

United Nations Development Programme

برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي



Independent External Project Evaluation of “Iraqis  
Rebuilding Iraq” Phase II  
Implemented by The International Organisation for  
Migration (IOM)

15 June 2010

Prepared for UNDP by:

Mr.Christian Bugnion, Team  
Leader.

Dr. Abbas Balasm, Senior  
National Consultant

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AMU	Amman Management Unit
AF	Application Form
BSC	Baghdad Support Cell
EF	Employer Form
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRI	Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq
ITF	Iraq Trust Fund
IRFFI	International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
MoPDC	Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
RQN	Return of Qualified Nationals (IOM)
SC	Steering Committee
TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals-UNDP
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

### Acknowledgements:

The evaluation team leader is grateful for the continued support and assistance provided by the IOM throughout the evaluation, without which this report could not have been prepared.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	Page
Acronyms and abbreviations.....	2
Table of contents.....	3
I. Executive summary.....	4
II. Introduction, background and context of the project.....	6
III. Description of the project.....	7
IV. Evaluation methodology and approach.....	10
V. Evaluation findings and interpretation.....	11
VI. Conclusions.....	19
VII. Recommendations.....	20
VIII. Lessons identified and generalisation.....	21
Annexes:.....	22
TOR	
IRI expert survey report	
Expert survey form	
Focal point survey report	
Focal point questionnaire	
Steering Committee member questionnaire	
List of interviews	
Bibliography	

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The IRI project was launched at a time of high volatility given the socio-political situation in Iraq, with high concerns regarding the security situation which conditioned the evolution of the project throughout its life span (2005 to end 2007).

In the prevailing environment there were massive needs of all kinds, and many projects were being launched to exemplify the reconstruction efforts in the country and in an effort to resume the backlog in the development of Iraq. Political pressure was high on the international community and the ruling authorities to undertake visible action to stabilise the country and resume its developmental backlog, after thirteen years of sanctions. However many of these projects were hurriedly launched and were often not fully thought out. Furthermore all projects and undertakings in Baghdad were equally subject to the increasingly worsening security situation.

The IRI project came as a pilot to Iraq on several counts. For one, it was the first time that the country had this sort of a project. The government did not know the mechanisms and procedures and therefore was learning and developing skills through the implementation of the project. Second, it was also the first Return of Qualified Nationals project undertaken after the change of regime by the IOM. The project correctly identified the gaps in human resources in the country, and proposed to mitigate and fill these gaps by the deployment of highly qualified Iraqi experts in various sectors in collaboration with the government. The primary project government counterpart, the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC), was highly supportive of the project.

The project also proposed to various government ministries<sup>1</sup> the experts' services to fill their human resource gaps. In total 59 experts were deployed, in line with the 60 anticipated in the project objectives, for a total of 62 assignments (3 experts were deployed twice).

The immediate objectives of the project were all fulfilled: research on the Iraqi expatriate community was undertaken to assist in developing a skills roster for Iraqi Nationals to be used by the government; a database with all the relevant profiles of the experts was created, and a website containing information on the IRI project, application procedures, potential employment opportunities and various relevant information was provided in three languages. The MoPDC and ministry focal points received the assistance of the IRI project and the BSC in order to appraise their HR needs and develop the proper employment forms for the qualified Iraqi candidates residing abroad. The project staff providing guidance to the Iraqi expatriate experts in filling the application form for deployment in Iraq under the project, while guidance was also provided to the MoPDC with the creation of the Baghdad Support Cell (BSC) within their office, and staffed by an IOM national consultant. Another national consultant was recruited and deploomaryed in Erbil given the high number of experts that were deployed in the North where security conditions were much better than in Baghdad.

In addition a Human Resources training to 22 focal points undertaken in 2007 obtained high marks from the participants.

The deployment of the experts was positive from the point of view of the MoPDC and from that of the experts themselves, as well as from the focal points at the participating ministries.

The single most important achievement may possibly be that the project was able to perform and adjust to the changing situation and the increasingly difficult security conditions in Baghdad. While security conditions were different in many parts of the country, most of the violence and the highest insecurity was found in Baghdad. To have been able to reach the immediate project objectives and outputs in such a constraining context is a major achievement.

The development objective of "contributing to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country's human resources in the key areas of the public sector" was not achieved to any significant extent. The

---

<sup>1</sup> up to 37 ministry focal points were identified

size of the project, the number of experts deployed, the time frame and resources were fairly small for such an ambitious objective. The project also extended across various sectors of expertise, the impact of individual assignments is widely disseminated to obtain an aggregate noticeable impact.

Despite the project's immediate success, an opportunity continues the project to second phase was lost, at a time when similar projects were likely to be much more useful and feasible. Some of the design gaps, and the lack of key elements such as a monitoring and evaluation budget line, solid monitoring plan, external evaluation of the project and benchmarks or assessment on how to measure the capacity building of the government, contributed to the lack of financial support from potential donors for another phase of the project.

The issue of sustainability was also a missing component of the project design, furthermore there was no hand-over or exit strategy with the necessary milestones to allow for a gradual transfer of competencies. Despite its documented support to the IRI project and its stated interest in another phase, the MoPDC primary project counterpart proved reticent to participate in the current evaluation process and had already stated in a Steering Committee meeting that the project was an obvious success and therefore did not require a formal evaluation. Therefore only limited feedback could be gathered from one of the primary stakeholders, although one of the members of the Project Steering Committee in the MoPDC did provide a written feedback.

Be as it may, doubt remain as to the level of ownership and commitment to this project from the MoPDC. There is a consensus amongst all stakeholders that in Iraq today this type of project could be very useful. However a full review of the primary project stakeholders and the mechanisms put in place are necessary if another project of this sort is to be undertaken today in Iraq.

## II. INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE PROJECT

The project "Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq" (IRI in short) was conceptualised during 2004 and its initial design was to have been undertaken in one single phase from preparation to implementation. However it appears that the DSRSG at the time requested to have two separate phases: *phase one* which was the set-up and preparatory phase, followed by *phase II* the project implementation phase.

The project therefore was initiated under *phase I* in September 2004 for a period of six months, until February 2005. During this time the structures and staff were to be identified, recruited and trained. This was done through the deployment of an international consultant inside Iraq and the establishment of the Baghdad Support Cell (BSC) and the Amman Management Unit for the project. It is worth noting that *phase I* is not covered by the current evaluation which focuses on *phase II*, which is the actual project implementation phase as defined in the evaluation TOR.

*Phase II* was to start in March 2005 but actually started in May 2005, for an initial period of 15 months. It had two no cost extensions during the year 2007 and was officially coming to an end by December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2007.

At the time and as a result of the regime change inside Iraq following the armed invasion of the country, there were massive needs and most of the focus of aid actors was on large and visible infrastructure projects. The IRI project was a rare sort of project as it was neither the typical life-saving humanitarian project vertically driven to assist beneficiaries, nor was it a large highly visible reconstruction project. The project was therefore one-of-a-kind, undertaken as a pilot in a context of high uncertainty and rising insecurity. It was supposed to bring together the expertise of the UNDP with the TOKTEN<sup>2</sup> projects and that of the IOM in Return of Qualified Nationals (RQN)<sup>3</sup> under a common project. However it is not clear from the design of the project which specific expertise was brought by which agency.

It is impossible to undertake an evaluation of a project in Iraq without considering the security conditions during the life-span of the project, as these have been up to the most recent past, among the major constraints in the implementation of all projects. The death toll from the date of the invasion until the end of 2007 is anywhere between 150,000 to one million violent deaths, including international and national, civilian and military persons. Despite the wide differences according to the source consulted (Lancet, Guardian, Opinion Poll) the security situation in Iraq was a huge source of concern for all aid actors alike. The situation was very volatile and unpredictable, with rising violence and arbitrary kidnappings and killings, reaching unsuspected peaks in mid 2006.

In terms of operations all actors operated under remote management systems. The bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 killing the top UN envoy and 19 other UN staff triggered the evacuation of the operations within Iraq. On 22 September 2003 a second car bomb outside UN HQ killed and wounded 21 people, leading to the final withdrawal of all international staff from Baghdad.

Under these conditions a phased and gradual incremental planning of project implementation was ludicrous and aid agencies had to show creativity and adaptability to adjust to a highly volatile context. A look at the IOM brochure "The story of IOM Iraq 2003-2008" also contains an unfortunate report of the government casualties from the violence who were the primary partners and counterparts of a number of the IOM implemented projects.

Nonetheless it must also be stated that much of the violence and insecurity took place in specific geographical areas, primarily in Baghdad. Other geographical areas, notably the Kurdistan area, rapidly enjoyed relative security and stability. The high level of insecurity in

---

<sup>2</sup> Transfer Of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals is a UNDP programme that was launched in 1977 and successfully replicated in a number of countries

<sup>3</sup> IOM launched the first RQN programmes in the 1970s in Latin America, and progressively expanded in different countries.

Baghdad did not allow attracting the number of experts initially planned, and therefore safer areas were envisaged to reach the target objectives.

### III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The project was essentially presented as a capacity building project for the Iraqi government. The proposal was endorsed by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation on 30 September 2004 and the UNDG ITF Steering Committee Chairman on 4 October 2004 (for *phase I*), and on 29 May 2005 for *phase II* (while the submission to the ITF was made on 27 February 2005).

The project was actually implemented by the IOM, co-managed by the UNDP, and funded from the UNDG Iraq Trust Fund.

The amount of funding requested for *phase II* was USD 2,777,323 for an initial 15 month period foreseen from 1 March 2005 until 31 May 2006, but given the delay in the approval it started from May 2005 and ran until the end of December 2007, as a result of two no cost extensions.

According to the project document (point 2 Management arrangements), the project was to be jointly managed by IOM and UNDP. However in practice and because IOM did not have access to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), UNDP was responsible for overall financial reporting, while IOM was managing and implementing the project.

The project's development objective was: "To contribute to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country's human resources in the key areas of the public sector".

The Immediate objectives of the project were four:

1. Assist Iraqi authorities to identify human resources gaps in key areas of public sector and develop professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps;
2. Identify specific skills available among the Iraqi émigré community based on the needs identified by Iraqi public sector authorities;
3. Develop a database and website to serve the establishment of an Iraqi Skills Roster and to match the demand and supply of human resources;
4. Deploy and support Iraqi expatriate experts to fill identified gaps in the Ministries and other public sector institutions and to provide capacity building, professional support and training for existing staff.

In order to obtain these objectives, the project had to undertake the following activities:

1. Establish a fully functional Amman Management Unit - AMU (remote control of HQ given security conditions, with the programme manager and supporting staff, telephone lines and e-mail help line);
2. Establish a fully functional Baghdad Support Cell – BSC with 2 national consultants within the MoPDC;
3. Facilitate the initial needs assessment for priority positions required in the Ministries;
4. Research the Iraqi émigré population;
5. Develop a fully functional website and database
6. Develop administrative templates (application forms, employer forms, registration forms, etc.)
7. Produce promotional material and devise an information campaign;
8. Conduct targeted information campaigns in the host countries aimed at the Iraqi émigré communities.

Three basic assumptions supported the project logic theory:

1. The current operational set-up (AMU and BSC) continues to function despite security problems;
2. Cooperation with the MoPDC, other ministries / authorities and counterparts, continues

3. Highly qualified Iraqi experts continue to express willingness to return to Iraq under the current circumstances.

While the programme management was actually established in Jordan (AMU), the role of the BSC was key in facilitating and streamlining the experts' identification and recruitment process from the different ministries, and in ensuring coordination and collaboration with the project's primary counterpart, the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.

The project sought to attract some 60 highly qualified Iraqis back into Iraq to support the various needs of the government given the human resources gap. While it does not state that the project is looking for a permanent return of the Iraqi experts to Iraq; however drawn on the example of the Afghan programme indicating that 80% of the Returning Qualified Nationals were statistically willing to stay<sup>4</sup>, some expectations that the project will create a similar situation in Iraq were raised. The project was not labelled as a TRQN (Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals), which may have also contributed to creating expectations that the Iraqi experts might stay in Iraq after having completed their assignment. There was a certain level of ambiguity regarding the conditions of return (temporary versus permanent) under the project, although the employment contracts were time-bound.

The project proceeded as follows:

IOM worked both upstream with the Iraqi émigré experts in order to identify the supply side, as well as downstream with the MoPDC and various ministries and partners' focal points in order to identify the demand side (employer forms and human resource needs assessment).

The project established a database and a website. According to IOM the original database was developed by a UNDP consultant, and it had to be adjusted to the needs of the IOM as the project evolved. It was not possible to triangulate this information with UNDP. The evaluator was able to see and consult the database as well as request further data and statistics for the needs of the evaluation.

the website that was developed for the project, is no longer operational ([www.iraqi-iri.org](http://www.iraqi-iri.org)). At the time of the project it served as information to the Iraqi community (in three languages) to provide information on the project and their modalities.

