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 Moldova

 FINAL REPORT (January 2010)

 Institutional Development Outcome Evaluation

 Institutional Development Outcome Evaluation

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Table of Contents

[Executive summary 5](#_Toc251593941)

[DAC Evaluation Criteria 6](#_Toc251593942)

[Key Findings 7](#_Toc251593943)

[Benchmarking 7](#_Toc251593944)

[Strategic Issues 7](#_Toc251593945)

[Methodology and Approach 9](#_Toc251593946)

[2.1Political Context 11](#_Toc251593947)

[2.2 Economic Context 13](#_Toc251593948)

[Ex-post Review 15](#_Toc251593949)

[Short- and Medium-term Implications of the Current Economic Situation 17](#_Toc251593950)

[2.2 Governance 18](#_Toc251593951)

[3. Evaluation Results 21](#_Toc251593952)

[3.1 Relevance 21](#_Toc251593953)

[Current and Future Relevance 25](#_Toc251593954)

[3.2 Robustness of Outcomes and Outputs and the links between them 26](#_Toc251593955)

[3.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness 30](#_Toc251593956)

[3.3 Impact and Sustainability 31](#_Toc251593957)

[3.4 Broader Strategic Issues 34](#_Toc251593958)

[Conclusions and Recommendations for the future 36](#_Toc251593959)

[Annexes: 38](#_Toc251593960)

[Annex 1: 39](#_Toc251593961)

[A. BRIEF NATIONAL and PROGRAMME CONTEXT 40](#_Toc251593962)

[B. SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION 44](#_Toc251593963)

[C. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 46](#_Toc251593964)

[D. METHODOLOGY 50](#_Toc251593965)

[E. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION 51](#_Toc251593966)

[F. EVALUATION TEAM 52](#_Toc251593967)

[G. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 53](#_Toc251593968)

[H. DOCUMENTS FOR STUDY BY THE EVALUATORS 54](#_Toc251593969)

[Annex 2: People Met 55](#_Toc251593970)

[Annex 3: List of References 57](#_Toc251593971)

**List of Tables**

[Table 1: Project and Outcome Evaluations: key differences 9](#_Toc251592736)

[Table 2: Forecasts in December 2008 14](#_Toc251592737)

[Table 3: Programmes and Relevance 22](#_Toc251592738)

[Table 4: UNDP Outcomes and Outputs for Cluster 26](#_Toc251592739)

[Table 5: UNFPA Outcomes and Outputs 29](#_Toc251592740)

[Table 6: Expected Impact and Sustainability 31](#_Toc251592741)

**List of Figures**

Figure 1: Possible Transition Trajectories........................................................................13

Figure 2: Donor Funding and UNDP Comparative Strengths..........................................15

Figure 3: Moldova Percentile Rank for Governance........................................................17

[Figure 4: Rule of Law (1996-2008) 18](#_Toc251582506)

[Figure 5: Government Effectiveness (1996-2008) 18](#_Toc251582507)

# Executive summary

1. The UNDP office in Moldova commissioned an Outcome Evaluation (OE) Report for the Institutional Development Outcome for the UNDP and the and the Population and Development Component for the UNFPA as outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) and which covers a total of 8 underlying projects.
2. The evaluation assignment commenced in November 2009, a field mission to Chisinau undertaken in December and an Inception Report was issued thereafter. This report is the second and Final Report and follows the structure proposed in the ToR and given in the Inception Report. Following the Executive Summary, Section 1 sets out the Background that includes the development context, Section 2 the Evaluation results and Section 3 the Conclusions and Recommendations.
3. The timing of the OE is opportune. The broadly uninterrupted dominance by a single party – the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova - since 2001 was interrupted in 2009. The ‘Alliance for European Integration’ is a four-party coalition that formed government following the second parliamentary election of the year in July. In principle the change in the political scene offers a significant window of opportunity for redirecting foreign policy and domestic policies towards clearer development goals and in turn for demand for external development assistance. In this context the role and comparative advantage of UNDP intervention is a key question.
4. The political-economy context will shape the path of Moldova’s socio-economic development. Sustained political will for reform – economic and institutional – has been the key challenge in recent years. Whether this political will is credible and sustainable remains to be seen – political risk for Moldova over 2010 has risen given the uncertainties surrounding the pending Presidential elections, a possible new parliamentary election and a possible referendum. The economic impact of the global slow-down coupled with the effects of poor agricultural seasons has had a severe effect on the economy and human development. This in turn has negatively affected public finances. Fiscal imbalances will require pruning notwithstanding possible budget support from the IMF and World Bank. Whether the government will have the will and societal backing to underwrite significant cuts in current expenditure will be a key test.
5. In essence, the key pre-condition for institutional reform is the existence of political will to implement the change management process including the investment in human capital for training and salaries. This *sine qua non* for lasting impact is as valid in 2010 for future intervention as it was in 2006-07 for the intervention thereafter. There are significant risks in terms of future intervention in the current political context but equally the UNDP’s existing footprint in the sector coupled with its comparative advantage of being seen as independent means that a sequenced approach is appropriate that allows for scale-up in late 2010. Of the current cluster of UNDP projects, assistance to the Central Election Committee (CEC) and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MoFA and EI) are projects should be front-loaded - both meet the broader logic of intervention in terms of deepening and enhancing governance.
6. By corollary to the issue of political will as a necessary pre-condition, Institutional Development is in itself a thematic target and not in an end in itself. In the context of reform from plan to market the change in the role of government, functions and required skill sets typically first involves central government functions and related agencies. All the UNDP projects fit this rubric although the scope remains wide. A more cohesive cluster heading for the cluster is Governance and the subsequent inclusion of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and on e-government, Justice and Home Affairs via BUMAD and EUBAM programmes, assisting improved statistics. Formally, the cluster is part of Democratic Governance and reference to the latter should be made prominent.
7. Section 1 reviews the Background to the interventions. The evidence shows that UNDP, and to a large extent UNFPA intervention, occurred within three overlapping contexts:

i. developmental challenges and identification of need and demand for external support

ii. follow-up, scale-up or evolution from existing intervention, and

iii. request for UNDP to intervene by government or by other donors as an implementing body due to its reputation, access to government or due to time constraints for commitment of funds.

### DAC Evaluation Criteria

1. UNDP and UNFPA intervention is assessed to have been relevant for the cluster reviewed. However, the degree of relevance varied across the UNDP projects reflecting the specific context identified in Para 7. The factors that called for the initiation of the Support to Public Administration Reform project in 2005-2006 proved to be weak in terms of a credible policy-anchor: either an Estonian or Georgian style domestic consensus for a particular economic model and resultant focus on the role of government within a largely laissez-faire environment, or; an exogenous one partially adopted as a result for of convergence processes related to EU integration for the new EU Member States. The same critique applies however to the entire aid envelope including the larger World Bank Trust Fund to meet this end.
2. For UNFPA, the intervention into statistics was somewhat non-standard but the intervention had logic and the outturn has been impressive in terms of impact, justifying the approach. The challenge for the UNFPA is to now to clarify an exit strategy that allows the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to continue specific TA from agencies with competence in statistics on the one hand and to identify a policy-niche building on the raft of data produced.
3. Efficiency and Effectiveness were assessed to be satisfactory on the whole. Both efficiency and effectiveness are higher where the link between inputs and outputs is clearly defined in terms of benchmarks. Both these DAC criteria refer to intra-programme and intra-project assessment. The rate of effectiveness in particular tends to be proportional to the degree of relevance – hence, effects are more tangible and durable where the needs assessment and gap-plugging are more cohesive.
4. Impact and sustainability are ex-post benchmarks. However this OE confirms that expected impact is positive for both the Institutional Development portfolio and the UNFPA, although there is inter-project variance.

## Key Findings

### Benchmarking

1. Formally, the UNDP interventions are set against CP Outcome 1.4 and UNDAF outcome 1. Although the process of benchmarking reveals good practice as regards the use of indicators, a key weakness is the definition of the defined outcomes. Outcome 1.4, “Public Administration Reform Promoted in selected institutions” is artificially narrow in scope and the connection with UNDAF outcome 1 consequently unclear. An UNDAF review is pending in 2010 but in the meantime, Outcome 1.4 should be modified to give greater focus on Governance – something that is happening in effect.
2. Outcome 1.4 should be re-defined to more accurately reflect the governance-based scope for the Institutional Development Component (IDC). Globally, the UNDP has strong comparative strengths in Democratic Governance that covers 7 segments: policy support; parliamentary development; electoral systems and processes; Justice and Human Rights; E-governance and access to information for citizens; decentralisation and local governance; and Public Administration Reform and anti-corruption. The range of projects in the IDC becomes more rational when set against the 7 UNDP governance pillars and which in general are wider in scope than a narrower focus on economic governance, thereby setting a clearer differentiation to World Bank assistance in the area
3. A re-calibration of Outcome 1.4 to encompass Governance segments would in turn improve the fit to the UNDAF outcome but also change the locus of benchmarking within the CPD benchmarking for both the indicators for Outcome 1.4 and the related outputs.

### Strategic Issues

1. The re-calibration proposed would not materially change the scope of the projects but would give a clearer sense UNDP value-added and comparative advantage in terms of “donor space” – highly relevant in terms of a strategic of the agency’s positioning going forward from 2010 but also in the short-term in 2010
2. Flexibility to react to changing circumstances is a major comparative strength for the UNDP and gives it a significant first-move advantage for emerging needs and demand for external support, in turn fostering strong demand and ties with bilateral donors. The challenge is to retain this flexibility but serious consideration should be given to accepting partner-led projects that are outside the core Governance outcome and outputs. To some extent this issue should become self-regulating as the EC in particular will reduce its reliance on the UN agencies for implementation.
3. Irrespective of the political outturn in 2010-11, the role and scale of EU financing is likely to rise both in nominal amount and as a share of the total external aid envelope. This opens up a number of challenges and opportunities for other donors, in particular for the UNDP. If the EU-drive through the Association Agreement process sustains and accelerates toward some notional potential candidate status as in the Western Balkans for countries such as Albania and Serbia, then the entire focus of aid will begin to be shaped around this policy anchor. Typically other EU donors can be expected to converge their country strategies around the EC’s interventions also.
4. The UNDP is well-positioned to gain from the pro-EU bias but equally if there is a change in political sentiment in the event of an electoral reversal to the left. A key difference for the Government of Moldova (GoM) is that the UNDP does not have an interest either as a lender (IMF, World Bank) or as the EC for a pro-EU bias.
5. This report identifies clear directions to ensure that the UNDP remains true to its core aim in development and flexible enough to meet the current pro-EU bias or a possible reversal thereof. Policy neutrality remains the key. Governance as a core aim allows for provision of advice on matters related to the Association Agreement and indeed any credible advance toward a pre-candidate status although the core knowledge and competence of the *acquis communautaire –* the body of EU law - would reside with the EC in this case and with EU Member States. The accession process is a sub-set of wider development and Governance, hence the UNDP’s inputs will remain relevant although interventions will need to be carefully developed to focus on core strengths and value-added to government.
6. The UNDP and UNFPA’s intervention received highly favourable assessment from beneficiaries. The trust and existing contacts is a strong intangible and provides a strong base for UNDP interventions in the current programming cycle and thereafter. Three specific recommendations follow:
7. The policy-level advocacy or “upstream” function should be enhanced to build on the trust and reputation but also provide competition in policy-advice to the IFIs (essentially lenders) and to the EC (with a specific convergence policy agenda).
8. The developmental and governance context should be emphasised rather than European Integration to map out a specific niche. Given Moldova’s starting point, the transition toward Euro-integration via the Association process is consistent with development and governance but would allow the UNDP to identify gaps within the 7 Governance clusters. Perhaps more importantly, this approach is risk-neutral should there be a political reversal towards the Communists.
9. Synergies between “downstream” projects and clusters should be built upon. This is particularly pertinent for the UNFPA which can potentially build on the network existing through the Local Development portfolio and thereby affect regional sectoral policy and in conjunction with the IDC cluster the potential policy advice at a central level.

