



## Independent External Joint Evaluation of “Local Area Development Programme”

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## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACSI	Access to Credit Services Initiatives
BIC	Business Information Centres
BDS	Business Development Services
BMT	Business Management Training
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
COSIT	Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
DIBS	Disputed Internal Boundaries
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GOI	Government of Iraq
IDP	Internally Displace People
ILO	International Labour Organization
ICI	International Compact with Iraq
ISG	International Services Group
ITF	Iraqi Trust Fund
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
LADP	Local Area Development Programme
LADPs	Local Area Development Programmes
LSC	Local Steering Committee
MoSM	Ministry of State for the Marshlands
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund

MIS	Management Information System
MoPDC	Ministry of Planning and Developmental Coordination
MPWM	Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works
MOE	Ministry of Education
NOH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NDS	National Development Strategy
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSC	National Steering Committee
RCP	Recovery and Crisis Prevention
RBM	Results Based Management
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOE	State Owned Enterprises
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG-ITF	United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States Dollars
WED	Women's Entrepreneurship Development
WB	World Bank

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## **Executive Summary**

This report documents the evaluation conducted of the Local Area Development Programme (LADP) assessing the programme against its stated Results Based Management (RBM) framework. The evaluation was undertaken in the spring of 2010 when the LADP was near the conclusion of its programming activity. The LADP is a joint programming effort of seven United Nations (UN) agencies and the Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) and is financed through the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG-ITF). The operational budget of the LADP for the evaluation period was USD 30 million. The donor agencies for the LADP have been the European Union and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). The lead executing agency of the LADP is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the International Labour Organization (ILO) working with United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) through a joint execution agreement and UN-HABITAT playing important coordination roles at the field level. The other UN partners involved in the LADP are the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The LADP commenced in May 2007 and through a series of extensions is to remain operational until July 2010. The ITF had determined that the LADP would have a one year operational period. This evaluation covers LADP programming activities completed up until the end of April 2010 with the exclusion of the SIDA-funded component focusing exclusively on the Marshlands, which has been administered only by UNDP outside of the ITF framework agreement.

The LADP has operated with three key programming objectives: First, to strengthen the capabilities of local authorities to plan and manage reconstruction and development activities through the formulation and implementation of human rights based; gender sensitive, local area development plans. Secondly, to stimulate local economic development and generate short-term and sustainable long term employment. Finally, to improve social and physical infrastructure using labour intensive approaches and the service delivery capabilities of local governments.

In practical terms the LADP has had three dominant programming thrusts: The first relates to building local capacity and the nurturing of attitudes towards more transparent and participatory developmental processes. To this end, the LADP supported activities at the district level that would result in the development of local development plans overseen by Local Steering Committees (LSC) formed through the LADP. The LSCs are comprised of local officials, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trade unions and other stakeholders. The LSCs had responsibility for preparing the local development plans, identification of the fast-track social and economic development and physical rehabilitation projects, encouraging cooperation, coordination and partnership with governorate, local government officials and other stakeholders and monitor programme activities. The local development processes are meant to sensitize a broad range of stakeholders of the benefits of more participatory local development processes. To provide support and guidance to the LSCs, the LADP also backed the creation of a National Steering Committee (NSC) to provide guidance from a pan Iraqi perspective. The second programming

component relates to “fast-track projects” that involved physical works like the construction of schools, basic infrastructure related to healthcare facilities, water and sewage and electricity networks. These projects were managed by respective UN agencies with UN-HABITAT, WHO and the UNDP being especially engaged on this front. The final programming thrust is economic recovery with the ILO overseeing activities in this sector. The LADP worked with stakeholders in three parts of the country the south, central and northern regions and in five governorates and was operational in six districts (Sharazour and Sayed in Sulymaniya in the north where the ILO acted as area coordinator, the old city of Hillah in Babylon in the central region where UN-HABITAT served as area coordinator and Maimouna in Missan, Chibayesh in Thi-Qar and Mdaina in Basra in the south where the UNDP assumed area coordination responsibilities).

The LADP evaluation team consisted of an international evaluator working with two national Iraqi consultants. The main coordinating agency of the evaluation was the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) team of UNDP in conjunction with the ILO’s regional evaluation office in Beirut that had determined given the extent of the ILO’s involvement in the LADP, additional time and effort was needed to assess the ILO’s role in the LADP.

### **Evaluation Findings**

In terms of development results, the LADP has by and large achieved its programming aims. The key elements of the LADP: the support provided to the local development processes in six districts, the economic recovery component and the fast-track projects have largely been successful. These successes have occurred by and large at the output level.

Some of the achievements of the LADP at the output level include the completion of 132 fast-track projects which included 28 Water and sanitation projects implemented and services improved in the three programming areas. Thirty-five community based electricity facilities and services were improved. Five major health facilities were rehabilitated. In addition over 150 health care professionals and an equal number of community members were trained on health related matters. Short-term employment was generated through the fast-track infrastructure projects (UNDP, HABITAT, WHO) for more than 135,000 person days. In terms of economic recovery activity 2685 (local trainers, NGO managers and final beneficiaries) were provided technical training on business development practices. Seven hundred and fifteen entrepreneurs were provided loans including 156 women owned businesses. In total, 3400 enterprises were supported and 463 businesses were created. There were other accomplishments in the economic recovery field such as the establishments of three Business Information Centres and the Governorates Action Plans for Economic Recovery. The economic recovery plans compliment the six district plans that were prepared through the participatory planning processes.

Collectively these results have been considerable given the relative short time frame of the programme especially when one takes into account the slow start of the LADP, implementing the programme through seven agencies, and the diverse implementing contexts that the programme operated in across Iraq.



The LADP is short on achievements at the output level but there was one key outcome: From a long term strategic perspective the LADP has succeeded in helping to understand the broader Iraqi context and the role strong local planning and engagement could play in the country's future. One of the more encouraging indications of the viability of the LADP concept can be found in the south in the Marshlands where an additional six districts committed to the LADP district planning approach through support of LADP SIDA's supported component. Subsequently, the consolidation of nine district plans for the entire Marshland area under the auspices of the Ministry of State for the Marshlands (MOSM) has resulted in all requested rural projects being incorporated into the MOSM five-year plan which has been submitted to the Ministry of Planning Development Cooperation.

The three years of the LADP's existence have not been sufficient to create the conditions for genuine sustainability. The programme is best viewed as reaching its mid-term than as a fully mature programme judged from its end point. For while, LADP project activities have led to developmental benefits and provided important experience and exposure to constructive developmental practices in the current context where the appropriate administrative arrangement to support the participatory local planning championed by the programme are still in flux, discussions of overall sustainability of the LADP approach are premature.

Although the strong centralised tendencies that still dominate Iraqi governance share little in common with the LADP approach and some factions in Iraqi society remain sceptical about the programme's participatory concepts, the LADP has met with enthusiastic support from Iraqi stakeholders. This passion for the LADP has been a critical factor in the programme's success. Iraqi stakeholders from all three programming geographic areas have demonstrated an interest and commitment to the LADP and the developmental concepts and objectives the programme has championed and through this experience have established a sense of ownership of the LADP. However in the current six project areas further testing and stronger institutionalization of the LADP concept are required. Through a well conceived second phase of the LADP the issues of sustainability and Iraqi ownership are likely to be perceived more favourably. However, greater sustainability is contingent on some resolution between national and local layers of the Iraqi political system over factors that currently hinder the preparation and implementation of locally conceived development plans.

One of the shortcomings of the LADP was not involving all administrative levels more effectively in the LADP. This admittedly will be a highly difficult undertaking as it also implies addressing a range of administrative bottlenecks that currently impede effective local planning.

Although the programme ultimately succeeded, the first year of the LADP's implementation was marked by low productivity as the UNDP struggled to recruit and retain an appropriate programme manager. There were also delays in recruiting and retaining Iraqi field staff and putting into operation the integrated planning methodology. This conclusion can be drawn about a number of UN agencies. As a result in the early stages the LADP suffered from a lack of leadership and a certain amount of disaccord between the participating UN agencies. The fortunes of the LADP began to turn around with the recruitment of a capable UNDP programme manager. At this point stakeholders began to view the LADP

in a more favourable light. Concerns regarding poor communication and coordination diminished as the UNDP started to demonstrate the management the LADP required.

Beyond the developmental impacts one of the most important outcomes of the fast-track projects is that this experience appears to have stimulated interest in seeing more projects of this nature implemented. This raises challenges for the anticipated second phase of the LADP as to how to finance such projects. A possible solution could come through some form of cost-sharing with the Iraqi government the mechanisms for which are currently under consideration.

The ILO/UNOPS led economic recovery activities met with success especially in the north where the ILO acted as the area coordinator and where more favourable circumstances for project implementation can be found. Important gains were made through the provisions of loans and business development services to entrepreneurs, training and building capacity of local economic institutions and NGOs in support of strengthening and diversifying local economies. The work of the ILO revealed a critical need for providing ongoing support in Iraq on basic matters related to economic recovery. At the same time more in-depth economic related interventions and the introduction of other ideas and practices to facilitate the transition from economic recovery towards economic development seems to be in order for the next phase of the LADP.

The joint UN agency approach to programme implementation employed by the LADP can be considered successful to a certain degree. There are some examples of strong inter-agency collaboration on programming matters. There were also a number of missed opportunities where improvements could have been made if perhaps there had been a stronger obligation to learn from successes and failures.

The use of multiple UN administrative systems whereby each UN agency employed its own procedures to support their programming activities did not overly hinder the LADP. However, it did create confusion and an excessive amount of procedural responsibilities at the local level for the programme's Iraqi partners.

It is on practical matters like procurement procedures that improvements must be made for the second phase. There are instances of some agencies encountering difficulties in executing project activities in a timely fashion and other circumstances where the financial disbursement procedures of certain agencies were found to be too rigid. There are concerns related to coordination between the agencies in the field on project activity as it appears that at times the agencies were working independently as opposed to through a shared vision that was worked out with a number of practical considerations in areas such as information sharing and the designs of training programmes.

One area of clear success was the level of collaboration between the UN agencies on the local development processes. The contribution of each agency in the realization of the five-step planning process is noteworthy. Also, the sharing of area coordination duties amongst the ILO, UN-HABITAT and UNDP proved to be effective. The implementing agencies relied on the UNDP to provide overriding support on matters like coordination and the implementation of a common communication strategy and on these matters the UNDP was found to be very effective. The UNDP as lead agency had a number of

concerns regarding the joint agency approach. The issue for the UNDP is about agreeing on a model that achieves more effective coordination of multiple agencies. In the LADP, seven agencies received parallel funding from ITF and reported separately on financial matters whose details were not divulged to neither the NSC nor the coordinating agency. The UNDP is seeking a model that would provide enhanced transparency and accountability to Iraqi stakeholders and the coordinating agency with the project board (donors-GOI-UN) being privy to budget allocation and actual expenditure versus delivery. This opinion is shared by some Iraqi stakeholders especially on financial matters.

Strategically, a mistake was made in the original programme design when each UN agency was assigned a certain amount of the LADP's budget before development priorities could be properly set by Iraqi stakeholders. A valuable opportunity to effectively reinforce learning through the use of participatory development planning practices was lost. The missed opportunity could only be identified in retrospect based on the realization that the LADP's actual cumulative life span lasted slightly more than three years as opposed to the initial project concept of a one-year implementation period. Although it was understood that the LADP could not be implemented within a year, at the time the ITF could not accept submissions that went beyond 2008. In more ideal circumstances the five-step local development process would have concluded with the identification and implementation of development activities and had the LADP been operating with a proper three or five year plan this could actually have happened. The next stage of the LADP should seek a better integration of efforts focussed on building participatory planning capabilities and implementation of development activities reflecting Iraqi identified priorities.

The LADP programme has been significant in that it has practically addressed a number of implicit strategic issues in regards to the UN's mandate in Iraq and for the country itself. Firstly, it has demonstrated that inter-agency collaboration in programme implementation is possible and has many benefits albeit with a greater emphasis on accountability and mechanisms for coordination. The LADP has also demonstrated the viability of participatory planning in support of local development. Embracing this concept has enormous implications for the Iraqi government. At this point in time, a second phase of the LADP approach appears well positioned as a practical vehicle to assist the Iraqi people and its institutions in understanding how to make participatory planning a viable concept.

The evaluation process identified a number of areas for future intervention that would be highly beneficial and result in a more comprehensive and supportive environment for supporting participatory local development. These include; (i) expanding the LADP to other parts of Iraq (ii) intervening at other administrative levels (iii) expanding the focus of the LADP with more substantial consideration of gender mainstreaming and the environment, (iv) exploring different approaches and introducing cost sharing with the government (iv) further consolidating the work begun in the original six districts ensure sustainability and institutionalization and establishing models for other districts to follow.

Based on the results of the LADP over the last three years, the most important contribution that the LADP made was by acting first and foremost as a platform for promoting both collective and individual learning and capacity building in participatory local development. This evaluation concludes strongly that this should be the focus of the next phase of the LADP. This is not to say that the LADP should be

discouraged from being involved in development projects especially when there is an opportunity to enforce capacity and encourage learning.

The report concludes making recommendations on a number of issues including programming, capacity building, cost-sharing and a possible contribution of the LADP to improving planning at all administrative levels in Iraq. In terms of programming recommendations the report concludes that a five year programming cycle be employed for the next phase of the LADP with the initial year dedicated to better understanding lessons learned from the first year and studying similar interventions in Iraq as a means to clarify the strategic potential of the second phase of the LADP. Another key recommendation in relation to programming is the importance of consolidating and building on the achievements of the first phase of the LADP. It is recommended that the priority for the second phase of the LADP is to act as a platform for promoting learning and investing in human capital both collectively and individually through knowledge acquisition, technical training and the internalization of concepts like gender equality and environmental stewardship. Another recommendation is made regarding the need to reinforce the capacity of the Ministry of Planning. In terms of the economic focus of the LADP, the report recommends that the programme continue to make a contribution to improving general economic capacity to allow Iraq to complete a full economic recovery. However, a second programming theme should be focused on economic development. In terms of fast-track or infrastructure type project activity, the report recommends that this type of activity should largely be financed through cost sharing arrangements with the GOI. The report also makes a number of recommendations related to the UN administrative and managerial arrangements in support of the LADP. The key recommendation relates to ensuring the UNDP has the necessary administrative control of the LADP to help guarantee that programming obligations are met in the most timely and technically effective manner possible. However, before this occurs it is recommended that an internal discussion be held between the concerned UN agencies to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the administrative arrangements of the last phase of the LADP and potential managerial innovations in support of a joint agency implemented second phase that would help to ensure greater UN agency accountability and transparency.

## 1.0 Introduction

The LADP is a manifestation of discussions held between UN agencies (most notably the UNDP, the ILO, and UN Habitat) and Iraqi stakeholders at the Governorate, and Federal Government levels on how to promote more effective local development processes while addressing such development objectives as poverty reduction and economic recovery. Commencing in 2007, the LADP, is a programme with an operational budget of US\$ 30,827,310 with a one year project implementation time frame. The lead UN executing agency is the UNDP and the principal Iraqi counterpart is the MoPDC. The LADP was operational in a context of wide spread economic and social devastation which has led to a situation in Iraq where local governments are weak and lacking in basic capacity and financial resources to deliver services and maintain basic infrastructure.

The objective of the LADP has been to work with local authorities to strengthen their abilities to prepare and implement human rights based, gender sensitive local area development plans. The LADP has sought to work with local partners to stimulate local economic development and generate short term and sustainable long term employment. The LADP has also worked towards improving the social and physical infrastructure through labour intensive approaches and ameliorating the service delivery capabilities of local authorities. The LADP is operational in the Marshlands in the south (Basra, Thi Qar and Missan), Hilla in the centre of the country and Sulaimaniya in the north. The UNDP acts as the area coordinator in the south, UN-HABITAT in the central region and the ILO in the north.

While the UNDP acts as the lead executing agency, the LADP is a joint UN agency effort involving the contributions of seven UN agencies: the UN Habitat, WHO, UNESCO, UNIFEM, and the ILO in direction collaboration with UNOPS. The strategy has been to have the Iraqi people and its institutions benefit through the LADP from the sector specific capabilities and experience of the participating agencies. The UNDP retains an overall coordination role while the other UN agencies act as implementing agencies in collaboration with local Iraqi partners from the private, public and NGO sectors. In terms of in-country field coordination, the ILO has been responsible for area coordination in the north, UN Habitat in the centre region and UNDP assuming local coordination in the south. The LADP has three main programming thrusts. The first relates to establishing more transparent and participatory development processes at the local level that build local capacity while bringing in a broad range of stakeholders in a participatory manner to reduce poverty and attain other developmental objectives like improving the status of women in Iraqi society. The second programming component involves fast-track projects that are designed to address local development concerns, enhance service provision, and provide short term employment. The third programming element involves stimulating economic recovery activity to help remediate the grave economic circumstances of Iraq. This evaluation is intended to assess the achievements of the LADP against the stated RBM framework and to consider other factors facilitating and hindering the success of the LADP.

## **2.0 Description of the LADP**

### **2.1.1 A Context of Violence and Insecurity and the Need for Remote Management**

The LADP operates in a very unique set of circumstances that make the design and implementation of development projects difficult. The most notable feature is the level of violence and conflict. The ongoing security situation has resulted in among other measures, the establishment of a remote management system for UN agencies from Amman, Jordan. This includes the LADP.

Over the last 25 years, Iraq has known constant economic and social devastation. Especially damaging was the 2003 to 2008 period that commenced with war and involved post war conflict that led to the destruction of valuable infrastructure and incredible damage to the economic foundation of the country. The situation has been very volatile and unpredictable in Iraq. However, the violence and arbitrary kidnappings and killings reached its peak in 2006. Since this time, the incidents of violence have decreased. Most of the concern regarding violence and insecurity relates to the situation in Baghdad and a few other geographic areas of the country including the south. The northern Kurdistan area has experienced increasing and relative security, stability and prosperity. Nevertheless a UN green zone is maintained in Erbil from which UNOPS and the UNDP have active offices that support the LADP. LADP was never overly reliant on the UN operational base in Baghdad apart from initial support for the fast-track projects, the programme's launching and a NSC meeting. The specific events that led to the establishment of the remote management system include the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 that killed the top UN envoy and 19 other UN staff members. This triggered the evacuation of UN operations from Iraq. In the early fall of 2003, a second car bomb outside UN HQ killed and wounded 21 people leading to the final withdrawal of all international staff from Baghdad.

### **2.1.2 Developmental Context**

Iraq is considered to have high levels of poverty and unemployment. According to a recent study by the University of Babel, 10 million Iraqis or one third of the population are living in absolute poverty. The unemployment rate is estimated to be between 18 to 50% depending on the source of figures and definition of unemployment that is used. Iraq is nevertheless, viewed by the UN as a middle income country due in large part to its oil and gas revenues.

The violence and the economic circumstances of the country have set the stage for major spikes in the numbers of vulnerable groups that include minorities, women, youth, Internally Displace People (IDPs), the disabled and in general, the poor. Gender inequality is a major concern throughout Iraq. Prior to the war the situation of women has been described as being relative good. However, with a lack of leadership on such matters pervading the country the situation of women has degraded considerably. Violence against women has become especially worrisome. According to the UN led IDP Working Group there are close to 2.8 million displaced people in Iraq or roughly 10% of the population who can be found throughout the country with a large percentage of refugees seeking refuge in other countries especially neighbouring countries like Jordan.

Due to the relative peace in the north that is governed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), there are more positive economic conditions. In 2004, the per capita income in the north was 25% higher than the rest of Iraq. Generally speaking circumstances related to internal mobility are much more favourable in the north than those found in other LADP programming areas.

