



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA



## Evaluation of the '*Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja*'

July 2010



*The daily challenges of security and development in Karamoja.*

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBO	Community Based Organizations
CDOs	Community Development Officers
CEWARM	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response' Mechanism
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CCF	Common Country Assessment
DISO	District Internal Security Officer
DPDC	District Peace and Development Committee
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
IGAs	Income Generating Activities
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Sector
KIDDP	Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
LC	Local Council
LC1	Local Council 1 (Village Councils)
LCII	Local Council II (Parish Councils at lower Local government)
LCIII	Local Council III (Municipal and Town divisions at Lower Local Government)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MADEFO	Matheniko Development Forum
MFI	Micro-Finance Institution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NUNV	National United Nations Volunteers
NUREP	Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
ToRs	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
VSLAs	Village Savings and Loan Associations
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

## Executive Summary

### Brief Description of the Project

The project development objective or overall goal of the 'Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja' is, *"To contribute to the Promotion of Human Security, Peace and Stability in order to create conditions for Sustainable Development in Karamoja"*. This was to be achieved by supporting women and local government's participation in peaceful conflict resolution, by supporting cross-border peacebuilding initiatives and by supporting development interventions that enhance peaceful coexistence.

### Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the midterm evaluation was to identify factors affecting the efficient implementation of project for the Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja. The evaluation includes a focus on 'lessons learned', identification of any good practices, next steps and recommendations for future programming.

### Key Findings

The project should be considered as a good starting point with some important lessons learned in project design and management arrangements. Building on the suspension of the previous programme, the entry points of peacebuilding, capacity development for Local Government, empowerment of women through labour based initiatives and cross-border collaboration seem appropriate and uncontroversial for UNDP when compared to being engaged directly in related disarmament activities. The district leadership and government acknowledges the role UNDP has played in the process of contributing towards the provision of security as well as the importance for violence reduction of UNDP's efforts to provide alternative livelihoods that will draw communities away from participation in armed violence and towards more mainstream household-level economic development.

The programme has contributed towards the implementation of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Program (KIDDP) and the Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. The four objectives of the program to strengthen the capacity of local governments; support them to undertake development interventions geared towards enhancing peace building and conflict resolution; undertake cross border building initiatives and empowering communities to positively contribute to peace building and conflict resolution were and are still relevant to the main goal of the program. Overall, the target beneficiaries- both the communities and district leadership- believed in the theory underlying the project: that augmenting peace activities across district and international borders, and within and between warring communities, as well as supporting women and disarmed groups in a bid to expand their livelihoods options are appropriate components of building sustainable peace and development.

Since its inception, the programme achieved the following:

A UNDP project office was established in Moroto, which improved project coordination, management and collaboration with district leadership and other stakeholders, as well as the recruitment of an effective Head of Project Office and Programme Manager, representing UNDP on the ground within Karamoja. Project ‘Coordinators’ were also recruited and embedded within local government, expanding the reach of UNDP programming down to the district and sub-County levels- although the structures and management arrangements suffered from a number of shortfalls, further elaborated in this report.

In support of the peacebuilding component of the programme, numerous peace dialogues, meetings and related activities were carried out, produced some meaningful resolutions, and were followed up in some cases by practical actions to consolidate the peace. In a limited number of cases, where peacebuilding activities were deliberately linked with other security and development activities (police and military redeployments, road construction and income generating) they represent an important contribution to the consolidation of security in those areas. In many cases, however, these benefits proved to be short lived and commitments to ‘peace’ tactical in nature. New working-level relationships were established between district and community leadership and elders across the international borders- which are potentially entry points for further peace activities to be expanded upon by the district leadership and several other peace actors in Karamoja.

Income generating activities (IGAs) were extended to some 88 groups (each one averaging 30 members) and therefore reaching some 2900 beneficiaries and their respective households. Participants, organized in groups, either benefitted from training in savings and loan management, to which they received cash as starter package for the groups, or were given capital in cash or materials to start income generating activities. The results from these seemingly small innovations not only allowed members to earn income (with associated benefits in food security and education reported) but made a significant and very clear contribution towards the overall objective of the programme by changing attitudes towards participating in or encouraging violent livelihood strategies.

The programme implementation also had a number of limitations, and faced constraints in implementation which affected the results and consequently the efficiency and impact. Considering the historical context in which the program was designed, it has for the greater part of the project duration and until recently, suffered as a result of weak staffing at the Karamoja-level- both as a result of a weak candidate in the position of programme manager during the start-up of the project and weak supervision of National UNV staff up until their removal in late 2009. While experienced leadership and management has been restored to the project at Karamoja-level, the project suffers from an unsustainable lack of human resources, considering its geographic and thematic scope.

Perhaps only half of the programme activities, as initially designed in the project document, were implemented- with few capacity building or cross-border activities taking place over the life of the project. In addition, some components have produced few tangible dividends (peace activities and capacity development for local government in particular). The delivery of labour based activities has been significantly delayed and only one labour based road construction project has been completed to date in Karamoja, although the remainder are under development

and are planned for the next/final quarter through a new partnership arrangement with the World Food Programme (WFP). Modest, although very promising cross-border programming took place- and should be significantly augmented. Empowerment of women (and to a lesser degree, disarmed youth) has been successful in altering individual choices towards peace and security- and in this area lies the programmes' greatest accomplishments to date. A much greater emphasis on providing alternative livelihoods to armed youth is required, as is a deliberate leveraging of successful armed youth group participants to mobilise additional group members through incentive mechanisms.

The implementation of most of the project activities was delayed as a result of weak human resources, procurement delays and confusion over management arrangements. Determining the cost-effectiveness of the project has been difficult, with most measurable project activities taking place only recently -within the past 6-10 months. The project evaluation uncovered evidence of a small number of small scale procedural and financial irregularities, which were in addition to irregularities previously under investigation by UN, Government of Uganda and independent authorities.

Project management structures, including reporting lines, chain of command, monitoring and planning processes need to be redesigned as a collaboration between UNDP, OPM and district officials/Ministry of local government, in order to achieve a rationalized, mutually agreeable and efficient implementation of future programmes. Future project staff, regardless of management arrangements that are developed, require improved induction training, systems and supervision.

While alignment of the programme with Government of Uganda priorities through NEX/NIM implementation modalities is appropriate and field-level collaboration with security organs (including the Police and UPDF) seems to be effective, if verified- ongoing allegations of abuses, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killings by the UPDF against the civilian population (including during the programme evaluation period<sup>1</sup>) threaten to place UNDP in a difficult position programmatically and ethically. Any collaboration and joint programming should be reviewed on a regular basis by UNDP and a framework for joint programming between the UN and the military established if it is to continue.

Such a visible and close collaboration also poses problems for any potential NGO partnerships and might constrain future NGO implementation options - even though improvements to the overall security situation in Karamoja are likely attributable to a significant improvement in the deployment of additional security forces and the development of more collaborative and sophisticated approach to integrated security and development (through CIMIC, Community Policing as well as a substantial investment in infrastructure and development by the Government of Uganda).

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Report by the Ugandan Human Rights Commission and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). May 8<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

**Conclusions:**

The program was and is still highly relevant to the Karamoja region, to Uganda and to the sub-region.

Recent attention to the overall problematic of underdevelopment and insecurity in Karamoja by the Government of Uganda, donors and development agencies is beginning to show dividends and seems poised to break this historical trend and draw the sub-region into mainstream markets and development strategies.

UNDP has been at the frontline of this ‘stabilisation’ process and is still one of governments’ most strategic partners in this area. The relevance of UNDP’s programming is undeniable and the associated assistance still much required. Although, truly dramatic results have not yet been achieved in terms of macro-level outcomes on peace and security through the programme thus far- it is appreciated that on a conceptual basis (and with the provisos of the previous paragraph), programming is focusing in the right directions- despite the process being slow- and that lessons learned during the current phase can usefully be built upon to improve the lives of Karamojong- if rationalised implementation modalities allow for a better integrated and accelerated programming.

We can conclude, based primarily on observations from the field and the testimony of beneficiaries themselves, that the program has a significant potential for positively influencing individual and communal behaviours and values towards sustainable peace and security.

**‘Best Practices’ and ‘Lessons Learned’**

1. Best practices attributable to the programme are primarily evident in the area of income generating activities and have been able to change the attitudes of individuals and groups towards participation in non-violent livelihoods with modest inputs and should be bolstered with further support to insulate beneficiaries against market or environmental shocks.
2. Infrastructure projects, if strategic in nature, can have multiple benefits in the areas of security and development, regardless of whether they are labour-based or not.
3. Peace meetings (in Abim district in particular) have been best used strategically in conjunction with resettlement, deployment of security forces and livelihoods support as a package.
4. Where ‘integrated’ programming has taken place and has been successful, it coincides with areas where Local Government and Programme staff have enjoyed good daily cooperation, have shared a common vision and have enabled one another



5. While support for JLOS and security actors in the region is correct and strategic in order to improve conditions over time, ongoing allegations of human rights violations carried out by the UPDF may jeopardize closer collaboration and places UNDP in an ethical dilemma.

### **Recommendations for Future Programming:**

#### Evidence-based programming:

- Future programming needs to be evidence-based. The proposed area-based programme should be initiated through the collection of baseline information.

#### Integrated Programming:

- The programme logic should be based on the Local Government's plans for providing security and livelihoods options to both existing and re-settling populations. It should ensure that programme activities feed into a comprehensive plan for delivering security, including road access, support for JLOS actors (including infrastructure, transport and communications), Community Policing and livelihoods support targeting armed youth and women (with an increased focus on armed youth- as much as 70% of livelihoods/IGA focused resources).
- Broadly speaking, UN programming in the border regions of these four countries should be carried out according to a common framework and as part of a stabilisation, security and development strategy for the sub-region- especially considering the current trends in Karamoja and the possible scenarios for regional trade, road/pipeline construction and security dynamics resulting from the probably creation of a new state in 'Southern Sudan'.

#### Peacebuilding:

- Support should be more strategic and should include rapid reaction logistical support for Local Government and security organs and further cross-border meetings and collaboration. Engagement should begin by hosting a technical-level cross-border meeting between UNDP Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia.
- Where peace meetings do take place, they should include joint planning between conflicting communities to generate conflict sensitive programming that will create mutual gains. Resources for such programming must be allocated in advance to avoid delays that could create tensions.

Programmatic scope:

- There is a likelihood of being encouraged towards focusing on government priorities of water and food although this is not a UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery area of specialisation. UNDP should focus on areas of expertise and ensure that food and water related programming is linked up with the appropriate UN partner organisations with comparative advantage in these areas (WFP, FAO and UNICEF) rather than attempting to move into these programming areas themselves.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Project background

The Project on *Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja (2007 -2010)* was designed to contribute to the overall Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) by supplementing community and local government peace building efforts through dialogue and promoting reconciliation between rival ethnic and cross border groups Karamoja. By strengthening local governments' capacities to support local communities in their peace-building and conflict resolution efforts, the project would contribute to enhancing the rule of law and promoting economic recovery in Karamoja in line with the overall strategic framework for interventions<sup>2</sup> (KIDDP and PRDP) in Northern Uganda.

The project development objective or overall goal of the 'Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja' is, *"To contribute to the Promotion of Human Security, Peace and Stability in order to create conditions for Sustainable Development in Karamoja"*. In order to achieve the overall goal, the project had four strategic interventions, comprised of a variety of sub-activities, including:

1. Strengthen capacity of local governments in Karamoja to undertake peace building and conflict transformation
2. Empower women to positively contribute to peace building and peaceful conflict resolution in Karamoja
3. Support district local governments to undertake development interventions that enhance peace building and peaceful conflict resolution in Karamoja
4. Collaborate with the district local governments to undertake cross-border peace building initiatives with pastoral groups in countries neighbouring Karamoja

### 1.2 Rationale, Purpose, Scope and Method of Evaluation

The purpose of the midterm evaluation was to identify factors affecting the efficient implementation of project for the Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja. In particular the evaluation sought to furnish information to management and implementers in the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) Unit, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), beneficiaries and local governments in Karamoja on current and the future status of this project and/or other successor programs. As with other evaluations, the evaluation serves primarily to promote learning by utilization of the lessons herein drawn as inputs into the future plans for UNDP programming.

Therefore, beyond the initial remit of the evaluators to generate a *"clear understanding of what is working and what is not, and also provide necessary management information for decision making to enable the project to achieve its set goal and objectives..."* [and to] *"understand how project design, project start-up, implementation issues including (procurement, recruitment, management structure, staff capacity, culture and*

*operational guidelines) are impacting on achievement of project results*”, it was also agreed to include a greater focus on ‘lessons learned’, identification of any good practices, next steps and recommendations for future programming through an area-based programme- for which some preliminary development has already taken place.

Although initially conceived as a midterm evaluation aimed at identifying factors affecting the efficient implementation of the programme, after preliminary meetings with UNDP management staff in Kampala, it was agreed that (as there were only four months left in the formal project period), the evaluation should be seen more as an ‘end of project’ evaluation- and should be forward looking.

### ***Preliminaries***

Before beginning the field component of the mission, the team carried out a comprehensive desk review of various project documents which was later followed by a series of meetings that discussed and refined the field work plan focusing on the stakeholders, method of consultations and time frame.

A first meeting was held with key project staff and UNDP management in Kampala to discuss the draft ToR for the project evaluation and agreed to make the evaluation as forward looking as possible, as the programme was formally closing within 4 months (July 2010). The second and inception meeting was held with leadership and management staff from the Crisis and Prevention Unit. It comprised a de-briefing, and question & answer clarifications on project objectives, design, strategies and operations. Work plans, were re-discussed between staff and consultants as well as sharing expectations and challenges with regard to the current status of the project in Karamoja and UNDP’s ongoing organizational and corporate changes. The unit staff appraised the consultants of the key programme stakeholders

### ***Scope and coverage***

At the time of the evaluation Karamoja region had 6<sup>3</sup> districts namely: Moroto, Abim, Kotido, Nakapiripirit, Kaabong and Amudat which was a new district carved from Nakapiripirit during the course of the project phase. For this reason, the evaluation considered only the first 5 districts herein mentioned. While in each district, there was an attempt to sample all stakeholders, using capitalizing on information from the desk review, the team identified peculiar issues in each district which served as focus for drawing depth and de-limitations for consultation explained in the next paragraph.

Moroto district was used as a focus on learning about macro-level best practices from other agencies carrying out peace and development projects in Karamoja, because it hosts a large number of NGOs and UN agency sub regional offices, while Abim which had a history of forensic audit was used a learning point for programme financial management. Kotido had a fairly well streamlined development interventions, hence the team focused on meeting as many of the income generating groups as possible. Given the geographical location of Kaabong, learning was specifically focused on studying effects of sharing local and international borders and results of associated peace interventions. In addition, Kaabong was the only district that had attempted a labour-based project by the time of the evaluation. Nakapiripirit was identified as an area leading the way in integrating project support for peacebuilding, resettlement and development interventions.

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<sup>3</sup> Another new district (Napak District ) has been carved out of Moroto District and will take effect FY 2010/2011

The evaluation covered issues of project design, implementation, project management, project results, resource utilization; issues of sustainability, lessons learnt and measurement of delivery against the intended results of the project for the time period of 2007 to-date. On average, the evaluation team was able to spend 3 days in each district and visited as many stakeholders as was logistically possible.

### ***Data source***

Both primary and secondary data was used for this evaluation to critically assess implementation, process outputs, outcomes and any other achievements. Project data was mainly got from project documents key of which were; pro-document, work-plans where available, quarterly narrative progress and activity reports at the districts. Specific activity reports like peace meetings, at the districts and monitoring reports by OPM and UNDP headquarter reports also guided the evaluation. Other key national documents included the national development documents (including the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), Northern Uganda Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP), Options for Enhancing Access to Justice and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja, Second Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF2). Literature also included other documents focusing on armed violence and insecurity, peace building, small arms control and on overall development in Karamoja.

### ***Stakeholders consulted and method***

Using the information from the desk review, different districts were selected in-depth assessments of the different level of focus as indicated in Box 1. At the field level, primary information was gathered from a scope of stakeholders summarised in Box 1. In all cases except two occasions, discussions were held with the individuals and organizations in the presence of the two consultants, and/or in presence of the Karamoja project manager or a representative from the district. On exceptional occasions, time was maximized by consultants carrying out separate activities and convening to consolidate findings.

In the field, key stakeholder meetings were held with Government counterparts within District Local Governments in each district. [See Annex # 2 below for a list of individuals with whom the team met] Typically these included LC5 Chairpersons, Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), Chief Accounting Officers (CAOs) and their Assistant CAOs, District Internal Security Officers (DISOs), Regional and District Police Commissioners, Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) commanding officers, project focal points within local government, as well as accountants within the district. A total of about 390 persons were consulted 61 of which were in Moroto, 70 persons in Abim, 115 from Kotido , 81 Kaabong and 53 in Nakapiripirit. The people were consulted is smaller groups

The evaluation started with meeting with project staff, project partners and beneficiaries in Kampala, followed by field staff and beneficiaries. Having in mind that key target beneficiaries were both the local population and district administration in the 5 districts of Karamoja, a checklist aligned to evaluative issues in the TOR was designed to guide interviews and focus group discussions. The team also carried out site visits and stakeholder meetings with project beneficiaries, as well as contractors formerly and currently hired to implement various components of the project. In some cases, where project activities are still in the planning phase or ongoing, the team met with those implementing agencies selected to implement. The team

also met with NGOs and CBO partners to the project as well as those carrying out related or similar work in the project area in order to compare and contrast approaches.

Box 1: Stakeholders and Inquiry Focus Areas		
	Stakeholders	Focus <sup>4</sup>
1.	UNDP and OPM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNDP CPRU</li> <li>• Office of Undersecretary and development interventions</li> <li>• Coordination offices , OPM and sub Office Moroto</li> </ul>	Program design and institutional arrangements, including the human resources, and financial arrangements, responsiveness to the Karamoja Development plans, linkages to the future ABD, institutional and structural changes within UNDP
2.	District leadership including administrative, security agencies, and law enforcers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAO, LCV, RDC, DISOs, etc</li> <li>• Lower local govt (S/C chiefs)</li> <li>• Focal persons</li> <li>• Police, UPDF, local security</li> </ul>	Administrative and implementation procedures, challenges, benefits, outputs, short and long term outcomes, priorities and opportunities both foregone and futuristic, level of participation and satisfaction with design, processes and outcomes <sup>5</sup>
3.	Beneficiary communities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IGA groups (men , women, elder, youth, opinion leaders )</li> <li>• Disarmed vs not disarmed</li> </ul>	Type and level of engagement, perceptions on quality and quantity of benefits and relevance, priorities foregone and futurelistic Alternative /better ways of handling
4.	Partners <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN agencies</li> <li>• Private sector</li> <li>• NGOs, INGOs, CBOs, and others CSOs</li> </ul>	Type of partnership, level of collaboration, and degree of sharing, perception of UNDP project designs, (activities, outputs, efficiency, relevance,
5.	Others e.g. program designer,	Objectives, strategies and rationale behind the project. Expected outcomes, outputs and impact as well as challenges anticipated

### ***Main evaluation questions***

Guided by the UNDP evaluation policy and UN Evaluation Group Standards (UN, 2005), the team sought answers to respond to a series of questions provided in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation [ See Annex #1 below for the original ToR questions]. The Questions were in some cases slightly reordered or re-combined, as follows:

- a) How appropriate was the design of the project in addressing the development problem? Are there any improvements to the design that can be made to enhance achievement of project objectives? The question addressed the extent to which the project has attained its objectives
- b) How relevant is the project theory (the conceptual thinking of peace building for Karamoja) in addressing the development challenge in Karamoja? Are there other efficient peace building philosophies that could be adopted for Karamoja? Relevance was also assessed in terms of the extent to which the project has addressed the priorities of

<sup>4</sup> Includes key evaluative parameters, of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability if any and lessons learnt

the target groups, and the response to national strategies and development needs in alignment to the KIDDP and PRDP

- c) To what extent are the project institutional arrangements functional and responsive (UNDP Kampala office, Moroto Sub-office, OPM, and the local governments)? What factors are responsible for institutional arrangement functionality?
- d) How efficient is the project implementation? How cost effective is the project implementation? Criteria for measuring efficiency were considered in terms of inputs and resource utilization against the quality and quantity outputs.
- e) How functional is project management structure? What changes if any could improve on the management structure?
- f) What operational challenges that were not anticipated have emerged? How would these be overcome (i.e. staffing, regulations/guidelines, procurement, communication and roles & responsibilities)? To what extent did project start-up activities prepare the project staff, district local governments, OPM and the beneficiaries?
- g) What factors both positive and negative have influenced project implementation? What lessons have been learned to improve on programming?

### **1.3 Factors Limiting the Evaluation:**

A number of factors limited the ability of the evaluation team to carry out the evaluation as designed. These included the following factors:

- Accessing project related documents (workplans, budget information and reports) at the district level was difficult in some cases due to poor record keeping, and/or unavailability of local government officials. It was only possible to meet 2 of the coordinators as one had earlier on resigned and the others were not available since the contracts had expired. This affected access and triangulation of information since these were the primary district-level managers and implementers of the project. In one case, the former coordinator was present but refused to meet the evaluation team. In one case, documents were not easily available from the CAOs office since he was not available at the time of the team's visit.
- Limited institutional memory: as the focal persons (Assistant CAOs) who are currently managing the projects were newly assigned to the projects and were in some cases were not adequately informed about the project and the way it had previously been run.
- On the administrative part, in Kaabong, the CAO had only taken up office one month previously and was yet to be informed about the various programme components.

#### **1.4 Organisation of this Report**

The document is divided into 4 main components. The first section highlights the context of the UNDP Karamoja project as well as the purpose and objectives of the evaluation ending with the evaluative approaches; the section that follows describes in details the findings under each district as relate to the project objectives and expected outputs. The overall findings and analysis of the exercise with a focus on responding to key questions highlighted under the Terms of Reference is highlighted in the third chapter. The last section gives a summary of the evaluative findings, conclusions and linkages to the future and mentions key lessons learnt. Terms of Reference and interviewee-related information are included in annexes.