Ideally the website was supposed to match the potential applicants with the potential employers, but for some technical reason, according to the IOM, it was not able to do so. Therefore the website was primarily an information centre and was indeed the first place that Iraqi experts were referred to.

#### *Expert identification and application process*

The registration process initially took the form of a telephone call with the programme management staff in Amman, who referred the expert to the internet website for further information. The potential candidate, if the person met with the established selection criteria, then he/she would register by filling an application form. Once reviewed by the AMU to ensure all selection criteria were fulfilled (first filter) including all documentary requirements (such as proof of citizenship, educational level, etc.), it was sent to Iraq to the BSC for submission and approval by the MoPDC (second filter). After receiving the acceptance of the MoPDC, the final decision on the recruitment of the expert was made by the participating ministries or partners (third filter). The three filter process was designed to avoid any conflict of interest and to minimize any potential biases when selecting the candidates for deployment.

In theory the work on the supply side (experts' database) was to match the work on the demand side. On the demand side, the BSC provided technical assistance to the MoPDC and ministries' and partners focal points on how to fill the employer forms and identify their human resources

---

<sup>4</sup> UNDG- ITF project document, box 1.1.1



needs. This was done by placing the BSC within the MoPDC offices and by ensuring a close collaboration between the BSC staff and the government staff.

#### *Ministry identification of human resource gaps and employer form process*

In line with activity number 3 (facilitate the needs assessment for the initial needs assessment for priority positions within the ministries); the BSC helped the ministry to identify their HR needs, and proceeded to assist in the preparation of the Employer Forms (EF). The employer forms were then matched with the experts Application Form in order to identify the suitable candidates for deployment.

However the process was often slow and the EF were not created until the project was being implemented. According to the Steering Committee minutes of the meetings, the forms for AF and EF were often dispatched in bulk with the hope of triggering a rapid recruitment process, but in fact it often took more than one month to obtain the response from the focal points at the ministries.

Despite the high number of constraints, chief of which was the gradually worsening security situation in Baghdad, for the most part of the project life, and the ensuing refusal of experts to be deployed in Baghdad, the project was able to continue and actually met a number of the expected objectives and activities.

In concrete terms the project did succeed in establishing a database for Iraqi experts living abroad, and a functional website containing concrete information that could be used for the potential candidates for return. It also succeeded in deploying 59 experts in Iraq during the project period, with three experts being deployed twice (e.g. 62 deployments in total).

22 out of the 37 focal points at the ministries and partners were able to follow a Human Resource Management training in 2007 which received high marks as a capacity development opportunity for the attendants.<sup>5</sup>

The level to which the objectives and activities were achieved is presented in the findings section of the evaluation report, structured around the evaluation criteria.

---

<sup>5</sup> According to the IRI HRM workshop evaluation, 78% of the participants rated the training overall as excellent or very good, and 22% as good.

#### IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

In order to be very inclusive in the process the evaluation used a participatory approach and appreciative inquiry with some of the key informants (such as IOM).

As standard project methodology the evaluation started with a desk review of available documentation. Because the project had been closed for 27 months, it proved difficult to obtain the complete documentation. Therefore it was necessary, useful and possible to obtain additional documentation during the initial visit to Amman, both from the IOM and from the UNDP, particularly the internal correspondence of the project.

A major method used to collect information was a questionnaire-survey sent to all 59 IRI experts deployed under the project. The questionnaires were not tested due to the short time-frame allocated for the evaluation and some questions may have had some bias or had been distorted. This is further explained in the findings section of the report. It is worth mentioning that the questionnaire did not reach 10 of the experts; due to 8 invalid email addresses and lack of any other contact information. Two experts had passed away (not related to their assignment in Iraq). Therefore, the maximum number of responses to be obtained was 49. The evaluation received 32 valid answers; which ultimately renders a positive 65% response rate. Two follow-up e-mails were sent to the experts to ensure the largest possible response rate, the second on 30 March 2010.

Another method was key informant interviews in Amman and in Baghdad. The list of contacts and interviews are included as annex. The interviews were semi-structured with the evaluation team using a questionnaire protocol to ensure consistency and comparability of the answers from the different interviewees. In some cases the interviews were done by telephone when face-to-face interviews were not possible. The interviews in Baghdad were to be carried out by the national consultant recruited by the UNDP.

A questionnaire was also developed and sent to government and partners' focal points, mainly to the 22 people who were appointed as IRI project focal points and who participated in the human resource management training in 2007. Despite the difficulties faced such as staff turnover, retirement and change of e-mail addresses<sup>6</sup> and mostly due to the time lag between the end of the project and the survey the focal points provided a good 50% response rate.

A separate questionnaire was developed for the members of the project Steering Committee (e.g. IOM, MoPDC, UNDP) and sent by e-mail to the MoPDC, was used as interview guide during the key informant interviews in Amman with UNDP and IOM. One member of the SC from the MoPDC provided written feedback.

In addition to the project information, the evaluation also used the statistics generated by the IOM database and requested IOM for additional work and explanation regarding some of the figures. An analysis and interpretation of the database statistics is presented in the findings section. The statistics and the survey to the IRI experts undertaken by this evaluation are useful in informing some aspects of the evaluation. However there are some limitations on the use and accuracy of the data.

##### *Constraints and limitations of the evaluation*

The available database did not contain all necessary information allowing the appraisal of the efficiency of the selection and recruitment process. Other projects databases include the date of first contact of the expert with the project management, the registration date, the filled application date, the employer form date, and the actual deployment date in this order. As for this project, only the filled application date is mentioned in the database, and it cannot be used to match the employer's forms (demand side) because the latter were generated as the project developed with the support of the BSC to the ministries' and partners' focal points. In other words, it is not possible to appraise the time required to fill a vacant position, nor the time that

---

<sup>6</sup> Please refer to the focal point survey report in annex for details

candidates had to await a response from the moment they fill the application form until they receive an official answer regarding their matching with an employment opportunity followed by their deployment, as the Employer Forms were most often done in batches (thus the date did not necessarily correspond to the date of the vacancy).

The evaluation and the survey therefore focussed on the timeliness and efficiency of deployment (time between the filled application form until the expert was actually deployed in Iraq) for those experts who had served in Iraq. Given time and budget constraints the 256 experts that were registered and identified as potential candidates (315 complete application forms minus the 59 experts deployed) but were not deployed were not included in the survey seeing as it only focused on the 59 experts deployed. The evaluation team leader considered that all deployment taking place within 2 months of the accepted application as the norm, and IOM was requested to justify and present the explanation for those experts whose deployment took longer.

The biggest challenge for this evaluation was to ensure that the primary project stakeholders remained available. Fortunately, the institutional memory at IOM proved to be effective, as five of the former staff including the former chief of mission were available for interviews. This greatly facilitated the work of the evaluation team even though additional information and triangulation had to be done to validate some of the information obtained. From the UNDP side, the IRI focal point for a part of the project life (but not the entire period) was also available and was able to provide useful feedback on the project.

The national consultant was responsible for interviews inside Iraq since the Evaluation Team Leader did not travel to Iraq because of limitations such as his TORs and the limited evaluation budget. Given a case of *force majeure* the consultant initially recruited had to be replaced by another consultant who was able to obtain feedback from the IRI project focal points. Not all the anticipated interviews could take place, which led to a little delay in the finalisation of the evaluation report.

Triangulation of findings was done where and when possible.

#### *Evaluation approach*

The evaluation was undertaken bearing in mind its formative nature, therefore it was more focused on the process of learning and improvement, as opposed to the more judgmental nature of the summative evaluations.

In order to maximise the response and participation of all respondents and at the request of the evaluation team, the IOM sent e-mails to all primary stakeholders with the terms of reference attached, asking them to contribute to the best of their ability to the evaluation.

Given the limited engagement of some of the stakeholders in the evaluation process, the evaluation used secondary sources and documentation to analyse the situation, as well as the questionnaires that were received. Moreover, good key informant interviews were held with the IOM staff (previous chief of mission, AMU and BSC staff), and a good response rate was received from the experts' survey undertaken by e-mail and the focal points survey.

## **V. EVALUATION FINDINGS**

In line with the terms of reference and its suggested analytical framework (point 5 of the TOR), the findings section hereby addresses the different issues raised.

### **1. Relevance and strategic fit**

The IRI project appears to have filled a gap. The submitted project document states how the project fits under the UNDG ITF programmes and its linkage with the Cluster System that was being used at the time of the project inception. The IRI project was thus placed under the C10 Cluster (Poverty Reduction and Human Development) and was endorsed by both the UNDP

Cluster Manager and the UNDG ITF. It was listed as part of the “Institution and Capacity Development” programme outcome / activity for Cluster 10 within the UN Strategy for Assistance to Iraq 2005 – 2007. The project was initiated at the request of many senior staff of the newly established Iraqi government to the UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq). It was designed as a governmental capacity building project at a time of shortage of skilled human resources in the country. While the project’s immediate objectives were relevant and its intended results were equally realistic. The project’s progress was tributary to the very volatile security situation prevailing throughout most of the project life in Baghdad, which constrained the recruitment and deployment of the Iraqi experts identified under the project – with a 35% rejection rate for Baghdad deployments given security concerns and the subsequent opening of more secure geographical locations, namely Erbil, Sulaimaniya, and Najaf.

The project mentioned that the World Bank had another two Capacity Building projects in Iraq targeting Iraqi Ministries and that it would explore synergies. However there is no documented evidence at any attempt to explore synergies nor any mention of the WB projects in any of the Project Steering Committee minutes. Therefore the evaluation believes that synergies with other projects were not established and the project was implemented as a pilot on a small scale with an objective of 60 experts to be recruited and deployed in Iraq to assist the government ministries and partners but lacked the ambition to inform a wider capacity building strategy.

## **2. Project design**


The project was designed without a very clear idea of what could realistically be achieved given the prevailing context in Iraq at the time. It was essentially a pilot project to gauge the level and commitment of the government to be involved in such an endeavour and the willingness of experts to return. Therefore the project design did not fully spell out the details of the process. It did not specifically address the issue of the type of return that was foreseen under the project. In the UNDP TOKTEN programme, experts are clearly identified for temporary short-term to medium-term deployment, while IOM has experience in both temporary and permanent return of qualified nationals. The project design did not specifically address the issue of return, but given its reference to the example in Afghanistan where 80% of the returns were to be permanent, it did contribute to creating the expectation that some of the Iraqis deployed under the IRI could be returning permanently, which was the case for 9 of the 59 experts deployed.

While the project mentions the past experience of both UNDP and IOM, it does not clearly spell out the responsibility of each agency, over and beyond the fact that the project would be “jointly managed” by UNDP and IOM. However responsibilities were not specifically allocated except for the role of financial oversight of the UNDP, and the fact that without the UNDP the IOM would not have been able to access the UNDG ITF funds.


In the project document it is unclear what and how past experience between UNDP’s TOKTEN and IOM’s RQN programme is incorporated in the design of the current project. While much of the preparation work that was done under *Phase I* was completed and a first batch of qualified Iraqi experts were already identified as potential candidates for return, the initial project time frame of 15 months, from March 2005 to May 2006, proved to be much too short. The process of accepting the experts by the line ministries proved to take longer than initially anticipated, thereby delaying the time of the expert’s deployment. From the experts survey results undertaken by this evaluation, half of the respondents were deployed within two months, something which appears to be quite acceptable considering the context in Iraq.

But for a quarter of the deployment, it took 6 months or more to have the experts inside Iraq undertaking their assignment, something which is too long for a project life of 15 months.

16 experts were deployed within 2 months (50%), 8 experts were deployed between 3 and 5 months (25%), and 8 experts were deployed after 6 months or more (25%).



From the experts' perspective, the efficiency in their deployment is considered mostly as normal with 53%, while 38% consider it to have been fast. Only 2 respondents of 32 considered their deployment to have been slow (6%).



Nonetheless, IOM has provided due justification for the deployment of all experts requiring more than two months between their filled application date and the starting date of their contract. Additionally from the feedback received from the MoPDC, partner ministries were using regular mail for communications and not electronic means, which obviously means additional delay (and consequently a likely higher number of experts rejection given the delays).

In terms of the logical framework and results framework of the project, the immediate objectives and outputs are clear and well defined. Although indicators are focused on outputs rather than looking at process or change indicators (e.g. indicators which show that the government is actually using the project outputs to lead to the desired outcome of capacity building). However at the higher level the outcomes of the project and its impact in terms of the development objective are insufficiently developed. The development objective as stated in the logical framework cannot be using the same measurable indicator as the immediate objectives. There is a clear focus on identifying supply side results, but there is a gap in regards to how the demand side of the project will be monitored. More particularly, for a capacity building project,

there are neither indicators nor means of verification identifying how the government's capacity has been built.

The size of the project, with the deployment of 60 experts, and its short time-frame, appears to be rather limited the ability of its contribution to the overall development objective. As in most past projects evaluated, the IRI has no specific hand-over or exit strategy, which lays out the steps and processes that need to be in place to ensure that the capacity building project will be owned and internalised and used by the government at the end of the project life.

