RESULTS FOR KENYA PROGRAMME
END PHASE EVALUATION
RFP/UNDPKEN/002/2010

Draft Report 3

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<tr>
<td>AAPAM</td>
<td>African Association for Public Administration and Management</td>
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<td>AFCOP</td>
<td>African Community of Practice (on Management for Development Results)</td>
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<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CIDDA</td>
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<td>CPPMU</td>
<td>Central Planning and Project Monitoring Unit</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
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<td>DPM</td>
<td>Directorate of Personnel Management</td>
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<td>ERS</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Strategy</td>
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<td>ERSWEC</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Financial Management System</td>
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<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>GJLOS</td>
<td>Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Information, Education, Communication</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
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<td>National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>NPMF</td>
<td>National Performance Management Framework</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non State Actor</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>Office of the President</td>
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<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PAS</td>
<td>Performance Appraisal System</td>
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<td>RFKI</td>
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<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rapid Results Approach</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Purpose of this evaluation was to conduct an independent assessment to determine the outputs, outcomes, and impact of the Results for Kenyans Programme. The results were to be measured based on the following key programme documents:

- The PSR&DS Strategic Plan 2006-2008
- The Joint Statement of Intent signed between Development Partners (DP) and Government of Kenya (GoK); June 2006.
- Aide Memoirs produced following three Joint Reviews from 2007 and 2008
- The World Bank Institutional Reform and Capacity Building (IRCB) Project Appraisal Document (PAD) signed between the GoK and the World Bank
- The Annual Work Plans signed by GoK and UNDP

The evaluation was to ascertain the effectiveness, impact, the value for money in the application of availed resources and the prospects for the sustainability of the programme, among other facets. In assessing the impact, the consultants looked at the overall product; the extent of the programme outcomes at institutional and individual level, the programmatic results, new networks and linkages, stakeholders, culture, norms and other reinforcing factors that have arisen as a result of the programme. The evaluation further examined the programme impact by drawing on the experiences of the various MDAs (Ministries Departments and Agencies) interviewed during the study. The evaluation exercise also reviewed the programme design and degree of implementation against set objectives, particularly as contained in the PSR&DS Strategic Plan 2006-2008, the Joint Statement of Intent (JSI), and the PSR Work Plan for 2007-2009.

The evaluation used participatory and appreciative inquiry methodologies to assess the programme based on the five evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. The consultants used both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies including; in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, community meetings, service delivery exit questionnaires and case studies to study the outcome of the programme.

The general objective of the programme was to facilitate the delivery of efficient, effective and ethical results for the achievement of the targets contained in the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) through Results Based Management (RBM). The strategies for executing the programme included the formulation of an Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Strategy, Capacity Building Programme for Transforming the Public Service and National Performance Management Framework. This was supplemented by an institutional framework that includes the Cabinet Standing Committee on reforms, the National Steering Committee of Permanent Secretaries on reforms, the Ministerial Management Steering Committee of Heads of Departments, Ministerial/Institutional Management Units (MMUs) and RBM implementation tools such as Rapid Results Initiative (RRI), Performance Appraisal Systems (PAS), and the Management Accountability Framework (MAF).
The programme, among other things, sought to re-define the roles for the PSC and DPM as human resource management institutions and articulate the right levels of delegation of authority in human resource management to line ministries, articulate institutional arrangements and relations to enhance industrial relations between the public service and unions.

Through an effective information, education and communication (IEC) strategy, the government sought to communicate its messages to the public by enhancing collective responsibility towards achieving results, attaining a coherent strategic direction and effective implementation of the programme through team work and duty orientation. In order to do this effectively there was need for clarification and harmonization of the linkages between Results Based Management (RBM), Strategic Planning, Performance Contracting and Performance Appraisal Systems as well as their implementation modalities. In addition, there was the objective of engendering a culture of on-the-job training for a more practical and sustainable implementation of RBM.

The overall findings of this end phase evaluation of the Results for Kenya Programme (RFKP), indicate that most of the programme objectives were satisfactorily achieved, especially in establishing the requisite institutional framework, despite the very challenging operational environment.

Milestones include the preparation of the programme's scope of work, establishment of the secretariat, redefining the roles of PSC and DPM and delegation of authority in human resource management to line ministries, building on the relationships with trade unions, mainstreaming RBM through institutionalization of strategic planning in MDAs, initiation and sustained implementation of performance contracts, Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs), development of a Performance Appraisal System (PAS) and capacity building, including on the job training for some 2000 officers.

One of the discernible programme impacts has been a paradigm shift from process oriented service delivery to results orientation. This has been achieved through adoption of various tools including short and long term strategic planning in the government systems, performance contracting, transformative leadership training and engagement of stakeholders in reform activities. Additionally, the programme has catalysed the development of new strategies such as the human resource, IEC¹, Performance Management Framework, Rapid Results Approach and Public Service Reform Strategy. Other achievements include design of an M&E system for the PSR&DS and formulation of Public Sector Stakeholder Policy. The programme saw the creation of new networks and linkages internationally, regionally and nationally plus the establishment of new institutions such as the Management for Development Results (MFDR) and African Community of Practice² (AFCOP), which were created in collaboration with the UK School of Government, Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC), and AAPAM (African Association for Public Administration and Management).

¹ Though this has not been implemented
² On management for development results
The outcome extends to new norms of accountability and transparency being inculcated during the programme implementation, mentorship from the development partners; which contributed to enhanced innovation, team work, skills exchange and a more cordial relationship at the institutional and individual levels. To foster this cultural change new reform champions were also borne who are spearheading reform throughout the public service.

Nevertheless the review found that a number of challenges arose due to a lack of understanding of the programme mandate, inadequate succession planning and mentoring for key staff at the MDA levels. This was partly compounded by the lack of a conflict resolution mechanism within the programme, budgets not being strictly linked to resource allocation, low capacity levels to mainstream the RBM within the MDAs, as well as low capacity to monitor and document progress and key results attained during programme implementation.

On the whole, the evaluation concludes that the programme has had a significant impact on how the government does its business; particularly on how results are planned, implemented, evaluated and reported on. However more would have been achieved with stronger coordination and a more conducive working environment as the programme implementation, and by extension impact, was somewhat constrained by the series of institutional and key staff changes that took place during the period under review.

In view of the evident positive impact, especially in culture change among public servants and enhanced service delivery to Kenyans, the consultant recommends a continuation of the programme while strengthening the following areas in the next phase: i) Increased government funding to the programme for enhanced sustainability, ii) further donor support to complement Government efforts iii) more stringent application of resources in line with budgets iv) more capacity building to increase change champions within the MDAs, iv) enhancing of the PSTD internal capacity to monitor and document the programme progress and maintain better database management.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Kenya has been in a reform mode since independence in the 1960s, initially guided by *Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning*. The first reforms were to address the challenges the young nation faced namely: disease, poverty and ignorance. However due to ineffective implementation of policies and inequitable governance structures that have spanned most of Kenya's post-independence period, there still remain many Kenyans in poverty, ignorance and disease.

The first regime after independence introduced ethnic favouritism within the public service and ushered an era of regional inequality in the country – while reinforcing marginalization of the pastoral areas which had also been neglected by the colonial government. Service delivery during the colonial era and at the start of independence was based on the county system which was closer to the people and more equitable. Centralization of service delivery during the first regime brought about a situation where certain favoured regions received the bulk of public resources and services while others were crowded out. Despite the inequities, the civil service attracted adequately qualified staff that ensured efficient and effective service delivery to various parts of the country, with the economy growing at an average of 6-7% per year.

The trend of tribalism and nepotism heightened during the 1980's especially after the 1982 coup attempt, which polarised the country into tribal groupings. This scenario saw economic growth plummet to an average of 2-3%; which resulted in further deterioration of the overall service delivery in terms of equity, quality and timeliness. This necessitated further wider reforms under *Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth*, which was initiated through the World Bank led Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in response to the economic situation prevailing in most of Africa at the time.

Under the first phase of the SAP, employment in the public service was to be curtailed and downsizing done to reduce cost. During this period some 114,000 public servants were laid off under various schemes including the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme (VERS). Whereas the Civil Service Reform Programme, 1993-1998 was concerned with cost containment the 1998-2001 phase was concerned with performance improvement and the third phase (2002-2007) with consolidation of the gains made in the first two phases. The emphasis during this period, covering the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) era of 2003-2007, was Results Based Management (RBM).

During the period 1993-2001, several achievements were realised including civil service “right-sizing” through the Voluntary Early Retirement Scheme, rationalizing of the MDA functions and privatizations of state corporations; this programme saw the exit of 85,516 civil servants though the scheme as well as through natural attrition and 4,000 ghost workers were cleared from the payroll\(^3\). Phase ii entailed refining and rationalizing the government functions, staffing and management of the wage bill, pay and benefits reform, training and

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\(^3\) *Medium Term Plan For Public Service Reform Strategy 2008/2012 GOK*

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capacity building – this saw retrenchment of 23,448 civil servants in over-manned cadres and abolition of posts at a cost of Ksh. 4.4 billion. This also included staff retrenchment in state corporations, restructuring and privatization of some of the parastatals.

The unprecedented reduction in the civil service numbers led to acute staff shortages in a number of cadres which impaired service delivery. The outcome of the staff shortages included backlogs in service delivery especially in the essential services such as registration of persons, issuance of passports, determination of court cases, issuance of licences and land registration among others that opened new avenues for corruption to circumvent the delays in service provision.

Phase III focused on performance improvement in the public service. This entailed the introduction of strategic planning in ministries, Results Based Management (RBM) - a life-cycle approach to management that integrates strategy, people, resources, processes and measurements to improve decision-making, transparency, and accountability. The initiative focused on achieving outcomes, implementing performance measurement, learning and changing, and reporting performance. In this approach tools including performance contracts, service delivery improvement plans, service delivery surveys, and annual work plans were introduced and used in the public service. During the period progress was made in strengthening of institutional frameworks including establishment of strategic institutions such as the Public Reform and Development Secretariat (PSR&DS), through a cabinet decision/memo in 2004, to institutionalize Results Based Management (RBM) in the Public Service and coordinate all public service reforms.

The roots of the Results for Kenya Programme can be traced to 2003, when the newly elected NARC government sought to create a more efficient public sector, with a strong focus on service delivery to citizens to address public concerns and disenchchantment on government service. Since that period, the reform programme has endeavoured to entrench a Result Based Management (RBM) system in the public sector. In the quest to institutionalise RBM and synergise all public sector reforms through better coordination, the Results for Kenyans Programme was conceived and encapsulated in the 2006-2008 PSR&DS Strategic Plan.

This programme was benchmarked on the Results for Canadians model and informed by results based programmes in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions.

In April 2008, the Coalition Government merged PSR&DS and Performance Contracts Steering Committee (PCSC) to form the Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting (PSR & PC) Secretariat, under the Office of the Prime Minister. In August 2009, the Office of the Prime Minister established the Public Service Transformation Department with the mandate of leading the transformation of the Public Service through Capacity Building and improving service delivery to citizen. The Programme is currently supported by the GOK, the World Bank, UNDP, and the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK.

After the ERSWEC, the Government of Kenya set up a twenty-year core development strategy to become a middle income country by the year 2030. According to Kenya Vision 2030, the government aspires to build a globally competitive and prosperous society. Towards this
end, the government aims at full harmonization and integration of issues affecting the performance aspects of public programmes across all ministries and government agencies through RBM oriented strategies. In particular, the flagship projects of the First Medium Term Plan (2008-2012) for the Vision 2030 entail productivity issues for all sectors of the economy, spearheaded by the public sector.