### **2.1.3 The Move to a Federal System of Government and Decentralization**

Since 2004, there has been a concerted effort supported by the international community to work with Iraqi stakeholders to establish the necessary legal and institutional structures to underpin a federal state system of government. At the same time there has been a movement towards decentralization that was reinforced with an important policy announcement in January of 2010. The Law of Disengagement of the Departments of the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works was sent to the Presidency Council for promulgation. This law is the first real step towards achieving administrative and fiscal decentralization. Some international donors have been working on this issue such as WHO which has a long standing presence in Iraq working with The GOI on decentralizing the health system into a primary health care model.

As the new administrative and organizational arrangements have slowly begun to take shape, locally elected politicians and administrators have become increasingly charged with the responsibility to deliver services, maintain infrastructure and stimulate local economic development. Polling conducted of Iraqi people indicates there are growing expectations regarding local governments and its role in ensuring service delivery. After the local elections of 2009, those elected are particularly feeling the pressure to demonstrate results. In Basra, where opinion polls were held following the election, 81% of people polled expected the Provincial Administration to have a positive impact on their lives over the next two years.

Weaknesses exist at all government levels in Iraq but it is especially acute at the lower levels. The 18 governorates (Provincial Councils) have new political powers and responsibilities through the decentralization process but this enhanced status has not been matched with the necessary resources and capacity. The situation is even more out of proportion at the district levels where there is even less capacity and resources to deliver services as the pressure builds to do so.

Although the political and administrative culture of Iraq is changing, it has not evolved to the point where it has translated into tangible improvements in the quality of life of people through enhanced services and infrastructure. At both the district and governorate levels there are limited capabilities in relation to planning, budgeting and assuming responsibility for local development activities. Another consideration is the fact that Iraq has a limited tradition of engaging people in local public affairs which is an essential dynamic in improving local government. The current circumstances at the district and governorate levels are far from ideal for making a push towards stronger civic engagement.

A carryover from pre-war Iraq is the highly centralized public administrative system that still dictates how decisions are made and finances are allocated. The notion of fiscal autonomy and capacity to raise revenues at other levels of government except in certain circumstances is limited although as noted

there is an increasing desire to see this situation changed. A deep challenge is to determine how some of the more than adequate financial resources of the country can be transferred to the lower levels. Yet, until district and governorate level administrations can demonstrate they are able to plan, implement and manage development projects, the matter of transferring funds to local governments has to be done on a selective basis where the circumstances exist for guaranteeing successful implementation.

## **2.2 Relationship with UN Strategic Planning Framework**

The LADP derives from the UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq, emanating from the former Cluster C: Governance and Human Development. The Clusters C results matrix includes the implementation of area based development programmes and the preparation of local area development plans (LADPs) containing priority proposals for future investments in economic, social and physical development. According to the project document, the LADP was designed to contribute to the attainment of all the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and particularly:

- Eradicating extreme hunger and poverty
- Promoting gender equality and empowering women;
- Ensuring environmental sustainability; and
- Developing a global partnership for development.

The LADP was also related to the achievement of the developmental goals set out in the Iraqi government's own strategic planning frameworks. The LADP reflects the priority needs addressed in various sections of the Joint Iraqi Needs Assessment, most specifically sections in Sections II and III. Most of the development components as well as the National Development Strategy (NDS), clearly spells out the need to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens through the rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure as supported by the LADP. The NDS also emphasizes economic development, private sector and SME development.

The LADP was designed to respond to these issues in three areas: one in the south; one in the centre; and one in the north. The three projects were implemented by a team of seven UN agencies. The programme approach included the preparation of (i) local area development (district) plans, (ii) stimulating the creation of new businesses and jobs through vocational and skills training, (iii) improving physical and social infrastructure using labour intensive approaches and (iv) developing the capacities of local governments to more effectively deliver local services. The objectives of the LADP are as follows:

1. Strengthen the capabilities of local authorities in three selected areas in the north, centre and south to plan and manage reconstruction and development activities through the formulation and implementation of human rights based, gender sensitive local area development plans.
2. Stimulate local economic development and generate short term and sustainable long term employment in the three selected areas.



3. Improve social and physical infrastructure using labour intensive approaches and the service delivery capabilities of local governments in the three selected areas.

The main outputs of LADP are:

(1.1) Comprehensive human rights based, gender sensitive local area development plans (LADPs) for three areas prepared and adopted by local authorities and stakeholders assisted by a team of UN agencies based on joint participatory needs assessments;

(1.2) Strengthened coordination and communication mechanisms between central government and local authorities in the three areas;

(2.1) Improved local business environment for small businesses in three areas;

(2.2) At least 80 new small enterprises and cooperatives established in three areas;

(2.3) Enhanced employment skills for at least 1500 residents in three areas;

(3.1) 30 water and sanitation facilities and services improved in three areas;

(3.2) 9 primary educational facilities and programme activities improved in three areas;

(3.3) 12 health services centres and services improved in three areas;

(3.4) 2500 housing units and 12 community facilities improved in three areas;

(3.5) Improved conditions for agriculture development and the promotion of environment awareness including through 60 small infrastructures projects in three areas;


(3.6) 30 community based electricity facilities and services improved in three areas; and

(3.7) 9 damaged religious sites rehabilitated in three areas.

## **2.3 Partnerships and Key Programming Approaches**

The programme partnered with the following Iraqi institutions to implement local area development initiatives: Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC); Ministry of Education (MoE); Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works; Ministry of Water Resources; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA); Selected Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Iraq in the target Governorates; ILO International Training Centre; Economists Union of Kurdistan and other Iraqi NGOs; and microfinance organizations. This is in addition to stakeholder partners at the district level. There is field level coordination between the various partners but no joint programming activity.

Key for both the fast-track projects and the local planning processes is the use of participatory development practices. This is best exemplified by the five-step planning process that was developed by the LADP and used in support of the preparation of the district plans. The five- step process is outlined below:



## 2.4 A New Context for UN and Government of Iraq Collaboration


The UN and GOI recently signed the first United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Iraq that is to cover the period from 2011-2014. This establishes a new strategic framework for partnership and the utilization of funds, and programmes and agencies of the UN in support of the mandate of the Government of Iraq. Over the coming four years the UN will contribute towards state and peace building through five key priority areas addressing inclusive economic growth, environmental management, promoting good governance and protection of human rights, ensuring access to improved basic services for all, and special investment in the capacities of women, youth and children to enable their full participation in all aspects of life in Iraq. The UNDAF, in alignment with the National Development Plan (NDP), will make significant contributions to improving the lives of all people in Iraq. The UNDAF reflects the priorities of the Five Year National Development Plan that considers effective human capital as the main pillar for building the new Iraq.

One of the critical objectives of UNDP's "Agenda for 2012 and Beyond", is to provide support to development countries in regards to strategic and transformational programmes that facilitate national development agendas and the achievement of the MDGs. From an operational standpoint, there will be a shift in the UNDP's philosophy towards becoming a knowledge based organization that imparts this new approach into its programming through its support for the agency's partners.

## 2.5 Implementation and Support Mechanisms

The LADP depends on a number of mechanisms to implement the programme in the three targeted areas. Overall, the LADP relies on a multi-layered project support framework that begins with the NSC and works down to the LSCs through which all LADP activities are channelled. The diagram 2.5.1 details the levels of programming support and interrelation with UN supporting elements.

Diagram 2.5.1 Programme Support Mechanism



## Support Mechanisms

1. National and Local Steering Committees (the NSC and LSCs). Table 2.5.2 displays the roles and responsibilities of the LSCs and NSC respectively.

Table 2.5.2

NSC Responsibilities	LSC Responsibilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Provide strategic advice on LADP design and implementation;</li><li>▪ Support the LSCs and facilitate the involvement of ministries in preparing and implementing local area development plans.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Prepare a local area development plan;</li><li>▪ Identify “fast-track” social and economic development and physical rehabilitation projects;</li><li>▪ Encourage cooperation coordination and partnership with governorate, local government officials and other stakeholders;</li><li>▪ Monitor implementation of programme activities.</li></ul>

2. Local consulting firms who have been contracted to assist local authorities, Civil Society Organizations (CSO), and the LSCs in identifying and designing small-scale activities that can be implemented and managed by local stakeholders.

3. Private companies that were contracted to implement fast-track projects mostly related to construction projects and the provision of goods and services.

4. International or local NGOs were also contracted to implement fast-track projects, particularly those related to skill development, community led projects, civil society capacity building etc.

5. Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed with Technical Departments of the Iraqi Government and/or municipalities to implement small and labour intensive fast track projects mostly through the UNDP

6. International and support staff of the project are based in Amman with travel to Iraq on a regular basis.


## 2. 6 Procurement Procedures

For the LADP each implementing agency followed its own corporate rules and regulations governing procurement issues.

## 2.7 Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements

An M&E system was employed by the LADP as a lesson learning tool and secondly to raise transparency and accountability of LADP interventions. The UNDP also introduced the Management Information System (MIS) that was intended to gather detailed project information in a common system that would

provide stakeholders access to comprehensive information on financial matters, project reports, information related to M&E , and basic information like MOUs. A common reporting system is at the heart of this M&E architecture as shown in the diagram below:



## 2.8 Financial Disbursement

As of March 2010, 88.55% of LADP funds are committed, amounting to just over US\$26 million disbursed. Details of fund disbursement are shown in the table below:

Agencies	Jun-08	Dec-08	Jun-09	Dec-09	Mar-10
UNDP	1,807,503	8,700,000	10,137,755	12,035,421	12,035,421
ILO/UNOPS	1,800,003	2,980,170	5,534,405	6,057,104	6,057,104
UN-HABITAT	740,573	1,595,801	2,504,684	3,051,472	3,180,526
UNESCO	467,404	665,030	1,537,919	2,246,514	2,320,712
WHO	700,000	840,691	2,398,279	2,487,962	2,562,962
UNIFEM	775,135	1,187,120	1,386,758	1,519,276	1,519,276
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,290,618</b>	<b>15,968,812</b>	<b>23,499,799</b>	<b>25,878,473</b>	<b>26,156,725</b>

## **2.9 A Proposed Second Phase for the LADP**

A second phase of LADP is now being proposed to consolidate and institutionalize comprehensive participatory development planning, and to extend these approaches to new geographical areas. The proposed second phase of the programme has received endorsement and support from the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. The provincial council of five governorates and the original LADP National steering Committee (NSC) have also provided their official endorsement to the proposed orientation of the second phase of the LADP.

## **3.0 Evaluation Methodology & Approach**

### **3.1 Overview**

After an initial desk review and reference to the suggested analytical framework, the following evaluation methodology was elaborated and designed to ensure consistency with UNDP's and ILO's Evaluation Policy. The key objective of the evaluation was to assess the progress made by the LADP against the programme's stated objectives and intended results. Where the LADP failed to reach its stated objectives the evaluation team sought to understand why. At the same time the evaluation process sought to develop a perspective as to why specific aspects of the LADP succeeded. Understanding both the successes and failures of the LADP was deemed necessary in developing lessons learned and recommendations for Phase Two of the LADP.

The evaluation team relied on the UNDP and ILO-UNOPS project teams based in Amman, Lebanon (for the ILO) and in Iraq for support but as the lead agency on the evaluation, UNDP's M&E Team was more prominent in terms of providing direction and support.

The evaluation was carried out using a desk review, field visits to project sites for consultations with project staff, partners and beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. Due to security constraints a stakeholder consultation processes took place in Amman. Apart from a field mission to Erbil by the lead evaluator, all field work was completed by the national Iraqi evaluators due to security restrictions.

The evaluation made use of participatory project evaluation principles and methodology like open ended focus groups discussions. It also relied on documentation produced by the various UN agencies to self assess progress made in achieving the LADP's objectives. ILO/UNOPS was exceptional in this regard.

As noted earlier, as per a request made by the ILO a more in depth analysis was undertaken to reflect ILO's role in the LADP. The LADP is a very important part of the ILO's programme in IRAQ. The evaluation of the LADP marks only the second time that an ILO project in Iraq has been evaluated. In considering the ILO's role in the LADP the key focuses are the organization's role in the economic recovery sector and as an area coordinator in the north.

### **3.2 Expected Deliverables**

- a) A desk review
- b) Key Informant interviews in Amman mostly with UN staff
- c) An evaluation plan (including instruments and methodology) prepared by the evaluation team.
- D) Development and administering of questionnaires (translated into Kurdish and Arabic) and focus groups discussions.
- E) Stakeholder workshops in Amman with project stakeholders from Iraq (more senior level officials) and individual interview with project beneficiaries and other project stakeholders in Iraq through the national evaluators and focus groups discussion facilitated by all members of the evaluation team. This includes a visit to Erbil by the evaluation team leader to meet with project stakeholders including members of the northern LSC and NSC.
- F) Draft evaluation report including stakeholder workshop proceedings, analysis of questionnaires, focus groups discussions and findings from field visits by evaluation team.
- G) Revision of Final report based on feedback on draft report.
- H) Respond to specific requirements of the ILO

See Annex 3 for the key Evaluation Criteria of the LADP evaluation.

### **3.3 Evaluation Strategy**

The evaluation followed two tracks. The first track related to examining with both UN staff and project stakeholders in Iraq issues related to the management and administrative arrangements of the LADP. As an area based development programme, the LADP involves a high degree of coordination between multiple UN agencies and this beckons that attention be paid as to how effective this has been. The second track involved examining with by and large, project stakeholders in Iraq the issues of project design, sustainability, ownership and project success. This was achieved in part through the use of questionnaires designed for project beneficiaries and other project stakeholders that can be found in annex 2.

There is clearly interdependence between the two evaluation tracks and this was addressed throughout the evaluation process. However, there are a lot of institutional matters specific to how the LADP has been managed and required assessment through direct discussions with representatives from the UN agencies having a stake in the LADP.

### **3.4 Key Evaluation Criteria**

In order to provide a strong focus to the evaluation process, it was determined that the following four evaluation criteria will frame the evaluation:

- 1) **Management and administrative arrangements:** The broad question to be answered is to what extent have the project's management and administrative arrangements facilitated or hindered the progress of the LADP.
- 2) **Sustainability:** Upon termination of the first phase of the LADP what if any, project activities appear to be sustainable.
- 3) **Ownership:** As the LADP has evolved to what extent local people in Iraq and their institutions have gained ownership over the local developmental process.
- 4) **Project Success at the field level:** How successful have activities like the fast track projects been in achieving their desired developmental impacts?

### 3.5 Evaluation Team

The evaluation of the LADP was conducted by an evaluation team made up of one international evaluator who acted as the team leader and two national Iraqi evaluators. One of the national evaluators worked with project stakeholders in the Kurdish speaking north mostly to seek a better understanding of issues surrounding ILO related activity and the fast track projects. The second national evaluator covered the Arabic speaking central and southern regions.

The responsibilities of the team leader were to conduct an analysis of the information gathered by the national consultants in the broader context of considering all information sources. The work of the national evaluators was critical to the success of the evaluation as they were tasked with directly documenting the opinions of most Iraqi stakeholders. The team leader, in addition to synthesizing all the information gathered, conducting meetings and overseeing a workshop in Amman, and writing up the evaluation report also travelled to Erbil to meet with key project stakeholders who were identified by the M&E units of the ILO and UNDP.

The evaluation team leader had the additional duty of working with the ILO to ensure that time was dedicated to examining in greater detail the ILO's role in the LADP and this is reflected in section 5.0 of the main report. Part of these ILO specific responsibilities involved overseeing site visits to ILO managed LADP project activity in northern Iraq.

### 3.5 Questionnaires and Focus group Discussions

Three questionnaires were used by the evaluation team as the main tools to gather information in Iraq either in the form of key informant interviews or to guide focus group discussions. They can be found in Annex 2 of this report. One questionnaire was dedicated specifically to project beneficiaries while the second a more encompassing questionnaire, was meant to gather information from stakeholders at other administrative and political levels within Iraq from the local governorates level up to the national steering committees. The third questionnaire that was used in the north by the Kurdish speaking evaluator was a hybrid between the two questionnaires and designed to collect and ascertain the opinions of northern stakeholders and project beneficiaries and most specifically those involved in ILO-UNOPS supported activity.



A variation on the questionnaire for LADP stakeholders was used to animate the focus group discussion in Erbil that the lead evaluator attended and the workshop held in Amman in April 2010 with Iraqi stakeholders. See Annex 3 for questions regarding the relevance and strategic fit of the LADP.

### **3.6 Challenges and Limitations**

The key challenge faced with this evaluation is the limited access to project sites and stakeholders within Iraq. In the southern and central parts of the country, the security protocol requirements rendered it impossible for the evaluation team leader to undertake field visits. The situation in the north is not as cumbersome and attempts were made to have the team leader visit project sites. Unfortunately, due to logistical difficulties, the team leader was limited to meeting with stakeholders in Erbil. The two national Iraqi evaluators were not burdened with such excessive security requirements and hence were able to meet more freely with project stakeholders in all parts of the country and to visit project sites. A way for compensating for the situation in Iraq was to have LADP stakeholders in Iraq attend an evaluation workshop in Amman in April. A second avenue that was explored was to make use of information generated through self assessment exercises of various project activities.

Another issue relates to the complexity of evaluating a multi-agency programme implemented in diverse geographical and cultural setting with a variety of Iraqi partners at different levels. To ensure an evaluation that accurately reflected the eventual importance of the LADP, it was necessary to direct the evaluation in a specific manner towards a realistic perspective on what was possible given the operational environment and short implementation period.

## **4.0 Findings**

One of the most important statements that can be made about the LADP is that it is a multilayered programme implemented by a multitude of agencies in perhaps one of the most difficult programming environments one could imagine. As such, one has to take great care in assessing the achievements and failures of the LADP. It can be said that all UN programmes in Iraq face similar challenges. Yet the LADP has succeeded remarkably well in achieving desired results. There are some discrepancies between the anticipated results based on the original RBM framework and what was eventually achieved; but in the end it has been judged that the LADP succeeded in a number of critical areas.

There were some anticipated outputs like the rehabilitation of nine damaged religious sites and the building of housing that were not realized due to strategic and pragmatic reasons and resources were directed towards other priorities. However, the key elements of the LADP: the support provided to the local development processes in six districts, the economic recovery component and the fast-track projects have largely been successful. The amount of project activity is considerable given the first year of the LADP was not productive.

It is important to stress that these accomplishments have occurred by and large at the output level through the fast-track projects, extensive training activity, and the development of the local development plans. The achievements of the LADP at the outcome level are limited and what has been achieved in this regard could not be properly assessed due to a number of limitations related to the

evaluation process and the lack of pertinent information gathered on matters like quantitative and qualitative assessment of the different fast track projects.

At the outcome level the LADP has made one important achievement: From a long term strategic perspective the LADP has succeeded in helping to understand the broader Iraqi context and the role strong local planning and engagement could play in the country's future. One of the more encouraging indicators in support of this outcome is the viability of the LADP concept as can be found in the south, in the Marshlands, where an additional six districts committed to the LADP district planning approach through support from a separate UNDP project financed by the Swedish government. This achievement results in the entire Marshlands area being covered through nine district plans. Moreover the Ministry of State of the Marshlands (MSOM) agreed to implement infrastructure projects activity in the rural areas of all nine districts as part of the Marshlands' master five-year plan. This is exactly the type of influence one would hope the LADP would have at the outcome level in terms of institutionalizing the LADP ideals.

What is impressive about the LADP is the unanimity regarding its success. The positive view is shared by the donor agencies, the UN partners, project beneficiaries, LSC and NSC committee members and the representatives from different levels of the Iraqi government. Some of the features that are valued by stakeholders include the emphasis on participatory practices where the LADP is considered exemplary by UN standards in this regard, the inroads in establishing an alternative manner for conceptualizing and implementing local development activity, and the fact that other LADP project activity has been rather successful. As one would expect, not all is favourable with the LADP. The next sections will provide a more balanced perspective on the programme's achievements and shortcomings.

