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| Mid-Term Review | MAY2010 |
| THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (UNDAF) 2007– 2011)IN THE GAMBIA |  |

FINAL REPORT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIDS Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome

AfDB African Development Bank

BAFROW Foundation for Research on Women’s Health, Productivity and Environment

CAADP Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme

CCA Common Country Assessment

CBEMP Capacity Building for Economic Management Project

CBO Community-Based Organization

CILSS Permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel (CILSS)

CLTS Community-Led Total Sanitation

CPAP Country Programme Action Plan

CRC Convention on the Rights of Children

CSO Civil Society Organization

DOSFEA Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs

DOSTIE Department of State for Trade, Industry and Employment

EMNCH Emergency Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health

EXCOM Executive Committee Member

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization

FGM/C Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting

GBoS Gambia Bureau of Statistics

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GFATM Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

GOTG Government of The Gambia

GTTI Gambia Technical Training Institute

HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country

HIV Human Immuno-deficiency Virus

HWT Household Water Treatment

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

ISFP Initiative for Soaring Food Prices

IMR Infant Mortality Rate

IYCF Infant and Young Child Feeding

LIFDC Low Income Food Deficiency Country

MMR Maternal Mortality Rate

MTR Mid-Term Review

NACP National AIDS Control Programme

NaNA National Nutrition Agency

NAS National AIDS Secretariat

NEPAD New Partnership for African Development

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NPC National Planning Commission

NSF National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework

NSS National Statistics Service

NYC National Youth Council

NYSS National Youth Service Scheme

PIA President’s International Award

PLWHA People Living with HIV/AIDS

PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDG United Nations Development Group

LIST OF ACRONYMS (Cont’d)

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

WB The World Bank

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Background and Context**.

As part of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Reform Agenda which aims to make UN a more results-driven, effective and efficient institution, The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Common Country Assessment (CCA) have become the primary tools for facilitating a common programme framework for the UN System at the country level.

 In The Gambia, the 2007-2011 UNDAF emerged from a detailed analysis through the CCA, which provided the basis for harmonized preparation of the UN System’s Country programmes and projects. The UNDAF benefited from a consultative process involving the Government of The Gambia (GOTG), United Nations agencies, civil society organizations and other development partners. The end result was a set of concrete developmental objectives for the United Nations System in the Gambia over the 5-year period. These objectives which were derived as national priorities from the country’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MTP/PRSP II), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Vision 2020 provided the basis for the formulation of the UNDAF Outcomes.

The UN guidance on UNDAF processes recommends annual reviews for relevance and progress towards its prescribed outcomes. In the case where annual reviews are not undertaken, a Mid-Term Review (MTR) becomes expedient for identifying and addressing implementation concerns for the balance of the program cycle. As The Gambia UNCT did not undertake annual reviews of the UNDAF (2007-2011), the MTR became necessary to identify implementation bottlenecks, and to provide an improved platform for developing joint programmes with clearer targets, and also lay the ground work for common funding mechanisms and foster the design of better coordination arrangements.

The Gambia’s UNDAF MTR began in late January 2010 with the objectives of assessing the relevance, efficiency, impact, coherence and integration of the UN System’s mission, the delivery of support, and its alignment to the Government of Gambia’s national developmental priorities and needs as articulated in the PRSP II. In specific terms, the MTR is to provide the UNCT with feedback on the effectiveness of the UNDAF’s programming framework, and to enable the UNCT to:

* Assess progress towards achieving the expected results described as outcomes in the UNDAF Results Matrix;
* Assess continued relevance of the expected results, and make revisions when necessary;
* Assess the contribution of the UN System to the pursuit of the national priorities articulated in the PRSPII;
* Identify emerging issues from the national context that may call for review and/or re-orientation of the UNDAF;
* Identify lessons that can benefit the revision of the current UNDAF and the design of future ones;
* Draw conclusions on opportunities for greater progress towards UN Reform in The Gambia.

**Methodology and the MTR Process**

The Review was conducted as a two-tier process. With a prescribed duration of 25 working days, the first ten (10) days were devoted to internal consultations and desk reviews of program documents, including the UNDAF document, CCA, Annual and Mid-Term Review Reports of Country Programmes and Projects of the EXCOM members of UNCT, as well as the Mid-Term Review Report of the PRSP II. One-on-one consultations were held with Agency Heads and Focal Persons of the UNCT, and weekly validation meetings were arranged with the Programme Coordination Group (PCG). After the first 10 days, a consultative meeting involving the PCG members, government partners, NGOs and CSOs was held, during which the Consultant’s assessments based on the information gathered was shared with participants, and comments solicited in a consultative manner.

In the following 10 days, one-on-one consultations with government and other development partners, including NGOs, and CSOs, were also conducted. The number of meetings and the times for the consultative meetings overlapped considerably, as consultations were being held in the last five days that was normally devoted to report writing. After the final stakeholder meeting, the need for further consultations with governmental and other partner institutions became expedient, and the duration of the Review was extended for eight additional working days.

**Preliminary Findings**

1. The economic and social contexts within which UNDAF outcomes were developed have changed considerably. The UNDAF was designed at a time when most domestic and global economic indicators were relatively stable. Since then, the global financial crisis and the economic slowdown have generated unexpected increases in fuel prices and increases in the costs of producing food, including domestically produced food staples. The end result has been increased food prices. Some of these changes have threatened food security, and have required an orchestrated response from the UNCT that has demanded specific inter-agency coordination in the last few years of the UNDAF cycle. On a positive note, the crisis brought the best out of the UN agencies in terms of their ability to pull together and work as one entity to mitigate the impact of an external shock.
2. There seems to be a perception that the UNDAF is just another one of UN’s numerous initiatives, and that its time “shall come to pass.” It does not take long for an external observer to note that to most agencies the first order of priority is their agency mandate, with the UNDAF and its fanfare a secondary consideration. Rather than being the defining framework for each agency’s reordering of Country Programme/Project priorities, the UNDAF has played second fiddle to each agency’s defining pillars of strategic focus. The UNDAF currently receives a rather passive attention from some agencies. As a case in point, some agency representatives hardly attend the periodic meetings of the UNDAF Programme Coordination Group. The question to answer here is whether each agency can redefine its strategic focus within the framework of the UNDAF.
3. There are hardly any examples of joint programming among UN agencies from programme design stage through common budgeting to common implementation and monitoring. Nonetheless, there are a handful of examples of projects executed jointly by UN agencies. In fact, as it was remarked earlier, it is in the context of joint execution of emergency projects that the extraordinary capacity of UN agencies to rise up to confront a crisis in unity is revealed. However, joint programming from design through budgeting to joint implementation and joint monitoring is the direction that the UN Reform is pointing, and it is that direction that the UNCT will need to go in the spirit of “Delivering as One”.
4. In the spirit of” Delivering as One”, the UNCT will need to agree to work together as one UN entity by presenting a unified approach in support of clients, irrespective of the agency providing the support. This obviously requires considerable information and document sharing, and in some cases consensus building on policy messages going out of the UN. It is amazing how external partners can detect lack of cohesiveness among collaborating UN agencies from policy messages.
5. Human resources and other capacity constraints seem to cut across most partner institutions, particularly governmental implementing partners, as well as NGOs and CSOs, such that they impose considerable pressure on institutions to improvise with whatever is available. Underachievement of programmes outcomes is, therefore, an inevitable consequence of these constraints.
6. The national response to HIV/AIDS had been derailed in early 2007. As a consequence some background studies to assess the impact of the disease as a basis for the formulation evidence-based response has been lacking. For example, no effort has been made to conduct an evaluation of the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS on human development indicators in The Gambia, including life expectancy. Also, no portion of the HIPC Debt Relief dividend has ever been explicitly allocated to the nation’s AIDS response, although part of such dividend may have been provided to the pool of resources that generally finances some expenditures related to the nation’s response to HIV/AIDS.
7. Cross-country estimates show that GDP growth originating in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth outside agriculture. For China, aggregate growth originating in agriculture was estimated to have been 3.5 times more effective in reducing poverty than growth outside agriculture, and for Latin America 2.7 times more effective. Rapid agricultural growth in India following technological innovations, and China following institutional reform, were accompanied by major declines in rural poverty. More recently, in Ghana, rural households accounted for a large share of a steep decline in poverty, induced in part by agricultural growth. Based on this evidence, one expects The Gambia to “put her money where her mouth is”. While the PRSP II ranks agriculture first on its scale of priority, followed by education and health & nutrition, the allocations of government expenditures for FY 2007 and FY 2008 show both education and health & nutrition receiving at least two and a half times the amount allocated to agriculture in the two fiscal years. The PRSP II has obviously internalized the findings, but certainly not the Finance Ministry, regarding the effectiveness of growth in agriculture in reducing poverty.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**.

The UNDAF is indeed responding to the developmental priorities of The Gambia. Its interventions are not stand-alone interventions, but are very relevant to the nation’s development objectives, as well as the MDGs. Furthermore, they are aligned with PRSP. However, many challenges remain and pose as constraints to successful implementation of the UNDAF strategies:

* There is a weak monitoring system resulting from weak capacity among implementing partners. The monitoring system is also weak because there are no baselines and benchmarks by which to measure progress. This is the result of a weak statistical base, an important element of planning and priority setting.
* Implementation has been weak as a result of weak capacity among implementing partners.
* Agency coordination has been weak, as agencies implemented projects and programmes according to their mandates, leaving no room for synergies that only result from joint programming.
* The coordination of the UNDAF at Governmental level is even weaker, as much of the implementing responsibilities are situated in offices that are the least functional. For most of the programmes under the UNDAF, the coordinating center is the Office of the President. The Aid Coordination Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MFEA) is not apprised of project fund disbursements. Thus, UN agency contributions are not captured by the annual national budget.

**Recommendations**

1. **Enhanced coordination**: The UNCT will need to work systematically to enhance coordination, coherence, and integration of the UN mission and mandate. Coordination and coherence cannot be built overnight; rather it can be built systematically over time, and must be linked to, and integrated in, programme areas consistently. All UNCT members must be equally committed to working towards enhanced coordination, and the strategic intent of achieving the goal of “Delivering as One”. The paucity of staff and lack of capacity at the UN Coordination Office (UNCO) is a challenge, but it may be worthwhile to engage the services of a senior level coordination advisor to support the UNRC, along with one or two other official staff to complement the good work of the current Coordination Officer. Harmonization of issues surrounding differing programme cycles of the UNCT members is one major consideration that calls for the services of a senior coordination advisor. In the proposed staffing scenario, Monitoring and Evaluation would be handled by senior level experts who are well versed in aid coordination issues.
2. **Encouraging joint programming**: Joint Programming is the cornerstone of the UN coherence at the country level, and in operationalizing “Delivering as One” effectively. The UNCT and the UNRC may need to hold strategic planning meetings, to discuss and encourage vigorously joint programming in a coherent and meaningful manner. Additionally, joint programming issues may need to be linked to the clarity of roles and responsibilities of UNCT members, and work efficiently towards aligning the entire UNCT with the “Delivering as One” mandate in all of the UNDAF’s priority areas.
3. **Refining and Aligning UNDAF**. The UNDAF will need to be refined, taking into consideration current country conditions and environment, and an integration of the UN mission and mandate with PRSP II priorities. The UNDAF must be entirely aligned to emerging issues in The Gambia, notably food insecurity, slowly rising HIV prevalence rates, eroding human and institutional capacities, gender inequalities, and unresolved governance issues.
4. **Strategic Capacity Building**. There is an urgent need for the UNCT to mobilize and lead a collaborative effort with GOTG to conceptualize, design and implement some sustainable capacity building strategies to confront this endemic constraint to the UNDAF implementation. The solution requires practically enforceable, well considered strategies to attract, train and retain the requisite skills. The leadership of the UNCT lies in its perceived comparative advantage in crafting remuneration packages that can be readily accepted by potential recruits, perhaps featuring some commitment clauses, and dialoguing with GOTG for acceptance and implementation. Its enforcement will rest with the beneficiary institutions in The Gambia (including governmental partners, NGOs, etc.,) but the initiative and the design of the packages could benefit from the comparative advantage of the UN family of agencies acting with one voice and one coherent approach through the UNDAF.
5. **Youthful Entrepreneurs through GAMJOBS**. GAMJOBS is designed to create active economic agents who no longer have to depend on the labor market for their livelihoods. The corps of youthful entrepreneurs that GAMJOBS is aiming to create has collectively become a versatile engine of economic growth, and dominant employers in some economies. The formal and informal private sector, self-employed businesses absorb significant proportions of the labour force in some countries. Over time, as their businesses become viable and successful, their contributions to the GDP will more than offset developmental investments made on them in their youthful years of skills development. The UNDP needs to do more to mobilize the resources needed to ensure GAMJOBS’ successful implementation.
6. **Loan Conditions for Start**-**up Businesses.** The loan conditionsfrom Micro-Finance companies ought to be entirely different from those of conventional bank loans. The reason for the existence of micro-finance companies is to offer financing for those who, by their disadvantaged positions, cannot meet the requirements for conventional loans from the bank. It is, therefore, inexplicable for micro-finance loan conditions to be harder for start-up, and especially youthful, enterprises than those of conventional bank loans.
7. **UNDP’s Disbursement Procedures and Regulations**. The UNDP’s disbursement procedures and regulations will need to be revised for the sake of implementation effectiveness. A number of implementing partners are crying foul about the unwarranted delays that this procedure is imposing on project implementation. Concerns were expressed regarding lack of feedback on funding requests made to UNDP, and the lack of any mechanism for follow-up to such requests. Thus such requests continue to languish at the UNDP office with no feedback and no guidance for follow-up. UNDP will need to streamline the its disbursement procedures, and go further to institute follow-up mechanisms for monitoring progress on fund requests to avoid unwarranted delays in disbursements. Some partners echoed a trend of advice from the UNDP to scale down projects in order limit the disbursement of amounts initially committed to some projects. It is unclear if such advice is based on critical analysis of the effect of such advice. But if the advice turns out to be sound, then naturally the feasibility of the original project size becomes questionable.
8. **Targets for UNDAF Outcomes in Basic Social Services**. The UNDAF did not set targets for basic social services relating to infant mortality, Under-5 mortality, and maternal mortality rates. Instead, it relied on targets set within the framework of The Gambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II). Some of these targets are the MDG targets which have a longer time frame than the UNDAF. Agencies set their own targets and hoped to achieve them based on a number of assumptions. It is imperative that the successor UNDAF sets clear targets in order to permit constant monitoring and evaluation over time.
9. **Joint Programming in HIV/AIDS**. Whereas the Government’s response to HIV/AIDS has been on and off in the last three years, collaborating UN agencies are exhorted not to relent on their contributions towards the national response. There is considerable opportunity for joint progr**amm**ing among collaborating UN agencies, and thereby projecting a unified approach towards “Delivering as One”. The UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, WHO, UNFPA, and WFP would all have some roles to play in a jointly programmed response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. UNAIDS could be effectively harmonizing activities in HIV/AIDS if the country office would be charged with the responsibility to furnish the UNCT with annual reviews reports on progress made towards the achievement of the related UNDAF outcomes within the context of joint programming.
10. **Effective HIV/AIDS Coordination Structures**. The success of The Gambia’s National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework is contingent upon the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS coordination structures at national, LGA, and community levels. It is common knowledge that there are some governance issues within The Gambia’s three-tier health delivery system that need to be resolved, and an effective coordination system put in place to manage the national response at community levels. This calls for the strengthening of existing community systems, focusing on improving efficiency and effectiveness in the organization and management of the health system. It also calls for the creation of popular structures that reinforce community participation in decision-making, and by transferring responsibilities, authority and resources to the health care facilities, health management teams and village development committees. The NSF can build on the significant progress made by the World Bank-supported HARRP grants initiative which supported CSOs and CBOs as a good starting point for strengthening community involvement in the national response.
11. **Gender Inequality Issues relative to HIV/AIDS**. There is the need to increase exposure to gender-based issues relative to all health conditions and diseases in local communities. This will require community-based gender programmes to sensitizevarious communities about these kinds of issues. A woman should not have to request permission from her husband in order to get tested for HIV, not even in a predominantly patriarchal society. The same is true for all health conditions. Women should be accorded the same degree of independence when it comes to decisions affecting their health conditions and lives. Herein lies the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs in this proposed process of sensitization. It is an open criticism that the implementation of the current UNDAF has been kept at more than an arm’s length from NGOs and CSOs. There have also been allegations that, in some regions, certain governmental agencies have attempted to impede the normal operations of some NGOs and CSOs in activities that can only enhance the outcome status of the UNDAF in many ways.
12. **MDG targets in primary enrollment**. Achieving 100% enrollment in primary school is within reach in two years, if the strong growth registered from 2007 to 2008 continues. However, this requires improvements in educational facilities for the disabled, and elevating the overall quality of learning and teaching in primary education, including the Madrassah, where primary school enrollments experienced the highest increase in recent years.
13. **Retention of girls in education levels beyond primary school**. The Gambia’s educational target aspirations must go beyond 100 percent primary school enrollment and gender parity in primary and lower secondary education. It must include retention of girls in educational levels beyond primary and lower secondary levels. This requires adjustments in cultural attitudes and traditional practices, both of which may take longer to accomplish. In the meantime, modest gains can be achieved if the collaborating UN partners, through their country programmes, join forces with GOTG to mount sustained campaigns aimed at changing people’s attitudes about the virtues of education for girls.
14. **Promoting improvements in the indicator in (13)** should be intricately linked to efforts to increase enrollments at senior secondary and tertiary educational levels, where enrollments are very low. The implication is that a substantial proportion of primary and lower secondary graduates fall through the cracks every year between lower secondary and senior secondary, and between senior secondary and tertiary levels. More importantly, it means that a substantial percentage of the nation’s most valuable resource is missing out in education, and, unless there is a conscious effort to absorb this portion of the future labour force in other technical and vocational training activities, its implications for future GDP growth and poverty levels are ominous.
15. **Governance.** In order to make real gains in governance, the GOTG should decide whether it wants to pursue decentralization as a political process through which local institutions could exercise their autonomy to serve their subjects. When the capacities of LGA institutions are strengthened, there should be no limitations for the exercise of their political and economic responsibilities in the pursuit of policies aimed at enhancing the well-being of their subjects**.** Presently, in The Gambia, there is no clearly defined policy backed by statutes concerning the intentions of decentralization**.** What is perceived as decentralization is rather delegation of powers on ad hoc basis**.** The next UNDAF process should demand action from the GOTG regarding decentralization, and make capacity strengthening of LGAs contingent upon their autonomy to exercise economic responsibilities to their subjects without limitations.
16. **The Role of NGOs and CSOs.** Many partners contend that the UNDAF, as a process approach to supporting development in The Gambia, has not been adequately disseminated among local communities. Some go further to attribute this to the relative dormancy of NGOs and CSOs with respect to the UNDAF related activities. With the necessary capacity strengthening, NGOs and CSOs are quite well suited to empower communities through the dissemination of policy messages. The general complaint that NGOs and CSOs are kept at a distance from the UNDAF needs to be addressed in the remainder of the cycle, as well as in the successor UNDAF’s cycle.
17. **National Human Rights Commission.** As long as the UNDP and other UN collaborating partners are committed to the application of human rights-based approach to development, it is the collective responsibility of the UN, bilateral partners and major CSOs to mobilize efforts to engage the Government in a dialogue over human rights. A National Human Rights Commission is needed as a matter of urgency to provide oversight, and to exercise jurisdiction on all matters relating to human rights.
18. **The Ombudsman Act needs to be extended to cover the needs of those who work in the private sector.** It is asserted that approximately 85 percent of the complaints received by the Ombudsman come from those working in the private sector. Thus the Ombudsman must be the defender of all citizens, not just those working in the public sector
19. **INTRODUCTION**