1. Introduction and evaluation methodology

1. The OE followed the three classical phases of:
2. Data collection, analysis and review
3. Field mission to and to the PRO target region and final beneficiaries
4. Write-up, finalisation and dissemination
5. Phase 1 commenced upon signatures with the two-man team and went smoothly. The team accords its gratitude to the UNDP management for providing access to a raft of programme information and reports (see Annex 3) and for expediting relevant meetings with stakeholders (see Annex 2).
6. Phase 2 was completed on December 11th. This programme of meetings included a wide sample of stakeholders including the UNDP staff, programme managers, beneficiaries, donors and independent think tanks.
7. This OE is the output of Phase 3. In line with best practice, the Consultants will respond to any feedback. A follow-up dissemination mission to Chisinau is planned by February 2010.

# Methodology and Approach

1. The OE follows the standard model followed by all donors including the EC and UNDP[[1]](#footnote-1) and follow the 5-set of evaluation criteria:
	* 1. **Relevance**
		2. **Efficiency**
		3. **Effectiveness**
		4. **Impact**
		5. **Sustainability**
2. These above criteria are uniform under the Paris DAC system for all donors and for all evaluations – both in terms of timing (ex-ante through to ex-post) and context (from project to outcome).
3. Table 1 below outlines the key differences between project and outcome evaluations. The focus, scope and purpose is wider in scale for an outcome evaluation.

Table 1: Project and Outcome Evaluations: key differences

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*Source: UNDP Guidelines for Evaluators, 2002*

1. Outcome evaluations in UNDP assess the agency’s contributions towards the progress made on outcome achievements. These outcomes are generally identified in the programme or project results frameworks to which UNDP initiatives contribute. It also means that there is an implicit assumption that the logframes set out a clear logic of intervention and indicators to assess and validate outcomes as well as outputs. The robustness of the outcome-output architecture is assessed in section 3.2.

2. Development context

1. This section sets out the current situation analysis in the country and in 2005-07 when the current CP actions were designed. The backward review aims to capture the country context and the basis of intervention logic and also to identify any changes since 2007. The forward focus is relevant in assessing in an *ex-ante* context the challenges facing Moldova in the medium-term – politically, economically and more widely in the context of Governance. The role and comparative advantages of UNDP and UNFPA interventions can then be assessed and projected.

# 2.1Political Context

1. The political context for development is fundamental in setting out the strategic choices for societal development and the economic model for a nation. Domestic policy choices based on these strategic choices then determine the limits of domestic actions through national channels and domestic expenditure. The remaining needs/gaps then provide the basis for the intervention of external aid both in scope and scale but without risking additionality i.e. the funding should be additional and not replace national expenditure.
2. From a developmental and evaluation perspective three distinct periods can be delineated:

1.- the period until 2009

2.- 2009-10

3. - 2011 onward

1. The Moldovan political scene since the 2001 parliamentary elections has been relatively stable but marked by the dominance of the Party of Communists (PC), who was able to defeat the centrist and right-wing groups that had governed before then. The PC used its large mandate to elect its leader, Vladimir Voronin, to the presidency in a parliamentary vote in April 2001. In March 2005 the PC won another parliamentary majority, and a month later re-elected V. Voronin to a second presidential term, with the support of a part of parliamentary opposition, who backed Voronon’s re-election in return for PC promises for swifter reforms (a “national consensus” centred on European integration and democratic reform, fed by the signing of the EU-Moldova Action Plan in February 2005. The Plan served as a basis for Moldova to participate in the EU European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)). President Voronin was able to institute considerable control over the functioning of the Government shortly after his election in 2001 and maintained this control until the end of his term in office.
2. The period until April 2009 was to a large degree homogenous in terms of the political context of stabilisation and reform. The PC remained committed to a broadly socialist economic model despite liberalisation in prices, external trade and exchange rates. The country differed from other CIS economies with similarly autarkic or *de facto* prolongation of former Soviet elites previously in power. The key difference was the starting point economically – some states had larger industrial bases (Belarus, Ukraine) or access to significant natural resource endowments (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan). Moldova also differed from the EU convergence policy framework that provided an anchor for Governance and other sectoral reforms undertaken by the 3 Baltic (and former Soviet) Republics and by other former Comecon-bloc countries in central Europe.
3. The economic situation – described in Section 2.2 – that was a key in the collapse of the Soviet Union was equally manifest in the eventual impact on the rise in political instability in 2008-09 in Moldova. A series of exogenous shocks shook the economy and depleted fiscal resources for a country officially the poorest in Europe. Without access to significant external financing from private or official channels the impact on the real economy has been faster and more pronounced.
4. In his inaugural speech in April 2005 President Voronin announced the public administration reform as one of the top priorities for Moldova. Following this call for action, the Government of Moldova has started the preparation of a central public administration reform (CPAR) strategy, and has set up an institutional system for management of the reform (it included the Government PAR Council chaired by the Prime Minister and the PAR Unit of the Government Office reporting to the Prime Minister). Early in the preparation process the Government started to discuss with the donors the support for the CPAR implementation. The Government has approved the CPAR Strategy and Action Plan on December 28, 2005, and has started its implementation in January 2006. In late 2007, after the conduct of functional analysis and the presentation of recommendations for further reform, it became clear that the President and the Government are not ready for pursuing significant changes and the reform was put on hold.
5. 2009 was a year of significant political change and will spillover into 2010 in terms of political risk. The parliament elected in April 2009 did not succeed in electing a President. Repeated elections in July 2009 brought about the formation of a coalition of four non-communist parties - the Alliance for European Integration, who did not have enough votes to elect the next president on their own, but formed a government. The current parliament is in discussion of a possible constitutional referendum for the president’s election through direct vote. In the meantime the president’s position is held by the chairman of parliament, whilst a new parliamentary election is imminent. Whatever the outcome of the current situation, a fundamental shift in power is now likely. The PC has lost the near monopoly on political power that it has held since 2001, through its control of the parliament, the government and the presidency, and it is unlikely to regain this position even if there is another election.
6. The political situation is expected to become clear later in 2010. A reversal to a PC government seems unlikely, although cannot be discounted. The new government has identified European integration as its main goal, and announced that talks on a new agreement with the EU will be launched in early January 2010. It also prioritised relations with the US and Russia, and the restoration and strengthening of relations with Romania Some risks in the current political scene include the ability of the Alliance to manage the coalition it has formed and manage the complex economic situation. In turn this means that there are significant unknowns in terms of a clear medium-term basis for government policy and in turn the demand for external aid.

# 2.2 Economic Context

1. The Moldovan economy underwent a deep contraction of over 45% following the collapse of the Soviet Union but the contraction bottomed-out in 2000. More recently, the economy recorded an average growth in real terms of 5.5% over 2000-07. The resumption of growth was from a low base and fuelled by consumption and the boon of remittances from Moldovan workers abroad. Both the IMF and World Bank were relatively positive as late as 2008 about medium-term prospects. However, the Moldovan economy was hit by a combination of the fallout from the global economic and financial crisis that began in late 2007 and the effects of which were still being felt in late 2009. Whilst immune from the first-round effects of the credit crisis due to both a lack of foreign funding lines for banks and absence of investment by Moldovan banks in high-risk financial instruments in the US in particular, Moldova was hit by the economic impact of a resultant fall in the global – and in particular partner – trading economies. This led to a significant fall in exports as well as remittances whilst FDI has also fallen. Real GDP is expected to have fallen 9% in 2009 and forecast to be flat at a projected growth of 0-1% in 2010, although it is entirely possible that for a further reduction in economic activity during the year. The fall in GDP in 2009 is due in large part due to the exogenous nature of the economic shocks – both the impact of the global slowdown and the effects of floods and drought that have decimated agriculture in recent years, a key sector of the economy. However, the economic downturn also exposed the lack of a credible economic policy.
2. In the face of the economic collapse the de-facto single party government was unable even if willing to react to the speed and scale of the economic slowdown. The economic model in Moldova where a *de facto* single-party government ensured political stability but limited structural reforms had neither the policy framework nor the political will to take drastic actions. The economic slowdown had a marked effect on the public finances with revenue sharply down.
3. Whilst the standard response in developed economies has been for governments to seek Keynesian-style expansion of government-financed demand coupled with loose monetary policy, this option was not present for a number of emerging economies. On the other hand, the IFIs – in particular the IMF – have been extremely flexible to emerging economies in providing Balance of Payments and even budget support, complemented by other donors.
4. The GoM has agreed in principle a Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF for USD588m in October that is expected to be signed-off by February 2010. The IMF-programme will trigger the possible release of other Bank monies and EC financial support but will likely require significant fiscal retrenchment in 2010-11. Whether the government has the political will or whether it is able to get societal consensus for the painful measures including sufficient cuts in expenditure and government sector employment will be a significant risk to compliance, unless of course the conditions are softened or back-loaded.

**Figure 1: Possible transition trajectories**

P **Economic risks:**

1. Political risk remains high
2. Political stability and external support
3. Medium-term: structural adjustment

E Political and Economic risks

 a

R Impact on stabilisation and reform?

 b

 2009

2011-13

2 2010

1. This risk is essentially an “unknown” – the success and longevity of the current coalition government will reduce the risk of non-compliance whilst the return of the CP will put at risk commitments made by the former government. The latter scenario would lead to a double-dip depression with the possible on-set – without recourse to external finance which could potentially be provided by the Russian Federation – of a deeper economic crisis involving a possible bank run and/or currency crisis.
2. Figure 1 shows the possible scenarios:
	1. Political stability and a sharp fall in political risk (outturn b) followed by a graduating decline (outturn c) from 2011-13 if there is sufficient political will to sustain structural adjustment. The economy would stabilise and the potential for reform would be feasible.
	2. A worst-case scenario of a further rise in political risk (outturn a) and a consequent result in economic destabilisation.
3. Figure 1 pictorially outlines the short and medium-term possible possibilities and the outcome of which will determine the future needs for UNDP and UNFPA intervention.
4. Looking back, two overarching questions of interest from economics to this OE are:
	1. What was the economic landscape to the UNDP and UNFC intervention in 2005-06 that defined the context of its programming from 2007?
	2. What are the implications of the economic crisis facing Moldova today going forward for the remaining part of the programmes, and further out?

A further strategic question that emerges from the brief review in the context of UNDP competence and the UNFCA’s interventions is:

* 1. Whether the current developmental as well as key economic and structural issues could have been, currently are or could in future be better targeted for high-level UNDP focus.

## Ex-post Review

1. In terms of the ex-post focus on the defining economic context during programming, there was little sign of impending imbalances. Remarkably, as late as December 2008 the IFIs were forecasting on-going gradual growth for 2008-09. Table 2 below shows the still-current macro-table developed jointly by the IMF-World Bank and displayed in the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for Moldova.

