# SUPPORT TO THE POLICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

# PROJECT OUTCOME EVALUATION
## Phase I, II and III

# FINAL REPORT

**October 2007**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The report provides an independent evaluation of the UNDP Project in Support of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique. This evaluation assessed the design, management, and implementation of Phase III of the project through a rigorous analysis of the intended outputs prescribed under each of the four key components of the project. It discussed the intended outputs from a perspective of efficiency, effectiveness, adequacy, and sustainability. It then provided an assessment of the cumulative impact that the three phases of support had, whether directly or indirectly, on PRM in terms of a) improvement of the police as an organization and as a service provider; and b) improvement of PRM image. A summary of the findings and recommendations are set out below.

The summary of the Evaluation Team's findings and recommendations is structured in terms of *short-to-medium term interventions* and long-term interventions. Similar to the format of the Report itself, it is presented under the headings of the key components identified in the Project in Support of the PRM: *Management and Strategic Coordination; Organizational and Operational Improvement; Personnel and Training; Public Perception of the PRM.*

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SHORT-TO-MEDIUM-TERM PROGRAMMING ASSISTANCE TO THE PRM

### A. Management and strategic coordination

**Recommendation 1.** It was found that there is insufficient or inadequate **donor coordination**. The Mission recommends that PEPRM Steering Committee be reinforced; that UTIPE be provided with adequate staff to perform its function; and that the UNDP support it with a dedicated UNDP Program Officer.

**Recommendation 2.** The monitoring process of the **PEPRM** is not working well and as a result implementation is lagging. The Mission recommends that the monitoring system of the PEPRM be reviewed and streamlined; that capacity building in terms of staff training and monitoring methodologies be provided to UTIPE; and that the recommended reinforced PEPRM Steering Committee become functional.

**Recommendation 3.** It was found that the **Justice Sector Coordination** is not working for the Police. The Mission recommends that the representation of PRM in CCLJ, through MINT's participation in that coordinating body, should be maximized; that the Justice Sector Reform Program for 2007-2012 should reflect PRM's reform perspective; and that the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor-General be included in the PEPRM Steering Committee. The result of all of this would be a 360-degree coordination and flow of discussion throughout the justice sector.

## B. Organizational and operational improvement

**Recommendation 4.** There is a serious lack of basic office supplies and police equipment for the PRM to function even at a basic level as a police services organization. The Mission recommends that a needs assessment be performed not only to assess the basic operational needs of the PRM but also to incorporate a new **information management technology system** in the PRM; that such a system ensure compatibility with the information management systems in the other agencies in the criminal justice sector. Budgetary support to the specialized police units, such as PIC and the Maritime Police Unit, should be protected. Budget allocations for police stations and district commands should provide for the **maintenance and replacement costs of infrastructure and equipment**, including vehicles. Refectory services should be extended to all police stations and the working shifts should be adjusted to 24/48 hour tours of duty in the short-term, as both of these factors affect the operational ability of the police officer.

**Recommendation 5.** It was found that police personnel work long duty tours without a meal. The Mission recommends that meals be provided to the personnel on duty. Refectory services should be extended to all police stations and the working shifts should be adjusted to 24/48 hour tours of duty in the short-term, as both of these factors affect the operational ability of the police officer.

**Recommendation 6.** PRM's operations are still very centralized. The Mission recommends that it is important to ensure that the terms of the new Organic Law and the future regulations are applied in a progressive manner to foster **decentralization** where needed; that additional competencies be assigned at provincial and district level, and special attention be given in the areas of budget allocation and the provision of goods and services; and that sustainability of the **model stations** be ensured by allocating the necessary operating and maintenance budgets. It is also vital to ensure budgetary sustainability to the NEPs, to identify the bottlenecks and to activate the key operational and administrative systems linking the police to justice.

**Recommendation 7.** There is a need to increase awareness in the PRM of **ethics and integrity** matters and to ensure that the force attains **gender balance**. The Mission recommends the implementation of updated Code of Conduct and of disciplinary regulations as soon as possible; and that a plan of awareness-raising on matters of police integrity and ethics be developed and implemented in the immediate future. With respect to gender balance, it is important that the recruitment campaigns of the PRM be gender sensitive, and that the promotion panels consider the need to increase the number of women at the senior management posts, if necessary, through a program of *"Affirmative Action".*

## C. Personnel and training

**Recommendation 8.** Although good progress has been made in the area of **recruitment and training**, there are measures that need to be taken

to improve the level of personnel and training. The Mission recommends that the recruitment process should incorporate proper psychometric evaluation of candidates at entry and attitudinal and behavioural assessments throughout the training period; that training should adopt an alternating model so that recruits return to Matalane for a short program after completion of their probationary on-the-job training period; that sub-officers promotion training programs should be developed; and that the training programs should reinforce even more issues of **human rights, women's rights and children's rights.**

**Recommendation 9.** The sustainability of the skills gained during the **specialized training** needs attention and there is a need for more coordination and multi-organizational interchange. The Mission recommends that a strategic plan for training be developed, prioritizing the specialization programs on the basis of sustainability capacity of each specialized unit acquiring the new skills; and that joint training programs be offered, such as a program on criminal investigation offered to PIC and prosecutors together or a joint training initiative by the military police and the Navy.

## D. Improvement of PRM image

**Recommendation 10.** It was found that the **public perception of the PRM** is negative and that it is the result of many factors, including but not limited to, poor quality of recruits, poor basic training, poor quality of equipment and transport (even such things as appearance of uniforms, functionality of shoe wear and hats), lack of posture and authority, and poor salary. It is also fuelled by misconceptions caused by media reports of weak police, corrupt police, higher crime rate, to mention some of the generalizations.

**Recommendation 11.** The PRM lacks a systematic and proactive approach to engage the public. In addition to the training recommendations being made in this report, the Mission recommends that a communications strategy be developed for the PRM mainly using the national media of large circulation, especially radio programs, to showcase its successes in the service to the public, promote police work as a vocation and a noble profession, and to encourage enrolment of young and bright people.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LONG-TERM PROGRAMMING ASSISTANCE TO THE PRM

## A. Management and strategic coordination

**Recommendation 12.** The sustainability of UTIPE in the long-run depends on whether its operation is absorbed into the GoM/MINT budget. The Mission recommends that UTIPE's budget be progressively absorbed into the national budget of Mozambique. International donors in the short-to-medium term should include PRM in their broader support to the Rule of Law sector in Mozambique, to ensure that their support for the PRM is not overlooked or minimized. In the long-term, support to the PRM for police

reform should be through direct contributions to the GoM General Budget, in the framework of the **PARPA** strategy.

## B. Organizational and operational

**Recommendation 13.**    It was found that that the system of discipline and oversight of police conduct is still a basic and fragile process.  The Mission recommends that disciplinary processes be independent; that an independent **civilian oversight body** be created to investigate serious misconduct cases; that the **Office of the** *Provedor de Justiça* provided for in the Constitution be established;

## C. Personnel and training

**Recommendation 14.**    **T**here is an urgent need to establish an aggressive recruitment and training program to be able to increase the number of *efectivos* in the force, and progressively build the PRM to reach international ratios of police to population.  In addition to an expansion of the Matalane School, the Mission recommends that the training centers in Beira and in Nampula be re-established.  The establishment of police schools in the center and north of the country provides for decentralization, more diverse recruitment, and better and more effective training.

## D. Improvement of PRM image

**Recommendation 15.**    It will not be easy to improve the public perception of the police in the short-to-medium term, so long-term strategies have to be developed and continually adjusted to ensure that such perception is improved.  Democratic rights and freedoms cannot be fully enjoyed if citizens do not trust their police force.  The Mission recommends that support be given to the public relations office of the PRM to build capacity of the staff to conduct public outreach activities and to continue implementing the communications strategy developed as a result of the implementation of **Recommendation 11**.  Successful projects, such as the Model Office for the Assistance of Women and Children in Beira, should be expanded to all other provinces, as it brings victims and families of victims to see the police as a protector and a friend.

**Recommendation 16.**    It was found that there is a great confusion in the country about the concept of **community policing** (*Policiamento Comunitário*).    The Mission recommends the re-examination of the Community Policing system, studying other reforms experienced by countries like Kenya or Albania, and following the Saferworld/SEESAC/UNDP Community Policing Guidelines. The police should forge relationships with the civil society and establish a **community police unit** based on international norms**.**  The development of a comprehensive statistic capability through the creation of a **National Crime Observatory** is key to the development of a modern police force and would assist in improving the image of the police by providing accurate scientific crime statistics, which builds public confidence and trust in the police.

# I. INTRODUCTION

1.     Having gone through a period of severe internal conflict, Mozambique is today a nation in transition.  Not unlike most post-conflict countries, it suffers from a low economic base and a lack of qualified human resources.   It requires capacity building in the public sector with emphasis on accountability, transparency, and due process. The foundation of any democracy is governance in accordance with the rule of law and human rights.  In support of it, the police force is on the frontline and becomes the face of the law for the citizens they are sworn to serve and to protect.   The police force of Mozambique (Polícia da República de Moçambique –PRM) was composed mainly by former members of the Mozambican Armed Forces.  Soon after the Rome Agreement in 1992, the international community recognized the need to provide assistance to transform the police from a military-oriented force to a police service, trained to ensure law and order in accordance with international norms and human rights. In 1997, the UNDP, the Government of Spain and the Government of the Netherlands, pulled efforts together to start a multilateral project of support to the PRM. The initial project with the duration of 3 years was followed by a Phase II. The present Phase III has only the support of the Government of the Netherlands.

2.     This evaluation[*], while it reviews various aspects of the intervention by UNDP and its international partners with the PRM since 1997, its focus is on the evaluation of the outcome of Phase III of the project.  This outcome is stated on the project document (ProDoc Phase I)[1] as follows:

> *"Improved effectiveness of PRM to ensure law and order, security and public safety in strict accordance with current laws, citizens' freedom, and international norms for human rights."*

3.     To achieve this outcome, Phase III focused on 4 key components:

   A.    Implementation of the Strategic Plan of the PRM (Plano Estratégico da Polícia de Moçambique – PEPRM)
   B.    Improvement of PRM organization and management capability
   C.    Continuous training of personnel
   D.    Improvement of PRM image

4.     This evaluation will assess the design, management, and implementation of Phase III of the project through a rigorous analysis of the intended outputs prescribed under each of the four key components of the project.  It will discuss the intended outputs from a perspective of efficiency,

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[1] Which is the same as in ProDocs I and II

effectiveness, adequacy, and sustainability. It will then provide an assessment of the cumulative impact that the three phases of support had, whether directly or indirectly, on PRM in terms of a) improvement of the police as an organization and as a service provider; and b) improvement of PRM image.

5. The methodology applied consisted of UNDP initial briefing, review of project documents, the progress reports, work plans and other relevant documentation (see Annex 5), interviews with stakeholders such as the Ministry of Interior (MINT), PRM, UTIPE, donor partners, UN agencies and civil society (see Annex 3). The team also conducted a limited number of focus group discussions with university students, who were also asked to complete a survey designed to assess their perception of the PRM. The findings were presented to stakeholders and project partners for their comments and input, prior to the final report being submitted.

6. The Report addresses the following issues and makes specific recommendations on:

- The importance of the project since 1997;
- The process of capacity building in the PRM;
- The pace of the modernization and of the optimization of operational and administrative procedures and means of work;
- The sustainability of the project and the likelihood that the project results will endure after the project has ended;
- The impact of the project since 1997 on public perception and the image of the PRM; and
- The continuing importance of the support of the Strategic Plan of the PRM.

7. This external and independent evaluation gives UNDP and the project partners an objective assessment of the project, its management and implementation, areas of successes and results, lessons learned, and provides recommendations for the way forward. It is intended to be used as guidance for future action by MINT, PRM and UTIPE, and for the design of future intervention by present and future donors, if such intervention is planned.

# II. THE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

## 2.1 Brief Overview of the PRM

8.     The PRM is under the MINT and has a General Commander. Each province has a provincial command and each district has at least a police station. The PRM is divided into three branches: the Protection Police (Polícia de Protecção – PP), the Criminal Investigation Police (Polícia de Investigação Criminal – PIC) and the Special and Reserve Forces (divided further into sub-units).There are roughly 20,000 police officers, which corresponds to an approximate ratio of 1 officer per 1,000 inhabitants (the international standard is 1 to 350/450). Given the size of Mozambique this does not allow for an adequate representation, and restricts citizens´ access to police services. The PEPRM is cognizant of this problem and one of its major goals is the rapid increase of the force to 40,000 officers. Even though there has been regular recruitment of new officers this has neither been sufficient to achieve this goal or to compensate for the loss of officers affected by HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Although the recruitment of women is improving, the PRM is still a male-dominated force, even more visible in the upper echelons, despite the rhetoric of gender equality. Besides the lack of staff, the PRM lacks adequate infrastructures and equipment, which hinders its efficiency.

9.     Since 1992, the PRM has been going through important institutional changes. The most recent has been the development and adoption of a ten year strategic plan for 2003-2012 (PEPRM), which was a main outcome of the Police support project Phase II. The PEPRM, first of its kind for the police in Mozambique, is an important document as it makes an analysis of the crime situation and establishes desired objectives, corresponding projects, indicators and resources needed. However, it does not shed light on how the resources can be attained, what the GoM contribution is supposed to be, and what is the sustainability strategy. This lack of specificity may have contributed to low international interest, so far, in funding projects in support of the PEPRM. The PEPRM does not include PIC, thus pointing to a possible separation of PIC from the PRM, which appears to be under discussion. The PEPRM also fails to adequately address relevant contemporary issues, such as community policing, the impact of HIV/AIDS in the police force, an adequate representation of women, and the creation of control mechanisms to deal with police corruption and police misconduct. Finally, although extensive consultation was carried out, it took the form of a top-down approach and the majority of officers in the field "just knew" the plan existed, but were not aware of its content.  The general population does not appear to be aware of the existence of the PEPRM, which is probably understandable.  Still, the PEPRM has been developed by the PRM and approved by the Council of Ministers of the GoM, and the feeling of ownership within the force is quite high.

### 2.2 Background analysis of Phase I of the Project

10.   Phase I of the Support to the Police of the Republic of Mozambique started as a UNDP initiative and was developed through consultations and negotiations by the UNDP with the Ministry of Interior (MINT) of the Government of Mozambique (GoM) and the governments of Spain and the Netherlands as donors.  The total funding for the project was US$12 million plus US$3 million in-kind contribution (US$6 million – Netherlands; US$5.2 million – Spain; Spain providing technical assistance/training by the Guardia Civil as a US$3 million in-kind contribution).  Phase I Project commenced in 1997 with UNOPS as the executing agency.  Its focus was two-folded: (a) the rehabilitation and furnishing of the main police training centre [Michafutene Police Training Center]; and (b) the rehabilitation of selected police stations in Maputo.  The Governments of Switzerland and Spain funded the establishment and training activities of the Police Training Academy ACIPOL (*Academia de Ciências Policiais*) in the amount of US$2.6 million [US$1.6 – Switzerland; US$0.9 million – Spain].  The management modality for ACIPOL is the National Execution modality. The project was undertaken in coordination with other bilateral programs funded by Portugal, South Africa, USA and Germany.  The reforms undertaken under this phase established a base for a Phase II Project in support of PRM.

### 2.3 Background analysis of Phase II of Project

11.   Phase II Project commenced in October 2000 and was financed by Spain and the Netherlands (US$12 million), with co-financing from GoM, and coordinated in a similar fashion as Phase I. Phase II Project was designed to consolidate and build on the progress achieved in the previous phase by:

- Training more recruits and re-training existing police (*formação e reciclagem*);
- Support the establishment of a number of model units at selected police stations, district and police commands – through rehabilitation of premises, provision of necessary support equipment and technical assistance. The selected Police Station and District Commands were to include an office dedicated to women and children victims of domestic violence and were supposed to improve detainee's conditions to comply with international standards;
- Support improvements in the managerial and planning functions of the PRM, including the General Command.

12.   The units dedicated to women and children victims of domestic violence (*Gabinete de Atendimento a Mulheres e Crianças Vítimas de Violência Doméstica*) are an integral part of the Police structure and are funded and assisted by UNICEF. Today there are over 150 of these units spread out in the country. However there are no common standards, and in most cases, their effectiveness depend on the awareness and interest of the officer in charge, as well as on extra funds from other partners, such as non-governmental organizations.

13. During Phase II Project, PRM and MINT embarked on extensive and widespread consultations with stakeholders, by establishing a Steering Committee made up of 52 members, representing all concerned sectors of government, civil society, bilateral and multilateral donors, and developed the PEPRM. While the Strategic Plan is an ambitious document in terms of the cost of the proposed projects, it is a major step forward for the Corporation in that it provides an institutional direction for the future as well as a mechanism to identify priorities, costs, and indicators to monitor and measure outcomes.

## 2.4  Brief Overview of UNDP Justice Sector Support

14. In post-conflict countries, often international support is directed more towards the Courts and the Prosecution Services, than to the Police Services. However, it is important to understand that the justice system will likely never function well unless there is a well-trained and equipped police force in the country. In the case of Mozambique, while there has been a failure to recognize and integrate the whole criminal justice system, there are ambitious projects in the justice sector, such as the UNDP/EU Project in support of "Citizens Access to Justice" (*Apoio ao Cidadão no Acesso a Justiça*), which is a well-financed project investing over €11 million in the justice sector. One key output of this program involves a One-Stop-Shop, the *Palácio da Justiça* [or Justice Palace] to be located in district capitals across the country, which is in the drawing stages with planned pilot buildings congregating the courthouse, the prosecutor and PIC offices.

15. Until 2005, there appeared to have been very little coordination or inclusion of the police in the high-level coordination bodies of the justice sector. However, in 2005 MINT was incorporated into the CCLJ (Council of Coordination for Law and Justice), which resulted in better coordination between the police and the rest of the justice sector components. In September/October 2006 the UNDP/EU Project above-mentioned commissioned and received a Report on the design and implementation of a modern system of criminal investigation, intended to provide institutional support to PIC[2]. The support to PIC is important to the functioning of the courts and the work of the prosecutors, in presenting evidence during trials. The recognition of this factor is an important step, in that it may lead to more international attention to the PRM, when planning support to the justice system of the Republic of Mozambique.

> The Mission urges more coordination and more inclusion of the police in the different coordinating organs of the justice sector and urges the international community to ensure equitable funding to projects in support of the police whenever funding is being directed towards the justice sector.

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[2] Tito Soares, Relatório de Consultoria Técnica (31 October 2006).

# III. ASSESSMENT OF PHASE III OF THE POLICE SUPPORT PROJECT

## 3.1 Introduction

16. Phase III, following the previous two phases and having already the benefit of the PEPRM, was designed to support the country program to improve governance. It took into account some key governance institutions and it complements the UNDP Justice Sector Support Program. Phase III provides support for the implementation of the following key priorities identified in the PEPRM:

    A. Monitoring and implementation of the Strategic Plan
    B. Organizational and management improvement
    C. Personnel and training
    D. Improvement of PRM image

17. Cross-cutting issues such as **gender, human rights, juvenile justice, HIV/AIDS**, and environment, were to be taken into account in activities where applicable. A prime opportunity to introduce cross-cutting issues was provided during training programs and in the development of systems and structures aimed at ensuring compliance.

18. The project budget was estimated around US$7 million, while the initial contribution from the UNDP and the Netherlands Government was established at around US$1 million, clearly setting a huge financial gap to be covered by the GoM and the international donor community

## 3.2 Project Design, Management and Implementation

19. **Project Design.** Similar to the previous phases of the support to the police of Mozambique, UNDP assumed the coordination role of Phase III, with the Netherlands as the main co-funding partner. The design of Phase III focused on the establishment of tools for implementing the PEPRM, which had been approved in Phase II. It took into consideration the recommendations of Phase II Mid-term Evaluation Report, which stated that if a phase III was to be implemented, it was necessary to:

> *"place more emphasis on capacity building, high level project coordination of donor support across the sector, increased participation of counterparts and civil society, and more integration with both reforms in the justice sector and the whole of the government approach to strengthening public administration in Mozambique."*

20. While UNDP acted as an honest broker in the mobilization of resources in support to the reform of the police, the project documents do not detail how consultation were carried out in the project design. The apparent lack of

proper consultation with stakeholders constitutes always a great risk. It may have contributed to the lack of efficiency and effectiveness, even though this was mitigated by the wide consultation used to produce the PEPRM, which was the basis for the design of Phase III. It must be highlighted however that a proper consultation process could had positively contributed to bring onboard more donors, and establish a better collaborative environment with key sectors like Justice reform to maximize impact.