Just as important is the lack of any monitoring and evaluation system or M&E budget for the project, something which is striking when it is widely known as good practice that all projects should contain a provision from 3 to 7% of the budget to develop a monitoring and evaluation system (including human resources and material support for the development of a monitoring plan, and the subsequent external project evaluation).

The larger issue in the project design, which is just as applicable to the other projects developed during a period of high volatility and unpredictability, in line with the widespread insecurity situation that characterized the Baghdad operating environment during the life of the project, is to what extent it is necessary and feasible to plan things in uncertain conditions. This issue is further discussed in the lessons section of this report.

### **3. Project achievements**

The project was able to achieve its immediate objectives as mentioned in the logical framework. A database containing the experts' profiles (called 'Iraqi Skills Roster') was established. A functional website providing detailed project information in various languages was set-up – although it was not able to automatically match the application forms and the demand forms, it initially identified as an expected result, and the IRI was able to identify 315 complete application forms from experts, of which 59 were actually deployed in Iraq (19% of the total potential candidates). In addition, a public information campaign was undertaken, although judging by the responses from the expert survey its outreach capacity is questionable. The work of the BSC focused on assisting the Iraqi authorities in identifying the human resource gaps and preparing the employer forms (EF) which were used to match the applications from Iraqi experts in view of their deployment in Iraq.


The single most significant achievement of the project appears to have been the deployment of the experts, as well as the creation of an 'Iraqi Skills Roster'. Much effort was made in ensuring the experts' deployment, and on the recruitment procedure. A three level filtering system was established for the selection of candidates, in order to avoid personal preferences and other potential biases. At the same time this screening also meant that more time was required until the candidate could finally be told to travel back to Iraq.

The creation of the experts' roster was also an interesting achievement. However given the lack of feedback from the MoPDC, it is not clear if and to what extent it has been used. Judging from the feedback received from the experts' survey, it appears that some of the work undertaken by the project was followed through by the government. But again it is unclear to what level this was done, although anecdotal evidence does indicate that some of the individual experts' achievements did have a continuation even after their assignment was completed (see the annex on the expert survey).

The other project outputs are more difficult to appraise as they are no longer being used. While the website home-page is still there, there are no contents that may allow from an appraisal of its user-friendliness or relevance to the target audience. What has appeared from the interviews with the IOM staff is that it fell short of being able to match automatically the candidates' application form (AF) with the employment offers identified by the various participating ministries and partners through the employer forms (EF). Given some apparent technical problems, the matches had to be made manually, therefore taking longer than an automated and automatic website match.

The most positive aspect was the work undertaken by the Iraqi experts deployed under the project, as well as the high marks earned by the workshop on human resource management given in 2007 to 22 focal points of the project. Most experts have a high opinion of the work they undertook during their assignment, in line with the feedback from the MoPDC on their work (rating note of 4 out of 5) and the feedback of their focal points (average rating 3,81 out of 5).


78% of the experts felt they had succeeded in their work in Iraq, as per the following figure:



This is confirmed by the focal points' level of satisfaction with the experts' performance, with an 85% good to excellent appraisal, versus a 5% below average performance.




As to the impact left by the expert, the following figure indicates that in 29% of the cases there has been some justified follow-up to the work of the expert (5 YES without justification have not been tallied).



In terms of IOM performance in providing support to the experts, the ratings have been largely positive.

Experts themselves (n=32) found the support from IOM to have been good to excellent for 63% of the respondents, while 18% found the support below average.



One of the difficulties related to the deployment of experts was the compensation package. The MoPDC pushed for lower incentives for the experts because they believed it would create some friction with colleagues in similar positions who had stayed in the country. Feedback from the focal points proved the MoPDC right, as the situation reportedly created some resentment given what was seen as a preferential treatment to returning Iraqi experts. At the other end only 40% of the experts' responses indicated that the benefits of the project were largely appealing. In many cases expert responses included comments stating that the benefits should be increased given the opportunity cost of the experts leaving their house, family and jobs for a temporary assignment without any life insurance benefits. All in all it was difficult to establish a compensation package that would be accepted by all project stakeholders: too high would mean the opposition of the government as undermining the local salary structure; too low would mean no experts would accept to be deployed in Iraq. The evaluation believes that IOM was able to find a balance in the package that was offered, although more efforts should have been expended for supplying gender specific support to the candidates.

The research component was undertaken as planned in the logical framework, with several activities realized, although again it is difficult to judge its relevance at present now that the project is finished and in the current post election political environment.

It can be stated that the outputs and objectives of the project were achieved. It is however challenging to appraise the significance of some of these objectives at present.



In regards to the development objective of the project, the limited participation of the MoPDC in the evaluation, and the challenge of conducting the interviews in Iraq, does not allow a triangulated judgement. However as per the different sources of documentary information available, capacity building activities have clearly taken place. Feedback from the focal points indicate that they are still using some of the skills obtained during the project in their work something which is clearly a positive achievement. However it is not possible to take such a result at the outcome level on the capacity of the MoPDC and partner ministries in human resource management.

#### **4. Management effectiveness and efficiency**

The management set-up by the IOM was effective for the needs of the project. There was a lean structure with 1 project manager based in Amman at P-3 level, and a half-time project officer from 1<sup>st</sup> May till 31 July 2007.

There were 5 national staff, two of which were national consultants deployed in Iraq as the Baghdad Support Cell (in fact there were two cells as one consultant was in Erbil to support the deployments in Kurdistan and one in Baghdad at the MoPDC). In the Amman AMU there were three national staff members: a project assistant, a candidate support assistant and a database assistant.

This is the minimum staffing that was necessary for the project and that indicates an efficient and light structure which is what was needed to run the project without the usual heavy structures which are sometimes created for projects.

This set-up was established as the project was in “remote control mode” due to the security situation and the expatriate staff that had been relocated as a result of the Canal Hotel bombing.

The management arrangements and responsibilities between the UNDP and the IOM under this project are unclear. While financial accountability is clearly a responsibility of the UNDP, the actual management arrangements were not specified in writing nor has there been a clear division of labour between IOM and UNDP. UNDP apparently did send a consultant to develop the database that was used by the IOM for this project, but it was not tailored to the project specific needs and appears to have been imported from another place. Also monitoring and oversight responsibilities were unclear. Initially the UNDP identified a focal point for the IRI project, and three progress reports were established until the end of 2005. The UNDP focal point had no written definition of responsibilities as focal point and no clarity as to what being a UNDP focal point in the IRI meant. She participated to the Steering Committee meetings until she was moved to another project, and there was no longer a focal point for the IRI project within the UNDP. Different UNDP staff participated in the subsequent SC meetings.

There seems to have been some lack of clarity about the role of the UNDP in this project over and beyond its financial reporting function. The only obvious advantage of UNDP’s involvement in this project appears to have been access to the UNDG ITF, something that would have been impossible for IOM to do alone. However the IRI was also the only project financed by the ITF, as all other funding sources stemmed from bilateral donors.

The feedback obtained through the e-mail questionnaires sent to focal points and MoPDC Steering Committee members indicates that their capacity had been strengthened to some degree by the project. With the lack of internal consultations in Iraq to follow-up and triangulate the questionnaire responses, it is not possible to appraise the significance of the capacity development to the MoPDC. However the training for 22 focal points that was undertaken in 2007 in Human Resource management obtained very high rating from the participants and the feedback received indicates that they are still using the skills acquired during the training.

The IRI project was placed under the overall guidance of a Steering Committee, or SC, composed of the IOM, MoPDC, and the UNDP. However the SC did not have any TOR. It was therefore a self-proclaimed SC, where organisations (and not individuals) were apparently self-appointed as members. One gap was the presence of any donor representative, something which might have in various cases provided an added value for the guidance and sustainability


of the project. Another gap was that focal points were not part of the SC. The SC structure was therefore not inclusive and did not encompass the variety of the different project stakeholders.

One of the major gaps of the project was the absence of any monitoring and evaluation plan for the project. Although IOM included debriefing of the experts at the end of their assignment in Amman and feedback from the focal points as part of the project implementation structure, yet there was not a formal monitoring plan established for the project, nor any budget line for monitoring and evaluation. It is surprising to note that despite having a large portfolio of projects which ran up to US\$ 250 million during the period 2003-2008, the IOM still does not have an M&E officer in their office. This seems to indicate a limited culture of M&E in the organisation and the fact that bilateral donors are not pushing for a stronger M&E function in the organisation.

## 5. Impact and sustainability

The impact of the project must be seen at two levels: at the individual expert's level, there is some evidence of impact from the individual assignment undertaken with 29% of the deployed experts responses indicating some follow-up to their work and 59% of the deployed experts response indicating what that impact was<sup>7</sup>. This is also corroborated by the responses from the focal points and the one response from the MoPDC SC member.

The experts themselves widely viewed the project as having developed the government human resource management capacity, with two thirds of positive answers.




However it is not possible to appraise a global impact given the fact that the project was not focused on a specific skill set, ministry or type of employer or even limited to a specific geographical location. While in effect in Baghdad the majority of the experts were public administration experts, in Kurdistan the majority were faculty staff and medical staff, and engineering in Najaf. In other words, the variety of the experts' profiles, the evolution of the project which evolved from a Baghdad central government support project to a largely decentralised assistance to various geographical areas offering greater security, and the limited number of experts deployed, does not allow for an appraisal of the overall impact of the 62 assignments undertaken. Nor is it possible to aggregate the different assignments.

It is therefore difficult to estimate an overall impact. There is evidence however that the government has been giving greater attention to the return of qualified Iraqis through various ministerial decrees, such as Decree No. 441 of 2008, or Ministerial Order 95 of 2009, dealing with the return of qualified and experience scientific personnel. But it is not possible to assess what role, if any, this project has had in informing this policy decision.

The evaluation concludes that there has been some positive overall impact, but not sustained given the ending of the project, and with a limited magnitude which does not allow to claim that the project has decisively been able, as per the development objective, "to contribute to the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country's human resources in the key areas of the public sector".

<sup>7</sup> Please refer to the enclosed Annex : The IRI expert survey, for full details

The resources available, the size of the project, the number of experts and the lack of a focused approach with up to 37 potential partners (focal points) at a point in time means that efforts were too disseminated across different areas of expertise and geographical locations to make a significant impact, something which is not surprising for a pilot project. At the same time, 9 experts of the 59 deployed are said to have remained in Iraq after their assignment (15% of the deployed experts), therefore bringing their expertise into the reconstruction process. This although an unintended impact of the project is a positive one. Of the experts who responded to the survey (n=32) one quarter of respondents actually stayed in Iraq, with another 22% who had considered staying.



This is a positive, albeit unintended, effect of the IRI project.

In terms of sustainability, it has already been mentioned that the project lacked from the start an exit or a hand-over strategy. Nonetheless according to the SC minutes the issue of sustainability was discussed and a response from the MoPDC was to be given. A partial effort to sustain the mechanism was done when the training of 22 focal points in Human Resource management was conducted in 2007. However it appears that the sustainability of the project was envisaged with a *phase III* for which the MoPDC had already given its agreement.

It needs to be clearly stated that a continuation of a project is not akin to its sustainability. According to the DAC glossary and criteria, sustainability has to do with the capacity to ensure that the benefits of the project will continue to be accrued when the project ends and the funding ceases. Sustainability has to do with national ownership and empowerment, not with a third phase of a project. In the cases where national ownership requires a longer time-frame, the project design should in any case contemplate the gradual transfer of competencies and ownership to the point where the government is able to take over the functions and perform similar services by itself, identifying the relative time-frame that will be required. This does not appear to have been the case of the MoPDC, which supported what would have been *phase III* of the project but was not able to obtain any funding, and did not appear willing to commit resources to the ownership and internationalisation process associated with the hand-over of capacity building projects.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

The project was a bold attempt at creating some capacity at a time of high volatility. It was indeed necessary, but the political environment and particularly the high insecurity in Baghdad during the project life made it the single most constraining factor. According to the MoPDC statistics one third of the experts refused their deployment given the lack of security, which shows the impact of the security conditions on experts' deployment in Baghdad and the very difficult working environment at the time of the project.

The project was able to reach all its immediate objectives with some degree of success; the website and database were functional and used, 59 experts were deployed through 62 assignments, research was undertaken on the Iraqi expatriate community, and the project did assist Iraqi authorities to identify human resources gaps and develop professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps. It is therefore considered as successful as all immediate objectives were reached.

A slightly more nuanced view can be obtained through the qualitative analysis and the different sources of feedback obtained (IRI experts, focal points, IOM, UNDP and MoPDC). While the project is a success globally, there were some gaps which should have been identified in the design phase. Had these gaps been properly identified and contingency planning done, it is likely that the project would now be into its third phase, instead of having abruptly come to an end.

