

Evaluation of Viva Rio Projects “Security and development:
Actions at local and regional levels” funded by DFID
&
“Human Security Partnerships with the Third Sector: Learning
from and Multiplying Local Experiences” funded by UNDP
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A word of thanks...

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Introduction

This report presents the findings of an evaluation of Viva Rio conducted on behalf of DFID, UNDP and the Swiss and Norwegian governments. The evaluation focused specifically on the projects “Security and Development: Actions at local and regional levels,” first launched with DFID funding in 2001 and “Human Security Partnerships with the Third Sector,” supported by UNDP (hereto referred to as “the Projects”). The Project aims to design and test specific solutions to the complex set of problems surrounding urban armed violence, with an overarching goal of attaining human security¹. The Project receives funding from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which is currently undergoing budget cuts and thus re-assessing funding proposals. The present evaluation is meant both to determine whether the Project has met its stated objectives, and to inform upcoming funding decisions.

The evaluation was conducted between June 6th and June 20th by a three person team. An independent consultant led the team and participated in the evaluation from June 6th – June 17th. A UNDP small arms expert joined the consultant from June 6th – June 10th, and a DFID social development adviser participated from June 14th to June 20th. The team conducted semi-structured interviews with Viva Rio staff and persons outside of Viva Rio who work either with the organization or on issues similar to those addressed by Viva Rio. A complete list of interviewees is presented in Annex 1.

As per the terms of reference, the evaluation sought to undertake an evidence-based analysis of Project performance against the original proposal and log frame, and the extent to which the project has met its stated goal. In particular, evaluators focused on (i) progress made to link small arms control with security sector reform, community development and youth at risk; (ii) the nature and extent of support provided by Viva Rio to the Government of Brazil in the areas of disarmament and security sector reform; (iii) progress made in promoting a human security approach among governments and NGOs in Latin America and (iv) the nature of Viva Rio’s relationships with other NGOs and civil society organizations. The evaluation team analyzed the progress and performance of the individual Project components (detailed below) based on oral presentations prepared by Viva Rio programme coordinators, individual interviews and internal documentation. The evaluation team did not at any point delve into the financial aspects of the Project’s management.

The evaluators and donors acknowledge the many excellent aspects of Viva Rio’s work, widely reflected in other studies and evaluations. Yet as primary donors of Viva Rio, DFID and UNDP felt it important to conduct their own evaluation to ensure that funds are being used both effectively and efficiently. As such, the intention of this evaluation was to examine Viva Rio critically, to identify strengths and weaknesses with a view of highlighting operational and organisational aspects that the evaluators deemed in need of attention.

The report is divided into three sections.

Section 1 will examine the **progress and performance** of the seven components of the Security and Development Project as they appear in the log frame: Youth at Risk, Small Arms and Light Weapons Control (SALW), Security Sector Reform, Communication, Research, Training,

¹ Project document, p. 3.

Monitoring. Because of Viva Rio's attempt to integrate its eight main programmes², several programme activities may be developed under one component of the Project.

Section II will focus on some **key institutional issues**, namely Viva Rio's relationship with the **Government of Brazil** and with other **civil society organizations**. This section will highlight the **most frequently voiced concerns and critiques** regarding the nature of Viva Rio's relationship with these two groups of actors, and will analyze both their legitimacy and impact.

Section III will summarize **Viva Rio's strengths and weaknesses and offers recommendations** directed both to Viva Rio and donors.

Section I: Progress and Performance

This section is organized according to each component of the DFID log frame for the Project (period 2004-2006). Each individual component is comprised of a number of activities, some which are funded by DFID, some by UNDP. A brief description of the activity is followed by an assessment of its progress and performance³. This report does not make a distinction between who funds what aspect of the component, nor does it examine activities that are funded by other donors.

It is important to note that a handful of activities were visited *in situ* by the evaluation team, which naturally permits a greater understanding of the activity and thus a more lengthy description. Due to time constraints, however, it was not possible to cover each and every activity in great detail. Nonetheless, Viva Rio (VR) presented evaluators abundant documentation (both written and audio-visual) for each activity funded by DFID and UNDP. The information below has been pieced together from direct observation of activities, interviews with key staff at VR headquarters and project literature.

Youth at Risk

- *Luta pela Paz*. This activity is one of its best-known and most visited by donor missions, and is the subject of several articles and books. It is centred on a boxing club in Mare, a large favela in Rio de Janeiro, but its activities extend well beyond sports, encompassing the growth of self-respect, the widening of horizons for youth in the community, and the offering of alternatives to armed violence to those youth who are already involved or at risk of becoming so. The target group for this activity is "at-risk" kids in the Mare, e.g. drop-outs, those with one foot already in armed violence (e.g. through family connections), and 16/17-year-olds running sales points for drugs in the street. The context in Mare is one where the favela is divided into three zones controlled by different gangs.

*Log frame Reference
2.6 Rescue – youth are
rescued from armed
violence, going through
recovery programme.*

Luta pela Paz has progressed significantly since establishment in 2000. Finishing touches are being put on a multi-purpose centre that will serve as the activities headquarters in the Mare. VR intends to use part of the space in the centre for other programme activities (such as Telecurso).

² Community Development; Education; Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV); Programa de Ações em Segurança Pública (PROASP); Arms Control, Conflict Mediation; International Center for Human Security; Communication.

³ So as to keep this report concise, activity descriptions are brief. For more detailed information, readers can refer to the viva rio website: www.vivario.org.br

Program staff have secured funding from foreign foundations to help fund the centre. Extensive efforts have been made to systematize the *Luta pela Paz* experience and a Methodology Manual has been developed in English and Portuguese, available at www.lutapelapaz.org.br. These efforts have helped launch VR's entry into international fora that share similar preoccupations of children's involvement in organized armed violence.

A visit to the Mare club and discussion with participating youth indicated what appears to be an impressive increase in self-esteem, a wider vision of life's possibilities, and determination not to be dragged back down into armed violence.

- *Resgate, Resende*. This activity is carried out in conjunction with the City Government of Resende, a municipality outside of the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region. It is a program of "integrated actions that search for prevention and social reintegration for youth" between 12 and 25 of age who are either in a vulnerable situation or have a police record. Rather than committing juveniles to prison, judges send some for rehabilitation under the auspices of VR, under strict conditions which are monitored by both VR and the justice system. If youths break the conditions they go to prison instead. VR designs an individual programme for each person, of whom there are 30 in the present pilot phase. This is a particularly important initiative in a context where youths in prison have no cultural nor educational facilities and where beatings and other physical abuse are commonplace (cf. Human Rights Watch: *In the Dark: Hidden Abuses Against Detained Youth in Rio de Janeiro*, June 2005). VR's pilot rehabilitation scheme and its attempt to give those youths other options is a radical departure from the norm. Viva Rio coordinates the programme and is responsible for monitoring and evaluation. Implementation is carried out by local professionals. Services provided to youth referred to the programme included individual accompaniment; citizenship classes, family visits and other events and cultural visits (e.g. sports, job training referral, volunteering in the community).

Concluding remarks & recommendations

- ✓ Overall, in the Youth at Risk component, VR is achieving its stated goal of developing experimental activities aimed at addressing various problems inherent to youth at risk and those involved in armed violence, promoting inclusion, and disseminating know-how.
- ✓ VR is contributing to its objective of promoting a human security approach at international levels though its involvement in international fora that address children and organized armed violence issues.
- ✓ The activities developed under this program are exemplary of the "social laboratory" aspect that VR attempts to create. The program has certainly created knowledge that could be used to inform public policy oriented towards youth. Nonetheless, the evaluators question the possibility of replicating such projects, which have developed under very specific circumstances (intense dedication, deep personal involvement and strong levels of appropriation by staff) that are rarely found within state entities.

