComs now? In construction, in PSCs and back working in their villages. There were too few partners in the South, and often the RFP brought only 2 or 3 responses from NGOs in the area. Some did a good job, including local NGOs. AREA ran into trouble and was cancelled, but this is partly donors' fault as it went from \$1m to \$10m in a year and hadn't the management structures to avoid theft.</p> <p>Many Afghan leaders in support of DDR were forced into conflicts of interests (cousins etc) and this slowed the programme. Much of the success came from Babington forcing through measures that few people could have achieved: assertiveness – friction – results!</p>
11 am	Lisa Pinsley, former ANBP program advisor	18 July we discussed how reintegration worked. A carpenter in his village will enjoy the new title <i>najaar shaib</i> and that of itself is a reward. He may even earn some cash, as well as prestige, and his tools will serve the whole community.
11am	<p>Samee, Tamim Private Sector DIGISTAN Former IT chief of ANBP <a href="mailto:Tamim.samee@digistan.com">Tamim.samee@digistan.com</a></p>	Tamim was one of the first five staff members recruited by Sultan Aziz, as he arrived from Washington DC with the perfect computer & IT skills for ANBP. Tamim set up the Mobile Units with an empty database they could fill, and then download from their laptops into the regional office computer. ID number, weapon number, barcode, thumbprint and photo were all recorded into the database to allow for selection and eliminate.
2 pm	<p>Lundberg, Paul 0799 649 287 UNDP Regional Governance Project Manager</p>	<p>He will introduce me to Mohd Ata Noor, Governor of Balk Province in Mazar, and to complexity theory.</p> <p>The project is supporting local governance in Balkh, Faryab and Herat provinces already</p>

4 pm	UNDP Country Director Anita Nirody Deputy Country Director Ian Holland Senior Programme Officer Lisa Singh Programme Officer Besmillah Ekhlās	Discussed overview of ANBP impacts and help to meet key donors: Anita will sign info letter to all donors and make especial efforts for the Japanese. We also cannot reach UK Emb/DFID & USAID. DDR is high profile, visible, seen as successful thru Japanese promotion and calls from Nepal, Sudan for advice. Some donors query the 'R' success, and we should examine it. Reintegration Support prog (ILO + UK funds) goes to July 2008. What is remarkable is that this is DDR while we are still in conflict. IH asks us to include the South & East: visit Jalalabad, telephone Gardez/Kandahar. CIP 'flagship' prog was it successful? Did CIP produce jobs as well as trng? Can they be connected to USAID loans and would that create employment? What is CIP relationship with GOLIAGS?
19 July Thursday		IT installation in our UNDP office
1pm	ANBP Mohan, Grant, Somah Ibrahimi, Haroon Atmar	Courtesy calls, installation of our office in ANBP, preparation of Chimène's arrival
Crane, Brig Sean Von Hacht, Lt Col Andreas <a href="mailto:vonhacht@un.org">vonhacht@un.org</a>	Senior Military Advisor, UNAMA  Military Advisor	We discussed DDR and explained the evaluation, and asked for an introduction to British Embassy +39 083 124 6005      Von Hacht 0799 825 956

<p>Schiewek, Eckart  <a href="mailto:schiewek@un.org">schiewek@un.org</a></p>	<p>Political Advisor, UNAMA  0700 299 001  +39 083 124 6089</p> <p>He advises us to read Giutozzi's article of June 2006  He is less impressed with Mark Sedra and Michael Bhatia's article of Jan 2007</p> <p>A Frenchman called Dorronsoro wrote a book <i>La Révolution Afghane</i>, 2000  We will find them in Kabul's bookshops</p> <p>Dorronsoro, student of Olivier Roy, created a 'typologie' of commanders:</p> <p>Landed chiefs  Upstart land thieves  Ideologues with education  Talibs  Others?</p> <p>Especially in Southern Afghanistan, there has been a renewal of the social elites</p>	<p>We discussed DDR and CIP and DIAG. ES has lived in Afg for 10 years, joining UNAMA after NGO and German govt jobs. Then he organized the Constitutional Loya Jirga. DDR came later for him, in 2004.</p> <p>*Heavy Weapons were booty = <i>ghanimat</i> until Fahim signed a decree making them 'property of the State'. Dostum was the first to put his weapons in cantonment, turning potential military weakness into political strength .. then Atta couldn't refuse and the rest followed. Panshir gave up most heavy weapons 2005. *DDR started badly 2003 with cash. Commanders loved it, but payments were stopped by UN</p> <p>* later CIP also benefits Commanders, yet Afghan populace sees them as wealthy... so why pay them?</p> <p>* UNAMA got DD of complete units, and *in 2004 linked DDR compliance to registration of political parties.</p> <p>* structure separating implementing UNDP from political UNAMA questionable as disarmament is a political operation, and weapons are linked to political conflict- so link to political process is vital</p> <p>* Registration and destruction of weapons a problem; UNAMA wanted destruction on the spot as a confidence-building measure but Fahim opposed a Veto.</p> <p>* Later UNAMA wanted to auction collectors' items on e-bay or e-guns to raise money for UNICEF, but ANBP destroyed all their stocks of ancient weapons. Why?</p> <p>* Stats on weapons collected, refurbished, destroyed and ceded to GoA should be available with ANBP and MoD</p> <p>* Afghans saw weapons as State Property, and a link to Independence from foreign control</p> <p>* ANBP paid GoA officials dealing with DDR – was UN supervision of these arrangements adequate?</p> <p>* UNAMA proposed new NATO weapons for ANA to outlaw and destroy all Soviet era weapons. NATO was not responsive. In 2007 US is bringing in M-16 and now we will have double the weapons and thousands of AK- will become surplus to needs: very dangerous for internat community</p> <p>* Did the DDR process make use of MoD manpower lists or did they rely on Commanders? Did DDR strengthen Commanders' ties to their men?</p>
	<p>Judge Nasseam Ahmadzai  President of the Family Court in Jalalabad</p>	<p>A charming German speaker, he will organize CIP /DDR focus groups for us.</p>
<p>20<sup>th</sup> July Friday</p>	<p>REP and Chimène worked and discussed at the hotel</p>	
<p>21 July Saturday</p>	<p>Dr Javid joined the team and began his advanced security clearance CD. Then Chimene will complete it.</p>	