The RFK programme has been running since 2006 and has undergone a number of changes and attained various results for Kenyans. The programme has also faced a number of challenges, some of which have been evolving. In order to position the programme for more effective results, the Development Partners and the Government of Kenya decided to have an independent evaluation undertaken to provide a frame of reference for refining the next phase of the programme.

1.2 Purpose of the Evaluation

The overall objective of this independent evaluation is to determine the outputs, outcomes, and impact of the Results for Kenyans programme. Specific objectives include assessing the extent to which the key result areas targeted during this programme were achieved in terms of:

1. The effectiveness of the reform implementation and ownership of the programme by all levels of the public service
2. The overall product in meeting the strategic objectives as set out in Public Service Reforms and Development (PSR&D) Strategic Plan 2006-2008 and the results for Kenya programme
3. The extent of the programme impact at institutional and individual level within the public service, especially in regard to the processes that may have facilitated results to Kenyans through the RBM mechanisms
4. The programmatic results in terms of key result areas of effective delivery of results, customer service, transformation and the environment and culture change that can be attributed to the strategy.
5. The new networks, linkages, institutions, stakeholders, culture, norms and other reinforcing factors that have arisen out of the programme
6. Comparative analysis of the successes and challenges experienced in the various public service institutions such as ministries, parastatals and local councils in the design of results for Kenya programme, implementation, delivery, resultant impacts and outcomes
7. An assessment of each objective as set out in the TOR and JSI, the PSR Workplan 2007-2009, the programme design documents with the aim of ascertaining their appropriateness, in terms of the reality on the ground, relevance, ability to deliver on them, the success rates in the delivery and implementation, and the challenges each of them posed.
8. The capacity availed to deliver the strategic objective in terms of finances, human resources, networks, frameworks, and infrastructure.
9. The gaps in programme design, deficiencies of the proposal, adequacy of programme objectives, and document lessons learnt.
10. The overall results that accrued to Kenyans taking into consideration the gender and human rights contexts
1.3 Programme Highlights

In an effort to institutionalize RBM and coordinate all public service reforms, the Results for Kenyans programme was developed, comprising the following components: i) Strategy Development, ii) Transformative Leadership Values and Ethics, iii) Institutional Capacity Building Programme, iv) Information, Education and Communication, v) Knowledge Management; vi) Structured Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships; vii) Management Reform and viii) Public Service Reform.

The programme objectives were to:

a. Facilitate the delivery of efficient, effective and ethical results for the achievement of the targets contained in the ERS

b. Institutionalise Results Based Management (RBM) through formulation of

   i. An Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy
   ii. Capacity Building Programme for Transforming the Public Service
   iii. National Performance Management Framework
   iv. Institutional framework that includes;
      • The Cabinet Standing Committee on Reforms
      • The National Steering Committee of Permanent Secretaries on Reforms
      • The Ministerial Management Steering Committee of Heads of Departments
      • Ministerial/Institutional Management Units (MMUs)

c. RBM implementation tools such as Rapid Results Initiative (RRI), Performance Appraisal Systems (PAS), and the Management Accountability Framework

The programme was fast tracked in ten ministries, all state corporations within the Ministry of Agriculture, six regional authorities and four local authorities. PSR&DS also collaborated with Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), government training institutes and private sector to develop curricula and conduct training programmes for the public sector.

The programme also established excellent working relations with development partners and has a very successful fundraising track record. The government and development partners signed the Joint Statement of Intent (JSI) in June 2006 to harmonize technical and financial support to the PSR&DS.

1.4 Programme Context and Evolution

Reforms in Kenya were initially driven through various development plans developed by the Kenyan government. In the 1980s The World Bank engaged the government in various reforms in the public service, where the initial reforms were driven by the need to reduce costs and restructure public institutions for better performance. RBM was adopted by the NARC Government in its desire to improve economic performance which had plummeted in the last years of the previous regime. However, the various facets of RBM were coordinated by different government offices, with the some aspects of RBM being carried out by PSR&DS with donor support, whereas PC was exclusively government funded. The RFKP was to implement wholly all aspects of RBM; but the implementation of PC turned out faster and more robust as it benefited from clear government support (with elaborate guidelines) unlike other RBM aspects whose impact was seen as long term.
In implementing the RFKP, PSR&DS faced a number of challenges such as weak succession planning and high staff turnover\(^4\) resulting in loss of institutional memory and focus. This problem was exacerbated by inadequate mentoring of prospective reform champions to cater for the frequent staff turnover.

### 1.5. Structure of the Report

This Report is presented in three parts as follows:

- **Part 1** Consists of the Preamble, which covers the Table of Contents, Acknowledgements, Acronyms and Executive Summary

- **Part II** covers the Main Body of the Report and includes the following Chapters: 1) Introduction, 2) Approach and Methodology, 3) Findings, 4) Lessons Learnt, 5) Observations, Conclusions and recommendations

- **Part III** Covers the Annexes: which include the Evaluation Grid, Summary Assessment of Performance against the PSR&DS 2006-2008 Strategic Plan, In-depth Interviews and Focus Group discussions Guide, Sample Questionnaire(s), Analysis of Questionnaire Responses, List of Key Persons Interviewed, Summary of Revenues & Expenditure, Glossary of Evaluation Terms and References

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\(^4\) Whenever the lead technical and managerial staff left it necessitated new people being trained thus putting the programme in a perpetual training/coping mode.
2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Approach, Structure and Reporting

On the premise that contracted work belongs to the Client, the Consultant worked closely with UNDP and the PSTD staff at all stages of this evaluation exercise in order to ensure that the undertaking would be participatory and inclusive by engaging all the stakeholders through participatory evaluation and appreciative inquiry approaches. The evaluation was carried out by Strategic Research and Management Consultants Ltd (SRMCL) through a team of four consultants. The consultants reported on all stages of the study to the appointed representatives from the Results for Kenyans Programme and the designated UNDP representative.

2.2. Methodology

The evaluation exercise was done following the five (5) evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact\(^5\). The Consultants utilised an Evaluation Grid based on the five programme/project evaluation criteria in the refinement of questionnaires, identification of study targets and in the selection of the data collection methods used in the study.

The consultant used participatory methodologies and appreciative inquiry in evaluating the Programme. This included an inclusive participation of a selected sample of the beneficiaries in the Results for Kenyans Programme and regular consultation with the programme staff, development partners and UNDP.

2.2.1. Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection was carried out by a trained team of research assistants guided and supervised by the consultants. The team carried out a pre-test before embarking on the actual data collection. This tested the appropriateness of the research instruments to elicit the responses desired by the survey. Data from the field was checked for completeness before analysis.

In order to gather and analyse the requisite data for this assignment the Consultant collected both secondary and primary data from diverse sources. Secondary data was collected by studying and examining reports and documents provided by the UNDP/GOK designated officers as well as other documents sourced from Development Partners and MDAs. Primary data was collected through various techniques including key informant interviews, field visits and questionnaires and focus group discussions.

Data from desk review was analyzed and synthesized per theme. Data collected from the field was analyzed using SPSS and other statistical packages that gave the most appropriate interpretation of the reality on the ground. Appropriate analysis levels were employed to get

\(^5\) See Annex 6.8 for a glossary of the Evaluation Criteria

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the best interpretation from the data. Qualitative data was analyzed in terms of emerging themes and patterns – manually and tabulated in a grid as well as through use of Nvivo statistical package where applicable.

2.2.2. Sampling

In consultation with the Client, the consultants selected the organisations that were evaluated in this study as set out in the TOR. Cluster sampling was used to select beneficiary populations (Kenyans targeted for service delivery). This took into account the spatial, geographical, gender and poverty dimensions of the programme.

The evaluation process took into account the accruing benefits of the programme to Kenyans through improved service delivery and other related outcomes. For this reason, the process considered obtaining the opinions of Kenyans at all levels on how the programme has impacted on service delivery and check the consistency of responses to the findings of discussions by service providers and the PSR&DS/PSTD on the achievements and limitations of the programme.

To accomplish this, population based responses and data was critical for assessing the collective opinion and levels of various outcomes of the programme. To achieve fair and unbiased representation of the population to establish the outcomes of the programme to citizens, a two-stage-cluster sampling survey was used to identify respondents for data collection using structured questionnaires that among other issues sought to establish the awareness of RFKP by the population and changes that the programme has made. At the national level, five (5) enumeration areas were selected to represent the whole country based on the coverage of the programme, demographic and contextual factors. With exception of Nairobi, Upper Central and Eastern which have similar characteristics and probably similar outcomes, other provinces were included in the study individually. At the provincial level, districts were listed out of which six districts were selected. Out of these, 2 clusters were selected, one rural and another urban.

Districts that have less developed urban centres represented the pre-urban component of the sample. The computation of the sample size was based on the premise that at least 50% of Kenyans are aware of the RFKP. Using this proportion to compute sample size at 95% confidence and 10% precision resulted to a sample size of 96 per enumeration area. The total sample size for the six enumeration areas was 480. Due to the design effect that could result from homogeneity of response associated with the sampling approach, the results were weighted during the analysis. The interviews were targeted at Kenyans seeking services in various service delivery points, particularly MDAs providing basic social services.

The key informant interviews were collected from nine (9) MDAs including six ministries, the National Assembly, Public Service Commission and Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) (see Annex 1). The consultants carried out 120 service delivery exit questionnaires.

2.2.3. Synoptic Evaluation of the pertinent Strategic Plan

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6 See analytical table at Annex 6.2

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A quick evaluation of the strategic plans covering the relevant period was undertaken in consultation with the key programme implementers in a workshop environment to assess the soundness (in regard to objective/target setting) of the plans and implementation effectiveness especially on variances between targets and actual outputs and the underlying reasons for under- or over-achievement. This process used a tool developed by the consultant. This workshop also provided a forum for harmonizing M&E key concepts between the Consultant and the Client and elucidating the range of expected assignment outputs.

2.2.4 Case Studies

A few success stories in the public sector were documented; with particular emphasis on lessons learnt.

2.2.5 Monitoring System

The Consultants sought to establish whether the programme had a self-monitoring system, and if such a system adequately addressed the issues of goal-orientedness (setting clear goals, objectives and targets for change), results chain management (whether the programme had clear outcome sequence charts) and whether the programme adopted and practiced the tenets of continuous improvement. This also entailed an assessment of the degree to which the existence or non-existence of such a system may have influenced effectiveness.

2.2.6 Value for Money

In addition to assessing the overall efficiency of the programme in the application of resources, the consultants specifically examined the application of funds in terms of cost effectiveness, audit trails, accountability and benefits accruing to Kenyans as a result of the development partners’ funds and public resources.

2.3. Basis of Judgement and Interpretation of Findings

In this study, the evaluation team has relied on plan documents, various progress and review reports (including aide memoirs and an earlier evaluation report\(^7\)), stakeholder interviews, questionnaires, focus group discussions and community meetings for its findings. Whereas candid conclusions have been drawn on issues where consistent data has been generated, there are several cases where respondents gave divergent information and opinions, leaving the consultants to make judgements based on statistical weighting and/or hindsight.

\(^7\) Prepared by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada & The Africa Development Professional Group (March 2009)

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3.0. EVALUATION RESULTS

3.1 Assessment on the basis of the Five Standard Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation exercise was done following the five (5) criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability.

