

# UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004 - 2007

## Terminal Evaluation

---

### Final Report

Meg Gawler  
Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.  
Alaric Tokpa

18 September 2009

UNDP Evaluation Focal Point:  
Teakon Williams, UNDP Liberia  
[teakon.williams@undp.org](mailto:teakon.williams@undp.org)



**ARTEMIS Services**  
*For Nature Conservation and Human Development*

E-mail: [meg@artemis-services.com](mailto:meg@artemis-services.com)  
Website: <http://www.artemis-services.com>

## **Acknowledgements**

The evaluators gratefully acknowledge all the efforts that were made to ensure a successful evaluation mission. Special thanks are due to: Maria-Threase Keating, Emmett Watson, Yvonne Wolo and the UNDP-Liberia Programme Managers for their invaluable support and cooperation as well as to the UNDP office and field staff for their help in facilitating the evaluation. We are grateful to Jordan Ryan and Dominic Sam for their thoughtful advice.

We are especially indebted to the 250 evaluation respondents (see full list in Annex 4), who took time out of their busy schedules to provide input to this evaluation.

Meg Gawler  
Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.  
Alaric Tokpa

18 September 2009

## Contents

Acknowledgements .....	ii
Executive Summary .....	vii
Acronyms .....	xiv
1. Introduction .....	1
1.1 Context.....	1
1.2 UNDP role and focus in Liberia .....	2
1.3 Purpose, objectives and expected use of the evaluation .....	2
1.4 Additional evaluation objectives .....	4
2. Methodology and limitations .....	5
2.1 Methodology.....	5
2.2 Limitations.....	10
3. What was the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme? .....	12
3.1 Background.....	12
3.2 The UNDP Liberia post-conflict strategy 2004/2005.....	13
3.3 The Country Programme Office extension for 2004-2006.....	14
3.4 Programme expenditures .....	14
3.5 Programme execution .....	18
3.6 Monitoring and evaluation assessment.....	18
4. Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration .....	20
4.1 DDRR – Design and relevance.....	21
4.2 DDRR – Partnership strategy .....	24
4.3 DDRR – Programme effectiveness.....	25
4.4 DDRR – Programme efficiency .....	27
4.5 DDRR – Degree of change .....	27
4.6 DDRR – Most significant change.....	29
4.7 DDRR – Sustainability .....	29
4.8 DDRR – Strengths and weaknesses.....	30
4.9 DDRR – Lessons learned .....	32
5. Community-based recovery .....	33
5.1 CBR – Design and relevance.....	34
5.2 CBR – Partnership strategy .....	34
5.3 CBR – Programme effectiveness.....	35
5.4 CBR – Programme efficiency.....	36
5.5 CBR – Degree of change .....	37
5.6 CBR – Most significant change.....	39
5.7 CBR – Sustainability .....	40
5.8 CBR – Strengths and weaknesses.....	41
5.9 CBR – Lessons learned.....	43
6. Democratic governance .....	44
6.1 DG – Design and relevance .....	45
6.2 DG – Partnership strategy.....	46
6.3 DG – Programme effectiveness .....	46
6.4 DG – Programme efficiency .....	47
6.5 DG – Degree of change .....	48

6.6	DG – Most significant change .....	50
6.7	DG – Sustainability .....	51
6.8	DG – Strengths and weaknesses .....	52
6.9	DG – Lessons learned .....	54
7.	Building capacity for HIV/AIDS response .....	55
7.1	HIV – Design and relevance .....	56
7.2	HIV – Partnership strategy .....	58
7.3	HIV – Programme effectiveness .....	59
7.4	HIV – Programme efficiency .....	60
7.5	HIV – Degree of change .....	61
7.6	HIV – Most significant change .....	62
7.7	HIV – Sustainability .....	63
7.8	HIV – Strengths and weaknesses .....	63
7.9	HIV – Lessons learned .....	65
8.	Human rights / protection / gender .....	65
8.1	HRPG – Design and relevance .....	68
8.2	HRPG – Partnership strategy .....	69
8.3	HRPG – Programme effectiveness .....	69
8.4	HRPG – Programme efficiency .....	71
8.5	HRPG – Degree of change .....	72
8.6	HRPG – Most significant change .....	74
8.7	HRPG – Sustainability .....	75
8.8	HRPG – Strengths and weaknesses .....	76
8.9	HRPG – Lessons learned .....	78
9.	Environmental management .....	79
9.1	EM – Design and relevance .....	82
9.2	EM – Partnership strategy .....	83
9.3	EM – Programme effectiveness .....	84
9.4	EM – Programme efficiency .....	85
9.5	EM – Degree of change .....	86
9.6	EM – Most significant change .....	87
9.7	EM – Sustainability .....	88
9.8	EM – Strengths and weaknesses .....	89
9.9	EM – Lessons learned .....	90
10.	Infrastructure .....	91
11.	Conclusions .....	95
11.1	Contribution to MDGs .....	95
11.2	Successes and constraints .....	96
12.	Recommendations .....	98
12.1	Strategic recommendations .....	99
12.2	Operational recommendations .....	104
	Annex 1. Terms of reference .....	109
	Annex 2. Documents reviewed .....	117
	Annex 3. Interview guide / questionnaire .....	125
	Annex 4. List of evaluation respondents .....	130
	Annex 5. Status of intended programme outcomes .....	146
	Annex 6. Status of intended programme outputs .....	156
	Annex 7. Summary of programme budgets and expenditures .....	162

Annex 8. Photographs .....	163
Annex 9. Profiles of the evaluators .....	166

## List of Figures

Figure 1. Map of Sites Visited by the Evaluation Team .....	7
Figure 2. Number of Evaluation Respondents by Stakeholder Group .....	8
Figure 3. Number of Evaluation Respondents by Strategic Programme Area and by gender ..	9
Figure 4. UNDP Liberia Programme 2004-2007: Budget and expenditure.....	15
Figure 5. Evolution of programme expenditure by strategic programme area .....	16
Figure 6. Evolution of overall programme expenditure: core funds and donor funds .....	17
Figure 7. Percentage of programme budget spent, 2004-2007.....	17
Figure 8. Percentage of programme expenditures from UNDP core funds .....	18
Figure 9. Stakeholder survey results - DDDR programme .....	20
Figure 10. Survey results by stakeholder group - DDDR programme .....	21
Figure 11. Stakeholder survey results - CBR programme .....	33
Figure 12. Survey results by stakeholder group - CBR programme .....	33
Figure 13. Stakeholder survey results for Democratic Governance programme .....	44
Figure 14. Survey results by stakeholder group for Democratic Governance programme .....	44
Figure 15. Stakeholder survey results for HIV/AIDS programme.....	55
Figure 16. Survey results by stakeholder group for HIV/AIDS programme .....	56
Figure 17. Stakeholder survey results: Human Rights, Protection and Gender programme ..	67
Figure 18. Survey results by stakeholder group for HRPD programme .....	67
Figure 19. Stakeholder survey results for Environmental Management programme .....	81
Figure 20. Survey results by stakeholder group for EM programme.....	81
Figure 21. Survey results for UNDP Liberia programme as a whole .....	97
Figure 22. Comparative results of the different strategic programme areas .....	98
Figure 23. Beneficiaries of DDDR auto mechanics training.....	163
Figure 24. Women marketers (CBR beneficiaries) work together across tribal lines.....	163
Figure 25. DG beneficiaries, student government leaders from Cuttington University.....	164
Figure 26. HIV/AIDS awareness campaign, Firestone Hospital.....	164
Figure 27. Beneficiaries of HRPD micro-loan programme .....	165
Figure 28. Beneficiaries of the EM solar panel pilot project .....	165

## List of Tables

Table 1. Evaluation design matrix.....	5
Table 2. Relative importance of the different strategic programme areas .....	14
Table 3. Evolution of overall programme expenditure .....	16
Table 4. Evolution of gender-sensitive MDG indicators 2002-2007 .....	74



## **Executive Summary**

### **UNDP Liberia Programme 2004-2007**

After fourteen years of devastating civil war, Liberia was faced with immense challenges of reconciliation, peace-building, reconciliation and recovery. UNDP Liberia's 2004-2007 Programme was intended to respond to this crisis by supporting first the National Transitional Government and then the new government democratically elected in 2005, in implementing the priorities identified in the Results Focused Transitional Framework document, the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, and then supporting the elected government in addressing the priorities of the full Poverty Reduction Strategy. The consolidation of peace and security was the first and most urgent challenge.

This evaluation covers the six strategic programme areas that were the focus of the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme:

1. Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR)
2. Community-Based Recovery (CBR)
3. Democratic Governance (DG)
4. Building Capacity for HIV/AIDS Response (HIV)
5. Human Rights / Protection / Gender (HRPG)
6. Environmental Management (EM).

In addition to these strategic programme areas, the evaluation team was also asked to look at the Infrastructure Project (InP) funded by The World Bank.

The 2004-2007 UNDP Programme was developed under the most trying of circumstances. The urgent need for immediate humanitarian action, together with a non-functional government, absence of leadership, and weak to non-existent national capacity meant that in the beginning of the programme, UNDP focused more on the country's most urgent priorities than on taking the time to prepare a definitive programme document to guide the organization's work during this critical four-year period. UNDP rightly responded to the post-conflict humanitarian crisis in Liberia with immediate intervention at the expense of elaborate and lengthy programme planning processes. This, however, resulted in challenges for both programme management and subsequently evaluation.

### **Purpose**

The purpose of this terminal evaluation was to measure the contribution of the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Country Programme to the national objectives of consolidating peace and security and to UNDP's corporate goals of reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This exercise is intended to support learning lessons about UNDP's work so as to implement a better assistance strategy for the current Country Programme, 2008-2012.

## **Methodology and approach**

Each of the strategic programme areas was evaluated according to six fundamental criteria: design and relevance; partnership strategies; effectiveness; efficiency; impact / degree of change; sustainability. As this was a terminal evaluation of a four-year programme, emphasis was placed on evaluating outcomes, in particular the contribution of the UNDP Programme to peace and security in Liberia and its contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

The evaluation process was guided by the criteria of utility, credibility, relevance and human rights. To achieve this, the team emphasized an approach that was strongly evidence-based and analytical, and also collaborative, humanistic, and constructive. We set ourselves two major goals for this evaluation:

- 1) to carry out the assignment so as to maximize objectivity and validity, minimize bias, and ensure impartiality
- 2) to generate evaluative knowledge that would enhance learning and empowerment, inform management decisions, and improve implementation and future programme design.

The methodology was based on: briefings and debriefings with UNDP Liberia; a study of contextual information and baselines; document review; meetings with the heads of the programmes to understand and critique the formulation of outcomes, and to establish a clear baseline for assessment and evaluation of project activities (see Annexes 5 and 6); interviews with 250 key informants (125 female and 125 male) using a structured interview guide to gather qualitative and quantitative data; field visits to 16 project sites in eight counties. All interviews commenced with a wide-open, outcome-focused question on what had been the most significant change of all as a result of the programme; the interviews then looked in detail at the relevant strategic programme area in terms of the evaluation criteria identified. The evaluation team targeted five stakeholder groups as data sources: direct beneficiaries; CSOs / NGOs / private sector; government; donors; and UNDP / UN. The team made a special effort to reach women, young people and especially vulnerable groups – particularly in rural areas.

## **Key Findings**

The 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme spent over USD 110 million over the four-year period. Donors provided 87 per cent of the programme funding, and 13 per cent came from UNDP core funds. The lion's share of the Programme funding (66 per cent) went to the DDRR programme. Three strategic programme areas – Infrastructure, DG and CBR – accounted for 12, 9 and 9 percent of the programme expenditures respectively. Relatively little (2, 1 and 0.6 per cent respectively) was spent on the HRP, HIV and EM programmes. Overall, UNDP Liberia spent 86 per cent of its budget during this period.

The consolidation of peace and security was the first and most urgent challenge. The DDRR programme laid the foundation necessary to begin addressing Liberia's enormous post-conflict humanitarian and development priorities.



A major constraint for effective implementation was that UNDP Liberia did not have an operational monitoring and evaluation system for the period 2004 to 2007. However, UNDP itself identified this weakness, and substantial efforts were made in 2008 and 2009 to improve the M&E capacity of the Country Office, including the development of a regular monitoring system, the engagement of an M&E volunteer in February 2009 and an M&E Specialist in June 2009, and the coordination of the M&E Working Group for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

Donors were very disappointed with UNDP's reporting, especially financial reporting. Procurement at UNDP Liberia emerged as the biggest operational constraint.

It is important to note that since 2007, UNDP has undergone tremendous changes with the aim of improving the quality of delivery of its services.

## **Conclusions**

The UNDP 2004-2007 Programme was not conceived, implemented, monitored or managed as a coherent programme. Rather it was a collection of rather autonomous "strategic programme areas". This was largely because the Programme was conceived in a time of acute humanitarian crisis during which action had to begin immediately. More, however, could perhaps have been achieved had the Programme been designed in an integrated fashion, regularly monitored according to a systematic and coordinated plan, and managed as a whole.

In a context of post-war devastation and suffering, the UNDP Liberia 2004-2007 Programme was intended to respond to the immense challenges of human rights, peace-building, reconciliation and recovery. The Programme was not by any means balanced among the strategic programme areas, with expenditures on DDRR dwarfing all the other programmes. In comparison, funding was inadequate for key strategic areas such as Human Rights / Protection / Gender, HIV/AIDS, and Environmental Management.

The evaluation findings demonstrated that the HRPG, EM and CBR programmes were seen by stakeholders as having made a significant contribution to achieving the MDGs, whereas respondents' views were more mixed about the contribution of the DDRR, HIV and DG programmes.

In terms of security much more should have been done to protect women and children, especially girls. Changing Liberia's culture of pervasive violence against women and girls will require far greater effort and funding than what has been allocated thus far. This is a moral imperative of the highest urgency both for the Liberian government and for UN agencies and other donors. Funding for human rights must no longer be such a minor portion of UNDP's budget in Liberia.

The evaluation compared the results of the different strategic programme areas. Every programme scored high on its relevance to Liberia's priorities. Respondents strongly agreed that the HRPG programme had an effective partnership strategy, but their views on the partnerships in the DG and CBR programmes were more mixed. All of the programmes were seen as having achieved their objectives, although views on the DDRR programme were more

mixed. All programmes, with the exception of DG, were seen as having achieved results at a reasonable cost, especially the HRPG and EM programmes.

Results of the evaluation at the outcome level were particularly impressive, in that respondents agreed that every programme had contributed to peace and security in Liberia and strongly agreed on this for the HRPG, CBR and DDDR programmes. Views were more mixed in terms of the contribution of the different programmes to the MDGs. The HRPG, EM and CBR programmes scored particularly well in contributing to achieving the MDGs.

Although this evaluation has revealed substantial problems of programme design and implementation, nevertheless it is clear from the evaluation results, that the UNDP Liberia Programme has been remarkably successful. This is evidenced by the overall findings of the evaluation, which clearly show that on average the evaluation respondents were convinced that the programme was highly relevant to Liberia's priorities, that it did enhance peace and security, and that it succeeded in achieving its objectives. Respondents' views were also positive, though somewhat less so, that the Programme had made a significant contribution towards the MDGs, that it achieved its results at a reasonable cost, and that it had a good partnership strategy.

On the other hand, the Programme was widely viewed as unsustainable without further support. This is not surprising, since the conditions were not in place in the humanitarian crisis of post-war Liberia to lay the foundations for sustainability. For most outcomes, the period 2004-2007 was simply too soon after the war for sustainable results to be a realistic possibility.

UNDP Liberia can be proud of its 2004-2007 Programme. Yes, there were problems. The context in which the Programme was implemented was extremely difficult – with the breakdown of virtually every aspect of life in Liberia following the 14-year civil war. The evaluation clearly demonstrates that in these challenging circumstances, UNDP carried out a programme that succeeded overall when measured by every evaluation criterion except sustainability (see especially Figures 21 and 22).

### **Key recommendations**

In an effort to ensure the relevance and usefulness of this report, recommendations are separated into key strategic recommendations, followed by detailed operational recommendations. Detailed strategic recommendations are given in Chapter 12.1 for nine topics: programme design, capacity building, the six strategic programme areas, and large-scale infrastructure work. Among these, we can highlight the following:

- 1) Strategic programme design: adopt more of a rights-based approach to programming; focus on reducing the risk of a return to conflict by emphasizing strategies such as promoting participation, employment and sustainable economic growth; conceive, implement, monitor and manage the Programme as a coherent whole, with special focus on reaching more rural areas, and more especially vulnerable beneficiaries; ensure adequate investment in the collection and analysis of baseline and monitoring data in Liberia; carry out a multi-disciplinary research programme – which takes advantage of anthropological methods such as direct observation of participants in

addition to culturally sensitive KAP surveys or focus groups – before, during and after the SGBV programme or other sensitive interventions; make the programme theory of change explicit; go beyond pilot projects to take programmes to scale; develop and provide an adequate budget for a comprehensive M&E plan; design projects so as to lay strong foundations for more sustainable outcomes.

- 2) Strategic capacity building: engage with the government to develop a long-term capacity building strategy; especially target building the capacity of government in monitoring and evaluation (ref: example of South Africa); directly confront corruption; constructively engage civil society and the private sector as much as with the government.
- 3) DDRR: Lessons for DDRR in other contexts include: plan DDRR programmes to fully address the needs of women and children ex-combatants, and design programmes particularly for them in close collaboration with UNIFEM and UNICEF; in particular, design DDRR programmes, and allocate adequate resources to ensure the prevention of all forms of violence against the more vulnerable ex-combatants: women and children; design RR programmes with a clear exit strategy; ensure that programmes targeting those who have not engaged in fighting and killing – especially the victims of violence – form an integral part of the RR component, as restricting support to ex-combatants creates the erroneous impression that there is reward in bearing arms; allocate sufficient resources to systematically monitor reintegration and track the progress of beneficiaries; maintain the structure of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, but change the name so as to remove stigma and rethink its function to better serve the interests of all war-affected people, especially women and youth; integrate HIV/AIDS prevention and response into DDRR programmes, including both voluntary counselling and testing, and care and treatment, for not only demobilizing ex-combatants, but also for their partners and children.
- 4) Community-Based Recovery: greatly increase fundraising in order to expand the reach of the CBR programme; continue targeting the most vulnerable groups of rural society – women and children; continue and strengthen the successful approach of empowering market women as a strategy for reducing poverty and promoting ethnic harmony; focus more on supporting sustainable food production in the interest of alleviating extreme hunger and malnutrition; link the CBR programme to national planning for sustainability; foster sustainability by building the capacity of local partners who will remain on the ground when external aid phases out.
- 5) Democratic governance: strengthen UNDP's own technical capacity and competence in the field of democracy and human rights, and take on an even stronger and more proactive advocacy role; further strengthen the focus on institutional capacity building, and increase the programme budget accordingly.
- 6) HIV/AIDS: generate more support for the HIV/AIDS programme in terms of funding, logistics and capacity building; in post-conflict situations, HIV/AIDS strategies must be closely aligned both with DDRR strategies and with HPRG – specifically the prevention of and response to sexual violence should be central to HIV/AIDS strategies; encourage the government to allocate adequate budgetary support for

Liberia's HIV/AIDS programme; strengthen the capacity of the National AIDS Commission so that it can take the lead in developing policy and in coordinating interventions to fight HIV/AIDS; continue to focus on and mobilize support for orphans and vulnerable children to better address their current well-being and build their self-reliance; continue campaigning for behaviour change by raising awareness on HIV/AIDS.

- 7) Human rights / Protection / Gender: articulate specific outcomes, outputs, indicators, baselines and targets to address the ongoing horror of the widespread sexual and gender-based violence that continues throughout Liberia to this day; greatly strengthen HRPG advocacy work; build the capacity of NGOs, CSOs and government, and promote integrity in governance regarding HRPG; comprehensively analyse the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming so that corrective measures can be taken to design an appropriate framework for the advancement of women in Liberia; ensure that UNDP's Programme adequately promotes human rights by:
- supporting education for women and girls
  - ensuring that the prevention of all forms of violence, particularly against women and children, becomes central to both DDDR and HIV/AIDS strategies, especially in environments affected by conflict addressing female genital mutilation
  - enhancing women's participation and empowerment
  - engaging stakeholders more effectively
  - continuing to raise women's awareness of their rights
  - continuing to encourage and educate women voters
  - addressing weaknesses and corruption in the Liberian police and judiciary
  - significantly increasing the number of trained women police and women judges
  - actively engaging males – whether they be policy makers, traditional leaders, parents, spouses or young boys – more strongly in campaigns to end gender-based violence (GBV)
  - targeting traditional (male) leaders for education in human rights and Liberian law
  - changing cultural concepts about femininity and masculinity
  - continuing efforts to break the silence that sustains GBV.

The evaluation notes that in its current programme, UNDP Liberia is placing special focus on gender mainstreaming throughout the programme.

- 8) Environmental management: vastly scale up UNDP's environmental programme in Liberia; develop, strengthen and test links between environmental management and poverty reduction; broaden the focus to include freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems as well as forests; raise funds for the participatory development of Liberia's National Environmental Action Plan; lobby the government to ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea, to pass environmental protection legislation, to produce the National Environmental Action Plan and to substantially increase the budget allocated to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Forest Development Authority; develop projects for other types of renewable energy, such as wind power and alternative cooking fuels; design projects with multiplier effects to enhance the sustainability of the EM programme; work closely with partners to solve the problem

of illegal diamond and gold mining in Sapo National Park; reinforce the environmental awareness campaign to ensure that it targets – and convinces – decision-makers as well as students and the general public.

- 9) Infrastructure: UNDP should not itself engage in large-scale infrastructure projects such as road-building, but rather keep its focus on the areas where it has a strong comparative advantage, namely human development.

## Acronyms

AFELL	Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia
BCC	Behaviour Change Communication
BCHR	Building Capacity for HIV/AIDS Response
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CBR	Community-Based Recovery
CCA	United Nations Common Country Agreement
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework
CCU	Cooperative Credit Union
CDA	Country Development Agenda
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFSNS	Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey
CO	Country Office
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPO	Country Programme Office
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CST	Country Support Team
CWIQ	Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire
DDC	District Development Committee
DEX	Direct Execution (by UNDP)
DG	Democratic Governance
DD	Disarmament and Demobilization
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIPSC	Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component
ELWA	Eternal Love Winning Africa Ministries Association
EM	Environmental Management
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ESIAs	Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCCC	Framework Convention on Climate Change
FDA	Forestry Development Authority
FGM	female genital mutilation
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GC	Governance Commission (formerly Governance Reform Commission)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEMAP	Government Economic Management Assistance Programme
GoL	Government of Liberia
GRC	Government Reform Commission
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus / acquired immune deficiency syndrome

HRPG	Human Rights / Protection / Gender
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Information, Education and Communications
IGWG	USAID Interagency Gender Working Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
InP	Infrastructure Project
IP	Implementing Partner
iPRS	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices
LDHS	Liberia Demographic and Health Survey
LECBS	Liberia Emergency Capacity Building Support Project
LISGIS	Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services
LIWOMAC	Liberia Women Media Action Committee
LNP	Liberia National Police
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCTI	Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOE	Ministry of Education
MPEA	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
NAC	National AIDS Commission
NACP	National AIDS Control Program
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NEAP	National Environmental Action Plan
NEC	National Elections Commission
NEX	National Execution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OVCs	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PEP	Public Expenditure Programmes
PIP	Public Investment Programmes
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
RFTF	Results Focused Transitional Framework
RR	Rehabilitation and Reintegration
PS	Private Sector
RIMCO	RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee
SAS	Strategic Area(s) of Support
SES	Senior Executive Service
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SMP	Staff-Monitored Programme

SoE	State of the Environment
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TSP	Transition Support Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USD	United States dollars
WACP	Women And Children Protection unit
WB	The World Bank
WONGOSOL	Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia
ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care



# **UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007 Terminal Evaluation**

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1 Context**

Liberia is emerging from decades of corruption, economic mismanagement, political instability and fourteen years of brutal civil war. The war started in December 1989. By August 1990, the country was engulfed in war. Between 1990 and 1995, there were several attempts at peace talks. In 1996 the war was concentrated mainly in central Monrovia. In 1999 war broke out again and lasted until 2003, when over a million people were displaced and in dire need of humanitarian assistance, and the government was left with virtually no capacity to function. An estimated 80 per cent of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees were women and children, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women and girls was rampant (WatchList 2004).

In August 2003, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the fourteen years of violent conflict in Liberia was signed in Accra, Ghana. The agreement contained guidelines for peace-building, the reconstruction of democratic political order in Liberia, and the pursuit of economic development activities. It called on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other partners to assist the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) with post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, resource mobilization and aid coordination, as well as the establishment of the Government Reform Commission (GRC) with the objective of promoting good governance in Liberia.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in October 2003 to assist the peace process. Also in October 2003, the two-year National Transitional Government was ushered in with a mandate to address governance issues and conduct free, fair and democratic presidential and general elections, which were held in October 2005. The result of this historic election was the ascension to the presidency of Africa's first female president, Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006.

The NTGL, in collaboration with the international community, undertook the preparation of a Joint Needs Assessment (February 2004), in which the Results-Focused Transition Framework (RFTF) was articulated, spelling out the country's priorities in addressing peace-building, rehabilitation and recovery for the transition period 2003-2005. The RFTF was followed by a 150-day action plan to guide the country, and then the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS), which led to Liberia's full Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), completed in March 2008.

Although progress has been made, endemic violence in Liberia remains a serious problem today. The 14-year war seems to have destroyed the very fabric of Liberian social norms. According to WatchList (2004), although the conflict was rooted in historical grievances, the atrocious and widespread war crimes (murders of innocent civilians, torture, beatings, rape, sexual assault, etc.) were previously little known in Liberian history.

During the period under review – 2004-2007 – Liberia stood at a crossroads facing the challenges of peace-building, reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery. The main root causes of the conflict have been identified as: poverty, weak economic management, corruption, social inequalities, exclusion and marginalization, ethnic and class polarization, animosities and rivalries. These critical issues have still not been fully addressed.

According to the 2008 National Census (Government of Liberia (GoL) 2008a), Liberia has a population of 3.5 million people. Liberia is among the countries of the world with the very worst human development indicators. The Human Development Index (HDI) for Liberia was estimated at 0.319 (GoL 2006a).

The lack of reliable data was, and continues to be, a major constraint for effective strategic planning, policy advice, and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007 originated in a context of high levels of corruption, an unstable political environment, ethnic polarization, huge operational constraints, violence and widespread violations of human rights.

## **1.2 UNDP role and focus in Liberia**

With Liberia in a post-war state of devastation and suffering, UNDP Liberia's 2004-2007 Programme was intended to respond to the immense challenges of human rights, peace-building, reconciliation and recovery by supporting the NTGL in implementing the priorities identified in the Results Focused Transitional Framework document and the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, and then supporting the elected government in addressing the priorities of the full Poverty Reduction Strategy. The consolidation of peace and security was the first and most urgent challenge.

UNDP's 2004-2007 Programme was squarely based on UNDP's corporate objectives of poverty reduction and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, and on the priorities of Liberia's RFTF:

- to maintain peace
- to disarm, demobilize, rehabilitate and reintegrate the ex-combatants
- to support the return of refugees and IDPs to their place of origin
- to re-establish governance institutions, promote transparency and accountability, and support free and fair elections
- to promote the rule of law and respect for human rights, including reform
- to increase access to basic social services
- to restore productive capacity and livelihoods
- to restore statistical capacity, establish a monitoring and evaluation framework and coordinating mechanism.

## **1.3 Purpose, objectives and expected use of the evaluation**

The purpose of this terminal evaluation is to measure the contribution of the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Country Programme to the national objectives of achieving peace and security

and to UNDP's corporate goals of reducing poverty and achieving the MDGs. This exercise is intended to support learning lessons about UNDP's work so as to implement a better assistance strategy for the current Country Programme, 2008-2012.

More specifically, this terminal evaluation seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- a) Assess progress towards the achievement of the outcome.
- b) Determine contributing factors and impediments, and the extent of UNDP's contribution to the achievement of the results.
- c) Assess key UNDP contributions to results, including those produced through "soft" assistance.
- d) Assess the viability and effectiveness of partnership strategies in relation to the achievement of the results.
- e) Assess the sustainability of Country Office (CO) Programme interventions.

There was a lack of clarity in the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR, Annex 1) in the intent of the subject to be evaluated. On the one hand, just under the title, the programme areas to be evaluated were given as:

- i) Peace building, reintegration and sustainable recovery
- ii) Good Governance
- iii) HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
- iv) Environment.

However, under the first section 3 of the ToR, the **Subject of the Evaluation** was given as:

- i) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR)
- ii) Democratic Governance (DG)
- iii) Community Based Recovery (CBR)
- iv) Human Rights, Protection and Gender (HRPG)
- v) Capacity Building for HIV/AIDS Response (HIV)
- vi) Environmental Management (EM).

After discussion with the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit, the evaluation team was instructed: 1) to focus on the six strategic programme areas under section 3 of the ToR, rather than the four on the first page, and 2) to evaluate the core UNDP programme on HIV/AIDS, and not the Global Fund .

Several weeks into the evaluation, the evaluation team was also asked to evaluate another important component: work to improve basic infrastructure, funded by The World Bank (WB). The Infrastructure project (InP) was not anticipated as part of the programme in the Country Programme document (UNDP Liberia, no date-b) – nor in the ToR for this evaluation.

The Country Office Evaluation Management Committee, including the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (MPEA) will review the evaluation report and follow up on its recommendations. UNDP is an organization with a strong commitment to learning, and intends to pay particular attention to the lessons learned and recommendations to improve the planning and implementation of its programme in Liberia and beyond.

#### **1.4 Additional evaluation objectives**

In addition to the purpose, objectives and expected use of the evaluation as described in the Terms of Reference (Annex 1) and in Chapter 1.2 above, the consultants brought to the evaluation additional objectives in line with the mission and values of *ARTEMIS Services*. Our approach is grounded in rigorous results-based performance measurement, and then strives to embrace deeper, more systemic evaluation objectives.

By emphasizing an approach that is evidence-based, collaborative, humanistic, analytical and constructive, we endeavoured to design and implement the evaluation with a view to:

- ✓ generating evaluative knowledge to enhance learning and empowerment, both institutional and individual
- ✓ doing no harm: honouring the dignity of everyone we meet, ensuring care and compassion for all persons involved in the evaluation and concern for the welfare of those affected by it
- ✓ understanding what works and why, as well as what does not work and unintended outcomes
- ✓ building the capacity of the programme teams – in analytical methods, monitoring, self-evaluation, etc.
- ✓ building understanding, communication and team work
- ✓ maximizing transparency, so that the evaluation purposes and processes are clear to all and ownership of the evaluation results is enhanced
- ✓ endeavouring to ensure that participants in the evaluation feel their input is valued and correctly interpreted
- ✓ guaranteeing accountability vis-à-vis management, stakeholders, and donors
- ✓ supporting adaptive management by providing a basis for improved, evidence-based decision making, and
- ✓ ensuring a strategic approach by connecting the evaluation to UNDP Liberia's ultimate goals, and working so that the evaluation itself contributes towards those goals.

Through this evaluation, we have tried to promote the use of evaluative evidence so that lessons learned inform both management decisions and programming for the future. We have endeavoured to guide this evaluation by the criteria of utility, credibility, relevance and human rights.

As professional evaluators, we embrace UNDP's people-centred approach to development and the universally shared values of human welfare, equity, women's rights, justice, cultural sensitivity and respect for diversity.

## 2. Methodology and limitations

### 2.1 Methodology

This evaluation was carried out by a team of three evaluators: Meg Gawler (team leader) of *ARTEMIS Services*, Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr. and Alaric Tokpa. The evaluation team comprised one woman and two men. Brief profiles of the evaluators are attached in Annex 9.

This exercise was preceded by a desk review by two members of the evaluation team, resulting in an inception report to inform the evaluation (Tokpa & Yengbeh 2008).

Work began in late January 2009 with document review and initiation of the evaluation design. In early February the evaluation team worked together with the staff of the strategic programme areas to clarify the object of the evaluation, to establish clear baselines, and to produce evaluation design matrices for the different strategic programme areas. The same design framework (Table 1) was used to develop and refine the evaluation questions, methodology and data sources for each strategic programme area.

**Table 1. Evaluation design matrix**

Evaluation Criteria	Specific Research Questions	Data Required	Data Source(s)	Collection Methods
Design and relevance				
Partnership strategies				
Effectiveness: degree to which programme objectives were achieved				
Efficiency: relative cost of achieving results				
Impact / degree of change: contribution to peace and security				
Impact / degree of change: contribution to MDGs				
Sustainability				

A number of evaluation guides informed our methodology (see Annex 2 for full references):

- Gawler, M. 2005. Monitoring and Evaluation. In *Project Design in the context of Project Cycle Management*
- UNDP. 2006b. The Evaluation Policy of UNDP
- UNDP. No date. Ethical code of conduct for UNDP evaluations
- UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002a. *Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results*
- UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002b. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
- UNDP Evaluation Office. No date. Evaluation report
- UNEG. 2005. Standards for evaluation in the UN system
- UNEG. 2007. Ethical guidelines for evaluation.

In preparing the evaluation design and report, we strove to ensure that the following UNDP criteria for terminal evaluations were well covered:


- A. level of achievement of outcomes, objectives and results
- B. consistency of and strong evidence for the evaluation findings
- C. sustainability of programme outcomes
- D. relevant lessons and recommendations supported by evidence
- E. assessment of costs and co-financing
- F. assessment of the programme's monitoring and evaluation system.

The evaluation methodology made use of the following tools and methods:

- an initial desk study and debriefing with UNDP Liberia, culminating in an evaluation inception report
- briefing session for the full evaluation mission with UNDP Liberia
- (to the extent possible) examination of the strategic results framework of the programme
- meetings with the heads of the programmes to understand and critique the formulation of outcomes, and to establish a clear baseline for assessment and evaluation of project activities (see Annexes 5 and 6)
- study of contextual information and baselines, e.g.:
  - Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 for Liberia (United Nations 2002)
  - Liberia's MDG Reports of 2004 and 2008 (GoL 2004a and GoL 2008b)
  - Liberia's Results Focused Transitional Framework (NTGL 2005)
  - Liberia's National Human Development Report 2006 (GoL 2006a)
  - United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012 (UNDAF) (United Nations in Liberia 2008)
  - Liberia Participatory Poverty Assessment (LISGIS 2008)
  - UNDP Liberia Annual Reports (UNDP Liberia 2004a-2007a)
  - National Environmental Policy (GoL 2002a)
  - Environment Protection and Management Law (GoL 2002b)
  - Act Creating the Environment Protection Agency (GoL 2002c)
  - Liberia's Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (GoL 2004b)
  - Act Creating the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (GoL 2005)
  - National Forestry Reform Law of 2006 (GoL 2006b)
  - National Forestry Policy and Implementation Strategy (GoL 2006c)
  - Demographic Health Survey (GoL 2007)
- a questionnaire / interview guide to gather qualitative and quantitative data on the key evaluation questions (Annex 3)
- field visits to 16 sites in eight counties (map in Figure 1)
- indicators: determination of whether indicators had been set for the various strategic programme areas, and if so, how they had been tracked
- review of documents such as mid-term evaluations and many other reports (complete list in Annex 2)
- interviews with 250 key informants (complete list in Annex 4), most of whom were interviewed in person; a few whom we were unable to see filled out and returned the questionnaire / interview guide to us

- a debriefing session with UNDP Liberia to gather feedback on the initial evaluation findings
- preparation of a draft report for comment by key stakeholders
- in-depth review and very helpful comments on the draft report by UNDP Liberia
- production of the final report.

We began all our data collection interviews by asking a completely open question: “Thinking about all the effects that this Programme Area had from 2004 to 2007, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?” This encouraged respondents to immediately focus on the impact or outcome level rather than activities or outputs.



**Figure 1. Map of Sites Visited by the Evaluation Team**


The questionnaire / interview guide (attached in Annex 3) included seven closed quantitative questions for which respondents ticked a box to indicate to what extent they agreed, or not, with respect to a given statement, using a standard Likert scale. The options – strongly disagree, disagree, neutral or mixed opinion, agree, strongly agree – were scored on a scale of zero to one as follows: 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.0. If a respondent did not know, their answer was simply not counted. The responses were averaged as a whole (Figures 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 19), and then were also broken down to reveal differences among respondent groups (Figures 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20).

For each of the seven quantitative questions, qualitative data were also gathered by asking respondents to explain their choice. In addition to these and to the initial most significant change question, six other qualitative questions were also included in the questionnaire.

In-depth interviews were carried out with UNDP Liberia staff from 16 to 20 February 2009, and then with external stakeholders from 23 February to 13 April. Data collection was completed on 19 May, when UNDP Liberia submitted the Programme budgets and expenditures to the evaluation team. The evaluation team gathered a very substantial amount of data, both qualitative and quantitative, and a thorough analysis of the data took longer than originally anticipated. The draft report was delivered to UNDP Liberia on 10 July. On 22 August, UNDP provided very helpful in-depth comments on most of the draft report, with the final comments sent to the evaluators on 16 September, after which the report was finalized in just a few days.

In planning our data collection, we identified five basic stakeholder groups: direct beneficiaries, civil society organizations (CSOs) / non-governmental organizations (NGOs) / private sector (PS), donors, government, and UNDP / United Nations.

When planning our interviews, we made a concerted effort to reach women – with an overall result of perfect gender parity among the evaluation respondents: of the 250 persons interviewed, 125 were women, and 125 men. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 2, the breakdown between women and men respondents varied considerably among the different stakeholder groups. The ratio of women to men was lowest among the government respondents, and highest among the beneficiaries. We interviewed far more beneficiaries than respondents from other stakeholder groups (Figure 2).




