Evaluation of UNDP Governance Projects
Funded by the Iraq Trust Fund

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Acronyms

BSA    Board of Supreme Audit
CIDA   Canadian International Development Agency
DAD    Donor Assistance Database
DFID   Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
EC     European Commission
GEO    Government Elections Office
ICI    International Compact for Iraq
IECI   Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq
IFES   International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IHEC   Independent High Electoral Commission
IRFFI  International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
ISRB   Iraq Strategic Review Board
ITF    Iraq Trust Fund
KRG    Kurdistan Regional Government
OCS    Office of Constitutional Support
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNAMI  United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq
UNDG ITF United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHQ   United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS  United Nations Office for Project Services
1. Executive Summary

1.1. The four governance projects evaluated in this report have been funded under the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDG ITF is one of two multi-donor trust funds under the umbrella of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). One is administered by the World Bank and the other, the UNDG ITF, is administered by UN Organizations.

1.2. The objective of the UNDG ITF has been to provide donors with a single channel for funding in order to reduce transaction costs and coordinate aid delivery for the reconstruction and recovery in post-conflict Iraq. After almost six years of operation, the UNDG ITF is winding down. In November 2009, the UNDG ITF Donor Committee decided no new projects or programmes would be considered for approval after 30 June 2010. It would then cease to function and in order to reflect on its experiences and generate lessons learned the Donor Committee decided to initiate an evaluation exercise.

1.3. The overall evaluation exercise consists of separate sub-evaluations covering different UN Organizations and examining a selection of 34 programmes and projects. This report covers four governance projects all approved by the UNDG ITF for implementation by the UNDP.

1.4. They are:

- Support for the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) C9-18 with a budgeted amount of $4,879,535. It was approved to begin October 2005 and to end in December 2006 although it formally ended in December 2009, 36 months past the original end date.

- Support for the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) II, ITF # C9-12 with a budgeted amount of $2,643,000. It was approved to begin January 2006 and to end in November 2007 although it formally ended in December 2009, a period of 46 months, 24 months past the original end date.

- Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) G11-14 with a budgeted amount of $3,735,426. It was approved to begin April 2007 and to end April 2008 although presently, 24 months past the original end date, the project is on-going. It is due to close 30 June 2010.

- Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process (C9-10A) with a budgeted amount of $15,429,927. It was approved to begin May 2005 and to end in December 2005 although the project formally ended in January 2009, 39 months past the original end date.
1.5. All four were approved under the governance cluster (subsequently named the Governance Sector Outcome Team) within the UNDG ITF. The cluster of governance projects has been the most endowed of the six sector groupings. A total of $302 million has been allocated to the governance sector (nearly a quarter of all UNDG ITF approvals) with funding to 33 separate projects, and of this amount, 23 have been awarded to UNDP totaling $140 million. These 23 governance projects approved for UNDP implementation amount to 46 per cent of all governance cluster funding under the UNDG ITF. Together the four projects considered here amount to $26.7 million. Within the overall UNDG ITF, this comes to 4 per cent of the total and as a proportion of the governance cluster, it amounts to 9 per cent of the total, both modest amounts. But they are 20 per cent of approved governance funding for UNDP and they cover four critical governance functions in Iraq. They are representative not only of the UNDG ITF approval process but also of the UNDP performance record in this sector.

1.6. Although this is not an evaluation of the UNDG ITF, the funding levels, the disbursement targets as well as the procedures for vetting, approving and tracking the performance of the projects are themselves important for understanding aspects of project performance. Section 4 discusses those aspects of the UNDG ITF which bear upon the functioning of the four projects in question.

1.7. The core of this evaluation is an in-depth assessment of the operational and developmental effectiveness of the four projects in line with DAC criteria as well as the operational elements agreed upon for all UNDF ITF programme/project evaluations, and the guidelines for the UNDG ITF lessons learned exercise. The evaluation has proceeded by examining the extent to which each project has met a number of evaluative criteria. These are, for each project, (1) its relevance, (2) the validity of its design, (3) development results (results achievement), (4) management effectiveness and (5) sustainability. Each of the five evaluative criteria is measured with reference to specific indicators: validity of design has five, development results has four, and so on. Numerical values have been assigned to the indicators according to the extent to which they have been met and this permits a composite score for each of the evaluative criteria. These have been tallied and the totals used to provide an overall project assessment. The evaluative criteria, their indicators and the scoring for each project are given in tabular form in Annex 1. They guide the narrative assessment of each project in Section 5.

1.8. Assessment results show that one of the four projects has performed well. Three others have performed less well.

1.9. Support to the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) has performed well with minor exceptions; the Iraqi partner is self-motivated and there has been conscientious project management in UNDP Iraq for a significant portion of the project’s duration. UNDP’s project management has overcome, to the extent possible, the challenge of collaborating across the geographical distance and across security restrictions by

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1 With the exception of the elections support project approved by the Electoral Support Cluster G.
maintaining constant contact with the Iraqi partners, intervening often to provide management assistance as needed.

1.10. The Donor Assistance Database has been well-conceived. UNDP has made an effort to put the database in place and encourage donors and ministries to forward information about their aid flows. Nevertheless, the database (1) is not complete and (2) does not have the necessary support of either the key donors or, apparently the line ministries, needed to make it complete and useful for coordinating international assistance.

1.11. UNDP’s involvement in building capacity within the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has been sporadic. When it has managed to have a presence in Baghdad, specifically when a project manager has been present within the IHEC offices, the results have been positive and any assessment of the elections support must recognize these contributions. UNDP’s presence has been intermittent, however. On the one hand, there have been distinctive contributions in specific areas. On the other hand these contributions have been for only limited periods of time. There were a number of factors. UNDP appears to have been unprepared to undertake implementation even after the project was approved and this partially explains its checkered performance. At the same time, it must be recognized that the UNAMI elections team maintained control over the project’s thematic direction obliging UNDP to fit into a project scheme over which it had little control.

1.12. Since UNDP had only a peripheral role in the Constitutional Drafting Process, a review of this project says relatively little about UNDP’s performance in drafting a constitution. UNDP provided project services to UNAMI while UNAMI drove the drafting project practically and thematically. These services included providing outreach services and soliciting public opinion; by all accounts UNDP performed these services capably. UNDP’s role was too marginal, however, to justify attributing results at the drafting or implementation stage. What stands out is that rendering services for the drafting process constitutes only a modest portion of what was actually done under the rubric of this project. The larger portion of activities took place after the drafting was completed when there was nearly two-thirds of the funds unspent and when a number of small expenditures were devised to support NGOs and studies related to human rights. It would be stretching the point to link them directly to the constitution.

1.13. These project assessments suggest that UNDP has not always been prepared to mobilize staff or facilities for implementation once projects were approved. Account must be taken of the laborious recruitment process in UNDP. Recruitment of new staff may take up to half a year, and filling vacant positions that have become vacant is equally time-consuming. Procurement remains ill-adapted to rapid response. Maintaining critical management standards has not always been accorded the high priority it should have. For all the four projects, in different degrees, slippage has occurred in achieving project objectives. While the UNDP must accept primary responsibility for meeting project commitments, a secondary responsibility belongs to
the UNDG ITF for allowing funding to proceed in spite of indications that performance was unlikely to be optimal.

1.14. There were political reasons. The UNDG ITF was eager to provide resources for doing something in Iraq. The sense of urgency appears to have occasionally overridden considerations that might have been prudent and might have given the fund time to construct a mechanism that could promise a greater quality of intervention by UN Organizations.

1.15. There were also structural reasons, one structural flaw in particular. The beneficiaries of the funding were UN Organizations, the same that exercised a first level of authority in UNDG ITF project approvals at the cluster level. Those standing to gain from the decisions are not likely to act independently. There was a need for an objective, independent party to exercise authority over funding decisions, and not only to make funding decisions but to hold UN Organizations accountable as they carried out implementation.

1.16. The security measures presently in effect for UN personnel in Iraq quarantine the UNDP from its development partners. Thoughtful development management involves a transfer of knowledge and decision-making in a collaborative environment, and this can not take place where transfers must traverse a rigid security divide. Funds may be transferred and surrogates may be trained to carry messages back to government ministries or NGO offices. This has sufficed for the last five years with less than impressive results. The choice at present is relatively clear: either accept middling to poor development results or re-think the existing security measures.

1.17. The decision to post more UNDP staff to Baghdad is a positive initial step. The real hurdle will be to devise ways of safely interacting with project partners on a regular basis once staff are within striking distance of their project partners. It will be to turn the present relationship between security and programming on its head: instead of security requirements determining the extent of programming activity, programming requirements will have to determine the role of security.

1.18. The recommendations below follow from Sections 4 (UNDG ITF and Project Performance) and Section 5 (Findings: Assessments of Four Projects) and are closely linked to the lessons learned in Section 6 (Lessons Learned).

To the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Steering Committee

- Provide for a third party assessment of projects submitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that is independent of the donors or the beneficiaries. Independent assessors could be drawn from experts in the relevant field as well as from host country decision-makers, unaffiliated with either donors or UN Organizations.
- Make provisions within the UNDG ITF for monitoring projects reliably obliging the implementers to submit regular progress reports to be reviewed by independent assessors as well as sector managers within the implementing organization.

*To UNDP Iraq*

- Take measures to reinforce UNDP’s partnership with the Board of Supreme Audit. It is proposed that the Governance Unit assemble a special panel of experts and supporters to provide a forum in which UNDP can support the work of the Board of Supreme Audit, nurture the relationship and take a proactive role in strengthening its network of allies and collaborators.

- Make a formal request for the Government of Iraq to endorse the Donor Assistance Database Project (DAD II) by addressing a letter from the highest level urging major donors and line ministries to participate more fully. Failing this, or failing an appropriate response from the major donors, the UNDP should phase out support.

- Fulfill commitments within the elections project to provide training in financial and human resource management. IHEC management expressed its concern that the UN is inclined to perform electoral functions rather than train IHEC staff to do so. The evaluation team was unable to verify this concern; it may nevertheless be worthwhile to meet its training commitment and in so doing, contribute to IHEC’s self sufficiency.

- Identify the reasons for delays in staffing and implementation within the UNDP Governance Unit and draft a plan for enhancing the culture of accountability within UNDP including adherence to tools of reporting for project management, as per Prince2 guidelines in use by UNDP.

- Advocate strongly within the UN Country Team for a review and revision of current security constraints.

- Identify as accurately as possible, perhaps with an independent security consultant, what are the actual threats and risks involved in establishing a significantly larger presence in Iraq with regular interaction with project partners. It should be assumed that UNDP will engage fully with its project partners outside of the IZ, and this should serve as a preliminary step toward ensuring that programming needs dictate security procedures, not the other way around.

- Initiate a practice, within the UNDP Governance Unit of empowering project managers to report realistically and identify underperformance where it occurs. This may entail the use of a different reporting format and a different approach to reporting generally.
Submit six monthly reports for review and criticism in meetings of project managers in the Governance Unit and urge participants in these review meetings to solve problems identified in the progress reports.
2. Introduction

Background

2.1. The four governance projects evaluated in this report have been funded under the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF) and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDG ITF is one of two multi-donor trust funds under the umbrella of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). One is administered by the World Bank and the other, the UNDG ITF, is administered by UN Organizations.

2.2. The objective of the UNDG ITF has been to provide donors with a single channel for funding in order to reduce transaction costs and coordinate aid delivery for the reconstruction and recovery in post-conflict Iraq. It was the first multi-donor trust fund to be undertaken by the United Nations system and remains the largest. The experience of the UNDG ITF has stimulated reflection on aid coordination, especially in post-conflict situations and paved the way for the UN to engage in other efforts to harmonize aid.

2.3. After almost six years of operation, the UNDG ITF is winding down. In November 2009, the UNDG ITF Donor Committee decided no new projects or programmes would be considered for approval after 30 June 2010. It would then cease to function and in order to reflect on its experiences and generate lessons learned the Donor Committee decided to initiate an evaluation exercise.

2.4. The evaluation exercise consists of separate sub-evaluations covering different UN Organizations and examining a selection of 34 programmes and projects. This report covers four governance projects all approved by the UNDG ITF for implementation by the UNDP.

2.5. The four governance projects selected are: (1) Support to the Supreme Audit Board; (2) Support for establishing a Donor Assistance Database within the Ministry of Planning; (3) Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and (4) Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process. Details of these projects are summarized below in Table 1.

Purpose

2.6. The separate evaluation exercises are managed by their respective UN Organizations and, accordingly, this one has been managed by the UNDP. UNDP has maintained full ownership of the evaluation which is conducted in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the participating UN Organizations and UNDG ITF.

2.7. The UNDP has defined the purposes of the evaluation in its own Terms of Reference:
To determine if the projects have achieved their stated objectives and where they have done so to account for why and where they have not done so, to account for why not;

To determine the results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) of the projects in terms of sustained improvements achieved;

To provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the projects and ensure that it is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;

To document lessons learned, success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained; the evaluation should take into consideration the projects’ duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;

To examine the achievement of the common pre-set objectives of the projects and recommend ways to improve future partnerships.2

The Four Projects in the Context of the Iraq Trust Fund

2.8. The UNDG ITF is the principal mechanism by which UN Organizations access funding for implementing projects and programmes in Iraq. The UNDG ITF serves the valuable function of administering funds on behalf of donors relieving donors of the onerous and costly obligation of executing bilaterally. The UNDG ITF further acts on behalf of donors who may not have sufficient development staff or, in some cases, no presence at all in Baghdad but who may wish to contribute to the reconstruction effort.

2.9. As of 31 October 2009, donor deposits to the fund totaled $1,354,639,372. A total of $1,276,701,979 had been approved for funding to UN Organizations for implementation in Iraq. Among the 16 beneficiary UN Organizations, the UNDP has been the largest recipient of funds with $343 million, 27 per cent of the total approved amounts between 2004 and 2010. Originally funding was divided into eleven sector groupings or clusters, each managed by a selection of relevant UN Organizations. The UNDP held a lead role in three of the largest sector groupings: (1) Governance and Civil Society; (2) Infrastructure Rehabilitation; and (3) Poverty Reduction and Human Development. Approved funding for UNDP projects fell primarily into one of these three groups. The cluster receiving the most approved funds between 2004 and 2010 has been the governance cluster.3

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2 These are paraphrased from: UNDP, Terms of Reference, UNDP Evaluation of Governance Projects, February 2010, p. 4
3 Initially, Support to Election Process was treated as a separate cluster. It was subsequently made part of the Governance and Civil Society Cluster, or as it is more recently known, the Governance Sector Outcome Team. The sector groups were reduced to seven in 2008 and renamed Sector Outcome Teams (SOT).
2.10. Though there were six UN Organizations participating in the Governance and Civil Society cluster, the UNDP served as the lead organization and received the largest portion of governance support approved by the cluster. A total of $302 million has been allocated to the governance sector with funding to 33 separate projects of this amount; the UNDP has received funding for 23 separate projects totaling $140 million. This is 46 per cent of all governance funding under the trust fund.

2.11. The four projects under evaluation are among those 23 governance cluster projects approved by the UNDG ITF for implementation by the UNDP. Together these four projects amount to $26.7 million. Within the overall trust fund, this comes to 4 per cent of the total and as a proportion of the governance cluster; it amounts to 9 per cent of the total, both modest amounts. But they are 20 per cent of approved governance funding for UNDP and they cover four critical governance functions in Iraq. They appear to be representative not only of the trust fund approval process but also of the UNDP activity in this sector. Table 1 summarizes these four projects with pertinent details.
Table 1: Four Governance Projects – Amounts, Duration, Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Approved Amount ($</th>
<th>Original Duration (Mos)</th>
<th>Actual Duration (Mos)</th>
<th>Governance Issue</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Supreme Audit</td>
<td>4,879,535</td>
<td>16 mos</td>
<td>52 mos</td>
<td>Anti-corruption</td>
<td>To train over 430 BSA auditors, including 42 from the Kurdistan region KRG) in ten different fields of audit; draft a comprehensive training needs report and long-term institutional strengthening plan; draft audit guides, including a code of conduct and measures against fraud; and establish an internal training and donor aid Coordination Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Assistance Database</td>
<td>2,643,000</td>
<td>22 mos</td>
<td>48 mos</td>
<td>Aid Coordination</td>
<td>To assist the Government of Iraq in establishing a comprehensive inter-ministerial, decentralized (throughout the regions) sustainable, transparent and accountable aid management system based on multi-dimensional capacity building both at the federal government and regional/sub-national levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)</td>
<td>3,735,426</td>
<td>12 mos</td>
<td>36 mos</td>
<td>Democratic governance</td>
<td>To develop management capacity and electoral understandings of the IHEC Commissioners, to increase financial and human resources management skills within the IHEC, to enhance awareness of electoral best practices and to strengthen relationships with external stakeholders including government, media and civil society groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the Constitution</td>
<td>15,429,927</td>
<td>6 mos</td>
<td>45 mos</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>To establish a legal and institutional framework for drafting the constitution; and to promote the adoption of the constitution in the course of a referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>26,687,888</td>
<td>56 mos</td>
<td>181 mos</td>
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</table>
3. Methodology

3.1. The core of the evaluation is an in-depth assessment of the operational and developmental effectiveness of the four projects in line with DAC criteria as well as the operational elements agreed upon for all UNDF ITF programme/project evaluations, and the guidelines for the UNDG ITF lessons learned exercise. The evaluation has proceeded by examining the extent to which each project has met a number of evaluative criteria. These are, for each project: (1) its relevance, (2) the validity of its design, (3) development results (results achievement), (4) management effectiveness and (5) sustainability. Each of the five evaluative criteria is measured with reference to specific indicators: validity of design has five indicators, development results has four, and so on. The list of evaluative criteria and the indicators used to measure whether they have been met is given on the following page in Box 1.