Table : Forecasts in December 2008

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*Source: WB Country Partnership Strategy for Moldova, 2008*

1. Table 2 highlights that even the IMF and World Bank were caught unawares by the economic tail winds following the already-in-progress global contraction.
2. Secondly, Table 2 shows the context of a benign environment of stable macroeconomics in the mid-decade – growth, moderate inflation and sound internal and external balances. In such a context, the demand for external support tends to be modest as need was not seen as pressing or fully-owned by policymakers. This is particularly so for a significant uplift in governance or Institutional reform where change is difficult to implement unless there is a strong political or economic pressure to undertake significant change, often involving major economic and policy shifts – both of which were lacking in 2005-06.
3. It is a moot question whether the UNDP in 2005-06 could realistically have been a “donor outlier” by taking a totally different position on the projected economic landscape for 2008-09. As Table 2 shows, the baseline forecasts were for continuing economic, and by corollary, political stability.
4. On the other hand, the actual outturn in 2009-10 and the range of future possibilities shows that there was an absence of critical policy competition to the IFI-positions. Figure 2 shows the classic Bell curve or Normal distribution that is considered a standard for socio-economic biological outcomes. The centre part the area in Figure 2 defines the average or consensus – akin to the forecasts for 2008-09 given in Table 2.

 **Figure 2: Donor Funding and UNDP Comparative Strengths**

T Tail 2: Downstream Governance

T Tail 1: Upstream policy

1. Figure 2 shows heuristically that given the highest marginal effect and what differentiates the UNDP and the UNFPA is its strong suit of often disparate projects within differing clusters on the one hand and the potential – though rarely realized – to maximise the policy-level issues that emanate from on-the-ground knowledge coupled with broader UNDP knowledge in areas such as Governance or Regional Development.
2. The tool to execute the upstream policy dimension is the existing network and open-door policy to senior policy-makers that the UNDP in particular enjoys. The advocacy element is generally poor and whilst its existence may not have given an alternative synopsis, the lack of such a function limits both the scale-up of successful initiatives under tail 2 and limits the possible macro assessments, including repercussions for poverty, development and economic growth.

## Short- and Medium-term Implications of the Current Economic Situation

1. The macroeconomic situation at the start of 2010 remains fragile. The new government is unlikely to take political risks by large scale fiscal retrenchment whilst it can be expected that the donor community will not impose hard budget constraints until the political situation is clarified.
2. This will mean hard choices for the government that takes reins in late 2010. Narrow macroeconomic policy and fiscal and/or monetary adjustment will need to be placed and explained in a wider developmental and multi-annual framework that is owned by Moldovan policy-makers.
3. Further macroeconomic imbalance cannot be ruled out for 2010 even with IFI largesse. The review of macroeconomic data and forecasts does not readily explain the likely source of growth. Private consumption remains moribund and the return of migrant workers in turn means that remittances in the short-term will also be restrained. Public investment has been falling and even a possible rise in net exports in 2011 will not be sufficient to avoid an overall fall in GDP. Bereft of access to external finance, the government has been borrowing on punitive terms from the banking sector – an unsustainable position and which is self-defeating since banks have even lower incentive to lend to the riskier wider economy. This means that realistically 2011-12 is likely to be the key period for a sustained effort at growth-enhancing policy adjustment.
4. From the UNDP and UNFPA perspectives this does not materially change matters. Section 3.3 under Impact and Sustainability assesses this point further. The key strategic point will be for the UN agencies to assess what is the value-added vis-a-vis the IFIs and the EC in the emerging competition for attention for policy-advice.
5. This in turn brings to the fore the strategic question proposed in para 34 iii. Put bluntly, the IFIs are lenders although committed to macroeconomic and structural reform. Yet, despite comparative strengths in macroeconomic coverage, there remains a key role for the UNDP to provide high-level policy advice that completes and if necessary competes with other donors. The UNDP has a mandate to do this and the trust and brand in Moldova which give it significant leverage. There are also possible synergies with existing clusters including the Institutional Development one that can provide a strong flow of two-way knowledge-transfer to underwrite this emerging possibility.

# 2.2 Governance

Figure 3: Moldova Percentile Rank for Governance

*Source: Authors’ derivations based on Kaufmann et al Governance Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators*

1. Figure 3 displays a spider-gram of 6 indicators of governance, charting the combination or matrix of data across the 6 yardsticks in a particular year. The Kaufmann Governance data is in fact quoted as a measure in the UNDAF Output 1 also so is a pertinent measure of the governance background generally and more specifically for any given focal aspect that was the basis for intervention by the UNDP.
2. For comparison, three years are selected – 1996 (the earliest available), 2006 and 2008 (the latest annual data available). Figure 3 shows that Moldova’s percentile ranks for the three selected years where this defines the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below Moldova for a given year. Higher values imply better governance ratings. The data shows that in fact there was Governance regression in general since 1996 relative to other 211 countries although there has been a modest improvement from 2006 to 2008.
3. Figures 3 and 4 map out two of the six indicators across 12 years from 1996 to 2008. Two indicators, aside from political stability, are selected as they show the greatest nominal adjustment over 2006-08, a period of direct relevance to this OE. Both Rule of Law and particularly Government effectiveness are of particular interest as together they touch on the role and success of reforms in Public Administration Reform and Institutional reform more generally.

**Figure 4: Rule of Law (1996-2008)**



*Source: Kaufmann et al Governance Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators*

Figure 5 Government Effectiveness (1996-2008)



*Source: Kaufmann et al Governance Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators*

1. The one other variable that showed improvement over the period is political stability. However, other country-risk measures confirm that political risk and in turn political instability has risen since 2008. Moreover, whilst political stability is often seen as a necessary condition for reform generally, it is not clear if a decrease in political stability has a measured negative effect on change in the other variables. In any case, political stability is an exogeneity and cannot be controlled or affected by outside intervention.
2. Did UNDP intervention have any impact on Governance? In one sense the ex-post impact and outcome indicators can only become visible 2-3 years after the end of the intervention. Nonetheless, what the above data shows is the potential logic of intervention from the context of governance in 2007 during programming and the outturn as of 2008.
3. In fact this broader review of governance highlights the difficulty of targeting a tangible programme or projects in 2006-07. Of the six variables:
* Political stability was part of the broader set of conditions and not a potential target of activity per se.
* Voice and accountability covers a wide gamut from the openness, transparency and accountability of public finances through to a more open press and freedom of expression. Public Finance Management (PFM) was an area that received substantial donor assistance from DFID and the World Bank and remains a key issue as part of the fiscal challenges facing Moldova. Whilst core PFM or macroeconomic advice was being provided the UNDP value-added in terms of advocacy and the links to a developmental challenge could have been – and remains – untapped and a potential niche.
* Control of Corruption is an observation but intervention is typically through areas such as reforms to the Budget process, public procurement, through improved financial regulation and audit capacity as well as effective punitive capacity – all of which require a) political commitment to in effect reduce the potential for vested interests and b) a functioning bureaucracy that is able to provide internal governance standards together with a strong legal framework and rule of law – the next benchmark. Again, donors have tried to focus on issues such as public procurement but with limited success.
* Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality are important for citizens and as incentive for investment – domestic and foreign. The UNDP’s comparative strength in the country context in 2005-06 could have been to cherry-pick an agency to deal with as a beneficiary. In a non-EU context, the first port-of-call should be the key power bases: Executive, Judiciary and Legislature.[[2]](#footnote-2)
* Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. This was an area that the UNDP selected for intervention and in hindsight was the correct area given the limited scope of intervention under Governance.

# 3. Evaluation Results

1. The evaluation results are presented in this section along each of the DAC Evaluation criterion: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

## 3.1 Relevance

1. There is a wide body of evidence from evaluations confirms the existence of a strong positive correlation between the quality of design and successful implementation, as well between the quality of design and the actual impact of the intervention of a project or programme.
2. Typically there are two aspects of Relevance that are pertinent for the OE. The first relates to a review of the design phase during the programming phase to assess the intervention logic and the elaboration of the projects to meet the identified demand and need for external aid. A related and often as important is the “real time” relevance to ensure that often-delayed implementation schedules remain relevant to the needs and priorities of the target beneficiary, set against the context of the available contracting and disbursement schedules.
3. As regards the first dimension, in general there is good evidence for both the UNDP and UNFPA that the process of programming was undertaken. Section 1 outlined the political and economic context of Moldovan reform from 2005-06 and the limited “intervention space” that existed for institutional reforms. The UNDP’s expertise in Governance was also reviewed in Section 2.3 in the Moldovan context and which again confirmed that the choices made for the cluster were the correct choices.
4. The key to relevance i in programming is feasibility and intervention that has a clear and measurable need, backed by a clear Identification and Formulation phases. In this sense, a dichotomy appears that differentiates the UNDP from bilateral donors and from service providers in the private sector that needs to be noted and in part filtered for evaluation:
	1. The UNDP is often asked to implement projects by other donors either due to lack of capacity to implement directly by the donor, due to contracting and disbursement deadlines from donor HQs that incentives bilateral donors to use the UN agencies or due to the UNDP’s comparative strength as an agency where the beneficiary country is also a member state and is seen as a trusted partner without a narrow profit-motive.
	2. This often means that UNDP country portfolios often have non-standard projects that do not necessarily fit the UNDP mandate or have the same robustness of needs analysis.
5. Table 3 below lists the Institutional Development projects and ranks them according to the criteria of own-design or externally designed or commissioned. One of the projects (#7) hasn’t really taken off but was relevant at the design stage. Of the remaining 7, 4 were due to a combination of external demand from donors for UN involvement and/or beneficiary demand.
6. Projects 1 (BUMAD) and 3 (EUBAM) are not core UNDP focus areas and were specifically undertaken due to external demand. Whilst they were relevant from a wider perspective, the intervention logic was not so well prescribed by the UNDP although it can be argued that as a *de facto* implementing body, there was no reason to do so.

Table : Programmes and Relevance

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Programme/project** | **Brief Description** | **Project: Own or Externally proposed** | **Relevant to core UNDP competences at time of design** |
| 1. **Programme for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova** **(BUMAD Programme)**
 | The Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Anti-Drugs (BUMAD) programme is a regional initiative funded by the European Union and UNDP since 2003 to tackle drug trafficking from and through the 3 countries to EU Member States. In Moldova, the programme specifically supports institutional reforms and strengthening of the judicial system in combating drug trafficking and prevention of drug abuse. | Externally, EC | Low - but good execution. |
| 1. **Building e-Governance in Moldova**
 | The project supports national institutions in applying Information and Communication Technologies to public administration systems and processes by advancing new solutions aimed at better public service delivery and more transparent decision-making. The areas of intervention cover policy-making for the development of the information society, development of on-line public services, training public servants in using ICTs and promoting e-democracy practices. | Unclear | Medium - but identification not sound – immature for programming |
| 1. **EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)**
 | The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission provides on-the-job training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian border officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance. | Externally, EC | Low - good execution |
| 1. **Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration**
 | The project aims at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) in the process of achieving its European Integration goals and commitments. | UNDP, demand from beneficiary | High  |
| 1. **Electoral Support to Moldova Project**
 | The project will support democratic development in Moldova through strengthening of the electoral processes over the coming electoral cycles up to 2013 with immediate emphasis on the 2009 parliamentary elections. It provides support to the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova in the key areas of improved voter register; use of IT in election administration; enfranchisement of diaspora; capacity building of electoral staff; enhanced transparency of the electoral process through use of media, voter education and observation; legislative reform; and direct support for procurement of specific election materials. The project will employ a team of international election experts in key areas to act as advisers to the Central Electoral Commission. | UNDP | High  |
| 1. **Support to Public Administration Reform**
 | This project was aimed to support Government of the Republic of Moldova in planning and implementation of Public Administration Reform in the Republic of Moldova. It included two components: (i) capacity building for Public Administration Reform; and (ii) implementation of the second stage of functional analysis to inform decision making in the area. | Formal request from the government, UNDP and bilateral donors | High |
| 1. **Support to Strategic Policy Formulation, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Republic of Moldova**
 | The present joint programme was designed to assist the Government of the Republic of Moldova in strategic long-term planning for achieving nationalized MDGs, as well as in the effective monitoring and evaluation of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy targets, Millennium Development Goals and the objectives of the European Union – Republic of Moldova Action Plan. Partially delivered | UNDP | High |
| 1. **Strengthening the National Statistical System**
 | Assisting the Ministry to provide high quality data related to population, migration and sectoral issues. | UNDP, UNFPA  | High – non-standard area of intervention but intervention logic was high and justified |

1. For other projects in the cluster, there is sufficient evidence of critical analysis undertaken at the design stage.
2. Project 8 is particularly interesting as support for a statistical agency is not normally the remit of UN agencies to any great extent. In table 3 the initial relevance is assessed as High because the UNDP and UNFPA rightly assessed a gap and need for quality data on issues to do with population which has now expanded to data at a decentralised level across regions in Moldova.