21. An example of this situation is well reflected in the consecution of the Output 1.6, concerning the elaboration of an IT plan duly costed, which has not been achieved by the end of Phase III. Documents indicate that there are pending negotiations of a bilateral agreement with Spain in order to fund it. Another example is the lack of effective coordination with the Justice Sector and the synchronization of activities with the Justice Sector reform.

22. A stakeholders' analysis prior to the finalization of the project design could as well have been beneficial in understanding the different activities planned by the multiple donors, specially the training support provided by the Portuguese Government. Such analysis could have prompted the need for ensuring synchronization of Phase III with these parallel support actions. This would generate, to the full extent, the maximization of results, given the scarce resources. Against the project budget, the available resources were by far too limited to carry out all of the proposed activities.

23. The recommendation issued in Phase II Mid-term Evaluation Report of promoting joint training activities was relevant and it could had been better accommodated in the Phase III project document. These activities included specialized courses on criminal investigation, bringing together personnel from the police and the prosecutor's office.

24. Although the promotion of gender equality was identified as a cross-cutting issue to be incorporated into all activities, this was limited to the incorporation of the theme in the training activities. In the project design, specific activities should have been identified to incorporate a gender perspective into the implementation of the PEPRM, and its monitoring process, as this might have contributed to the improvement of the image of the PRM. One example is that, despite the strong potential (and proven effectiveness) of the special gender-based domestic violence offices in improving Police's image, this was not taken into consideration and therefore not used to its full potential.

25. **Monitoring.** Key to measuring the progress and the outcome of any project, and even more essential, when attempting to reform a public administration system, is the establishment of a well-designed evaluation and monitoring plan. Adequate quantifiable impact indicators must be established, following the *SMART* principle, which states that indicators should be *i)Specific; ii) Measurable; iii) Achievable and Attributable; iv) Relevant and Realistic, and; v) Time-bound, Timely, Track-able, and Targeted*. The project document was successful in establishing some sort of time-bound indicators, perhaps too tight given the past experience of delays in project

implementation. However these were designed as output targets, being rather general indications of planned outputs than specific, measurable indicators. Some examples of these non-specific indicators are for instance *"policies, practices and procedures updated, documented, agreed by the end of month 12",* or the *"decentralisation and management program completed by the end of month 12".* These are clearly too ambiguous, providing a general idea of the expected output, but non functional if we want to measure real progress and use these as roadmaps to an adequate and successful implementation of the project.

26.   In addition to the establishment of proper indicators, measures need to be adopted for the monitoring of the project implementation, in accordance with the approved indicators. This important component of any project document was left to the discretion of UTIPE as the implementing agency. The consulting team has been unable to see a proper monitoring plan, with well structured indicators, baseline references and adequate sources of information to measure progress, which is fundamental for proper project design and implementation.

27.   The project document foresaw the adoption of quarterly progress reports as part of the monitoring and management plan. Once the project started, it was decided to report every six months which, given the pace of the project, has been considered adequate.

28.   The overall impact of the process on the project document  could have been much more positive if a more neat, structured process had been performed in the drafting of the project document, thus increasing the efficiency and efficacy of the project.

29.   **Project Management.**      Phase III was designed following a national execution modality, with the Ministry of Interior as the lead agency and UNDP responsible for donor coordination, joint administration of the resources allocated by the donor community, and the mobilization of any additional resources. The adoption of this agreement secured the transparent management and administration of the project funds.

30.   The establishment of the UTIPE unit within the Ministry of Interior, to lead the development and monitoring of the PRM Strategic plan, and the assignment of this unit as responsible for managing Phase III project can be, in general terms, assessed as positive and successful, with some *caveats*. The replacement of the UTIPE Director in the middle of the project caused some delays and disruptions, which could have been avoided if the Government had secured a replacement before the departure of the first Director. UTIPE remained without Director for a year.

31. UNDP involvement in the project was not only secured by the appointment of a CTA, but also by the periodical follow up that the program manager responsible of the police and rule of law area is supposed to do. The frequent replacement and absence of an assigned program manager to follow up on the project, resulted in lower monitoring standards than those usually

demanded by UNDP. In addition, the project document stipulated that UNDP was responsible for donor mobilization, a role it could have performed better if a program manager had been available and more involved with the project.

32.   Although the project document foresaw the adoption of a memorandum of understanding between the government and its project partners establishing the protocols for engagement and strategic decision making, this evaluation team has not been able to see it. This is an important document particularly since the evaluation team heard that the Government has not put forth sufficient efforts to achieve the project objectives. It seems that the lack of integration of UTIPE in MINT has resulted in some delays in implementing the project.  This situation improved substantially in the second semester of 2006, with the nomination of several liaison officers from the PRM General Command responsible for interacting with UTIPE.

33.   Finally, the document contemplated the creation of a GoM/Donors Steering Committee, as the overarching leading committee to guide the proper implementation of the project, and the implementation of the PEPRM by extension. While the steering committee has met on some occasions, it should be noted that a more frequent meeting schedule could have proved useful in reprogramming the project.  It would assist particularly in involving additional donors into the project and into the broader execution of the PEPRM. In general terms, it appears that the Steering Committee did fall short in achieving the necessary leadership role.

34.   Recognizing the difficulty in attempting the reform of a complex public service like the police, reprogramming and readjusting activities, in mid-term implementation frameworks, is necessary. The Mid-term Evaluation of the project programmed was adequate and relevant. Yet, it was not done due to the lack of funds. Evaluation should be always considered as a key element of a development effort, and thus, it should never be neglected. Adequate allocation of funds should be guaranteed to conduct evaluations.

35.   **Project Implementation.**   Although important advances have been realized in most of the components, implementation of the project has not fully attained the degree of achievement it was planned for. Several reasons from a design, management and financial perspective have influenced the delay in the implementation process, including but not limited to the following:

- The lack of a more specific project document, including SMART indicators and adequate monitoring system;
- The delayed replacement of the Director of UTIPE, the non-replacement of CTA and the delay in replacing the UNDP program manager;
- The partial commitment of the highest authorities from the Government;
- The lack of firm leadership of the steering committee;
- The lengthy legislative procedure to approve and adopt new legislation;

- The Netherlands's delay in disbursing funds and the delay in imputing it into the UNDP ATLAS system;
- The change of contract modalities between the UNDP and the GoM;
- The unclear contribution of GoM;
- The lack of additional funds being mobilized from other donors;
- The insufficient coordination and correlation with the justice sector reform;
- The limited incorporation into the project of gains achieved in parallel projects (for instance, the maritime police trained by the Portuguese was unable to put into practice its speciality due to lack of maritime transportation).

36.     Out of these, a special mention should be made of the lack of adequate resources, as the project budget was established at around US$7 million, with an initial funding from UNDP and the Netherlands Government of about US$1 million. The additional financial contributions, obtained during the implementation of the project, reached only US$0.5 million, limiting the overall implementation of the project. During this period, Portugal was a key supporter, with a contribution in kind to set up and run specialization courses. This contributed towards the achievement of some of the projects key outputs. UNICEF and Save the Children (Norway) have contributed towards the establishment and funding of the Gabinetes de Apoio à Mulher e Criança Vítima da Violência. GoM funding has remained unclear along all this whole period, due to the lack of specific and detailed information on their contributions to the project, in a macroeconomic framework, non-conducive for the GoM to absorb the unfunded project budget.

37.     The degree of achievement and efficiency of the programmed outputs will be further discussed in the next section.
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## 3.3   Output and Outcome evaluation of Phase III Project

### 3.3.1     Project components and outputs

38.     Phase III of the project in support of the reform of the PRM is aimed at contributing to the same previously stated overarching outcome:

*"Improved effectiveness of PRM to ensure law and order. Security and public safety in strict accordance with current laws, citizens' freedom, and international norms for human rights".*

39.     With this outcome as a strategic objective, the project document was designed around 4 **key areas of intervention** as set out in Paragraph 16 [s. 3.1] dealing with **the implementation of the PEPRM, management, training and the public perception of the police.** Each of the four key intervention areas was then further developed into specific outputs and activities, which constitute the roadmap for the project itself.

40.  Cross-cutting issues relating to gender, justice, HIV/AIDS, and human rights were to be taken into consideration in the project implementation, although in some cases, the project document did not detail enough how to incorporate these key issues. By the end of the project, this resulted in unclear results concerning the different cross-cutting issues. The Mission has observed some of these given its relevance and adequacy, and they will be discussed later on in this evaluation report.

### 3.3.2    Monitoring and Implementation of Strategic Plan

41.  This key intervention area includes just one output (No. 1.1. as per ProDoc results and resources framework), defined as the creation and effective implementation of *"Institutional mechanisms to monitor and support the implementation of the Strategic Plan (PEPRM)"*.

42.  The approval in 2003 of the PEPRM was a key success in PRM's efforts towards the modernization and improvement of its service delivery capacity to the citizens of Mozambique. As a result of the UNDP-lead Phase II project, the PEPRM gathered a considerable number of stakeholders in a widespread consultation, including donors and civil society, producing a PRM's roadmap for 2003-2012.

43.  While the document constitutes a very good and solid step towards the strategic development of the PRM, its long term implementation framework requires proper monitoring and implementation mechanisms, in order to secure its proper execution. Phase III project output 1.1 established a clear intention to do this.

44.  A number of key activities were proposed as follows: i) the creation of a GoM/Donors steering committee; ii) the creation of a Technical Implementation Unit (UTIPE); iii) the design of a monitoring system for the implementation of the PEPRM, and; iv) the celebration of workshops with the Justice sector in order to better coordinate the different intervention actions and create mutually beneficial synergies.

> The mission considers that the activities outlined under output 1.1. are relevant and adequate given the importance of the PEPRM and its necessary implementation. As a matter of fact, the entire project outputs are designed around the strategic lines approved in the PEPRM, therefore, coordination and supervision of the implementation of the strategic program is essential.

45.  **Steering Committee.**      The highest supervisory/consultative body that the Phase III ProDoc suggested was the establishment of a Steering Committee. In fact, in the production process of the PEPRM, a steering committee was already created with around 50 members from the GoM, donors and civil society. It appears, however, that this wide consultative forum was discontinued. The new redefined Steering committee includes now only participation of the MINT, the UNDP and some donors, excluding the

representatives from the civil society.  It resulted in much less determination to lead the effective implementation of the PEPRM. Out of the wide array of participants in the previous phase, only a few remain engaged in the process.

> The reestablishment of the wider-representation Steering Committee to provide guidance and consultation on the implementation of the PEPRM appears to be highly relevant and necessary. There is a need to engage the widest representation possible of donors and of pushing the information through to Government officials and civil society.

46.    According to the Phase III project reports, the first meeting of the smaller Steering Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Interior, took place in March 2005, while the second and last meeting was organized on October 2006. So far, the Mission is not aware of any planned meeting for 2007. This evaluation team, despite reasonable efforts made, could not find any minutes of the above mentioned meetings. While the first one was considered satisfactory, the second edition was deemed unsatisfactory[3] .

47.    The lack of a strategic approach from MINT towards donors and the development of the Justice Sector reform plan did probably result in lower donor interest in actively participating in the new PEPRM steering committee. Key donor countries like Spain have completely disengaged from supporting the police.

48.    However, new donor groups, such as the European Commission, are starting to consider Police reform in the wider reform of the criminal justice system.  At the present they do not participate in the steering committee.  It is important then to ensure the functionality of the Steering Committee, with meetings taking place at least twice a year, as a forum where the GoM can update donors and other stakeholders on the pace of PEPRM implementation and the projected needs in the short, medium and long term scenarios. Such a forum provides an opportunity to engage additional donors in the PEPRM implementation.  The PEPRM substantial budget, amounting to about US$250 million, requires a full strategy of donor resource mobilization, as the GoM has a very limited absorptive capacity for the needs of the Police, being only able to fund a small fraction of the overall proposed priority programs.

49.    The key to engaging donors is to keep them adequately updated and showing GoM commitment to the reform of the police in a well structured way. The PEPRM is the basis for it. However, as any other strategic plan, it needs to be continuously updated and readapted to the changing environment. Donors, civil society and affected stakeholders need to be able to participate in the process.   Similarly, ensuring civil society participation is equally important. Excluding civil society organizations from the Steering Committee negatively affects the overall process. It has also a negative impact on PRM's image.

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[3] Phase III Project Report for the Tripartite Meeting (Dec 05-April 07)  page 5

> It is recommended that future UNDP/donor actions in support of the police consider as a high priority to ensure the functionality of the PEPRM Steering Committee. The Steering Committee should be a body capable of leading the implementation of the PEPRM and with capacity enough to readapt and reassess the PEPRM as needed. Every effort should be made to achieve gender-balanced representation in the Committee and to include representation from human rights groups, and from women's and children's rights groups.

50. **UTIPE.** Probably one of the most successful outputs in Phase III project is the creation of UTIPE. Established under the authority of MINT in December 2004, UTIPE is managed by a national Director, supervising and supporting the implementation of the PEPRM. The evaluation team considers that UTIPE constitutes an essential entity in the successful consecution of the PEPRM. The nomination of a national Director, responsible for managing the unit, ensures national ownership and contributes to guarantee the sustainability of the unit from a human capacity point of view. The lack of adequate resources will mean that the operations of UTIPE will continue to be mostly financed by the international contributions to the project budget. The Mission considers that it is important that MINT incorporates UTIPE into their mid-term economic scenarios in order to progressively integrate UTIPE into MINT recurrent budget, thus ensuring sustainability of this key unit.

51. The Mission has observed how UTIPE's capacity of manoeuvre inside the PRM is still very limited despite the important role it is called to play in the implementation of the PEPRM. In the beginning of Phase III project, the unit was often ignored by several departments of the PRM, a situation that greatly improved in 2006 with the nomination, by the PRM General Command, of Departmental liaison officers assigned as focal points for UTIPE, and by extension, for the implementation of the PEPRM. Another comment received by the Mission is that UTIPE has often been perceived as a "money box", a unit where PRM Departments could expect financial contributions coming from the international development partners. It is important to make sure that UTIPE is placed at the right level in the institutional framework of the PRM, as the advisory and secretariat unit responsible for coordinating the PEPRM, and not just as an interlocutor to ask for international assistance.

52. As the PEPRM guardian, it is essential that UTIPE is bestowed with all the necessary means to conduct its key function, including a *Secretariat* with an appropriate level of human resources. UTIPE needs a functional and established management structure that would not only include a Director, but also 3 or 4 program officers responsible for different areas of the PEPRM. UTIPE Director needs at the same time to be included in all key discussions among PRM management, and be considered as a key member of PRM/MINT management committee.

53. Another important element in the proper development of UTIPE is the recruitment of a CTA. The departure of Phase III project CTA was felt in the implementation capacity of UTIPE, and together with the replacement of UTIPE Director, negatively affected the proper development of the project. Given the current lack of key donors supporting the police, UTIPE must intensify its efforts for engaging additional development partners in supporting the implementation of the PEPRM. The CTA could play a key role in facilitating contact with the international donor community. Yet, the greatest contribution of the CTA could be in providing capacity-building to UTIPE staff in strategic planning and monitoring, the core task of UTIPE which at present is not strong enough.

> The Mission considers that the role of the CTA remains still necessary given the magnitude of the change envisaged in the PEPRM.

54. **Monitoring System.** While the PEPRM steering committee is called to provide guidance and external monitoring of the pace of reform of PRM through the implementation of the PEPRM, UTIPE was designed to be responsible for the internal monitoring and follow up. As mentioned before, this constitutes the core task of UTIPE. The Mission has observed that the capacity of UTIPE to effectively monitor the PEPRM remains weak at present. UTIPE keeps somehow a record of the activities defined in the PEPRM that are under discussion here, however not in a clear or systematic way. A proper reporting and control system needs to be established so that UTIPE is able to provide detailed status reports, both to MINT and to the different stakeholders, on the different reforms being undertaken. Still, it must be mentioned that a **positive element was the preparation by the PRM of a 5-year operational plan for the implementation of the PEPRM**, prioritizing the actions to be undertaken within the wider framework of the PEPRM.

55. Monitoring systems are essential not only for understanding the pace of reforms and changes in the system, but also for understanding the benefits and impact that reforms are supposed to provide. While the PEPRM offers a good range of strategic working guidelines, with detailed activities, the monitoring indicators established in the document are not good enough. Most of the indicators refer to completion of activities, but almost none to the degree of improvement of PRM efficiency or service delivery capacity. This is essential in assessing the impact of the change, and in being successful in gaining trust from the society and development partners, who are expected to contribute financially to the reforms.

> The Mission recommends that UTIPE undertake, as soon as possible, a review of the PEPRM, redefining the set of indicators and the overall monitoring system, ensuring transparency and efficiency in such a way that the PEPRM impact would be unequivocally beneficial. The simple adoption of new rules or provision of equipment does not necessarily entail an improvement in the efficiency or quality of the service rendered.

56.    Staffing UTIPE with additional program officers would be helpful in reinforcing its monitoring capacity.

57.    **Justice Sector Coordination.**    According to the project reports, there were no formal workshops with the Justice sector. This situation was, however, compensated through the full incorporation of MINT into the CCLJ in 2005, which to a certain extent, was able to incorporate police issues in the negotiation and coordination discussions. The coordination of both sectors is considered by the Mission as highly relevant and necessary in order to maximize and harmonize results in the wider framework of the rule of law. However, the results have been limited so far. Prior to the incorporation of MINT into the CCLJ, the lack of productive dialogue between both sectors resulted in the creation of independent sectoral programs with little or no connection. For that reason, the PEPRM has an important gap in fully incorporating the perspective of the Justice sector. From the justice perspective, the draft Justice Sector Strategic Development Plan, covering the period 2007-2012, will hopefully include the police issues and recommendations, including some key programs that require the indispensable participation of the Police.

58.    While the inclusion of Police issues through MINT participation into the CCLJ is a good step, the Mission considers it not sufficient, as more practical and specific actions need to be undertaken to better coordinate both sectors. It must be said however that the situation appears to improve. The nomination of former UTIPE Director as Director of the Technical Unit for Legal Reform (UTREL), responsible for the implementation of the program of supporting citizens' access to Justice, can greatly contribute to the establishment of joint partnerships between both sectors. The PIC is an indispensable part of the criminal justice system, and thus, it requires close collaboration between both Ministries of Interior and Justice.

59.    The program "Supporting Citizen's Access to Justice" is considering establishing joint infrastructures (*Palácio da Justiça*) where the courthouse, the prosecutor's office and PIC would be placed in the same building, facilitating exchange of information and cooperation. The Attorney General's office has expressed as well an interest in improving collaboration. This cooperation can be found for instance in the planned Integrated System for Justice Sector Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (SIPMAJ), a joint information database, gathering different  sets of data relevant to the Justice sector, which will have a module directly relevant to the PRM criminal justice duties. The implementation of such information module would allow for inputting of data pertaining to criminal offences right from the police stations and then be available for the entire judicial system. The plan counts with the endorsement of MINT.  The mission has not received however a clear answer or assurance that SIPMAJ will be compatible with future IT/information management plans that the PRM may decide to implement.

> It is fundamental that all Information management systems in the Rule of Law area be designed in an inter-connectable, fully compatible modular architecture, so they can be easily upgraded and data can be shared between police and justice services.

60.   Overall, the cooperation between the police and the justice sector has slowly improved over the last few years. Coordination is still poor at the provincial and district levels, something the CCLJ and the Attorney's General office are aware of, but it appears it will require additional political will to improve the situation. At provincial and district level, cooperation is expected to take place in the framework of the Commissions for the Control of the Legality, an informal coordination body that, similarly to the CCLJ, gathers all Rule of Law state stakeholders, including the PRM. This Mission has however received unclear messages on how this is working in real terms in the provinces, appearing that the situation is not equal across the country, with some provinces where participation is minimal. In accordance with the opinion expressed by the CCLJ, the mission recommends the strengthening of the capacity of these provincial commissions so the cooperation between both sectors works effectively across all the country and not just in Maputo. Moreover, it is recommendable to identify the bottlenecks and the key operational and administrative processes interlinking police and justice that cause delays or inefficiencies in processing open cases.

61.   There are as well ongoing discussions on the capacity of PIC to operate autonomously from the PRM General Command, in order to gain efficiency. This is however something that no decision has been taken yet.

> Removal of PIC from the PRM General Command is a matter that the mission considers to be an important decision that must be postponed pending better advancement in the implementation of the PEPRM.