2.00	Saeed Iqbal Hashimi, Field Coordinator and Monitoring Specialist, RSPE Kabul Employment Services Center 0799 300 541	We had a focus group of 12 colonels and majors, all of whom feel abandoned by GoA and DDR. It began as a aggressive session, but Javid calmed the participants and we proved that we were listening. In every land it is very difficult for colonels to integrate civilian life, for their skills and status do not easily fit the commercial world.
7 pm	Mahboub-Ullah Ozob-Seraj, retired civil servant and cousin of the King	We discussed politics and history of Afghanistan, and the difficulty of re-integrating colonels
<b>22<sup>nd</sup> July Sunday</b>		
1.00	Basir, Besmillah and Neda Mansouri	Planning the mission trips
2.00	Abdullah Khan UNAMA Former CIP project officer  He refers us to Seraj Safi 0799 342 857 who works on CIP with Aziz Ahmadzai	We discussed types and motivations of CIP participants. In Mazar/Kunduz we should try to meet Regional Verification Committees who are not always unbiased but provide a good guide. Ghulam Isakzai (now UNDP DRR Nepal) began CIP to engage Qomandors. Internat community was not assertive enough, so UN tried a different route: bring them politics + keep them busy. Only two trips to Japan, 8+3= 11 total. Our stipends are peanuts,
3.30	AITM - Afghan Institute of Training & Management  Habibullah Rishtia Dep Dir Hamidullah Azamy, Dir of Studies <a href="mailto:aitm786@yahoo.com">aitm786@yahoo.com</a>  AITM began life 1989 in Peshawar as the Save the Children (UK) training unit for refugees and NGOs. Since 1995 it is a self-sustaining management center.	We discussed in detail the teaching strategy and content of the CIP business training: 335 officers/commanders spent one month living and learning, in 15 courses between July 2005 & Feb 2007: with 90 minutes per day of English and 60 minutes on the computer (both taught by women), this 26-day study course was not a degree program, but primarily aimed at "changing minds" by mixing commanders together from different regions and backgrounds, and forcing them to accept women as teachers.
5.00	Sultan Mohammed Rais bookshop With a private library on Afghanistan of 17,000 volumes, this is a free resource for students, researchers and journalists.	We sought and found the Doroson book <i>Revolution Unending</i> for a typology of Afghan Commandants, and photocopied the relevant 15-page section
<b>23<sup>rd</sup> July Monday</b>		
11.30	<b>HM Mohd Zahir Shah died today</b> <b>Director ANBP WILSON David</b> <a href="mailto:dwilson@anbpafg.org">dwilson@anbpafg.org</a>	Three days of mourning declared  First meeting on David's return to Kabul 0797 368 606 0700 280 943
2pm	Deputy Minister Bashiri - MoLSAMD Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs	courtesy visit: HE Minister expressed disappointment on reintegration and employment creation Fazel Ahmad Bahrami 0799 343 503
	Bahrami, Fazel Ahmad, National coordinator, Int'l Labor Migration Project <a href="mailto:Fazel_08@yahoo.com">Fazel_08@yahoo.com</a>	He assisted Minister Bashiri's meeting and translated into very good English Fazel Ahmad Bahrami 0799 343 503
4 pm	Colin Hicks, Pol-Mil at UK Embassy <a href="mailto:Colin.hicks@fco.gov.uk">Colin.hicks@fco.gov.uk</a> Tel: 0798 018 709	UK gave \$18 mil to ANBP and is now funding the follow-up 'R' project RSPE with ILO – so they are happy with the project and CH in on the RSPE Board.
<b>24<sup>th</sup> July Tuesday</b>		

<b>11 am</b>	Col (rtd) Dimiter Jelev, UNHCR Field Security Officer He has 10 years with UN in 6 different hotspots, after 27 years as a Bulgarian artillery officer.	REP met Col Jelev to get a professional UN security viewpoint on the impacts of DDR. DDR and now DIAG have collected lots of weapons; yet the ANBP regional manager estimated last month that Herat province alone has 110,000 weapons in the hand on non-legal armed groups... of which 2,700 have been collected by DIAG. Far more new weapons are coming in: NATO weapons, Taliban weapons, and Kandahar's Gov has just brought in Russian weapons from Badakhshan to arm his militias, with the blessing of Pres Karzai. On the other hand, the seizing of 70T TNT in trucks from Pakistan suggests that terrorist high quality explosive material is in short supply. Some Commanders run Private Security Companies = illegal armed groups with a license. DIAG will have trouble with some who are untouchable. UN policy is to train up Mol police to provide good security: UNHCR has 15, and the UN as a whole needs 2,500.
<b>12 am</b>	Najib Amiri, Programme manager, UN Habitat 0799-330 476	Najib runs the National Solidarity Program with 3000 Community Development Councils in 10 provinces and rural literacy in 16 provinces. He gave us an over view of DDR seen from the field, and helped us define a 'typology' of Commanders.
	Jayaseeli Bonnet arrives	Team is complete
8 pm	Michael Sachsse <a href="mailto:michael.ilokabul@undp.org">michael.ilokabul@undp.org</a> Ministry of Labour, Social Aff, Martyrs and the Disabled	Motor and Creator of the National Skills Development Programme, Mike described how it will work over 15 years, as one of Pres Karzai's priority programmes, to upgrade skills and create wealth and employment
<b>25th July Wed</b>		
8 am	Shapari comes from ANBP to brief the team	Ppt presentation showing the strengths, innovations and weaknesses of ANBP.
9 am	Chris Alexander, UNAMA 2 <sup>nd</sup> i/c Deputy SSR of SG for Political Affairs Former Ambassador of Canada in Kabul <a href="mailto:alexanderc@un.org">alexanderc@un.org</a> +1 212 963 2668 ext 6366 + 39 083 124 6366 +93(0)70 282 166 0799 305 464  4 main ANBP successes: reintegration formal dissolution of units heavy weapons ammo destruction	Valuable overview of the role and function of ANBP in the peace building evolution of Afg since the Bonn conference, and closer role of CIP and DIAG bringing Qomanders into the political process. ANBP helped change the political canvas and gave great coherence with DPKO + UNDP. Unity of effort, SSR and MoD are thanks to ANBP. but ANBP was slow to adapt in an unpredictable environment: 'R' was late, M&E too, DIAG was slow.
10.30	<b>Director ANBP WILSON David</b> <a href="mailto:dwilson@anbpafg.org">dwilson@anbpafg.org</a>	Short first meeting with the whole team 0797 368 606 0700 280 943

11.30	Maj (rtd) Nikolai Vanchev, Security officer and former member of ANBP Ammo Teams, he leaves Afghanistan Saturday to join UNHCR in Africa	Former head of AMMUNITIONS project for Kabul and surrounding provinces, in a team with two Afghan Colonels Ammo specialists and Halo Trust (for destruction). Described the lack of incentives and the political pressures he used to collect 1,500T in 18 months. Ammo collection/destruction should start at the same time as DDR.
<b>26<sup>th</sup> July Thursday</b>		
10.00 – 11.00	ANBP meetings with heads of department: Ops, M&E, ICT & PI	Facilitated by Shapari and Neda with efficiency and charm
11.00	Presentation by Aziz Ahmadzai of the CIP programme, with questions and debate	Excellent and very positive presentation of the how, and why and impacts of the CIP and discussion around the room with all ANBP staff. For further details and data we are to discuss with Safi Serajullah, charming assistant of Aziz. He and Chimène will meet soon.
1.00 pm	Brief discussion with KPMG Auditor Hilal Akbar Shah <a href="mailto:hshs@kpmg.com">hshs@kpmg.com</a>	We will meet after the Kunduz-Mazar trip  700 339 906
1.30	Haroon Atmar briefs us on security for Kunduz-Mazar trip	REP receives Thuraya phone
2.00 pm	Phone Interview Focus Groups with Commanders, DDR beneficiaries and IPs in Kandahar meeting in the ANBP regional office.	Organized by Besmillah Ekhlās, and animated by Javid Ahmadi, this interesting exercise permitted CM and JB to benefit from insights and answers from Kandaharis whom we could not otherwise have visited for security reasons. Aref was kindly willing to provide translation from the Pashtu while Javid posed the questions and developed the conversation - Javid also translated when necessary to obtain follow-up questions from CM & JB.
4.45	Norwegian Embassy POSTPONED	REP courtesy visit and also collecting information and opinions.
7pm	Vikram Parekh, Political Affairs Officer, Office of DSRG Pillar I UNAMA Formerly Int'l Crisis Group Work: 1 212 963 2668 x 6331 Mobile: 0799 010 276 <a href="mailto:parekh@un.org">parekh@un.org</a>	We had a political overview discussion of the situation now and previously UNAMA-UNDP-DDR and the role of DDR in Afghan political evolution.
<b>27<sup>th</sup> July Friday</b>		
	Bill Serruvakula (Security), John Hamilton (Admin) - ANBP regional staff in Kunduz	Thank you to Rahimi and his team for the generous and efficient hospitality
<b>28<sup>th</sup> July Saturday</b>		
08.30	El Haj Engineer Mahammad Omar Governor of Kunduz Province Sayed Sharif, DIAG Provincial Coordinator in Kunduz 0799 264 390	079 448 909 070 700 003 <a href="mailto:eng_mdomar@hotmail.com">eng_mdomar@hotmail.com</a> Claims to have been first with DDR: 809 officers, 2170 men mostly jobless. Some took weapons home, and DIAG is addressing this. Also follows Ammo project since Khanabad depot is in his province. He is worried about 6-7 powerful, restless commanders who need to be occupied, or they might join Taliban. He'd like to see them sent overseas for 3 years: these men dare not ravel outside their own zone for fear of vengeance. On the other hand, 'real jihadis' cannot put food on the table.