## Chapter 2

### Evaluation Findings

#### District Specific Evaluation Reports

The Districts of Karamoja assessed during the evaluation are as follows:

- A. Moroto
- B. Kotido
- C. Abim
- D. Kaabong
- E. Nakapiripirit

This section gives a summary of key findings as presented by stakeholders in each district. It is mainly presented along the project level outputs. Works through the UNDP programme in the 2 new Districts are covered under existing workplans and will not be evaluated as separate administrative entities for the purposes of this evaluation.

#### 2.1 MOROTO District

The project office in Moroto received operational support including administrative support, logistics and administrative facilitation, publications, and support to the driver and coordinator. The project continued to support disarmament and peace dialogues in and outside the district.

##### ***District level Outputs***

*Capacity of Local governments, CSOs strengthened for peace initiatives and district supported to undertake activities promoting confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation*

The project is credited to have supported peace initiatives and income generation activities. Support for labour-based projects remains at the planning and sub-contracting stages. The success of support for local government in the areas of capacity building and M&E training could not be established.

##### ***Security and Peace***

Meetings and peace dialogues were carried out at all levels including, inter-clan dialogues at Nakapelimoru in Kotido and Lorengwat in Nakapiririt. These meetings brought together the two main warring groups of Bokora and Matheniko in Moroto to dialogue with the Jie of Kotido. The beneficiaries believed that the outcomes from the peace dialogues- especially at the local level- were meagre with little indication of sustainability. The leadership however attests to benefits attributable to cross-border meetings that have established new working relationships

with authorities in Kenya undertaking similar work. Longer-term impacts, however, are yet to be assessed.

In order to provide peace dividends, and building on previous peace agreements and the construction of a road to the Kenyan border, a market was being constructed at Nakiloro. The market has a potential of bringing together both the Karimojong and Turkana warriors in hope to create more sustained and peaceful interaction, to facilitate and sustain peace processes and to build trust, and a common interests in community assets. According to records, the location for the market has been an insecure area where killing and rape had been occurring frequently. Its development has potential and is a right step in the direction towards bridging the divide between communities across the international frontier.



*Nakiloro ‘border market’ under construction: creating shared interests and community goods- linking infrastructure, livelihoods, economic activity, cross-border collaboration and security*

The market, though incomplete, has already attracted other potential partners into developing the area and has stimulated interest across the border- where the Turkana are also in the process of constructing a similar ‘border’ market. While the market potential is underscored, the evaluation team raises concerns over the manner in which the market contract has been handled. Despite, records of repeated warnings, the works have proceeded slowly, and there was evidence of poor supervision. Added to this finding was the fact that the contractor had already been paid the full sum of money, which breached contractual arrangements specifying that the balance of payments would be paid on completion of the works. At the time of the evaluation, the contractor was complaining that he needed additional funds to complete the market, suggesting that cost overruns, poor budgeting and planning or embezzlement had occurred. A failure to secure retainers from contractors and full payment in advance should be addressed through a review of standard contracting procedures.

### ***Program management***

While a number of UNDP supported activities were appreciated, there were equally strong sentiments from some district leadership that the program was disconnected from the district. They observed that neither were the project plans integrated into the district work plans, nor was the office of the CAO adequately updated on the implementation status- consequently affecting effective project outcome. Shortcomings were held to the ‘apparently unilateral decision making’ by the former UNV coordinator- which is blamed by the CAO on the person’s character and inexperience.

Evident were the undertones of dissatisfaction with the project structure- in which the coordinators are more empowered than their supervisors (the CAOs) in terms of remuneration, facilitation and budget lines. This was seemingly aggravated when the coordinator has no regard for protocol and is seen to communicate information selectively. It was consequently felt by the CAO that the CAOs office had been used more as a conduit than a partner with full ownership. The evaluation team was however not in position to validate the claims as the project coordinator in question expressed that she was not obligated to respond and refused to meet with the evaluation team.

### ***Security and peace***

The RDC and DISO’s office hold the responsibility for security on behalf of the central government facilitating their job of ensuring peace and security with other partners. They further observed that project outcomes related to peace are often short lived, and may sometimes appear insignificant in spite of the many inputs by various peace actors. This was attributed to the fact that activities are not regular, not sustained and sometimes not fully inclusive. Noted specifically was the inadequate engagement of the Karachunas despite the fact that they are the perpetrators and victims of violence in many instances. They however attest that UNDP activities have led to reduction of raids and thefts which is an indicator of a perceived positive move towards peace and security. A baseline assessment of attitudes towards insecurity as well as hard security indicators would help to validate or invalidate this belief, however, such a baseline assessment was not carried out at the inception of the project as planned, making measurement difficult.

### ***Labour- based projects***

The project planned to open Nakiloro-Rupa road and construct Nangirongole dam as labour-based projects associated with providing ‘peace dividends’ although by the time of this evaluation exercise, these projects had not been completed. The jobs were well conceptualized and intended to bring conflicting parties together to collectively utilize resources, creating a conducive environment for cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes. Records showed that district planners and the communities were well mobilized to participate in labour-based approaches and had actively participated in site selection. Construction of the roads has now been contracted to WFP as implementing partners on behalf of UNDP.

The implementation of the road project is over 9 months delayed from UNDP workplans and a few weeks delayed on the part of WFP as well. Ahead of the works to be undertaken by WFP, it has been observed that full time labour-based approaches are not fully cost-effective, while they may have more benefits from maximizing security infrastructure than from being labour-based. A more detailed comparison of results from labour only, machine only and combined labour/machine based projects would be required.

### ***Other UN agencies and peace actors***

Good relations were observed between UNDP and all her sister agencies including FAO, UNOCHA, WHO, UNICEF and WFP. They commended the work carried out recently by UNDP with special mention for the current Moroto UNDP project office manager, who had, they believed, turned the project around. They hailed UNDP for having come up with labour-based approaches which would empower communities through responsibility for shared public assets. FAO underscored the need to address the challenges insecurity, weak agency coordination in handling disaster, ownership in labour based approaches and changing the attitude of people towards dependency on relief.

Agencies decried the perception of Karamoja as an area recovering from crisis and requiring emergency measures -underscoring the need to start focusing in longer term effects of programming rather than being simplistically output oriented. UNOCHA, in agreement with other agencies, noted that while the UN agencies work with government to support disarmed youth and women, there was a need for practical government commitments to their pledges, otherwise the affected may out of desperation revert to the difficult decisions of taking up guns for 'livelihoods' purposes.

Other agencies noted that UNDP programme in Karamoja was absolutely relevant but did not have a clear strategy for implementation nor an adequate M& E framework to monitor the project. There was also a perception that supervision had been poor- both on the side of local government and OPM. It was suggested that the project had structural limitation which were partly responsible for limited outcomes. Additionally the project promised and failed to implement some of its original activities including capacity building at the district-level and a systematic identification of security/peace building-related gaps to spear head coordination which are looked at opportunities lost.

### *Districts Local Government supported to empower women to positively contribute to peace building and conflict resolution*

According to records, 14 groups were supported in Moroto district, through a variety of income generating activities. Beneficiaries included 3 women groups, 1 youth group and 10 mixed groups. The following were observations on some of the IGAs visited:

Nakoreto Women's Group, located within the town council, has a 30 person membership with only about 30% reportedly being active. The group was given sewing machines which they use to repair and tailor fabrics. Although the net profit was still low to date, the members expressed satisfaction with ownership and hoped to generate greater profit in the future. This group still requires technical help including on techniques of tailoring.

The 'Moroto Disarmed Youth Association' has 30 members and was given assistance in recognition of their decision to participate in 'voluntary disarmament'. The team was supported with a brick making machine, and some related equipments needed like wheel barrows. The members attested to direct and indirect benefits including 'peace within themselves', 'self actualization', being kept busy and a feeling of belonging- in addition to small income that they generated through sales of bricks. They claimed to be happy to be able to support their families through non-violent means and requested for more support to other groups similar to them for purposes of wooing youths and distracting them from raiding and criminal violence.

Although they were earning profit from their project, the rate of consumption of their services was poor- possibly because they were incompetent in searching for business options or markets but also perhaps because they were dependent on the level of development (and hence construction) in their communities. The Matheniko Development Forum (MADEF) was an example of a private sector development organization that UNDP was working with to support the implementation of livelihoods related activities. Their work was to build the capacity of communities in various fields- spanning from livestock activities to peace building workshops targeted at bringing victims and perpetrators together.

The Karamoja Development Private Sector Company- whose establishment and capacity building was supported by UNDPs CCFII and CPAP 2006- was also engaged to train the IGA groups in the establishment and management of Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs). While their competence in training was undeniable, it was observed that there are no follow-up of the groups trained. The agency has absolutely no idea nor intention of finding out whether the training yielded any outcomes. Whereas the agency clarified that monitoring the trained groups was not in their mandate, the evaluation team believed it was a lost opportunity for measuring institutional impact and, ultimately, cost effectiveness for UNDP.

#### **Observations and conclusions: Moroto district:**

- Overall relations between the project and the local administration had been very poor up until the replacement of the Project manager and the removal of the UNV coordinator. Subsequent to this, relations had improved and progress accelerated.
- Results from income generating projects funded through the project were weak but provided the most tangible benefit to date of UNDP funded programming. Beneficiaries stated that even the modest resources and successes to date were enough to encourage them to continue and encourage others to give up violent livelihoods. Considerable work needs to be done to improve the effectiveness and targeting of IGA support through basic market surveys in order to avoid failed project support.
- The cross-border market, while experiencing some contractual implementation problems, holds out the prospect of demonstrating successful integrated programming by linking peacebuilding, cross-border dialogue and planning, road infrastructure development and support for pastoralist livelihoods. As such, a number of new entry points for rule of law, health or veterinary service provision can be built upon and buttress such projects. This sort of 'linked-up' and sequenced programming is more likely through a better coordination with district planning processes.

- A number of additional livelihoods related activities were identified during the evaluation- which could build on existing natural resources in the area, including marble processing for future construction and cement manufacture, as well as artisanal gold mining- which could be developed through a cooperative organization and linked to newly established gold processing facilities in Uganda.

#### Recommendations:

- Streamlining supervision and improve human resources assigned to the project
- Ensure proper involvement of project staff in district workplan development and local government staff in project design and monitoring.
- Ensure baseline information in project areas collected for evidence-based programming
- Monitoring and evaluation needs to be well designed

## **2.2 KOTIDO district**

Kotido consists of 5 sub counties, namely Kotido town council (TC), Panyangara, Nakaperimolu, Kotido, Kacheri, and Rengeni. The Jie of Kotido are involved in raiding their neighbours in neighbouring districts and they also have issues with cross border neighbours like the Turkana.

### ***Program Management***

The district offices seemed to have been established with ease and space was provided to the UNDP office. The office appeared to be well equipped and organized. The following was observed:

- Logistical and materials support to the office Kotido office, including stationery, IT equipment, logistics and facilitation of coordinator, were duly provided as planned in output 1 of the project. The district availed office space to UNDP. Until the end of Dec 2009, the office had been run by the coordinator and with support of the driver.
- The records in Kotido district seemed to have been regularly produced and filed. The evaluation team found the work plans, reports and financial accountability reports available and easy to access.
- Whereas the records and day to day running of the project appeared to have been in order, anomalies were observed in the management structures and day to day reporting lines which, according to the former coordinator, affected program efficiency. Specifically, this included a case in which 6.5M Ushs in implementation funds designated for peace activities in the last quarter of the year were unutilized due to challenges within the district leadership (disagreement between local government officials). In a sense, this is an indication of sound management as funds were returned rather than diverted to other unplanned purposes.
- The UNV coordinator, as in the other districts, was the main implementer of the program and was accountable to the CAO. Unusually, the account had only 2 signatories

(CAO and CFO) instead of the usual 3- which on occasions affected the efficiency in implementation - showing that on most occasions one or both of them are out of office on other duties.

- Records show that in a number of instances there were delays in the implementation of project activities. Most of the releases were 3 months behind planned schedule based on the work plans). The delays were attributed to 3 factors: i) the bureaucracy within the UNDP system; ii) delays in confirmation from the OPM; and, iii) on occasions the absence of one of the signatories at the district level.
- In Kotido district, it is also perceived by local government officials that the UNDP work appeared to have been implemented ‘independently’ as project work plans were not integrated into the district work plans (a situation for which local government bears some responsibility).
- As in other districts, it was suggested that unclear reporting modalities also affected program implementation and it was observed that coordinators were often faced with dilemma of allegiance. While administratively the coordinator was answerable to the CAO of the districts, he was required to prepare parallel reports and briefs to the RDC who is rightfully in charge of the district security (and chairing the district security committee meetings). The LCV chairperson, heading the District Peace Committee represented an additional reporting line (the other 2 reporting chains being to the UNV office and UNDP). While, the reporting in districts would not create problems with the normal working relations between the leadership, Kotido presented a unique case contravening the norm.
- The evaluation team was not in a position to consult neither the CAO nor the ACAO who were both out of the district at the time of the evaluation exercise. This further underscores the previous observations that the current focal person within local government charged with managing the program (replacing the UNV Coordinator) may not be the best options since he appears to be extremely busy with other government work.
- As the number of supported income generation groups increases, the work load for monitoring the groups increases and would demand an almost daily follow up by the coordinator with little involvement by other District officials.

### ***District level Outputs***

*Capacity of Local governments, CSOs strengthened for peace initiatives and district supported to undertake activities promoting confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation*

Neither conflict mapping and analysis to identify CSOs engaged in peace building, nor the establishment of a baseline for the district to target interventions on the basis of evidence, was carried out. This failure to implement the programme as designed makes any evaluation of the impact of programming extremely difficult.

### ***Peace Meetings***

Although no formal preliminary conflict analysis was carried out, there were attempts to identify the sources of conflict from both current and a historical perspective at every meeting reviewed by the evaluation team. Over 10 peace meetings, both inter ethnic and cross border, were organized in Kotido since the inception of the project in 2008. Records from 2008 to 2009

showed continued inter-clan meetings being held between Jie and Matheniko , Jie and Ethur, inter district meetings were held between the Jie of Kotido and Dodoth of Kaabong, and related ethnic groups from Kitgum, Pader and Bokora. UNDP also reportedly supported peace cross border activities between Kotido district authorities and the Turkana leadership in Kenya.

The various meetings involved participants including elders, Kraal leaders, and communities themselves. In others, higher level representation of the district leadership, security officials including the Police, UPDF and DISO officers as well as parliamentarians from surrounding districts was visible. At these meetings ‘peace’ was often agreed and ‘agreed’ resolutions aimed towards reconciliation and the sharing of resources like water and pasture. Some of the resolutions were effective at improving relations on the ground for short periods, but longer term peace and security has been elusive.

An oft cited example was a meeting between the Jie and Dodoth, which resulted in collective grazing arrangements in common border pastures and youth exchanges between communities. This reduced raids between the 2 ethnic groups for a short while (weeks or months) until the clans resumed open conflict with revenge attacks being carried out against each other. An apparently unusual case of child abduction (of a female youth) was recorded recently- even immediately after parties commitment to each other to respect human rights of women, men and youth. The abducted girl youth, although successfully rescued, was returned with traumatic memories said to have affected her mental health.

Overall, ‘peace agreements’ reached in UNDP sponsored peace meetings seemed to be tactical and short term in nature. Follow up resources to address the root causes of conflict and monitoring mechanisms were lacking in the programme design. While well intentioned, these meetings have not reduced conflict in a significant way and it is not easy to measure their impact, if any. As with many activities, they may be necessary but not sufficient to tip the balance in favour of peaceful coexistence. As likely, however, a more systematic and deeper process is required- which incorporated conflict analysis and joint project design and funding in order to focus communities on developing mutual gains and common interests. Within Kotido, other INGOs are planning a more systematic approach (Mercy Corps in particular- having a dedicated project staff of 25 focused on conflict sensitive and peace building programming), involving the creation and ongoing support of local peace committees, the targeted involvement of armed youth leaders and the establishment and support of joint monitoring mechanisms. While new, these efforts provide an opportunity to give relevance to District Government Peace Committees and, through them, to link with regional mechanisms such as CEWARN, if improved.

These NGO efforts- while requiring further testing in order to assess their long term impact- represent the most sophisticated and deliberate peace building practice in the area. These efforts could perhaps be complemented by strengthening the District Government’s Peace Committees’ ability to make use of the lower level structures as functional and integrated peace building architecture, linking formal and informal actors in a sustained way. In comparison, UNDP’s ‘peace building’ efforts thus far seem ad hoc, lacking in depth and unsustainable- without linkages to programme funding and joint project and without targeting the perpetrators of violence and potential spoilers, with the possible exception of cross-border meetings between



authorities in Kenya and Uganda and integrated programming evidenced in Abim district. According to Local Government and security actors, this meeting provide an opportunity for engagement between security officials on cross-border security coordination (as opposed to grassroots-level ‘peace building’ necessarily).

### ***Labour based Projects***

No labour based projects have been implemented in the district to date, although all seem to be in the planning phase with delays attributed to inadequate technical expertise and contracting issues. As in all other districts, the labour-based projects (potentially including community assets and infrastructure including roads, dams and water points) were perceived as strong potential entry points for practical impacts in peace and reconciliation- as these projects could speculatively create ‘shared public goods and interests’, by enhancing physical integration, bonding & continued co-existence. These projects should deliberately promote a sharing of responsibility for and management of scarce resources between conflicting communities. The program in Kotido had planned to de-silt Nawokopal, Adoko, Langor, Kalongorok and Kaputh dams; to construct Kamoni dam, Kadurum dam and Kacheri-Langorn road; to maintain Ligoth –Layoro road; and, to rehabilitate Kacheri –Lobalangit road. These interventions were located throughout the 6 sub-counties of the district.

A substantial amount of time was spent in preliminaries including ‘preparing’ communities to identify these sites and own them, as well as facilitating transport of both LG officials and district leadership to the sites. Similarly, bids for works were called for, contractors’ submissions received and meetings held at various levels (all of which cost enormous amount of resources in terms on funds and time). Failure to implement even technically simple processes like manual desilting (which in view of this report should have been done after all necessary steps were taken-including sharing experience from Oxfam who had already implemented such activities), undermined project credibility, efficiency and effectiveness.

The expectations of the communities and the district officials were raised and then after a failure to implement in a timely manner, eroded- as a result of which the project has a task to re-build confidence and garner support amongst potential beneficiaries. Current plans by WFP, as the project implementing partner, seem focused on machine-based approaches- which may further erode confidence in the project, considering the commitments and expectations of employment created during mobilization. This raises the question of cost effectiveness and impact. According to WFP estimates, with labour alone it will cost 27,000,000 Ushs to construct each kilometre of road. With machinery alone, a kilometre costs 11,000,000 to construct. When considered against the cost, it may be more important to ensure that roads are extended further in order to allow for improved service delivery, than to ensure that money goes into people’s pockets through labour based approaches (at least as far as road construction is concerned). According to local government actors, the primary projected benefit of the road construction would be to assist resettlement and to allow for access, and hence protection, by security forces to resettling populations.

### ***Empowering district leaders***

Records showed that 36 district LG officials were trained in M&E and imparted with knowledge on the use of M&E tools and their significance in monitoring government programs in the district. The team was not able to evaluate the effectiveness of this one day training. It was, however, observed that there is no indication that the training translated into any increased and /or practical activities specifically related to UNDP/OPM programming- as monitoring of ongoing activities seemed to have been left solely to the UNDP Coordinator. The district officials mainly participated in preliminary visits to the sites that were identified for road and dam construction or dam de-silting (which has yet to take place and cannot, therefore, be monitored).

### ***Districts leadership***

Local governments continue to allege that the UNDP projects were implemented in isolation and without their inputs, in spite of the fact that Districts were involved in the development of the project annual work plans. The evaluation team found valid the critique that project work-plans were not integrated into the district work plans. However the TORs for engagement of the UNV coordinators were clear and had provision for reporting lines through the CAO. We therefore apportion the blame of weak quality assurance to both government and UNDP/OPM. There may not have been adequate administrative ownership of the project simply because of a lack of concrete guidelines on what the district was expected to do.

Information also shows that the district leadership were involved in the annual planning for the project at the headquarters level. For some district leadership, supporting peace initiatives takes priority, in spite of the seemingly limited impact of peace meetings. The district leadership also requested increased support for resettlement of people in the green belt areas, as government programs are opening land for their agriculture cultivation there. It was also believed that engaging the communities in agriculture activities would reduce the number of previously predominant livestock-related crimes.

The leadership also acknowledged that collective monitoring was weak and there was need for a 'holistic approach between partners'- meaning perhaps improved project management systems and a rationalized chain of reporting and command.

### ***Security and peace***

The RDC and DISO's office hold the responsibility for security on behalf of the central government. They observed that project outcomes related to peace are often short lived, and may sometimes appear insignificant in spite of the many inputs by various peace actors. This was attributed to the fact that activities were not regular, not sustained and sometimes not fully inclusive. Noted specifically was the inadequate engagement of the Karachunas (armed 'youth'/warriors'), in spite of the fact that they are among the primary perpetrators of violence and other criminal activity. They however attest that UNDP activities have led to a reduction of raids and thefts. Without a baseline assessment this claim is difficult to substantiate.

*“I used to be good at shooting vehicles, but since I have tasted the fruit of the project, I have even converted five other male members to join.”*

Former armed youth group member. Kotido

The District Security Officer identified the following priority areas for potential support through any follow-up in the JLOS area: 1) logistical and fuel support; 2) Juvenile remand facilities; 3) construction of male and female cells in prisons; 4) expansion of ‘Community Policing’; solutions to problems of water and transport for prisoners. The DISO further requested support for sub-county peace committees. Both the LC5 and DISO suggested that the UNDP project design was sound but that it needed to focus on identifying projects that could bind communities together with a common purpose, to unit people with a ‘common good’.

### ***Other UN agencies and peace actors***

The evaluation team also met with Mercy Cops, Oxfam and WFP in Kotido.