1. *Relevance* of the programme was assessed in connection with the development policy of the Kenyan government and the needs of the beneficiaries (the Kenyan people).

2. *Effectiveness* was assessed by analyzing the extent to which the programme objectives have been met.

3. *Efficiency* of project implementation was analyzed focusing on quality, quantity, timing of inputs, overall management of programme activities and the utilization of programme inputs (based on indicative benchmarking of average input/output ratios).

4. *Impact* of programme was identified focusing mainly on the positive and negative direct outcomes of the programme, and is related to the overall goal of the programme realized at the time of evaluation, followed by an analysis of future prospects of realization of the overall goal.

5. *Sustainability* of the programme was assessed by looking at the extent to which the Country can continue to successfully carry on the programme activities considering financial, institutional and technical aspects.

3.1.1 Relevance

The RFK programme was both in line with the country’s industrialisation strategy as well as relevant with Kenya’s main economic thrust as expounded through Vision 2030. The programme objectives were tailored towards producing results-oriented public sector professionals, which is aimed at enhancing service delivery and ultimately standards of living of the Kenyan people.

Specifically the following aspects of relevance may be cited:

- The programme has to a large extent addressed the country’s public sector performance, which is bound to catalyse the whole economy for faster growth. Despite the hitherto high levels of apathy and corruption in the public service, there is documented improvement in service delivery.
- The transformative leadership training has changed attitudes and work ethics among a good number of public servants, bringing on board a culture of customer orientation, which is bound to improve performance and service delivery across the public sector over time.

3.1.2 Effectiveness
On the whole the programme outputs conformed to programme expectations. Achievements were made by the programme in scaling up reforms by using the different facets of RBM through:

a. Development, training and implementation of the Performance Appraisal systems within the government service delivery systems;

b. Implementation of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) in more than 60 MDAs;

c. Training of senior staff in performance contracting and transformative leadership to lead reforms and manage for results in their respective MDAs;

d. Engagement of stakeholders in reform activities and conducting independent evaluation of the programme;

e. Effective provision by UNDP of operational support and management of the Basket Fund while taking account of the interests of each of the donors;

f. Provision of consultative forums by donors by participating in review meetings as stipulated in the JSI;

g. Adequate fund raising by the secretariat which guaranteed the programme stable operations

3.1.2.1 Strategic Plan Implementation

About 65percent\(^8\) of the planned activities were implemented during the term of the PSR&DS 2006-2008 strategic plan, these include:

- Development of a framework to facilitate strategic public private sector partnerships
- Establishment of a results office within the PSR&DS to coordinate RBM implementation
- Restructuring of the cabinet office
- Alignment of HR management to competency based /results orientation
- Public service results and performance bill
- Formulation of employment policies and HR strategies

In addition, transformative leadership capacity building and staff development and growing of our leaders programme were partially implemented.

However the following were not fully achieved

- Rationalization of ministries (only some of the planned ministries were covered; e.g. Ministry of Water and Ministry of Roads)
- 360 degree feedback assessment (Consultant hired and proposal made but not implemented)

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\(^8\) As computed during the strategic plan synoptic evaluation workshop
• Dissemination and implementation of the HR policy
• Setting up of the Kenya School of Government.

(See Annexes 6.2 for further details)

3.1.2.2 JSI Implementation

Based on interviews with stakeholders⁹

• Donors abided well with the JSI, attaining an average rating of 80%. They also nominated representatives to the technical committee as stipulated.

• Cabinet sub-committee meetings and quarterly technical committee meetings were well convened and attended – 90%

• Donor contributions were adequate and consistent with the secretariat being unable to absorb the initial disbursements in 2005.

  Donor funds disbursements
  2005 – More funds released than the Secretariat was able to utilize
  2006 – Programme on full thrust and more funds had to be sought
  2007 – Laxity due to general elections, with significant proportion of availed funds not being spent

• Corruption

  No clear case of corruption was reported. There were however undue procurement delays and cases of supplies going beyond the initial TORs/specifications without communicated justification.

However about 35 percent of the strategic plan targets were not met, largely due to factors relating to the following:

• Institutional inertia
• Inadequate coordination
• Resistance to change
• Political interference¹⁰

3.1.3 Efficiency

The financial and procurement systems that were put in place assured that efficient use of programme funds was in practice, thus ensuring value for money. This meant that funds management moved towards results oriented budgeting and that fund managers came

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⁹ See Annex 6.4
¹⁰ Though a number of respondents made strong claims on the political interference, others strongly refuted the claims. It is probably a matter of interpretation on what political interference entails. Most respondents however agreed that the programme was affected by the post-election violence and the Kenyan election cycle.
under close scrutiny and were held responsible in ensuring recurrent and development spending in terms of effectiveness.

- Audit of the UNDP managed basket fund reported no significant audit queries. Funding commitments were aligned with government priorities, as evidenced in various budgets. A vetting system was instituted by government authorities and audits were done to assure efficiency and effectiveness. Audit reports for the funds are available and there is evidence of responses to audit queries.

- The efforts towards Risk Management and Quality Assurance paid off through strict adherence to prescribed procurement procedures and validation of expenditures on the basis of expected outcomes, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of activities.

- Considerable expenditure savings were realised as a result of strict procedural disbursement requirements. For instance, payment of claims without supporting documentation was rejected, e.g. the table below illustrates such savings i.e. there is a difference of Kenya Shillings thirty million, nine hundred ninety eight, five hundred and fourteen (31,998,514.00).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>PREVIOUS PRICES</th>
<th>REVISED PRICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banners</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>5,545,000.00</td>
<td>272,765.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brochures</td>
<td>500000</td>
<td>9,750,000.00</td>
<td>2,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posters</td>
<td>500000</td>
<td>9,878,000.00</td>
<td>3,017,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-shirts</td>
<td>13000</td>
<td>12,090,000.00</td>
<td>5,525,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caps</td>
<td>13100</td>
<td>9,170,000.00</td>
<td>3,618,220.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>46,432,000.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,433,486.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Savings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31,998,514.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- To ensure transparency, the procurement tender awarding committee adopted a balloting system to select pre-qualified suppliers for quotations. This randomized system minimized collusion between individual suppliers and hence discouraged instances of corruption.

- The department was satisfied with funds disbursement from development partners. However undue procurement delays and overpricing\(^{11}\) of some items did compromise efficiency somewhat.

3.1.4 Sustainability

3.1.4.1 Institutional Aspects

The uptake of RBM within government has created inbuilt mechanisms for results. This has made managers and teams synchronize their work and perform better at institutional and individual levels, a scenario which has endeared RBM to the institutions and staff, setting the stage for its institutional sustainability. As a hub for RBM, PSR&DS managed to exist and

\(^{11}\) The overpricing was partly addressed during the latter stages of the programme through market surveys, which facilitated more competitive bidding

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remained functional despite an uncertain operational environment, arising from high staff turnover and other institutional challenges.

Capacity augmentation through training and recruitment of staff, especially at the MDAs level, has increased the skills and talents stock of the public service and thus enhanced the ability of government to sustain the reform agenda.

3.1.4.2 Financial Aspects

GoK has been gradually increasing its contribution to the programme and has increased its funding to KES 120,000,000 for the year KES 2010/2011 up from 40,000,000 for 2009/2010 towards the PSTD to continue reforms in the next programme cycle. The second phase of the programme has started participatory strategic planning sessions; however, the fundraising efforts need to be scaled up.

Development partner support will be essential for effective programme take-off as financial requirements are bound to increase substantially as the programme shifts from the strategic level management initiatives to system-wide delivery operations.

3.1.5. Impact

Overall the programme has transformed the way government carries out its business and has created a shift from a process to results-oriented service delivery. The Public Service Week and Performance Measurement have resulted in competition within the service and enhanced team work and commitment to service delivery by the staff. Impacts realised include the following:

3.1.5.1 Attitude Change

It is evident that attitudes of public servants as well as service delivery have changed for the better.

- Performance contracting has been accepted and adopted throughout most of the public service, including semi-autonomous government agencies, and is potentially an effective tool for performance accountability.

- Customer care culture has been entrenched in many MDAs. For example, change of attitude by service providers is clearly noticeable in the Provincial administration where hitherto rude and bland officials have become friendly and more service oriented. Given the change in management culture necessitated by the implementation of RBM, this progress is appreciable in that the Public Service has been engaged in the process for a fairly short time compared with other jurisdictions all over the world.

- Due to increased demand for services by wananchi (Huduma Bora Haki Yako) there has been a dampening effect on corruption

3.1.5.2 Service Delivery

- Service delivery improved as a result of the programme. Service delivery by a number of MDAs has been significantly enhanced, including such services as issuance of passports, IDs, birth certificates and driving licences. In the water sector, efficiency in billing has led to enhanced customer satisfaction while the water service companies have also realised
higher revenues. In Nakuru for example through the RRI, water rationing has dropped substantially due to increased water volumes and better management. The use of RRI in the Ministry of Agriculture has been partly credited for abundant production of food crops and dairy products.

- Service delivery has become proactive, results driven and staff have come to appreciate their end customers. The winning of a United Nations award in this regard can be taken as a pointer to the programme’s positive impact.
- The mainstreaming and cascading of RBM through RRI and PC, supported by Strategic Planning have led to improved performance.
- Some of the MDAs frequently carry out customer satisfaction surveys. A sample review of the results of recent surveys showed that there is a consistent upward improvement of service delivery, e.g. Health, Agriculture, Judiciary, Immigration etc.
- Reviewing a number of MDA strategic plans revealed that the objectives therein were aligned to the national objectives as stipulated in Vision 2030. The results-chain over the period, assessed in percentages, showed remarkable improvements in most service delivery sectors.

3.1.5.3 Capacity Development
- The Transformative Leadership Training that involved beneficiaries from the highest level down to the mid-level management enhanced buy-in to the RBM mechanisms and created potential for long-term positive impact.
- There were strong indicators of leaders’ personal commitment to the concept of outcomes-oriented public service and particularly in respect to the management of resources and accountabilities to time-bound targets.

3.1.5.4 Institutional Arrangements
- It was found that the process of institutionalizing RBM in many Ministries and Institutions was at a high gear. For instance, the office of the Deputy Director Medical Services in the Ministry of Health (MOH) was involved in frequent analysis of activity and output information from all government run and sponsored hospitals in the country. The analysis is primarily focused on service delivery to the patients.
- Performance Management Framework: enabled the programme to track the strategic planning process, implementation, performance measurement and reporting. This additionally created an environment where results were clearly stipulated to staff and teamwork enhanced in the public service.
- Performance Appraisal System (PAS) was completed in 2006. It has been rolled out into most MDAs and since been revised in 2008. This system enabled individual staff to understand their roles through having clearly spelt-out ToRs and their role in ensuring their respective MDAs met their overall results. It enabled managers to use resource based budgeting, workplans and report on results; hence moving the MDAs from process-oriented service delivery to results-oriented service delivery. Additionally this enhanced teamwork as staff understood that their performance depended on others in the team.
• Design of PSR&DS M&E system (though not fully functioning), which would eventually be linked to National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) and improve overall performance report is good step.

• The print and electronic media were engaged to create opportunities for dialogue between the public service and the Kenyan citizens through targeted media events (i.e. media interviews and infomercials). It was also the main channel for educating and communicating individual rights on access to quality and timely services.