3.2. The evaluation scores the criteria according to whether its indicators are fully met (=3), mostly met (=2), minimally met (=1) or not met at all (=0). The score for all criteria is summed and expressed as a percentage of what would have been a perfect score, in this instance 51 (3 X 17). The totals provide an overall project assessment. At the conclusion of Section 5, the scoring is used as well to analyze the evaluative criteria themselves; the relevance, validity of design, development results, management results and sustainability are assessed independently of the projects. The evaluative criteria, their indicators and the scoring for each project are given in tabular form in Annex 1. They guide the narrative assessment of each project assessment in Section 5.

3.3. A few key factors have influenced the performance of projects and are likely to explain why aspects of the evaluative criteria are met in various degrees, whether projects have or have not met their objectives. The functioning of the UNDG ITF and its system of approving projects is an important factor and helps understand whether enough attention has been given to ensuring whether the projects are well formulated. Inadequate formulation and insufficient organization preparedness has affected implementation.

3.4. UNDP management itself, notably management within the Governance Unit, has been a factor. The security apparatus which conditions how much and what kind of contact the UNDP has with its Iraqi partners has also played a role. Iraqi partners themselves, their capacity and their willingness to uptake the project, assuming responsibility with minimal UNDP presence have likewise been factors.

3.5 These projects cover a period of five years. Some observations apply to all projects over the entire time period. In other instances, it is important to emphasize differences in performance among the projects and, more importantly, differences in UNDP performance in project implementation at different times. Management of these governance projects appear to have been sluggish for the first three years: there were delays, position vacancies remained unfilled and disbursement targets fell short
of their targets. This has changed somewhat in the last two years as some vacancies have been filled and as delivery/disbursement rates have increased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: Assessment Format for Four Governance Projects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Criteria</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Criteria met:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=fully, 2= mostly, 1=minimally, 0= not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The project is consistent with UNDG ITF and UNDP priorities.</td>
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<td>2. The project responds to the needs of the beneficiaries as defined by the ICI and the National Development Strategy for Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The project enhances existing efforts to address issues of democratic governance and to build government institutions in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Validity of Design</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Project components are coherent and focused on clearly achievable objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Strategy for project implementation is consistent and appropriate to what is to be achieved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Project objectives are consistent with the needs of stakeholders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Logframe elements, indicators and assumptions are appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Project objectives have taken into consideration the constraints of working in a politically volatile environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development Results</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Outcomes, as they are defined in project documents, have been achieved to the extent possible given the circumstances in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Outputs, as they are defined in project documents, have been achieved to the extent possible given the circumstances in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Among the achievements has been a sense of ownership by national partners.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Provisions for gender equality and human rights have been incorporated where appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Management Effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Adequate personnel and other resources have been made available to complete the project on time and on budget.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Jointly administered projects have resulted in positive collaborations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Where results have not been achieved, appropriate corrective measures have been undertaken.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Monitoring and reporting to all stakeholders have been carried out as much as possible under the circumstances.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The strengthening of national institutions contribute to their organizational and financial durability.</td>
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</table>

3.6. Sources of information were consulted on a project’s progress and on factors likely to account for the progress. First among them has been a review of documentation. The UNDP evaluation unit assisted in making all documents in all four project files electronically available including planning documents, project proposals, six month reports (though large numbers are missing), occasional quarterly ‘fiches’, handover notes where project management changed hands, final reports, reports of lessons learned workshops, evaluations and commentaries of various sorts. They covered a
cumulative total of 15 project years and were voluminous. To the extent that the reports gave an accurate picture, they were useful and contributed to an overall understanding of projects.

3.7. Every effort was made to draw on numerical data where possible. Some numerical information on the UNDG ITF was available from UNAMI either from staff or from two websites that treat the IRFFI funds and multi-donor trust funds generally. Donors were canvassed to learn how effectively the UNDG ITF served their interests and, more specifically to find out how extensively they contracted bilaterally with UN Organizations instead of using the trust fund mechanism. Numerical indicators of delays and staffing were available with UNDP. Some numerical data were obtained from Iraqi partners when contact was made in Baghdad. Staff surveys were attempted at the Board of Supreme Audit, although managing the survey in a Red Zone organization has proven difficult.

3.8. Initial discussions with UNDP, donors and UNDG ITF officials indicated the importance of conducting a portion of the evaluation in Baghdad to supplement the two weeks spent in Amman. UNDP senior management, security officials and others facilitated a stay in Baghdad between 27 March and 7 April 2010. A national Iraqi consultant engaged throughout the evaluation played a critical role in making the best use of the mission to Baghdad, planning interviews, documenting them, undertaking surveys and following up.

3.9. Interviews, in person and by phone, in Amman and Baghdad became the principal means by which information was obtained. In Amman, interviews were held with UNDG ITF and UNAMI staff, donors and UNDP Governance Unit staff. In Baghdad, interviews were held with Baghdad-based UNDP staff, with UNDP project collaborators including UNOPS and UNAMI, and most importantly with project partners in the Government of Iraq. Meetings were held in the IZ and in the Amber Zone with most project partners; and in one instance, a meeting was arranged with a key partner, the Board of Supreme Audit, in the Red Zone. Project partners who were not able to be interviewed in person were contacted by phone. In the course of arranging and conducting these interviews, and in collaborating with the Iraqi national consultant, the international consultant experienced the security apparatus first hand.

3.10. Identification of criteria for assessing projects has drawn on UNAMI’s *Terms of Reference for the Iraq Trust Fund Lessons Learned Exercise* and on the terms of reference drafted by the UNDP for this evaluation specifically. During the initial two weeks in Amman, while preparing the inception report, the phrasing of the evaluative criteria and their indicators evolved as the evaluation conducted initial interviews and as interlocutors offered what they considered to be critical issues. While the evaluation is not participatory in the strictest sense, since assessment criteria are given in advance, the final formulation of the research design and the phrasing of the criteria have responded to stakeholder concerns. And every effort has been made to follow stakeholders’ leads and directions as the exercise proceeded.
4. UNDG ITF and Project Performance

4.1. The UNDG ITF administers donor resources on the donors’ behalf, setting criteria for project assessments, establishing budgets for sectors, organizing technical reviews, reviewing and approving projects and programmes and receiving and scrutinizing progress reports on a regular basis. On the one hand, these are administrative services. On the other hand, since these procedures for selecting and approving projects bear on the quality of projects approved, these UNDG ITF procedures have a role in determining project performance. This section describes how the UNDG ITF mechanism conditions the performance of the four projects in question.

4.2. The UNDG ITF geared up rapidly in 2004. Donor commitments in the initial years flowed in as donors were eager to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction and especially where there was a mechanism that would disburse and account for the funds reliably (see Table 2). The UNDG ITF was front-end loaded, that is, the bulk of donor deposits came within the first two years. With large amounts available in the first two years, there was some pressure for the UNDG ITF to get projects through the system, to prove to donors and to the Iraqi Government it was up to the task of using the funds effectively. This accounts in part for weaknesses in project design and for occasionally unrealistic timetables.

Table 2: Donor Deposits and Percentages of Totals 2004-2009 ($000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>628,821</td>
<td>274,592</td>
<td>212,823</td>
<td>160,877</td>
<td>55,435</td>
<td>22,091</td>
<td>1,354,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Some information is available at: [www.irffi.com](http://www.irffi.com) and [http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/fund/information](http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/fund/information). Breakdown by years was generated by the IRFFI office, UNAMI, Amman

4.3. Two-thirds of total funds flowed into the UNDG ITF in the first two years. And 82% of total funds came into the trust fund in the first three. There were two possibilities for managing the rapidly available resources. Either the fund could deliberately approve and disburse its resources in a measured fashion in which case disbursements would begin slowly and increase as the fund’s capacity for approving and assessing reports fell into place. Or the fund could respond immediately to meeting Iraq’s urgent needs, approving and disbursing the resources to UN Organizations quickly even as the UNDG ITF mechanism was evolving and before Iraq’s own mechanism for vetting was fully operational. The fund opted for the latter. A mechanism was put quickly in place and before it was fully operational while elements of the mechanism were still in the birthing process, funds were

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approved for projects to be implemented by UN Organizations. Table 3 has been constructed from yearly reports and since records were not always available year by year, especially early on, the years 2004 to 2006 are combined.

Table 3: UNDG ITF Disbursements to Participating UN Organizations ($000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>2004-2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Total available as of 2008</th>
<th>Total available as of 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>587,377</td>
<td>113,070</td>
<td>1,277,113</td>
<td>1,354,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNAMI staff, websites at: [www.irffi.com](http://www.irffi.com) and [http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/fund/information](http://mdtf.undp.org/dashboard/fund/information)

Note that neither of these websites provides easily accessible breakdown by year.

4.4. Nearly half all funds to be disbursed by the UNDG ITF were disbursed in the first two and a half years. The decision was to favour rapid disbursements, to respond to emergency needs in Iraq or if not emergency needs, to meet deadlines on political issues such as drafting the constitution and holding elections set by the United States. A number of approvals were fast-tracked and were moved toward implementation quickly.

4.5. While the decision to disburse as rapidly as possible had its value, and projects were rapidly approved for implementation, projects occasionally went forward without due consideration to whether the funds requested matched the work proposed or whether the UN Organization, the UNDP in this case, was prepared to execute the proposal. The following are some of the reasons. The evaluation relies in part here on an assessment of the UNDG ITF a year ago in Scanteam’s *Stocktaking Review of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq*.

- Vetting and approving projects began before the modalities of proposing and approving projects had been fully tested. Some projects went forward that might have benefitted from a more deliberate and disciplined approval process. An audit report carried out in 2008 observed that the UNDG ITF began operating at the same time that it was creating itself.

- In its initial years, the Government of Iraq was not fully prepared to undertake a full review of proposals. It was not prepared to ensure projects fit into a coordinated development plan for the country or met conditions for national ownership. In the early years before 2007, projects were often passed by the newly created Iraq Strategic Review Board with minimal scrutiny although the terms of reference for UNDG ITF procedures stressed the importance of responding to Iraqi priorities and approval of Iraqi authorities.5

- The UNDG ITF Donor Committee that was established to provide guidance did not consistently provide the level of strategic direction in the early years (2004-2007) that

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it should have and significantly, this was at a time when the largest portion of the funds were disbursed.\(^6\)

- The first level of approval for projects took place at the cluster level in which the participating UN Organizations were those seeking funding from the cluster. Clusters generally - and this applies as much to the governance sector as to the other clusters - was known for approving an agency’s submission on the understanding that the agency would support others when their time came. A number of projects appear to have gone forward which had not received an exhaustive or reliable appraisal.

4.6. One consequence was that UN Organizations were often not prepared to implement projects approved for them. A more effective review process might have taken into consideration the capacity of a UN Organization as well as the restrictive conditions of project delivery in Iraq (among other matters) when assessing feasibility, budgets and administrative preparedness. The Scanteam Stocktaking Review observed that among the 17 UNDG ITF projects examined 16 were delayed and these by an average of 130 per cent. The four governance projects assessed in this evaluation were delayed on average by 225 per cent. In some cases, projects were not fully completed and funds returned.

4.7. Initially, donors remained marginally involved. After the first two years, however, some donors began to suspect the UN Organizations were taking advantage of a less than systematic review process and concern grew among them that funds were not being used in ways that satisfied their standards of accountability.

4.8. In a first phase of the UNDG ITF, roughly between 2004 and 2007, scrutiny was lax, approvals were left largely to the UN Organizations themselves and donors were less directly involved. Approvals occasionally resulted from *quid pro quo* agreements among UN Organizations. The UNDG ITF did not provide a structure in which the UN Organizations were inclined to responsibly assess their own capabilities and therefore in which there was some assurance that funds allocated would be used efficiently. In some instances the desire among UN Organizations to generate revenue outweighed their obligation to ensure the funds were used properly.

4.9. In a second phase, roughly between 2007 and the end of 2009, some donors began to pay greater attention to the functioning of the UNDG ITF. These were particularly those that had contributed the most, the European Commission, Canada and others. Efforts were made, often assertive ones, to either restore more rigour to the approval process or, failing that, to avoid the UNDG ITF as a modality for delivery and contract directly with specific UN Organizations, retaining for themselves the responsibility for ensuring accountability.

4.10. UNDP was a beneficiary of the large sums available in the early years of the fund. Between 2004 and 2006, $165 million was disbursed to UNDP alone, the largest for

any UN Organization, 28 per cent of all funding committed for all 16 UN Organizations ($587 million) during this time. Some of it was for economic rehabilitation, some for poverty reduction, but a significant portion was for governance projects including the ones considered here, and the question has been raised whether the project proposals and their budgets were adequately scrutinized. There is the further question whether this approval process bears some responsibility for the less than impressive performance in three of the four governance projects under review.

4.11. Key donors hold this view. The European Commission’s view is that UNDP’s appetite for revenue generation outstripped its capacity to implement these projects. More effort was committed to securing projects by the UNDP with sometimes inflated budgets than to how they could be executed. The UNDP must bear most of the responsibility. But the UNDG ITF held the funds in trust for the donors and shared responsibility with the UNDP to exercise caution in awarding the funds to ensure they would be used efficiently.

4.12. Key donors have generally not trusted the UNDG ITF to distribute the funds among the sectors in ways they deemed best. They have hedged their contributions by earmarking funds to ensure that sectors which individual donors consider most important received the support. This has restricted the flexibility of the fund to allocate resources as it sees fit and to use its judgment for harmonizing aid. Donor skepticism has increased and their actions have now gone beyond earmarking. Donors now participate in the Peer Review process as well as in the final Steering Committee approval of projects. But some donors have also largely abandoned the UNDG ITF as a reliable mechanism for managing their funds and instead of giving to the UNDG ITF; they contract directly with specific UN Organizations on whom they feel they can rely, instead of allowing the UNDG ITF to allocate resources for them.

4.13. The pattern of contributions by the largest donor, the European Commission shows this trend. Table 4 gives first of all the European Commission’s contributions to the UNDG ITF. Between 2004 and 2006 European Commission contributions were substantial though diminishing as the fund ran its course. At the same time, the funds provided directly to UN Organizations increased. As the European Commission became disillusioned with UNDG ITF functioning, the European Commission diminished funding to the UNDG ITF and increased the amount allotted bilaterally. Generally, the funds provided by donors outside of the mechanism have increased over the past five years.

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7 An estimated 90 per cent of donor deposits were earmarked for specific sectors or agencies.
8 An additional factor is donor desire to have greater corporate visibility than contracting through the ITF typically gives.
Table 4: European Commission Multilateral and Bilateral Contributions 2004-2009 (000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC ITF contributions</td>
<td>101.798</td>
<td>195.327</td>
<td>164.072</td>
<td>76.158</td>
<td>31.011</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>568.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC direct funding to UN Agencies</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNAMI IRFFI records and European Commission financial records

4.14. The European Commission decision to contract bilaterally has not involved large amounts; what is involved is a matter of principle. The European Commission doubts the UNDG ITF’s ability to realistically assess a UN Organization’s capacity to perform, and it consequently prefers to make funding decisions directly with implementers it believes, by its own estimation, are the more promising.

4.15. Some resent this increased interference by donors in the affairs of the UNDG ITF and the inclination of donors to contract with implementers outside of it. There is the fear that demands by donors to exercise a greater hand in monitoring the approval and reporting process will undermine the ability of multi-donor trust funds to provide a flexible and responsive source of funding in post-conflict situations.

4.16. On the other hand, the four projects under evaluation would have benefited by a UNDG ITF mechanism which:

- ensured that projects submitted to the first level of approval be reviewed with greater attention to the “implementability of the project given the security situation and delivery capacity of the UN Organization(s);”
- “applied the principles programme synergy, use of best practices and cost effectiveness;” and
- made use of a third party to provide independent proposal assessments.

5. Findings: Assessment of Four Projects

Introduction

5.1. Project assessments in this section review the extent to which projects meet a set of evaluative criteria. The precise scoring on indicators for each criteria and the overall result for each project are given in Annex 1. This section does not treat each of the indicators separately; rather it summarizes the most pertinent elements for each of the five evaluative criteria: relevance, validity of design, development results, management effectiveness and sustainability. Some of the criteria for which the scoring is either obvious or unproblematic may not be mentioned in this section making room for adequate coverage of the more problematic or critical issues.

Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) C9-18

Summary Information

1. Budgeted Amount - $4,879,535
2. Timeframe - Approved to begin October 2005 and to end in December 2006. The project formally ended in December 2009, 36 months past the original end date.
3. Stakeholders – Board of Supreme Audit and the World Bank
4. Overall Project Assessment Score (Annex 1) - 90% of a perfect score

Overview

5.2. The Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) is one of three institutions in Iraq with a mandate to take action against fraud and corruption. Two of them, the Commission of Integrity and the Offices of Inspectors General are both of recent origin. The Board of Supreme Audit has been in continuous existence since 1927 and is presently headed by Dr. Abdul Basit Turky Saeed, a respected anti-corruption campaigner. For the last many years, the Board of Supreme Audit has continued its work against considerable odds, but over the past two decades its competence was unable keep up with evolving techniques from other audit organizations in the region or globally.

5.3. The project supported ten training courses, held in different venues on a variety of audit-related issues designed to upgrade the skills of the BSA auditors. It has further supported the production of two guidelines, one on performance and finance auditing and the other on the detection of fraud. The ten courses were impossible to complete within the timeframe proposed but, with extensions all were eventually concluded. The guidebooks are either produced or are in production and the 437 trained individuals continue their practice inside the BSA, some as auditors and inspectors and some as trainers for other members of the audit organization. An efficient UNDP project manager oversaw activities for UNDP between 2006 and 2008 and prepared a proposal for a second phase. Following his departure, UNDP failed to act expeditiously on the second phase and when the proposal was submitted, funds were
no longer available. The result has been a potential rupture in the partnership which, only quite recently, has been addressed. In 2009, the Board of Supreme Audit submitted 1300 audit reports to the Commission of Integrity and the Offices of the Inspectors General where fraudulent activities have been suspected and where further action has been recommended. The Board of Supreme Audit attributes this large number of fraud investigations to training received from the project.

Relevance

5.4. The UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq places a priority on “public sector reform and strengthening institutional/administrative infrastructure.” Both the National Development Strategy and the International Compact for Iraq (ICI) identify the Board of Supreme Audit as an important subject for public sector reform, specifically to “strengthen the BSA and decentralize its activities to the regions to ensure transparency in public financial management.” The project has upgraded the competence of its auditors and ensured that training was provided to auditors from the separate regions. The independent investigations of the Board of Supreme Audit are essential in a state where government oversight is weak and where the delivery of public services is vulnerable to the misuse of public funds.

Validity of Design

5.5. The proposed programme exceeded what could be accomplished in the time available. The project anticipated ten training programmes involving more than 400 participants to be designed and delivered all within 16 months. It would have been difficult had the training been held in Baghdad; since the training sessions were held abroad, it was impossible. The task was made more difficult by the BSA leadership taking an uncompromising stance on a number of curriculum issues requiring sometimes difficult negotiations. Clearly, however, the project strategy was in line with its objectives. The Board of Supreme Audit strongly supported the training of trainers for the organization to become self-sufficient in upgrading the entire staff and in fact, the organization seems to have accomplished this. The Director has worked closely with the head of the training department where an extensive training programme for BSA staff is on-going. Given the logistical challenges, it was imperative that the project restrict itself to meeting the minimum needs of the staff, and yet as the design evolved, the BSA leadership pushed to exceed the minimum and to provide extra training on fraud detection, privatization and database investigations.

Development Results

5.6. Development effectiveness is assessed by the extent to which stated project objectives have been met. They were to:

11 It is difficult to situate where responsibility lies from among the frequently diverging accounts.
- strengthen capacity of both men and women auditors and thereby reinforce the Board of Supreme Audit as a government watchdog institution;
- conduct a country-wide training needs assessment;
- support ten short courses for BSA auditors offered by international audit bodies;
- develop manuals and training guides for performance auditing, financial auditing, information technology auditing and fraud detection;
- improve capacity of 30 computer technicians able to digitize BSA operations;
- form an institutional strengthening committee;
- strengthen an existing training centre capable of raising funds and be self-sufficient in offering needed training programmes.

**Strengthen capacity of both men and women auditors**

5.7. It was proposed to offer training programmes to 430 auditor employees and the programme offered training to slightly more, 437 in total. The total along with the gender breakdown is shown in Table 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of trainees</strong></td>
<td>231</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of total</strong></td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BSA Project Records

5.8. The Board of Supreme Audit has become increasingly active in assessing whether government ministries carry out government services according to annual plans, regulations and commitments. Previous to the project, government auditing was largely restricted to financial audits. Performance audits were only 33 per cent of all auditing projects. In order to more fully meet its watchdog obligations, the proportion of performance audits has now increased and is expected to reach 75 per cent of all auditing exercises in the near future. In 2009, 1300 audits where fraud is suspected have been forwarded to the Commission of Integrity and the Offices of Inspectors General for further investigation.

**Country-wide training needs assessment**

5.9. The Board of Supreme Audit has six satellite offices around Baghdad, six branches in the governorates and two technical offices (Management/Technical and Financial Affairs) and the training needs assessment reflected the nation-wide needs of these offices for upgrading auditing skills.

**Ten short courses**

5.10. Ten short courses were planned and delivered. The Board of Supreme Audit deliberately selected two types of trainees: one with less than 5 years experience whose exposure would qualify them for basic audit exercises and another with 10 to 15 years of experience whose training would qualify them as trainers for other auditors within the Board of Supreme Audit.
Develop manuals and training guides in four key areas
5.11. These manuals are drafted but not yet finalized.

Improve capacity of 30 computer technicians
5.12. Thirty computer technicians were given training and have begun to computerize audit records to better manage audit exercises and facilitate the transfer of audits to other public servants, especially members of the Council of Representatives.

Create a Board of Supreme Audit institutional strengthening committee
5.13. Discussions on forming such a committee were held. The leadership of the BSA preferred not to democratize institutional strengthening and to guide the process from his office.

Reinforce the training department
5.14. With the addition of a number of experienced trainees whose courses were tailored for advanced auditors explicitly to train trainers, the training department under a capable director has been substantially strengthened and has increased the frequency and number of courses offered.

Management effectiveness and efficiency of resource use
5.15. The project was originally planned for 16 months to begin in September 2005 and to end in December 2006. The project formally ended in December 2009, a period of 52 months, 36 months past the original end date, a 225 percent increase over the original projected duration. There have been four extensions:
- 8 month extension from original end of project till October 2007
- 18 month extension from October 2007 to March 2009
- 3 month extension until June 2009
- 6 month extension until December 2009

5.16. Delays have been attributed to: (1) communication difficulties between UNDP Iraq in Amman and BSA in Baghdad, making negotiations protracted; (2) unrealistic expectations in the original project design of the time needed for planning and implementing 10 training courses out of country; and (3) insufficient UNDP support and operational staff available to the project.

5.17. Table 6 below distinguishes between the months when a full-time or full-fledged project manager was in place and the months when the position of project manager was filled by an acting or interim manager. For 29 per cent of the project’s duration, an acting project manager for the BSA project assumed the position in the absence of a full-time manager.
Table 6: Presence/Absence of Full-Time Project Manager for the Board of Supreme Audit (months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Mos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>+++</td>
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<td>+++</td>
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<td>+++</td>
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<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
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<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
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<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP BSA Project Management
Project manager in place +++
Interim or no manager in place °°°

5.18. These periods of absence at the beginning of the project and following the departure of the first project manager disrupted communications with the Board of Supreme Audit and caused some delays. During the first project manager’s tenure, communication challenges were overcome effectively. There were differences on how training should be conducted, on subjects to cover and how the Board of Supreme Audit would handle the special case of training of trainers, but they were resolved with time. The Board of Supreme Audit praises the first project manager who was able to find a modus operandi for maintaining communication on critical issues and to take corrective action where necessary.

Sustainability

5.19. Strong leadership within the Board of Supreme Audit assures it will continue to upgrade the capacity of its employee auditors and continue to develop as an institution. The training program which the UNDP helped to kick-start is now in full swing independent of UNDP funding with a largely self-sufficient training department. The principal danger to the institution is its own strength and growing competence which is likely to threaten those in the Government of Iraq who may fear its capacity to investigate fraud.

Programme Summary

5.20. The project was well-conceived and as well-designed as possible under the circumstances. It had, and still has, the potential to stem the growing incidence of fraud and corruption in Iraq. The BSA also has a clear vision of its own need for continual training by creating its own department for upgrading staff. It is an ideal partner for UNDP and every effort needs to be made to nurture this partnership, to deepen the relationship between BSA and UNDP. Because of this and because of its present and potential value to combating public sector fraud, innovative thought should be given to ways of institutionalizing this partnership and putting it on a long-term footing. The major concern observed by this evaluation is that instead of
doi

ning this, UNDP’s Governance Unit delayed seeking funding for a second phase even when a proposal had been completed. Although the issue appears resolved for moment, an important lesson is that, instead of jeopardizing this partnership for reasons that are unclear, UNDP should do the reverse. It should deliberately reinforce the relationship. UNDP should assemble a support committee chosen from experts and supporters to provide a forum, in which UNDP can support the work of the Bureau of Supreme Audit, nurture the relationship as well as take a proactive role in strengthening its network of allies and collaborators.

Donor Assistance Database (DAD) II, ITF # C9-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Budgeted Amount - $2,643,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Timeframe - Approved to begin January 2006 and to end in November 2007. The project formally ended in December 2009, a period of 46 months, 24 months past the end date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stakeholders – UNOPS and Ministry of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Overall Project Assessment Score (Annex 1) - 70% of a perfect score</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview

5.21. The project’s primary objective has been to promote the coordination of donor assistance and link the coordination mechanism with national budgets by creating a database in which donor contributions would be recorded, described and the information made available for national level planning. There was an additional component in which provincial councils in four southern governorates would receive training in tracking donor receipts and forwarding data to the central database in Baghdad. A software firm from the United States, Synergy, was contracted to design a database that would record donor receipts broken down by sector, facilitate coordination and link them to national budget planning. The software is now functional. Donors, however, do not keep their contributions up to date, and consequently information on the database represents only a portion of total aid flows. The United States provides less than a third of its bilateral assistance to the database. Canada’s contributions are not up to date. The European Commission does not supply its aid flows regularly and tellingly, the European Commission has decided to maintain its own donor database.

5.22. Efforts have been made to obtain donor contributions from ministries and to facilitate the transfer of this information by creating internet portals within specific ministries linked to the central database located in the Ministry of Planning. Cooperation from some ministries has not been forthcoming. The database training provided by UNOPS (under an inter-agency agreement) in the four southern governorates is complete but there is no link between these provincial councils and the central database in Baghdad. A sub-branch of the main database has been established in Erbil to serve the Kurdistan Regional Government that is
synchronized with the one in Baghdad. The broader objective, which is to use the database for programme planning and coordination within the Government of Iraq, remains elusive. The database is too incomplete for these purposes. As a result, its contribution to enhancing ownership of aid flows by the Government of Iraq, among other Paris Declaration ideals, remains modest.

Relevance

5.23. Promoting donor coordination is uniquely aligned with the UNDG ITF guiding principles which seek to “ensure coordinated, flexible and swift donor response for financing priority expenditures, including reconstruction activities, sector-wide programmes, investment projects, technical assistance and other development activities within the framework of the National Development Strategy and the International Compact for Iraq.”\textsuperscript{12} It is further broadly in support of the UN Assistance Strategy 2008-2011 in strengthening institutional, policy development and information and communication technology capacities of the Government of Iraq both at the federal and local levels.

5.24. The project further addresses a pressing need for aid coordination in Iraq. Between 2003 and the present, estimates of aid flows to Iraq approximate $50 billion.\textsuperscript{13} A significant portion of this amount has come from US sources, two-thirds of which are not made public. A small proportion has been channeled through the UNDG ITF which has made an effort to coordinate aid delivery by administering donor funds implemented by 16 UN Organizations through a single facility. There is further a portion provided by donors outside the management of the trust fund, the bulk of which comes from the US and may total in excess of $25 billion, parceled among many thousands of projects. A well placed observer has described this state of fragmentation:

The fragmentation in projects and the increasing number of small projects may add additional costs to the implementing departments, in addition to the security costs for project construction which may sometimes exceed 40 per cent of the project costs. And the steady increase in the volume of official development aid has focused on increasing the number of projects rather than the maintenance and expansion of existing projects and activities to ensure sustainability of development outcomes.

In this context, it should be noted that donor countries (and multilateral donors) implemented their aid programmes without consulting the federal government and sectoral ministries, but directly to local authorities sometimes addressing themselves to heads of clans in districts causing confusion and waste of financial

\textsuperscript{12} International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, \textit{Terms of Reference}, adopted at IRFFI Donor Committee Meeting, Bari, Italy, October 2007, p. 2
\textsuperscript{13} Interview with the Head, International Cooperation Directorate, Baghdad, 2 April 2010
resources in areas which may not contribute to advancing the level of development in provinces, or focusing only on narrow political gains.\textsuperscript{14}

Validity of design

5.25. There were two potentially mitigating circumstances at the project’s conception. One was the reluctance of donors to reveal their contributions or harmonize programmes which, some believe, was uniquely present after the war in 2003. A second was getting the Government of Iraq to participate. UNDP claims the project anticipated these difficulties though the extent is not clear to the evaluators.

5.26. There was a need for attention to outreach among donors and especially among those donors with both large contributions to the UNDG ITF and sizeable bilateral contributions. Originally there was a parallel database managed by the United States which presumed to serve the entire donor community. With patience, UNDP’s Donor Assistance Database displaced this one and subsequently, a portion of the US contributions was provided to the Donor Assistance Database. Refinements to the Donor Assistance Database have been slow, however. Furthermore, a component of the project, the training of students and functionaries in four southern governorates to manage aid flow data had little to do with the pressing matters in Baghdad.

5.27. The design of the project may have underestimated the difficulty in maintaining linkages with the 25 donors to ensure that all would forward the pertinent information. Trainers from the Donor Assistance Database visited key donors occasionally to show how the information should be submitted but these visits were sporadic and as donor personnel came and went, knowledge was lost. The design does not appear to have provided for the constant attention this component required. The project was fashioned after other similar projects in post-crisis countries such as Afghanistan and Kosovo where presumably, donors were similarly inhibited from fully participating. The design might have anticipated a need to focus more on outreach and training within the donor community.

5.28. What the design could not have anticipated was the deterioration of the security situation. Access to the Ministry of Planning was rarely possible as contact had to be arranged under exigent security restrictions. Direct, face-to-face contact with the actual database and with those who were trained to manage the database was inevitably irregular.

5.29. While the project could do little about the security situation in Baghdad, it might have anticipated more fully what it would take to bring the Government of Iraq on board. The project required government participation in at least two different areas. It needed ministries to collaborate by providing aid flows into the ministries, i.e. in education, public works and municipalities, electricity and health. And it needed

\textsuperscript{14} Huda Al-Ani, \textit{Position Paper on Aid Management in Iraq}, International Cooperation Unit, Ministry of Planning, 2009
the Iraq Strategic Review Board, which gives final approval of donor financed assistance projects to support the Donor Assistance Database as an essential tool for its function of reviewing proposals in the context of the government’s overall planning needs.

5.30. This has been difficult. An initial canvassing of ministry interest received little response. Ministries are proprietary about their sources of revenue. The project assisted ministries with internet portals that would allow them to access the Ministry of Planning database and gradually, interest increased. But there is still not full cooperation. More generally, the government has been preoccupied with constant political change. Ministers have changed and ministry personnel have changed. It is difficult to generate an interest in donor expenditures when security is problematic and when personnel are changing frequently.

**Development Results**

5.31. Development effectiveness is assessed by the extent to which stated project objectives have been met. They were to:

- Create a comprehensive aid management system
- Help the Ministry of Planning make informed decisions on the mobilization and coordination of foreign assistance
- Create an e-governance strategy with web portals for key ministries
- Contribute to administrative decentralization by building the competence of four southern governorates to communicate data to the Ministry of Planning.

**A comprehensive aid management system**

5.32. A database is functioning that has the potential to show a portion of donor commitments. It can show donor contributions by sector following the classification of OECD with a breakdown between what is committed and what is disbursed. There are perhaps 10 or 12 individuals in the Ministry of Planning who have been trained and who are directly or indirectly part of the database management team. Data is obtained from donors, from the Iraqi Strategic Review Board and from some ministries that participate in the programme. While the database is organized, it is not complete. Some estimates optimistically suggest it presently accounts for as much as 70 per cent of all aid flows; in fact it is probably less since only a third of US assistance, the largest bilateral donor, is represented. The next largest donor, European Commission, avows that its contributions are not up to date. The DFID office has never sent in its contributions. The Canadians are behind. The European Commission has created its own database which is more current. Government bodies, including four ministries were expected to provide information to the database and benefit from it, including the Ministry of Planning, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Ministries of Health, Education, Electricity and Municipalities and Public Works. In fact, only three of these compile and transmit information.
5.33 The Donor Assistance Database staff at the Ministry of Planning has received training and appreciates the value of the programme. The Head of the Directorate for International Cooperation who is closely associated with the project has written eloquently in its support. Its weaknesses have principally to do with the project’s lack of attention to the challenges that inhere in the dynamics of aid.