The development objective was too wide and ambitious to be reached by a project of such limited resources especially at a time of high insecurity. Evidence of impact would have been more conclusive had the MoPDC demonstrated a continued use of the mechanisms that were established by the project and more participation in the evaluation process to provide specific feedback.

The project was somehow victim of its own success. Without an external evaluation to bring to light the strengths and weaknesses of the project, and with no monitoring plan and report on the achievements of the project, and any identified benchmarks in terms of the government's capacity building process, the results of the projects were essentially stemming from the implementing agency (IOM) and the primary stakeholder, the MoPDC, thereby not providing the needed impartiality and credibility of the reported achievements.

The MoPDC never clarified how and to what extent their capacity had been developed, although the immediate objectives were all reached to their full satisfaction, and the experts' assignments were equally highly valued by the MoPDC.

However the lack of a more inclusive process in the SC composition and in the management of the project meant that neither the IOM nor the MoPDC were in a situation to leverage additional resources without completing a formal evaluation process with credible evidence regarding the project's end-results.

The present evaluation does to some extent provide answers to these questions, and recognizes the positive achievements of the project, despite the initial project design that was insufficiently structured and developed. The project achievements were to a large extent obtained through the commitment and the dedication of the IOM staff both in the AMU and the BSC despite the unfavourable context in which the project had to evolve.

As a project the IRI can thus be considered a success; but the UNDP may have missed the opportunity to capitalize on this project to develop a more comprehensive capacity building programme, with an integrated focus on the issues of return to strategic sectors and areas of activities. For which the development objectives of the IRI project could have been expected to materialize.

By itself the IRI project did not have the vision, structure and means to significantly contribute to the development objective, but it certainly did show that there was a possibility and a need for this sort of project despite the security situation and the high volatility in the country.

## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

This external evaluation comes at a time when the project has been closed for 27 months, and right after holding elections. The first recommendation is therefore to choose a more appropriate time for the evaluation to take place, as political uncertainty overshadows the possibility of engaging the national stakeholders in the evaluation process. The lack of participation of the primary government counterpart, the MoPDC, is a clear case in point.

Since there is a need for this sort of a project, a different design needs to be envisaged. Based on the available information, there is still a strong interest from the Iraqi expatriates to explore the possibility of return as for the demand at the government level, it still remains. Therefore there should be a project that is better focussed on specific areas of expertise and with

identified government ministries as the primary stakeholders, more targeted to specific skill building in a given sector.

Collaboration between the UNDP and the IOM during this project does not denote that any synergies were built or any multiplier effect was created. The potential links were not explored further, and the only clear advantage was that IOM was able to access the UNDG ITF funds, which would have been impossible without any cooperation from the UNDP.

However there are fundamental differences between the two organisations and their comparative advantages: IOM is a project based organisation, therefore much more experienced and focused on the supply side and the realisation of immediate objectives. While UNDP has a broader mandate and has a role of coordinating development assistance in programmatic frameworks into which projects can exploit their synergies to contribute to a multiplier effect, rather than being done in isolation. For some reason UNDP does not appear to have focused its efforts in this direction and the IRI project was largely overlooked. On the otherhand it could have been a strategic project especially that UNDP's main mandate is directly associated with capacity development, which is streamlined in the organisation.

In any case future collaboration between UNDP and IOM should be the subject of a MoU with identified responsibilities and clear division of labour.

## **VIII. LESSONS AND GENERALISATION**

All projects should contain a clear phase-out or hand-over strategy to avoid simply discontinued when the funding runs out.

Collaboration between organisations for joint management of a project should be spelt out in a MoU with clear division of labour.

In line with good practices there is a need for a monitoring and evaluation budget line to allow for a formal M&E system to be put in place (between 3% and 7% of the project budget).


The logical framework for a capacity building project should identify specific indicators to show what and how the counterparts' capacity is being developed. In the absence of such a results framework the evidence for judgement is mostly anecdotal.

There will be important gaps in the evaluation methodology if the project's primary stakeholders are not accessible during the evaluation process given the political environment. The commissioning agency of the evaluation should ensure that all primary stakeholders are available to participate in the evaluation process in order to obtain complete and comprehensive feedback.

Projects undertaken in highly volatile situations can still plan ahead and should do so in line with the Project Cycle Management (PCM) steps. Volatility and uncertainty are not excuses for the lack of planning and foresight. In volatile environments, project assumptions need to be monitored closely, so that corrective or contingency measures are applied when assumptions do not materialize.

There has been insufficient vision and strategic thinking behind this project by all stakeholders. As a result there was a lost opportunity to develop a pro-active capacity development programme under the potential UNDP leadership which could have included a more focused and better designed project to address the human resource gaps in specific areas of activity. In any case it is telling that all stakeholders interviewed do recognize the need for this sort of project today, as exemplified by the expert survey results hereafter:

### There remains a need for this sort of project today in Iraq



At the higher outcome level the choice of incorporating the project into the Poverty Reduction and Human Development Cluster structure which in 2008 was transferred to the Sector Outcome Team (SOT)<sup>8</sup> under the outcome “Economic reform and diversification sector”, is a debatable choice regarding the project objectives. Seeing as their primary focus and overarching objective is building the capacity of the government. The UNDG ITF progress report of May 2009 links the IRI projects with Outcome 1 of the Economic reform and diversification sector; “Improved policies, strategies, and related institutional developments that are sensitive to the MDGs, social inclusiveness, gender equality, and pro-poor economic growth”, while the project would have likely been much more logically placed under the Governance SOT, within outcome 4: “Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions, and processes of national and local governance”.

The same progress report indicates that of the 75 projects reviewed from the ITF; all but 7 had capacity building as one of the main outcomes to be achieved. Among the 11 types of capacity strengthening activities two clearly reflect the aims of the IRI project:

- Establish new centres within ministries and government to advocate for policy initiatives and provide oversight across various thematic areas such as gender, environment, human rights, agriculture, etc.
- Restructure and strengthen public sector institutions to increase effectiveness and accountability of institutions.

Yet there did not appear to have any continuation of the specific capacity building approach used in the IRI into the new round of projects funded under the ITF. The IRI project appears to have been overlooked by strategic planners, despite its promising but unfulfilled potential given its limited resources and the timing of operations.

Finally as knowledge is developed and institutions gradually learn from their experiences, it should be noted that UNDP is now moving away from the term capacity building and is developing a policy in order to address **capacity development** as the core overarching responsibility of the organisation. New strategies and programming should move to incorporate a more comprehensive concept of capacity development in substitution of the capacity building terminology previously employed and learn to include hand-over and transfer mechanisms allowing programmes and projects to gradually transfer ownership to the national authorities.

<sup>8</sup> The SOTs are designed to increase strategic planning, programming, and coordination as well as provide for technical review and approval of projects

## **ANNEX I: Terms of Reference**

### **1. Introduction and Context**

The United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Iraq Trust Fund is administered by the United Nations Development Programme on behalf of itself and Participating United Nations Organizations.

The UNDG ITF is the first MDTF to be administered by the United Nations in joint partnership with the World Bank, and to provide donors with a single channel for funding thereby reducing donors' transaction costs. It was also the first time that UNDG organizations adopted common planning, funding, coordination and reporting arrangements through a thematic 'cluster' framework.

As the Iraq Trust Fund (ITF) is closing down, the ITF steering Committee has decided to embark on evaluation of certain projects funded by the ITF. The evaluations are expected to generate lessons that will feed into the proposed UNDG ITF lessons learned initiative for broader internal and external information sharing. It will also aid into designs of future programme and similar engagements.

To ensure maximum accountability with ownership and in line with the Memorandum of Understanding between the participating UN organizations and the UNDP MDTF office as the administrative Agent, an evaluation is to be conducted and managed by the relevant UN agency in accordance with Norms and Standards set by the United Nations Evaluation Group.

UN agencies and IOM has been a direct recipient of requests from some of the newly established Iraqi Ministries for provision of support and assistance to build their capacities towards independence. The requests have emphasized the need to cover staff shortages, as well as fill posts requiring specialized skills. Similar requests have been articulated by senior Iraqi authorities to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI). The need to identify qualified Iraqi staff from abroad has therefore been recognized to be a top priority that needs to be coordinated and integrated into the UN Strategic Plan for programme and Capacity building activities for Iraq, through the Poverty Reduction and Human Development Cluster (C10). Additionally, IOM has received expressions of interest from Representatives of Iraqi émigré communities in various countries – including Sweden (Estimated 100 highly qualified Iraqis interested in participating in the programme) and Canada – to return to support the development of the public sector. In some cases, émigrés have been in direct contact with Ministries in Baghdad to offer their services, but a lack of funding and coordinated approach has blocked their return.

In response, IOM and UNDP launched a joint project "Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq" (IRI) in March 2005 for the return of around 60 highly qualified Iraqis with specialized skills within the Iraqi Ministries and other public sector institutions in order for them to contribute to the reconstruction of their country.

The IRI project intended to contribute to the sustainability of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq by establishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country's human resource base in the key areas of public sector. Specifically, the project offered expatriate Iraqis who have migrated to other countries and achieved professional success abroad the possibility to undertake short-term consultancies of up to one year in Iraq. The project targeted those needs which cannot be immediately met by the labour force inside Iraq and which are deemed essential for the reconstruction and development efforts of the country.

### **Key Objectives:**

- Supporting the government in identifying human resource gaps in key areas of the public sector;
- Providing support to Iraqi professionals, living abroad, interested in joining the programme and maintaining an 'Iraqi Skills Roster' to match the demand of human resources;
- Organising the screening, recruitment, deployments and monitoring for all selected IRI experts in the field.

**Budget and timeframe:** \$ 2,738,931

May 2005 Extended until December 2007

### **2. Outputs and Key Activities:**

- Assist Iraqi authorities to identify human resource gaps in key areas of public sector and develop professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps;
- Identify specific skills available among the Iraqi émigré community based on the needs identified by Iraqi public sector authorities;
- Develop a database and website to serve the establishment of an 'Iraqi Skills Roster' and to match the demand and supply of human resources;
- Deploy and support Iraqi expatriate experts to fill identified gaps in the Ministries and other public sector institutions and to provide capacity building, professional support and training for existing staff.

### **3. Key assumptions that guided the design and implementation strategies:**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will be jointly managing this programme. Since IOM does not have direct access to the IRFFI, UNDP will receive the funds on behalf of both organizations. UNDP will be responsible for overall financial reporting to the IRFFI and for that it will require IOM's inputs.

Substantive implementation, progress, and final reporting is the responsibility of the Amman Management Unit (Programme Manager and support staff), under the leadership of the International Programme Manager and the clearance of the Steering Committee. The Baghdad Support Cell operated in close coordination and under supervision of the Amman Management Unit. The Baghdad Support Cell consists of Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation appointed project counterparts and project recruited national consultants.

Of particular importance is the role of the programme Steering Committee, with membership by the Ministry of Planning, IOM, and UNDP as the main coordinating and decision-making body for the programme. The Steering Committee, will meet on a regular basis (at least quarterly) to review progress against the programme work plan, clear progress reports and make decisions a propos the critical path of programme implementation.

### ***Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (IRI) phase II* C10-03:**

**Budget and timeframe:** \$ 2,738,931

May 2005 Extended until December 2007



#### **4. Purpose of the evaluation.**

The purpose of the project evaluation is to:

- determine if the project has achieved its stated objectives and explain why/why not;
- determine the results (i.e. outputs) of the project in terms of sustained improvements achieved and where relevant, the likelihood of contributing to the intended outcome(s).
- provide recommendations on how to build on the achievements of the project and ensure that is sustained by the relevant stakeholders;
- Document lessons learned success stories and good practices in order to maximize the experiences gained. The evaluation should take into consideration the project duration, existing resources and political environmental constraints;

The evaluation will be guided by the following core evaluation questions:

- the relevance of the project to the national priorities Government of Iraq (GoI) and to the priorities of the UNDG-ITF mandate, assistance strategy, and
- the coherence between the design of the project focus, the integration of UNDP and IOM instruments in support of program objectives, and the coordination with other developmental actors,
- the efficiency measured both in terms of administrative costs and timeliness of execution;
- The development effectiveness of interventions with particular attention devoted to investigating the sustainability of results and the contribution of the project to the institutional development of the local and relevant national partners.

#### **5. Suggested Analytical Framework**

##### **5.1 Relevance and strategic fit**

- To what extent does the project respond to the UNDG ITF programs developed to support priorities outlined in the Government of Iraq's (GoI) National Development Strategy (2004, 2005, and 2007) and the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) (2007)?
- Does the project respond to the real needs of the beneficiaries?
- Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. outputs) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground?
- How well did the project design take into account local efforts already underway to address local level planning, reconstruction and recovery and make use of existing capacity to address these issues? Did the project's original design fill an existing gap that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?