• At the MDA levels; implementation of RBM was domesticated by the different MDAs and the impact on results include:
  - Better service delivery through the introduction of checks and balances
  - Capacity building
  - Transparency and public accountability
  - Paradigm shift to teams as opposed to individual implementation of work
  - Use of work plans and five year strategic plan
  - Institutionalization of rewards and sanctions system

3.1.5.5. Policies and strategies

• Human Resource and Management Reform Strategy: Shift from length of service to competency and productivity. This was the key driver that saw the delegation of authority to hire from the Public Service Commission (PSC) to direct hiring for MDAs for the lower job groups; that is job group A to J;

• Information Education and Communication (IEC) strategy: brought about the Public Service Week which was initially held at the national level and later cascaded to the district level; where MDAs carried out exhibition-style presentation of the services they offer. This also saw the judiciary, a profession known for its seclusion and insulation from public contact, hold an open day;

• Rapid Results Approach: this was a methodology targeted at MDAs, where they undertook 100-day RRI sessions; which saw the MDAs reorient budgets and activities towards better results by making reforms in procedures and processes and thereby creating synergy for more effective results in service delivery. Better results were evident at various service points, e.g. the Immigration Department where citizens could get passports in 5-10 days compared to the long periods (several months) experienced earlier.

• Public Service Reform Strategy in draft form; though not yet implemented sets a clear roadmap on achieving enduring reforms in the sector

• Public Sector Stakeholder’s Partnership Strategy: This created partnerships with the private sector and civil society that enabled feedback and buy-in into the reform agenda by groups that were hitherto not engaged in the running of the public service but who are key stakeholders and consumers of government services. At the initial stages, umbrella civil society organizations were engaged in the RBM strategy. The engagement of the civil society was instrumental in educating the public to demand and protect their rights as citizens. The public sector stakeholders provided a platform for review and feedback on progress made in the implementation of the RFKP. In health, the
stakeholder partnership has been most successful with the development of the second sector wide approach, which has ensured buy-in from the private sector and engagement of the final consumers of the service – the general Kenyan public. The partnerships enable joint planning, resource mobilization, monitoring and feedback to ensure efficient use of resources and better service delivery.

- **The Huduma Bora (Quality Service) Agenda:** This campaign using above and below the line communication methods educated Kenyans on the right to quality service and encouraged civil servants to be more proactive in meeting customer needs. The campaign impact on transforming service delivery was experienced most profoundly in the Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security which launched the campaign in 2006 during the first RRI wave.

### 3.2 Programme Framework Review

#### 3.2.1 Programme Design and Strategy Development

The PRSDS was established through a Cabinet decision in 2004 with the objective of institutionalizing Results Based Management (RBM) as a core tool for public sector reform. UNDP was requested by the GoK to coordinate the programme and UNDP seconded one staff to support the PRS&DS.

The programme was however not informed by a pertinent situational analysis and did not follow all the components of the Programme Management Cycle (PMC)\(^\text{12}\). Secondly, the transformative leadership training within capacity building initiative did not set benchmarks and binding contracts to hold the champions in whom the programme had invested in remain within the MDAs for specified periods to ensure they provided training and mentorship for sufficient periods to ensure sustained transformation process takes place. Thirdly there were no conflict and succession management strategies.

Nevertheless, the programming and strategy development were well done and addressed key result areas (KRAs) and remained relevant even with several changes that the programme has seen since inception. The overall approach has been laid in living documents that have facilitated changes in line with key government positions driven by political change, policy focus and administrative dynamics.

The design of the programme was in line with targeted results and based on proven models. However, the interpretation and understanding of the programme was not uniform and standardized by key actors. During the initial stages emphasis was put in development of structures and fundraising as opposed to implementation, key success factors in the RBM however lagged in implementation such as the M&E framework and system, the IEC component and a focused public and stakeholder engagement.

#### 3.2.2. Roll-out and Institutional arrangements

A key component of the roll-out was to develop curriculum and train senior officers who were to spearhead the FFK programme. Some 2000 officers were trained with about 1000

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\(^{12}\) E.g. No baseline study was done; neither was any comprehensive reporting system designed
senior officers being trained at KIA on RBM and Performance Appraisal. Though the training component seems to have been fairly well implemented, there was no follow-up mechanism to assess the effectiveness of the trainees nor were the trainers involved in the follow-up, even on an ad hoc basis. Follow-up after training has been slow and inconsistent, for example momentum of RRI dropped significantly in a number of MDAs, while the programme was negatively affected by capacity constraints arising from unexpected exit of staff – both GoK and UNDP.

In a number of instances institutions (or individuals) who were involved in the preparation of the training curriculum and design of RRI were not involved in the dissemination and implementation of the same – creating some level of disconnect between formulation and implementation.

A number of MDAs, e.g. Ministry of Water, Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons and Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA), do not quite have the original concept of MMUs as per the official communication from OP, but they have crafted equivalents which nevertheless carry out some of the expected MMU functions. Thus the MMU concept is not uniform among the MDAs, a factor that can make quality and performance standards difficult to compare or enforce. For example, it is not clear among most of the MDAs interviewed who is supposed to be the MMU lead person. The proposal to have a high-ranking officer (e.g. Job Group P) as the MMU lead person has not been feasible in many MDAs, and as such officers were not always available for such deployment while some declined because they did not find the terms clearly spelt out.

As in all effective reforms, top management support is critical and where CEOs took an active role, the RFK programme, especially RRIIs were very successful. However, the requirement that the PS/CEO be the champion has not worked well in most MDAs. The programme also lost momentum due to exit of key officers especially due to rapid change of guard and institutional arrangements.

Lastly, the basis the recent hiving out of PC from PSTD is yet to be appreciated or understood among the MDAs – there is need for a more effective IEC strategy.

### 3.3. Coordination, Alignment and Harmonization

#### 3.3.1. Coordination

The RFKP coordination mechanism has been well positioned to deliver on various aspects of the programme. PSR&DS remained the main coordinating body. However, the capacity to provide overall oversight was undermined by inadequacy of staff, as well as limited understanding by MDA staff of key areas of the programme and its dynamics.

All stakeholders have been involved in meetings as stipulated in the JSI. Nevertheless Information was weak due to a lack of a structured feedback mechanism.

On the other hand coordination with the line ministries seems to have been better structured though affected by recurrent changes and the consequent limited understanding of the initiative, which was exacerbated by inadequate information sharing. This has partly precluded standardisation and effectiveness of MMUs across MDAs. A synoptic evaluation of
the Strategic Plan implementation conducted at a workshop with the facilitation of the Consultants, found out that some of the key stakeholders are not conversant with some of the pertinent issues and are therefore unlikely to leverage their efforts in complete support of the activities of this programme.

The approach taken by the donors in establishing a basket fund under the management of UNDP has proved to be an effective approach. Development Partners played a critical role by facilitating call down agreements where technical expertise was sourced from international Government training institutions to provide expertise in public sector reform. Through the support of development partners senior Government officers went on RBM benchmarking tours at the inception of the programme.

Uniformity in coordination was somewhat weakened due to some of the partners funding programme activities outside the basket fund.

3.3.2. Alignment and Harmonization

The programme is in line with the ERS and Vision 2030 as spelt in its mission and vision. The recently reconstituted Public Service Transformation Department (PSTD) and MMUs staff and other stakeholders are aware of this and conceptualize the link between reforms and the vision. In terms of design, most of the MDAs strategic plans have been aligned to the Vision. The RFK programme has also been aligned to other reform initiatives and there is no apparent duplication in terms of programming or funding from the donors and the government.

Based on the progress of the reform process, GoK recognized the need to harmonise its reform strategy to hasten the process of effective and efficient service delivery at all levels. In April 2008, a merger between PSRD and PC, whose aim was to synergise each department's comparative strengths to effectively deliver on the results for Kenyans from a collective standpoint, resulted into PRS&PC. However, this noble idea did not work during the period under review because some units were not willing to participate in the merger for number reasons, some of which were difficult to confirm, as given below:

- The risk management and succession strategy were not included in the programme design thus the programme was not able to mitigate the risks and resolve conflict arising out of implementation and ownership of key tools of RBM;
- The government's fluid human resource deployment – sudden transfers and promotions exposed the programme to frequent staff changes and loss of institution memory, which consigned the programme into in a coping and training mode throughout the implementation period;
- The fact that government did not have full control of the fiscal and procurement functions of the programme makes attribution of the results achieved difficult;
- In a number of cases, due to a perceived insecurity of tenure, some of the staff resorted to the implementation of activities that could enhance their survival rather optimising realisation of the programme objectives. This tended to blur the results focus. (See details in the Evaluation Grid at Annex 6.1.)

3.4. Results from the exit interviews and community meetings
Exit interviews were conducted among citizens/customers in Nairobi, Thika, Machakos and Kajiado districts to ascertain whether there was any marked change in the provision of services to Kenyans. The respondents were picked through random survey from key service delivery points including lands office, immigration, chief’s office, agriculture and veterinary officers. Community interviews were conducted in Kilifi, Isiolo, Nakuru, Eldoret, Kisumu and Vihiga districts. A total of 500 males and females were covered in this evaluation.

3.4.1 Demographics

We conducted exit interviews involving 120 adult Kenyans consisting of 40% males and 60% females. Of these 12% were aged 15-24 years, 40% 25-34 years, 17.3% were aged 35-44 years, 14.7% were of the age group 45-54 years and 15% were aged 55 years and above. The respondents education level ranged from 4% with no education, 34% had primary education, 45.3% had secondary education and 14.5% had tertiary education.

3.4.2 Services sought from the government offices

Of the Kenyans interviewed 42.7% were seeking health services, 41.3% were seeking services and 1.3% had come for registration services and 14% had come for other services such as advisory and complaints to chiefs and police.

3.4.3 Time taken to receive services

At service delivery points a minority of 2.7% received services in less than 15 minutes, 4% within 16-60 minutes and a majority received services after 1 hour. Of these 52%; 1.3% said the staff were at lunch, 6.7% were referred, 9.3% reported receiving no services, while 6.35 were waiting to be served, 6.7% reported slow service and 1.3% said there was corruption. Of those who received services; 12% reported having spent a short time at service delivery point, 13.3% reported receiving service in good time, 46.7% reported having this service after a long time and 20% said the service time was unacceptable; translating to 66.7% receiving necessary service after unduly long time. Those who reported that the service took too long; 22.7% said that the staff were uncommitted or slow, 13.3% reported that there were too many procedures/bureaucracy, 2.7% reported manual/handling process, 8.0% reported it was due to corruption, while 20.0% said it was due to the inadequacy of the staff attending clients and 14.7% sighted other reasons, while 18% did not give any opinion that caused the delay.

3.4.4 Areas that cause service delivery delays

The areas in the service delivery system that are prone to delays were given as; preparation at 13.3%, service delivery at 24%, accounts/cashier 1.3%, other at 36% and 25.3% did not answer the question. The specific offices that cause delay were given as billing office at 4.0%, authorizing office at 1.35, laboratory at 9.3%, consultation at 9.3%, nutrition clinic at 9.35 and infant clinic at 1.3%.
3.4.5 Satisfaction levels with public service delivery

Of the respondents in the evaluation, 47% said they were satisfied with the services that they received in government offices, 38% were dissatisfied with 3% completely dissatisfied while 12% said they were frustrated. As shown in Graph 1 below:

![Graph 1: Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery](image)

3.4.6 Awareness of Reforms for Kenya programme

Of the respondents, 45.3% were aware of the results for Kenya programme and 54.7% had not known of the programme as shown below: these points to weaknesses in branding the programme and enlightening citizens on the objectives of the programmes in general. This is shown in graph 2 below:

![Graph 2: Awareness of Results for Kenya Programme](image)

3.4.7 Improvement of service delivery

Of the respondents, 38.7% said public service delivery has improved while 61.3% said there have been no improvements. Of those who said there were no improvements; 4% said there has been no proper administration of service delivery, 12% attributed this to long waiting hours, 2.7% to corruption, and 10.7% no remarkable change and the rest did not answer.
3.4.8 Staff attitudes

The respondents were asked to describe the attitudes of staff at service delivery points. The responses were 46% said staff were courteous while 29% said they were attentive while only 9% said they were rude. This is shown in graph 3 below.