09.30	Meeting at ANBP with 9 former Commanders, generals or colonels	
13.30	Meeting women	
16.00	Implementing Partners meeting with those who accepted the invite: CFA Child Fund Afghanistan AGEF UNOPS	Nasrullah Khan of CFA (US NGO) Mahtub of AGEF German NGO Anwar Gul & Victorio of UNOPS described their work. They were executing ANBP training modules and not offered the chance to create appropriate programs for XCs.
evening	Andrew Harvey, FAO pest managements expert based in Mazar	He told us about Melon Fly in Faryab, and Colorado Beetle in Baghlan <a href="mailto:Afghanlocust@yahoo.com">Afghanlocust@yahoo.com</a> 0799 820 546
<b>29<sup>th</sup> Sunday</b>		
08.00	Meeting with ex-Combatants JA, JB, CM Three groups came in during the morning for an excellent discussion	Fascinating look into reintegration from the soldiers' point of view, and understanding of the neglect of wounded, disabled and reluctance to accept responsibility for children: most took up arms at age 13.
9.00	Ex-Commander Ainullah of Khanabad met REP and Roof Qazizada of ANBP Kunduz	Interesting man who began life in prison for murder, fought with or against everybody, just avoided execution by the Taliban, holds no grudges and believes DDR was fine in the circumstances
10.30	Child Fund Afghanistan - REP Dr Feda Mohd, Head of Taloqan office, Takhar province <a href="mailto:feda@cfafghanistan.org">feda@cfafghanistan.org</a> 0799 697 687 Mr Nasrullah, Head of Kunduz Office Mohd Sarwar, Kunduz Child Protection Officer and Mohd Taher, Regional Child Protection Office ANBP says CFA is their best IP	They dealt with 2205 child soldiers (189 girls) in the 4 provinces of NE. 998 were demobilized 1124 fitted the criteria as war-affected and benefited from health education, agric or livestock assistance (681 received seeds for wheat and kitchen gardens, and fertilizer while 859 received two animals – 46 being girls), and/or vocational training (for 778 youths: 105 girls and 673 boys).  They set up 102 Child Welfare Committees to help reintegrate kids into the community
12.00	Mohammad Shafi Rahimi, ANBP Regional Manager for Kunduz & NE <a href="mailto:mshafi@anbpafg.org">mshafi@anbpafg.org</a> 070 502 716	Over lunch we discussed progress with ANBP and DIAG. He sees Cdrs as weaker, but DIAG fails to progress because GoA officials and ISAF are afraid to confront abusive Cdrs. Some Goliags are an obstacle, of course, but the main restraint on disarmament is the ongoing conflict in the South.
13.00 departure	To Mazar-i-Sharif via Pul-i-Khumri	Arrived 6pm Thank you ANBP Mazar, Qureichi and his team for the generous and efficient hospitality
<b>Monday 30<sup>th</sup> July</b>		

8.00	Hameed Qureishi, UNDP & ANBP Regional Manager, Balkh Province <a href="mailto:hquraishi@anbpafg.org">hquraishi@anbpafg.org</a> 0700 522 477	Hameed sees DDR as 'successful' but in the street people see 'failure' because people still have weapons. DDR brought peace to Mazar; removed roadblocks and Cdr taxes; reduced criminal activities; took guns and pick-ups filled with bodyguards off the streets; removed the threat that fighting might break out at any moment between Junbish and Jamiat. Some of the big commanders may still have a couple of bodyguards, but their weapons are licensed. For 'R' we should have used more than one IP: IOM was overwhelmed with numbers of XCs. To sustain livelihoods we needed more time and effort;
9.00	Acting Governor of Balkh Province Alhaj M. Anwar Razaqyar  0799 200 054 070 501 958  Governor Atta Mohamed is in Kabul for the mourning ceremonies following the death of Zahir Shah, the Father of the nation.	DDR started in Balkh, but the 'R' had problems: promises not kept, policies changed (the \$200 payment began here and was stopped), training given, expectations raised, but jobs not found. Broken DDR promises cost the govt a lot of prestige. Why do we allow road construction to take place with foreign labor? Unemployment is an invitation to Cdrs to restart and soldiers to be recruited. Most of the AgGovernor's DIAG problems concern lack of decentralization: Kabul delays DIAG actions for 6 months until the weapons have been sold and smuggled; we need flexibility to act fast on our own authority; ammo or weapon denunciations should be checked with the Provincial Devt Council before Kabul takes action; we need more flexibility to determine projects to fit the needs of districts: \$150,000 once-size-fits-all is not the adequate solution.
10.00	Meeting 8 women trained as teachers, wives of ex-Combatants: CM & JB	Unlike the Kunduz women, these were positive about their experiences and most have found teaching jobs. They find officials unhelpful in terms of facilitating their task – for instance refusing to appoint two women from the same village to teach together, which helps their movements. But their diplomas are accepted (unlike Kunduz). Their main worry is that their husbands have no work, and this puts a strain on finances and on relationships.
14.00	Meeting ex-Commanders: CM & JA	6 generals and colonels, most from the Afghan army (but not all: at least one was from a Muj group that fought the Afghan army) Many of this group were content with their lot, well-off, and simply waiting for official retirement to take place.
14.00	Meeting ex-Combatants: JB & REP	9 Xcoms – several of them officers – told us of their troubles to make ends meet and find employment. Later we visited two of them.
16.00	UNAMA Security Briefing with Viktor.	
16.30	Visits to XComs:	
	- the meat fast-food that burned down	Leaving the XCom penniless
	- the telephone booth	That makes tiny profits from tiny turnover
	- the corner shop	That cannot feed the family