#### **4.1 Local development Process and the District Plans**

In a context of great cultural and economic diversity and where factions are an integral part of the local fabric in some programming areas, the LSCs oversaw the preparation of six district plans in five different governorates through the five-step process developed by all participating UN agencies. In preparing the plans a certain amount of capacity building and training was undertaken to ensure that local planners and other stakeholders were able to effectively participate in the planning processes and subsequently ensure the enactment of the plans. The plans were designed to identify and address short, medium and long term needs in key sectors through a five year time framework where public investment and civil society mobilization are required for the development of the area. This experience in public-private partnership provides an indication of what is possible in a context where new alliances and arrangements are sought in an emerging decentralized system.

In Said Sadiq, 200 participants attended three participatory planning workshops that sought to build on expert assessments conducted by local organizations with UN support. This was typical of the engagement in the LADP planning processes across the country. One of the interesting outcomes of the five-step process was that it afforded ordinary citizens the opportunity to speak directly to local officials, a practice that has been rather rare in Iraq. The districts plans present a general overview with sector

specific plans. There is a good level of detail and analysis in each district plan that should provide a good basis for strategic planning over the next few years.

As mentioned, through additional Swedish financial support the local planning process was extended to an additional six districts. The project ***“Support to Iraq for Job Creation and Local Development through the UNDP Local Area Development Plan Programme”*** ended in December of 2009. This addition to the programme speaks highly of the appeal and potential that Iraqi stakeholders and donor agencies see in the LADP approach.

Yet, in the original six districts there are questions as to whether the district plans are viable over the long term without further support than can be provided by the LSCs and the local councils and their still limited capabilities. The LSCs as a project implementing tool cannot be counted on over the long term to guide the plans and associate planning processes. There is a need to establish stronger institutional support and ownership. This is in addition to ensuring that the plans receive the funding to make the priorities identified in the plans achievable.

There are other concerns regarding the LSCs in terms of working with clear roles and responsibilities, communication, the sharing of information, and the permanence of committee members in the central and southern regions where elections mandated change. The creation of the LSCs established a forum for bringing Iraqi stakeholders together (i.e. women, CSOs, government, the private sector, UN agencies) on a relatively regular basis to discuss matters of importance. For stakeholders involved in the LSCs this was highly valued. There appears to be a long term role for the LSCs or at least the LSC concept in support of local planning. However, at local government structures should be viewed as key in terms of implementation and institutionalization of the LSC/LADP approach.

Having a strong mixture of stakeholders as members of the local supporting body of the LADP is a key feature that should be retained regardless of whether or not the LSC model is retained or a decision is made to work more exclusively through local government to implement the LADP. Regardless of the local structure, it will be important to identify committee members that are motivated and that will remain active over the long term.

It is important to highlight the role of the UN agencies in developing the district plans. In preparing the plans there were substantive complementary inputs on planning, education, health, water, sanitation and other focus areas. This was facilitated in great part by the partnering UN agencies and their field staff. The content of the district plans also reflected interactions between Ministries, Governorates staff and politician and officials on the LSCs. Through the five-step participatory process a co-ordinated view of the issues and then potential responses for each area were devised in good part through assistance from UN agencies. In a situation as complex as Iraq where the relationships between central and local actors are in flux the fact that the UN successfully achieved this with agencies working together is a key success of the programme.

## 4.2 Fast Track Projects

One of the strongest conclusions from the evaluation workshop that was held with Iraqi stakeholders in April 2010 was the degree to which they expressed their support for the LADP fast-track projects. The needs that were being addressed in relation to the delivery of basic services, the employment that was generated and the capacity building in support of the fast-track projects were all highly appreciated.

At this point in time the physical infrastructure associated with the fast-track projects is in evidence. There is agreement that the fast-track projects were responding to clear needs and hence their relevance and utility should not be doubted. What is not available is objective information on how the fast-track projects resulted in developmental benefits or negative impacts. This situation should be corrected for the benefit of both Iraqi and UN stakeholders.

There were some concerns regarding the pace of implementation of a number of the fast-track projects, the lack of local control over the process, and the financial disbursement systems in support of the projects. Another worry was the excessive amount of administrative requirements attached to the fast-track projects that emanated from the fact that both Iraqi and UN administrative procedures had to be respected.

With each of the UN agencies employing their own approaches to implementing the fast-track projects there could be healthy debate between the agencies as to what is the most effective implementation modality. A thorough examination was not possible through the evaluation regarding the efficiency and pace of each of implementing systems used simply because it was not possible to visit a sufficient number of fast-projects due to security restrictions. The UNDP used national execution while at the other end of the spectrum UN-HABITAT opted to work through private contractors. ILO/UNOPS chose another modality through for the economic recovery activity handing over responsibilities to the local chambers of commerce and NGOs and international agencies to implement projects. The WHO worked through its established relations and agreed to practices with the Ministry of Health.

What was found admirable with all the fast-track project delivery systems employed by the UN agencies was that there was minimal use of external expertise. By trusting and engaging local partners a contribution was made by the LADP in solidifying and improving their capabilities. However, within the methods employed by the UN agencies there can be a further debate as to how “infrastructure type” projects like the fast-track project can not only deliver basic services but can also provide a better platform for learning and developing capacity related to designing, implementing and ensuring maintenance. This should be a serious consideration for the next phase of the LADP.

As noted, Iraqi stakeholders placed a high value on the fast track projects. They have a physical presence, a visibility and a direct relevance that cannot be matched by the other LADP project activities. But at the same time it was also felt the fast-track projects were not a strong enough response to the problems in the LADP programming areas both in terms of the number and the scale of the interventions. Stakeholders felt that the financial limit of the LADP project activity should be raised. A figure of a \$500,000 limit per project was suggested on a few occasions. Currently the limit of \$100,000

was generally adopted by UNDP supported activity because of the chosen modality of implementation heavily relying on Iraqi counterpart institutions while UN-HABITAT did undertake projects in excess of this amount. This evaluation process has concluded that considering larger project should not be dismissed by the LADP provided that supporting such activities can lead to other types of improvements like in terms of institutional transformation in relation to how the projects are funded. This point is elaborated in subsequent chapters in the context of cost sharing and its implications.

A few additional negative criticisms were made regarding the fast-track projects. The opinion was expressed from participants from the south that some of the fast-track projects in that part of the country did not end up assisting the poorest of the poor. Another concern that is very complex and is discussed in greater detail in the section on project design is the degree to which there was integration of the fast-track projects with the local planning process and how the types of projects to be supported by the LADP was predetermined. Table 4.1.8 presents achievements of the UN agencies except ILO/UNOPS against Outputs 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.

<u>Output 3.1:</u> 30 water and sanitation facilities and services improved in three areas.	UNDP	28 Water and sanitation projects implemented and services improved in the three areas.
<u>Output 3.2:</u> 9 primary educational facilities and programme activities improved in three areas.	UNESCO	8 school laboratories and education facilitates rehabilitated
	UNDP	1 primary school rehabilitation
	HABITAT	7 school and youth centre rehabilitation
<u>Output 3.3:</u> 12 health services centers and services improved in three areas.	WHO	6 centers fully built or rehabilitated, which includes a doctors' residence (cost-shared, four apartments houses
	WHO	25 capacity building programs conducted for health care workers, teachers, and community members.
<u>Output 3.4:</u> communal upgrading in poor housing areas through improvements to access roads and surface drainage and 12 community facilities improved in three areas.*	HABITAT	3 Paved access roads 3 primary schools 1 school hall 2 secondary schools 2 Youth centers 4 local parks Construction of 2 workshops for Crafting School Construction of multi-purpose playing yard and 2 green areas
<u>Output 3.5:</u> Improved conditions for agriculture development and the	UNDP	13 projects implemented and services improved in the three areas.

promotion of environment awareness including 60 small infrastructure projects in three areas.	WHO	3 environmental awareness capacity building programs have been implemented, as well as community awareness increased of environment and sanitation.
	UNDP	60 local planners trained in Jordan on Natural Resources Management and Environment
Output 3.6: 30 community based electricity facilities and services improved in three areas.	UNDP	35 projects implemented and services improved in the three areas.
Output 3.7: Restoration and construction of buildings and sites reflecting culture and tradition**	UNDP	14 projects implemented
<p><i>*In assessing the scope of work for this output, construction of individual housing units was considered problematic due to difficulties in selecting beneficiaries and insufficient budget allocation. It was decided to invest in communal upgrading in poor housing areas through improvements to access roads and surface drainage thus benefiting a larger number of people in low income housing areas.</i></p> <p><i>**In assessing the scope of work for this output, the rehabilitation of religious sites (UNDP) was considered overly sensitive in terms of perceived impartiality and equity by various religious groups and would have possibly required particular care for cultural heritage preservation. This would have likely resulted in slow implementation and costly interventions, which was not adequate for fast-track projects. Instead, it was decided to invest in initiatives promoting culture and tradition that have been identified and prioritized by local communities themselves.</i></p>		

### 4.3 Economic Recovery

As the ILO was the lead agency on the economic recovery portfolio, the issue is dealt with in section 5.0. Overall it can be stated that despite some concerns, the perspective of Iraqi stakeholders is that the economic recovery activities of the LADP are viewed very positively.

### 4.4 Management and Administrative Arrangements

#### 4.4.1 Inter Agency Coordination

The use of multiple UN administrative systems did not overly hinder the LADP in terms of creating a debilitating obstacle. There were in fact some very encouraging aspects from this arrangement like as already noted with the local development process where the agencies each made an important contribution, but there were also some serious concerns.

The sharing of area coordination duties amongst the ILO, UN-HABITAT and UNDP also proved to be effective with each agency taking the lead on logistical, administrative, and substantive inputs related to the execution of the truly joint component of the programme, the district plans; and facilitating,

coordinating, monitoring, the design and execution of fast-track projects. The implementing agencies relied on the UNDP to provide overriding support on matters like coordination and the implementation of a common communication strategy, reporting, and printing of publications. This is probably where the UNDP becomes concerned. It has the responsibility to coordinate and ensure inter-agency cooperation but does not have the authority to ensure that field level engagements are respected. The three individuals hired to act as area coordinators were considered to be very strong LADP assets. There was communication and mutual support between them on LADP related matters.

The picture regarding Iraqi perceptions of the LADP's managerial arrangements are as equally multilayered. There was some confusion in the field amongst Iraqi stakeholders about the roles of the different UN organizations brought on by the myriad of administrative procedures governing the programme that would be intertwined and deal with simultaneously with Iraqi procedures.

It has to be mentioned that Iraqi stakeholders never felt there was any noticeable disaccord between the agencies in the field and in fact praised the UN for appearing to be so unified. However, for those closer to the implementation of the LADP it was difficult working with agencies when each has their own set of rules. There was little communication and coordination between the agencies and the area coordinators, were not always on top of what was going on with each agency. On the issue of training it was noted that each agency had its own ambitious training programme. The various training programmes were designed and carried out as part of the ***"Consolidated Capacity Building Programme"*** that was developed by the UN agencies. This was considered a coordinated plan. However, this plan was developed more from the UN agencies perspective and not centered on the needs and requirements of institutionalized processes and as defined by Iraqi stakeholders. There was a strong feeling from Iraqi stakeholders that there was no coordination on matters relating to training.

On another matter some of the focal points in the field for the different agencies were considered by some Iraqi stakeholders not to be as effective as they needed to be. This is in reference to the local representatives of each UN agency in the three programming areas.

From the Iraqi perspective and hopefully the UN's, there are a small number of deeper issues to consider. With all the different procedures in place it was impossible to provide a regular and accurate picture of the LADP's finances to Iraqi stakeholders. The second concern was how to ensure that the UN agencies were held accountable for their field level activities as the effectiveness and efficiency of each agency in terms of implementation varied.

One of the most important ideas that could be expressed about ensuring effective project management for the LADP in the future is the need to hire competent and engaged staff. Within the UN agencies and at the field level the LADP has been subject to a range of qualification of staff. The LADP had a well documented slow start that was by and large corrected by the recruitment of a dedicated programme manager. His ability to move the LADP forward changed the opinions of Iraqi stakeholders regarding the LADP. Regardless of the level of their involvement, each UN agency has to strive to ensure the most competent and motivated individuals are hired. This is as paramount as the LADP managerial structure.

Moving forward one has to consider the managerial structure of the LADP. What type of managerial structure is required for a programme that is at the point of becoming more complex in terms of being

operational in more parts of the country and administrative levels? In discussions with UN staff members familiar or working on the LADP the concept of “pooled funding”, and of sub-contracting UN agencies on the basis of identified needs, seems to have merit. The LADP in its infancy was innovative in its approach to management and there is no need to abandon this tendency. If the second phase of the LADP was to include "sub-contracting" arrangements for UN agencies, it would be another substantial innovation as there are very few such examples of this in the UN system.

Regardless of the ultimate project management structure there will be a need to engage more substantially Iraqi partners in defining and implementing LADP project activity. This means that no agency should anticipate their level of involvement in the second phase of the LADP until it has been properly considered by Iraqi stakeholders. Another goal has to be greater Iraqi ownership of the programme that would presumably be accompanied by extensive capacity building in this regard.

#### **4.4.2 The NSC and the MoPDC**

The general comment about the NSC was that it was underutilized and lacked a strong purpose in the LADP. In examining the original project Terms of Reference it is easy to understand how this situation could arise where there is clear attempt, probably rightfully so, to ensure that the LADP was locally driven. In the end perhaps the NSC could have used more definition in terms of its roles and responsibilities. During the lifetime of the programme the NSC held but five meetings. It was felt by some stakeholders at the local level that NSC members did not always have a good perspective of what was taking place in the six districts.

One of the objectives of the LADP was to engage the MoPDC in a productive manner to assist in eliminating some of the administrative blockages that would help set the groundwork for the LADP to better flourish. In this regard the programme has not succeeded. The inability of the project to more effectively engage the MoPDC at a national level in support of the project’s objectives is a failure but one has to consider that the LADP had a very limited lifespan with a highly varied and complex agenda. The interaction with the MoPDC was solely through NSC meetings, which took place in Amman, Erbil and Baghdad.

The LADP was successful in positioning itself so the MoPDC with its representation at the federal level and planning units in the district governments have to take the programme seriously. At this point the MoPDC is highly motivated to see the LADP make further inroads through a second phase and as such, was constructively involved in the evaluation process.

### **4.5 Key Evaluation Criteria**

#### **4.5.1 Sustainability**

The three years of the LADP’s existence have not been sufficient to allow for the true achievement of genuine sustainability. The training and capacity building activities, the stimulus to re-establish the Iraqi economy, the exposure to new concepts related to local planning and overseeing the implementation of the fast-track projects have led to developmental benefits, provided important experience and exposure



to constructive developmental practices but this has not been enough to ensure sustainability. This is due in large part to the extent of the needs in Iraq including the programming areas. In terms of the substantive changes sought by the programme in relation to a decentralized approach to local planning, there are still strong tendencies in Iraq that dominate the Iraqi governance system that share little in common with the LADP that could not be overcome given the relative limited scope of the LADP's intervention.

The district plans and the five-step planning process that supported it established a point of reference on a direction that could be taken in relation to promoting an alternative planning model. That in the Marshlands the LADP experience would be emulated and result in an additional six development plans speaks to the potential for long term sustainability related to the LADP approach in regards to participatory local planning. Another indication of the potential for sustainability is that the LADP drew largely on local expertise for support in implementing project activity. This indicates that the challenge relates more to establishing the proper mechanisms for utilizing and nurturing further local capabilities.

The main concern with the LADP experience is that it has not been integrated into the broader Iraqi administrative system. There have been some attempts to align the district plans with provincial development plans like what occurred during the Basra Provincial Development Strategy Review in 2009. Also, the district plans in the North were aligned to the Provincial Development Strategies, and are, moreover, integrated in the process of decentralised budget allocations. The Provincial Council and district authorities, responsible for such allocations, did discuss budgetary matters at an LADP participatory workshop on how each sector in the plan could be funded over the next five years. However, until the plans are actually funded through a supportive legislative framework it is impossible to speak of sustainability. Also more practical experience in putting the participatory practices to work in support of local planning and implementing of the plans is required.

The project team has rightfully identified that the next phase of the LADP should be working more strategically at the governorate level which is a natural choice because budget and decision making on budget allocation is bestowed on Provincial Councils. This will provide a better platform for ensuring that the district plans are institutionalized, afforded financial resources and benefiting from strategic institutional support.

The feeling was expressed from stakeholders in the six participating districts that the concepts promoted by the LADP like consensus based development and gender mainstreaming have not been internalized to the point where they can be properly employed by the districts in support of local development. More assistance is being requested to help make these concepts a part of common practice. One of the trends identified through the evaluation is that in some quarters there remains a certain amount of resentment towards international agencies like the UN and the practices and ideas they promote. This is not startling news but is something that one should keep in mind.

Another factor that will continue to hinder the path towards sustainability is the constant changes in councils and local governments that are re-elected every four years. Each new council brings their own ideas and approaches and creates another challenge for ensuring the sustainability of the concepts promoted by the LADP. The LADP will have to find ways to consider this issue in the design of the next

phase. One suggestion was to transfer the LSC over to local governments. Another proposed solution is to ensure that the LSCs are dominated by people who are permanent in their professional duties whether they are nurses, teachers or local planners.

Concern was also expressed during the evaluation regarding the sustainability of the fast-track projects. There are questions as to whether or not there are the resources and capability to ensure the long term up keep and maintenance of infrastructure created through the fast-track projects. This is a level of analysis that was not possible during this evaluation but that should be considered.

#### **4.5.2 Ownership**

The question of ownership is very much intertwined with that of sustainability in that there are common challenges in both areas. Iraqi stakeholders have embraced the LADP and actively engaged in the six local development processes. From all three programming areas stakeholders have demonstrated an enthusiasm and commitment to the LADP and the developmental concepts and objectives the programme has championed. The district plans are in fact a manifestation of this ownership. In this sense one can speak of ownership but it has not been fully realized. More trial and error in relation to implementing the plans is required to allow for stronger institutionalization of the LADP approach are required. Through a well conceived second phase the issues of sustainability and Iraqi ownership will be seen from a much more favourable perspective. The Programme intended to demonstrate the usefulness of participatory, multi-annual and multi-sectoral local development planning. There is evidence to show local authorities and stakeholders have been convinced of the usefulness of the initiative and are strong advocates of a second phase that would take on the challenge of institutionalization which will help to ensure ownership.

The UN could do much more in a second phase to encourage ownership by having more clearly defined objectives towards transferring control of the LADP over to the Iraq government and other Iraqi stakeholders like NGOs that could both help implement and play a role in monitoring achievement towards the programme's stated objectives. This is where work on establishing undertaking focussed capacity building that allows Iraq to develop and implement project activity, the development of an appropriate institutional framework and cost sharing mechanism can help to reinforce an Iraqi sense of ownership of the LADP.

#### **4.5.3 Project Design**

One issue regarding the LADP that is beyond dispute is the relevance of the LADP. This is a programme that despite whatever hiccups it has encountered has identified a path for Iraq's people and institutions that can help in establishing a new direction for the country. It has had its moments in terms of effectiveness and efficiency but the LADP was designed in such a way as to slowly gain credibility through relatively quickly conceived project activity that bought buy in into a more substantive process.

There remain a number of concerns related to the design of the LADP that deserve to be mentioned. The LADP began operating as a one year programme. It was understood that it was impossible to programme 30 million dollars in a single year nonetheless the programme commenced operating

without a more appropriate three or five year plan. At the time of the design (2007), the ITF could not accept submissions that went beyond 2008. In the end the first phase of the LADP will be operational for just over three years. At the same time the ITF had earmarked the total budget for the sector. Subsequently, interested agencies having agreed to join forces in developing a joint programme devised a scheme for sharing resources that was submitted to the ITF for final approval. This is really a critique of the UN and joint programming modalities rather than a facet of the project design that could be altered. Instead of prudently working through the local planning processes to determine what if even any role each agency would have, each agency began with a part of the budget to programme.