Discussions with these groups revealed the following perceptions:

- That government requires further training, support and human resources capacity to monitor programs in addition to being overloaded by the various actors’ demands.
- The actors themselves are not coordinated. They have different priorities and therefore seem unwilling to undertake collective planning even where it is very obvious that they would have maximized resources- and possibly improved equitable distribution of resources between and within communities and sub counties. Issues of attribution and visibility seem to dictate this behaviour.
- Oxfam as an example was one of the partners that had successfully implemented some activities similar to those that UNDP had planned (and still plans to engage communities in). Oxfam’s programmes included labour based projects, peace dialogues, cultural galas, development initiatives targeting the disarmed youth and IGAs for women groups and plans to experiment with community mobilization through mobile ‘peace van’ approaches. Oxfam’s past work offers a good opportunity for UNDP to compare lessons learned and best practices in advance of the design of future programming.
- WFP, as an implementing partner for UNDP ‘labour-intensive’ activities, was in the final stages of embarking on road construction in Panyangara sub-county. They cited the following challenges to have affected effective implementation: i) weak technical capacity within the district structures which are charged as custodians of the contracting and supervision processes, ii) bureaucratic processes of bringing partners together , iii) decision dilemmas related to whether to actually prioritize labour-based approaches against project efficiency- (effective having concluded that predominantly labour based approaches are not cost-effective, but may be effective from ownership and income generation basis), v) in the absence of the machinery needed for the initial demarcation of the road- and in a perhaps unorthodox move for a UN agency- a UPDF tank was employed to ‘clear’ the route, in spite of the prohibitively costly fuel consumption and optics of such an initiative.
- Mercy Corps’ approach (while still new to Karamoja) to community-level peacebuilding is conceptually more sophisticated, is based on experiences in northern Uganda, is likely

more sustainable and is better resourced than UNDPs. However, UNDP's responsiveness to and direct support for local government initiatives does place it in a unique position. In many cases, Local Government and law enforcement suggested that UNDP provision of fuel for rapid response to crises was as important as 'peacebuilding' in the classic sense of direct engagement in conflict management or mediation.

*Districts Local Government supported to empower women to positively contribute to peace building and conflict resolution*

Through the UNDP/OPM programme, Kotido local government supported ten income generating activity (IGA) groups of various stakeholders, including women, men, disarmed youth and persons living with HIV. Equitable geographic distribution was evident, with a group being supported in each county including the town council. The groups were given training and start-up funding of Ushs 2M for VSLAs, and also received support for one or two other income generation activities. Of the groups visited, Mogos Women Group in Nakapelimoru, Aporu group in Panyangara, Kotido Positive Living Association (KOPLA) in city council, Rom Rom Youth group in Kotido and Losilang group in Kotido, most of them were trained to manage savings and micro credit loans, VSLAs and had also benefitted from other income generating activities (primarily grinding mills and cereal banking).

*Question: "What is the relationship between the project and peace?"*

*Answer: "When we didn't have money, everyone thought to steal- even from their neighbours. Now everyone has something."*

*Question: "What is the biggest obstacle to peace and security in the area?"*

*Answer: "Hunger and harsh conditions, ignorance, jealousy and high bride price. This project will completely rubbish the idea of raiding when the money is there."*

The evaluation team visited and held discussions with a number of the groups and the overall view was that they had selected the activities according to their perceived priorities. They had good knowledge of the principles and best practices on savings and loan management. From the 2 million Ushs given to each group by UNDP for the VSLAs, a number of them had accumulated savings varying between 5 to 10 M- which should be highlighted as good practice. The money was being loaned to group members and there was evidence of satisfaction, ownership and even changes in livelihoods as many attested to using loans for meeting domestic needs including food, medical needs and education for self and their children.

### Quick appraisal of IGA groups' status

Name	Members F/M	Support	Ave Income for IGA individual business	Cumulative groups assets	Other remarks
KOPLA	40 (29/11)	Ushs 2,000,000 40 sorghum	20,000	Ushs 1,930,000 50 bags	Not focused Less team work
Magos	20	Ushs 2,000,000 Grinding mill	20,000	Ushs 2,000,000	Focused Has value on peace

Name	Members F/M	Support	Ave Income for IGA individual business	Cumulative groups assets	Other remarks
					outcomes
Aporu	36 (31/5)	Ushs 2,000,000 Grinding mill (incomplete )	30,000	Ushs 4,800,000	High investment in milling house Cohesive
Napumpum	25 (2/23)	Ushs 2,000,000 40 bags cereal Livestock trading	50,000	Ushs 10,000,000	Good record management Focused
Rom Rom	52 (24/28)	Ushs 2,000,000 40 bags cereals Grinding mill (incomplete)		Ushs 7,600,000	Focused High number soon un manageable
Kotido disarmed youth	25 (0/25)	Car wash machine Compressor	Ush 30,000 /day (group)	Information not got	Group dynamics lacking Not focused

The strong elements of sustainability and ownership were reflected in the IGA groups, as most groups had contributed to the cost of building materials and their own labour in the construction of the grinding mill houses.



*Highly motivated project beneficiaries celebrate in front of their newly constructed grinding mill storage shed in Kotido. Members contributed labour and local materials to this construction.*

This sense of ownership was not observed during consultations with the two town-based groups. The Kotido Disarmed Youth Association (which received a compressor machine for mending tyres and a jet car washing machine) did not exhibit the same seriousness, in spite of their project having potential for financial viability. In the opinion of the evaluators, this group still requires guidance and close supervision. Perhaps significantly, this project only seemed to employ 1 or two group members on a daily basis in direct labour. Other members simply benefit indirectly with a share of profits, resulting perhaps in less group cohesion and individual sense of

ownership (most group members have other jobs and do not actually work collectively in large numbers on a day to day basis).

The other town based group (KOPLA) also failed to exhibit obvious team work and did not show obvious cohesiveness. While it is understandable that the challenges facing its members are more acute than those of the general population (with members still facing significant stigmatization in Kotido as a result of their positive and public HIV status by association), the group activities and decision making, on the basis of our short meeting, also seemed to be driven by the chairperson of the group, with rather timid input from the rest of group members.

### **Observations and Conclusions: Kotido District**

The failure by project staff and local government to carry out conflict assessments and baseline information gathering presents a challenge for evaluation of the project as it is difficult to measure the overall impact or identify trends and attribute these to project activities.

For the balance of the project duration, activities carried out in Kotido were primarily ‘peacebuilding’ related or preparatory in nature, with a shift in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 towards income generating activities targeting vulnerable groups. These income generating activities, based on beneficiaries testimony and financial successes, seem to have had a positive impact on diversifying livelihood options and life choices for formerly armed warriors even during this short period. As such, they represent the single greatest contribution of the project towards improving security in the district- and ultimately towards the overall programme objectives.

For the balance of the life of the project, therefore, only partial implementation of the project was taking place. Suspension of UNV Coordinators’ contracts at the end of 2009 and the withdrawal of project assets (vehicles), from Districts has also made ongoing monitoring of activities challenging for recently appointed local government ‘focal points’.

To the district leadership of Kotido, UNDP activities are perceived as relevant- with various parties identifying ‘relevance’ according to their own priorities. While the district leadership greatly appreciates the role and support of UNDP towards peace activities (mainly by availing resources to the district whenever there is urgent need), the communities themselves viewed income generating activities as the principal impacts and benefits from UNDP support. The security forces equally appreciate UNDP activities for the contribution towards peace initiatives, but often identified logistical support (mainly fuel) as their priority over actual peace meetings. It was often mentioned that UNDP should continue ‘peace activities’, but on a smaller scale, with emphasis on material support to Local Government or security organs on the one hand and income generating activities on the other, as priorities.

There is some evidence that the peace meetings contributed to a short-term reduction in violence and associated human rights abuses. It is recorded that immediately after such meetings, raids between Dodoth of Kaabong and Jie of Kotido subsided and the youth groups were able to share kraals and stay together peacefully for a short period before spoiling incidents would lead to an unravelling of progress and a general resumption of hostile relations. During the evaluation mission, raiding between these communities was ongoing- reportedly resulting in

the death of some 40 people. It was observed that peace initiatives are initiated but have not had adequate follow up and have not strengthened either local government or community-level structures for conflict management- and hence their sustainability is negligible.

Labour-based approaches to improving or creating common public assets and infrastructure may have potential for sustainability if they deliberately attempt to bring communities together, fostering long-term shared interests in peace. This, more than the short-term income generated for individuals, is their greatest potential impact. From the perspective of the Local Government and security organs, improved roads allow for quicker reactions by Police and military personnel to security incidents or interdiction of raiders- which will perhaps bolster community confidence in such formal security institutions (and reducing the legitimacy of and need for community driven security responses through self-defence forces/armed civilians).

That communities have been involved from the beginning in identifying labour-based activities increases the likelihood that appropriate and priority projects are identified. However it is not known whether the proposed projects will deliberately build relations between conflicting communities and create common interests in peaceful coexistence. To date, the team could not assess any such impact- positive or negative- as the 'labour-based' projects have not yet been implemented in Kotido district.

There is an overwhelming view, from the vast majority of the persons consulted and identified in the various reports, that in order to have the greatest possible impact on local conflict dynamics, UNDP funding and activities should focus more resources on the tangible and measurable income generation activities and less on peace dialogues. This view is not as strongly held by the district leadership, who believe that peace dialogues continue to play an important role in working towards security, stability and sustainable development in the region. This may be because they have inadequate funding to these activities, because these meetings present opportunities for politicians to visit and mobilize communities, or because they may be a 'necessary but not sufficient' contributing factor towards the overall goals of achieving security and good governance.

Sustainability for the various IGA projects on the other hand will differ according to the nature of the project, the composition of the groups themselves, and the mode of implementation by the groups. Overall, to date, these income generating activities have been extremely popular with communities, have demonstrated tangible financial benefits for members, and have provided a positive example for others that alternatives to raiding as a livelihood option are viable and profitable (with considerably less personal risk). If sustained, bolstered with additional activities and expanded in number and geographic focus there exists an opportunity to contribute in a significant way towards improving security by creating a vested interest in peace amongst an increasing proportion of the population- and hence potentially exerting increased social pressure on spoilers.

Possibly the objectives were overly ambitious and the project did not take account of adequate risks and assumptions of implementation at the design stage. As well as having been hampered by implementation inefficiencies, monitoring structures were grossly lacking, were not standardized between districts and were to a great extent responsible for having failed to track

and report financial and other implementation anomalies- which subsequently failed to alert project management when the implementation was running off track.

While the activities and budget expenses focused towards direct peace building activities like peace meetings and facilitating dialogues, poverty remains the highest threat to peace in the region. As long as the disarmed groups and the women have no food on their plates, the threshold to resort to fighting and raiding activities will remain low, a factor exacerbated by a lack of alternative sources of livelihood. It is however, highly likely that the practical activities carried out and outputs achieved through the project thus far will contribute towards creating sustainable peace in the region.

### **Recommendations:**

- UNDP human resources in the region are inadequate (in both technical/thematic and management/monitoring terms) in consideration of the scope of work, nature of projects and geographical coverage. There is need to expand the human resource allocated as soon as possible, once broader management arrangements are rationalized.
- Project planning and management structures need to be rationalized and agreed between UNDP, OPM and Local Governments to reduce the workload for District-level staff.
- Implementation modalities must be designed so as to reduce opportunities for corrupt practices.
- The peace initiatives do not yield measurable or lasting results and impacts even if almost 50% of the budget is spent on peace dialogues and activities. This ratio in the budget needs to be changed.
- Increased targeting of the Karachunas for peace meetings and convincing women to desist from encouraging youth into cattle raiding activities must be prioritized over generalized peace meetings.
- IGA related programming should be more strategic- creating incentive mechanisms for current participants to attract further armed youth candidates (i.e. groups that successfully recruit new (dis)armed youth members or sponsor the creation of new IGA groups are eligible for additional support). In this way, expansion of programming is encouraged and deliberately contributes towards drawing the most at risk individuals into programming.
- In some areas, apparently smaller roads that are not yet ranked as top priorities for district LGs work-plans remain significant sources of insecurity.
- Ensure that focal persons are not overburdened (many seem to have multiple portfolios) and are able to play the clearly stipulated roles and responsibilities delegated by the CAO, including by regularly updating and informing council and different district fora on the project implementation status, including work plans and budgets.
- Interventions addressing cross-border issues with the Kenyan administration, security organs and Turkana are a step in the right direction and need to be continued and strengthened.
- Security roads and common markets remain high on the priority list and should be implemented as previously planned since it is still held that they will create incentives for communities to come together in sharing of resources and learning to tolerate each other as well as improving security .



- Inadequate facilitation of law enforcers in terms of transport, handling juveniles, overloaded judiciary leading to heavy case backlog and vastness of the region since one magistrate is in charge of both Kaabong and Kotido were seen as pertinent to security. Provide support to improve the effectiveness of the judiciary and corrections.

### 2.3 ABIM district

**Program Management:** Programme management in Abim should be considered as a ‘worst practice’.

*“Somebody will sleep at the Police station...”*

**Abim District Internal Security Officer**

#### *Strengthening Peace and Development for Karamoja*

Both conflict mapping and analysis to identify CSOs engaged in peace building and survey work to establish a baseline for targeting programming and for future evaluation of project impacts was not carried out. As a result, it is difficult to assess the overall impact of the project on peace and security in Abim and Karamoja generally, in spite of some declared positive household-level impacts.

Logistical and materials support to the Abim office including stationery, logistics and facilitation of coordinator, were duly provided as required. Records showed that the funds for running the office seemed to have been available, and, according to bank statements, were drawn in a timely manner from the bank. Abim records show that funds for stationery, office newspaper and publications, fuel, vehicle maintenance and logistical facilities like generator and office equipment were all available. The coordinator and drivers were recruited as per requirements and set guidelines.

For 2 years however the district did not avail office space to the UNDP coordination office- one possible result of which is that files and records were kept in the personal residence of the coordinator. The result was that most of the day to day project records were not available to the office, making information sharing difficult even to the regional project manager. Other project records of 2008 however contradict this, where it was reported that office space had been availed to the project<sup>6</sup>.

Whereas the evaluation team was able to access the documents through non conventional channels (tracking down a former roommate of the project coordinator, who left his post in December 2009), it was observed as a gross anomaly for the coordinator not to have handed over project documents either to the regional office or the CAO’s office or his immediate supervisors, instead abandoning them at his former residence. While this is a sign of irresponsibility by the officer, it also reflects a weakness that existed in the supervision and management of the project.

There was a disconnect between the CAOs office and the program implementation in spite of the program design (and Coordinator’s ToR) mandating the Coordinator to report to the CAO. During the first effective year of implementation, reporting was adequate and satisfactory and

<sup>6</sup> Activity progress report April 2008

the records allow easy and clear follow up of the events and project activities. This was however not the case in the second year of implementing, prompting a question of what changed to trigger this change in procedure. Speculatively, lax procedure, violation of UNV regulation and the unsupervised opportunity for the coordinator to undertake direct local procurement of goods and services opened the opportunity for illegal practices to take place.

Overall, there seems to have been a lack of management and oversight of the national UNV Project Coordinator in Abim. The induction training provided to UNVs seems to have been inadequate and UNVs were not provided with procedural materials and model/standardized report templates. Beyond this, procedural, chain of command and reporting guidelines seem to have been blurry. Documentation available in Abim suggests that the UNV Project Coordinator was able to travel to withdraw large sums of cash money and to retain it in his personal possession without being required to report on these funds. If local government did not require such accounting, the project certainly should have, implicating both in the unaccounted for project funds.

Local Government actors and potential beneficiaries complained that project components agreed locally and approved through quarterly workplans, were declined at Kampala-level for what were locally seen as arbitrary or uninformed reasons. A youth-focused fish farming project (the only project specifically focused on at-risk youth), for example, was vetoed by UNDP officials in Kampala because they did not believe it would be sustainable or viable in Abim (in contradiction to locally held views).

Currently, the assistant CAOs who are acting as selected focal persons to manage the programs, have little knowledge of the program and are only being introduced to the beneficiary communities. Although this is a temporary measure, all efforts must be made to streamline this operation as supervisors should not implement.

### **District level Outputs**

*Capacity of Local governments and CSOs strengthened for peace initiatives and district supported to undertake activities promoting confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation*

While there were no regular capacity development activities targeting the local government officials, some community representatives were facilitated to attend peace meetings between communities and districts. According to a Parish Councillor, Obonyo Kalisto Paco Paco of Lotuke Sub County, the training carried out and the follow-up activities at the communities brought youth, women and elders from as far as Pader, Lira and Abim districts together. Accordingly, Akech Catherine, the Chairperson of Penwir women Group, Awach, Lotuke and her members further attested that the training always involved women and was very useful as it addressed real peace issues and resulted into communities from neighbouring attending each others' markets. There were other views that the training were not as effective and efficient as they could have been due to poor representation as representatives were asked to pre-fund transport which therefore favoured the better facilitated to attend.

### ***Peace building***

Project implementation records showed that a series of consultative peace meetings up to 10 in number were held in sequence to address peace and conflict concerning the neighbouring Jie and Bokora who were the main perpetrators of myriad conflicts for Abim. The activities mainly took

place in 2008. At the meetings held at different places like Abuk, Akado, Nyakwae and Alerek, participants were men and women from sub counties, of Abim, LCIII chairmen, RDC, DPC, CDOs, COs SCAOs and parish chiefs were among the groups often in attendance. Cross border meetings between Lira and Abim are also recorded to have taken place at Rwoth Nyachii offices in Abim between people of Lango and Abwor . Other meetings were held in Nakapiririt.

The meetings were facilitated by UNDP. Whereas there was evidence of the meetings having been held, with equally evidence of having facilitated the communities to identify what they need and make resolutions on the way forward, there were no records showing that the project followed up to link activities to outcome of peace arising from the documented resolutions. The team can neither therefore conclusively attribute the very tenuous existing peace and security to the UNDP funded activities nor even conclude that the objectives were effectively achieved.

While some male and female participants had undergone training in peace building and had also participated in peace meetings, the impact of these peace meetings was mixed in terms of their ultimate impact of improving security. In the western areas of Abim, bordering Pader district, communities stated that peace dialogues with their neighbours had allowed for improved relations, as well as an expansion of trade and joint markets and general interaction.

At the same time that participants said that they benefitted from peace trainings (that, “allowed neighbours to come and trade freely”) they also said that violence from raiders who were, “shooting people in their gardens” continued and posed the greatest threat to their security. When asked what the priority intervention would be to reduce this violence, both male and female respondents suggested that an increase in the number of paramilitaries (currently trained, fed and armed by the UPDF in Abim) as well as the establishment of new police or army garrisons- closer to existing and new settlements- would be the preferred interventions.

*Districts Local Government supported to empower women to positively contribute to peace building and conflict resolution*

The women that were visited in Abim confirmed that they were always well represented and participated effectively in the peace building structures at community level. In addition they were facilitated with IGAs which included (VSLAs), goat rearing projects and in some sale of produce. On a positive note, the women collectively echoed appreciation for the support underscoring the social and economic benefits accruing from the projects. Particularly noted, were positive attributes of ownership, and change of attitude as key outcomes from this part of the project as the women clung to the goats as their own wealth possessions. The goats being contributed by women to the households brought reconciliation, peace and better understanding within the homes according to both male and female participants.

As a result of the new household asset and demonstrated income generating potential through VSL groups, the men learnt to respect their women and it was agreed that there was more peace in the homes where the goats were. The placement of the goat under the ownership of the women also curbed the male dominated practices of selling property (often to buy alcohol). The

reconciliation brought by goats was evidenced by some men who attended the meetings on behalf of their wives who were unavailable because of household tasks at the time of meeting.

*Empowering women to positively contribute to peace building*

***“This project is trying to remove poverty from us. We will hold onto this group.”***

**Awach Women’s Group, Abim**

The project targeted 420 women for support through income generating activities, through sale of produce, livestock projects and some use of ox-ploughs to alleviate the burden and facilitate crop agriculture. The projects were variously implemented and in some outputs were clear although the evaluation uncovered numerous cases of malpractice by the coordinator and local trainer/mobilisers hired through the project. The anomalies hampered the overall visibility of the empowerment program and its effectiveness. Some of the findings to this effect are:

1. Not all the targeted groups received the start up projects and are still waiting with anxiety in spite of having been promised goats or other support. Others, where the project took off and they received goats, although evidently very appreciative, were promised much more than they received (for example, one group were apparently promised 3 goats each in writing, of which they received only one goat each).
2. The records show that although project funds (Ushs 31.2 m in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2009) were withdrawn to support at least 14 projects (12 goats rearing and VSL groups and 2 produce sales and VSL groups), only 7 (6 goat and 1 produce groups) received the IG project material support- of which half of the money for supplying goods was paid to contractors. Only 180 of the 360 goats were actually procured and delivered and the balance of funds withdrawn is unaccounted for. Goats were procured at a value of 70,000 Ushs (the project budget was at 75,000 Ushs per goat). Beyond the other instanced of suspected embezzlement, and since it does not appear, based on the available records, that any funds were returned or in any way accounted for, we can also assume that the balance was retained by the Coordinator.
3. There exists cases of extortion bordering on fraud in which money was extorted from the groups as a contribution towards the VSCL boxes and record books some of which may total to Ushs 300,000 /= per group and yet the items are budgeted for and paid for by the project. In some cases, record keeping books were simply not given to groups. In another case, participants were each charged Ushs 1000 for the record books and 2000 Ushs for the record boxes (both covered by project costs). In some groups, money was extorted as a precondition for benefitting from UNDP programming. To add insult to injury, in at least one case, even after community trainers extorted funds from vulnerable women’s groups in order to be considered as beneficiaries, the goats were still never supplied.
4. There were also anomalies of direct procurement contravening the local government contract procedures which went on unsupervised in spite of the fact that the procedures were endorsed by the CAOs Office.