✓ Small Arms and Light Weapons Control

Viva Rio's work to address small arms and light weapons had foreseen the following components:

- (a) Advocacy for a new law on small arms (including the referendum).

- (b) The creation of a small arms national information system (SINARMS) for the federal police.
- (c) SINARM produces reports for aggregate tracing.
- (d) International tracing program.
- (e) National Plan on small arms control.
- (f) The rules for implementing the Disarmament Statute.
- (g) Parliamentary control over SALW information.
- (h) Campaign on gender and guns.
- (i) Small arms destruction programme.
- (j) Support for the internationalisation of Brazil's small arms policies.
- (k) Contribution to national efforts for the control of SALW.
- (l) The development of a proposal to set up an international centre on human security.

The evaluation team found that substantive progress has been made with the implementation of most foreseen activities. However, the creation of a small arms national information system did not take place, taking into account that the government already initiated the development of such a system in cooperation with SERPRO (a governmental institution that provides technical computer support to all governmental institutions). Therefore, the stakeholders involved identified other activities within this framework that will support government's efforts and thus strengthen the information system.

(a) Advocacy for a new law on small arms (including the referendum)

- *Campaign on Referendum.* The Disarmament Statute, approved by the Brazilian Federal Congress in December 2003, called for a referendum on the prohibition of the sale of firearms and ammunition to civilians. At the time of the evaluation, the Congress still had to set a date for the Referendum and define the question to be put to the electorate. During the mission the Congress had more or less stopped work because of a massive corruption scandal (which also implicated one of the leaders of the gun lobby). On 6 July the Congress voted that the referendum should take place on 23rd October 2005. This will be the first national referendum on gun control to take place anywhere in the world, and also the first nationwide popular referendum in Brazilian history. It represents a considerable triumph for Brazilian civil society organisations over lobbying by the firearms and ammunition industries.

The outcome is expected to be close. Although opinion polls indicate that 60% to 80% of Brazilians in favour, groups opposed to the referendum have substantial financial resources, including support from the NRA in the U.S. The Federal Police (FP) states that they are in favour of the upcoming referendum (as is the Federal Government). The FP sees the main problem to be prosecuting those acting against the law.

VR has worked with two other NGOs: *Sou da Paz* (São Paulo) and *CONVIVE* (Brasília) for campaigning on the referendum and the Voluntary Collection Program. This is an informal coalition, but they have been accepted to be part of an official parliamentary coalition that has been set up to campaign in favour of the referendum.

Log frame Reference:
 4.1 Definition of the rules on how to implement the new law on SALW
 4.2 Campaign on Referendum – multi media & events
 4.3 Design of National Information System on SALW
 4.4 National Plan on SALW Control
 4.5 Parliamentary Control over SALW info
 4.6 Six manuals on SALW control, covering supply, stocks & demand
 4.7 Campaign on Gender & SALW control
 4.8 Demand reduction
 4.9 National Info System on SALW produces reports for aggregate tracing
 4.10 Domestic tracing program – 30.000 SALW submitted for tracing
 4.11 International tracing program – 6.000 SALW submitted for tracing
 4.12 SALW destruction program expanded to 13 states
 4.13 Active Brazilian Foreign Policy on SALW
 4.14 Active MERCOSUR Policy on U.N. 2005 and 2006.

In addition to extremely active lobbying of elected officials in Brasilia, advocacy has targeted middle-income people through newspaper articles, TV spots and a CD made with popular musicians, to name just a few actions. Campaigning also takes place in the favelas notwithstanding that they are not the main focus of the campaign. The SALW problem in the favelas is considered to be of a different nature. Control and rules exist in the favelas whereby only traffickers are in possession of SALW. Accordingly, other measures need to be prioritized which are more closely related to social inclusion and community policing.

- *Voluntary Collection Programme.* In the period leading up to the referendum there has been a Voluntary Small Arms Collection Campaign, which began in July 2004. The mission visited a collection post on what was supposed to be the final weekend of the campaign (June 2005), although it has subsequently been extended until the referendum date. Viva Rio and other organisations had asked for more time, seeing this as part of a broad public security campaign, not just addressing violent crime.

Viva Rio coordinates a network of collecting posts in the State of Rio, composed of 56 institutions and has directly collected and destroyed 10,650 arms up to August 26th. Viva Rio is mainly engaged with training churches (main collection points throughout the country) and in facilitating relationships between local organisations (e.g. churches) and the police. So far some 385,000 firearms have been collected in Brazil under this programme. A study conducted by ISER, with the support of Viva Rio and Small Arms Survey, has estimated that there are some 17,010,941 small arms in circulation in Brazil, of which 10% (1,753,133) are in the hands of State Actors. Among civilians there are about 15,257,808 firearms, of which 6,764,951 are legally registered, 4,635,058 are informally held by law abiding citizens and 3,857,799 in criminal hands. Assuming that 450,000 weapons will be voluntarily surrendered till October 23 and presuming that criminals are not participating in this campaign, it is expected that about 4% of the arms held by law abiding civilians (registered and informal) will be collected and destroyed by Oct, 2005.

It is very difficult to judge at this time whether the collection has been able to reduce armed violence since that data is only available after two years. However, preliminary findings suggest a positive impact. At this stage data is being collected at the city levels, mainly related to suicides and accidents by firearms. In São Paulo, a decrease in hospitalization by cause of firearms incidents has been noted. However, it is important to note that the collection did not have the objective to reduce armed violence but to get rid of weapons in possession of 'honest civilians'. Unfortunately this was not entirely clear to the public (the government awareness campaign appears to have been weak) and therefore expectations have not been met (the public in general expected that collection would solve the armed violence problem).

One of the evaluators visited a collection point at a Presbyterian church located in a relatively wealthy neighbourhood of Rio, Barra da Tijuca. It was explained that 30% of guns found by the police on criminals in the state of RJ were registered with, and stolen from, law-abiding civilians. Very often the first question asked by a burglar is "Do you have a gun?" and stealing guns is one of the burglars' main objectives.

(b) and (c) The creation of a small arms national information system (SINARMS) for the federal police / SINARM produces reports for aggregate tracing.

Notwithstanding that Viva Rio is not involved in the creation of SINARMS, project activities have been identified that will support the functionality of SINARMS. The topics mentioned below are considered part of endeavours to strengthen registration and classification efforts (indirectly linked to SINARMS).

- *Development of a Classification Manual for Tracing Seized Small Arms*. VR has developed a classification manual for tracing small arms in accordance with the guidelines laid out in the Disarmament Statute. Two versions were developed, one for the State Police of Rio de Janeiro and another for the Federal Agencies responsible for small arms control, namely the Federal Police and the Army. The manual for the State Police of RJ was developed according to their needs, is in place and operational. The State Police of RJ receives training by Pablo of the Viva Rio disarmament team in the use of the manual. Notwithstanding its success, the evaluation team questions the sustainability of this initiative, taking into account that no efforts are made to incorporate training on the use of the manual in the official training curriculum of the RJ State Police. The manual has also been adapted and presented to the Federal Police and the Army. According to VR, the first reaction of the FP and the Army was negative but now they are implementing it through inclusion of some content components in the registration forms used for the voluntary collection campaign. The Federal Police however, has a different perspective. It was stated that they are not satisfied with the quality of the manual and that it has not been adopted by the Federal Police. Furthermore, the National Secretary of Public Security (SENASP), after consultations with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC), concluded that the classification manual does not meet its needs in terms of depth of information presented, and therefore it is not being used. Due to time constraints, the evaluation team did not meet with the Army. However, Viva Rio is positive about constructive consultations regarding the manual with the Army. The executive summary of the manual is available on the internet.

(e) National Plan on small arms control.

The National Plan on Small Arms Control is actually a national security plan including a chapter regarding small arms.