**Figure 2. Number of Evaluation Respondents by Stakeholder Group**

Figure 3 below shows the number of evaluation respondents according to the strategic programme areas that were the subject of the evaluation:



- i) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR)
- ii) Democratic Governance (DG)
- iii) Community Based Recovery (CBR)
- iv) Human Rights, Protection and Gender (HRPG)
- v) Capacity Building for HIV/AIDS Response (HIV)
- vi) Environmental Management (EM)
- vii) Infrastructure / World Bank (WB).

The number of respondents varied from 29 for the Democratic Governance programme to 72 for Human Rights / Protection and Gender. We interviewed only three respondents for the Infrastructure / World Bank project (which was not included in the evaluation ToR). Another three respondents provided information on UNDP overall.



**Figure 3. Number of Evaluation Respondents by Strategic Programme Area and by gender**

The evaluation team made consistent and extensive use of triangulation to verify the basis of our findings. We did this by: gathering information both from documents and from a large number of individuals and by comparing individual responses; comparing the views of different stakeholder groups for each strategic programme area; collecting data from both women and men, from young and old, and from vulnerable, marginalized and hard-to-reach groups. This use of multiple sources helped to ensure the representativeness of the data collected.

We began each interview by assuring our respondents that their responses would be strictly confidential. Furthermore, basing our interview techniques on a human rights perspective, and conveying our sincere respect to each and every stakeholder interviewed, produced an atmosphere of trust for the interviews, with the result that respondents felt comfortable confiding in us, and were – without exception – open and frank in their answers.

This report draws heavily on the data gathered from the 250 stakeholders we interviewed. To the extent possible, we wanted to give UNDP stakeholders a real voice in this evaluation, and to this end direct quotes are included throughout the report. Verbatim direct quotations are presented in italics with a grey background, and are identified by stakeholder group rather than by individual in order to protect the confidentiality of our sources.

References in the text to documents are given in Annex 2.

## **2.2 Limitations**

The post-conflict situation in Liberia has created substantial difficulties – not only for programme planning and implementation – but also for programme evaluation. There were a number of concerns about the evaluability of the 2004-2007 UNDP Programme in Liberia, related to:

- lack of an approved programme for 2004-2007
- absence of programme logic theory
- timing of the evaluation
- lack of an effective monitoring and evaluation system during the programme
- lack of data or unreliability of data
- scope of the evaluation.

### **2.2.1 Lack of clarity in the programme document(s)**

The 2004-2007 UNDP Programme was developed under the most trying of circumstances. The urgent need for immediate humanitarian action, together with a non-functional government, absence of leadership, and weak to non-existent national capacity meant that in the beginning of the programme, UNDP focused more on the country's most urgent priorities than on taking the time to prepare a definitive programme document to guide the organization's work during this critical four-year period. UNDP rightly responded to the post-conflict humanitarian crisis in Liberia with immediate intervention at the expense of elaborate and lengthy programme planning processes. This, however, resulted in challenges for both programme management and subsequently evaluation.

Given UNDP's focus on responding to the most urgent priorities, a multiplicity of programme documents were produced for this period, with a multiplicity of intended outcomes, outputs and indicators that changed from year to year. There was not an official UNDP 2004-2007 Programme Document signed by the Government of Liberia, and thus, no definitive basis of exactly what programme was to be evaluated.

This required that the evaluation team spend a considerable amount of time and effort working with the programme area leaders to define what the programme actually was, and to articulate the baseline of what the outcomes and outputs were that each strategic programme area intended to achieve during this period. The results of this analysis are presented below in Chapter 3, and in Annexes 5 and 6.

The work of clarifying what the UNDP 2004-2007 Programme actually intended to achieve was essential as a basis for the evaluation, but it did take time from what had been intended for data collection.

### **2.2.2 Absence of programme logic theory**

In none of the multiple programme documents we reviewed, did we find an articulation of the programme theory – the conceptual linkages explaining the logic of how achieving the programme outputs would result in the realization of the intended outcome(s). Although this would have been useful, time did not allow us to work with the heads of the strategic programme areas to map out, post hoc, the various programme theories.

### **2.2.3 Timing of the evaluation**

This evaluation was carried out in the first half of 2009, for a programme that ended in December 2007. It is thus about a year and a half late.

The late timing was unfortunate for several reasons:

- a) Utility: The recommendations will be of limited usefulness in informing the 2008-2012 UNDP Liberia Country Programme, which is already underway.
- b) Availability of stakeholders: There have been many changes in personnel in UNDP, in the government and in partner organizations. Thus, it was not always possible for the evaluators to interview those people with the most first-hand knowledge of the various programmes. This would not have been the case had the evaluation been carried out in late 2007.
- c) Data: In being late, the evaluation suffered from a loss of institutional and individual memory.
- d) Focus: During the interviews the evaluators had to make sure that the stakeholders stayed focused on the period from 2004 to 2007, as many were tempted to talk also about what happened in 2008.

### **2.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation system**

It appears that UNDP Liberia did not have an operational monitoring and evaluation system for the period 2004 to 2007. Mid-term evaluations of three strategic programme areas were carried out, but the evaluation team was not given monitoring reports for the any of the programmes. We were also not given management responses to the mid-term evaluations. Monitoring data would have been extremely useful for this evaluation.

### **2.2.5 Data**

The availability of data is an immense problem in Liberia. For example, UNDP collects data and computes the Human Development Index for 177 countries worldwide (UNDP 2003-2007). However, each year, there remain a few additional countries – 17 in 2007 – for which data are severely lacking and the HDI could not be calculated; Liberia is one of these data-

deficient countries. The paucity of accurate human development indicators for Liberia in the global Human Development Reports meant that trends could not be established for Liberia for the period 2003 to 2007, nor could Liberia be compared to other countries. The government did produce a National Human Development Report for Liberia in 2006 (GoL 2006a), which is very useful, but again does not permit an assessment of trends.

In addition, capacity still needs to be built in national institutions responsible for data collection and statistics, such as the Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services. Rigorous methodology in data collection is sometimes lacking, and the reliability of data cannot always be ensured.

#### **2.2.6 Scope of the evaluation**

This evaluation addresses six strategic programme areas, each of which was/is a very substantial programme in its own right. In addition to the six strategic programme areas stipulated in the evaluation Terms of Reference (Annex 1), we were also asked to look at an additional programme to rebuild infrastructure funded by The World Bank. Thus the evaluation team was essentially asked to evaluate seven strategic programmes within the overall Programme. The evaluation had to strike a balance between keeping the focus at the strategic level, while also being specific and concrete enough to be meaningful. Nevertheless, the task was enormous for the time and human resources allocated.

Likewise, because of the scope of having to cover seven strategic programme areas, it was not possible to produce a meaningful report with evidence to back up our findings and recommendations within the standard 50-page limit. We have done our best to be concise.

### **3. What was the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme?**

Given the multiplicity of programme documents, the evaluation team's first job was to try to reconstruct what the 2004-2007 UNDP Programme actually was. This meant, first of all, re-articulating – with the input of the managers of the UNDP strategic programme areas – what the baselines and big-picture programme outcomes were, what outputs were anticipated, and what indicators could be used to measure progress towards achievement of the outcomes.

#### **3.1 Background**

The first Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) for Liberia covered the period 2000-2002, and focused on:

- poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, and
- good governance and economic management.

Our first reference document defining the 2004-2007 programme was the “Country Programme Outline UNDP Liberia 2003-2005” (UNDP Liberia no date-a). This outline (4 pages + 3 pages of annexes) defined two programme areas in the text:

- a) Reintegration and recovery at community level

- b) Capacity building for key governance institutions and mechanisms.

However, the framework matrix attached to this same document identifies not two, but five strategic areas of support:

- a) Conflict resolution, peace-building and recovery at the community level
- b) Electoral legislation and institutional capacity of electoral commission, system and processes
- c) Efficiency of public sector financial management
- d) Aid coordination and management
- e) Comprehensive strategies to prevent the spread and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS.

UNDP's work in Liberia in 2003 was severely constrained by the continuous fighting in the first half of the year, lack of social cohesion, weak leadership, and the country's pariah status vis-à-vis the international community, which had a significant impact on the ability to mobilize resources for Liberia. This changed with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August 2003, and the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia in October 2003.

### **3.2 The UNDP Liberia post-conflict strategy 2004/2005**

In December 2004, UNDP Liberia published its post-conflict strategy for 2004/2005 (UNDP Liberia, 2003), which was a plan of action with emphasis on strategic sectors that would have an immediate impact on the catastrophic humanitarian situation, and would also lay the foundations for long-term recovery. The purpose of this strategy was to refocus the Country Programme around a set of activities that were strategic, coherent and complementary in support of the overall goal of achieving peace and stability in Liberia. This document identified six priority areas of operation fundamental to UNDP's mandate and identity in Liberia. These six priority areas were:

- a) Supporting the DDRR process
- b) Supporting community-based reintegration and recovery
- c) Fostering democratic governance and economic management
- d) Promoting human rights and protection
- e) Responding to HIV/AIDS
- f) Managing natural resources for sustainable recovery.

A framework was annexed to this document, which exactly reproduced the six priority areas, and articulated the key results expected for each for 2003-2005. In addition to this, another annex gave the results expected for three Liberian trust funds.

These programmes were designed to bridge the gap between the urgent and enormous humanitarian needs and laying the foundations for longer-term recovery and development in Liberia. Because national ownership of this process is of critical importance, UNDP's interventions have had an ongoing capacity building component targeting key government ministries and agencies.

### 3.3 The Country Programme Office extension for 2004-2006

The primary reference document we had for what constituted the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme was the “Proposed CPO Extension for UNDP/Liberia, 2004-2006” (UNDP Liberia no date-b). The proposed CPO Extension identified four major areas of focus:

- a) Peace building, reintegration, and sustainable recovery
- b) Good governance
- c) HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis
- d) Environmental sustainability.

However, once again, the Strategic Areas of Support (SAS) listed in the attached framework matrix were a bit different from the four areas identified in the text of the document. The eight SAS articulated in the matrix were:

- a) Conflict resolution, peace-building and recovery processes at the community level
- b) Electoral legislation and institutional capacity of electoral commission, system and processes
- c) Promotion of human rights and the rule of law
- d) Efficiency and accountability in the public sector
- e) Aid coordination and management
- f) Comprehensive strategies to prevent and mitigate the spread of HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria
- g) National policy, legal and regulatory framework for environmentally sustainable development
- h) Monitoring and assessment of environmental sustainability.

The proposed areas of focus for UNDP Liberia for 2004-2006 were derived from national priorities underlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 for Liberia (United Nations 2002), and the RFTF (NTGL 2005), which constituted the focus of donor support to the restoration of peace, rehabilitation and recovery of the country, taking into consideration UNDP’s comparative advantage.

### 3.4 Programme expenditures


**Table 2. Relative importance of the different strategic programme areas in terms of total expenditure**

Strategic programme area	Expenditure 2004-2007 (USD)	Per cent of total programme expenditure
<b>DDRR</b>	72 344 768	65.7%
<b>CBR</b>	9 608 588	8.7%
<b>DG</b>	10 182 852	9.2%
<b>HIV</b>	1 190 865	1.1%
<b>HRPG</b>	2 618 572	2.4%
<b>EM</b>	673 585	0.6%
<b>Infrastructure</b>	13 566 019	12.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>110 185 250</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Table 2 and Figure 4 present a telling account of the relative importance of the seven strategic programme areas, as measured by total expenditure during the programme period.


The DDRR programme, with 66 per cent of the entire programme expenditure, accounted for the lion's share of the overall Programme. In second place was the (unprogrammed) Infrastructure project at 12 per cent of the overall programme. This was followed by the Democratic Governance and Community-Based Recovery programmes at approximately 9 per cent each. In comparison, relatively little was spent on Human Rights / Protection / Gender, on HIV/AIDS and on Environmental Management.

Given the situation at that time, where arms were still in the hands of ex-combatants, the major priority in bringing relief and sanity to Liberia was disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration. Therefore, DDRR was identified as key area which had to be solved early on in order to provide a situation of basic peace and security, as the foundation for other longer-term programmatic investments.



**Figure 4. UNDP Liberia Programme 2004-2007: Budget and expenditure by strategic programme area**

The evolution of programme expenditure by strategic programme areas is illustrated in Figure 5. Expenditures for the DDRR programme were relatively stable for 2004 to 2006, and began to taper off in 2007 as the programme wound down. The expenditure of all of the other strategic programme areas was essentially stable over the four-year period, with the exception of the Infrastructure programme, which was implemented in 2007.




**Figure 5. Evolution of programme expenditure by strategic programme area**

A grand total of approximately USD 110 million was spent over the four-year period, with an annual average of almost USD 28 million (Table 3 and Annex 7). Annual programme expenditures grew from approximately USD 24.5 million in 2004 to approximately USD 29 million in 2007 (Table 3 and Figure 6).

**Table 3. Evolution of overall programme expenditure (USD)**


	2004	2005	2006	2007	TOTAL	Annual Average
<b>UNDP Core Funds</b>	5 402 586	2 491 943	2 405 521	3 752 036	<b>14 052 085</b>	<b>3 513 021</b>
<b>Donor Funds through UNDP</b>	19 097 425	25 216 487	26 419 439	25 399 813	<b>96 133 165</b>	<b>24 033 291</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24 500 011</b>	<b>27 708 430</b>	<b>28 824 961</b>	<b>29 151 849</b>	<b>110 185 250</b>	<b>27 546 313</b>





**Figure 6. Evolution of overall programme expenditure: core funds and donor funds**


The total amount budgeted for the programme over the four-year period was almost USD 129 million (Annex 7). Of this, approximately USD 110 million – or 86 per cent – was spent. Figure 7 presents a breakdown of the percentage of each strategic programme area's budget that was spent, which ranged from a high of 94 per cent for the DDDR programme to a low of 64 per cent for the Democratic Governance programme.



**Figure 7. Percentage of programme budget spent, 2004-2007**

Over the lifetime of the Programme, UNDP core funds amounted to 13 per cent of total expenditures, and funds from other donors 87 per cent (Figures 6 and 8). Donors to the Programme included: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Global Environment Facility (GEF), Global Fund to Fight Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands (through Small Arms Development Unit), Norway, Sweden, SIDA, Switzerland, U.K. DFID, USA, USAID, USA Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration,

The amount of UNDP core funding varied dramatically from one strategic programme area to another (Figure 8), ranging from zero for the Infrastructure programme to 94 per cent for the HIV/AIDS programme.



**Figure 8. Percentage of programme expenditures from UNDP core funds**

### 3.5 Programme execution

The political, security and humanitarian situation in Liberia left UNDP with no option other than working on the basis of direct execution (DEX) until adequate capacity is built within the Liberian government. The DEX modality was intended to give UNDP maximum flexibility while ensuring accountability and transparency.

UNDP Liberia plans to move to a National Execution (NEX) modality as soon as is feasible, when issues of government human and institutional capacities, as well as corruption, have been satisfactorily improved.

### 3.6 Monitoring and evaluation assessment

As mentioned above under the limitations of the evaluation methodology, it would seem that UNDP Liberia did not have an operational monitoring and evaluation system for the period 2004 to 2007. A number of the evaluation respondents noted the difficulty of monitoring the

implementation and impact of the UNDP programme as there was no follow-up mechanism in place.

UNDP itself identified this weakness, and substantial efforts were made in 2008 and 2009 to improve the M&E capacity of the Country Office, including the development of a regular monitoring system, the engagement of an M&E volunteer in February 2009 and an M&E Specialist in June 2009. In addition, UNDP is now leading the UNDAF M&E Working Group, coordinating all other UN agencies, UNMIL and government institutions. The UNDAF M&E Working Group has the potential to be a strong, unifying platform for all UN agencies in Liberia, which encourages support for one another through sharing experience and resources.

Lack of baseline data is a common phenomenon in emergency interventions where the acquisition of baseline study is often not possible before the start of a new programme. In the case of the 2004-2007 UNDP Liberia Programme, most of the strategic programme areas did not have any baseline information. This was corrected to some extent when the Common Country Assessment for Liberia was published by the UN in 2006 (United Nations 2006). This report presented the best information available, but cautioned that the data could not realistically form the basis of programme planning. Additional investment in data collection and analysis in Liberia remains an essential priority.

The Country Office raised the issue, and requested advice on the socio-cultural aspects of measuring behavioural changes in SGBV and other human rights violations. The most widely used method to investigate changes in behaviour (with regard to health, violence, farming methods, etc.) is the Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey (IGWG 2003; Kaliyaperumal 2004; Hlongwana et al. 2009; Launiala 2009). KAP surveys are attractive because of their ease of design and quantifiable data. However, because KAP surveys rely on a Western, scientific approach to producing generalizable results, there are a number of important limitations that must be taken into account when designing and implementing them in different cultural contexts. A major problem is the cultural gap between researchers with western scientific training and local respondents, especially in poor communities. Many surveys conducted in rural areas of the South can be faulted for failure to meet even the fundamental requirement of formulating questions in meaningful ways that make sense to local respondents (Launiala 2009). Another risk is that desirable practices tend to be over-reported by respondents (Stanton et al. 1987). In cultures where there is little formal schooling and which emphasize the value of being non-confrontational, respondents may tend to give answers which they believe to be correct, acceptable, favourable, or appreciated – the “courtesy bias” (Launiala 2009). In our opinion, KAP surveys can provide useful data, but only when they are designed with a keen understanding of the local context and local language, and only when they are triangulated with empirical, anthropological methods such as direct observation. On sensitive issues such as GBV, a questionnaire may be a rather unnatural instrument, and would better be replaced by methods, such as focus groups, that build rapport and understanding between the interviewer and the respondents. A key element, of course, in measuring behaviour change is to carry out a well-designed study before the beginning of the programme, and to repeat it mid-way (or annually) and at the end of the programme. Bearing in mind that what people say can be different from what they think and do – i.e., that words cannot be taken at face value – underscores the importance of multi-disciplinary methods that include anthropological research using participant observation. We agree with Lambert & McKevitt (2002) that research (in the UNDP case on behaviour

changes with regard to human rights) must be context specific, and that such research can be improved by multi-disciplinary efforts informed by anthropological conceptual frameworks and methodologies.

#### 4. Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration

The 14-year civil war in Liberia led to the disruption and breakdown of virtually every aspect of life in the country. As a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it was unanimously agreed by the Government of Liberia, the warring parties, international partners and other stakeholders that DDRR was crucial for restoring peace and stability in Liberia.

Thus disarmament and demobilization started in April 2004 and, in spite of temporary setbacks, concluded by November 2004. Due to the underestimation of the number of ex-combatants that were expected to undergo the DDRR, the budgetary appropriation was far less than funds actually required. It had been estimated that 38,000 ex-combatants would participate in the DDRR process. Instead, official records show and independent studies confirm that 103,019 ex-fighters were eventually disarmed and 101,495 demobilized. These exercises were followed by a prolonged period of rehabilitation and reintegration activities which were still underway during this evaluation, in the first quarter of 2009. The rehabilitation and reintegration component of the DDRR programme started in late 2004.

The main purpose of Disarmament and Demobilization (DD) component was to solidify national peace and security. The Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR) component was to provide ex-combatants with skills-training and sustainable livelihoods aimed at making them economically self-reliant, contributing to reconciliation and national development, and bringing them back into normal (civilian community) life (example in Figure 23, Annex 8). This phase was initially designed to formally close in November 2006, but was then extended to October 2007. By early 2009, a residual caseload of former combatants was still undergoing RR.





Figure 9. Stakeholder survey results - DDRR programme



**Figure 10. Survey results by stakeholder group - DDRR programme**

A summary of the collective views of respondents, as well as their opinions by stakeholder groups is presented in Figures 9 and 10 above.

#### **4.1 DDRR – Design and relevance**

As evidenced in Figure 9, there was a strong agreement on average that DDRR was relevant to Liberia's priority needs from 2004 to 2007. Peace, security, political stability and economic development had emerged as the highest priorities of the country. There was need for free movement of citizens (i.e. the uninterrupted resettlement of refugees and IDPs), the restoration of constitutional political authority, and the resumption of normal economic activities, which were the major requirements for rebuilding lives in post-war Liberia. Hence, DDRR was a prerequisite. The quick and timely response of the international community reflected sensitivity to these urgent priorities.

According to UNDP Liberia's Annual Reports of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, the DDRR programme was coordinated by a Joint Implementation Unit, comprised of UNDP, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) and UNMIL.

*UNDP was, and continues to be instrumental in the design and coordination, as well as the implementation of the entire programme, providing both technical expertise and acting as manager of the DDRR Trust Fund. (UNDP Liberia 2005a)*

Although the UN Security Council determined in 2003 that the DDRR process in Liberia must give particular attention to the special needs of women and children, this proved to be

difficult in practice. According to Refugees International (2005), the planners of the DDRR programme failed to design the programme to account adequately for the needs of child and women combatants, and the programme was characterized by fraud.

WatchList (2004) reported:

*Far fewer children than expected have participated in the DDRR process; reasons include lack of access (especially for girls), lack of effective sensitization about the process, inadequate prioritization of children's situation... IDPs girls are regularly exposed to rape, sexual abuse and prostitution in camps... gender-based violence against women and girls was rampant[in IDP camps].*

UNICEF was tasked with carrying out the DDRR programme for child soldiers. According to an evaluation of the disarmament and demobilisation programme for children associated with the fighting forces in Liberia (UNICEF 2005):

*Although the DDRR framework document describes the prioritisation of children in the DD process, this was never translated into action... Military and political considerations took precedence over child protection principles. The DD process was hurried, and did not allow child protection agencies enough time to obtain sufficient funding or prepare communities to accept children... It was not possible to determine the number of children that were left out of the DD... few girls went through the DD programme... The payment of TSA [transitional safety allowance] in cash... exposed [children] to abuse and exploitation by their commanders... and created a negative precedent... by rewarding the engagement of children in fighting.*

Similar findings were reported by Amnesty International (2009):

*There was not enough ... political support to make sure that DDRR staff followed the UN's DDRR Standards, and involved women ... in the planning and implementation... [This] discouraged women and girls from participating fully in the DDRR programme, and has hampered [their] further integration into civilian life.*

According to a mid-term evaluation commissioned by UNDP (Bugnion et al. 2006):

*Women did not have a lead agency to cater for their needs... beyond the DD phase and as such lacked adequate and differentiated reintegration assistance.*

Likewise, an empirical study (Pugel 2007) of ex-combatants in Liberia found that:

*Males appear to be progressing through the DDRR process ahead of the females. Indicators of this include a DDRR training completion rate of 10% (female) versus 18% (male).*

It is regrettable that the UNDP DDRR programme reports do not mention collaboration with UNICEF, nor how the special needs of former child soldiers and women were handled.

We raised the question of gender sensitivity with beneficiaries in particular. The main finding here was that there was a need to give more consideration to the needs of women, especially in the RR phase.

Overall, however, as shown in Figure 10, government and CSO respondents generally agreed that the DDRR programme was relevant, while the direct beneficiaries, donors and UNDP agreed strongly.

Similarly, many stakeholders thought that the DDRR programme had been poorly conceived and poorly delivered, while they also acknowledged the fact that UNDP executed the programme under extremely difficult circumstances. One constraint at the time was the lack of capacity in-country to deliver the programme.

Many stakeholders expressed concerns over the short duration of the programme. The 3 to 4.5 day processing of ex-combatants at cantonment sites was considered too short. Government respondents in particular noted the negative impact of the planning and execution of the DD component on the RR phase. On the other hand, a longer cantonment would have meant more time to process the 100,000+ combatants, which could have had a negative impact on the political process vis-à-vis elections.

For the DDRR programme to have been more effective, it should have included far more psychosocial counselling, additional support for skills training, formal education and employment creation for war-affected youth. In addition, a mechanism for tracking the progress of ex-combatants should have been part of the programme.

Likewise, the mid-term evaluation report on the DDRR programme (Bugnion et al. 2008) found that psychosocial counselling together with reconciliation were two very necessary components which received insufficient attention and support.

Other concerns included: the absence of community involvement in programme design and execution; the counterproductive effect of the flat rate paid despite the quantity of arms received; poor quality and short duration of the training provided to some ex-combatants; the absence of a link between the programme and entrepreneurship in the private sector; and failure to organize follow-up with direct beneficiaries. We heard a general criticism that the programme design was based largely on UNDP's experience of similar programmes from other countries, rather than on in-depth consideration of the Liberian context.

A major design flaw was the lack of an exit strategy for the programme.

A cutting-edge report providing evidence-based findings on the mutually reinforcing dynamics linking HIV/AIDS, conflict and security (Walker 2009) points out that DDRR programmes are an important and consistently overlooked focus for both HIV/AIDS prevention and HIV/AIDS response. Because DDRR programmes provide important entry points for HIV/AIDS prevention, testing, care and treatment, they need to pay greater attention to HIV/AIDS at the level of programme design and implementation.

Similarly, DDRR programmes must be designed to ensure the prevention of all forms of violence against the more vulnerable ex-combatants: women and children.

Following is a selection of direct quotes from evaluation respondents.

*In terms of peace and security, the programme responded to priority issues. But economically, the programme did not respond.*

- Government

*The DDRR programme was poorly conceived and delivered. It did not deal with the trauma of the entire society; it did not deal appropriately with the trauma of the ex-combatants, and thus created the impression to ex-combatants that DDRR was their benefit for waging war. The disarmament was not comprehensive; the demobilization was incomplete; the resettlement and reintegration was hardly done at all. We are now living with the results of this haphazardly designed and implemented programme.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*It did not address gender. The RR did not target females, most of who were illiterate and did not understand the announcement that went out. The number of women participating in the [RR] programme was not significant until there were new programmes targeting women.*

- Government

*The DDRR was the bedrock; it was necessary [to create] the enabling environment for free and fair elections in 2005. It was the basis of the democracy that we have today in Liberia.*

- UNDP

## **4.2 DDRR – Partnership strategy**

Partnership in the DDRR programme was mainly between the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNDP, the Liberian Government and local NGOs. The National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) represented the GoL on a coordinating committee, the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) which also included UNMIL and UNDP. With strong support from the donor community, the JIU led and promoted the information and sensitization campaign regarding the DDRR process. Local NGOs were contracted to implement different aspects of the programme. However, the programme did not adequately involve local communities in designing and implementing the DDRR programme.

As shown in Figure 9, there was generally a positive opinion on average that the partnership strategy was effective. As evidenced in Figure 10, UNDP had a higher opinion of the effectiveness of the partnership strategy than did the other respondent groups, especially the direct beneficiaries.

All stakeholder groups were generally appreciative of UNDP's leadership in the DDRR programme. They expressed appreciation particularly for UNDP's role and collaboration in improving the lives of ex-combatants, and in enhancing peace and security.

Government respondents expressed the desire for a leading role in the design and coordination of the programme. The local NGOs would have preferred a partnership relationship, rather than the contractual relationship they had with UNDP. It was unfortunate that contractual arrangements terminated any involvement of the implementing NGOs with the programme after the expiration of the agreement. Interestingly however, we observed that most UNDP signboards reflecting collaboration with local NGOs throughout the countryside had a partnership label. The NGOs told us that they did not have a real partnership with UNDP.



NGOs and direct beneficiaries experienced the UNDP procurement and disbursement bureaucracy as problematic. The lack of input of NGOs in the formulation of contracts and delays by UNDP in the disbursement of funds created difficulties in programme implementation.

Donors and other stakeholders were concerned about UNDP's weakness in monitoring and evaluating its programmes. Moreover, parallel funding, alternative project designs, fragmented management and different rules in same programme area by the major donors were seen as problematic by ex-combatants and by the Liberian Government (e.g. simultaneous interventions by the European Union and the United States outside the JIU framework).

A major shortcoming was that local communities who had been victimized during the war and were then expected to host and live with the ex-combatants after DDRR were not included in the partnership.

In the assessment of the evaluation team, two major factors negatively impacted aspects of the programme implementation: 1) the infiltration of the programme by certain donor-driven NGOs, and 2) delays due to procurement and disbursement procedures at UNDP.

*DDRR was donor driven and implemented in ways that were disempowering.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The partnership went well, even though there were disagreements, which were minimal.*

- Government

*UNDP needs to work on its partnership strategy.*

- Government

### **4.3 DDRR – Programme effectiveness**

In 2002, the civil war intensified, engulfing the country. In early 2003, the warring factions, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia, were clashing intensely against the government forces, Armed Forces of Liberia, for control of the country. The three warring parties created military command structures with combatants and child soldiers who were traumatized and unpredictable. They were roaming the country outside organized civilian life, and devoted themselves to violent competition for power in the interest of rebel leaders, and basically relying on arms for their livelihood.

As a result the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, DDRR was one of the principal mandates, requiring that the ex-combatants be disarmed and demobilized, as well as rehabilitated and reintegrated into civilian communities. Two outcomes were intended for the DDRR programme: an improvement in peace and security, and the creation of an enabling environment for the promotion of national security.

Between 2004 and 2007, a significant number of ex-fighters had participated in the DDRR process and in the 2005 presidential and legislative elections, and subsequent legislative by-elections. Many ex-combatants also benefited from the socio-economic life of civilian communities through small income-generating businesses supported by UNDP.

DDRR improved the behaviour of a significant number of ex-combatants; reduced illiteracy among ex-fighters; provided skills training and improved agriculture and farming methods; and facilitated youth involvement in construction and other vocational activities, such as auto mechanics training (photo in Figure 23, Annex 8).

The lack of an exit strategy led to an uncertain future for most of the direct beneficiaries in the last RR phase. More importantly, we learned from beneficiaries that the training was inadequate and too short. Beneficiaries were worried about finding employment after completing the little training they got. The formal education component was agreed to by both donors and the government for a support period of 3 years. When the programme ended in 2007, UNDP, based on request from the Liberian Government paid an additional year of tuition for RR beneficiaries. Unfortunately, some beneficiaries in formal education programmes will not complete their degrees before closure of the programme. Another major flaw was that psychosocial counselling was essentially unavailable for most ex-combatants traumatized by war and drug use.

In spite of these major challenges, the DDRR programme made considerable progress towards the achievement of desired outcomes between 2004 and 2007, including:

- ✓ improving peace and security
- ✓ erasing the war mentality in a number of ex-fighters
- ✓ restoring the authority of the government
- ✓ reintegrating some ex-combatants into Liberian society
- ✓ reviving economic activity by helping the private sector to re-establish itself; encouraging small businesses; and initiating the collection of taxes by the government.

The evaluation team asked all stakeholders whether the programme achieved its desired outcomes from 2004 to 2007. As evidenced in Figure 10, UNDP again had a far higher opinion of the effectiveness of the DDRR programme than did the other respondent groups, especially the direct beneficiaries.

*DDRR... created chasms between the community and the ex-combatants as a distinct group; it did not dismantle the command structure of the warring groups; it reinforced a control-by-weapons mentality that makes real demobilization so much harder to achieve.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*[Given] the fact that they had been accustomed to holding arms, to be able to control [the ex-combatants] again - the outcome was good.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*There was success in DDRR in terms of outcome. "Improvement in peace and the state of security" was achieved.*

- Government

#### **4.4 DDRR – Programme efficiency**

Despite the unexpected high cost that was associated with programme execution and given the overall importance of peace and security, there was generally a positive opinion on average that the programme achieved results at a reasonable cost (Figure 9). As shown in Figure 10, donors had more mixed views on the efficiency of DDRR. According to UNDP, the importance of peace and security justified the high spending of the programme.

As discussed above in reference to Table 2 and Figure 4, the DDRR programme was by far the most important strategic programme area, as measured by programme expenditure. Other donors provided 94 per cent of DDRR expenditures, and UNDP core funds only 6 per cent (Figure 8 and Annex 7). UNDP made no contribution in 2006, but there was most likely in-kind assistance for the programme.

In terms of getting money out the door, the DDRR programme was the most efficient of all the strategic programme areas, with a remarkable proportion of the programme budget actually spent: fully 94 per cent (Figure 7).

Despite the enormous efforts made to achieve success in the DDRR, much more money was still required by the programme. There was a huge disparity between the expected caseload, underestimated initially at around 38,000 ex-combatants, and the actual caseload of 103,000 ex-combatants who ultimately participated in the programme. A key finding is that this huge discrepancy in the caseload and the consequent gap in funding greatly stressed the entire DDRR process.

*There were gaps. When the number went up to 103,000, the programme got overstretched. Ex-combatants are not known for their patience. So some fighters had proxies, e.g. other family members (taking advantage of the programme) that were sent to schools.*

- Government

*You cannot put a price on peace and security... There had to be a way to accommodate cost when the number went far beyond what was planned. The cost per ex-combatant for RR was about \$800. This is one of the cheapest around the globe, [which often average] about \$1000 per head.*

- UNDP

#### **4.5 DDRR – Degree of change**

##### **4.5.1 Impact on peace and security**

Although not perfect in its design and implementation, the DDRR programme was critical to the achievement of peace and security in Liberia. The implementation of DDRR made possible freedom of movement and association, democratic elections, the reconstitution of governmental authority, and improvement in the social and economic situation of some ex-combatants and other war-affected Liberians. Both the skills training and formal education

programmes were essential to national economic development. In addition, the execution of the programme created an enabling environment for the revitalization of the private sector. The programme promoted national integration, and contributed to national development.

However, stakeholders expressed concern about lack of employment opportunities, limited access to markets, and the fragility of the peace and security attained so far. Moreover, as has been noted in the discussion of the programme design, a major defect of the DDRR process was that only a small portion of children, especially girls, associated with fighting forces had access to DDRR. This deficiency is certain to negatively impact post-war peace building endeavours in Liberia.

As can be seen in Figures 9 and 10, there was agreement among all respondent groups that the programme enhanced peace and security in Liberia. However, the high rate of unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods to absorb the energy of potentially violent young ex-combatants and other was cited as one important reason why peace in Liberia is still fragile.

*The programme helped to bring peace to Liberia. There is a good change in the movement of ex-combatants. We do not want to hear about war anymore.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*To some level it improved peace, but security is not guaranteed. The security system in Liberia is very weak. It is not protecting citizens.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*We did see so much violence amongst the youths. Now, we have seen a reduction in violent crimes.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The foundation is still weak; when it comes to the future it is still fragile. But it has provided the window for us to experience peace up until now.*

- Government

*There was success in DDRR. In terms of outcome, "Improvement in peace and the state of security" was achieved.*

- Government

#### 4.5.2 Contribution to MDGs

We asked stakeholders whether the programme made a substantial contribution to the achievement of the MDGs, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, education and health. As shown in Figures 9 and 10, there was generally a positive opinion among the various respondent groups that the programme made a substantial contribution to the attainment of the MDGs. However, opinions were often more mixed when respondents discussed the MDG question in depth.

*For those ex-combatants that put their training into practice, the programme contributed to reducing poverty.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*We provided ex-combatants with relevant skills, but the farm-to-market roads are bad. Most of what they grow will go bad because of the roads. Until this problem can be solved, I don't think we have reduced poverty.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The programme did not relieve poverty. It has not created sustainable employment. It laid the foundation for contributing to MDGs.*

- Government

#### **4.6 DDRR – Most significant change**

As explained above in Chapter 2, we began all our interviews by asking “Thinking about all the effects that this Programme Area had from 2004 to 2007, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?” Against the background of insecurity and instability that characterized Liberia prior to the DDRR, the attainment of peace and security, the restoration of state authority, and improvement in the behaviour and social economic status of some ex-combatants were seen as interrelated developments that changed in the period. According to evaluation respondents, DDRR led first to an improvement in the behaviour of a significant number of ex-combatants. Second, as a result of formal education, skills and vocational training, and small-scale economic assistance, the most significant change was that some ex-combatants saw an improvement in their socio-economic status. Respondents also cited an improvement, although fragile, in peace and security in the country.

*There has been change in some of the attitudes and behaviour of ex-combatants.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Some ex-combatants reintegrated into their own communities. Because we live with them, we can see them. Their attitudes also changed. Some are now town chiefs in their communities.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The ex-combatants are often some of the best students in the schools. This debunks the mentality that they are good-for-nothing people – this is very important.*

- Government

*Before 2004, the whole country was in a state of insecurity. With the DDRR [process], there was significant improvement of security throughout the whole country. The guns were collected by the programme. Ex-combatants have returned to their communities.*

- UNDP

#### **4.7 DDRR – Sustainability**

As evidenced in Figure 10, the direct beneficiaries and the government disagreed strongly and CSOs disagreed that the DDRR programme was sustainable beyond 2007 without further

support. In comparison, UNDP respondents had a mixed opinion and donors were more positive about sustainability of the DDRR.

We were told that the RR component of the programme was not designed to be sustainable. Initially, the exit strategy from the RR phase was not effectively conceived and executed. As a result, a number of outstanding caseloads were still ongoing during the evaluation. The future remains uncertain for those unfinished caseloads.

In the absence of external support, the capacity for sustainability on the part of direct beneficiaries is unlikely. As long as there is a lack of local ownership, employment generation, and uncompleted caseloads a security risk will remain.

*We strongly disagree that it is sustainable. If UNDP does not come to our aid, we will become a security burden.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Our exit strategy was to have follow-up activities for three months. But this wasn't done because of lack of funding. UNDP didn't agree to fund this. We proposed to UNDP to do follow-up to see what graduates were doing, how many were employed, etc. UNDP said it was not our business. Because of the lost opportunity, we have no way to see the efforts of the programme. We don't have any way to figure out about sustainability.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*According to the impact assessment we have conducted, not all are employed. Employment creation is a national issue, it goes beyond DDRR; it has to be a priority. We need a programme that addresses the employment question - not only for ex-combatants, but for youth as a whole.*

- UNDP

## **4.8 DDRR – Strengths and weaknesses**

### **4.8.1 Strengths**

Overall, the DDRR programme in Liberia was a positive development with many important and positive impacts. The key strengths of the DDRR programme were:

- ✓ UNDP's leadership role in the DDRR process
- ✓ the strong commitment on the part of the Liberian Government
- ✓ effective media usage and good sensitization programmes
- ✓ quick response of the donor community
- ✓ commitment to and cooperation of disbanded warring faction leaders with the disarmament process, and the willingness of ex-combatants to disarm, and
- ✓ the empowerment achieved by some ex-combatants (both male and female) through financial assistance, skills training and formal education.