## Current and Future Relevance

1. One test of relevance often overlooked is the contemporaneous nature of the evaluation criterion. Put another way, the question is whether the projects in the Institutional Development cluster remain relevant today? Part of the answer depends on the efficiency of management and the monitoring function to allow for real-time changes to be integrated as required but without affected the broader target outcomes.
2. There is no evidence that outcomes and outputs have been formally amended.
3. Excluding the termination of projects 1 and 3, all other projects remain broadly relevant for the remainder of the current programming period. In particular,
	1. Project 4 remains valid and although the emerging focus on EU issues should be broadened to a developmental one whilst careful attention is required to ensure that capacity substitution is re-assessed against the context of greater demand from a ministry in the vanguard of an accelerated commitment to sign an Association Agreement with the EU
	2. Project 5 with the CEC is extremely relevant and timely. It addresses core governance issues of fairness and democratic accountability
	3. Project 6 on PAR reforms remains valid but requires a careful re-assessment going forward. Put simply, are the pre-conditions for a true PAR process really in place? If not then a further and deeper commitment to PAR assistance remains immature.
	4. Project 7 remains valid but requires a genuine commitment which is unlikely to be in place until the political situation is first settled. Hence the project is not fully feasible – something that reflects the current situation with limited implementation.
	5. Project 8 has been a success to date and the UNFPA in particular is aware of the need to now shift away from the data generation to assessing the policy side usage of this data.

# 3.2 Robustness of Outcomes and Outputs and the links between them

1. At first sight the UNDP programmes in Moldova are very coherent as regards structure of logframes and the use of benchmarks. Upon detailed examination the following conclusions emerge:
2. A sometimes weak linkage between the outcomes and outputs within a project, and
3. the generally weak causality between the relevant CPD outcome and corresponding UNDAF outcome
4. Table 4 below outlines the key outputs and outcomes. The table neatly codifies the relevant projects in the Institutional Development cluster against the target outputs and UNDP outcomes and also between the CPD outcomes and the higher-level UNDAF outcome.
5. In terms of the coherence within the UNDP CPD matrix given in Table 4, both outcome 1.4 and the related outputs are non-achievable as set out. Whilst the outcome is by definition a wider objective which the UNDP-provisioned outputs should help Moldova to meet, in practice it is clear that a modernised public administration is not in place and there is little or no evidence that there has been any notable positive change in terms of its efficiency in delivering public goods – if anything there has been regression.
6. To be fair the economic and political problems over the last year explain much of the policy drift – that is in effect an exogenous factor beyond the control of programming. On the other hand it is arguable whether, even without this exogenous shock, the definition of the outputs was sufficiently realistic.
7. Are the indicators for the CPD outputs sufficient to meet the SMART criteria – ie specific, measureable, achievable, relevant and time-bound? And is there clarity in terms of source and means of verification? In short, the answers are negative on both counts.
8. Indicator 1 for CPD Outcome: although this seemed feasible, there is no evidence that the baseline was itself of substance in actually providing any genuine anchor or incentive for genuine PAR given the political vision of the then Communist government against the context of a benign economic situation.
9. Indicator 2 is spurious in its connection to the target output
10. Indicator 3 derives from the e-Governance project but was overly ambitious without clear pre-conditions and ownership by the government.
11. Put together the three indicators do not really measure the output, nor is it in fact feasible, meaning it is no longer relevant.
12. The same logic is applicable to the indicator used for outcome 1.4 although the benchmarking is more clear here.
13. The review of the UNDAF benchmarking and that of the UNDP outcomes is outside the scope of this OE. This exercise should however be advanced in order to make the UNDAF targets time-consistent with the reality of underlying UN programmes. This in turn pre-supposes that the UNDP CPDs are also first re-assessed and re-calibrated.
14. The benchmarking is far clearer for the partner-financed projects BUMAD and EUBAM, even though these are not core area of UNDP expertise, possibly underscoring the more detailed Identification and Formulation phases undertaken by the EC.
15. The implications of this brief review are that it underscores the need for a thorough needs assessment during programming and a problem-tree analysis that in turn clearly elaborates causality and the means of benchmarking. Secondly, it is the role of interim evaluations such as this OE to highlight to management the need to fine-tune and make more relevant the programming logic.
16. Thirdly, and narrowly to the assessment of Efficiency and Effectiveness, the above findings mean that a strict application and review of the benchmarking is not appropriate.

Table : UNDP Outcomes and Outputs for Cluster

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| UNDAF  | CPD | CPD Outputs | Projects |
| **Outcome 1**By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights**Indicators:** Kauffman:Voice and accountability (VA)Government effectiveness (GE)Rule of law (RL)Political stability and absence of violence (PV)Corruption perception index (CPI) | **Outcome 1.4.**Public Administration Reform promoted in selected institutions**Indicator**:Extent of implementation of PAR in national institutions, including recommendations of functional reviews, creation of policy units and number of staff trained on strategic planning, budgeting, human resource management etc.Baseline:Functional review of central public institutions undertaken. Implementation has not started.Target:Functional review recommendations implemented, policy analysis units created and 500 ministerial staff trained | A modernized public administration system in place, more efficient and better able to develop, implement and monitor long-term policies and programmes, linked to national budgeting processes.**Indicator 1**:Number of policy making units modernized as a result of PAR implementationBaseline: 6 policy making units under creation in 6 pilot ministries (2006)Target: At least 8 policy units modernized by the end of period**Indicator 2**: Each long-term programme to include M&E componentBaseline: TBD in 2006Target: All long-term programmes have M&E component.**Indicator 3**: number of electronic public services operating on-lineBaseline: 1 service is operating on-lineTarget: 5 services operating on-line | e-Governance Electoral Support to MoldovaSupport to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EU integrationSupport to the Central Public Administration Reform |
| Enhanced capacity to combat drug trafficking and prevent/reduce drug abuse**Indicators 1**:Volume of Illegal Drug Trafficking Baseline: In 2005 the Ministry of Interior confiscated and destroyed 18 418 kg of illegally cultivated opium poppy and 16 680 kg of cannabis.Target: Illegal drug trafficking and production is annually reduced**Indicator** **2**: Number of drug seizuresBaseline: In 2005 the Ministry of Interior reported 2092 drug-related crimes, of which 2074 cases have been prosecuted and 1935 of them submitted to the courts. 282 crimes were related to drugs traffic and 376 to drug productionTarget: Number of drug-related crimes reduced**Indicator 3**: Sustainability of the Report on Drugs (prevention and policy indicator)Baseline: Report on Drugs is produced with support of projectTarget: National institutions produce the report on drugs annually without donor support | Programme for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight Against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine And Moldova (BUMAD) |
| Enhanced institutional capacities are in place for improved border and customs control and surveillance.**Indicator 1**:Use of risk analysis within Border Guards and Customs ServicesBaseline: Risk management systems are not in place. Border and customs control and surveillance is carried without risk analysis and information exchange between institutionsTarget: Risk analysis capacity established (BG and CS risk analysis units created and staff trained)**Indicator** **2**: % of military personnel in Border Guards ServiceBaseline: 50%Target: Completely demilitarized Border Guards Service (0%)**Indicator 3**: Training capacity of the Border GuardsBaseline: Training is not institutionalized in the Border Guards Service. Training is conducted in the Military Institute and outside the countryTarget: New Training school in place for the Border Guards | EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) Improving Management on the Moldovan-Ukrainian State Border (BOMMOLUK)Improving Border Guards Human Resource Management (pipeline) |

Similar assessment applies for the UNFPA benchmarking, given in

1. Table 5 below. The UNFPA’s role and focus was relevant in Moldova given the specificities relating to large population changes and the consequent need to focus initially on getting a handle on the right data – thus the assistance to the NBS. The mapping of the 3 indicators to Output 4.1 is reasonable although the SMART basis of the benchmarking requires improvement. On the other hand the link between output 4.1 and outcome 4.1 is clearer – improved data collection and capacity will help to meet the broader objective set out in outcome 4.1 although the jump is large.
2. Interviews with the UNFPA representative have confirmed that the real target now is to use the statistical data derived and to start using it for policy purposes. What these policies will be cannot be forecast so the idea of a pro-poor focus may no longer be the correct target. Instead the target should be related to more efficient policy-decisions based on demographic tendencies and which allows for a wider scope as well as allow for future shift to a possible decentralised approach – using potential synergies through the UNDP’s existing programme on regional development.

Table : UNFPA Outcomes and Outputs

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| UNDAF  | CPD | CPD Outputs |
| **Outcome 1**By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights**Indicators:** Kauffman:Voice and accountability (VA)Government effectiveness (GE)Rule of law (RL)Political stability and absence of violence (PV)Corruption perception index (CPI) | **Outcome 4**Pro-poor policies addressing development and population are formulated, implemented and monitored in a transparent and participatory manner**Baseline:** TBD**Indicator**:No. and type of policies developed/ implemented/ monitored **Target:**Increased number of the pro-poor policies developed/revised | **Output 4.1**Institutional capacity developed to establish a system to collect and analyse disaggregated demographic and population data, and to formulate national policies and monitor their implementation and impact**Indicator 1**:National Population Commission (NPC) established **Baseline:** No**Target:** NPC established and is operationalRelevant State Institutions, academics and civil society represented**Indicator 2**: Number and quality of population policies initiated**Baseline:** No holistic population policies. Pro-natalist stipulations, without proper costing and resources attached to them**Target:** * + - * Assessment of existent normative framework
* Amendments to existent normative framework
* Overarching P&D concept
* P&D Strategy in place

**Indicator 3**: Information sharing and data flows system between relevant institutions operational**Baseline:** No**Target:** * Protocols for data flows developed
* ICT network created among relevant institutions
* Migration soft integrated
 |

## 3.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness

1. Efficiency is a measure of outputs derived on the basis of inputs. In the context of logframes this has dual application: for the link between activities to achieve a given outcome or, alternatively to estimate the extent of the UNDP’s contribution to the outcome versus that of other partners. In the case of Effectiveness, the key test is whether the outcome has been achieved or whether the UNDP made significant contributions in terms of strategic outputs.
2. Budget data was requested and provided by the UNDP for the projects in the Institutional Development cluster. The disaggregated data provided was not sufficiently lucid to review the financial aspects in detail without aggregation and without significant investment in time. Where available – e.g. for the PAR project, the financial data showed a very high cost base due to the extensive use of a British firm and extensive use of foreign experts for an output that was good in terms of quality and rigour of work but did little to meet Outcome 1.4.
3. On the other hand it is feasible on the basis of a range of project documentation and report to assess the deliverables against the target outputs and outcomes.
4. In terms of Tables 3 and 4 and on the basis of interviews held in Chisinau with stakeholders, the UNDP’s contribution to meeting Outcome 1.4 has been on par with other partners, not least the World Bank’s Trust Fund initiative. However, this OE is somewhat sanguine about the overall achievement in PAR by the entire donor community to date or indeed what could have been achieved. To the extent that donors reacted to demand from the president for assistance in this area the response was correct if over-committed given the limited windows for opportunity until then. One can however question whether supply of assistance was proportionate to the demand and there is a general sense that despite what the Bank in particular stated, that there has been excess supply of TA.
5. Figures 3-5 showed that assessment of government capacity has been volatile if rising in 2007-08 although there is no direct correlation to the limited intervention from donors including the UNDP that commenced in 2007.
6. Narrow project-based efficiency cannot be assessed in detail nor is it required for an OE, although with the exception of the (relatively) high-cost use of a British firm for the PAR project that produced functional reviews but which has not led to any actual change, there is no counter-evidence to suggest inefficiency. Moreover, the projects in the cluster have been well-managed and are not overly labour-intensive.