Ownership and coordination of foreign assistance

5.34. National ownership remains an ideal for the project, largely unattainable at present. The project is managed and staffed by Iraqis and to that extent, Iraqis are directly involved and own the day to day management. And the project clearly supports the ideal of ownership; it does so by supporting the Directorate of International Cooperation and by encouraging the Government to sign the Paris Declaration, which espouses five important principles of aid management: alignment, ownership, harmonization, management for results and mutual accountability. It is difficult, however, to realize these ideals when the jurisdiction of the main government approval body, the Iraqi Strategic Review Board, extends to less than 10 per cent of all aid flows. The ISRB clearly needs a broader remit and a reinforced mandate in order to capture more external assistance. It is also difficult when the database, however appreciated in its conception, has not succeeded in creating confidence among donors. It has not, as one interviewee noted, empowered the Government in front of the donors. One can attribute this to ‘bad faith’ among donors or to reluctance among Government ministries, but the result is that the Government does not regard the database as one of its valuable assets.

5.35. The database has recently been amended to include data on the national budget though there have been no entries. If eventually, national budget figures can be incorporated, this will make it possible to know how to ensure that aid flows address national needs as well as to complement provisions that are already in the national budget. The evaluators have also learned that the database has become part of the recently introduced Iraq Development Management, an outcome of the combination of the database and the USAID Tatweer’s Government Assistance Database (GAD). One of the outcomes may be to make the database more comprehensive, potentially linking some aid flows to national budget data.

E-governance promotion

5.36. The creation of web portals in the Ministries of Education, Electricity and Municipalities and Public Works linked with the core database in the Ministry of Planning lays the foundation for further expanding internet linkages. This is likely to contribute to the coordination of assistance through the sharing of information.

Decentralization

5.37. Training of officers and students in four southern Governorates on using database for recording budgeting and aid information was completed in 2007. While it was funded through the project, its results have not been integrated into the database at the Ministry of Planning.
Management and Resource Use

5.38. The project was originally planned for 22 months to begin in January 2006 and to end in November 2007. The project formally ended in December 2009, a period of 48 months, 26 months past the original end date, 120 percent increase over the original projected duration. The delays have been attributed to: (1) insecurity which caused delays in training of Ministry of Planning personnel; (2) delays in installing web portals in collaborating ministries; (3) delays in developing the KRG capacity building plan; and (4) cost overruns as a result of holding trainings outside of Iraq. Delays and cost pressures resulted in the project shifting its emphasis from developing database capacity within ministries to developing database capacity in the KRG. There have been four extensions:
- 6 month extension from original end of project till 31 May 2008
- 6 month extension from 31 May 2008 to December 2008 along with a change of scope
- 6 month extension until 30 June 2009
- 6 month extension until 31 December 2009

5.39. Table 7 below distinguishes between the months when a full-time or full-fledged project manager was in place and the months when the position of project manager was filled by an acting manager. Three project managers have succeeded one another over four years (see Table 7). There was a hiatus between February and August 2008 when the project operated with an acting project manager, a period of 6 months, slightly more than 12 percent of project’s four year tenure.

| Table 7: Presence/Absence of a Full-Time Project Manager for the Donor Assistance Database (months) |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2006                                            | 2007                            | 2008                            | 2009                            | Mos                            |
| Q1  | Q2  | Q3  | Q4  | Q1  | Q2  | Q3  | Q4  | Q1  | Q2  | Q3  | Q4  | 42  |
| ++  | ++  | +++ | +++ | +++ | +++ | +++ | +++ | +   | ++  | +++ | +++ | +++ | 6   |
| Total |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 48  |
| Source: UNDP DAD Project Management               |
| Project manager in place +++                      |
| Interim or no manager in place ooo                 |

5.40. UNOPS participated as a partner and implemented the modest component in four southern governorates. This portion of the project was completed well before the UNDP components and no obvious effort has been made to link the database production of this UNOPS portion to the database maintained in Baghdad.

Sustainability

5.41. The project has supported aid harmonization practically with the database and in principle by encouraging the Government of Iraq’s alignment with the Paris
Declaration. The Government of Iraq will probably continue its support of the Paris Declaration’s five principles and may invoke them in its dealings with donors. There may be a residual legacy in the Ministry of Planning where the Head of the Directorate of International Cooperation is likely to continue to argue against the fragmentation of aid as she has done eloquently up to now. The database itself, however, will probably not elicit the support it needs from donors to be viable, at least not unless the UNDP is able to convince donors to record their contributions more regularly and this is not likely to happen. UNDP has received funding for a second phase of the project for 18 months and this may offer some resources for strengthening the database, but the emphasis in the second phase is more policy than practice. There needs to be a significant change in commitment of the Government of Iraq, in the level of involvement of the UNDP and among the donors for there to be any lasting legacy.

5.42. The lukewarm interest of the government is the more serious challenge to sustainability. The project requires government participation in at least two different areas. It needs ministries to collaborate by providing aid flows into the ministries, i.e. in education, public works and municipalities, electricity and health. And it needs the Iraq Strategic Review Board, which gives final approval of donor-financed projects to support the Donor Assistance Database as an essential tool for its function of reviewing proposals in the context of the government’s overall planning needs. The needed collaboration has, in both cases, been partial. There was scarcely a functioning government during the early period of the DAD project and though there has been a notable increase in the government capacity to use and apply quantitative tools, it is slow in coming.

Programme Summary

5.43. The central concern here is the reluctance of major donors to submit their contributions in a timely and systematic manner. There are two possible explanations. One is negligence; donors may wish to comply but do not have the motivation or the staff to do so. The other is that donors simply do not wish to take part in an effort at synthesizing aid flow information under the auspices of the UNDP. It is probably some of both. Some donors simply do not have the staff or the inclination. And others, such as the European Union are frustrated with the inefficiency of the UNDP effort and prefer to be custodians, themselves, of a synthesizing project. The project has had, and will continue to have an uphill battle. Bilateral donors are accountable to their own constituencies and the United Nations is not one of them. The situation is aggravated by a lukewarm interest within Iraq, among ministries and other beneficiaries, in coordinating all aid deliveries to Iraq through a central mechanism.

5.44. The donor database is in principle a fine idea. Under adverse circumstances, UNDP has done its best to put in place a database in spite of its remove from the Ministry of Planning and in spite of the reluctance of donors. It boasts that it is the largest data base of its kind in the world; that it is the only officially recognized external
resources database by the Government of Iraq and is now becoming part of a new Iraq Development Management System as it combines with USAID Tatweer's Government Assistance Database (GAD). A second phase of the original project is underway.

5.45. In spite of valiant efforts and in spite of relatively continuous attention over the past few years, the database (1) is not complete and (2) does not have the support of either the key donors or, apparently the line ministries, needed to make it complete. A decision needs to be taken. The UNDP should formally request the Government of Iraq to address a request from the highest level to the major donors urging them to support the project. Failing this, the UNDP would be well advised to withdraw support for the database at the conclusion of the present phase of support.

Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) G11-14

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<tr>
<td>1. Budgeted Amount - $3,735,426</td>
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<td>2. Timeframe - Approved to begin April 2007 and to end April 2008. At present, 24 months past the original end date, the project is on-going and due to end 30 June 2010.</td>
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<td>3. Stakeholders – The Independent High Electoral Commission, the Government Elections Office (GEO) and the UNAMI International Elections Assistance Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Overall Project Assessment Score (Annex 1) - 63% of a perfect score</td>
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Overview

5.46. In April 2007, a new Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) was mandated by the Iraqi parliament to replace the previous provisional one. New commissioners needed briefing on electoral matters, and the new organization needed help in managing finances and human resources. These were to be UNDP’s primary responsibilities within this project. In 2007 there was a lull with no elections on the immediate horizon, but governorate elections were likely to be called followed by national parliamentary elections, and when these were called, implementation would have to be responsive and rapid.

5.47. An early component was a study tour for Commissioners to South Korea which, by all accounts, did not go well. Two other study tours to Spain and Australia went better but as the project progressed, UNDP failed to recruit a project manager or place anyone in Baghdad and, as a consequence, did not keep abreast of activities in the Independent High Electoral Commission. UNAMI election advisors and other international advisors from the NGO IFES, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, were meanwhile working inside the IHEC offices daily. UNOPS’ deputy was proactive, frequently in Baghdad and visiting the IHEC offices. UNDP’s
absence continued and as time went on, UNDP’s activities diminished further. By 2008, workplans were not in place. No project manager had yet been identified. In a project with interdependent components, UNDP was not completing the tasks on which other inputs by project partners depended.

5.48. In April 2008, IHEC and UNAMI agreed that the exigencies of planning and carrying out the 2009 provincial elections (originally scheduled for late 2008) and the 2010 national parliamentary elections (originally scheduled for 2009) would make it difficult for IHEC to devote time to institutional capacity development. UNAMI urged UNDP to alter its elections support programme during this period. It was agreed that UNDP would address a substantive gap in IHEC’s competencies specifically in public and media relations. At that point, a media specialist was designated UNDP project manager and because the post was associated with UNAMI’s team, this media specialist/project manager was granted mission approval under the UNAMI ceilings to establish an on-going presence in Baghdad.

5.49. The UNDP project manager led an institutional restructuring of the public outreach division, a process which led to the establishment of the external media unit and the office of the spokesperson. IHEC was exposed to new concepts such as social media networking and rights to access information and to privacy, which have changed the working practices of the Commission, and it has developed formal links with other important institutions such as the Iraqi Media Network and the Communications and Media Commission. There was the added advantage for UNDP of having an on-site project manager based in Baghdad. Eight months later, however, despite these successful activities, a decision was taken by the head of the Governance Unit to withdraw the media specialist/project manager. On-going activities were disrupted and UNDP presence in the elections project was discontinued. Eight months passed when UNDP was once again without a presence in Baghdad before an arrangement was made with UNAMI for one of the UNAMI elections specialists to join UNDP as a project manager in August 2009.

5.50. The new project manager brought expertise and experience to the UNDP project and re-established a UNDP presence. The performance of the new project manager in the lead up to the March 2010 parliamentary elections in managing electoral complaints, refining electoral processes and in organizing out of country voting has received praise.

5.51. UNDP’s extended absences from Baghdad and lack of involvement in the project during long periods raised questions among its partners, UNAMI and UNOPS, about UNDP’s capacity to meet its obligations. Key donors began to look elsewhere – notably to UNOPS – to do what, by rights, UNDP should have been doing. From this perspective, UNDP’s performance has been subject to criticism. When the UNDP did have a presence, i.e. the involvement of the media advisor in the second half of 2008 and the presence of an elections specialist beginning in late 2009, the assessment of UNDP’s performance is positive.
Relevance

5.52. Security Council Resolution 1546 gave a clear mandate to the United Nations to support the electoral process in Iraq. The United Nations supported two elections and one referendum in 2005 under this mandate and assisted in the selection of the seven commissioners plus one UN non-voting commissioner for the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI). United Nations support had already included provision of support to observer groups, support for professional media coverage and a range of logistical and substantive electoral expertise. In January 2007 the Council of Representatives approved a law replacing the transitional IECI with the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), a permanent electoral body with nine commissioners. This project was approved following this new law and was to provide timely assistance to a new board that would assume responsibility for a new round of upcoming governorate and parliamentary elections.

Validity of design

5.53. Project components appeared to be appropriate to the needs of the Independent High Electoral Commission. UNDP was to provide opportunities to the new set of IHEC commissioners to learn about election commissions in other countries; it was to provide training for the organization in financial and human resource management, to help with increasing knowledge among IHEC members of electoral best practices. These had been identified in a needs assessment study the year before. What was not made clear in the design documents is the interdependence of these activities with other activities to be undertaken by project partners, UNAMI and UNOPS. UNDP bore the responsibility of meeting its commitments not only to the beneficiary, IHEC, but also to its co-implementers. Had this been clearer, UNDP might have acted sooner to meet its commitments. There was further the concern that the project was to be completed within a single year and, based on UNDP’s track record and the fact that delays were being experienced in a number of other projects, the UNDG ITF would have had reason to question the feasibility of the project’s 12 month duration.

Development Results

5.54. Development effectiveness is assessed by the extent to which stated project objectives have been met. They were to:

- Develop the management capacity of the new Commissioners with training packages and study visits to other jurisdictions;
- Arrange for training on financial systems for HQ and governorate offices;
- Arrange for training on human resources best practices;
- Implement training packages for middle management on leadership, time management, public relations and communication skills;
- Promote the accreditation of Bridge facilitators.

**Commissioner visits to other jurisdictions**

5.56. Three study tours were arranged, one for the commissioners and two for IHEC staff. The two staff tours were positively received while the commissioners’ visit to South Korea has become the subject of considerable criticism. There might have been more study tours during 2008 except that UNAMI urged UNDP to put study tours aside as the governorate elections scheduled for January 2009 were approaching and required the attention of all commissioners.

**Training on financial systems**

5.57. The training did not take place. This may have been due in part to the decision by UNAMI and IHEC to focus all attention on supporting the governorate and parliamentary elections.

**Training on human resources best practices**

5.58. The training did not take place. This may have been due in part to the decision by UNAMI and IHEC to focus all attention on supporting the governorate and parliamentary elections.

**Training packages for middle management on leadership, public relations and communications**

5.59. In early 2008, when IHEC was preparing for upcoming electoral events, UNAMI recommended that UNDP amend the work plan to improve IHEC’s competencies in public and media relations. UNDP assigned a project manager to assume this responsibility who then moved to Baghdad to work directly with the UNAMI International Electoral Assistance Team in the IHEC offices. At the time, this was the only UNDP project activity. The project manager assisted in restructuring the public outreach division and in establishing the external media unit and the office of the spokesperson. The project manager was withdrawn for reasons that are not clear to the evaluation team, since the performance is assessed positively. Among the outputs of this middle management public relations component was a reinforcement of IHEC’s authority to manage fair elections and, given a more effective use of the media, a larger voter turnout than would otherwise have occurred.

5.60. Since August 2009, with the engagement of an election specialist as UNDP project manager, UNDP has been able to more fully participate in the UN elections advisory team and contribute to providing assistance to out of country voting as well as electoral procedures, audit and complaints processes for the March 2009 parliamentary elections.

**Promote accreditation of Bridge facilitators**

5.61. 5 Bridge Modules were translated into Arabic: Electoral Systems, Electoral Contestant Voter Education, Media, and Voter Registration. UNDP enabled full accreditation of two IHEC staff and semi-accreditation of 12 further IHEC staff.
UNDP organized a regional BRIDGE Training for facilitators and BRIDGE Implementation Workshop for relevant IHEC senior management staff involved in developing capacity building strategies.

Management effectiveness and efficiency of resource use

5.62. The project was originally planned for 12 months to begin in April 2007 and to end in April 2008. The project has not ended as of April 2010 although it is 24 months passed the original end date. Delays have been attributed to: (1) a management deficit in UNDP; (2) a cease in capacity building activities for IHEC during the period when elections were taking place; and (3) a lack of collaboration between UNDP, UNAMI and UNOPS at different periods in the project. There have been three extensions:
- 12 month extension from original end of project till March 2008 along with a change of scope and a reallocation of funds
- 6 month extension from March 2009 to September 2009
- 9 month extension until June 2010

5.63. Table 8 below distinguishes between the months when a full-time or full-fledged project manager was in place and the months when the position of project manager was filled by an acting or interim manager. Between the beginning of the project in April 2007 and March 2010, the project functioned with an interim or acting project manager 61 per cent of the time.

| Table 8: Presence/Absence of Full-Time Project Manager for Elections Project (months) |
| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | Mos |
| Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q1 | ++ | +++ |
| ooo | ooo | ooo | ooo | + | +++ | +++ | 14 |
| Total | 36 |

Source: UNDP Elections Project Management
Project manager in place +++
Interim or no manager in place ooo

5.64. Partnership quality is manifest in the dynamics between UNDP, UNAMI and UNOPS. UNDP was to provide long-term capacity building. UNOPS was to provide short-term training along with logistical support and the two agencies were to collaborate with the ten to fifteen UNAMI staff working inside IHEC offices providing advice as needed. UNDP did not show signs of meeting its project commitments in the early period of the project. UNOPS, by contrast, did meet its commitments, inclining UNAMI leadership to turn toward UNOPS for critical services and away from UNDP. Frequent waivers were required as UNOPS assumed an increasingly central role while UNDP’s absence and lack of attention to management issues led to its marginalization. This continued until August 2009 when, UNDP engaged a full time project manager to be based in IHEC’s Baghdad offices.
5.65. There was opportunity for UNDP to take corrective measures early on. A decision was taken in early 2008 to shift a media specialist from another project to the elections project to manage the project and offer technical assistance and advice in outreach and media relations. This provided relevant inputs although they were not the inputs in the original project design. The media in elections project manager was replaced with an interim project manager in late May 2009, after all but one activity had concluded. It would have been better for the UNDP to recruit a competent elections specialist to manage the project and to ensure that UNDP’s original commitments were met from the beginning.