### 3.3.3   Organizational and Management capability

62.   The second key intervention area that Phase III project was designed for corresponds to improving PRM's organizational and management capabilities. The intervention was designed around 5 outputs, which are detailed as follows:

- *Policies, practices and procedures for logistics and finance reviewed, updated and implemented (Output 1.2. as per ProDoc results and resources framework);*
- *Review and evaluation of existing resources in relation to objectives of the Strategic Plan (Output 1.3.);*
- *Decentralization and management of human, financial an material resources at the provincial and district levels (Output 1.4.);*
- *Integrity, ethics and professionalism of the PRM strengthened (Output 1.5.);*

- *Technology plan for the duration of the Strategic Plan developed (Output 1.6.).*

63. **Review and improvement of logistic and financial procedures.** The modernization and rationalization of logistic and financial procedures is an important element in the improvement of the service delivery capacity of a public service like police. Already in Phase II, the non existence of almost any organizational and administrative rule at the police station level, negatively affected performance. The introduction, by an initiative of the Spanish Guardia Civil of basic, yet effective proposals, for management at the police station level was a success, and at present, it remains in great measure the current procedure or practice. Nevertheless, PRM has, under Phase III, advanced in their complete review of rules and procedures. The pace of reform and introduction of changes however remains very slow.

64. According to the project reports, at central command level, the salary payment system was computerized and executed through individual bank accounts, and procurement procedures were to be harmonized with the SISTAFE rules of the GoM. The Ministry of Finance conducted an audit of the financial procedures of the PRM and elaborated a diagnosis to clarify misinterpretations. One important issue foreseen in the project design was the establishment of depreciation methods for equipment, vehicles and buildings, so PRM's budget would contemplate replacement, once certain assets extinguish their functional life. Another important issue was concerning the maintenance of vehicles and buildings.

65. The mission, with limited access to MINT budget documentation, has observed that in the 2007 MINT budget, depreciation models for these items are not clearly reflected, and so replacement is not contemplated. This poses a serious problem for the entire PRM organization, as once the functional life of operational assets end, no replacement will be available. A similar situation is found with maintenance policies. The lack of regular maintenance has caused most of the vehicles donated under previous project phases to be currently inoperative, due to lack of spare parts and maintenance budget. The problem is specially felt in district commands and police stations.

> Lack of maintenance policy and corresponding budget allocation is also felt in the buildings rehabilitated or constructed under previous phases that given the poor construction quality, and lack of maintenance, are quickly deteriorating. Therefore, this is an area the mission would urge action, by putting in place an adequate maintenance, depreciation and replacement policy and budget in order to ensure sustainability of the investments made in previous phases of the project in terms of infrastructure and equipment, especially in vehicles.

66. Besides the instructions introduced as result of Phase II, several new administrative instructions have been drafted in form of Permanent Execution Norms (NEP) and tested since the beginning of the project in several police

stations, starting with Maputo. These have however, remained as pilot, and have not been yet fully incorporated in the daily life of the majority of police stations and district commands. While not specifically dealing with financial or logistic issues, these remain to be highly relevant for the improvement of the operational and administrative management of the PRM. Dissemination has been achieved during phase III in all the provinces, although some of them were just covered in early 2007. Some of the NEPs designed are:

- Procedural manual on patrols, rotations, "fixed posts" [4], and "assumptions of decision making"[5];
- Template/models of reports for "Permanent Officials" [6], Section Commanders, and for firearm use;
- New model of case numbers and other procedures;
- Template/model for evaluation and respective tables for Operative Units and Sub-units.

67.    As indicated in the project reports, PRM is showing strong willingness to implement the above reforms. The implementation and applicability of these instruction manuals will depend on the logistical resources available, especially in terms of computers and stationery. The Mission has experienced a dramatic reality where police stations have no budget to even buy paper or ribbons for typewriters. Any reform issued by the General Command must be adopted in the framework of budgetary sustainability, as this appears recurrently to be the main obstacle for all changes in the PRM.

68.    The project reports mention as well the approval of at least 15 new models of *autos* and other procedural pieces, leading to the simplification of the processes, which the mission considers highly relevant and adequate, leading to a more efficient and effective police service. The mission however has experienced in the visits to police stations and district commands that, in the vast majority of the cases, the last updates police personnel received dated back to as far as 2003-2004. It appears as if these were products of Phase II rather than Phase III. The mission has asked UTIPE in several occasions to provide a list of these NEPs and other procedural instructions already approved, and their degree of applicability in the country, but was not successful in accessing this information.

69.    **Review of Existing Resources.**    Similarly to the previous section, the rationalization and allocation, on a priority basis, of the scarce resources available is a must in improving PRM's performance. Under Phase III project, and according to the ProDoc, PRM has conducted an audit and assessment analysis of the human and material needs to perform PRM's duties. This mission has however not had the chance to see detailed documents

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[4] Translated from Portuguese "postos fixos".

[5] Translated from Portuguese "pressupostos de tomada de decisão".

[6] Translated from Portuguese "Oficiais de Permanência".

concerning the above mentioned resource assessment or any written documents on strategic allocation of resources on a priority basis.

70. According to the ProDoc, a Working Group for the Development of Human Resources was created in Phase III, carrying out diagnosis and scheduling members' training. This process included analysis and description of posts, planning and allocation of resources, and optimal career sequencing.

71. The mission has however observed that in real terms in the police stations and district commands, the allocation of personnel remains deficient. Career possibilities remain to be highly limited, as even with the current system where vacancies are advertised, interviewed officers claim that selection is being done in a non transparent, non competitive way. Often ACIPOL new graduates assigned to their first police station, remain there for a considerable, often excessive, amount of years pending further advancement possibilities. The situation is even worse for basic police guards, as the promotion to sub-officers ranks appear to be even more chaotic, with no specific training program for promotion being offered.  Women are most affected by a deficient career development system, having fewer opportunities to upgrade, and this is illustrated by the PRM's reduced number of women in higher echelons.

72. Another recurrent problem is that, despite the introduction of more progressive shift rotations in Stations and District Commands, the reality in most of the police stations continue to operate on a 24/24 hours duty tours. This affects tremendously the performance and morale of the police, and diminishes their capacity to function in an effective manner. The mission recommends that this matter be given high priority, while reorganizing staff (*efectivos*). Given the scarcity of personnel, it will remain impossible for the short-to-medium term to organize duty tours of 8 hours per day. However, the achievement of a 24/48 hours tour seems to be an attainable target in a short-to-medium term scenario.

73. Starting in 2005, PRM worked in the elaboration and submission for approval of a performance evaluation model for PRM Units. The mission considers that it is important to introduce such an instrument, as it is an indispensable part of the evaluation of available human resources and the strategic reallocation of police personnel.

74. **Decentralization to provincial and district levels.**  While efforts to improve PRM's management and operational procedures are being carried out at PRM's Central Command level, they need to be extended to the provincial and district level, in order to improve the performance of PRM across the entire territory of Mozambique. Phase III project adequately focused attention on this key issue, although the advance in this area has been very limited.  Efforts were concentrated on just a few national and provincial seminars in order to identify bottlenecks and suggest improvements. Beyond this point, little has been achieved in terms of de-concentration or decentralization of responsibilities at provincial level.  The situation is even worse, not to say non-existing, at district level. PRM structure remains

excessively hierarchical, with limited inputs from the territorial units to the Central Command during the process of planning and preparing of annual budgets, key for incorporating a local needs perspective.

75.   According to project reports, 10 provincial seminars were held with the participation of Provincial and District Commanders, station and operations Chiefs, with 490 officials in total, producing a set of proposals for the simplification of procedures, currently under consideration by PRM's General Command and by the Coordinating Council of MINT.

76.   The preparation of the new Organic Law of the Police and its corresponding regulations is considered to be the door leading to the implementation of a decentralization process. This law is, at the time of this report, on the final stages of approval.

77.   **Strengthening the integrity, ethics and professionalism of PRM.** The project aimed at strengthening the integrity, ethics and professionalism of PRM, which is key to ensure a professional police service. Under the aegis of the project, several legal instruments have been pushed forward, as part of PRM's strategy to fight corruption.  A new Police Statute, PRM's Disciplinary Regulation and Police Code of Conduct can positively contribute to improve the PRM.  At the time of this report, the different legal documents are still in their final approval stages.

78.   The corruption survey sponsored by the government in August 2005[7] considered the Traffic Police as the most corrupt institution in Mozambique. PRM as a whole is also reported not to help too much in the fight against corruption.

79.   The Mission noticed that in all police stations visited, there was an office of ethics and discipline, responsible for dealing with the cases of complains against police officers. Yet, the degree of use by citizens still remains very low, in part due to the lack of knowledge, and in part due to the lack of trust in the police itself to go into the station to complain about police misconduct. While the mission considers the advances very positive, and recommends the implementation of the code of conduct and disciplinary regulation as soon as possible, the independence of the overall process remains an issue to be solved.

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[7] Ministério da Administração Estatal (2005), *National Survey on Governance and Corruption,* (Austral Consultoria e Projectos, Lda).

> Within this framework, the mission suggests that the GoM prioritize the creation of an independent civilian oversight agency that would investigate all serious allegations made against the police, including cases involving the police where death or serious bodily harm has occurred. In the alternative, this function could be performed by the office of the *Provedor de Justiça* (Ombudsman), which is currently provided in the country's constitution, as a public independent institution that could guarantee the independence and transparency in addressing complains against the integrity and ethics of the police.

80.	The simple introduction of a new code of conduct or disciplinary regulation will not be sufficient to address potential deviations from the ethics code.

> A proper plan of awareness-raising among PRM members will be needed, an action foreseen in Phase III but not realized given the processing time needed to endorse the new integrity instruments.

81.	**Development of an Information Technology (IT) Plan.**	This key output has not been achieved at all.	Project reports indicate its implementation is pending on the negotiation of a bilateral agreement with Spain to fund the needs assessment and the subsequent plan of intervention. The mission has verified the scarce availability and use of IT equipment all over PRM's structure, and the almost non existence of digital records of autos, case files or of any other procedure pertaining to PRM duties towards the citizens.

> The mission considers that in light of the current IT initiatives being undertaken by the Justice sector, and in particular, the SIPMAJ project, it is urgent that PRM perform a needs assessment and draft a plan on how to best approach the incorporation of new information management technologies in the PRM service, and in coordination with affected stakeholders like Justice.

82.	The use of IT equipment is rudimentary and mainly restricted to the Central Command, with a limited use in the provincial command, and non-existing in the district and police station level. Even in the facilities where computers were available as consequence of the previous Project Phases, the equipment is either non-functioning, or simply the police lacks the minimum means to keep it operational and running. The overall picture is rather dramatic, with piles of papers been considered case file archives, and with little guarantee of proper file management.

### 3.3.4  Personnel and Training

83.	Personnel and training has emerged as one of the critical components since the effectiveness and efficiency of any police organization rests on it. Hence, this component impacts not only on the personnel's ability to properly

and judiciously use police equipment and carry out established procedures but also on the way the personnel handle the general public.

84.   The project considered training in two main levels: (a) the basic training and (b) the higher level training, which includes also the executive training. The training at Matalane Police Training School, which is the basic training designed for the bulk of the force, can be sub-divided into two categories of training activities: (i) the general *basic training for new recruits;* and (ii) the *retraining courses* designed to introduce veteran personnel to new policing concepts. The higher level training takes place at ACIPOL, established to train police officers. ACIPOL also runs executive courses for police officers who hold leadership positions at the various levels of the organization. In addition, ACIPOL runs the *specialized training* programs, such as investigation techniques, the training for traffic police, border patrol, and VIP protection units.

85.   **Training sub-System.**      The project calls for a training subsystem 1.7 *"with well defined policies, coordination and evaluation mechanisms cognisant of the special training requirements in the field of HIV/AIDS".* The training of police personnel, while a challenge in any part of the world, becomes even more problematic in a country with pervasive poverty and low education level. Therefore, it is a challenge to design this kind of training subsystem dealing with transversal issues such as human rights, gender, and HIV/AIDS. These issues are embedded as part of the training curricula in both the Police Practical School of Matalane and ACIPOL. Human Rights and HIV/AIDS are subjects dealt with in specific courses.

> Although the opinions of some officials interviewed indicate in the direction of improvement, the impact of the introduction of such transversal issues in the overall change of profile and attitude of the personnel is yet to be established.  There is a need to continue the training and dissemination of information about these subjects.

86.   There is a need to implement a training needs assessment for all the areas of training. Of particular importance in this process is the establishment of a system through which the special or parallel programs can be coordinated. This would mean that the intervention by countries outside the UNDP managed project, such as that of Portugal and the United States for example, can occur within and complement the activities stipulated in the project document. There is a need to establish training plans that are coordinated by the police, through UTIPE, so that the activities are able to create synergies for the implementation of the PEPRM.

87.   **Matalane Police Practical School.**      The goal of the project at the basic level is to enhance basic training program and make it able to respond to the personnel needs of PRM. The basic training at Matalane is yet to meet the personnel needs of the PRM. Although the annual intake is estimated at

1,200 recruits, who go through a 9-month training program, it is insufficient to provide the necessary personnel for the needs of the police. This is due to two main factors: 1) the ten years when the Matalane training program was inactive; and 2) the impact of HIV/AIDS on the police force. The Mission heard comments from police commanders and officials interviewed that the training of new recruits is ultimately geared toward replacing the ill and/or dead rather than expanding personnel. Although national laws and international norms do not allow discriminatory recruitment practices, the Mission heard comments that it happens in certain regions, which is a concern.

> In the opinion of the evaluation team, the GoM should continue its HIV/AIDS awareness raising campaign, particularly within the police force, and develop a uniform approach to deal with this matter in compliance with international norms and human rights laws. MINT must also take into account this factor in planning personnel needs of police stations. Some police stations are deemed to have a full contingent of officers, without recognition that 35-40% of its personnel is either dead or at home sick, adding to the problem of corruption with 'ghost officers' on government payroll.

88. In Phase III, the personnel trained at Matalane amounted to 2,400 recruits, while an additional 1,200 will complete their training in November 2007. Yet, the PRM faces a mammoth challenge to achieve an adequate level of personnel. In order for the number of annual entries to reach the desired purposes defined in the PEPRM, the police would need to recruit and train at least the double of the current number of recruits.

> The expansion of the number of recruits that enter the basic training is of utmost importance. The training facilities and the logistics support at Matalane will need to be further expanded to accommodate the increased number. The Mission recommends that this be done in the very short run. The rehabilitation of the training centers in Sofala and Nampula should also be considered to deal with the shortage of personnel to carry out policing duties. The Mission recommends this option in the longer-term as it would encourage enrolment throughout the country and would provide a more efficient and de-concentrated police training model.

89. The use of media outlets is one of the essential elements in the promotion of a good image of the police. While a media campaign was included in the plans of the police, there seems to be a lack of systematic approach to the media. TV programs, like **"*Pela Lei e Ordem*",** acquainted the public with the activities and portrayed the police in fighting crime, which was good and should be supported. Its programming could be improved to provide more content towards the valorization of the police profession.

> The evaluation team recommends that PRM define a media and communications strategy that informs the public of the activities of the police while concomitantly promoting policing as a profession for the young and bright. This would improve the level of the police as an organization.

90. Although the curricula covers themes such as police sciences and technologies (29%), judicial sciences (16%), social sciences and mathematics (19%), languages, physical education, and conferences/seminars (36%), the officials interviewed seem to share the opinion that the quality of the graduates is below expectation. Officials interviewed often mentioned new recruits' lack of knowledge and skills needed in operational duties, such as the proper organization and conduct of patrols, control of fire arms and accurate shooting.

91. After the end of the training period at Matalane and during their probationary training year with the force, graduates should be provided more mentoring by the station commanders and senior police officers, before they could be admitted as police personnel (as '*efectivos*'). This *practicum* would allow the graduates to obtain the missing practical training. Yet, it would be necessary to ensure that the police station commanders act as mentors and consider that the graduates are there to undergo on-the-job-training, not to study. Currently there is a mismatch of expectations with the commanders placing the new graduates in rotations with no monitoring and/or mentoring while expecting them to perform at the level of the proficiency of a seasoned police officer.

> As a result, the evaluation team witnessed repeated complaints about the quality of the newly graduated recruits from Matalane. Thus, the adoption of the approach above would require a review of the basic training curricula to include the necessary *protocols* that would regulate the practicum stage. After spending the year of practicum at the station, the graduates should go back to Matalane to undertake a short (one to two months) *Program of Review and Consolidation of Police Training*, before being deployed to their permanent posts.

92. **Recruitment process.** Another point of weakness is related to the recruitment process, which has allowed for **infiltration of anti-social elements in the police force**. Entry to the police force is open to anyone who fulfils the criteria: (a) completion of standard tenth grade secondary education; (b) pass physical aptitude tests; and (c) pass admissions exam. Due to the level of infiltration in the force of individuals with anti-social profile, there are efforts to revise the recruitment procedures.

93.   A clear illustration of the problems with the infiltration of individuals of anti-social behaviour in the police force is provided by the number of disciplinary actions taken against police personnel. For example, between 2005 and 2007, PRM expelled 66 agents, demoted 5, and detained 5 for criminal transgressions, while some 100 disciplinary cases are pending review by the council.

94.   To address the issue of infiltration of criminal elements in the police, the PRM is in the process of establishing a new recruitment strategy. This includes a vetting process by the communities; candidates to police recruits are presented in their *bairros* (neighbourhoods) for the population to have an input on their profile and selection.  While it is important to create links with the community and acknowledge local practices and values, it is also important to move towards a professional selection of police personnel.

95.   The mission recommends that the recruitment process for the police force needs to be addressed. It is important that the recruitment is advertised as widely as possible to allow the attraction and selection of individuals that are better suited for the role of policemen or policewomen. The selection process needs to go beyond the mere pre-screening of candidates. The selection process needs to be reviewed to include a pre-screening written psychological testing of all applicants who have passed the initial entrance requirements.  In addition, behavioural and attitudinal assessment of recruits should be continually carried out, while he or she is in Matalane, in order to detect tendencies for anti-social conduct.

> The evaluation team recommends the incorporation of a small team of professional psychologists that would work in Matalane to perform a continuous evaluation of the trainees.

96.   **ACIPOL.**      Another goal of the project was to consolidate specialized on-the-job and superior level training. The superior level training activities are undertaken at ACIPOL. These include the four-year regular academic program that offers a Bachelor and *Licenciatura* degrees in Police Sciences. There are also executive training courses for police officers who hold leadership positions at the various levels of the organization. Finally, it also provides *specialized training* programs, such as the training for traffic police, border patrol, and VIP protection units.

97.   During Phase III, ACIPOL graduated 215 cadets, of which 54 graduated at the BA level. Upon completion, graduates enter to the police force at the level of Officers. Officers trained at ACIPOL are placed in the stations and several of them have responsibility roles, such as booking [*permanência*] and operations.

98.   During the evaluation, the team came across two contradictory positions about the quality of the ACIPOL graduate. All the police commanders interviewed by the evaluation team consider that the work of the ACIPOL

graduate has improved the quality of the work of the police, particularly with respect to the instruction of processes and operations. ACIPOL graduates play a valuable role in the change and streamlining of the police practices. According to the interviewees, the quality of the *autos* has improved and increasingly fewer cases are rejected by the courts for lack of proper filing. Yet, a survey conducted by ACIPOL, within the police, apparently indicates a wide dissatisfaction with the quality of the ACIPOL graduate.[8] Based on the field interviews and a cross reading of the ACIPOL survey itself, the evaluation team sees one of the potential reasons for such perception as being the generational conflict, which is also depicted in the same study.

99.   The evaluation team has observed that a major challenge remains with the criminal investigation branch (PIC).  Being a specialized area, the training for PIC requires a practical link to the daily work that the police officer will have to perform after graduation. Although it applies to the other graduates, the lack of access to the means to apply their ACIPOL acquired skills once deployed is very demoralizing for PIC officers.

100. An important aspect of the training process was the organization of the lectures and seminars. During Phase III the topics addressed were: good governance within the PRM; human resources management within MINT; ethical and legal considerations in policing; the role of the police in developing societies; and the role of the Central Bank in the economy. There was also the II National Seminar of the District and Station Commanders[9].

101. In general, there has been an improvement on the performance of the police. The training has allowed for new concepts and methods to be developed into the daily work of the police in Mozambique. **The training at Matalane and ACIPOL need to include an emphasis on practical skills. The graduates must be given the opportunity to train and develop skills such as target firing, martial arts as well as body-building techniques**. Therefore, the PRM must consider the need for continuing training programs.

> Despite the success in candidates opting for ACIPOL, there is a real problem with the basic guard level. In order to attract and retain the best suited people, the PRM needs to develop a clear and systematic process of promotions. Short-duration courses should be offered that would allow them to upgrade their level while still be able to stay on the job.  In the future, when computerized internet connection is available at all *esquadras*, online courses could be offered with a short three-week classroom period and examination at the end. There is definitely a need to operationalize and clarify the role of the promotion committees so that professional development can occur in a predictable way. This would allow officers to see through their career development within the organization.