5. In the above cases mentioned in 3 and 4, there are neither records nor reports showing how the money was spent. Of the Ushs 31.2 withdrawn by the UNV Coordinator, only 6 million can easily be accounted for, itself representing only partial payment for a contract with suppliers. The UNV Coordinator reportedly misled the contractor that the balance of payments owing (more than 6 million Ushs) for 180 goats would be made directly to the contractor by UNDP/OPM in Kampala. In fact, a total of Ushs44, 898,000 was withdrawn by the UNDP Coordinator from the project account during July 2009 (the bulk of funds against the quarterly workplan) with the authorization of the CAO. Very little of this money can verifiably be accounted for using the documents recovered by the consulting team. A further audit is required.
6. Other anomalies exist in purchase of oxen being referenced in the work plan and delivering animals to groups that were not officially enlisted. No record could be found describing the planning underlying or the selection process to identify recipient groups for oxen. The consultants were also not able to determine a) how many oxen were in fact purchase; b) how much the oxen actually cost; c) where oxen had been distributed. The consultants only learned that oxen had been distributed at all as one elder complained that one of his oxen had died.
7. The women groups were not trained in husbandry practices on rearing the goats before prior to being introduced to the project.
8. While the women have managed the goat projects well, there records show mortalities of 10 -20 % of the purchased goats, possibly due to pneumonias and stress shortly after arrival. The women strongly attributed this to poor transport facilities as they reported that goats were over-packed and injured in the delivery vehicles. In the supplier's contracts, however, there was a clause holding the supplier responsible for such delivery associated accidents.
9. Peace building training was also provided to come groups and not to others. No planning documents or reports explaining the logic behind training and beneficiary selection and distribution could be found.
10. On a positive note, there was evidence that the trainings- especially in the area of village savings and loans (VSL) were effective. The women not only exhibited satisfactory knowledge of the management and benefits of VSL but were also already practicing and utilizing their savings and credit schemes. 'Kaleme', 'Kucbere', 'Penywii', 'Aremo' and 'Mon Tem Gum' women groups attested to this, with varying levels of success through savings. Evidence included the fact that groups had started their VSL groups without an initial contribution from UNDP (as had happened in some other districts, with initial cash contributions from UNDP of up to 2 million Ushs) and by the time of the evaluation some had saved up to 2 -3 mi Ushs on the basis of a 5000 Ushs contribution from each member. They also adhered to their internal guidelines and sanctions for managing their small savings and credits.
11. Participants stated that they were both re-investing in the group while at the same time using dividends and profits from their loans to pay school fees or medical expenses and to increase their household food security. One group, who had received VSL support but not goats (as promised), had still managed to save 3,000,000 based on their own initial contribution of 150,000 Ushs. These women remained enthusiastic and claimed, "if we get goats, in two years we will be at another 'level'" [in a much better situation financially speaking].

*Development interventions undertaken to promote peace and development:*

### ***Labour based activities***

The plan for labour based projects had been appreciated during the period of preliminary mobilization and anticipated with a lot of enthusiasm. The project had planned to build the Kakomongole –Nabilatuk road as a way of bringing the 2 communities of Pain and Bokora together but this was not achieved, neither was there any construction of the dams of Morulem, Nyakwae and Abim as was planned. Failure to implement the projects was demoralizing to the communities and UNDP has to start afresh to sensitize the communities and assure them that the commitments would be met during upcoming programming.

UNDP has recently concluded a contract with the World Food Programme to complete the labour-based projects. Based on meeting with WFP in Abim, it is likely that road construction will primarily be carried out by machine with an as yet to be determined component involving local labour (perhaps digging out and installing culverts for example). It was unclear at the time of writing this report what ratio of the overall budget would go towards local labour- and hence, how much of the budget would be affecting local livelihoods. Beyond that, it was generally believed that the new road would contribute towards security in the district and foster improved relationships with neighbouring areas.

### ***Security***

While a Civil Military Relations unit exists in Abim, it seemed to be closed during our visit. A meeting with the UPDF commander in charge of the district confirmed that the CIMC center was not open. The UPDF also confirmed that they had trained three batches of paramilitaries and considered that Abim was a district where paramilitary structures could safely be supported since the local population was not considered to be actively involved in offensive raiding. The UPDF commander did not report any incidents involving abuses by paramilitaries (although one was recently shot, killed and stripped of his weapon by unknown assailants, while returning from training).

A Police officer was similarly killed and stripped of his weapon on the 15<sup>th</sup> of April. The commander referred to the development of Community policing as a joint activity between the UPDF, Police and communities and looked forward to an expansion of the programme. The District Police Commissioner confirmed the establishment of paramilitaries and community policing programmes. He was enthusiastic about the prospect of increased support for rule of law and justice programming in future UNDP programming, indicating that there were plans both to increase the number of Police in the district and to establish new Police posts.

Our conclusion was that the UNDP activities were and remained highly relevant to the communities as a means to improve livelihoods and could theoretically contribute toward achieving the targeted project objectives of encouraging peace and security. Overall, this type of limited programming should be considered as necessary but not sufficient to dramatically alter

local security dynamics, while it is definitely a step in the right direction and a huge encouragement to participants and local observers alike. When asked directly how these types of programming could contribute towards peace, respondents offered that any reduction in poverty in the home would make crime and violence less attractive as a livelihood option, with one group member simply stating, “Poverty makes people to steal and fight”.

Possibly the objectives were overly ambitious and the project design did not take sufficient account risks and assumptions at the design stage. Beyond this, the project implementation was hampered by implementation inefficiencies and possibly corrupt practices by project staff. Monitoring structures were grossly lacking and were to a great extent responsible for having failed to track and report financial and other implementation anomalies which subsequently failed to warn when the implementation was running off track.

### **Observations and Conclusions : Abim District :**

Support for peace building activities and income generation and livelihoods have demonstrated tangible benefits for participants. While it is agreed that the program theory and concept was fairly well articulated and clear, development objectives were neither achieved at district level nor in sum total. Outputs leading to the expected outcomes were achieved in isolation (a small number of beneficiaries have benefitted and state clearly that they are happy with the project) but do not effectively contribute to the expected overall outcomes of the project in any verifiable way. Capacity building and Labour based programming has not been significant to date and cross-border activities have been limited (although successful).

Small scale successes can easily be identified, but they cannot be justified against an overall budget which should have contributed significantly more to improvements in attitudes towards development and conflict. Seeming misuse of project funds, including evidence of extortion, coercion, threats against beneficiaries as well as, possibly, outright theft of project funds may go some way to explain the positive, although limited impact of programming in Abim.

### **Recommendations:**

1. A forensic audit and potentially a criminal investigation should take place, to establish what has been done with unreported project funds.
2. Ensure that existing commitments (to provide 8 trained groups with goats for example) are fulfilled. Previously supported groups have shown good progress (savings and entrepreneurial skills) and enthusiasm. They have also clearly articulated the relationship between improved livelihoods and improved security.
3. It was recommended that more security required related roads be opened up and supported under the labour-based programs.
4. Reduce, but do not entirely eliminate, peace building training and peace meeting support related activities. Perhaps leave a small amount of funds to follow up on past cross-district processes and to support rapid reaction interventions by law enforcement and Local Government agents. Focus any further peace building on engaging directly with armed youth, using formerly armed youth as ambassadors for peace and development-with adequate resources set aside to target youth surrendering weapons with development assistance
5. While peace and reconciliation is a slow process and cannot be achieved overnight, there is need to ensure that activities that are initiated are followed up to ensure that tangible outcomes are recorded.

6. Focus more resources on formerly armed youth-related programming.
7. Where UNDP projects did not have clear monitoring frameworks embedded in the design and this must be made a requirement for all future programs

## **2.4 KAABONG district**

Kaabong is the largest district in the project area, composed of the 9 sub counties of Kaabong, namely: Kalapata, Kapedo, Kaabong, Kabong TC, Karenga, Kathile, Loyoro, Loleia and Sidoki. Half of the sub counties are bordered by either international borders with Sudan and Kenya or share district borders with Kitgum and Kotido. The district records conflicts between elements within the Dodoth of Kaabong and the Jie from Kotido. It suffers from porous borders, leading to an unregulated and continuous movement of goods and commodities, including arms and ammunition, from Didinga and Toposa in Southern Sudan and Turkana in Kenya. Some areas of Kaabong, including Loyoro- lying at the border of Kaabong and Kotido- lie in the main pathways of the Jie raiders and experience considerable insecurity in spite of being potentially food self sufficient as part of the 'green belt', with good pastures, access to water and fertile soils.

### ***Program Management***

- The UNDP Kaabong project was provided with an office by the local government of Kaabong district at the inception of the project. A preliminary workshop was carried out to sensitize the leadership, security and law implementing agencies as well as elders and opinion leaders of the UNDP Karamoja project and intended activities.
- The program seemed to have been implemented relatively smoothly for the 2 years according to the available records. At the time of the assessment, some records were reported to have been missing since the end of the UNV contracts at the end of the 2009- a case which was being handled by the district. Nevertheless, as in other districts, the district also reported ineffective coordination with the project activities not being fully integrated into the district work plans.
- The evaluation team however, was not able to triangulate program management in this district since the current CAO has only been in the district for one month and the team was not able to meet the former program coordinator, as he was not in the district.
- According to the current focal point within local government, it was believed that management of the program in Abim, was rather more costly compared to other districts. Basis is the geographical dispersion and size of this district, remoteness and inaccessibility of some areas, number of counties and distance between target groups, which all make monitoring of the program activities to be exceptionally demanding.

### ***District level Outputs***

*Capacity of Local governments, CSOs strengthened for peace initiatives and district supported to undertake activities promoting confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation*

The evaluation team could not find any dramatic evidence of local government benefiting from capacity building training in the areas of peace building and M&E. Where local government was engaged in project activities, it seemed that this could more readily be explained by individual personalities, rather than improvements in capacity that could be attributed to a specific training provided through the programme. The failure to identify significant impacts from these



activities having taken place could also be explained by the almost complete change of LG and UNDP project management personnel.

### ***Peace building***

Kaabong, like other districts, benefitted from UNDP supported Peace dialogues organized at inter-clan levels, inter-districts and across the international border with Kenya. Peace meetings were held at Loyoro, Loria and in Kitgum and in Kotido. Cross border meetings were organized between the Dodoth of Kaabong and Jie of Kotido in 2008. In the following year, 2 peace dialogue meetings gathering over 150 elders, youth, women and CSOs were held with the Jie. Peace building-themed drama, music and sports event were also sponsored through the project. Resolutions to end the fighting and maintain sustained peace were made, in support of which Kraal Peace mobilizers (KPM) and Special Peace Mobilisers (SPM) groups were formed to follow up the resolutions.

Another UNDP supported activity with peace orientation were the sensitization workshops for the political leadership like LCs and Councillors. Three such workshops were held in April 2008, April 2009 and July 2009. They aimed at sensitizing the political leadership to mobilize communities to embrace UNDP activities as well as to engage in community monitoring. Findings on the impacts of these workshops in the communities were mixed. While in some sub counties (Karenga for example) the leadership took up interest and were on top of the activities, in others there was no evidence that the leaders had played any effective role. An example is the case explained below where no one ensured that communities participated in construction of Ligoth–Loyoro Rd which was supposed to be a labour based project.

### ***Security***

In an unusual case of evidence-based programming, Police records demonstrate that cases of defilement and rape report decreased dramatically in areas of Kaabong where Community Policing initiatives (to sensitize remote communities on the laws of Uganda and role of Police in society) have taken place. Unfortunately this success cannot be attributed to UNDP supported activities, but it points towards a validation of Community Policing as a potential component of an area based programme under the umbrella of broader support for the Justice, Law and Order Sector. It also demonstrated that baseline data collection and analysis is not difficult where project partners are already collecting data- an area where the UNDP project demonstrably failed.

The Police also expressed their belief that the number and severity of raids have been on the decline and that raiding now involved smaller groups and could be better described as ‘theft’ being perpetrated by spoilers rather than an activity with wide support amongst the community. Again, without baseline analysis and statistics or surveys to attribute causality, it is difficult to attribute these changes (if they are accurate) to the UNDP programme. As likely, sustained disarmament and an increase in the number of Police and UPDF have played a role. Police also suggested that by-laws that banned the drinking of potent local gin contributed to a reduction of idle and disorderly conduct of the ‘redundant youth’ in the town centre.

The RDC and DISO's office affirmed that the security and peace meetings sponsored through the UNDP/OPM project took place in Karamoja. However, in spite the several meetings between Dodoth and Jie, raids of as many as 3000 cattle still occur- with a recent one occurring on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April in Kalapata-during the project evaluation. Some 40 people were reportedly killed during the raid and afterwards during clashes between the UPDF interdiction force and persons taking part in the raid. Fatalities resulting from these clashes are said to have included children. Trade and exchange of livestock for guns across districts and international borders between Kaabong, Kitgum, Pader and Turkana –Dodoth, Toposa- Dodoth and Didinga – Dodoth still occurs and can be a threat to security and to the UNDP supported development activities.

### ***Labour based projects***

Kaabong was the only district in Karamoja to have implemented a UNDP/OPM 'labour-based' project at the time of this evaluation. According to the community leadership of Lokwakaramoi interviewed by the team, where the 10 km road terminates, the improvements to the road (which had previously been opened by hand by the community itself without external support) had been useful in attracting agencies and government for social services in the area. Currently a school has been established by Save the Children and other developmental interventions by Oxfam were in evidence. They community representatives attested that previously the community was hardly accessible (one of the reasons that the community had moved there for protection after being displaced during previous attacks by the Turkana). The opening of the road was referenced by district security officials as having contributed positively to the State's capacity to provide security. According to the DISO, the UPDF had been able to use the new road on three occasions to intercept retreating cattle raiders.

The communities reported an historical pattern of attacks from the Kenyan side of the border, reportedly carried out by the Turkana. During these attacks, including as recently as last year (early 2009), serious crimes were reportedly committed, including the burning to the ground of the village health centre, random destruction of peoples' houses as well as killings and looting. The people of Rwakaramoi have resorted to building their dwellings higher up on the hills in a fortified position where the majority continue to live- which is inconvenient (especially for the elderly), but offered the only option to achieve relative security. The community had, in the past formed community self-defence groups employing armed civilians for protection (the community in question- the 'Ik'- does not keep cattle nor, they claimed, does it have a history of raiding its neighbours). The community claimed that they had surrendered their weapons to the government. A small UPDF detach was obvious nearby but appeared to be unoccupied.

The construction of the road therefore contributes to the project objectives relating to improving security and stability, even though it was not clear that the project employed a labour based implementation modality. Community representatives claimed that they had neither participated in the road improvements nor benefitted financially from them through the UNDP funded activity. They strongly attested that they were never paid for any work at all related to the road (raising the issue of potential fraud on the part of one of the parties- either the contractor or the communities).

The contractor, on the other hand, claimed that payments had been made for community labour and that only a small portion of funds remained to be paid to local labourers (blaming local government for failing to complete payment for the work done). The contractor insisted, although with some un-certainty, that he had paid Ushs 6,000 per day to 100 people (50 of the Rwakaramoi community and 50 of Kalapata) for local labour. When pressed further, the story changed and the contractor claimed that he had paid some of the workers but not all, as he was awaiting further payments. He was not immediately able to present any evidence of having made these payments to workers after being requested to. This issue will require follow up by project staff in order to determine whether communities did in fact benefit from the project and whether project funds were used as intended.

During the field visit to Rwakaramoi to assess the impact of the road construction, it was observed that the road was not being maintained. Information from both the communities and contractors, showed that issues of sustainability were not incorporated into the design nor in the contract- indeed the contract makes no mention of which labour-based modalities are to be employed, numbers of community members to be employed etc.- beyond calling it a labour based project. This lack of specificity in the contract may be responsible for the possible failure to implement this labour based project- and for this, responsibility lies with project staff and the local administration.

Also planned as a labour-based project was the construction of Kamion Dam which was not yet implemented, but the team was reliably informed that this activity fell within the next work plan. The participation of the local government leaders in this project has been limited to participation in initial mobilization meetings that were held to discuss the issues and a field visit to inspect the future dam site.

### ***Financial management***

The evaluation team did not uncover any glaring financial irregularities in the projects implemented thus far, although a general lack of records available at the time of the assessment, the recent replacement of the CAO presiding during the project implementation thus far and the unavailability of the former UNV coordinator made a deeper evaluation of this impossible. One issue which was seen as problematic was the full payment for services rendered being paid to contractors in advance of projects being handed over to communities. It was not clear why this had taken place and why retainers- which should have been paid by contractors- were not being leveraged to ensure effective handover/closure of specific sub-projects. This could simply be a product of the LG focal point not having sufficient time, communications and transport resources to follow up on the details of each project. Regardless, it is resulted, to date, in the failure to satisfactorily complete and hand over specific projects.

Further, the overall ratio of funds allocated to specific programme components should be reversed. For example, in the 2009 Kaabong budget some US\$ 211,000,000 was being allocated of peacebuilding activities, while only 12 million was allocated for income generating activities- If reversed, it is likely that significantly greater impacts on peace and security would have been felt.

*Districts Local Government supported to empower women to positively contribute to peace building and conflict resolution*

A total of 14 groups were supported in Kaabong, of which 9 were given start-up support of Ushs 1M to engage in income generating activities and 5 groups of disarmed youth were given grinding mills. Overall there is evidence that IGAs bring the communities together and can have a significant impact on life choices by participants, while in the case Kaabong there were mixed results. Some groups still needed assistance to help them understand group management and simple skills in financial management and record keeping as they had not benefitted from training in savings and micro credit, as in other areas- representing a missed opportunity, but one that should be addressed through future programming.



*Handover of a grinding mill to formerly armed youth in Kaabong.*

Significantly for the programme and for potential peace in Karamoja (and consistent with all formerly armed youth interviewed during this evaluation) disarmed youth testified that even the most modest support was sufficient to convince them to engage in the formal economy (or at least to give it a try) and hypothetically to prevent them from returning to raiding and banditry as a livelihoods strategy. The dangers associated with failure are high.

*“Even some iron sheets are enough to encourage the youth to leave the gun”*

Former armed youth. Kaabong

Once individuals have attempted another (non-violent) strategy and it has demonstrably failed in spite of what they may consider to be their best efforts (whether for structural, logistical,

management or conceptual reasons), they will be reluctant to attempt this again (as with peace meetings) unless they have other demonstrably successful options to fall back on. Hence, a diversification of options- as well as multiple potential revenue streams (in order to overcome short-term shocks to specific enterprises or business failures) will minimize the chances of individuals or groups returning to criminal and violent livelihood options.

### ***Income generating activities in Kaabong***

Loyoro members put the money into the petty trade as a group and is managed by the chairperson as a group. While the approach is simplistic and the overhead costs are low, management becomes elusive. It is dependent on many factors including: i) Terms under which the member in charge is given the responsibility, ii) degree to which members own the program, iii) efficiency of the person being contracted and iv) how the project is structured with check and balances . The approach was not effective in terms of income and group benefits. Similar conditions were identified in Lolelia, Sidok and Kaabong Sub County.

The members in Kalapata invested in VSLA. Money is borrowed by members and returned with profit of 10%. By the evaluation visit, they reported to have accumulated a profit of 2 million after several months. The agreement is to share the profits once an agreed threshold is reached. In comparison, although members of Kaabong TC received only one million for IGA, the paid up members were already focused on what they wanted which was a grinding mill (Natasha Mode). The group is fairly organized and deposit the money regularly in a village bank. In Kathile, the group is composed of disarmed people with 45 members. They were given one grinding mill and visit by the evaluation team confirmed this and noted that the mill was functional. The members however, felt that this was not adequate as their profit depended on the seasonal harvest and could not guarantee them a steady income. The group had not yet worked out modalities on how to share or utilize the money between group members. They did request for supplementary support, as has happened in many districts, like a cereal banking business. Some of the members belonged to various savings and loan associations but a substantial number appeared to have no functional knowledge on savings.

The Karenga group of 20 women was identified for a fish pond. The terms were that the women only inherit the project once the pond has the first fish harvest estimated to be after 4 months. Currently, there are technical problems with the fish pond which is silting very fast. The filling has resulted in water fouling and fish being suffocated. At the visit we observed some fish which were not only small but dead possibly attributed to the filthy water in the pond. The S/C leadership has been keen on the project and has monitored the development including having consultative meetings with the contractor. They are however restricted in terms of action to remedy the situation as contractual procedures are a function of the district.



*But where are the fish? Poor design and technical oversight of this fishpond project have delayed handover and challenges the viability of the project in Karenga.*

The team of evaluators held discussions with the contractor which only revealed a blame game where the contractor believes the district was to blame for poor technical advice which he says was strongly defended by the district engineer against his will. While there is still opportunity to address the technical problems, the process will be costly and challenges lie ahead in what we have observed as a common anomaly in most of the project financial management procedures. The contractors are paid full amount even when the contractual agreements spell out 50 % initial payment and the rest to be paid on delivery of the works, goods or services. Another group, Kapedo : was supposed to have been given a fish pond but the proposed location was found to be inadequate. Instead they were given a grinding mill which had not yet been installed. For both Kapedo and Karenga, the fish ponds were estimated at Ushs 15,290,000. The package included training of the women in fish farming, functionality and management. The visit from the field showed that the fish ponds have not yet yielded positive results.

#### **Observations and Conclusions: Kaabong district**

- The UNDP activities in Kaabong were relevant to the main goal of sustainability of peace, and security and a similar. The peace activities supported were effective only to a limited degree. Decreased raids and relative peace was achieved temporarily where peace meetings were held and although with collective efforts, a degree of attribution to UNDP activities can be ascertained to the outputs.
- In relation to income generating activities, while the groups seemed to have delivered substantial outputs and with some tangible short term outcomes, the project effectiveness, efficiency and impact was hampered by a number of factors namely: i) the support given to the IGAs in this district being comparatively low and could not translate into substantial impact ii) the supervision of the groups was very weak in this district and the groups did not receive adequate guidance. Their income generating activities varied and the majority would be left with one or two groups members to manage with unclear guidelines on how to share benefits. iii) The projects in the district have a number of

failed or delayed goods and service deliveries associated with failure to follow good procurement practices.