Sustainability

5.66. Observers have praised the governorate elections in January 2009, and by all indications, after the dust has cleared from the March 2010 parliamentary elections, these too will be judged positively. The machinery for voting was efficient, voter turnout was commendable and, excepting some less than credible accusations, both these elections appeared free of fraud. The credibility of the election machinery seems to have generated higher than expected turnout in the governorate elections accounting in part for less support for sectarian candidates.\(^\text{15}\) Two lessons learned workshops following the January 2009 elections have noted the accuracy and effectiveness of Voter Registration and the efficient implementation of logistical and security activities.\(^\text{16}\) The more recent parliamentary elections will probably be similarly assessed. UNDP, specifically, has been acknowledged for its part in supporting outreach and media support as well as its part in supporting out of country voting during the lead up to the national parliamentary elections in 2010. Both have contributed modestly to the sustainability of elections capacity in Iraq.

Programme Summary

5.67. UNDP’s involvement in building capacity within IHEC has been sporadic. When it has managed to have a presence in Baghdad, specifically when a project manager has been present within the IHEC offices, results have been positive. UNDP’s presence has been inconsistent, however. On the one hand, there have been distinctive contributions in specific areas. On the other hand these contributions have been for only limited periods of time, and there have been extended periods of time when UNDP has had very little to with its project partner.

5.68. UNDP’s failure to maintain an on-going presence is attributed in part to a culture of accountability within the UNDP Governance Unit that has not been as attentive to management obligations as it could have been. Planning for the promised

\(^{15}\) International Crisis Group, *Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond*, Middle East Report No. 94, 25 February 2010

components, for capacity building in specific election functions, should have begun well before project approval in order to be ready to mobilize project resources as soon as funds became available. Account should have been taken of the laborious recruitment process in UNDP and, with this in mind, informal measures taken to determine the availability of appropriate elections expertise. This was not done. It seems unusual that UNDP with global expertise in elections was unable to provide an appropriate expert for the project over its three year duration. This is not to detract from the quality of the media expert who served as project manager for 8 months or that of the project manager who came to UNDP from UNAMI. It is to underline the anomaly of UNDP’s unpreparedness to undertake the initiative.

5.69 The difficulties are also attributable, in part, to matters over which UNDP had no control. UNDP had little say over the thematic direction of the elections programme in Iraq since ultimate authority, in this instance belonged to UNAMI. UNDP had to negotiate its role and do so in conformity with UNAMI strategies. And UNDG ITF, while a welcome source of funds, did not at the same time exercise the necessary discipline over approvals when it might have prevented an unrealistic project design.

5.70. On a final note and without pre-empting the judgment of the present project manager, the UNDP would be well advised to fulfill its commitment within the elections project to provide training in financial and human resource management. IHEC management expressed its concern to the evaluation team that the UNAMI team is inclined to perform electoral functions themselves rather than train IHEC staff to do so. It may be advisable for the UNDP to meet its training commitment and in doing so, contribute to IHEC’s self sufficiency.

Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process (C9-10A)

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<td>1. Budgeted Amount - $15,429,927</td>
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<td>2. Timeframe - Approved to begin May 2005 and to end in December 2005. The project formally ended in January 2009, 39 months past the original end date.</td>
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<td>3. Stakeholders – UNAMI, UNOPS, UNESCO, UNIFEM, national and international NGOs</td>
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<td>4. Overall Project Assessment Score (Annex 1) – 69% of a perfect score</td>
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Overview

5.71. In early 2005, a newly created Transitional National Assembly set procedures in motion for drafting a permanent constitution. Although the transitional government had originally allotted six months for the drafting process, there were delays in constituting the committee and it was only in mid-May of that year that Sheikh
Humam Hammoudi was officially recognized as chair. There were further procedural issues to settle. Meanwhile the US Coalition Provincial Authority insisted on maintaining the original deadline of 15 August for submission of a final draft. This left only a matter of weeks for constitutional deliberations and drafting. It was up to the United Nations to find a way to contribute effectively to the process, squeezed between the maneuverings of the transitional Iraqi government on the one hand and the inflexible US deadline.

5.72. The UNDG ITF fast-tracked six projects totaling $24.5 million for activities to be carried out by UNAMI, UNDP, UNOPS, UNIFEM and UNESCO. UNAMI assumed the lead in this group of projects under the political guidance of the Department of Political Affairs and, within UNAMI, under the Office of Constitutional Support. The main question was “whether the UN would be able to develop (sufficient) political space within the existing US – Iraq – UN triangular framework to implement its mandate under (Security Council) Resolution 1546.”

UNAMI adapted itself to the available political space. The UNDP supported UNAMI’s involvement which itself shifted as the political space and requirements shifted. Project coherence would be less important than doing what was feasible under the circumstances. Initially, this involved:

- Providing logistical and infrastructural support to the Constitutional Drafting Committee Secretariat;
- Supporting the coordination of donor inputs;
- Promoting public outreach initiatives to stimulate public dialogue;
- Soliciting submissions giving feedback from the population.

5.73. UNDP’s role was principally logistical, peripheral to the substantive drafting effort. UNDP’s most direct contribution to the drafting process was to support the Constitution Drafting Committee Subcommittee on Media and Public Dialogue Outreach Unit that drew on media and civil society organizations to disseminate information and solicit submissions. Advertisements were printed in 61 newspapers, announcements were aired on 22 radio stations and 16 television channels and press conferences were held with UNDP support. The outreach unit engaged 342 civil society organizations, organized 38 lectures or workshops, worked with a network of 1500 employees and received 449,000 public submissions in just over a month. UNDP managed most of these efforts and in this way contributed to the inclusivity of the drafting process. Special efforts were made to engage Sunni communities by contact with mosques and trusted persons in order to compensate for the marginalization of Sunni communities from the drafting process.

5.74. Whether these efforts had an impact on the constitution is a matter of debate. It was difficult to encourage Sunni participation as Sunnis had recently boycotted the elections for the Transitional National Assembly. It was difficult to overcome a general fear in the population of participating. When the drafting process entered

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the final stage of consideration by the Leadership Council, there was no mechanism for reviewing public submissions. The US deadline pushed the process to an early conclusion and at the final stage, “the public was not informed whether their views had been taken into account” and it became clear “that the final amendments did not reflect the public submissions.”

The result, according to some observers, was a constitution in which there was positive agreement on media and human rights and yet there was no agreement on sharing of wealth, on centralization of powers and on provisions for establishing regions. Viable treatment of these matters was neglected.

5.75. The drafting process concluded with a referendum in mid-October. At that point, 60 per cent of the project budget – approximately $9.3 million – remained unspent. The original sum of $15.4 million had exceeded what could feasibly be disbursed. The remaining funds were re-programmed and though expenditures ended up supporting one or another of the broad governance categories (human rights, national reconciliation, criminal justice etc.) in reality, they had mainly in common an effort to absorb the remaining funds. They included training on freedom of expression, support to Iraqi journalists, defining a minimum pension for Iraqi widows, study tours to promote national reconciliation, campaigns to support the right to live in safety and so on.

5.76. This assortment of expenditures undoubtedly had positive outcomes. Their relationship to the constitution drafting process and the review process that followed is, however, not always obvious. These numerous small endeavors appear to have been driven by a supply of funds more than by a singular and focused objective. Re-programming left-over funds from the drafting process was probably not the ideal mechanism for addressing the specific issues that plagued the constitution in December 2005 or would plague it in the coming years.

Relevance

5.77. The Government of Iraq formally requested the United Nations in May 2005 “to provide technical assistance including technical and logistical public affairs expertise that can help promote national dialogue between the Transitional National Authority Constitutional Drafting Committee and the Iraqi People and build consensus nationwide.” Such assistance was in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1546, the strategy of the United Nations Country Team at the time and, more broadly, Millennium Development Goal 8.

Validity of design

5.78. The purpose of the design was to anticipate what functions UNAMI’s Office of Constitutional Support would serve and prepare UNDP to assist in meeting them. These would include accessing expertise, accessing the appropriate literature and setting up the infrastructure for a drafting committee secretariat along with

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building the capacity of staff. There would be the special function of supporting the Media and Public Affairs Outreach Unit in disseminating information and soliciting public submissions, and this would draw heavily on media outlets and civil society organizations.

5.79. A practical assessment of the constraints might have led to a more realistic budget, one that matched the activities involved. The budget far exceeded the need. The timeline was exceedingly short for the budget approved. At the project’s conclusion, following the drafting and the referendum, 60 per cent of the budget remained unspent and the challenge then was to disburse considerable resources without a coherent programme apart from guidelines for drafting a constitution that was by then complete. This is not to discount the value of these many separate expenditures that occurred between December 2005 and December 2008; it is rather to question the overall value of disbursing donor funds in the absence of a singular objective. Responsibility here rests with the design of the project, budget estimates and the process of approval that allowed the design to go forward without a disciplined assessment.

Development Results

5.80. Development effectiveness is assessed by the extent to which stated project objectives have been met. They were to:

- Support the Constitution Drafting Committee in its effort to elaborate a constitution that reflected the interests of the Iraqi citizens;
- Support donor coordination of inputs to the constitution
- Support media and public information activities of the drafting committee by promoting public outreach initiatives that encourage public dialogue and debate among the wider population
- Promote inclusiveness and participation in the constitution drafting process
- Support implementation of the constitution
- Provide institutional development and capacity building

Elaboration of a constitution

5.81. The UNDP supported UNAMI/OCS in providing logistical support for drafting a constitution. Circumstances beyond the control of the UN compromised the extent to which it fully reflected the interests of the Iraqi citizens.

Donor coordination

5.82. Initial plans for coordinating donor inputs were not realized but the efforts led to subsequent efforts to support donor coordination and track donor contributions with a database housed within the Ministry of Planning.

Media and public information activities

5.83. Newspapers, radio and television were all used effectively to disseminate information. Hundreds of civil society groups were contracted to hold workshops
and to solicit public views on articles in the constitution. This component of the project, orchestrated in large measure by UNDP, successfully engaged a large number of Iraqis in the constitution drafting process. Innovative strategies were devised for accessing communities that might have otherwise not been involved.

**Promote inclusiveness**

5.84. The target set by UNAMI/UNDP for measuring the impact of the program was a turnout of 70-80 per cent for the referendum. The election commission estimated that 66 per cent of the population voted in the referendum, just short of the target.

**Support implementation of the constitution**

5.85. Support to implementation appears to have been an afterthought and a convenient cover for the collection of activities financed with funds unspent once the drafting was concluded. These funds were used to support a number of activities that seemed pertinent: training on freedom of expression, support to Iraqi journalists, support to the NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq for 12 workshops held in Amman, defining a minimum pension for Iraqi widows, study tours to promote national reconciliation, campaigns to support the right to live in safety and photo exhibitions.

**Institutional development**

5.86. UNDP mobilized resources quickly to rent three offices for three different functions of the drafting committee, equip the offices, provide vehicles, internet connectivity, residence facilities for the chairman, translation services and promotional materials.

**Management effectiveness and efficiency of resource use**

5.87. The project was originally planned for 6 months, to begin May 2005 and to end December 2005. It formally ended in January 2009, 39 months past the original end date. The delays have been attributed to: (1) poor financial planning, i.e. unrealistically large financial resources to be expended in a short period; (2) UNDP’s peripheral role and lack of control over project activities; and (3) fragmentation of project activities without on-site project management. There have been three extensions:

- extension of 12 months to December 2006
- extension of 24 months to December 2008
- extension of 16 months to July 2007

5.88. UNDP’s role in drafting the constitution was to provide services peripheral to the drafting process itself, to inform the public, to generate public input, to contract expertise for the drafting committee as needed and to provide logistical or infrastructural support to the drafting committee secretariat as needed. These support services were under the authority of a project manager within UNAMI. Once the drafting process was complete, additional projects were devised to absorb the left-over funds, some of which had their own sub-project manager. Overall
project management was assumed by the head of UNDP’s Governance Unit who provided some oversight. Although regarded as a singular project by UNDG ITF management, in the final reckoning following the first six months, the Constitutional Drafting Project was in reality a number of separate initiatives, some of them related to the drafting of the constitution and some not.

5.89. Table 9 below distinguishes between the months when a full-time and full-fledged project manager was in place and the months when the position of project manager was filled by an acting or interim manager. During the constitution drafting process, the Head of the Governance Unit, the Programme Officer, and the Media Project Manager spent a large portion of their time in Baghdad working closely with UNAMI and the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Following this original period, no one project manager was dedicated exclusively to managing the funds for this assortment of sub-projects; for an estimated 30 per cent of the project’s duration, there was either an interim or an acting project manager. Beginning in 2007, individual support programmes did have their own sub-managers and the Team Leader of the Governance Unit in UNDP served as project manager among other duties and though there was no consistent central management, there was an active management presence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>09</th>
<th>Mos</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP Support to Constitution Drafting Project Management

Project manager in place +++
Interim or no dedicated manager in place °°°

5.90. A critical question is whether the activities that followed the drafting process evolved out of a planning process aiming to address, in a concerted fashion, specific issues that remained relevant to the constitution. This seems unlikely, judging by the assortment of activities. The management of these funds, following the conclusion of the drafting process was assumed by sub-project managers one of whom became the Project Manager for the new activities and later by a senior National Officer. What is not clear is whether these funds were scrutinized and programmed under a single coordinating authority or whether they were, as it appears, one-off efforts separately conceived. This is not a commentary on the projects themselves, many of which were properly designed and executed; it is rather a concern about the planning of the original constitutional drafting support project whose budget and design were incommensurate with what was to be done leaving a significant unspent amount.
Sustainability

5.91. The legacy of support to the drafting of the constitution receives mixed reviews. Inclusivity is essential in a drafting process and from the beginning Sunni communities were under-represented. Pressure to complete the drafting process came from both the US and some high ranking Iraqis and pushed the process to make compromises that could have been avoided with more time for deliberation. The result is a constitution that did little more than meet the immediate need to promote sovereignty and democracy at a critical moment in Iraq’s history. By participating in the exercise, UNDP has emerged the wiser. UNAMI and UNDP have together recognized the “ad hoc fashion in which UN constitutional support activities were planned and implemented.” The UNDP has further noted that a “UNHQ capacity should be established that would serve as an institutional memory and a support base for the planning and implementation of constitutional assistance programmes,”19 drawing on East Timor, Afghanistan as well as the Iraq experiences. This alone would be a valuable legacy.

Programme Summary

5.92. Since UNDP had only a peripheral role in drafting the constitution, a review of this project says relatively about UNDP’s performance in facilitating a constitutional drafting process. UNDP provided project services to UNAMI while UNAMI drove the project practically and thematically. These services included providing public relations services and soliciting public opinion; by all accounts UNDP performed these services capably. UNDP’s role was sufficiently marginal; however, to make attribution to specific intended results at the drafting or implementation stage unjustifiable.

5.93. What stands out is that rendering services for the drafting process constitutes only a modest portion of what was done under the rubric of this project. The larger portion of activities took place after the drafting was completed when there was nearly two-thirds of the funds unspent and when a number of small expenditures were devised to support NGOs and studies related to human rights. It would be stretching the point to link them directly to the constitution.

5.94. Accountability standards in UNDP place a high value on exhaustive planning so that a project proceeds more or less as expected and can be assessed by what was originally intended. The idea is to minimize expenditures which do not contribute directly to the explicit purposes and goals of the programme. The intention here is not to be overly demanding on these matters by calling attention to the large numbers of expenditures marginally related to the core purpose of the project; many of these were documented and had concrete results. It is to note that UNDP would not want this to be standard practice.

Overview of Four Projects

5.95. This section has judged four projects on the extent to which each has met a set of evaluative criteria covering issues of relevance, validity of design, development results, management effectiveness and sustainability. The assessment concludes that one of the four projects has performed well when assessed against these criteria. Three others have performed less well. Table 10 summarizes these assessments based on the project-by-project summaries given in Annex 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project assessment (out of 51)</th>
<th>Board of Supreme Audit</th>
<th>Donor Assistance Database</th>
<th>Institution Building for Elections</th>
<th>Drafting of Constitution</th>
<th>Four projects combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project assessment (out of 51)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of perfect score (51)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.96. The Board of Supreme Audit has performed unusually well under the circumstances. The Donor Assistance Database, though relevant to UNDP and UNDG ITF objectives and reasonably well managed, has not achieved the results anticipated. Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission, while relevant and well-designed, has had modest development results and experienced significant management challenges. Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process was uniquely relevant, but the design was unrealistic and management allowed a fragmentation of activities.

5.97. Table 11 observes UNDP performance from a different angle, not project-by-project but rather by evaluative criteria. In this table, the scoring by evaluative criteria - relevance, validity of design, results achievement, management effectiveness and sustainability – is analyzed separately to focus on the evaluative criteria themselves. It is important to keep in mind that this covers only four projects and any judgment made here is relevant only to these four projects, not the UNDP as a whole or the Governance Unit as a whole.