All these developments were strong factors in engaging ex-combatants, addressing their poverty, and moving them away from the mentality of making war as means of survival.

*The good will and tenacity of the actors made it happen: UNDP, GoL, UNMIL came together to make this happen. And the beneficiaries themselves were willing to engage in this.*

- Government

#### 4.8.2 Weaknesses

Examination of the design, partnership strategy and implementation processes revealed some shortcomings in the programme:

- absence of community involvement in programme design and execution
- failure to invest sufficiently in psychosocial counselling
- negative impact of the poor planning of DD component on RR phase
- the counterproductive effect of the flat rate payment made despite the quantity of arms received from any one combatant
- uncritical involvement of some unqualified donor-driven NGOs/CSOs in programme implementation
- poor quality and short duration of the training for some ex-combatants
- lack of jobs or subsidiary programmes to absorb most ex-combatants who graduated from skills training (one of the assumptions for sustainable reintegration was wider economic recovery leading to job creation)
- absence of a link between the programme and the private sector
- delays in UNDP procurement and disbursement procedures
- inadequate monitoring and evaluation by UNDP and implementing partners
- failure to organize follow-up with beneficiaries of programme
- over-reliance on UNDP's experience of similar programmes in other countries, rather than on in-depth understanding of the Liberian context (this was an unavoidable consequence of the urgency of delivering the programme quickly)
- ineffective exit strategy
- the poor quality and inadequacy of the toolkits supplied to some of the ex-combatants after training and
- inadequate attention given to the special needs of women and former child soldiers.

*Everything was donor-driven.*

- Government

*In an abuse situation, eight months training is not enough for deeply traumatized people.*

- Government

*We had to wait four years to take care of some people, and people lost interest in the programme.*

- UNDP

## **4.9 DDRR – Lessons learned**

The most important lessons learned from the DDRR programme are:

- Disarmament is crucial to the demobilization of warring factions; its planning and execution should involve the government, implementing partners, the international community and local communities. The design should anticipate the possibility of residual cases and include post programme follow-up activities to track results of the programme and residual caseloads that require attention.
- Hasty processing of ex-combatants in cantonment sites can be counterproductive. On average, ex-combatants stayed only three to four-and-a-half days in cantonment sites. For these people, most of whom had been traumatized by prolonged years of war, this was insufficient.
- Psychosocial counselling is crucial, and should form an integral part of DDRR programme design and implementation.
- An effective way to maintain peace in post-war countries is to keep ex-combatants and other war-affected youth busy with activities such as skills training, formal schooling, and practical development projects.
- In order to succeed in reintegration and to avert the rise of destabilizing forces in post-conflict societies, employment generation is essential.
- In RR, periodic assistance allowance was found to be a major motivating factor for building a sense of unity. The money brought together ex-combatants originally from different warring factions.
- Mixing ex-combatants and other war-affected people in the same schools, training programmes and work environment helps to build mutual understanding and trust, and is thus a useful approach to reintegration.
- Partnership is productive if it is founded on good, collaborative principles with those who will be directly affected by the programme execution. Programmes succeed best when those affected (both direct beneficiaries and local communities) are brought into the programme focus.
- In order to sustain the peace, post-conflict demands require prompt action and strict observation of delivery timelines is important. In terms of gender sensitivity, women and girls should be more involved in the policy formulation and programme design in order for their needs to be better catered for. Of great significance is the issue of gender mainstreaming in programme design and implementation.
- In planning and implementing DDRR programmes, UNDP's collaboration with UNICEF and UNIFEM should be more explicit so that the special needs of women and children ex-combatants can be properly addressed.



## 5. Community-based recovery




Figure 11. Stakeholder survey results - CBR programme




Figure 12. Survey results by stakeholder group - CBR programme

## 5.1 CBR – Design and relevance

The Community-Based Recovery programme was designed and implemented in a complex emergency environment aimed at dealing with the difficult post-conflict context of Liberia. After 14 years of civil conflict, Liberia is still a fragile state. Of great significance was the intervention of UNDP in the area of CBR. The desired outcomes were two-fold:

- 1) improved local and municipal governance structures and planning tools ensuring fullest representation of local population
- 2) improved capacity of community social structures to deliver basic services and livelihood opportunities.

The CBR programme was one of the main pillars for Liberia's post-conflict reconstruction. The devastating effects of the war on people's lives called for a response strategy to address urgent humanitarian needs in the country. The CBR programme was very instrumental in responding to the urgent humanitarian needs of people who suffered the brunt of the crisis. It helped in stabilizing the country and in reconciling the people. The CBR programme was highly relevant to Liberia's post-war development priorities.

We asked stakeholders to what extent they agreed that the CBR programme had responded to Liberia's priority issues from 2004 to 2007. As shown in Figures 11 and 12, all stakeholder groups agreed that the CBR programme had been designed in terms of its relevance to Liberia's priorities. Direct beneficiaries were particularly positive about the relevance of the CBR programme. With only one donor and one person from UNDP interviewed on the CBR programme, no generalizations can be made about these groups.

*Most parents could not afford to send their children to private schools. Their fees were just too expensive and out of their reach. The public school brought relief to lots of parents... It met the needs of the people.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The people were really in need of the project and they got it. So the project was relevant. Many other organizations went in the area to do assessment, but nothing happened. UNDP came in, and we delivered.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*These are programmes that were designed to address critical needs and issues of concern taking into consideration the country context. The collaboration of other development partners in these programmes shows their importance at the time.*

- Government

## 5.2 CBR – Partnership strategy

The overall partnership strategy of the Community-Based Recovery programme was to promote a close working relationship between the GoL, UNDP, UN Agencies and other partners. The aim was to build the institutional capacity of government, and to enable it to

take ownership for the implementation of Liberia's development priorities. UNDP formed various strategic partnerships with national and local government institutions, CSOs, NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and local communities towards achieving the desired outcomes above. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was the major national partner.

As evidenced in Figure 11, there was more uncertainty as to whether the CBR programme had an effective partnership strategy from 2004 to 2007 than for any other evaluation criterion except sustainability. Direct beneficiaries, stakeholders and other partners felt that they had not been sufficiently involved in the design of UNDP interventions in the CBR programme, and stressed that an inclusive and participatory design is fundamental for effective partnerships.

At the community level, a lack of social cohesion, ethnic division and poor leadership had severely limited the participation of direct beneficiaries in the design and implementation of projects. While the CBR programme restored a number of basic infrastructure and social services, there is now a need to adopt a more comprehensive, integrated and participatory approach at the local and national levels.

*The partnership worked well with everybody. Citizens contributed the sand and rocks.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Local people had the desire to see change in their community. We saw that motivation in Nimba County, and it motivated us as outsiders.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

### **5.3 CBR – Programme effectiveness**

During the programme period, there was no formal monitoring and evaluation system to track the achievement of desired outcomes and results for the CBR programme. We held discussions with the CBR Programme Manager and other stakeholders to document the effectiveness at the output and activity levels. The results of this exercise are presented in Annexes 5 and 6, which record for each outcome and output planned to what extent it was achieved. The analysis presented in Annex 6 on the extent of implementation of programme activities was based on the document review and data provided by the Project Team.

To validate the effectiveness of CBR, we asked the stakeholders to what extent they agreed that the programme had achieved its target outputs. The establishment of the District Development Committees (DDCs) was mostly achieved in the fifteen counties with capacity to serve the local community members and to strengthen governance structures. The objectives of the micro-projects were partly achieved.

As evidenced in Figures 11 and 12, there was strong agreement that the CBR programme achieved its desired outcomes from 2004 to 2007, with the government respondents and direct beneficiaries the most positive.

According to UNDP Annual Reports (2004-2007), a total of 547,000 rural Liberians – approximately 16 per cent of the population of Liberia – are now benefiting from the CBR programme. This is an impressive reach.

Below are a few testimonials about the effectiveness of the CBR programme:

*We are happy to have our children in school. We didn't have a building before this.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Many other organizations went in the area to do assessment but nothing happened. UNDP came in, and we delivered.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The programme helped to renovate and construct new facilities in many communities in the county. These facilities (such as schools, roads, clinics, etc.) are benefitting members of these communities in many ways.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

#### **5.4 CBR – Programme efficiency**

To verify the efficiency of CBR, we asked the stakeholders to what extent they agreed that the programme achieved results at a reasonable cost in terms of human and financial resources. As evidenced in Figures 11 and 12, all respondent groups were somewhat positive on average that the CBR programme achieved results at a reasonable cost, while the direct beneficiaries tended to agree the most.

However, we repeatedly heard criticism that too much money was spent on salaries to the detriment of achieving actual results. The huge gap between the salaries paid to international staff and those paid to Liberian nationals has created widespread resentment. There is a general misgiving that this money takes away from the important work in Liberia. It should be noted, however, that UNDP was in effect implementing the CBR programme under very difficult circumstances. The lack of in-country capacity necessitated the recruitment of international staff to fill in the gap at the time.

Furthermore, challenging socio-economic conditions including widespread illiteracy, high unemployment, massive poverty and bad roads were the most significant limitations that contributed to the inefficiencies of CBR programme. To the extent that the programme succeeded, a syndrome of dependency could be a threat in the not-too-distant future.

We were told about the following problems that hindered the efficiency of programme delivery:

- UNDP bureaucracy and its perceived desire to carry out too many projects at one time
- low national capacity of the government, local NGOs, CBOs and communities
- inefficient UNDP procurement practices and long delays in transferring funds to contractors or to implementing partners in the field

- inadequate funding for projects due to underestimated cost analyses, inflation or changes in price due to delays in providing building materials and fuel
- lack of basic infrastructure (i.e., bad roads), which made it too expensive to implement projects during the rainy season.

In response to these inefficiencies, UNDP has put into place a programme management control framework that takes into consideration a more realistic estimation of the number of projects to be completed, and also takes into account the time of completion, quality and climatic conditions. UNDP told the evaluation team that it has taken steps to improve the procurement process, including hiring procurement experts to take the lead in procurement, and assigning two procurement officers to deal specifically with CBR projects. In addition, UNDP informs us that it has hired competent engineers to calculate realistic cost estimates based on detailed project designs and scopes of work. UNDP is currently carrying out most of the solicitation of civil work projects in the rainy season, and implementation in the dry season

A summary of the programme budgets and expenditures is presented in Annex 7. The CBR programme was the fourth largest strategic programme area in terms of expenditure, after the DDRR, Infrastructure and DG programmes (Table 2 and Figure 4). The CBR programme accounted for less than 9 per cent of overall expenditures. Other donors contributed 86 per cent of total expenditures for the CBR programme, while UNDP provided 14 per cent from core support.

The main finding to improve efficiency is that UNDP must pay more attention to the concerns of civil society organizations, the government and donors.

*The payment of funds was very slow. Getting our paperwork through the UNDP system was also a problem. This made it difficult for us in implementing the project. Later, the payment improved when UNDP established sub-offices in the counties.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Each project had duration of 4-5 months, but it took too long for UNDP to make the payments. So the project took a year to complete. It caused us serious problems as the contractor.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*In general it might have been a bit expensive. The administrative costs were quite high, more than a third.*

- Donor

## **5.5 CBR – Degree of change**

### **5.5.1 Impact on peace and security**

As evidenced in Figures 11 and 12, there was a strong agreement that the CBR programme enhanced peace and security in Liberia from 2004 to 2007. All respondent groups were

categorically positive on average that the CBR programme had enhanced peace and security in Liberia, with the direct beneficiaries, CSOs and the government agreeing the most.

*Peace and security along with poverty reduction has improved in our community.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Our children are secured without travelling remote distances to school.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The wells served the people. Girls usually go to fetch water from the creeks. Sometimes people might rape them on the way. The hand pumps also helped to alleviate raping activities.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The CBR and DG programmes provided a springboard for community decision-making and ownership of community recovery initiatives, which are important ingredients of both national stability and peace.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

## 5.5.2 Contribution to MDGs

There was general agreement that the CBR programme made a substantial contribution towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Figure 11).

With respect to the MDGs, four key principles emerge regarding programme design and implementation that usefully could guide future CBR interventions.

- **MDG 1** (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger): Most respondents told us that the opportunity to engage in sustainable livelihoods (e.g. agriculture, business through micro-credit loans) had helped in reducing poverty for them. As shown in Figure 12, there was a strong agreement amongst direct beneficiaries that the CBR programme made a substantial contribution towards the achievement of MDGs. Direct beneficiaries particularly expressed a general sense of confidence that they can now use their skills and businesses to rebuild their lives.
- **MDG 2** (Achieve universal primary education): Most parent beneficiaries expressed great relief that their children were provided the opportunity to attend school. This appreciation was expressed by direct beneficiaries everywhere. However, rural communities are faced with serious challenges, such as the lack of trained teachers and insufficient instruction materials in their schools. The GoL is unable to pay regular teachers on time, and most voluntary teachers do not get paid at all. Poor parents cannot afford to provide uniforms for their children.
- **MDG 3** (Promote gender equality and empower women): There was some evidence in empowering young girls and women through the provision of primary education and micro-enterprises. But more needs to be done because of the dangerous trend that many young girls do attend school for the first few years, but then drop out due to either unwanted pregnancies or financial difficulties. Regrettably, we saw no evidence at either the local and national levels aimed at providing well-targeted interventions to address these problems..

- **MDG 4** (Reduce infant mortality) and **MDG 5** (Reduce maternal mortality): The reduction of both infant and maternal mortality is a grave challenge in Liberia. The provision of safe drinking water from hand pumps, clinics/health centres, and midwifery services to rural populations has helped to fight diseases, to reduce sicknesses and child mortality, and to improve maternal health. However, a major challenge is the lack of trained medical personnel in rural communities. In addition, people must travel far to access even limited medical facilities and services. The lack of incentives and low salaries are a serious inhibiting factor for most Liberian doctors, nurses and other health practitioners.

## 5.6 CBR – Most significant change

From the analysis of the responses from the various respondent groups, four key themes emerged in answer to the question of what had been the most significant change of all brought about by the CBR programme:

- ✓ The restoration of basic infrastructure and social services in Liberia stabilized people's lives in the country and allowed them to return to their villages and rural communities.
- ✓ The programme was very instrumental in the creation of District Development Committees in the 15 counties, and it improved participation and acceptance of local communities in grassroots democracy and development issues. As a result, ordinary Liberians are now able to make crucial decisions about their lives involving vital issues of stability, local ownership and sustainability.
- ✓ CBR provided humanitarian relief to parents and their children, in particular with respect to schools, clinics, hand pumps, market facilities, etc. This has helped to reduce poverty and illiteracy. Security for children was improved when long distances to schools were reduced.
- ✓ Some people who were once enemies are now working together to do business for their economic survival, thus enhancing peace and national security. This is illustrated in the photo of women marketers in Figure 24 (Annex 8).

The following is a rich set of responses from various stakeholder groups to the key question of what had been the most significant change brought about by the CBR programme:

*The building of the school has reduced the illiteracy rate. It also helped with poverty reduction because parents could not afford to send their children to private schools. The school has provided the opportunity for children to get their education. This is very, very important.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Through this market building, we are able to sell our goods and make some money. This enables us to help each other and to undertake small development projects for ourselves.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Prior to the renovation, the people were learning in the rain. As we renovated the buildings, the students moved there. The hand pumps provided safe drinking water for the students and local community. As a result, the population of students increased significantly.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*It created the opportunity for children to have access to their own school. Before the project, children around 4 to 7 years old did not go to school. They had to wait until 9 years old to start going to school because they could not walk the long distances.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*[The CBR programme] increased the participation of community people across the country in grassroots democracy. Because it provided an opportunity for the ordinary village people to make decisions about their communities and their lives – an important element of ownership that promotes stability and national security.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The most significant change was the restoration of basic social services. Now the national planning system of government is working. If the infrastructure had not been in place, the elections would not have been possible. The infrastructure allowed people to return to their villages from the IDP camps.*

- UNDP

## 5.7 CBR – Sustainability

The CBR programme was designed and implemented in a complex emergency environment aimed at dealing with the difficult post-conflict context of Liberia. Accordingly, the evaluation team finds that it is too early to expect the results and activities of CBR to be sustainable beyond the humanitarian relief and recovery phase. The primary focus of the intervention was to address urgent humanitarian needs – and not necessarily sustainability. On the other hand, UNDP needs to do much more to encourage local ownership and sustainability in the early phases of project development.

There is evidence that the programme facilitated a number of mechanisms to ensure sustainability, namely:

- building capacity of direct beneficiaries, local communities and implementing partners
- creating the District Development Committees
- engaging national and local government authorities, and civil society organizations
- attracting the commitment and support of international donors.

Despite these efforts, as evidenced in Figure 12, all respondent groups, with the exception of UNDP, felt that the CBR programme is not sustainable at this time.

*It is still too soon for anything to be sustainable after 14 years of war.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The DDCs are still operational in many parts of the country contributing to the work of the County Support Teams. However, DDCs still see themselves as UNDP projects. Raising the bar to confront this kind of patronage and dependency will require more work that will confront these twin enemies of community development.*

- CSO / NGO / PS



*We are not at the stage of sustainability at this point. Sustainability depends on a number of factors – well established structures and functioning government with financial capacity (good governance), national capacity well established, opportunities for self-actualization available, social services available and affordable, clear roles and responsibilities defined with associated capacity for implementation from community to national levels, and rights that are protected. The nation is going through a rebirth and it will take time.*

- Government

## **5.8 CBR – Strengths and weaknesses**

### **5.8.1 Strengths**

The most significant strength of the CBR programme was that it provided financial support to people in key areas of need.

The programme made important contributions for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure (schools, clinics, hand pumps, markets, roads/bridges, etc.) in selected rural communities throughout Liberia.

Another important strength was that the District Development Committees encouraged the active participation and support of the Liberian people to pursue and champion their own development agenda. We were told that most people now understand the roles and functions of the government and local authorities in a healthier manner. Women and youths are now very active in various districts in the counties. This is a remarkable accomplishment given that these groups took such a back seat in the past.

Another great strength is that the programme has helped to reconcile people in the country. Specifically, the economic empowerment component has brought people together through the provision of market facilities and micro-credit loans. We witnessed this development in Nimba, Grand Gedeh and Lofa Counties where people who were once enemies have put their ethnic and other differences aside, and are now working together for their common economic growth and survival. This is a wonderful accomplishment given the recent history of protracted conflict amongst the people in these counties.

*UNDP mobilized resources that would have been otherwise unavailable to the country.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Programmes opened a door for local participation through recruitment of local NGOs and assessment of local communities for project implementation.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The market brings unity. People come from Nimba County to stay with us in our homes in Grand Gedeh County. We eat and do business together.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Market women are saving their money together to help themselves. The economic empowerment project... created a level of self-confidence in these women groups. It helped to bring people together.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*One objective of CBR was to reconcile people. It addressed critical areas of needs, ensured partnerships and desired collaboration from conception to implementation stages. Good technical leadership and guidance, although costly, facilitated implementation of other programmes, and contributed to restoration of peace.*

- Government

### 5.8.2 Weaknesses

One of the major weaknesses of the CBR programme was the bureaucracy of UNDP. We were informed that the procurement process and long delays in transferring funds to implementing partners impeded the implementation of the programme. Projects were not only delayed for a long period of time, but it was more expensive due to unexpected increases in the price of building materials. The heavy rainy season made it extremely difficult to carry out many of these projects in the counties. In some cases, projects were left incomplete in the field.

Another shortcoming of the CBR programme in terms of its design and relevance was a lack of the involvement of implementing partners, as well as of attention to gender issues. This was partly due to the absence of a participatory design process in the CBR programme. We were told that some contractors took the money to do work, although they knew full well that they did not have the technical capacity to do so.

The effectiveness of the CBR programme was limited by weak national capacity in terms of human and financial resources. Liberia did not have enough funding, nor enough trained personnel to provide full coverage of the programme delivery services throughout the country.

Two CBR projects were left unfinished: the Toe's Town General Market, and the Kolahun Central Market.

Although schools were built, there is a serious problem of a lack of trained teachers, books, and other educational materials in most rural schools.

A major limitation was the lack of adequate monitoring and supervision of the CBR projects implemented by UNDP. We were told that UNDP neglected to visit a number of project sites.

Another hindrance was that some communities were still subordinating themselves to old practices of unnecessary submission to political authorities. We were informed that the Gbarzon District in Grand Gedeh County is a particular example of this.

More needs to be done to address the huge challenge of limited coverage throughout the country. We were told that the programme only served people and communities close to roads.

The absence of local ownership and sustainability has become a serious problem in most rural communities. Therefore, a good exit strategy must now be put in place to address the unintended consequence of dependency on the part of direct beneficiaries.

*UNDP didn't come to check their work.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*UNDP never allowed us to be a part of project design.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Not much use was made of local knowledge or local actors.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*We have been complaining about – we have seen that the gender dimension has not really been put into many of the programmes. Women in this country, in the sense of human rights for example, are not being used. There is a lot to do to empower women. If you want to address the issue, fundamentally you have to increase women's participation, empowerment and education. The UN can do more here.*

- Donor

*Our own bureaucracy was a weakness because it sometimes delayed support. The situation of competitive bidding and advertising is not appropriate for a humanitarian programme.*

- UNDP

## 5.9 CBR – Lessons learned

The main lessons that emerged from the CBR programme and which might have a broader, generic application include the following.

- The key lesson is that the CBR programme must be designed and implemented through a holistic and participatory approach, with direct beneficiaries and local communities involved in the entire process. The experience with the District Development Committees is an excellent example that, if done properly, direct beneficiaries and local communities can demonstrate ownership and sustainable investment in the project. An inclusive, effective partnership strategy will be essential to achieving lasting results.
- Direct beneficiaries and local communities should be sensitized and trained to take ownership of their development agenda – if not, the project is likely to fail or not be sustainable.
- Despite the number of results achieved, the overall impact was severely constrained by the extreme weakness of national capacity and poor infrastructure. An important lesson is therefore to build the institutional capacities of local NGOs, CBOs, communities and direct beneficiaries, and to better enable them to engage in strategic planning, management, and advocacy. UNDP support should focus on building the technical

capacity of local actors, so that they learn to do things for themselves rather than depending on others. The motivation of local people will be a key factor for achieving sustainable development and national reconstruction in post-conflict Liberia.

- Most Liberians now realize that there is a need for the national government and its functions to be more decentralized. This would enhance durable peace in the country. Local economic development initiatives should provide a sense of belonging and ownership. One way to promote governance and sustain peace is through cooperative methods that bring people together. People also now realize that they need peace – not war – in their communities in order to do business.

## 6. Democratic governance




Figure 13. Stakeholder survey results for Democratic Governance programme




Figure 14. Survey results by stakeholder group for Democratic Governance programme

## 6.1 DG – Design and relevance

After 14 years of civil conflict, Liberia was and still is a fragile state. The Democratic Governance programme was designed and implemented in a complex emergency environment aimed at dealing with the difficult post-conflict context of Liberia. As agreed by the warring factions on 18 August 2003 in Accra, Ghana, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ushered in the National Transitional Government of Liberia with a mandate to carry out the functions of government, and to address specific governance issues including the holding of presidential and general elections in October 2005. The intervention of UNDP in the area of democratic governance was a key strategy for rebuilding the country.

In the project document the formulation of the outcomes for the DG programme was rather vague. The mid-term evaluation of the Good Governance Project (Mugabi 2006) noted that the project documents were prepared hurriedly. Nevertheless, this problem was not corrected in the second half of programme cycle from February 2006 to December 2007.

After consultations with the heads of the DG components, we were able to establish that the programme aimed to achieve three desired outcomes:

- 1) enhanced national capacity for good governance principles and policies
- 2) established institutional and electoral framework conducive to free and fair democratic elections
- 3) improved economic stimulus environment for sustainable growth and development.

The DG programme was one of the principal pillars of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It was instrumental in holding free and fair democratic elections, and in promoting economic growth and sustainable development in Liberia. The DG programme was divided into two sub-components: good governance and economic governance.

We asked the various stakeholders to what extent they agreed that the Democratic Governance programme had responded to Liberia's priority issues from 2004 to 2007. As shown in Figures 13 and 14, there was a general agreement that the programme did respond to Liberia's priorities. All stakeholder groups agreed that the DG programme had been designed properly in terms of its relevance to the priorities of the country. However, generalizations about the DG programme cannot be made for donors and UNDP respondent groups because of the small number of respondents interviewed in these groups (one and two respectively).

A central message was that, although not sufficient on its own, good governance was seen as vital in order to promote national ownership and sustainability in post-conflict Liberia.

*The [programme] period settled the question on the issue of democratic elections.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*I agree because civil participation has been a serious threat to development and the consolidation of democracy in this country. This lack of participation can be attributed to lack of knowledge, so the fact that we could build understanding was very important. In*

*advancing our development agenda, the period set for these programmes were somewhat short.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Yes, in a nutshell it did. UNDP in the 2005 elections contributed to the civic education programme, made an enormous contribution to that, accredited by this commission. We considered the fact that we have a high illiteracy rate at 85%. Anything that is done to educate the population with respect to how they go about voting – was very important to the success of the elections – for people to be informed. That contribution was critical.*

- Government

*UNDP helped with elections. Women's participation was improved. For the first time, as many women as men voted.*

- Government

## **6.2 DG – Partnership strategy**

The overall partnership strategy of the DG programme was to promote a collaborative working relationship between the GoL, CSOs, and donors. The aim was to build the capacity of government and to enable it to take national ownership for the implementation of Liberia's development priorities. Various strategic partnerships were formed with national government institutions, CSOs, and NGOs with a view to achieving the desired outcomes of the programme. The major national partners were the Governance Commission (GC), National Elections Commission (NEC), and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs.

We asked the various respondent groups whether the DG programme had had an effective partnership strategy from 2004 to 2007. As shown in Figures 13 and 14, opinions of the evaluation respondent groups were mixed on this question. Many respondents replied that they had not been sufficiently involved in the design of UNDP interventions in the DG programme area. An inclusive and participatory design process is fundamental for an effective partnership strategy.

*It is my suspicion that decision making in the partnership was not effective. It was only portrayed as representing the general interest of the people.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*I disagree because partnership strategy must be underpinned by setting indicators for the effectiveness of the partnership. The partnership with UNDP was that of a contractor. We were not able to present a proposal. So it cannot be considered an effective partnership.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

## **6.3 DG – Programme effectiveness**

Prior to this evaluation, there was no formal monitoring and evaluation system to track the achievement of desired outcomes and results for the DG programme. We held discussions

with the DG Programme Managers and other stakeholders to document the effectiveness at the output and activity levels. The detailed results of this exercise are presented in Annexes 5 and 6, which record for each outcome and output planned to what extent it was achieved. According to this analysis, the DG programme made good progress with respect to its first and second outcomes (enhanced national capacity for good governance, and the establishment of an institutional and electoral framework conducive for free and fair democratic elections). However the third outcome (improved economic stimulus environment) was not fully achieved.

To validate the effectiveness of the DG programme, we also asked the stakeholders to what extent they agreed that the programme had achieved its target outcomes.

As shown in Figures 13 and 14, the average opinion of all stakeholder groups was generally positive that the DG programme achieved its desired outcomes, with the government respondents being the most positive. It appeared to us that people with more knowledge of the DG programme were likely to hold more positive opinions, while those with less knowledge were more negative.

*Being able to bring into existence several commissions is a major success. If you take the National Elections Commission, UNDP input was very strong. Governance Commission and General Auditing Commission have been structured.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*There was improved awareness. Youth knew that their future was tied to the outcome of these elections. We were involved in the process of voter education. Young people were very excited. So yes!*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*In Accra the intent was to stop the fighting and put in place a democratic government. Democratic governance was the biggest outcome of the RFTF: ensuring that Liberians could go to the polls and elect a democratic government. That was achieved. It achieved one major outcome (elections) but not all. The rule of law is still in shambles. The economy is still in shambles.*

- Government

#### **6.4 DG – Programme efficiency**

We asked the various stakeholder groups to what extent they agreed that the Democratic Governance programme achieved results at a reasonable cost in terms of human and financial resources. The average opinion of all stakeholders was quite mixed (Figure 13). As shown in Figure 14, the government respondent group was the only one with an average positive opinion about programme efficiency. Often, we heard criticism that too much money was spent on salaries to the detriment of achieving actual project results.

Various respondent groups expressed major concerns about the bureaucracy and operational problems at UNDP Liberia in terms of procurement, the failure to make payments on time, and long delays in UNDP fulfilling its commitments. If corrective actions are not taken, these

problems create the risk that the trust and confidence between UNDP and national stakeholders will erode in the future. These issues should be addressed sooner rather than later, because the longer they continue, the more time and energy will be needed to repair damaged relationships.

Annual programme budgets and expenditures from 2004 to 2007 are given in Annex 7. The DG programme, at slightly over 9 per cent of the total programme expenditure, was the third largest expenditure after the DDDR and Infrastructure programmes (Table 2 and Figure 4). UNDP provided slightly over 50 per cent of the funding spent on the DG programme, while other donors contributed just under 50 per cent.

Over the four-year period, the DG programme spent only 64 per cent of its budget (Figure 7), making it the least efficient of all the strategic programme areas in terms of being able to spend the money it had.

*There was a huge disproportionality [disparity] between money spent and results achieved. People used Liberia as good proposal-writing ground. A vast amount was also spent on international experts rather than Liberian themselves.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Finances in some instances were delayed for more than six months. Equipment promised to communities was not delivered on time, which made the cost to the partner's integrity higher than the financial cost. Many person-hours were spent on making amends to communities and working to restore trust and confidence. It is difficult to see best practices under the circumstances within which we operated.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The programme achieved its outputs at a reasonable cost. Actually it achieved them at an undervalued cost. The quality of Liberians that were recruited to do the work and the cost for their services was really under-valued. The gap between the expatriates and the locals has been shameful. In some cases the external consultants were over-valued.*

- Government

## **6.5 DG – Degree of change**

### **6.5.1 Impact on peace and security**

As evidenced in Figures 13 and 14, the average opinion of various stakeholder groups was generally positive that the DG programme enhanced peace and security in Liberia from 2004 to 2007; however, the views of the direct beneficiaries were more mixed than those of the other respondent groups.

Young DG beneficiaries stressed the importance of participatory democracy for building a more peaceful and stable Liberia (photo in Figure 25, Annex 8).



*The DG programme established peace to some extent. We do not have warring factions, but we do not have security.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Liberia now enjoys relative peace.*

- CSO / NGO / Private Sector

*It is difficult to access the direct impact on peace and security. People have started a process of dialogue. The Governance Commission went around the country and asked what people wanted in terms of governance – and people said that they wanted the government to be more decentralized and this would enhance peace. This programme is not a direct intervention in terms of peace and security.*

- UNDP

### 6.5.2 Contribution to MDGs

At the 2000 Millennium Summit, the world's leaders highlighted the critical importance of democratic governance in the developing world. The United Nations Millennium Declaration states:

*We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.*

A consensus was built on improving the quality of democratic institutions and processes, and managing the changing roles of the state and civil society in an increasingly globalized world. This must underpin national efforts to reduce poverty, sustain the environment, and promote human development. At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders further declared:

*We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.*

As evidenced in Figures 13 and 14, respondents had mixed views as to whether the DG programme made a substantial contribution towards achieving the MDGs, with the direct beneficiaries disagreeing, and CSOs, NGOs and government being more positive. Major stakeholders said that the ending of war and the highly successful elections were very instrumental for Liberia's post-war reconstruction. The results of the DG programme are likely to create an enabling environment for rebuilding the nation in the long run.

Table 4 below (in section 8.5.2) presents the evolution of gender-sensitive MDG indicators from 2002 to 2007 (source: GoL 2008b). Aside from improving the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary schools, the prediction that by 2015 Liberia will achieve the other gender-sensitive MDG targets, including the proportion of women in parliament, remains unlikely. Marginal gains have been made in terms of the number of women in the government with 14 per cent participating in the legislative, 25 per cent in the executive and 40 per cent in the judiciary branches. Significantly, the election of Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as Liberia's and Africa's first female president has brought hope and inspiration to Liberian women and others around the world.

## 6.6 DG – Most significant change

Four major themes have emerged from an analysis of the responses from various stakeholder groups to the question on the most significant change of all for the DG programme:

- ✓ Democratic elections in 2005 and subsequent by-elections have been the most successful and freest of all in Liberia. There is now increased participation and acceptance of democracy by the Liberian people.
- ✓ The intervention of international partners including UNDP was instrumental for the creation of a more stable environment in Liberia. Democratic governance and the elections are no exception.
- ✓ Liberians are returning home from the diaspora to contribute to the post-war reconstruction of the country.
- ✓ While enormous progress has been made in the area of democratic governance, various respondent groups recognized the fact that Liberia is facing serious challenges in fixing the economy, education and corruption, etc. This is a fundamental problem, which poses a real risk to the country.

*The most significant change was the election of a female as president – gender equity. Now we see women as partners in progress.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Between 2004 and 2007, there have been major changes. For example, the 2005 election was a point of departure from the rule of warlords. It gave the Liberian people the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*It increased the participation of community people across the country in grassroots democracy. Because it provided an opportunity for the ordinary village people to make decisions about their communities and their lives – an important element of ownership that promotes stability and national security.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*The most significant change was democratic governance and elections in 2005. UNDP played a key role in the entire planning and execution of the elections. Democratic governance brought some peace.*

- Government

*I can give a candid opinion of where we are coming from. We had a democratic election in 1997 although the feeling at the time was that the playing field was not level. The elections in 2005 were the freest in Liberia's history. The transparent nature in which local by-elections are conducted shows that democracy is gaining roots over time. We have done six by-elections: the ruling party won four and lost two. The seventh by-election will be tomorrow. Some people will remain critical, but we believe that as long as the system continues to be transparent, the system can speak for itself.*

- Government

*The most significant change is the institutionalization of the Governance Commission. It is important because there needed to be a focal point through which the reform process could be coordinated. Bad governance was identified as a conflict factor contributing to the war.*

- UNDP

## 6.7 DG – Sustainability

The DG programme was designed and implemented in a complex emergency environment aimed at dealing with the difficult post-conflict context of Liberia. There is evidence that the programme facilitated a number of mechanisms to ensure sustainability, namely:

- ✓ establishing the National Elections Commission and Governance Commission
- ✓ engaging national government and local authorities, and civil society organizations
- ✓ attracting the commitment and support of international donors
- ✓ successfully conducting the presidential and general elections in 2005 and seven by-elections, where the ruling Unity Party won four and lost three.
- ✓ advancing good governance principles and policies.

Despite these efforts, as shown in Figures 13 and 14, all respondent groups disagreed on average that the results of DG programme were sustainable. This is mostly due to the lack of national capacity in terms of human resources, and to poor economic conditions throughout the country. As a result, UNDP needs to do more to encourage local ownership and sustainability.

As observed in the evaluation inception report (Tokpa & Yengbeh 2008), with the continuation of corrupt acts in Liberia, it is imperative for UNDP to increase support for building the technical capacities of government and civil society institutions, and to provide training programmes in best practices of good governance (e.g., accountability, transparency, economic management, and participatory decision-making processes).

*We are just coming from war. It will take a long time to be self-sufficient. Our democracy is still fragile.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*We are not at the stage of sustainability at this point. Sustainability depends on a number of factors – well established structures and functioning government with financial capacity (good governance), national capacity well established, opportunities for self-actualization available, social services available and affordable, clear roles and responsibilities defined with associated capacity for implementation from community to national levels and rights are protected. The nation is going through a rebirth and it will take time.*

- Government

*The first question is “Is Liberia going back to violent conflict?” But this is in the balance now. If Liberia is to get through the next one and half years financially, then something must be done to translate to more solid growth and job creation. Otherwise, it is risky.*

- Donor

## 6.8 DG – Strengths and weaknesses

### 6.8.1 Strengths

First and foremost, the most significant strength of the DG programme was that it enabled good governance principles and policies to take root in Liberia.

Second, the programme made a genuine contribution to holding free and fair presidential and legislative elections in 2005 and seven by-elections, so far successfully. These are major accomplishments considering Liberia's past history of political violence and undemocratic elections. Despite the fact that Liberia has recently made important advances in electoral processes and is now considered a multiparty democracy, effective checks and balances between the different powers of the State should be strengthened.

UNDP's contribution to the electoral process dealt with competing demands on political powers, and strengthened the capacity of government ministries and institutions (Tokpa & Yengbeh, 2008). The intervention focused on the provision of technical leadership and financial support for rebuilding Liberia in crucial priority areas such as the elections, national youth policy, political, judicial and governance reforms. The GC, NEC and MPEA benefited the most. According to the mid-term evaluation of the good governance project (Mugabi 2006), the programme was of vital importance in terms of the UNDP mandate and the GC. The mid-term evaluation further concluded that "activities of the GC are germane and crucial to the promotion of good governance."

*Liberian people now feel that they are part of the body politic.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Both resources and education were provided to the people in a timely manner for the intervention. The opportunity to train our staff also enabled us to execute our plan.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*A major strength was that the programme brought major donors and the government together. It created a forum to put Liberia's problems in a prism and to discuss how to solve these problems. It helped to move the country from war to peace.*

- Government

*The County Support Teams were quite innovative.*

- Donor

### 6.8.2 Weaknesses

The biggest weaknesses of the DG programme were initially the lack of national vision, political consensus and broad citizen participation in the formulation and advocacy for policy reforms. The capacity of government had been totally destroyed. During the period under review, the acute absence of national ownership made it necessary for international partners to

lead nearly everything. The commitment of the GoL will need to go beyond political will to provide adequate budgets for the GC, the NEC, and the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission

Although recommended in the mid-term evaluation, we saw no evidence that a revised Memorandum of Understanding was signed between UNDP and GoL. This recommendation was intended to deal with the inconsistencies in the project document, the RFTF and the deliverables of the GC. As a consequence, this may have overstretched GC's limited capability to meet urgent national priorities.