- The evaluation was intended to be Mid-term Evaluation although implemented as an ‘end of project’ evaluation. While this does not negate any findings, one would bear in mind that the project phase is not yet come to an end and more activities are yet to be implemented. Hence the overall percentage outputs and therefore achievements would be higher. To what extent this would positively change the outcome, is not easily predictable.
- The effectiveness and efficiency of the program is also affected by the degree to which the program has been institutionalized in the district work plans and the understanding of the roles and responsibilities of either party. Often times partnership principles are not observed. Failure of UNDP to timely submit the plans for incorporation into district work plans and government planning cycle also to a degree affected effective implementation of the program. Lack of program monitoring both by the project implementers and the districts also contributed to poor achievements.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Resources should be allocated with a consideration of coverage and number people where possible
- Resources /funds for peace building activities at lower level S/c and community should be considered.
- Effectiveness of the labour-based programs is questionable and therefore the future UNDP program needs to review the concept in terms of cost effectiveness, impact and sustainability. While there is strong anecdotal evidence that construction of roads and dams, can lead to outputs that will eventually contribute towards peace and security, for the moment they may be considered as having provided immediate economic benefit to local stakeholders beyond those gained from general improvements in infrastructure.
- In some of the groups collective work is prohibitive as the households are dispersed far from each other. Hence, the implementation of the IGA becomes less efficient and requires
- The district also highlighted as part of its constraints to addressing peace, the fact that they have limited budgets for security programs
- While institutions have their own management guidelines, the district queried why UNDP vehicle was removed from the districts when the activities did not come to a halt even if UNDP was reorganizing its institutional structures. This raises an element of either MoUs not being implicit or lack of comprehension by the different parties.
- The law enforcers believe that if community policing activities are strengthened, where the law enforcers with assistance of community leaders and TOTs roll sensitization activities to as low as individual Manyatas, peace and security will be both enhanced and sustained. Involvement of mothers, teachers and schools will further increase the outputs.
- Commodity exchange including guns for cows, and porosity of international borders remains a challenge. There is need for cross border talks at higher level and further

commitment from either side to beef up security and sensitize their communities to respect and sustain the peace resolutions

- One of the most efficient entry points is to increase the engagement of the youth and karachunas and their mothers in various peace activities. Historically the elders have dominated the peace dialogues leaving out the youths who at the front lines of the raids. Piloting this approach has shown signs of positive results where a few youth leaders have been engaged in follow up and reporting of the wrong elements and those holding guns and in turn have been given incentives (phones and income generation activities). This approach needs to be further explored.
- At the design, there is need for developing effective monitoring frameworks with clear indicators of achievements that can be monitored, economic and achievable. The police and security regularly update data on cases of raids, rape, and deaths associated with raids and some of this can be used as measurable indicators for some of the UNDP peace activities rather than measuring simple outputs like meeting held which have limited usefulness in assessing project effectiveness.
- Failure on the side of the government to keep their commitment of providing for the disarmed youth is a big challenge to peace. The Karachuna are easily lured into reverting back to their old habits or raiding as due to redundancy. Likewise the others who have not yet surrendered their guns have not incentive to do so.
- Various results are shown by IGAs. The success of the IGA depends on a number of factors namely i) cohesion and group dynamics. In some this was lacking, ii) How much capital for given for the particular enterprise. Different enterprises require more input and a fee of IM may not be adequate to bring about the changes needed within a reasonable time. Iii) some IGAs like grinding mill depend on the markets available, harvest year and how many other mills are within the vicinity
- Other women believe that illiteracy is a problem in cases affected the youth and if it also addressed it will be one of the ways towards addressing the problems of the Karachunas towards changing attitude and hence peace.

## 2.5 NAKAPIRIPIRIT district

The district had 11 sub-counties namely: Namalu, Kakomomgole, Moruita, Loregae, Nabilatuk, Lolachat, Lorengedwat, Nakapiripirit Town council, Loro, Karita and Amudat. The latter was later converted into a district. The communities in the district are both nomadic and semi-nomadic - a factor which should be taken into consideration during programme design.

*“The project has the capacity to change the lives of the people”*

CAO Nakapiripirit

### ***Program Management***

- The project office was supported with the necessary logistics for day to day operations that include : communication, transport, and 2 staff (the coordinator and driver)



- According to Local Government officials interviewed, the programme management suffered in the district as a result of high turnover of coordinators- who were changed 2 times within the 3 years. While it may not have had serious effects on the outcomes, it affected the smooth running of the office and the extent to which the results were achieved.
- Unlike other districts, relations, planning and daily working collaboration between District authorities and UNV Coordinators was excellent.
- Local Government officials interviewed exhibited a detailed knowledge of the programme, project components and beneficiary groups.

### **District level Outputs**

*Capacity of Local governments, CSOs strengthened for peace initiatives and district supported to undertake activities promoting confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation*

#### ***Empowering district leaders***

District leaders and officials participated in a training workshop on conflict resolution and management under the capacity building component of the programme. Under the same component, a study tour was also supported that enabled leaders to visit other similar communities in Kenya within the rift valley region. Best practices identified during this trip are said to have inspired current and potential future programming in Nakapiripirit. The CAO recommended increasing both the number of participants and frequency of such trainings/exchanges in future programming.

#### ***Peace meetings***

The project supported a series of activities including dialogue and cross border meetings aimed at promoting peace and reconciliation. They brought together the Pokot of both Uganda and Kenya who have engaged in almost incessant predatory activities against one another. Other inter-district meetings were supported involving the neighbouring Sironko and Kapchorwa districts.

The leadership in charge of security attested that during and immediately after the peace talks, there was a reduced frequency in cattle raids from the neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Sironko, and Kapchorwa. Shootings targeting vehicles are also said to have reduced although given the lack of baseline data, the evaluation could not quantify the extent reduced. During the field visit to Nakapiripirit district, at least one raid was reported to have taken place- on the outskirts of Nakapiripirit town- involving raiders, Police and the UPDF. As no baseline data was collected by the project in advance of supporting such meetings it is difficult, without further research, to establish whether this programming can claim attribution for any potential positive trend.

Local Government officials interviewed stated variously that peace meetings should be maintained and extended down to the lower levels of administration to maintain momentum; that peace meetings created space for ceasefires- and were useful for buying time for further peace activities; that all NGOs should incorporate peace building into their work; and, that such

meetings need to be broadened in terms of their stakeholders to deliberately include the armed youth; and, that such processes need monitoring to ensure that they represent, “the word of the heart and not the word of the mouth”. The LC5 also suggested that what benefits had accrued from these meetings had to some extent been undone as a result of cross-border raiding which was harder to control, in spite of the cross-border meetings between Kenya and Uganda to date.

### ***Labour based projects***

Kakamongole –Nabilatuk road was the route selected for undertaking the labour based component of the programme. As in all other districts, considerable preparatory work seems to have taken place in order to select the project and to mobilise community involvement and buy-in. Subsequent delays have eroded some confidence in the process.

The CAO expressed a profound desire to see labour-based road construction take place, describing it as an activity which had a clear multiplier effect which would allow the following benefits:

- 1) Strategic access by security forces and more rapid reaction;
- 2) By opening up access to fertile areas for cultivation;
- 3) By building peace through joint resettlement of areas by populations previously divided and in conflict; and,
- 4) By generating income for individuals and families through agriculture.

### ***Empowering women and youth through Income Generating Activities***

The team met with a number of groups undertaking ongoing income generating projects funded through the programme. These included groups receiving support for the first time at the time of the project evaluation- mainly in the areas of craft production for women. Another women’s group in Nakapiripirit is already undertaking such activities and is having difficulty finding a market for their high quality work. The team was able to meet with four groups who had received support previously- and whose success could be assessed. Two of these groups were women’s groups and the other two were groups of formerly armed youth. Of the three groups supported in Nabilatuk, two were seen by the local administration as being functional and productive as designed. The third project- running a saloon- was not seen as having taken off. Unfortunately the team did not have the opportunity to meet with the participants from the groups that had reportedly failed.

The first group- the ‘Juakali Youth Tyre Mending and Brick-making Group’ was one of the most impressive groups of beneficiaries encountered during the assessment and can be considered as a ‘best practice’ for the project. Not only had the group capitalized on the support provided through the project, but had also expanded into other income generating activities using their profits. The group had additional business ideas and believed that they would be able to attract additional youth ‘troublemakers’ to participate in groups. Participants suggested that many armed youth come and ask to join their group. Group activities include tyre repair, firewood collection, brick making and, most recently, transportation using a used pick-up that the group had financed and were paying off using the profits from their income generating activities.

The women's group in Nabilatuk had experienced less success to date, complaining that their grinding mill project had not taken off as intended due to poor harvests. However, the project was only recently established (Jan 2010), so it is too early to assess whether the project is viable or not. To date, the mill had only generated income of some 30-40,000 Ushs per month- an amount that they claimed barely covered the costs of their inputs, namely diesel. The group claimed that the project had the potential to support peace building locally, as it had the potential to, "create common interests between groups"- since the nearest grinding mill was said to be more than three kilometres away. The group requested additional support (suggesting craft making).



*UNDP Magic: The compressor that turned into a pick-up. Best income-generating practices amongst former armed youth in Nakapiripirit*

The Namalu Youth Bicycle Repair group was a group established independently by local entrepreneurial youth in 2004, whose former activities were self-described as "chewing mira and using guns". The group claimed that bicycles being handed over to the group during the assessment mission would be used in support of peace in several ways. The group members claimed that they would generate group and individual income as boda bodas (local transport), that bicycles could be used to mobilize people for peace meetings, that bicycles could generate income by carrying water and goods and that the group would also profit from repairing bicycles and punctured tyres. The group had already benefitted from receiving a brick-making machine (which had been put to good use). However the group had, thus far, failed to identify a single buyer for their bricks. The group requested additional support in the form of an air compressor machine for repairing tires.

### **Observations and Conclusions: Nakapiripirit district**

Refreshingly, project management demonstrated a positive, cooperative and functional working relationship between the UNV coordinators and the district leadership- in spite of the unusual high turn-over of the coordinators. The leadership evinced knowledge, ownership and control

over the rollout of the program and appeared to be closely involved in ongoing monitoring of the implementation.

Unlike in many districts, local authorities saw the programme holistically as an integrated approach to building peace and security and used the programme resources as such, by deliberately creating joint projects between conflicting communities and by deliberately linking peacebuilding activities to set the stage for follow-up livelihoods programming in order to build broader stability and enable relocation and resettlement of populations. This was accomplished in close coordination with security forces and included the redeployment of security assets and the establishment of new detachments.

The LC5, CAO and RDC all suggested that there needed to be a deliberate linking of resettlement, peacebuilding, improvements in the capacity of law enforcement and community development projects. The CAO emphasized the need to build ‘tangible community assets’ in order to secure the populations’ support for and stake in maintaining security. Cross-border cooperation between Kenyan and Ugandan authorities was often cited as an area where more resources were needed and where great benefit was possible. Improvements in roads towards and across the border would certainly contribute to improved interaction, trade and cooperation between security forces.

Income generating activities in Nakapiripirit demonstrated mixed results, but in specific instances should be considered as providing some best practices to date within UNDP programming within Karamoja.

#### *Challenges and Recommendations:*

- The district has already adopted an integrated approach to peace building, resettlement and development programming, as a close collaboration between communities, civil and military authorities. UNDP appears to be well positioned to contribute significantly through strategic interventions.
- Gains achieved through cross-border meetings with Kenyan authorities and Pokot communities split during previous conflict have proven to be extremely fruitful, have allowed for cohabitation between clans previously thought to be irreconcilable in new settlements. Such dialogue should be sustained should continue and be strengthened.
- While the above is positive, information received also alluded that this kind of cohabitation has at times created negative situations as taken advantage of by the spoilers. The families (Pokot Uganda and Pokot Kenya) on either side of the borders, sometimes do not easily divulge information concerning law breakers seeking refuge in their communities and instead in the name of unity, conceal and shield them from investigating officers. More sensitization and buy-in commitment to clean the communities of wrong elements is needed.

## Chapter 3

### Analysis and Overall Responses to evaluation questions

- a) **How appropriate was the design of the project in addressing the development problem? Are there any improvements to the design that can be made to enhance achievement of project objectives?**

The project was designed to promote peace, recovery and development in Karamoja with broad country project outcome of enhancing human security to create an enabling environment for recovery and development. The design takes cognition of the 2 broad frameworks of KIDDP and PRDP. Borrowing from lessons learned from previous projects. The project opted to target beneficiaries strategically- identified as women and de-mobilized youth- for income generation, alternative livelihoods and employment initiatives; and local governments, community leaders and cross border communities for engagement in peace building, response, and conflict prevention capacities. While the conceptual theory of provision of alternative livelihood, economic empowerment, active participation in dialogue and capacity building were rightly perceived and are sound as key avenues to prevent conflict and sustain peace and security initiatives already achieved, the design strategy did not seem to align priorities to community perception. Results have shown that communities prefer more activities for income generation rather than what they termed '*endless peace dialogue*'. The majority of the beneficiaries believe that stabilizing and improving livelihood may be a longer lasting solution in building and consolidating peace through short and long term economic related recoveries as was perceived by the theory of the project. The real gap is therefore the priority setting rather than the concept theory. It is also conceivable that critical issues of project management and implementation including staffing, reporting, partnership and monitoring did not receive due attention at the design phase.

The project should be considered as a good starting point with some important lessons learned in project design and management arrangements. Building on the suspension of the previous programme, the entry points of peace building, capacity development for LG, empowerment of women and labour based initiatives seem appropriate and uncontroversial compared to being engaged in disarmament activities.

Perhaps only half of the programme activities, as designated in the project document, were implemented. Some of the activities designed to promote confidence building, negotiation and reconciliation like cultural galas were not fully undertaken. Added to the list, most of the labour based projects which targeted employment, public participation and community ownership had not taken place as planned by the end of the field evaluation exercise. At the time of the evaluation, labour based activities had only been completed in Kaabong district, through a road rehabilitation project. The delay in implementation resulting from procurement challenges was being overcome through a new implementation arrangement with the World Food Programme with implication of being completed outside project frame. Some tangible dividends were however visible specifically in areas of peace and income generation activities. Few cross border activities have taken place between Uganda and neighbouring Kenya and Sudan. Empowerment of women (and to a lesser degree, disarmed youth) has been successful in altering individual choices towards peace and security.

Direct attribution of general improvements or changes in the security situation to any specific project output or peace building activity was difficult. This is especially the case when baseline attitude surveys have not been carried out or have not been consulted in project design. Similarly, when project activities are taking place alongside similar interventions being carried out by NGOs, large scale government programmes as well as military (security and disarmament) and Police (rule of law and community policing) interventions. It is difficult to attribute general or macro-level improvements to the security situation in Karamoja directly to the UNDP/OPM programme. At the micro-level, however, many project beneficiaries testified that the project interventions or support had allowed them to alter their life choices- away from participation in organised violence and towards personal and community development.

Ultimately, war and peace is made in the minds of men and women. Altering personal choices by providing opportunities that will inspire others does seem to have a contagious effect where sustained. Similarly, the programme has probably not done any harm (of itself a noteworthy and significant achievement in contexts such as this- and not to be undervalued) and recent successes in livelihoods support are very promising for future programming. If consolidated and expanded in scope, there is the potential for UNDP to contribute significantly to the stabilisation and development of Karamoja over the next project cycle.

Where successful programming has taken place (mainly in the area of livelihoods support and income generation), it has overwhelmingly been during the past 10 months of the programme, suggesting that current efforts by the project management and local governments need to be reinforced with additional human resources, and expanded. In all areas where project beneficiaries were interviewed, participants suggested that they knew of people who wanted to benefit from similar activities and who would be willing to convince others to join if new resources were available- to create new income generating groups for example. As such, programme design can be said to have been appropriate.

The programme, as outlined in the programme document, was much more ambitious in scope and, overall, the modest results (to date) attributable to some components of the project has more to do with failures to implement efficiently (for a variety of legitimate organisational or logistical reasons) rather than to a conceptual problems with the overall approach. If all project components had been implemented as designed, the overall impact of the programme would likely have been even greater than the current positive, although mixed results.

**b) How relevant is the project theory (the conceptual thinking of peace building for Karamoja) in addressing the development challenge in Karamoja? Are there other efficient peace building philosophies that could be adopted for Karamoja?**

In its simplest form, the project document for the *Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja* presents a project theory that postulates that an “integrated development approach” should be adopted by combining “peace building initiatives and peaceful conflict resolution activities” with activities to address “the underlying or structural causes of poverty experienced in Karamoja”. The text suggests that this approach has been adopted as a result of a failure to achieve ‘human security, peace and stability’ through disarmament alone, and proposes that an

‘integrated’ and ‘conflict sensitive’ approach would be likely to yield better results in the “promotion of human security, peace and stability”.

The project designers believe that beyond carrying out programming in the areas of development and peace building, the project should actually focus on improving the capacity of government actors to engage in peace building, mediation and general conflict management. The project document states that, “in order to improve the human development indicators in Karamoja, guns collection interventions need to be undertaken within a context in which these interventions are complemented by strengthening the capacity for peace building and peaceful conflict resolution and management and prevention” (p5.)

The project had an ambitious theoretical and practical agenda to engage with local governments as a central node for documentation, coordination and monitoring of peace processes. The project also intended to undertake a variety of reviews and studies in order to understand how changing conflict dynamics and actors would affect development focused programming and to act as a selection mechanisms for such livelihoods support. The project proposed to work through indigenous mechanisms since project analysis suggested that the authority of elders had been eroded as a result of armed violence and shifting power dynamics and that the public at large should be targeted through drama, sports and public information campaigns and through the training of peace mobilisers. In these ways, and as articulated in the project document, the project designers clearly intended an integrated and conflict sensitive approach to prevail, stating:

*“The project will, in collaboration with the district and sub-county local governments, identify and support community projects that enhance the ability and capability of individuals to sustainably improve their economic, political and social well-being statuses, which improves their quality of life, and in the process contributes to peace building.”*

The project document also clearly intended for a multi-stakeholder approach to be applied, both within Karamoja between agencies, but also across international borders. In recognition of the regional dimensions of conflict in the ‘broader ‘Karamoja cluster’- covering the border areas of Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia, the project intended to coordinate cross border peace building activities through various fora and partnerships, including in collaboration with UNDP Kenya and UNDP Sudan. The project document also proposed that, *“Policy advocacy will be undertaken at the regional (East African Community - EAC) and international (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development – IGAD and African Union - AU) levels to promote peaceful conflict resolution in communities across the common international border.”* (P11) Similarly, the project document proposes that the project would operate at ‘micro, macro and meso’ levels, engaging in and shaping future disarmament approaches, based on lessons learned in integrated and conflict sensitive programming linked to peace building. The project designers propose that, “While interventions will be undertaken at the local level, structural challenges encountered will become the basis for advocacy at the district, national and international level.”

Overall, this project theory represents and proposes an ambitious and vast scope of peace building, development and policy engagement, which was perhaps beyond the ability of the project management and staff to coordinate or undertake. The day to day logistical, procurement, security and political challenges of project management and delivery in a difficult

operating environment such as Karamoja are often enough to overwhelm project officers and delay or prevent the full scope of proposed activities being carried out. As such, the project theory is not discredited- and in fact seems quite sound. Rather the ability of the project staff and managers to implement the project as designed, within the initial time period of the project, was circumscribed by limited human resources and time for the task as well as cumbersome management arrangements and project administrative systems.

Based on stakeholder interviews, it seems that the project theory and approach was interpreted differently by local government and project staff in the districts- suggesting varying capacity and/or inadequate project initiation training/planning. While in many cases, the project activities seemed to be considered as separate activities to be carried out as possible (and in many cases, before the recruitment of the new project manager, only one or two of the project activities was even attempted- peace meetings and some capacity building in most cases). As discussed elsewhere, the impact of these two interventions was successful in a limited way in at least two districts. Only in Nakapiripirit district was it clear that local government and project staff had held a vision of the project as an integrated programme from the start- whose peacebuilding and development components complemented and enabled each other as part of a broader strategy that drew assets from a variety of sources- both within and outside of the UNDP/OPM project- in order to alter local conflict and development dynamics over time.

There are very few examples of peace meetings funded through the programme that can be credited with having singlehandedly created significant and lasting security or demonstrably opened space for development. In most cases, Local Government- while believing that peace meetings were useful, could not attribute significant or lasting change to these meetings. Only in Abim and Nakapiripirit could Local Government convincingly state that UNDP funded peace activities had had a sustainable impact and that current and future programme was consolidating and building upon gains attributable to these meetings. Where peace meetings were considered to be a contributing factor to a positive trend in peace, it seems that they were considered as part of an integrated strategy, including resettlement, provision of additional security by Police and UPDF, road construction and development projects, rather than a one-off event. This reflects an understanding of the initial intent of the programme as described in the project theory of the project document- to pursue integrated, multi-levelled, sequenced, conflict-sensitive interventions that emanate from local government planning. In both Kotido and Kaabong districts, local government and security officials suggested that peace meetings had been useful, but then conceded that they had failed to generate lasting peace, mainly attributing this failure to the tactical and opportunistic nature of agreements and the failure to prevent spoiling incidents that would cause the local –level agreements to unravel as confidence waned. Significant further programming did take place in these areas, but was likely detached from the peacebuilding work in time- and in the perception of the target beneficiaries and participants.

Peace meetings as stand-alone activities can be dangerous as they raise expectations and reduce willingness to engage in further meetings if not properly structured (no monitoring or verification mechanisms) and if tangible change is not possible in the short to medium term. The project was not able to deliver this in order to buttress peace meetings with development support in a deliberate and synchronised way. Other NGOs are attempting a more systematic approach, involving the creation and ongoing support for peace structures (parish-level peace



committees or Joint Monitoring Mechanisms) as well as supportive development programming that emerges from the peace meetings themselves. UNDP could assist the Government of Uganda to convene a review meeting with all actors involved in peacebuilding in Karamoja to assess progress to date and propose, based on any good practices, an overall strategy for achieving peace through dialogue and conflict sensitive programming. Ultimately, if peacebuilding remains decentralised at the district level and at least partly outside of the control of local government, then it will remain disjointed and uneven in impact. At a minimum, District level Peace committees require some secretariat support to coordinate peace related activities and strategic decision –making. This support can extend down to parish-level peace committees- through District committees- in order ensure coordination and ownership in peace processes, access to government actors by parish level actors and the development of monitoring and follow-up mechanisms as a standard component of all peace interventions.

Related to this is the selection or targeting of interlocutors. Throughout the programme evaluation, respondents suggested that peace activities had targeted the wrong actors- focusing mainly on traditional authorities and ‘indigenous’ structures rather than dealing with the actual perpetrators of violence and spoilers- who are primarily youth. Direct dialogue with youth through Community Policing initiatives has shown some positive results. Police in Kaabong have evidence that their Community Policing pilot activities have demonstrably reduced the incidence of particular crimes based on crime statistics. Support for such evidence-based interventions should be provided through any follow-up programmes, including the Justice and Rule of Law components of the proposed area-based programme.