##### **5.2. Validity of design / the re-design**

- Were the objectives of the project clear, realistic and likely to be achieved within the established time schedule and with the allocated resources (including human resources)?
- Assess whether the project design / re-design was logical and coherent in a) taking into account the roles, capacities and commitment of stakeholders and b) in realistically achieving the planned outcomes.
- Were the planned project objectives and intended results (i.e. intended outputs and outcomes) relevant and realistic to the situation and needs on the ground? Where the problems and needs adequately analyzed?
- How appropriate and useful are the indicators described in the project document for monitoring and measuring results? If necessary, how should they be modified to be more useful? Are the means of verifications for the indicators appropriate?
- To what extent were external factors identified and assumptions identified at the time of design?
- Was the time frame for programme implementation and the sequencing of project activities logical and realistic?

- Was the Project designed in a flexible way to respond to changes / needs that could occur during the implementation?
- Was the strategy for sustainability of impact defined clearly at the design stage of the project? If yes how? And was the methodology / approach taken appropriate to the context?

### **5.3. Achievements (Implementation and Effectiveness)**

- Assess the achievements of the project against planned outcome(s), outputs and activities. What were the quantity and quality of outputs produced?
- Which aspects of the project had the greatest achievements? What were the supporting factors? How can the project build or expand on these achievements?
- In which areas does the project have the least achievements? What were the constraining factors and why? How can they be overcome?
- Did the project develop capacities of partners on planning and development activities? How effective was the collaboration with other participating UN organizations and what was the added value of this collaboration?
- What alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving its objectives?
- How have stakeholders been involved in project implementation? How effective has the project been in establishing ownership?
- Assess the criteria and governance aspects related to the selection of beneficiaries and partner institutions.
- Assess the effectiveness of the activities implemented by partner institutions and their contribution to the immediate objectives of the project. Assess the lessons learned from these partnerships and the possibilities to replicate them.
- How did factors outside of the control of the project affect project implementation and project objectives? How did the project deal with these external factors? How realistic were the critical assumptions identified by the project?

### **5.4. Effectiveness of management arrangements and efficiency of resource use**

- Have resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc) been allocated strategically to achieve the relevant outputs and outcomes? Have resources been used efficiently?
- Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner?
- Assess the managerial and work efficiency (especially the joint management matter). Were management capacities adequate?
- Did project governance facilitate efficient delivery and good results?
- Did the project receive adequate political, technical and administrative support from its local and national partners? Has its collaboration been efficient taking into account that the implementation management is partially done remotely?
- Has relevant gender expertise and Human rights approach programming been sought? Have available gender mainstreaming tools been adapted and utilized? Have any Human rights programming initiation or toolkit been introduced to project/ plan developers?
- How effectively did the project management monitor project performance and results?
- Assess the process for documenting, disseminating and replicating/up-scaling pilot projects.
- How efficient was the project in communicating its results?

### **5.5. Impact orientation and sustainability**

- To what extent did the project make a significant contribution to the reconstruction and development of institutions in Iraq?
- How effectively has the project built necessary capacity of local authorities and community level organizations to plan, initiate, implement and monitor planning, reconstruction and development projects?
- To what extent were sustainability considerations taken into account in the execution and conduct of the project's activities? Assess to what extent a phasing-out strategy has been defined and what steps have been taken to ensure project sustainability
- Are the project results, achievements and benefits likely to be durable? Are these anchored in national institutions and can the partner maintain them financially at end of the project?

- Can the project approach and results be replicated or scaled-up by national partners and cover other Iraqi areas? What would support their replication and scaling-up?

## 6. Evaluation Scope

The evaluation will look at the entire project duration and at all activities implemented to date in Iraq, The evaluation will also have to put a specific focus on the role of UNDP and IOM constituents in the implementation of the project, the integration of the gender dimension and human rights based approach.

In particular the evaluation will evaluate the quality and impact of project activities on the target groups, including:

- Assess overall contribution to development results - i.e. outputs and outcome;
- Assess whether the monitoring system for collecting performance data was appropriate for systematically measuring results (i.e. outputs and outcome) of project performance.
- Needs assessments processes and reports and their use by the project and its stakeholders;
- Stakeholder understanding and capacity to address their needs;
- Quality and use of the materials/products developed by the project;
- Evaluate the management of the project, its staff and the services it has provided;
- Evaluate the project's sustainability plan, if any. Are project activities/ improvements likely to be sustained after project completion, and by whom?;
- Evaluate the value of the project in the context of other relevant development activities in Iraq and indicate whether there are overlaps or duplication of efforts;
- Assess the level of stakeholder commitment to the project and the effectiveness of the project in fostering constituents' involvement and in promoting social dialogue;
- Assess whether and how the project approach and its results have been internalized and/or expanded within other ongoing development efforts in Iraq;
- Assess whether the choice of partners has been strategic in implementing the strategy;
- Evaluate how the project has addressed gender issues and Human Rights approaches.

## 7. Evaluation Methodology

***Note that defining the detailed evaluation methodology will require the involvement of the evaluator(s)***

- The methodology section of the TOR should outline how the evaluation will be conducted. The TOR should provide only the key elements of the evaluation approach, the minimum standards that must be adhered to, upon which the evaluator(s) can elaborate.
- The evaluation methodology is dependent, among other things, on the purpose, scope and objectives of the evaluation. It will also depend on the nature of information available to the evaluator(s), such as indicators, baseline information, and specific targets.
- Refer to key approaches for the review and analysis of secondary/existing information including the quality and availability of existing information. Spell out the needs for the collection of primary data (as required), and plans for engaging with programme/project stakeholders.

## 8. Expected Deliverables

The expected outputs to be delivered by the evaluation consultants are:

- A desk review
- An evaluation plan (including instruments and methodology) prepared by the evaluation team
- Stakeholder workshops facilitated by the evaluation team

- Draft evaluation report including stakeholder workshop proceedings and findings from field visits by evaluation team
- Final Report including:
  - Executive Summary
  - Clearly identified findings
  - Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations
  - Lessons learned and potential good practices and effective models of intervention
  - drafted in user-friendly language for publication and circulation to wide audiences
  - Appropriate Annexes including present TORs
  - Standard evaluation instrument matrix

### **Structure of the final report:**

- The **Evaluation Report** should contain the following:
  - Title Page
  - List of acronyms and abbreviations
  - Table of contents, including list of annexes
  - Executive Summary (1-2 pages)
  - Introduction: background and context of the programme (1 page)
  - Description of the project/ programme – its logic theory, results framework and external factors likely to affect success (6 pages)
  - Evaluation Methodology & Approach (including key challenges and limitations) (6 pages)
  - Findings with clear evidence base and interpretations (3-4 pages)
  - Conclusions (2-3 pages)
  - Recommendations (1-2 pages)
  - Lessons and generalizations (2-3 pages)
  - Annexes
- **The report will not exceed 55 pages, including annexes.**

The final report will be circulated to key stakeholders (those participants present at stakeholder evaluation workshop will be considered key stakeholders) for their review. Comments from stakeholders will be consolidated by the M&E Specialist, UNDP Iraq and provided to the team leader. In preparing the final report the team leader and the principal consultant should consider these comments, incorporate as appropriate and provide a brief note explaining why any comments might not have been incorporated.

### **9. Composition, skills and experience of the evaluation team**

The Evaluation team will consist of one International consultant (Team Leader) and one National consultant.

The composition, skills and experience of the International consultant (Team Leader):

- at least 10 years of relevant experience in international development;
- at least 2 years team leader experience in the evaluation of development agencies, programmes and policies in national and international settings;
- demonstrated capacity for strategic thinking and policy advice,
- experience in team leadership;
- knowledge in two or more of the thematic areas of UNDP's interventions in Iraq; and
- Excellent writing and editorial skills in English, including substantive knowledge of the region and Iraq. Some familiarity with UNDP or UN operations would be an asset.

The composition, skills and experience of the National consultant:

- A minimum of 4 years at a senior level in Government or in a national level development and/or research organization;
- Excellent analytical and presentation skills, with solid background of research work and analysis, and be able to work interactively with a team;
- Substantial and first-hand knowledge of Iraq's national development plans and programmes, including extensive knowledge of multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor programmes as well as civil society organizations in the country; and
- Able to deliver high quality report under short deadlines, with excellent ability to distil information.

#### 10. Estimated duration

The expected starting date of the evaluation is **1 March 2010** at the latest, and the expected submission of the final report date is **10 May 2010**. The dissemination of the results will take place during the last week of **May 2010**.

Phase	Key Activities	Time Frame*	Responsibility
Preparatory phase	Desk review of relevant documents and database sites(project documents with amendments made, review reports – mid-term, final, donor-specific, audit and financial; Preparing Approach Note and Methodology	1 March	Evaluation Team with the Task Manager
Field work/ Data Collection	Field visits, interviews with partners and other key stakeholders	10 March (after National Election)	National Consultant
Data Analysis	Finalize evaluation design and work-plan,	1 April	Evaluation Team with the Task Manager
Report preparation	Drafting of the evaluation report, share it with UN Agencies for comments	10 May	Evaluation Team with the Task Manager
Dissemination	Finalization of the evaluation report–incorporating comments received on first draft, submit it to the ITF steering Committee	30 May	Evaluation Team with the Task Manager

\* Tentative and to be finalized with the Evaluation Team/ Evaluator(s)

## 11. Deliverables, Reporting Lines and Travel Plan

#	Deliverables	% of payment (US\$)	Target date
1	An Approach Note to include: a) an assessment of the evaluability of results from the identified UNDP Iraq UNDG ITF Programme / Project, and b) the proposed approach and methodology for the Programme / Project evaluation;	20 %	7 <sup>th</sup> March
2	A first draft report on the full evaluation of the UNDG ITF Programme / Project, following the report structure given in the ToR;	20 %	20 <sup>th</sup> April
3	A revised final draft UNDG ITF Programme / Project evaluation report, including its executive summary and all annexes with detailed data. The revised draft should take into account comments and suggestions from review of the first draft by UNDP Iraq and IOM	30 %	10 <sup>th</sup> May
4	Self-standing 1-2 pagers, relating to lessons from the evaluations (i.e. process lessons learned issues) that are ready for dissemination.	30 %	30 <sup>th</sup> May
TOTAL:		100%	

**Post title:** Team leader for the Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (IRI) *phase II*  
IOM / UNDP Joint Evaluation

**Suggested Level:** SSA – Specialist

**Organization Unit:** UNDP – Iraq

**Supervisor:** Task Manager (M&E Specialist)

**Estimated duration:** 20 working days (spread over one and half month)

**Duty Station:** Home Base with two trip to Amman - Jordan

### Travel Plan: (Out side Home Country)

#	Country / City	# of Travels	Period
1.	Amman - Jordan	2	6 days each

**ANNEX II: THE IRI EXPERTS SURVEY**

<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b>	<b>Page Number</b>
<b>I. Introduction.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>II. Respondents' profiles.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>III. Survey results.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Annex: questionnaire format.....</b>	<b>29</b>

## **I. Introduction:**

This report provides an analysis of the IRI expert survey that was undertaken by e-mail to all 59 experts deployed by the IRI project during its implementation phase, from May 2005 to December 2007<sup>9</sup>. The questionnaire survey was designed and sent during the evaluation's team visit to Amman from 13 to 19 March 2010 with the 31 March 2010 set as a due date to respond. A draft survey questionnaire was shared with the UNDP M&E officer prior to sending out the e-mail for his inputs and suggestions for improvement.

Given the short time-frame, the questionnaire was not tested. One of the major constraints was the fact that the project finished in December 2007, 27 months prior to undertaking the survey. Therefore some of the expert's e-mails changed. The survey received 8 invalid e-mails, bringing the total of potential respondents down to 51, and IOM indicated that two of the experts had since passed away. In total the survey could expect a response from 49 experts. 31 questionnaires were received on time by the evaluation team leader, 1 was received after the deadline, and 1 response was given without using the questionnaire form. In this final survey report a total of 32 questionnaires have therefore been analysed. The response rate of the valid questionnaires was 65%, making almost two thirds of all experts. This is a good response from the evaluation team leader's experience in conducting this kind of survey.

Some of the contents of this report have been interpreted in the evaluation report, along with the rest of findings, conclusions and recommendations. This report deals solely with the IRI expert's feedback on the survey and does not include the interpretation of the results and their significance in regards to the evaluation – this appears in the evaluation report.

To facilitate reading, a number of graphs have been used to illustrate the results at a glance. In certain cases where the results are not self-explanatory additional comments and interpretation of the findings are made.

The names of respondents have been withheld to ensure confidentiality and no quoting nor attribution is made to any individual to protect the respondent's identity.

---


<sup>9</sup> 62 experts deployed; 3 experts repeated the assignment therefore deployed twice.



## II. Respondents profiles


Total number of valid responses (n): 32  
 Average age: 51 years (min. 33, max. 70)  
 Average years lived in Iraq: 33  
 Average years lived outside Iraq: 18

The gender breakdown was 25 males to 7 females, as per the details hereunder:



This number is significantly higher than the gender breakdown of experts deployed under the project (18% female, 82% male)<sup>10</sup>. This could indicate that female response to the survey was comparatively higher than male response, or that the invalid e-mails were mostly for mail respondents.