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is an operational framework that guides the work of all UN Agencies towards a common vision and strategy in support of the member country’s socio-economic development priorities. Its purpose is to enable the UN System to work together and in close cooperation with the Government and development partners for enhanced efficiency and impact, in response to the development challenges confronting the Government of The Gambia. As part of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda of Reform (1997), which aims to make the UN a more results-driven, effective and efficient institution, the UNDAF and the Common Country Assessment (CCA) have become the primary tools for facilitating a common programme framework for the UN System at the country level.

In The Gambia, the 2007-2011 UNDAF emerged from a detailed analysis of the CCA which provided the basis for harmonized preparation of United Nations System’s Country Programmes and projects. It benefited from a consultative process involving the Government of The Gambia (GoTG), United Nations agencies, civil society and other development partners. The end result of this process was a set of concrete development objectives for the United Nations System in The Gambia over the 5-year period. These objectives which were derived as national priorities from the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MTP/PRSP II), the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Vision 2020 provided the basis for the formulation of the UNDAF outcomes.

Implementation of the current five-year UNDAF for The Gambia commenced in 2007. The UN guidance on UNDAF processes recommends annual reviews for relevance and progress towards its set of outcomes. In the case where annual reviews are not undertaken, mid-term review (MTR) becomes expedient for identifying and addressing implementation concerns for the balance of the programming cycle. As The Gambia UNCT did not undertake annual reviews of UNDAF 2007-2011, the MTR is particularly important in that it will provide an improved platform for developing joint programs with clearer targets, and lay the groundwork for common funding mechanisms and foster the design of better coordination arrangements.

1. **THE UNDAF MID-TERM REVIEW PROCESS**

**2.1 Review Objectives**

The overall objective of the UNDAF MTR is to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and integration of the UN’s mission, delivery of support and alignment to the Government of The Gambia’s national developmental priorities and needs as articulated in its second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II).

Specifically, the purpose is to provide the UNCT with feedback on the effectiveness of UNDAF’s programming framework in identifying and addressing implementation concerns for the remainder of the programming cycle, and for more effective and efficient delivery of developmental support. In the context of The Gambia, the Mid-Term Review (MTR) will enable the UNCT to:

* Assess progress towards achieving the expected results as defined in the UNDAF Results Matrix;
* Assess continued relevance of the expected results and make revisions when necessary;
* Assess the contribution of the UN System to the pursuit of the national priorities articulated in the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II);
* Identify and/or assess emerging issues from the national context that may call for review and/or reorientation of the UNDAF;
* Identify lessons that can benefit the revision of the current UNDAF, as well as the design of the successive ones;
* Draw conclusions on opportunities for greater progress towards UN Reform in The Gambia.

A major challenge that confronted the MTR related to the non-synchronization of the efforts by UN agencies in a way that permits outright assessment of each agency’s contributions to the developmental aspirations of the host country in the context of UNDAF. There are three agencies whose programme cycles are synchronized with the UNDAF cycle. These agencies are UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA. Together with WFP, which is one of the five (5) specialized agencies, they make up the EXCOM Group of the UN Country Team UNCT) in The Gambia. While UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA have synchronized their country programmes with the UNDAF cycle, and thus are readily able to assess their contributions to the Gambia’s MDG-based PRSP II, the contributions of specialized agencies are not measurable by the same standards as those with synchronized programme cycles. These specialized agencies include FAO, WHO, WFP, and UNHCR. WFP is the only EXCOM member whose country programme is not synchronized with the other EXCOM member agencies and the UNDAF. The challenge was to ascertain the relevant evaluation mechanism by which the specialized agencies validated their contributions to the developmental aspirations of the host country, and to assess these evaluation instruments in relation to the evaluation instruments of those with synchronized programme cycles. For the latter group of agencies, these evaluations are usually done through annual and mid-term reviews of country programme outcomes that are derived from the MDG-based PRSP II.

For those agencies whose country programme cycles are synchronized with the UNDAF, Annual Review Reports and Mid-Term Review reports were received and reviewed for their agency contributions. For some specialized agencies (e.g., WHO) Annual Review Reports for 2007 and 2008 were reviewed in conjunction with their Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS) documents to discern agency contributions. For other specialized agencies, Country project documents on specific projects that had been undertaken during the cycle were received, in addition to face-to-face consultations with Agency Heads and Agency Focal Persons that were held. During these consultations, specific structured questions were asked about each agency’s contributions to the current UNDAF.

**2.2** **Government Leadership and Participation**

The UNDAF derives its outcomes from national developmental priorities, as articulated in nationally- owned strategic documents such as the MDGs-based PRSP and Vision 2020. This makes the Government an indispensable partner in the UNDAF process. Furthermore, the UNDAF represents a unified framework designed to enable the UN family of agencies provide the programme country with the necessary technical and financial assistance, towards the achievement of the stated goals and objectives in the Framework. This again ascribes some roles in the pursuit of these goals to the Government of The Gambia.

 In recent times, features of Country Programmes that have emerged are the phasing out of the Agency Execution modality, and the reintroduction of the National Execution modality. These developments have conferred leadership roles on the Government of The Gambia for project management and implementation. Thus, leadership is expected of the Government of The Gambia to conduct the necessary mid-term reviews of the underlying government-owned PRSP to feed the MTR process. Fortunately, the UNDAF MTR occurred at an opportune time when the mid-term review of the MDGs-based Poverty Reduction Strategy II had been in progress for some time. Other things being equal, this development was expected to facilitate the assessment of the continued relevance of the UNDAF to the national goals and priorities.

 One cannot overemphasize the dictum that the verification of the continued relevance of UNDAF is the rationale for conducting the MTR. Therefore, active participation by the governmental implementing partners, in addition to the participation of other development partners, including other donors, NGOs, CBOs and CSOs, is required not only to preserve the consultative nature of the evaluation process, but also to monitor the congruence of the UNDAF implementation and its outputs to the stated national priorities. A consultative group meeting of all governmental and non-governmental partners was convened closer to the end of the review period to discuss and elicit feedback from partners to the review findings of the UNDAF Consultant, after which the comments and feedback were incorporated in a draft report for further discussion at a final stakeholder meeting.

**2.3** **Participation of UN Agencies and Partners**

Mid-Term Review of the UNDAF is a joint UN review, conducted with national partners, of the overall results expected from UN cooperation in the programme country. The main users of the output are the UNDAF’s UN partners, the government of the host country, and other development partners, including donors, NGOs, CBOs, CSOs and private sector institutions that support the programmes. While the MTR provides an opportunity to ensure the consistency of its outcomes with national priorities, it directly feeds into the design and preparation of the next UNDAF and of its component Country Programmes and projects by individual Agencies. Thus, the MTR involved all the UNCT Agencies, whose individual assessments of the state of the implementation of the UNDAF constitute an invaluable input to the review process. Such assessments are often the product of the Agencies’ respective mid-term reviews of their country programmes, ahead of a typical UNDAF MTR. For specialized agencies that do not have country programmes, their own methods of evaluating their contributions to the process must be shared with the Consultant. Mid-Term Review reports were received from a number of UN agencies, along with their respective Country Programme Action Plans. There are seven (7) UN agencies resident in The Gambia, out of which four (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP) are Executive Committee Members (EXCOM) of the UN Development Group (UNDG). The other three (FAO, WHO, and UNHCR) are specialized agencies. Over time, these resident UN agencies have been instrumental in assisting the government of The Gambia to develop and implement policies and promoting the delivery of key social services such as education and health, the formulation of national strategy for poverty reduction, decentralization of government institutions, development of capacity aimed at promoting livelihoods and reducing poverty among marginalized people such as women and the youth. The Agencies have also assisted the government in recent past to internalize international commitments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

**2.4 Management, Organization, and Methodologies deployed in the Review**

The review was managed by the UNDAF National Steering Committee led by the UN and the Office of the President (OP), in collaboration with the National Planning Commission. The Office of the President, as the Government Coordinating Agency, ensured that the government implementing partners fully participated in the process, including consultative meetings. At the UN, the process was supported by the Office of the Resident Coordinator, as well as the Programme Coordination Group (PCG). The agencies were responsible for coordinating preparation and consolidation of agency review reports and presentations in close collaboration with the Office of the Resident Coordinator.

With a pre-determined time frame of 25 working days, the review was conducted as a two-tier process. The first tier that took the first 10 days was devoted to internal consultations, including desk reviews of program documents: the UNDAF, the CCA, and the Annual and Mid-Term Progress Reports on PRSP II. The documents reviewed also included Mid-Term Review Reports of the EXCOM members of the UNCT , as well as the evaluation instruments of other specialized member agencies of the UNCT that have different programming cycles from that of the UNDAF. One-on-one consultations were held with Agency heads and focal persons of the UNCT, and weekly validation meetings were arranged with the Programme Coordination Group (PCG) to review progress and to clarify issues that may arise in the review process. In this period, while the consultant was still waiting to secure appointments with a couple of the agencies, he had the opportunity, based on the evidence gathered, to form an interim opinion of the current state of the UNDAF implementation, along with an impression of the successes, challenges, and emerging issues from the perspective of the UNCT. After the first ten (10) days, a consultative meeting involving the PCG members, government partners and NGOs and CSO was held, during which the Consultant’s assessment of the information gathered from the internal review was shared, and comments solicited in a consultative process. The process covered part of the next (10) days, during which one-on-one consultations with government partners and civic society organizations were also conducted. The remaining period was devoted to analysis and report writing.

**2.5** **Preliminary Observations**

The following were the observations made by the Consultant, following the internal review and consultations with UN Agency heads and other focal persons within the UN system. They are also the outcome of the desk review of governmental and agency strategic documents such as the PRSP II. Some of these observations will be revisited as performance assessments are made on the UNDAF outcome clusters. These preliminary observations were thoroughly discussed during the first consultative meeting held after the first 10 days of internal review. A number of suggestions and feedback were received and appropriately addressed during the second part of the review which was subsequently extended to permit completion of the governmental consultations.