If such peacebuilding activities are sustained through a renewed or new joint GoU/UNDP programme in Karamoja there is a need to deliberately plan for joint programming **between** groups in conflict, in order to build relationships, trust and shared interests in peace. Peace meetings alone do not built trust for very long and can actually reduce trust over time, once spoiling incidents begin to occur. Confidence in the interlocutors, facilitators, mediators or sponsors of meetings can also be eroded if agreements cannot be implemented because of delays, lack of capacity or resources to follow up. This can place related development programming in jeopardy as communities begin to associate failed peace processes with development actors who sponsor them and to suspect that they are being manipulated into making themselves vulnerable according to a higher-level design (this is especially dangerous when development actors are already working directly with government and security organs who may be in conflict or confrontation with some community members).

Similarly, and as a general comment on similar programming throughout the region, alignment with and sponsoring of peace meetings chaired by elected local politicians can also causes problems of perception for ‘integrated’ or ‘conflict-sensitive’ programming, where politicians often use peacebuilding meetings as a forum for promoting themselves, making political promises to their electorate and generally campaigning- linking NGO/UN programming to the individual politician rather than a general collaboration with government. The optics of this support and collaboration are especially important to consider where high levels of violence are occurring and may be manipulated by politicians.

Some ongoing activities of the project have taken this approach to the creation of common goods and community assets (border markets for example) and many pipeline activities also have great potential in this area (common dams for example). It is in this area that the project must ensure that adequate conflict analysis is carried out in order to ensure that over the longer term the project activities and deliverables ‘do no harm’. A framework or checklist for conflict sensitive programming should be developed in order to review each proposed intervention according to a common standard of ‘conflict sensitivity’.

UNDP comparative advantage in the peace building arena comes in inter-State dialogue and policy development. UNDP should focus its peacebuilding resources in two areas: rapid response and improved material capacity for law enforcement, justice, corrections and security agencies; and, in the area of sustained cross-border (inter-state) meetings between Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. While the project document states that UNDP Uganda would link with UNDP in Kenya and Sudan in order to pursue joint programming, this has not yet taken place. If carried out, and in light of recent progress in road construction, border markets etc. there is great potential for effective regional collaboration on security issues.

**c) To what extent are the project institutional arrangements functional and responsive (UNDP Kampala office, Moroto Sub-office, OPM, and the local governments)? What factors are responsible for institutional arrangement functionality?**

The ‘*Building a Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja*’ is a UNDP funded project executed under a collaboration between Government of Uganda and UNDP. The project is established under the Crisis and Prevention Unit of UNDP Uganda, is implemented by several partners key of which is the Office of the Minister, Local governments of the 5 selected Karamoja Districts in question and supported by several UN agencies, and selected CSOs. The funding (TRAC resources) was initially directly executed with the funds disbursed to the implementing agencies from UNDP on quarterly disbursements basing on receipts of quarterly technical and financial reports as well as quarterly projected expenditure reports. While OPM was charged with the oversight responsibility including monitoring and supervision, it was assumed that there was adequate capacity at the districts to assume the full responsibility of coordination under the CAOs office. District Coordinators with UNDP contracts reported to the CAO who in turn reported to OPM which although well intentioned, raised considerable conflicts between reporting and management arrangements.

Several positive changes at various levels including setting up a UNDP sub office at Moroto to which a Regional Project Manager was recruited, Program Analyst an UNDP, Project Officer at OPM, and recruitment of UNV Coordinators at the district were introduced but have been insufficient to address real institutional issues within the project. In practice, the some of them introduced new conflict management complexities rendering project coordination ineffective. Capacity and ownership issues are seemingly un-addressed, district supervision is still inadequate and the blame game on reporting lines, bureaucratic and irregular decision making process with consequences of slow financial flows were strong vibes expressed by various concerned stakeholders.

Institutional gaps, especially inadequate human resources capacity both in numbers, and limited supervision and quality assurance at different levels at UNDP, OPM and district are in evidence. Project Coordinators for example, were not adequately supervised and became full time decision makers, budget holders and implementers. Consequently contractors, and Coordinators themselves in some cases, took advantage of the gaps, weak procurement processes and lack of effective oversight.

The removal of UNV staff and the replacement of the initial Project Manager with a capable Head of Office for the Moroto project office- doing double duty as a Project Manager- saved the programme from collapse and/or potentially irrelevance. During the first 2 years of the project, barely any implementation of 3 of the 4 project objectives was even attempted. The shift in programming observed subsequent to the appointment of the new PM was correct and strategic. It began to place the programme, and UNDP, back into a central position as a close partner with and supporter of local and central government efforts to stabilize and develop Karamoja.

The selection of the Programme Manager was also very strategic as she brings considerable practical and theoretical experience from similar contexts in northern Kenya to bear on the complex local conflict dynamics and is equally comfortable in her engagement with Local Government, Security and community actors. In order to maximize impacts and strategic change on the ground, this skill set, experience and drive to affect positive change through the project- not to mention willingness to operate in an insecure environment- must be supported through adequate HR levels and the careful selection of skilled project staff. While much has been accomplished during this period to keep the project on track, a lack of human resources currently places the project in an unsustainable position.

Implementation of the program was delayed and has been further affected by UNDP's institutional restructuring. The current evaluation although considered effectively as an 'End of Project' review was initially intended to be a Mid-term review. On the ground, however, the reality is that the project activities are ongoing, and many of them (especially the IGAs) were not more than 4 months old. As such the impact cannot be conclusively ascertained on the basis of outputs, short term outcomes and perceived community satisfaction or dissatisfaction. In general, we believe that the program has a potential for positively influencing community and individual behaviours and values towards sustainable peace and security.

Meetings with Government of Uganda counterparts within the Office of the Prime Minister suggested that, beyond the immediate objectives of the project, that 'success' should also be measured by the extent to which UNDP is able to work with government to address the fundamental problems of Karamoja (as identified in national development strategies) - which include weak capacity as much as insecurity. The emphasis placed on the importance of maintaining the working relationship between UNDP and the GoU to ensure smooth delivery through local government structures cannot be overemphasized. Challenges identified include those which appear to have plagued the project since its inception, including confused and multiple reporting lines; the challenge and paradox of supporting decentralization while at the same time staffing the project with UNDP staff; failures to coordinate workplans and agree on project priorities; and, delays reportedly caused mainly by UNDP procurement procedures.

Sub-project management at the local level has suffered as a result of unclear roles, responsibilities and procedures. UNDP has attempted to support local government structures with capacity building support through UNVs and capacity building training, but maintains that it is not responsible for project implementation (as this is a project implemented through 'National Execution' arrangements)- while still recruiting the staff and the distribution of funds. Based on the project evaluation it seems that at the district-level there was a general confusion over who 'owned' the project, who was implementing the project and who was monitoring the project implementation. This situation, while improving, must be remedied through a project management design workshop between UNDP, OPM and Local Government representatives that should elaborate a new project management arrangement as well as a refined workflow to improve efficiency based on experiences to date.

**d) How efficient is the project implementation? How cost effective is the project implementation**

Design issues are responsible for the apparent and real time inefficiencies in the program. The failure of project managers to ensure clear ownership on the side of the districts (while currently improving and with some notable exceptions) associated with failed appreciation of roles and responsibilities on one hand and also very high expectations from both political and administrative leadership almost ensured a confused implementation experience. District structures, including peace committees, have struggled to coordinate the multiple and overlapping peace actors and as a result peacebuilding related resources were not equitably distributed nor necessarily targeted according to Local Government priorities. More can be achieved through collective and effective planning by the districts- which UNDP should be facilitating rather than exacerbating (including by harmonising and enhancing peace committees and various levels through training and secretariat support as outlines elsewhere in the report).

Strategic partnerships with NGOs were explored early on in the project but were reportedly delayed as a result of procurement-related constraints and have only been resolved towards the end of the project- with WFP in labour-based initiatives for example- leaving much un-exploited collaborative potential.

According to most interviewees, delays in approval, funding and procurement led to an erosion of confidence in the programme. In very rough terms, perhaps 90% of the positive impacts of the project can be attributed to less than 20% of the budget. (In Kaabong for example, of 211M US\$ budgeted for one quarter in early 2009, only 12M US\$ were allocated for income generating activities compared to more than 100M allocated for peace meetings). Institutional capacity at the District level to implement projects was identified as a challenge which resulted in long delays in submission of work plans as well as financial and substantive reporting. The lack of 'absorption capacity' on the part of local government (to receive, manage and re-allocate funds) and at the Office of the Prime Minister to liquidate NEX advances, was also identified as an impediment to timely delivery, which cause the project management to resort to direct payments for some contracting- impacting on overall project and institutional performance.

The project evaluation were notified by beneficiaries of cases of extortion targeting project beneficiaries by a project sub-contractor, compounding existing allegations of fraud and embezzlement by programme staff- and raising serious problems of accountability. Action has already been taken in some areas by local government and law enforcement actors to address these allegations. The completion of such investigations should be seen as a precondition for future programming in Abim and Moroto districts, but should not delay the continuation of the programme as a whole- where positive programming momentum is building.

**Cost effectiveness/comparison:**

One area of the project evaluation where costs were underestimated and which subsequently affected overall budget projections in a negative way, were the issues of security and accessibility for project staff. The challenges of absorbing unanticipated costs related to ensuring that project staff hired on UNDP contracts received adequate protection as specified in the UN's Minimum Operational Safety and Security requirements can only be ascribed to a lack of experience by project designers in carrying out programming in these sorts of operational environments. The project environment is UN 'level 3', requiring armed escorts and protective equipment while moving between project locations. This required UNDP to procure services to hire escort vehicles and pay associated fuel and driver costs. During multi-day missions, the UN is also required to pay some subsistence support to escort personnel. These requirements throughout Karamoja add significantly to the logistical and planning burden of project staff and management. Ultimately staff safety and security is the most important consideration for project managers and these requirements are one of the predictable costs of doing business in post-conflict and insecure environments.<sup>7</sup>

Because of time constraints and a decision to re-cast the evaluation as an end of project evaluation with a focus on next steps, the evaluation team was not able to collect information from NGOs or agencies in order to compare costings on specific subcomponents of projects (where NGOs are doing similar programming and costings can be compared (workshop DSA, transport costs, security and logistics costs, overheads, commodities and sub-project inputs such as livestock or road construction costs by method and per km.) Since the programme to date has only undertaken one labour intensive project (a road construction project which may or may not have been labour intensive) the evaluation team was only able to obtain data comparing labour intensive vs machine construction costs of roads in Karamoja. The cost trade-offs available are discussed in the section on labour intensive projects.

None of the other NGOs interviewed used the same security procedures as the UN and the costs of this requirement cannot then be compared (except perhaps to note the human costs of

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<sup>7</sup> Ideally projects should procure vehicles with ballistic protection to withstand up to 7.62 mm small arms fire. At a minimum, staff should be provided with improved body armour. Current issue personal ballistic protection does not have side panels to protect the wearer against bullets fired at the side of the vehicles (where most injuries occur to passengers during 'L-shaped' roadside ambushes. Such personal protection equipment is heavy and expensive, but necessary for staff safety.

travelling without escorts, as recently illustrated by attacks against unescorted vehicles used by NGOs and the killing of NGO staff). However, vehicles with escorts have also been attacked, making the establishment of close relationships with security forces a point of debate between those willing to associate their programmes closely with security forces and those not willing to do so for a variety of reasons central to the neutrality/security and relief/development debate. For the UN, however, this is a moot point and an area where costs are fixed unless a renewed project does not use UN staff. If the UN continues to carry out programming in these environments, it will have to abide by MOSS requirements.

Beyond this, the evaluation team was not able to identify areas where interesting comparisons could take place between programmes, without going into a level of detail which the team's schedule did not permit. For example, several NGOs have been involved in peacebuilding activities. Comparing them on a unit basis would have involved breaking down implementation costs in areas such as vehicle rental, hall rental, payment of per diems etc. Similarly, the team also requested information from project staff, NGOs and contractors/suppliers on the cost of project inputs- goats for example- and received a spectrum of prices. However, it was not clear for example that different projects were procuring the same types of goats (male vs female, local goats, improved goats or hybrid goats for example). Ideally the project manager or M&E specialist should create a questionnaire specifying which specific costs the project wishes to compare and circulate this to NGOs throughout Karamoja, in order to obtain a statistically sound analysis of comparative costing.

**e) How functional is project management structure? What changes if any could improve on the management structure?**

Management arrangements for approval and disbursements of funds between headquarters and District offices have been identified throughout the evaluation as significant bottlenecks to efficient and timely implementation of project components. For example, the following is a description of the workflow currently being employed in the project.

<b>Step 1.</b> The districts generate their priorities and put them in a draft work plan (sometimes during a work planning seminar organised by UNDP)
<b>Step 2.</b> The districts then forward the drafts to OPM for review, then forwarded to UNDP officers (Programme Analyst or Head of office, Moroto sub-office & Head of CPR unit) for review.
<b>Step 3.</b> Reviewed and adjusted draft Work plans are sent back to the districts for fine tuning.
<b>Step 4.</b> Final signed quarterly WPs, together with quarterly FACE forms/ other accountability documents are sent to OPM review and approval (signatures).
<b>Step 5.</b> The signed WPs/ FACE forms are forwarded to UNDP by OPM. The FACE forms bear accountability section as well as the requesting section for new funds release. The

Programme Analyst reviews accountabilities, endorses and forwards to the Head of CPR unit for final approval & signature.

**Step 6.** The Programme Assistant (at OPM) enters the accountabilities in the system- ATLAS (if it's not the first advance) and notifies the DCD (Programmes or operations) for approval in the system- ATLAS. This process is very lengthy & delicate since it involves inputting each item of expenditure from each district in its own line in ATLAS even if it requires 50 entries from each district's Expenditure report.

**Step 7.** The Programme Assistant enters the WPs in the system and again notifies the DCD (O) or DCD (P) for approval. Once approved, a BUDGET REVISION is done to allow expenditures to take place.

**Step 8.** The Programme Assistant prepares a Memo requesting for release of funds as per each district's request. Once the memo has been endorsed and signed by the Head of Unit (ARR), its forwarded to DCD (O) for his approval and signature. Once signed by DCD (O) the amounts requested by each district are entered into ATLAS.

**Step 9.** Programme Assistant notifies the DCD (O) in the system (ATLAS). Once he approves in the system (ATLAS). The vouchers are printed and attached to the districts' accountability/ FACE forms and approved WPs and then sent to Finance Dept for payment.

**Step 10.** Once the districts receive the funds on their project bank accounts, they start spending according to their quarterly work plans/ FACE request.

Failure to timely integrate project activities implementation into the national institutions and structures, has to a small extent worked against sustainability and continuity.

### **Options for improving the work-flow**

1. Shorten processes and number of persons reviewing WPs, once annual WPs have been approved in order to avoid second guessing by HQ.
2. Shorten the process of approving quarterly WPs between the districts, OPM and UNDP (the WPs should be cleaned from the districts before they reach Kampala, requiring all reviewers (OPM, analyst, Programme manager, Programme assistant) to sit together with the districts in the field and agree at one time and return to Kampala with final WPs/accountabilities.
3. Redundant approval processes (paper and then in Atlas) makes the whole process cumbersome.
4. Heads of units (ARR) could be given the rights to approve everything both on paper and in ATLAS at the same time, instead of requiring approvals from the DCDs.

### **Management Options for Field Implementation: Pros and cons of each**

A variety of options exist for future implementation of project activities, based on experiences during the current programme. There are pros and cons to each option and they must be considered within the framework of 'National Implementation Modalities', which will constrain UNDP and Government of Uganda project management and procurement guidelines on the other hand. The following options were proposed and discussed during the evaluation:

<b>Option 1: NGO implementation</b>	
<p><b>Pros:</b> Theoretically reduces the project management burden on UNDP field staff, with implications for human resource requirements for the project. (Assumes that NGOs may be more cost effective and flexible than UN in terms of implementation modalities, approvals, procurement processes, financial management etc.)</p>	<p><b>Cons:</b> There are opportunities and hazards associated with working directly with and providing support to security actors on conflict/security-related issues. Since UNDP is working directly with security agencies on some components of the current project (and is likely to continue to engage in this area through the JLOS component of the area based programme) this may be an area where NGO implementation is unlikely owing to deliberate mandate constraints on the part of many international NGOs. Many INGOs choose not work directly in support of security institutions in order to preserve their perceived neutrality- a consideration of particular importance where security agencies have been accused of gross human rights violations in the past. UNDP and OPM/GoU visibility are also an issue under this scenario.</p>
<b>Option 2: Thematic focal points</b>	
<p><b>Pros:</b> Project content should be better designed through baseline data collection/analysis and M&amp;E frameworks (most importantly-including by being based on existing good practice globally). Thematic focal points could be consultants, involved in design only.</p> <p>Could be complemented by employing constant 'external' mobile monitoring (there needs to be a clear division of implementation and monitoring between partners in order to avoid previous problems of accountability/corruption).</p>	<p><b>Cons:</b> Challenges of conducting design and monitoring in each district, while also having a parallel geographic project management responsibility. Thematic focal points would all be working in each other's geographic areas- raising the logistical/security/cost implications of each thematic staff member having to visit and monitor activities in each of the 7 districts. This could be avoided if thematic focal points only participate in initial design/planning of programme activities and leave implementation and monitoring to local government and geographic focal points.</p>
<b>Option 3: Geographic focal points (Continued use of National UNVs or National Professional Officers)</b>	
<p><b>Pros:</b> Should allow for better reporting and day to day relations between UNDP, OPM and Local Government, although this was not the case to date in 4 out of the 5 districts evaluated. Lessons learned in terms of staff preparation, standard business practices, ToRs and supervision could probably reduce or eliminate these tensions and contribute to efficient project management as a collaboration between UNDP, Local Government and OPM. This would require joint design of project</p>	<p><b>Cons:</b> The previous phases of the project was implemented using geographic focal points without substantive knowledge in the various component areas of the project (peacebuilding, training, women's economic empowerment, cross-border collaboration, policy development, infrastructure development though labour intensive works etc.) This lack of technical depth makes appropriate design less likely. Unless staff are trained in these areas in advance, it is not reasonable to</p>



management mechanisms by these 3 stakeholders.	<p>expect them to be able to provide local government appropriate technical support.</p> <p>There may be restrictions on having national UNVs operating in a Phase 3 security environment that could have implications for UNDP in terms of liability.</p>
<b>Option 4: A combination of approaches and modalities depending on project activities in any subsequent programme</b>	
<p><b>Pros:</b> May allow for easier scaling-up of programming. Overall, future programming (and considerations about staffing structures, roles and responsibilities) will need to take into account these different implementation modality scenarios. Ideally, implementation modalities would be tailored for each of the project component activities- theoretically resulting in more efficient programming and value for money based on comparative advantage. Some project components could be sub-contracted and others managed directly, based on efficiency and agreed staffing structures and roles.</p>	<p><b>Cons:</b> Contractual complexity for UNDP. Could dilute ability to carry out ‘integrated programme design’ that allows for sophisticated and deliberate programming that bridges conflict, JLOS, infrastructure and income generation in a conflict-sensitive manner- and contributes to the overall objectives of supporting peace, stability and development in Karamoja.</p>

Ideally management arrangements need to be re-designed and rationalized by OPM, districts and UNDP in advance of the initiation of the Area-based programme. In order to achieve a rationalised structure and business process, a workshop should be conducted to develop a mutually agreed management and reporting structure in line with UNDP National Implementation Modalities (NIM) and Government of Uganda procedures.

**f) What operational challenges that were not anticipated have emerged? How would these be overcome (i.e. staffing, regulations/guidelines, procurement, communication and roles & responsibilities)? To what extent did project start-up activities prepare the project staff, district local governments, OPM and the beneficiaries?**

- It is clear that throughout most of the programme, field staff were not well prepared for their assignments and lacked adequate supervision and oversight in some cases. Delivery of tangible outcomes can be attributed largely to new project management and improved relations between the project and district governments through ‘focal points’ assigned by the districts (who are staff of the district). While this new arrangement has improved communication and perhaps reduced tensions, it is not clear whether focal points-who have existing ToRs and responsibilities at district level, will be able to manage the workload associated with a renewed or expanded programme.
- Security procedures and the expenses required for project staff to operate according to MOSS regulations were not taken into account during the design phase and this has represented a learning experience for UNDP Uganda. Similarly, the use of UNV staff in

a phase 3 environment has created ambiguities in terms of liability, efficiency and security requirements for UNDP.

- While ToRs were quite explicit, a common interpretation and ‘operationalisation’ of the ToRs for UNVs was not reached between the UNVs and Local Government in many cases and each UNV developed systems and procedures for the implementation of the projects with local government counterparts in an ad hoc way. For example, ToRs clearly state that UV Coordinators would report directly to the Chief Accounting Officer in each district. Apparently, however, CAOs often felt that Coordinators were acting independently of Local Government or at least the CAO’s office.
- Based on interviews with former UNV Coordinators and Local Government officials, the use of project vehicles was a contentious issue. An MoU describing appropriate vehicle use by project staff and Local Government was created in order to address this, but at the time of evaluation project vehicles had been withdrawn to Moroto pending the development of new implementation modalities. On a number of occasions during the evaluation, Local government officials inquired about the timing of the return of said vehicles to the districts as a matter of concern.
- Reporting lines and chains of command seem to have been confusing, with most local government counterparts suggesting that UNVs were implementing project activities independently and outside of District workplans. This speaks to the general confusion over who was responsible for implementation, financial management and monitoring.
- Where Local Government actors were involved in workplans, they often complained that projects agreed at the district level based on agreed community priorities and included in workplans, were then arbitrarily changed by UNDP based on unknown considerations- leading to a loss of faith between districts and UNDP management and between the project and beneficiaries to whom commitments had been made.
- Reporting formats do not appear to have been standardized
- All project staff need proper training/orientation
- An operations manual must be prepared to define agreed processes/chain of command, operational issues
- Templates for all documentation/reports are required.
- Review/harmonize procurement procedures (UNDP or LG?) at different levels of expenditure in order to determine which is more efficient.