VR, in its progress report from October 2004 to March 2005, states it “designed and presented [the National Plan] to the Brazilian government.” The representative of the Ministry of Justice (MJ) interviewed by the evaluation team, however, states that VR has collaborated with the MJ, but by no means designed the plan, an activity which stays in the hands of the government. SENASP interviewees did not consider the involvement of VR on the National Security Plan to be substantive. This might be due to the fact that the Public Security Plan has been under development over the last two years and the SENASP management has changed over this period⁴. According to SENASP, the Instituto da Cidadania was mainly involved with the development of the public security plan. Differing versions aside, there is a plan in effect, and VR has contributed to it.

(d) International tracing program.

At a domestic level, VR has contributed to tracing inasmuch as it produced research which indicates that 70% of the seized SALW are Brazilian made and 30% were registered weapons.

⁴ Luis Eduardo Soares, former head of SENASP and one of the founding members of VR, was forced out of the government due to a political scandal.

VR's work on tracing at the international level has mainly been regarding the high fire power weapons found in Rio. Actions include:

- Organization of a seminar with Brazil, France and Germany;
- Organization of a seminar with UN-LiREC and 14 governments;
- Participation in the Porto Alegre meetings;
- Participation in the MERCOSUR SALW working group (as the only NGO) where it presents its research and provides advice (e.g. standard format for information exchange in the region);
- Provision of information on arms trafficking from Belgium in an exposé published in *Le Soir* (Belgian newspaper);
- Supported the discovery of an illegal network from Argentina to Brazil, through Paraguay. In this connection a high level meeting took place between VR and the president of Paraguay;
- Facilitated meetings between Colombian and Brazilian authorities.
- Dissemination of information and requests on investigation with governments of Austria and Spain;
- A mapping of European exports to LA&C and their diversion to Rio. This is ongoing and in cooperation with PRIO. The objective is to confront the EU in 2006 and request a stricter implementation of the EU COC. There is no cooperation with INTERPOL.
- Aforementioned manual on the classification of SALW.
- Provision of a list with the automatic guns found in Rio to the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms;

The Federal Police (FP) is responsible for addressing illicit trafficking and from their perspective, VR support regarding tracing has not been substantive. This is not surprising since VR has mainly been supporting the State Police and tracing the weapons found in Rio back to their origin. The evaluation team identified a discrepancy between obtained political support at the MJ level and the technical level (SENASP). It is found that efforts to address this discrepancy might also contribute to strengthened more effective partnerships.

- *Reports on SALW control, supply, stocks and demand.* VR has effectively produced a series of reports. Many have been passed on to relevant governments (US, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay) in the course of the aforementioned meetings. At the national level, evaluators found little evidence that VR-produced manuals or reports were being used, which is to say interviewees did not mention the existence of such manuals. At the state level, the classification manual is being used by the State Police.

(h) Campaign on gender and guns.

- Viva Rio's 18-month case-study in Rio of "Women and Girls in the Context of Armed Violence" is funded by the Ford Foundation and UNESCO but not DFID, though it is still short of some US\$80k. The original COAV work had been very male-oriented, and when interviewed, many men said that one reason they wanted a gun was to attract girls. Some will borrow a gun to walk around with or get a gun just for the weekend. VR decide to take this on and to challenge the idea that a guy with a gun is macho and attractive.

The message is getting through that guns make people more insecure. Many in the favelas realise that a man with a gun is unlikely to live beyond his 25th birthday, and the Women's Disarmament Campaign ("Choose gun-free"; "It's your gun or me") is providing women with evidence that having a gun is actually more dangerous. But girls in the favelas say yes, they do find men with

guns attractive and sexy, but perhaps more importantly the guy is likely to be able to provide for her. Girls say they feel less poor when they're with a man with a gun.

This study is planned to finish in time for the UN Conference on small arms planned for July 2006. The need to understand better the relationship between men, women and gun violence is not limited to Rio but also obtains at the regional level, especially since the UN's small arms control process has been notably gender-negligent. The final product will be a case study, looking at the different roles of men and women in gun violence, and at specific impacts of gun violence on women's lives.

Generally it needs to be asked how thoroughly VR has thought through gender questions, and whether the organisation seriously addresses gender as a cross-cutting issue. There are of course huge needs for women of all ages – for instance, although VR's *telecurso* remote-learning work is touted as being directed particularly at young men most likely to become involved in armed violence, in fact the majority (more than 60%) of people taking the courses are women, many of them older. VR has also designed special *Ana e Maria* programmes to address women at risk, women's health issues, early pregnancy (and the resultant problems such as disappearance of the father, expulsion from the parental home) etc. VR's research has shown that the circumstances of birth are very important for the health and social futures of both mother and baby, so the programme tries to ensure a presence when any of the girls they are working with gives birth.

Apparently Pro-Mundo, a gender-focussed NGO also based in Rio, is working with gender in a more integrated way, dealing not only with women but with gender relations and masculinities. This includes support groups for young men, in attempt to show that there are other men who question violent models of masculinity. As Rubem says, "a macho culture still prevails but can no longer deliver". Women have grown a great deal, and their increased assertiveness does not fit with macho ideology. Women also have greater control over their fertility, with the average number of children falling from 6 to 2 in a single generation. All this has enormous impacts on gender relations, which need to be integrated across VR's activities as much more than "women's projects".

There are generational differences too, with VR finding that mothers are often more supportive of anti-gun movements than their daughters.

(j) Support for the internationalisation of Brazil's small arms policies.

Viva Rio participated in the 2001 UN Conference on illicit traffic in SALW (in New York). Only 10 of some 200 delegations included NGOs, and VR was the only one from the South America. This was seen by VR as recognition of their work and technical expertise in the area.

The MERCOSUR SALW working group began in mid-2003, and was confronted in particular by a problem of arms trafficking from police and military forces in Argentina, including grenades and assault rifles. Viva Rio was able to deploy very sensitive information because of its access to Brazilian databases and through contacts with the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and state government of RJ (all of these had to be kept low-profile); moreover, one of VR's staff had previously worked for the Argentinean government. For a bilateral meeting in 2003 VR drafted a list of points for the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, along with advisory notes on how to pursue these points. VR cite this as an example of the "invisible" work

which they do, which could otherwise be called policy work. This led to an MoU between Brazil and Argentina for information exchange, and in turn to an Argentinean initiative to extend the work to the whole of MERCOSUR.

In late 2003 a meeting took place in Montevideo, to which VR was invited (surprisingly) although the Government of Brazil (GoB) did not attend. This was important as many complaints about Brazil were voiced at the meeting; VR noted these and lobbied GoB as a result. VR generally works through the Ministry of Justice rather than MFA, because MFA has traditionally taken the view that Brazil must export, whether coffee, guns, or other commodities. However, a new generation in MFA is apparently now developing a greater interest in prevention of trans-border crime. In interviews, SENASP stated that MFA is working efficiently and is including technical experts in the MERCOSUR working group to represent Brazil. SENASP feels that VR does not need to be involved in order for the Brazilian Government to contribute at the regional and international level.

Viva Rio conveyed the message (through “months of subtle and low-key work” with MoJ and MFA) that GoB needed to be present at these sessions, with the result that a very large Brazilian delegation participated in the next meeting of the MERCOSUR working group on SALW, in May 2004. Since then, Brazil has taken the lead on these issues, e.g. in addressing the problems presented by Paraguay. VR also carried out the first study of laws relating to guns in each MERCOSUR country, a text which was needed by all the states and again assisted in reaching understanding and agreement.