5.98. Column 2 gives the total of actual scores by evaluative criteria for all four projects. Column 3 gives what this total would be if perfect scores had been achieved on each criteria for all four projects combined. Column 4 then calculates, for the actual score, its percentage of a perfect score. This breaks down performance by evaluative criteria for these four projects. It is interesting to note that the relevance of the four projects was judged perfect, 100 per cent of a perfect score. The validity of the design and the achievement of results were both judged reasonably well overall, 70 per cent and 73 per cent of a perfect score respectively. The
management effectiveness and sustainability did not score as well; on management effectiveness, the score was 60 per cent of a perfect score for four projects combined and 66 per cent for sustainability.

Table 11: Summary of Overall Performance by Evaluative Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1 Evaluative Criteria</th>
<th>Column 2 Actual Scores for all 4 Projects</th>
<th>Column 3 Perfect Scores for all 4 Projects</th>
<th>Column 4 Percentage of Perfect Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validity of Design</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Results</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Effectiveness</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Lessons Learned

A Trust Fund Structured for Results

6.1. The four project assessments suggest that UNDP has not always been prepared to mobilize staff or facilities for implementation once projects were approved. While the UNDP must accept primary responsibility for meeting project commitments, a secondary responsibility belongs to the UNDG ITF for allowing funding to proceed in spite of indications that performance was unlikely to be optimal.

6.2. There were political reasons. The UNDG ITF was eager to provide resources for doing something in Iraq. The sense of urgency appears to have occasionally overridden considerations that might have been prudent and might have given the fund time to construct a mechanism that could promise a greater quality of intervention by UN Organizations.

6.3. A more deliberate approach would have allowed the approval and tracking mechanism to be put in place and tested instead of setting up the mechanism while approvals and other project management functions were underway. This refers not only to the cluster system and the first level of consideration but also to other steps in the approval process, Peer Review and Steering Committee, as well as standards and practices for tracking project performance.

6.4. There were also structural reasons, one structural flaw in particular. The beneficiaries of the funding were UN Organizations, the same that exercised a first level of authority in UNDG ITF project approvals at the cluster level. Those standing to gain from the decisions are not likely to act independently. There was a need for an objective, independent party to exercise authority over funding decisions, and not only to make funding decisions but to hold UN Organizations accountable as they carried out implementation.

6.5. Donors might have played a greater role from the beginning and yet the purpose of the UNDG ITF was to exempt donors from these obligations, as they did not have the presence in Iraq to exercise these functions; in the end, when frustration increased with the increasing number of questionable funding decisions, donors did begin to play a greater role. But this was not ideal. A combination of independent sector experts and Iraqi advisors would have been a better choice even if this would have meant a slower and less responsive process.

6.6. The lesson is to avoid managing trust funds as in-house resources for distribution among members and instead to structure them with checks and balances as mechanisms with the sole purpose of guaranteeing concrete development results.
A Culture of Accountability

6.7. The four UNDP projects in question have each had their positive outcomes. Intensive training of auditors within the Board of Supreme Audit has restored the Board of Supreme Audit’s respect in the region and reinforced its resolve to tackle corruption in Iraq. A donor database has given the Ministry of Planning more impetus to reflect on the value of coordinating donor contributions. An outreach programme designed for the Independent High Election Board appears to have had an impact on voter participation. Support to media and networks of civil society organizations have spurred public participation in the drafting of the constitution.

6.8. Each of the projects could have done more. Support to the Board of Supreme Audit would have done better to respond more readily when a second phase was proposed. The Donor Assistance Database project needed a strategy for generating greater commitment among donors. Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission had to compensate for the suspension of the core capacity building activities and did so only partially when the media in elections activities were undertaken instead. And the project to draft the constitution lost its focus once the drafting was over and ended up supporting a diverse assortment of sub-projects.

6.9. The principal asset UNDP has brought to these projects has been a depth of expertise; they are relevant and generally well conceived. The principal liability has been a lack of management accountability. Workplans and timings were unrealistic. In two of the four projects, UNDP was not fully in control of the substantive thematic areas. Delays are one indication indicated in Table 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1 Project</th>
<th>Column 2 Planned duration (months)</th>
<th>Column 3 Actual duration (months)</th>
<th>Column 4 Per cent overrun</th>
<th>Column 5 Months with interim or no manager</th>
<th>Column 6 Per cent of total with interim or no manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board of Supreme Audit</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>225%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Assistance Database</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Elections</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting Constitution</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>650%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>225%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP project files; IRFFI UNDP-specific database

6.10. Slippage has been common. The four governance projects have each taken two, three and sometimes four times the original planned duration to complete. This may be a reflection of a poor design, inattentive management, laborious UNDP
hiring policies or in some instances the delays were simply a management device to ensure UNDP continuity on the ground. Table 12, above, lists the expected duration (column 2) next to the actual duration (column 3) and the percentage overrun (column 4). There are mitigating circumstances, not the least being the security limitations that inhibit collaboration among UNDP and its project partners. These restrictions have affected all UNDG ITF projects to some degree and extensions are common. Delays for these four projects exceed the norm.

6.11. Project manager vacancies are another indication. The Board of Supreme Audit project lacked a full-time dedicated manager for 29 per cent of its duration. The Donor Assistance Database lacked a dedicated full-time project manager for a modest stretch of time; but both the elections and the constitutional drafting projects were without dedicated full-time project managers for lengthy periods. Capacity building for IHEC remained without a project manager for 22 out of 36 months; and support to drafting the constitution lacked a dedicated full-time project manager for 14 months out of 47.

6.12. Project manager positions remained vacant even when gaps persisted in implementation. For two extended periods in the Board of Supreme Audit project, a year at the beginning and a half-year as the project was concluding its first phase and preparing a second, there was an interim manager. Similarly, following the initial six months drafting the constitution a left-over amount of approximately $9 million was administered by project managers who simultaneously had other functions; this may explain the lack of a clear focus in the project’s post-drafting phase.

6.13. Retention and recruitment of staff have been an issue. Procurement remains ill-adapted to rapid response. Reporting often obscures problems rather than highlights them. A culture of management has prevailed in UNDP Iraq’s Governance Unit that prioritizes the mobilization of funds and engagement with policy and upstream issues while occasionally according less priority to the efficient delivery and accounting for specific project components.

6.14. There is some indication that corrective measures are being taken. After a period of low disbursements by the Governance Unit between 2005 and 2008, to be expected with low levels of efficiency, disbursements are catching up in 2009 with a near doubling of delivery over 2008. Table 13 shows the progression and the rate of change year on year.

| Table 13: Amounts Delivered (Disbursed) by UNDP Governance Unit (2004-2009) |
|-----------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| **Year** | **2004** | **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** |
| **Delivery (000s)** | 12.8 | 15.5 | 5.3 | 8.8 | 13.8 | 26.0 |
| **Percentage change from previous year** | +21% | -190% | +66% | +56% | +88% |

Source: Governance Unit compilation of delivery rates
6.15. The level of disbursements indicates that funds are being spent, not whether the activities are appropriate or effective.

6.16. In the final analysis, accountability relies on meeting concrete commitments with respectable outcomes. Since 2005, the Governance Unit has frequently regarded delays or incomplete outputs as excusable given the circumstances. Only since 2009 is there evidence to the contrary, with a greater incidence of delivery on target. Delays have sometimes been described as partially excusable given that UNDP compensates by excelling in other domains, i.e. policy insights. Meeting these concrete commitments may have also taken a back seat to raising revenue. This is all understandable. But election deadlines have to be met. UNDP’s investment in a database for donor contributions must function for UNDP’s intervention to be credible. Agency and Iraqi partners rely on UNDP’s project performances to make their own contributions viable.

6.17. A critical lesson learned has been the importance of maintaining a culture of accountability, not only for the credibility of UNDP but also for the credibility (and continued support) of contributors, be they trust funds or donors.

The Primacy of Direct Engagement in Iraq

6.18. UNDP is presently asking more staff to work out of Baghdad instead of Amman. It is an important decision and an essential first step toward removing a barrier to making UNDP interventions more effective. More needs to be done.

6.19. There are ceilings for the number of staff that agencies may have in Baghdad set by security authorities in the UN system and it is generally assumed that UNDP cannot, and should not challenge these ceilings. This may have been the case in 2005 and 2006 when violence was at its worst. Presently, UNDP would be well justified in advocating, with the UN Country Team for adjusting the ceiling to evolving circumstances.

6.20. The assumption has been that UN personnel in Iraq risk exposure to life-threatening situations. The August 2003 catastrophe at the Canal Hotel remains a preoccupation, and a zero risk tolerance policy has come to shape security policy among UN staff. A strict security policy has come to be taken for granted over the last half decade. Meetings outside of the closely guarded IZ where UN offices and residences are located, even if they are immediately peripheral to this area (Amber Zone) must be in the company of a personal security detail of two bodyguards. Requests for access to these areas which include the nearby meeting points at the Convention Centre and the Al Rasheed Hotel require two weeks advance notification. Requests are commonly granted but they are also commonly canceled if bodyguards are needed in other assignments for more senior officials.

6.21. Meetings outside the IZ into the Red Zone are accompanied by a convoy of armoured vehicles manned by American soldiers. Arrangements for these convoys
must be made over three weeks in advance and permission is not easily obtained. Even once requests and forms have been prepared and the request granted, this may not be honoured. Traveling in a convoy of American force is furthermore not likely to endear a UNDP project manager to Iraqi partners. And the only alternative is to ask an Iraqi partner to go through the laborious process of passing through the IZ check points to reach a meeting place where UNDP programmers can go with only two weeks planning and a pair of bodyguards.

6.22. These security measures effectively quarantine the UNDP from its development partners. The same rules apply to all UN agencies. Thoughtful development management involves a transfer of knowledge and decision-making in a collaborative environment, and this can not take place where transfers must traverse a rigid security divide. Funds may be transferred and surrogates may be trained to carry messages back to government ministries or NGO offices. This has sufficed for the last five years with unimpressive results. In one case, support to the Board of Supreme Audit, where the leadership is uniquely pro-active, the project proceeded well enough without UNDP contact and impetus. Similarly, the public and media relations assistance provided to IHEC benefited from privileged access to partners for the UNDP project manager. In the other projects, limitation of access has been a factor. The choice at present is relatively clear: either accept middling to poor development results or re-think the existing security measures.

6.23. The decision to post more UNDP staff to Baghdad is an initial step. The real hurdle will be to devise ways of safely meeting project partners on a regular basis once staff are within striking distance. It will be to turn the present relationship between security and programming on its head: instead of security requirements determining the extent of programming activity, programming requirements will have to determine the role of security. UNDP does not have a direct involvement in making security decisions, however, the UNDP views do carry weight in the UN system and a UNDP position is likely to provoke a constructive discussion. Managing complex programmes across an impermeable security divide is counterproductive and arguably not worth the time and resources.

6.24. The United Nations will have to take the initiative to avoid relying on the United States occupying force. Dissociating from the United States is itself a first step toward risk reduction. This does not mean abandoning protection. It means devising security measures that are particular to the needs and risk levels acceptable to the programming requirements of the UNDP. This is the appropriate moment for the UNDP to advocate for a re-examination of what these risks are and ensure these risks are accurately assessed. Programme partners may build this kind of risk reduction into their own budgets and take responsibility themselves for ensuring the relationship with their UNDP counterpart is nurtured without incident.

6.25. The lesson learned is that some level of risk must be tolerated. Development can not work when its actors are quarantined. As long as the UNDP continues to be severed from its counterparts, suspicion of the UN in Iraq and disillusion with the ideals it
promotes will become ever more entrenched. An argument is often made that nothing can be done, security decisions are made without UNDP consultation. This may be the case but an argument could also be made that UNDP is a lead organization and is in a position, if any agency is, to lead the way on this critical matter.

**Reporting Reality**

6.26. In only one instance among the numerous documents of these projects was there a note that announced an irregularity. In this case it was a note-to-file to the effect that critical documentation was not available prior to a project manager assuming responsibility of the Board of Supreme Audit file. For the rest, progress reports and fiches and final reports all reiterate project objectives and show how the project has contributed to them. Rarely is there a hint of what dilemmas need attention, what difficulties have arisen in the reporting period, what irregularities caused concerns or why little was done if this was the case. The Prince2 guidelines exist but are not being followed and the way reporting is done in UNDP is in need of revision.

6.27. Project files may contain planning documents, proposals, six monthly reports, the occasional quarterly ‘fiche’, handover notes where project management changed hands and final reports. There are occasional reports of lessons learned workshops. There may be the odd evaluation. There is a critique by Dr. Huda from the Directorate for International Cooperation on the architecture of aid in the Donor Assistance Database file. There is a report on the polling of opinion regarding the Independent High Electoral Commission. These commentaries and lessons learned take a broad view and reveal little about the functioning of a project. The progress reports and the fiches offer mainly a litany of steady progress toward project goals.

6.28. The effect of these projects’ paper trail is to create a veneer of good work in which all is proceeding as it should. Neither the UNDG ITF administrators, nor the donors who may occasionally examine the reports nor UNDP’s staff in the Governance Unit and beyond are likely to learn anything pertinent, certainly not much that would require action. The more serious effect of this muted commentary in the reports is that attention to serious concerns is hardly ever brought before the stakeholders, the donors or implementing partners, or indeed UNDP staff who might be in a position to take corrective action.

6.29. The lesson learned is this. Reporting that renders a realistic picture of the UNDP project performance can assist management to address issues as they arise and take corrective action where necessary.
7. Recommendations

7.1. The recommendations in this section follow from the preceding Sections 4 (UNDG ITF and Project Performance) and Section 5 (Findings: Assessments of Four Projects) and are closely linked to the lessons learned in Section Six (Lessons Learned).

To the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Steering Committee

- Provide for a third party assessment of projects submitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that is independent of the donors or the beneficiaries. Independent assessors could be drawn from experts in the relevant field as well as from host country decision-makers, unaffiliated with either donors or UN Organizations.

- Make provisions within the UNDG ITF for monitoring projects reliably obliging the implementers to submit regular progress reports to be reviewed by independent assessors as well as sector managers within the implementing organization.

To UNDP Iraq

- Take measures to reinforce UNDP’s partnership with the Board of Supreme Audit. It is proposed that the Governance Unit assemble a special panel from experts and supporters to provide a forum in which UNDP can support the work of the Board of Supreme Audit, nurture its relationship and take a proactive role in strengthening the Board of Supreme Audit’s network of allies and collaborators.

- Make a formal request for the Government of Iraq to endorse the successor to the Donor Assistance Database Project (DAD II) by addressing a letter from the highest level urging major donors and line ministries to participate more fully. Failing this, or failing an appropriate response from the major donors, the UNDP should phase out its support.

- Fulfill commitments within the elections project to provide training in financial and human resource management. IHEC management expressed its concern that the UN is inclined to perform electoral functions rather than train IHEC staff to do so. It may be advisable for the UNDP to meet its training commitment and in doing so, contribute to IHEC’s self sufficiency.

- Identify the reasons for delays in staffing and implementation within the UNDP Governance Unit and draft a plan for enhancing the culture of accountability within UNDP including adherence to tools of reporting for project management, as per Prince2 guidelines in use by UNDP.

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20 Since the UNDG ITF concludes in a matter of weeks, these two recommendations are relevant to multi-donor trust funds generally.
Advocate strongly within the UN Country Team for a review and revision of current security constraints.

Identify as accurately as possible, perhaps with an independent security consultant, what are the actual threats and risks involved in establishing a significantly larger presence in Iraq with regular interaction with project partners. It should be assumed that UNDP will engage fully with its project partners outside of the IZ, and this should serve as a preliminary step toward ensuring that programming needs dictate security procedures, not the other way around.

Initiate a practice, within the UNDP Governance Unit, of empowering project managers to report realistically and identify underperformance where it occurs with explicit reasons. This may entail the use of a different reporting format and a different approach to reporting generally.