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[8] ACIPOL, *Plano Estratégico da ACIPOL para o Período 2007 a 2016*, Vol. II: "Estudo de Opinião sobre a ACIPOL." Maputo, September 2006. The study surveyed 712 police officers.

[9] However, this evaluation team did not have access to the number of people that participated in all of these activities.

### 3.3.5      Public Perception of PRM

102. A good public perception of the police and its work is fundamental for a stable social environment. Hence, police personnel that are better trained and treat citizens with respect can contribute a great deal to improve the image of the police corporation. PRM's current strategy to improve its image is mainly related to public relations activities. Yet, the improvement of the police image is not just a matter of public relations. On the one hand, it requires an approach that includes the incorporation of a strong internal dimension focused on eliminating entrenched organizational practices and personnel attitudes, which are perceived by the public as negative. On the other hand, it requires active collaboration and involvement with other institutions and organizations in society, such as schools, universities, the media and the general public.

103. PRM needs to develop capacity and competencies to produce regular press releases to all media outlets, through which it would not only inform the public on the activities of the police with respect to crime prevention, but would also focus on promoting the police career as a profession.

104. **Institutional Strategy to Disseminate the PEPRM.**   One   point   of departure recognised in the Phase III intended outputs of the PRM Image project component, is the design and implementation of *"an institutional strategy to spread the objectives of the Strategic Plan among the PRM and reinforce its application" (Output 1.10).* This involved the organization of activities to disseminate the PEPRM throughout the country. Several seminars were organized within the PRM to promote the PEPRM and disseminate the objectives and implementation procedures. Seminars were organized in all provinces except Zambézia. According to the officials interviewed, up to the date of this Report, no seminars had been carried out in the province of Zambézia due to agenda problems[10].

105. In the dissemination activities, the project document also refers to the design, printing and distribution of basic information and brochures. Yet, the evaluation team could not find any evidence of such material.  Thus, while the organization of seminars is a step towards wider dissemination of the PEPRM, these cannot be episodic. There is a need for permanent dissemination activities, with officers at the local level playing an active role. Although a good part of the officers interviewed acknowledged the existence of the PEPRM, many displayed poor knowledge of its contents and activities.

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[10] The seminar planned in Zambézia had to be postponed once due to the visit of the Head of the State to the province and in another occasion due to the coincidence with the IX Congress of the Frelimo party held in Quelimane. During these occasions the police needed to provide security, which made it impossible to have people available to attend the seminars.

> There is a need for a systematic dissemination approach that takes the PEPRM beyond UTIPE and beyond the project mentality, making it a daily working tool of the police corporation. The incorporation of UTIPE activities into the state budget will indicate a movement away from being considered merely a token creature of the project.

106. **Exchange Programs with Educational Institutions.** Improving public perception of the police depends on a series of interrelated activities. As mentioned, a prime activity is the constant contact with the public via the media. Phase III project document also inscribes as an intended output (Output 1.11), '*the establishment of exchange programs with educational institutions'*. The program "*Escolas Seguras*" is one such activity. The police used the program to reach out to the communities, establishing direct contact with the teaching staff and students at neighbourhood schools, to speak about issues such as gang violence and crime. In the Maputo City, the program covers 133 schools. Yet, this program and its activities would greatly benefit from an improved structure and organization.

107. In the design and implementation of exchange programs the PRM should look at the higher education system as well. As part of its dissemination and promotional activities, the PRM/MINT should invite and promote collaboration with the various higher education and research institutions in the country. These could be part of the research and extension initiatives of these institutions on issues related to crime (crime-fighting, prevention, and analysis), public security (domestic violence, human rights, gender issues, etc), and crime statistics.

108. At the academic level, for example, ACIPOL could promote programs with the other higher educational institutions to exchange professors and students, as well as establish joint degree programs and joint research initiatives. A program could also be developed to have faculty members, teaching at the higher educational institutions, work at Matalane as well.

> Being one of the institutions of higher education system in Mozambique, while being part of the PRM structure as well, ACIPOL could play a major role in establishing a collaborative partnership between the universities, the justice and the police sectors. ACIPOL BA degree program could be open to justice personnel and civilian students at the universities, at least on some selected subjects, if not whole joint programs.

# IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE PROJECT OF SUPPORT TO PRM [1997-2007]

109. The assessment of the cumulative impact of the Project on the PRM during the ten years of its implementation takes into consideration the following four areas:

- Effectiveness and public perception
- Sustainability
- Areas of success and results
- Lessons learned

110. First, it should be pointed out that a major catalyst for the Project in Support of the PRM was the steady increase in the crime indexes throughout the country in 1995 and 1996, particularly along the Maputo and Beira corridors and the main National Road (EN1).  It was also by then that the GoM demonstrated a serious attitude about reforming its police force along the lines of a professional police services organization.  The GoM adopted the Defence and Security Policy[11] in 1997 signalling its intention to implement the *Principles of the Rule of Law and of no affiliation of police forces*[12] subscribed to by the government within the ambit of the General Peace Agreement in Law no. 19/92.  The GoM also launched an expression of interest in partnering with the international community to strengthen and reform the police of Mozambique, and in July 1997 an agreement [Project MOZ/95/015] was signed for international assistance to the PRM in the areas of organization, training, infrastructure and equipment.

111. It is difficult to technically measure the long-term [1997-2007] impact of the UNDP Project in Support of the PRM, partly because there were other bilateral interventions, partly because some consequences or results may not be able to be traced as a direct consequence of the project, and partly because some of the outputs do not have an immediate and measurable impact, such as the case of the formulation of the Strategic Plan of the PRM. Also the impact of the project on some of the bilateral components of the overall international support to the PRM, such as on ACIPOL graduates performance, may not be easy to disaggregate between the bilateral and the UNDP support. In the case of ACIPOL for instance, it would even be more complicated as its overall impact has not been fully felt yet simply because it takes 4-5 years after the commencement of the training program for the new graduated officers be posted in active police duty.  Moreover, there was no specified baseline established at the commencement of the intervention in 1997 that could be used as a yardstick for measurement purposes. [13]

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[11] paragraph e) of article 2 of Law no. 17/97, of 1st October

[12] no. 1 of article 2 of Law no. 19/92, of 31st December

[13] The first comprehensive surveys on victimization and public perception on police performance were conducted only in 2003 by UNICRI and the National Institute of Statistics.

Therefore, tracing the cumulative impact of the project is not straightforward. **The approach adopted by the Mission is to highlight key accomplishments of the PRM since 1997**, whether directly or indirectly connected with the project, and examine the impact it had on the police services, particularly on the key components selected for evaluation and on some cross-cutting areas in police operations. The key substantive components selected for evaluation are those fundamental to the project in all its three phases: **(a) Organizational, operational and management capability; (b) Personnel and Training; and (c) Public perception of the police.**

**Support to Basic Training, Retraining and Rehabilitation of 'Michafutene Police Training School'**

112. During and after the civil war in Mozambique police training programs at the various training centers, namely Michafutene, Matalane, Dondo and Natikiri, either deteriorated or became inoperative, and were in need of reform. The decision to fully rehabilitate the Michafutene Police School and to consolidate most of the previous basic training centers in this facility, as a professional training centre was a key output of the Project in Support of the PRM. With the creation of ACIPOL and the increased needs for higher level training, all the basic training was moved later on to Matalane. A major problem reflected on the First-Year Annual Project Report (July 1997-June 1998) was the shortage of financial resources for the PRM to equip its members and for the rehabilitation of the Matalane School.

113. **Impact on organizational, operational and management capability.** The basic police training started in Michafutene and currently imparted in Matalane is often criticized within the hierarchy of the PRM, particularly in regards to the last two graduating classes, to be heavy on general classroom training and weak on the more practical aspects of policing, such as patrolling and the use of firearms. The basic training program, however, has improved the ability of the police officer in functions such as how to properly fill the complaint forms ['*auto de denuncia*'] and to comply with other administrative functions, which adds to the PRM organizational and management capability. It remains however necessary to undertake a full review of the Basic training curricula, foreseen in Phase III, to better reflect the needs for administrative and operational knowledge.

114. Improvement of operational skills of new recruits could be done not only by reviewing the curriculum of in-class subjects, but also redefining the practical period recruits spend as trainees in police stations. While it is expected recruits will gain valuable practical operational knowledge during their placement in the police stations, the lack of preparation of commanders in mentoring the new recruits and the scarce means to apply the newly acquired skills in the field severely curtails the practical apprenticing of the police duties. **It is therefore highly recommended to include this aspect in the curricular review of the basic training program.**

115. In another front, the retraining programs undertaken in the first two phases of the project greatly contributed to update the skills of the existing police staff, in great need due to years of inactivity and lack of professional actualization. The process provided training to a vast number of PRM's staff.

116. **Impact on Personnel and Training.** Considering the rate of attrition in the PRM whether as a result of resignations or due to the high rate of death by HIV/AIDS or by other causes, there would be a negligible number of trained police officers in Mozambique if it were not for the fact that the basic training program has graduated 1,200 cadets annually since it reopened in January 2002 under the Project. The retraining program made possible to update a vast number of PRM's staff.

117. **Impact on public perception of police**. The improved quality of faculty / trainers at Michafutene and later at Matalane and the new training curriculum developed to comply with international standards has improved the professionalism of the police force, particularly in the areas of respect for human rights and client service ['*atendimento*'].

118. A positive adjustment to the activities originally planned for Phase I ProDoc was the inclusion of training in the following areas:

- Lectures on the Constitution, human rights and the rule of law
- Lectures on the Penal Code provisions on violence, particularly domestic violence and gender-related offences
- Development of material for the 6-hour human rights course, dealing with rights of women and children
- Establishment of a 6-hour training course on domestic violence and sexual abuse of minors.

119. On average 27 Mozambican civilian teachers were hired to lecture at Matalane. Fifteen Mozambican civilian teachers were selected to teach law, human rights and socio-cultural courses. While their contracts provided for performance evaluation on course-by-course basis, the Mission heard complaints that the leadership at Matalane were not consulted during the process of performance evaluation of the faculty members.

> The Mission recommends that a component on the evaluation process of teachers in the Matalane School include the opinions of the senior leadership of Matalane, including the School Headmaster (Director).

### Organic Statute of the PRM

120. By Decree No. 27/99 which came into effect on the 24th of May 1999, GoM approved the Organic Statute of the PRM and adopted a new internal organization of the police. Even though the promulgation of the Organic Statute of the PRM was not necessarily a direct consequence of the Project in Support of the PRM, it could be said that the existence of the project and the

international focus on the police helped in drawing the attention of the government to the organizational needs of the police force, resulting in the approval of the organic law of the PRM. The project also impacted positively and interactively [generating a symbiotic and co-energizing relationship] on the activities of different units and departments of the PRM, such as the Personnel and Training Department and the Office for the Assistance of Women and Children and the Office of Police Ethics and Discipline.

While the contribution of the May 99 Organic statute has been positive, and as consequence of the project's continuous support to PRM's improvement and reform, a new organic law is currently in its final endorsement and approval stage. The new organic statute will hopefully provide the necessary action for undertaking key reforms in the structure of PRM's, including the decentralization process and the reform of the code of conduct and disciplinary regulations.

121. **Impact on organizational, operational and management capability.** The PRM is structured in units, such as the General Command, Provincial Command, Special and Reserve Forces and Training Institutions. It also has subunits, such as district commands, police stations, police posts and detachments of Special and Reserve Forces. Under the General Command, there are key departments, such as Personnel & Training, Public Order & Security, Criminal Investigations, and Logistics & Finance. It also has a Council of Ethics & Discipline, and it has a Department of Internal Affairs and a Department of Public Relations reporting to the General Commander. This centralized approach was adopted as an express statement by the organic law of the PRM that "within *MINT there is only one Police, the PRM, with various operational areas and units ['Forças'], which henceforth will not be designated as a Police but as "Forças*"[14]. This structure of the PRM improved its organizational and management capabilities. Attached as Annex 6 is the Organigram of the PRM.

While in the first years after the peace agreement it was fundamental to consolidate the law enforcement agencies under one single entity, exercising a very centralized management. The situation has changed over the years. As a public service organization, PRM has experienced great progress since 1997. However, it remains still far from the desirable level of performance and service delivery. New challenges have appeared on the way, as the need for increasing the budgetary allocations and providing increased administrative and operational authority to the provinces and districts. Phase III intended to support this process, but it is however still pending on the approval of the new organic law of the police.

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[14] Plano Estratégico da Polícia da República de Moçambique – PEPRM, Volume I, p.29

122. **Impact on Personnel and Training.** With the emphasis of the project on training *['formação']* the Department of Personnel and Training of the PRM became a high profile department at the PRM and a strong partner of the project, improving its recruitment strategy and its professional development strategies for existing police officers *['reciclagem']*. One recruitment strategy adopted to ensure better quality in the recruitment of cadets applying to enter the PRM was a **vetting process** of the applicants by the neighbourhood [*bairros*] residents. The applicants would be presented at a meeting in their own neighbourhood and the residents would be asked to comment on their character, conduct, and prior criminal behaviour or association. This strategy was designed to improve the moral quality of new recruits and also to prevent infiltration of criminal elements into the police force.

123. Although the recruitment system in place provided good initial results, and as consequence of PRM's continuous transformation, the system is in need of a review which would confer a more professional and modern approach to the recruitment of candidates.

> The mission recommends that the current recruitment system is reviewed, incorporating proper behavioural and attitudinal assessments of the candidates, not only in the entrance exam, but through a continuous monitoring process during the basic training period.

124. Another important aspect to be reviewed in the framework of the organic law is the review of the promotion and career plan of police staff. While the previous organic statute already provided for some initial provisions in this regard, increasing transparency and fairness, the mission considers these not to be sufficiently effective, as police staff interviewed consider that promotions are still given very much on discretionary methods rather than examination of competencies. Career plan constitutes at present another problem to be addressed, as there are no clear paths for guards to be promoted to sub-officers positions, nor regular mid-level promotion courses which police guards could attend to compete for promotion to immediate higher scale.

125. **Impact on the public perception of the police.** The Council on Ethics and Discipline has resulted in the opening of an **Office of Police Ethics** [*'Gabinete de Ética e Disciplina da Polícia'*] in Provincial and District Commands and in many police stations all across the country. Although its impact on the public perception is difficult to measure without a study of client satisfaction with the service, just the fact that such offices exist in so many police stations is bound to have a positive impact on the public attending at the station and it is bound to have a restraining influence on police's misconduct.

126. While citizens consider essential that police misconduct be fully investigated, a task for the office of police ethics, it remains at the same time evident that the prosecution of these cases requires ensuring the

independence of the Office of police ethics. The mission recommends therefore this to be considered in the framework of the new police organic law. Despite all the progress in the preservation and control of PRM's integrity, independence will continue to be an issue for a long time.

It is in this regard that the mission considers very important that the GoM take action in the establishment of an independent civilian oversight agency to investigate all serious allegations against the police, including incidents involving the police resulting in loss of life or serious bodily harm. The GoM could also activate the Office of the Provedor of Justice (*Provedor da Justiça*) or Ombudsman which is already envisioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, which could guarantee full independence and impartiality to the citizens in all areas where they are victims of injustice emanating from a government institution or official, including those who are victims of police misconduct.

### Creation of 'Model Police Stations' in Maputo and across the country

127. The construction of new stations and the renovation/refitting of old stations into a uniform design of a model police station, providing it with functional furniture and equipment, was one of the key outputs of the project. The overall impact however is at stake, given the lack of sufficient budgetary allocation to perform a proper maintenance policy, which together with the lack of operational means, greatly limit the performance of the police, especially at police station and district command level.

128. **Impact on the Organizational, operational and Management Capability**. The uniform design of model police stations made it easier for the police to function and discharge their various duties at the station. Observations of the operations at a model station compared to those of a non-model station disclosed better organizational and management capability. The availability of a computer at some model stations, the resources and ability to collect some crime statistics, and the more professional approach of recording complaints, are examples of factors that contribute to the improved organizational capability.

129. It should be pointed out that the **sustainability** of the capacity developed by the creation of model police stations depends on further and immediate support in terms of maintenance of the original infrastructure, repair and/or replacement of office equipment, police equipment, such as communication equipment and police vehicles. The mission observed that most of the police stations have either non functional computer, some have outdated and malfunctioning typewriters, many function without radio communication and most without even one working vehicle. The mission estimates that up to 80% of the vehicles provided by the project are simply not working due to the lack of maintenance. Even when they are forced to borrow a vehicle from another institution or from a civilian, the stations lack access to

a petty cash fund to buy fuel for the vehicle. Infrastructure maintenance is another problem the mission observed in their visits. Many newly constructed buildings were poorly built, and some have water infiltrations which are affecting the structure. Again, the lack of maintenance budget is causing its quick deterioration. The Mission also wants to point out that no satisfactory explanation was provided to its members when it inquired as to the reasons why the Police has not taken occupancy of the new model District Command station in Quelimane built two years ago. It appears to be as a result of poor workmanship in the construction and a dispute with the builder. This matter ought to be resolved quickly in order to protect the initial investment by the project.

130. Operational procedural manuals created by the Guardia Civil, as reflected on the 5th Progress Report of the project, impacted greatly on the operational capacity of the PRM at the time, but they are in urgent need of update. The Operating Plan developed by Guardia Civil and approved by PRM General Command allowed deployment teams to work in coordination with Provincial Commands in the development of diverse documents required for Police Station routine work. The Plan included models of operation, service and administrative manuals, and different on-the-job training activities, which were introduced in the 'model' stations.

> The Mission had the opportunity to observe, during its visits to model police stations, that the manuals and procedures for routine daily activities of police on the beat are still those developed by the Guardia Civil, and although it is helpful to the station, it needs urgent updating.

131. **Impact on Personnel and Training.** The model police stations have boosted the pride and professional performance of the police officers working in those stations. The mission noted the facilitation of a kitchen/cantina space in a few stations which has had an impact on performance, particularly since most stations work on a 24/24 basis due to understaffing.

> It is therefore recommendable to further explore the possibility of extending refectory services to all police stations.

132. It should be noted that often newly-graduated ACIPOL officers are placed under the command of either a model district command or of a model police station. They serve partly as role models for new police guards but also are expected to share/transfer their knowledge and training with others at the station, including to the older police. The expectations of the PRM is that these young ACIPOL graduates will learn from the practical police experience of the older commander under whom he/she works and, at the same time, will help the older commander in the modern approach to policing in accordance to international norms. However, given the lack of a proper approach to

implement this transfer of skills, the knowledge transfer of the new ACIPOL officers to their colleagues at the police station level remains very low. There are no specific provisions for in-job training actions at police station level. Very little advantage has been taken of the material for on-the job training activities originally developed by Guardia Civil for the model police stations. The lack of means to conduct operations, as for instance criminal investigation equipment, severely limits not only the transfer of skills from ACIPOL graduates, but also to simply perform their duties the way they were taught at ACIPOL. This may lead in the near future to the frustration of the new generation of officers, aggravated by the lack of proper career advancement and planning. Ultimately, it will limit PRM performance improvement.

133. **Impact on the public perception of the police.** The uniform and improved appearance of the model police stations has had a positive impact on the public perception of the police, particularly on those attending at the station to file a complaint. The physical aspect of the reception and the availability of offices where complainants and witnesses can have privacy during interviews make citizens more comfortable in their dealing with the police. Also most model police have not only the **Office of Police Ethics** but also the **Office for the Assistance of Women and Children** which helps women reporting domestic violence and children victims of violence. This Office not only made the complainants and their friends and neighbours see the police as a friends and protectors, but it also helped make police officers working at the model station more aware about human rights and gender-related offences.

> The establishment of a pilot Office for the Assistance of Women and Children in Beira, which currently is located in a different facility and completely independent from the normal police station consists as well an excellent experience that the mission would like to suggest for further expansion in the country. The Mission has experienced that separate facilities for this kind greatly fosters confidence and facilitates the victim's access to the police. It is also a center that can provide support to the offices in the police stations, inviting them to workshops and providing them with material and expert advice on gender-related issues and on human rights.

## Creation of ACIPOL

134. The establishment of an academy of police sciences in Mozambique provided the vehicle necessary for the development of a professional police services in the country. The police points to ACIPOL as the crown jewel in the police organization and development. Although not a direct product of the UNDP Support to the Police project, the existence of the project encouraged other donors [in this case, the Swiss] to fund other complementing projects such as ACIPOL. UNDP supported the establishment of ACIPOL and coordinated the training components of the project with those of ACIPOL's.