In retrospect based on the realization that the LADP actual cumulative life span would cover just over three years, a different orientation towards the fast-track project activity was possible. The original project design fixed the fast-track projects to move forward apart from the participatory local planning process. It was deemed by project stakeholders that it was important to demonstrate results or real change on the ground while local stakeholders were going through a participatory planning process. The importance Iraqi stakeholders place on the visibility and benefits of the fast track projects tends to support the appropriateness of this approach. However, the approach towards the fast-track projects could have been thought through differently. A fully participatory process and fast-track implementation are not mutually exclusive especially when one considers that most project activity related to the fast track projects and the local development processes was completed over the last few years of the programme.

To some degree or another, the fast-track projects were channelled through the local development processes. The UNDP did this in Basra, Missan, Thi-Qar and identified all its fast-track projects through LADP Planning process STEP1 (rapid priority needs assessments). In the centre and north, Habitat and ILO had already worked alongside LSCs in 2007- early 2008 in order to identify their fast-track projects. In the south because UNDP was late, the fast-track activity had not taken place yet hence leaving an opportunity for Step One to happen.

Although the LADP was a programme that relied heavily on participatory development practices, it also predetermined in considerable detail the number of schools to be built, businesses to be supported and houses to be constructed before any participatory process had taken place. It was mentioned on two occasions during the evaluation that although the LADP fast-track projects responded to critical needs, the reality was that had the fast-track projects been identified through the fully completed five-step local development processes, the type of projects supported by the programme would have been different. Yes, there were some clear needs that had to be addressed in either case and this did not require any deep analysis to determine what needed to be done. Yet there would have been differences and as one stakeholder noted, the approach with the LADP was often implement and discuss later.

In the north for example, there was some agricultural activity. However, it was noted there would have been a much stronger programming emphasis on agriculture had the project activity been completely channelled through the local development process. Following this path would have created an interesting dilemma for the UN agencies involved in the LADP as none has a particularly strong agricultural mandate in the same way the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has. This is a

cautionary tale for the UN for the next phase in terms of not overly committing to any UN agency before Iraqi stakeholders have their say.

Another important question is whether or not there was any added-value in utilizing the joint agency implementation approach. This evaluation has concluded yes because on certain matters there was substantive collaboration between agencies that enhanced the LADP and Iraqi stakeholders had an opportunity to work and benefit from a range of UN partners that brought varied knowledge and expertise to the programme.

Under ideal conditions joint programming should make it easier for the UN agencies to collaborate with one another, decrease transaction costs, avoid duplication, and increase the impact of development projects and of development support in general by drawing on a multitude of agencies. It should also help the UN system to support the achievement of national development goals more coherently, effectively and efficiently. The question is whether or not any of this was achieved through the LADP and this does not seem to be the case. One cannot be too harsh with this criticism simply because the LADP relatively speaking is considered a success story by many people knowledgeable regarding other UN joint agency initiatives in Iraq. However, there should have been a mechanism in place that obliged the participating agencies towards identifying lessons learned on their shared experience and where necessary and possible, attempt to modify practices. This is perhaps something that could have been insisted upon through the ITF. Requiring regular reporting on this matter might have directed the agencies to think through what was taking place in the field in terms of inter-agency coordination. An important part of this would have been listening to individuals at the field level including the area coordinators who have a special perspective of the strengths and weaknesses of the joint agency implementing approach.

There were a number of problems encountered in trying to evaluate the LADP that originates with the original project document that outlines the objectives, performance indicators and means to verify the validity of the indicators. These elements are the basis from which a project is to be monitored and eventually evaluated. Indicators and the means for verifying the degree to which the indicators are being validated inform project reporting as much as any other factor.

Hence when the stated indicators are too ambitious as was the case with the LADP and the means to verify them are not realistic, again like what was the case with the LADP, the evaluation process begins on uncertain ground. “A statistically significant reduction in unemployment figures in the programme areas” was an unacceptably ambitious indicator for the LAPD as was the indicator anticipating that the programme would benefit from the Ministry of Finance dedicating a portion of the national budget to LADP activities. Given what should have been understood regarding the workings of the Iraqi administrative system, this was a very naive expectation. Also, “Project beneficiaries recognize improved basic services delivery in the areas including from municipal and local administrations” is a worthy indicator but there has to be a manner in which to properly assess its validity with tools that are viable in the Iraqi context not only at the time of the evaluation but throughout the programme’s life. A programme as complex as the LADP; requires an appropriate and realistic set of indicators and coherent intended outputs and outcomes. In the end the LADP made great progress on a realistic level than was not outlined in the original project document. For the next phase the importance of having a programme that works with realistic expectations is probably as important lesson as any from the first stage.

One of the clear problems with the design was the lack of documentation and how information was shared amongst the various project partners. It was repeatedly mentioned by stakeholders how this factor undermined the LADP from making a stronger contribution to the institutionalization of the local planning process. This refers most specifically to the lines of communication and information between the LSCs, NSCs and the MoPDC.

Finally, one of the weaknesses' of the LADP that should be addressed in the second phase is the need to strengthen and establish clearer relations among the different stakeholders. In this regard the programme should have focussed more on the question of coordination between the central and local layers. The role of the MoPDC should have been heightened as a coordination body. However as noted earlier, the LADP could not accomplish everything and a more complete engagement of the MoPDC was something that ended up being neglected.

#### **4.5.4 Contribution towards Achievement of the MDGs**

The first contribution of the LADP to the MDGs was to place an emphasis on the MDGs through the local planning processes. This was important as it was one of the first experiences in Iraq of trying to understand the importance of focussing on the MDGs at the local planning level. In addition, through the fast-track projects the LADP was certainly able to contribute to Iraq achieving the MDGs. However the consistent comment made throughout the evaluation was that the fast-track projects were a very limited response to the scale of the problems facing the country in relation to poverty reduction, gender mainstreaming, environmental sustainability and the other MDGs. To attempt to provide any meaningful statistical interpretation of how far LADP made inroads towards achieving the MDGs would be futile.

The first phase of the LADP can take credit for demonstrating how development activities can be planned and carried out in support of the achievement of the MDGs and more could have been done in enabling the capacity to use the MDGs as a strategic planning tool.

The GOI takes the MDGs very seriously but does not have the resources to monitor and track progress being made in achieving results against the MDGs. This is where the UNDP can play a role during the second phase and where the agency could have been more prominent through the first phase of the LADP. The UNDP has considerable global resources related to the MDGs that could have served a variety of purposes with LADP. However, it was clearly not practical to put these resources to use. In context where it is nearly impossible for project officers to conduct field visits, facilitating international consultations is not really an option for the LADP except in support of exceptional circumstances.

Given the ongoing circumstances in Iraq, it is doubtful that during the next NDP Iraq will be able to completely eradicate poverty, the overriding MDG. However, while continuing to make strides towards achieving the MDGs the LADP could be doing more directed work at building capacity while encouraging the country to take full responsibility for focussing on the MDGs. The LADP has demonstrated that there are strong capacities within Iraq that can be mobilised. It is a question of how to focus these towards the MDGs.

By supporting the district and governorate levels during the next phase the LADP can provide more defined support towards implementing a framework for monitoring progress towards the MDGs. As a result of the on-going decentralization process, the governorates will have increasing responsibilities to support Central Government efforts to track the MDGs. The Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) is tasked with working with the governorates to ensure they have the capacity to monitor the MDGs. With the anticipated increased emphasis on working at the governorate level for the next phase of the programme, the LADP should be able to provide some critical support on matters related to the MDGs.

Another important consideration in regards to the contribution of the LADP towards the achievement of the MDGs is that the second pillar of UNDP's Breakthrough Strategy on the MDGs focuses specifically on addressing longer-term structural constraints. The emphasis of the LADP on robust local planning and carrying out of development interventions that are MDG centered falls in line with this approach.

#### **4.5.5 Relationship between Iraqi Stakeholders and the UN Agencies**

One of the more important outcomes of the LADP identified through the evaluation is the importance that Iraqi stakeholders involved in the LADP place on establishing relationships with the participating UN agencies. This is a very hard to define but tangible positive result and something that the overseers of the LADP need to take into consideration in the design of the next phase. While it will be important to encourage the institutionalization of the LADP and striving to ensure the programme is Iraqi driven, the value placed on the interaction between the UN agencies and Iraqi stakeholders especially at the district and governorate should not be forgotten.

#### **4.5.6 Capacity Building and Training**

There was a concerted effort of the LADP to train and build capacity in support of the programme's aims. Section 5.6 describes ILO/UNOPS efforts to train, organizations, managers and beneficiaries in economic practices. The WHO trained over 150 health care professionals and an equal number of community members on health related matters. UN-HABITAT provided additional training to the private contractors who were being asked to implement fast-track projects. UNDP provided directed training on matters like RBM and the environment. A value was placed on these training modules in terms of learning practical skills, and providing exposure to new concepts and ideas and information on how Iraq could be managed differently. There was also training related to the finalization of district maps and spatial analysis, district planning workshops, monitoring and evaluation, and Iraqi partner NGO workshop to enhance project cycle management skills.

The most important achievement of the LADP in terms of capacity building and training was targeting individuals who normally do not have a chance to participate in such workshops like people from the district planning units. However, this is also considered to be one of the LADP's shortcomings in that it was felt the programme could have done a better job in targeting the people who really required training. It was felt that the process of finding appropriate trainees was often flawed by other considerations. It was described in the south as being subject to "favouritism and moodiness".

As mentioned, the lack of coordination between the UN agencies on training matters was an irritant as was the fact that too much of the training came in the form of predetermined training modules that did not always reflect the real needs of the intended beneficiaries. The point was made that Iraq was made up of regions with different capabilities and needs and this should have been reflected in the training modules. It was pointed out by the UNDP that there was a requirement to ensure that all training was carried out in an impartial and equitable manner. There was an overall criticism that the training tended to be too general and with standard modules being three to five days too short to be of any significant usefulness.

#### **4.5.7 Media Communications and Awareness Raising**

There was strong positive feedback from stakeholders regarding LADP media and communication related activity and materials. Although it was pointed out during the Lesson Learned workshop in Amman in the fall of 2009 that there could be better awareness raising of the programme's objectives at the local level, during the evaluation workshop participants expressed the contrary, finding the local media campaigns to have been effective. One can also differentiate between the media coverage and attention granted to the LADP by the local media that the programme has sought to generate and properly speaking LADP media campaigns which involved TV spots, billboards and other tools.

In terms of the content and quality of the materials like the reports and brochures, they are considered to be of a very good quality especially when one considers the additional challenge of having to produce materials in Arabic, English and Kurdish. This was also an attempt to contribute to reconciliation and nation building by systematically making available all publications in three languages.


Moving towards the next phase of the LADP there is a number of ideas that were expressed during the evaluation on how the communications aspect of the LADP could be improved. The most critical appears to be to position the LADPs communication strategy in support of the Iraqi Government and the decentralization and local development agenda as opposed to the LADP. Another area would relate to communications interventions being more involved in educating Iraqi people on development issues that have significant importance to a particular area or possibly, the country as a whole. For example an in-depth examination of the water situation in the south and its implications for local planning would have priority over covering LADP events. Another novel suggestion was to have a permanent media presence on the LSCs.

There have been communications challenges related to the LADP. In some cases it is doubtful that a pamphlet or ad campaign could resolve them. A notable case is the ILO and the microfinance component. This is discussed in greater length in section 5.0. Strong attitudes can develop about a particular aspect of the LADP and it is difficult to temper them with what appears to be relevant information. A mechanism should be established to address these types of problems.

#### 4.6 The Role of the Respective UN Agencies

As much as possible this evaluation has chosen to avoid being overly critical of the UN agencies involved, or to compare one region against another as some stakeholders wished or to focus specifically on the performance of a particular project officer. This is not to say that opinions were not formulated on these matters. However, ultimately without the benefit of being able to assess each issue surrounded in controversy in a consistent and comprehensive manner that would ensure impartiality, it was determined to avoid taking this route. Iraqi stakeholders and the UN are aware of the performance of each agency and this will surely be taken into consideration in the second phase. Below are a series of tables that outline the expenditure of each agency throughout the life of the LADP. One can draw their own conclusions as to how effectively each agency was able to disburse money.


##### 4.6.1 Pie Chart Depicting Budget breakdown per agency






Overall, chart 4.6.2 depicts the slow start of the programme after one year with an average disbursement of 21% with the lowest 14% and the highest 51%. One denotes a very slow start of UNDP (less than 15% of the funds committed after one year) and a very fast start of UNIFEM (51% committed after one year).

*Chart 4.6.2 Delivery (commitments and disbursements) per agency over Time*



#### 4.6.3 Agency Disbursement

Agency	Jun-08	Dec-08	Jun-09	Dec-09
UNDP	15%	72%	83%	99%
ILO/UNOPS	29%	48%	89%	97%
UN-HABITAT	19%	40%	63%	77%
UNESCO	14%	21%	48%	71%
WHO	22%	26%	75%	87%
UNIFEM	51%	78%	91%	100%
TOTAL	21%	53%	77%	89%



#### UNDP

It was mentioned by numerous LADP stakeholders both within the UN system and from Iraq that the key to the LADP having success over the last few years has been the current LADP management team and in particular the LADP's programme manager. There has been a steady and nurturing management style adopted by the LADP programme manager that is greatly appreciated by all stakeholders. Generally speaking communication and planning (i.e. monthly coordination meetings) has been satisfactory after the rough start up period. In its role as area coordinator in the south, stakeholders are generally very satisfied with the UNDP and its work in guiding LADP's mandate in this part of the country. The fact that

UNDP field staff has remained relatively constant is considered a strong attribute. The UNDP's slow payment practices and tying instalments to project completion stages has been viewed as being problematic but also speaks to the need to find a mechanism whereby UN agencies no longer have complete authority on financial matters.

In terms as a project implementing agency, the UNDP has largely fulfilled its mandate. It often chose to take a more time consuming route like relying on local institutions to implement the fast track projects even though this implied a higher amount of capacity building and training. In addition to the 112 fast track projects the agency has overseen, the UNDP has also carried out basic skills training and supported a variety of capacity building exercises. As for buildings of religious importance, it was considered overly sensitive in terms of perceived impartiality and equity by various religious groups and would have possibly required particular care for cultural heritage preservation. This would have likely resulted in slow implementation and costly interventions, which was not adequate for fast-track projects. Instead, it was decided to invest in initiatives promoting culture and tradition that have been identified and prioritized by local communities themselves.

The UNDP has also built partnerships for the programme with donors who have not only remained steadfastly behind the LADP but have also agreed to support complimentary activity in the Marshlands. One of the key contributions of the UNDP was taking the lead on the five-step development process that as a planning tool proved to be highly effective. The MIS was not implemented as planned and the objective of establishing greater visibility of the project in Baghdad and stronger ownership in the LADP at that level was not entirely met.

## **WHO**

Iraqi stakeholders that worked with the WHO were generally satisfied with the agency and felt that it had fulfilled its mandate. Their interventions were deemed to be responding to critical needs related to the establishment of basic health related services. The WHO having its previous experience working with the MOH was able to further its mandate in the area of CBI through the LADP that corresponded with the programme's objectives. One of the WHO's contribution to the LADP has been sharing its experience on matters related to operating a programme in a decentralized manner. Another contribution has been in the area of cost-sharing where the WHO has piloted two cost-shared projects.

## **UNIFEM**

This is one UN organization who might want to have implemented its activities differently. This is not to say that they were not well executed but more so they were completed too quickly and hence limited the agency's involvement once the LADP was truly operational. While the LADP struggled in the early going, UNIFEM went ahead and implemented its activities. It was noted by a few LADP stakeholders that the LADP could have benefited from stronger punctual and strategic support on gender related matters as the programme struggled in some cases to ensure effective female participation. UNIFEM readily admits that even for its activities it was a challenge sometimes for the agency to find the appropriate female candidates to participate in its own workshops and training activities. UNIFEM provide ten grants

to local NGOs for employment related activities through which 713 (437 women and 276 men) were trained on gender related matters like vocational training for women, integration of women into Iraqi society through training for office jobs, training in combating violence against women and gender awareness of the local councils.

UNIFEM also contributed to the LADP Planning Handbook that outlines the Five-step district planning process in relation to Gender Mainstreaming. Furthermore, UNIFEM did ensure presence in the field and adequate participation and contribution to jointly prepare and organize participatory planning workshops, and district profiling activities.

### **UN Habitat**

Stakeholders generally spoke well of UN-HABITAT's role in the LADP both as area coordinator and implementer of a series of fast-track projects. UN-HABITAT was able to fulfill an altered mandate that removed the emphasis on housing due to difficulties in selecting beneficiaries and insufficient budget allocation. Instead, it was decided to invest in communal upgrading in poor housing areas through improvements to access roads and surface drainage thus benefiting a larger number of people in low income housing areas.

The agency's work as area coordinator in the central region was deemed to be very effective. During the course of the evaluation a concern was expressed that private contracting process employed by UN-HABITAT was not transparent. This evaluation does not endorse this perception as there was no concrete information available to substantiate the claim. This perception could relate to the overall problem the LADP faced in terms of sharing information between the local, governorate and national levels and between the LSCs and the NSCs.

Once the current programme manager arrived a year into the LADP UN-HABITAT had in place a steady remote management team. In the end six schools, four youth centres, three green areas and two training secessions for unemployed youth and contractors in the three project areas were completed. In addition, UN-HABITAT contributed to the local development planning process with two key contributions being the introduction of spatial analysis of the districts and the implementation plan prioritised around available financial resources.

### **ILO – UNOPS**

Please see section 5.0 for a more detailed discussion on the role of ILO-UNOPS in the LADP.

### **UNESCO**

As this report was being finalized UNESCO had yet to complete all of its project activity. The agency's procurement procedures are slow and a big part of what UNESCO is expected to do is procure equipment. This has been compounded by the fact that Iraqi customs has delayed the arrival of equipment required to complete project activity. One activity in particular the creation of the vocational training centres has been delayed. The main obstacle according to UNESCO is getting its partners in Iraq to fulfill their commitments in rehabilitating all vocational training centres in the three areas, in

order to install the equipment and begin training courses. LADP stakeholders expressed repeatedly through the course of the evaluation their disappointment in UNESCO from an implementation standpoint and in relation to field level coordination. Again, this evaluation did not have the capacity to ascertain in an objective manner whether or not the criticism of UNESCO was valid.

According to UNESCO its achievements are as follows:

1. UNESCO has completed the implementation of the project that relates to the ministry of education;
2. Providing science lab equipment for 8 schools (chemistry, physics, biology, computers and lab furniture);
3. Providing Training for science teachers in the above mentioned 8 schools (24 teachers);
4. Providing Capacity Building for Directors of Education (19 person);
5. UNESCO has implanted 90% of the activities that relate to opening of vocational training centers;
6. Providing 5 sets of workshop equipment to the three areas (carpentry, welding, automotive, sewing and computer labs);
7. Providing Life Skills Training for VTC trainers (20 trainers);
8. Providing Technical Training of using the new equipment for carpentry, welding, automotive and sewing for VTC trainers (15 trainers);
9. Providing Capacity Building for Managers of Vocational training Centers (29 persons);

#### **4.7 Monitoring and Evaluation and the MIS**

The issue of M&E might be one of the better examples of where the LADP could have benefitted from all UN agencies buying into a shared systematic approach. The UNDP developed common M&E tools, but these were not applied evenly by the different implementing agencies. The establishment of a joint monitoring authority within the programme was discussed, but resisted by many agencies.

Of all the participating UN agencies, only UNDP allocated substantive resources to M&E activities although this could also be said for ILO/UNOPS that relied on extensive reporting and self assessment tools. The UNDP oversaw training of Iraqi stakeholders in M&E practices most specifically training the LSCs in M&E. There was also some RBM training.