Submit six monthly reports for review and criticism in meetings of project managers in the Governance Unit and urge participants in these review meetings to solve problems identified in the progress reports.
### Annex 1: Scoring Results from Four Project Assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Board of Supreme Audit</th>
<th>Criteria met: 3=fully, 2= mostly, 1=minimally, 0= not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The project is consistent with UNDG ITF and UNDP priorities.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The project responds to the needs of the beneficiaries as defined by the ICI and the National Development Strategy for Iraq.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The project enhances existing efforts to address issues of democratic governance and to build government institutions in Iraq.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Validity of Design</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Project components are coherent and focused on clearly achievable objectives.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Strategy for project implementation is consistent and appropriate to what is to be achieved.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Project objectives are consistent with the needs of stakeholders.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Log frame elements, indicators and assumptions are appropriate.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Project objectives have taken into consideration the constraints of working in a politically volatile environment.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Outcomes, as they are defined in project documents, have been achieved to the extent possible given the circumstances in Iraq.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Provisions for gender equality and human rights have been incorporated where appropriate.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Adequate personnel and other resources have been made available to complete the project on time and on budget.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Jointly administered projects have resulted in positive collaborations.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Where results have not been achieved, appropriate corrective measures have been undertaken.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Monitoring and reporting to all stakeholders have been carried out as much as possible under the circumstances.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. The strengthening of national institutions contributes to their organizational and financial durability.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum of Scores</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Perfect Score (51)</strong></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Assistance Database</td>
<td>Criteria</td>
<td>Criteria met: 3=fully, 2=mostly, 1=minimally, 0=not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Development Results</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum of Scores</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Perfect Score (51)</strong></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission

#### Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Criteria met:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The project is consistent with UNDG ITF and UNDP priorities.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Validity of Design

| 4. Project components are coherent and focused on clearly achievable objectives. | 1             |
| 5. Strategy for project implementation is consistent and appropriate to what is to be achieved. | 2             |
| 6. Project objectives are consistent with the needs of stakeholders. | 3             |
| 7. Logframe elements, indicators and assumptions are appropriate. | 3             |
| 8. Project objectives have taken into consideration the constraints of working in a politically volatile environment. | 2             |

#### Development Results

| 9. Outcomes, as they are defined in project documents, have been achieved to the extent possible given the circumstances in Iraq. | 1             |
| 10. Outputs, as they are defined in project documents, have been achieved to the extent possible given the circumstances in Iraq. | 1             |
| 11. Among the achievements has been a sense of ownership by national partners. | 1             |
| 12. Provisions for gender equality and human rights have been incorporated where appropriate. | 3             |

#### Management Effectiveness

| 13. Adequate personnel and other resources have been made available to complete the project on time and on budget. | 1             |
| 14. Jointly administered projects have resulted in positive collaborations. | 1             |
| 15. Where results have not been achieved, appropriate corrective measures have been undertaken. | 2             |
| 16. Monitoring and reporting to all stakeholders have been carried out as much as possible under the circumstances. | 1             |

#### Sustainability

| 17. The strengthening of national institutions contributes to their organizational and financial durability. | 2             |

#### Sum of Scores

- 32

#### Percentage of Perfect Score (51)

- 63%
### Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process

#### Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria met:</th>
<th>3=fully, 2= mostly, 1=minimally, 0= not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Relevance

1. The project is consistent with UNDG ITF and UNDP priorities.  
2. The project responds to the needs of the beneficiaries as defined by the ICI and the National Development Strategy for Iraq.  
3. The project enhances existing efforts to address issues of democratic governance and to build government institutions in Iraq.

#### Validity of Design

4. Project components are coherent and focused on clearly achievable objectives.  
5. Strategy for project implementation is consistent and appropriate to what is to be achieved.  
6. Project objectives are consistent with the needs of stakeholders.  
7. Logframe elements, indicators and assumptions are appropriate.  
8. Project objectives have taken into consideration the constraints of working in a politically volatile environment.

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12. Provisions for gender equality and human rights have been incorporated where appropriate.

#### Management Effectiveness

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14. Jointly administered projects have resulted in positive collaborations.  
15. Where results have not been achieved, appropriate corrective measures have been undertaken.  
16. Monitoring and reporting to all stakeholders have been carried out as much as possible under the circumstances.

#### Sustainability

17. The strengthening of national institutions contributes to their organizational and financial durability.

#### Sum of Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sum of Scores</th>
<th>35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### Percentage of Perfect Score (51)

| Percentage of Perfect Score (51) | 69% |
Annex 2: Persons Interviewed

Persons interviewed are presented in two lists, differently arranged. One list arranges them according to their institution affiliation. Another arranges them according to which of the four projects evaluated they served. Some duplication is inevitable.

ARRANGED BY INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION

UNDP
Paolo Lembo
Country Director
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad

Sylvia Fletcher
Team Leader / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad

Sudipto Mukerjee
Team Leader / Economic Reform Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad

Maha Al Nuaimy
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Saad Al Khadimi
Programme Manager
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad

Khaled Ehsan
Evaluation Programme Officer
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Zina Habib Ailback
Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Emad Alememie
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Richard Cox
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman
Tuleen Khoffash
Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Abeer Fawaeer
E-Governance Specialist / Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Katie Green
Programme Manager
UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Previously Programme Officer / UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Shadin Goussous
Programme Officer / Mine Action
UNDP Iraq, Amman
Previously Programme Officer with the Steering Committee Support Office, Iraq Trust Fund, UNAMI, Amman

Muhammad Ghannam
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad
Previously with the Office of Constitution Support, UNAMI, Amman and Baghdad

Jane Brouillette
Strategic Planning Specialist / Economic Recovery Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Helen Olafsdottir
Crisis Prevention and Recovery Advisor
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Jacky Sutton
Project Manager and Media Specialist / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

UNAMI
Moin Karim
Head, Trust Fund Steering Committee Support Office
UNAMI

Pamela Husain
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
Office of the Resident Coordinator Iraq
UNAMI, Amman
Hakam Shahwan  
Elections Coordinator  
UNAMI, Amman

M. Usman  
Evaluation Officer  
UNAMI

Marla Zabach  
Steering Committee Support Office Associate  
Iraq Trust Fund  
UNAMI, Amman

Dima Issam Sweidan  
Steering Committee Support Office Associate, Iraq Trust Fund  
UNAMI, Amman

Oliver Vick  
Programme Associate  
UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Kristina Boszo  
Programme Associate  
UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Sven M. Spengemann  
Senior Constitutional Officer, Office of Constitutional Support  
UNAMI, Baghdad

Other UN Organizations  
Niels W. Guenther  
Head of Operations, Deputy Director  
UNOPS Baghdad

Jim Pansegrouw  
Director, Iraq Operations Centre  
UNOPS Amman

Kristine Verhoeven  
Humanitarian Affairs Officer  
OCHA Iraq, Amman
Donors

Achim Ladwig
Chargé d’Affairs
European Union, Delegation to Iraq, Baghdad

Sarah Barnat
Attaché / Programme Manager
Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Iraq, Amman

Hanna Sherif
Programme Associate
European Commission Liaison with Iraq Trust Fund, European Union Delegation to Iraq, Amman

Isabelle Valois
Head of Cooperation
Canadian International Development Agency Iraq, Embassy of Canada, Amman

Peter Rundell
Representative
Department for International Development, British Compound, Amman

Government of Iraq

Dr. Hazim Badry Ahmed
Director Capacity Building Department
International High Electoral Commission, Baghdad

Adnan M. Hasan
Political Advisor for Governmental Affairs, Iraq Council of Representatives
Previously participant in the Constitution Drafting Committee working with the Sub-Committee on Outreach

Saif Al-Hassan
Site Manager
Donor Assistance Database Unit
Ministry of Planning, Baghdad

Huda Al Ani
Head, Directorate of International Cooperation
Ministry of Planning, Baghdad

Staff of Board of Supreme Audit

Dr. Alaa Hatim Kadhum
Director General
Directorate of Technical Affairs
Mr. Ahmed Salim Dhari  
Deputy Director General  
Directorate of Administration and Finance

Mrs. Suhad N. Ahmed  
Director of Capacity Building

Mr. Anmar Kurdi Saeed  
UNDP Focal Point

Mr. Jabar Abdul Fatah Muhammad  
Director General, Financial Audit  
Erbil, KRG

Mr. Ahmed Ameen Rasheed  
Director General, Directorate of Administration and Finance  
KRG

NGOs

Sean Dunne  
Chief of Party, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Election Support Unit  
Baghdad, Iraq

Hanaa Edwar  
Secretary General, Al Amal NGO participant in the Drafting of Constitution, UNDP-supported Outreach Programme, Baghdad

Jamal Al-Jawahiri  
Assistant Secretary General of the Al Amal NGO participant in the Drafting of Constitution  
UNDP-supported Outreach Programme, Baghdad

Others

Mazen Chouaib  
Governance Consultant, Ottawa Canada,  
Previously Canadian Governance Advisor, UNDP Iraq, Amman

Claude Desilets  
Contracts Officer, Canadian International Development Agency  
Previously Programme Manager, Governance Unit, UNDP Iraq, Amman
ARRANGED BY PROJECT AFFILIATION

Board of Supreme Audit (BSA)
Emad Alememie
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Zina Habib Ailback
Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Staff of Board of Supreme Audit
Dr. Alaa Hatim Kadhum
Director General, Directorate of Technical Affairs

Mr. Ahmed Salim Dhari
Deputy Director General, Directorate of Administration and Finance

Mrs. Suhad N. Ahmed
Director of Capacity Building

Mr. Anmar Kurdi Saeed
UNDP Focal Point

Mr. Jabar Abdul Fatah Muhammad
Director General, Financial Audit
Erbil, KRG

Mr. Ahmed Ameen Rasheed
Director General, Directorate of Administration and Finance
KRG

Claude Desilets
Contracts Officer, Canadian International Development Agency
Previously Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Donor Assistance Database (DAD)
Richard Cox
Programme Manager / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Tuleen Khoffash
Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman
Abeer Fawaeer
E-Governance Specialist / Project Associate / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Saif Al-Hassan
Site Manager / Donor Assistance Database Unit
Ministry of Planning, Baghdad

Huda Al Ani
Head, Directorate of International Cooperation, Ministry of Planning
Government of Iraq, Baghdad

Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
Katie Green
Programme Manager / UNDP Iraq, Baghdad
Previously Programme Officer, UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Jacky Sutton
Project Manager and Media Specialist / Governance Unit
UNDP Iraq, Amman

Hakam Shahwan
Elections Coordinator
UNAMI, Amman

Kristina Boszo
Programme Associate
UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Oliver Vick
Programme Associate
UNAMI Elections Team, Baghdad

Niels W. Guenther
Head of Operations, Deputy Director
UNOPS, Baghdad

Dr. Hazim Badry Ahmed
Director, Capacity Building Department
International High Electoral Commission, Baghdad

Sean Dunne
Chief of Party
International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Election Support Unit, Iraq Baghdad
Mazen Chouaib  
Governance Consultant, Ottawa, Canada  
*Previously* Canadian Governance Advisor, UNDP Iraq, Amman

**Constitutional Drafting Process**

**Maha Al Nuaimy**  
Programme Officer / Governance Unit  
UNDP Iraq, Amman

**Muhammad Ghannam**  
Programme Manager / Governance Unit  
UNDP Iraq, Amman and Baghdad  
*Previously* with the Office of Constitution Support, UNAMI, Amman and Baghdad

**Sven M. Spengemann**  
Senior Constitutional Officer, Office of Constitutional Support  
UNAMI, Baghdad

**Adnan M. Hasan**  
Political Advisor for Governmental Affairs, Iraq Council of Representatives  
*Previously* participant in the Constitution Drafting Committee working with the Sub-Committee on Outreach, Baghdad

**Hanaa Edwar**  
Secretary General, Al Amal NGO participant in the Drafting of Constitution  
UNDP-supported Outreach Programme, Baghdad

**Jamal Al-Jawahiri**  
Assistant Secretary General of the Al Amal NGO participant in the Drafting of Constitution, UNDP-supported Outreach Programme, Baghdad
Annex 3: Terms of Reference

1. Introduction and Context

The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund is administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on behalf of itself and Participating United Nations Organizations.

Iraq is undergoing a fundamental political transition to a sovereign, unified, democratic and federal state in which all Iraqis live in dignity. At the heart of this process is a national debate on how best to ensure inclusive, democratic institutions that will provide for equitable sharing of resources at the national and sub-national levels.

Iraqi national dialogue has not fully addressed the divisiveness entrenched over many years. The drafting and adoption of a new constitution in 2004-2005 and the 2005 elections helped establish the legitimacy of the Government and improved representation. However, both processes were imperfect and should be considered stages in a transition toward good governance. The constitutional review in 2008-2009 will enable broader participation, and local elections and referenda planned for 2008 will give all Iraqis a new opportunity to participate in electing officials freely and fairly.

The UNDP responded by undertaking the Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process C9-10/A Project which is a DEX (Direct Execution) delivery modality. In most instances it was UNDP staff that designed, developed and implemented, with Iraqi counterparts the projects with national and international implementing partners. UNDP used the expert services of UN specialized agencies, national and international NGOs. International venues were also used for many of the constitutional implementation meetings and conferences.

The Governance Sector’s (GS) assistance strategy will address the fundamental need for political inclusion, fairness in the judiciary and the rule of law, and accountability of government to the people.

Work Plan: The GS will accomplish its objective by strengthening electoral processes through increased institutional capacity of the IHEC to carry out free and fair elections, improved electoral awareness and citizen participation in electoral processes, and support for elections in 2008, including training for electoral observers and the media. The GS will also strengthen national dialogue for reconciliation, support an active role of civil society, particularly constituency-based organizations and the media, and empower women. The GS will promote constitutional review to increase participation of all Iraqis in the formation of new government institutions and municipal associations. Further, the GS will contribute to reforms for enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards, with particular attention to developing models of efficient judicial institutions, the protection of the rights of detainees and the recovery of
The UNDP responded by undertaking the **Institutional Development and Capacity Building for IHEC G11-14** Project as part of the Institutional Development – Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) programme, is mandated to carry out institutional development activities to improve the level of IHEC Board and Electoral Administration management skills, to enhance awareness of electoral best practices, and strengthen relationships with external stakeholders.

The overall goal of the programme is to increase the IHEC’s ability to operate as a fully functional and independent institution in the long term, with or without international support or cooperation. This includes functional and efficient internal management and the effective sound delivery of elections: the public service of the institution. The legitimacy of an electoral event rests on basic, but fundamental, guiding principles: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, credibility, and service orientation. All activities should further and deepen the IHEC’s understanding and application of these basic principles of independent election management bodies.

The GS will also provide assistance for improved national and local governance by strengthening regulatory frameworks, institutions and processes for planning, urban planning, aid coordination to monitor progress on the ICI, increase the effectiveness of Parliament in national dialogue and for key legislative tasks mandated under the ICI. The GS will assist with the development of a legal framework and capacity to implement decentralization, as constitutionally mandated, and increase the accountability of government through support to the five institutions responsible for preventing and prosecuting corruption: the Board of Supreme Audit, the Commission on Public Integrity, the Inspector General’s Office, the Joint Anti-Corruption Council and the Parliamentary Committee on Integrity. The GS will contribute to strengthened national dialogue for reconciliation, supporting an active role for civil society, particularly constituency-based organizations and the media, and empowering women.

The UNDP responded by undertaking the **Board of Supreme Audit Project C9-18** is responsible for the independent financial monitoring of the activities of public and private institutions. In a climate clouded by mismanagement and corruption, the upgrading of BSA’s skills would give the Iraqi population the confidence they need in those who are managing the public purse and inspire a new generation of citizens to trust their government.

The project aimed to support the UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq’s priority of “Public sector reform and strengthening institutional/administrative infrastructure” by building the audit capabilities of BSA principally through training programmes for BSA auditors.

**Advocacy Plan:** The GS will advocate for structural and durable institutional means to protect and promote human rights, especially the rights of vulnerable persons. It will advocate on behalf of Iraqis to protect their rights to determine their own governance
priorities and lead the process of political reform. The GS will also advocate for increased accountability in the management of public revenues, especially oil revenues.

The UNDP responded by undertaking the **Donor Assistance Database (DAD) II**. This project covers all dimensions of aid coordination that are grouped within the following main categories: institutional arrangements, technological support and knowledge transfer and skills development. Significant progress towards the establishment of aid coordination capacities within MoPDC has been achieved so far. This includes setting up the Donor Assistance Database of Iraq hosted by MoPDC, training of 12 officials with both management and technical profile, the establishment of an Aid Coordination Unit within MoPDC, and the supply of equipment for the secure and uninterrupted operation of DAD and the ACU. Further support is envisaged in designing and implementing data collection procedures from both donor and Government agencies and assisting in the interpretation and presentation of this data in DAD.

As the Iraq Trust Fund (ITF) is operationally closing down in June 2010, the ITF Steering Committee has decided to embark on evaluations of certain projects funded by the ITF. The evaluations are expected to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative for broader internal and external information sharing. It will also aid into designs of future programme and similar engagements.

To ensure maximum accountability with ownership and in line with the Memorandum of Understanding between the participating UN organizations and the UNDP MDTF office as the administrative Agent, all evaluation processes will be managed by respective UN agencies in accordance with Norms and Standards set by the United Nations Evaluation Group.

Four UNDP Governance projects have been selected for evaluation – (i) Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process; (ii) Support to Government of Iraq in International Assistance Coordination and Capacity Building DAD; (iii) Supreme Audit Board; and (iv) Institutional Development-Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the IECI/IHEC

2. **The Projects and Key Features:**

   1. **Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process C9-10/A:**

   **Description:** Assist the establishment of a democratic system based on principles of good governance and the rule of law, which enables Iraqi citizens and institutions to interact in a participatory and transparent way in the upcoming constitutional process.

   **Objectives:** To achieve two key results: (1) the establishment of a legal and institutional framework and (2) the adoption of the Constitution after a referendum.

   **Stakeholders:** UNAMI, UNOPS, UNESCO and UNIFEM, national and international NGOs

   **Budget and timeframe:** $15,429,927 ($14,929,927, plus $500,000 extension - Greek funds)

      May 2005-June 2007, extension date 12/16/2006
2. **Board of Supreme Audit Project  C9-18:**

**Description:** Enhance the independent financial monitoring of the activities of public and private institutions.

**Objectives:** To train over 430 BSA auditors, including 42 from the Kurdistan region (KRG), in ten different fields of audit; draft a comprehensive training needs report and long-term institutional strengthening plan; draft audit guides, including a code of conduct and measures against fraud; and establish an internal Training and Donor Aid Coordination Secretariat.