## 3.3 Impact and Sustainability

1. Outcomes are developmental changes between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact, and are achieved in partnership with others. Partners are agents or actors with whom UNDP has, or intends to have, a substantive relationship in the pursuit of common outcomes. Partners may include stakeholders, if they are involved in working towards the outcome; beneficiaries of outcome actions; and donors involved in some way with UNDP on the outcome.
2. Impact is often regarded as the lasting effect after the termination of aid and although ideally assessed in an ex-post context after two or more years. Sustainability refers to the lasting legacy following the intervention.
3. Both impact and sustainability cannot realistically be assessed whilst the programmes are in mid-cycle. However, it is possible to project outturns for impact and sustainability and therefore related measures to raise potential impact and sustainability.
4. In general, impact is higher the better is programming and the more cohesive is the logframe that underpins the intervention logic. In this sense, the internal consistency of the benchmarking needs to be improved since variance between current need time-lagged programmed actions will by nature lead to rising inefficiencies and ineffectiveness - and in turn dilution of impact. This also reinforces the need to improve the architecture of linking outcomes and outputs.
5. Section 2.2 reviewed the six dimensions for Governance that in essence is the real overall context for the Institutional Development cluster. The analysis outlined that the approach in 2007 was broadly correct in identifying areas of possible UNDP intervention. Other projects such as BUMAD and EUBAM were in essence special-case projects where the agency was a service provider for the EC.
6. The key question for both Impact and Sustainability is whether there needs to be any significant change for intervention of on-going programmes. This in turn returns the analysis to the starting point in section 1 in terms of the political economy in Moldova in the coming 15 months and the degree of government ownership that is feasible given the political risks ahead and which could lead to changes in policy and the roadmap for future assistance will only be clear from 2011 as shown in Figure 2.
7. Table 6 outlines the key points for the UNDP and UNFPA interventions in terms of the overall impact and sustainability.

Table : Expected Impact and Sustainability

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Programme/project** | **Potential Impact and Sustainability** |
| **Programme for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova** **(BUMAD Programme)** | Although an exit phase is planned – in part with the creation of an EC Delegation in Chisinau that drastically reduces the EC’s need to use the UNDP – the immediate impact has been good in terms of increasing knowledge and in improving policing. Sustainability will depend on the retention of this knowledge and networks and on a committed effort to tackle drug trafficking. Although outside the scope of the UNDP cluster, the overall ambit of following up is within both the UN mandate and the existing links through the project with the police and also drug monitoring means that the UNDP has now a comparative strength and experience in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), a key part of the Association Agreement process and any pre-accession drive that may in future materialise.Impact would be greater the better the advocacy at a strategic level.  |
| **Building e-Governance in Moldova** | The potential impact of this initiative is poor given the lack of enabling conditions. Although a worthy aim, both impact and sustainability will require commitment in terms of large scale physical investment and IT skills that are simply not feasible given the budgetary constraints and without a clear overall political policy on the choice of economic model and role of public administration. |
| **EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)** | The project is not being extended by the EC. A budget support package is being developed for a possible followup on the Ukrainian side by the Kiev ECD. In principle, a similar approach could be feasible in Moldova and the UNDP’s knowledge and network could help the beneficiary to develop the framework to undertake this, including necessary PFM pre-conditions that the EC has for Budget Support. |
| **Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration**  | The project aims at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) in the process of achieving its European Integration goals and commitments. The project’s impact is likely to be high in the near term given a marked rise in the new government’s pro-EU vision although strategically the UNDP should aim to have a wider compass that incorporates development more generally and focus on capacity development rather than policy aspects related to advice on EU Integration per se. |
| **Electoral Support to Moldova Project** | The project will support democratic development in Moldova through strengthening of the electoral processes over the coming electoral cycles up to 2013 with immediate emphasis on the 2009 parliamentary elections. As such the project has enormous potential for immediate and medium-term impact and indeed sustainability. In many ways this is the most relevant project since its efficacy may shape the legitimacy and mandate of the government in 2010 and in turn the bedrock of future Moldovan transition and wider reforms in governance. |
| **Support to Public Administration Reform** | Direct impact is likely to be low although there is a possibility that the functional review work could be updated in future. PAR reform is an area that is subject to a degree of herd-instinct by donors and impact will be higher if there is a shift toward advocacy and policy advice rather than direct implementation – which is extremely costly and requires strong political will to implement. The UNDP should continue intervention but limited to strategic advice until 2011 (through flexible on-demand policy advice services) . |
| **Support to Strategic Policy Formulation, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Republic of Moldova** | A well meaning project that was not reviewed in detail. DFID has an on-going project in the same area. In practice, these type of projects have not generally taken off in emerging Europe given the demands for current-year financing. |

## 3.4 Broader Strategic Issues

1. This subsection synthesises the analysis and findings to flesh out key strategic issues for present and future UNDP and UNFPA interventions.
2. Donor co-ordination has been evident although in the context of Institutional Development there is clear concern about both supply of and absorption capacity for external aid. Whilst there is an argument that the Bank, DFID and UNDP interventions have been complementary, the risk of over-crowding is real. The risk of duplication exists despite efforts to create clear boundaries. Of bigger concern is the merit of continuing intervention while the political situation remains unclear and therefore the blueprint for the economic model and role of government.
3. There is a perception amongst donors that the Bank has comparative advantage terms of competence and resources – backed by access to large scale loans to which the TA is often tied.
4. In this context, the UNDP in Moldova should focus on its core strengths and build on its knowledge. The broader UNDAF outcome that focuses on Governance is the core that should be the framework to create a “wrapper” for the current Institutional Development portfolio. Focus on the UNDP Governance pillars is wider than the quasi-economic variant of the Bank and includes Justice and Human Rights and Democracy and should be the baseline both to be true to the UNDP aims and to create clear differentiation with the Bank. This approach would allow the UNDP to also negate the perception identified in the last paragraph.
5. On the other hand one clear advantage of the UNDP remains its flexibility to react to changing circumstance and as a partner for other donors. The flexibility is a positive aspect that should be retained but serious consideration should be given to accepting partner-led projects that are outside the core Governance outcome and outputs. To some extent this issue should be self-regulating as the EC in particular will reduce its reliance on the UN agencies for implementation.
6. Irrespective of the political outturn in 2010-11, the role and scale of EU financing is likely to rise both in nominal amount and as a share of the total external aid envelope. This opens up a number of challenges and opportunities for other donors. If the EU-drive through the Association Agreement process sustains and accelerates toward some notional potential candidate status as in the Western Balkans for countries such as Albania and Serbia, then the entire focus of aid will begin to be shaped around this policy anchor. Typically other EU donors will then converge their country strategies around the EC’s interventions also.
7. The UNDP is well-positioned to gain from the pro-EU bias but equally if there is a change in political sentiment in the event of an electoral reversal to the left. Moreover, a key difference for the GoM is that the UNDP does not have an interest either as a lender (IMF, World Bank) or as the EC for a pro-EU bias. There is however a danger – expressed by some interviewees – of the UNDP being seen as an advisor or lead on EU Integration without any clear competence or experience.
8. This OE for the cluster identifies some clear directions to ensure that the UNDP remains true to its core aim in development and flexible enough to meet the current pro-EU bias or a possible reversal thereof. Policy neutrality is key. Hence Governance as a core aim allows for provision of advice on matters related to the Association Agreement although the core competence would reside with the EC in this case and with EU Member States. Of course, the UNDP could tap key sectoral knowhow through its consultancy services and directly from the UN services but this would be crowded-out in scale by the funding that will come into play from the EC.
9. Hence the value-added of UNDP intervention and support to the GoM is not the scale of financing but its quality and the ability to access key policymakers. Hence there is a current gap in the form of a “Blue-Ribbon” type initiative created by the UNDP in Kiev to create a formal advocacy tool that allows it to have a high-level policy advice role. Moreover, there is a real need and gap for policy competition. The UNDP has a mandate for development and poverty alleviation and this means that its overarch into macroeconomics and structural issues is desirable.
10. A high level node for policy advice would fit nicely the knowledge transfer to and from underlying projects within the cluster and indeed across other clusters such as the one on local development.
11. Moreover, the policy advice could be provided not only in the form of Blue-Ribbon report, but also in a more flexible manner, through individual advice on subjects of interest to the Government/where the Government requests this advice. The mechanism for the provision of such policy advice services could be similar to the one used in Georgia (On-demand Service Scheme). Such a mechanism can be put in place very quickly, even before the elections. After the elections support to GoM can be provided in the form of a Capacity Building Fund (departing from Georgia model), with several components besides the continuation of policy advice services.
12. A specific area for policy advice could be social protection. The good pool of data that has been accumulated recently in the statistics project can be used for assessing the impact of the raising tariffs on the vulnerable groups of the population/the poor. Such policy work can be very useful for the government in the short term and influence policy decisions.
13. The EC’s system of aid management is shifting from classical TA to Budget Support. The UNDP could carve an interesting niche position within the Governance wrapper by possibly assisting beneficiaries with whom it has worked within the cluster e.g. Border Management, Customs, Police/Judiciary – to put together a framework to launch this.

# Conclusions and Recommendations for the future

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Conclusions** | **Recommendations** |
| 1 | Political change amid economic destabilisation has changed the country context since the adoption of the programmes and instability will remain over 2010. | i) The UNDP’s reputation and brand in Moldova is high and this neutrality should be retained. A governance approach should be adopted and focus on poverty issues, population policy issues via UNFPA continued. ii) The Institutional Development heading should be amended to Governance that is consistent with the current project range and where Governance confirms to the wider UNDP 7 pillars to differentiate it from the World Bank’s more economic focus on Governance.ii) Priority should be accorded to the CEC in 2010 to help ensure a high level of governance, fairness and accountability for the election, and large-scale focus on capacity development and PAR generally minimised to policy advice until the political situation is clarified and a clearer shape of polity and role of government emerges. |
| 2 | UNDP and UNFPA interventions were relevant when designed. PAR and e-governance reforms are difficult without binding government commitment and this applies to all donor intervention in the area. | i) As 1ii) above. |
| 3 | The programmes are sound in terms of efficiency and effectiveness although there is a need to re-calibrate and update the outcomes and outputs and the links between them. | i) The outputs and indicators for the UNDP interventions in particular should be modified.ii) The UNDAF review is pending and should be advanced to ensure broader consistency with the UNDP and UNFPA programmes. |
| 4 | There is insufficient policy competition offered to IFIs due in part due to a lack of a policy advice node at a senior level and despite the advantage that the UNDP has of good access to senior policy-makers and on the ground in regions through its regional development and other projects. | i) A policy-advice node/s should be created with high-level expertise on a range of issues ii) Introduce an instrument for advocacy such as a “Blue-Ribbon” report as done by the UNDP in Ukraine or the On-demand Policy Advice facility as in Georgia. |

# Annexes:

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Annex 2: Persons Met

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## Annex 1:

**United Nations Development Programme in Moldova**

**United Nations Population Fund, Moldova Country Office**

**Terms of Reference**

**for**

**Institutional Development Outcome Evaluation**

***Subject:*** *UNDP and UNFPA will hire two consultants for this assignment: one international and one national*

***Duty Station:*** *Chisinau, Republic of Moldova*

***Timeframe:*** *30.10.2009-30.12.2009*

***Payable working days:*** *38*

***Contract type:*** *SSA*

***Organizational setting:*** *The consultants will work under the supervision of the Programme Analyst/Governance for achievement of the tasks.*

Content

[A. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION 2](#_Toc230860756)

[B. BRIEF NATIONAL and PROGRAMME CONTEXT 2](#_Toc230860757)

[C. SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION 4](#_Toc230860758)

[D. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 4](#_Toc230860759)

[E. METHODOLOGY 4](#_Toc230860760)

[F. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION 4](#_Toc230860761)

[G. EVALUATION TEAM 4](#_Toc230860762)

[H. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 4](#_Toc230860763)

[I. DOCUMENTS FOR STUDY BY THE EVALUATORS 4](#_Toc230860764)

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation exercise is commissioned according to the Evaluation Plan of the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (2007-2011) in the Republic of Moldova and UNFPA Moldova Country Programme Action Plan. The evaluation covers the Institutional Development Outcome for the UNDP and the Population and Development Component for the UNFPA. In case of UNDP the portfolio relates to CPD Outcome 1.4 “***Public Administration Reform promoted in selected institutions***”. In case of UNFPA the portfolio relates to the Component on Population and Development: CPD Outcome 4. ***Pro-poor policies addressing development and population issues are formulated, implemented and monitored in a transparent and participatory manner*** and CPD Outcome 5. ***Improved readiness to prevent and mitigate natural and man-made disasters.*** The evaluation will put a major focus on assessing the impact and overall contribution of this portfolio towards progress in achieving the outcome 1 of UNDAF: “***By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights***”, as well as draw recommendations for eventual adjustments and, to the extent possible, lessons learnt for the elaboration of the next Country Programme.

# BRIEF NATIONAL and PROGRAMME CONTEXT

Since gaining independence in 1991, the Republic of Moldova as a young state had to build new state institutions appropriate to manage the country and to build democratic, market-related and social-protection mechanisms. Despite the reforms carried out during the past decade aimed at establishing the rule of law, democratization and market oriented economy, the changes that took place in the public administration were ad-hoc and not following a strategic approach. The population is still dissatisfied with the quality of governance while trust in state institutions is low.

The lack of an effective public administration system significantly slowed down the transition process in Moldova. Laws were enacted and policies adopted, but enforcement lagged behind. Some of the causes of the existing problems are residing in the lack of strategic vision on functions and obligations of state bodies and their relationships with local governments; the limited capacity of the public service, and first of all the quantity and quality of personnel, their access to training in the country and abroad. While there are individuals and groups within departments and ministries with excellent skills, the civil service overall lacks grounding in evidence-based policy development, and sound methods for policy implementation and monitoring. This is explained in part by the absence of a transparent, fair and competitive process for the recruitment, retention and motivation of public servants on the basis of competencies and performance.

While the institutional infrastructure of the central and local public administration still lacks the capacity to fulfil its primary roles, the population showed worrisome trends in Moldova particularly through natural decrease, continuous aging, low fertility and birth rate, high morbidly among economically active population and high rates of emigration. The institutional underdevelopment of Moldova didn’t allow for comprehensive evidence-based and results-oriented policies to be elaborated and/or implemented in a coordinated manner in the country. The population forecasts are very pessimistic about the demographic future of the country and are demanding urgent actions to improve the response systems both in terms of research/data collection and policy formulation/ implementation.

***Central Public Administration Reform***

In 2005 upon a call from the then Moldovan president, the government started a programme for modernisation of the central public administration – Central Public Administration Reform (CPAR). This call for reform created a window of opportunity to start a long-awaited comprehensive public administration reform. In April 2005 an inter-governmental Commission was formed to lead this initiative, chaired by the Prime Minister. The subordinated structures of the Government Office have developed the CPAR strategy and Implementation plan[[3]](#footnote-3), comprising components such as: Institutional reorganization; Government Policy-Making capacity; Merit-based Professional Civil Service; Management, Information and Communication.

***Donor Assistance to CPAR***

The Prime Minister has addressed a request to UNDP (in early April 2005), the World Bank, Sida and other donors to provide assistance to the process of reform of central public authorities: immediate support was requested as well as longer-term assistance. As a result a group of donors (WB, Sida, UNDP, DFID) have agreed in December, 2005 to create a PAR working group, helping to coordinate support to CPAR, discuss issues and speak with one voice with other counterparts. The group considered the CPAR Strategy and Implementation plan, developed and approved by the Government as the basis for its work, and was open to new members. The World Bank has established a $6,000,000 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for assistance to support the PAR, financed by the Swedish, Dutch and British Governments; UNDP has also shaped its programme to assist in CPAR implementation outside the MDTF but in close donor coordination.

***CPAR Support by UNDP Moldova***

During the period of 2005 – 2007 UNDP has provided support to the Government in developing the CPAR Strategy through funding strategic functional and decision making process analyses[[4]](#footnote-4). As part of assistance towards its implementation UNDP, jointly with other donors, has funded the thorough vertical functional review of the public administration, which was completed in 2006. With a vision and recommendations in place and agreed through a participatory process, the next UNDP 2007-2011 Country Programme was designed to support as well national efforts in developing a functioning public sector able to produce good policies, serve effectively its clients in a transparent and accountable manner. Under its Good Governance component, a distinct intervention area was identified, Institutional Development[[5]](#footnote-5), comprising capacity development assistance aimed at improving the functioning of central PA institutions.

*UNDP Moldova support to CPAR was based on:*

* + - * + UNDP's substantive expertise and experience in public administration reform in the region as well as worldwide, demonstrated in 2005 when UNDP Moldova was able to provide quick and good quality advice as required by the Moldovan Prime Minister and other key officials, as well as to make available to the PAR Unit relevant “codified knowledge” (practice notes, guidelines, notes on reform in the region, examples of strategies) together with the advice of UNDP specialists.
				+ UNDP’s focus on helping Government building its capacity, so that it can implement the respective programmes by itself, at the same high standards. UNDP's role was envisaged from the outset as transitory, with a strong capacity-development component and a clearly spelled-out exit strategy.
				+ UNDP Moldova’s proven record of assisting the Government to mplement priority programmes with high-quality, quick and transparent assistance.

***The UNDP Institutional Development portfolio*** is addressing a range of institutional reform matters highlighted in the CCA. Results achieved with UNDP assistance will contribute to the achievement of CP outcome and namely will support the achievement of CP outcome 1.4, and refer to the development of institutions in the public sector, and more specifically, in the area of home affairs (border service and guards), external affairs, elections administration and others. These interventions are implemented with donor co-funding and implementing partners of this portfolio are: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Ministry of Informational Development, Central Electoral Commission, Border Guards Service, Customs Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Government Apparatus (Office of the Prime Minister).

***The UNFPA Population and Development portfolio*** contributes to achieving the UNDAF outcome on governance and participation. All interventions under this component shall aim at consolidating national capacity at the central and local levels. UNFPA will engage in policy dialogue and advocacy to establish clear institutional responsibilities in assessing population and development linkages, making demographic projections, and using population data in developing all national plans and policies. UNFPA will advocate for the establishment of a system of population data flows, and institutional capacity to collect and process demographic data. A Population Data Register shall be developed and constantly updated. Support shall be granted to the NSB for collection of disaggregated demographic data. Capacity building activities for staff of designated institutions shall be undertaken. The programme will provide technical assistance to strengthen institutional and professional capacities in formulating and monitoring evidence-based population- and development-related policies.

Due to the importance of population and development issues, the Office of the Ministry of Economy and Trade shall also undertake the role of PCM for the PDS component of the UNFPA Country Programme. The Ministry of Informational Development, the National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Inferior shall act as implementing co-partners for the PDS component. The institutional capacity shall be developed in order to establish a functional system of disaggregated data collection, and information flows for appropriate data processing and use. The Ministry of Economy and Trade in its capacity as coordinator of DevInfo database, shall integrate population indicators in the database and existing data collection systems.

The Academy of Science shall assist the state institutions in the development of policies and plans making proper use for population data. UNFPA shall advocate for the establishment of a National Population Council, with primary responsibilities to assess population data and formulate national policies and plans based on such data and demographic projections and analysis. The Council shall also have supervisory functions and shall monitor the implementation of national policies and plans, assessing their impact. The Council shall act as a coordination body, supervising population information flows.

***The current context of 2009 Parliamentary Elections***

A parliamentary election was held in Moldova on 5 April 2009. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) won a majority of seats (60 out of 101) for the third consecutive occasion. The other three opposition parties that succeeded to parliament (passing the threshold of 6%) are the Liberal Party of Moldova – 15 seats, Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova – 15 seats and Our Moldova Alliance – 11 seats. Turnout was 59.49 percent, exceeding the 50% necessary for the election to be valid.

The new parliament had to elect a new President of Moldova as the incumbent Vladimir Voronin has to step down after completing two terms. For this one candidate should have garnered at minimum 61 votes from MPs. As the PCRM had only 60 seats, election of a new president by this legislature failed The Constitution requires that the Parliament is dissolved if after two attempts to elect a new President, it fails to do so. In such a situation new elections is called. The Moldovan Parliament failed to elect a new President on 20 May and 3 June. The acting President subsequently dissolved the Parliament and called for new elections to be held on Wednesday 29 July.

*Post Elections events*

Following the announcement of preliminary election results on April 6, 2009, which showed the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova victorious, gaining 60 seats, the opposition rejected the results, accusing the authorities of falsification by manipulating electoral lists and demanded new elections. Following this, peaceful demonstrations have been organized in the center of Chişinău on April 6th and 7th that spun out of control and escalated into a riot on April 7th, with protesters attacking and devastating the parliament building and the presidential palace. Police forces had regained control of the city center by April 8th, arresting several hundred protesters. The government and opposition parties have accused each other of sending provocateurs to incite the crowds. Following the arrests, numerous cases of excessive force usage including beatings and torture by the police were reported by the detainees and confirmed later by special missions from EU and CoE sent to Moldova to investigate the situation. They included Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner, CoE Parliamentary Assembly representatives, European Union Parliamentary Members and all issued statements and resolutions of concern confirming major and large scale violations. The EU has adopted a special resolution on Moldova calling authorities to respect human rights and act on the irregularities during and post-elections.