From the community interviews they said they did not receive quality and timely services when they go to the facilities. Staff reported that equipments and supplies are limited and thus they cannot perform their duties to the expected levels. This is illustrated the following observation during a community meeting in Isiolo:

“Hata nikiamka asubuhu kwenda hospitalini, huwa nafikiria kuhusu wale wagonjwa ambao huja hospitali lakini unajua hakuna njia ambayo unaweza kuwasaidia kwa sababu hakuna dawa za kuwatibu.” Translated to mean “I wake up in the morning, thinking of my patients, but I do not have the medicines and equipment to treat their illnesss”.

Female respondent’ Isiolo

The RFK program was perceived as positive in ensuring the citizens receive quality service from the community as evidenced by the following:

“Siku hizi ukienda kwa DC, wale polisi wa customer service, wanakusalimia na kuckleokeza pale unataka...” meaning “these days when you go to the DC ’s place to seek service, the administration police greet you and guide you to the offices that can serve you....

“Male respondent Kilifi

However there are other areas that still show lethargy in service delivery due to vested interests in the same service being delivered by the public and private sector, this was exemplified by the quote below:

“You go to the general hospital, and staff tell you that the medicines are not available in the hospital, they then direct you to a private pharmacy to buy then you find the person selling is the same one who referred you to them....”

Female respondent, Eldoret

3.4.9 Confidence in Government Service Delivery
The respondents were asked if they had confidence and would refer others to seek services at government service delivery points; 66.7% said they had confidence while 33.3 did not have any confidence.

Many community members felt they need government services and since it is only government that gives specialized services like registrations of persons and land, they will have no choice but to access these services from the government. They however would like to see this services improve over time.

3.4.10 Areas of improvement for service delivery

The respondents were asked what they would like to see improved in the civil service; most said they would like to see better service delivery at 36.5%, 32.4% said they would like to see staff numbers increase especially in the health facilities, 6.6% wanted facility improvement and 2.7% said the reforms were to be continued, 1.4% asked for increase of incentives to staff and 1.4% saw that service charge should be reduced including 16.2 % who did not answer the question. This is as shown in the table 2 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Improvement for Quality Service Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase staff...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Service Charge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From community meetings: a most of the Kenyan public had heard of the results for Kenya programme and noted that there was some marked improvement in the attitude of officers more so the public administration police manning the District Commissioner’s offices and the DO’s offices. The community were of the view that if the changes are due to reforms then they should continue, but more citizen engagements and involvement in the programme should be central in the reforms.

3.5 Case Study

Ministry of Agriculture was one of the most revitalised MDAs that turned its operations from process orientation to results orientation. The ministry domesticated the RBM through creation of a team to oversee the implementation of the RBM throughout the ministry. This saw a shift from ad-hoc implementation of the ministry core mandate to strategic management; whereby staff from all departments got involved strategic planning and based their operations on clearly defined goals and objectives implemented using ministerial,
divisional, departmental and individual work plans that were linked and supported by a well defined Monitoring and Evaluation system. Rigorous implementation, feedback and redesigning supported by funding from the agricultural sector partnerships have resulted in:

i. Helping staff to orient themselves to serve
ii. Enabled staff to continuously seek to achieve targets
iii. Facilitated the ministry to cascade the results areas vertically and horizontally
iv. Increased revenue in the departments e.g. the Department of Machination from KES 44,000,000 to KES 88,000,000
v. Introduced teams and teamwork which encouraged buy-in to set objectives and results areas and synchronized work and activities to achieve clear targets. The ministry ensured success by having gatekeepers who helped track progress and enabled the ministry move towards achieving its results
vi. Monthly senior staff meetings acted as the main monitoring system during which reports on progress and feedback were tabled
vii. MMUs (Secretariat) enabled quality assurance and trouble shooting and annual reporting by April of each year; these reports helped clarify goals
viii. At the individual level, RBM enabled clarify roles, helped individuals link their work to the ministerial goals and the PC signed by the PS. The yearly sessions held at the headquarters helped augment the team work and links providing career satisfaction and individual gratification in seeing that one has contributed to achieving results
ix. Service charters helped target staff efforts towards meeting customers’ expectations
x. Staff in meeting their results had to change their approach to a more proactive and positive attitude towards Kenyan farmers who are their main customers
xi. Leadership training and mentorship helped impact in managers leadership skills that enabled the managers and staff manage and achieve results
xii. Training in risk management also helped manage change within the ministry
xiii. IT-based M&E reports from districts greatly improved feedback and performance

3.5.1. Implementation Challenges

i. The technical nature of the ministry made change difficult in the initial stages
ii. Varying levels of documentation did not enable the requisite speed of integrating lessons learnt in the next annual implementation phase
iii. The large volume of reports from the field proved a challenge in analyzing and documenting the results achieved
iv. The sanctions and rewards systems has not been implemented
v. The multiple initiatives being implemented with various stakeholders gave an information overload in terms of the volume of reports being produced
vi. The linkage to Water Sector, Environment Sector and NIMES including automation – all this have to coordinated and reported by the same staff leading to work overload on individual staff and teams
vii. The state of repair and maintenance of equipment and the work environment is a challenge to staff
The evaluation tools do not adequately cover all areas of public engagement, public perception and ranking of MDAs.

### 3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation

#### 3.6.1 Monitoring

There is no evidence of any systematic data collection, analysis, interpretation and response which forms the basis of a functional M&E system. The existence of PSRS&DS/PSTD as a catalyst challenges its very capability of managing an effective M&E system because data is collected at service delivery and implementation levels and yet there is no formalised reporting system to routinely transfer the data to the centre. This can however be explained by the fact that the design of the programme did not envisage results at the population level in the initial years of the programme and key steps to measure the performance were lacking. Monitoring of results and tracking of the same is inadequate and there is currently no requisite capacity for this.

*The Monitoring system is weak due to the following reasons:*

- The programme lacks a M&E framework that addresses the conventional components of a comprehensive M&E system
- Continued focus on process monitoring as opposed to the results monitoring
- Weak routine monitoring supervisory support and poor feedback at programme delivery levels.

#### 3.6.2. Evaluation

The programme has undertaken mid-term evaluation to assess the progress of the programme. However, the focus of evaluation has been on management, operational and coordination issues at the programme level. There has been limited focus on the translation of these efforts to improvement of service delivery or any attribution. There is no programmatic data on which performance of key result areas can be established through a comprehensive analysis of data in its totality.

The programme is currently developing an M&E framework with the assistance of a renowned institute from Canada (IDEA).

### 3.7. Factors Impacting On Programme Effectiveness

#### 3.7.1. Promoting Factors

- There was political commitment from the President and Cabinet in the first phase of implementation and in the second phase from the Prime Minister and Cabinet
- The international community was in a change mood and was interested in results from governments and the drive for meeting the MDGs
- The Public financial management reforms enabled alignment with stated goal priorities in the Kenya Vision 2030. It also led to reduction of budget disparities, actual expenditure disparities, and predictability of annual/midterm cash allocation flows.
External audit reports were prepared in a timely fashion in accordance with Public Audit Act 2003; leading to efficiency-gains

- Earlier reforms in the country had engendered a reformist culture that facilitated easier acceptance of the Results for Kenyans Programme

Programme implementation was further facilitated by:

- Creation of an enabling environment
  
  The Cabinet decision of 2004 gave grounding to the RFKP and enabled it to start out. The result has been in the form of the institutionalization of RBM in government services and trickle down to the private sector. There is evidence of appreciation of RBM in government, in MDAs such as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons, Police and Provincial Administration.

- Capacity building for RBM
  
  The setting up of MMUs has enabled the government to institutionalize RBM in the MDAs. The various capacity building initiatives, especially the skills training, have facilitated acquisition of new skills and improvement of existing capabilities, particularly in the areas of leadership, mentorship, communication, teamwork, monitoring and evaluation, performance and appraisal management and coordination. MMUs are the main planning, implementation coordination, monitoring and evaluation nerve centres for the MDAs.

- Development of constituent strategies within the MDAs
  
  RRIs and domestication of the RBM initiative to fit the unique positions of the various MDAs saw creation of reform management teams within the MDAs that spearheaded reforms. This created ownership, ensured teamwork and clear result areas. In the MDAs where this was actualised, both performance and service delivery improved.

3.7.2 Inhibiting Factors

- The mandate of the secretariat was not well understood. Various stakeholders had different conceptualization of the issues and processes;

- Limited skills and human resource capacity slowed down the process; the capacity of the programme was compromised by perpetual shortages of staff and fluid deployment and redeployment of staff. High staff turnover coupled with the limitation of PSR&DS to replace staff, which deprived the department of institutional memory, exacerbated capacity constraints making it difficult for the programme to cover all MDAs and all regions effectively;

- UNDP was responsible for programme finance and procurement management, hence there was limited knowledge transfer to PSR&DS staff in these areas

- Multiplicity of financial and procurement procures led to delays in implementation. The basket fund brought together different partners and government with different operations systems, this was a challenge in procurement and implementation procedures;

- High staff turnover lead to underutilization of the funds;

- Failure to implement findings and recommendations of the ministerial rationalization programme and the aide memoirs precluded improvements in programme implementation;
• The 2007 post election crisis interfered with the donor disbursement schedules and this caused a programme lull until around March 2008 when the programme picked up again;
• Frequent changes of office names, administrators and ministerial locations slowed down the implementation process as the new implementers had to understand the programme before they could be gainfully engaged;
• Internal continuous monitoring and evaluation process suffered due to weak M&E Systems

3.7.3. Issues and Challenges

Table 3: Issues and challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSRS was not able to fully execute its mandate</td>
<td>Operational challenges, e.g. lack of linkage to other reforms and non adherence to work plans impeding its work as a coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSR&amp;DS structure remained an unsettled issue</td>
<td>Lack of clarity of institutional roles and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of RBM is still far from being fully realised</td>
<td>RBM as a concept is not well understood by all MDA staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of RBM by key actors was low</td>
<td>Lack of holistic implementation and coordination of RBM from a central point where the PC component of the RBM was fast tracked and the other components lagged behind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak implementation of RBM due to poor coordination</td>
<td>Clear policy on RBM sanctions and link to PAS still outstanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties in formulating and instituting incentives and disincentives for performers and non performers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management System not fully linked to budgets/predictable funding, nor to incentives (rewards and sanctions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMUs facing conflicting reform agendas</td>
<td>There has not been a sharing forum for all MDAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of transformative leadership and ethics still low</td>
<td>RFKP capacity constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building status so far only 2000 officials have been trained compared to the overall threshold of tens of thousands (exact requirements not specified).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low staffing levels in many MDAs</td>
<td>Freeze on employment still affecting capacity of many MDAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of clearly defined individual roles and responsibilities in PSTD as well as a spectrum of MDAs (MMUs) not always clearly defined</td>
<td>Shifting roles of departments and staff due to frequent changes in ministerial portfolios and structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement delays and other issues</td>
<td>Cases of nonconformity between government and donor procurement systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication effectiveness still low</td>
<td>IEC strategy not finalised/formalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is perceived lack of ownership of the reforms</td>
<td>Weak Public stakeholder partnerships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Some of the issues and challenges are still relevant to PSTD
Results for Kenyans Programme Evaluation: End Phase 1
### Issues by the public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate prioritization and sequencing of targeted results</td>
<td>Weak Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no coordinated and focused analysis of reports that gives the targeted recommendations for results achievement to ensure a 360 feedback and management system</td>
<td>Weak M&amp;E system. PSTD M&amp;E system not synergistic or properly linked to NIMES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gains in RRIs lessons learnt were not used to improve service delivery as the systems present were not able to take these up, analyze and use this to inform the policy direction and legal framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Results for Kenyans Programme Evaluation: End Phase 1
4.0 LESSONS LEARNT

4.1 Lessons for Development Partners

i. There is need for continuous capacity building due to high turnover of staff in the various areas of work, especially to increase skills to implement the next phase of the programme.

ii. There is need to continue support for capacity building and Information, education and Communication (IEC).

iii. All partners in the basket fund should seek to only use particular basket fund to channel their development support

iv. There is need to harmonise development assistance to create more impact through the basket fund model.