	- the Colonel's/Captain's market stall	Not only is Col Din Mohd a shopholder, he is also an electrician having been trained in army Signals. He is OK financially and happy, despite his demotion from Col to Capt in the MoD reshuffle.
<b>July 31<sup>st</sup> Tuesday</b>	Visit Balkh	Governor sent guards to ensure our safety
10.00	Depart Mazar for Kabul	
	Bektash joins us for the ride Mazar Office UNDP Regional Governance Ex-DDR officer	Supplies very interesting insights into DDR and CIP through his contacts with Jimbash (Dostum's party)
<b>1<sup>st</sup> August 2007</b>		
10.00	Jean-Francois Fitou, 1er Conseiller, Ambassade de France <a href="mailto:jean-francois.fitou@diplomatie.gouv.fr">jean-francois.fitou@diplomatie.gouv.fr</a>	+93 (0) 797 165 065 REP & CM Security situation slowly degrading, Kuchis are one destabilizing factor (recent Dai Kundi clashes and <i>jirga</i> ). Decentralization is one of the solutions, centralization may not be. We received names for contacts in ISAF civil affairs.
11.00	Ambassador Junichi KOSUGE, Embassy of Japan <a href="mailto:junichi.kosuge@mofa.go.jp">junichi.kosuge@mofa.go.jp</a>	REP & CM with David Wilson We discussed DDR, successes and timings, funding and DIAG strategies. Security is bad, Japan has raised alert to highest level 'evacuation' for the regions.
11.30	Mr Ogawa, First Secretary Embassy of Japan	Weapons and destruction: if NATO is supplying weapons to the ANA, and ANA weapons are going to the ANP, how many are surplus, who is destroying surplus weapons and where are those weapons to be identified? Will DDR weapons leak into the market? Ogawa will find some data.
12.00	Meeting on drug treatments in DDR with UNDP project officers ...	CM & JB.
1.00	Mark Zellenrath, Netherlands Emb In the old Goethe Institut building He leaves in one week to take up a position in Den Haag  <a href="mailto:mark.zellenrath@minbusa.nl">mark.zellenrath@minbusa.nl</a> +93 (0)20 220 15 99 Off: 0700 286 641 Mob: 0700 279 661	REP. Netherlands gave money to the ANBP and is satisfied with the result, which was the best we could have achieved in the difficult circumstances, and took place at the 'perfect moment' – UNDP seized the window of opportunity, which would probably not be open any longer in the conditions of 2007. Expensive? Maybe, but not a waste of money ... in fact every DDR project should ideally be funded so that not everything is spent. Good transition to DIAG, but now conditions have changed. Is 'R' sustainable? Is it too early to tell?
2.00	Thomas Johnson, USAID Supervisory Program Officer 0799 822 352 1-202-216-6288 x 4341 <a href="mailto:tjohnson@usaid.gov">tjohnson@usaid.gov</a>  He leaves soon for a post in Jerusalem  Secretary Ms Nadia Shaherzad 070 234 209	It turns out that the USAID projects ASMED (business planning for 300 commanders) and ARIES (business loans) have been designed specifically to take ANBP's reintegration process forward. Ambassador Newman saw that the top and bottom are not a threat to peace, but 'middle commanders can be spoilers.' All USAID contractors are also supposed to hire DDR people.

3.30	<p>Ahmad Shah Sediqi, UNDP Admin Services Mgr, former demobilization Mgt Officer, then i/c DDR in Mazar-i-Sharif, and finally ANBP Senior Prog Officer Kandahar, Mazar, Herat</p> <p><a href="mailto:ahmadshah.sediqi@undp.org">ahmadshah.sediqi@undp.org</a></p> <p>0700 251 292</p>	<p>We discussed DDR health issues, drug addict treatment and equity/reintegration issues regarding handicapped soldiers and war widows.</p> <p>If we ask soldiers, they will all say DDR 'failed' because it did not transform their lives. But the 'R' was generally a success.</p> <p>Sediqi outlines 7 lessons for others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reintegration packages should be market-based, and more carefully designed;</li> <li>- Coordination would have reduced overlap: NGOs and UN all repeating similar training courses;</li> <li>- We trained too many people with skills they cannot use for profit;</li> <li>- More group packaging (ie DDR beneficiaries working together as teams) can generate more profit;</li> <li>- Most ex-soldiers in Afg needed some form of psychological med or treatment;</li> <li>- Gender sensitivity is vital: widows lose their cash to in-laws unless they are protected, and they need income-generation (ie Roshan rural widow-telephonists project)</li> </ul>
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> August Thurs</b>	<p>Travel to Jalalabad</p> <p>US convoy breaks down and causes a back-up of 150 trucks going south, but we have the privilege of passing them all</p>	<p>We meet an ANBP convoy of two trucks with police escort coming north: ammo project deliveries.</p>
12.00	<p>Dr Hameed Omar, MD, ANBP Regional Director</p>	<p>Hameed was in DDR, and rose to become a Senior Programme Officer. Before that he was an election officer. We discussed in some detail the role of IPs.</p> <p>Thank you to Dr Hameed and his team for generous and efficient hospitality.</p>
<b>14.00</b>	<p>Malangar, Haji Sahib Gen Mohd Halim Former Deputy Gov of Nangahar &amp; ex-Commander of Division 11 appointed by President Karzai.</p> <p>and five colonels who served in his division</p> <p>Two of them brandish their AITM certificates as if they are an insult, for there was no government job waiting for them. They have nothing: neither job nor respect</p> <p>663 officers were dismissed in an earlier MoD down-sizing exercise, and are very unhappy, says Malangar – mainly older officers were selected for dismissal, because the MoD couldn't pay them all. These are most of the Kabul demonstrators, but later some DDR officers joined them.</p>	<p>Maj Gen Malangar led DDR in E. Region for 3000 soldiers, after years as Mujahid fighting against Russians and later against Taliban.</p> <p>Three Mujahid commanders seem happy to be out of the war and building peace; the era of 'Seven Pakistans in Afghanistan' ( the seven fighting factions) is over.</p> <p>Two professional army colonels trained in War College are miserable, hate civilian life and want only to be respected colonels again. "Small boys run after me and shout ' you are a DDR colonel with nothing' – they do not have any respect for me. All I got was a training course."</p> <p>DDR is for soldiers, but 'R' shd be for families. Disabled soldiers were mostly left out. The Min of Martyrs &amp; Disabled pays a symbolic \$3 per month. The widows and orphans suffer, and the disabled walk the streets on one leg while their commanders drive in cars. Future DDR should take account of martyrs and disabled under 'R'.</p>