A major limitation of the DG programme was the lack of national capacity in terms of human and financial resources. Liberia did not have enough trained human resources and money to provide full coverage of the programme delivery services through the country.

As noted above for other strategic programme areas, another shortcoming of the programme was the slow procurement process and bureaucracy of UNDP.

Finally, another limitation – which we have also seen in other strategic programme areas – was the lack of participatory design, monitoring and supervision of the DG programme by UNDP.

*UNDP is very weak in providing regular support for civic education in the informal sector. Civic education is the bedrock for good citizenship and a foundation for democratic governance.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Education on the electoral process was hasty. As a result, people were not educated and the awareness process was narrow.*

- Direct beneficiary

*There were limited resources relative to needs and therefore limited coverage was provided.*

- Government

*There was more eagerness to meet planned programme targets rather than real community aspirations and needs.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*UNDP must speed up on their procurement. It has negatively affected the timetable for programme implementation for partners.*

- Government

*A major problem with UNDP is the weak monitoring aspect.*

- Direct beneficiary

## **6.9 DG – Lessons learned**

The evaluation team asked the various stakeholder groups the main lessons that can be learned on the experience from the DG programme that might have a broader, generic application.

- The main lesson is that democratic governance programme must be designed and implemented through a holistic and participatory approach. We learned from various respondent groups how essential it is for project planners and designers to demonstrate that the desired results can be achieved by a clear programme formulation, strategic planning and international best practices put in place within a national context. It is thus imperative to focus programme design and implementation in well-defined areas of intervention. Sequencing of work is also vital for achieving desired outcomes and maximizing success.
- The absence of political participation and exclusion have been serious problems in Liberia for decades. It is clear that the denial of people's basic human and political rights to participate in government was one of the key reasons for the civil war. We were told by various respondent groups that active citizen participation in the democratization and decentralization processes was fundamental for achieving genuine democracy, local ownership and sustainability.
- An important lesson is to build the institutional capacities of local NGOs, CBOs, communities and direct beneficiaries, and to better enable them to engage in strategic planning, management and advocacy for local decentralization and democratic developments. Various respondent groups informed us that capacity was not only about the lack of qualified people, or the preparedness of people to do their jobs. Of particular importance is the fact that capacity has also to do with intrinsic values such as commitment, honesty and integrity to serve the country and people. We were told that many educated Liberians lack a real commitment to the country. The issue of values also needs to be addressed in capacity building.
- Another lesson from the experience of the DG programme is that there was a need for more involvement of direct beneficiaries, civil society organizations and local communities in strategic partnerships. Building and nurturing strategic partnerships can improve resource mobilization, local ownership and sustainable programme implementation. Moreover, we were told by the government and other respondent groups that they desire a stronger partnership with UNDP that is more productive and is based on principles such as mutual accountability and transparency. To maximize programme success, partnerships need to focus on people who are affected directly, and involve them in a meaningful way in programme design and decision-making processes.
- Most Liberians now realize that there is a need for the national government and its functions to be more decentralized. Direct beneficiaries told us that it is very important to galvanize the willingness of the people to reach out to each other and to participate

in democratic processes. This would enhance durable peace in the country. Obviously the rule of law is also vital for democratic governance and lasting peace.

- Last but not least, another significant lesson was the need to address the problem that Liberians in powerful positions sometimes marginalize their own people. Therefore, in efforts to build capacity, emphasis also needs to be placed on inspiring humility, dignity, acceptance, love and respect for all fellow citizens, especially among Liberians in situations of power.

## 7. Building capacity for HIV/AIDS response

The assignment of this evaluation was to assess the core UNDP HIV/AIDS programme and not the Global Fund. At the beginning of 2004, an effective response to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS in Liberia had not been developed, although medical professionals were alerting the public at large about the dangers of HIV/AIDS to Liberia's public health and socio-economic development. On the other hand, there seems to have been less awareness of the role of rampant sexual and gender-based violence in facilitating the spread of HIV/AIDS. In addition, endemic poverty has forced many Liberian children and adolescents into commercial sex work (WatchList 2004). Concerns over the threat posed by the lack of an effective response to the pandemic claimed the attention of the Government of Liberia, UNDP and the international community.

The stigma of HIV/AIDS in Liberia is a major problem, which affects even the medical profession. Most doctors and clinicians shy away from the field because of the associated stigma. According to a government source, only four to five doctors are involved in HIV/AIDS treatment at the national level. What should be the doctors' work is therefore handled by physician assistants who are not adequately trained.

In order to appreciate the change in the response to HIV/AIDS from 2004 to 2007, the evaluation team engaged stakeholders and requested their candid and critical reflection. The quantitative results of the survey are presented in Figures 15 and 16.





Figure 15. Stakeholder survey results for HIV/AIDS programme

With regard to Figures 15 and 16, we regret that the donors familiar with the programme could not be interviewed due to time constraints. While infected and non-infected caregivers were also interviewed, infected adults tended to refuse interviews, no doubt because of a feeling of stigma and shame. The majority of these beneficiaries of the programme were young children, students and young people who had lost their parents. Arranging interviews with beneficiaries of the HIV/AIDS programme was especially difficult. We had to carefully engage their counsellors and caregivers with whom the beneficiaries had developed a relationship of comfort and trust. We were impressed by the courage and commitment of these counsellors in caring for HIV/AIDS victims. Most our interviewees were too young to have a solid understanding of and reliable information on the complexities of HIV/AIDS, and it was difficult to acquire usable data from them. The beneficiaries of the HIV/AIDS programme had little or nothing to say about peace, security or MDGs. .



**Figure 16. Survey results by stakeholder group for HIV/AIDS programme**

## 7.1 HIV – Design and relevance

A report on strengthening the HIV/AIDS service delivery system in Liberia (Johnson et al. 2005) drew urgent attention to the worsening condition characterizing the HIV/AIDS crisis in Liberia. The study highlighted the “lack of HIV/AIDS research infrastructure, including organizational structure, linkages, leadership, expertise, resources and policies and procedures”. It was against this background, that the UNDP HIV/AIDS programme was designed to develop policy, support service delivery, promote awareness and reduce stigma. The evaluation team applauds UNDP’s particular focus on helping Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs).



The major design flaw was the allocation of insufficient financial resources. Another shortcoming was that the programme design mostly favoured people living in urban rather than rural areas.

As evidenced in Figures 15 and 16, the average opinion of various respondent groups was agreement that the HIV/AIDS programme was relevant, with the direct beneficiaries agreeing the most.

The HIV/AIDS programme was considered important because it dealt with the low level of awareness regarding the pandemic, as well as the non-use or poor use of preventive methods. Even though healthcare practitioners indicated that there were improvements as a result of the programme intervention, the desire was expressed to design an improved HIV/AIDS programme to better enhance awareness, community involvement, service to the counties (some of which are inaccessible) and government commitment (which, during the programme period, was regarded as “negligible”).

An important new report (Walker 2009) highlights the under-examined risks of HIV/AIDS in humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict transition, and makes ten recommendations for designing more integrated HIV/AIDS programmes in post-conflict situations:

1. *Align HIV/AIDS and sexual violence prevention and response. Urgent recognition must be given to... sexual violence as a physiological and social factor in risk transmission.*
2. *Develop command-centred approaches to HIV prevention and AIDS treatment and care in the uniformed services. Emphasize military responsibility for HIV/AIDS policy development and implementation.*
3. *Integrate HIV prevention and response into the design and command of peace support operations... address the heightened risk of HIV and AIDS during post-conflict peace-building.*
4. *Integrate HIV and AIDS prevention and response into DDR programmes.*
5. *Reframe the testing debate... [in favour of a more balanced dialogue regarding mandatory testing in the armed forces and concerns for individual human rights].*
6. *Integrate HIV prevention and response into policing and law enforcement... especially in relation to stigmatized and criminalized activities [that] influence the trajectory of... epidemics.*
7. *Increase focus on HIV and AIDS across borders, and in relationship to traffic and trade.*
8. *Increase continuity of HIV and AIDS responses during conflict transitions... paying attention to a variety of gender-related factors... The linkages between psychosocial recovery and HIV risk are among the most under-explored.*
9. *Address HIV and AIDS in fragile states: strengthen local government, community and family care arrangements.*
10. *Rethink the tools of measurement. ... There is a need for more finely tuned indicators and approaches that are sensitive to these social and gender dimensions, especially in situations of... post-conflict transformation... consider local variations in sexuality and violence.*

Comments from respondents on the design and relevance of the HIV/AIDS programme include the following:

*The programme area responded to the priority issues of the country from 2004 to 2007, yet there were lots of bottlenecks in the implementation process.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Liberia is very dependant. This programme also supports this dependency. We need to focus on the development phase and help the people to do it on their own.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*We did not have a good exit strategy. No needs assessments were conducted before starting the programme. So beneficiaries want to learn different skills, but we provide them with what is available.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*There is need for more awareness, more community involvement.*

- Government

## **7.2 HIV – Partnership strategy**

Between 2004 and 2007, UNDP, with the support of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, entered into a partnership with the Liberian Government in order to improve the response to the HIV/AIDS crisis in the country. Private health services (e.g. Catholic Hospital, ELWA Hospital, and Firestone Health Service) were also brought into the partnership. Through analysis of UNDP's relationship with beneficiaries and implementing partners, it is clear that partnership arrangements evolved and improved over the programme period.

As shown in Figure 16, opinions of the stakeholder groups differed markedly regarding the effectiveness of UNDP's partnership strategy, with beneficiaries and CSOs agreeing, and government and UNDP disagreeing. The government also expressed appreciation for UNDP's role in managing donor support from the Global Fund, but desired a stronger leadership role and greater responsibility.

*The partnership approach from 2004 to 2007 was effective in that there was a proper reporting system and quarterly review meetings during which time issues relevant to the implementation of the programme were addressed and action taken to enhance... implementation.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*Our understanding of partnership is where you have proper coordination and collaboration. It is only now that we have procedures. Earlier, we only received instruction to do things. Part of the problem is that the Ministry of Health gave certain international institutions the go-ahead to undertake activities without reference to the relevant programme arm.*

- Government

*During the period, the programme had no strategy for partnership. So there was overlapping of functions and poor coordination.*

- Government

### **7.3 HIV – Programme effectiveness**

The HIV/AIDS programme was intended to achieve two outcomes: 1) to promote HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, and 2) to develop strategies to prevent the spread and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS.

Available baseline information from before the programme started, indicated: an increase in the spread of HIV/AIDS (8.2 per cent prevalence rate with an upward trend); a poor framework for policy implementation; low capacity of government and private health institutions to address the pandemic; very high stigma towards carriers of the virus; poor awareness of the pandemic, and a poor campaign against it.

When it was conceived, the HIV/AIDS programme was basically aimed at: policy development; awareness campaigns to promote behaviour change; building the capacity of counsellors in prevention; care and treatment; and reducing the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS. The implementation of the programme facilitated: the preparation of the national HIV/AIDS policy, guidelines and legislation; decentralization of HIV/AIDS intervention programmes; the promotion of information, education and communication (IEC) programmes and behaviour change communication (BCC) strategies. One of the posters produced by the programme to raise awareness and change behaviour is illustrated in Figure 26 (Annex 8).

The behaviour change campaign brought awareness to and changed attitudes of some Liberians, leading to decline in stigma, while improved treatment and care prolonged the lives of beneficiaries. According to government sources, where once people hesitated to get tested, by the end of the programme cycle in 2007, some people were voluntarily taking tests to determine their HIV status.

By 2007, a policy had been formulated and concrete actions started, but the National AIDS/STD Control Program (NACP) lacked capacity to fully execute its mandate. Nevertheless, the programme registered some positive developments, such as an active campaign to combat HIV/AIDS, and improvement in the capacities of some public and private institutions in fighting HIV/AIDS.

Progress towards intended outcomes was made during the programme period, including the following results:

- ✓ increased awareness about HIV/AIDS
- ✓ reduced stigma
- ✓ reduced mortality rate
- ✓ improved prevention, treatment and care
- ✓ increase in the number of testing centres, from three at the beginning (all located in private health facilities in Monrovia and Firestone) to 89 (extended to other parts of the country) by the end of the programme.

Nevertheless, the Liberian Government still today views HIV/AIDS as a serious problem facing the entire society, where everyone is either infected or affected. However, providing fully effective service delivery is still a challenge for the NACP. At the time of the evaluation, some treatment centres still did not have counsellors. Behaviour change remains a top priority. As is the case elsewhere, sensitization, training and psychosocial support are crucial elements for changing risky behaviour.

As shown in Figures 15 and 16, there was general agreement that the programme achieved its desired outcomes between 2004 and 2007, with direct beneficiaries agreeing most strongly about the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS programme.

*In 2004, the whole HIV/AIDS community was stigmatized. Before people used to point fingers; this stopped in 2007. One of the reasons for this is the massive awareness programme. Also, one way or another everyone in Liberia is either infected or affected – so people put their fingers down.*

- CSO / NGO / PS

*If we look at the indicators in terms of implementation, they were carried out [by] expanding services. But in terms of behaviour change, no!*

- Government

*In the time period, 2004 to 2006, Liberia had just come out of war and... the [HIV] programme achieved results.*

- Government

#### **7.4 HIV – Programme efficiency**

As shown in Figure 4 and Table 2, the HIV/AIDS programme spent almost USD 1.2 million over four years, accounting for only one per cent of overall programme expenditure. The average annual expenditure for the HIV/AIDS programme was slightly less than USD 298,000.

Only 6 per cent of the funds spent on the HIV/AIDS programme were provided by other donors; 94 per cent of the funding came from UNDP core funds – the highest proportion of core funds among all the strategic programme areas (Figure 8 and Annex 7).

The programme managed to spend 89 per cent of its budget over the four years, making this programme the second most efficient in terms of spending after the DDDR programme (Figure 7).

When we asked stakeholders for their perspectives on programme efficiency, beneficiaries, government and CSOs all tended to agree that the programme had achieved results at a reasonable cost (Figure 16), with the beneficiaries agreeing more strongly. UNDP respondents, on the other hand, disagreed strongly. UNDP saw that more resources were being injected into the programme in Liberia than was the case in most developing countries.

UNDP respondents specifically made reference to the high cost of training and the additional costs associated bringing drugs into the country.

Although the programme made achievements, it was hampered by a lack of capacity in terms of human resources and essential facilities. Both the government and CSOs were faced with constraints in programme implementation.

*The help that we are getting is very important. Where would we have been today if it was not for the assistance? Only God knows.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*We achieved a lot from 2004 to 2007. But we do not have enough counsellors. We could have done so much more if had we more staff.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The assumptions made to estimate need led to an overestimation. Accordingly, drugs were purchased without taking into consideration the actual numbers of the HIV/AIDS population and their particular needs. This led to waste, as some unused drugs expired.*

- Government

## **7.5 HIV – Degree of change**

### **7.5.1 Impact on peace and security**

Since most of the young beneficiaries had lost their parents, the free treatment, educational support, feeding, care giving, and awareness that they received in the programme gave them a sense of increased peace and security. The beneficiaries we talked with expressed no views on the issues of peace and security and MDGs. The majority of the young people interviewed did not understand the intricate link between the programme and the issue of peace and security. The few infected mothers and caregivers among the interviewees never spoke to the issue.

As evidenced in Figure 16, however, government, CSO and UNDP respondents tended to agree that the programme area enhanced peace and security from 2004 to 2007.

*The programme area enhanced peace and security in Liberia to some extent in that OVCs were free from strife, and safety was provided for enhancing their livelihoods.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

### **7.5.2 Contribution to MDGs**

Regarding contribution by the HIV/AIDS programme to the MDGs, the evaluation team focused on successes in the areas of poverty reduction and the delivery of social services (e.g. education and health). In response to the question “From 2004 to 2007, did the HIV/AIDS

programme make a substantial contribution to the MDGs?”, CSOs respondents agreed, while government and UNDP respondents had somewhat more mixed views.

Respondents considered poverty a major obstacle in the fight against HIV/AIDS. CSOs stressed that most OVCs live in unhealthy conditions. In particular, those in rural areas lack the basic necessities of life: clothing, shelter, food, shoes, text books and an avenue for recreation. CSO respondents felt that the OVC programme certainly contributed to the MDGs by providing these orphans and vulnerable children with medical support, school fees, test books, and training for independence and self-reliance.

*[The programme provided] assistance with education, counselling, hospital, and feeding. Now we have no mothers and no fathers.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The awareness we have provided has increased security. People feel safer when they are protected from AIDS.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*[When we consider] poverty reduction, we are still far from there yet. There is no programme to empower people with productive skills. Talk about poverty reduction is still theory.*

- Government

## **7.6 HIV – Most significant change**

While all of the positive developments arising from the HIV/AIDS response could not be measured exactly, there was during the programme period some degree of behaviour change, a decline in stigma, and a reduction in the mortality rate, especially in the urban centres. This was due to several factors, including better equipped laboratory facilities, better infrastructure, improved testing and the application of appropriate treatment, improved care for beneficiaries and the awareness campaign. The support from the Global Fund also provided incentives for caregivers and the CSOs working with HIV/AIDS. During the interviews, government and other implementing partners attributed these achievements to the Global Fund and UNDP.

In rural areas on the other hand stigma and a high level of denial are still widespread. Concerns were expressed that poverty and the continuing fight for survival were leading to the ongoing increase in infection and re-infection.

*The mortality rate from AIDS has gone down. We now have drugs for HIV/AIDS. The case load we had has dropped. Now we have improved on knowing what kind of HIV/AIDS there are, and we now supply appropriate drugs.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The [most significant change is the] development of people's knowledge against the spread of HIV in Liberia. Through the effect of this programme area, people have turned away from their misbeliefs as regards the existence of HIV/AIDS.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*There has been change in level of service delivery. Functioning sites have been extended to other counties. Where we had few (three) testing centres and all located at private health facilities, we now have over 89 testing and counselling centres all over Liberia.*

- Government

## **7.7 HIV – Sustainability**

The programme targeted infected and affected adults, children and caregivers. The evaluation team interviewed mostly teenagers and younger boys and girls. From the point of view of the young beneficiaries, caregivers, national institutions, social workers, national service providers and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), the sustainability of the HIV/AIDS programme is not possible without continued outside intervention. This is clearly evidenced in Figure 16.

During the programme period, no sustainability mechanism had been put in place for the HIV/AIDS programme. For example, there was no phase-out strategy that would remove beneficiaries from the programme. This is particularly difficult as many of the beneficiaries are orphans.

Respondents from several stakeholder groups stressed the problem that Liberia is very dependent on outside aid. The GoL allocated no funding to combat HIV/AIDS. In addition, national capacity and support were very weak.

*We have no mothers and no fathers. We will not make it on our own. Without support, there will be nobody to pay the school fees.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Liberia is very dependant. Obviously, the programme also supports this dependency. There is a need to focus on the development phase and help the people to do it on their own.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*There has been no sustainability mechanism put in place for the programme area... The programme areas still depended on donor funds for support in 2008.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*We still have more to do and we need a lot of understanding and support. There are still many people out there infecting others and re-infecting themselves.*

- Government

## **7.8 HIV – Strengths and weaknesses**

### **7.8.1 Strengths**

Among the most important strengths of the programme were:

- ✓ the co-financing approach
- ✓ the good partnership between donors and other stakeholders – both local and international
- ✓ the strong awareness programme for people increasingly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS
- ✓ the support for the integration of Orphans and Vulnerable Children into extended families
- ✓ the free treatment, payment of school fees, and feeding of young beneficiaries
- ✓ the drug supply and improved testing-kits
- ✓ the human resource training.

### 7.8.2 Weaknesses

Amid these strengths, a number of weaknesses were also observed in the programme:

- ✘ the lack of an exit strategy including persuading the government to do its share in combating HIV/AIDS in Liberia
- ✘ no mechanism for young beneficiaries to become self-sufficient
- ✘ difficult partnership with the GoL because of: a lack of political will, inadequate government funding and an over-dependence on donors, poor national capacity and slow response at the National AIDS Commission (NAC), poor planning and data collection
- ✘ partnerships hindered by poor coordination by UNDP and its bureaucratic procedures – although respondents observed that by the end of 2007, there had been some improvement in this
- ✘ inadequate funding to fully implement the core programme areas for OVCs
- ✘ lack of requisite laboratory facilities and, where they were available, inability of lab technicians to repair and maintain equipment
- ✘ insufficient logistics
- ✘ poor coordination resulting in parallel responses to the same problems because some institutions did not go through the responsible national institutions
- ✘ inadequate staff to implement the programme
- ✘ the absence of sufficient psychosocial counselling and the inadequacy of counsellors in some facilities – this is important because some of the drugs are hard for patients to handle, and clients' reactions to them are often problematic
- ✘ inadequate monitoring, supervision and oversight by UNDP.

Another problem was the low incentives for health workers, though this is the responsibility of the government and private health care providers. At the same time, UNDP should be concerned that healthcare workers are not paid sufficiently, as this does affect the ultimate success of the programme.

*[The programme did] not [have] enough national commitment. There is lack of political will. The programme is under-funded from the government of Liberia side. The response to HIV/AIDS is low in government.*

- Government



## **7.9 HIV – Lessons learned**

Among the most important lessons learned were the following:

- Obviously, effective partnerships are crucial to programme success. This is well known but remains problematic far too often.
- Effective response and additional programme successes will largely be dependent on the political will and commitment of the government.
- Co-financing is an effective approach to programme implementation.
- In order for results to be sustainable, those who are infected and/or affected by HIV/AIDS should be brought further into the programme focus and, strategies should be developed to enable beneficiaries to eventually take responsibility for themselves.
- Adequate counselling is an essential component to improve and prolong the lives of OVCs.
- To address the problem of denial, a good strategy is to mobilize and persuade those affected by HIV/AIDS to get directly involved in the advocacy work for behaviour change.

## **8. Human rights / protection / gender**

Violence against women has been called the most pervasive yet least recognized human rights abuse in the world (UNFPA 2009). It is estimated that 90 per cent of Liberian women have been victims of violence, and 75 per cent have been raped (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2008). Worse still, the age group most affected by rape is girls aged 10 to 14 (UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, personal communication). Although the new government has designed campaigns to break taboos concerning SGBV, violence against women and girls is a cultural norm that is proving very difficult to change. It is against this backdrop of the extraordinary ongoing violence today against women and girls in Liberia that the UNDP Human Rights / Protection and Gender Programme must be assessed.

Liberia has ratified most the major international human rights instruments (UNDP 2007):

- International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – in 1950
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination – in 1976
- Convention on the Rights of the Child – in 1993.
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – in 1984
- Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour – in 2000
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – in 2004

- International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – in 2004
- Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – in 2004.

Liberian women received the right to vote and to stand for office in 1946.

Liberia faces major challenges in gender disparities and in pervasive sexual and gender-based violence. Liberia's women and children are negatively impacted in terms of living standards, education, and health – especially HIV/AIDS. HIV prevalence rates among people aged 15-49 are 1.2% for men and 1.8% for women (GoL 2007). Many Liberian women and girls are unskilled and are under-employed in the informal sector; very few are employed in the formal sector. The situation in Liberia exposes women and girls to the chronic ills of ignorance, abject poverty, domestic and gender-based violence, rape, incest, illicit sex and prostitution.

Before 2003, women in Liberia married under customary law did not enjoy the same rights as women married under statutory law. The law discriminated against traditional women: they had no right to own property, could not inherit the property of their deceased husbands, and could not share property after divorce. A great advance was the passage of the Inheritance Law in October 2003; however, most women in Liberia had no knowledge of their new rights. An awareness programme was needed to inform women of the new law so that they could benefit from it. UNDP played a strong role in the passage of the Inheritance Law, and made raising awareness on the new law a priority for its 2004-2007 programme.

Domestic slavery is another issue confronting women in Liberia, especially in the hinterlands. In subsistence farming, women do most of the work. In traditional societies in Liberia, early marriage is widely practiced, and husbands are imposed on very young girls as a way of life. Confessions of all sorts are extracted from women under extreme pressure by their husbands.


Following the end of the 2004-2007 programme, the human rights situation in Liberia continues to be a cause for concern. According to the 2008 Human Rights Report for Liberia (US Department of State 2009):

- *Widespread child abuse continued, and reports of sexual violence against children increased during the year [2008]. CSOs reported increased incidence of rape of girls under 12.*
- *The government took no action against female genital mutilation (FGM) during the year... Victims of FGM died from the procedure.*
- *Young women and girls engaged in prostitution for money, food, and school fees... There were still many children who lived on the streets... Young women and children were at a particularly high risk for trafficking.*
- *Nearly all children had witnessed atrocities during the 14-year civil war, and some children had committed atrocities.*
- *Violence against women, including rape, was a problem, and domestic violence was widespread.*


It is well known that the severity and incidence of domestic violence often increases in the aftermath of disasters, including war (IASC 2005).

As shown above in Figure 4 and Table 2 in section 3.4, the HRPG programme amounted to only 2.4 per cent of the overall UNDP Liberia programme from 2004 to 2007, as measured by programme expenditure.

For the HRPG programme, the evaluation team interviewed 72 respondents, and was able to obtain quantitative data from 66 of them, including: 52 direct beneficiaries (all women), nine respondents from CSOs, and three from government. We obtained quantitative responses from one donor and one person from UNDP, so no generalizations can be made about these two respondent groups for HRPG.



**Figure 17. Stakeholder survey results for Human Rights, Protection and Gender programme**



**Figure 18. Survey results by stakeholder group for HRPG programme**

The responses to the quantitative questions for the HRPG programme are presented in Figures 17 and 18. With such a strong representation of beneficiaries in the sample, the overall results in Figure 17 are heavily weighted towards this respondent group.

### **8.1 HRPG – Design and relevance**

According to the Country Programme Outline 2003-2005 (UNDP Liberia, no date-a), enhanced human rights protection was identified as one of the intended results of the programme, but initially HRPG was not specifically developed as part of the Country Programme. It was, however, mainstreamed into the other strategic programme area.

In the CPO Extension for Liberia 2004-2006 (UNDP Liberia, no date-b), Promotion of human rights and the rule of law was one of three key areas under Good Governance. UNDP activities were to:

- contribute to the capacity of security forces on protection issues
- strengthen the capacity of selected human rights organizations
- support human rights education
- support: preparation of a report on sexual and gender-based violence, mapping human rights violations, and the establishment and operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
- support, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), to address gender and related issues.

The strategies and activities of the HRPG programme evolved during its implementation from 2004 to 2007. Work with the UNDP HRPG management unit enabled the evaluation team to identify the intended outcome and outputs of the programme, its indicators and baseline status (see Annexes 5 and 6).

As shown in Figure 18, there was agreement among beneficiaries, CSOs and government that the design of the HRPG programme was relevant to Liberia's priorities, with the beneficiaries being the most appreciative.

During the programme period, UNDP's approach to promoting women's rights became increasingly coordinated and visible. UNDP did well to count on the experience and expertise of the CSOs that implemented the HRPG programme to prioritize their activities based on their knowledge of human rights priorities in the country.

As mentioned above in section 7.1, urgent recognition must be given to sexual violence as a factor in risk transmission in HIV/AIDS. The prevention of sexual violence and the prevention of HIV/AIDS must be more closely aligned, and preventing sexual violence should be central to HIV/AIDS strategies in environments affected by conflict (Walker 2009).

We also stressed above in section 4.1 the importance of designing DDRR programmes to ensure the prevention of all forms of violence, particularly against women and children.

The major design flaw was that insufficient funds were raised and allocated to this critically important programme. The HRPG programme also suffered from a lack of follow-up, and solutions for this should have been anticipated in the programme design.

*We said to UNDP that the time was too short, and the money too small.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*It is like you raise hopes and dash them. For example, women tell their sad stories [to the TRC], but then what next? You do nothing about them!*

- CSO/NGO/PS

## **8.2 HRPG – Partnership strategy**

UNDP worked in partnership with both government and civil society to implement the HRPG programme. The major government partners were the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Gender and Development. UNDP encouraged national NGOs and created an umbrella NGO for organizations working on human rights, the Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia. As shown in Figure 18, government and CSOs generally agreed, and direct beneficiaries strongly agreed that UNDP had an effective partnership strategy for the programme.

On the other hand, one CSO felt that UNDP was dictating the amount of the grants without taking into account the realities on the ground, nor the views of the implementing CSO. Another CSO stressed that UNDP will need to improve on the timely disbursement of project funds if the HRPG programme is to achieve its objectives.

In addition, one donor respondent pointed out that there had been poor cooperation from the judicial system and from the Liberian National Police.

Overall, however support from partners was critical to the success of the programme.

The challenges of working to promote human rights in Liberia are immense. A tragic case in point is that of Zubah Mulbah, a young police officer assigned to Zorzor in Lofa County, who facilitated a number of workshops for the HRPG programme, and who paid with his life for his efforts to address violations of human rights, particularly those of women and youth. He was allegedly murdered in 2007, and the perpetrators have still not been brought to justice. This is one example of the courage of those engaged in the daunting, and sometimes dangerous, task of confronting certain harmful traditions in order to advance and protect the human rights of all Liberians.

## **8.3 HRPG – Programme effectiveness**

According to UNDP annual reports (UNDP Liberia 2004a-2007a), many HRPG activities were carried out during the programme period, including:

- ✓ educating male ex-combatants on human rights, child protection and gender issues

- ✓ joint (international / national) teams to monitor the human rights situation in IDP camps
- ✓ training of cantonment site security forces, ex-combatants and civil society on human rights issues
- ✓ strong support to the TRC process to make accountable those who committed war crimes, including drafting the TRC Act, its passage into law, developing simple materials to raise public awareness on the TRC Act, and strengthening the TRC process through the “Mapping of Conflict” project, which gathered over 13,000 testimonies of human rights abuses and SGBV during the conflict
- ✓ a nine-month training course for 70 Liberian human rights workers
- ✓ support to the development of the National Action Plan on Gender
- ✓ completion of a study, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), on SGBV
- ✓ advanced training for members of the Human Rights and Protection Forum on: monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, international humanitarian law, SGBV, refugee law, protection of children and IDPs, and an overview of the Liberian constitution
- ✓ raising awareness on human rights during the 2005 campaigning period prior to the elections
- ✓ training Liberian journalists in Monrovia and Zwedru on human rights issues
- ✓ development, together with Oxfam and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, of a training module on human rights targeting aid workers, NGOs and CSOs
- ✓ continued support to the Independent National Commission on Human Rights
- ✓ training, together with UNMIL, of correctional officers in human rights
- ✓ research on traditional forms of reconciliation in support of the peace and reconciliation process
- ✓ implementation of a project to prevent sexual exploitation by humanitarian workers
- ✓ support to Zorzor District Women Care (ZODWOCA), a local NGO, to raise awareness on and monitor SGBV in the Zorzor and Salaya Districts of Lofa County, and to the Liberia Women Media Action Committee (LIWOMAC)
- ✓ support to the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) to promote the Inheritance Act, and to prosecute cases of rape
- ✓ micro-finance and micro-credit support to over 2250 women in Cooperative Credit Unions (CCUs) in seven districts in Bong and Nimba counties.

The intended outcome of the HRPG programme was increased awareness and recognition of human rights, protection and gender issues. According to the opinions of those interviewed (Figure 18), beneficiaries, CSOs and government representatives agreed on average that the HRPG programme achieved its desired outcome from 2004 to 2007, with the beneficiaries having the most positive views.

However, closer examination of the programme indicators (Annexes 5 and 6) would suggest that the results of the programme were mixed. The biggest success was in advocacy work: from a low level of advocacy activities in 2003, the programme period saw the development of strong advocacy work by local and international organizations in 2007. Support to the TRC

process was also achieved, although not throughout the country during the period under review; the TRC process is still ongoing.

On the other hand, increasing government capacity to address human rights and protection issues remains problematic, primarily because of the continued low capacity, weakness and corruption of the judicial system. Likewise, nowhere near enough progress was made in reducing the incidence of human rights violations, especially sexual and gender-based violence. Violations were widespread before the start of the programme, and although some progress has been made, a high incidence of human rights violations remains a disturbing reality throughout the country despite the outreach of human rights education programmes to the general public. This would imply that the HRPG strategy would need to change dramatically if the respect of human rights is to become a reality in Liberia.

*The men never used to talk to the women. Some are learning how to talk to us now... The poverty rate is reducing slowly. Women's behaviours have improved. Most women here now understand their rights through these workshops.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The money [from the micro-credit programme] has helped us to make gardens and send our children to school. My business has also helped to keep me and my husband together.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Women felt that they will be arrested if they talk, or their husband will beat them. We were able to go in the rural areas to encourage women to come and tell their stories [to the TRC]... We also trained statement takers for the TRC process.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*Before, we were facing many challenges in Lofa. Ritualistic killings and rapes are now declining... We talked to women about the inheritance bill. Women now know about their rights. Male and female children were not treated the same before. The male child had a right to own property, while the female child had no rights. We told them that if a male child could own property, then the female child also had right to own properties. Under our traditional laws, women were properties to their husbands. Our mothers and sisters have been victimized by that. So women married the traditional way could not claim their husband's properties after death. If a man dies, his family could say that the women should marry a brother... Women are now able to speak about their rights. It is a gradual process to change those traditional beliefs. We are making a difference.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

#### **8.4 HRPG – Programme efficiency**

Over the programme period, 2004-2007, the HRPG programme spent a total of USD 2.6 million out of a budget of USD 3.8 million (Annex 7). At a 69 per cent expenditure rate, the HRPG programme performed less well than all the other strategic programme areas, with the exception of Democratic Governance (Figure 7). The first year of the programme was funded entirely by UNDP, and funds from other donors were raised for 2005-2007. Annual

expenditures were relatively constant (Figure 5), with an average annual expenditure of approximately USD 650,000. UNDP core funds accounted for 59 per cent of the total programme expenditure (Figure 8). The HRPG programme amounted to only 2.4 per cent of the overall UNDP Programme in terms of total expenditure (Table 2 and Figure 4 in section 3.4 above).

Given the dearth of data, it is not possible to make a definitive assessment of the efficiency of the HRPG programme. The opinions of the respondent groups were mixed on this question (Figure 18). When asked to what extent they agreed that the HRPG programme achieved results at a reasonable cost: the CSOs implementing the programme responded on average between disagree and neutral; the government respondents between neutral and agree; and the beneficiaries strongly agreed. The qualitative data we collected reflected this divergence of views. The beneficiaries of the micro-credit projects felt that they were able to do a tremendous amount with a small amount of funding. However CSOs implementing projects on women's human rights, gender and support for women's participation in the TRC as well as those building awareness on the Inheritance Law, said that the funding provided was far from adequate for the job at hand. One of the donors complained of wasted investments. The HRPG Unit at UNDP, however, felt that the programme had achieved far more than the spending would indicate.

As with the other strategic programme areas, there were problems with delays in the disbursement of funds, which negatively impacted programme delivery, causing some projects to start over a year late.

*UNDP will have to improve its bureaucracy. Those who implement UNDP projects always complain of delay in disbursement of project funds. This usually leads to delays in project implementation.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The... programme to build awareness on women's rights... was very much under-funded.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The project was extended and will be completed in 2009 with a certain cost overrun. There was poor cooperation with Liberian National Police, particularly on the use and the funding of the running of the facilities. Hundreds of thousands of dollars in investments for generators are rusting away due to lack of funds for fuel.*

- Donor

## 8.5 HRPG – Degree of change

### 8.5.1 Impact on peace and security

In Liberia peace and security are very different issues for women than they are for men. Women are still exceedingly vulnerable (to beatings, other violence and rape), and they still desperately need protection.



All respondent groups agreed, and the direct beneficiaries strongly agreed, that “The HRPG programme area enhanced peace and security in Liberia from 2004 to 2007” (Figure 18). The results have indeed been laudable in improving peace and security for women in the areas where the programme has been active. What is lacking, however, is data on how many women have been reached by the HRPG programme with respect to the total number of Liberian women. The disturbing reality is that in most of Liberia, violence against women and girls is still endemic. Two of the weak links, even where the HRPG programme has been active, are the corrupt and weak police and judiciary systems. Although improving gradually, cultural taboos and traditions remain a major challenge to overcome.

Where it has been active, the HRPG programme has had a positive impact on peace and security for women and girls by: making women aware of their human rights; empowering women economically; educating women about their property rights; breaking down the barriers of tribalism; and supporting the TRC process, a key mechanism for peace in Liberia. Many women and girls are now advocating for their own rights and protection. The impact of the programme on the lives of poor women is brought to life in the smiles of the beneficiaries of one of the micro-loan programmes in Lofa County (Figure 27, Annex 8).

*I have a question mark there. Police are not taking good care of us. When a person commits a crime and you take them to the police, nothing happens. The police only care about money.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Our solidarity group is helping us. We don't ask people their tribes. When any of our members have a need, we all pull together to help them.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*You know, we are awakening the consciousness of society, including men... Once Liberians understand women's protection and awareness issues, there will be peace... We were empowering women in Liberia. When you educate women about their property rights you empower them economically.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*Presently women and women's organizations are holding dialogues around the TRC, focusing on how the process can effectively address women's issues and how they (women) can contribute to peace-building, especially at the community level.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

### 8.5.2 Contribution to MDGs

The HRPG programme is intended to make a substantial contribution to Millennium Development Goal 3 in Liberia: promoting gender equality and empowering women.

As shown in Figure 18, the direct beneficiaries strongly agreed that the HRPG programme made a substantial contribution to the Millennium Development Goals in Liberia, whereas CSOs and government respondents fell just short of agreeing.