Concluding remarks & recommendations

- ✓ VR has clearly achieved significant progress in its campaigning, advocacy and lobbying activities. It has built up a significant network of contacts in the SALW sector at national, regional and international levels, and engages actively in information dissemination. It has made important contributions to SALW literature through its research. Further, there is no doubt that it has been one of the major forces behind the referendum efforts and in keeping SALW on the security agenda at the state and national level.
- ✓ A great deal of energy and resources are directed towards SALW Control and the Referendum. While no one denies the importance of this work, armed violence instigated mainly by traffickers is what is plaguing Rio’s marginalized population. It is debateable whether the gun law or the collection campaign will have any effect on this.
- ✓ It was common to hear differing versions of the extent to which VR supports various governmental bodies. This is not surprising, given that these entities compete for similar sources of funds. Nonetheless, it indicates that communication between VR and its “partners” is not very transparent. It also suggests that VR relies on one or two good contacts within these institutions, making for more of an *individual* partnership rather than an *institutional/sustainable* partnership. This may not impede VR from doing its work, but it is neither sustainable nor a true partnership (see section II for further discussion on partnerships).
- ✓ It needs to be asked how thoroughly VR has thought through gender questions, and whether the organisation addresses gender as a cross-cutting issue. Analysis of gender relationships and their impact on activities is not integrated across VR’s activities.
- ✓ VR has the intention to export its working model on SALW control. While VR has been successful in this area (as have other organizations with whom it partners, such as *Sou da Paz* in São Paulo), it is unclear whether the VR model—a product of the Rio de Janeiro context and heavily reliant on its excellent relationship with the media, high-level personal connections and individual partnerships—is really replicable. Perhaps more interesting than trying to export a particular methodological model is to first suss out lessons learned and good

practices. For this kind of exercise to be useful and valid, it should compare different intervention styles (For example VR, with *Sou da Paz*⁵, CONVIVE and/or other institutions working in this area. A cross-country study comparing and contrasting interventions methods and results would also be interesting).

Security Sector Reform

- (i) *Municipal Public Security Plans and Information Systems.* SENASP has technical agreements with the 27 Brazilian States through which municipalities can submit to SENASP public security plans for funding. The municipalities develop the proposals and are responsible for their implementation. Four municipalities (Resende, Niteroi, Barra Mansa and Piraí) contracted VR to help develop their proposal, and Resende has asked VR to also be the implementer,⁶ an activity funded by UNDP. SENASP evaluates the plan once submitted to ensure it is in accordance with its national strategy.

Log frame Reference:
 5.1 Advocacy on SSR on national and regional levels.
 5.2 City Plan on Public Security (six cities)
 5.3 City Wide Information System on Public Security
 5.4 Production of 5 manuals on particular domains of SSR
 5.5 Conflict Mediation Centres (ten Centres), with a global average of 15 cases per day.
 5.6 Workshops on SSR (three workshops)

VR work in Resende's municipal security plan has four elements: municipal guard reform, gender and youth, a municipal information system and training for municipal guards. The project was visited by the UNDP Country Office in December 2004 and gave a very positive evaluation of their work. The partnership between the police and the community was very positively strengthened and VR succeeded in getting everybody involved at the municipal level (cabinet meetings with the various stakeholders were considered key). They also succeeded in changing the culture of the Municipal Guards and increase their self-esteem, according to the UNDP evaluation. The plan also involved developing a management information system (MIS) whereby data is collected by all municipal stakeholders. The MIS indicated a reduction of violence while the plan was being implemented.

During the monitoring phase, however, there was a change of government. The consequences have been significant: the MIS is still in place but the information is not analysed any more; there are no more cabinet meetings and some of the social activities of the plan have stopped. VR has met with the new government and is lobbying to obtain the project's continuation. Violence is deemed to be back to the pre-plan levels.

The other municipalities have yet implemented the plans. It is unknown if they will.

- (j) *Security Reforms.* VR has been supporting Military Police (MP) units in several favelas (the *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais-GPAE*) by developing a training course on community policing. This support is provided through an agreement between VR and the MP at the state level. VR carried out a diagnostic to identify needs, carrying out focus groups with community members (in favelas where a GPAE team is present), police officers and public security experts).

The team visited the most successful of the GPAEs (by both MP's and VR's own admission), Cavalão in Niteroi. Training has not yet begun formally there, but VR has carried out focus

⁵ While not the object of this study, *Sou da Paz* maintains that its working methodology and model are very different from VR's.

⁶ Other institutions in the state of RJ that offer similar support in this area include the *Núcleo Fluminense de Estudos e Pesquisas* (NuFEP) of the *Universidade Federal Fluminense* and *Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania* (CESeC) of *Universidade Candido Mendes*.

groups with officers and community members for the diagnostic. According to one of the GPAE officers, VR has thus far provided little assistance to the GPAE. The commander, however, feels that VR's support has helped invigorate interest in community policing in the MP. According to the commander, GPAE programmes were slowly waning with the MP; since VR's involvement, MP authorities have shown increased motivation for making the programme work. While this commander has already received training in community policing from the MP (a one month course in Espirito Santo and another GPAE specific training in Brasília), he thinks the VR training course will be useful to refresh his memory and update his knowledge.

VR has also developed a Municipal Guard Training Manual for a Training of Trainers programme aimed at Sergeants in the MP of the State of RJ. This manual has developed in part out of VR's experience with the Municipal Security Plans and is considered the first step in building a model for reforming municipal guards. The training is underway in Rio and VR staff have been invited to other Latin American countries (Guatemala, Nicaragua) to execute the training.

(k) *Conflict Mediation Centres*. Viva Rio's Conflict Mediation Programme has grown out of its legal advice work which started in the favelas in 1996. Each advice centre (*Balcao de Direitos*, literally "Rights Desk") provides legal assistance, information on civil and human rights, facilitation of civil documentation, etc., and also training for local people. Each *balcao* is a little different, depending on the needs of the particular favela. There are now five such centres in different favelas, and the focus of their work has changed to mediation. This is not least because many cases brought to them are not legally resolvable. People come to ask advice on all sorts of issues, including disputes (neighbourhood, family, and sometimes work). Life in the favela is very informal, houses have no legal status, etc., so VR has had to move from formal law to processes of mediation.

The mission visited the centre in Rocinha, one of the largest and most famous of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. The staff consist of a coordinator and a "citizenship agent"⁷, assisted by law students on internships. It is planned to bring in professionals from other disciplines, e.g. an architect to help resolve housing issues.

The most frequent cases concern family issues (divorce, paternity of a child, etc.), employment rights, or the neighbourhood. Domestic violence is present in everyday life, but people do not usually come for that reason as such, although when they come for other reasons the staff often find that there is domestic violence involved. Often women are unwilling to go to the police with such cases, as they do not wish to see their husbands/partners arrested. If she comes to the Centre on the other hand, she knows someone will talk to him and try to influence or rehabilitate him, but not have him jailed. In general, staff say that violence against children is even worse than against women. This is a new issue for VR, and the organisation is now negotiating with the Catholic University for the provision of specialist advice to victims of domestic violence. Sexual

⁷ VR staff were keen to highlight the importance of this "citizenship agent." He was born in the community, is very well known, and provides a kind of bridge between the language of the community and the formal language of the outside world. People often say "I'm going to Ismael's" when they mean that they are going to the Centre. Ismael has long worked with street kids in Rocinha, is also director of the children's group at the local samba school, and found the opportunity to join VR in 1997. He is now the "face" of the Centre for the community and people come to him for advice all the time, even if he is having a drink in a bar; indeed the Centre has to convince clients that Ismael is not the only one who can help them. Previously, people used to go to the drug traffickers to solve all their problems. Every Thursday there was a meeting where the trafficker would give orders in an attempt to resolve problems. He would decree that certain actions would be taken, etc. Now everyone knows that this does not happen any more.

abuse in particular needs psychologists, not just lawyers, and VR cannot handle this at present. “Our language is that of rights, but this is not enough”.

An important feature of the Centre’s work is the provision of training, workshops, and information on rights. In particular “rights agents” in the community are trained. One of the Centre’s most important roles is seen as telling people what their rights are, and recently they have been asked to give workshops to particular groups, e.g. with a local doctor, or for elderly people. Often people do know what their rights are but do not believe in the judicial system nor that they would be able to access that system.