16.00	<p>Kamal Sendigul Shinwari A radiantly happy former combatant</p> <p>‘From 1979 until 2002, I will love and remember most of all the DDR process.’</p>	<p>Nothing we could say would turn this cheerful mechanic from his satisfaction with DDR! He was a driver for 5 years, so 6 months’ training was enough for him – though not for everybody. Now he trains other mechanics in his workshop.</p> <p>Kamal joined <i>jihad</i> under Mullah Kandar, a neighbour, and when Kandar was killed he served Cdr Ghalib. The latter did not benefit from DDR because when he was Chief of Police in Gheinkhel the Americans took him. He’s back now. While Kamal was being trained in mechanics, Ghalib was in Guantanamo.</p>
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> August Friday</b>		
8.30pm	<p>Nazir Ahmad Mohmand, Country Director of BEST – Basic Education and Employable Skills Training, an NGO based in Peshawar and Jalalabad. <a href="mailto:namohmand@hotmail.com">namohmand@hotmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:nammohmand@gmail.com">nammohmand@gmail.com</a> 070 606 463 070 600 730</p>	<p>BEST seems to be the best DDR Implementing Partner in E. Region with 65% job placement (others have joined the ANA). BEST’s committed to creating jobs. To prove it, they brought us three unemployed painters who had been trained by GTZ and only found jobs once GTZ left Jalalabad they came to BEST!!!</p> <p>There were 18 different skills on offer, and some seems to have been market-based: carpet weaving motor and bicycle mechanics, and construction trades. No follow-up was included in ANBP funds – ‘if we do not pursue the reintegration process, some men could relapse and join the Taliban.’</p> <p>To offset this with jobs, BEST has created a construction company that uses DRR labour.</p>
2.30pm	<p>Atikullah, Former Manager of SAB centre for child soldiers funded by UNICEF and run by NGO Solidarité Afghan-Belge</p> <p>Tel: 0700 634 821</p>	<p>SAB ran 4 centres in E. Region with 70 boys and 10 girls (sisters of armed boys) in each, aged 14-18. Two social workers covered each centre, where literacy and other classes were held mornings, followed by on-the-job skills training afternoons. The 9-month programme changed boys’ attitudes, reduced anger and allowed 70% to achieve incomes using their skills.</p>
	<p>While driving around Jalalabad we see and photograph a poster offering cash for weapons – apparently for a rocket launcher. The small print says nothing about cash, and asks for Stinger missiles to be handed in.</p>	<p>In terms of a bad message for DDR, this takes some beating.</p> <p>It shows clearly that all parts of the international community are not pushing the same agendas.</p>
	<p>UNHCR Jalalabad team comes to lunch at WFP guest house, and we hear karaoke sung by Uzbek, Ethiopian, Japanese, Sudanese and Filipino voices.</p>	
<b>4 August Saturday</b>		
8.30	<p>Allai High School women’s group of trained teachers</p>	<p>CM &amp; JB Thanks to DDR domestic violence is down, men are less violent and sons no longer shoot their mothers.</p> <p>These women are wives and daughters of officers, chosen as much for their connexions as for their knowledge altho all have passed High School. Some have MoE teaching jobs at \$30 p month and the biggest attraction of DDR was the training salary of \$120. Some have been refused jobs because MoE refuses to recognize their certificate despite the MOU signed with ANBP.</p>



9.00	Col (rtd) Rasiq Khan Chairman of the Eastern Provinces Regional Verification Committee (RVC) for ANBP	The RVC persuades commanders to join DDR (and now DIAG) and checks that soldiers have right ID. They are officers (army or mujahiddeen) who know what IDs look like, and they rejected those with changed names or photos. Qualities include experience, respect, lack of extremist positions, qualities of mediator (Rasiq Khan is a low-key man, a patient listener). They were paid \$450 per month rising to \$600. Tow of them are still on the DIAG programme.
9.45	Eng Homayoun Wafa, <a href="mailto:homayoun32@gmail.com">homayoun32@gmail.com</a> 0799-331 439 0700 274 354  A Pachay - former ANBP Program Officer - now running a private Management Training Institute in Jalalabad.	Strengths of ANBP: - very well planned - DDR packages popular except problems with for agricultural seasons: carpet weaving employs whole family; tailoring, carpentry, auto mechanic, small bus. all good and est. 65% of the 500 beneficiaries still working in their chosen professions. Greenhouse package also was popular for agric. ANBP weakness: - 3 years too short - therefore too little follow-up (need 2 more years) - market assessments needed for packages - community awareness was not well planned, and XCs had too little time to decide on choices
10.30	H.E. Sherzai, Governor of Nangahar Formerly Governor of Kandahar, a man proud to be Barakzai descended from Abdul Rahman Khan whose restored palace is now his office	The Governor is strongly supportive of DDR, democracy, the private sector and President Karzai (and apparently not a single other Afghan politician). He announced that the Provincial Dev Council will be the point of contact for DIAG.
12.00	Lunch invitation from Haji Sahib Major General Mohd Halim Malangyar, Former Deputy Gov of Nangahar & ex- Commander of Division 11 0777 531 415 0799 531 415	Conversation moved across <i>jihad</i> through Ahmad Shah Masood to Malangyar's former neighbour Osama ben Laden
	<b>Return to Kabul 5.30 pm</b>	
<b>5 August Sunday</b>	<b>ANBP sessions on statistics</b>	
9 am	CM & JB meet ANBP staff M&E	
10 am	REP – DDR Heavy Weapons Team Leader operations and AMMO Project Anton Ivanov, Operations Manager Former Bulgarian military officer AMP&ASDP <a href="mailto:aivanov@anbpafg.org">aivanov@anbpafg.org</a> 070 227 281 & Abdullah	Discussion on staffing, planning, logistics and management of heavy weapons cantonment /disarmament He will send us complete HWC data and photos Numbers of ANBP expats can be deceptive since 25-33 % are on leave or R&R at any one time: so with 3 expat military members of a mobile team, you will only ever have two present in the field.
11 am	REP and Bajrami, Bexhat DDR Officer, Central Region DDR-DIAG <a href="mailto:bexhat@yahoo.com">bexhat@yahoo.com</a> 070 261 292 <a href="mailto:bbajrami@anbpafg.org">bbajrami@anbpafg.org</a> 0799 861 001 and Andry Larin, 0700 274 345 <a href="mailto:alarin@anbpafg.org">alarin@anbpafg.org</a> former DDR Security Officer for MDUs and former Soviet military officer with oblique views of AhmadShah Masood	Former leader MDU Bajrami Former MDU security officer Larin We had two meetings on how Mobile Disarmament Units functioned, mechanisms used, resources needed & lessons learned. Recce is vital, planning is critical, security is paramount when returning with trucks filled with weapons and/or ammo.