4.2. Lessons for the Fund Manager/Development Partners

i. Consistent and effective communication and feedback is imperative in basket fund management;

ii. Sanctions and rewards need to be put in place to ensure all basket fund contributors adhere to the shared principles;

iii. There is need to enhance ICT so that all partners are able to know the funds transfers and activity implementation in real time;

iv. There is a need to cede the management to the government in a clearly benchmarked skills and procedures transfer;

v. There is need to give more autonomy to implementers and possibly give the money directly to an appointed funds manager outside the donor community

vi. Loosen restrictions on areas that can be supported in the next phase; include infrastructure support i.e. capital equipment and expenditure.

4.3. Lessons for the Kenya Government

i. Strengthened stakeholder engagement in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and reporting of reform initiatives is vital to enhance buy-in by taxpayers and service users

ii. RBM has enabled greater accountability, efficient, effective service delivery and instituted a results culture in provision of government services

iii. There was resistance to RBM at inception; thus the need to carefully phase, consult and engage stakeholders as needed in any intervention.
iv. The Results for Kenya Programme were largely demand-driven; thus those institutions whose leadership are not motivated by results will tend to lag behind.

v. The enforcement of the circular on RRI was not strong thus need to enforce RBM as a whole to see widespread conformance; thus more results for Kenyans.

vi. There is need to document success and disseminate results widely to act as a guide and inspiration for RBM take-up.

vii. The programme has demonstrated a clear way forward and needs enhanced government commitment funding;

viii. There is need to shift from the manual nature of records to electronic reporting and filing systems so that results are quickly shared and used to redesign the programme as implementation continues.

ix. Need to have coordinated reforms as this enhances implementation, avoids duplication and enhances synergy within the many reform platforms in the public sector. The RFK programme and the institutionalization of the RBM in particular should be charged to a particular person or group of people who should be explicitly identifiable and hence accountable for its success or failure. Once the above is achieved then such a person or persons should be under a specific Ministry (ideally Office of the President or Cabinet Office; i.e. highest office) that bears the character of reforms and the closest mechanisms as those that support public service delivery;

x. The RBM programme as initially conceptualized though excellent had a weak mechanism of regular in-service training that would equip change managers with the necessary information and education for the purpose of maintaining continuous reform momentum.\[14\];

xi. There are signs that the programme was introduced rather hurriedly since issues of ethics and human rights should have been inculcated in the society’s psyche to prepare them for change of the magnitude that was envisaged through institutionalization of RBM;\[15\]

xii. Political leadership, being instrumental in the success of reforms, should be ready to accept responsibility and accountability for the results of the reform agenda;

xiii. RFK AWPs should be developed with the participation of all levels of staff to create a wider ownership and awareness among all pertinent stakeholders in MDAs;

xiv. To discourage the alleged over-dependence on UNDP by government, there should have been developed a clear exit strategy for UNDP that would ensure transfer of capacity and continuity;

xv. Need to have coordinated reforms as this enhances implementation, avoids duplication and enhances synergy within the many reform platforms in the sector;

xvi. There is need to engage the service delivery staff and elicit feedback on quality of services so that these services can be improved;

xvii. The service charters encourage better delivery of services so they should be continued;

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\[14\] Though KIA now runs course on RBM, this is not explicitly linked to the programme

\[15\] A code of Ethics produced for Ministers and Assistant Ministers did seem to have been properly entrenched
xviii. Citizens’ awareness and demand for their rights- *huduma bora ni haki yako* resulted in being served more efficiently, while discouraging corruption and poor service provision;

### 4.4. Gaps in programme design and adequacy of programme objectives

From the data availed both through literature review and informant interviews, it is apparent that the programme design should have dealt with the issues of:

i. Coordination of policy, planning and central management of all issues related to reforms

ii. Baseline survey of the existing service delivery systems that would have benchmarked the issues to be improved and areas to be evaluated.

iii. The PSR&DS strategic plan, as formulated, was inadequate to carry out the programme on its own and there is therefore need to come up with a more comprehensive and better structured Strategic plan for the next phase;

iv. A strategy for enhancing MDAs buy in and better engagement of staff at the service delivery points would have attained better results

v. Stakeholder engagement should have been better broadened to include professional bodies, wider civil society engagement especially of the community based organizations at the service delivery points levels to increase demand for services and monitoring and evaluation of the program thus enhancing transparency and accountability

vi. Though the ToR did not include evaluation at the outcome levels- the ordinary Kenyans – it is important for this aspect to be included in future.
5.0. OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Observations

- The basket funding idea works as it creates synergy and pools funds that can be applied to achieve greater results as opposed to individual funding where resources are used to perform the same functions creating duplications and creating avenues for resource wasting and corruption. During the RFKP the challenges experienced showed the need for proper and coordinated commitment to have most of the funds channelled towards reforms pass through the basket fund systems, and the need for synchronized single systems of procurement of services and equipment and joint decision making as far as the RKP is concerned.

- There was inadequate record keeping and documentation; for instance, even though assets were physically identifiable, they were not reflected in the Fixed Assets Register\(^\text{16}\). The assets should be clearly identified and most probably show a logo of its source of funding.

- Due to long procurement procedures the department, in some particular occasions, was unable to spend their allocations in time and had to return funds to donors.

- Manual financial information processing persistently slowed down delivering of financial data, information and reports.

- Due to several structural changes within the PSR&DS, PSR&PC (and currently PSTD), resource capacity in terms of HR/skills was limited. Even though there is improvement in this area, capacity constraints still exist that need to be addressed across the board and this should particularly address the need to own this programme.

5.2 Conclusions

Overall the RFKP achieved its targets at a rate of 80\(^\%\)\(^\text{17}\). The programme coordinated the RBM reforms at the management levels of the public service and saw widespread uptake of reform initiatives, which encompassed tools such as RRI, strategic planning, performance frameworks, public service week, performance contracting, performance appraisal system and public private partnerships. The programme achieved enhanced output level results in the first phase and is moving to the outcome level results in the second phase.

The design of this programme addressed key result areas and was relevant for the prevailing situation and status of reforms in the country prior to the intervention. The programme has made significant gains in institutionalising RBM, and so far there are tangible results among Kenyans who were targeted beneficiaries. However, the programme could have performed better in the absence of the political dynamics that reportedly shaped decision making during efforts to harmonize reforms through merging of the two related departments. Inadequacy of the M&E system and IEC strategy negatively affected programme

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\(^{16}\) This has now been corrected as from 2009

\(^{17}\) Based on the average rankings of the informants

Results for Kenyans Programme Evaluation: End Phase 1
implementation. The changes at the PSR&DS have affected continuity of approaches and fostered a culture of non-committal response to key issues of programmatic concern.\(^{18}\)

At the operational level, UNDP supported the programme in a big way. However, UNDP was not able to facilitate the process of transition to enable the PSR&DS take over operational responsibilities despite similarities and flexibilities between UNDP and GoK procedures. This has undermined the continuous capacity building role at the programme level. In addition to this, the World Bank’s stringent financial procedures were not adequately transferred to government to enhance financial management public sector wide.

The programme has an inadequately developed M&E framework to date and uses a process-based system to monitor a results-oriented programme. The current system cannot comprehensively establish the progress that has been made so far and lacks capacity to document and disseminate achievements.

The capacity of the PMD is still weak and the support of the donors (UNDP) in technical areas remains an integral part of the future of the RFKI.

In its 7\(^{th}\) year now, the programme should focus on delivering services to Kenyans by going beyond operational issues. This will not only justify its existence but will facilitate up-scaling of reforms to other sectors and MDAs that were identified for fast tracking.

### 5.2. Recommendations

The effectiveness and efficiency of a country’s public sector is vital to the success of development activities. An efficient civil service and administrative policy, efficient and fair collection of taxes, and transparent operations that are relatively free of corruption all contribute to good delivery of public services\(^ {19}\). The public sector is the largest spender and employer in Kenya and the Public service sets the policy environment for the rest of the economy. The RFK programme is a key initiative towards achieving a quality public service sector that is accountable, effective and efficient in service delivery as well as being motivated towards achieving development results. Improving the efficiency of government counterparts is also essential for the effectiveness of the Development Partner’s support in catalysing development.

Based on the lessons drawn from the first phase of the RFK programme, a second phase of the programme is bound offer greater benefits to Kenyans by incorporating or taking account of the following:

- A strong driver who leads by example. The overall driver/CEO of the reform programme should be a committed, passionate and empowered personality.

- Instead of creating new structures, the government should utilise existing structures – where people need not leave their core jobs. This would for example be accomplished by embedding the MMUs in the existing CPPMUs, which are already spearheading planning, coordination, performance contracting, monitoring & evaluation in Ministries. Alternatively a cadre of MMU staff (e.g. under the title of Performance Improvement

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\(^{18}\) Given that PC is a tool of RBM, it is imperative that the two be well coordinated for optimum synergy

\(^{19}\) [http://go.worldbank.org/1C817NN930](http://go.worldbank.org/1C817NN930)

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Officers) should be established, with clearly stipulated qualifications and terms. The concept of Performance Improvement Officers/Coordinators should be replicated at departmental and branch/district levels.\textsuperscript{20}

- There is need to develop an effective M&E system and transform M&E from process based approach to results focus. M&E should be redesigned and strengthened and regular (e.g. quarterly) reporting entrenched and extended to all MDAs and feedback improved as well as a NIMES link established\textsuperscript{21}. This should go hand in hand with indicators for periodic impact evaluation of the RFK training programmes and skills needs assessment for staff at MDA levels; which will provide a basis for recruitment and retention of staff at the PSR&DS and MDAs for specified periods to ensure programme effectiveness.

- A framework for measurement of “results” should be well defined and aligned to Vision 2030 based on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for each MDA

- IEC should be strengthened with targeted below and above the line advertisements and real time social media interactive outreach to increase demand for quality service from service delivery. This aspect should also link to customer protection organizations to make follow ups and assure quality of service. A study on out-reach effectiveness may need to be undertaken to inform future IEC strategies.