**Stakeholders:** Audit Bureau of Egypt; Audit Bureau of Jordan; Court of Accounts of Tunisia; International Monetary Fund; National Audit Office of the United Kingdom; Office of the Auditor General of Saudi Arabia; ITCILO- International Labour Organization; Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India; and the World Bank.

**Budget and timeframe:** $ 4,879,535

January 1, 2006 and is projected to end on December 31, 2009

3. **Donor Assistance Database (DAD) II C9-12:**

**Description:** Enhance all dimensions of aid coordination with specific reference to institutional arrangements, technological support and knowledge transfer and skills development.

**Objectives:** (1) Enhance municipal, local community and civil society’s capabilities for greater role in defining, designing and implementing rehabilitation programme; and (2) Strengthen the capacities of local governments through capacity building initiatives in the areas of organization improvement, financial management and budgeting and sustainable development planning.

**Stakeholders:** UNOPS & MoPDC.

**Budget and timeframe:** $ 2,643,000

September 1st 2005 until December 2009

4. **Institutional Development and Capacity Building for IHEC G11-14:**

**Description:** This project is mandated to carry out institutional development activities to improve the level of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) Board and Electoral Administration management skills, to enhance awareness of electoral best practices, and strengthen relationships with external stakeholders.

**Objectives:** (1) To Improve the level of the IHEC’s Board and Electoral Administration Management Skills; and (2) Enhance Awareness of Electoral Best Practices.

**Stakeholders:** The IHEC; International Election Assistance Team (IEAT); & Government Election Offices (GEO).

**Budget and timeframe:** $ 3,735,426

April 2007 Extended until 30 September 2009
3. Purpose and the Objectives of the evaluation.

This project evaluations need to be considered in the context of the UNDP implementation of the four projects. The projects structure has offered opportunities as well as challenges, against which the performance of the UNDP components needs to be appraised. The objectives of the evaluation are to:

- determine if the projects have achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- determine the results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) of the projects in terms of sustained improvements achieved;
- provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the projects and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- Document lessons learned success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the projects duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;
- examine the achievement of the common pre-set objectives of the projects and recommend ways to improve future partnerships;

4. Scope and Clients of the Evaluation

The evaluation will look at the entire projects duration and at all activities implemented to date in Iraq, mainly in the centre. The evaluation will also have to put a specific focus on the role of UNDP constituents in the implementation of the projects, the integration of the gender dimension and human rights based approach.

The primary clients for this evaluation are the ITF Steering Committee UNDP, constituents, the donor, the local and national partners listed above. Secondary clients are the other participating UN Organizations.

The performance of the projects will be reviewed with regards to relevance, design, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, taking into account the following issues:

5. Key Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will be guided by the following set of core evaluation questions:

5.1 Relevance and strategic fit

- To what extent does the project respond to the UNDG ITF programs developed to support priorities outlined in the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) National Development Strategy (2004, 2005, and 2007) and the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) (2007)?
• Does the project respond to the real needs of the beneficiaries? Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Where the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
• How well did the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address local level planning, reconstruction and recovery and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? Did the project’s original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?

5.2. Validity of design / the re-design
• Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?
• Was the project design / re-design logical and coherent in terms of the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders to realistically achieve the planned outcomes?
• How effective was the coherence between the design of the project focus, the integration of UNDP, instruments in support of programme objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors?
• How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
• To what extent were external factors identified and assumptions identified at the time of design?
• Was the project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes / needs that could occur during the implementation?
• Was the level of stakeholder commitment sufficient to foster constituents’ involvement in promoting social dialogue and human rights?
• Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If so, what were the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?

5.3. Achievements (Implementation and Development Effectiveness)
• What are the development results (i.e. against planned outputs and outcomes) of interventions, taking into account the quality of the policies, the process of endorsement and adaptation at the local and national level, the feasibility and sustainability of those policies and the institutional development of the local and relevant national partners?
• Which aspects of the project had the greatest achievements? What have been the supporting factors? What are the main lessons learned from the partnership strategies and what are the possibilities of replication and scaling-up? How can the project build or expand on achievements?

• In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?

• To what extent have interventions addressed gender and Human Rights issues?

• How effective was the collaboration between the participating UN organizations and what has been the added value of this collaboration?

• How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation (Local GO, Trade Unions, Chambers of Commerce, NGOs etc)? How effective has the project been in establishing ownership especially with reference to the local development plans?

5.4. Effectiveness of management arrangements and efficiency of resource use

• Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes? Have resources been used efficiently?

• Were project funds and activities delivered in a timely manner?

• Were management capacities adequate?

• Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partners institutions, including NGOs.

• Did the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its local and national partners?

• Was there adequate technical, programmatic, administrative and financial backstopping for the project from the “remote offices” of UNDP, in Amman, and the relevant HQ departments? Was the collaboration effective and efficient taking into account that the implementation management is partially done remotely?

• Has relevant gender expertise and Human rights approaches programming been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized? Have any Human Right’s programming initiation or toolkit been introduced to local planners?

• How effectively did the project management monitor project performance and results?

• What has been the quality of documentation and dissemination of knowledge within the project?

• How efficient was the project in communicating its results?
5.5. Impact orientation and sustainability

- To what extent did the project make a significant contribution to the reconstruction and development of institutions in the Governmental entities in Iraq, namely MoPDC and Supreme Board of Audits?

- How effectively has the project built necessary capacity of national organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor local level planning, reconstruction and development projects?

- To what extent was sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conduct of the project’s activities? Is there an exit strategy and, if so, what steps have been taken to ensure sustainability?

- Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Are these anchored in national institutions and can the partners maintain them financially at end of the project?

- Can the project approach and results be replicated and scaled up by national partners and cover other Iraqi areas?

6. Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation will be conducted by an evaluation team including one international evaluator (a team leader), and one national evaluator based in Iraq. The team leader, in close collaboration with the national consultant, will be requested to present a more detailed evaluation methodology and an evaluation plan based on the suggested analytical framework and the desk review. This will need to be approved by the evaluation focal points of UNDP.

The UNDP projects teams based in Amman will be responsible for providing all logistical support.

The evaluation will be carried out using a desk review, field visits to projects sites for consultations with projects staff and projects partners and beneficiaries and other key stakeholders and to hold a stakeholder workshop for dissemination of initial findings. Due to security constraints it is envisaged that selected stakeholder consultation processes may take place outside Iraq, where and when deemed necessary, mainly in Amman.

While the evaluation will be strictly external and independent in nature, it is deemed appropriate that it is based on participatory project evaluation principles and methodology, following the nature of the project.

Overall, the evaluation will include but will not be restricted to;

a) A desk review conducted in home-country of projects documents and materials provided by the evaluation manager to the evaluation consultant.
b) Presentations /Inductions with available projects staff and key stakeholders and partners to the project explaining the process, methodology, objectives and principles of the participatory evaluation (depending on staff and key stakeholder security and mobility the evaluation team could repeat this presentation in several locations).

c) Key interviews with projects staff (UNDP), projects partners, and key projects stakeholders.

d) Phone Interviews with all relevant UN agency staff, as appropriate.

e) Presentation of findings and recommendations and their discussion with the selected stakeholders and partners to the projects.

7. Management arrangements, work plan and timeframe

The final project evaluations of the selected Governance projects will be undertaken in line with UNDP policies and procedures on evaluations. It will be conducted by an external evaluation team, which comprises of international expert, i.e. a Team Leader (TL) and one National Consultants (NC). The external evaluation team will be managed by the task manager of UNDP (the M&E Specialist) which will meet at regular intervals in order to agree on methodology, monitor progress of the evaluations exercise and review key findings and other issues relating to this independent evaluation.

8. Expected Deliverables

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluation consultants are:

- A desk review
- An evaluation plan (including instruments and methodology) prepared by the evaluation team
- Consultations and where possible stakeholder workshops facilitated by the evaluation team
- Draft evaluation report including stakeholder consultation/workshop proceedings and findings from field visits by evaluation team
- Final Report including:
  - Executive Summary
  - Clearly identified findings
  - Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations
  - Lessons learned and potential good practices and effective models of intervention
  - Drafted in user-friendly language for publication and circulation to wide audiences
  - Appropriate Annexes including present TORs
  - Standard evaluation instrument matrix
Structure of the final report:
- The Evaluation Report should contain the following:
  - Title Page
  - List of acronyms and abbreviations
  - Table of contents, including list of annexes
  - Executive Summary (1-2 pages)
  - Introduction: background and context of the programme (1 page)
  - Description of the project/programme – its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success (6 pages)
  - Evaluation Methodology & Approach (including key challenges and limitations) (6 pages)
  - Findings with clear evidence base and interpretations (3-4 pages)
  - Conclusions (2-3 pages)
  - Recommendations (1-2 pages)
  - Lessons and generalizations (2-3 pages)
  - Annexes

The report will not exceed 40 pages, including annexes.

The final report will be circulated to key stakeholders (those participants present at stakeholder evaluation workshop will be considered key stakeholders) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be jointly consolidated by the M&E Specialist, UNDP Iraq and provided to the team leader. In preparing the final report the team leader and the principal consultant should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

9. Composition, skills and experience of the evaluation team

Team Leader:

I. Specific Job Description of the Team Leader
- Review all in-country studies and surveys and/or evaluations (including internal reviews) relevant to the projects subjected to the evaluation exercise undertaken by UNDP and the other UN agencies,
- Lead an evaluability assessment and present this through an Approach Note to the designated Task Manager, which will identify gaps in the data base and building blocks for the evaluation and evaluative solution, taking into account the review of secondary source materials during the preparatory phase of the evaluation.
- Design the overall approach and methodology for conducting the project evaluations, consistent with UNDP’s project evaluations methodology.
- Provide substantive guidance to the National Consultants and oversee/monitor the conduct of in-country interviews, consultations, studies and surveys initiated as a result of the evaluability assessment.
- Prepare the framework or outline for the draft report, based on the ToR and evidence gathered through secondary source material and from the in-country studies and surveys;
• Provide intellectual and strategic leadership and participate fully in the main joint evaluation mission to Amman to fill gaps identified from the previous actions, and in triangulating and validating findings and recommendations. This would include leading some key dialogues with decision-makers and stakeholders at national and local government levels and key government officials and UNDP partners.

• Lead in the in-depth evaluation of selected thematic and/or cross-cutting issues, including desk review and analyses of the projects relevant documents and data.

• Provide evaluative expertise and experience to ensure the integrity of data and minimise distortions or misinformation in the data on which the joint evaluation will be based, including but not confined to:
  ➢ Extensive and varied consultations sufficient to gain an overview of key development issues relating to the projects outputs and their links/relevance to UNDP’s strategic positioning and development results;
  ➢ Persistent observation aimed at identifying significant information, salient features and/or atypical events or issues relevant to the scope and coverage of the joint evaluation;
  ➢ Triangulation designed to corroborate findings by ascertaining their validity on the basis of different directions, sources, methods and tools.

• Prepare the draft joint evaluation report, with support from the National Consultants, and finalize report based on comments received from UNDP and other relevant stakeholders.

• Explicitly link analyses, findings and recommendations in the final report and prioritize only a limited number of recommendations for each key decision maker/stakeholder.

• Lead in debriefing all stakeholders (location will be Amman) at an exit workshop and/or meeting(s) before the evaluation report is formally submitted to UNDP Iraq.

**Expected Outputs**
The Team Leader will be responsible for ensuring the quality and timely delivery of expected outputs, based on inputs from the other members of the Evaluation Team. Expected outputs include:

- An Approach Note to include: a) an assessment of the evaluability of results from the identified projects outputs over the implementation period, and b) the proposed approach and methodology for the joint evaluation;
- A first draft report on the full evaluation of the Governance projects, following the report structure given in the ToR;
- A revised final draft project evaluations report, including its executive summary and all annexes with detailed data. The revised draft should take into account comments and suggestions from review of the first draft by the relevant UN agencies;
- Self-standing 1-2 pagers, relating to lessons from the evaluations (i.e. process lessons learned issues) that are ready for dissemination.
**Required Qualifications:**

- Relevant background in development and humanitarian / conflict and post conflict intervention;
- At least 15 years experience in the design, management and evaluation of development; projects, in particular with district planning process and other local development projects in conflict and post conflict interventions;
- Experience in evaluations in the UN system, preferably as team leader;
- Relevant regional experience preferably prior working experience in Iraq or with Iraqis;
- Experience in the area of Local economic recovery and local economic development with demonstrated experience of working on gender and human rights issues;
- Experience in the UN system or similar international development experience;
- Fluency in spoken and written English and strong editorial skills in English necessary; knowledge of Arabic would be appreciated;
- Experience in facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

**National evaluation consultants:**

**II. Specific job description of the National consultants**

The National Consultant will work closely with the Team Leader in contributing major substance to the project evaluation. Under the overall guidance of the Team Leader, specific responsibilities of the National Consultant will include the following:

- Support the Team Leader in overall leadership and guidance to the evaluation team, including setting parameters and refining and implementing the overall approach to the project evaluation;
- Review all in-country studies and surveys and/or evaluations (including internal reviews) undertaken by UNDP and the other UN agencies, key national and international partners working relevant to the project in Iraq and assist the Team Leader in the identification, analysis and interpretation of key findings.
- Support the Team Leader in translating short summaries from Arabic or Kurdish to English and visa versa – as appropriate. Where relevant, the National Consultant would provide simultaneous translation services in meetings/consultations with stakeholders that are conducted in Arabic or Kurdish for the benefit of the Team Leader.
- Prepare a comprehensive stakeholder map for the projects- UNDP Iraq along with an inventory of UNDP interventions, showing linkages/connections (or not) between the interventions.
- Based on an agreed timeframe and set of evaluative tools/overall methodology approved by the Team Leader, take a lead in conducting interviews and consultations with all relevant stakeholders in certain designated areas of Iraq. This would include leading some key dialogues with decision-makers and stakeholders at national and local government levels and key government officials and UNDP as well as project/programme beneficiaries and other partners located in Iraq.
• Prepare analytical briefs, charts, diagrams and undertake other relevant tasks to present evaluative information gathered from all stakeholder consultations/interviews carried out in Iraq in English. Take a lead in the in-depth evaluation of selected thematic and/or cross-cutting issue(s), including desk review and analyses of relevant documents and data, drawing out and checking findings, making recommendations and writing sections of the draft outcome evaluation report as agreed by the Team Leader.

• Provide relevant support to Team Leader to ensure the integrity of data and minimise distortions or misinformation in the data on which the outcome evaluation will be based.

• Participate in the Evaluation Team’s exit meeting(s) and/or workshop with stakeholders and other debriefings for the selected projects and partners.

• Support the Team Leader to incorporate comments from stakeholders and finalize the evaluation report.

Expected Outputs
The National Consultant will be responsible for ensuring the quality and timely delivery of outputs as defined by the Team Leader. Expected outputs will include the following:

- Draft section(s) of the project evaluations report relating to in-depth analyses of thematic/cross-cutting thematic areas of focus, agreed with the Team Leader, with relevant annexes, containing, amongst other things, the data on which the evaluation findings are based;
- Revised drafts to take into account comments and suggestions from review of the first draft by the Team Leader and other members of the team and UNDP external and internal stakeholders;
- Comments on the first draft report on the project evaluation report as prepared by the Team Leader; and
- Drafts for self standing 1-2 pagers, relating to lessons from the evaluation (i.e. process lessons learned issues) that is ready for dissemination.

Required Qualifications:
• Excellent analytical and presentation skills, with solid background of research work and analysis, and be able to work interactively with a team;
• Good mastery of Information Technology (Excel, PowerPoint, other spreadsheets, graphs, and/or design software);
• Substantial and first-hand knowledge of Iraq’s national development plans and programmes, including extensive knowledge of multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor programmes as well as civil society organizations in the country;
• Able to deliver high quality report under short deadlines, with excellent ability to distill information;
• A minimum of 4 years at a senior level in Government or in a national level development and/or research organization;
• No direct programme or project management responsibilities with the Government and UNDP over the last four years;
• Respected in both Government and civil society as well as amongst locally based development partners as a credible and independent interlocutor;
• University degree in economics/social sciences or any other relevant graduate qualifications;
• Excellent drafting skills in English and fluency in reading and writing Arabic;
• Familiarity with the work of the UN and its mandate in Iraq.
• Relevant background in social and/or economic development;
• Experience in the design, management and evaluation of development projects, in particular with local development projects;
• Technical knowledge of local economic development or agricultural development projects;
• Experience facilitating workshops for evaluation findings.

10. Indicative Work Plan

Estimated duration
The expected starting date of the evaluation is 1st March 2010 at the latest, and the expected submission of the final report date is 1 April 2010. The dissemination of the results will take place during the first two week of June 2010.

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<td>Field visits, interviews with partners and other key stakeholders</td>
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