3 pm	Michael Semple, Deputy to EU Special Representative <a href="mailto:Michael.Semple@dal.piplex.com">Michael.Semple@dal.piplex.com</a> 0799 015 675 070 279 204	With 10 years of Afghan experience in OCHA, Oxfam, UNAMA and a home in Pakistan, Michael is hardly a Dubliner any more. He described the problems and politics of DDR, but recognized the value of HWC as changing the nature of politics and violence, as well as CIP and Ammo projects. DIAG would be good, if only ...
7 pm	Geert Gompelman DDR Researcher at Univ Utrecht Funded by CORDAID <a href="mailto:geertgompelman@icqmail.com">geertgompelman@icqmail.com</a> 0700 304 481  he returns this week to Utrecht	Carrying out research on DDR in Afghanistan (others are in Congo and S Leone). After three months in Balkh, meeting every IP and many XComs, this Persian speaker has an unfavorable view of the impact of DDR: most XCs are living in poverty and few have made a good living. This is not all the fault of DDR: the economy provides few opportunities for jobs or business.
8 pm	Team visualized DDR films made for TV by the USAID – funded Public Info Unit	These are information-cum-propaganda shorts aimed at encouraging people to believe in and take part in DDR. They were shown on Afghan TV on unknown dates.
<b>6<sup>th</sup> August Monday</b>		
	ANBP meetings with M&E and other staff	
Lunch	Suliman, programme officer InterSOS – Italian NGO dealing with refugees	We met his mother (a teacher) and wife for discussions over <i>pilau</i> and <i>ashak</i> .
3pm	UN ODC Drug Administration Guadaloupe Sanchez, Mgr of Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund	Brief meeting to look at links with UNODC evaluation processes
7pm	DDR Officer, Central Region & DIAG Bexhat Bajrami, <a href="mailto:bexhat@yahoo.com">bexhat@yahoo.com</a> <a href="mailto:bbajrami@anbpafg.org">bbajrami@anbpafg.org</a> 070 261 292      0799 861 001  Bexhat, an electrical engineer, is a very knowledgeable, serious and open-minded Muslim from Kosovo with a range of exciting stories to tell.	More on Mobile Units & lessons learned, together with descriptions of how D and D and R were practiced and how security incidents were avoided – sometimes with rifles pointed into the bellies of ANBP staff. Slow at the beginning, food packages and word of mouth brought the Xcs in. The lack of medical examination and treatments surprised the team: it would be easy to do and extremely popular, showing Respect and also ensuring that XCs do not take infectious diseases to their children.
<b>7<sup>th</sup> August Tuesday</b>		
8.am	Besmillah Ekhlās	General overview of progress in the mission. BE points out that 'jobs' were not a specific part of ANBP's mandate, and are a function of the general economic situation. No promises of 'jobs' were supposed to be made, although interpretations of what was actually said to the DRR beneficiaries will obviously differ.
9am	Yukari Oto at UNMACA – JB,CM,JA	Described ANBP's successes and weaknesses in a 'hostile environment'
9am	Kavil Mohan – REP  I asked Kavil for concrete data in table format on weapons and personnel	We discussed management structures, ANBP personnel strategies, security sector reform, ammo collection, results/impacts of weapon collection. KM will provide data on numbers, grades, qualifications and salaries of personnel 2003-2006. Donors need to conduct conflict vulnerability analysis and look at role of PSCs.

<b>10.30</b>	Deputy Minister of Defence Nuristani	<p>The Min repeated his previous dissatisfaction with the 'R' and made suggestions for job creation – some of which he had already proposed to 'deaf ears' in GoA. We agreed that political will is a vital ingredient.</p> <p>ANA and ANP will both be equipped with NATO standard arms, and Mr Nuristani assured us the existing stocks of soviet grade weapons would be 'melted or burned, or transformed into a monument'.</p> <p>ANA will rise to 70,000 in mid-2008, and currently has 52,000. ANP will have 60,000 plus Border Police and Special Units for a total of 82,000. He explained training policies for soldiers and officers.</p> <p>Retirement of officers will bring them a piece of land in their province, and a lump sum – in addition to the two years of salary they received from ANBP and MoD. 'We give them respect, but respect has to be earned. Some of them have lost it.'</p>
<b>4.00 pm</b>	Harmsma, Ronald, Political Advisor to NATO Senior Civilian Representative <a href="mailto:ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int">ronald.harmsma@hq.isaf.nato.int</a> 0799 511 759 070 920 929 Gezer, Ufuk <a href="mailto:gezeru@isaf-hq.nato.int">gezeru@isaf-hq.nato.int</a> Pitterle, Kenneth J. <a href="mailto:Ken.pitterle@hq.isaf.nato.int">Ken.pitterle@hq.isaf.nato.int</a>	<p>Aug 7 we discussed Afghan strategy and DDR with the PoLAds</p> <p>They were very reluctant to say anything, or even to offer phone numbers in ISAF to help us find information or obtain any opinion whatsoever on DRR. 'We certainly do not want to sit on the first row' was the main theme, suggesting NATO is happier to observe disaster than to take action! However there will be some support for ammunition storage.</p> <p>We had the sense that his two colleagues would have been helpful if Mr Harmsma had not blocked all conversation. If he has so little interest in promoting peace and cooperation, why is he working in Afghanistan at all!</p>
<b>5.30</b>	Anita Nirody UNDP Country Director	REP hoped to brief UNDP senior management on progress, but Ian Holland is away and Anita was unable to fit me into her schedule.
<b>6.00 pm</b>	Shapari Enshayan <a href="mailto:senshayan@anbpafg.org">senshayan@anbpafg.org</a>	General overview of progress in the mission
	<b>The outline plans of our reports are posted on the wall</b>	Writing has begun: <b>TARGET is to have first draft by August 12<sup>th</sup> before team leaves for Heart</b>
<b>8<sup>th</sup> August 2007</b>		
<b>8.00</b>	ANBP admin and finance meeting	REP departs to France on R&R. He will be writing the General Report during his R&R

<b>10.00</b>	Mir Wais, UNMACA field officer Also friend of Daud Mohammad Fortuitous Airport meeting	DDR is good for Afghanistan, because it helped bring peace and limit the problem of Commanders. While the big ones became very rich, the small ones lost their power and so did half the middling commanders. Ordinary XCs did OK if they were literate – jobs as teachers or govt positions. Others lost out because the tool was removed with which they made a living: the gun. So they may not like DDR's results, but they were good anyway. Communities got nothing out of DDR except peace: but that is what they want after 30 years of war. So DDR was good for Afg
	ANBP M&E meeting JB & CM	M&E staff are struggling to supply data
	Min of Health and Min of Martyrs and Disabled	JA will contact for data to back up our health analysis
	Afghanistan Times JA is contacting for assistance with illustrations	
<b>9 August Thursday</b>	Restriction of movement issued by security. Only essential staff going to office	Assa II guest house. CM & JB writing report
<b>10 August Friday</b>	IDEM	IDEM
<b>11 August Saturday</b>	IDEM	IDEM
<b>12 August Sunday</b>	Departure for Herat. Left Guest House at 7h arrival at 10h30.	CM and JB staying at WFP Guest House. JA in town with a friend.
13h00	Meeting with ROM Ramin Shahriari	Short introduction, ROM arrived at same time as commanders. We will meet him tomorrow
13h30	Meeting with CIP commanders	7 angry commanders! 3 Jihad non professional and 4 ex MOD Officers. Gov has extended the period of payment for 1 year. It's been five months they did not receive their salaries. They say DDR was a disaster, it left security vacuum and they're not able to protect themselves. Benefits of DDR is that it left commanders selling potatoes in the market.
15h30	Security Briefing by UNDSS FSCO Saleh Tembo	Situation calm, curfew 23h-05h . 3 attacks in 20 days on UNAMA compound, (rockets) last one was 3 weeks ago. Commander Yahya suspected of having organized the attacks. He refused to enter the DIAG process. He is said to have considerable influence over several militias in the area.
16h00	Meeting with UNICEF Ghulam Rabbani Wardak Project officer Health and nutrition	Courtesy meeting he received us in the absence of the Representative, but said that there are rumors in Herat about DIAG collecting weapons to redistribute them to militias... Was ROM teacher in the past, they know each other very well. Arranged meeting with Child Protection Officer tomorrow morning at guest house.
<b>13 August Monday</b>	Herat	