1. The task of making informed assessments of what has been achieved in the last three years is a very difficult one. The UNDAF outcomes themselves are unusually broad, and are such that they generally encompass the programme objectives of every partner. They lack the specificity of outcome indicators and benchmarks by which efforts and outputs can be compared. The situation is perhaps an unintended outcome of the UNDAF design, since these outcomes were, as they should be, derived from government strategic documents such as PRSP II and Vision 2020. It is widely acknowledged that some of these documents are based on The Gambia’s relatively weak and unresponsive statistical base, and may thus lack the necessary updated indicators for planning and monitoring. In its current form, the UNDAF’s implementation could at best be assessed in qualitative terms, just by cataloguing the set of activities that has occurred for the purpose of influencing the critical indicator variables. With a more reliable statistical database that is also responsive to the data needs for planning, monitoring and evaluation, one should expect to see more statistically measurable UNDAF outcomes.
2. The economic and social contexts that gave birth to the UNDAF in its current form have changed considerably. The UNDAF was designed at a time when most domestic and global economic indicators were relatively stable. Since then, the global financial crisis and the economic slowdown have come to pass, although the baggage they brought has come to stay. Also, there were increases in fuel prices and the costs of production and hence increases in the prices of domestic staple food. Some of these changes have threatened food security, and required orchestrated responses from affected country governments by revisiting the goals and priorities and, with support from their development partners, reformulate plans to minimize the impact of those changes on the poor and vulnerable citizens. More significantly, these developments suggest the need for a review of the framework as it exists now, and to make the necessary adjustments to place more emphasis on currently emerging priorities such as food insecurity, inadequate capacity development, and the slow pace of decentralization, if indeed there is one..
3. There seems to be a perception that the UNDAF is just another one of the UN’s numerous initiatives, and that its glamour will fade with time, and that the pre-UNDAF status quo will be back in place. It does not take much to observe that to most agencies, allegiance is owed foremost to their respective agency programmes. Therefore, rather than being the defining framework for the agency’s country programme, the UNDAF has played second fiddle to each agency’s pillars of strategic focus.
4. There are hardly any examples of joint programming among UN agencies from design stage through common budgeting, to common time frame for implementation and monitoring. However, there are a handful of examples of projects executed jointly by UN agencies. While joint project execution is a healthy development, it needs to be emphasized that joint programming in the sense described above is the direction that the UNCT may need to encourage more vigorously in the successor UNDAF framework, in the spirit of “Delivering as One” which the UN Reform advocates.
5. UNCT leaders will need to agree to work together as one UN entity by presenting a unified approach in support of clients irrespective of the agency presenting it. This obviously requires considerable information and document sharing and, in some cases, consensus building on the language of policy messages going out of the UN.
6. The human resources and other capacity constraints seem to cut across most institutions, particularly governmental implementing partners, as well as NGOs, CSOs, etc., and it imposes considerable pressure on institutions to improvise with whatever is available. Underachievement is therefore an inevitable consequence of this constraint.
7. Due to a temporary derailment of national HIV/AIDS response in 2007, no effort has been made to conduct an evaluation of the socio-economic impact at the national, community and household levels. Likewise, no studies have been commissioned, with UN assistance, to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS on human development indicators in The Gambia, including life expectancy. Also, no portion of the HIPC Debt Relief dividend has ever been explicitly allocated to the nation’s AIDS response.
8. Cross-country estimates show that GDP growth originating in agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as GDP growth outside agriculture (Ligon and Sadoulet 2007). For China, aggregate growth originating in agriculture was estimated to have been 3.5 times more effective in reducing poverty than growth outside agriculture, and for Latin America 2.7 times more effective. Rapid agricultural growth in India following technological innovations (the diffusion of high yielding varieties) and in China following institutional reform (market liberalization) was accompanied by major declines in rural poverty. More recently, in Ghana, rural households accounted for a large share of a steep decline in poverty induced in part by agricultural growth (McKay & Aryeetey, 2004). Based on this evidence, one expects The Gambia to give agriculture the same priority that the PRSP II attaches to agriculture. While PRSP II ranks agriculture first, followed by education and health and nutrition, the government’s budgetary appropriations for 2007 and 2008 show both education and health receiving at least two and a half times the amount allocated to agriculture. The architects of PRSP II have obviously internalized the above referenced study results, but apparently the Finance Ministry have not. Thus, the Governments rhetoric relative to poverty reduction is not matched by its actions towards poverty reduction.
9. **SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE NATIONAL CONTEXT**

The Gambia ranks 160 out of 179 countries on the 2008 UN Human Development Index score, and remains a poor country with GNI per capita of US$360.[[1]](#footnote-1) Poverty headcount ratio (at poverty line of $1.25) is estimated at 67% with large socio-economic and regional variations. The economy of The Gambia is largely undiversified, and is limited by a small internal market. With a population of 1.6 million, growing at an annual rate of 2.8 %, and a land area of some 11,000 sq. km., The Gambia remains one of the most densely populated countries on the continent with 135 persons per sq. km.

The country has enjoyed steady growth and a stable macroeconomic environment in recent years (World Bank and IMF, 2007, WB, 2008[[2]](#footnote-2)). The PRSP II Annual Progress Report (January-December 2008, p.10) reported that GDP grew from 6.1 percent in 2007 to 7.2 percent in 2008. Growth has been broad based, led by the construction, telecommunication, and tourism sectors. The agriculture sector accounts for 33 percent of the GDP in The Gambia, and employs some 75 percent of the labour force. In addition, it is the sole source of income generation and food supply for majority of the rural households below the poverty line. The sector, however, registered only a 4 percent growth. Real GDP growth has averaged 6.2 percent since 2003, after a brief contraction in 2002 due to low rainfalls and poor macroeconomic management.

Sustained fiscal and monetary discipline has been accompanied by significant improvements of public financial management. The average inflation rate declined from 17.0 percent in 2003 to 2.1 percent in 2006, but it rebounded to between 5-6 percent in 2007as a result of rising costs of food and oil imports, before moderating to 4.5 percent in 2008.

The Gambia reached HIPC Completion point in December 2007, and also qualified for debt relief under MDRI, as a result of which the country’s stock of debt declined from 110% to 50% of its GDP. The debt relief provided some fiscal space for the Government to improve service delivery, and made more resources available for the social sectors for poverty reduction. However, the country remains at high risk of debt distress, and a declining international credit rating, due to the high level of outstanding debt and the country’s vulnerability to external shocks.

The global economic melt-down largely contributed to the global food crises, which accelerated soaring food and fuel prices and global credit crunch. These food prices have increased rapidly owing to a number of factors :(i) growing effective demand in fast growing economies; (ii) rapid diversion of grains to bio-fuels and animal feed; (iii) escalating production input costs (costs of seeds, fertilizers and agro-chemicals). Simultaneously, global food reserves were found to be at their lowest level in 25 years. The dramatic rise in food prices is severely affected the food security of large populations in many countries, particularly amongst the poorest of the poor and most vulnerable. Furthermore, higher prices have also significantly increased the food import bill of Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs).[[3]](#footnote-3)

The vulnerability of The Gambian economy to external shocks was revealed during the global economic crises (financial, fuel, and food) as the impact of these crises turned a budget surplus of GMD 120 million in 2007 (0.5% of GDP) to a deficit in 2008 equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP,[[4]](#footnote-4) and left in its path, an across- the- board budget reduction from GMD 5.1 billion to GMD 3.9 billion for the 2009 fiscal year. These developments have had serious repercussions on those social services that go a long way in alleviating poverty, particularly those that are critical for the survival of the poor and the vulnerable. These developments have also engendered permanent changes in the strategic focus of those UN agencies whose work relate to food security in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The context in which UNDAF outcomes are being pursued is rapidly changing. In recent times, external shocks of rising food and fuel prices, climate change, and the global economic slowdown have altered the perceived responsibilities of some UN Agencies. For example, the strategic objectives of WFP have changed to reflect the evolving nature of food aid and hunger. The change also marks a historical shift in the role of WFP from a ***food aid agency*** to a ***food assistance agency***, with a more nuanced and robust set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs. The overarching goal of this shift is to reduce dependency and to support governmental and global efforts to help to rebuild lives and livelihoods along the priorities defined by the host government. This includes building the institutional capacity of governments to manage and respond to emergency situations (WFP strategic Plan 2008-2011).

Following a joint mission between WFP and FAO in 2008 on the soaring food prices, WFP received a grant of GMD 2.6 million from the European Union to expand its on-going Food for Education Project that targeted 500 schools in nearly all rural communities in The Gambia, with an estimated 118,000 beneficiaries. The EU grant was aimed at expanding the school feeding programme to an additional 50,000 students in the urban areas, and also to secure the services of a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Officer to assess the food security situation in The Gambia.

On the health front, The Gambia is plagued by a rather high maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of 730 deaths per 100, 000 live births (2001) and infant mortality ratio (IMR) of 84 deaths per 1000 live births. The contributing factors for the high MMR include (a) poor quality of care in prenatal and delivery services; (b) an inadequate high-risk referral system; (c) delayed and/or inappropriate treatment of life-threatening complications of pregnancies and delivery. Although access to social services such as health and education has improved, insufficient resources have undermined the quality of these services. The vulnerable and the underserved, notably rural women and youth, urban poor and refugees are primarily affected. There is a high unmet need for emergency obstetric services (79 %). Access to these services, especially at the community level, is constrained by a poorly functioning emergency obstetric care system, including ill-equipped and inadequately staffed facilities. Harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) and early marriage contribute to the poor health status of women and children.[[5]](#footnote-5)

According to the 2003 census, nearly 42 percent of those aged 15-24 were sexually active, and low awareness among the youth about reproductive health issues, coupled with their limited access to youth-friendly services, exposes them to sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS and unwanted pregnancies.

The Gambia is predominantly a patriarchal society, characterized by gender disparities in health, education and services in other sectors. While the Government has initiated gender-sensitive policies to bridge the disparities gap, the structures for implementation and monitoring are weak.

**4**. **OVERALL PROGRESS RELATIVE TO THE UNDAF RESULTS MATRIX**

Three priority areas were identified for UN support in The Gambia for the period 2007-2011:

1. Poverty Reduction and Social Protection; 2) Basic Social Services; and 3) Governance and Human Rights. On the basis of these priorities, the UNDAF design process arrived at three programme outcome clusters that were targeted for support during the programming cycle, and were also aligned with the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP II) and the MDGs. They include
* **Outcome Cluster 1**: Poverty reduction and social protection strategies and systems established that enable the poor, vulnerable, women and youth to increase their productive capacities and generate livelihoods while protecting the environment;
* **Outcome Cluster 2**: Improved access to quality basic social services with particular attention to the vulnerable and the marginalized; and
* **Outcome Cluster 3**: Economic and political systems that utilize transparent, accountable, participatory and inclusive decision-making processes at national and decentralized levels.

The achievements under each outcome cluster are enunciated in the accompanying progress matrix designated in this report as Appendix 1. The *UNDAF Implementation Progress Matrix* attempts to capture progress made on each UNDAF outcome by reviewing the various UN agency contributions against the indicators and baseline attributes as defined in the UNDAF Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. In the sections that follow, the **major** achievements relating to the three outcome clusters are outlined, along with challenges, lessons learned and constraints identified. Brief overall assessments are made based on these major achievements, constraints and challenges. Recommendations are offered whenever necessary, and are recast later in the Conclusions and Recommendations section as the epilogue of this review report.

**4.1 Achievements, Challenges & Constraints under Outcome Cluster 1**

OUTCOME CLUSTER1:

***Poverty Reduction & Social Protection strategies and systems are established that enable the poor, vulnerable and youth to increase their production capacities and generate sustainable livelihoods while protecting the environment***.

**CP Outcome 1.1**: The *Establishment and capacity building of national institutions responsible for development and implementation of strategies to promote economic growth and poverty reduction supported.*

**Achievements**

There are success stories as well as failures in the implementation of strategies under this cluster. Progress has been made on some outputs, but other outputs are yet to be explored. UN agencies have been the main catalysts (through their respective country programmes and projects) for most of the outputs accomplished. Capacity constraints remain the most formidable barriers to progress. A good number of capacity building and capacity enhancement activities have been implemented since the beginning of the UNDAF cycle, and others are still underway, and yet there is a general concern that strategic institutions of the state are hampered by acute scarcity of trained manpower. There is a widespread acquiescence of the complicity of non-governmental organizations in The Gambia, including UN agencies, in the on-going high attrition rate that has eroded the institutional capacities of governmental institutions. As implementing agencies most of the trained personnel in these institutions typically receive training from UN and through agency sponsored projects, including those of the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and others in various fields during implementation of country programmes and projects. Upon receiving such training, they find themselves marketable, and end up selling their services to the highest bidders in terms of compensation, and they end up in the employment of non-governmental agencies with better conditions of service, including UN agencies. Thus, there is almost a moral obligation on the part of these beneficiary agencies to provide the technical and other forms of assistance for the government of The Gambia to design strategies and compensation packages that will assist it to attract the requisite personnel, train, utilize and retain such personnel.

Outlined below are some of the successes recorded so far in the UNDAF cycle, with the most obvious being the replacement since 2007 of the “agency execution” modality by the “national execution” modality.

The National Planning Commission (NPC) was successfully institutionalized as the main vehicle for coordination and monitoring of the MDGs-based PRSP II. Through the UNDP Country Programme (2007-2011), the NPC Bill was sent to the National Assembly with UN support and passed as NPC Act... Support was also provided for the development of the PRSP II, and subsequently for the organization of the Round Table Conference on the PRSP II in London in January 2008. Since 2007, the NPC has produced two (2) Annual Review Reports and one (1) Mid-Term Review Report of PRSP II. Also, with UN (UNDP) support, The National Action Plan for the implementation of the Paris Declaration was developed and disseminated. The challenge facing the NPC is its narrow-based support. The UNDP Country Programmes was instrumental in setting up the NPC, and remains its primary supporter. This overreliance on UNDP is a strategic weakness that needs to be addressed by broadening the partnership base of the Commission (UNDP: CPAP MTR 2009).

The NPC is working closely with the Aid Coordination Unit of the Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs (DOSFEA), and is promoting sector-wide approach (SWAp) for the funding and implementation of interventions in the PRSP II for the social sectors. Other development partners including the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank are already committed to budget support, and the European Union is leaning toward a commitment as well (UNFPA: CPAP Nov. 2009).

* The Disaster Management Act and Policy were formulated and the Disaster Management Agency has been established.
* Several other key policies including the Gambia Environmental Action Plan (GEAP), the Gambia Women’s Policy, and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) were formulated and enacted with support from UNDP.
* Agricultural production registered strong growth in 2008 and 2009, although most crop production levels were still below national consumption requirements. Recently new projects have begun to implement policies aimed at improving agric sector productivity and ultimately reduce poverty.
* Partnerships were harnessed for aid coordination and monitoring, including resource mobilization following the Round Table Conference. Memoranda of Understanding were signed between UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP for the launching of *DevInfo.* There is an expectation that, other things being equal, GamInfo, the customized version of Dev Info, will be launched in March 2010. Another MOU was signed among the UNDP, the Business Coalition, Media Houses and Networks regarding HIV/AIDS interventions in the Gambia.
* The oversight role of the National Assembly was enhanced in areas such as pro-poor budgeting and monitoring, and gender equity and HIV/AIDS have been mainstreamed into PRSP II and other sector policies.
* Sustainable Capacity development of national counterparts and institutions has been one formidable challenge so far. Capacity development has indeed been a feature in many interventions. Apart from the NPC, specific and institutional support was provided to Office of the President, the National Audit Office, the Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the National AIDS Secretariat, the Women’s Bureau, the National Disaster Agency, the National Environmental Agency, three (3) media houses and three Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Staff of the Independent Electoral Commission and members of the National Assembly were also beneficiaries of various capacity-strengthening training programmes, and the capacities of networks including PLWA, women’s groups and other support systems have been enhanced.
* The UNDP funded a number of capacity building and enhancement activities, including the dissemination of Annual Progress Reports of the PRSP II. The UNDP also supported a series of capacity building training programmes for the Police, Nurses, and Social Workers on Child Rights and Protection in 2007 and 2008. Despite all of these efforts, weak implementation capacity remains the major bottleneck for progress.
* A common factor that has been cited as a constraint to monitoring and evaluation is the nation’s weak statistical base, with a National Statistics System (NSS) that was unresponsive to statistical data needs for planning, monitoring and evaluation. Reform of the NSS began two years before the UNDAF, with support from the World Bank under the Capacity Building for Economic Management Project (CBEMP) which started in 2005. The objective of the reform was to strengthen the statistical reporting system in The Gambia that could also respond to the growing demand for statistical information. The Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBoS) was established to coordinate the NSS. It has been mentioned that in 2007, UNICEF, in collaboration with UNFPA and UNDP, launched a joint initiative with the view to establishing *DevInfo* as a national statistical database to measure progress in the achievement of the MDGs and the implementation of PRSP II. The database was to be eventually customized as *GamInfo*. In 2008, a Technical Working Group comprised of Government and UN Staff identified 356 indicators to be adapted into *GamInfo*. Currently, the database has over 2000 data values, and it is web-enabled. Several capacity building exercises were done for GBoS and Government Officials on *DevInfo*. In July 2009, an International UNV was recruited as the *DevInfo*’s Database Administrator.
* Three Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) were carried out between 1995 and 2005/2006. The finali*zation of* the third survey (MICS III) was followed by capacity building for GBoS in data processing, data analysis, and report writing in 2007. In 2008, its results *were up*loaded onto UNICEF and GBoS websites, making The Gambia’s country-specific disaggregated data widely available for programming, resource mobilization and advocacy.
* The PRSP has produced two Annual Progress Reports (2007, 2008) and a Draft Mid-Term Review Report with support from the UNDP.

**Overall Assessment**:

Considerable capacity building seems to have taken place as this impressive account suggests. However, one cannot make an informed assessment about adequacy or otherwise unless there are pre-determined capacity targets explicitly specified for each institution. It is heartening to note that the NPC has been successfully established, but there are no indications that it possesses the skills set required for it to fulfill its responsibilities. Creating the Commission is a means to an end, but it is not clear if it can accomplish that end without the requisite capacity. The same can be said of GBoS. While the latter (GBoS) has benefited from several training programmes, one cannot conclude that these training programmes are adequate or even close to the array of statistical skills set required to manage a national database. In short, one needs to know the target capacities for the institutions concerned in order to make an informed assessment of the degree of achievement in this outcome. Ironically, the PRSP II MTR cites inadequate capacity as the major constraints for the effective functioning of both the NPC and the GBoS.

