

## Evaluations Management Response, Summary & Lessons Worksheet:

### Management Response

Evaluation name: **Puxirum Project: Cooperation in Forest Conservation and Sustainable Development in the State of Pará**  
(BRA/02/009)\_\_\_\_\_

Evaluation Type: \_\_\_Final\_\_\_\_\_

Responsible Unit for Key action: \_\_\_Environment\_\_\_\_\_

Key action Time frame. From : \_2002\_\_\_\_\_ To: \_2006\_\_\_\_\_

Status of Key action: (Pending, Initiated, Completed, Overdue) Completed

Issues and recommendations: (see examples bellow)

<b>Issue:</b> From evaluation report or management discussion	<b>Recommendation:</b> From evaluation report or management discussion	<b>Management Response</b> Agree/Disagree/Pending (if need explain and detail steps and strategy)
The complex environment in the state of Pará and other parts of the Amazon contributed decisively to a demand larger than originally planned for Project Puxirum in the struggle for creation of new Extractive Reserves.	Review strategy in cooperation with stakeholders and local counterparts in order to mobilize local communities and stress federal and state governments for the creation and implementation of new extractive reserves.	Agree. National Rubber Tappers (CNS) played through project fundamental role in mobilizing communities and pressing governments.
Demand for qualified technical personnel to assist local productive projects.	Selection for local technicians to attend demand from communities.	Agree. Management worked to hire skilled technicians, without success due to the lack of qualified technicians in the region and the lack of interest of non Amazonian technicians to move to the region.
Project failed to create and elaborate a development model for extractive reserves in the Amazon social and market services.	This critique should be carefully examined, since it does not reflect the whole reality.	Disagree. CNS, nevertheless, through Puxirum and other initiatives, has been successful in mobilizing and organizing 'amazonized' communities for development of a new land-use model. The lifetime of a single project is certainly not long enough for development and testing of such a model. Were this possible, a significant part of the problems assailing communities and the whole region could be solved. For the same reasons and lack of baseline data, monitoring of results is made difficult and measures of the results are

		often carried out indirectly. Many of the difficulties in monitoring were overcome through open and democratic participation of the Steering Committee and Regional Project Committee with the stakeholders.
Create mechanisms to promote long lasting results in the region and for the local communities.	Project promotes cooperation and networking to foster lasting results	During execution of the project, UNDP made an effort to introduce Puxirum to other organizations and projects to encourage cooperation, emphasizing capacity-building and elimination of bottlenecks related to production, particularly marketing of agro-extractive products. UNDP also promoted events for exchange of experience and networking, enabling the establishment of partnerships between CNS and other institutions. Examples are discussions in Brasília, promoted by the Ministry of Environment and UNDP, with other projects and government representatives and private sector.

### **Summary & Lessons learned**

Summary: (can write information down or attach document to be uploaded to system)

Among the main results achieved by Puxirum, the following stand out:

- a. Success in the extractivist communities' struggle for creation of new Extractive Reserves. Indeed, during project execution, thanks to the effort of the Puxirum team and its allies, 24 reserves were created in the Amazon, with **4,737,800 ha, (14.0% of the area of the Republic of Finland)**. 14 of these new Extractive Reserves (2,615,000 ha) and a Sustainable Development Reserve (65,000 ha) were created in the **state of Pará (2,680,000 ha)**. This was possible largely because of the CNS effort, which, through Puxirum, mobilized and marshaled extractive communities, involving civil society in putting pressure on government. In Pará alone, over 12 Extractive Reserves are currently in an advanced stage of studies for creation, 5 of which spread over 650,000 ha and the remaining 7 are not yet defined. 96 more areas in Brazil are in the first stages of studies for transformation into Extractive Reserves.
- b. Through the Puxirum project, CNS was very successful in establishing partnerships and raising funds. Support from PRODEX, PRONAF and INCRA stands out, adding up to US\$2,450,000.00 (R\$5,350,000.00) for productive activities and improvements to the households of the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve extractivists.
- c. To contribute to Extractive Reserve sustainability, CNS mobilized BNDES funds in the amount of R\$30,000,000.00 (US\$13,640,000.00) for development and implementation of management plans for

Amazon Extractive Reserves.

- d. With Puxirum support, CNS developed joint activities in 34 municipalities of the Southeastern Pará, Isles, Lower Tocantins, Guajarina and Salgado regions, involving approximately 204 associations, 20 unions, 12 fisher colonies and 4 cooperatives<sup>1</sup>. Furthermore, CAAM is currently a reference for capacity-building in the region, where 36 more events have been carried out for capacity-building of over 1000 people.
- e. 31 small productive projects were financed by Puxirum, 26 of which were inside the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve and 5 outside.
- f. CNS had decisive participation through Puxirum in federal government agencies, issuing identification documents for 6,000 extractivists. These documents are indispensable for full citizenship, including access to bank credit for production and improved quality of life.
- g. 13 marketing outposts were built in the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, and 9 outside. Communication improved thanks to radiophones and capacity-building and marshaling were encouraged through meetings, training sessions and fairs. This contributes not only toward sales of products, but also toward Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve vigilance and strengthening of bonds among communities.
- h. Purchase of rubber at the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve by ACOSPER grew by 300% in 2005, from 15 tons in 2003 to 77 tons in 2005. Production of other products also grew, such as nuts and honey, which in 2005 reached 11,686 kg and 300 kg, respectively. It should be noted that these products were not produced prior to the project<sup>1</sup>.
- i. Partnerships brought about a significant improvement in conditions of life in the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve, where, in contrast to its surroundings, population does not decline due to out-migration to cities. Improved quality of dwellings reached 90% of the families, with an increase of 132% in the number of households with plumbing, 130% in the use of water filters and 15% in the number of appropriate outhouses.
- j. Self-management and development mechanisms were put into place at the Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractive Reserve by the Steering Committee, Regional Committee, community-based associations and Women's Coordination, among others.

Lessons learned: (please write information down to be copied to the ERC system – do not attach document)

- a. Flexible and transparent UNDP mechanisms for financial management, which definitely make project implementation easier, are fundamental in adverse situations such as those found in the Brazilian Amazon. This is of special importance due to the difficulty the CNS (National Rubber Tapper Council) staff, made up of extractivists, has in managing funds in a project of this size and complexity.
- b. Financial independence from federal, state or municipal governments insures more flexibility and responsiveness. This can contribute significantly in crisis situations, avoiding dependence on regulations set by federal laws for internal funds, without however compromising transparency in the use of these funds.
- c. Lack of highly qualified technical coordination to promote continuous dialog between CNS and other parties such as UNDP and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs affected project performance.
- d. A project can make significant contributions to raising funds from other sources, governmental or otherwise, and to establishing partnerships, thus widening the scope and outreach of the results originally planned.
- e. A Geographic Information System should be a top priority in the project, facilitating project management, supervision of activities and preparation of reports with different levels of details.
- f. Lack of a clear definition of responsibilities for each partner in the project (HCG, UNDP, CNS and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) raises doubts about how to proceed in the respective

institutions.

- g. Difficulties in attracting qualified technical personnel to promote extension and increase capacity-building among extractivists involved in productive activities are hard to overcome and may compromise important activities for project implementation. Alternatives to overcome these difficulties should be considered from the start of the project.