UNDP was allocated funds to build an MIS for accessing project information online on behalf of all agencies. The system allows fast-track project submission and approval. All relevant supporting documents (project proposal, letters of endorsements, site visit certificate, price survey, technical designs and costs etc) are uploaded to make them accessible to authorized users. The MIS was tested by UNDP and some of the UN agencies (UNESCO, UNHABITAT). Based on this experience, some modifications were made.

The MIS was never used for the purpose of project management and monitoring. There were complaints by users that the information made available by the MIS was limited and the system difficult to navigate. Clearly an enhanced MIS would appear to be one solution and a critical one on the matter of LADP

project material being properly circulated to stakeholders. A shared and recognized depository for Iraqi and UN stakeholders would appear to be an obvious improvement over the current situation of people feeling they are not properly informed. The UNDP will have to make sure every effort is made to guarantee the information is relevant, easily accessible and holding abundant enough information regarding second phase activity to warrant a reliance on the MIS.

One of the biggest concerns in evaluating the LADP has been the complexity of the programme and the endless number of small components that needed some sort of assessment in order to come to an overall conclusion on the effectiveness of the LADP. The second issue was devising an adequate Iraq specific evaluation strategy. The task of evaluating the LADP would have been greatly facilitated had there been periodic independent assessment of project activities prior to the evaluation.

The constraints of operating in Iraq obliges that the LADP look at a very Iraq specific approach to M&E. One priority would be to work with selected NGOs and government organizations to build their M&E capacity and that this can in turn support the LADP's M&E needs. The promotion of participatory evaluation practices would appear to be in step with the ambitions of the LADP even if there is a need for promoting standard practices related to RBM and basic M&E practices.

For the LADP Phase II, there should be a more coherent and harmonized approach to M&E between the agencies that relies on different M&E tools. It is also appropriate to consider assigning an independent project monitor to the LADP. The programme is too complex with too many intricacies to allow it to build up over a three or five year period without benefiting from prior independent scrutiny. Documenting in an honest and constructive manner what is taking place with the programme in terms of successes and failures would also be helpful. This might come in the form of reporting of the minutes of meetings between various configurations of stakeholder where issues confronting the LADP are discussed openly. This is possible and can be done without it being construed as being a negative reflection on the programme.

A great effort was made by the project team to hold a lessons learned seminar. This exercise and other reporting functions could have been more beneficial had the participants been working with a more refined sense of the function of lessons learned reporting.

## **4.8 The Issues of Gender and the Environment**

### **4.8.1 Gender Mainstreaming**

A number of the LADP programming activities for which women are direct beneficiaries are highlighted throughout this report. This includes training on matters related to enterprise development and efforts to reinforce healthcare facilities and activities carried out by UNFEM. This section looks specifically at the question of female participation in the LADP and its strategic implications for the next phase. Since its inception, the LADP has sought to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women both by encouraging women's participation in the LADP as project leaders and as beneficiaries. The LADP set the objective of 30% female participation in the LADP. This has not always been an easy task. Sometimes the target of 30% would be met but there would be concerns surrounding the effectiveness

of the female participation. The current position of women in the Iraqi society has made this objective difficult to achieve comfortably. Table 4.4 that looks at female participation during Steps Three and Four of the five-step planning process in support of the preparation of the district plans is typical of the sort of scenarios emerging from female participation in LADP training and project activity. The ILO/UNOPS, UN-Habitat and UNDP were able to meet its output-level targets of ensuring adequate female participation in the district planning process but as one can see just barely. The question that could not be fully assessed was the issue of the quality of the female participation.

*Table 4.4 Female Participation in the Steps 3 & 4 Planning Workshops conducted in Iraq by multi-agency LADP teams*

Governorate	District	Lead Agency	Date	Total # participants	Total # women	% women
Missan	Maimouna	UNDP	12-14 Oct 08	99	32	32%
Thi-Qar	Chibayish	UNDP	19-21 Oct 08	106	20	18%
Babil	Hillah	UN HABITAT	21-23 Oct 08	75	28	37%
Basrah	Midaina	UNDP	27-29 Oct 08	119	28	23%
Sulymaniyah	Sayed Sadiq	ILO/UNOPS	28-30 Oct 08	100	28	28%
Sulymaniyah	Sharazour	ILO/UNOPS	4-6 Aug 08	84	26	31%
			<b>Total</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>28%</b>

Goodwill amongst Iraqi LADP stakeholders is apparent in terms of wanting to see the issue of gender mainstreaming properly accounted for through the programme. At the same time, it has been pointed out by LADP stakeholders that some quarters in Iraqi society continue to demonstrate extreme resistance to the notion of the emancipation of women in Iraq. This inconsistency was noted throughout the evaluation.

As the LADP concludes its third year of operation it can be said that the programme is still at the exploratory stage in terms of understanding how to achieve its objectives related to gender mainstreaming. The programme has addressed some difficult issues like violence against women. However, there remain a number of areas where improvements can be made.

Moving forward it may be beneficial for the LADP to focus on a few critical strategies. One would be to better prepare a cadre of women to more fully participate in the LADP so that the 30% quota of female participation can be more easily achieved. Some LADP activities like the ILOs Business Management training for women did work from this principle. The second objective would be to have the LADP focus

specific programming activity on ensuring outcomes at the institutional level since the programme appears to be moving in a direction where these types of developmental results are possible. For example, the notion of gender sensitive budgeting whereby local planners are actively developing local plans and supporting budgets that are designated to improve the well being of women could be one example of what the LADP could accomplish.

It is important to note that a few people cited the important contribution that women were making to the LADP as project proponents. Some of these women were active participants in the evaluation process from all programming areas. However, it was also pointed out that the female presence in the LADP decision making processes was too limited.

It is important to note that both the UNDP and the ILO/UNOPS have made a very good effort in tracking the participation of women in the various project activities supported by the two agencies. This evaluation would have been greatly facilitated had concise yearly reports been available on efforts made by the LADP in support of gender mainstreaming.

#### **4.8.2 Environment**

In terms of the environment, the LADP worked with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraqi laws were respected during the implementation of the fast-track projects. There were also a small number of projects that actually had pronounced environmental components. In addition, the UNDP oversaw two five-day courses entitled Natural Resources Management and Environment Training Courses that were held in Amman for local Iraqi planners. This training was considered by participants to be very useful. It was pointed out during the evaluation that the matter of integrating the environment was consistently addressed during the design and development of LADP project activity although there was no way to determine how well this was achieved.

It was also identified that there exists knowledge and technological gaps in Iraq relative to the scale of the environmental problems facing the country. This is not to question that there are environmental policies and laws and internal capabilities. However, water shortages, and climate change among other problems have and will increasingly pose serious challenges at the local level. These are complex issues that even developing countries are grappling with.

The notion was expressed consistently throughout the evaluation that the LADP should be more directly engaged on environmental matters particular as it relates to natural resource management and sustainable economic development. During the life of the LADP there have been major environmental events like the problem of increasing salinity in the Shatt al-Arab. This is regarded as one of most important events in Basra over the last number of years. The high salinity levels saw the loss of a large number of livestock, fisheries and a significant number of farmers and ranchers having to leave their lands and move to other areas. A stronger environmental focus for the LADP would be in step with the NDP for the 2011 to 2014 period as environmental management has been identified as a key priority.



## **5.0 The ILO-UNOPS Component of the LADP**

### **5.1 Background**

ILO and UNOPS collaborate on the LADP through a joint execution agreement whereby the ILO assumes the lead technical role while UNOPS provides specific expertise and ensures responsibility for administrative and logistical matters. In support of the LADP the ILO/UNOPS established an integrated operational support team based in Amman, and an overall joint ILO/UNOPS project team. In addition to field staff, the ILO has assigned an international project manager and an international economic recovery specialist and UNOPS an international operations manager, with all three based in Amman. The ILO project manager of the LADP is expected to travel on average every two months to Iraq. However, given the complications related to the logistics and the UN travel approval process, this frequency of visits can be difficult to maintain. ILO/UNOPS has established operational capacity in Sulaymaniya and through recruitment of four senior national staff that are assigned to the three project areas of the LADP. One individual recruited for the north acts as the area coordinator for all LADP activity while the others support the UN Habitat and UNDP area coordinators who are responsible for the central and southern regions respectively. The Sulaymaniya hub and the Amman team are also supported on administrative, financial, and security/logistical issues, by the UNOPS Office of Erbil, located in the UN Compound and the core UNOPS admin/finance team in Amman. In total, there is a nine person project team supported by additional administration and financial staff.

### **5.2 ILO/UNOPS LADP Mandate**

As the lead agency on the economic recovery component of the programme, ILO/UNOPS have the following duties:

- financial and regulatory environment for small and medium business development
- support to the creation and development of micro and small businesses
- Local economic development component of LADPs
- Training in local economic recovery and business development
- Preparation of sector based business development plans
- Strengthening financial service providers
- Small business advisory services

ILO/UNOPS was not involved in any fast track project activity. It was however responsible for the microfinance component. The micro and small business fund of 1.5 million USD was awarded through three international bids. An effort was made to promote local NGOs to participate in such bids, including through LSCs. The three bids were won by the same International NGO, the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF), on the basis of efficiency, capacity and other key criteria. Microfinance contracts were established for the three areas covering the six districts: Sulaymaniya (Sayed Sadiq and Sharazour), Babyl (Hillah city) and the Marshlands (Maymouna, Chibayesh, Mdain) for 400,000 US\$, 400,000\$ and 700,000\$ respectively.

In addition, the ILO/UNOPS team was tasked with establishing Business Information Centres (BICs) in the three project zones and to provide support and funding for BDS activities, conducting business surveys, undertaking economic related studies like value chain studies. A key aspect of ILO/UNOPS work

was the Capacity Building and Planning Programme on Economic Governance that was tied very closely to the local planning processes encouraged through the LADP. In addition there was responsibility for overseeing the NGO grants “Get Ahead” training in Sulaymaniya and Women’s Entrepreneurship Development (WED) and Business Management Training (BMT) grants. The International Services Group (ISG) was contracted to administer the Get Ahead and the WED-BMT grants.

### **5.3 Programming Context**

In many ways, the experience of the ILO has mirrored that of other UN agencies involved in the LADP especially during the early period in terms of low field level performance. There were internal issues in terms of recruiting and retaining staff. At the same time, the ILO/UNOPS team was highly dependent on the UNDP to facilitate its engagement in the LADP and as noted earlier in the report, the UNDP was not functional at this time. The problem of repetitive denial of access to Baghdad and other implementation areas of the programme including Sulaymaniya by UN security while necessary for the protection of UN staff has and remains a barrier to effective programming. At one point in time five consecutive mission requests by the ILO were denied by UNAMI. There were also project delays in 2008 in central and southern Iraq due to violence.

Although Iraq has enormous economic potential due to the oil and gas reserves and before the commencement of conflict the country had relatively strong economic infrastructure, the current task of establishing a new economic foundation for the country is challenging. This is especially true when one considers the route taken by ILO/UNOPS where there is a focus on training and recruiting potential beneficiaries into entrepreneurial activity like women who have had limited experience in such matters. In addition through the value chain studies and other interventions, the economic recovery component has been attempting to encourage new patterns of economic behaviour based on identifying potential markets and building local economic capacity. In attempting to encourage entrepreneurship, and diversify local economies the ILO/UNOPS had perhaps the most challenging project related activities of the LADP.

The ILO had some distinct advantages over UN Habitat and the UNDP as area coordinator. Of the three programming areas, the north was by far the most favourable. The potential for disruption of activities is relatively low and like the situation with the rest of country, it has been improving in the north. This has allowed project staff a great deal of freedom to circulate and conduct matters related to the LADP.

As part of the assessment of ILO/UNOPS activity, the evaluation made use of a number efforts made by the ILO/UNOPS team to self assess project activity as a means to supplement other sources of information informing the evaluation. In a context where it is difficult to arrange visits of outside experts to visit project sites and meet with project stakeholders, this was a very reasonable step to take.

### **5.4 Findings**

The performance of the ILO/UNOPS team is to be evaluated on two levels. The first would be as LADP area coordinator in the north and in conjunction to being a member of the larger UN joint implementing team. On these issues ILO/UNOPS has been found to be very effective. Specifically on the question of

the ILO/UNOPS role as area coordinator, the work of the ILO has been very satisfactory with stakeholders in the north being very pleased with the support and guidance provided by the ILO. The area coordinator was highly capable and fully engaged in the LADP. There were no substantive criticisms either by stakeholders from the north or the other UN agencies involved in the north regarding the support and coordination provided by the ILO/UNOPS team.

The ILO/UNOPS area coordinator in conjunction with the larger ILO/UNOPS team oversaw the successful completion of two local planning processes that resulted in two district plans. Furthermore, there is a strong and dynamic LSC in place from which the LADP can anchor future project activities in the north and expand into other districts and governorates. There were some minor concerns expressed regarding matters like the distribution of reports following the completion of one of the five-steps in the local planning process. However, this can be attributed to an isolated case of oversight as opposed to a systematic problem.

The feedback from the UNDP and on a more limited basis other LADP implementing UN agencies regarding the ILO/UNOPS contribution to the broader UN implementing team was also very favourable. The ILO/UNOPS team was found to be very constructive and consistent in its commitment to the LADP. This includes regular attendance at meetings.

The second level of performance review regards the field level implementation of economic recovery related project activity. The most important consideration in regards to achievements on economic recovery activity is that in most cases, it is too premature to effectively evaluate the activity in terms of outcomes. There is a broad and impressive range of project results against the RBM framework. However, most of the economic recovery activity is relatively recent. The ILO/UNOPS activity was intended pursue a mixture of short term and longer term impacts. Some immediate results in support of economic recovery (enterprise promotion) are summarised in the table 5.4 below.

*Table 5.4 ILO/UNOPS Immediate Impact on Enterprise Promotion*

	Training programmes: WED, Get Ahead, BMT (2007-2010)	Micro and small business finance (2009)	Training and counselling through BICs (2009)	Total
Technical support	2095		78 counselling and 510 trained	2685
Financial support (first cycle of micro and small business fund)		715		715
Enterprises supported				3400
New Businesses created*	350	113	250	463
Enterprises developed*	750	602		1602

\*Estimate based on internal impact assessments

On the quality and effectiveness of the economic recovery activity, the evaluation team received consistent feedback from project stakeholders and via limited field level observation that the ILO had by and large, successfully been able to implement LADP project activity throughout the country although this does come with a caveat. There is some dispute regarding the effectiveness of ILO supported activity in southern Iraq. This is discussed at length throughout this chapter.

In the north where the ILO/UNOPS team is very well organized and benefits from having built strong relations with the LSC and other local stakeholders, activities met with great success. It is clear that the favourable working conditions found in the north worked in the ILO/UNOPS favour. Another factor is the high level of motivation on the part of stakeholders in the north to see the LADP succeed. The enthusiasm in the north for the LADP and the opportunity to collaborate with the UN manifested itself in meetings throughout the evaluation process. Another factor that could be considered as favouring a positive result is the reliance on experienced international agencies like ISG and CHF to manage activities and in the case of CHF, manage large sums of money. This approach can be contrasted with the UNDP's national execution philosophy that was employed with the fast-track projects and that carries with it requirements of strong capacity building and higher risk in terms of relying on individuals and institutions that may not have proper experience and expertise. The decision to rely on CHF and ISG, two organizations with operational experience in Iraq to implement important parts of the LADP's economic recovery component was very sensible. The CHF in particular is the leading international agency in Iraq in terms of microfinance and with its support for the creation of the ACSI could not have been better placed to manage the microfinance component.

In the central region a similar scenario was identified but perhaps not at the same level of success in the north and as noted, the picture in the south is not as clear. During the evaluation southern participants reported that the BIC in the south was underutilized. There is a general feeling in the south that the economic recovery activities have not been as successful but this could not be properly verified during the course of the evaluation. The evaluation team did conclude that there is a strong possibility that the perception of all ILO/UNOPS activity in the south may be clouded by an unreasonably negative perception of the performance that may have been brought on in part by some programming shortcomings.

Closer scrutiny of a number of the projects supported by ILO/UNOPS but especially the microfinance component revealed that the question of lack of performance in the south was not as bad as one was lead to believe. One of the factors that may have contributed to this situation was an inadequate communication strategy and a few other considerations that are discussed in the sections on microfinance. One overriding factor that appears to be relevant is the nature of the ILO/UNOPS intervention, the provision of loans in a cultural context where this practice is neither understood nor completely accepted.

While the north and the centre regions were areas where the economic recovery component met with strong support and satisfaction, it is also true that in the south there were unique success stories. For example, the Basra BIC successfully organized the "Trade Fair for Local Products", the first of its kind in

the region in generations. There was widespread agreement that this was a very important event for Basra in terms of promoting the local economy and as an exercise in self-affirmation.

One point that was made during the evaluation that should also be taken into consideration is to better tailor all economic recovery to needs of each region.

## **5.5 Microfinance**

No single LADP activity required as much attention during the evaluation as the microfinance component. In the end, it was determined that the microfinance component was successfully completed in terms of providing loans to individuals in all three project areas. In total about 750 people received loans with each one paying the full amount back. The ILO randomly sampled 90 individuals receiving loans to verify and monitor the reporting provided by CHF. There was more or less unanimous agreement that the micro loans component had been beneficial. There were complaints about the rate of interest charged but there was also a strong desire expressed in wanting to see a second round of loans. On the surface a 100% repayment rate might appear to some as being unreasonably successful in field that does not normally achieve such favourable results. The information provided to the evaluation team substantiated this result. An important question that might have been evaluated was how the loans were repaid. If the loan beneficiaries could respond that the loans were repaid through revenues generated through their respective enterprises this would completely confirm the full success of the microfinance component.

The strict conditions associated with the collateral where a loan beneficiary had to have someone with government employment co-sign for the loans helps to explain the perfect loan repayment record. However, it also leads to speculation that this type of loan programme was not intended for the truly marginalized. The ILO points out that considering how very generously public employment has been provided throughout Iraq, using public employment arguably as a veiled safety net mechanism, this is not a significant issue. The ILO also points out the exception might be with respect to ethnic minorities in specific local areas that may be expected not to have benefitted as much from public employment opportunities. The ILO adds that the CHF had to make considerable logistical and cash-flow efforts to be able to enter into marginal areas that had not been previously reached by any microfinance intervention and were able to deliver the programme there.

In hindsight, there might have been room to be legitimately concerned about how the microfinance component was conceived and designed in terms of whom in the end was eligible to receive loans. However, there should be question as to whether or not the microfinance component was properly implemented according to the terms of reference that were agreed to by the parties involved. There is legitimate criticism that perhaps as part of its mandate CHF should have been tasked with pro-actively educating concerned stakeholders especially after the controversy began. However, there is no contractual obligation in this regard.

Stakeholders in the south and individuals at higher levels of the Iraqi government questioned why the names of the loan beneficiaries were not shared with the local LSCs and how they were chosen. Another

concern is what will happen to the \$700,000 dedicated to microfinance activity in the south once the programme was completed. There was also a very serious allegation that the CHF was acting against Iraqi government policy. The ILO project manager communicated to the evaluation team that regarding these accusations the CHF was following international guidelines established by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and as agreed to in the contract with ILO/UNOPS. In addition, the funds would remain in the south and the other regions with the expectation that in the near future it would be managed by ACSI once it was fully able to do so and ACSI would continue to make micro loans available through the original funds. The evaluation team concluded that this was indeed the case.

In table 5.4.1 the outputs reported by ILO/UNOPS against Output 2.2 are listed. One has to concur that these are impressive results not only in terms of providing loans but also in undertaking auxiliary activities. There was no evidence presented to the evaluation team that these achievements were not fully realized.

Table 5.5 Microfinance Programme Results against LADP Output 2.2 hoping to create at least 80 new small enterprises and cooperatives established in three areas.