Again the major question is one of scale. The programme did contribute to reducing poverty for many of the 2,250 women targeted by the micro-credit and micro-finance projects. How this translates into poverty reduction for Liberian women in general is another question.

*With the money, I have built a house. I have nine children and everybody is going to school.*  
- Direct Beneficiary

*There was some impact made. Not substantially. Poverty is very high in Liberia. The rich are becoming richer and the poor are getting poorer.*  
- CSO/NGO/PS

*The MDGs, among several things, require support for women's participation, access to information, education and human rights protection, and the projects carried out directly and indirectly responded to these requirements.*  
- CSO/NGO/PS

Although changes in gender-sensitive MDG indicators in Liberia cannot be attributed to the UNDP HRPG programme, it is interesting to note the evolution of these indicators from 2002 to 2007 (Table 4). While excellent progress was made in improving the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education in Liberia, achievement of the other gender-sensitive MDG targets by 2015 remains unlikely (girls' net enrolment in primary education; literacy rate; proportion of women in Parliament; and especially maternal mortality ratio).

**Table 4. Evolution of gender-sensitive MDG indicators 2002-2007** (Source: GoL 2008b)

MDG Indicator	2015 Target	Status in 2002	Status in 2007	Likelihood of Achievement
Girls' net enrolment ratio in primary education	100%	14.5%	37.1%	Unlikely
Ratio of girls to boys in primary education	100%	59.2%	93%	Likely
Ratio of girls to boys in secondary education	100%	69.5%	84%	Likely
Literacy rate of females aged 15-24	100%	(data unavailable)	64.7%	Unlikely
Proportion of seats held by women in Parliament	25%	11%	14%	Unlikely
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births	140	1,370 (2000)	994	Unlikely

## 8.6 HRPG – Most significant change

When we asked stakeholders: "Thinking about all the effects that the HRPG programme had from 2004 to 2007, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all?" – a number of extraordinary stories emerged, for example:

*The men were not holding us good. Some men have changed, while others have refused to change. Women and youths are together. But the men are still not with us... There is also the issue of compensation of women for their work. For example, I am the chief of the women in this region. I don't get compensated, while the men get compensated.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*Before the workshops, people used to take their friends to court. Now, conflict is being resolved through mediation amongst our members.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*When we meet in a forum nowadays, the women are highly respected by the men – today the men allow us to take independent decisions as women and then share our views with them before a final decision is taken. In the past, a girl child didn't own property – today we have learned that a girl child can own property. Husbands use to beat their wives – this has stopped today – men are taxed to pay fines if they beat their wives.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*[Our] engagement with women inspired security and confidence in the TRC process. This led to a massive turnout of women before TRC. It was hard to get women in Lofa County to talk. Some complained of living under threat by the same husbands who victimized them in the war. For example, one complained of having been raped at 13 years of age by a rebel general to whom she later gave birth to four children. Fear of the general made it difficult for her to accept meeting the TRC. Some girls were made women before their time, and had children for combatants. This experience led to advising the TRC to arrange confidential hearings in camera.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*Women are now vocal and know about their rights. For example, Korbu Senneh has learned from our workshops, and is now the chief in the entire region. Women could not hold this position before. Women are also reporting rape cases. You could not hear this before because of the stigma. When women are victims of rape, they could contract diseases and unwanted pregnancies. We taught them to stand up and report these cases.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*[When] Liberia was emerging from war, human rights violations were the norm, not the exception, particularly in the IDP camps. Their basic needs were denied and violated. Because of these violations in the IDP camps, this unit was set up. This is important because human rights are protected and promoted.*

- UNDP

## **8.7 HRPG – Sustainability**

All respondent groups, with the exception of UNDP, disagreed that the results of the HRPG programme from 2004 to 2007 were sustainable during 2008 without further support (Figures 17 and 18). Since the beneficiaries unanimously strongly disagreed, the overall score for this respondent group was 0, and does not show in Figure 18. In the comparative results of the

different strategic programme areas (Figure 21), the HRPG programme scored the lowest of all in views on the sustainability of the programme.

Beneficiaries felt strongly that they needed further support. In particular, beneficiaries of the micro-credit projects felt they needed more help; beneficiaries of the project to address gender-based violence in the Zorzor District (Lofa County) felt they needed more workshops in GBV.

CSOs criticized the programme design, which they said did not help the implementing organizations to stand on their own. CSOs also recognized that the task of educating women about their rights is far from complete. One of the donors also flagged sustainability as a problem.

On the other hand, with the exception of the direct beneficiaries, other respondent groups also had positive comments about the sustainability of the HRPG work, as shown in some of the direct quotations below.

*With gender we have come so far, we cannot go back.*

- Government

*The project supporting women's participation in the TRC process has been sustained in that women have taken responsibility to ensure their qualitative participation. That was not the case with previous projects.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*We still need more awareness and education for women. They are still in the backseat, still scared.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The donors do not give institutional support that leads to sustainability. They usually do not support projects to stand on their own. This is very important.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

## **8.8 HRPG – Strengths and weaknesses**

### **8.8.1 Strengths**

One of the fundamental strengths of the HRPG programme was the commitment by UNDP of core funding, which accounted for almost 60 per cent of programme expenditures. In addition the programme was helped by confidence in UNDP from both donors and beneficiaries. Another strength was that UNDP chose to work with indigenous CSOs to implement the programme, and made good use of local expertise. Effective partnerships with communities and with local authorities contributed to the programme's success.

The programme is highly relevant, and addresses the still enormous vulnerability of women and girls throughout Liberia.

The HRPG programme did well to focus on capacity building, as the results of this are likely to be lasting. It also benefited from a genuinely multi-faceted approach to addressing human rights, protection and gender, as shown in the list of activities undertaken in section 8.3 above.

The HRPG programme brought about real changes in the lives of the beneficiaries, and did so at a relatively modest cost.

*We enjoy unity. We meet monthly to discuss business strategies. Workshops are helping us learn new business skills.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*The beating of women has changed. It has actually reduced.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*We have made huge progress in terms of human rights and women's rights.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

### 8.8.2 Weaknesses

The biggest weakness of the HRPG programme was the relatively small amount of resources allocated – only three per cent of the overall programme budget – to address a problem of such immense importance. Furthermore, of the amount budgeted, only 69 per cent was actually spent, indicating inefficiencies in programme implementation. The inability of the Country Office to disburse funds in a timely manner was a major problem, which negatively impacted programme delivery. Procurement problems were also noted. In addition, a number of respondents pointed out that the CO did not have adequate capacity itself in issues of human rights, protection and gender.

Underfunding often meant that CSOs implementing the programme lacked adequate resources (human resources, vehicles, security) and realistic timeframes to do their jobs satisfactorily. Some CSOs also complained that UNDP did not live up to its promises in terms of institutional capacity building, and that the programme was too donor-driven.

Cooperation from men in positions of traditional leadership sometimes remained problematic. Women too, out of fear, were sometimes reluctant to attend workshops.

Systematic programme monitoring and evaluation seems to have been close to inexistent. No data were collected to monitor the impact of the programme, nor to provide UNDP and the implementing CSOs with information to better manage the programme. UNDP expected NGOs to monitor human rights in the counties; this proved to be unrealistic because of the low capacity of many of these organizations.

The biggest weakness of the HRPG programme is one of scale. The threats to the security of Liberian women and girls constitute an ongoing crisis, which will require substantially more

investment in order to permit a broader and more long-term strategy to put an end to this sadly pervasive evil.

*We planned that UNDP would monitor our work, but that did not happen. That was a shortcoming. There was a lack of institutional capacity building. UNDP gave strong support for what the donors themselves wanted to see happen. There was a focus on time without consideration of reality in project implementation.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*There was no follow-up mechanism to the programmes, making it difficult to monitor the impact on participants and the overall effects on targeted communities. Also there was a lack of logistical support from UNDP.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The implementation, monitoring and reporting were... slow and insufficient due to weak staffing. The procurements were not optimal. [UNDP] did not have a good overview of other partners' contributions – that was one of the weaknesses of the programme. There was weak capacity of the UNDP Country Office to follow up.*

- Donor

*[The main weakness is] manpower. We struggled when resources were meagre. We were operating in all the counties, and we relied on NGOs to monitor human rights in the counties. That has been a constraint. Our programme is a national programme – we do not have the capacity to reach all the areas. We need counterparts and their capacity is low. You have to know the facts to be able to convince people.*

- UNDP

## **8.9 HRPG – Lessons learned**

Direct beneficiaries told us that they had learned about the importance of: successful businesses; training workshops; of respect for women's organizations from government and community leaders; sharing their experiences and knowledge with other women; unity among women.

CSOs shared that they had learned: about the extraordinary willingness of women to reconcile; about the strong impact of tradition and culture on women; that stakeholder engagement is critical; that the strategy of training trainers proved to be effective, even with trainers having no formal education.

One of the donors pointed out that the role of UNDP as implementer, as well as the role of the beneficiary, should have been more clearly defined.

UNDP reported that the creation of the umbrella organization for NGOs helped to maximize the impact of each organization. As a team, they were able to complement and reinforce each other in their work on human rights, protection and gender.

The most tragic lesson learned was that Liberian human rights workers may risk their lives in their efforts to change traditional cultures by promoting the rights of women and girls. The situation in Zorzor in particular, and in Lofa County in general, is that women and young people stick together and are happy with their newly found rights, while many of the older men are very bitter about this.

*We had support from local government. One police officer served as facilitator. Unfortunately, he was killed in 2007 and the case is still under investigation. It appears that some people wanted to get rid of him.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*When you enter a community, you need to engage local leaders. They know their community best. You will succeed with local leadership support. If they are part of it, they will support you. Otherwise, you will fail.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*You must plan with community about their needs. We did PRA which taught us to know the community and talk to community leaders. We did this and it was successful. Study the culture and norms carefully.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

## 9. Environmental management

Liberia is the country with the largest remaining portion – fully 42 per cent – of the Upper Guinea Moist Forest ecosystem of West Africa (IUCN 2009). This is the second largest tropical rainforest in the world. The Sapo National Park is the country's largest protected area and contains the second-largest block of primary tropical rainforest in the West Africa sub-region. Liberia's forests, which cover 45 per cent of the country (Woods 2007), are an important reserve of stored carbon, and are of great value in preventing further global climate change. These forests are one of only 34 biodiversity hotspots worldwide (Woods et al. 2008).

Liberia's biodiversity was devastated by the war. In addition, hunting and the consumption of wild animals is known to have increased significantly recently, with the continuing practice illegal forestry and poaching inside high conservation value forests. Poaching now represents the most important threat for a large variety of threatened and endemic species, such as the rare Liberian Mongoose, the Pigmy Hippo, the forest elephant and an important population of chimpanzees (IUCN 2009).

Liberia has ratified most of the major international environmental conventions:

- Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora – in 1981
- Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer – in 1996
- Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer – in 1996
- Convention to Combat Desertification – in 1998

- Convention on Biological Diversity – in 2000
- Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – in 2002
- Convention on the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage – in 2002
- Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol – in 2002
- Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants – in 2002
- Ramsar Convention on Wetlands – in 2003.

In 1982 Liberia signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but has not yet ratified this convention.

In 2002, the government adopted a National Environmental Policy (GoL 2002a), which mandated a comprehensive set of laws to protect the environment through sustainable development and management (GoL 2002b), and established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (GoL 2002c).

It is widely known that the regime of ex-President Charles Taylor engaged in illegal exploitation of natural resources, including timber, diamonds and gold. Timber was a key resource for Liberia's armed factions: wood flowed out; money and arms flowed in. In addition to “blood diamonds”, “conflict timber” was a key source of revenue for the warring factions. The United Nations Security Council passed resolutions starting in 2003 to require Liberia to clean up its timber trade because logging was financing weapons and fuelling the war. The Security Council insisted on comprehensive forest sector reforms before timber sanctions could be lifted.

The UNDP Environmental Management programme started in a context in which a huge amount needed to be done to bring transparency to the management of Liberia's environment, and to turn Liberia's Forest Development Authority (FDA) and the EPA into expert, principled and modern agencies, free of corruption. In addition, for the law to be enforced against those who would illegally sell Liberia's natural resources for personal gain, the police and judiciary also required effective reform.

In 2006 President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf made her first executive act the scrapping of all timber concessions issued under previous regimes. The forestry law enacted in 2006, aimed at rebuilding the industry with firm foundations, and led to the lifting of UN sanctions. Under the new law, Liberia's forests will be allocated to three types of management regimes: conservation, community forestry and commercial forestry.

At the local level, it is poverty that fuels the bushmeat trade, and that drives the culling of trees for agricultural land, which is costing Liberia about 2 per cent of its remaining forest cover each year (Jordan Ryan in Black 2006).

For the EM programme, the evaluation team interviewed 47 respondents, and was able to obtain quantitative data from 43 of these, including: 30 direct beneficiaries, seven government respondents, five respondents from NGOs/CSOs, and two from UNDP. We were not able to interview donors to the EM programme, but it should be noted that 91 per cent of the programme was paid for by UNDP core funding.






Figure 19. Stakeholder survey results for Environmental Management programme




Figure 20. Survey results by stakeholder group for EM programme

The quantitative results of the evaluation of the EM programme are summarized in Figures 19 and 20 above.

The evaluation team visited the two solar power pilot projects: one in Jundu, Grand Cape Mount County and one in Ulah, Bong County. The opinions of these two different beneficiary groups differed markedly, as shown in Figure 20.

### **9.1 EM – Design and relevance**

The environment was not a focus of the 2003-2005 UNDP Country Programme (UNDP Liberia, no date-a). However, in the 2004-2006 CPO Extension (UNDP Liberia, no date-b), environment was identified as one of four key programme areas, with the aim of ensuring the integration of environmentally sustainable approaches in development planning linked to poverty reduction through: mainstreaming; sustainable energy for the poor; improving environmental awareness; building capacity on environmental impact assessment; monitoring and evaluation of environmental activities; policy and legal frameworks.

Two intended outcomes were identified in the 2004-2006 CPO Extension:

1. A comprehensive approach to environmentally sustainable development integrated in national development planning and linked to poverty reduction
2. Improved awareness and understanding among decision-makers and the public of linkages between environmental sustainability and human poverty and well-being.

A third intended outcome was added later:

3. Improved environmental management through renewable energy technologies and capacity-building initiatives.

UNDP did not, however, have a programme document signed by the Liberian government for the EM programme.

As shown above in Figure 20, on average, evaluation respondents agreed that the Environmental Management programme responded to the priority issues of the country from 2004 to 2007.

Nevertheless, evaluation respondents identified a number of design problems:

- lack of a proper strategic plan for programme design and implementation
- a programme driven by activities rather than by policy or strategy
- defective installation of solar panels, without angle brackets and on a damaged zinc roof in one of the pilot villages (Jundu)
- nothing in the energy work to address ongoing deforestation from charcoal production, with charcoal continuing to supply 90 per cent of domestic energy in Liberia
- lack of support for some high environmental priorities identified by the government – mangroves and wind energy for instance.

Symptomatic of UNDP's changing environmental strategy was that UNDP had a different title for this programme in each of its annual reports from 2004 to 2006: "Biodiversity" then "Environment" then "Energy and Environment".

Perhaps the most important design failure was the inadequacy of programme funding. As shown in Figure 4 and Table 2 (section 3.4 above), the UNDP Environmental Management

programme amounted to only 0.6 per cent of the overall UNDP Liberia programme from 2004 to 2007, as measured by programme expenditure.

*[There was a] lack of a proper strategic plan for programme design and implementation. It has been confusing for us. Key activities were identified, but outcomes were not clear.*

- UNDP

*The installation was done in way that it ruined the roofing. The contractor didn't do a good job, but we have been blamed... It brought joy, but it is also disheartening that our roofs are leaking. We cannot fix the roofs because the solar panels are already there.*

- Direct Beneficiary

*[UNDP] would have responded more strongly to national issues if they had followed what the government suggested. We prepared our annual work plan, but UNDP said it could not fund certain things.*

- Government

*[UNDP is] in line on environmental issues. UNDP does not have the money, but they intervene in the aspects we are concerned about.*

- Government

## **9.2 EM – Partnership strategy**

UNDP implemented the EM programme in collaboration with the Government of Liberia, and in particular the EPA and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, civil society, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Global Environment Facility and the World Bank, and worked with CSOs at the community level. The government made in-kind contributions such as human resources and office space. From 2004 to 2007, GEF was the lead supporter of environmental management in Liberia. The World Bank and GEF took the lead on working with the Forestry Development Authority (FDA) on Liberia's protected areas network. UNEP partnered with the government on the poverty and environment initiative and mainstreaming environment into development plans like the PRS, but closed its office in Monrovia in 2006. UNDP, working closely with the EPA, led on sustainable land management, implementing the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), coastal defence, and phasing out ozone-depleting substances.

The average opinion of the different respondent groups was between “neutral” and “agree” that the EM programme had an effective partnership strategy from 2004 to 2007 (Figure 20). In particular, the beneficiaries of the solar energy project in Jundu had a mixed opinion of the partnership strategy, while the beneficiaries in Ulah agreed.

*There was no follow up from UNDP. For a long time, they did not come down to see if the plan was being implemented.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*I do agree. UNDP gave us a free hand to determine who your partners are. So I consider this a very good strategy.*

- Government

*We have a very good relationship with UNDP. I appreciate UNDP's presence. They are very responsive. They come when you call them. They give advice and are willing to help.*

- Government

*I will not agree. Even in the UNDP Country Office, forging partnership has been difficult. There was not too much collaboration with other programmes. Every programme focused on the development area. A lot of our colleagues have lack of awareness about the environment.*

- UNDP

### **9.3 EM – Programme effectiveness**

Expected results of the programme were:

- State of the Environment report
- National Environmental Action Plan
- an institutional framework for sustainable environmental management
- energy development.

Accomplishments, in cooperation with the government, UNEP and GEF, included:

- ✓ launch of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) in 2004
- ✓ training NGOs, civil society, government and other key actors in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2005 and 2006
- ✓ the Act creating the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission in 2005
- ✓ the National Forestry Reform Law and the National Forestry Policy and Implementation Strategy in 2006
- ✓ evolution of the EIA process to include social as well as environmental impacts
- ✓ launch in 2007 of the first (2006) State of the Environment report for Liberia, which establishes a baseline for monitoring environmental trends
- ✓ establishment of five nature clubs, in Grand Bassa, Margibi and Montserrado Counties
- ✓ completion of two pilot projects in solar energy technology, turned over to the communities after training in how to maintain the facilities: the project in Jundu was marred by poor construction and lack of maintenance, while the one in Ulah was quite successful (see photo in Figure 28, Annex 8)
- ✓ UNDP was asked to serve on the government task force for renewable energy in 2007, and contributed to the renewable energy master plan.

Little progress was made on one of the major goals, developing a National Environmental Action Plan for Liberia due to lack of funding.

In addition, problems still exist with illegal mining of gold and diamonds in Sapo National Park.

Comments from evaluation respondents included the following:

*We are satisfied. So we are taking good care of [the solar energy system] so it can go all over our country.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Ulah)

*People were cutting down trees without planting them back. People were killing animals in the bush. This has changed. UNDP came in – raised awareness of importance of planting trees back.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*The improvement since 2004 has been very dramatic.*

- Government

*Even though the EPA is established, policy-makers do not understand environmental issues. People are still looking for how the environment can contribute to poverty reduction. I haven't seen the impact it is making. On the upstream we have not done so well. We have not seen raising awareness among decision-makers, but with the public we have done well.*

- UNDP

#### **9.4 EM – Programme efficiency**

The EM programme was by far the smallest of all the strategic programme areas: it amounted to only 0.6 per cent of the overall UNDP Programme in terms of total expenditure (Table 2 and Figure 4 in section 3.4 above). Over the programme period, 2004-2007, the EM programme spent a total of approximately USD 670,000 out of a budget of approximately USD 960,000 (Annex 7), i.e., approximately 70 per cent (Figure 7). Expenditures varied during the lifetime of the programme, from approximately USD 18,000 in 2004, to 109,000 in 2005, 330,000 in 2006 and 216,000 in 2007 (Annex 7). UNDP core funds accounted for 91 per cent of the total programme expenditure – more than for any other programme except HIV/AIDS (Figure 8).

When asked to what extent they agreed that the EM programme achieved results at a reasonable cost, respondents' opinions were mixed (Figure 20), particularly for the beneficiaries of the two solar pilot projects.

*Since UNDP does not have money, everything is at a reasonable cost!*

- Government

*UNDP got free labour from everyone!*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*If you look at the amount of support that UNDP has given so far, especially the strengthening of the EPA, even though the support has been minimum, there has been impact... With the*

*small amount of money given to us, we achieved good results... We could have done more if more resources had been received.*

- UNDP

## 9.5 EM – Degree of change

### 9.5.1 Impact on peace and security

Interestingly, the beneficiaries of the two solar projects had differing opinions on whether the EM programme enhanced peace and security, with the Jundu beneficiaries agreeing, and the Ulah beneficiaries having mixed opinions (Figure 20). Even though the project was not completely successful in Jundu, having light in the evening very much increased the villagers' sense of security. On the other hand, in Ulah, where the project was very successful, the villagers were afraid of resentment and possible retaliation from the neighbouring towns where people had not received such benefits.

The nature clubs did succeed in bringing young people – who had previously been fighting each other – together with a common sense of purpose.

One of the causes of conflict in Liberia was the poor governance of natural resources. We believe that UNDP's contribution to improved natural resources management, although limited compared to that of other players, did help to improve peace and security.

*[The project] brought peace and security. When there is dark, we human beings are afraid to move around. Where there is light, people come out.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Jundu)

*We do not know the hearts of people in the surrounding towns and villages. Because people tell us that we have a school, midwife house and everything, we feel that criminals can come anytime... Our lives are not safe. We are really afraid of armed robbery and other criminals in the area... Hatred is very high around us.*

- Direct Beneficiaries (Ulah)

*With respect to forestry, there has been an impact. Reform in the forestry sector... everything has to be done according to the rule of law now in the forestry. People know the rules; the procedures are laid down... This done with transparency and this promotes peace.*

- Government

### 9.5.2 Contribution to MDGs

The UNDP Environmental Management programme was intended to contribute to the first target of MDG 7 (Ensure environmental sustainability): to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources. The two indicators for this target are the proportion of land covered by forest, and the proportion of protected areas.

Marine protected areas in Liberia amount to only 18 km<sup>2</sup>, while terrestrial protected areas cover 16,718 km<sup>2</sup>. The proportion of terrestrial protected areas to the total surface area of the country remained unchanged from 2004 to 2007 at 15 per cent.

According to the United Nations MDG database (<http://data.un.org/Browse.aspx?d=MDG>), the percentage of land covered by forest in Liberia has continued to decline: from 42 per cent in 1990, to 36 per cent in 2000, to 33 per cent in 2005. Other sources (GoL 2008b) indicate that the forest is regenerating rapidly, but still conclude that Liberia is unlikely to achieve the target of 42.1 per cent forest coverage by 2015.

When asked to what extent they agreed that the EM programme had made a substantial contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, all respondent groups agreed, with the exception of the CSOs (Figure 20). Again, there was a striking difference between the beneficiaries in Jundu and those in Ulah.

We found evidence that in Ulah at least, the solar energy pilot project contributed not only to MDG 7 (Environmental sustainability), but also to Goal 2 (Universal primary education), and to Goals 4 and 5 (Reduce child mortality and Improve maternal health).

*It helped to reduce poverty, but I am worried that none of us know how to fix it.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Jundu)

*We are far from buying kerosene and candles. People are going to school.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Ulah)

*People got awareness, but nothing was given to them economically... It never reduced poverty... Poverty exists everywhere in my community. People are still dying from hunger.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*Even though we are making some impact, it is not all over the country. It is true that if you go to Ulah in Bong County, people are using solar energy for maternity services, helping women to have a safe delivery, and reducing the child mortality rate. They also use light for the education programmes, helping people to learn to read and write.*

- UNDP

## 9.6 EM – Most significant change

Following are some of the stories of the evaluation respondents of what they saw as the most significant change that resulted from the UNDP Environmental Management programme.

*Security improved because people are not afraid to move around at night when there is light... When we had electricity, the average student grade was very different. We are able to hold community meetings and other programmes at night.*

- Direct Beneficiaries (Jundu)

*The most important change is that electricity is always available on the three facilities: school, church and midwife house. The midwife house is being fully utilized... The literacy rate is changing. Different ages are going to school. These things are helping our community.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Ulah)

*Our area became clean. As we clean the city, we are sensitizing people... Previously people dumped garbage on the street. Those habits are gone... Now the city is not congested with garbage.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*Disposable wastes have been minimized and people's behaviours have also improved. There has been a reduction in the burning of garbage. This was achieved as a result of the awareness campaign. Another change is in the way people were mining sand from our beaches, which was causing erosion.*

- CSO/NGO/PS

*I would link [the most significant change] to the public awareness. People began to accept the environment. UNDP was able to penetrate even the government itself. Because of UNDP, people have come to accept that the environment was part of them and they have a responsibility to the environment.*

- Government

*The most significant change is the establishment and strengthening of the EPA in Liberia – this has really made a difference. Ensuring that development projects strictly adhere to environmental impact assessment – we have provided training for this. We are proud that they are strong, and vocal – that is all because of the capacity building effort. This change is important because our environment will be safeguarded and our development will be sustainable.*

- UNDP

## **9.7 EM – Sustainability**

As shown in Figure 20: the beneficiaries from Ulah strongly agreed that the results of the EM programme were sustainable during 2008 without further support; CSOs had a mixed opinion; and the other respondent groups – beneficiaries from Jundu, the government and UNDP – disagreed.

Selected men and women from Ulah were trained in the maintenance of the solar energy system, and they are able to maintain it properly. The Ulah project has an income-generation aspect, and funds are set aside for maintenance purposes. This project is a good example of sustainability.

Although the same number of people in Jundu were trained in maintenance, they were not able to manage the system properly. In addition, the solar panels were not properly installed.



These factors explain the disagreement of the stakeholders in Jundu that the results were sustainable.

In Kakata, the nature club has created a nursery of Umbrella trees, which they perceive as sustainable because they are able to sell seedlings for one US dollar each.

Other CSOs felt that there was too much dependence on UNDP.

Government respondents acknowledged that institutions are very weak in environmental management, and that environmental laws are written, but are not enacted. In addition, the results of the awareness programme as well as the technical assistance to the government are not perceived as sustainable without further support. A major problem is that the government budget for the EPA is so low it cannot carry out its mandate or statutory responsibilities without support from donors.

On the other hand, broadening the scope of EIAs to include the social dimension is seen as a positive step towards sustainability. Liberia now requires Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs).

*We take good care of the solar panels, like an egg.*

- Direct Beneficiary (Ulah)

*Everything went down when the panels damaged [the roofs]... We have to repair the roofs. They should help us learn how to maintain the system... I am worried none of us know how to fix it. We will still need help. It is very expensive.*

- Direct Beneficiaries (Jundu)

*The technical assistance input has no exit strategy.*

- Government

## **9.8 EM – Strengths and weaknesses**

### **9.8.1 Strengths**

One of the strengths of the UNDP Environmental Management programme was the willingness of UNDP Liberia to invest core funding: fully 91 per cent of the programme was funded by core funds (Figure 8). UNDP also used the small amount of funding it had for environmental management quite strategically, investing in small scale, but highly visible projects, and focusing on capacity building and on raising awareness.

Government respondents also identified as strengths UNDP's good intentions and the willingness of the CO management to listen and to provide support.

The solar panels project in Ulah was a successful example for bringing renewable energy to a rural population in Liberia.

Likewise, UNDP appreciated the willingness of its partners, citing good collaboration, especially with the EPA and with the community members from Ulah.

### 9.8.2 Weaknesses

The greatest weakness of the EM programme was the inadequacy of its budget. Despite the recognized strategic importance of environmental management, the resources spent on this programme were insignificant compared to the other strategic programme areas (Figure 4 and Table 2). It goes without saying that without adequate resources, it is difficult for a programme to accomplish much, and impossible to carry out programmes at the scale that is necessary in order to have lasting impact.

Another weakness was the seemingly ad hoc approach of the programme – without any strategic plan or programme design.

The citizens of Ulah, while delighted with the solar energy project, were also very unhappy by what they saw as unkept promises to provide electricity to people's houses. They also criticized UNDP for not visiting the project.

Nature clubs and student organizations complained about UNDP always expecting them to work without any remuneration.

Evaluation respondents found that the environmental programme was not only underfunded by the government, but also underappreciated, underfunded and understaffed at UNDP. In addition, not all technical experts were properly qualified.

*One inherent weakness is the low level of environmental awareness in UNDP itself.*

- Government

*[One weakness was UNDP's] limited expertise in dealing with [environmental] policy issues.*

- UNDP

*We lacked a proper strategic plan for programme design and implementation. It has been confusing for us. Key activities were identified, but [intended] outcomes were not clear.*

- UNDP

### 9.9 EM – Lessons learned

The sustainable energy pilot projects provided useful lessons in community development. The beneficiaries from Ulah told us that it was their sense of solidarity that made the project a success.

Government respondents identified the following key lessons:

- the importance of public review of key documents and proposed laws

- the importance of investing in collecting – and not just validating – data from/with the counties and local communities
- that UNDP Liberia can learn from UNEP in raising funds for and implementing environmental programmes
- too much zeal can result in laws that are difficult to apply – for example, the government now finds that the taxes required by the National Forest Reform Law are excessive and are driving away investors in the forest sector; in addition, the restrictions on the participation of foreign capital in forestry contracts is tying the hands of both Liberian and foreign investors
- the need to go beyond pilot projects to make a difference in enhancing the management of the environment.

Lessons provided by the UNDP environmental unit included:

- the importance of a well-designed strategy with clear targets
- the essential role of good collaboration with government and community partners in achieving results.

*Our unity made us to succeed. We were together before the solar panels project.*

- Direct Beneficiaries (Ulah)

*The energy projects were not enough. They were just little make-shift projects in promoting solar panels. But you have to have a massive thrust. There were not really programme design efforts in this.*

- Government

## 10. Infrastructure

The assessment of the Infrastructure Project (InP) was not a part of the original ToR for this evaluation. However, after we had completed the evaluation design, had finalized the questionnaire, and had begun our data collection, we were asked by UNDP management to add on an assessment of the InP. Given the severe time constraints for our data collection, we conducted interviews for InP only with UNDP and the World Bank, in addition to a desk review of the documents received.

The Infrastructure Project included the rehabilitation of critical sections of the Voinjama-Zorzor Road, covering 95km. The project also included additional work for resurfacing of urban streets and the provision of solid waste disposal facility in Monrovia.

Figures of the project budget and the allocation of core costs differed widely in the project documents given to the evaluation team. For this information we finally decided to rely on the analysis of Country Programme budgets and expenditures from 2004 to 2007 provided to us by UNDP Liberia (Annex 7). During the programme period InP spent a total of USD 13.6 million: approximately USD 1 million in 2006 and USD 12.6 million in 2007 (Figure 5 and Annex 7).

### **Infrastructure – Design and relevance**

The Infrastructure Project was a pilot project, jointly implemented between GoL, UNDP, UNMIL and the World Bank as the donor. InP had two sub-projects: Transition Support Fund (TSF) and Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component (EIPSC). TSF was implemented from August 2006 to April 2009, and EIPSC is from February 2006 to February 2010. TSF provided bridge funding between humanitarian assistance and development aid which was not yet available. Our impression is that the Infrastructure Project, developed in both rural and urban contexts, was highly relevant.

### **Infrastructure – Partnership strategy**

The project document was signed between the Government of Liberia through the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), UNDP, UNMIL and the World Bank (GoL, UNDP, UNMIL & WB 2006). MPW was responsible for monitoring the technical implementation of the project, as well as the recruitment of labour in keeping with national labour standards; MPW also provided engineers. UNDP provided overall financial management, procurement and recruitment of skilled and unskilled labour with the grant of US\$600,000 from the World Bank. UNMIL had overall responsibility of implementing InP in the field. InP required a new level of close collaboration between implementing partners and donors. From all indications, the level of collaboration and working relationship was strong between the GOL, UNDP, UNMIL and World Bank. We were informed by major stakeholders that although some implementation challenges were encountered, these partners worked well together and delivered.

### **Infrastructure – Programme effectiveness**

From what we could ascertain from interviews with major stakeholders, it seems that InP was very effective in achieving its outcomes: accessible roads and employment generation. We held discussions with the Infrastructure Project Manager and other stakeholders to determine the effectiveness of the projects. We understand that the projects were very effective in their outcomes. Major outcomes were accessible roads and employment generation, which were achieved. InP also required close collaboration between implementing partners and donors for the first time.

### **Infrastructure – Programme efficiency**

Surprisingly for such a large project, UNDP Liberia managed InP through the DEX Service Centre without recruiting additional staff. UNDP first charged the WB an administration fee of 7 per cent and later 7.5 per cent for the provision of these services. Financially, the Bank took a cost-savings measure of 3-5 per cent by selecting UNDP as opposed to UNOPS which would have charged an administration fee of 10-12 per cent. It was surprising to the evaluation team that UNDP offered to manage this project at such a low rate, which was unlikely to cover UNDP's costs, and in fact it appears that the fee paid to UNDP was inadequate to perform the operations properly.

In terms of efficiency, InP was highly efficient for the WB, which paid relatively little for the services it got from UNDP. On the other hand, it was highly inefficient for UNDP, which had

to manage this project without adequate human or financial resources. The evaluation team was told that there was a misunderstanding or miscommunication between the partners in terms of the project execution.

A summary of the budgets and expenditures from 2004 to 2007 was provided by the UNDP Liberia Country Office, and is included in Annex 7. A total of nearly USD 13.6 million was spent for the Infrastructure project, which makes this unplanned project the second largest after DDRR in terms of expenditure (Figure 4 and Table 2). InP, implemented essentially in only one year (2007), accounted for approximately 12 per cent of overall programme expenditure. It was the only programme area to spend no UNDP core funds at all, and was funded entirely by the World Bank (Figure 8 and Annex 7).

During the programme period, InP spent 83 per cent of the budget allocated (Figure 7).

The key findings to improve efficiency are that UNDP must strive to address concerns about the adequacy of its human resources and procurement capacities, as well as to negotiate a better fee for its services.

#### **Infrastructure – Degree of change**

Stakeholders indicated that InP categorically enhanced peace and security in Liberia from 2006 to 2007. Of great importance was the fact that InP was intended to help the government maintain security. Particularly, TSF helped to reduce crimes in the communities targeted when the roads opened, as well as stabilized the economy by creating employment. Before the roads, many businesses were by necessity centralized in Monrovia. The implementation of InP enabled people and their businesses to return into the counties.

#### **Infrastructure – Most significant change**

Analysis of responses from major stakeholders to the question of the most significant change brought about by the project clearly indicated that the most significant change was seen to be that the roads are now open. Four major access roads were built including Voinjama-Zorzor Road. Without EIPSC, there were no access roads. The major achievement was in social infrastructure.

Respondents also mentioned that InP created jobs, reduced crimes and that security improved. Children were able to attend schools. Some women were employed, often for the first time in their lives. From 2004 to 2005 people dumped their solid waste on the streets; this was cleaned up. Under TSF, there were also schools, health, water and sanitation carried out. In addition capacity was built for partner organizations: national and international NGOs and the Ministry of Finance.

#### **Infrastructure – Sustainability**

The primary focus of the Infrastructure Project was to build roads and to create temporary jobs. We were told that TSF was not meant to be sustainable – it was an emergency project which was sustainable for only two rainy seasons. The roads built through TSF are not sustainable, and the forest comes back. On the other hand, EIPSC was designed to be

sustainable. We were told that the sustainability process was put in place. However, there is no evidence of a concrete sustainability plan at this time.

### **Infrastructure – Strengths and weaknesses**

We learned from major stakeholders that the most important strength of InP was the One UN Partnership, which enabled UNDP and UNMIL to work together and deliver.

On the other hand, the major weaknesses of InP were: 1) a steep learning curve because this was the first major project involving these partners; 2) lack of clarity in the implementation arrangements which led to misunderstanding between the partners; 3) lots of logistical problems; and 4) that the government (MPW) failed to take ownership and a leading role. This is precisely where sustainability should have taken root.

### **Infrastructure – Lessons learned**

Three main lessons emerged from implementing InP:

- UNDP Liberia learned from this project the importance of accurately estimating cost recovery. Not surprisingly to the evaluation team, the 7 to 7.5 per cent administration fee charged by UNDP did not by any means cover the costs of administration, salaries and logistics. The project team did not even have vehicles to go to the field for this US\$16 million project to go and had to borrow vehicles from other programmes. This constrained mobility not only for InP, but for other Country Office programmes as well. The evaluation team does not feel that administering large infrastructure projects is the best use of UNDP's energies; however, if UNDP Liberia does agree to administer large projects for other donors such as the WB, it needs to be more realistic in estimating the costs.
- There is a difference between a project implementing agency and a procurement agent. A procurement agent is given a list of requirements. An implementing agency should have in place an overall management structure, with funding, staff and logistical support.
- When UNDP Liberia implements a World Bank project there should be a clear contractual agreement, including liability waiver. In the case of InP, the project documents at the entry point were not sufficiently clear. This had a domino effect in terms of project execution. When taking on the administration of major projects, UNDP Liberia must ensure that the project documents provide detailed implementation modalities and a proper legal agreement framework specifying inter alia the roles of each party. It is important that project documents and contracts are sufficiently specific and clear to all parties at the entry point.

## 11. Conclusions

### 11.1 Contribution to MDGs

As shown in Figure 22 below, the HRP, EM and CBR programmes were seen as having made a significant contribution to achieving the MDGs, whereas respondents' views were more mixed about the contribution of the DRR, HIV and DG programmes.

The HRP programme was seen as having made the strongest contribution to achieving the MDGs (Figure 22). While all respondent groups generally agreed, the direct beneficiaries of the programme were particularly enthusiastic about this (Figure 18). The micro-finance projects designed to help poor women lift themselves out of poverty were successful and very much appreciated.