8h00	Meeting with Child Protection Officer UNICEF. Aysha Ghafoori	In 2005 local NGO (Area) did a survey and identified 1400 child soldiers in Herat region. German NGO (name ? AGEF) implemented the project. 9 months training, literacy + vocational in carpentry, tailoring, etc...in Herat. Says there were some girls but does know how many. UNICEF never had any contact with ANBP. She thinks not all the children were ex cbts. UNICEF reintegration program had to stop due to lack of funding. Aysha had been advocating for the continuation of the program at Kabul level with no results.
10h00	Visit to 3 ex cbts businesses. IOM reintegration program	All 3 reintegrate and happy! Jessie to write case study
14h00	Meeting with World Vision Yahay Amid Human resources Officer	WV was ANBP implementing partner. Reintegration program for 875 ex cbts started in July 2004 and ended Dec 2005. 21 staff to run the project. WV was present at the demobilization and registration stages. WV had 34 skills area for training, 6 to 18 months each. They say 60 to 70% of the 600 they trained are reintegrated. They don't do follow up because they don't have funds. Says IP should be involved in the planning of DDR activities. They had 100 children (under 18) among the 600. They have been disarmed by ANBP. They did not refer to UNICEF because they had their own project. Only English and computer training for children under 18. Says they need more education.
15h30	Meeting with UNOPS	Had road construction project, from 2004 to 2006. They trained ex cbts in plumbing, carpentry, mechanic... Each of them of 6 months. They had an agreement with a contractor to employ 100 ex cbts for road construction for 6 months. Ex cbts were paid 3\$ a day. The project could not be extended, and all 100 had to leave the project after 6 months. Says Ex cbts were very frustrated. He says there was a lack of coordination among partners and the information sharing was bad. Says all should be involved at the earliest stage of DDR and that a monitoring system has to be put in place.
<b>14 August Tuesday</b>	Herat	
10h	Visiting 3 ex Cbts business in Herat.	Jessie

14h	Meeting with family members of ex Cbts (teacher training program)	<p>28 women, cousins, nieces, sisters-in-law of ex cbts. (only 2 ex cbts wives in the group) attended the meeting, the group was too big to discuss personal issues. They mainly complained about the non recognition of the certificate. In Herat the teacher training ended in October 2006, 64 women attended it. All received the certificate. In this group only 2 women were employed as teacher, because of their previous experience in teaching. They say the certificate is not recognized by the MoE. They did not bring the issue to ANBP or to the MoE. They are happy about the DDR process because they have fewer responsibilities now that men are back. They say women are not organized because of insecurity. Organizing themselves now would not change anything to their lives. They're skeptical when mentioned that it could change things for their daughters!</p> <p>Complaining because men are unemployed, life was easier when they were soldiers because MOD was paying salaries. We noticed that all of them were educated women, not from rural areas. Only 2 of them were ex cbts wives, the transparency of the selection for the teacher training is questionable.</p>
<b>15 August Wednesday</b>	Herat	

7h30	Meeting with ROM Ramin Shahriari	Briefed us about the difficulties of doing DDR in Herat province at the time when Ismael Khan was military and politically involved. IK was strongly opposed to DDR. Even when Kabul nominated a new military commander all commanders and troops remained faithful to IK. DDR could not start with IK in Herat and in 2004, Kabul offered him a minister post within the Gov. It is said that he has still influence over more 5000 men. Ramin says DD was well planned, but R is missing. \$1500 per XCom is not enough for reintegration. The program was too centralized; he feels he did not have any control on IPs projects in Herat and that Kabul was only interested in "dismantling" commanders. He says that Commanders who have joined DDR are very bitter because they are not recognized, jobless and humiliated. They feel the Gov is stigmatizing them because they are from Herat, and supposedly IK supporters. He suggests forming a council of commanders who could advise the Gov on political and military issues. That way he says, the Gov would be able to keep on eye on the commanders. Commanders would appreciate recognition and their influence at the community level could be used. According to Ramin, all commanders are loyal to IK, the city of Herat could easily be retaken in short time. Commander Yahya, who joined the Taliban recently is said to have at least 5000 troops under his command. As he did not get a position in the Karzai Gov, Taliban gave him military support. He is strongly opposed to the DIAG program showing his discontentment by occasionally throwing rockets into the UNAMA compound.
	Departing Herat for Kabul	Arrival Kabul 14h30
16h	Meeting with Basil Massey Former ANBP Chief of Staff and Gerdez ROM. Now Deputy Chief UNMIS DDR (Sudan)	Long and interesting meeting (I recorded some pieces) Basil says that DDR was a challenge, logistical constraints as well as dealing with MOD (who did not know their exact strength, who was corrupted) was a day to day job and nothing can be written about that. Teams have been working under lot of pressure and in very difficult circumstances (4am to 12am non stop for months) he agrees that R had in way been left out, but IPs were to implement and they did. (strong critics towards IOM) about disabled and child soldiers, he says that the program was in no way able to look after millions of handicapped people, and that Child soldiers were followed by UNICEF. Says that ANBP tried to work with UNICEF, but they have always been reluctant in sharing information and refused to have ANBP involved in the criteria's selection of child soldiers. Says that ANBP should have had a UNICEF liaison officer. Says that first thing he did was to bring different nationalities and different backgrounds to ANBP. (too many British) Very auto satisfied and strong personally! (more on my recorder and from Jessy's notes)

<b>16 August Thursday</b>		
9h	Meeting with IOM Fernando Arocena and Lorena Lando IOM Chief and deputy Chief of Mission	Both of them arrived in 2006, the program was over and the main task was to downsize IOM who had more than 400 nationals and around 40 internationals at the time of the DDR operation. According to Fernando, the DDR program was composed of DDR activities, it was not a proper DDR process as there was no legal frame or agreement between parties and armed groups, a part from the Bonn agreement from which the Taliban were left out. The rebuilding of the country did not take place; it brought stabilization to a certain category of people but did not stabilize the country. IOM is generally satisfied with their R package, they trained ex cbts on the usual vocational training package (carpentry, tailoring...) and they have their own monitoring mechanism. An internal evaluation was conducted last year (they'll send us a copy) About the info data sharing with ANBP, they did not have a clear answer (Jessy, can you help?) but it seems that IOM having its own monitoring mechanism was one of the reasons, added to the fact that coordination among IPs and ANBP was weak. Fernando said that although relations with ANBP were good, UNDP being the lead on DDR there was different levels of implication and all IPs were not equals. (Jessy, is it what he said? I did not get his point)
10h30	Tushar Dighe UNOPS Advisor to the Country Director	Could not remember UNOPS level of implication in DDR issues!
14h30	Migena Tane, UNMACA Program Officer	UNMACA trained ex cbts in demining through nationals and Intern NGOs (UNMACA is a coordination body). Their project ended in Dec 2006. They insisted on the sustainability of the program by making sure that ex cbts would be "put" in others UNMACA projects when possible and some "on call" teams have been formed in the Provinces. When ex cbts could not undergo the demining training (because they did not fill the criteria's) they were referred to AGEEF, out of 850 ex cbts UNMACA have trained 683 ex cbts.
<b>17 August Friday</b>	Guest house	Researching and writing
<b>18 August Saturday</b>	Guest house restriction of movement one German lady kidnapped in a restaurant in Kabul	Researching and writing
<b>19 August Sunday</b>		Researching and writing
13h	Ms Bobani, female XC officer	See case study