In terms of geographical deployment; the large majority were deployed in Kurdistan, as shown below:




**69% of the experts were deployed in Kurdistan and 28% in Baghdad, with 3% in Najaf** (the "N/A" was working for a central ministry and was interpreted as being located in Baghdad). This is roughly the same percentage as that of the overall MoPDC statistics. **The project initially foresaw experts' deployment to be at the central level, in Baghdad only.** However given the volatile security situation in Baghdad and the large number of experts refusing deployment in Baghdad due to the high level of insecurity, it was agreed by the project Steering Committee

<sup>10</sup> MoPDC statistics covering the period from 23rd May 2005 to 31<sup>st</sup> October 2007, graph 1.2

that experts can be deployed to other more secure geographical areas. This largely explains why the large majority of the experts were deployed in Kurdistan.


The experts' academic background is shown in the respondents' breakdown, as follows:



There might be some inconsistency in figures as some of the medical specialisations were considered as Masters Level, when it would have been possible to consider them at PhD level.


The experts' residence breakdown is as follows:

From all the responses obtained; there are now 8 experts currently residing in Iraq. There are 4 experts in each of Germany and Canada. While there are 2 experts residing in France and the UK and UAE each. There is one expert residing in each of the remaining countries.



### III. Survey results


Looking at the length of the experts' deployment, the assignment period ranged from 2 months to 12 months. Something that has to be triangulated by IOM is the fact that two experts indicated serving 14 months. **The total number of working months amounts to 225 months for the 32 experts. It gives an average assignment time of 7 months per expert.**




The minimum amount of time served was two months, but as the figure above shows, experts deployment period was fairly evenly distributed ranging from very short periods (2-3 months, for

9 experts), to medium term deployment (4-9 months, 13 experts) and longer term deployment (10 months and above, 10 experts).


In regards to the **duration** of their assignment, generally experts considered it as **too short** (two thirds) versus one third considering the duration as adequate. Not a single expert considered the assignment to be too long.



The experts were asked how efficient the time for their deployment was (from application to actual deployment). The choices were: slow, normal, and fast. The evaluation team leader considered that two months between application and deployment was acceptable, and any period over two months should be justified. From the experts' perspective, the efficiency in their deployment is considered mostly as normal with 53%, while 38% consider it to have been fast. 2 respondents considered their deployment to have been slow (6%).




In addition to the perceived deployment efficiency by the experts, the graph hereunder shows the monthly delays from application to deployment by the experts. **16 experts were deployed within 2 months (50%), 8 experts were deployed between 3 and 5 months (25%), and 8 experts were deployed after 6 months or more (25%).**




At the request of the evaluation team The IOM researched the files and provided a written explanation for those deployments taking more than 2 months.

The experts were also asked if they considered their assignment in Iraq as positive; which was mostly the case, with a 91% positive appreciation of their assignment.



The experts were also requested to indicate how they had come in contact with the IRI project (Question 1, multiple responses possible).


### How did you hear about the IRI




The most widely used method was through internet search (14 cases), followed by professional contacts (11 cases) and word of mouth (10 cases). This could indicate that the public information campaign had a limited effectiveness as the word of mouth category was expected to be the most common means of discovering the IRI project. While the sample may not be representative of all the applicants, as it did not include those who did apply but did not have a chance of being deployed in Iraq under the project. It does indicate that internet today is the major information source for candidates who responded to the survey.

The experts were also asked why they applied for the IRI project (Question 2), with a list of choices to which they were asked to state the **degree to which they agreed with the specific statement. An overwhelming 69% found that the role they could play in rebuilding Iraq was the main motive** for their application, followed by the possibility of returning to live in Iraq. The next five graphs show the level of agreement with the statement indicated in the graph title; as follows:



### See the situation in Iraq





### Establish contact with relatives/friends




### Possibility of return to live




### Interesting role to play in rebuilding Iraq






94% of the experts largely or completely agreed that their having an interesting role in rebuilding Iraq was a cause for application to the IRI. 76% of the experts largely or completely agreed that the possibility of returning to live in Iraq was a reason for their application (although permanent returns were not the objective of the project). 41% largely or completely agreed that the possibility of seeing the situation in Iraq was a motive for their application, almost the same percentage as for those finding the benefits of the project appealing (compensation package), and 38% largely or completely agreed that establishing contact with friends and/or relatives was also a cause of application.

The experts were further asked to provide a rating from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) on a series of statements (question 6) indicated in every graph's title.




63% of the experts found IOM services good or excellent, and 18% found them to be below average.







40% of the experts rated their work environment in Iraq as good or excellent, and 25% found it to be below average.




47% found their welcome good or excellent from those Iraqis colleagues who had remained in Iraq, while 29% found it to be below average.



59% of the experts found the security situation good to excellent (Kurdistan deployment), with 25% who found it below average (Baghdad deployment), and one sixth who rated security as average.




19% found the socio-economic situation of post-conflict Iraq as good, with 47% who found it below average, and more than one third found it average.




46% found the support form the focal point good or excellent, with 29% found it below average and a quarter as average.

The experts were asked about the challenges and constraints faced during deployment in Iraq (question 10, multiple answers possible). **The most common answers in order are housing (21x), logistical/transportation constraints (12x), financial constraints (10x). security concerns came in fourth place (8x) followed by “other” (6x) and Human Rights concerns (5x):**




The experts were asked if they considered staying in Iraq after the end of their assignment (question 11). It is worth mentioning that *the project was designed as a temporary return project, and not as a permanent return of the experts to Iraq*. Nonetheless **a quarter of all respondents have actually chosen to stay in Iraq after their deployment**. This is a positive, albeit unintended, effect of the project. Furthermore, 22% have considered staying and in particular in one case the expert wanted to stay but did not find a way to do so.




For those experts who did not consider staying in Iraq after their assignment, they were asked to point out which of the following factors influenced their decision not to return (question 12):

### Factors for those who did not consider staying




Again the most common factor was housing (9x), followed by having a better job outside entailing other professional commitments (7x each), lack of good employment opportunities (6x) and security and personal difficulties to adjust to the in-country situation at the time of return (5x each). Other factors (4x), political situation (3x) and HR/Governance issues (3x) closed the list.

The experts were also asked if a new IRI project was started, whether they would a) recommend it to a friend or relative and b) apply again for deployment (question 13). **72% would apply again, and 91% would recommend it to a friend or relative.**




The experts were asked if they felt they succeeded in their assignment in Iraq (question 16). 78% felt they had succeeded in their assignment.

### Did you succeed in your work in Iraq



The experts were also asked if their work encouraged the ministry or supervising organisation to follow-up on their accomplishments (question 17).

### Ministry follow-up?



**29% of the cases experts indicated that there had been a follow-up to their work in Iraq,** Indicate that capacity building in the institutions where the experts were deployed. In most cases a justified yes is based on the continuation of the expert’s functions, projects or research during the assignment.

Question 18 asked experts to identify what was the important impact they had left in Iraq after their deployment. 19 experts (59%) felt their work had some positive impact, described in the following terms:

Question 18: What is the important impact you left in Iraq after your deployment?

**Q. 18 IMPACT  
POSITIVE (19)**

Yes, colleagues are behind and they need courses

**Develop new system and teaching methods, supply the University with up to date programs to follow**

**The Ministry has stated the need for my services in a letter and they were willing to extend my services. They saw the how I benefitted from getting exposed to overseas training through the program**

Updating the Syllabus of many subjects for college requirements

Supervision of numerous undergraduate and post-graduate research projects

I was very professional in delivering the lectures and training the staff by using computer databases to organise work, resources and references

**Supervision of post-graduate MSC and PhD students from Erbil and Sulaimani from my residence. I also helped in developing new research projects**

Maintained good relations with other students

I received numerous e-mail from students saying I have been instrumental in changing the way they studied

Teaching medical students and treating thousands of Iraqis with most up to date neurology skills

**I am still working in Iraq at the University**

I left a very good impression based on the good feedback that I got from the Dean, Vice-Dean, all colleagues and students

Contributed to educational management

New technologies to be followed for projects implementation

**I stayed in Iraq**

Good feedback from students - some colleagues "stole" my idea of updating the curriculum but lack the specialisation to do so

I gave lectures about new teaching methods

Shared most current knowledge and technology which helped in opening their eyes on the use of internet to get information sources

**I have stayed in Iraq and now I'm working with a donor funded project**

**NEGATIVE (4)**

Nothing

No important impact because my assignment was too short

No big changes so far

At the time people were busy dodging road bombs and securing their day to day needs. I'm afraid they did not notice me leaving!

**N/A (9)**

The experts were also asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the IRI project (question 14). Below is a synopsis of their response:

**SYNOPSIS**

<b>STRENGTHS</b>	<b>WEAKNESSES</b>
Bringing Iraqi professional back to Iraq	good project at theoretical level but many defects at practical level: presence of
We experienced the secure part of Iraq; it gave us an idea of the bad future in Iraq; strengthening education	the expert in the field of work not always accepted, difficulties in getting established in terms of housing, transport and communication, better to be offered by IOM
It encourages the Iraqi professionals to return to Iraq and helps in improving the situation	tools and areas and supplies should be arranged prior to the return of experts to Iraq. There should be houses in the long run, Iraqi govt should be aware and ready to
The project was a sincere attempt to improve the performance of different institutions; the focal points were very professional in handling the needs of the experts:	cooperate with professionals and ready to change; Iraqi institutes should be ready to change; the stay should be longer; salary should be higher, travel and school
Organisation, deployment, service, financial, assistant	arrangements for kids
Salary was reasonable at that time compared to that of the Iraqi academic staff	Not well organised, did not care about our personal problems;
communication; organized; acceleration performance	No follow-up after finishing, did not tell us about the feedback, failed in convincing us to return; the staff who run the project in Jordan mostly non-Iraqis
Encouraging Iraqi people to redeploy in Iraq and help rebuilding Iraq	the project overlooked the security situation
service provided to the city by someone who can speak the language of locals; outside experience given to locals	short period; financial support for research requirements
supporting the government in human resource gaps; organising the screening & recruitment and deployments; maintaining an Iraqi skills roster to match the demand of HR;	Project life span very short, not able to complete the entire mission. Project did not restart for the past 3 years, even though it is vital.
Administration of experts during the assignment; organising the expert monthly report	monitoring and justification are required at the beginning of the assignment to ensure that the project performance carry on the same pathway not to be effected
Good contact between IRI and the experts; Perfect and fast response to our requirement, However it was limited. Well managed the expertise application with no complication	by the surrounding factor; Monthly group meeting for the project manager with the experts to exchange opinions and feedback; cooperative organisation of the
to introduce updated methods to Iraq; to share the experiences of the experts;	assignment activities for the experts in the area of employment
to observe how people work in Iraq and how they think	short time allocated to the process; weak financial support; identify treatment of different experts involved in the project. Different expertise require different
Creating good relation between Iraqis inside and outside Iraq	support like material, equipment, references, in addition to different periods
Chance to assess the situation in Iraq hands-on; very useful for experts & the location of their employment	not properly utilizing the time of the experts there
Encouraging Iraqis to return back to Iraq	No motivation from the people working there
It brings back Iraqis to their homeland; people in Iraq benefit from Iraqi experts who have lived abroad to rebuild the	Housing
country; a lot of Iraqi students and fellows learned from IRI experts; financial benefits, as it is very difficult for consultants to find jobs in western countries and follow their difficult roles in assignments	Still feeling some colleagues consider us competition for private work
idea and objectives of the project; the team efforts to make it work	



Planning	Low compensation package
Everything has gone well and successful	Short program with short time warning notice before it ends
good and practical project for Iraq and qualified Iraqis living abroad to return to Iraq	environment, logistics
Knowledge transfer	Very short time of contract of IIRI with Iraqis to discover if they are satisfied to return to Iraq
Providing modern technology	time was short
Showing enhancing local staff's productivity	short term contracts; limited duration
assisted the ministry through my academic experience and communication skills	Coordination and lack of communication between the expert and POC
Helped locate and establish contact with Iraqi experts abroad, which is a useful data.	shortage of the deployment period
Provided a unique double purpose opportunity for Iraqi experts to see the new Iraq and participate in rebuilding it	Project duration not adjusted to the situation in Iraq, review the experts' offered salary and increase it, review provision of health/security insurance for experts
Good work plan and follow-up; good assessment of ministries	<b>Evaluator's note : shortness of time mentioned 9 times as a weakness by experts</b>
Training the Iraqi cadres to develop their informational abilities, putting in new mechanisms in the institutions accompanying global growth; it delivered all experts to all ministries in Iraq,	
helped economic development of Iraq	
planning; transfer the American experience to Iraq	
Exchanging up to date technology with people who work in Iraq;	
Providing a real view to those willing to reside in Iraq	
Holding workshops, readiness of people to learn, building positive relationships	
<b>Evaluator's note : opportunity for qualified experts to come back and see the situation 11 times</b>	