**g) What factors both positive and negative have influenced project implementation?  
What lessons have been learned to improve on programming?**

**General Factors Affecting Programming**

1. Programming has not been evidence based as intended. Neither conflict mapping and analysis- to identify CSOs engaged in peace building, nor the establishment of a baseline for the district to target interventions on the basis of evidence, was carried out.

**Lesson and proposal for improvement:**

1. This failure to implement the programme as designed makes any evaluation of the impact of programming extremely difficult. This must be addressed as a priority during the design phase of the area-based programme by collecting available data from NGO, UN and Government sources in order to identify any areas where targeted assessments are required. On the basis of this information gathering exercise, design appropriate tools to create a baseline for all proposed project activities in upcoming programmes. This need not be a costly or time consuming exercise, as significant studies relating to conflict and armed violence have been carried out in Karamoja and should be available. Similarly, literature reviews have also been carried out and crime statistics are available from Police and the military.
2. As discussed elsewhere, the programme as designed and articulated in the project document, was extremely ambitious in scope. As a result of the institutional and human resource constraints outlined in this report, it was not possible to implement the programme in its entirety, or during the time period envisioned. This does not, however, take away from the validity of the project philosophy and assumptions/intention informing the programme.

**Lesson and proposal for improvement:**

Ensure that project activities are matched by sufficiently qualified and sufficient numbers of project staff, or reduce the complexity of the project accordingly. Attempting to reduce costs by reducing staff at the project design phase- or by using less expensive staffing options is rarely beneficial to the project or serves the intended project beneficiaries. Investing in human resources is absolutely critical, considering the challenges of the complex and insecure operating environment and programme management modalities-even if human resources represent a higher than average proportion of project costs in comparison with less sensitive development environments.

3. Results to date have been difficult to measure and are modest compared with the intentions of the programme at its inception. However, what has been achieved (mainly in the past 10 months) has been very promising and beneficiaries can often testify that it has created viable alternatives to livelihoods based on criminal activities.

**Lesson and proposal for improvement:**

Continue the implementation of successful programming, while making small adjustments to increase the focus on engagement with and support for armed/disarmed male youth through income generating activities and incentive mechanisms. Ensure that there is not a lag between the current programme and future programmes- even if this means extending through no-cost extensions and finding bridging resources to keep the momentum going. It is critical to ensure that groups that have been created feel that they will continue to receive supervisions, oversight and the potential for future support if they are able to

manage their groups and sub-projects well. It is important that communities believe that the changes that they are currently experiencing will be sustained and that they represent the beginning of a macro-level historical change for their community as a whole. In this way, social pressure will be exerted by those who now have a stake in peace, to curb tactical violent predation and spoiling incidents between communities- often carried out by small numbers of warriors.

4. The project period has not been sufficiently long to implement all components of the programme- and hence to learn lessons on the basis of the experiences of a full programme cycle.

**Lesson and proposal for improvement:** The project period should be increased. A new area-based project should be 3-4 years in length in order to identify and learn on the basis of project impacts on macro-level change. This is especially important if UNDP staff will be recruited, as UN recruitment processes tend to be protracted and can cause significant delays in project implementation.

### **Income Generating Activities**

- Most obvious benefit of programming to date is in the area of VSLs and IGAs. Most other projects are too recent to measure impacts.
- Increase the number of projects for armed/disarmed youth as well as the ratio of male youth focussed programming to women/elderly focussed programming. Focus perhaps 70% of IGA resources on disarmed youth; and 30% of resources on women, disabled and elders' groups, with a view to achieving an even greater impact on drawing perpetrators of violence into income generating activities and hopefully reducing spoiling incidents
- Take proactive steps to engage with and mobilize youth (and expose them to examples of successes to date), using VSL beneficiaries as ambassadors to encourage new participants to form groups
- Increase overall number of groups to build momentum
- Support successful groups to recruit new warriors through some kind of incentive mechanism (for example: groups that recruit or mentor new candidates can receive additional support or groups can compete with one another on the basis of new recruits, number of new groups formed or profits generated). Prizes and additional incentives can be awarded on the basis of this success, in public during peace rallies/public celebrations.
- There is a need to create incentives to link formerly conflicting communities (joint projects between conflicting parties contribute more to the overall objectives of building peace and security). This can be done through a deliberate joint conflict analysis and planning meeting involving community stakeholders from both communities- including the potential spoilers. Resources for such

processes MUST be available in advance and as a deliberate component of the programme. Delays in securing funds and delays in implementation can cause tremendous tensions once commitments have been made. In some cases, these processes can take the place of more conventional peace meetings- where commitments have to do with verbal promises as opposed to commitments to joint programming that will create shared resources or assets/goods.

- There is a need to standardize approach to VSL/IGA across districts as not all beneficiaries benefitted equally under past programming. For example, some received start-up capital for VSL associations and other groups used only their own contributions. It would be very interesting to survey all 88 VSL groups to chart the training and capital inputs against their generation of profits in order to identify which factors are most important in explaining the success of VSL groups (level of capital and hence scale of borrowing vs complete ownership etc.)
- Consider systematically providing armed youth with a package of support, including VSL training and start-up support, one additional business opportunity (mill, Pond, cereal banking etc.) as well as some immediate support as an incentive (iron sheets and ox ploughs were proposed by formerly armed youth). In this way, livelihood options are not contingent on a single source of income and support is diversified in order to avoid shocks and failure. Some of the groups interviewed had project components that were failing as a result of seasonal or market forces- as with any business venture,- so providing the maximum protection against such shocks in order to encourage individuals to remain with their groups in pursuit of profit is very important.

Reported breakdown of beneficiaries through UNDP-supported groups is as follows:

District	Disarmed Youth Groups	Women's' Groups	Mixed Groups	Elders Groups
Kotido	1	3	10	0
Kaabong	5	5	3	0
Moroto	1	3	10	0
Abim	0	14*	0	1
Nakapiripirit	11	15	6	0
Total # of groups	28	40	29	1
Extrapolated # of beneficiaries @ 30 persons per group on average.	840	1200	870	30
Total: approximately 2940 beneficiaries				

\* Not all groups in Abim received support promised through the project.

### Peace Meetings and Cross Border Activities

- Peace meetings are able to demonstrate short –term gains in terms of reductions in violence. As a whole, however, agreements reached have proven to be tactical in nature and contribute little to longer terms stability and sustainable development. In some cases, the failure of peace processes to create and maintain common assets

between communities or to offer material support for IGAs/projects as a deliberate component of the processes, may actually cause harm. Consequently, the focus on stand-alone peacebuilding activities in evidence from the first 12 months of programming in most districts, should be dramatically reduced as a proportion of the budget and replaced with peace/planning meetings where communities conduct conflict analysis together and identify a recipe for conflict sensitive programming that will contribute towards satisfying their common needs and creating common goods/assets as well as individual stakes in maintaining the peace.

- Ensure that if peace processes are funded through the programme that they target armed youth directly, as opposed to other stakeholders. Ensure that any such engagement is used as an opportunity to draw armed youth into productive programming by ensuring that resources are available to create common goods/projects between communities and to provide project incentives (IGA group membership opportunities) for youth who agree to ‘come out’.
- Cross border programming with Southern Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia is required in the following areas or could benefit from the following activities:
  - i. Development of joint monitoring mechanisms, through NGOs and District peace committees or CEWARN if their implementation can be improved;
  - ii. Establishment of marking and tracing best practices to ensure that surrendered weapons are properly disposed of;
  - iii. Sharing of Livestock best practices in areas of branding, registration, electronic tagging, marketing controls with neighbouring countries;
  - iv. Coordinated development of border roads and Joint border patrolling between Uganda, Kenya and Sudan at a minimum;
  - v. Exchanges of liaison officers between Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces/Kenyan Armed Forces/Ethiopian National Defence Forces as disarmament liaisons or by creating a ‘Joint Disarmament Monitoring Team’ for disarmament (this could be coordinated through Small Arms and Light Weapons National Focal Points, Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control or under the auspices of the ICGLR ‘Cluster 3 disarmament’);
  - vi. A joint military, Police, Customs and Immigration, MFA meeting on border cooperation and strengthening could be held in Karamoja in Kidepo National Park or Moroto;
  - vii. Joint activities of and exchanges between Anti Stock Theft Units (now extant in Kenya, Uganda and Southern Sudan); among others.

Moving this scale of cross-border programming forward will require dedicated staff-possibly embedded within the National Small Arms Focal Point or as a joint UNDP-GoU sub-project.

**Labour-based Activities**

- Labour based projects are delayed, have suffered from inadequate technical support and led to an erosion of confidence amongst community members who participated in the planning processes.
- In the one case where a supposedly labour based road project took place, it seems that the contractor switched to a machine-based modality in mid-stream and in the target community local government representatives claimed that nobody had been employed through the project.
- In the one completed project, no standards were set in the contract to specify what labour-based programming would consist of.
- If they are strategically important they should take place whether or not they are labour based (roads mainly).
- Labour based projects, where possible, should consist of joint planning between communities in conflict in order to create shared assets and stakes in peace- and hence social pressure to maintain access to shared access through peaceful coexistence and contact in the maintenance and use of the shared assets.

## Chapter 5

### Overall Conclusions

#### Relevance

The program was and is still highly relevant to the Karamoja region, to Uganda and to the sub-region. The sub-region still has massive challenges associated with addressing peace and security both internally between clans, ethnic groups and across districts within each of the neighbouring states- as well as challenges associated with weak borders and establishing collective security across international borders. The project represents an attempt to support the state to assert control over, and bring development to, what has historically been an under-governed and underserved area, largely considered as peripheral by central governments of both the colonial and post-colonial periods. The adjacent areas of Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya suffer from similar insecurity and underdevelopment.

Recent attention to the overall problematique of underdevelopment and insecurity in Karamoja by the Government of Uganda, donors and development agencies is beginning to show dividends and seems poised to break this historical trend and draw the sub-region into mainstream markets and development strategies. As everywhere, this State-building process has proven complicated, messy and costly in terms of lives. Success, (if this is measured as a function of engagement with modernity, diversification of lifestyle choices, improvements in lifespan and other development indicators- as opposed to notions of ‘cultural’ preservation) however, will ultimately depend on sustained engagement, massive resources over time, the continuation and expansion of more comprehensive and integrated approaches now being attempted (linking security, resettlement, service delivery, border strengthening and development) as well as a regional approach linking programming to similar political and material ‘progress’ in Southern Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia- as well as regional integration generally- in areas that have essentially functioned as war economies.

UNDP has been at the frontline of this ‘stabilisation’ process and is still one of governments’ most strategic partners in this area. Her relevance is undeniable and assistance still much required. Although, truly dramatic results have yet been achieved in terms of tangible outcomes on peace and security through the programme thus far, it is appreciated that, on a conceptual basis (and with the provisos of the previous paragraph) programming is focusing in the right directions- despite the process being slow- and that lessons learned during the current phase can usefully be built upon to improve the lives of Karamojong- if implementation modalities allow for a better integrated and accelerated programming.

#### Impact

Implementation of the program was delayed and has been further affected by UNDPs institutional restructuring. The current evaluation although considered as an end of project review was initially supposed to be a Mid-term review. On the ground however, project activities



continue, and many of them (especially the IGAs) were not more than 4 months old. In all likelihood the project will require a no-cost extension in order to maintain momentum and continue delivery until a successor programme can be brought online (8-10 months). As such the impact cannot be conclusively ascertained on mere outputs and short term outcomes of access usage and perceived community satisfaction or dissatisfaction. We can conclude, based primarily on observations from the field and the testimony of beneficiaries themselves, that the program has a significant potential for positively influencing individual and communal behaviours and values towards sustainable peace and security.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

The project has suffered from inadequate staffing at the Karamoja-level, both as a result of having had a weak candidate in the position of programme manager during the start-up of the project as well as inadequate supervision of National UNV staff up until their removal in late 2009. Time has been lost in recruitment and restructuring of the program. This affected the efficiency of the project. Although currently, experienced leadership and management has been restored to the project, useful project time was already lost during crisis management in restructuring, including recruitment, and orientations. This explains partly why a number of project activities were not done and/or are behind schedule. The efficiency of the project was and is still affected by inadequacy in human resources not in the 'real terms' of numbers but rather the structures. Unclear implementation policies including reporting lines and chains of command while seemingly clear have led to confusion with consequences of partial ownership of the project by different stakeholders including the implementing agencies themselves. Coordinators of 3 districts were reported to be working in 'isolation' and drawing command from UNDP rather than the respective CAOs to whom they are answerable.

Therefore, project management structures, including reporting lines, chain of command, monitoring and planning processes need to be redesigned as a collaboration between UNDP, OPM and district officials/ministry of local government in order to achieve a rationalized, mutually agreeable and efficient implementation of future programmes. Future project staff, regardless of management arrangements that are developed, require adequate training and supervision and joint induction alongside Local Government counterparts to ensure teamwork and delivery.

The project effectiveness was assessed on whether the intended objectives, and outcomes have been achieved. Earlier in the report, it was observed that only part of the programme, as initially conceptualised and designed, was implemented. Tangible peace dividends although visible, the capacity of local governments in Karamoja to undertake peace building and conflict transformation still has only been partially developed. Lasting and attributable results from Peace building activities funded through the project are rare, and where they occurred, produced tactical and short term gains in terms of security in most districts, with a number of notable exceptions. Overall, peace building activities required more depth of programming in the area of establishing longer-term conflict management mechanisms and could be improved by adding a number of the following components: create and provide secretariat support for committees linking grass roots actors/stakeholders with government structures and committees; joint monitoring mechanisms between belligerents and neutral parties to build confidence; conflict

sensitive joint activities/projects to buttress agreements by creating mutual gains/benefits and shared community assets/goods/stakes in peace; and, activities deliberately drawing spoilers into programme activities).

Within the objective for district local governments to undertake cross border peace building initiatives, a degree of success is primarily evident between Kenya and Uganda where peace building was a deliberate component of a broader plan involving LGs , Security forces, communities, NGOs and the UN to re-settle, provide security and carry out income generating activities. District like Nakapiririt have developed close and positive working collaboration between local governments at both national and international borders.

The empowering women (and to a lesser degree, disarmed youth) to positively contribute to peace building and peaceful conflict resolution objective was as previously discussed the most effective in altering individual choices towards peace and security- and in this area lies the programmes' greatest accomplishments to date. Although an estimated 2,940 people have benefited from the IGAs, the demand is still overwhelming as the number of vulnerable and demobilized persons demanding for quick impact stipends and jobs as part of the re-integration incentive package is bigger than the UNDP project planned and can effectively offer.

Insecurity and still existing acts of cattle theft affected both the efficiency and effectiveness of the project. A sizeable proportion of the budget is spent on ensuring security of the implementers as well as safety in routine operations like handling finances and access to fuel which is related in some instances to lack of basic infrastructure in some operational areas. In a few cases political interference was cited but the evaluators were of view that it hardly affected outcomes.

Determining the cost-effectiveness of the project has been difficult, with most measurable project activities taking place only recently -within the past 6-10 months. It is likely that in a small number of cases project funds have been misappropriated by project staff, requiring a further investigation by UNDP, GoU and law enforcement agencies in Karamoja.

### **'Best Practices' and 'Lessons Learned'**

1. Best practices attributable to the programme are primarily evident in the area of income generating activities. The programme support has been able to change the attitudes of individuals and groups towards participation in non-violent livelihoods. In this sense, even modest support through IGAs has, thus far, been sufficient to contribute to a reduction in potential conflict and to support the overall goals of the project. Since these gains are still short-term in nature, they should be bolstered with further support to insulate beneficiaries against market or environmental shocks.
2. Infrastructure projects, if strategic in nature, can have multiple benefits in the areas of security and development, regardless of whether they are labour-based or not.

3. Peace meetings (in Abim district in particular) have been used strategically in conjunction with resettlement, deployment of security forces and livelihoods support as a package.
4. Where 'integrated' programming has taken place and has been successful, it coincides with areas where Local Government and Programme staff have enjoyed good daily cooperation, have shared a common vision and have enabled one another- suggesting that staff selection on the basis of competency and joint induction/planning between UN staff and government counterparts is critical to the success of programming.
5. Considering the past history of UNDP programming in Karamoja, as regards linkages with disarmament, as well as current violence taking place in Karamoja, hazards of collaborative programming between UNDP and the UPDF remain. While the current approach to collaboration (based on loose and informal information sharing, provision of security escorts for programme staff and limited joint planning) appears to be working on the ground, this appears to be at least partially because of the presence of a committed and dynamic UPDF Brigade Commander and an independent UPDF development programming capacity (in itself unusual for a military organisation). While support for JLOS and security actors in the region is correct and strategic in order to improve conditions over time, ongoing allegations of human rights violations carried out by the UPDF may jeopardize closer collaboration and places UNDP in an ethical dilemma.

### **Recommendations for Future Programming:**

Evidence-based programming: Future programming needs to be evidence-based. The proposed area-based programme should be initiated through the collection of baseline information in order to measure the impact of the project over time and facilitate attribution of results to activities.

Integrated Programming: The programme logic should be based on the Local Government's plans for providing security and livelihoods options to both existing and re-settling populations. It should ensure that programme activities feed into a comprehensive plan for delivering security, including road access, support for JLOS actors (including infrastructure, transport and communications), Community Policing and livelihoods support targeting armed youth and women (with an increased focus on armed youth- as much as 70% of livelihoods/IGA focused resources). Community level development projects intended to provide incentives and opportunities for re-integration must as a matter of urgency be embraced at a broader national level programming, as over whelmingly expressed by the communities. This will pervert the potential for retribution and re-engagement in the renewed cattle raids.

Future integrated programming should integrate support for roads, police posts and communications equipment, support for the judiciary through one planning session/process- ideally linked with international actors (Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya) as well as UNDP programmes in those Countries in order to prioritize collaboration and linked-up programming over the next 3 years. Broadly speaking, programming in the border regions of these four countries should be carried out according to a common framework and as part of a stabilisation, security and development strategy for the sub-region- especially considering the current trends in Karamoja and the possible scenarios for regional trade, road/pipeline construction and security dynamics resulting from the probably creation of a new state in Southern Sudan. This does not require the development of a regional programme per se, but does require complementary programming relating to border programming in the areas of infrastructure development, support for the security sector and for peacebuilding or there is a hazard of contributing to instability by supporting programming that will exacerbate conflict dynamics or create security imbalances/vacuums.

Peacebuilding: Support should be more strategic and should include rapid reaction logistical support for Local Government and security organs and further cross-border meetings and collaboration. Engagement should begin by hosting a technical-level cross-border meeting between UNDP Uganda, Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia. [See the section on potential cross-border activities in Overall Evaluation Findings] Where peace meetings do take place, they should include joint planning between conflicting communities to generate conflict sensitive programming that will create mutual gains. Resources for such programming must be allocated in advance to avoid delays that could create tensions.

Programmatic scope: There is a likelihood of being encouraged towards focusing on government priorities of water and food although this is not a UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery area of specialisation. UNDP should focus on areas of expertise and ensure that food and water related programming is linked up with the appropriate UN partner organisations with comparative advantage in these areas (WFP, FAO and UNICEF) rather than attempting to move into these programming areas themselves.

## **Annex 1: Terms of Reference for Mid Term Evaluation for Building Sustainable Peace and Development in Karamoja Project**

### ***Purpose of the evaluation***

The purpose of the midterm evaluation is to establish factors affecting the efficient implementation of the Building Sustainable Peace and Development Project in Karamoja. The evaluation should lead to a clear understanding of what is working and what is not, and also provide necessary management information for decision making to enable the project to achieve its set goal and objectives. In particular, UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) Unit, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), beneficiaries and local governments in Karamoja, who are the project implementers want to understand how project design, project start-up, implementation issues including (procurement, recruitment, management structure, staff capacity, culture and operational guidelines) are impacting on achievement of project results. The evaluation should provide recommendations on how best to strengthen project implementation.

### ***Description of the social, economic and political context***

Karamoja sub-region is located in the north-eastern part of Uganda and is made up of the districts Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Kotido, Kaabong and Abim districts. The natural harsh semi-arid environment, security, development and human rights in the sub-region are profound. Due to the hostile physical environment of Karamoja, livestock production entails competition for grazing pastures and water, especially during the dry season. This leads to intra and inter-ethnic conflicts, which have also involved the raiding of livestock. Over the years, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Karamoja, had not only intensified inter and intra-ethnic conflicts in Karamoja, it had also increased the levels and scale of the violence, affecting not only Karamoja, but also all the districts neighbouring Karamoja. The conflicts over access to resources had now been transformed into conflicts involving armed cattle raiding driven by economic interests of primitive accumulation. Cattle raiding is mainly orchestrated by powerful ‘warlords’ within the various ethnic groups, who not only profit from selling raided livestock, but had also chipped away at the powers of traditional authorities who in the past monopolised the decision making over the commitment of raids. This has become a major obstacle to the realisation of human security in Karamoja and neighbouring districts.

The nature of the armed conflicts associated with cattle raids, the human development indicators of Karamoja are far worse than the rest of the geographical north of Uganda, which has suffered 20 years of insurgency caused by the rapacious Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) that has waged a war with intention to overthrow the government. According to the Ministry of Health (MoH), Nakapiripirit District has the poorest outpatient attendance in government health units in the whole country. In the list of the bottom 10 performers in terms of the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP), Kaabong and Moroto Districts were at very bottom. The districts of Karamoja performed poorest in terms of household latrine coverage, deliveries of babies in health centres. The biannual health and nutrition assessments showed that the entire Karamoja districts were only slightly above the emergency level cut-off point of 9.8, while the data for the rest of the districts in conflict afflicted Northern Uganda showed significant improvements.

The 2004 Baseline Survey for the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics shows that 70% of the population in the 18 districts in the NUSAF region were living below the poverty line. Poverty was less pronounced in Teso region (66%), followed by Acholi sub-region (73%), and most pronounced in Karamoja region (82%). Poverty intensity was directly associated with the long period of insecurity experienced. An

analysis of expenditure patterns of households in the NUSAF sub-region showed that the share of food/drink and tobacco consumption accounted for about 70% of the total household expenditure, which was higher than the national average of 44% in 2002/2003 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS).