Future interventions in support of the police need to make sure alignment between ACIPOL training activities, bilateral training support like the one provided by Portugal and the PEPRM are fully harmonized and aligned. Phase III project did not fully achieve this comprehensive vision of the higher and specialized training area.

135. **Impact on organizational and management capability.** The bachelor and *licenciatura* programs offered at ACIPOL appear to be providing the police force with well-trained young police leadership. In the command posts the scheme of matching newly ACIPOL graduates with existing senior police commanders appear to be met with some success. The fact that ACIPOL has also developed 'Executive Programs' for older commanders helped in providing those officers with sufficient skills to work together with the younger officers. This has not only helped to lessen resistance to change within the organization, but also contributed to improving the organizational and management capability throughout the organization.

136. **Impact on Personnel and Training.** ACIPOL appears to benefit from a good faculty, sometimes drawn from universities and distinguished law practitioners, and it has developed adequate curricula for its courses. Although the Mission heard about the necessity of ACIPOL providing medium-level officers training programs, there seems to be consensus that the ACIPOL training programs are excellent and that it has had a very positive impact on personnel not only in developing professionalism but also a sense of pride in the force. Given the success of ACIPOL and its recognition by government officials and the senior officers of the PRM, one would conclude that the **sustainability** of the quality of its programs will be ensured by the GoM with some continued international support.

137. One of the initiatives carried out in Phase III are the **Executive courses**. ACIPOL runs the executive courses once a year involving 70 officers. These courses are in their third consecutive year. Yet, ACIPOL has not graduated any officer from the executive courses. Currently, 210 officers are in the various stages of the training process.

138. Specialized training programs have been carried out at ACIPOL since 2000 (Phase I). Since then, more than 340 officers from the different branches of the PRM have been trained. The specialized training programs are designed to run for as short as 5 days to 180 days. In Phase III, approximately 100 police officers were trained on programs such as Applied Administration for Police, Criminal Investigation, Criminal Forensics, Trainers for Martial Arts, and Trainers of Military Tactics and Techniques. Other courses that were carried out include: Drug Analysis (6 courses); Dactiloscopia (5 courses); Grafologia (2 courses); and Judicial photography (1 course). Some of these courses were carried out for the intermediary and the basic levels as well. During Phase III, ACIPOL also ran three courses for the Municipal Police involving 54 people.

139. **Impact on the perception of the public.** The improvement in client service at the police stations may be attributed in part by the mentoring of

police agents by ACIPOL officers. It is normal to find ACIPOL graduates as speakers at seminars and public meetings to discuss the role of the police and different aspects of law and order.

## The development of the Strategic Plan of the PRM [PEPRM], 2003-2012

140. The development of the PEPRM was a key output of the UNDP Project in Support of the PRM and one that gradually the police is taking ownership of due to the extensive and comprehensive consultation that was undertaken during its development process. Most of the officers consulted by the mission are aware of the existence of the PEPRM, although few possess detailed knowledge of its content. Although some believe it needs to be reviewed and updated, it is seen by a large majority as a roadmap for the PRM in the near future. Most members of the police force believe that projects supporting the police should be drawn from the 52 programs identified in the PEPRM, even though most of them acknowledged that if no prompt action is taken, especially from the budgetary point of view, the PEPRM could risk becoming quickly outdated.

141. **Impact on the organizational and management capability.** The PEPRM provided the PRM with a roadmap for the way forward, which helps build organizational and management capability and assists in long-term planning and budgeting. It also provides a national focus and direction and should promote uniformity and standardization throughout the country. As a result of the Strategic Plan a technical unit [UTIPE] was created to implement the programs of the PRM, which had an impact on the organizational and management capability of the police. Although the PEPRM is an ambitious plan, it can help international partners and donors to know the priorities of the PRM and be able to make decisions on which areas they wish to provide support. It will also contribute towards the **sustainability of the project** and of capacity developed during the activities of the project as it is a document approved by the GoM and the PRM has taken full ownership of its contents. What is at the stake however is the sustainability of the PEPRM itself, as it is an ambitious plan with an overall necessary investment of about US$250 million. While the PEPRM discussed the possibility of the GoM budget absorbing most of the expenses forecasted, the reality has shown that the MINT has a very limited capacity to undertake the proposed investments and, that the interest being shown by donors, remains low at present.

> The mission considers that it is urgent to seek the commitment of the GoM and the international donor community in ensuring the implementation of the PEPRM, in the broader framework of the rule of law sector. Integration of the PEPRM needs in the broader discussions of general budgetary support provided by donors in the framework of the PARPA program appears to be highly recommendable.

142. **Impact on personnel and training.** The Strategic Plan had impact in the design of programs of training and professional development ['formação'] for police personnel, as well as in providing for strategies and identification of projects. It was, for example, credited by some to be one of the sources for the establishment of the Office for Assistance of Women and Children [Gabinete de Atendimento à Mulher e Criança] in the Command-General and in the provincial and district commands and in some police stations, which has resulted in specialized police officers handling matters of domestic violence, child abuse and neglect. Some credit it also for assisting in the design and development of activities of the border patrol unit.

143. **Impact on the perception of the public.** The impact of the PEPRM on the perception that the public has of the PRM cannot be measured in abstract because most individual citizens are not aware of the Strategic Plan. Nevertheless, the wide consultative process undertaken in the preparation of the PEPRM with the civil society and other stakeholders generated an initial positive impact with citizens.

> The mission has however observed that civil society is no longer represented in the PEPRM steering committee, and therefore recommends its inclusion in order to reinforce the dialogue and positive impact towards the citizens.

144. In addition, it must be noted that by looking quickly at the impact the Strategic Plan on the organizational and management capability of the PRM and on personnel and training, it can be inferred that the existence of the PEPRM will have a positive impact on the PRM and will indirectly result in an improved image of the police. For example, all police stations visited by the Mission had an Office for Assistance of Women and Children, often referred to as domestic violence office. Although the effectiveness of these offices varied from station to station depending on the police officer running the office, it was clear that the community meetings and public relations' work conducted by this office helped increase the sensitiveness about domestic violence amongst the police and helped improve police relations and image in the community.

### Creation of UTIPE

145. The creation of a technical implementation unit within the PRM is one of the key outputs of the Project in Support of the PRM. UTIPE not only is responsible for the implementation of the Strategic Plan of the Police, but also of all projects in support of the police that adopt the national execution model [NEX], an example of which is the Phase III of the UNDP project.

146. **Impact on organizational and management capability.** The creation of UTIPE had a great impact on the organizational and management capability of the PRM. It developed capacity and confidence of members of the PRM and is key to the sustainability of the gains accomplished by the

project. It performed a wide dissemination of the PEPRM which is fundamental to generate ownership of the plan among PRM members. UTIPE is tasked as well to act as the "guardian" of the PEPRM implementation. As such, it performs its monitoring and follow-up. The mission has however observed that UTIPE capabilities, to effectively monitor and, particularly, to measure the improvement and degree of impact caused by PEPRM programs, remains limited.

> Therefore it is strongly recommended to adequately staff the unit, provide additional capacity building and redesign the monitoring systems including impact and performance indicators of the PEPRM in such a way that gains produced by the PRM become sustainable.

147. **Impact on personnel and training.** After the initial resistance by the PRM management structure towards the PEPRM, the fact that later on each unit of the PRM had to appoint a focal point for UTIPE [usually the commander] made senior management much more involved in the implementation and monitoring of project activities, and in the development of guidelines, management and budgeting of projects. Senior management meets regularly [once a month] with the Director of UTIPE to review execution of the Strategic Plan. The adoption of a national execution model will contribute towards the **sustainability** of the capacity developed by the various activities of the project.

148. **Impact on the perception of the public**. Just as the general public is not aware of the PEPRM, they are not aware either of UTIPE. For that reason, it is difficult to measure its impact on the public perception of the police. However, the impact of UTIPE is already being felt in every unit and department of the police and throughout the country as UTIPE has focal points designated by the PRM General Command. The involvement of an increased number of senior officers in the implementation and monitoring of programs in support of the PEPRM is bound to result in better outcomes and better police services.

### Addressing Public Perception of the PRM

149. The evaluation team found that public perception of the PRM is directly linked to the public's perception of an increase in crime. While statistics show that the crime situation in Mozambique has shown a decline in the past 10 years, the perception of the public indicates otherwise. Therefore, the image of the police suffers from the effects of such perception. **In fact, a look at the crime statistics of the last ten years indicates that, in general cumulative terms, crime decreased by 10%.** For example, according to PRM General Command data, during the ten years of the project, crime fluctuated from 39,839 in 1997 to 30,786 in 2006. Phase III of the project witnessed both the highest increase in the reported crime (40,496 in 2004) and the lowest

(30,786 in 2006). Phase III saw the sharpest decline in crime, with an average of 36,178 (9.5% of the total).[15]

150. **Studies on Governance and Corruption:** Several studies have been carried out that ascertain the level of public perception of the police in Mozambique. Some of these were made in the context of broader studies about governance issues, while a few others were specific to the police. **All the studies share one common thread: public perception of the police is not very positive. Corrupt behaviour toward the citizens by police personnel (bribery) is often the main culprit for the poor image of the police;**[16] yet, the *Governance and Anti-corruption Diagnostic Survey* shows that the PRM is the institution that should be in the forefront of the fight to corruption.[17]

151. **The Mini-survey conducted under this evaluation:** While crime has decreased in average, particularly in the last two years, the popular perception of the police and of the criminal situation is still negative. **The evaluation team conducted a limited survey on the perception of university students have of the police in Mozambique (see annexes 7 to 9).** A total of 119 people were surveyed, of which 33% were female. The large majority of the respondents (79%) belong in the age bracket between 21 and 30 years of age; the respondent ages varied from 19 to 56 years. Most respondents are based in Maputo (87%).[18]

152. **Survey findings and analysis**. In issues related directly to the perceptions of the police and its work, the results of the mini-survey show that, in broad terms, there is dissatisfaction with the performance of the police, as shown in the inserted figure. Similarly, the survey also shows that only 12% declared that they trust in the police, while approximately 71% of the respondents trusted **a little** and 16% did not. These results may also be associated to the fact that there is a weak responsiveness by the police towards the needs of the public. Only 7% found the police to be responsive to

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[15] These figures were compiled and calculated from the statistical data provided by the PRM General Command. The data for the period 1997-2001 are available in the *Strategic Plan of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique*, Vol. I, p. 21; data from 2002 to 2006 is available in the *Statistical Yearbook 2006,* published by the National Institute of Statistics, p. 49.

[16] Studies on public perception often cite corruption as the main problem in their contact with the police. Among these reports we find *Strategic Plan of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique: Results of surveys on victimization and police performance* (UNICRI, 2003), p.14; *Governance and Anti-corruption Diagnostic Survey* (Austral Consultoria e Projectos, for the Ministry of State Administration, 2005), pp. 17-18; and USAID, *Corruption Assessment: Mozambique – Final Report* (USAID, 2005), p. 5

[17] Ministry of State Administration, *Governance and Anti-corruption Diagnostic Survey,* p. 114.

[18] These results show a snapshot sample of the perception of a small part of the society. The results do not necessarily represent the perception of the whole university student population and, definitely not, that of the general population of the country. The survey was intended to provide indicative elements as to help the evaluation team to make some sense of more recent ideas of the perception of the police at the end of Phase III.

the demands of the public; 64% declared lack of PRM responsiveness to public demands.

**PRM Performance**



The survey found that the 20% of the students surveyed find the Police performance good. Yet, the majority (79%) considered the PRM performance as poor.

153. The perception of the police as a neutral service-oriented institution is also negative. For example, 81% declared to have witnessed abusive behaviour by police personnel, while the majority of respondents (75%) consider the police as a corrupt institution, where citizens need to pay bribes in order to obtain assistance or access services. Likewise, 89% see the police as favouring the elite members. The role of Community Police as a source of order in the community is recognized by 25% of the respondents.

**Trust in the Police**



Although only 12% of the students surveyed stated to fully trust in the police, it is worth to note that the proportion of those that do not trust in the police at all (16%) is considerably smaller if compared to those who have some faith in it (71%).

**Potential areas of Intervention**

154. The respondents were asked to list three priority areas of intervention in order to improve the work and image of the police. A list of the following nine (9) areas was supplied to the respondents:

- Fighting corruption;
- Improve and expand police training;
- Improve crime prevention actions;
- Acquisition of transportation means;
- Acquisition of means of communication;
- Build or rehabilitate police stations;
- Increase salaries of the police personnel;
- Increase the number of police personnel; and
- Bring the police closer to community.

155. The three areas that the majority found relevant for immediate support action:

- **Increase in the Police Salaries:** the issue of police salaries came high in the list of priorities submitted by the survey respondents with 58% of them recommending such action;
- **Fighting corruption:** the need to fight corruption within the police force was, according to the respondents, as important as the increase in police salaries with 57% of respondents urging such action; and
- **Bring the police closer to Community:** the development of a PRM strategy that would bring the police closer to the community was the third main priority that most of respondents (53%) indicated as vital towards the promotion of a positive image of the PRM.

**Beyond the Image of the Police**

156. The indications presented about the public perception of the PRM present a continued theme: that the police needs to do a better job to improve its image with the public and dispel the perception that they are the most corrupt institution in the public service. It is worth noting that the role assigned to the police to ensure order is seen in a high note with 67% of respondents looking up to the PRM to ensure order in the community. This is in itself a positive point that needs to be further nurtured. In fact, the focus groups meetings have shown the participants' empathy towards the challenges facing the police. There was an understanding of the difficulties that the police face to carry out their daily obligations. Most importantly, there was also a consensus on what is needed as a first step to give value to the profession of police. For most participants, the police should be provided with the means to boost their physical appearance (access to food during shift hours, and access to physical exercise facilities during off days). Therefore, improving the social and working conditions for the members of the police will contribute a long way to improve the image of the Police.

157. Another positive issue that deserves notice is the perception that the presence of women, particularly in their role in the Offices of Women and Children, is seen as very positive. The majority of all of the survey respondents (71%) subscribes to the idea that the presence of police women encourages other women to report cases of domestic violence. The figure below illustrates this situation.

**Police Women and Report of Domestic Violence**



- Yes
- No
- Don't Know

The majority of the students surveyed (71%) agree that the having more female police officers will encourage more women to report sexual assaults and domestic violence. Only 13% disagree, while 16% have no idea.

158. The work of the police is fundamental for the development of society. This is a responsibility that needs to be understood and embraced by all, particularly by the PRM. A good image of the police will depend in large part on the perception of the public towards the corporation. In turn, this will likely have a greater impact on the police's ability to promote and receive cooperation with the communities in preventing and combating crime as it will be seen as serving the interests of the society at large.

## SUMMARY OF THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

- Better training centers for the police: Matalane/ACIPOL
- Better training programs and curricula ['Cursos de Formação]
- Better trained and more capable officers, particularly at the medium and high rank levels
- Model Provincial and district police commands and model police stations
- Development of a Strategic Plan for the PRM
- Creation of a technical unit for the implementation of the Strategic Plan [UTIPE]
- Rejuvenation of the police force
- Some improvement in area of infrastructure and equipment
- Better understanding of concepts of human rights, gender-related issues, and better client services ['atendimento ao público']
- Better perception of the role of the police by the community
- Better service provided to women and children victims of domestic violence

# V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

159. Based on the overall assessment of the support provided in the last 10 years to the reform of the PRM, **a set of recommendations can be provided, grouped into immediate-to-medium and long term actions.**

160. The recommendations can be as well further divided around the following **key interventions areas:**

- Management and strategic coordination
- Organizational and operational improvement
- Personnel and training
- Improvement of PRM image

161. **Strategy.** In the **short-to-medium term** period, UNDP should focus on providing support aimed at protecting past investments made into the PRM, particularly in terms of infrastructure maintenance, equipment, operational and administrative capability, but also in terms of manpower, recruitment and training of personnel. These issues are interrelated because if immediate investment is not made to restore infrastructure and equipment, gains made in terms of a better trained and functional police force will be lost. In the **long-term**, programming assistance to the PRM should be directed towards more and better specialized training, the development of oversight bodies empowered to be a check on police ethics and be an anti-corruption watchdog, and support PIC to be a more independent and professional police unit.

## 5.1. Recommendations for short-to-medium-term programming assistance to the PRM

### A. Management and strategic coordination

162. **Donor Coordination.** Given the huge need for international assistance to implement the PEPRM, it becomes indispensable to elaborate an efficient donor mobilization policy. PEPRM Steering Committee constitutes the right place to do so. Therefore, **it is recommended** that the steering committee be reinforced, by providing better secretariat support through UTIPE, by actively seeking the incorporation of additional stakeholders, including those working in the justice sector, and by including again the civil society sector, in order to show a clear intent in conducting a consultative, transparent and committed process of reform.

163. As mentioned, UTIPE plays an important role in the support of the PEPRM. **It is therefore recommended that:**

- ➢ UTIPE be placed at the right level in the hierarchy of PRM, so it is considered as a mentor and guardian of the PEPRM and as a body that can effectively advise on the strategic change of PRM.

> ➢ UTIPE be adequately staffed in order to be able to fully perform its duties.

164. UNDP plays a vital role in supporting the reform of the police. **It is recommended** that UNDP take stock of its overall support provided along the last 10 years and that it include PRM and Rule of Law sector on its priority areas of intervention. Along these lines, it is important that UNDP ensure the dedication of a program officer, able to follow up the complex process of change in this key sector. Such program officer, with the support of senior UNDP management, needs to be effective in the coordination of urgently needed donor mobilization, harmonization and alignment.

165. **PEPRM.** The PEPRM constitutes one of the key outputs of the support to the police, and it is called to be the roadmap to the transformation of the PRM. As such, it is a live instrument that requires continuous monitoring, consultation and adaptation, in order to achieve its purpose.

166. Therefore, **it is recommended that:**

> ➢ The monitoring system of the PEPRM be tightened, by approving a set of indicators that are sufficiently specific, substantive, and measurable in a way that it can be determined if the performance of the PRM and its service delivery to the citizens is satisfactory.

> ➢ That UTIPE be assisted and provided capacity building and methodologies to be able to monitor the PEPRM and act as a strategic advisory unit to the GoM, PRM's General Command and to the stakeholders. Within this framework, **it is recommended to support the provision of an international CTA** to contribute in this key process.

167. It is also **recommended** that future UNDP/donor actions in support of the police consider as a **high priority** to ensure the functionality of the PEPRM Steering Committee. The Steering Committee should be a body capable of moving forward the implementation of the PEPRM and with capacity enough to reassess and readapt the PEPRM as needed.

168. **Justice Sector Coordination.** As mentioned along this evaluation report, and in accordance with previous evaluations, assisting in the reform of the police requires a comprehensive and integrated approach to the overall Rule of Law sector, and especially, to the reform of the criminal justice system.

169. Therefore, it is necessary that future interventions in support of the police are fully aligned with the justice sector reform programs. This would contribute to improve the synergies of both sectors and exploit the complementarities, and would allow for better indicators to measure the impact of the project in the criminal justice sector, which cannot be fully measured if interventions are designed and implemented separately.

170. Particular **recommendations** are to:

> ➢ Maximize the representation of PRM into the CCLJ through the participation of MINT as a coordination body for the Rule of Law area.

> ➢ Ensure PRM particularities and current situation is well reflected into the draft Justice Sector Reform Program for 2007-2012.

> ➢ Seek for inclusion of the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor General's Office into the Steering Committee of the PEPRM.

### B.  Organizational and operational improvement

171. The modernization and rationalization of logistic and financial procedures is an important element in the improvement of the service delivery capacity of a public service like the police. PRM has achieved a certain degree of progress in this field, but there are still fragilities, which negatively affects the performance of the entire organization.

172. Operational and administrative procedures have been reviewed resulting in a series of Permanent Executive Norms (NEP), tested in some pilot stations. **It remains recommendable** to extend the application of these new instructions. However, the **mission recommends** its application ensuring its budgetary sustainability, as this appears recurrently to be the main obstacle for all changes in the PRM.

173. NEPs need to take into account the full process cycle of *autos* (Incident Reports) and other cases handled by the police, including its subsequent hand over to the prosecutor's office where appropriate. In this framework **it would appear recommendable** to identify the bottlenecks and key operational and administrative processes, interlinking police and justice, which cause delays or inefficiencies in processing open cases.

174. **It is recommended** to promote an active participation of the police at the provincial and district level in the *Commissions for the Control of the Legality*, as an adequate forum where snags in the process can be discussed and further addressed to the higher authorities.