The centres also attach great importance to their “transformative” work, which they see as a learning process by which people face a problem and talk about it. They say that whereas in the legal process a judge merely applies the law to a specific fact, mediation works on the conflict and re-establishes dialogue between the parties.

VR’s strategy is now to reach more people by building more partnerships to train community leadership, so that the *balcão* becomes more and more a reference centre for conflict mediation. They also want to build partnerships with universities and bring them into the community, although VR admits they have to find ways of making this viable, since the worlds of academia and the favela are still very remote from each other. Lack of funds also means that VR is not yet able to produce enough materials.

From VR’s *Balcão de Direitos* initiative, the Federal Government has now created a programme (with the same name) in 17 states. VR supports GoB by monitoring the programmes in other states, and is still a point of reference in this respect for GoB.

- (1) *Urban Conflict Mediation*. This is an *ad hoc* activity developed by VR in response to serious conflict in the favelas last year, both between drug-trafficking factions, and between the traffickers and the police. The community asked for something to be done because the battles were restricting people’s movements. Even though they had no clear methodology nor trained staff to implement it, VR said ‘let’s see what we can do.’ Out of this grew the idea of a team specialised in Urban Conflict Mediation. This was also important to VR in confronting the criticism that although the organisation was going national and international in its activities, it was failing to confront violence at home.

Previously, VR used to go into a favela and start projects which were not directly related to conflict. There was pressure both from within VR and from the community to change this and engage more directly with conflict. This has brought gains in terms of trust in VR, because usually when conflict breaks out, government and police simply shut down. VR stays there and has gained considerable credibility and respect by doing so. VR’s intention is to add to the voice of the community, not just by denouncing particular parties but by opening up the field for negotiation. They aim to show how and where government can effectively intervene, encourage community leaders to believe that there is a way out, and open up space for negotiation between community and government.

VR was contracted by the UNDP DDR programme in Haiti to assist in developing their Community Mobilization module for violence reduction in the gang-affected communities in Port-au-Prince. UNDP had heard of VR “mainly through word of mouth advertising” and chose the organization because of its experience with the issues in a similarly violent context. Rubem and a colleague carried out the consultancy and according to the UNDP officer, “quickly brought

on board government actors, influential artists from the music, art , literature and other cultural areas, to develop an ambitious program for the Haitian context. Rubem was also able to bring the patronage of Mr Gilberto Gil, the Brazilian Minister for Culture. This was most useful in influencing the support of the Haitian Minister for Culture. He identified a local consultant to work with us and left us with as workable project document. Rubem has returned to Haiti bringing a specialist in the area of gang policing, to assist in addressing the need for SSR, particularly in the approach to gang affected areas.” The UNDP officer in Haiti reports to be very satisfied with the quality of VR’s work.

Concluding remarks & recommendations

- ✓ Progress and performance of the activities under the SSR component has been consistent and commendable. Requests from foreign counterparts to learn about VR’s experiences attest to the originality of the work they are doing. Staff involved in the Municipal Guard Training and Conflict Mediation activities came across as particularly open to examining their projects critically, and described the systematic efforts they make to evaluate their work⁸, learn from lessons learn and systemize these lessons in manuals.
- ✓ The Municipal Security Plan implemented in Resende as well as the Conflict Mediation Centres are examples of successful integration of different VR social and security projects with a positive result.
- ✓ While the MS Plans and GPAE activities involve several stakeholders, the evaluation team’s impression is that VR takes ownership for the projects⁹. Staff working on these activities are capable of ticking of their list of partners without hesitation, but the language used to describe projects leads one to perceive VR as the main actor. This may be a question of semantics, however it is representative of a unequal power dynamic commonly observed between VR and its “partners,” discussed in detail in Section II.
- ✓ The evaluation team was impressed with the Cavalão GPAE team and our initial reaction was to involve some of these experienced officers in developing and giving the training modules. It is our understanding that VR exchanges regularly with high-level GPAE representatives (weekly meetings with the Chief), and officers in the field are somewhat involved in the process (in the diagnostic phase, as FGD members), however there are no plans of including field officers as trainers. This would create a more dynamic partnership, *i.e.* a two-way dialogue in which VR gives *and* receives, clearly recognizing the value of the experiences of the GPAE officers that live the community policing reality day-by-day.

Communication

The evaluation team did not interview the communication project team nor look at any particular communication activity in detail. We did however meet with staff members who manage VR websites (desarme.org and coav.org) and two journalists who are accustomed to working with VR.

The websites are professional, content-rich, up-to-date and, according to VR figures that track number of hits, increasingly relevant. VR’s internally generated reports on its media coverage also testify to their success in maintaining a constant presence in the public eye, especially on the disarmament issue.

⁸ All VR projects included an monitoring and evaluation component (M & E), which is usually carried out by sister organization Instituto de Estudos da Religião (ISER). Monitoring issues will be addressed in the section below.

⁹ Sentiment echoed by UNDP staff that visited Resende.

Log frame Reference:
 6.1 Press work: average of 3 minutes of TV Time per day and 50cms per day in newspapers
 6.2 Viva Rio Radio Station, 24hs in the air, multiplies its audience 5 fold, to 5.000 listeners per minute
 6.3 Network of Community Radios involves 300 radios.
 6.4 Viva Favela has 300.000 visitors and is a regular source for mainstream media.
 6.5 Desarme becomes main source of Human Security on the web for Portuguese & Spanish speakers

VR has a very sophisticated communication and media strategy, which dates back to its origins in the early 1990's. The first impetus that brought together the people that were to form VR came from the media. One of the editors of the principle newspapers in Rio, *O Dia*, called upon Betinho, the legendary social activist with whom Rubem was working at the time, to talk about launching a campaign against urban violence. This led to a meeting which brought together quite extraordinarily the three main *carioca* newspapers (fiercely competitive with each other), which itself led to an event—a *comissão da cidadão*—on urban violence that united specialists in public security, the justice system, the police and social areas to discuss alternatives to repression. This highly mediated event was the first of many very public actions that would come to characterise VR's working methodology, *i.e.* very reliant on media publicity, dependent on personal networks (especially Rubem's), pioneering and unifying (in the sense social actors from many different areas are brought together under the VR umbrella).

The journalists interviewed for the evaluation consider VR the most “credible” NGO working on violence. VR is consistently called upon when TV Globo needs to “get into the communities” (*i.e.* poor communities). It is praised for being a “media-ready” NGO, and for having a good feel for what is news.

Research

Different programmes develop their own research activities (especially COAV and SALW control). The log frame reference for this component refers to market research done in favelas. One study has been done on VR's image in favelas. Results showed that VR is well-known in favelas for its social work (39% of respondents), education work (27%) and disarmament work (10%), and considered in a more positive light than nearly all the other social actors on the list, other than family (which included “community, religious institutions, ONGs, neighbourhood associations, the justice system, police and politicians”).

*Log frame Reference:
7.4 Research on Opinion
& Market in Favelas
produces minimum of 3
reports per year.*

- ✓ While Rubem attests that VR has no intention of becoming a think tank or research NGO, the organisation is reputed for its research, especially in the area of SALW control and youth and armed violence. Given the wide dissemination of much of this research, it would be wise to submit research to an independent peer review board to ensure the quality and scientific rigour.

Training

This International Program on Human Security is being devised as a response to a felt international demand for VR's activities and an internal need to “catalyze” VR experiences, develop a VR policy and provide an assessment and feedback to their projects. Its ad hoc nature at first meant that different programmes had neither the time nor the logistical capacity to respond, especially those without strong international links. In August 2004 VR launched a more consistent and organised process, hiring an external consultant to develop a proposal. The consultant made recommendations based on consultations with universities, VR partners, and research centres in Latin America, Europe and North America, participation in international seminars on human security, secondary research on the internet and internal debates within VR. including After presenting ideas to UNDP in December 2004 and discussing with Peter Batchelor (UNDP/BCPR) and other possible stakeholders, a workshop was held in February 2005 to discuss the creation of a centre.