Two Annual Progress Reports (2007, 2008) and a Draft Mid-Term Review Report of the PRSP II have been produced. The effectiveness of monitoring progress with respect to the PRSP II depends on the maintenance of a strong statistics database that permits the tracking of its statistically measurable indicators. That The Gambia has a weak statistics database is widely known fact, and it suggests that there is still some work to be done in terms of building and sustaining the capacity to update the database in order to monitor specified indicators regularly and effectively. GBoS lacks both the human and the institutional capacities to undertake periodic surveys as a means of updating statistical variables that are typically used to track socio-economic progress. The lack of current data on variables makes the design of the UNDAF very challenging. For the sake of monitoring, UNDP and other UN agencies, upon consultations with GBoS, will need to suggest indicators that can be readily updated, for use in tracking progress in the remaining period of the UNDAF cycle, as well as the successor UNDAF’s cycle.

A major effort has been initiated in confronting the capacity constraint. This is the launching of the Public Service Reform programme aimed at ensuring that the Civil Service has the right capacity to deliver services to the poor and the vulnerable. The reform is targeted at addressing three components of the capacity constraint: institutional, organizational and human. The long-term vision is an efficient and effective public service sustained by appropriate institutional arrangements and partnerships.

While the project was expected to be implemented from 2007 to 2011, the implementation was delayed for one (1) year due to late procurement. The Project Manager was hired at the end of 2008, and started work in early 2009. Whereas the Spanish DGTTF has fulfilled its financial commitment of US$1.45 million to this project since 2007, it is understood that UNDP’s funding of the project is still purported to end in December 2010. That would effectively reduce the project life from five (5) years to two-and-a half to three years. It is unlikely that the noble project expectations articulated in the project document can be realized in such a short period of the project’s life.

**Recommendations:**

There is an urgent need for a concerted effort by the UNCT to initiate a collaborative effort with GOTG leadership in conceptualizing, designing and implementing a capacity building strategy that is sustainable to tackle this endemic constraint facing institutions. Inadequate capacity is the most significant factor constraining progress in many of the UNDAF strategies. This issue requires practically enforceable, well thought-out strategy to attract, train and retain the requisite skills to implement the strategies designed to impact the lives of the poor and the vulnerable through various country programmes. Its enforcement will rest with the beneficiary institutions in The Gambia (including governmental partners, NGOs and CSOs), but the initiative and the design of the strategies could use the experience of the UN family of agencies. To a large extent, the initiation of the Public Service Reform programme is a welcome beginning of an effort that must eventually transcend the civil service and find its usefulness in capacity enhancement in non-governmental institutions including NGOs and CSOs which are important partners in the implementation of development frameworks such as the UNDAF.

**CP Outcome 1.2**: *National systems to increase employment (formal and informal) and productive capacity with a particular focus on women and youth enhanced*.

Achievements:

Support from the UNDP and the ILO enabled the launching of the Gambia Priority Employment Programme (GAMJOBS) with the overall objective of developing skilled, versatile, dynamic and efficient workforce, and creating the opportunities for self employment for the youth in both the formal and informal economies. Sectors with high growth potentials in the economy, including agriculture, tourism, fisheries, re-export trade and infrastructure, were targeted for the activities of GAMJOBS.

GAMJOBS was expected to create 10,000 jobs annually, and at the end of the Program (2011), 20,000 young women and men would have been trained in vocational skills and entrepreneurship; support was to be secured to establish 500 rural community enterprises and 5000 micro and small enterprises in the urban areas; and it was expected to generate economic activities to directly support more than 100,000 people and about 500,000 people indirectly. GAMJOBS was institutionalized in July 2007 and became fully operational in 2008. Like the Public Service Reform, this project also has an end date of 2011. Since its inception in 2007/2008, the following achievements have been recorded:

* A consultancy service was engaged to establish a national framework of state and non-state actors for continuous assessment of the impact of policies on employment, in line with the MDGs, the PRSP II, the Vision 2020, and the National Employment Action Plan (NEAP).
* A study of the impact of macroeconomic and social policies on employment and poverty was commissioned in 2007.
* A consultant was engaged to study micro-finance institutions and facilities with the view to gathering lessons for the development of a micro-finance institution to be known as GETFUND to back GAMJOBS.
* Support to National Youth Service Scheme (NYSS) for on-lending to twenty-two (22) Ex-Corps graduates as start-up capital for self-employment enterprises. The total amount of lending was GMD890, 500. GAMJOBS also funded a consultancy on behalf of the NYSS to conduct the Impact Assessment and Tracer Study of NYSS graduates.
* Support to the President’s International Award (PIA) valued at D 285,000 to acquire tools for a skills training centre in the North Bank Region.
* Support to National Youth Council (NYC) valued at D 164,325 to fund a National Youth Conference and Festival at Farafenni in the North Bank Region.
* Cumulatively, GAMJOBS has helped 68 youth and women with entrepreneurial training and loans to start up new enterprises since its inception**.** At this rate, it is inconceivable that the target 20,000 trained youthful entrepreneurs can be accomplished by the end of the cycle.

**Challenges:**

1. ***Unmet financial expectations***: The objectives of GAMJOBS were conceived with an anticipated operational budget of US$9.5 million including UNDP TRAC Funding of some US$100,000 and a contribution from the Spanish DGTTF. Up to date, over US$ 8.5 million is yet to be mobilized with the assistance of UNDP**.** Thus, unmet funding expectation has been a major obstacle to implementation progress. Also,there is low level of awareness of the opportunities for the target youth, particularly those not in education, not in employment, and not in training. (i.e., the NEET youth).
2. ***Slow Disbursements***: There is a widely held view that difficult UNDP disbursement procedures have led to persistent delays in disbursement of funds for approved activities, and hence delays in implementation.
3. Frequently, there are unsatisfactory project proposals submitted for fundin**g**.
4. There is a high attrition rate among programme personnel which is generally attributed to the slow rate of progress on implementation, underscored by the unmet funding expectations.

**Overall assessment:**

The evidence is clear that GAMJOBS is up and running to boost employment creation (in both the formal and informal economies) for the youth, women, and other disadvantaged people such as refugees. However, it is unlikely that the target objectives outlined above can be met by the end of this UNDAF’s cycle. According to the MTR (2010) of PRSP II, the national labour policies are currently under review by consultants with the view to updating these policies. This suggests that progress in this indicator is far behind schedule, although the Programme Management Unit has been doing a decent job in laying structures for partnerships and operational effectiveness.

The slowness of action has been attributed to the unmet funding expectations. While GAMJOBS may not reach desired goals by the end of this UNDAF cycle, the outcome expectations will need to be revisited, given what is known now about the pace of implementation, the finances, and the unresolved bottlenecks.

A specter of persistent admonition by UNDP as a solution to unmet funding expectations was echoed on a few occasions. UNDP was known to have asked for programs to be scaled down as a result of unmet funding expectations, and GAMJOBS has been one recipient of such admonitions.

In principle, the objectives of GAMJOBS are laudable and it needs all the support it requires to make an impact in the lives of the target beneficiaries. The programme has the potential to create a corps of new generation of entrepreneurs who no longer have to depend on the labour market for their livelihoods. It is indeed the most honourable escape route from poverty.

**Recommendations**:

1. The corps of entrepreneurs that GAMJOBS is designed to create is the type that has become the dominant employers in some well-developed economies. The formal and informal private sector, self-employed businesses absorb an increasing share of the labour force in some countries. It is good to develop the entrepreneurial acumen of the youth while they are in the experimental stages in their lives, and to help them to access start-up capital with favourable conditions, as well as and other business incentives to start up their own enterprises. In the long run, their contributions to the GDP will more than offset the investments made on them in their grooming stages.
2. The UNDP’s disbursement procedures have been cited more often as a source of delays by many implementers, including the PMO, the Executing Agency for GAMJOBS. The UNCT may need to take a closer look at the prospects for revision for the sake of implementation effectiveness. This Consultant’s experience in other countries reveals similar disbursement rigidities and their untold delays on project implementation.
3. The loan conditions for start-up businesses for the youth ought to be entirely different from those of the conventional bank loans. This is the raison d’être of the existence of micro-finance firms: to provide financing for those clients who, by virtue of their disadvantaged positions, cannot fulfill conventional loan conditions of commercial banks. It is, therefore, inexplicable for micro-finance loan conditions to be harder for a start-up youth enterprise than those of conventional commercial bank loans. It is understood that GAMJOBS is leaving no stone unturned to secure favorable micro-financing conditions for start-up businesses, and this effort deserves unreserved support by all major stakeholders. It may be necessary to look outside the financial market within Gambia, and to seek development partners’ assistance in mobilizing micro-financing resources purposely geared towards making GAMJOBS a successful programme worthy of emulation elsewhere on the continent.

**CP Outcome 1.3:** Establishment *of effective social and civil protection mechanisms to protect the most vulnerable supported, and timely emergency response strengthened taking into account environmental sustainability.*

Some success stories under this output can be attributed to some of the few collaborative efforts between UN agencies in terms of joint execution of projects:

* UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP have jointly enabled the establishment of an operational national information system on the situation of children and women, making quality, disaggregated data available for policy analysis and advocacy.
* WFP and UNICEF have collaboratively worked on the National School Feeding Programme in The Gambia that covers almost all rural primary schools.
* WFP, in collaboration with UNHCR provided full support of food for the recent case load of some 7,000 refugees; and WFP, FAO and CILSS (an agency related with FAO) have been jointly engaged in Annual Crop Assessments

UN agencies have also worked with NGOs towards achieving this output:

* The UNICEF-Tostan-GOTG Community Empowerment Project is geared towards reduced incidence of harmful traditional practices such as early marriage and FGM/C. In early 2009, 33 Communities signed an MOU publicly abandoning FGM/C. Since then, more than 40 Mandinka communities involved in the first phase of the project have moved to full public declaration to abandon FGM/C and early marriage.

Also, UNFPA, working with BAFROW and GAMCOTRAP, is implementing a programme on FGM/C aimed at empowering communities to abandon the practice as well as other harmful traditional practices. A regional working group on the abandonment of FGM/C, Sharing Technology and Resources for an Engaged Active Media (STREAM), of which BAFROW represents in The Gambia, manages the related information and advocacy website.

Through its country programme,

* UNICEF has supported mechanisms established to protect children against abuse, exploitation, and violence. A Child protection database is currently operational which provides up-to-date information on children and the services available to children.
* UNICEF has supported Youth in conflict with the law with psycho-social counseling and care services at the Juvenile Wing in Jeshwang. Some have been re integrated with their families and supported to acquire livelihood skills.
* UNICEF has supported twenty (20) out-of-school youths at the GTTI to acquire car body repairs and auto mechanic skills in 2008. In the same year, over 1500 orphans and vulnerable children were sponsored to attend school.
* To a very large extent, UNICEF’s child and social protection activities have been implemented in the URR on the basis of the region’s poor rating on social indicators relative to other regions. Sustained birth registration (BR) at RCH facilities combined with BR campaigns through mobile registration teams achieved 71% coverage of children under 5 years. Prior to the campaign, URR was the region with the lowest BR. Now URR is the second highest region. The on-going process of decentralization may be an opportunity to secure BR funding from municipal budgets so that it may be sustained.
1. . WFP’s Emergency Assistance to Flood Victims Project and the Emergency Assistance to the Cassamance Refugees in Foni were short-term responses to emergency situations.
2. WFP also secured funding to conduct food security and vulnerability analysis and mapping, and provided support to the National Disaster Management Agency through assistance to 15,000 flood victims throughout the country in 2009. WFP also helped to strengthen the capacities of the five (5) regional disaster management teams (from URR, CRR, LRR, WR, and NBR) via on-the-job training and other formal sessions. WFP is in the process of securing the services of a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Officer to strengthen its ability to provide long term assistance for improving food security.

**Overall Assessment**

Progress has been made on this programme outcome, particularly on the social and civil protection outcomes, and is spearheaded by UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNDP. The impact of the interventions on the poor and the vulnerable has been captured in some of the annual reports of the agencies. Based on the intensity of activities carried out in this area, if efforts continue with the same degree of intensity, a substantial portion of this outcome could be accomplished.

However, the synergies arising from joint agency interventions have not been felt in most of the programme areas, simply because there have not been many examples of joint programming. In situations when the activities themselves require agencies to operate in their strategic focus areas, joint supervision and joint monitoring could enhance the outputs of the interventions. In the remaining period of the UNDAF cycle, and leading up to the design of the next cycle, UN agencies should be encouraged to share information, plan and strategize together and indulge more in joint execution of programmes in their efforts toward providing relief to the poor and the vulnerable.

**CP Outcome 1.4:** *National systems to improve household food security enhanced*

The Gambia is one of the most vulnerable countries to food crisis, and it was already a food deficit country before the onset of the recent food crisis. The country has an annual consumption requirement of 160,000 metric tons of rice- the staple food- of which only 7,400 metric tons, representing some 4.6% of annual consumption requirements, are produced locally. The causes of this food deficit can be traced to low productivity in key food crops (rice, millet, sorghum, and maize), high dependence on rain-fed agriculture, inappropriate production techniques, lack of production inputs, pests and diseases, capped by the dominance of smallholder subsistence farming. At the same time, cereal consumption increased from 214,000 metric tons in 1997 to 291,000 metric tons in 2007. A WFP trend analysis projected that the cereal gap would increase from 65,000 metric tons in 1997 to 150,000 metric tons in 2007.

Thus, the national context on the basis of which UNDAF was designed has changed, and continues to change. In the recent past, external shocks of rising food and fuel prices, climate change, and the global economic slowdown have altered the perceived responsibilities of some UN Agencies. WFP’s strategic objectives have changed since the inception of UNDAF 2007-2011 to reflect the changing nature of food aid and hunger. The change also marks a historical shift in the role of WFP from a **food aid agency** to a **food assistance agency**, with a more nuanced and robust set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs. The overarching goal of this shift is to reduce dependency and to support governmental and global efforts to help to rebuild lives and livelihoods in line with priorities defined by the host government. This includes building the institutional capacity of governments to manage and respond to emergency situations (WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011).

In recent years, the agricultural sector has suffered from declining production due to adverse weather conditions, combined with a range of other constraints, including weak levels of support. It was estimated that the gap in food grain availability from local production for 2008 was approximately 151,000 metric tons (MTs). This represented 12 months’ consumption needs for some 860,000 persons (approximately 54 percent of the population, which had to be met by import purchases or through barter arrangements.[[6]](#footnote-6) As a result of this food deficit, and soaring food and fuel prices, the Government’s budget balance declined from a surplus of GMD 120 million (0.5percent of the GDP) in FY 2007 to a deficit equivalent to 2.2percent of the GDP.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The activities of specialized UN agencies (FAO, WFP) and UNDP as well as other collaborating agencies were particularly visible during and after the period of the soaring food crisis in 2007/2008.

* FAO sourced FSCA facility for The Gambia to improve food security through improved agricultural productivity, improved output marketing, and sustained increases in the incomes of project beneficiaries, mostly farmer-based organizations and small-scale agro-processors. All of these changes are expected to result in improved livelihoods and food security.
* FAO & WFP jointly undertook Annual Crop Assessments along with CILSS. The two agencies are in the process of launching a School Gardening Pilot Project this year (2010), with WFP sponsoring 20 schools and FAO sponsoring 10 schools. In connection with this pilot project, FAO has prepared a school gardening manual which is currently in print.
* In collaboration with UNICEF, WFP is implementing a School Feeding Programme covering all primary schools in rural Gambia. This programme has yielded unintended benefits such as increased and sustained school enrollment and attendance, as well as income transfers to parents (in the form of increased savings).
* WFP is also helping to build the institutional capacity of the government to manage and respond to emergency situations. Sometimes, WFP buys surplus agricultural output in times of gluts in the market to boost and sustain investments and agricultural productivity.
* UNDP, as the implementing agency for the GEF, is providing funding for the Sustainable Management of Endemic Ruminant Livestock project, which is being executed under the GEF. FAO is serving on the National Technical Advisory Body.
* FAO, UNICEF, WFP and WHO all sit on the Steering Committee of the Nutritional Education Project.