175. **Maintenance and infrastructure.**  One important issue foreseen in the project design was the establishment of depreciation methods for equipment, vehicles and buildings, so PRM's budget would contemplate the replacement once certain assets extinguish their functional life. Another important issue was concerning the maintenance of vehicles and buildings. The mission has observed the inexistence of such provisions in the PRM budget, especially the extremely scarce or non-existence at all of budget for maintenance at police station and district command level.

176. Lack of maintenance policy and corresponding budget allocation is also felt in the buildings rehabilitated or constructed under previous phases that given the poor construction quality, and lack of maintenance, are quickly deteriorating. Therefore, **this is an area the mission would urge action**, by

putting in place an adequate maintenance, depreciation and replacement policy and budget in order to ensure sustainability of the investments made in previous phases of the project in terms of infrastructure and equipment, especially in vehicles.

177. In addition, and given the current overstretched 24/24 hours duty rotations, the mission **recommends** further exploring the possibility of extending **refectory services to all police stations.**

178. **Model Stations.**     Model stations were introduced by the project quite successfully. However, its overall positive impact is at stake, given the lack of resources in personnel, infrastructure and equipment. Original improvements in those areas have progressively been deemed unsustainable. Lack of proper planning for skills transfer is hampering the process as well.

179. Based on the observations by the mission, **it is recommended** that should any further project explore the establishment of model units, these should be done on a strictly sustainable basis, even it means that only very limited number of model stations or units can be implemented. The mission **recommends** that donor financed strategies in this area be immediately contemplated and assumed into PRMs recurrent cost budget, allocating the necessary operating and maintenance budget. Lack of compliance with this provision will result in the quick deterioration of past international efforts.

180. **Decentralization.**     PRM    structure    remains    to    be    excessively hierarchical, with limited inputs from the territorial units to the Central Command. An example is the limited participation of territorial units in the planning and preparing of the annual budgets, key for incorporating the local needs' perspective.

181. The preparation of the new Organic Law of the Police and its corresponding regulations are considered to be the door leading to the implementation of a decentralization process. This law is, at the time of this report, in its final stage of approval. The mission **recommends** its progressive application once approved, defining additional competencies at provincial and district level and with special emphasis at the decentralization of budget allocations corresponding to maintenance and certain provision for goods and services.

182. **Gender.**     The limited number of women at all levels of the organization, operations and management, is evident. This has consequences for the desired gender balance and sensitivity. In addition to the existing awareness-rising actions, **it is recommended** that PRM's recruitment campaigns take into consideration the need to increase the percentage of women in the PRM, and that promotion panels take this fact into consideration, with special regard to the appointment into the senior management positions.

183. **Strengthening of the integrity and ethics.**     The project aimed at strengthening the integrity, ethics and professionalism of PRM. Under the aegis of the project, several legal instruments have been pushed forward, as

part of PRM's strategy against corruption. A new Police Statute, PRM's Disciplinary Regulation and Police Code of Conduct can positively contribute to guide police action and deal with PRM members' misconduct.

184. While the mission considers the advances very positive, and recommends the implementation of the code of conduct and disciplinary regulation as soon as possible, the independence of the overall process remains an issue to be addressed.

185. In addition, the simple introduction of a new code of conduct or disciplinary regulation will not be sufficient to address potential deviations from the ethic code. A proper **plan of awareness-raising** among PRM members will be needed, an action foreseen in Phase III but not realized given the processing time needed to endorse the new integrity instruments.

186. **Information Technologies.** The mission has verified the scarce availability and use of IT equipment at all levels of the PRM, and the almost non-existence of digital records of *autos*, case files and other procedure pertaining to PRM duties towards the citizens.

187. **The mission considers that**, in light of the current IT initiatives been undertaken by the Justice sector, and in particular, the SIPMAJ project, it is urgent that PRM performs a needs assessment and drafts a plan on how to best approach the incorporation of new information management technologies in the PRM service and in coordination with affected stakeholders like Justice

188. It is fundamental that all Information management systems in the Rule of Law area are designed in an interconnectable, fully compatible modular architecture, so they can be easily upgraded and data can be shared between police and justice services.

## C. Personnel and training

189. Substantial progress has been achieved during the last ten years. The creation of ACIPOL added an important element in capacitating PRM management to be able to tackle the challenges of the PRM reform process. It is therefore, strongly suggested that the GoM continues its support to ACIPOL, which according to its statutes, is a public autonomous academic institution, receiving its budget directly from the GoM general budget.

190. The creation of a Working Group for the Development of Human Resources, responsible for elaborating a diagnosis and scheduling members' training, is an additional landmark. **The mission recommends** that the Working Group continue its task of the consolidation of posts' descriptions, of planning and allocation of resources, and of optimal career sequence. In this framework, the **Mission makes the following specific recommendations** :

➢ Improve personnel career plans. Ensure transparency and competence-based promotions, rather that a nepotism-based system.

Need for transparent recruitment and selection panels in addition to the already established system of publishing the posts.

➤ Promote mobility across the same level around the country.

➤ Establish sub-officers promotion training courses, similarly to what has been done with the training for officer's level.

191. Another recurrent problem the mission has witnessed is that despite the introduction of new methods for service rotation in Stations and District Commands, the reality in most of the police stations remains to be 24/24 hours duty. This affects tremendously the performance and morale of the police members, and diminishes their capabilities to react to sudden needs. **The mission recommends** therefore that this must be considered a top priority while reorganizing staff effectives. Given the scarcity of personnel, it will remain impossible for the near future to organize duty tours of 8 hours per day, or even into a 12/24 duty tour. However, the achievement of a 24/48 hours tour seems to be an attainable target in a short-mid term scenario.

192. Starting in 2005, PRM worked in the elaboration and submission for approval of a performance evaluation model for PRM Units. The mission considers that it is important to introduce such a system, as it is an indispensable part of the evaluation of available human resources and the strategic reallocation of same, maximizing personnel contribution to PRM's duties.

193. Training on human rights, women's and children's rights should be reinforced with practical examples of discriminatory behaviours and how to avoid them. It is of little relevance for citizens that police officers know the year of signature of the main human rights conventions but in a life case scenario continue to behave in violation of those rights. It is extremely important to maintain and reinforce awareness on HIV/AIDS as PRM personnel continue to be highly affected by it. In general, it is important to avoid any strategy that might result in discrimination of a given group. Given the level of under-representation of women in the PRM, it is **recommended** that consideration be given to an affirmative action program designed to include more women into the PRM.

194. **Recruitment.** The Department of Personnel and Training of the PRM has over the last 10 years improved its recruitment strategy. One recruitment strategy adopted, to ensure better quality in the recruitment of cadets applying to enter the PRM was a **vetting process** of the applicants by the neighbourhood [*bairros*] residents.

195. Although the recruitment system in place provided good initial results, as consequence of PRM's continuous transformation, the system is in need of a review. It requires a more professional and modern approach to the recruitment of candidates. **The mission recommends** that the current recruitment system be reviewed, incorporating proper behavioural and

attitudinal **assessments** of the candidates, not only in the entrance exam, but through a continuous monitoring process during the basic training period.

196. **Basic Training.** The basic police training currently conducted at Matalane is often criticized for its weak preparation of recruits on the more practical aspects of policing, such as patrolling and the use of firearms. The basic training program, however, has improved the ability of the police officer in procedural issues and general knowledge. It remains however necessary to undertake a full review of the Basic training curricula, foreseen in Phase III, to better reflect the needs for administrative and operational knowledge.

197. Improvement of operational skills of new recruits could be done not only by reviewing the curriculum of in-class subjects, but also redefining the practical period recruits spend as trainees in police stations. While it is expected recruits will gain valuable practical operational knowledge during their placement in the police stations, the lack of preparation of commanders in mentoring the new recruits and the scarce means to apply the newly acquired skills in the field, severely curtail the practical apprenticeship of the police duties. It is therefore **highly recommended** to include this aspect in the curricular review of the basic training program.

198. **It is recommended** as well to consider the possibility of combining and alternating the periods of school and on-the-job training, so recruits are placed in police stations as trainees after a period of basic instruction in the school, and once finished the practical stage, then return to the school to review the knowledge acquired in both the school and on-the-job practical periods.

199. **Specialization Training.** A great number of specialized training programs have been provided since 1997, thanks to the assistance of key stakeholders like Portugal. While most of the training is relevant to the implementation of the PEPRM, it remains **recommendable** to prepare a strategic plan for training, prioritizing the different specialization programs on the basis of the sustainability of the police units acquiring the new skills. **Often units like maritime police are being trained but they have no means to conduct their duties.** [19] All actions should be done based on their sustainability and applicability in real terms

200. Promoting joint training activities, like specialized courses on criminal investigation, bringing together personnel from the police and the prosecutor's office, is also **recommended.** Joint training initiatives should also be considered between the maritime police and the Navy.

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[19] The Mission heard embarrassing tales from the maritime police, who have no boats at all (except one provided to them by the Province of Niassa for use in the region). Their patrols are conducted on foot on the coastal beaches. Even when they are able to borrow a civilian boat to conduct search and rescue operations, they have no fuel for the boat. When a unit, such as the maritime police, is not provided means to ensure sustainability of the skills gained during a specialized training there is a serious loss or impairment of the initial training investment.

## D. Improvement of PRM image

201. Improvement of PRM image should combine a two-fold strategy. On the one hand, PRM should continue to invest in the qualifications of its officers and improvement of the services provided. In practice, this means higher quality of education and integrity of officers, the establishment of effective, accessible and transparent mechanisms to deal with complaints regarding police misconduct and improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of police action.

202. The PRM should foster relationships with civil society, such as universities, schools, non-governmental organizations and take an active role in seminars, lectures, roundtables and other public forum. **It is recommended** that the PRM should make use of radio programs as the major communication tool to reach out to the community and communicate their message to the general population.

203. It is essential to establish closer links with the community. One important window of opportunity, but still with important challenges, is **Community Policing**. The first challenge is to clear up the misunderstanding of the concept of community policing.  It has to be made abundantly clear that the only people doing the 'policing' in Community Policing is the police.  The residents group assisting the police are to function as a civilian "neighbourhood watch" association, to provide advice and community information to the police.  **It is recommended** that the PRM should establish a strategy to build Community Policing based on the internationally accepted principles and that the donor community cooperate to its fullest with the PRM in this process.

204. The establishment, in most of the stations, of the Office for the Assistance of Women and Children, which assists victims of domestic violence, has significantly contributed to improve the image of the police among the general population. As such, **the mission recommends** the continued investment in the quality of services provided by these offices and respective expansion to all police units.


## 5.2 Recommendations for long-term programming assistance to the PRM

### A. Management and strategic coordination

205. While the GoM already contributes to a substantial amount of UTIPE operating costs, the importance of this unit requires ensuring its permanence. Therefore, **the mission recommends** that UTIPE budget is progressively absorbed into GoM MINT budget, gaining sustainability apart from donor oriented project financing.

206. Overall, the needs for PRM reform are enormous, as it is reflected in the US$250 million investment budget endorsed in the PEPRM. Donor project financing will certainly not be able to assume such a magnitude of investment.

**The mission therefore recommends** that police reform needs be included into the broader discussion of international financial assistance to the Rule of Law sector and through direct contributions to the GoM General Budget, in the framework of the PARPA strategy.

## B. Organizational and Operational

207. Given the notable challenges ahead in improving PRM operational capabilities, the ongoing discussions about the possibility of separating PIC from the PRM General Command is a matter that the mission considers to be an important decision. **The Mission recommends** that a decision in this regard be postponed pending further advancement in the implementation of the PEPRM.

208. Regarding the importance of increased transparency and compliance with PRM's code of conduct, the **Mission recommends** that the GoM prioritizes the creation of an independent civilian oversight agency that would investigate all serious allegations made against the police, including cases involving the police where death or serious bodily harm has occurred. In the alternative, this function could be performed by the office of the *Provedor de Justiça* (Ombudsman), which is currently provided in the country's constitution, as a public independent institution that could guarantee the independence and transparency in addressing complains against the integrity and ethics of the police.

## C. Personnel and training

209. Given the expansion needs of the PRM, and considering the worrying rate of deaths of police personnel, it appears appropriate to establish a long term plan to increase the intake capacity to the basic training program of the PRM. This would require either the expansion and refurbishment of Matalane School, or the opening additional basic training schools around the country. While the first appears to be the most cost-effective solution, the second would positively contribute to the decentralization of PRM and contribute to bolster public image. In any case, this discussion should be placed in the broader budgetary analysis of PRM's needs as discussed previously.

## D. Improvement of PRM image

210. The re-establishment of the wider-representation Steering Committee to provide guidance and consultation on the implementation of the PEPRM appears to be highly relevant and necessary. There is a need to continue to engage the widest representation possible of donors and pushing the information through to Government officials and civil society.

211. The improvement of the image of the PRM will also depend on the level, quality and amount of joint initiatives between the Police sector and the civil society at large. The cooperation with the civilian universities in joint or complementary programs is crucial. The discussion of police subjects should be expanded to the rest of the society. This systematic cooperation and

collaboration with academic institutions and other civil society organizations will contribute to the development of the PRM and the attraction of the right kind of personnel to PRM.

212. The establishment of a pilot Office for the Assistance of Women and Children in Beira, which currently is located in a different facility and completely independent from the normal police station, consists as well of an excellent experiment that the mission would like to suggest for further expansion at provincial level in the country. While the progress experienced by the inclusion of these offices in regular police stations is very positive and should continue, the mission has experienced that separate facilities for this kind of victims greatly fosters confidence and facilitates the victim's access to justice via the police.

213. **Community Policing.** Community Policing in Mozambique is structured in community councils composed of mainly unoccupied young males. Their function is to zeal for the public order of their neighbourhoods which can range from informing the police regarding suspect individuals and/or activities, to patrol the streets. The mission considers that there are several worrisome factors regarding Community Policing as it is being applied, as it is in itself problematic that citizens assume police functions that are state responsibility.

214. Therefore, **the Mission recommends** the work already started by the GoM of re-examining this particular area, and in light of other reforms experienced by countries like Kenya or Albania. Kenya's community policing reform is deemed to be very positive, in an attempt to apply internationally recognised standards as the ones gathered in the Saferworld/SEESAC/UNDP Community Policing guidelines.[20]

215. International practice shows Community Policing as an approximation of the Police to the communities. Police officers are trained in specific skills as to involve the community in the prevention of crime and violence and thus create safer neighbourhoods. The main principles governing community-based policing can be summarized as follows:

- Practicing policing by consent not coercion.
- Being part of the community not apart from it.
- Finding out (together with the community) what the communities' needs are.
- Working in partnership with other agencies and the public.
- Tailoring the 'business' of policing to meet the communities' needs being accountable for its 'business service'.

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[20] Please see "Philosophy and principles of community-based policing" (http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=55)

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

# LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| ACIPOL | Academy of Police Sciences |
| CCLJ | Coordination Council for Legality and Justice |
| EU | European Union |
| FLECS | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
| GoM | Government of the Republic of Mozambique |
| HIV/AIDS | Human Immunity Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| ISPU | Polytechnic University |
| ISRI | Higher Institute for International Relations |
| NEP | Permanent Execution Norm |
| MINT | Ministry of Interior |
| PARPA | Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| PEPRM | Strategic Plan of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique |
| PIC | Criminal Investigation Police |
| PP | Protection Police |
| PRM | Police of the Republic of Mozambique |
| ProDoc | Project Document |
| PT | Transit Police |
| SIPMAJ | Justice Sector Integrated System for the Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation |
| SISTAFE | State Financial Administration System |
| UEM | Eduardo Mondlane University |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNICRI | United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UTREL | Technical Unit for Legal Reform |
| UTRESP | Technical Unit for Public Sector Reform |

# VI. ANNEXES

## ANNEX 1: The Joint Evaluation Team

**Mr. Carl Defaria** – Team Leader (email: carl_defaria@yahoo.com)

Carl DeFaria is a former Chief International Prosecutor for the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and the Senior Human Rights Officer in Timor-Leste. He led the Democratic Governance Unit at UNMIT from its inception until February 2007. He is a Canadian international criminal and human rights lawyer, who served as an elected parliamentarian for eight years, occupying senior posts such as the Vice-Chair of the Legislative Assembly Standing Committee on Justice and as Cabinet Minister in Ontario, Canada.

**Mr. Jordi Capdevila** (email: jordicadevila@yahoo.com)

Jordi Capdevila is a Postconflict Governance Specialist from Spain. He has extensive experience in national development planning, governance and donor coordination in Afghanistan, Balkans and Central Asia. He previously worked for the Asian Development Bank and the UN Peace Keeping missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He has participated in the reform of the police services in Kosovo and has worked as consultant for the School of Police of Catalonia, Spain.

**Ms. Mónica Nascimiento e Silva** (email: monica_n_silva@yahoo.co.uk)

Mónica Nascimento e Silva has graduated in International Relations in the University of Coimbra, Portugal and holds a Master's Degree in Human Rights and Democratization by the University of Padua, Italy, and the University of Maastricht, the Netherlands. She has worked in human rights, democratization and good governance in Europe, Latin America and Africa. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, she gained extensive experience in Public Security, where she coordinated the implementation of a programme on police reform and violence prevention.

**Mr. Laudemiro Francisco** (email: laudecisco@gmail.com)

Laudemiro Francisco, PhD, is a Political Economist, faculty and researcher at the Higher Institute for International Relations (ISRI) in Maputo, Mozambique. He has a large international experience on security related issues and has taken part in several research initiatives, including the World Bank/Yale University project on the economics of political and criminal violence; the AERC/IAE project on post-conflict economic reconstruction; the IPA project on security sector reform; the SADC Hashim Mbita project on the liberation process in Southern Africa; and South Africa's SADET project on the role of international solidarity in the liberation of South Africa.

## ANNEX 2: The Terms of Reference for the Outcome Evaluation

## SUPPORT TO THE POLICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE
### Outcome Evaluation Phase I, II and III

**Background:**

The project "Support to the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) – Phase III" gives continuity to former UNDP projects MOZ/95/015 (Phase I) and MOZ/00/007 (Phase II), which were aimed at revitalizing and improving the effectiveness of the PRM, currently by supporting the implementation of the Strategic Plan.

The support to the PRM is currently designed to implement the priority areas of the Strategic Plan such as the monitoring and implementation of the National Strategic Plan, improvement in the organizational and management arrangements of the PRM, continued training of personnel and an improvement in the public image of the PRM. It directly supports the country program goal to improve governance and the justice component of the sub-goal to improve key governance institutions. This project complements the UNDP justice sector program and has enable the PRM to contribute to a more coordinated and better functioning criminal justice sector and the broader public sector reform program of the Government of Mozambique (GoM). Since 1997, three phases comprise the UNDP support:

**Phase I :**

Under the Ministry of Interior (MINT), UNDP project (MOZ/95/015) support to the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) – Phase I, was designed to coordinate donor efforts to strengthen the capacity of the PRM to carry out its fundamental tasks of maintaining public order and security, preventing and suppressing crime, and upholding the rule of law. Spain and the Netherlands committed donor funding to this UNDP initiative of more than US$ 12,000,000 (US$5,228,224 Spain-financially and US$ 6,000,000 Netherlands) that included a guaranteed availability of Technical Assistance by the Guardia Civil in what amounted to a in-kind contribution of US$ 3 million from Spain.

The Phase I Project to provide support to the PRM commenced in 1997 with UNOPS as the executing agency. The main focus of Phase I was the rehabilitation and furnishing of the main police training centre, and the rehabilitation of selected police stations in Maputo.

**Phase II:**

The aim of Phase II (financed again by the Spanish and the Dutch – US$ 12,000,000, with co-financing from the Government of Mozambique) was to build on and consolidate the achievements of Phase I. Efforts were concentrated on strengthening the PRM through retraining of the existing staff and the training of new recruits, supporting the establishment of a number of well-functioning model units at selected police stations, district commands and provincial commands through rehabilitation of premises, technical assistance and the provision of necessary support equipment, including motorbikes, photographic equipment, crime investigation kits, communication equipment, torch lights and typewriters. It also focused on the reinforcement of managerial and planning capabilities of PRM including the Central Command.

This UNDP coordinated project was complemented by MOZ/98/006, which also supported the PRM by establishing a training academy ("Academia de Ciencias Policiais" - ACIPOL) for new officers drawn from the general population through a competitive examination process. The Academy offered two courses – one at bachelor level and another at degree level. The ACIPOL initiative was financed by the Swiss and Spanish Governments to the amount of $1.7 million and $0.9 million respectively, and managed using a National Execution modality. The project was undertaken in coordination with bilateral programs funded by France, Portugal, South Africa, Germany and USA.