- The government needs to progressively set aside funds for human resource management and reforms within the public service to produce effective drives for its policy and regulatory functions.

- More call down agreements should be done with the aim of enriching the knowledge and learning to continuously improve, recruit and retain talents that maintain competitiveness and assure results for Kenyans.

- All programmes should have risk and succession aspects of management inbuilt in them.

- Public employees should have contract times agreed on deliverables and timelines to avoid the scenario of frequent transfers and promotions that rob programmes of key skills and talents. This should be coupled with continuous capacity building and empowerment of staff, delegation of authority on finance and human resource management to managers at lower levels with broad guidelines from the centre to strengthen field administration vertically and laterally from policy making centres to implementation levels

- to sustain and augment the results achieved in the first phase, further integration of organisational, human resource and financial audits need to be prioritised, with a focused plan to move to the field to ensure results for Kenyans are delivered through capacity building and empowerment of the service providers at the districts and lower levels\textsuperscript{22}

- Citizens involvement should be scaled up by focused engagement through the Public Sector Stakeholder Partnership (PSSP) and the Ministerial Stakeholder Forum (MSF), as

\textsuperscript{20} This cascading of the performance improvement function has reportedly worked well in Botswana

\textsuperscript{21} Refer to Handbook on Reporting Indicators, by Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate

\textsuperscript{22} Resourcing of lower offices will also be necessary for the officers to be in an empowered position to deliver
this will ensure transfer of competitive talents into the civil service, and facilitate design systems that reduce the opportunities for corruption;

- The Government should establish a policy to offer sufficient remuneration to attract, retain and motivate staff of a suitable calibre to provide the public with effective, efficient and high quality service. In order to ensure that civil service pay is regarded as fair and reasonable by both civil servants who provide the service and the public who foot the bill, the Government should adopt the principle that the level of civil service pay should be broadly comparable with private sector pay

- In the next phase a concerted effort should be made to institutionalize a Performance Appraisal System that is geared to maximise individual performance and enhancing overall corporate efficiency and effectiveness.
### 6.1. Evaluation Grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of results based management (RBM)</td>
<td>RRIs</td>
<td>Formation of the PSRD secretariat Strategies ; HR, IEC, PAF, SPs</td>
<td>Transformations in the way government carries out its business by moving from process orientation to results orientation. Strategic Plans mainstreamed as a planning tool for MDAs</td>
<td>.improving the performance of staff and institutions</td>
<td>Should be sustained and in the next phase, shift focus to the outcome/impacts areas and manage for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Appraisal Systems</td>
<td>Service delivery surveys</td>
<td>Won a UN award for top ten best practices in public service delivery</td>
<td>.Focusing on results and results management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEC Strategy and other components</td>
<td>Annual Work plans</td>
<td>Staff performance appraisal</td>
<td>.Paradigm shift in management of government service delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance Contracts</td>
<td>MMUs and Departments</td>
<td>systems Permanent Public Service Remuneration Review</td>
<td>.Institutional framework for managing for results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target setting</td>
<td>Development of Strategic Plans</td>
<td>Development of Strategic Plans ICT policy and E-Government Strategy</td>
<td>.public expenditure reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring and measuring public service</td>
<td>Performance Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td>.Enhancement of GJLOS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Enhance institutional performance</td>
<td>Performance management system</td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved coordination with MED, E-Government MOPND &amp; Cabinet Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Enhance individual performance</td>
<td>Enforcement mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Set up coordination mechanism</td>
<td>Enactment of the Public Service Results and Performance act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Five year Public service Reform Strategy</td>
<td>Institutionalization of RBM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Framework for stakeholder participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Performance management system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Enforcement mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.Enactment of the Public Service Results and Performance act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSR&amp;D SP Funding from development partners</td>
<td>Signing of the JSI</td>
<td><strong>JSI signed and funds allocated for the program</strong></td>
<td>.Institutionalization of measurement for results</td>
<td>Enhanced and better service delivery</td>
<td>loopholes where parallel funding takes place should be sealed and wholesome basket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mentoring and capacity building Basket funding</strong></td>
<td>.Increased partnerships and networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results for Kenyans Programme Evaluation: End Phase 1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transformative Leadership Values and Ethics,</strong></td>
<td>Capacity building initiatives and instilling of leadership values and ethics</td>
<td>.1 highest level training done for President, Prime Minister and Ministers .1 held for Permanent Secretaries .Several for MMUs within the MDAs</td>
<td>Team work Transparency and accountability to the Kenyan public Shift from process to results management</td>
<td>A more energized and engaged Kenyan public service</td>
<td>Should continue to the next phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity Building Programme for Transforming the Public Service</strong></td>
<td>.Capacity building training .Capacity building of KIA to provide leadership in capacity building</td>
<td>-Coordination of RBM -Needs assessment -Media outreach programmes IEC materials .Minutes and Reports of engagement with the public.</td>
<td>Fast tracking of the Strategic Plans in MDAs</td>
<td>Skills and knowledge enhancement for better results</td>
<td>An assessment of the capacity building impact to be done in the next phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge management</strong></td>
<td>.Documentation of best practices .Robust M&amp;E System</td>
<td>Progress reports aide memoirs documentation</td>
<td>Documentation of successes led to replication in other MDAs Frequent monitoring increased interest and sustained the basket funding</td>
<td>Not evident</td>
<td>This section was weak and needs to be revamped in the next phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structured Public Sector Stakeholder Partnerships</strong></td>
<td>Policy on public private sector partnership</td>
<td>Policy on public private sector stakeholders</td>
<td>Public Private sector partnership</td>
<td>Increased engagement with the private and civil sectors</td>
<td>Needs to be enhanced in the next stage to include wider Civil Society engagement and the involvement of professional bodies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Re-align the PSC and DPM and delegate</strong></td>
<td>-Human Resource Policy and Job design -Human resources planning Reward and performance mgt -Developing people to deliver -Structuring of training -Valuing our people -HRM balance scorecard</td>
<td>.Delegation of HR to line ministries .Performance management systems .Competency based/result orientated HR management .Review of HR Policies and legislations .Public Service Results and performance act .Employment policies</td>
<td>MDAs delegated to hire lower cadres directly Competency based recruitment</td>
<td>Enhanced recruitment for results</td>
<td>To be enhanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Impacts</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation Consultation plan</td>
<td>HR management strategy</td>
<td>. Reporting to stakeholders Reward system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. Results based career management Balanced Score Card</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. Institutional framework for managing for results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. Technical and professional capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation Framework</td>
<td>A robust M &amp; E system</td>
<td>. RBM monitoring and evaluation system Enactment of the information act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Connect to NIMEs and enhance capacity and monitoring and evaluation systems Implement the designed M&amp;E system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>. Results based appraisal systems Performance appraisal system Performance targets Performance contracting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Management Accountability Framework (MAF)</td>
<td>Customised but not implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial and Procurement</td>
<td>Shift to results based budgeting Strengthening internal audit Automation of the financial management systems</td>
<td>Results based budgeting Strong internal audit undermining accountability updating of legal and procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td>IFMIS put in place</td>
<td>More emphasis needs to be put in the results based budgeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.2. Summary Assessment of Performance against Strategic Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Goal/Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Objective(s)</th>
<th>Implementation Status</th>
<th>Explanation/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1        | Institutionalise RBM approach in the public service to achieve the national goals and the ERS targets | Establish a framework to facilitate Public Private Sector Partnerships  
Establish a results Office within the PSR&DS to coordinate RBM implementation | Yes by PRSD/T and through other initiatives- Partnerships key to the delivery of the objective  
Done but not by PRSD |                                                                                       |
| 2        | Create an enabling environment for RBM implementation                                         | Restructuring of the Cabinet Office  
Rationalisation of Ministries  
Review and realignment of HR management to competency based/results orientation  
Review policies and legislation, including enactment of Public Service Results and Performance Act as stipulated in the Cabinet Memo No (04) 106 of 24 September 2004  
Formulation of employment policies and human resource management strategies | Done but report not widely circulated  
Doc forwarded to PS public Service  
Draft Bill finalised by June 2007 | The resulting 40 ministries after the accord made this difficult |
| 3        | Develop the capacity of public service officers to transform the Public Service               |                                                                                               | Programme developed with 9 modules for building capacity and launched and been piloted in several institutions |                                                                                       |
| 4        | Develop the capacity of Leaders in the Public Service to champion change                     | 360-degree feedback assessment  
Transformative leadership capacity building and staff development  
Institutional Capacity Building  
Growing our leaders programme | Not done |                                                                                       |
6.3 Evaluation Instruments

6.3.1 In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussion Guide

*(For key implementers)*

1. Are you aware of the Results for Kenya Programme? *If yes what was it about?* *Probe for awareness, involvement and interventions that have been made by the programme*

2. Is (or has) been your ministry/department/authority/Parastatal involved in the programme? *Probe for involvement in the design, planning, dissemination, implementation evaluations, target setting and the benefits accrued from the programme*

3. Is your institution using Results Based Management and Performance Contracts? *Do you have a Service Charter?* *If yes, to what extent do you think it is being implemented and in what specific aspects do you think this has improved service delivery? Probe for whether RBM and PC has enabled better management and ensured better results for the Kenyan people’s*

4. In your opinion did the RBM encourage better performance from individual staff? *Probe for staff training and capacity building, increased individual performance and motivation of public servants and overall institutional performance, successes, challenges and lessons learnt*

5. Are these the results attained from these programme sustainable? *Probe for the probability of the activities being continued after donor support ends, replication of the same in other areas*

6. Have you set up systems within your organization for effective RBM? *Probe for existence of performance improvement teams, and their main functions, successes and challenges that are facing the respective institutions*
6.3.2 Community Meetings and Focus Groups

Community meetings and Focus Groups
(For ordinary citizens, civil society and media)

1. What are the general problems people face in this area? (note service delivery related problems)

2. How is the delivery of government services to the people in this area?

3. Are there challenges citizens here face when accessing services from the government offices? Probe for efficiency in service delivery, time it takes to receive services when citizens demand for it and hurdles they face when accessing government services

4. Are you aware of government reforms (efforts/initiative of the government to improve service delivery to Kenyans)? Probe for general knowledge on any reforms that they would be knowing and whether there are results in their interaction with government officials that can be attributable to this reforms

5. Are you aware of the Results for Kenya Programme? If yes what was it about? Probe for awareness, involvement and interventions that have been made by the programme in the provision of services to local populations

6. For the last five years, have you experienced any change in the service delivery by government officers in this area? Can you please share with us some of the specific changes that you have witnessed? Probe for attentiveness, courtesy, timeliness to get services and the general attitude of public employees towards citizens and service delivery to the public

7. Do you think the service improvements that you have experience will remain? If yes/no give reasons for your opinion? Are these the results attained from these programme sustainable? Probe for the probability of the activities being continued after donor support ends, replication of the same in other areas

8. Were you adequately involved in the service improvement process? In future government and donor reform programmes how would you like to be involved? Probe for involvement in design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and value for money

9. What else would you recommend to the government to improve service delivery? Probe for specific examples
6.3.3 Questionnaire

*(To MMUs, RDAs, Parastatals and local authorities to those immediately involved in the implementation of the programme)*

1. What planning process was adopted? *(Probe for involvement of people, planning period, coverage of strategic areas)*

2. Were the plans linked with national plans and business environment? *(Probe for connectedness to other national reform programmes, main five year, ten year and 30 year programmes)*

3. Was there mid course correction, contingency planning? *(Probe for flexibility to fit in with changes and shocks within government budgets and donors and staff turnover, amalgamation and split of key MDAs)*

4. Was the implementation integrated with operational documents? *(Probe for integration with revenue budgets, capital budget, HR budget)*

5. Was the implementation strategy time bound, compatible to corporate plans and annual plans?

6. Was this aligned to national plans, policy plans, useful for infrastructure development?

7. Was the RBM strategy flexible to changes in the operational environment?

8. Were objectives and targets clearly stipulated?

9. Was target setting realistic and growth oriented?

10. Was the modality of information flow and evaluation clearly mentioned in the programme and what were the successes and challenges in its implementation?