# SUBJECT OF THE EVALUATION

According to the evaluation plan of the UNDP Moldova office, in 2009 an evaluation will be conducted for the Institutional Development Outcome. The following CPD Outputs falling under this Outcome, as stated in the Country Program Action Plan (CPAP) 2007-2011, are to be included in this evaluation:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| UNDAF  | CPD | CPD Outputs | Projects |
| **Outcome 1**By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights**Indicators:** Kauffman:Voice and accountability (VA)Government effectiveness (GE)Rule of law (RL)Political stability and absence of violence (PV)Corruption perception index (CPI) | **Outcome 1.4.**Public Administration Reform promoted in selected institutions**Indicator**:Extent of implementation of PAR in national institutions, including recommendations of functional reviews, creation of policy units and number of staff trained on strategic planning, budgeting, human resource management etc.Baseline:Functional review of central public institutions undertaken. Implementation has not started.Target:Functional review recommendations implemented, policy anlalysis units created and 500 ministerial staff trained | A modernized public administration system in place, more efficient and better able to develop, implement and monitor long-term policies and programmes, linked to national budgeting processes.**Indicator 1**:Number of policy making units modernized as a result of PAR implementationBaseline: 6 policy making units under creation in 6 pilot ministries (2006)Target: At least 8 policy units modernized by the end of period**Indicator 2**: Each long-term programme to include M&E componentBaseline: TBD in 2006Target: All long-term programmes have M&E component.**Indicator 3**: number of electronic public services operating on-lineBaseline: 1 service is operating on-lineTarget: 5 services operating on-line | e-Governance Electoral Support to MoldovaSupport to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EU integrationSupport to the Central Public Administration Reform |
| Enhanced capacity to combat drug trafficking and prevent/reduce drug abuse**Indicators 1**:Volume of Illegal Drug Trafficking Baseline: In 2005 the Ministry of Interior confiscated and destroyed 18 418 kg of illegally cultivated opium poppy and 16 680 kg of cannabis.Target: Illegal drug trafficking and production is annually reduced**Indicator** **2**: Number of drug seizuresBaseline: In 2005 the Ministry of Interior reported 2092 drug-related crimes, of which 2074 cases have been prosecuted and 1935 of them submitted to the courts. 282 crimes were related to drugs traffic and 376 to drug productionTarget: Number of drug-related crimes reduced**Indicator 3**: Sustainability of the Report on Drugs (prevention and policy indicator)Baseline: Report on Drugs is produced with support of projectTarget: National institutions produce the report on drugs annually without donor support | Programme for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight Against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine And Moldova (BUMAD) |
| Enhanced institutional capacities are in place for improved border and customs control and surveillance.**Indicator 1**:Use of risk analysis within Border Guards and Customs ServicesBaseline: Risk management systems are not in place. Border and customs control and surveillance is carried without risk analysis and information exchange between institutionsTarget: Risk analysis capacity established (BG and CS risk analysis units created and staff trained)**Indicator** **2**: % of military personnel in Border Guards ServiceBaseline: 50%Target: Completely demilitarized Border Guards Service (0%)**Indicator 3**: Training capacity of the Border GuardsBaseline: Training is not institutionalized in the Border Guards Service. Training is conducted in the Military Institute and outside the countryTarget: New Training school in place for the Border Guards | EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) Improving Management on the Moldovan-Ukrainian State Border (BOMMOLUK)Improving Border Guards Human Resource Management (pipeline) |

The evaluation will cover the Population and Development component of the UNFPA CPD which will include the following outcomes and outputs:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| UNDAF  | CPD | CPD Outputs | Projects |
| **Outcome 1**By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights**Indicators:** Kauffman:Voice and accountability (VA)Government effectiveness (GE)Rule of law (RL)Political stability and absence of violence (PV)Corruption perception index (CPI) | **Outcome 4**Pro-poor policies addressing development and population are formulated, implemented and monitored in a transparent and participatory manner**Baseline:** TBD**Indicator**:No. and type of policies developed/ implemented/ monitored **Target:**Increased number of the pro-poor policies developed/revised | **Output 4.1**Institutional capacity developed to establish a system to collect and analyse disaggregated demographic and population data, and to formulate national policies and monitor their implementation and impact**Indicator 1**:National Population Commission (NPC) established **Baseline:** No**Target:** NPC established and is operationalRelevant State Institutions, academics and civil society represented**Indicator 2**: Number and quality of population policies initiated**Baseline:** No holistic population policies. Pro-natalist stipulations, without proper costing and resources attached to them**Target:** * + - * Assessment of existent normative framework
* Amendments to existent normative framework
* Overarching P&D concept
* P&D Strategy in place

**Indicator 3**: Information sharing and data flows system between relevant institutions operational**Baseline:** No**Target:** * Protocols for data flows developed
* ICT network created among relevant institutions
* Migration soft integrated
 | **„Strengthening the National Statistical System” (UNFPA component) as well as other UNFPA specific projects** |

# OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

This is a summary progress evaluation, aiming to assess the extent to which programme and project activities implemented with partners during 2007-2009 have contributed to progress under **CPD Outcome 1.4 (for UNDP) and CPD Outcome 4 and 5 (for UNFPA)**, as well as overall contribution to the **UNDAF Outcome 1** implementation, also, the achievement of set targets, whether existing UNDP’s and UNFPA’s partnership arrangements with local partners proved to be successful and relevant and overall whether UNDP and UNFPA-supported activities have contributed to improved performance of governance institutions in Moldova, including on population issues and in preparedness to mitigate disasters. The evaluation shall identify changes that happened within the last two and a half years as they relate to the development outcomes, the degree and levels of these changes, i.e. enabling environment, organizational and/or individual levels. It shall also assess whether UNDP’s and UNFPA’s strategic positioning in this area can be improved.

Since this is an evaluation carried out in the middle of the development interventions planned for in the current CPAPs, evaluators shall give greater importance to assessing efficiency and to a possible extent the effectiveness of UNDP’s Institutional Development Portfolio contribution to the CPD Outcome 1.4 and UNDAF outcome 1 implementation: whether the size of resources, both financial and human, and partnership strategies continue to be cost-effective and may be applied in continuation and/or revised/changed in the Country Programme Action Plan 2007-2011. Same considerations should be applied in evaluating respective components of UNFPA CPD.

Evaluators shall take into account and rank the following items:

* Status of and degree of change in the outcomes, and factors influencing the outcomes
* Level of incurred changes: Enabling environment, Organizational and/or Individual levels
* UNDP and UNFPA strategic positioning on achieving the outcomes
* Relevance of the outcomes and outputs
* Partnership strategy
* Sustainability: whether there is ownership and capacity to maintain and manage development in the outcomes

The main partners to be involved in the evaluation are: MFAEI, CEC, Ministry of Informational Development, Border Guards Service, Customs Service, Projects’ Implementation Units, NBS, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family, Academy of Science, National Commission on Population and Development, National Disaster Medicine Centre.

**Worksheet on Outcome Evaluation: Categories of Analysis/Scope**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Notes** |
|  |
| Progress to outcome realization | Review indicators and benchmarks to determine extent/degree of contribution in the outcome realization by assessing progresses made to-date vis-à-vis baseline. Focus on the how and why outputs and strategies contributed to achieving outcome. Focus on questions of relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact.  |
| Factors affecting outcome | These are social, political and economic factors. As such, the evaluation scope shall be as broad as possible so as to take all factors into account |
| UNDP’s and UNFPA’s contribution to outcome | Conduct quantitative and qualitative assessments of contributions from UNDP’s and UNFPA’s interventions vis-à-vis outcome indicator baseline. Assessment should focus on determine the continued validity of the strategies applied to-date by UNDP and UNFPA so as to decide whether they should be revised and/or changed for the rest of the programme |
| Partnership strategy | Determine whether the best possible synergies have been established among partners and the steering role played by UNDP and UNFPA within this context. Assess whether other stakeholders and/or sponsors should be included and/or excluded from the programme in continuation as well as referring to the next phase of CPAP. |

Specifically, the outcome evaluation should address, but not be limited to, the following ***questions and issues***:

1. Outcome analysis
* Are the outcomes and associated projects relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and the UNDP and UNFPA mandate?
* Were the actions to achieve the outputs and outcomes effective and efficient?
* Were there multi-level interventions conducted (environment, organization, individual)? How many?
* Are the outputs and outcomes leading to benefits beyond the life of the existing projects?
* Which findings may have relevance for eventual adjustments and/or future programming?
* Are the stated outcome, indicator and target appropriate for the development situation in Moldova and UNDP’s and UNFPA’s programme of assistance in this field?
* What is the current status and prospects for achieving the outcome with the indicated inputs and within the indicated timeframe?
* What are the main factors (positive and negative) within and beyond UNDP’s and UNFPA’s interventions that affected or are affecting the achievement of the outcome? How have these factors limited or facilitated progress towards the outcome?
* Were UNDP’s and UNFPA’s proposed contributions to the achievement of the outcome appropriate, sufficient, effective and sustainable?
1. Output analysis
	* What are the key outputs that have been produced by UNDP and UNFPA to contribute to the outcome?
	* Are the UNDP and UNFPA outputs relevant to the outcome?
	* Are the monitoring and evaluation indicators appropriate to link these outputs to the outcome, or is there a need to improve these indicators?
	* Is sufficient progress been made with regard to UNDP and UNFPA outputs?
2. Resources, partnerships, and management analysis
	* Was UNDP’s and UNFPA’s resource mobilization strategy in this field appropriate and effective in achieving this outcome?
	* Was UNDP’s and UNFPA’s partnership strategy in this field appropriate and effective in achieving this outcome?
	* Are UNDP’s and UNFPA’s management structures and working methods appropriate and effective in achieving this outcome?
	* Overall, assess the scope, relevance, efficiency and sustainability of UNDP’s and UNFPA’s resources mobilization, partnership and management arrangements in achieving this outcome.
3. Recommendations
* Based on the above analysis, recommendations should be provide as to how UNDP and UNFPA should adjust its programming, partnership arrangements, resource mobilization strategies, working methods and/or management structures for an efficient and effective implementation of the current CPAC and to the extent possible for the next country programming cycle.

**Institutional Development Portfolio**

1. **Programme for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Fight against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova** **(BUMAD Programme)**

The Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Anti-Drugs (BUMAD) programme is a regional initiative funded by the European Union and UNDP since 2003 to tackle drug trafficking from and through Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova to EU Member States. In Moldova, the programme specifically supports institutional reforms and strengthening of the judicial system in combating drug trafficking and prevention of drug abuse.

1. **Building e-Governance in Moldova**

The project supports national institutions in applying Information and Communication Technologies to public administration systems and processes by advancing new solutions aimed at better public service delivery and more transparent decision-making. The areas of intervention cover policy-making for the development of the information society, development of on-line public services, training public servants in using ICTs and promoting e-democracy practices.

1. **EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)**

The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission provides on-the-job training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian border officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective border and customs controls and border surveillance.

1. **Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration**

The project aims at strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) in the process of achieving its European Integration goals and commitments.

1. **Electoral Support to Moldova Project**

The project will support democratic development in Moldova through strengthening of the electoral processes over the coming electoral cycles up to 2013 with immediate emphasis on the 2009 parliamentary elections. It will provide support to the Central Electoral Commission of Moldova in the key areas of improved voter register; use of IT in election administration; enfranchisement of diaspora; capacity building of electoral staff; enhanced transparency of the electoral process through use of media, voter education and observation; legislative reform; and direct support for procurement of specific election materials. The project will employ a team of international election experts in key areas to act as advisers to the Central Electoral Commission.

1. **Support to Public Administration Reform**

This project was aimed to support Government of the Republic of Moldova in planning and implementation of Public Administration Reform in the Republic of Moldova. It included two components: (i) capacity building for Public Administration Reform; and (ii) implementation of the second stage of functional analysis to inform decision making in the area.

1. **Support to Strategic Policy Formulation, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Republic of Moldova[[6]](#footnote-6)**

The present joint programme was designed to assist the Government of the Republic of Moldova in strategic long-term planning for achieving nationalized MDGs, as well as in the effective monitoring and evaluation of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy targets, Millennium Development Goals and the objectives of the European Union – Republic of Moldova Action Plan. The focus of the joint programme will be on strengthening national capacities in evidence-based and participatory formulation, monitoring and evaluation of development policies and programmes.

1. **Strengthening the National Statistical System**

# METHODOLOGY

Overall guidance on outcome evaluation methodologies is provided in the UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for Results and the UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators. On the UNFPA side, the evaluation will be guided by UNFPA Policies and Procedures Manual; Country Programme Monitoring and Evaluation. Based on these guiding documents, and in consultation with UNDP and UNFPA in Moldova, the evaluators should develop a suitable methodology for this outcome evaluation.