The key outcome of Phase II was the development of a PRM Strategic Plan for 2003-2012 by the PRM and the Ministry of Interior (MINT) and widespread consultation with key stakeholders (a total of 52 members made up the Steering Committee, representing all concerned sectors of government, civil society, bilateral and multilateral donors). The development of the Strategic Plan, was, and is, an important step for the PRM and the MINT, and provides a sound direction for the future as well as a mechanism for prioritizing goals, budgeting to achieve these goals and the establishment of performance and impact indicators to monitor and measure outcomes and achievements.

**Phase III:**

The third phase of support to the PRM has been designed to implement the priority areas of the Strategic Plan such as the monitoring and implementation of the Strategic Plan, improvement in the organizational and management arrangements of the PRM, continued training of personnel and an improvement in the public image of the PRM. It directly supports the country program goal to improve governance and the justice component of the sub-goal to improve key governance institutions.

This program complements the UNDP justice sector program and will enable the PRM to contribute to a more coordinated and better functioning criminal justice sector and the broader public sector reform program of the GoM.

**Objectives of the Evaluation:**

An external and independent final evaluation is foreseen in the project document of "Support to the Police of the Republic of Mozambique - Phase III"; the evaluation will cover the period from the start of the project in 2004 until the commencement of the evaluation (foreseen August 2007) – but will also take into account the impact of the first two phases of support to the PRM beginning in 1997.

**The objectives of the final evaluation are:**

1. Examine the process by which the project support document was developed, and assess how the environment surrounding its development impacted the final project document;
2. Assess the degree of efficiency and effectiveness of the project in meeting the objectives and achievements for which it was designed;
3. Review the implementation of the project from the date of its commencement until the date at which the evaluation begins;
4. Identify challenges, strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned in project

implementation and make recommendations on possible ways forward within the
context of the National Strategic Plan;

5. Identify successes in project implementation, facilitating and constraining factors,
   and opportunities that exist to build upon these successes;
6. Assess the impact of the continued support provided to the PRM beginning in 1997,
   in the context of its effectiveness and public perception as a public service provider,
   and in light of the security sector reform framework.

**Scope of the Evaluation:**

The evaluation should cover all activities carried out by the project, as well as the impact
of the previous phases of support. It should include, but not be limited to, examination of
the following:

- Assess the results of the activities implemented by the project compared to those
  key outputs foreseen in the project work plans;
- Assess the project strategy and design as described in the PSD including the
  adequacy of results framework;
- Assess factors outside the scope of the project, which impacted on the
  performance;
- Assess impact of the project on the institutions, groups, individuals that benefited
  from its support;
- Assess the roles and responsibilities of various partners involved since 1997: PRM,
  UNDP, involved donors, the ministries and other stakeholders;
- Assess the role of the Unit for the Implementation of the Strategic Plan for the
  Police (UTIPE) and its predecessors in managing the project, specifically in terms
  of execution modalities;
- Assess monitoring and evaluation of the project in relation to the broader human
  rights and governance situation, including the availably and quality of usable
  baselines and indicators;
- Assess the cumulative impact of the three phases of support through an in-depth
  analysis of past reviews;
- Assess the cumulative impact of the three phases of support through an analysis of
  its effect on the public's perception of the PRM and its ability to carry out its
  mandate; In view of the assessment findings, make recommendations for a
  possible future project and provide guidance on its major design features.

**Issues to be addressed by the Evaluation**

The evaluators should, to the extent relevant and possible, address the following issues
and make recommendations:

- The continuing importance of the support to the Strategic Plan (approach,
  objectives, implementation modality) in view of any developments in the prevailing
  sectoral context since the time of project design and approval;
- The sustainability of the project, giving an assessment of the likelihood that the
  project results will endure after the project has ended;
- The process of capacity-building in the sector;
- The impact of the support provided since 1997 on the public image and perception

of the PRM.

**Evaluation Methodology:**

The evaluators are expected to incorporate the following modalities for assessing the project performance into their proposed Methodology:

- Briefing with UNDP;
- Review of documentation, including the Programme Support Document, the Progress Reports and Work Plans, minutes of TPR meetings, the Substantive Revision of the Programme, the Monitoring and Evaluation chapters from the UNDP Programming Manual, the Guidelines for Evaluators, and other relevant documentation;
- Interview relevant stakeholders: MINT, UTIPE, PIC, Donor partners, UN agencies and Civil Society Organisations;
- Site visits to the Police Training Centres;
- Devote at least 15 days to carry out limited survey public perception of the PRM;
- Presentation of findings to the relevant institutions;
- Elaboration of final report.

**Composition of External Evaluation Team**

The evaluation team will be composed primarily of external consultants (up to a maximum of 5) selected through an open competition. A panel consisting of representatives from the MINT-PRM, the UNDP and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands will convene to select the most appropriate and qualified candidates. The panel will appoint a team leader for the evaluation from the candidates selected.

The Government of Mozambique is welcome to contribute or take part in the evaluation efforts in a supporting role. A national consultant may be appointed and added to the evaluation team to facilitate the work of the evaluation team, and provide access and language assistance where necessary. The national consultant cannot, under any circumstances, be staff of the Ministry of the Interior.

The mission is open to other donors that wish to be associated, on their own expenses.

**Description of Responsibilities :**

The evaluation team leader is responsible for:

- The overall management and coordination of the mission and team's activities;
- Ensuring that the mission objectives are complete and delivered within the given schedule;
- Ensuring the independence, impartiality and accuracy of all conclusions, recommendations and/or findings reported;
- The compiling and drafting of the final report and the coordinating the presentation of its findings.

The evaluation team will be required to:

- Review the project documentation (conduct a literature review) including the Project Support Documents (PSD), previous evaluations, Progress Reports, Annual and bi-annual work plans, Minutes of the Tripartite Meetings, Cost-Sharing Agreements;
- Interview relevant stakeholders, national (MINT, UTIPE, PRM, UNDP, donors and Civil Society Organizations;
- Study UNCRI's "Strategic Plan of the PRM: Results of surveys on victimization and police performance" 2003 report as a guiding document and example in order to carry out a limited survey on public perception of the PRM.

The evaluation team should prepare their conclusions and present them through the following steps:

- Circulation of draft evaluation report;
- Debriefing of relevant stakeholders on the evaluators' preliminary findings;
- Presentation of evaluators' findings to PRM, UNDP, and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands;
- Elaboration of the final report;
- The team should submit the report in six copies. It is the responsibility of the Resident Representative to ensure that the Government, including the Ministry of the Interior, UTIPE and Donor partners receives a copy, along with UNDP Headquarters Evaluation Office.

## Competencies :

- Objectivity and independence;
- Competence in the field of governance, public administration and police related activities in particular;
- Extensive experience in developing countries and prior experience and expertise with police reform, senior police management and/or police training development;
- Extensive experience in strategic planning and information systems;
- Practical project management and/or implementation experience;
- Extensive experience in monitoring and evaluation in a developing country.

## Qualifications :

- Fluency in Portuguese and an excellent knowledge of English;
- Knowledge about social, political and development context an added advantage;
- Proven ability in working in politically sensitive environments;
- Minimum educational qualifications of Masters degree, in Police Science, Law, or related field or in any other Social Sciences;
- Computer Literate.

# ANNEX 3: List of Consultations and Interviews

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Gilberto Madime** | National Project Coordinator | UTIPE, Ministry of Interior |
| **Sebastião Pechiço Cumbe** | Logistics and Finance Officer | UTIPE, Ministry of Interior |
| **Lurdes Afonso Mabunda** | Department of Women and Children, Deputy Coordinator of Gender Unit | UTIPE, Ministry of Interior |
| **Joaquim Bule** | Head, International Relations Office | Ministry of Interior |
| **Adriano Boane** | General Secretary | General Prosecutor's Office |
| **Sandra Torre do Vale** | National Director for Planning | General Prosecutor's Office |
| **Gaspar Moniquela** | Executive Secretary | Council for Coordination of Legality and Justice |
| **Jorge Henrique da Costa Kalau** | Deputy-Commander | PRM General Command |
| **Jaime Basílio Monteiro** | Director, Public Order & Security | PRM General Command |
| **Geremias Cumbi** | Head, Department of Studies, Information and Planning | PRM General Command |
| **Adriano João Mucuapera** | Commander | PRM Maputo Provincial Command |
| **Carlos Ubisse** | Director, Public Order & Security | PRM Maputo Provincial Command |
| **António Parruque** | Director of Criminal Investigation | PRM Maputo Provincial Command |
| **Adriano Nashwe Caetano** | Director of Personnel | PRM Maputo Provincial Command |
| **Mushachane Mucavele** | Director of Logistics | PRM Maputo Provincial Command |
| **Carlos Francisco Come** | National Director | Criminal Investigation Directorate |
| **Abilio Chivavel** | Head of Department | Criminal Investigation Directorate |
| **Ana Dimande Sitoe** | Director, Personnel and Training | PRM General Command |
| **Izidine Aly Ussene** | Head, Department of Personnel | PRM General Command |
| **Manuel Jamaca** | Head, Department of Training | PRM General Command |
| **Fernando Saiete** | Commander | Matalane Police Practical School |
| **Alberto Vago Nguirande** | Director, Logistics and Finance | Matalane Police Practical School |
| **Ernesto Fernando Chirindza** | Deputy Commander | Coast Guard (FPMLF), PRM Maputo |

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|---|---|---|
| **João Zandamela** | General Director | General Directorate of Prisons |
| **Rosario Antonio R. Gemo** | Chief of Staff | Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) |
| **Luis Manuel Mazuza** | Commander | Maputo City Command |
| **Felciano Juvane** | Director, Public Order & Security | Maputo City Command |
| **Dias Francisco Balate** | Director of PIC | Maputo City Command |
| **Moisés Mabecuana** | Director, Personnel and Training | Maputo City Command |
| **Julieta Joaquim** | Head of Health Department | Maputo City Command |
| **Rosa Maria** | Assistant to the Commander | Maputo City Command |
| **Fernando Bata** | Commander | Maputo 1st Police Station |
| **Roque Jamisse** | Commander | Maputo 2nd Police Station |
| **Atália Mondlane** | Commander | Maputo 7th Police Station |
| **Laura Mahuaia** | Commander | Maputo 9th Police Station |
| **Chadreque Tivane** | Commander | Matola 1st Police Station |
| **Almeida dos Santos Tsonga** | Commander | Matola 2nd Police Station |
| **Zacarias Cossa** | Commander | PRM Sofala Provincial Command |
| **Maria Odete Amade** | Head of Gender Unit | Office for Women and Children (Beira, Sofala) |
| **Rosário Manuel** | Deputy Chief of Operations | Dondo PRM District Command |
| **Lourenço Catandica** | Acting Provincial Commander | Zambezia PRM Command |
| **Jaime Ribas** | Commander | Quelimane 1st Police Station |
| **Almeida Candrinho** | Commander | Mocuba PRM District Command |
| **Amilcar dos Santos** | Head of Operations | Mocuba PRM District Command |
| **Alberto Mondlane** | Vice-Rector | ACIPOL |
| **Filipe Mendes Z. Machate** | Head of Finance Department | ACIPOL |
| **Abedemingo Mausse** | Head, Public Relations and International Cooperation | ACIPOL |
| **Alberto Domingos Assane** | Head, Informatics & Communications | ACIPOL |
| **Manuel Carlos Cape** | Head of Rector's Office | ACIPOL |

| **Paul J. M. Litjens** | Head, Development Co-operation, Deputy Head of Mission | Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands |
|---|---|---|
| **Bastiaan Engelhard** | Political Affairs | Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands |
| **Fernando Carvalho** | Head of Cooperation | Embassy of Portugal |
| **Paulo António Pereira Soares** | Liaison Officer, Ministry of Internal Affairs | Embassy of Portugal |
| **Naomi Kitahara** | Deputy Resident Representative | UNDP Mozambique |
| **Habiba Rodolfo** | Assistant Resident Representative, Head of Unit, Governance I | UNDP Mozambique |
| **Miguel Barreiro Laredo** | Project Coordinator, Small Arms and Light Weapons | UNDP Mozambique |
| **Bruno Nordeste** | Programme Officer | UNDP Mozambique |
| **Mioh Nemoto** | Child Protection Specialist | UNICEF Mozambique |
| **Eduardo Mussanhane** | National Project Coordinator | Project Support Citizens Access to Justice EU/UNDP/00039005/06 |
| **Tomás Vieira Mário** | Chairperson | Media Institute for Southern Africa |
| **Marcelo Mosse** | Executive Coordinator | Center for Public Integrity (CIP) |
| **Custódio Duma** | Assistant to the Office of the President | Human Rights League |
| **Carlos Cauio** | President | Mozambique Lawyers' Order |
| **Albino Forquia** | Executive Director | Mozambican Force for the Investigation of Crimes and Social Reinsertion (FOMICRES) |
| **Eugénia Pascoal** | Financial Officer | FOMICRES |
| **Mijausse Maguiava** | Founding Member | FOMICRES |
| **Antonio Rangel Bandeira** | Head | Small Arms Control Project of Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil |
| **Geraldo Roberto Peixoto** | Coordinator of Systems Development | The Delegacia Legal Programme, Civilian Police of Rio de Janeiro |
| **Pablo Gabriel Dreyfus** | Research Coordinator | Small Arms Control Project of Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil |
| **Júlio César Purcena** | Researcher | Small Arms Control Project, of Viva Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil |
| **Marcelo Souza de Nascimento** | Chief Statistician | ISER |

## ANNEX 4: Program for the Evaluation Mission of the Project

## <u>SUPPORT TO THE POLICE OF MOZAMBIQUE (PHASE III)</u>
### 03 September to 03 October 2007

| | Monday | Tuesday | Wednesday | Thursday | Friday |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **03 September** | **04 September** | **05 September** | **06 September** | **07 September** |
| Week1 | **9:00** Team meetings<br>**9:30** UNDP, Briefing/ Introduction<br>**11:00** Team meetings<br>**14:00** Meeting with UNDP Field Security Officer<br>**13:00** Document review<br>**16:30** Meeting with UNDP RR a.i | **8:30** Team Meetings Document review<br>**10:30** Meeting with Police/SALW CTA<br>**14:00** UTIPE, meeting with implementation unit<br>**16:00** Meeting Embassy of Portugal | **9:30** Meeting with General Commander of PRM<br>**10:45** Meeting with the Director of Public Order and Safety<br>**14:00** Meeting with the Director for Maritime Security<br>**15:30** Meeting with FIR<br>**17:00** Meeting with UTIPE | **9:00** Meeting with the Director of PIC<br>**10:00** Meeting with the Director of Personnel and Training<br>**12:00** Meeting with Gender/Youth Unit Director MINT/PRM<br>**13:15** Embassy of the Netherlands<br>**16:00** FOMICRES | **HOLIDAY** |
| | **10 September** | **11 September** | **12 September** | **13 September** | **14 September** |
| Week 2 | **8:30** Visit to Michafutene - ACIPOL <mark>(unable to meet – to be rescheduled)</mark><br>**14:00** Visit to Matalane practical school | **8:00** Visit 1st PRM station<br>**9:00** Visit 2nd PRM station<br>**10:00** Visit 6th PRM station <mark>(could not make it)</mark><br>**11:00** Visit 7th PRM station<br>**12:00** Visit 9th PRM station<br>**14:00** Visit to Maputo City Command<br>**16:30** Visit to Michafutene - ACIPOL <mark>(rescheduled)</mark> | **9:00** Visit to Maputo Provincial Command Followed by visit to Matola Police Stations rehabilitated by project funds (1st) and to a non rehabilitated Station (2nd) – Director will indicate contact individual at Stations<br>**14:00** Team Meetings & Document review<br>**15:00** Meeting with Human Rights League of Mozambique | **6:45** Depart for Beira<br>**7:55** Arrive in Beira<br>**8:30** Visit Provincial Commander<br>**11:30** Visit to UNICEF sponsored projects on domestic violence<br>**14:00** Visit District Command<br>**18:10** Depart for Zambezia<br>**18:50** Arrive in Zambezia | **9:00** Visit Provincial Command & meeting with Provincial Commander<br>**12:30** Visit District Command |

| | 17 September | 18 September | 19 September | 20 September | 21 September |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Week 3 | **9:00** Meeting with UNDP Justice Program, National Coordinator (also former coordinator of Police Project for phase 1&2) **11:30** Director of DEIPL **14:00** Team meetings | **9:00** Team meetings **10:00** Meeting with Attorney General **14:00** National Director of Prisons (unable to meet – to be rescheduled) | **9:00** Team meetings **14:00** National Director of Prisons (rescheduled) **15:00** Ordem dos Advogados | **9:00** Team meetings **14:00** Meeting with Brazil Police Mission or Viva Rio Mission **16:00** Meeting with UNDP ARR and PO for Justice, Rule of Law and Security | **9:00** Centro de Integridade Pública **11:00** COPRECAL **13:00** Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Mozambique National Chapter **15:00** UNICEF |
| | **24 September** | **25 September** | **26 September** | **27 September** | **28 September** |
| Week 4 | **7:00** Student Focus Groups (ISRI) **9:00** Student Focus Groups (UEM-FLECS) **11:00** CCLJ Secretariat (Dr. Gaspar) **14:00** Drafting of preliminary report | • Team meetings & Drafting of preliminary report | • Team meetings & Drafting of preliminary report | • Team meetings & Drafting of preliminary report | • Team meetings & Drafting of preliminary report |
| | **01 October** | **02 October** | **03 October** | | |
| Week 5 | • Team meetings & Drafting of preliminary report **16:00** Presentation of preliminary report UNDP RR/P, ARR, and PO | • Incorporation of amendments and other considerations **14:00** Meeting with UNDP RR (at RCO) | **9:00** Presentation of final report to UNDP, MINT, Kingdom of the Netherlands | | |

Additional visits carried out by the evaluation team:
National Institute of Statistics

Meetings that Evaluation Team was unable to have:
Meeting with the Director of Logistics and Finance (rescheduled)
Meeting with Ministry of Panning & Ministry of Finance
Meeting with Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Public Order
Meeting with the Association for Human Rights and Development
Meeting with the EC
Meeting with Spanish Cooperation
Meeting with Embassy of South Africa
Meeting with Embassy of USA
Meeting with Embassy of France

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# ANNEX 6: Organization Chart of the General Command of PRM

Organization Chart of the General Command of PRM

**General Commander**
(General Inspector)

**Vice-General Commander**
(Comissário)

**Social Services**

**Council of PRM**

**Council of Ethics and Discipline**

**Office of Comde General**
(Superintendent General)

**Main Office**
(Deputy Superintendent)

**Depto de Reseach, Information and Planning**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto of Internal Affairs**
(1º Adjunto do Comissário)

**Depto de Relações Públicas**
(1º Adjunto do Comissário)

**Directore of Public Order and Security**
(Commissioner)

**Directorate of Criminal Investiagtion**
(Comissário)

**Command of Special Forces and Reserve**
(Commissioner)

**Directorate of Personnel and Training**
(Commissioner)

**Direcção de Logística e Finanças**
(Comissário)

**Depto of Operations**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto de Instructions and Investigation**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Border Control Unit**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto of Administration & Personnel Management**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto de Administração e Logística**
(1º Adjunto do Comissário)

**Depto of Protection**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Rapid Intervention Unit**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**VIP Protection Unit**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto of Training**
(Deputy Commissionner)

**Departament of Finances**
(Adjunto do Comissario)

**Depto of Traffic**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto of Criminilastic Technique**
(1º Deputy Commissioner)

**Sea, River and Lake Protection Unit**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Departament of Infra-structures**
(Adjunto do Comissário)

**Depto de Communications e Informática**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto de Archive and Operative Registry**
(General)

**Depto of Health**
(Adjunto do Comissário)

**Depto of Prisions Administration**
(Deputy Commissioner)

**Depto of Coordination (with INTERPOL)**
(General)

**Depto of Forests, Wildelife and Environment**
(Deputy Commissioner)

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## ANNEX 7: Evaluation Methodology

### 1. The Research Methods

This evaluation was designed to rely essentially on primary data. It combines several methods of data collection focusing on on-site visits, a review of project documents, focused interviews with project partners and stakeholders, a survey questionnaire, as well as focus groups. There was also an effort to access data that has been collected by public surveys conducted by local and external organizations dealing with the Mozambicans perceptions of the police. This data was used to provide indications of the public perception of the PRM.

The interviews are intended to explore the perceptions of the partners, stakeholders and the public about the project's implementation and sustainability. They also serve to ascertain the perceptions about the possibilities for future support to the police support project. The questionnaire is intended to gauge public perception of the existing knowledge and support to the work of the police as well as public's view of the priorities in the support to the police.