**Key Achievements of ILO/UNOPS Supported the Microfinance Component**

- Three small business funds established through 3 grants to a microfinance institutions (CHF)
- Delivered loans to 113 new and 606 existing businesses, with 100% repayment rate after one year;
- Loans provided to 156 women-owned businesses;
- Loans targeted at locally-identified key sectors and vulnerable groups in each area; these grants are being transferred by the implementing partner (CHF) to a locally registered organization established under the supervision of Iraq's Central Bank.
- Outreach to most vulnerable groups for these business funds has been increased through linking the business management and women entrepreneurship training provided to marginalised groups with CHF's loan provision,
- Ensured the permanent presence of CHF loan officers in the target areas,
- Awareness raising and information sharing conducted in the areas with key representatives of the civil society (including religious and tribal leaders).

Given the tight timeframe and the in-country circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the microfinance could have been implemented in any other manner then working with an experienced agency like CHF. However, having supported the CHF/ASCI experience, it may be useful to reflect on how the second phase of the LADP might approach the issue of providing financial support to small scale entrepreneurs differently in terms of finding some value added beyond making micro loans available.

### 5.5.1 Results of Microfinance Activity in the South

Given the controversy surrounding microfinance in the south, it was deemed appropriate to present what CHF reported as microfinance related results in the area. This can be found in Table 5.5.1 \$700 thousand USD in loan capital was assigned to the districts of Maymouna (Missan), Chibayesh (ThiQar)

and Mudaina (Basra). CHF reported that it had successfully exhausted the grant over the grant period achieving all planned activities that aimed to build the capacity of the ACSI programme. It is worth stating again that when a project component is earning such a negative treatment that taints the entire intervention it is worth placing an extra effort in campaigning to educate about the facts regarding the project component. The ILO argues that in fact, quite an elaborate consultation process took place in the design of the microfinance intervention in the south before any procurement action has been taken by ILO/UNOPS. ILO/UNOPS claims that this consultation process, while limiting the role of local stakeholders in defining the technical implementation modalities as the activity should be left to a professional organization, the process gave as much scope as possible to the local stakeholders in establishing the goals and targets to be met through the intervention.

A few factors might have contributed to the negative perception of what occurred with microfinance in the south. While the LSCs in the central and northern region participated in the monitoring evaluations of the microfinance exercise, this was not the case in the south. Also, although the ILO/UNOPS coordinator in the south provided documentation that he did attend LSC coordination meetings, his attendance was not perfect. These factors combined with a general suspicion about microfinance might have been enough to cast the southern microfinance component in a negative light. It is important that ILO/UNOPS consider conducting a thorough and independent assessment of what occurred in the south and that the results are shared with all concerned stakeholders.

Table 5.5.1 Results of Microfinance in the South

UNOPS Outreach Report						
Indicators			Marshland			Total Marshland
			Mudayna	Maymouna	Chibayesh	
1. Grant Totals	Total	Value	\$609,121	\$35,675	\$55,215	\$700,011
		Number	288	15	25	328
	Only Females	Value	\$90,830	\$0	\$11,390	\$102,220
		Number	74	0	7	81
	% Females	Value	14.9%	0.0%	20.6%	14.6%
		Number	25.69%	0.00%	28.00%	24.70%
2. Grant Loan Portfolio Structure	3.1. Business Loans	Value	\$562,286	\$35,675	\$53,515	\$651,476
		%	92.3%	100.0%	96.9%	93.1%
		Number	266	15	24	305
	3.2. Start_up business Loans	Value	\$46,835	\$0	\$1,700	\$48,535
		%	7.7%	0.0%	3.1%	6.9%
		Number	22	0	1	23
	3.3. Consumer Loans	Value	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
		%	0.0%	#DIV/0!	0.0%	0.0%
		Number				
	3.4. Insider Loans	Value	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
		%	0.0%	#DIV/0!	0.0%	0.0%
		Number				
3. Average Loan Size			\$2,115	\$2,378	\$2,209	\$2,134.18
4. Grant Sector Distribution	Trade	Value	\$407,896	\$18,335	\$34,900	\$461,131
		Number	170	7	14	191
	Services	Value	\$161,670	\$10,540	\$16,915	\$189,125
		Number	105	6	10	121
	Manufacturing	Value	\$39,555.0	\$6,800.0	\$3,400.0	\$49,755
		Number	13	2	1	16
	Agriculture	Value				\$0
		Number				-
5. Total # of Current Jobs		Number	430	29	36	495
6. Total # of Expected new Jobs		Number	0	0	0	0
8. Written-Off Loans		Value	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
9. Loan Loss		%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%	0.000%

## 5.6 NGO Grants

The WED and Get Ahead local NGO sub-granting was managed by ISG. The need for an intermediary to manage these activities was dictated by the large number of NGOs to be allowed to bid for access to these grants (on the basis of successful completion of their staff to training of trainers activity and submission of an action plan for utilization of the funds. For the “Get Ahead”, the training module was administered directly through local NGO bids in the three areas. The grants were offered to one selected NGO in each area.



An internal impact assessment was conducted of WED, Get Ahead and BMT training programmes by ISG and the selected NGOs. The assessment was produced through a survey of 164 beneficiaries including 64 NGO trainers and managers. Among the participants in the self assessment 48% were women. Fifteen focus group sessions were facilitated by local project staff and the local BICs in each area in support of the assessment. Table 5.6 displays the overall number of beneficiaries from the three initiatives.

*Table 5.6 Beneficiaries of the WED, Get Ahead and BMT training programmes (2008-2010)*

	WED	Get Ahead	BMT	TOTAL
<b>Trained Trainers</b>	24	44	23	
<b>Partner local NGOs receiving grants</b>	10	3	13	
<b>Final Beneficiaries</b>	690	900	505	2095

For expediency sake, it is useful to focus on the example of the Get Ahead training activity. The Get Ahead training results are representative of the other two training modules. The training courses of all three modules involved courses of three to five day duration. Participants in the focus groups indicated that the GET Ahead training workshops were very useful in helping them to come up with new ideas for creating businesses and new ways to develop them. They acquired a better understanding of how to plan their businesses, the importance of registration and calculating their expenditures in comparison to the profit through the new tools they were introduced to. The training material was considered easy to absorb and the exercises reinforced the concepts taught in the course and developed practical skills. The Chart below looks more specifically at the opinions of the participants regarding the utility of the Get Ahead training module.



In terms of follow up to the training, 95% of the Get Ahead survey respondents declared having taken some actions as a result of the training. Among these, 30% have developed their businesses or organizations and 20% have started up a new business. 40% are seeking more training to further improve their knowledge and skills. The Get Ahead training module helps to illuminate a number of comments made during the evaluation regarding LADP training activity in general. In fact all three training modules received some criticism for being too basic. Although it is currently struggling to find itself, Iraq is also a country that used to act as a donor in the region based on its considerable economic capacity. The point being is that it is a very unique situation in terms of a country where knowledge of economic concepts and capabilities may be mixed, and this will pose a dilemma in developing appropriate training programmes.

ILO/UNOPS should be commended for insisting on the project team conducting the assessment. Given what was accomplished with the economic recovery component in general and the positive comments regarding the three training modules, there is no reason to doubt the positive findings. However in more ideal circumstances, the evaluation should have been completed independently or partially independently and at a later date when the true impact of the training could be more properly assessed. ILO/UNOPS points out all that could be supported through the limited funds of LADP as the project was closing was an internal assessment of immediate impacts. For the three training modules a suitable participatory evaluation could have been conducted overseen by a trained specialist who would lend greater credibility to the findings. Self assessment practices could continue as long as it is done in concert with some form of third party evaluation. For example, in each region one of the three components could have been assessed independently and this contrasted with the self assessment. Given the difficult circumstances in Iraq this could be the way forward for ILO/UNOPS in terms of finding a solutions posed by Iraq.

## **5.7 Building Local Economic Capacity**

Another key feature of the Local Economic Recovery intervention has been the work with local partners to build the capacity of local economic institutions and to provide BDS. In this regard a key decision was to make the Chambers of Commerce and local industry the central players in driving local capacity building activity. This was a conscious strategic decision of the project to work with the legally mandated and most representative private sector organizations locally. This carried with it some negative implications in terms of the pace and rates of delivery. The three chambers of commerce were far from equipped to play such a role. The objective was not only to increase BDS in support of local enterprises but also the institutionalising and anchoring of the initiative in view of the longer term through the Chambers of Commerce.

As noted, there was some concern expressed regarding the dynamism of the BIC in the south. However, the feedback on the current capacity of the BICS in the centre and north as a result of the project is highly positive especially in the north. As noted earlier the BIC in the south did oversee a very successful trade fair and there are other positive achievements that are shared with the BICs in the centre and north. Overall, programme activity has made the three Chambers much more responsive to the needs of the local small business community. Although not all BICs are performing to their potential, the

commitment of the local Chambers to make them more efficient, active and responsive players in support of their constituents is supported by evidence.

One of the key achievements and that helps to situate the economic component for the next phase are the Governorates Action Plans for Economic Recovery. The plans have been adopted and are being implemented in the three Governorates. There has also been awareness raising campaigns in support of entrepreneurship. Both of these activities were carried out through the local BICs and other smaller activities like the development of business directories. In addition a total of 16 value chain studies related to the activities of the BICs for the three areas were finalized. The analysis focused on local products. In Hillah/Babylon: yogurts, dates, handcrafts, yellow corn, fish lakes were the products; For Basra; yellow cheese, wheat, fishing, Bareiha, rice, yellow corn; and in Sulymaniya: blacksmith, goats, tomato, barley, retail trade. Those VCA studies have been prepared for the use of entrepreneurs (women and men) who are willing to start up their own business and entrepreneurs who want to reduce their production costs. These studies have been uploaded on the BICs websites and hard copies are available in the BIC libraries.

One of the more appreciated aspects in relation to the BICs is the attempt to expose the beneficiaries of the microfinance loans and the NGO training modules to the services available through the BICs. Connecting microfinance loan beneficiaries to the activities of local chambers of commerce is an innovative practice, not typical of economic recovery activities in Iraq.

## **5.8 Sustainability of Activities and Ownership**

As with the LADP in general, it is much too premature to speak of the sustainability of economic recovery activities. It is difficult to say what will be the end result of the training, loans and capacity building that the economic recovery component delivered. In the north with a strong motivation to see the economic recovery activities succeed it would appear the chances for long term sustainability and ownership are the strongest. The BIC in the north is operating more or less in an autonomous manner although there is desire to continue the collaboration with the LADP. A similar assessment could perhaps be made in the central region but given the scope of the evaluation, a detailed site visit similar to that conducted in the north was not permitted. In the south the perception of a somewhat mixed performance clouds any possibility of making a prognosis on sustainability and ownership. The BICs were provided with sustainability plans from the project team and sustainability may indeed be what occurs with all three BICs. It is in the interest of ILO/UNOPS to monitor this intervention to the point where they can be more accurately assessed from an outcome perspective.

It is worth mentioning that before the LADP, economic recovery was an “orphaned” sector in the North as much as elsewhere, with no local institution responsible for this sector. It was a very low priority and the capacity and understanding from the elected leaders and other stakeholders of what was needed and could be done was far from developed. In this sense the interventions through the economic recovery component have made an important contribution towards sustainability and ownership that comes in part from the activities and from building consensus around the importance of concepts like providing business services to entrepreneurs

Much of the activities supported through the economic recovery component can best be categorized as basic capacity building in support of the creation of a business environment that is conducive to facilitating sustainability and strong local economies. Continuing to build basic business capacity and further progress in building additional economic pillars at the local level will contribute to ensuring long term sustainability. However, another key moving forward would appear to be facilitating economic stakeholders to understanding and embracing more refined and pro-active economic practices.

## **5.9 Monitoring and Evaluation**

As noted, ILO/UNOPS employed a number of techniques to evaluate the different project activities including self assessment techniques that should be encouraged as long as they are used selectively and in conjunction to other practices. It is understood that the circumstances in Iraq are far from perfect and that self-assessment is better than no evaluation at all.

The next comment can be made in relation to the LADP in general. It involves the volume of reporting that at times can be excessive and in the end, there is not a lot one can learn about what is really taking place with the project activity. There is an excessive amount of cutting and pasting that takes place from one report to the next in order to ensure reporting compliance. It is expected that this will happen but where it can become a bit disconcerting is when one is reading cut and paste material in sections that require fresh analysis or possibly would be better left blank if there is nothing new to add. It is understood that much of this reporting is done due to the need to respond to general reporting requirements beyond the project itself but in terms of understanding what is taking place with a project it is not helpful.

## **5.10 Concluding Remarks on ILO/UNOPS Programming**

There are a broad range of quantifiable outputs that speak to what has been achieved through the economic recovery component. It is nevertheless incumbent upon the ILO and UNOPS to monitor how these outputs have resulted into tangible developmental outcomes over the next few years. This would be equally useful for project stakeholders in Iraq in understanding what in the end was accomplished.

As the LADP moves into the next phase of operation, economic related activity is poised to continue playing an important role. At the time of the LADP's inception, a recovery type initiative that was intended to help stimulate an economic revival was ideal. It was a time when severe internal conflict and risks of national disaggregation were the overriding concerns. However, circumstances are evolving and although there is still a need to be working with stakeholders on matters that can be affiliated with the broad concept of economic recovery, there also appears to be room in the second phase of the LADP to expand economic recovery activities, possibly with stakeholders from the first phase, building on key achievements to harness more innovative thinking and practices on economic matters among project beneficiaries.

## 6.0 Considerations for a Second Phase of the LADP

The overseers of the LADP have begun the process of looking at what the next phase of the LADP should look like. The initial anticipated outcomes that have been identified for the second phase relate to building stronger institutional capacity in all 18 governorates across Iraq and (selected districts within the governorates), the empowerment of men and women by addressing their needs and engaging them in the local planning processes and institutionalisation of the planning processes and related capacity building. The evaluation process has concluded these objectives are representative of what is required and are broad enough to create a wide range of programming options. Based on the findings of the evaluation, this section focuses on a small number of practical objectives that the second phase of the LADP should be working towards in light of the anticipated focus of the second of the LADP.

Much of what is suggested here begins from the premise that the LADP has been and should continue to be a platform for building capacity and learning. This is not meant simply in terms of how people come to understand and master a particular practice like to budget and plan for an infrastructure project. It also refers to the acceptance of ideas and concepts that can enrich Iraqi society and its institutions.

This evaluation process agrees with Iraq's new NDP that proposes a strong emphasis on investing in human capital and that this should be shared by the LADP. The commitment to building human capital can and should be closely tied to the ultimate objective of the LADP, eradicating poverty. It can also be tied to another LADP objective of improved governance through stable, responsive and transparent administrative systems that favours strong local engagement. The investment in human capital can also embrace the cross cutting themes of the LADP like gender mainstreaming, environmental stewardship, and consensus building. There should also be an equal focus on developing the human capacity of Iraqi people in the public, civil society and the private sector through knowledge acquisition and technical training. The LADP can play a role on all these matters at the local, governorate and federal levels.

By becoming strongly focussed on capacity building and learning the LADP can create better conditions for international organizations to partner with Iraqi stakeholders in a variety of contexts especially at the governorate and district levels where there is a stronger possibility to have developmental impacts. Seen in this light the LADP has the potential to play an important facilitation role. More importantly, the focus on human capacity and the promotion of constructive ideas and practices will assist the Iraqi people in building their own effective internal partnerships and institutional relationships.

This strong emphasis on learning and capacity building can move forward with an ongoing focus on local development provided a broader spectrum of Iraqi stakeholders and institutions are brought on board to support, benefit and learn from the LADP experience. The stakes have to be raised for this second phase in terms of attempting to make a stronger impact strategically and this can most likely be achieved through a focus on learning and capacity building.

While helping Iraqi institutions to overcome some of the administrative blockages that are currently impeding strong decentralized planning, every LADP project activity whether it is a fast-projects or a training session should present an opportunity for learning and capacity building.

Moving forward a balance has to be struck by the LADP between helping Iraq address issues related to capacity and human skill development and resolving administrative conundrums and responding to more immediate needs. This balancing act should take into consideration a continued LADP presence in existing districts to consolidate the gains and to establish more definitive examples of what can be achieved through concepts like consensus building. A great deal can still be accomplished in the existing six districts in terms of setting a strong example for other parts of the country. Below are some additional notes on these and other related matters

### **6.1 UN Coordination and the Case for a more Coherent UN Administrative System**

Although this section is mostly about thoughts on programming for the next phase of the LADP, it would be inappropriate not to consider the administrative structure that will underpin the programme. It is true that the LADP was spared from severe inter-agency conflict or dysfunction that could have easily crippled the programme and that in fact the multi-agency approach in support of the local planning processes did produce a certain amount of synergy between the agencies involved. The reality was the programme was probably never too far from some sort of disaster from occurring given all the different administrative, managerial and staffing variables attached to the LADP and not to mention those of the Iraqi administrative system. The way the LADP is currently structured it is too dependent on the personalities and the motivation of UN staff members. The question is how to establish better control over these variables while facilitating the possibility of the LADP being enriched through interagency cooperation.

From an Iraqi perspective, there are two concerns. The first is whether or not the LADP has the most effective administrative system possible for achieving its programming objectives. This does not require six procurement processes. The second concern for Iraq is having access to the best the UN has to offer in terms of experience and expertise whether it comes from the ILO, UN Habitat or some other UN agency. This was on display in the first phase. The work of the ILO and UN Habitat as area coordinators demonstrates that other UN agencies can play leadership roles. The value though of each agency should be assessed from an Iraqi perspective as Iraq is slowly encouraged take control of the LADP. In this regard, the project committees - the LSCs and NSC- and eventually the MoPDC should have a stronger platform for ascertaining the relevance of expertise and holding agencies accountable for their performance.

### **6.2 Consolidating the Achievements of the First Phase of the LADP**

There should be a logical plan in place to put the stronger attributes of the first phase to good use during the second phase. For example, the ILO oversaw sixteen value chain studies across the country as a way of better understanding the potential of supporting entrepreneurial activity in a number of sectors. These studies can be taken to another level of learning that would afford Iraqi stakeholders a

perspective beyond the already completed studies. This might for example involve working intensively over the course of the second phase with wheat and cheese producers in the south to develop their markets both for economic purposes and from a broader learning standpoint that can be shared with other sectors. In looking at carrying over the achievements of the first phase a question is raised as to what may be the best UN agency for carrying a particular idea or project forward beyond the first phase. The example of the cheese and wheat producers might imply a role for either the FAO or the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Or it might require a further intervention on the part of the ILO or UNDP. It really depends on what agency has the comparative advantage. This type of pragmatism will be a good addition to the LADP and to the joint agency approach.

In terms of the original six districts, there may be a strong desire to want to share the benefits of the LADP with other areas. But it would be a strategic mistake not to continue working in the existing districts. They offer the best possibility of presenting a complete and integrated picture of what the LADP concept can lead to.

### **6.3 Cost Sharing and Programming Synergy**

When speaking of cost sharing the first thought is in relation to in-kind contributions that the LADP benefited from during the first phase but this is really just the starting point. It is well known that Iraq is a country well endowed in oil and gas resources and with this wealth comes both opportunities and responsibilities. If the various activities of the LADP are to become sustainable and maintained in an autonomous manner, it cannot occur exclusively through UN financial resources. There is a point when the circumstances will present themselves where Iraqi financial resources should match or surpass the contribution of UN and other donor agencies.

In terms of the co-financing that is envisaged, there are examples from the first phase. In relation to the WHO, in the north a doctors' house in Saidaadiq was constructed with the Sulaimaniya Provincial Council and a maternity ward in Thi-Qar Al Chibayesh with assistance from the MOH. In addition, in the north UNESCO collaborated with the Sulaimaniya Provincial Council and the Department of Social Affairs in Sulaimaniya to build vocational training centres in Saidaadiq and Sharazur. These are modest projects but useful in understanding what can be accomplished through some form of cost sharing.