11. Was delegation of power appropriate and related to the performance targets?

12. What were the major successes if the RFKP?

13. What were the major challenges in the implementation of the RFKP?

14. Overall how did the RFKP relate to the other government reform programmes undertaken over the past 20 years?
### 6.3.3.1. Service Delivery – Exit Questionnaire

**District ___________**  
**Ministry ______________**

**Serving Office ___________**

**Setting**:  
1. Rural  
2. Urban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the respondent ___________</th>
<th>Sex: 1. Male 2. Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. **How old are you?**
   - 1. 15-24  
   - 2. 25-34  
   - 3. 35-44  
   - 4. 45-54  
   - 5. Above 55

2. **What level of education have you attained?**
   - 1. No education  
   - 2. Primary school incomplete
   - 3. Primary school complete
   - 4. Secondary school incomplete
   - 5. Secondary school complete
   - 6. Tertiary/ college
   - 7. University

3. **What prompted your visit here today?**
   - 1. Health seeking
   - 2. Service seeking
   - 3. Registration
   - 4. Other specify ______________

4. **What time did you come?**
   - Interviewer record time come________
   - Time left____________________

4. **Was your problem solved or expectations met?**
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No
   - If no indicated why? ______________

5. **The time it took to receive service was?**
   - 1. Short
   - 2. Normal
   - 3. Long
   - 4. Unacceptable

6. **In the event it was long why do you believe it took so long?**
   - 1. Uncommitted /slow staff
   - 2. Too many procedures/ Bureaucracy
   - 3. Manual handling of process
   - 4. Corruption
   - 5. Inadequacy of staff attending clients
   - 6. Other specify________

7. **In which point were you delayed most?**
   - 1. Preparation
   - 2. Service delivery
   - 3. Accounts/ cashier
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>4. Other specify___________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 8 | In summary what would you say about your experience in service seeking in this office? Are you? | 1. Satisfied  
2. Dissatisfied  
3. Completely dissatisfied  
4. Frustated |
| 9 | Have you heard of government public transformation reforms? | 1. Yes  
2. No |
| 10 | Have you ever heard of results for Kenya program? | 1. Yes  
2. No |
| 11 | In your own opinion, has service delivery improved because of this program? | 1. Yes  
2. No  

*Why do you think so?*
6.2.1. Issues considered during the synoptic Strategic Plan evaluation

1. Were the strategic plans implemented as scheduled, and what were the major successes and challenges experienced at design and during implementation? What was the overall degree of objective attainment?

2. Were sufficient resources committed to training and equipping staff

3. What was the general level of coordination during policy making, programming, budgeting, implementation and evaluation of this programme

4. What was the general state of communication including publicity and advocacy during the life of this programme

5. What was the level of stakeholder participation in the strategic plan development and how did this aid or impede implementation?

6. What was the state of public accountability and openness during design, implementation, evaluation and reporting

7. Were public interests, values and ethics preserved in design, implementation and evaluation

8. Was capacity increased or enhanced to meet the Results for Kenyans Programme

9. Was commitment from the leadership (President, Parliament, Prime minister, Permanent secretaries) gained during the programme implementation

10. What have been the effects of the anti corruption crusade to the results from the programme

11. Were the lessons drawn from the mid-term evaluation used to improve the programme? Cite three and how each helped improve results
6.3.4. Issues considered during the synoptic Strategic Plan evaluation

1. Was the strategic plan implemented as scheduled, and what were the major successes and challenges experienced at design and during implementation? What was the overall degree of objective attainment?

2. Were sufficient resources committed to training and equipping staff?

3. What was the general level of coordination during policy making, programming, budgeting, implementation and evaluation of this programme?

4. What was the general state of communication including publicity and advocacy during the life of this programme?

5. What was the level of stakeholder participation in the strategic plan development and how did this aid or impede implementation?

6. What was the state of public accountability and openness during design, implementation, evaluation and reporting?

7. Were public interests, values and ethics preserved in design, implementation and evaluation?

8. Was capacity increased or enhanced to meet the Results for Kenyans Programme?

9. Was commitment from the leadership (President, Parliament, Prime minister, Permanent secretaries) gained during the programme implementation?

10. What have been the effects of the anti corruption crusade to the results from the programme?

11. Were the lessons drawn from the mid-term evaluation used to improve the programme? Cite three and how each helped improve results.
6.4. List of Institutions/Officials Sampled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of Public Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of PSTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Secretaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Provincial Administration and internal security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Immigration &amp; Registration of Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Immigration and registration of persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Institute of Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local authorities**
- Nairobi City Council
- Kilifi County Council
- Wareng County council
- Kakamega county Council

**Development Partners**
- UNDP
- World Bank
- DFID
- CIDA
- SIDA
- Denmark
- Finland
- Norway

**Stakeholders**
- Kenya Private Sector alliance
- NCCK
- Supkem
- Media

6.5. Questionnaires Distribution

- 10 Ministerial Management Units
- 10 Parastatals
- Institutions of Higher Learning
  - Kenyatta university

Results for Kenyans Programme Evaluation: End Phase 1
• 5 Regional Authorities
  o Coast Development Authority
  o TARDA
  o Lake Basin
  o Kerio valley

• 10 Local Authorities
  o Mombasa
  o Nairobi
  o Eldoret
  o Kisumu
  o Isiolo

6.6. Focus Group Discussions

• 14 PMUs
• 14 Local Councils
6.7. Summary of Revenues and Expenditure

6.7.1. Selected quotation with evidence of over pricing

Following is a table showing comparison between the earlier floated quotations and the revised quotations after Marker Research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>PREVIOUS PRICES</th>
<th>REVISED PRICES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banners</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>5,545,000.00</td>
<td>272,765.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brochures</td>
<td>500000</td>
<td>9,750,000.00</td>
<td>2,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posters</td>
<td>500000</td>
<td>9,878,000.00</td>
<td>3,017,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t-shirts</td>
<td>13000</td>
<td>12,090,000.00</td>
<td>5,525,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caps</td>
<td>13100</td>
<td>9,170,000.00</td>
<td>3,618,220.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>46,432,000.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,433,486.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Savings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31,998,514.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table it can be seen that there is a difference of Kenya Shillings Thirty million, nine hundred ninety eight, five hundred and fourteen (31,998,514.00) Saved.
### 6.7.2. Public Sector Reforms Outputs and Completed Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUDGET &amp; OUTPUTS</th>
<th>ACTIVITY/EXPENDITURE DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>AMOUNT IN US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Budgeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AWP Outputs</strong></td>
<td>(2005) Capacity for Public Service</td>
<td>184,673.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2005) Institutionalization of RBM</td>
<td>10,686.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2006) An enabling environment for the Implementation of Results Based Management (RBM) created</td>
<td>64,784.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalization of RBM</td>
<td>128,352.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity of Public Service Leaders to Champion change in the Implementation of RBM and Mainstreaming of values and Ethics in the Public Service developed</td>
<td>793,166.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information, Education and Communication strategy for disseminating “Results for Kenya” developed</td>
<td>65,365.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long term Public Service Strategy including national vision and branding Kenya (Kenya Incorporated) developed</td>
<td>35,872.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resources mobilization strategy for coordinated implementation of the project</td>
<td>1,666.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2007/2008) Result Based Management Institutionalization in the Public Service</td>
<td>559,733.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007/2008 Transformed Public Service through Capacity Building and Change management</td>
<td>188,645.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2007/2008) A responsive, Proactive patriotic citizenry that knows its rights and obligation and information available for Evidence Based Policy and Decision Making</td>
<td>698,657.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>Programme Delivery enhanced through Technical Advisory Services</td>
<td>306,537.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>Focused Strategic Leadership, Policy and Partnership for Results</td>
<td>630,264.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programme delivery enhanced through Programme Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>RBM Institutionalization in the Public Service</td>
<td>327,940.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>Transformed Public Service through Capacity Building and change Management</td>
<td>288,667.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>Transformed Public Service</td>
<td>18616.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>A responsive, Proactive patriotic citizenry that knows its rights and</td>
<td>867,128.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>obligation and information available for Evidence Based Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>Programme Delivery enhanced through Technical Advisory Services</td>
<td>254,009.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.8. List of RRIs planned during the period under review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES / AGENCIES</th>
<th>RRI STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ministry of State for Public Service</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Ministry of State for Defence</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ministry of Planning and National Development</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs</td>
<td>NOT DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Ministry of Education</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Ministry of Health</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Ministry of Science and Technology</td>
<td>NOT DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Dev</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Ministry of East African Community</td>
<td>NOT DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Ministry of Local Government</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Ministry of State for Special Programmes</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Ministry of State for National Heritage</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Ministry of State for Youth Affairs</td>
<td>DONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Ministry of Roads and Public Works</td>
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<td>20 Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<td>23 Ministry of Transport</td>
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<td>28 Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>30 Ministry of Lands</td>
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<td>31 Ministry of Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>32 Ministry of Co-operative Dev. and Marketing</td>
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<td>33 Public Service Commission</td>
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<td>34 National Assembly</td>
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<td>35 State Law Office</td>
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<td>36 Kenya National Audit Office</td>
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<td>37 Performance Contracts Steering Committee</td>
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<td>38 Public Communications Secretary</td>
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<td>39 State House</td>
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<td>40 Electoral Commission of Kenya</td>
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</table>
6.9. Update on the Public Service Transformation Department

Following the launch of the Office of the Prime Minister’s Strategic Plan in 2009, the Public Service Transformation Department (PSTD) was established in the Office of the Prime Minister.

The Department is mandated to:

- Strengthen the government’s capacity to coordinate public sector reforms;
- Oversee the implementation of the Public Service Reforms Strategy that supports Vision 2030
- Institutionalise Results Based Management across Government

However the new department seems to have a number of challenges; including the following:

- Capacity constraints due to inadequate staff capacity for execution of both programmatic and operational activities.
- Reluctance by some key staff within the Prime Minister’s Office to accord reforms the expected high level focus.
- Slow adoption of the new reform vision by some key officers.
- Inadequate funding for spearheading comprehensive and effective public sector transformation
6.10. References

Aide Memoires (Several)

Annual Work Plans (AWPs)

Draft concept for Kenya School of Government

Draft Human Resources Management Strategy

Draft Information, Education, and Communication Strategy for the Reform Programme

Draft Integrated National Performance Management Framework

Draft Public Sector Stakeholder Partnership Policy

Draft Results and Performance Bill

Draft Youth Leadership Programme entitled “Growing our Leaders”

Joint Statement of Intent

Performance Appraisal System (PAS),

Performance Review of the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat (PSR&DS), November 2006-January 2007 by Joyce Deloge & John Njoka)

PSR&DS 2006-2008 Strategic Plan

Results for Kenyans Programme, 2006-7, Office of the President

Various training manuals, guides and curricula on Results Based Management strategies