At the national level, the interviews are intended to ascertain existing perceptions of the role of the various actors in the process of formulation and implementation of the Strategic Plan of the Police (PEPRM) and the Police Support Project from the perspective of both the project partners and the stakeholders; interviews were also intended to identify the rationale behind the current approaches to police reform. The interviews at the local level (provincial, district, and station) are intended to learn from those whose daily work is the face of the police and therefore directly impacted by policies centrally decided. These are considered a particularly important group of people because they have a vested interest on the changes and improvements to their work. The interviewees were reached at the place and time of their convenience, which most of the time was the office and sometimes the home.

The design of the survey was intended to collect data related to the respondents': (1) knowledge of the police organizational structure and respective functioning mechanisms; (2) perceptions of the quality and efficacy of the police; (3) opinions toward the role of the police and the priorities of change, including perceptions of gender, corruption and human rights; and (4) the respondents perceptions of the priority areas of support to the police.

## A. The Survey Questionnaires

The survey questionnaire targeted the third-year university students in the cities of Quelimane and Maputo. These were expected to have a background sufficient enough to respond to the four key issues of the terms of reference for the evaluation report. The survey has a representative sample size of 119 observations, of which 13% in Quelimane and 87% in Maputo. The sample is constituted by students of:

(1) *Universidade Politécnica* (ISPU) in Quelimane: the survey targeted the students from the juridical sciences and administration and management. A total of 15 students responded to the survey questionnaire.
(2) *Universidade Eduardo Mondlane* (FLECS/UEM) in Maputo: the survey targeted students from the program on Political and Administrative Sciences at Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FLECS). A total of 48 students responded to the survey.
(3) *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais* (ISRI) in Maputo: the survey target students of the program of International Relations and Diplomacy. A total of 56 students answered to the survey.

## B. The Focus Groups

The focus group methodology was designed as an additional tool to gauge the general perception of the role, functions, actions and capacity of the police. The focus groups involved the same students at the three locations that took part in the survey. Yet, in order to avoid influencing the opinions of the respondents, the focus groups took place after all the questionnaires were collected.

The focus groups provided an additional means to understand the answers given in the survey questionnaires and engage the university students in the debate over their perceptions of the police role and the continuation of the support to the police. The participants were presented with five issues around which the discussion took place: (1) the role of the police in Mozambique; (2) the performance of the police; (3) the effectiveness of the police; (4) the measures to improve the image of the police; and (5) the willingness to join the police.

In the preparation for using of the focus groups as tools of evaluation research, the evaluation team paid close attention to the target participants and the questions of discussion. The evaluation team used one main moderator to guide the discussions and ensure that it discussion followed in a logical manner within the parameters that were previously defined. The questions moved from general to specific, and some flexibility was allowed in order to guide the discussion, yet without imposing on the participants.

## 2. Data Processing and Analysis

As mentioned earlier, the report takes into consideration the surveys that cover public perceptions of the PRM. Given the width and depth of such surveys, they offer a good indication of the public perception level at the time they were undertaken. For this report, there was a need to obtain fresh data that, although not deep and hence not necessarily comparable to the other ones, provide an indication of some level of perception at the level of a limited group of a specific category of Mozambique's population: university students.

Regarding the survey questionnaire, precautions were taken to accurately post and protect the data. The data was revised, coded and inputted to the computer using the *Statistical Program for Social Sciences* (SPSS). After entry, data was checked for accuracy, namely, correct format, range, values, place and missing values and also tested for internal consistency and reliability. The data was further analyzed to ascertain the extent to which the different variables relate to one another.

The study took into consideration the inherent difficulties in assigning cause and effect in survey research. Yet, the results of the survey observations used in this work must be taken with caution as they are weakened by the limited size of the sample. Due to its limited scope, the data from the questionnaire shall be considered as merely indicative. Therefore, it shall not be read as to lead to any conclusions beyond its limited scope. Thus, the combination of descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis was deemed indicative to illuminate the context that informs the public perceptions of the Police.

## A. Survey Findings and Analysis

The mini-survey involved 119 university students, of which 33% were female. The large majority of the respondents (79%) belong in the age bracket between 21 and 30 years of age; the respondent ages varied from 19 to 56 years. Most respondents are based in Maputo (87%).

## Perceptions of the Police

In issues related directly to the perceptions of the police and its work, the results of the mini-survey show that, in broad terms, there is dissatisfaction with the performance of the police. Approximately 79% find PRM performance as poor, with only 20% classified the performance of the PRM as good.  Similarly, the survey also showed that only 12% declared that they trust in the police, while approximately 71% of the respondents trusted a little and 16% did not. These results may also be associated to the fact that there is a weak responsiveness of the police toward the demands of the public. Only 7% found

the police to be responsive to the demands of the public; 64% find the police irresponsive to public demands.

The perception of the police as neutral service-oriented institution is also negative. For example, 81% declared to have witnessed abusive behaviour by police personnel, while the majority of respondents (75%) consider the police as a corrupt institution, where citizens need to pay bribes in order to obtain assistance or access services. Likewise, 89% see the police as favouring the elite members. The role of Community Police as a source of order in the community is recognized by 25% of the respondents.

Being that Maputo was greatly affected violent and spectacular crimes in the past few weeks, it appeared safe to assume that the negative perception of the work of the police would be accentuated in Maputo. Yet, the proportion of respondents who perceive the police to have a negative image is relatively similar for the case of Quelimane as well. Looking at the same indicators, the picture indicates that 80% of the respondents regard the work of the police as poor, while only 7% trusted in the police. The proportion of respondents that trust in the police to a certain degree is 53%, while 33% did not trust in the police. The majority (87%) see the police as giving preferential treatment to the members of the elite. In Quelimane, the perception that police fails to respond to public demands is also high (73%). The share of respondents that have witnessed police abusive behaviour is higher in Quelimane (87%). Finally, compared to the total of the observations, the perception of the role of the Community Police as a source of order in the community is relatively higher in Quelimane (27%).

**Perception of Potential Areas of Intervention**

The respondents were asked to list three priority areas of intervention in order to improve the work and image of the police. A list of the following nine (9) areas was supplied to the respondents:
- o Fighting corruption
- o Improve and expand police training
- o Improve crime prevention actions
- o Acquisition of transportation means
- o Acquisition of means of communication
- o Built or rehabilitate police stations
- o Increase salaries of the police personnel
- o Increase the number of police personnel
- o Bring the police closer to community.

The three areas that the majority found relevant are:
- o Increase the Police Salaries (58%)
- o Fighting corruption (57%); and
- o Bring the police closer to Community (53%).

**Beyond the Image of the Police**

Although the image of the police is perceived negatively, it is worth noting that the role assigned to the police to ensure order is seen in a high note with 67% of respondents looking up to the PRM to ensure order in the community. This is in itself a positive point that needs to be further nurtured. The work of the police is fundamental for the development of society. This is a responsibility that needs to be understood by all, particularly by the PRM. A good image of the police will depend in large part on the perception of the public towards the corporation. In turn, this will likely have a greater impact on the police's ability to promote and receive cooperation with the communities in preventing and combating crime as it will be seen as serving the interests of the society at large.

**B. The Survey Data Tables**

**Table 1: Age**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | 17-20 | 3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
|  | 21-30 | 94 | 79.0 | 81.0 | 83.6 |
|  | 31-40 | 15 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 96.6 |
|  | 41-50 | 3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 99.1 |
|  | 51-60 | 1 | .8 | .9 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 116 | 97.5 | 100.0 |  |
| Missing System |  | 3 | 2.5 |  |  |
| Total |  | 119 | 100.0 |  |  |

**Table 2: Sex**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Male | 80 | 67.2 | 67.2 | 67.2 |
|  | Female | 39 | 32.8 | 32.8 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 3: Residence**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Quelimane | 15 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| | Maputo | 104 | 87.4 | 87.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 4: Institution**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | ISPU | 15 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.6 |
| | ISRI | 56 | 47.1 | 47.1 | 59.7 |
| | UEM | 48 | 40.3 | 40.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 5: PRM Performance**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Excellent | 1 | .8 | .8 | .8 |
| | Good | 23 | 19.3 | 19.5 | 20.3 |
| | Poor | 93 | 78.2 | 78.8 | 99.2 |
| | Don't know | 1 | .8 | .8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 118 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | .8 | | |
| Total | | 119 | 100.0 | | |

**Table 6: Ensuring Order in the Community**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | PRM | 78 | 65.5 | 66.7 | 66.7 |
| | Community Police | 29 | 24.4 | 24.8 | 91.5 |
| | Other | 10 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 117 | 98.3 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 2 | 1.7 | | |
| Total | | 119 | 100.0 | | |
| * There were no entries for Municipal Police | | | | | |

**Table 7: Trust in the Police**

|       |          | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Yes      | 14        | 11.8    | 11.8          | 11.8               |
|       | A little | 84        | 70.6    | 70.6          | 82.4               |
|       | No       | 19        | 16.0    | 16.0          | 98.3               |
|       | Not sure | 2         | 1.7     | 1.7           | 100.0              |
|       | Total    | 119       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Table 8: Contact with the Police**

|         |        | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|--------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | Yes    | 33        | 27.7    | 28.2          | 28.2               |
|         | No     | 84        | 70.6    | 71.8          | 100.0              |
|         | Total  | 117       | 98.3    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | System | 2         | 1.7     |               |                    |
| Total   |        | 119       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 9: Responsiveness to Public Demand**

|         |            | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | Yes        | 8         | 6.7     | 6.8           | 6.8                |
|         | No         | 75        | 63.0    | 64.1          | 70.9               |
|         | Don't know | 34        | 28.6    | 29.1          | 100.0              |
|         | Total      | 117       | 98.3    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | System     | 2         | 1.7     |               |                    |
| Total   |            | 119       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 10: Public Awareness of their Rights**

|       |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Sufficient   | 15        | 12.6    | 12.6          | 12.6               |
|       | Insufficient | 103       | 86.6    | 86.6          | 99.2               |
|       | Don't know   | 1         | .8      | .8            | 100.0              |
|       | Total        | 119       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Table 11: Awareness of Services/assistance from Police**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Sufficient | 60 | 50.4 | 50.8 | 50.8 |
| | Insufficient | 54 | 45.4 | 45.8 | 96.6 |
| | Don't know | 4 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 118 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | .8 | | |
| Total | | 119 | 100.0 | | |

**Table 13: Witness to Police Abusive Behaviour**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 96 | 80.7 | 80.7 | 80.7 |
| | No | 20 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 97.5 |
| | Don't know | 3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 14: Mechanisms of Control for Police Behaviour**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 41 | 34.5 | 34.7 | 34.7 |
| | No | 50 | 42.0 | 42.4 | 77.1 |
| | Yes, but doesn't know where to go | 27 | 22.7 | 22.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 118 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | .8 | | |
| Total | | 119 | 100.0 | | |

**Table 15: Adequacy of Salaries and Working Conditions**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 17 | 14.3 | 14.3 | 14.3 |
| | No | 95 | 79.8 | 79.8 | 94.1 |
| | Don't know | 7 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 16: Payment of Bribes for Service/assistance**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 89 | 74.8 | 74.8 | 74.8 |
| | No | 16 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 88.2 |
| | Don't know | 14 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 18: Access to Justice via Police**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 14 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 11.8 |
| | No | 87 | 73.1 | 73.1 | 84.9 |
| | Don't know | 18 | 15.1 | 15.1 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 19: Preferential Treatment for Elite Members**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 106 | 89.1 | 89.1 | 89.1 |
| | No | 6 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 94.1 |
| | Don't know | 7 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 20: Women and Improvement of Police Work**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 37 | 31.1 | 31.4 | 31.4 |
| | No | 41 | 34.5 | 34.7 | 66.1 |
| | Don't know | 40 | 33.6 | 33.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 118 | 99.2 | 100.0 | |
| Missing | System | 1 | .8 | | |
| Total | | 119 | 100.0 | | |

**Table 21: Women and Report of Violence against Women**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | Yes | 85 | 71.4 | 71.4 | 71.4 |
|  | No | 15 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 84.0 |
|  | Don't know | 19 | 16.0 | 16.0 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 22: Fight Corruption**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 51 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 42.9 |
|  | Yes | 68 | 57.1 | 57.1 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 23: Improve and Expand Training**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 67 | 56.3 | 56.3 | 56.3 |
|  | Yes | 52 | 43.7 | 43.7 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 24: Improve Crime Prevention Actions**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 80 | 67.2 | 67.2 | 67.2 |
|  | Yes | 39 | 32.8 | 32.8 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 25: Acquire Means of Transportation**

|  |  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 93 | 78.2 | 78.2 | 78.2 |
|  | Yes | 26 | 21.8 | 21.8 | 100.0 |
|  | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 |  |

**Table 26: Acquire Means of Communication**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 98 | 82.4 | 82.4 | 82.4 |
| | Yes | 21 | 17.6 | 17.6 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 27: Build or Rehabilitate Police Stations**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 118 | 99.2 | 99.2 | 99.2 |
| | Yes | 1 | .8 | .8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 28: Increase Police Salaries**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 50 | 42.0 | 42.0 | 42.0 |
| | Yes | 69 | 58.0 | 58.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 29: Increase Police Personnel**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 106 | 89.1 | 89.1 | 89.1 |
| | Yes | 13 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

**Table 30: Bring Police Closer to Community**

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Valid | No | 55 | 46.2 | 46.2 | 46.2 |
| | Yes | 64 | 53.8 | 53.8 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 119 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

## ANNEX 8: Mini-Survey for the Police Support Project Evaluation

Age: _____          Gender: _____          Date: _____
Occupation: _____
Neighbourhood/City/Province: _____

1. How do you evaluate the performance of the police?
    □    Excellent
    □    Good
    □    Poor
    □    Don't know

2. Who provides order in the community?
    □    Police (PRM)
    □    Municipal Police
    □    Community Police
    □    Other: _____

3. Do you trust the police?
    □    Yes
    □    A little
    □    No
    □    Not sure

4. Did have any contact with the police in the past year?
    □    Yes. What _____
    □    No

5. Do officers in the police stations respond positively and promptly to requests of information and services?
    □    Yes
    □    No
    □    Don't know

6. Do you think there is enough mobilization of people about their rights and about the function of the police in protecting the citizens?
    □    Enough
    □    Not enough
    □    Don't know

7. Are you aware of the services or assistance you can obtain from the Police?
    □    Enough
    □    Not enough
    □    Don't know

8. Have you experienced or observed abusive behaviour by police?
    □    Yes
    □    No
    □    Don't know

9. Do you know of any of the oversight mechanism – a department where you would go if you want to complain about a police officer's action?
    □    Yes
    □    No
    □    Yes, but Don't Know where to go

10. Do you think that the salary and working conditions are adequate for a better performance of the PRM?
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know

11. Do you think that if you pay a bribe to a police officer you will obtain better access to services?
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know

12. Do you think that there is adequate access to justice [by going to the police] for the disadvantaged-poor/women/HIV/AIDS-infected/juvenile/children/people-with disability?
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Don't know

13. Do you see the police of Mozambique as favouring elite members of the community (Government officials and other authorities)?
- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No
- ☐ Don't know

14. Do you think that having more females in the police contributes to improve PRM's work?
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Don't know

15. Do you agree that having more female police officers will encourage more women to come for assistance from the police in matters such as sexual assaults and domestic violence?
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Don't know

16. If you had the power to choose the main priority to support the police, you would pick:
- ☐ Figthing corruption
- ☐ Improve and expand police training
- ☐ Design and acquisition of new vests
- ☐ Acquisition of transportation means
- ☐ Acquisition of means of communication
- ☐ Built or rehabilitate police stations
- ☐ Increase police salaries
- ☐ Increase police personnel
- ☐ Bring police closer to community

Thank you!

# PORTUGUESE VERSION

NOTE: the survey respondents were distributed a questionnaire in the Portuguese language

### MINI-SURVEY PARA A AVALIAÇÃO DO PROJECTO DE APOIO À POLÍCIA

Idade: _____     Sexo: _____          Data: _____
Ocupação: _____
Bairro/Cidade/Província: _____

1. Como avalia o desempenho da polícia (PRM)?
   - ☐ Excelente
   - ☐ Bom
   - ☐ Pobre
   - ☐ Não sabe

2. Quem garante a ordem na comunidade?
   - ☐ Polícia (PRM)
   - ☐ Polícia Municipal
   - ☐ Polícia Comunitária
   - ☐ Outra: _____

3. Você confia na polícia?
   - ☐ Sim
   - ☐ Um pouco
   - ☐ Não
   - ☐ Não tem certeza

4. Teve algum contacto com a polícia no último ano?
   - ☐ Sim. Qual: _____
   - ☐ Não

5. Os oficiais nas esquadras respondem positiva e rapidamente aos pedidos de informação e serviços?
   - ☐ Sim
   - ☐ Não
   - ☐ Não sabe

6. Há suficiente sensibilização das pessoas sobre os seus direitos e sobre a função da polícia na protecção dos cidadãos?
   - ☐ Suficiente
   - ☐ Insuficiente
   - ☐ Não sabe

7. Tem conhecimento dos serviços ou assistência que você pode obter da polícia?
   - ☐ Suficiente
   - ☐ Insuficiente
   - ☐ Não sabe

8. Já experimentou ou observou um comportamento abusivo da polícia?
   - ☐ Sim
   - ☐ Não
   - ☐ Não sabe

9. Sabe da existência de um mecanismo de controle – um departamento onde você poderia ir para apresentar queixa contra alguma acção ou comportamento da polícia?

    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Sim, mas não sabe onde ir

10. Pensa que o salário e as condições de trabalho são adequadas para um bom desempenho da PRM?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

11. Pensa que se pagar suborno a um polícia consegue obter melhor assistência?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

12. Pensa que existe acesso adequado à justiça, através da polícia, para os mais vulneráveis – pobres / mulheres / infectados pelo HIV/SIDA / adolescentes / ciranças / deficientes?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

13. Acha que a polícia de Moçambique favorece os membros da elite na sociedade (oficiais do Governo e outras autoridades)?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

14. Pensa que a existência de mais mulheres na policia contribui para melhorar o trabalho da PRM?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

15. Pensa que a existência de mais mulheres policias vai encorajar mais mulheres a procurar a polícia para pedir assistência em casos como abuso sexual e violência doméstica?
    ☐  Sim
    ☐  Não
    ☐  Não sabe

16. Para melhorar o trabalho da PRM indique as 3 principais prioridades:
    ☐  Combate à corrupção
    ☐  Melhoria e expansão da Formação
    ☐  Desenho e aquisição de novo fardamento
    ☐  Aquisição de meios de transporte
    ☐  Aquisição de meios de comunicação
    ☐  Construir ou reabilitar esquadras da polícia
    ☐  Aumentar os salários dos polícias
    ☐  Aumentar o efectivo
    ☐  Aproximar a polícia da comunidade

Muito Obrigado!

## ANNEX 9: Data Code Book

| Variable | Translation | Coding |
|---|---|---|
| **age** | Age group | 1 = 17-20<br>2 = 21-30<br>3 = 21-40<br>4 = 41-50<br>5 = 51-60 |
| **gen** | Gender | 1 = Male<br>2 = Female |
| **ccode** | City code | 1 = Quelimane<br>2 = Maputo |
| **Q1** | Police performance | 1 = Excellent<br>2 = Good<br>3 = Poor<br>4 = Don't know |
| **Q2** | Policing Responsibility | 1 = Police (PRM)<br>2 = Municipal Police<br>3 = Community Police<br>4 = Other |
| **Q3** | Trust in Police | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q4** | Contact with Police | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q5** | Police Responsiveness | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q6** | Rights Awareness | 1 = Sufficient<br>2 = Insufficient<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q7** | Awareness of Police Services | 1 = Sufficient<br>2 = Insufficient<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q8** | Police Misconduct | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q9** | Control Mechanisms | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q10** | Wage & working conditions | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |

| | | 3 = Don't know |
|---|---|---|
| **Q11** | Police Corruption | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 =Don't know |
| **Q12** | Access to justice | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q13** | Equal treatment | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q14** | Women and performance | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q15** | Women and recruitment | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No<br>3 = Don't know |
| **Q16** | Main Priorities | |
| **Q16_1** | Fight Corruption | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_2** | Improve and expand training | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_3** | Improve crime prevention activities | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_4** | Acquire means of transportation | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_5** | Acquire communication means | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_6** | Build or rehabilitate police stations | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_7** | Increase police salaries | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_8** | Increase the size of the police personnel | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |
| **Q16_9** | Bring police closer to community | 1 = Yes<br>2 = No |