Recently in Baghdad there have been high council meetings in support of trying to establish a clause in the Iraqi budget to support cost sharing. It is anticipated that something definitive should be announced within the next three to four months on this matter. It is being suggested as part of the second phase of the LADP to improve coordination between the various levels of governments that the programme serve as a testing ground for cost sharing. Co-financing with the GOI offers the opportunity for examining the intricacies of building stronger and more effective administrative and policy links between the districts and governorates and higher levels of government engagement on financial and administrative and policy matters.

One of the trends identified by the evaluation process is the diminishing interest of donors in seeing their resources supporting infrastructure type projects in Iraq. There will always be a willingness on the

part of donors to provide technical assistance and advisory support on matters like procurement, contract management, and EIA. However, the days of large sums of money available for infrastructure projects in Iraq may be numbered. Hence there is a shared interest from both parties in trying to understand how to make cost sharing work.

Several other co-financing mechanisms could be envisaged for Phase Two. For example, the Ministry of Planning supports activities related to its mandate e.g. capacity development of governorate level planners, M&E and quality assurance of sub-national planning, alignment with NDP etc.). The cost of these activities could be shared. Similarly, participating governorates might want to co-finance activities directly pertaining to their local development e.g. feasibility studies, capacity development and technical assistance pertaining to their top priority needs e.g. drought, pollution, urbanization, unemployment that fit the mandate of the LADP.

At the same time, if the LADP creates effective local planning bodies with credible district plans and a strong foundation with the 18 governorates, this should hold considerable appeal to donors in terms of presenting suitable circumstances for programming opportunities. Other UN programmes like UNDP's Private Sector Development Programme would appear to be a natural fit to put to good use the foundation that the LADP is building. Another possibility involves the LADP setting the stage for enhanced synergy between different development initiatives like the recently announced Iraqi Public Sector Modernization Programme (IPSMP) that as its fifth output has prioritized decentralized service delivery in priority sectors through improved local governance and enhanced participation. There appears to be a need for some kind of programming alliance between these two initiatives that would allow the IPSMP to benefit from the experience and achievements of the LADP.

#### **6.4 Removing Bottlenecks in the Planning Process**

It was beyond the reach of this evaluation to understand and present all the intricacies related to the changes required in the Iraqi administrative system to allow decentralization to flourish. It does appear that what Iraqi stakeholders are hoping for is that the LADP while working with the MoPDC will be highly focussed on eliminating administrative bottlenecks. This could include working with the Ministry of Planning to provide guidance and oversight on sub-national planning efforts, which could include alignment requirements to support the NDP as well as support on procedural matters. The pretext of facilitating greater cost-sharing might provide a useful vehicle for addressing administrative blockages. The LADP could serve as a testing ground for looking at cost sharing modalities and what is necessary in terms of administrative reform to ensure money flows to the local levels and there is a supporting administrative context.

#### **6.5 New Approaches towards Fast Track Projects**

Similarly, the desire of Iraqi stakeholders to see more and larger infrastructure type projects could serve as another impetus for developing an effective cost sharing modality with the GOI. Maintaining a stream of activity that supports infrastructure type project in the second phase also appears to be a way in which to promote greater Iraqi engagement and by consequence, ownership of the LADP. This may



require joint programme designing to ensure that all LADP programme activity has the necessary relevance and will be a priority for the GOI. It might also lead to other circumstances like some level of co-management and co-decision making on key issues, and possibly joint project steering. Infrastructure projects in the second phase should also be designed and implemented in a manner from the overall perspective of addressing any technical and administrative shortcomings that local departments may be encountering in conjunction to the infrastructure projects and that would build capacity in support of downstream project activity.

## **6.6 New Approaches towards Training and Capacity Building**

Following along the idea of promoting learning both practically and conceptually is the notion of encouraging different types of capacity building and training. A key focus in this regard is more intensified learning experiences. During the first phase of the LADP trainees were exposed to different concepts like International Standard Organization (ISO) certification. A logical step for the second phase would be to see some Iraqi companies become ISO certified and this could then serve as a point of reference for other enterprises. Another example of what the LADP could support from a learning perspective would be GLOBALGAP. GLOBALGAP is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of production processes of agricultural (including aquaculture) products around the globe. The GLOBALGAP standard is primarily designed to reassure consumers about how food is produced in terms of minimizing detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations, reducing the use of chemical inputs and ensuring a responsible approach to worker health and safety as well as animal welfare. Another example in this regard would be to support efforts to promote Fair Trade Certification. With all these types of programmes (Fair Trade, ISO and GLOBALGAP) the advantage is that in addition to learning about good business practices, they are also a platform for furthering understanding of most of the cross cutting themes of the LADP like environmental stewardship. It should not go unnoticed that a lot of the suggestions made in relation to intensified training touch on environmental themes. What has been learned through the analysis of the LADP is that ad hoc training should be avoided and as much as possible.

Another capacity building priority should be encouraging activities that enable Iraqi NGOs, consultants, educational institutions and most importantly government departments to develop their own capacities to provide expertise related to training and capacity building. LADP training activity should be conducted in Iraq to help develop this internal capacity. The focus as is desired by the Iraqi government should be to institutionalize the practice of capacity building in the country. Currently one of the growing aspirations of the Iraqi government is to develop and institutionalize capacity building mechanisms and capabilities. This is spelt out in the new NDP. The LADP is well positioned to assist on this matter.

## **6.7 A Period of Reflection as a first Step in a Five year plan**

It is important that the first year of the next phase of the LADP serve as a period to process and internalize the lessons learned from the first phase and for undertaking preparatory work so as to make the second phase more strategic and effective. This evaluation was overwhelmed by the complexity of this programme and its implications for Iraq. The programme has to alter its focus in order to make the

accomplishments of the first phase more valuable to the country. This will take reflection, consensus building, and a better understanding of what is taking place in Iraq in terms of other donor activity on the decentralization front both in Iraq and the region and relevant changes at the governmental level. Since this evaluation began the new NDP was announced and there was movement on the issue of cost sharing. By allowing some time to pass the programme will better understand how to position itself. One area for examination should be an examination and detailed comparison of the different implementation modalities of the fast-track projects

## **6.8 Focussing on Poverty Reduction**

If the programme moves to a stronger focus on capacity building there will be an extra challenge in ensuring that the LADP remains relevant as a force dedicated to poverty alleviation, and employment and income generation. One of the ways to ensure this is to prioritize the poor areas of the country that are not already participating in the programme Or prioritize based on needs or economic sectors rather than geographic areas.

## **7.0 Recommendations**

### **Programming**

- It is recommended that a five-year programming cycle be employed for the next phase of the LADP to help establish a common framework with the Iraqi NDP and more importantly, allow the LADP the necessary time to nurture stronger capacity at the district, governorate and national levels in support of the institutionalization of an adapted and effective process, which capitalizes on LADP lessons learnt and other relevant initiatives from the first phase.
- It is recommended that the first year of the second phase of the LADP place an emphasis on stocktaking and reviewing of district planning exercises and methodology/approach adaptation/recommendations for Governorate-level planning and analysis of national planning and budgeting framework with the Ministry of Planning and joint preparation of the second phase together with GOI. This should also include an examination of the UNDP Basra Governance Support Project, and the practices of other local governance projects in Iraq. This preparation should help establish the groundwork for a programme that will be largely government led.
- It is recommended that a concerted effort be made to consolidate and build on the achievements of the first phase of the LADP. Areas of specific interest in this regard would be transitioning from the economic recovery focus of the first phase to an economic development orientation and furthering the gains made in establishing the local planning capabilities in the six districts form the first phase of the LADP. The ultimate aim with the continued presence in the original five governorates is to establish strong points of reference for the rest of the country.
- It is recommended that for the second phase all LADP programming is a direct result of priorities identified by Iraqi stakeholders and prospective project beneficiaries.

- It is recommended that a more systematic involvement of non-governmental actors including civil society and private sectors, and allow for broader and systematic citizen participation and consultation in local development and quality/coverage monitoring of essential service delivery. It may be necessary for the LADP to dedicate a certain amount of support towards ensuring the CSO in Iraq are able to effectively participate.

### **Capacity Building**

- It is recommended that for the next phase the LADP establishes itself as a platform for learning and investing in human capital both collectively and individually through knowledge acquisition, technical training and the internalization of concepts like gender equality and environmental stewardship. The investment in developing the human capacity of Iraq should be equally focussed on the public and private spheres.

- It is recommended that the LADP place a priority on enabling Iraqi NGOs, the private sector, educational institutions and government departments to develop their own capacities and expertise related to training and capacity building that can serve the long term interest of the country.

- It is recommended that the LADP makes a concerted effort to build the participatory development capabilities of Iraq. This could include building capacity related to participatory project planning, budgeting and monitoring and evaluation practices.

### **In Relation to Planning in Iraq**

- It is recommended that Ministry of Planning (in Baghdad and KRG) become a programming priority in terms of building its capacity in support of more effective decentralized planning which contributes to the National Development Plan and in support of enhanced vertical interaction between governorates and the centre.

- It is recommended that the LADP work at the governorate level to develop adequate planning and implementation framework(s) for monitoring progress towards the MDGs.

- It is recommended that in the identification of new project zones for the LADP that a priority be made to work in the poorest regions of the country that are not yet being supported by the LADP.

### **Regarding Economic Activities**

- It is recommended that the ILO continues its contribution to improving the general circumstance to allow Iraq to complete a full economic recovery. However, a second programming theme should be less focused on economy recovery and more on economic development.

- It is recommended that the ILO collaborate with LADP stakeholders to further valorize and explore economic related programming possibilities based on the achievements of the first phase of the LADP.

- It is recommended that the ILO/UNOPS's microfinance component and training activities be evaluated in the near future to better assess their ultimate impact. In this same regard it is recommended that

ILO/UNOPS facilitate an independent review of the microfinance activities in southern Iraq. The objective is to clarify misunderstandings regarding loan activity and to objectively assess the activity's results.

### **Fast Track Projects**

- It is recommended that an evaluation be conducted in the near future of the fast-track project supported by the first phase of the LADP. This evaluation should assess the physical state of project infrastructure, plans and capabilities regarding their up keep and the developmental impacts. This evaluation should also cover the project selection and identification and participation level of communities in decision making and whether or not this was a priority for people. A cost assessment should also be considered. Did communities receive good value for the money invested? Socio-economic impacts should also be assessed.

- It is recommended that a fast-track or infrastructure project component be maintained for the second phase that would be financed largely through cost sharing arrangements with the GOI. The LADPs role would largely be to provide technical and capacity support in relation to the implementation of project activity.

### **Gender**

- It is recommended that a LADP gender strategy be established that would ensure consistent guidance on gender issues. This may include the recruitment of both national and/or an international gender expert who can provide constant support to the LADP on gender issues.

- It is recommended that the gender strategy operate with clearly identified indicators of expected end result after three or five years of programme implementation with regard to women empowerment and gender equity.

- It is recommended that a strategy be established that will allow the LADP to more comfortably achieve its target of 30% level of participation in LADP activities and other gender related objectives. This may include additional training for female participants to ensure they are able to effectively participate in LADP activity.

- It is recommended that the LADP explore the possibility of introducing innovative practice like the promotion of gender based budgeting as a means to improving the situation of women in programming areas and where possible, through national level interventions.

### **Environment**

- It is recommended that the environment is established as a strong programming element for the next phase of LADP. This should include ongoing training and support as a cross cutting theme in the preparation of all LADP project activity but should be broaden to include other areas like climate change which might be of direct concern.

- It is recommended that the concepts of sustainable economic development and natural resource management are given prominence as programming themes.

### **Project Funding and Cost Sharing**

- It is recommended that the LADP collaborate with concerned departments of the various government levels to establish the circumstances and mechanism(s) to permit a more effective co-financing of development projects at the local level. A key objective is to work with Iraqi authorities to create the possibility to cost share on infrastructure type projects that are identified through local participatory planning processes.

- It is recommended that LADP stakeholders examine other areas of potential cost-sharing. This could include matters related to the capacity development of civil service, quality control and the use of specific expertise.

- It is recommended that a concerted effort be made to coordinate with other international donors to secure financing for additional project activities that can be channelled through the various local planning processes and governorates supported by the LADP.

- It is recommended that the LADP serve as mechanism for cost sharing experimentation with the Iraqi government.

### **Communication Strategy and Intensifying Awareness of the LADP**

- It is recommended that the communication and media campaign capacity of the LADP be intensified in support of the next phase of the LADP as a means of supporting the GOI in its endeavours in planning and managing human-right based sustainable socio-economic development in Iraq in an inclusive and participatory manner. This is in anticipation of programme that will be more pro-actively involved at the national, governorate and district levels.

- It is recommended that the LADP facilitates greater direct observation by UN staff, national and provincial partners of LADP activity at the district. Of particular interest is increasing exposure to participatory planning exercises.

### **UN Administration of the LADP**

- It is recommended that an administrative arrangement be established that would ensure that the UNDP has the necessary administrative control of the LADP to help ensure that programming obligations are met in the most timely and technically effective manner possible. However, before this occurs it is recommended that an internal discussion be held between the concerned UN agencies to consider the strength and weaknesses of the administrative arrangements of the last phase of the LADP and potential managerial innovations in support of a joint agency implemented second phase.

- It is recommended that in the context of a joint agency implementation approach mechanisms are established to obligate participating agencies to examine on a regular basis on how collaboration between the agencies can be improved in support of improved programming results.
- It is recommended that a common procurement platform for all UN agencies be in place for the next phase of the LADP.
- It is recommended that the next phase of the LADP employs a common Monitoring and Evaluation framework and tools for all project activity and that this would include the use of the MIS. The MIS should also act as a mechanism for the sharing of information and documentation between project stakeholders. It is also recommended that the LADP work towards a situation whereby the custodians of the MIS are the GOI, governorates and the Ministry of Planning. Long term objectives could be for the MIS to assist in local level situation analysis, benchmarking and progress & performance measurement while being linked to national level strategic objectives, priorities and targets.
- It is recommended that an independent project monitor be assigned to the LADP. It is also recommended that periodic evaluation activities be conducted of specific second phase LADP activity.
- It is recommended that the level of participation of each UN agency be determined in function of the outcomes of the local planning processes and other means employed by Iraqi stakeholders to define the priorities of the LADP.
- It is recommended that a systematic but practical approach be established for regular coordination meetings between UN agencies. This should take into account the level of participation of each respective UN agency in the LADP.
- It is recommended that each UN agency be required to demonstrate that it is capable of ensuring the effective implementation of LADP activity. This could take the form of an agency self assessment that takes into consideration current staff capabilities and other factors both in Amman and Iraq.
- It is recommended that the current practice of sharing responsibilities for the coordination of LADP activities amongst UN agencies be continued but as per previous practices, this should only occur when a UN agency presents the capabilities to undertake such responsibilities. The experiences of the ILO and UN Habitat should serve as the benchmarks for determining the suitability of other UN agencies as area coordinators.

## **8.0 Lesson Learned**

- Coordination and management arrangements in multi-administrative effort must be thought out carefully. This is especially for an initiative that is operating at number of levels and involves a wide number of institutions. There should also be some pressure on the participating agencies to ensure that the arrangement works and efforts are made by all to seek and implement improvements.
- It is important that projects and programmes operate with realistic expectations even if this requires an extended preparation period to properly understand what can realistically be expected in terms of project impacts.

- If an institutional process is desired it is necessary to involve all administrative levels.
- The process of participatory development is time consuming but it is necessary to ensure achieve meaningful results. On a related matter the willingness of people to accept new practices and ideas should never be underestimated.
- Trade offs are made in development. A programme can choose to invest and train and build the capacity of local partners or rely on the capabilities of international experts who bring with them the necessary skill set and experience. Both approaches can be advantageous. In the context of long term planning the preference should be towards building the capacity of local partners.
- In a volatile project implementation environment expectations have to be adjusted but this should not act as an excuse for poor project performance.
- Projects and programmes need to operate within appropriate project cycles. Projects and programmes hoping to nurture change at a deeper level cannot expect to meet with success in a short time frame.
- The LADP as much as any development programme has demonstrated the importance of hiring and maintaining quality staff members.
- Projects and programmes operating in highly unstable circumstances have added pressure to ensure that effective project management practices are in place and there is strong stakeholder engagement. This will assist the project management team to guide the programme during times when volatility impedes the ability to programme effectively.
- Continuous reporting may help ensure accountability. However, for evaluation purposes it is better to have some access to documents that can better tell the story of the project in terms of its ups and downs. Reporting that renders a realistic picture of the UNDP project performance can assist management to address issues as they arise and take corrective action where necessary.
- There will be considerable challenges with an evaluation if there is not adequate accessibility in terms of meeting with project beneficiaries and other project stakeholders. This can be overcome to some degree through a variety of means.
- Clear responsibility for monitoring and evaluation of combined outputs and outcomes needs to be identified from the outset;

## 9.0 Conclusions

This evaluation demonstrates that the LADP succeeded in achieving a number of important results related to project outputs but it is premature to judge the programme on the issue of strong easy to identify project outcomes. The LADP was implemented at a critical time in the history of Iraq. In the post-war context of diminishing volatility there remained a number of limitations on what the programme could accomplish. Nevertheless, in this environment the LADP sought to promote ideas and concepts that would have been impossible to fathom ten years prior in Iraq. Through the participatory local development processes promoted by the LADP, six districts in Iraq had an opportunity to learn and to test an approach to local development that was alien as one could imagine from past Iraqi practices. Project activity in this area is a major achievement that was a result of laboriously promoting and following the five-step planning process that the LADP insisted upon that brought together stakeholders who had little inclination or opportunity to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. This experience was looked upon very favourably by participants in all districts. The process was inspirational enough that an additional six districts in the Marshlands agreed to become involved and prepare their own district plans through another project based on Swedish SIDA funding and recognizing the value of the LADP concept.

Although concepts like gender mainstreaming and participatory based planning were introduced into the six participating districts and there was success associated with their promotion, it is uncertain that these cross cutting themes were internalized to the point where one can be sure they have become fixtures of the local planning processes. In fact, it is unclear as to whether the local planning processes themselves are sustainable.

Further experience and technical support in identifying priorities and carrying out local development activities appears to be in order in the existing six districts as a means of further nurturing the LADP's objectives and institutionalizing the local planning process. This does not mean the LADP is meant to be staying the course in the six districts. On the contrary, the gains made during the first phase should establish a basis for introducing other innovations and entrenchment of valued ideas and concepts and that this experience can then serve as an example for other districts and governorates in the country.

As positive as the local planning processes were, they also brought attention to the fact that much more needs to be accomplished to provide local development planning in Iraq the opportunities and support required to help it flourish. Basically the LADP sought to promote institutional change without involving all the necessary administrative levels. As a result there remain various blockages and contradictions in the current LADP administrative arrangements that still have to be addressed to allow participatory local planning to contribute seriously to Iraq's development. One of the elements in support of local planning is the need to promote greater understanding of the benefits of local participation as an important strategic tool in elaborating local plans.



A key challenge for the next phase of the LADP is determining how to grow the LADP concept to other parts of the country. The LADP management team has rightfully identified the need to gravitate the programme towards being more pro-active at the governorate level as a means of better positioning the programme. Support for and a stronger working relationship with the MoPDC is also critical in this regard and should be achieved hand in hand with other developmental activities.

While the fast-track projects may not have had the strategic impact that the local planning processes experienced, they nevertheless addressed important local development priorities and were greatly appreciated for their strong physical representation of the programme. However the implementation of the fast-track projects also revealed the gravity of the situation at the local level in terms of the need for such projects that goes well beyond the financial resources of the LADP.