**Overall Assessment:**

The PRSP II MTR laments the reasonably good performance of the agricultural sector in the 2007/2008 cropping season, and recounts nine new projects on the ground aimed at addressing food insecurity in The Gambia. They include the Participatory Integrated Watershed Management Project (PIWAMP), the Rural Finance Project (RFP), the Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS), the Farmer-Managed Rice Irrigation Project (FMRIP), and the dissemination and cultivation of New Rice for Africa (NERICA). There were also some new investments in the livestock sub-sector. A new hatchery project is currently in operation with the capacity to produce 20,000 chicks per month, and a potential for producing up to 200,000 chicks per month. There is also the Sustainable Management of Endemic Ruminants’ Species (SMERS) project launched by the International Trypanosomiases Centre (ITC) under the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The Rural Finance Project established 66 Village Savings and Credit Associations (VISACAs) to enable farmers to have access to rural micro-finance institutions.

All of these projects are in place with the support of UN agencies. Thus the visibility of UN agencies during and after the recent food crisis is a natural reaction to the desire of UN agencies to ensure the effectiveness of their respective programmes and projects in looking for solutions during periods of crises. It may be recalled that WFP’s strategic focus has changed to reflect the evolving nature of hunger and food assistance. This has called for the performance of other non-traditional functions such as Annual Crops Assessments, and Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM). WFP also has an array of community-based programmes to help communities to reinforce their essential food and nutrition security systems. Thus the increased involvement of UN agencies, especially during the recent crisis, must be seen as a sign that the necessary infrastructure for a food secure future for The Gambia was in progress.

However, given the complementarities of efforts of UN agencies, particularly during crisis periods, there seems to be tremendous opportunities for joint programming among agencies even before the next crisis arrives. “In many countries, the end of a disaster often becomes the precursor of the next one, either because the first shock has undermined the resilience capacities of countries and communities, or there is an underlying low level of disaster preparedness.[[8]](#footnote-8) Among other things, one of WFP’s strategic objectives is to prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. Therefore, at various times throughout the cycle, WFP will be deploying its set of tools to support and strengthen the capacities of governments and communities to prepare for, assess and respond to acute hunger, and to support and strengthen the resilience of communities to shocks through the creation of safety nets and assets. In this effort, it should be feasible for other agencies to engage in joint planning, joint financing, joint execution and joint monitoring of food-security programmes in a way that communities would benefit from the synergies arising from such programming.

OUTCOME CLUSTER 2

***Improved access to quality basic social services with particular attention to the vulnerable and marginalized***.

**CP Outcome 2.1**: *Improved quality services in reproductive health, child health, nutrition, water and environmental sanitation for targeted groups*.

**The context and some achievements**

* National under-five (U-5) mortality rate stood at 131(per 1000 live births) in 2006, down from 141 in 2000, representing a total decline of 7.1 percent ( or an average annual decrease of 1.2 percent). UNICEF’s CP targeted a decline of 29 percent by 2011. Historically, this would be an unusually large decline for The Gambia. This would bring the rate to 93 by 2011, requiring an average annual decline of 5.8 percent. Given the health profile of the country, along with the prevailing health infrastructure, this target is clearly not feasible in a 5-year time frame, although some recent positive developments may lead to a modest decline in the rate: (a) almost 50% of U-5 children sleep under Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs) (up from 35 % in 2000); (b) morbidity and mortality due to malaria reportedly reduced by 85% and 100% respectively[[9]](#footnote-9); (c) 75% of U-5 children vaccinated against all 6 malaria antigens; (d) The Global Fund has paved the way for Accelerated Child Survival and Development interventions; and (e) 82 % of the population are using improved drinking water sources.
* The maternal mortality rate (MMR) was last estimated at 730 (per 100,000 live births) in 2001, down from 1,050 in 1990, an average annual decline of 2.8%. According to the PRSP II MTR, this rate of decline is unsatisfactory. UNICEF targeted 38 % decline in MMR to 456 by 2011, translating into an annual decline of 7.6%. The contributing factors for the high MMR include (a) the poor quality of care in prenatal delivery services; (b) an inadequate high risk referral system; and (c) delayed and /or inappropriate treatment of life-threatening complications of pregnancies and delivery. UNICEF’s optimism may be based on the finding that presently over one-third of all maternal deaths are due to (totally preventable) infections (UNICEF: CPAP MTR 2009), and also on the positive developments that 78% of women have received tetanus toxoid (TT2), while 89% of all pregnant women make at least one ante-natal care visit. Also, 57% of all births are assisted by skilled attendants.[[10]](#footnote-10) However, the PRSP II MTR 2010 quotes a recent Fistula-based study in 2006 which estimates MMR to be 556 per 100,000 live births. While this rate is still above the global average of 400, and definitely far above the MDG target of 263, the UNICEF target of 456 is clearly unattainable.[[11]](#footnote-11) Nevertheless, The UNFPA MTR 2009 recommended the strengthening of referrals by identifying specific barriers to timely referral system for adolescents. In 2009, UNFPA, in a collaborative arrangement with WHO and UNICEF, supported Emergency Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health (EMNCH) services in Basse Health Centre.
* Management of severe malnutrition is now implemented in two health facilities using new WHO guidelines. Community-based management of malnutrition has been strengthened with supplies by UNICEF of Ready-to-use therapeutic foods (RUTF), including plump nut preparations. Vitamin A supplementation (VAS) and de-worming are carried out within routine vaccination and national immunization days. Coverage for the last routine VAS was 83%, up from 26% in the first VAS. The baby-friendly community initiative is implemented by UNICEF in partnership with NaNA in all 70 primary health care villages. Exclusive breast-feeding up to 6 months now stands at 41 % nationally. The Nutrition Policy 2000-2005 has been revised, with the new version covering the years 2010-2020, and to include iodine deficiency disorder (IDD), HIV/AIDS, infant and young child feeding (IYFC) and severe malnutrition. The National Food Act promotes breastfeeding and regulates iodized salt consumption.
* Through UNICEF’s Country Programme, safe water was provided to 10 villages in the most remote part of URR, to the benefit of some 5298 citizens. This represents 3% increase in water coverage. Twenty (20) community taps were installed in Talinding, an urban slump of cholera hotspot. In these hotspots, access to safe water reached 31% in 2008. One-fifth of all households are using appropriate water treatment methods in the area. A total of 25 water management committees and 60 community health workers were trained and engaged in the promotion of household water treatment (HWT). The proportion of the population using HWT increased from 3 % to 22% in 2008. Fifty (50) masons in URR were trained in improved latrine construction skills in 25 communities with a total population of 60,052 (29% of the population of URR). Community-led total sanitation (CLTS) is being piloted in URR, and 13 communities were sensitized to stop open field defecation, a practice utilized by 4% of the population. Through the school system, water and sanitation facilities were constructed to serve some 7,298 school children. A Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) manual has been developed for school health sensitization. Hand washing promotion campaigns were held in 15 schools in 2008, supported by a local soap manufacturer.

**Overall Assessment:**

Agency activities under this outcome have been intense, with UNFPA (for reproductive health and other related activities) and UNICEF (child health and other related services) leading the pack. Important contributions also came by collaborative efforts between UNFPA and WHO in establishing EMNCH services in Basse, URR. As noted in the Implementation Matrix in Annex 1, UNICEF spent considerable efforts to influence child health and nutrition, as well as maternal health, although in the latter, UNFPA was the largest and most active partner. The Global Fund, through its Round 6 (Malaria) and Round 8 (HIV/AIDS) grants, paved the way for Accelerated Child Survival and Development interventions, and UNICEF spent approximately 36 percent of its Country Programme spending from 2007-2009 on Child Survival and Development (CSD).

There were unmet expectations as UNICEF, perhaps relying on other collaborating UN partners, projected 29% decline in Under-5 mortality from 131/1000 to 93/1000 live births, and 37.5 percent decline in maternal mortality, from 730/100,000 to 456/100,000 live births. By its Mid-Term evaluation, UNICEF had scaled down its expectations. For one thing, the historical record did not support such high expectations. However, some observers partly attribute the unmet expectations to the apparent competitive tendencies among other collaborating UN agencies. It is believed that uninterrupted, sustained activities in the spirit of cooperation among collaborating UN partners could have made the difference.

The results on this outcome are mixed. While there are gradual movements in some of the indicators, the general consensus is that these movements are not significant enough to make a dent in the health and other basic social profile of the country. Many of the indicators are still well above global targets, and by regional standards, some are well above the averages in sub-Saharan Africa.

The UNDAF did not set targets for these indicators. Instead, it relied on targets set within the framework of The Gambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II). Some of these targets are based on MDGs which have a longer cycle than the UNDAF. It is imperative that the successor UNDAF sets clear indicator targets in order to permit constant monitoring of progress over time, ceteris paribus.

**CP Outcome 2.2:** *National capacity to respond to HIV/AIDS strengthened***.**

**Achievements:**

1. The National HIV/AIDS Policy is in place with an overall goal “*to stabilize and reduce the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in The Gambia and provide treatment, care and support for people living with or affected by HIV/AIDS*.”
2. The National PMTCT Policy Guidelines are currently under review to include a shift from mono-therapy to complex ARV regimen, opt-in/opt-out and routine tests for CD4 cell count to all pregnant women who are HIV positive.

The National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework has been revised to cover the four priority areas (Four Ps). However, the Framework does not adequately articulate specific indicators for monitoring progress with respect to children affected by HIV/AIDS.

1. Until recently, the VCT uptake services in The Gambia was low with services mainly offered through Reproductive and Child Health clinics at public health facilities, and thus limiting access to the general population.
2. WHO, UNAIDS and other collaborating UN partners provided technical support to the National AIDS Secretariat (NAS) and the National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) in developing a successful proposal to the Global Fund (GFATM) for funds to address the issue within the context of the national response to HIV/AIDS. Funds were made available in 2008 to the WHO Country Office (WCO) for VCT training in order to expand the services.
3. UNAIDS supported the development of a rich framework of composite indicators that are used to track progress in the overall response management.
4. Support groups of people living with HIV/AIDS have been strengthened, with financial and technical support from the UNDP, to participate effectively in the national response. In most cases these support groups have served as resource persons in training programmes and workshops organized by CBOs and NGOs. Despite the fear of stigma and discrimination, nine (9) functional support groups have been formed in different parts of the country.
5. The Gambia’s other development/cooperating partners, including national and International NGOs have played significant roles in funding national HIV responses, and supporting HIV/AIDS programmes through respective organizational efforts towards the fight against the pandemic.

**Constraints and Lessons Learned**

There has been a lack of priority for HIV/AIDS programming among the UNCT. While the UN Theme Group and the Technical Working Group are still active, The Gambia is yet to establish a Joint Team on AIDS, as well as a joint programme.

1. On the surface, the lack of priority seems hard to explain, as it runs contrary to the experience of other countries with similar prevalence status. Upon a deeper reflection, the reason for the lack of urgency is discernible. The National AIDS Council was dormant following the President’s claim in January 2007 that he had found an alternative cure for AIDS. This derailed the national response as the lack of political commitment, underscored by the President’s claim, led to the suspension of virtually all forms programmes for prevention. The National AIDS Secretariat lost almost its entire core staff in 2007, and decentralized offices were shut down due to lack of funding and commitment to ensure the functionality of regional offices. Obviously, in a difficult political environment, the UNCT could not be seen to be advancing a national response that was not owned by the government. Indeed the government was trumpeting an alternative non-evidence-based response. As late as 2006, HIV/AIDS Response Planning was not evidence-based. The design of the 2009-2014 National Strategic Framework (NSF) marks the renewal of the Government’s commitment and return to evidence-based national response to the pandemic. This followed a revelation by the 2008 sentinel surveillance that the HIV prevalence was in fact on the increase.
2. Low donor confidence at a time when additional resources were required to scale up and sustain prevention services, following the closure of the Multi-country HIV/AIDS Programme (MAP), revealed funding gaps that persist up to date. Also, as HIV/AIDS became temporarily invisible on the country’s priority radar screen, it became relatively difficult to mobilize resources from the private and/or business sector to boost HIV prevention efforts. The PRSP II MTR 2010 reveals that no portion of the HIPC Debt Relief funds has so far been explicitly allocated to finance the nation’s AIDS response, and there are a few funding gaps in the NSF which require immediate attention, to avert reversal of progress made on this outcome.
3. The Gambia Country Assessment reports cite inadequate funding for HIV/AIDS programmes and interventions from national government budget (The Gambia/NAS/UNAIDS 2006; PRSP II 2007-2011). Between 2007 and 2008, total expenditure on HIV/AIDS-related activities increased by only 1.7% (NASA studies 2007; 2008), and the low level of funding has dimming implications for sustainability of flow of funds for the national response. Even at the current low prevalence rates, the economic burden on the national economy necessitates increased reliance on external funding sources. However, because of the low prevalence, The Gambia could be sidelined for increased funding, at a time when increased funding is needed in the face of new infections and the sustainability of PLWHA on ARV drugs. Thus, alternative sources of funding are required.
4. To date, there has been no effort made to conduct an evaluation of the socio-economic impact of AIDS at the national, community and household levels. Likewise, no studies have been commissioned, with UN assistance, to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS on important human development indicators in The Gambia, including life expectancy.
5. There is consensus among HIV stakeholders that gender inequalities contribute to the fuelling of the epidemic. However, experiences in other countries also show that typically, there is the lack of requisite skills amongst stakeholders that can utilize this knowledge to design gender-responsive transformative policies, strategies and interventions to neutralize the gender-based source of the epidemic.
6. UNDP’s disbursement procedures and regulations have been cited by many partners as a major challenge to implementers, and it is alleged to cause untold delays in programme implementation.
7. There are a number of formidable challenges in M & E with respect to HIV/AIDS. The Gambia lacks a comprehensive tool for harmonizing HIV/AIDS data generated by various stakeholders, and there is no nationally integrated HIV database that captures routine monitoring, surveys, surveillance and research information. Also, the NAS as a coordinating body lacks adequate capacity to produce periodic outputs to disseminate the results of M & E activities.

**Overall Assessment**:

The UN System in The Gambia has been a major partner in the national response by providing technical assistance and financial support in key strategic areas, including institutional strengthening of PLWHA support groups, technical assistance in grant proposals writing, strengthening of the health care delivery system, care and support programmes, promotion of life skills education targeting youth, women and children, procurement and supply of both male and female condoms, training of health care workers, and the Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT).

The key programme interventions for the national response include strategies to strengthen surveillance, strengthen the M&E system, and undertake specific disease-related studies such as conducting a gender analysis of female and male vulnerability to AIDS in all geographic regions. Other important interventions involve the strengthening of HIV/AIDS related research, promoting operational research, and improving HIV/AIDS learning, knowledge-sharing and information management.