An opportunity was also provide for comments and suggestions (question 20). This is the list of answers:

#### COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS

we need to prepare the areas where we work, build new, bring new machines and tools before bringing back the professionals
This survey is 4 years late. I had the impression that IOM staff were just clerks but not really interested in getting Iraqis back. I suggest if there is a repetition, more compensation should be provided considering one has to leave his job and family to a place of less security
Renew the programme
I would request a secure accommodation and special ID papers if I had to go to a similar mission again
Decision makers in government do not care about the achievements we have made. There is no assessment of the work we have accomplished. The problem is not the project, but government employees. E-government lectures were given in different ministries but not applied given the security situation
Iraq needs more help
The project objectives were clear and realistic. It had great roles and capacities for sustained improvements in Iraq. Its re-establishment is vital for the country today
Longer program, longer contracts, not only academic expertise but also focus on work experience. Ask feedback from focal points. Study the role and changes brought about by the expertise, differentiate time and financial support for the various projects, consider expert's input in their role in Iraq, and IRI should have an experts committee to accept the applicants after consultation with experts.
More interaction between the experts and the organisation in Iraq in order to implement the ideas there on how to improve services
I hope the project starts again
After this experience, I would like to return back for help and live again in Iraq, but unfortunately I didn't find a way to do this. If you can help IRI project is very useful for Iraq, it should be extended for more years
Working for 6 months was not enough to implement all the planning we do in education specially in my field I had to plan a condensed course and it was hard to finish it given all holidays and days off in the Iraqi academic year
Most government offices suffer from corruption, inefficiency and indifference. To make effective improvement, there is a need for specialised institutional projects rather than individual expert effort.
There is a paramount need to improve the management efficiency of the administration. I therefore suggest that UNDP plans a project to fulfil this need. During my assignment I sent a proposal outline to the MoPDC but I received no response
The project needed more advertisement between Iraqis abroad. It was necessary to take into consideration that there is some kind of "hostility" regarding Iraqis living abroad, especially those who had succeeded or were living well. The HQ had to be in Iraq close to the experts, it was not insecure in Kurdistan
The administrative corruption departments in Iraq is thus an obstacle to such projects and programs, especially if these projects are not under their management and disposal




The experts were also asked if they knew the IRI project development objective (question 15).

Only two of the respondents that provided an answer regarding the development objective were actually able to identify it correctly (8% of those that answered and 6% of all respondents). 22 of the answers contained very creative responses but did not reflect the project's development objective.

**This indicates that not many efforts were placed in making the experts understand the project development's objective and its capacity building nature, as the variety and contents of the different answers hereunder show.**


### Experts knowledge of the IRI development objective




Those who thought they knew
To help our country to get up again and keep going with the overall development of other developed countries
Bringing back Iraqi professional
To encourage the Iraqi to return back home and improve the standard
To improve the performance of scientific and education institutions by providing proper training and consultation
Iraqi experts settled outside Iraq rebuild Iraq
It is a good opportunity to develop our country and to keep us in touch with the world
helping Iraqi people to be redeployed in Iraq and help in rebuilding Iraq
Iraqis going back to their native country to help rebuild Iraq
IRI played positive role in development, although limited but effective in rebuilding many fields in Iraq
To encourage people to return to Iraq
Help Iraq with relatively cheap expertise to help bring the country up to global standards
Helping Iraqi people to be redeployed in Iraq and help in rebuilding Iraq
The objective was a mutual benefit for both the expert and his country
Participate in the Influenza A, H5N1 control project
Bringing Iraqis to rebuild Iraq instead of foreigners! That was clever because we had no problem understanding the situation
To assist in rebuilding a modern Iraq through encouraging Iraqi expatriate experts to participate in this process
To bring experience to the country to rebuild it
To help rebuilding Iraq by Iraqis and to encourage Iraqis abroad to come back participating with their experience and knowledge in the reconstruction of their country after 13 years of sanctions through which development was stopped leaving Iraq in

total regression
To benefit from the expertise and experience of qualified Iraqis in rebuilding their country
Transfer the American experience to Iraq
Providing a chance for Iraqi expertise to share technology to help rebuild Iraq
Transferring Iraqi expatriats' experiences to Iraqis in Iraq
programme contributed in developing the declining economy in Iraq and its growth step by step
<b>Those who knew</b>
Contribute to the sustainability of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction attempt in post-conflict Iraq by
establishing feasible mechanism to cover staff shortage, as well as fill posts requiring specialized skills. Project offered
migrant expatriates who obtained professional success abroad the opportunity to undertake short-term consultancies in
demanding areas within the Ministries and other sector/institutions in Iraq
To assist the government of Iraq in recruiting and placing qualified Iraqis for the reconstruction and rehab. of the country

Four final questions were directed at the experts regarding the impact of the project on the national capacity (question 19). The answers are as follows:




Two thirds of the experts consider that the project increased government's human resource management capacity, versus 9% who do not.




Almost 70% of the experts also believe the project triggered the creation of new mechanisms for return of qualified nationals, versus 9% who did not.

**Did the project make a significant contribution to enhancing capacity building of govt or partner institutions**



Almost two thirds of the experts consider that the project made a significant contribution to enhancing capacity building of government or partner institutions, versus 13% who did not.

**There remains a need for this sort of project today in Iraq**



Finally 97% of the experts who responded consider that there remains a need for this sort of project in Iraq today.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

To be returned by 31st March 2010 to  
[suburconsulting@telefonica.net](mailto:suburconsulting@telefonica.net)  
with the indication "IRI evaluation" in the subject line  
and copy to : mwwzn\_alanbari@yahoo.com

As a follow-up to the e-mail you have received from the **International Organization for Migration (IOM)**, an evaluation team made up of independent consultants (one international consultant and one senior national consultant) have been recruited by the **United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** in order to undertake an external independent evaluation of the IRI project in which you have participated.

Although the project has officially ended in 2007, the funding for the project came from the United Nations Iraqi Trust Fund, which requested this evaluation.

As a result we are asking your kind collaboration in order to provide some feedback on the project and your experience by filling the following questionnaire. **We guarantee that the survey will only be used for the evaluation, and that further the information will be treated confidentially.** The personal information you provide at the beginning of the questionnaire **will remain confidential** and will only be used for statistical purposes. Your names will be withheld and coded by the evaluators to protect your identity. You will not be quoted nominally. Please **only respond in English** as we have been informed that you are all fluent in this language, by filling in directly the colored areas of the form **for the entire 20 questions.**

The questionnaire will take you only **15 minutes to complete.** It has been designed for **all 62 experts that have been deployed in Iraq under the IRI project.**

The results will be used by the evaluators to sustain the findings of the evaluation report which will be made available to the UNDP and project stakeholders as per **details of the Terms of Reference of the Evaluation** which you have received from the **IOM.**

Once you have filled this word document, please save the questionnaire in word format and send it as an attachment to your message.

**Thank you for taking part** and we look forward to receiving your answers **by the 31st March 2010.** Please note that due to tight deadlines it will not be possible to consider survey questionnaires returned after 31<sup>st</sup> of March.

With our warmest gratitude and regards,

**Christian Bugnion, Team Leader and international consultant**  
**Mohammad Al-anbari, senior national consultant**

## A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

(For statistical purposes – will remain confidential!)

Surname (optional):			
First Name (optional):			
Educational level:			
Gender:		Age:	
Current country of residence:			
Years living in Iraq since birth:			
Years living outside Iraq since birth:			

## B. substantive information

1. How did you hear or learn about the IRI project? (Please mark with "X" all responses that apply, multiple responses are possible)			
Word of mouth from friends or relatives in Iraq		Professional contacts	
Internet search		Public event, conference, seminar	
Media (radio, television, press)		Other - please explain	

2. Why did you apply for the IRI project? (Please mark with "X" in the column of your response for each line, and please fill an answer for each line)				
Degree to which you agree	not at all	partially	Largely	completely
I wanted to see the situation in Iraq				
I wanted to establish again contact with relative or friends in Iraq				
I wanted to see it is was possible to return to live in Iraq				
I wanted to see if there was an interesting role I could play in rebuilding Iraq				
I found the benefits of the project (compensation package) appealing				
Other: (Please explain)				

3 Where did you work in Iraq? (specify Baghdad or name of governorate)
4. How long was your assignment in Iraq in months? (specific number of months)

--

5. Do you <b>personally feel</b> the assignment was positive experience for you? (Mark with X)		
YES	NO	NOT APPLICABLE
If not, please explain why?		

6. Please give a number rating from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) for the question in each line.	
<b>How satisfied have you been with the following</b>	
Services and assistance provided by IOM under the project	
Your work environment in Iraq	
Welcome from your Iraqi colleagues who remained in the country	
The security situation at the time of your deployment	
Iraq's overall socio-economic situation at the time of your return	
Support and encouragement from your focal point at the Ministry or participating organization	
Other: Please explain	

7. How much time was there between your application and the date of your deployment? (Please indicate the number of months)

8. How fast was your deployment? (please select by marking with X)			
SLOW	NORMAL	FAST	N/A (specify if <b>you</b> needed additional time in months to come to Iraq)

9. The length of your assignment in Iraq was : (please select by marking with X)			
TOO SHORT	ADEQUATE	TOO LONG	N/A
If you marked "too short" or "too long", please explain why:			



10. What were the challenges and constraints you faced during your deployment in Iraq? (Please mark with "X" all responses that apply, multiple responses possible)			
Housing constraints		Security constraints	
Financial constraints		Human Rights constraints	
Logistical/transportation constraints		Gender constraints	
Other: Please explain			

11. Did you <b>personally consider</b> staying in Iraq after the end of your assignment? (Mark with X)			
YES	NO	I HAVE STAYED	N/A

12. If you answered NO in question 11, which of these factors influenced your decision? (Please mark with "X" all responses that apply, multiple responses possible)			
Lack of housing		I had other professional commitments	
Lack of good employment opportunities		Human Rights/governance issues	
I had a better job outside Iraq		Security	
Friends and/or relatives		Political situation	
Personal difficulties to adjust to the in-country situation at time of return		Gender considerations	
Other: please explain			

13. If a new IRI project was started, would you <b>personally</b> : (Mark with X)			
	YES	NO	N/A
A. Recommend it to a friend or relative			
B. Apply again for deployment in Iraq through the project			
If you answered "NO" to either question, please explain why :			

14. Please identify the strengths of the project (what it did well) as well as it weaknesses (what it did not and should do better)	
STRENGTHS	WEAKNESS


15. Can you indicate what was the overall objective of the IRI project? (if not, mark "X" in the NO column)	
OBJECTIVE:	NO

16. Do you feel you succeeded in the work you deployed in Iraq : (Mark with X)		
YES	NO	N/A
<i>Why?</i>		

17. Did your work encourage the ministry or supervising organization to follow-up on any of your accomplishments : (Mark with X)		
YES	NO	N/A
<i>If yes, what was done?</i>		

18. What was the important impact you left in Iraq after your deployment?

### C. PROJECT INFORMATION

The following questions are not linked to your own performance in the IRI project. However given your experience and background we would like to have your feedback and perspective on WHAT THIS PROJECT HAS BROUGHT TO YOUR COUNTRY, and not on your contribution as an individual. You may not be in a position to answer all questions. If you do not know, please mark N/A for Not Applicable

19. Kindly mark with X in the relevant column your answer:				
	YES	NO	N/A	OTHER (Explain)
1. The IRI project has increased the government capacity in human resource management				
2. The IRI project has triggered the creation of new mechanisms in the Ministries to obtain the return of qualified nationals to Iraq				
3. The IRI project has made a significant contribution to enhancing capacity building of government ministries and/or partner institutions such as universities				
4. There remains a need for this sort of project today in Iraq				
COMMENTS				

20. Any general comments, suggestions or observations?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!

Many thanks for your informed opinion and the time spent in completing this survey.

This information is invaluable to us, please return by

**31st March 2010**

to:

[suburconsulting@telefonica.net](mailto:suburconsulting@telefonica.net) (subject line "IRI evaluation) copy

[mwwzn\\_alanbari@yahoo.com](mailto:mwwzn_alanbari@yahoo.com)

## **ANNEX III: IRI Focal point questionnaire survey report**

### **1. Introduction**

As part of the approach and methodology for the ex post independent evaluation of the IRI project implemented by IOM and co-managed by UNDP, a survey questionnaire was designed to obtain feedback from the “focal points” among partners and ministries where the demand for expert services was emanating. At the height of the programme there were 37 focal points identified. However expert deployment and recruitment came to an end mid-2007 to allow the project to close by the 31<sup>st</sup> December 2007. In the second part of 2007 IOM organised a training workshop on human resources for 22 of the focal points. These 22 focal points were the ones from which feedback was sought, both on the IRI project and on the training in which they participated.