The EM programme also scored very high on respondents' views of its contribution to the MDGs (Figure 22). Again, this was largely due to the enthusiasm of the direct beneficiaries, particularly those in the community of Ulah, where the solar panels pilot project had been successful. We found here that the solar energy project contributed not only to MDG 7 on environmental sustainability, but also to Goal 2 (Universal primary education), and to Goals 4 and 5 (Reduce child mortality and Improve maternal health) by providing light and electricity to the school and the midwife clinic.

There was agreement across all stakeholder groups that the CBR programme made a substantial contribution towards the achievement of MDGs (Figure 12). Reduction in poverty as a result of the CBR programme was witnessed first-hand with the direct beneficiaries (example in Figure 24, Annex 8).

As shown in Figure 10, the different respondent groups expressed relatively positive views that the DRR programme contributed to the achievement of MDGs. The programme provided ex-combatants with crucial support, which changed their attitudes towards war, promoted behaviour change, and improved their socio-economic conditions.

Regarding the HIV/AIDS programme, Figure 16 shows that CSOs, NGOs and the private sector agreed that the programme had made a significant contribution to the MDGs, while the views of government respondents were more mixed. Respondents considered poverty a major obstacle in the fight against HIV/AIDS.

The programme seen to have made the least contribution to the MDGs was the DG programme (Figure 22). Respondents' views overall were neutral (Figure 13), with the beneficiaries clearly disagreeing (Figure 14). This is not surprising as the DG programme was not a direct intervention towards achieving the MDGs.

## **11.2 Successes and constraints**

The UNDP 2004-2007 Programme was not conceived, implemented, monitored or managed as a coherent programme. Rather it was a collection of rather autonomous “strategic programme areas”. This was largely because the Programme was conceived in a time of acute humanitarian crisis during which action had to begin immediately. More, however, could perhaps have been achieved had the Programme been designed in an integrated fashion, regularly monitored according to a systematic and coordinated plan, and managed as a whole. A major constraint for effective implementation was that UNDP Liberia did not have an operational monitoring and evaluation system for the period 2004 to 2007, although this began to improve in 2008.

Donors were very disappointed with UNDP’s reporting, especially financial reporting. The evaluation team also experienced this first-hand: it took UNDP Liberia 3½ months to provide us with the summary of annual budgets and expenditures (Annex 7), which we had requested at the outset of the evaluation mission. Producing this simple table required an inordinate amount of work by the CO, and this should not be the case.

Procurement at UNDP Liberia emerged as the biggest operational constraint of all. Overly complicated and inefficient procurement procedures greatly hindered programme implementation and too often compromised achievement of programme objectives. This was a universal finding, across every strategic programme area, and according to every stakeholder group involved in implementation.

It is important to note that since 2007, UNDP has undergone tremendous changes with the aim of improving the quality of delivery of its services.


As shown dramatically in Figure 4 (section 3.4 above), the Programme was not by any means balanced among the strategic programme areas, although there were good reasons for this. Expenditures for DDDR dwarfed all the other programmes. Unfortunately, funding was inadequate for key strategic areas such as Human Rights / Protection / Gender, HIV/AIDS, and Environmental Management. In a context of post-war devastation and suffering, the UNDP Liberia 2004-2007 Programme was intended to respond to the immense challenges of human rights, peace-building, reconciliation and recovery. The consolidation of peace and security was the first and most urgent challenge. The DDDR programme laid the foundation necessary to begin addressing Liberia’s enormous post-conflict humanitarian and development priorities.

In terms of security much more should have been done to protect women and children, especially girls. Changing Liberia’s culture of pervasive violence against women and girls will require far greater effort and funding than what has been allocated thus far. This is a moral imperative of the highest urgency both for the Liberian government and for UN agencies and other donors. Funding for human rights must no longer be such a minor portion of UNDP’s budget in Liberia.

Although this evaluation has revealed substantial problems of programme design and implementation, nevertheless it is clear from the evaluation results, that the UNDP Liberia



Programme has been remarkably successful. This is clearly evidenced in Figure 21, which shows that on average the evaluation respondents were convinced that the programme was highly relevant to Liberia's priorities, that it did enhance peace and security, and that it succeeded in achieving its objectives. Respondents' views were also positive, though somewhat less so, that the Programme had made a significant contribution towards the MDGs, that it achieved its results at a reasonable cost, and that it had a good partnership strategy. On the other hand, the Programme was widely viewed as unsustainable without further support. This is not surprising, since the conditions were not in place in the humanitarian crisis of post-war Liberia to achieve sustainable outcomes. The period 2004-2007 was simply too soon after the war for sustainable outcomes to be a realistic possibility. Now is the time, during the 2008-2012 Programme, to lay strong foundations for more sustainable outcomes.




**Figure 21. Survey results for UNDP Liberia programme as a whole**

(Key: 0 = strongly disagree; 0.25 = disagree; 0.50 = neutral or mixed opinion; 0.75 = agree; 1.0 = strongly agree)

Figure 22 illustrates the comparative results of the different strategic programme areas. Every programme scored high on its relevance to Liberia's priorities. Respondents strongly agreed that the HRPG programme had an effective partnership strategy, but their views on the partnerships in the DG and CBR programmes were more mixed. All of the programmes were seen as having achieved their objectives, although views on the DDRR programme were more mixed. All programmes, with the exception of DG, were seen as having achieved results at a reasonable cost, especially the HRPG and EM programmes. Results of the evaluation at the outcome level were particularly impressive, in that respondents agreed that every programme had contributed to peace and security in Liberia and strongly agreed on this for the HRPG,

CBR and DDRR programmes. Views were more mixed in terms of the contribution of the different programmes to the MDGs. The HRPG, EM and CBR programmes scored particularly well in contributing to achieving the MDGs. On the other hand, with the exception of the EM programme, respondents clearly disagreed that the programmes were sustainable.



**Figure 22. Comparative results of the different strategic programme areas**

UNDP Liberia can be proud of its 2004-2007 Programme. Yes, there were problems. The context in which the Programme was implemented was extremely difficult – with the breakdown of virtually every aspect of life in Liberia following the 14-year civil. In these challenging circumstances, UNDP carried out a programme that – according to the findings of this evaluation – succeeded overall when measured by every evaluation criterion except sustainability. This is clearly evidenced in Figures 21 and 22.

## 12. Recommendations

In an effort to ensure the relevancy and usefulness of this report, we have separated our recommendations for the UNDP Liberia programme into key strategic recommendations followed by detailed operational recommendations.

The backdrop for any recommendations of this terminal evaluation will be UNDP Liberia's current 2008-2012 Country Programme (UNDP and UNPFA 2007). The current programme is categorized under two broad pillars of Liberia's PRS: democratic governance and pro-poor economic development. The objectives of the 2008-2012 programme are twofold:

- To enhance national and local capacity to articulate, formulate and implement policies and programmes for the promotion of democracy and the consolidation of peace and security in a manner which is participatory, gender-sensitive and accountable; and
- To contribute to the implementation of national economic policies and programmes designed to support equitable, inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development during Liberia's recovery process.

According to the website of UNDP Liberia (<http://www.lr.undp.org/>), the organization's current activities in Liberia fall within six corporate thematic areas:

- democratic governance
- poverty reduction
- crisis prevention and recovery
- environment and energy
- HIV/AIDS
- women's empowerment
- capacity development.

Since the DDRR programme in Liberia has come to a close, the recommendations generated by this evaluation will be included here as lessons learned that may be helpful to DDRR programmes in another context.

## **12.1 Strategic recommendations**

### **1) Strategic programme design:**

- a) In principle, UN agencies now work to fulfil the rights of people, rather than the needs of beneficiaries, and there is a critical distinction between the two approaches. A *need* not fulfilled leads to dissatisfaction; in contrast, a *right* that is not respected leads to a violation, and its redress or reparation can be legally and legitimately claimed. A human rights-based approach to programming differs from the needs-based approach in that it recognizes the existence of rights, and reinforces obligations of duty bearers (usually governments) to respect, protect and guarantee these rights. UNDP Liberia should seek to move to a programme based fundamentally on human rights.
- b) To reduce the risk of a return to conflict, action must be taken to promote participation, employment and sustainable economic growth for all sectors of the population.
- c) Because the UNDP 2004-2007 Programme was not conceived, implemented, monitored or managed as a coherent programme, opportunities for synergies and for institutional learning were lost, and this should not be repeated in future programmes.
- d) UNDP Liberia needs to be explicit about its programme theory – the conceptual linkages explaining the logic of how achieving the programme outputs would result in the realization of the intended outcome(s). The 2008-2012 Programme could be strengthened strategically if its theory of change were mapped and tested.
- e) UNDP Liberia should increase its fundraising effort so as to be able to go beyond pilot projects and take its programme to scale, with special focus on reaching more rural areas, and more especially vulnerable beneficiaries.
- f) UNDP should develop – and provide an adequate budget for – a comprehensive M&E plan

- g) The lack of baseline data against which to measure progress remains a serious constraint. Adequate investment in the collection and analysis of baseline and monitoring data in Liberia is an essential priority.
  - h) To measure behavioural changes in SGBV and other human rights violations, a multi-disciplinary research programme, which takes advantage of anthropological methods such as direct observation of participants in addition to culturally sensitive KAP surveys or focus groups, should be carried out before, during and after the intervention.
  - i) Now is the time, during the 2008-2012 Programme, to lay strong foundations for more sustainable outcomes.
- 2) Strategic capacity building:
- a) UNDP Liberia should engage with the government to develop a long-term capacity building strategy.
  - b) One area to be particularly targeted is building government capacity in monitoring and evaluation. The Republic of South Africa has recently created a high-level Ministry of Monitoring and Evaluation; a study to explore how applicable this model may be to Liberia would be interesting.
  - c) UNDP should directly confront corruption.
- 3) DDRR – Strategic recommendations:
- a) One of the primary concerns in planning DDRR programmes should be to fully address the needs of women and children ex-combatants, and design programmes particularly for them in close collaboration with UNIFEM and UNICEF.
  - b) In particular, DDRR programmes must be carefully designed, and adequate resources allocated, to ensure the prevention of all forms of violence against the more vulnerable ex-combatants: women and children.
  - c) With respect to former girl soldiers, support for transitional justice mechanisms that bring gross human rights violations into account must be maintained.
  - d) While the DD component is not intended to be sustained, the RR phase should be designed with a clear exit strategy, aimed at cultivating national ownership and responsibility and promoting local ownership by the beneficiaries and their communities; forging collaborative partnerships with local communities and institutions that will bear the responsibility to ensure follow-up to monitor the reintegration of beneficiaries; and promoting self-reliance of and ownership by the beneficiaries.
  - e) When planning DDRR, programmes targeting those who have not engaged in fighting and killing, and especially the victims of violence, should form an integral part of the RR component. Restricting support to ex-combatants creates the erroneous impression that there is reward for bearing arms.
  - f) Adequate human, financial and logistical resources should be provided for the systematic monitoring and supervision of reintegration assistance and the tracking of the progress of beneficiaries towards achieving productive lives.
  - g) UNDP should encourage the Liberian authorities to maintain the function of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, but change the name so as to remove the stigma which embarrasses most ex-combatants, and also rethink its function to reflect a mandate that will serve the interests of all war-affected people, especially women and youth.

- h) Integrate HIV/AIDS prevention and response into DDDR programmes, including both voluntary counselling and testing, and care and treatment, for not only demobilizing ex-combatants, but also for their partners and children.
- 4) CBR – Strategic recommendations:
- a) UNDP should greatly increase fundraising in order to expand the reach of the CBR programme as much as possible, working with rural communities to build schools, clinics, hand pumps, roads, bridges, etc. as needed.
  - b) The CBR programme has targeted the most vulnerable groups of rural society – women and children – and this should be continued and strengthened even further.
  - c) Empowering market women has been a successful strategy for reducing poverty and promoting ethnic harmony, and support through micro-loans and market facilities should be increased. Ethnic reconciliation should be further encouraged by means of additional training.
  - d) In the interest of alleviating extreme hunger and malnutrition, UNDP should focus more on supporting sustainable food production – for example through improved agriculture, access to markets, and communal electrification and refrigeration systems.
  - e) The CBR programme should be linked to national planning for sustainability, so that for example, when a school is finished, the government has a budget to pay the teachers.
  - f) Sustainability could be fostered by building the capacity of local NGOs or other partners who will remain on the ground when the international non-governmental organizations phase out.
- 5) DG – Strategic recommendations:
- a) UNDP should continue to strengthen its own technical capacity and competence in the field of democracy and human rights, and should take on an even stronger and more proactive advocacy role in the country.
  - b) UNDP should further strengthen its focus on institutional capacity building, and increase the programme budget accordingly. The government can take over the Democratic Governance programme once the requisite national capacity is built.
- 6) HIV – Strategic recommendations:
- a) There is need for more support in the HIV/AIDS programme area in terms of funding, logistics and capacity building.
  - b) In post-conflict situations, HIV/AIDS strategies must be closely aligned both with DDDR strategies and with HPRG – specifically the prevention of and response to sexual violence should be central to HIV/AIDS strategies.
  - c) As part of an exit strategy, UNDP should encourage the GoL to allocate adequate budgetary support for Liberia's HIV/AIDS programme – for drugs, supplies, transportation, blood testing facilities and other equipment, as well as support for professional and social workers.
  - d) Relevant government agencies such as NAC should take the lead in developing policy and in coordinating interventions to fight HIV/AIDS.
  - e) UNDP should continue to focus on and to mobilize support for orphans and vulnerable children. In spite of the support to OVCs by care givers, donors, local NGOs and CSOs, they remain devastated by their difficult circumstances. UNDP should ensure that OVCs have adequate food and sanitary living conditions. At the same time, the strategy to help OVCs should seek to reduce their dependency and eventually enable

them to be self-reliant. Education and capacity building for OVCs is essential. UNDP should pay particular attention to OVCs living in rural areas, the majority of whom live in deplorable conditions and lack the basic necessities of life.

- f) Continuing to raise awareness on HIV/AIDS remains critical to campaign for behaviour change, and support for this should be increased. Otherwise, the infection rate is poised to explode.

7) HRPG – Strategic recommendations:

- a) The UNDP Liberia 2008-2012 country programme now concentrates on two, rather than six, strategic areas of focus: democratic governance and pro-poor economic growth. Given the ongoing crisis of widespread violations of human rights in Liberia, experience for women and girls, it is regrettable that UNDP Liberia's country programme no longer articulates a strategic programme area of human rights, protection and gender. Instead, these grave issues are considered to be cross-cutting. The evaluation notes that in its current programme, UNDP Liberia is placing special focus on gender mainstreaming throughout the programme. However, inspection of UNDP Liberia's website (<http://www.lr.undp.org/ghr.htm>) yields precious little on what UNDP is currently doing to address gender and human rights. We strongly recommend that, within the framework of the current country programme, UNDP Liberia articulate specific outcomes, outputs, indicators, baselines and targets to address the ongoing horror of widespread sexual and gender-based violence. UNDP is the strongest UN agency in Liberia besides UNMIL, and without explicit UNDP programming to address violations of human rights, chances are that, once again, at the end of the programme period in 2012, violence against women and girls will continue to be rampant in Liberia. This is unconscionable.
- b) To make a significant difference in the protection of women and girls in Liberia, UNDP will need to greatly strengthen its advocacy work, build the capacity of NGOs, CSOs and government, and promote integrity in governance.
- c) Gender mainstreaming is still far from a reality in most areas of development, and this should be comprehensively analysed so that corrective measures can be taken to design an appropriate framework for the advancement of women in Liberia.
- d) HRPG programmes should work to ensure that the prevention of all forms of violence, particularly against women and children, becomes central to both DDDR and HIV/AIDS strategies, especially in environments affected by conflict.
- e) For the respect of human rights in Liberia to become a reality, fundamental elements of success will include:
- education for women and girls
  - enhancing women's participation and empowerment
  - engaging stakeholders more effectively
  - continuing to raise women's awareness of their rights
  - continuing to encourage and educate women voters
  - addressing weaknesses and corruption in the Liberian police and judiciary
  - significantly increasing the number of trained women police and women judges
  - involving men and boys more strongly in anti-rape campaigns
  - targeting traditional (male) leaders for education in human rights and Liberian law.

- f) In Liberia a number of human rights issues, such as genital mutilation, are hardly being dealt with, and UNDP could be much stronger on this.
  - g) Violence against women is inextricably linked to gender-based inequalities. Ending GBV will mean changing cultural concepts about femininity and masculinity. GBV is sustained by silence, and efforts must continue to break this silence. Ending GBV requires actively engaging males, whether they be policy makers, traditional leaders, parents, spouses or young boys.
- 8) EM – Strategic recommendations:
- a) Good stewardship of the natural environment will be key to Liberia's long-term development and sustainable economic growth. UNDP should vastly scale up its environmental programme in Liberia by: identifying a strategy at the national level with clear and ambitious targets, and raising sufficient funds for a programme that will have broader and more lasting impact.
  - b) Links between improved environmental management and poverty reduction need to be greatly strengthened and concrete examples developed and tested.
  - c) The focus of the environmental programme should be broadened to include freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems as well as forests.
  - d) Funds should be raised for the participatory development of Liberia's NEAP.
  - e) The sustainable energy project should be scaled up, by: applying the lessons from the pilot projects in the 2004-2007 programme, taking the programme to every county in Liberia, targeting as many communities as possible, and developing projects for other types of renewable energy, such as wind power and alternative cooking fuels. A strategy for building sustainability and multiplier effects to neighbouring communities into rural alternative energy projects should be developed.
  - f) The environmental awareness campaign needs to be reinforced, ensuring that it targets – and convinces – decision-makers as well as students and the general public. Objectives of the campaign should include:
    - Ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea
    - passage of Liberia's environmental protection law
    - a substantial increase in the budget allocated by government to the EPA and the FDA.
  - g) Sapo National Park is a global biodiversity hotspot, and protection of its biodiversity must be ensured. In particular UNDP should work closely with its partners to solve the problem of illegal diamond and gold mining in Sapo.
- 9) Infrastructure – Strategic recommendation: UNDP should not itself engage in large-scale infrastructure projects such as road-building, as that is not its area of core competence and expertise. UNDP should rather avoid getting involved in such undertakings, and focus more on human development and instilling best practices for programme design, management and implementation of development work. Large infrastructure work does not make best use of UNDP's comparative advantage.

## **12.2 Operational recommendations**

UNDP's partnership strategy should broaden its focus to work more with civil society and the private sector in addition to government. Realistic costs for building the capacity of strategic partners should be included in the programme budget

### **10) Partnerships:**

- a) UNDP needs to better clarify its role in key partnerships, i.e., focusing on outcomes and outputs that will impact human lives. Then UNDP must be very clear with its partners what it can and cannot do.
- b) UNDP should implement its field programme through strategic partnerships, and should focus its own role on monitoring and supervision.
- c) In many cases, UNDP needs to better know its local partners, and should avoid depending on government when selecting partner NGOs and CSOs, in order to ensure their independence.
- d) UNDP needs to focus on working together with Implementing Partners (IPs) and CBOs that have both the relevant technical capabilities and are well-grounded in their communities. IPs should be given ongoing capacity building to enhance their skills in project implementation. Partnerships with IPs could be enhanced through longer-term collaborations. In addition, UNDP should create ample opportunities for IPs to get involved at early stages of planning, programme design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.
- e) At the country level annual donors /stakeholders meetings would be useful for better co-ordination.
- f) UNDP should develop a partnership strategy that better captures the views and concerns of its partners. GoL, national partners, beneficiaries and local people should be involved in dialogue, project planning, design, execution, monitoring and evaluation. UNDP would benefit from longer-term partnerships to enhance impact and sustainability.
- g) Where necessary, capacities of implementing partners should be built.
- h) Criteria for ensuring transparency and proper financial accountability by implementing partners must be set by UNDP.
- i) Partnership is very productive if it is founded on good principles. No programme will succeed unless those who are affected are brought into the programme focus. Build capacity in terms of logistics and training.
- j) The selection of NGOs and other implementing partners should be based on credibility. Unfortunately this was not always the case during the 2004-2007 programme. Only qualified people and firms should be engaged.
- k) UNDP should facilitate a harmonized approach of partners dealing with the government. The aim is to be more strategic in their engagement to avoid spreading themselves too thin, as well as to avoid duplication and improve programme delivery.
- l) UNDP should work with civil society and the private sector as it works with government. Both civil society and the private sector have very significant roles to play in the post-conflict reconstruction of Liberia.
- m) UNDP should focus on helping government to take more national ownership of its own development agenda.



- n) It would be useful to engage all national stakeholders and other partners in key aspects of programme delivery – joint assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. A national framework for the engagement of strategic partners and dialogues could be very productive.

11) Programme planning:

- a) UNDP should conduct joint assessments with direct beneficiaries, local communities and partners in order to know what people really need. UNDP should emphasize local ownership and sustainability in all aspects of programme design and implementation. One way to do this is to work together with the local people to determine how they would sustain potential projects.
- b) UNDP should undertake long-lasting projects that will benefit ordinary Liberians. There is a need to strive more intensely to legitimize these programmes in the Liberian population.
- c) Good programme planning begins with clear, measurable outcomes and outputs agreed by all the implementing partners, and which do not change every year.

12) Monitoring and evaluation:

- a) UNDP Liberia must significantly improve the monitoring and evaluation of its programmes. Regular and timely programme evaluations (mid-term and terminal) must be put in place for all programmes.
- b) UNDP needs to build a monitoring and evaluation culture throughout the Country Office. Instrumental to this will be putting in place knowledge management systems, and nurturing communities of practice.
- c) UNDP should improve its monitoring role by: allocating adequate funding for programme monitoring, developing and carrying out a rigorous monitoring plan, and visiting projects frequently together with professionals such as site engineers in order to enhance quality control.
- d) UNDP should develop an electronic document management system for tracking, monitoring, management and oversight of project documents. This could be financed from UNDP core support, with a cost-sharing mechanism put in place from different programmes. This would enhance programme management, oversight and evaluability.

13) Programme administration:

- a) Something must be done to simplify UNDP's financial reporting system, which seems to be so complicated that it is impossible for most CO staff to use – this will be essential to improve financial reporting to donors, and to better monitor and oversee programme implementation.
- b) UNDP must find a way to lighten the bureaucracy of its financial management, and in particular to expedite payments. UNDP Liberia would have accomplished much more in the 2004-2007 programme if it had been able to make disbursements on time.
- c) UNDP Liberia's procurement system is in grave need of improvement. There is a strong and pervasive feeling of resentment for UNDP bureaucracy in government, among beneficiaries, and within civil society organizations, NGOs and the private sector – in fact with all partners.
  - Procurement procedures could be improved by involving implementing partners in the bidding process so as to start with a more realistic idea of project costs.

- When hiring contractors, it would be better, wherever possible, to select contractors from the area where the projects will be implemented. Local communities will be likely to know local contractors better and will be able to advise on how they have performed in the past.
  - Effective procurement is not always best served by giving the most weight to the lowest price among bidders, and this practice should be revisited.
  - Rather than spending large sums of money on foreign experts and consultants, every effort should be made to identify and involve professional local nationals in programme development and implementation.
- d) UNDP should award projects in time to commence in November of each year. During the 2004-2007 Programme, many projects suffered long delays when they were unable to be carried out because of the rains. To avoid working during the rains and the resulting bad roads, a six month period for projects may be more realistic longer projects.

14) DDRR – Operational recommendations:

- a) Rather than exclusive emphasis on the cooperation of individual ex-combatants, community involvement must be factored into the design and implementation of DDRR programmes.
- b) Instead of relying on collaboration with NGOs and CSOs that emerge in response to donor support for projects in post-conflict societies, DDRR programmes should – whenever possible – first seek to collaborate with institutions that are already established, and should also support the establishment of permanent technical and vocational training institutions.
- c) Training programmes for ex-combatants are enhanced when they promote interaction and collaboration between former fighters and those who have not fought.
- d) Where possible, creative ways should be found to link monetary assistance to ex-combatants to vocational training, formal education, adult literacy training, in-kind assistance to local communities, national development projects and employment opportunities.
- e) The quality and duration of training must be improved so that ex-combatants who are trained have a better chance of being absorbed into the job market.
- f) Toolkits intended for ex-combatants should be examined for their sufficiency and usability before distribution. Ideally, toolkits should be jointly distributed to ex-combatants from the same communities of origin, keeping in mind their desired type of employment.
- g) In order to pre-empt potential security threats posed by unemployed ex-combatants, it would be advisable to mobilize donor support for an income-generating and employment programme that holistically addresses the plight of the youth and ex-combatants who have not been properly integrated. Such a programme should not be directed exclusively at ex-combatants. There is still need to integrate highly vulnerable, disadvantaged and at risk youths and other target groups into a longer-term sustainable economic / livelihoods programme.

15) DG – Operational recommendations:

- a) UNDP should do more to build capacities of citizens in civic education and decision-making with respect to implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the County

Development Agenda. Civil society capacity should be built to ensure PRS tracking, monitoring and evaluation, and the provision of civic education.

- b) UNDP should strengthen the coordination in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs. There is a need to restore the legislative mandate for the coordination of international assistance.
- c) UNDP should not rely on third parties to connect to the people. The Liberian people and local communities should get involved through a participatory design process. This would avoid duplication and improve programme delivery.

16) HIV/AIDS – Operational recommendations:

- a) The quality of data generated needs to be improved at every level – from the national level to the level of treatment facilities. In particular, in order to avoid wasting resources, there is a need to improve data collection and accurate forecasting to inform procurement decisions to bring the purchase of medications in line with the patient needs.
- b) In designing and executing programmes, UNDP should give more attention to the input of Liberian nationals who can bring experience of working with HIV/AIDS beneficiaries in the Liberian context.
- c) HIV/AIDS workers all over the country need good incentives and continuous capacity building.
- d) The programme was constrained by lack of transportation. UNDP should help to provide adequate transportation to government institutions and other partners working to prolong the lives of HIV/AIDS clients.
- e) The micro credit programme for self-sufficiency of clients should be reviewed. The micro credit programme enables HIV/AIDS beneficiaries to assume part of the responsibility of taking care of themselves. More favourable terms for repaying these loans would be helpful.

17) HRPG – Operational recommendations:

- a) UNDP Liberia should increase the capacity of its HRPG Unit so as to be able to provide the support needed to implement and monitor the programme effectively, including more frequent visits to project sites.
- b) More effort should be focused on building the institutional capacity of indigenous women's organizations such as Zorzor District Women Care and the Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia.
- c) Work with social institutions, such as the media, should be enhanced and more strategic.

18) EM – Operational recommendations:

- a) UNDP Liberia should consider how to staff up its environmental unit and how to provide it with adequate resources.
- b) Understanding of the critical importance of the environment for sustainable development needs to be improved throughout the Country Office.
- c) Much more effort needs to be spent on engaging partners and raising funds to improve environmental management in Liberia.
- d) Specific funding should be provided to the EPA to enable it to monitor its environmental work, and the report on the State of the Environment should be repeated every five years.
- e) Funding is also needed to develop Liberia's National Environmental Action Plan.

f) Technical assistance should be indigenized to the extent possible.

19) Infrastructure – Operational recommendation: If UNDP decides to administrate large-scale infrastructure projects (which the evaluation recommends against), it must be sure to realistically calculate the real costs of administrating such projects, and charge fees that cover these costs completely.

## **Annex 1. Terms of reference**

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TERMINAL EVALUATION OF UNDP LIBERIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2004 – 2007**

---

**Programme Evaluation Period:** 2004 – 2007

**Programme Areas** : Peace building, reintegration and sustainable recovery,  
Good Governance; HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,  
Environment

**Management Arrangement:** Direct Execution (DEX)

---

#### **1. Purpose of the Evaluation**

In line with Country Programme evaluation plan for 2004-2007, UNDP Liberia Country Office is preparing to carry out a Terminal evaluation of the Country Programme in February 2008. The purpose of the proposed Terminal Evaluation is to measure UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007's contribution to the national objectives of achieving peace and security and to UNDP's corporate (MYFF) goals of reducing poverty and achieving MDGs with a view to inform, guide and fine-tune the new Country Programme 2008-2012 strategy. This will support learning lessons about UNDP's contribution to the Country Programme cycle so as to design a better assistance strategy for the next Country Programme 2008-2012. The CO Evaluation Management Committee, comprising Government of Liberia Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and other national partners will review and adopt evaluation report and follow up implementation of evaluation recommendations by tracking actions through UNDP Liberia CO Management Response and Tracking matrix to ensure these feed into the Country Programme Strategy, 2008-2012.

#### **2. Social, Economic and Political context**

The peace agreement signed on 18 August 2003, the subsequent departure of Charles Taylor and the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 provided a renewed chance for peace and stability in Liberia, after many years of destructive war. The establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and the implementation of the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) facilitated the subsequent holding of landmark national elections culminating in the accession to the Presidency of Liberia in January 2006 of Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first democratically elected female President in Africa. The government and people of Liberia, with the enormous support of the international community has made tremendous progress towards achieving its vision of enhancing peace and security, revitalizing economic and social infrastructures, restoring the rule of law and democratic governance and improving basic service delivery. The government has produced an Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRSP) which was endorsed at the Partner's Forum in Washington in February 2007. The document is founded on four strategic pillars: security, economic revitalization, governance and rule of law and basic services and infrastructure. A full Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) will be completed by December 2007 to cover the period 2008 – 2012 and is expected to provide a framework for medium to longer term socio-

economic development infused with a strong conflict analysis as a basis for framing interventions.

Despite the laudable achievements realized so far in restoring peace and stability in the country, the critical issues of exclusion and marginalization, corruption, ethnic and class animosities and rivalries which were the main roots of the conflict have not been fully addressed. This situation is compounded by the lack of robust economic growth necessary for effectively addressing the widespread poverty in the country.

The Human Development Index for Liberia was estimated at 0.319 (NHDR 2006). The National Human Development Report (NHDR), 2006 ([www.lr.undp.org/nhdr/2006](http://www.lr.undp.org/nhdr/2006)), estimates that half of the estimated population of 3.6 million people, lives on less than half a US dollar per day with 86 per cent living in rural areas. Unemployment in the formal sector is estimated at 80 per cent, characterised by pervasive youth unemployment. These factors have a serious negative impact on national security.

The country has some of the world's worst social indicators: infant mortality stands at 157 per 1,000 live births, under-five mortality at 235 per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality at 578 per 100,000 live births (1999/2000 LDHS). Only an estimated 32% of the entire population of Liberia has access to safe drinking water and less than 24% to adequate sanitation (WFP 2006). Adult literacy is 37% (50% male and 24% female) and gross enrolment in primary school is estimated at 69.5% (MOE School Census 2005/2006). HIV/AIDS is on the rise with the sero-prevalence estimated at 5.7 per cent (Liberia's Global Fund Proposal). Liberia's first MDGR, published in 2004 ([www.lr.undp.org/MDGR/2004](http://www.lr.undp.org/MDGR/2004)) concludes that most of the MDG targets might not be achieved by 2015. However, there is still a lack of nationally representative updated and disaggregated data on key socio-economic indicators to facilitate effective planning and decision-making.

The iPRS indicates that Liberia's economy has experienced a downward trend since the 1980s. GDP per capita declined from \$1,269 in 1980 to \$163 in 2005- an 87 per cent decline. Revenue from exports also plummeted from \$486 million in 1978 to about \$10.3 million in 2004. External debt is about \$3.7 billion (mid-2005) which is equivalent to 800 per cent of GDP and 3,000 per cent of exports. Domestic debt, including salary arrears, is estimated at about \$700 million, a significant part of which is owed to the banks, including the Central Bank of Liberia .

Sustaining the current governance reforms will be crucial to the consolidation of peace and stability, revitalising the economy and fighting poverty. To this end, the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Liberia National Police are undergoing restructuring with assistance from the international community. The Government has produced, through UNDP support, a national security strategy. However, success in the security sector reform process will also be contingent on the necessary legal, judicial and constitutional reforms as well as the effective completion of the Rehabilitation and Reintegration components of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration programme which operationally ended in September 2007.

Liberia suffers from enormous institutional and human capacity constraints which require effective and sustained national leadership and ownership of the development processes. The public service and other state enterprises are decimated, civil servants are inadequately

remunerated, have poor morale, and in the overall, ill-equipped to support the delivery of basic services to the people. The skilled manpower required to steer the reforms reside outside the country as there is not yet an enabling environment and incentives to attract them back. Donor resource utilisation is not optimum. Rebuilding Liberia requires a holistic capacity building agenda targeting individuals, institutions and the entire society.

### **3. Subject of the evaluation**

UNDP Country Programme 2004-2007 focused on six strategic programme areas, namely, i) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR); ii) democratic governance, iii) community based recovery, iv) human rights, protection and gender; v) capacity building for HIV/AIDS response; and vii environmental management. A total of \$119.356 million was expended in support of national programmes and projects.

### **3. Evaluation Objectives and Scope**

The proposed Terminal Evaluation evaluation will assess the extent to which “Peace and Security and UNDP’s corporate (MYFF ) goals of reducing poverty and achieving MDGs” outcome have been achieved, reasons for their achievement or otherwise in a Liberia country context, and assess UNDP’s contribution through projects, programmes, non-project activities and "soft" assistance within and outside of projects. The Terminal evaluation will also assess how these results contribute, together with the assistance of other partners, to a change in development conditions clarify underlying factors affecting the situation, highlighting unintended consequences either positive or negative, recommending actions to improve performance in future programming, and generating lessons learned. The Terminal evaluation will cover UNDP Country Programme 2004-2007, focusing on six strategic programme areas, namely, i) Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR); ii) democratic governance, iii) community based recovery, iv) human rights, protection and gender; v) capacity building for HIV/AIDS response; and vii) environmental management .

The overall objective of the Terminal evaluation will be to assess how UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004-2007 results contributed, together with the assistance of partners, to a change in development conditions in Liberia.

More specifically, this Terminal evaluation therefore seeks to achieve the following objectives, namely;

- a) Assess progress towards the achievement of the outcome, the extent to which the Country Programme outcome resulting from the inputs and outputs have been achieved
- b) Determine contributing factors and impediments and extent of the UNDP contribution to the achievement of the results
- c) Assess key UNDP contributions to results, including those produced through "soft" assistance,
- d) Assess the viability and effectiveness of partnership strategies in relation to the achievement of the results.
- e) Assess sustainability of CO Programme interventions

#### 4. Evaluation Questions

It will examine the extent to which UNDP Country Programme results have been achieved. This Terminal Evaluation will assess progress towards the UNDP results, the factors affecting the results, key UNDP contributions to results and assess the partnership strategy. The following broad questions need to be addressed;

- ✓ Have the right things been done? ( was the UNDP results and associated programmes and projects relevant, appropriate and strategic to national goals and the UNDP mandate?)
- ✓ Have things been done right? (were the actions to achieve the results effective and efficient?)
- ✓ Are the results sustainable? (will the results lead to benefits beyond the life of the existing programmes(s)/projects(s) ?
- ✓ How might we do things better in the future? (which findings may have relevance for future programming or for other similar initiatives elsewhere?)

*Outcome status:* Determine whether or not the outcome has been achieved and, if not, whether there has been progress made towards its achievement, and also identify the challenges to the attainment of the outcome. Identify innovative approaches and capacities developed through UNDP assistance. Assess the relevance of UNDP outputs to the outcome.

*Underlying factors:* Analyze the underlying factors beyond UNDP's control that influenced the outcome. Distinguish the substantive design issues from the key implementation and/or management capacities and issues including the timeliness of results, the degree of stakeholders and partners' involvement in the completion of results, and how processes were managed/carried out.

*Strategic Positioning of UNDP:* Examine the distinctive characteristics and features of UNDP Liberia Country programme and how it has shaped UNDP's relevance as a current and potential partner. The Country Office (CO) position will be analyzed in terms of communication that goes into articulating UNDP's relevance, or how the CO is positioned to meet partner needs by offering specific, tailored services to these partners, creating value by responding to partners' needs, mobilizing resources for the benefit of the country, demonstrating a clear breakdown of tailored UNDP services and having comparative advantages relative to other development organizations in the six strategic programme areas indicated.

*Partnership strategy:* Ascertain whether UNDP's partnership strategy has been appropriate and effective. What were the partnerships formed? What was the role of UNDP? How did the partnership contribute to the achievement of the outcome? What was the level of stakeholders' participation? Examine the partnership among UN Agencies and other donor organizations in the relevant field.

This will also aim at validating the appropriateness and relevance of the Country Programme results to the country's needs and the partnership strategy and hence enhancing development effectiveness and/or decision making on UNDP future programming and role.

*Lessons learnt:* Identify lessons learnt and best practices and related innovative ideas and approaches in programming, and in relation to management and implementation of activities



to achieve related outcomes. This will support learning lessons about UNDP's contribution to the Country Programme cycle so as to design a better assistance strategy for the next Country Programme 2008-2012.

## **5. Evaluation Approach**

Based on the objectives mentioned above, the lead consultant will propose a methodology and plan for this assignment, which will be approved by UNDP Liberia CO senior management. A design matrix approach relating objectives and/or outcomes to indicators, study questions, data required to measure indicators, data sources and collection methods that allow triangulation of data and information often ensure adequate attention is given to all study objectives.