*Log frame Reference:
8.1 International
Training Center on
Human Security serves
local and international
audience.*

At this stage the Programme includes a coordinator and a web master for its portal and two researchers. It is located in a separate building, in order to give the team more distance from VR other programmes, as part of the IHSP's work will be to study VR's activities and suss out lessons learned and good practices ("catalyzing" of VR's experiences).

Research is already underway in the IHSP, organised in three workstreams: gender and violence (funded by Ford and UNESCO); drugs and violence (started only a couple of months previous to the evaluation); youth and violence (joint with COAV, to start in July 2005). Team members are developing position papers, working toward their strategies. The IHSP is also working on a proposal for a four-week police training in Latin American and Caribbean countries regarding police techniques, management, tactics and strategies and community policing. At this stage the Programme is in urgent need of core-funding.

The knowledge management component will include a web portal, a database on countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and lusophone countries, and access to policy papers by NGOs, academics, and others. A search mechanism will be established and regular mailings will inform interested parties of new additions, links etc.

- ✓ The IHSP is an exciting initiative with excellent potential to achieve VR's intention of promoting a human security approach in Latin America. The idea to have the Programme be responsible for catalyzing VR activities is also well-conceived, as long as it is not just about systematizing what exists, but looking at materials with a critical perspective.
- ✓ The evaluation team expressed concern about the IHSP's partnership strategy. While the consultant's report emphasizes the many consultations made with various actors, in interviews with Programme members, mention was made for the need to further identify partners. Given that the Programme is presented as a network that will respond to demands across the region, it seems strange that critical partners are not yet on board (see following paragraph) even after it is up and running. The impression is that the IHSP has been set up to disseminate VR's work, for which there is apparently a real demand. However the Programme could have a much broader impact if it were a platform that collected, analysed and disseminated regional experiences, not just those of VR. This would also be useful for VR to see its own experiences from a critical perspective, by being able to compare and contrast with others.
- ✓ Interviews with SENASP revealed that it has established a Regional Training Centre in cooperation with UN-LiREC. An executive team has been legally created and each institution has officially designated a focal point. The Regional Centre is operational and working. So far they have organized NGO and parliamentary training courses, a seminar with MERCOSUR on criteria relating to import, export and transit of SALW (took place in Porto Alegre). A course on intelligence is under development, as well as the adaptation of the UN-LiREC Investigative Manual for future courses. To our understanding, there is no dialogue between VR and the SENASP/UN-LiREC centre, which leads to concerns of duplication and indicates that the initial stock-taking process was not as thorough as it could have been. **These comments were transmitted to VR in the debriefing between UNDP evaluator and Rubem. Consequently, VR has decided to review the IHSP proposal and submit a new one to UNDP.**

Monitoring

The evaluation team met with the ISER counterpart responsible for the evaluation and monitoring of VR's projects. The M & E is an internal exercise, and should not be confused with measuring impact.

<i>Log frame Reference: 10.1 Quantitative monitoring</i>
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While M & E looks at performance and measure achievement of specific project activities and objectives, impact assessment goes beyond simple measurement of what happen to estimate how much of the observed change is attributable to the project. VR has not conducted any impact analyses, which are necessarily longitudinal and comparative.

- ✓ The DFID log frame stipulates quantitative monitoring, much to the surprise of the DFID evaluator who expected the focus to be on qualitative aspects. The team was presented the quantitative and qualitative results for a handful of activities. Our impression was that despite the obvious technical competence of the ISER staff member in charge of this aspect, the research did not go into enough depth to confirm or challenge the activity's hypothesis. It is difficult to say where this problem originates, either in the design or analysis phase, without looking at the monitoring methods more closely.
- ✓ M & E is essential to good project management. Provided the research is well done and a feedback loop is in place, results can help modify and improve projects even while they are still underway. Our impression is that VR is underutilizing the resources available for M & E, and could benefit from revamping this component to get more out of the research. Though should be given to determine if M & E could be linked in to the "catalyzing" work of the IHSP.

Conclusion of Section I: Focusing energies

It is difficult to prioritise VR's interventions according to their importance: each one reviewed by the team has is benefiting the target population in some way in addition to adding to a body of experience that may eventually be drawn on to formulate social policy. However, as one of the objectives of this evaluation is to help donors make decisions in light of funding cuts to the Global Pool Small Arms Strategy, we will make suggestions here regarding where VR could focus less energy, should cuts be inevitable.

Shifting focus...

When VR began in the early 1990's, it was a pioneer. It was the first time a movement from the civil society appropriated the topic of public security, which until then had been inextricably associated with the right-wing and the military dictatorship. The founders of VR helped turn public security into a legitimate object of study, and have continued over the years to affirm the right of non-governmental actors to contribute to finding non-violent alternatives to repression. VR has contributed significantly to getting disarmament and public security on the local, national and regional agendas. The organisation's research, lobbying, advocacy and presence have been an impetus to government entities to build capacity and act more aggressively on issues of SALW and security. However, based on interviews with some of these government actors (SENASP, Federal Police), it may be time for VR to pull back from some activities and let the government play a larger role. This includes activities regarding national policy development, information exchange and capacity building of law enforcement agencies, as well as defining regional and foreign policy. VR has produced impressive work on tracing, but the FP has been building its capacity in this area, as well. That the FP has taken part in the UN governmental experts working group on marking and tracing in June 2005 is indicative of their increasing knowledge of instruments and initiatives related to SALW.

By shifting its focus from these activities, VR can concentrate on what it does more effectively: mobilization, lobbying, campaigning and community work. In addition, more energy could be put into analysing current VR activities: comparing and contrasting them with other interventions,

locally, regionally and internationally, distilling lessons learned and proposing good practices. This kind of analytical research combined with a knowledge management component would benefit all actors in the public security sector, and provide a more solid basis for policy formulation than just one successful experience.

Section II: Key Issues

Section II will focus on some **key institutional issues**, namely Viva Rio's image, its relationship with the **Government of Brazil** and with other **civil society organizations**. This section will highlight the **most frequently voiced concerns and critiques** regarding the nature of Viva Rio's relationship with these two groups of actors, and will analyze both their legitimacy and impact on VR's work.

Viva Rio's image

VR is loved or hated. Among organized entities, reactions are rarely lukewarm. VR is well aware of this, and passes it off to jealousy, competition and resentment. Most critics emphasized that their criticism has nothing to do with the individuals working in VR, but rather the way the organization works. Common critiques include:

- VR doesn't know how to work in partnership, doesn't give credit to its partners;
- Too event-focused;
- Too much marketing, not enough content;
- Unfocused—does too much;
- Too close of a relationship to the government (called the *sub-prefeitura* of Rio);
- Too status quo—VR does not challenge power relationships, does not seek to transform society, empower beneficiaries/partners;
- *Viva Rico* – VR is a wealthy organisation that seeks to protect the middle class from populations from the *morro*.

VR is aware of most of these critiques, many which are based on misconceptions of the organisation. VR is seen as an arm of the government, but its relationship with both the city and state government is strained, to say the least. VR is adamant about staying politically neutral at both the local and national level and shows no signs of trying to curry favour with the ruling political party. VR has a reputation for being too event-focused but its activities in poor communities attest that events are not their only focus. The *Viva Rico* critique is again based on misconceptions of the organization's objectives, but, like all the other critiques, is a reflection, albeit distorted, of a certain reality. VR *is* wealthy compared to most NGOs and its staff and Board are for the most part middle class. But critiques like this one and that which says VR is too status quo, are nothing more than criticisms that come from institutions that have not made the same choices VR has. For the most part, VR does not aim to empower marginalized populations, as Rubem openly admits. The approach is pragmatic; the organisation seeks to address specific needs, often in an *ad hoc* way. There is no discourse of transforming power relationships or creating a new economic/social/cultural model for society. This seems to be the main reason VR has little relationship with NGOs from ABONG (*Associação brasileiro de ONGs*), which are much more militant in this respect.