During the outcome evaluation, the evaluators are expected to apply the following approaches for data collection and analysis:

* Desk review of relevant documents (project documents with amendments made, review reports -midterm/final, donor-specific, etc);
* Discussions with the Senior Management and programme staff of UNDP and UNFPA Country Offices;
* Briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP, UNFPA and the Government/Parliament, as well as with other donors and partners
* Interviews with partners and stakeholders (including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved with regard to the outcome and what strategies they have used); other donors, including European Commission, SIDA, Council of Europe, WB, etc.
* Field visits to selected project sites and discussions with project teams, project beneficiaries;
* Consultation meetings.

Contributions made towards Outcomes to be evaluated:

* UNDP CP Outcome 1.4: **“*Public Administration Reform promoted in selected institutions”***
* UNFPA CP Outcome 4: ***“Pro-poor policies addressing development and population are formulated, implemented and monitored in a transparent and participatory manner”***
* UNFPA CP Outcome 5: ***“Improved readiness to prevent and mitigate natural and man-made disasters”***
* UNDAF Outcome 1: **“*By 2011, public institutions with the support of civil society organizations are better able to ensure good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice and the promotion of human rights*”**

# PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION

The key product expected is a comprehensive analytical report that includes, but is
not limited to the following components: (see the UNDP and UNFPA Guidelines for outcome evaluators for detailed information):

* Executive summary
* Introduction
* Description of the evaluation methodology
* Development context
* Key findings
* Lessons learned
* Recommendations for the future (including viable project ideas and other recommendations)
* Annexes: ToRs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc.[[7]](#footnote-7)

It is expected that the report will draw separate conclusions for UNDP and UNFPA.

The evaluator should provide a proposed report structure to UNDP and UNFPA prior to the start of fieldwork. The report should be prepared in English. The UNDP and UNFPA Evaluation Focal Team will ensure that report is translated into Romanian. It should take into account the opinions/voices of people from Moldova, government representatives, donors and NGOs. The evaluators will prepare a presentation of the preliminary findings to be discussed at a roundtable in Chisinau with UNDP, UNFPA and its partners. Consultation process, entirely or in parts, might be undertaken separately by UNDP and UINFPA

2. An outline for the future UNDP and UNFPA interventions in the respective area (if still deemed relevant) based on the recommendations of the mission is to be produced. The format of the outline will be agreed between UNDP, UNFPA and the evaluators prior to the start of the evaluation.

The evaluators are required to discuss the full draft of the evaluation report prior to departure from Moldova. Both products shall be submitted in hard copy and electronic form.

***Dissemination mechanisms***

The results shall presented at a round-table to all key stakeholders (representatives of Government, relevant Parliamentary Committees, projects and specialized NGOs) and shared through specialized local and regional networks. The final evaluation report will be placed on the UNDP and UNFPA web-site and distributed through regular Government channels to interested parties.

# EVALUATION TEAM

Members of the mission must not have been associated with the project’s formulation, implementation or monitoring. It is proposed that the mission be led by a senior international consultant and one national consultant. The Government and Donors active in the sector are invited to be represented in the mission by consultants/staff selected by them. UNDP and UNFPA Cos in Moldova welcome suggestions from partners as to candidates for the posts of team leader and national consultants.

Required qualification and skills for the international consultant:

* Advanced university degree in public administration, economics, international development or related field
* At least eight years of work experience in the field of democratic governance, including participatory planning monitoring and evaluation
* Sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation)
* Previous work experience in related areas with UNDP or other development organizations preferably in the region
* Fluency in English (Russian or Romanian are an advantage)

Specifically, the team leader will perform the following tasks:

* Lead and manage the evaluation mission;
* Design the detailed evaluation scope and methodology (including the methods for data collection and analysis) for the report;
* Decide the division of labor within the evaluation team;
* Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs and partnership strategy (as per the scope of the evaluation described above) for the report;
* Draft related parts of the evaluation reports; and
* Finalize the whole evaluation report.

The team leader will take the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of the evaluation reports to the UNDP Country Office.

Required qualification and skills for the National Consultant:

* Advanced university degrees in the area of in public administration, economics, international development or related field;
* At least five years work experience in the areas related to good governance/public administration.
* Sound knowledge and understanding of the specifics and developments in Good Governance Area / public administration in Moldova and have experience in conducting evaluations.
* Previous work experience in related areas with UNDP in Moldova
* Fluency in English, Romanian and Russian languages

S/he will perform the following tasks respectively:

* Review documents
* Participate in the design of the evaluation methodology;
* Data collection
* Assessment /construction of indicators’ baselines
* Actively participate in conducting the analysis of the outcome, outputs and targets (as per the scope of the evaluation described above), as agreed with the international consultant
* Draft related parts of the evaluation report; and,
* Assist Team leader in finalizing document through incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

 ***Timeframe***

The detailed schedule of the evaluation and the length of the assignment will be discussed with the evaluators prior to the assignment. The estimated duration of evaluators’ assignment is up to 32 working days. The final evaluation report should be delivered by November 30, 2009.

# IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

To facilitate the outcome evaluation process, UNDP and UNFPA Cos in Moldova will set up an Evaluation Focal Team (EFT). The EFT—with support from the Institutional Development Portfolio Manager and UNFPA team will assist in connecting the evaluation team with the senior management, and key stakeholders. In addition, the EFT will assist in developing a detailed evaluation plan; conduct field visits; and organize meetings. During the evaluation, the EFT will help identify key partners for interviews by the evaluation team. However, the evaluation will be fully independent and the evaluation team will retain enough flexibility to determine the best approach in collecting and analyzing data for the outcome evaluation.

***Indicative Mission Schedule***

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | **Timeframe** | **Place** | **Responsible Party** |
| Evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan | 15 - 25 October, 2009 2 days | On-line | UNDP CO, UNFPA CO International consultantNational consultant |
| Desk review  | 25 October– 1 November, 20095 days | On-line  | International consultantNational Consultant |
| Interviews, consultations1st Draft Outline and Presentation to the UN/UNDP/UNFPA | Due 15 December, 200912 days | In Moldova  | International, national consultant and EFT |
| Preparation and submission of 1st draft of the evaluation report  | 5 November, 20098 days  | On-line | International consultant  |
| Feedback on draft report from partners, UNDP and UNFPA | 5 - 20 November, 2009 | Online | EFT |
| Finalization of evaluation report. Presentation to stakeholders | 30 November, 20095 days | On-line or In Moldova  | International, national consultants  |

# DOCUMENTS FOR STUDY BY THE EVALUATORS

1. UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for results
2. UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
3. Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
4. UNDP Result-Based Management: Technical Note
5. UNDAF Moldova 2007-2011
6. UNDP Moldova CPAP 2007-2011
7. National Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2008-2011
8. CPAR Strategy and Action Plan
9. Reports on Decision Making Process Review and Functional Analysis
10. 2nd Stage Functional Review Report
11. Progress Reports on CPAR Implementation
12. Millennium Development Goals Report in Moldova, 2008
13. Projects’ Documents and progress reports
14. UNFPA Policies and Procedures Manual. Country Programe Monitoring and Evaluation
15. UNFPA Moldova CPAP 2007-2011
16. UNFPA Moldova COARs
17. UNFPA Strategic Plan 2008-2011
18. UNFPA and joint project reports

## Annex 2: People Met

**UNDP & UNFPA**

Dimovska Matilda, DRR, UNDP

Niculita , Aliona, ARR, UNDP

Vremis, Vitalie, Programme Specialist /Governance, UNDP

Palade, Veaceslav, Programme Associate, UNDP

Lutenco, Victor, Program Analyst, UNFPA

**Project Staff**

Pelivan, Alexandru, Project Manager, Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Project

Balan, Veaceslav, Project Manager, Electoral Support to Moldova Project

Spataru, Aurelia, Project Manager, Strengthening the National Statistical System Project

**Donors**

Skvortova,Alla, Head of Section, DFID

Razlog, Lilia, Economist, WB office in Moldova

Orlova, Nina, National Programme Officer, Sida

Ms. Lilia Razlog, Consultant Public Sector and Institutional Reform, World Bank

**Government**

Mocanu, Stela, Adviser to Prime Minister of Moldova

Gheorghiu, Valeriu, Director, Department for European Integration, MFAEI

Ciocan, Iurie,Sercetary,Central Electoral Commission

Rotaru, Oleg, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Information Technologiesand Communications

Cara, Oleg, Deputy Director, National Bureau of Statistics

Catrinescu, Natalia, Ex Head of General Department for Macroeconomic Policies and Development Programmes, MET

Panfile, Igor, Consultant, Protocol and International Relations Department of Customs Service of Moldova

Vasiloi, Rosian, Head, Central Apparatus of the Border Guard Service of Moldova

Gheorghita, Tamara, Head of Personnel Poliiicy Division, Governament Office of the Republic of Moldova

Codreanu, Ruslan, Head of Policy Coordination Section, Governament Office of the Republic of Moldova

Ciurea, Lucretia, Head of Section, Aid Coordination, Government Office

**NGOs/Think Tanks**

Prohnitki, Valeriu, Director, Expert Grup

Grosu, Igor, Independent Expert

Adam, Zinaida, Programme Coordinator, Public Administration and Good Governance Programme, Soros Foundation

Mereacre, Sorin, County Director, Eurasia Foundation

Brighidin, Andrei, Programme Manager, Eurasia Foundation

Popovici, Corneliu, vice – Rector, Moldova State Institute for International Relations

## Annex 3: List of References

1. UNDP Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluation for results
2. UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
3. Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
4. UNDP Result-Based Management: Technical Note
5. Evaluation of Results Based Management at UNDP
6. UNDAF Moldova 2007-2011
7. UNDP Moldova CPAP 2007-2011
8. National Development Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, 2008-2011
9. Activity Programme of the Government of Moldova 2009-2013 “European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Wellfare”
10. CPAR Strategy and Action Plan
11. Reports on Decision Making Process Review and Functional Analysis
12. 2nd Stage Functional Review Report
13. Progress Reports on CPAR Implementation
14. Millennium Development Goals Report in Moldova, 2008
15. Project Documents, Steering Committee Minutes and progress reports for all projects included in the evaluations
16. Result-Oriented Annual Report of UNDP Moldova for 2006, 2007, 2008.
17. UNFPA Policies and Procedures Manual. Country Programe Monitoring and Evaluation
18. UNFPA Moldova CPAP 2007-2011
19. UNFPA Moldova COARs
20. UNFPA Strategic Plan 2008-2011
21. UNFPA and joint project reports
22. WB Country Partnership Strategy for Moldova, 2008
23. Kaufmann et al Governance Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators
24. IMF: various press releases 2008-09, <http://imf.org/external/country/mda/index.htm>
25. The Economist Intelligence Unit Report on Moldova, November 2009
1. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for Development Results, UNDP, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. An EU-focus through a committed approach to the Association Agreement or even more so under a pre-candidate drive would see a far greater focus on the reform of laws, capacities and implementation of reforms for agencies that underpin the operation of the EU Single Market. This in turn offers the possibility for the UNDP to focus on key sectoral issues using as base the existing work and efforts. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://rapc.gov.md/en/refcomp/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Both reports are available upon request [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. UNDP-Government of Moldova Country Programme Document and Country Programme Action Plan, <http://www.undp.md> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Only a part of this Programme was contributing to the attainment of the outcome under evaluation hence its absence from the Worksheet above [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See the ***UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators*** and ***UNFPA Policies and Procedures Manual*** for a detailed guidance on the preparation of an outcome evaluation report. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)