However, it's recommended that the methodology should take into account the following, namely;

- Strategic Results Framework (SRF) for a description of the intended results, the baseline for the results and the indicators and benchmarks used. Obtain information from the country office gathered through monitoring and reporting on the outcome. This will help inform evaluation of whether change has taken place.
- Examination of contextual information and baselines contained in project documents, the CCF (for older programmes) or the Country Programme (for newer programmes), Common Country Assessment/United Nations Development Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF) and other sources. These documents speak to the outcome itself, as opposed to what UNDP is doing about it, and how it was envisaged at certain points in time preceding UNDP's interventions.
- Validation of information about the status of the results that is culled from contextual sources such as the SRF or monitoring reports. To do this, consultant(s) may use interviews or questionnaires during the evaluation that seek key respondents' perceptions on a number of issues, including their perception of whether an outcome has changed.
- Probing the pre-selected outcome indicators, go beyond these to explore other possible outcome indicators, and determine whether the indicators have actually been continuously tracked.
- Undertake a constructive critique of the outcome formulation itself (and the associated indicators). This is integral to the scope of outcome evaluation. The consultants can and should make recommendations on how the outcome statement can be improved in terms of conceptual clarity, credibility of association with UNDP operations and prospects for gathering of evidence.
- Desk review of existing documents and materials such as support documents, evaluations, assessments, and a variety of temporal and focused reports. In particular it will review mission, programme/project reports, the annual reports and the consultant's technical assessment reports.
- Interviews with key informants including gathering the information on what the partners have achieved with regard to the outcome and what strategies they have used including focus group discussions.
- Field visits to selected sites; and briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP and the Government, as well as with donors and partners.

## 6. Expected Products

The consultant(s) will produce a report (in line with UNDP evaluation report format and quality control checklist for its content), with an executive summary describing key findings and recommendations. The assessment will entail, *inter alia*:

- 1) A report containing (Hard copy, a soft copy in MS Word and Acrobat reader, Times New Roman, Size 12, Single Spacing):
  - Executive summary
  - Introduction, description of the evaluation methodology
  - An analysis of key interactions (the outcome, substantive influences, UNDP's contribution and how UNDP works with other relevant actors) and associations between variables measuring the outcome,
  - Key lessons learnt, highlighting key factors that might hamper the impact of CO programmes and projects and suggesting possible recommendations,
  - Conceptual Framework to the Country Programme in terms of future programming and policy
  - Assumptions made during the evaluation and study limitations, and
  - Conclusions and recommendations
  - Annexes: ToRs, field visits, people interviewed, documents reviewed, etc
- 2) Provide a draft report before leaving Liberia, and submit a final report within two weeks
- 3) Debrief UNDP, Government of Liberia, other UN agencies and development partners in Liberia

## UNDP obligations

UNDP will:

- Provide the consultant with all the necessary support (not under the consultant's control) to ensure that the consultant(s) undertake the study with reasonable efficiency.
- Appoint a focal point in the programme section to support the consultant(s) during the evaluation process.
- Collect comprehensive background documentation and inform partners and selected project counterparts.
- Meet all travel related costs to project sites as part of the programme evaluation cost.
- Support and identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the evaluation.
- The programme staff members will be responsible for liaising with partners, logistical backstopping and providing relevant documentation and feedback to the evaluation team
- Organize inception meeting between the consultants, partners and stakeholders, including Government prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.

## 7. Composition, skills and experience of the evaluation team

The evaluation team shall consist of four consultants: an International consultant (team leader) and three national consultants. The national consultants will facilitate initial data collection prior to arrival of the Team/Lead evaluator. The Team Leader (International) will have the responsibility for the overall co-ordination of the evaluation and for the overall quality and timely submission of the evaluation report to the UNDP Liberia Country Office.

### **International Senior Consultant (1)**

- Possesses advanced university degree, demonstrate strong understanding of the Post-conflict development concepts and prior experience in programming in a post-conflict setting
- Proven experience of a minimum of 15 years at the international level, preferably with UN experience
- Proven knowledge of evaluation methodology and tools and demonstrate solid experience in evaluation
- Strong knowledge of the political, cultural and economic situation in West Africa
- Excellent writing and analytical skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines
- Fluency in English.

#### **Responsibilities**

- Documentation review
- Leading the evaluation team in planning, conducting and reporting on the evaluation.
- Deciding on division of labour within the evaluation team
- Use of best practice evaluation methodologies in conducting the evaluation
- Leading presentation of the draft evaluation findings and recommendations in-country
- Conducting the debriefing for UNDP and Partners
- Leading the drafting and finalization of the evaluation report

### **National Consultants (3)**

- Possess Post graduate university degree in one of the relevant subject areas (Governance, Conflict Prevention & Recovery and HIV/AIDS)
- Demonstrate sound understanding of the political environment and challenges in post-conflict development issues in Liberia
- Previous experience in conducting similar evaluations
- Excellent writing and analytical skills
- Ability to meet tight deadlines
- Computer literacy
- Fluency in English

#### **Responsibilities**

- Documentation review
- Informing on the social, economic and political context
- Contributing to the development of the evaluation plan and methodology
- Conducting those elements of the evaluation determined by the lead consultant
- Contributing to presentation of the evaluation findings and recommendations at the

evaluation wrap-up meeting

- Contributing to the drafting and finalization of the evaluation report.

## **8. Tentative Plan for evaluation implementation**

### **Tentative Scheme for proposed 60- day Evaluation mission**

- Deskwork at UNDP Liberia Country Office in Liberia ( 5 days)
- Mission planning, schedule of work in Monrovia ( 3 day)
- Documents review ( 5 days )
- UNDP CO, MPEA, UNCT etc briefing ( 5 days)
- Consultations in Monrovia, meetings with major stakeholders and partners ( 5 days)
- Collecting inputs and feedback of in-country donors (5 days)
- Visit to project sites, information gathering and analysis ( 10 days)
- Preparation of draft evaluation report ( 5 days)
- Briefing and debriefing sessions with UNDP CO, Government, donors and partners ( 5 days)
- Evaluation report finalisation and submission (10 days)
- Final Review and adoption by CO Evaluation Management Committee (2 days)

**Annexes.** The following documents will be provided to the Evaluation Team

- ✓ UNDP Quality Criteria for Evaluation Report
- ✓ Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
- ✓ UNDP Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators
- ✓ Mid Term Outcome Evaluation; LDDRRP, Capacity Building and Human Rights Awareness, Community Based Recovery report prepared Dr Fuat Andic in collaboration with Messrs Dan Saryee, Francis Maweah and Eric Nyanzeh in February 2006.
- ✓ Evaluation of the Preparatory Assistance Small Arms Control and Micro-Disarmament Programme in Liberia, Evaluation done for UNDP/BCPR Small Arms and Disarmament Unit, undertaken by Dr Abiodun Alao in September 2006
- ✓ External Mid Term Evaluation Report of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme in Liberia, written by Christian Bugnion, Director, Subur Consulting S.L., External Consultant and Team Leader; Luc Lafniere, UNDP BCPR Geneva; Sam Gbaydee Doe, External Consultant ESCU-UNMIL; Hirut Tefferi, External Consultant, UNICEF; Cerue Garlo, Consultant, Gender Activist for Peace and Human Rights in October 2006
- ✓ Programme and Project Documents
- ✓ Annual Reports

## **Annex 2. Documents reviewed**

Amnesty International. 2009. Lessons from Liberia: Reintegrating women in post-conflict Liberia. 3pp. At: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/002/2009/en/442e0181-c8e2-4057-81f6-d19ceddf0045/afr340022009en.pdf>.

Anderson, M.B. & Olson, L. 2003. Confronting war: Critical lessons for peace practitioners. 97pp. At: <http://69.36.179.111/publications/rpp/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf>.

Andic, F. 2006. Mid-term Outcome Evaluation: LDDRRP; Capacity Building and Human Rights Awareness; Community-based Recovery. UNDP. 45pp.

BEMFAM. No date. Attitude Against Violence Project in Brazil. 4pp. At: <http://www.gwg.in/data/gbv/publications/updates/GBV%20Update.pdf>.

Black, R. 2006. New dawn for Liberia's "blood forests". BBC News. 3pp. At: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6035617.stm>.

Bugnion, C; Lafrenière, L; Doe, SG; Tefferi, H; Garlo, C. 2006. External Mid-term Evaluation Report of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme in Liberia. UNDP. 54pp.

Bush, K. 1998. A measure of peace: Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) of development projects in conflict zones. 35pp. At: [http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10533919790A\\_Measure\\_of\\_Peace.pdf](http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10533919790A_Measure_of_Peace.pdf).

FAO. 2006. Liberia Forest Initiative: Achievements. 4pp. At: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/29664/en/>.

Gawler, M. 2005. Monitoring and Evaluation. In *Project Design in the context of Project Cycle Management*, pp 39-48. At: [http://www.artemis-services.com/downloads/sourcebook\\_0502.pdf](http://www.artemis-services.com/downloads/sourcebook_0502.pdf).

Global Witness. 2005. Global Witness welcomes the report of the Forest Concession Review Committee. 2pp. At: [http://www.globalwitness.org/media\\_library\\_detail.php/389/en/global\\_witness\\_welcomes\\_the\\_report\\_of\\_the\\_forest\\_c](http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/389/en/global_witness_welcomes_the_report_of_the_forest_c).

Government of Liberia. 2002a. The National Environmental Policy of the Republic of Liberia. 38pp. Can be found at: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/31586/en/>.

Government of Liberia. 2002b. An Act Adopting the Environment Protection and Management Law of the Republic of Liberia. 76pp. At: [http://www.epa.gov.lr/pdf/NEP\\_ACT.pdf](http://www.epa.gov.lr/pdf/NEP_ACT.pdf).

Government of Liberia. 2002c. An Act Creating the Environment Protection Agency of the Republic of Liberia. 46pp. At: [http://www.epa.gov.lr/pdf/EPA\\_ACT.pdf](http://www.epa.gov.lr/pdf/EPA_ACT.pdf).

Government of Liberia. 2004a. Millennium Development Goals Report 2004. 36pp. At: [http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Liberia/Liberia\\_MDGR\\_2004.pdf](http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Liberia/Liberia_MDGR_2004.pdf).

Government of Liberia. 2004b. Liberia's National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. 228pp. At: <http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/lr/lr-nbsap-01-p1-en.doc> and <http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/lr/lr-nbsap-01-p2-en.doc>.

Government of Liberia. 2005. An Act Creating the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission. 89pp. At: <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/lbr67266.pdf>.

Government of Liberia. 2006a. National Human Development Report 2006. 72pp. At: <http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Liberia/Liberia%20HDR.pdf>.

Government of Liberia. 2006b. An Act Adopting the National Forestry Reform Law of 2006. 54p. Can be found at: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/31586/en/>.

Government of Liberia. 2006c. National Forestry Policy and Implementation Strategy. 29pp. Can be found at: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/31586/en/>.

Government of Liberia. 2007. Demographic Health Survey – preliminary report.

Government of Liberia. 2008a. 2008 National population and housing census: Preliminary results. 18pp. At: [http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/census\\_2008provisionalresults.pdf](http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/census_2008provisionalresults.pdf).

Government of Liberia. 2008b. Liberia's Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 2008. 60pp. At: <http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/RecentPublic/Liberia-MDG-Report-2008-small.pdf>.

Government of Liberia. 2008c. Appraisal of Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project (URIRP) – P113099: Mission aide memoire. 70pp.

Government of Liberia. 2008d. Letter, IDA Financing Grant Number H256 – Emergency Infrastructure Project Supplemental Component, January 24, 2008. 2pp.

Government of Liberia. 2008e. Poverty Reduction Strategy. 188pp.

Government of Liberia, UNDP, UNMIL & WB. 2006. Joint project implementation document for the rehabilitation of the Zorzor-Voinjama road. 18pp.

Hlongwana, KW et al. 2009. Community knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) on malaria in Swaziland. Malaria Journal 8. At: <http://malariajournal.com/content/8/1/29>. See also: Household Survey KAP Baseline 2007 Swaziland. 5pp. At: <http://malariajournal.com/content/supplementary/1475-2875-8-29-s1.pdf>.

IASC. 2005. Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings. 87pp. At: [http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib\\_pub\\_file/716\\_filename\\_gender\\_gbv2005.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/716_filename_gender_gbv2005.pdf).

IFAD. 2004. Independent External Evaluation of IFAD Inception Report, Final Version, 1 March 2004. 88pp.

IGWG. 2003. Successful Approaches in Educating or Changing Men's Attitudes. Pp 87-129 in *Reaching Men to Improve Reproductive Health for All*. USAID Interagency Gender Working Group. At: <http://www.jhuccp.org/igwg/guide/chap7.pdf>.

IMF. 2007. IMF Executive Board Discusses Liberia's Progress under Staff-Monitored Program. At: <http://imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2007/pr07160.htm>.

IUCN. 2009. Liberia joins IUCN family. 1p. At: <http://cms.iucn.org/about/union/members/resources/news/?uNewsID=2743>.

Johnson, K, Kennedy, S.B., Harris, A.O., Lincoln, A., Neace, W. and Collins, D. 2005. Strengthening the HIV/AIDS service delivery system in Liberia: an international research capacity-building strategy. *Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice* 11 (3) 257-273.

Kaliyaperumal, K. 2004. Guideline for Conducting Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) Study. At: [http://laico.org/v2020resource/files/guideline\\_kap\\_Jan\\_mar04.pdf](http://laico.org/v2020resource/files/guideline_kap_Jan_mar04.pdf).

Lambert, H & McKevitt, C. 2002. Anthropology in health research: from qualitative methods to multidisciplinary. *BMJ* 325. At: <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/325/7357/210>.

Launiala, A. 2009. How much can a KAP survey tell us about people's knowledge, attitudes and practices? Some observations from medical anthropology research on malaria in pregnancy in Malawi. *Anthropology Matters Journal* 11 (1). At: [http://www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/2009-1/launiala\\_2009\\_how.pdf](http://www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/2009-1/launiala_2009_how.pdf).

LISGIS. 2008. Liberia Participatory Poverty Assessment. 33pp. At: [http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/RecentPublic/PPA\\_report.pdf](http://www.lr.undp.org/Documents/RecentPublic/PPA_report.pdf).

Mongabay. 2009. Liberia environmental profile. 4pp. At: <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20liberia.htm>.

Mugabi, E. 2006. Mid-term Evaluation of the Good Governance Project. UNDP. 22pp.

NTGL. 2005. Results Focused Transitional Framework. 185pp. At: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2005.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/ACIO-6C2MY-ntgl-lib-30apr.pdf/\\$File/ntgl-lib-30apr.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2005.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/ACIO-6C2MY-ntgl-lib-30apr.pdf/$File/ntgl-lib-30apr.pdf).

OECD. 2005. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 8pp. At: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf>.

Pugel, J. 2007. What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia. UNDP Liberia. 74pp. At: <http://www.lr.undp.org/UNDPwhatFightersSayLiberia-2006.pdf>.

Refugees International. 2005. Liberia: Payments to Disarmed Child Soldiers Create Protection Problems. *RI Bulletin*, January 26, 2005. 2pp.

Sato, A. 2008. Is HIV/AIDS a Threat to Security in Fragile States? 31pp. At:  
<http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/is-hiv-aids-a-threat-to-security-in-fragile-states/attachment>.

Sendolo, J. 2009a. Our country's coffer is bleeding. In: *Liberian Daily Observer* Vol. 12 No. 356, pp 1 & 10.

Sendolo, J. 2009b. Let's battle corruption in the education system. In: *Liberian Daily Observer* Vol. 12 No. 369.

Stanton, BF; Clemens, JD; Aziz, KMA & Rahman, M. 1987. Twenty-four-hour recall, knowledge-attitude-practice questionnaires, and direct observations of sanitary practices: a comparative study. *Bulletin of the WHO* (65: 2: 217-222). At:  
<http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=2490842&blobtype=pdf>.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2008. Strategy for Development Cooperation with Liberia, July 2008 - June 2013. 22pp.

Tokpa, A. and Yengbeh, V.A. 2008. Inception Report for the Terminal Evaluation of Government of Liberia / UNDP Liberia Country Programme: 2004-2007. UNDP. 47pp.

UNDP. 2003. Human Development Report 2003. 367pp.

UNDP. 2004. Human Development Report 2004. 285pp.

UNDP. 2005. Human Development Report 2005. 372pp.

UNDP. 2006a. Human Development Report 2006. 422pp.

UNDP. 2006b. The Evaluation Policy of UNDP. DP2006/28. 13pp. At:  
<http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>.

UNDP. 2006c. State of the Environment Report for Liberia 2006. 132pp. At:  
<http://www.lr.undp.org/State%20of%20the%20environment%20report%20final.pdf>.

UNDP. 2007. Human Development Report 2007/2008. 384pp.

UNDP. 2009. Annual Report 2009. 40pp. At:  
[http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2009/pdf/EN\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2009/pdf/EN_FINAL.pdf).

UNDP. No date. Ethical code of conduct for UNDP evaluations. 1p. At:  
[http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/erc/Code\\_of\\_Conduct.doc](http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/erc/Code_of_Conduct.doc)

UNDP & UNPFA. 2007. Draft country programme document for Liberia (2008-2012). 7pp. At: <http://www.undp.org/execbrd/word/DPDCPLBR1.doc>.

UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002a. Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results. 140pp. At: <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/HandBook/ME-HandBook.pdf>.



UNDP Evaluation Office. 2002b. Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators. 27pp. At:  
<http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/HandBook/OC-guidelines/Guidelines-for-OutcomeEvaluators-2002.pdf>

UNDP Evaluation Office. No date. Evaluation report. 5pp. At:  
[http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/erc/documents/Evaluation\\_Report.doc](http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/erc/documents/Evaluation_Report.doc)

UNDP Liberia. 2003. UNDP Liberia Post-Conflict Strategy 2004/2005. UNDP. 4+2pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2004a. Annual Report 2004. UNDP. 35pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2004b. Liberia, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme, Draft Trust Fund Activity Report, Volume II, September 2004 - March 2005. 110pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2004c. Final Review Report, Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management, Project ID: 00013436, April 2004 - March 2008. 7pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2005a. Annual Report 2005. UNDP. 39pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2005b. Current RR Activities Supported by the UNDP Trust Fund. 62pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2005c. EB Documents (CPO) / Liberia. 2pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2005d. Final Review, Energy and the Environment, Project ID: 0044606. 5pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2006a. Annual Report 2006. UNDP. 45pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2006b. Final Review, PA for Small Arms and Micro Disarmament in Liberia, Project ID: 00044567, April 2005 - June 2006. 7pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2006d. Final Review, Communications Project, Project ID: 00052583. 5pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2006e. Letter, Joint WB/UNMIL/GOL & UNDP Voinjama/Zorzor Road Rehabilitation Project. 1pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2007a. Annual Report 2007. UNDP. 36pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2007b. Final Report, LBR-304-GO3-M: Malaria Control and Prevention Through Partnership. 18pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2007c. Final Report, LBR-202-GO1-H-00: Strengthening of HIV and AIDS Prevention, Care and Treatment. 21pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2007d. Final Report, LBR-GO2-T: Strengthening of Tuberculosis Control and the Management of People with TB/HIV Co-infection.

UNDP Liberia. 2007e. Final Review, Diamonds for Development, Project ID: 00055457.

UNDP Liberia. 2007f. Closure – Global Fund Grants Round 2 & Round 3.

UNDP Liberia. 2008a. Vulnerability Assessment Mapping Project ID 00013428. 6pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008b. Minutes, Final Review Meeting, “Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management,” 20 March 2008.

UNDP Liberia. 2008c. Final Project Report for the Protection of IDPs Project, Project ID: 00033226. 4pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008d. Final Review Meeting, Diamonds for Development (D4D), March 28, 2008. 5pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008e. Final Project Review, “Giving Women a Voice and Leadership Role in Decision-Making and Peace-building”. 6pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008f. Minutes, UNDP-Liberia Outcome Board Meeting, 19 March 2008. 5pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008g. Minutes, UNDP Outcome Board Meeting, Democratic Governance Pillar: Strengthening State and Institutional Capacity, 31 March 2008. 4pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008h. Minutes, UNDP Outcome Board Meeting, Strengthening Local Capacity for Environmental and Natural Resources Management (SCENRM) in Liberia, April 10, 2008. 7pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008i. Country Programme Action Plan 2008-2012. 24pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008j. Final Review Meeting, “Vulnerability Assessment Mapping,” 7pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008k. Final Review, Communications Budget (2006-2007). 7pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008l. Final Review Meeting, Communications Budget Project ID: 00052583, 26 March 2008. UNDP. 2pp.

UNDP Liberia. 2008m. Final Review Meeting, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons Report, 27 March 2008. UNDP. 8pp.

UNDP Liberia. No date-a. Country Programme Outline, UNDP Liberia 2003-2005. 4+3pp.

UNDP Liberia. No date-b. Proposed CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006. 7+6pp.

UNDP Liberia. No date-c. Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006. 7+6pp.

UNDP Liberia. No date-d. CBRD IP Listing. 4pp.

UNDP Liberia. No date-e. UNDP Combined Delivery Report by Activity with Encumbrance, Report ID: ungl143b. 6pp.

- UNEG. 2005. Standards for evaluation in the UN system. 23pp. At: [http://www.uneval.org/documentdownload?doc\\_id=22&file\\_id=128](http://www.uneval.org/documentdownload?doc_id=22&file_id=128)
- UNEG. 2007. Ethical guidelines for evaluation. 13pp. At: [http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/erc/documents/Code\\_of\\_Conduct.doc](http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/erc/documents/Code_of_Conduct.doc)
- UNFPA. 2003. Addressing violence against women: Piloting and programming. 39pp. At: [http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib\\_pub\\_file/361\\_filename\\_gbv\\_report.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/361_filename_gbv_report.pdf).
- UNFPA. 2006. Ending Violence Against Women: Programming for Prevention, Protection and Care. 77pp. At: <http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2007/endingvaw.pdf>
- UNFPA. 2009. Ending Widespread Violence Against Women. 4pp. At: <http://www.unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm>.
- UNICEF. 2005. Evaluation of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Programme for Children Associated with the Fighting Forces in Liberia. 80pp.
- UNICEF & GoL 1999. *Impact of Underdevelopment, Debt, and War on Liberia's Children*, Monrovia.
- United Nations. 2000. United Nations Millennium Declaration. 6pp. At: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm>.
- United Nations. 2002. Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 for Liberia. 70pp. At: <http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/lib03.pdf>.
- United Nations. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 38pp. At: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>.
- United Nations. 2006. Common Country Assessment – Liberia: Consolidating Peace and National Recovery for Sustainable Development. 43pp.
- United Nations in Liberia. 2008. United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Liberia 2008-2012. 53pp. At: [http://unliberia.org/doc/undaf\\_doc.pdf](http://unliberia.org/doc/undaf_doc.pdf).
- United Nations Panel of Experts on Liberia. 2008. Personal communication.
- United Nations Security Council. 2000. Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. At: <http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html>.
- US Department of State. 2009. 2008 Human Rights Report: Liberia. At: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119009.htm>.
- USAID & UNDP. 2007. First steps in post-conflict state-building: A UNDP-USAID study. 74pp.

Voker, J.T. 2008. Status of development and implementation of Liberia Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans. 19pp. At: <https://www.cbd.int/doc/nbsap/nbsapcbw-wafr-01/nbsapcbw-wafr-01-lr-01-en.pdf>.

Walker, S. 2009. HIV/AIDS, Security and Conflict: New Realities, New Responses. At: [http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/working-papers/HIV\\_AIDS%2C%20Security%20and%20Conflict.pdf](http://asci.researchhub.ssrc.org/working-papers/HIV_AIDS%2C%20Security%20and%20Conflict.pdf).

WatchList. 2004. Nothing Left to Lose: The Legacy of Armed Conflict and Liberia's Children. 48pp. At: <http://www.watchlist.org/reports/pdf/liberia.report.pdf>.

Woods, J.T. 2007. Liberia forest sector: Governance and reform. Liberia Forest Development Authority. 40pp. At: [http://www.fao.org/forestry/foris/data/cofo/2007/woods\\_john\\_t\\_liberia\\_forest\\_sector\\_governance\\_and\\_reform.pdf](http://www.fao.org/forestry/foris/data/cofo/2007/woods_john_t_liberia_forest_sector_governance_and_reform.pdf).

Woods, J., Blundell, A.G. & Simpson, R. 2008. Investment in the Liberian forest sector: A road map to legal forest operations in Liberia. 7pp. At: <http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/publications/LiberiaGuidelinesEng.pdf>.

World Bank. 2006. Project Document on a Proposed Grant from the Trust Fund for Liberia: Development Forestry Sector Management Project, August 17, 2006. World Bank. 45pp.

World Health Organization. 2005. Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment, Liberia. By Prof. Marie-Claire O. Omanyondo. 63pp. At: [http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia\\_RESULTS\\_AND\\_DISCUSSION13.pdf](http://www.who.int/hac/crises/lbr/Liberia_RESULTS_AND_DISCUSSION13.pdf)

World Health Organization. 2009a. Violence Prevention – The Evidence – Promoting Gender Equality to Prevent Violence against Women. 18pp. At: [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/gender.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/gender.pdf).

World Health Organization. 2009b. Violence Prevention – The Evidence – Changing Cultural and Social Norms that Support Violence. 18pp. At: [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/norms.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/norms.pdf).

World Health Organization. 2009c. Violence Prevention – The Evidence – Reducing Violence through Victim Identification, Care and Support Programmes. 20pp. At: [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/programmes.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/programmes.pdf).

### Annex 3. Interview guide / questionnaire

#### UNDP Liberia Country Programme 2004 - 2007 Terminal Evaluation

#### INTERVIEW GUIDE / QUESTIONNAIRE

You have been selected as a key source for input for a terminal external evaluation of the UNDP Liberia Country Programme from 2004 to 2007. The evaluation covers six strategic programme areas:

7. Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR)
8. Community-based Recovery (CBR)
9. Democratic Governance (DG)
10. Building Capacity for HIV/AIDS Response (HIV)
11. Human Rights / Protection / Gender (HRPG)
12. Environmental Management (EM).

The review is being carried out by a team of independent consultants:

- Meg Gawler ([meg@artemis-services.com](mailto:meg@artemis-services.com)); tel: +231 77 200 255
- Alaric Tokpa ([alamintogba@yahoo.com](mailto:alamintogba@yahoo.com)); tel: +231 6 817 444
- Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr. ([vyengbeh@yahoo.com](mailto:vyengbeh@yahoo.com)); tel: +231 6 514 552.

The purpose of this interview guide is to provide quantitative and qualitative data to the evaluation. There are 14 questions on the programme from 2004 to 2007.

**All interviews and questionnaires will be treated in the strictest confidence.** They will not be passed on to anyone. Information will be aggregated by stakeholder group, synthesized, and presented in a report to UNDP. If direct citations are used, the identity of the respondent will be kept anonymous. **Your views are extremely valuable for this exercise. We realize that your time is precious, and we thank you very much for your input to the review.**

IDENTIFICATION	
Your LAST Name:	
Your First Name:	
Position*:	
Organization*:	
Location*:	
Your email:	
Your telephone:	
Male / female:	
Please indicate which stakeholder group you belong to:	<input type="checkbox"/> UNDP
	<input type="checkbox"/> Government
	<input type="checkbox"/> Civil society organization / NGO / private sector
	<input type="checkbox"/> Direct beneficiaries
	<input type="checkbox"/> Donors
Please indicate which programme area(s) you will be responding to:	<input type="checkbox"/> Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Community-based Recovery (CBR)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Democratic Governance (DG)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Building Capacity for HIV/AIDS Response (HIV)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Human Rights / Protection / Gender (HRPG)
	<input type="checkbox"/> Environmental Management (EM)
* during the time you were involved with the UNDP Programme	

Date:	
-------	--

Interviewed by: \_\_\_\_\_

**IN THE TABLES, PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING BROAD STATEMENTS BY IDENTIFYING THE PROGRAMME AREA(S) ON THE LEFT THAT YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH; THEN TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO THE RIGHT THAT BEST SUMMARIZES TO WHAT EXTENT YOU AGREE, AND THEN EXPLAIN.**

Your Organization - Please complete this questionnaire if you were involved in UNDP's Programme during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007:

**0. How and when was your organization involved with the UNDP Liberia Programme from 2004 to 2007?**

**Did your organization receive funds from UNDP or that passed through UNDP?**

**Most Significant Change**

1. Thinking about all the effects that this Programme Area had from 2004 to 2007, what, in your opinion, has been the most significant change of all? Why is this change important?

**Design and Relevance**

2. The programme area responded to the priority issues of the country from 2004 to 2007.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								

Please explain:

**Partnership Strategy**

3. The programme area had an effective partnership strategy from 2004 to 2007.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								

<b>HIV</b>							
<b>HRPG</b>							
<b>EM</b>							

Please explain:

4. What was UNDP's contribution – financial and “soft” assistance (from 2004 to 2007)?
5. What was the Government's contribution – financial and “soft” assistance (from 2004 to 2007)?
6. What was the contribution of Partners – financial and “soft” assistance (from 2004 to 2007)?

### Effectiveness

7. The programme area achieved its desired outcomes from 2004 to 2007.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								

Please explain:

### Efficiency

8. The programme area achieved results at a reasonable cost in terms of human and financial resources from 2004 to 2007.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								

Please explain:

### Degree of Change

9. The programme area enhanced peace and security in Liberia from 2004 to 2007.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								

Please explain:

10. From 2004 to 2007 the programme area made a substantial contribution to the Millennium Development Goals.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								

Please explain:

### Sustainability

11. The results of the programme area from 2004 to 2007 were sustainable during 2008 without further support.

Prog. Area		Don't know		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral or Mixed Opinion	Agree	Strongly agree
<b>DDRR</b>								
<b>CBR</b>								
<b>DG</b>								
<b>HIV</b>								
<b>HRPG</b>								
<b>EM</b>								



Please explain:

12. Please identify the strengths and/or weaknesses of the programme area from 2004 to 2007, as you see them:
13. What lessons were learned from this programme area from 2004 to 2007 that might have generic application?
14. What recommendations would you make for the next phase?

Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS EVALUATION!

#### **Annex 4. List of evaluation respondents**

<b>LAST Name</b>	<b>First Name</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Organization, Location</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Stakeholder Group</b>	<b>Strat. Prog. Area</b>
ACKATIA	Patrick	CCC	Concerned Christian Community, Monrovia	Program Officer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
AIBINU	Adermi	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Technical Coordinator, DDDR	M	UNDP	DDRR
AL-MASUD	Mohammed	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Head of M&E	M	UNDP	All
ARKU	Moses S.	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa Country	Project Officer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
ASSALE	Philippe	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Programme Support Specialist DDDR	M	UNDP	DDRR
ASUMANA	Patrick M.	CU	Cuttington University - Suacoco, Bong County	Piggery Trainer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
BADIO	Moses	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	Data Manager	M	Government	HIV
BAO-IN	Joan	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Project Support Officer	F	UNDP	DDRR
BAYO	Manaseh S. K.	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Programme Manager, HRPG	M	UNDP	HRPG
BAYON	Esther	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
BAYSAH	Jallah K.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Interim Committee Chairman; Major in Nursing	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
BARCO	Atu	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
BEST	Kenneth Y.	LOC	Liberian Observer Corporation, Monrovia	Publisher & Managing Director	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
BLACKIE	Alex	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM

BOYE	Thorvald	Norway	Norwegian Embassy, Abidjan	Counselor	M	Donors	DDRR, HRPG
BOYEE	ORETHA	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
BROWN	J. Gbleh-bo	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Project Coordinator CBR	M	UNDP	CBR
BROWN	James	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	M	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
BRYANT	Charles Gyude	NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia, Monrovia	Chairman & Head of State, 2003 – 2005	M	Government	All
CAESAR	Hon. Dr. Ruth G.	NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, Monrovia	Deputy Executive Director for Operations	F	Government	DDRR
CARLON	Dr. S. Jabaru	GC	Governance Commission, Monrovia	Commissioner	M	Government	DG
CATAKAW	B. Miller	LUP / COTOL	LUP/COTOL, Monrovia	Acting Secretary General	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
CHAPIN	Rachel	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	Training Coordinator	F	Government	HIV
COLE	Samuel	NEC	National Elections Commission, Monrovia	Director of Civic and Voter Education	M	Government	DG
COLE	Winifred	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
COOPER	Josephine	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
DANIELS	Adolphus K.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Junior Student, Accounting & Management	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
DANNIE	David	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DARPOH	Josephine	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Caregiver	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
DARWOLO	John G.	NEC	National Elections Commission, Monrovia	Manager of Human Resources	M	Government	DG
DARZAKOLU	Youngor	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Chief	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
DAVIES	Kruba	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation,	Client	F	Direct	HIV

			Monrovia			Beneficiary	
DAYLUE-BERNARD	Atty. Zeor	AFELL	Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, Monrovia	First Vice President	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG
DENNIS	John R.	NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, Monrovia	Special Assistant/Assistant Executive Director	M	Government	DDRR
DOGBEY	James	NEC	National Elections Commission, Monrovia	Director of Information Technology	M	Government	DG
DOGOOD	Kou	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DOGOOD	Namie	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DOGOOD	Noun	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DOLO	Esther	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DOLO	Yatee	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
DOMAH	Reuben	KENC	Kakata Environmental Nature Club - Kakata, Margibi County	Acting President	M	CSO / NGO / PS	EM
DONNIE	Ben Turtur	EPA	Environmental Protection Agency, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	Government	EM
DUNBAR	Ernest J.	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	IT Manager	M	Government	HIV
DUO	Edna	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
DUO	Korpo	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
ENTSUA	George	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation	Project Manager	M	CSO / NGO / PS	HIV
FAHNBALLEH	D. Ambulai	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
FAHNBALLEH	Maima	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
FAHNBULEH	Saybah	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG

FAYIA	Kumba	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
FELLO, II	John B.	CEGCM	Civic Education and Good Citizenship Movement, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DG, HRPG
FLOMO	Lorpu	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Chief, DDC Representative & Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
FODAY, SR.	David G.	CCC	Concerned Christian Community, Monrovia	Deputy Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
FORKPAH	Gayduo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
FORKPAH	Vesselee	NUCE	Nuukili United Construction Enterprise – Kolahun, Lofa County	Supervisor	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
FROMAYAN	Hon. James M.	NEC	National Elections Commission, Monrovia	Chairman	M	Government	DG
GAYAH	Mama	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GBADEKOLU	Lorpu	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GBALAKPAH	Yassah	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GBAYGULO	Doris	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
GBOLEH	Mama	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GEETEH	Jerry	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Canteen Manager	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
GENAYAN	Korto	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GOLOKAI	Nessie	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Assistant Resident Representative/Programme – ARR/Governance	F	UNDP	DG
GONTEE	Joseph	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
GONTEE	Voin	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM

GOUYAN	Jallah A. M.	NDS	National Drug Service, Monrovia	M & E Coordinator	M	Government	HIV
GOWEE	Kebbeh	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Member of Management Committee	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GOWEE	Lorpu	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
GREAVES	Frances	WONGOSOL	Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia, Monrovia	2 <sup>nd</sup> Vice Chair, Board of Directors	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG
GUAN	Doris	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
GULLEY	Tom N.	NDS	National Drug Service, Monrovia	Managing Director	M	Government	HIV
GUYAN	Alice	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
HARRIS	Elizabeth	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
HARRIS	Gayduo	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
HASSAN	Vivian Kemah	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Senator, College of Nursing	F	Direct Beneficiary	DG
HERBERT	Christian G.	MPEA	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs, Monrovia	Minister of Planning, 2004-2006; Leadership on RIMCO issues (now Transport Economist/Consultant at Ministry of Public Works)	M	Government	All
HOWARD	Roosevelt	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	Volunteer	M	Government	HIV
IONKOVA	Kremena	WB	World Bank, Monrovia	Urban Specialist, Urban and Water Group, Africa Region	F	Donors	WB
JACKOLLIE	Mulbah S.	BWI	Booker Washington Institute, Kakata	Principal	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
JACKSON	Louise T.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Junior Student; Management & Economics	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
JALLABAH	Siennah	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation,	Client	F	Direct	HIV

			Monrovia			Beneficiary	
JALLAH	Alice	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
JALLAH	Oretha	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
JOHANSEN	Hilde	NORWAY	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway), Oslo	Senior Adviser	F	Donors	DDRR, HRP
JOHNSON	Boye	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Programme Assistant	M	UNDP	EM
JOHNSON	Daniel D.	FIND	Foundation for International Dignity, Monrovia	National Program Officer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR, CBR, HRP
JOHNSON	Lewis	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Junior Student, Nursing	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
JONES	JanJay	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	Deputy Program Manager M & E Surveillance	M	Government	HIV
JOSIAH	Dennis G.	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	M & E Assistant	M	Government	HIV
KAHNPLAYE	B. Wilson	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Senior	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
KALLON	Tejanie	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	M	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
KAMARA	Massam	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KAMARA	Sedekie B.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Representative, Sophomore Class	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
KANDA	Ndomanii Saa	RIMCO	Results-Focused Transitional Framework Implementation & Monitoring Committee, Monrovia	National Planning and Policy Advisor, 2004-2006 (now National Programme Officer with UNAIDS)	M	Government	DG
KARNUE	Oliver M.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	President of JIU Students; Senior Student, Agriculture	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
KEATING	Maria-Threase	UNDP	United Nations Development	Deputy Resident	F	UNDP	All

			Programme, Monrovia	Representative/Program me			
KESSELY	Bleedee	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Mother & Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
KESSELY	Gayduo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KESSELY	Kebbeh	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KIALAIN	Dr. David	GC	Governance Commission, Monrovia	Senior Public Sector Manager	M	Government	DG
KIAZOLU	Massa	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
KING	Albert	YWCA	YWCA – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Trainee	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
KOLLIA	Nemiah	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
KOLLIE	Joseph M.	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainer, Auto Mechanics	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
KOLLIE	Kormassa	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KOLLIE	Momo G.	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care, Monrovia	Finance Officer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG
KOLLIE	Varbah	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KOLUBAH	Abraham D.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Principal	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
KONAH	Korpo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KONIAHSAYE	SULAH	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
KORMAH	Saybah	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainee	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
KORTIMAI	Agnes F.	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care, Monrovia	Executive Director	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG



KORTIMAI	Korpo Solbor	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care, Monrovia	Assistant Coordinator for Human Rights	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG
KORTU	Esther	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Acting Chair Lady	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
KORVAH	Prince M.	UMUSU	United Methodist University Student Union, Monrovia	President	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
KPAIWON	Joseph V.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
KRAYEE	Sarah	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
KROMAH	Miatta	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
KUMEH	Agnes	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
KUMEH	Yvonne	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
LABLAH	Moses J.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
MADY-YUU	Moses B.	NDM	New Deal Movement, Monrovia	Acting National Chairman	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
MAIWEIN	Garmai	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
MAMA	Lorpu	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
MAMAI	Sonnie	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
MASON	Sonnie	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Clan Chief & Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
MASSAH	Moses	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Programme Manager Energy and Environment	M	UNDP	EM
MASSALEY	Korpo	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
MASSAQUOI	James K.	GBAG	Grand Bassa Agricultural Group – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Administrator	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
MASSAQUOI	Molly	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Assistant Farm Manager	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR

MATHEWS	Lancedell	NARDA	New African Research and Development Agency, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR, CBR, DG, HRPG
MATOR, JR.	David K.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Chief Accountant	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
MATTHEWS	Juebah V.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Junior, Nursing	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
MAWOLO	James	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainee	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
MENDOABO	Sarah Z.	TMHS	Tappeh Memorial High School – Tappita, Nimba County	Mayor of Tappita	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
MIANTONA	G. Edward	TMHS	Tappeh Memorial High School – Tappita, Nimba County	Registrar of Tappeh Memorial High School	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
MIENWIPIA	Abraham	BENC	Buchanan Environmental Nature Club – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	General Secretary	M	CSO / NGO / PS	EM
MORIBAH	Simeon	MPEA UNDP	Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs; United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs and Policy, 2006-2008; Assistant Resident Representative/Program me (now with the Mano River Union as Deputy Secretary General)	M	Government	All
MOMO	TUON	RADP	Rural Agricultural and Development Programme	Secretary	F	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
MULBAH	Soko	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Upper Junior Student, Theology & Sociology	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
MULBAH	Victoria	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
NEH	Cornelius	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
NEH	Rufina	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
NELSON	Tovian Estella	LIWOMAC	Liberia Women Media Action	Executive Director	F	CSO / NGO /	HRPG

			Committee, Monrovia			PS	
NEOR	Marthaline	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
N'GELE	Edward M. O.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Assistant Director & Curator of Africana Museum	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
NIELSEN	Jenny	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Procurement Specialist	F	UNDP	WB
NOMBIAH	Augustus	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Acting Town Chief	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
NOMBIAH	Dyrus	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
NOMBIAH	Mucy	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
NOMBIAH	Sphean	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
NUAH	Veronica	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
NYALEY	Gertrude W. K.	FDA	Forestry Development Authority, Monrovia	Administrative Assistant	F	Government	EM
NYANAMA	Roland	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	M & E Officer Global Fund	M	UNDP	HIV
NYELLA	James T.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Mobilizer; Major in agriculture	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
OSTMAN	Anders	SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Minister of Swedish Embassy (now Country Manager for Liberia)	M	Donors	DDRR, CBR, DG, HRP
PAJIBO	Sarah	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Market Superintendent	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
PARLEH	Augustine	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	M & E Assistant	M	Government	HIV
PAYE	John	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Upper Junior Student, Theology & Education	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
PEWEE	Famatta	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG

PRATT	Victor	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation	Administrative Assistant	M	CSO / NGO / PS	HIV
QUEBEHN	John G.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
QUELLU	Paul V. S.	RADP	Rural Agricultural and Development Programme – Gbarnga, Bong County	President	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
QUOI	Boima	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
QUOINGEWU	Kebbeh	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
RAILEY	Olivia	BENC	Buchanan Environmental Nature Club – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Member	F	CSO / NGO / PS	EM
REEVES	Wilmot A.	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	National Economist	M	UNDP	DG
RYAN	Jordan	UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia, Monrovia	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UN Resident Coordinator in Liberia	M	UNMIL	All
SAAH	Tawah	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
SAM	Dominic	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Country Director	M	UNDP	All
SANKAITUAH	Joseph Jimmy	FLY	Federation of Liberian Youth, Monrovia	President	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DG
SARKOR	Evangeline S.	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	M & E Data Processor	F	Government	HIV
SARYEE	Dan	LDI	Liberia Democratic Initiative, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DG
SATURDAY	Baindu T.	WONGOSOL	Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia, Monrovia	1 <sup>st</sup> Vice Chair, Board of Directors	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HRPG
SAWYER	Dr. Amos C.	GC	Governance Commission, Monrovia	Chairman	M	Government	DG
SAYE-KEHNEL	Julius Y.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	President, Nimba University Student	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG

				Association			
SEI-KORKPOR	N. Sam	ZADC	Zao Development Council, Ganta City	General Coordinator	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
SENGBE	Dr. W. Kpangbala	NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, Monrovia	Psychotherapist/Program Manager	M	Government	DDRR
SESAY	Kollie	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Class President	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
SEVELEE	Robert B.	GBAG	Grand Bassa Agricultural Group – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Program Officer	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
SHAH	Zainulabedin	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Finance Manager GFATM/UNDP	M	UNDP	HIV
SHANNON	Dr. Eugene	MLME	Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy, Monrovia	Minister	M	Government	EM
SHERIFF	Boima	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
SHERIFF	Fatima	KENC	Kakata Environmental Nature Club – Kakata, Margibi County	Financial Secretary	F	CSO / NGO / PS	EM
SHERIFF	Haja	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainee	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
SHERIFF	Makula	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainee	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
SHERIFF	Mayama	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
SHERIFF	Zoe	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
SHERMAN	Ben	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
SIAFFA	Amelia	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
SIEH	Sonpon B.	NACP	National AIDS STD Control Program, Monrovia	Acting Deputy Program Manager for Programs	M	Government	HIV
SIENNEH	Klubo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
SIRLEAF	George	ACDRSI	All Christian Development & Relief Services International, Brewerville City	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR

SIRLEAF	Hawa K.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Vice President; Junior Student, Management & Economics	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
SIRLEAF	Sando	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Senior Student, Nursing	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
SOLON	James S. N.	RADP	Rural Agricultural and Development Programme	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
SONII	Massa	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
SONII	Varney	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
SORSOR	Mary	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
SULUNTEH	G. Kevin	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Accountant	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
SUMO	Garmai	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
TAIKERWEYAH	Olive Y.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Sophomore Student, Accounting & Management	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
TAMAGNINI	Andrea	RRR – UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Monrovia	Director of Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery – RRR	M	UNDP	DDRR
TAMBA	Samuel	JUNDU	Jundu Community, Grand Cape Mount County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
TARNUE	Rufus	MLME	Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy, Monrovia	Director, Department of Energy	M	Government	EM
TEWOLDE	Assefan	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Head of DEX Service Centre 2004-2008	M	UNDP	WB
TOCLO	Arthur S.	BENC	Buchanan Environmental Nature Club – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Students Coordinator, St. Peter Claver's Catholic High School	M	CSO / NGO / PS	EM
TOE	Sametta S.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Upper Junior, Nursing	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
TOEKPEI	Paye M.	ZADC	Zao Development Council (ZADC), Inc. Ganta City	Deputy Coordinator of Administration and	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR

				Finance			
TOGBA	Jappa	SAH	Society for the Advancement of Humanity, Inc., Monrovia	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
TOKPA	Lisa	SP	Samaritan's Purse International Relief, Monrovia	OVC Program Coordinator	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HIV
TRAORE	Mariam H.	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Program Manager GFATM/UNDP	F	UNDP	HIV
TUGBA	Samuel T.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Senator of Junior Class	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG
VASSELEE	Mary	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Vice Principal	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
VESSELEE	Krubo	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
VOWU	Lorpu	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WAH	G. E. Theophilus	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Senior Accountant/Facilitator/JI U/2006-2007	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
WAMAH, JR.	G. Morris	LIDS	Liberia Initiative for Developmental Services – Gbarnga, Bong County	Administrative Assistant	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR HRPG
WASHINGTON	Abraham	CESP	Christian Empowerment and Sustainable Program – Voinjama, Lofa County	Trainee	M	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
WASHINGTON	Kebbeh	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WAYONGAR	Samuel G.	VHI	Volunteers for Homeless International, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR
WEAFAR	Reginald P.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	General Secretary	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
WEAH	Danica	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
WENSAYA	YEAH	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
WESLEY	Gayduo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WILLIAMS	George Sie	ULSU	University of Liberia Student Union,	President	M	Direct	DG

			Monrovia			Beneficiary	
WILLIE	Charstane	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
WILLIE	James	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
WILLIE	John M.	LIDS	Liberia Initiative for Developmental Services – Gbarnga, Bong County	MED Supervisor	M	CSO / NGO / PS	CBR HRP
WILLIE	Kruba	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Assistant Chair Person & Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WILLIE	Mater	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	F	Direct Beneficiary	EM
WILLIE	Stanie	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
WILSON	Korpo	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WILSON	Terri	LOAF	Liberia Orphans of AIDS Foundation, Monrovia	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HIV
WITHERSPOON, SR.	Rev. Jervis A.	NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, Monrovia	Executive Director	M	Government	DDRR
WOHN-A-NEHN	Yaularia B.	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Junior Student; Nursing	F	Direct Beneficiary	DDRR
WOLO	Yvonne N. J.	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme, Monrovia	Programme Associate M&E	F	UNDP	All
WOLOBAH	Lorpu	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
WOODS	John T.	FDA	Forestry Development Authority, Monrovia	Managing Director	M	Government	EM
YAMAH	Klubo	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
YARKPAWOLO	John V.	GPS	Gbanway Public School, Lofa County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
YARKPAWOLO	Nennie	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
YARSIAH	Kebbeh	ACU	Alakaminee Credit Union – Salayea, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG



YENNEH	Dormuwa	WCU	Woulamai Credit Union – Voinjama, Lofa County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
YORGOLDMER	Rev. Salome V.	FHS	Firestone Health Services, Firestone	RN, Coordinator/Counselor	F	CSO / NGO / PS	HIV
YOUNQUOIE	D. Rufus	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Teacher	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
YOUNQUOIE	Gbatar	ULAH	Ulah Community, Bong County	Member	M	Direct Beneficiary	EM
ZAWU	Garmai	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
ZAWU	Kebbeh	ZODWOCA	Zorzor District Women Care – Zorzor, Lofa County	Client	F	Direct Beneficiary	HRPG
ZAYZAY	Rev. Mulbah F.	SP	Samaritan's Purse International Relief, Monrovia	Program Manager, HIV/AIDS	M	CSO / NGO / PS	HIV
ZEAN	Albertha	TTGM	Toe's Town General Market, Grand Gedeh County	Marketer	F	Direct Beneficiary	CBR
ZEKIEH	James C. Z.	GBAG	Grand Bassa Agricultural Group – Buchanan, Grand Bassa County	Field Technician	M	CSO / NGO / PS	DDRR
ZOLUE	G. Moses	CU	Cuttington University – Suacoco, Bong County	Speaker of the 7 <sup>th</sup> Student Legislative Council	M	Direct Beneficiary	DG

## Annex 5. Status of intended programme outcomes

### DDRR – Programme outcomes

Outcome	Indicator(s)	Baseline/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of verification	Comments
Improvement in peace and state of security achieved	Disarmament of combatants	Existence of armed factions/intense confrontation between armed factions and government forces	Warring factions and government forces disarmed and disbanded	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Accra, Ghana, August 18, 2003; UN resolution 1509; External Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the DDRR in Liberia; UNDP annual report 2004/2007	There is still the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, but these are not connected to the existence of warring factions.
Creation of enabling environment for the promotion of national security	Demobilization of ex-fighters	Combatants under military command structures	Fighters de-linked from commanders	DDRR Trust Fund Activity Report – September 2005 to March 2005; UNDP Annual Report 2004	
	Rehabilitation of ex-combatants	Combatants traumatized and unpredictable	Ex-combatants rehabilitated	Bugnion et al, External Mid-Term Evaluation Report of the DDRR IN Liberia, July 2006; DDRR Trust Fund Activity Report – September 2004 to March 2005; UNDP Liberia DDRR Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/ddrr.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/ddrr.htm</a> , July 2008)	Rehabilitation not developed for adults
	Reintegration of ex-combatants into communities	Combatants outside organized community life	Socio-economic integration of ex-combatants into civilian communities	UNDP Annual Report 2007 DDRR Trust Fund Activity Report – September 2004 to March 2005;	Considerable number of ex-combatants have since returned to their communities of origin or choice
	Participation of ex-combatants in social and economic life of civilian communities	Reliance on arms as means of livelihood	Considerable number of ex-combatants in small income earning business	UNDP Liberia DDRR Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/ddrr.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/ddrr.htm</a> , July 2008)	Significant number of ex-fighters engaged in economic activities that meet daily survival needs

	Participation in non-violent political expression	Violent competition for power	Democratic quest for power	James Pugel, What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Liberia (February-March 2006), April 2007	Diminishing level of violence involving firearms
--	---	-------------------------------	----------------------------	--	--

## CBR – Programme outcomes

Outcomes	Indicators	Baseline/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of Verification	Comments
Improved local and municipal governance structures and planning tools ensuring fullest representation of local population	<p>CBR programmes designed and operational.</p> <p>Community governance structures revived, re-established, trained and operational</p>	<p>Very weak or little capacity of governance systems and institutions</p> <p>Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels</p>	<p>By the end of 2004, a total of 17 DDCs were set up in three counties: Bong (8), Nimba (6) and Grand Geddeh (3)</p> <p>A total of 73 DDCs were established in 15 counties by the end of 2006.</p> <p>In 2007, a total of 110 micro projects successfully implemented</p> <p>Capacity Building: 1,022 DDC members and 60 local government officials trained; 73 DDCs in the 15 counties strengthened; staff of 60 national NGOs trained</p> <p>Rehabilitation and Basic Services: 80 km farm-to-market roads rehabilitated; 21 bridges constructed; 36 schools built; 1 hospital, 1 health centre and 4 clinics</p>	<p>Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006</p> <p>UNDP Liberia Annual Reports 2004-2007</p>	<p>Signed in 2004 between GOL and UNDP, the CBR programme supported the rehabilitation of infrastructure for the delivery of basic services.</p> <p>A total of 547,000 rural Liberians are now benefiting from these facilities</p>

			rehabilitated; 3 markets reconstructed; 119 safe drinking water wells and 135 four-access latrines constructed		
Improved capacity of community social structures to deliver basic services and livelihood opportunities	About 60% of beneficiary community members having access to basic social services and sustainable livelihood opportunities	Very weak or little capacity of governance systems and institutions  Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels	Key areas of interventions were education, health, water and sanitation, roads/bridges, market buildings, sustainable livelihood and training the DDCs.	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	

## DG – Programme outcomes

Outcomes	Indicators	Baseline/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of Verification	Comments
Enhanced national capacity to articulate, formulate and implement good governance principles and policies	Governance Commission established and public sector reform effectively pursued	Very weak capacity of governance systems and institutions	GC is active in consultative process, research & conceptualization of major governance policies	Final Review Report, Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management Project ID: 00013426 April 2004 – March 2008	Governance Commission received considerable support from international community
	Improved efficiency and equity in the delivery of public services	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels  None exist in terms of policy and regulatory framework	Short-term capacity building programmes established and fully operational  Long-term capacity building commenced	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006	Civil Service Agency and Ministry of Planning & Economic Affairs were responsible for managing various capacity building initiatives

	Improved efficiency, accountability, and transparency in the civil service	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels	GEMAP & SMP established and fully operational	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  Poverty Reduction Strategy	
Institutional and electoral framework conducive to free and fair elections in place and operational and supported by international standards	A functioning independent electoral management commission with the capacity to conduct free and fair elections established	None exist in terms of institutional capacities  Bad governance and poor economic management were identified as major causes of conflict	National Elections Commission established  Legislative and presidential elections held  Liberia had a successful transition and accession to power of democratically elected government, which is headed by female President and Legislators in January 2006	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	National Elections Commission received considerable support from international community
	An electoral law adopted that provides for a free and fair process	None existed	The Electoral Reform Law 2004 which was an act suspending certain provisions of the Constitution of Liberia and amending specific sections of the New Elections Law 1986 and approving new provisions relating to the budget appropriations of the National Elections Commission	CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	
	Increased citizens participation in electoral processes	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels	High voters turned out during presidential and general elections  Low citizens involvement	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006	Today, Liberians are far more worried about current economic realities than their

			and high voters apathy in subsequent by- and run-off elections		participation in political life
	Increased participation of women candidates in national and local elections	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels	Liberian Presidency is headed by a woman. Legislature Senators (30); Male (25) & Female (5) Representatives (64); Male (56) & Female (8) Executive (Cabinet Ministers) (19); Male (14) & Female (5)	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  UNDP Liberia Annual Reports 2004-2007	Women gained major political leadership positions including the Presidency, Legislature and Cabinet
Enhanced economic stimulus environment for sustainable growth and development	Requisite private sector development strategies developed and adopted	High unemployment rate (formal sector) 85%  High external and domestic debts  GDP per capita (in 2005 US\$ and PPP\$) 130  Real GDP growth rate (2005) 5.3%  Inflation rate (2005) 11.1%	High unemployment rate (formal sector) 80%  External and domestic debts total (US\$ Billion) reduced  GDP per capita (in 2007 US\$ prices) 195  Real GDP growth rate (2007) 7.9%  Inflation rate 11.4%	Final Review Report, Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management Project ID: 00013426 April 2004 – March 2008  UNDP Liberia Annual Reports 2004-2007  NHDR 2006  Central Bank of Liberia 2007  Poverty Reduction Strategy	Economic stimulus has achieved only marginal success because the government and international partners focused principally on the consolidation of peace and stability, and instituting governance and security sector reforms
	Human and institutional capacity building undertaken at national and local levels	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels	Various emergency capacity-building programmes were instituted including TOKTEN, LECBS, and SES	Final Review Report, Capacity Building for Governance and Economic Management Project ID: 00013426 April 2004 – March 2008	

	Effective government ownership of the mobilization and management of external resources flows	None existed in terms of human and institutional capacities	Government has improved its aid coordination mechanism. But much more still needs to be done in terms of direct budgetary support and fighting corruption	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	UNDP Liberia is primarily using Direct Execution (DEX) modality to implement projects, while National Execution (NEX) modality remains a major challenge for government due to issues of human and institutional capacities, as well as corruption
	Efficient and effective programming of the Public Investment Programmes (PIPs) and Public Expenditure Programmes (PEPs) of the government	Poor economic management was identified as a major cause of conflict	150-day action plan, iPRS and PRS, as well as Public Financial Management System put in place as a benchmark for fighting corruption	CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	
	Strengthened capacity of MPEA for economic data collection, analysis and reporting	No data available	LISGIS, an autonomous national statistical office, was established and fully operational	CPO UNDP Liberia 2003-2005  Poverty Reduction Strategy	LISGIS conducted major surveys including LDHS, CWIQ, PPA, CFSNS and National Census in 2008

## HIV – Programme outcomes

Outcome	Indicator(s)	Baselines/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of verification	Comments
Increase in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention	Preparation of national HIV/AIDS policy, guidelines and legislation	Increase in spread of HIV/AIDS (8.2%) with upward trend	Existing as policy reference point, but lack of capacity on part of National AIDS Control Program to execute its mandate	Proposed CPO Extension for UNDP/Liberia 2004-2006; country Programme Outline, UNDP Liberia 2003-2005	
Strategies to prevent the spread of and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS	Planning and policy development for combating HIV/AIDS	Poor policy implementation framework	Policy formulated and concrete actions started	Country Programme Outline, UNDP Liberia	National capacity for addressing issue still low
	Decentralization of HIV/AIDS intervention programs	Poor attempts	Attempts underway	Final Report, Strengthening of HIV and AIDS Prevention, Care and Treatment: LBR-202 –H-GO1-00, 25 July 2007	Need to be confirm through concrete observation of programs outside Monrovia
	Promotion of information, education and communication (IEC) as well as Behaviour change communication (BCC) strategies	Poor campaign	Appreciable campaign	UNDP Liberia HIV/AIDS Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm</a> )	Not clear extent to which campaign affects countryside
	Building capacity of counsellors by institutions involved with HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment	No capacity	Some capacity	Final Report, Strengthening of Tuberculosis Control and the Management of People with TB/HIV Co-infection, 25 July 2007	Capacity still low (minimum commitment from Government)
	Reduction in stigma associated with HIV/AIDS	Very high stigma	Reduction in stigma	Andic et al, Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation LDDRRP, Capacity Building and Human Rights Awareness, Community-Based Recovery, HIV/AIDS, February 2006;	



				UNDP Liberia HIV/AIDS Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm</a> , July 2007)	
	Behaviour change awareness campaigns	Poor awareness	Increased awareness	UNDP Liberia HIV/AIDS Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/aids.htm</a> , July 2007)	Change in old habit of denial and individual actions to prevent HIV/AIDS

## HRPG – Programme outcomes

Outcome	Indicator(s)	Baselines/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of verification	Comments
Increased awareness and recognition of human rights, protection and gender issues	Strong advocacy on human rights, protection and gender issues by human rights institutions	low	High: Period saw strong advocacy by local and international institutions	UNDP Human Rights, Protection and Gender Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm</a> , July 2007)	
	Increased government capacity to address human rights and protection issues	Very low	Low capacity and weakness of justice system	UNDP Human Rights, Protection and Gender Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm</a> , July 2007); Andic 2006	
	Support to the TRC process	National policy decision	Implementation of TRC process underway	UNDP Human Rights, Protection and Gender Programme (See <a href="http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm">http://www.lr.undp.org/hr.htm</a> , July 2007)	Still ongoing
	Promotion of human rights and the rule of law	Human rights violation widespread	Civil society human rights education programmes reaching general public in period, but incidents of human rights violations still evident		

## EM – Programme outcomes

Outcome	Indicator(s)	Baseline/Status 2003	Status end 2007	Sources of Verification	Comments
A comprehensive approach to environmentally sustainable development integrated in national development planning and linked to poverty reduction	Poverty-environment linkages reflected in CCA and UNDAF	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels  None exist in terms of policy and regulatory framework	Three legal instruments for environmental management enacted; Environmental Protection Agency established and functioning; Environment and renewable energy concerns integrated into the PRS and arrangements concluded between UNDP and UNEP for poverty and environment works in Liberia	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  UNDP Liberia Annual Reports 2007	
Improved awareness and understanding among decision-makers and the public of linkages between environmental sustainability and human poverty and well-being	Increased media coverage of environmentally sustainable issues	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels  None exist in terms of policy and regulatory framework	Regional environmental awareness raising workshops held, school-based nature clubs established and print and electronic media activities carried out resulted to improved public understanding on environmental issues. Policy-makers were less targeted during the period, making it difficult to put environmental issues on the radar screen of government.	Proposed/Revised CPO Extension for UNDP Liberia 2004-2006  Final Review, Energy and the Environment Project ID: 00044606 May 2005 – March 2008  UNDP Liberia Annual Report 2007  PRS	
Improved environmental management through renewable	Pilot projects in solar power technology implemented in two rural communities	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels  None exist in terms of	Two pilot projects in solar energy technology implemented by installing 123 pieces of solar panels in schools, 2 community halls, 1	Final Review, Energy and the Environment Project ID: 00044606 May 2005 – March 2008  UNDP Liberia Annual Report 2007	

energy technologies and capacity-building initiatives		policy and regulatory framework	clinic and 1 midwifery centre. These projects turned over to the local communities after training. One is operational and other isn't.	Site visits	
	Stakeholders from private, public and civil society organizations trained in Environmental Impact Assessment	Low human and institutional capacities existed at all levels  None exist in terms of policy and regulatory framework	Environmental impact assessment trainings were conducted in partnership with UNEP; as a result of the trainings there are now twelve EPA certified independent EIA consultants in the country.	Final Review, Energy and the Environment Project ID: 00044606 May 2005 – March 2008  UNDP Liberia Annual Report 2007	
	State of the environment report is elaborated and launched	None exist in terms of policy and regulatory framework	The first State of the Environment (SoE) report was produced and launched on 5 June 2007.	Final Review, Energy and the Environment Project ID: 00044606 May 2005 – March 2008  UNDP Liberia Annual Report 2007	

## Annex 6. Status of intended programme outputs

### DDRR – Programme outputs

<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Improvement in peace and state of security achieved</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Collection of arms from combatants			✓		Evidence of arm proliferation after formal disarmament ended; prevalence of armed robbery
Demobilization of combatants			✓		Some combatants still loosely attached to their formal commanders;
Educational support and skills training for combatants		✓			Some benefited, but was not a comprehensive programme covering all
Financial assistance to some ex-combatants		✓			Some benefited

### CBR – Programme outputs

<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Improved local and municipal governance structures and planning tools ensuring fullest representation of local population</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Established community structures (District Development Committees) with capacity to serve the members				✓	A total of 73 DDCs established in 15 counties to strengthen their outreach to communities and smooth functioning
<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Improved capacity of community social structures to deliver basic services and livelihood opportunities</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
225 micro projects implemented focusing on rehabilitation of schools (89), clinics/health centres (34), water and sanitation (85), market facilities (6) and access roads (11) benefiting some 400,000		✓			A total of 110 micro projects were successfully completed. It appears that 110 of 225 or 48 % achieved  A total of 547,000 rural Liberians are now benefiting from

persons in rural communities					these facilities
CBOs and NGOs managing effective micro-credit programme and agricultural production and processing system established		✓			At the middle of CBR programme, UNDP established a different programme unit to handle micro-loans. CBR provided the training.

## DG – Programme outputs

<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Enhanced national capacity to articulate, formulate and implement good governance principles and policies</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Governance Commission established and operational				✓	
Public sector reform strategy developed and operational. A reformed public sector agenda being pursued by the government			✓		
Policy framework papers and public investment programmes prepared by the government			✓		Joint needs assessment conducted and RFTF short-term stabilization plan put in place in 2004
Technical and logistical support provided to government		✓			
RIMCO established				✓	
New civil service rules and procedures prepared			✓		
Rooster of civil servants prepared				✓	
<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Institutional and electoral framework conducive for free and fair elections established and operational and supported by international standards</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Reconstituted electoral body with capacity to carry out free and fair elections			✓		National Elections Commission established and fully operational
Adequate technical and logistical support provided to the National Elections Commission to function effectively		✓			National Elections Commission received considerable support from international community
Draft revised electoral laws prepared and approved			✓		Electoral law was enacted

Increased awareness of the population on their rights and responsibilities		✓			Number of registered voters is 1.3 million people. It is estimated that 900,000 Liberians or 69 per cent of population actually turned out for elections in 2005.
Civic and voter education programmes conducted in all parts of the country			✓		Massive civic and voter education conducted by the National Elections Commission and CSOs
Voter turnout for elections high			✓		2005 elections were declared free and fair by international observers
Increase in proportion of women candidates in political parties. Women fully involved in government holding elected and appointed positions		✓			Liberia is governed by a democratically elected female president. Legislature has 30 senators of which 5 are females while 25 are males; 64 representatives of which 8 are females while 56 are males. Executive (Cabinet ministers) has 5 females while 14 are males
Vibrant women organizations operational		✓			
<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Enhanced economic stimulus environment for sustainable growth and development</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Development management action plan prepared				✓	
Dialogue initiated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on enhancing private sector development			✓		Ongoing process
Draft entrepreneurial project documents prepared by the Ministry of Commerce		✓			
Aid coordination mechanism established and operational. Government prepared and approved policy and framework for aid coordination		✓			
Technical and logistical support provided to the Ministries of Planning and Finance, and the Budget Bureau for preparation of Public Investment Programmes (PIPs) and Public Expenditure Programmes (PEPs) and for instituting fiscal and budgetary reforms		✓			
Annual development budget efficiently prepared		✓			
Regular reports on public expenditure prepared and	✓				

disseminated					
Public Investment Programmes and Public Expenditure Programmes procedure manual prepared	✓				
A functional statistical delivery system and/or national database established		✓			

### HIV – Programme outputs

Outcome:	Increase in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Assistance to people living with HIV/AIDS		✓			National capacity for addressing the issue of HIV/AIDS still low
Concrete actions regarding HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention campaigns in media			✓		Effectiveness of campaign reflected in action not only of males but females in adopting preventive measures
HIV/AIDS policy adopted and coordinating/monitoring mechanism established				✓	Effectiveness of policy implementation not certain
HIV/AIDS prevention part of school curriculum	✓				Policy conceptualized but no implementation yet
National development plan and budget integrate HIV/AIDS				✓	See 2005 and 2006 budget

### HRPG – Programme outputs

Outcome:	Increased awareness and recognition of human rights, protection and gender issues				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Strong campaigns against violation and abuse of human rights			✓		Many NGOs, INGOs and some government institutions in campaign
Punitive action against some offenders		✓			Capacity of justice system poor and weak; corruption in justice system

Protection of IDPs			✓		
Support to human rights organizations		✓			
Support to TRC process			✓		
Economic support for women programmes		✓			

## EM – Programme outputs

<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>A comprehensive approach to environmentally sustainable development integrated in national development planning and linked to poverty reduction</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
State of environment report prepared				✓	The first state of the environment report for Liberia launched on July 5, 2007 in Buchanan, Grand Bassa County to coincide with World Environment Day
National Environmental Action Plan prepared	✓				UNDP Liberia Annual Report of 2007 states that “Support to the development of the National Environmental Action Plan” was a priority for 2008. However, it was never funded.
Sustainable environment and energy issues reflected in PRSP				✓	PRS fully supports the provision of affordable, reliable and sustainable environmental and energy services to all Liberians. See PRS Priority Action Matrices such as Land & Environmental Policy, Energy, Forestry, Mining, etc.
Institutional framework for sustainable environmental management and energy development established				✓	Three legal instruments include Environmental Protection and Management Law of Liberia, Act creating EPA, and the National Environmental Policy of Liberia
<b>Outcome:</b>	<b>Improved awareness and understanding among decision-makers and the public of linkages between environmental sustainability and human poverty and well-being</b>				
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Training in environmental impact assessment conducted				✓	Major stakeholders from private, public and civil society organizations trained in environmental impact assessment (EIA)
Environmental awareness workshops held				✓	



Outcome:		Improved environmental management through renewable energy technologies and capacity-building initiatives			
Output	Extent Achieved				Comments – What happened?
	Not	Partly	Mostly	Fully	
Enhanced capacity of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with its policy council established and Board of Directors setup, thus making its functions and activities relative to environmental governance more visible				✓	EPA serves as key government partner on environmental governance issues
Increased environmental awareness promoted at both national and local levels leading for the establishment of nature clubs		✓			Capacity building for national and academic institutions did not receive significant support as envisaged by the project due to limited funding. However, minimum support provided to some national and academic institutions set the basis for conducting further assessments to determine priority areas of focus for future capacity building
Provided basic and useful information on the state of environment including biodiversity, climate variability, energy sector and water resources			✓		The report serves as a baseline for future research work on the Liberian environment
Implemented pilot projects in solar power technology in two rural communities				✓	Two pilot project created public awareness on the use of renewable energy and provided an entry point for future investment with clear understanding on the cost and benefits analysis to beneficiary communities

## Annex 7. Summary of programme budgets and expenditures

Explanation:

- White rows represent budgets.
- Grey rows represent expenditures.
- C = Funds utilized from core budget though no budget was approved.
- D = Donor resources were mainly utilized instead of UNDP core resources.
- E = Funds were utilized mainly from UNDP core support. Balance resources from donors were carried forward to the following year.

### UNDP Liberia country programme budgets and expenditures 2004-2007 (in USD)

Strategic Programme Area	2004		2005		2006		2007		Total UNDP Core	Total Through UNDP	GRAND TOTAL (2004-2007)
	UNDP Core	Through UNDP	UNDP Core	Through UNDP	UNDP Core	Through UNDP	UNDP Core	Through UNDP			
DDRR	2,200,051	19,216,246	C	21,148,906	70,000	22,239,332	2,126,504	9,595,426	4,396,555	72,199,911	76,596,466
	2,666,405	19,079,044	55,855	19,741,498	D	20,145,342	1,572,081	9,084,539	4,294,343	68,050,425	72,344,768
CBR	1,918,303	571,429	1,149,547	3,122,449	85,325	4,142,000	74,453	2,731,998	3,227,628	10,567,876	13,795,504
	415,554	E	783,265	2,339,211	88,933	3,656,669	74,453	2,250,502	1,362,206	8,246,382	9,608,588
DG	1,696,410		1,600,000	4,579,377	1,495,000	3,082,033	1,462,324	1,932,696	6,253,734	9,594,107	15,847,842
	1,491,051		805,632	2,884,141	1,382,960	1,223,965	1,440,270	954,831	5,119,913	5,062,938	10,182,852
HIV	358,421		350,000		400,000		155,000	72,603	1,263,421	72,603	1,336,024
	375,050		283,790		310,143		150,039	71,843	1,119,022	71,843	1,190,865
HRPG	476,385		583,707	270,000	393,095	855,561	325,029	909,549	1,778,216	2,035,110	3,813,326
	454,524		454,462	251,636	312,513	383,217	320,079	442,139	1,541,578	1,076,993	2,618,572
EM		18,381	200,000		330,000	20,000	366,050	22,341	896,050	60,722	956,772
		18,381	108,936		310,971	19,000	195,113	21,183	615,021	58,564	673,585
Infrastructure (World Bank)						1,641,987		14,693,364		16,335,351	16,335,351
						991,245		12,574,773		13,566,018	13,566,018
GRAND TOTAL	6,649,570	19,806,056	3,883,254	29,120,732	2,773,420	31,980,913	4,509,361	29,957,979	17,815,605	110,865,681	128,681,286
	5,402,585	19,097,425	2,491,942	25,216,487	2,405,521	26,419,439	3,752,035	25,399,813	14,052,085	96,133,165	110,185,250

## Annex 8. Photographs



**Figure 23. The beneficiaries of DDRR auto mechanics training are grateful to have learned new skills (Voinjama, Lofa County)**

(photo © Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.)



**Figure 24. Women marketers (CBR beneficiaries) work together across tribal lines for their economic survival (Toe's Town, Grand Gedeh County)**

(photo © Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.)



**Figure 25. According to these DG beneficiaries, student government leaders from Cuttington University, participatory democracy is vital for building a more peaceful and stable Liberia (Suacoco, Bong County)**

(photo © Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.)



**Figure 26. HIV/AIDS awareness campaign, Firestone Hospital**

(photo © ARTEMIS Services / Meg Gawler)





**Figure 27. Beneficiaries of HRPG micro-loan programme hope to grow their new businesses (Woulamai Credit Union, Lofa County)**

(photo © Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.)



**Figure 28. Beneficiaries of the EM solar panel pilot project feel privileged for their new school, church and midwifery facility (Ulah, Bong County)**

## **Annex 9. Profiles of the evaluators**

### **Meg Gawler**

Meg Gawler has long experience in the design, monitoring and evaluation of development projects and programmes. She is trained in programme evaluation, strategic planning, project cycle management, goal oriented project planning, logical frameworks, focus groups and workshop facilitation. To date, she has worked on short- and long-term assignments over 60 countries (25 in Africa), and has good multi-cultural and interpersonal abilities. She has over 15 years experience as an evaluator, and this has become the focus of her work for the last ten years. Meg has carried out over 45 evaluation exercises worldwide, 35 of which as the team leader or sole evaluator – in English and/or French – and with a wide variety of stakeholders and objectives, including:

- ❖ project and programme evaluations
- ❖ organizational assessments
- ❖ meta-evaluations – analysing and drawing lessons learned from a portfolio of evaluations
- ❖ defining organizational standards for evaluations
- ❖ developing organizational strategies for monitoring and evaluation, and
- ❖ providing training in participatory monitoring and evaluation.

In carrying out evaluations, Meg's emphasis is on a humanistic and analytical process that enhances institutional learning and builds capacity for the project team who are at the heart of the evaluation. She is a member of the American Evaluation Association, the European Evaluation Society and the International Development Evaluation Association.

### **Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr.**

Varney A. Yengbeh, Jr. is an international affairs expert with proven knowledge and leadership in business, policy analysis, strategic planning, project management, programme evaluation, technology, and research and development. He has more than twenty years experience as a consultant, engineer, strategist and technical advisor to firms in the United States and Africa. In 2004, he gave up an accomplished professional career in the United States to devote his life to policy-oriented research and development, and advocacy for Liberia's future.

He holds a M.A. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a MSEE from the University of Massachusetts Lowell, a BSEE from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Distinction Diploma in forestry from the Mano River Union Forestry Training Institute.

Yengbeh recently embarked on setting up Afrivision Corporation as a privately held business services and management consulting firm, as well as The Liberia Institute, an independent public policy research and development think tank. His research interests include exploring creative approaches that link market reforms and democratization,

and the role of private enterprises and the informal sector in building democratic governance systems. He has published papers on various policy issues about Liberia.

Additionally, Yengbeh brings executive leadership and board membership experience from non-governmental organizations. Trained originally as a forester, he has a deep appreciation of the rich biodiversity and ecosystems of Liberia. He is a member of AfricanLiberty.org, the African Evaluation Association, the American Evaluation Association, and the International Development Evaluation Association.

### **Alaric Tokpa**

As Assistant Professor of political science, Alaric Tokpa also lectures social science research methods at the University of Liberia. In addition, he provides consultancy services for national and international organizations, in which his tasks have included directing research projects, designing monitoring and evaluation of NGO and CSO projects, organizing workshops and writing reports. He facilitates technical report writing in the writing workshop for NGOs and CSOs in Liberia.

He is Associate Director for Research, Documentation and Publication in the Center for Security and Development Studies in Liberia. He is also National Investigator of Afrobarometer, an institution which collects and disseminates information on the views of Africans on democracy, governance, economic reform, civil society, and quality of life.