The critiques that need to be examined more closely are those regarding partnerships and focus. The latter point was addressed in the previous section; VR does indeed appear to be diffusing its energies and it would behoove the organisation to re-evaluate its focus. Partnerships is a much

more complex issue, all the more so because VR generally disregards this critique as unfounded. While VR recognizes that its weak relationships with ABONG members and have made steps to remedy this,¹⁰ the impression is that VR is satisfied with its partners. Interviews conducted by the evaluation team suggest the opposite is not always the case.

Relationships with Government of Brazil

VR's partnerships with government bodies appear to rely on a good personal relationship between someone in the government institution and someone in VR (usually Rubem). This has several consequences.

1. Some key counterparts are not VR's main counterparts. For example, despite its extensive work on tracing VR does not work with Interpol which it deems to be too slow (the FP do, on the other hand). VR is not participating in the UN Habitat and World Bank National Centre on Urban Violence, nor the *Rota de Fuga*, an ILO-led initiative that seeks to create public policies for the prevention of children's involvement in drug trafficking.
2. Roles are not clearly defined. Some of VR's governmental partners feel that VR is overstepping its non-governmental boundaries, involving itself in issues that are the government's domain (the information system on arms, tracing issues, national plan on security). No one denies VR's contributions, but there is a feeling that VR tries to take the lead on too many things. This is compounded by its successful media strategy, since much of what VR does ends up in the press, so it ends up looking like VR is the only one doing anything. Consequently, a common critique is that VR is focused more on marketing itself (to access more funds) than on the issues.
3. There seem to be missed opportunities for VR to build the capacity of their different partners. Pablo from the disarmament team, for example, is giving an officer of the FP in Rio assistance with classifying and tracing arms. This work is somewhat *ad hoc* and could have a much broader impact if it would focus on capacity development. Similarly, VR might be able to lesson the hostility regarding its "marketing focus" by sharing information on how to be more media savvy; this involves more than just contacts: knowing what is news, how to present it and how to have pertinent information on hand is a skill VR has mastered and could help others develop.
4. Finally, a personal partnership is more fragile and limited than an institutional partnership. The latter may very well involve two focal points in each institution, but by basing the relationship on a formal agreement, the give and take between the two institutions is likely to be greater, ambiguity of roles is avoided and there is more accountability.

Relationships with civil society

The partnership issue is complex within VR. In fact, there seem to be three forms of partnership. The first are service providers. These are churches, neighbourhood associations, small NGOs, community groups (all formally established and registered with a corporate identity—*pessoa juridica*) that are called upon to help implement activities. VR establishes a formal contract with the partner to define roles, remuneration and responsibilities. The education programme has the largest network of these kind of partners; organisations are contracted by VR to provide a space

¹⁰ Steps have been taken to improve these relationships; for example, one staff member in the Conflict Mediation program is in charge of networking with NGOs that work with human rights.

and basic services (electricity, W.C., etc.) for the Telecurso programme and receive compensation for this. VR says to have some 1000 organisations registered in its partner database. We do not know how many are active, and the database is currently being revised.

A second group of partners are organisations with whom VR works in coalition, mainly to campaign, mobilise and occasionally carry out research. These include larger NGOs and organisations that work on similar issues. There is no remuneration involved.

There is a third group that VR refers to as partners, but in fact are institutions that contract VR to carry out services. This includes entities such as the municipal governments of the cities that called upon VR to develop municipal security plans.

VR does not make a distinction between these different forms of partnership, and in general considers its partners the “arms of the organisation.” It sees its partners as local project managers and aims to build their capacity and transform their institutional culture. This perspective indicates the vertical nature of many of these partnerships, and suggests an unequal power dynamic at work. Interviews with partners from the first and second groups confirmed this. Many of them feel frustrated with VR, particularly those who are called upon to mobilise people and organise events. When the event comes to pass, VR is the focus of the media blitz and the partner goes unnoticed. The partners feel used and suggest that VR could both step back from the spotlight and be more generous in contributing to offsetting the costs required for the local partner to mobilise and organise.

The following is a selection of quotes from VR civil society partners:

“Viva Rio opens doors, but it is hard to make your voice heard if you disagree with their ideas.”

“Viva Rio is an elephant. It doesn’t make space for its partners.”

“Viva Rio needs to learn to work with its partners. Why doesn’t it just divide the space?”

“If Viva Rio wants to create a closer relationship [with NGOs], it needs to make space for other debates, look at questions that aren’t just VR’s.”

“Viva Rio has to let go of its brand-name to make more space. They need to open up to criticisms in order to dialogue.”

“Working in their presence is suffocating. VR always gets the recognition...the press recognizes “news,” Viva Rio is the news.... But Viva Rio is an umbrella, everyone [even its critics] has reaped benefits at one time or another from being associated with Viva Rio.”

“We work closely with VR, but never once has VR come to our offices. We always come to theirs. Our organisation manages to work with VR, because we can’t be avoided and we are not an internal competitor (VR is too far ahead of us!) but we’ve had to fight it all the way.”

Such comments may be passed off as jealousy, but they are representative of a dynamic that characterises—and will ultimately weaken—VR. VR has not been challenged to dialogue with other civil society organisations in part because there are few interlocutors in Brazil that have their breadth of experience and in part because the social capital of its founders is such that VR emerged with a network in place; it has not needed to build horizontal linkages. As a result, VR has grown disproportionately powerful next to its partners, leaves little space for debate, has not been forced to develop a critical perspective of its own work. This has led to an organisation that is very confident and centred on itself¹¹ and unaccustomed to engaging in two-way dialogue.

¹¹ In an institutional sense, since its programmes are undeniably designed with a greater good in mind.

Why should VR bother to question this dynamic? The organisation is functioning just fine as it is. It appears to be spending funds appropriately¹² and is meeting its objectives. But is VR achieving as much impact as it could? Most partners will work with VR because their reputation benefits from the being associated with the major player in the Rio NGO world, and because there are often funds involved. However, the level of frustration is increasing, and several interviewees stated that there is growing reticence to work with VR. Further, without strong local partners, VR cannot expect their activities to be sustainable. Good partners help increase the impact of activities, increase chances for multiplication of results and usually help reduce costs. Good partners can also offer new perspectives, constructive criticism and opportunity to mature. Creating good and open partnerships takes work; listing names in a project document or even newspaper article is not enough. There must be a willingness to learn from others. This appears to be VR's weak spot.

Concluding remarks & recommendations:

- ✓ That so many people in the general public see VR as the opposite of what it is (linked to government, focused on publicised events that target the middle class, etc.) suggests that VR's image is unclear. The market study shows VR has strong "brand" recognition, but VR's organisational identity is ambiguous, which can be threatening, especially to organisational structures with strong identities. Rubem prefers VR not to assume an identity because it is necessarily constructed by opposition to something. He would like VR to a social movement that campaigns, mobilises populations, organises events via a non-profit organisational structure with an institutional strategy similar to a socially-responsible company (without the demands of financial sustainability). Be that as it may, VR should consider how to present itself and to strengthen and polish its image (not its brand recognition).
- ✓ VR should reflect on the issue of partnerships. What exactly does it mean to work in partnership? What concessions is VR willing to make to create harmonious partnerships? In what way can VR create more space for its partners? How are partners identified? How are partners' needs, demands taken into account?
- ✓ Concurrently, VR should undertake an in-depth independent study of its current partners; this evaluation only scratches the surface. Who are they? What are their motivations for partnering with VR? What are their objectives, needs demands? Are they being taken into account? What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the partnership? Suggestions for improvement?
- ✓ This said, the evaluators understand that partnering is not always easy, even with the best intentions. For example, SENASP would like to discuss ideas and proposals together with VR, including fundraising. This does not happen however because VR does not want to get too closely associated with governmental institutions for political reasons. VR feels that if they were to cooperate at the federal level, they might not be accepted at the regional or municipal level because of political parties' competition. The process of a partnership strategy could flesh out these difficulties and help VR determine which partnerships are most effective for achieving VR's partnership objectives.
- ✓ Encourage critical reflection within VR and seek two-way relationships with partners. One way to do this would be to create of network of institutions with similar interventions to carry out peer reviews of each others' activities, provided there be collective interest in such a project. This could result in a compendium of lessons learned and good practice that would have a wider audience and potentially greater multiplication effects than book/monograph strictly document VR's experiences, as is currently planned as a key activity in the UNDP project.