**Recommendations**:

1. Most country responses to HIV/AIDS are owned and driven by the state, and the UN family of agencies can bring its comparative advantage in technical expertise to enhance the country’s response management. In view of the shortage of skilled personnel in the health sector, exacerbated by the high attrition rate, one of the ways by which the UNCT can assist the country to strengthen its health system’s capacity is by the establishment of a health training institute to train people in specific areas of personnel scarcity, including laboratory technicians, x-ray technicians, physiotherapists and many other health system specialty areas. Building the capacity of health system personnel who work in the field of HIV/AIDS is particularly critical to ensure that clinical interventions embodied in the country’s HIV/AIDS response are effectively implemented.
2. Successful implementation of the national response in the context of the 2009-2014 National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework (NSF) is contingent upon the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS coordination structures at all levels. It is common knowledge that there are some governance issues within The Gambia’s three-tier health delivery system that need to be resolved, and an effective coordination system must be put in place to manage the national response at community levels. This calls for the strengthening of existing community systems, focusing on improving efficiency and effectiveness in the organization and management of the health system. It also calls for the creation of popular structures that reinforce community participation in decision-making, and by transferring responsibilities, authority and resources to the health care facilities, health management teams and village development committees. The NSF can build on the significant progress made by the World Bank-supported HIV/AIDS Rapid Response Project (HARRP) grants initiative which supported CSOs and CBOs as a good starting point for strengthening community involvement in the national response.
3. Collaborating UN partners need not have competing interests in HIV/AIDS programming. Rather, joint programming and participatory planning should be encouraged to minimize duplication and/or overlaps. Rather than coming up with stand-alone programmes, all partners should endeavor to abide by the provisions of the NSF, and be encouraged to engage in joint programming. UNICEF, UNAIDS and WHO are involved in some joint planning within the NSF. The next step forward would be joint programming, and the national HIV/AIDS response presents opportunities for joint programming among UN partners.
4. There is the need for increased exposure to gender-based issues related to HIV/AIDS in local communities, and this may require community gender programs to sensitize various communities about these kinds of issues. A woman should not have to request permission from a husband in order to get tested for HIV, not even in a predominantly patriarchal society. This is true for all other diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, and others. There is considerable work to be done here through education (mostly of women in rural communities) related to gender equality and responsibilities.
5. There is an urgent need to commission studies on assessing the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS on key human development indicators, as well as the extent and the channel by which HIV/AIDS deepens poverty. Results of these studies should inform the design of future national response and the design of strategies for reducing poverty. Also, it should inform the formulation of future UNDAF monitoring frameworks.
6. The UNDP may need to revisit its disbursement procedures to eliminate the bottlenecks they impose on implementers, causing delays in meeting programme time schedules. Approximately 43% of respondents cited this factor as a source of implementation delays.
7. Development partners should take the necessary steps to apply fully, the Paris Declaration on harmonization which calls for the use of country reporting systems.

**CP Outcome 2.3**: *Increased enrollment of girls and boys in affordable, quality basic education services in focused geographic areas*.

**Achievements**:

1. Net enrollment in primary education was 46.3 (1991); 64% (2007 MDGs Report); 77% (2008/2009 MDGs Report). The MDG target is 100%. This shows a remarkable improvement of 13 percentage points over the last two years.
2. The proportion of pupils that started Grade 1 who reached the last grade of primary school also rose to 96.6 in 2006 from 88.1% in 1992. The MDG target for 2015 is 100%.
3. The ratio of boys to girls in primary education was 0.74 (1990); 1.06 (2006); 1.04 (2008)
4. **UNICEF,** which has been leading the EFA-FTI Donor Coordination since 2002 raised US$ 4 million in 2007 for the education sector. In 2009, through the in-country donor mechanism, UNICEF also helped to mobilize EFA/FTI catalytic funding amounting to US$ 28 million. Other contributions from UNICEF include that which was given for school construction in response to acute shortage of classrooms (US$ 750,000); support for school retention and advocacy with Mother’s Club; support for Parental Education initiative that reached some 13,500 parents and religious leaders in 25 Baby-Friendly communities in URR. **UNICEF** also contributed to the achievement of gender parity in primary school enrollment through the Child-Friendly School initiative.
5. **WFP** and **UNICEF** collaboratively supported the Schools Feeding Programme in URR and the KMC area.
6. **UNFPA** and **UNICEF** also collaborated closely in HIV/AIDS prevention activities (Life skills).

**Overall Assessment**:

The Gambia had achieved gender parity in primary school education since 2003, even before the commencement of the UNDAF cycle, and the parity has since been maintained. Gender parity had also been achieved in Lower Secondary School education by 2006, although there were regional variations in the parity index from 0.81 in URR to 1.15 in CRR. The overall parity index of 1.00 was driven mainly by the parity in CRR, LRR (1.11) and Banjul/Kanifing (1.03).

Since 2006, all regions except URR have reached or surpassed the 1.0 index. Thus, gender parity levels at the Lower Secondary School have improved considerably. However, the parity indices in Upper Secondary School and Tertiary Institution levels are low, although the former is much closer to parity (0.83 in 2006 and 0.94 in 2008). As both of these indices are not target indicators for the UNDAF, no further comment will be made on them. The proportion of those who started grade 1 and reached the last grade of primary school also reached 96.6 percent in 2006 and remains so, according to the MDG Status Report, 2009. Net enrollment rate in primary education increased by 13 percentage points between 2007 (64%) and 2008 (77%), with this increase attributed to the integration of the Madrassah, which experienced increased enrollment, with the regular school system. With an MDG target of 100 percent by 2015, The Gambia is some 23 percentage points below the target. If the strong growth performance between 2007 and 2008 continues, The Gambia should reach this target within 2 years (by 2012).

These developments are by no means accidental, but the result of programmes such as those outlined above, which recounts the contributions of UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, and UNDP, and are implemented within the UNDAF. However, a number of challenges still remain, including improvements in educational facilities for the disabled (visually, physically and mentally impaired); retention of girls in schools beyond the primary level; and, improvements in overall quality of teaching and learning in primary schools. Also, with the increased enrollment in the Madrassah, there is the need to ensure that comparable quality education is provided in all of such facilities to ensure relevance and high standards.

**Recommendations**:

1. Overcoming the challenges outlined above may require adjustments in cultural attitudes and traditional practices, and that may take longer to accomplish. In the meantime, modest gains can be achieved as UN partners join forces with the GOTG to mount sustained campaign to change attitudes about the virtues of education, particularly for girls.
2. Promoting improvements in this indicator should be intricately linked to efforts to increase enrollments at senior secondary and tertiary educational levels, where enrollments are very low. The implication is that a substantial share of the primary and lower secondary school graduates falls through the cracks between lower secondary and senior secondary, and between senior secondary and tertiary education levels, and could be creating a generation of semi-literate cadre of the nation’s most valuable resource.

**4.3 Achievements, Challenges and Constraints under Outcome Cluster #3**

Outcome Cluster 3:

***Economic and political systems utilize transparent, accountable, participatory and inclusive decision-making processes at national and decentralized levels.***

**CP Outcome 3.1:** *Strengthened local authorities’ capacity in selected Local Government Areas to effectively deliver basic social services for the poor*.

**Achievements*:***

The selected local governmental authorities (LGAs) were Brikama, Mansakonko, and Basse Area Councils. Support was provided by UNDP to these LGAs to improve planning capacities and to respond to emerging needs. UNDP also funded grassroots development and poverty reduction initiatives to make it possible for some communities to be provided with clean drinking water throughout the year. With UNDP support, relevant resource materials were provided, and training was conducted for thirty (30) resource centre attendants (RCAs) and local government authorities in five (5) regional/municipal LGAs; and regional/municipal planning and management capacities were enhanced to develop and implement their own community action plans (CAPs), and monitor local level PRSP and MDG indicators.

The Public Service Reform programme is currently underway, having experienced initial delays in the start-up, and it began with nine (9) key institutions[[12]](#footnote-12), and support has been provided under UNDP’s CPAP, inter alia, to permit the formulation and implementation of strategic planning tools for key government institutions; to engender a review and update of the legal framework of the public service sector; and to enable the provision of training and coordination among supported institutions.

Under its CPAP’s Gender Pillar, the UNFPA provided support to strengthen the technical capacity of national and local institutions to mainstream gender into national and sectoral policies and programmes. The UNFPA’s country programme collected data on two out of seven indicators for this capacity strengthening output. The two indicators are: a) the number of labour-saving devices provided to local women’s associations; and b) the number of women and girls trained in livelihood and management skills. Only two (2) labour-saving devices had been provided compared to a target of five (5) in 2008, and eight (8) by the end of 2009 in UNFPA’s Results and Resources Framework (RRF). The Country Programme achieved the 2008 target of 250 for the number of women and girls trained in livelihood and management skills.

**Emerging Issues**

1. Whereas capacity building at LGAs is on-going under the UNDP’s CPAP, the duty bearers of this so-called decentralization have no legal or financial autonomy. For example, a Local Government Council has no power to exact taxes on its subjects or implement any revenue policy with autonomy. What is perceived as decentralization is rather delegation of powers on ad hoc basis. Those who receive the skills to deliver services ultimately have to await directives from the delegating authority in Banjul in order to become effective. Thus, capacity strengthening of the local government institutions must be preceded by local autonomy in order to permit effective exercise of acquired skills.
2. Presently, there is no clearly defined policy backed by statutes concerning the intentions of decentralization. Furthermore, the subjects of decentralization are themselves not empowered and, therefore, are not aware of the functions they should perform. If the Government were to announce at any time that all central institutional powers are decentralized, the local authorities in these local areas would clearly be unprepared to advance the goals of decentralization.
3. The arguments advanced in (1) and (2), above, is that effective governance must be pursued on two fronts: a) by developing capacity of institutions in LGAs while also dialoguing with the Government to grant LGAs autonomy and legal authority to exercise their legal responsibilities to their citizens; and b) by empowering the subjects through constant education and dissemination of the intentions of decentralization so that these intentions can become internalized, allowing citizens to get themselves prepared to advance the goals of decentralization.
4. In The Gambia, the composition of the National Governance Council, the body whose decisions projects the state’s commitment to governance, is such that it has been unable to meet regularly.[[13]](#footnote-13) Furthermore, there are some challenges that may arise with the composition of the Council, such as the unethical practice of having to evaluate its own performance.
5. Stakeholder consultations revealed that many citizens are unaware of their rights with regard to decentralization, and considerable effort towards sensitizing citizens should be a priority. The Local Government Act of 2002 gave rise to the Governance Policy on the books, and was recently validated. Citizens, however, need to be educated on their rights under decentralization, and there is the need to build trust between the Government and CSOs, and empower the latter to undertake the education and sensitization of citizens. Concurrently, decentralization as a political process needs to be backed by statutes that confer economic and political autonomy on the LGAs to engender the exercise of economic responsibilities to their citizens.

**Overall Assessment**:

It appears too early in the process to assess the gains from governance at the mid –term of the UNDAF cycle, as gains are typically long term in nature. Moreover, some of the preconditions for effective governance to occur are clearly not in place. At best one can only point at the intensity of on-going governance activities of UN agencies in LGAs to get a sense of what has transpired so far in this cycle.

The UNDP is involved in a number of capacity strengthening activities in the three selected LGAs, including training, public service reform, and augmentation of management skills. The UNFPA is strengthening technical capacity of national and local institutions to mainstream gender into national and sector policies and programmes. In terms of the UNDAF, all of these efforts look good, but it may be too early to expect gains that are well documented.

**Recommendations**:

1. In order to make real gains in governance, the host government needs to meet the UN family of development partners halfway by doing its part to create the enabling environment of governance institutions that perform effectively. For example, the Government of The Gambia should decide whether it wants to pursue decentralization as a political process through which governance institutions could be accorded the political and economic autonomy so that they may exercise their legal responsibilities to the benefit of their residents.
2. When the capacities of LGA institutions are strengthened, there should be no limitations for the exercise of legal responsibilities for the pursuit of policies aimed at enhancing the well-being of their residents.
3. Decentralization should be preceded by intense sensitization of citizens and dissemination of the virtues of decentralization so that the intentions are well accepted by the local population, and they would be ready to advance its goals.
4. In the process of sensitizing and disseminating, the usefulness of NGOs and CSOs cannot be over-emphasized. To consolidate the gains from a democratic process, the local people should be educated and empowered through dissemination, and for that purpose, NGOs and CSOs are quite well suited to deliver invaluable services, given the requisite capacity and experience. Planned capacity enhancements must spillover to NGOs and CSOs in order to equip them with the skills and the institutional capacity they need to provide quality services expected towards the achievement of the UNDAF’s objectives.
5. There is a consensus among local partners that the UNDAF has not been adequately disseminated both locally and centrally. Some go further to suggest that NGOs and CSOs were not adequately deployed in the dissemination of the UNDAF as a process approach to development in The Gambia. Furthermore, other partners express concern that NGOs and CSOs are kept at a distance from the implementation of programmes under the current UNDAF.

However, in The Gambia, it is a widely held view that that NGOs, and CSOs, and other implementing institutions require capacity strengthening in order to deliver effective services. Therefore, considerable training and other forms of capacity strengthening need be devoted to NGOs and CSOs to render them capable of delivering effective services. They could also be the ones that will ultimately do the capacity strengthening of other institutions.

**CP Outcome 3.2**: *Increased people’s participation in decision-making processes at national and decentralized levels*

**Achievements**:

Under the UNDP’s Country Programme Action Plan:

1. The capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was strengthened to organize credible elections.
2. The capacities of CSOs were strengthened to promote accountability and transparency in the electoral process. Support was also provided to CSOs to build effective partnerships, and to advocate for efficient service delivery and greater participation of the citizenry in national issues, both political and social.
3. Support was provided for the review of the National Women’s Policy, and gender issues were mainstreamed in the MDG-based PRSP II. Gender issues have been given prominence in many policy dialogues. During the PRSP’s focused Round Table Conference (RTC), a strategy paper was developed for the Empowerment of Gambian women, which was selected as one of the ten (10) key strategic documents distributed at the 2008 RTC.
4. Support was also provided for the pursuit of MDG 3: Gender Empowerment and the Advancement of Women, by addressing the under-representation of women in decision-making positions, as highlighted in the Women’s Policy 1999-2011 and the PRSP II 2007-2011. Specific interventions were aimed at strengthening the position of women, capacitate, and increase the number of women running for office in the 2008 Local Government Elections.
5. A successful nationwide sensitization campaign on the virtues of women in leadership positions and breaking cultural barriers was mounted. The campaigns enabled all political parties and CSOs to access information, training, and engage in policy dialogue. This resulted in an increase in the proportion of elected female Councilors in the Local Government Election. In 2008, 15 of the 20 women who contested were elected (75%), compared with 6 out of 9 elected in 2002 (67%). Of the 15 elected in 2008, 4 were elected as Deputy Chairpersons for their respective Councils. A quota of 30% for women has been proposed in the Women’s Bill and was headed for adoption by the National Assembly.
6. A capacity assessment exercise for women in decision-making was conducted and nationally validated by all key stakeholders, leading to the recommendation that The Gambia develops a Gender Policy to replace the Women’s Policy by 2009.
7. A strategic partnership with other collaborating UN partners (UNICEF and UNFPA), the National Council of Civic Education (NCCE) and CSOs has been established.
8. UNFPA’s CPAP made provision for strengthening institutional and technical capacities to integrate population, reproductive health and gender concerns into national plans and programmes.
9. WFP has ensured that its corporate policy of 50/50 participation of women in their food management committees is enforced.

**Overall Assessment**

The list of activities above shows that collaborating UN partners, particularly UNDP, have been busy with activities towards a decentralized decision-making process that is all-inclusive. Since there are no targets or benchmarks to measure progress in this activity, it is clear that all of these activities are bound to have effect on decision-making processes in The Gambia with time. Tracking progress requires result-based indicators that may need to be developed, piloted, and included in the next round of the UNDAF.

It is the considered opinion of this MTR Consultant that the Government needs to declare its intent with regards to decentralization and grant the local structures the autonomy they so desperately require to exercise both economic and political governance.

Achieving both democratic and economic governance is a process that requires continuous effort at training, empowerment, sensitization and dialogue. The principle of accountability inherent in effective governance requires the development of institutions and legal processes that protect the rights of people to constantly ask questions about the actions of public servants.