15h	UNICEF Hamidullah Ahmady	<p>In 2004 a UNICEF CP international officer has been seconded to ANBP. Initial UNICEF/ANBP plan was to have joint demob then to separate children from adults for reintegration. There was a disagreement about criteria. UNICEF using Cape Town principles, ANBP considering Child Soldiers only those carrying weapon. In 2003 UNICEF did a rapid survey and found about 8000 child soldiers, (final figure was 7744) when ANBP got only few hundreds. (Ahmidullah thinks there is much more because guns are part of the culture, children are given a gun very early). They could not agree on criteria, Country Representative and CT decided to withdraw seconded CP from ANBP. No funds from ANBP was allocated to UNICEF, but they had enough funds to run their own program (from the US-Labor Dpt)</p> <p>UNICEF then realized it was important to extent their program to Children Affected by War instead of only focusing on Child Soldiers. According to Ahmidullah, one of the grave mistakes from ANBP was to deliver cash, when UNICEF was firstly identifying them, then demobilizing. UNICEF created and trained Demobilization and Reintegration Committees in every province. Committees were composed by elders, and religious people. UNICEF IPs were verifying the lists and issuing demob cards. IPs in charge of reintegration were selected on the knowledge they had on the province and their previous experience in child protection, it was a 1 year program. All programs did not start at the same time in all provinces. Girls and disabled children were included in the War Affected Children program. Target was 50% of girls to be included in the program. No particular project on women. There was few girl soldiers most of them already married to a commander, they decide not to approach the issue in the best interest of the child and because they did not know how to approach it. Every province has now a Child Protection Action network dealing with all kind of Child Protection issues and working with different ministries.</p>
<b>20 August Monday</b>	Draft Report submitted to UNDP	
10h30	Halo Trust	Jessy met with Tom Dibb to discuss DDR collaboration and synergies between Halo and ANBP in weapon destruction, HWC, mine stockpile and ammo destruction.
<b>21 August 2007</b>		
<b>22 August 2007</b>	Team Leader returned to Kabul	
	Safi Serajuddin DIAG	Came to the office, after putting us off for nearly three weeks, and said he could only stay half an hour. We kept him for an hour, but in terms of data he told us to ask ANBP M&E or Programme officials because he has none. He knows nothing about form A and B data sources on commanders, and tells us to ask M&E.

<b>23 August</b>		
	Minister Mohammad ZIA  MRRD	Your reintegration models from other countries are not useful here because the Afghan XCs are already integrated. It is very rare that they don't live at home. What they want are jobs, and that is a problem for the government. If there were really 100,000 mujaheddin
	Asst Dep Minister Payenda Maj Gen Habib Brig Gen Zalmay 0799-400 193	Complaints about poor quality SALW and increasingly unserviceable HWC gave way to contentment with ANBP partnership.
<b>14.30</b>	EC European Commission of the European Union Clément Bourse  Michael Alexander	
<b>17.30</b>	Aziz Ahmadzai DIAG	Aziz was interviewing in the next room, and we invited him in to chat. DIAG does not use the CIP database, which is not updated. He and ANBP regional managers keep their meetings and memories in their heads. When we suggested this was creating no institutional memory, Aziz was silent.
<b>18.30</b>	Anthony Fitzherbert (independent) and Andrew Harvey (FAO) Afghan and Iranian agriculture and drug replacement expert	General discussion about agriculture and pest problems for potatoes and melons. Good general culture.
<b>19.00</b>	Tamim Samee  MD of Digistan phone call	I told Tamim that we have been unable to access or use the ANBP database despite weeks of trying, and could he talk to his former colleagues to discover the problem and find a solution. He will call Ubaid.
<b>24 August</b>		
	Noor Akbari PRT Panshir Former NSP programme officer  Phone conversation	People in Panshir think, 'They are taking our weapons from us, and then how do we know what will happen tomorrow? Will we need our weapons? That is their view of DDR.' Taliban are distributing money to people- and GoA is not. Taliban pays \$200, and ANA pays \$70. The Taliban have force and they have money. How is that? How does the International Coalition allow that? Where does this Kuwait and Saudi and other money come from? Thank God, they are not in Panshir yet. Not yet. I tell this to ISAF, to GoA, to foreigners that people are fed up with war, but if they have to take up weapons again, they will do it. Foreign Afghans come with money, then they make more money and go back to their US or Germany or UK. Meanwhile ordinary Afghans – real Afghans – cannot make a living. What is the Economic Devt Plan? We do not see it.
<b>19.00</b>	Chrissie Hirst and Vlada Danish Afghan Committee	Chrissie works as deputy director of the local delegation, after a career in SALW and SSR in the Balkans where she met Vlada (who is preparing his PhD)

<b>25<sup>th</sup> August</b>		.
<b>14.30</b>	Henri Morand, UNDP Country Director a.i.	Discussed questions of decentralizing UNDP operations, using the ANBP regional structure, and pursuing reintegration.
<b>15.00</b>	Ian Holland UNDP Deputy Country Director	Discussed our preliminary findings and our major recommendations
<b>26<sup>th</sup> August</b>		
<b>10.30</b>	Vice-President Karim Khalili Minister Stanekzai Chris Alexander Vikram Parekh Henri Morand Ian Holland	We presented the main recommendations and findings of the evaluation including: - 3 years support for the D&R Commission - do not hand over DIAG and Ammo yet - expand mandate to include weapons - have a weapon destruction 9 July 08 - President Karzai to speak at UNGA
<b>13.30</b>	Presentation to stakeholders Minister Stanekzai Dep MoD Habibullah Maj Gen Habib and 20 others	We need to revise the numbers we have received from ANBP
<b>15.00</b>	Mohamed Reza, UNMACA	Update mine numbers- nearly 500,000 now destroyed
<b>18.00</b>	Philippe Gauthier ONG Solidarités	Has worked in Afghanistan on-and-off since the 1980s, supporting Masood and projects for rural development and community development in the Hazarajat
<b>27<sup>th</sup> August</b>		
<b>9.00</b>	Ubaid ANBP Data base manager  We have the impression that M&E was never able to know how to answer our questions, until Tamim broke the deadlock. M&E has no management support inside ANBP.	Ubaid understood from Tamim Samee what we needed, and he now provided (on our last day!!) some explanation about cross-over questions between Client Satisfaction Surveys and the DDR database, and he also found a group of documents about CIP on a shared P drive – docs that Chimène has been trying to find for 6 weeks.
<b>15.00</b>	Presentation to ANBP	
<b>16.30</b>	Anton Ivanov	Anton explains that only when Dominic was OiC did the message about data requests reach him. He offers us a list of numbers and certain evidence that is in total contradiction with the numbers originally supplied by ANBP. These are fascinating, and we shall use them on the basis that they appear to be latest and to have validity.
<b>28<sup>th</sup> August</b>	Team departure to Dubai	
<b>29-30 Aug</b>	Writing final report	Still receiving data on CIP from ANBP
<b>1-6 Sept</b>	Finalising and Editing Final Report	Receiving comments from stakeholders
<b>6 Sept</b>	Report is finished	Electronic dispatch to UNDP Kabul