Focal points respondents:

Out of the 22 training participants, 2 people were actually IOM BSC staff, so the total number of partners and ministry focal points were 20. Given the three year period between the training and the current evaluation, some of the focal points have moved on to another job and some have retired. Through the services of a national consultant recruited to undertake the interviews in Iraq, the evaluation managed to obtain feedback from 10 out of the 20 potential respondents, which is a good response rate of 50% considering the time between the end of the project and the undertaking of the evaluation.

The questionnaire form (enclosed as annex) was not tested given time constraints and was also translated into Arabic. Five of the questionnaires had to be translated back into English by the national consultant.

Nature of the respondents:

The ten respondents belonged to the following organisations:


- Ministry of Water Resources
- Ministry of Trade
- Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
- Ministry of Higher Education
- Ministry of Science and Technology
- Baghdad Municipality
- Hawler Medical University
- Foundation of Technical Education – FTE
- Technical College, Najaf (2 answers)

Gender of respondents: 7 male, 3 female

Average age: 44 years (minimum 30, maximum 65)


### **2. Survey results**

Question 9: How good was the communication between you (focal point) and the MoPDC in this project in their capacity as Project Steering Committee members?



70% of respondents indicated having a good or excellent communication with the MoPDC under the IRI, 10% average, and 20% not indicating any answer (N/A). The mathematical average using a 5 point scale is 4.5 for the quality of communication with the MoPDC.

Question 12: How good was the communication between you (focal point) and the IOM Baghdad Support Cell created under the project?



The communication with IOM BSC is also highly rated with 70% of good or excellent, 10% bad, and 20% not indicating an answer (N/A). One answer was rated as N/A given that the respondent mistakenly believed the IOM BSC staff to be MoPDC staff. The mathematical average using a 5 point scale is 4,375 for the quality of communication with the MoPDC.

Based on these responses, it appears that communication processes inside the project in Iraq were smooth and streamlined and adequate communication channels were created under the project.


Question 14: Did you request experts for deployment under this project?

All respondents indicated that they had requested experts to be deployed under the project. However in 2 cases (20% of responses) there were no experts provided. From the respondents survey 80% of the requests for expertise was therefore positively addressed (although not necessarily in sufficient numbers to meet the demand).

Question 16: How many experts did you employ?

In total 21 experts were employed by the survey respondents, which represents a little more than one third (35.6%) of the 59 experts deployed throughout the life of the project.

Question 15: How satisfied are you with the work of the expert?



Three fourth of respondents found the work of the experts to be good. 10% found it excellent, another 10% found it to be average, and 5% found it to be insufficient. While the coded level of satisfaction of the expert work is relatively high (weighed mathematical average of 3,81 on a 5 point scale), the narrative comments made in the survey also indicated that the level of the expert did not always match the anticipated level of expertise. In some cases the theoretical/academic knowledge was not matched by practical experience.

Question 17: Impact of the project

All respondents except for the 2 N/A who did not receive any experts considered that there was some degree of positive impact from the project.

Question 19: Are you continuing to recruit qualified expatriate experts outside the project?

A surprisingly high 50% of the respondents indicated that they are continuing to identify and use expatriate experts in their organisation. This is a clear indication of the positive results of the project as it shows an existing demand for a continuation of qualified expatriate experts in Iraq.

Question 22: Did your ministry/organisation have the proper structures in place to support the work of the expert?

Here 50% of the respondents answered negatively. This indicates that further internal work should be undertaken in the administration so that the proper structures are put in place, particularly for those with further interest in obtaining expatriate experts.

Question 25: Where steps taken to ensure sustainability of the project?

Only 20% of respondents were able to take sustainability measures, while another 20% recommended a continuation but it did not happen due to the lack of funds. Most partners awaited an extension of the project and did not look for alternative funding sources either within the government or through other channels.

Question 24: What have been your major constraints/challenges/problems?

As for all open-ended narrative questions, the responses received are provided in the table hereunder:

- Communication with suitable experts who refuse to come due to the security situation
- Low financial assignment for buying needed devices
- IRI experts pay higher than local teachers salary
- Experts suggested by MoPDC unfit
- Shortage of financial support
- The security situation
- Low level of experts

Question 26: Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the IRI project

<b>Positive</b>	<b>Negative</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-communication with the other Iraqi Ministries</li> <li>-Thinking about new and developed plans to improve our higher education</li> <li>- Improving the abilities of trainees in recruitment</li> <li>- Communication with Iraqi experts abroad and trying their experiments in foreign universities</li> <li>- Scheduling plans established in Jordan workshop</li> <li>- Removal of barriers between Iraqi employees &amp; UN staff</li> <li>- getting good ideas from the experts</li> <li>- good response from the IOM BSC in Baghdad</li> <li>- Get ideas from Western countries</li> <li>- Department performance assessment</li> <li>- Holding educational loops and course</li> <li>- Provide the expat expert a chance to return to Iraq</li> <li>- Assisted in teaching &amp; providing medical care to patients</li> <li>- Provided support in critical period to the university</li> <li>- Covered a gap in different specialties where they were Shortages</li> <li>- Many (experts) remained at the university (sustainability)</li> <li>- Technology transfer 2 x</li> <li>- Improve performance standards</li> <li>- Training courses organised by the expert</li> <li>- Possible return of the expert</li> <li>- UN support to the experts</li> <li>- Acceptance of the ideas of the expert</li> <li>- Use of modern technology</li> <li>- we were hoping of getting experts 2x</li> <li>- some experts provided us with references and equipment</li> <li>- Gaining experience taking into consideration the period of boycott and isolation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Recruitment of some persons who did not hold sufficient experience</li> <li>- Focal points in Iraqi institutions did not contribute to the selection of suitable experts</li> <li>- the budget supplied to the expert very limited</li> <li>- geographical limitation (Salah Al Din and Baghdad)</li> <li>- the project stopped so workplans established in Jordan did not materialize.</li> <li>- Experts refusing to enter Iraq because bad security</li> <li>- high salaries compared to university staff</li> <li>- limited number of experts</li> <li>- shortage of experts in certain fields 3 x</li> <li>- short project duration</li> <li>- No monitoring of the expert's performance</li> <li>- No local financial support</li> <li>- security situation 4 x</li> <li>- Confidentiality issues prevents the participation of the whole group</li> <li>- low level of experts</li> <li>- the project was not clear to the senior administration</li> <li>- Lack of communication with the expert before arrival to estimate his ability</li> </ul>

### 3. Training results

As mentioned the IOM provided specific training for four days in 2007 to the 20 focal points in human resource management. Given the high rating received during the training and as a way to appraise the impact of the training, a few questions were included to gather feedback on the training and to identify any gaps/further needs in training among the focal points.

The most encouraging sign that the training was needed and relevant is the fact that all respondents (100%) unanimously indicated that they were still using the skills acquired during the training in their work (question 29). This shows that training can be a worthwhile investment to raise the management staff performance.

Regarding the most useful aspect of the training (question 28), the most common answers were:

- a. Communication and interaction with other Iraqi ministries (4 times)
- b. Gaining experience in Human Resource management (4 times)

Other answers included:

- c. Having and experienced and knowledgeable instructor
- d. Obtaining theoretical and practical aspects of the training
- e. Get to know the participants from other ministries
- f. Improved performance of the administration and application of experience gained at various levels

It appears that the training was too short to cover all the necessary topics (for 50% of respondents), while 30% considered it was sufficiently long (question 30). The following suggestions were also made :

- We would welcome the possibility of supporting the training through workshops
- We hope to improve our expertise to become trainers in our field
- Envisage a study tour, expand the period of the training course
- More time for the workshop, make a tour in an organisation to see HR management details at work

The synthesis of positives and negatives regarding the training are mentioned in the table hereunder (question 31):

Positive aspects of training

- Interaction with other Iraqi ministries 3 x
- To have a chance of self-expression in a non-homogenised group
- Thinking about new and developed plans to improve our higher education
- Increased chances in skills development
- Improve the administration performance in HR
- Improving the abilities of trainees in recruitment
- Removal of barriers between Iraqi employees and UN staff
- information provided by lecturer; skills for HR,
- experienced and knowledgeable instructor 2 x
- Obtained knowledge and skills in different aspects of HR management
- Provide a database on the activities of the organisation
- Provide references related to the training course and use it in our work
- Practical exercises, good logistics and administration

Negative aspects of training

- The information was not good; only 1 trainer
- Need for more applicable aspects related to HR (case study)
- Needed more time or a refresher course given the limited time and a new field of experience
- Few practical applications
- Short period 2 x

Overall there is a positive feedback regarding the IRI despite the bad security situation that caused a number of experts to refuse deployment and the fact that some of the focal points did not get the experts they needed (20%). The report points to additional improvements that could be built into the design of another project of this sort, particularly in terms of more experience (not only academic degrees) of the experts to ensure that their assignment is making a difference. It has been noted by the focal points that the IRI had great potential, but the security conditions and small number of experts conditioned its impact.



## ANNEX IV: BIBLIOGRAPHY

- UNDG, ITF 32nd FUNDING FRAMEWORK, as of 16 February 2010
- Stocktaking Review of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, Draft report, January to December 2008, Volume I, Scan team, Oslo
- Volume 2, projects review, Scanteam, Oslo, January 2009
- Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Governance, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq, Jim Freedman, 28 June 2009
- UNDG ITF, Projects SOT as of October 2008
- UNDG ITF Ninth Progress report, May 2009
- UNDP Evaluation policy, May 2006
- OECD/DAC, Evaluation Development Co-operation, summary of key norms and standards
- UNDP Handbook on planning, monitoring and evaluating development results, 2009
- UNDP strategic plan 2008-2011
- UNAMI - The UNCT (Iraq) Cluster Approach – Lessons Learned to Date, 11 November 2004
- C10-01, Final original project document IRI, 4.10.2006
- C10-01 IRI revised final proposal, 27.05.2005
- IRI proposal for phase III, undated
- IRI management workplan phase I and II, undated
- MoPDC, letter of approval for the IRI project, 30 September 2004
- IRI project document phase I, June 2004
- IRI project budget for phase I
- Joint IOM/UNDP action plan for preparatory phase (Phase I), undated
- Project submission form to the ITF, June 2004
- Project submission form to the ITF (Phase II), 27 February 2005
- IRI statistics as of 31 August 2005
- Project progress reports 1,2,3 until 31 December 2005
- IRI interim financial report as of 31 December 2006
- IRI progress reports 4, 1<sup>st</sup> January to 30 June 2006, and 5, 1<sup>st</sup> July to 31 December 2006
- IRI public information strategy, undated, November 2005 to March 2006
- IOM, consultant report on the preparatory phase, Jeff Mc Murdo, October 2004
- IRI newsletters samples from 2006

**ANNEX V: AGENDA AND LIST OF INTERVIEWS  
IN AMMAN 13 – 19 MARCH 2010**

Sunday 14/03/2010, UNDP offices

Omar	Awabdeh	UNDP	M	M&E associate
Khaled	Ehsan	UNDP	M	M&E Specialist

90 minute discussion on evaluation approach, expectations, deliverables

Abbas	Balasm	Consultant	M	National consultant
Mohammad	Al-Anbari	Consultant	M	National consultant

Discussion about approach and methodology for the evaluation, review documents available, logistical arrangements and stakeholder list

Natsuko	Yukawa	UNDP	F	Former IRI focal point.
---------	--------	------	---	-------------------------

(40 minute phone interview)

Monday 15/03/2010      Group Meeting with the IOM office in Amman

Rafiq	Tschannen	IOM	M	Former Chief Of Mission
Mio	Sato	IOM	F	Donor reporting officer
Haya	Fataftah	IOM	F	Logistics & procurement officer
Ranya	Shanti	IOM	F	Project assistant

6 hour discussion

Rest of the day : review additional documentation received and develop work plan and stakeholder questionnaires and IRI expert survey form

Tuesday 16/03/2010

Mohammad	Bassam	OCHA	M	Former IOM BSC
----------	--------	------	---	----------------

4 hour interview at the IOM Amman offices

Mio	Sato	IOM	F	Donor Reporting Officer
Daniela		IOM	F	Database manager

Review statistics and generate data on the IRI experts as per requests of the evaluation team leader – 1 hour at the IOM

Wednesday 17/03/2010

Review and finalize the IRI expert survey form, the questionnaires for focal points, MoPDC SC members, develop the work plan and the inception report, review documentation and files at the UNDP offices

Natsuko	Yukawa	UNDP	F	former IRI focal point
---------	--------	------	---	------------------------

30 minute face to face interview

Thursday 18/03/2010

Anton	Stemberger	EU	M	Programme manager
Jobst	Von Kirchmann	EU	M	Head of cooperation

Christine	McNab	UNAMI	F	DSRSG & RC
Pamela	Husain	RC Office	F	Planning and M&E Unit
Marla	Zapach	RC Office	F	Programme Specialist

Individual e-mail to all IRI experts deployed under the project with the questionnaires.