### ***Description of the subject of the evaluation***

The project development objective or overall goal is: “*To contribute to the Promotion of Human Security, Peace and Stability in order to create conditions for Sustainable Development in Karamoja*”. In order to achieve the overall goal, the project has four strategic interventions:

5. Strengthen capacity of local governments in Karamoja to undertake peace building and conflict transformation
6. Empower women to positively contribute to peace building and peaceful conflict resolution in Karamoja
7. Support district local governments to undertake development interventions that enhance peace building and peaceful conflict resolution in Karamoja
8. Collaborate with the district local governments to undertake cross-border peace building initiatives with pastoral groups in countries neighbouring Karamoja

The evaluation will cover all the four strategic objectives, focussing mainly on projects outputs which are local government capacity building related.

The project was designed contribute to the overall Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). KIDDP is a development programme that elaborates the Karamoja component of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. The PRDP provides the overall strategic framework for interventions in Northern Uganda, including Karamoja. The project contributes to the achievement of the overall objective of the KIDDP, which builds upon the PRDP. The focus of the project is capacity development of district local governments, which in a very special way, prepares the districts the implementation of KIDDP. The evaluation will therefore cover the intervention in the wider context of its contribution to the KIDPP and PRDP.

### ***Evaluation Objectives and Scope***

The evaluation will cover project design, implementation, project management, project results, resource utilization; issues of sustainability, lessons learnt and intended results of the project. The evaluation will also cover the UNDP Moroto sub-office. The evaluation will cover the time period 2007 to 2009 (to-date). In terms of geographical coverage, the evaluation will focus on all districts of Karamoja i.e. Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Kotido, Kaabong and Abim districts in which the project was implemented. The target beneficiaries are the local governments and the population of Karamoja region that the project intended to assist.

### ***Evaluation Questions***

The following key questions need to be addressed in the evaluation:

1. How appropriate was the design of the project in addressing the development problem?
  - a. Are there any improvements to the design that can be made to enhance achievement of project objectives?
2. How relevant is the project theory (the conceptual thinking of peace building for Karamoja) in addressing the development challenge in Karamoja?
  - a. Are there other efficient peace building philosophies that could be adopted for Karamoja?
3. To what extent are the project institutional arrangements functional and responsive (UNDP Kampala office, Moroto Sub-office, OPM, and the local governments)?

- a. What factors are responsible for institutional arrangement functionality?
4. To what extent did project start-up activities prepare the project staff, district local governments, OPM and the beneficiaries?
5. How efficient is the project implementation?
  - a. How cost effective is the project implementation (for details see)
  - b. What factors both positive and negative have influenced project implementation?
6. How functional is project management structure? What changes if any could improve on the management structure?
7. What operational challenges that were not anticipated have emerged? How would these be overcome (i.e. staffing, regulations/guidelines, procurement, communication and roles & responsibilities)?
8. What lessons have been learned to strengthen on implementation?

### ***Evaluation Approach***

The evaluator(s) are expected to use the following research methods among others:

1. A desk review of relevant documents (country programme, project document, annual work plans, progress reports, financial reports, etc.)
2. Interviews and consultations with relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries i.e. UNDP, OPM, local governments and beneficiaries
3. Comparison Analysis
4. Field visits to project beneficiaries

The detailed evaluation methodology rather cost effectiveness will be developed by the evaluation team and submitted to UNDP as part of the inception report for approval. The detailed methodology will include:

- Research methodology
- Data collection approach
- Data collection tools
- Data analysis techniques
- A table indicating how to get to answers for all evaluation questions.

### **Cost-effectiveness**

Cost-effectiveness analysis assumes that a certain benefit or output is desired, and that there are several alternative ways to achieve it. The basic question asked is, "Which of these alternatives is the cheapest or most efficient way to get this benefit?" By definition, cost-effectiveness analysis is comparative. For purposes of cost effectiveness in this evaluation, the team is expected to perform the following two analyses:

- i. The analysis should compare project outputs costs on the basis of some common scale for measuring output costs. Specifically whether the unit cost of the project is higher than what the other development partners<sup>8</sup> are paying. In this case, average development partners' cost may serve as the common scale.
- ii. The other analysis that is required is a comparison between the project budget and actual costs. The question here is whether the project costs are consistently higher than the budgets<sup>9</sup>.

### ***Expected products***

The following key products are expected from the evaluation team:

- Inception Report including detailed methodology

<sup>8</sup> Development partners operating in Karamoja area

<sup>9</sup> The evaluation team OPM and UNDP will agree on the list items to be included under the cost-effectiveness analysis

- Field work debriefing before draft report writing
- Draft Evaluation Report
- PowerPoint Presentation for UNDP and stakeholders
- Final Evaluation Report

The final evaluation report structure will be guided by UNDP evaluation report format and quality control checklist.



**Annex 2: List of Individuals Consulted**

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
	Centre	
1.	Ssebatindira Rose	Assistant RR CPRU, UNDP Uganda
2.	Matagaro Pamela	Regional Manager
3.	Ossiya Debbie	Programme Analyst, OPM. Building Sustainable Peace and Development in Karamoja Project
4.	Nabakooza Agnes	Project Assistant - OPM Building Sustainable Peace and Development in Karamoja Project
5.	Waduwa Flavia	Undersecretary Pacification and Development OPM Uganda
	<b>MOROTO</b>	
1.	Chuna Moses	Assistant CAO- Moroto
2.	Ouma Steven	CAO
3.	Lochap Peter	LCV Chairperson Moroto
4.		RDC
5.	Brigadier Kankiriho Patrick	Regional Commander – Eastern Region
6.	Simon Peter	Councillor
7.	Opio Edward (Dr)	Livestock Specialist FAO
8.	Okon Edward (Dr)	Livestock Consultant FAO
9.	Bana Elizabeth	Chairperson Nakoreto Women Group
10.	Nangiro	Nakoreto Women Group
11.	Lokoni Asher	Nakoreto Women Group
12.	Longok Christine	Nakoreto Women Group
13.	Logono Madalena	Nakoreto Women Group
14.	Ewaru Norah	Promoter, Moroto Association of Disarmed Warriors
15.	Ocuge Peter	Chair person, Moroto Association of Disarmed Warriors
16.	22 youth Warriors	Moroto Association of Disarmed Warriors
17.	Achier Peter	Program Officer Matheniko Development Forum
18.	Jimmy	Moroto Private Sector Development
19.	Engborg Kasper	HAH/Head Sub Office UN OCHA
20.	Lakidi Gordon	National Program Officer UNOCHA
21.	Contractor	Nakiror Market
22.	Komakech Innocent Dr	Program Officer WHO Moroto
23.	Aleper Simon Peter	Former Zonal Project Coordinator Abim District (UNV)
24.	Sharma Narinder	Chief Moroto Field Office UNICEF
25.	Abur Juliet	Program Coordinator IRC
26.	Abongir Patrick	Conflict Development Manager IRC
27.	Sankoh Bai Mankay	Deputy Program Manager , WFP
28.	Matovu Patrick (Major )	Commissar – UPDF Eastern region
29.	Obwona Okot	Regional Police Commander -Moroto
30.	Kabuye	Regional CID
31.	Edurati Franscis	Regional Police Commander
32.	Aumo	Motor Transport Officer
33.	Mangu	Regional Mechanic Officer
34.	Odido James	Deputy Coordinator – Law and Order KIDDP
35.	Magombe	Ag Deputy Police Commander
36.	Atibun	Regional Traffic Officer
37.	Sekikya	OC Stores

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
38.	Outeke Joseph	OC Prisons
39.	Fowler Harriet	NUREP
40.	Kellermen Monica	Program Officer GTZ Karamoja
	<b>ABIM DISTRICT</b>	
1.	Ocen John	AR and Sons (contractor service provision)
2.	Olwit Atim Nelson	Assistant CAO
3.	Awir Martin Ongom	Parish Chief , Awach – Lotuke sub county
4.	Obonyo Kalisto Paco Paco	Parish Councillor and Elder Awach Lotuke s/county
5.	Awilli Sande	Youth Councillor
6.	Aketch Christine	Penywir Womens Group
7.	Members of Penywir Women gp	22 members names not listed )
8.	Members of Kucber Women Gp	28 members names not listed
9.	Members of Kaleme Women Gp	6 members, names not listed
10.	Akong Helen, Kucber Women Gp	Chairperson, Kucber Women Group
11.	Jing Pari Group	20 members names not listed
12.	Pachan Ambrose	
13.	Norman Achieno	Chairman
14.	Aleper Simon Peter	UNV Coordinator of Program Abim
15.	Obwire Elma	District Police Commissioner
16.	Captain B.B Lendi	UPDF
17.	David Drichi	DISO
	<b>KOTIDO DISTRICT</b>	
1.	Ocen Jackson Okoth	Personnel Officer
2.	Ogwang John Bosco Maxwell	Accountant to UNDP Program
3.	Oyuge Grace	LCV Chairperson
4.	Musinguzi Godfrey	DISO and for RDC
5.	Opio George	Program Officer Mercy Corps
6.	Koruma KonKofa Samuel	Chief of Party Mercy Corps
7.	Chepes Noro	Mercy Corps
8.	Ouko Wangoole Joseph	Oxfam
9.	Ssewava Richard	WFP Kotido
10.	10 members	Kotido Positive Living Association (KOPLA)
11.	Acan Betty	Chairperson MOGOS Women grp- Nakaperimoru
12.	Moding Grace	Secretary MOGO Women group- Nakaperimoru
13.	Brian Etuko	S/County Chief - Nakaperimoru
14.	Loluk Martin	MOGOS Womens Group - Nakaperimoru
15.	Achilla Magdalene	MOGOS Womens Group - Nakaperimoru
16.	30 members	MOGOS Womens Group - Nakaperimoru
17.	Akullo Sophie	Vice Chairperson - Nakaperimoru S/C
18.	Amojong Doreen	Secretary , Aporu Women's Group Panyangara
19.	Nadim Maria	Treasurer Aporu Womens' Group Panyangara S/C
20.	Lodya Francis	Mobilizer – Aporu Womens Group Panyangara S/C
21.	Alana Sylvia	Committee Member Aporu Womens Group
22.	Adong Lily	Committee Member Panyangara S/C
23.	25 members	Aporu Womens Group -Panyangara
24.	Loboyi Paul	Napupum cattle Trader Group – PanyangaraS/C
25.	12 members	Napupum Cattle Traders' Group – Panyangara S/C

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
26.	Olweny Charles	Councillor - Rom Rom Group
27.	Keno James Chinese	LC3- Rom Rom Group
28.	Abong Jonathan	Chairperson – Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
29.	Lokonyeri Mathe	Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
30.	Nanel Simon Peter	Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
31.	Lomara Aporoway	Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
32.	Aporu Lucy	Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
33.	8 other members	Rom Rom Gp – Kotido S/C
34.	Lotyang	Kotido Disarmed Youth group
35.	Omongo Robby	Former UNV –Kotido Coordinator
	<b>KAABONG DISTRICT</b>	
1.	Lukyamu Thomas	UNDP focus person/District Information Officer
2.	Lokoro Joseph	LCV Chairperson , Sec Education and Finance
3.	Ngaruye George	DPC
4.	Insp Barry Paul	Officer In Charge Station
5.	Okello Robert	DISO / Rep RDC
6.	Abach Peter	LC3 Chairperson Karenga S/C
7.	Lokol Jino	S/C Chief Karenga S/C
8.	Lolemu Lucy	Chairperson Karenga Women Group
9.	Acan RoseMary	Secretary Karenga Women Group
10.	Lukwa	Treasurer Karenga Women Group
11.	10 women	Members , Karenga Women Group
12.	Komol Joseph	LC3 Chairperson
13.	35 Members	Members Kathile Disarmed Group
14.	Lokwanga Mark	LC2 Lokwakarmoi – Kalapata S/C
15.	Tutu Joseph	Retired Office – Village Committee Lokwarakarmoi
16.	Langoli Hilary	Village Health Trainer – Lokwakarmoi
17.	Acayo Edith Leila	Vice Chairperson Kaabong Women Moslem Group
18.	Loitaka Zainabu	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
19.	Menmaji	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
20.	Nobora	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
21.	Losile Sarah	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
22.	Lonyikoi Ibrahim	LC1 – Kaabong TC
23.	Nagenyi Amina	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
24.	Lochoro Shabani	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
25.	Ongori Fatuma	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
26.	10 men and women	Kaabong Women Moslem Group
27.	Moding Mark	Contractor –Ligoth –Loyoro Rd
28.	Okol Rashid	Contractor – Fish pond and Fish enterprise
29.	Aluuka Francisc	CAO – Kaabong District
	<b>NAKAPIRIPIRIT</b>	
1.	Achiyo Denis	Senior Probation Officer /focus person
2.	Napajja Andrew Keem	RDC – Nakapiripirit district
3.	Nangiro	LCV Chairperson

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>
4.	Ilukol Jobs	Deputy CAO- Nakapiripirit district
5.	Topos Hilary R	S/county Chief – Nabilatuk
6.	Haji Abdallah	Director/Patron – Jua Kali Youth Association
7.	Christine	Treasurer - Jua Kali Youth Association
8.	Hassan	Jua Kali Youth Association
9.	Youssuf	Jua Kali Youth Association
10.	Abdallah	Jua Kali Youth Association
11.	20 members (names not recorded)	Jua Kali Youth Association
12.	Awasi Lin	Chairperson –Mothers Union Group - Nabilatuk
13.	Nangiro Rebecca	Member - Mothers Union Group - Nabilatuk
14.	Nakiru Joyce	Member
15.	Nangiro Rachael	Member
16.	Aisu Ann	Member
17.	Mutonyi Deborah	Member
18.	Grace	Namalu S/County Chief
19.	Loburu Robert	Chairperson Namalu Youth Bicycles Repairs Association
20.	12 Members (full names not recorded )	Namalu Youth Bicycles Repairs Association
21.	Lokales Women Group	
22.	Pulkol Hellen	Chairperson , Namalu Mothers group
23.	Mothers Union Group	Namalu sub county

### Annex 3: Evaluation Program, Activities, and generic Issues discussed

<u>Date</u>	<u>Activities /Method</u>	<u>Issues</u>
<b>Thursday 8/04/10</b>	Inception meeting – discussion with Project Management Unit , Kampala	Preliminaries including:: Project de-brief, task description, work plans , methodology and tools
<b>Friday 9/04/10</b>	i) Interviews with focal persons (Karamoja project) ii) Meeting with RR UNDP	Field work plan and methodological approaches Courtesy call and de-brief
<b>Monday 12/04/10</b>	Meeting with Frank Muhereza (Consultant) Project author	Discussion on design of the project, goals, objectives and intended outcome
<b>Wednesday 14/04/10</b>	i) Meeting with LCV, RDC, CAO, Police, Prisons & UPDF in Moroto ii) FAO office Moroto Iii) FGD with Nakoreto Women’s Group iv) FGD with Moroto Association of Dis –Armed Warriors v) Private Sector MADEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issues on project design, implementation and administrative challenges</li> <li>• FAO working collaboration with UNDP and areas of collaboration</li> <li>• FGD with 6 members of Nakoreto</li> <li>• Group dynamics , project implementation, benefits, challenges</li> </ul>
<b>Thursday 15/04/10</b>	i) Meeting with Chairperson, RDC councillor and members of parliament ii) Field visit Nakiloro Market s iii) One on one discussion , coordinator Abim iv) Discussion with WHO representatives , UNICEF Chief, IRC staff , WFP , Assist Regional Division Commander	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issues on project design, implementation and administrative challenges</li> <li>• WHO working collaboration with UNDP, lessons learnt from</li> <li>• Discussion of project objectives , perceived benefits and , challenges in design</li> <li>• Issues of collaboration and challenges and opportunities</li> <li>• CIMIC centres, Military support challenges</li> </ul>
<b>Friday 16/04/10</b>	i) FGD with 15 senior Police Officers ,Moroto ii) Visit to Prison and discussion with prison leaders iii) Discussion with NUREP rep	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law and Order issues in Moroto, UNDP support, police challenges</li> <li>• Child welfares, civilian courts and UNDP support , challenges with Moroto Prison</li> <li>• Working relations with UNDP, Capacity issues in the district, policy issues and challenges</li> </ul>
<b>Saturday &amp; Sunday 17/04/10</b>	Work from hotel, travel to Abim	Pre-view of information, and review of work plans
<b>Monday 19/04/10</b>	i) Discussion with ABIM leadership and representatives for coordination including ACAO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FGD with leadership on implementing issue</li> <li>• Project implementation, challenges and <b>lessons learnt</b></li> </ul>
<b>Tuesday 20/04/10 to 22<sup>nd</sup> April</b>	i) Discussion with suppliers and contractors ii) FGD with 25 members Penywir Women’s group iii) FGD with 30 members of Kucber Women’s Group iv) Meeting with 15 members of	<p>FGD with Lotuke Sub county leadership</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion on UNDP assistance and livelihood before and after UNDP assistance, benefits, lessons , Challenges in the peace development process,</li> <li>• Prevention of conflicts , livelihoods</li> </ul>

Date	Activities /Method	Issues
	Kaleme Women's Group v) 22 members of Jim Pari Group	
<b>Wednesday 21/04/10 -22<sup>nd</sup></b>	i) Meeting and discussion with Kotido Leadership including LCV chairperson and ACAO , DISO ii) FGDs with other UN agencies and NGOs including Mercy Corps leadership, Oxfam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Program management, UNDP support, district challenges,</li> <li>• Security issues, committee support , peace in Kotido, and law enforcement</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Friday 23/04/10</b>	i) Discussion with WFP Kotido, ii) FGD KOPLA 10 members iii) Magos Women Group FGD with 35 members in Nakaperimoru iv) APORU Women's Group – Panyangara 25 members v) Napumpum Cattle Traders group 15 members vi) FGD with ROM ROM gp met with 20 members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Type of assistance from UNDP</li> <li>• Benefits of the program comparing before and after UNDP</li> <li>• Selection of priorities and implementation and implementation challenges</li> <li>• Relationship between UNDP program and peace status in Kotido</li> <li>• Income and alternative livelihood</li> <li>• Support from the local governments and other agencies</li> </ul>
<b>Saturday 24/04/10 –Sunday 25/04/10</b>	i) Meeting with a few members and rep of Kotido Dis –armed group , ii) One on one discussion with former UNV Kotido Coordinator ii) Travel to Kaabong	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion of UNDP assistance and group dynamics</li> <li>• Issues of implementing and coordination from point of view of a coordinator , challenges, lessons to learn , individual perception</li> </ul>
<b>Monday 26/04/10</b>	i) Meeting and discussion with Kaabong District Leadership including Acting Coordinator, Chairperson, ii) Meet security persons include RDC, DISO, DPC, OC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discuss program, implementation , successes , gaps and challenges</li> <li>• Issues of security and peace in Kaabong and across borders from Sudan, Kenya,</li> <li>• Issues of movement across borders with Dodoth , Jie and</li> </ul>
<b>Tuesday 27/04/10</b>	The following groups were visited i) 15 members of Karenga Women's group ii) Chairperson, LC3 and Sub county Chief of Karenga S/c iii) Visit to Fish ponds in karenga	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discuss program, implementation , successes , gaps and challenges</li> <li>• Issues of security and peace in Karenga.</li> <li>• Agriculture development projects</li> <li>• The UNDP supported project, why it was incomplete and challenges the groups face.</li> <li>• Linkages between UNDP support and peace issues</li> </ul>
<b>Wednesday 28/04/10</b> –	i) Kathile S/c meeting with LC3 and Kathile Dis-armed group 40 members ii) Visited Tukum Lokwarakamoi Rd in labour iii) FGD with the LCI and LC2 and 5 other members in Lwakaramoi iv) Kaabong Women Moslem Group , FGD with 18 persons v) Discussion with district	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issues of peace and sustainable development in Kalapata</li> <li>• Members perceived and real benefits from UNDP support,</li> <li>• Challenges</li> <li>• Discussed Labour based project , participation of communities, benefits, implementation and challenges with the communities</li> <li>• Project support and challenges in the</li> </ul>

Date	Activities /Method	Issues
	contractors for fish ponds and road construction vi) Courtesy visit to the CAO	project by Women's Moslem group • Discussion of UNDP support to the district and role of administrators
<b>Friday 30/04/10- to Sunday 02/05/2010</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Travel back to Moroto for document review and gap filling</li> <li>• Review documents from the field</li> <li>• Travel to Nakapiripirit</li> </ul>	Review field document and field program for final days
<b>Monday 3/05/10- Tuesday 04/05/2010</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting and discussion with Nakapiripirit Leadership, RDC, CAO, LCV Chairperson, ACAO,</li> <li>• Field visits Nabilatuk sub county and meeting S/C Chief</li> <li>• FGDs with the 25 members of Jua Kali Youth Association</li> <li>• Nabilatuk Mothers Union Group (8 members)</li> <li>• Namalu Youth Bicycel repairs (15 members )</li> <li>• Discussion with Namalu S/C Chief</li> </ul>	Project implementation, challenges, security issues in the district, and benefits from UNDP support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussed with group s , support by UNDP, benefits real and perceived from project support</li> <li>• Hand over of bicycles , visiting the groups projects , bricks, compressor, bicycle repairs, women with Karimojong Crafts</li> <li>• Discussed peace dividends associated with income generation projects</li> </ul>
<b>Wednesday 05/05/10</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion with Regional Commander and RDCs</li> <li>• Field Visit to Kakamongole Dam</li> </ul> Return to Kampala via Moroto	Issues of Peace and Security in Nakapiripirit Role of UPDF and collaboration Future of UNDP program support and UPDF collaboration
<b>Friday 07/05/2010</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meeting with Undersecretary , Pacification and Development OPM</li> <li>• Senior program officer</li> </ul>	Program implementation , coordination and challenges Budget, and finances, Reporting mechanisms and ownership of project

#### Annex 4: Selected Reference

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10. Republic of Uganda/ UNDP, 2010-2012; Building sustainable peace in Karamoja: Strengthening capacities for community security, rule of law and economic recovery. Draft Version 2 , 1<sup>st</sup> October 2009
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15. Abim District Local Government : Annual Work Plan (2008) *Building Peace and Sustainable Project , Karamoja*