**CP Outcome 3.3**: *Enhanced capacities of state and non-state actors to address legal and human rights.*

**Achievements**

UNDP’s Country Programme provided support to:

1. Strengthen professional standards and economic viability of Media Houses to advocate for human rights-based human development;
2. Strengthen CSOs to monitor and respond to economic and political decisions taken at the national and local levels;
3. Create the policy and legal environment for the protection of human rights, and greater civic participation in the economic and political decision-making process,

UNICEF, through consultations with Government, and backed by the support of other UNCT members, established various mechanisms to protect children against abuse, exploitation and neglect. These mechanisms have led to the following outcomes:

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1. Parity has been achieved in primary school enrollment, A Juvenile court has been opened in Kanifing Municipality
2. A guideline to prevent sexual harassment of children in school has been developed and introduced into schools.
3. Alternative discipline booklet has been developed promoting positive non-violent discipline techniques to address violence against children in schools
4. A Child Sex Tourism Code of Conduct agreement which was executed with several major hotels.
5. A Child Protection Alliance (CPA) was formed with 63 member NGOs.
6. A Rights and Civic Education System has been developed for schools, and also introduced into the Teacher Training curriculum at the Gambia College of Education
7. Community Child protection committees have been set up in KMC and URR in a bid to take child protection to community level and foster the referral linkage between community members and the professional protectors at regional and central levels
8. Adolescent neighbourhoods watch groups have been set up and trained in the Tourism Development Area to foster the participation of young people in the fight against child sex tourism.
9. In collaboration with Child Fund and Department of Social Welfare, a drop-in centre for children living and working on the streets have been set-up at Tallinding Buffer zone and provided with recreation, medical screening and family tracing and mediation facilities.
10. Five hundred (500) copies of the Children’s Act have been printed and distributed to all Police stations and police posts in the Country.

**Overall Assessment**

Although the collaborating UN partners have demonstrated their desire and capacity to move forward to address the legal and human rights aspects of development in The Gambia, for the most part it is not clear if the Government is committed to human rights principles in its desire to address the developmental priorities of the country. For example, not much progress has been made on the establishment of the Human Rights Commission. In the absence of a Human Rights Commission, there are many challenges pertaining to the enforcement of human rights issues.

Governance is both a developmental issue and also a legal process, as was discussed in the previous section. More often people place more emphasis on the development aspects, to the neglect of the legal process, although one reinforces the other. UNDP’s Results Oriented Annual Report (ROAR) 2000 confirmed the emergence of human rights as the key focus in governance, and human rights perspective calls for enhanced attention to the full understanding of the legal framework of a country, and the factors that create and perpetuate discrimination and social exclusion and hinder people from realizing their full potential.

Human rights add value to the development agenda by drawing attention to increased focus on accountability to respect, protect, promote and fulfill all human rights of all people. Increased focus also holds the key to improved effectiveness and transparency of action. Another important value of the human rights approach is the focus it places on the most marginalized and neglected in the society whose human rights are most widely denied or left unfulfilled.

**Recommendations**:

1. As long as the UNDP and other UN partners are committed to the application of human rights-based approach to development programming, it is the collective responsibility of all development partners, including bilateral donors and major civil society organizations to mobilize efforts to engage the Government in dialogue on this human rights matter. As the list above clearly shows, some grounds are already prepared for progress to be made, and the National Human Rights Commission is needed urgently to provide oversight, and to exercise jurisdiction on all matters relating to human rights.
2. There is a general view that The Gambia needs a National Governance Council that is made up of independent members with the ability to undertake objective evaluation of the work of the Council. The current Council could be reduced to a Chancery made up of the Secretary General, the Attorney General, and the Speaker of the National Assembly. This Council would be backed by a Technical Committee that develops a National Governance Policy and Action Plan
3. There is also a consensus that UN agencies programming under the UNDAF could help to lay down the structures for a National Governance Council with an Action Plan that is operational and measurable. The National Governance Policy could be broken down functionally as follows:
* Political Governance
* Financial Governance
* Public Sector Reform
* Legal and Judiciary Services Delivery
* Local Government Decentralization
* Citizens Empowerment and Information (participatory and all-inclusive governance).
1. The Ombudsman Act needs to be extended to cover the needs of those who work in the private sector. It is asserted that approximately 85% of the complaints received by the Ombudsman come from those working in the private sector, and the Ombudsman must be the defender of all citizens.
2. **MAJOR CONSTRAINTS AND LESSONS LEARNED**
	1. **Major Constraints Associated with The Gambia UNDAF**

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**5.1.1 Challenges in “Delivering as One**”

UN agencies work under different mandates. The role of the UNRC in getting these agencies with diverse mandates to speak with one voice and “Deliver as One” in accordance with the UN Reform presents many challenges. Within the UNCT, a small group of agencies have a joint executive committee at the corporate level, referred to as the EXCOM agencies. In The Gambia, these agencies are the UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WFP. With the exception of WFP, the other three agencies have their programme cycles synchronized with the UNDAF. WFP has projects cycles that vary depending on the nature of the project. Some projects arise as emergencies, and are typically short-term in nature. There are other projects that WFP often executes jointly with other agencies such as FAO or UNICEF (i.e. those with agricultural and/or nutritional outcomes). During internal consultations with agency heads and agency focal points, mention was made of the difficulties associated with coordination and the coherence of UNCT partners in implementing the UNDAF. It was expressed on more than a few occasions that UN agencies were wedded to their individual mandates and directives, and failed to provide a unified front. Coming closer home, the Programme Coordination Group comprising of agency focal persons, had the role of providing guidance to the UNDAF Consultant throughout the review process. Weekly meetings were held with the Consultant to review progress and to clarify issues for the Consultant as the process unfolded. There were some agency focal persons who never attended any of these meetings. If this is an indication of the agencies’ commitment to the UNDAF, then there are formidable challenges ahead for the Office of UNRC to address.

**5.1.2 Familiarity with the UNDAF**

One of the major challenges for UN is how to build an effective communication with respect to the UNDAF and its objectives in The Gambia. Most of the governmental partners that the Consultant met demonstrated ample knowledge about the UNDAF, and, even more impressively, they were very conversant with the applicable UNDAF Outcomes relevant to their work. However, some NGOs and CSOs contend that the UNDAF and its objectives are not properly disseminated in the LGAs, and that this is partly due to the limited participation of NGOs and CSOs in the implementation of the UNDAF.

Also, most partners perceived the UNDAF as a first-stop source of funding for specific programmes, rather than a framework that defines a specific agency’s Country Programme Action Plan. For example, a governmental partner was “waiting for UNDAF to make funds available to procure some equipment.” Unless an appropriation is earmarked under a country programme for such procurement, such an expectation cannot be fulfilled. Some amount of work remains to be done on educating partners and citizens in the LGAs with regards to the UNDAF as a process framework for local area development.

**5.1.3** **Weak Human Resources and other Capacity of Implementing Partners**.

 Human resource and other capacity constraints seem to cut across most partner institutions, particularly governmental implementing partners, as well as NGOs and CSOs, such that they impose considerable pressure on institutions to improvise with whatever is available. Underachievement of programme outcomes is the inevitable consequence of these constraints.

 **5.1.4** The **UNDAF Monitoring Framework**

The most obvious challenge deriving from the design of the UNDAF was the lack of statistically measurable indicators, which makes it difficult to track progress quantitatively. It is now common knowledge that the UNDAF’s monitoring framework does not have baseline information on the outcomes that are being tracked. This is the result of a weak statistics base, and the general paucity of information on relevant indicators. For this reason, evaluations are limited to process evaluations rather than results-based evaluations. In many instances, baseline data are gleaned from various surveys and independent studies and used for evaluation at different times. Such practices are statistically flawed since surveys and independent studies are typically based on different methodologies, and therefore cannot be compared. For example, the census-based maternal mortality rate (MMR) in The Gambia in 2003 was 730/100,000 live births. The MDG Status Report, 2009 cites a reduction in MMR to 556 in accordance with a Fistula-based study. It is clear that these two rates are not comparable, let alone being used as evaluation tools.

**5.1.5** **Harmonizing HIV/AIDS Data**.

There are a number of serious challenges in M&E for HIV/AIDS. The Gambia lacks a comprehensive tool for harmonizing HIV/AIDS data generated by various stakeholders, and there is no nationally integrated HIV/AIDS database that captures routine monitoring surveys, surveillance and research information. Also, NAS as a coordinating body lacks full understanding of the information of HIV/AIDS stakeholders. Furthermore, it has inadequate capacity to produce periodic outputs to disseminate results from M &E.

5.1.6. The UNDP’s disbursement procedures and regulations have been cited by many partners as a major constraint to effective implementation as they cause unwarranted delays in programme implementation.

* 1. **LESSONS LEARNED**

 **5.2.1 Changes in National Context**

The national context for UNDAF has been changing rapidly. In recent times, external shocks of rising food and fuel prices, climate change and the global economic slowdown have altered the perceived responsibilities of some UN agencies, such as WFP and, to some extent, FAO. The strategic objectives of WFP have changed to reflect the changing nature of food aid and hunger. The change also marks the historical shift in the role of WFP from a food aid agency to a food assistance agency, with more nuanced and robust set of tools to respond to critical hunger needs. The overarching goal of this shift is to reduce dependency and to support governmental and global efforts to rebuild lives and livelihoods in the context of priorities defined by the host government’s nationally formulated developmental strategies. This encompasses the building of institutional capacity of governments to manage and respond to emergency situations (WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011). The Implementation Progress Matrix recounts the roles of WFP, FAO, UNDP and others in the formulation of Disaster Management Act and Policy, and the establishment of the Disaster Management Agency in The Gambia.

**5.2.2 Weak National Execution Capacity**.

From both UN collaborating agents’ and other partners’ perspectives, the implementation of, and the monitoring of the UNDAF strategies are confronted by capacity challenges. On the side of UN agencies, certain positions remain vacant, and are bound to affect programme implementation and monitoring adversely. On the side of other partners, there is weak human capacity, accentuated by high attrition rates, culminating in loss of institutional memories in key implementing institutions. The high attrition rate is somehow fueled by the tendency of non-governmental agencies, including UN agencies, to poach skilled personnel who leave government institutions in search for better conditions of service. The result is a weakened national execution capacity.

**5.2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Relative to UNDAF**

It was the observation of this Consultant that monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects in the context of the UNDAF were not carried out regularly. A few partners managed to undertake annual evaluations of their respective CPs, but the monitoring activities were neither based on the UNDAF evaluation framework nor the PRSP evaluation framework. Furthermore, there are hardly any examples of joint monitoring among UN partners, even when the partners are supporting the same institutions.

**5.2.4 UNCT and HIV/AIDS Response in The Gambia**

The UNCT has neither accorded HIV/AIDS the urgency it deserves nor given it a priority consideration in programming. On the surface, the lack of priority is hard to understand, and runs contrary to the experience in many countries with similar prevalence status. However, in retrospect, it appears that the national response to HIV/AIDS was derailed by the Government from January 2007 until recently when it reaffirmed its commitment to a concerted national response and proceeded to design the 2009-2014 National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework (NSF). Whether this is an explanation for the UNCT’s apparent lack of urgency is debatable.

**5.2.5 Evidence-based Planning**.

As late as 2006, HIV/AIDS Response Planning was not evidence-based, and because it was temporarily invisible on the country’s priority radar screen, it became relatively difficult to convince the business sector to invest in HIV prevention efforts.

**5.2.6 Socio-economic studies relative to the Impact of HIV/AIDS**.

So far, no effort has been made to conduct an evaluation of the socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS at the national, community and household levels. Likewise, no studies have been commissioned, with UN assistance, to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS on human development indicators in The Gambia, including life expectancy.

**5.2.7 HIV/AIDS and the HIPC Debt Relief**.

The PRSP II MTR 2010 reveals that no portion of the HIPC Debt Relief dividend has so far been allocated to the nation’s AIDS response.

**5.2.8 Gender inequalities and HIV infections.**

There is consensus among HIV/AIDS stakeholders that gender inequalities contribute to the fuelling of the pandemic. However, experiences in other countries indicate that stakeholders lack the skills to utilize this knowledge to design gender-responsive and transformative policies, strategies and programmes to neutralize the gender-based component of HIV infections.

**6 ASSUMPTIONS, RELEVANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

* 1. **Changes in broad planning assumptions, risks and emerging opportunities**.

The UNDAF Outcome Clusters, along with the Country Programme Outcomes were chosen based on specific risks and assumptions. These risks and assumptions were revisited with the intent of confirming their relevance in the national context. In this section, the assumptions that have not held up to test, which therefore requiring changes, are discussed. In some instances, the risk has occurred, and is worth mentioning. The assumptions are identified by Cluster number and the relevant Country Programme Outcome.

**CP Outcome 1.1**:

*Sufficient resources allocated to capacity building of national institutions*. This assumption requires a revision. It is not clear what constitutes sufficient resources, but up to the Mid-Term milestone of the UNDAF, several national institutions were scratching their heads for resources to enhance their human resource capacities.

**CP Outcome 1.2**:

1. *Estimates of annual inflows into the labour force can be obtained from demographic and educational data*. It is not clear if the educational institutions and the GBoS are equipped to provide this data readily.
2. *Increase in resources allocated to Employment component of DOSTIE*. So far, the expected funding for GAMJOBS has not materialized.
3. *Labour market information can be obtained through periodic labour market surveys undertaken by CSD (GBoS) and DOSTIE*. One of the most limiting constraints to GBoS is resources for conducting periodic surveys. In reality, data from GBoS and DOSTIE have not been available at all, let alone on timely basis. Also, local demand for skilled labour has not been met by skilled labour inflows from neighboring countries.

**CP Outcome 1.4**:

*Government provides adequate resources and farming inputs to the agriculture sector*. The government’s budgetary allocations to the agriculture sector have left much to be desired.

**CP Outcome 2.1**

*Adequate trained human resources for health sector will be available*. Rather, there is continued attrition of trained health staff. Also if budgetary allocation is anything to go by, there is some evidence that the government‘s focus on education is higher than that on health.

**CP Outcome 2.2**

*The Availability of adequate financial, human and material resources for HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities*. In fact the reverse may be more true than false. Also there is evidence of increased poverty resulting from HIV/AIDS.

**CP Outcome 2.3**.: *SWAp will be effectively implemented*. At the very best, implementation has barely begun, and more time is required to assess implementation effectiveness.

**CP Outcome 3.1**

Under this outcome, all of the assumptions do not hold.

With many of the assumption not holding, it seems logical that the relevant programme outcomes would be revised based on a revised set of assumptions. But even so, it is unlikely that if these outcomes are reframed, they could be realized within the remaining period of the UNDAF cycle. Instead, reviewing these outcomes would surely benefit the successor UNDAF.

* 1. **Continued relevance of the UNDAF**.

Based on the discussion in section 6.1 above, with many of the Country Programme Outcomes requiring review, the UNDAF itself needs to be redesigned to reflect the realities of the current national context, while also endeavoring to align it with the emerging national priorities.

* 1. **Recommendations**

The UNDAF MTR provides the following set of recommendations, based on the analysis and the implementation progress outlined in this report. A few of the recommendations are strategic in nature, but majority are based on the constraints and challenges, as well as the lessons learned in this review.

**6.3.1 Enhanced coordination**: The UNCT will need to work systematically to enhance coordination, coherence, and integration of the UN mission and mandate in The Gambia. Coordination and coherence cannot be built overnight; rather it can be built systematically over time, and must be linked to, and integrated in, programme areas consistently. All UNCT members must be equally committed to working towards enhanced coordination, and the strategic intent of achieving the goal of “Delivering as One”. The paucity of staff and lack of capacity at the UN Coordination Office (UNCO) is a challenge, but it may be worthwhile to engage the services of a senior level Coordination Advisor to support the UNRC, along with one or two other official staff to complement the good work of the Coordination Officer. Harmonization of issues surrounding differing programme cycles of the UNCT members is one major consideration that calls for the services of a senior Coordination Advisor. In the proposed staffing scenario, Monitoring and Evaluation would be handled by senior level experts who are well versed in aid coordination issues.

**6.3.2** **Encouraging joint programming**: Joint Programming is the cornerstone of the UN functioning at the country level, and in operationalizing “Delivering as One” effectively. The UNCT and the UNRC may need to hold strategic planning meetings, to discuss and encourage joint programming in a coherent meaningful manner. Additionally, joint programming issues may need to be linked to the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the UNCT members, in order to work efficiently towards aligning the entire UNCT with the “Delivering as One” mandate in all of the UNDAF’s priority areas.