Although in the next phase the LADP can play a role in facilitating further development projects at the local level, in the end, much of the responsibility and desire to make this happen is with Iraqi government. The challenge of the LADP is creating the circumstances for Iraqi Government resources to more directly support project sharing through cost-sharing arrangements with the LADP which would clearly define the roles of each partner. Cost sharing on local development projects is seen as a step in encouraging Iraqi ownership of the LADP.

One of the more encouraging findings of the evaluation was the extent to which Iraqi stakeholders valued their relationships with UN partners. Moving forward the UN will want to further embrace and nurture these relations but at the same time ensuring that a process is in place that will ensure that over the life of the next phase of the LADP the programme is being controlled and implemented by the Iraqi government.

The UN in terms of its own inter-agency coordination in support of the LADP has to undertake a certain amount of reflection. There was much to like about how the participating UN agencies collaborated especially in relation to matters like support the local planning processes. However, the administrative structure is unwieldy and tied to too many separate administrative procedures required by the different UN agencies. There is a need for clarity and commonality in an administrative system that can support the LADP in the most effective manner possible and provide greater transparency in the eyes of Iraqi stakeholders.

The participation of each UN agency has to be driven by priorities identified by Iraqi stakeholders and not by any internal imperative within the UN system to see specific agencies collaborating on the LADP. The key to succeeding with a joint agency approach is to ensure the counterpart has access to the best of what the UN has to offer in terms of expertise and experience. The UN should be congratulated on the success of the LADP in terms of it being a joint agency effort. However, this should not stop the UN from trying to understand how the joint agency approach can be improved.

The LADP has been very much a programme that has encouraged learning and understanding of concepts and practices. This evaluation report comes out strongly in favour of seeing the tendency towards encouraging learning and capacity building being an even more dominate theme of the second

phase. There remains so much to be gained by Iraqi society and its institutions by continuing to embrace, internalize and institutionalize ideas and practices that will help improve governance practices within the broader framework of alleviating poverty through participatory local development.

The LADP as a programming concept requires time to understand and even more to effectively programme. It is made up of an endless number of layers of activities and programming considerations. In such circumstances one cannot assume meaningful results in a short time frame although as the first phase proved; it was still possible to achieve a considerable number of project outputs. A five year implementation period will a better framework for nurturing growth towards achieving the objectives of the LADP both vertically and horizontally across Iraq. This will require a robust monitoring and evaluation system that will allow stakeholders an opportunity to subjectively assess the progress being made by the programme through a made in Iraq approach to M&E that should rely on participatory evaluation methodologies to some degree or the other.

Finally, the LADP is a limited programme in terms of its resources but it is understood by all stakeholders that it has important symbolism for Iraq in terms of pointing the country in another direction on how the Iraqi people and their institutions can interrelate and develop the country. Through a second phase that should become operational at the same time that the new Iraqi NDP is enacted, the LADP has an opportunity to play an important role in embracing the NDP and demonstrating and championing important aspects outlined in the plan. At the same time there are other critical developments taking place in Iraq like the high level discussion regarding cost sharing that should not be ignored as the second phase of the LADP is conceptualized and implemented.

## **Annex 1: List of Individuals Consulted**

### **Sudipto Mukerjee**

Head Economic Recovery & Poverty Alleviation Pillar  
UNDP-IRAQ

### **Rob Duys**

Project Manager Marshalls  
Poverty Reduction & Human development Units  
Local Area Development Programme  
UNDP

### **Khaled Eshan**

Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist  
Iraq Country Office  
UNDP

### **Dr. Anton Stemberger**

Attaché Programme Manager  
European Union  
Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Iraq

### **Jobst Von Kirchmann**

First Counsellor  
Head of Development Cooperation  
European Union  
Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Iraq

### **Nidhal Al-Kadhim**

National Programme officer  
UNESCO Iraq

### **Nahida El Saies**

Consultant  
UNESCO Iraq

### **Fiona McCluney**

Senior Programme Officer  
UN Habitat  
United Nations Human Settlements Programme

**Wael Al-Ashhab**

Project Manager - Infrastructure

UN Habitat

United Nations Human Settlements Programme

**Darbaz Hawizi**

Project Officer

Infrastructure, & Basic Services

UN Habitat

United Nations Human Settlements Programme

**Souroush Javardi**

CTA and Iraq Team Leader

International Labour Organization

**Luca Fedi**

Economic Recovery Specialist

LADP Project Officer

**Dina Zorba**

Gender Advisor/Iraq

UNIFEM

**Dima Al-Masri**

MIS Officer

UNDP

**Lionel Laurens**

Programme Manager

Local Area Development Programme

UNDP

**Zeina Amereh**

Local Economic Recovery Officer

UNOPS

**Christine McNab**

Deputy Special Representative

Development and Humanitarian Support for Iraq

United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq

**Rabeen Pasha**

Technical Officer

World Health Organization

**Sinan Shakir**

Area Coordinator Southern Region  
Local Area Development Programme  
UNDP

**Hayder Al-Shuwalili**

ILO Focal Point  
Southern Region of Iraq

**Erbil Mission Interviewees**

**Mahmoud Ahmed Uthman**

Regional Representative of Kurdistan Regional Government  
in Strategic Review Board

**Mrs. Soz Abdulqadir Abudlrahman**

Deputy Head of Sulaimaniya,  
Provincial Council and Head of LADP Local Steering Committee

**Mr. Jabbar Jalal**

Representative of Sidsadiq District in Sulaimaniya Provincial Council

**Mr. Mohammed Hussien**

Representative of Sharazur District in Sulaimaniya Provincial Council

**Mr. Raof Qadir Tawfeeq**

Director of Sidsadiq Municipality

**Mr. Salar Ahmed Rasid**

Director of Sharazur Municipality

**Mr. Jaafar Latif Mohammed**

Director of Education Sidsadiq Municipality

**Mrs. Sara Kamil Noori** UNDP- Sulaimaniya

**Aree Taha Mustaffa** UNOPS/ILO- Sulaimaniya

List of Individuals who filled the Questionnaire and interviewed by the National consultants:

Maimona			
#	Name(En)	Name(Ar)	Position
1	Husain Nema Kholofi	حسين نعمه	Sub district chairman
2	Sa'ad Abdulhusain Miasser	سعد عبد الحسين	Messan Electricity Department
3	Wissam Jabar Abdulreda	وسام جبار	Consultant
4	Kareem Abduamir Mansor	كريم عبد الامير	Maimona Water directorate
5	Raheem Wahed Hamady	رحيم واحد	LC Member
6	Majed Ahmed Qasi	ماجد احمد	LC Member
7	Adnan Khalaf Jeber	عدنان خلف	Maimona Local council chairman
8	Sadeq Jumaa Husain	ساصدق جمعه	LSC Member
9	Sabah Flaih Muhsen	صباح فليح	LC Member
10	Muhamed Abdula Yaser	محمد عبدالله	LC Member
11	Ali Abdulrazaq Taher	علي عبد الرزاق	Project consultant
12	Muhamed Karim Qarib	محمد كريم	Project consultant
13	Muhamed Hashem Luaiby	محمد هاشم	LC Member
14	Faleh Tuma Juaer	فالح طعمه	PC Member
15	Ali Husain Karim	علي حسين	LSC Member
Mdaina			
#	Name		
1	Hamed Naser Aldhalemi	حامد ناصر	previous LSC Chairman
2	Benan Abdulwahab Abdulsalm	بنان عبد الوهاب	LSC Member
3	Suhail Najem Abud	سهيل نجم	LSC Chairman
4	Abdulrahem Muhamed Juhar	عبد الرحيم محمد	Local Council Chairman
5	Ahmed Naser Maki	أحمد ناصر	LC Member
6	Majed Muhamed Taqy	ماجد محمد	Mdaina Hospital Directorate
7	Aiad Kadem Mutlak	ايداد كاظم	Mdaina Municipality
8	Rabe'e Mansor Tuma'a	ربيع منصور	LC Member
9	Yaqub Nori	يعقوب نوري	LC Member
10	Emad Abdulhusain Bader	عماد عبد الحسين	Mdaina Agriculture Directorate
11	Adel Rashash Shnawa	عادل رشاش	Sub district chairman
12	Salim Shawqy	سليم شوقي	LC Member
13	Saeed Fadel	سعيد فاضل	LC Member
14	Qais Abdulhaqim	قيس عبد الحكيم	Electricity Directorate
15	Seqna Falak	سكنه فلك	PC Member
16	Majed Yasin Sharif	ماجد ياسين	LC Member
17	Baqir Fatir	باقر فاتر	LC Member

<b>Mdaina Meeting participants</b>			
1	Yaqub Nori	يعقوب نوري	Local Council Member
2	Jaber Mezher Jasem	جابر مزهر	Local Council Member
3	Rabe'e Mansor Tuma'a	ربيع منصور	Local Council Member
4	Abdulrahem Muhamed Juhar	عبد الرحيم محمد جوهر	Local Council Chairman
5	Nehad Qasem	نهاد قاسم	Health Directorate
6	Suhail Najem Abud	سهيل نجم	LSC Chairman
7	Baqir Fater Hasan	باقر فاطر	Local Council Member
8	Emad Abdulhusain Bader	عماد عبد الحسين	Mdaina Agriculture Directorate
9	Majed Yasin Sharif	ماجد ياسين	Local Council Member
10	Ahmed Naser Maki	أحمد ناصر	Local Council Member
11	Aiad Kadem Mutlak	اياذ كاظم	Mdaina Municipality
12	Saleem Abdulsahab	سليم عبد الصاحب	Local Council Member
13	Saleem Shawqy	سليم شوقي	Local Council Member
14	Majed Muhamed Taqy	ماجد محمد	Mdaina Hospital Directorate
<b>Babil Meeting participants</b>			
1	Qais N. A. Altaai	قصي نادر علي الطائي	USAID ENMAA BABIL
2	Dr.Hayder A. H. Jaborry	حيدر عبد حسن الجبوري	Babil University
3	Dr.Ibrahem R. Hany	د. ابراهيم رسول هاني	Invesment of Babil
4	Dr. Saad M. Jashamy	د. سعد محسن الجشعمي	Babil University
5	Nahla G. M. Al-loza	نهلة غازي محمد اللوزة	NGOs of Babil
6	Hanna Sh. Jaborry	هنا شهاب الجبوري	Babil Mohafda
7	Sohad K. Saheeb	سهاد كريم صاحب	Education Babil
8	Salem H. Salghy	سليم حميد الصلحي	Local Council Q. Hella
9	Ehab H. Ali	ايهاب حسين علي	Electricity Sirectorate of Hella
10	Akram H. Saheb	اكرم حسن صاحب	Education Babil
11	Naser H. Saheb	ناصر حسن صاحب	UNESCO
12	Raqeb M. R. Al Janabi	رقيب محمد رشيد الجنابي	Sport & Yang, Babil
13	Emad J. Hussain	عماد جاسم حسين	Municipality Of Hella
14	Maky M. Radam	مكي محمد ردام	LSC Babil

15	Fawzia M. Khadem	فوزية محمد كاظم	LSC Babil
16	Amera A. Saham	اميرة عبيد سهم	LSC Babil
17	Ahmed HADI	احمد هادي	Rafdeen Center Information Babil
18	Mohammed Z. Taheer	محمد عبد الزهراء الطاهر	Babil Mohafda
19	Nedal Al-Dalawy	نضال الدلوي	Babil Mohafda
20	Nabil A. Hassany	نبيل عبدالله حساني	Organization of Local Labor
21	Sabah M. Mohammed	صباح مسلم محمد	Directorate of Sewage
22	Qasem Kh. A. Ssaheb	قاسم خلف عبد الصاحب	Directorate of Water
23	Essam A. Raheem	عصام عبد الرحيم	Directorate of Education
24	Hathem A. Zayd	هيثم عبد زيد	LSC Babil
25	Suher Allaa'	سهير علاء	NGOs of Babil
26	Salah H. Salman	صلاح حسن سلمان	Invesment of Babil
27	Kanan Khalf	كنعان خلف	Invesment of Babil
28	Dr.Ali H. Mamory	علي حميد المعموري	Information Center Babil
29	Eidan A. Abaid	عيدان عبد السادة عبيد	Director of Himmar
30	Ali A. Jaber	علي عكلة جابر	Director of Municipal Council of Himmar
31	Fadhel S. Maktaf	فاضل صبار مكطف	Chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Municipal Council of Himmar
32	Rahim Abdel Hussein	رحيم عبد الحسين	Member of the Municipal Council of Himmar
33	Sabah Hazeer	صباح هزير	Director of the Municipality of Himmar
34	Sami Hashim	سامي هاشم	Director of the Water Department of Himmar
35	Hussein Waryosh	حسن وريوش	Steering Committee Member / Chairman of the Marshlands Revival Committee



36	Mohammad Ghanem	محمد غانم	Himmar Municipality
37	Ahmad K. Salman	احمد كاظم سلمان	President of the Municipal Council Chabaish
38	Abdel Kadhim M. Taher	عبد الكاظم ملك طاهر	Mayor of Chabaish
39	Abed Al Ridha Aw'eed	عبد الرضا أو عيد	Chabaish Water
40	Hassan H. Alawi	حسن حسين علاوي	President of the Municipal Council of Suq Al Shuyukh
41	Wisam K. Saleh	وسام كاظم صالح	Director of the Veterinary Clinic
42	Raysan M. Sagheer	ريسان محسن صغير	Chabaish Agriculture
43	Shaker H. Abbas	شاكرك حسن عباس	Municipality Council Member
44	Zaki H. Hanoon	زكي حسين حنون	Director of Al Fuhud
45	Musa Abdel Hadi	موسى عبد الهادي	Al Fuhud Municipality
46	Qusai D. Juweid	قصي دفتر جويد	Al Fuhud Municipality
47	Sami K. Mohammad	سامي كريم محمد	Services Committee
48	Muthfer M. Mohammad	مظفر مجيد محمد	Steering Committee member
49	Rahim A. Thamer	رحيم عبد الحسين ثامر	Director of Chabaish Water
50	Imad A. Khalhen	عماد عبد خلهن	Follow-up eEngineer / Provincial Council Technical Department

## **Annex Two: Questionnaire for LADP Stakeholders**

**Name of Interviewee:**

**Position:**

- 1) Briefly explain your involvement in the LADP and the length of your participation.
- 2) One of the objectives of the LADP is to improve the local planning process by building the necessary capacity of local authorities and community level organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor local development projects. Do you feel that the LADP has made progress in this regard? Please explain.
- 3) Do you feel that the LADP has made a contribution in establishing more participatory and transparent local planning processes in Iraq and to what extent have stakeholders been able to put a participatory approach in practice (Local GO, Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, and NGOs)? Please elaborate
- 4) How effectively are the LSC working in terms of representation and effectiveness?
- 5) One objective of LADP is to promote the involvement of women both in terms of playing a greater in the development of project activity and as project beneficiaries. Do you feel the LADP has achieved this objective? Please elaborate
- 6) In the implementation of LADP project activities do you feel there has been proper recognition and respect for the human rights of all participants?
- 7) Do you feel that the LADP provided adequate support in achieving this objective?
- 8) What contribution has LADP made towards changing attitudes and practices regarding how local projects are designed and implemented? If so, are these new attitudes sustainable?
- 9) What modifications would ensure a further entrenchment of the local development process that has been promoted by the LADP?
- 10) To what extent did LADP project activity respond to local development needs both in terms of the fast track projects, training and institutional capacity building?

- 11) Were project activities clear with realistic timetables and were the roles of each project stakeholder properly spelled out?

### **Overall Project Performance**

- 12) In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors?
- 13) In which areas has the project had the most achievement? What have been the contributing factors?
- 14) A major emphasis of the LADP has been economic recovery. Among other activities in the field of economic recovery, a number of product (value chain analysis) studies have been undertaken, business services centres have been established and micro finance programmes were launched in all three project zones. From your perspective, how successful have these activities been? Please elaborate

### **Role of Area LADP Coordination Team**

- 15) How would you assess the support and guidance by the LADP area team?
- 16) What improvements could be made in terms of how the LADP area team supports local districts, NGOs and communities? Please elaborate

### **Joint UN Programming, Coordination and Management**

- 17) How effective was the coherence between the design of the project, the integration of UNDP, UNHABITAT, ILO, WHO, UNESCO, and UNIFEM support towards the achievement of the project's objectives and the overall coordination with other project partners?
- 18) What have been your overriding concerns with the project management of the LAPD? (communication, remote management, etc)
- 19) From an Iraqi institutional perspective, what have been some of the key obstacles encountered with the approach of the LADP? Similarly, what have been some of the positive impacts of the project?
- 20) From your perspective what have Iraqi institutions (local to national) gained through the LADP that contributes to more effective organization and ownership of the local development process?

21) Do you have any further comments?

### **Annex 3: Key Evaluation Questions**

#### **Relevance and Validity of Design**

The following question regarding the relevance and strategic fit of the LADP helped to guide evaluation:

- To what extent does the project respond to the UNDG ITF pros developed to support priorities outlined in the Government of Iraq's (GOI) National Development Strategy (2004, 2005, and 2007) and the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) (2007).
- Does the project respond to the real needs of the beneficiaries? Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Where the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- How well did the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address local level planning, reconstruction and recovery and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? Did the project's original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?

#### **Regarding the validity of the Design:**

- Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?
- Was the project design / re-design logical and coherent in terms of the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders to realistically achieve the planned outcomes?
- How effective was the coherence between the design of the project focus, the integration of UNDP, UNHABITAT, ILO, UNOPS and WHO, UNESCO and UNIFEM instruments in support of programme objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors?
- How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- To what extent were external factors identified and assumptions identified at the time of design?
- Was the project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes / needs that could occur during the implementation?
- Was the level of stakeholder commitment sufficient to foster constituents' involvement in promoting social dialogue and human rights?
- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If so, what was the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?

#### **Regarding Achievements (Implementation and Development Effectiveness)**

- What are the development results (i.e. against planned outputs and outcomes) of interventions, taking into account the quality of the local development plans, the process of endorsement and

adaptation at the district and governorate level, the feasibility and sustainability of those plans and the institutional development of the local and relevant national partners?

- Which aspects of the project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? What are the main lessons learned from the partnership strategies and what are the possibilities of replication and scaling-up? How can the project build or expand on achievements?
- In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- To what extent have interventions addressed gender and Human Rights issues?
- How effective was the collaboration between the participating UN organizations and what has been the added value of this collaboration?
- How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation (Local GO, Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, NGOs etc)? How effective has the project been in establishing ownership especially with reference to the local development plans?

#### **Regarding Effectiveness of management arrangements and efficiency of resource use**

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes? Have resources been used efficiently?
- Were project funds and activities delivered in a timely manner?
- Were management capacities adequate?
- Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partners institutions, including NGOs.
- Did the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its local and national partners?
- Was there adequate technical, programmatic, administrative and financial backstopping for the project from the “remote offices” of UNDP, UNHABITAT, ILO & UNOPS and WHO, UNESCO and UNIFEM in Amman, ILO Regional Office for Arab States and the relevant HQ departments? Was the collaboration effective and efficient taking into account that the implementation management is partially done remotely?
- Has relevant gender expertise and Human rights approaches programming been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized? Have any Human Right’s programming initiation or toolkit been introduced to local planners?
- How effectively did the project management monitor project performance and results?
- What has been the quality of documentation and dissemination of knowledge within the project?
- How efficient was the project in communicating its results?

#### **Regarding Impact orientation and sustainability**

- To what extent did the project make a significant contribution to the reconstruction and development of institutions in three areas in Iraq, namely Sulymaniya, Babil, the Marshlands in the south, including Thi Qar, Missan and Basra Governorates?

- How effectively has the project built necessary capacity of local authorities and community level organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor local level planning, reconstruction and development projects?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conduct of the project's activities? Is there an exit strategy and, if so, what steps have been taken to ensure sustainability?
- Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Are these anchored in national institutions and can the partners maintain them financially at end of the project?
- Can the project approach and results be replicated and scaled up by national partners and cover other Iraqi areas?