¹² Although a financial audit would be necessary to verify whether funds are being spent most efficiently.

Section III – SWOT Analysis

This section summarizes the previous two sections in the matrix below.

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity to mobilize & disseminate information widely • Visibility • Ability to mobilize different social actors • Dynamism • Dedication of staff • Innovation • Agility • Advocacy & Policy work • Esprit de corps • Intention to integrate programme areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ineffectualn when working in networks/coalitions/partnerships. • Tendency to take ownership for activities developed in partnership and overpower partners. • Lack of consideration for sustainability and exit strategies. • Nebulous organisational identity as perceived by outsiders. • Lack of depth and underutilisation of M & E. • Propensity to not apply a critical perspective to own work • Tendency to take on too many activities.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building of governmental entities working on SALW issues in areas like research, communication, mobilization. • Creation of a platform (via IHSP) for analysing public security projects both within and outside of VR to improve sector knowledge. • Can help build (via IHSP, Desarme.org) a vibrant Latin American community (research, advocacy, policy) on SALW) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Growing reticence of potential partners (including government) to work with VR. • Changes in governments at all levels. • Misconceptions of what VR is and does. • Funding cuts.

Final Recommendations

Recommendations for VR

- ✓ Engage in internal reflection on the notion/forms of partnership; take stock of current partnerships through an independent study; define a partnership strategy.
- ✓ Revise current partnerships to see how to make more space for partners.
- ✓ Strengthen M & E and link it to catalyzing work to be carried out by IHSP.
- ✓ Establish a peer review network with organisations working on issues similar to VR in view of reviewing each others' activities and distilling lessons learned and good practices for the public security sector.
- ✓ Set up an independent peer review board to review VR research publications.

- ✓ Encourage internal reflection on operational (as opposed to financial) sustainability of projects, taking into account local partners, exit strategies, funding issues.
- ✓ Reflect on image problems and consider a strategy to improve VR's image. It is worthwhile to note that this is not about PR but how they are perceived by current and potential partners.
- ✓ Review its programme strategy and activity workplan on the basis of a needs assessment conducted jointly with all appropriate stakeholders.
- ✓ Focus on a results-based approach (in which desired results—defined based on the aforementioned needs assessment—define activities) rather than the other way around (an activity-based approach).

Recommendations for Donors

- ✓ Provide incentives to help VR improve partnership relationships: *e.g.* require an abbreviated pre- and post project evaluation of partner satisfaction.
- ✓ Provide incentives to encourage VR to reflect on moving certain activities (*e.g.* Rights Desk, *Luta pela Paz*) towards operational sustainability.
- ✓ Strive for increased donor coordination to help VR avoid dispersing energies and taking on too much. Synchronise reporting and evaluation procedures.
- ✓ Consider providing support to governmental bodies working on SALW while encouraging their exchange with VR so as to avoid duplication of activities and “reinventing the wheel”.
- ✓ Take stock of and consider providing support to non-governmental entities working on SALW in view of strengthening different actors and creating a more vibrant public security sector.
- ✓ Create mechanisms to encourage networking among the different actors in this sector, to encourage exchange of experiences and lessons learned.
- ✓ Engage local researchers to conduct independent studies in the communities where VR works, to establish how the intended beneficiaries see VR's activities, how they prioritise them, what they perceive as their needs etc. DFID could oversee this or advise on it but should not be main investigators.
- ✓ Audit of VR's finances to ensure that funds for SALW are being channeled appropriately.

Appendix 1

INTERVIEWEES OUTSIDE OF VIVA RIO incomplete

Barbara Soares	CESEC	Anthropologist	Academia
Roberto Kant da Lima	NuFEP	Researcher; Coordinator	Academia
Michel Misse	IFCS	Sociologist	Academia
Bruno Sasson	Independent	Consultant for Municipal Plans, currently under contract with Niterói	Government/Police
Regina Novaes	National Youth Secretariat	Adjunta	Government
Raul Jungmann	Parliamentarian	Federal Deputy	Government
Marcelo Behar	Ministry of Justice	Assistant to Minister of Justice	Government
Luis Felipe Soares	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	head of LA Division	Government
Robson Robin	SENASP		Government
Mona	Rede Globo	TV Producer	Media
André	Rede Globo	TV Reporter	Media
Michael Astor	Associated Press	Correspondent	Média
Desmond Malloy	UNDP-Haiti		multilateral
Maristela Baioni	UNDP-Brazil		multilateral
Jayilson de Souza e Silva	CEASME	President	non- governmental
Gabrielle de Los Rio	genteBrasil	Project Coordinator	non- governmental
Eduardo	President of Neighbourhood Association of Cavalão		non- governmental
Andrea Fortes de Lima	CUFA	Responsible for computer center in CUFA complex in Cidade de Deus	non- governmental
Celso Aythayde	CUFA	Executive Director	non- governmental
Itamar Silva	IBASE		non- governmental
Cristina Leonardo	Lobbyist for families of gun victims		non- governmental
Denis Mizne	Sou da Paz	Executive Director	non- governmental
Felipe Gonçalves Romeu	PM of RJ	Commander GPAE Cavalão	Police
Gilmar	PM of RJ	Officer	Police
Ubiratan d'Angelo	MP	Coronel, Commander of CPAE	Police
Amaro Rodrigues	President of Neighbourhood Association of Mare	Board of Directors of Viva Rio	non- governmental
Elysio Pires	Marketing Consultant	Board of Directors of Viva Rio	non- governmental

INTERVIEWEES WITHIN VIVA RIO

NAME	PROGRAMME	POSITION
Marta Ramos	Community Development	Coordinator
Marco Maranhão Costa	Education	Coordinator
Sibele	Education	Ana e Maria project
Eucrisio	Conflict Mediation	Responsible for Solidarity Network
Pedro Strozenberg	Conflict Mediation	Coordinator
		Responsible for networking with
Rodolfo	Conflict Mediation	Human Rights NGOs
Josephine Bourgeois	SALW Control	Researcher
Haydee Caruso	PROASP	Coordinator
Luciane Braga	PROASP	Researcher
Luke Dowdney	COAV	Coordinator
Verônica dos Anjos	PROASP	Researcher
Pablo Dreyfus	SALW Control	Researcher
Florência Fontan Balestra	IHSP	Coordinator
Jéssica Galeria	IHSP	Researcher
Mayra Juca	IHSP	Web manager
José Marcelo	Independent	Consultant
Benjamin Lessing	IHSP	Research
Rubem Cesar		Director
Sandra	Finance & Administration	
Sydney	Finance & Administration	MIS
Luciano	Finance & Administration	MIS
Juliana	Finance & Administration	Human Resource
		Coordinator of Favela, Opinion and
		Market Resarch for ISER
Luís Eduardo (Duda) Guedes	ISER	Coordinator
Rangel Bandeira	SALW Control	
Iloina	Conflict Mediation	
Mariana	Conflict Mediation	
Gustavo	Conflict Mediation	
Ismael	Conflict Mediation	
Carlinho	Conflict Mediation	