**6.3.3 Refining and Aligning the UNDAF**. The UNDAF will need to be refined, taking into consideration the current country situation and environment, to ensure an integration of the UN mission and mandate with PRSP II priorities. The UNDAF must be entirely aligned to emerging issues in The Gambia, notably food insecurity, slowly rising HIV prevalence rates, eroding human and institutional capacities, gender inequalities, and unresolved governance issues.

**6.3.4 Strategic Capacity Building**. There is an urgent need for the UNCT to mobilize and lead a collaborative effort with the GOTG to conceptualize, design and implement some sustainable capacity building strategies to confront this endemic constraint to the UNDAF implementation.. The solution requires practically enforceable, well considered strategies to attract, train and retain the requisite skills. The leadership of UNCT lies in its perceived comparative advantage in sharing best-practice human resource capacity building and staff retention strategies with the GoTG.

**6.3.5 Youthful Entrepreneurs through GAMJOBS**. GAMJOBS is designed to create active economic agents who no longer have to depend on the labor market for their livelihoods. The corps of youthful entrepreneurs that GAMJOBS is aiming to create has collectively become a versatile engine of economic growth, and dominant employers in some economies. The formal and informal private sector, self-employed businesses absorb significant proportions of the labour force in some countries. Over time, as their businesses become viable and successful, their contributions to the GDP will more than offset developmental investments made on them in their youthful years of skills development. UNDP needs to do more to mobilize the resources needed to ensure GAMJOBS’ successful implementation.

**6.3.6 Loan Conditions for Start**-**up Businesses.** The loan conditionsfrom Micro-Finance companies ought to be entirely different from those of conventional commercial bank loans. The reason for the existence of micro-finance companies is to offer financing for those who, by their disadvantaged positions, cannot meet the requirements for conventional loans from the bank. It is, therefore, inexplicable for micro-finance loan conditions to be harder for start-up, and especially youthful, enterprises than those of commercial bank loans.

**6.3.7 UNDP’s Disbursement Procedures and Regulations**. The UNDP’s disbursement procedure and regulations will need to be revised for the sake of implementation effectiveness. A number of implementing partners are crying foul about the unwarranted delays that this procedure imposes on project implementation. Concerns were expressed regarding lack of feedback on funding requests made to UNDP, and the lack of a mechanism for follow-up to such requests. Thus such requests continue to be stuck at the UNDP Office with no feedback and follow-up. The UNDP will need to streamline its disbursement procedures, and go further to institute follow-up mechanisms for monitoring progress on fund requests, to avoid unwarranted delays in fund disbursements.

**6.3.8 Targets for UNDAF Outcomes in Basic Social Services**. The current UNDAF did not set targets for basic social services relating to infant mortality, Under-5 mortality, and maternal mortality rates. Instead, it relied on targets set within the framework of The Gambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II). Some of these targets are the MDG targets which collectively have a longer time frame than the UNDAF cycle. Agencies set their own target rates and hoped to achieve them based on a number of assumptions. It is imperative that the successor UNDAF set clear targets, in order to permit constant monitoring and evaluation over time.

**6.3.9 Joint Programming in HIV/AIDS**. While the GoTG’s response to HIV/AIDS has been off and on in the last three years, collaborating UN agencies are exhorted not to relent on their efforts towards containing the pandemic. There is considerable opportunity for joint progr**amm**ing among collaborating UN agencies, and thereby projecting a unified approach towards “Delivering as One”. The UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, WHO, UNFPA, and WFP would all have some roles to play in a jointly programmed response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The UNAIDS could be effectively harmonizing activities in HIV/AIDS if the country office would be charged with the responsibility to furnish the UNCT with annual review reports on progress made towards the achievement of the UNDAF outcomes in the context of joint programming.

**6.3.10 Effective HIV/AIDS Coordination Structures**. The implementation success of The Gambia’s National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework is contingent upon the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS coordination structures at national, LGA, and community levels. It is common knowledge that there are some governance issues within The Gambia’s three-tier health delivery system that need to be resolved, and an effective coordination system must be put in place to manage the national response at community levels. This calls for the strengthening of existing community systems, focusing on improving efficiency and effectiveness in the organization and management of the health system. It also calls for the creation of popular structures that reinforce community participation in decision-making, and by transferring responsibilities, authority and resources to the health care facilities, health management teams and village development committees. The NSF can build on the significant progress made by the World Bank-supported HARRP grants initiative which supported CSOs and CBOs as a good starting point for strengthening community involvement in the national response.

**6.3.11** Gender **Inequality Issues relative to HIV/AIDS**. There is the need to increase sensitization regarding gender-based issues related to all health conditions and diseases in local communities. This will require community-based gender programmes to sensitize various communities about these kinds of issues. A woman should not have to request permission from her husband in order to get tested for HIV, not even in a predominantly patriarchal society. The same is true for all health conditions. Women should be accorded the same degree of independence when it comes to decisions affecting their own health conditions and lives. Herein lies the role of Civil Society Organization (CSOs) and NGOs in this process of sensitization. It is an open criticism that the implementation of the current UNDAF has been kept at a distance from NGOs and CSOs. There have also been allegations that certain governmental agencies have attempted to impede the normal operations of some NGOs and CSOs in activities that can only enhance the outcome status of the UNDAF in many ways.

**6.3.12 MDG targets in primary enrollment**. Achieving 100% enrollment in primary school is within reach in two years, if the strong growth registered from 2007 to 2008 continues. However, this requires improvements in educational facilities for the disabled, and elevating the overall quality of learning and teaching in primary education, including the Madrassahs, where primary school enrollments registered the highest growth in recent years.

**6.3.13 Retention of girls in education levels beyond primary school**. The Gambia’s educational target aspirations must go beyond 100 percent primary school enrollment and gender parity in primary and lower secondary education. It must also include the retention of girls in educational levels beyond primary and lower secondary levels. This requires adjustments in cultural attitudes and traditional practices, both of which may take longer to accomplish. In the meantime, modest gains can be achieved if the collaborating UN partners, through their country programmes, join forces with the GOTG to mount sustained campaigns aimed at changing people’s attitudes about the virtues of education for girls.

1. **6.3.14Promoting improvements in the indicator in (13)** should be intricately linked to efforts to increase enrollments at the senior secondary and the tertiary educational levels, where enrollments are very low. The implication is that a substantial proportion of primary and lower secondary graduates fall through the cracks every year between lower secondary and senior secondary, and between senior secondary and tertiary levels. More importantly, it means that a substantial percentage of the nation’s most valuable resource is missing out in education, and, unless this portion of the nation’s resource is absorbed in technical and vocational training institutions, its implications for future GDP growth and poverty levels are ominous.

**6.3.15 Governance.** In order to make real gains in governance, GOTG should decide whether it wants to pursue decentralization as a political process through which local institutions could exercise their degrees of autonomy to serve their residents. When the capacities of LGAs are strengthened, there should then be no limitations for the exercise of their political and economic responsibilities for the pursuit of policies aimed at enhancing the well-being of their residents**.** Presently, in The Gambia, there is no clearly defined policy backed by statutes concerning the intentions of decentralization**.** What is perceived as decentralization is rather delegation of powers on ad hoc basis**.**

**6.3.16 The Role of NGOs and CSOs.** Many partners contend that the UNDAF, as a process approach to development for The Gambia, has not been adequately disseminated among local communities. Some go further to attribute this to the relative dormancy of NGOs and CSOs with regard to UNDAF related activities. With the necessary capacity strengthening, NGOs and CSOs are quite well suited to empower communities through the dissemination of policy messages. The general complaint that NGOs and CSOs are kept at a distance from the UNDAF process needs to be addressed in the remainder of the cycle, as well as in the successor UNDAF.

**6.3.17 National Human Rights Commission.** As long as UNDP and other UN collaborating partners are committed to the application of human rights-based approach to development, it is the collective responsibility of the UN, bilateral and major CSOs to mobilize efforts to engage the Government in a dialogue over human rights. A National Human Rights Commission is needed,

 as a matter of urgency, to provide oversight, and to exercise jurisdiction on all matters relating to human rights.

**6.3.18 The Ombudsman Act needs to be extended to cover the needs of those who work in the private sector.** It is estimated that approximately 85 percent of the complaints received by the Ombudsman come from those working in the private sector. Thus the Ombudsman must be the defender of all citizens, not just those working in public sector.

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**22.** Tanzania- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

**23.** Zambia- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

**24.** Ghana- United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

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 28. McKay Andrew and Ernest Aryeetey (2004), Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth –A Country Case Study on Ghana. A Joint Initiative of AFD, BMZ (GTZ, KfW) DFID and World Bank.

**ANNEX 1**

**List of Participants in the First and Second Consultative Meetings**

1. **First Meeting on February 16, 2010**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **NAME** | **ORGANIZATION** | **TITLE** | **CONTACT** |
| Binta Jamme-SidibeLamin CamaraAlhagie ColleyMeritxell RelanoPamela ColeYadi Njie ErikaKumba JammehFrancois MandyKebba N. SonkoMomodou J SuwarehMacang KeitaMayjula JawenaMusa JallowEbou A.A. JallowKebba K. BarrowMomodou A. BahNuru SeyBintou Keita KuujoFalleu SoweJohn C. NjiePatricia WallLamin A E TourayDodou C.M. KebbehSabatou CamaraBakary JallowBai ChamMomodou CeesayMomodou L. ChamLimya Eltayeb | APGWAUNAIDSUNFPAUNICEFWANEPFAWEGAMMOHERSTECONOMIC CONSULTINGMOFENNational Env. AgencyGBOSCHILD FUNDGAMCOTRAPNPCSTANGOGAFNANSGACHILD FUNDDEPT of SOCIAL WELFAREPRO-PAGCONCERN UNIVERSALMINISTRY OF JUSTICENATIONAL ASSEMBLYMIN. OF YOUTH & SPORTSNaNANASWHOMOSHSWUNDP | Executive DirectorProgramme AssistantNational Programme OfficerDeputy RepresentativeNational Network Coord.National CoordinatorResearch OfficerConsultantAg DPS (T)Sr. Programme OfficerDir. Of National AccountsGrant Dev’t OfficerFinance OfficerAssistant DirectorProgram OfficerIntegration/Livelihood OfficerProject ManagerProgram OfficerDeputy DirectorAg DirectorCountry DirectorCurator InterstateClerk of National AssemblySr. Assistant SecretaryPrin. Program OfficerDeputy DirectorHealth EconomistDeputy UNDP Rep. | 439-2826lcamara@unaids.orgkolley@unfpa.orgmrelano@unicef.orgwanepgambia@yahoo.comyadinenbo@hotmail.comkumbaikonne@yahoo.comfra1mandy@gmail.comkebbasonko@hotmail.comMuhammedkeita@yahoo.comsabatoucamara@yahoo.combakary.jallow@nana.gmddirector@qanet.gmceesaym@gm.afro.who.int9897273Limya.eltayeb@undp.org |

1. **Second Consultative Meeting held on March 4, 2010 at UN Library**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **NAME** | **ORGANIZATION** | **TITLE** | **CONTACT** |
|  |  |  |  |
| Modou PhallAnnie Bojang SissokoBinta NjiePamela ColeMomodou BahOley DibbaNyakassi TarjuMeritxell RelanoAlhagie KolleyAmie JarraAlbert CoxAbsatu Saredy CamaraPatricia WallSaikou K. SanyangLamin CamaraMomodou CeesayMomodou B. SarrNaffie BarryBintou SUSOKekoi KuyatehNeneh TourayBaboucar NjieMomodou TourayLimya EltayebJohn C. NjieMma TourayMajula JawaraSultecy JawoKehha K BarrowFallu SoweKebba N. Sonko | NaNAGAMCOTRAPAPGWAWANEPMOBSEGAWFAACTION AIDUNICEFUNFPAMOFWR &NAMSGAFNAFAWEGAMCONCERN UNIVERSALMiN. OF LOCAL GOVT & LANDSUNAIDSWHONEAMiN. of TRADE & EMPLOYMENTUNFPAMOTAWOMEN’S BUREAUMinistry of FinanceUNDPUNDPPRO-PAGMOHERSTCHILD FUNDMOYSTANGODOSWMOFEN |  | 9954038995759299042779934349642436799343583919424996042199020527453838449647299417137759698990060537600804462283996073299175684494790994466399173383528477775997577599759973351990842177812009926939991852899534919858090 |
| ANNEX2 |  |  |  |

**List of Agencies and Partners Consulted During the UNDAF M-T Review**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **NAME** | **ORGANIZATION** | **TITLE** | **CONTACT TELEPHONE** |
| **UN AGENCIES:** |  |  |  |
| Robert Duthie | WFP | WFP Representative | 9969697 |
| Patrick Teixeira | WFP | Programme Officer | 4494785 |
| Chinwe M. Dike |  | UNRC/UNDP Res. Rep | 4494820 |
| Mojakisane Mathaha | Office of UNRC | UN Coordination Officer | 4494820 |
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| Alhagie Kolley | UNFPA | National Programme Officer | 9902052 |
| Dr Babagana Ahmadu | FAO | FAO Representative | 9960199 |
| Msriatou Njie | FAO | Assistant Representative | 9941417 |
| Limya Eltayeb | UNDP | Deputy UNDP Representative | 7759975 |
| Meritxell Relano | UNICEF | Deputy UNICEF Representative | 4494760 |
| Momodou Ceesay | WHO | Health Economist | 4462289 |
| Nuha Ceesay | UNAIDS | UNAIDS Country Officer | 3399991 |
|  |  |  |  |
| GOV’T,/NGOs/CSOs and Others |  |  |  |
| Momodou Mbye Jabang | MINSTRY OF AGRICULTURE | Project Coordinator | 9966007 |
| Abdou Rahman Jobe | MINSTRY OF AGRICULTURE | Permanent Secretary II | 4374307 |
| Alieu Jammeh | NAS | Director | 9904336 |
| Bai Cham | NAS | Deputy Director | 9902653 |
| Madi Jobarteh | TANGO | Programme Manager | 6396987 |
| Abdou Touray | National Planning Commission | Director General | 9961199 |
| Lamin Jawara | Office of the President | Deputy Permanent Secretary (PMO) | 9927977 |
| **Momodou B. Sarr** | NEA | Executive Director, and | 4399424 |
|  |  | GEF Council Member |  |
| **Malang Nyass** | GAMJOBS | Project Coordinator | 9904226 |
| Madi Jobarteh | TANGO | Programme Manager | 6396987 |
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| Lamin Jawara | Office of the President | Deputy Permanent Secretary (PMO) | 9927977 |
| Momodou B. Sarr | NEA | Executive Director, and | 4399424 |
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| Naffie Barry | MIN. OF TRADE & EMPLOYMENT |  | 9917568 |
|  | MINISTRY OF FINANCE | Dep Perm. Secretary II |  |
|  | MOBSE | Permanent Secretary |  |
| **Dodou C.M. Kebbeh** | National Assembly | Clerk of National Assembly | 9962178 |
| Mambanyick Njie | Ministry of Youth & Sports | Permanent Secretary | 9966991 |

**APPENDIX 1**: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS MATRIX (Attached).

1. World Bank Country Brief, www.worldbank.org/website/external/countries/AfricaExt/GambiaExtn [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. World Bank Programme Document Concept Note for a public growth grants sector reform, July 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Source: FAO, *Support to Initiative on Soaring Food Prices* (ISFP) ECOWAS Final Report (Sept. 2009) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Source: NPC, PRSP II- Mid-Term Report, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. UNFPA: Country Programme Document (2007-2011), October 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The Government of Gambia/FAO/WFP. ISFP, Nov.2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. PRSP II MTR 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2011, p 17, paragraph 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The Lancet Series, Nov. 2008 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. MDG Status Report, 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. In view of the methodological differences in the Fistula-based study versus the Census-based result, it is problematic to compare these two estimates. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. These institutions are: Office of the President; Personnel Management Office (PMO); Public Service Commission (PSC); Management Development Institute (MDI); The Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA); Ministry of Finance & Economic Affairs (MOFEA); Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW); Ministry of Local Government (MOLG); and Ministry of Basic and Secondary Education (MOBSE). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The National Governance Council has met twice in the last 5 years. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)